THE HISTORICAL VALIDITY OF LUCAN'S

BELLUM CIVILE

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ABSTRACT

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The objective of this thesis is to analyze, with reference to other available sources, the extent to which Lucan's Bellum Civile may be treated as a contribution to historical knowledge. The thesis consists of five separate chapters, each of these analyzing a different type of inaccuracy of which Lucan has been accused in the past. An attempt is made after a point-by-point analysis, to take an overall view of the poem, and assess its value as an imaginative and personal interpretation of history.
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REMARKS

The text used is that of J. D. Duff, which is essentially that of A. E. Housman (for both, see Bibliography).
INTRODUCTION

There are broadly speaking three different ways in which the materials of history may be presented. First, there is a straightforward recounting of events, without any attempt at analysis. Though tedious to read, this is the only really unbiased method. Prosopographical stemmata and chronicles are examples of this type of writing.

The second way involved attempts to relate and analyze events, causes, and results as thoroughly as possible, narrated with as little emotional or political bias as can be achieved. The ideal would be perfect historical knowledge and total abstention from personal bias, in Ranke’s words “Wie es eigentlich gewesen”; but this ideal is impossible to attain. The best to which the historian may aspire is to make the most thorough attempt of which he is capable to research and relate “sine ira et studio.” Thucydides best sums up the case:

And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not that even so the truth was easy to discover; different eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or else from imperfect memories. And it may well be that
my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.  

While it may be justly argued that this way is not and cannot be free of bias, nor perhaps unwarped by the historian's feelings concerning the events described, and his chronological distance from them, nevertheless one must accept Finley's statement:

Unfortunately the historian is no mere chronicler, and he cannot do his work at all without assumptions and judgements, without generalizations in other words. . . . But even the most casual acquaintance with pre-nineteenth century historians, the ones we still read as historians (and not merely as possible sources of factual information), were deeply concerned with general truths and with the difficulties in both establishing them and communicating them, often explicitly so; in the case of Thucydides, obsessively so.

This history, once written, will be compared with and verified by reference to other sources, subject to the same limitations, and the result thus obtained may be positive or negative, but at least for the perfectionist or faultfinder, and indeed, for that matter, for the historian of any later time, never entirely satisfying.

Finally the third type—that found in Lucan among others—is history with a bias, in which the writer is patently attempting to
carry a point. Polybius and Livy, by no means free of either their own personal bias or the spirit of the age, are examples of this. If on top of this bias the history is in verse, then the claims of poetry must also be taken into account, and the demands of pure history will often take second place. The poet’s imagination comes into play and has a greater role than the bare facts of history. To cite Aristotle on the poet-historian:

Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things are faults. But from another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the ends of poetry itself—if they make the effect of either that very portion of the work or some other portion more astounding. ³

And again:

The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. ⁴

The time in which Lucan wrote was the first century A.D., a century in which a transformation of values was taking place, and the old Republican spirit was a phenomenon of the past—a situation viewed with bitterness and resentment by Republican and Stoic writers, such as Lucan and Seneca. Rome was absorbing whatever, for good or ill, the East and indeed the West had to offer, and had
become a melting pot of cultures: Gauls in the Senate, the streets of Rome contaminated (from the Republican point of view) by the various effeminate and over-luxurious customs of the Orient; the worship of Isis with its eunuch priests, sistra and other unfamiliar trappings:

Nos in templâ tuam Româna recepimus Isis
Semideosque canes et sistra iubentia luctus.
(Luc. 8.831-32)

Lucan imbibed certain presuppositions, prejudices, beliefs and attitudes from the century in which he lived (even for a doctrinaire Stoic it would have been impossible not to do so), and this would be reflected in his epic. The fact that he lived under Nero, towards whom he had personal cause to feel bitterness, and keenly felt the loss of *Libertas* which he and others, Stoics especially, associated with the Republic, naturally rendered him hostile to the notions of empire and tyranny in general. This attitude is clearly mirrored in his portrayal of Julius Caesar as the beginning of all evils: it was he who had abolished *Libertas*. This love of *Libertas* was a continuing family tradition among the Stoics—most memorably spelt out in the lines:

... sed par quod semper habemus,  
Libertas et Caesar erit.  
(Luc. 7.695-96).

In Lucan's mind it is not so much Caesar and Pompey who are irreconcilable, but rather Caesar and *Libertas*. 
Lucan, then, is first and foremost a poet, with all the freedom of imagination that that word suggests; secondly, with his strongly held republican views, he is necessarily biased; and only thirdly is he a historian. While this thesis is dealing with his historical validity, which will necessitate a point-by-point analysis of the epic, it is important also to indicate the overall value of the poem as history. It reflects, as few other works do, the bitter feeling prevalent in Rome, especially among the Republicans, against the loss of Libertas under Nero, and the Roman Republican's aversion to all things foreign and dubbed barbarian—all those things, in fact, which a far less criticized and far more esteemed writer, Cicero, deplored just as much and depicted just as bitterly and, albeit in a different style, no less eloquently. Lucan's purpose is not to provide a mere record of events in strict chronological order: others, some of them his sources, had done that as best they could, notably Pollio and Livy. These texts, lost to us, were available to Lucan, and if these texts were extant today, perhaps some of the criticisms made against Lucan's inaccuracy would be withdrawn.

Word of mouth is also a way of preserving newsworthy events, and while Lucan lived later than the events he recorded, we live later still, and must give him some credit in this respect:

Lucan... is the one writer who had and still has something important to say, to his contemporaries and to us. Unless we are prepared to take the trouble to understand and criticize that message we might just as well
not bother to read him at all. But that attempt can only be made in a historical context as part of a study of the Roman Revolution, its consequences, and attitudes to it and to them in the first century A.D. I cannot myself see why Lucan’s judgements and his interpretation of Roman history (for all that history to him seems to have meant Livy) should not deserve respect. I will risk saying, perhaps as much respect as Tacitus'. I know that Lucan was a poet, but so was Tacitus, after all, and so was Livy; and at least Lucan makes no pretence of being anything but a poet, he gives you fair warning. And he was there. Poets have as much right as anybody else to interpret the history and politics and religion of their times—perhaps more. 6

Lucan’s purpose is to preserve in verse an account of the disaster that robbed Rome of the Libertas supposedly enjoyed during the Republic and to present the Stoic’s sorrow and outrage at the loss of that most precious of possessions. That in doing so he takes some liberties to the detriment of strict historical fact is then understandable. It is Horace who best illustrates the poet’s freedom to highlight some aspects and eliminate others:

... pictoribus atque poetis quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas. 7

It is generally agreed that Lucan, as posited in the theory put forward by René Pichon, 8 used as his main source Livy’s history, the relevant books of which (those dealing with the civil war) are now lost, and can only be reconstructed in its broadest outlines from the Periochae and Florus. While Pichon maintains that Livy was Lucan’s sole source, the possibility of other sources having
been used exists. The fact remains that the agreement between Lucan and the Periochae of Livy is remarkably close, both in subject matter selected and in the order used. This agreement is too close to allow a fortuitous coincidence. This has been proved in detail by Berthe Marti. 9

For the purposes of this thesis, I shall assume that the main source Lucan used, and turned to as the final word, was Livy, but in their turn I shall refer to other works, such as Florus, who was a contemporary of Lucan, and thus useful only as a cross-reference; Appian; Caesar, whose commentaries, in my opinion, were certainly consulted by Lucan; Cicero, for whose status as a source Vivian Holliday 10 makes a strong case; Frontinus, useful on military matters; and Valerius Maximus, who is particularly noteworthy for having had access to the missing parts of Livy. Some of these will be referred to in their rôle of possible sources for the Bellum Civile, and others as useful checkpoints in cross-references.
CHAPTER 1

UNINTENTIONAL HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL MISTAKES

The fact that Lucan in the course of his long epic can be convicted of sundry mistakes and distortions has attracted the critics in an altogether disproportional way; it is easier to detect small errors than to appreciate large virtues. Of the said mistakes a great many are the result of simple problems, such as the lack of an accurate map at Lucan's disposal; Other mistakes are the result of either popular ignorance on the part of the era, or perhaps the habit of having to follow precedent. Morford sums it up:

Lucan has seldom been considered on his merits; critics, ancient and modern, have for the most part denied him a dispassionate approach. From Petronius to Robert Graves he has been generally condemned for being tainted with the vices of declamation, to such an extent that his claim to be called a poet has often not even been considered. The assumption which underlies this prejudice is that a Roman epic poet should be judged by reference to Virgil; a poet who fails to conform to the Virgilian canons of taste and technique has failed as a poet. This is explicitly stated by Quintilian, of ancient authors, who prefaced his remarks on Roman epic poetry with laudes Vergilii (10. 1. 85-6) in which Virgil is established as the standard by which all others fail. A similar attitude is implicit throughout Héitland's essay, which may be taken as representative of modern criticism (although it was published eighty years ago). It is a remarkable fact that one of Rome's most powerful authors should have
been unfailingly subjected to such inadequate critical techniques and denied the right to be considered with reference to the circumstances, tastes and traditions of his own time.

Little space will be devoted to the kind of mistakes cited in paragraph one, as they are in fact unimportant; in spite of all the attention they have received.

Most of these little mistakes are listed by Heitland. Others emerge upon repeated reading. A representative list is attempted here:

- The somewhat over-publicized confusion between Pharsalia and Philippi, appearing in the frenzied matron's speech and several other places, has already been shown to have probably had its origin in Virgil. The confusion between the deciding battles in the two civil wars is perhaps understandable and interesting even without the Virgilian precedent. It is not impossible that in Nero's time the two names with their alliterative quality were subject to confusion in popular parlance.

- In the passage 1.552-55, where Lucan is describing the prodigies that presaged the Civil War, it has been suggested that Atlas, situated inland, is being treated as a seaside mountain, the reference being that the sea overwhelmed Atlas in a flood of water. This needs little probing. The entire passage is one great piece of geographical and meteorological nonsense. Lucan may or may not be
implying that Atlas is a seaside mountain. He is at pains to show how high the sea ran. What better way to show this than by the absurd supposition that it overran an inland mountain?

- Heitland points out that in Bk. 2,409-20 Lucan implies that the Po (Eridanus) has no tributaries. This is not stated as such, and is a deduction from the passage. The criticism that can be made is that the size of the Po is exaggerated.

- In Bk. 2,665 of Lucan’s text, Mt. Eryx, situated in western Sicily, is imagined as cast into the Aegean sea. This, as Heitland points out, is indeed a careless mistake. If, on the other hand, we accept Bentley’s solution that the actual reading ought to be " Aeolian" instead of "Aegean," a solution which fits the text metrically, the picture is much improved. Even without resorting to Bentley, Lucan’s fondness for metonymy is well known; it may well be that he used Eryx simply as representative of any high mountain, the location being secondary to his purpose, in order to carry his point. The above-named passage reads:

    . . . sed (sc. Caesar) molibus undas
    Obstruit et latum deiectis rupibus aequor.
    Cedit in inmensum cassus labor: omnia pontus
    Haurit saxa vorax montesque inmiscet harenis:
    Ut maris Aeolii medias si celsus in undas,
    Depellatur Eryx, nullae tamen aequore rupes
    Emineant . . . (2.661-67)

If one considers this, one will see that Lucan merely intends to illustrate the futility of Caesar’s endeavour. The critic who does
not consider it ridiculous that Mount Eryx should be thrown down in the first place should not put too fine a point on where it lands.

- In several passages (notably in the proud speech of the Massilians to Caesar asserting their independence), the city of Phocaea, mother state of Massilia, is confused with the district of Phocis in Greece proper. It is true that Lucan is guilty of this, but then others have made the same mistake, and little wonder it is. Notable among these are Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 10.16.4), and Seneca (Ad Helv. 7, 8).

- Another passage which has been the subject of much adverse criticism is 5.417 ff. Caesar comes to his troops at Brundisium and encourages them to cross over to Dyrrachium, explaining that this would be easy as they do not have to sail along a curving shore, but merely to cut across (recti fluctus secandi) to the Illyrian coast, with the aid of the North wind (Aquilo) only. As Dyrrachium lies slightly North-East of Brundisium, this has raised some eyebrows among Lucan's critics. Pamela Barratt discusses the problem at great length, and even goes so far as to offer a partial solution. She discusses the three navigations Lucan gives between Brundisium and the Illyrian coast: that of Pompey (2.645 ff. and 3.1ff.), that of Caesar (present passage), and that of Antony (5.703-721). She says:
He [Lucan] seems unsure of the positions of the two cities and which wind renders the crossing possible. To go from Brundisium to Dyrrhachium, i.e., S.E. to N.W. [sic], Caesar tells his soldiers to go ahead driven by Aquilo (417), and the same is the case with Antony's crossing (705) and Pompey's in 2.646. Lucan placed the Illyrian coast further south than it in fact is. . . . The error in our present passage is not so great as it at first seems, because we are told that the fleet disembarked at Palaeste (460), for which one would need perhaps a N.W.

First of all, to sail from Brundisium to Dyrrhachium one is going S.W. to N.E., not, as Miss Barratt states, S.E. to N.W. This is probably a slip. However, both she and many other sources she quotes seem to be under the impression that a sailing-ship's sails are fixed in one direction and are immovable, thus being forced to wait upon winds from exactly the right point of the compass before sailing. There is a discourse along with several diagrams and a scale model of these ships in Casson, clearly indicating the ropes, mainsail, foresail, rudder and stays of the Roman sailing ship, whereby she could be manoeuvred. All Caesar's soldiers had to do in order to reach Dyrrhachium is sail close-hauled into the North wind. For a parallel to this, we can turn to Virgil's Aeneid, book 5, lines 1-4. This passage reads:

Interea medium Aeneas iam classe tenebat
certus iter fluctusque atros Aquilone secabant
moenia respiciens, quae iam infelicis Elissae
conluent flammis.

Aeneas is leaving Carthage and sailing North-East; thus, the case is identical to Lucan's passage. In his commentary to book 5 of
the Aeneid, R. D. Williams discusses the problem, stating that in this case also the direction of the winds has been much discussed, and concludes by saying that Aeneas would be sailing close-hauled into the North wind. Lucan himself describes the process involved quite clearly in lines 426-29:

... totosque rudentes
Laxavere sinus, at flexo navita cornu
Obliquat laevo pede carbaṣa summaque pandens
Sipara velorum perituras colligit auras.

It could not be made more explicit than that. As if more proof were required, Lucan states that Caesar's ships set sail when the "moon had begun to throw shadows of her own," therefore, at night. S. L. Mohler points out, citing modern handbooks, that in the southern Mediterranean during the night there is a land breeze (south or west), and during the day a sea breeze (north-east). Aeneas or Caesar would thus have got out of the harbour on the land breeze, and by daylight be sailing close-hauled into the north wind. Checking this against Lucan, we find that Caesar left Brundisium at night, and shortly after was becalmed completely (434-55) till dawn, when the north wind rose (455-60), and the fleet landed at Palaestra, south of Dyrrachium, the possibility of which P. Barratt deals with admirably.

- In book 8. 283-88 Pompey gives a speech in which he expresses his fear of Juba, the Numidian king. The passage reads as follows:
Hinc anceps dubii terret sullertia Mauri;
Namque memor generis Carthaginis inopia proles
Inminet Hesperiae, multusque in pectore vano est
Hannibal, obliquo maculat qui sanguine regnum
Et Numidas contingit avos.

Several commentators fall into the same trap here. They interpret 'qui' in line 286 as referring to Juba, thus immediately raising questions as to his ancestry, with the erroneous conclusion that he is descended from Hannibal. Juba is a descendant of the Numidian king Masinissa, and if one persists in the incorrect attribution of 'qui,' one inevitably falls prey to a futile chain of speculation about Masinissa’s doomed marriage to the Carthaginian Sophonisba, who died by poison long before she could have had any children by Masinissa, be that Juba or anyone else. While it is true that 'obliquo sanguine' indicates descent from the female line, if we read the 'qui' correctly as referring to Hannibal, and not Juba, then we can arrive at the correct solution, put forward by Cortius, and supported by Housman ad loc. that a male ancestor of Hannibal had married at some point a sister or daughter of the Numidian royal house, and thus he (Hannibal) "touches Numidian ancestors." It would be ridiculous for Lucan to state that Juba touches Numidian ancestors, this being obvious. There is no mention of Sophonisba anywhere; the inference is simply to a female ancestor of Hannibal's who had Numidian royal blood.

To take the antecedent of 'qui' as Juba rather than Hannibal would be (quite apart from the meaning discussed above) gram-
matically perverse, if not impossible. Perhaps the misunderstanding of the passage arose from the assumption that 'obliquo sanguine' denoted illegitimacy.

- In book 7.14., Lucan mistakenly refers to the celebration of Pompey's first triumph, awarded for having "conquered the clans surrounded by the swift Hiberus, and defeated every force that Sertorius had hurled against him in guerrilla warfare." Lucan has confused his historical data here; Pompey celebrated his first triumph over Numidia in 81 B.C. The defeat of Sertorius took place 10 years later in Spain, in 71 B.C., occasioning his second triumph, and his third triumph was celebrated over Asia in 61 B.C.

- Aspects of Cato's desert march in book 9 could be inserted here, but as that passage contains mistakes that are not all equally simple and straightforward, they will be dealt with together in Chapter 3.

- In book 10.32-3, Alexander the Great is depicted as having turned back from the Ganges, when in fact he only got as far as the Satlej (Hyphasis).

The *Bellum Civile* is full of small mistakes of this type. They are mainly trivial, and it is not the purpose of this paper to list more of these, to which too many pages in Lucan criticism have already been devoted as it is. It is sufficient to say that the mistakes are present, that some of them are in fact real mistakes—historical, geographical, and otherwise—and that others are not.
CHAPTER 2

MISLEADING HYPERBOLE

In the process of writing history and verse epic, though more so in the case of the latter, the poet/historian is faced with the task of sorting out those incidents which are of more importance than others, and of conveying this difference in writing. To the historian this will present a very real problem, which can only be solved by painstaking research and comparison. To the poet this problem is perhaps welcome, because he is not under the same obligation to eradicate partisanship; his aim, in Lucan's case, is clearly stated in book 1.1-32; it is to tell of war worse than civil, of how kindred fought against kindred. He is at the same time writing both a rhetorical poem and history, and inevitably one gets in the way of the other. As Morford\(^1\) points out, the sententia is the mark of Silver Latin rhetoric, and it, along with Lucan's fire and partisanship, is the 'Kennzeichen' of the Bellum Civile. Whether these are faults or virtues is arguable, but the chief argument in favour must be that these are some of the very qualities which set Lucan apart from other poets such as Virgil, on the one hand, and Silius Italicus, Statius, and Valerius Flaccus, on the other. No one denies that Lucan's rhetoric is at times forced, and it is the aim of this chapter to explore this tendency toward hyperbole. While the events that Lucan records actually took place, they did
not necessarily happen in quite the same way.

One such rhetorical device Lucan seems to be particularly fond of, namely hyperbole, is to be found in several of his battle descriptions. The first instance to be explored occurs in book 2, 204-06, in an old man’s reminiscences of the Sullan massacres. At Praeneste, after the slaughter, the corpses were so numerous that they were unable to fall, but remained upright, supported by the density of their fellow corpses crowding around: an exaggeration indeed. It is a rhetorical device Lucan uses to set a particularly gruesome incident apart, giving it precedence in emphasis over other similar incidents, less integral to his purpose. For comparison let us examine another passage, 3.394-452, in which Caesar orders a sacred grove cut down in order to build ships. Lucan describes the awesome reverence in which this place was held, and its deep, sinister mystery due to the branches being so close together that no sunlight could penetrate into the grove. When his men balk at the act of desecration involved in violating the sanctuary, Caesar strikes the first blow himself, and when the trees are finally severed they are unable to topple; so densely did they stand together that one felled tree is supported upright by all the rest. The object here is the same as in the former instance, a device to convey unusually great, wasteful destruction. The same is the case in book 4.787, where Curio’s army is routed by the Numidians. Here again the corpses remain nodding upright, unable to fall; sup-
ported by their fellows. Lucan is demonstrating by his device the wanton cruelty of the Moor by exaggerating the damage. It is interesting to note that Lucan is in this instance free of his much-discussed partisanship of Pompey's cause, as Juba's army is allied with Pompey, and the defeated Curio (for whom Lucan shows some admiration) is Caesar's lieutenant. All three of the above passages are travesties of reality, but they serve to underline Lucan's objective in demonstrating the horrors of a war 'plus quam civile.'

Some mention is due in this chapter to the murder of Marius Gratidianus in 2,174-93 (part of the old man's reminiscences of the Sullan massacres mentioned above), who, while Sulla's cruelty is well attested, was killed in such a horrible, piecemeal fashion, that even if it were possible for one man to inflict such cruelty, it is unlikely that the victim could have lived through it for as long as the passage states.

In a similar vein is the passage dealing with the naval battle of Massilia in book 3,509-762. Lucan has often, and with good reason, been taken to task over this egregious piece of exaggerated description. On the other hand, as Ilona Opelt notes, what has received less attention is that it is the first detailed description of a sea-battle in the course of Latin epic, and forms one of the great set pieces of the Bellum Civile. As described in Caesar's Civil War, the Caesarean admiral Brutus defeated the Massilians in two decisive encounters. Lucan compresses these two into one great
epic battle (see Chapter 3). As regards the gruesome Einzelschicksalen of some of the combatants, Lucan's aim is still the portrayal of a war 'worse than civil,' and the detailed suffering of one man, who is introduced to the reader, has always carried at least as much conviction and elicited as great a compassion and horror as the destruction of nameless masses, and often more. There is no pretense made to accurate history. The fates of the twin brothers, one of whom shields his brother with his armless body; of Catus, transfixed by two spears meeting in the middle so that his blood is undecided which wound to flow from; and the fates of all others must, in the words of Ilona Opelt, be taken as "reine Erfindung." She also notes:

Bemerkenswerterweise lässt Lucan die einzige auch sonst bezeugte Heldentat eines Acilius, die gewiss bei Livius überliefert war, aus. Der Tod des massaliotischen Zwillingbruders ist eine Umformung davon.

The reference is to Lucan's book 3.609ff., to which Heitland adds:

It is a piece of astounding audacity or carelessness, when he attributes to a Massaliote the exploit which Suetonius Iul. 68, Plut Caes 16, Val Max III 2, 22, all attribute to Acilius a soldier of Caesar. Surely he cannot be right; but the unwillingness to name an Acilius (his mother's original family) on Caesar's side may possibly account for the perversion.

The three historical facts Lucan takes into account are:

a) The Massilians were besieged by the Romans at sea.

b) The Massilians' resistance was heroic, if hopeless.

c) The Romans won.
Within the scope of this there is ample room for the writing of poetry, rhetoric, sententiae, and to point to the Messilians' struggle for freedom and its result as a shining example of the heroic resistance of Libertas to Caesar's tyranny. The victory of that tyranny, to Lucan, was after all merely "ius datum sceleri."

Lucan now shifts the scene to Ilerda, and reports on the activities there of the Pompeian generals, Afranius and Petreius. There are three features in this report of Lucan that are important for the purposes of this essay. They are a) the contraction, once again, as with Massilia, of the actual events into a more compact form; b) the exaggerated account of the spring flood that harassed Caesar's army; and c) the singularly accurate description of the campaign in general, and particularly the touching and elsewhere attested fraternization scene between the two armies. Of these features the first will be discussed in its proper place (Chapter 3), and the latter two will be dealt with here.

In Lucan's account of the flood (4.48-120) the East wind blows all the clouds of Arabia into Spain, and all the storms of the North and the South also congregate there. As it is there that the heavens meet the sea, the clouds had nowhere left to go, and discharged all the rain meant for the entire globe over, Caesar's army camped on the banks of the Sicoris, on the shore across from Ilerda. So torrential is this rain, that it puts out the fire of lightning bolts. The waters of the sea are carried up to the clouds
by the ministration of a rainbow, and thus the sea in turn descends upon the Caesareans. The Pyrenean snows, never before melted, now also find their way to the camp. Then the waters recede, but not before they have made it impossible for the army to forage, as all the crops have perished in the flood.

This passage reads much like a fairy-tale, in which such impossibilities are commonly employed to convince the reader that this was not only a great flood, but an extraordinarily great flood, the like of which has never been before. Caesar himself describes the Ilerda campaign in great detail, and from him we learn that:

Tanta enim tempestas cooritur ut numquam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. Tum autem ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summam ripas fluminis superavit pontisque ambos quos C. Fabius fecerat uno die interrupt. Quae res magnas difficultates exercuit Caesaris attulit.
(Caes. B. C. 1.48.2-3)

and that:

"Hae permanserunt aquae dies compluris."
(Caes. B. C. 1.50.1)

and finally:

\[ ... militum vires inopiá frumenti diminuerat atque incommoda in dies augebantur; et tam paucis diebus magna erat rerum facta commutatio, ac se fortuna inclinaverat ut nostri magna inopia necessariarum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superiorisque habentur. \]
(Caes. B. C. 1.52.1-4)

Remove the element of exaggeration, and the two passages (Lucan's and Caesar's) read surprisingly alike, as is the case with the
Illeda campaign in general. Once again it is Lucan's penchant for hyperbole that places an otherwise accurate account of Caesar's great setback into the realm of fantasy. As a small attempt at justification one might adduce Caesar's note at the end of his account of the famine:

Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribabant. Multa rumor adfingebat, ut paene bellum confectum videretur.  
(Caes. B.C. 1.53.1)

It is often the case with great disasters that they are reported as something greater still, as no participant in a disaster ever thinks that someone hearing of it secondhand can possibly appreciate its magnitude by simply listening to a factual account. An author may well have the same fear in trying to convey great dangers to an audience who has not participated in them.

It is interesting to note that no such exaggeration mars Lucan's account of the fraternization between the two armies in the absence of the Pompeian generals (4.157-204). As Lucan builds up to this passage, his account becomes realistic and factual. He reports how the Caesarean infantry forded the swollen Sicoris under almost impossible conditions; he describes the soldiers' eagerness to fight a pitched battle and Caesar's refusal to do so, in order to avoid bloodshed—a point only too well attested in Caesar's propagandist but true-to-life account (Caes. B.C. 1.85.1-2) of his unwillingness to cause any more trouble than absolutely necessary; he
describes the race between the two armies, each trying to reach
the Ebro first and cut off the other, as well as the Caesareans' success; and he recounts how the two camps were pitched in close proximity to each other. All this is attested by several sources, notably Caesar.

Here Lucan is in his element. By his own assurance we know that this is what he is writing about in the first place, the evils of civil war; and kinsmen opposing each other, plus quam civilia bella in fact. The fraternization scene is described in simple, accurate, poignant terms: the soldiers at first hesitating, then spotting friends and kinsmen, and finally wandering about arm in arm with their 'enemies' in each others' camps. Lucan touches, like Caesar, on the possibility that had the soldiers had their way, the war would have been ended. Again like Caesar, he notes that Petreius had been the cause of destroying the hopes for a speedy peace, by arming his slaves, and by using talk and force in winning back his army, and practising needless, unprovoked (and unreturned) violence upon the Caesareans:

"... multo disturbabat sanguine pacem." (4, 209-11)

As his final triumph, Lucan overcomes his anti-Caesarean bias for a moment to record that due to this treachery on the part of the Pompeians:

Tu, Caesar, quamvis spoliatus milite molto,
Agnoscis superos: neque enim tibi maior in arvis
Emathiiis fortuna fuit nec Phocidos undis
Massiliae, Phario nec tantum est aequore gestum, 
Hoc- siquidem solo civilis crimine belli 
Dux causae melioris eris. (4.254-59)

This sentiment, grudgingly conceded by Lucan, is espoused wholeheartedly by Caesar, who dwells on it at length when he gives a speech of gracious pardon to Afranius, in spite of the unfair treatment received at his hands, upon the latter's suing for peace (Caes. B. C. 1.85.1). Caesar's own account in this case might draw the adjectives usually reserved for Lucan's rhetoric: while the account of the pardon is true, the rhetoric in which it is couched cannot hide the underlying basis of propaganda.

Still in book 4.794ff., we come upon yet another example of hyperbole. Lucan is describing the rout of Curio's (Caesar's lieutenant's) forces by the Numidians under Juba. The carnage is such that the dust (which in Libya is all the more plentiful) kicked up in the heat of the battle is settled by the blood shed on it. In a similar vein is the picturesque but ludicrous description of the heroics of Scaeva during a Pompeian attack on Caesar's outpost near Dyrrhachium (Luc. 4.169-269; especially 194-95): Caesar is blockading Pompey in Dyrrhachium immediately before the final encounter in Thessaly. The outcome of an actual engagement, or a successful breakout for Pompey might possibly decide the war. The scene is one of Caesar's bastions at Dyrrhachium. The situation is critical; the defenders have lost heart. The centurion Scaeva singlehandedly defends the outpost, while taunting his en-
feebled companions about their incomprehensible reluctance to add-
themselves to the ever-mounting heaps of corpses. The soldiers,
heartened by his optimism, take up their weapons and follow his
example. Scaeva fights off the attackers by flinging at them
corpses, wooden beams, rocks and whatever else comes to hand.
Running out of ammunition, he leaps upon the enemy with his
sword, and when this is blunted by the coagulated blood, he uses
only his body as buffer between Pompey and victory over his
bastion. His chest is a thick forest of spears (he has ceased to
use his armour for fear that he would be thought a coward), his
left eye is shot out—he pulls out arrow and eye and stamps upon
them in scorn—it is in fact useless to shoot more arrows or
javelins into him; there is room for no more quills in this human
porcupine. The approach of Caesar's cohorts saves Pompey's army
from the disgrace of being routed by Scaeva singlehanded. Lucan's
Muse at this point must have been Thalia, because while it is
doubtful that he meant it to do so, the passage liberally provides
the reader with comic relief. Not all the horrors of war can
screen out the gruesome and probably unintentional absurdity of the
scene. It is true that Caesar, generally a faithful chronicler of the
valour of his men at arms, gives Scaeva honourable mention in his
own diaries. He describes the scene:

Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum quin
vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte
centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris
sui periculique testimonium adferre vellent, milia sagittarium circiter xxx in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina cxx. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritus et de re publica, donatum milibus cc (atque) ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit—eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat—cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, vespeciariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit. (Caes. B. C. 3.53.4-5)

Apart from Caesar, several ancient sources carry, with variations in detail, the story of Scaeva’s heroism, although his name suffers alteration: Scaeva (Florus), Cassius Scaeva (Suetonius), Minucius (Appian—who mentions in the same battle a Scaeva losing an eye), Caesius Scaeva (Valerius Maximus). All these accounts speak of almost superhuman effort and endurance. But since from Caesar’s account we learn that Scaeva lived to be rewarded, while the condition of Lucan’s hero at the end of the battle would hardly seem liable to recovery, any historical enquiry must conclude that Lucan has outdone himself in the matter of Scaeva.

A smaller instance is to be found in book 7.477, where at Pharsalia the din of battle assails the dome of Olympus, or the passage (Luc. 9.32ff.) in which after the defeat of the Pompeians at Pharsalia, the army is scattered and Cato, so as to save them from falling into Caesar’s hands, gathers them up and takes them with him in retiring to Corcyra. He does this by means of a thousand ships, when in fact it is well known that the ships num-
bered but three hundred.

On a larger scale again, and reminiscent of the Scaeva episode, is the heroic, if somewhat perverse, suicide of Vulteius in book 4.402-581. This is a particularly interesting case because of the problems it raises in cross references. The position is as follows: C. Antonius, the Caesarean general, commands a body of troops on Curicta, an island off Illyricum, whence he wishes to cross over to join Basilus, who is on the mainland with more of Caesar's troops. The coast is held by Pompey's admiral, Octavius. The Caesareans resort to a ruse; they build low rafts constructed of planks laid upon empty barrels, and the rowers are covered above, so that the raft seems to move on the water without the aid of sails or oars. They embark at the coming of night. The Cilicians in Pompey's pay stretch underwater ropes to catch the rafts as they drift down towards the mainland. Two rafts escape the trap, but the third sticks fast and drifts into a small inlet, in clear sight of the enemy who surrounds it, and also of the Caesarean forces on the mainland coast.

Vulteius, the commander of the raft, gives an impassioned speech to his comrades, the main points of which are:

a) that death is inevitable, but by a glorious suicide they could set an example and show Caesar their loyalty;

b) that death is feared only because the gods hide from the living the fact that it is a boon, in order to trick
them into staying alive;
c) that while it is not enough for a soldier of Caesar to
lay down his life for the commander, hemmed in as,
they are they can do no better;
d) that once the enemy perceives the glory that the
Caesareans' valour has vouchsafed them, they'll thank
their lucky stars that only one of the rafts got stuck.

Having asked his men whom they thought worthy to shed his,
Vultureus' blood, he is immediately attacked by a dozen swords. He
thanks them all, and in turn gratefully slays the author of the first
blow.

A wholesale scene of carnage follows, wherein the soldiers
hack each other to pieces; blows are unnecessary, as they willingly
dash their own breasts against the swords (shades of Scaeva). They
smile and exult as they drag their entrails all over the raft and
into the water so as to horrify the enemy.

The piece is singularly exaggerated, and the sentiments
involved, such as loyalty to Caesar and the glory of suicide,
through this exaggeration become absurd travesties of what may
have happened. If, however, the emphasis is switched from the
ridiculous, there are traces of the sublime to be found. The
entire episode is a large-scale demonstration of Stoicism. The
soldiers must die, so let them do it joyfully, by turning it to their
advantage. For every absurd notion in Vultureus' speech, there is
another in which the Stoic doctrine is skilfully expressed, in Lucan's precise, poetic *sententiae*, so that one thrills in reading it. It is indeed conceivable that a band of soldiers could be fired to superhuman efforts by such a speech. There are examples in history of this, Masada, to mention only one. The *sententiae* would inspire anyone:

\begin{quote}
Vita brevis nulli superest, qui tempus in illa Quaerendae sibi mortis habet; nec gloria leti Inferior, iuvenes, ad moto occurrere fato. \\
(4.478-80),
\end{quote}

"Cupias, quocumque necesse est." (4.487)

and the motto later adopted by and engraved onto the sabres of the Gardé Nationale in 1789:

"Ignorantque datos, ne quisquam serviat, enses." (4.579)

This overly orchestrated passage presents some of the most beautiful lines, and certainly some of the most salient Stoic principles in the epic. Once again Lucan pays grudging tribute to the valour and loyalty of the Caesareans, although, as in the case of Scaeva, he prefaces it with the notion that bravery in civil war is a crime. Characteristic too is Lucan's statement, harking back to his sentiments regarding civil war:

\begin{quote}
Concurrant alii totumque in partibus unis Bellorum fecere nefas. (4.548-49)
\end{quote}

But Lucan is in a quandary: he is a Pompeian in politics, but a Stoic in philosophy, and Vultéius' tribute to Stoicism could not be
passed up by the nephew of Seneca, especially with its overtones, beloved by Lucan, of violence, bloodshed, passions, loyalty, and excess, so conducive to impassioned rhetoric.

Whether one subscribes to the theory that Lucan would have carried his epic through to the death of Cato in Utica, or, as this thesis supposes, that the projected end was to be the assassination of Caesar, it is reasonable to assume that Lucan's description of Cato's suicide in Utica, involving as it does high Stoic ideals and passions, would have made the Vulteius episode look small by comparison.

An interesting point is raised by the Vulteius episode regarding other references. The episode appears in Livy's Periochae, but does not figure anywhere else. However, Caesar's account, which begins a detailed description of Antony and the crossing from Curicta (Caes. B.C. 3.8), abruptly breaks off after a few lines. This lacuna corresponds exactly to the place where the Vulteius episode ought to be, if it was in fact included. The narrative picks up again with "discessu Liburnarum ex Ilyrico M. Octavius cum eis quas habebat navibus Salonas pervenit"; that is, exactly after the episode of Antony's crossing over to join Basilus. Caesar himself was painstakingly scrupulous in giving his men credit for their bravery, and singled them out by name in his commentaries. This is clearly demonstrated in the example of Scaeva, quoted above, and Crastinus (Caes. B.C. 3.91.1), the man who was
first to strike a blow at Pharsalia, telling Caesar "Faciam...hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas."

(Caes. B.C. 3.91.3). Caesar, upon Crassinus' death, writes as follows:

In eo proelio non amplius ducentos milites desideravit, sed centuriones, fortis viros, circiter xxx amisit. Interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crassinus, cujus mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. Neque id fuit falsum quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. Sic enim Caesar existimabat eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crassini fuisse optimeque eum de se meritum judicabat. (Caes. B.C. 3.99.1-4)

This practice of Caesar's, of giving credit where credit is due, is clear throughout the commentaries. It is difficult to believe that Caesar would simply have left unmentioned Vulteius's bravery, which, if stripped of Lucan's rhodomontade, stands on its own as a deed of great fortitude and loyalty such as Caesar valued, and credited in writing in so many instances. The lacuna at the end of 3.8., then, can be reasonably assumed to have contained the Vulteius episode and Caesar's evaluation of it.

The last instance of the misleading hyperbole remaining is the episode where Caesar attempts to cross the Adriatic single-handedly in a small boat. This passage, however, for the purposes of this thesis, is better located in the chapter dealing with Lucan's chief distortion, that is, the character of Julius Caesar, and therefore will be discussed there.
In many of the foregoing examples Lucan has deliberately used hyperbole as a rhetorical device to provide his narrative with greater impact. In other cases the exaggeration may be accidental and unpremeditated. In either case the result is misleading historically, although poetically speaking, hyperbole is so inseparable a part of Lucan's thinking that his writing is almost inconceivable without it.
CHAPTER 3

INTENTIONAL INACCURACIES FOR ARTISTIC PURPOSES—CHIEFLY IN THE FORM OF COMPRESSION OR EXPANSION

In most cases, Lucan's shortcomings which belong under this heading are forgivable. Several of the problems relating to the description of the Ilerda campaign have already been dealt with in Chapter 1: now it remains to examine the chief historical inaccuracy involved there. The Ilerda campaign is well documented. All available sources deal with it at length, chief among them being Caesar's firsthand account. All accounts tally in general, and it has already been mentioned that Lucan's own rendering is a creditable one, on the whole, and very like that of Caesar. The major difference is Lucan's contraction of the two battles mentioned by Caesar into a single encounter. Caesar's version is as follows: the first battle takes place on and under a hill situated between Afranius' camp and the town of Ilerda. Caesar attempts to take the hill, but the Pompeians get there first, and thus Caesar's men are caught in a dangerous position at the foot of the hill, harassed from two sides by the Pompeians, both above and below. Although inferior in numbers, in the end the Caesareans charge up the hill with drawn swords, and turn the defeat into a stalemate.

After this battle, Afranius and Petreius decide to take the war further west into Pompeian territory. Caesar pursues, and a
second engagement ensues, one that is a resounding success for Caesar, whereupon the Pompeians capitulate.

Lucan describes the first encounter (4.32-48) in great and largely accurate detail—the battle for the hill, the difficulty of Caesar's soldiers struggling up with drawn swords, and the eventual draw, ending with the retention of the hill by the Pompeians. There follows the long description of the storm and the resulting famine, at times very accurate, at times greatly overstated. Following this, Lucan, like Caesar, describes the Pompeians' westward move and Caesar's pursuit, down to the details (mentioned by Caesar) of the Caesarean vanguard harassing the Pompeian rear. Here, however, he leaves off, and launches into his description of the fraternization scene between the two armies, without touching on the second engagement, which Caesar won. Although as history this is unacceptable, as poetry it has the merit of brevity and non-repetition, without leaving out the essence. The battle scenes are important to Lucan here mainly as a contrast to his wonderful description of the fraternization scene. As his aim is to condemn civil war, this episode of fraternization, where, but for Petreius, the issue could have been decided in kindred friendship rather than kindred bloodshed, is the artistic high point of book 4, and which, as such, is in fact historically accurate.

Much the same difficulty occurs with the naval battle and siege of Massilia. The primary sources (that is, Caesar, Cassius
Dio, Suetonius, Florus and Velleius Paterculus) are largely in agreement over the events at Massilia. Caesar entrusted the Massilian campaign to his admiral Decimus Brutus, who emerged victorious from the first naval engagement. Following this victory, Caesar's land forces under Gaius Trebonius began the siege of the town. While the siege was still in its early stages, sixteen ships, recently sent by Pompey, managed to elude Caesar's lieutenant, Curio, who was guarding the Sicilian strait, and came to the aid of Massilia. The Massilians decided to try their fortunes one more time in a naval engagement. Their desperate courage is movingly portrayed in several accounts, not least in Lucan's and Caesar's. Once again the Caesareans are victorious, and in the continuing siege the Massilians, on the point of defeat, resort to a ruse. They ask for a truce, and the two forces put up their weapons to wait for Caesar's arrival. With the Caesareans thus off their guard, the Massilians make a sally, burn many of the siege towers and other equipment, and retire back into the town. Eventually they are starved out and are forced to capitulate.

Lucan's own portrayal of the beginning of ills for Massilia is a masterpiece of historical and artistic writing: He sketches the Massilians' loyalty to Rome from "time immemorial," and touches on their policy of non-involvement in civil war:

Semper in externis populo communia vestro
Massiliam bellis testatur fata tulisse,
Compensa est Latilis quaecumque annalibus aetas.
Et nunc, ignoto si quos petis orbe triumphos,
Accipe devotas externa in proelia dextras.
At, si funestas acies, si dira paratis,
Proelia discordes, lacrimas civilibus armis
Secretumque damus. (Luc. 3.307-14)

He outlines the fact, attested everywhere, that the Massilians shut their gates to both Pompey and Caesar. At this point, however, he passes over the first naval skirmish and proceeds straight to the description of the siege, describing, much like Caesar, the various towers, mantlets and testudines employed. Although he fails to mention the Massilians' perfidy in breaking the truce (this omission is obviously due to Lucan's extreme partisanship, rather than to ignorance of the facts), he does describe their sally and the burning of the Caesarean siege works that is its result. He then passes on to the actual second naval engagement, with its at times brilliant and at times forced description of the individual fates of some of the men (see Chapter 2). As with IIerda, Lucan has not given a strictly historical rendering of the campaign, but he has succeeded once again in creating the atmosphere of despair and the horror of war, without any really substantial distortions of history. One aspect of his much criticized picture of the naval battle that has not, to my knowledge, received due credit is in fact unique in history: that is his detailed description of the types of naval vessels used by the two sides. Two major authorities on ships and sea-faring in the ancient world both base their sections on Roman ships of the late Republic and early Empire on this passage of the
Bellum Civile.

The charge of contraction can also be brought against Lucan's account of the battles before Dyrrhachium in book 4. This is the same passage which contains the controversial episode of Scaeva mentioned in Chapter 2. As with Massilia and Ilerda, the salient historical facts are present: those which further the cause of Lucan are given in great detail, those which do not, or would be repetitious, are passed over. Lucan describes accurately the race of Caesar and Pompey to reach Dyrrhachium, and Caesar's inability to take it. Then follows a detailed and accurate account of Caesar's gigantic fifteen-mile fortifications with which he hoped to surround Pompey and cut him off from his supply routes by sea, and from the town, and Pompey's equally large-scale counter-measures. He passes over the many scattered skirmishes reported by Caesar, as they are superfluous to his purpose, would retard his narrative and transform it into a piece of repetitious field-reportage. The rest of the account is so factual and detailed—right down to his mention of Caesar repeatedly trying to coax Pompey from behind his fortifications to give battle, to a detailed description of the terrain of Petra and Dyrrhachium, to the famine and pestilence in the respective camps—and the camouflaging by Caesar of his earthworks, to Pompey's final sally and his successful breakout which result in Caesar changing strategy in carrying the war into Thessaly—that one marvels that Lucan manages to reconcile his
high rhetorical style with such specialized military subject matter.

In opposition to these instances of contraction is one of expansion, to wit the passage dealing with Cato's desert march in book 9, which has raised controversy with almost every line. Some aspects of it, such as the infamous episode of the snakes, belong by right in Chapter 2, but as the entire book has received a great deal of critical scrutiny, it will be dealt with now as a whole.

The first question that has been raised is, what point, if any, does book 9 have at all? Morford has answered this in detail, noting that this book is easily underestimated, since it:

a) comes directly after the catastrophe (Pompey's death);

b) contains no less than five digressions [303-18 (Syrtes);

348-67 (Lake Tritonis); 411-44 (Libya); 511-43 (Hammonium);

619-99 (Perseus)]

c) contains the serpents, the most exotic and least defensible of Lucan's episodes.

Book 8 closes with the death of Pompey; the Republican cause is thus without a champion. Book 9 opens by presenting the new leader of the cause, which is now no longer that of Pompey but Libertas. The entire body of book 9 now becomes the instrument of Lucan in demonstrating the Stoic virtus of the new champion, and if in places it tends towards the bizarre, it should be remembered that it also delineates the finest qualities of a man as Lucan
saw them, and contains some of the best *sententiae* in the epic.

The speeches of Tarcondimotus (leader of an army of Cilicians which has escaped from Pharsalia) and Cato (217-93) prepare the stage for the theme of *Libertas*: Tarcondimotus wishes to desert as

\[
\text{Nos ... Pompei duxit in arma,} \\
\text{non belli civiliis amor. (227-28)}
\]

The Cilicians enjoyed the status of clients to Pompey, dating back to an early command of his when he first rid the Mediterranean of these pirates and then arranged land settlements for them. Cato's answer is in the form of a magnificent speech to the effect that it is *Libertas* that is worth fighting for, not any one leader:

\[
\text{... et Pompeiana fuisti,} \\
\text{Non Romana manus? (257-58)}
\]

This then is to be the theme of the book, the *virtus* of Cato, which contains within it the "apotheosized" essence of Pompey who, his vital force having ascended to join the cosmic fire, according to Stoic doctrine, has returned with *ignea virtus* to reside in the hearts of Cato and Brutus.

The second aspect of book 9 which has met with critical disapproval is the undeniable fact that Lucan draws out the time Cato spent in the desert to two months, when the actual figure, stated by both Plutarch and Strabo, is closer to two weeks. This inaccuracy goes hand in hand with the fact that Cato, according to Lucan, visits the oracle of Hammon in Libya, near the sea where
he has landed, when in fact the oracle is some 400 miles inland and in the other direction. There is no way to defend this from a historical point of view. The Hammon episode is integral to the poem, however, as it illustrates the very fundamental tenets of the Stoics, and throws into the sharpest relief the contrast between Cato and all other actors in the epic. Lucan wanted Cato at the oracle, he wanted the best Stoic speech and example of virtus to come out of Cato's mouth, and he wanted to show that a man like Cato could hold his own even when faced with divinity. Thus the cause can have no better champion than Cato—the lines are reminiscent of an earlier sententia:

"Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni."

(1, 128)

Upon arrival at the oracle Labienus urges Cato to consult it, and Cato replies with a series of questions that he will not ask, because they are in fact, for a Stoic, strictly rhetorical:


(566-572)

He goes on to define several other salient points of the Stoic philosophy and

Servataque fide templi discedit ab aris
Non exploratum populis Hammona relinquens.

(585-86)
He has thereby fulfilled Lucan's purpose in bringing him to the oracle by not consulting it.

But the Stoic hero of Lucan is not finished yet. He now goes on to perform a series of "labours" (as Morford calls them) akin to those of Hercules, which, including as it does the redoubtable snakes, forms the third element which contributes to the critical disapproval of Book 9. Morford mentions several precedents to the serpent episode as a customary device to demonstrate the endurance of heroes in the face of awesome odds. He quotes the march of Ophellas in 309 B.C. (Diod. 20.42.; Diodorus emphasizes the lack of water and danger from the snakes), and the endurance of Regulus, symbolized by his conquest of a monstrous serpent.

All the episodes dealing with the labours are outlying parts of the theme as a whole, the qualities of Cato as champion of Libertas, and in fact every exploit of his is merely a way of shedding light on a new Stoic tenet. His speech (379-406) explains just this, that he intends in every way to demonstrate his beliefs, and it spells out what these are to be:

... Serpens, sitis, ardor harenæ
Dulcia virtuti; gaudet patientia duris;
Laetius est, quotiens magno sibi constat, honestum.

Cato thus explains what he means to do for Libertas, and Lucan makes sure that he does it. Serpens, sitis, ardor harenæ is what he wants, and serpens, sitis, ardor harenæ is what he gets. Cato
withstands wind (444-92), the lack of landmarks (493-97), and the
agony of thirst (498-510) when he refuses to drink while his men
go thirsty, followed by the contrast (607-18) in which he is the
first to drink from a water-hole swarming with serpents. Thus the
snakes make their entrance. The reason for their presence is best
explained by Morford, in view of the Stoic attitude towards death:

Death . . . begins and ends Book 9: at its
climax it is death that dominates Cato's
thoughts. His speech at Hammonium ends
with these sententiae:

    me non oracula certum
Sed mors certa facit. Pavido fortique cadendum est:
Hoc satis est dixisse Iovem.

The one anchor for a man in the perplexities of
life is the certainty of death. Therefore Cato,
the virtuous man in action, must be shown when
confronted with death: the serpent episode takes
on a new dimension besides the obvious symbolism
of the struggle of Virtue against adversity. It is
the vehicle for the facing of death in various
forms: in each case Cato was present, to give
the sufferers the consolation and the courage of
philosophy (9, 884-9). [cf. Sen., Ep., 77, 5-9,
where amicus noster Stoicus strengthens the
resolution of Marcellinus in committing suicide.
Jason (Ap. Rhod., Arg., 4, 1528) showed none
of Cato's firmness when Mopsus was bitten by
a snake.] With the final sententia of the
sufferings Lucan clearly explains his purpose:

    [ Cato ] . . . casus alieno in pectore vincit
Spectatorque docet magnos nil posse dolores.

     (888-89)\textsuperscript{6}

The sufferings of Cato's men are treated with much
hyperbole, as are the abilities and properties of the snakes, but in
each case, the man dies with Stoic courage, thanks to Cato's presence.
While most of the examples of distortion for artistic purposes are in the form of contraction or expansion, the chief example is of a considerably more serious nature.

Book 7 opens in Pompey's camp immediately before Pharsalia. The general is undecided; he does not want to fight a pitched battle, but his soldiers are impatient: the defeat they had inflicted on Caesar at Dyrrhachium has made them wish for a speedy settlement of the issue. Pompey's foreign allies are also counselling him to accept Caesar's challenge, as they have been away from their native lands longer than they wish. Nevertheless, in the face of all this Pompey is still reluctant. With the issue hanging in the balance, Cicero appears on the scene—

Cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor
Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque
Pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina secures.
(7.62–64)

and delivers a speech urging Pompey to settle the issue, as all that is required for the final defeat of Caesar is one more engagement. His rousing speech spurs to action the hesitating Pompey, and the army prepares for the fatal battle.

There is plenty of documentation (we have even the authority of Livy, Lucan's source, for it) that Cicero was not anywhere near Pharsalia at this time. Virtually all commentators touch on it: Lucan not only transports Cicero to Pompey's camp, but once there, he has him deliver a speech in which he expresses
his opinion that the proper course to follow is to fight, and by this speech he sways Pompey, whose own opinion was to delay the issue and not bring on a pitched battle. This is a serious breach of historical fidelity on Lucan's part, one that may be explained, but not excused.

Several of Lucan's commentators mention this, and fortunately we have the voice of Cicero himself disclaiming the pro-war attitude ascribed to him. In a letter to M. Marius, Cicero outlines his position towards war and towards Pompey:

... nihil boni (sc. apud Pompeium) praeter causam. Quae cum vidi semper, desperans victoriam primum coepi suadere pacem, cuius fueram semper auctor; deinde, cum ab ea sententia Pompeius valde abhorreret, suadere institui ut bellum duceret. Hoc interdum probabat et in ea sententia videbatur fore et fuisset fortasse, nisi quadam ex pygna coepisset suis militibus confidere.

It is as if Cicero had penned these lines in answer to the charge that he had urged Pompey to battle.

Lucan then is guilty on both accounts, that of placing Cicero in Pompey's camp when in fact he was elsewhere, and of putting into his mouth a speech that the orator clearly would not have delivered. One does not, of course, have to search far for Lucan's reasons for committing such a violation of the facts. He was aware that Pompey had been reluctant to come to grips with Caesar, that the army was eager for the fight, and finally that the issue was in fact decided by resorting to arms. He needed the
catalyst that changed Pompey's mind, and for this he needed a good orator, indeed the best. We have already seen that strict adherence to actual events was at times irrelevant to Lucan, if by disregarding it he could make an artistic embellishment of his case. Thus it is that we have "cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor" present at a battle he never saw, and his talents as an orator responsible for it.

As with the previous chapters, some of the examples cited here constitute a serious breach of historical facts, and others do not. All of them may be explained in the light of Lucan's character, views and methods, although they are not, for that reason, acceptable as strict history. Lucan himself was probably fully aware of the facts, and aware that he was distorting them for his own ends; it is also obvious that for him those ends justified the means.
CHAPTER 4

INTENTIONAL DISTORTIONS FOR

POLITICAL PURPOSES

Following closely on the subject matter of the previous chapter comes a collateral topic. By their very nature, political distortions are an inevitable part of any history, probably even the most painstakingly honest one, and Lucan's historical epic is certainly no exception. By his own admission Lucan's poem was written with an objective, i.e., the glorification of the cause that was lost at Pharsalia; thus, it is not surprising that he grasps at any opportunity to distort and colour events in the interest of the Optimates and their leader.

Haec et apud seras gentes populosque nepotum,
Sive sua tantum venient in saecula fama,
Sive aliquid magnis nostri quoque cura laboris
Nominibus prodesse potest, cum bella legentur,
Spesque metusque simul perituraque vota movebunt,
Attonitique omnes veluti venientia fata,
Non transmissa, legent et adhuc tibi, Magne, favebunt.

(Luc. 7.207-13)

With the implications of this passage it is not surprising that Lucan's poem, always coloured by partisanship, should take on even brighter hues for the description of the battle in which the Optimates' cause was finally lost.

Throughout the poem Lucan has followed and highlighted the career of the Pompeian champion Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus.
An ancestor of Nero, Domitius receives at Lucan's hand the epithet *pugnax*, "warlike," "determined to keep fighting," and no opportunity is lost to extol his heroism. His first appearance occurs in Book 2.479ff., where he ensconces himself in Corfinium, about to be besieged by Caesar, and prepares to defend it. All accounts tally on the episode. According to Caesar, the facts are as follows: Domitius arrives in Corfinium in order to stem Caesar's southward drive, and sends a message to Pompey to supply reinforcements, as he cannot hope to stop Caesar with the little he has. While awaiting the reply he heartens the defenders, and when Pompey's message arrives refusing reinforcements and ordering Domitius to abandon Corfinium and join him in the south, as he has need of the garrison at Corfinium, Domitius keeps the news from his soldiers and reinforces their belief that Pompey's troops are on the way. His manner, however, is furtive and his troops notice that he is holding conference with a few close associates. Domitius, in fact, is preparing to abandon the fort and flee:

*Ipsa arcana cum paucis familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere constituit.*

(Caes. B.C. 1.19.3)

His soldiers, learning of his plan, take him prisoner, and upon surrendering Corfinium, deliver him into Caesar's hands. Caesar, as usual, relates how he magnanimously pardons him.

The same account in Lucan takes on a significantly different form. The fact that Domitius asked for reinforcements is
not mentioned, nor is the fact that, in refusing, Pompey abandoned his general to his fate. Concerning Domitius' intent to flee, Lucan preserves strict silence. His version consists in the cowardly soldiers surrendering their heroic commander to the tyrannical Caesar. Smarting under the humiliation of the pardon, Domitius decides to go to where the fighting is the thickest:

... Romamne petes pacisque recessus
Degener? in medios belli non ire furores
Iam dudum moriure paras? rue certus et omnes
Lucis rumpe moras et Caesariis effuge munus.
(Luc. 2, 522-25)

Lucan must have been in a dilemma over Pompey's not supporting Domitius: he could not show Pompey, the Optimates' hero, leaving an ally to his fate, and he could not very well brand Domitius as "fugax" instead of "pugnax," as this would not be appropriate for Nero's ancestor. Therefore, he chose the safest route: he simply left out the entire disgraceful episode. As Francken notes: "Domitium a Pompeio proditum esse consulto reticet Lucanus."¹

It is interesting to note that he does the same thing with Domitius' further activities in Massilia, which, for reasons similar to the above, he leaves out entirely.

Source materials are in accordance with Caesar that after Corfinium Domitius proceeded to Massilia, where he was put in charge of the defense:

Quo [Galliae] cum venisset [Caesar], cognoscit ... profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis VII,
quas Iglii et in Cosano a privatis coactas
servis, libertis, colonis suis conpleverat.
... Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit
atque ab eis receptus urbi praeficitur;
summa ei belli administrandi permittitur.
(Caes. B.C. 1.34.1-3 and 1.36.1)

Lucan's words, therefore, that Domitius, smarting under the
humiliating pardon, had gone to hurl himself into the thick of battle,
are correct. Why then, in his lengthy and fiery description of the
Massilians' heroic struggle against Caesar, does he remain silent
about Domitius being the commander and prime mover of the re-
sistance? The description of the siege of Massilia is one of the
most graphic even in the Bellum Civile, where heroic deeds abound.
Yet, nowhere in this operation do we see Domitius, although the
opportunity is a golden one for further extolling the virtues of
Nero's ancestor. The reason is that, once again, Domitius' hero-
ism lasted only as long as the actual danger was not immediate.
When the struggle became desperate, we learn from Caesar that
the Massilians:

... sese dedere sine fraude constituunt. Sed
paucis ante diebus L. Domitius cognita Mas-
siliensium voluntate navibus iii comparatis,
ex quibus duas familiaribus suis attribuerat,
um ipse conscenderat, nactus turbidam
tempestatem profectus est. Hunc conspicatae
naves, quae missu Bruti consuetudine cotidiana
ad portum excubabant, sublatis ancoris sequi
coperunt. Ex his unum ipsius navigium con-
tendit et fugere perseveravit auxilioque
tempestatis ex conspectu abit, duo perterrita
concursu nostrarum navium sese in portum
receperunt. (Caes. B.C. 2.22.2-5)
Once again Domitius would deserve the designation "fugax" rather than "pugnax." Lucan, who at the time when he was writing Book 3, in which the siege of Massilia appears, still enjoyed the friendship of Nero, had perhaps for this reason decided to leave out Domitius' part in the siege. Had he mentioned that Domitius was in charge of the operation, he might have found himself in a difficult position having to explain why, when Caesar entered Massilia, Domitius was not among those present.

At this point the constant epithet "pugnax" takes on some significance again, as we learn that, far from having had enough after the disaster at Massilia, Domitius proceeded with Pompey to the field of Pharsalia.

Lucan opens Book 7 with a description of the grey day on the morning of Pharsalia, and goes on to describe the order of battle of the Pompeians. In his description,

... Tibi numine pugnax
Adverso Domiti, dextri frons tradita Martis.
(7.219-20)

Lucan would have us believe that Domitius commanded the right wing. The various authorities are not in agreement, their versions being as follows:²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caes. B.C. 3, 88</td>
<td>Pompey (not necessarily as commander)</td>
<td>Scipio</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plut., Caes. 44; and Pomp. 69.</td>
<td>L. Domitius</td>
<td>Scipio</td>
<td>Pompey</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appian. B.C. 2, 76 (316)</td>
<td>L. Domitius</td>
<td>Scipio</td>
<td>Lentulus</td>
<td>Afranius &amp; Pompey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucan</td>
<td>Lentulus</td>
<td>Scipio</td>
<td>L. Domitius</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All are agreed that Scipio commanded the centre. If Lucan (or his authority, probably Livy, relying partly on Caesar) confused left and right, then Appian is correct, except as regards the camp: Pompey spent only the end of the battle there, and during the battle may have held temporary command on one or both wings. Thus Caesar (3, 89) tells us that in his own army he put Antony on the left, Qn. Domitius in the centre, and P. Sulla on the right, but that he posted himself too on the right.

Thus, if we believe Caesar's account (as far as it goes, since it does not say much about Pompey's line), then he himself would have been facing Pompey. It is clear from Lucan's description that he wanted to place Domitius on the wing facing Caesar himself. Whether he simply made a mistake or deliberately distorted the facts in order to put Domitius into the limelight is problematic. W. E. Gwatkin, in his article "Some Reflections on
the Battle of Pharsalus, is of the opinion that the error lies with Caesar. He suggests that the mistake Caesar makes (Caes. B.C. 3.88.2-3) in placing Pompey on the left, arose from an observation of his on the battlefield, where he would see Pompey on his left. This opinion stands on an extremely precarious footing due to the fact that Caesar had long years of practice describing battles, and failed to commit an error such as this one anywhere else throughout his diaries. Suffice it to say that the "error" lies probably with Lucan.

After he places Domitius on the right wing, Lucan launches into his description of the battle, at the end of which he delivers his concluding distortion: that of the death of Domitius. As Lucan would have it, Domitius fell bravely in battle, and as he lay dying, he was spotted by the jubilant Caesar who was gloatingly surveying the field of battle (see below). He taunts the fallen hero, who in turn delivers a brilliant dying oration championing the cause of Pompey. The entire scene is a fabrication. Domitius did not die in battle. He was caught and killed by Antony's cavalry, in full flight, while he was literally "heading for the hills." Lucan's description (7.599-604),

```
Mors tamen eminuit clarorum in straga virorum
Pugnacis Domiti, quem clades fata per omnes
Ducebant: nusquam Magni fortuna sine illo
Succubuit. Victus totiens a Caesare salva
Libertate perit; tunc mille in vulnera laetus
Labitur ac venia gaudet caruisse secunda.
```
is given the lie by Caesar's account (Caes. B. C. 3. 99, 5)

L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens,
cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab
equitibus est interfactus.

which in turn is supported by Cicero (Phil. 2. 71), showing that
Domitius was killed by Antony's cavalry:

L. Domitium ... occideras multosque praeterea
qui e proelio effugerant, quos Caesar, ut non
nullos, fortasse servasset, crudelissime per-
secutus trucidaras.

The question as to why Lucan has distorted Domitius'
career, and especially his death, in this way has been raised
among Lucan's critics. The general consensus is that since his
actual undistinguished end was not on the level of heroism re-
quired for an ancestor of Nero, Lucan "coolly alters it," in the
words of Dilke. Haskins, in his note to line 600 concurs: "This
eulogy of Domitius is intended as a compliment to his descen-
don Nero." This has remained the accepted explanation. However, it
is assumed that Lucan wrote Books 1 - 3 during his friendship
with Nero, but Books 4 - 10 subsequent to his quarrel with the
latter. In the light of this, Dilke says:

This was not good enough (Domitius' death in
flight) for an ancestor of Nero's, and Lucan
makes him die a hero's death on the battlefield.
This is nothing like the servile flattery of the
emperor which we find in Book One and which
the poet has managed to couple with republican
feelings; it is only surprising that after the
quarrel between the two ... Lucan should still
have condescended to fabricate such a death
scene or follow some writer who had fabricated it.
But did Lucan really do that? Assuming that the painting of Domitius in heroic colours after Book 3 was not in fact intended to flatter Nero, we must look for a different explanation. Gagliardi suggests that Domitius' death, as rendered by Lucan, presents a hero of the Optimates opposing Caesar and the tyranny that comes with monarchy. Nero is a monarch, and Lucan proposes (according to Gagliardi), that Domitius has died to defend the Republican cause against the tyranny of such as Caesar, and the latter’s eventual successor, Nero. In opposing Caesar, Domitius was actually putting the stamp of disapproval on Nero:

... la descrizione della morte di lui: una morte presentata come quella di un puro eroe repubblicano. La celebrazione di Domizio come difensore della libertas anche in questo libro del poema, scritto certamente dopo il discidium con Nerone, induce a ritenere che voglia assumere per Lucano il significato d’una condanna del dispotismo di Nerone, attraverso la glorificazione dell’antennato.  

This view does not appear to have received any support. If Lucan had wanted a champion of the Republican cause, he probably would not have chosen Domitius, having already used him to flatter Nero.

Another possible explanation, and one that does not seem to have been proposed, would be that the fabrication of Domitius' death may have had absolutely nothing to do with Nero in the first place. While there is dissent over the matter, many commentators subscribe to the theory that the real hero of the Bellum Civile, the one intended by Lucan as the hero, is neither Pompey nor
Caesar, but Cato. Accepting this as given, the matter may be
looked at as follows:

L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, as posited in Plutarch's Cato
Minor I.41., was married to Cato's sister, Porcia. The fact is
attested by several letters of Cicero as well. What could be more
typical of Lucan's extreme views of loyalty than to flatter Cato's
memory (after all, he had even condescended to flatter a mere
Nero) by fabricating a glorious end for his brother-in-law? It is
at least no less likely than that he would have wished to flatter
Nero after their quarrel.

At this point the time has arrived to examine what is
ultimately the greatest distortion of all in the Bellum Civile, that
is, the character of Julius Caesar. It is not the aim of this paper
to examine whether or not Caesar is in fact the anti-hero of the
epic. Good evaluations of the question may be found in Morford,
Heitland and F.M. Ahl. It is impossible to pinpoint every single
instance of distortion since the thread of Lucan's hatred for Caesar
runs all the way through the epic. It must suffice to concentrate
on the major ones.

When we first meet Caesar it is through Lucan's eyes in
the passage where he compares the two leaders. The picture is
essentially faithful to the original:

... Sed non in Caesare tantum
Nomen erat nec fama ducis, sed nescia virtus
Stare loco, solusque pudor non vincere bello;
Acer et indomitus, quo spes quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum et numquam temerando par cere ferro
Successus urguere suos, instare favori
Numinis, impellens, quidquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina. (1.143-50)

Throughout the poem the general glimpses of Caesar are not in-
compatible with his known character, leading one to believe that
Lucan had, at least in general, to paint a true portrait. Caesar
was despotic. It is when we look at the isolated scenes Lucan has
inserted as artistic devices that we come upon gross misrepresenta-
tions.

One of the first instances we come upon is in Book 3
(394-452), where we meet Caesar cutting down and thus desecrating
a grove sacred to some Gallic deity. The glee with which he does
this is typical of Lucan's picture or Caesar's excessive appetite
for destruction and carnage.

Iam ne quis vestrum dubitet subvertere silvam,
Credite me fecisse nefas. (3.436-37)

These are the words which precede the savage blow Caesar deals
the first tree, a task at which his men have balked. The episode
is likely to be unhistorical, for, although the desecration of the
grove may accord with Lucan's conception of Caesar, as O.C.

Phillips observes:

... Lucan's words describing the cutting of the
timber 'tunc omnia late/procumbunt nemora et
spoliatur robore silvae' (3.394-95), do seem
to echo somewhat Caesar's in his Bellum Civile,
'omnibus arboribus longe lateque in finibus
Massiliensium excisis et convectis' (2.15.1);
but the actions there are those of Trebonius, for Caesar had long since moved on to Spain and in no extant account of the Civil War other than Lucan's is there any hint of such a desecration as the one described by Lucan.  

Another example is in Book 5 (476-677). Caesar has crossed over from Brundisium to Epirus in pursuit of Pompey. When Antony, still in Italy, delays in following, Caesar, in his reckless impatience, attempts to cross the Adriatic alone in a small boat, in the middle of a storm, to fetch him. When the gods send in his way every obstacle imaginable to Lucan, he finally turns back, raging all the way to Epirus.

... 'Quantusne evertere' dixit
'Me superis labor est, parva quem pupe sedentem
Tam magno petiere mari? sit fides leti
Est pelago donata mi belliisque negamur,
Intrepidus, quamcumque datis mihi, numina, mortem
Accipiam.' (5, 654-59)

Again there is no evidence that this ever happened, but the episode does tally with Lucan's picture of Caesar's ambition and matchless impatience of any delay.

Probably the least believable and most gruesome portrait Lucan paints of Caesar is on the morning after Pharsalia (7, 792), where, as he surveys the carnage from a hill, he has his men prepare a "picnic" for him in full view of the slaughtered masses.

Postquam clara dies Pharsalica damna retexit,
Nulla loci facies revocat feralibus arvis
Haerentes oculos. Cernit propulsae cruore
Flumina et excelsos cumulis aqueantia colles
Corpora, sidentes in tabem spectat acervos
Et Magni numerat populos, epulisque paratur.
ille locus, voltus ex quo faciesque iacentum
Agnoscat. Iuvat Ermathiam non cernere terram
Et lustrare oculis campos sub clade latentes.
Fortunam superosque suos in sanguine cernit.
Ac ne laeta fueens scelerum spectacula perdat,
Invidet igne rogi miseris caeloque nocenti
Ingerit Ermathiam. (7.787-99)

This morbid delight in carnage that Lucan attributes to Caesar
goes against every historical fact, for, as he himself is the first
to point out, Caesar was famous for his clementia, and whether
for creditable reasons or for the sake of mere form, he had
repeatedly tried to resolve the issue by means other than war.

There are so many examples of this view of Caesar in
Lucan that it would be sheer repetition to look at more of them.
Suffice it to say that the reader would get a very misleading and
inaccurate view of the character of Julius Caesar were he to
confine himself to reading Lucan's partisan account. Ira et
studium are but inadequate words to express the spirit of Lucan's
portrayal.
CHAPTER 5

ARTISTIC INVENTIONS AND ELABORATIONS TO EMBODY SITUATIONS AND IDEAS

In a chapter such as this, it is important to note the difference between elaborations and outright inventions. Certain passages in Lucan that bear the outward signs of being reine Erfindung are well attested by several other sources. The examples given here are necessarily representative:

a) Omens and Destiny

In the above category belong the prodigies in Book 1, 523-83, and the omens before, during, and after Pharsalia. The latter are mentioned by the usually non-superstitious Caesar.¹ Lucan's poem is uniquely free of the usual epic practice of divine intervention, for which he substitutes instead the Stoic ideas of Fatum and Fortuna.² Why Lucan has dissociated himself from the well-established epic device of deus ex machina is suggested by Wolf Friedrich in his article "Cato, Caesar und Fortuna bei Lucan."

Der Ausgang des Bürgerkriegs ist für ihn eine empörende Ungerechtigkeit; es siegt eine Partei die verwenen und geradezu verbrecherisch handelt, über eine gute und rechtliche. Dies Urteil führt zum Zweifel an der Gerechtigkeit oder Macht der Götter, die angeblich die Welt beherrschen: entweder kümmern sie sich nicht um die Menschen, oder es gibt über ihnen andere stärkere Kräfte, von denen die irdischen Schicksale in Wahrheit abhängen.
Cicero in *Nat. Deor.* 3.79 cites the *Telamon* of Ennius, saying:

Telamo autem uno versu locum totum conficit
cur di homines neglectant:
'nam si curent, bene boenis sit, male malis,
quod nunc abest—'

and as proof of Lucan's disillusionment we can place next to this his own lines:

\[
\ldots \text{sunt nobis nulla profecto} \\
\text{numina: cum caeco raptuntur saecula casu} \\
\text{mentimur regnare Iovem} \quad \ldots \quad \ldots \\
\text{\ldots \ldots \ldots mortalia nulli} \\
\text{sunt curata deo. } (7. 445-55)
\]

Cicero (*Nat. Deor.* 2.167) writes that if small things go wrong with the ordering of the world, that must not be taken as a sign that the gods do not care for mankind, as they are only concerned with events of real consequence.

"Magna di curant, parva neglectunt." 3

Assuming this to be correct, one can fully understand why Lucan wondered where the gods were at Pharsalia.

Thus, although Lucan says bitterly "mentimur regnare Iovem," he does not mean that Jove does not exist, merely that he is not ruler over Providence. He proceeds to prove his belief in the existence of the gods, by frequently resorting to the use of omens and prophecies, which, as Cicero points out, are one of the major proofs of the existence of the gods:

\[
\ldots \text{quam praedictionem rerum futurarum, mihi} \\
\text{videtur vel maxume confirmare deorum prudentia}
\]
consuli rebus humanis, est enim profecto
divinatio, quae multis locis rebus temporibus
apparet cum in privatis tum maxime publicis:
multa cernunt haruspices multa augures
provident, multa oracles declarantur multa
vaticinationibus multa somniis multa portentis;
quibus cognitis multae saepe res (ex) hominum
sententia atque utilitatem partae, multa etiam
pericula depulsa sunt. haec igitur sive vis
sive ars sive natura ad scientiam rerum
futurarum homini profecto est nec ali cuiquam
a dis immortalibus data. (Nat. Deor. 2, 162-63)

These prophecies are employed by Lucan to enhance
artistically certain situations, and to set the mood he requires. A
large part of Book 1 deals with the rapid approach of Caesar
towards Rome, and Lucan mirrors the terror reigning there by
the artistic devices of the prodigies (523-83), the ill-omened sacri-
ifice of the seer Aruns (584-63), the prophecies of the astrologer
Nigidius Figulus (639-72), and finally the foretelling of the coming
disasters by a frenzied matron (673-95). It is in the mouth of
this last that Lucan places his own feelings regarding the Civil War—
that of its being the greatest horror yet to befall the Roman race,
and, in foretelling the death of Pompey lying as a headless corpse
on the sands of Egypt, he intimates that the evil will not stop
there, but will keep moving on—just as the matron makes another
circuit of the earth, this time to look upon Philippi, having started
at Pharsalia.

The matron is probably an artistic invention to carry the
vision of the future as Lucan intended to set it down in the rest of
the poem, and her words certainly are. As if to prove his point
in setting Fate up as the true governor of the universe, in the
lines immediately following the matron's frenzy, Lucan addresses
Jove:

... Cur hanc tibi, rector Olympi,
Sollicitis visum mortalibus addere curam,
Noscant venturas ut dira per omnia clades?

... sit caeca futuri
Mens hominum fati; licet sperare timenti.

(2. 4-6 and 14-15)

b) Devices to Point Out Contrasts and Similarities in Events

Another artistic device Lucan employs to point out the
events that led up to the present disaster is a "flashback," whereby
he presents a picture of the civil wars of Marius and Sulla, through
the reminiscences of an old man. The device is different, but the
purpose is the same: to underline the horrors of civil war, and
thereby to show how much more grisly than even that will be this
present war, this war that is plus quam civile. This passage has
already been mentioned (Chapter 2) in connection with the murder
of Marius Gratidianus. Here, just as the frenzied matron looked
forward to the disasters of civil war, this old man looks back,
once again to civil war. This perpetual and unremitting state of
civil war seems to have been the fate of Rome as Lucan saw her.

Hyperbole certainly raises its head in various places throughout
this speech, but one does not need to search all available sources
to come upon similar descriptions of the cruelty practised under Marius and Sulla. Lucan may well be within the bounds of historical truth, especially as it is mainly the emotions of the victims he describes in the passage, not so much actual occurrences, and it is unlikely that it is possible to exaggerate such emotions. The device of using the old man, who is described as an eyewitness, is a clever and effective one which carried its purpose well. Such men, who had heard these stories from fathers or grandfathers, must have abounded in Rome, and Lucan may well be paraphrasing the fireside reminiscences of some Roman about his grandfather. The passage smacks of an eyewitness account, especially lines 2.169-74:

Meque ipsum memini caesi deformia fratri
Ora rogo cupidum vetitisque iponeire flammis
Omnia Sullanae lustrasse cadavera pacis
Perque omnes truncos, cum qua cervice recisum
Conveniat, quaesisse, caput.

The lines also, in which the old man talks about tombs and wild beasts being filled with fugitives from Sulla's justice, have an air of originality about them that rarely comes from history books.

Following immediately after the old man's reminiscences comes the visit of Brutus to the house of Cato (2.234-325). There is no evidence to suggest that this consultation actually took place, nor is there any to the contrary. Assuming it to be another of Lucan's artistic devices, the purpose is clear—it is the introduction of the third major character (possibly the hero) of the Bellum
Civile, in which the reader is acquainted with the characters of Brutus and Cato, especially the latter, and the opportunity is grasped to present him as the true Stoic champion. The episode, in its capacity of artistic invention, provides a welcome scene of tranquillity, contemplation and quiet domestic life, after the unrelied carnage and evil portents of the previous passages. We are shown a Rome not yet ravaged by civil war, and the sentiments that its great men and peace-loving citizens hold concerning the approaching storm. The contrast between the honest but unresolved Brutus and the contemplative Cato to whom all alternatives must be explored before resorting to violence is clearly presented, as are the tenets they hold in common. The contrast between the egotism of Caesar and the generous Stoic cosmopolitanism of Cato are presented:

"[Cato] urbi pater est, urbique maritus" (2.388)

The episode of Marcia's return is added to an already perfect picture; the great man is not only brave and upright, but also loving and compassionate. As is the case with most of Lucan's artistic devices, this one is eminently successful in conveying the powerful forces set into motion by the civil war. Each one of these devices adds one more brick to the edifice Lucan has built to stand out tall from the rest of his epic, that of his avowed purpose: to depict the terribleness of this war, worse than civil, where the cause of Libertas fell on the plains of Pharsalia.
Brutus' speech is a beautiful example of the turbulent feelings the rivalry of Pompey and Caesar had aroused in the Republicans, and he echoes Lucan's own sentiments on the endangered Libertas:

Nunc neque Pompei Brutum neque Caesaris hostem,  
Post bellum victoris habes. (2.284-85)

He is to prove the verity of his statement later, on the Senate steps. Cato himself, in his answering speech, wishes that he alone could be the victim of war, and at the end of the speech reluctantly declares himself for Pompey, knowing that the latter is only the lesser of two evils:

... Quin publica signa ducemque 
Pompeium sequimur? nec, si fortuna favebit, 
Hunc quoque totius sibi ius promittere mundi 
Non bene conpertum est: ideo me milite vincat, 
Ne sibi vicesse putet. (2.319-23)

In a similar fashion Lucan makes use of the two dreams of Pompey, the first on board ship as he leaves Italy (3.1-45), and the second on the eve of Pharsalia (7.1-44). In the former, Julia appears, an outraged ghost, who paints a picture of the netherworld preparing to receive the countless dead of the civil war. As the daughter of Caesar and the former wife of Pompey, she had been one of the factors that kept the rivals from open warfare; her death dissolved one more tie between the leaders. She, in her own words, represents a time of joyful triumphs for Pompey, but now that he has embarked on civil war, there is to be no more
joy for him or for Rome. As with Cato, the episode of Julia harks back to the "good old days" that are no more, and predicts the downfall of Rome through civil war. There is the same purpose in Pompey's second dream, again in a strategic place in the poem, at a crossroads. The eve of Pharsalia finds Pompey dreaming in his tent about a time of peace, when he had come home victorious from war and celebrated his first triumph (Lucan is mistaken about the time). The setting is one of peace and celebration. Pompey is loved equally in "pura toga," the mark of a private citizen, and the ornamental one worn by a victorious general. The dream sets a sharp and beautiful contrast to what must come in the morning—carnage and defeat, and the end of the free, glorious days of the Republic.

This second dream, unlike the first, is recorded in Plutarch and Florus, but Plutarch is of the opinion that Pompey thought of the applause as relating to his coming victory at Pharsalia, rather than a flashback into the past, as in Lucan. The image of Pompey in his peace-time toga being applauded in the theatre is one that recurs in Lucan: in Book 1, where he compares the two leaders, he presents a similar picture:

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... Alter vergentibus annis
In senium longoque togae tranquillior usu
Dedidicit iam pace ducem, famaque petitor
Multa dare in volgus, totus popularibus auris
Inpelli, plausuque sui gaudere theatri.
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(1.129-33)
This picture of Pompey is the one Lucan makes use of in both cases to paint his former glory, now declined, and thus the imagery in the dream ought to be taken as a contrast to the coming disaster, not as a false omen presaging a victory. Plutarch mentions that in the same dream Pompey saw himself decorating the shrine of Venus Victrix with the trophies of battle. Venus being the patron goddess of the Julian house, and "Venus Victrix" the battle-cry of the Caesareans at Pharsalia, the message of the dream may well have been read by the anxious Pompey as ambiguous, both hopeful and presaging doom.

c) Miscellaneous Devices

The apotheosis of Pompey (9.1-18), while qualifying as an artistic device, serves a very important tactical function in the poem. Coming as it does immediately after the book dealing with the death of Pompey and his burial, this passage represents the transition between the two phases in the war for the preservation of Libertas, that of Pompey's leadership, and that of Lucan's champion, Cato. Pompey's soul, as a metaphor for the banner of the Republican cause, settles in the hearts of Brutus and Cato, thus openly nominating them as the new leaders of the cause—not now that of the Optimates but of Libertas, the only cause Cato will fight for. The death of a protagonist would probably be a jarring note in any epic, and it could prove difficult to continue the narrative for several more books in a smooth and flowing
fashion. Lucan effects the change of leaders with this deceptively easy device, thus ensuring that no discordant note creeps into his story. Cato, the new leader, delivers a truly Stoic eulogy of the fallen commander, and thus the transition is effected without the actual passing of Pompey from the epic. He is with us still, as a small but integral part of the greater whole: Cato. The cause is finally the right one—Cato fights for the good of all mankind; with him there is no danger of reaching out for despotism if victory is vouchsafed him, such as he feared from both Caesar and Pompey. The war has been removed from the plane of private quarrels, and transferred to the sphere of universal freedom against one man's tyranny.

The following passage, that of Cato's desert march, has been discussed in Chapter 3. It remains here to touch upon one small aspect of it, that of the episode involving Cato and a helmetful of water (9.498-510). The entire army is suffering from terrible thirst. Coming upon a scanty stream, a soldier collects the precious drops in a helmet, and as it is only enough for one, hands it to the general. Cato, with one of his magnificent gestures, rebukes the soldier for assuming that he would drink when the common soldiers have to go thirsty, dashes the helmet to the ground to the delight of the army, and in Lucan's usual apt, terse phraseology "suffecitque omnibus unda."
This scene is a particularly interesting one because of the questions it raises with regard to its originality. As a device, it once again turns the spotlight on Cato's dauntlessness. Whether it is merely an artistic device or a historical fact, the episode is too close to the well-known anecdote of Alexander the Great in the same situation for it to allow of coincidence. The anecdote would have appealed to Lucan's love of the spectacular, and would have suited his mental picture of Cato.

The possibilities are threefold:

a) the episode of Alexander must have been well-known (indeed it still is), and Cato, suddenly stumbling upon such an opportunity would hardly have wasted it. In this case, Lucan would certainly not fail to report it (or Livy, for that matter);

b) Lucan may simply have "borrowed" the episode (in his eyes such an exploit would be more natural coming from a Cato than an Alexander);

c) the episode may have been invented by Lucan altogether, or performed by Cato independently of the precedent, but knowing the anecdotal value of the latter, this last possibility seems unlikely.

In Book 6 (415-830) the scene with the Thessalian witch Erictho presents a problem. Sextus Pompey, "magno proles indigna parente," cannot, like a Stoic, wait calmly for what destiny has in store, but resolves to find out on his own. He does this not by
consulting the accepted oracles, but, being near the dread abodes of the Thessalian witches (Pompey has pitched camp, in readiness for the final battle, in Thessaly), visits one of them, the horribly picturesque Erictho. She brings a recently slain warrior to life (as Lucan would have us believe, there was an abundance of freshly slain corpses littering the plain of Thessaly, although no encounter had as yet taken place) and compels him to answer her questions. The terrible aspect of Erictho and the gruesome rites she employs take up the better part of 300 lines, the purpose of which is not clear, except as a vehicle for Lucan to demonstrate his encyclopaedic knowledge of strange lore. The fact that there is no visible reason why Lucan should have included this episode is little cause for wonder; digressions are an integral part of the entire poem. Four possible purposes present themselves:

1) Lucan wished to point to Sextus Pompey (who later became a pirate, though son to the pirate-conquering Pompey) as an unworthy element in the true cause;

2) Lucan, with his characteristic love of the bizarre and violent, wanted to include his store of wisdom relating to the witches of Thessaly;

3) Lucan may simply be trying to out-Virgil Virgil in the rendering of an underworld scene;

4) in order to include the passage (784-811) in which he calls the illustrious Roman dead to witness that the cause he (Lucan) has
espoused is the right one. He describes the noble, revered Roman shades as sad, and those who were known to have fomented revolt while they were alive, as exultant. Thus does he foretell the fate of the Optimates at Pharsalia, and sanctions their cause by presenting all those venerable names (familiar to all Romans) as being on the side of Pompey. Compare:

... Tristis felicibus umbris
Voltus erat: vidi Decios, natumque patremque
Lustrales bellis animas, flenteque Camillum
Et Curios, Sullam de te, Fortuna querentem,
Deplorat Libycis perituram Scipio terris
Infaustum subolem; maior Cartaginis hostis
Non servituri maeret Cato fata nepotis.
(784-92)

where those shades who, according to Lucan side with the Optimates, wear sorrowful miens, with:

Solum te, consul depulsis prime tyrannis,
Brute, pias inter gaudentem vidimus umbras.
(791-92)

where the sole "good" shade to rejoice is Brutus, knowing that it would be his descendant who was to assassinate Caesar: and finally with:

Abruptis Carilina minax fractisque catenis
Exultat Mariique truces nudique Cethegi;
Vidi ego laetantes, popularia nomina, Drusos
Legibus inmodicos ausosque ingentia Gracchos.
Aeternis chalybis nodis et carcere Ditis
Constrictae plauere manus, camposque piorum
Poscit turba nocens. (793-99)

This last possibility then is perhaps the salient purpose of the episode; a presentation of "omnes boni" as sad because they
know their cause is a losing one, and of the evil shades (it is interesting that Lucan has these in chains and fetters) as wildly exultant over the victory of their crony Caesar.

d) Speeches

Finally a device which is a familiar one in epic poetry and history as well is that of presenting speeches firsthand. About this practice Thucydides says:

In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.

Lucan's own speeches fit into this pattern without much conflict. He, too, improvised (in the case of Domitius' dying speech, extensively), but those improvisations are more or less what the occasion in question seems to have called for. The overall value of having speeches in history at all is summed up by M.I. Finley, in his introduction to the Penguin Thucydides of 1972:

... his main device is the speech. It was a device he employed with variety and artistry: sometimes he chose only one speech out of a number made at an assembly or conference ... sometimes an address to his troops by a commander before an engagement. The total impact is overwhelming. The reader is quite carried away; not only does he feel that he has seen the Peloponnesian War from the inside,
but he is certain that he knows exactly what the issues were, why things happened as they did. More than that, his understanding seems to come from the actors themselves, without the intervention of the historian, as it were.  

This, as already set down in the introduction to this paper, is Lucan's cardinal virtue; an overall understanding and presentation of issues that happened long ago, and the display of them in vivid colours which brings them into the realm of the reader of any age. To illustrate Lucan's speeches, two examples will serve, the speeches of Caesar (1.296-355) and Pompey (2.526-95) to their respective armies at the outset of the war. The two commanders are flesh-and-blood creatures in these speeches, with human weaknesses, hurling political invective at each other's reputations, and slyly weaving in propaganda to their troops, mainly in references to their wrongs and glorious deeds, and possible rewards.

Caesar refers (Lucan's knowledge of historical detail stands him in good stead again) to Pompey's entering office too early according to the Lex Annalis; his 5-year charge of the corn supply is made out to look like the cause of famine (which, traditionally, was mitigated by Pompey); Caesar touches upon the episode when Pompey's troops invaded the court-house where Milo was being tried; and finally his "apprenticeship" to Sulla is mentioned in its worst colours.

... suetus civilibus armis
Et docilis Sullam scelerum vicisse magistrum.
Utque ferae tigres numquam posuere furorem,
Quas nemore Hyrcano, Matrum dum lustra secuntur,  
Altus caesorum pavit cruer armentorum,  
Sic et Sullanum solito lambere ferrum  
Durat, Magne, sitis. (1.325-31)

The effect is very similar to two modern-day politicians campaigning by the familiar method of blackening each other's careers.

Caesar goes on to say that, if all this was not enough, he does not really want anything for himself, as long as his faithful soldiers may reap the well-merited rewards for their long years spent in the wars, rewards which Pompey would deny them:

... mihi si merces erepta laborum est,  
His saltum longi non cum duce praeemia belli  
Reddantur; miles sub quolibet iste triumphet,  
Conferet exsanguis quo se post bella senectus?  
Quae sedes erit emeritis? quae rura dabuntur,  
Quae noster veteranus arer? quae moenia fessis?  
An melius fient piratae; Magne, coloni?  
(1.340-46)

Pompey in turn is no less caustic: whatever justification Caesar could claim for his actions is ridden over roughshod by Pompey's description of Caesar's ravages down the length of Italy:

Nec magis hoc bellum est, quam quom Catilina paravit  
Arsuras in tecta faces sociusque furoris  
Lentulus exerite manus vaesana Cethegi.  
O rabies miseranda ducis! cum fata Camillis  
Te, Caesar, magnisque velint miscere Metellis,  
Ad Cinnas Mariisque venis. (2.541-46)

A most effective device is this, to complain not of one's real object, but of the greatest evil-doers within living memory, and deftly rank one's enemy among them. Both Caesar and Pompey make use of the rhetorical device of praeteritio that Cicero has
made his trademark: the "I will not mention the fact that . . . " followed by a lengthy elaboration on the theme. The overall result is that the reader feels present at these speeches, and can picture the panorama as if he were a part of it.

On the negative value of these speeches Finley, again on Thucydides, mentions:

The speeches are reproduced in direct discourse, and they are very much abridged—a perfectly legitimate procedure. But they are also, without exception, written in the language and style of Thucydides, and that begins to give the modern reader twinges of discomfort.

Lucan is certainly to be included in this criticism; his speeches all bear his mark. That, of course, is impossible to avoid, and the alternative is not to have the speeches at all, in which case the loss would presumably be greater. Finley quotes the example of Polybius, writing in the second century B.C., who:

... was very free with his criticism of predecessors who invented speeches and whose surviving work includes thirty-seven, a fair number of which he could not possibly have had accurate reports about, if any. Nor is it possible to examine the vast, unending discussions among modern scholars, who naturally raise different questions, stimulated by modern ideas of what is and what is not proper in historical writing.

He notes that the best he can do is to present the point of view he shares, and indicate some of the reasons for it.

Even if Lucan did invent the speeches he uses, he could always claim the precedent of Thucydides, Livy and Tacitus, to
name only the greatest and most conscientious of his fellow historians. They, in turn, may be exonerated by the fact that the speeches, although in the style of the reporter, express the sentiments and ideas of the historical characters who deliver them.
CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters I have attempted, by a point-by-point analysis, to examine the historical value of the Bellum Civile. I have concentrated mainly on its inaccuracies (in some cases proposing solutions for them), since to have dwelt on the bulk of the poem, which is historically accurate, would have produced a eulogy instead of a critical examination. But now it must be said in conclusion that, whatever its scattered faults may be, there remains an inner verity in Lucan's work which we can reach only by a profound acquaintance with the text and its spirit. H-I. Marrou has suggested how we may attain this:

Prenons alors Tacite: grâce au progrès de la documentation accumulée et exploitée par nos sciences auxiliaires, grâce aux monnaies, aux inscriptions, aux papyrus, nous pouvons aujourd'hui connaître Tibère, Claude ou Néron par bien d'autres voies que les Histoires ou les Annales et pourtant nous relisons toujours Tacite—j'entends bien en historien. Certes, ici également, nous percevons clairement ses limites, nous savons critiquer son témoignage, les déformations ou les sélections qu'il implique: c'est un représentant de l'aristocratie sénatoriale qui parle et, qui plus est (dans une certaine mesure), un parvenu: comme Saint-Simon, il 'en rajoute.' Nous sommes même en mesure, grâce aux Tables Claudiennes de Lyon, qui nous ont conservé le texte authentique de l'empereur Claude, de le surprendre en train de manipuler ses sources: J. Carcopino a
montré qu'il avait eu le texte original sous les yeux, mais il l'a entièrement refait, re-written!

Mais nous ne pouvons pas élaborder notre propre vision de Tibère, de Claude ou de Néron en nous privant de l'apport que représente Tacite, et il ne s'agit pas de la documentation supplémentaire qu'il peut nous procurer, mais, cette fois encore, de cette intelligibilité, de cette vérité humaine qu'il introduit, par son effort de pensée, dans son récit. Le dialogue, en quelque sorte, ne s'établit plus en tête à tête entre, disons, Tibère et le historien: Tacite se dresse entiers entre nous, figure noble, grave, parfois un peu guindée, et je l'entends répéter ses formules prestigieuses (**ruere in servitium, **ibatur in caedes) que j'admire, non certes pour leur seule magie verbale, mais en tant que leur splendeur est prémâante de vérité: c'est en un tel sens que l'oeuvre historique participe à l'éternité de l'oeuvre d'art, 'bien pour toujours, trésor impétrissable,' κηνμα αίτιο, selon le mot prophétique de Thucydide.1

The inner truth enshrined in Lucan's work arises from the fact that he lived near the events he described, separated from them by about the span of time which separates us from the war of 1914-18; that he had talked to men descended from the participants; and that he had in his bones a feeling for his civilization which even the greatest of historians today can sense only dimly. Only constant perusal of his text can enable us to glimpse what he saw. He was not an historian. He was a poet expressing in the only way he knew an experience which changed a whole way of life; he transmuted the civil war into a poetic vision, combining the ideal Rome which he envisaged with the actual Rome which he so tragically experienced.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


4 Ibid., Chapter 9, 1451b 1-8. See also B. L. Ullman, "History and Tragedy," TAPA 73 (1942), 25-57.

5 J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Liverpool: Duckworth, 1979). Balsdon refers to Seneca, ad Helv. 6.2f., saying: "Look at the crowds for whom, vast as Rome is, there is hardly sufficient housing accommodation... they have flooded in... from all over the world. And their motives in coming? A hope to get on in the world in some cases... in others self-indulgence in search of a good, rich opportunity for vicious living... Or they have brought something to sell, a beautiful body, or, perhaps, a beautiful voice. Rome offers high rewards for good qualities and bad alike; and so every sort of being has come here."


7 Horace Ars Poetica 9-10.


Chapter 1


5Heitland, op. cit., p. lxi: "... the well-known confusion between Philippi and Pharsalia, a blunder no doubt arising from the ambiguity of some lines of Virgil, into which many others fell beside Lucan."

6Lucan 3.301, 340, 561, 583, 697, 728; 5.53, 144.

7Pamela Barratt (ed.). M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis Liber V. Classical and Byzantine Monographs, vol. IV. (Amster-


Chapter 2


Chapter 3


2 Plutarch Cato Minor 56.4. and Strabo 17.3.20.

3 Madwig's emendation is clumsy, but nevertheless explains the meaning.


6 Ibid., p. 127.

7 The Periocha of Livy CXI has "Cicero in castris remansit, vir nihil minus quam ad bella natus," but castris here means the camp near Dyrrhachium. It is quite clear from Cicero's De Divinatione 1.68. that he was not in the town itself. Also see Plutarch Cicero 39, Cato Minor 55; and Cicero Ad Atticum XI.5.3.


9 Cicero Ad Fam. 7.3.2.
Chapter 4


4 Dilke, op. cit., pp. 32-33.


6 Cicero Ad Att. 9.3; 13.37; 13.48.


Chapter 5

1 Caesar B.C. 3.105.3-5.


3 Cicero De Natura Deorum 2.167.

4 Plutarch Pompey 68.2-3; and Florus 2.13.45.
5. Thucydides 1.22.1, Rex Warner (trans.), introduction by M.I. Finley, Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972). About this passage see A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 140: "τα διευρία cannot mean 'the ideal argument,' that is, what 'to the best of Thucydides' own judgement, the circumstances called for' (Forbes), for in that case '... he could not have kept closely to what was actually said, and would have had no difficulty in keeping as close as possible,' for once he had ascertained that there was a debate about Mytilene ... he could have gone to compose his own speeches." See also Ullman, op. cit., pp. 25-57.

6. Finley, introduction to the Penguin Thucydides, p. 25.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 27.

Conclusion

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