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The Influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Certain Prominent Educationalists in Georgian England

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A Thesis in the
Department of Education

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

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Abstract

The Influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Certain Prominent Educationalists in Georgian England.

Jeffrey Sworowski

This thesis examines the essential educational message in Rousseau's *Emile* and its influence on some writers on education in Georgian England. It explores the relationship of *Emile* to other works by the same author, most particularly to the *Social Contract* and *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*; and also to his *Considerations on the Government of Poland* and the sequel to *Emile* entitled *Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires*.

Five notable British writers of the generation immediately following Rousseau's are reviewed in order to identify the link between the philosophe and early nineteenth century educational ideas. These people are Richard and Maria Edgeworth, Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin and Robert Owen.

The thesis demonstrates that there is a central theme of social justice which pervades Rousseau's work. This manifests itself in *Emile* in the form of an attitude of decency to children which, despite the paradoxes of his educational doctrine, are retained by the educational writers and 'activists' of Georgian England as the important basis of their new education.
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In this lack of shielding, there is also no trace of Rousseau's concerns with books. Locke then, did not give Rousseau his concerns with the influences of the past, that aspect of Rousseau's philosophy emanates from his own 'glorification' of nature, and his views on the degeneration of society.

What Rousseau drew from Locke is what is described earlier as the first element of his 'freedom of the individual', the fact that children are born innocent. Other parts of Locke's teaching are accepted if they fall into the general fabric of Rousseau's structure, or rejected and sometimes adapted, if not. An example of adaptation is in play. Locke likes children to play, but not at the expense of their books. He at one point recommends over indulgence in play, to drive them back to the books as relief\(^ {136} \) (If he had post dated Rousseau, one could have cited it as Rousseauan manipulation). This would certainly not do for Rousseau, who wants children to waste time, with no further covert reasoning than that it is good for them. However, it is interesting, in a final comparison, to note in another letter from Locke to Clarke, in February 1688, that even a "gentleman's" education would be enhanced by learning a skill in handicrafts, with a strong advocation of "working in wood"\(^ {137} \). Rousseau obviously found this suggestion to his satisfaction as he adopted it

\(^ {136} \) Letter to Clarke, July 1687 in James L. Axtell, p379.

\(^ {137} \) James L. Axtell, p381.
without reservation for Emile.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whilst a major turning point in educational thinking, had his philosophical mentors, and in this respect John Locke was the most significant. He grew his philosophy of education out of Locke's original thinking, and credits him for it.

As was indicated earlier in this chapter, there are two ways of examining Rousseau and the English; one is to look at their influence on him, and the other is to see what he sent back, by return.

The English View of Rousseau

The English had the opportunity to view Rousseau at first hand, when he accepted David Hume's invitation to live there in 1766. As Saint-Lambert had quipped, however, his reputation had gone before him\(^{138}\). Even the King and Queen were eager to have a view of him when he accepted Mrs. Garrick's theatre box, opposite their's\(^ {139}\). He liked at that time to wear Armenian dress which tended to draw as much attention to him as his 'reputation'. Some were very supportive of Rousseau, and his plight. In particular David Hume gave him accommodation and sustenance, and the King ultimately gave him a pension. There were others, however, who harboured a much

\(^{138}\) Diderot letter to Sophie Volland, 20 December 1765, p152.

\(^{139}\) J.Y.T. Greig, Letter from David Hume to the Marquise de Barbentane, 16 February 1766.
less charitable view of the Genevan philosopher. The following conversation between Samuel Johnson and James Boswell, which is recorded as having taken place during the same month as the theatre visit, indicates a different view:

"BOSWELL. My dear Sir, you don't call Rousseau bad company. Do you really think him a bad man?
JOHNSON. Sir, if you are talking jestingly of this, I don't talk with you. If you mean to be serious, I think him one of the worst of men; a rascal who ought to be hunted out of society, as he has been. Three or four nations have expelled him; and it is a shame that he is protected in this country.
BOSWELL. I don't deny, Sir, but that his novel may, perhaps, do harm; but I cannot think that his intention was bad.
JOHNSON. Sir, that will not do. We cannot prove any man's intention to be bad. You may shoot a man through the head, and say you intended to miss him; but the Judge will order you to be hanged. An alleged want of intention, when evil is committed, will not be allowed in a court of justice. Rousseau, Sir, is a very bad man. I would sooner sign a sentence for his transportation, than that of any felon who has gone from the Old Bailey these many years..."\(^\text{140}\)

Rousseau's *Emile* had been translated into English by this time and was widely read. Despite some views, like Johnson's, to the contrary, there was a progressive element in English society which embraced Rousseau’s philosophy.

One such group was the Lunar Society which derived its name from its meeting schedule, which occurred on each full moon. The fourteen members of the society included some of the brightest minds of the new industrial age. Some were scientists, some manufacturers, and others educationalists.

All were willing to pool their minds on the subject of scientific advancement and its ramifications for society. Amongst their members were James Watt, inventor of steam engines, Josiah Wedgwood the successful pottery manufacturer, and Joseph Priestley, Erasmus Darwin, Thomas Day and Richard Edgeworth; men better known today for their interest in education. Brian Simon says of them,

"It was to the writings of the great French philosophes of the Enlightenment that they most eagerly turned and they also most enthusiastically acclaimed the works of Rousseau with their social and educational implications."\textsuperscript{141}

Two of the society, Edgeworth and Day, were to become significant enthusiasts for Rousseau's educational philosophy.

Thomas Day was totally enthralled by the \textit{Emile}, claiming that after the Bible it was the second book he would "wish to save"\textsuperscript{142}. He believed that it held the answer to the poor forms of education he saw around him. As a consequence he did two things; the first was quite strange, and the other most exemplary. The strange thing which he did was to decide to apply a Rousseauan type of education to two young orphan girls in the hope of raising one in suitable fashion to become his wife. He lived with them in a rural part of France, and raised some local consternation at the spectacle of a strange


Englishman living alone with young girls. The project was ultimately deemed a failure when neither lived up to Day's expectation which had been buoyed by the wonderful results claimed by Rousseau.

In his failure to achieve the great educational accomplishments of Emile's tutor, Thomas Day was not alone. Richard Edgeworth's failure with his own first son Dick is discussed in the next chapter. Also the notable politician Charles Fox, who was the leader of the opposition Whig party, is said to have had an education on "Rousseau-esque principles". As in the cases of Day and Edgeworth's pupils the exercise is not considered successful, despite his elevation to such a high position in political life. His "indulgent" upbringing is blamed for the fact that, "His vast talents were squandered almost as dramatically as his inheritance".143

The other (exemplary) thing which Thomas Day did, was to write his own novel, directed towards children, entitled Sandford and Merton. In it he was able to weave his case for a new form of schooling on Rousseauan principles, against what he saw as the poor schooling of the day, in such a way as to keep the story interesting for young readers. Day's book was extremely successful, being put onto the reading lists of many

schools well into the following century. Brian Simon says of Day’s work on Sandford and Merton,

"Instead of bowing to established values, accepting the prevailing social morality, men must find new ethical values to inform enlightened behaviour; this was Thomas Day’s message..." 144

Day then, not only recognized in Rousseau a new way of thinking about education, but he went out and did something, in writing his book, to facilitate its practical implementation.

Another influence which Rousseau had on the English comes out of the romanticism of his call to nature, which is reflected in popular literature; one such example is the poet Wordsworth. An article in Fraser’s Magazine in February 1880 claims,

"Wordsworth is Rousseau moralised, Christianised, and, as it were, transfigured by the light of imagination." 145

Whilst the poet may have agreed with Rousseau in principle, he also found the manipulative propensity of the latter a desertion of natural principles. This passage is said to be a reference by Wordsworth to the too close guidance which Rousseau gives to the child along the path of nature:

"Rarely, and with reluctance, would I stoop
By transitory themes; yet I rejoice,
And, by these thoughts admonish’d, must speak out

144 Brian Simon, p43.

Thanksgivings from my heart, that I was rear'd
Safe from an evil which these days have laid
Upon the children of the land, a pest
That might have dried me up, body and soul.
This verse is dedicated to Nature's self,
And things that teach as Nature teaches, then...

Here, of course, the poet is like the modern film critic, who is not obliged to demonstrate how it could have been done better. As with earlier notes on Charles Fourier, Wordsworth criticises whilst building on Rousseau's philosophy.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau had something to say to a broad section of English thought in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Social thinkers, educationalists, romantics, and even those of the rising technologies, had cause to reflect on what he had to say. Despite the fact that he has no recommendations for public education, and his method in Emile is distinctly singular in nature, even school proponents gave due deference to his philosophy.

Of course, in a time of transition, and with a lack of central direction in education, one can find a variety of educational schemes. Barnard summarises events thus,

"The 'homunculus' (child as an adult writ small) tradition died hard. There were many traces of it in the nineteenth century .... But in spite of this the movement inspired by Rousseau widened rapidly during the nineteenth century and eventually transformed the education of young children."

A scheme written by David Morice, in 1801, for the education

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147 H.C. Barnard, p253.
of children, is particularly lacking in anything which could be traced back to Rousseau's philosophy. The writer claims to have read the recent work on education by "Miss and Mr. Edgeworth", and "...found nothing in it that struck me so forcibly as to induce me to alter one line of my own,...". This statement would be grossly misread if it were to be taken to infer that the education prescribed by Mr. Morice had anything in common with that of the Edgeworths'. What he probably means is that he was so far apart from them in a philosophical sense, that he could not recognize their proposed improvements over what he puts forth. A paragraph which presents how far Morice is away from anything which could be described as Rousseauan is presented below:

"I consider it as the first preparatory duty that should be attended to: if they can teach their children to spell and read before they are sent to school, so much the better; but, at all events, let them be taught obedience, subordination, and respect for their instructors - let them be drilled into it both at home and at school. Subordination is very easily kept up in the army and the navy, and I do not see why it cannot be effectually done in schools, if the too fond papas and mammas would permit it."  

It is not a large step from here to the 'Academy' of Dotheboys Hall, run by the schoolmaster Wackford Squeers in Charles Dickens’ Nicholas Nickleby.

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148 David Morice, The Art of Teaching or Communicating Instruction, Examined, Methodized, and Facilitated, as well as applied to all the branches of Scholastic Education (London: Lackington, Allen, and Co., 1801), p5.

149 David Morice, p456.
A very different kind of school was created in Birmingham, inspired by the Lunar Society, called Hazelwood. Francis Horner wrote, after visiting the school in 1809,

"The remnant of the Lunar Society, and the fresh remembrance in others, of the remarkable men who composed it, are very interesting; the impression which they made is not yet worn out, but shows itself, to the second and third generations, in a spirit of scientific curiosity and free inquiry, which even yet makes some stand against the combined forces of Methodism, Toryism, and the love of gain."\(^{150}\)

Could anything be more to Rousseau's liking than "a spirit of scientific curiosity", "free inquiry" or a "stand against ... the love of gain"?

These are, of course, notions which can be rightly traced back to Rousseau through his influence on the Lunar Society. It should be noted, however, that Hazelwood's inspiration is credited to Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian philosophy\(^{151}\). Whilst undoubtedly Rousseau influenced him, Bentham's fundamental influence came from the adaptation of the philosophy of Emile presented by Helvétius.

In 1827 the school produced an anonymous work which described the way the institution functioned, and to some extent displayed the thinking behind the method. It is interesting to note that sixty five years after the publication of Emile, with the obvious growth of the


\(^{151}\) Brian Simon, p82.
philosophy in the hands of other educational thinkers in between, the author(s) look directly to Rousseau as a mentor. This is demonstrated in the following passage:

"We perfectly agree with Rousseau, that the severest evil which children suffer is the bondage which they endure. We also agree with him, that the restraints of necessity are more easily borne than those which are imposed by the will of others."^152

In fact, on occasion there is even note taken of deviations, in the following courteous fashion,

"...we join issue with Rousseau and the Edgeworths, though not without some trepidation: we should certainly feel more at ease in agreeing with them."^153

It is also interesting to note that the author(s) of this work find Rousseau's educational thinking synonymous with that of the Edgeworths. In fact, the Edgeworths' view of education is an outgrowth of Rousseau, but contained adaptations. In their time, however, they were obviously considered sufficiently close to be treated as one.

Two important maxims are taken directly from Rousseau. The first is the encouragement of self-instruction. Despite the method having been condemned as being impractical beyond individual tutoring, it is said here to be working in a system defined as being for the "instruction" of "large numbers". The book proclaims "it is better to learn than to


^153 Plans for the Government..., p302.
be taught"\textsuperscript{154}. The second of Rousseau's maxims which is respected by the Hazelwood school is the need for play, not only as a benefit to the body, but to the mind also. Besides extensive play-grounds, the school provided gymnastic apparatus and a swimming bath. They claim:

"...we have taken some pains to render the life of a schoolboy as happy in progress as it generally is in recollection;..."\textsuperscript{155}

Their total approach to education, as has been said, is not fully Rousseauan but is 'utilitarian'. This can be seen particularly in the following passage, where they justify their deviation from Rousseau's doctrine:

"The first object of education should be, we think, to render the after-life of the pupil most useful to society and most happy to himself; the next should be, to render the passing years of the pupil as happy as possible. Rousseau places the latter object first, because, he says, it is uncertain the pupil will ever live beyond the period of childhood; but we think, that if society takes (as it does) the trouble and expense of education upon itself, and if (as cannot be doubted) education is a valuable gift to the child, that then society has a fair claim upon the services of the future man; and that he ought to be so instructed as to render those services in the most effectual manner."\textsuperscript{156}

This is distinctly different from what Rousseau presents in Emile, but it can be seen as an adaptation of the philosophy, and the essentials of social justice are maintained.

\textsuperscript{154} Plans for the Government..., p6.
\textsuperscript{155} Plans for the Government..., p7.
\textsuperscript{156} Plans for the Government..., p293.
Rousseau's influence can be seen to have been retained to some degree in the writings of certain educationalists in the early nineteenth century. The thesis now goes on to look not at schools, but directly at five individuals who proclaimed an interest in education. They all published works which were to influence the English in the way they thought about education. It will be demonstrated that in each case, what they had to say was in some way influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's educational philosophy. In no case is his thinking exactly transferred into theirs, but his is a foundation work, which they adapt and build upon.
Chapter 7
Richard and Maria Edgeworth

That Richard Lovell Edgeworth opened his interest in education as a devout follower of Rousseau's doctrines cannot be doubted. He was so convinced of the value of the education which is designed for Emile that he dedicated himself to raising his first son in the same way. In the early years Edgeworth was enthusiastic about the results. In the Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth, he is said to have boasted that the boy possessed "all the virtues of a child bred in the hut of a savage, and all the knowledge of things which could be acquired by a boy bred in civilized society."\textsuperscript{157}. He was so proud of what he had achieved with young Dick that at eight years old he was put through the supreme test of being presented to Jean-Jacques Rousseau himself, for approval. Rousseau was not reported to have been as off-hand with Edgeworth as he was with others who similarly sought his approval, or searched for guidance when their efforts failed. However, he found Dick wanting\textsuperscript{158}. The boy was found by Rousseau to display an unacceptable nationalism in his observations. Things familiar were referred to as 'English', that is English horses or English carriages. Obviously Dick was not considered to need any of


\textsuperscript{158} Isabel C. Clarke, p21.
the national character training which is recommended in the
Considerations on the Government of Poland.

As the boy got older Edgeworth found himself inadequate
to the role of emulator of Emile's tutor. The father had too
many interests to dedicate his entire life to the education
of one boy, so he was dispatched to a school. The child
trained to freedom and learning by random experience was not
equipped for the discipline of a school, and he ultimately
left school for a life at sea, with Edgeworth's approval\textsuperscript{159}.
At that point he departed from the story of Richard
Edgeworth's life. He is understood to have settled down in
America when he left the navy, and never to have returned to
the family home in Edgeworthstown.

Richard Edgeworth's interest in education was not
diminished by his experience, but in the true spirit of
scientific endeavour, he grew somewhat from it. His own
family continued to be the chosen subject in a two way
educational study. He, and his wife Honora, during her
lifetime, performed a lengthy study of their children, and
at the same time, to a lesser degree than with Dick, tried
things out on them. It is said to be "...the first pioneer
child study of the age,..."\textsuperscript{160}. Apart from a large family
upon which to test his theories, and to observe, Richard
Edgeworth had a learned group, in the Lunar Society, among

\textsuperscript{159} Isabel C. Clarke, p24.

\textsuperscript{160} W.H.G. Arbytage, p30.
whom he could discuss his findings. He found receptive ears in the,

"...relatively small group of like-minded intellectuals ..." who "...illustrate the growing faith in education and its incipient appeal to social reform and a developing belief in human equality and the malleability of circumstances."\textsuperscript{161}

Edgeworth supplemented Rousseau's educational doctrine with real scientific observation. His results, unlike Rousseau's, had some credibility, rendering him capable of recognizing the practical from the desirable for education.

The first practical thing Richard Edgeworth did outside of his family activities was concerned with books. Unlike Rousseau, he found books a necessary aid to teaching, but considered that those which were available were not readily understandable to the child. His first concern was that books be attractive to children\textsuperscript{162}, believing that this would induce the child to learning. It can be speculated that this concept could likewise have been attractive to Rousseau. He was concerned not to clutter up the mind with things which the child could not understand, and with avoiding the opinions of others. However, the creation of a literature which they can understand goes part way to the ideal, and the complete ideal would have been impractical in a school


\textsuperscript{162} Marilyn Butler, Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p62.)
situation.

The first book was written jointly by Edgeworth and his wife Honora, titled *Harry and Lucy*, and was published in 1779. Its objective is said to have been to lay seeds in children's minds; to give them reactive situations which would induce emulation. Honora, however, died the following year, and ultimately the writing of children's books fell to his eldest daughter Maria. The father and daughter team continued to pursue the former's interest in education, culminating in their joint authorship of a significant treatise, in 1798, titled *Practical Education*. Said to be a "...key to progressive eighteenth-century educational thought,..." it outlines an educational system which lays great stress on the treatment of children as individuals demanding respect. Elizabeth Harden summarizes the extent of Rousseau's doctrine which exists in *Practical Education* in the following way:

"Edgeworth rejected the principle of natural virtue because it had failed in practice with his eldest son, Richard. But he retained in original of modified form many of Rousseau's theories."

She goes on to identify the elements of those retained theories as "the stress on self reliance" and experience, "preference for early private over public education",

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163 Marilyn Butler, p63.


165 Elizabeth Harden, p25.
"child-centred education" as the basis of "good society" and a stress on the mental development of children in stages.

That Rousseau's philosophy of education underlies the book is obvious from the way that attention is drawn to the points where the thinking of the Edgeworths diverge from his. At the beginning of the chapter entitled "On Truth", in fact, they give credit to both Rousseau and Locke in the following way:

"Rousseau's eloquence and Locke's reasoning have sufficiently reprobated, and it is to be hoped have exploded, the system of lecturing children upon morality; of giving them precepts and general maxims which they cannot apply. We shall not produce long quotations from books which are in everybody's hands." (Practical Education, Vol.I, p191.)

It is very similar in tone to Rousseau's words of credit to Locke.

The Edgeworths do not lightly throw out any element of Rousseau's philosophy. Instead, they generally counter his argument by a careful explanation of the processes which lead to their view, or they methodically discuss the relative methods employed. The best example is the way they refute Rousseau's maxim that education should occur by experience only. They begin,

"Rousseau advises, that children should be governed solely by the necessity of circumstances; but there are one and twenty excellent objections to this system, the first being that it is impossible: of this Rousseau must have been sensible..." (Practical Education, Vol.I, p177)

They proceed with an example of Rousseau's where events are
so orchestrated as to lead the child to 'learn' a particular thing from an encounter. For the experience to be valid, it is necessary that it appear natural. They reflect,

"This scene, as Rousseau observes, was admirably well performed; but what occasion could there be for so much contrivance and deceit? If his pupil had not been uncommonly deficient in penetration, he would soon have discovered his preceptor in some of his artifices; then adieu to both obedience and confidence."

The problem with Rousseau, according to the Edgeworths is that he has a mistaken notion of liberty, at least as he conceives it in the mind of the child. In the same way as their minds, according to his own doctrine, cannot cope with certain notions, that of liberty is beyond their understanding. They say, "...liberty is, with them, the liberty of doing certain specific things which they have found to be agreeable; liberty is not the general idea of pleasure, in doing whatever they WILL to do."

They explain that Rousseau's way can become a farce, benefitting neither the child, nor the parent or tutor. They support this assertion by what is claimed to have been an actual example from a family who tried to raise a child in accordance with Rousseau's doctrine. In the example, which has the father playing chess and the child removing one of the pieces, there is no possibility of orchestrating something on the spot to teach the child the error of his actions. Likewise, he should not be reprimanded, as nothing in his education has taught him that this is wrong. They, in
fact consider that this sort of situation will breakdown the resolve of the parents, in that when the situation is untenable, "...the power is entirely in their own hands, it is most probable that they will defend their own interests." There are probably some recollections of Dick behind these words. In summary, whilst believing themselves to have demonstrated the error of this aspect of Rousseau's work, they are quick to point out that it is this aspect alone to which their criticism refers. They summarize,

"We shall not, like many who have spoken of Rousseau, steal from him after having abused him; his remarks upon the absurd and tyrannical restraints which are continually imposed upon children by the folly of nurses and servants, or by the imprudent anxiety of parents and preceptors, are excellent; whenever Rousseau is in the right, his eloquence is irresistible. (Practical Education, Vol.I, p178)

Rousseau is also tackled 'head on' about the subject of representing ideas in words (p64), on the supposed cunning of women, which is described as "debasing" (p167) and the limitations of "experimental knowledge" (p457).

What is evident in the statement quoted above is that Richard and Maria Edgeworth could see beyond the contradictions and impracticalities of Rousseau. They saw that despite everything, what was important was the need for social justice in the young. His humanitarian message is what is important about Emile, and this aspect is completely retained in Practical Education. Whilst not being such strong proponents of the whole gamut of societal change as
were Godwin and Owen, the Edgeworths were laying important groundwork. Their closeness, through Lunar Society associates, to the motives which were changing society made them fully aware of the implications and potential perils of what was happening. Their humanitarian considerations for children would lay out the way for a general feeling of equality which would ultimately promote some sharing of the benefits of the new industrial wealth by all. Social justice cannot be retroactively applied to adults, it needs to be initially experienced in childhood, and carried forward as a natural view of life. In this way the Edgeworths presented the essence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s philosophy to children for them to carry forward into the new century.

If Jean-Jacques Rousseau had just been another thinker whose doctrines one of the authors had dabbled in a quarter of a century before, then there would have been no need to justify all of these deviations. What is clear is that *Practical Education*, to be considered as the "key to progressive eighteenth-century educational thought", had to address itself to the major source of ideas on the subject; and that source was Rousseau’s *Emile*. He is not the only educational thinker to be mentioned in the Edgeworth’s treatise, but he is not only the most common reference, he is the only one who warrants such detailed discussion. Rousseau then, was the foundation of the education which was presented by Richard and Maria Edgeworth to the new century.
It came in adapted form, and the changes were not detrimental to the central theme. Rousseau's plea for social justice through education is enhanced, if anything. Their changes lose none of his respect for childhood, and are more in tune with the societal needs of an industrial society which Rousseau could not have comprehended.

Maria Edgeworth, though having put considerable effort into their joint work on education, made her own reputation as a novelist. It is through this medium that one can in fact glean her feelings for the romanticism in Rousseau's beliefs in a return to nature, and interestingly for this thesis, on her attitude to the feminist stance of her contemporary, Mary Wollstonecraft. The particular novel to address is Belinda which she wrote immediately after the publication of Practical Education. C.H. Herford explains the roles of the leading players in the novel:

"Belinda herself, Miss Edgeworth's ideal, is a somewhat shadowy creation thrown into relief by three vigorous, if somewhat coarsely drawn, embodiments of what she disapproves. Lady Delacour is the frivolous woman of society; Harriet Preke, a burlesque vindicator of the rights, and scroller of the modesty, of women, marks where Miss Edgeworth parted company with Mary Wollstonecraft; Virginia, an artless maiden brought up in idyllic innocence in the New Forest, who cannot read and 'has never spoken to a man,' marks where she parts company with Rousseau."

The designated roles are not difficult to detect.

Lady Delacour could have been one of Rousseau's

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despised Parisian 'coquettes'. She is described as repairing her face with paint "...and her spirits with opium." (Belinda, p29). She claims that the reason she married her husband was because he was a fool and so, "I should find no trouble in governing him." (Belinda, p31). Then, as if to taunt Rousseau, Edgeworth has the Lady try breast feeding with one of her children, but give up because, "...after the novelty was over, I became heartily sick of the business;..." (Belinda, p36). If the coquette is visible in Lady Delacour, then the task of identifying Miss Freke with Mary Wollstonecraft is simpler. The choice of name is also a direct pointer to how the authoress of the novel viewed the well known feminist. How can one mistake the reference in the following quotation?

"'I hate slavery! Vive la liberté!' cried Mrs. Freke. 'I'm a champion of the Rights of Woman'" (Belinda, p222)

In order to ensure that nothing is lost in the subtlety of the story, Maria Edgeworth makes sure the reader recognizes the origins of the concept of Virginia. She has the hero, Clarence Hervey formulating a project to educate himself a Sophie after just reading the works of Rousseau (Belinda, p351). As one might expect, he comes across such a person, whom he later calls Virginia, living deep in isolation from society in the New Forest. He brings her to Windsor, and acquires a lady housekeeper/tutor for her sustenance and education. The young woman, however, does not
make the progress which Mr. Hervey hopes for. The lady tutor
exclaims,

"...I have done everything in my power, but when a
person comes to be sixteen or seventeen, it is up-
hill work." (Belinda, p363)

The consequence of this lack of education is presented as a
comparison between the Sophie of Rousseau's Emile and Maria
Edgeworth herself:

"In comparison with Belinda, Virginia appeared to
him but an insipid, though innocent child: the one
he found was his equal, the other his inferior;
the one he saw could be a companion, a friend to
him for life, the other would merely be his pupil,
or his plaything." (Belinda, p368)

Thus, without invoking any of the feminist rhetoric, Maria
Edgeworth lays out the problems of Sophie's education. In
fact, what is seen is the Sophie of the sequel, les
Solitaires; unable to sufficiently interest her husband,
Emile, to keep him home, but with an innocence which could
not resist the approach of another. The authoress used the
medium of the novel aptly, to say what she thought of
Rousseau's Sophie, in a way that a treatise on education
would not allow.
Chapter 8

Mary Wollstonecraft

It is not in the role of educationalist that Mary Wollstonecraft is discussed here; that was not her interest. Her first concern is for social justice; and, to the extent that she found it wanting in Rousseau’s Emile, she took upon herself the role of educational critic. The focus of her work, however, can be seen in the relationship of her two major works, A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). Both were pleas for social justice, the first on behalf of all mankind, and the second concentrating on the unequal treatment of women. Both works suffer, and benefit from their haste of preparation. The earlier work was fed to the printer page by page as she finished each one, and of the later one she said in a letter of the 3rd January 1792,

"I shall give the last sheet to the printer today; and, I am dissatisfied with myself for not having done justice to the subject - Do not suspect me of false modesty - I mean to say, that had I allowed myself more time I could have written a better book,..." (Vindication, p8 - Textual Introduction)

With more time her works might have been better literary pieces, but in their urgently applied form they display a feeling which might have been edited out in the period of reflection.

Edmund Burke, against whom A Vindication of the Rights of Men is directed, spent about a year composing and editing
his Reflections on the Revolution in France. What troubled
Mary Wollstonecraft, and the twenty or so other respondents,
was that, in speaking against the French Revolution Burke
found himself denying some of the liberties the English
believed themselves to have achieved in the Revolution of
1688. A fundamental concern echoed Locke's assertion that no
man has inherent rights over another. Wollstonecraft spells
it back to Burke in the following way,

"It is necessary to emphatically repeat, that
there are rights which men inherit at their birth,
as rational creatures, who were raised above the
brute creation by their improvable faculties; and
that, in receiving these, not from their
forefathers but, from God, prescription can never
undermine natural rights."\(^{167}\)

Many in England had been concerned that the freedoms
expected out of the 1688 Revolution had not fully
materialised. Now, in Burke's tirade against the Revolution
in France they saw further cause for concern. Objections
polarised among the Dissenters, of whom a leading figure was
Joseph Johnson, Wollstonecraft's (and, incidentally, the
Edgeworth's) publisher.

After proclaiming her concerns for mankind, it is
natural that a feminist should look to the specific case of
women. She was not the first to query why the fundamental

\(^{167}\) Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of
Men, in a letter to the right honourable Edmund Burke;
occaisioned by his reflections on the Revolution in France,
second edition, (London: J. Johnson, 1790) - reprint with
intro. by Eleanor Louise Nicholes (Gainesville: Scholars'
freedoms which came about in 1688, were only attributed to men. In 1706 Mary Astell wrote,

"If absolute sovereignty be not necessary in a State, how comes it to be so in a family?...Is it not then partial in men to the last degree to contend for and practice that arbitrary dominion in their families which they abhor and exclaim against in the State?...If all men are born free, how is it that all women are born slaves?"\textsuperscript{156}

In \textit{A Vindication of the Rights of Women} Wollstonecraft homes in on those restrictions which society applied to women, which deny their equal treatment with men. In the process she vents her anger on those who stand in the way of that equality, and reserves most for Jean-Jacques Rousseau; partly for his different, subservient, role for women, but more so for his lack of a better vision.

As one who appreciated the vision in Rousseau’s \textit{Emile}, the feminist writer is angry at the fact that it did not go further. She explains,

"...the nature of the poison points out the antidote; and had Rousseau mounted one step higher in his investigation, or could his eye have pierced through the foggy atmosphere, which he almost disdained to breathe, his active mind would have darted forward to contemplate the perfection of man in the establishment of true civilization, instead of taking his ferocious flight back to the night of sensual ignorance." (\textit{Vindication}, p53)

But, by the time her book was written, there was an acceptable general sense that Rousseau’s education in accordance with nature is unworkable. When Wollstonecraft

\textsuperscript{158} From Lawrence Stone, \textit{The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800} (Harmondsworth, 1979) quoted in J.C.D. Clarke, p85.
says that Rousseau's "...arguments in favour of a state of nature are plausible, but unfound" (Vindication, p44), she breaks no new ground. However, in her aspirations for what Rousseau could have done for women she was presenting her own thesis. It is aptly said that she was looking for "... a higher and more perfect civilization..."\textsuperscript{169}, and thus, feels betrayed by the same Rousseau, who, whilst having advanced the cause of individual freedoms, should also have considered all 'individuals', of both sexes.

Her call in Vindication is for the rights of man to apply to mankind, not to the male sex alone. She claims, in what appears as a play on Locke's words on fundamental freedoms, that,

"The rights of humanity have been thus confined to the male line from Adam downwards. Rousseau would carry his male aristocracy further,..." (Vindication, p191)

Jane Roland Martin reads into Wollstonecraft's work a "threelfold task". In so doing she relegates the rationale for extending the "rights of man" as being argued by Wollstonecraft on the basis that "women's domestic duties will not suffer."\textsuperscript{170}. Ms. Martin is looking too closely and finding multiple tasks; Vindication simply wants the rights of mankind for all, she does not have a multiple mandate.

\textsuperscript{169} Emma Rauschenbusch-Clough, A Study of Mary Wollstonecraft and the Rights of Woman (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1898), p90.

\textsuperscript{170} Jane Roland Martin, p76.
Wollstonecraft's unfortunate hurry to print leaves the text somewhat unstructured and unfocussed, and tends to lead the observer away from the essential message, into a 'spreadshot' of demands and observed inequalities.

She always remained a true disciple of Rousseau and his educational philosophy. As such, it appears to have accentuated her bitterness, in that she could immediately accept his humanitarian and societal values. She gained some of her fervour for Rousseau, according to the memoirs written by her husband, William Godwin, from Henry Fuseli, a Swiss acquaintance. She is said to have "...caught the infection of some of his faults."^{171} As Homer and Rousseau were favourites of Mr. Fuseli, so consequently they became Wollstonecraft's. There appears to be some resentment of the Swiss painter by Godwin in this passage,

"Smitten with Rousseau's conception of the perfectness of the savage state, and the essential abortiveness of all civilization, Mr. Fuseli looks at all our little attempts at improvement, with a spirit that borders too much upon contempt and indifference."^{172}

Contained in the passage is an inference, not only of Mr. Fuseli's enthusiasm for Rousseau, but of the fact that Mary Wollstonecraft was sharing it with him.

When she first read Rousseau's work on education

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^{172} William Godwin, Memoirs of the Author..., p88.
Wollstonecraft was particularly enthusiastic. She wrote to her sister,

"I am now reading Rousseau's 'Emile,' and love his paradoxes. He chooses a common capacity to educate, and gives as a reason that genius will educate itself. However, he rambles into that chimerical world in which I have too often wandered, and draws the usual conclusion that all is vanity and vexation of spirit."\(^{173}\)

The publication of *Vindication* did not dampen her enthusiasm for Rousseau in general, as the following passage about her four month old daughter attests. It was written around 1794, two years after her published attacks on Rousseau:

"Besides looking at me, there are three other things, which delight her - to ride in a coach, to look at a scarlet waistcoat, and hear loud music - yesterday at the fête she enjoyed the two latter; but to honour J.J. Rousseau, I intend to give her a sash,..."\(^{174}\)

Her blame of Rousseau, however, extends deeper than in the fact that he did nothing for women. She believed that what he had done in the infamous separate education for women had in fact worsened their situation. She claimed that educational writers from Rousseau to her own time had "...contributed to render women more artificial, weak characters, than they would otherwise have been;..." (*Vindication*, p59). The result was that women were "...educated like a fanciful kind of half


\(^{174}\) Margaret George, *One Woman's "Situation": A Study of Mary Wollstonecraft* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, [ ], p124.)
being..." (Vindication, p92)

With the cold clear light of two centuries between us, it is obvious that Mary Wollstonecraft was a beacon of social justice. It seems so logical now, but was not then, that firstly Locke's message of 1690 that all 'men' are equal is unquestionable, and that Wollstonecraft was right to deny Burke's retreat from that position; and secondly the term 'men' should be read as 'mankind'. As can be seen from the previous chapter, even contemporary women did not support her cause though. Maria Edgeworth found her freakish, seeing nothing inadequate in her own education, and restricting her criticism of Sophie's upbringing to a demonstration of its inadequacy. Wollstonecraft, however, was operating on a higher plane than Edgeworth. The latter was an accomplished novelist, but somewhat mechanistic in her work on education lacking the fervour for social justice. She can be accused of being somewhat Rousseauistic in her willingness to overlook the masculine prejudices of her day. Mary Wollstonecraft had no time for that.

Despite the obvious beneficial ramifications of what she had to say, Wollstonecraft's words fell on deaf ears, and she is only recently emerging as a subject of literary interest. The major cause of her disappearance was that those with the power to implement her requirements were not willing to listen. The second reason is that she did not articulate herself well enough. If she had, then her text
might have been central to the process of acquiring those liberties for women which she demanded. In fact, her work has appeared as a historical re-discovery, largely after the fact. The reason is that her works, whilst suitable criticisms of Burke and Rousseau, in turn, do not clearly state her own vision.

There is criticism, in the case of the later work, that Wollstonecraft simply got it wrong in the presentation of some of her 'evidence' against Rousseau. Professor Cumming claims that,

"At times she is over-anxious to pour scorn on his "ridiculous stories" and in her own "blind zeal" she misreads him."

175 Going on to present an example of her misunderstanding of one of Rousseau's stories. As if there were not adequate in Rousseau for feminist criticism, Cumming contends that she sees more than is really there, and that she fails to observe some of the beneficial aspects of *Emile*, like the emphasis on the complimentary aspects of the sexes in marriage

176 which does not accord with her master-slave interpretation.

What can be said for Mary Wollstonecraft was that she did recognize the link between social justice for women and


176 A. Cumming, p17.
education. Until such time as women were educated for equivalent status, then there could be no relative improvement in their social condition. For this reason, then, it was necessary in asserting the need for social justice for women, to draw attention to the shortcomings of the central text on education at the time; Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile. Despite her travels to France, and her extensive reading, Rousseau is the only philosopher she considers in Vindication, in any significant way. His importance for educational thinking was of such significance that, despite a general admiration for his work it was necessary to refute him in a grand style. Also, the stature of Rousseau was analogous to Burke before, guaranteeing attention when the publication ‘hit the streets’.
Chapter 9
William Godwin

That Jean-Jacques Rousseau was part of the intellectual framework of both Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin is evident in the way they even presume on him in their love letters. After an upset between them she threatens the following day to take the course of the "'solitary walker', and make her way in the world alone". The situation ends happily, with Godwin responding in romantic terms, pleading with her at one point, "Do not cast me off. Do not become again a solitary walker.". This occurred in 1796, four years after the publication of A Vindication of the Rights of Women and three years after Godwin had published Political Justice, his best known work. That Mary influenced Godwin to read Rousseau is suggested by some, including St. Clair, but it could only have been revision if he was listening. Godwin had undoubtedly read Rousseau extensively before this time, having borrowed much from Emile in his Account of the Seminary which was published in 1783.

It was, in fact, said that it was his readings of the French philosophes Rousseau, Helvétius and D’Holbach which caused Godwin to abandon his profession as a church minister, as it "...severely shook his faith in the

existence of God...". There were other influences, most notably the Lunar Society educationalist Joseph Priestly, in converting Godwin from Calvinism to,

"... the doctrines of Socinius, who denied the divinity of Christ and held that the soul of man was born pure - a belief that accorded with Godwin's later idea of the infant as a kind of "tabula rasa" on which experience writes its story.".

Whilst emanating indirectly from Locke, Godwin's 'tabula rasa' view of children's entry to life equates absolutely with the similar concept which is described in *Emile*.

Godwin's exit from a priestly career, along with his new found views on life, society and education, led him to try to employ his energies in the latter endeavour. In order to do that he proposed to operate his own establishment for twelve boys, beginning at an optimum age of ten years. In order to explain his venture he prepared a sort of prospectus under the full title of *An Account of the Seminary that will be opened on Monday the Fourth Day of August, at Epsom in Surrey, for the instruction of twelve pupils in the Greek, Latin, French, and English Languages.* If the title is long, so was the document considering it was a prospectus, which runs to fifty four pages. In it Godwin says little about curriculum or teaching method, but much

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about his philosophy of education. It was more abstract than one would expect a parent to want to read. Perhaps predictably, in retrospect, he attracted no pupils. His advertising method probably failed to link him up with the appropriate market. Nevertheless, the Account of the Seminary does put on record Godwin's 1783 philosophy of education in a form which he considered suitable for implementation.

Based on Godwin's words it is not too much to say that this was his attempt to present Rousseau's educational doctrine, modified by both his own (new found) philosophy and the needs of practicality. He explains his debt to Rousseau in the following way:

"Of the writers upon this interesting subject, he perhaps that has produced the most valuable treatise is Rousseau. If men of equal abilities have explored this ample field, I know of none, however, who have so thoroughly investigated the first principles of the science, or who have treated it so much at large. If he have indulged to a thousand agreeable visions, and wandered in the pursuit of many a specious paradox, he has however richly repaid us for this defect, by the profoundest researches, and the most solid discoveries. I have borrowed so many of my ideas from this admirable writer,..." (Account of the Seminary, p4)

It is also in this document that Godwin first puts into print his views on society and the link to education, which are much better developed a decade later. Even in a school prospectus, however, he deems it necessary to state early in

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181 George Woodcock, William Godwin..., p62.
the text the fundamental principle that,

"The state of society is incontestably artificial; the power of one man over another must be always derived from convention, or from conquest; by nature we are equal." (Account of the Seminary, p2)

Godwin, then, does not equate to the Edgeworths, for whom the study of education was a primary task. Godwin is, in fact, closer to Rousseau himself, in that his was an overall pursuit of social justice, of which education emerged as an important element. Rousseau began with an examination of the causes of inequality and looked on education as the means of correction. Whilst disregarding the 'causes' Godwin begins with the premise of universal equality and thereafter parallels Rousseau’s plea for social justice achieved through a new education.

When Political Justice was completed in 1793 it emerged as a complete treatise of what was needed to give equal rights to everyone. Education was not a discrete document, but a part of the integrated whole, and very essential to the credibility of the complete notion of justice for the individual. In his criticism of existing education he still echoed Rousseau, saying,

"Modern education not only corrupts the heart of our youth, by the rigid slavery to which it condemns them, it also undermines their reason, by the unintelligible jargon with which they are overwhelmed in the first instance,..." 182

He goes beyond Rousseau though, in a significant way, in

182 George Woodcock, William Godwin..., p23.
that he makes the link between the need of education in order to fulfil a proper role in society. He does it in saying that in order to obey the law, one must first be able to comprehend it:

"...the maxim that has prevailed in the majority of civilised countries, that ignorance of the law is no apology for the breach of it, is in the highest degree iniquitous; and that government cannot justly punish us for our crimes when committed unless it have forewarned us against their commission, which cannot be adequately done without something of the nature of public education."\(^{183}\)

It is a simple extension from this maxim, to say that in order to function within a democracy, that is, in order to decide on voting preference, one needs to be adequately educated. But, without even universal male suffrage at that time, Godwin obviously regarded the link to the law as being more immediately relevant.

Godwin and the Edgeworths parted company with Rousseau in some of the same aspects of his doctrine. He was much concerned that children should not be deceived. He required that the "...language of truth and reason..."\(^{184}\) be used with children, in an extension of his belief that only by "...honest men speaking honestly to one another can society


progress."\(^{185}\) Rousseau's overt manipulation of Emile is unacceptable to Godwin. He compares it to a "puppet-show" where the "master holds the wires" and the pupil dances unsuspectingly\(^{186}\).

In place of manipulation, Godwin substitutes a more socially acceptable variant. Children are seen as a "ductile and yielding substance"\(^{187}\) to be moulded to the requirements of society. Despite his best wishes for the social benefits of his idea, there is a sinister aspect of children being indoctrinated with what is thought best for them. Against his words that,

"To mould these pliant dispositions, upon which the happiness of multitudes may one day depend, must be infinitely important."\(^{188}\)

one can visualize a production line of children being indoctrinated in a way which may serve a particular view of societal happiness. There are echoes in these words of the totalitarian methods which have been used during this century. There is great potential in collecting the mass of children to be educated in the same manner, to use the opportunity to either incite or subdue them, whichever might


\(^{186}\) George Woodcock, William Godwin..., p131.


\(^{188}\) William Godwin, Political Justice, from George Woodcock, William Godwin..., p22.
best serve political interests.

To give Godwin credit where due, he did see the dangers inherent in what he proposed. Thus, in his call for public education, generally available, he saw a safeguard in the exclusion of government from the process. He accurately predicted the danger:

"...the project of national education ought uniformly to be discouraged on account of its obvious alliance with national government. This is an alliance of a more formidable nature than the old and much contested alliance of church and state. .... Government will not fail to employ it to strengthen its hands..."\(^{189}\)

However, what he was identifying is a problem which will never go away, regardless of who runs the education system. Be it a government body, religious group or an independently elected forum, their interpretation of happiness and societal needs will always be susceptible to bias. Although Godwin's sentiments were correct, excluding government from education is not the solution.

The moulding of children is more of a distortion of the 'natural' than Rousseau's manipulation, in that the latter can be seen as merely a guidance mechanism which does not change the child itself, in the way a mould does. Godwin argues differently, believing that somehow his method was more free than Rousseau's. He did share with Rousseau the fundamental belief in the goodness of nature, saying,

"The vices of youth spring not from nature, who is equally the kind and blameless mother of all her children; they derive from the defects of education." (Account of the Seminary, p52)

Thus, the corrective is that children can only be maintained in their state of goodness by the application of an education designed for the purpose; vice is derived from a bad educational process. In this regard Godwin echoes Helvétius's philosophy that the morality of man comes through his education. This is what leads Harold Silver to assert that Political Justice "...relies heavily on the kind of ideas Helvétius elaborated..."190

A similarity which Godwin shared with the Edgeworths is his rejection of Rousseau's antipathy for books. Godwin hoped to use fables as a means of imparting those messages which would be ultimately useful to the adult191. He saw in reading matter the potential for making education attractive to children, and thereby encouraging to progress. He said, "Books gratify and excite our curiosity in innumerable ways. They hurry us from point to point."192. In 1805 he went so far in parallel with the Edgeworths as to produce his own book of fables for children, titled Fables, Ancient and Modern. Rousseau spoke against the use of fables for

191 Margaret Fearn, p252.
children as he reasoned,

"All children are made to learn the fables of La Fontaine; and there is not a single one who understands them. If they were to understand them, that would be still worse, for the moral in them is so mixed and so disproportionate to their age that it would lead them more to vice than to virtue." (Emile, p113)

However, Rousseau is not intrinsically against fables, just against presenting anything to a child who is unable to appreciate it. It would, he believed, simply muddle his mind. Later in the book, as Emile is preparing to leave the childhood behind, and when his tutor believes him capable of understanding the messages, Rousseau says,

"...it is only men who get instruction from fables, and now is the time for Emile to begin." (Emile, p249)

As has been discussed earlier, Rousseau may well have welcomed the dedication of people like Godwin, Day, and the Edgeworths. They accepted his sentiment that children should not be subjected to information which they cannot absorb, and proceeded to tailor written works to suit their young audience. They ignore in the process Rousseau's concern with passing on the opinions of others, but even this can be contended, in that Rousseau was concerned with the 'rejection of the past'. These writers though, embraced his value of the natural, and could be said to be pointing children towards the complementary ideals of nature and social justice.

Godwin, as is noted above, has the same sort of all
round social objective as Rousseau, though tempered with his own derived perspective, and the passage of time which engenders some general reflection on what the Genevan had to say. Education, is thus presented as a means towards the achievement of improved social justice. To this end, it was Rousseau who gave him his early inspiration, and despite the influence of others, most notably Helvétius, it is the former's overall social message which conditions Godwin's total perspective. Like Rousseau, Godwin was more the philosopher than the practitioner. Writing in 1922, C.H. Herford compares Godwin with Jeremy Bentham:

"Godwin resembles Bentham in his coldness, in his repugnance of the violent methods of the Revolution, in his want of sympathetic imagination, in his rejection of theology, and in his blind contempt of the past. But Godwin's system still bore the marks of its origin in the glowing prophesies of Rousseau; with all its abstractness of manner, it belonged, and appealed, rather to literature than science."\(^{193}\)

There were in Rousseau two elements in the process of attainment of social justice; rejection of the past and the notion of individual freedom, which are emulated in totality in William Godwin.
Chapter 10

Robert Owen

Not all theorists of the era disagreed with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's rejection of early reading. Robert Owen, the eminently practical social philosopher, spoke as late as 1857 against the use of books by children under the age of ten years. Owen, however, is the least obvious student of Rousseau. There is no direct indication that Robert Owen actually read *Emile*, though he is viewed as exercising a philosophy "...in tune with such reformers as Rousseau, Helvétius and Pestalozzi...". Frank Podmore wrote of Robert Owen, in 1906,

"The general similarity of his ideas with those of Rousseau and of Rousseau's most prominent disciple, Pestalozzi, leave no room for doubt on this point. But the debt on Owen's part was probably unrecognised. There is no allusion to Rousseau in any of his writings; he no doubt drank in the Genevan prophet's ideas at second-hand."

Harold Silver judges the primary influence on Owen to have been Helvétius, with lesser credit being attributed to Rousseau, Godwin and Wollstonecraft. Silver supports the case for Owen's following of Helvétius with a quotation from

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197 Harold Silver, p11.
a speech he made, in 1812 in Glasgow, to welcome the educationalist Joseph Lancaster, in which he echoed the 'philosophe':

"Man becomes a wild ferocious savage, a cannibal, or a highly civilised and benevolent being, according to the circumstances in which he may be placed from his birth."\footnote{198}

It is noted that Owen tended to use the words 'education' and 'circumstance' interchangeably.

The connection to Helvétius is made by reference to the following passage from his \textit{Treatise on Man},

"Let me not be accused of denying the existence of good men: I know there are such, who tenderly sympathize in the miseries of their fellow-creatures: but the humanity of these is the effect of their education, not their nature. Had these men been born among the Iroquois, they would have adopted their barbarous customs."\footnote{199}

Helvétius thus contends that the "original goodness" of the savage is simply a condition of circumstance. To take one step back from this point, then, there does exist a fundamental difference of opinion between the two 'philosophes'. Rousseau's belief in the purity of the mind at birth is contended by Helvétius, who asserts that,

"In vain does M. Rousseau repeat incessantly that all men are good, and all the first movements of nature right. The necessity of laws proves the contrary. What does this necessity imply? That the different interests of men render them good or bad; and that the only method to form virtuous..."

\footnote{198} Harold Silver, p16.

citizens, is to unite the interest of the individual with that of the public."\textsuperscript{200}

The essential difference between the two is that Rousseau believes the human naturally inclines to goodness, whilst Helvétius considers that they can naturally be good or bad; goodness is the result of good teaching. Now, it is difficult to distinguish Robert Owen from either mentor, especially as he sees none and appears to believe that "Owenism" sprang only from himself. However, the following passage from his \textit{New View of Society} is considered pertinent:

"...man has always been instructed from infancy to believe impossibilities; he is still taught to pursue the same insane course, and the result still is misery. Let this source of wretchedness, this most lamentable of all errors, this scourge of the human race, be publicly exposed; and let those just principles be introduced, which prove themselves true by their uniform consistency and the evidence of our senses: hence insincerity, hatred, revenge, and even a wish to injure a fellow-creature, will ere long be unknown; and mental charity, heartfelt benevolence, and acts of kindness to one another, will be the distinguishing characteristics of human nature. (\textit{A New View of Society}, p116)

Owen's tone is that if appropriate education is devised, then evil "ere long will be unknown". There is an inference that it will no longer exist, not that it will be constrained or stamped out. Also, in his 1813 essays, he says,

"That man is born with a desire to obtain happiness, which desire is the primary cause of

\textsuperscript{200} M. Helvétius, p17.
all his actions, continues through life, and, in popular language, is called self interest.
That he is also born with the germs of animal propensities, or the desire to sustain, enjoy, and propagate life; and which desires, as they grow and develop themselves, are termed his natural inclinations.\textsuperscript{201}

Though he does not say that the child has no innate evil, there is certainly the tone that the human begins good, and later he explains that they remain so by the application of a good education. Thus, it is contended that Owen’s fundamental thinking is Rousseauist, but his method Helvetian. That is to say, that given the right conditions such that education will prevent the corruptions of society from having effect on the child, then the child will incline to the good. However, the tone of education, references to moulding and the belief that only by the right education can the child come out good, are distinctly Helvetian. At heart, therefore, Robert Owen was a Rousseauist Helvetian, but in his mind he was purely Owenist.

This is not to say that his educational thinking is overly attributable to either, just that there is a direct stream of Rousseau in the social justice which Owen was seeking, and it is not appropriate to stress one source over the other. It is highly likely that Owen developed his total view of social improvement, based on educational improvement, from Godwin, who is also likely the direct

\textsuperscript{201} Robert Owen, \textit{A New View of Society and Other Writings}, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1949), p54.
influence for his belief in moulding children (A New View of Society, p80). The strong theme in Rousseau of social justice through a rejection of the past, and individual freedoms are plainly visible in Owen as they were in Godwin. In that Helvétius, whilst influencing the latter two, himself reacts to Rousseau, then it can be said that the tree has its roots in Rousseau, and that the premature blooms were Owen, in the growth of social justice.

It is considered highly likely that Owen read Political Justice at the time of publication, in 1793, when he was working in Manchester. The influence of Godwin's work was so strong that Owen's writing is said to be strikingly similar, "...extending in some cases to the actual phrases employed,..."\textsuperscript{202}. In his autobiography, Owen claimed both Godwin and Maria Edgeworth as "friendly" to his views\textsuperscript{203}. In fact, with the former it went closer than that. On the 8th January 1813, they met for the first time, and continued in close liaison:

"On 20 January Owen called at Skinner Street, and during the following weeks Godwin and he saw each other every few days. By the time Owen left London at the beginning of April they had met over twenty times, and when he returned in May their friendship was at once resumed, with meetings whenever opportunity permitted."\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{202} Frank Podmore, p119.


\textsuperscript{204} William St. Clair, p349.
In that the first essay of *A New View of Society* was published in early 1813, and the second at the end of the same year, it is more than speculation to consider that Godwin exerted some influence on that work.

As was noted earlier, a particularly Rousseauist feature of Owen's work is his rejection of books in the early years of education. This feature is the more notable in that it is not pursued by other educational thinkers, even those who are easily identified with Rousseau's doctrines. There is a close resemblance between the rationale presented by Owen in *A New View of Society*, and that in *Emile*:

"In many schools, the children of the poor and labouring classes are never taught to understand what they read; the time therefore which is occupied in the mockery of instruction is lost;..."

"The books by which it is now the common custom to teach people to read, inform them of anything except that which they ought to be taught: hence the inconsistencies and follies of adults. It is full time that the system should be changed." (*A New View of Society*, ppl10/1)

He later explains his concern, that as children come to understand learning as being the commitment to memory of great amounts of facts which they do not understand, then the most accomplished scholar is not the one who can best rationalize a problem, but the one who can most easily reiterate just what has been read (*A New View of Society*, p136).

Another close analogy between Rousseau and Owen, is in
the latter's belief that children's lives should be enjoyable, and their education "natural and spontaneous"\(^{205}\), intended to render their education "a pleasure and delight to them." (\textit{A New View of Society}, p94). He was an original in his willingness to forego the cheap labour children constituted, by banning them from his factory below the age of ten years. It can be said that in establishing schools he freed up the mothers for his work force, but the cost of the infrastructure and staffing of schools would significantly outweigh the alternative labour. It is said that Owen took a very personal view of his schools. He spent much time in the Infant School at New Lanark, which he opened in 1816, personally choosing the teachers to convince himself of their fondness for children, and ensuring that they were not the types of people to use harsh words.\(^{206}\)

Despite his mistrust of books, he does ultimately drift from the impracticality of not using them, but was careful to search out those which were suitable for children. Frank Podmore notes that Owen found "Miss Edgeworth's" tales the most suitable\(^{207}\). An aspect of Rousseauist education which Owen does not pursue, surprisingly in a man of such practicality, is work for little hands. There is said to be


\(^{206}\) Frank Podmore, pp132/3.

\(^{207}\) Frank Podmore, p137.
"...no hint of painting or any kind of craft..." in his classrooms. Despite the fact that Owen was charitable enough to put money into the society he deemed appropriate, there may have been a mercenary reason for the lack of craft training. New Lanark was a one industry town, and the new machinery offset the requirement for craftsmen. The teaching of craft skills to children, along with their superior education, would likely have induced some of his future workforce to yearn for a different form of employment, away from Owen's New Lanark factory.

Owen might be likened to Richard Edgeworth in that he took his ideas and tested them; by the time of his publication of A New View of Society he claims to have been implementing his ideas for sixteen years. At the only recorded encounter between the two men Owen records that Edgeworth told the Archbishop of Armagh:

"I have read that man's works, and he has been in my brains and stolen my ideas."  

One can posit Owen as taking up the torch from Edgeworth. Edgeworth took off the sharp edges of Rousseau's Emile in his development of a practical system of education, which retained the essentially humanitarian aspects. With his personal dynamism, Owen created a society in microcosm, whose educational system could be judged as an outgrowth of

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208 Margaret Cole, p83.

the Edgeworths' Practical Education; Richard Edgeworth certainly appeared to believe so, as their meeting occurred after publication of A New View of Society, and his words infer that he had read it.

In one particular aspect, Owen would have disappointed Godwin, as he took the success of his mini society at New Lanark as the basis of a call for national schooling in Britain. Godwin looked for societal improvement through the individual, whilst Owen was an across the board 'socialist'. He went at it with a fervour normally expected in religious zealots, which he most certainly was not. Bantock describes it aptly, in saying that "...he had the truth and he announced it with unabashed forthrightness."210. His impact was such that it established him as a world figure, allowing him access not only to British leaders, but also to other national heads of state. Consequently, he has been called the most outstanding protagonist for popular education in the eighteenth century211.

Visitors to New Lanark were numerous, and without fail were extremely complimentary of what Owen had achieved. They included dignitaries like Lord Sidmouth, the Home Secretary, and foreigners of such stature as the Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia, who was to become Czar Nicholas I. Among the

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210 G.H. Bantock, "Diversified Innocent Amusement", p134.

professional attendees were the three Leeds Poor Law Guardians, who reported that,

"In the education of the children the thing that is most remarkable is the general spirit of kindness and affection which is shown towards them, and the entire absence of anything that is likely to give them bad habits, with the presence of whatever is calculated to give them good ones;..."\(^{212}\)

He had in fact, with size and other adaptations, replicated the education of *Emile*, on a social scale. New Lanark was sufficiently isolated to exclude the corruptions of the outside world. Thus, by an attitude of respect for all individuals, and a control of the educational process, which exposed children only to those things deemed appropriate to their 'improvement', he was able to demonstrate a happy and prosperous community, even after sixteen years, which largely lacked the common vices of the era. Frank Podmore quotes a D. H. Grey Macnab’s account of his visit to the New Lanark school in 1819, in which he analogizes what he saw with nature:

"The children and youth of this delightful colony are superior in point of conduct and character to all the children and youth I have ever seen. The maxim of our poet, that nature unadorned is most adorned, is recalled to the mind on being amongst these promising candidates for honour and happiness."\(^{213}\)

Podmore goes on to reflect on the analogy between Owen’s achievements in 1819, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s

\(^{212}\) Margaret Cole, p89.

\(^{213}\) Frank Podmore, p149.
educational philosophy. He refers to Macnab’s words:

"From this brief statement it is not difficult to infer that Owen’s inspiration, as already said, was derived mainly from Rousseau. A return to Nature has been the cry of all educational reformers. But Owen’s return to Nature, in the abolition of all rewards and punishments, and the replacement of these arbitrary incentives to virtue by a demonstration of the natural consequences of social and unsocial conduct, was more radical than that of any other social reformer save Rousseau."

As Podmore says, there was so much of Rousseau in what Owen did, so much more than of any other philosopher, that the search for basic inspiration points in that direction. Helvétius speaks here as well, but Owen’s belief in orchestrating his community such that it takes its lessons from nature and natural consequences goes beyond that philosophe. Even the Poor Law Guardians recognized the learning from ‘things’, and that by manipulation of the environment only the right things are there to be encountered.

Robert Owen was unusual for his age, especially as a mill owner, in that he did not believe workers were responsible for their vices, but considered them "innocent victims of circumstance". This view equates to Rousseau’s in that it assumes that there is no innate evil in people, and that all one needs do is to put them in a situation

\[214\] Frank Podmore, p150.

where the corruption of society will not reach them. In his later life, in fact, Owen became more Rousseauist, in that he began to look back in time for a more just, even utopian, society. He saw it in the agrarian life style of the English villages\textsuperscript{216} of the times before the industrial revolution. He even went so far as to establish a miniature agrarian society on the Wabash, in the American mid-west. Ironically however, Owen's backward glance took him to the sort of 'natural' environment which Rousseau would have retreated to in his day.

The uncredited alliance with Rousseau on the purity of the mind brought with it a philosophical burden which was to cause Owen as much pain as it had to the Genevan before him. The problem is that the lack of innate evil in mankind runs counter to the doctrines of the Church. He developed a belief in "true religion" which sounds so like the "natural religion" of the Savoyard Vicar; tending to a state called "the Millennium"\textsuperscript{217}. It did not deny the existence of God, but, (along with Moravians, Sandemanians and Antonomians) is described as "...exclusive pentecostal cells, emphasizing scriptural liberalism, personal conversion, and emotional, participatory worship."\textsuperscript{218}.

\textsuperscript{216} Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, p681.


Owen, became more sceptical, and was to consider religious influence negative and undesirable in his society. In the early days his concern had not been so much to remove religious influence, as to make it non-denominational. For that reason, whilst supporting both Lancaster and Bell in their efforts to establish monitory schooling, he did try unsuccessfully to influence the latter against his exclusively Church of England stance\(^{219}\). He saw the Church influence as acting contrary to the acquisition of an adequate education. In 1813 he sarcastically remarks,

"The establishment of the Reverend Dr. Bell’s system for initiating the children of the poor in all the tenets of the Church of England, is an attempt to ward off a little longer the yet dreaded period of a change from ignorance to reason; from misery to happiness." (A New View of Society, p139)

But, in his day the power of the Church was as great as it had been in Rousseau’s time. Manuel and Manuel explain his conflict thus:

"...Owen handicapped himself with his virulent anticlericalism, his refusal to countenance religious education in any way in his plan, and his essays on the formation of character that abolish original sin and denied moral accountability."\(^{220}\)

Unfortunately, it was Owen’s anti-religious sentiments which were to stand in the way of his further progress, in expanding what he had tried at New Lanark, onto a greater


\(^{220}\) Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, p681.
model. There are other factors which would indicate that the world was not yet ready for Robert Owen's 'view of society', but for a while they were listening. It was the religious aspect which turned them off. Speaking at the time, in 1844 (Owen lived to 1858 and remained 'active'), Parke Godwin said,

"Mr. Owen was, beyond all question, the most conspicuous and influential man in the world.

But while his popularity was at its flood, he ran foul of the breakers. Before this he had not developed his opinions on the subject of religion and politics, satisfying himself with a negative toleration of creeds and parties. His business had been to organize labor; he now undertook the criticism of church and state."

"Religion was regarded as too sacred an element of society to be rudely handled by any man, however great and good, and therefore his Noble and newspaper patrons withdrew their countenance. His persistence in his course soon rendered him as odious to public sentiment as he had before been agreeable."

Owen then, ran aground on the same rocks that had snared Rousseau. His was a premature bloom; he recognized the course to a new society, and tried it in practice and saw it work, but he was not to see it widely implemented because he could not overcome the forces of the past. Rousseau would have sympathised.

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Chapter 11

Conclusion

Emile is a large work, running to more than four hundred pages in the Allan Bloom translation. Rousseau took the time and space to develop fully his case for education, trying to ensure that his work was complete. He might have done as many others have, and taken education as addressing only those years of conventional schooling. That, however, would only suffice for one who was interested merely in the mechanics of how schools are to operate in order to generate a particular 'product'. Rousseau's educational scheme addresses the whole period of life from birth to early adulthood, because his interest is in the complete development of a person for their role in society and formal education is only a part of that process.

A look back at his earlier work, the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality puts into perspective his overall writing scheme. Rousseau sees the society in which he lived as unequal and thus socially unjust. He looks back to the savage human state to assert that there is no basic right for one human to have authority over others. Unfortunately though, whilst he saw human equality in the savage state, he made no provision for other than male equality in either his educational or his social treatise. However, despite Mary Wollstonecraft's wish that he had seen further, it has to be conceded that he did see further than most. It would take
another century and a half before the problem of female equality would begin to be properly addressed.

What Rousseau was correct about was that the current social structure was designed on the basis of self-preservation. Justice was intrinsically associated with wealth. Wealthy aristocrats and gentry, along with the Church, had a complete hold on society in such a way that they made the rules and naturally those same rules were biased in their favour. It is interesting to note however, that Rousseau was not a crusader for the really poor. The spectrum for him probably ran from rich nobles to poor gentry. The case of the really poor, particularly those on the land, he viewed with a kind of admiration likely considering them all the more advantaged than the rich due to their closeness to the savage state.

Despite contradictions in the way Rousseau presented his case, when he says that man is born free he does not qualify the statement. Hence, his philosophy has been taken to address all people though, as has just been observed he is less than universal in his understanding of equality. Thus, the message which comes out of his work is one of social justice for all.

His own contribution to the concept of social justice was through the publication of two books; the Social Contract and Emile. Each had a specific, yet related, role to play, the former setting out a society which would be
just to all members, and the latter identifying a training scheme for that society. The task for Emile is difficult. Rousseau had to consider how best to take a child, one like those he might see around about, and bring it to adulthood ready for a society which was not readily visible. Further, even after the prescribed education there was no prospect that the new society would be ready.

At this stage, one enters the world of 'if'. Rousseau takes a single child, isolates him from prevailing society, and comes up with a youth who would be eminently suitable for his new society, if it existed. Moreover, it could also be said that, if it were possible to raise a vast multitude of Emiles, then their education would suit them for the new society. Emile then is a utopian concept, and for that reason fails when subjected to the practicalities of life. It renders life down to the ideal case where one child receives the dedicated care of one tutor, for the duration of his active life to adulthood. Being handled in this way does not invalidate the story, it merely leads the reader to look for overall concepts, not specific instructions.

In Emile the overall message is one of social justice, not that all children should have dedicated tutors. In order to emphasize the message of social justice, Rousseau stresses two sub-messages. The first is to insist on rejecting the past. That rejection covers the whole spectrum from the 'Divine Right of Kings' down to the way children
are nursed by servants, or taught in schools. Particularly
dangerous are authority figures, in and out of school. They
achieved their eminent positions through the precepts of the
old society, and will work to maintain its structure. Thus,
children are to be protected from their 'opinions' which
will always tend towards maintaining existing social values.

The second sub-message of *Emile* concerns individual
freedom. For a new society to come about people have to
understand the concept of freedom. They have to be separated
from civil and religious obligations in order to look at
life with a truly open mind. The only way to do this is by
purifying the process by which knowledge is acquired.
Firstly children are accepted as being born without innate
ideas. Then they are educated in such a way as to learn
those things they need to know, as they encounter the
requirement to know them. In this way their minds are not
cluttered with things society wants them to have, only with
what they need to have. This is the essence of Rousseau's
'negative education'. Neither "virtue" nor "truth" are to be
taught to the child, he will simply be protected from error
by the elimination of the bias of others.

The most credible criticism of Rousseau's educational
philosophy concerns his inconsistency. For example, what
appears as a most commendable process of allowing the child
to learn only what he wants to is facilitated by covert
manipulation on the part of the tutor. The noble purpose is
seen by many to be achieved by sinister means. The other credible criticism is the feminist one, where Rousseau's 'vision' fails him. The less credible criticisms are religious. Rousseau's call was not for atheism, but for religion without the wealth and power of Church organizations. Further, the Church was diametrically opposed to viewing the child as born innocent. Thus the Church, despite its many commendable attributes, represents the old society based on the legitimacy of subservience. The doctrines of the Church do not equate with social justice.

The other unfounded criticism, which comes from many sources, is that of impracticality. Rousseau's educational utopia, however, was not for replication in a complete sense. Some facets of Emile's education are individually commendable. His preference for play and exercise, the recognition that doing things is better than imparted opinions and the underlying emphasis on enjoying childhood as a distinct life in itself, are examples. Emile though, is a novel and makes no claim to practicality. When Jean-Jacques shed his utopia for a practical guide to education in his Considerations on the Government of Poland, he retained his overall humanitarian concerns for children and a watered down 'negative education', but omitted the 'impractical' aspects of Emile.

What the Edgeworths did for English schooling was somewhat analogous to what Rousseau did for Poland. Their
situations were quite different though. Poland, as a nation was disappearing, whilst Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century was entering a period of significant industrial and economic growth. Thus the nationalistic rhetoric devised for Polish children was unnecessary in the British case. It can be said, however, that the Edgeworths and Rousseau filtered the *Emile* in order to appropriately adapt it to the case in hand.

Richard Edgeworth may well have pursued his interest in education by reading many writers on the subject. None however, can doubt that he was in his early intellectual career a devout Rousseauist. Having not only raised his own boy as an *Emile*, he even went so far as to have the product personally examined by the originator of the doctrine. Over the years though, he was well positioned to review the validity of his earlier views. Besides his practical experiment, along with his wife Honora, and later his daughter Maria, he was to study the education of his many children, and analyze the results in a scientific manner.

In his analysis of what he found, Edgeworth's membership of the Lunar Society was fortunate. These men of science and industry had a particular interest in education. The society constituted an ideal forum at which his findings could be discussed. Thus the Edgeworths' *Practical Education* can be said to have a Rousseauist philosophy, supported by practical experiment and supplemented by the opinions of the
most successful industrial and scientific minds in the country. It is difficult to perceive how one might have devised a better process for developing a tract on education at that time.

What survived the decades of experimentation and assessment was the social justice in Rousseau’s work. Richard and Maria Edgeworth sidestepped the contradictions and impracticalities of *Emile*, but retained its belief that children have a life to live, in itself. Their own publication remains true to children’s happiness, despite the fact that they are inclined to train them for their future adult roles. In this way they somewhat compromise with Rousseau. He wanted children to live a happy life which only concerned the present, while the Edgeworths believed that pupils could prepare for their adult roles in an enjoyable way. Neither had a role for severe punishment, preferring that children somehow suffer the consequences of their errors. In this, and many other ways, they supported the notion that for the evolving society, education would need to reject past methods. They did not subscribe to the isolation which Rousseau’s utopian format required, but they did see that what was needed was more than a new doctrine for the old structure.

Richard and Maria Edgeworth’s *Practical Education* became somewhat of a standard text on education in its era. No other publication could be considered credible if it did
not reference their earlier work, even if only to explain deviations. They brought to the new century the education for a new society, and in their baggage was the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau appropriately filtered.

Mary Wollstonecraft was not the careful scholar of the type of Richard Edgeworth. Instead of decades of experimentation and analysis, she rushed off her criticism of Rousseau's *Emile* within weeks of starting, admitting at the time that she could have done a better job if only she had taken more time. She was of the same era however, and represents a distinctly different perspective on the Genevan philosopher. As with the Edgeworths she was accustomed to travelling in France, and understood the society of Rousseau's day, and the Revolution which was displacing it. She never stopped being a disciple of Rousseau, commending him to Godwin (to whom such commendation was redundant) several years after publication of *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*.

Wollstonecraft was not a true educationalist. What she saw in Rousseau was his plea for social justice and she could not help allowing her disappointment at his exclusion of women from turning to anger. She might be said to have been perplexed that one who so accurately identified the extent of the evils of his society should have ignored the most significant one. Mary Wollstonecraft then, had more to say about who should be taught than how it should happen.
Her husband of only a year, William Godwin, was more analogous to Rousseau in his concerns for society, and for the relationship education has with it.

The focus of Godwin's life changed. From being a priest, to an atheist, to a social philosopher to a book seller, he changed his stance. His best known work was Political Justice. It represents the most complete development of his thoughts on society and its most desirable course of development. In his earlier days, soon after giving up on the priesthood, Godwin looked to teaching as a potential profession. Despite its failure it does identify Godwin's educational thinking, at that time, as being based on a deep respect for the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Thus, despite his obvious acceptance of other philosophical mentors, like Helvétius in particular, Rousseau conditioned his philosophy. Also, the way that Godwin connects education to societal improvement in Political Justice accords with the inter-relationship of Emile and the Social Contract, and is again similar in outline to Rousseau's Polish text.

What can be said with certainty about Richard Edgeworth, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin, is that at some phase in their life they were disciples of Rousseau's educational philosophy. Documentation exists to confirm the link, and in each case it is evident that to some degree their own pursuit of social justice owes
somewhat of a debt to the original thinking of the philosopher from Geneva. Such a firm and obvious link cannot be made to Robert Owen. In fact, in traceable and documented form Owen appears to credit his social philosophy only to Owen, almost as if all of his thoughts originated only from him.

There is however, circumstantial evidence to support the case for his having been well supported in developing his own philosophy. He is believed to have widely read the 'philosophes' and Godwin's *Political Justice*. He is certainly documented as having confided extensively in Godwin at the time he was preparing his *New View of Society* essays. And further, if he did not acknowledge any debt to Richard Edgeworth in formulating his thoughts, the former certainly recognized similarities. Later writers do not dispute the origins of Robert Owen's social, and related educational, philosophy in the ideas of the eighteenth century French philosophes. Ironically, the dispute over which is most influential centres around two Genevans, Helvétius and Rousseau.

Examples can be sought out of Owen's work to answer the question of who was the greatest influence with opposing results. What has to be pointed out, however, is that the major educational work from Helvétius, his *Treatise on Man*, is largely a critique of *Emile*. As such then, it does what the Edgeworths also did in dealing with the contradictions
and impracticalities of Rousseau's work. Thus, giving credit to Helvétius in effect, credits Rousseau for the basic text.

This argument is only partially satisfactory in that some aspects of what Helvétius had to say were so different from Rousseau's philosophy. When Jean-Jacques says "All men are born free" he later explains that freedom as being not only a freedom from subservience, but a freedom from any mental debt at birth. The belief that humans can be 'moulded' through education is attributed to Helvétius and does not accord with Rousseau's doctrine. He believes that humans will incline to good ways, and thus should only be shielded from the bad ones in childhood. Helvétius, however, sees education as imposing whatever 'shape' the educator requires, and that goodness will only occur if the proper influence is exerted.

In the case of Robert Owen it can be demonstrated that he accepts the notion of education as moulding children. In accepting this notion, he does not lose his faith in children themselves. It is also demonstrated that in accepting the child's mind as devoid of innate ideas at birth, he is apt to believe as Rousseau does, that the child will incline to happiness and goodness.

This does not mean to say that he is more Rousseauist than Helvétian. For the purposes of this thesis it suffices to say that it establishes a debt from Owen to Rousseau. Owen's message of social justice is most significant as it
was carried into practical implementation. It rejected past society and extolled the virtues of freedom and equality. It set a firm example to a world which, if it was looking, did not care to know at that time. One might go so far as to say that it was Rousseau's design adapted and issued in prototype.

British society and education still had a long way to go, but it was on its way. When people began to envisage social justice it was the first step in the process of making it happen. During the century after Owen children would be completely excluded from industry, and schools would accord them a reasonable and humane education. Universal suffrage would occur, despite having to happen in stages, and society would in turn become more just. In having inspired the work of such prominent writers, in particular William Godwin and Robert Owen, Jean-Jacques Rousseau can be said to have significantly influenced the trend towards social justice in Georgian England.
Appendix I

The 'Philosophes'

The 'philosophes' were a loosely connected group of luminary thinkers of the mid-eighteenth century who saw that the structure of society was not only incorrect, but unjustifiable, and must change. Barnard quotes from Condorcet to support his description of them,

"Wherever they looked they saw a spirit of intolerance and against this they made a determined attack. "They lifted up their voice," says Condorcet, "against all the crimes of fanaticism and tyranny; withstanding in religion, in political government, in morals, in legislation, whatever bore the character of oppression or harshness or barbarism... Their war-cry was reason, toleration, humanity." They included in their ranks writers and thinkers of the highest genius - Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Helvétius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and many another ...."222

Whilst none called for violence, they have been credited with inspiring the French Revolution, referred to by Victor Hugo as "...that blessed and superb catastrophe...". He was speaking in Paris at a celebration of the 100th anniversary of Voltaire's death, on the 30th May 1878. He went on to claim that behind Danton, there was Diderot, behind Robespierre, Rousseau, and that behind Mirabeau there was Voltaire223. Their calls for justice were taken up by violent means after their time.

While most of the philosophes remained on cordial terms

222 H.C. Barnard, p221.
223 Victor Thaddeus, p279.
with one another, with only the occasional outburst of intellectual bickering, only one had such bitter disputes that he stands apart from the rest. This one was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and his standing apart was both intellectual and physical. Despite having worked closely with the group, particularly with Diderot on the Encyclopédie, Rousseau grew apart. He particularly rejected the patronizing leadership role which Voltaire assumed. The latter was wealthy, and Rousseau poor. Both were fond of their own condition, and despised the other. Voltaire is quoted as having referred to an aspect of Rousseau's *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* as "...the philosophy of a beggar who would have the rich robbed by the poor."\(^{224}\). Rousseau's most bitter disputes were with Voltaire. The English philosopher David Hume was warned about Rousseau as he prepared to escort him out of France to his 'exile' in England. He said,

"The philosophers of Paris foretold me that I could not conduct him to Calais without a Quarrel, but I think I could live with him all my Life, in mutual Friendship and Esteem."\(^{225}\)

Hume would live to regret those latter words. Rousseau did not maintain any friendships for long, and none survived with those who were his intellectual equals.

Rousseau's separation from the group was deeper than


his anti-social behaviour. Whilst all the philosophes wanted societal change, Jean-Jacques felt so strongly about the need that he was to shun the conventions of his own society. Ernst Cassirer explains his different concern, by reference to Diderot and Voltaire,

"His ethical and political ideal does not pursue, as does that of Voltaire and Diderot, pure utilitarian goals. He did not inquire into happiness and utility; he was concerned with the dignity of man and with the means of securing and realizing it."\(^{226}\)

Rousseau is part of the Enlightenment, but walks his own, very individual path.

**Voltaire**

Rousseau reserved his greatest animosity for Voltaire, perhaps because he was viewed as the "high priest"\(^{227}\) of the philosophes. Voltaire had even more elevated views of his status. William Kessen writes, "When Voltaire wrote that Rousseau might have been Paul if he hadn’t better liked being Judas, we can guess who Voltaire was casting as Jesus."\(^{228}\). Rousseau’s belief in the ‘natural’ led to a consequent regard for wealth as ‘unnatural’. And, whilst Jean-Jacques had no wealth and tended to prefer a hermit-

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\(^{226}\) Ernst Cassirer, p71.


\(^{228}\) Voltaire’s original remark is in a letter to Damilaville, written shortly after the publication of *Emile*. Quotation here from, William Kessen, "Rousseau’s Children", *Daedalus*, Vol. 107, No. 3, Summer 1978, p164.
like existence, Voltaire was rich, and preferred the haunts, and adulation, of high society. One writer articulated their difference well in saying,

"For Rousseau the deliverance of man from corrupt society required an uncompromising integrity of purpose that could only be sustained if all the Voltairean mask of pretence, subterfuge and deception were first removed from one's character." 229

It was as much a rejection of Voltaire, as of society in general, which drove Jean-Jacques to his personal and philosophical retreat to nature. From beginning with an ambition on Rousseau's part to be able to measure up to Voltaire's ability as a writer 230, their regard for each other degenerated continuously. It is said that "...the ability to turn very nasty was the only thing they had in common." 231. They were certainly willing to readily put their disregard, each for the other, into print. In his Confessions Rousseau says of Voltaire that he believes in the Devil, and "...only takes pleasure in doing harm". He persists with his attack, obviously considering himself aptly qualified to be an arbiter on the causes of evil, saying of Voltaire,

"...it is particularly revolting in a man loaded


230 Lester G. Crocker, ...: The Quest, p96.

with every kind of blessing who, living in the lap of luxury, seeks to disillusion his fellow-men by a frightening and cruel picture of all the calamities from which he is himself exempt. I who had a better right to count up and weigh the evils of human life, examined them impartially and proved to him that there was not one of all those evils that could not be blamed on Providence, not one that has not its source rather in the misuse that man has made of his faculties than in Nature herself." (Confessions, p399)

An earlier attack by Voltaire, in 1766, was more personal:

"Look at Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He drags around with him the beautiful Mademoiselle LeVasseur, his laundress, fifty years old, to whom he has given three children, whom he abandoned in order to devote himself to the education of Lord Emile, in order to make a good carpenter out of him."232

Their mutual dislike does seem to have been their greatest point of commonality.

On social progress they are seen as having distinctly differing views233. Voltaire looked at the 'dark ages', and contrasted the terrible oppression of the middle ages with improvements to their time. Rousseau's view was the converse, he saw only the degeneration of society. While Voltaire wanted to continue the current trend of social progress, Rousseau wanted to halt what he saw as a process of degeneration. The inference is that they looked in opposite directions. In fact they were both looking the same way, forward. Rousseau's vision of the way to social justice was less smug, and altogether more practical than

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232 Lester G. Crocker, ...The Quest, pp179/180.

233 Joseph Featherstone, p182.
Voltaire's. He had less baggage to carry. Rousseau had nothing to leave behind when he set off on his solitary road, and his exposure to a class of people below the aristocrat level facilitated a deeper examination of, and for, the aforementioned "dignity of man". Voltaire's place on the pedestal limited his ability to put together an all-embracing concept of social justice. Geoffrey Brereton describes him as "superficial", proceeding to explain that, "...in the field of ideas it would leave him far behind his more muddled but fertile near contemporaries Diderot and Rousseau."\(^{234}\)

In principle, however, both were humanitarian, and both wanted what U.S. President George Bush was to refer to as a 'kinder, gentler society'. Although there is similarity in some of their writings, though from a different perspective, on the subject of education they had no interface. Voltaire did not produce a work of consequence, so their only point of contact in this area involved Voltaire's insults, like the last quotation, on Rousseau's educational treatise.

**Diderot**

Voltaire had always been somewhat distant from Rousseau. In the early years Jean-Jacques wanted to emulate Voltaire, but as the former's stature as a philosopher grew

the two became remote. Rousseau’s relationship with Diderot, however, was quite different, and for many years they maintained a closeness based on the similarity of their intellectual development. Whilst their rapport began with their work together, it continued in their philosophy beyond their later acrimony. Diderot did take an active interest in education, producing his own works on the subject, the best rationalized being his Plan for a University for Russia, which had been commissioned for the Empress Catherine (the Great). It was intended as a practical guide to the establishment of an educational system for Russia, and was not, as the title indicates, a design for one academic institution. Catherine, however, found it too ambitious, and rejected it as impractical for Russia at that stage of its development. Although it may have appeared as somewhat of a failure in his lifetime, this work is credited as being the basis of the national education system established in France in 1808, by Napoleon Bonaparte.\(^{235}\)

Unlike Rousseau’s Emile, Diderot’s Plan for a University for Russia goes beyond the philosophical to the practical. It afforded Diderot the opportunity to propose national education, extended to all, not merely down to the ‘poor nobles’ as Rousseau proposes for Poland. Diderot answers his rhetorical question, "Qu’est-ce qu’une

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université?" with,

"Une université est une école dont la porte
est ouverte indistinctement à tous les enfants
d'une nation et où des maîtres stipendiés par
l'État les initient à la connaissance élémentaires
de toutes les sciences.

Je dis indistinctement, parce qu'il serait
aussi cruel qu'absurde de condamner à l'ignorance
les contitions subalternes de la société." ²³⁶

The treatise favours vocational over liberal education, with
Crocker going so far as to credit Diderot as the "...first
to envisage the importance of technical studies..."²³⁷.

Whilst different in nature from Emile, Diderot's Russian
work is analogous to the educational aspects of
Considerations on the Government of Poland, but goes into
more detail on the subject. Both works were written at a
similar time.

There are more similarities between Diderot and
Rousseau than these two works. He appears to be describing
Rousseau's pupil Emile, in a recommendation to Sophie
Volland:

"Do not over educate is a maxim particularly
suited to boys. You should abandon them a little
to their natural impulses. I prefer them to be
rough, thoughtless and wilful. I like a tousled
head better than a neatly combed one. Let them
have the sort of appearance that suits them. If in
their foolish behaviour I see some originality I

²³⁶ Denis Diderot, "Plan d'une Université pour le
Gouvernement de Russie" Oeuvres Complètes de Diderot (Paris:
Garnier Frères, 1875), reprinted (Nendeln, Liechtenstein:
Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1966), p433.

²³⁷ Lester G. Crocker, The Embattled Philosopher: A
Biography of Denis Diderot (Michigan State College Press,
1954), p392.
am satisfied. To my mind one of our unlicked provincial bear-cubs is worth a hundred of your little well-trained spaniels."  

Philosophically Diderot and Rousseau are on the same 'wave length'. Also, Diderot's words on nature and freedom echo Rousseau (or vice versa, depending on one's perspective). In the early pages of the Encyclopédie he writes,

"No man has received from nature the right to command over other men. Freedom is a present from heaven, and every individual of the same species has the right to enjoy it as soon as he enjoys reason."  

This work, of which the first parts were published in 1759, received a similar hostile response as did Rousseau's Emile when published in 1762. It is interesting to compare this quotation with the opening to the Social Contract:

"Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. Those who think themselves the masters of others are indeed greater slaves than they. How did this transformation come about? I do not know." (Social Contract, p49)

A further similarity can be observed in Diderot's first play, The Natural Son (1757). He has his narrator saying that a man of genius would leave the city, following with

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this profound appeal to the 'natural',

"...O Nature, everything good is unfolded in your heart! You are the fecund spring of every truth! Nothing in this world but truth and virtue are worthy of my concern..."

However, whilst their ideals were similar their views on how this glorification of the natural can be brought to bear on society, diverge. Despite Diderot's claim that the man of genius would leave the city, it is not he, but his onetime colleague Rousseau, who did so.

Diderot appears to be struggling for the answer, whilst Rousseau believes he has it. It is said of Diderot that he was "...nowhere able to find an answer of his own..." to the right relationship between nature and society, whilst Rousseau is said to have "...given a brilliant answer in his 'Discours sur l'inegalité'...". Mason goes further, in saying,

"It is however, always a mistake to expect Diderot to arrive at firm or clear conclusions. None of these writings arrives at a decisive end, with a single answer of clear meaning."

Others point to the greater focus of Rousseau. Peter France explains it by the following analogy to a Russian proverb,

"If the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing, then Diderot, for all his aspirations to unity, was not a hedgehog. ... the real hedgehog was his friend, later his enemy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a man with a message, who still speaks to readers with a greater intensity

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than we find in Diderot."^{242}

As Peter France alludes, Rousseau’s friendship with Diderot went the way of all his other friendships with intellectuals; they ultimately argued in a most distasteful way. Rousseau said of Diderot that he was "...even more sensitive to criticism than Voltaire..." (*The Confessions*, p427). One could speculate on which of the two ‘philosophes’ was being criticised by this comment, though by that time it is likely that neither of them expected anything better from Jean-Jacques.

**Helvétius**

A ‘philosophe’ who managed to avoid being singled out for severe criticism by Rousseau was Helvétius, perhaps because his stature was not so great as to need to be challenged by the former. Helvétius did, however, see fit to criticize *Emile* in his *A Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and his Education*, but its posthumous publication late in Rousseau’s life probably mitigated against a structured response. Diderot, though, responded to Helvétius, on his own behalf, in the 1773 publication of his *Systematic Refutation of the Book of Helvétius on Man*.

The criticisms which Helvétius outlines in his *Treatise on Man* are scholarly, or even ‘constructive’, and contain none of the acrimony sometimes seen between Rousseau and the other philosophes. Despite his refutation of Rousseau, the two were close in educational philosophy and Helvétius was relatively courteous to his fellow Genevan, saying,

"It is not my design in refuting some of his ideas, to criticise the Emilius; that work is at once worthy of its author and of public esteem."^{243}


^{243} M. Helvétius, pl.
Essentially, Helvétius asserts that man is born devoid of anything; no character traits, or preset considerations of good or evil. The principle which he expounds is one in which education is all powerful. The difference here between the two is that whilst Rousseau's version of being born without innate ideas sees the child incline to the good, Helvétius considers that goodness has to be taught. He was perhaps the first of so many who would not so much contend Rousseau, as grow their own ideas from his basic educational thinking. Helvétius was, however, sceptical of Rousseau's 'noble savage', believing so much in the emptiness of the mind at birth, that even the concept of humanity is not naturally occurring; it is, he believes, "...the effect of their education, not their nature." He contends that there would be no educational benefit from being raised in a savage tribe; that such children would merely "...adopt barbarous customs." He asks and answers himself, with respect to Rousseau's beloved education according to nature,

"What does a prospect of nature present to us? A multitude of beings destined to devour each other."

Helvétius cannot, then, buy into the concept that by shielding the child from corrupt influences, he will develop naturally into a good, moral being. He believes that

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244 M. Helvétius, p4.
245 M. Helvétius, p23.
246 M. Helvétius, p20.
morality, or any other thing one wants the child to understand or be, is to be taught in. Kant was to echo Helvétius in saying,

"Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes him."247

Thus, whilst Helvétius supports Rousseau's humanitarian approach to children themselves248, and the respect of childhood, he is philosophically opposed to his teaching method; children cannot simply be put into the right environment and allowed to self teach.

Helvétius does have his critics, despite the fact that in a practical sense his philosophy is much more workable than Rousseau's. Boyd is concerned that a belief in education as equally beneficent to all, assumes the mind to be "...a passive recipient of experience from without..."249, which is all too simple an explanation. If Boyd infers that Helvétius' educational thinking was somehow inadequate, Harold Silver credits him with having rationalized the new views on education with the needs of a new society. Silver quotes Helvétius, with his own comments, in this regard,

"Not only could self-interest be made to coincide with public interest, but progress through knowledge, "...is a force in the creating of a better society and a better individual." ...It was a total theme more consistently revolutionary

247 Immanuel Kant, p6.
248 M. Helvétius, p462.
in its implications than that of Rousseau, more consistently rationalist than even that of Voltaire.”

Bantock, observes in the influence of the "French Helvetians" the inspiration for popular education, in that,

"...they shared the view that man was the product of environment rather than innate qualities and thus opened the way for a decisive adjustment of human affairs through the manipulation of social and cultural influences."\(^{251}\)

However, the consequence of people being seen as becoming what their education made them led social philosophers to envision ‘moulding’ whole communities. It was this prospect of a uniform progress to social justice which is said to have endeared Helvétius to English social and educational thinkers like Jeremy Bentham and Robert Owen.

\(^{250}\) Harold Silver, p14.

\(^{251}\) G.H. Bantock, "Diversified Innocent Amusement", p132.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Over the past two centuries social conditions have changed to a vast extent; due to advances in technology, and due the opening up of government to the participation of the whole population. This latter situation refers to the non-totalitarian, so called, 'Western' nations. Nevertheless actual participation is exercised only by those who are interested. The facility exists, however, and government has had to recognize that its existence in power relies upon maintaining credibility with all of the people; not only with a privileged few.

Along with improvements in technology and representation has come improvement in the availability and standards of education. Apart from the purely democratic ideal of the participants in government needing to be sufficiently educated to appropriately exercise their 'rights', the improvement and proliferation of advanced technology has necessitated the education of both a workforce and the consumer market.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century recognition of these two needs for education was in embryonic form; there were calls for a more educated workforce to feed the industrial revolution, and early calls for political equality were being sounded. Sometimes those calling for changes were viewed as rather dangerous revolutionaries at worst, or as
risqué thinkers on the fringes of society. This in turn led to calls for education to combat the 'fringe' thinkers\(^1\). The mainstream emphasis of calls for education tended to be religious. The cause was not the exercise of social responsibility by the church, paralleling a move towards democratic rights. It was in fact, a firmly held belief, held by many reformers, that improvements in education would enhance the religious fervour of the ordinary people and reduce their propensity to turn to crime. Newspapers occasionally correlated educational standards with crime, as did The Times in a re-presentation on the 17th August 1837 of an article from the Manchester Guardian. In it, prisoners waiting for trial at the South Lancaster Assizes were categorized as - "7 cannot write, and can only read imperfectly; and 13 neither read nor write at all" out of forty four. The article linked education with crime to demonstrate in a weak way that criminals were inadequately educated, with the implication that education would somehow

\(^{1}\) A contributor to The Times of London on the 3rd November 1798 (p3, c3) complained "If a system of natural education was more necessary at any period of our history than another, the present is certainly that period.

At an epoch when the revolution of France has burst upon the world like an earthquake, and stifled the civil and political faculties of all Europe with its noxious vapours, every lunatic performer and chimerical politician, from the National Convention or Legislative Assembly of France to the remotest extremity where French politics have undulated, has felt himself warranted to pour forth in harangues, in pamphlets, or newspaper speculations, his crude and abstracted opinion on political topics, regardless of the mischief he might thus produce."
correct their evil ways.

For a variety of reasons, then, at the beginning of the last century education was receiving more attention than ever before in history. In Britain it was being approached from various vantage points; Dr. Bell and Mr. Lancaster were concerned to provide 'education' to the greatest number possible, for the least financial outlay, or to put it in a way which is more appropriate to their intentions, they wanted to educate the greatest number possible with the limited funding available. Richard and Maria Edgeworth were less concerned with the establishment of schools than with laying out an appropriate teaching method, which would ensure that school children received a proper education for the era in which they lived. Whilst their education was cognizant of increased industrialisation, William Godwin's was education for a more just society. It can be readily asserted that Robert Owen was the first to exercise a genuine concern for children (as a part of his concern for humanity generally) into a practical method of schooling, in the British context. He had a theory of the best way to educate and was sufficiently practical and energetic to make it work on a modest but realistic scale. Whilst in Britain the expansion of education beyond the privileged classes begins in the early years of the nineteenth century, the philosophy of education can be said to have passed over a watershed a generation before. The French Enlightenment thinkers at the middle of the
eighteenth century, and in particular Jean-Jacques Rousseau (actually a Genevan), had paid great attention to how children should be educated. Their works were extensively read by the British soon after their original publication.

Not all of the ideas which Rousseau propounded were his in origin, but he can be said to have formulated a philosophy of education around the child as the central beneficiary, and for whom the first concern of the practice of education should be directed. His was an altogether more humanitarian approach to education, which links in with his wider concerns for social justice; a factor which leads to his being acclaimed by leaders of the French Revolution.

It is appropriate to recollect that Rousseau was part of a movement, and that much of what he stood for was what the group stood for. The French Enlightenment of the mid-eighteenth century had as its leading lights some of the greatest thinkers of all time, referred to collectively as 'les philosophes'. The philosophes were luminaries, recognizing the changes which were to happen to take Western societies, from the era of serfdom and the 'Divine Right of Kings' through the Enlightenment, into the modern world of individual rights and freedoms. They lived in an age of transition, and by their works they became somewhat of a stimulus, or even the engine, of the changes which occurred.

Each had his own particular emphasis, whilst maintaining a common belief in justice and humanity. They rejected
privilege at birth in favour of basic human equality. From that premise sprang their own unique courses to social justice which each pursued in his written works. Nevertheless, none worked in a vacuum, and in considering Rousseau, particularly with respect to those who were to study him later, it has to be borne in mind that his works were being read alongside his contemporaries.²

The object of this thesis is firstly, to examine Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his philosophy of education; to visit the paradoxes and to identify his imparted message(s), and the received message to his disciples and sceptics alike. The second object is to examine the extent to which Rousseau stimulated the ideas of significant British writers on education at the turn of the eighteenth century. There are many candidates for review, and some significant ones are omitted, like Messrs. Bell and Lancaster, Jeremy Bentham, and James Mill, in the interests of keeping the research reasonably manageable and objective. Those who have been chosen here represent particular aspects of the developing philosophy of education. Richard Edgeworth is notable in that he experimented with educating his first son directly according to the doctrines of Rousseau’s Emile, even discussing the outcome with the author. Later, along with his daughter Maria, he went on to write a treatise entitled

² Appendix I is an extended discussion of the three philosophers who were most closely connected with Rousseau; Voltaire, Diderot and Helvétius.
Practical Education, which was based on carefully collected data on the education of his other children, and which reflected the influence of his association with the technical luminaries of his day, who were fellow members of the Lunar Society. William Godwin is of a different type. Having been educated as a priest only to become an atheist, his interest in education was as part of a wider pursuit of social and political justice. For that latter reason, he can be said to be the closest emulation of Rousseau (in principle), in his ultimate aims for education. His wife, Mary Wollstonecraft, is included as the most significant feminist voice of her age. She calls for respect for the feminine perspective and is specifically upset that Rousseau failed to recognize that great inequality, and thus social injustice, of her age.

Robert Owen is the final subject of review. As has been said, he embodies the transition from philosophy to practicality. Moreover, his cause is distinctly not that of religion, and also not so much that of crime abatement (though he might use the argument to make a point); his was an exercise of social justice, pre-dating, and to some extent feeding, Marxist social thinking.

The question this thesis is addressing is whether Jean-Jacques Rousseau has a rightful claim (retrospectively) to have set British educational thinking along the road towards the humanitarian approach to education which has come to prevail in modern schools. The actual link between the early
nineteenth century and the present is the stuff of another thesis. This one leaves the story at about 1830, having identified the humanitarian thinking of prominent people, but recognizing that the era of the Dickensian school was still in the future.
Chapter 2

Emile, or On Education

The search for what Emile is all about takes many courses. It is seen by some as pure educational philosophy and likewise as a practical guide to teaching the young; some have read it as extending discussion on the evolution of mankind which is interpreted from Rousseau's earlier works. Yet others see it as important as an early work of psychology. Another view of Emile is as a logical partner to the Social Contract, in that it presents the development of the ideal citizen to participate in the ideal state. There are more directions than are indicated here, and whilst Jean-Jacques Rousseau certainly never intended to be "all things to all men" as St. Paul said (in I Corinthians, 9, v22) of himself, he was read as many different things by many different people.

In preparing the Emile for publication Rousseau recognized that he had prepared a large work which had no easy trail guide to interpretation, and that it by no means answered all of the questions it raised. He says in the introduction,

"For a long time I hesitated to publish it; and often, in working at it, it has made me aware that it is not sufficient to have written a few pamphlets to know how to compose a book. After vain efforts to do better, I believe I ought to present it as it is, judging that it is important to turn public attention in this direction; and that although my ideas may be bad, if I cause others to give birth to good ones, I shall not entirely have wasted my time." (Emile, p33)

A further source of confusion in sorting out Emile is the fact
that it is written as a novel. As a consequence, in any study of the work one has to be careful to separate the license taken by the novelist from the seeming output of research or experiment. In the latter stages of the book, where Rousseau, through the tutor, revels in the success of his educational system, it has to be viewed as the fiction that it is. This way in which the story slips in and out of fiction has led observers to refer to the work as chimerical, and whilst it is appropriate to warn of the fictions in Emile, it is equally important to warn against taking it too lightly. Bantock is speaking along the same lines when he explains,

"...to dismiss Emile as a dream would be to ignore its curious appearance of logicality, its pervasive emphasis on a certain mode of experience which have deceived others than Thomas Day into the possibility of concrete implementation."  

So, in fact, Rousseau not only speaks to many different areas of interest, he speaks throughout Emile on two different planes, through the facts of his experience and observation, and through the fiction of what he presents as the outcome of experimentation. He is consequently unable to keep track of his changing positions through such a major work. For this reason the author is often accused of contradiction. If Rousseau had trouble keeping all of what he had to say in the context of what he meant to say, his observers have had more difficulty. They often consider themselves to have failed

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because, having identified a particular thesis, or 'message', they find evidence elsewhere which appears to deny it. Broome compliments Rousseau on his ability to reduce complicated matters to impressive formulae, but notes that they "...may turn out in the end to cloud his real meaning."4. One might say that these failures in comprehension emanate from the desire to put Rousseau himself into a particular category, or box. Whenever you do so, there is always some bodily appendage sticking out and preventing the lid from going down, and changing the box shape does not seem to work. The solution is to accept Asher Horowitz's assertion that,

"Various contextualizations of Rousseau's writings have been pursued with a view to ferreting out his intended meaning. But even though historical research has succeeded both in dispelling many crude misconceptions and in raising the level of sophistication in subsequent debates, there has been little in the way of fundamental agreement or conclusive demonstration concerning the specific content of the notions Rousseau intended to communicate. Agreement seems to exist only on the fact that Rousseau does not fit well or consistently into a neat set of recognizable or stable categories."5

Emile, then, is a multiplicity of 'messages', which, whether they were aimed there or not, have been received by many academic disciplines. This thesis returns to the full title of the work, Emile, or On Education, and examines what are considered to be the primary messages for education; not, that


is, the messages for teaching method so much as those addressing the ‘philosophy’ of education, that is, the principles governing the way education is delivered. Whilst the two are intrinsically linked, one might say it deals with the strategic rather than the tactical, if the military analogy can be excused. This appears to be the way Rousseau wanted the book to be considered when he looked back on the work. In response to an assertion on the impracticability of Emile, Rousseau comments, in a letter to M. Philbert Cramer, on the 13th October 1764,

"Vous dites très bien qu’il est impossible de faire un Emile. Mais je ne puis croire que vous preniez le Livre qui porte ce nom pour un vrai traité d’Education. C’est un ouvrage assez philosophique sur ce principe avancé par l’Auteur dans d’autre écrits que l’homme est naturellement bon."^{6}

Despite the problems involved with trying to identify at what the author was aiming, at no time since the publication of Emile has it been regarded as anything less than a significant work on the education of children. It could be seen as a watershed of educational thinking, because although some of what he preached had been heard before, Rousseau was the first to put together the Enlightenment view on educational thinking in so complete a manner, and certainly no one before, and perhaps after, managed to draw the extent of public attention to the subject. For a long time after

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Rousseau, no one could present a work of educational thinking without comparing or contrasting it with *Emile*; much of current educational thinking still has to give him due credit. Rousseau may not have got it right, but it was necessary to pay homage to his work, and then go on to explain contentious areas. In Pickering's 1979 introduction to translations of Emile Durkheim's work, he says of *Emile*, "Probably no other book has had a greater effect on education...". Others go so far as to describe Rousseau as being "...like Jesus, a prophet issuing with a new law from the desert...". A more acceptable description is the one presented by John Sommerville, as follows,

"The book which is most often treated as the dividing line between the dark age of childhood and the beginning of an enlightened concern appeared in France in 1762 - Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile*. ... No book can change deep-rooted attitudes by itself, but it may catalyze change."

Despite the fact that Rousseau's impact on the philosophy of education is considered more important than his impact on the practicalities of schooling, in 1922 H.C. Barnard credited him for "...the sweetness and light which pervade the modern...

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infant school..."\textsuperscript{10}. Thus, whether accepted or rejected, loved or hated, Rousseau's contribution to educational philosophy had, and has, to be respected.

Education was addressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in other works, some of which will be discussed later, but his \textit{Emile} is his most important treatise on the subject. It comes out of the author's most successful period. The novel, \textit{La Nouvelle Héloïse} was published in 1761, with the \textit{Social Contract} and \textit{Emile} appearing the following year. Many of the principles outlined in these works about what Rousseau saw as the ideal world, and the people who should inhabit it, can be traced back to earlier works, but in these three publications he put together his thoughts on a major scale. Although he wrote much more between 1762 and his death in 1778, these later works characteristically defend his ideas to the mid 1760's, and no major new contribution to philosophy can be attributed to them.

Whist all three works won popular acclaim upon release, \textit{Emile} was notable for the negative reaction which developed. The description and apparent recommendation of 'natural religion' in place of the paraphernalia of the established church led to the book's being ordered destroyed in Paris, public burnings and a consequent warrant for Rousseau's arrest. He managed to escape to his homeland in Geneva, only

to have to flee again when that government followed the lead of the Parisians. Ultimately things cooled down enough for Rousseau to be able to travel freely in these countries, but the events following the publication of *Emile* provided him with cause for reflection, and did no long term harm to his reputation as a writer of consequence (there are many precedents for building reputation and circulation as a consequence of a works' repression). By no means, though, was this the only work for which he was criticized. The first major criticisms of Rousseau came with his exploration of man's drift from nature in *A Discourse on Inequality* in 1754. Perhaps the one which most hurt Rousseau was the mocking letter from Voltaire in which he said,

"I have received, monsieur, your new book against the human species, and I thank you for it. No one has ever employed so much intellect in the attempt to turn us into animals."\(^{11}\)

Voltaire's criticism has not been supported over time. Maurice Cranston refers to this work as "...the masterpiece of his early years."\(^{12}\) He supports this point with a reference to Napoleon, Burke and Hegel having considered Rousseau's inspiration of the French Revolution as originating from *A Discourse on Inequality*.

In order to examine *Emile* properly, it is necessary to


consider the author's earlier thinking, so as to recognize "...that Rousseau's educational theory and his conception of human nature are parts of the same reality."\textsuperscript{13} He looks around him at the corrupt world, in cities like Paris; then searches beyond for an example of lesser corruption and finds it in the simple folk of the countryside. He decides that due to their closeness to nature, that goodness can be equated to nature. In the book he traces to nature those traits which he considers most noble in humankind, and examines the ways in which they became distorted in the 'civilizing process'. Rousseau explains it,

"In thus discovering and tracing the lost and forgotten paths which must have led men from the natural state to the civil state, in reconstructing together with the intermediate situations which I have just noted, those which lack of time has made me omit or which imagination has not suggested to me, no attentive reader can fail to be impressed by the immense space which separates these two states. It is in this slow succession of things that he will see the solution to an infinity of moral and political problems which philosophers cannot solve" (Discourse, p135)

In nature children are said to be born with the "...excellent physique of their fathers...", and when the odd exception occurs, then the weakling is expected to die (Discourse, p82). Presumably as a consequence, there is little illness, and "...little need of remedies, and even less for physicians;...") (Discourse, p85). In this tone Rousseau extols

the virtues of the natural life. People are said to do good to themselves and as little harm as possible to others (Discourse, p101). Natural man relies on no one, and so neither needs to enslave others, nor is he enslaved himself. Consequently, "...inequality is hardly perceived in the state of nature,..." (Discourse, p106). Emile follows the lead of A Discourse on Inequality in that it takes the values of the natural as given, presumed proven in the earlier work, and examines the extent to which recognition of natural goodness can benefit the education of children. The ...Discourse... does not call for a return to nature, it claims to look back to a sort of Garden of Eden, and in a more Darwinian than Biblical sense, traces the way humans strayed from the path of the good. The culprit, or devil, behind the straying, is always society.

Societal wants or needs caused the separation from nature. As Crocker observes,

"The real theme of the Discourse is that society alienates man from his natural self, thus creating a situation of conflict with other men."^{14}

The link between Rousseau's natural virtue of A Discourse on Inequality and Emile is quite obvious, as is demonstrated by the following quotation,

"Men are made not to be crowded into anthills but to be dispersed over the earth which they should cultivate. The more they come together, the more

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they are corrupted." (Emile, p59)

Rousseau was inclined, however, to stray beyond the bounds of his own experience, as has been said with respect to Emile. This is nowhere more evident than when he speaks of the savage tribes of the world. Many areas were still inhabited by truly savage tribes of natives in the mid eighteenth century. Hence, when tracing humans back to their savage origins, Rousseau could not resist making analogies with those people, which he could not support. This made him vulnerable to criticism, and many took advantage of this weakness, readily making fun of his 'noble savage'. Typical of the license which he took is this quotation from the Discourse where the author takes the assumed scarcity of suicide in the savage state as an example of the degeneration of society,

"I ask which - civilized or natural life - is the more liable to become unbearable to those who experience it? We see around us people who nearly all complain and several of whom indeed deprive themselves of their existence as far as they are able;... I ask if anyone has ever heard of a savage in a condition of freedom ever dreaming of complaining about his life and killing himself?" (Discourse, p97)

On what could he base the assumption in his rhetorical question? He also refers to savages being healthier than their civilized counterparts, and living longer robust lives. If he had visited their lands and gained more experience he might not have so glorified their existence.

However, as with much of Rousseau, at the point one
becomes critical it is appropriate to step back and ask, 'does it matter'? Does he need to have experienced the savages he talks about, and does it matter if he was taking license, and making it look factual? It can be posited that he was merely putting his savage into a current context in order that his audience would better perceive what he was saying. He was not saying that the savage was good, but that the natural was good. It was merely a mechanism for demonstrating the distance civilization had strayed from the natural, and he was correlating that distance with the distance society was from human happiness, or at least, human contentment. Rousseau proclaims,

"Remain in the place which nature assigns to you in the chain of being. Nothing will be able to make you leave it. Do not rebel against the hard law of necessity; and do not exhaust your strength by your will to resist that law - ..." (Emile, p83)

a message which has an attractive 'ring' today when considered against the stresses of ambition.

So, if the savage can be taken as making a point, and if there is benefit in maintaining a place in the natural order of things, what has this to do with education? Well, for Rousseau education is the way back, even if only a little way. It is obviously quite impossible to take the average person (perhaps an occasional exception would try), and even less the average state, and hope to have them shed all of the trappings of society and take to the natural life. Even with all the will in the world, none would know how to do it; they would
have to be re-educated, or more to the point de-educated (or perhaps 'negatively' educated). A more sensible approach, of course, is to write off the current citizenry and start again with a new educational ideal, designed for the purpose. Allan Bloom excuses the paradoxical way that Rousseau stumbles around with his "noble savage", as he recognizes that the "...real world structure..." he is trying to come to grips with is also incoherent. He says of Emile that it is,

"...an experiment in restoring harmony to that world by reordering the emergence of man's acquisitions in such a way as to avoid the imbalances created by them, while allowing the full actualization of man's potential."\(^{15}\)

In the same way, Peter Carbone asserts that Rousseau has no interest in the education of a "noble savage", but that he wants to create "...an individual self-reliant enough to fend off the prevailing corruption..."\(^{16}\) of society. In other words, society will not disappear with the emergence of Emile from his educational process. Hence, he has to not only be educated for nature, but he has to be given the defences to keep him from going the ways of those around him.

Keeping Emile from straying is a major concern for Rousseau, through his tutor. A major principle of what Rousseau considers natural, and a subject of much criticism


\(^{16}\) Peter F. Carbone, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Rousseau's Educational Ambivalence", Educational Theory, Fall 1985, Vol. 35, No. 4, p403.
and persecution of him, is his belief that humans are born good, and that evil only accrues due to contact with society. So important is this point to him, that Rousseau opens the book with these carefully chosen words,

"Everything is good as it leaves the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man." (Emile, p37)

From this basis, Rousseau builds his education for the boy Emile. He will be exposed to few people other than his dedicated tutor, who will see to it that his education is as close to nature as possible, with almost no interference from 'society'.

The opinions on this view are many, but none are so strongly presented as the religious ones. Luella Cole presents an apt description of the impact which Rousseau's basic concept had on religious attitudes, and consequently on teaching method, as a great majority of schools fell under strong religious influence,

"In flat contradiction to the doctrine that man is born bad and must be saved by God's grace, Rousseau was emphatic in stating that man was born good and was spoiled by contact with human society and by education. The spirit of severe repression that had dominated the schools for centuries was based upon the supposed need to cure children of their innate badness. Beating the evil out of them in this world was regarded as preferable to letting them continue in sin and suffer hell-fire throughout eternity." 17

As may also be observed, this basic concept of Rousseau's, before looking any deeper into Emile, renders it immediately

more humane than any previous means of dealing with children. Whilst he was not the first to advocate an improved attitude to the child, his call received wider attention than those before. Children were to be considered to be intrinsically good, and were to be coaxed to remain so in the manner of handling them through their education. There is no place in Rousseau's educational scheme for physical punishment.

Green, however, gently points out that, despite Rousseau's assurances, children do tend to take on the characters of "little devils" or "little angels" at quite an early age. He goes on to say with what appears to be intended as mild sarcasm, that "we may accept with confidence Rousseau's guarantee that every new born child carries the imprint of Nature's goodness."\(^\text{18}\) In the cases of Cassirer\(^\text{19}\) and Cranston\(^\text{20}\), they make the immediate connection between the child's innate goodness, and Rousseau's belief in the condition of amour de soi, or self love. The education of Emile is to prevent the degeneration of amour de soi to amour propre; the selfish love which tends towards the subjection of others. Seclusion from society is intended to retard the

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development of the latter state.

The relationship between 'amour de soi' and 'amour propre' is most important to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Amour de soi is seen as that natural self respect which occurs in such a way as not to be detrimental to others. With amour propre, however, there comes a selfish love which is altogether more competitive and sees humans acquiring self respect at the expense of others. Thus amour propre is the manifestation of the tendency in humans to seek to subject others to their will. It is Rousseau's interpretation of the psychological development of man. He sees man as born pure, and recognizes the faults of pride and selfishness which come later. These he attributes to the uncontrolled transition from 'amour de soi' to 'amour propre'.

In his introduction to *Emile* (p4) Allan Bloom credits Rousseau with identifying the worst manifestations of amour propre in the 'bourgeois'. These are the members of the Parisian society which he so much despised. They lived on their pride and were considered totally degenerate. Rousseau's negative education of Emile was intended to retard the onset of amour propre until the boy could handle it. The author does not see it as something one prevents completely, but he is insistent that this state is best handled by the mature individual. The worst form of amour propre is that selfish pride which was prevalent in the arrogant young men who frequented the salons of Paris.
In order to prevent the onset of amour propre Rousseau analyses the reasons a baby cries. At first, crying is a natural method of attracting attention for a very young child, having no other way of doing so. However, the responses which an adult makes to the child can result, ultimately, in the child taking some level of control over the encounter between them. It is common to see a child throw a tantrum, or drop some object on the floor, merely to attract attention. At this early stage, children are developing an ability to control others; according to Rousseau’s doctrine they are already beginning to drift from nature. He advises thus,

"The first tears of children are prayers. If one is not careful, they soon become orders. Children begin by getting themselves assisted; they end by getting themselves served. Thus, from their own weakness, which is in the first place the source of the feeling of their dependence, is subsequently born the idea of empire and domination." (Emile, p66)

In Allan Bloom’s words, "In these first seeds of amour-propre as seen in tears, one can recognize the source of the human problem." The presented solution is to quickly accustom children to rely on things and not people, in such a way that they can feel that they are finding out about things for themselves, from nature, rather than having them presented by people.

Undoubtedly, Emile’s education could not be natural if amour propre were allowed to develop at this early stage. It

21 Allan Bloom, p142.
would cause, as Bloom says, "...a division within man’s soul ... which ruptures his originality or wholeness." As with much of Rousseau’s fundamental thinking on the subject of what is natural, he develops his concept of amour de soi and amour propre first around the Discourse on Inequality. In his notes appended to that work, Rousseau had the following to say,

"One must not confuse pride (amour-propre) and self-love (amour de soi), two passions very different in their nature and in their effects. Self-love is a natural sentiment which prompts every animal to watch over its own conservation and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Pride is only a relative, artificial sentiment born in society, a sentiment which prompts each individual to attach more importance to himself than to anyone else, which inspires all the injuries men do to themselves and others, and which is the true source of honour. ....in the true state of nature, pride does not exist;..." (Discourse, p167)

Amour propre cannot be totally excluded from an individual. Rousseau’s scheme for Emile is to prevent its development until he can properly cope with it. Maurice Cranston refers to Emile’s attaining the age of fifteen years as critical because it marks his transition from boyhood towards manhood, and also, where "...‘amour de soi’ changes into ‘amour propre’..."^{23}

The general concept of education by ‘things’ is a temporary concept. Rousseau wants the child not to have to try to absorb concepts he is not ready for. ‘Things’ can be

^{22} Allan Bloom, p136.

^{23} Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage..., p182.
touched, played with and easily understood. Book learning is particularly unacceptable until quite late on in Emile's education, as it involves the acceptance of remote facts which the child may well not be capable of envisioning. The author of *Emile* also maintains a certain consistency between what is natural and good, and what is societal and bad, in his attraction to things. He says,

"There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders all vices, ..."

Keep the child in dependence only on things. You will have followed the order of nature in the progress of his education. Never present to his undiscriminating will anything but physical obstacles or punishments which stem from the actions themselves and which he will recall on the proper occasion." (*Emile*, p85)

The notion of education only by things, and punishment only as a natural consequence of things, again turns upside-down the way that all teaching was organized. And, one cannot help feeling, as with much of what Rousseau has to say, that it is at the same time impractical and yet thoroughly logical. It also bears with it an attractive aspect of social justice towards the child in general. Emile Durkheim's lecture notes, prepared in 1904, indicate his grasp on the consequences of Rousseau's belief in limiting education to 'things', and, although in note form, there is a feeling of the exciting changes this inferred for the way children should be handled in schools,

The principle reversed. Things. Still retain their earlier form, in a sense. Not themselves the domain of morality. But they lay the foundations of moral education. An essential preparatory part of education. It is from them that the sentiment of absolute necessity comes (discipline, moderation). It will have to be modified; take on a new form. But first must exist if it is to be transformed. Can only be educated by things as his teachers.

Why? Social man in the image of natural man."

"No orders. No commands. No obedience. ... In general terms, no verbal lessons. Things speak,... Consequently, no punishment as such. What punishment is. No place for it. (1) No orders. (2) No morality. Latter replaced by the natural consequences of the act."24

Despite the attractiveness of the concept, there are some practical questions raised. The first is that the great literature of the past would not be known to people until adulthood. Without an adequate exposure at school, in the short period towards the end of the ideal education, the benefits of ancient literature would be lost. Also, how could subjects like history be handled without the participants passing down their experiences through books? This is, of course, another question of the practicality of Emile which needs to be side stepped in favour of the benefits of the overall philosophy. The inclination to make education as practical as possible, with as little taken on trust through the medium of teachers or books, is highly commendable, whilst

recognizing that neither is actually dispensable.

There are those, however, who go one step further, to their peril. If it is difficult to reconcile Rousseau's thinking on 'things' with the practicalities of school life, then one is bound to run aground in an argument about what the author calls things, and what are really things. Jules LeMaitre, in a 1907 work, said "...Rousseau calls things what he chooses." in support of his criticism of the author for taking upon himself the role of deciding what is natural and consequently good.

There is an irony in the way history responded to Rousseau's call for a limitation in the use of books for the early school years. He appears to have stimulated people, some of whom were undoubtedly 'disciples' of Rousseau, into the writing of books specifically aimed at the age group in question. Emile Legois observes,

"It was therefore against his desire, though in accordance with his doctrine, that a whole literature for children began to grow and multiply, banishing the romantic and the marvellous,...

... The most popular novel of the type was that of Thomas Day, a fanatical admirer of Rousseau, who published his Sandford and Merton in 1783-9. His books heralded those of Miss Edgeworth, whose talent was to eclipse the efforts of her predecessors." 26

In that Jean-Jacques Rousseau was primarily concerned with

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preventing children from having their minds filled with concepts they could not possibly understand, this movement must be seen as beneficial, and he deserves credit. Whilst his principle of exclusion of books is laudable, his own exception of Robinson Crusoe can be cited as indicating that a book which parallels his overall scheme of things is acceptable. Sandford and Merton is intended to accord with the values of 'nature'. Day takes his own somewhat distorted version of Emile (Harry Sandford), but concentrates on demonstrating how favourably he compares with a product of conventional high society upbringing (Tommy Merton). Both are put in the care of one tutor, Mr. Barlow, who educates them in a rural environment. The wealthy child, Tommy, is exposed to the three-way influence of Harry's commendable behaviour, his idyllic rural surroundings, and stories generated to appeal to the benefits of the 'natural'.

Day's use of the two boys allows him not only to demonstrate the benefits of a natural education, but he is able to contrast the two for the education of the reader. He supports Rousseau's rejection of the past educational methods. At one point in the book one of Tommy Merton's society friends is said to have,

"...almost finished his education at a public school, where he had learned every vice and folly which is commonly taught in such places, without the least improvement either of his character or
his understanding."
Rousseau would likely have approved (in principle - in practice he approved of little which emanated from his contemporaries!). Once one exception is made, as Rousseau did himself with allowing Robinson Crusoe for Emile, then the gates are open for providing books to children, provided they are designed for the purpose. William Godwin would follow Thomas Day and Maria Edgeworth in writing specifically for children.

The belief in self discipline through direct contact with 'things' and the resultant requirement to accept the consequences of that contact puts a certain responsibility on the child. The rules of education are changed in that the curriculum cannot schedule experience in the way that it can book reading; interface with things is apt to be random. Emile's tutor, however, has the difficult task of ensuring that the boy is involved in sufficient, and suitably varied, experiences for his learning to progress at an adequate pace. The pace, itself, has to appear to be unhurried. There are two points which bear note in this process. The obvious one is that Emile's tutor has to be quite covert and incredibly active, in order to keep thinking sufficiently ahead of his pupil's experience to ensure a smooth flow of seemingly natural encounters. If such is feasible with one child, it

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certainly cannot work with any more children.

The second point is that for all of these things to happen, the child is being treated by his tutor in a different manner than one would expect in any school system, and most certainly different from those which prevailed in the mid eighteenth century. In fact, Rousseau had a distinct view of childhood, which is as different, even today (in that the prevailing view of our society is that schooling's primary aim is to establish earning capacity in adulthood), from what we do in schools, as it was in his day. He viewed childhood as "...a mature, complete condition of life..." and not as a part of the process in developing into an adult. It is not a time, for Rousseau, in which children make sacrifices for their later benefit, it is a time to be lived to the full for its own reasons. The "...barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future,..." (Emile, p79) was particularly cruel in an age of high infant mortality. So many children died before adolescence; and Rousseau even portrays the ones who suffered most at school as preferring death as an escape from school. His call was,

"Men, be humane. This is your first duty. Be humane with every station, every age, everything which is not alien to man. What wisdom is there for you save humanity? Love childhood; promote its games, its pleasures, its amiable instinct." (Emile, p79)

And in connection with his theme of nature, he asserts that,

"Nature wants children to be children before being men." (Emile, p90)

This view of the child changes the emphasis of the ideal education. Education is geared towards supporting the natural development of children, rather than providing the tools they are assumed to want later. Combined with their involvement with things, theirs is to be an education for the immediate, dealing only with matters of immediate concern. Peter Gay presents a good assessment of Rousseau's motives,

"...no one before Rousseau had drawn the consequences implicit in the idea of human development. The child, Rousseau forcefully argues, is not an imperfect or incomplete adult; he is a full human being with his own capacities and limitations. This is why Rousseau demands that the intellect be cultivated last - not from some innate hostility to reason, but from his estimate of the place of reason in the rhythm of human growth." 29

In his desire to go beyond Rousseau, and to become altogether more scientific, Claparède even compared the skeletons of adults and children to demonstrate that "... the child is not a miniature man ... he presents a special type." 30, in that a child's body is structured in different proportions from the adult, with the particularly noticeable feature being the head which is proportionally much bigger. Dr. Claparède's work is most notable in that, being of a more scientific nature than


Rousseau's, and about a century and a half later, he does not contend but builds on the earlier writings. Two other aspects of Rousseau's ideal education which are retained by Claparède are the encouragement of "...play and imitation."\textsuperscript{31} in order to facilitate self development, and the observation of the progression of childhood as occurring in distinct stages.

Claparède identifies four developmental stages, as Rousseau does, but he is not concerned to keep his pupils as long as Rousseau. The latter takes Emile through the Infancy stage from his just being able to walk and talk, to five years, followed by Childhood proper to the age of twelve years, the critical period in establishing the child's attitudes for life. Next he experiences the Boyhood stage to fifteen years, and Adolescence to his twentieth year; beyond that into the world of Adulthood. Armytage presents Emile's resumé of the stages of his development in brief, crisp form,

"Having acquired the age of two, the capacity to eat, walk and talk, the child then goes on to acquire the mastery of the five senses up to the age of twelve. At twelve the child becomes a virtual Robinson Crusoe, discovering physics, geography, astronomy, whilst at the same time discovering himself. The self discovery is enhanced, at fifteen by his sexual development, his relations to others. When mature he leaves the village to find a mate."\textsuperscript{32}

It should be noted that these stages are not targets for the pupil, but the authors judgement of the dividing lines between

\textsuperscript{31} Claparède, p120.

the phases of human development. The first stage is essentially physical, the second conditions Emile's attitudes, and education proper begins at fifteen years.

In the period since the *Emile* was published, other educational theorists have observed stages in the psychological development of the human. Claparède has been mentioned, and there was Jean Piaget and more recently Lawrence Kohlberg. In Kohlberg there is little other than the use of stages to compare his theories with Rousseau's, in that he is measuring moral development, and Rousseau would have no need of such a process. Society is immoral, not the members, so a display of morality organized in accordance with the norms of that society would be a contradiction in terms. Another contradiction exists within Rousseau's own method. Whilst he does not teach morality believing it to develop naturally, he manipulates its recognition by what the Edgeworths would call "artifice". The tutor uses examples like the destruction of the gardener's beans to show Emile respect for property (*Emile*, pp98/9). Thus, while he would be averse to staging moral development, Rousseau's process does not accord with nature. Kohlberg measures the emergence of virtue, while Rousseau is concerned with preventing its disintegration. Another way in which Kohlberg differs from Rousseau is in the way the former encourages stage advancement. Mechanisms are devised whereby the individual can demonstrate adequacy for 'promotion'. Such an approach would
not accord with Rousseau's thinking as it would involve reasoning by the child, a process which is discouraged as it deals in the abstract, and not in solid facts i.e. things; also, the process would introduce an urgency which would act contrary to the natural flow of development.\textsuperscript{33}

Boyd says of Rousseau that it was his account of the changing stages of the developing human that indicate "...a study of childhood as no one had even attempted before his time...", going on to credit the Genevan with making "...important advances towards a dynamic psychology."\textsuperscript{34} There is certainly an appropriate flow in what is presented to Emile for his education, with certain endeavour held back for the appropriate stage. A good example is in the use of fables in instruction. In Book II he inveighs against them saying,

"...permit me not to let him study a single one of them until you have proved to me that it is good for him to learn things a quarter of which he will not understand;..." (Emile, p116)

However, by Book IV the pupil is considered sufficiently advanced in his natural development to properly appreciate them, as we learn,

"...it is only men who get instruction from fables, and now is the time for Emile to begin." (Emile, p249)


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In fact, through Book II no reading is acceptable, whereas in Book III Robinson Crusoe is introduced, as a story which will accord with the type of person Emile's tutor wants him to emulate, at this stage. Now the pupil is still being isolated from society. Another story is reserved for Book IV, the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, which is to explain "...human beings and his proper relation to them when he tries to live in society..." The latter is thus, not only a moral story to benefit his education, but readies Emile for the way that society accustoms itself to accepting stories sometimes, in place of 'things'.

The core of Rousseau's education is in the 'childhood' period, from five to twelve years of age. This is the time of greatest protection from outside influences, and the term used by the author for the education applied in this period is negative education. In infancy the child is prepared for negative education, and from boyhood onwards (twelve years and up), he reaps the benefits of it. Negative education might be said to be the mechanism by which the pupil is, as closely as possible, to replicate the ideals of A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. It is certainly a logical description for the educational process advocated in Emile. Durkheim's lecture notes are as perceptive as they are brief,

"How is this education to be described? It is

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positive if sentiments and ideas are transmitted. In this case none. Tutor remains aloof. At a distance. Offers no information. Thus negative."

"Term negative accurate in a sense. For something has been eliminated, excluded; man. Society. No imparting of information. Opinions eliminated."  

Rousseau’s own explanation is presented in the following form,

"Thus, the first education ought to be negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error. If you could do nothing and let nothing be done, if you could bring your pupil healthy and robust to the age of twelve without his being able to distinguish his right hand from his left, at your first lessons the eyes of his understanding would open up to reason."  (Emile, p93)

There is a sense at the end of this explanation from Rousseau, that negative education is an exercise in suspended animation. That, so long as the child is brought to the age of twelve years healthy and happy, education will occur, almost magically, soon thereafter. In fact some basic education is imparted, and the pupil is conditioned to explore and find things out for himself. As Allan Bloom says, the senses are to "...develop in relation to their proper objects;.."  

and through the senses Emile is steered towards some preliminary practical scientific learning. He goes on to reason negative education,

"All animals go through a similar apprenticeship to life. But with man something intervenes which impedes or distorts nature's progress, and therefore a specifically negative education, a human effort, is required. This new factor is the

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36 Emile Durkheim, p186.

37 Allan Bloom, p140.
growth of the passions, particularly fear of death and amour-propre, ... The negative education means specifically the tutor's artifice invented to prevent the emergence of these two passions which attach men to one another and to opinions."

Although Rousseau, Durkheim and Bloom explain the what, and part of the why, of negative education, Peters hits the critical why. He says,

"The negative education of Emile is an attempt to sketch how a man might be educated so as to resist corruption as he could no longer be a 'natural' man." 38

Negative education is to be his armour when the pupil finally emerges into society. Emile's eminent practicability, coupled with an ability to quickly learn without instruction, along with a robust constitution, will arm him adequately to deal with the corrupt weaklings Rousseau observed in society. This attitude on Rousseau's part does give him an elitist aspect.

The subject, Emile, is from a modestly wealthy family. It would have to be so, if it was to dedicate a tutor to the boy's constant care. Also, the very separation of an individual from a society, which was openly declared as not being good enough for him, was an elitist action. The elitist concept goes along with the concept of individualism. However, to the extent that Rousseau hardly expected people to emulate in practice the education of Emile, he did not speak only to one class of people; his was a philosophical text put out for whoever would pick it up. As such, it presents the interaction

of one pupil with one tutor in order to simplify the relationship. The reason for doing so would be to remain objective about his educational theory, and not to allow himself to be deviated by introducing a series of personal relationships. He was acting much as a scientist would when performing an experiment, minimizing redundant outside influences.

There were those who embraced Rousseau's perceived individualism. Others, like Durkheim, were opposed themselves to "individualistic utilitarianism" 39 and contended that such a doctrine was never Rousseau's intention. It was, in fact, neither the intention, nor was it the outcome. Rousseau's Emile has had an impact on education across the board, and apart from a very few early cases, all attempts to work Rousseau's thinking into an educational process have been applied on a wide basis, from Pestalozzi's shaky attempt onwards Morley credits Emile with being anything but elitist, in saying,

"In fine we may add that Emilius was the first expression of that democratic tendency in education, which political and other circumstances gradually made alike in England, France, and Germany; a tendency, that is, to look on education as a process concerning others besides the rich and well-born." 40

If he was not educating Emile as a member of an elite

39 W.S.F. Pickering, p115.

group, or for an elite role, what did Jean-Jacques Rousseau see him as? A view has been suggested that the subject of the novel is raised "...as an adventurer, a Ulysses armed with all the weapons of reason."\(^{41}\) and that this is his recommendation for all. Whilst Emile as a Ulysses does equate with the older Emile of the unfinished sequel to Emile in Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires, in neither case can one assert that Rousseau was expecting this as a general outcome, in that becoming a Ulysses would involve a leadership role; and command over men. Jean-Jacques would point back to Emile and say (excusing Friday) that Emile is raised as a latter day Robinson Crusoe, who will be capable of adapting to his environment without suppressing his fellow man. If Emile was going to be anything else than the individual case study, then he was going to be another Jean-Jacques. It is an idealised telling of his own story, or maybe a road map for his recreation. If one Jean-Jacques could do wonderful things for the world, so much the better to have two! Jean Starobinski observes,

"If a return to nature is impossible and if society proves incorrigible, then the man who sees clearly how things are is condemned to solitude. The only activity still open to him is the education of an individual, as in Emile. But Emile himself is a stranger among men, a savage made to live in cities. Significantly, Rousseau traces Emile's education to the point where he becomes a hermit.

like Jean-Jacques."\(^\text{42}\)

It is likely the case that Rousseau saw in his younger self the potential to be an Emile, and then in his evolution, the potential in Emile to be a Jean-Jacques.

The similarity Rousseau would be seeking would not be in intellect so much as in character. Emile can be viewed as primarily about character formation, with some believing that it goes as far as to aspire to "...reforming character in the mature."\(^\text{43}\) In an overall sense what would Rousseau’s objectives be in character formation? As has been explained, he is concerned to rear the child under some protection from the prevailing vices of society, whilst recognizing that in the later stages, he will need to be conditioned for entry to that society. Interwoven with this scheme is the desire that a flow of 'Emile’s' into the world at large would improve society itself. In Geoffrey Fidler’s words (on both Rousseau and Diderot), "...education is simultaneously liberating of the individual and instrumental in the social-collective ideal:..."\(^\text{44}\). The critical aspect of character which Rousseau wishes to eliminate from Emile’s education is desire, with its


worse 'ugly sister' greed. It is in wanting things, and the exertions and manipulations which ensue to achieve them, which Rousseau sees as the basis of all the evils in society. At the heart of social injustice is desire. In terms an economist might use, a settled (social) state of affairs, with total mutual respect for others cannot occur where people's collective wants exceed supply. As Frank Manuel explains,

"The moral, however, is reasonably sustained. If Emile or mankind or a nation or a world civilization lives in a fantasy of desire far outstripping its needs and its faculties, it courts moral disaster."\(^4\)

There is a hint of utopia in the society Emile is to enter. What best accords with the character formed in Emile is a land, not of ever enhancing wants, but of people getting what they need, whilst needing only what they get. No lust for more, merely a satisfaction with what is available to them.

The only conceivable way to condition an individual to this notion, if at all possible, is to begin early. In Emile Rousseau curbs desire in the early stages,

"Do you know the surest means of making your child miserable? It is to accustom him to getting everything; since his desires grow constantly due to the ease of satisfying them, ..." (Emile, p87)

Although a believer in the child being reared in the home, by the mother, in the early years, this did not prevent Rousseau from laying out how it should be done. The ideal education begins in infancy, and the consequences of doing it right,

according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, are significant,

"But let mothers deign to nurse their children, morals will reform themselves, nature's sentiments will be awakened in every heart, the state will be repeopled. This first point, this point alone, will bring everything back together. The attraction of domestic life is the best counterpoison for bad morals." (Emile, p46)

His calls for a return to breast feeding by mothers, and against the practice of using wet nurses, stimulated a strong following in Europe. In Tolstoy's War and Peace this dictum of Rousseau's is mentioned, and applied. The early part of Emile is a strong criticism of the prevailing ways in which children were being raised in the mid eighteenth century. In that this dictum was logical, and easily implemented, it was the first area in which he stimulated practical changes. Other progressive thinkers on early education, like Madame Necker de Saussure, tended to agree on most aspects of the early child rearing practices of Rousseau.

An aspect of Emile's education which finds little agreement, is the way in which the tutor manipulates his pupil. This method brings out some of the worst criticisms of the author, and leads some to believe that it is a basis for invalidating the whole doctrine. The difficulty for Rousseau is that, whilst practical learning will be absorbed better than second hand data, random experiences will not necessarily provide the variety and type of encounters one would deem necessary for development. The tutor, therefore, needs to

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46 Joseph Featherstone, p172.
orchestrate events, whilst giving the boy the feeling that his encounters are natural, or undevised. Someone has to exercise authority, if not by directly ordering the pupil, then, by some form of covert coaxing. R.S. Peters is of this opinion, saying of Rousseau,

"Although opposed to authoritarianism and the imposition of orders on the child, he appreciated that a learning situation must involve authority of some sort."\(^{47}\)

Allan Bloom is also sympathetic to Rousseau’s method, believing that,

"He presents natural necessity in palpable form to the child so that the child lives according to nature prior to understanding it."\(^{48}\)

The alternative of a completely ‘free’ situation, which allows the child to choose his educational direction without manipulation, would appear to render the child’s mind like somewhat of a roulette wheel, with an educated outcome being only one of the many slots the ball might fall into. However, while unlimited freedom is impractical, the reduced authoritarian approach of giving the feeling of freedom, and random experience will be better appreciated by the child, than the rote method of, ‘do this, you will find out later in life that it’s good for you’.

Rousseau has the tutor going to a lot of trouble to stage-manage events, as in the case of the encounter with the

\(^{47}\) R.S. Peters, p30.

\(^{48}\) Allan Bloom, p144.
gardener (Emile, pp98/9). The boy learns the importance of respect for property, and labour, by an artifice which sees him planting beans whilst destroying the gardener's melons. Can it be wrong to manipulate the child this way? Is it somehow a betrayal of the fundamental freedom which Rousseau espouses? No! How else can Rousseau put over his point. He could hardly present these activities occurring in some supernatural sequence, and as they are necessary to presentation of a doctrine, they do present a feasible way in which the pupil can encounter the required activities. His point would likely be that the process is as moral, if not more so, as taking book writers on trust. And, consequently the encounter is much more likely to be retained in the mind of the child. The lesson learned will be as devoid of external opinion as any educational encounter could be. Durkheim defends Rousseau's action on another event where actions are to educate directly (the broken windows) by asserting,

"It is no violation of the principle to convey a sense of the force of things, to present them in whatever way is appropriate so that they will bring at the action latent within them. It is the things themselves that act. It is their lesson which educates."\(^{49}\)

Despite that, elsewhere in his notes Durkheim draws a line. Whilst he accepts education by experience, he doubts that 'morality' can come from Rousseau's orchestrated lessons on "self control", saying that it is "Debatable whether morality

\(^{49}\) Durkheim, p180.
can arise this way."\textsuperscript{50} What has to be borne in mind in criticisms of Rousseau's manipulation of children is that any process of 'education' takes children through a manipulative process. They are coerced or forced into classrooms and exposed to a flow which is presented in a fashion considered most likely to establish a certain mode of thinking. Curricula are generally designed to manipulate children through their early years, in order to bring them to adulthood with what society considers suitable intellectual baggage for an ongoing career. The manipulation of children for their adult role is analogous to what Rousseau does, but he suggests that the feeling of choice, or random experience will improve the child's attitude towards learning. He is undoubtedly right, but cannot be replicated for classes of children.

There are other sceptical views on the ways Rousseau proposes to manipulate pupils. Jules LeMaitre said of one event which would have taken no little effort to organize, "What a fuss ... when a box on the ear would have sufficed!"\textsuperscript{51}. A more serious observation comes from Jane Roland Martin, who believes that, having been manipulated by his tutor for the whole of his life, Emile will emerge into society vulnerable to other manipulators\textsuperscript{52}, principally his wife Sophie. Martin

\textsuperscript{50} Durkheim, p179.

\textsuperscript{51} LeMaitre, p229.

\textsuperscript{52} Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p61.
believes this renders Emile quite incapable of taking the leading role, in family and society alike, which Rousseau believes he is being trained for. She observes that Rousseau's inadequate training for girls equates to evidence of the equal inadequacy of his education for males. The feminist criticisms of Rousseau are quite as bitter as those aimed from any other quarter. He is cited as regarding women as "...a major source of the world's evil." and one writer proclaims that,

"In any feminist Chamber of Horrors Jean-Jacques Rousseau would occupy a prominent place."

Criticisms of Rousseau's treatment of women are by no means limited to 'feminists', and are also not a recent innovation. In 1923 Morley referred to the handling of education for females in Book V of Emile as "...pernicious nonsense". This latter part of the educational treatise is considered good

53 Jane Roland Martin devotes the whole of the second chapter of Reclaiming a Conversation... to a critical analysis of the different educational methods Rousseau designs for Emile and Sophie. She sees the manipulation which he receives from his tutor as rendering him helpless in the hands of a Sophie who is trained in the art of manipulation. Thus, Martin posits that not only is Sophie's education faulty, but Emile's also lacks credibility.


literature, but inappropriate,

"As an idyll it is delicious; as a serious contribution to the hardest problem it is naught." 37

Morley, in line with many others concerned with the way Rousseau addresses the education of girls, is disturbed by the way such an educational visionary could have neglected the other sex. For many, this omission has been regarded as an error, and the fifth book has been passed over in favour of regarding the first four books of Emile as being equally applicable to both sexes.

Returning to the view of Emile as a scientific condition applied to one subject, it can be suggested that all other influences are the exercise of some license. In the same way as the pupil’s encounters with meaningful experiences are orchestrated, so in fact, is Sophie. As such then, Book V may be examined, not so much as an educational guideline for girls, but as an understanding of Rousseau’s preoccupation with woman’s role in society. He was profoundly concerned with what he perceived as a woman’s ability to undermine both family and society. He says,

"If there is a frightful condition in the world, it is that of an unhappy father who, lacking confidence in his wife, does not dare to yield to the sweetest sentiments of his heart, who wonders, in embracing his child, whether he is embracing another’s, the token of his dishonour, the plunderer of his own children’s property." (Emile, p361)

Woman is seen as the potential destroyer of all that Rousseau

sees as important. His limited education for women can be read as intended to restrain their power, as he feared the consequences of its misuse. Rousseau asserts that the source of women's power is,

"...an invariable law of nature which gives woman more facility to excite the desires than man to satisfy them. This causes the latter, whether he likes it or not, to depend on the former's wish and constrains him to seek to please her in turn, so that she will consent to let him be the stronger." (Emile, p360)

He saw, and despised, the society of his era (especially that aspect which centred around the 'salons'), and believed that a particular element of societal improvement would occur with the return to what Rousseau considered the correct and naturally chaste role of women. As Boyd commented cryptically, "'Nature' speaks the language of eighteenth century prejudice." But not only were women to be 'faithful' to their mate, the condition must be unquestionable. Wexler examines Rousseau's intentions and his motivations as follows,

"Sophie's subjugation is indeed more than a manifestation of a reactionary side of a revolutionary thinker. It is central to Rousseau's conception of a virtuous society, as opposed to the corrupt one he knew and rejected. But beyond that, I believe, an expression not of his disdain for women, but rather his fear of them, a fear he never conquered."  


59 William Boyd, Emile for Today..., p177.

60 Victor G. Wexler, p269.
The great irony of Rousseau's treatment of women is hinted at by Maurice Cranston. He reflects on the fact that the family, according to *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* is not deigned to be 'natural'\(^{61}\), but occurs as an institution in the early stages of the development of society. Woman is thus not said, in the natural state, to be a partner to man, or to have any other permanent connection. Men and women are therefore equal, in that they go about their business separately, coming together only to copulate, but, otherwise organizing their own lives. The woman raises the children alone, much as is the habit of bears (my analogy). One is left wondering, then, that if *Emile* is the closest education one can get for a boy to be endowed with natural virtue, why there is not a similar course plotted for girls. If Rousseau had not written Book V then maybe one could have speculated along the lines of the need for a singular case for 'scientific' review, and Rousseau was naturally familiar with the male. However, Book V invalidates that is a line of argument. The likely answer lies in Wexler's belief that it is based in Rousseau's own fear of women. It prevents the greater exercise of his vision.

Another interesting difference between the way Rousseau treats girls, from boys, is that the former are taught religion at a much earlier age. Cranston comments that his reason, "...decidedly unflattering to the female sex..." is

that "...a true conception of religion is something she is unlikely to ever attain." so "Her faith must be subject to authority:..." This thought combines two of the sources of most bitter criticism of Rousseau. His religious critics were quick off the mark, and in the summer of 1762, the year of publication, he had to flee France as a consequence. What antagonized the clerics was Rousseau's belief in birth without innate ideas, and his views against the established Church which are described with the notion of 'natural religion'. Both of these facets are contained in the part of Book IV titled, the 'Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar'.

The 'Profession' is the story of an encounter between Rousseau himself, in his youth, with a priest from Savoie, a beautiful mountainous region of France quite close and similar to Jean-Jacques' home in Geneva. The priest finds the youth lacking direction in life, and attempts to focus him by giving an account of the course his own faith had taken over the years. He had begun in a routine way, learning what he was supposed to learn, saying what he was supposed to say (Emile, pp266/7). To his sorrow he later found that, "...in obliging myself not to be a man I had promised more than I could keep."(Emile, p267). Unacceptable sexual conduct in a priest led to his arrest and expulsion.

Consequently, the Savoyard priest found work in Italy, and passes the years pondering what had happened to him,

62 Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage, p190.
against the faith he had accepted in routine form. He looked to the alternatives presented by the philosophers.

"I found them all to be proud, assertive, dogmatic (even in their pretended scepticism), ignorant of nothing, proving nothing, mocking one another;..." (Emile, p268)

He also examined his own religion against others in the world and finds that if rendered down there is a base of 'natural religion', which recognizes God but does not accept the intricate dogma and paraphernalia of the religious organizations. He tells Jean-Jacques "...I found nothing in natural religion but the elements of every religion." (Emile, p296). On the authority of the established church the priest observes sceptically,

"Our Catholics make a great to-do about the authority of the Church;... The Church decides that the Church has the right to decide." (Emile, p303)

There is a parallel, as Broome says, between the fall of the priest, and his redemption63, and the course of Rousseau's life. Jean-Jacques found himself 'out of step' with his environment, which allowed him to observe society from the outside and assess its faults. The Vicar does to religion what Rousseau does to society in A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, looking for the point where the Church diverted from the good, 'natural' course.

Interwoven within the profession is the concept of humans being born pure, and evil being acquired in this life. Ernst

Cassirer explains it,

"...since guilt belongs to this world, not to the world beyond; since it does not exist before the empirical, historical existence of mankind, but arises out of this existence, we must therefore seek redemption solely in this world. No help from above can bring us deliverance. We must bring it about ourselves and be answerable for it. With this approach Rousseau finds the new approach to the problem of evil..."\(^{64}\)

This is the first factor which the Church homes in on in condemning Rousseau. Christophe de Beaumont, Archbishop of Paris quotes from the *Emile* and refutes it in the following way,

"We lay it down, says he, as an incontestible maxim, that the first emotions of nature are always right; and that there is no original perversity in the human heart." How contradictory is this to the doctrines of the holy scripture and the church,..."\(^{65}\)

The Archbishop goes on to demonstrate his case for children's tendency to evil if not carefully controlled,

"Into what errors, into what excesses, do they not, when left alone, precipitate themselves? The torrent breaks in upon them,..."\(^{66}\)

It has been observed that the priest's cameo appearance

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\(^{64}\) Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques. *\(_{sseau}


\(^{66}\) Christopher de Beaumont, p213.
in the book is somewhat that of a "visiting teacher"\textsuperscript{67}, in that it is a different and special part of Emile's curriculum. As such he handles a significant issue as Emile prepares to enter society. The issue is that in its drift from nature, even the concept of God has been perverted\textsuperscript{68}, and that coupled with the fall of society is the "fall of God". The religious aspect, then, is the last brick in the structure of Emile. It is too important for the tutor to handle, or even Rousseau, so the Vicar provides the added authority necessary. Now the boy is ready for the world, but what world. Broome reflects that,

\textit{"...a collection of Emiles whose education includes religious enlightenment on the lines of the Profession de foi, must produce, logically, the society of the Contrat Social, which may be described simply as the Kingdom of God on Earth."}\textsuperscript{69}

The practicability of creating "a collection of Emiles" large enough to influence society renders the assertion philosophical only. However, it is of interest to look at the education presented in the context of a modern dilemma; that of liberal education against child centred education. Rousseau, particularly on a reading of \textit{Emile}, is seen by many as the father of child centred education. William Boyd has no


\textsuperscript{68} J.H. Broome, p112.

\textsuperscript{69} J.H. Broome, p123.
doubts, in saying,

"The revolutionary idea in education, expressed with strange compelling power in the Emile, is at once simple and profound. It is, in a word, that education to be effective in the making of good human beings and through them of a good society, must be child-centred."

However, whilst his aversion to books in the central part of the educational process appears to be distinctly contrary to notions of liberal education, in other aspects Rousseau sounds closer. His assertion that Emile will be,

"...neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will in the first place be a man. All that a man should be, he will in case of need know how to be as well as anyone:..." (Emile, p42),

has an interesting 'ring'. These words are similar to those used by advocates of a liberal education in that they emphasise all round capability, over education for a specific purpose. To designate him as being for 'liberal' or 'child-centred' education, then one would have to put Rousseau in the latter camp; his concerns for children themselves out weigh all other considerations. A visit to his Considerations on the Government of Poland may be said to shed some light on the extent to which he would implement the doctrines of Emile into practical schooling. In it his humanity towards children remains, yet in his curriculum for learning about Poland, its history and its people, there is a distinct application of liberal education, in a nationalistic form. Rousseau then, is at heart a child-centred liberal educationalist, and perhaps

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the two are not mutually exclusive.

Rousseau would keep the child away from books in the early part of his education; a view which our modern society would utterly reject. Parents in particular take great pride in measuring early education in the ability to read. However, whilst liberal education is commonly viewed as an accumulation of 'learned' readings, the essence of such an education is surely an all-round capability for intellectual life. This cannot include the optional or random courses often ascribed to child-centred education, nor is it specifically vocational. Thus, in the same way that Rousseau can be seen as specifying some literature, in the form, initially, of Robinson Crusoe, and fables later in his education, when the pupil is able to understand it, it is obvious that some literature is not only acceptable, but necessary. It has to be noted that Rousseau does not reject books outright, but puts them off until the mind is ready to rationalize the opinions contained in them. He is afraid of the impact of confusing the mind with things it cannot properly handle. Later, the mind can cope, and reading becomes appropriate; the use of books is a matter of schedule.

If a definition of liberal education can be restricted to the provision of an all-round capability, instead of stacking up on the number of readings achieved, then this is what Rousseau wants of Emile. He wants to give him such an education as will render him intelligent, but adaptable, a
theme often cited as the benefit of liberal education. Rousseau can be said to support in principle the definition provided by Alfred North Whitehead, who says,

"In its essence a liberal education is an education for thought and for aesthetic appreciation. It proceeds by imparting a knowledge of the masterpieces of thought, of imaginative literature, and of art."\(^{71}\)

He would merely advocate holding the "imparting a knowledge of" part until such time as the mind was capable of rationalizing what it was accepting, as opposed to taking it as a parrot would. Hence, what Rousseau's child receives is a liberal education presented in a child-centred fashion.

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Chapter 3

Other Pertinent Works by Rousseau

The three works examined in this chapter do not represent the remainder of Rousseau's educational writings. Education is a topic in many of his other publications. These three are, however, the writings which have the most significant bearing towards an examination of the *Emile*. The *Social Contract* is important because it puts *Emile* into the perspective of Rousseau's total pursuit of social justice. In the case of the intended sequel *les Solitaires*, it is appropriate to discuss why Rousseau appeared to want to take the story of Emile further, and then why he abandoned it. Lastly, in the *Considerations on the Government of Poland* one sees the extent to which the impracticalities of *Emile* are erased in the face of a nation in peril. There are other works by Rousseau on education, but these three adequately provide insight into the wider realm of what *Emile* was really all about.

*Emile* and the *Social Contract*

That *Emile* and the *Social Contract* have some common notions is not surprising as they were written in parallel. To go further, and to suggest that the education of Emile is aimed at preparing the citizen of the *Social Contract* is not so obvious and therefore warrants more discussion.

One primary pointer is the agenda to the *Social Contract*. Whilst Rousseau goes to great lengths to discuss all aspects
of his ideal society, he does not address education. In his other political work, the *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, Chapter IV is dedicated to the subject. The reason for the omission in the *Social Contract*, one can surmise, is that this subject was covered in adequate detail in the other book which he published also in 1762, fully titled, *Emile, or on Education*. Also, one can make a structural comparison between the two books, as Maurice Cranston does, that "...just as the Tutor is the dominant figure of Emile so does the Lawgiver become the dominant figure of the Social Contract."\(^{72}\) A distinct link between what Emile is being prepared for in his entry to society, and the society which is being 'designed' in the *Social Contract*, is religion.

Broome makes this point strongly. Having posited the "...convergence of the Emile and the Social Contract...", with the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, the two doctrines are said o "interlock"\(^ {73}\). In fact if the religious part of the *Social Contract* is read soon after that section of Book IV of *Emile*, it sounds as if the old priest is still speaking; for instance,

"...without temples, altars or rituals, and limited to inward devotion to the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality, is the pure and simple religion of the Gospel, the true theism, and might be called the divine natural law." (*Social Contract*, p181)

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\(^{73}\) J.H. Broome, p95.
The **Social Contract** has as one of its major features the natural religion which Rousseau has prepared Emile to view as the only true way. And, one of the concepts running through *Emile* from the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* is the need to condition humans not to want to hold power over men. Rousseau was not an atheist, so religion has to play a part in the ideal society, but in a form which will accord with the ideal citizen, Emile. Of prevailing religion, he says,

"Christianity preaches only servitude and submission. Its spirit is too favourable to tyranny for tyranny not to take advantage of it. True Christians are made to be slaves; they know it and they hardly care; this short life has too little value in their eyes." (**Social Contract**, p186)

One can posit the 'Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar' as the history of Rousseau's thought process. As such, religion may be taken as the analogy of society, with the **Social Contract** containing the derived law. And, an element of the presented law is the description of natural religion,

"The dogmas of civil religion must be simple and few in number, expressed precisely and without explanations or commentaries. The existence of an omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment of sinners; the sanctity of the social contract and the law – these are the positive dogmas. As for the negative dogmas, I would limit them to a single one: no intolerance. Intolerance is something which belongs to the religions we have rejected." (**Social Contract**, p186)

Religion is but one element of the preparation which the pupil *Emile* receives to prepare him for adulthood in the ideal society. His whole education is structured with his societal
place in mind, to the extent that it can rightly be said that,

"No student of education has provided more carefully than did Rousseau, in the Emile, for the deliberate guidance of the life of a growing individual, so that it may conform to the authoritative will of a society."^74

Society and education are intrinsically interlinked. A change in one is felt in the other. Governments, as the voice of society, influence education, and the way people are educated will influence the types and ways of government. Kant sees the two, government and education, as the most difficult human inventions, in that it is difficult to ascertain their meaning'^^75, and hence where the one begins and the other ends.

There is a clear indication in reading Rousseau that he believed society to be thoroughly corrupt and in need of overhaul. Whether he really believed France to be "...doomed..." and "...on the edge of revolution."^76 appears to be more a case of retrospective speculation. What we can interpret is that the route to a new society should be traced through education. As Broome says, it is conceivable that education can provide "...the controlled moral development which his system requires."^77 That moral development, and the moral force at work in the just society, again tie the two


^76 C. John Sommerville, p152.

^77 J.H. Broome, p77.
works together. In Durkheim's lecture, "What does nature tell us about education?", he puts a pause into discussion of Emile to say, "Remember the Contract. If the citizen is to be natural, he must feel that he is under the sway of a moral force..."78. That is the same moral force which Emile's education has allowed him to recognize throughout his learning process; the sort of lesson learned when he inadvertently destroyed the gardener's melons.

Graham Oliver claims that Emile "...is an attempt to remain true..." to the Social Contract. Such a view appears to set the latter on a pedestal for the other to grasp towards. This is an inappropriate view of the two works. They were developed in unison and are parts of the same whole. To the extent that they are written in a different manner, they may not co-ordinate exactly. Their form is different, the Social Contract being laid out in the cold manner of, perhaps, a judicial document, with Emile being presented as a novel. The political treatise, of course, was later tied in philosophically to the French Revolution, which somehow appears to give it greater claim to fame than a novel on education. It has to be born in mind, however, that they came out of the same mind, in the same period, and are directly linked; one cannot totally divorce education from society. Conversely, in reading Emile, one has to respect instruction from one as eminent as Durkheim, and "Remember the Contract".

78 Emile Durkheim, p171.
There is a certain unity between the philosophy of the Social Contract and Emile. Rousseau did not have an educational philosophy and a political philosophy, he had a social philosophy which embraced both. His writings are not a collection of isolated discussions, but part of a complete exploration of the concept of social justice. It is, moreover, in the notion of the social justice of Emile that the educational writers of Georgian England are in debt to Rousseau. In fact it is only incidental if any of the elements of teaching method survive at all. What Rousseau implies is that what society needs is a new structure, along the lines of the Social Contract, and that feelings of equality, and social justice, will be normal to society if the educational process has allowed such notions to develop naturally.

All of the British writers who are examined later are pursuing slightly different things. The Edgeworths look directly at education, Wollstonecraft at women's rights, Godwin at politics and society, and Owen at the well-being of the lower classes. In all, however, there is a central desire that people be treated in a decent manner; all are in agreement in wanting social justice to a degree unknown before. That social justice is the composite message emanating from the Social Contract and Emile. However, the view that these two parts constitute a composite message leads one to wonder why Rousseau began a sequel to Emile, and then, why he did not complete it.
Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires

It may be suggested that a suitable place to examine the benefits of Emile's education is in his performance as an adult. Rousseau set about providing that picture in another novel, Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires, which tests the young married couple against the realities of life. The sequel was not finished, running only to thirty two pages. Hence, any assertions made about the consequences of the education which both Emile and Sophie received are limited. One is left to speculate on how the story would have ended, and further, why Rousseau was writing it, and why he abandoned it.

Les Solitaires is centred around the heroine's adulterous pregnancy. Having raised the boy in the first four books of Emile, and found him the perfect mate in the fifth book, he follows with a severe test of the marriage in the sequel. Some observers suggest that not only did Emile and Sophie's marriage fail in Les Solitaires, but as a consequence of presenting the sequel Rousseau's concept of education failed with it.79 It leads one to question why Rousseau pursued the sequel. Was he being mischievous, or did he have a 'scientific' reason to test the model? Georges May suggests in his Rousseau par lui-même that the sequel to Emile was

79 Guy Turbet-Delof details observers since 1782 who believe that Les Solitaires demonstrates the failure of the thesis of Emile in "A Propos d'<Emile et Sophie>'', Revue d'Histoire Litteraire de la France, 64e Année, No. 1, janv-mars 1964, p45.
intended to demonstrate the wisdom of existing for one's self alone; "par lui-même".

In order to approach why the author wrote *Les Solitaires* it is necessary to examine the chronology of certain events. The first is the fact that *Emile* was completed in 1761, as was the *Social Contract*; two great works ready for publication during the following year. *Emile* and the *Social Contract* were published in Amsterdam, as *La Nouvelle Héloïse* had been before. *Emile* was the only one which was also published in Paris.

An early reaction came to the author in the form of a letter from Renee-Caroline de Froullay, marquise de Crequi, dated the 2nd June 1762, in which she said,

"In other ways you deal with your Emile perfectly, but you owe us the details of this couple; although he is very much in love, will he not be weak on the occasions that Sophie has need of a master? Will he not be very strong when love changes itself to friendship? Will Sophie not have any of these whims which are only human, which our sex subjects us to? I see well the plan of his duties, I suppose you wish to fulfil them, but the distance is so great between speculation and reality! It is true that she will no more likely have the faults of our Parisian coquettes than their statues, however it could be that she has other faults; and it would be good to see this kind of woman deep down; furthermore Emile is wealthy, and I wish, reluctantly, that he could be tested..."

The Marquise de Crequi appears to have been taunting Rousseau

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to take away Emile's wealth, and to expose Sophie to the high society which she had been sheltered from, in order to observe the consequences. The author, however, had less than a week to contemplate the suggestion, as another letter from de Crequi dated the 8th June 1762 warned that an arrest warrant had been issued in his name.

As a consequence, Jean-Jacques Rousseau found his books being burned, and himself a fugitive from the Parliament in Paris. He first fled out of Paris to his native Geneva. The Amsterdam backers, having put up the publication money, were troubled about their 'return on investment'. Rousseau was concerned that their reaction to the troubles over Emile might be to edit out the offending parts. The alternative, which appears to have been acceptable to both parties, was for Rousseau to accept the suggestion of Jean Néaulme, for the publishers, and write an "Anti-Emile".

That agreement likely inspired Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires which first appears as a formal title in a reference to the author having "...donne lecture de la Suite d'Emile, ...., c'est-a-dire Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires,...". The reading was given to Baron Nicholas-Antoine de Kirchberger, a Bernese nobleman, on the 17th.

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November 1762. The novel was incomplete, having been written in epistolary form covering one letter and the beginning of another. Thus it remained; quoted in a listing sent to Pierre-Alexandre Du Peyrou on the 24th January 1765\textsuperscript{84} as a fragment.

The piece was not so much abandoned by Rousseau as in abeyance. A difficulty would have been the fact that his travels abroad led him to become separated from most of his works. However, in another letter, dated 6th July 1.68, to Du Peyrou he refers to a wish to complete *Les Solitaires*,

"...on the poor days of winter, where my condition and the season give me difficulty with my wild flower collecting; the one which interests me most would be 'Emile et Sophie ou les Solitaires'. I have a special weakness for that task..."\textsuperscript{85}

The following passage from the *Confessions* (completed in 1770) indicates that it likely stayed with Rousseau as a potential task for the remainder of his life. Speaking of the "...one philosophy really proper to the human heart...", and his intention "...to delve deeper into its riches...", he goes on to say,

"...I intend to give, in the sequel to Emile, such an attractive and striking illustration of the same maxim that my reader will be forced to take notice of it." (Confessions, p62)

Without a formal ending, the only course open to assess

\textsuperscript{84} R.A. Leigh (ed.), *Correspondence complète de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Banbury: The Voltaire Foundation, 1975), Tome XXIII, janv-fev 1765, p182.

what conclusion Rousseau was intending for the story is to refer to those in whom he confided. Charles Wirz identifies Baron Kirchberger and the Marquise de Crequi as being close enough to Rousseau to have some indication of what he was intending with the unfinished novel, along with Pierre Prevost, Bernadin de Saint-Pierre, and the English philosopher, David Hume. No account from Kirchberger or de Crequi can be traced. Prevost and Saint Pierre did construct endings to *Les Solitaires*, the former detailing an encounter on a desert island, where Sophie is revealed as a priestess. Saint Pierre also has the couple meeting again on a desert island, but in his version it occurs only after Emile has taken another wife. Thus, at the time they meet he has committed a crime similar in magnitude to that of Sophie’s and two wrongs are presented as equalling a right (presumably). Hume is more credible as he did not dabble with the actual story, but wrote of Rousseau’s intention towards it. He says that Rousseau intended to put Emile into "...most trying situations.." to show that he would overcome them. Even Sophie, despite her transgressions, is intended to come out "...in such a light that she will appear equally amiable, equally virtuous and equally estimable,...". Hume continues his discussion of the sequel in a letter of March 1766 with

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87 Charles Wirz, p293.
Rousseau quoted as having said,

"...I hate Marvellous and supernatural Events in Novels. The only thing that can give pleasure in such Performances is to place the personages in Situations difficult and singular."\textsuperscript{88}

Hume wrote his understanding of Jean-Jacque’s intentions in the time frame of the dialogue between them in England. Thus his account was not dimmed by the passage of time, but reflects his immediate understanding. This was in 1766, four years after the publication of \textit{Emile} and the consequent generation of the first thirty two pages of the sequel. It was sixteen years from the writing of \textit{les Solitaires} to Rousseau’s death, and thus longer to the preparation of his assumed conclusions.

Rousseau certainly put the hero and heroine in \textit{Les Solitaires} into "situations difficult and singular". Rousseau’s perfect couple were put in the most difficult situation which he could devise, almost exactly as the Marquise de Crequi had proposed. That the two would somehow overcome their difficulties is without doubt. As Jean Starobinski explains,

"Emile will go back to Sophie and tell her that her sin was not her fault:... The novel is unfinished but from the outset it heralds the rapture of return:..."\textsuperscript{89}

The route to such an ending will never be known, and perhaps


\textsuperscript{89} Jean Starobinski, p128.
even Rousseau did not know.

The epistolary novel begins with Emile narrating the story of the events which befall his, and Sophie’s marriage. He relates the happiness of the first eight years in a most exuberant way, beginning;

"J’étais libre, j’étais heureux, Ô mon maître! vous m’aviez fait un coeur propre à goûter le bonheur, et vous m’aviez donné Sophie; aux délices de l’amour..." (les Solitaires, p1)

Emile speaks of having loved Sophie before he knew her (les Solitaires, p2), a complimentary reference to the way the tutor had prepared him for married life. Sophie is mentioned as his "adorable spouse", and the children as "...the dear fruits of her tenderness" (les Solitaires, p3). His satisfaction with his family leads him to declare that the son will be educated as he was, and the daughter will be raised under her mother’s guidance, as Sophie had been.

Marital bliss ends for Emile and Sophie when their fortitude is tested by severe domestic misfortunes. Sophie becomes depressed when, in the space of one month, both of her parents die, followed by the death of her daughter. In the hopes of diverting his wife from her sadness, Emile persuades Sophie to move out of their rural dwelling to a home in Paris. Although he recognizes that everything he has been taught of cities boded badly for the venture, his wife’s misery is so great as to make it the only remedy he can devise.

The move seems to work well, but after two years, all at
once, Sophie becomes sedentary and retiring (les Solitaires, p6). Emile finds himself rejected and he cannot understand why. One day, however, as he believes himself to be on the verge of breaking down his wife's resistance to his tender approaches, she stops him declaring that another man has defiled his bed and that consequently she is pregnant (les Solitaires, p7). She had committed that great evil which Rousseau describes in Emile as one of the worst powers of a woman. Emile leaves home, and ultimately Paris.

He examines his unfortunate situation in detail. How could such a perfect marriage be so completely ruined? "If the infidelity of an ordinary woman is a crime, what name can we give to hers?" (les Solitaires, p11). He searches himself for the cause, and whilst not chastising himself for his own actions, he does consider that he should have recognized her discomfort in the big city. He also tells himself that he had seen her regrets and repentance in her eyes (les Solitaires, p12). His self recrimination turns to a form of admiration. In keeping with Rousseau's belief in the heinous nature of women who deceive their husbands by passing off extra marital children to their husbands as their own, Emile begins to respect Sophie's truthfulness in not doing that to him. He says, "...she committed a crime, but not a cowardly act" (les Solitaires, p13).

As Emile walks further from the city his attitude mellows, but even so, he cannot overcome in his mind the crime
which he feels has been perpetrated against him. His mind, in examining what has happened, alternates between understanding and outright bitterness. He ruminates on the fact that if his wife gives her tenderness to two sons (the new one and his own), then likewise she is forced to an attachment to two fathers (les Solitaires, p17). The revulsion of this concept leads Emile to tell himself that he would rather see his own son dead than to see Sophie with the son of another father. With that consideration he resolves (again) never to return. His journey farther afield, reads like the prelude to an adventure of the type experienced by the hero of Voltaire's Candide. He leaves France by ship, and, in Emile's case, is captured by pirates and sold into slavery in Algeria. At the point where les Solitaires is interrupted, in the second letter, Emile's status is improving as a slave to the Dey of Algiers. The remainder is speculation.

What would become of the hero and heroine? Would they be reconciled, and if so, how could they possibly overcome the fact that Sophie had committed a crime of such magnitude against her husband? How could Rousseau demonstrate the benefits of his educational thesis when his ideal family has been so distorted?

There have been several published speculations as to why Rousseau set out to write a sequel to Emile, and some as to why it was not completed. Two writers, Turbet-Delof⁹⁰ and

⁹⁰ Guy Turbet-Delof, p54.
Crocker⁹¹, see *les Solitaires* as an allegorical response to criticisms of the author by his one time fellow philosopher, Denis Diderot. As one of those insulted in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" it is understandable both that he should attack Rousseau, and that the latter should respond in the form of a sequel to the offending novel. There is, however, no evidence in the text to support such a notion; he is neither kind to philosophers, nor does he builds on his insults from *Emile*.

Another line of thought has *Emile*, in the sequel, getting too close to autobiography. Green writes of Rousseau,

"...he too, like *Emile*, had briefly experienced at Montmorency the exquisite delights of love in a rustic, Arcadian setting. And, having never really, in his heart of hearts, accepted the prior claims of Saint-Lambert he viewed the defection of Mme d'Houdetot as a betrayal comparable to that announced by the guilty Sophie."⁹²

An extension of this view is that, if the author had not managed to overcome his dilemma in 'real life', then it would be difficult for him to be able to design the solution in fiction. Perhaps he was waiting for his own life's course to provide him with an ending to the novel. This notion of Rousseau making *Emile* in his own image correlates with, and extends, the view expressed earlier of *Emile* being educated to the point where he is Rousseau.

Pierre Burgelin echoes Rousseau's words from the

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⁹¹ Lester G. Crocker, *...: The Quest*, p304.
⁹² F.C. Green, p266.
Confessions (above), when he says, "The source of each man's happiness remains within himself. Rousseau intended to devote to this theme his unfinished novel, "Les Solitaires"." 93 In saying this Burgelin indicates his belief that Rousseau was following a positive plan, intending that in writing Les Solitaire the author would further expand on the benefits which the hero (and perhaps the heroine) had received from his special education, in overcoming the ruinous events of their stay in Paris. There is a contrary theory which sees the educational doctrine of Emile self-destruct in the sequel.

One such proponent is Maurice Cranston, who suggests that les Solitaires confers a "...certificate of failure..." on the education of Emile, in that one so

"...elaborately trained to be a man, has his only success in the role of a slave, and Sophie, brought up to be the ideal wife, is easily seduced into adultery." 94

What then does the sequel say for Emile? Does it negate any, or all of it? Was he appeasing his critics, or intent on elaborating on his original theme, having had some 'feedback' from his readership? In fact, a better view of les Solitaires is to see it as the closest the author could get to a practical application of the concepts developed in Emile; not that is to say, his message on education, but of Emile's entry into society. He certainly demonstrates how badly 'society'

94 Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage, p192.
treats his pupil, and intends to demonstrate how well Emile would cope.

In fact, the Marquise de Crequi probably goaded him into beginning something he had not fully thought through. As with Richard Edgeworth and Thomas Day, when he came to grips with the reality of testing Emile's education it was probably beyond his capability to put together a credible account. For a writer as prolific as Rousseau, there was the time, and the inclination. He in fact suffered the fate of all of those who attempted to too closely emulate Emile in practice. All found it a disaster; Emile is not for practical education. As Rousseau himself said in the letter to M. Cramer, quoted earlier, Emile is a philosophical work, and is thus not for emulation. That is to say, accept it as the novel which it is, with the license that goes along with it, and take its message not from specifics, but from its overall sense. Even Rousseau could not wrestle with the specifics.

Considerations on the Government of Poland

Earlier chapters have examined the relationship between Emile and the Social Contract. They are not to be classed as similar works by the same author, or books with a similar theme; as the quotation from J.H. Broome says, they "interlock". The Social Contract lays out the design of the ideal state, and Emile portrays the education of the citizen commensurate with it. This has to be qualified, in that Emile
does not emerge in adulthood to the society of the Social Contract, but to existing society. Thus, whilst the Social Contract is utopian, in working with a 'clean slate' for the nation, Emile is less so. Though taking the pupil as a 'clean slate', it ultimately has to dispatch him into the real world. That venture, especially as has been seen in the experiences of les Solitaires, does not bode well for the educational philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It was however, as has been said, unfinished, and a novel at that. Ten years after his great works of the early 1760's, Rousseau had a real chance to superimpose his political and educational thinking onto a real nation; Poland.

Unfortunately, nations do not emerge with the 'clean slate' which is available to philosophers, and Poland’s 'slate' was about as murky as they come. As a nation they had powerful neighbours with the empires of Russia and Austria to the east and south respectively, and the Swedes to the north and the Prussians to the west. At times they more than equalled these nations, as in 1683, when it fell to the Polish King Jan Sobieski III to lead Christian armies to victory over the Turkish armies which had been laying seige to Vienna. This was, however, the last time that Poland was able to take a leading role on the world stage.

Poland had neither a hereditary monarchy, nor an effective parliamentary system. The most disastrous feature of its constitution was the 'liberum veto', analogous in a
less extreme way to Canadian provincial powers, which allowed a vote in parliament to each nobleman, but allowed any motion to be defeated, and thus the government to close, with only one dissenting vote. Compounding this chaos was the process of having kings rule by invitation. In times of crisis, their monarchs tended to be invited from potential aggressors, or to counter balance that aggression. The result was a disintegration of government, followed by the state itself, from which Poland was not to emerge until this century; one might say it did not effectively emerge until recent years.

The beginning of the end came in 1732 with the secret "alliance of the three Black Eagles"\(^95\), where Russia, Austria and Prussia agreed to jointly preserve Poland's system of government. Whilst it appears to be a generous move, whenever other nations have the power to act as protectors, then the nation concerned has lost its freedom for self determination. Over the years its situation deteriorated, and it became gradually more obvious that Poland's three powerful neighbours would take more significant action in the future. By 1770 even Turkey, at that time a supposed ally of the Poles, had designs on its territory. There were many in Poland who recognized that their problems lay in their mode of government, and so the 'philosophes' Rousseau and Malby, were requested to


Rousseau began work on his \textit{Considerations on the Government of Poland, and on its Proposed Reformation} in 1771, completing it in April 1772. Events were not awaiting the Genevan philosopher as, in February 1772, Prussia and Russia, had taken possession of large tracts of Polish territory in what is called the first partition. In the further partitions of 1793 and 1797 the remainder of the country was divided up between the three "Black Eagles". Rousseau's task was far from ideal. He recognized that far from being able to work on a clean slate, the slate itself was disappearing. That is to say, if there was to be a Polish social entity, it needed 'Polish' children, and such beings might not exist in the near future. He does lay out a design for government, but must have realised that the Poles would have little scope for deciding their own fates by this time. What he does see is the possibility for national survival through education. This message appears not to have fallen on deaf ears, as in 1773 the "...ideas of the philosophes..."\footnote{Will and Ariel Durant, p486.} were heard by an education committee which became what is claimed to have been "...the first state education authority in Europe to have the status of a separate ministry."\footnote{\textit{A Panorama of Polish History}, p79.}
How then was Rousseau going to educate a Polish Emile? He states the problems of his mandate and his lack of close ties with his subject, and goes on to summarize the Polish nation as falling,

"...into paralysis whenever it tries to make any effort or to satisfy any need; and which, in spite of all this, lives and maintains its vigour:..." (Poland, p160)

He even advocates a decrease in the size of the nation believing it to be beneficial to government reform, noting also that "Perhaps your neighbours are thinking of doing you this service." (Poland, p182). With many references to the Social Contract and comparisons (favourable and otherwise) with the English Parliament, Rousseau lays out a formula for the government of Poland which hinges around the abolition or amendment of the 'liberum veto' (Poland, p192).

Emile, we are told in the work of 1762, will emerge from his education, not as a priest, magistrate or soldier, but as a 'man'. In similar tone, we are told that "At twenty, a Pole ought not to be a man of any other sort; he ought to be a Pole." (Poland, p176). This is the essence of Rousseau's education for Poland. Whereas Emile's education was to be an armour against the corruption he would experience in the prevailing society (presumably of mid eighteenth century France), the Polish version was to wear distinctly different protection. Again, as with Emile, education was to support a particular notion of social organization, and is inseparable from it. Without a strong sense of Polish nationalism Rousseau
had the foresight to see that it would not have the strength ever to rise out of its current subservience. It is not too much to draw an analogy with some aspects of the philosophy of Emile. Whereas Rousseau's education of the Poles prepares them for their ideal of a free and independent Poland, when it emerges, Emile's education likewise prepares him for the ideal society of the Social Contract, when it emerges.

The principles of Emile are retained, but the period of childhood ends for Polish children at ten years as opposed to twelve. In familiar tone, Rousseau says,

"I can never sufficiently repeat that good education ought to be negative. Prevent vices from arising and you will have done enough for virtue. In a good system of public education, the way to accomplish this is simplicity itself: it is to keep children always on the alert, not by boring studies of which they understand nothing and which they hate simply because they are forced to sit still; but by exercises which give them pleasure..."
(Poland, p178)

His concern, then, is still that education be a pleasurable experience for children. Despite a distinctly nationalistic curriculum, and the awesome realities of the state in Poland, Rousseau is true to his philosophy. At ascending age levels the Polish child is to become accomplished in different facets of Polish geography, economics and history, the method of imparting this knowledge is not specified. One cannot but assume that, as with Emile, the system will be quite as humanitarian as his age had yet seen.

The notion has been put forward that Rousseau's Polish proposals somehow invalidate Emile. Margaret Gillett is of
that view, claiming that the "...free individualistic spirit of Emile." is denied\textsuperscript{99}, seeing his public education necessitating "...adherence to the general will." Such a view, infers that Emile's education recognizes no ultimate design, and no correlation with the \textit{Social Contract}. In fact, Rousseau's education for the Poles retains much of the humanitarian spirit of \textit{Emile}, but only by necessity of the specific Polish situation, denies the individuality of \textit{Emile}. As has been suggested earlier, that individuality is more a means of presentation than an essential of the doctrine. What he could do was to retain the humanity to children which is so important an aspect of the earlier work, whilst amending those aspects of education which could aid the state in crisis. One such point is in play. Rousseau calls on Polish children to be encouraged always to play together, never alone. His object is to ensure that they all work towards common goals (\textit{Poland}, p178). In other words, he wants them to begin to develop an understanding of society at an earlier age than Emile did. This did not invalidate \textit{Emile}, merely elaborated on it. \textsc{immanuel Kant} said,

"...we see the advantage of public education in that under such a system, we learn to measure our powers with those of others, and to know the limits imposed upon us by the rights of others. .... Public education is the best education for future

As an enthusiast for *Emile*, it is interesting to see that Kant's recommendations see the same benefits for citizenship as Rousseau. In the Polish text he was looking for the survival of national identity, and he did so without prejudice to the philosophy of *Emile*, nor to the adoption of practices which even a neutral thinker would consider appropriate to a good society.

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100 Immanuel Kant, p29.
Chapter 4
Rousseau's Critics

Scholars have causes for criticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, often for good reason, but sometimes biased by perspective, and occasionally for lack of proper understanding. He lays himself open to criticism, recognizing that he is not able to fully rationalize his educational philosophy, but that he is laying a stepping stone to some greater understanding. His writings are aggressive and outrageous. He believed himself to be a lone voice in the wilderness, and as such he did not look for disciples. He, in fact, expected to be attacked and, particularly in his later life, saw attacks where there were none. Perhaps his greatest personal tragedy was that in his earlier days he invited the criticism which later life found him unable to cope with.

The first category of Rousseau's critics are those who criticize his personal behaviour. The general direction of such attacks is to point to his own performance as a father, and educational mentor. The only recorded offsprings of his relationship with Thérèse Levasseur were all bundled off to the foundlings hospital, presumed never to be seen again. They certainly do not return to any of the accounts of the writer or his mistress. He claims some remorse for his actions, by his account in *Emile*, where he says,

"He who cannot fulfill the duties of a father has no right to become one. Neither poverty of labours nor concern for public opinion exempts him from feeding his children and from raising them himself."
Readers, you can believe me. I predict to whoever has vitals and neglects such holy duties that he will long shed bitter tears for his offense and will never find consolation for it." (Emile, p49)

Barnard is sympathetic to Rousseau, believing Emile to be "...to some extent a kind of reparation for his own short-comings as a father?"$^{101}$ McClintock's is the more often cited type of observation, which asks, "Should one take seriously a critique of civilization by a man so imperfectly civilized?"$^{102}$ However, sometimes in the course of a lifetime irredeemable errors are committed, which likewise stimulate a clearer vision of what should have been done on later consideration; hindsight has great popular acclaim.

Sceptics of his educational process are concerned that it just will not work. They believe that Rousseau glosses over some troublesome issues as he exerts his license as a novelist, sweeping the boy to adulthood without truly testing some important notions. In his aversion to the pupil being impregnated with the opinions of others, both books and reasoning are outlawed. But, without books history and all of the learning of past ages are lost on the pupil; and further, without some intellectual intercourse with others he will fail to develop "...the critical spirit and training in argument and discussion."$^{103}$, which need to be in place as the youth

$^{101}$ H.C. Barnard, p256.

$^{102}$ Robert McClintock, p309.

$^{103}$ R.S. Peters, p21.
enters society. Peters counters the answer that Emile is learning how to learn with the repost that, "...there is no point in learning how to learn unless something is eventually learnt."\textsuperscript{104} Whilst the point made by R.S. Peters is undoubtedly correct, it assumes that Rousseau intended education to be practised on an individual basis. If, as has been suggested earlier, Emile is a single demonstration to avoid unwieldy interfaces, then practical education, as demonstrated by the Polish case, would involve communal exchange in the learning process. In a similar way, Rousseau's aversion to books might have been moderated had books been available which directed themselves more closely to a child's ability to understand. His concern was primarily not to fill the child's minds with things they were unable to comprehend, not with avoiding books for their own sake.

That empty void, when the child is supposedly learning only from things, concerns others than Peters. Madame Necker de Saussure was concerned that whilst nothing was done, nothing was prevented, in that a child is as likely to drift to bad habits as good ones\textsuperscript{105}. The response is to point to the fact that the tutor is tasked with ensuring that Emile is shielded from such things, but Bantock suggests this would be

\textsuperscript{104} R.S. Peters, p26.

\textsuperscript{105} H.C. Barnard, p267.
a practical impossibility. In fact, in any reading of Rousseau's educational philosophy it is inappropriate to expect practicality. Individual tutors who dedicate their lives to one pupil cannot be a basis for 'practicality'. For those who are looking for a sensible approach from Rousseau, Meiclejohn has some appropriate words,

"Rousseau, ... has no common sense. He is absurd. His creative, tumultuous mind rushes to extremes. But its particular genius lies in the fact that when contradictory ideas are being dealt with, he rushes to both extremes. He presses the claim of unity just as clearly and passionately as diversity."  

"Few men of sober mind would be inclined to accept his theories as he frames them. And yet he cannot be ignored. He is absurd. But he is never ridiculous."  

Whether something can in fact be implemented is not a particularly relevant argument on a work of philosophy. What is less credible though, is the extension of license used by the author to give the impression of a careful study, which was not the case.

Claparède's criticism is noted earlier, in his scepticism of whether "...sufficiently careful methods..." have been used by Rousseau. Also, John Adams is said to have criticized

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107 Alexander Meiclejohn, p71.
108 Alexander Meiclejohn, p72.
109 Dr Ed. Claparède, p74.
his glorification of 'savages' because "... he knew what
indians were really like..".110 Mary Wollstonecraft accused him
of not "...properly sifting the subject,..." (Vindication, p47)
in her tirade against Rousseau for not doing anything for the
cause of women’s equality. These people were undoubtedly
correct, and despite the good words about the license of
novelists and philosophers, one cannot help but wish Rousseau
had not been quite so smug about his fictitious results. Many
great things are said to result from the educational process
which Emile goes through, based only on the fact that Jean-
Jacques says so. The reader can feel as manipulated as the
pupil.

That manipulation is a significant concern not so much
from a practical perspective, but the question goes deep into
the philosophical basis of Emile, and back to A Discourse on
the Origins of Inequality. The one important concern which
Rousseau runs through each work is the importance of nature,
and the educational process being as near natural as possible.
This leads scholars to query, as Geoffrey Fidler does, the
"...coercive tendencies..."111 displayed in Emile. Early
critics of this aspect of Emile were Richard and Maria
Edgeworth. They proclaimed it "...very dangerous counsel ...
to teach truth by falsehood.". They assert that children by

110 Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian
Thought in the Western World (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

111 Geoffrey Fidler, p29.
"...theatric effect of circumstances treacherously arranged, are to be duped, surprised, and cheated, into virtue." (Practical Education, Vol. I, p191).

There is a further concern with the long term impact of the pupil's manipulation at the hands of his tutor. Bantock sees him as remaining reliant on the tutor, being "...anaesthatised from any tendency to argue."\textsuperscript{112} Kant reads another concern into the pupils belief that he is receiving an unconstrained upbringing, asserting that "...a certain lawlessness will cling to him throughout his life."\textsuperscript{113} These two versions demonstrate the extent to which opinions differ on the consequences of what Rousseau's Emile has to say. One reads the boy becoming overly reliant on the covert protection which he receives, and the other sees him becoming wild due to his perceived lack of constraint.

Powerful critics of Rousseau, with a powerful case, are the feminists. In Jean-Jacques there was a philosopher, willing to retreat from society, ready to risk ridicule to have his theory heard on how mankind strayed from the path of virtuous society. Yet why, after asserting in A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality that in the beginning men and women were in effect equal, did he go along the easy road of accepting the status quo. Plato provided him a precedent in his female guardians, and it is a simple step for Rousseau to

\textsuperscript{112} G.H. Bantock, 'The Mountain Goat', p273.

\textsuperscript{113} Immanuel Kant, p4.
extend his strong belief against men enslaving men to not allowing them to enslave women either. Unfortunately, on that one the great mind stumbled; he was not visionary enough, or he was but could not bring himself to articulate it.

Some observers just cannot cope with their perceived sense of unreality which pervades Rousseau's work. Jules LeMaitre deals with it in very strong language,

"All this education is one continual lie. Lies are the very soul of three-fourths of all Jean-Jacques' books."\(^{112}\)

R.S. Peters prefers sarcasm,

"Childhood to Rousseau was what 'the working man' has been to many intellectual socialists - an idealised object of respect, not a creature of flesh and blood to be welcomed at home."\(^{113}\)

The unreality of Emile's supposed 'natural' upbringing is expressed by different people in different ways; Featherstone finds it "foolishness"\(^{116}\), Sommerville even sees "sadism"\(^{117}\) and Bantock describes Rousseau's descriptions as "embarrassingly rhapsodical"\(^{118}\). There is a great deal of unease at the way Rousseau presents his case, but also some posturing. Sometimes it is appropriate to put a great philosopher on the pedestal as a sort of 'whipping boy', to

\(^{114}\) Jules LeMaitre, p245.

\(^{115}\) R.S. Peters, p18.

\(^{116}\) Joseph Featherstone, p181.

\(^{117}\) C. John Sommerville, p154.

\(^{118}\) G.H. Bantock, "Emile Reconsidered", p65.
be the justification of some new line of thinking. Charles Fourier did it to Rousseau in grand style and to others as well, when he began his first "revelation" in 1803 with the following words,

"Great men of all the centuries! Newton and Leibniz, Voltaire and Rousseau, do you know in what you are great? In blindness."119

Fourier was criticising Rousseau to draw attention to himself. He was closer to Rousseau than these words might infer, in effect developing his theories out of, and as adaptations to, Rousseau's earlier work.

The criticisms of Rousseau take many forms, but two more should be noted. One concerns the relevance of the education which Emile receives. Fourier points out that he is of a wealthy family, inferring that any lessons learned can have no message to the masses120. That Fourier was wrong could have been recognized if he had been a little introspective. Rousseau's influence was being exercised if in no other way than as a sounding board for his own ideas.

The last criticism to be discussed is the accusation which is levelled at Rousseau that he is somewhat totalitarian. Featherstone says of him,


"Like the Grand Inquisitor and his twentieth-century heirs, he is tempted to enslave the human race out of pity for its weakness."  

This view of Rousseau is recognizable, but contentious. Whilst he is prone to manipulation of the pupil, as far as a reading of Emile or The Considerations on the Government of Poland are concerned, his central cause remains the happiness of the individual. There is no utilitarian expression about the greater happiness, and his references in this respect are not abstract. He is concerned that children grow happy, and if through some misfortune they do not survive to adulthood, then at least the life they had will not be tainted with regret. That does not equate with totalitarianism. To the extent that the Social Contract deals with the communal good, then maybe the accusation has more weight, but that work does not speak to individuals, in that it does not provide individual instances. Thus, as Meiklejohn alludes in the earlier quotation, Rousseau can easily fly to opposite extremes; he can be for individual happiness, and general happiness at the same time. The totalitarian would always sacrifice the individual! Therefore, although what exactly Rousseau was is unclear, he was not a totalitarian; he would not 'totally' submit the individual to the state. He looks to the individual to participate in the 'general will', but a totalitarian would

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121 Joseph Featherstone, p182.
not have spent all that time developing Emile’s individual ability to choose and discern.
Chapter 5
Rousseau's Educational 'Message'

As a benefit of the interesting circumstances of his life, Jean-Jacques Rousseau was able to take a considerable amount of time to concentrate his mind on the meaning of human existence. A century before Darwin he found himself with a preliminary evolutionary theory. He began from his current vantage point, and projected backwards examining each change which had occurred as humans passed through the different stages; looking from the social beings of his day to the wandering hunters of antiquity. The whole concept was ultimately presented for public scrutiny in *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*. As the title indicates, this was not only a study of nature, in a pure sense, but a study of social evolution. He began with a presupposition that at some point in antiquity all men (and women, but he down-plays that aspect) were equal, and examines the ways that social evolution generated inequalities.

There is a next logical question which follows the processes through which Rousseau went, which is - so what can be done about it? If a great mind can take us back to the roots of inequality, then is his mental capacity not adequate to chart a course back there. Or, if not exactly back there, can the ship not be turned from its current divergent course to a convergent course, or, as a return towards a 'savage' state is impractical, could not the pace of degradation be
halted? There is no doubt that even to a 'philosophe', an absolute return to nature was not possible. For one thing, the world had become too populous. The French could hardly return to isolation in the woods; with the best will in the world, the people were so many, and the woodlands so few, that these new found stone-age people would keep falling over one another. No, in order for social man to turn back towards equality, someone would need to identify the target; that is, someone would have to point the way. The target would need to be something which was not totally out of reach.

Rousseau's *Social Contract* was established as the target. It is a compromise between the ideals of a return to 'natural' equality, and the realities of modern social conditions. It by no means gives everyone total equality, but it lays down the conditions under which substantial equality is achieved. The next logical question involves the 'how' of getting there, and the answer is through education. Minds had to be conditioned towards a changed concept of society.

People were taught throughout the centuries to expect no more than they had. The aristocracy and the church acted to their mutual benefit in pressing the virtues of acceptance of whatever this life might bring, with its abject miseries for the majority, in favour of something better in the life hereafter. They were not to look for equality, merely to fall in line with the greater scheme of things, and to accept the guidance of their betters. Thus, if education was to present
a route to the new society, it was going to have to be
different, not just in content but also in structure. The
methods which maintained people in the unquestioned obedience
to the status quo, would not provide candidates for a new
social order.

So, as Jean-Jacques sat with pen poised ready to begin
the Emile, what were the concepts which he would establish as
his structure, around which the fabric of his treatise would
be laid? Two eminent modern scholars have presented their
views of what the central themes of Emile are. R.S. Peters
sees three main themes, namely,

1. That the child is to be the central concern of
   education, not the curriculum.
2. That it equates to the Social Contract in its "plea
   for freedom", plotting a course for survival in a corrupt
   society.
3. That it glorifies Nature, and refers to it as a
   "standard".\footnote{R.S. Peters, p15.}

Maurice Cranston refers to "two theses of a philosophical kind
which inform the whole work." They are,

1. That learning must be by experience, in that the mind
   is fundamentally blank, and all acquired knowledge is to
   reach it "through the senses".
2. Corruption is of society, people are born innocent.\footnote{Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage, p175.}
It is suggested, however, that although these are important themes they are not the most important. They are the 'fabric' of Rousseau's educational philosophy, not its 'structure'. The overall theme of Emile, which is only alluded to in Peters' second point, is that it is not merely an education for the Social Contract, but it is an education directed towards equality. The term 'directed' is used carefully, in that it is unlikely that Rousseau himself would have advocated total equality, despite the fact that his educational philosophy was aimed that way. What he was more likely aiming for is social justice. This can be rationalized by equating a return to equality with a complete return to nature. Social justice is the achievable target along the 'utopian' path to equality. It is that education which will shed the constraints of centuries of history, and render each individual so free of the prejudices and corruption of his prevailing society, that they would be able to exercise freedom to the extent reasonable in the context of a society.

In order to achieve social justice, through education, two things needed to occur. The first is that the connection with the past needs to be severed, and the second is that individuals need to recognize and feel their freedom. Thus, if 'social justice' is the main theme of Rousseau's Emile, then the secondary themes are the rejection of the past and the freedom of individuals. Only from these secondary themes do the elements of Rousseau's philosophy become defined. These
elements constitute the fabric of his education for equality.

**Rejection of the Past**

There are three essential elements of Rousseau's rejection of the past. They all constitute forms of isolation, and are so necessary as the past pervades everything, and is at the root of anything labelled 'education'.

The first element is isolation from opinion. Opinion is handed down to the pupil by teachers and family alike. It is a very persuasive form of extension of historical values. We are all so tempted to defend the values by which we were educated; they provide a basis of existence, and a power over others who are not yet so well versed in them. Rejection of the past would be a rejection of much of what parents and teachers considered as their important values. This very dynamic form of extension would always work counter to change, until such time as the new 'breed' emerge.

This is not to say that teachers and parents can be excluded from their traditional roles. However, Rousseau completely rejects their practices in his own time. In both *La Nouvelle Heloise*, and *Emile*, he both extols the virtues of the family, and criticizes much of what was current practise in child rearing. The theme of preventing children from becoming miniature dictators through their crying is explained in *La Nouvelle Heloise* thus,

"The thing that encourages children to bawl is the attention paid to them, either in yielding to them
or in opposing them. Generally a whole day's weeping is enough to show them that we do not want them to weep."\textsuperscript{124}

The same theme is presented in Emile along with others like the encouragement of mothers to breast feed their own babies. Hence, in his rejection of the past Rousseau did not join Plato in rejecting the family. He was rejecting practices in the family, as he was rejecting bad practices in schools.

If teachers and parents are the dynamic exponents of the ways of the past, then in Rousseau's day the passive exponents, or the tools of the trade, were books. Isolation from books would be necessary, as the philosophy of subservience was written into much of the supposedly great literature. The catalyst was often religion. Religious bodies influenced literature. In no way is it more clear than when considering censorship of the day (or even today). The originators of any call for a book to be banned would invariably be a religious order. Ironically, such was the case with Emile itself. Hence, with religious orders both determining what was considered good literature, and being the fundamental order for organizing the repression of social justice, then books could provide nothing to a movement towards equality.

The third element of a rejection of the past is an

isolation from the present. In that the present is biased by the past, and impregnated by past values, Emile should have no part of it either, because social pressures would be directed towards having him conform to present norms and mores.

**Freedom of Individuals**

Freedom is the most important of the two 'secondary themes' of social justice, but it cannot be pursued until the first 'secondary theme', rejection of the past, has been achieved. Equality and freedom are interconnected and they are two essential elements of Rousseau's conditioning of the child in order for it to be ready for freedom. Freedom is not a thing which would emerge. Those freed at the stroke of a pen, or sword, usually go on to enslave others, in that they see society as black and white; as masters and slaves. Freedom has to be an inner concept to have any chance to bloom.

For this reason the first element of freedom for the individual is respect for childhood; it is of primary importance to dispel the myth of an inherent debt at birth. People have to begin the education process with a clear feeling of innocence in order to avoid any perception of subservience to anything. And, throughout their childhood they should be treated not so much as adults but as individuals deserving respect; a sentiment deserved by adults and children alike.
The other component of Rousseau's sub-structure for ensuring the freedom of the individual is the 'powerhouse' of his new social order. It is the purification of the process by which knowledge is acquired. It takes the pupil, Emile, and instead of making him reliant on the teachings of others, it endows him with the ability to teach himself. It ensures that he will be equipped to avoid the snares of past education, which was aimed at subservience, and directs him towards the freedom of individual choice. 'Negative education' and the other aspects of Rousseau's education for Emile, particularly in the childhood period to twelve years, are methods of achieving the ability to self-teach.

The structure discussed here is presented in figure i. in diagrammatic form. It is not suggested that Rousseau actually sat with pen poised and this structure by his side. It is, however, suggested that the Emile hangs around this structure. It supports the notion of Emile and the Social Contract as connected works, but only in as much as they both combine to answer the question which comes out of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. That is the question of how to stop the trend of increasing inequality. It may be observed that nature is excluded from the presented structure, but from a Rousseauean perspective, equality is synonymous with nature; and the achievement of improved social justice would be a move towards the natural.

The two aspects of Rousseau's educational message are
presented in figure i. Also presented as figure ii. is a fanciful graphical representation of social degradation against time, as Jean-Jacques might have seen it. The solid line, getting progressively worse with the passage of time, represents the unchecked acceleration of the oppression of those who were supposedly born to have power, over the others who were supposedly born to serve. The dotted line curving to a horizontal from a tangent to the solid line is an indication that with a move to recognize the realities of social injustice, and to reverse them, then social degradation can be halted. This model assumes that despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Rousseau was not really expecting to reverse 'progress', merely to arrest it. It is a debatable point along the lines of trying to interpret the difference between what he said, and what he really meant. Immediately above the baseline is another dotted line representing savage man, with a hardly discernible level of social degradation.

In terms of Rousseau’s literature, and the structure of his philosophy, the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, is a reflection from Rousseau’s point on the ascending solid line, back to the horizontal dotted line. The Social Contract and Emile represent his total plan for social justice, which will arrest the current degradation. What he presented, however, was only the plan, the architects initial drawing, which would need to be adapted and amended and ultimately implemented by others. In Newtonian terms, the movement
towards social justice would need the exertion of significant force to divert the course of social 'progress'. And, in the British scenario, the types of people who did that were Richard and Maria Edgeworth, Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin and Robert Owen. They were all absolutely keen to change the prevailing methods of education, they were all distinctly humanitarian, and all were in debt to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who articulated the link from education to social justice. They did not always see themselves as Rousseauist, but without a doubt he was in the baggage carried by all.
A STRUCTURAL BREAKDOWN OF THE "MESSAGE" IN ROUSSEAU'S ÉMILE

SOCIAL JUSTICE

REJECTION OF THE PAST
- Isolation from opinions based on the past
- Isolation from books which transfer oppressive concepts of the past
- Isolation from the present as biased by the past

FREEDOM OF INDIVIDUALS
- Children born innocent i.e. No innate ideas
  - Purify the acquisition of knowledge by learning through experience only
    - Education of the senses
    - Negative education
DIAGRAMMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUSSEAU'S PAST, PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SOCIETIES

- The course of social degradation at the mid eighteenth century
- Natural conditions of social equilibrium: (see the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality)
- New equilibrium to be achieved through the Social Contract and Emile

Figure II.

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau was not simply a philosopher who chose to write on several topics of interest. His fundamental concern is with social justice. He first rationalized how equality was lost, and next worked to see if it could be regained. In recognizing that this was unreasonable, he accepts social justice as an appropriate objective. He would likely look on the society of today as having achieved much of what he was looking for. He was at heart a humanitarian, and whilst the *Emile* by no means lays a design for getting from the education of his day to that of today, his influence on the fact of its occurrence is irrefutable. Of the two main elements of his structure, it is his call for individual freedom which is the most important donation to progress. Rejection of the past was for the moment. There were those like Thomas Day, and Maria Edgeworth who heard that message and applied their energy to a new literature more suitable to a new society. Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Owen followed up on their own versions of social justice. None did so in the name of Rousseauism, but all were to some degree influenced by his philosophy.
Chapter 6

Rousseau and the English

As a bridge between discussion of the educational philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and its interpretation by the five chosen English writers, this chapter takes a two way look at Rousseau and the English; one backwards and the other forwards. The 'philosophes' in general, and Rousseau in particular, owe a debt to English philosophy. If a distinct start point can be given to the 'Enlightenment' (which is taking some license as movements of this type are not instantaneous, but emerge over time), it is in the England of 1688, when the expulsion of King James II finally put an end to the notion of the 'Divine Right of Kings'. With it went the whole concept of the pyramid of power exercising down through the aristocracy the fundamental principle that God had structured society in such a way that people were born either privileged, or not. The peak of the pyramid is the monarch with all powers over people, and at the base were peasants with no powers and a totally subservient condition. The peasant class had begun to diminish prior to 1688, and the concept could not survive the Enlightenment philosophy.

John Locke

The first significant works exploring the consequent realisation, that if God did not create a vertical structure for society, then all people were born equal, and free, was
John Locke. He had been a political exile for five years before 1688, and returned to become the spokesman for the new philosophy with the publication of both his second Treatise of Civil Government and his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, both in 1690. Locke's views had been known prior to this time, hence his exile. The first version of the former document was begun in 1680. In the introduction to the second Treatise on Civil Government, Locke begins by asserting that, as Adam was given no rights by God to rule others, then his heirs inherited no such right. Consequently, he says,

"...we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man."125

He proceeded to detail everyone's rights to equality in a way which is clear, and stood the test of time. In fact, beyond the reach of the old aristocratic structure, Locke's logic became the foundation of the United States' constitution.

John Locke and Isaac Newton were friends, and their similarities are often noted. Locke did for human rights what Newton did for science. One writer analogises Locke to Newton by asserting that he produced "...the law of gravity

controlling the formation of human ideas."\textsuperscript{126} However, Locke may have been riding the crest of a wave in the early years after 1688, but he had to beware of prevailing religious intolerance. Hampson proceeds to note that he "...was careful to fit his theories within a Christian framework,...". Whilst he avoided a serious religious reaction, Locke's views were not considered acceptable by all his observers. A student at Cambridge, John Byrom, is recorded as being warned off reading Locke, in 1709, because he is considered an atheist.\textsuperscript{127} Locke's works, however, went on to become the texts which no Enlightenment thinker could dispense with, and in due course Jean-Jacques Rousseau was to give them thorough examination. Throughout \textit{Emile} there are many references to Locke, and Locke's book; this reference being to a work titled \textit{Some Thoughts on Education}, which was also published in 1690. Its importance to Rousseau is stressed by Allan Bloom in his note (4) on the preface to \textit{Emile} in which he says,

"This book is of capital importance for Rousseau's project, not only because he adopts much of it, but especially because it represents the other great modern alternative. Rousseau defines much of his position as over against that of Locke. A deep understanding of \textit{Emile} presupposes a knowledge of Locke's teaching." (Emile, p481)

References to Locke tend to be made when Rousseau is deviating


\textsuperscript{127} J.C.D. Clark, \textit{English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, social structure and political practice during the ancien regime} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p47.
from his work. One of the deviations noted by Rousseau is in his presentation of the education of Sophie (*Emile*, p357). Locke, sensibly, is quoted as ending his story where his male pupil is ready to marry. As noted earlier, observers since might have been kinder to Rousseau if he had followed suit. Rousseau's deference to Locke can be noted in his treatment of the subject of exercise for children, in which he says,

"I have already spoken sufficiently of its importance, and since on this point one cannot give better reasons or more sensible rules than those to be found in Locke's book, I shall content myself with referring you to it after having taken the liberty of adding some observations to his." (*Emile*, p126)

Thus, as Bloom notes, a full appreciation of Rousseau's educational philosophy necessitates filling in the missing gaps in *Emile*, from Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*.

The most significant 'message' Rousseau takes from Locke concerns the mind at birth. In his first chapter after the introduction to *An Essay on Human Understanding*, Locke presents his case in a point by point logic described as "the way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it is not innate."[^128]. Locke, in fact, subscribed to the concept of the mind as a 'tabula rasa', or clean slate, though he did not use exactly that term. His own term to describe the

blankness of the mind at birth was "white paper".\textsuperscript{129}

The originator of the concept was Aristotle, who is translated as having referred to the mind as,

"...in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written;..."\textsuperscript{130}

The reappearance of the concept is credited to John Locke\textsuperscript{131}, but for the use of the term 'tabula rasa' it is necessary to look to one of his critics\textsuperscript{132}. Thomas Watts objected to Locke's views on the state of the human mind at birth from a firmly religious standpoint. In formulating his objection, he states:

"...I take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions, as a rasa tabula, or white paper:..."\textsuperscript{133}

John Locke elaborates the principle of the blank mind at birth in \textit{Some Thoughts Concerning Education}, explaining,

"I imagine the minds of children as easily turned

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} John Locke, \textit{An Essay Concerning...}, p59.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Takamura Ando, \textit{Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p49.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Kenneth MacLean, \textit{John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century} (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1962), p23.
\end{itemize}
this or that way, as Water it self;..."\textsuperscript{134}

In this work he goes on to discuss many elements in the education of a child which can be seen to re-emerge in *Emile*. There is the caution not to pamper crying children due to the bad habits they grow with (p139), and the reader is also cautioned against "great Severity of Punishment" (p146), whilst not abolishing beatings, Locke speaks against the prevailing harsh attitudes of tutors. In Locke, as in Rousseau, there is a humanity which looked for the better treatment of childhood. Although he does not articulate, in the way Rousseau does, in favour of childhood being respected as a state of life in itself, he certainly gives particular consideration to the child.

In a letter to Edward Clarke in July 1684, there is something of what Helvétius and Owen later adopted, in the observation that,

"...I think I may say of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten, or perhaps ninety-nine of one hundred, are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education."\textsuperscript{135}

It affirms the assertion that good and evil are not inherent. He does not however, interpret, as Rousseau later does, that education simply needs to shield the child from corruption. He sees a more active role for education in moulding its attributes, similar to the case Helvétius was to make later.

\textsuperscript{135} James L. Axtell, p341.