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The Internal and the External: A Critical Evaluation of
Peter Winch's Idea of Social Science

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A Thesis
In
The Department
of
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ABSTRACT

The Internal and The External: A Critical Evaluation of Peter Winch's Idea of Social Science
Stephen Charles Block

This thesis attempts to critically examine Peter Winch's own critical examination of the social studies wherein he distinguishes proper quasi-philosophical method from improper 'pseudo-science'.

Chapter One is an expository look at Winch's discussion of social scientific methodology, and the proposals for such a methodology as made by both philosophers and social scientists over the last century or so. Winch suggests most of such proposals, being 'external' examinations which copy or resemble physical scientific procedures, do not support an appropriate method for examining human social life and issues. He also suggests it has been shown that philosophy, with its 'internal' method of evaluating ideas and meanings, is best suited to provide the outline for such an undertaking.

Chapter Two is an expository look at several of the most relevant essays Winch wrote on social theoretical and moral philosophical issues. It continues to draw the distinction between the physicalist and conceptual models of attempting to understand human ethics and action.
Chapter Three is an interpretive look at Winch's notion of 'logical relations' wherein he distinguishes between inference-drawing, as it would pertain in physical science and in thought in general. Winch tries to provide further insight into why the logic of human life also ought to be the logic for the investigation of it.

Chapter Four is a point by point reevaluation of three prominent areas Winch touched on in his analysis of social scientists' methodologies to show that Winch has not understood what the real significance was of those methodologies. It also briefly questions Winch's own priorities in criticizing or failing to criticize the thinkers he looks at. My claim is that Winch's thesis is as external, in ignoring the internality of theory, as the scientific thinking to which his critique was meant to be aimed.

I then draw my conclusions and suggest how Winch may have been able to go about his critique differently—the way some social scientists already have attempted to do. This would have enabled him to arrive at an even more compelling 'internal' critique of social scientific methodology.
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ABBREVIATIONS


All other abbreviations will be explained in the footnotes
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.

Milton (Aeropagitica)

"I have little patience with scientists who take a board of wood, look for its thinnest part, and drill a great number of holes where drilling is easy."

Albert Einstein (quoted by Philip Frank in "Einstein's Philosophy of Science," Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1949)

"Unreserved devotion to a cause is the loftiest precondition of intellectual independence....At issue was more than the elaboration of known material;...It was necessary to bear responsibility for a piece of momentous knowledge, which presehted a direct challenge to a world of superficiality and formalism. It was necessary to stand alone—which did not exactly foster popularity....Honest pioneer work in the field of science has always been, and will continue to be, life's pilot. On all sides, life is surrounded by hostility. This puts us under an obligation."

Wilhelm Reich (discussing his time as Freud's disciple in The Function of the Orgasm, Pp. 36-37, Touchstone, 1961).
Introduction

This thesis is a critical look at Peter Winch's own critique of social science. It is undertaken for two reasons: the first is that I believe many, if not almost all, of the criticisms Winch lays at the door of social scientific methodology are in fact valid ones. At the same time, and second, I am not satisfied with his peculiar philosophical representation of the problems inherent in the social studies.

I generally like and accept the distinction between internal philosophical and external quasi-scientific critique which he outlines, but I also suspect that it can serve as a kind of incestuous self-affirmation within philosophical circles; especially when philosophy sees itself in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the social sciences. This, I will argue, creates a paradox such that philosophers condemn social science in precisely the way—externally—they claim social science is so often guilty of offering its own criticisms. Only perhaps in the case of philosophy it is done so without what Winch calls 'extra-scientific' pretensions.

Nonetheless, as I argue, external critique is external critique and the purpose of this thesis is to encourage a dialogue between the fields of the social studies and philosophy. For regardless of offences committed or imagined, my belief is that the only way for one discipline to understand another is for those disciplines to undertake to read each other in a manner at least compatible with (stated or unstated) intentions. As Winch emphasizes this in relation to all thought except that emanating from the social studies, I find myself dissenting from the conclusions of his thesis even if I am in general accord with the thrust of his enterprise.
Introduction

Generally my view accords with Alfred Schutz's who said of the difficulties in the social studies that:

This unsatisfactory state of affairs results chiefly from the fact that the development of the modern social sciences occurred during a period in which the science of logic was mostly concerned with the logic of the natural sciences. In a kind of monopolistic imperialism the methods of the latter were frequently declared to be the only scientific ones and the particular problems which social scientists encountered in their work were disregarded. Left without help and guidance in their revolt against this dogmatism, the students of human affairs had to develop their own conceptions of what they believed to be the methodology of the social sciences. They did it without sufficient philosophical knowledge and stopped their effort when they reached a level of generalization which seemed to justify their deeply felt conviction that the goal of their inquiry could not be reached by adopting the methods of the natural sciences without modification or implementation. No wonder that their arguments are frequently ill-founded, their formulations insufficient, and that many understandings obfuscate the controversy. Not what social scientists said but what they meant is therefore our main concern in the following.

It is with these sympathetic sentiments in mind that I always intended to proceed with my own criticisms of social science, and it is therefore why I found myself dissatisfied with Winch's version of the source of the same difficulties.

Chapter One details the view Winch put forward in The Idea of a Social Science (1955) wherein he discusses in detail the difference between
philosophical analysis, scientific investigation and what he calls pseudo-scientific explanation. He introduces that book by berating those who have believed philosophy ought to be the handmaiden of other disciplines, such as science. For he argues that philosophy has its own distinctive character and a unique contribution to make all of its own. My outline is expository and attempts to capture, as best as possible, the range of nuances found in Winch's original statement.

Winch describes the kind of contribution he thinks philosophy can make and what its importance is in relation to resolving social theoretical problems. And he states, I believe, something which well needs to be stated about the importance of the philosophical perspective; on its own and in relation to other world views such as that of natural science.

Chapter Two reviews several essays in Winch's *Ethics and Action* (E&A). There Winch continues the theme of the difference between philosophical 'understanding' and scientific 'study'. He broadens and deepens its implications so that they include the examination of such things as the universalizability thesis in social philosophy, the effects of scientific 'logic' on the understanding of magic and religion in 'primitive' culture and the different senses in which meanings are conveyed and interpreted in philosophy, religion and science.

This book is an extension, as I said, of the argument found in ESS. But it is at the same time a way for Winch to extend his analysis to other areas beside the largely methodological concerns of his earlier work My.
interest in it is that Winch shows the philosophical character of his argument more in these essays than in ISS and consequently, I say in Chapter Four, exposes many inconsistencies in his own logic. But as with Chapter One, my interest here is only in detailing Winch's argument.

Chapter Three brings many strains of his view together and develops the underlying theme of logical relations. Winch argues that the logical relations, as between people, which involve communication of whichever level, is what has to be accounted for, not the sociological or 'factual' phenomena most commonly associated with social scientific research. I have taken representations and samplings of this theme from all parts of the essays and books I looked at in Chapters One and Two, and I have attempted to pay as close attention as possible to the way Winch ties in his argument, which favours one kind of inferential method—philosophical inference—and rejects the other—scientific-formal-logical inference.

While I agree that an emphasis on the logic of human thought and discourse has to be made, my eventual query is as to its implications when taken to its logical conclusions. For it is then, I argue in Chapter Four, that we are left with meanings and values but no way to assert the existence of anything actual, or even decide what exists and what does not. So while I agree with the tone of Winch's argument here, and believe he makes a point well worth making, I am left agreeing with Emile Durkheim who feared philosophy was "dangerously aloof" from physical reality and with Karl Mannheim for whom philosophy was too specific and consequently not at all helpful in aiding people resolve practical issues of daily living.
Chapter Four gives three accounts in some detail of how Winch ignored the real views and purposes of the thinkers he analyzed. And it questions his defense of Max Weber's position in light of his critique of other views which expressed milder versions of Weber's chauvinistic defense of European and scientific logic. My feeling is that Winch is comfortable with his own philosophical position, and perhaps too much so. My purpose here then is to remind philosophers that it is as important to evaluate and reevaluate their own views at least as rigorously as they attempt to evaluate the views of others. For my feeling is that this would lead to the overcoming of many of the obstacles now in the way of mutual understanding in the various fields of the social sciences and philosophy.

I then draw my conclusion and suggest how Winch's view has not only unfortunately lead to obfuscation of the issues he discusses, but has also contributed to the burial of many potentially and actually worthwhile methods social scientists developed in the last century. This heightens my belief that philosophy cannot adequately understand these other fields without going beyond its own boundaries in at least investigating these other undertakings internal to these other fields. My view is that the philosopher who does not go beyond the accepted bounds of philosophical analysis of her day confines himself to the shibboleths and obscurity of her or his enterprise; as surely as social science has, according to Winch, succumbed to another great shibboleth of the day—science. On the other hand, I believe a real dialogue between the disciplines is precisely the way to avoid such myopia.
Introduction

The ultimate judgment of any thesis on this subject, I would submit then, has to be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which it has encouraged or enabled such a dialogue to take place. It is therefore hoped that I have succeeded, however meagerly, in making such a contribution to open discussion.
1. Hence the sentiments expressed in the Frontispiece to Dr. Grell Grant's M.A. thesis "The Relevance of Psychoanalysis to Philosophy: The View of Morris Lazerowitz", completed in this department in 1978, quoting Maxwell John Charlesworth, that

...criticism may be either of an internal or an external kind: in other words, one may show the need to adopt another standpoint by exposing the inadequacy of a philosophical position in terms of the position itself. Or, one may criticize a position in a completely external and mechanical way, condemning it simply because it does not measure up to one's own criteria. This latter criticism...is very satisfying to the critic but unfortunately convinces no one else.


3. Hence Henry Peyre says of Durkheim that

Philosophy as then struck him as superficial and dangerously aloof from science. His eagerness was at one and the same time for more objective first-hand research so as to rest philosophy on a bedrock of scientific knowledge, and to put such speculation and research to pragmatic use...not that social facts are but things, but that they have to be observed and studied objectively, our concern being for causes, not for teleological ends.

Philosophers have too long concerned themselves with their own thinking. When they wrote of thought, they had in mind primarily their own history, the history of philosophy, or quite special fields of knowledge such as mathematics or physics. This type of thinking is applicable only under quite special circumstances, and what can be learned by analyzing it is not transferable to other spheres of life. Even when it is applicable, it refers only to a specific dimension of existence which does not suffice for living human beings who are seeking to comprehend and mold their world.

From *Ideology and Utopia*, by Karl Mannheim, Harvest Books, New York, 1936, Pp3-4. As the reader will see, this forms, in part, the critique Winch himself makes of certain philosophical positions. But then he attributes it to its scientific character. But I believe, as I try to show, Winch's view is also too specific for the practical purposes for which it was intended. It should also be noted that Mannheim was a sociologist (of knowledge) who was well aware of many of the issues Winch raised. This reflects, I believe, the extent to which the critique of sociology could have been undertaken from within sociology itself and not from the outside—philosophically—as Winch undertook it.

4. See ISS p. 2 where Winch says, "Philosophy...has no business to be anti-scientific", and "if it tries to be so it will succeed only in making itself look ridiculous". At the same time, it "must be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of science." And as "science is one of the chief shibboleths of the present age this is bound to make the philosopher unpopular... But the day when philosophy becomes popular", Winch says, "is the day for the philosopher to consider where he took the wrong turning." What is remarkable about this passage however, from the point of view of many of the social scientists Winch discusses and does not discuss, is that they would undoubtedly believe it is true science which is actively criticized and that "the day when science becomes popular, is the day for the scientist to consider where she [sic] took the wrong turning." See, for example, the Wilhelm Reich quotation in the Frontispiece just before this introduction.
Winch's Idea of A Social Science

In The Idea of a Social Science (ISS), Peter Winch offers a critique of contemporary social theory. This chapter then will be devoted to an introductory sketch of Winch's position therein concerning the appropriate and inappropriate methods of social science.

Winch says the seeds of the problem of the way many social theorists carry out their investigation of social reality can be found in philosophy; specifically in the Empiricist tradition. There, it had been assumed by Hume, for instance, that "knowledge of... [a cause and effect] relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience." 1

Winch says that Hume's skepticism is useful when it is applied to instances where a priori reasoning is thought of as being "in direct competition with science and aims at constructing or refuting scientific theories by purely a priori reasoning", as in the case of Hegel's "amateur pseudo-scientific speculations." 2 But the trouble, according to Winch, is this skepticism is equally as often misapplied to areas where metaphysics is both valid and vital to the intellectual enterprise. It is misapplied to questions which require not an empirical solution but a conceptual one because the questions raised are conceptual ones. Winch asserts that in the social studies "many of the more important theoretical issues...raised...belong to philosophy rather than to science and are, therefore, to be settled by a priori..."
conceptual analysis rather than by empirical research.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{The Problem}

The problem with social science, according to Winch, is that social scientists too often assume a perspective he says is usually reserved for the natural sciences where the phenomena under consideration are physical objects or cause and effect relations involving such objects. Whereas, the phenomena under consideration in the social sciences are human beings.\textsuperscript{4} But the 'methodologies' adopted by social scientists usually do not reflect this.\textsuperscript{5}

While the use of these natural scientific methods in description of social reality render it unintelligible, according to Winch, their proponents claim their scientific interpretation is unique in its veracity and superior to other non-scientific ways of understanding the world.\textsuperscript{6} Winch believes this begs the very question of what is meant by the term 'intelligibility'. For historians, artists, religious thinkers and others all have different ways of interpreting the world and making it intelligible to themselves and others.\textsuperscript{7}

Winch contends, therefore, that there are many drawbacks to viewing social phenomena the way we usually view physical objects. One is typified by the way some social psychologists discuss conceptual issues as when it is claimed 'concepts are products of interaction of many people carrying on the important business of living together in groups'.\textsuperscript{8} What this view ignores, according to Winch, is that concepts cannot be understood separately from the social and group life out of which they are born.
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Often, Winch says, when social scientists speak of language, social activity and ideas as being "the product of" or a "function" of other phenomena, they assume a pseudo-scientific perspective which then attempts to "study" such phenomena as if they were detached from social life. This is disastrous, he says, because it overlooks the way in which the people under discussion are involved in a social reality which "influences" them and which they in turn have some input. This is why, for instance, according to Winch, religious ideas can only really be comprehended by someone who has had a religious upbringing and has considered these issues seriously.

In the natural sciences, on the other hand, assuming a detached point of view and examining phenomena as separate and discrete makes sense because relations, such as cause and effect, are not in any way related to conscious, purposeful action. Winch takes as an example to illustrate his point the relation of thunder to lightning, and contrasts it with the issuance of a command and the following of that command. In the first instance, it makes sense to speak of cause and effect, but in the second one it does not, according to Winch, because the latter relation has 'sense' where the former one is only physical.

The difference between instance one and two is that in instance two, we are dealing with interactions between two human beings. Implicit in the giving of a command and its being followed is that the parties (participants) understand what the issuance of a command implies. The command has social significance and it is followed because those following the command know how he or she is expected to react. The relationship between the two is defined socially and institutionally.
An army, as a social institution, has its own set of rules and chain of command. This fact is recognized by all those within that chain of command. The relationship is then not properly characterized by saying a person ordered to act was "caused" to act. It is better described by saying that given the social significance of a command, and given that in an army, when a superior issues a command, subordinates are expected to obey and follow an order.

Another way, Winch says, of noticing the difference between the relations of physical objects and those of people is through understanding that in the case of human beings, we take account of the way human life is institutional and conventional. That is why, for instance, when describing an event, such as war, it makes no sense to describe it as if one were describing the activities of animals fighting over a piece of meat. It is, on the other hand, necessary to recognize how war is conventional and relies upon the conscious and active participation of warring parties, war itself having a history.

**Understanding**

In attempting to understand and describe social phenomena and human activity it makes more sense, according to Winch, to search for meaning rather than for causes. And when we search for meaning we do so by examining meaning "internal" to the social context. This resembles more the philosopher's search for meaning internal to the "logic" of an argument than it does the search for relations between physical objects; e.g. hidden causes.
Chapter One

Winch says searching for 'causes' adds nothing to our understanding of human activity and instead imposes a scientific world view on human life which is inappropriate both for the purposes of description and understanding. 

Following from this predisposition to view human activity and social behaviour as similar to the 'behaviour' of physical phenomena, many contemporary social theorists have assumed that, from the point of view of attempting to make social theory 'scientific', it makes sense to examine human society and group life as if individual consciousness and personal goals were not a factor at all. Winch cites as an example Durkheim's way of thinking when he stated:

I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner according to which the associated individuals are grouped. Only in this way, it seems, can history become a science, and sociology itself exist. 

What is wrong with what Durkheim had to say, according to Winch, is he assumes an "external" perspective usually associated with the natural sciences. In so doing Durkheim looks on social life as from the outside, ignoring, as others have done, the "cultural aims" of those who participate in social life. Durkheim assumes something can be identified as being hidden to consciousness, or hidden from view, which is an ultimate or more relevant cause of human action than the stated aims of the participants. But such
positions, according to Winch,

do in fact come into conflict with philosophy,
conceived as an enquiry into the nature of man's
knowledge of reality and into the differences
which the possibility of such knowledge makes to
human life.\footnote{15}

This philosophical concern is captured well by John Burnet,
according to Winch, when he said: "we have to ask whether the mind of man
can have any contact with reality at all, and, if it can, what difference this
will make to his life".\footnote{16} The philosopher, Winch says, and not the scientist,
is very much interested in attempting to make reality 'intelligible' in this
kind of way.

The philosopher, for instance, may wish to examine the question of
whether reality is potentially intelligible at all, or if interpretations of
reality are illusory. She or he may wish to call attention to the relation of
conceptual clarity to self-knowledge and the ability to interpret reality
intelligibly. Durkheim, according to Winch, thereby undervalues the
importance of the subjective point of view and the important bearing ideas
have on people's lives.\footnote{17} Instead he searches for processes which are not
consciously understood by those who participate in social life.

This preoccupation with hidden causes and processes is, however,
"misbegotten", according to Winch. Winch in fact refers to sociology as
'misbegotten epistemology'.\footnote{18} He does so because he claims Wittgenstein has
shown that in attempting to understand what is intrinsic to social life, one ought to investigate the "forms of life" which accompany language, thought and social behaviour. Consequently, what we are attempting to do is elucidate "the concept of social behaviour". This can only be done by recognizing the extent to which our concepts are bound up in the social life in which we participate.

Durkheim, on the other hand, in attempting to make social studies scientific, is interested in discovering causes 'more profound' than those evident to the participant; more profound, for example, than stated cultural aims. Winch, however, says understanding social activity involves recognizing those very cultural aims, and as it is the unique concern of epistemology to investigate reality "as such and in general"; and as Wittgenstein has shown through his discussion of 'forms of life' as a 'given' in social reality, this job is better accomplished by philosophy than by empirical science.

The Problem in its Crude and Raw Form

The preoccupation with the development of a science of social studies runs throughout nineteenth century social theory, according to Winch. John Stuart Mill, for instance, asserted that psychology ought to be experimental and observational. Winch quotes Mill as stating:

The laws of the formation of character are...derivative laws resulting from the general laws of the mind, and are to be obtained by deducing them from those general laws by supposing any given set of circumstances, and then considering what, according to the laws of mind, will be the influence of those circumstances on the formation of character.
Chapter One

What Mill's way of thinking presupposes, according to Winch, is that physical phenomena and mental phenomena are not really different in kind. Mental phenomena may be more complex than physical phenomena, but in time a science of mental phenomena will emerge. Mill uses the analogy of tidalology and meteorology to try to show that whereas the study of tides or weather are not perfect sciences, it is still possible to make predictions, even if those predictions do not match those made in the physical sciences in accuracy. Winch states that Mill is however incorrect in assuming physical and mental phenomena are different only in degrees of complexity. They are, according to Winch, in fact different in kind.22

The difference Winch identifies between the two kinds of phenomena, the physical and the mental, can perhaps be better understood by understanding his distinction between philosophy and science. This in turn can be easily understood, according to Winch, when the difference between philosophical and scientific proof is considered. In philosophy, as G.E. Moore's "Proof of an External World" showed, the issue is not to prove 'externality' experimentally, but rather to remind people of how the "expression 'external object' is in fact used". It is to "elucidate the concept of externality".23 This, Winch says, shows there is an obvious "connection between this issue and the central philosophical problem about the general nature of reality".24

To further illustrate the difference in considering questions concerning human nature and those concerning physical nature, Winch asks us to reflect on whether the writer of his book was alive at the time of its writing.25 The difference between life and non-life, and consequently the
complexity of each, is not just a difference in degree, Winch says, any more than "the reaction of a cat which is seriously hurt is 'very much more complex' than that of a tree which is being chopped down".26

Winch compares these confusions of life and non-life and differences in degree and kind to other instances where he states "Clearly a mechanical model is at work here".27 Most accounts of 'motives', 'causes' or 'drives', which involve physiological, rather than psychological phenomena, treat the "actions of a man [as if they] were like the behaviour of a watch, where the energy contained in a tensed spring is transmitted via the mechanism...as to bring about the regular revolution of the hands".28

The Philosophical Reminder

Winch wants to remind his readership that intrinsic to life is the conception of life in general: "It is not for me to decide whether I, as I write these words, am alive or not".29 And one's conception of life, Winch says, is in turn given to us through the social life in which we are involved. Hence Wittgenstein stated that "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world".30 Similarly the concepts we develop about our lives determine for us how we see 'the world' and what we imagine it to be.

Winch believes a more appropriate way of describing social reality can be found in Wittgenstein's analysis of 'rules'. This analysis showed that "the notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake".31 And, "the point of the concept of a rule is that it should enable us to evaluate what is being done."32 Further,
Chapter One

A mistake is a contravention of what is established as correct; as such, it must be recognisable as such a contravention. If this is not so, I can do what I like and there is no external check on what I do. Establishing a standard is not on activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation from other individuals. For it is contact with other individuals which alone makes possible the external check on one's actions which is inseparable from an established standard.33

Winch states that the notion of 'following a rule' has obvious implications for questions involving the elucidation of the nature of language. But he also feels it sheds light on other forms of human interaction besides speech.34 Hence he turns to what he says are 'analogous categories' of activities where it can be 'sensibly said that they have a meaning, a symbolic character'.35 He wishes to show how with the employment of the empiricist type description of human social activity, 'the idea of a reason for an action would be in danger of losing its sense'.36

Winch takes as a paradigm of someone who acted with a reason the example of N of whom it is said that he 'voted for Labour at the last General Election because he thought that a Labour government would be most likely to preserve industrial peace'.37 Even in instances where N's reasons for acting were not as clearcut, not as well known or thought out, such as in an instance where N may have voted because his family customarily did so, Winch says his act of voting nonetheless had 'sense'; more sense than marking a piece of paper in an arbitrary way would.38
In his discussion of Michael Oakeshott's distinction between two kinds of morality, Winch takes issue with Oakeshott's distinction between reflective and habitual morality. Winch attempts to show there, as he had done earlier, that rules are followed in any moral decision. This would tend to unite the two supposedly different kinds of morality. It would not be so important, in instance one, for example, that N did what he did reflectively whereas in instance two he did it habitually. What would be more important, according to Winch, is that in either instance it can be said of N that he did what he did correctly or incorrectly.

In either moral situation, according to Winch, there is always a sense of continuing something from the past, of going on "in the same way", thereby following an established procedure, regardless of how unconsciously or unreflectively this is done. Winch suggests Oakeshott's distinction between two kinds of morality is "in many ways like the distinction between statute law and case law". Winch says Roscoe Pound had an attitude toward this distinction similar to the one Oakeshott made when Pound referred to statute law as "the mechanical application of rules", as distinct from case law which involves "intuitions". This may sometimes be helpful in speaking, Winch says "but it should not blind us to the fact that the interpretation of precedents, just as much as the application of statutes, involves the following of rules in the sense I have been using the expression here." Oakeshott had said that the predicament facing our Western morals is that "our moral life has come to be dominated by the pursuit of ideals, a dominance ruinous to a settled mode of behaviour". Winch responds:
But what is ruinous to a settled mode of behaviour, of whatever kind, is an unstable environment. The only mode of life which can undergo a meaningful development in response to environmental changes is one which contains within itself the means of assessing the significance of the behaviour which it prescribes. Human history is not just an account of changing habits; it is the story of how men have tried to carry over what they regard as important in their modes of behaviour into new institutions which they had to face.44

As we shall see in Chapter Two, Winch will argue that Rousseau's discussion of citizenship provides a better model for responding to potential social change by instilling in the citizenry a sense of the legitimacy of social institutions.45 Winch states:

A type of case even farther removed from my paradigm is that discussed by Freud in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. N forgets to post a letter and insists, even after reflection that this was 'just an oversight' and had no reason. A Freudian observer might insist that 'N must have had a reason' even though it was not apparent to N; suggesting perhaps that N unconsciously connected the posting of the letter with something in his life which is painful and which he wants to suppress.46

It is worth noting, however, according to Winch, that 'Freudians' seeking explanations 'in the course of psychotherapy' try to get the patient himself to recognize the validity of the proffered explanation, that this indeed is almost a condition of its being accepted as the 'right' explanation.47 In other words, 'Freudians', according to Winch, do not discount the individual's own self-awareness in the therapeutic process.
Winch contrasts this way of interpreting consciousness with a method of interpretation—Weber's—which he wishes to commend. Weber spoke of such interpretations as having been made by the 'expert.' But Weber, Winch says, emphasized that we come to understand (Verstehen) behaviour by understanding the "subjective intentions" of the agent. Consequently we can speak of actions as having "meaning," or of being "meaningfully directed." But there is no room in this way of interpreting human action for hidden reasons or motives. Whereas the "motive" action, according to many social scientists, is more akin to the motivating "force" in a physical action, in Weber's thesis motive is tied to consciousness and to what the actor intended to do or "meant" by an action, according to Winch. Consequently Winch says Weber is right in claiming the notion of "meaningful behaviour" is more closely related to the social symbolism of actions. The search for meaning in that context, resembling the search for meaning in a philosophical discussion, more accurately conveys the reasoning accompanying an action than does the "pseudo-scientific" search for causes and effects.

A further assumption common to many social theorists and some philosophers is that human action is "law-like." Mill refers to "laws of the mind" (as others such as Durkheim, speak of "laws of society"). Wittgenstein seemed to have been similarly criticizing Freud stating:

"... suppose you want to speak of causality in the operation of feelings. "Determinism applies to the mind as truly as to physical things." This is obscure because when we think of causal laws in physical things we think of experiments. We have nothing like this in connexion with feelings and motivation. And yet psychologists want [sic] to
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say: "There must be some law"—although no law has been found. (Freud: "Do you want to say gentlemen, that the changes in mental phenomena are guided by chance?") Whereas to me the fact that there aren't such laws seems important.50

The Negative Effects of the Pseudo-Scientific Model

The search for causes and laws in social theory is, according to Winch, not only misbegotten, it is misleading. It is misleading for the reasons Winch would say Wittgenstein alluded to above: because there are no evident laws for human behaviour and thought. Searching for them, therefore, according to Winch, leads us down the garden path to pseudo-scientific speculation. Consequently, the most important aspects of human interaction and social behaviour are overlooked; those aspects which bring out the reasons for behaviour and the meaning conveyed through interactions.

Only the understanding of action and behaviour as conscious and meaningful allows for the proper description of human social activity, according to Winch. Insofar as Weber sticks with his descriptions of human behaviour, in terms of their subjective intentions and understands actions as they were "meant", Winch says he succeeds in capturing what is intrinsic to social life. Weber, however, also occasionally lapses into the 'external' way of describing things, as when he describes two "non-social" beings meeting in what Winch calls a "purely physical sense", 'exchanging' objects.51 What such a description ignores, according to Winch, is that an economic exchange is a social event which, for example, involves the notion of promise-keeping or "being committed". And this is identical in form to the connection between a
definition and the subsequent use of the word defined.\textsuperscript{52} Winch also takes exception with Weber's suggestion that factory workers can be manipulated by their boss in a way which resembles "the technique of manipulating natural objects [e.g. machinery]."\textsuperscript{53} And he further wonders why Weber describes workers in a factory as "being handed pieces of metal, handing those pieces of metal to other people and receiving other objects from them", instead of "speaking of the workers in his factory as being paid and spending money."\textsuperscript{54} In the same vein he wonders why policemen are described as "people with helmets coming and giving back the workers the pieces of metal which other people have taken away from them", instead of describing policemen as "protecting the workers property."\textsuperscript{55} Winch says of this approach that Weber

In short...adopts the external point of view and forgets to take account of the 'subjectively intended sense' of the behaviour he is talking about; and this, I want to say, is a natural result of his attempt to divorce the social relations linking those workers from the ideas which their actions embody: ideas such as those of 'money', 'property', 'police', 'buying and selling'.\textsuperscript{56}

Winch suggests such social theorists ought to take their empiricism one step further and dispense altogether with reference to 'people'.

For what the sociological observer has presented to his senses is not at all people holding certain theories, believing in certain propositions, but people making certain movements and sounds.
Indeed, even describing them as ‘people’ really goes too far, which may explain the popularity of the sociological and social psychological jargon word ‘organism’: but organisms, as opposed to people, do not believe propositions or embrace theories. \(^5\)

This Winch states specifically in criticizing Vilfredo Pareto, who Winch claims exemplifies the absurdity of attempting to observe human social activity “from the outside”, in accordance with Durkheim’s first rule of sociology: “to consider social facts as things”. \(^5\) Pareto believed that, through his logico-experimental method, he could make generalizations which could cut across cultural boundaries; that for example, he could compare the social relation between ‘an American millionaire and a plain American’ to that between an Indian of high caste and one of low caste. \(^5\) This kind of comparison Winch contends is “essential to his whole method of procedure”. \(^6\)

Pareto believed his experimental procedure bore fruit, as he was able to uncover different kinds of elements in human history; some which were constant and some variable. The constant and recurring elements, Winch points out, Pareto called “residues”; the variable ones “derivations”. These elements, Pareto believed, are understood when one considers that certain kinds of conduct occur repeatedly throughout history, whereas others are less stable. Winch states that the concept of a derivation “obviously offers many points of comparison with, for example, the Marxian concept of ‘ideology’ and the Freudian concept of a ‘rationalization’”. \(^6\) Winch states:
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The point I should like to emphasize here, however, is that it is only by way of this conceptual distinction (between residues and derivations) that Pareto succeeds in finding common features of different societies which appear suitable as a subject for scientific generalization. That is, the claim that there are sociological uniformities goes hand in hand with the claim that human intelligence is much overrated as a real influence on social events. 62

This, for Winch, summarizes the limitation of the external perspective in social studies. What Winch further wishes to point out is that far from describing social reality as it is experienced, the external view proposes an exaggerated way of viewing the world. Bertolt Brecht, for instance, known for his use of hyperbole in theatre, perhaps succeeds in shaking us from our complacent way of looking at the world. But with this otherwise useful device there is a danger, Winch says, that "the user of these devices should come to think of his way of looking at things as somehow more real than the usual way". This, Winch says, would be to assume a "God-like attitude". 63

The whole point of philosophical investigation, according to Winch is, on the other hand, to describe things as they are. ("Philosophy leaves everything as it was.") 64 In describing social reality, therefore, the point is to describe things in the usual way thereby capturing what is intrinsic to social activity. The external perspective cannot do this because it offers, in the end, a distorted view of social reality. Whereas, the philosophical internal perspective captures the meaning of social events by understanding
how things are usually expressed and what meaning they usually have. The alternative way of looking at human actions would be to assume that actions have no 'sense' to them, according to Winch. And apart from the meaningless actions of a 'berserk' lunatic, Winch says it is not clear where such a description would fit the case. The scientific description, for that reason is, therefore, incorrect from several points of view. It not only misdescribes social life, it also fails to communicate what social life is all about.

Winch cites as an example the behaviourists' description of the sexual behaviour of a rat seeking the affections of its mate while avoiding the shocks of the electrically charged apparatus on which he is forced to run. He implies that the functionalist's description of 'primitive' culture and sexual relations, resembles the one above. Malinowski, for instance, speaks in terms of basic biological activities. Winch suggests that 'one does not throw much light on the particular form which the [biological] activities may take...by speaking of them in Malinowski's neo-Marxist terminology as performing the 'function' of providing satisfaction of 'basic biological needs'..

Instead Winch asks us to compare this sort of description with the ones we might find in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. And he asks us: "does not Shakespeare do this much better?" Here Shakespeare is not committed to the scientific way of describing which Winch says the 'external' theorists are. Consequently Shakespeare describes social reality as it is experienced and does not offer a description which appears to be more real than reality itself (as for example we find in Brecht's hyperbolic descriptions).
Winch says, that as it is philosophy's peculiar role to remain 'uncommitted' in attempting to evaluate the concepts with which it deals, it falls to philosophy, not science, to interpret and elucidate social reality. He perhaps would wish to have his thoughts summarized by his statement that

To take an uncommitted view of such competing conceptions is peculiarly the task of philosophy; it is not its business to award prizes to science, religion, or anything else. It is not its business to advocate any Weltanschauung [in the way Pareto offers a pseudo-scientific Weltanschauung]. In Wittgenstein's words, "Philosophy leaves everything as it was".68

Winch ends by stating he believes that the "broad outline" of what he has had to say also applies to other fields not discussed, such as economics.69
1. ISS op. cit., p.7, with Winch’s reference to *Enquiry into Human Understanding*, by David Hume, Section IV, Part I. No further reference information is given.

2. ISS op. cit., p.7 I assume here Winch is referring to Hegel’s attempt to show how his metaphysics could explain the orbitational patterns of planets, such as in his “De Orbitus Planetarum” of 1801, and not to Hegel’s social or political philosophy; although Winch never makes a distinction between the two. Later, on page 72, Winch criticizes Hegel for “confusing” physical and conceptual changes. Consequently he claims Hegel’s metaphysics, here in relation to social theory, is not valid.

3. ISS op. cit., p.17

4. Ibid. p.134

5. Ibid. p.136 Winch implies that the term ‘methodology’ itself has the mechanistic, pseudo-scientific ring to it he is attacking in his book.

6. This will be brought out at greater length when it is the subject of the first sections of Chapter Two.

7. Ibid. p.19. Winch states specifically in this context that

   the philosophy of science will be concerned with the kind of understanding sought and conveyed by the scientist; the philosophy of religion will be concerned with the way in which religion attempts to present an intelligible picture of the world; and so on.

8. Ibid. p. 44

9. The term ‘study’ is my rendering of his position and will become relevant in what Winch has to say concerning Hobbes’ conception of learning in Chapter Two.

10. Ibid. p. 55 Might this not imply social scientific ideas can only be comprehended by someone who had been a social scientist, or someone who has been educated to think as a social scientist? But Winch does not seem to see it this way. For his argument suggests, as I will try to prove in Chapter Four, that he does not give the same serious consideration to unique validity of social science that he does to religion, ‘and so on’. For he implies that social scientific issues can be resolved and comprehended a priori; prior, it would seem, even to understanding what the basic concepts used in social science come to mean to the theorists who first used and defined them.
11. ISS op. cit., Pp. 124-125
12. Ibid. Pp. 131
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. Pp. 23-24, quoting from Durkheim's review of A. Labriola: "Essais sur la conception materialiste de l'histoire" in Revue Philosophique, Dec., 1897. Winch also says this in relation to von Wiese's contention that sociology ought to give an account of social life "disregarding the cultural aims of the individuals in order to study the influences which they exert on each other as a result of community life." (With reference to German Sociology, by R. Aron, Heinemann, 1957.) But Durkheim's point elsewhere is that increasingly the 'cultural aims' of individuals are determined by factors beyond their control and understanding; e.g., the growth of urban centres, the increased determination of lifestyle in relation to occupation; the increase in specialization in occupations. See Durkheim's The Division of Labour in Society, The Free Press, N.Y. During the gathering of information on Durkheim's work, Dr. Harold Chorney's Ph.D. thesis entitled "The Political Economy of Urbanization and Its Implications for Public Policy", University of Toronto, 1983 was consulted.
15. ISS op. cit., Pp. 23-24
16. Ibid. p. 9, with Winch's reference to Greek Philosophy, by John Burnet, Pp. 11-12. No further reference information is provided by Winch.
17. But Durkheim himself mentions that "We no longer think that the exclusive duty of man is to realize in himself the qualities of man in general; but we believe he must have those pertaining to his function. Division of Labour in Society, op. cit., p. 43. So he is clearly aware of Winch's point, and more. He is also aware of the difficulty which faces the ordinary person in maintaining this perspective and permitting philosophy to have the kind of influence on her or his life it might if conditions were more ideal.

Also, it has been noted that Durkheim's formalistic style covers an essentially open-minded humanistic and highly moral view of the world and of society. See the forward by Henri Peyre to Montesquieu and Rousseau Forerunners of Sociology, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, where Peyre says:
Sociology was to him, as indeed was economics, a moral science in the broad sense which the French attach to the adjective moral...Ethics was, in the first two decades of the [twentieth] century, severed from the narrow dependence on religion which conservatives still proclaimed, fearing that any weakening of the religious bond would throw man back to the state of an ignoble savage. Durkheim linked the moral code to society and envisaged it as both immanent and transcendent, as he did society itself. Social sciences may be able to describe accurately and even to predict. But they cannot abdicate their essential function, which is to help man become better.\[x]\n
Winch never mentions either Durkheim’s objections to the positivism he accuses him of holding or that Durkheim himself attempted, unlike the positivists, to take account of the moral aspect of human life and its investigation. By focusing only on the language Durkheim uses here, Winch suggests this language is an adequate representation of Durkheim’s position. In fact, it was considerably more complex and subtle than that one passage conveys.

18. ISS op. cit., p.43
19. ibid. p. 18
20. Ibid. p. 40 Winch there speaks of “there having been a genuine revolution in philosophy in recent years.”
21. Ibid. p. 70, with Winch’s reference to System of Logic by J.S. Mill, Book VI, Chapter I; only reference given.
22. Ibid. p. 72
23. Ibid. p. 10
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. p. 73
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. p. 76
28. Ibid. But interestingly Wilhelm Reich claims to have found instances where the musculature and behaviour of the individual suggests that biological energy had become so tensed the musculature acted like a spring when the tension was released. See the Function of the Orgasm, or
Character Analysis, both published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Perhaps such an analogy, faulty as it is when generalized to explain all of human behaviour, may be seen as an interesting self-description and can consequently give some insight into the nature of certain kinds of personalities.

29. Ibid. p. 73


31. ISS op. cit., p. 32

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid. p. 45

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. p. 46

37. Ibid. p. 45

38. Ibid. p. 51

39. Ibid. p. 59

40. Ibid. p. 61

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. p. 64

44. Ibid.

45. See my Chapter Two, where Hobbes’ philosophy is compared to Rousseau’s.

46. ISS op. cit. p. 47

47. Ibid. p. 48

48. Ibid. It seems worthy of note that a term such as ‘Freudian’ has an ‘external’ ring to it; i.e. it conveys the sense that the seer is either inimical to psychoanalysis or in any event sees himself as being outside the confines of its way of thinking. But this, as I will show in Chapter Four, hardly provides an adequate basis for accurately describing or understanding its underlying principles.

49. Ibid. p. 80. Wiénch refers to Ryle’s use of the expression ‘law-like proposition’ in attempting to show that as with Mill’s account of human behaviour, assuming human motives to be ‘law-like’ is to be guilty of employing a mechanistic logic.

51. Ibid. p.49

52. Ibid. p. 50 Winch says also that

The notion of being committed by what I do now to doing something else in the future is identical in form with the connection between a definition and the subsequent word defined....It follows that I can only be committed in the future by what I do now if my present act is the application of a rule.

53. Ibid. Pp. 116 Here Winch is clearly, also objecting to Weber's understanding becoming 'ideologized' in the way he would say Marx's was.

54. ISS op. cit., p.118

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. Pp. 117-118

57. Ibid. p.110

58. Ibid. p 109


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid. p. 104

62. Ibid. Pp 104-105

63. Ibid. p 118

64. Ibid. p.103 No reference information is provided for this quotation.

65. Ibid. p 53 Here the roles seem clearly to be reversed for it is the sociologist or psychologist who might well wish to understand the subjective intentions of the "berserk lunatic".
66. ISS op. cit., p. 131
67. Ibid. p. 102
68. Ibid. p. 103
69. Ibid. p. 136
Ethics and Action

The practical application of Winch's position, as well as the significance Winch believes it has for questions of ethics and their relation to action, are found in Winch's book entitled *Ethics and Action* (E&A). In this chapter I will focus on Winch's discussion in E&A of the distinction he wishes to draw between the study and explanation of human behaviour, on the one hand, and the description of human experience, on the other.

Continuing the theme of the distinction between the scientific conception and the internal, moral conception, Winch restates his position and applies it to specific moral issues and moral philosophers. He does so to show that the discourse of science, the scientific way of making things intelligible and of understanding social life, is inappropriate, inferior to and incompatible with, a moral way of interpreting social events.

The Reality of Magic

The first essay in the volume is entitled "Understanding a Primitive Society" (UPS). There Winch is concerned with two issues: rationality, and the scientific conception of the 'independently real'. Social scientists, Winch says, often combine these two issues and assume, as for instance European anthropologists often do, that their own conceptions of 'rationality' and 'reality' are somehow more 'objective' and 'rational' than those of the 'primitives' they observe. Winch says:

Like many other primitive people, the African Azande hold beliefs that we cannot possibly share and engage in practices which it is peculiarly difficult for us to comprehend....
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An anthropologist studying such a people wishes to
make those beliefs and practices intelligible to himself
and his readers. This means presenting an
account of them that will somehow satisfy the criteria
of rationality demanded by the culture to which he and
his readers belong: a culture whose conception of
rationality is deeply affected by the achievement and
methods of the sciences, and one which treats such
things as a belief in magic or the practice of consulting
oracles as almost a paradigm of the irrational.2

This assumption, of the superiority of scientific logic as compared
to more 'primitive' ways of knowing and understanding, Winch says, was
criticized by Evans-Pritchard. But in doing so, Evans-Pritchard nonetheless
showed a predisposition toward overvaluing his own cultural perspective and
undervaluing that of the peoples he was observing.

Winch shows how Evans-Pritchard had taken issue with Levy-Bruhl's
assumption that understanding the 'causes and effects' of magical rites, and
the 'illusory' quality of magical ideas, justifies the conclusion that Europeans
are more intelligent than 'primitives'. There, Winch says, Evans-Pritchard
claimed that although "obviously there are no witches", a careful distinction
must be made between logical and scientific thinking so as not to assume the
latter is superior.3 Accordingly,

Scientific notions are those which accord with
objective reality both with regard to the validity
of their premisses and to the inferences drawn
from their propositions. Logical notions are those
in which according to the rules of thought
inferences would be true were the premisses true,
the truth of the premisses irrelevant.4
Scientific truth then is dependent upon its being testable in terms of criteria such as cause and effect; whereas logical truth need only be considered internal to the logic of the way of thinking itself. But Winch wants to point out that even in making this distinction Evans-Pritchard is "crucially wrong" in one significant way. Like Pareto, Evans-Pritchard makes the following mistake:

Evans-Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member of scientific culture has a different conception of reality from that of a Zande believer in magic, wants to go beyond registering this fact and making the differences explicit, and to say, finally, that the scientific conception agrees with what reality actually is like, whereas the magical conception does not.

The Independently Real

The notion of something being in accord or in "agreement with reality" is an important one, Winch says, for to abandon it is "to plunge straight into an extreme Protagorean relativism." However, it is necessary, on the other hand, to fix "the precise role that this conception of the independently real does play in men's thoughts." Winch makes two points concerning this issue:

In the first place we should notice that the check of the independently real is not peculiar to science.... My second point follows from the first. Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense language has.
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Further, both the distinction between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves belong to our language. I will not say that they are concepts of the language like any other, since it is clear that they occupy a commanding, and in a sense a limiting, position there. We can imagine a language with no concept of, say, wetness, but hardly one in which there is no way of distinguishing the real from the unreal. Nevertheless we could not in fact distinguish the real from the unreal without understanding the way this distinction operates in the language. If then we wish to understand the significance of these concepts, we must examine the use they actually do have---in the language. Evans-Pritchard, on the contrary, is trying to work with a conception of reality which is not determined by its actual use in language.  

As an example of what Winch means by the conception of reality and its relation to its "actual use in language", he compares the religious sense of reality to the scientific one.

Consider what God says to Job out of the whirlwind: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?...Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding?"

In the discourse of the Bible, "God's reality is certainly independent of what any man may care to think, but what that reality amounts to can only be seen from the religious tradition in which the concept of God is used..." And, according to Winch, this kind of use of a concept is quite unlike the use
of a concept in science where it is a theoretical entity.

In science, as well, there is an important way in which the information given is only accessible to someone conversant in the language of the discourse. Accordingly, "a scientific illiterate, asked to describe the results of an experiment he 'observes' in an advanced physics laboratory could not do so in terms relevant to the hypothesis being tested... and it is only "in such terms that we can sensibly speak of the 'results of an experiment' at all", according to Winch.11

Winch asks according to what criteria, and within which universe of discourse, can one establish "a true link between our ideas and an independent reality".12 Evans-Pritchard, according to Winch, has not been able to answer this question and Winch takes it upon himself to do so.

Winch says:

Two questions arise out of what I have been saying. First, is it in fact the case that a primitive system of magic, like that of the Azande, constitutes a coherent universe of discourse like science, in terms of which an intelligible conception of reality and clear ways of deciding what beliefs are and are not in agreement with this reality are discerned? Second, what are we to make of the possibility of understanding primitive social institutions, like Zande magic, if the situation is as I have outlined? I do not claim to be able to give a satisfactory answer to the second question. It raises some very important and fundamental issues about the nature of human social life, which requires conceptions different from, and harder to elucidate than, those I have hitherto introduced.13
Some of those considerations, Winch says, remind us of how the
cancepts of witchcraft and magic in our own culture, "have been parasitic on,
and a perversion of other orthodox concepts, both religious and, increasingly,
scientific.14 The relation between the understanding of Black Mass and a
prior understanding of a proper Mass is one example, Winch says. The relation
between astrology and astronomy is another. Others are the relation between
the irrational and the rational, and the sophistic to the rational. The former
set would not be intelligible without prior understanding of the latter set.15

Accordingly, such terms as "rational," "real," "irrational," "right" and
"wrong," are part of language, and they get their "sense," as he says elsewhere
does the concept of "politeness," from language.16 The concepts of the "real"
and the "unreal" or the irrational or illusory Winch says are found in all
cultures, not just ours. This is why it would be difficult to imagine a language
which did not contain notions such as "real" and "unreal," "right" and "wrong":

The Irrelevance of Theory
in Understanding "Norms"

Therefore, assumptions cannot be made concerning the logical
structure of the investigation of such notions. For instance, if we apply our
conception of reality to another culture, we may conclude that what a member
of that other culture is doing constitutes a mistake.17 We may falsely apply
our criteria of rationality and reality to the actions of that other person
failing to see how they do not apply to the other culture nor to the actions
undertaken. Correctness then is not always a "theoretical" consideration the
way it so often is for members of our own culture.\textsuperscript{18} "Primitives" in fact would have "no theoretical interest" in the conception of what is right and wrong. The correctness of acting according to what an oracle says; for instance, is a social matter not a theoretical one. It involves, Winch says, understanding how to act and not how to understand anything theoretically.\textsuperscript{19} Winch suggests what the real understanding of another culture would involve.

Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our own — not simply to bring the other way within the already existing boundaries of our own, because the point about the latter in their present form, is that they \textit{ex hypothesi} exclude the other.\textsuperscript{20}

Later he states that

the concept of \textit{learning from} which is involved in the study of other cultures is closely linked with the concept of wisdom. We are confronted not just with different techniques, but with new possibilities of good and evil, in relation to which men may indeed come to terms with life.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Our Standards and Theirs}

Winch's comments regarding the serious study of an alien culture are meant as a rebuke of the Marxian position, especially put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre, according to Winch, had asserted that as if
was necessary to explain to members of our culture how the members of an alien culture thought and behaved, it was necessary to use the conception of rationality of the observer's culture to enable communication. What Winch makes of this is the following: (S here is a foreign culture.)

The task MacIntyre says we must undertake is to make intelligible (a) (to us) why it is that members of S think that certain of their practices are intelligible (b) (to them), when in fact they are not...MacIntyre's task is not like that of making intelligible a natural phenomenon, where we are limited only by what counts as intelligibility for us. We must somehow bring S's conception of intelligibility (b) into (intelligible!) relation with our own conception of intelligibility (a). That is, we have to create a new unity for the concept of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old-one and perhaps requiring a considerable realignment of our categories.  

This is why our conceptions of life must be extended, as Winch had previously said, and not imposed or used in order to bring other ways of thinking into our own conceptual framework. "It is not so much a matter of invoking "our own norms of rationality", Winch says in reference to the position held by MacIntyre, but rather it is a matter of "invoking our notion of rationality in speaking of 'conformity to norms'. But how we apply this notion itself depends upon how we read "their conformity to norms -- what counts for them as conformity and what does not."
A commonly found anthropological assertion concerning magical rites is that they reflect a sense of insecurity concerning the probability of a good crop yield. Magical rites, like rain dances and divining rods, for instance, are found contiguous to social problems created by shortages of rain, according to this sort of observation. This form of 'technical' or 'technological' explanation of primitive belief systems is inadequate, according to Winch, because it tends to ignore the sense of significance which the rites have in their relation to social life. That is, it does not recognize how much magical rites are part of the fabric of primitive society. Winch says that important social events are expressed 'quasi-sacramentally', at least insofar as the social order does not promote bestiality.24

The very emphasis upon conceptions such as 'efficiency of production', and the explanation of beliefs in terms of technical phenomena, Winch says, is a 'symptom of what Marx called the 'alienation' characteristic of man in industrial society. Marx's own confusions about the relations between production and consumption are further symptoms of that same alienation, according to Winch.25

The unalienated conception of magical rites, and its relation to the concern about the contingencies of life, is more analogous to the conception central to Christian prayers of supplication, according to Winch. Therein lies a recognition that 'one's life is subject to contingencies, rather than an attempt to control these'.26 This comparison, Winch says, enables an understanding of rules and conventions of the alien culture by properly finding the common ground necessary to compare equivalent phenomena. It also allows for a description which understands the 'sense of significance of
human life", and the real "point" that conventions have in a society.27

This brings Winch to his conclusion concerning the possibility of
making any accurate cross-cultural generalizations; identifying those aspects
of human life and society which are universal—common to all known social
systems. This can be expressed in terms of what Winch calls 'limiting
concepts'. Those limiting concepts are birth, death and sexual relations.28

Accordingly, "the masculinity or the femininity are not just comments in the
life, they are its mode...my masculinity is not an experience in the world, but
my way of experiencing the world".29 Winch goes on to say that "the vulgar
identification of morality with sexual morality certainly is vulgar; but it is
a vulgarization of an important truth."30

Winch points out that "unlike beasts, men do not merely live but also
have a conception of life...To have a conception of life is also to have a
conception of death."31 But the conception of death is not an ordinary
conception. "When I speak of 'my death', I am not speaking of a future event in
my life...I am speaking of the cessation of my world."32 This also is a
cessation of "my ability to do good and evil...my very concept of what it is to
be able to do good or evil is deeply bound up with my concept of my life as
ending in death."33

The limiting character of the concept of birth is related to what had
been already said regarding death and sex, according to Winch. The concept of
birth is fundamentally linked to that of relations between the sexes...for it
remains true that man is born of woman, not man.34

Winch believes this adds a new dimension to "ethical institutions in
which relations between the sexes are expressed. He therefore finds himself in agreement with Vico who pointed out that

We observe in all nations, barbarous as well as civilized, though separately founded because remote from each other in time and space, keep these three human customs: all have some religion, all contract solemn marriages, all bury their dead. And in no nation, however savage and crude, are any human actions performed with more elaborate ceremonies and more sacred solemnity than the rites of religion, marriage and burial. For by the axiom that "uniform ideas, born among peoples unknown to each other, must have a common ground of truth", it must have been dictated to all nations that from these institutions humanity began among all, and therefore they must be devoutly guarded by them all so that the world should not again become a beastial wilderness. For this reason we have taken these three eternal and universal customs as the first principles of this Science.

The Natural and the Conventional

In the essay "Nature and Convention" (N&C), Winch continues the theme that morality is conventional in character. However, he gives this proposition a twist by pointing out that "there are certain aspects of morality which make it necessary to say that it is not entirely based on convention but that, on the contrary, it is presupposed by any possible conventions." Social norms are different from scientific norms as the "grammar" of the word
'norm' suggests. In a social setting, it is "intelligible to say that a man may choose not to adhere to any given norm." And of course it would not be intelligible to say that of a norm found in natural law. The norm reflects what people in a given society adhere to more often than they do not. It also reflects the attitudes people have toward the breaches of a norm; attitudes such as condemnation or remorse.

Moral norms are not the same as the scientific norms which sociologists, according to Winch, use in attempting to understand and measure human and social phenomena. The two kinds of norms are different, incompatible and diametrically opposed. The relation between moral ideas and human behaviour is different from that between scientific ideas and the behaviour of natural phenomena. Science itself, according to Winch, is a cultural phenomenon, and this explains why "the barrier that stands in the way of a layman who wants to understand something in modern physics is a cultural barrier."

In turn, the community in which people live is a moral community. Winch points out that the notion of a moral community is quite unlike that of a scientific community and the discourses found in the two differ accordingly. The notion of a moral community suggests a common life. But, says Winch, "everything turns on precisely how it is thought to be relevant." Winch points to Hobbes' notion of the natural state of human beings living together, the so-called 'state of nature', as a constant state of bellicum omnium contra omnes, an individualistic conception of human behaviour which Winch says "follows directly from his individualistic conception of human language and intelligence."
Chapter Two

What keeps human beings from destroying themselves, what unites them, at least artificially, according to Hobbes, is a covenant which would guarantee that agreement would be "constant and lasting." The covenant then was needed to overcome the constant state of war which would 'naturally' occur without the intervention of 'rational' and conscious decision. Winch says that there are parallels between this way of understanding human nature—a term which he in fact deliberately avoids using (for reasons which will be discussed in the next section)—and assuming that "nobody, or hardly anybody, could ever be relied on to speak truthfully." There is something self-contradictory, according to Winch, about the notion of a society in which "there is a language but in which truth-telling is not regarded as the norm." This is because the conception of a distinction between true and false statements could not precede a general adherence to the norm of truthfulness. Winch points out that he is not speaking about what an individual might do as much as he is speaking of what generally is the case in a society.

An individual who can talk can of course deliberate on a given occasion whether to tell the truth or not. But he will already have learned what telling the truth is, and what I wish to argue is both that learning this is part of the process of learning to speak and also that learning this involves at the same time learning that speaking untruthfully is the norm and speaking untruthfully the deviation.

Winch is taking an ironic swipe here at sociological talk of 'norms' and 'deviations.' He wants to show that when a person belongs to a so-called
in-group or out-group, the patterns of behaviour have to be understood in
relation to the person's own thoughts, intentions and self-understanding, and
not, for instance, as Durkheim's view suggested, in terms of plots on a graph
which externally reflect behaviour's adherence to a 'norm'.

Instead, a 'norm', such as the norm of truthfulness, is closely and
unavoidably linked to 'truthfulness' as a virtue. In any event, if there were no
distinction between truthfulness and falsity, communication itself would be
impossible because there would be no rule, no reference point and hence no
commonality possible in thought or speech, according to Winch.

Lying "always needs special justification if it is not to be
condemned" what is regarded as 'such a justification', according to Winch,
"will depend on the particular institutions of the society in question." That
justification would have to reflect a commitment to the principle of
truthfulness itself if the person who lied is not to be identified as a willful
liar, manipulator or a person devoid of common feelings for others.

A person such as Senator Joe McCarthy, for instance, "was himself
incapable of true rancour, spite, animosity as a eunuch is incapable of
marriage. He could not comprehend true outrage, true indignation, true
anything." Winch uses this quote from Richard Rovere to illustrate the
connection between depth of feeling, sense of commitment and passion, to the
moral. Accordingly, understanding moral issues is only trivialized by
attempting to divorce emotions from the moral issues which evoked them. To
do so is to neuter the elucidation, so to speak, in the name of 'objectivity'.
Chapter Two

Theories of the Natural

Until now, although the subject under consideration was often social or political philosophy, it should be noted that the focus really has been one of method. In this section, the focus will be on Winch's treatment of political philosophical issues, primarily as explained through his comparison of Rousseau's and Hobbes' differing metaphysical positions. As well it will include a look at the comparison Winch makes between Sidgwick's moral philosophy and the view espoused, implied or described by novelist Herman Melville in the novel *Billy Budd, Foretopman*. In the two comparisons we find a summation of Winch's positions on social scientific methodology as well as his prescription for the development of an openminded social, moral and political philosophy.

In the short essay "Human Nature", Winch had taken issue with attempts to classify and 'explain' features of human nature. He continues this theme in the essay which follows entitled "Man and Society in Hobbes and Rousseau" (1965, 5). Winch is especially critical of the belief that one can speak of human nature as having fixed attributes. This often occurs, Winch says, when social theorists try to explain what human nature is in relation to the 'fulfilling of needs', or when they attempt to develop a *theory* of morality.

Winch says a belief in a 'science' or a theory of morals is mistaken, as is the belief that human nature has fixed properties. In comparing Hobbes' quasi-scientific view with Rousseau's 'philosophical' one, Winch wants to prove sociology tends to rely on this sort of external, explanatory, theoretical, pseudo-scientific approach whereas the philosophical approach, as exemplified by Rousseau, is in fact a superior one; one which succeeds in
elucidating the important concepts and issues in political and moral philosophy. And, says Winch, consequently it is one which is also more appropriate for social science. Hobbes says:

You may perhaps think a man has need of nothing else to know the duty he owes his governor, and what right he has to order him, but a good natural wit; but it is otherwise. For it is a science, and built upon sure and clear principles, and to be learned by deep and careful study, or from masters that have deeply studied it.\(^\text{51}\)

On the other hand, Rousseau says:

There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no virtue without citizens, create citizens, and you will have everything you need, without them, you will have nothing but debased slaves, from the rules of the State downwards. To form citizens is not the work of a day, and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children.\(^\text{52}\)

Winch says of Hobbes' position, "the 'science' which Hobbes would have his citizens taught is based on a theory about what human nature is."\(^\text{53}\)

This theory, according to Winch, is in turn "based upon an elaborate monistic materialist metaphysics.\(^\text{54}\) In this metaphysics, Winch says, "everything that can be intelligibly said must be reducible to a statement about the motion of material substance.\(^\text{55}\) The science Hobbes speaks of demonstrates the relations either between continually warring individuals or those in a
commonwealth of "subjects owing allegiance to the absolute sovereign" 56

Rousseau's view is that thinking is an art which must be learnt. A person's 'nature' is created by education. And clearly the communications, through speech, that Hobbes' vision presupposes, must presuppose the great complexity of thought and grammar that goes into speech. Hobbes seems unaware of this. The 'state of nature' found in Hobbes' account leads to the possibility and probability of vanity or 'amour propre', according to Winch. "Hence the tyranny of opinion" the subject of Rousseau's critique of Hobbes. 57

Hobbes' metaphysic does not enable him to see the importance of grammar. Hence, he cannot distinguish between "senseless strings of images and structured thoughts" 58. This distinction Rousseau can make because of his insistence that "sensations become ideas, capable of forming part of a judgment, only in so far as they are seen as having determinate relation to each other." 59

In Rousseau's view then, when human beings come into relation with each other, practical, moral problems are brought into focus. Whereas for Hobbes, presumably moral problems are not practical in the same sense, but are rather 'theoretical', in the pejorative sense of their being the object of detached study which is disengaged from practical day to day experience and human intercourse. 60 Winch says Hobbes' 'study' is in fact a study in the art of manipulation of people through the understanding of human motivation. He suggests that any 'scientific' examination of human motivation probably has at its root similar sinister intentions which revolve around a desire to rule and dominate. Rousseau believes such enlistment of support is illusory.
Domination is itself servile when it depends on opinion; for it depends on the prejudices of those whom you govern by prejudice. In order to make them behave according to your wishes, you have to behave according to their wishes. As soon as you have to see with others' eyes, you have to will with their wills.\(^6\)

Hobbes's argument then removes the possibility of a "genuinely independent and critical" standpoint. As well, Hobbes' notion of "sovereign power" is "really a form of servility."\(^6\) Hobbes' disagreement with Rousseau, Winch says, turns on the consideration of whether Rousseau is raising pseudo-questions against Hobbes, or real philosophical ones without which political philosophical issues cannot be settled.

Winch states that if we could now consider the question of how judgments concerning what is good and what is evil are germane to political philosophy, such an account would shed light on the dispute between Hobbes and Rousseau in a way which Hobbes would not permit but Rousseau would welcome. He says, however, that by turning to Hobbes' view of human nature and examining it, with the help of Rousseau, it can be shown that Hobbes' philosophy is incoherent.\(^6\)

**Political Philosophy**

Winch points out that "the central question of political philosophy concerns the nature of the authority of the state."\(^6\) In Hobbes' account, *sovereignty* and *legitimacy* are things which the rulers take for
themselves and maintain through persuasive and coercive techniques. For Rousseau the very question of legitimacy rests, not on some formal notion of legal power, but on the recognition of the legitimacy of the authority of the state and its rulers as having the consent of the governed. The recognition of power as legitimate must be "an act of will", rather than an act of necessity or prudence, Winch says, paraphrasing Rousseau's comment that "power can be transmitted, but not will". 65 Any consideration to the contrary involves a "fiction" or "feigned" or "artificial" person, according to Winch. 66

But for Hobbes, what is important is the unity of the state, the unitary aspect of the state. The people must be as one as the sovereign is one. A covenant must ensure such a single-minded commitment to unity. Hobbes' way of speaking, where there is a "split in the argument between a legalistic way of speaking" (in what he says about 'authorization', 'transference of rights', and 'representation'), reminds Winch of what might be called a "sociological way of speaking". 67

The former ignores the sense of commitment which people have for their leaders, and the feeling that what is legitimate goes beyond the strictly legal. The latter also displays an ignorance of people's will and intention in action. Winch ends this essay by saying that Hobbes' 'scientific' account emphasizes "factual political arrangements" without providing any insight into the way people develop a consensus or have conceptions of justice and liberty. 68

The mechanistic, quasi-physiological explanation Hobbes provides cannot explain the transition from the state of nature to civil society and can
provide no insight into how a society can guarantee continuance of the political arrangements other than 'factual' ones. It also ignores the fact that conceptions of justice are only developed through discussions of injustices. Men capable of becoming citizens must receive an education which enables them to understand what those injustices are, an education which consists not merely in inculcating a 'science' of what human relationships necessarily are, but rather in creating human beings of a sort who will be capable of discerning qualitative distinctions between different types of human relationship and who will therefore be capable of entering into such relationships.

On the other hand, Hobbes' description of the origins of social life, and the sociological views which seem to follow his logic, seem to assume human conception occurs in a vacuum. As a physicalist model is used to explain social phenomena and as a 'science' is used to inculcate ideas, in Hobbes' model, and to interpret the significance and understand of social relations in the commonly found social scientific models, concepts central to social scientific debate cannot even be coherently raised within this context. And these models are equally lacking in their capacity to teach people to develop skills which would enable them to make the qualitative distinctions necessary for the contemplation of questions of significance both to social theorists and to citizens concerned with assuming active and creative roles in community life in general.
Chapter Two

Universalizability

In the essay "The Universalizability of Moral Judgments," (UMJ), Winch wants to show what is involved in making a decision, specifically a moral one. He at the same time wishes to make a point concerning Sidgwick's claim that

We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for differences in their duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in certain important respects.

Winch takes issue with Sidgwick's claim that moral judgments can, and ought to be, universalized. This would seem to follow from his critique of the anthropological view which assumed European epistemology could be universalized, although Winch never makes this point explicitly. What seems evident is that Winch is attempting to lift the moralistic veil from moral philosophy, taking to task the quasi-empiricist view that moral judgments can be examined, ignoring the difficult part of the actual process of making a decision, as if, that is, morality could be examined the way a specimen might be examined in a beaker.

What the universalizability thesis ignores, according to Winch, is the extent to which people, in the crush of daily life and responsibilities, in the midst of battle or generally engaged in the practical activity of living, do not make moral decisions the way Sidgwick thinks they do or ought to.
ought they be held accountable in the way Sidgwick suggests. Quoting from Melville's novel *Billy Budd, Foretopman*, Winch provides an alternative view:

Says a writer whom few know, "Forty years after the battle it is easy for a non-combatant to reason about how it ought to have been fought. It is another thing personally and under fire to direct the fighting while involved in the obscuring-smoke....Little wen the snug card-players in the cabin of the responsibilities of the sleepless man on the bridge." 71

"Armchair quarterbacking, especially done by second guessers, looks good "on paper", "in theory", as it is said. But the detached and abstract version of what is moral and what is imperative; is not "engaged" and can hardly hope to be sensitive to, or be aware of the care, daring, intelligence, insight, sense of duty, commitment and dedication that went into a split second decision. Such action, as it often does, calls for an almost reflexive (as opposed to reflective) reaction to a situation. It also often requires great courage in the undertaking. The armchair quarterback, cum philosopher, might find himself or herself asleep at the switch in such a situation. Winch says:

As Melville suggests, it may well happen that when I am confronted with an actual situation demanding a delicate moral decision from me, I find that things strike me rather differently from the way they struck me when I was thinking only generally, or as a spectator." 72
So what is ‘right for me’, in the abstract, and what was ‘right’ for someone else, in the concrete situation, may be two very different things; a fact Winch says Sidgwick’s position cannot account for. When Sidgwick says that “other people too, if they are to judge rightly, must make the same judgements as I have made concerning these situations”, he makes, according to Winch “a much more sweeping claim” than Winch can find acceptable.73

To illustrate what he means, Winch cites the story of the predicament that Captain Vere was put in in Melville’s story of Billy Budd.

Budd, a foretopman of angelic character, is impressed into service on the Indomitable from the Rights of Man on the high seas. He is persecuted by the satanic master-at-arms of the Indomitable, Claggart, in a campaign which culminates in Claggart’s falsely accusing Billy, before Vere (the ship’s captain), of inciting the crew to mutiny. In the stress of this situation, Budd is afflicted with a speech-impediment which prevents him from answering the charge. Frustrated, he strikes Claggart, who falls, strikes his head and dies.74

Melville’s summation continues like this

In the legal view, the apparent victim of the tragedy was he who had sought to victimise a man blameless and the indisputable deed of the latter, navally regarded, constituted the most heinous of military crimes, yet more The essential right and wrong in the matter, the clearer that might be, so much the worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea commander, inasmuch as he was authorised to determine the matter on that primitive legal basis.75
In other words, "innocence and guilt, personified in Cleggart and Budd, in effect changed places." Nevertheless, Captain Vere, a man of unusually high moral principles, felt torn because of his strong sense of duty to uphold the laws of the sea, regardless of the consideration that in them he found only the crudest of legal instruction. Captain Vere deliberates to himself aloud as he serves as a witness at Budd's court-martial:

... If mindful of palliating circumstances, we are bound to regard the death of the master-at-arms as the prisoner's deed, then does the deed constitute a capital crime whereof the penalty is a mortal one? But in natural justice is nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be considered? Now can we adjudge to summary and shameful death a fellow-creature, innocent before God, and whom we feel to be so?—Does that state it aright? You sign sad assent. Well, I feel the full force of that. It is nature. But do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegiance is to nature? No, to the King....let no warm hearts betray heads that should be cool....The heart is the feminine in men, and hard though it be, she must here be ruled out.
Winch points out that Melville "is at pains to emphasize the moral side of the court-martial's dilemma." There is a conflict between "moral obligation...between two moral obligations". Vere, according to Winch, is faced with two "genuinely moral 'oughts', a conflict, that is, within morality." Both moral 'oughts', therefore, are universalizable in Sidgwick's scheme of things. Winch presents it this way: "On the one hand I ought to do this, on the other hand I ought to do that. So what ought I really to do? I am interested here in the force of the word 'ought' in the last question and in the answer given to it." Winch says that the deciding of what to do is "a sort of finding out what is the right thing to do...finding out what I ought to do." Finding out then ends up being a decision of what it is right for me to do. It may not suit someone else, but neither can that someone else tell me what I did was wrong. I can say I would have acted differently, but not what another did was wrong, in such a situation.

Winch says he would not have done what Vere did, but that does not mean that Vere's decision was wrong, immoral or ill-considered. It just means that for Vere, he was led by his conscience to make the decision he made. Because Sidgwick's position cannot account for the practical subtleties and importances of moral decisions, his universalizability principle is idle, according to Winch. Consequently "the last vestige of logical force is removed from the universalizability thesis." This seems to summarize Winch's view of the empiricist perspective. What is missing in this perspective, he says, is an understanding that when we speak of human relations we speak of logical relations. Logical relation then is the topic of the next chapter, and then again of the succeeding chapters where I offer my response to Winch's position.
1. E&A
2. Ibid. Pp. 8-9 The heading is Winch's, and is to be found on page 8.
3. Ibid. p. 9
5. E&A op. cit., p. 11
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. Pp. 11-12
8. Ibid. p. 12
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. However, it ought to be noted that the expression 'religious tradition' itself is a culturally loaded one which certainly carries with it the connotation of 'study'.
11. Ibid. p. 13
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. p. 14
14. Ibid. p. 15
15. Ibid. p. 16
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. Pp. 23-25
18. Ibid. p. 24
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. p. 33 The heading is Winch's, and is to be found on page 27.
21. Ibid. p. 42
22. Ibid. p. 32
23. Ibid. p. 34
24. Ibid. p. 46-47 Winch does not specify who might be unaware of this.
25. Ibid. p. 42
26. Ibid. p. 40 This would seem to be a cross-cultural generalization Winch believes can be made. For Winch states, he believes in reply to Mcintyre, that:

In a discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophical use of language games Mr. Rush Rhees points out that to try to account for the meaningfulness of language solely in terms of isolated language games is to omit the important fact that ways of speaking are not insulated from each other in mutually exclusive systems of rules. [Pp. 40-41]
It is one of the great ironies of Winch's critique, however, that this was precisely the kind of sentiment Marxists expressed in relation to the postivist and English individualist view for a century preceding Winch's discovery of it. Here Winch uses this apparently new-found insight against its likely source. Marx, for instance stated:

Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me, language like consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as men exist at all.

From *The German Ideology* by Karl Marx, International Publishers, 1947, p. 44.

27 E&A op cit., p. 40
28 Ibid. p. 43
29 Ibid. p. 46
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. p. 44
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. p. 46. But is this 'not a fact independent of what anyone might care to think?'
35 Ibid. Pp. 46-7
36 Ibid. p. 47
37 Ibid. p. 51 Winch makes this comment in relation to Karl Popper's position which he calls 'the nonsensical idea that norms can be laid down in accordance with natural laws in the scientific sense.'
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. p. 52
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid p. 54 This is stated in relation to, and in agreement with, sentiments expressed by Robert Oppenheimer (the 'father' of the atomic bomb) who, some may remember, was dismissed from his post in the United States, during the McCarthy era, for allegedly being a security risk. Ironically, it was Oppenheimer, a scientist, who was among the first to question the moral implications of the Manhattan Project.

42 Ibid p 59

43 Ibid

44 Ibid p. 60 Winch there states that his discussion of following a rule, which he had elucidated in ISS, as proposed by Wittgenstein, explains 'that human rationality is essential social in character'. And he believes this settles the question as to whether rationality can be elucidated in purely individual terms, as he says Hobbes had in mind.

45 Ibid p 61

46 Ibid

47 Ibid. Pp 61-62

48 Ibid p. 62 The question still remains, it seems to me, as to the real influence Hobbes' ideas have had on our form of life, specifically our political life. See a discussion of the influence of Hobbes upon American life, for instance, in Hobbes and America, by Frank Coleman, University of Toronto Press; Toronto and Buffalo, 1982.

49 E&A op cit, p 69

50 Ibid p 68

51 Ibid p 90

52 Ibid. p 91

53 Ibid

54 Ibid Is, however, the monism the problem or the materialism? Is Winch trying to claim that any materialism reflects the kind of alienated view he criticized MacIntyre and Marx for, or is it just Hobbes' peculiar materialism which is lacking? Would he, on the other hand, also find fault with Freud's, Durkheim's or any other materialism because it is a materialism? Winch does not say.

55 Ibid.
56 E&A op. cit., p 92
57 Ibid. Pp 94-95
58 Ibid. p. 95 On page 92 Winch had pointed to Rousseau's argument in which Rousseau criticized Hobbes' conception of language for ignoring "the enormous complexities of grammar". From the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, J.J. Rousseau. No other reference is given for this quotation.

59 E&A op. cit., p 99
61 Ibid. p 98
62 Ibid p 99
63 Ibid
64 Ibid p 100
65 Ibid, and p 104
66 Ibid p 104
67 Ibid Pp 105 and 106
68 Ibid. p 108
69 Ibid Pp 108-109
70 Ibid. p 151
71 Ibid
72 Ibid p 153
73 Ibid p 154
74 Ibid. p 155
75 Ibid p 156

76. This is somewhat confounding, however, if there is no 'objective' way of determining 'innocence' and 'guilt'. For to be able to say Billy Budd personified innocence is surely to universalize the notion of goodness which is precisely what Winch says Sidgwick cannot do.

77 Ibid. Pp. 156-157 Here again, according to Winch's own criterion, Billy Budd is 'innocent before God', presumably enough of an arguable reason not to convict him.

78 Ibid. p 158
79 Ibid Pp 158-159 Although Winch describes the situation variously as a conflict between "moral obligation" or sense of duty and "two moral obligations", he does not make the distinction Rousseau does between acting out of a sense of duty and acting according to one's conscience. Although it is arguably true Rousseau would have rejected Sidgwick's universalizability thesis because it contained a notion of 'duty' he
rejected, Winch wants to have it both ways. He wants to say Sidgwick is wrong, but that the sense of 'duty' (moral obligation) he takes as given, still holds, and is on the same 'logical footing' as an appeal to conscience; a suggestion Rousseau would flatly reject. And here we begin to see the difference between 'internal' 'description' and radical critical social philosophy. See Winch's interest is primarily to identify Rousseau's philosophy as being a kind of 'internal' method, and not so much as an example of critical and radical philosophy.

60 Ibid p.161
61 Ibid. p.165
82 Ibid p 168
83 Ibid. p.169 Winch seems to have proven, on the other hand, through the compelling argument Melville puts forward, just how forceful it is; especially in relation to Winch's own.
In this chapter I will focus on Winch's conception of logical relations. Specifically I will be interested in two different aspects of what Winch calls logical relations. The first (LRA) bears on his assertion that the relation of human consciousness to factuality is a logical one. The second aspect (LRB) involves Winch’s description of inference drawing and its relation to human activity in general. In either case Winch is to say that the kind of inference which is relevant to the social studies has less to do with the kind of inferential thinking found in the sciences than it does with the common practice of drawing inferences, generally, concerning the thoughts of others, not just specific to when they involve the description of scientific 'facts' or the engaging in some formal logical endeavour.

The implication of Winch's conception of logical relations is that if all relations of mind to understanding, description, interpretation and theorizing are logical, then they are, or should be, considered on an equal footing. Consequently religious thinking is as valid as scientific thinking. But it requires a different kind of logic to understand the former than the latter. This is why the logic of one field, as for instance a field which attempts to understand physical phenomena, does not apply and consequently should not be applied to another field which might want, for example, to understand cultural phenomena such as magico-religious beliefs. And so if we understand that science does not have a magical or special status, that it is no more 'real' than religion is, then we can judge ideas from these two fields more fairly while appreciating that there are 'differences', but not necessarily different levels of correctness.
Chapter Three

Intellectual History and Tradition

When the scientist sets out to do an experiment or develop a theory, she is nonetheless bound by a set of customs and traditions which would determine, for instance, correct procedure from incorrect procedure, and would define and require such considerations as honesty and precision. He is therefore aware, however unselfconsciously, of being part of a critical community. In this respect the scientist's situation, given his 'internal' and logical relations to his thoughts, and the thoughts of others, to conventions and theories, has much in common with the situations of those who live in so-called 'moral' communities.

The difference between the two communities, generally speaking, is that when a scientist sets out to do her work, the subject matter at hand, physical phenomena, is being examined within the context of a known assumption, an understanding, that the phenomena itself is governed by certain (physical) laws of which it can be said they apply universally. This, presumably, is largely why the phenomena is being studied to 'observe' the 'behaviour' of the phenomena given the known laws. And therefore the study is itself completely regulated by such knowledge and such an understanding. Such an understanding then is 'internal' to what can be said of science, even though the study of scientific phenomena is conducted, of necessity, in a way in which the laws of nature apply 'externally' to the phenomena under study.

The relation of laws to phenomena, in that respect, do not change. The subject matter, in the case of physical science, does not have the choice
of complying with laws which govern its behaviour (therefore deviations from
norms would not be met with disapprobation, for example) Of course physical
phenomena do not choose and in any event the laws of nature apply to all
things regardless of preference to the contrary With the scientist then, the
intellectual historical tradition is internal both to the dictates of the
specific discipline, and it shares, at the same time, other moral norms, such
as honesty, from the larger moral community The scientist, in the case of a
conception such as precision, would of course be doubly bound in his attempt
at precision, both because of her obligation to conduct an experiment which
did what it claimed to be wanting to do, and by virtue of being required to
conclude the experiment with certain physical acumen in order to accomplish a
physical and mental task 1

In the social sciences, however, the so-called scientist is doubly
bound in a different way While he is obviously bound by his place in a critical
community, the precision he attempts is by necessity different Her concern
for such precision would likely be more one of precision concerning the
understanding and elucidation of meanings, ideas, thoughts and feelings,
rather than precision, for instance, of measurement Here again the 'internal'
concern, for understanding meaning, as experienced within a context of
standards, conventions, feelings, morality etc., would take precedence over
the 'external' considerations, such as understanding causes and being able to
measure phenomena from some 'objective' position or in relation to some
objective criteria or reference point There would, at the same time, be a real
problem of precision if one were to want to measure, say, the feelings,
thoughts or actions of the subject of social science, itself being an agent.

One could say then that any distinguishing features of the two kinds of 'science' lie in the fact that in the one, social science, there is both an agent who 'observes' and an agent who is being observed. This changes the relation between the two in many ways. One clear way is that while 'laws', are generally immutable in the physical sciences, no such laws can be derived in the social sciences. Another is that the activity of the subject, within the social sciences, feeds back and effects the 'observer', at least in some way. There is interaction as there are thoughts, feelings and beliefs about the subject (agent) where there would be none in the case of the subject of physical science.

Of course scientists have differing opinions on the 'behaviour' of physical objects. But even the connotations of the notion of behaviour in physical science is different as it does not have the connotations of agency, of purposeful, meaningful action. The physical object is inactive, literally a non-agent, in the psychological and emotional sense, even if it might be, for instance, in the chemical sense. So once again, in such a distinction between the two notions of human as opposed to physical scientific 'agency', this shows a difference between the 'internal' and the 'external' concerns.

So one can say that even though moral norms certainly do apply to what the scientist thinks, does and how she behaves, scientific norms, or laws, do not reciprocally apply to human behaviour. This is why, for instance, 'behaviourism' uses an incorrect model. For it sees behaviour in only a physical-scientific way explained above and not in the social scientific way.
which has the connotations of active, participatory agency.

*Drawing an Inference is like 'Following a Rule'*

In the second case (LRB), that of drawing an inference, Winch wants to express something about the way people live and learn. He says there is a relationship between living, learning and following rules, as there is a relationship between learning to do something and social activity in general. He cites Lewis Carroll's tale of "What Achilles Said to the Tortoise" where Winch wants to prove Oakeshott's contention that, in Winch's words, human activity cannot be "summed up in a set of explicit precepts. The activity 'goes beyond' the precepts." The precepts, that is, "have to be applied in practice," and although we may formulate another, higher-order, set of precepts prescribing how the first set is to be applied, we cannot go further along this road without finding ourselves on the slippery slope pointed out by Lewis Carroll in Carroll's celebrated essay, as Winch describes it.

Achilles and the Tortoise are discussing three propositions, A, B, and Z, which are so related that Z follows logically from A and B. The Tortoise asks Achilles to treat him as if he accepted A and B as true but did not yet accept the truth of the hypothetical proposition (c) "if A and B be true, Z must be true", and to force him, logically, to accept Z as true. Achilles begins by asking the Tortoise to accept C, which the Tortoise does. Achilles then writes in his notebook
"A
B
C (If A and B are true, Z must be true)
Z."

He now says to the Tortoise, "if you accept A and B and C, you must accept Z." When the Tortoise asks why he must, Achilles replies: "Because it follows logically from them. If A and B and C are true, Z must be true (D). You don't dispute that, I imagine?" The Tortoise agrees to accept D if Achilles will write it down.¹

Then the following dialogue is quoted from Carroll's original story:

"Now that you accept A and B and C and D, of course you accept Z."

"Do I?" said the Tortoise innocently. "Let's make that quite clear. I accept A and B and C and D. Suppose I still refuse to accept Z?"

"Then Logic would take you by the throat, and force you to do it!" Achilles triumphantly replied. "Logic would tell you 'You can't help yourself. Now that you've accepted A and B and C and D, you must accept Z.' So you've no choice, you see."

"Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down," said the Tortoise. "So enter it in your book, please. We will call it

(E) If A and B and C and D are true, Z must be true.

Until I've granted that, of course, I needn't grant Z. So it's quite a necessary step, you see?"

"I see," said Achilles, and there was a touch of sadness in his tone.⁵
Winch says of Carroll's tale

The story ends some months later with the narrator returning to the spot and finding the pair still sitting there. The notebook is nearly full.

The moral of this, if I may be boring enough to point is, is that the actual process of drawing an inference, which is after all the heart of logic, is something which cannot be represented as a logical formula, that, moreover, a sufficient justification for inferring a conclusion does in fact follow from a set of premisses is to see that the conclusion does in fact follow. To insist on any further justification is not to be extra cautious, it is to display a misunderstanding of what inference is. Learning to infer is not just a matter of being taught about explicit logical relations between propositions, it is learning to do something. Now the point which Oakeshott is making is really a generalization of this, where Carroll spoke only of logical inference, Oakeshott is making a similar point about human activities in general.

Taken together, these two aspects of Winch's conception of logical relations yield the following results. From Rousseau, we learn something about logical relations which we could not learn from Hobbes. According to Rousseau, logical relations are 'social', born of interaction. They are then woven and interwoven with the fabric of a community. They reflect the 'social' and in that sense 'cohere' with the social. They are consequently 'coherent'. They are also in that sense meaningful and purposeful. And inferences, in that same sense, are reflective of human thought and purposefulness. We come to understand a person's way of thinking when we
understand what she means or intends. By virtue of this we are drawing inferences from what he has said and what he believes. Although it is a form of inference-drawing somewhat different from that of the one Carroll describes above, it is nonetheless illuminating, I believe, to see Winch’s conception of inference-drawing in this light.

In Hobbes’ conception of logical relations (given the distinction Winch means to make between his conception and Rousseau’s, as one might expect) Winch finds Hobbes’ conception ‘incoherent’ for the same reasons he finds Rousseau’s philosophy coherent: because it is based upon an individualistic conception of language and thought; because it sees learning as a process of mechanistic procedures; because for Hobbes there is no social conception of thought as there is in Rousseau; because in that sense thought appears to be self-generated; and because when Hobbes conceives of inference-drawing he sees it in formal and quasi-scientific terms. Consequently Rousseau’s representation better appreciates the intrinsic meaning and value of political ideas and institutions, ideas such as democracy and citizenship, and the many (internal) ways those institutions are interrelated to the community they are designed to serve.

From Carroll we learn that logic is not a merely formal nor a pointless activity. It is as much human activity with a point to it as cooking is. It is purposeful, meaningfully-directed and it only makes sense within a given social context. Like cooking, when we explore the logic of something we really are doing something. Drawing an inference, in that respect, is not, or ought not to be, a cold or robotic like activity as one might imagine.
experimentation to be. It is a practical human activity with a point to it. And in understanding this we understand human activity itself better. For we are then reminded that human activity itself is not senseless. It is done with a reason in mind and this is why, for instance, we would even ever call it a 'human' activity as opposed to an animal one.

We are also reminded then of what institutions and human thought and action involve. This makes it easier not only to 'draw inferences' concerning human thought and behaviour, in a way, that is, which will more likely closely describe those thoughts and actions, it points in the direction of the kinds of theories we should be attempting to construct when we consider the possibility of developing a 'sociology', a science of human behaviour.

Human activities, Winch explains, involve following rules, just as logic involves drawing inferences. But when people follow rules, (logic LRA), they do so according to the internal logic (logic LRB), the rules of the type of activity in which they are involved. But in following rules, people do not continuously or consciously refer to a code which would govern their activity. They simply act as per usual, in a more or less unselfconscious way. How they behave, and how they learn is more or less matter of course.

From this Winch is able to conclude that concepts such as duty are learnt within the context of the daily social and political living experience and that duty is exercised, not because one has a 'reason' to be dutiful, not because someone has an ulterior motive, not because someone has observed
what ought to be done or studied about it formally, but because that person is capable of having moral feelings and making decisions which reflect, to the best of her ability, what she truly believes ought to be done.

Rules and Feelings

But as has been noted, in the examples he chooses, most notably the one involving Melville's Captain Vere, the Captain chooses to follow the law "to the letter", ignoring "the gentle kinswoman"—i.e., his heart and his inner feelings—in choosing to have the boy, Billy Budd, executed. Vere's decision, nonetheless, according to Winch, reflected the depth of feeling, anguish, and the necessity to consider conflicting loyalties and ideas before coming to a final decision. According to Winch, this shows the extent to which the exercise of duty is itself not an empty or cold and mechanical activity undertaken without reflection or feeling. Instead, it is an activity with great logical and moral force. This, says Winch, has obvious implications for coming to understand human action, especially motivation and its meaning.
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Grammar

An important way of understanding human activity and human psychology, for instance, would be to examine the grammar used and to understand what that grammar implied. And so for instance, much could be learnt about human attitudes and conceptions by understanding the way words are used. The word 'norm', for instance, as used by sociologists, does not imply conscious, purposeful human activity. It implies reflexive reaction, and a life situation which is imposed rather than created.

But here we sense not the conscious and purposeful activities of human beings going about their daily lives. Instead we sense a dot on a graph being moved about or perhaps the activity of a rat on an electrically charged grid. And here the conditions of life weigh so heavily as to make decisions and actions freely taken virtually impossible.

The point seems to be then that if such a method is so mechanistic that it is not sufficiently subtle or sensitive to capture human feelings, attitudes, emotions, reactions and ideas, all of which are expressed through grammar, then how can such a method be sensitive enough to accurately describe or even register what is going on—either intra-psychically or inter-psychically? And Winch wants to say that the problem with modern day sociology is that it is mechanistic in that kind of way. It ignores personal decisions and fails to account for the entire procedure by which people come to recognize who they are, where they are, what they want and how they are going to go about doing what needs to be done in, what is for them, the most efficacious and meaningful fashion.
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The Sociological

Winch mimics what he believes is a typical sociological description of the life of a person when he writes:

A child is born within, and grows up into the life of a particular human society. He learns to speak and to engage in various kinds of activity in relation to other people. The way a person develops will be influenced by the kinds of people, the kinds of situation and the kinds of problems which he finds himself confronted with in the course of his life. But of course it is also true that his growth will depend on what he himself brings to the situations he faces. Our problem is to understand these two factors.

What Winch says of these sentiments is:

there is something misleading in this way of formulating the issue. A man is not 'confronted' with situations and problems as he is 'confronted' with a brick wall. A brick wall confronts a man whether he recognizes it or not, but the same is not unqualifiedly true of the other case.

In other words, whether a person 'confronts' something, or is confronted by something, has to do with whether that person recognizes the existence and significance of that thing. In the case of a wall, of course it is there whether we will it to be or not. And in that sense we are 'confronted' with it whether we like it or not. But this does not apply in the same way to other kinds of situations in our life, situations which involve decisions and
dilemmas, learning experiences or emotional and psychological events. In such cases such events are at least partially, and at least a part of the time, experienced in accordance with our beliefs and in conjunction with our understanding of the implications involved in making choices and decisions.

Even if it were true then that people sometimes come to feel that they came up against something they do not understand, or are confronted by something which they find overwhelming in some respect, Winch's objection lies in the language-game sociologists use to describe or generally characterize the lives of people, because, he would say, it is a characterization which does not seem to describe human experience at all. Consequently, it is misleading and fails to bring out the difference between instances where one would confront a brick wall and where one would face a choice. In fact, it goes beyond failing to bring out the difference it takes the one instance for the other.

The Logical

What Winch is of course implying here is that human experience involves decisions and understanding. Action is tied to reflection, it is volitional and it is intentional and informed as he believes Weber says. He therefore offers the following counter-example to that of the sociological. It is a passage which he cites from R.G. Collingwood’s Autobiography:

My father had plenty of books and allowed me to read in them as I pleased. Among others, he kept the books of classical scholarship, ancient history, and philosophy which he had used at Oxford. As a rule I left these alone;
but one day when I was eight years old curiosity moved me
to take down a little black book lettered on its spine 'Kant's
Theory of Ethics'. As I began reading it, my small form
wedged between the bookcase and that table, I was attacked
by a strange succession of emotions. I felt that things of
the highest importance were being said about matters of
utmost urgency; things which at all costs I must
understand. I felt that the contents of this book, although
I did not understand it, were somehow my business—a matter
personal to myself, or rather to some future self of my own.
It was not like the common boyish intention to 'be an engine
driver when I grow up', for there was no desire in it. I did
not, in any natural sense of the word 'want', to master the
Kantian ethics when I should be old enough, but I felt as if a
veil had been lifted and my destiny revealed.\(^{11}\)

Which says of these thoughts

Our first reaction to this passage is likely to be that the
young Collingwood must have been a very remarkable little
boy. A vocation needs someone with ears to hear as well as
a call. But of course a call is necessary too and we should
ask what are the conditions necessary for this. In
Collingwood's case it was necessary that there should have
existed a tradition of thought in which there were certain
live problems, questions which had not been answered.
Someone who feels moved to ask himself such questions,
who, speaking more generally, finds that his situation
confronts him with problems, discovers something about
himself by that very fact—as the young Collingwood
discovered about himself in dimly feeling the force of the
questions Kant was asking. But we could not say what a man
discovers about himself in such a situation without
referring to the nature of the problems he finds himself
faced with; it is in his response to those problems that he
makes the discovery. And we understand what those
problems are only in the context of the traditions of thought
and activity out of which they arise.\(^{12}\)
The essential difference between logical relations and sociological ones, for Winch, at least as far as the latter are described quasi-scientifically, is that logical relations involve decisions which are personal and significant to the life of the person who takes them. The 'turning points', so to speak, in a person's life are 'logical', not 'sociological'. They involve recognitions and decisions and not just 'facts'. Or if they involve 'facts', these facts are not just 'things' but are a part of a person's living history.

At the same time Winch wants to point out that logical relations have a reference point, a backdrop, which is different from the one sociologists describe. Here the backdrop is not the hard, material facts of daily life, as much as it is the intellectual and cultural history into which we are all born. The logic feeds back onto itself, so to speak. It is the logic of the intellectual and cultural milieu which surrounds us and is also part of what comes to be our individual personalities.

And while it is the exceptional child, such as Collingwood, who chooses to dream of philosophical ideas instead of fire engines, it is nonetheless more generally the case that the problems which we face when growing up, and the way we tackle them, say something about who we are. This enables us to understand ourselves in the process. This too is unlike the sociological characterization where a person appears to be more like a labyrinth than a situation which involves different kinds of questions and problems. Many of those questions and problems bear on people's lives personally, rather than impersonally (empirically), as one would expect of the problems one would face in working oneself out of a maze.
Implicit then in Winch's conception of logical relations are the notions of recognizing and choosing, of volition and of making decisions.

Winch says, "what makes a decision intelligible is its relation to the facts of a situation in which it is made, and this relation is a logical one. 13 What Winch means here is that the concept of 'fact' is like the concept of the 'world', or the concept of the 'real'. All in being conceptual are at once conventional. The concept of factuality is given, it arises out of the way men live. 14"

In other words, social 'facts' reflect 'forms of life'. What someone believes to be a 'fact' is itself conditioned by many other conceptual factors which in turn determine one entire way of looking at the world and understanding what 'the world' means to that person.

Winch says of the relation of logic to the world in which people live:

The notion of logic is the notion of what is and what is not intelligible in human behaviour and it can be applied to anything men do. If it is abstracted from the ways in which men live it loses its significance as logic even as applied to relations between statements, for a statement is essentially something which men may make in the course of their lives. 15

So just as 'facts' have a 'logical relation' to the 'knower', logic has a 'factual relation', so to speak, to the world in which the people who are being described live. For instance, it would be 'illogical' for a religious person to believe that she or he could fight God. It would contradict the very logic of
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the belief that God was all-powerful and all-knowing being But we 'know'
that only by knowing what the concept of 'God' means. Without understanding
this, or believing to begin with that God had such attributes, the very reaction
of a religious person would have to a suggestion that she or he could fight God
would be incomprehensible From the 'outside', it would seem absurd

'Understanding' then, must have a 'logical' context. This applies to
scientific questions as well as it does to moral ones. 'The barrier that stands
in the way of a layman who wants to understand something in modern physics
is a cultural barrier.' And quoting Robert Oppenheimer who said 'The deep
things in physics, and probably in mathematics too, are not things you can
tell about unless you are talking to someone who has lived long time acquiring
the tradition'. Winch then makes the point that this situation is analogous to
the study of ideas which are of a 'historically or culturally remote society'.

Winch says:

Consider, for instance, the practice of child sacrifice in
Pre-Abrahamic Hebrew society. This is a practice which,
in terms of our own way of living and the moral ideas
that go along with it, is just unintelligible To try to
understand it is to try to understand something of what
life and thought must have been like in that society. What
I want to emphasize here is that the main problem about
this is one of understanding what is involved, not just
taking up an attitude, for without understanding we
should not know what we were taking up an attitude to.
And it would be no more open to anyone to propose that
this practice should be adopted in our society that it is
open to anyone to propose the rejection of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics in physics. My point is not just that no one would listen to such a proposal but that no one would understand what was being proposed. What made child-sacrifice what it was, was the role it played in the life of the society in which it was practiced, there is a logical absurdity in supposing that the very same practice could be instituted in our own quite different society.  

"What this indicates", according to Winch "is that decision is not the fundamental concept in morality. For a decision can only be made within the context of a meaningful way of life and a moral decision can only be made within the context of a morality. That is, the fundamental consideration in the understanding of moral questions, as in the understanding of scientific questions, is the form of life to which those decisions and concepts are attached and out of which and from which historical context they are found and drawn.

Logic and Volition

Decision-making, Winch says, is obviously related to the general capacity to discriminate. And so knowledge itself reflects the extent to which the human will underlies the very capacity to discriminate. Winch quotes Anscombe as saying

Knowledge itself cannot be described independently of volition, the ascription of sensible knowledge and of description go together. The prime mark of colour

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discrimination is doing things with objects. Thus the
scription of sensible discrimination and that of volition
are inseparable, one cannot describe a creature as having
the power of sensation without also describing it as
doing things in accordance with perceived sensible
differences. 21

The fundamental question of social science, as Winch had previously
said, is an epistemological one. At the root of epistemology, whether it be in
making sensible discriminations or moral decisions, is volition. The relation
we have with our world, a logical one, is in that sense a voluntary one. This is
why Hobbes and Marx and the Marxists (such as Brecht and MacIntyre) are
wrong when they do not recognize this sense of the voluntary, the legitimate,
duty etc. Instead, they offer a fiction, either hyperbole, as with the Marxists,
or artificiality and formalism, as with the Hobbesian kind of analysis. This is
why Rousseau's conception of the legitimate, assented covenant properly
describes social reality in a way that neither the Hobbesian nor the Marxist
view does.

The implication this has for social science is that the social
scientist must be or become equipped with the tools, so to speak, Rousseau
provides for understanding human consciousness and behavior. For as
Rousseau's method accounts for, and even encourages 'citizenship', part of
becoming a citizen is recognizing one's place in society, recognizing the
meaning and function of institutions in that society and understanding one's
role and the significance of one's decisions in relation to others. These are
the same tools a social scientist must have when 'studying' people.
In order to understand social life, therefore, one must understand the internal logical relation a person has, or a community has, to beliefs held. Without this internal examination, a serious study is impossible as is the understanding of what is intrinsic to social life. For to understand human relations, one must understand the logical relations which exist between human beings. And to understand human behaviour, one must understand the logical relation of that behaviour to the ideas current in the society and in its institutions.

**Two Logics, Two Moralities**

All this comes to demonstrate that moral norms are not the same as the scientific norms which sociologists so often use in attempting to understand human action and social phenomena. The two kinds of norms are different and incompatible. Winch says:

Modern scientific theories could be used to describe and explain natural phenomena occurring in the time of Abraham as well as they can be used for phenomena occurring now, but modern moral concepts could not be used to describe and explain the actions of Abraham and his contemporaries.

In one instance, for example, social history is crucially significant. Whereas in the other it is not. In one instance social laws change as social customs change. In the other, although the study of those laws may alter, they
are, for the sake of argument, immutable, even if the interpretation of them changes somewhat over time.

But consider, Winch would say, the equivalent scenario in relation to social laws and customs. For to understand Abraham's, or anyone else's response, either to the customs of his day, or our day, we would literally have to think his thoughts and experience his experience in precisely the way he did. This is of course impossible because his experience is no longer accessible, as his form of life is also not accessible, and as our forms of life were not accessible to him.

The same cannot be said, however, concerning the influence of the laws of science which, if he were aware of them in as great detail as we are today, would have been as accessible as his own customs. For they applied as much then as his own customary laws did, as he and all the phenomena surrounding him, were surely as subject to them then as they would be today.

The Logical and the Social

Understanding the difference between the laws of nature and the laws or rules of social convention one understands that examining the relation of moral concepts to social action involves one kind of logic; the same logic as would be found in that relation. While understanding scientific theories means understanding laws internal to or specific to a particular scientific discipline but which are then not applicable to the understanding of
moral ideas and social phenomena. But as Winch sees it, with science’s
general popularity, its methods are held out as ideal and essential.
Consequently they are assumed to be ones uniquely suited to for the
investigation of all phenomena.

Science’s promotion in social studies, according to Winch, therefore
leads to the creation of a pseudo-science, ill-suited to the understanding of
human behaviour and explaining nothing. This is because this ‘science’, as so
defined, is no longer the science of the physical scientific discipline. It is a
science which becomes a peculiar form of life; a bastardization of science. It
is a form of ‘science’ which, one might say, is a popularized version of
science, one so much ingrained in the larger culture that its ‘pretensions’, its
‘extra-scientific’ pretensions are taken as expert opinion.

In the study of social phenomena we then see two different kinds of
logic lying side by side: the logic of the social itself, with its applicability to
that social phenomena, and the logic of science, which is taken as also being
applicable to the same phenomena. But in the former logic, the logic
employed is that of the ideas and rules which are internal to the conventions
and moral norms of the society at large. Employing the latter logic, that of
the physical sciences, leads not only to incoherence, it resembles, Winch
might say, exploring the social conventions of Abraham’s time, not just by
illegitimately applying the rules of our own time upon that situation, but
worse by applying the rules of physical science to ‘observe’ and ‘study’ such
mores. And this, Winch says, is clearly not only illegitimate, it is also
counterproductive and bad ‘science’. For in such cases applying criteria from
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The 'outside', as a scientist would to physical phenomena, which is then 'external' to the logic of the situation, reveals nothing truly intrinsic or important concerning the phenomena being studied.

Good science, for Winch, means understanding that social conventions stand in logical relation to that which communities feel is significant. Universally, societies recognize as sacred birth, death and sexual relations. This is reflected in the importance given to the institutions and ceremonies which celebrate (or mourn) the occasions of marriages, births and deaths. So just as I stand in logical relation to my own death as I stand in logical relation to my own world, my world stands in logical relation to the worlds of others. All our worlds, within a community, are logically interrelated and have at the nexus the logical relations of the society at large. Meaning, both individual and social, is 'given' to us through interaction, not just through abstract contemplation.

The Logical and the Subjective

The relation between a scientist and an experiment or research is a logical one, as is the relation between a businessperson and one's way of doing business or one's knowledge and understanding of business. The logic of his or her enterprise is already built into the experimental method or the way in which scientists usually go about doing research. One can say that the logical relation of the scientist to his or her work is that of someone to a set of principles and standards of investigation which which bear on phenomena
which are examined through procedures and in accordance with laws which are not meant to be mutable and are not treated as such. (Of course if new interpretations call for changes in theory, then laws might themselves be readjusted to explain phenomena.) What is conventional is that those standards are accepted as legitimate, as standards. In that respect, Winch would say, all human activities resemble each other in being bounded, one way or another, by convention.

I will now offer some critical suggestions as to how I believe his position could have been made stronger.
1. The idea for this example, as well for the structure of this entire chapter, was inspired through discussions with, and on the suggestion of, Dr. O'connor.

2. ISS op. cit., p. 55

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Pp. 55-56

5. Ibid. p. 56

6. Ibid. Pp. 56-57

7. This is just to remind the reader of Winch's distinction between human activity and animal-like activity, made in ISS on pages 130-131 where he points out that war cannot and should not be compared to "a fight of wild animals over a piece of meat", because

   the belligerents are societies in which much more goes on besides eating, seeking shelter and reproducing; in which life is carried on in terms of symbolic ideas which express certain attitudes between man and man....

8. E&A op. cit., This is in relation to a discussion of Macintyre's criticism of Hare's theory of morals Pp. 75-83. In this context Winch has taken issue with the claim he attributes to Macintyre that

   the 'superiority' of the Aristotelian view of human nature and of its relation to morality in comparison with, e.g., those to be found in Christianity, the Sophists and Hobbes...[is that] it does squarely link up duties with specific social roles and with social rewards and satisfactions provided for one who fulfils those roles worthily within the life of the society. [p. 81]

Winch's objections to this kind of sentiment is that the holder firstly believes it has provided an 'explanation' of why people are obedient and have a 'sense' of duty. Secondly, and following from the first, this only comes to show that those holding such an opinion (here Macintyre) "were considerably less liberal than once appeared concerning what can and what cannot be accepted in morality" [p. 83]
9. Ibid. p. 84
10. Ibid. p. 84-85
12. Ibid. Pp. 85-86
13. Ibid. p. 55
14. See footnote 7 of this chapter and page 44 of E&A where Winch says: "Unlike beasts, men do not merely live but also have a conception of life."
15. E&A op. cit., p. 56
16. Ibid. p. 12
17. Ibid. p. 54
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. p. 57
22. Ibid. Pp. 52-53
Winch's own External View of Social Theory

The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine Winch's critique of social theoretical methodology. As I am in general agreement with his position, I have attempted to present his views in as sympathetic a light as possible. There are, however, some potential overriding difficulties which I will discuss in this concluding chapter. The purpose of this chapter then is to offer some suggestions as to where his position may be ambiguous or incomplete, mistaken or too superficial; where, that is, accepting the 'broad outline' of his position, it can be improved.

Crucial to Winch's own thesis is the notion of understanding a thinker's thoughts from his or her own point of view, within a relevant social and historical context. This would mean that we understand a point of view, not from some such 'external' criteria, as science would impose, but from the point of view of what actions and thoughts mean 'internally'—internal to their social context.

His critique is, however, less straightforward than one is first lead to believe. As an example, I will take Winch's criticism of Hobbes. Winch is here meaning to discuss Hobbes' reliance upon a physicalist model he sees him employing. And in this respect he means to point out how Hobbes cannot explain human behaviour using this model. But nonetheless, underneath this discussion I believe Winch is conducting a parallel one which I now will attempt to isolate.

I see the use of two different kinds of (what Winch would call) descriptive models. The one, Rousseau's view, Winch favours because it
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succeeds in describing the way in which people develop a notion such as citizenship. It can also explain how people form agreements, make decisions and come to recognize and interpret the reality they face. Rousseau's model also seems to describe an ideal, which Winch, not incidentally, calls more real (less surreal) than Hobbes' view. On the basis of his critique of Hobbes' model, Winch is able to draw certain conclusions concerning the pretentious and faulty nature of the (quasi-physicalist) scientistic point of view. But he has nothing to say in criticism of the idyllic model.

I would contend he has undervalued Hobbes' description as he has overlooked the social context of Hobbes' philosophical viewpoint. And, I would further submit, he has failed to take seriously enough the extent to which Hobbes described his own social reality with great skill and critical insight. This may sound like a contradiction in terms so I will make my point in some detail. In this regard Macpherson states:

...the original seventeenth-century individualism contained the central difficulty, which lay in its possessive quality. Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is the proprietor of his person and his capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors.
Now my first comment about this passage is that if Macpherson is right that the central difficulty of the individualism of Hobbes' time lay in its 'possessive quality', then Hobbes was, in that respect, not confusing the a-social and the social. Macpherson says:

"When we see his [Hobbes'] theory of human nature as a reflection of his insight into the behaviour of men towards each other in a specific kind of society [an emerging market-economic one], we can see why Hobbes thought his propositions about human nature would be self-evident to all honest contemporary observers once he had set them out 'orderly and perspicuously.'"

A little later Macpherson observes of Hobbes that it is apparent that because of the assumption he made about the nature of society, which he saw as a series of competitive relations between naturally disassociated and independently self-moving individuals, with no natural order of subordination, he was also to deduce a moral obligation from the supposed facts, without importing hierarchic moral values or teleological principles; that his materialism was an integral part of that deduction; and that the deduction of obligation directly from the supposed facts about the nature of men and the necessary relations between men is not illogical in principle but requires conditions which were not clearly satisfied before Hobbes' time.

In other words, Hobbes' conclusions concerning the nature of society and the nature of humanity was also based upon 'observation' of the social relations within his own time and society, albeit, of course, a different kind
of observation. Hobbes' description of social relations implied that they were, in Macpherson's words "a series of competitive relations between naturally dissociated and independently self-moving individuals". Once again I grant that Hobbes did employ a physicalist model, but he also demonstrated his insights into actual social relations through some of his other descriptions of social reality. Hobbes' position does have its own peculiar validity, even in relation to Galileo's. Even more so. For there were no such phenomena to observe and describe before Hobbes did so. Such was not the case for Galileo.

Now the type of 'observation' I am describing here obviously is not the same kind of observation the physicist engages in when conducting an experiment. Understanding this kind of 'observational' component in Hobbes' work is particularly important, however, precisely from the point of view of coming to understand Hobbes' purpose and intentions in what he thought he was describing, from the point of view, that is, of understanding what Hobbes was 'recognizing' and what was, consequently, being recognized for the first time in recorded human history.

Winch's critique of Hobbes' method, in this respect, overlooks the substance of the recognition in calling not only for a change in Hobbes' procedure for understanding social reality, which is fair enough, but also by not addressing adequately what Hobbes saw. That is to say, what Hobbes 'recognizes' is bound up with what he 'observes' and the way he 'describes' the 'form of life' and social relations of his day.

Winch's collapsing of two forms of observation into one, the scientific and the social scientific, therefore assumes that Hobbes proceeds,
In the manner of the scientist in setting out to understand his society and its social relations. But this does not appear to be all of what Hobbes was doing. In understanding this we come to understand, in part, the false dichotomy Winch draws between his conception of philosophy and his conception of pseudo-scientific social science—between 'real' philosophical description and false 'scientific' description. Once again Macpherson:

The behaviour of men in Hobbes's model of society is, so to speak, so anti-social, that when he carries this behaviour into the hypothetical state of nature, it is there easily mistaken for a statement of the behaviour of non-social men. But it is a statement of the behaviour of social, civilized men. 4

Then Macpherson quotes Hobbes as saying:

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. 5
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Later Macpherson comments that "there can be little doubt that... the state of nature is a logical abstraction drawn from the behaviour of men in civilized society." In other words, the state of nature is not the opposite of civilized society. It is merely another side of it, a logical abstraction of it and from it. When describing the anti-social nature of the so-called state of nature, Hobbes is then describing, as he sees and understands it, the social nature and the logical relations of his own society.

Winch's attempt to reconstruct Hobbes' thesis in relation to his own view of 'logical relations' in that sense glosses over the actual historical setting and the logical relations of the day. In that sense it is a-historical and a-logical; i.e., external. Having failed to 'see what Hobbes saw', Winch does not even try to do so. And it is a-logical because it fails to see and describe what Hobbes saw. Consequently Winch's reconstruction of Hobbes' view does little other than impose external categories of thought upon Hobbes' view through the very notion of 'logical relations' by being an incomplete rendering of his position; at least from the point of view of the substantive social theoretical questions involved.
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Section ii

Science on a Logical footing

The debate as to whether a theorist contravenes the principles Winch outlines for proper social theoretical methodology becomes, I believe, a moot point when it is considered that Winch simply does not represent the intentions or theories of the theorists he discusses in anything resembling a faithful manner. Therefore the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his position is decided on the basis of the consideration that Winch's critique is more a critique, in many instances, of straw theories rather than of actual ones. I say this, because I believe he has failed to understand the intention, significance or method of many of the thinkers he criticizes. I would contend, therefore, that he has himself attempted to understand social theory on here external philosophical terms rather than on the social theoretical terms originally intended. Hence it is here Winch's own method which is illegitimate on its own terms.

Winch suggested, for example, what it would take to move from the 'mistaken' external-scientific-logic to the actual logic where the human 'event' is the focus of investigation and study. He says in that context that if Freud had wished to study the aetiology of neuroses among the Trobriand Islanders, he could not "just apply without further reflection", the concepts he developed "for situations arising in our society." For the investigation to make sense Winch says it would have to include, for instance, the idea of fatherhood the Trobrianders had, not the idea of fatherhood a European might previously have been found to have.
In other words, the investigations of a new culture would have to account for the logical structure of the thoughts and ideas of that new culture. There would have to be a "logical relation" and a continuity, along the same lines as the previous investigation. The new investigation of new cultures would have to, that is, follow the previous investigation of Europeans, using the techniques previously used by Freud, while incorporating any new concepts discovered in the new investigation, thereby adjusting old techniques to understand these new concepts.

The notion of continuity, or of 'going on the same way', (which Winch had spoken of previously in relation to following rules) is, he says, an important one here too. This is why the investigator "must also extend our conception of intelligibility as to make it possible for us to see what intelligibility amounts to in the life of the society we are investigating". To understand how people make things intelligible, to understand how they conceive of fatherhood, for instance, is to understand their logical relations.

Similarly, to understand how to extend our own conceptions of intelligibility, he says, is to understand how to extend the technique for understanding the relation of our own peculiar notions of fatherhood, in relation to our own neuroses, to other less familiar notions of fatherhood and their relations to neuroses. It is to put our investigation, one might say, on the same logical footing as their experience of life. It is to put our logical relations on the same logical footing as their logical relations.

The various ideas, logical relations and techniques of investigations must all be on a compatible logical footing or there can be no meshing and no
real understanding, according to Winch. Knowing their logical relations is to know their categories of thought. It is not just seeing their categories, he says, in terms of "our own ready-made distinction between science and non-science." 10

To impose this distinction on their categories, or to investigate their categories of thought without achieving the logical compatibility Winch speaks of, necessarily, he says, leads to incoherence. This incoherence, Winch says, extends generally to other questions, those, for instance, concerning morality and norms, decisions and judgments, legitimacy and citizenship. This is what he meant when he said logic could not be abstracted from the situation to which it pertained.

But Winch's position on concept-formation and morality involves him in a paradox. For while he attempts to demonstrate the importance of social scientific research and thought in general, he also attempts to prove, philosophically, how such questions must be investigated purely a priori. For his emphasis here, as elsewhere, is upon both the 'logical relations' inherent in the 'primitive's' 'world' (individual conception of reality) and on the 'scientist's' individual logical relation to her or his work. So Winch has already explained to us, through his conception of logical relations, exactly the bounds within which he believes people experience social reality and consequently, how, as scientists, they ought to undertake their work.

Now on the surface there may not appear to be anything wrong with his formulation. His suggestion that we put our forms of social scientific investigation on a compatible footing with those of the other cultures we
study seems like a perfectly sensible one. But then we must ask what our goal, or his goal would be in doing this. And it seems to me the answer in either case is that it ought to be to elucidate Freud's position; certainly before launching into suggestions as to how that position ought to be corrected. But surely this would entail attempting to first recognize what Freud recognized, and discover how, if at all, his method was unusual; how, for example, it might differ either from other social scientific positions or, for that matter, from a view philosophers might hold.

Such an investigation also ought to be undertaken to see if Freud thought questions, such as those raised here, were important. And if so, how so? How, for instance, it might be pondered, did Freud attempt to incorporate such questions in his practice? If he did not, why not? An inquiry should then be undertaken to see if and/or how Freud followed through on the implications of what he seemed to think was important, how he attempted to develop a method for social scientific inquiry and how that method worked in practice.

Instead, it seems to me Winch assumes Freud's position to be straightforward and unproblematic, at least from the point of view of his logical relations model. That is, he treats Freud's methodology purely hypothetically. He speculates without directly referring to anything Freud actually ever wrote or thought about. He assumes his own notion of logical relations is relevant to Freud's work without attempting to demonstrate this with reference to Freud's own position. In other words, he never really even offers an interpretation of Freud's position; at least of anything Freud actually said. He merely offers an a priori interpretation which is done
totally in the abstract of what Freud might have said or have been thinking.

Here it is Winch who assumes a detached view which could well be alien to the view Freud embraced. How can we know one way or another? For here Winch has to be assuming that Freud proceeds as a philosopher (would) and not a scientist (would); that Freud's view of methodology would emphasize, for example, the conceptual, as opposed to material or physical (for example the biological) aspects of human dynamics.

"So what may be wrong with such an assumption? Two things I believe. First, in the example above, in relation to the question of the investigation of the relation of neurosis to the notion of fatherhood among Trobriand Islanders, Winch calls for the interpretation of the concept of fatherhood among the Trobrianders as if to imply Trobrianders would have their own peculiar brand of understanding what fatherhood means; hence their own peculiar brand of neurosis. That being the case, some modification in technique would be required to make Freudian analysis compatible with Trobriand beliefs.

Although it certainly may seem that analysis would require an understanding of the way Trobrianders form concepts such as fatherhood, it is not clear how that would differ from the adjustment an analyst would have to make to each new patient, assuming, that is, a Trobriander ever were to be analyzed or that Freud would ever think she or he had to be. But this is a very complicated assumption indeed, one based upon an apparent belief that in any society "their" idea of fatherhood would markedly resemble our own more
than it would differ from it. In other words, in "their" idea of fatherhood we would find an idea of fatherhood we recognized. But not only does this assumption beg the question, it universalizes our notion of fatherhood even if only to establish it as a point of comparison. But this is precisely what Winch said the Freudian ought not to do.

Further, another assumption Winch would have to be making is that in "our" form of life there is not already the variegation of which Freud himself speaks: that the technique developed would not already be sufficiently flexible and openminded to adjust to new kinds of patients and new conceptual schema. Winch would also have to be assuming that in "their" form of life, human bonding is as of a different species; at least if the concept of fatherhood were to be as different or as mysterious as he believes it might be. This he says even though he has otherwise stated that such institutions as the family resemble each other in every human society known.

The second part of my objection to his position is that Winch assumes Freud believed neurosis had to do only with concept-formation. But Freud does not say that. He says concept-formation is the manifestation of neurosis; the outward manifestation of, one might say, of the effects social relations, morality and form of life have on human physiological and biological "functioning." That is, Freud believed that neurosis itself had a biological core. The etiology of neurosis, according to Freud's original formulation, was biological and had no conceptual component. So Winch's notion of "logical relations", which presupposes the investigation only of
human consciousness and concepts cannot explain or accommodate Freud's (functionalist) thinking here.\(^{15}\) For 'understanding' neurosis in general for Freud meant understanding it as a physical-biological phenomenon: a 'pathology' in the medical sense of the term.

Now whether Freud was correct or incorrect in his theory, Winch would first have to recognize Freud's position and acknowledge it before he could have anything to suggest as an improvement or a criticism. Freud's thesis being essentially a materialist one, albeit an extremely complex materialism, must be judged as such. And because Winch has not first dealt with that aspect of Freud's theories, his potential corrections to them are 'immaterial', in either sense of the term.

Freud's position, being as complex as it is, and bearing, as it does, both on conceptual and on physical-scientific questions, suggests that cultural differences make less difference than Winch predicted they would. For all human beings both have a biological core and form concepts. Freud does not wish to emphasize one at the expense of the other even if Winch does.

Freud more likely would have said then that neuroses in Trobriand communities, although only accessible conceptually, had their aetiology, as anywhere else, in the sexual practices and morality of the communities and families within which the people being analyzed resided. This, of course, is assuming there were any evidence of the existence of neurosis in the first place and consequently that a good reason existed to warrant further investigation. Of course this is a very big assumption, one Winch makes with
no justification whatsoever.

For as Freud would likely have said that we come to understand neurosis by coming to understand the incoherences, contradictions and compulsory nature of that specific morality and the behaviour which accompanies it, the assumption Winch would have then to be making is that either there were such contradictions in the Trobriand communities, or that such contradictions were irrelevant to Freud’s procedure. On either account Winch is wrong.

He is wrong because ironically, as I will try to show, the issue of neurosis in the Trobriands has nothing at all to do with the concept of fatherhood found in the Trobriands. Nor does it have to do with any contradictions found in Trobriand morality or social relations. For there were no neuroses, as we know them, and as Freud explained them, in the Trobriands before the arrival of the Europeans. Winch understands the implication of this kind of ‘social fact’ when it applies to examples of how ‘primitives’ react when in the hands of European courts. But he does not seem to understand its implications when the same primitives fall into the hands of other purveyors of European ‘culture’ and morality, such as European religionists.

And here it seems evident that Winch is blind to his own shibboleths, the shibboleth, for instance, of his own organized system of religion. On the other hand, he has a heightened awareness of other shibboleths such as those of science and law. But in being so aware of the one and not the other, it seems the awareness of the defects of one function to
defend the mythology of the other. In other words his critique of science and
law provide a defense for religious opinion, regardless of how damaging or
demeaning it might be on a cultural or theoretical level.

The irony then is that this speculation concerning prospective
Freudian methodology may lead, as it did, to the anthropological suggestion
that neurosis, as we understand it, and as Freud explained it, is not something
indigenous to a primitive culture, such as the Trobriand's, but is imported
from European culture and imposed upon 'primitive' culture, Winch neither
thought to make such a suggestion, nor would he be able to explain it the way
someone who had watched such culture in transition would; someone, that is,
such as Malinowski. With this thought in mind I will proceed to the next
section.
A Methodological Overview of the Trobrianders' Analysis: 
A Case in Point of Winch's Confusion on Social Scientific Methodology

The issue of the understanding of Trobriand Islanders of course stems from the fact that Malinowski, who Winch had been critical of for adopting what he called a "neo-Marxist terminology", was the anthropologist most notably associated with research on the Trobriands. 17 I will now cite at greater length the context within which Winch's criticism of Malinowski occurred.

Winch had made the point that it did not make sense to compare warring human parties to "a fight between two wild animals over a piece of meat. For the belligerents are societies," he goes on to say, "in which much goes on besides eating, seeking shelter and reproducing, in which life is carried on in terms of symbolic ideas which express certain attitudes as between man and man. 18 Then he says, as an apparent chastisement of what he takes Malinowksi's position or intent to be, that

These symbolic relationships, incidentally will affect the character even of those basic 'biological' activities, one does not throw much light on the particular form which the latter may take in a given society by speaking of them in Malinowski's neo-Marxist terminology as performing the 'function' of providing for the satisfaction of the basic biological needs. Now of course 'out-group attitudes' between the members of my hypothetical warring societies will not be the same as 'in-group attitudes' (if I may be forgiven the momentary lapse into the jargon of social psychology). Nevertheless, the fact that the enemies are men, with their own ideas and institutions, and with whom
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it would be possible to communicate, will affect the
attitudes of members of the other society to them, even if
its only effect is to make them the more ferocious. Human
war, like all other human activities, is governed by
conventions; and where one is dealing with conventions, one
is dealing with internal relations.\(^{19}\)

Now I can say in a word that nearly all of my objections to Winch's
thesis can be found in this less than one page passage: The two which most
quickly come to mind are the implication that it even makes sense to mix
Malinowski's views with those of social psychologists who speak in terms of
'\textit{in-group}' and '\textit{out-group}' attitudes. For Malinowski's intention always seemed
to be to describe the Trobrianders, as a notable example, in relation to their
cultural unity. This is one of the factors which distinguished them from
other primitive cultures and certainly distinguished them from the European
societies for which such terms ('\textit{in-group}' and '\textit{out-group}') were originally
intended.

Therefore the obvious European bias of social-psychological
lapses, if and when applied to the description of primitive culture, would be
precisely what Malinowski would want to avoid. But more importantly, he
would want to avoid them for methodological reasons: because they do not
describe Trobriand society internally, but instead impose foreign categories
(of description) obviously derived from a social setting which reflects
disintegration, cultural disunity, fragmentation and what Durkheim called
'\textit{anomie}'.\(^{20}\)
That Winch feels more comfortable than Malinowski in using this kind of terminology is telling, I believe, because it reflects the extent to which, much contrary to Winch's own protestations, he, and not Malinowski, is willing to accept the cultural descriptions of his own culture in describing another culture. For at least it can be said that when Malinowski lapses into cultural bias he does so unwillingly and with regret and that it is therefore likely he would be openminded enough to be corrected if someone were to raise it as an objection to his studies. I hope this will be evident soon when I cite Malinowski's own ethnographic accounts of the societies he studied. Winch, then, for some reason, is not as apologetic as he suggests above. He does apologize for the lapse but fails to realize the real significance of it in terms of his own cultural position. And in that respect he is hardly less guilty of cultural bias than say Evans-Pritchard was.  

My second objection follows from the first. It is that Malinowski's work is not an attempt to merely describe 'eating', seeking shelter and reproducing in Trobriand society and elsewhere. And it requires less effort to discover what Malinowski is wanting to describe than to understand how Winch can think this is all, or even close to Malinowski's purpose. I will explain what I mean first by citing a passage from Malinowski then by proceeding to other related objections. Malinowski observed that
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Children in the Trobriand Islands enjoy considerable freedom and independence. They soon become emancipated from a parental tutelage which has never been very strict. Some of them obey their parents willingly, but this is entirely a matter of the personal character of both parties: there is no idea of a regular discipline, no system of domestic coercion.²²

And a little later:

The child's freedom and independence extend also to sexual matters. To begin with, children hear of and witness much in the sexual life of their elders. Within the house, where parents have no possibility of finding privacy, a child has opportunities of acquiring practical information concerning the sexual act. I was told that no special precautions are taken to prevent children from witnessing their parents' sexual enjoyment. The child would merely be scolded and told to cover its head with a mat.²³

...There are plenty of opportunities for both boys and girls to receive instruction in erotic matters from their companions. The children initiate each other into the mysteries of sexual life in a directly practical manner at an early age. A premature amorous existence begins among them long before they are able really to carry out the act of sex.... As they are untramelled by the authority of their elders and unrestrained by any moral code, except that of specific tribal taboo, there is nothing but their degree of curiosity, of ripeness, and of "tempérament" or sensuality, to determine how much or how little they shall indulge in sexual pastimes.²⁴
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Now the significance of these passages lies in their general sensitivity, both to detail and to the people and activities being described. But there is perhaps an even greater significance which lies behind this sort of description. That is that in comparing such accounts to those of other cultures, it becomes possible for the first time to point out distinctions between such primitive cultures and our own, differences among primitive cultures, and finally similarities between some of those other cultures and ours. And these 'internal' descriptions shed light, as I will soon show, on the notion of what it is to make a decision within these different social settings.25

For now, I will continue to focus on the question of the significance of Malinowski's work has for coming to understand the etiology of neurosis in the Trobriands. Thus he writes:

In the Trobriands though I knew scores of natives intimately and had a nodding acquaintance with many more, I could not name a single man or woman who was hysterical or even neurasthenic. Nervous tics, compulsory actions or obsessive ideas were not to be found.26

But contrast that description with this one.

...during my few months stay in the Amphletts, my first and strongest impression was that this was a community of neurasthenics...Coming from open, gay, hearty and accessible Trobrianders, it was astonishing to find oneself among a community of...
people distrustful of the newcomer, impatient at work, arrogant in their claims, though easily cowed and extremely nervous when tackled more energetically. The women ran away as I landed in the villages and kept in hiding the whole of my stay.... I at once found a number of people affected with nervousness. 27

Now clearly Malinowski is presupposing and using Freudian terminology and methodology, mixed with anthropology, to understand both the Trobrianders and the Amphlett Islanders. What he finds in the Amphletts that he does not find in the Trobriands is a social system which is rigidly structured and based upon class distinctions. Men have more power, authority and rights than women. Generally the people live in fear; not only of strangers, but in terror of authority. It is a society based upon property ownership where the chief has the most power and greatest prerogatives and the ordinary 'citizen' has little or no prerogative at all. 28

Here we see a society where decision and relations of power are intimately bound to one another. Volition then is something, relatively speaking, really enjoyed only by the chief. Volition is then not so much associated with 'will' as with willfulness. It is a sign of power, status and prestige. It is not within the sphere of all members of the community to enjoy the freedom to make many 'decisions' without permission, or without adherence to a moral code enforced by the chief or by those who carry out his 'will'. 29
And here it can be said that Winch's notion of 'sensible
discriminations', derived as it was from Anscombe, has a 'Hobbesian' ring to
it; both because it attempts to describe the behaviour and consciousnesses of
individuals independent of any social context, and because it describes a
concept of 'will' which here happens to presuppose the power of a central
figure of authority—such as a monarch or chief. And it does so while ignoring
the possible effect that authority might have on the kinds of decisions and
even the decision-making capacity of his or her 'subjects'.

I say this because Winch's notion of 'volition' is neutral where it
cannot and should not be. For in the Amphlettts, there was, unlike in the
Trobiands, a rigid moral code and an authoritarian (patriarchal) social
structuring. There was also a society based upon the notion of property
relations. In many ways the Amphlett society resembled European life as
Hobbes described. A 'neutral' description here does nothing but 'explain
everything' while really explaining nothing. This is symptomatic of Winch's
general (positivist) inclination to separate facts from values; emphasizing
the 'value' instead of the 'fact'. For in universally emphasizing values, he can
assume social conventionalism, as he envisions it, is universal.

But then of course he has done no more nor less than universalize
his own view of morality. And his 'neutral' description of it universalizes the
'internal' nature of his own ideas of his own culture. This would not be so bad
if he acknowledged this. But he does not. He in fact specifically condemns
those, such as Macintyre, for assuming a theorist must use his own cultural
position when investigating another culture. It is as if he believes he alone escapes the trap he sees others falling into. He is able to escape it, or so he would lead us to believe, without even undertaking to understand the positions these other 'misbegotten' thinkers have embraced.

Winch's notion of 'social convention' in fact comes to suit the description of the Amphletts far better than it does the Trobriands; even though, as I said, he means this notion to have universal application. This is probably because Winch, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, has in mind, when he thinks of conventions, European conventions, even those as specific as conventions of war.

And there is a special irony to Winch's use of war as an example here as there is one to his continuous use of military models. For in the Amphletts, in a socially and sexually repressive society, Malinowski also found a warlike society. Whereas in the Trobriands he found a peaceful gentle one. Perhaps then it can be said that the ferocity of the Amphletts warlike attitude, and the peacefulness of the Trobrianders, is a function of their respective social and sexual mores.

Attributing such differences merely to social conventions in a way which deliberately downplays the role sexual relations play in those conventions, shows the inadequacy of mere description without explanation. For it succeeds in covering over precisely what Malinowski's work came to show: that a repressive and consequently frustrating morality comes to materially affect the biology, social lives, and hence the concepts people
come to form. And this, as well, was precisely Freud's point. Surmising or suggesting, on the other hand, that Malinowsksi was unaware of this is to entirely disregard the real intention of his work and his thinking. And it is to prejudice his entire thesis; especially for those who have never read it.

Now the resemblance of the Amphlettts to Europe (or more specifically of the authoritarian and repressive character of Amphlett culture to European culture), Malinowski certainly is to claim, is in the authoritarian and (formal) moralistic character of both; a moralism, in the case of the European society, obviously designed, to paraphrase Winch, to prevent the promotion of "beastiality". Malinowski says:

It is fully confirmed in the Trobriands that free sex life does not allow homosexuality to form there. It cropped up in the Trobriands only with the influence of white man, more especially of white man's morality. The boys and girls on a Mission Station, penned in separate and strictly isolated houses...had to help themselves out as best they could, since that which every Trobriander looks upon as his due and right [heterosexual relations] was denied to them. According to very careful inquiries made on non-missionary as well as missionary natives, homosexuality is the rule among those upon whom white man's morality has been forced in such an irrational and unscientific manner.

So Malinowski says that in imposing their European ways the missionaries, religious or scientific, were acting irrationally and unscientifically. In other words, science for Malinowski meant precisely
leaving things as they were, just as Winch had prescribed. But that meant leaving at home (unscientific) moralisms which it is not clear Winch himself was prepared to do. Of interest here of course is the fact that the very attempt to prevent perversion, or what 'white man's morality' called perversions or 'bestiality', caused the very perversions it was attempting to prevent. This being 'unscientific' behaviour, Winch might well be proud to wear it as a distinction. But in fact he ought to wear it with ambiguous feelings. In the eyes of the missionaries, uncontrolled (hetero)sexual behaviour was sinful. But controlling it lead to (the only available outlet-) homosexual behaviour. This eventually brought about many of the symptoms of nervousness (nervous disorders) found among the Amphlett people.

Now it therefore becomes possible to once again ask the question I dealt with in the last section as to how the 'Freudian' ought to come to understand neurosis in the Trobriand Islands. The answer Winch says is to be found in the 'idea of fatherhood' among the population. But this is obviously false on one account, and only humorously and peripherally relevant on another. For the first point is that there were no neuroses (nervous disorders) in the Trobriands before the imposition of European morality. So one is forced to ask what Winch means by the question, or perhaps by the term 'neurosis'.

If, and this is my second point, we want in fact to know the aetiology of neurosis in the Trobriands, the only 'idea of fatherhood' which needs to be investigated is the one which involves the logical relation of
Trobiand youth to the (European) priest. For the aetiology of neurosis is to be found in the repressive moralism of this other cultural influence; not in the (morality of) Trobriand culture itself.

This only underscores the contradictory nature of Winch's own understanding of these kinds of issues. For the 'idea of fatherhood' appears in Winch's schema as something lodged somewhere in the Trobriander's head—like a toothache. On the other hand it has a life of its own. It is a transcendental idea, which I believe the notion of a logical relation is of a sort, hanging over Trobriand life. For the (neurotic) idea of fatherhood is part of the social fabric of Trobriand, according to Winch, in spite of any 'empirical' (ethnographic) evidence to the contrary, independent, presumably then, of what anyone would care to think.

Now I know I am mixing Winch's metaphors here. But this seems to demonstrate how the example he uses of Job's plight in the wilderness does nothing but underscore Winch's desire to 'understand', 'a priori', foreign cultures without even examining the ethnographic material available about such cultures. And although his rhetoric concerning 'learning from' such other cultures is compelling, it pales significantly when it is understood that Winch's real claim is that he knows before he knows and that this is the real function a priori investigation plays in his thesis.

Whereas a cursory reading of Malinowski's position demonstrates that no such ideas, as Winch assumed in his argument, existed before the Europeans, Winch discusses them as if they had to exist. But the moral system of the Trobriands would not have supported this (authoritarian) view.
of fatherhood as it did not foster the neuroses that were a 'function of' it (if
I may be permitted a lapse into neo-Marxist terminology).

There is further irony in both the missionaries' belief, and
apparently in Winch's too, that too loose a moral code leads to beastiality. For
what Malinowski concludes of the Trobriander is that "in some respects his
moral regulations are biologically sounder than our own, in some refined and
subtle, in some a more efficient safeguard for marriage and the family." 37

Now there are some overriding complexities and controversises in
Malinowski's account which I have not been able to discuss here. 38 But my
point in raising it is to show the context of Malinowski's work. Thereby I
believe I have shown the inadequacy of Winch's account of it which I hope
dispels the belief that a mere idea is any more sufficient for understanding
social science than an 'idea' of neurosis was sufficient for understanding it
(in relation, of course, to an 'idea' of fatherhood). I could add a similar point
concerning the 'concept of social behaviour', but I believe my point here is
sufficiently well made.

I will now go on to discuss, more generally, how Winch's ordering of
methodological preferences, according to methodologists he commends and
rejects, is also internally inconsistent.
Further Methodological Ironies of Winch's position

Specifically in Relation to Weber

Now it must be understood that the three theorists and theoretical positions I have chosen so far in this chapter have been so chosen because the difficulties that arose in Winch's critique, vis-à-vis those positions, were somewhat transparent. Consequently they were relatively easy to express in a short analysis, easier, for instance, than his position on Marxism (ideology) or Durkheim's scientific method. But I believe much of what I had to say concerning what Hobbes recognized, and also what Malinowski and Freud recognized, which Winch does not take into account in his analysis, could apply equally well to many other theorists I do not have time to discuss here.39

So for the sake of brevity, I will question the logic of Winch's selections, or rather his selectivity, in choosing to criticize, or critically examine the works of one thinker, such as Evans-Pritchard, for not consistently maintaining, for example, a culturally neutral position, without applying the same criteria of cultural neutrality to other thinkers, such as Weber.

It seems Winch has two sets of criteria here. One which bears on the physicalist as opposed to non-physicalist model of science, and the other on understanding and accounting for cultural distinctions. On either account Winch is very selective in whom he criticizes under whichever category, whom he exempts, and whom he endorses, even with qualification.
For example, Winch rejected Mill's theoretical model for application to social scientific problems because of the scientific, or scientistic rhetoric contained in its pronouncements. Yet Weber, while not professing the same scientific approach Mill as a philosopher professed, is nonetheless quite explicit in his advocacy of a scientific model. And given that Weber's thesis, as a social scientist, and as an extremely influential social scientific methodological theorist, had at least as much influence on the development of social scientific methodology as Mill's, it is puzzling why Weber's position is commended while Mill's is condemned.

There is a further irony, or so it seems to me, if it is true that Mill-expresses, however crudely, naively and unself-consciously, a position twentieth century practitioners were to follow through on. For Weber's view is far more deliberate. As I will show, it is deliberate on several accounts which violate Winch's thesis.

Weber's position is prescriptive. He says exactly how and why he believes social science ought to develop the way he suggests. The fact/value distinction, the basis for positivist-empirical social science, is the basis for the development of a set of criteria for investigation. Furthermore, although Weber pays attention, it is true, to the internal structure of thought and does not impose, as Mill does, a pseudo-scientific formulation suggesting an external investigation of human character, Weber is unapologetic in his own specifically European philosophical views.

Perhaps, in fact, Weber's view is stronger than almost any other thinker's because of its sophistication and attention to detail. Weber's
position, self-consciously or not, chronicles the 'veracity' of the European view. He defends the European vision of the 'rational'. In fact his notion of 'rationalisation', which Winch compares favourably to the Freudian notion of the 'rationalization', is as specific an endorsement of this view as one can find. So much so that it even extends to his description of the modern bureaucratic state as being an expression of that rationality.42

Consequently I would ask how Weber's thinking demonstrates adherence to the principle of cultural neutrality Evans-Pritchard was guilty of violating? And if Weber also violated it, then why not take him to task as well? Why isolate Evans-Pritchard in this instance and commend Weber in others?

In his economics, Weber is unabashedly utilitarian. His thinking provides, with others such as Bentham, the basis for the positivist-marginalist economic model; a model which strongly reflects the (possessive) individualism of Hobbes' position, the fact/value distinction, as I said, and a theory in support of social, political and even cultural domination. In fact paternalism and domination are seen as being intimately linked to, if not the 'rational', then certainly acceptable behaviour.43

Two other short points concerning Weber's notion of rationality. First, rational economic behaviour, in Weber's thesis, as in marginalist economic theory, when we are speaking on the micro level, as when discussing individual behaviour, is considered behaviour which attempts to maximize profit. Second, on the macro level, or when discussing economic
schema for manufacturing and production and social planning, efficiency of production is the model Weber uses. Efficiency in fact is taken as the highest exemplification of rationality within marginalist economic thinking, because it is so taken within capitalist production.

Consequently, it is 'internal' to such production (thought) that Weber describes rationality. However, unless one is (advocating) putting one's thinking on the same logical footing as capitalist production, the efficiency model can hardly be seen as 'rational' in any (culturally) neutral or (philosophically) uncommitted sense, because, as Winch otherwise seems aware, the very notion of efficiency has a mind of its own, so to speak, at least as much as Mill's logic of the moral sciences did.

Now of course this is a controversial topic. But I raise it just to point in the direction of the ambiguities in Winch's thinking. For Winch is otherwise to criticize MacIntyre and Marx for even discussing 'efficiency of production' when both of them explicitly reject it as a model for human production and living. But such a criticism is not extended to Weber who explicitly endorses it as a model for economic theory.

And here the notion of 'internal' description does double duty. For it apologizes for its own philosophical and cultural position in putting a conservative interpretation on the socio-economic view of one's own society (and 'society' in general). In endorsing Weber's internal-descriptive model, Winch gives 'approbation' to a view which is culturally-centered not culturally neutral. That that view happens to strongly resemble Winch's own...
is, I would venture, not coincidental. His concept of 'conventions', as a consequence, reflects the 'approbation' he gives to the conventions of his own society when he is describing 'conventions'. On the other hand, he rejects those same conventions when he is describing their relation to 'methodologies' and shibboleths, even though he himself said such a distinction (of different kinds of conventions) could not be made.46

In endorsing Weber's 'internal' description (endorsement), one can say, semifacetiously, 'approbation' of the efficiency model is, albeit indirectly, given justification and legitimacy by Winch. Whereas the most specific critique of such thinking, Marx's, is condemned as it is subject to far more strenuous and rigorous criteria of methodological purity. And of course my question here is, why the inconsistency here, as elsewhere, in Winch's thesis?

There is no time to offer anything but the most cursory speculation on that subject here. So instead of doing that, I will leave it to the reader to develop his or her own theory on the subject, and leave to a future occasion the consideration of this question in greater depth. I will now draw my conclusions concerning Winch's thesis.
1. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, op. cit., p. 3
2. Ibid. p.13
3. Ibid. p. 17
4. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, op. cit. p. 22
7. ISS op. cit., p. 90
8. Ibid.
9. E&A op. cit., p. 32
10. Ibid. p. 37 Winch does not say who the 'our' is in this phrase.

   It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement—that they seek power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life. And yet in making any general judgement of this sort, we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the human world and its mental life are. [p. 11]

My only point here is that Freud was well aware of the complexities of his own thesis and of the thinking to which that thesis was to be applied.

12. See Pp. 36-37 of this thesis.

13. Freud distinguished between "psychoneuroses" and "actual" neuroses. The former included hysteria and obsessional behaviour and was the outward manifestation of the latter. It was accessible conceptually as it had a conceptual component. The latter was referred to variously as 'simple' neurosis, "genital disturbance", "neurasthenia" or "anxiety" neurosis" etc. See The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, Hogarth Press and the Institute for Psycho-Analysis, 1953-1974, Vol I, p. 179; Vol. 3, p. 39 & 279; Vol. 11, p. 224.

14. For an interesting discussion of Freud's position on these issues see Reich Speaks of Freud, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1967, an interview conducted for the Freud Archives, by Dr. K.R. Eissler.


17. See *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia*, from now on SL by Bronislaw Malinowski, Harcourt, Brace & World; and also *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1927.

18. ISS op. cit. Pp. 130-131

19. Ibid. p. 131

20. Winch suggests that we go back and reread Durkheim's *Suicide* in light of his critique of pseudo-science. See ISS p. 111 where he says:

> it is particularly important to notice the connection between Durkheim's conclusion—that conscious deliberations may be treated as "purely formal, with no object but confirmation of a resolve previously formed for reasons unknown to consciousness", and his initial decision to define the word 'suicide' for the purposes of his study in a sense different from that which it bore within the societies which he was studying.

The quotation within the text is from *Suicide*, by E. Durkheim, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952. No further information is given for this citation.

Now I agree with Winch's general point that this sort of treatment of social phenomena does appear to proceed, as Pareto's view did, with the sense of being detached and removed from the social situation; so much so, perhaps, that it strikes the reader as almost numbing or being numb to the actual events. But I believe in this context it is worthy of note that Durkheim's view did not appear to come only from a positivistic view of social science but also reflected his only personal experience. Durkheim was originally from a small town in France. He and his closest friend moved from the small town of their childhood to the urban life of a larger metropolitan centre. Durkheim, especially after the suicide death of his friend, became convinced that there was something inherent in modern industrial life, and the urbanizing process it created, which
caused mental illness, destroyed family and community life and generally proved ruinous to all traditional cultural and social values. And it seems to me that rereading his great work with this thought in mind will prove at least as illuminating as recalling Winch's view that Durkheim's view reflected a mechanistic, positivistic, materialistic logic. See S Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973.

21 See Pp 27-29 of this thesis where Winch accuses Evans-Pritchard of being biased.


23 SL op. cit. p. 54 and quoted from ICSM, Pp. 4-5. The method only used to prevent the children from interrupting their parents' enjoyment of their sexual relations, not to censor the children.

24 SL op. cit. p 57, and quoted from ICSM Pp. 6-7

25 See p. 100.

26 *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, op. cit., p. 89.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid and see Wilhelm Reich's treatment of this work in ICSM, op. cit., especially Chapters Two and Three.

30 See Winch's critique of Macintyre on Pp. 33-34 of this thesis.

31 E&A p. 44 and in citing Vico on p. 47.


33 Winch defends religion against science and condemns science but here it is science which is more respectable than religion. Winch's position in this context is little but an apology for 'unscientific' or culturally destructive reasoning when it happens to be conducted by 'religious' moralists.

34 I am here poking fun at Winch's own paraphrasing of Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian mentalism on p. 79 of ISS, op. cit.

35 See the discussion of Job and the whirlwind on p. 30 of this thesis.
36. The reference to his rhetoric concerning 'learning from' another culture is to be found on p. 33 of this thesis.
37. SL op. cit. p. 440.
38. Once again I suggest ICSM, op. cit., for an interesting and sympathetic treatment of the strengths and possible weakness of Malinowski's position.
39. Freud and Marx would figure prominently in any prospective in-depth counter-critique I would have in mind here.
41. Ibid.
43. For an extremely informative review of Weber's economic position see Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, by Simon Clarke, MacMillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1982; especially Chapter 7 which is entitled "From Marginalism to Modern Sociology".
44. See p. 35 of this thesis.
45. Ibid. Winch acknowledges this but proceeds as if it were not important.
46. This is a reference to his position on logical relations, outlined in Chapter Three, where Winch very carefully attempts to show how even science is bound by conventions.
Conclusion

In beginning to summarize Winch's position, I would first like to draw attention to the most prominent kinds of tensions in it. First there are the differences in professional fields which Winch says promotes different kinds of thinking. But he seems there quite absolute about the nature of philosophical conception and scientific conception, for example, and the nature of the difference between the two fields' conceptions. It is, however, far from obvious that scientists think exclusively, or even often, the way Winch describes their thought. It is not evident that scientists, especially social scientists, have not already worked out, intuitively or deliberately, the implications of many of Winch's methodological suggestions.

Then there is the tension between other kinds of world views, as would exist in differing cultural positions. But here because Winch has not described, in enough detail, the enormous complexities in the 'scientific' view of social science, the obfuscations in this tension carry over into his discussion of competing world views. So when science becomes a form of cultural imperialism in Winch's scheme, it does so, according to Winch, even in instances where it does not seem to, such as in Malinowski's position. For Winch makes no distinction between methodological mistakes, cultural biases and inappropriate phraseology; i.e. terminological mistakes.

His solution of logical relations seems in fact to suppress the good with the bad—the description of social phenomena, that which is observed and recognized, with the proffered methodological solutions and the symptoms they were designed to remedy. Winch's attempt to find alternative solutions seems to stem in fact from a lack of awareness of the
existence of alternative solutions. Ironically, a truly 'internal' investigation of social science would have discovered these. Presumably if he had undertaken such an internal investigation he would have been able to discover the existence of theories which had considerable merit. Instead he is forced to confine himself to criticizing obviously faulty theories while dismissing all social theoretical positions which attempt to be 'scientific', or which call themselves scientific in any sense of the term.

He appears, therefore, to do to social scientific methodology what religious moralists did to 'primitive' cultural ideas. This I believe is the real function of his 'limiting' concepts. They limit latitude of thought as they limit latitude of social action. Not only does he not 'learn from' any of social scientists he indiscriminately calls 'pseudo-scientists', he discriminates against them merely on the basis of their being 'scientific'. Winch seems obsessed with his own 'philosophical' viewpoint which he seems to believe justifiably crowds out all others.

Beginning with Mill's conception of the 'logic of the moral sciences', for example, we can see, according to Winch, Mill did not believe there was such a logic. Winch says:

Mill does not really believe that there is a 'logic of the moral sciences'. The logic is the same as that of any other science and all that has to be done is to elucidate certain difficulties arising in its application to the peculiar subject-matter studied in the moral sciences.
Mill in fact says "Any facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which follow one another according to constant law."

Winch says that "Mill states naively a position which underlies the pronouncements of a large proportion of contemporary social scientists."

But it is curious that Winch mentions the establishment of social scientific methodology only in relation to Mill, a philosopher. The greatest similarity to Mill's position, he implies, is to be found in Ryle's position of 'law-like' propositions. Yet Ryle is another philosopher. Nonetheless it is true, as Winch has pointed out, Mill's pronouncements on scientific method do not seem very promising when applied to social science.

But the problem I see arising out of its dismissal is that, in this case, it dismisses, *a priori*, the possibility of developing such a science of the social studies. On the other hand, because Ryle and Mill are philosophers, and not social scientists, their theories, of necessity, are speculative and not borne, for instance, out of the desire to work out practical methodological questions. And in that respect Winch's views are closer to those of the other two philosophers than they are to any of the social scientists he mentions. I say that even though Winch claims to be looking for a solution to methodological questions.

But they are, of necessity, not practical solutions but merely 'theoretical' ones. This is so precisely because in Winch's view of social science, there are no practical problems per se, as there would be in science, but merely conceptual solutions which bear on conceptual issues. And even though Winch would like to suggest that, in fact, practical problems are also
conceptual ones, all this does is deny the difference between philosophy and science when it is convenient to do. Otherwise it is asserted at all times just how different science and philosophy are and why they are different.

The question as to the difference between practical and theoretical, or perhaps more pertinently, practical and philosophical questions within the social sciences never really arises in Winch's discussion of social science. But it certainly does in social science. Therefore Winch expects the reader to be convinced that he can offer (even the equivalent of) a practical solution without knowing anything about the practice. His criticism of practice as, for example, being "misconceived", does little more than create a riddle whose substance is purely rhetorical.

But if he expects, by this rhetorical device, that he has contributed seriously to solving practical methodological questions, he seems to be saying that the one and only way of solving such problems is by putting forward compelling philosophical arguments which have no bearing on the attempt to find practical solutions, solutions, that is, derived from trial and error-field work and experimentation.

Once again here I do not necessarily mean 'experimentation' in the physical scientific sense of the word. I mean by it little more than being openminded enough to recognize the proper contribution many different kinds of thinking might make in any given situation. In denying even the possibility of developing a scientific social scientific methodology, he is neither willing to attempt to learn from his mistakes nor allow anyone else to do the same. For he has ruled out any kind of experimental procedure a priori.
Mill's mistake, for example, it could otherwise have been stated, was in believing facts are already fitted 'to be a subject of science'. That is, Mill was not concerned to fit science to phenomena because he did not believe it was necessary to do so. Taking Mill's crude rendering as a paradigm case, and a forerunner of things to come, Winch can 'legitimately' claim the only issue facing social theory, in the Twentieth Century, is the examination and correction of faulty logic.

Using Mill's logical structures as examples Winch can say, with justification, that the 'logic of science' and the logic of morality are incompatible. This he indeed says without qualification. He never indicates he believes it is ever possible to fit science to facts, so as to make science compatible with (the understanding and study of) morality. Instead, he takes science, as he sees it misapplied at its worst, to prove the incompatibility of science and morality. In fact, Winch's entire discussion reduces all issues to those which are either compatible or incompatible with the logic he envisions for social theory. But this is precisely what he has said science had mistakenly done.

Winch could have taken another tack. He could have begun with social scientific methods which either appear to work in practice (which, as I said, would presuppose some practical knowledge of them), or he could have pointed out the theorists who, while seeing themselves as 'scientists' were nonetheless critical of pseudo-science and scientism. For there certainly are an adequate enough number of examples which he could have cited.

His not citing them I assume was not out of choice but because he,
more or less, expressed, unselfconsciously, the philosophical position with
which he was most familiar. But the net result, I am afraid to say, is that his
thesis does not really inform those ignorant of the history of social science.
Nor does it help the development of (intelligent) methodology.

In fact it never leaves its own philosophical launching pad. Instead
his analysis remains internal (here read loyal) to a fairly single-minded
philosophical viewpoint. In that sense it can hardly claim to be uncommitted.
And while it preaches to the converted, it does little or nothing to encourage
social scientists to join in the dialogue. Instead it seems to offer an array of
mixed messages and critical insights which more often than not have their
wires crossed. For example, as I said, he criticizes philosophers for being
pseudo-scientific while on the other hand he never explores actual scientific
theories.

I would conclude then that good methodology, or the search for good
methodological solutions depends very much on the searcher’s initial view of
science. Winch, I believe, should be happy with this perspective as it aligns
well enough with his notions of ‘world’ views. But in this case its
implications are not happy ones for his own perspective.

I say this because it seems evident that a mechanistic or
scientistic view of science will carry with it the fact/value distinction. This
may be manifest, as it does in much social science, with the rejection of
'value' in the 'objective' study of 'facts'. But it also can well manifest itself,
as in Winch’s case, with the rejection of 'facts' in the attempt to 'evaluate'
and 'interpret' 'meanings', thoughts and values. For in either case there is an
assertion that social science must separate facts from values and choose the one over the other. And in either case, one being a 'function of' the other, or a 'by-product' of the other, both emulate, not surprisingly, from the positivist-empiricist tradition which Hobbes was instrumental in helping found.

Winch's critique, then, displays an ambivalence toward that tradition. For it is conducted 'internal' to it, even if sometimes not respectfully. The critique occurs 'within' the walls of that tradition. It is an 'internal' critique which in that respect is relatively submissive to its powers. His critique, that is, accepts the parameters but merely wishes to rearrange the furnishings. He both rejects and accepts the implications of the (empiricist) thinking he criticizes in assuming he has to live within the confines of that tradition.

As for those who never accepted those same confines, Winch is mysteriously quiet concerning their social theory, or alternatively mercilessly unpleasant. Consequently he directs more 'approbation' toward empiricism than he does toward its opponents. In these respects he displays a kind of monopolistic imperialism of his own toward them. He treats all thinkers, that is, either as if they were part of the British empiricist tradition or as if they should be subject to its criticisms or to the criticisms applied to it. I cite Hegel as a prime example of someone whose social theory and methodology was to influence an entire set of schools of thought. Yet Hegel gets only passing mention. And there it is only to show how he was properly criticized by Locke or committed the same kind of error Mill, Pareto...
or Engels would have. In this sense Winch has done little more than scale down the British empiricist philosophical view and put it on a 'logical footing' with other kinds of thinking. I believe this is an ambiguous legacy as my mixed review has attempted to show. It is for all these reasons that I must conclude, therefore, that Winch's effort, regardless of how valiant or compelling, is, in the end, a failure.
1. ISS op. cit., p. 67
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p. 66
4. See pp. 7-8 of this thesis.
5. In this context Wilhelm Reich wrote:

With my clinical-theoretical solution of the problem of drives, I had come very close to the border of mechanistic thinking. Opposites are opposites and nothing but that. They are incompatible [said mockingly], I had the same experience later with concepts such as "science" and "politics", or the supposed incompatibility between research and evaluation.

This retrospective review is proof that correct clinical observation can never lead one astray. Philosophy is simply wrong! Correct observation must always lead to functional formulations, if one does not turn aside too soon. The fear of functional thinking is itself a riddle.

[my emphasis]

From The Function of the Orgasm, by Wilhelm Reich, Touchstone Books, 1947, p. 53. The riddle of course is that if one does not undertake the research, the observation and the clinical work and engage in the functional thinking, one never gets to speculate on whether the findings are conclusive, correct, incorrect, relevant, irrelevant, misconceived, etc.

6. For an extremely interesting view of Freud's methodological approach, especially his attack on mechanistic thinking, see Freud On Aphasia, by S. Freud, IUP, New York, 1953.

7. On the other hand it seems to me this is precisely what Freud, Malinowski and Reich have attempted to do. See for example, The Cancer Biopathy, by W. Reich, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1973, where on p. xix Reich says:
Cancer, the essential mechanism of which consists in a gradual shrinking of the autonomic system, is easily understood as soon as one overcomes his resistance to comprehending the following facts as a unified whole:

2. The role of the emotions in organic diseases must be given full consideration.

3. The development of living, spontaneous moving substance from other living beings or even non-living substances, must be acknowledged. In other words, in dealing with cancer we are directly confronted with the problem of biogenesis.

4. It is imperative, in our work on cancer, that we place sexual pathology, which is generally hated and avoided, at the center of our medical efforts....

Now my point in quoting Reich here is to exemplify the significance of much of the scientific work Winch's critique would dismiss at the same time as it would Mill's pseudo-scientific ruminations. For Reich is also concerned with developing a science of characterology (see Character Analysis, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1968), a biologically-based social science, like Malinowski, as well as remaining within the confines of Winch's notion of 'human' social studies. And here it is Winch's own mechanistic logic which dictates that "opposites are opposites", that science cannot be conducted in a way in which it is developed to be compatible with moral thinking; research cannot be conducted while evaluation also takes place, and 'observation' cannot occur, where 'recognition' also does. In so doing Winch dismisses psychosomatic diagnosis a priori and fails to consider precisely those scientific approaches which dismiss mechanistic thinking; for the former is dismissed, a priori, as (necessarily being like) the latter. See footnotes 5 and 6 above.

6. This was of course the crux of my Chapters One through Three.

9. See footnotes 5-7 above.

10. See ISS, op. cit., p. 7 and p. 72.
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