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The Origins of Public Relations as an Occupation in Canada

Merle Emms

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Communication Studies

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
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ABSTRACT

The Origins of Public Relations as an Occupation in Canada

Merle Emms

Because so little has been written about the history of public relations in Canada, this thesis provides a modest contribution of groundwork from which further study might ensue. Models and theories of public relations are used to analyze immigration campaigns conducted by the Government of Canada before 1900, to establish whether the function and occupation of public relations existed at this time. Drawing on primary research of archival material, and secondary sources for historical context and communications theory, activities in the departments of agriculture, the interior and the Canadian Pacific Railways are examined for evidence of a public relations function. The early use of public relations in the Bell Telephone Company and the Royal Bank are also considered, for characteristics consistent with those identified in government and railway public relations. The view of public relations emerging in response to organizational need is argued in light of the combination of historical circumstances and organizational recognition evident in the success of immigration campaigns after 1896. This study suggests that access to the dominant coalition played a key role in how the PR function emerged and that government regulation may have triggered the recognition of a PR function in non-government organizations. The enduring influence of journalists who moved into public relations is considered, with illustrations of that influence persisting for at least 80 years after the first journalists were recruited by the Department of the Interior.
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THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AS AN OCCUPATION IN CANADA

Chapter I  Looking for Public Relations History

Introduction

The field of public relations (PR) offers an intriguing paradox in communication studies: PR endures frequent and harsh criticism from scholars and others for its propaganda strategies and questionable techniques, but the origins of public relations in Canada rarely have been examined by either academics or practitioners.

Unlike in the United States, little has been published on the history of public relations in this country. Despite the existence of a sizable body of literature on the history of public relations in the United States, a comparison between how PR developed in the U.S. and Canada is largely impossible. Without much information on when and how public relations emerged as an occupation in this country, Canadian practitioners and scholars must be forgiven if they suppose that U.S. historical models of PR practice reflect how Canadian public relations started and grew.

Undoubtedly, the history of PR in the United States offers a useful backdrop for preliminary research into how the public relations industry emerged in Canada. At the very least, American PR history can be observed as a broad silhouette--like using the dark outlines of birds sitting on a wire to identify similar species. Lacking corresponding and well-documented detail on Canadian public relations workers, however, the strong temptation to
accept American PR history as our own seems questionable. Similarly, weighing the relevance to Canadian PR practice of assumptions about strategies and goals inherent in U.S. historical models becomes unworkable, because we know so little about the early years of our own PR industry. In the spirit of informed, critical debate in the field of communications, the study of public relations in Canada calls for reliable historical information.

The absence of a body of comprehensive history in this area of communication studies raises a number of questions. Among the most puzzling is why so little has been written about Canadian PR history. American teachers of public relations can draw on a wide range of historical books and articles on their history of PR, and on the related area of journalism in America. The history of newspapers and the history of journalism in Canada have also attracted some attention, so why has the history of public relations in Canada been largely ignored? The answer may be partly because public relations is a relatively new area of study in Canadian universities, and partly because so much has been readily available on and by public relations practitioners in the United States. As well, Mount Saint Vincent University Professor Ron Pearson, who died in 1990, may have been laying the foundations for the study of PR history in Canada with his analysis of the range of perspectives represented in American public relations history (in Toth and Heath, eds., 1992). At the practical level, finding out how and when organizations began to use PR practitioners presents no simple undertaking. For example, access to corporate archives is often limited to employees. In addition, PR workers may be identified by a range of job titles, if they and their work are
accounted for at all in official corporate documents, making the task of tracing employees awkward and time-consuming. In light of such constraints, research about the history of Canadian public relations may seem less attractive than other aspects of research in the field.

But just how limited is knowledge about the make-up of the early years of PR in Canada? What can be gleaned from the occasional mention in non-academic writing that lacks specific documentation? In the absence of substantial published history on PR in Canada, what information can reveal the path public relations practice followed in this country? Were early practitioners simply propagandists? Who did they work for, what were their goals, and what means did they use to achieve their ends?

Defining the problem and finding a focus

This thesis will document some background work on the emergence and development of public relations as an occupation in Canada. The topic is unique, inasmuch as no one else has chosen to write about how and why public relations established itself as a line of work in this country. By identifying and examining public relations activities, I will trace the process as certain organizations created a recognizable public relations function, and consider how this function translated into public relations roles. The focus of my argument is this clearly recognizable public relations work as a paid occupation was carried out in Canada by the 1890s, as well, subsequent examples suggest the strategies and techniques of PR practice remained remarkably unchanged from that time until well into the 1950s.

The manner in which PR started and grew has importance for me because of the current shift in public relations practice away from
journalistic skills and communication theory, toward business skills and management theory. As both a PR practitioner and a communications student, I am curious about where this shift will lead. An old saying comes to mind: it's harder to figure out where you are headed, if you don't know where you've been. I believe an understanding of how PR developed in Canada can inform debate among practitioners about transitions underway now about how public relations people carry out their jobs. However, the relatively unexplored area of Canadian PR history may also have a wider appeal. Given ethical and practical issues generated by growth and change in the PR industry, those who strongly criticize PR may also need to question the unspoken assumption that the American public relations experience is somehow universally applicable or at least mirrored in Canada. To that end, questioning unspoken assumptions about American PR historical models requires some sense of what took place in Canada. Understanding how public relations began here may eventually cast critics' concerns about PR strategies and techniques in a different light. But apart from providing some historical context to critics' concerns, ethical debates within the public relations industry may be moved forward by some insight into the points at which PR practitioners in Canada defined themselves as something other than propagandists or information agents. I suspect a shortage of preliminary information on the topic is one reason Canada's public relations history has remained largely unexamined. Nonetheless, as small but tempting pieces of information begin to surface, the time also seems right to start to draw them together.

Without a doubt, the emergence and development of more than one hundred years of public relations activity in Canada presents an enormous
topic, well beyond the scope of a single paper. My study may be regarded as basic groundwork in which a sense of issues and arguments emerges. The research I have undertaken is too preliminary to attempt to argue that the origin of PR as an occupation in Canada differs substantially from its American counterpart. In fact, trying to mount an argument of that nature would be premature, because a reliable comparison to U.S. history requires a substantial foundation built on a comprehensive account of public relations in each country. However, this thesis aims to contribute a starting point for further study of Canada's public relations history, and to identify the type of events relevant to the pursuit of public relations roots. By suggesting an illustration of well-developed public relations practice from the 1890s in one organization, I effectively invite a search for earlier or better examples of what has come to be known as the public relations function. By looking at subsequent examples after the 1890s, this work also provides some means to assess the progress made in those very early years. Quite simply, the information on what happened in public relations in Canada up to and during the 1890s makes far more sense in light of later development in the field. Overall, though, perhaps the most important contribution this thesis can make is to propose one valid starting point for further research and argument.

How can practitioners of public relations contribute to an examination of the origins of PR practice in Canada? Historian Mary Vipond, who has written (among other texts) on the history of mass communications in Canada, cautioned students about the limitations of oral histories and histories developed by writers from within their own field of practice (Guest lecture in Communications 605, January 26, 1993, Concordia University)
Indeed, Ms. Vipond urged communication students to leave writing about history to historians. However, in pursuit of qualitative introspective research on public relations in Canada as a field of employment, even a composite of self-portraits would reveal more than is currently known. Very early practitioners' impressions of the nature of their work around the turn of the century may be recorded incidentally in corporate and public archives. In addition, some individuals whose practices began in the 1930s and 1940s are available for personal interviews, though their recollections may have become alternately faded and embellished with time. Despite Ms. Vipond's warning, in trying to locate a moment in history and then make sense of the moment, I will draw on a wide range of sources including ethnographic information, looking for insight into how public relations became an established, identifiable occupation in Canada.

Organization of material

Chapter I will provide a definition of public relations. In addition, the first chapter will offer an overview of relevant literature from several areas within communications, comprising media critiques, propaganda studies, social history of the media, and the history of public relations in the United States. To lay an appropriate foundation for subsequent chapters, Chapter I will consider existing material on PR in Canada to propose a possible starting point, and will describe the research methods used to develop my thesis.

Chapter II will offer a brief review of two frames of reference in American PR literature helpful in the search for origins of public relations. The first of these originates with a commonly-used convention for
developing case studies in public relations practice called the RACE formula, which stands for research, action, communication and evaluation. I will propose that the RACE formula can be used to mark important passages in how practitioners themselves define and describe their work. The second tool for measuring the importance of historical evidence comes from the historical models of public relations developed by James Grunig and Todd Hunt (1984) and modified as part of an enormous work called *Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management* (1992). The Grunig models help categorize developmental stages in how public relations has evolved.

Chapter III will document archival research into early public relations campaigns designed by the federal government’s interior department to recruit immigrants and immigrant settlers to Canada. This information, the key portion of my thesis, will be integrated with historians’ interpretations of the corresponding time period, to show the context in which the public relations function emerged and established a foothold in the 1890s. Using a similar approach, Chapter IV will consider the public relations function applied to immigration and tourist campaigns at the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Chapter V will use corporate archival material to examine the initial development of public relations of the Bell telephone company, where PR activities followed by only a few years the first major success in immigration public relations, and in the Royal Bank of Canada. By looking briefly at public relations during World War II described in conventional secondary sources, Chapter VI will set the scene for four practitioners’ understanding of their work, covering the period from 1930 to the present. In conclusion,
Chapter VII will summarize the implications of my research for communication studies

Defining the term public relations

To establish how and when public relations was first practised in Canada means looking for patterns and trends. My task also requires settling on a current definition of public relations, to establish what I will look for in archival material. Like occupations, definitions tend to change over the years. However, an understanding of how current PR practice is defined provides the same kind of useful silhouette for historical inquiry as the shadow of American history presents in looking for similarities in Canada. To be sure, the term public relations enjoys such frequent usage in popular media that the existence of a clear, shared definition seems no more than a faint possibility. Nonetheless, a current definition provides an outline to work from.

In its present sense, the term public relations dates back to the 1920s, when American practitioner Edward Bernays promoted the use of the phrase public relations counsel (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). Today, public relations carries a distinctly different meaning to those who work in the field from those outside. Although many people associate public relations purely with publicity or manipulation, the definition accepted by professional associations for public relations describes PR as a kind of strategic management. Grunig (1992) helpfully distinguished between publics, which create themselves or are triggered by organizations' behaviour when "organizational actions have consequences for other organizations or groupings of people" (p. 170) and markets, which organizations create "for
their products and services by segmenting a population into components most likely to purchase or use a product or service" (p 14). In effect, a market can be defined and sought after, while the formation of a public is largely beyond the control of an organization. What organizations can do is identify latent and active publics. As well, sometimes the lines between different aspects of communication become blurred. For example, PR writing textbook authors Newsom and Carrell (1995) clearly separated public relations from advertising, which refers to buyer-controlled content of time or space paid for by a purchaser. The same authors indicated the term publicity usually refers to information supplied to a news medium at no cost to the media; use of publicity material occurs at the discretion of the media and publicity is often one of many responsibilities of public relations people.

For the most part, public relations today is given a broad definition; PR may involve the use of advertising and publicity, but such decisions revolve around judgments made about how to communicate most effectively and efficiently with specific publics. Used at its best, PR theorists see public relations work idealistically as a kind of two-way street, designed to negotiate solutions to problems and designed to promote mutual understanding with stakeholders and interest groups (also known publics) who are affected by the activities of an organization. With this approach in mind, the Bylaws of the Canadian Public Relations Society, like its American counterpart, defined public relations as "the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies policies and procedures of an individual or organization with the public interest, and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance" (1993, Article II). For practitioners who aspire to a new kind of practice, good
public relations means an effective way of running an organization, so that problems between an organization and any of its internal or external publics are resolved by clarifying issues, and by encouraging debate. As a simple but inclusive definition, Grunig (1992) said it best: public relations is "the management of communication between an organization and its publics" (p. 484).

However, you have only to read a newspaper or listen to a newscast to hear a different view of what constitutes public relations. For those who do not work in public relations, the term is regularly and consistently linked with self-interested individuals or corporations using deceit, manipulation or worse. "It would seem that if you have something particularly nasty do do, they [PR firm Burson Marsteller] are the people to hire" (The Gazette, October 1991) reads R.B. Wright's letter to the editor. How often have you heard a government initiative described disparagingly as "a public relations exercise" (The Gazette, June 1994)? In their use of the term, popular critics imply that public relations means orchestrated, token actions with no real value or actual change, or a cover up designed for public consumption. "Right to the end, the Mohawk Warriors played to the gallery with consummate public relations skills. They even stage managed their surrender for the benefit of television cameras" (The Gazette, October 1990).

On the other hand, not all criticism originates from outside the field. James Grunig and Jon White (in J. Grunig, Ed., 1992) called on practitioners to confront what they call the dominant worldview of public relations, "that public relations is a way of getting what an organization wants without changing its behaviour or without compromising" (p. 39), and to change that
worldview by changing the way they practice. Public relations practitioners recognize that the status of their occupation suffers because of the way public relations is both perceived and practised. Not surprisingly, the Canadian and American public relations associations (CPRS and PRSA) have instituted letter writing campaigns to media who misuse the term public relations, particularly when the media or the people they quote imply lying is a valuable PR skill (PRSA President-elect Summar’s letter to The Wall Street Journal, July 1987), but the gap between practitioners’ and others’ definitions persists. The significance of the split in definitions of PR comes back to the historical association of public relations as a new name for nothing more than old-fashioned propaganda.

In addition to the division in meaning between practitioners and those outside the occupation, a second problem arises in examining PR history. Some writers use the terms public relations and public affairs interchangeably, while others consider them two different areas of practice. However, Concordia University’s Andrew Gollner (1983) defined public affairs in a way that bears an unmistakable likeness to what everyday public relations practice entails.

A process by which a corporation anticipates, monitors and manages its relations with those social and political environmental forces that shape the company’s operations and environment. Broadly similar to corporate external relations, the public affairs function includes, among others, such activities as government relations, community relations, media relations, environmental monitoring and issues management (p. 8).

American theorist Grunig (1992), on the other hand, regarded public affairs
as a narrow area of practice related primarily to lobbying government (p.5). Consistent with the CPRS definition of public relations and the nature of current practice and theory, this study will view public affairs as one type of PR practice, just as it would communications, government relations or investor relations. For this thesis the term public relations will encompass the widest range of communication function at all levels, from entry level PR jobs and tasks, to strategic planning at the management level. The working definition for public relations for this study will, then, follow Grunig's broad lead (1992) as "the management of communication between an organization and its publics" (p. 484), which leaves ample room for consideration of a wide selection of techniques, strategies and goals.

PR in communications literature

In spite of the chronic split between practitioners' and others' view of what exactly constitutes public relations, both sides are talking about the same occupation and the same industry. The following brief summaries may cast some light on how the history and practice of public relations are positioned in relevant fields of literature.

Recent books by Canadian media critics such as Joyce Nelson (1989) and James Winter (1992) offer strong condemnation of current public relations practices in this country, including the use of deception and propaganda by government and business. They concluded that manipulation and propaganda create a serious imbalance when information campaigns are used to dis-empower Canadian citizens rather than to inform them. Because their critiques also raised questions about whether the strategies they cite are really new to PR, their concerns have
relevance to the history of public relations practice in Canada.

Motivated in part by the rapid growth of public relations, ecofeminist and freelance writer Nelson set out "to reveal the incredible power that profession and industry have in modern life" (p. 19). In *Sultans of Sleaze: Public Relations and the Media* (1989), she suggested occupants of the information society tend to believe they are well-informed because of all the information available in the mass media. She argued the reverse through assiduous use of PR strategies, government and big business effectively manipulate the media and public opinion, while maintaining an illusion of openness. For Nelson, the PR industry remains a big part of what's wrong with media, and by her reckoning PR's key players provide unapologetic accounts of how they do what they do so well. She believes the public relations industry matters, because of the power it wields.

Nelson pointed out that corporations and governments don't actually change their behaviour, but merely concentrate on changing public expectations about what can be accomplished, on changing symbolism or language, and on changing public perception about what is being done. She said big business and governments use PR to conceal their activities and to create favourable public perception. Nelson traced how PR has expropriated certain techniques (such as polling) and perfected others (such as media relations, and news media by-pass through advocacy advertisements). At one point, Nelson called on the history of public relations to help build her argument about the deliberate, self-serving nature of corporate PR agendas, way back to American pioneers Ivy Lee in 1906 and Edward Bernays at the time of World War I.

Despite the overall strength of her case, Nelson made a few
oversights. Unfortunately, she referred only to the history of PR in the United States, even though the main topic of her book is how the PR industry in Canada operates. She also limited her examination to positions she felt ran counter to the public interest, although many of the same techniques have been used in the public interest—such as use by health care groups in the anti-smoking lobby. In fact, she avoided any discussion of the non-profit sector, which represents a significant portion of public relations activities.

Nelson made a tenuous connection between the amount of money spent on campaigns and whether deceit is involved, and regarded PR as a profession although it lacks many of the basic criteria for such status. Nelson also showed some inconsistency in her examination. The unevenness varies according to her position on issues, such as when she barely considered the substantial PR arsenal and initiatives of Greenpeace and the Sierra Coalition, while taking big business to task for what she called its fake green veneer. A reader is left to wonder: if, in some instances, Nelson would say the end justifies the means, since PR strategies used by environmental groups don’t receive the same scrutiny as those used to counter the environmental lobby.

Overall, however, Nelson’s examination of public relations techniques and strategies revealed questionable tactics and made a sound case that public relations has become a powerful source of manipulation. With similar concern for the damaging effects of public relations on democracy, Winter (1992) developed a theory about what he calls a mythical “common-sense” view of the world. Winter, an associate professor of communication at the University of Windsor, offered his critique of shared offences by public relations and journalism in Common Cents Media.
Portrayal of the Gulf War and Other Events  He described how and why the news media limit our understanding of important events by consistently reducing complex issues to stories with only two sides. From his point of view, media serve only the interests of the business elites which own them. In addition, he said governments exert dangerous influence on public opinion through calculated misuse of media. He focused on an over-simplified picture the media create, a view which becomes a commonly accepted or common-sense (hegemonic) interpretation of whatever is happening in the news. He maintained that once this view invades the news, its presence consistently restricts any other interpretation.

Winter said this common-sense view develops because of how journalists do their job and because of how media institutions control the type of news they produce, to ensure they stay in the business of selling audiences to advertisers. He suggested governments are just as guilty of manipulation as the media, either directly through public relations and censorship (as in the case of war), or through their shared interests with big business. Like Nelson, he found Canada's free trade debate (Winter, p. 75) a clear example of misuse of propaganda and advocacy--in particular, he's talking about the practice of public relations. He found that no matter what the issue or whose interests were at stake, the news was moulded to suit the combined government and business agenda, translated into a simple conflict and stamped with a limited, common-sense perspective.

By selecting familiar, recent cases where different media presented remarkably similar views of events, Winter appealed to readers' felt sense that the picture they received was incomplete. His book also addressed questions journalists raised themselves, particularly when faced with
military censorship characteristic of the Gulf War and with contradictory positions during the incidents at Oka in 1990, when the depiction of Mohawk warriors was undermined by Mulroney's public relations techniques for "the government of public opinion management" (p. 249).

Winter called for continued education for the public about media manipulation. He suggested nothing short of revolutionary change in the basic power structure in Canada could create "a truly functioning democracy" (p. 263) and could overcome the ravages of government and corporate public relations tactics. Aside from the raving tone of his book (which somewhat neutralizes the impact of his analysis), Winter could also be faulted for leaving so much of the responsibility in the lap of journalists, who represent a small portion of players in the media game. However, examining the complex relationship of conflict, negotiation and cooperation between public relations practitioners and journalists might have detracted from his larger message about the danger manipulation holds for democracy.

Given Nelson and Winter's dismal view of the role of public relations in Canada, it is difficult to reconcile their analysis with the picture supplied by most public relations authors.

The view from inside public relations

Historical accounts of American public relations usually start with the growth of PR practice among ruthless publicists and masterful press agents around 1900. PR writers tend to agree a new phase appeared when former journalists shifted from churning out publicity to offering PR counselling. This shift to counselling was refined during World War II, when large
numbers of PR counselors and journalists further honed their PR skills as wartime propagandists. The wartime propaganda wave was followed by PR managers who took their new skills back to executive teams in businesses, institutions and governments. In addition, American PR theorists maintain that after World War II, effective PR counselors identified with the public interest, although it rarely seems that way to those outside the profession and even to some who work in PR.

Of the two most often cited pioneers of public relations in America (Ivy Lee from the early 1900s, and Edward Bernays from the 1920s), practitioner, writer and teacher Bernays is credited with coining the term public relations counsel. His work represents the earliest American writings on what most resembles public relations practice today, with his major contributions being *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (1923), *Propaganda* (1928) and *The Engineering of Consent* (1955). In the early part of his career, Bernays made no apologies for the PR task of manipulating the public mind. He identified the PR counsel as "the propagandist who specializes in interpreting enterprises and ideas to the public and in interpreting the public to promulgators of new enterprises and ideas" and who "shapes the actions of his client so they will gain the interest, the approval and the acceptance of the public" (1928, p. 37, 39). During the 1920s, Bernays wrote enthusiastically about the propaganda strategies he learned working for the U.S. government propaganda committee in World War I. As well, the 1961 edition of *Crystallizing Public Opinion* indicated the U.S. Army, Navy and Treasury Department "all called on Mr. Bernays for advice" during World War II (p. 219). Stuart Ewen (in *Adbusters Quarterly*, Winter 1995) described Bernays as "a far-sighted architect of modern propaganda".
techniques who, dramatically, from the early 1920s onward, helped to consolidate a fateful marriage between theories of mass psychology and schemes of corporate and political persuasion "(p. 21). In *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (1961 edition) Bernays expressed limited faith in what he called "the group mind and the herd reaction" (p. 122). In that same book, he advocated that intellectual elites and experts use public relations to make democracy work by injecting public opinion with a public conscience, based on the values defined by those elites. In Bernays' concept of how public relations worked in a democracy, this leadership role carried out by elites constituted looking out for the public interest. For the purposes of this study, several characteristics emerge in Bernays' view of public relations practice. He represented a type of practice which relied heavily knowing, as Ewen pointed out, on integrating social science theory to the process of persuasion. Bernays not only knew how to use media and other tools, he also understood how to combine strategies and techniques, to design effective messages and events on behalf of his clients. As his books show, Bernays held little regard for the press agents' buckshot and crossed fingers approach to communication. Instead he carefully selected his targets, and controlled and crafted his messages for maximum benefit. From the viewpoint of history, he also made his mark as a recorder and an advocate of the positive power of public relations in America.

Unlike Bernays and other public relations writers, not all those who reflect on the past cast public relations as an essential component of democracy. Martin Olasky (1992) actually proposed that some firms return to what he called private relations and recommended that many companies eliminate their PR departments. Olasky found Bernays' whole idea of social
responsibility unrealistic and unhealthy, because it created an artificial environment for conducting business. In Corporate Public Relations A New Historical Perspective, Olasky described how public relations activity can damage competition and the rights of individuals. He also argued that once PR became a crutch to prop up industries like the private railroads, it simultaneously betrayed private interests and ceased to serve the public interest.

Given the spectrum of interpretations on the history of public relations in America, Canadian PR theorist Ron Pearson argued against a single, privileged interpretation of (American) public relations' past (Chapter 6 in Toth and Heath, 1992). In his review of PR's origins, Pearson considered the contribution of a British historian Pimlott who saw PR as a kind of specialization from the growth of mass media. Pearson also examined the work of Harvard business historian Tedlow, who suggested PR writers had been lured by a self-serving myth of a business class that disdained public opinion and was rescued by public relations. And, at different ends of the spectrum, Pearson reviewed the work of Marxist communication theorist Smythe on "the consciousness industry and capitalism" (p.122) and the writing on PR history by conservative historian Olasky, who called for private rather than public relations.

Pearson considered public relations in light of what he calls "a broad management paradigm" (129) which says the way PR develops depends on what an organization needs. Without picking a favourite, Pearson surveyed the line-up of writers' views on American PR history and devised one new category to add to Wise's three major clusters for writers of American history (as cited in Toth and Heath, pp. 127-129). To the already
established approaches of progressive historians, counter-progressives, and new left historians, Pearson added what he termed "new right historians" (p. 128) to apply to Olasky. Pearson maintained the middle ground is occupied by a predominant view that "public relations develops as a specialized role . because it is functional for organizational survival" (p. 129). This idea probably corresponds to the popular notion that if public relations did not exist, organizations would have to invent it--suggesting a structural-functional approach might be useful in trying to establish how PR as an occupation emerged in Canada. Pearson's examination of American PR history offers two reminders. The first reminder concerns the decidedly subjective nature of historical writing on public relations, and in particular how PR writers fail to separate their view of the way public relations should be practised from how it "actually evolved" (p. 116)--somewhat reminiscent of the cautions offered by Vipond to communications students on the limitations of practitioners' history. The second point suggested by Pearson's analysis alerts researchers on Canadian PR history to the possible role of perceived or real crisis in searching for the point at which organizations develop public relations, consistent with a functional perspective.

The propaganda ghost

Though its presence is sometimes ignored by practitioners, the role of propaganda haunts the margins of public relations literature and the corners of practice. Bernays' celebration of propaganda represents an exception in PR literature, apart from writings specifically about wartime. For the most part, public relations practitioners of today like to think of
themselves as working in communication or information, rather than in propaganda. However, some communication scholars suggest interest in studying the role of propaganda in society has been renewed, providing PR practitioners and others an opportunity to address unresolved issues surrounding its current and historical use by the public relations industry. A brief review of literature on what happened to propaganda analysis may help explain why PR practitioners cringe at the use of the word, and why those outside the practice use it regularly to describe public relations activities. From a historical perspective, the role of propaganda may provide some insight into how the field of public relations has developed.

The study of propaganda once held a solid place in academic circles in the United States, though it all but disappeared after the 1940s. Indeed, what J. Michael Sproule (1987) called "the rise and fall of the critical paradigm" (p. 60) serves as a helpful point of reference in understanding why PR people began to distance themselves from the term propaganda. Sproule described how a school of thought called the propaganda analysis approach appeared shortly after World War I in the United States and then lost out to an alternative social science framework after World War II. Both Sproule (1987, 1991) and Garth Jowett (1987) identified the first world war as a significant event in the use of and response to propaganda made in America. This watershed, as Jowett (1987) termed it, takes on added importance if you keep in mind Bernays' and other PR writers' position that World War I marked a coming of age for the practice of public relations in the United States. By way of background, Sproule (1987) maintained Americans saw public opinion at the turn of the century as a more positive influence in society than Europeans did. As well,
he said Americans lacked an academic framework to study social influence. However, he suggested the American perspective on propaganda was badly shaken by the experience of U.S. government propaganda campaigns—the same campaigns PR practitioner Bernays wrote about so enthusiastically.

America's first official wartime propaganda unit, the U.S. Committee on Public Information or CPI, was set up by U.S. government during World War I "to both centralize wartime communication and avoid restrictive European-style censorship" (Sproule, 1987, p. 63). Jowett (1987) described the CPI as a "civilian propaganda agency" which left in its wake "a dual legacy of deep suspicion and awe" (p. 98). The CPI was also known as the Creel committee for its director, former newspaperman George Creel, who after the war wrote How We Advertised America (1920). Sproule (1987, 1991) and Jowett (1987) suggested the CPI's pervasive manipulation, orchestrated by using the combined talents of public relations practitioners, journalists and advertising professionals during the first world war, alerted ordinary citizens and academics to the social problem of domestic propaganda used to influence public opinion. After the war, Jowett said, Americans were shocked to find out what the CPI had been doing in their midst, when previously propaganda was regarded as something the enemy engaged in, or as something America would direct only at the enemy. In addition, Jowett suggested postwar revelations discredited many of the CPI's wartime claims, and were then followed in the 1930s by an increase in the use of propaganda campaigns by the Soviet Union and fascist states. In this newly sensitized environment, propaganda analysis probably peaked in the United States with the establishment of the privately-funded
Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937, and the subsequent establishment of programs in schools and colleges to analyze propaganda. Sproule (1991) said propaganda analysis "stood as the dominant American perspective for analyzing social influence" until America entered World War II (p. 218). In an earlier article, Sproule (1987) described how the Propaganda Analysis Institute linked academic analysis of propaganda to social reform and adult education, with the idea that citizens who were taught to evaluate propaganda critically were best equipped to take part in the national reform of a changing society. As a result of the institute's efforts, an academic paradigm had emerged, heavily promoting the notion of education as a defense against propaganda just when the public relations industry and others figured out the most effective means for influencing public opinion. However, as Sproule and Jowett pointed out, the political and social pressures of World War II proved too much for the propaganda analysis movement.

Quite simply, Sproule (1989) suggested America was more concerned with national security by World War II than with social self-criticism. He said academic researchers were encouraged to use their understanding of propaganda to help government institutions in the U.S. conduct effective propaganda campaigns. In addition, he said, sponsoring foundations encouraged the use of the neutral term communications to describe research projects, so the foundations could maintain their tax exempt status. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis "was labelled a left wing subversive group" (Sproule, 1990, p. 224-226) and those who studied propaganda analysis were "tied to notions of disloyalty" (p. 229). The once-popular Institute of Propaganda Analysis ceased operation in 1942, when
board members concluded U.S. propaganda ought to be analyzed by the institute as part of its mandate (Jowett, 1987, p. 100). What Jowett suggested was the institute refused to continue its work rather than submit to restrictions on what it could examine. In short, the propaganda analysis paradigm was replaced by a rival field called communications research, because communications research could serve the goals of government at a time when a wartime agenda determined the national academic agenda. In this regard, public relations practitioners who disconnected their own view of their peacetime work from propaganda after World War II simply reflected a paradigm shift in the communication field.

However, Smith (1989, Introduction p.2) pointed to a subsequent "dramatic resurgence" of scholarly and popular interest in the study of propaganda. He based his prediction on a marked increase in the number of scholarly articles and books from different authors in the 1980s. In part, Smith attributed the renewed interest to challenges to the use of power by government and business since the 1960s. In addition, he cited a new understanding of the phenomenon of propaganda following the first English publication of Jacques Ellul's classic book Propaganda The Formation of Men's Attitudes in 1965. Included in the renewed interest trend are books such as Propaganda and Persuasion (1992) by Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, who concentrated on distinguishing propaganda from persuasion. Jowett and O'Donnell argued propaganda differs from persuasion in ways important for democracy. Propaganda, they said, is identified by its motives to shape perceptions and behaviours, and to send out ideology, all to serve the interests of the propagandist. They suggested propaganda is not necessarily an evil thing in an democracy, provided
audiences have access to alternative messages. In contrast, they saw persuasion as an interactive, mutual, two-way process which "attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee" (1992, p. 1). This view of persuasion is noticeably consistent with current definitions of public relations. Although critics such as Nelson and Winter would likely argue propaganda techniques employing mass media have enjoyed an enduring and dangerous relationship with the public relations function, the more current perspective on propaganda reflected in Jowett and O'Donnell (1992) provides a role for both propaganda and persuasion in the communication process inherent in democracy. Current scholarly work assigns different values to different types of propaganda, reflecting the influence of Ellul's English edition on Propaganda and acknowledging both negative and positive uses of propaganda. While the word propaganda may never lose its sinister connotation, public relations practitioners could benefit from a better understanding of academics' use of the term in reference to public relations work carried out now and in the past, and often involving mass media. Research into the origins of public relations in Canada could benefit from looking for points at which PR practitioners either identified their work as propaganda or openly embraced the communications research model.

Public relations and publicity roots

At the turn of the century, the portion of public relations activity called publicity relied on print media, in particular on newspapers. For example, PR pioneer Ivy Lee made his mark on American PR history through his efforts to get favourable newspaper publicity for mining owner John D
Rockefeller Jr  This strong link to print media suggests a relationship existed between the development of public relations in the United States and the development of the penny press. In *Discovering the News A Social History of American Newspapers* (1978), Michael Schudson maintained news as it was known by the end of the 1800s had only been created around the 1830s, and the role of reporter followed later in the 1880s and 1890s. In addition, he said the difficult transition from partisan story journalism to fact-based information journalism "was shaped by the expansion of democracy and of the market" and "would lead, in time, to the journalist’s uneasy allegiance to objectivity" (p. 14) However, the growth of newspapers fostered more than a change in storytelling conventions and an unofficial professional code for journalists.

The period of tension in defining news, as Schudson described in his book, eventually produced a news product that appealed to a general readership whose members were no longer segmented by political parties and whose numbers were reliably verified by audited subscriptions. Such a readership would have been equally attractive to to advertisers and to publicists seeking to influence public opinion. In terms of searching for public relations history, Schudson's work suggests understanding how newspapers had evolved toward the 1890s could be relevant to the timing of the development of role of publicists, and further suggests that the role of reporter had become associated with a fact-based style of writing around the same time. Under these circumstances, both the need for access to a general readership and the style of writing employed by publicity writers--who in the American tradition came initially from the ranks of reporters--could play a role in attempting to trace the development of public relations.
as an occupation in Canada. The history of newspapers would predict publicity efforts to target immigrants should be recorded in newspapers of the day, because of the access to publics sought by institutions and organizations. As part of the same phenomenon, recruitment of reporters should figure at significant points in the development of public relations as an occupation in this country, since their skills would also help organizations reach the newly assembled general readerships.

Reconciling the public relations effects described by Nelson and Winter with the rationale of American PR writers may be an impossible task. Nonetheless, examining Canadian PR history in the context of ideas provided in communications literature may reveal much to practitioners about the assumptions inherent in their own views of public relations. Critiques of techniques, like those written by Nelson and Winter, and pieces on American PR history seem obviously relevant to the search for the history of public relations in Canada. The development of public relations as an occupation in Canada probably lacked the momentum of an early volunteer component, flamboyant publicist figures, controversial big business promoters and high profile PR counselors with a social responsibility mission and a penchant for writing about their own field—all characteristic of well-documented American PR history. However, related areas apart from American PR history can hint at characteristics and trends to watch for, such as the history of propaganda studies and the social history of newspapers. As Larissa Grunig (Toth and Heath, 1992) observed, "public relations practitioners who fail to understand their origins cannot understand their most important role in society ... to restore and maintain a sense of community ... serving both the client or the organization and
society as a whole" (77) If practitioners are to come to grips with significant changes in their role in the future, they may have to first deal with their past, including Canadian roots in propaganda and elsewhere. Depending on when and how PR started in Canada, the outrage of current critics (such as Winter and Nelson) may be somewhat misplaced, when they focus on the use of what they consider new and improved public relations strategies that threaten democracy. If public relations practice in Canada has evolved from a traditional relationship between business and government on a shared goal related to immigrants, then both the propaganda element of PR practice, and close ties between government and business, may represent nothing more than business as usual. Similarly, techniques which Winter and Nelson find new and threatening may have been in use since the beginning of public relations in this country.

Research method

My thesis will draw on the literature described so far, to provide descriptions and context for activities that might reveal the development of a public relations function in Canada. In addition, a combination of historical and archival documents will be used, looking not only to find out how and when the occupation took root in Canada, but also to discover what purpose PR served or why organizations required public relations. Appropriate federal government documents will be examined to verify previously undocumented accounts of early PR activity in Canada. Using a combination of primary and secondary research, this report attempts to document patterns involving people, events and organizational responses significant to the emergence of public relations as an occupation.
Descriptions of practice from two well-known elements of PR theory, namely Grunig's models (1984, 1992) and the RACE formula (John Marston 1963) will serve informally as frameworks for interpreting what evidence can be uncovered. The impact of efforts to sustain railways, sell support for war efforts and lobby for or against legislative change will be considered. To provide some sense of balance to the information gathered on the early years, the observations of four practitioners will be incorporated from interviews about changes they believe occurred during their careers, which span 1930 to the present.

Figuring out just where to start looking for a beginning requires its own portion of research. Computer searches of the Canadian Periodical Index, Bibliotheque Quebecoise and the Canadian Business and Current Affairs Index, conducted in March 1994, generated no articles on the history of public relations in Canada. *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (1988) contained one reference to the history of public relations in connection with immigration, and also offered a way to establish the names of some of Canada's oldest institutions, such as the three oldest banks and three oldest universities, with less clear entries on specific hospitals and churches. In addition, a Canadian directory called *Sources for Editors, Reporters and Researchers* (1993-1994, 33rd edition) listed current mailing addresses and the names of public relations people to contact in many of the organizations identified in the encyclopedia research. The *Sources* directory also contributed the names of some institutions not covered in the encyclopedia, based on the descriptions of long-established organizations provided by contributors to the directory. The limited archives of the professional association of public relations practitioners in Canada, the
Canadian Public Relations Society (or CPRS) in Ottawa, yielded the names of members who held office during the association's early years (around 1950), hints about historical documents in government, and mentions of one book written by a group of practitioners in Canada in 1984.

Working from the encyclopedia information on early Canadian organizations, together with the CPRS names and the current Sources contacts, I prepared two lists. The first list comprised PR practitioners who had written even brief, undocumented references to the history of public relations in Canada, current contacts in organizations in operation before 1900, or current umbrella groups whose origins predated 1900. The list included Canada's three oldest banks and three oldest universities, a national hospital association, the Anglican Church of Canada, Bell Canada, the Canadian Electrical Association (a technical and lobby group established in 1891), CP Rail, Canada's oldest stock exchange (Montreal), the Canadian Manufacturers' Association (founded in 1871), the National Council of Women (advocates since 1893), an insurance company founded in 1871 and the Victorian Order of Nurses (founded in 1897), and federal government departments in agriculture, health and immigration. The objective in writing to public relations workers in these organizations was to seek access to organizations with records where I could document the development of a public relations function. The government areas of immigration, health and agriculture were selected on the basis of the initial Canadian encyclopedia entry on public relations. I compiled a second list of 32 men whose names appeared in documents of the professional association CPRS or other published and unpublished works in connection with PR in Canada from the 1930s and onward. This list was used to
stimulate conversations in interviews with practitioners whose own work might cast some light on how public relations had developed after it first appeared as an occupation in Canada.

As a result of response to the initial inquiries to organizations and individuals in the summer of 1994, my research in the following year focused primarily on the federal departments of agriculture and the interior (who were responsible at different times for immigration in the 1800s), and to a lesser degree on Canadian Pacific Railways, Bell Canada and the Royal Bank of Canada. The work of the CPR in public relations is a natural extension of the government’s immigration campaigns, since the railways needed passengers and the government needed to move settlers. Bell Canada provides some information about the different use of public relations in what came to be a regulated industry, in a company that actually received its charter before the CPR. The Royal Bank, which is now Canada’s largest bank, reveals yet another kind of public relations function, arising from the demands that competition and regulation place on an organization. I also selected and interviewed four practitioners, whose varied careers included military and government public relations, private consulting and public relations in the banking business, and who were willing to talk about their impressions and recollections of developments in public relations. Three of the four people were chosen on the recommendation of members of the Canadian Public Relations Society, because the three were well-known in the field and had contributed actively through their professional association. The interview with the fourth person came as a direct result of contact with a public relations practitioner in Canada’s oldest bank.
This research methodology was guided mainly by the need for permission to use archives and a process of elimination based on the availability of relevant archival resources. Although universities looked initially like promising sources for investigating non-profit PR development, their archives before and after 1900 ranged from weak to non-existent, at least in documents relative to the public relations function. Government departments, on the other hand, proved to be a rich source of information, because departments had to file detailed annual reports with Parliament, and because corresponding examples of their work can sometimes be found in either the National Library of Canada or the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa. At the same time, readers must keep in mind the limitations of government annual reports: then as now, departments tend to put the events of the previous year in the best possible light, so the information must be regarded as neither complete nor unbiased. For that reason, I looked to biographies and histories on the same time period, to fill in missing details and to offer a view beyond the government chronicles of what was happening and why. The findings of the research collected on efforts to attract immigrants to Canada before 1900 called for additional context, because of the surprisingly sophisticated nature of those campaigns. Primarily for that reason, information on the experiences of practitioners who remember their own early careers was sought, so readers can judge to what extent strategies and techniques in the occupation of public relations changed between the 1890s and present day. A limited effort to consider public relations "pioneers" from the second world war propaganda campaigns was made, largely to provide context for comments made by practitioners on the significance of that war on the development of
public relations in Canada. Similarly, the framework provided (in Chapter II) by Grunig's historical models and the RACE formula (or case study approach) can help readers understand the importance of specific people, events and organizational responses in the historical development of public relations in Canada. Overall, my research methodology has been one of following promising leads in uncharted areas, looking for verification where possible, and of attempting to provide a long-term perspective on what I maintain are some significant events in public relations that took place between 1890 and 1910. None of the organizations is presented as representative of any sector, but rather the organizations were chosen to illustrate what public relations events and issues were important in their own growth and development. Given the limitations of this research methodology, scholars may be unconvinced that the 1890s represent a seminal period in Canadian PR history. Nonetheless, working with the evidence available, I believe looking for logical connections between the need of governments and business for immigrants and the role of public relations has merit, and a search-and-interpret research strategy can serve as a springboard for future research.

Along the same line of inquiry, as a preliminary source of information practitioners and students can also ask what has already been written about the people and practices that mark the start of public relations as an occupation in Canada.

Finding a place to begin

As previously suggested, it's hard to start at the beginning when you don't know where the beginning is. Isolating the point at which the
occupation of public relations appeared in Canada is about as easy as distinguishing the change in seasons--you can't really identify a moment, but have to read accumulated signs and conclude the movement to something different has taken place.

Among the few published references to early PR in this country, The Canadian Encyclopedia (1988) credited Clifford Sifton for the success in attracting settlers to Canada between 1896 and 1911. The brief encyclopedia entry on public relations tended to concur with historians' position that Sifton was responsible for this initiative. Identified as then editor of PR Strategies of Scarborough, Ontario, encyclopedia contributor David Norman said Sifton's promotion work "stands as a model in communications, targeted to specific audiences, and it probably represents the greatest and most successful public relations campaign in Canadian history" (p. 1786). The source of the encyclopedia information remained unidentified, but the author listed some of the tactics used to accompany the grants of free land. Norman referred to tools familiar to many PR practitioners today, including media tours, lectures at fairs, pamphlets, and advertisements. Based on this entry, some helpful questions can be formed. Why is Sifton assigned credit for this campaign? How was it planned and developed? On what basis can the merits of the campaign be judged? Have any other public relations writers shown an interest in Sifton's campaigns? What was happening before Sifton's influence was felt?

In fact, the limited and scattered offerings by public relations writers about early PR in Canada do mention immigration publicity. In his personal anecdotal recollections, Canadian practitioner Jack Donoghue (1993) offered no documentation but named a John Donaldson as "probably the
first government publicist” in the 1880s (p. 99), in what would now be called the federal department of immigration. Walter Herbert and John Jenkins (1984), in their collection of personal observations, also named Donaldson (p. 166), although the source of the name is unspecified, just as in the Donoghue book. Donoghue said his information on Donaldson was based on conversations Donoghue had with officials of the immigration department, when he worked there to develop its information services between 1965 and 1969 (personal communication, December 4, 1994).

An unpublished, undated manuscript from the archives of the Canadian Public Relations Society provided a similarly tantalizing reference to immigration publicity, in a 21-page typewritten document called “An outline of Canadian public relations history.” Bill Deacon (undated, p. 4) wrote about “an 1893 report to the Canada Department of the Interior” and mentioned four activities: immigration literature published in eight languages, Sir Charles Tupper’s comments on magic lantern slide shows in Britain, sponsored tours to Canada and paid advertisements in Scandinavian newspapers. An end note to the same document (p. 21) cited yet another unpublished source—a lecture called “Government of Canada Information Services Starting Points and Development,” delivered to an unidentified audience in 1968 by R. Brian O’Regan. Promoting immigration shortly before the turn of the century appeared as a consistent theme in the meagre offerings on early Canadian PR, though the sources of information are hard to verify.

Despite their precarious documentation, these fleeting mentions seem to refer to roughly the same set of activities. As such, these entries suggest the immigration campaign of Clifford Sifton might indeed be a
fruitful point of entry to examine public relations history in Canada. The passing references also provide some names and lead to a few more useful questions: who was John Donaldson and what was his line of work? How is Charles Tupper involved and why was 1893 a significant year? Just what did Clifford Sifton do about immigration and why is his campaign considered a landmark?

In addition, the unpublished Deacon manuscript (undated, Canadian Public Relations Society archives) alluded to a curious partnership. Lurking quietly in its single paragraph on early PR history is one otherwise undeveloped line of thought: "In 1897, the Canadian Pacific Railway joined with the federal government in the noisiest publicity campaign for immigrants that Canada has ever run" (p. 4). If the federal government did generate one of the first PR campaigns in Canada, how did the railways fit into the picture? What are the implications of a joint venture between private industry and government as the first major PR campaign in a very young country? Certainly such a project could cast new light on the common suggestion that wartime was the first time government and business united for propaganda purposes in Canada. At the very least, some evidence should exist to suggest parallel immigration campaigns and complimentary management responses, if a joint campaign proves hard to establish.

Using the promotion of immigration as a starting point actually moves the search for public relations activities several governments ahead of the 1896 Laurier government that won Clifford Sifton such acclaim. The first legislation on immigration in Canada was enacted in 1841 by the Province of Canada (Higgins Canadian Government Publication A Manual for Librarians, undated, National Archives of Canada, p. 262), possibly to deal
with what *The Canadian Encyclopedia* calls "the flood of Irish immigrants" in the 1840s and 1850s (p. 1045). Mary Higgins identified the early immigration legislation as providing for transportation, medical care and support to homeless immigrants until they became established in Canada. In her manual, designed to help librarians track back records and locate old government publications in departments that no longer exist, Higgins said the greater part of the department of agriculture's work from 1869 to 1892 was devoted to immigration. It established immigration agencies in foreign countries and Canada, "supervising the work of such agencies, advertising in foreign countries, organizing immigration societies, making regulations for the care of immigrants, especially juveniles, and making statistical reports on all phases of the work" (p. 126). In the absence of copies of the actual publications used for immigration publicity and promotion, Higgins' book at least provided a paper trail. She listed a number of publications (p. 132-134) directed at intending settlers, including *Canada: Its History, Production and Natural Resources* (1886); *Emigration to Canada: a Brief Outline of her Geographical Position* (1860, and also printed in German, 1862); and *Report of Tenant Farmers' Delegates on the Dominion of Canada as a Field for Settlement* (1880). Overall, then, the limited but consistent references to immigration-based PR campaigns in the late 1800s, and evidence of legislation and publications related to attracting settlers, confirm the usefulness of immigration campaigns in the search for the origins of public relations as an occupation in Canada. In addition to identifying the subject area of immigration public relations, two organizations emerge as substantial players in the field of public relations—the federal government and the Canadian Pacific Railway. With the topic, a
rough time period and organizations identified, the search for organizational responses, events and individuals important to the origins of public relations in Canada can begin.

Before proceeding further, however, two well-known conventions from existing public relations and communication literature--the Grunig models and the RACE formula--may offer some logic to the research process, by describing patterns and frameworks which may be interwoven among isolated bits of relevant evidence.
Chapter II. Models and Conventions in PR Practice

Given the rather open-ended nature of this research into Canada’s public relations history, two commonly used perspectives on public relations in the United States may provide some sense of what to look for, and how to view the evidence encountered. Often called the Grunig models (Grunig and Hunt, 1984) and the RACE formula (Marston, 1963), these two elements of public relations theory figure prominently in discussions about the practice of public relations in both Canada and the United States. Because each of these approaches provides a kind of description of public relations practice, they can offer useful hints on what research might uncover.

American communications professor John E. Marston first advocated the use of what he termed the R-A-C-E formula in The Nature of Public Relations, in 1963. He intended the initials to serve as a shorthand reminder of a specific sequence of work activities—research, action, communication and evaluation—as a means to emphasize a systematic approach for analyzing and acting on a public relations problem. The formula, now spelled simply RACE, has become widely accepted as a convention for preparing case studies. For example, as an examiner for the current accreditation program of the Canadian Public Relations Society, I can verify that the society requires candidates to answer one of its three sections on its written exam applying the RACE formula, and to develop their work examples using the RACE formula. As well, most college and university courses recommend the RACE formula for public relations case
study presentations. For the purposes of my research, the significance of the formula lies not only in how it's used, but also with the assumptions that come with its use. Inherent in the acceptance of the formula is the acknowledgement that public relations work exceeds the singular activity of communicating information in one direction, from a source to a receiver. The formula requires the use of research to determine the most effective course of action, calls for action to be taken by an entire organization (rather than work carried out solely by a communications unit), and further requires evaluation to assess the effect of the action and communication that took place. Although practitioners such as Edward Bernays had long advocated the application of research to public relations work in America, popular acceptance of the RACE formula officially signalled the incorporation of research and evaluation into individual practitioners' responsibility. Furthermore, the use of all four elements of the formula meant practitioners had a framework from which to judge their own work and the work of their peers. As Marston suggested, "Remembering these words won't make a dull man bright, but orderly consideration of them will prevent many mistakes and omissions" (p. 161). Keeping in mind that the majority of American PR practitioners at work in the 1960s had started their careers as journalists, the acceptance of the formula also implied that knowledge of media relations and strong writing skills by themselves were no longer a sufficient base for an effective public relations career. Possibly in the same way Schudson (1978) suggested objectivity was a value created by reporters to enhance their professional status, public relations people may have embraced the RACE formula to redefine their work as distinct from journalism and as embodying more than communication technician roles. In
any event, the RACE formula offers a set of activities which suggest the existence of a public relations function. Further, evidence of their use in sequence might suggest a specific stage had been reached in the development of the occupation of public relations.

As might be expected when the formula was first introduced, Marston's concept of what constituted research was fairly broad. Included in his explanation was research on clarifying public relations goals and objectives with management, background information on the organization and that particular issue or problem, and opinion research on the publics involved, both from existing evidence (such as sales figures or other internally generated statistics), and from formal sampling. Under the category of action, Marston included the possibility that some situations required policy changes or changes in a service, changes in a product or changes in an organizational response. The example he gave was if a bus company had complaints about slow service, public relations could not begin to help until the problem was corrected, suggesting only then could public relations effectively inform customers of the change. Marston also recommended what he called "organized listening" as an appropriate action (p. 165), referring to an organization's obligation to solicit and respond formally to the opinions of its publics. For Marston, his understanding of action separated public relations from "the old-style press agentry which simply tried to whitewash events and never took a hand in their development. Action makes public relations a part of management, because action is primarily a management responsibility" (p. 166). Marston's insistence on this point may be easier to understand in light of an organizational approach common to public relations in the 1960s. Many
organizations saw PR as a line function, not unlike the mail room or printing services, where someone other than PR practitioners decided what needed to be done and the PR person or unit simply figured out how to carry out the communication action that arose from a predetermined decision. On the other hand, Marston conceded a substantial portion of public relations work still revolved around understanding the communication function and using communication media, which he labelled the communication step in his formula. Marston said the final stage, called evaluation, was essential for accountability to measure success or failure, and additionally as a means to inform the organization’s subsequent actions. Acknowledging the difficulties and costs involved in the evaluation stage, he suggested frequent use of the evaluation step was generally limited to “large companies with continuous problems” (p. 168), and conceded evaluation was essentially another name for research carried out at the end stage of a campaign. The way Marston conceived of public relations, the research and action portions of his RACE formula signalled a particular kind of PR practice distinct from press agentry, because the first two elements of the formula required preplanning and also required relocation of the public relations function into decision making at the management level. In terms of using the RACE formula to understand the history of public relations, Marston’s approach would assign some significance to instances when either planning or execution of public relations campaigns was integrated with decision making about changes in programs and policies of an organization. In addition, identifiable research and post-campaign evaluation would mark a type of practice further developed than press agentry.

The four models of practice advocated by James Grunig (in Grunig
and Hunt, 1984) are consistent with the approach taken by Marston, but offer considerably more detail. Despite the range of work that falls under the heading public relations, Grunig and Hunt believed both the history and the practice of public relations could be captured in four models. The models were distinguished by differing characteristics including the purpose of the communication, the nature of communication, the communication model in use and the nature of research associated with each type of practice. In a historical sense, Grunig and Hunt offered their models as an abstract depiction of stages, and suggested the practice of public relations had the potential to move developmentally from one stage to the next, depending on the needs of organizations and institutions who used public relations.

Although the authors suggested certain types of organizations were inclined to use certain models, Grunig and Hunt also asserted that the fourth model (which called for mutual understanding and equitable, two-way communication) was an ideal type which responsible practitioners ought to strive to use, even in the event of organizational resistance.

Both Grunig and Hunt were scholars, though Hunt described himself in their introduction as a former journalist. *Managing Public Relations* was written as a textbook, and argued that the public relations function rightfully belonged at the management level. The design of the book merged the usual how-to public relations theory, on areas such as media relations and public affairs, with a broad rationale supplied by systems theory to explain organizational behaviour. The sections that dealt specifically with Grunig’s models of practice also provided some historical information on the development of business into big business in America, and how big business made use of publicity to further its causes.
Grunig and Hunt dated the appearance of the first of their categories, called press agentry or publicity, with political press agents and other publicists at work between 1830 and 1900. They suggested the publicity model of public relations is characterized by a one-way flow of information from a source to a receiver, using information designed for the purpose of propaganda. They indicated "complete truth" was not essential in this type of practice (p. 20), and connected press agentry to historical figures such as circus promoter P. T. Barnum. Research employed in press agentry was limited to keeping track of publicity received. Grunig and Hunt further suggested this type of public relations was still practised in the 1980s in sports, theatre, and product promotion, although with greater emphasis on employing truthful information than had been the case when this type of practice first appeared. They estimated press agentry or publicity accounted for 15 percent of current PR practice at the time their textbook was written.

Grunig called his second model public information, saying the purpose of this kind of PR shifted from propaganda to "dissemination of information not necessarily with a persuasive intent" (p. 22). He offered the public information model as the main model of practice in use between 1900 and 1920, when he said most PR information still travelled in a one-way direction only, from an organization to intended receivers. Grunig maintained that truthful, accurate information was important to practitioners of the public information type of PR. Together with a change in purpose, the insistence on truth represented the main differences between press agentry and public information. This period or stage reflected the influx of former journalists into the occupation, working primarily as writers in residence; such a practitioner's job was "to report objectively information about his

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organization to the public" (p. 22). Research was still minimal in public information practice, centred (if used at all) on readability levels of texts or inquiries about characteristics of the readership. Leading historical figures included pioneers such as Ivy Lee, often cited in American PR history books for his Declaration of Principles concerning openness and honesty in dealing with the media, and known also for his work with high profile clients such as the Rockefeller family. Although Lee’s professed commitment to truth did not endure throughout his career, he nonetheless remains an important figure for articulating standards of practice. Grunig suggested the public information model, in the mid 1930s, was still prevalent in at least 50 percent of governments, nonprofit associations and businesses which used public relations.

Grunig called his third model or stage in development of public relations the two-way asymmetric model. Its name referred in particular to the nature of the communication which occurred, where information no longer passed only from the organization to the receiver. Instead, he suggested the organization did seek feedback from the receiving publics, by activities such as research to evaluate attitudes toward an organization, or its policies or on issues, making this a two-way exchange. However, although the information moved in two directions Grunig classified it as asymmetric, because the information collected was used primarily by the organization to craft and re-craft its messages in such a way as to make them more acceptable to its publics. Members of an organization’s publics acquired no power or influence by virtue of the two-way exchange. The purpose of communication in the two-way asymmetric model was scientific persuasion, meaning the practitioner would incorporate an understanding
of sociology and psychology into his work to enhance the effectiveness of
the public relations activity. Grunig regarded this situation as asymmetric,
since the balance of power still lay with the organization; the intent was
limited to changing public attitudes, not to changing the organization's
policies or behaviour. As a historical model, Grunig connected this type of
practice with figures such as PR teacher, counselor and writer Edward
Bernays, who described his own early work as that of a propagandist. This
form of practice would correspond to Joyce Nelson's (1989) account of the
links between the polling firm Decima, advocacy advertisements and the oil
industry's lobby of the federal government. Grunig (1984) proposed that
competition served as a "catalyst" which prompted organizations such as
competitive businesses and agencies to use the two-way asymmetric model
of practice, and estimated that about 20 percent of organizations which
used public relations in the 1980s practised this type of PR.

The final stage in the four models rests with the two-way symmetric
model, which Grunig proposed had as its purpose seeking mutual
understanding between two groups. The organization serves as one group
in this communication model, and different publics serve at different times
as the other group in the consensus-seeking pair, with neither group
designated as source or receiver. Given the purpose of mutual
understanding, Grunig felt his fourth model described a balanced form of
communication, which would use research to evaluate the extent to which
understanding (not necessarily resulting in opinion change in any of the
groups) had been achieved by organizations and their publics. Naming
Bernays as a proponent of this fourth model of public relations, as well as
being representative of the third model, Grunig said educators and leaders
of professional associations in public relations also advocated the fourth model of public relations. Grunig estimated that about 15 percent of organizations using public relations in the 1980s practised the two-way symmetric model, often prompted by regulation as a catalyst. As such, he said this two-way symmetric practice was most often found in regulated business and agencies.

Most of the evidence and argument Grunig advanced for his models arose from accounts of the history of public relations in America. For example, he offered instances of publicists' "constant efforts to get free space in the media for their clients, using every possible trick to take advantage of the newspaper and other media" (p. 30), ranging from railroad stunts to publicity wars between competing electric companies. The same pattern of using historical material as evidence holds with the public information and two-way asymmetric models. Grunig conceded, however, that historical evidence for the two-way symmetric model was lacking, mostly because "practitioners only now are beginning to practice (sic) the model" (p. 41). Nonetheless, he found autobiographies and public relations textbooks written by American public relations counselors to verify his description of two-way symmetric practice.

Many of the reservations about Grunig's four theoretical and historical models were addressed in 1992 with the publication of *Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management*. As part of a detailed study sponsored by the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC), Grunig updated his models and set them within the context of a 666-page digest of literature from disciplines including sociology, psychology, management, marketing, women's studies,
philosophy, anthropology and communication. The work of the eight-member IABC team comprised a comprehensive review of literature from the 1970s and 1980s, and relied heavily on management theory to organize what one contributor called their "road map to excellence" (p. 110). The second part of the project, possibly to be published in 1995, involved a survey and qualitative research to test the propositions developed from the literature review.

James Grunig edited and contributed to the IABC project, funded to mark the tenth anniversary of the IABC research foundation. The project set out to identify the characteristics of an excellent communication department, to explain how excellent public relations improves organizational effectiveness, and to show how much the PR contribution is worth financially. However, in the course of their work the authors said "what started out as a routine review of literature turned out to be a massive effort to build theory" (p. xiii, xiv). Drawing on themes popularized in Peters' and Waterman's bestseller _In Search of Excellence_ (1982) and documented subsequently in the literature of organizational behaviour, the authors maintained that their idealistic, symmetric model of public relations practice provides the most effective and efficient type of PR. The Grunig group explained the two-way symmetric model works best, because it allows an organization to build relationships with the groups or public that prevent or allow an organization to achieve its goals, a strategy also called "managing interdependence" (p. 69). The notion of excellence requires not only efficient and effective public relations, but a commitment to long-term goals.

Criticism of the 1984 Grunig models often centres on the idealistic portrayal of the two-way symmetric model. To begin, people who work in PR
suggested that practice designed to achieve mutual understanding is so rare that its merit as a model is questionable. In an updated explanation of the four models, as part of the excellence study, James and Larissa Grunig implied the critics had a point. They explained that on second thought excellent public relations "deviates from pure symmetrical public relations and can be described as a combination of two-way asymmetrical and symmetrical models--mixed motive public relations" (p. 285). Their revised version of the models allowed that organizations do not practise pure forms of theoretical models, sometimes combining models and sometimes using whichever particular model matches the situation. In addition, Grunig conceded even when organizations ought to use two-way and symmetrical communication they may not, because of the combined influences provided by organizational culture, the potential of a PR department and how PR fits into the organization. In further amendments to the 1984 models, the excellence book suggested press agentry and not public information continued to be the most common form of public relations among organizations overall, although the public information model predominates among government agencies. Even among studies of utilities, where Grunig suggested his models would predict practice of a two-way symmetrical model, the excellence book reported on PR research that showed something similar to two-way symmetrical practice was used, but the users "had asymmetrical results in mind" (p. 306). In these cases, Grunig said the research revealed organizations really wanted persuasion even when they set up strategies for mutual understanding, clinging to an assumption captured in the phrase ' "If you knew what I knew you'd make the same decision" ' (p. 306), and accounting for Grunig's use of the term mixed-
motive models in their 1992 version. Ultimately, the excellence book makes substantial amendments to predictions on the incidence of use of the two-way symmetrical models and to estimates of the predominant model of practice, while also providing a thorough argument for shifting the base of public relations theory and practice away from journalism into management disciplines.

Perhaps in response to finding out just how pervasive press agentry still is in practice, Grunig et al. (1992) continued to call aggressively for practitioners to embrace a new kind of public relations, consistent with the two-way symmetrical model. However, as evidenced in responses at a CPRS Ottawa chapter seminar on "The new PR and How it Works" (Ottawa, October 28, 1993), practitioners who regarded themselves as competent and effective PR managers resented the idea that forms of practice other than the two-way symmetric model were inherently unethical and by definition ineligible for excellence, particularly when organizations were well-satisfied with the results achieved. The authors of Excellence in Public Relations clearly argued in their book against practitioners accepting the dominant worldview of public relations "that public relations is a way of getting what an organization wants without changing its behaviour or without compromising" (p. 39). The IABC team said in the long run organizations "get more of what they want when they give up some of what they want" (p. 39) and said "we do not accept public relations as it is currently practised" (p. 10), namely as a way to manipulate publics. Adding more tension to the debate, the book on excellence in PR suggested most current practice of public relations fails to meet standards of excellence or ethics, largely because the majority of practitioners lack the knowledge to
meet those standards. On the whole, practitioner criticisms of the Grunig models tend to focus on the contrast or gap between what organizations demand of practitioners and what the fourth Grunig model demands, rather than engaging in debate about the scholarly rationale for the models themselves (CPRS National Conference Plenary Session, featuring James and Larissa Grunig, Ottawa, May 6, 1995). As well, the press agentry and public information models draw little in the way of response.

On the other hand, tensions and controversy that surround Grunig’s two-way symmetric model as a representation of how PR should be practised have limited impact on the usefulness of his four models as historical descriptions. To begin with, most of the concerns raised about the 1984 version of the models apply to the fourth model in particular, which is largely a model about the future of public relations. The first three models provide a reasonably good representation of practice and of historical development. As such, the revised estimates of which model predominates (press agentry) and the suggestion that government PR runs largely on the public information model suggest historical evidence about how public relations originated in Canada should correspond in some important ways with those models. As well, the detailed categories concerning research variations between the models and the direction of communication should be reflected in accounts of how public relations campaigns were developed and positioned by organizations.

Looking at Marston’s RACE formula and Grunig’s models together as tools for examining Canadian PR history, a number of possibilities emerge. The RACE formula provides a context adaptable to historical inquiry in which to view practitioner’s description of their own work. Marston’s four
units of the formula cluster the wide range of PR activities into identifiable chunks, which may well be carried out by a number of different people sprinkled throughout an organization, but which viewed together as they are in the RACE formula can signal the presence of a public relations function. As well, the RACE formula provides a way to evaluate public relations activities, and if some activities are missing then the PR function most likely reflects an early period of development. The Grunig models set out a similar blueprint, but extend well beyond a means to evaluate specific activities. The detailed Grunig models allow some insight into the organizational perspective of the public relations function. For example, Grunig’s models suggest understanding organizational support for different types of PR practice means looking at how PR units or workers are placed and who they report to, and looking at what issues or problems PR is employed to deal with and how those issues feature in the organization’s decision making process. Because Grunig’s models are developmental, one could also predict that public relations does not likely occur at conception as a two-way model, so historical evidence should bear out some progression between publicity and the later models Grunig provides. In brief, the RACE formula describes the nature of public relations work and the Grunig models show in detail how PR work figures in an organizational context over a period of time. For historical research, then, the two concepts from PR theory suggest useful patterns for organizing the bits and pieces of information related to the early years of public relations in Canada.
Chapter III: Trial and Error in Immigration Public Relations

Leads from *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, the public relations society archives, and the undated Higgins manual for tracking old government documents point to immigration publicity as a useful starting block for understanding how public relations roles emerged in Canada. Here as elsewhere, people performed public relations roles before the term was invented and before specific jobs were dedicated to that line of work. Early Canadian public relations involves governments driven by political and economic agendas of their own and buffeted by those of other nations, together with immigrant farmers lured by dreams of land ownership and independence. During this period in Canadian history, individual and political ambitions pushed across the continent on a cash-strapped railway, which was itself sustained by the distant promise of commercial development. Add to the mixture a sequence of worldwide depressions and pressures for Confederation, and you have a good picture of the mid- to late 1800s when the public relations function began to take hold in government around the issue of immigration.

As Higgins (undated) pointed out, the Province of Canada enacted its first immigration legislation in 1841, the year Upper and Lower Canada combined. However, by that time the country had already absorbed a substantial number of immigrants. *The Canadian Encyclopedia* noted that before the British Conquest of 1760, colonial governments of both France and Great Britain "carefully and slowly encouraged settlement in Canada, hoping that settlers would guarantee the sovereignty of colonial land"
claims, would Christianize the natives and would exploit the natural resources, often on behalf of European investors" (p. 1045). The paths of immigrants in North America corresponded to the extension of British and French trade, particularly for fur and for timber. Timber gradually increased in importance to support the shipbuilding industry, which transported all kinds of goods back and forth between continents. In effect, the initial pressure for immigration was external in origin: the first immigrants came to North America because France and England sent them to enhance their respective economic and political positions. However, as The Canadian Encyclopedia (1988) noted, the Conquest of 1760 effectively ended immigration from France, and Britain then assumed the role of main provider of immigrants, for as long as it suited Britain's purposes. So even when France ceased to transplant immigrants into North America for its own commercial development, immigration continued to be an externally driven function, primarily for one external power instead of two. Lower (1966) said that following Napoleon's defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon invoked his Continental Policy in an attempt to destroy Britain's commercial foundations. As a result, for the early part of the 1800s Britain, the United States and France traded embargoes which "effectively created a British North American economy" (p. 76). The eventual, self-sustaining nature of the North American economy was actually a by-product of the tit-for-tat trade wars involving old rivals Britain and France, and the fast-growing United States.

For several decades after the British fought the War of 1812 with America, Lower reported, "a large number of immigrants came to British North America, almost exclusively from the British Isles, where
unemployment and distress, aggravated principally by the Industrial Revolution and the Enclosure Act, encouraged immigration" (p. 83). Lower pointed out significant characteristics of this early immigration. To begin, he said, although the Irish potato famine of 1845 brought a surge in immigrants to North America, immigration numbers had already been enormously swelled by 1838 by German, Dutch, British and American immigrants who settled in Upper Canada. As well, he said immigrants left their homelands not only because they wanted to escape poor conditions, but because they were attracted to British North America by cheap land and high wages. For example, the population of Upper Canada in 1824 was 150,000 but had shot up to almost 400,000 by 1838 (p. 84). Waite (1967) suggested the 1840s saw "the end of the merchantilist system" which meant British North America no longer served as either a source or a market for Britain. What is more, he suggested, with the outbreak of civil war in America, Canada actually became "a liability" since the border with the United States was too large to defend (p. 19). As distinctive an influence as the large number of Irish immigrants who came in the 1840s was, their arrival did not at all mark the start of immigration to British North America. In fact, by the 1840s North America had begun, in its own right, to become a desirable destination for immigrants beyond the agenda set by Britain. In addition, not only did British North America cease to be of use to Britain when the British moved on to larger world markets, but in rather short order Britain came to regard the colonies as source of danger in the struggle between Britain and the United States.

On the other hand, in some ways the shift from the influence of France and Britain, and then Britain alone, moved with all the speed of a
glacier. In fact, the colonial agenda lingered into the 1890s over Canadian immigration policies. As the development of publicity and related government policies will show, the historical tradition of equating potential immigrants with British citizens was hard to shake.

Publicity activities cited in government documents

The first home of government immigration activities—the department of agriculture—may seem an odd location. However, if you think of recent combinations such as manpower and immigration, the logic becomes more apparent, because agricultural work provided the main demand for manpower when the Province of Canada was formed. Reports on some elements of publicity to solicit immigrant farmers can be found among the early Sessional Papers (CSP 1860, pp. 20-22) for the Province of Canada. Based on those reports, from the Bureau of Agriculture and Statistics for 1859 to the Minister of Agriculture, the number of settlers was already being recorded according to the roads on which they lived, and included estimates and counts of animals and crops. The same report showed the minister of agriculture was also responsible for immigration efforts, described as “the publication and extensive distribution of Pamphlets in the German and Norwegian languages, as well as English” (p. 22), together with the distribution of a map of Canada. His officials reported a second edition already in use of a pamphlet called Canada, saying “steps are being taken to disseminate it very widely in Great Britain along with the map” (p. 22), and agriculture department officials also reported opening an immigration office in Liverpool, England that year. These mentions of producing and disseminating information as early as 1859 certainly suggest
the trend toward immigration work incorporating public relations practice originated well before publicity became so strongly associated with Interior Minister Clifford Sifton in the 1890s.

The contents of the annual report on the year 1859 suggested that even before the development of the west was an issue, four areas of government business were connected under a single minister: settlement, agriculture, immigration and statistics. In fact, the agriculture portfolio seemed to cover everything from crime statistics to inspecting the health of immigrants and farm animals arriving in Canada. By the 1862 Sessional Report (published in 1862, concerning the year 1861), N.F. Belleau was referred to as the Minister of Agriculture, Emigration and Statistics. In other words, the intimate links between collecting statistics (or research), identifying immigration problems, promoting farmland settlement and developing agricultural policy were acknowledged in initial administrative groupings. In addition, publicity efforts in Great Britain and Europe were among the earliest tactics to address the government's need for immigrant-farmers who could populate and survive in rural areas.

Problems with immigration evident at the half-way point in the 1800s would persist for some time, generating a variety of public relations and policy responses. Immigrants did not necessarily translate into farming settlers for Canada, and by 1850 Canadian farmers were already moving to the U.S. because of a shortage of arable land in Upper and Lower Canada (Lower, 1966, p 106). That is, before Confederation, before the construction of the railways and before settling the west became a goal in itself. Immigrants were using Canada as an entry point into the United States and experienced farmers in Upper and Lower Canada were abandoning the
Province of Canada for greener pastures to the south. The spread between immigration numbers and numbers of settlers would continue for many years. For example, the annual report of the minister of agriculture for the year 1889 gives 176,462 as the immigration figure, but only 91,600 as total settlers (CSP 1890, p. xx, xxii). Since the task of luring immigrants had existed for so long, and since government’s initial publicity efforts can be traced back at least to 1859, what accounts for the success of the public relations campaign eventually credited to Clifford Sifton in 1896?

To start with, by the 1870s the immigration issue had been redefined at political and management levels as a western problem. Prime Minister Macdonald’s three-phase policy for the 1872 election called for settlement and agricultural development, industrial development of the east (meaning what we now think of as central Canada), and construction of a railway to link the east and west (Lower, 1966). Although, as P.B. Waite (1967) concluded, Confederation “was not, except in Canada West, what is usually referred to as a popular movement,” Confederation did launch government attempts to tie the thinly populated country together by promoting the development of railways and industry. As a starting point for increased emphasis on recruiting farmers, the Dominion Lands Act of 1872 promised new immigrants a quarter section of Western land suitable for farming, together with the right to an adjoining quarter at low cost after three years of settlement. However, a combination of events over the next 20 years worked against the government’s programs, which were intended to boost substantially the number of settlers. In fact, more people left the country than arrived in Canada in the twenty years after the Lands Act (Lower, p. 132). Only one year after the lands act took force, the effect of what came to be
seen as an endless, world-wide depression was felt in Canada, and relatively few would-be immigrants from Great Britain and Europe could muster the transatlantic boat fare. Even the completion of the railway to the west coast in 1886, five years ahead of schedule, was insufficient to overcome the influence of crop failures, recurring depression, and Britain's lack of interest in the Canadian west. As Lower observed, "Despite a lavish propaganda campaign in Britain and repeated promotion efforts by Galt, Canada's first High Commissioner in London, the number of immigrants did not live up to the high hopes of the government" (p. 135).

Indeed, the job of high commissioner of Canada in London might be regarded as one of Canada's first public relations positions, though Galt's appointment brought little improvement to the recruitment numbers. The Canadian Encyclopedia described Sir Alexander Galt as the first high commissioner appointed from 1880 to 1883, "to promote interest in financing Canadian railways, buying Canadian products, and emigration to the Canadian North-West" (p. 870). Yet even with the creation of the lands act and the implementation of the overseas management position of high commissioner, the Conservatives were frustrated by low numbers of settlers. The Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Dominion of Canada for the Calendar Year 1885 (CSP1886) offered a catalogue of reasons why the number of immigrants repeatedly fell below anticipated levels. The preface to the report cited the North West Rebellion of 1885 as discouraging bookings because of "exaggerated and sensational reports" in the United Kingdom and on the continent (p. xxvii), together with a rate war that left the routes to Canada far more expensive than those from Liverpool to Chicago, and slowdowns in business both in North American
and Britain. Given their lack of success, the nature of those early campaigns bears looking into, as a means to consider how subsequent campaigns differed from the later, successful programs of Clifford Sifton.

**Characteristics of early publicity tools**

Where original documents can be found, they provide an irresistible peek at the type of public relations tools and strategies employed in the publicity campaigns that predated Clifford Sifton's much lauded initiatives. From annual reports of the department of agriculture, Charles Foy can be identified as a Canadian government immigration agent in Belfast during the 1870s. In his book *Emigration or No Emigration Facts for Immigrants* (1874), Foy compiled 72 pages of letters he wrote in correspondence and rebuttals with newspapers, often in the form of letters to the editors. He addressed his book to the farmers, farm labourers and servant girls of Ireland. Most of the entries appear to have been published in newspapers, carrying the date of publication (usually some time in the previous two years), and the names of newspapers such as The *Belfast News*, *The Northern Whig* and *The Londonderry Journal*. Others are reprints of letters (or testimonials) from immigrants in Canada, writing about their experiences. This book suggests a good part of Foy's job, as a Canadian civil servant reporting to the minister of agriculture, was to monitor the newspapers and respond with his own write-in campaigns.

Testimonials formed a somewhat common theme in government publicity of the time and seemed to rely in part on the merits of the person offering the testimonial. The Department of Agriculture booklet *Dominion of Canada as a Farming and Stock Raising Country* (1878) subitled itself
“Eminent Men on Canada,” and included pieces of writing from “The Marquis of Lorne on Canada as a Field for Settlement,” Lord Dufferin, the Duke of Manchester and a “Professor Goldwin Smith, M.A.,” together with quotations about Canada from The Times of London. The booklet declared “the farmers of Canada are a prosperous race” (introduction) and asserted “There can be no doubt that, for the farming classes, especially those with a capital of 400 [pounds] and upwards, Canada is the finest country in the world—affording the certainty of present comfort, and the prospect of future independence” (p. 24).

The messages play on an interesting contrast. On the one hand, the authority of the publications derived from the class position, expertise and corresponding prestige of contributors. At the same time, the publications appealed to the ideals of achievement, prosperity and equality, free from the constraints of aristocracy. Even as the publicity shifted more and more specifically to settlement of the North West area, invoking the ideal of independence through land ownership persisted in the literature. In effect, the government message did not change much when immigration was redirected from Upper and Lower Canada to the Canadian west. The 1893 publication Emigration to North Western Canada Information for Intending Settlers boasted, “In a year of two ... his house is his own, built with his own hands, after his own ideas. His wife and family are here, happy and contented, and he calls no man lord, he is independent” (p. 6). Overall, the content of publications from the 1870s and 1890s remained remarkably similar in their use of a fact-dispensing style and their focus on equality through land ownership.

Quite predictably, most of the publications also shared an upbeat
tone, incorporating relevant geographic and agricultural detail with answers to commonly asked questions. *Dominion of Canada A Handy Book for Emigrants* (1880, 139 pages plus appendixes) contained sections on practical matters such as dairy farming, rates of wages and the administration of justice. It also included more noticeably persuasive pieces called "motives to emigrate" and "classes who should emigrate." The harsh climate of Canada tended to be played down: "during the winter the atmosphere is bracing and pleasant" and "perfectly absurd ideas prevail respecting the rigours of Canadian winters" (p. 11). The recruitment documents have in common a reliance on what we might now regard as celebrity contributors, to both attract attention and to lend an air of credibility to the Canadian government's information books. Testimonials of this kind were mixed with staff monitoring and response to newspaper stories at recruitment sources, and to corresponding accounts of the life awaiting those who emigrate to Canada. So actual copies of documents published in and around the 1880s implicate government departments and government employees, in public relations activities which at the least included soliciting and making use of testimonials, publication of pamphlets and small books—some of which where written by staff members—and monitoring of newspapers and responding as needed to stories and letters to the editor. Most of these products and activities tend to be consistent with Grunig's (1984, 1992) first model of public relations—the publicity or press agency model, where the information is decidedly one way in direction, from source to receiver, the goal is essentially propaganda, and the notion of truth in the information presented is questionable. Despite the poor showing in results obtained, none of the government reports indicates an attempt to research
why their rather long-standing campaigns were not achieving the desired results, so research appears to have played little or no part in how the campaigns were constructed or assessed—another characteristic of Grunig’s publicity model of public relations.

**Tupper and immigration publicity**

In fact, noticeably absent from the annual government reports of 1885 to 1890 is mention of funds allocated for or activities connected to publicity. That is, an organized, identifiable public relations response to chronically low recruitment numbers did not seem to figure in the department of agriculture’s priorities. At least in the document of record, the annual report. Apart from identifying Sir Charles Tupper as High Commissioner to London (CSP1887, p. xxvi), mention of immigration is restricted largely to statistical information, such as numbers of immigrants and numbers of settlers, despite evidence from other sources that advertising and distributing pamphlets took place.

While it’s not quite clear why, reporting on the publicity programs begins to appear in very small amounts in annual reports starting with the department of agriculture’s annual report for 1890. Annual reports for the next six years reveal significant changes imposed before Sifton took over as minister, and offer some insight into how the department’s information and publicity programs developed.

In 1891 (CSP 1891, covering the year 1890), the annual agriculture report comments on the work of Charles Tupper in England. As high commissioner, Tupper reported to the minister of agriculture. Tupper took over as high commissioner in 1884, although he returned to Ottawa from
1887 to 1888 to serve as finance minister before returning to London. According to the annual report, in 1890 Tupper adopted a plan "for calling attention to Canada" (p. xvii) by using teachers in the United Kingdom to give a copy of "official hand-books of information" to every school child. Despite appearances, adults were really the intended audience, as the report indicates "... such pamphlets will be read, not only in schools but also by the parents of the children to whom they have been given" (p. xvii). Lobbying efforts were also underway by Tupper and his government officials. A British group called the United Women's British Emigration Association developed a program to provide money to help people from overpopulated districts move to Canada. After the association presented its plans to the British Select Committee on Agriculture and Colonization, Tupper sent out a total of ten thousand copies of the association's proposal, to every municipal body, agricultural society and postmaster (p. xvii) in the U.K. Also in 1890, Canadian Agriculture Minister John Carling authorized the high commissioner to invite a group of tenant farmer delegates to visit Canada, so they could report back "on the agricultural resources of the country and its advantages generally" (p. xxvii). While similar farmer-delegate groups had visited and had been shepherded around before, this is the first mention in the high commissioner's report, suggesting the visit had taken on added importance.

Canada's first government PR worker?

That same year, a Toronto immigration worker named J.A. Donaldson--possibly the person Donoghue (1993) and Brown (in Herbert and Jenkins' Public Relations in Canada) referred to--filed what Donaldson
called his thirtieth annual report with the department. In *Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Dominion of Canada for the Calendar Year 1890* (CSP1891, p. 48, 49) Agent Donaldson commented that "the demands for farm labourers and domestic help greatly exceed supply" and called the visit of British farm delegates "a move in the right direction." The following year, in reference to the year 1891, Donaldson said good farm hands were still scarce because farmers' sons and young men made their way to the North West and then drifted into the cities.

Although immigration matters were an important part of the department of agriculture's work, agriculture was not alone in the task of recruiting settlers, and this duplication would have consequences for Agent John Donaldson and others. The department of the interior was also involved in promoting emigration, long before the transfer of the immigration portfolio to the interior was made in 1892. In correspondence from 1880 and 1881 to the deputy minister of the interior, Thomas Spence discussed his fifth pamphlet on the resources of the North West, the first having appeared in 1871. "In this, as in previous publications, there has been no attempt to depict in glowing terms the resources of the country, beyond the warrant of facts" wrote Spence (Archives RG 15, VOL. 250 FILE #28321). The author of *Useful and Practical Hints for the Settler of Canadian Prairie Land*, Mr. Spence identified himself as Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba and corresponded periodically with the department about pieces of his work, such as an advertisement to publicize a new pamphlet, or how the preface of a booklet was coming along. As further evidence of their involvement in public relations aspects, in the *Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1889* (CSP 1890)
Deputy Minister A.M. Burgess defended the department’s role in bringing Scottish crofters (tenant farmers) to Manitoba, in response to what he calls “discussion and misrepresentation in the British press” (p. xxv). The department of the interior was involved in both publicity and subsidy programs related to emigration at the same time as the department of agriculture, though this area received fairly limited attention in the interior department’s annual reports.

With almost no explanation, the reports of immigration agents suddenly disappeared from the Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1892 (CSP 1893). John Carling was replaced by A.R. Angers as agriculture minister, and Angers wrote only that on Carling’s request an Order in Council transferred immigration to the Department of the Interior “for the reasons mainly of associating that subject with the settlement of Dominion Lands and also for economy of administration, one set of [immigration] officers being considered sufficient for the two services” (p. lxi). From an administrative viewpoint, this transfer amounted to a consolidation which meant government could afford to continue running emigration agencies in foreign countries and throughout Canada. As well, medical inspection and juvenile immigration were given special attention and “a special division of Chinese immigration was set up” (Higgins Canadian Government Publication, p. 163). It also meant “extensive reorganization of the Department between 1892 and 1893” (Ernest Voorhis, 1927, p. 9). From the viewpoint of public relations work as an occupation, this change in venue held enormous consequences, as subsequent annual reports from the Department of the Interior reveal.
Immigration PR expands in interior department

The transfer of immigration business from agriculture to the interior in 1892 was designed to save money by cutting back to one group of immigration officers and by putting the officers under the control of the Commissioner of Dominion Lands, H.H. Smith. By this time, most of the immigrants who were arriving came intending to settle in the North West. As part of the 1892 annual report, the lands commissioner's report to the interior minister indicated a clearly defined goal for immigration as "simply the means to settle our vacant lands ... the only desirable classes are acknowledged to be farmers and farm labourers or persons who are willing to engage in agricultural pursuits, and female servants" (CSP 1893, p. 4), pointing out there was "not much use in Canada for artisans or professional classes." Officials in agriculture had long written about the most desirable classes of immigrants, but Lands Commissioner Smith set a firm tone about who would be eligible for land and who his agents should seek out. Similarly, Smith identified where and how he would search for settlers. Not content to continue with the problem of losing settlers to the United States, he wanted to intercept immigrants from Germany, Sweden and Norway who came to New York.

From a management perspective, this meant the lands commissioner identified a problem and imposed a solution that embodied a substantial public relations element. Clearly his strategy held some risks connected to good relations with the United States, but H H. Smith said "to divert a portion of this stream to our Canadian ports a wider and more thorough diffusion of immigration literature and information should be made, and this can be done without in any way transgressing the laws of the land" (p. 7)
He explained his plan to send interior department officials to help Canadian immigration agents in the United States with preparing advertisements, meeting the local press and and meeting potential immigrants. He also suggested his officials visit successful settlers who were former United States residents, to solicit testimonial letters for use in publicity in American localities. The lands commissioner also planned to enhance the use of what he called "return men," meaning successful male settlers who had come to Canada through the United States, and whose passage would be paid back to the United States to offer evidence of the benefits of emigration to Canada. Commissioner Smith proposed to extend the program to cover wives of return men, since "information could be imparted in this way without exciting the attention of authorities" (p. 7). He could effectively but discreetly double the number of "return men" by including their wives as part of the persuasive strategy. He also wrote about aggressively countering unfavourable information on the severity of Canadian winters "represented by rival agents,[which] does much to frighten people from coming here (p. 7). The single-minded and energetic tone evident in this report comes in marked contrast to the gentle accounts carried for years in the annual reports of the department of agriculture.

Overall, the transfer of immigration to the department of the interior greatly changed the status of the immigration portfolio. As a starting point, the transfer tied immigration distinctly to the high profile area of settling the west and to the easily promoted appeal of the lands act. As well, the transfer consolidated the workforce and clearly defined the task of finding settlers, and the department of the interior began to develop distinct monitoring and supervisory networks, under the responsibility of the Commissioner of
Dominion Lands. When the lands commissioner identified farmers living in the United States as a target group and then began designing mass media strategies to appeal to them, he satisfied one of the key requirements in Marston's RACE formula (research, action, communication, evaluation) for public relations practice—the use of research to plan public relations activities. In addition, when the lands commissioner adjusted policies (like funding return men and their wives, or providing support to immigration agents operating in the United States), these changes are consistent with the RACE formula's call for appropriate organizational changes in concert with publicity or other PR strategies and tactics. Using the RACE formula to compare the initial changes that accompanied the transfer of immigration from agriculture to the interior, the transfer saw fairly substantial changes, suggesting a considerably more planned type of public relations function was being developed in the department of the interior by 1892.

Among the most noticeable effects of the transfer was written and published documentation of what might today be considered a communications plan. For the first time, a comprehensive presentation on emigration publicity strategies and related programs appeared in the interior department's annual report on 1892, from Canada's high commissioner in London. As the first in a series of detailed Reports of European Agents, Tupper outlined how handbills (located in post offices) and newspaper advertising were used and placed, mentioned illustrated lectures and distribution of pamphlets, and described at some length his successful lobbying to have specific geographic units on Canada made mandatory in all school curricula in the U.K. (CSP 1893) The report also covered cooperation with Canadian Pacific Railway agents, steamship
agents and philanthropic societies which sponsored emigrants. Then, after four pages of explanatory letters from tenant farmer delegates (local U.K. farmers who promoted emigration to Canada), Tupper outlined advertising and exhibits at fairs, commented on the nature and frequency of what he called "press notices" or references to Canada in the newspapers, how "unfriendly" press notices were handled (by watching for them and responding immediately, chiefly in the letters to the editor), and moved into plans for the future promotion of emigration (p. 12-17). The Canadian Encyclopedia suggested Tupper "had a real capacity for administration" (p. 2202), and his 1892 annual report indicated an extensive and thorough approach to public relations for immigration recruiting in Britain. Tupper's detailed report corresponds to Grunig's (1984) first model of public relations practice, propaganda material with a very strong emphasis on seeking publicity, with research relying on press notices, and using workers whose roles could often be described as press agents. At the very least, Tupper should be acknowledged as one of Canada's first public relations managers, and his immigration agents as serving as publicists. To some extent, the work of those same immigration agents sometimes fell under Grunig's second model, that of public information with the primary purpose of information dissemination. While the lands commissioner in Canada was describing a clear media relations plan for implementation in the United States, the high commissioner in London was documenting different versions of a similar campaign in Britain, and the British campaign may have begun to move periodically into the next level of operation identified in Grunig's models. Considering these activities, the organization of government made use of somewhat different forms of public relations
practice, depending on its needs. In these early years of immigration public relations, those needs sometimes shifted between press agentry or publicity, and public information.

All this detail comes from a designated portion of the department of the interior's annual report on the year 1892, which would have been published in 1893 and likely corresponds to the references made in the unpublished document by Bill Deacon ("An Outline of Canadian Public Relations History," p. 4). Deacon mentioned "an 1893 report" which had in turn been cited from an unpublished lecture in 1968 on the development of federal government information services. So this reference to 1893 from the public relations society archives can be verified in Canadian sessional papers of that period. The simple answer to why 1893 was significant probably rests with the publication of the first detailed report accompanying the transfer of immigration from one department to another. The transfer may have been the event that compelled the high commissioner to justify his work, in an extensive report on the activities that had in fact been used on and off, in various forms, for thirty years or more before that date. The report on the year 1892, published in 1893, stands as the first time the wide range of public relations planning and activities is represented as something like a unified campaign.

In addition, this report also marks the first time Tupper labelled what his emigration agents were doing, although he suggested otherwise. "As I have explained in previous reports, the duties of these gentlemen were originally chiefly limited to the dissemination of information respecting the different Provinces of the Dominion" (CSP 1893, Part IV, p. 3). Though he did talk about his agents' work in previous annual reports, this is the first.
time he used the term dissemination of information and the first time he
explained just how much of this type of work his agents performed. He
further added, "The public naturally look upon the government
representatives as more disinterested in the advice they give, than agents
of the steamship and railway companies" (p. 3)

In a separate section on the "usefulness of agencies," (CSP 1893,
Part IV, p. 4) Tupper said the agents "are now applied to" commercial
matters, and were also "utilized to an increasing extent by gentlemen
engaged in journalism and in literary avocations, as well as by lecturers." In
a way, he was suggesting the immigration agents worked as combined
press agents and trade promoters in their own areas. He further indicated
"immigration matters are being dealt with in a more systematic manner" (p.
4) and personally took credit for the success of the lobby to place maps of
Canada and pamphlets in the schools of the United Kingdom. All of the
activities the high commissioner mentioned would readily fit under present
day definitions of public relations and even public affairs. By articulating the
nature of his work and the work of his immigration agents in terms of
dissemination of information, Tupper's report offered clear evidence that the
occupation of public relations had found a secure foothold in the federal
government at least by 1892, under the working titles of immigration agent
and at the director and supervisory levels of high commissioner and
dominion lands supervisor. By definition, government annual reports dwelt
on what worked and omitted or downplayed programs and policies that
failed. Nonetheless, Tupper's description of his work and the work of his
agents signalled a new level of awareness of public relations practice on
behalf of the interior department. Tupper contributed directly to the

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development of the occupation by the lobbying initiatives he undertook, and in his role as an advocate for immigration agents as information disseminators. Between the activities of the high commissioner and the initiatives of the lands commissioner, the government of Canada was employing a clearly identifiable public relations function; by 1892, before Clifford Sifton ever took over as minister of the interior. What is more, a substantial portion of the groundwork had been laid down by Charles Tupper and his immigration agents in Britain, before the North American campaign was launched.

The downside of the transfer to the interior department

As secure as the origins of the occupation of public relations itself may have been because immigration was a government priority, letters and documents surrounding the 1892 transfer suggest individuals were not correspondingly secure in their jobs. Noticeably absent from the agents list in the annual report of the department of the interior on 1892 was the J Donaldson who filed his thirtieth report with the Department of Agriculture’s annual report on 1890 (CSP 1891, p. vii). An archival file (RG 15, VOL. 674 FILE 306621) contains 15 ticket stubs from CP Rail and a handwritten note from John A. Donaldson in September 1892, asking that the tickets be paid, with correspondence suggesting they were sent to Donaldson for verification by someone named Hall in the department of the interior, as if accounts were being settled after the transfer. If Donaldson was sending in tickets as usual, for reimbursement, why was his name left off the list of agents?

Stepping back a bit further in the tale of John Donaldson, another
National Archives file (RG 15 VOL. 670 FILE 297242) provides a 1888 letter from the department of agriculture, which authorized the employment of Gerald Donaldson as an assistant to John Donaldson in the Toronto immigration office. However, a letter from John Donaldson to the department of the interior, dated 3 March 1893, is signed as “ex-immigration agent, Toronto.” In the same archival file, a February 1893 letter from A.M. Burgess (to Burgess' boss, the minister of the interior) said nothing can be done to help “Mr. Donaldson, the son of our former agent in Toronto... thrown out of employment on account of the change of policy.” In other words, when immigration was shifted from agriculture to the interior, many of the agriculture immigration agents lost their jobs, including the John Donaldson whom Donoghue (1993) calls possibly the first government publicist, as did Donaldson’s son Gerald, the one Donaldson had hired to work with him.

A letter with a settlement of $150 was sent to Gerald Donaldson in July 1892, authorized by Order in Council. In the letter accompanying the payment, the deputy minister of agriculture on behalf of himself and the minister said “their personal relations with the immigration agents had been satisfactory and they felt regret at the closing of the connection” (RG 15 Vol. 670 File 297242). In fact, the same archival file contains a handwritten letter from John Donaldson to Interior Minister T. Mayne Daly in 1893, politely pleading that the minister find work for his son Gerald Jasper, even if it means sending Gerald to the North West. John Donaldson indicated in the letter he was not asking for his own job back, only that one be found for his son. Just by way of interest, when Gerald Jasper was hired as an assistant immigration officer in 1888, essentially as
what Tupper would later call an information disseminator, his pay was $50 per month. Nothing in the archival files or the annual reports that follow suggests Gerald subsequently found work in immigration with the department of the interior, and John Donaldson appears to have retired when his job was eliminated in 1892. Although Donoghue's (1993) reference to John Donaldson as the first government publicist might still be true, given Donaldson’s 32 years of service as an immigration agent with the department of agriculture, he was no longer employed when Sifton's famous immigration campaign went into operation.

Nor were the sticky aspects of the transition between departments limited to employees of the department, as disagreements extended into their supply of outside contracts. For example, a Mr. F.B. Anderson's dispute first with the Department of Agriculture and then with the Interior is documented in memos and an extract of a report of the Committee of the Privy Council (Archives RG 15 Vol. 82). Anderson alleged breach of contract concerning the purchase and publication of Handbook of Canada which he translated into Scandinavian. In settling accounts as a result of the transfer of immigration business into the interior department, the Privy Council awarded him $500 in 1896, although Mr. Anderson wanted $1,000 for his 42,000 booklets. Overall, then, the shift of immigration work from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior in 1892 was fairly sudden, decidedly significant for its implications for public relations, and not particularly smooth, despite the careful wording of departmental annual reports.
Between the transfer to the interior department and when Sirfor. : ok over

Moving immigration into the interior department spawned a series of changes with implications for the public relations activities and function of that department. Many of the changes related to centralization of activities, but like an organized crew on an unfinished boat, the public relations function still lacked a rudder. While the changes were important, they were not enough to significantly improve the effectiveness of the department's immigration recruitment program.

The Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1893 suggested some of the problems encountered in increasing the number of settlers had been examined. Deputy Minister Burgess expressed frustration that "numerous journalists and public men from Great Britain, and also from continental countries" had visited Canada while in North America for the World's Fair, but tended to include Canada in "the all embracing term America" (CSP 1894, p. xxiv), even though Canada had been unaffected by the immediate financial crisis that plagued the United States. He also isolated what he called two particular "misrepresentations" that he hoped would be attended to: "too glowing accounts of its [Canada's] attractions and the extent to which its disadvantages are ignored or belittled" and the "extent to which immigrants who have come to the country and have proved unsuccessful have been able to obtain publications through the press" (p. xxxiv). Burgess complained, then, that journalists failed to distinguish between the American and Canadian agricultural economies, and that negative stories about immigrants in Canada received too much coverage, and that perceptions about life in Canada were frequently inaccurate. All in all, the problems described came under the areas of media relations and
news management. For a department whose model of practice fits with Grunig's publicity model, the effectiveness of media relations becomes all consuming. Burgess' preoccupation with journalists' portrayal of Canada, and the image of Canada in newspapers generally, confirms the suggestion that the public relations function at this point in the department focused largely on a press agency model of operation, occasionally using aspects of the public information model when it suited the organization's purposes. The contents of the annual report on 1893 provide another insight into the development of public relations, since the deputy minister discussed public relations activities within his section of the department's report. When immigration was part of the department of agriculture, its coverage in the annual report was limited to statistics. With immigration's transfer into the department of the interior, the 1892 report includes details of public relations activities, and by the 1893 report, highlights are appearing in the deputy minister's portion. Keeping in mind Grunig's emphasis on the need for the public relations function to have support of the dominant coalition, considerable attention in the deputy minister's report may further signal a change in the status of public relations within the department.

On the issue of too glowing accounts of Canada, Burgess was careful in his annual report not to implicate his own staff. He might have been referring to steamship agents, known for booking anyone who had money, regardless of their chances for success or interest in farming. Describing the department's own publicity and policies, the deputy minister wrote "Great care has been taken always... to impress upon the agents and representatives of the department... to tell nothing but the simple truth about the country, its climate and resources, and upon no account to minimize any
of its few disadvantages, for the purpose of overcoming the objectives of a hesitating immigrant” (CSP 1894, Interior, p. xxv). According to Grunig’s models, this commitment to truth would move the department’s public relations function towards the public information mode, where truth is important. However, Burgess is writing in an annual report, where he was not likely to advertise a commitment to deceit or manipulation, so his statement must be weighed accordingly. One further administrative advance that year was implementation of a new management position, when L.M. Fortier became Clerk of Immigration (p. 3). Appointing an overall supervisor in Ottawa as clerk meant the work of agents in Canada and the U.S. came under a measure of scrutiny. In addition, Fortier seems to have had some say in dispatching agents to Europe and Britain.

Fortier had his own section of the department’s 1893 annual report within Part III, Immigration (p. 3-8), where he lists his initiatives and actions especially related to all kinds of publicity and to further administrative changes. He outlined the work of his department in editing and supervising the publication and distribution of nine different pamphlets, including 300,000 leaflets and small folders in various languages, 80,000 copies of the Official Hand-book for 1894, and 50,000 each of Western Canada and its Great Resources and a special folder for distribution at the Chicago Exhibition, with a map and what Fortier called an illuminated cover. Fortier said the department found a useful form of advertising in special issues of newspapers having a large foreign circulation, primarily in Europe. As well, the system for return men was again altered, so the men were given “free transportation one way only, together with a small pecuniary advance and their return passage, and further compensation is made to depend entirely
on their efforts in securing suitable settlers for Canada" (p. 5). Fortier had
begun to tie earnings of certain contract employees to the number of settlers
brought in--a trend which would later be expanded. In addition, a special
agent was sent to each of Germany, England, Sweden, Denmark and
Norway, and Belgium. By appointing a clerk to oversee many of the details
of immigration, the department was able to inspect its own work and
workers, and to enact some changes to encourage more active recruiting in
Britain and Europe. As well, simple questions about the distribution of costly
printed material could be asked and answered.

The greatly expanded approach taken by the high commissioner to
London in his report on 1892 continued into 1893. Tupper distinguished
between the work of regular immigration agents in various cities and what
he called temporary agents, who also handled correspondence, visited
steamship agents, and delivered lectures all as a means "to awaken an
interest in Canada, to stimulate inquiry" (p. 10). In an enormous section of
his report (pages 15 to 30), Tupper offered details of "the measures we take
to attract attention to Canada and to encourage immigration." He said when
advertising was run in major papers, it boosted inquiries to his office to
about 500 per week. Many of the activities are described in previous
annual reports, but among the ones highlighted in the report on 1893 are
prizes for essays on Canada, a bonus or commission for steamship agents
on emigrants booked through to Manitoba, the North-west Territories and
British Columbia; and holding a conference in Liverpool for government
agents, the representatives of the different provinces, and of the steamship
and railway companies, "to discuss the question of the encouragement of
emigration" (p. 21). Tupper dispatched his secretary to Scandinavia "to
make inquiries into emigration matters" and to make a report to the minister. He also acknowledged a Canadian Pacific Railway Company traffic agent, Archer Baker, as being active in emigration work. All of these activities, including consulting external agents to improve the effectiveness of the campaign, are consistent with publicity and information models proposed by James Grunig. The flow of information is still primarily one way from sender to receiver, and designed to persuade or to inform, with research and evaluation still focused on counting press reviews or responses to advertisements. The detail provided by Tupper's annual report suggests the publicity model was still alive and well in Britain, while the staffs operating in Canada and the United States were being increased rapidly.

From the time immigration was moved to the interior in 1892, its share of the annual report grew progressively larger and more detailed. The report for the year 1894 (CSP 1895) continues the trend with reports from no fewer than 47 individuals as part of the immigration section. The content of the report suggested some on-going analysis of how effective the campaigns were, with related adjustments in staff, and strong support for the public relations aspects of immigration, although overall immigration figures were termed "disappointing" (p. xxx). In his introductory remarks, Deputy Minister Burgess noted an important feature of homesteaders—that "the number coming from the United States is very nearly as great as the total from Great Britain and continental Europe combined" (CSP 1895, Interior, p. xii). In part, he attributed the attraction for settlers to the fact that little land for free homesteading was left in the United States (p. xxxii), but cautioned "...the present is not the time to relax our effort to attract a suitable class of people to Canada" (p. xxxiii). Because the potential was greater...
than ever for luring would-be settlers from the U.S., the managers sought support to continue refining the U.S. wing of the campaign.

Along these lines, the clerk of immigration reported on withdrawing salaried agents from the United States and replacing them with "local men", and on ending the use of "return men" in Europe, since [the return men] "were getting long term but not immediate results" (CSP 1895, Interior, Part III, p. 4). While the annual report did not draw attention to new positions, it included a report from a chief agent for the United States, an agent in charge of the Canadian Exhibit at the California mid-winter fair, and a special Scandinavian agent in the New England States. Overall, putting immigration agents under the Dominion Lands Commissioner and appointing an immigration clerk seemed to have begun to pay off in expanded staff, and in efforts to plan deployment of personnel, though actual expansion of budgets for the campaign was limited at this point.

In commenting on the work of his agents, the high commissioner in London once again confirmed their link to public relations, in the report on 1894. "Under the present system the policy of our department as carried out by me and by your agents is largely directed to the dissemination of information about Canada, and to the stimulation of enquiries from persons who are contemplating changing their homes" (CSP 1895, Interior, Part III, p. 11). Tupper may have recognized a problematic side to his detailed annual reports when he wrote "in order that the public may be aware of what is being done, so far as it is desirable to publish our methods, in view of the competition to which we are subjected, I propose to explain the efforts that are made to promote emigration." (p. 12). In addition to the now familiar line-up of activities, the report on 1894 further suggested the
Canadian Pacific Railway had begun to step up its campaign. "The two great railways in Canada, the Canadian Pacific and the Grand Trunk Railway, are also showing considerable interest in emigration," he wrote. "This remark applies particularly to the Canadian Pacific Railway, in view of the fact of their immense interests in Manitoba and the North-west Territories and British Columbia" (p. 13) As further indication of the close ties between the government promotion of immigration and the railways' role, the report on 1894 included directly quoted reports solicited by the commissioner from individual steamship and railway companies, as part of the high commissioner's report.

Tupper also explained more fully how he made use of some of the public relations tools, such as what he called the lantern slides. Lantern slides were over-sized photographic slides printed on glass and projected onto a screen. Offers inviting use of the 18 sets of illustrative glass slides and additional material in public presentations were carried in newspapers, to anyone willing to lecture on Canada. Users included travellers (probably well-connected and wealthy people who travelled extensively), clergymen, school teachers, and the technical education committees of county councils. He also mentioned "2,000 or more school-masters" (CSP 1895, Interior, p 13) who used Canadian material as reading texts for studies in colonial geography in elementary and later school curricula, and even for adult night students. In addition, church officials are identified in 1894 as a particularly influential in promoting emigration, so a special pamphlet was prepared to attract their attention, using "papers by two prominent English clergymen and a Canadian clergyman" (p. 16), with a copy sent to every clergyman in the United Kingdom. When Tupper made repeated references to continued
lobbying to keep study of Canada in the geography curriculum, or introduced new initiatives such as designating the clergy as opinion leaders and seeking to influence them, he was acknowledging basic principles of what public relations strategists would now identify as long-term objectives of building relationships with important publics. While the use of return men was dropped because it provided only long-term results, other long-term PR techniques were tried in place of the return men. As energetic and bold as the campaign to lure American farmers to Canada was becoming, Tupper’s campaign in Britain continued to test and revise its programs, whether shifting from schools to churches, or short-term to long-term.

In the final year before Sifton became minister and before Tupper was replaced as high commissioner, the immigration clerk in Ottawa called attention to the department’s increasingly unified PR approach to immigration, through the work of the lands commissioner and the high commissioner. In the *Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the year 1895*, Fortier wrote “we have made the most of our very limited resources, and have neglected no opportunity of bringing the advantages Canada has to offer to the notice of the emigrating classes in other lands, and that too in a manner calculated to be both forcible and convincing.” (CSP 1896, Interior, p. 4). He wrote of the substantial contingent of immigration workers in the United States, “61 local men, who, for a small commission on actual results, are doing a good deal to promote our interests, chiefly by distributing our literature and keeping alive the interest awakened by our salaried agents in previous years” (p. 3). Fortier also noted a new program had been devised to use 300 British consuls around the world to disseminate information on emigration to Canada.
London High Commissioner Tupper complained mildly about budget cutbacks that reduced advertising, printing, and the number of exhibits at fairs in 1895, although the slides sets were increased to 30, from 18 the previous year. He also mentioned another of his lobbying efforts, where a report from Canada's minister of the interior was presented to the British Parliament by order of the Queen. "In that way it secured considerable prominence, not only among members of Parliament, but in the press; and a special issue which was printed off for widespread circulation attracted a good deal of attention" (p. 11) Overall the report for 1895 suggests somewhat of a lull in the publicity and promotion campaign for immigration, with supplies of publications running low and little in the way of funds for new initiatives.

As an election year, 1896 was predictably shy of change or new programs and continued the treading-water approach of 1895. Even Fortier, the clerk in charge of immigration, wrote in the annual report for 1896 "Our work for the year has been to a greater extent than usual of a routine character, but it has been performed, I believe, with unfailing promptness and efficiency ..." (p. 4). The department did publish 20,000 copies of one new publication called Western Canada and reprinted the Official Handbook. Elderly railway financier Donald Smith replaced Tupper as high commissioner suggesting "... more money might, and, it appears to me should, be spent in promoting emigration" (p. 7). In one interesting initiative, Smith sought the cooperation of newspaper editors throughout the United Kingdom to insert (for free) a rather lengthy open letter from him about how the government of Canada would like to see more people emigrate there, on the nature of programs available to assist settlers, and giving addresses
so readers could contact the nearest immigration agent's office (as listed) or his own office. In his report, he said "The effect has been to stimulate inquiry and the correspondence with all the government offices has increased during the last few weeks in a remarkable way" (p. 10), and he called for a follow-up campaign of paid advertising to stimulate emigration numbers for the coming spring. He also suggested "testing the efficacy of advertising Canada by way of farmer delegates, " which would involve his making a tour of Canada to visit new settlers and solicit their testimonials. Unlike Tupper's style in previous annual reports, High Commissioner Smith does not break down activities according to publications, advertising and other headings on public relations events, and relies mainly on testimonial letters to complete his report. In this particular election year in Canada, settlers were in low supply from all fronts, not just from Britain. By all accounts, Smith's first year as high commissioner (an important post from the PR viewpoint) came at a difficult time for recruitment. In fact, fewer than 17,000 immigrants arrived in Canada in 1896, the lowest number since 1868 (Hall, 1981, p. 131).

Nonetheless, by the time Clifford Sifton took over as minister of the interior in November 1896, department staff had set up what amounts to an on-going public relations campaign. Important publics had been identified, PR lobbying strategies had been tried, publications were printed and distributed on a regular basis, and administrative procedures had been streamlined to incorporate a measure of accountability. Documented primarily in the published annual reports and supplemented by archival material, evidence exists of publications and promotion of activities that could fall under the terms media relations, news management and public...
affairs. In addition, government officials had begun to identify just how much of their work was connected to disseminating information and had begun to write about their work as connected to a large (though not integrated) campaign. In fact, a significant amount of PR planning and communication was accomplished in the four years immediately following the transfer of immigration from agriculture to the interior department. As well, the transfer allowed the interior department to build on what had been started in agriculture and to combine their separate experiences in attracting attention to Canada and stimulating inquiries. Sir Charles Tupper played a key role in describing the public relations activities conducted in support of the programs to recruit immigrant settlers, particularly for the North-west of Canada. In addition to serving as a kind of public relations manager in Britain, Tupper was an active lobbyist for Canadian interests and initiated imaginative approaches to influencing the views of a wide range of public opinion leaders, from educators and clergymen, to parents and philanthropist society directors. Back in Canada, an intricate and responsive network of immigration agents and supervisors was being developed, with a determined eye cast on American farmers. Through the lens of Grunig's public relations models, the fairly diverse and scattered public relations activities in Britain and Canada easily constituted press agentry and public information types of public relations. So the question remains, why does history assign so much credit to Clifford Sifton for attracting immigrants to Canada?

Sifton fine tunes the department and boosts the campaign

In the simplest terms, credit for effectiveness goes to the new minister.
because the numbers of settlers began to increase and continued to climb within two years after he took over. For a vast country full of empty spaces, Clifford Sifton’s immigration campaigns got results. Furthermore, the numbers probably increased largely because he provided leadership, demanded efficiency and applied his own knowledge of how public relations worked. Looking back, all but a few key ingredients for an effective public relations campaign were in place when Sifton took over as minister of the interior at the end of 1896. With a particular debt to Charles Tupper, officials in the interior department had at least figured how to get their message out and what the message should be. However, they were unclear on what markets and publics should be the objects of their limited resources, and on how widespread their campaigns ought to be. As well, previous administrations seemed to lack the authority and knowledge to address problems they had identified, such as ways of monitoring distribution of printed materials and of directing their agents. In Grunig’s terms we might say the tools and strategies for publicity and information dissemination were available and even in use, but the campaign had two serious shortcomings: it lacked focus and existed outside the mission and support of the dominant coalition.

To start with, Sifton brought with him a different definition of the problem of chronically low numbers of settlers. From the outset, he saw immigration as one of three major issues within his larger vision of national development, the others being revising tariffs and getting agricultural products to market, so he started by getting the prime minister’s full support, in advance, for his policies for western development (Hall, 1981, 123-124). Sifton deliberately tied the programs and policies in immigration to the
larger goals and objectives of the government of the country, and negotiated the support he needed outside the department to make changes in programs and in the operation of the department. Then he turned his attention to the organization of the interior department, already struggling with its strange mixture of responsibilities when immigration was added in 1892. Its diverse mandate included everything from geological surveys and aboriginal land claims, to policies on homesteads, parks, schools and grazing lands. Commenting in the House of Commons (as quoted in Dafoe, 1931, p. 105), Sifton described the record of the Interior as "a department of delay, a department of circumlocution, a department in which people could not get business done, a department which tired men to death who undertook to get any business transacted with it." As historian D.J. Hall (1981) pointed out, "the stage was set for an able man in the right circumstances to realize the department's tremendous potential" (p. 123). Still, as this examination will show, Sifton's success derived from more than being in the right place at the right time; he knew where to target his campaign and studied how to introduce efficiencies before he expanded the policies and campaigns for immigration. And, most of all, he manipulated human and other department resources in pursuit of settlers, in a way that had never been done before.

However, the energy and spirit of reform historians attributed to Sifton took a few years to spill into the interior department's annual reports. Starting at the top of the department, by April 1897 Sifton had dropped interior deputy minister Burgess. Sifton brought in James Smart for the twin deputy-level tasks of Indian affairs and immigration, and had begun "a careful investigation" of how the department worked in the west (Hall, 1981,
p. 124-126, 128). At the same time that Sifton studied the department's operations and readied it for "radical change," he also set out "to persuade those in power that excessively high tariffs and freight rates and poor administration of public lands had driven thousands of settlers from their lands" (p. 124). The annual report for 1897 was published under Smart's name and that of another key new manager, Frank Pedley. Sifton biographer Hall identified Pedley as a Liberal lawyer from Toronto who took over in September that year as superintendent of immigration, working from Ottawa "to oversee all aspects of the immigration service" (Hall, 1981, p. 237). By bringing in Pedley, Sifton centralized the work of the administration of the department and abolished the Dominion Lands Board (Hall, 1981, p. 253), while making the regulations of the act "simpler and more flexible" (p. 254). Pedley's initial annual report referred only indirectly to the impact of Sifton's first full year as minister, and said "the work at headquarters has been very heavy throughout the past year in consequence of the new life which has been put into the service everywhere since its reorganization" (CSP 1895, Interior Part IV, p. 3). Pedley's comment was a marvel of understatement. Looking at quantities of printing orders alone, the department had not seen such activity in years. 65,000 copies of the Western Canada section of the official handbook were printed, together with 15 other publications, several with runs of 20,000 and 25,000 copies. In another departure from previous years, the new superintendent invited debate by including in the annual report a detailed document called "Memorandum on juvenile immigration." The background piece retraced often controversial immigration policy and practices since 1868, when the department of agriculture had first reported on its programs to bring young
children to work in Canada. As these examples suggest, the first year of
Sifton’s term as minister brought at the least, important changes in
personnel, sizable printing contracts, and the promise of substantial change
to come in the immigration portion of the department’s activities.

In that first year following the Liberal victory of 1896, overhauling
policies and reorganizing the department were hardly small tasks,
especially since no Liberal had been appointed to the civil service in
eighteen years (Dafoe, p. 107) and Sifton was faced with incredible
expectations. Liberal job-hunters, seeking revenge and rewards, utterly
monopolized the correspondence and activity in Sifton’s Brandon home
riding in 1897 (Sifton Papers, National Archives Reel C401) Dealing with
the staff he inherited, in 1897 Sifton withheld the automatic annual salary
increases of $50 for civil servants (Hall, 1981, p. 127) and used the
increase only as incentives for performance. As Dafoe described the
situation, in those days the winners of an election always placed the party
faithful in civil service jobs and provided patronage contracts to their
remaining supporters. Hall (1981) indicated “the Department of the Interior
was one of the great patronage portfolios” (p. 125) and Dafoe (1931) said
when Sifton took over as minister “the job hunters descended upon him
singly, in droves and in battalions” (p. 107). As well, Dafoe said the few
remaining Liberal civil servants who had survived the change of
government in 1878 had been denied promotion since then. All in all, Sifton
did not have enough jobs to go around for the hundreds of people who
wrote letters on their own behalf, or wrote and visited seeking rewards for
constituents and friends. However, Hall (1981) said Sifton “quickly gained a
reputation as a thoroughgoing reformer” (p. 125). Sifton fired the drunks
and incompetents who had been protected by political connections, as well as civil servants who had worked actively for the Conservatives, and encouraged others to resign by pensioning them off, "by demotion or transfer, by withholding promotions or salary increases, or even by decreasing salaries" (Hall, p. 125). Hall also noted Sifton's most substantial cuts were reserved for the Indian affairs department; in the interior department Sifton "wanted to make a number of short-term changes" but "preferred to institute organizational changes more cautiously" (p. 128). By introducing legislation to improve settlement and registry of land titles, Sifton wanted to make the interior department work better, rather than to remake the entire approach to immigration. Given the heated political context in which they were introducing structural changes, it is no wonder Pedley's and Smart's published annual reports for 1897 are guarded, factual, and short on detail.

Changes to the British campaign

As for the on-going publicity campaign, Sifton picked carefully where he would invest his resources. In the 1897 annual report, High Commissioner Donald Smith in London commented that the limited money for advertising had forced his office to make better use of the press and special events such as shows, fairs and markets. For example, as a result of his previous year's lengthy letter to the press, Smith wrote, "This letter received wide publicity and much correspondence resulted, which I trust will lead to a considerable and satisfactory emigration" (CSP 1898, Interior p. 13). The high commissioner complimented the minister on the new edition of the Official Handbook, which Smith says contained enough
information for preparing smaller pamphlets, while the handbook itself proved suitable for distribution through public libraries and reading rooms, workingmen’s institutions and farmers’ clubs. Smith noted a new twist to his office’s on-going, long term lobbying to secure useful content about Canada in British school curricula. Appendix A of the interior department’s report says the office made direct communication with the publishers of school textbooks, “to improve the information they contain” (p. 19). The commissioner also shifted resources within the United Kingdom, as his agent in Liverpool referred to “the greater activity in emigration propaganda which was made possible by the larger appropriation at our disposal added to the wider publicity which was given to the office as a commercial agency” (p. 119).

Interpreting the careful language of annual reports, it appears the London office’s advertising budget was reduced or at least held at the previous year’s level, and the high commissioner’s publicity budget was cut, to the extent that he could not print the publications he wanted. However, Smith received more of his publications from the department for distribution, as Sifton’s centralized operations took effect.

As Hall (1981) pointed out, though, relations between the immigration branch and the high commissioner’s office were tense. Under Tupper and then Smith, both British and European campaigns had been the responsibility of the high commissioner for Canada in London. Laurier had chosen to keep Smith on after the 1896 election, but Smith “did not view the promotion of emigration as his first priority,” and saw the return of the Liberals to power “as a most peculiar and unfortunate event, not likely to happen again in the next century” (p. 260). According to Hall, Sifton chose to work directly with agents in Britain without going through the
London office—to the extent that the commissioner’s office and the department each appointed agents to work some of the same areas in Britain.

On the continental portion of the campaign, High Commissioner Smith expressed hesitation about pushing immigration in Europe, writing "...but our efforts in this respect must be governed by a due regard to the legislation that is in force in many countries discouraging incitement to emigration" (CSP 1899, p. 17). If anything, the report of the high commissioner seems somewhat uninspired compared to those Charles Tupper wrote when the department was transferred in 1892. For the second year in a row, Smith built primarily on initiatives already underway when he took over. In addition, he offered no new ideas about how to gain access to potential immigrants from Europe and begrudged the unlikelihood of any increase in money at his disposal in the coming year. Smith also reflected on real cutbacks in the work of the London office—cutbacks which initially seem inconsistent with Sifton’s declared intentions to recruit more settlers. From a public relations perspective, the question then arises: what was really happening in Canada’s campaign for British immigrants?

In the annual report on 1898, the public relations components of Sifton’s overseas immigration strategies become increasingly clear. He effectively by-passed High Commissioner Smith to search out European settlers. Relations between Sifton and Sir Donald Smith (or Lord Strathcona, as he signed his reports) had faltered on a variety of counts, so it comes as no surprise Sifton found other ways to do business. Smith held office as a Conservative-appointed high commissioner when Sifton took
over; and Hall said one of Sifton’s own agents indicated Smith resisted the newly imposed centralization of control. Smith continued what Hall called "the inefficiency of the Canadian immigration operations in Great Britain" (Hall, 1981, p. 261), so Sifton appointed his own agents to work Britain and removed the European wing of the campaign from the control of the London office. According to Hall, Sifton had his department officials in Canada make direct deals with individual shipping agents in Europe, and Sifton even appointed an inspector of all agencies in Britain and Europe. Sifton also identified key problems in recruiting on the continent, where Canada had no competitive bonus to motivate shipping agents to direct immigrants to Canada. Sifton set out to lure blocks of European ethnic groups as settlers so they would in turn “have the desired magnetic effect” (Hall, 1981, p. 261) and appointed a somewhat shady character named Preston as inspector of agents in Britain and Europe. Hall described Preston as “a former Liberal organizer of malodorous reputation” who “evinced a monumental disdain for Lord Strathcona” (p. 261) Hall referred to Preston as “instrumental in the formation of the North Atlantic Trading Company, a clandestine organization of European shipping agents who agreed to try to divert agricultural settlers to Canada in return for an increased bonus” (p. 261). As a result, Canada increased its bonus to 500 pounds and dropped the age requirement from 18 to 12, but, as Hall pointed out, Canada paid only for actual agricultural settlers rather than for immigrants in general. With his by-pass of the London office and the appointment of a somewhat dubious character to oversee immigration agents in Britain and Europe, Sifton effectively reorganised the British and European public relations campaigns, while leaving Donald Smith to muddle along with the remnants
of an outdated version of immigration operations in Great Britain.

In addition to his revised European strategies, Sifton stuck with his policy to settle the west with farming families from Europe. Standing by his programs to lure European settlers meant Sifton had to resist substantial, hostile agitation among the mainly white, Protestant population in the Canadian west. Sifton's policies to recruit European farmers brought him hard against the element of racism that historians consistently allude to in the discussion of Canada's early immigration philosophy. Using terms such as "desirable classes" (Dafoe, p. 105), or "desirable settlers," "better class of settlers" (Hall, 1981, p. 262, 267), and "preferred immigrants" (The Canadian Encyclopedia, p. 1045), historical and departmental accounts of immigration policy suggest farming skills or other measures of employability alone did not determine whether candidates were considered appropriate for immigration to Canada. From the time of the British conquest, most immigration to Canada had been white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, consistent with the ideals of the British Empire.

According to the 1870-71 census, Canada's total population was about 3.6 million .... the two largest groups were the French (1 million) and the British (2.1 million). Excepting the Germans (203,000), other groups (Dutch, American blacks, Swiss, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese) were much smaller (The Canadian Encyclopedia 1988, p. 1047).

As The Canadian Encyclopedia acknowledged, "Sifton and the government may only have reflected their times, but Canadian immigration policy and public opinion were nevertheless racist" (p. 1046), defining ideal immigrants as British or American farmers who would settle in the West. For
example, Hall indicated Israel Tarte, the minister of public works, and Sifton "...seemed to be always at daggers drawn. Tarte was convinced, correctly, that Sifton had little sympathy for promoting immigration in French-speaking countries and that he was reluctant to hire French-Canadian civil servants" (Hall, 1981, p. 133).

However, despite his own leanings and the long history of a biased immigration policy, where Clifford Sifton ran into trouble was the area of public opinion. Rather than welcoming Sifton's success after 1897 in attracting settlers, residents felt threatened. What Hall termed the "swell of nativist hostility" and "agitation" meant many westerners "believed the dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant society was seriously threatened" (1981, p. 262). Hall suggested the hostility focused mainly on the Galacians (or Ukrainians) and the Doukhobors on the prairies, and the Orientals in British Columbia. Groups such as the Galacians were vilified in the press as "...illiterate peasants, Catholics (it hardly mattered that few were Roman Catholics), drinkers, diseased, wife-beaters, criminally inclined, with no sense of democratic institutions" (Hall, p. 264). So vocal was the opposition to these groups, which consistently outnumbered British and American immigrants between 1897 and 1899, that "Sifton bowed to the popular will and dropped all continental shipping agents' bonuses effective June 1, 1899" (Hall, 1981, p. 266).

**Revitalizing the American campaign**

Meanwhile, Sifton's ability to put together a comprehensive, integrated campaign was reflected most vividly in the thorough nature of his pursuit of the American settler. According to the interior department's report
for 1898, Sifton pushed the campaign in the United States to previously unimagined levels. A record 200,000 copies of the 16 page booklet *Going to Western Canada* were printed that year, together with 90,000 copies of the 47-page booklet called *Western Canada*. Among the twelve new pieces of literature listed altogether for that year were eight other publications printed in quantities of between 18,000 and 30,000 copies, along with 72,800 reprints of newspapers containing immigration material (CSP 1899). Immigration Superintendent Pedley's report for 1898 covers more than six pages, and incorporates highlights from all the individual reports. Looking at policy rather than publicity alone, Sifton established a bureau in the Canadian Northwest, so his officials could keep contact with immigrants who were at risk for drifting to the United States, or for drifting into cities while they waited to be placed on their land (Hall, 1981, p. 132-133).

Just the idea of addressing the particular problem of losing these settlers at this point shows how well Sifton had analyzed the needs of his intended public. In fact, his approach to immigration revealed insight into another basic problem: finding homesteaders meant not only attracting new settlers, but also balancing the massive exodus of recent immigrants and other Canadians. In other words, the immigration issue for his department was not merely one of recruitment but also included retention. Sifton moved the headquarters for American immigrant recruitment from Chicago to St. Paul, to be closer to the source of potential immigrants. In the restructuring he started in 1897 in the interior department, Hall (1981) said Sifton also "extended the principle of payment of agents by commission for immigrants actually placed on the land, rather than payment by salary" (p. 132) and let
all agents know promotions and pay depended on “the energy with which they pursued immigrants” (p. 257). The effect of these changes created careful management of both internal publics (such as employees) and external publics (such as new immigrants after they arrived in the country).

Besides the management and program changes, Sifton’s leadership inspired specific public relations initiatives, by revamping and refocussing media relations. In a hiring strategy which became the norm in public relations after World War II, Sifton appointed a journalist to run the press campaign in the United States. W J White had formerly been editor of the *Brandon Sun* and later had his work expanded as inspector of Canadian immigration agencies in the U.S. (Hall, 1981, p. 259). In 1898, for the first time in the interior department reports, Immigration Superintendent Pedley referred to “The Press excursions for the last two years, conducted under the auspices of the Department” which “have resulted in giving us a most satisfactory advertisement” (CSP 1899 Interior Part IV, p. 110). The interior’s annual report for 1899 also refers to the United States inspector’s “work with editorial associations and Canadian Press” (CSP 1900, p. 178). Using immigration agents and other department staff, American and British journalists and editors were approached to take part in conducted tours of the Canadian west, provided they “agreed to write about their impressions” (Hall, p. 258). This was a new and highly effective element of the media relations portion of the immigration campaign, through which “the available media were exploited heavily to extol the virtues of western Canada” (Hall, p. 258). The press junkets for which the CPR later became famous were among the new strategies for improved media relations tried successfully under Clifford Sifton and his superintendent Pedley. As Grunig’s (1984,
press agentry and public information models of public relations predict, the emphasis on media relations and the expropriation of journalists into public relations roles become identifiable markers in the appearance and development of the public relations function. As well, the social history of newspapers (Schudson 1978) suggests the style of reporting and the numbers of reporters by this time would lend themselves to movement into related fields. By this point in Canada's history, the evidence clearly points to the existence of public relations as an occupation in Canada, at least in the field of government information for immigration purposes, operating according to press agentry and public information models. Given that level or stage of development, how was the public relations function integrated with management of the department?

Rather than seeing recruitment as purely a public relations problem, Pedley commented openly on the sensitive issue of recovering or repatriating settlers and the need to motivate department personnel. He wrote, "One extremely assuring feature of the movement of population, is the large numbers of ex-Canadians returning from the United States" (CSP 1899, Interior, p. 109) whose numbers are kept from further increasing only because they need time to dispose of their property in the United States and save the money to move to Canada. Pedley also described a mixture of salaried and commission-only agents working in the United States to encourage movement back to Canada. While the application of PR initiatives represent a significant difference from previous years, part of their effectiveness stems from how Sifton integrated them with his widespread department changes.

The newly introduced media tours and other tactics proved effective
because Sifton also insisted on a larger, multi-level approach to recruiting immigrants. He never believed, for example, "that blanket advertising would do more than arouse interest, plant a seed in the minds of potential settlers, and perhaps dispel some myths and prejudices and create a favourable impression about Canada" (Hall, 1981, p. 258). He urged his agents make "active pursuit of the individual settler" (p. 258) at fairs or other community events. In essence, Sifton recognized that a campaign of information dissemination could create awareness and motivate individuals to make inquiries, but to really change their behaviour (that is, to get people to emigrate) required individual-level persuasion. Sifton told the House of Commons finding immigrants was like any type of sales dependent on both "advertising and missionary work" (as quoted in Hall, p. 258). He realized he could capitalize on a large number of American immigrants if he could only "start a substantial flow" into Canada (p. 259). As testimonial pamphlets and visits from successful homesteaders showed, happy and prosperous settlers were the best advertisement possible. The success of this combined approach makes it easier to understand how the earlier immigration publicity campaigns stalled when they relied so heavily on mass media techniques, in the absence of responsive management structures and timely reinforcement at the individual level. In contrast, the annual report for 1899 called the year "exceptionally satisfactory" (CSP 1990, Interior, p. vii & viii, ), with the number of entries into the country "never exceeded in the history of the department" aside from the anomaly of 1882 when so many farmers rushed into Eastern Canada en route to Manitoba (CSP 1900 Interior, p. viii). In particular, Sifton's policies dramatically increased the number of Americans entering Canada, from
less than 2,500 in 1897 to more than 12,000 in 1899; actual homestead entries by Americans grew from 164 in 1897 to 1,307 in 1900 (Hall, p. 259). On the other hand, the level of British immigration remained fairly consistent between 1897 and 1900 (Hall, p. 200), which only added value to Sifton’s insistence on circumventing the London office to recruit actively in Europe.

When you examine the extent and nature of Sifton’s reforms to the department of the interior, the unprecedented effectiveness of his immigration campaigns makes sense. A few important markers on the emergence of public relations as an occupation predate Sifton’s appointment in 1896. London High Commissioner Tupper developed a rich web of PR strategies and workers, and his detailed annual reports signalled the evolution of immigration workers into a redefined role as primarily information agents—possibly the first identifiable cluster of information workers in Canadian government public relations, even though many of the agents worked outside the country. The transfer of the immigration portfolio from the department of agriculture and into the department of the interior altered the structure of the dissemination system for immigration, and forced expanded documentation of public relations activities. Because of his role as a chronicler of public relations work and because of his own lobbying strategies, Tupper merits recognition as one of Canada’s first public relations managers.

Following the significant transfer of immigration into the interior department a few years earlier, Sifton did not simply develop a clever PR campaign for immigration; instead he changed what had been isolated though occasionally energetic immigration publicity activities into an
integral part of the way the department was managed. Sifton designed and organized a machine to deliver, monitor and provide the administrative follow-up to the PR campaign, while also securing reassurances of external support from the prime minister for the larger area of development of the west. In other words, the heart of Sifton's success lay in integrating a wide range of media and lobbying strategies with actual program delivery—vital to public relations as a management function. Even though immigration agents were carrying out public relations roles well before Sifton took over as minister in 1896, Sifton rightfully deserves credit for one of Canada's earliest and best-executed public relations campaigns. In terms of public relations models, Sifton brought a relatively ineffective publicity program considerably closer to elements of a public information model, and even gave PR some access to what Grunig might term the dominant coalition, by incorporating a series of organizational and policy changes as a way to coordinate efforts to both recruit and retain immigrant settlers. As well, the process Sifton used to research and investigate the operation of the department before he enacted his changes conforms with the steps of Marston's RACE formula. Marston (1963) advocated the need for an entire organization to research and take action before or in concert with PR communication activities, for public relations to be truly effective.

This wider view, of public relations within an organizational and even an environmental context, provides the connection for considering one additional aspect of immigration public relations. In annual government reports and historians' accounts, the link between government immigration campaigns and railway public relations received sufficient mention to warrant further exploration. As high commissioner in London, Tupper
included brief and positive comments on the publicity programs of the CPR in his 1894 annual report to the department of the interior. Under those circumstances, a reader might well ask to what extent were the government and CPR publicity programs parallel or even coordinated?
In the early years of the Canadian Pacific Railway, immigrants formed a highly visible market for the railway as passengers, though the CPR's most memorable PR campaigns were designed to increase the number of tourist passengers. At one point, the government of Canada and the CPR shared an interest in attracting immigrants, although they did not necessarily agree on campaign strategies. In fact, just as Clifford Sifton's immigration campaigns peaked, the CPR shifted its focus from PR directed at immigrants to PR directed at tourists. Nonetheless, a study of the CPR's public relations organization can provide another perspective on how PR originated in Canada. Some of the people who carried out the public relations function for the CPR were not initially called publicists but agents. These early practitioners worked as part of a network of managers and top executives who also performed PR activities, as had been the case in government immigration with High Commissioner Charles Tupper and his team of immigration agents. So, who were the PR pioneers at the Canadian Pacific Railway, and to what extent did this mixture of personnel, working at different levels in the CPR, run parallel or even joint PR campaigns with government to recruit immigrants?

Cornelius Van Horne could be regarded as the first public relations official in the Canadian Pacific Railway. Van Horne was appointed general manager of the CPR in 1882, one year after the railway was granted its charter. The Canadian Encyclopedia (1988) described Van Horne as "a complex personality: a brilliant railway manager, a gourmet and a man with
tremendous intellectual curiosity" (p. 2239). According to the encyclopedia, Van Horne went to work as a telegrapher in 1857 with the Illinois Central Railroad at the age of 14, rising to general superintendent of the Milwaukee Road from which he was recruited to complete the CPR line across the Canadian prairies. In other words, Van Horne had built a thorough understanding of how railways operated by starting in a low-level position. Historical accounts also suggest Van Horne took a personal interest and an active role in what would now be described as the public relations function.

Van Horne's best-known publicity work may be the CPR's highly distinctive tourist promotions. However, his interest and experience in publicity predated both his pursuit of tourists and Clifford Sifton's move into the department of the interior. As the railway's general manager, Van Horne's work often focused on construction of lines, on negotiating rates and on moving people and goods into the west. In trying to build and run a railway, Van Horne's goals and perspective on immigration differed from those of government. For example, Van Horne urged Sifton's predecessor, T.M. Daly, to pursue Americans as immigrants to Canada, but Daly refused, fearing they would be "propagandists of annexation" (Vaughan, 1920). According to Hall (1981), Van Horne also felt that free homestead lands were not so great an attraction and the lands ought to be sold instead a very low prices, because he believed British and European workers would assume the land was too poor to farm if it were given away free. Hall suggested Van Horne's idea of financing immigration services by selling land at a dollar an acre "would have been a political disaster, whatever its practical merits" (p. 131), but added that because Van Horne "had been in the business of promoting immigration for longer than most
people in the government," his views carried some weight with interior ministers.

Just as The Canadian Encyclopedia described Van Horne as a complex person, the self-interest of the CPR was similarly complex, if its public relations initiatives are any indication. Hart (1983) suggested immigrant and local passenger traffic were important for their contribution to the railway's total earnings only in the period of massive immigration to the west. Taking a long-term view of CPR returns, Hart wrote

"Passenger rail service in its totality during the four decades after the completion of the line took a back seat to freight traffic. In 1886 freight earnings were $6,112,380 and by 1920 had grown to $145,303,400. Over the same period, passenger earnings grew from $2,768,840 to $49,125,740 (p. 8)."

Hart suggested that, from the beginning of the CPR, immigrant and local passenger traffic probably contributed more to earnings than tourist traffic ever did, but freight traffic easily contributed more than tourist and immigrant traffic combined. In other words, from the start the CPR made most of its money by far on freight traffic, but continued to maintain campaigns first to promote immigration and then to promote tourism. The logical question is why would the CPR promote the two areas where it stood to make the least money? Or put another way, under the circumstances, what role did the public relations function of promoting immigration and tourism play in the larger interests of the CPR?

The notion of larger interest may be key in understanding why the CPR focused its publicity and public relations programs primarily on tourism. From the government's viewpoint, the construction of a rail link
was a promise built into Confederation and Macdonald had to ensure the railway was completed. When the CPR was incorporated in 1881, it received what *The Canadian Encyclopedia* called "generous provisions" from the Conservative government, including "$25 million in cash, 25 million acres of land in a belt along the railway, the cost of surveys totalling $37 million, [and] monopoly over transportation south to the U.S. for 20 years" (p. 347), together with additional relief bills in 1884 and 1885. With this level of government funding and with freight rates negotiated on an on-going basis, we can speculate the CPR would have been obliged to demonstrate substantial support for government initiatives in common areas such as immigration and development, to keep negotiations open and moving. At the risk of over-simplification, promoting immigration and tourism may have allowed the CPR to satisfy politicians' urgent need to justify support for the railways, so the CPR could continue to make its money moving freight. In a somewhat indirect sense, then, public relations at the CPR was born as an organizational response to government regulation in the larger political environment in which the railway operated.

According to *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, the CPR "had become involved with the sale and settlement of land" in 1881 when the railway was under construction (p. 347). However, Hall (1981) suggested that although the CPR was at one point interested in encouraging settlement as a way to make the railways profitable, that interest dwindled. Hall described Van Horne's reaction when Sifton recommended the CPR sell some of its land in Manitoba to government at a low price to "give the CPR needed capital and encourage the early settlement of the eastern
prairies" (p. 131). Van Horne responded that he preferred to wait for a rise in land prices, and also that the CPR's massive landholdings were the basis on which the CPR was able to borrow money abroad. This example conforms with a suggestion made in The Canadian Encyclopedia, that settlement in the west proved to be "insufficient to sustain the line fully for many years" (p. 347), so the CPR moved on into tourism and the cargo trade across the Pacific. In other words, promoting immigration was only a means to an end for the CPR. When immigration passenger levels failed to reach expected levels, the railway moved into tourism publicity on a large scale.

At the beginning, Van Horne himself was aggressive in proposals to improve government immigration campaigns. Hall (1981) said Van Horne saw no revitalization in the campaigns when immigration was transferred from agriculture to the interior department and wanted to ensure immigration was handled better under the new Laurier government than it had been by the Conservatives. Recounting Van Horne's subsequent lobbying of Laurier, Hall pointed to Van Horne's unsuccessful campaign to set up a three-member commission to oversee immigration, separate from any single government minister and civil servants. Hall also referred to Van Horne's sarcastic analysis that the government's efforts in immigration consisted mainly of getting free passes from the CPR so immigrants could return to their original countries and spread the word about Canada. The approach of the CPR to immigration appears to have varied with the railway's needs of the moment. While the line was under construction, immigration seemed to be important to the CPR, because the CPR had lands to settle, because
development increased the value of its own land holdings, and because promoting immigration provided a shared goal with government. Once the line was completed and the number of immigrant passengers was insufficient to make the railway profitable, the CPR had to find other ways to make the line pay for itself, even though government had stepped up its own programs to attract farm settlers.

The benefits of the government immigration campaign and CPR publicity campaigns flowed both ways. Hart (1983) suggested the CPR’s spectacular tourist and immigration literature introduced many Canadians and potential immigrants to the country. In particular, Hart said “Van Horne himself directed the advertising campaign … applied his limited funds to newspaper and journal advertising, the production of posters and the writing and illustrating of promotional brochures and pamphlets” (p. 21). More specifically, Hart said Van Horne “had kept control of publicity in his own hands, corresponding with artists, photographers, tourists and excursion groups, and overseeing the design and production of promotional material,” until he became president of the CPR in 1888 (p. 69). As the theme of many early government publications showed, the basic government message was freedom (through self-employment as a result of land ownership) from a life predetermined by social class. In a subtle but important contrast, the railway essentially used dreams of a new life surrounded by a scenic country to sell train tickets to anyone, regardless of their suitability for farm life. As well, Hart suggested Van Horne’s approach to material produced for tourist consumption “was not above exaggeration” (p. 35), placing his work solidly in Grunig’s press agentry model of public
relations. Though Hart did not underestimate the value of the work of the CPR in attracting people to Canada, he did point out "...it may be accurately stated that the CPR's tourist promotion was launched on the back of its [government's] well-oiled emigration campaign" (p. 22).

Determining the extent to which the CPR and the Canadian government actually cooperated in the immigration campaign requires some reading between the lines. In tracing moments in the development of federal government PR, Donoghue (1993) mentioned a former journalist reporting to government offices in London in 1880, about conducting programs to spread information about Canada. Donoghue's undocumented example described a travelling exhibit that included samples of Canadian agricultural produce, advance posters to publicize an event, and lectures featuring the use of lantern slides. Curiously, there's no comparable mention in the Department of Agriculture's annual report for 1880. Similarly, the unpublished, undated Deacon manuscript in the Canadian Public Relations Society archives offered a fleeting mention of a noisy, joint publicity campaign between the federal government and the CPR for immigrants in 1897. The Deacon reference could coincide with Sifton's departmental reforms and revitalized publicity campaign, and with the time that Van Horne suggested much-needed improvement had finally arrived in the form of Clifford Sifton (Hall, 1981, p. 132) in government's immigration programs. The search for evidence then turns to indirect but verifiable references.

In view of the documentation provided by Tupper as high commissioner in London, the Donoghue example most likely refers to some combination of government resources and railway sponsored
events. Though Tupper never directly linked the two, one portion of this 1892 annual report commented on the use of six sets of magic lantern slides as increasingly popular in rural areas, while elsewhere in the same report he gives credit to the CPR for its active promotion of emigration from the United Kingdom. In particular, Tupper wrote, "They advertise extensively and distribute large quantities of printed matter; and the experiment they initiated of sending a van containing specimens of Canadian produce, and a supply of pamphlets for distribution through the rural districts is said to have been attended with success" (CSP 1893, Interior Part VI, p. 8). By 1894, Immigration Clerk Fortier wrote in his annual report of a cooperative program with a Mr. L.O. Armstrong of the CPR, involving an exhibition car and a system where one agent acted as an advance agent to promote lectures and presentations, while the other agent travelled with the car "inducing people to emigrate--the car advertises the lecture and the lecture the car" (CSP 1895, Interior Part III, p. 4). An additional hint about the cooperative nature of their campaigns comes through common contributors to publications. For example, The Selling of Canada The CPR and the Beginnings of Canadian Tourism (1983) drew on reports from the London office of the CPR, which said the Lorne Pamphlet was finally ready in 1887, describing it as a reproduction of the Marquis of Lorne's article Our Railway to the Pacific (p. 25). The Marquis of Lorne, who served as Governor General for Canada from 1878 to 1883, was also a favourite contributor for the Department of Agriculture testimonials, as he wrote the introduction for Dominion of Canada as a Farming and Stock Raising Country, published by the Department of Agriculture in 1878, and
contributed to *Dominion of Canada Views of Members of the British Association and Others Information for Intending Settlers* (Agriculture, 1884). The government immigration campaign and the CPR campaign of the 1880s and 1890s had somewhat different goals, but at the least they probably shared some resources such as lantern slides, operated cooperative ventures like the travelling car exhibits, and drew on some of the same contributors.

As far as actually recognizing the role of information workers in the Canadian Pacific Railway, one significant event occurred with Van Horne's appointment as CPR president when banker George Stephen resigned in 1888. The first step on the path to institutionalizing public relations work in the organization came when Van Horne's duties changed and he could no longer retain all the tasks he had carried out as general manager. Hart (1983) wrote that although Van Horne "was forced to delegate some of his workload" in 1888, he hung on to publicity until 1893 when he turned it over to David McNicoll, "though his fine hand could still be seen working in the background" (p. 69). McNicoll had started as a general passenger agent and, by 1900, was second vice-president and general manager of the CPR. For founding the CPR's first publicity department, however, Hart assigns credit to another employee recruited in 1891 by Van Horne to help McNicoll.

Like the first publicity specialists hired by Clifford Sifton in the interior department, George Ham was a former newspaper man. A copy of Ham's employment file in the CPR Archives shows Ham was initially given the title "train passenger agent" in July 1891, even though Van Horne hired him specifically to help McNicoll with publicity. Ham
received a general pass for travel with the CPR when he was hired. His record shows he was
renamed in 1893 in the newly-created position "journalist, passenger traffic," although the CPR did not actually establish
a public relations department until 1945. Hart (1983) pointed out Ham's employment as CPR
journalist in 1893 "was essentially the beginning of what would become known as the Canadian
Pacific Press Bureau," while Ham curiously insisted throughout his career that he had no
specific title (p. 70). As Grunig's PR models predict, the CPR like the Department of the
Interior turned to journalists when managers and executive officers began to distribute and
reassign public relations work. In what may be essentially a coincidence, the newly appointed
public relations workers were initially called agents, as was the case in the interior department.

Ham was recruited by Van Horne from his job as a writer for the Manitoba Free Press, after
learning the printing trade in his native province of Ontario. Hart (1983) said Van Horne likely knew of the
flamboyant Ham because of the columnist's defence of the CPR and its policies in the Free Press. One of Ham's more unconventional PR
strategies of that time concerned women journalists. The CP Rail News of March 13, 1985 reported
on a plaque erected by the Canadian Women's Press Club at Windsor Station honouring George
Henry Ham, whom they referred to as their founder. When Ham died, the same group
had "honoured him with the construction of a memorial porch before the door of St. John's Church in
Whitby," near where he had been born. From the CP Rail News, it seems Ham organized press excursions exclusively for women reporters. The women had their own car assigned
them, giving them privacy and security as they travelled across the west, at a time when women journalists received virtually no recognition from their own employers, never mind from the business community. As a result of Ham's bringing the women journalists together, they formed their own press club and also wrote extensively about the new Canadian west.

The same CP Rail News article said Ham had served in the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870 as a member of Canada's militia "which made him a perfect candidate for newspaper correspondent in the Northwest Rebellion of 1885." CP Rail News described Ham's role with the CPR as "publicist and tour guide and the company's Ottawa lobbyist and ambassador-at-large--a definition close to portions of Gollner's (1983) description of public affairs. Ham's biographic file in the CPR archives contains an excerpt from Canadian Railway and Marine News of May 1926, which indicated Ham was admitted to the Ottawa Press Gallery in 1885, before he joined the CPR. Ham was the author of several books after he joined the CPR, including The View West, The Flitting of the Gods, Reminiscences of a Raconteur and The Miracleman of Montreal. Hart (1983) described Ham's role as "In addition to preparing publicity, he squired parties of journalists or other special excursions across the country, spoke at dinners and public functions, represented the company at fairs and expositions and entertained special guests. And ... he was a master at his job" (p. 70).

Ham's employment record in the CPR Archives shows he remained as "journalist, passenger traffic" until 1903, when the entry changed to read "on special work." Turning to Hart (1983) for an
explanation, it seems Thomas G. Shaughnessy was chosen to succeed Van Horne as CPR president in 1899 and, in decided contrast to Van Horne, the new president consistently avoided public roles and activities. Hart described Shaughnessy as "a shrewd and successful manager but an introspective man" (p. 81). Hart said Shaughnessy left all the public relations work to Ham and even moved him temporarily into the president's office in 1903 under the title "special work," to "guarantee close support in the vital field of tourist promotion" (p. 81). Hall (1985) offered a similar description of Shaughnessy, and also pointed to the markedly different relationship between Shaughnessy and Interior Minister Sifton, compared to Van Horne and Sifton.

He [Sifton] and Sir William Van Horne had shared a pragmatic, aggressive attitude to policies of development and a mutual respect. T.G. Shaughnessy, by contrast, was a more private, less openly aggressive man. The company expanded dramatically under him, but less now to open new country than to protect CPR interests against vigorous competitors strongly supported by government. He entered the presidency in 1899 at a time when pressure on government to provide competition began to coincide with evidence of a strong diversifying and growing economy. For politicians like Sifton, the CPR was no less necessary than before, but a second transcontinental line appeared both necessary and economically viable (p. 99).

Ham's appointment confirmed the shift of CPR publicity from immigration to tourism, at a time when Shaughnessy's approach to publicity differed from the hands-on style of Van Horne. Shaughnessy's priorities for the CPR had moved from development
and expansion, to expansion and protection of CPR interests. As well, the relationship between Sifton and Shaughnessy remained strained, to the extent that Hall (1985) said Sifton opposed a knighthood offered Shaughnessy by the cabinet. Nonetheless, Ham's transfer into the president's office shows how much public relations at CPR continued to be part of what Grunig (1984, 1992) called the dominant coalition. The public relations function at CPR started with Van Horne's direct management of publicity work when he was general manager of the railway. He delegated some of the work to McNicoll and personally hired Ham. This tradition of close ties with the decision making culture at the CPR continued with Van Horne's successor, Shaughnessy, who solidified the position of PR by making Ham part of the president's office as the campaign for tourists mounted.

Shaughnessy's presidency continued to exert a profound influence on how public relations developed in the CPR, even though Shaughnessy divorced himself as much as possible from the public role of spokesperson for the company. The next major step involved John Murray Gibbon, who first joined the company through CP's London office. According to his employment record in the CPR Archives, Gibbon was hired as "agent, department of advertising, London" in 1907, at a pay rate of 33.6 pounds for eight months, shortly after which he moved to Canada as general publicity agent at $416.66 per month. However, when Gibbon retired the Canadian Pacific Staff Bulletin (July 1945) said "His first association with the Canadian Pacific came in 1907, when he was appointed supervisor of the company's European propaganda."
Initially, his work involved writing advertising and literature, preparing exhibits, and doing fieldwork, which he most preferred. Whether his title was agent or supervisor, Hart (1983) said Gibbon eventually “became more important than Ham himself as an image maker for Canada and the CPR” (p. 81). According to Hart, Gibbon came to the job highly qualified. He was born in Ceylon, the son of a Scottish tea planter, and studied languages under scholarship at Oxford. He apprenticed with a journal called Black and White writing on the Boer War, and “made a name for himself as a freelance writer... who knew Fleet Street and the continent equally well” (p. 81). One of his first CPR assignments was to “line up twelve leading British newspaper editors to tour Canada as quests of the president” of CPR, taking them as far as Quebec, where George Ham took over (p. 81).

Not long after Gibbon started in 1907, Shaughnessy brought him over to Canada with a new title of general publicity agent to replace Ham in the publicity office. According to Hart, the president had moved Ham back once more as staff of the president’s office, this time to use him as a political lobbyist for the company. Shaughnessy expanded Ham’s old position to incorporate responsibility for both publicity and advertising, and in that capacity Gibbon reported directly to the vice-president of traffic. Later, in 1911, the president reorganised the traffic department again, to create a separate branch for publicity people attached to other departments. Hart said Gibbon set the tone early on for his style of PR practice. When Shaughnessy asked for proposals “for extending the influence of the company’s advertising campaign in Canada,” Gibbon recommended French Canadian newspaper editors be consulted to
nominate the assistant for the CPR’s publicity office, and hired the man they named (p. 99). Negotiating the candidacy for the media relations position at the CPR shows just how closely the cooperation between journalists and public relations practitioners was at this point in the emergence of public relations as an occupation.

Even though Shaughnessy created a highly favourable situation for the expansion and development of public relations within the CPR, Gibbon’s talents and knowledge undoubtedly contributed to his success in the field. Gibbon carefully advanced the company’s role in promoting authors and artists (Hart, p. 100), probably identifying them as two groups with great potential for serving the CPR’s publicity goals in ways reporters and editors could not. Gibbon was himself an author, a composer, and an expert on North American Indians and on French Canadian ballads (which he translated). The Geographic Board of Canada named a pass in the Rockies for him “for his work as a poet, novelist, and promoter of musical folklore festivals” (p. 176). Gibbon wrote \textit{Steel of Empire The Romantic History of the Canadian Pacific, The Northwest Passage of Today} (1935), and five novels. The original manuscript for his book \textit{Scot to Canadian-One of More than a Million} remains in the CPR Archives. According to his book, \textit{Scot to Canadian}, Gibbon received an honorary degree from the University of Manitoba in 1940 when he was 65, because of his work promoting the study of the folksongs and folklore of Quebec. During his career with the CPR, Gibbon guided the public relations of the company through an exciting period of growth in rail, steamship, hotel and other services, heading a department “responsible for preparation and distribution of more than
1,500,000 copies annually of CP publications dealing with tourist services, facilities and opportunities in the country” (Hart, p. 176). On the whole, to categorize Gibbon simply as a former journalist who went into public relations with the CPR would be a gross understatement.

Just as Gibbon retired from the CPR in 1945, the company established a Public Relations Department “to integrate the work of the former General Publicity Agent including its Advertising Branch, Press Bureau and Exhibits Branch, and to devote special attention to all phases of the company’s activities which have a bearing on public relations” (CPR Archives, Public Relations and Advertising Department Biography Screen). Hart (1983) noted that by the mid-thirties, Gibbon’s general publicity department already included four sections: advertising, press bureau, photography department and the art department. The press bureau alone “had branch offices at Winnipeg, Toronto, Vancouver, New York and London, [which] supplied information and news of company activities and services to newspapers, magazines and other publications throughout the world” (p. 100). The CPR had developed an infrastructure of public relations roles and bureaus as complex and far-reaching as any Canadian newspaper. By the same token, the design of the CPR public relations unit closely mimicked that of a news gathering organization, again testifying to the overlap in roles between public relations and journalism in the early years of the occupation.

Consistent with Grunig’s press agency and public information models of public relations, the flow of information at CPR was primarily in one direction, from the source to receiver (such as the newspapers).
Cornelius Van Horne had established the public relations function by making publicity part of his job when he became CPR general manager in 1882. As the content of CPR publicity material shifted from immigration activities conducted largely in Britain to tourism promotion on a much wider basis, Van Horne re-defined the occupation of public relations at CP when he recruited talented journalists to assume public relations duties. Two key figures, George Ham and John M. Gibbon, worked as part of the management team for the company, while applying their considerable skills as writers, their knowledge of how mass media worked, and their enduring ability to remain part of the dominant coalition of the firm. An extensive and insightful program of media relations dominated the visible part of the CPR's public relations function. While the company did not call its public relations department by that name until 1945, the CPR began hiring people to work full time in what would now be called public relations as part of the president's office from 1893 onwards, with substantial recognition awarded their role in Gibbon's appointment as publicity manager in 1923. In effect, the CPR had become a primary manufacturer of what might now be termed Canada's global image—an important commodity for political leaders, and a highly visible demonstration of the CPR's commitment to development of the country where the real profits lay in moving freight. Promoting tourism was to the CPR what promoting immigration was to government public relations—the visible goal around which the occupation of public relations clearly took root in the 1890s.
Chapter V: Public Relations Origins at the Bell and The Royal Bank

This chapter will examine how public relations developed at Bell Telephone and The Royal Bank—two institutions similar in age to the Canadian Pacific Railway. The examination means looking for conditions and events that can be identified in the process by which the PR function developed into roles at Bell and The Royal Bank, especially for characteristics that also contributed to the development of PR in government immigration campaigns and the CPR. The propositions and models Grunig (1992) promoted in *Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management* tied the influence of government regulation and potential competition to organizations’ use of his two-way symmetric model of public relations. Grunig suggested organizations such as public utilities require mutual understanding with their publics to survive in today’s economy. From a historical perspective, however, I suggest the threat and impact of government regulation may also be identified as key factors in motivating organizations to institute a public relations function in the first place. As such, I continue to suggest that Grunig’s models can help explain how public relations developed, and that historical events can help explain why PR developed.

**Public opinion and political agendas launch PR at Bell**

The incorporation of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada actually predates the beginning of the Canadian Pacific Railway by one year, although Bell was somewhat slower in recognizing its need for public relations. Problems with patents in the 1880s, followed by the threat of
federal and provincial government takeovers of telephone service in 1905 seemed to trigger Bell’s corporate recognition of its vulnerability. Bell set up a formal publicity department in 1914. However, Bell carried out one of its first major public relations campaigns using advocacy advertising in 1905, in an attempt to challenge what Bell executives saw as public misunderstanding of how the company was structured, and to halt growing sentiment across Canada in favour of government-owned telephone businesses. A prominent characteristic of public relations at Bell Telephone was a strong emphasis on communication with employees. In a way, Bell saw its employees as both a public to deal with, and as a PR tool to use in its dealings with clients. On the whole, once the Bell Telephone Company began to evaluate public opinion it undertook a wide range of public relations activities, with a clear commitment to both internal and external publics. However, Bell’s public relations objectives were ultimately driven by the business and political environment in which it had to operate, more than they were designed in pursuit of a particular market or category of consumer. Unlike the CPR, which developed its most visible public relations programs to increase the number of immigrant and tourist passengers, the Bell Telephone Company had to worry from the start about its survival as a company, in the light of threatened regulation and changes in legislation.

Between 1880 and 1881 two companies were involved in the acts of incorporation for Bell in Canada: one company was set up as the operating company, the other as the holding and manufacturing company (Fetherstonehaugh, 1944) The Canadian patents and patent rights to the telephone were purchased by the holding company from Melville Bell, with the agreement of his son Alexander Graham Bell, in 1882. The Bell
operating company was formed mainly by buying out two existing telephone companies in Montreal and Toronto (p.113-134); Andrew Robertson was president of the operating company (Bell Telephone Company of Canada) and Charles Fleetford Sise was Canadian manager, vice-president and managing director of both companies. According to Sise's authorized biographer Fetherstonehaugh, Sise had been sent to Canada by the National Bell Telephone Company of Boston to set up a Canadian subsidiary. The biographer said Sise and Robertson had warned shareholders, in their 1884 annual report, that the loss of certain patents would cause financial problems.

Unfortunately for Bell, a key patent covering Alexander Graham Bell's system was declared void by the Minister of Agriculture in 1885, at that time with no avenue for appeal, and "the decision opened the door to competition" (p. 172). As Featherstonehaugh put it, "In the year when the North West Rebellion plagued the Dominion with racial and political discord, the Bell Telephone Company of Canada suffered some peculiar reverses of fortune" (p. 171), with the patent decision opening the door to competition. According to The Canadian Encyclopedia (1988, p. 2124), several hundred independent companies came into existence after the patent ruling against Bell, and these companies were then able to offer service in direct competition with Bell. Although Bell eventually sold its facilities in the prairies and Atlantic provinces, it had to concern itself with independent companies in Quebec and Ontario. For example, by 1915 one third of the telephones in Ontario were served by independent companies (The Canadian Encyclopedia, p. 2124). Only five years after it was incorporated, the government's patent ruling meant the Bell Telephone
Company found itself operating in a decidedly different business environment than its executive had anticipated when the company was formed.

In a roundabout way, Fetherstonehaugh suggested the patent ruling prompted Bell to set up its corporate philosophy or policy for dealing with competition, stressing quality of service, low rates, increased long-distance lines, and valuing the good will of telephone subscribers. Sise succeeded Robertson as president of the Bell Telephone Company when Robertson died suddenly in 1890. Fetherstonehaugh said Sise was utterly convinced that keeping the telephone lines working well would earn the company all the good will it needed; he was also a man who "shunned publicity all his life" (p. 206) to the degree that delivering his annual speech to shareholders caused him considerable distress. Sise initially placed his faith in the business actions of a company, without particular affection for the process of communication with publics inside or outside the company. The Bell Archives contain a memo from Earle Lyman (information manager with Bell in the 1940s) about an interview he conducted with W.H. Black, a former secretary and close associate of Sise. The topic was Sise's responses to customers in the 1890s when they wrote with complaints or requests for special rates. The memo said Sise "was always frank in talking with subscribers ...[with] a public be served attitude ... and a sincere belief that the average subscriber complained only when he felt justified and only when he appeared to have a grievance." Sise's approach to doing business was often summed up in a motto sprinkled through employee publications: "The best possible service at the lowest cost to the user consistent with financial safety." Sise seemed to subscribe initially to the
view that quality service and sound fiscal behaviour in themselves were adequate strategies for continued business success; as well, he preferred one to one communication with individual customers, rather than viewing customers as a group or public.

Despite its policy to keep the good will of the public by providing a quality service, the officers of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada soon found themselves facing what Sise's biographer called "a gruelling ordeal," testifying in front of a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1905 (Featherstonehaugh, p. 174). According to The Canadian Encyclopedia (1988), Postmaster General William Mulock wanted Bell turned into a government-owned telephone system for Canada, like the one Great Britain had at that time. For the officers of Bell Telephone, the hostile nature of the Mulock commission hearings presented a serious threat to the existence of the company, but the hearings also had some positive use. As Featherstonehaugh pointed out, "The investigation ... produced an opportunity for all those with grievances against the company to present their complaints in public, but it also provided the company with the chance to expose the hollow nature of the claims some of its noisiest opponents were advancing" (p. 179). After 43 sittings and 50 witnesses, the committee's report eventually led to a Commons bill that amended the Railway Act of 1903, bringing all telephone companies under one supervising board. On the positive side, the report did not support any government-owned telephone service.

From a public relations perspective, the Mulock hearings were a turning point at Bell. In July 1905, the final report from Mulock was due for release, and an anticipated bill to regulate the industry for debate was
expected in the House of Commons. At the time the Bell Telephone
Company hired Charles E. Fortier, previous communication activities had
focused largely on advertising telephone services. According to an article
from The Blue Bell in July 1946 (when Fortier retired), his career started
with Bell on August 1, 1905. However, Bell Archives’ An Historical
Background C.E. Fortier File (p. 1) contains this reference: “There is an
entry in one of the Log Books kept by the late Charles Fleetford Sise as
follows: July 13, 1905 - engaged C.E. Fortier, Toronto Star, as assistant to
W.C.Scott”. Fortier, a journalist, was working as night editor and private
secretary to Joseph Atkinson at the Toronto Star. He joined Bell with the title
of chief clerk and assistant to W.C. Scott, and his first job with Bell was
preparing press releases (CPR Archives, An Historical Background, C.E.
Fortier File), probably in connection with the Mulock hearings; the Mulock
committee brought out its final report on July 15, 1905. The timing of
Fortier’s hiring suggests the experiences of the Bell executives and its
imported witnesses at the Mulock hearings finally compelled Sise to revise
his belief in good telephone service alone as sufficient public relations
initiative.

As a new employee, Fortier brought more than writing skills to Bell’s
cause; he knew how to combine his understanding of business with
influencing opinion through mass media. Fortier was a native of Orillia,
Ontario who distinguished himself in commercial studies there, worked for
the Tudhope carriage manufacturing company, and then chose a career in
journalism, at first with Saturday Night (Bell Archives, C.E.Fortier File).
Reflecting back on the period when he joined the company, Fortier saw the
Mulock committee hearings as producing a significant revision in the
thinking of Bell officials. "The management realized that they would have been in a much stronger position [at the Mulock hearings] if the public had been more fully informed of its services and operation. There was a widespread impression that we were a monopoly owned and dominated by the American Telegraph Company, whereas that company has never held a controlling share of Bell Telephone stock" (CPR Archives, C.E. Fortier File, An Historical Background, p. 2). At this point, the public relations function launched a propaganda initiative of a different kind.

After the Mulock committee made its report public, Bell took the contents of its own witnesses' testimony and developed 25 newspaper ads, or advocacy advertisements, and ran them in Ontario and Quebec where they had decided to concentrate their activities. While the stated objectives of this advertising campaign referred to "the need for public education" (An Historical Background, C.E. Fortier File, Bell Archives), their publication coincided with the recent release of the Mulock report and the strong sentiment for government-owned telephone companies exemplified in Manitoba. The use of the ads also preceded the anticipated amendments to the Railway Act in 1906, which brought all federally chartered telephone companies under the control of the Board of Railway Commissioners of Canada. As such, these advertisements can be viewed as part of Bell's lobbying campaign to influence public opinion about restricting the role of government in the telephone business. Writing in Advocacy Advertising: Propaganda or Democratic Right? (D. McDowal, Ed., 1982), S. P. Sethi explains that an advocacy ad "attempts to sustain or change public opinion on long-term fundamental values that underlie social and political institutions" (p. 21). Bell's series of short essays, called Telephone Talks
used a fact-based style of persuasive argument to isolate and address topics such as Bell's investment in Canada, Bell's independence from the U.S. telephone companies, its patents, its attention to rural areas, and its rate system. In addition, expert testimony from the hearings was also incorporated into the text of the ads to show how the British system was weak, how poor municipal service was in the United Kingdom, how Bell compared favourably to the British, French, German, Swedish and American systems, and to explain the pitfalls of government ownership of telephone and telegraph systems.

In an interview with the weekly newspaper Marketing's fortieth anniversary issue (Bell Archives, Fortier File) Fortier described the on-going theme of the ads as "how well Bell Telephone has served the community and kept pace with scientific development in its equipment." Reviewing the ads suggests a far more defensive tone and a public policy agenda. Using government ownership of long-distance lines in Britain as an example, one ad said:

"Following the disclosure made in evidence before the Special Committee, of the disastrous results financially, of [British] Government operation of telegraph, the question naturally arises why the Government should also have taken over the long distance lines. The reason is plain. The long distance lines owned and operated by an aggressive company were encroaching on the business of the already unprofitable Government telegraphs. The government therefore decided to take control of the telephone service to avert competition" (CPR Archives File 17959).

The ad eventually concludes that government takeover of the telephone
industry results in the worst possible service. The use of advocacy advertising was a new venture for Bell, which had used general advertising of its services for some time. However, as Fortier pointed out in the Marketing interview, after the Mulock report "the management became increasingly aware of the need for public education" (Bell Archives, Fortier File, Marketing, p. 33). In classic propaganda style, Bell had used the situation (or crisis) of government hearings to make its own position clear, and then continued to use advocacy ads to turn the information and arguments generated by the public forum into positive advantage for the company.

In the early 1900s, the movement Bell faced for publicly owned telephone systems was not limited to the federal government. For example, the government of Manitoba (where Bell had properties) had a campaign to convince municipalities in that province to support a publicly owned system. However, the government of Canada limited its objectives towards regulation in the 1906 bill to bringing all telephone companies in Canada under the control of the Board of Railway Commissioners, which had to approve all telephone tolls. After the Mulock hearings were completed and its reported made public, Fortier subsequently spent part of 1906 and 1907 canvassing in Manitoba and Alberta. In Charles Fortier Retires (Blue Bell, July 1946, Bell Archives), Fortier is referred to as a "pioneer canvasser" in both those provinces, before Bell sold its interests there to the respective provincial governments.

When Fortier first returned from canvassing in the prairies, he worked in the combined area of directories and advertising. The Yellow Pages, which became a valuable medium for advertisers, were introduced in 1910.
(Bell Archives, Fortier File). On January 1, 1914 Fortier was given overall responsibility for publicity, as manager of the advertising and directory department (The Blue Bell, July 1946). Publicity seemed to be a catch-all name that included what today would be termed media relations and general communications work. In that same Blue Bell item, Fortier is described as having "laid the foundation and reared the structure of a complete public relations activity." With some reorganization in Bell that took place in 1917, Fortier acquired the title advertising manager. In 1923 his title changed to publicity manager, the title he held until he retired in July 1946. The publicity department became an executive unit in 1927, with Fortier reporting to a vice-president instead of to the general manager. That meant although Fortier himself was not part of the executive circle (or what Grunig would term the dominant coalition), the function of public relations was represented in the uppermost decision-making unit in the company. In 1939, Bell appointed a vice-president specifically in charge of personnel and public relations. Despite the way Fortier describes Bell's management embracing public relations, the lengthy path to the boardroom suggests otherwise. Keeping in mind a crisis brought the need for PR to the forefront, the need may have been downgraded once the crisis passed. In any event, Bell, like the CPR, certainly had a firmly established public relations function before World War II.

In a glowing article about his retirement, in the internal publication The Blue Bell (July 1946), Fortier's work was described as also including speech writing, and writing and editing company publications. In 1939, Fortier's publicity department added several new public relations vehicles to its standard list of exhibitions, booklets, advertising analysis, and tours. In
a paper he prepared as publicity manager (Bell Archives, Fortier File), he
described Bell’s first moving picture, which had more than 650 showings in
1938, to school principals and church officials. Also that year, Bell tried out
a series of 26, 15-minute, twice a week recorded
programs over a group of 18 stations in Ontario
and Quebec, titled Beauty that Endures—high
class orchestral music, a vocal solo and a one
minute talk by announcer on some small feature
of employee activity, [and] the traditional
devotion to duty of telephone workers, as an
added attempt to increase public appreciation of
the work and effort of Bell employees (Archives).

When Fortier retired, W.C. Beamer took over as an assistant vice-
president in charge of the newly formed information department, which
had been restructured to include publicity. By 1955, the Public Relations
Department of Bell included public relations workers in each of the
following units: general information (including The Blue Bell, news
services, information and public relations) and advertising (including
advertising, advertising studies, art director, customer relations, customer
relations production and customer relations planning), as well as survey
statistics, historical services, and contracting of an outside advertising
agency. Also that year, Bell named a vice president responsible for public
relations alone, solidifying its position in the dominant coalition.

PR activities at the Bell and CPR started within 15 years of one
another, both operating as a mixture of publicity and public information
models. However, the contrast in their PR orientation (with the CPR’s
public relations organization built strongly on a model to respond to news
media) and their differing roles in strategic decision making show just
how widely the organizational response to public relations can be, even

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within the same models of practice. On the other hand, while the public relations function at Bell may have been less a part of the dominant culture at Bell than at the CPR, PR also had a broader sense of its publics in the telephone company. By 1921, Bell began publishing its first monthly newsletter for employees. *The Blue Bell* was prepared from the head office in Montreal, with Vol. 1 No. 1 in November of that year declaring to employees it would provide them with "a vehicle for expressing yourselves, to give you a wider vision of the work you are doing and how it ties in with the job of each of the other thirteen thousand Bell workers" (p. 10). Fortier frequently contributed editorials to *The Blue Bell*. Though it promised to keep employees better acquainted with each other, the company magazine for employees carried more than its share of corporate messages. The January 1922 issue proclaimed

> The most effective Public Relations Agent is the individual employee who appreciates the seriousness and importance of the work ... Subscribers receive their impressions of the company from contact with the employee serving them ... Service first, with the inevitable result—better public relations ... diminish the large number of applications now waiting service, approximately 19,000 (Jan. 1922, p. 3).

A newspaper for Toronto subscribers, called *Telephone News*, was started in 1926 "in the interest of that understanding and cooperation between telephone subscribers and telephone workers which is essential to good telephone service." By 1938, the yearly circulation was 2,120,000, with Toronto and Montreal receiving six issues each year (Bell Archives, Paper submitted by C.E. Fortier Publicity Manager, 1939). Keeping up with the
demand for telephone installations seemed to be a chronic problem for Bell, and the newspaper tried to explain the problems of serving a large city, while also providing articles on company employees as athletes and musicians, on increases in use and decreases in rates, and also promoting newly-opened Bell business offices. In an interview with Marketing, Fortier said the company offered continuous and well-planned training courses to put added emphasis on employees' "obligation to treat subscribers with courtesy and considerate helpfulness" (Bell Archives, Fortier File). By the nature of its work, Bell employees made thousands of contacts daily with customers. Communication with its employees was designed to keep them sufficiently informed to serve as missionaries for overall Bell service, and to improve employee morale. Publications for the employees and about the employees were part of the larger plan for maintaining the good will Sise had come to value so much after the 1905 Mulock hearings.

The origins of public relations at the Bell Telephone Company of Canada seem to arise suddenly from a government-induced awareness of the implications of taking good will for granted. From using news releases and advocacy advertising in 1905, through to creating a public relations vice presidency in 1955, Bell provided a steady growth of PR positions. Former journalist Charles Fortier was a key figure in the start, although public relations seems periodically subordinated to other functions up to 1955. Substantial management recognition of public relations was a post-war response in Bell, but by that time the function was woven throughout to deal with a broad range of publics, including employees, customers, and school and church officials (or opinion leaders).

The early PR ventures at the CPR and Bell offer a number of insights
into different levels at which public relations operates, and into the business and historical contexts which may kick-start public relations responses. Even within the same models of public relations, connections to the organizations' leaders can vary significantly. The early Bell campaigns are consistent with Grunig's press agentry and public information models, in seeking publicity, recruiting journalists, and adopting journalistic styles of writing in publicity and propaganda products. Two consistent characteristics in government immigration PR, the CPR and the Bell are the role of ex-newspaper people and the close initial relationship between PR and advertising. Like the immigration campaigns, looking into early PR techniques at Bell reveals an interesting mixture of media relations initiatives, including carefully crafted advocacy advertising on behalf of Bell. Once again, an early concentration on publicity and media relations both derives from the influence of journalists and responds to the growth in the influence of mass media on public opinion after the turn of the century. In the case of the Bell Telephone Company, however, a strong case can be made for the influence of government regulations (such as the patent ruling of 1885) and political agendas (demonstrated in the Mulock commission of 1905) on how an organization initially recognizes its own need for the public relations function. For the Bell Telephone Company, then, the origins of public relations lay in the impetus provided by the external influences of regulation and competition. From a historical perspective, the question arises whether similar influences are consistently evident in large institutions of the same age as Bell, such as The Royal Bank.
Using PR to change the image of a large bank

An example in the banking industry suggests further support for the idea that a particular set of historical circumstances combines with organizational readiness to create a situation favourable to the development of the public relations function. The Royal Bank of Canada originally opened under the name the Merchants Bank of Halifax in 1864, and was incorporated in 1869, taking the name the Royal Bank in 1901 (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 1988, p. 1892). Although what is now Canada’s largest bank did not actually establish its public relations department until 1967, the 1940s played a major role in how the public relations function was used. Since the development of public relations in the Department of the Interior, at the CPR and at Bell involved a protracted gestation period and strong links with advertising, similar conditions might be identified in PR at the Royal Bank.

In fact, until 1967 the PR function at the Royal Bank seems to have been carried out by the Advertising Department, which was set up in 1900. A. Gordon Tait, who joined the Merchants Bank in 1898, went to the head office in 1900 to manage the bank’s advertising department. A fact sheet written by H.A. Mortimer in 1944, describing the work of the advertising department, appears in the Royal Bank Archives (personal correspondence, February 24, 1995). Mortimer indicated the advertising department was responsible for the publication of The Royal Bank Magazine for staff members, with the first issue appearing in November 1920; according to Mortimer, it had a circulation of about 7,000 per issue, by 1944.

In an article published in The Royal Bank Magazine for staff in June
1921 (Royal Bank Archives), Tait wrote about publicity programs carried out by the Advertising Department. His historical feature reminds readers of "the power of advertising [which] was brought home to the public during the recent war and will not soon be forgotten." Using illustrations of Merchants Bank of Halifax advertisements from July 1873, Tait described how its advertising and publicity programs had been developed to appeal to different publics of the bank. As examples, he included photographs of the designs of silver and bronze medals, shields and cups for competitions at agricultural fairs. The bank also initiated educational PR projects in the 1920s with community service groups, printing blotters on the theme of forest fire prevention with the Canadian Forestry Association, and others with the Boy Scouts, the Royal Life Saving Society and the St. John Ambulance Association, and developing a special blotting book for university students. Offering its support for community projects, Tait said, had the purpose of supporting the events themselves, of gaining publicity for the bank, and of allowing advertising department employees and local bank employees to become better known when they made presentations at the local level.

Just like immigration department and the railways, Tait suggested a sizable portion of the bank's publicity and advertising also took place outside the country, to attract clients to its foreign services branches and to appeal to immigrants headed for the Canadian west. He outlined printing projects such as calendars in a variety of languages such as Chinese, Roumanian, Italian, German and Spanish for what he termed "Canada's foreign population." Tait appealed to his branch office readers to support the Head Office publicity programs with a high quality of service, urging
"without the good will of the public, appreciative of the services and facilities cheerfully and intelligently placed at their disposal, no banking business ... can hope to reap a full measure of success" (p. 72). As these examples suggest, the first twenty years of the advertising department saw some small steps taken beyond placement of paid advertising and into the area of publicity for community relations. As well, bank employees were regarded as a sufficiently important public to have at least one PR vehicle, the monthly newsletter, directed at them.

As the advertising department developed, not all of the publicity programs withstood tests for efficiency. A.G. Tait died suddenly in 1921 and was eventually replaced at head office by advertising manager C.E.H. Bourne. The same employee magazine Tait wrote for carried a reprint of Bourne's address to an annual convention of the Financial Advertisers' Association, published in November 1928 (Royal Bank Archives). Discussing his centralized system at the bank for all advertising, Bourne said he found one young manager on the Prairies who wanted 3,000 blotters entitled Learn to Swim, when the entire school population was less than 1,000 and there was no swimming hole for 20 miles. He told of another manager asking for forest fire prevention blotters when the nearest forest was 200 miles away. Bourne was talking about using research and a centralized advertising structure to detect inefficiencies. On the other hand, Bourne said an information booklet prepared ostensibly to promote immigration to Canada was really designed to befriend the intending immigrant before he landed in Canada "so that when he does arrive, he will instinctively come to us to conduct his banking business" (p. 12). Bourne's article said the bank achieved remarkable success with its appeals to
immigrants, with an enquiry form inserted at the back of the booklet to check up on its distribution and to create a list of prospective customers, many of whom "opened their first accounts on this side of the Atlantic with some branch of the Royal Bank of Canada." The fact sheet by H.A. Mortimer (1944) mentioned the same booklet Bourne refers to. *Canada the Land of Opportunity* was first issued in 1923 and required five reprints between then and 1944 to meet demand. Mortimer's fact sheet named a number of activities the Advertising Department carried out, activities which fall as much into the area of public relations as they do paid advertising. They included distributing the annual report to shareholders, distributing 100,000 copies of budget books during wartime, distributing banking forms in schools, and issuing farmers' account books on livestock and poultry. Just as a note of interest, the manager of the Royal Bank's promotions and advertising department from 1963 to 1967 was John Gibbon, son of the John M. Gibbon who enjoyed such a distinguished career in public relations with the Canadian Pacific Railway. Overall, the articles by Tait and Bourne on their department's operations suggest public relations was generally limited to a publicity function under the advertising department. However, that may be an unfair assessment when on the the Royal Bank's most famous public relations tools--the *Royal Bank Letter*--is taken into account.

A report on the bank's Foreign Trade Department (Royal Bank Archives) described the early issues of *The Royal Bank Letter* as "a monthly commercial letter reviewing trade and business conditions in Canada and the countries where we are established." The Foreign Trade Department was formed in 1919 and initially published the newsletter for the benefit of
commercial clients at home and abroad. A 75th anniversary commemorative edition of the newsletter (January/February 1994) named bank economist Graham Towers, from the bank's Foreign Trade Department, as the original author. He was followed by three more economists: Dr. D.V. Marvin, F.J. Horring and Mildred Turnbull. The newsletter's most famous author, John Heron, was a "seasoned journalist" who joined the Royal Bank as a public relations advisor in 1940. According to the commemorative issue, Heron proposed that the letter could be used "to show that the bank cares about other things besides money," and the bank's general manager, Sydney Dobson agreed to turn it into a general interest letter. Dobson's role highlights again the notion of support from the dominant coalition as a key factor in how public relations develops within an organization.

Once again, the history of public relations at the Royal Bank presents a familiar set of factors: the strong connection with advertising, identification of specific publics (internal ones such as employees, external ones such as farm-clients, foreign investors, university students, and community service groups), the introduction of former journalists at a specific point in development of the PR function, and the support of the dominant coalition. Using Grunig's models as a guide, these early examples of public relations activities at the Royal Bank are consistent with the publicity and public information models of public relations. One curious aspect to the development of the PR function at the Royal Bank, however, comes with the time lag between the community relations and publicity orientation of its advertising function in the 1920s and the use of John Heron's PR counsel in the 1940s. Since the Royal Bank had been in operation almost as long as
the the CPR and Bell, the age of an organization alone seems insufficient to predict the point at which a PR function takes on importance in the organization. What factors, then, could have led to the increased interest or need for public relations at the Royal Bank by the 1940s?

Government regulation and the influence of the world-wide Depression of the 1930s may have contributed to an increased awareness of the need for public relations in banking generally, including awareness at the Royal Bank. *The Canadian Encyclopedia* estimated in Canada "between 1929 and 1933, the Gross National Expenditure declined by 42 percent" (p. 933) and said Canada's dependence on exports meant "Canada was particularly affected by the collapse of world trade" (p. 933). While most accounts suggest Canada was not affected as badly by the Great Depression as the United States, nonetheless the economic impact in this country was substantial, particularly in the Prairie Provinces. From a public relations perspective, the impact could also be seen for its effect on public opinion, or as *The Canadian Encyclopedia* put it "The Depression altered established perceptions of the economy and the role of the state" (p 934). In response to what the Bank of Montreal's corporate history (Denison, 1967) termed "the country's economic malaise," in 1933 Prime Minister R.B. Bennett set up what was referred to as the Macmillan Commission, to carry out "the most searching investigation of the kind ever held in Canada" (p. 383) since the banking inquiry held immediately after Confederation.

The five-member commission's task was "to examine the Canadian banking and monetary systems with special reference not only to the Bank Act, but also to the Dominion Notes Act, the Currency Act, the Finance Act
and the advisability of establishing a central banking institution" (p. 383). *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (1988) said the Bank Act of 1934 and the subsequent creation of the Bank of Canada in 1935 were in direct response to the 1933 Royal Commission on Banking and Currency. According to the encyclopedia, the Bank Act and its provisions "changed the legal framework for Canada's chartered banks" (p. 171), setting up a central bank, regulating chartered banks and the country's monetary system, and obliging banks to maintain certain ratios of cash reserves. Denison (1967) suggested the Depression had seen the rise of a political call for "the socialization of the banking, credit and financial systems of the country" (p. 384). Denison also pointed to the emergence of "a radical standpoint [that] much of the distress and human misery that Canada suffered was attributable directly to government inertia and the credit policies adopted by the banks," even though the banking fraternity solidly maintained the financial problems of the country were due to external factors "beyond Canada's ability to control" (p. 384). With the founding of the Bank of Canada, the Bank of Montreal lost "a major portion of the business of its largest single customer, the federal government," because it was no longer the government bank. The Bank of Montreal is Canada's oldest bank, and at the time of the creation of the Bank of Canada was also Canada's largest bank.

Overall, then, the 1930s saw enormous change in the banking landscape in Canada. In the wake of the Depression, banks had earned some lingering resentment . . . their lending policies, government regulation and a central banking system had been imposed, and Canada's oldest bank had lost its position as the government bank, possibly leaving room for stronger competition from other institutions such as the Royal Bank. Given
the vast changes banks encountered in the 1930s, the retention of former journalist John Heron as PR counsel by the Royal Bank in 1940 (Royal Bank Letter Jan./Feb. 1994) makes sense. Not surprisingly, the Bank of Montreal also appointed its first public relations manager around the same time—in 1945 (Personal communication, Munro Brown, August 17, 1994), calling on a former journalist who had come to work initially for the Bank of Montreal's advertising department in 1932. The timing of John Heron's now famous tenure at the Royal Bank reflected influences in the industry in general, as well as the specific needs of the Royal Bank.

Not only did Royal Bank General Manager Dobson accept Heron's ideas about the newsletter, he talked Heron into writing it, starting with the December 1943 edition. Heron expanded the subjects covered to include topics like social welfare, youth, and medicine. He was ahead of his time in writing about causes which have since become subjects of public debate. As early as 1946 he devoted an essay to the status of women, and in 1947 he addressed the question of the rightful place of aboriginal people in Canada. Long before anybody ever heard of environmentalism, the Letter was advocating the conservation of forests, energy and soil (Royal Bank Letter Jan./Feb. 1994, 2).

The Letter's January/February 1994 edition said the public relations benefits of their publication were not lost on the bank's top executives, who recognized "here they had a medium for building warm, direct personal relationships with present and potential customers ... the Letter set the bank apart from other financial institutions, with their forbidding aura of stony pragmatism. It gave the bank a human face" (p. 2). Self-authored tributes of this type tend to overlook the decidedly one-way direction of this mass yet
"personal" relationship, but just the same the free subscriptions available to anyone (not just Royal Bank clients) climbed steadily without any advertising other than word of mouth. As an innovative public relations strategy, the newsletter seemed to appeal to an unusually broad and mixed public or reader. From the time Heron took control, he produced a general interest corporate newsletter in a magazine like format. On the surface the newsletters seems, as stated in the January 1994 edition, designed to help people better understand their lives and the world they live in. However, the management tributes suggest the goal had more to do with changing the bank's image than with the intellectual quality of life of its readers. By the mid-sixties, the circulation was more than 650,000 copies a month (p. 6). At Heron's insistence, he wrote without a byline, to protect "a direct link between the bank and its readers" (p. 6). According to the historical picture in the commemorative edition, "the Letter has always been a corporate effort in that the bank's senior management reviews the topics and the text from a policy standpoint, and often suggest changes in the interest of thoroughness and clarity" (p. 6). As a forerunner to the most effective role for public relations espoused by Grunig and others in the 1980s and 1990s, Heron is cited as saying he was "the voice of the Royal's social conscience" (p. 5).

A Head Office Circular Letter from the chief general manager, dated April 17, 1967, says Heron "asked to be relieved of duties other than those pertaining to the Monthly Letter" that year, when he celebrated his 70th birthday (Royal Bank Archives). John Heron retired in 1976, after 32 years of writing the Letter. After his retirement, reprints were run from earlier issues until freelance journalist Robert Stewart took over writing the Letter.
in 1978. As a quick summary, then, the public relations function in Canada's largest bank started within the advertising and publicity department, at first as part of the bank's head office in 1900. In addition, a key activity called the *Royal Bank Letter* actually began as *The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Letter* in 1920, written by economists in the bank's foreign service to inform and recruit commercial clients. John Heron joined the bank as public relations advisor in 1940 and shortly afterward changed the direction and application of the *Royal Bank Letter* into a highly innovative and much admired public relations tool.

Public relations continued to develop into areas such as community relations through a series of managers of Advertising and Publicity from 1900 to 1967, when its then-manager John Gibbon assumed new duties in the head office (Royal Bank Archives, A Head Office Circular Letter April 17, 1967). With Gibbon's move in 1967, the Advertising and Publicity Department was renamed Advertising and Sales Promotion Department and a separate Public Relations Department was set up; both of the new units came under the Marketing Division of the bank. In the general manager's memo of April 17, 1967, the duties of the new Public Relations Department were listed as including public information programs for customers, shareholders and others, internal communications, community relations, financial community relations, press relations and the general area of publicity. 1967 was the same year John Heron reduced his responsibilities to those connected solely with the *Royal Bank Letter*.

In a bank archives clipping from a newsletter for employees called *Teller*, dated February 1968, the new public relations manager David Grier described public relations as "acting right and getting credit for it," saying
the PR unit served both advisory and operational functions, looking for "the implications of proposed bank policies and actions" (Royal Bank Archives) on public opinion. Grier was quoted in the article as saying their publics included customers, shareholders, government officials and educators, with staff as the most important public of all. The article made particular mention of hiring a specialist in employee communications early in 1968 to work in the public relations department, to find out employees' opinions about the bank and to improve methods for keeping staff informed. Grier's comments on the impact of the bank's actions sound similar to an element of what Gollner (1983) called mature public affairs. In fact, Gollner used the Royal Bank as part of his study. Certainly Grier's appointment can be taken as an indicator of change in the Royal Bank's application of public relations, marking another step in the often recursive movement away from the ubiquitous influence of journalism in the field of public relations. Even though the Royal Bank did not name a department as public relations in the 1940s, it acted on the advice of a practitioner whose influence persisted well beyond that decade.

This brief look at how and why PR started in Bell and the Royal Bank reveals some interesting parallels with the origins of PR in government immigration and the CPR. To begin with, in each case the use of advertising somehow splits and develops into separate but closely related functions of advertising and publicity, with a decidedly public information element emerging in the area of publicity, as the public relations function establishes itself. In all these institutions, former journalists figure prominently at a significant point of change in how public relations is perceived by the organization or when the organization faces a particular
crisis. As well, an element of organizational readiness is often tied to a marked change in political agendas or government regulations which profoundly influence the environment in which these organizations operate. For example, a key in immigration was the Liberal government win in 1896 which put Clifford Sifton in the Department of the Interior. For the CPR, the threat of competing rail lines followed on the heels of a shift in government attitude about the need for more lines to serve the country. At the Bell, PR emerged in the face of political interest in publicly owned telephone companies, while for the Royal Bank a government imposed central bank and the influence of the Great Depression on public opinion created the right conditions for the recognition of the public relations function. In all these examples, an idiosyncratic combination of organizational need and external conditions can be identified, using Grunig’s models of public relations as a scanning guide. In a way, the consistent elements found in the Bell and the Royal’s PR histories re-affirm the experience of the interior department and the CPR, that PR emerges when the dominant coalition identifies a problem or need, and not before. As Grunig predicts, publicity and public information types of practice predominate in the early forms of PR practice within an organization, whether the PR function emerges in 1890, the early 1900s or even into the 1940s. Of course, generalizations about history or origins of public relations in Canada cannot be based on four examples; however, the examples suggest the history of PR at the level of individual organizations reveals some interesting consistencies.
Chapter VI: Separating growth from change in PR in Canada

The intricate and far-reaching immigration campaigns from before 1900 reveal a wide range of PR techniques and strategies, some of which (such as media relations) waited years to be labelled and acknowledged as part of a public relations function. Similarly, the Bell Telephone Company's use of advocacy advertising just after the turn of the century and the recognition of the importance of image at the Royal Bank remind us of the extent to which public relations strategy is rooted in influencing public opinion. However, piecing together the elements which precipitate organizational recognition of public relations is no simple task, and certainly can't be achieved only by looking into techniques employed in a few isolated examples. I suggest putting the origins of public relations into context also calls for some perspective on what happened after PR had become an identifiable activity, because public relations practice may have grown greatly in Canada but actually changed very little from its immigration origins until as late as the 1970s. The contributions to public relations made by figures such as Tupper, Sifton, Van Horne, Ham and Gibbon seem even more important when you realize how long their strategies and techniques endured.

Then again, with so little written on the history of public relations in Canada, what means exist to balance the origins of public relations in Canada with information on how the occupation of public relations has
developed? This chapter will use interviews with four practitioners, whose careers together have spanned from 1930 to the present, to consider how the occupation of public relations has changed. To understand the practitioners' interpretations of the events and trends they were part of requires some preliminary background. This background will be constructed from information on perceptions of public relations during World War II, the history of a professional association for public relations in Canada, Andrew Gollner's study (1983) on the growth of public affairs in Canada, and Grunig's models practice of PR in America. The purpose of this chapter lies in providing readers the opportunity to judge the implications of what happened in public relations in the 1890s, in light of the timing and extent of subsequent change in public relations practice in Canada. In the process, the practitioners offer pictures of four different career paths with surprisingly similar recollections of the changes they observed.

The influence of wartime information on PR in Canada

Fifty years after the end of World War II may be as good a time as any to consider the impact of the Canadian government's wartime propaganda machine on the occupation of public relations in this country. Keeping in mind Ron Pearson's caution against any single interpretation of PR history (in Toth and Heath, 1992), what interpretations can be found of the PR knowledge gained in wartime propaganda? Practitioners whose careers were somehow touched by this war tend to believe the practice of public relations never resumed its pre-war status. In Canada, World War II seems consistently cited by PR writers as the springboard that launched
remarkable growth in this country's public relations industry, although
growth may not be synonymous with immediate change.

Herbert and Jenkins' collection of invited PR practitioners' opinions
in *Public Relations in Canada* (1984) exemplified the cheerleading
perspective of Canadian public relations during World War II. Certainly
unsubstantiated accounts by PR practitioners must be viewed like the
government annual reports of the 1890s--limited by their obvious self-
interest, but still part of a larger picture. In Chapter 2 of *Public Relations in
Canada*, practitioner Gerald Brown declared "World War II propagandists
used every communications technique available to them to win the "war of
words and for men's minds," (p. 9) and "Never has the Canadian public
been so deluged with propaganda and so successfully for so long a period"
(p. 10). He conceded the conscription issue was an exception in what he
termed extremely favourable public opinion of the war effort and
government, the defence industries and the armed forces. In Brown's
opinion, PR practitioners brought with them a "high sense of social
responsibility" and "wanted to use their highly trained propaganda skills to
propagate good causes and good policies" (p. 11).

In *PR Fifty Years in the Field*, Donoghue (1993) suggested
"Canadian government public relations came of age in the Second World
War as did PR in the private sector" (p. 101), but his assessment was
somewhat more reserved than Brown's. Donoghue also mentioned the
formation of the Wartime Information Board (WIB) as a centralized
information unit, though he avoided the term propaganda. Donoghue
acknowledged that the WIB, which was set up on the recommendation of
PR man Charles Vining, floundered just as its predecessor the Bureau of
Public Information had done, until its direction was changed once more by Vining's replacement, John Grierson. To be fair, Donoghue's comment on PR coming of age probably owed much to his personal experiences in overseas army public relations, not on wartime PR as a whole. Elsewhere in his book he suggested "The Canadian Public Relations units [of the armed forces] became highly efficient, recognized as probably the best and most cooperative in the Allied forces" (p. 12).

Deacon, in his unpublished manuscript An Outline of Canadian Public Relations History (CPRS Archives, undated), named a dozen Canadian public relations practitioners who became part of the wartime information organization in Ottawa (including Walter Thompson, Herbert Lash and Charles Vining), and concluded "On the whole, the war years had tested and vindicated the public relations profession" (p. 18). On a similar vein, the 1991 CPRS Accreditation Handbook stated

The Second World War brought about a major expansion of public relations practice because of the need to rally support for the war effort. During the conflict, public relations came of age and became recognized as an essential component in both the public and private sector (p. 1).

Overall, then, the few available references by Canadian practitioners to government PR work during World War II suggested successful contributions by PR practitioners, positive application of public relations strategies, and implied a firm foothold for subsequent expansion of the industry.

In fact, the record of PR practitioners may not merit the unqualified enthusiasm retroactively assigned by their colleagues. Missing from the
practitioners' references to public relations track record in World War II are at least two important elements: an explanation of how and why corporate public relations practitioners were systematically replaced in the face of ineffective performance, and any serious discussion of the substantial oversights surrounding the conscription issue in Quebec. In addition, an unpublished scholarly document suggests the PR practitioners involved failed to grasp the importance of applying psychological and sociological principles to their work, and were mired in an outdated paradigm somewhere between Grunig's press agentry and public information models of public relations.

In his doctoral thesis, William Robert Young (unpublished, 1978) provided a detailed study of wartime information structures in Canada and, in the process, painted a decidedly unflattering account of the role of Canada's PR professionals. Starting with the Bureau of Public Information (BPI)—a structure made possible by legislation left over from World War I—then Prime Minister King promoted CNR publicity man Walter Thompson from his wartime post as director of censorship to the top position, director of public information. Young says Thompson “advocated an open approach in providing material to the media and minimal government secrecy as a means of overcoming the newspapers' feeling that the government had tried to choke off the news” (p. 12). Young said Thompson wanted the prime minister to use a candid, personal approach to gain access to reporters and editors, who would then understand the problems government faced and write their own stories. This approach would be characteristic of a mixture of the public information model described by Grunig (1984), where an emphasis was placed on a one-way flow of accurate information and the
publicity model, for which the goal was propaganda--in this case, wartime propaganda. In 1942, from his hospital bed, Thompson suddenly resigned and his assistant Lash (who also had worked in public relations for CNR) also wanted to resign. G. Herbert Lash stayed on as wartime publicity became an election issue, and in less than two months took over as director of Public Information. According to Young, Lash tried unsuccessfully to make reforms that would rationalize the government's information services and make them more effective. Young suggested the information system set up by Thompson was ineffective. To institute reforms, Lash had to deal with Prime Minister King and with Gardiner, the new minister of National War Services. What Young calls King's "ambivalent approach" led King to mistrust the press even though he supported the idea of seeking support from an informed public.

Ambivalence notwithstanding, King was well versed in how public relations worked. In Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre (1988) Gitelman described how King travelled ahead of his client John D. Rockefeller Jr.: "with all the skill of an experienced political campaigner, he [King] had set about making arrangements for the tour of the camps and planning the human interest stunts that won so much favourable publicity" (p. 186) As a labor relations lawyer, working with Rockefeller and American PR pioneer Ivy Lee from 1914 to 1918 had provided King with a solid background in what would now be called crisis communications--a background rich with an inside knowledge of clients' hidden agendas, of PR inadequacies and of Lee's superficial commitment to truth. Gitelman, who drew heavily on King's diaries, said King was concerned Lee worked only for immediate effect and "worried about Lee's ineptitude," reflecting that "nothing in public life
required more sensitive appraisal than the estimate of how much information the public might be trusted with" (pp. 110, 141). Because of his previous experience with public relations and his position as prime minister, King was in the right position to offer the support of the dominant coalition that Grunig (1992) deemed so vital to change in how public relations is practised.

Young (1978) said that in responding to Lash's recommendations King eventually agreed to an expanded information role for government, as a means to develop the support he needed for his war programs without using conscription. Young concluded the expanded organization (the Bureau of Public Information under Gardiner) gave newspapers, advertising firms and adult educators the chance they wanted to promote their views. However, Young also said newspapers soon gained the upper hand in influencing Gardiner and the Bureau of Public Information. When the Tory press complained loudly about Liberal propaganda, Gardiner ordered Lash to curtail operations while he brought in Liberal and Regina Leader Post editor, David Rogers "to assess requirements" (p. 18). Rogers supported the idea that newspapers' interests "should take precedence in any government war news policy."

Advertising firms and adult educators held a different view, according to Young. He wrote about an alliance that predated World War II, between civil servants and government officials with social scientists. The alliance network had grown out of voluntary associations and organizations Young described as "self-appointed promotors of a Canadian national consciousness" (p. 23)--groups reminiscent of Olasky's (1987) recognition of decentralized, voluntary citizens who worked for causes because they
believed their work to be useful. The educators were urging the use of "current social scientific techniques to bolster Canadian democracy" (Young, p. 28). They and the social scientists felt Canadians would suffer from serious unrest if propaganda set citizens up for unfulfilled hopes and disillusionment. Instead of just using information to get better news coverage, the educators wanted government to use a scientific approach to the media "to prevent confusion about the effect of domestic and foreign events and combine this with an interpretive long-term perspective" (p. 37).

Included among the network members was Walter Herbert, an Alberta lawyer turned PR practitioner who had moved to Ottawa in 1936 to work as secretary of the National Liberal Federation. Herbert later served as assistant director of public information. Young says when Lash took over he did what he thought was important, but suggested those activities were limited to meeting the needs of the press and did not move into the area of new techniques advocated by the adult educators and politicians "who understood the potential of social scientific work in propaganda" (p. 38).

Aside from Lash’s missing the chance to incorporate a social science approach into his PR practice, Young also documented how Lash failed to develop a way to coordinate interdepartmental information activities, antagonized some deputy ministers and fell short of the newspapers’ expectations. As a result, in June 1942 King called in public relations practitioner Charles Vining, to recommend changes in the government’s information system. Vining began his career as a journalist with the Toronto Star and Saturday Night, then moved into the advertising business in 1928 as a research analyst and public relations specialist with the advertising firm Cockfield Brown (N.A. Benson in Saturday Night, Oct. 31, 1942). In
1934, he was appointed president of the Newsprint Export Manufacturers' Association, where he remained for seven years until he assumed the role of Canada's newsprint controller for the federal Wartime Prices and Trade Board. Young said Vining was supposed to look mainly into Canada's information role in the United States, but his report of July 10, 1942 examined the entire service, including the domestic Bureau of Public Information.

Vining consulted a wide range of newsmen and adult educators and identified several specific problems, according to Young, including criticisms of a lack of Canadian activity in the United States, war polices which were in themselves sound but poorly presented to the public, and the mishandling of the conscription issue. Young suggested Vining's report incorporated his background as a lobbyist for the pulp and paper industry, particularly the call for research to check public opinion more accurately and plan methods of approach. Vining urged government to give more weight to improving morale in Canada, to return to a news approach, and to recognize interconnections between internal and external activities. Vining advised government to set up a Wartime Information Board as part of the prime minister's office, a board which would run external publicity and absorb the Bureau of Public Information. However, Young maintained Vining's recommendations were flawed from the beginning. To start with, he said, Vining focused so much on Canada-U.S. relations that he missed domestic problems--such as serious PR problems in French Canada--and ignored foreign sites other than the U.S. Young said Vining considered only newspapers, going overboard not to antagonize them, and ignored other communications media. Young's harsh review said Vining "went so far as to
imply that (in order to improve Canada’s press image in the United States) the government should adopt conscription for overseas service despite Quebec’s opposition” (p. 44).

By fall, the prime minister asked Vining to serve as chairman of the new War Information Board. According to Young, Lash was dissatisfied with Vining’s offer to make Lash director for domestic information instead of giving him a board appointment, so Lash circulated his complaints among his newspaper friends. Educators disliked Vining’s newspaper, advertising and political appointments to the board, and academics thought Vining’s staff were of questionable “intellectual calibre” (p. 47). Young reported on an ugly confrontation between Vining and Walter Herbert, who had stayed on to help set up the War Information Board but “stomped out of the WIB” when Vining “slandered him to a reporter” (p. 48). On the program side, the press resented Vining’s system of leaking news to the press at Rideau Club lunches. In an extraordinary indication of non-confidence, some of Vining’s own board members met with government film commissioner John Grierson “proposing to extend operations beyond news leaks and lobbying” (p. 50). In an abrupt end to his career as Canada’s chief propagandist, Vining resigned on January 27, 1943; Young suggested the “unexpected and mysterious illness” may have been a nervous breakdown (p. 50). Under his successor, Grierson, the war information operations “became less congenial for corporate public relations executives than Vining’s when many public relations men had joined the board, “ and ”after the corporate appointees retired from the WIB, Grierson replaced them by newsmen or academics” (p. 77), with positions abroad in the external service the only ones left to public relations men. Young said as the number of corporate
executives was reduced, the number of academics--especially social scientists--increased.

The trend Young identifies is entirely consistent with Sproule's (1989) observations that American communication researchers shifted their focus between the two world wars, from analysis of propaganda to "providing reliable knowledge that could serve the needs of the nation's policymakers" (p. 16). By redesigning the make-up of the War Information Board and its staff, Griesner would also have responded to the methods attributed to American PR counselor and writer Edward Bernays, who urged public relations professionals as early as the 1920s to incorporate sociological and psychological principles into their practice. If Young's interpretation is correct, World War II may have been an important learning experience for the occupation of public relations in Canada because of what structures failed, as well as because of what campaigns worked. For the purposes of my study, the significance of Young's research occurs in the contrast it offers to the almost mythical influence that practitioners attribute to World War II government propaganda on the development of public relations in Canada.

Public affairs as a new kind of PR practice

Changing business environments provided the theme for Andrew Gollner's (1983) investigation into corporate public affairs departments in the top 100 corporations in Canada. Gollner defined public affairs as "a process by which a corporation anticipates, monitors and manages its relations with those social and political environmental forces that shape the company's operations and environment" (p. 8). As part of his

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definition, he said public affairs includes "such activities as government relations, community relations, media relations, environmental monitoring and issues management" (p. 8). In an extremely useful section for historical purposes, Gollner summarized two stages in the development of corporate public affairs. The predominant stage he called adolescent public affairs, described as a crisis management function, "a fire-fighting approach to socio-political events" and not quite part of central strategic planning (p. 155). Mature public affairs, on the other hand, is diffused throughout all management levels—not something left to one department—and consisted mainly of relationship management "based on objective analysis, mutual interest and formalized procedures," using quantitative measures "as much as possible" (pp. 155-156). Gollner clearly distinguished both stages of public affairs from what he termed traditional public relations, which he said focuses on reactive communication production and management of events, arising from an agenda generated inside the organization. However, he conceded a blurring trend existed in Canada, where the line between the two had become indistinguishable at times, because "the roots of public affairs lie within public relations" (p. 151). Gollner approached his inquiry into the emergence of the public affairs function from his background in business management and public affairs, rather than from a historical interest or from a PR practitioner's point of view. Gollner's specific look at public affairs in Canada between 1950 and 1980 resulted in essentially the same conclusions that Grunig and Hunt described and classified in 1984, through their four models of how PR is practised, and which Grunig et al. subsequently explain in detail, in
Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management in 1992. All three authors seemed intent on promoting the cause of negotiated two-way communication between organizations and the publics affected by the decisions organizations make.

Gollner (1983) documented the rate at which 100 corporations in Canada established public affairs departments, and found 22 percent of the corporations had public affairs departments before 1950, 35 percent set them up between 1951 and 1970 and a phenomenal 43 percent set them up between 1971 and 1980 (p. 30). In other words, he tracked the introduction of public affairs departments, which he identified as part of the corporate response to accommodate outside influences on decision-making in organizations. According to Gollner, "Whether a government is trying to reduce inflation, or a corporation is trying to enter new markets or to increase its profits, external hands weigh increasingly heavily upon the steering mechanisms of all our major institutions" (p. 25). And, as his study showed, the trend of integrating public affairs accelerated after 1970. Gollner's traditional PR category fits closely with Grunig's information model of public relations, the adolescent public affairs is like the two-way asymmetrical model, and his mature stage public affairs is entirely consistent with Grunig and Hunt's fourth model, the two-way symmetrical practice of public relations. Applying Gollner's criteria, practitioners who indicated they began to use research in public relations and to get involved in labour-management relations were moving away from what he would call traditional public relations roles, and moving into the adolescent stage of public affairs, which also happens to be like Grunig's third model of PR. Gollner also made three
key observations: he said the traditional public relations approach still
dominated in PR, the adolescent form of public affairs was the more
prevalent form of the two stages when public affairs was practised in
Canada, and there was recursive movement between the adolescent
and mature stages in corporate practice. In other words, he described an
enormous and fluctuating transition in the practice of PR, a transition that
started shortly after the second world war and continues today.

In search of professional status

Gollner’s interest in the period after 1950 corresponds with the
establishment of the Canadian Public Relations Society—a voluntary
professional association for people who work in public relations. In its
introduction, Canadian Public Relations Society, Inc. 1948-1963 said
after World War II “public relations became accepted as a legitimate
business function” in Canada. Despite this assured tone, public relations
people sought to develop an organization which could confer some
professional status to their work. Unlike occupations which require
practitioners to be licensed or registered, public relations was then and
continues to be inhabited by self-declared specialists in communication
and management. Largely because membership remains voluntary, the
number of members in CPRS has never reflected anywhere near the
quantity of people who work in the field. As such, its influence has been
distinct but limited to a tiny portion of practitioners across Canada.
However, the timing of CPRS’ assembly and the discourse it generated
provide a useful insight into the growth of PR in the postwar period.

According to the CPRS’ own history (undated), the first in a series
of organizational meetings for Montreal's Canadian Public Relations Society started in January 1948, approving its constitution and by-laws on April 20, 1948, and naming 26 charter members. Full-time voting membership in the Montreal group excluded independent consultants because they had "financial interest in performing public relations duties for others" (p. 3). Many PR workers were former journalists, a group whose own members clung to the tenuous ideology of professional objectivity untainted by their employers' profit motives, in the similarly low status occupation of reporting. Consultants were somehow seen as motivated differently because they were self-employed, rather like linguistic mercenaries ready for hire for any cause at the right price. As a result, membership in the Montreal society was purposely limited to men and women who had worked exclusively and full-time for two years as salaried staff in public relations for a particular employer. Their new society's objectives were "to promote discussion on all phases of public relations; to provide a clearinghouse for ideas and experience in public relations activities; [and] to advance the knowledge, skill and professional status of individuals engaged in public relations" (Canadian Public Relations Society Inc. 1948-1963, p.3). Theirs was a fledgling occupation whose members saw joining together as a way to share their experiences, to enhance their standing with their employers and to improve their effectiveness in their jobs.

Meanwhile, the Public Relations Society of Ontario elected its first officers in November of 1948, in Toronto; amalgamation with the Montreal society was ruled out at this point, because of the Montreal policy which excluded outside public relations consultants (p. 7). The
CPRS account suggested there were some problems in Toronto with "splinter groups advocating different criteria to be used for membership qualifications," (p. 8) but the membership remained open to consultants and in-house practitioners alike. Toronto's first major project for 1948-1949 was co-sponsorship of the first public relations extension course held at the University of Toronto, with the Toronto Advertising Club—a partnership which recalls the intricate relationship between advertising and public relations evident back in the 1890s. By 1950, the association was running the course independently of the advertising club. When the Toronto club ratified its first constitution in 1950, its aims were described as:

- to promote the public welfare through the advancement of the art and science of public relations; to elevate the prestige of the profession; to promote and foster discussion on all phases of public relations; to provide a clearing house for ideas and experience in public relations activities; to advance the knowledge, skill and status of those engaged in public relations (p. 15).

At this point, dedicating PR to promote the public welfare and establishing a wider eligibility ruling on membership were the two most obvious differences between the Montreal and Toronto organizations. By March 1952, the Montreal association extended its membership to consultants (p. 19) and by March 30, 1953, the two groups had agreed to amalgamate, "largely the result of the forbearance, understanding and co-operation of the council of the Public Relations Association of Ontario" (p. 21). In June 1953, the Montreal group accepted the
constitution of the Ontario society until a new national constitution took its place; by December 10, 1953 the first president of the new Canadian Public Relations Society was elected. The Canadian Public Relations Society was incorporated in 1956, by which time groups had met in Vancouver and Calgary and were considering joining the national society.

Looking at the CPRS history suggests attempts to institutionalize practice may actually signal the impact of larger events outside the field. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, some Canadian practitioners entertained the idea of setting up a chapter of the American Public Relations Association or the Public Relations Society of America (p.6). Probably as part of the courtship, an article called "Public relations in Canada the lag--the reasons--the promise," by Canadian practitioner Kim Beattie, appeared in the June 1953 issue of The Public Relations Journal, published by the Public Relations Society of America (Reprint sponsored by National Editorial Services, available in Bell Canada Archives). Beattie, identified as managing director of National Editorial Services of Canada, cited a long list of reasons why PR practice in Canada developed more slowly than it had in the United States. His top two reasons were lack of money for national PR programs (with a few large exceptions such as banks and railroads) and the absence of "crusading public relations leaders to help educate business" (p. 2). From a historical viewpoint, the most intriguing part of the practitioner-author's article comes in the reasons he gives for the rise of public relations after the war. Beattie cites "a new labour know-how in handling public opinion" and the public opinion fallout "as a result of postwar
investigations under the Combines Act” (p. 4). If Beattie’s suggestions are correct, some aspects of labour relations and an altered business environment should appear in practitioners own recollections of the public relations industry at that time.

**Practitioners’ recollections of their own careers**

Although a comprehensive history of public relations in Canada remains to be written, enough sources and witnesses may exist to sketch a rough drawing for the purpose at hand. Like a police composite based on observers’ recall, the proportions in this portrait of public relations may be somewhat distorted, since each source or witness contributes a different version. However, even an approximate picture of the recent past can contribute to our overall understanding of how public relations has developed. The observations of the four practitioners described here should be regarded as illustrative rather than representative. Louis Cahill, Jack Donoghue and Ruth Hammond were chosen on the basis of their long-standing involvement with the Canadian Public Relations Society; Munro Brown was chosen because he was the first PR manager for Canada’s oldest bank. Their recollections portray the nature of public relations practice fitting somewhere between the bookends of immigration PR and Gollner’s investigation of the arrival of public affairs in Canadian corporations. Their comments suggest that certain characteristics of public relations work and workers in Canada underwent subtle changes in the period after World War II, characteristics which may be more readily identifiable in the recollections of people who worked before, during and after the gusts of wartime information activity. At the individual level,
perhaps the simplest distinguishing feature of this period of practice was
the connection with newspaper reporting. Looking at early PR activities in
immigration and railways in Canada, and at the history of PR in the U.S., the
journalistic connection is a enduring and well-known feature of public
relations history. What makes the news orientation important historically
was how publicity and media relations came to define and possibly limit the
occupation for such an extended period of time.

Munro Brown and the Bank of Montreal

Though their career paths and even the nature of their work differed
in some important ways, both Munro Brown (former PR manager with the
Bank of Montreal, now retired) and Louis Cahill (currently honorary
chairman of the PR firm OEB International) began to practise public
relations in Canada during the 1930s. Brown's entry into public relations in
Montreal predated Cahill's earliest work in the Niagara region of Ontario by
only a few years. Brown (personal communication, August 17, 1994) first
moved from working as a journalist into public relations with a book
publishing company. A few years later he took on the job as manager of
advertising for the Bank of Montreal at its headquarters in Montreal, in 1932.

Although the Bank of Montreal holds the distinction as the oldest
chartered bank in Canada, its first public relations department was not
established until 1945, when Brown's new PR department was set up
reporting to the general manager of the bank. Founded in 1817, the Bank of
Montreal served as the banker for the Government of Canada from 1863
until the Bank of Canada was set up in 1935, and played an important role
in major projects such as the first canals and the Canadian Pacific Railway

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Published confirmation of when the Bank of Montreal established its PR department appeared in a list of its executive officers in its annual report for 1945. Previous reports contain no reference to public relations, while the 1945 report named F.W. (Munro) Brown as manager of the (new) public relations department. Bank general manager B.C. Gardiner conceded in the report "We realize that the greatly increased volume of transactions has resulted in some delays and inconvenience to customers" (Bank of Montreal, Annual General Meeting, Dec 3, 1945 p. 13). In a brief paragraph on public relations, Gardiner said:

During the past two years we have enlarged the scope of the Bank's advertising and publicity efforts with, we believe, satisfactory results. We have received much favourable comment from the public on this score and we believe the result has been broadly beneficial both to our business and to our public relations. I may add that our advertising recently received the highest rating in an independent appraisal of bank advertising in North America during the past year (p. 28).

The general manager's comments highlight the now familiar lumping together of public relations and advertising.

Brown said he believes most of his colleagues in the early years of his practice came from backgrounds in journalism. He suggested public relations may not have been the only recipient of people trained in journalism, though, since there were "all kinds of jobs that people moved into from the newspapers." Brown himself was recruited into PR from The Gazette in Montreal by Louis Carrier, the owner of a book publishing company, on the basis of a story he had written when Carrier spoke to a literary society meeting. Brown said the advantage of journalism training
was that it enabled a person to see a problem from many angles, rather than from a purely business or accounting standpoint. At the age of 14 he had gone to work with a firm of chartered accountants, moving from there into reporting for *The Gazette* in 1927. After 16 months of general reporting with *The Gazette*, he started his first public relations job with Louis Carrier and Company, where Brown did both public relations and advertising. His promotional work included a regular news sheet for editors interested in the book trade. Brown said he worked “wearing two hats,” meaning he handled publicity both as advertising tasks and editorial roles (such as writing news sheets), though he left editing of book manuscripts to his colleagues at Louis Carrier and Company.

Brown maintained the Bank of Montreal, like other Canadian banks after World War II, was slow to recognize public relations problems in how the banking business dealt with clients. Based on his experience with the bank from 1932 onwards, he said banks generally were “disliked, very, very substantially during the 30s, by a great, great many people.” By the 1940s, Brown said, banks were only beginning to see how they could rebuild. From a public relations perspective, he said the turn around came when a general manager who was open to Brown’s concerns moved into the presidency of the bank. George Spinney served as the bank’s president from 1942 to 1948, and during his term accepted two important briefs from Brown—one criticizing how the bank organized and administered its public relations activities, and a second brief proposing a new structure and a new approach.

To begin with, Brown said, he recommended the bank reverse the direction of its information. In other words, instead of telling the public about
the bank, he suggested the bank find out what its clients' banking problems were and try to deal with those problems. Appointed public relations manager in 1945 and with Spinney's backing, Brown hired a public opinion survey company called Canadian Facts. For $20,000--considered a large sum in those days to spend on a public relations initiative--Brown worked with the company to develop a questionnaire and conduct a survey to find out how people felt about banking and about the Bank of Montreal in particular. Brown had recommended initially that bank employees also be surveyed, to deal with the attitudes of the bank's internal publics. However, he was unable to convince the officers of the bank of the need and was unable to overcome internal resistance to the idea of asking employees their opinions, so the internal survey did not take place at that time. Brown said he still regards failing to convince bank officials to make the internal survey as his "greatest mistake," particularly in light of increasing evidence that employees are a key public for any business faced with competition and uncertainty.

At any rate, Brown said specific changes made as a result of the survey were significant but largely invisible. He suggested the greatest advance was integrating communication with the bank's various publics into how policy was determined for the financial community, the business community, and the average customer. In other words, Brown suggests management began to use public relations research to find out how its publics differed and how the bank could address the impression or image it held with different groups it needed to carry out the business of banking. Consistent with Grunig and Hunt's two-way asymmetric model of public relations (1984), the research was used to determine the public's point of
view on banks in general and how clients and others views the Bank of
Montreal's advertisements, so the public relations programs could be
structured to be more acceptable. Establishing a public relations
department in itself was a change, as was giving the PR manager the
authority to use public opinion research in the first instance, and to continue
to use research to test attitudes, ads and slogans. This type of survey
research represents one of the main characteristics of Grunig's third model
of public relations, the two-way asymmetric model which uses research to
improve the effectiveness of its persuasive programs.

When Brown joined the bank, the advertising department had a total
of six people. By the time Brown left the public relations department in
1960 to work on special projects, he had 35 people working there, including
three assistant editors--one each for news, administration and advertising.
Brown saw no conflict in working both on what he calls the merchandising
side (meaning advertising) and the editorial side (meaning public relations),
just as he had with the book publishing company. His department promoted
the bank economists' business letter using news items made accessible for
readers of weekly and daily newspapers (not just readers of the financial
pages), and publicized crop reports that came in from the branches.
However, he insisted the key difference was presenting the information from
the bank in a way that appealed to the average person. In this regard, the
public relations skills involved were those Grunig calls the writer in
residence element of practice, where practitioners trained in journalism
used a fact-based approach to address the needs of the media and the
media's audiences and readers. For the most part, he said, his worked
revolved around the creation of news, developing and writing economic
stories in a way which would appeal to newspaper editors and to their general readers. Brown maintained he had no difficulty carrying out the two roles, though some colleagues might find them conflicting interests, and says his department never tried to disguise advertising as news.

One additional characteristic of Brown’s early practice involved a split between in-house public relations workers and PR consultants. Brown recounted how he used to meet once a month for an informal dinner with an invited group of a dozen former newspaper people who were “working public relations people who headed PR departments.” He called them “practical people,” and distinguished them from the “professional PR men who had their own businesses,” and who were never invited. The self-imposed division Brown described, between in-house practitioners who worked for one firm and consultants who hired their services out to a variety of clients, was reflected in the way Montreal and Toronto organized their first professional associations.

Overall, then, many of the characteristics Brown identified in his career echo the early immigration campaigns. Included are the initial link with advertising and the movement of journalists into PR work. He also described the news orientation of PR products and the necessity of support from the dominant coalition in order to institute change. For the Bank of Montreal, he suggested substantial change occurred in 1945, with the incorporation of research into his PR practice. Although Brown was not a member of the association CPRS, he identified the same split between in-house practitioners and PR consultants that initially distinguished the Montreal and Toronto PR societies. And citing the influence of the Depression on the image of banks generally, Brown confirmed the timing of
noticeable change in the nature of his own practice as the mid-1940s.

**Louis Cahill and the Ontario Editorial Bureau**

From the very start, Louis Cahill followed the route Brown would classify as the professional PR man, meaning working as an outside consultant, though Cahill's career grew from a foundation of journalistic skills and a similar early focus on publicity. However, Cahill did not move directly from journalism into public relations. His earliest start out of high school came with sports writing, then he moved into general reporting on the Niagara area for papers including The Telegram in Toronto, and The Standard in St. Catherine's (personal communication, Feb. 19, 1995) Cahill said he simultaneously worked as a journalist and provided news and photographic services to the media by developing the Niagara News Bureau—the forerunner of the PR news service later called the Ontario Editorial Bureau. He recalled one of his first PR jobs working as the Canadian contact for an American PR consultant who was organizing the official dedication and re-opening of Old Fort Niagara “restored through Roosevelt’s make-work projects in the early 1930s.” While he acknowledged today’s practitioners might see working at the same time in journalism and in PR as a conflict, Cahill said, “Also remember that this was in the Depression, when things were very tough and making a buck was quite an achievement.” Rather than jumping in a single career move into public relations from journalism, Cahill said his PR career was “an evolution” of the Niagara News Bureau, which became recognized in that area as a successful way to gain to publicity and evolved into the Ontario Editorial Bureau. Among his first big clients was The Ontario Paper
Company Ltd., which retained the Niagara News Bureau in 1936—a firm OEB International still represents today. (The Ontario Editorial Bureau was later renamed OEB International.) Cahill believes the length of the client relationship between Ontario Paper and OEB International may even constitute a Canadian record. While working with the St. Catherine’s newspaper, Cahill also served through his Niagara News Bureau as the Niagara region press officer for the 1939 royal tour of King George the VI and Queen Elizabeth. The booklet *Public Relations in the Making*, published as a promotion tool by the Ontario Editorial Bureau some time after 1962, referred to another possible Canadian PR record, when the bureau joined Canada Public Relations Ltd. in 1951 as a founding member, the OEB booklet called the affiliation with Canada PR Ltd. Canada’s “first national public relations organization.”

The nature of Cahill’s early practice centred on publicity, or what Cahill terms “a news release business.” Though he regarded himself as a generalist, he identified three different elements as his career developed through OEB: the news focus, then an emphasis on labour relations, and eventually the broader area of communications and public affairs. In public affairs, he included the application of knowledge about the economic environment in which businesses operate, and identification of trends. Cahill cited the substantial impact on OEB’s growth of PR counselling on labour management. In fact, the Ontario Editorial Bureau, as it was then called, had prepared a booklet called *Management and the Media A Guide to Industrial Relations Communication with the News Media* for a group of major industrial employers. The growth came not from change in the business environment—change reflected in a power shift in labour relation.
He placed his first use of research in his practice in the 1950s, gathering "intelligence" on the business environment in other areas of the country as part of preparations for writing speeches to be delivered elsewhere. Cahill also recalled the early years in the PR association CPRS as a general membership, for PR practitioners who worked on staff of an organization or in a government department, or worked as consultants.

Unlike Brown, Cahill's career did not pass through advertising on the way from journalism. In most other regards, however, their recollections are remarkably similar, even though they pursued very different careers. Working primarily as an in-house practitioner, Brown relied heavily on his journalism background to produce products with a strong news orientation and placed his use of research starting in 1945. Cahill initially built his practice on the basis of his ability to actually combine PR and journalism and felt he began to use research in the 1950s. Both described a type of practice that conformed initially to Grunig's publicity and public information models of public relations. Also, as Gollner suggested, both practitioners identified external influences in the evolution of their work. For Brown, the Depression consolidated public opinion of banks; for Cahill, the demands of labor generated a distinct focus for a portion of his career as a PR counselor. As well, both practitioners were conscious of a shift in their own careers once they began to employ research, away from publicity and information roles, into more counselling at the decision-making level of organizations.

Jack Donoghue starts in military PR. The same royal tour that found Lou Cahill reporting and working as a
press officer in the Niagara touched Jack Donoghue, the new college
graduate serving as a lifeguard at the CPR hotel in Banff Springs. In his
book of recollections PR Fifty Years in the Field, Donoghue described his
“first brush with royalty” when the royal couple appeared unexpectedly to
view the hotel’s indoor pool. Donoghue went to work that fall of 1939 as a
reporter with British United Press in Vancouver, "learning how reporters
worked, how they approached news and why they did the things they did,
knowledge that was fundamental for a PR individual" (p. 6). He enlisted in
the army in 1942. Although he’d “never met a PR person or seen a news
release “(p. 7)” before enlisting, he wound up in army public relations,
evergreen doubt added to units at the front. Donoghue’s
earliest recollection of women working in public relations came in the army
during the second world war (personal communication, February 02, 1995).
Although women did not work in the field doing wartime public relations, he
said members of the Canadian Women’s Army Corps worked at the
headquarters in London in the film and photo unit. For the most part, he said
the army corps women performed administrative jobs in a public relations
environment, though some went on to become specialists in areas such as
organizing special events.

Donoghue remained in military public relations until 1964 when he
entered public sector PR with the federal immigration department and later
with the energy department. He subsequently moved into the private sector
as a consultant with Francis, Williams & Johnson Ltd., a PR firm in Calgary,
in 1973. In contrast to the other practitioners interviewed, Donoghue did not
recall that the majority of his colleagues in military public relations or
government PR came from journalistic backgrounds, though he said a
significant number would have. Still, apart from his own immediate colleagues in the military, he suggested in his book that journalists were the largest single group from which PR people were drawn after the war. He also distinguished between career civil servants doing public relations work, and ministerial press agents who are primarily political appointments and do often come from the ranks of journalists (personal communication, Feb 02, 1995). On the division between public relations consultants and in-house public relations practitioners, Donoghue felt the primary distinction rested with the status assigned consultants because they run their own businesses as well as practise public relations. In other words, Donoghue suggested what set consultants apart was simply their business orientation, rather than any sense that they practised PR differently from PR managers and directors who held in-house positions. His book, *PR Fifty Years in the Field*, characterized the different roles in his own career as consistently providing him direct access to the key decision makers in the military and the federal government. In an interview, he suggested public relations officers in current federal civil service may be further removed from what Grunig would call the dominant coalition because of revisions in structure.

Most of the cases presented in Donoghue’s book address primarily the media relations aspects of public relations issues. Chapter 12 on the development of a plan for “a park for all seasons” in Calgary provided somewhat of a departure from the other recollections. It recounted a case study meeting most of the characteristics of Grunig’s two-way symmetrical model, in a PR campaign carried out with Francis, Williams and Johnson Ltd. in 1973. Citizens who were potential park users were surveyed extensively and a complex feedback and decision-making plan followed, to
successfully develop a plan to accommodate the wishes of a wide range of publics, from politicians, to snowmobile enthusiasts and nature lovers.

Perhaps because of his wide range of experience in three applications of public relations, in his interview Donoghue tied the predominance of media relations work to a stage or level of individual practice. He associated a focus on news and media relations more with entry level positions and less to a specific period of time in the way he saw the occupation of public relations develop throughout his career. As for beginning to use research in his own PR practice, he believes the first time he used research such as surveys was in working with the federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR), to investigate the value to the department of scientists' time spent in preparing research articles for publication. Donoghue worked with EMR from 1969 to 1973, the surveys were conducted by an outside firm and designed so they could be repeated at little cost, at three year intervals.

Donoghue's career was just starting when Brown and Cahill were moving toward the use of research, but despite the time lag Donoghue was also drawn into public relations on the basis of his background in journalism. Like Cahill, he made no reference to a connection with advertising, either in the way his different roles functioned or in terms of the organizational structures in which he worked. In his book and interview, Donoghue described a career in which the first twenty years focused at various levels on different aspects of media relations. In short, journalism provided a fundamental and often defining influence on the nature of public relations for a substantial portion of Donoghue's early practice. Consistent with Grunig's models and Gollner's study, a more two-way approach to
public relations (involving research) accompanied his move into Energy, Mines and Resources after 1969 and subsequent campaigns as part of a team at the firm Francis, Williams and Johnson Ltd. starting in 1973; Gollner placed the surge in a public affairs approach in corporations in the 1970s.

**Ruth Hammond and publicity**

Toronto practitioner Ruth Hammond worked briefly during the war as a teacher, then worked as a reporter and editor for *The Star* in Toronto, and eventually moved into public relations in the 1950s. As was the case at that time with the employment policies of many employers toward women, when Hammond became pregnant she "had to leave," (personal communication, February 13, 1995). Her impression was publicity was the basis of most public relations consulting work being done at the time, though she recalled, "There weren't a lot of public relations men around either." As a newspaper section editor, her earliest recollection of women working in public relations were those who did publicity for Eaton's and Simpsons fashion shows; as well, she recalled two women--Joyce Tedman and Lois Stockdale--who had come to Toronto to work in public relations after working in wartime PR in Ottawa. By the time Hammond left the newspaper, she had built a small public relations practice operating from her home. Her business started from handling publicity for groups such as the YWCA, Girl Guides, and the Cancer Society--contacts she had made with various women's groups during her work as editor of the women's section of *The Star*. Particularly in the fifties, Hammond said her practice centred on publicity:

> In the beginning, the only way that people ever wanted anybody in public relations was to get
the press, that was their idea of it, they didn't understand anything else. It was to get ink... if it was the big firms, partly to see that they didn’t get bad press (personal communication, Feb. 13, 1995).

She later shifted her practice from home to an arrangement working from the offices of the public relations section of an advertising firm, continuing to specialize in non-profit organizations, but expanding as well into corporate clients such as insurance companies and manufacturers of packaged goods.

For Hammond, the change in her own practice away from a predominant focus on publicity came in the 1950s after she became involved with the public relations society in Toronto. Possibly the first woman to be accredited by the Canadian Public Relations Society, Hammond was originally recruited to the Toronto organization by Jack Brockie, known for his role in developing Eaton’s Santa Claus parade. Hammond said the society held exchange meetings with American PR practitioners and in-house corporate practitioners from the Toronto area, who would share their experiences in informal case study discussions. She said she also began to rely more on research in her own practice in the 1960s, as a result of the literature and case histories she examined in developing college level public relations courses. Hammond co-authored *Public Relations for Small Business* (1979) with Forbes LeClair.

Despite entering PR practice later than Brown, Cahill and Donoghue, Hammond still identified the press agency model of public relations as the predominant influence on her own public relations.
practice, well into the 1960s. These examples suggest individuals (like organizations) who began public relations work between 1930 and 1950 tended to work in a manner consistent with the publicity and public information models before they moved on to a type of practice like Grunig's asymmetric and symmetric two-way models of communication or Gollner's category called public affairs. Whether this results on an individual level because of journalistic background, or at the occupational level because of organizational expectations, the pattern of press agentry and public information style of practice persists. The public relations practice that emerged in the 1890s became populated largely by ex-journalists, because the skills they possessed matched the propaganda and information purposes of the day--purposes which persisted after World War II.

Gollner and Grunig also account for some of the shifts Brown, Cahill, Donoghue and Hammond observed in their combined practices from 1930 to the present day. All four practitioners interviewed described significant events between 1945 and the 1960s, including a noticeable increase in how many people took up public relations as an occupation, gradual introduction of communication research into their practice, reconciliation between consultants and in-house practitioners through the establishment of professional associations, and the introduction of what Gollner labelled as public affairs into their practice. In a way, Gollner's study quantified some of the practitioners' observations. The four practitioners interviewed worked and developed their practice in a period marked not only by expansion of the public relations industry, but also by a productive tension between the traditional, journalism-based
approach and the first stage of an entirely new style of public relations management. If government and organizations invent the kind of public relations they need, then as the need changes, so does the nature of public relations practice. The indicators of transition saw Brown set up his public relations department in the Bank of Montreal in 1945 and Cahill move with Ontario Editorial Bureau into labour relations in the 1950s. Similarly, Donoghue became part of the transition when he integrated research into his role as a PR counsellor in government public relations and in his work with Francis, Williams and Johnson Ltd, and Hammond was affected when she drew on literature and case studies to move her practice beyond “getting ink” for clients. Taken as an illustration of what happened in public relations, the four practitioners suggested that the changes Gollner pinpointed as occurring around 1970 may have amounted to the first noticeable shift since the emergence of public relations in the 1890s.
Chapter VII: Conclusion

This documented search for early signs of public relations practices in Canada reveals an intricate and irregular weave of government and corporate initiatives used to recruit immigrant farmers for Canada before the turn of the century. For no particular reason, the history of public relations in Canada has been seldom explored and little examined, but detailed government reports make immigration campaigns a useful place to begin. At the very least, this thesis attributes and documents some of the historical aspects of public relations practice that Canadian practitioners have talked about but rarely recorded in formally documented texts. To accomplish this task, the evidence of PR activities is informed by interpretations in light of communication theory, including the social history of news and the role of journalists, propaganda studies, and public relations theory. In short, this thesis assigns a starting point to the origins of public relations in Canada—a starting point which can then be argued or verified, as the case may be, in subsequent inquiries.

Although the terms public relations and public relations counsel were not invented at the time, my research clearly shows how the federal government, the CPR, and the Bell Telephone Company applied public relations techniques and strategies during the late 1800s and early the 1900s. Their initial PR campaigns revolved around using newspapers, printed material and public gatherings to generate publicity, as a means to win over opinion leaders and to persuade individuals. On the whole, the immigration campaigns appear divided between propaganda and
information objectives, to develop a new country beyond its origins as British North America. To fuel the much-needed development, successive governments of Canada chose to recruit settlers who would own and work the land in western Canada. As well, the government’s selected agent of expansion, the CPR, needed immigrants and tourists to keep its new business growing, and to perpetuate political support. Founded around the same time as the CPR, the Bell Telephone Company fought nationalization of the industry with public relations as a matter of survival. In their own ways, these organizations institutionalized original and imaginative public relations strategies, while developing public relations roles among staff and contract employees to carry out their campaigns.

Despite occasional setbacks, evidence of the rich and creative public relations strategies employed in the late 1800s means Canadian practitioners need not sit in awe of the clever tactics and publicly declared rationale employed by high-profile American figures such as Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays. From pursuing letter writing campaigns in the editorial pages of daily papers, to lobbying British clergy and textbook publishers, the early campaigns in Great Britain served as pilot projects for subsequent attempts to lure people to Canada. Charles Tupper, Clifford Sifton and Cornelius Van Horne masterfully orchestrated the development of public relations as a management function in Canada, and paved the way for journalists to apply their much-needed skills in the public relations field. Public relations tools tested and found wanting in Britain before 1896 were skillfully refined and targeted in pursuit of European immigrants and American farmers. Further advances were evident in media relations displayed in luring tourists, for example by conducting media tours for
newspaper editors and women journalists. A form of issue management was employed to fend off regulation in the telephone industry, by assembling experts to rebut the royal commission on telephone ownership and later by turning their testimony into propaganda. The profile of PR workers began to change once Interior Minister Clifford Sifton brought journalists into the occupation in key positions as he needed them, while he revamped departmental policies to attract American and European settlers in unprecedented numbers. This thesis also positions historical documents and archival sources in light of recent public relations and communications theory, to assess what factors eventually made the immigration campaigns effective. Particularly in the case of Sifton, his talents as a leader and insightful administrator are documented in departmental annual reports, historians’ analyses and the Sifton Papers.

Given the early connections between government public relations campaigns and business agendas, the use of propaganda strategies and techniques which, alarm current media critics may be improved, but their use is certainly not new. The Department of the Interior worked so closely with the privately-owned CPR company that reports from some CPR employees were incorporated into the department’s annual reports to Parliament. Nelson (1989) and Winter (1992) despaired over the power of advocacy advertisements in Canada’s recent free trade debate, but as early as 1905 Bell Telephone used advocacy ads to undermine the credibility of publicly owned telephone companies.

To provide context for the early years, this analysis includes some observations by practitioners whose work dates back to 1930s. From looking at early immigration and railway campaigns, we know that
journalists were introduced into the field of public relations in the 1890s. In the light of Gollner's study (1983) of public affairs in Canada and Grunig's models (1984, 1992), we can see how the influence of journalists endured well past the 1950s. Gollner acknowledged the interplay of technological, economic, social and political forces that compel corporations to develop new priorities and new decision making systems for the management of changing corporate environmental relations" (p. 9). In addition, he used his study to point out that "the single most important political force demanding a new managerial approach has been the growth of government intervention" (p. 41). I believe this observation is equally applicable to public relations for immigration recruitment including the railways in the 1890s, and for institutions such as banks and telephone companies at the turn of the century. I suggest that just as an interplay of forces resulted in the emergence of public affairs in the period Gollner studied in Canada, so pressures of development, political agendas and changed economies influenced Sifton's successful public relations ventures in 1896. As well, I believe a combination of these same forces inspired the CPR, the Bell Telephone Company and the Royal Bank to institute their initial PR campaigns.

One overall question lingers in the margins of PR history: what do lessons about the origins of public relations contribute to understanding current trends and changes? For one thing, this study suggests the field of public relations in Canada has benefited from change in the past. Immigration campaigns of the 1800s did not improve and prove effective until three things happened. The first was a change in government which provided a new minister who instituted deliberate management decisions
and initiatives to integrate the campaign objectives with the way the department of the interior did business. The second element was having immigration designated a national priority. The third element occurred when government and railways began to recruit journalists into the ranks of public relations workers, as a means to make best use of the mass media. None of these adjustments originated from within the field of public relations. In brief, the immigration recruitment successes of 1896 to 1900 suggest Grunig was correct when he said change will not occur in public relations without the support of the dominant coalition and unless practitioners have the skills needed to conduct the type of PR practice needed by organizations at that point in their history. The skills required in 1890 came from journalism and employers recruited people who possessed those skills. In the 1930s, Grunig and others are suggesting organizations require a different set of skills; the example of the immigration campaigns suggests organizations may seek out workers from other occupations if necessary, to meet their needs.

Grunig’s models of public relations and even Marston’s RACE formula have proved helpful in interpreting what to make of the PR products and strategies used as much as one hundred years ago. For example, the difference between listing the elements of Clifford Sifton’s immigration campaigns and recognizing how the campaigns differed from previous years rests with the framework provided by Grunig’s models. As well, finding campaigns documented as far back as 1890 suggests a far richer public relations industry may have been in place before World War II than has been previously imagined. The conscious use of traditional forms of mass media figures prominently in the early types of practice, and now we
know the history of media use in Canada dates back at least to the 1800s. Roots that strong are hard to deny and still permeate public relations thinking and use today.

**Filling in the gaps**

Such a brief analysis as this leaves countless intriguing avenues for further study into the origins and development of public relations in Canada. Based on my preliminary investigations, what could be revealed by following the path of immigration public relations from its roots in the departments of agriculture and the interior, to its current organization? Who were the leading figures in designing the enormous federal government information structure in place today, and what historical events have shaped that bureaucracy? How have access to information principles altered public sector information procedures? How could the study of propaganda inform an investigation of the rise and fall of Information Canada? Can an account be developed of all the public relations people and journalists who worked in Canada’s domestic and out-of-country wartime propaganda organizations? And how was Canada’s military propaganda machine related to the government propaganda network during World War II? What public relations activities accompanied major projects in Canada such as the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway? Given the extensive nature of the government public relations machinery at federal and provincial levels, together with their legal obligation for annual reports, the public sector PR industry could yield considerable insight into how public relations has grown in this country.

Just as intriguing is the development of public relations in the private
sector. This thesis implies that by using Grunig’s models, the RACE formula and Golin’s study, public relations practitioners could examine their own corporate archives and corporate histories for patterns that would identify when and why public relations began in their particular organizations. For example, how long has the Hudson Bay Company or The Bay store been using public relations, and how do their PR histories compare with that of Eaton’s or Simpsons? Or what internal and external public relations campaigns characterize the history of electrical power companies in Canada, both private and public? Who were the pioneers of public relations in Canada between 1900 and 1939, and how extensive was the public relations industry before World War II?

Lying just below the surface of any historical inquiries such as these lurks an important question: what should we make of the power of public relations in our society? Although learning about the history of public relations in Canada may benefit practitioners for its instructional potential, for communication scholars the history of the public relations industry ultimately returns to questions of access, democracy and the public interest. How do public relations giants such as Greenpeace mark their territory in Canada and what influence do they wield? Based on past history, how can we assess the respective PR power of supposedly opposing interests, such as environmental groups and resource-based industries? What are the implications for Canadians when PR campaigns seep into public policy issues from tobacco sales to hospital closings and inevitably pit one public against another? Ultimately, just what role does public relations play in our society and is that role in the best interests of the country and its citizens?

In the end, this thesis may have fallen into the trap of generating
more questions than answers. However, although I do not explain why the
history of PR in Canada has generated so little interest until now, at the
least I assign some long-overdue attention to the topic. We can say with
some assurance that people were paid to perform public relations activities
in Canada before 1900 under job titles such as immigration agent, traffic
agent or special agent. We can point to our own PR characters, such as
George Ham and John Gibbon, whose jobs created the mould for public
relations functions for the better part of this century, and we can ask whether
this model of practice can accommodate change. And we can analyze what
made one campaign in the 1890s succeed when others failed. As well, the
merits of using related fields such as propaganda studies and the social
history of newspapers are demonstrated in making sense of trends in the
history of PR in Canada. On the whole, this thesis provides a tiny piece of
groundwork which may spark the interest of public relations practitioners
and teachers, and possibly launch further study.
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