THE PROBLEM OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN CONFRONTATION
AS CONCEIVED BY LEO BAECK

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ABSTRACT

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The phenomena of Judeo-Christian disputation and polemic is perhaps as old as Christianity itself. Up to the modern times this type of dialogue between members of the Jewish faith and of the Christian faith took place, each attempting to prove the superiority and validity of his faith. In early modern time, the best known polemics of this nature are – the Mendelssohn-Lavater dialogue, and the Rosenzweig-Rosenstock dialogue.

It is hard to include Baeck's polemics with Christianity under the exact same definition, (although his confrontation with Harnack has some of the characteristics of the above classical polemics) however, Baeck's writings on Judaism and Christianity can most definitely be considered as polemic.

This thesis will examine Leo Baeck's approach to the above phenomena and will include the following:
a) An observation of the history of the above problem,
b) An examination of the events in Leo Baeck's life which
affected his views on the matter.

c) A study of Leo Baeck's fundamental definition of Christianity-Romanticism.

d) The antithesis to the above - Judaism as a classical religion.

e) A comparison between the approach of Baeck and the approach of two other contemporary philosophers: Franz Rosenzweig, and Martin Buber.
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BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

Leo Baeck was born in 1873 in Lissa, Possen, at this time a part of Prussia. Following in his father's steps as a rabbi, Baeck began his religious studies at the Jewish Theological Seminary in Breslau. In 1897, Baeck was ordained as a rabbi in the "Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des Judenmens". For the next ten years, Leo Baeck held the position of a rabbi in the city of Oppeln and for another five years he was a rabbi in Dusseldorf. In 1912, Baeck became the rabbi of the great Jewish community of Berlin, where he began to emerge as one of the leaders of German Jewry.

During these years of serving as rabbi in Berlin, Baeck taught at the "Hochschule" and served as head of major Jewish organizations in Germany, including the General Rabbinical Assembly and B'nai B'rith. When the Nazis came to power, Baeck was elected president of the Représentative Council of German Jews. As the Jews' condition in Germany grew worse, Baeck was urged by his friends to emigrate, but he refused, insisting that he cannot desert his brothers in times of crisis. In 1943, Baeck was sent to the concentration camp of Theresienstadt where by his leadership and teaching he set an example of hope and spiritual courage. When the war was over, Baeck immigrated from Germany to London where he
continued his theological writing, and thought at the Hebrew Union College in America.

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There is something significant in the fact that Leo Baeck's last published book is a statement on Christianity. With the appearance of "Judaism and Christianity" a circle was closed; Baeck began his way in theology with an answer to a Christian's statement on Christianity, and his work was completed by a major systematic study on this same religion.

Moreover, it seems that Leo Baeck almost needed Christianity for his writings on Judaism. No major work on Judaism was written by Baeck without having Christianity in
mind. It is always: "Essence of Judaism" as against "Essence of Christianity"; "Classicism" as against "Romanticism"; "Commandments" as against "Mystery"; Judaism as against Christianity.

Indeed Leo Baeck's works on Christianity which are contained in his book "The Essence of Judaism" as well as in "Judaism and Christianity", are writings of polemic. Yet, an important difference must be mentioned. In "The Essence of Judaism", Christianity is presented through Baeck's view of Judaism. Such a method must have some limitations, the picture of Christianity cannot be full and systematic. The picture of Baeck's Christianity became completed only with the publication of his last work; "Judaism and Christianity".

The trend of beginning by a presentation of a partial understanding and only later presenting the whole picture is not unique to Baeck's writing on Christianity. It was the same in his presentation of Judaism. Baeck began with what he called the "Essence", again a presentation of one religion through another. Only in his later book, "The Existence" was added to the "Essence" ("This People Israel - The Meaning of Jewish Existence").

The above suggested method of beginning with pure polemic and closing with a systematic comparative study of Christianity, does not mean to say that in his later writings on Christianity the sharpness of Baeck's argument is any milder. On the opposite, only in the book "Judaism and
Christianity" Baeck's conviction on the superiority of Judaism over Christianity is clearly apparent.
CHAPTER I

JUDEO-CHRISTIAN POLEMICS AND DISPUTATIONS

In the introduction to his book "Philosophy of Judaism", Julius Guttman makes the following statement:

"The Jewish people did not philosophize because of an irresistible urge to do so, they received philosophy from outside sources."

The above suggestion may even further stressed; traditional Judaism tended to reject philosophy. This tendency between Judaism and philosophy is decisively expressed in the Jewish history. The traditional conflict between ancient Israel and Greece was not solely based upon political grounds, it was, above all, the conflict between Jerusalem the city of revelation and Athens the city of philosophy and reason. Judaism and philosophy, or Jerusalem and Athens could hardly exist together. In Judaism, the discipline of philosophy was traditionally viewed as being a danger to the continuation of pure religious faith. This understanding is expressed by I. Husik in his essay "The Philosophy of Maimonides":

"Maimonides did not write his philosophy for the masses, nor did he compose his 'Guide for the Perplexed' for the simple and the pious, though learned students of the Talmud and other rabbinical literature. They are satisfied with their faith and Maimonides was not interested in disturbing it."
Maimonides' philosophy was not aimed for the general people, his "Guide" was never meant to be a book of religious authority for all, it was written solely for the perplexed.

In a world where the ultimate belief is that God created the universe and He stands behind all events, there is no place for perplexity. Indeed, in ancient Israel very little perplexity can be noticed. Religious perplexity had begun to be an important factor for the Jews only when, willing or not, they became exposed to outside religions and cultures. Therefore, only for the Jews dwelling in the diaspora did philosophy become an essential factor of Jewish spiritual life.

The creation of Jewish philosophy in the diaspora was aimed to satisfy two needs. The first is the need to demonstrate to the Jews and to the others that Judaism can be philosophically justified. The Jews who lived within the orbit of Greek culture, where philosophy was conceived to be the highest and most progressive expression of culture and ideological creativity, had to demonstrate the philosophical character of the Jewish idea of God and of the nature of man. This was the meaning of Philo's philosophy. The second need that Jewish philosophy meant to fulfil, was the need to defend Judaism from outside philosophical expressions which consciously or unconsciously could create doubts on the truth of Jewish religious conceptions. Since philosophy can be met only by philosophy, the discipline became a legitimate way
in Judaism. This type of philosophy, polemic in its essential, is the interest of this chapter.

The phenomenon of disputes between Judaism and Christianity is as ancient as Christianity itself. Parts of the New Testament bear the character of polemic, as well as traits of polemic might be found in the Talmudic literature.

Prior to the modern time, the encounters between Jews and Christians were generally marked by three factors. First, the existence of inequality between the partners to the dispute, the Christian counterpart was attacking while the Jew could normally only defend. Second, the disputes were initiated by Christians, and Jews reluctantly were forced to participate. Third, aggressiveness marked the argument of the Christians, thus, the encounter was not merely on academic grounds, the attempt by the Christians to destroy Judaism and to turn Jews into conversion was clearly demonstrated. For example, in the 15th century a Jewish scholar from Ferrara, Italy wrote: "Our Lord Ercole, the Duke of Ferrara and his wife and his brother...ordered me to speak and dispute with two celebrated scholars...I was compelled on their order...against my will I obeyed the above mentioned friars." The reluctance to engage in a dispute was not generated from a conviction of religious inferiority on the side of the Jew, it was an outcome of simple physical fear. Statements such as; "My speech with them was mild", "I am not afraid of the multitude", reveal clearly that the atmosphere of the dispute
was not peacefulness and tranquility.

Only with the appearance of the first buds of the
Enlightenment had the atmosphere of the dispute changed.
More and more a certain equality between the sides was assumed,
and the encounter became a dialogue between two equal par-
ties. When the fear of the Jew to engage in a dispute dis-
appeared, the tone of his argument had changed and instead of
the traditional mild speech, a full conviction of superiority
has been demonstrated. Yet, the reluctance of the Jews to
take part in the dispute can still be noticed, but this time
no longer out of physical fear. The best example of a dispute
that took place under these conditions is the dispute between
Moses Mendelssohn and J.C. Lavater in 1769.

When Mendelssohn was challenged by Lavater to engage
in a dispute he was shocked and refused to do so. This refu-
sal was not out of fear, nor was it as a result of a convic-
tion that Judaism is inferior to Christianity. His refusal
was because the challenge itself represented for Mendelssohn
a regression to the period when Jews had to publicly defend
their faith. In addition to this Mendelssohn stressed that
the non-missionary attitude of Judaism makes the whole pheno-
mena of disputation non-desirable for Jews. Moreover,
Mendelssohn knew that behind the challenge lies an attempt to
convert him. "The inevitable question: How can you, a learned
man, a philosopher, remain a Jew! - was bound to arise",^5
wrote Mendelssohn to a friend.

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A whole year after the initial challenge was issued to Mendelssohn, he realized that he can no longer avoid the dispute. Mendelssohn's final decision to engage in the dispute was marked by his full conviction that he goes to sacred battle and not merely to an academic dialogue. When accepting the challenge in 1770, Mendelssohn wrote to his friend:

"All my life I restrained myself from religious disputes and polemic... But I trust in the Lord my Fortress. He will gird me with strength for His battle and will put in my heart what I shall speak, and I know I shall not be ashamed."6

In his argument Mendelssohn listed the principles of Christianity, which he claimed, cannot be supported by reason, thus, he will never accept: the conception of the trinity in the divine, the incarnation of God, the redemption of one person through the suffering of another and the idea of original sin. Mendelssohn also expressed his doubt about the Christian claim that it is according to Jesus' teaching that the Jewish law must be abolished.7 Judaism, on the other hand, was viewed by Mendelssohn as being a pure, natural religion in which reason always prevails. This understanding is expressed in a letter written by Mendelssohn at the end of the dispute:

"We have no principles which are contrary to, or beyond reason. We add nothing to natural religion but commandments, statutes and just ordinances - thank God. But the principles and foundation of our religion are based upon pillars of reason and agreed in every respect with true analysis and speculation, without any contradiction or controversy whatever."8
This is perhaps the first time in the history of Jewish-Christian dispute that a Jew explicitly claims the absolute superiority of Judaism over Christianity.

In enlightened Germany of the 19th century, the relationship between Christianity and Judaism is marked by a paradox. On one hand, German society granted the Jews equal rights, this created for the Jews an atmosphere almost unknown until that time. On the other hand, whenever this was not met by the Jews with assimilation and conversion, it generated growing anti-semitism. In this strange and dynamic atmosphere the Mendelssohn-Lavater dispute took place. The same atmosphere was the background to the dispute between a devoted Christian who once was a Jew, a philosopher and historian, and a young but promising Jewish philosopher. This was the dispute between Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig.

The Rosenstock-Rosenzweig dispute is perhaps unique in its kind as it did not start as a command or a challenge to the Jew to defend his faith. It began rather as a dialogue between good friends. But typically to the time, the friendship was accompanied with a rather aggressive attempt by Rosenstock to bring about the conversion of Rosenzweig to Christianity. This trend can be noticed in Rosenzweig's description of his friend: "A persistent but inexperienced missionary." 9

Prior to October 1913 Rosenzweig's argument was marked by his conviction that his statement is inferior to
that of his opponent, and when he came to the final realization that the "staff of the synagogue" is really broken, Rosenzweig decided to accept the consequences and to be baptized. It was, however after Rosenzweig's participation, for the first time in his life, in an Orthodox ceremony of Yom Kippur that he decided that his evaluation of Judaism was wrong. Thus, he reversed his decision to convert. Knowing the impact of this decision on his friend, Rosenzweig wrote:

"I have something to tell you...I have arrived at the point of taking back my resolution. It seems to me no longer necessary and therefore, in my case, no longer possible. So I am remaining a Jew."\(^{10}\)

Following Rosenzweig's resolution, and with the removal of the conviction that in his argument he "Judaised" his outlook of Christianity,\(^{11}\) the dispute began to be laid in more equal basis. Both scholars had been now convinced of the absolute truth of the religions which they represent.

Many of the debatable issues in the Rosenstock-Hochbauer-Rosenzweig dispute are based upon the principle which had been traditionally debated in the disputes. Such issues were: the concept of law within Judaism and its abolishment by Christianity, the crucifixion of Jesus and the interpretation of Hebrew Bible stories. The first two issues will be strongly stressed in the remainder of this work, with respect to the last issue the dispute shows some very interesting insights. Such was the dialogue concerning the concept of the
"Akeda" - the sacrifice of the son, within Judaism and Christianity.

The dialogue began by comparing the "Akeda" of Isaac to the concept of sacrifice in the New Testament. For both scholars, the sacrifice is a manifestation of the level of faith within Judaism and Christianity. Rosenstock's basic argument was that while Abraham sacrificed what he had, Jesus sacrificed himself, namely "Christianity sacrificed itself". This according to him bears the essential difference between Judaism and Christianity. In Judaism, the one who does the sacrificing does not do it to his own body, and himself comes out gaining from his deed, becoming the father of a nation. In Christianity, on the other hand, the sacrifice is purely for the name of God without thought of any gain:

"Abraham sacrifices his son; in the New Testament he who brings the covenant with God sacrifices himself. Among... the Jews, everyone aspires to be founder, father, owner, testator, ancestor, guardian, master... The Christian, on the other hand, knows a second kingdom of poverty, weakness, dependence, minority, shame, repentance, and shy childishness. Abraham sacrificed what he had, Christ what he is."  

Rosenzweig agrees that the ultimate expression of Christian religiosity is the self sacrifice, but he points out that no promise of gain laid behind Abraham's readiness. Furthermore, says Rosenzweig, the sacrifice meant for Abraham the destruction of any possible promised gain:

"The remaining of the promise according to human understanding becomes impossible
through the sacrifice."14

Abraham's sacrifice meant the sacrifice of his possibility to become the people of God, which for him, was the meaning of his existence. Thus, when Abraham went to kill his son he was ready not only to sacrifice what he has but what he is and what he will be:

"It is the prototype of the sacrifice not of one's person but of one's existence in one's people; of the son and all future sons."15

Rosenzweig agrees that Christ sacrificed "That he is" while Abraham sacrificed not only "all that he is" but "all that he could be".16

Both partners to the dispute, Rosenzweig and Rosenstock, were united in their affirmation that they represent religions which bear the absolute truth and this affirmation becomes stronger and stronger as the dialogue progresses. However, the final goal of their discussion was not to destroy but rather to clarify and to understand.17

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Leo Baeck's major theological work, "The Essence of Judaism", is indeed a book of polemic. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the book, one can hardly be mistaken - "The Essence of Judaism" is an antithesis to Adolf Harnack's "Essence of Christianity". The name of Baeck's book and its contents clearly demonstrate that this statement on Judaism
was written by Badeck as an answer to Harnack’s statement on Christianity.

Adolf Harnack (1851-1930) was already at the end of the 19th century, a well-known theologian and a scholar of German Protestantism. His teaching, however, was debatable within the German and the general Christian milieu. Despite the fact that Harnack’s statement on liberal Christianity was not accepted by the Church as a valid interpretation, he was invited to teach at the University of Berlin where he was a professor of "History of the Church" for thirty-two years. In 1900, at the age of forty, Harnack was invited by the Berlin Academy of Science to write a book on the two-hundred-year history of the institution. Harnack’s major contribution to Christianity of the early twentieth century was a series of sixteen lectures which he held for students and members of all the faculties of the University of Berlin. These lectures on Christianity were the foundation of his major work "Das Desen des Christenthums", which was published in its first edition in Leipzig in 1900, and was translated into English under the somewhat misleading title "What is Christianity?".

The main message of this book is that Christianity must step into a new era, it must reverse itself to its real origin, to being a religion of Jesus rather than a religion about Jesus. According to this ideology, Christianity must rise from its sickness, namely from Hellenistic and Jewish concepts which had penetrated during the course of the Church's
history, and return to pure faith in the living spirit of Jesus Christ. In other words, Harnack claimed that the time had come for Christianity to emancipate itself from its historical ties to reason (Hellinism) and to law (Judaism). In this light, we may understand Harnack's rejection of Judaism and of the Hebrew Bible as a valuable source for Christian faith:

"The conviction that Old Testament prophecy was fulfilled in Jew's history had a disturbing effect on tradition."18

In fact, the trend of disassociating Christianity from its roots in the Hebrew Bible and in Judaism is an early phenomena in the history of the Church. Marcion (85-160), a Christian from Sinope, Greece, tried to oppose an attempt to explain the Hebrew Bible in an allegoric fashion in order to eliminate differences between the biblical writings and Christian concepts. Marcion understood that such an explanation would legitimize the Hebrew Bible and would make it an organic part of Christianity. He admitted that the God of the Jews is the creator of the universe, but since this world is evil in its nature, it is incomprehensible that its creator is the father of Christ. Marcion believed that Paul was aware of this, and therefore he did not conceive Jesus as being the realization of the Biblical Messiah, but rather the master of compassion to all people who believed in his life and death. It was only latter Christians, claimed

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Marcion, who under the influence of Judaism, introduced into Paul's pure faith in Jesus the notion of the Father. Thus, to Marcion, God (the Father) must be rejected from having a holy role for Christians, and faith in Jesus Christ, the only pure deity, must be restored. Consequently, a rejection of the Hebrew Bible followed. This method of regarding Jesus as being the Lord of compassion and mercy while regarding the biblical God as representing severity and strictness only, brought upon Marcion the rejection of the Church, and his theory has never been accepted as the official way of Christianity.

In Marcion's teachings, Harnack saw the foundation of his own doctrine. In a letter which he wrote at 1900, Harnack said the following:

"There can be no doubt that Paul would have perceived with sorrow and indignation the growth of Christian syncretism. It is equally questionable that he would have approved of Marcionic criticism of Christianity. He also would have regarded it, i.e. Christianity, as a mislead and lost flock. He would have seen a genuine disciple of himself in this man who arose here as a reformer."19

Marcion is perceived by Harnack to be the true follower of Paul. Thus, his attempt to reform Christianity by creating a faith which is absolutely independent of its Jewish origin and the Hebrew Bible was an adaptation of Marcionic theology.

It would be irresponsible to perceive Harnack's
rejection of Judaism as an indicator of an anti-Semitic attitude. Harnack was above all a liberal; he rejected the anti-Semitic demagogy of Adolf Stoecker (1897). Harnack was above any form of racial prejudice.

Harnack's method of theology may be summarized in the following way: there were three personalities in the history of Christianity who attempted to form Christian religion on the basis of pure faith in Jesus Christ: Paul, Marcion, and Luther. All failed, the reason being that the people of their time were not ready to accept their ideology. In his time, (the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century) a time of "enormous changes in our knowledge of the world", Harnack believed that the generation was ready for a religious reform as well.

Harnack's theology is not as extreme as Marcion's. Unlike Marcion, he did not reject the ties between Christ and the Father but he was careful to point out that Christian faith is in "The God whom Jesus Christ called his father." He rejected the Jewish religious attitude as it manifested itself in the Hebrew Bible. This rejection did not include all part of the Bible. The songs of Psalm and the sayings of the classical prophets were conceived as a valuable material to Christianity. It is only the essential canonic character of the Hebrew Bible which Harnack rejected. Consequently, Harnack claimed, the traditional outlook of ties between Judaism and Christianity is absolutely false:
"Jesus Christ's teaching will at once bring us by steps...to a height where its connexion with Judaism is seen to be only a loose one, and most of the threads leading from it into 'contemporary history' become of no importance at all."22

According to the understanding of professor A. Earnest Simon,23 it was this last statement which originated Baeck's sharp polemic. Baeck's anxiety was awakened not essentially by Harnack's attempt to disassociate Christianity from Judaism but rather from his attempt to disassociate Judaism from having a major role within the forces which formulated the modern western culture. Moreover, Baeck, the young liberal rabbi refused to see Judaism reduced to a past phenomena on the path of history. For him, Judaism's contribution to the modern world was and still remains crucial, just as the contribution of the rest of the world is to Judaism:

"It is sufficient to point out the influence of Jewish thinkers and scientific investigators in the thought of the Middle Ages, and to the way in which that thought in turn influenced them."24

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Baeck's polemic with Adolf Harnack and with Christianity will be the major content of this thesis, nevertheless, it is appropriate to point out some problem prior to the penetration into the depths of Baeck's argument.

First of all, a methodological remark: the fact that Leo Baeck uses the term "essence" within the title is
understood, but here a question must be put forth: can a work which is essentially polemic represent a clear picture of the essence of Judaism? An apologetic writing, by the nature of its character, must to a certain degree, be determined by an outside factor (i.e., the opposed material). Indeed, Leo Baek's "Essence of Judaism" is to some degree, directed by its subject - Harnack's "Essence of Christianity". Therefore, Baek in his early works might have been successful in disputing Harnack's attitude. His statement on Judaism, however, is not always accurate.

One illustration to the fact that the destruction of Harnack's theory was presented for Leo Baek before all, and thus, his representation of Judaism is somewhat inaccurate is Baek's understanding of the Jew's role within the nations.

In his anxiety to attack Harnack's attempt to disclude Judaism from being an effective contribution to modern religion and culture, Baek argues in the opening of his book:

"Only at very rare period did the Jewish world...exist in a spiritual ghetto."25

This somewhat strong statement is further stressed at the end of his book:

"All presuppositions and all aims of Judaism are directed towards converting the world."26

This is to say that Baek assumes active missionary to be the task of Judaism. Baek's attempt to demonstrate an essence of Judaism through a phenomena that existed only during a
limited period of Jewish history, the early years of the Roman Empire, is not only denied by Jewish scholarship and historical reality but by Baeck himself:

"All education was directed to this end: to be different was the law of existence."27

Is it not feasible to argue that the attempt of the Jews to retain their difference from others is paradoxical to missionary being an essence of Judaism? Judaism only rarely considered itself a missionary religion, its task to the nations was being a passive example rather than an active converter, a quiet "light for the nations" rather than a loudly trying to win "believers among non-Jewish people".28 The above argument is only one illustration of the penetration of the atmosphere of polemic into Baeck's teaching of Judaism.

The second problem arises from Baeck's apologetic. Harnack's use of the word "essence", was essentially an outcome of a practical attempt to define Christian concepts in a way which would unite all different Christian groups. The degree of differentiation between movements within Judaism does not compel such a definition, which is essentially not traditional.

These two remarks are not aimed to radically diminish Baeck's argument. In the whole, Baeck's polemic and his statement of Judaism are solid. What I meant to say was that the attempt to combine a presentation of "essence" of Judaism within a framework of polemic cannot be perfect. It can only
completely satisfy one side, in this case — polemic.

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There is one important difference between the Baeck-Harnack disputation and most of the preceding. It was a one-sided dispute. Harnack never meant to write polemic. When he lectured the series of sixteen lectures, he did not assume that these lectures would become a base for a Judeo-Christian disputation. Moreover, there is no indication that the well-respected professor was ever aware that a young liberal rabbi is trying to denounce his argument.

Therefore, this dispute was probably the first one which was initiated by a Jew. It was the first time that a religious manifestation which contained an anti-Jewish statement was not met by quiet disapproval but by a sharp criticism from a Jew who was convinced of the superiority of his faith.
CHAPTER II

ROMANTICISM

The traditional development of both, Judaism and Christianity, is based upon historical figures and realities. People and events of the past are significant to the understanding of both religions. Judaism cannot be read apart from the "Giving of the Torah" and the character and deed of Moses. Christian religion will have no meaning if divorced from the crucifixion and the life and teaching of Christ. These are root events and figures in these two faiths, without them these religions could not have been created or would have a totally different meaning from the way they were meaningful through history. Therefore, historical events and key personalities are the theological affirmation of the essential presence of the Divine within a western religion. It is understood, thus, that the examination of root events and figures, rather than merely understanding the final expression of religion, is crucial when attempting to compare and contrast Judaism and Christianity.

Religious tradition may never be assumed as finalized. The development of religious doctrine accompanies and will accompany a religion as long as it will exist. This is the secret of freshness and liveliness within a religious order.
All religious concepts and rituals have been changed and modified during the course of history, for in every generation a different perspective may be emphasized. Moreover, some religious concepts are not equally shared by all believers. Some groups adopt one concept and reject another. In some cases a whole concept is rejected by a sect and another is highly elevated. However, every religion contains concepts and notions which have always been accepted. These concepts, which are indispensible, were always considered as the essence of a religion. Such concepts are the particulars which must be examined when coming to study the nature of any western religion.

The above understanding determines Leo Baeck's methodology when coming to study Judaism and Christianity. Baeck bases his statements upon two elements: first, upon an examination of root events and figures in the process of the development of the two faiths. Here, the personality of Paul and his contribution to Christianity is particularly emphasized for Paul is considered by Baeck as being the most significant contributor to the formulation of Christian doctrines. Then, key concepts of Christianity such as, the concept of sin, cult, law, ethics, faith, are analyzed by him.

* * *

To be sure, for Leo Baeck the significant personality in the process of the Church's development is not Jesus,
neither is the teaching of Christ considered by him to be the theological ground of Christian concepts. It is Paul who more than any other has his imprint on the theological outlook of Christian faith. It is Paul and his life which are the grounds of Leo Baeck's essential definition of Christianity—Christianity is a romanticism:

"If we classify types of piety in accordance with the manner in which they have historically become types of religion, then we encounter two forms above all: classical and romantic religiousness, classical and romantic religion. The distinction and opposition between these two types is exemplified especially by two phenomena of world history. One of these, to be sure, is connected with the other by its origin and hence remains determined by it within certain limits; and yet the significant dividing line separates them clearly. These two religions are Judaism and Christianity. In essential respects they confront each other as the classical religion and the romantic religion."

The Paulin religion which Baeck uses for his definition is not Christianity at any specific time or place. It is the essence of Christianity, common to all its divisions and at all times.

Baeck chooses to use the term "Romanticism" not by an accident. Historically, it was the period when the romantic movement rose in western Europe and in Germany in particular as an anti-thesis to the reason and knowledge of the Enlightenment. In these times, the romantic mood began to penetrate into many different aspects of life; into art, into religion, and even into politics. Perhaps this
inspired Baeck's decision to use the notion of romanticism as a base to his critique on Christianity.

It is the customary meaning of romanticism which is used by Leo Baeck in his argument. He does not mean to change its meaning at all, only to carefully prove the accuracy of his diagnosis of Christianity as a romantic religion.³

Christianity is, to Baeck a religion which is built upon blind faith, rather than understanding, experiencing life rather than taking an active part in it, being completely dependent rather than attempting to determine the course of life, being passive rather than creative. As suggested, for Leo Baeck it was Paul who introduced all these notions into Christianity, it was him who made romanticism the main theme of this faith.

There exists only a minimal amount of reliable material from which Baeck can learn about Paul's biography. Paul's own correspondence which appears in his Epistles in the New Testament, contains some biographical material from which information of his life was taken by Baeck.

In Paul's life, two potential conflicting elements are seen by Baeck. In his early years, Paul lived and was brought up in Tarsus, Cilicia (Asia Minor) which is known as a cosmopolitan city and a home of some famous philosophers. Here, Paul apparently began to use the Latin name Paulus in reference to his Hebrew name Saul. In his later life Paul immigrated to Palestine where he was reintroduced to Judaism.
by, as it is believed, I Gamaliel. Under the guidance of Gamaliel, Paul mastered in Torah, Mishna and Midrash.

Leo Baeck tends to emphasize the early part of Paul's life and to somewhat underplay the second. However, Baeck does not fail to recognize Paul's Judaism as being a factor in his teachings. According to Leo Baeck, the central motive in Paul's life was the conflict within himself between the ideologies formulated in his youth in Tarsus and the ideologies of traditional Judaism. Baeck believes that this conflict manifested itself in Paul's new created faith.

The expression of two opposing cultures and religious experiences could have led Paul into three avenues of reaction; he could have turned to one extreme and neglect the other, or some fusion essentially structured upon one culture but complete with concessions to the other could have taken place. Baeck's argument is that Paul selected the third avenue. The conflict finally manifested itself in a process of fusion. Therefore, Paul's created faith is considered by Leo Baeck to be a combination of Roman, Egyptian and other mystery cults, which all share the common denominator—romanticism, with an added progressive dimension which was essential to Paul's understanding of religion—monotheism:

"Moreover, it has received further strength from all sides, wherever religious romanticism had a home: from the oriental and Egyptian mysteries, from the cults of Mithras and Adonis, of Attis and Serapis. In essentials they were all alike: they shared the sentimental attitude which
seeks escape from life into living experience and turns the attention towards a phantastic and marvelous beyond."4

Indeed, the belief in a setting where death and resurrection of a deity, was rooted in many myths of the time. This belief which emphasizes notions such as; human original sin, a saviour, a sacred sacrament, gave ground to Baeck’s claim that the mystery of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection was not new to Paul when he arrived in Palestine:

"It (the combined factor of all the mystery cults which Paul was introduced to in Tarsus) was the faith in a heavenly being that had become man, died, and been resurrected and whose divine life a mortal could share through mysterious rites, the faith in force of grace entering the believer from above through a sacrament, to redeem him from the bonds of earthly guilt and earthly death and to awaken him to a new life which mean eternal existence and blessedness."5

The striking resemblance of Paul’s presentation of Christianity to the mystery cult legends is used by Leo Baeck to describe Paul’s labour in forming Christianity as being a manifestation of him being a romantic. For Leo Baeck Paul did not creat a new faith; "Paul was like all romantics, not so much a creator of ideas as a connector of ideas.6

Paul arrived in Judea in the midst of the dilemma of Jesus’ death and its effect on his Jewish followers. This was a fertile ground for the resolutiin of his own inner conflict. Those Jews anticipating the return of Jesus were unconsciously caught up in a similar situation as pagans who anticipate resurrection of their saviour deity. It was only
logical for Paul to offer this particular group his own conclusion about the nature of the Messiah, just as it was natural that this conclusion would be accepted. By a simple act, argues Baeck, Paul was able to diminish the most important conception of Judaism, i.e. the Messiah, to a second-rate pagan myth, and to introduce into paganism the essential of a progressive religion. Moreover, by a single act he was able to provide a religion which will appeal to the pagan and to the suffering Jew who strives for quick redemption:

"Now he grasped it: not Attis or Adonis, not Mithras or Serapis was the name of the resurrected, the saviour who became man and had been God, but his name was Jesus Christ. . . . the day that was promised had become today and had been fulfilled. In him Jews and pagans were the new man, the true Israel."

The genius distinction of Paul lays, according to Leo Baeck, in his ability to unit and coordinate a multiple natured religion, a mosaic of faith which provides answers and comfort to all troubled souls, be it pagans or Jews. The enormous fast-spreading of Paul's religion is therefore evident, for this and only this can be the character of a religion that may become a world religious order. Accordingly, Baeck argues:

"In the world wide empire it could become the world religion and the world philosophy. Whatever it was that a human being might seek - it promised everything to everybody, mysteries and knowledge, ecstasy and vision, living experience and eternity. It was everything, and took the place of everything, therefore it finally overcame everything."
The argument that Christianity was influenced by mystery cults is generally accepted. The distinct feature which Leo Baeck added to this discussion is the answer to the question of the magnitude of the different elements within Christianity. Thus, to the question: is Christianity essentially a romantic faith enriched by elements from Judaism, or is it essentially Judaism bearing unessential romantic elements, Baeck's answer is clear; "what is called the victory of Christianity was in reality the victory of romanticism."9

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Among the different movements within Christianity there appears to be a considerable area of agreement on the problem of man's nature. Traditionally, both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians alike accept the concept of original sin. Paul's attempt to justify this concept by using the biblical narrative hardly impresses Leo Baeck:

"The theory of original sin..., which Paul formulated after the manners of ancient mystery doctrine, and then shrouded in a biblical talmudical dress..."10

For Leo Baeck this concept is a natural expression of the main trend of Paul's faith, of romanticism. Not only is it a romantic theory for it is borrowed from romantic cults, it is romantic because it bears the idea that Man is "helpless and absolute dependant",14 essential terms in the definition of the romantic person. Where man is assumed to be helpless, for he is essentially motivated by sin, his will and his
deeds have very little relevancy. Thus, claims Baeck, aside from blind faith only passivity is demanded:

"In this way religion becomes redemption from the will, liberation from the deed."12

Faith is perhaps the ultimate expression of man's religious urge within western religions. In Christianity faith is clearly regarded as God's gift of grace extended to man. "Although man can pray for faith, it is not something he can achieve with his own efforts. This understanding of faith contains the core notion of romanticism - passivity, labouring for the achievement of faith is of no value. Baeck admits that in the Middle Ages an attempt was made to "soften this conception and grant a certain amount of human participation",13 but Martin Luther, who is considered by Baeck as the renewer of romantic trends in Christianity, preached:

"Sola Fide, through faith alone; it must come from heaven and solely through grace ... 'as one paralyzed', men should wait for salvation and faith."14

Baeck's vier of the concept of faith is different. The achievement of faith is a process which begins with man's inquiry, and only when being convinced, only when having the knowledge, faith can be reached. This order does not imply within a romantic religion. Here the opposite order is assumed, passivity is the essential condition, then faith will come as a gift of grace, and only then will man be provided with knowledge:

"This faith is therefore decidedly not the
expression of a conviction obtained through struggle, or of a certainty grown out of search and inquiry. Seeking and inquiring is only 'wisdom of the flesh' and the manner of 'philosophers and rabbis.' True knowledge is not worked out by man but worked in him; man cannot clear a way toward it; only the flood of grace brings it to him and gives him the quintessence of knowledge, the totality of insight."

Not only is knowledge and wisdom considered of no value for faith, they are assumed to be an obstacle. Accordingly Baeck quotes from Martin Luther: "...reason shall be killed for reason fights faith". Passivity, claims Baeck, becomes a religious commandment in a romantic faith.

The concept of miracles within Christianity, is for Baeck an extended expression of its romanticism. It is the tendency, claims Baeck, of a progressive religion to, to some extend, underplay the role of miracles in its history and within its theological outlook. Judaism, says Baeck, sees the miracle as a phenomena of its childhood. But in a religion characterized by a romantic attitude where man's effort and struggle are regarded as irrelevant, the miracles become an indispensable religious feature:

"Now in Christianity, this abundance (of the miracle) emerged again as a constant - every flowering of romanticism has involved a flourishing of the faith in miracles - and it here becomes a principle, a dogma, a central concept of the religion." 17

Relationship between man and his God are marked in a romantic religion by having only one direction - the direction from heaven to earth. Man, thus, is a mere subject
to God's action, he cannot do anything but experience God's miracles. Living experience of the miracle is therefore, the ultimate necessity. The problem of experience, argues Baeck, is by its being a function of man's mood. Mood, however, cannot always be determined by man himself, sometimes he is a mere subject of his moods. Here, Baeck notices a paradox within Christianity:

"...it can never do without the living experience, yet this experience does not want to and cannot come continuously, nor can it be brought to everybody; it 'bloweth where it listeth'."

Consequently, a solution must be found by which the experience will be "brought down to earth". Some cultic action must be provided to man which will open for him the gates of heaven whenever he needs it.

Cult is an essential element in western religious order, for among other things, it represents a form of organisation by which the individual believer or the community as a whole may worship God. All forms of cults are designed to bring the believer into close relation with his deity. Cultic ceremonies normally consist of symbols which remind people of religious doctrines. The sacrament, the most important ceremony of Christian worship, represent for Leo Baeck the ultimate cultic act of a romantic religion. The sacrament is not aimed to intensify man's faith and to make him receptive of the religious doctrine, the sacrament is the doctrine. By
practicing the sacrament, the individual is not merely reminded of the miracle, he is experiencing it. For Baeck, the sacrament is the "ever ready miracle". Typically, for a romantic religion, the sacrament provides, with no demanded human effort, the possibility to experience and re-experience the miracle of salvation day after day. The sacrament, thus, is not a symbol of Christian doctrine, it is Christianity itself. Paulin Christianity had in mind the person "who would rather dream than work", to this man the sacrament is the fantastic path to redemption. In one act, the ultimate dream of mankind is turned to reality. Paul introduced a religious order which "promised everything to everybody" indeed, claims Baeck, the ultimate cultic experience must be an expression of this religious way. The sacrament, thus, "gave everything and accomplished everything, it saves and redeems and was at the same time the ever ready gift of everyday".

The position of the miracle as the only expression of God's presence elevates the sacrament to an ultimate height. Cult, therefore, becomes not merely an important religious expression, it is the only one. Consequently, religion must be strictly organized. Here, Leo Baeck introduces the church as an obvious outcome of a romantic religious formula.

The church which came into existence through a miracle claims the sole possession of the "keys of the kingdom of
heaven". Typically, for romanticism the dependency of the believer on a religious authority is absolute. "For only with it," claims Baek:

"does the experience occur, and it alone dispenses the miracle and thus effects redemption...it shuts and opens the gates of the kingdom of heaven. It is everything and the individual in his striving and searching is nothing; he is absolutely dependent on it and can only share its faith. Whatever would be different and independent, is denied salvation and turned over to the abyss."24

Baeck's attitude to the problem of religious organisation is essentially an expansion of his perception of the church as an expression of romantic trend.

In a religion where aside from cult the emphasis is upon activism, man's labouring and his use of the priesthood in ceremonial matters are together the established path of religious practice. However, the authority of the priesthood is limited, the priesthood is merely a normative element. (This is the reason why in contemporary Judaism, the fact that the priesthood is no longer a functioning authority, has no serious diminishing effect on Jewish life). However, in a faith where activism is rejected and man's decision has no value, only "with ecclesiastical authority - whatever pope, bishop, council or secular church body - lies the power of decision".25 Thus, only a firm and tangible authority can provide the believer with the means and guide him in his way to God. In this light Baek understands Augustin's declaration:

- 34 -
"I should have no faith in the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not induce me." 26

The attitude of the church of having the exclusive possession of "the key to the gate of heaven" has for Leo Baeck a further implication. Two classical conceptions are being jeopardized, claims Baeck, the image of God as God of the universe and the notion of the equality of all man in front of God:

"The glory of God no longer fills the world but only the Church; everything outside the Church is the realm of the devil, given over to his dominion. Mankind is cut to two; the deep abyss passes right through it and separates the elect and the damned. . . . The conception of the unity of mankind is thus broken up." 27

Unity of mankind is no more assumed, one who rejects the Church is automatically denied redemption for the truth is only within the Church. Truth, therefore, argues Baeck, loses its eternal meaning, it is no longer objective. The judgement whether something is true or false is not determined by universal conception. Whatever is against it is a lie. This is Baeck's interpretation of the verses from the Gospel: "He who is a liar but one who deneth that Jesus is the Christ." 28

Truth is no longer universal, beyond the barrier of any particular religion, it only belongs to one side. Love of truth is being substituted by love of the Church.

Using a combination of quotations from the New Testament and from Luther, who is perceived by Baeck to be the renewer of Paul's romantic attitude, Baeck continues his argument and
discuss Christianity attitude towards the traditional Jewish law:

"Christ is the end of the law" (Romans 10:4)
"The Gospel is the doctrine which admits no law", "The law was fulfilled by Christ, one needs not fulfill it but only adhere with to Him who has fulfilled it and be made like Him." 29.

For Leo Baeck, the romantic person's behaviour is the ultimate expression of man's passivity. Man's life is being determined by external powers. Man does not control life but he is being controlled, thus, he does not work he experiences. When romanticism becomes a religious philosophy, evidently, commandments are rejected. In the core of this argument lies Baeck's involvement in Rabbinical Judaism which conceived the fulfilment of the law as an expression of man's freedom to determine his destiny. Paul's preaching "sola fide" (by faith) is not understood by Baeck to mean an introduction of a revolutionary religious conception. It is merely an adoption of an additional romantic idea. Christ, therefore, is not considered by Baeck as:

"...the end of the law, it is Paul's affirmation of romantic ideas which marks the 'Crossing of the boundary of Judaism'." 30

Christianity's attitude towards justice is conceived by Baeck to be a consequence of its approach to the law. Justice is not neglected by Christianity. The classical outlook that the fulfilment of the law assures justice is irrelevant for justice is determined by one thing only - by
faith. "Christian justice is faith in the son of God," quotes Baek from Martin Luther. Man's duty, thus, is no longer to search and struggle for justice, it is a gift of grace:

"We are called just not when we do what is just but when we believe in God." Typical to romanticism, claims Baek, man's partnership in the process of justice is not assumed - justice is not performed by man: "Justice is now... performed on Man." Justice is not originated in man, this is the key principal which generates Baek's discussion of Christianity's outlook on human's nature. Man is assumed to be evil, sin is the bottom line of his character. Man, however, is not the father of his sin for should he be, man will be able to liberate himself from it. Sin, therefore, must be induced into man by some external supernatural power. Here, Leo Baek extends his formula of romantic Christianity to include the concept of the devil. The rest of Baek's argument is almost mathematically structured. If sin is induced by the devil and justice can only be induced by God, consequently the devil is the "adversary of God." The need for a divine redeemer is now evident. The devil is now termed by Baek to be an essential element in Christianity for it is the devil who originates the need for a divine saviour:

"Nullus diabolus, nullus redemptor."

The understanding that redemption cannot be achieved
by human action is conceived by Baeck to be a further step of Christianity on its way towards pure romanticism. Redemption may only be reached in the romantic way, by passive waiting and experiencing:

"For it is more passive. It is wholly fitting for the faith which does not want to wrestle and act, but is content to wait and experience; it is entirely commensurate with the redemption of the law. The moral duty of justice and the fight for justice are associated with the phase that lies in the past and has been overcome."36

Redemption, the pivotal eschatological doctrine of Christianity, is an expression of romanticism with all its aspect.

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At the bottom line of Baeck's study of Christianity lies the examination of Paul's personality and his contribution to the development of Christianity's conceptions. Baeck's tendency to somewhat ignore the Jewish side within Paul can be easily noticed. For Leo Baeck Paul is above all, a product of paganism. Paul's exposure to the romantic moods of oriental cults and cultures removed him out of his Jewish framework. Paul's attempt to include Jewish traditional doctrines within his religious program is not viewed by Baeck as being a legitimate expression of a person in search of an avenue to introduce God to people who are essentially pagan. Paul's monotheism is conceived by Baeck as artificial, no more perhaps, than a progressive paganism. Paul's creation is considered by Baeck as essentially being romanticism
wrapped up with a Jewish garment. For Baeck, biblical classicism was substituted by Paul with pagan romanticism.

Although in his latter writing, Baeck's attitude towards Paul is generally more sympathetic, it does not lead him into any retraction regarding Paul's teaching. Baeck never challenges Paul's honestly, he recognizes that Paul's Jewish background never ceased to fight romanticism but romanticism ended victoriously. Paul's conversion was, therefore, inevitable, but yet it is regarded by Baeck as being painful to Paul for he had to "forget many things" which he hardly could forget.

The fact that Christianity emerged as the victorious religion and that it is conceived as a monotheism by a great many people does not turn Baeck to reevaluate Christianity but rather, to redefine monotheism. Baeck distinguishes between two types of monotheism, one is God-centered:

"A turning point in the history of monotheism, is seemed here, the old theocentric faith of Judaism is superseded by the new Christ centered faith. The belief in God, the one, has receded before the belief in the Christ." The fine irony in this argument can hardly go by unnoticed.

For Leo Baeck, the fundamental disagreement between Judaism and Christianity is not on the nature of the Messiah, it is on the ultimate, on the nature of God and Man. The evolution of the concept of Christ (through Paul's teaching) from that of a Messiah to that of a God, had to be understood by Baeck as a rationalization of a myth. Thus, a mythological
notion had not been treated as a mere symbol but as a functioning reality. This, for Baeck, cannot be a continuation of Judaism, for Judaism never treats myth as being more than a symbol or a parable. When Paul's myth pre-empted those aspects of Judaism which are grounded in the active deeds (Mitzvot), romantic religion was born. At this point, Judaism had to reject Paul and Jews could no longer find in his teaching a solution to their own (Jewish) problems. Jew's rejection of Paul's teaching is thus, not conceived by Baeck to be rooted in reluctance to accept Jesus but in their reluctance to accept romanticism because:

"there was no place in it (i.e., in Judaism) for any myth that was more than a parable."39

Judaism can neither accept a romantic outlook of man, nor can it accept a romantic outlook of God.

* * *

Baeck's treatment of Christianity as essentially romantic does not prevent him from seeing that Judaism, too, contains romantic elements:

"Judaism too has created its ceremonies; perhaps even too great a profusion of them, but here they were executed only as the outwork of the religion, as 'fence around the doctrine', as ancient saying puts it; they are symbols and signs which point to something religious, but their observation as such was not yet considered true piety, not yet work."40

Hinting to his liberal view on Judaism, Baeck's main claim is that romantic elements in Judaism are, at the most, only
covers. They are perhaps as restricted surrounding to human needs. The opposite is the case in Christianity, here romanticism is the doctrine itself, it is indispensable. In the centre of Leo Baeck's analysis lies this: whatever is rejected by Judaism or adapted only unwillingly, became the essence of Christianity.

Baeck knows that present Christianity is not united, he is aware that some streams of Christianity had partially rejected romanticism. Baeck expresses sympathy for Calvinism which upon more leaning on the Hebrew bible had stressed ethical action and voluntarism, preaching that the way to improve the self and the world of God is living an active fruitful communal life:

"One wanted to lead to a pure unmixed faith through 'reformation' to faith for 'the sake of faith. The other (Calvinism) wanted to revolutionize the will, to turn will into a God given destiny, in order that this destiny becomes will.... The other confronted the principal of the church with another principal, that of the congregation... the other, as through an internal logic, led to constitutional life, to a parlimentary or republican form of communal life, responsible for itself and governing itself."41

Here, Baeck is apparently influenced by Max Weber's understanding of Calvinism to be the most notable Christian sect which laid the notion of organized charity in the bases of a religious work.42 Baeck's argument is with Paul, the founder of romantic Christianity, with Martin Luther, the renewer of Paul's doctrine, and with Adolf Harnack who states the two
following statements:

"Paul was the one who understood the master and continued His work."\(^{42}\)

"It is he (Paul) who removed every particularistic element from the Gospel so that it could and did become the universal religion."\(^{43}\)
CHAPTER III

CLASSICISM

Leo Baeck planned at one point to write a major work under the title: "Classical and Romantic Religions". For some reason this plan was never executed. It can be assumed that Baeck’s essay "Romanticism" would have been included in the work demonstrating his approach to the Christian religion. Baeck’s interpretation of Judaism as a classical religion may, therefore, be learned only from his other writings, essentially from "The Essence of Judaism" and "This People Israel - The Meaning of Jewish Existence". This chapter has to be read, therefore, as the antithesis to the preceding, it represents Baeck’s outlook on Judaism as against his outlook on Christianity, i.e. Classicism as against Romanticism.

As in his study of Christianity, the methodology used by Baeck is based upon the two same elements. The examination of root events in the history of Jewish development and the understanding of key concepts in Jewish religion are determining Baeck’s view on Judaism. Accordingly, this chapter will be structured in two parts. The first will include an examination of Baeck’s outlook on the event of Exodus as being the root of Jewish creativity. The second part of this
chapter will include an understanding of Baeck's approach to the Jewish moral law which to him is the ultimate expression of Jewish creativity.

Similarly to his definition of Christianity as a Romanticism, Baeck's definition of Judaism as a Classical religion is inspired by the customary meaning of the term Classicism.² Judaism is for Baeck a religion which is based upon learning and knowledge rather than blind faith, activism and creativity rather than passive experience, man's work for the name of God rather than man's expectation that God will work on and for him.

Focusing on the contrast between a romantic and a classical faith, Baeck writes:

"Absolute dependence as opposed to the commandments, the task of achieving freedom; learning as opposed to self affirmation and self development; Quietism as opposed to dynamism. There the human being is the subject; here in romantic religion, the object. There, freedom is received as a gift, the granting of salvation as a fact, not a goal to be fought for. It is the faith that does not go beyond itself, that is not the task of life, only a 'thou hast' not a 'thou shalt'. In a classical religion man becomes free through the commandments."³

Above all, for Baeck, Judaism is a religion which provides only a path. The goal, however, may only be reached through human efforts. Liberation can only be achieved through activism, human freedom can only be sought through struggle and fight. Nothing is gifted, and nothing is granted.
It is only man who can elevate himself towards God, only by his creativity may he achieve salvation. To Leo Baeck this is the essential meaning of Jewish existence. This is also expressed by him as the foundation of a classical religion.

Exodus is conceived by Baeck as the period which marks the beginning of Jewish history. For him Exodus represents the point in time in which scattered notions of a religious method were joined together to form the religion of Israel.

Baeck is aware that major conceptions of Judaism were formulated prior to Exodus. He knows, that the commandment to Abraham, "Get thee out of thy country" marks the beginning of ethical monotheism, and that "Take now thy son" presents the ultimate expression human integrity demonstrated by the highest level of faith. Baeck also mentions that it was the father of the Jewish nation whose name is symbolic testimony to human struggle. Baeck quotes from the Bible:

"Thy name shall be called no more Jacob but Israel for thou hast striven with God and with man and hast prevailed." (Gen. 32:29)

Yet, the period of the forefathers is conceived by Baeck as the formulation of roots. Jewish history began only when Israel became a people and the word of God was revealed to them.

The historical phenomena that the birth of Israel and the revelation of God to the nation occurred simultaneously,
is for Baeck an expression of a major concept of Judaism: the concept of unity:

"Revelation and the beginning of history are cojoined. The essence and the origin of this people are conceived as one."4

The concept of unity which is customarily conceived as involving the understanding of God in Judaism is extended by Baeck further. For him, unity is expressed in Judaism, above all, in the human sphere. This is the unity of a nation and a faith, and the unity of past, present time and the days to come. The Jew, therefore, knows a unity of history:

"The Jew realizes that he is not merely of this day, but that his life is derived from the man who in the ancient past had given birth to his faith, for the fathers of his race were also the fathers of his religion."5

History for him is not only a story of the past, and his existence is not one small part of a long process to be forgotten. The Jew's realization that he is existing as a part of an historical realm which began in his forefather, passed through him and will continue to eternity, provides him with the feeling that his life is a contribution to the transcendent:

"When he thought of the future, he felt that the days to come would live through him, that his own/existence and future pointed to the existence of the ancient God on earth."6

As argued, for Baeck the beginning of Jewish history is at the period of Exodus. Here another concept is pointed out. In accordance with his overall definition of Judaism
as a classical religion, the concept of struggle is elevated by Baeck to be an essence of Jewish faith.

Indeed, the historical reality of Exodus is one of human struggle. Not merely physical struggle as wandering in a desert implies, but above all, mental struggle of a wandering nation in its attempt to form a society; to bring together the individual with the community and to create terms of harmonious life within the framework of a people.

Decision making, therefore, is conceived by Baeck to be an essential character of the Jews. For Baeck, the departure of Israel from Egypt is a beginning of a new era, the era in which nothing is any longer decided for them as it was before. From that point in history, people were no longer subject to divine decision. Therefore, the Sons of Israel are now required to determine for themselves what to do and how to do. The notion of free will is now introduced:

"God only led them out; that is what is given. How they continued from there and continued now is their will; it is determined by their decision."

Free will is normally regarded as the decision to act, but for Baeck it is much more. It is above all, the negative form of decision, the freedom of man to decide what are his limits. The determination of what is forbidden is, therefore, conceived by Baeck as the core of freedom in Judaism. Here, Baeck sees the seed of the moral law:

"All certainty rests upon what is moral and, therefore, involves a decision. But
every decision is at the same time a rejection; in every moral 'yes' there is also a 'no'. And the 'no' often has to be at the beginning...with the 'Thou shalt not' the boundary is drawn."8

For Baeck the glory of Judaism is in its being the ultimate expression of human free activism. The problem which Baeck is faced with is, how to harmonize biblical reality with this concept. It is clear to Baeck that the Bible describes the act of Israel leaving the land of Egypt as being a pure act of God which the people themselves had very little or no part in it. This event, more than any other in the history of the Jewish people, is characterized by an endless amount of miracles and by almost no human independant participation. This is, for Leo Baeck, precisely the meaning of God's intervention. God provides the starting point, that which points direction, but creates all possibilities. Israel received its possibilities when freed from slavery. God freed the people only for one purpose; to be free to form a society based hopefully upon justice and morality. From here—"it is their will, it is determined by their decision".9 This for Baeck is the difference between being a slave to man and being a servant of God:

"Israel had been brought out of the house of bondage. It was now to live with the will of freedom: servants of the eternal, but slaves to no Egyptian. At the Mount Sinai, it was proclaimed: 'For unto me the children of Israel are servants; they are My servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt'."10
The Sons of Israel have been redeemed from Egypt not to be "free from" but to be "free to". For Baeck the rejection of slavery by Judaism is not for its physical implications, but for it denies the purpose of Jewish existence. This insight determines Baeck's understanding of the fact that:

"The legislation concerning the king contains the words: 'Only he shall...cause the people to return to Egypt.' (Deut. 17:16), and why;...the utmost in punishment and vengeance is presented as 'He-Who-Is shall bring thee back into Egypt in ships'. (Deut. 28:68)"

Slavery in Egypt is for Judaism the ultimate expression of human passivity.

Using Baeck's terminology, it will be safe to say the following: for Leo Baeck, Exodus is the point in time when romanticism was transferred to classicism, when the pure gift of grace ceased its existence and active creativity began. Redemption of Egypt is marked as the last gift of God to passive people. Exodus is marked by being the beginning of human work for the name of God.

Freedom cannot cease, but no longer can it be granted—it must be earned. Labouring becomes a value in Jewish religion. The biblical verse: "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread." (Gen. 3:18) is for Baeck the testimony that all kinds of freedom, even from physical burdens, must be worked for and strived for. From this understanding of Judaism, Baeck derives another concept, the optimistic outlook of the nature of man.
In Judaism, human freedom is assumed and God's trust that "Man can choose his life and he can shape it for the good,"\(^{12}\) is an essence. Thus, man's trust and faith in his neighbour becomes the core of his trust and faith in God: "From faith in God springs faith in man."\(^{13}\) God approaches mankind with optimism, it is therefore man's duty to share this optimism with God:

"The optimism of Judaism consists of the belief in God, and consequently also the belief in man who is realized in himself the good which first finds its reality in God. From this optimism all the ideas of Judaism can be derived. Thereby a three-fold relationship is established. First, the belief in oneself, one's soul is created in the image of God, and, therefore is capable of parity and freedom. Secondly, the belief in one's neighbour: every human being has the same individuality that I have. Thirdly, the belief in mankind: all men are children of God."\(^{14}\)

Baeck's Judaism does not know limits in its optimism. Man's religion is not a boundary, faith in mankind is regardless to the religion to which he belongs.\(^{15}\)

Following the discussion of Baeck's optimism, a deeper insight into Baeck's perception of man's nature in Judaism will be in order. Baeck's discussion of this category begins with an examination of the Hebrew term "yetzer". The word "yetzer" is literally translated into English as "drive". This translation is perceived by Leó Baeck as misleading, for it represents only a partial meaning of the term. Baeck emphasizes the fact that "yetzer" is a derivation from another
Hebrew term - "yetzira", i.e. creation. Thus, for him Judaism is not concerned mainly with man's drives, but rather with his "ability to form what is good - to be Yetzer tov (a creator of good), or with man's ability to form what is bad (to be yetzer hara), a creator of evil."\textsuperscript{16}

The word "yetzer", according to Baeck's interpretation, is not essentially related to a moral qualification, rather it expresses man's ability to be active. Thus, the usage of the term "yetzer" as a description of man represents two major conceptions in Judaism - the understanding of man's task to create ("yetzer" - a derivation from the word "yetzira", i.e. creativity), and man's freedom to choose his way of creation (to be a "yetzer", a creator of good or of evil). Indeed, evil is not denied as an element in man's psyche, but so is the power to overcome it; "Who is mighty? He who subdues his evil impulse."\textsuperscript{(Abot. 4:1)}

Original sin and fatalism, the two essential concepts of romanticism have obviously no share in Baeck's classical Judaism.

"In these terms, (romantic terms) the tragedy of man is but a tragedy of fate ...but for Judaism, the human tragedy is the struggle of the will, a struggle of a man who chose his life. Who makes his way...this is the drama of man's struggle ...it is the direct opposition of Christianity."\textsuperscript{17}

As argued, Baeck's interpretation of the term "yetzer" unites freedom and creativity. The same term, which is a
verbal expression of man's nature, also contains a guide to the way in which God is to be served. First, with freedom and despite the freedom not to serve Him. Second, the only legitimate way to serve Him is by active creativity. In this way, God is served in a classical religion. Serving God by mere feeling is for Leo Baeck the manner of romanticism. Hinting at the difference between romantic Christianity and classical Judaism, Baeck writes:

"The Bible often uses the term 'Serve the Lord' in relation to man's freedom to choose the good. It seems that we can do something, not only feel something for God... We offer the God that which we not merely received from Him, but which we created for Him... We are able to offer something to Him, to acknowledge Him through our own decision." 18

Moreover, as against the Christian conception that man's only way to reach faith is by submitting himself entirely and expecting the gift of God to be granted, Baeck's classical Judaism claims the opposite; only by man elevating himself may he reach God. Thus, the Jew serves God without diminishing himself:

"In the Bible; 'To serve and to bow down' is a term regularly used to describe idolatry." 19

(Baeck's interpretation of Christianity as a romanticism which contains some essential pagan concepts must not be forgotten.)

In Baeck's presentation of Judaism creativity is an expression of man's two loves, his love of God which inspires
his love of man. Thus, the creation of a legal moral system in Judaism is conceived by Baeck as having a twofold aim; it is the means to express love for Him, but above all, it is a way to achieve love of His world. Love of the neighbour is an essence in Baeck's Judaism.

For Leo Baeck as for the rabbis, the concept of love in Judaism is particularly problematic. Although Judaism emphasizes love of man for his neighbour, it recognizes the limitations of man. It is clear to Baeck as it is to the rabbis that "love thy neighbour as thy self" is an indication of an ultimate goal rather than a commandment to be fulfilled. Jewish tradition dealt with the matter in a similar way - "love thy neighbour" was translated to "do not do unto others that which you would not have done unto you".20 In this outlook, Baeck finds another expression of classicism, for here again he sees an additional indication of the ultimacy of activism in Judaism:

"To love means first and foremost, not to hate. Through deeds, feelings are awakened and through it they are developed."21

The pure much emphasized notion of love in Christianity receives from Baeck some rather sceptical words:

"Much more easily then justice can love become insincere. It is easy for love to lose itself in empty emotionalism or hypocrisy."22

Judaism, therefore, offers something for the establishment of correct relationships between men. Justice,
unlike love, can be defined and its fulfilment can be demanded. Moreover, less than love is justice subject to hypocrisy. Indeed, Baeck is aware that mere justice contains the danger of "hardness and coldness," yet, justice combined with faith in mankind (which in Judaism is not an option but a theological imperative), will clear a path to love. Baeck's assessment that "justice comes first and then love" is a presentation of a typical attitude of a classical religion, a religion which aims for the ultimate, but which faces reality.

The attempt to build a social order based upon justice is the bottom line of the development of what became the center of Judaism and the ultimate expression of Jewish creative labour - the moral laws and commandments.

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As a prelude to the discussion of Leo Baeck's approach to law, a quotation of Robert Gordis will perhaps be of value:

"No matter how much one may reduce the importance of the loyalty to the law in Judaism and stress the value of law in Christianity, a substantial margin of difference will remain...For classical Judaism, obedience to the law is an unique and indispensable instrument for the fulfilment of the will of God."25

In modern Jewish thinking, the discussion of the place of the law and commandments in Judaism is marked by
deep crises. The general way, however, of analyzing the law by many modern philosophers is in its accordance with reason. In this respect, Mendelssohn's discussion of the law must be emphasized for his argument became the foundation for the modern attitude to the issue. Mendelssohn divided the law into two essential categories; laws which are common to all people (thus, every enlightened person has to fulfill them) and, "laws and commandments, rules of conduct...particular to this people (Israel) and their observation was to bring happiness to the entire nation as well as to its individual members".  

The laws of Judaism were conceived by Mendelssohn as having an authority above the state law, for they "were revealed, that is, they were made known by God through the spoken and written word".  Therefore, the fulfilment of the law "guides the...mind to divine truth". Although Mendelssohn had doubts about the significance of ritual laws in the present days, yet he argued their fulfilment for "their necessity as a unifying bond of our people". The strict observance of all Jewish laws is demanded by Mendelssohn, despite and because of the fact that Jews are not living in Israel.

The common ground of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century philosophy was that Jewish law is an expression of Jewish intellectual creativity. Although this understanding was an outcome of varying standpoints, the common argument was the same; the law represents an
indispensable notion in Judaism. This was the teaching of representative figures of American Jewry such as M. Kaplan, A. Heschel, and of German Jewry, such as H. Cohen, F. Rosenzweig and Leo Baeck.

H. Cohen, for example, perceived the law to be an expression of reason for Judaism. Moreover, for Cohen, no true monotheism can exist without containing a code of commandments. In a religion in which close relationship between man and God are emphasized, God cannot be assumed isolating Himself from man. Thus, argues Cohen, commandments must be given by God, and by their obedience, the relationship between man and God will be deepened:

"God cannot remain isolated on his Olympus, but as creator of man and as Lord of the earth, must impose his commandments upon man as law for their life." 30

Franz Rosenzweig essentially followed his teacher H. Cohen. He too, perceived the law as the ultimate in Judaism, and its observance as an obligation of the Jew. The term law as representative of Halakha was to Rosenzweig misleading, for it reduces the Jewish law from its divine power and authority. Only the word commandment is a good presentation of divinity within the Jewish law, for God is not a law giver, He commands.

Leo Baeck's major contribution to the discussion of law in Judaism is mainly his theory on mystery and commandments. 31 Following his distinction between classical
religion and romantic religion, Baeck divides fundamental religious experiences into two categories. One contains the experience of mystery and commandments and the other contains merely the experience of mystery.

This must be said: when carefully reading Baeck's "Essence" and "This People Israel", a tendency to overplay one segment of Judaism and underplay another is noticed. Perhaps because of being involved in a dispute with Christianity, Baeck tends to emphasize the different and to somewhat ignore the similar. The role of mystery in Judaism is generally underplayed. It is mentioned with a considerable measure of apology. The impression that Baeck's Judaism consists of deeds only and faith and grace are of no value, may strike the reader. The role of creativity is elevated by Baeck to its highest, the role of devotion in Judaism is minimized. There is something ironic about this feeling for from preliminary readings of Baeck, the striking fact appears to be that Baeck is a warm Jew. Thus, to him emotional factors are an organic elements in Judaism and without it Jewish faith cannot be correctly read.

It is my impression that Baeck's writing of the role of commandments in Judaism (essentially in the essay "Mystery and Commandments") was aimed to restore the balance between the creative and emotional elements in his teaching on Judaism.

Baeck distinguishes human experiences into two
categories; the experience of mystery and the experience of commandments. The origin of mystery is when man asserts himself, when he feels the presence of something lasting, when man knows that he was created and his creator is a protective power in his life. The experience of mystery is the experience of God in the universe. Faith, therefore, may be considered a response to the feeling of mystery, and thus, is the expression of the relationship between man and God. In Judaism, this relationship is based on a tradition which indicates that God revealed Himself to the people of Israel as individuals and as a nation. Moreover, the relationship between man and God in Judaism are based upon an older tradition, the tradition that God is the creator of the world and of man. To be sure, faith in Judaism does not evolve from mere knowledge of historical phenomena, it is the living and re-living of creation and revelation which provides man with the feeling of God's hand in his life - the feeling of faith. The experience of mystery, thus, is the continuing experience of God's presence.

For Leo Baeck, the experience of mystery has no purpose if it does not originate within the individual the feeling that life has a goal and man has a task to fulfill. Thus, when experiencing mystery, man becomes aware that his foundation is from God, but his future, his task in life, is to be achieved by himself. With that, a partnership between God and man is formed. Man becomes a partner to creation, a
participator in the transcendent. This is argued by Leo Baeck as following:

"the twofold experience can also be intimate in this way: The consciousness that we have been created versus the consciousness that we are accepted to create."32

(The term - versus, is somewhat misleading for it create the impression that these two experiences act one against the other. It will be argued that Baeck's intention was the opposite.) Baeck's understanding of the development of the Jewish nation is according to this theory. Mystery was experienced by Israel at Exodus, when for Baeck Israel was created. The acknowledgment of Israel that it was God who created them by redeeming them from Egypt, generated the concept of creativity as an expression of these tasks. This is Baeck's interpretation of the fact that in the Bible the reason given for many laws is that God redeemed Israel from Egypt. A verse such as "When thou gathered the grapes... thou shalt not glean it afterward... and thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt", (Deut. 24:22f) is now receiving a fresh insight.

These two experiences of being created and having to create, become one in Judaism; "the consciousness that we have been created suggests the demand to create, every demand to create means and suggests that we have been created."33 Man's experience of mystery must bear a message to create. Man's creativity for the name of God keeps him in
continual awareness of God's hand in his life, thus, it is the means to assure faith.

An attempt to separate the two categories, to avoid one and to glorify the other, diminishes a classical religion to a romanticism - "The religion of mere romanticism, devoid of commandments, is no longer Judaism" writes Baeck. On the other hand, pointing to the extreme Jewish orthodoxy, Baeck continues:

"Nor is Judaism to be found where the commandment is content with itself and is nothing but commandment...the world of Judaism is to be found only where faith has its commandment and commandment has its faith."35

This perhaps involves the clear and most explicit expression of Baeck's polemic with Christianity. While Judaism is the religion where faith and creativity, mystery and commandments, have been existing in full harmony, it is Pauline Christianity which destroyed the well-balanced order. Rejection of the commandments means for Baeck the establishment of a romantic religion:

"This is why Paul left Judaism when he preached - Sola fide (by faith only) and thereby wound up with sacraments and dogma. Mystery becomes everything for him..."36

To be sure, Jesus is perceived by Leo Baeck to be a Jew in every trait and feature of his character and teaching:

"...we encounter a man with noble feature who lived in the land of the Jews in tense and excited times, and helped and laboured and suffered and died; a man
of the Jewish people who walked on a Jewish path with Jewish faith and hopes...man who had been looking for the Messiah, the son of David, who had been promised."37

Even the fact that later on Jesus started "believing in himself"38 is not perceived by Leo Baeck as the breaking point where another religion was born. It happened only when commandments were rejected and all the emphasis was put on mystery:

"The boundary of Judaism was crossed by Paul at the point where mystery wanted to prevail without commandments and faith without the law."39

Mystery and commandments are the meaning of Judaism not only in the individual's sphere. History too receives its meaning. The creation of the world and the creation of Israel are no longer stories of the past. History becomes a command to the future, creation becomes a message to create and, since every creative act is considered to be man's partnership to creation, it commands another creation. For Leo Baeck this is the endless realm of Judaism, and also the reason behind Paul's opposition to the commandments. Being a romanticist, Paul needed something which bears fulfilment of "once and forever".40

This is the essential difference between the law of man and the law of God. Man's law can be entirely fulfilled; religious law is an arrow which points in the direction of the future, towards the mission which started in the beginning
of Jewish history and will continue "from generation to generation".

With this understanding of Leo Baeck, a line connecting his teaching and the teaching of philosophers such as Mendelssohn, Cohen and Rosenzweig can be drawn. Unlike Spinoza, they all recognized that the law in Judaism has its foundation and its legitimacy not from being a state law aimed to provide a temporal individual with temporal social order. It is the law of God, which goes beyond anything temporary - to the eternal.

Leo Baeck is aware that a man living in the midst of life, stormed by endless fulfilling of commandments, where the fulfillment of one commandment is a commandment for another, may neglect mystery. This for Baeck is the reasoning for the greatest law of Judaism, the Law of the Sabbath:

"The whole love of the 'Law' have been lavished on and has cherished the Sabbath. As the day of rest, it gives life its balance and rhythm; it sustains the week. Rest is something entirely different from a mere recess, from a mere interruption of work. A recess is something essentially physical, part of the earthly everyday sphere. Rest, on the other hand, is essentially religious, part of the atmosphere of the divine; it leads us to the mystery, to the depth which all commandments come."

The spirit of the above argument is deeply rooted in biblical and rabbinical tradition. In the verse "Kol Melechet Avoda Lo Taaso", the term "Melachah" is approached by the rabbis as being distinguished from the term - "Avoda". While
"Avoda" means mere work, "Melachah" means creativity. The Law of the Sabbath, therefore, forbids essentially creativity, not labouring. For Leo Baeck, this is apparently the justification for the idea that the Sabbath contains the notion of non-creativity for the sake of renewal of faith.

The discussion of the essential expression of Jewish eschatology, the concept of messianism, is done by Baeck with special care. Although, as argued, for Baeck this concept is not the cause of the theological conflict between Judaism and Christianity, yet he is sensitive to the fact that historically this concept was the root of the crisis. In "The Essence of Judaism" Baeck says:

"Judaism's messianic conception may also be contrasted with that of Christianity. Judaism stresses the kingdom of God not something already accomplished, but as something yet to be achieved, not as a religious possession of the elect, but as the moral task of all. In Judaism man sanctifies the world by sanctifying God and by overcoming evil and realizing good. The kingdom of God lies before each man so that he may begin to work. For Judaism, the whole of mankind is 'chosen': God's covenant was made with man."

For Baeck the essential principle of disagreement, on the concept of the Messiah, between Judaism and Christianity involves different emphasis. While for Christianity the emphasis is placed upon the historical Jesus as the Messiah, for Judaism the emphasis is upon the means to narrow the gap towards the messianic kingdom. While for Christianity
redemption is a gift of grace, for Judaism it is a thing to be laboured for. Unlike Christianity, in Judaism only the sum of individual efforts will bring upon the kingdom of the Messiah. For Christianity the coming of the Messiah was the starting point, for Judaism it is the ultimate goal of Jewish creativity. Thus, for Baeck, the emphasis in Judaism is not on the nature of the Messiah, neither is it on the time of his coming. The importance lies in the concept of man's creativity aimed at the realization of God, which is generated by the hope for the Messiah. This understanding must give birth to another idea: Judaism must keep up hope for the Messiah for it is an incentive for man's work.

A parallel to the above concept may be noticed in Franz Rosenzweig:

"The first great messianic movement in Judaism, the Bar Kokhba movement under Hadrian, which in its outer manifestation was the greatest of all, was purely political...and yet Rabbi Akiba, the greatest homo-religious of the Judaism of the Pharisaic centuries joined it, declared Bar Kokhba to be a Messiah."43

Akiba's recognition of the Messiah was despite the fact that his kingdom was not in accordance with biblical reality (it was essentially political), and despite the fact that Bar Kokhba was not even a descendent of David. Clearly Akiba meant only to keep the flame of hope burning, for in this flame lies the promise of the continuation of the realm of Judaism.
CHAPTER IV

"JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY"

A COMPARISON AMONG LEO BAECK, FRANZ ROSENZWEIG AND MARTIN BUBER

The systematic study of Christianity appears to have been a major interest of Jewish philosophers in Germany during the last three centuries. It was, however, only during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries that Christianity became an organic part of the philosophy of great Jewish thinkers.

Germany being the ground of this new phenomena is an understood fact, for it was here where the Jews were exposed to secular thought and to the reality of the enlightenment at an earlier stage then in other European centers. With the Enlightenment, the Jews of Germany have been faced with a somewhat paradoxical reality. On one hand, the falling of the Ghetto walls represented for the Jews the new opportunity to become socially involved in the Christian milieu. This involvement, particularly when it took place in the universities, brought upon the inevitable – the thirst of the Jews to know and understand the other side. This thirst which the Enlightenment produced, could have been satisfied only at this time. Before this period any attempt to learn Christianity was almost miserably impossible, for the Jews were not admitted
for studies at major learning institutions. Moreover, any demonstration by a Jew of involvement in a systematic study of Christianity would have been rejected by the Jewish community.

The spirit of freedom which Jews began to experience with the Enlightenment represented for them a challenge. Being free, the Christian voice criticizing Judaism demanded an answer. Before the Enlightenment, the lack of freedom, in a way, served the Jews. Their reluctance from being involved in a religious dispute had its justification. This could not be continued any longer - the Christian voice was a challenge and the Jew had to answer. Again, knowledge of Christianity becomes an important need.

With the beginning of interrelations between Jews and Christians, Jewish scholars became known to the general milieu. The fact that Jews could demonstrate superior philosophy generated the attempt to convert them. The question which Mendelssohn faced so often: how can such a great philosopher retain his Judaism, was symptomatic and demanded an answer. The only effective answer was the demonstration of superiority of Judaism over Christianity. Christianity, thus, had to be learned.

The tradition which was formulated with the beginning of the Enlightenment reached its supremacy at the end of the nineteenth, the beginning of the twentieth centuries. All three well known Jewish scholars of Germany demonstrated great involvement in the study of Christianity. Rosenzweig's
correspondence with Rosenstock-Huessy, Buber's essays and his major book "Two Types of Faith" and Baeck's major essays on Christianity have been recognized by Christian theologians to be a valuable understanding of the Christian religion.

The fact that the three above named Jewish philosophers wrote during the same period, in the same country, and from similar circumstances on a topic somewhat new to the Jews make it appropriate to present a comparison between them.

The scholarship of Leo Baeck is, of course, the major interest of this work. Therefore, the structure of this chapter will be to compare and contrast Baeck's attitude to Christianity with that of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber. As a result of this comparison to be made reference to the common and different between Rosenzweig and Buber may surface.

Martin Buber and Leo Baeck alike, although from different standpoints, are rejecting what might be called the essence of Christianity. Franz Rosenzweig too, sharply criticizes the Christian faith. But despite of his criticism he sees an unique path through which Judaism and Christianity may be reconciled. Rosenzweig's theory on the "Double Covenants" is not only interesting, but it bears some very positive ideas for a way of co-existence, despite disagreement, of both faiths.

The first part of this chapter will include a short examination of Rosenzweig's "Double Covenant" doctrine, and an attempt to understand if Leo Baeck's approach to Christianity
and Judaism allows place for a similar method.

Martin Buber's attitude to Christianity shifted between two extremes. In his early days of scholarship, Buber demonstrated considerable sympathy to Christian concepts. Having probably been influenced by his academic and emotional interest in mystery, Buber was able to find in Christianity references to his own philosophical and theological outlook. In his later days, a shift in Buber's approach to Christianity is noted. Buber's early sympathy is less apparent and it is substituted by a rather critical approach. Buber's final major work on Christianity, "Two Types of Faith" is marked by a deep rejection of Christian principles.

In the second part of this chapter Buber's final outlook on Christianity will be compared to that of Leo Baeck.

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The history of the relationship between the church and the synagogue is essentially marked by deep disagreement. Sometimes the disagreement was expressed through hatred and violence, at other times it was a "cold war". Only in recent years with the rise of liberalism within the Jewish and Christian religions an attempt was made to introduce a spirit of understanding between these two faiths. The results of this attempt became noticeable in the early part of the twentieth century when the "Judeo-Christian Tradition"² was first formed.

Essentially, this doctrine is based upon the ideology
that Christianity is a true heir of Judaism – an ideology as old as Christianity itself. Christian faith, according to the outlook of the common tradition method, was not only historically, but mainly theologically derived from Judaism. Concepts of Christianity such as the understanding of God as a Father; the notion of redemption, the idea of ressurection, the adoption of the Hebrew Bible, the method of interpretation of holy scriptures so they may be used as sources of religious affirmation, can be found in Judaism too. All these common factors are being counted as proof that not only Jesus, but Christianity as a divine system was born out of Judaism. The above understanding was the base for the establishment of the theory which views the connection between Judaism and Christianity as a mother-daughter relationship. 3

The suggested mother-daughter relationship bears some obvious advantages, mainly for it provides the grounds for a respectful co-existence of Judaism and Christianity. This type of relationship naturally features the spirit of mutual recognition between the faiths, that each of the two possesses a legitimate individuality. Moreover, such a relationship is essentially characterized by a mutual desire of the continuing existence despite disagreements and tensions which may occur.

On the other hand, this mother-daughter type of relationship does not prevent any independent development of the two. Furthermore, the aspiration for dynamism is not an egoistic trait; each one desires the development of the other,
namely, Judaism hopes to see the growth of Christianity and Christianity looks favourably on the advancement of Judaism. This idea was metaphorically expressed by Robert Gardis:

"The mother continues to live and grow older — one hopes wiser too — even after the birth of the daughter. Thus...they have developed their distinct individu-ality despite of the close genetic rela-tionship that continues to exist."4

Not only is the mother-daughter relationship an advantage to both parties, even the danger of theological stagnation which might result from this mutuality is being eliminated. This idea received further support from the discipline of Psychology which emphasizes that conflicts and tensions between parents and children are a normal and healthy phenomenon.

The establishment of a peaceful and tranquil atmos-phere within the framework of independent individuality is the core of the "Judeo-Christian Tradition".

This relatively new doctrine is meant to be a substitu-tion for an earlier claim: with the birth of the daughter, the mother was expected to cease existing, namely, with the formation of the church, the synagogue had lost its vitality, therefore its validity.

The "Judeo-Christian Tradition" is indeed a refreshing approach.

The question however is twofold. First, an essen-tially theological question. Aside from the historical real-ity which emphasizes that Jesus was born as a Jew, are Christian doctrine really originated from Judaism, or are they only superficially so? The other question is practical
in nature. Are both sides emotionally prepared to say that despite and after years of disagreements and tensions, both religions have a divine mandate, or the old antagonism will remain? This antagonism which was best stated by Marcion: "...consequently, the Jews belong to the devil and Christ to God."⁵

Perhaps more than any other Jewish philosopher, it was Franz Rosenzweig whose contribution to theology endorsed the developing concept of "Judeo-Christian Tradition."

In the core of Rosenzweig's thinking lies the attempt to reconcile the church and the synagogue. Thus to lift the debate from its traditional structure of "either or" and to prove that in order to affirm the validity of Judaism, Christianity must not be declared as invalid and vice-versa.

The central principle in Rosenzweig's theory is the argument that the church just like the synagogue has the divine mandate to bring men to God. Rosenzweig proposes that the covenant between God and man was repeated twice, once with Isreal and then with the gentiles. The formation of Christianity marks for Rosenzweig the revolutionary event of providing the rest of mankind with a path towards God. Since other faiths are denounced by Rosenzweig and Islam is dismissed as an episode,⁶ it is only Christianity which can carry out the divine task:

"No one can reach the Father save through Him." (i.e. Jesus)?

The authority and validity of the church is affirmed, but the role of the synagogue is also acknowledged when Rosenzweig
adds:

"...the situation is quite different for one who does not have to reach the Father because he is with Him." 8

Judaism, therefore, still maintains its high status since for the Jew, a mediator is not necessary. The Jew was chosen by God thus, by his blood, by virtue of being born Jewish, he needs no intermediary:

"That connection of innermost heart with God, the heather, can only reach through Jesus is something the Jew already possesses...; he possesses it by nature, by having been born one of the chosen people.9

With care one may assess that Rosenzweig sees a certain order of evolution in the development of God's relationship to man. In the beginning God chose a people, naturally from within these people rose the branch whose task is within the rest of mankind. The uniqueness of Judaism and Christianity is thus only in their duty, but once this task will be fulfilled, once Christianity will complete its ultimate goal thus, the "last Greek will be silenced"10, and God will be within the heart of all mankind, then, neither the direct relationship between Jews and God nor the indirect between gentile and Him will be relevant:

"Then when Christ ceases to be the Lord, Israel will cease to be the chosen people. On this day God will lose the name only Israel calls Him...God will no longer be its"11

In my opinion, with the above suggestion, Rosenzweig crosses the boundaries of Jewish and Christian traditional theology. The first part of his argument where he claims
uniqueness by virtue of divine duty, is basically affirmed by both religions. However, when Rosenzweig follows the consequences of his initial claim, he must conclude that any trait of uniqueness will disappear in the Messianic era. Here, Rosenzweig neglects, (I believe, knowingly) the tradition concepts of Judaism and Christianity.

For Franz Rosenzweig it is not only the common goal which gives ground to mutual co-existence of the two religions, it is also the origin. For him, Christianity is derived from Judaism. In "The Star of Redemption", Rosenzweig says the following:

"The rays shoot forth from the fiery nucleus of the Star."12

It is possible to believe that by this somewhat cloudy metaphorical expression, the author claims that Judaism and Christianity have a common root. This impression is finally affirmed by a more precise statement:

"Christianity is the tree that grows from the seed of Judaism."13

Rosenzweig is aware that his proposed two ways to God cannot be easily accepted either by Jews or by Christians, for within both sides some essential opposing concepts have been developed through the years. For the Jews, the principle of immediate and direct relationship between God and man is a crucial value, thus no ideology of intermediary can be tolerated:

"...To the Jew it is incomprehensible that one should need a teacher, be who may be, why should a third person have to be between me and my Father in heaven."14

This is not only Rosenzweig's justification for his decision
not to baptize, but it is also the explanation for the Jews' basic inability to affirm the divine validity of Christianity.

Within Christianity, on the other hand, the disturbing factor is rooted in its "imperialistic" attitude. It is the Church's policy of missionary and conversion, which Rosenzweig conceives as being an organic and legitimate outcome of its divine task:

"The Christians love of one's enemy is a reality... The moment the church or the individual follows the original commandment of Christianity to proselytize, then the love of one's enemy becomes the strongest weapon with which to conquer the world, for the enemy is loved as one who will become a brother." 15

Rosenzweig, indeed, does not basically reject the advancement of the church through missionary. Yet, the aggression in which this mission is being executed cannot be accepted by Rosenzweig, the Jew. For the Jews the idea of love for the enemy is a mere expression of an ultimate goal, it was never conceived as an actual law. However, the fact that Christianity accepts it as a practical commandment produced, according to Franz Rosenzweig, the inevitable attempt to convert. Thus, it follows that the acceptance of the validity of Judaism is impossible for the church.

It will be an error to assume that when Rosenzweig states: "to the Jew it is incomprehensible that one should need a teacher..." 16 he does not include himself. Rosenzweig, just like any other Jew, cannot comprehend a mediator. However, this is exactly the secret of his argument. When examining Christianity, Rosenzweig attempts to
look at the matter from a Christian point of view, since any other way, will not produce a solution to the problem of Judeo-Christian relationship.

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The comparison between Franz Rosenzweig and Leo Baeck will begin by focusing on these thinkers attitudes to Christ's place within Christianity. From there, the scope will be broaded to other issues.

To be sure, with all respect given, with all understanding that Christ is an indispensable figure in the Christian religion, still Rosenzweig remains a Jew, and he thinks accordingly. Thus, for him, Jesus is not a fully primary element in Christianity. Christ's authority is understood by Rosenzweig to be only as a mediator. The emphasis, however, is always on the Father:

"Christianity itself cleaves to the Lord because it knows that the Father can be reached only through him."17

Consequently, to Rosenzweig, Christianity is not yearning for Jesus, he merely provides the possibility; Christianity is striving for the Father. Therefore, Jesus' divine authority is merely a temporary phenomena:

"...but then He(i.e. Jesus) will cease to be the Lord, he too will be subject to the Father."18

Rosenzweig's attempts to see Christianity, more or less, through the eyes of a Christian is not shared by Léo Baeck. Being a rabbi, Baeck's outlook on Christianity is determined essentially by Jewish traditional concepts; thus,
his disagreement with Rosenweig is quite apparent.

It was Marcion who argued that it is inconceivable that the God of the Hebrew Bible, the one who created the world, is the Father of Jesus. What Marcion preached is what Leo Baeck understands as Christianity. Christianity did not merely reject the Jews and Judaism, it rejected the Jewish concept of God. Jesus' divine authority within Christianity is not merely a function of a task, faith in Jesus is the task. According to Leo Baeck Jesus is for Christianity "...a God who once walked on earth." 19

For Baeck, the relationship between Christianity and Judaism begins and ends only with the physical fact that Jesus was Jewish. Any further connection is for him merely artificial. Baeck emphasizes that essential Christian's outlooks are oriented in oriental myths and cults. Furthermore, one can carefully claim that for Baeck the godhead of Christianity and the one of Judaism are not common. It is the mystery cults which determine the nature of Christianity. It is the same cults which determine the nature of Christian perception of God.

For Franz Rosenzweig Christianity is an extension of the duty carried by Judaism, consequently a mutual God must be assumed. For Baeck even a common task is incomprehensible for he does not view Christianity as a true monotheism. This understanding of Christianity is parallel to that of his teacher Herman Cohen, who too refused to recognize Christianity as being a pure monotheism. As a matter of fact, for Cohen
the essence of the Messianic era meant the conversion of Christians to pure monotheism, i.e., to Judaism.20 To be sure, Baack does not criticize Christianity merely for its way in practising religion, he criticizes the essence of the religion, he does not criticize Christianity for its blind-beliefs, he criticizes its beliefs. When Baack defines Christianity as a romanticism he does not describe merely the cultic side, he describes Christianity in its totality. Only a romantic deity can be worshipped by romantic means. Therefore, when Baack states: "Romanticism is the opposition and contradiction of Judaism"21 he slams the door on any possible serious theological dialogue between Judaism and Christianity. Here, finally, Baack comes to terms with Harnack's claim that "its (i.e. Christianity's) connexion with Judaism is seen to be only a loose one.22

This assessment by Harnack of Judeo-Christian relationships, although made from different standpoints, may also represent Baack's outlook on the possibility of a "Judeo-Christian Tradition".23

* * *

Martin Buber's polemic with Christianity is generally not considered to be sharp. Within the Jewish milieu Buber was not once blamed for being somewhat too apologetic. Within the Christian milieu he was often perceived to be "one of us". However, a comparative study of Martin Buber and Leo Baack will prove that in many essential matters the outlook of the two scholars is much the same.
In one point the agreement between Buber and Baeck is clearly manifested. Both Buber and Baeck suggest that in the historical theological process of the development of the church, Jesus was not a key participator. For Buber and for Baeck alike, Jesus was before all a Jew whose Judaism never ceased. Baeck asserts that:

"We encounter a man with noble features who lived in the land of the Jews and helped and laboured and suffered and died, a man out of the Jewish people who walked on Jewish paths with Jewish faith and hope."24

Buber's understanding of Jesus' life is almost identical:

"...a Jew to the core in whom the Jewish desire for realization was concentrated...His original Jewish spirit."25

Moreover, Buber's affirmation of Jesus' place in Judaism is sometimes expressed in an emotional manner:

"From my youth onwards I have found Jesus my great brother."26

Jesus' teaching is considered by both philosophers to be an extension of biblical religious outlooks and completely parallel to the teachings of the prophets. Consequently, any teachings which are opposed to the traditional conceptions of Judaism are opposed to the teachings of Jesus. Therefore, Paul's introduction of doctrines rejecting Judaism are perceived by Buber as by Baeck to be in contradiction to Jesus. Accordingly, Buber writes:

"Here not only the Old Testament belief and the living faith of past biblical Judaism are opposed to Paul, but also the Jesus of the Sermon of the Mount."27

Both Leo Baeck and Martin Buber agree that the two
core concepts by which Paul created an unbridgeable difference between Judaism and Christianity are: the Principle of Intermediary, and the Concept of Non-Creativity. Naturally, each of the two thinkers emphasizes that concept which is essential to his overall philosophical outlook. For Martin Buber it is indeed the Principle of Intermediary which marks the point when Paul's teaching became ultimately non-Jewish. Using as a base the gospel's verse "I am the door", (John 10:9) Buber argues:

"A wall had been erected about the deity in which only one door had been broken open, only to those individuals for whom it opened will there be vouchsafed the right of the gracious God who has redeemed the world." 28

The ultimate expression of Judaism as conceived by Buber, the immediacy in man-God relationship, had been jeopardized.

Leo Baeck finds the glory of Judaism in its striving for divine creativity. Consequently, he emphasizes Paul's breaking from the Torah: as the point where Paul's faith and Judaism could no longer co-exist:

"The boundary of Judaism was crossed only by Paul at the point where mystery wanted to prevail without the commandments and faith without law." 29

The notion that only through Christ may men reach God is equally rejected by Baeck and by Buber. Both view this understanding as diminishing the image of God and destroying the unity and the quality of men before God. Baeck says:

"It had already been narrowed down considerably by the conception of the Church, which had done away with the unity of mankind and
all but reduced the God of all men to a God of the Church."30

Buber is not essentially different:

"Whoever remains remote from the door is given up to the Satanic host."31

This is Buber's argument against Christianity which introduced a concept which is a "...narrowing and impoverishment of that fullness of life."32

The reason behind Paul's concept is also grasped by both scholars in a similar manner, although from different viewpoints. Both Baek and Buber perceive Paul's admiration of mystery to be the motivation for his doctrines. For Baek it is the romantic mystery cult which had been introduced to Paul in Tersas Asia Minor. For Martin Buber it is Paul's fascination with the mystery of Jesus.

Consequently, Leo Baek and Martin Buber draw similar conclusions. Both are committed to Judaism and opposed to Christianity. However, Baek's criticism is sharper and more extreme, he does not submit at all; Christianity is the complete contradiction of Judaism. Buber, on the other hand, tends to admit that some concepts within Christianity are valuable. However, he is quick to emphasize that these concepts are all borrowed from Judaism. Whatever is original in Christianity is dismissed by Buber as being non-creative:

"That which is creative in Christianity is not Christianity, but Judaism...and that which within Christianity is not creative, is not Jewish."33

The concept of pure faith, stresses Buber, is known to Judaism from the time that Abraham by virtue of God's command, went to
an unknown land and was ready to sacrifice his only son. The notion of pure suffering, says Buber, was also taught to Christianity by Judaism, for the life of Job and Jeremiah are the ultimate expression of pure suffering. So is for Buber the concept of the suffering servant which was introduced through Isaiah long before Christianity. Therefore, Buber concludes that the demand from Jews to adjust and perhaps to learn from Christianity is out of order:

"So that there is no need for us to fill with it (i.e. Christianity). All we have to do is to recognize it within us and to take possession of it."34

It was suggested above that Buber's affirmation "I have found in Jesus my brother" can be easily misleading. One is instantly impressed that by this Buber expresses his sympathy to the overall outlook of Christianity. But this sympathy is limited to Jesus and his role within Judaism and nothing else, as argued by Arthur A. Cohen:

"Buber affirmation that 'from my youth onwards I have found Jesus my great brother' attests only to the consistency of Buber's position and his unqualified honestly. The Jesus in whom Buber finds companionship is he whom Buber considers the inheritor of the prophetic tradition of the 'suffering servant'."35

It is safe to say, therefore, that not only do Buber and Baeck reject the essence of Christianity but they use quite similar reasons as grounds for this rejection. In the essence of Baeck's and Buber's polemic with Christianity lies the conviction that Judaism is not inferior to Christianity but rather superior. This is their answer to
most Christians who are convinced of the immeasurable superiority of Christianity over all other religions, Judaism in particular.
NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. J. Guttman, Philosophy of Judaism, p.3

2. David Hartman, Maimonides, Torah and Philosphic Quest, p.16, quoted from I. Russoik, "The philosophy of Maimonides".

3. Encyclopedia Judaica, entry under "Disputation and Polemics", Vol.6 p.94

4. Ibid p.96


6. Ibid p.34

7. M. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, p.123


9. E. Rosenstock, Judaism Despite Christianity, p.6

10. Ibid p.37

11. "I had Judaized my view of Christianity." (N. Glatzer, F. Rosenzweig p.24) Having this conviction Rosenzweig decided that in this world there seems to be no longer any room for Judaism between the faiths. He thus decided to convert to Christianity.

12. E. Rosenstock, Judaism Despite Christianity, p.124

13. Ibid p.134


15. Ibid p.134

16. Ibid p.134

17. It is interesting to note that some thirty years later Rosenstock mentioned in his book "The Christian Future":

- 83 -
"...I may use some example by which a Jewish friend
nearly thirty years ago refuted my own understanding of
Judaism. I had said that, after all, the Greek King
Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia was
about the same as Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his
son Isaac. Whereupon my friend came down on me with
terrific energy." (p.182)

19. M. Rumscheidt, Revelation and Tradition, p.86f
21. ibid p.301
22. ibid p.16
23. Leo Baek, Mahot Hayhadut, Introduction by A. E. Simon
24. Leo Baek, Essence of Judaism, p.11
25. ibid p.10
26. ibid p.257
27. ibid p.261
28. ibid p.257

CHAPTER II

1. Leo Baek, Judaism and Christianity, p.189

2. Customarily, the romantic person is defined as tending to
   perceive the world as he wishes to. Reality is seen by
   him the way he imagines it rather than according to objec-
   tive facts. The romantic person is described as reacting
   first then intellectualizing his reaction. (according to
   Webster's Dictionary)

   The romantic movement in general is characterised as
   a reaction against classicism with its emphasis upon
   rationality and intellect. The direction of this move-
   ment, generally, has tended towards imagination, emotion-
   alism which are manifested in a predilection for auto-
   biographical literature. (according to ibid)

   Romanticism is not a limited phenomenon in art literature
or religion. Political romanticism is a concrete example of the penetration of romanticism into the sphere of social interaction: "The core of the political romanticism is that the romantic passivity belongs to its occasional structure." (Carl Schmidt, 1919. Quoted by A. Friedlander in 'T.O.T.' p.122).

The assumption of the Enlightenment that activism can take care of all aspects of life is denied. Thus, passivism becomes an essential mood of behavior. The traditional value of reason and knowledge is being reduced and substituted by feelings and emotions.

3. ibid
4. Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity*, p.197
5. ibid p.197
6. ibid p.199
7. ibid p.201
8. ibid p.198
9. ibid p.198
10. ibid p.204
11. ibid p.205
12. ibid p.205
13. ibid p.205
14. ibid p.205
15. ibid p.205
16. ibid p.201, Quoted from M. Luther.
17. ibid p.227
18. ibid p.220
19. ibid p.220
20. ibid p.221
21. ibid p.212
22. ibid p.198
23. ibid p.223
24. ibid p.228
25. Leo Baeck, *Essence of Judaism*, p.15
26. Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity*, p.233
   Quoted from Augustin.
27. ibid p.229
28. ibid p.238, Quoted from John 2:22
29. ibid p.242, Quoted from Romans 10:4 and from M. Luther.
30. ibid p.177
31. ibid p.244, Quoted from M. Luther
32. ibid p.227, Quoted from M. Luther
33. ibid p.242
34. ibid p.246
35. ibid p.247
36. ibid p.275
37. ibid p.143
38. ibid p.146-147
39. ibid p.202
40. ibid p.227
41. Leo Baeck, *This People Israel*, p.131
42. A. Harnack, *What Is Christianity*, p.176
43. H. M. Rumscheidt, *Religion and Theology*, p.84

CHAPTER III

1. A. H. Friedlander, Leo Baeck, *Teacher of Theresienstadt*, p.120
2. The terminology used to define Romanticism essentially contains the terms: feelings, mood, dreams, experience, mystery and passivity. On the other hand, terminology used in the description of Classicism is based on notions such as: mere reality and deeds - "What we see and do explains what we say". (Ency. Britanica, ent. "Classicism") While in Romanticism faith is assumed to be blind, Classicism is generally associated with active search for the truth - "Whoever does not understand must ask. No one is blamed for not understanding, all are blamed for not asking."

Essentially the classical personality is a learner, one who makes his way in life by an active effort and search. For the classicist, everything is subject to doubts and questions. Struggle, thus, is the core of his existence, for everything must be learned and nothing automatically accepted. Active understanding is a priority only through it may faith be determined. Knowledge and learning bear a twofold role in the classician's life, - they determine his conceptions and the structure of his personality. "The real merit of this method lies in its effect on the learners are willing to learn and happy to learn." (ibid)

Classical phenomena is regarded to be one of its kind thus fitting to serve as a model, having significance and honorific value. Classicism is generally conceived as being the opposite method of Romanticism. (Webster's Dictionary, ent. Classicism)

Baeck's presentation of Judaism is within these limits. Using the essence of this definition, he reads Judaism as being the classical religion. To Leo Baeck, Judaism is the faith of reason and knowledge, search and struggle. It is the absolute religion which served along the history and continues to serve as a model to western modern religions and cultures.

3. Leo Baeck, Judaism and Christianity, p.211
4. Leo Baeck, This People Israel, p.29
5. Leo Baeck, Essence of Judaism, p.10
6. ibid p.10
7. Leo Baeck, This People Israel, p.31
8. ibid p.41
9. ibid p.31
10. ibid p.41
11. ibid p.41-42
12. Leo Baeck, *Essence of Judaism*, p.88
13. ibid p.150
14. ibid p.87
15. Baeck's outlook on the world was, undoubtedly determined by ultimate optimism. Even at the darkest time of history of man, when Baeck himself was a prisoner in the death camp of Theresienstadt, his basic optimism and trust in the goodness of man remained pure.
16. Leo Baeck, *This People Israel*, p.163
17. Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity*, p.202
19. ibid p.125
20. "Targum Yehonatan Ben Uziel."
22. ibid p.217
23. ibid p.217
24. ibid p.217
27. ibid p.99
28. ibid p.99
29. ibid p.148
31. This discussion is essentially based on the essay: "Mystery and Commandments". Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity*, p.173
32. Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity*, p.173
33. ibid p.176
34. ibid/p.176-177
35. ibid p.177
36. ibid p.100-101
37. ibid p.101
38. ibid p.177
39. ibid p.179
40. ibid p.183
41. ibid p.172
42. Leo Baeck, *Essence of Judaism*, p.252
43. E. Rosenstock, *Judaism Despite Christianity*, p.126

**CHAPTER IV**

3. ibid
4. ibid p.151
5. N. N. Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig*, p.342
6. ibid p.341
7. ibid p.34
8. ibid p.27
9. ibid p.342
10. ibid p.343
11. F. Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, p.337
12. N. N. Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig*, p.346 - according to J. Halevi
13. ibid p.346-347
14. ibid p.348
15. ibid p.346
16. ibid p.341
17. ibid p.341
18. Leo Baeck, Judaism and Christianity, p.96
19. N. N. Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig, p.357
As testified by Rosenzweig, Cohen's aspiration for the Messiah was, for it will follow "The conversion of the Christians to the pure monotheism of his (Cohen's) Judaism."
20. Leo Baeck, Judaism and Christianity, p.206
22. In 1901, Baeck affirmed Christianity as the daughter of Judaism "which the mother can never hate". This statement may not be considered as an expression of his final outlook of the Judeo-Christian relationship. Baeck stated this statement when he was only 28 and beginning his way as a thinker. This was written by the rabbi who was furious of the attempt of A. Harnack to exclude Judaism from being a part in the development of Christianity, thus from the formation of western culture. Essentially, Baeck's polemic with Harnack brought him to propose a common theological structure to Judaism and Christianity. However, as argued in Chapter II (Romanticism), this outlook had been radically changed twenty years later when Leo Baeck was more mature, less interested in polemic and more interested in an academic study of comparative religion. Then the relationship between the theological content of Christianity and Judaism are paralleled to the relationship between romanticism and classicism - two opposit faiths.
23. Leo Baeck, Judaism and Christianity, p.100-101
24. Martin Buber, On Judaism, p.122
25. Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith, p.12
26. ibid p.55
27. M. Brod, Judaism and Christianity in Buber's Work, p.329
28. Leo Baeck, Judaism and Christianity, p.177
29. ibid. p.270
30. M. Brod, Judaism and Christianity in Buber's Work, p.329
31. ibid

32. A. H. Friedlander, Leo Baeck, Teacher of Theresienstadt, p.139, Quoted from Buber - Drei Reden über das Judentum.
33. M. Brod, Judaism and Christianity in Buber's Work, p.329
34. A. A. Cohen, Martin Buber, p.65
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