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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCEVE
The Relationship of Spanish Church-State Union to Philippine Catholicism

"A study of the impact of Church-State relationship on clerical vocation and participation in rural Philippines; and the consequent relation of friary to national social development, 1570-1900."

Ann McManamen

A Thesis in
The Department of Religion

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University, Montréal, Québec, Canada

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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SPANISH CHURCH-STATE UNION TO PHILIPPINE CATHOLICISM

"A study of the impact of Church-State relationship on clerical vocation and participation in rural Philippines; and the consequent relation of friary to national social development, 1570-1900."

Ann McManamen

The purpose of this thesis is to present an historical analysis of the impact of the Patronato Real on the vocation and participation of Spanish missionaries in the Philippines. It examines how the Patronato was carried over to the colonial church in the Philippines, that is, what the union meant for Spain, for the colonial church establishment, for the missionaries and not least of all, for the Filipino population itself. The analysis illustrates how the self-identity, purposes and actions of the missionaries were a direct consequence of the dynamics of this church-state union on all levels as the latter worked together positively, or as it created hostility and confusion for all. A more elaborate breakdown of the structure of this thesis is to be found in the introduction.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I - THE IMPACT OF SPANISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS ON CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES TO THE PHILIPPINES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section I - &quot;Patronato Real&quot; - A Union of Church and State</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section II - Clerical Understanding of Church and State in the Islands</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section III - The Missionaries -- In Service of God and King</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II - THE INTEGRATION OF SPANISH MISSIONARIES INTO FILIPINO LIFE; THEIR ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE NATIVE POPULATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section I - Missionary Methods -- Evangelization and Education</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section II - Missionary Methods -- and Local Government</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section III - The Patronato, Spanish Friars and Filipino Priests</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III - THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPANISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AND FRIARY IN THE PHILIPPINES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The union of Church and State in Spain was an immensely authoritative combination. Their cooperative pursuits, reflecting only just and holy schemes, aimed to accomplish an incredible task—the simultaneous Hispanization and Christianization of the entire world. In order to understand more profoundly Spanish missionaries and their activity in the Philippines, it is absolutely essential to comprehend the impact of this church-state alliance on their personalities, perceptions, goals and actions. I maintain that the self-identity, the particular style and accomplishments of the missionaries were a direct consequence of the dynamics of this church-state compact, and that without its influence, missionary vocation and participation in the Philippines would have been significantly different.

When I refer to the "impact" of church-state union I envisage the following possibilities: that the union provided support and security to the missionaries and their work; that it was restrictive to missionary activity and therefore to its beneficiaries; and in contrast, at the same time it was not restrictive enough and led to excessive,
sometimes exploitative behavior. Let me examine each of these categories more closely.

Under certain circumstances the impact of the union was supportive and provided its participants with security. In this case the collaboration of the two most majestic authorities in the land thoroughly legitimized all of their combined aims and actions, to the satisfaction of everyone involved. Approval within or by the church-state union did not just tolerate or legalize something, but honoured and exalted that which it espoused or represented. The missionaries felt secure in the support of the union because they knew for sure that the most venerable of human beings, the King and the Pope (in approbation of the one supreme God), approved the goodness and necessity of their work. They were confident because both church and state authorities depended upon them to perform essential roles; in return, the terms of the union agreed to feed and to clothe them, to protect and to defend them on their mission. And finally, the Spanish Crown authorized them to demand whatever more they required, directly from native sources. It was the impact of this support therefore, which penetrated the self-identity and motivation, which stimulated the abilities and actions of the missionary from beginning to end. They became agents of both God and King, exuding with certainty of purpose and direction.
If the impact of the union was restrictive or led to excessive consequences, then the combination of church and state authority was imbalanced or conflictual. For example, the role of the friar in his mission post was often ambiguous. He was at once called to organize and administer in the name of religion, and in the name of the colonial government. If, at times, it was difficult for him to combine these duties (which he strove to do), therefore neglecting one or the other, then the exigencies of the union were restrictive to his total performance.

On the other hand, it was precisely the restrictions exerted by the union which led, in the end, to excessive consequences. In the above example, the inability to precisely define the role of the missionary resulted in much church-state conflict. The friars, consequently, found themselves in positions where it was easy to assume ever-broadening jurisdictions, where it was tempting to defy authority, and to manipulate their charges.

Throughout this thesis I wish to make it clear that at any one given time, it was most likely that each of these impacts (that is, the weaknesses or supportiveness) of church-state union were provoking, directing and buttressing missionary vocation and participation in the Philippines.

This thesis is divided into three chapters, each comprising three sections. The first section of chapter one
introduces medieval church-state cooperation and, as it developed in Spain, the union known as the Patronato Real. It then examines the responsibilities and privileges integral to the agreement for the Spanish Crown, and concomitantly, the dependence of the missionaries on the King in order to fulfill their evangelical obligations. Section two looks at some of the immediate complications developed by the union as civil actors neglected their quasi-missionary responsibilities, and as the first clergy to the Philippines struggled to interpret their spiritual relationship to temporal conquest and its secular (non-religious) participants. At this point in time, the ecclesiastics set forth for themselves in a formally authoritative manner, those reasons justifying their assumption, as missionaries, of both spiritual and temporal roles, and their precise status and responsibility in union with Spanish government officials. The final section of the first chapter looks at who the missionaries in the Philippines were, and investigates the circumstances encouraging their role as both spiritual and political leaders. In particular, this section focuses in on the "episcopal jurisdiction controversy", the examination of which is essential to an understanding of how the friars viewed themselves and their role in the church-state union. It illustrates beautifully the obstinate and recalcitrant
personalities of clergy as they dealt with higher church and state authorities; it shows the confused and perplexed response of church and state leaders toward the rural priests as they grew more autonomous and powerful—in a few words, it exposes the conflictual reality of inter-church and church-state relationship, and its consequences for missionary performance. Significantly also, the visitation controversy was the first step in the development of more potent problems leading to major-scale hostility. What began as a jurisdictional dilemma between rivaling Spanish actors, soon developed, as we will see, into racial contest between European and Filipino.

Chapter two of this work deals with the aims and methods, scope and profundity of missionary participation, as Spanish clergy sought to Christianize and Hispanize the Filipino masses through leadership positions in education and local government. It analyzes their accomplishments in response to their perception of Christian vocation, in relationship to the goals of their church and state superiors, and their sense of responsibility or cooperation in fulfilling these goals. This chapter also examines Spanish attitudes toward native abilities and participation in their local institutions. Section three specifically looks at the obstructive impact of church-state union on the development of a native clergy in the Philippines. As the
partners of the union combined forces against the ordination of Filipinos, much was revealed about their own fears and insecurities, about their understanding of religion and attitudes toward non-Spanish peoples.

Finally, chapter three investigates the consequences of missionary vocation and participation. As 19th century Philippines opened up to the rest of the world thus stimulating dissatisfaction at home, nationalist sentiments were, for the first time, coherently organized and openly associated with the abuses of clericalism. But while Filipinos from all walks of society coalesced against their ecclesiastical exploiters, the Hispanic church-state union became even more cohesive and consistent—the two opponent groups polarizing in vicious competition. Section two of this chapter looks at the gradual but complete disintegration of church-state legitimacy in the eyes of the native population; at the angry wars and radical defiance of Filipinos who had grown to abhor their Spanish oppressors; and at the willful self-righteousness of Spanish missionaries to the very last moment, nonetheless. The final section of chapter three deals with the American contribution to the abolition of friary, and to their alternative solution to church-state relationship.

Once again, I hypothesize that missionary vocation and participation in the Philippines was directly consequential
to the influence and exigencies of the union of church and state. On the one hand that union supported and thus strengthened the self-image, endurance and role of the missionaries. At the same time though, the sense of power which it imbued in its participants proved destructive to the reputation of the union and consequently, to Hispanic missionary life altogether.

Despite the eventual termination of friary in the Islands, over 300 years of missionary work had left its mark inescapably apparent. As we examine the purposes and performances of missionaries over this time, I will analyze the relationship of friary, as a religious institution, to social development in the Philippines. Social development will refer to the building of those skills which allowed and encouraged people to think and create, to analyze and act, for the purpose of fundamentally changing the conditions and quality of their lives. It will refer to steps in the liberation of Filipino consciousness which empowered men to understand their "national predicament"; which forced them to strive for its improvement in the establishment of structures and standards promoting the dignity, security and happiness of its citizens. Any statement I make with regard to social development will be based upon missionary attitudes, methods and accomplishments in native education and town politics, and Filipino responses to these.
CHAPTER I
THE IMPACT OF SPANISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
ON CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES TO THE PHILIPPINES

Introduction:

In this chapter the nature of the union of church and state, as comprehended by the elements composing it, are examined. A comparison of these various perceptions provide the basis of our understanding of the relationship which governed civil and ecclesiastical interaction in the Philippines at all levels, and throughout the entire Spanish regime. While this Hispanic alliance was by far the most powerful political combination in the world at its time, the members of the union did not always share a harmonious relationship. In fact, the church-state compact in the Philippines was characterized by incessant discord and independent decision-making on the part of its actors. This disorder filtered down into local institutions and was emulated by the most junior of church and state officials.

The problem between civil and clerical representatives was inevitable. Both claimed supreme authority over identical jurisdictions, covering both spiritual and
temporal spheres. The King interpreted his obligations within the Patronato as inherently conferring him with ecclesiastical sovereignty. Clergy, in turn, condemned this as a grossly misinterpreted exaggeration of the papal grants which had indeed delegated duties, but solely with the spiritual welfare of natives in mind. On the other hand, with a clear conscience the ecclesiastics were able to legitimize the extension of their own spiritual jurisdiction into the natural realm, claiming temporal sovereignty over native subjects whenever necessary to the achievement of spiritual goals.

Perhaps Horacio de la Costa is more meticulously accurate when he chooses not to speak of "the union" of church and state per se, but of varied and numerous "unions" integral to individual historical incidents which took place in the Philippines. Nonetheless, it was the impact of the dynamic nature of this union, or these unions, as interpreted by those involved, which shaped the self-identity of the missionaries and the course of their activity in the archipelago.
Section I:

"Patronato Real" - A Union of Church and State

Roman Catholic missionary activity in the Philippines would have been seriously undermined, possibly non-existent, had it not been for that uniquely Hispanic institution which merged church and state into a powerful liaison called the Patronato Real, or royal patronage. Though history has proven the partners of the union to be at times selfish or unfaithful, their official marriage sprouted exuberantly self-righteous attitudes and endeavours. But before I begin with the development of church-state cooperation in Spain, let me first of all set the emotional tone of the country in the late 15th century.

When Ferdinand II (married to Isabella, Queen of Castile since 1474) succeeded to the Crown of Aragon in 1479, the union of Spain's two principal Kingdoms, Aragon and Castile, was finally achieved. The joint rule of Ferdinand and Isabella inaugurated the reign of the "Catholic Kings" and the beginning of a new era in Spanish history. Several remarkable events rank among the accomplishments of the duo; in their time, these historical achievements served as deep sources of a completely ethnocentric sense of pride, power and adventurousness.

One of the earliest features of Ferdinand and
Isabella's regime was the Spanish Inquisition, launched in 1478 with the permission of Pope Sixtus IV. Ostensibly, the Inquisition was founded to curb the evil influences of the "conversos", converted Jews suspected of Judaizing practices after Christian baptism. But the activities of the Inquisition soon expanded beyond this. Medieval Spain was the only country in western Europe with a significantly heterogeneous population practicing a variety of independent religious traditions. Large concentrations of Moorish and Jewish peoples therefore, inevitably became the target of a jealously racist Spanish society determined to dominate them at all costs or ideally, to eliminate them. Finding its ultimate goal in such attitudes, the Inquisition's purification of the Roman Catholic faith meant more than just dealing with sly conversos, but soon included the systematic persecution, execution or expulsion of all unconverted (and therefore heretical) Jews and Muslims. The Inquisition had set itself up as the sole judge and guardian of Christian orthodoxy and morality in Spain. The climax of the Inquisition came in 1492 when the royal couple were persuaded by the inquisitor-general, Tomás de Torquemada, to uniformly expel from Spanish territory all those Jews who refused to be baptized. Following on March 31, the pious monarchs' dutifully issued a royal edict offering Jews one of two possibilities, baptism or expulsion. Consequently,
some 165,000 to 170,000 Jews found themselves homeless, forced to emigrate abroad. Another 50,000 or so chose to remain and convert.² Such fanatical obsession with purity of blood and faith would continue to characterize Spanish attitudes well into the 17th century.

Another accomplishment of Ferdinand and Isabella was the conquest of Granada (1482-1492), the last Muslim occupied state in the peninsula. This defeat terminated the Christian crusade popularly known as the Reconquista or Reconquest. Way back in the 7th century Spain had been rapidly and completely overtaken by various Arab nations, and since that time dominated by Muslim culture and religion. The triumph over the emirate of Granada (located in the southeast corner of the country), marked the final elimination of Arab power by Christians whom, beginning effectively in the 11th century, had fought to reconquer Muslim controlled territory in Spain. The conquest was built up as a holy crusade which, in addition to re-establishing peninsular unity, was aimed at spreading the Christian faith abroad, and at liberating those Christians who had for so long been held captive of a heretical Muslim regime. The success of the Catholic Monarchs' in Granada was of enormous emotional significance for Christian Spain. It was regarded as a victory at the hand of God, divine compensation for virtuous motives and actions.
Finally, following the conquest of Granada Ferdinand and Isabella were, for the first time since the battles began in 1482, able to channel resources into a new fascination, world exploration. Culminating the spectacular year of 1492 then, Christopher Columbus' discovery of the West Indies inspired national pride with a new sense of excitement and power.

To summarize this far, we find Spain in the late 15th century hungry for power, glory and adventure. Victoriously confident in its strength and future, we find a country yet deeply preoccupied with the purity of the race and the religion from which its power derived. Without question, it was this same kind of militant political and religious intensity which profoundly influenced Spanish missionaries leaving for the Philippines, and which was to have a direct impact on their activity overseas.

From the moment Ferdinand and Isabella engaged Spain in the quest for new lands, it entered into a conflictual competition with Portugal, also intent upon building itself a colonial empire. And at the same time these countries rivaled one another for superiority in world colonization, the Holy See in Rome sought to integrate itself into their pursuits. Motivated and directed by an understanding of itself, the Corpus Christianum, as coterminous to the Kingdom of God and thus responsible for the safety of all
souls, it assumed the role of "arbiter of Christendom" among world powers.\(^3\) In response to the adventurous appetites of the two Iberian competitors therefore, Pope Alexander VI issued a series of bulls which proved decisive to the course of history in southeast Asia.

On May 4, 1493, the papal decree "Inter caetera" set forth the first demarcation line dividing the globe into jurisdictions between Spain and Portugal. The imaginary division cut the Atlantic Ocean vertically, from North to South Pole, 100 leagues\(^4\) west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. According to the decree, Pope Alexander VI had granted Spain the following:

\[\ldots\text{ all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south [of the demarcation line] with full and free power, authority, and jurisdiction of every kind }\ldots\]

Although not specifically stated in the declaration (only inferred from a previous bull, also Inter caetera, May 3, 1493), and consequently the source of much controversy, the lands to the east of the demarcation line were left for Portugal.\(^6\) Through this bull, the Pope entrusted Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain with not only the right, but also the duty to send missionaries to the lands of the New World discovered by Columbus, as well as to those lands yet to be discovered and claimed by Spain:
Moreover we command you in virtue of holy obedience that... you should appoint to the aforesaid mainlands and islands worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled, and experienced men, in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals.

On September 26, 1493, the same Pope, a Spaniard and evidently disposed in favour of the Spanish Crown, issued another bull allowing for the extension of Spanish authority to undiscovered lands in the East. The Portuguese King protested the outrageous bias and differences were finally settled on June 7, 1499, with the Treaty of Tordesillas. The new agreement shifted the original 1493 demarcation line another 270 leagues west and reassigned all the lands west of it to Spain, and east to Portugal.

The history of Spain in the Philippine Islands begins on March 17, 1521, with Ferdinand Magellan unintentionally landing on the shores of Samar. Magellan was searching for a new route to the Moluccas, officially in Spanish territory, where he would find riches bringing glory to Spain and to himself. On Easter Sunday, exactly two weeks after his arrival, the first mass in the Philippines was celebrated with a boom amid Spanish and Filipino participants. Two of the natives present at the ceremony were local chieftains. Antonio Pigafetta, a Venetian member of Magellan’s crew described the solemn event:

... Before we reached the shore with our boats, six pieces were discharged as a sign of peace. We
landed; the two kings (Kolambú and Siagu) embraced the captain-general [Magellan], and placed him between them. We went in marching order to the place consecrated, which was not far from the shore. Before the commencement of mass, the captain sprinkled the entire bodies of the two kings with musk water. The mass was offered up. The kings went forward to kiss the cross as we did, but they did not offer the sacrifice. When the body of our Lord was elevated, they remained on their knees and worshipped Him with clasped hands. The ships fired all their artillery at once when the body of Christ was elevated, the signal having been given from the shore with muskets.

Later on around dusk, Magellan planted a cross on a hilltop overlooking the ocean and formally took possession of the Islands for Spain. Pigafetta concluded:

After the cross was erected in position, each of us repeated a Pater Noster and an Ave Maria, and adored the cross; and the kings did the same.

After this initial discovery of the Philippines by Magellan (a European revelation at any rate), the Islands were left only nominally Spanish for almost the next half century. During this time the Crown dispatched successive expeditions with instructions to colonize and Christianize the lands and peoples found by Magellan. The first four efforts were fruitless and it wasn't until February 1565 that Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, commander of the fifth, arrived on the island of Cebu with the first colonizers and missionaries and established permanent settlement in the Philippines. As the two Iberian world powers fought to extend their
sovereignty abroad and the conquests of Spain prevailed, the Roman Catholic church understood as part of these successes, an inherent responsibility to provide for the proper evangelization of their new colonies. But the only way possible, it seemed, to ensure the Christianization of distant, unbelieving peoples was entering upon an agreement with their responsible colonial ruler. What followed from this were even more papal decrees which granted the Spanish Crown extraordinary rights over the colonial church in America and the Philippines, in exchange for duties measured particularly in monetary and military support.

With each new papal bull issued to Spanish sovereigns came extended responsibilities and privileges. The decree "Eximiae devotionis", also by Alexander VI, November 16, 1501, granted the King right to titles in America as long as he provided for the material needs of its colonial church. On July 28, 1508, with the bull "Universalis ecclesiae regimini" of Julius II, Spanish monarchs were given a decisive role in the selection of all ecclesiastical personnel bound for overseas, as well as the permission to erect all churches in her new colonies. Numerous other papal declarations profoundly reassured the urgency and expediency of simultaneous conquest and evangelization, and the King's absolute responsibility over the colonial church in the Philippines.
According to the Spanish monarch and his royal bureaucracy, the duties bestowed upon the Crown by the Pope were representative of a relationship between the two which went much deeper than just a patronage. The way they saw it, a ruler's responsibility to fulfill his duties demanded his right to use whatever means necessary to allow for it. Basing themselves upon this principle then, they deduced that inherent in the Patronato were not only obligations, but corresponding rights, together creating jurisdictions possessing ecclesiastical and spiritual authority. In addition to this, the unprecedented scope and quantity of the papal bulls, many of which were specifically irrevocable, led regalists to interpret them as apostolic delegations of authority.15 What developed from this was an attitude toward the nature of the Patronato that, as Horacio de la Costa explains, "while it could not touch the strictly sacramental order and was not explicitly universal, was nevertheless capable of being indefinitely extended." He continues:

By the second half of the 18th century the patronato had grown to such proportions that the King could consider even ecclesiastical judges as receiving their authority from him...

As papal delegate therefore, the Spanish Crown's authority in church affairs was all-embracing. The latter controlled church revenues; clerical appointments, dismissals and
transfers; mission boundaries; the erection of churches, convents and schools; and the mediation of communications between Rome and missionaries in the Islands.\footnote{17}

For her part in covenant with Rome, Spain undertook the transportation of clergy abroad, provided them with their equipment and personal stipends, and all that was necessary to fulfill its obligation to propagate and safeguard the Christian faith in Asia. Legaspi’s instructions from the Royal Audiencia of Mexico\footnote{18} upon departure for the Philippines in 1564 included the careful reminder:

And you shall have special care that, in all your negotiations with the natives of those regions some of the religious accompanying you be present, both, in order to avail yourself of their good counsel and advice, and so that the natives may see and understand your high estimation of them; for seeing this and the great reverence of the soldiers toward them, they themselves will hold the religious in great respect. This will be of great moment... since you are aware that the chief thing sought after by his Majesty is the increase of our holy Catholic Faith, and the salvation of the souls of those infidels.

Even before Magellan first stumbled upon the Philippine Islands in 1521 and claimed their possession for Spain, the union of church and state construed by the Patronato set the tone and framework within which missionaries to the Islands would carve out the definition of their roles, and the scope of their possibilities in the new land. On the one hand they embarked on expeditions to
the Orient with the enthusiastic sanction of God, the Pope and the King. Could a more legitimate and secure combination of approval exist? But on the other hand, the union of church and state would be the catalyst to conflicting opinions and motives, confusions of allegiance and anxious disorder. Social development in the Philippines would be directly affected and shaped by the support, excesses or restraints posed by this dynamic.
Section II:

Clerical Understanding of Church and State in the Islands

Soon after the Spanish colonizers and ecclesiastics settled down in the Islands side by side, it became evident that the intricacies of the union were not as simple as the general agreement had presumed. When the first bishop to the Philippines, Dominican prelate Domingo de Salazar, arrived in Manila in 1581 he found the young colony in a state of appalling confusion.

The Legaspi expedition had brought with it, as a feature of settlement, the encomienda system. Through this arrangement Spanish conquistadores and colonizers were granted by the King, as a favour for services rendered to their country, replete jurisdiction over the inhabitants and natural resources of areas of land known as encomiendas. The holder of an encomienda was referred to as an encomendero. In 1571 Legaspi, acting on orders from the Crown, distributed the first encomiendas in the Philippines to his soldiers, on the island of Cebu. As other islands were settled, new encomiendas were apportioned.

But according to the laws of the Indies, an encomendero had certain responsibilities attached to his role. Not only was he obliged to make Spanish sovereignty known across the Islands, and to protect and defend the
welfare of Filipinos in his territory. Equally important, in a quasi-missionary capacity, the encomendero was to precede and then aid Spanish friars in building chapels and teaching the rudiments of the Christian faith. In return for these civil and spiritual services provided by Spain, encomenderos were authorized to levy tribute (subject to government regulation) in labour services, goods or specie, from the Filipinos. It was not long before the performance of encomenderos in these respects became exploitative and violent. Instead of attracting the natives under their charge by peaceful means, providing protection and religious instruction geared toward conversion, they flogged, enslaved, overtaxed and killed. It was obvious to Bishop Salazar that the first settlers and civil bureaucrats did not understand the Christian obligation integral to conquest and colonization as outlined by King and Pope. Under what conditions then, was their conquest just or justifiable? What was the rightful nature of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands?; and in practically applying this, what was the correct and desirable relationship of church and state toward one another, and together toward the Filipinos?

Soon after his arrival, Bishop Salazar called together what became known as the first Synod of Manila (1582–1586). His purpose, described by H. de la Costa, "to set forth clearly what right reason and sound theology demanded in
matters of justice; that is, to come to some general agreement on major questions which deeply affected the health of the new colony, and to provide a guide or ideal for all Spaniards in the Philippines to follow. The conclusions reached by the Synod, as well as ensuing elaborations on these by Salazar, were fundamental to clerical perceptions of reality and the basis of a tradition assuming extensive episcopal influence over colonial administration in the Philippines.

Representatives from four religious orders (Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans and Jesuits) were present at the Synod. To begin the discussions, they all agreed that the only reason for bringing the Philippines under Spanish rule in the first place was to convert the Filipinos to Christianity.

Next, they established that the nature of the Patronato granted by Rome to the King was not a natural right, but an apostolic delegation. The Augustinians and Jesuits were quick to take their opinions one step further, simply, that the obvious native opposition to the gospels warranted Spain's political intervention with the permission of the Pope. The Dominicans were not so hastily drawn to the same conclusion which they considered inadequately reasoned, and worked out a more juristic position based on a distinction between political and Spiritual spheres of
power. 5

According to Salazar and the other Dominicans, natural sovereignty empowered one to direct others toward the attainment of temporal or natural well-being. A supernatural sovereign directed man towards the attainment of supernatural or spiritual happiness. Only natural sovereignty existed in man by nature; that sovereignty which led others to spiritual beatitude could not be produced from one's own resources and therefore, had to be sought from outside the mundane. Sovereignty over the spiritual society of man founded by Christ (i.e. the Church) was vested, by apostolic succession, in the Pope. It was he who possessed the authoritative direction to eternal fulfillment and the responsibility to see that this, summarized in the Christian gospels, was preached to every creature on earth. In order to effectively exercise this sovereignty the Pope could delegate a portion of his task to a civil leader who agreed to help him. Therefore, the Pope had conferred on the Spanish Crown the authority he had received from Christ through Peter, a share in the supernatural sovereignty of the Philippines. This privilege was not the same as the King's sovereignty in Spain which belonged to him by natural right. The authority he possessed in the Islands could exist and be exercised only with the spiritual well-being of the natives in mind. This meant, for example, that the
right to impose taxes on the Filipinos could only be justified if the natives were actually receiving spiritual benefits such as religious instruction and the sacraments.  

In the end, all of the religious orders arrived at the same conclusion: while the mission to spread the gospel was a purely spiritual one, the establishment of Spanish civil rule was lawful wherever it was necessary to create the conditions required for the spread of Christianity. The divine right and duty to preach the gospel implied, as they saw it, an obligation on the part of the native to listen (if not hear it), and to allow for its free predication and acceptance by others.

The Synod outlined three conditions which were absolutely essential to the proper absorption of the Christian tenets of faith. Deficiency in any one constituted an interference and entitled Spain to temporal sovereignty in the Philippines: 1. that native governments and laws conformed to "right reason and sound theology" as defined by the principles and commandments of the gospel; 2. that the level and structure of society and its culture be conducive to the free growth of Christian institutions and practices; and 3. that the inhabitants were "well-behaved" people who would not inhibit or prevent others from exercising their right to preach the gospel. Needless to say, the Synod delegates didn't have to debate past the
first condition. Without hesitation they were able to judge the governments of native rulers tyrannical and fundamentally evil, their laws cruel and perverse, and their customs profane and barbaric. The pitiful evidence demanded extraordinary measures in order to protect both missionary and Filipino.

The inferences of the Synod are glaring examples of the attitudes which fired missionary fervour in the Philippines. They set up an indisputable table of facts which governed the intensity of their task, which prescribed the course of its methods and the standards of its success. Not only was the lawfulness of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands established, but their own roles as missionaries in this spiritual undertaking could, by implication, be justifiably extended to the temporal sphere—and worse, always at the threat of withholding sacramental absolution. The clergy saw themselves in possession of supernatural authority by virtue of their ecclesiastical consecration and thus, in a position demanding their supervision, not merely their advice. This is not to say that these powers were imaginary, or employed only abusively. They were often disputed and distorted, but just as frequently legitimate, or at least conscientiously self justified. They were powers conferred by the law of God, (sometimes via the King), and not merely selfish desires to usurp glory.
Section III:

The Missionaries—In Service of God and King

The spread of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines was a monopoly of the Spanish Religious Orders. Members of these religious orders were known as "regular priests" (derived from the Latin "regula" meaning rule) because they took vows of chastity, obedience and poverty, lived in communities under the supervision of an elected superior and were bound together by the rule of their order. They stood apart for their self discipline and asceticism. Thus, when the Spanish Crown looked for missionaries to staff the jungle outposts of the Philippine Islands, the regulars were approached over the seculars. "Secular priests" (derived from the Latin "saecularis" meaning world) referred to those clergy who lived in the world, for example parish priests, free from monastic rules. Only a handful of friars from these religious orders were of non-Spanish European blood, and only rarely were any of these actually secular priests.¹

The first missionaries arrived on the shores of Cebu in 1571 with Legaspi. These were five Augustinian fathers. Next came the Franciscans in 1577; the first Jesuits and Dominicans together in 1581; the Augustinian Recollects in 1606; and the Benedictines much later in 1895. From these times onward, missionary recruitments came with almost every
ship which left Spain and Mexico for the Philippines.

With a mind to organize missionary exploits in the archipelago, the Council of the Indies in Spain, in 1594, instructed the governor and the bishop to divide the Islands into districts and to distribute them among the religious orders. Though officially designated, these mission fields were not permanent, were often transferred from one order to another or even exchanged between themselves. Eventually, each order established a discernible territory under a provincial superior with headquarters in Manila.

Inevitably, the scope of tasks pursued by the friars went far beyond strictly missionary limits. Not only did the Patronato encourage a certain interpenetration of functions, and not only did the ecological situation in the Philippines demand an even greater collaboration, but the awesome respect held by rulers and ruled alike toward sacred things, actively included clergy in deliberations and decision-making of all sorts. In addition to evangelization and the charge of religious matters, clergy were often asked to advise the colonial government on administrative affairs, to affirm the judiciousness of political decisions and even to represent Spain on political missions.  

At all times throughout the 300 years of intensive Spanish presence in the Islands, civil rulers were dependent on the clergy in one way or another. In earlier years this
relationship was a conscious choice. Over the centuries though, as the friars became more independently influential, the dependence of civil authorities on the priests was determined more and more by political circumstance. A brief look at the "episcopal visitation controversy" will illuminate the process of this development in the practical relationship of church and state as it functioned in the Islands, as well as the implications of clerical autonomy for the Filipino people.

While the Spanish Crown expanded its role over ecclesiastical affairs in the Philippines and turned practice into unofficial law, papal decrees directed to the friars tugged away in the opposite direction. On May 9, 1522, the bull of Adrian VI granted Franciscan missionaries (later extended to the other orders) the right to administer the sacraments to the natives and to discharge all the activities involved in operating a parish, independently of the local bishop. Thus, they were given the authority to perform duties ordinarily done by the seculars, but without having to submit to the constituent supervision by the diocesan bishop, which included regular visits to mission outposts. In essence then, they were given the rights and duties of a bishop, save those tasks which required, specifically, episcopal orders. In the beginning, this grant was considered necessary to allow for more effective
movement in the missionary field where episcopates and regular parochial administrations had not yet been set up.

Four decades later the question of episcopal visitation had become an agonizing thorn in the relationship between secular bishops and the religious orders in the Islands. So, when the Council of Trent met in 1564 this particular problem, among others, was tackled. In keeping with the aim of the Council to tighten up morals and discipline within the Roman Church, it ruled that the authority of a bishop over all aspects of religious life in his diocese had to be strengthened. Therefore, all priests serving parishes became subject to the discipline of their bishop, regulars included. The tension created by this new development pushed King Philip II to secure a clarification from Pope Pius V. On March 23, 1567, "Exponi nobis" authorized missionaries in the Indies to continue with their work as parish priests, entirely independent of the approval or permission of their bishop, as they were before the decrees of the Council of Trent. In addition, the Pope gave the Spanish Crown discretionary powers to enforce the Tridentine canon in the Indies. This led to the cedula of Philip II almost two decades later (1585) imposing episcopal visitation of the regular clergy "in accordance with the decrees of the Council of Trent." Confusing and contradictory as it was, all the cedulas and sacred decrees
then and thereafter did nothing to alter the attitude of the friars vis-à-vis the unwelcome diocesan prelate. They would simply not submit to his supervision.

The issue was met with obstinate indignation. Why? Was it a matter of pride, principle, malpractice? Episcopal visitation involved the inspection of missions with regard to parochial administration and the maintenance of parish records, the care of baptisteries and sacristies, prudence in the ministration of sacraments, and the general religious and moral quality of parish life. Visitation, bishops claimed, restricted itself to the religious ministry of the friars, not to their personal conduct which was the responsibility of their superiors. But each time an archbishop would impose the visits, even at the threat of excommunication, the same thing would happen. Supported by their superiors the friars would refer to papal privileges of exemption, to the sovereignty of the rule of their order, and to the limitations which would inhibit evangelization and the conversion of natives. The next step could only be the resignation of their posts and parishes. No other option was reasonable or possible.

Bishop and King considered several alternative solutions to the impasse. The most obvious was to develop a secular clergy large enough to replace the religious orders, as soon as the latter's initial pioneering tasks in the
outposts were stable enough to be handed on. It was only under these circumstances anyway, that official immunity from episcopal authority existed. Therefore, another cedula by Philip II on December 6, 1583, gave the secular clergy outright preference over the friars in appointments to vacant parishes. Unfortunately, the severe lack in numbers of seculars made the decree inapplicable and the Crown ended up suspending it two years later. Not enough secular priests from either Spain or Mexico were willing to leave for mission posts in the remote, inconvenient Islands. And while the Spanish population in the Philippines was just too small to promise a significant number of candidates for priesthood, the idea of developing a native clergy seemed sacrilegious. The Spanish friars were in an excellent position to hold out from all commands, except those which came directly from their religious superiors.

The visitation controversy gave rise to an ongoing conflict in which the regular clergy, episcopate and civil government were inextricably involved. From Salazar's time onward the issue would build up pressure, explode, subside, and slowly start to build again so that the entire process repeated itself many times during Spanish domination in the Islands. The role of the colonial government in the whole situation was much more ambiguous than the stances of episcopate or friar. Their position was one of reserve,
preferring to leave the friars as they were. (Very few Spanish civil bureaucrats or lay settlers resided outside the cities of Manila or Cebu—the only representatives of civil affairs across most of the countryside were the friars. Without them, Spanish presence in the Philippines became more a fantasy than a reality. But despite the preference of the colonial government to maintain status quo arrangements, the Crown was anxious about the inflexibility of the religious orders to yield to visitation. The independent attitude of the friars was surely indicative of more serious trouble, disdain of the Patronato itself. It was based on this fear that the Crown purposefully yet delicately, integrated itself into the problem. 8

Although the King had always looked to the colonial governor as vicepatrón of the church in the Islands (and thus charged with protecting the privileges of the Patronato in the Philippines), the tradition set by Salazar long before, elevating the rights and role of the episcopate, had overshadowed this facet of colonial administration. But now that the episcopate was having a difficult time controlling the friars, the response of the Crown was to re-emphasize the original terms of the Patronato and magnify the role of his vicepatron therein. In effect, the King was attempting to place the desires of both bishop and friar at the mercy of the governor. Therefore, in 1624 the Crown issued a
cedula reminding the bickering clerics of its superseding authority. It declared that, if the parish of a regular priest became vacant the superior of the order was required to notify the governor of the reason why, and then submit to him a list of three possible replacements. If the vicepatron approved the vacancy he, not the superior or the bishop, would then choose another cleric from the list to staff the mission post. When appointments and dismissals continued amiss, the King decided in another decree (1629) that the choice of a successor by the governor had to be approved, this time, in collaboration with the bishop. Again the religious orders barely responded. Not even withholding their stipends would make them budge. Once more, the old threat of renouncing their parishes emerged and the King had no choice but to give way to their wishes. The conditions in the Islands made the friars indispensable and nothing, apparently, was worth the risk of losing them.

With the close of the 18th century and Spain's involvement in political wars on the European continent, much of her hold on colonies in America were lost and weakened. By the early 19th century there was no question that if Spain didn't want to lose any more of her sovereignty abroad, the friars had to stay in the Philippines. They were infuriating and unruly, but nonetheless, they were Spanish. And so, until the Philippine
Wars and the arrival of the Americans at the turn of the 19th century, the friars remained in their parishes and retained all of their privileges.

The facts and implications of the "visitation controversy" are essential to an analysis of church-state impact on the self identity and participation of the friars in the Philippines. First of all it becomes evident that the number of sources claiming sovereignty over the movements of the missionaries, during the entire Spanish regime in the Islands, was confusing, if not absurd. Between the wishes and whims of King and Pope, colonial governor and archbishop, bishop and religious superior, the friars surely had reason to assume that their own concerns warranted recognition in the scramble. More often than not the instructions issued by one of the parties directly contravened the edict of the next; while one governor favoured a particular religious order and encouraged royal support in its direction, another at odds with a certain group was capable of making life difficult for them. So as Rome and Madrid made decisions together or separately, from abroad; as archbishop and governor fought, from Manila, for authority over vacillating jurisdictions; the friars and their superiors perpetuated the course of their own decisions. Scattered across the countryside in remote barrios, they were literally free to do as they pleased.
One might wonder whether the friars would have been any more receptive to official decisions had the commands been more unified? Given the depth of their motivation to evangelize and convert it would be easy to suppose not. But maybe, if civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies had been more coherent and conciliatory, a compromise position could have been reached with the friars. In later years, as most of the religious orders amassed fortunes in land and influence, it was just too late for official decrees to have commanding significance for them.

At the same time, the friars were well aware that, even if everybody opposed them, they were indispensable to them all. Without their participation the Christianization and Hispanization of the Orient, and the world, was a ridiculous sham. Their bargaining position was vast and their sense of power overwhelming. Whether their intentions were motivated by Christian love or personal pleasure (or a mixture of both), the fact remains that for over 300 years friars were left largely alone, free to interpret and pursue what they reasoned to be just and necessary, in the eyes of God, for Filipinos and for Spain.

Given that the missionaries were frequently the only Spaniards outside the larger cities, and that they were often the only people who learned and spoke native dialects, state officials depended heavily on their expertise in
dealing with the population. The friars interacted directly with the Filipinos, purported to understand the native mind, and mediated between them and their colonial rulers. Even more powerfully, the friars had learned how to manipulate the conduct of the natives. Could civil authority ever gain the confidence of a Filipino as effectively? John Forman's description of this is vivid:

... till the last day of Spanish rule—the placid word of the ecclesiastic, the superstitious veneration which he inspired in the ignorant native community, had a greater law-binding effect than the commands of the civil functionary. ... A Royal Decree or the sound of the cornet would not have been half so effective as the elevation of the Holy Cross before the fanatical majority, who became an easy prey to fantastic promises of eternal bliss, or the threats of everlasting perdition.

But as history shows only too well, the freedom of the friars became excessive and abusive. This is not to judge all clergy as self-motivated power mongers (no doubt some were), but what friars saw as essential to the proper education and refinement of Filipinos, the Filipinos became reluctant or not at all willing to accept. By the 19th century, what started out as inter-church and church-state rivalry, built up into passionate anti-friary. Missionary attitudes and practices became racial issues. Roman Catholic clergy became identified directly with Spain and imperialism. In 1898 civil and religious authorities had more to worry about than just the stubbornness of the
missionaries--Filipino nationalists had declared war on Spain, on everything Spanish, with vehement purpose and impact. Spain was on its way out of the Philippines.
NOTES - CHAPTER I

Introduction


Section I

1The Philippines soon proved to be an economic liability to Spain, rather than the "Islands of spice" they had hoped for. Three times, royal ministers advised their Kings (Philip II, III and IV) to abandon the profitless and burdensome colony. Each time the King declined holding fast to his religious obligation. See Gregorio Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, v.1, Philippine Education Company, Manila, 1957, pp. 160-161.

2Henry Kamen, A Concise History of Spain, Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1973, p. 57.


At this time, one league measured just over three nautical miles.


Davenport, op. cit. p. 77.

Zaide, op. cit., p. 98.


Ibid., p. 115, quoting from BRPI, vol. 33, p. 129.

Dated 1525, 1526, 1527 and 1542.

As it turned out, the Philippines were actually located on the Portuguese side of the 1499 demarcation line. Father Andres de Urdaneta, the Augustinian
co-navigator with Legaspi, brought this to the attention of King Philip II before the expedition departed. At first the King had genuinely believed that the Islands were on the Spanish side—but after Father Urdaneta's correction he completely disregarded the issue and pushed forward with his plans to colonize the Islands under the Spanish flag. Legaspi, four ships and 380 men (including five Augustinian missionaries) departed for the Philippines from Mexico on November 21, 1564. See Zaide, op. cit., pp. 137-138.


15 A second principle upon which the King could claim jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters derived from the relationship between obligation and right, as it was rooted in natural law. For example, the obligation of a sovereign ruler to safeguard individual civil rights, as well as to maintain the peace and order of his kingdom, gave him the right to intervene or suspend ecclesiastical processes, upon the appeal of a citizen, if church officials were seen to violate justice. This royal prerogative was known as the
"recurso de fuerza" and was held in virtue of the King's temporal sovereignty, not as a consequence of delegated spiritual authority. See Costa, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

16 Costa, op. cit., pp. 43-44.


18 Until 1821 when Mexico won independence from Spain, the Philippines were legally administered through Mexico. From 1821 until the American conquest the Islands were ruled directly from Madrid. In the Spanish colonial system the Royal Audiencia was the governor's highest council of state.


Section II


2 Despite efforts by the Spanish Crown to enforce the humane treatment of natives and the retribution of abusive encomenderos, the situation never improved and in fact, only
worsened. This led to the eventual abolition of the system around the beginning of the 19th century. See Zaide, op. cit., pp. 170-171, see Chapter II, Section II, footnote #6.


7 Horacio de la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768*, p. 27.

8 See Chapter I, Section III for impact of papal privileges.

Section III

Philippine Life in Town and Country, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1905, p. 120.


4Gerald H. Anderson, op. cit., p. 49.

5Nicholas P. Cushner, Spain in the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila, 1971, pp. 84-85.


7Examples of the more significant confrontations occurred in 1582, 1611–15, 1621–22, 1624, 1629, 1654–55,


9 The royal cedula of 1624 also reaffirmed the diocesan prelate's right to visitation, but this was not the primary intention for issuing it.


11 Nicholas P. Cushner, op. cit., pp. 86-87, outlines incidents of conflict between governors and religious orders.

CHAPTER II
THE INTEGRATION OF SPANISH MISSIONARIES INTO FILIPINO LIFE;
THEIR ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE NATIVE POPULATION

Introduction

Unlike the conquests of Mexico and Peru, the imposition of Spanish authority in the Philippine Islands was a relatively pacific operation, involving a minimum of violence and loss of lives. In fact, it is peculiar that almost the entire spectrum of Philippine history dominated by Spain, is void of any significant military organization. The subjection and acceptance by natives of the new Hispanic order was not so much the accomplishment of state coercion, as the peaceful, yet powerful persuasion of the missionaries. Right from the beginning the friars commanded an incredible influence. Through their sacerdotal office, often by virtue of it, they were able to demand and instill those traits (i.e. respect for authority), which firmly secured native obedience to their colonial rulers.

Once in the Philippines we must bear in mind that missionary policy and practice were hardly ever random experiments. Evangelical standards and strategies were, for
the most part, appropriated, directly from New Spain, or re-formulated based upon the experience of missionaries in the Americas, and adapted to the particular conditions in the Philippines. For example, the general content and methods of instruction used in the Philippines were directly extended from Spain's South American colonies.

During the earliest years of missionary activity in the archipelago, the main priorities of the friars were to teach the necessary content of prebaptismal material (the mastery of which constituted conversion), and then to administer the sacrament of baptism. Before a native could receive baptism though, it was essential that the following conditions be met: that he renounce paganism and affirm belief in the salvational nature of baptism; promise to engage in monogamous marriage relationships only; be able to recite by heart the Pater Noster, Ave Maria, the Credo and the Ten Commandments; be aware of the significance of the other sacraments and of one's practical obligations as a Roman Catholic, such as, Sunday mass attendance and at least, an annual confession. Sometimes all of these criteria were followed meticulously, and at other times they were only haphazardly demanded.

At first the process of converting and baptizing went very slowly. Between 1565 and 1570 less than 100 natives entered into the Roman Catholic faith, and up until 1578,
most of the baptisms were performed on children only. By 1586 there were 94 missionaries in the Philippines and baptismal counts approached 170,000; these numbers soared, by 1594, to 267 friars and 286,000 baptisms. The number of people baptized continued to rise proportionally to increases in the numbers of Spanish priests posted in the Islands so that by 1622, approximately 500,000 Filipinos, over half the entire population, had received the sacrament. The pioneering process of breaking into the countryside, introducing Christianity to the natives and enticing their cooperation to the point of baptism, took a solid 50 years of intensive proselytizing--thus laying the first foundations of the faith.

The other concern of the missionaries (a concern which followed each and every baptism), was the day to day maintenance of the religion in native lives. Most Filipinos still lived in dispersed clan groups across the many islands, yet intimately dependent on the folk traditions of their forefathers. But through a minutely contrived process revolved around the relocation of natives and the establishment of local political and educational institutions, Filipinos were further indoctrinated into the essentials of Christian belief and lifestyle. Rural monastic schools and the friar-dominated system of local government aimed not only to train an elite class of
Filipinos who would act as intermediaries between parish priests and the rest of the village population, but also intended to consolidate a permanent "master-servant" pattern in the relationship of native to Spaniard, and to maintain that particular power arrangement as tightly as possible. By the middle of the 18th century, many of the precarious rural mission posts of earlier days had become official parishes with a fixed population of parishioners, at least one elementary school and a completely established local government machinery.

I would like to clarify several points related to the content of material dealt with in this chapter. First of all, I will not explore the differences between the various monastic orders in the Philippines, nor their relationship to one another. Our concern will be with the consequences of church-state relationship (as opposed to inter-church conflict), on missionary attitudes and performances generally.

Secondly, in the section on education, I will not elaborate on clerical participation in the higher levels. Secondary school and university educations were, for the most part, only open to Spaniards and much later on, to a very limited quota of wealthy native applicants.

Finally, as I examine Spanish missionary activity among the native population, I exclude their interaction
with the Muslim Filipinos of Mindanao and Sulu (to the far south of the Philippine Islands), referred to as Moros by the Spaniards. Of the same Malay stock as Christian Filipinos, the Moros were distinguished from them by their Islamic religion and culture, and by their fiercely hostile determination to preserve their independence from outside authority. Therefore, when the earliest Spanish conquistadores attempted to subject the Moros, along with the rest of the native population, to Hispanic sovereignty, the Muslims entered upon a state of war against the Spanish "infidels". This was precisely the relationship which endured between them for the next 300 years. Despite many efforts, the Spanish were never able to suppress the wild fighting spirit of the Muslim warriors, never able to claim sovereignty over them.
Section: I

Missionary Methods--Evangelization and Education

Sixteenth century Spain was a vibrantly influential European power, a nation proud of its culture, its politics and its religion. From earliest times Spanish authorities were concerned with the promotion of education in their overseas colonies, an interest rooted in their ethnocentric approach to the world. The official aims of a Spanish education in the colonies were three-fold. Since the primary concern of medieval instruction at home was the preparation of students for eschatological reward rather than temporal successes, religion predominated all facets of the system. Likewise, the aim of instruction in the Philippines was the preparation of natives in anticipation of similar rewards. Secondly and thirdly, though equally salient, education in the Islands was contemplated as a means to penetrate and root the Hispanic culture and the Spanish language beyond the borders of the mother country. Responsibility to implement this peculiar brand of education impressing Christian doctrine, Spanish tradition and language, was delegated from the beginning to the Spanish religious orders.

When the missionaries first arrived in the designated territory of their particular order, they set about
establishing mission stations in all those places where a sufficient number of people lived, or could be induced to congregate. Almost simultaneously they erected a chapel, proceeded to gather the people for instruction, started catechism classes in preparation for baptisms and set to work organizing a school. This was by no means a painless task. The first and principal obstacle encountered by the missionaries was the nature of native settlements. They were small clan groups, widely scattered across the Islands and living adjacent to the land they cultivated. Under these circumstances the apostle-friars spent most of their time just travelling the countryside, in twos, trying to find and reach the people.  

The combination of a highly dispersed Filipino population and a severe shortage of ecclesiastical personnel soon led representatives at the Synod of Manila to recommend to Spanish authorities the extension of the "civil congregations" of New Spain, to the Philippine Islands. As early as 1512 with the Laws of Burgos, Hispanic imperial policy involved repeated efforts to civilize and refine the natives of Spanish colonies by urbanizing and patterning them according to medieval European religion, morals, ideas, dress, bureaucracies and so on. The creation of civil congregations involved therefore, relocating and concentrating indigenous peoples into larger communities
around a church, in sites carefully chosen by church and state officials according to the requirements set out by the laws of Spain. In this way, civil and religious authorities were given the political, economic and evangelical leverage to pursue their objectives. For the friars this meant primarily, more rapid and methodical religious instruction; for civil authorities it meant, in addition to this, a more coherent colonial administration and more profitable exploitation of resources. The Spanish Crown did not hesitate in dedicating itself to resettlement schemes in the Philippines. During the 1580's and 1590's it launched a vigorous program of societal reorganization similar to those already operating in Mexico and Peru.

Initially, many of the Spanish encomenderos in the Islands opposed and even blocked the urbanization policy. They claimed that the friars, by interfering with native traditions and customs, drove the Filipinos away into the mountains or even onto other islands. Needless to say, this left the tribute collectors without their clientele of taxpayers. Despite this earlier opposition, the friars went ahead determined to implement the project, if by themselves. They chose sites in consultation with the authorities and erected churches and convents around central squares—these were called the "cabecera" or today, "poblacion", and were designed to be the capital of the
parish. It was around these plazas that the new village population would locate itself. The missionaries then proceeded to compel the natives to move. Different stories chronicle methods ranging from military coercion and cunning deception, to seduction through the pomp and colour of numerous Holy festivals and ceremonies.

Throughout the entire Spanish regime, concentrating the natives into towns remained a concern for the friars. Unfortunately though, the Filipinos were reluctant to move and the missionaries had to content themselves with only partial success. A total change in the social structure of society demanded a reorganization of their subsistence economy and for some reason, the friars didn't offer the natives any viable alternatives. So while some Filipinos would and did relocate, the missionaries were forced to adopt a compromise system whereby, a series of "visita chapels" (located in what are known today as barrios or baráquyos) were built and periodically visited by the clergy who staffed the población. This unit consisting of población surrounded by numerous barrios is today, still the predominant pattern of rural settlement in the Philippines. Decentralization of the population was significantly reduced, but not ever to the total satisfaction of Spain or colonial church. In 1660 Ignacio Alcina, a Jesuit in the Visayas, described the early towns:
For the most part there is nothing in the towns except the priest's house and the chapel, small or big according to the number of people, and a few huts which the natives use when they come to town. This they do only when the father is there, and they do not come every day but only on Sundays. The only ones who stay are the boys who are still learning their catechism, for we insist on their being there as long as the father is; the old folks too and the sick stay for a while. But even this much requires a great deal of persuasion, for they are scattered all over the countryside, wherever they have a mind to dwell. 14

The process of converting Filipinos to Christianity involved rigorous teaching before preaching the Word could actually be effective. Spanish missionaries saw themselves as battling with a devil who had successfully cursed and now tyrannized the native masses. Their approach therefore, was not to present the Christian faith as an evolved or more perfect state of Filipino beliefs. The religion they presented to them was something totally new, the designs of an almighty and omniscient God. 15 As they strove to break the natives completely from their heathen past, Christian practices were persistently substituted for pagan customs. For example, propitiatory sacrifices at planting time were replaced by the solemn blessing of rice seed by the friar; catechism and prayers were set to traditional planting and rowing chants which once recounted the heroic enterprises of gods and ancestors. 16 In this sense, the existing superstitions of the natives were not genuinely extirpated for the new doctrines of the missionaries, but were used to
entice and hold the Filipinos to new Christian practices.

But the insertion of a new religion into the belief system of the indigenous population required a logical and effective point of entry. Hence, special attention was focused on native children, and primary education became a major preoccupation of the friars. By making the children the target of religious instruction, the missionaries gave themselves access to the native community without having to struggle directly with rigidly fixed pagan mentalities. So after the missionary had set up his station with chapel and residence, his next step was to build up a base of young boys from the community--students whom native leaders would entrust to their care. As the friar indoctrinated the minds of the youngsters, the latter in turn taught their families; once the leaders of the native clans had been won over by the new enlivened disposition of their children, the conversion of the rest of the community was just a matter of time.

Until the end of the Spanish regime, the principal feature of primary school education in the Islands remained memorization of the prayers and the catechism. These included, in the reduced form taught by the missionaries: the Our Father, Hail Mary, Hail Holy Queen and the Creed; the 10 Commandments, the 7 sacraments, the 5 commandments of the Church, the 7 capital sins, the 14 works of mercy, the
14 articles of faith, and the practice of confession. At times this schedule was embellished with courses in deportment, reading, writing and arithmetic; liturgical, vocal or instrumental music, but these were considered significant only as they reinforced Christian doctrine. Only after 1863 did a sadly inadequate "secular" textbook appear and even this, when used at all, was predominated by religious and moral content.17

The aim of instruction for the friars was always religious conversion epitomized in the sacrament of baptism, and the maintenance of the newly acquired faith after this. For the most part, it was the maintenance of the faith which required the greatest dedication. Again, the shortage of priests in relation to the size and dispersal of the Filipino population demanded extreme action by the friars. Ignacio Alcino describes the frustrations effected by these inadequacies:

Each father has under his care at least two towns; some have three, others four and even five. I myself, this Lent of 1660, visited and heard confessions in four. Thus we are always on the move . . . the missionary must be forever raveling and unraveling this work. What he accomplishes by a sojourn of 19 or 20 days (sometimes more, sometimes less, depending on the size of the town), he finds when he returns one or two months later to be altogether undone and forgotten. Thus we are continually starting all over again . . . Many evils result from the distance and inaccessibility of their settlements, such as, in the temporal order, the complete lack of human intercourse and refinement, and in the spiritual order, the undisciplined manner of life, the
survival of their ancient usages and superstitions, the drunken feasts they indulge in... the frequent extramarital relationships, the crimes of violence and rapes committed without witnesses, in a word, the fact that they leave their faith and their Christian principles the moment they leave the church.

The style or method of instruction which emerged in response to this was not particular to any one religious order, but became general practice with all the missionaries. The Roman Catholicism taught to Filipinos was one steeped in religiosity and ritual. Music became an important vehicle of the faith and the catechism and prayers were often instilled as songs; visual senses were stimulated by pictures vividly illustrating the horrors of hell; and ceremonies integral to instruction (or instructive ritual) were made into awesome, solemn events in order to impress the sacred importance of lessons taught by the friars. The daily timetable of any elementary schooler was intensely imbued with serious religious formality, a formality and rigidity reminiscent of medieval monastic Rules generally. The following description by a Franciscan friar, Juan Francisco de San Antonio, is by no means atypical:

Every day without exception, at the sound of the bell, all the school children promptly assemble in the church. The little choristers led by their choir master intone the Te Deum with solemn devotion ending with the versicle and prayer to the Most Holy Trinity, after which they sing prime of the Little Office of the Blessed Mother. There follows the conventional mass, after which the boys recite the rosary together along with those of the faithful who stay for this exercise. Then
the school children file out in order, following a small processional cross and reciting a prayer, to go to the school house, while the choristers go with their master to choir practice. Two strokes of the bell is the signal for the end of classes, and then everyone goes home for the mid-day meal.

At two o'clock the bell is rung for vespers, and all the children return to the church to sing the Little Office of the Blessed Mother in the manner described. After this everyone goes to his assigned task until five o'clock, when a very devotional procession is formed in the church and winds its way through the streets of the town singing or reciting the rosary. This is concluded in the church with litanies, the antiphon of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God, and a responsory for the blessed souls in Purgatory.

The method and quality of teaching did vary from order to order, and from friar to friar. For example, the Franciscans became prominent for their competent and intensive instruction, and the Jesuits for their proficient pedagogical methods. The Augustinians attained the reputation as the least effective educators, maybe due to the continued disciplinary problems within the order. The differences in instruction across the Philippines are particularly interesting though, for our purposes, when examined in the light of an analysis by John Leddy Phelan. He notes that the variations between the different orders did not always accurately reflect the actual quality of their instruction. Those parishes which were most concentrated and densely populated, whether or not the quality of their indoctrination was high, tended to be the most intensively penetrated and therefore, most readily
converted and maintained. Because the Filipinos in the Visayas were so scattered, the intensity of Jesuit instruction, despite the superior quality of their methods, was no greater than that of their Augustinian brothers who held the more densely populated territory around Manila. Phelan maintains therefore, that the success of clerical education, measured according to their aims, depended more on the density of the population than on the methods or quality of instruction. Nevertheless, no matter how high the quality or sensible the method, all friar education remained conspicuously anti-intellectual and rigid. It commanded only obedient response to the narrowest reductions of Christian doctrine.

Another method used by the friars to maintain the intensity and observance of their lessons was the use of fiscales, native intermediaries between themselves and their congregations. The fiscal, always chosen from among the converted indigenous elite, became every friar's right-hand man. His duties included the organization of the town's patronal fiesta; parish sacristan, as he attended to the upkeep and beautification of the church; teacher, as he organized and supervised, more and more, the instruction of catechism beginning in the 17th century; and above all, the fiscal served as a sort of Christian truant officer. He compelled his fellow parishioners to attend Sunday mass,
holy feasts and catechism classes, and admonished those who set undesirable examples. In 1605 the role of fiscal was described in the following manner, as one who:

... teaches catechism to the ignorant, strengthens the weak, visits the sick, and if they are dangerously ill sends for the priest. He incites sinners to confession, solicits alms, helps bury the dead, reprehends the guilty, gives advice, promotes charity, inflames zeal, corrects what he can, and what he cannot, deplores.

Also quite common practice with the friars was training the more advanced catechumens to supervise and conduct lessons while the priest travelled to outlying barrios, or attended to other parish duties. It seems that the missionaries were not especially wary of employing native assistance for parochial responsibilities including sacred instruction and, in extraordinary circumstances, even the administration of baptism. But these Filipinos were always a meagerly equipped, poorly financed staff, created only to serve and perpetuate the designs of their parish priest.

The languages of instruction employed by the missionaries, unlike in the American colonies, were native dialects. This practice directly opposed official royal policy which firmly and repeatedly demanded instruction in Spanish. The decision taken by the friars to use native dialects instead of Spanish was motivated by both practical and expedient concerns. On the one hand it was easier for
one person to learn the 3 or 4 dialects of a particular region, than for the multitudes to master Spanish. Their principal task of teaching the Christian doctrine, friars argued, could only be done properly and efficiently in the language of the people. On the other hand, the language situation served to consolidate the political position of the missionaries in the rural areas. Not only could the friars choose and thus control the ideas which entered the native mind, but colonial officials were forced into a relationship of dependence on the priests whom they needed as mediators between themselves and the Filipinos. Colonial officials in the provinces, if not represented in the person of friar, held office for short terms and were not as apt or motivated to learn the dialects as the missionary whose enterprise depended entirely on his personal relationship to Filipinos. Use of Spanish in rural areas was usually limited to essential theological words which were not readily translated into the native dialects. Hence the Spanish words for concepts such as God, Holy Spirit, grace, church, virgin, sacrament, redemption and so on were directly transplanted into the Filipino languages in order to preserve the orthodoxy of the ideas they represented.26

The status of language in the Islands soon became as ambiguous as the jurisdictional controversies among clergy, and between church and state. While the promulgation of
successive laws made Spanish the only legal language of instruction, the friars who were in charge of education successfully resisted royal checks on their domination therein. This became particularly unfair for Filipinos when, in 1863, civil authorities in Manila passed a law stating that 15 years after the establishment of a school in any given community, only those who knew Spanish could qualify for the two main elected town offices; 30 years hence only those who knew Spanish would be considered for exemption from draft labour; and after December 20, 1868, any office contemplated by a Filipino required absolutely, fluency in Spanish. It was understandable that over three centuries, civil authorities felt pushed to severe measures. Unfortunately, the victims of the new language law remained largely incapable of rectifying their plight. Although the royal cédula could not be seriously enforced—only few Filipinos spoke Spanish—it provided the friars with additional leverage. The combination of church practice and state policy here worked together to mitigate Filipino advancements possible through the apprehension of the language of their colonialists.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, many efforts were taken by the Spanish Crown to bring education in the Islands more decisively under its helm. But even though these steps were often embodied in laws they remained, for long periods
of time or indefinitely, as empty orders. The most striking and persistent effort at reform came on December 20, 1863, motivated by the new "liberal" regime in Madrid. The educational decrees promulgated at that time were based on the recommendations of an educational commission appointed in 1855 and provided for the establishment of a public school system. This didn't mean that the whole educational system was to be secularized at once, or even eventually. The provisions of the new law demanded that the same course of elementary school study practiced in Spain be implemented in the Philippines; that at least one primary school for boys and one for girls be established in each town; that municipal governments maintain and upkeep these village schools; that primary instruction be free and compulsorily conducted in Spanish; and that local school boards of a secular nature, comprising lay members, be formed. In Manila, the "Superior Commission of Primary Instruction" was created and presided over by the governor-general of the colony, in consultation with the archbishop and seven other members. The civil authority of each province also became the provincial Inspector of Education, assisted by a provincial school board on which sat the provincial superior of the religious order in that province. The parish priests remained, officially, the supervisors of religious instruction and more generally,
Inspector of Education in each town. Also, the new law provided for the creation of a teacher's training school for male Filipinos, established in Manila and placed under the charge of the Jesuits.

The outcome of the Educational Decree, as might have been anticipated, was not commendable. While many new school buildings were erected and an increased number of pupils enrolled, and while a new class of more competent lay teachers were trained to replace the inadequately equipped native assistants employed by the priests, the educational system remained effectively under friar control. Unofficially, they managed to preserve their domination over everything, relegating school boards to token agencies and lay teachers to lackeys of clerical persuasion. Catechism remained the predominant and powerful feature of primary school education. Before 1863, and right up until the arrival of the Americans in 1898, the missionaries succeeded in nullifying all reforms aimed at the secularization of education.

Spanish missionaries were also responsible for setting up and maintained complete control over, higher institutes of education in Manila and elsewhere (such as the universities of Santo Tomás, San José, and San Ignacio in the capital, and a handful of secondary schools in the more important towns outside Manila). These schools offered
varying but broader lists of Arts and Science courses including Latin grammar, Spanish, philosophy, civil and Roman law, chemistry, physics, medicine, theology and canon law. Unfortunately, the majority of Filipinos could not benefit from these schools which were created for, and served foremost, Spanish and mestizo children. Most pure-blooded Filipinos never secured more than a village school training, and on a non-compulsory basis.

But even at the higher levels many a Spaniard and Filipino were critical of the narrowness of instruction. While in Europe José Rizal, a brilliant Filipino scholar and reformist, was overwhelmed by the discrepancy in methods of laboratory research abroad and at home. He wrote about the instruction of physics at the leading university in the Philippines, Santo Tomás, in his famous novel El Filibusterismo:

The walls were entirely bare; not a drawing, nor an engraving, nor even any kind of a representation of an instrument of physics ... From time to time, when some complacent professor came, a day of the year was assigned for visiting the mysterious 'cabinet', and admiring from afar the enigmatic apparatus arranged inside the cases. Then no one could complain; that day there were seen much brass, much glass, many tubes, disks, wheels, bells etc. And the show stopped there, and the Filipinos were not turned upside down ... The 'cabinet' was made to be shown to foreigners and to high officials from Spain, that, on seeing it, they may nod in approbation, while their guide smiles as if saying: 'You have been thinking you were going to find a lot of backward monks, eh?'
Still, it was this minority of students from the higher institutes of education in the Philippines (including also those Filipinos attending European universities), who became the seed to strong nationalistic influences which were to play, as we shall see, a decisive role in 19th century Philippine history.

The aims of colonial education according to church and state both overlapped and diverged. While civil authorities were concerned with the cultivation of a religious, cultural and linguistic tradition, the friars attended to a less comprehensive version of instruction. They acquiesced with civil experiments or promoted royal orders if, and only if, they coincided with religious or personal goals. Hence native resettlement, a policy of the state administrators, was almost completely the product of missionary ambitions (if only partially accomplished) which concentrated communities more and more intensively around churches, and rendered village life more thoroughly dependent on Christian laws and practices, as they still are today.

But if we look at the language situation we find that the story differs. Even though the national dialect, tagalog, and many of the regional dialects have been penetrated by numerous Spanish words and sounds, Spanish Kings completely failed to impart their mother tongue to the natives in the same way they were able to do in Latin
America. The friars effectively obstructed all royal decrees pertaining to language of instruction. While throughout history this worked both positively and negatively for Filipinos, it would be difficult to speculate which set of consequences might have proved most detrimental. For centuries, absence of facility in Spanish left the natives at the mercy of their priests, it barred them from public offices, from higher educations and from substantial interpenetration with Spaniards in the Islands. But despite this, it preserved their ancient languages and much of native tradition and thus, provided a source of pride and encouragement amid nationalist fervour.

The extent to which a friar-education successfully Hispanized the Filipino masses is not as blatant as their triumphs in blocking the implementation of Spanish, and saturating primary school curriculum with religion. For the most part, the impact and absorption of Spanish culture by the natives was limited by its indirect application. Just as the regular clergy were often able to maintain considerable autonomy from their superiors in both Madrid and Manila, so too, conditions in the countryside allowed Filipinos a measure of choice in their response to local Spanish authorities. For example, the reluctance of natives to resettle in larger, centralized villages, the cultural isolation of priests and their parishes, poor communications.
with Manila and Spain, the shortage of clergy, scarcity of Spanish settlers, and the failure of the colonists to spread their language, are all factors which enabled Filipinos to maintain native particularisms. Yet, the very determination of the friars to impose their brand of Hispanic tradition, usually motivated and bound up in the perpetuation of religious ideals, forced Filipinos to absorb permanent, if not violently disruptive, changes in pre-conquest patterns. The combination of necessarily having to accommodate Filipino disinclination and ecological limitations on the one hand, and selective integration of Spanish tradition by the natives on the other, created a largely externalized, only partial Hispanization of the Filipino people.
Section II:

Missionary Methods—Evangelization and Local Government

In addition to complete command over education in the Philippines, Spanish missionaries monopolized another crucial facet of town life, that of local government. Through their domination of the latter they entrenched and integrated even further their own religious priorities and values with native reality.

In the medieval Roman Catholic world, even the most humble of the priestly class were endowed with special divine powers. Their direct link to the Origin of life and Savior of mankind placed them in a category of men above all the rest. They possessed the insight to distinguish God’s will from the devil’s and therefore, the wisdom to direct earthly matters in the name of temporal sovereigns and officials. Their clerical role then, was adaptable to any ranking secular position. They could be secretaries or treasurers, governor-generals or military commanders, merchants or managers: The only discrepancy which had to be endured—sometimes scarcely understood but always respected—was their zealous religious drive. Hence, civil positions appropriated by priests brought with them awesome codes, commandments, doctrines and dogmas which, in varying ways and degrees, altered both their spiritual and temporal
roles. This was exactly the situation found in the Philippines as local Spanish missionaries were delegated or assumed, sweeping political prerogatives.

In order to visualize the process of political transformation from pre-Conquest to Spanish colonial times; and in order to understand how the friars manipulated this transformation in order to strengthen, in the name of religion, their relationship with the Filipino people, I will first provide some historical background. I will then analyze the interacting political functions of priest and parishioner and the implications of this interdependence for religion and the political system in the Philippines.

Before the Spanish arrived, certain political divisions and hierarchies among natives characterized their society. The small, dispersed settlements which the first missionaries encountered were kinship groups known as barangays (derived from the Malay word "balanghai" depicting the sea craft which brought the first Malay immigrants to the Philippines), and comprised anywhere from 30 to 100 families. Each barangay was ruled by a patriarchal chieftain, a dato or datus, who held his position primarily by inheritance, occasionally through a self-made reputation as fearless warrior and leader. Sometimes several barangays settled together or within close proximity but they remained distinctly separate entities, cooperating only for pragmatic
purposes of survival.

Within the barangay several definite social classes existed, reminiscent of the earliest feudal relationships in Europe. The noblemen, that is, datus and their families, held the highest place in society referred to as "marharlika" in tagalog (i.e. high or great by birth). As chief legislator, executor, judge and military commander, the datus was responsible for the interests and welfare of his barangay. In return he collected a tribute from his clan members, was dutifully served whenever he commanded and loyally revered by his subjects. The next class of citizenry were the "timagua", a group of freeborn persons or emancipated commoners, followed by the lowest social strata known as "aliping". The latter were divided into two main sections: serfs (aliping namamahay) who owned property, lived in their own homes, but served a lord; and slaves (aliping saguiguilid) who did not own property, served their lord in his house and farm, and could be sold.3

During the first three decades of permanent Spanish settlement in the Philippines, political organization was minimal. Falling roughly under the categories of "conquest", "pacification" and "extraction of tribute", management of affairs in the Islands was left rather loosely to conquistadore, cleric and encomendero. By 1610 a system of provincial and municipal governments was established
through which authorities in Manila organized and administered the colony. It was this system which remained, with only minor changes, almost until the end of the Spanish regime.

For the entire duration of colonial rule, Spain's attitude toward the Philippines was that of a nation inhabited exclusively by legal minors, urgently requiring direction and defense. Filipinos were never regarded as equals warranting representation in the Spanish Cortes, or native institution equivalent to this. They were always segregated politically from Spanish and mestizo communities in the colony, governed as a separate state with their own laws (including decrees by the Crown, executive proclamations by colonial governor, and Spanish laws applicable to the colony by permission of the King), and their own hierarchy of officials.

The political organization implemented by Spanish imperialists early in the 17th century took the following form: The "pacified" regions of the Islands (those areas where natives submitted themselves to Spanish rule and religion), were divided into provinces called alcaldías and placed under the rule of civil executives known as "alcaldes mayores", or provincial governors. The yet unpacified or strategically located areas were divided into territories called corregimientos, under the charge of político-military
governors known as "corregidores". The provinces were distinguished, one from another, according to dialects and as time went on more were created out of corregimientos as they were pacified, and out of private encomiendas which were gradually being phased out. The offices of alcalde mayor and corregidor were directly responsible to the Governor and the Audiencia in Manila, and were open only to Spaniards on the basis of appointment. They empowered the new officials with executive and judicial functions, the supervision of tribute-collection in their administrative units, and at times, the privilege to engage in trade. Those who served as alcaldes mayores soon attained reputations as some of the most unqualified and incapable representatives of the Spanish Crown. During those times when participation in trade was open to them, the provincial governors took advantage of their meagerly salaried positions and became notorious for controlling prices, harassing and even terminating competition in their provinces. In 1810 Tomás Comyn, an 18 year veteran in the Islands wrote:

It is in fact common enough to see a hairdresser or a lackey converted into a governor; a sailor or a deserter transformed into a district magistrate, collector, or military commander of a populous province, without any other counsellor than his own crude understanding, or any other guide than his passions.

It was only beginning at the municipal level that
Filipinos played any role in the colonial government, a role cleverly circumscribed by church and state authorities. Upon arrival to the Islands, the first handful of Augustinian fathers quickly analyzed native social structures and recommended to Philip II, as soon as 1573, that the reign of the privileged marharlika be perpetuated through Spanish rule. The prestige and influence wielded by the traditional native aristocracy, if properly manipulated by Spanish authorities, could be used to obviate resistance among Filipinos of all classes, to Hispanic imperialism. A decade later, clergy present at the Synod of Manila strongly urged that local government be left, as far as possible, to native officials:

On the supposition that the King and his governor exercise a just sovereignty in this land (as we have said), we affirm that the governor is obliged not only to appoint alcaldes mayores, but also to authorize in the larger and more settled towns native magistrates, elected by the natives themselves, who shall have charge of public peace and order and the hearing of ordinary cases.

The Fathers outlined their reasons with the following postulations:

In the first place, in order that the alcaldes mayores, who try cases of greater moment, may not always be among the natives, since this is not advisable. Secondly, because this is of natural right, and nature itself enjoins it even on brute animals. Thus we see that cranes, ants and sheep have governors and chiefs belonging to their respective species and not others. Thirdly, because the magistrate must be familiar with the laws, customs, uses and abuses of his community,
and this the alcalde mayor cannot be, because he has to depend on an interpreter. . . . And so even with the best of intentions he is liable to commit serious errors, to the scandal of the natives who see only what is done and not what is intended. It follows from this that the alcaldes mayores are not qualified to attend to the details of administration. Let them leave these matters to the native magistrate, who without incurring the expense of hiring interpreters and scribes, but solely by word of mouth, can administer them better than the alcalde mayor with his interpreters and scribes, because of his familiarity with local conditions.

The recommendation was concluded, evidently, with a threat:

. . . it is the opinion of the synod that the governor is obliged under pain of mortal sin and restitution of the damages that may otherwise arise to institute such native magistrates wherever possible. And let him not do so as a mere formality, but in such a way that they are truly magistrates . . .

Synod's suggestion was enthusiastically adopted into official colonial policy. It became the rudiments of the system of municipal government soon to follow. The only difference was that the liberal spirit of the proposal came, in practice, considerably toned down. Over the centuries, Spanish confidence in native talent would continue to lose strength.

After the provinces had been outlined and designated to Spanish church and state officials, they were subdivided into areas called pueblos or townships, with the parish church and plaza (poblacion) at the center. A Filipino official known as the "gobernadorcillo" or petty governor
(corresponding to contemporary town mayor) was charged with the duties of the pueblo, assisted by a staff of native town officials. The pueblo, in turn, was divided into barangays or barrios which were collectively part of and serviced by, the town (i.e. a población surrounded by tiny villages of approximately 40 to 50 families who had relocated their barangay groups closer to visita chapels). Each barrio was headed by a "cabeza de barangay" or today, barangay captain.

The two main offices through which Filipinos could participate in local politics were that of gobernadorcillo and cabeza de barangay, followed by a series of subordinate positions such as teniente mayor (deputy mayor), directorcillo (town secretary), chief of police, notary, Inspector of rice fields, Inspector of palm trees and so on, clerks and other secretaries. And since Spanish policy advocated the assimilation of pre-colonial barangays and the preservation of traditional power relationships between Filipinos, it was from within the ranks of the indigenous aristocracy that natives were chosen to fill up the two primary and other petty offices in municipal units of government. By officially acknowledging the authority of the datus and his family, Spaniards (particularly the friars or those stationed in the provinces), found safe and inherent allies from among the native population willing to
cooperate with colonial designs. Indeed, it was through a system of "pleasing" traditional native rulers, their relatives and friends, that Spanish missionaries were able to direct and control the population single-handed from their isolated outposts. While the friars gave native leaders a sense of personal power thus satisfying their immediate needs, they reassured the masses they were not captives of an arbitrary and alien tyranny. Members of the native upper class became middle-men between their own people on one side, the local priest and entire hierarchy of Spanish officialdom on the other. It was in this sense that colonial rule entrenched and deepened the power and class distinction traditionally held by native leaders.11

The duties of the gobernadorcillo were delegated to him by the Spanish provincial governor and involved fundamentally, from the beginning, his supervision over the collection of taxes in his municipality. As time went on, the scope of his role broadened to include: drawing up lists of eligible statutory labourers and soldiers, and assignment to their respective projects; charge of building and repairing roads, bridges and other public works; administration of justice in civil cases involving P44 or less, and the preparation of suits to be tried by the provincial governor; maintenance of the municipal jail and village school; guardian of peace and order in the pueblo.
local post office duties; and providing for the comforts of official guests and travellers to the town. The only catch was that the treasury in Manila did not provide for any of the expenses incurred in the above listed duties. Not only was the office of gobernadorcillo supported by only a nominal wage, but the incumbent was left personally responsible for finding the monies to pay his assistants, feed his guests, operate and upkeep his town. In addition, he was legally accountable for remittance of a specific tribute total to the alcalde mayor—an amount to be collected in his pueblo including the difference fallen short by those of his town who couldn't pay, those whom might have absconded, and sometimes even those who had died (if taxation lists had not been revised before the annual collection). This kind of pressure forced the local governor to resort to his own creative measures in raising funds. Needless to say, this situation was the catalyst to many illegal practices and the growth of an attitude whereby, out of sheer frustration, dubious methods became an essential part of local administration. To this day, a similar attitude pervades municipal governments across the Philippines.

According to John Foreman, the duties of barangay captain "were perhaps the most irksome and repugnant of all". If the gobernadorcillo could manage it, and most
likely he could, the burden of responsibilities involved in
exacting taxes were thrust onto the actual collector, the
cabeza de barangay. His primary job was to approach each
adult member of his barrio for tribute and exemption
payments, and to ascertain the fulfillment of draft labour
services. Remuneration for his time and troubles came
partly as a royal concession—exemption of cabeza and his
eldest sons from tribute and participation in compulsory
labour projects—and partly derived from the prestigiousness
of the position itself. Both gobernadorcillo and cabeza
were acknowledged the right to demand personal services from
their townsmen, a legacy of customary law which was freely
accepted, but which led to much abuse under the oppressive
circumstances of Spanish rule.

The system of local government administered by the
native aristocracy was characterized by what was known in
the Hispanic world as caciquism—that is, a town politics
monopolized by a small group of influential bosses.
Although James A. LeRoy maintains that caciquism was a
native institution before the Spanish came, it might be
more accurate to speak of it, in its post-conquest form, as
a product of colonial oppression. If we look at the content
and role of native leadership after the conquest, as
compared to before, we find them drastically changed in
response to their new circumstances. If the roles of the
new aristocracy became exaggerated and misrepresented; and if an oligarchical municipal structure flourished amid widespread abuse, greed and mismanagement, a tyrannic colonialism was probably more responsible than the influences of native tradition.

For most of the 17th century all married males belonging to a pueblo voted annually for candidates from among the native elite, to fill the position of gobernadorcillo. A final decision was made in approbation of the parish priest, and confirmed by the Spanish governor in Manila. Later on, under the rule of ensuing governors, this popular franchise was severely curbed. Instead of all male householders participating in the elections, voting became limited to a small group of electors, chosen by lot, from among the "principalia" (the term given to the local native aristocracy during the Spanish regime). The composition of the franchised elite altered from time to time. For example, in 1696 under the Ordinances of Good Government of Governor Cruzat, annual elections for the position of gobernadorcillo in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Laguna and Tondo were reduced to voting by 12 of the senior barangay captains and the outgoing gobernadorcillo—again, under the supervision of the local priest with final decision pending approval of, or sometimes selection by, a Spanish state official. According to
Cruzat, the circumscription of popular elections was essential to peace and order in the colony. The old system was leading to "the formation of factions among the natives, resulting in lawsuits, disturbances and secret deals." In those municipalities where popular franchise was not a problem, that is, areas further from Manila and therefore less sophisticated politically, no immediate changes were made. In 1768, Governor Raon's ordinances provided for the same electoral content as above, voting annually by secret ballot, but this time across all parts of the country. On October 5, 1847, the Municipal Election Law changed the composition of the electoral board from the preceding, to six ex-gobernadorcillos, six incumbent barangay captains and the outgoing official. These 12 were chosen by lot prior to the annual election.

The second most distinguished municipal office, that of cabeza de barangay, was an inherited position turned over from the beginning to the immemorial datus and his descendants. Only in 1786 was hereditary succession abrogated and barangay captains elected by members of the principality for three years, renewable terms.

Although various municipal and village positions were open to the native population, real Filipino participation or representation, even at the local levels, was preeminently lacking. Besides the fact that political
offices were open only to members of the principalia, and only a small number from this same group were empowered to vote, final decisions rested ultimately in Spanish hands. All avenues of social mobility and democratic representation were closed to the ordinary Filipino. Petty bureaucrats were granted privileges, honourific titles and opportunities for aggrandizement, but only in return for representing the wishes of their colonizers; only in return for making Spanish authority real by submitting to it, and inducing their fellow townsmen to do likewise. If they hoped to preserve their liberties within the colonial order, they had no choice but to comply. Gobernadorcillo and cabeza de barangay were the "political shock absorbers" through which the demands of friar and state official were transmitted and justified to the masses, and from the other side, through which native concerns were represented to their Spanish rulers.

But even if members of the principalia remained an exalted class in the eyes of their fellows, as far as the Spanish were concerned they constituted a politically subordinate, all around inferior group. It was for this reason that the local parish priest became such an essential figure in the chain of command. In his midst, all Filipino officials automatically became dependents. It was the missionary in each town who became the vital link between
the Spanish alcalde mayor and the native town magistrates. The role of the friar in municipal affairs was omnipotent. By law he supervised municipal elections, he confirmed their results and oversaw the performance of Filipino leaders in office; he had the authority to suspend or remove civil officials from their posts; he was supervisor of the census, inspector of taxation and censor of municipal budgets before they were sent to the alcalde mayor; he was advisor to the municipal council when it met; he certified the civil statuses and physical conditions of men chosen for draft labour or the army; and he endorsed or suppressed royal cedulas according to their appropriateness or accuracy. It was the opinions and concerns of the friar which carried majority-rule weight in the pueblo:

... nothing is done without his counsel, or more precisely without his consent. What the town governor does before everything else, upon receiving an order from the alcalde, is to seek the father's permission; and it is really the father who causes the order either to be obeyed or disregarded. It is the father who settles out of hand, or takes upon himself the conduct of the litigations of the town; who draws up the necessary documents; who trudges to the capital to plead for his Indians; who opposes his prayers, and sometimes his threats, to the outrages of the alcaldes mayores; and who gets his own way in the end. In short, there cannot be any human institution more simple yet more solid, and more capable of securing greater advantages to the state, than that which has been established in the parishes of those islands ... 26

Even more forcefully, in 1768 Governor Anda y Salazar
wrote the following about the predominance and independence of friars in local political matters:

With respect to jurisdiction it is a well-known fact that no gobernadorcillo executes any order of the governor-general, Audiencia, or provincial governor without the permission of the curate, under penalty of 100 lashes, which is meted out instantly if he obeys the king’s officials.

Alone in their mission posts Spanish priests inevitably, used their political powers to strengthen religious (and personal) goals; and used their religion to build up and solidify their political power. As political leaders, their word combined the laws of both spiritual and temporal sovereigns, without competition. Thus, it was not at all unusual to find Spanish priests liberally borrowing money from the community treasury to finance bountiful religious festivals; it was not absurd or uncommon for the priest to declare a holyday of obligation over a council meeting, or prohibit work for the occasion of a certain religious holiday. Indeed, for the missionaries religious events were an essential aspect in their determination to maintain the intensity of the faith. They brought Filipinos together from their scattered abodes in God’s honour, under circumstances where a lone Spanish friar could systematically supervise the faith-behaviour of his flock. Evidently, the multitude of these religious occasions, despite their usefulness in the provinces, became a problem
for Spanish entrepreneurs. Even the Archbishop of Manila, Juan Angel Rodriguez was concerned:

In the first place, one is bound to admit that there are entirely too many holydays of obligation. They now total one hundred and twenty-one, which is one-third of the year; a little less, perhaps, when some of them fall on a Sunday. ... the frequency of holydays is an impediment in Manila--the center and as it were the heart of the archipelago--to many of the functions and services essential to the proper conduct of this commonwealth.

In the same way that the friar maneuvered his town's agenda of yearly events (with the corresponding allocation of funds to finance them) in an effort to safeguard the faith, the priest also dominated over decisions regarding the use of forced labour. Unlike the missionaries in Mexico, those in the Philippines accepted as necessary and even integral to the life of missionary activity there, the exploitation of native labour. Because they were always on their guard against the threat of invasion by a pagan power (i.e. the Protestant Dutch, Muslim Filipinos) Spanish priests agreed to the employment of forced labour for defense purposes, despite the burdens it placed on the natives. And once the friars had legitimized the connection between draft labour and the protection of Christianity from heathen affront, the distribution of Filipino labour became their prerogative within the community. Before anything else native manpower was used to
build churches, parochial residences and schools; to operate and maintain them; to row the local priest's boat, guide his travels and cook his meals. In addition, if community revenues were insufficient to finance the needs of the parish and parish priest, then the latter obliged his parishioners to provide for him in kind, and levied church fees for the ministration of the sacraments. By responding, Filipinos were simply playing their due role in parochial matters, in return for opportunities already extended to them by the missionaries. Nonetheless, it was not uncommon for church fees to become excessive and abusive, and for the friars to monopolize native labour for their own purposes. By controlling compulsory labour the friar not only kept a rigid command over people in his parish, but used his political influence to aggrandize any task even remotely related to the propagation of the faith.

As we have seen, the native aristocracy in each pueblo became an extremely important group for the parish priest. Not only did town officials and electors originate from here, but its members were among the first Filipinos in the community who had been converted by Spanish missionaries. The principalia then, represented the town's most profoundly or dependably Christian, as well as political, core of officials. All Filipinos in the service of the church (i.e. the fiscale and the choir cantor) automatically became
principales and enjoyed the same statutory privileges as political officeholders. In fact, there was much overlapping between religious and political community roles, if at all they could be separated into such categories. John Leddy Phelan states that most fiscales were actually ex-gobernadorcillos, and that rotation of offices among the native elite was commonly observed.\textsuperscript{33} The austere moral codes and inflexible formulations of Christian doctrine brought by the Spanish friars and imparted (or imposed) as truth to the native upper class were duly adopted and in turn, impressed upon the rest of the parish population through the principales, according to their various public roles. At times Filipino rulers were induced to aid in the proselytizing enterprise of their missionaries. For example, on July 28, 1591, the Jesuit priest Alonso Sánchez convinced Pope Gregory XIV to grant those datus significantly involved in the conversion of their townsmen, a list of indulgences which made their efforts worthwhile.\textsuperscript{34} But whether blatantly enticed or not, the fact remained that in order to be a member of the town council one had to be, at the same time, a 'soldier of the faith.' And the person who set the qualifications for both, also made the final choice of representatives.

Finally, during the colonial period the renowned pulpit became a very versatile instrument of communication.
From its stand many a political discourse was pledged as God's will or cursed as the devil's. In 1636, Governor Hurtado de Corcuera protested the audacity of certain preachers using their pulpit to criticize the mismanagement of Spanish government. Indeed, town law according to the incumbent curate was outlined and commanded from pulpits across the country and obedience to it, conveniently verified by its complementary rite, the sacrament of penance.

Understandably, the political independence of the friars was cause for ongoing fear among civil and ecclesiastical authorities in Manila. But given the flagrant incompetence and corruption rampant among provincial and municipal officials, it might well be that those in Manila deemed clerical intervention the least vicious of two evils. At least the missionaries were succeeding to keep Filipinos in safely subordinate roles and in doing so, were still the most dependable and stable guardians of Spanish faith and sovereignty.

From the beginning, church and state authorities in the Islands acquiesced to the incorporation of a political structure open to native participation. Although policy formulations and directives always originated from either Madrid or Manila, local Filipino magistrates were able to exert a significant measure of authority in the enforcement
of Spanish laws in the countryside. But their power operated within limitations. In addition to the cumbersome and often hateful nature of their tasks, there was the ominous presence of the parish priest. It was he who compelled them to observe or ignore orders from above. Only at the risk of antagonism could they directly oppose the wishes of their curate.

The growth of the principalia during the Spanish regime has had enduring consequences for subsequent political development in the Philippines. First of all, even though Filipinos did not achieve national self-government until well into the 20th century, their limited participation in the colonial regime exposed them to new political practices, opportunities and possibilities. In addition to acquiring an intimate understanding of the problems and processes of local government, the inadequacies of the colonial system (i.e. lack of money, widespread corruption and incompetence, concentration of civil officials in Manila, the omnipotence of the parish priest, and so on), forced native leaders to make decisions and accommodations for it, on their own terms. They were inadvertently trained to develop personal initiative and creativity. It was this same group who acquired familiarity with Spanish law and literature; who at the same time perpetuated through Hispanic sovereignty aspects of native
customary law regarding property and inheritance, pre-colonial forms of debt slavery and religious superstitions.

On the other hand, the political caciquism entrenched by Spanish rule became one of the chief obstacles to political and social progress. The development of stable democratic institutions, to this very day, has been obstructed by the cacique tradition which, once a local phenomenon and never since uprooted, has become an institutionalized facet of national politics.36

As for religion, the dual role of the friar and to a lesser extent, of all town delegates, most certainly strengthened its significance for Filipinos. In order to be anyone of importance, one had to be a baptized Christian. But whether or not it helped to make Filipinos more spiritually religious, in other words, whether it facilitated an interiorization of the faith, can only be surmised. It might well be that the poor political performances of both Spanish and native officials across the country confused and alienated Filipinos from a religion they very urgently wanted and needed. In any case, Filipinos were taught by it the association of all leaders with Father-figures, and the assurance that all father-figures were wise because their inspiration came from God. Their response could only be indulgent obedience,
deferent respect and submissive dependence.
Section III:

The Patronato, Spanish Friars and Filipino Priests

Historian H. de la Costa describes the development of a native clergy in the Philippines as "abnormally slow". Nevertheless, the ordination of indigenous peoples in parts of the pagan world was not a new phenomenon. The papal brief of Leo X in 1518 gave permission for the administration of Holy Orders to capable and worthy East Indians and Negroes; in 1541, the year before Francis Xavier's arrival in Goa, a native seminary was established and functioned there; as early as 1626 onward, the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda directed bishops abroad to recruit and train suitable young natives for the priesthood in order that they might promote, in a more profound and permanent manner, the propagation of the faith among their unbelieving countrymen; and on July 15, 1563, the Council of Trent made the creation of seminaries for the training and education of future priests obligatory in Roman Catholic dioceses world-wide. So what was the problem in the Philippines? And how did the impact of this retarded growth effect social institutions and development in the Islands during Spanish occupation?

The rationale deliberately holding back natives from entry into the priesthood in the Philippines was always
basically the same, yet different facets of the defense were highlighted according to the spirit of the times. To begin with though, certain ecclesiastical legislation in the New World combined with complications created by the Spanish Patronato, set the tone and foundation upon which all future prejudices would be steadily built up.

During the course of the 16th century premature experiments with the development of a native clergy in Mexico resulted in severely negative attitudes on the part of church officials there. Consequently, the first and second Councils of Mexico in 1555 and 1585 respectively, and the second Council of Lima held in 1591, all clearly and sharply prohibited the ordination of natives. Their aim at this point, to prevent the absorption of unworthy elements into the ranks of the Holy Ordered was to be effected at the expense of all possible native aspirants. A Jesuit priest, Father Bayle wrote:

... after the generous intentions of the beginning had suffered shipwreck on the reefs of experience, the ordinary legislation [of the church in New Spain] was unfavourable to the native clergy, whose ignorance and natural instability inspired no confidence, and whose mean origin obscured the dignity [of the priesthood].

The full force of the policy embodied in the legislation of the Councils of New Spain was directly extended to the Philippines, and, as in the American colonies, completely obstructed the admission of "those who suffer from natural
or other defects which . . . detract from the dignity of the clerical state . . . " into any of the religious orders in the Islands.

The influence of the Patronato was much more subtle and indirect, and in many ways much more cumbersome. In 1557 and 1561 decrees by Philip II forbade bishops from transferring mission posts assigned to the regular orders, to secular clergy. Parishes in territories outside the jurisdiction of the various orders were to be designated to secular priests. The only problem with this was that after the Islands had been divided and distributed among the regulars in 1594, virtually all parts of the country became the official responsibility of one religious order or another. Secular priests became automatically subject to the sovereignty of a religious order or more specifically, a friar. This point is important in two respects. First of all, the problem of a native clergy developed categorically into a battle between the regulars and seculars. While the religious orders, over time, admitted few or no Filipinos into their numbers, the secular clergy in the Islands became almost entirely composed of natives. The seculars, as we have seen in the "episcopal visitation controversy", became potential threats to the security of the mission footholds of their regular brothers. Within the framework of the Patronato, an "all or nothing" approach to the replacement
of regulars by seculars had developed in the Philippines—secular priests gained parishes only at the expense of the regulars. It was precisely the lack of seculars which perpetuated the power of the religious orders and their friars.

Secondly, under the terms of the Patronato the Spanish Crown obtained many privileges: it regulated the erection of churches and seminaries, the qualifications and selection of candidates for priesthood, and the transfer of parishes and priests from one to the other, or between regulars and seculars. Needless to say, the royal prerogative involved in all such matters worked toward solutions which favoured royal concerns. And throughout the Spanish regime the predominant position of the home government, except on several occasions, ruled toward the entrenchment of regular clergy in their posts and parishes. To them the Spanish friars represented adamant, trustworthy guardians of Spain's political hegemony in southeast Asia; they represented a zealous and moral force for peace and order in the Islands; they were intelligent, stable men, unquestionably loyal to King and country. Since royal legislation under the auspices of the Patronato did little to encourage a secular clergy, it consequently put a damper on the aspirations of possible native clergy and the willingness of incumbent orders to train them for roles other than coadjutor or
caretaker.

By the latter half of the 17th century, the ecclesiastical legislation which had so effectively denied natives ordination no longer existed as a legitimate excuse for their exclusion. The old laws were officially recognized as prejudicial and appropriately qualified. Unfortunately, the damage had already been firmly wedged into comfortably biased minds. The attitudes which had developed in the Spanish Indies a century before would continue to haunt the opinions and decisions of subsequent centuries.

The prevailing rationale of 18th century proponents against a native clergy appears to rest on their hardlined, yet genuine convictions about the inherently defective and immoral character of Filipinos generally, for sacerdotal office. Numerous accounts recorded by both church and state officials, boldly reveal the discriminatory and ethnocentric nature of Spanish colonial mentality. Gaspar de San Augustín, an Augustinian friar who considered himself an expert on Filipinos wrote:

The complexion of these Indians, as revealed by their outward features, is cold and moist, being much under the influence of the moon . . . This complexion and influence is what makes them inconstant, malicious, suspicious, sleepy, lazy, sluggish, given to frequenting rivers, seas and lakes . . . poor-spirited owing to their cold humour and little inclined to work.
Fray Augustín argued that much harm would result if Filipinos were admitted to Holy Orders:

Their pride will be aggravated with their elevation to so sublime a state; their avarice with the increased opportunity of preying on others; their sloth with their no longer having to work for a living; and their vanity with the adulation that they must needs seek, desiring to be served by those whom in another state of life they would have had to respect and obey... All of which does not apply to the Spaniard, who by becoming a cleric deprives himself of the opportunity of becoming a mayor, a captain or a general, together with many other comforts of his native land... What reverence will the Indians themselves have for such a priest, when they see that he is of their colour and race? Especially when they realize that they are the equals or betters, perhaps, of one who managed to get himself ordained, when his proper station in life should have been that of a convict or a slave?

In addition to building upon the prejudices of previous centuries, 19th century opposition to a native clergy rested largely on political considerations. In the same way that the presence of Spanish friars in the Islands was crucial to the political dominance of Spain in Asia and the world, the ordination of natives amid Spanish American cries and claims to independence, amid escalating national consciousness in the Philippines, was no doubt a self-destructive policy. In 1863 a royal commissioner, Patricio de la Escosura, was sent to the Islands to report on conditions there. He wrote:

Here the native ecclesiastics are, with very few exceptions, either a liability to the clergy or a danger to the colony... every time a native
priest here distinguishes himself by his learning or his activity, every time that he is seen to succeed in his chosen profession, every time that he shines in one way or another, the same psychological phenomenon is invariably produced. Public opinion marks him out as an insurgent, and the disaffected seek him out and surround him.

Indeed, why would the Crown want to offer possible native reformers and radicals the political leverage intrinsic to the priestly station? If Spanish friars could fulfill the same duties, more patriotically? The following observation by Governor Sarrio was precisely that rationale which induced Ferdinand VII to reverse the secularization of parishes (began by Archbishop Sancho shortly after his arrival in 1767), by royal decree on June 8, 1826:

Be assured that in each European priest Your Majesty has a sentry who observes all the actions and movements of the Indians to inform the government of all that happens... The fact of being a priest does not remove the fact of being one of the conquered nor the affinity he has towards his fellow-countrymen.

By 1870, all those parishes which Archbishop Sancho had succeeded in transferring from regular to secular hands had been returned back to the friars, thus completing the entire reversal process.

The first indication of an interest by the Spanish Crown in the development of a native clergy came embodied in a royal cedula in 1677. It ordered the establishment of seminaries to train native boys for priesthood, in keeping
with the provision of the Council of Trent (1563). The response in the colony, spearheaded by Archbishop Felipe Pardo of Manila himself, was emphatically negative and no seminaries were built. Again in 1702, the first Bourbon successor to the throne, Philip V, issued a decree ordering the construction of a seminary in Manila for eight seminarians. The story which surrounds this proclamation is an excellent example of a pathetic situation where royal indifference, colonial independence, and the arrogance of both unnecessarily complicated a delicate issue.

At the same time King Philip decided to push the creation of a modestly sized seminary, an Italian secular priest visiting the Islands, Father Gianbattista Sidotti, came up with an even more grandiose idea. He imagined turning Manila into the center for an Asian regional seminary which would train candidates for the priesthood from all the surrounding countries. Archbishop Camacho of Manila supported and blessed the idea and in no time at all the monies were raised and an edifice large enough to accommodate 72 seminarians was completed and named. But while authorities were proud to inform Pope Clement XI about their admirable accomplishment, a report to the King was somehow overlooked. When the sensitive Philip V found out about the new seminary he was not pleased. Considering his patronal rights violated and his royal authority insulted by
the interference of a foreigner, he ordered that all foreign clerical students be sent home and the new seminary demolished. In its place the original eight person building was to be started again. The foundations of the latter were erected, but the smaller seminary was never completed. In 1720 a letter from Madrid to the governor in Manila suggested that the foundations of the discontinued seminary be used instead to complete and lodge the Royal Treasury, an armory and infantry barracks. Finally in 1772, Archbishop Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufina of Manila converted the Jesuit university, San Ignacio (after the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Islands in 1767) into the first official seminary renamed San Carlos.

But even before the first formal seminary was established in Manila, several of the religious orders, particularly the Jesuits and Dominicans, had taken the initiative to provide a form of clerical training for natives through several of the colleges they operated in Manila. Probably not before 1680, small numbers of Filipinos began to enter these programs and according to Costa, the first of them ordained shortly after 1720. Nevertheless, these were a group of clergy educated exclusively for subordinate parochial responsibilities, in the interests of their overburdened Spanish missionaries. If these native priests often endured accusations of
inadequacy and incompetence, their insufficiencies were more a reflection of the second-rate intentions of their sacerdotal training, than of congenital deficiencies and base origins. 22

The nature of Christianity in the Philippines and its impact on the Filipino people were largely influenced by the failure of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical officials to make room for a native clergy. It is true that the initial disparity between pre-conquest Philippines and medieval Spanish cultural levels made it difficult for Spaniards to find "suitable" clerical material among the native masses. But surely this wasn't a permanent problem? Instead of bringing the two groups closer together, haughty state officials and missionaries only crystalized colonial relationships and deepened the racial disparity between themselves and the Filipinos. The independent and zealous friars ruled the countryside as masters to their obedient native servants and subjects. Given this, one can imagine how difficult it would be for a Filipino to aspire to such a noble vocation as priesthood and likewise, for Spanish officials to consider the ordination of menial attendants and lahourers. On the other hand, Spanish friars stuck to their prejudices with such unyielding tenacity that their justifications for them, in many cases, became obscured and obsolete long before they would let them go. If local
priests were not adverse to employing natives for almost any parochial duty, including the administration of sacraments, then why did the prospect of their ordination create so much hostility?

One can only speculate about the consequences which might have followed from the development of a well-trained native clergy. Considering the unproportionate numbers of ecclesiastical personnel per capita and the scattered distribution of the population, a native clergy might have been a tremendous help in consolidating the hold of the Roman Catholic church, not to mention that of the Spanish Crown, over the masses. Folk tendencies embracing superstition, magic and idolatry would have been more closely controlled; the sacraments administered more frequently; and the outward formalism of the faith supplemented by more profound and solid understanding. Instead, what John Leddy Phelan refers to as the "Philippinization" of Spanish Catholicism, was set in motion. Church and state authorities were left largely incapable of regulating the perceptions and expressions of the faith which Filipinos chose to interpret and adapt. But while this facilitated, in a sense, the preservation of native traditions, it did nothing to elevate national self esteem and honour through the presence of Filipino mediums to God and eternal life. Filipinos were obliged to turn to
their captors for absolution and grace; social and political
decisions remained the exclusive right of the friar; in a
few words, the colonial status quo was maintained.

When the Americans arrived in 1898 and induced Spanish
friars to eventually leave their parishes, Filipinos were
not, understandably, prepared or equipped to fill their
vacant posts. Despite his pro friar attitude, American
Archbishop Michael O'Doherty wrote:

A careful analysis of after events will lead one
to the conclusion that if the Spanish friars made
a mistake in their policy of governing the
Filipinos, it was solely in this that they failed
to realize that a day might come when Spanish
sovereignty in the Islands would cease. Hence
they made no plans for an emergency such as
happened in 1898. They neglected the Catholic
principle that no Church can rest upon a
substantial basis unless it is manned by a native
clergy. True, native priests had been ordained in
the Philippines, but they were seldom, if ever,
allowed to become pastors. Rather were their
offices, those of helpers in the more ordinary
duties of the parish.

Only with the triumph of the United States and their
separation of church and state, were Filipinos given the
freedom to assume the responsibilities involved in
developing a full-fledged indigenous clergy.
NOTES - CHAPTER II

Introduction


*ibid.*, p. 56.

Section I.

The decree of Charles I in 1555 instructed the implementation of an educational system in its colonies: "To serve God, our Lord, and for the sake of the public welfare of our kingdom, vassels, subjects and natives have in them universities and studia generalia where they may be instructed and graduated in all the sciences and faculties." Gregorio Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, v.2, Philippine Education Company, Manila, 1957, p. 89 (footnote), quoting from the *Recopilacion de las leyes de Indias*, Lib.I, tit.22, ley.1.

*Zaide, op. cit., p. 89.*

*Nicholas' P. Cushner, "Early Jesuit Missionary

4 The Laws of Burgos attempted, for the first time, a comprehensive remodelling of the New World along Spanish-European lines. See Lesley Byrd Simpson, "The Civil Congregation", *Ibero-Americana*, 7 (1934), p. 31.


8 Centuries later when the first American civil Governor of the Philippines, the non-Catholic William Howard Taft, travelled around the Islands he noted the predominance of the parish churches which appeared almost as fortresses at the centers of towns. Unacquainted with the finer details of Spain in the Philippines, he inquired how the
Roman Catholics managed prime town land for the construction of their churches. The American prelate accompanying him, Bishop Rooker of Jaro, was amused and recorded his response. He claimed that the Governor reminded him of the foreigner in Europe who had remarked, "How wise God is, to have built His rivers so close to the cities"

9 Phelan, op. cit., p. 46.

10 In the province of Zambales, one Dominican missionary organized a group of soldiers to stage a pseudo-raid on a settlement of Filipinos, claiming they had orders to destroy all their homes. At that point the Dominican planned to come forward, gallantly, in defense of the natives, to dismiss the soldiers and then try to persuade the Filipinos to move their homes closer to his church where they would be afforded greater protection.


11 Phelan, op. cit. p. 47.


13 A "visita" was a district which, because it had no resident friar, was dependent on the missionary services of the closest poblacion or town. Today it is known more
commonly in the secular terms of barrio or barangay.

14 Costa, op. cit., pp. 458-459, quoting a letter from Ignacio Alcino to Juan Marín in *Pintados*, June 24, 1660, ARSI Phil. 12, 1-12. (ARSI-Archivum romanum Societatis Iesu)

15 Phelan, op. cit., p. 53.


21 Phelan, op. cit., p. 60.

22 ibid., pp. 60-61.


27 Spanish defense of the Philippines included a system of draft labour known as the "polo". All townsmen except for native chieftans, their eldest sons and the other local Filipino politicians, were required to participate for 40 days a year in the labour pool on tasks such as building and repairing roads and churches, cutting timber, or working in artillery foundaries, shipyards and so on. Exemption for richer Filipinos could be bought.

28 Corpuz, op. cit., p. 36.

29 In 1770, 1772, 1774 and 1778 the Crown instructed colonial authorities to organize public primary schools in
the towns. The royal decrees were never enforced. Zaide, op. cit., p. 93.

30 Costa, op. cit., p. 571; and LeRoy, op. cit., p. 662.


Section II

More than once a Spanish prelate acted as colonial governor when the latter’s chair was vacant. Examples of this are Archbishop Francisco de la Cuesta (1719-21); Bishop Juan de Arrechederra (1745-1750); Bishop Miguel Lino de Espeleta (1759-61); and Archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo (1761-64).


4 Only for three short periods of time--1810-13,
1820-23 and 1834-37--were Filipinos granted representation in the Spanish Cortes and the benefits of the Spanish constitution. Spain’s last two American colonies, Cuba and Puerto Rico, were permitted by the Constitution of 1876 to representation in parliament, but the Philippines were not included.


6 Phelan maintains that the encomienda began its decline between 1621 and 1655. A royal cedula dated September 17, 1721, clearly marked a turning point in its descent, stating that as encomiendas fell vacant, they be reverted to Crown lands and not given back into the hands of private encomenderos or religious orders. Despite this, Zaide reports the continued apportioning of encomiendas by the King through cedulas dated May 1, 1774 and June 8, 1792, authorizing their reassignment for five year periods in all colonies except Peru. Also, in 1789 the colonial governor granted an encomienda to the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Manila, for a four year period. It was only around the beginning of the 19th century that the system began to fade away for good. See Phelan, op. cit., p. 97, and Zaide, op. cit., p. 171.

8 Phelan, op. cit., p. 122.


10 By the end of the 18th century, the pre-conquest barangay aristocracy which Spanish authorities had used to entrench their sovereignty no longer existed as a kinship group per se. Rather, it persisted by the same name, as a grouping of families representing a territorial unit of taxpayers. By this time also, the barangay captain was not necessarily a common ancestor, but a municipal official whose job it was to collect their tribute.

The Mexican concept of communal treasuries was established in the Philippines early on, at the advise of Bishop Salazar. At tribute time each member of a pueblo would contribute a specified amount of rice to the caja de comunidad, which would serve as an emergency surplus and loan bank; and which would finance public instruction and the salaries of municipal officials. The system did not flourish—no surpluses were collected and if there were, the money was more often than not borrowed by town officials to pay for religious fiestas or other non-imperative, often personal matters. Reform measures throughout the regime did little to change these practices. See Phelan, op. cit., p. 128.


Costa, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

Foreman, op. cit., p. 246.

LeRoy, op. cit., p. 176.


19 Costa, op. cit., p. 533; Phelan, op. cit., p. 125.


22 A German scientist travelling in the Philippines in the 19th century, Dr. Feodor Jagor, chronicled the local election he witnessed on the island of Lauan, just north of Samar: "It took place in the common hall; the governor (or his deputy) sitting at the table, with the pastor on his right hand, and the clerk on his left, the latter also acting as interpreter; while the cabezas de barangay, the gobernadorcillo, and those who had previously filled the office, took their places all together on benches. First of all, six cabezas and as many former gobernadorcillos are chosen by lot as electors; the actual gobernadorcillo is the thirteenth, and the rest quit the hall.

After the reading of the statutes by the president,
who exhorts the electors to the conscientious performances of their duty, the latter advance singly to the table, and write three names on a piece of paper. Unless a valid protest be made either by the pastor or by the electors, the one who has the most votes is forthwith named gobernadorcillo for the coming year, subject to the approval of the superior jurisdiction at Manila; which, however, always consents, for the influence of the cura would provide against a disagreeable election. The election of other functionaries takes place in the same manner, after the new gobernadorcillo has been first summoned into the hall, in order that, if he has any important objections to the officers then about to be elected, he may be able to make them." In Zaide, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 131 (footnote), quoting from Dr. Feodor Jagor, Travels in the Philippines, London, 1875, pp. 235-236.

23 Phelan, op. cit., p. 123.


26 Costa, Readings in Philippine History, op. cit.,
pp. 131-132, quoting from Comyn, \textit{Estatad}, pp. 149-150
(translation by H. de la Costa).


28 Phelan, op. cit., p. 128.

29 Phelan, op. cit., p. 73.


31 Phelan, op. cit., p. 102.

32 Phelan, op. cit., p. 103. The Dominicans and Jesuits were the only religious orders who did not levy fees for the administration of the sacraments.

33 Phelan, op. cit., p. 126.


Pastells, VIII, p. XXIX.

3 Phelan, op. cit., p. 127.

Section III


2 The Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith is the department of the Roman Curia responsible for the direction and administration of missionary matters in the Church. It was made an official organ under the reign of Gregory XV in January 1622, in response to divergent missionary methods among the different religious orders, and the excesses of Spanish and Portuguese claims to missionary control under the Patronato. The SCPF saw itself as an organization which would unify the direction of missionary endeavours. Until the 20th century it was vested not only with administrative jurisdiction, but legislative and judicial powers as well.

3 Costa, op. cit., p. 76.

4 Before this provision provided by the Council of Trent, acquisition of the necessary training in preparation
for the priesthood was a responsibility left up to the individual candidate. There were no obligatory institutions or norms which bound an aspirant to a particular education and spiritual formation. Nevertheless, several organized training schools did exist in different parts of the Roman Catholic world before the Council's ruling.


7 Costa, ibid., pp. 74-75, quoting from Council of Mexico (4585), Lib. 1, tit. 4, "De vita, fama et moribus ordinandorum", note 3, in Mansi, Conciliorum . . . amplissima collectio XXXIV, cols, 1034-35.

8 Costa, ibid., pp. 72, 104.


10 This opinion was strongly reinforced by the
following incident: In 1767, King Charles III's concern over the monopoly control position of the religious orders in their parishes pushed him to send a court prelate to the Islands as Archbishop of Manila. At once Archbishop Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufina reopened the question of episcopal visitation and ordered submission to it by all the regular orders. The response was as he expected—the majority of friars would not, under any circumstances, obey. So Archbishop Sancho proceeded to transfer as many parishes as he could, from regular to secular clergy. As he soon found out, the task he had set before himself was great. In order to assure the supply of seculars he needed to fill the large number of vacant parishes, he hurriedly pushed through large quantities of inadequately prepared natives for ordination. The consequences of this move were disastrous. The performance of the new Filipino priests was disgraceful and often blatantly criminal. Archbishop Sancho lamented his mistake, and the Spanish friars were eventually returned to their parishes. Unfortunately, this was not the end of the story for Filipino clergy. The incident blackened their reputation so severely that all hope was lost in having others take them seriously, as the course of history has shown, for at least the next century to come and even longer.

Horacio de la Costa, Readings in Philippine History.

12 Costa, ibid., pp. 90-91, quoting San Agustín in Mas, Informe II, pp. 33-34.


14 See footnote #10 of this section.

15 Nicholas P. Cushner, Spain in the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila, 1971, p. 215, quoting Pedro Sarrio to Charles III, Manila, December 22, 1787, in Retana, Archivo del bibliófilo filipino, I, 63.

16 Costa, op. cit., p. 82.

17 Named the College of San Clemente in honour of the reigning pope. (Father Sidotti was one of a group accompanying Archbishop Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon, appointed by the Pope to travel to Peking to settle the dispute over Chinese rites.)
Horacio de la Costa, "The Development of the Native Clergy in the Philippines", op. cit., p. 86.

In 1767 King Charles III ordered the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from all Spanish colonies. The following year all Jesuits left the Philippines. Although Charles did not elaborate in his decree the reasons for his unforeseen decision, his move was likely motivated by concern over the powerful independence and influence wielded by this particular Order who became prominent across the Roman Catholic world for their ability and wisdom as scholars, scientists and educators. The fear they evoked made them the target of many anti-clerical campaigns across Europe—a fear which came to be shared by Roman Catholics outside the Order, and eventually official Christendom. Zaide reports that the immediate reason for their expulsion was incited by an uprising in Madrid against a reactionary Italian-born minister in the court of Charles III. For no substantial reason the Jesuits were accused of provoking the March 1766 outbreak. See Gregorio Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, v.2, Philippine Education company, Manila, 1957, p. 21; also, Nicholas P. Cushner, Philippine Jesuits in Exile, Institutum Historicum S.I., Rome, 1964.

Costa, op. cit., p. 89.


23 Phelan, ibid., p. 88.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPANISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
AND FRIARY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Introduction

That sector of the population upon which Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines was built and by which it was maintained; constituting the most dependent and permanent institution in the Islands, were the religious orders. By the 19th century though, the reputation of friary among Filipinos had eroded to sarcastic and hostile resentment. The rural missionaries had become the target of all native accusations singling out friary and clericalism as the core of everything evil and abusive in their country. Indeed, over their 300 year reign in the Philippines the Spanish priests had escaped all pressures, from above or below, to reform, liberalize or secularize their operations in the countryside. In the end, not only the natives but all other Spanish church and state officials found themselves making exceptional accommodations to the wishes and whims of the friars. Among Filipinos, emotions had escalated to such a point that peace or war in the Islands depended entirely on
the presence or absence of the friars.

It wasn't until the latter part of the 19th century that Filipinos developed an organized nationalist movement, at first intending only to secure certain reforms from their colonialists, but before long advocating independence from Spain. Many factors combine to explain why the process was so long and slow. For example, geographically, the multitude of islands and mountainous terrain kept social contact between parishes at a minimum; linguistic differences among natives regionalized the population; and Spanish policy requiring passports to journey from one region to another inhibited travel. Poor communication between natives prevented them from knowing that their brothers countrywide, shared a bitter hatred toward clerical abuse.

The movement for national unity and independence in the Philippines came 50 years and more after those of New Spain and, unlike the latter, was a struggle by and for the indigenous population. In the Americas, on the other hand, those ringleading the revolutions for independence were Spanish-blooded or mestizo rebels. Right from the beginning, due to its closer proximity to Spain and ostensibly greater abundance in riches, massive numbers of Spanish entrepreneurs flocked to the New World. Over the centuries, descendants of these first Spanish immigrants
developed strong allegiances and profitable commercial interests in their respective countries. In the Philippines, the number of Spanish settlers represented only a fraction of the native population. In 1896 there were no more than 5000 resident in the Islands, amid 7,000,000 Filipinos. It was for this reason that the Spanish in the archipelago were always much more segregated from the native population (originally they were prohibited from residing among them), much less in tune with Filipino interests or able to identify their own concerns with theirs. Those who were in the position to understand and promote native interests were precisely those who indulged directly in their subjugation and control.
Section I:

Nineteenth Century--Anticlericalism and Filipino Nationalism

The development of a national consciousness in the Philippines was integral to the growth of anticlerical sentiments focused on the Spanish friars. As we will see, it was the secularization controversy which first aroused the sense of a national identity, and it was an anti-friar focus which fueled its craving for fulfillment.

For centuries, Filipino responses to Christianity and its colonial ministers ranged a narrow spectrum from welcome acceptance to tolerant, yet selective, accommodation. Resistance only sporadically reached organized, violent dimensions, and never were these demonstrations sustained or coordinated. But the 19th century was to change all this. The stage was set so that the radical attitudes of indigenous leadership and the diffusion of their influence, heretofore never experienced, could unfold and mature; and so that status quo actors could no longer suppress or elude that which their oppressive rule had finally brought to surface.

In 1815 the monopolistic Manila-Acapulco galleon trade was abolished leaving the economically isolated archipelago informally dependent, for the first time since the late
16th century, upon foreign business and trade. Up until this time, the transpacific galleon trade had supplied the principal source of income to the Islands. Once a year one ship each left Acapulco and Manila with export products for an exclusive market. Those goods leaving Manila were predominantly Chinese and other southeast Asian products which were brought to the capital by oriental traders. But by 1859, the British governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Bowring, reported the operation of several foreign business firms in Manila—7 British, 3 American, 2 Swiss, 2 French and 1 German. Between 1855 and 1873 six other ports were opened across the Islands leading to the demand for certain export crops and the encouragement of their cultivation on commercial scales; the application of new scientific techniques brought improved production and increases in capital. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened reducing the distance between Spain and the Philippines; communications between the two were faster, transportation less dangerous. As the doors opened, the Islands began to fill and mix with new blood, new ideas, new perspectives. Eighteenth and 19th century European liberalism could no longer be confined to the continent. Its ideas about humanitarianism, equality, freedom and self-government, combined with revolutionary ideas from France, fermented the minds of curious Filipinos, especially those from among the new, economically prosperous
and educated middle class.

Following the opening of the Islands to world trade markets, participation by Filipinos in profitable commercial ventures generated a new strata of native entrepreneurs. Financially successful and socially ennobled, they interacted directly with Spaniards and other foreign bureaucrats and merchants; they sent their children to colleges in Manila and Europe. But while they demanded the political and social prerogatives corresponding to their new status, they were made to endure the policies and excesses of medieval colonial administrations and attitudes. Hence, it was from within this new enlightened group of Filipinos that ideological criticisms and expressions of discontent were analyzed and organized for the first time.

Back in Spain, a chaotic political scene was also contributing to problems in the Philippines. Earlier on in the century, the Cortes of Cadiz (1810-1812) had decided in a struggle between conservatives and anti-clerical liberals (inspired, in the absence of a monarch, by the constitutions of revolutionary France), to limit the power of the Crown by providing a constitution and obliging the King to work through the responsible members of the Cortes. The Constitution of Cadiz gave no special seats to the nobility or the church in its single-chambered Parliament, but based itself upon a more general distribution of provincial and
municipal representation. In 1814 King Ferdinand VII returned from exile in France and proclaimed the work of the Cortes null and void. Nevertheless, the liberal/conservative dichotomy which emerged so forcefully at that time became the basis of the political strife both Spain and the Philippines saw carried on throughout the 19th century. From 1833 onward many Spanish governments came and went, oscillating between the two antithetical platforms. Naturally, any triumph or defeat in Spain meant, in the colonies, a change of governor and his train of lesser officials, and a disruption in the programs of that particular colonial administration. Over the period between 1835 and the American arrival, fifty governor-generals took office averaging terms of one year, three months each.

Finally, the Revolution of 1868 in Spain with its victory of liberalism, was decisively important for the Philippines. The new colonial administration which followed in 1869 consequently, under the leadership of governor Carlos María de la Torre, was the most liberal government ever seen in the Philippines. Unlike any previous executive head, de la Torre entertained and mingled freely with natives and mestizos. Among other things he encouraged freedom of speech, terminated censorship of the press, abolished flogging and approved the Moret Decrees of 1870 partially secularizing education in the Islands. Although
his regime lasted only a few short years, it had an overwhelming impact. Given a taste of freedom straight from the spoon of a Spanish governor, Filipinos could never again lower their expectations. They would never quietly accept the reactionary leadership of governors to come, those who would reverse de la Torre's munificent policies and seek to reaffirm hard-lined Spanish authority.

In 1859 the German observer-scientist, Feodor Jagor, commented on the irreversibility of changes wrought in the islands during the 19th century:

The old situation [that of Filipino rustic simplicity and theocratic rule of a rather bengvolent sort] is no longer practicable, with the social change which the times have brought. The colony can no longer be excluded from the general concert of peoples. Every facility in communication opens a breach in the ancient system and gives cause for reforms in a liberal sense. The more that foreign capital and foreign brains penetrate, the more they increase the general welfare, the spread of education, and the stock of self-esteem, the existing ills becoming in consequence the more intolerable.

Although nationalist dissension in the Philippines eventually culminated in a politico-religious revolution, the seed of the conflict was religious in origin, and was planted long before the 19th century. As early as 1582 disputes over the allocation of power between regular orders and secular priests sparked the commencement of a conflict which was to evolve over time into racial battle between Spanish friars and Filipino priests. Hence, the issue which
started out as a question of secularization (i.e. the substitution of regular priests--those belonging to a monastic order, with secular priests--those who didn't), became one of the Filipinization of parishes. Filipinization demanded that Spanish missionaries turn over their cherished posts not just to any secular priest, but to native seculars in particular.

Throughout the centuries, official church and state policy with regard to secularization remained ambiguous and confusing. By the 19th century this obscured situation reached its most decisively negative point with two devastating royal decrees. The first, issued on June 8, 1826, ordered the desecularization of all parishes in the Philippines. Motivated primarily by political concerns, this policy drove numerous native secular priests from churches they had held peacefully for many, many years.

The second decree was enacted in response to the return of the Jesuits to the Philippines in 1859. Upon their arrival, authorities in Manila ordered that parishes in Mindanao, several of which the Jesuits had held previously, be yielded to them. The Augustinian Recollects who were presently administering the parishes were not prepared to abandon them so simply. Therefore, in order to compensate the Recollects for their losses in Mindanao, the cedula of July 30, 1860, allocated them parishes in the archdiocese of
Manila, the majority of which were in the control of Filipino secular clergy. Once again the latter were uprooted and dispersed. In addition to these overtly racist decrees, anticlerical legislation in Spain at this same time was impelling threatening numbers of peninsular clergy to the Philippines. Official colonial response to them was sympathetic and they were readily handed over those parishes which remained in the care of Filipino seculars. In 1831 Governor Pascual Enrile summarized, in a letter to the Secretary of State, generally accepted sentiments by both church and state authorities regarding why the Filipinization of curacies, at this time, was not only dangerous but morally wrong:

Your Excellency is not unaware of the fact that the number of Spanish settlers in these Islands is insignificant compared with the large Indian and half-caste population; it is therefore illusory to expect that so small a force can hold down a determined revolutionary movement. We must realize that if these Islands submit to Spanish rule, it is thanks to the moral ascendancy that we still possess, though no longer to the same extent as before the dissemination in the Spanish dominions of innovating ideas.

In this our unhappy age, the moral fiber of the colony has suffered notable deterioration; and the fundamental reason for it, in my opinion, is the fact that Indian and mestizo priests have been allowed to take over many of the parishes.

Religion gains nothing by this policy, and the state loses much. Religion gains nothing, because the little training that these priests get, far from ridding them of the vices of their upbringing and natural character, as might perhaps be expected elsewhere, merely increases and aggravates those vices, and the ecclesiastical state even provides for them a convenient shield.
The state loses much, because the parishioners, following the example of their present pastors, forget the sound principles inculcated by the religious who formerly had charge of them, and gradually open their hearts to feelings of disaffection against the Spanish government. Given this attitude of mind, it is not inconceivable that they should one day think of rising against it.

Needless to say, by the 19th century the issue of Filipinization was no longer just a problem for native priests. Spanish accusations of racial inferiority implicated the entire Filipino population.

But even well into the century, Filipino resistance to their oppressors was minimal and unorganized, their hostility quiet. It would take an outrageous provocation before the anger of the disaffected secular priests and the new native middle class would explode. Only then would the breaking point arrive where resistance would become an insatiable means, and where no amount of compensation could induce them to turn back. The critical event which precipitated "the" nationalist movement in the Philippines, came only in 1872 under the reactionary leadership of governor Rafael de Izquierdo (de la Torre's successor). Juxtaposed to his predecessor, Izquierdo's return to an iron-rule regime with the reintroduction of tribute and forced labour inflamed 250 native artillerymen, soldiers and workers at the arsenal in Cavite to seize the nearby fort of San Felipe, killing 11 Spaniards in the endeavour. The
"Cavite Mutiny" was easily suppressed by government troops, 30 to 40 rebels were shot and the remaining taken prisoner. The British consul in Manila described the rebellion to the Foreign Office in London:

... it is evident that it was without organization and but very limited in its ramifications; for we find that the native troops sent from Manila hired on their brethren in arms at Cavite instead of assisting them as they might easily have done had they been so disposed; that no rumours of tumults were heard in any of the towns or villages in the interior; ... that the people even of the town of Cavite remained throughout passive spectators of the scene ...

Nevertheless, it seems as if Izquierdo interpreted the manifestation as a symptom of widespread insurrection to come and so accordingly, he took recourse to terroristic measures. Many prominent native clerics, professionals and merchants were arrested on suspicion of conspiracy against Spanish sovereignty. Most were either sentenced to life imprisonment or exiled to remote islands and provinces. Among those sentenced to death, three popular native priests, Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora, accused of ringleading the revolt were privately tried and amid much mystery and controversy, publicly garroted on February 17, 1872. The execution of these three native priests as the bells in the Cathedral of Manila tolled in their honour, was the event which finally struck the most profound disgust and hatred among Filipinos, toward Spanish
rule.

Although the momentum of the nationalist movement was driven by victims of religious and/or political injustice, it was not long before both camps joined forces, the Filipino intelligensia assuming the leadership of all the rest, but this time with a common, inevitable focus. Clericalism was the enemy--clericalism wielded specifically by Spanish friary. All factions of the Filipino nationalist movement--be they clergy, intelligensia or merchant, shared identical reasons for orienting their popular dissent around the Spanish missionaries. In the Philippines it was the local curate who possessed the spiritual, social, political and economic clout. It was he who decided and delegated, sanctioned and supervised, judged and reported; and then forgave or punished all those who disobeyed or fell short of his orders. Therefore, no matter what stance Filipinos took in the name of national integrity--secularization, political or social emancipation, increased shares in the benefits of power, and so on--they would somehow have to face a friar eye to eye. And their alternatives were limited: either they integrate themselves into the current system designed and dominated by the religious orders, or demand the reduction or abolition of the political and social authority they exercised. As far as Filipinos were concerned, the Spanish friars were immediately responsible for all the
misrule, exploitation and alienation suffered by natives throughout the centuries. It was they who blocked their ambitions and deliberately isolated the Philippines from Spain, and from Spanish church and state officialdom in Manila. In the words of reformist Marcelo H. del Pilar:

The basis of monastic wealth is the lack of union between the people and the government. . . To frighten the government with the rebelliousness of the country, and frighten the country with the despotism of the government—that is the system that the friars have so skillfully evolved in order to be able to rule at the expense of every one.

Ironically, the nationalist movement which took its cue from the execution of three priests, started out as peaceful agitation for reform within the context of the Spanish empire. Reformists demanded the assimilation of the Philippine Islands to Spain; hence, Filipinos would become full Spanish citizens, represented in the Cortes and immune from abuse. But as "pen and tongue" strategies brought no results, reform tactics became revolutionary. Anti-friary turned into passionate hatred of Spanish sovereignty altogether, which soon meant the advocacy of political separation from Spain.

For the most part opposition to the Spanish religious orders was not the expression of disloyalty to the Roman Catholic church. Nationalists contested the friars as a socio-political unit, not according to their affiliation
with a particular religious institution. But often enough, especially among the Filipino intelligensia, anticlericalism did lead to anti-church stances. As José Rizal wrote:

I wanted to hit the friars, but since they used religion not only as a shield but as a weapon, protection, castle, fort and armour, etc., I was forced to attack their false and superstitious religion to fight the enemy who hid behind it ... God should not be utilized as a shield and protector of abuses, and there is less reason for religion to be used for this purpose. If the friars really had more respect for their religion they would not often use its sacred name or expose it to the most dangerous situations.

So just as peaceful demands for political reform transformed into raging cries of independence, anticlericalism, in many cases, became an attack on the Roman Catholic church, its role and function in Filipino society. This tangent of the revolution eventually led to the 20th century establishment of the furiously nationalistic Iglesia Filipina Independiente under the leadership of a former Roman Catholic priest, Gregorio Aglipay. But right up until the Philippine Wars at the turn of the century the dichotomy between pro and anti church elements in the nationalist movement did not create major problems—their alliance was politically urgent. So even after anti-church factors had personally ceased regular religious practice, the secularization of parishes was retained as an essential part of their platform.

There was almost no demand which Filipino nationalists
made, that did not directly undermine the traditional position of the friars in the Philippines. From native equality before the laws of Spain, to the disamortization of friar lands, nationalist appeals were interpreted as posing a danger to the strength of the faith, or the rightful jurisdiction of the friar and so were completely rejected by all the religious orders. As long as the friars felt that their work in the Islands was "perfectly amalgamated with religious interests", which they claimed to be the case, then they could do no harm to the native masses. On the other hand, the criticisms and accusations of Filipino nationalists toward the friars became only more malicious and vindictive. They attacked them personally, accused them of immorality; of charging excessive church fees, of commerce in religious objects; they criticized their extensive landholdings and exploitation of tenant farmers; their opulent wealth and deliberate racism. By 1896 the Philippines was on the verge of a national revolution.

As we have seen, complex political confusion originating in Spain and reverberating in the colonies inhibited harmonious and ongoing communications between them. Distracted by her own problems, the most Spain could offer to appease the tension in the Islands were a handful of palliative decrees which did nothing to overcome the ills of Spanish misgovernment and which, nonetheless, went
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largely unheeded by colonial executives; and another collection of decisively pro-friar laws intended to protect Spanish sovereignty against the threat of native uprising.

At this point in time Spain felt more threatened than ever by the prospect of losing her stronghold in the Philippines. By 1824 she had lost most of her South American territory (save Cuba and Puerto Rico) to their native populations who had taken advantage of the unrest in Spain to establish themselves as independent nations. Another loss, especially of her only colony in the Orient, would have detracted significantly from her international status and honour. In the Philippines proper the fear of violence was even closer. Thus, church and state authorities, with only occasional exceptions, strove to maintain the status quo. But no longer was it so easy to grant simple concessions to native leaders in order to command the same blind obedience of the past. If Spain wanted to avoid a revolution she would have to allow for a minimum of reform with the guarantee of its support and integration through to the friars. But at this point even bare minimum was a risk Spain was not ready to make. The friars were Spain's soldiers, and so she chose to strengthen and support them.
Section II: Religion and the Philippine Revolution

The last few years of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines were a whirlwind of activity. The friars always remained the immediate target of the revolutionaries but as Filipinos negotiated and interacted directly with Spanish state officials, their suspicions were directed toward an even larger group of adversaries whom, evidently, supported the hegemony of the missionaries. So while Filipino leaders once denounced Spanish friars and simultaneously accepted, even encouraged ongoing cooperation with the mother country, the integrity of the latter now deteriorated in their eyes. Filipino nationalists, ironically, had been willing to accept Spanish empire and religion in return for certain reforms. Total disregard of their pleas proved to be even more dangerous than Spaniards anticipated. That awesome church-state combination which naturally substantiated each other's presence in the Philippines, disintegrated with increased rapidity and completeness. The impact this would have on native confidence not only in friar-related institutions, but in the political sovereignty and religion of Spain itself, severely undermined their intense 300 year experience in the islands.

The Philippine Revolution can be divided into three
phases. During the first two of these, the immediate enemy of Filipinos were the Spanish; in the last phase, Filipinos fought with American soldiers. In this section I will examine attitudes toward friary and religion during the first two phases of the revolution. Section III will continue with the consequences, for religion, of the third phase.

Chronologically, the first period of the Philippine Revolution began in August 1896 with the discovery of the Katipunan, and ended formally in December 1897 with the truce of Biaknabato. The second phase began in May 1898 with the arrival of the Americans in the Philippines, and ended in February 1899 with the commencement of the Philippine-American war.

During each of these two periods Filipino leaders established Revolutionary Governments', separate from Spain, in order to deal with their colonialists on issues such as friary and independence. The transition from one phase to the next witnesses a significant strengthening in Filipino sense of power and ability to act decisively in terms of developing structures and strategies aimed at liberation. At first Filipinos were unclear about their longer-term destiny—they looked into the future with a certain amount of determination, but in broader, more undefined terms. They were more sure about their immediate concerns, namely,
the tyranny wielded by the religious orders and other manifestations of Spanish oppression. At this earlier point in time Filipinos were still contemplating reconciliation with Spain and the Spanish church, in exchange for the removal of friars from their parish powerholds, and for legal equality with Spaniards. As it became evident by the end of the first phase that status quo conditions were only temporarily disturbed by all the months of bloody battle, and that real changes were not forthcoming; as Filipino insurgents, hence, became more mature and decisive, strategies during the second phase of revolution were even bolder and less dependent on Spanish responses. The Revolutionary Government during this time stepped forward to legislate and enforce laws directly contravening Spanish authority; it even went as far as to provoke the disestablishment of the Spanish Roman Catholic church hierarchy in Manila, while legitimizing an alternate Filipino version.

After the failure of peaceful reform organizations (such as the Propaganda Movement and the Liga Filipina) to elicit response to the demands of Filipino nationalists, in July 1892 an underground association was founded by Andres Bonifacio with the goal of Philippine independence, but this time to be accomplished by armed revolution. For years the Katipunan secretly built up its membership, gradually
constitution, the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and their formation into an independent state with its own government. But despite this radical bottom line, the demands of the revolutionaries displayed, on the other hand, an inclination to possible cooperation with Spain. Their stipulations included, among others, the permanent expulsion of Spanish religious orders from the Philippines and the return of their lands to the Filipino people; tax reforms; freedom of association and of the press; legal equality of Filipinos with Spaniards and representation in the Spanish Cortes.

When Governor Primo de Rivera realised that the revolution had reached and continued to sustain levels of disorder he was unable to control, he endeavoured to settle peacefully with the rebels. Subsequent negotiations terminated in mid-December, 1897, with the Pact of Biaknâbato, the terms of which provided for various monetary payments and a general amnesty to those who agreed to discontinue fighting. Much to their resentment though, the reforms requested by Filipino leaders were not formally incorporated into the Pact. Aguinaldo insisted that Governor Primo de Rivera had promised certain concessions during the negotiations (especially regarding the expulsion of the friars), but fearful of public criticism, requested that they not be put into writing. The Spanish Governor denied
Aguinaldo's accusation. Nonetheless, it was soon evident that both sides of the Pact were wavering. Not all rebels showed initiative in surrendering their weapons and only part of the payment pledged to the revolutionaries was met. On February 24, 1898, from exile in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo declared the truce null and void. Thus, this first phase of revolution fought as a political battle (with implicit social, economic and religious goals) against their most tangible opponent, the Spanish friars, terminated with Filipinos strongly suspicious of all Spanish authority. Native insurrection might have resumed immediately had not their leaders been in exile, many of their arms given up, and their outrage disorganized.

The charges that the friars were responsible for driving natives to desperation in a revolution must have been intense and widespread. On April 21, 1898, members of four religious orders found it necessary to respond to accusations in a solicitous, formal denial directed to the Minister of Colonies in Spain. In what is known as the "Friar Memorial" the missionaries emphasized the honourable intentions of their work and listed their selfless accomplishments among the natives. They alleged that antifriary was an abusive technique used by Filipinos to gain the support of liberals in Spain, in order to avoid the consequences of treasonous behavior as natives plotted, in
reality, the destruction of Spanish sovereignty. The friars claimed that the unfortunate infiltration of liberalism was to be blamed for instilling anarchical ideas in native minds. For every known fault or offense reproaching the missionaries, the Memorial provided a refutation or explanation. In addition to this, it recommended to the Spanish government that, in keeping with their obligation to Christianize and preserve the faith in the Islands, Masonry and other secret organizations be prohibited; that affronts against clergy be regarded as both religious and civil offenses; that the Spanish government abstain from involvement in the right of friars to parishes and lands; and that the traditional respect for the ecclesiastics be encouraged by enforcing colonial officials to set public examples as dedicated Christians. Only if their recommendations were closely followed would missionaries be able to "resist the enemies of the fatherland with greater force" for friary, they maintained, was the key to Spanish authority in the Philippines.

Evidently, the religious orders emerged from the 1896 Revolution even more forcefully convinced of their rightful and urgent role in the Islands. Any liberal concession Spain might contemplate granting to Filipinos was, according to the missionaries, absolutely absurd even at this point. The Friar Memorial advocated only the intensification of
Religious supervision and control. Meanwhile, native sentiments against the friars remained feverish. The Taft Commission\(^{10}\) verified the profundity of native vehemence:

... the statement of the bishops and the friars that the mass of the people in the islands, except only a few of the leading men of each town and the native clergy, are friendly to them, cannot be accepted as accurate. All the evidence derived from every source, but the friars themselves, shows clearly that the feeling of hatred for the friars is well-nigh universal and permeates all classes.

Nevertheless, right up until their very last minute on Philippine soil the fanatically self-righteous Spanish friars felt extremely powerful and vindicated in their actions.

Before a continuation of the 1896 Revolution could be maneuvered, on April 24, 1898,\(^{12}\) war broke out between Spain and the United States (over the question of U.S. intervention in the struggle for Cuban independence from Spain) radically altering the destinies of all those in the archipelago. The following day the American fleet, anchored just outside of Hong Kong in anticipation of hostilities, was given orders to sail for the Philippines and on May 1, under the leadership of Commodore George Dewey, successfully paralyzed the Spanish vessels guarding Manila Bay. Led to assume that the Americans had come to the Philippines as anti-Spanish allies in the name of national liberation and independence, Filipinos rallied to welcome the triumphant
squadron.

At this point begins the second phase of the Philippine Revolution. Just two months after Aguinaldo had declared the Pact of Biaknabato (February 1898) obsolete, the Americans arrived on the scene. Filipinos regarded the U.S. soldiers as friends and were immediately strengthened by their material aid and supportive presence. Invigorated and confident, they wasted no time in pushing through with serious plans for a total liberation from friary and Spanish imperialism. But shortly after Aguinaldo had established a second Revolutionary Government, it became clear to Filipinos that their alleged ally had deceived them. The Americans had not come to their rescue as sympathetic liberator, but as an imperial conqueror. Hence, Filipinos now prepared to do battle with enemies on two fronts. All the while, natives felt certain that the Spanish and the Americans were scheming together against them, in the name of friar control. It was under these circumstances and pressures that the Revolutionary Government and ensuing government of the First Philippine Republic, during this second phase of revolution, passed decisive laws and plotted bold strategies aimed at undermining friary and Spanish control of the Roman Catholic church hierarchy; and during which time leading Filipino citizens (as exemplified at the Malolos Congress), displayed remarkable changes in
traditional attitudes toward church and religion.

Let us return to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in the Philippines. While the Americans held Manila Bay against the Spanish and waited for military reinforcements to arrive from the States, Commodore Dewey shrewdly calculated his next move. He gave instructions to send one of his warships to fetch Aguinaldo, by this time a national hero, from Hong Kong. Upon arrival he supplied Aguinaldo with weapons in order to mobilize a Filipino army against their common enemy, and fully approved his subsequent establishment of military headquarters in Cavite.

Before the Spanish-American War had broken out and during its first few months, Aguinaldo had been summoned by various American officials residing outside of the Philippines, to private conferences where Filipino-American collaboration and future, were discussed and negotiated. Once back in the Philippines, Aguinaldo had had similar discussions with Commodore Dewey also. Throughout all the conversations, the Filipino leader was slowly yet eventually, persuaded to believe that the Americans had come to the Islands as allies, not as colonizers. Aguinaldo maintained that U.S. representatives had promised him recognition of Philippine independence in return for Filipino cooperation against Spain (an allegation denied by the American deliberators despite much evidence pointing
toward their implication). Nonetheless, given Aguinaldo's prior communications with American officials it is easier to understand why on May 24, 1898, several days after his arrival on Dewey's warship, he was able to affirm the altruistic intentions behind the American presence in the Philippines, to the Filipino people:

The Great North American nation, example of true liberty, and, as such, the friend of freedom for our country oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, has come to offer its inhabitants protection as decisive as it is disinterested, regarding our unfortunate country as gifted with sufficient civilization and aptitude for self-government.

As Commodore Dewey looked on from his ship in Manila Bay, Filipinos took advantage of their new "freedom" in his midst, and proceeded to make history for themselves. Aguinaldo and approximately 30 thousand native patriots, now well-armed and strengthened in revolutionary spirit, advanced into the countryside winning province after province in Luzon from Spanish troops. On June 12, 1898, Filipinos celebrated the signing of the "Act of Declaration of Independence" (complete with public hoisting of a new national flag while a band performed the recently composed national anthem, as yet without words) announcing to the world their freedom from all imperial fetters. Dewey had been invited to the momentous event but was obliged to decline, preoccupied with other business. On June 23,
1898, Aguinaldo decreed the institution of a Revolutionary Government "to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country so that a true republic may be established." And so the days passed by, the Americans waiting and observing quietly from the Bay, while Filipinos fought and revelled on their course to an independent republic. Historian Usha Mahajani wrote:

"Between July and October 1898, Philippine vessels flying the flag of the Philippine Republic passed in and out of the Manila harbour saluting and being saluted by American men of war."

But as one might surmise, this plausibly idyllic Filipino-American partnership was not to last much longer.

By summer 1898, thousands of American reinforcements had arrived in the Philippines (in itself causing concern for Filipino leaders). But the event which really prompted native skepticism toward their North American ally was the capture of Manila on August 13. Although it had been a combination of American and Filipino efforts which had taken the Spanish foothold, American troops pouring into the capital to celebrate their victory barred entry to their Filipino counterparts. From this moment onward American schemes became clearer and clearer to the revolutionaries. On December 10, 1898, they crystallized when, after several months of negotiation Spanish and U.S. commissioners signed
the Treaty of Paris. By the terms of the treaty, Spain transferred sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, to the United States. The determination of civil rights and the political status of Filipinos was henceforth under the jurisdiction of American Congress. On December 21, U.S. President McKinley informed the incumbent Military Governor of the Islands, General Elwell Otis, of his decision to retain the Philippines. The first public proclamation by the Americans regarding their claim to the Islands came to the Filipino people finally on January 4, 1899.

Meanwhile, months before the Treaty of Paris was actually signed, Filipinos anticipated American betrayal. With independence all of a sudden teetering precariously, national leaders had called together a Constitutional Congress in order to sanction the authority of their Revolutionary Government (June 23, 1898): to ratify their declaration of independence (June 12, 1898), and frame a constitution which would legitimize the sovereignty of the Filipino people and prescribe the fundamental laws of their nation. Between September 15 and November 29, 1898, delegates from among the most highly educated and upper classes met at Malolos, Bulacan, to participate in the deliberations and on January 23, 1899, after executive approval of the constitution, the First Philippine Republic was duly inaugurated with Aguinaldo at its helm.
Particularly interesting for our purposes are some of the
laws and undertakings of the Revolutionary Government, of
the Malolos Congress and the First Philippine Republic which
illustrate the attitudes and concerns of Filipinos toward
religion during this time.

The second phase of national revolution beginning with
the arrival of the Americans and ending in battle with them,
is peculiarly preoccupied with the religious aspect of the
general political revolt (in a more absolute way than the
events of 1896-97). Politically, the Revolutionary
Government struggled to emancipate Filipinos from the
temporal sovereignty of Spanish and American imperialists;
religiously, it struck out against all levels of the Spanish
ecclesiastical hierarchy, aiming to appropriate its
spiritual authority and re-delegate it to a uniquely
Filipino, yet indisputably Roman Catholic, church
organization.

I do not intend to judge whether or not the Spanish
friars merited the quantity and gravity of charges directed
toward them. The fact remains that Filipinos believed in
their abuse, were intensely repulsed and resolved to
extirpate all evidence of it, however possible. From the
viewpoint of their leaders, Filipinos had battled heroically
to shake themselves from Spanish clutches, they had
jubilantly proclaimed their independence and established a
governing arm to safeguard national interests—yet all the
while Spanish friars continued to dominate episcopal sees
and parishes. Therefore, if Spanish clergy had not already
fled in fear their rural kingdoms, if they had not been
imprisoned or killed by Filipino insurgents, then they
continued to manipulate native lives. A political
revolution, they learned, was not sufficient to destroy
Spanish imperialism. Until Filipinos controlled
ecclesiastical posts across the Islands revolutionaries
would be, in a large sense, waging battle against their own
people and at the risk of perpetual subjugation
nonetheless.

On October 20, 1898, a Filipino priest of well-repute
named Gregorio Aglipay was appointed, or rather
"recognized", by the Revolutionary Government as Military
Vicar General of the Philippines, spiritual head of the
country under the existing state of war. During the week
which followed his assumption to office, Aglipay issued
three circulars to Filipino clergy country-wide,
elaborating plans for what Pedro S. Achútegui and Miguel A.
Bernad appropriately refer to as a religious coup d'état.

Aglipay's first circular began justifying the
necessity of Filipino clergy to overthrow the incumbent
church government. Given that Spanish ecclesiastics were
monetarily maintained by the Spanish government, and that
their vested interest and participation in colonial politics was by no means negligible, the downfall of that organ by which their very existence thrived, could only mean their own loss of authority. An independent Filipino régime could no longer support the spiritual leadership of a hierarchy whose temporal associate tyrannized defenseless masses, and whose own partnership in state affairs implicated it also. If Filipino clergy aspired to preserve the purity and profundity of the faith among their people during this time of upheaval, it was essential for them to renounce the spiritual authority of their corrupted episcopal despots. In this matter the Revolutionary Government, also seeking to expire Spanish abuse, offered its wholehearted support to Filipino clergy who denounced the Spanish church hierarchy. In his circular Aglipay insisted that the cooperation of Filipino clergy with the Revolutionary Government, against monastic monopoly, was essential.

In the same circular, Aglipay proceeded to establish the new ecclesiastical organization. Clergy from each province were to assemble immediately for the election of provincial heads, to be known as Deputy Military Vicars. All those who complied and participated in the elections would be understood as friends of the Revolution and recognized as Military Chaplains by the Revolutionary Government. All Military Chaplains were to defer to their respective Deputy,
Military Vicar as immediate superior, and to Aglipay himself as Vicar General and supreme head over spiritual matters in the Philippines. Each province was also to elect an ecclesiastical Deputy who would become a member of Aglipay's advisory Council. From among the latter a special Commission would be assigned to represent Filipino clergy to the Pope for canonical sanction of appointments and actions taken thus far. Aglipay remained fervently committed to the Roman Catholic communion—the emphasis of his rationale was the preservation of the faith under the unusual and urgent conditions created by the Revolution, and the necessity of indigenous clergy to participate with the Revolutionary Government to defend it at all costs. The circular ended with a warning to all those whom it addressed:

The Council will call upon the Revolutionary Government not to permit any Filipino priest to exercise his spiritual ministry in the territory occupied by said Government, unless that priest submit to these rules.  

But as simply as Aglipay foresaw the execution of his project, the theological weaknesses of his proposals were clear, even to his lay proponents. Spiritual jurisdiction and powers, unlike temporal authority, could not be so easily transferred. They were not elements in the natural order of things but came delegated by God, through the visible head of His Church. No earthly sovereign could effectively bestow or retract spiritual authority, could
legitimately repudiate or re-create an ecclesiastical hierarchy. This, of course, worried Aglipay who held his own position by virtue of Aguinaldo's civil authority, and in the face of a severely conventional, respectfully obedient native clergy. Aglipay toyed dangerously with the realms of sacred and profane. Hence, the following two circulars he issued gently, yet firmly, aimed to convince Filipino clergy that the principles of his plan were profoundly religious, morally exigent and that cooperation with the Revolutionary Government would not compromise the traditional spheres of church authority. Political leaders did not intend to render church subordinate to state concerns—their collaboration was crucial, but their powers unquestionably separate. This was precisely why a plan involving the spiritual welfare of its recipients demanded initiation by clergy, only utilizing the resources supplied by the state.

But the problem still remained to be further engaged. The efficacy of Aglipay's scheme rested solely on the assumption that spiritual authority derived inherently from his appointment as Military Vicar General of the Philippines; a supposition he knew was not only false, but heretical. If Aglipay was going to coordinate the expropriation of spiritual functions from the established order and their re-delegation to another, he required at
very least, some measure of legitimate ecclesiastical authority to do so. His next move then, was to find it.

Aglipay's resourceful solution brought him to the imprisoned, torture-broken Spanish Bishop of Nueva Segovia, Hevia Campomanes, now far from his palace in Vigan and completely disconnected from his episcopal responsibilities. With three letters of high recommendation from vicars whom the Bishop trusted, Aglipay successfully induced the superior to appoint him Ecclesiastical Governor of his vacant see, in the hope of restoring the unattended diocese somewhat to its normal state. 27 Bishop Hevia of course, knew nothing 28 about Aglipay's subversive circulars and actions up to this point. He only welcomed his good faith and enthusiasm. So on December 17, 1898, the new Ecclesiastical Governor of Nueva Segovia was solemnly but festively, inducted to office at the cathedral in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

During his incumbency Aglipay issued 24 decrees ranging in content from the purely administrative to the seriously political. 29 He took advantage of his authoritative seat to scold clerical inefficiencies and inappropriate conduct, as well as to plot with the Philippine Government revolutionary strategies. Aglipay forcefully promoted the coalition of Filipino clergy against friary, the "enemy", and against the Americans whom, in the
event of conquest would undoubtedly vindicate the Spanish religious orders and this time annihilate the indigenous priesthood. Aglipay encouraged clergy to "march at the side of the Government of our Republic" in the name of God and religion, through prayers and obligatory money donations; he compelled priests to incite revolutionary spirit from their pulpits, and even organize citizen militias ready to fight for national deliverance at any moment and to the bitter end.

In May 1899 Aglipay was declared anathema by a Philippine ecclesiastical court (comprised solely of Spanish priests) and, "being guilty of the misdemeanors of usurpation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and of having impeded the exercise of the same . . .", was excommunicated. Aglipay's response to the sentence was at first to ignore it, and then finally to defy it. The obstinate clergyman refused to give up his spiritual authority in submission to the Spanish church establishment in Manila. On October 23, 1899, under the persuasion of an influential former member of the Revolutionary Government, Apolinario Mabini, Aglipay called together a general assembly of Filipino priests at Paniqui, Tarlac, for the purpose of organizing them as he had envisioned in his first circular one year prior (October 21, 1898). Twenty-seven clergy, mostly from the northern provinces of Luzon, were
present for the conference. Aglipay reassured them that under the conditions of war, Spanish ecclesiastical leadership in the Islands was "impeded" and therefore, it was the responsibility of Filipino clergy to assume the governing functions of their church which presently operated without direction. He explained that papal approval of their irregular conduct was essential, but impossible while the Philippines were still at war. The main accomplishment of the Assembly was the adoption of a Provisional Constitution which established, for native clergy, a new church structure, its relationship to the Revolutionary Government and to Spanish priests and prelates. For example, canon VI of the Constitution, one of the more radical provisions, read:

The Council will not recognize any foreign bishop as pastor of any diocese of the Philippines without previous approval of the majority of the Filipino priests in a general plebiscite.

Although the constitution of the Assembly was never implemented, it was in fact a public declaration by Filipino clergy of independence from the Spanish ecclesiastical hierarchy; and although it professed to complete allegiance with Rome, it was most conspicuously a first step in the direction of schism with the Roman Catholic Church. The eventual move to separate from the established church completely, might have come sooner had it not been for the
Philippine-American war which slowly broke down native resistance generally, leaving Filipinos powerless to act. Nevertheless, revolutionary leaders had ostensibly accomplished an astonishing feat—the complete seizure of spiritual authority from Spanish ecclesiastics—an event which, Achutequi and Bernad lament, has not been given commensurate consideration in Philippine church histories.

From the moment Filipinos declared themselves an independent nation (June 12, 1898) they sought to challenge and undermine the traditional jurisdictions of the religious orders and even the legitimacy of the church itself, with their own laws. For example, on June 20, 1898, while native revolutionaries battled Spanish soldiers with American guns, Aguinaldo decreed that according to Philippine law canonical marriages were invalid unless preceded by a civil ceremony. The mandatory nature of civil marriages was reiterated again in August 1898, and adopted by the Malolos Republic. Understandably, objection to the law arose among those elements whom, although anti-friar, wished to preserve the traditional prerogatives of the church. For the most part though, opposition was minimal, even among Filipino priests who simply lacked the strength to resist.

The most fiery instance of inter-Filipino contest with regard to religion came in November 1898, as Malolos delegates debated Title III of the draft constitution,
presented to the Malolos Congress by attorney Felipe Calderón. Calderón, ardently anti-friar yet heading the strongly conservative faction of the Congress, fought for the unity of church and state with Roman Catholicism as the official religion of the Republic (as was the situation under Spanish rule), but tolerant of minority sects. The debates went on and on, one side dwelling on the past conflicts and abuse of church-state partnership (i.e. clericalism; the relegation of Church to a subordinate department of the State); and the other extolling its moral and spiritual advantages (i.e. acknowledging God's supreme role in temporal matters; fostering national unity). 33 The final vote was taken among 52 delegates on an amendment to Calderón's initial proposition and read:

The state recognizes the freedom and equality of all religious worship, and the separation of Church and State.

The first result of balloting was a tie, while the second favoured the amended proposal by only one vote. The entire argument was so emotionally as well as politically delicate, 35 revolutionary leaders replaced Title III with a temporary provision which passed adoption in the new constitution. The issue of church and state had been deferred to a later, unspecified date. Theoretically, the separation of church and state had triumphed; practically, the status quo still reigned,
The passion provoked by the status of church and state during the Malolos Congress is very revealing. The authors of the constitution deliberated with 300 years of history heavy in their memories. While most Filipinos agreed that clericalism and friary were completely adverse to Philippine development and national dreams, not all, not nearly a majority of the population, were yet willing to forfeit Roman Catholicism or religion. Both were absolutely intrinsic to a particular understanding of reality—even minimal erosion of the validity of that worldview would require many more years of contact with a secular world. On the other hand, the very fact that so many of the Filipino elite espoused such a radical stand was an indication that native attitudes could and were, genuinely changing.

Leandro H. Fernandez, a Filipino doctoral student wrote:

It is truly surprising that a Catholic country should have taken such a liberal view regarding the separation of Church and State and the freedom of worship. It can only be accounted for because of the many abuses and tyrannies that had resulted from a union of Church and State in the Islands, and from the fact that the members of the Congress were of a superior type, many of whom were well educated and had had opportunity for travel in countries in which abuses of the Church did not exist. Many, no doubt, felt that a continuation of the union of Church and State in the Philippines would involve a continuation of the friar rule and this they desired to avoid at all costs, even to the extent of permitting other religions to enter... 36

Fernandez' observation raises an interesting point-
about the conviction of the congress-members based on their social class and level of education. Throughout Philippine history the disparity of political and social consciousness between leading Filipino townsmen and the masses was always gaping. From pre-conquest times, the native population had willingly and simply deferred to the judgements and opinions of their respected leaders. In fact, the role of any given individual entitled "leader" was, within his particular sphere of responsibility (i.e. family, barrio, town or country), precisely to make decisions for those subject to him with full concern, of course, for their welfare and interests. The masses, in response, almost instinctively placed an unyielding trust in the decisions of their superiors. It is improbable that the views of the Malolos delegates reflected those of the ordinary Filipino. What is essential to remember though, is that the judgements of native leaders, especially in matters of national importance, were completely accepted and as far as they could be comprehended, integrated into native reality.

With regard to education, Title IV, Article 23 of the Malolos constitution sought, again, to liberalize that jurisdiction which had been traditionally coveted and controlled by the Spanish missionaries:

Any Filipino can found and maintain establishments of instruction or education, in accordance with the provisions which are established. Popular education shall be obligatory and gratuitous in
the schools of the nation.

Finally, based on the continued partnership of church and state, the legality of the Spanish religious corporations and the disposition of their vast landed estates were clarified according to Philippine law. On January 1, 1899, and again on the 23rd following the proclamation of the Republic, President Aguinaldo announced the expulsion of all regular Spanish clergy from Philippine territory regardless of their ecclesiastical rank, and including those unordained ministers who had dedicated themselves permanently to the life and functions of a Religious. In an additional provision of the new constitution the Republic declared that as of May 24, 1898, all friar "buildings, properties, and other belongings . . . will be understood as restored to the Filipino government." Indeed, much of the resentment built up against the missionaries was aggravated by their claims to some of the most fertile and productive lands in the Philippines. At the time of the Malolos Republic the Dominican order owned 161,953 acres, the Augustinians 151,742 acres, and the Recollects 93,035 acres, distributed all across the Islands. 38

Unfortunately, the First Philippine Republic did not last long enough to implement its impressive constitution and evolve over time into the "popular, representative and
"responsible" regime to which it aspired. On February 4, 1899, as U.S. troops proceeded to occupy Philippine territory against the wishes of its native inhabitants, war broke out again—the Americans battling to establish their proclaimed sovereignty, and Filipinos to defend their independence. But from this point onward, steadfast political direction and control by native revolutionaries over the destiny of their country, were lost. The First Philippine Republic came to an end on March 23, 1901, with the capture of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, by American soldiers disguised as Filipinos. Despite the obvious superiority of the foreign troops warfare dragged on for another year after Aguinaldo's seizure, ending finally on April 16, 1902. Another era in Philippine history had begun, this time under the leadership of the United States.

While the first phase of the Revolution engaged Filipino soldiers in war against the oppression of friary, its Revolutionary Government was not able to alter the organization and power of Spanish missionaries over native lives. Young and naive, the government at Biaknabato always anticipated Spanish cooperation with native demands. Revolutionary leaders soon came to realize though, that they would have to become more resolute and aggressive, if they didn't wish to remain permanently victim to exploitation by Hispanic church and state authority. So, during the second
phase of revolution, Filipino leaders changed their style. Fired by relentless Spanish arrogance and abuse; by American support and then deception; and with a more definite perception of what they wanted for their future, revolutionary leaders took drastic steps to undermine status quo power relationships inhibiting national emancipation and independence. But unfortunately, no matter what their tactic was (i.e. religious coup d'etat or revolutionary legislation), several factors always worked in their disfavour. For one, the philosophical and social disparity between natives kept the population largely divided. While a safe majority of Filipinos could claim profound anti-Spanish and anti-friar sentiments, other "national" feelings were not so clear cut or sweeping. Beside the major dichotomy between elite and masses, the native upper class was broken into clergy and laity; the laity into pro and anti-Roman Catholic church, pro and anti-religion; the clergy into pro-Revolutionary Government and pro-Roman Catholic church establishment. But even if Filipinos had been more ideologically cohesive, they were still up against yet another challenge--the military might of a new imperial power, the United States, whose troops continued to flood the Islands. Through the Treaty of Paris the Americans gained legal sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and, as we have seen, moved in to annihilate what self-determined
course Filipinos had carved out for themselves during the past two and a half years of revolution.
Section III:  
American Solution to Friary and Church-State Relationship in the Philippines

From the moment the Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila harbour and tenaciously pursued the conquest of the Philippine Islands, they set themselves up for participation in the archipelago's complex religious affairs. The climactic Treaty of Paris fused U.S. involvement therein, and led to the highly delicate process of disentanglement and redirection, a la Américaine, of a profoundly entrenched religious tradition. In this final section I aim to accomplish two things: to look at American response to the two most tangible legacies of friary confronting them upon official installation in the Islands (i.e. the missionaries themselves and their lands): to identify American policy on religion and analyze its immediate implications for spiritual, social and political life in the Philippines.

Through the Treaty of Paris, Spain implicitly yielded authority over the structure of Philippine church-state relationship to the U.S., and made several explicit provisions for her remaining religious interest in the Islands. Article X of the peace Treaty assured freedom of religious practice in the Philippines, an arrangement which
up until this time Spain was reluctant to even imagine let alone adopt, but which safeguarded the right of Spaniards to perpetuate their brand of Christianity amid a potential variety of North American choices. Article VI of the Treaty obliged the American government to "undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines", many of whom, as noted earlier, were friars being held by the Revolutionary Government for political bargaining purposes. Article VIII, concerned with Spanish landholdings, stated that American assumption of authority in the Islands could not "in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, ... public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies ..." Through these particular terms, the Treaty of Paris placed the United States in a perplexing situation. Against the febrile antifriary rampaging its newly won colony, the American government had committed itself to protecting the lives, lands and religion of Spanish missionaries. Legally, Spanish friars were free to return to their vacant parishes (though realistically this could not yet happen) and were entitled to protection under the law if they chose to do so.² And as far as the Vatican was concerned, they were still vested with the full force of their ecclesiastical power. But as the United States
endeavoured to keep her part of the Paris Treaty, the more practical consequences of her role in Filipino-friar contentions became fearfully apparent. At this point it was up to American politicians to set their own priorities straight, and work out a solution which would honour their obligations to Spain while not unduly provoking Filipino sensibilities.

Every step taken by U.S. authorities upon occupation of the Islands was observed by Filipino revolutionaries with suspicious contempt. American moves seemed to confirm over and over again their worst fears—that the latter indeed, plotted with Spanish priests to re-establish friary in the Philippines. For example, when the reputedly pro-friar American Archbishop, Placide Chapelle, arrived in Manila on January 2, 1900 (the delegate chosen by the Vatican to handle the Philippine church situation), Filipinos felt deceived as Military Governor Elwell Otis joined the despised friar Archbishop Nozaleda and a group of friar cohorts, to give Chapelle an all too impressive welcome. Chapelle’s American nationality and tactlessly open alliance with the Spanish religious orders combined as proof to Filipinos of their clandestine intrigue against native interests.³

But this time Filipino worries were unwarranted. Whether or not American prelates supported Spanish friary
(which would not be surprising), and whether or not American politicians had promised to safeguard Spanish lives, U.S. officials were definitely not interested in using the friars to manipulate the Filipino masses, nor in supporting them as Spain had done. Their first challenge then, was to prove this to Filipinos.

On July 6, 1900, Military Governor Arthur MacArthur (Otis' successor) circulated a pledge to the people of the Philippines, clearly outlining fundamental American policy on religion. It clarified an altogether new approach to church-state relationship in the Islands:

As under the Constitution of the United States complete freedom is guaranteed . . . and there must be a complete separation of Church and State, so here the civil government of these Islands hereafter to be established will give the same security to the citizens thereof, and guarantee that no form of religion shall be forced by the government upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that no minister of religion in following his calling in a peaceful and lawful manner shall be interfered with or molested by the government or any person; that no public funds shall be used for the support of religious organizations or any member thereof; that no official process shall be used to collect contributions from the people for the support of any church, priest or religious order; that no minister of religion, by virtue of his being a minister, shall exercise any public or governmental office or authority and that the separation of Church and State must be complete and entire.

In pursuance of the policy embodied in the foregoing paragraph, it is apparent that congregations, by independent individual action, so far as any governmental interference is concerned, may reject any clergyman who is not acceptable to the majority of the communicants of the parish, and prevent his ministrations therein by such means as are suitable to accomplish the
purpose, provided that any action in the premises be not accompanied by application of violence.

Understandably, the American promise (circulated in the Spanish language only) was treated with careful skepticism by Filipinos. This time, around only solid action was going to win their confidence. Those issues immediately disturbing to Filipinos, and which therefore became of primary concern to U.S. strategies, were the fate of the friars and their vast landed properties. The mere knowledge that either one of these occupied or claimed Philippine territory, plagued Filipinos with the fear of perpetual enslavement. And as if to reinforce their gloom, the outlook of the Spanish missionaries remained, after all the tribulation endured over years of revolutionary activity, relentlessly hopeful and optimistic. James A. LeRoy described their disposition:

The general attitude of the friars, both then and for some time afterward, was that of saying to the people, through their publications of various sorts, through occasional emissaries to work up petitions for their return to their parishes, and through the Filipino priests who remained actually, not just outwardly, obedient to the friar archbishop and friar bishops: "The insurrection must soon end, for the Filipinos cannot hold out much longer; we shall be recognized and protected by the United States as we were by Spain; if you want to be on the safe side in the future, you must be for us now."

On January 31, 1900, the First Philippine Commission \(6\) (Schurman Commission), an advisory body appointed by
President McKinley to investigate and make recommendations relevant to contemporary conditions in the Philippines, submitted its final report. It contended that the hatred for Spanish friars, indeed deep-seated and thorough among the native population, was rooted primarily in the fact that the religious corporations owned so much land. It recommended therefore, the purchase of these lands by the American government and their resale to natives in small tracts, at affordable prices. Seventeen months later the Second Philippine Commission, under the leadership of William Howard Taft, came to the same conclusion. In a recommendation dated June 30, 1901, they stressed the urgency of its administration:

The matter is a pressing one, for the action of the courts in enforcing legal decrees in favour of the real owners of the land against the tenants will be a constant source of irritation, riot, and lawlessness in the provinces where land is, and will lead to distrust and uneasiness everywhere.

Despite the fact that neither of the two Commissions formally suggested the withdrawal of the friars from the Islands altogether, it was certainly not a remote alternative. Various members sitting on either Commission supported and encouraged their expulsion for the sake of future American-Filipino relations. In 1902 William Taft wrote:

If the purchase of the lands of the friars and the adjustment of all other questions arising between
the Church and State should include a withdrawal of the friars from the Islands, it would greatly facilitate the harmony between the government and the people and between the Church and the State.

William Taft was particularly concerned with the fate of friary in the Islands. As early as July, 1902, the month following his arrival in Manila with the Second Philippine Commission, he had approached the missionaries with an offer to purchase their lands at a good price, on the condition that they promise not to go back to their parishes, or at least not to return as parish priests. The willful friars flatly rejected Taft's suggestion—after all, they anxiously anticipated their resumption of parochial tasks and functions. Why in the world would they want to undermine their mission at this point?

Many months passed by after this and the friar issue dragged on, unresolved. On July 4, 1901, the Americans terminated military rule in the Philippines and established Civil Government with William Taft as first Civil Governor. And as the United States undertook to evolve its own political plans, guerrilla warfare persisted between Filipino and American soldiers. It wasn't until May 9, 1902, that the American Secretary of War, Elihu Root, instructed Taft to return from business in Washington via Rome, in order to negotiate directly with the Vatican on the subject of Spanish priests and church property. In the name of public welfare and good government, the Americans would
make a diplomatic attempt to eliminate friary as a problem in the Philippines. On the one hand they were constrained to acknowledge the legal rights of the missionaries and could not, as Filipinos preferred, outright confiscate church lands and immediately expel the priests. Even if the friars constituted a threat to peace in the colony, they would have to be removed without insulting the Roman Catholic establishment. On the other hand, even if the Americans were going out of their way to arrive at a settlement with the religious orders, they didn't want Filipino nationalism to appear or feel all the more powerful as a result. After weeks of discussion in Rome, Taft was able to negotiate what he considered a disappointing bargain. Vatican agreed to support the purchase of friar lands by the U.S. government through the mediation of a papal delegate acting on their behalf, if the friars wanted to sell; maintained that Spanish priests were still free to return to their curacies if their respective native communities wished to accept them back; and refused to acquiesce to their forced withdrawal from the Philippines. If they wanted, the friars could leave the Islands voluntarily. According to the Vatican, their forced withdrawal would place the Americans at odds with their obligation to the Paris Peace Treaty, the Vatican at odds with Spain, and would infer the accuracy of all those base accusations aimed at the missionaries, blatantly false.
or exaggerated concoctions. Taft proceeded back to Manila hoping to secure the cooperation of the friars as far as possible. He arrived in August, 1902, to find the Spanish missionaries now ready to do business. The immensely complicated task of land purchase could begin, the entire process involving the following steps.

To start off, the American government would have to verify the legality of Religious land titles. Many Filipinos held that the religious orders could not show valid titles for their lands which, by national right, belonged to the Filipino people anyway. The question rested then, on whether or not the principle of "prescription" (legality of titles based on use over long periods of time) applied to the property claimed by any of the religious corporations.

Next in the process of land purchase, the immediate ownership of the titles had to be distinguished. Many friar land titles had been transferred to various corporations and individuals with the ecclesiastics holding the controlling interest. For example, the Augustinians had transferred all of their agricultural lands to the "Sociedad Agrícola de Ultramar"; the Dominican lands were to be found under the "Philippine Sugar Estates Developing Co. Ltd."; and the Recollects had signed their land over to the "British Manila
Estates Company Ltd. of Hong Kong. Such transfers made the purchase of the lands even more complicated as agents now had to negotiate with representatives from these companies in addition to those of the religious orders.

What might have provoked the friars to deal with their lands in this way? Ever since war had erupted in 1896, most of the 60,000 tenants occupying church territory had not paid their rents. It was held that the transfers (dated 1898, 1899 and 1900) were an effort on the part of the priests to collect rents peacefully, believing that the tenants would pay once sure that the friars were no longer their landlords. 17

The last steps of the transaction involved the evaluation of the lands and agreement by both parties on a purchasing price. The combination of all of the above resulted in months of elaborate investigation and hard bargaining. Finally, on December 22, 1903, the land contracts were signed. The Philippine Government had bought 410,000 acres 18 of church property for $7,239,784.66, a high price as far as business deals go. Taft reconciled the cost to its therapeutic function:

We paid a large price for the lands because we were paying for a political object. We were not making a land speculation... There has thus been eliminated an open sore in the social and political body of the Islands which would have involved them in constant pain and most injurious disturbances of law and order.
More importantly to Filipinos though, the economic sovereignty of the Spanish missionaries dissipated with the purchase of their lands. The transaction indicated to them that the political powerhold of the friars might have indeed been broken for good when the Americans defeated Spain back in 1898.

At first the resale of friar lands to Filipinos went smoothly. Those areas already occupied by tenant farmers were bought up almost immediately, under long-term contracts and leases which allowed 20 years for repayment. But once occupied lands were sold or leased, general land sales slowed down significantly. By August 29, 1911, 173,772-1/2 acres of friar land remained on the market, with no sign of imminent resale. This began to worry the Philippine government who had purchased the lands with borrowed money (compounded with interest and expensive administrative fees) and who found themselves consequently, under pressure to dispose of them as quickly as possible. If they could not repay their loan through land resales they would be obliged to raise money through taxation, burdening a population who did not directly benefit from the land transaction to begin with.

The idea behind selling the friar lands back to Filipinos in limited parcels, was to allow for the development of small, independent landowners, no longer subject to the extravagances and oppression which
sovereignty of the Spanish monks dissipated with the purchase of their lands. The transaction indicated to them that the political powerhold of the friars might have indeed been broken for good when the Americans defeated Spain back in 1898.

At first the resale of friar lands to Filipinos went smoothly. Those areas already occupied by tenant farmers were bought up almost immediately, under long-term contracts and leases which allowed 20 years for repayment. But once occupied lands were sold or leased, general land sales slowed down significantly. By August 29, 1911, 173,772-1/2 acres of friar land remained on the market, with no sign of imminent resale. This began to worry the Philippine government who had purchased the lands with borrowed money (compounded with interest and expensive administrative fees) and who found themselves consequently, under pressure to dispose of them as quickly as possible. If they could not repay their loan through land resales they would be obliged to raise money through taxation, burdening a population who did not directly benefit from the land transaction to begin with.

The idea behind selling the friar lands back to Filipinos in limited parcels, was to allow for the development of small, independent landowners, no longer subject to the extravagances and oppression which
predominated their previous experience. The Americans anticipated thousands of natives rushing out to buy pieces of property, anywhere across the country, elated with the prospect of economic independence. But Filipinos, an extremely community-oriented people accustomed to living in small villages, could not be enticed by an offer of land when it dictated isolation and insecurity apart from their barrio "barkadas". So as the American homestead idea failed to attract customers, land sales, especially of those vacant and uncultivated, continued to decline.

On the other hand, government officials realized that the areas most difficult to sell to Filipinos could probably be sold in larger tracts to corporations interested in developing the country's natural resource industry. As it stood now, limited by quotas on land acreage, the latter could not secure enough territory to make business in the Philippine profitable for them. Opening up friar lands in this way would not only solve the Government's financial dilemma, but would provide natives with employment opportunities and bring badly needed capital into the country. Consequently, on July 3, 1908, the legal restrictions on maximum land-acreage which could be sold to an individual or corporation, were removed.²⁰ (This decision was passed unanimously in the all-Filipino assembly of the Philippine legislature.) Indeed, the Philippine government
regarded itself as fortunate when, in following, corporations bought and moved into territories of unoccupied, uncultivated friar lands, in isolated locations where it might take generations before Filipinos would be ready to buy them.

Because of ensuing controversy over the alleged abuse provoked by the abrogated land restriction, on February 28, 1914, the Philippine legislature (now completely under Filipino control) again limited the sale of friar lands to 16 hectares per individual, and 1,024 hectares for a corporation. Two years later in 1916, the Philippine Government Law commanded that all friar lands remaining unsold, if not considered part of the "public domain", be placed under the final authority of the Philippine legislature. Otherwise, decisions by the Legislature with regard to friar lands were subject to the approval of the American President. The question hence was, were the friar lands "public domain", or not?

Policy with regard to the sale of the church property remained ambiguous. Nonetheless, one crucial and enduring consequence of it was that once quantity restrictions had been removed from land transactions in 1908, the door was immediately opened to the arrival of transnational corporations which wasted no time in establishing subsidiary branches abroad. While the sale of small areas of land to
Filipinos eventually put the Philippine government in debt as purchasers failed to produce the crop-yield sufficient for their payments, the situation thus created was not an irreversible one. But the sale of friar lands to industry was the beginning of a new era for international profit-oriented business in the Philippines—an era in which Filipinos witnessed the perpetuation, in a different form, of the exploitative landlord-tenant relations of the past.

As for the fate of the Spanish missionaries in the Philippines, it seems that voluntary withdrawal was taken more seriously than expected. Out of the 1,124 friars resident in the Islands at the outbreak of war in 1896, by December 1, 1903, only 246 of these remained, involved primarily in educational work in the larger cities. Why the change in attitude? A combination of rejection by individual rural parishes, the increasingly popular tendency of Vatican to replace the higher Spanish church officials with American and Filipino priests, and the fear created by U.S. attitudes and actions pointing toward the destruction of the ongoing hold of friary over life in the Philippines, made the venture back to their parishes all the more precarious and insecure. Concerning their lack of unqualified American support, James A. LeRoy astutely concluded:

It is significant that the friars, though free to return to their parishes in most districts since
1900, and in all since 1901, have in but a few cases ventured back into the towns of the more settled and populous provinces. They would have done so, could they have been assured of the special favour and protection of American military power, and could they have gone back carrying the virtual threat to their opponents that the "Government was behind them", as it was in the old days. With the purchase of their landed estates by the new Government in the islands, and the final assurance that they could expect nothing more than a free field and no favours under the present administration, the "friar-question" under its old form has almost been eliminated from the Philippine situation.  

LeRoy also maintained that that particular component of the Filipino population which barred friars from returning to their parishes was the educated middle class, the more resolutely radical sector of the nationalist movement. He believed that if the Americans had cared to control this group under force of arms (constituting what he thought would have been "a political mistake of the crassest sort for the Government"), then it would have been fairly easy for the majority of Spanish missionaries to return to their folds and old roles, even in those areas where the impact of the revolution had been great. He based his conclusion on the fearful, obedient and humble nature of the ordinary farmer, and upon the manipulative hold of Spanish priests over the native women.  

It is indeed amazing that after such a long and concentrated experience with Hispanic Christianity, its basic principle of church-state union, and all that this
union implied, would be so decisively reversed almost overnight. And if, as LeRoy suggests, a significant portion of the rural population were maintained in their revolutionary spirit by a minority of educated rebels whose absence would allow Spanish friary to flourish once again unconstrained, then what could "the separation of church and state" or "freedom of religion" possibly mean to the average Filipino?

The fact that the Americans could still effectively bait the masses with the threat of friar-rule even after most of them had gone, that the arrival of new Protestant groups to the Philippines provoked native hostilities even to the point of violence (believing these to be the substitutes for a new American-funded friar-rule), indicate the confusion of the masses and their lack of comprehension with regard to the new religious policy. Only time could successfully illustrate to them the depths of its meaning and prove to them that friary was, without doubt, an institution of the past.

The new relationship between church and state, and freedom of worship, were to substantially alter the nature of spiritual, social and political life in the Philippines. While Filipinos severed direct contact with Spanish blood and tradition, the intent and anticipated function of missionaries arriving from Europe and America were
difference. Roman Catholicism was no longer the official state religion. Many other Christian denominations freely established missions across the country; the Philippine Independent Church broke away from Roman Catholicism and developed openly without state interference. The Patronato Real with all of its mutually supportive alliances and agreements became obsolete; no longer could priests hold positions in the civil administration, no longer could they involve themselves in worldly enterprise, could they circumscribe, predetermine or manipulate national life. While the American government forfeited the right to make ecclesiastical appointments, to control church property and money, neither would it sustain the livelihood and privileges of any priest. Where ecclesiastical influence and inflexibility had once intimidated civil authorities into supporting or enforcing their temporal and spiritual designs, a secular ruling power now usurped major roles in facets of town life once monopolized by the religious. For the first time the church could no longer protect itself with claims to ecclesiastical immunity but, like its civil counterparts, became subject to the laws of the land.

In education, a genuinely secularized system would soon predominate. On January 21, 1901, amid much fired controversy, the Public School Bill, Act Seventy-Four, was passed providing for free and compulsory, secular primary
education. Section 16 of the Bill, dealing with religious instruction, stated that school teachers were forbidden to teach religion in their classrooms, to try and influence their students with their own religious views, to make fun out of or criticize the religion of their pupils. Religious education would be provided for on the school premises, after school hours only. Section 15 of the Act provided for 1000 American teachers to fill pedagogical positions across the Islands. There was no specific statement regarding the selection of teachers, but Taft insisted that at least 200 of these, or more if possible, be Roman Catholic.31

All of this does not mean to imply that Roman Catholicism in the Philippines suddenly became less important than before. To the contrary, even today the Islands remain pervasively Roman Catholic, steeped in all the emotion, colour and ritual of before. Only this time the religiosity fostered by Spanish friars in the past, became separated from politics and school curriculum adding a markedly secular dimension to town life. Religiosity adjusted itself to the cultural idiosyncracies of new priests (foreign or Filipino), and responded to new political realities such as democracy and nationalism, which liberalized and socialized the manifestation of their Catholicism.
NOTES - CHAPTER III

Section I

1. In 1834 the Philippines were officially opened up to world trade markets.

2. The galleon trade was responsible for many ills in the Philippines: nearly all Spaniards in the colony stayed in Manila to speculate in and enjoy the proceeds from their participation in the profitable trade—thus preoccupied, political prerogatives were delegated to parish priests who were left alone in the provinces to carry on; engrossed in and solely dependent on the galleon trade for revenue; agriculture and industry in the colony were totally neglected; and the prohibition of other European ships to the Philippines, even of Spanish trade with other Asian countries, left the Islands completely closed off to the world.

Ports opened at Zamboanga, Iloilo, Sual in Pangasinan, Cebu, Legaspi and Tacloban.

This new native middle class was not necessarily descendant from the traditional principality but the line which separated the two (the upper and middle class) almost entirely disappeared during the 19th century.


See Chapter II, Section III, footnote #10.


Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Milagros C. Guerrero, History of the Filipino People, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1970, p. 159, quoting Marcelo H. del Pilar, La Soberanía Monacal en Filipinas, Barcelona, Spain, 1899 (translation by
Dr. Encarnación Alzona, 1957).

Usha Mahajani writes: "The argument of loyalty [to Spain] merits closer study for it was used by the Filipinos with the Americans and the Japanese as well. Filipino intellectuals may have sincerely desired closer, but honourable association with Spain; but there was also the question of strategy; a pledge of loyalty was calculated to advance a case for reform. Under Spanish rule, a political agitator was liquidated as an enemy but a "loyalist" could not be so disposed of ..." See Usha Mahajani, Philippine Nationalism: External Challenge and Filipino Response, 1565-1946, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1971, pp. 56-57.


Majul, ibid., p. 161.

Majul, ibid., p. 163, quoting the "Friar Memorial of 1898". Complete text found in BRPI, LIII, pp. 227-286.

For example, the tax reform of 1884 repealed the
despised tribute tax, only to replace it with the cedula tax, a yearly payment for identification papers, the price adjusted according to race and civil status. The idea behind both taxes remained identical—they were tokens of acknowledgement of the Spanish king for his protection and services, still symbols of a colonized people; the Provincial Reform of 1886 took away executive and administrative powers from the notorious alcaldes mayores and relegated them to judges of the courts of first instance, but simply handed over the same job to new Spanish representatives in the title of Civil Governors; the royal decree of 1889 applied the Spanish Civil Code to the Philippines but before it could even be implemented, the colonial governor withdrew several of its provisions for Filipinos—those pertaining to civil marriage, civil registration and freedom of the press; the Moret Decrees of 1870 which aimed to partially secularize education, and the Maura Law of 1893 which planned to give more political autonomy to the larger towns, were never implemented; and so on.

Section II

Usha Mahajani questions whether or not Filipino nationalists were genuinely willing to settle for anything less than total independence; he suggests that the demand
for certain reforms was just a tactic in the face of Spain's obstinate claim to unconditional sovereignty over the Islands. He writes: "Even ideology and ideological objectives cannot be implemented without tactical manouevres." See Usha Mahajani, *Philippine Nationalism: External Challenge and Filipino Response, 1565-1946*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1971, pp. 56-57, 78-79.


5 Mahajani, op. cit., p. 78.

6 Mahajani, op. cit., pp. 77-78.


9 Majul, ibid., p. 164, quoting the "Friar Memorial of 1898". Complete text found in BRPI, LIII, pp. 227-286.

0 See Chapter III Section III footnote #8, for identification of Taft Commission.


12 Spain declared war against the United States on April 24, 1898. The following day the American Congress proclaimed war with Spain as of April 21, 1898.

13 Dewey's policy was to avoid armed conflict with the Spanish until after American reinforcements had arrived. Altogether, over 15 thousand troops and 641 officers were sent to the Philippines to join Dewey after his victory in Manila Bay.

14 Wood-Aguinaldo talks in Hong Kong from March to April 6, 1898; Pratt-Aguinaldo talks in Singapore in April 1898; Wildman-Aguinaldo talks in Hong Kong in May 1898.

15 For more details see Mahajani, op. cit., pp. 89-105; Zaide, op. cit., pp. 184-85. For a completely opposite version of the same story see Dean C. Worcester,
The Philippines Past and Present, v.1, Mills and Boon Ltd.,

16 Foreman, op. cit., p. 586, quoting Senate Document

17 Zaide, op. cit., p. 195.

18 From Senate Document No. 62, Part I, 55th Congress,
3rd Session, 1898-99, pp. 433-37. The Revolutionary
Government replaced, but continued the work of the
dictatorial regime established by Aguinaldo one month prior
on May 24, 1898. In the face of the confusion and disorder
which dominated the Islands, Aguinaldo had been advised to
temporarily postpone the creation of a constitutional
government.

19 Mahajani, op. cit., p. 98.

20 The capture of Manila by American and Filipino
soldiers was actually a sham. Prior to the event, top U.S.
and Spanish officials had negotiated a surrender whereby
Spanish troops would fight for a short while to save face
for Spain, and then hoist the white flag. As part of the
secret agreement between the two powers, upon seizure of
Manila Filipinos were to be prohibited from entering the
capital for fear that native forces would proceed to
massacre their Spanish captives.
The Americans proclaimed military occupation of Manila on August 14, 1898, under General Wesley Merritt, the day after it was taken. It was the actual existence of war, which empowered the American president to set up a military government in captured territory.

The total number of delegates increased up to 110.

Of the 1,124 Spanish missionaries who resided in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war in 1896, from 300 to 400 of them were being held prisoner by the revolutionaries. Charles Burke Elliot claims that about 650 friars had been either exiled or killed; and yet others took refuge in Manila under the protection of Spanish, and then American arms. Filipino rebels held many of the friars in order to increase their bargaining power as they fought for recognition of their independence by the U.S. and the Vatican. Reports about the treatment of the captive missionaries vary from good, to humiliating and torturous, depending on the part of the country, the friar, his power and previous conduct toward the natives. Charles Burke Elliot, The Philippines to the End of Commission Government, Greenwood Press, N.Y., 1968, pp. 42-43; Anderson op. cit.; in article by Peter G. Gowing, "The Disentanglement of Church and State early in the American regime in the Philippines", p. 204.
Dated October 21, 22 and 28, 1898.


For full text of first circular see Achútegui and Bernad, ibid., (2nd edition, 1961), pp. 52-54.

Ibid., pp. 69-72. Bishop Hevia prepared 2 documents for Aglipay, both dated November 15, 1898. The first announced his appointment as Ecclesiastical Governor and the other directed clergy of Nueva Segovia to obey and honour their new spiritual director.

Achútegui and Bernad suggest that Aglipay's three references may have also been beguiled by his professed intentions; at least one of the three letters of recommendation was written before the appearance of Aglipay's first circular.

Achútegui and Bernad, op. cit., p. 75.

Achútegui and Bernad, op. cit., p. 79, quoting from Circular 20, April 1, 1899.

Achútegui and Bernad, op. cit., p. 89.

Achútegui and Bernad, op. cit., p. 111.

34 Quoted in Agoncillo and Guerrero, op. cit., p. 235.

35 "Aglipay's entire position and his effectiveness as an agent for the Philippine Government depended on the supposition that he was a powerful figure in that government, a supposition that would have to be abandoned in a context where the Church had no longer any ties with the State." Achútegui and Bernad, op. cit., (2nd edition, 1961), p. 63.


37 Quoted in Majul, op. cit., p. 167.

38 Elliot, op. cit., p. 43. William Howard Taft reports a total of 425,000 acres in friar hands at this time. See Special Report of Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War, to the President on the Philippines, January 3, 1908 (Manila 1909) pp. 20-21.
Section III

1 See Chapter III Section II footnote #23.


6 The First Philippine Commission under Dr. Jacob G. Schurman, arrived in Manila on March 4, 1899, just 2 months after the commencement of war between the Filipinos and Americans. The instructions of President McKinley to the Commission were: to present to the Filipino people, on behalf of the President and the American public, a message
of goodwill and statement of their altruistic purpose in the Islands; to investigate social and political conditions in the archipelago; to reflect and make recommendations concerning the possible direction of U.S. policy in the Philippines. The final report of the Commission included the authoritative observation that the people of the Philippines were not yet prepared for independence, and that the presence of the U.S. government in the Islands was therefore essential. For the full text of the "Instructions of the President to the First Philippine Commission", and the "Proclamation of the First Philippine Commission to the Filipino People" see Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present, Mills and Boon Ltd., London, 1914, v.2, pp. 975-80 (appendix).

7 See Chapter III Section II, p. 147 for quote by Taft Commission.

8 The Second Philippine Commission arrived in Manila on June 3, 1900. Unlike the First, the Taft Commission was not merely an advisory body, but had legislative and some executive powers as well. Its mandate was to see to the gradual transfer of government control from military to civilian rulers, and to aid in the organization and establishment of all levels of civil government. Beginning September 1, 1900, the Commission was authorized to assume
the legislative functions of the incumbent military governor (leaving the latter with executive powers only) until that time when a central, civil government was created and ready to take over permanently from the Commission, or until Congress decided otherwise. Among other things, the Taft Commission was also instructed to investigate problems related to the religious situation in the Islands; to "promote and extend, and, as they find occasion, to improve" the educational system already established by military officials; they were empowered to make laws governing taxation, national budget, the creation of a civil service, courts, the structure of government and in all other civil matters. William J. Pomeroy writes: "In its effect, and undoubtedly in its intention, the Taft Commission was a means of by-passing the American Congress at a time when the introduction of colonial legislation in that body would have precipitated a bitter debate on imperialism that would have affected the election of 1900." William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-colonialism, Its emergence in the Philippines and Asia, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1970, p. 133. For full text of "Instructions of the President to the Second Philippine Commission" see Worcester, op. cit., pp. 980-88 (appendix). The Second Philippine Commission was abolished on August 29, 1916 by The Philippine Government Law of 1916.
Despite all the controversy otherwise, the Americans seriously regarded the Spanish friars as legal owners of the land they claimed, even before any land investigations had begun. As Usha Mahanjani notes: "The United States was not interested in the rights and wrongs of the friar question."


11 Elwell Otis, a member of the First Philippine Commission, also advised against the return of the friars to their parishes. See LeRoy, op. cit., pp. 298-99, 298 (footnote).


13 Elliott, op. cit., p. 44.

14 Military government under the leadership of Military Governor Adna R. Chaffee, continued to exist for another year in the unacified Christian provinces. On July 4, 1902, the entire Christian portion of the Philippines was proclaimed at peace. The title "Civil Governor" was changed
to "Governor-General" on February 6, 1905.

15 Mahajani, op. cit., p. 284.


17 Elliott records the following testimony made at a hearing in Manila: "The real reason why we conveyed our property to another party was to have nothing further to do with the administration of these agricultural lands, and to remove that complaint which was made against us, that the friars owned all the lands, and were making all the money."

18 Precisely 167,127 hectares. Charles Burke Elliott reports that the government had acquired title to 386,120 acres of agricultural land. Elliott, op. cit., p. 49. The approximate price paid per acre was $18.00. One hectare is equal to 2.5 acres.

19 William Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, v. 2, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1928, p. 503, quoting from "Excerpts from Ex-President Taft's Address before the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, November 19, 1913."
20 By Act No. 1847.

21 Elliott, op. cit., pp. 55-57.

22 Elliott, op. cit., p. 57.

23 Gowing, op. cit., p. 217.


25 Gowing, op. cit., p. 218; Mahajani, op. cit., p. 286.


30 After unsuccessful attempts by Filipino clergy and laymen to come to an understanding with Spanish and American prelates on the Filipinization of curacies and all higher ecclesiastical posts; after an unsuccessful attempt by Filipino clergy to deal directly with Vatican on the matter, anti-friar sentiments became even more highly emotional and bitterly defiant. In January 1902 and again on May 8 of the
same year, Ilocano clergy met to discuss the secession of Filipino clergy from Rome and the establishment of an independent Filipino church. (The May 8 gathering became known as the Kullabeng Assembly.) Gregorio Aglipay was named by the priests to carry out their resolution. As it turned out though, the person who finally launched the radical strategy was a lawyer and journalist from Vigan named Isabelo de los Reyes. On August 3, 1902, he proclaimed the birth of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and its complete separation from Rome. Initial reaction to de los Reyes and his outrageous stand, by both clergy and laity, was very negative. Even Aglipay was skeptical about joining, let alone about his nomination, by de los Reyes, as Supreme Bishop of the new church. Nonetheless, by this point in time the idea of a national church was not at all an absurd alternative. The following month Aglipay decided to accept the leadership of the Filipino church, and began work on its structure and organization. On October 25-26, 1902, the Iglesia Filipina Independiente was officially inaugurated. In no time at all, what became known as Aglipayanism, spread like wildfire across the Islands, more influential in some parts (i.e. Luzon) and weaker in others (i.e. Visayas), until its membership grew to claim one quarter of the entire Filipino population. In 1904 there were approximately 1,500,000 Aglipayans out of a population
of 7 million. By 1906 the movement began to lose some of its membership back to the Roman Catholic Church and continued to decrease in numbers. Today 5% of Filipinos still adhere to the Philippine Independent Church. For a complete history see Pedro S. Achútegui and Miguel A. Bernad, Religious Revolution in the Philippines, vols. 1 & 2, 2nd edition, Ateneo de Manila, Manila, 1961. Also, see Chapter III Section II of this work, pp. 154-161.

CONCLUSION

We have seen how overwhelmingly powerful the Spanish missionaries were and became over the course of their reign in the Philippines. Throughout this thesis I have maintained that it was the dynamics of the union of church and state which empowered them. From the moment the missionaries arrived in the Islands they brought with them the certainty of their superiority in nationality and religion. The union of church and state reinforced this medieval conviction as it legitimized and sanctified the aims and fruits of its cross combination. As the King trustfully delegated civil tasks to the Spirit-fired men of God, he in turn was entrusted with the responsibility to promote and safeguard the Christian faith abroad. The Spanish government therefore, supported the religious mission and livelihood of the friars and at the same time depended upon their performance for temporal Hispanic successes.

Beside the emotional and monetary security which the union provided, other aspects of the alliance provoked and directed certain missionary responses which entrenched even further their sense of correctness and power. For example, the pervasively conflictual relationship between colonial
governor and archbishop in Manila re church and state
jurisdictions and goals; the confusion of divergent official
policy emanating independently from church or state sources
without true collaboration or consultation between the two;
the failure of civil colonial officials to promote,
diligently, religious ideals; the scarcity of civil
officials in the countryside to counterbalance and check
clerical activities; the preclusion of a role for secular
clergy motivated by state policy delegating jurisdictions to
the friars only, and thus paving the way for monopoly by the
religious orders; the ambiguous or non-existent response of
state officials to the recalcitrant and inflexible behavior
of friars as they ignored official church or state rules and
decrees, alone in their rural mission posts—all of these
are instances of weaknesses or restrictions posed by the
union (i.e. in an imbalanced or conflictual relationship),
which prompted clerical activity based on their own
interpretations and personal needs. Because the
missionaries were at all times so politically and
religiously expedient, church and state leaders tended
deliberately, to overlook clerical obstinacy and its
consequences, thus legitimizing all the more forcefully the
free direction of missionary convictions, decisions and
actions. Spanish friars became the intermediaries between
the native population and church-state officialdom. If they
could transform both their support and independence from the latter into an autonomously authoritative seat of power, then their relationship to Filipinos became even more exclusively or personally magisterial. This is precisely what happened in the Philippines.

On the other hand, if official church and state policy supported the goals of the missionaries, then the latter cooperated wholeheartedly and used the legislation to buttress their evangelical designs. For example, Filipino relocation or rural resettlement schemes; prejudicial attitudes toward the development of an indigenous clergy; the particular organization of local government and function of its native participants; Spanish language requirements for native town officeholders; draft labour and tribute schedules; and endless efforts to maintain status quo conditions in the Philippines—in all of these instances missionaries participated with state policy which worked naturally to their advantage.

Either way, Spanish friars derived their power from the support or shortcomings of the church-state union. When the Americans defeated the Spanish in 1898 and resumed sovereignty in the Islands shortly thereafter, they disassembled the official compact between church and state. All of a sudden, the American government refused to support Spanish missionaries any further than to guarantee them
their civil rights. It was only at that point where Spanish clergy were convinced that U.S. authorities would not patronize or sustain their participation in the same way that the Patronato had, that they resigned to leaving the Philippines altogether. Not a moment before this time would they surrender, and right up until then they felt completely powerful and important.

Despite the excesses of friary in the Philippines it is curious to note that anti-church or anti-religion sentiments remained minimal. Anti-clericalism, with the responsibility for abuse focused on the Spanish religious orders, never substantially dissuaded or undermined the religiousness of the masses, or the predominance of Roman Catholicism. It is true that at the turn of the century, amid malicious anti-friar wars and the American annexation of the Philippines, Roman Catholicism found itself in a considerably weakened position. Not any longer the official religion of the Philippines, and given a new place in society entirely removed from politics and business; against the new American policy of religious toleration and facing the breakdown of its internal organization, Roman Catholicism appeared dejected and defeated. But this sad picture did not last for long. Still supported by a majority of the Filipino population, the Church immediately responded to its faltering health—it thrust itself into
competition with nationalist schisms such as Aglipayanism, and with the new Protestant groups arriving in the Islands from America and Europe. With the friars gone and the role of the Roman Catholic church substantially altered by American religious policy, it was compelled to change its orientation, to revitalize and refurbish itself in both program and leadership. By 1915 the Church emerged from its previously unsteady situation with growing strength and vigour.

As the organization of the Roman Catholic church expanded during the American regime, more and more Filipino candidates were trained, ordained and chosen to fill clerical positions in parishes and in the upper echelons of its hierarchy. By 1936 a majority of curacies were under the charge of native priests; seven of the ten bishops across the Islands were Filipino; and in 1934 the first native to fill the highest ecclesiastical post, Archbishop of Manila, had been appointed. Thus, the denial of an indigenous clergy, a major irritant provoking the development of nationalist movements and schisms, was now removed.

With the arrival of the Americans, Christianity in the Philippines ceased to be entirely and directly of the Hispanic variety. It was no longer an indiscreet colonial tool of the most arrogant and militant form; it no longer
symbolized for Filipinos, Spanish rule, friary and tribute payments. Nonetheless, one can neither conclude that Roman Catholicism became any less important as an instrument of socio-political manipulation (especially at the local levels), or any more important as a system of theological belief. That set of Christian practices and symbols which Spanish friars had substituted for pagan traditions, and which continued to embody folk beliefs, remained unchanged. Generally speaking, sophisticated Christian concepts were still not internalized by the masses; the outward emotion and colour of Hispanic ritual and avid indulgence in religious ceremony or festivity, were perpetuated; a major focus on morality, receiving the sacraments, on the creeds and the catechism as essentials of the faith prerequisite for salvation, still prevailed. The masses continued to pray to the saints, to revere and submissively obey their parish priest, to embellish their homes with holy pictures, statuettes and other religious paraphernalia—in the superstitious tradition of their forefathers.

But even as many vestiges of a Hispanic Christianity prevailed, the religious situation in the Islands had fundamentally changed, and so therefore, had the visible depth of absorption or acceptance of the faith under its new direction and status. With the dichotomy of church and state, and the establishment of a secular educational
system, life in the Philippines became less religiously and more politically regimented. A Filipino was not compelled, under the threat of punishment by his politician-parish priest, to comply to the rigorous outward formality of the faith. Everyday existence became more secular, religious ritual and spirituality a more compartmentalized aspect of a person's life. This is not to say that the general dependence of the population on religion was significantly minimized, but rather, that the direct motivation behind this dependence had shifted somewhat. Compliance with the rules of the faith was not so much to avoid retribution by their colonialists, but in fear of the supernatural, or in anticipation of help for particular needs. The following account by Antonio Pigafetta as he records Magellan's appeal to the natives he encountered in 1521, clearly illustrates the classical missionary attitude on conversion to Christianity; precisely that attitude which no longer compelled Filipinos:

The captain-general told them that they should not become Christians for fear or to please us, but of their own free wills, and that he should not cause any displeasure to those who wished to live according to their own law, but that the Christians would be better regarded and treated than the others.

But with the new American policy on religion Filipinos were left free, at least theoretically, to decide, independently, the course and depth of their religious life. They were
left even freer than before, to interpret the significance of Christian truths for their own lives, and to accommodate these to folk beliefs or superstition. In this way, the downfall of friary actually promoted a greater possible internalization of the faith. Where friary undermined the Christian message of personal responsibility for one's decisions and actions by minutely regulating them both, under the ensuing regime this Christian freedom was ostensibly restored. Influenced by ideas such as democracy, equality and plurality, and in competition with other religious organizations striving to attract Filipino attentions, the Roman Catholic church became more responsive to social and personal needs, rather than dictative of the content of those needs. At the same time though, one cannot overestimate the tangible consequences of a shift emphasizing personal responsibility in moral and spiritual life, especially when the change was so abrupt, and considering the high dependency level of the population involved. The Church still wielded much influence over the daily activity and decisions of its adherents. It would take many more decades of development before Filipinos would respond to their new spiritual freedom, and before they would take the initiative to probe and explore the depths of their faith.

The final observation I would like to make regards the
relationship of friary to national social development. I defined "social development" as the building up of social tools or skills which promoted a deeper self-understanding, an ability to analyze and act upon one's situation (in this case the "national predicament"), in order to fundamentally change and improve it, in order to build a happier, freer, qualitatively better life.

In the Philippines friary played an absolutely key role in the social and political organization of rural life. Missionaries, as representatives of the Spanish Crown and Roman Catholic church, monopolized the educational system and local political structures in the Islands. In doing so they carefully regulated, as far as they could independently oversee, the information, rules, schedules, codes, conduct and participation of Filipinos in their parishes. Perpetually at the threat of punishment of seduction of reward, natives were indoctrinated into a lifestyle minutely prescribed by the tenets of Hispanic Catholicism, according to the local friar. The narrowly limited school curriculum combined with anti-intellectual methods of instruction; the saturation of town life with obligatory religious ritual; recourse to sensation with the intention to intimidate; the restriction of higher education to Spanish and wealthy Filipinos only; efforts to relocate natives from their scattered dwellings into larger, more
concentrated settlements; denial of the right of the masses to vote for their own elected town officials, or to involve themselves with decisions pertaining to their nation's destiny; the delegation of menial tasks to Filipinos holding offices of "prestige" in local governments; the aggressive opposition to the ordination of natives, and the low quality levels of instruction to those accepted into clerical studies—all of these examples illustrate efforts by missionaries to segregate Filipinos from Spaniards, from positions of power, and levels of education comparable to that of their colonialists. The friars calculated their moves specifically to maintain status quo power relations between them and their native subjects. Filipinos were never taught to think or initiate, to question or analyze; only to accept and obey. They grew thus to depend more on divine intercession than their own abilities and efforts. They came to trust more in the intelligence and wisdom of their Spanish missionary for the answers to life's mystery and mundane reality, than in their own capacity to reason and make decisions. It was the priest whom, directly linked to the one Almighty God, became their surrogate father-figure. Independent native thinkers were accused by the missionaries as subversive agents of the devil, a conviction which came to be widely shared by the native masses as they were convinced of the inherent evils of knowledge.
One might question the supposedly subservient disposition of Filipinos who fought relentlessly for national independence from Spanish and then American sovereigns. We must keep in mind though that widespread nationalist movements, demonstration, and wars, though physically fought by many, were fully understood by only a minority of natives. As Renato Constantino wrote, the quest for national freedom from colonial fetters required a universal liberation of consciousness:

It cannot be the work of a select group, even if this group regards itself as motivated by the best interests of the people. It needs the participation of the backbone of the nation. Our [Filipino] history presents us with numerous examples of militant participation of masses of men in struggle but with a limited consciousness of the dimensions of their objectives and of the reality they were striving to change.

If then, we are going to analyze the impact of friary on the average Filipino, we find that it promoted only passivity, servility, dependence and fear; hardly social skills or developmental tools. Far outlasting the presence of the Spanish missionaries in the Philippines, friary kept the vast majority of native minds deprived and captive, perpetuated the anti-progressive, colonial mentalities which Filipinos today still struggle to overcome.
NOTES - CONCLUSION


3 Ibid., p. 258.
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