ABSTRACT

THE SELEUCID WEAKNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HASMONEAN STATE

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The establishment of the Hasmonean state laid a cornerstone in Jewish history.

While examining the background of its establishment, we confronted major problems, caused both by our lack of sources and by those available to us, since they exposed a pro-Hasmonean bias. Therefore, we implemented a method whereby our sources were examined. This method enables us to dismiss the myth surrounding the establishment of the Hasmonean state as well as shedding some light on the way Judaea paved her way to independence. In order to determine the "Seleucid Weakness" that was brilliantly used by the Hasmoneans, we divided our study into two major parts:

In the first part we analyzed the nature of the "Seleucid Weakness" by examining the following three aspects which together formulate the concept of Weakness.

a. The Empire structure and its governing system.

b. Examination of internal struggles over the Crown.

c. A study of the influence of the major powers of Rome, Parthia and Egypt on the Seleucids.

In the second part, we examined the situation in Judaea, the affects of the "Seleucid Weakness" on Judaea and the way in which the Hasmoneans established their independence.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ............................................ pages

CHAPTER

I  The Sources ................................. 1

II  The Weakness of the Seleucids .......... 24
    The Structure of the Seleucid Empire and its
    governing system ....................... 26
    The Struggles, over the Crown .......... 39
    The Influence of Foreign Forces ...... 55
    Rome ...................................... 56
    Parthia .................................. 68
    Egypt ................................... 78

III The Hasmoneans' Ways of Benefiting from the 
   "Weakness of the Seleucids" .......... 94

CONCLUSION ...................................... 148

NOTES ........................................... 157

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................. 204
PREFACE

One of the basic problems encountered in writing this thesis concerns the availability and utilization of Sources. This is a key issue when researching the Second Temple period, especially in reference to the establishment of the Hasmonean state, which is the subject of this thesis. This period is not rich in Sources and those available to us must be used with caution. This thesis thus deals first with the methods of evaluating the particular sources in question, second, in placing the establishment of the Hasmonean state in the proper historical perspective. It is hoped that this study will expose the myths surrounding the Hasmonean state, as well as determine the extent of the Seleucid Weakness.

The examination of the Seleucid Empire is crucial to the study of the emergence of the Hasmonean state. Therefore, part of the study will examine the situation of the Empire, which will, in turn, help us understand the very nature of the "Seleucid Weakness". This weakness was well utilized by the Hasmoneans in bringing about the independence of Judaea.

I could not have undertaken the writing of this Thesis without Bevan's study of The House of Seleucus and Manachem Stern's The Documents on the History of the Hasmonean Revolt. Bezalel Bar Kochva's The Seleucid Army Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, shed new light on
the Seleucid military strength and helped to determine our
Source's bias as well as the nature of the "Seleucid Weak-
ness".
CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES

As mentioned in the preface, the major obstacle to the study of the Second Temple era is not only the relative scarcity of available sources, but their doubtful degree of credibility.

The books Maccabees I and II as well as Josephus' Jewish Antiquities XIII, XIV are essential to our study. Undoubtedly, because Hellenistic literature which idealized the remote past was the prevailing genre at the time, it helped to shape the nature of these Sources so that critical analysis is necessary if we are to establish their historical value. History in Hellenistic literature can often become ... "an instrument of propaganda, whether for an individual or a policy, or for the manifest destiny of a nation, or for inculcating some specific philosophical or theological ideal." This special "nature" of Hellenistic literature creates the need for caution when dealing with the Sources of that period. Their credibility and reliability will be determined through our method of study which will be described later. This study will attempt to answer the questions dealing with the origin of our sources and the reason for any possible distortion of events. We will attempt to expose the myths that have been built around
These events and distinguish between the actual facts and the author's biased presentation of these facts.

The manner in which our methodology was executed is best illustrated by an examination of I Maccabée's description of the Elasa battle and Josephus' description of the Hasmonean house. A central issue one must be concerned with while examining the validity of any source is the author's identity. Such clarification could help us determine the extent to which we can rely upon his accounts, as well as to the historical value that one can attribute to his testimony. The book of I Maccabees does not mention the writer's identity. Only through careful examination will the reader glean some information about the author's identity and personality.

It is generally agreed among Scholars that the book was originally written in Hebrew. This theory is supported by the author's detailed knowledge of the Geography and Topography of the Land of Israel. His detailed descriptions of roads and landmarks seem to indicate a first hand and personal experience of them. His knowledge of the international scene however, is far more shaky. For example, he considered Elymais as one of the cities in Persia, and not being familiar with the Sessions of the Senate, he described them as being held daily, while in fact they were held every month and just in Kalendae, Nones, Ides and Festes. In other instances, when international events are described, especially those
which took place outside of Judaea, our writer betrays his lack of knowledge as for example when describing Alexander dividing his kingdom. To be fair, however, it must be noted that it is possible that these common mistakes may have derived from ancient Hellenistic traditions which provide many different conflicting versions of Alexander's death. These different accounts within the Hellenistic and Jewish Historiography demonstrates the obscurity surrounding Alexander's death which might later have affected our author's retelling of the events.

Another discrepancy found in the Sources is the number of elephants participating in the battle of Magnesia. (190 B.C.E). While Livy's version counts fifty-four elephants, the author of I Maccabees describes the participation of a hundred and twenty, which is undoubtedly an exaggerated figure. Furthermore, our classical authors do not mention Antiochus falling into Rome's captivity during this battle, but state that he was able to escape.

In contrast to our author's imprecise description of the world outside Judaea and of international events, he demonstrates great understanding of the events taking place within the Seleucid kingdom during Simon's and Jonathan's leadership. Using dates according to the Seleucid Calendar, the author provides precise and detailed description in I Maccabees concerning events in Judaea at that time. These facts lead us to conclude, as most
historians do, that our author was a native Judean, with a
native knowledge and understanding of his region.

The dating of I Maccabees is crucial to a determina-
tion of its credibility. The writer shows much favor to
Rome and its regime, and attributes great importance to
the relationships between Rome and Judaea. It is commonly
agreed among Scholars that the book could not have been
written after 63 B.C.E., the time Jerusalem was conquered
by Pompeius. It is highly unlikely that so pro-Hasmonean
historian as our writer would show such favor to the
Romans when memories of Pompeius' regime were still fresh
in his mind.

The author's description of events in 143 B.C.E., "This
is the sepulcher which he made at Modin unto this day." gives us another indication of the date of the work. We
can not consider the statement simply a style of writing,
but rather we can assume that some years passed since the
building of the sepulcher which justified this remark.
The author clearly expresses some degree of satisfaction
that in spite of the prevailing situation, the Monument
remained until his day. The last two verses of the book
can also assist in the dating process

... the rest of the acts of John, and of
his wars, and of his valiant deeds which he
did, and of the building of the walls which
he built, and of his (other) deeds, behold
they are written in the Chronicles of his
high-priesthood, from the time that he was
made high-priest after his father.
We can hardly accept this as referring to some book which were available after John's death, as Schürer, Grimm and Kahana suggest.\(^{21}\) We can, however, accept Stern's assumption which explains these verses as referring to a court diary, which was a common item in every Royal Hellenistic Court.

This being the case, we can assume that our book was compiled between the end of John Hyrcanus' leadership and the beginning of his son's, Aristobolus. However, the writer's sympathy with the Roman regime gives us a hint of his displeasure with the establishment of the Royal Hasmonean house during Aristobolus' times, and his longing for the early days of the Hasmoneans. This hypothesis is validated when the author states at the end of the verse "... all are obedient to this one, and that there is neither envy nor emulation among them"\(^{22}\) clearly stressing his dissatisfaction with the situation during the period that he was writing I Maccabees, namely the period ending John's rule that marked the beginning of a severe crises.\(^{23}\) Intrigues and power struggles became the byword, between the brothers during Aristobolus' reign.\(^{24}\) Between the lines of the quote the author expresses his yearning for those times in which one strong and central leader of the Hasmonean house governed, and all obeyed him. Taking all the aforementioned points into consideration, we, therefore, suggest that the book was written between the end of John's regime and the beginning of Aristobolus'.

Although we do not have the original Hebrew version of
the book, there is no doubt that it was originally written in Hebrew. Origen, one of the Church fathers, was quoted by Eusebius, as counting the names of Biblical books with Greek names. Except these there are the Maccabees called the book of the house of the Hasmonaeans.

We can conclude, that during Origen's time, the book was still available in its original Hebrew version. Furthermore, Hieronymus from the fourth century C.E. described "The first book of Maccabees I have found to be Hebrew, the second is Greek, as can be proven from the very style." We can assume, therefore, that the book was originally written in Hebrew, especially in the places where the Greek translator erred, as in for example . The translator obviously made a mistake in the Hebrew form.

The book often uses traditional Biblical expressions such as "and came to pass"..., "and the rest of the acts of John" ..., "They come unto us in fulness of insolence and lawlessness ..." "... and the land of Judaea had rest two years" etc.

The Edomites as in the Bible are referred to as the Children of Esau and the Macedonians as Chittim. Mattias' will was written in a Biblical style filled with memories from the past. When describing the gathering of Judah's army in Mizpeh, the writer transfers the reader to the world of "Deuteronomy". All of these stylistic details clearly indicate that the book of I Maccabees was
written in Hebrew, and in Biblical style.\textsuperscript{34}

The translator had done well with the Hebrew version, and as a result the translation from Greek to Hebrew must be bound to the Greek version, in order to obtain the original Hebrew version. The translation was probably done before the first century C.E. because Josephus used it for his \textit{Antiquities}. As for the author's sources, we can accept Stern's argument that the author did not mention his sources because he wrote his book only a short time after the actual events took place.\textsuperscript{35} He was even an eyewitness to some of these, and his account of other events were based on the secondhand reports of people who had taken part in the occurrences.\textsuperscript{36}

It is possible that in the description of Simon's and Jonathan's period, the author used the official king's diary. The exact and detailed dates given, referring to the Seleucid Calendar, points to the possibility of foreign sources as well, which the author was able to assimilate to the Biblical style. Most 20th Century scholars agree that the documents \textit{I Maccabees} provide us with are authentic.\textsuperscript{37} Documents that the author could have taken from the Hasmoneans archives including letters exchanged between the Hasmoneans, Rome and Sparta, can be accepted as equally valid and authentic.

The book of \textit{I Maccabees} is of great historical value, not only for its account of Jewish History, but also for that of the Hellenistic world. Polybius' work is the
accepted source for the Hellenistic period until Antiochus Epiphanes' reign, simply because only his early books survived. For the period after Antiochus IV, we rely on later sources such as Livy, Appian, Justin, and Pompius Trogus, all of whom used Polybius. I Maccabees remains the only independent source that does not depend on Polybius, and gives us detailed and accurate information. 38

The importance of I Maccabees is not only for its Hellenistic historiography, but mainly for the insight it provides to the events taking place in Judaea during the first and second century B.C.E. I Maccabees' account helps us to clarify some of the obscurity which surrounds this era, and gives us a better understanding of the events which led to the establishment of the Hasmonean state. The detailed dates and organized chronology make the book fundamental to Jewish historiography. However, we must be cautious when we use it as our source because of its pro-Hasmonean bias. The author's patriotism, his devotion to the Hasmoneans, and his personal religious beliefs are made abundantly clear in his writing. Believing in God's intervention he states that . . . "there is no difference in the sight of heaven to save by many or by few: for victory in battle standeth not in the multitude of arm host, but strength is from heaven." 39 In the writer's view, then, God's intervention was not by means of spectacular miracles but by means of "natural" events. God's people would be aided through chosen individuals as during the Judges' time.
and the writer firmly believed the go-between selected to save Judaea from the Seleucid Dominion. To prove his point, the writer draws our attention to the fact that when people other than the Hasmoneans ruled, disaster followed in their wake, Joseph Ben Zacharia and Azaria initiations being cases in point. 40

Dividing the people into two distinct categories, the author presents the Hasmoneans' opponents in a negative light, 41 as wicked and deceiving, while the Hasmoneans naturally fall into the category of the righteous. This categorization clarifies any remaining doubt regarding the pro-Hasmonean stance of our author. His bias caused him to justify every Hasmonean act as for example, when he portrays Jonathan's fight against Tryphon as being held on moral grounds when he was clearly motivated by political interest. 42

Maccabees I is filled with the author's contempt for the "Hellinistic party" which he called "Bmai Bial" and for Antiochus IV who was called the "source of evil". The manner in which different people are described by the author seems to be determined, then, by their relationship to the Hasmonean cause. Therefore, our author describes Alexander Balas in a sympathetic manner. The entire book is in fact, basically a song of praise of the Hasmonean House and the author therefore, selects historical details carefully, conveniently forgetting to mention such facts as the internal opponents in the persons of Menelaus and
Jason. Figures such as Honi is are mentioned only casually in the letter to the Spartans. The book of *I Maccabees* in its extravagant praise the Hasmoneans and sets the ground for the legitimization of the transition of power and the high priesthood to the Hasmonean family.\(^{43}\) Other issues, being of less importance to the author, are ignored. This clearly prejudiced viewpoint of our author forces us to separate myth from reality and place within a proper perspective events taking place during that period of time.

A detailed examination of the battle of Elasa\(^ {44}\) will illustrate the way in which all our sources are and must be examined. The first scholar not to accept *I Maccabees* account of Judah's last battle and the numbers involved was Prof. M. Avi-yona.\(^ {45}\) In his study, Avi-yona rejects the stated number of Soldiers participating in Judah's last battle for the following reason. At the beginning of the battle, *I Maccabees* counts 6000 soldiers in addition to 3000 soldiers that were attributed to "the experienced in war".\(^ {46}\) Furthermore, in previous accounts describing the events after Lysias' retreat from Beth-Zur, the author describes Simon's expedition to Galilee as being accompanied by 3000 soldiers, while at the same time Judah went to the Gilead accompanied by 8000 soldiers. The rest of the Judaean army remained in Judaea, under the command of Joseph Ben Zacharia and Azaria, who were engaged in a battle near Jamania. This resulted in heavy casualties on the Judaean side specifically in 2000 deaths.\(^ {47}\) Relying
on Bar-Kochva's estimates that the number of casualties in any battlefield at that period did not exceed more than one fifth of the army especially under the geographic conditions in the given location, we can conclude that more than 10,000 soldiers were under Joseph Ben Zacharia's and Azaria's command. This leaves a total of more than 20,000 soldiers available under Judah's command in his last battle. Furthermore, it is hard to accept I Maccabees' version that an army of 800 soldiers would choose to fight on a plain against the Seleucid army which was especially competent in fighting in this area. This point becomes even more incredible when one realizes that the Judaean army headed by the brilliant commander, Judah, who knew quite well from previous experience the Seleucids' military powers. This fact supports Bur-Kochva's assumption that if Judah did not have equal forces, he probably would have avoided such a confrontation and would have chosen a different battlefield and different conditions offering him a better chance of vanquishing the Seleucid commander. Even if one assumes that Judah's intentions were to protect Jerusalem against the Seleucid attack, it is clear that the best way to have done so would be to close the gates of the city and disrupt the siege by using Judaean forces outside the city.

The author of first Maccabees describes this battle as a troublesome and difficult one, "... from morning until evening," in which a brilliant tactical move by Bacchides secured the Seleucid victory. This description
of the military situation, explains why we cannot accept the numbers given by I Maccabees. Although Bar Kochva's analysis of the Jewish army structure includes Phalanx and cavalry, I Maccabees ignores this structure of the Jewish forces for the same reason that it reduces the number of soldiers in the Jewish army. However, we can accept the numerical figures attributed to the Seleucid army as 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. These figures are validated by the reception Demetrius got in Babylonia as well as the advanced stages of the Jewish revolt after the victory over Nicanor. In addition, we must consider Bacchides' high rank in the Seleucid army and the type of mission that was given to him. Furthermore, the great forces under Judah's command invalidates any theory that Demetrius would risk the Seleucid prestige once more, in sending a small army unit to suppress the revolt. It is clear, then, that the situation at Elasa was not exactly as described by the authors of I and II Maccabees.

Our task, however, is to determine what motivated our author to distort the true make-up of Judah's army. The author of first Maccabees described the battle as an encounter between the few against the many. This description resulted from the writer's point of view concerning the Revolt. He believed in God's providence as acting directly behind the scenes and protecting those faithful to his laws. The Maccabees, being God's disciples, were certainly worthy of this heavenly intervention and protection. The same point of
view led to a negative description of the Hellenized Party.\textsuperscript{59}

The didactic tendency of the author made him describe Judah's forces as numbering only 800 soldiers. Had he given the correct number of soldiers that participated in this battle and provided us with more details concerning the army's structure and armament, he would have destroyed the image of the mercurial battle and would have undone the very myths surrounding the Hasmonean family that he wished to perpetuate. Moreover, a realistic description of the events would not only destroy the myths, but also raise some criticism and concern with the way Judah conducted this battle. His strong pro-Hasmonean bias dictated the author's exaggerated descriptions of ambushes and local attacks as being major confrontations,\textsuperscript{60} while simultaneously minimizing defeats.\textsuperscript{61}

We have clearly learned from our examination, that the writer's pro-Hasmonean stand affected his description. As a result, every event that could have damaged the Hasmonean's prestige, such as defeats on the battlefield, were minimized while local great victories were emphasized. The author wrote his book fifty years after the battle, at the end of John's days and the beginning of Aristobulus' reign, a time which should have been free of any fears of criticism about his book. We must also remember that in Judaea there was no tradition of historiographic criticism. Very few people were still alive who had witnessed the actual events and even less of a possibility that they would obtain the book.
Even if this would be the case, it is hard to believe that someone would try to expose the myth thus damaging the Hasmonean and his own glory.

We have argued that I Maccabees' pro-Hasmonean stand led to a slanted description of events, as in the case of the Elasa battle. However, despite the writer's prejudice and his inaccurate numerical figures, we are given a reliable and detailed description of the battle. A detailed picture of the geographic location and topographical structure of the arena in which the battle took place is given. In addition, the actual number of Selucid soldiers is stated from which we can deduce an impressive understanding of Judah's last battle.

In the final analysis, there is no doubt that the description of the battle and our ability to separate between illusion and reality place Judah's last battle in its proper perspective as well as helping us to understand the facts of the revolt which finally led to independence.

Antiquities by Joseph Ben Matityah is also of great importance to our study. Josephus, as a historian, is a bone of contention among scholars who argue the extent to which he can be relied upon. Therefore, a study of Josephus the man, may help us to determine the extent of his reliability as a source for the establishment of the Hasmonean State.

Josephus was born in Jerusalem in 37/8 C.E., while it was under Roman dominion. He belonged to the family of
Joarib and was related on his mother's side to the Hasmonean family. Josephus was able to validate his blood connection to these families through official documents. Nobility was of great importance to everyone during this period of time, and especially important to Josephus as it strengthened his position against critics such as Justus of Tiberias. When he was sixteen years old, Josephus is said to have inquired about the different sects within "Judaism". He even spent one year with the hermit Banus. Josephus states that he explored the three sects, and when he was nineteen he joined the Pharisees. There is little doubt that Josephus' autobiography, and his direct involvement in the historical events, affected his descriptions in the Jewish war and Life of Josephus. However, our study deals with the establishment of the Hasmonean state and therefore will focus on Antiquities.

Jewish Antiquities, the most extensive work by Josephus, relate the history of the people of Israel from biblical times to the war against Rome. Josephus took 20 years to complete this work, from 73-93 C.E. Scholars agree about the apologetic nature of this book, as well as its main objective of enlightening the Gentiles by familiarizing them with the History of the Jewish people.

In my history of our antiquities most excellent Epaphroditus, I have I think, made sufficiently clear to any who may peruse that work the extreme antiquity of our Jewish race, the purity of the original stock and the manner in which it established itself in the country in which we occupy today.
When Josephtus explains the motives for his work, he emphasizes the contribution of the Septuagint translation of the Bible in the enlightening of the Gentiles.\textsuperscript{67} Josephtus explains that the Gentiles' hatred of the Jewish people is a result of their ignorance of Jewish Laws and Customs,\textsuperscript{68} and he therefore aims to introduce them to Jewish history as the title, \textit{Jewish Antiquities}, clearly emphasizes.

The form and the title of the \textit{Jewish Antiquities} was largely influenced by Dionisus of Alicarnasos' work \textit{Romes histories} entitled \textit{Romes Antiquities} in twenty volumes.\textsuperscript{69} The use of the word "Antiquities" served the writers' purpose by emphasizing the Antiquity of the Jewish people. This was important in two respects, the first by giving the work respectability, and the second as challenging accusations of the relative youth of the Jewish people. Josephtus stressed "... our race goes back to a remote antiquity..."\textsuperscript{70}

In his first eleven books, Josephtus dealt with the Biblical period. He presents Judaism in an idealistic light. Josephtus' apologetic tendency in \textit{Antiquities} led him to be extremely selective, ignoring certain events which could have harmed the image of the Jewish people, in favour of other events which glorified them. For example, he ignores some central stories such as that of the golden calf. Our study, however, will focus on the Judaean revolt, and the emergence of the Hasmoncean state.\textsuperscript{71}

Josephtus wrote his \textit{Antiquities} long after the events he described actually took place and the circumstances
under which he wrote did not seem to affect his writing.72 Because of the great time lapse since the events in question, Josephus was forced to use secondary sources for his work, his main source being the book of first Maccabees. Although Josephus failed to mention that he used I Maccabees,73 it is nevertheless clear that he did so in the book concerning Judaea's struggle for independence. In some portions of Antiquities he even goes so far as to paraphrase I Maccabees. Therefore, in order to evaluate the credibility of Josephus, we will implement the same method we used previously in our examination of first Maccabees.74

For the period after Simon's leadership, Josephus used other Sources, one of which was Hellenistic. This becomes apparent through the study of the text as well as through Josephus, easy access to his source. His account gives us in great detail the names on the Gentile side,75 such as names of Greek leaders in the cities of Acre and Gaza. The writer evinces great expertise in the names of commanders in Latus' army, such as Philostophanes, the commanders of the Greek mercenaries. The detailed information given by the author about the Gentiles emphasizes his lack of comparable information regarding the Jewish army or details pertaining to the Jewish commanders serving under Jhon Hyrcanus and Yanai.76

The Hellenistic source Josephus used was not sympathetic to the Hasmonean house. Yanai's reign, as described by Josephus, can best illustrate this attitude. Yanai, during
whose reign the Hasmoneas reached a climax in territorial expansion, was portrayed by this source as a failure. He was defeated by Ptolemy Latirus, and later he was defeated in trans-Jordan in the battle in which he lost 10,000 soldiers as well as his wealth. Yanai was ambushed by Avedat, the Arab king, and barely escaped. He was also defeated by Demetrius, and all his mercenary soldiers died sacrificing their lives for him. Yanai's stronghold could not withstand the siege of Antiochus Dionisus. Furthermore, Yanai's victories were described only in the shadow of his defeats as illustrated in the description of his conquest of the fortified cities of Dion and Gares. The source describes this incident by focusing on the city's surrender without even the pretense of a fight thus damaging the glory of the victory. However, when the same source describes Gaza's surrender, we can clearly see how his anti-Hasmonean tendency affects his description. He praises the defeated and not the victors.

The Gazaeans, however, held their ground and did not yield either through lack of supplies or because of number of their slain ... for his brothers Lysimachus, who was envious of his prestige ... deliver the city to Alexander.

Such a description leaves us with little doubt as to the writer's intention. He deliberately did not describe the glory of the victor, but chose to dwell on the stubborn resistance of the defenders. Moreover, the source emphasizes that the city was betrayed to Alexander by a
traitor.

According to this description given by Josephus, we could consider Yanai's reign as a period of military decline and great territorial losses. However, a careful examination of events, particularly of Yanai's victory over Dionisius as described by Synaceius provides us with a different outlook on Yanai's reign. Furthermore, from the continuation of Josephus' own account, we learn that as a result of internal dispute within the Hasmonean house, John promised Aretas that he would return to him the territory and twelve cities which his father Alexander had taken from the Arabs. Our source somehow fails to mention this fact when he describes Yanai's reign. This same Hellenistic source caused Josephus to describe Hyncanus as voluntarily accompanying Sidete's expedition to the east rather than under force. He also portrays the Seleucid king in a sympathetic manner.

Josephus' Hellenistic sources for the description of the events taking place after Simon's death, were Nicollaus of Damascus and Estrabon. We might also mention Polybios whom Josephus used twice. For the description of John's period, Josephus used both Nicollaus and Estrabon. It is clear that an examination of Josephus' sources is essential in determining the degree to which we can rely upon them.

Nicollaus of Damascus was born in 64 B.C.E. in Damascus. Most historians assume that his father, Antipater, functioned as an official of the city. The members of Nicollaus family
were involved in Damascus' political and social affairs for generations. The position of his father in the city council seems to imply that he was not a Jew. Nicollaus' own stand as a Gentile was exposed when he advised Archelaus not to withdraw the promised autonomy to the Greek cities which once were included within Herod's kingdom, as well as when he refused to represent Archelaus' interests in this dispute before Augustus.

Nicollaus' talents secured his connections with important people of his time. He served as the teacher to Cleopatra and Antonius' children. After their fall, he joined Herod's court before 14 B.C.E. where he served as advisor to the king, as well as his personal ambassador on several missions. In 14 B.C.E. he joined Herod in his campaigns to Asia Minor where he defended before Agrippa the interests of the local Jewish Community, against the Greek cities' claims. In 12 B.C.E. after Herod's military expansion in Arabia caused a rift between the King and Rome, Nicollaus accompanied Herod there. Due to his success on these diplomatic missions, Nicollaus earned a great deal of status and prestige within Herod's Court, which naturally put him in a powerful position. This position become apparent when he later rejected the succession of Herod's oldest son while supporting Archelaus. His talent helped him to convince Augustus to confirm Herod's will.

Stern and others suggest that the rest of Nicollaus' life was spent in Rome, where he wrote *Historiae* consisting
of 144 books describing the History of ancient Eastern kingdoms. His histories progressively became more detailed as they reached the writer's own era. Some of his histories were published while he still served as Herod's advisor. Although he states that he gave a detailed account of Jewish insights in Asia Minor in his 123-4 Books, just a small portion of his histories survived in Athenaeus and Josephus' accounts. In *War* Nicollaus portrayed Herod and his father in a sympathetic manner and in *Antiquities* Josephus criticizes Nicollaus' Pro-Herodian bias. Despite his criticism, however, Josephus relied heavily on Nicollaus.

It is clear that Nicollaus' bias affected his description of the Hasmonean period. He did not express great sympathy for the three Hasmonean kings, Aristobolus and Yanai, Sliomzian. As illustrated previously when we analyzed Yanai's reign Nicollaus from his pro-Herodian perspective, described it as a period of decline. His anti-Hasmonean description were noticed by Josephus, for he criticized him saying that Nicollaus "... wrote to please him and to be of service to him, dwelling only on those things that redounded to his glory."90 Josephus, who considered himself a descendant of the Hasmonean family would have considered it unfitting to tell any falsehood about them and "... for this reason we relate their deeds with sincerity and fairness."91

Josephus does not manage in some instances to integrate his different sources. This, in fact, helps us to determine
Nicolaus' bias. He describes Aristobulus as a pathetic king, focusing on the tragedy which ended in the murder of Antigonus. He does not, however, provide us with any details concerning the political and military affairs of this period of time. While giving Estrabon's account for the same period, Josephus portrays Aristobulus in a positive manner.

This man was a kindly person and very seviceable to the Jews, for he acquired additional territory for them, and brought over to them a portion of the Iturean nation, whom he joined to them by the bond of circumcision.93

Estrabon gives us a description contradictory to that given by Nicolaus. His account describes the great achievement, taking place during Aristobulus' reign.

Estrabon of Amesia, the second Hellenistic source used by Josephus, was born in 64 B.C.E. to an aristocratic family94 and was renowned as an Historian and Geographer. His geographical histories included forty three books. Most of Estrabon's lost works are referred to in Josephus' writings and they seem mainly to concern Jewish affairs. Epiphanes' plundering of the Temple was the first instance in which Josephus used Estrabon. The murder of Antigonus, the Hasmonian, by Antonius in 37 B.C.E.95 is the last event that Josephus' account relied upon Estrabon.

As Josephus states, Estrabon used other sources in his writings such as Timagenes, Asinius, Pollio, Hypsicrates.96 Estrabon could not have used the histories of Nicolaus since they were written later on.97 In cases where identical description of the same event are given by both Estrabon and Nicolaus98 we can explain this seeming coincidence by the
use of independent sources or common sources. Another possibility, one however that cannot be proven, is that Nicollaus used Estrabon.

Estrabon's account is most valuable whenever contradictory version of the same event are described, as in the case of I Aristobolus. In these instances, Estrabon's version is most commonly accepted as the reliable one.

We can conclude by saying that Josephus' writing should be used as a source only with the greatest of caution. The reader must always consider Josephus' personality as well as his apologetic tendency on his Jewish Antiquities before accepting his account at face value. The same degree of caution should also be used when examining Josephus' own sources, especially when they refer to the Hasmonean history following Simon's era.

In order to determine our method of study, we set some criteria which helped us to establish the extent of reliability of I and II Maccabees as well as Josephus Books of Antiquities XIII XIV. Primary among these, was to explore any reason the sources might have to distort the course of events. In spite of the differing biases discovered, we attempted to deduce the actual facts and events which led to the Hasmonean independence.
CHAPTER II

THE WEAKNESS OF THE SELEUCIDS

Most historians considered the house of Seleucus and its history from the moment it misses the founder's hand is one of decline. It was a "sick man" from its birth.\(^1\) However, a review of events indicates that when we speak of Seleucid weakness, we mainly focus on the period following Antiochus IV's death. Was, in fact, that period of time different from the one previous to it? Can we accept Bevan's and other historians' general assumption and consider Seleucid history on the whole as one of decline? If so, in what way can we evaluate the age of recovery during the reigns of Antiochus III, Antiochus IV, and Antiochus Sidetes?\(^2\)

This chapter will attempt to analyze the main factors that caused the weakness of the Seleucid kingdom. Two essential characteristics must be examined; firstly, the structure and governing techniques of the Seleucid Empire and, secondly, the factor that eventually effected great changes in the Seleucid kingdom after Antiochus IV's death, the internal struggles over the Crown. A third factor, but not third, in its importance, was the international forces which carved their influence in the Mediterranean; the growing power of the Parthians in the East, and Rome's in the West, and finally the constant threat of the Ptolemaic house in the South.
It will be seen that every factor contributed to the weakness of the Seleucids, but the impact was more drastic when those factors were compounded. Their destructive power grew even stronger after Antiochus IV's death, which marked the end of the Seleucid Empire and the beginning of a whole new range of forces and events.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE AND ITS GOVERNING SYSTEM

In order to understand one of the most important factors that caused historians to consider the Seleucid kingdom as a weak one, it is necessary to examine the Empire's structure and its methods of control. An examination of this kind will provide us with answers to important questions such as: was the Seleucid weakness the result of the difficulties that every powerful nation faces, those of controlling vast areas and vastly different peoples? What were the weak points in the system of governments? How, if at all, did the Seleucids try to solve all these problems?

The Seleucid empire was a conglomerate of diverse nations and civilizations, roughly constituting three large complexes. The Eastern third, which included Persia, was highly civilized with its Appanages in the region of the Indus, Ganges on one side, Armenia and the foothills of the Caucasus on the other. The central portion, included the remnants of Babylonia and Assyria, Syria with its Carvan cities, Phoenicia, and Palestine. The third portion, Asia Minor, was made up of Greek cities on the coast, populated with a variety of people. The Eastern portion was predominantly Iranian, the central portion Semitic and the third diversified to the extent that categorization seems impossible.
The geographical stretch created several problems in the natural clefts and fissures of any Empire were fragile and liable to weaken at any loosening of the central authority. Northern Syria and the western provinces were cut off by the line of the Taurus. On the East, the desert separated Syria from the seats of Assyrian-Babylonian civilization, and beyond that the mountain wall of Zagrus fenced off Iran. To connect these geographically detached members to a single base, remained a problem.

The kingdom of Alexander and of his successors show a mingling of several distinct traditions which they did not entirely succeed in reconciling. We may distinguish among three of these: The oriental tradition, the forms and conceptions of which the new rulers of the East inherited from the Barbarian Empires before them; the Macedonian tradition, and finally the Hellenic tradition. In the political constitution of the realm, the oriental tradition was predominant, for kings were "absolute despots." The kingdom exhibited the same type of government that was common in the East; a sovereign at the head, and a hierarchy of officials, who derived all their authority from him. Seleucus Nicator had publicly adopted the principle of despotism "... What kings ordains is always right." Although Seleucid kings followed these barbarian traditions in punishing rebels, they distinguished themselves as Macedonians by avoiding the use of titles such as "king of kings" which have an oriental colour.
"Great king," was a title born only when there was some special reason to emphasize the oriental dominion, as in the cases of Antiochus III and Antiochus sidetes.

The Macedonian influence is seen in the "popular element" of the Seleucid realm, as illustrated by the following facts.Seleucus I, having resolved to make his son, Antiochus, king of the Eastern provinces, called together the Army, or as Plutarch puts it, an Assembly of all the people to give its approval. It is the Army which calls Antiochus from Babylonia to ascend the throne on the murder of Seleucus III. The guardians of the child Antiochus V are said to have been given to him by the people. After making himself king, Tryphon, sought the support of the soldiers.

In the political framework of the Seleucid empire, Oriental disposition and Macedonian popular kingship, were combined. The Hellenic tradition was opposed in principle to monarchy, and could therefore barely find a place in the constitution. Greek influence is visible mainly in the policy and spirit of administration, as when the Hellenic policy creates city states and deals favourably with the popular forms of ancestral constitution in the senior Greek cities.

The Seleucid Empire possessed three separate nerve centers; Ionia with its capital in Sarades, Northern Syria and Babylonia. All others were secondary, through Antioch, the north Syrian capital, was important in that
it was to reach the other centers. Seleucia, on the Tigris, was also a capital, ranking of less importance.

Tarn and Griffith suggest that the Seleucids saw their own Empire as embracing four categories of subjects: kings, dynasties, people, and cities. The Seleucids, like Alexander, retained the great Persian Satrapies with names usually ending in-λα, but in the land east of the Euphrates, they were divided into three sub-divisions: Satrapy, Eparchy, Hyparchy, corresponding to the threefold division in Egypt: Nome, Topos and Village. As the Seleucid Empire was much more extensive than that of Egypt, a Hyparchy might contain a considerable number of Villages, with an organization much looser than that of Ptolemaies. This threefold division in the two countries may have had a common source, but if so, what it was is unknown.

The Eparchy might well be an older form or, a Seleucid innovation. A typical Eparchy name ended in-νυν. It was the mass of-νυν names in Asia which enabled the Eparchy to be identified as the important Seleucid subdivision, when the Empire began to most disintegrate, the successor states, led by the Graeco-Bacterians and the Parthians, transformed all their Eparchies into Satrapies (primary division). Each Seleucid Eparchy had had its own organization with a governor who had his own staff and official residence. Some Eparchy governors as Hyspaosines of Mesene, were able to freely turn their Eparchies into independent kingdoms, with fresh-νυν subdivisions. At first the Eparchy system which was confined
to the Satrapies fast of the Euphrates, may have subsequently extended itself west of the river into Cappadocia Pontus and eventually northward into Armenia. Neither of them, however, were proper successor states. Armenia, by creating ornate names in the -να model, proved to copy an already established system line Xerxene, Cambysene, for new territorial divisions.14

Asia Minor, west of Halys and Syria are unique in that their organization system still remains obscure. Seleucus' four great cities in northern Syria were called Satrapies by Posidonius, and probably only referred to a new subdivision of the Seleucids.

Exactly when Seleucid rule fell apart, and whether or not the Seleucid created Satrapies of Southern Syria with Judaea (which were under Ptolemaic control until 200 B.C.E.) is doubt.16 Divisions called "merides" seem to be unknown elsewhere in Asia, excluding Greek India, which was under Saca rule; and Judaea during the time that it was a tributary priest state under Seleucid Suzerainty.17

In theory, the Seleucid kings were autocrats, but in actuality, their autocracy was limited by their obligation to respect the rights which they themselves had bestowed on the numerous cities and colonies they had founded. Little is known about the officials;18 of these divisions within the Seleucid Empire although Bevan19 and other historians considered the Satrapy as governed by Strategos. Bengston's study20 shows the possibility that each Satrapy contained
Both a Satrap and a Strategos. Over the Empire as a whole a minister for "political affairs" ruled, but he is mentioned only after Antiochus III. Another minister who was responsible for the revenue may have headed the Empire's financial administration, even though the name seems to place him as a subordinate. Bevan considered this office as "controller of the finance", but what office exactly corresponded to the title Oikonomos and Dioiketes is obscure. The same inscription gives the title of this district officer as Hyparchus. This word, in colloquial speech means any one who bears authority under someone else. It was also used as a translation of the Persian Satrap. In more official and formal language, however, Hyparchus meant the governor of these smaller districts, Hyparchies, into which the Satrapy was divided.

The Seleucid's imitated, though sparingly, Alexander's system of using Persians as provincial governors. There was a land register in each Hyparchy, giving the boundaries of villages and properties which assisted in the compilation of the registers of the Satrapy. From these Satraphal registers the central register which the king used was compiled. As each Eparchy had its own governor's seat, it might have had a land register also, acting as an intermediary between those of the hyparchies and the Satrapy; otherwise it is difficult to understand what happened later when the Eparchy became the Satrapy itself.

The Seleucid's Empire's chief concern was to ensure unity under its own dominion. This, however, seemed impossible,
as their government over vast territories and peoples was inefficient: In fact, the very foundation of the empire lacked strength and structure. This weakness stemmed from various sources and appeared as early as 312 B.C.E., when the Seleucid empire was established. Seleucus found himself governing an empire which constituted people of many cultures such as Parthians, Persians, Bactrians, Arabs, etc. This heterogenic population with cultures equally well developed as the Seleucid's, created the need for special attention. Some Seleucid kings hoped to unite the kingdom by pushing the Greek colonies to form one Hellenistic Empire. However, the lack of Greek settlers and their political rivalries hindered the actualization of this hope and despite all the Seleucid efforts to achieve that goal, their work was like the labour of Sisyphus.

Tarn and Griffith assume that the major obstacle to the unification of the Hellenistic Empire was the Asiatic willingness to accept its form from the Greek culture, but not its substance. The local inhabitants felt that their culture would outlast that of the Greeks and they were very loathe to make any change. The organized opposition, if it were to materialize, would have been motivated not by antipathy to the Hellinistic cause, but by the natural desire for independence and perhaps the ambition of rival forces to gain power. Hadas considered this to be primary to "Accept the largest possible measure of Hellenization and retain the greatest possible measure of loyalty to
The variety of people under the yoke of the Seleucid empire foresaw independence and protected their unique traditions, thus hindering the implementation of the Seleucid policy.

The vast geographical stretch of the Empire from India to the Mediterranean, did, in no way, alleviate the difficulties of control, especially during the era of fourth and second century B.C.E., when means of travel and communication were poor. In order to achieve the necessary control, small armed forces were posted at the extreme limits of the Empire in an attempt to halt any raids. Secure roads were needed if speedy departure of forces from the capital to all parts of the Empire was to be guaranteed. As Bar Kochva suggests, "the concentration of the largest forces in northern Syria was eminently reasonable, for they could be relatively quickly mobilized to every possible corner of the empire."^27

Because of manpower shortage and economic difficulties, as well as internal struggles over the Crown, there seemed to be no easy resolution in sight, especially after Antiochus IV's death. In addition to these hardships, the time that it took the expeditions to travel from the capital to the far borders created logistical difficulties. A strong central government was therefore not easily attained.\textsuperscript{28} This situation was aggravated when the central government, such as it was, began moving in order to enforce its policies elsewhere. Large sums of money were needed to finance such moves, especially the acquisition of supplies for the army.
The inability to keep up with such demands meant compromises on the part of the Seleucids. A study of Antiochus' III journey to enforce policies in the East, best illustrates the difficulties confronting the king. Antiochus III reached India eight years after setting out in 205/204 B.C.E. At the end of his campaign, he justifiably earned the title "Great" after repossessing territory lost by his father and grandfather. This, however, did in no way mean that the Eastern borders were completely secure. The doubt still remained as to whether his military expedition did in fact achieve its political goals. Antiochus III learnt that the only way to control the Satrapies was through compromise. This is seen in his signing of a peace agreement with Antabonus and promising his daughter to Demetrius, Euthydemus son. 29 Through such compromises, these people of the East gained special status, enabling them to pave the way for future disengagement from the Seleucid's control. Therefore, Bevan's conclusion

... that wherever the subordinate dynasties had been left in possession, at the first opportunity, the first shortening of the Suzerian's arm or the ability to do without him, those dynasties would forget their allegiance. The Seleucid rule only existed so long as the Great king was prepared to enforce it by fresh military expeditions from the seat of government. 30

Because of the geographical and topographical make up of the Seleucid Empire, control was not an easy task, and disintegration was certainly more possible. The first sign of this loss of control was the refusal to pay taxes. 31 The sudden lack of revenue from Satrapies created an economic
burden, and with an already weak political foundation the Seleucid Empire began to experience its own decline. According to Rostovtzeff analysis, the economic situation of the Seleucid empire before the death of Antiochus IV, was one of stability, regardless of the losses of Magnesia and other political misfortunes. Rostovtzeff reinforces his theory by stressing the Seleucid's great advantage through the control of the caravan routes and their reestablishment of control over the east, in addition to the annexation of Ptolemaic domain of Southern Syria and Palestine.

Rostovtzeff also reminds us of the great agricultural and industrial value found in Syria. He quotes Posidonius who described all people of Syria as living "in continuous fest." However, it is clear that the deterioration of the economic situation of the Seleucid Empire eventually took a turn for the worse. Losses in the East and even more harmful losses occurred in the West when the territory of Asia Minor which was rich in natural resources, fell into the hands of independent Anatolian kings. Central Asia minor and its valuable mineral wealth became the possession of Pergamum kings, while the mining districts of the South eastern Euxine coast was controlled by Mithradates of Pontus. Southern Caucasus, Armenia, and finally Asia Minor in its entirety were severed from the Seleucid empire with the treaty of Apamea. The Battle of Magnesia further aggravated the economic and political situation. This loss of revenue added to the already existing financial.
difficulties. The Seleucid's greatest failure, lay firstly in their insistence on maintaining a powerful international status, and secondly in their inability to come to grips with reality. The financial resources needed to run a large army, navy and administration added to the debts contributed to Rome resulted in a disastrous depletion of the Royal treasury. In addition, the Seleucid tended to use bribery and were very liberal in bestowing gifts as part of their foreign policies as well as Antiochus IV's public relations campaign in the Greek cities.

The Seleucid inability to come to grips with reality was illustrated in the games held in Daphne, an event which in no way eased the financial pressures on the Seleucid treasury and which necessitated the plundering of temples in the East, as a means of financing their policies.

As already noted, the military expeditions that were supposed to assure tax collection did not always succeed: as in the case of Antiochus III. This pressure led his successor, Antiochus IV, to search for new sources of income, especially under the continuing burden of the debt to Rome. These financial difficulties explain Antiochus IV's plundering of the Temple in Elymais, as well as Seleucus IV's and Antiochus IV's assault on the temple in Jerusalem. Therefore, Rostovzef's assumption pertaining to the sufficient wealth of Antiochus III, Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV and their ability to continue payments to Rome and distribute gifts throughout Greek cities while maintaining
a large army is unacceptable. Those acts of the plundering of Temples cannot be separated from the economic stresses exerted after magnesia as described by Maccabees II. Although military expeditions to the East sometimes ended in victory, security could never be absolutely guaranteed, and, on the contrary, this policy emphasized the difficulties facing the Seleucids when imposing their policy in the East.

Another element which contributed to the weakness of the Seleucid empire was its organizational system. The Seleucid Empire retained the division of Satrapies used by the former Achaean Empire, where each autonomous Satrapy was locally governed by a "Satrap". It was thought that this type of division would bring about loyalty and trust among the local satraps, but, in reality the loose ties between local and central government encouraged independence through revolt. Each Eparchy was well established, with its own staff and official residence, thus creating a situation favouring separation from the Seleucid Empire, rather than unity. The ensuing results were that governors such as Ayspaaoesines of Mesene were able to single-handedly transform their Eparchies into independent kingdoms with fresh subdivisions.

In other areas of the Empire, compromises seemed necessary when the Seleucids found many ancient Hellenistic towns, in Asia Minor including those built by Alexander in central Asia. This, in turn, caused the Seleucids to limit the power and control of these central government in the hope of ensuring these towns' support as allies. Finally, the
Temple states had the required organizational means to become independent through revolt when the best opportunity presented itself.

To summarize, the weakness of the Seleucid Empire, the lack of cohesion between the subdivisions and the central government were due to various factors. These loosely bound ties could be easily broken by any governor or priest and result in the formation of an independent state. Furthermore, the very foundations of the Seleucid Empire were unstable and any additional centrifugal forces would surely bring about the disintegration of the Seleucid Empire.
THE STRUGGLES OVER THE CROWN

When studying the factors involved in the decline of the Seleucid Empire, one must realize that in addition to its poor structure and administration, the struggles and rivalries over the crown played an essential role in its downfall.

After the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, the weakness became more apparent when the inner structure and administration were further jeopardized by continuous jostling for the crown. Up until the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, seven different kings ruled in the Seleucid house between the years 306-176 B.C.E. When one considers that Seleucus Soter stayed in power for only three years, it becomes apparent that each king from The House of Seleucus held on to the crown for at least eleven years.\(^1\) In addition, we know that Seleucus Nicator and Antiochus the Great, reigned for 25 to 30 years, a period that was considered climatic for the Seleucids. Until the crowning of Antiochus Epiphanes, relative equilibrium reigned, but the empire was not entirely free of power struggles. However, this did not upset the Seleucid Kingdom. The struggles over the crown became aggravated after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes when six kings were crowned in swift succession in the short period of twenty-six years.\(^2\) The crown passed from one hand to the next\(^3\) which emphasized the lack of stability in the
monarchy. This lack of stability is clearly illustrated in periods during which the kingdom was divided between two kings. These facts imply weakness rather than permanence and stresses the cruelties and treachery that the would-be kings had to show in attaining the Crown.

Regarding the turning of events in the Seleucid house, between the death of Antiochus Epiphanes and the crowning of Antiochus Sidetes, two major questions arise: were the conflicts for the throne only personal rivalries? and what was their impact on the Seleucid empire?

With the death of Antiochus IV, Antiochus V Eupator, his son, inherited the right to rule at the early age of nine. In reality, it was his guardian who actually took command until the young king reached maturity. After the death of Antiochus IV, however, yet another guardian of the king, Philip, hastened to return to the Capital in order to establish his position. At the same time, Lysias, who was the guardian of Antiochus V while Antiochus IV campaigned in the East was given the authority and duty by Antiochus IV to settle the situation in Judaea. When,

... Lysias heard that Philip, whom Antiochus, the king,—while he was yet alive—appointed to raise up his son, Antiochus, that he might be king, had returned from Persia and Media, and with him the forces that went with the king, and that he was seeking to take into him the government and he made haste and gave consent to depart. . . .

When examining this, it becomes clear to what extent private interests damaged the overall situation of the Seleucid kingdom. From this
it becomes apparent how personal motives weakened the state of affairs in the Seleucid Monarchy. By taking the forces who were supposed to be campaigning in Asia Minor and the East with him, Philip endangered the Seleucid established footholds in the above mentioned areas.

It should have been clear to Philip, from the experience of Antiochus III, that a situation of this nature would be exploited by the Parthians, Bactrians and others who would nibble at the Eastern borders upon hearing of the withdrawal. When news reached Lysias' quarters of Philip's return to the Capital, he too hastened there leaving the execution of his policies uncompleted.

When the siege of Jerusalem was at its final stages and surrender was only a question of time, Lysias returned as head of the army with Antiochus V at his side. After a somewhat hasty compromise was established, Lysias and Antiochus returned only to secure their own crown. In a confrontation between Lysias and Philip, the latter met his death. News of this event reached Rome in 164 B.C.E. where Demetrius I waited. All Demetrius I's requests concerning his claims to the throne were rejected by the Roman Senate. Demetrius I, twenty-three years of age at the time, was not left without hope; for with the help of Polybius and Menyllus the ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor, he managed to escape by sea reaching the shores of Tripolis in Syria. These steps were taken after Demetrius I's friend, Diodorus, informed him of the growing
animosity among the people towards the leadership of Lysias. It became clear upon Demetrius I's arrival in Tripolis, that Diodorus' report of the hostile unsupportative attitude of the people towards Lysias was not exaggerated. Demetrius was welcomed by the people with a declaration of their solidarity... "when he had formed the purpose of entering into the house of the kingdom... that the soldiery laid hands on Antiochus and Lysias, to bring them unto him... he said 'show me not their faces.' And the soldiery slew them."^{12}

Demetrius' peaceful and successful foray into the circle of power did not last long. His rigid policies were ill-favoured by Rome and Pergamum, Egypt and other neighbouring kingdoms. Moreover, the attempted conquest of Cyprus in 154 B.C.E.^{13} and support given to one of the opponents in the struggle over the crown in Cappadocia Orophernes, proved to be to Demetrius I's disadvantage and resulted in an unexpected end to his reign.^{14} With the combined support of Eumenes, Egypt, Rome and Pergamum, a new rival for the throne was created in 159 B.C.E., namely, Alexander Balas.^{15} Demetrius was pressured by foreign powers and was further threatened by his own people who called for his removal, preferring Alexander.^{16} At the same time, his opponent got Rome's recognition and support.^{17} Demetrius' ambitious policy resulted in a coalition of three neighbouring kings, Attalus of Pergamum, Ariarathes of Cappadocia and Ptolemy Philometor, and as Justin records
... "Alexander was girt with the might of all the nearer east."

Strong battle between Demetrius and Alexander took place until the year...

one hundred and sixtieth year. Alexander Epiphanes, the son of Antiochus, went up and took possession of Ptolemais, and they received him, and he reigned there. And when king Demetrius heard, he gathered together exceeding great forces, and went forth to meet him in the battle.

Josephus adds and describes that the city was captured as a result of... "treason of the soldiers within, for they were hostile to Demetrius because of his arrogance and unapproachableness." Jewish sources fail to mention the intermingling of foreign powers, but Justin's and Appian's accounts clearly imply that the kings played an essential role in the removal of Demetrius.

In the year 150 B.C.E., Demetrius I died on the battlefield. That date, the year 162 in the Seleucid calendar, was marked by an issue of coins stamped with the name "Balas". Although Demetrius I held power for twelve years, as early as in 159 B.C.E. he had been beset by the opposition of Alexander Balas who would prove to be a constant and finally a fatal threat.

The newly crowned king did not enjoy a long-lived stay in power. His government saw a period of corruption and decadence led by Ammonius, a dominant figure in his court. In addition, the rule over Antiochia was handed to Hierax and Diodotus.

According to Athenaeus, their monarchy experienced much corruption, a state of affairs
that could not last long. Within the three years of his reign, Alexander lost Syrian popular support, as a result of the enforcement of rigid policies, and a new leader was demanded.

This set the scene for the accession of Demetrius II in 147 B.C.E. With the support and aid of Philometor, he gained control over Antioch even though the people did not welcome him, for the memories of his father were still fresh in their minds and hearts. Demetrius, nevertheless, entered the capital with Philometor by his side and was recognized as the Seleucid king. Another supporter was found for Demetrius II, namely Apollonius, the commander of the army responsible of Coele Syria.

In a clash between the forces of Philometor and Alexander, the latter fell, resulting in the crowning of Demetrius II. Clearly, any king in need of direct and massive intervention by Philometor in order to secure the throne and one who had to be forced by Ptolemy to take the crown was a ruler who was highly unpopular with the people. The cruelty of the mercenaries in imposing Demetrius II's reign increased the hatred of the people towards the king, and their acts of cruelty improved neither the mercenaries' relationship with the people, nor the king's popularity. This unstable situation finally exploded in a revolt in Antioch which created an era of terrorism. The captured were executed and their belongings were confiscated by the crown. With the help of Jonathan's forces this revolt was suppressed, as described by the author of
I Maccabean.28 We can also assume that others were taking part in the suppression of the revolt. "Many Antiochenes, in fear and hatred, fled the city and wandered all about Syria, biding their time to attack the king."29 An opportunity to overthrow Demetrius arose soon after Tryphon, (also known as Diodotus) one of the two rulers of Antioch during the era of Alexander Balas, used the atmosphere of resentment and uncooperativeness to his advantage.

Tryphon, a citizen of Apamea which was the military nucleus and arsenal of the Empire30 approached Malchus, the Arab who had raised the son of Alexander, Antiochus. In spite of the fact that Malchus suspected Tryphon's intentions, he agreed to turn Antiochus over to Tryphon after being given assurances that Antiochus was to be the next Seleucid king.31 Tryphon turned to the desert where Arab tribes such as Jamlik could send aid quickly from their bases. Immediately following this move, a great portion of Larissa's horsemen joined Tryphon's camp. Now Tryphon was ready to confront Demetrius II.

The battle between Demetrius II and Tryphon ended in Demetrius II's defeat and Tryphon's acquisition of Apamea with its royal arsenal and elephants of war.32 Tryphon was prepared to ascend the throne in Antioch and the people were ready and willing to acknowledge both Tryphon and Antiochus as victorious.33 Unable to entirely unseat Demetrius II from his throne, Tryphon was forced to share the crown of the Seleucid Empire. It seems as though Tryphon
concentrated his control from Apamea to Antiochus, while Demetrius controlled the Syrian coast from Seleucia to the Lyban. Coinage dating from that period seems to confirm that Demetrius' control was over Tyre and Zidon. In Babylonia, there is definite evidence that Demetrius was recognized as the king in 140 B.C.E.  

The struggle over the hegemony within the divided Seleucid kingdom progressively worsened. During that struggle, the boy king, Antiochus, was murdered by Tryphon, who, having realized that the Seleucid kings had lost their popular support among the population, thought it best and most opportune to crown himself and gain the support of the military.  

Demetrius II left for the East in order to resolve all Eastern Satrapies lost to former Seleucids through the expansion of the Parthians. Demetrius II probably had renewed hopes to regain the East. He... "crossed into Mesopotamia, wishing to occupy both that country and Babylonia, and, by taking possession of the upper Satrapies, to make these his base for an attempt to control the entire kingdom". Although Demetrius II seemed to have the upper hand against the Parthians, he was later defeated and fell captive. It was at this point in the city of Pamphylian that Antiochus Sidetes learnt of his brother's captivity. Wishing to wrench the crown from the hands of Tryphon and restore it to his family, Antiochus sent letters to the Syrian congregation informing them of his intention to repossess the throne and
asking for their support. According to his letters, recorded in the book of 2 Maccabees,\(^{39}\) he prematurely calls himself "the king".\(^{40}\) Nevertheless, the shore cities of Coele-Syria, adherents to Tryphon, rejected his proposals and closed the doors to him.\(^{41}\) With Cleopatra's aid, Seleucia received him.\(^{42}\)

Tryphon's prestige diminished, and as a result, he was expelled from upper Syria,\(^{43}\) and Phoenicia. Tryphon sought refuge in Dor while Antiochus Sidetes besieged his stronghold by land and sea. Tryphon escaped to Arthosia and Apamea\(^{44}\) where he had originally established his power.\(^{45}\) Ironically, it was there that he was humiliated by Antiochus.

It is clear that the short-lived reign of the Seleucid kings from 164 B.C.E. had great impact on the Seleucid affairs. The many kings of the Seleucid kingdom and their short reigns of one or two years prevented the establishment of an effective and stable administration. Limited and interrupted rule rendered the formation of any type of long-term policy, and the absence of central government resulted in inefficient and lenient control. Therefore, we can easily understand why the formation of expeditions outside the capital in order to enforce long-term policies were difficult to manage. Moreover, these journeys sometimes lasted eight years, as for example, the journey of Antiochus the Great. Journeys of this sort, which are intended to implement incorporated in a specific political policy, require
internal stability and a king secure enough of his power at home to spend his time and energies conducting foreign affairs and tending to all frontiers. This, however, was not the case in the Seleucid kingdom, where all the king's efforts were aimed at possessing and maintaining the crown.

Lysias and Antiochus V lost their advantageous military position in Judaea and returned to Antiochia only to face Philip, the current threat to the crown. Fear of losing the throne to him, rather than the welfare of the people, remained their chief concern. Between the lines, Josephus described Lysias' and Antiochus' true motivation for their retreat from Judaea. Josephus described the way in which the king and Lysias, on the one hand, convinced the army commanders to retreat from Jerusalem by emphasizing the long and difficult siege, in addition to the lack of supplies. On the other hand, Philipus' retreat to the capital goes without mention. This necessary tactic used by Lysias and Antiochus reaffirms our hypothesis that interests alone motivated this move. Because fear, instability, and lack of confidence were so strongly embedded in the minds of the kings, military manoeuvres to prevent the erosion of power and land against the nibbling process in the East could not be carried out. 46 Demetrius II Nicator was the only king of the six who reigned after the death of Epiphanês and the reign of Sidetes, who managed to penetrate eastward and "face" the Parthian threats. In effect, Demetrius Nicator's move, although surprising, seems to be motivated by internal
struggles and was the sole manner in which he could attain recognition, prestige and control of the whole kingdom.

Most kings attained the throne not through the people's support but rather because of their contempt and hostility for the reigning king. The situation became aggravated when Demetrius II was not only disliked by the people, but was imposed on the people by Ptolemy Philometor, who himself seemed to be better favoured. 49 The lack of constant support for any of the Seleucid kings led to foreign forces supporting new candidates in order to threaten the presiding king. One of the most important factors responsible for the lack of stability in the Seleucid Empire and the creation of a "political vacuums" which permitted the practice of such tactics was the young age of the kings. As we have already seen, at the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, his son was crowned at the tender age of nine. This fact helps to explain the reasoning behind the Senate's decision to keep Demetrius, the elder, in Rome. 50 Philip was appointed "regent of his kingdom, and giving him his diadem and robe and seal-ring, ordered him to take these and give them to his son, Antiochus. . . ." 51

After informing the people of Antiochus IV's death, Lysias, the guardian of Antiochus' son, appointed the son king and called him Eupator. 52 It is clear that Antiochus Eupator was used merely as a political card for the two commanders enabling them to establish powerful positions in the kingdom. In that struggle, Philip was defeated. The
dominant characteristic of this period to come was the phenomenon of a governing court gang which often resorted to murder to achieve their ends. Both the king and his affairs were manipulated by Lysias and the "court gang".

Demetrius I who ascended the throne in 162 B.C.E. proved to be an exception in his lengthy stay in power and his mature age: he was twenty-three at his crowning, an advantage which helped him to retain power. His mature attitude and personal experiences enabled Demetrius I to act independently of the court gang's intervention. When Demetrius I disposed of his opponents at home, Antiochus and Lysias, he felt secure enough to turn to and establish foreign policy. In spite of Rome's cold attitude towards him, he carried out his campaigns against Timarchus who had just returned from Rome with a letter of alliance. Demetrius, while campaigning in the East was welcomed in Babylonia and was given the name "Soter", in 160 B.C.E. Aware of Judaea's significance, Demetrius I did not fail to secure his political ambitions by sending both his commanders, Nicander and Baccides, to Judaea in 161 B.C.E. His dynamic policy resulted in a direct involvement in Cyprus in 154 B.C.E., which was then considered under Ptolemaic protection, and his move, therefore, constituted interference in the internal affairs of the Ptolemaic house. Demetrius I is also accredited for his intervention in the struggle over the crown of the Cappadocian House. This energetic and enterprising form of policy was directly linked to Demetrius I's maturity, both
in age and thinking, and led to a mature and experienced performance.

Alexander Balas at Euamanes' urging and with his support became Demetrius I's opponent at the young age of fourteen. (159 B.C.E.)

Euamanes sent the child to Seleucia under the supervision of Zenophanes so that when the time was ripe, he could be used. Although Balas succeeded in ascending the throne at the age of twenty-three years, his weak character did not permit him to function effectively as a ruler. His government became corrupt when the affairs of the kingdom were decided by Ammonius, his "prime minister", who actually ruled solely and independently. Rome's policy of non-intervention in Alexander's affairs emphasizes their recognition of Alexander's weak personality and political immaturity. This, in effect, substantiates Rome's contentions that Ammonius ruled over the court while the governmental affairs of Antioch were handed over to Hierax and Diocletus (Tryphon). It is clear, however, that a king such as Balas could not enforce his policies along the Eastern borders.

In 147/148 B.C.E., Demetrius II was probably not older than fourteen. Demetrius was able to return to his fatherland with military help from Crete, commanded by Lasthenes, but remained a mere puppet in Philometor's hands. Moreover, Demetrius was still dependent upon Lasthenes, his military commander. His power was limited within the walls of the capital and could not extend beyond. Instability and general
chaos characterize his stay in power. Bevan's assumption that Lasthenes' rule predominated the kingdom's policies is, therefore, valid. Only in 140 B.C.E. when Demetrius reached the age of twenty did he journey to the East, leaving Queen Cleopatra under Aeschrion's supervision in Seleucia. The motive behind this journey was to gain prestige, which in turn would reinforce military power and recruit additional outside forces and allied contingents. This proved to be an advantageous time for Demetrius to leave Cleopatra, for Tryphon was the assassin of her son and the enemy of her husband. Demetrius, therefore, did not fear for his crown at home. Nevertheless, Demetrius' journey ended with his captivity by the Parthians.

Tryphon turned against Demetrius II with the same tactics that had aided Demetrius II to ascend the throne. Tryphon convinced Malchus to hand Antiochus (who was just a child at the time), over to him, in order to throne him. While the power struggle between Tryphon and Demetrius II was taking place, Antiochus VI was murdered. Until that time, Antiochus VI was merely a puppet in the hands of the ambitious Tryphon, who, without hesitation, had him murdered upon discovering the loss of Macedonian popular support for the Seleucid House. This set the scene for Tryphon's ascension to the throne.

Sidetes' reign marks a turning point in the history of kings who reigned during that era and within our context, by his coronation at the age of twenty. His maturity is
illustrated by the independent manner in which he reigned and by the length of his stay in power. As we have seen till now, Antiochus Euæpator was just a child at the time of his crowning and Alexander Balas was but fourteen years old when he was set against Demetrius I as his rival. So too was the nature of the crowning of Antiochus VI and Demetrius II.

Four out of the six kings who were crowned between 164-138 B.C.E. were extremely young at the time of their ascension. The ensuing lack of stability in the Seleucid Empire, and the young king's inability to cope with the complexities of the Empire is directly associated with their youth, (and inexperience ) and which, in turn, resulted in brief reigns, with behind the scene manipulators governing state affairs while the kings became mere figure-heads.\(^{67}\)

This state of affairs left an open door to anyone interested in weakening the Seleucid kingdom. Therefore, the use of a rival became an essential political weapon during this era. This constant fear, added to the instability at home, explains why so few Seleucid kings confronted the dangers in the East, even though their borders were being threatened. Even though some short expeditions were carried out in Judæa, often the king's crown was endangered during these brief departures.

The necessity to stay in the capital was due to the lack of security within, and such atmosphere was understood by the people of the East to be a sign of weakness and acted
as a catalyst in the erosion of the Empire's Eastern
borders. This resulted in the creation of massive inde-
pendent states and the establishment of Parthian hegemony
in the East. 68

One of the most significant factors marking the de-
cline of the Seleucid Empire is the reign of one sole king,
namely Tryphon, a phenomenon without precedent in the
history of the Seleucid dynasty. Tryphon, a man behind the
scenes, (not a member of the Royal family), did not hesi-
tate to overthrow the legitimate king, Antiochus VI, in
order to crown himself. Bevan's analysis thus seems correct
when he states that Tryphon:

...believed that time was come when the house of
Seleucus might be set aside. It had—so he read
the times—lost its basis in popular will, the will
of "Macedonian" people of Syria, and that will can
now raise another to place which the degenerate
heirs of Seleucus had forfeited. 69

Weaknesses of this nature, along with internal power
struggles, created the vacuum needed to invite foreign in-
tervention, which in fact did happen.
THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES

In addition to the internal Seleucid weakness, we can notice a very important factor which marked a great change in the political arena during the second century B.C.E. New powers rose up in the West and the East. These forces were Rome and Parthia, in addition to Egypt, the constant threat to the Seleucid southern border. These three forces claimed a very important place in shaping the events during the second century B.C.E. and in the process of the Seleucid decline, mainly by reinforcing all the centrifugal elements within the Seleucid kingdom. The relationship between these powers and the Seleucids give us some indication on the Seleucid status during that period of time. However, one must ask oneself what was the influence of these three powers on the Seleucid kingdom, if at all? A close examination of the Seleucid kingdom's relationships with them will help us to put into proper perspective their influence.
ROME

The turning point in the relationship between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom was in their encounter at the fields of Magnesia. Antiochus III had lately been able, by a succession of brilliant victories in the East, to enlarge the Seleucid Empire almost to its former extent. He concluded an agreement with Egypt, and it seems that Rome had no grounds for interfering in the internal affairs of the Hellenistic states in Asia. For a time she stuck to the policy of non-interference. She was glad to leave Asia to Antiochus III and only insisted that he should not advance further West. However, the moderate attitude of Rome and Antiochus' conviction of his own power drove Antiochus into adopting bolder measures. Hannibal was now at his elbow promising the support of Carthage, in case of a war with Rome and an invasion of Italy. In Greece the Aetolian League was dissatisfied with the situation of affairs. In the spring of 192 B.C.E. Antiochus acted: his envoy told the Aetolians that the king was ready to join them in restoring Greek freedom, and in Flamininii's very presence, the Aetolians reached a decision to ask Antiochus to free Greece and to arbitrate between them and Rome. The king could thus play the same role of liberation in Greece as Rome had in the cities of Asia—not yet by open war but, by armed mediation. 1 In late October Antiochus arrived in Greece, hoping that if the Romans insisted on war the campaign might be
fought in Greece. By November, Flamininus had persuaded
the Achaens to declare war on Antiochus and the Aetolians.
When one of Antiochus' generals almost annihilated a small
detachment of Roman troops, he provided the Romans with
justification for declaring war. Antiochus suffered an ini-
tial set-back when he learned that Philip had decided to
give Rome active support. He thus reaped the harvest of his
disregard of the war kings of Hannibal who had clearly per-
ceived the need to win over or neutralize Philip. Now
Philip's support of the Roman's cause rendered an attack on
Italy less probable. The Romans could safely fling their
main strength into Greece. By April Acilus had wrested
Thessaly from Antiochus, and then faced him at Thermopylae.
In that battle Antiochus was defeated.

At Magnesia, the fate of the Seleucid army was decided.
The terms in which the defeat was translated included: A)
The Taurus to be the frontier of the Seleucid Empire and
the king's hand to be held off Europe. B) An indemnity
covering the total cost of the war, estimated at 15,000
Euboic talents, of which 500 were to be paid at once, 2500
when peace was ratified, and the remainder in twelve annual
instalments. C) A supplementary indemnity to Eumenes of
400 talents, besides the arrears of a debt for corn supplied
to the Seleucid government by the late king Attalus. D) The
delivery of twenty hostages, to be selected by Rome. E) The
extradition of Hannibal, Thoas and certain other obnoxious
persons. F) The regular supply to the Roman army of a fixed
amount of grain till the conclusion of peace. The news of the Seleucid defeat spread all over the ancient world and reached even Judaea.

We can notice from the conclusions of the agreement that Rome's first concern was the neutralizing of Greece in order to secure her Eastern frontiers. The maintenance of Greece as a neutral zone with her "independence" guaranteed by Rome alone was the cardinal point of Rome's policy during these years. Her policy toward more distant states followed the same pattern of guarding her security without involving herself in responsibility for the welfare of the states. Moreover, Rome's foreign policy concentrated in keeping the balance of power between the important states. Yet, Rome did not realize that her rôle in the international arena had been changed. It took Rome a long time to change her policy. A change from the outlook of a powerful state to that of a world power, and that may have come as a result of a gradual realization of her new position.

For the long run the defeat of Antiochus III by the Romans, the heavy contribution imposed on him and on his successors by the treaty of Apamea, and the loss of the Anatolian Satrapies created temporarily a difficult situation for Antiochus III and his immediate successors, especially at a time when they were engaged in ambitious and costly political and military enterprises. Furthermore, the Seleucid Empire lost a lot of her prestige at that battle which caused subordinated people to look for Rome's
friendship and intervention in cases of crises. Magnesia made such groups renounce the Seleucid supremacy. One more impact of the battle was the obligation of the Seleucid to provide Rome with hostages as requested. We notice that it was of great importance in the Roman attempt to obtain some control on the Seleucid house. The case of Demetrius Soter is a clear example.

The shadow of Rome since Magnesia reflected all the later encounters between Rome and the Seleucids. Antiochus IV had to convince the Roman delegation which visited Antioch in 173/172 B.C.E., that he was absolutely at the command of Rome. Meanwhile Rome was occupied in the war with Macedonia and Perseus. Antiochus IV's ambassador, Meleager, whom Antiochus IV sent to lay before the Senate evidence of the aggressive attitude of Egypt and to justify his own measures of defence, found that Rome at that moment was fully engaged elsewhere. Early in 169 B.C.E. another embassy of Antiochus IV was in Rome headed by Meleager and Heraclides. Its mission was to convince the Senate of Egyptian aggression, but until the Macedonian affair was decided, the Senate could not give a definite answer.

The Egyptians attacked first under the command of Eulaeus and Lenaeus. The battle ended with the victory of the Seleucids, and the way to Egypt lay open. The Syrian army poured into the Delta, and began the siege of Alexandria, even though Rome sent a special embassy to Antiochus IV under Titus Numiusius to make peace between Antiochus IV
and the Alexandrian court. They returned with firm words doubtless, but with nothing else.\textsuperscript{11}

Antiochus IV invaded Egypt the second time, but at that time Rome ended the battle of Pydna (June 168 B.C.E.) and the struggle with Perseus. When Antiochus IV had almost reached Alexandria, the Roman mission arrived, imposing on Antiochus the resolution of the Senate to evacuate Egypt. The ultimatum handed by Popilius to Antiochus forms one of the most frequently cited episodes in Roman history.\textsuperscript{12} Rome kept her ambassadors in Cyprus to make sure that Antiochus IV fulfilled the Senate's demands.\textsuperscript{13}

After Magnesia, Rome kept a close eye on the Seleucid affairs. As a part of that policy a Roman delegation took part in the festivities at Daphne.\textsuperscript{14} The Roman's delegation was led by Teberius Sempronius Gracchus. The delegation found it impossible to believe that Antiochus IV\textsuperscript{th} could be cherishing any serious designs.\textsuperscript{15} The Roman delegation's aim was to provide reassurance that nothing had changed in the status quo or balance of power in the East.

Upon the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, the young Antiochus Eupator (a boy of nine years old), became the king. The drastic policy of Antiochus IV was given up and the kingdom entered a period of inefita and abasement. This state of affairs was contemplated with extreme satisfaction at Rome, and there was no relaxing of the grasp which held the rightful heir to the Seleucid throne, Demetrius I, the son of Seleucus, who was a hostage in Rome.\textsuperscript{16} Rome took
advantage of the political situation in the Seleucid kingdom in which a boy was a king, and the real ruler was Lysias. Meanwhile, a mission was dispatched in 164 B.C.E. soon after the death of Antiochus IV, consisting of Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius and Lucius Aurelius to regulate the affairs of the kingdom, which meant (in other words), fulfilling the terms of Magnesia: destruction of newly formed fleet and the corps of elephants. The Romans estimated that their demand would be obeyed by the weak boy-king and his Apotropus. The Romans could always threaten the present Seleucid king by supporting the legal heir, Demetrius I. Even though Octavius' assassination caused some escalation in the relationship between Rome and the Seleucids, the Senate did not take any action against the Seleucids. However, the Seleucids sent immediate ambassadors to Rome to reassure the Senate that the court was entirely innocent of any part in the crime. The Senate was pleased with the political circumstances of the Seleucid kingdom after Antiochus IV's death, with a child heading the kingdom and with the real power being in the hands of the court. Such a political situation was favoured by Rome because in such a condition, there is no worry concerning any change in the balance of power. Therefore, it is understandable why they rejected Demetrius I's plea to retain his inheritance, and instead sent a mission to destroy the ships and corps of elephants.

Despite Roman will, Demetrius I escaped from Rome with
Polybius' and Menelaus' assistance and set upon the throne in 162 B.C.E. Although Rome could not prevent the escape of Demetrius I, it never gave up her guard in the east. As a result of that policy she again sent a delegation headed by T. Graebchus and two other colleagues to keep a close eye on the events. During Demetrius I's reign, Rome did everything she could politically to shake Demetrius I, such as her recognition of Timarchus as the king of Medes by the Senate, which graciously handed him a piece of paper announcing "As far as Rome was concerned, Timarchus was king". Later on, in 161 B.C.E. the Senate sent a letter of alliance to the Jews. Rome's position against Demetrius I caused Ariarthes, Demetrius I's cousin, the king of Cappadocia, to refuse the hand of Demetrius I's sister in order to win Rome's favour. The embassy, headed by T. Gracchus, was convinced by Demetrius that he would do everything to meet the wishes of Rome; although Gracchus' report was in favour of Demetrius, a factor which helped him finally to obtain Rome's recognition in 160 B.C.E., Demetrius did not win the Senate's confidence, which could not have confidence in anyone, but a puppet king. The Roman's attitude to the Seleucid kingdom can be easily illustrated by the Senate's answer to the delegation sent by Demetrius with 10,000 gold pieces and the slayer of Octavius replying... "he would meet with consideration if his conduct were satisfactory to the Senate". Rome also intervened in the quarrel that broke out in
the royal house of Cappadocia. In that dispute, Ariarathes found his crown was in danger, as a result of Demetrius I's provocation in supporting Orophernes as the heir to the crown. Demetrius I's stand caused Ariarathes V to carry his cry for Rome's intervention. As a result of that dispute when every party wished to gain Rome's support, delegations of the parties involved arrived in Rome. The Senate's decision concerning the dispute was that the two should divide the kingdom between themselves.25 Rome's function in this internal dispute must command our attention, not because of Rome's initiative but for the simple reason that all the factions involved, (including the Seleucid king), came for arbitration to Rome, or at least were very much concerned with Roman opinion. Once again it should be emphasized that Rome in 160 B.C.E. was considered by all the nations as a powerful state.26

As we mentioned before, Rome did not favour Demetrius I. This attitude characterized Rome's relationship with the Seleucids. Demetrius I's political isolation was partly due to his ambitious policy.27 This policy was observed by Rome with satisfaction; "Ariarathes, Cappadociae rex, consilio Demetrii regis Syriae et viribus pulsus regno a senatu restitutus est."28 However, when Rome realized that Alexander Balas was set upon as a claimant to the crown by the initiative of the neighbouring kings,29 she supported him. Rome gave Balas her support and a Senate decree, issued to the effect that the Senate had given him the authority to return to the
kingdom of his father. Rome, moreover, by her silent approval agreed with the Egyptian initiative in setting Alexander on the throne. This silent approval of Rome was necessary, because of Egypt's great concern with Rome's outlook. We can assume that Rome supported Balas due to his "weakness of character", as such a king could not be a threat to the balance of power. A king who was governed by his court could not be any danger to the status quo, for the same reason.

We can understand Rome's non-intervention policy when Demetrius II assumed the crown while he was only fourteen years old in 147/6 B.C.E. In spite of her lack of interference in the Seleucid affair, Rome kept a close eye over the Seleucid kingdom and at the same time used all political means to encourage every cause that would weaken the Seleucids. With this background, we can understand the renewals of the alliance with Judaea under Jonathan's leadership.

At that stage, Rome's relation towards the Seleucid kingdom could be evaluated by examining Tryphon wooing for Rome's recognition in his reign. Tryphon sent a golden figure of victory as a present to Rome. The Senate accepted the gift but it inscribed as donor not Tryphon, but the murdered boy king, Antichus VI. Meanwhile the Senate renewed the alliance with Judaea. That state in Seleucid-Rome's relationship exposes the great change in the status quo. The Seleucid king was treated with despise by Rome.

Roman policy of non-intervention during Sidetes' reign
could be caused by Roman occupation in Numantia as well as the result of a brilliant foreign policy carried out by Sidetes, in which the giving of bribes and gifts to influential magistrates had great effect.37

We have noticed that the relationship between Rome and the Seleucid Empire stood under the trauma of Magnesia. The heavy tribute imposed on the Seleucids created some financial difficulties which for some time forced them to provide revenues through means of violence.38 As in the cases of Antiochus IV and Seleucus V in Judaea, and later on Antiochus IV's raid on Nahaia in Elymais.39 The need for money drove the kingdom into increasing heavy expenses which were necessitated by such military enterprises. Another indirect effect was the damage to the image and the supremacy of the Seleucid caused by these attacks, and their failure. The hostages that the Seleucids were forced to give Rome provided the latter with a great political card which was used, as it was in Demetrius I's case.

While on the one hand, the Seleucid prestige declined, on the other hand, Rome gained prestige, partly by means of the overthrow of Antiochus III and the Macedonian kingdom. These facts maintained a hold upon the minds of men and as Bevan stated "The world is always ruled half by imagination."40 As the result of her supreme status, Rome had come to exercise the role of universal arbiter and regulator, giving her a commanding position for diplomatic intrigue, and without any overt intervention, she could play off one
potentate against another. We have noticed Rome functioning as arbiter in Egypt between the two brothers, between Antiochus IV and Egypt and later on in the Cappadocian royal house. But the most important fact that demonstrates Roman strength is provided us by a Seleucid king himself, Tryphon, when he asked for Rome's recognition. As a result of Roman strong position, the Senate used to trade upon the terror of the Roman name to issue decrees as in the case of Alexander Balas and Laodicea, and sent out commissions to arbitrate the affairs of the nations.

Rome was not ready yet to rule as world power. We have to consider that for many years Cato was one of Rome's leading statesmen and his strong opposition to eastern adventure is well known. Another reason held by historians in explaining Rome's lack of direct involvement is due to her weak position on the sea. During the period after 168 B.C.E., Rome maintained no fleet capable of operation in the Mediterranean waters. After Magnesia, the Romans let their fleet run down and had trouble sending transport in 171 B.C.E. This lack of naval strength in addition to the other reasons we have mentioned, is the key to understanding why the Senate had no intention of directly intervening in the Eastern affairs, although throughout the Hellenistic world numerous opportunities arose which Rome could have used as an excuse for direct and massive military intervention. Instead Rome preferred by diplomatic pressure to avoid decisive action and to keep all these precariously balanced power subservient
to her will. When the Seleucid kingdom seemed to collapse, the Romans availed themselves of the mistakes of others to augment and strengthen their own Empire under the guise of granting favours and benefiting those who commit the errors.47 Rome was mainly concerned with maintaining the status quo and every action that could damage it was considered very seriously by Rome.

Therefore, every Seleucid or Ptolemaic king should have had to consider Rome's power and interest in order not to come into direct clash with Rome in such a way as Antiochus III's did. However, there is no doubt that Roman strength and influence became a central factor in the events taking place in the Mediterranean after the battle of Magnesia and especially affected the fate of the Seleucid kingdom.
PARTHIA

While Rome became a world power in the West, in the East a new power was growing, an Empire with great influence on the political constellation in the second century B.C.E.: namely, Parthia.

By the middle of the third century B.C.E., the situation in the eastern Seleucid Satrapies was becoming tense. The north-eastern borders were constantly threatened by the danger of Nomadic invasion from central Asia. The situation was made all the more dangerous with the presence of the semi-Nomadic Iranian tribe of the Parni. When a leader of character, Arsaces, appeared in the tribe, the stage was set for the first act. The outbreak of civil war in the West in 245 B.C.E., which involved hostilities with Egypt gave the Satrap of Parthia, (probably Andragoras, by name), the opportunity to revolt. This defection was followed by that of Diodotus, governor of Bactria, probably in 230 B.C.E. Meanwhile, Arsaces and the Parni had been watching the events. The defeat of the reigning monarch, Seleucus II, by Celtic invaders at Ancyra about 238 B.C.E., opened the way for Arsaces to eject Andragoras and occupy the province of Parthia. An entire Seleucid Satrapy was now in Iranian hands.

The successor of Arsaces, his brother Tiridates, had time to organize the kingdom and build up his army, before the expected punitive expedition of Seleucus II's which did not take place until about 228 B.C.E. Tiridates was forced
to retreat north-eastward when confronted by Seleucus II into the distant steppes of the Apa/Saca (water Saca) tribes of central Asia. But Seleucus was recalled to Antioch to settle further domestic troubles, leaving the Parthians masters of their Satrapy. The fact that none of the early Parthian monarchs issued any coins of their own, but used Seleucid issues, would suggest that they all stood in an official relationship with the Seleucids. We do not have any information that can indicate any Parthian involvement in Molons' revolt.

After the death of Tiridates, Antiochus III considered it the proper time to restore the Seleucid control in the East. During his journey there, he advanced to Ecbatana. In 209 B.C.E. he continued eastward with a large army. Artabanus destroyed the wells and canals before Antiochus. The Seleucid forces reached Hecatompylos practically unopposed. Antiochus III was determined to advance into Hyrcania and moved forward to Tagae, near Damghan. Antiochus III had continued his progress into Ayrncania where he occupied Tambrax and the important center of Syrnix. The lack of sources cannot help us to determine Antiochus III's reasons for making peace with Artabanus, but he did, in fact, create such a treaty of alliance. Other information concerning Artabanus' reign is unavailable. We do know that his reign probably came to an end around 191 B.C.E.

Phreaputius, the succeeding monarch, ruled for fifteen years, but beyond this fact, our sources are silent.
left two sons Mithradates and Phraates. The elder, Phraates succeeded and reopened serious campaigning against the peoples who dwelt in the Elburze range, south of the Caspian sea. He deported the Mardians and settled them in Charax, near the Caspian gates. We can assume that the Parthians utilized the Seleucid defeat in Magnesia and Antiochus IV's inactivity to progress their interests. One by one, the provinces of Iran were lost by the Seleucids.

When Phraates died, he abdicated the throne to his brother Mithradates. It is commonly agreed among scholars that Mithradates ascended the throne around 171 B.C.E. Bacteria's warfare helped him in the invasion of Tapuria and Traxiana. However, the Parthian erosion in the eastern borders of the Seleucid kingdom became a serious threat to Antiochus IV. These events resulted in his hasty departure from Judaea. According to Antiochus IV, the situation of the East was of major importance and should be dealt with by the king himself. In 165 B.C.E., Antiochus crossed the Euphrates and marched into Armenia, where the king, Artaxias, was captured and forced to acknowledge the supremacy of Antiochus IV. Later Antiochus IV attacked Persepolis where the enraged populace drove him out. Perhaps Antiochus entered Elymais... "a city in Persia of surprising wealth,"... excited by these reports, he set out for Elymais to assault it... "his hopes were dashed; for they drove him off from the city, and went out against him in pursuit..." Antiochus was defeated and moved back to Gabae where
he finally died. 27

Antiochus IV's death gave Mithradates the opportunity for his excursion into Elymais, 28 and soon after he invaded Media. Following a long war in which he was victorious, he set Bacasis to rule over the new territory. 29 Media opened the gates to Mesopotamia for Parthian expansion. Mithradates' successful campaigns alarmed Demetrius Nicator, then in Babylonia. Demetrius gathered those men that he could secure 30 and marched to Media. Apparently, as Debovise suggested, the Parthians managed to outmanoeuvre him. In the meantime, Demetrius left orders to gather additional troops. 31 In the battle that took place, Demetrius was defeated by Mithradates. The latter entered the royal city of Seleucia late in June or early July 141 B.C.E. Before October of that year the Parthian king was acknowledged as far south as Uruk.

Mithradates then turned to Hyrana 32 where the second clash between him and Demetrius II took place. Demetrius II was tangled in the encounter as a result of the appeal for help coming from suppressed people. 33 As Demetrius II advanced in the East, large numbers flocked to his aid. We can hear of contingents from Bactria, Elymais and Persis. 34 Bevan's suggestion regarding Demetrius II's move explains this military journey coming as a result of Demetrius II's aim to gain glory and prestige by military victories as well as the search for spoils. 35 We might also consider that victories in the east could have strengthened Demetrius II's internal and military position and could secure his throne
at home and maybe help him to unite the Seleucid kingdom under his leadership. Although Demetrius II won several victories in some battles, he lost the war. He was defeated and became a prisoner in the Parthian's hands. Demetrius II was taken by the Parthians through all the cities under Parthian sway to teach the Greeks that they had to trust Parthia alone. Afterwards, Demetrius II was sent to Hyrcania to Mithradates and there he was treated in accordance with his rank, and was given Rhodogune, daughter of Mithradates, in marriage.

The Empire of Mithradates at the time of his death included Parthia proper, Hyrcania, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Elymais, Persis and districts in Tapuria and Traxiana.

Phraates, the second, came to the throne about 138/7 B.C.E. On the death of his father, he must have been very young, for his mother acted as regent. The way the Parthian treated Demetrius II while he was in captivity exposed their policy for the long run. The Parthians realized that Demetrius II could be used at any time as a carte blanche to Seleucid affairs by being supported by them as a claimant to the throne. Demetrius II, however, could always be used as a weapon to weaken the present Seleucid king, whenever the Parthians thought it necessary. The political importance that the Parthians saw in Demetrius II is apparent when his attempt to escape did not worsen his condition in "prison".

Meanwhile, in the Seleucid kingdom, Antiochus Sidetes, having disposed of Tryphon and defeated Hyrcanus, prepared
to secure his brother Demetrius II and so removed him as a political candidate to his throne. Antiochus VII set out in 130 B.C.E. with large forces. During his journey, Antiochus encountered much opposition and fought three battles before becoming the master of Babylonia. When the Parthians evacuated Babylonia and Enius, the Parthian Satrap found his death at the hands of the people of Seleucia. With the coming of winter Antiochus went into quarters in Media and the problems of housing and feeding the great army became difficult. In spring 129 B.C.E. messengers were sent to ask terms of peace from Antiochus VII, who named three conditions: first, the Arsacid kingdom must abandon everything outside Parthia; second, they must pay regular tribute, and third, they must deliver Demetrius II. Those demands had been refused by Phraates who then used his last political card, namely "Demetrius", who was released from captivity and escorted by the Parthian to the Seleucid capital.

When victory was complete Phraates regretted the release of Demetrius and ordered a body of cavalry to recapture him. Although this plan failed, there was no doubt who became the dominant kingdom in the East.

There is no doubt that the Parthians' appearance in the international arena in the east during the second century B.C.E. was of great affect and caused a change in the balance of power. During Mithradates I's reign from 171-138 B.C.E., the Parthian Empire controlled vast territories including
Parthia, Hyrcania, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Elymais, Persia and parts of Tapuria and Traxiana. It was the Seleucid kingdom that paid a heavy price for this expansion. The reduction of territory brought about a great loss of income taxes. It was Mithradates' talent that was responsible for causing Parthia to enjoy such status in 138 B.C.E. He is considered by most historians as the establisher of the Arsacid dynasty. Mithradates governed for 33 years, which gives us another indication of his stable regime in comparison to that of the Seleucid House, whose throne shifted six times during the same period. Although the constant growth of the Parthians' power became a threat to the Seleucid kingdom, only four Seleucid kings confronted that threat from the East. Antiochus III, Antiochus IV, Demetrius II and Antiochus Sidetes. Both Antiochus III and Antiochus VII utilized the transit periods in the Parthian dynasty. Moreover, the journeys to the East were quite crucial to the Seleucids; three of their kings died there, and the fourth one was imprisoned. Most military expeditions carried on by the Seleucids against the Parthians failed except Antiochus III's military success which ended with their alliance with Artabanus. This treaty established a recognition de facto in the existing power of the Parthian Satrapy. Antiochus III realized that the alliance was the best solution for maintaining some control over Parthia without losing the revenues.

The next military encounter between the two kingdoms took place during Antiochus IV's reign due to the constant
nibbling of the Parthians in the Eastern border. That intolerable irritation caused the quick Seleucid departure from Judaea to the East, where he met his death. The third encounter between the two took place during Demetrius II's reign. Demetrius II's expedition to the East, as we examined before, differed from those Antiochus III and IV. Although Demetrius II did not secure his crown at home, he nevertheless carried out an expedition against the Parthian army, so one can understand his determination to evoke the Macedonian and Greek elements in the territories possessed by the Parthians. In addition, Demetrius II sought prestige and strength through a military victory and a unification of the Seleucid kingdom under his leadership. However, the Seleucid army was defeated and Demetrius II fell into captivity. The capture of the Seleucid king by the Parthians symbolizes a dramatic shift in the status quo in the East. From then on, Parthia became a force that could not be ignored by the Seleucid Empire.

The fourth encounter between the two kingdoms took place during Antiochus Sidetes' reign, seeking to restore Seleucid prestige in the East as well as releasing his hostage brother. The most opportune time an expedition of this category was carried out was after the death of Mithradates. The battle between Sidetes and Praates ended with the great success for the first. While being in the position of power, Sidetes dictated harsh demands to Praates to which Praates could not agree. Instead, he used his last political card by initiating
the return of Demetrius II to the Seleucid capital, seeking retreat of Sidetes from Parthia. Praates' political wisdom, on the one hand, and Sidetes' failure to translate his military success into political achievements on the other hand, contributed to his defeat. In addition, logistical difficulties faced by Sidetes because of his lengthy stay helped Praates in defeating Antiochus's army. Moreover, both Demetrius' daughter and the son of Antiochus Seleucus fell into Parthians' hands. That encounter clarified who held the hegemony in the East.

We can summarize and say that after the encounter between Mitradeates and Demetrius II in 140 B.C.E., the hegemony in the East passed to the Parthians. However, the efforts of Sidetes to restore Seleucid supremacy were destroyed by Praates.

The Parthians' expansion, along with their growth of power, had a direct effect on the Seleucid status. They caused a chain of rebellions against the Seleucids in the East when people looked upon their assistance to pave their way to independence. These events dramatically reduced the Seleucid territories which were the main source of subject and allied contingents along with their economical value as sources of income. However, one must consider that the tributes of these people were an important part to the Royal Treasury as we notice

... When he (Antiochus IV) had distributed the soldiers' pay, he saw that his treasuries were failing and that there was a lack of money— for
not all the tribute had been paid because of up-
risings among the (subject) nations. . . .

It is clear that the sources of income were of great
importance and had great effect on the king's status.
Antiochus IV needed money to pay his forces in order to
carry through his expedition to the East. Demetrius II
thought . . . "if he should subdue the Parthians and ac-
quire a force of his own, he would make war on Tryphon and
drive him out of Syria." The Parthian expansion affected
another source of income which came from trade. The Parthian
expansion caused constant erosion in Seleucid domination
over the most important caravan routes connecting the Greco-
Italian world with Arabia, India and China, and especially
the silk route.

There is no doubt that the Parthians' dominion in the
East had a destructive effect on the Seleucid image as a
powerful kingdom. Moreover, only four kings were able to
confront the Parthian threat from the time of Antiochus the
Great until Sidetes' reign. The Seleucid inactivity in-
spired by Parthian provocation was translated to be a sign
of weakness in the people's eyes. Nevertheless, the four
encounters between the Seleucids and Parthians exposed the
"Seleucid Weakness". However, the defeats of Demetrius II
and Antiochus Sidetes marked a turning point in the status
quo in the Eastern arena. From then on, the Parthians be-
came the dominant power in the East.
If the nibbling of the Seleucid Empire from the West and the East came mainly from the growth of the two powerful nations, Rome and Parthia, we ought to consider another foreign factor in the Southern frontier which also did not constitute a secure border for the Seleucids.

The Egyptian kingdom watched carefully the events in the Seleucid kingdom and in some cases intervened in internal Seleucid affairs. That intervention symbolized, more than anything else, the decline of the Seleucid kingdom in the second century B.C.E.

The battle of Banias in 198 B.C.E.¹ can be considered as a turning point in the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Antiochus III regained the hegemony of the Seleucid house while defeating Scopas' army and broke the long Ptolemaic control over Judaea and parts of Coele-Syria which had been under Ptolemaic domain since 320 B.C.E.

At this time the ruler in Egypt was the young Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was only twelve years of age in October 197 B.C.E. Antiochus III, after the Banias' victory, had not made any attempt to invade Egypt. From our sources we cannot study when the state of war between the two houses was brought to an end, but we know that the daughter of Antiochus, Cleopatra, was betrothed to the young Ptolemy.² On the other hand, we also know that Antiochus considered Egypt to be so feeble under its present regime that he might seize the Ptolemaic overseas possessions, annexing the regions of Thrace and
Gallipoli. But in spite of Antiochus III's supreme strength, the Ptolemaic house had never given up their claims on Coele-Syria and Judaea. Polybius' version, in which Antiochus agreed to retrocede Coele-Syria as part of the dowry is doubtful, and cannot prove any Ptolemaic authority over those territories. The loss of that vast area brought about a serious diminution in the Egyptian revenues but with the exception of the economical value of Coele-Syria which is indisputable, the Ptolemaic house lost one of its main strategic areas, the bridge to Asia and the secure borders which gave Egypt the warning zone against any Seleucid invasion or any other attack coming from the East and North.

The death of Epiphanes was a severe blow to the country; a minor, Philometor, was a king. We can accept Bevan's suggestion that he was only sixteen when he married Cleopatra and that the court was directing the kingdom's affairs. In the court, two dominant leaders, Eulaeus and Leneus, directed the policy of the kingdom. As they had never acquiesced to the loss of Coele-Syria, they assembled the populace at Alexandria and promised to regain the lost provinces and even spoke of annexing the whole Seleucid Empire. This attitude led Egypt to an offensive which took place in 170/69 B.C.E. The regents, Euleus and Lenaes, marched out with an army to invade Coele-Syria. The battle between the two armies ended in a crushing defeat for the generals of Ptolemy. The news of the defeat forced the young king to flee to the sacred island of Samothrace, but he fell
nevertheless into Antiochus IV's hands. Antiochus IV later reached an agreement with the king and announced him as his "friend". Philometer later spoke of Antiochus as his "Socius". The Alexandrians accused Philometor of giving in. As a result, they set up a rival king, Philometor's younger brother, Ptolemy VII Euergetes, commonly called Physcon. Antiochus IV represented himself as the champion of the legitimate king against the usurping brother. Moreover, Antiochus IV fixed the seat of the rival government, for which Ptolemy Philometor was to serve as figure-head at Memphis. The reasons for Antiochus IV's departure from Egypt are disputed among historians. Otto claims that the cause was the Jewish revolt in Judaea. But we can accept Swain's assumption— that the reason for Antiochus IV's departure was his desire to get on with the great eastern adventure, which he had long been planning, but the excuse he gave is reported quite clearly and distinctly by Polybius. Antiochus IV undoubtedly had changed the balance of power. His strong position and great intervention in Egypt helped the Seleucid kingdom to recover its image as a powerful nation which caused Perseus to look for Seleucid's assistance against Rome. Antiochus IV's second invasion of Egypt took place in the spring of 168 B.C.E. He occupied Memphis, had himself crowned the king of Egypt and slowly advanced upon Alexandria until he was approached by the Roman Embassy which forced his withdrawal from Egypt.

The great change that took place in the Seleucid kingdom's position after the death of Antiochus IV is evident from the
following events: While Demetrius I sat on the Seleucid throne he proved that he was an ambitious king. Demetrius I's initiative alarmed Rome, as well as the neighbouring kings, including the king of Egypt, who was specially concerned with Demetrius I's designs upon the island of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{18}

As a result of Demetrius I's interference and ambitions, Eumenus, the king of Pergamum\textsuperscript{19} set up another claimant to the Seleucid throne in the name of Alexander Balas. The new claimant was approved by Rome and all other neighbouring kings. The active part in overthrowing Demetrius I was carried out by Ptolemy Philometor.\textsuperscript{20} Philometor, in order to reinforce Balas' position, granted Balas his own daughter, Cleopatra, for a wife. An act, which as Bevan suggests, derived for the same reason that her grandmother, the Seleucid Cleopatra had been married half a century before, to Ptolemy Epiphanes, in order to promote the Seleucid interest in Egypt. Now, Cleopatra was sent to the Seleucid court "... to confirm his (Ptolemy's) ascendancy over Syria."\textsuperscript{21}

The cycle had turned over since Antiochus IV was the Seleucid king whose throne had direct influence on the Ptolemaic throne, and who gave his daughter, Cleopatra, to the young Ptolemy in order to maintain and protect his interest in the Egyptian court. Now the Ptolemaic king found himself in the same position Antiochus IV held previously, and used the same methods in order to secure his interests in the Seleucid kingdom. With the marriage of his daughter to the Seleucid king Balas, he reasoned that he would manage to keep
his interests. This event can emphasize the great change in balance of power between the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic houses.

However, it cannot be looked upon as the result of the Egyptian strength, but as the result of the Seleucid decline during this period of time.

This great shift came to expression later on when Philometor entered Coele-Syria with a strong force, passing through Ashdod and Joffa to Ptolemais (Aco) in 148 B.C.E. It is difficult to say whether Philometor came in support of Alexander Balas or against him. At Ptolemais, there was an attempt to assassinate Philometor for which he declared Alexander was responsible. Alexander evaded Philometor's demand to give up Ammonius to be executed. That, as our sources describe, caused Philometor to support Demetrius II as a claimant to the throne by giving him Cleopatra, Balas' former wife as a wife. Demetrius II or rather the people who directed his action, naturally accepted the offer. The city of Antioch expelled Alexander, who fled to Cilicia while Ptolemy Philometor entered the great Syrian city which his ancestor Ptolemy Euergetes had entered as a conqueror almost a century before. The people of Antioch wanted neither Balas nor the son of Demetrius I. Ptolemy persuaded the people of Antioch to allow the young Demetrius II to ascend his ancestral throne. Ptolemy was too prudent to accept the offer of Antioch to become the king of the two houses, while the Romans kept a close eye, . . . "being skilled in
reading the future, he determined to refrain from appearing to give the Romans any reason for disliking him".  

The marriage of his daughter to the fourteen year old Demetrius II was his best solution, one which aimed to achieve both purposes—to promote the Egyptian's interest within the Seleucid house without causing any escalation in the relationship between Egypt and Rome.

The same man who in his boyhood had seen the house of Seleucus intervening in the Ptolemaic house, and had watched Antiochus playing the Pharaoh in Memphis, now was invited by the Antiochians to dominate the Seleucid realm. The change in the balance of power was not a result of the Egyptian strength but rather as the result of the Seleucid weakness, which reached such a stage when her traditional southern enemy interfered in the most important matter of the Seleucid affair: The question of who would be the next Seleucid king. As a result, this king had to fit in with Ptolemies' interests.

The Egyptian supremacy in Syria did not last for a long time and it came to an end with the death of Philometor. Egypt was confronted with doubtful succession, for Philometor left an infant son in charge of his sister and wife, Cleopatra II, whilst his brother, Ptolemy Euergetes, who reigned in Cyrene, had been a rival claimant for the Egyptian throne even during Philometor's life. This situation helped Demetrius II's count to rub out the result of the Ptolemaic reconquest in Syria.
The Ptolemaic reconquest in Coele-Syria had a significant importance and proved more than ever that from the death of Antiochus IV the Seleucid Empire became weaker and weaker, to such an extent that the neighboring hostile Egypt, a weak kingdom herself, achieved such a great influence over the Seleucid's affairs. This decline becomes apparent when we compare it to the period of 168/7 B.C.E. when the path of the Egyptian kingdom was in the hands of a Seleucid king.

Most historians who have studied the Seleucid Empire considered the Seleucids as a weak empire from the beginning of her history. However, those historians failed when they point to the period after Antiochus IV's death, in order to prove their assumptions. Therefore, Quire, as Tcherikover puts it, is quite relevant: Was the Seleucid kingdom before Antiochus IV a strong state which was fighting successfully against the Eastern people?

It seems that most of the scholars failed to distinguish between the constant factors causing the Seleucid weakness that were commonly accepted by all scholars including Tcherikover and factors such as internal struggles and international forces that were of great influence on the Seleucid Empire, especially after Antiochus IV's death. However, to consider one as a cause and another as a result is the wrong way to judge the events. We studied how all the forces were affecting each other and together caused the decline of the Seleucid Empire.
The examination of the factors contributing to the Seléucid decline helped us to determine how people could carve their way to independence. However, one must bear in mind the proper perspective when one uses the terms "Seléucid Weakness". There is no arguing that the Seléucid Empire failed to control its vast territory. The problems that the Seléucid faced were faced before them and after them by great ancient Empires, such as the Acheamids and Rome. These difficulties were laid in the nature of administrating giant Empires.

The Seléucids found themselves in 312 B.C.E. controlling a vast territory with heterogenic population, which created from the beginning several problems the Seléucids tried to solve. Mainly in their internal organization and their system of governing the Empire. This system was based on the division to Satrapies. The Satrapies were a Persian inheritance, and basically a compromise system.

The Satrapy was an autonomous part in the kingdom governed by the local Satraps. This division and administrative system had both advantages and disadvantages. The Seléucids thought they would obtain peace, and win the obedience of their native population if they were being governed by their own leaders. This advantage which the Seléucids hoped to maintain was also their great disadvantage. The Satrapies had external ties to the center. These ties could exist so far as the kingdom was strong enough to exercise its military supremacy. When that power ceased to exist, most of the
Satraps carved their way to independence, partly because all the means for that were laid within the Satrapy as an autonomous unit, while serving as Seleucid officials. We can agree with Bevan, that even the Seleucid king would substitute for each of the Satraps, a Satrap appointed by him, he would not gain much; the new Satrap would be just like the old dynasts—he would look forward to inciting the occasion to revolt. The internal organization of the Seleucid Empire as an administrative organization was never strong enough to bring the conquered people under the yoke of political discipline. The vast territories and their topographical and geographical complexion made it even harder to control, especially when the means of transportation and the lack of secure and good roads made a military journey to the East a very difficult one. This stretch created several logistical problems such as the maintenance of the army during a long journey. Moreover, in order to protect such strategic roads, it was necessary to maintain a huge army as well as maintaining military settlement in important places.

The Seleucid kings had to face all those logistical difficulties when they had to impose their policy and authority in the remote borders of the kingdom. Such difficulties brought upon compromises, as that of Antiochus III's in the East, while his adventure in the East had extended to eight years. Antiochus III's military victory could not conceal his political failure. The successful offensive of Antiochus
CHAPTER III

THE HASMONEANS WAYS OF BENEFITING FROM

THE "WEAKNESS OF THE SELEUCIDS."

This chapter will examine the means by which the Hasmoneans utilized the situation in the Seleucid Empire to further their goal of the creation of an independent state. This chapter will place into proper perspective the Weakness of the Seleucids especially pertaining to the situation in Judaea. We will also examine Judaea's special status within the Seleucid kingdom. We shall show that not all the factors that are of importance to a study of the "Seleucid Weakness" as an Empire in the East, were of great relevance to Judaea. Important factors such as long distances, the length and duration of a military journey, as well as, limited transportation routes which effected the maintenance of armies, were not valid in relation to the Judaean situation. One must instead consider the strategic value of Judaea (positioned at the southern border of the Seleucid kingdom) and Judaea's economic value which derived from its location as a crossroads in the Middle East.

While examining the events of this period we have noticed that the Seleucids were engaged in few campaigns in the East at the same time that the Seleucid kings were involved in constant military journeys in Judaea. Although the Seleucid kingdom was not militarily weak in her encounters with Judaea, Judaea was the test case which exposed the
Seleucid Empire's "weakness" and which helped us to clarify the meaning of the "Seleucid Weakness". Judaea proved that most of the general factors effecting the Seleucid Weakness were not of great importance to the Judaean situation. The Hasmoneans utilized internal struggles over the crown together with international involvements to break the yoke of the Seleucids.

Therefore, we can not review all the aspects that led to the establishment of the Hasmonean state and place them into proper perspective unless we understand what current events took place in the Seleucid kingdom during this period of time.

It is clear that the military force of Judaea alone, did not give her the power to exercise political independence. This we shall determine from an examination of three important military encounters: Lysias 162 B.C.E., Bacchides 160 B.C.E. and Sidetes 134 B.C.E. These three incidents proved that the military supremacy of the Seleucid army was indisputable. When the Seleucids concentrated their military might against the Jewish forces, the Hasmoneans could not resist for very long, only certain circumstances within the kingdom avoided them from translating their military victories into political achievements.

These circumstances were utilized with great skill by the Hasmoneans who knew how to derive benefit from them in order to create and maintain an independent state.
First and Second Maccabees are surrounded with great myths concerning the Hasmonean battles. These battles are described as battles between a few against many. We shall prove that this was not always the case. However, an examination of Judah's last battle clearly exposes this myth. Furthermore, the sources described the battle as taking place between the "Greek kingdom" on one hand and Judaea on the other hand. That outlook of the sources can give us one dimension of the reasons for the exaggeration in the description of power proportion between the Seleucids and the Hasmoneans, throughout the descriptions, the notion of the small Judaean forces confronting the Great Greek Empire stood foremost in the minds of our sources.

Our sources have the tendency to portray the creation of the Hasmonean state in the light of a military victory over the Seleucids... "for this victory contributed not a little to the regaining of their liberty." Nevertheless, a study between the lines of these same sources can determine the proper weight of the Hasmonean military victories, and show that on several occasions they barely escaped military defeats. These military failures placed into danger the previous military achievements. Therefore, our ultimate task is to explore the way in which the Hasmoneans managed to utilize the situation within the Seleucid Empire to carve their way to independence in spite of their military inferiority.

The writer of I Maccabees provides the best description of the creation of the Hasmonean state "And Jonathan
saw that the time served him, . . . "4. The "time" meant the over-all circumstances in the Seleucids kingdom, the great leadership of the Hasmoneans, and the high degree of courage and sacrifice of their army. All these facts created the conglomeration of factors that led to independence during Simon's and John's leadership.

As we stated previously, the situation in Judæa differed from that of the Eastern provinces. We have analyzed in previous chapters the factors which caused the Seleucid Empire difficulties. These factors included the problem of controlling these satrapies. One of the difficulties that was central to this problem was the vastness of the territories which the Seleucids had to control. Therefore, we analyzed the difficulties that the Seleucids confronted in controlling their Empire. These difficulties, however, fell apart when viewed in reference to the situation in Judæa. The effect of distance from the Seleucid capital to the Satrapies played no role in Judæa's situation. Judæa was located near the power center, Antioch. This made it easier to control and to carry out policy and enforcement. The routes to Judæa were many and quite accessible. There were no special topographical difficulties they needed to face when marching into Judæa's territory. In addition to Judæa's geographical location, in relation to the Seleucid capital, Judæa had been a great strategical and economical value. The location of Judæa was important because it was a crossroad, which connected Syria to the Nabatians in the south, as well as providing access to
the sea ports. Its control was without doubt of great economic and strategic importance. The strategic importance of Judaea is indisputable. It caused the long dispute between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic houses during the third and second century B.C.E. The Seleucids gained control in 200 B.C.E. after the Banias battle. However, the Ptolemaic house never gave up its claim over this territory. The territory of Judaea was of great importance to the Seleucids as well as to the Ptolemaic house as a buffer zone.

The great difference between the strategic status and geographical location of Judaea compared with those of the Eastern Satrapies resulted in different Seleucid policy towards Judaea. During the reign of Antiochus IV until the reign of Sidetes, the Seleucids were engaged in only three military campaigns in the East. While on the other hand the Seleucid were engaged in a massive "policing policy" in Judaea, during the same period of time, all Seleucid kings except Balas took part in that aggressive policy in Judaea. The very rare intervention policy in the Eastern affairs greatly contrasted with a massive Seleucid military activity in Judaea. This once more reflects the special attention and concern that Judaea received in the Seleucids' affairs.

In order to understand the Seleucids' affairs, and the Seleucids different policy for Judaea, one must note that all the Eastern campaign launched, were all led by the Seleucid kings themselves. This fact alone gives us some indication as to the importance the Seleucid placed on their campaigns in the East while at the same time we can estimate
the size of the military force needed to carry out such campaigns. Campaigns, such as these, involved a great portion of the Seleucid army. In order to carry out military expeditions in the East, it was necessary that the king enjoyed a stable position. In other words, that his crown was secure and unthreatened. This was a prerequisite to carrying out any military expedition in the East. In addition, we must also stress the logistics and economic difficulties that faced a Seleucid king. Such difficulties as these were not relevant with regard to the revolt in Judaea. While the massive involvement in the East was looked upon with disfavour by Rome, the "policing policy" in Judaea was considered as an internal affair and did not contribute to an escalation of tensions between Rome and the house of Seleucus. Furthermore, we must emphasize that all the campaigns in the East were headed by the kings themselves. In Judaea, the military campaigns were handled by local Seleucid commanders. These Seleucid campaigns help us study the concentration of the Seleucid military efforts during that battle or another, as well as to give us some indication of the Seleucid attitude towards the Hasmonean's revolt.

Antiochus IV's campaign in the East gave us the proper perspective to evaluate the Seleucid attitude to affairs in Judaea. Antiochus left Lysias one of his commanders in command of the kingdom's affairs from Euphrates till the border with Egypt. This command included the task to suppress the revolt in Judaea. In order to carry out his policy,
Lysias appointed three local commanders. During the same time, Antiochus IV himself conducted a great military journey into the East. He... "removed from Antioch, from his royal city, in the one hundred and forty-seventh year; and he passed over the river Euphrates, and went through the upper countries."  

In other words, Lysias estimated that the three local commanders would be sufficient to face and suppress the revolt in Judaea. While the importance of carrying out the policy of the government in the East necessitate the direct command of the king, as well as a great portion of his army.

Part of the problem that the Seleucids' king encountered during such campaign in the East were mentioned by the writer of I Maccabees. Antiochus gave his army a salary for a year in advance. This fact alone gives us some indication as to the economic and military resources that were required to carry out such a journey and the resulting difficulties they created. These difficulties were the main reasons for more Seleucid campaigns to the East.  

We can assume that Seleucid attitude to Judaea was also reflected in Rome's policy. Demetrius I in 161 B.C.E. did not hesitate to carry out his policy against the Hasmoneans despite the letter of alliance between Rome and the Judaeans. A quite similar event took place when Demetrius faced Timarchus revolt in Medes. In that instance as well, although Rome recognized Timarchus the legitimate king of Medes, Demetrius did not hesitate to fight and defeat him. The only way to explain these exceptions in the Seleucids' policy which in
general showed a great concern with Rome's opinion, is the assumption that Demetrius I recognized the Roman's foreign policy. As a result, he knew that a "policing policy" carried out by him would not change the balance of power and the status quo.

Therefore, such a policy would not bring about an escalation of tension between himself and Rome. In other words, Demetrius I knew how far he could go without jeopardizing his relationships with Rome. Therefore, regardless of the alliance letters exchanged between the Senate and the Jews and Timarchus, Demetrius I did not hesitate in the use of harsh military measures towards Judaea and Medes. From these instances we can determine Roman policy which although permitted exchange of letters of friendship with Judaea still considered Judaea as a local power under Seleucid patronage. Judaea's efforts to break from under the Seleucid yoke coincided with Rome's interests. In general, these interests encouraged every means which weaken the Seleucids. However, the "policing policy" of the Seleucids in Judaea could not bring about direct intervention of Rome, in other words that "policing policy" could not affect the international balance of power which was Rome's greatest concern.

Rome's foreign policy was of great concern to the Seleucid kings, particularly after the battle of Magnesia. Nevertheless, they did feel that this carrying out of "policing policy" in Judaea and other areas near the kingdom's capital would not bring about an escalation of tension with Rome.
Judaean's special position in the Seleucid Empire calls for a revised outlook, concerning the creation of the Judaean state. The literary sources of time exhibit an unmistakable tendency to surround the battle of independence with a great deal of myth. They present it as a clear Jewish military victory over the Hellenistic pagah house. Furthermore, they dramatize the victory as that of few against many, a battle between the righteous and the non devoted called by the name "Pestilent Fellows" (Bnai Blial). By reading between the lines of these same sources we find that some Judaean defeats are intentionally underplayed.

In order to place into proper perspective the military balance of power between the Hasmoneans and the Seleucids as well as placing into proper perspective the creation of the Hasmonean state, we must analyze three military encounters: Lysias 162 B.C.E., Bacchides 160 B.C.E., Sidetes 134 B.C.E. These three battles undermined all the previous achievements of Judaea in the battle-fields.

Judaean was able to stop all four previous Seleucids' attempts to suppress the revolt until a serious attempt was made by Lysias and Antiochus V, the nine year old who joined him. We can accept the numbers of soldiers who took part in this campaign on the Seleucid side as given by Josephus... "50,000 infantry, some 5,000 horses." This Seleucid army was larger than the Hasmonean army, a fact that we can accept, based on Josephus' version which derived from another source rather than the Maccabees. The results of that battle were clear: Lysias placed
Jerusalem under heavy siege during the time that Jerusalem and the rest of the country were in Sabbatical year while one portion of the Seleucid army maintained a siege on Jerusalem, another part held the siege on Beth-Zur and forced her inhabitants to surrender the city. Meanwhile the conditions of the besieged in Jerusalem became worse. "Their supply of food, however, had begun to give out, for the present crop had been consumed. ... Many of the besieged, therefore, ran away because of the lack of necessities." This was the state of affairs when Lysias was forced to withdraw from Jerusalem, but not before demolishing its walls.

The results of that military encounter between the two armies was quite clear. Judah was defeated and forced to retreat from Jerusalem and fled with the remainder to the province of Gophna. Lysias' journey put the success of the revolt in question. He proved that a massive Seleucid operation could confront and defeat the Hasmonean army.

Bacchides' campaign of 160 B.C.E. exemplifies the creation of the Hasmonean myth. The defeat in Elasa battle was over-shadowed and the focus was placed on the glorious and heroic fight of Judah and his handful soldiers made, in their last battle. However, the writer's pro-Hasmonean bias can be exposed by an examination of the description of the glorious Hasmonean victory over Nicanor. The author of first Maccabees and Josephus which are the only sources available concerning the battle of Elasa describe it as a battle between a Jewish force of 800 soldiers opposed to a Seleucid army of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen.
Prof. Avi-Yona was the first scholar who placed doubt as to the credibility of these figures. He pointed out the author's pro-Hasmonean leanings and surmised that 15,000 soldiers, most probably, participated in Judah's army during his last campaign. Prof. Avi-Yona as well rejected the figures of the Seleucid force, following the same reasoning Avi-Yona theorized that as a result of the source's bias, the figures were distorted, to maximize the strength of the victor and minimize the strength of the defeated.

Bar-Kochva's work is a reliable and important analysis of this battle. Bar-Kochva reviews the figures quoted in I Maccabees after Lysias' retreat from his first campaign in Judaea. Simon carried out Judah's policy in the Galilee with a force of 3,000 soldiers, while Judah went to the Gilead during the same period of time with 8,000 soldiers. While Judah and Simon carried out Judaea's policy in the Galilee and Gilead, Judaea was left under Joseph Ben Zacharia and Azaria's command. These commanders got entangled in a fight against Gorgias near Jamnia after their defeat, the Hasmoneans showed heavy casualties which amounted to 2,000 dead. II Maccabees' attempts to ignore this defeat and it can only be noticed by a close reading, and from I Maccabees description. By examining the casualties figures on the Jewish side Bar-Kochva could estimate the numbers of Jewish soldiers taking part at the battle. We can conclude with Bar-Kochva that Bacchides' army stood against at least 20,000 Jewish combatants. We accept Bar-Kochva's claim that in a defensive war people that had not taken part in the salvation missions
carried on by Judah and his brothers joined in the former. In addition, there existed a high morale and spirit in the Jewish quarters, especially after the victory over Nicanor. All these factors indicate that the number of 20,000 soldiers under Judah's command is quite reasonable.\(^{39}\) We will not study the battle in detail.\(^{40}\) However, the description given by 1 Maccabees serves to stress the point that the fight took place between powers of equal quantity,\(^{41}\) and at the end of the battle, the Hasmonean army was defeated.

With Judah's death, all the previous achievements of the Hasmoneans feel apart. Judaea once more became dominated by the Seleucids.\(^{42}\) The Seleucid government represented by Bacchides appointed people in Judaea to represent their interests. The Seleucid commander "chose out the ungodly men, and made them lords of the country".\(^{43}\)

While these two military encounters took place at the very beginning of the Hasmonean revolt, we must focus our study on the most significant military encounter which took place during the reign of Antiochus Sidetes. This Seleucid campaign was carried out in the fourth year of Sidetes' reign in the summer of 134 B.C.E. A year after John's succession as Judaea's leader,\(^{44}\) thirty-three years after the break out of the Hasmoneans' revolt and seven years after Judaea broke off the yoke of the Seleucids.\(^{45}\) Antiochus Sidetes besieged Jerusalem while on his way to Jerusalem he destroyed the country's economical supplies.\(^{46}\) The siege was long and heavy. In order to ease the pressure, the besieged were forced to evacuate the population which were helpless,
in order to continue fighting... "and retained only those who were in the prime of life and able to fight." But those people who were evacuated from the city were trapped in between the two armies. While Antiochus on his side prevented their evacuation, they remained wandering between the walls and Sidetes' camp. This was the situation until the festival of Tabernacles arrived. John was forced to accept the conditions imposed by Antiochus Sidetes. According to these conditions he had to hand over his arms, pay tribute for Jaffa and other cities bordering on Judaea, "gave hostages and five hundred talents of silver... three hundred of which and the hostages they gave at once among them being Hyrcanus, own brother." Antiochus left Jerusalem after he pulled down the walls encircling the city.

The results of Sidetes' military journey and the siege on Jerusalem can once more provide us with evidence of Seleucid military power when concentrating a massive operation under the king's command. Such an operation demolished the independence of Judaea, an independence which was gained during Simon's leadership after thirty-three years of constant struggle against the Seleucid hegemony. This defeat resulted in Judaea's becoming a satellite state while John was forced by Sidetes to join his campaign against the Parthians 130/129 B.C.E. However, it is clear from Josephus' description... "when Antiochus undertook an expedition against the Parthians, Hyrcanus set out with him" as that, he joined the expedition willingly and not under stress. Josephus' double bias becomes clearer in the description of
the siege on Jerusalem. The sympathetic way in which he described Antiochus Sidetes while at the same time aimed to cover up the great defeat and the fact that Judaea became a satellite state underlines this bias. In order to obtain the reader's sympathy with Sidetes, Josephus compared him to Epiphanes, in such a way he clearly portrays Sidetes in a positive light. Furthermore, he shows even the surrender of Jerusalem as a result of Hyrcanus... "being favourably impressed by his (Sidetes) affability, and learning of his reverence for the Deity..." He described the final agreement achieved, as the result of negotiation between equal sides. Those tendencies caused the description of Hyrcanus joining Sidetes' campaign in a positive manner and not as a result of the harsh terms dictated after heavy defeat.

The events taking place in the early days of John Hyrcanus' control, stressed once more that the small Judaean state could not withstand a massive operation held by the Seleucid army.

The situation in Judaea after Sidetes' military campaign put into the proper perspective the creation of the Hasmonean state. Those events must be taken into consideration by historians who portray the creation of the state solely as a result of military heroism and the inner strength of the Jewish people. Although, one can not ignore these important factors, one must also place them into the proper perspective among all other events as seen in our examination of the three military encounters.
We have studied that although the Hasmoneans were militarily defeated, they managed to maintain their way to independence. They achieved full independence, mainly as a result of their ability to utilize the inner struggles over the crown in the Seleucid kingdom, as well as the change in the balance of power in the international arena. This political ability to utilize those changes, helped them to translate their local military power into political power. This brought them, step by step, to the creation of an independent state.

It is clear that it was not the military power of Judaea by itself which paved the road to independence. However, it was not a coincidence that Judaea obtained her independence during Simon's leadership. One of the great Hasmoneans' advantages lay with their knowledge of inner Seleucid affairs. This political wisdom was indeed of great benefit to Judaea'sleaders. The time was in favour of the Hasmoneans since Epiphanes' death. They were also able to benefit from changes in the international situation including the growing power of Parthia in the East, and the strategic position of Rome in the West, as well as the constant threat of the Ptolemaic house from the South. The road to independence faced serious obstacles three times during Lysias' Bacchides' and Sidetes' campaigns. Therefore, an examination of the way in which the Hasmoneans overcame these obstacles can clarify their success in achieving independence despite military inferiority.
However, when we analyze the events leading to independence, we must pay special caution to our use of pro-Hasmoneans sources. Therefore, in the sequel of this work we will separate myth from facts. While doing so, we shall be able to examine the events taking place in Judaea and determine how the Hasmoneans carved their way to independence, and benefited from the internal struggles over the crown in the Seleucid house. As well as, the way they harnessed the international forces to further their cause.

During Lysias' second journey to Jerusalem, the Hasmonean force under Judah was defeated. The internal situation in the Seleucid kingdom was of great help to the Hasmoneans, since this situation avoided harsh measures at the very beginning of the revolt. Jerusalem and the besieged people were caught, figuratively speaking, between the anvil and the hammer. The military siege and the shortage of food was caused both by the siege and the Sabbatical year. At that critical moment in the siege, Lysias was informed that Philipus, who had been appointed guardian to Antiochus' son, returned from Persia, accompanied by Euphrones' forces. Lysias feared that Philipus, accompanied by the great portion of the Seleucid army, would gain control over Antioch, the capital of the Seleucid kingdom. However, Lysias never gave up his determination to maintain the status quo, in which he controlled the kingdom in the name of the "boy-king", Antiochus Epiphanes. This explanation is also mentioned by the author of I Maccabees. It was largely due to these motivations that Lysias departed
from Jerusalem to Antioch. This departure was clearly to Lysias' advantage, and further, his own interest. In fact, Lysias informed his army that they had to return to Antioch was not as the result of, as he recalls, to his army; because of the siege and shortage of food. Lysias had to convince his troops in the necessity of a quick departure, just before the fruits of victory were at hand. This explanation is reinforced by Lysias' action of demolishing the walls of Jerusalem, in spite of his promise not to do so. This action came as a result of his need to strengthen his position within his army, and to boost morale. It was an act which left no doubt as to who was on the victor's side. The Seleucid army headed by Lysias had not achieved their objective. Judah and his force were not destroyed and so not the revolt. Therefore, as a result of an internal struggle between Lysias and Philipus over the control of the kingdom benefited Judaea. In order to neutralize Antiochus IV's act of appointing Philipus as guardian to his son, Lysias actually crowned Euphator as a king. The return of Philipus to the capital of the kingdom forced Lysias' quick departure from Jerusalem. After a short struggle between the two, Lysias was able to secure Antiochus Euphator and himself the kingdom. Lysias, in order to secure his own interests within the kingdom was forced to depart from Jerusalem, although achieving the campaign's targets were just a question of time.

Lysias and Antiochus V did not maintain control for a long period of time. They were defeated by Demetrius
Soter. That period of time until Bacchides' journey to Judaea enabled Judah to benefit. He gained support in Judaea and strengthened his family's power and leadership against his "Hellenistic" opponents headed by Elcimus, the high-priest who was backed by the Seleucid authorities.

After Judah's victory over Nicanor, the Hasmoneans who had gained prestige as the sole leaders of the Judeans, signed their first alliance with the people of Rome. On previous relationships between Judaea and Rome, there exists little information. In 164 B.C.E., half a year before Judah entered Jerusalem, Roman delegates to the Seleucid's Quintas Memmius and Titus Manlius favoured the Jews. In a letter found in II Maccabees, the delegates expressed their will to represent the Hasmonean cause before the Seleucid king. The alliance that Judah achieved with Rome after his great victory over Nicanor was a reasonable and necessary step. However, it was clear to Judah that as long as Judaea was under Seleucid control, the Seleucids would maintain their support of the "Hellenistic faction" which was guarding their interests. Only an international force of the stature of Rome could serve as a deterrent and bring about a change in the situation. We can assume that Judah realized the real political situation and the inferiority of the Jewish forces. This was evident after his encounters with Lysias. In order to prevent another massive Seleucid operation by Lysias against Judaea, he exchanged a letter of alliance with Rome — aiming to benefit from Rome's power as a deterrent. On this ground alone, we can also understand why the author of first Maccabees
was so impressed with Rome. An impression which he passed over to his readers. Rome was described as a powerful nation with a great reputation. He stressed Rome’s status as a nation with a powerful army. "Antiochus also, the great king of Asia, who had come against them to battle had also been discomfited by them". This description leaves no doubts that word of the Magnesia battle in 190 B.C.E. reached as far as Judaea and left a deep impression on the author of first Maccabees and his contemporaries. One of Judah’s considerations in establishing a relationship with Rome derived from the knowledge that the Seleucid king himself had been hostage in Rome. His presence in Rome had assured his knowledge of Rome’s military might. Such close contact with Rome’s power could not help but effect any Seleucid king who wished to confront Rome. Furthermore, Demetrius I escaped from Rome after the Senate refused to recognize him as the Seleucid legitimate king. At the time that Judah exchanged the letters of alliance with Rome, Demetrius I was not yet recognized by Rome as the legitimate king of the Seleucid kingdom. Under these circumstances, Judah had chosen the best of possible time to establish an alliance with Rome. In addition, we must note the ever-present goal of Judaeans leadership to attain international recognition for Judaea. Such recognition from Rome could pave the road to independence. The importance of such recognition can be determined from other ancient sources, such as Pompius Trogus. "A Demetrio cum descivissent amicitia
Romanorum petita princi omen ex Orientalibus libertatem acceperunt, facile tunc Romanis de alieno largientibus." In other words, the alliance with Rome, according to Pompius, was par with independence. The alliance between Judaea and Rome was confirmed by other sources other than I Maccabees.

II Maccabees (4, 11) tell us about John, the father of Eupolemus, who was appointed to the delegation which went to deliver the letter of alliance to Rome. Josephus also mentioned that Judah was the first Judaean leader to sign a treaty of alliance with Rome. It is clear that his source was not the book of I Maccabees.

The treaty between Rome and Judaea was also confirmed by the letter of Rome's consul, Gaius Fanius Strbo, to Cos. Strbo served as a consul in 161 B.C.E., at that time, the treaty was signed. The context of the letter included assurances for safe return to Jerusalem of the Judaean delegates.

We can conclude that the treaty took place after the victory over Nicanor. Moreover, the alliance was in Rome's interest, an interest which was clear to Judah from his previous encounters with the two Roman delegates, Quintus Memnius and Titus Manlius. As we have pointed out previously, Rome was willing to support every element that would weaken the Seleucid Empire, Judaea or Medes, as long as they served Rome's interests. This alliance, according to M. Stern, belongs to the category of alliances which the Republic signed with nations outside Italy. This alliance was between
equal parties "Fœdus Aequum." In such category we have many examples. The act of such an alliance by small people of less importance than Judaea did not affect their status as independent or their sovereignty. Such alliances were divided into two parts. A. neutral friendship, B. defence pact.

However, the assumption that an alliance with Rome would affect the Seleucid attitude to Judaea, was a disillusionment. The presence of Demetrius in Rome not only familiarized him with Rome's power, but also with Rome's foreign policy. This fact becomes clearer considering the circumstances which led to his escape from Rome and his good personal relationships with some influential figures in Rome. Demetrius I's familiarity with Rome's foreign policy helped him to establish his own. He knew to what extent he could stretch the rope in his relationship with Rome. Demetrius realized that except for lip service to Judaea, Rome would not interfere directly in the events taking place in that region. Local rebellions and their subsequent suppression did not change the international status quo. The measures initiated by the Seleucids in Judaea were considered only a part of their "policing policy" and therefore did not alarm Rome. Demetrius I's policy justified itself in the long run when he managed to carry on his campaign in the East against Timarchus while simultaneously Bacchides defeated Judah in Judaea.

With the death of Judah, the previous achievements of the Hasmoneans collapsed. The author of first Maccabees
described this period:

... "after the death of Judas that the lawless put forth their heads in all the borders of Israel, and all they that wrought iniquity rose up... And Bacchides chose out the ungodly men, and made them lords of the country."84

Once again the Seleucid government selected leaders in Judaea who would represent their best interests and clearly pushed aside the Hasmonean family and their supporters.85

Meanwhile, Demetrius continued his ambitious policy. When he marched to the East in 160 B.C.E. he was welcomed with great affection and gratitude by the people and was given the name Soter.86 However, his ambitions caused him trouble when he intervened in the internal dispute over the crown in Cappadocia and in 154 B.C.E. in Cyprus, which was under Ptolemaic patronage.

During this period of time, the Seleucid king was engaged in a policy of international intervention which gave Judaea respite from pressure, and helped Jonathan87 to organize his forces. Jonathan recognized the strong position of Demetrius within his own kingdom, while his recent military victories convinced Jonathan to maintain a low profile. At the same time, he organized his forces and awaited for a more propitious time to act.88

This state of affairs supports our hypothesis by showing that when there was a strong Seleucid regime, Judaea was unable to advance towards independence.

There is little source material concerning this period, except for references to the attack by the Children of Ambri.
on John and his companions and the retaliation action of the Hasmoneans. Only a minor incident which carries few implications to our study reveals an encounter with Baccides. Bacchides reinforced the Seleucid presence in Judaea by fortifying cities and installing within them military garrisons. This strengthened Judaean ties with the Seleucids. In keeping with his policy, Bacchides took hostages and kept them in Acre. There exists little information from our sources (160-153 B.C.E.) concerning the events of the next seven years.

It is clear however, that Jonathan spent that time strengthening his position as a leader in Judaea, as well as, building by the Hasmoneans force. We can determine this growth in power because only two years after, Bacchides' departure from Judaea, a delegation from the Pro-Seleucid faction set forth complaints before the Seleucid king. They warned Bacchides of the danger of the increased power of the Hasmoneans. This news resulted in the quick departure of Bacchides to Judaea, where he found the Hasmonean army camping at Beth-Basi. Although Bacchides laid siege on the city, Jonathan and some troops were able to get away and attack Odomera and the Children of Phasiron. Simon and his forces, remaining at Beth-Basi were able to withstand the siege. Bacchides did not expect such a confrontation from the Hasmoneans, especially when just two years previously he had demolished the Jewish army and their leader. Therefore, he decided to return to Antioch. In order to
decrease tension in Judaea, Bacchides released many war prisoners that were taken during his previous campaign.

The dynamic policy of Demetrius I during his long reign (162-150 B.C.E.), did not give the Hasmonaens any chance to break the Seleucid dominion. Every effort towards independence at that time was countered by a massive Seleucid suppression. It was this time that Jonathan built his power, and gained support from the Judaean population. Demetrius' policy which prevented any possibility of a break in his control of Judaea, also involved him in the affairs of other nations such as Cappadocia and Cyprus. This dynamic policy was not regarded with favour by Rome. Rome did not favour him since the early days of his reign and therefore, did everything to isolate him politically. Rome supported every rebel element in his kingdom. When a coalition of forces was set up to overthrow him, Rome gave her blessing to the new candidate, namely Alexander Balas. Alexander Balas was supported by II Attalus, king of Pergamum, Ariarathes V the king of Cappadocia, as well as Ptolemy Philometor, which took an active part in Balas' crowning. All these forces were united under one cause, namely the overthrow of Demetrius I.

While major forces pressed from outside of Demetrius I's kingdom, the crown became insecure at home. Under these circumstances, Demetrius I aimed to insure this southern border, Judaea, or at least, prevent Judaea from joining the coalition of forces set against him. Demetrius I proposed some compromises that previously, because of his powerful
position, he had never been willing to make. Now, he
"gave him authority to gather together forces, and to
provide arms, and to be his confederate; and he commanded
that they should deliver up to him the hostages that were
in the citadel."102 Jonathan immediately acted on those
promises, received back the hostages from the Citadel and
started to gather forces which helped him to fortify and
build the walls of Jerusalem and Mount Zion.103 The
strength of Jonathan's forces, together with Demetrius I's
compromises causes many of the strongholds' inhabitants
formerly built by Bacchides to flee.104

Meanwhile, Alexander Balas continued his struggle
against Demetrius I over Jonathan's support which resulted
in a generous offer given from Aco-Ptolemais in which he
appointed Jonathan as high priest. To give evidence of his
good will, he sent him a purple robe and a crown of gold.105
It was the first time since the outbreak of the Hasmonean
revolt that a leader of the Hasmonean house had been offi-
cially recognized by a claimant to the throne as the legi-
timate leader of Judaea. Jonathan wore the garment
which symbolized to all that he accepted Balas' recognition
of his leadership, but still he kept a low profile by not
yet lending his support to either side. This tactic proved
itself to be a sound one, when Jonathan obtained more com-
promises given in hopes of gaining his support. These com-
promises included freeing Jews from tributes, and from
custom on salt and from the crowns and other taxes as
well. Demetrius I also promised the expansion of Judaea's
territory by annexing three districts from Samaria. In addition, he promised to grant money and presents to the Temple in Jerusalem and for the building of its walls. Moreover, the king allowed Jonathan the recruiting of thirty thousand soldiers who would be paid from the Royal Treasury.

In spite of these generous promises offered by Demetrius I, Jonathan decision to support Balas proved his political wisdom. Jonathan was familiar with Demetrius I's regime which did not give the Hasmoneans any chance to break towards independence. However, it was clear to Jonathan that the king lost the popular ground of support in his own capital. Furthermore, he realized just how powerful was the consolidation of powers against Demetrius I, which included Rome and Egypt. Under such political circumstances, Jonathan knew, which side he must support in order to progress Judaea's interest. The acceptance of the purple robe and crown of gold from Balas on one hand, and his diplomatic delay in assuring support to any of the parties on the other hand, keeping for a while a neutral stand, brought forth generous compromises from Demetrius I and at the same time raised the value of Jonathan's support to Alexander. Jonathan's support of Alexander proved itself later on when Alexander defeated Demetrius I.

During Alexander's reign, Jonathan received formal recognition of promises given previously by Alexander while he was a claimant. When Alexander married Cleopatra, Ptolemy's daughter in 162 to the Seleucid Calendar (150/151 B.C.E.), Jonathan was invited as a guest of honour to the
celebration. Jonathan's position was so solid that during the ceremonies when members of the "Hellenistic party" set forward complaint to the king against him, their complaint was rejected and Jonathan was accepted with great honour and appointed as "Chief friend", "Captain" and "governor of a province." 110

It was the first time that the Seleucid house recognized officially the status that Jonathan already had as a military and political leader of his people. This was, in addition to the position of high priest that was promised when the struggle between Balas and Demetrius I took place.

Alexander Balas' kingdom was corrupt. 111 The king diffused his power among some members of his court and appointed Diodotus and Hierax governors of Antioch, 112 while the central government was controlled and ruled by Ammonius. Alexander's "weakness of character rendered him incompetent to govern a kingdom". 113 This weakness of the character was probably the reason behind the wide support he got as a claimant, and can also explain Rome's non-intervention in Seleucid's affairs. Rome was pleased with the distribution of power between several members of the Seleucid court. Rome favoured such a state of affairs. For the same reasons, our sources described Alexander's reign in a sympathetic way. During Alexander's reign, Jonathan obtained official recognition of his leadership. Alexander's internal weakness prevented any possibility of retreating from the compromises he granted before as a claimant to the throne. This weakness provided Jonathan with the political
vacuum which enabled him to extend Judaea's territory and to strengthen his position within Judaea.

In the year 165 to the Seleucid calendar (147/8 B.C.E.), Demetrius II, the new claimant to the throne, came from Crete, supported by the Syrian governor, Appolonius Taus. Meanwhile, Jonathan maintained his support for Alexander Balas because under his regime Jonathan could carry out his ambitious policy. Jonathan, acting in the name of the Syrian king, faced Appolonius in that battle Appolonius was defeated. As a result, Appolonius' stronghold in Joffa surrendered. The Hasmonean army entered the city of Asdod and set on fire the Dagon Temple and the neighbouring farms. Jonathan returned to Jerusalem with great amounts of booty. In gratitude to his loyalty, he received all of the territory of Ecron and many other gifts. Jonathan utilized his power in the name of the king to extend Judaea's territory.

Under such circumstances, it was clear why Jonathan's interests lay in maintaining the status quo. When the political situation turned in favour of Demetrius, Jonathan found himself still supporting Balas while Demetrius II got Ptolemy's support. In addition to international pressure, Antioch's citizens were dissatisfied with Alexander's government. In the struggle that took place between the two, Alexander was defeated and killed while trying to escape to the Nābatians.

While Demetrius II sat upon the throne in 145 B.C.E., Jonathan besieged Acre in Jerusalem. Jonathan determined
that the struggle over power between the two provided his best opportunity to conquer Acre. The instability of Demetrius II's early days in reign was quite familiar to Jonathan. The population of Antioch still remembered his father and as a result, were not satisfied with the new king. Demetrius II became the king after the massive intervention by the Egyptian king. Being in such a position, Demetrius II could not react drastically against Jonathan's attempt to conquer Acre. He called him to Aco-Ptolemais. There, Jonathan asked Demetrius II to exempt Judaea and the three regions annexed from taxes. This demand derived from previous promises given by Demetrius' father to Jonathan. Jonathan once more demonstrated his great ability as a politician. He knew when and what demands to place before Demetrius II. His policy was a great success. Demetrius II reaffirmed the promises given by his father. The result was an official recognition of the special status of Judaea and the three annexed regions. Jonathan used the same method he had used previously when he translated promises given by Alexander as a rival to the throne, to action when Alexander gained the power. Demetrius II confirmed the status of the three regions in Samaria and all the appointments that Jonathan received from the previous Seleucid kings. Jonathan was called by the king: "Chief Friends." Although the immediate stop of Acre siege is not mentioned by our sources it was probably obtained as a result of Demetrius' last concessions.
Demetrius II's regime was in the midst of unrest caused by its unpopularity among Antiochian citizens. From I Maccabees, we learn about the unrest among the population of the capital. This situation erupted later on in a form of a revolt in Antioch. Meanwhile, Diodotus of Apamea, known as Tryphon, a former governor of Antioch during Alexander Balas' regime, took under his patronage Alexander's son. Diodotus declared Antiochus VI, as a claimant to the throne.

Demetrius II's internal difficulties pressured him into asking for Jonathan's support. Jonathan was willing to grant his support, but not before he accepted Demetrius II's promise, including the withdrawal from Acre, and other strongholds. Because Jonathan's military assistance was vital for securing Demetrius II's crown, he promised to fulfill these requests. Jonathan sent three thousand soldiers to the Seleucid capital to suppress the revolt. This event marks a turning point in the history of the Hasmoneans' struggle in which an Hasmonean army crossed the borders of "Eretz Israel" towards the Seleucid capital to assist the Seleucid king to secure his crown. Because of this difficult situation, Demetrius II was willing to grant any concession in Judaea in order to suppress the revolt and maintain his crown, even if it includes the promise to withdraw from Acre, a promise that even a weak king such as Alexander, did not give. Acre had symbolized the subordination of Judaea to the Seleucid kingdom. Jonathan's forces helped the king to overcome the revolt. The Seleucid king in return for this help,
gave the forces a great amount of plunder. When Demetrius II found himself again secure, he backed off from promises he had given Jonathan.

The oppression of the revolt in Antioch did not alter Diodotus and Antiochus VI's plans. Furthermore, a great part of Demetrius II's army deserted and joined Diodotus' camp. There was constant bitterness among the population towards Demetrius II's regime, and they waited for the proper opportunity to expel him. This opportunity arrived when Demetrius II was defeated by Diodotus. A victory that secured Diodotus' position at Apamea. Assisted by local elements in Antioch, Diodotus was able to conquer the city. Demetrius II pulled out towards Cilicia.

At this point, the Seleucid kingdom was divided into two regions. One region was controlled by Demetrius II. This included the areas between Seleucia to Leaban, Laodicea, Tyre, Sidon, Mesopotamia and Babylonia. The other region was controlled by Diodotus and Antiochus VI and it contained the central regions of the kingdom, the Euripantes valley from Apamea to Antioch.

Due to these circumstances, in order to gain Jonathan's support, Antiochus VI and Diodotus confirmed once again all the promises made by Demetrius II. In addition, Simon was appointed as a "Royal Strategos", "from the Ladder of Tyre unto the borders of Egypt". Although Josephus in Antiquities explains Jonathan's support to Antiochus VI on moral grounds, we can see beyond the moral motives that the support for Antiochus VI and Diodotus was very
necessary to the interests of Judaea, especially after the previous bitter experience with Demetrius II's promises. Jonathan's policy was a realistic one. His main concern was with the benefits he could gain by his support for either party. He wished to support the party which would provide him with the greatest opportunity for his political aspiration. We can not, therefore, accept Josephus's explanation but instead view Jonathan's actions as wise political moves made in Judaea's best interest. This political move justified itself with the appointment of Simon as governor of the region which encompassed the Ladder of Tyre till the border of Egypt.

This appointment helped Jonathan to carry out his military expeditions in the name of Antiochus VI. Although Askalon opened her gates to Jonathan, Gaza refused to grant her support to Antiochus. As a result, Jonathan sieged the city. After burning her outlying villages, he took hostages which were brought to Jerusalem. After his campaign, along the sea shore, he confronted Demetrius II's forces in the Galilee at Kades. Although he had some difficulties at the beginning of the battle, at the end he defeated Demetrius II's commanders. Simon in the meantime, besieged Beth-Zur until they surrendered. Simon made Beth-Zur a Hasmonean garrison. Beth-Zur was no longer a constant threat to Jerusalem and Judaea. Jonathan was able to utilize the situation by acting under Antiochus VI's name. Jonathan took an active part in the battle against Demetrius II's commanders in the north of Hamath, an area which was far beyond
Judea's borders. He continued his campaign, passing through Damascus defeating the Gabadaeans. Meanwhile, Simon moved from Askalon to conquer Joffa, and established there a Jewish garrison. Simon also built and fortified Adida. The fortification of Adida was a necessary step to secure Jerusalem and Judea's access to the sea. Jonathan fortified Jerusalem and besieged Acre.

Jonathan, acting in the king's name, extended the boundaries of Judea and provided her with the gate to the sea-Joffa. In addition, he did not hide his intention to break Seleucid control. This was demonstrated when he laid siege to the Citadel.

Jonathan's activities in the local arena did not alter his active foreign policy. Jonathan realized that this was the proper time to renew Judea's relationship with Rome. Jonathan's siege of Acre was met with great anger by Diodotus and Antiochus VI, in whose name he acted. Therefore, now more than ever, Jonathan needed Rome's recognition and the renewal of the relationship with the Spartans. The timing of the renewal of the relationship with Rome serves to illustrate Jonathan's outstanding foreign policy and his great leadership. A renewal of the treaty of 161 B.C.E. during Balas' regime could only undermine the good relationship between Jonathan and the Seleucid king. The Seleucid kingdom was divided into two parts when Jonathan gave his support to Antiochus VI and Diodotus, (known also as Tryphon). This provided Jonathan with the necessary political vacuum, which he needed to strengthen Judea and extend her territory.
The siege of Acre was a "de facto" act which aimed to eliminate Seleucid control over Judaea. Jonathan needed Rome's recognition and support for this act. This support he tried to obtain by sending Numenius and Antipater to Rome. Our sources do not tell us Jonathan's motives in sending delegates to Rome in order to renew the alliances. Previous treaties with Rome during Judah's leadership were not fruitful. However, part of the answer can be found by reading between the lines of Pompius Trogus. He considered an alliance with Rome as equal to freedom. We can assume that Jonathan wished to achieve through that alliance entrance to the international arena. In addition, such a treaty would serve as a deterrent to the Seleucids, although it did not carry any immediate political benefits. This international recognition carried also an indirect effect, by strengthening Jonathan's position within Judaea together with breaching Judaea's isolation from the rest of the world. For the same reason Jonathan renewed his relationship with Sparta. Momigliano in his introduction to the Maccabean tradition claimed that the letters were not reliable because Jonathan's letter to the Spartans was not mentioned in the letter of the Spartans to Simon. This claim can not be accepted on the basis of Momigliano's assumption that the source desire to glorify Judaea's power caused the necessity to provide us with such a letter. This was characteristic to the Hellenistic style of writing. But all these claims questioning the authenticity of the letter must be rejected, if we assume that it was a result of the pro-Hasmonean bias.
of our sources. It is clear that he would achieve it better with a description of Judaea's relationship with a powerful military nation. Sparta especially, can prove the authenticity of our letter. Sparta during that time was not an international power, a fact that Jonathan was also familiar with. "We were not minded, however, to be troublesome to you, or to the rest of our confederates and friends in these wars; for we have the help that is from heaven to help us". However, we might be concerned with Sparta's good relationship with Rome. Such relationships between Rome and Sparta gave us another aspect to the background of the renewal of the relationships between Rome and Sparta with Judaea.

The Hasmonean activity in external and internal affairs called for Tryphon's special attention, especially after the siege on the Citadel and the renewal of the relationship with Rome. This Hasmonean policy swept away any doubt as to what their intentions were. The new situation in Judaea caused Tryphon's departure towards Judaea. We can not accept the first Maccabees' explanation to Tryphon's expedition against Jonathan as a step to eliminate an obstacle for his long range plan, to murder Antiochus VI. Jonathan's concern with the internal Seleucid affairs was merely a political, one, and not a moral one. Jonathan realized that the continuation of a status quo would best serve his interests. A situation in which the Seleucid kingdom was divided into two. This situation, indeed, helped him to pave Judaea's road to independence.
Diodotus, (known as Tryphon) as we mentioned previously, was aware of Jonathan's intentions and aimed to disrupt them. As a result, he went to confront Jonathan at Beth-Shean. Jonathan's great army persuaded Tryphon to eliminate Jonathan in another manner. He convinced Jonathan of his good intentions and invited him to join him in further discussion of their affairs in Aco-Polemais. Tryphon promised he would give Jonathan the city, together with all the other fortified cities. But when they arrived in Aco, Tryphon murdered Jonathan's entourage and took Jonathan as hostage.

Simon took the leadership after Jonathan's capture. Simon gathered all the manpower available, most of whom had previously belonged to Jonathan's army. Simon completed the fortification of Jerusalem and sent Jonathan the son of Absalom, to expel the native population from Joppa. At this stage, the city became a Jewish city and an integral part of Judaea. At the same time, Tryphon marched with his army towards Jerusalem holding Jonathan as hostage. Tryphon explained to Simon that the reason he held Jonathan in captivity was due to his failure to pay the Royal debts. But if Simon would pay these debts, Jonathan would be released. Although Simon was forced to give in to Tryphon's extortion, Jonathan was not released. Tryphon did not give up his plans to conquer Jerusalem via Adora, but heavy snow and due to his long journey he altered his plans and retreated with his forces via Gilead while executing Jonathan at Basama.
During this time, the power struggles over the supremacy within the Seleucid kingdom continued, on the one hand, Tryphon and Antiochus VI and on the other Demetrius II. During that struggle Tryphon murdered Antiochus VI, who had been used as a puppet. The murder of Antiochus VI signifies the decline of the kingdom, in which a non-member of the Royal family sat upon the throne.

Simon knew now how to utilize this situation. He fortified Judaea's strongholds and stored them with food preparing them for a long siege. Simoh also gave his support to Demetrius II for different reasons. Tryphon was the murderer of Jonathan. Tryphon also carried on an ambitious policy in Judaea. Simon assumed that Demetrius who has lost control over Judaea to Tryphon would be willing to grant him new concessions, in order to regain some control in Judaea. Simon's demand in return for his support: the exemption of Judaea from taxes. The demand was accepted by Demetrius II. This event (142/3 B.C.E.) was a great achievement as marked in I Maccabees.

In the one hundred and seventieth year was the yoke of the heathen taken away from Israel. And the people of Israel began to write in their instruments and contracts 'In the first year of Simon the great high priest and captain leader of the Jews'. That event signifies another step in Judaea's road to independence. Simon's request came as a result of the new political situation in which he realized that Demetrius II would grant any promise to Judaea, which was not then under his domination. Demetrius II welcomed every power that
could confront Tryphon. The alliance between Simon and Demetrius II had immediate effects as we can determine from our numismatic sources in Gaza which provide us with coins bearing Demetrius II's name in 171 to the Seleucid calendar, 165 until 173 to the same calendar. The friendship between Demetrius II and Simon restored temporarily Demetrius II's control in Gaza until his fall in Parthia's captivity. 166 In addition, we must consider the impact of Simon's good relationships with Rome on Demetrius II's concession. "For he had heard that the Jews had been proclaimed by Romans friends, and confederates, and brethren, and that they had met the ambassadors of Simon honourable." 167 The nature of the relationship between Rome and Judaea could not be ignored, by any Seleucid king. We can attribute that friendly relationship to Rome's "cold" attitude towards Tryphon.

Simon, following his brother Jonathan's policy, resulted in greater momentum to the international relationships of the Hasmoneans. He renewed the alliance with the Spartans 168 and for the renewal of the friendship with Rome, he sent Numenius with ... "a great shield of gold of a thousand pound weight, in order to confirm the confederacy with them". 169 This confederacy was very important to Simon and the timing of its renewal gave the relationship a power of deterrence. Especially for the shaky Seleucid kingdom, Rome's stand was of great concern. In addition, we must consider Judaea's constant interest to be recognized and in acquiring entrance to the international arena.
We must remember that the ambassadors sent by Jonathan returned to Judaea at the beginning of Simon's leadership and informed him about the treaty renewal. These ambassadors while staying in Rome were aware of the Senate's "cold attitude" towards Tryphon. Since Tryphon murdered Antiochus VI he looked for Rome's recognition. But Rome denied recognition of Tryphon for the same reason that she showed a "cold attitude" towards Demetrius I and to every other ambitious king that could have endangered the status quo.

The news about the letter of Locius in which the friendship with the Jews was renewed was addressed to Demetrius II and not to Tryphon. This was not by accident but by intention. Rome did not yet recognize Tryphon as the legitimate king.

The Seleucid poor position in the international arena gave a greater political importance to the alliance with Rome. Nomienius headed the delegation to Rome. The delegation was well accepted and was given "Senatus Consultum" which we can learn from the letter of the Consul Locius. This letter confirmed the treaty between the two peoples and addressed itself to Simon and to the Jews, in addition to Demetrius II, the king, as well as to the cities and leaders. It stated that they must extradict to Simon any pestilent that should fled from Judaea.

Simon continued the fortification of Jerusalem and Judaea. In order to secure the way to Joppa, he conquered the fortified city of Gazara that controlled the way from the Coast to Jerusalem. Simon . . . "put all uncleanness
out of it, and caused to dwell in it men who observed the law; and he made it stronger, and he built therein a dwelling-place for himself, and appointed his son, John, as governor of Gazara. The conquest of Gazara secured Judaea's exit to the sea—Jaffa.

The next inevitable step to obtain independence was the conquest of the last Seleucid stronghold: Acre. The siege on Acre was long but fruitful, the isolation of the besieged from their sources of supply caused "on the three and twentieth day of the second month, in the one hundred and seventy-first year . . . a great enemy had been destroyed out of Israel." For the first time since the breakout of the revolt, Judaea achieved complete independence. The last sign of Seleucid authority in Judaea was destroyed. This event marked up the day as historic, one to be remembered and celebrated. At the Beginning of June 141 B.C.E. Simon entered Acre . . . "with praise, and palm-branches" . . . . This great event marked Judaea's final step towards independence. The previous steps included the releasing of hostages taken during Jonathan's leadership, the exemption from taxes and finally, the fall of the last Seleucid stronghold in Judaea.

Simon's conquest of Acre was a step that in all previous occasions confronted with immediate Seleucid interference. But that was not the situation when the Seleucid kingdom was weak and crumbling. This reality was realized by Simon. The kingdom was divided into two regions in which every king aimed to unite the kingdom under his leadership.
In addition, the deterrent power of Rome, and the pressure of the Parthians from the East did not give the Seleucid the opportunity to concentrate in Judaea's affairs. This decline in the Seleucid history became a glorious period in the history of the Hasmonean house. As First Maccabees described "And they tilled their land in peace; and the land gave her increase, and the trees of the plains their fruit."¹⁸²

The Hasmoneans' family achievements, particularly Simon's contribution to the nation, led Judaea to independence on the eighteenth day of Elul in the one hundred and seventy second year the Seleucid Calendar to Simon was promulgated . . . "if great congregation of priest and people and princes of the nation, and of the elders of the country . . ."¹⁸³ as their leader and high priest. Simon was confirmed by the nation in public as high priest and the leader of Judaea. With that act, Simon legalized the transition of the high priesthood to the Hasmonean house. Simon insured the possession of the peoples' leadership within the Hasmonean family in heritage, for generations until a faithful prophet should arise.¹⁸⁴ The decision of the assembly gave official recognition by the people to Simon's leadership which was previously recognized only by Demetrius II and Rome. It was a formal recognition of the people in the Hasmonean house as the legitimate governing house. This resolution was placed in precinct of the sanctuary in a conspicuous place and copies of this were placed in the treasury.

Demetrius II fell in Parthia's captivity while he carried a military expedition to the East in 140/39 B.C.E.¹⁸⁵
Tryphon became the sole ruler of the Seleucid kingdom, while Cleopatra Demetrius's wife, kept control over some cities in the Phoenician Coast.  

While staying in Rhodes, Antiochus VII, (known as Sidetes) heard rumours of Demetrius II's captivity. Having already Cleopatra's promise of support, Antiochus then sought Simon's support. Simon was considered a natural ally because of his constant conflict with Tryphon. Antiochus VII sent him a letter which confirmed all the previous promises made by the Seleucid kings and in addition. . . . "I give thee leave to coin money for thy country". . . .  

Although we do not have any numismatic evidence that Simon ever minted these coins, Antiochus VII's concessions were of great importance. Once more we can see the extent to which the Seleucid kings were willing to go in their efforts to gain possession of the Crown. This permission to coin clearly symbolized the recognition of Judaea as an independent both politically and economically.  

In the year one hundred seventy-four, according to the Seleucid Calendar, (138-9 B.C.E.) Antiochus VII landed in Syria.  

Tryphon could not resist and was defeated and escaped to Dor. Antiochus Sidetes laid a siege on the city by sea and by land. No one could enter or leave. Simon sent Antiochus VII soldiers, gold, silver and supplies. This goodwill gesture was rejected, because Antiochus VII knew that the defeat of Tryphon was just a question of time. It was at this point that he backed off from the previous concessions he had given Simon.
Sidetes' strong position resolved to restore his control over Judaea. To carry out his policy, he sent Athenobius one of his "friends" to Simon with the demands:

... deliver up the cities which ye have taken, and the tributes of the places whereof ye have gotten dominion outside of the borders of Judaea; or else give me for them five hundred talents of silver; and for the harm that ye have done, and the tributes of the cities other five hundred talents ... 192

Simon replied that he was only willing to send 1000 talents. Antiochus' occupation with Tryphon, in addition to the Seleucid's poor position, stood behind Simon's firm declaration: "We have neither taken other men's land, nor have we possession of that which appertaineth to other, but of the inheritance of our fathers." 193

Athenobius reported to the king Simon's reply. While Sidetes was still engaged in the struggle with Tryphon, he sent Cendebeaues "Chief Captain" of the sea coast to impose his oral demands. Cendebeaues fortified Jamnia from where he invaded Judaea. 194 Simon sent his two sons, Judah and John, to command the battle against Cendebeaues. In this battle, Cendebeaues was defeated and forced to flee back to his stronghold. 195 Meanwhile, Sidetes demolished the resistance to his reign. Tryphon escaped to Ptolemais and later on to Orthosia and Trypholis, 196 from were he finally arrived at Apamea, 197 where he met his death. 198

The period between the death of Simon, hundred seventy-seventh year to the Seleucid Calendar 199 (135/4 B.C.E.) until the first year of Hyrcanus' readership is historically blank. Our sources do not describe a Seleucid involvement
in Judaea's affairs. Although, we may assume that Ptolemy, the son of A bubas, Simon's murderer, received some support from Sidetes. It was in Sidetes' interest to remove Simon, in order to carry through his policy. Furthermore, Simon, in recent encounters, exposed the Seleucid kingdom weakness, its inability to carry through its "policing policy". Therefore, it was in Sidetes' interest, while reinforcing his position in the Seleucid capital, to encourage such elements as Ptolemy.

Antiochus Sidetes did not give up his intention to renew Seleucid control over Judaea. After the death of Simon and securing of his position, he focused his efforts on fulfilling this aim, in 134 B.C.E., the first year of John's leadership. While Sidetes prepared his campaign against Judaea, John renewed Judaea's relationships with Rome. The renewal of the relationships after succeeding a former leader was a well known custom. Simon did it when he became Judaea's leader, while only political consideration effected Jonathan's decision not to renew these relationships. Scholars differed on dating the document. We can accept M. Stern's dating which attributed this letter to Hyrcanus I. M. Stern argues the fact that Numinius, the son of Antiochus, took part in this delegation. Numinius took part in previous delegations in the past. Another member in the delegation was Alexander, the son of Jason. Alexander was probably the son of Jason Ben-Eliezer, Judah's delegate. Moreover, the document is clearly misplaced and out of context in the way Josephus presents it. The structure
of the document is of "Senatus consultum" and can fit the early days of John's leadership. John, in the first year of his leadership, aimed to deter Sidetes. He wished to force him to back away from his determination to impose Seleucid dominion in Judaea. An aim which he clearly indicated to Simon. The general appeal of the Senate to help us in the dating process of the "Senatus consultum". We can date the letter to John's early days of leadership. Otherwise, it would have dealt with concrete problems. Sidetes soon carried massive expeditions to Judaea, resulted in a siege on Jerusalem. The Seleucid king dictated seven years after "Judaea's independence" harsh peace conditions which brought Judaea once again under the dominion of the Seleucids. John was forced to pay tributes for Joffa and other cities bordering Judaea. He was forced to give hostages, and Jerusalem's walls were demolished as well. Furthermore, John was forced to join the Seleucid king in his expedition to the East. The defeat of Hyrcanus in his encounter against Sidetes' forces renewed the Seleucid control over Judaea. Only Sidetes' death on the battlefield against the Parthians in 129 B.C.E. reversed the circumstances. John utilized the opportunity to renew Judaea's independence.

At the same time, in the Seleucid kingdom, Demetrius II regained power after he was released from his Parthian captivity. The release came in order to force the withdrawal of Sidetes in the East. The attempt of Phraates after defeating Sidetes to recapture Demetrius II failed. When Demetrius II regained the throne, he set out on a campaign
against Egypt. Ptolemy Physcon VII, as a result of Demetrius II's aggression, proclaimed Alexander Zabinas as a claimant to Seleucid's throne. Ptolemy employed a common political weapon used previously by his house to weaken the Seleucid kings. Demetrius II was defeated by Alexander near Damascus. He escaped to Ptolemais and from there to Tyre where he was murdered in 125 B.C.E.

We have numismatics evidence supporting Alexander's control over Antioch in 128 B.C.E.

The current events in the Seleucid kingdom caused us to doubt Josephus' sequence of events describing the renewal of Judaea's relationships with Rome. Josephus described them as occurring after Sidetes' death and John's great expansion. We can accept Stern's assumption that it was impossible that all John's territorial expansion took place during 128-129 B.C.E. Josephus, himself, described the..."captured Medaba after six months, during which his army suffered great hardship". Therefore, we can assume that the letter of renewal of relationships with Rome took place between 125-128 B.C.E. This was the time in which many rivals were struggling over the Seleucid throne. This was the best time for John to obtain Rome's important declaration on restoring to the Jews the control over Gaza, Joffa and other places captured by Sidetes. The response of the Senate came without a definite stand on the territorial issues, and the military compensation of damage caused during Sidetes' campaign in Judaea. This response supports Stern's assumption in dating the document. The political situation within the Seleucid kingdom
with both Demetrius II and Zabinas struggling over the power, postphoned the Senate's clear stand.216 The response of the Senate was part of Rome's foreign policy. The Senate renewed its alliance with the Jews and assured the safe return of their delegates.217 They also provided them with financial aid. As we mentioned previously, the Senate did not give any concrete reply to John's request for financial compensation for the agricultural damage caused by Sidetes' campaign or the assurance of restoring the control over the cities conquered by Sidetes.218

Alexander Zabinas' reign was quickly disturbed by a new claimant, Antiochus Grypus. The struggle between the two led Zabinas to an alliance with John.219 In 123/2 B.C.E. Zabinas was defeated by Grypus resulting in the establishment of Grypus' rule over all the Syrian territory.220 In the Year 113 B.C.E. the fourth year to the 166 olympics, Antiochus Cyzicenus was set upon the throne. He ruled from the fourth of the 166 olympics until the second year of the 167 olympics, as the sole ruler of the Seleucid kingdom. Cyzicenus expended his control over Antioch, Damascus, Ptolemais, Askalon and the Sea Shore of Eretz Israël. At the end of 112 B.C.E., he lost control over Antioch but regained it later on. The ambitious activity of Cyzicenus led John to renew his relations with Rome. This ambitious policy of Cyzicenus was not favoured by Rome.221 The Senate, therefore, decided that:
King Antiochus, son of Antiochus, shall do no injury to the Jews, the allies of the Romans; and that the fortresses, harbours, territory and whatever else he may have taken from them shall be restored to them; and that it shall be lawful for them to export goods from their harbours and that no king or people exporting goods from the territory of the Jews or from their harbours shall be untaxed except only Ptolemy, king of Alexandria . . . and that the garrison in Joppa shall be expelled as they have requested. 222

Rome's interest lay with John. Rome could not tolerate any ambitious Seleucid king. Furthermore, the Senate was also concerned with Egypt's status and interest. The relationships between the Seleucids and the Ptolemaic house deteriorated after the marriage of Cleopatra, Ptolemy's wife to Cyzicus. However, our sources give us some details on the good relationship that Grypus maintained with some circles in Rome's society. 224

Rome supported the triangle, John—Ptolemy—Grypus, because they fit in with her policy of maintaining the status quo. Therefore, now the Senate, not as in previous letters of alliances gave a strong support to the Jewish request for the renewal of control over the territory taken by Sidetes. At the same time that John developed his good relationship with Rome, he maintained a good relationship with Ptolemy. As a result, he also kept friendly relationships with Alexander Zabinas, the claimant which was set by Ptolemy against Demetrius II. As we mentioned previously, John was a member in the triangle Ptolemy—Grypus—John, which fought against Antiochus Cyzicus. This triangle was supported by Rome.
John's diligence in his development of foreign relations assisted him when he went on with his campaigns. John marched against Medaba which was captured after six months of siege. Next he captured Samoqa and its environs and in addition to these, Scechem and Garizein. Hyrcanus also captured the Idumaean cities of Adora and Marisá. He permitted the residents to remain in their cities, as long as they had themselves circumcised and were willing to observe the laws of the Jews. Hyrcanus campaigned against Samaria, a very strongly fortified city. After a year of difficult siege and in spite of Cyzicenus' attempt to help Samaria, the city was conquered.

John expanded Judaea's territory by conquering Scythopolis and other places neighbouring it.

The internal struggles over the throne in the Seleucid house gave Hyrcanus the possibility of regaining Judaea's independence. He stopped paying taxes, the taxes which were imposed again by Sidetes on the cities that were out of Judaea's territory. He..."no longer furnished them any aid either as a subject or as a friend."

Hyrcanus exposed his great talent to benefit from the internal conflicts within the Seleucid court. Hyrcanus led Judaea in a brilliant foreign policy in which he stood in the same camp with Rome—Ptolemy—Zabinas, and later on with Rome—Ptolemy—Grypus. John, Hyrcanus' good international relationships helped him to carry out the expansion of Judaea. This was a necessary step to regain independence. This foreign policy, in addition to the intrigues
within the Seleucid house, gave Hyrcanus'... leisure to exploit Judaea undisturbed".

In this chapter, we have studied the way in which the Hasmoneans benefited from the "timing" that came as a result of internal struggle over the throne. These struggles provide the Hasmoneans with political vacuum, from Judah's time. These internal struggles gave the Hasmoneans the possibility to manipulate their policy in such a manner that they were able to translate their local military power into political power. In other words, into independence. On the other hand, the Seleucid house could not adjust their policy to the changes in the balance of power taking place within the international arena, especially after Magnesia battle. The rise of the Parthian kingdom in the East and Rome supremacy in the West. This new status quo should have caused some changes in the Seleucid concept of a "super power". But that change was not realized by the Seleucids. The Seleucid kings fostered the dream of the great Seleucid kingdom as it was during Antiochus III's reign. The few campaigns to the East carried out by Antiochus IV, Demetrius II and Antiochus Sidetes were partly attributed to this policy and ended with harsh results. This because of the Seleucids inability to accept the shift in power which took place in the Eastern arena. All the Seleucids journeys to the East failed and did not achieve their military and political goals. These defeats just emphasized one of the greatest weaknesses of the Seleucid's policy—their inability to adjust to a new political structure, and a new balance
of power. (Rome in the West and Parthia in the East).

The failures in their Eastern campaigns exposed other Seleucid weakness which were partly laid in the nature of the Seleucid kingdom. The kingdom based her policy on compromise. These compromises were vital because of her inability to maintain a constant military presence. This military presence was necessary to keep the Satrapies subordinated to the central government. Therefore, in the absence of Seleucid military presence, the local governor would do everything to break the Seleucid yoke. The same situation occurred in Judaea. The Seleucid kings supported the "Hellenistic" faction which carried out their vital interests. However, the "Hellenistic" faction needed a constant Seleucid military presence, in order to maintain its own position in Judaea. When the Seleucids failed to provide that presence, the Hasmoneans took the country's affairs into their own hands.

As we noticed from our study, the situation in Judaea differed from that of the Eastern Satrapies, and as a result, the situation in Judaea exposed more than anywhere else, the nature of the "Seleucid Weakness". Because in Judaea, it was quite comfortable for the Seleucid kings to exercise their military might and constant "policing policy". This constant involvement was characteristic of the Seleucid policy in Judaea. All the Seleucid kings took part in carrying out this policy. Nevertheless, the Hasmoneans were able to carve their way to independence. That was mainly because of the ability of their great leaders to utilize both
the poor internal Seleucid situation and their realization of changes taking place in the balance of power, in order to pave the road to independence.

This great ability of the Hasmoneans in political maneuvering brought about the official recognition of Jonathan as the leader of Judaea during the reign of Alexander. When a struggle over internal power took place between Alexander Balas and Demetrius I. A recognition given by Balas in order to get Jonathan's support to his reign. In later events the Hasmonean proved their skills in obtaining Royal and Military appointments from the Seleucid kings. They released hostages from the Seleucid captivity, and achieved promises including the evacuation of the strongholds from Seleucid soldiers. They continued with the conquering of Acre until they achieved independence during Simon's days.

However, it was clear that the evaluation of the Hasmonean state must be examined in proper perspective. In spite of our sources, pro-Hasmonean bias in describing these events, we have examined the establishment of the Hasmonean state on the background of the "Seleucid weakness" and the great effect of the international forces. As we had noticed from our examination, we cannot attribute the establishment of the Hasmonean state only to the Hasmonean military might, although this power cannot be ignored. The military inferiority of the Hasmoneans was realized by the Hasmonean leaders themselves and resulted in their numerous diplomatic maneuvers with Rome. This was a policy that all the Hasmonean
leaders adopted, in order to secure the military fruits achieved in local battles. This relationship aimed to deter the Seleucid kings from harsh retaliation measures, although the relationship with Rome did not carry immediate results, or influence on the Seleucid policy. They certainly indicate the concern of the Hasmonean leaders with the possible danger they could face from a massive and direct military encounter with the Seleucid kingdom. This army three times placed in jeopardy the success of the revolt. This danger, the Hasmoneans aimed to prevent, mainly by establishing good relationships with the great forces in the international arena.

The fears of the Hasmonean leaders were justified after Sidetes' campaign in Judaea. When seven years after Judaea achieved independence, one ambitious Seleucid king swept away her independence and brought Judaea back to the status of a satellite state of the Seleucid. Our sources described the achievements of the Hasmoneans mainly resulting from their military strength, and their great victories over the Seleucids. We can, however, also determine from these same sources that the Seleucid attitude to Judaea's affairs resulted in a "policing policy", carried out by local commanders. These commanders, in most instances, were defeated by the Hasmoneans. But when Lysias, Bacchides and Antiochus Sidetes carried out a massive concentrated military effort in Judaea, the Hasmonean army could not resist. In other words, the power of the Hasmonean army, although being a great factor in the local arena, could not stand
effectively against a major Seleucid campaign. In addition, it did not prevent constant Seleucid intervention in Judaea. This massive intervention must be examined in relation with lack of activity, characterizing of Seleucid policy in the East. Furthermore, even weak Seleucid kings such as Demetrius III and Antiochus Dionysus, did not hesitate to confront a strong Hasmonean army during Yanai's reign. The military power of Judaea was overestimated by our sources as a result of their pro-Hasmonean tendency. This military power although of great local importance, did not deter even weak Seleucid kings.

Therefore, while we evaluate the Hasmonean state, we must place into the proper perspective the Hasmoneans' leaders great diplomacy as well as their military achievements, although in many instances these two were bound together. The Hasmoneans showed great ability in translating their local power in the decrepit internal Seleucid house as well as in the international political forum. This policy in addition to their cosmopolitan outlook, paved Judaea's road to independence.

This was not an accidental occurrence during Simon's and John's leadership. More than ever it was a result of propitious timing and circumstances.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this work we have examined the situation of the Seleucid Empire at the turn of the second century B.C.E. During that period of time, the Seleucid Empire was comprised of vast territories which were very difficult to control. In addition, international forces (Rome in the West, Parthia in the East, and Egypt in the South), served to further complicate the situation.

Most historians, therefore, consider the Seleucid Empire weak. However, our study analyzed the extent of this weakness, and determined if indeed it did exist. If this was the case we must expose the causes which brought about this weakness. Therefore in the conclusion of this work we must distinguish between two main factors: constant factors - those factors which lay in the nature of the Empire since it was established, and the particular factors - those which were set into gear after the death of Antiochus IV.

The examination of the Seleucid Empire is vital when one wishes to evaluate the creation of the Judaean state. Most of the constant factors pertaining to the weakness of the Seleucid Empire were not of great importance in reference to the particular situation of Judaea. In addition, the Seleucids could exercise their military supremacy especially over Judaea. Therefore, one must ask oneself how did Judaea carve her way to independence?
In order to answer this important question, one confronts various difficulties from the sources. These sources show, without doubt, as we have noted, a Pro-Hasmonean bias. In spite of this tendency, we can expose the myth surrounding the battle for independence, or at the very least, place in proper perspective the creation of the Hasmonean state.

In order to deal with these issues, and many others, we have made a detailed examination of the situation in Judaea. We have analyzed the three main military encounters that took place between the Seleucids and the Hasmoneans. In all of these episodes the Hasmoneans were defeated. Although we cannot ignore the many Hasmoneans victories over local Seleucid commanders, it is clear that the Hasmonean army could not face the massive operation that had been held by Lysias, Bacchides and Sidetes. This is one of the reasons why we could not simplify and say that Seleucid weakness brought upon the Hasmonean success in carving their way to independence.

As we have previously noted, this was clearly not the case in Judaea. Therefore, the simple explanation as given by Bevan and other historians -- concluding that the Seleucid weakness caused the establishment of the Hasmonean state -- can not be accepted. Tcherikover's explanation\(^1\) which states that the Seleucid Empire was never a strong one, and which compares the Seleucid concession in the East made by Antiochus III to those given later on to Jonathan and to other Hasmonean rulers,\(^2\) is equally unacceptable.

As we examine this work we should be more accurate and careful when we use the term "Seleucid weakness". However,
when we speak of "Seleucid weakness" in Judaea it is clearly not in a military sense. As we have pointed out, on three occasions the Hasmonean cause was in danger. Lysias, Bacchides and Sidetes proved that whatever the Seleucid weakness was, they handled with great success through military prowess; this was proved once more during Timarchus' revolt. Furthermore, even after the creation of the Hasmonean state, during the reign of Yanai when the Judaean army gained strength, a weak Seleucid king did not hesitate to attack Judaea.

There are two main schools of thought concerning the establishment of the Hasmoneans state. The first, held by Schürer, Meyer and Bevan (among others), focusses on the Seleucid weakness. The second, exposed by Klausner and Tcherikover, attributes the establishment of the state to the inner Hasmonean power. There is some degree of truth in these theories, but neither of them provides us with either a proper perspective or a complete picture of the circumstances in which, the Judaean state was established. This picture can not be completed unless we examine the entire situation and pay particular attention to the way in which certain factors combined and were set into gear during the period of Simon's and John's leadership.

The culmination occurred when both the inner power of the Judaean and the political situation inside and outside the Seleucid kingdom were in favour of the creation of the Judaean state.
This occurred during a time when the Hasmoneans, under the leadership of Simon and John, looked for those opportune moments which would allow Judaea to break the Seleucid yoke. As described by Josephus: "For after the death of Antiochus ... no longer furnished them any did either as subject or as a friend. ..." No longer was it necessary to give hostages; pay taxes, or have Seleucid garrisons in Judaea and, most important of all, the state itself controlled its own religious and political affairs.

We have noticed throughout this work that when all the factors were set in motion, they caused the Seleucid decline. This created a vacuum in which the Hasmoneans, through the ability of their leadership, acted in forwarding their goal of independence. That this occurred during the leadership of Simon and John was not coincidental. The centrifugal forces came into play during this period of time. The Seleucid kingdom was divided into two. One part was headed by Demetrius II, and the other by Tryphon and Antiochus VI. While this internal struggle over the hegemony was taking place in the Seleucid kingdom, the Parthian in the East did not ease their pressure and ate away at the Eastern borders. Rome in the West, although not directly involved, was a grave concern to both Seleucid kings, Demetrius II and Tryphon. This pressure from Rome and Parthia, in addition to the continual threat from Egypt on the Southern border, gave the Hasmoneans the opportunity to break out from under the rule of the Seleucids.
When Simon entered the Acre in 141 B.C.E., this event symbolized (more than any other) Judaea's independence. Since the breakout of the revolt of 167 B.C.E., every attempt made by the Hasmoneans to conquer the Acre resulted in harsh reprisals from the Seleucid, for the simple reason that Acre symbolized Seleucid authority in Judaea. The fall of Acre in Judaea 141 B.C.E., and the inability of the Seleucid to avoid it, resulted in the exposure of the decline of the Seleucids on one hand, and the great policy of Simon on the other hand.

The great influence of the international forces appeared once again when Sidetes lost his life during his campaign against the Parthians in 129 B.C.E. This was the time when John could regain Judaea's independence, which was demolished by Sidetes' campaign in Judaea in 134 B.C.E. Rome and Egypt contributed, as in the past, by weakening the Seleucid kingdom.

However, it is obvious that the Hasmoneans' success in bringing about independence was not accomplished merely through their military strength and heroism, as our sources have led us to believe by embroidering the battle for independence with myths.

As we have studied the events that lead Judaea to independence we can conclude and say that the Hasmonean leaders, by their cosmopolitan view and diplomacy, helped Judaea to carve its way to independence. They were able to accomplish this by utilizing the current events in the Seleucid house to their own advantage. These events included the struggles over the crown, and the changes that took place in the political
arena. The Hasmoneans displayed a great ability to translate their immediate military power into political power and to bring about the creation of an independent state which, during John's reign, became "... whereas the interior above Phoenicia, as far as the Arabians, between Gaza and Antilebanus is called Judaea."

The struggle of the Hasmoneans for independence is surrounded by myth. This is the result of the biased pro-Hasmonean tendency our sources exposed. As we have noticed clearly in our study of the sources, the writers of *first* and *second Maccabees* were pro-Hasmonean. As a result, their writings provide us with a song of glory to the Hasmonean house. This stand taken by the sources resulted in the glorification of the last battle of Judah against Bacchides "... Judas although abandoned by his own soldiers, and with enemy pressing him ... was ready to engage Bacchides' men with his eight hundred; and so he was exhorted these few to face danger braverly, and urged them to advance to battle." The aim of this description is quite clear and had been dealt with in great length in previous chapters.

As a direct result of the writer's pro-Hasmonean stand, he has portrayed in his book of *first Maccabees*, the Hasmoneans as those belonging to the faithful observants of the laws and carriers of God's will. The writer expressed his belief that the Hasmoneans were the family that had to lead the people against the "Hellenized party," called by the writers. "Snai Blial" wicked, and also against the pagan Hellenistic
rulers. It was for this reason that the writers described Judah's last battle the way he did. For the same reason we do not have a variety of accounts which focus on the Hasmonean defeats. The little information available must often be derived from reading between the lines of those accounts which do exist. While on the other hand, every local victory became a festival and national celebration. However, even a Seleucid king, Alexander Balas, is described as a king of good natures and as Bevan noticed, Alexander Balas was thoroughly popular only in one quarter - that of the Jews. The Jews liked him because he left them alone. Throughout the book of first Maccabees the writer tries to convince us that leadership was given to the Hasmoneans through the will of God. Therefore Joseph Ben Zacharia and Azaria failed because "... they were not of the seed of those men, by whose hand deliverance was given unto Israel." The writer's purpose was to convince us of the legitimacy of the Hasmonean house and with it the transition of the high-priesthood, that occurred during Simon's leadership, to the Hasmoneans. "Simon should be their leader and high priest forever, until faithful prophet should arise."

This Pro-Hasmonean tendency of our sources calls our attention, as Historians, to determine wherein the valid information lies, to expose myth from fact, and to place in proper perspective, the rebirth of the Judaean state. We
can, in spite of the sources' bias, study the events taking place during the Hasmonean revolt. Therefore, we must doubt the conclusion reached by Schürer. On one hand Schürer accepts the numbers of soldiers as given in first Maccabees during Judaeans' last battle. However, he concludes by saying that what the Maccabees finally achieved, they won through the voluntary concessions of the rival pretenders to the Syrian throne, and as a result of internal disorganization of the Syrian empire. Some queries must be asked: How could Schürer ignore the strength of the Hasmoneans while simultaneously accepting the numerical figures given by the author of first Maccabees? What caused Schürer to ignore the facts that he himself had accepted?

We can accept Zeitlin's criticism directed at some Christian historians, stating that in their studies he found a deep influence derived from the hostility of the church. That probably caused E. Meyer to describe the Hasmoneans "echte Judische Fanatiker" while he pays homage to Jason and Menelaus as reform Jews. On the other hand, it is difficult to accept the narrow Jewish nationalistic interpretation as given by Kluesner and it is equally difficult to accept the view of Zeitlin in his eagerness to draw parallels between the emergence of the second Commonwealth and the third. (the present state of Israel).

Therefore, the task of this work was to place in proper perspective the creation of the Judaean state by exposing a great deal of the myth with which our sources surrounded it.
While reexamining our sources and determining where—in the valid information lies, we received a better balanced perspective of the events that led the Hasmoneans to carve their way to independence, as well as studying the character of our sources, as literature.

There is no doubt, however, that putting in proper perspective the events concerning the struggle for independence provides us with another aspect of Jewish literature during the Hellenistic period. That type of literature, although it represents pro-Hasmonean bias, is our only literary source to the establishment of the Judaean state. By exposing the characteristic tendencies of this literature, we established our method of study which helped us determine wherein the valid information lies, and so to place in a proper perspective the establishment of the Hasmonean state.
CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES


II Maccabees covers 18 years of events: from Seleucus IV until the death of Nicanor. The book is an epitome of a wide historical composition divided into five parts and written by Jason of Cyrene.


3. I Maccabees will be examined first because it served as a source for Josephus.


7. I Macc. 6.1.
The Senate assembled just in Kalendæ which was the first day of the month. Nones the ninth day before Ides which is the fifteenth day of the Month of March, May, July and in the thirteenth of the other months as well as in holidays—Festes, and in every emergency the Senate could be assembled.

1. 

Justin's claims that before his death Alexander gave the ring to Pericles, the commander of his guard; Arrian and Diodorus gave different accounts. When Alexander was asked by his commander to whom he should hand the kingdom, he replied: to the best of all. Diod. 12.17. Just. 14.12. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander 27. M. Zeitlin, First Book of Maccabees, p. 27 assumed that the Seleucids as well as the Ptolemies, claimed that Alexander left a will naming the country's new ruler, in order to strengthen their own position. This was taken as a historical truth. Zeitlin's assumption proves weak because the book of I Maccabees, as well as other Hellenistic sources, do not indicate to whom Alexander left his kingdom.


3. I Macc. 1.8.8.


5. The Seleucid calendar started in the summer of 312 B.C.E., marking Seleucus' victory over Demetrius in Gaza and the establishment of the Seleucid dynasty. The book of first Maccabees contains twenty-one Seleucid dates among them eleven concerned with Jewish events. These dates were calculated according to Jewish tradition that start its count from Tishri in the fall and Nisan in spring. It is clear, however, that the Jews count the start from Tishrei as the Second year. On chronology see S. Zeitlin, ibid., pp. 50-49, 263-257.


8. I Macc. 8.15. and so in the people's mind.


21. A. Kahana, The Book of Apocrypha, p. 75, referring to Grimm's claims that Sixtus Senesis (Bibliotheca Sancta Lib. I p. 39) saw, in the library of Santes Pagninus in Lion, Greek manuscript of I Maccabees in Hebrew style and includes chronicles of thirty-one years, and as we know from Josephus' testimony John governed thirty-one years. The chronicle starts...after the murder of Simon John his son ruled instead of him..." This led Grimm as well as Kahana to conclude that this book probably included the book of Chronicel mentioned in I Maccabees.

22. We can not accept M. Stern's interpretation of the author's ignorance of international events by his mistake of mentioning only one Consul. Stern ignores the fact that even if the book was written as he suggests during John's leadership at least two delegations from Judaea visited Rome and probably became familiar with the fact that two consuls were in office. However, these passages can strengthen our hypothesis that it was I Maccabees author's intention that led to his description and serve some propaganda for one ruler. However, Stern's claim that it could not be compiled during Aristobulus is rather weak from the simple reason I Maccabees praised every cause that supported the Hasmoneans, the Romans as well as Alexander Balas. See Stern, Documents on the History of the Hasmonean Revolt, p. 14.

23. I Macc. 8.15-16. Joseph. Antiq. 13.298-293. It is possible that here we can find some indication to the beginning of the crises between the Hasmonean and the Pharisees.


25. Eusebius Ecclesiastical History VI.25.2.


27. Jerome The Principle Works of St. Jerome. Vol. 6, translated by W.H. Fremantle, (New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1893), p. 489. "...The first book of Maccabees I have found to be Hebrew the second is Greek, as can be proven from the very style..."
28. I Macc. 1.29. Translated the officer of the Mysians to the officer of Taxes.

29. The Hebrew original of the book is being the usual septuagint rendering of ναταζανεῖον: I Macc. 3.20:9.57.

30. I Macc. 5.3.

31. Ibid. 15:8.5.

32. Ibid. 2.49.

33. Ibid. 3.46.

34. This is commonly agreed among Scholars, c.c. Torrey, Apocryphal Literature, p. 70. Dany, Commentary on I Maccabees, pp. 2-3. Stern, Documents on the History of the Hasmonean Revolt, p. 16.


38. Justin describes the murder of Alexander Balas in the fight with Demetrius. Diod (frag B.32) reports that Alexander Balas was defeated and escaped to the Arabian desert where he was murdered by Tabbathil who sent back his head to Ptolemy. I Maccabees version (11,13-18) supports Diodorus version, and it is probably correct. In another incident, Livy (52) described the defeat of II Demetrius by Tryphon and his escape to Seleucia, Appian (The Syrian Wars 67.8) describes that II Demetrius, while engaged in a battle against the Parthians fell in captivity. When the kingdom was without a King Tryphon proclaimed Antiochus VI as the legitimate king. Justin in a similar manner (36.1) described Tryphon's proclamation of Antiochus VI as a king and himself as his patron while II Demetrius was prisoner. I Maccabees describes that Tryphon proclaimed Antiochus VI as a king when Demetrius was still governing. I Maccabees account supports Livy, once again and proves that I Maccabees account of events is complete and correct.


43. A fact that we must consider and pointed out by Antiq. 13. 299 that "... he (John) was accounted by God worthy of three of the greatest privileges the rule of the nation, the office of high priest and the gift of prophecy. ..."

44. I Macc. 9.22-1.


46. I Macc. 4.69.

47. I Macc. 5.60. We can accept B. Bar-Kochva's pp. 186-185 point that the author of I Maccabees would not feel it necessary to exaggerate the number of casualties as a means of illustrating the disastrous results when a non Hasmonian led the people to battle, for those results were obvious enough without any distortion of the facts. II Maccabees exposes inspite of his tendency to reduce the defect that it was quite heavy.


49. See Diod. 19.82.85 Gaza. Polyb. 5.13.70: 5.86 Rafah.

50. Prof. Avi-Yona estimates the total amount as 15,000 claiming that Joseph Ben Zacharia's and Azaria's army amounted 4000 soldiers. Prof. Avi-Yona, Essays and Studies in the Lore of the Holy Land, p. 57.

51. Plutarchus Emilius 6.9 describes Emilius Faulous reaction to the Seleucid military power.

52. As he did in the past.
A step which Bar-Kochva rejects but could be taken into consideration by the Jewish commander.

1 Macc. 9.14.


A basis to the Seleucid armed forces is the parade in Daphane 165 B.C.E. The numerical figures derived from this description lists 46,000 in the infantry from them 2000 Phalangites and 5000 cavalry. Polyb. 30.25.

Appiah Syria 47.


The term "Hellenized" has a negative connotation, meaning, it co-operates with the Seleucid regime: "lawless" and "Bnai Bhial", this term originated from the outlook of the writers of First and Second Maccabees.

1 Macc. 3.11:4.11-14, 34.

The death of Elazar, see: I Macc. 1.47: 13.22.

Josephus The life 1. A. Geiger claims that if that was the case, it was impossible that Josephus would not stress it in his books. So modesty was not one of his qualities.

Compare with Ezra 2.62 and Nehemaiah 7.64.

However, there is no evidence that Josephus, when writing Antiquities still adopted the Pharisees' philosophies and way of living, as it is not reflected in his writing. Moreover, we must examine it with the context in which Josephus mentioned it, namely, that he explored the three sects of Judaea. See G. Alon, Studies in Jewish History in the Times of Second Temple, The Mishna and the Talmud, vol. 1 (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1957), pp. 25-15.


Josephus Against Apion 1.1.


Josephus Against Apion 2.288.


We can accept Schürer's, Stern's, and Thackeray's claims of the use of I Maccabees by Josephus. This use can be determined from the context and style. M. Stern, Documents on the History of the Hasmonean Revolt, p. 25 Thackeray, Josephus the man and the Historian, pp. 64-63.


As to the question, does the book of I Maccabees provide us with detailed information on Jewish leaders? We must argue that I Maccabees does not provide us with detailed information on the Gentile side. I Maccabees' purpose is the glorification of the Hasmoneans, while Antiquities is an apologetical work and details on the Jewish side could have served Josephus' purpose and glorified this period.


Ibid., 13. 375.

Joseph. Antig. 13.378. The description does not damage the mercenaries' glory but what about that of Yannai?


The same event was made by Josephus as a defeat. Joseph. Antig. 13.391.

Syncellus Georgias... ed. G. Dindorfius (Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae) I (Bon: 1839), p. 559.
85 Joseph. Antiq. 13 256-236.
86 Ibid., 12. 135, 358.
Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmenta der Griechischen Historiker
88 Ibid.
89 Joseph. Antiq. 16.27.
90 Ibid., 16.183.
91 Ibid., 16.187.
92 Ibid., 13. 301.
93 Ibid., 13. 319.
94 See H.L. Jones in his introduction to The Geography
of Estrabon.
95 Joseph. Antiq. 15.8.
96 Ibid., 14. 63-34.
97 M. Stern, Greek and Latin authors, p. 262.
Against Apion 2. 84-85.
CHAPTER II

THE WEAKNESS OF THE SELEUCIDS

The Structure of the Seleucid Empire and its Governing System


3 Appian Syria 61: Plutarchus Demetrius 38.

4 As in the cases of Molon and Achaicus.


6 Eusebius Pamphili Chronicorum Libri duo, I, 253.

7 Junia Justinus Historiae Philippicae 34, 3.6.


10 Though -των, -τα and -τις all occur.


14 Str. 12.528.

15 Str. 12.750.

16 Str. 12.750. it's largely guesswork.

17 Too much weight has often been put on information professedly derived from Judaea merely because it exists. The Jewish writers indeed had much to say but they can not be trusted blindly. Anyhow the peculiar circumstances of that province do not necessarily shed any light on the Empire at large.


19 "While Satraphy continued to be the official name for the province, the governor in official documents is called by the Greek title of Strategos. In popular language, he was still spoken as of a Satrap." Bevan, The House of Seleucus, Vol. 1, p. 152.


21 Polybius The Histories 5.41.1.

22 Bevan claims that Oikonomos was stated in an inscription saying that his duty was to relay an order to the district officer which he received from the Strategos who had received it from the king relating to the alienation of a portion of the Royal domain. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, vol. 1 p. 152.

23 Diodorus Siculus 19.48.5.
24 On their military and political importance see Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army*, pp. 48-2.


27 Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army*, p. 43.

28 Antiochus III and Antiochus VII expeditious exposes some of these hardships. See also Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army*, p. 43 as well as all the chapter.

29 Just. XLl.5.7. polyb. 11.39.


31 IMaccabees.3.27-31.


35 Polyb. 32.2; App. Syr. 38.

36 Polyb. 28.20.

37 Polyb. 30.25.1: 20.26: Diod. 31.19a:29.15; polyb. 31.9.


39 II Macc. 8.10.


THE STRUGGLES OVER THE CROWN

1Seleucus Philometor, 187-175 B.C.E.

2During a period of hundred thirty years, only seven kings reigned. This fact alone, emphasizes the great change that took place in the Seleucid kingdom, a change from relative stability to instability during which time the crown shifted often. (except the reign of Demetrius I (Soter) 162-150 B.C.E.


4Alexander and Demetrius II 143-147 B.C.E., Antiochus VI and Tryphon 145-142 B.C.E., Tryphon and Demetrius II.

5I Macc. 6.15.

6I Macc. 6.55-57.


8We must note that Josephus emphasized Antiochus V's and Lysias' explanation to their army concerning the cause for their retreat, while the victory was at hand. They mentioned the difficulties of the siege, as well as the lack of supplies. However, it is obvious that Lysias' motivation for the departure towards the capital was caused by the return of Philip. Josephus Jewish Antiquities 12.379-381.


10Polybius The Histories 31.11-12: See the chapter on Rome.

11Polyb. 31.12.

Polyb. 33.5.2.

Polyb. 32.11-18: Diod. 31.32.


Diod. 31.40a: Liv. Epit. 45.

Polyb. 33.18.

Justinus Historiae Philippicae 36.9.

I Macc. 10.1-2.

Joseph. Antiq. 13.35.

Just. 35.1.6: App. Syr. 67.

Joseph. Antiq. 13.58; Just. 35.1.10.

Just. 35.2.2.

Diod. 33.3.

Athenaeus The Deinosophists v.211a.

Joseph. Antiq. 13.86.

B. Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army, p. 21. Bar-Kochva suggests that Demetrius II, after establishing the Cretan mercenaries around the court, dismissed his ancestors' army each to his own place. This act provoked bitter resentment among the population of Northern Syria known to be of Macedonian descent. (Just.35.2.)

I Macc. 11.41.

Diod. 33.4: Joseph. Antiq. 13.129: I Macc. 11.38.

31 I Macc. 11.40.

32 Strabo Geography 16:752: Diod. 33.4a.

33 I Macc. 11.54-58.


35 Just. 36.1.7: Joseph. Antiq. 13.219.


37 Just. 36.1.3f.


39 Most scholars agree that the documents brought in I Maccabees are reliable. In this same category we can include Antiochus' letter to Simon as it has been recorded in the book of I Maccabees (15.3-9). We can not attribute any reasons for the distortion of the letter by our author. However, later events concerning the refusal to accept Simon's military assistance suggests that a previous appeal for help existed. Furthermore, the letter has a typical style used in the hellenistic cultures, where the name of the king appears without a nickname. Our study of events once again reinforces the sources' credibility. The bitter struggle between Antiochus VII and Tryphon required support, therefore, it is possible that in order to improve his own position in the struggle Antiochus asked for Simon's support.

40 I Macc. 15.1.


42 I Macc. 15.10: Joseph. Antiq. 13.222.


44 I Macc. 15.37.

46 As B. Bar-Kochva explained, the defence of the Empire depended on the mobility of the Royal Guard and "strategic reserve provided by the military settlers. The use by the rivals of this manpower, namely the settlers, to back their political ambition to the throne, had an enormous damaging effect on the Seleucid Empire. Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army, p. 36.

47 Antiochus V, Demetrius I, Alexander Balas, Demetrius II, Antiochus VI, Tryphon.

48 Demetrius II hoped to reunite the kingdom under his leadership. He thought that "...if he should subdue the Parthians and acquire a price of his own, he would make war on Tryphon and drive him of Syria". Joseph. Antig. 13.187.


50 Polyb. 31.11-12; App. Syr. 46.


53 As the case of the murder of the queen Antiochis, see E.R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, Vol. 2, p. 185.

54 Polyb. 31.11-13.


56 Diod. 31.27a; App. Syr. 47; Soter: (The Savior).

57 1 Macc. 7.23.

58 Eupator was born in 174 according to the Seleucid's calendar. Therefore, Alexander Balas could not be born before 173 by the same calendar.

59 Just. 35.2, 2.

60 As Bevan suggests "Demetrius Soter married in 162 and Demetrius was born in 161, he would be fourteen in 147. But the Antigonus murdered by Ammonius was not improbably the eldest son of Demetrius I..."Bevan, The House of Seleucus, vol. 2, p. 218, note no. 1.

62 Bevan, _The House of Seleucus_, vol. 2, p. 302; see Appendix R.

63 _Diod._ 33.28.


65 We have numismatic evidence which proves that the reign of Antiochus dates within 167 according to the Seleucid calendar. _I Macc._ 11.54-56: _Joseph. Antiq._ 13.144.


67 Lysias during the reign of Antiochus V. Eumenes and Ammonius during Balas' reign. Lasthenes' influence during Demetrius II reign. Tryphon also dominated the reign of Antiochus VI. (Although Alexander Balas ascended the throne when he was 23 years of age, he was used by Eumenes as a political puppet against Demetrius, since the time he was 14 years old.


THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES

ROME

1 Polybius The Histories 20.8.1.

2 Livius From the Founding of the City 36.7.17-20.


5 I Macc. 14.1-3. Antiochus IV and Demetrius Soter were hostages in Rome as a result of that treaty.


7 Liv. 43.26.

8 Polyb. 27.19.

9 Diod. 31.27a.

10 Liv. 44.19.


There are historians such as Otto (p. 89) who considered Popilius policy a will to maintain the double kingship in Egypt with the hope that quarrels between the brothers would facilitate Rome's domination. We can accept Swain's criticism of Otto's assumption which relies upon the advice of Popilius to the brothers to live in harmony. See Joseph Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt," Classical Philology 39 (1944): 94.

14 Polyb. 30.25.3-11.
15 Polyb. 30.27.
16 Polyb. 31.2: App. 46.
17 Polyb. 31.2.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid 31.15.
20 Diod. 31.27a.
21 The relationships between Rome and Judaea will be examined in the next chapter.
22 Diod. 31.28: Just 35.1.2.
23 Polyb. 31.2.
24 Ibid 32.3: Diod. 31.30.29: App. syr. 47.
25 Polyb. 32.10: App. 47.
26 I Macc. 5, 1-16.
27 A policy that brought about the clashes with the Ptolemaic house, Attalus and Ariarathes.
28 Livus Epitomae 47.
29 Just. 35.1.9.
30 Polyb. 33.18.
31. Joseph. Antiq. 13.114. "... he determined to refrain from appearing to give the Romans any reason for disliking him."

32. Diod. 33.3.

33. His weak personality, could be effected by the fact that he was under Eumenes and Zeophanus' patronage since the age of fourteen years. Later, Balas received Philometor's support. Therefore, it is not surprising when he finally succeeded the throne, his government was abandoned to his Prime Minister Ammonius. Diod. 31.32a; 33.3.

34. I Macc. 12.2.

35. Diod. 33.48a.


37. Livius Epitomae 47. Another possibility is our sources lack of information.

38. II Macc. 8.10.


41. Polyb. 32.11.

42. Diod. 33, 28a. Although we must bear in mind that all the Seleucid kings were aware of Rome's outlook.

43. Polyb. 33.18.

44. II Macc. 10.13.


46. Compare with Rome's naval strength during Pompeius' time (63 B.C.E.).

47. Polyb. 31.10.7.
PARTHIA


2See Strabo and Pompius Trogus in Justin’s *Epitomae*.


4Justinus *Historiae Philippicae* 41.4.6-7. Arrian parthia fr. 1.

5The date is uncertain, although we can assume that the conquest of Parthia did not take place until the battle of Ancyra, Just. 41.4.7.

6We have divergent statements as to the rise of the Parthian Dynasty and they are all halos of mist, even the Greek themselves were quite uncertain as to the historicity of their accounts of this early period. See Strabo Geography 11.515. or Arrian *Parthia* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58.

7Just: 41.4.8.

8Polybius *The Histories* 10.46. Str. 11.513.

9Just. 41.5.1.

10Arrian fr. 1, quoted in Syncellus p. 539.

11Polyb. 9.43.

12Ibid: 10.27.

13Just 41.5.7. The figures are probably exaggerated.

14Polyb. 10.28-29.
15 Ibid. 10.27-31.

16 Just 41.5.7.


18 Bevan suggested that the change of ruler perhaps meant a fresh declaration of independence. He points out the numismatic evidence presented by Prof. Gardner in which the coins were struck by Arsaces dated 187/8 B.C.E. However, Mr. Wroth's research date them at 125 B.C.E. Furthermore, one must bear in mind that the events took place after the Seleucid defeat in Magnesia. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, vol. 2, p. 119. Just 41.5.9.

19 Just. 41.5.9.

20 Just 41.5.9-10.


23 The rank that stood in command of the forces reflects the Seleucid attitude to this matter. See Bezalel Bar Kochva, The Seleucid Army Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 85, 142.

24 App. 45 Diod. 31.17a.

25 II Macc. 9.1-2.


27 Polyb. 31.9.


30 Debevoise suggestion came as a result of the study of the Cuneiform tablet. Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia, p. 22 (Notes 98,99).

31 Ibid. pp. 22-23.

32 Just. 41.6.6-9.

33 Ibid. 36.1.2-4.

34 Ibid. 36.1.4.


36 The goal to change the status quo in which the kingdom was divided between two kings Tryphon and Demetrius. He could obtain new allied contingents to his army which could help him in the future to establish his position as a sole king of the Seleucid kingdom.


38 I Macc. 14.1-3: Just. 36.1.5-6: 38.9.2-3.

39 App. 67.

40 Just. 42.1.1.

41 Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia, p. 29.

42 App. 67. Just. 38.9.

43 The figures are disputed among scholars: Just. 38.10.2. Orsius. The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans. 5.10.8. Diod. 34, 17.1.

44 Just. 38.10.5f.
45 Diod. 34.19.

46 Just. 38.10.10.

47 Ibid. 38.10.11: 39.1.1.

48 Ibid. 41.4.6-7.

49 The first utilized the death of Tirdates I and the crowning of Artabanus as well as Sidetes who used the death of Mitrdates and ascension of Praetes to his benefit.

50 Just. 41-5.7.


52 Polyb. 31.9.

53 The pre-conditions to any expedition to the East were dealt previously in details. Bevan claims that Demetrius II secured his crown by leaving Cleopatra alone. Tryphon was her husband's enemy and the murderer of her son. Therefore, Demetrius II was not afraid of leaving her alone in the capital. However, we can not accept it as the reason for Demetrius II's departure, but it could have encouraged him to carry out his plans in the East in order to gain prestige that would later on help him to reunite the kingdom. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, p. 233.

54 Ibid.


56 In order to dismiss his use has a claimant to the throne.

57 Just. 38.10.10.


59 Ibid. 186.


61 Mainly as a result of the insecure throne as well as natural difficulties in carrying military expedition to the East.
EGYPT

1 On the date of the battle and the origin of the name of the God pan, see Maurice Holleaux, "Etudes d’histoire hellénistique, la Chronologie de la cinquième guerre de Syrie," Klio 8 (1908): 267, the Origin of the name the God pan, Avi-yona, Atlas of the period of the Second Temple, The Mishna and Talmud, (Jerusalem: Carta, 1966), (Hebrew).

2 Titus, Livius From the Founding of the City 33.40.

3 Polybius The Histories 28.20.9.

4 Antiochus IV denied any such kind of agreement and it is difficult to believe that Antiochus gave promises of that kind, six months after he possessed that territory. Moreover, the Seleucid House was always looking for the opportunity to dominate this territory. The statement found in Josephus Antiquities (XII, 160) may indicate just that Antiochus promised his daughter some revenue that was collected from Coele-Syria.


7 Polyb. 28.21.

8 Ibid.: Diod. 30.17.

9 Polyb. 28.23.4. Diod. 30.18.2.


11 Antiochus’ interests in being Philometor’s guardian were dealt in detail by Joseph Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt, Classical Philology 39 (1944): 85-82.

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid p. 84.

14 Tacitus History v. 8 "rex Antiochus demere superstitionem et mores Graecorum dare adnitus, quominus taeterrimans gentem in melius mutaret, Parthorum bello prohibitus est" that quotation from Tacitus can help us as similar to other sources. Polyb. XXVIII.23.4f that Antiochus' main concern was the nibbling process held by the Parthians. That process had great effect both on the economical and political status of the Seleucid kingdom. See also "Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt", Swain, pp. 84-85.

15 Polyb. 28.23.4f: Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt", pp. 84-85.

16 Polyb. 29.4.7-9.

17 See The Chapter on Rome.

18 Polyb. 33.5.

19 Diod. 31.32.

20 App. Syr. 67.


We reject Bouche, Leclercq conjectures. He supposes that Philometor had originally intended to get Coele Syria back but when Alexander asked for his daughter's hand, he thought that on the whole good policy to agree and drop the question of Coele Syria. Two main points Bouche Leclercq fails to prove true because our lack of knowledge of what was in the mind of those in the Alexandrian court. The Second is Egypt's great concern towards the Roman outlook. A consideration which was recorded by Josephus, Antiquities when Philometor reached Antioch "... he determined to refrain from appearing to give the Romans any reason for disliking him." (Antiq. 13.114). Therefore, we cannot accept Bouche Leclercq interpretation of events.

22 The contradiction within our sources makes it obscure. Polybius describes that Ptolemy's intentions were to support Alexander, but from the book of I Macc. 2.1. We study that Philometor came to conquer Alexander's kingdom slowly. We can accept I Macc. version as reliable as a result of the constant conflict between the Ptolemaic House and Alexander as well as Ptolemy's accusation on a plot to assassinate him.


26 I Macc. 2.18.


29 Somehow we fail to examine every case separately, because we tend to consider the Seleucid as a powerful Empire. The Seleucids in the Second Century B.C.E. lost much of that, but on the other hand, this does not mean that the kingdom had no power and was not strong enough to defend its very necessary interests. Antiochus IV, Demetrius II and Aniochus Sidetes and their aggressive policies provide us with the proper perspective to evaluate the Seleucid kingdom. However, we must distinguish between the Seleucid military power and their inability to translate this power into political achievements, as in Antiochus VII's and Antiochus III's cases.

30 Bar Kochva estimated that Seleucid's success to control its vast empire depended on their military settlement which aimed A. to establish islands of Greco Macedonian population among the Orientals and spreading the culture among the upper classes of the subjected nations. B. provide reservoirs of trained and loyal manpower. After Antiochus IV's death the Seleucid seemed to lose that strength and as a result it effected the strategy of defensive mobility and were not able to send forces to suppress the uprisings in the Eastern borders. See Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 201.


32 For example, Antiochus III journey to the East.
74 Ibid.

75 Josephus *Jewish War* 1.38.


78 We can easily remove all doubts of it being the tendency of the Maccabees which aimed to glorify the Hasmonean by attaching to them letters of alliance with a great powerful nation in the stature of Rome.


We cannot accept Wirgin's assumption regarding the first Maccabees treaty, with Rome solely on economical grounds for the following reasons. A. We cannot separate this treaty from the rest of the treaties between Rome and Judaea. B. There remains some doubt that in a struggle of independence, even though economical issues are of great concern, that the main concern is the achievement of international recognition - Rome C. in 165 B.C.E. Judah and the Hasmonean party did not yet establish their positions in Judaea, especially in Jerusalem. Their opponents were quite strong and supported by the Seleucids. Although we can assume that while being in Rome the Judaeans discussed the economical matter, it is clear that it was not on the central agenda. However, the monument of Simon to his family can be explained also as the building of monument to their achievements: namely a gate to the Sea of Jaffa. Wolf, Wirgin, "Judah Maccabees Embassy to Rome and the Jewish Roman Treaty: Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 101 (1969): 20-15.


81 This is the only way that we can understand Dametrios' subsequent policy in Judaea and Medes. His harsh measures against their two leaders, Judaea and Timarchus, despite them having signed a treaty with Rome, contradicted the general Seleucid policy. This policy attracted much attention and concern from Rome's opinion. On the relationship between the house of Seleucids and Rome, see the chapter on Rome.
82 Polyb. 31.11.

83 Bacchides reached Jerusalem in the fall of 161 B.C.E. in the battle between the two armies, the Hasmoneans were defeated and Judah was killed.

84 I Macc. 9.23-25.

85 I Macc. 9.23-30.


87 I Macc. 9.31.

88 See chapter Seleucid Weakness p. 39-55. We can accept some of Kolbe's conclusion focusing on the internal struggles which gave Jonathan the possibility of carrying on with Judaea's struggle for independence. But we can not underplay the Hasmonean great diplomacy and leadership as well as the inner power of the people. Walther Kolbe, Beiträge zur Syrischen und Jüdischen Geschichte, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1926), p. 167.

89 I Macc. 9.36-49.

90 The garrison in Jerusalem. I Macc. 9.49-54.

91 I Macc. 9.57.

92 Judean desert east from Tkoā.

93 I Macc. 9.64-67.

94 I Macc. 9.58.

95 We suggest that the reason for his departure came as a result of the popular support given to the Hasmoneans. He realized, however, that the Pro-Selucid faction could only survive when there was a massive Selucid military presence. Such a presence could not be maintained, especially, when the crown of Demetrius was in danger from the new claimant to the crown, Alexander Balas, supported by Emmanus.

96 I Macc. 9.73.
Rome did not recognize Demetrius until 160 B.C.E. See the Chapter on Rome (p. 67).

Polyb. 33.18.

Diod. 31.32a.: Just. 35.1.6-7.

Joseph. Antiq. 13.36.


I Macc. 10.6.

Ibid. 10.9-12.


I Macc. 10.18-21.

I Macc. 10.21; Joseph. Antiq. 13.46.

I Macc. 10.25.

This support came in spite of Demetrius' great offers, aimed to gain prestige within the Seleucid house, as they in fact did, when Jonathan obtained a special status in the Royal House. I Macc. 10.65.


I Macc. 10.58-65.

Just. 35, 22.

Diod. 33.3.

Ibid.

I Macc. 10.68.

Ibid. 10.74-85.


120. *I Macc.* 11.16-17.

121. *I Macc.* 11.27.


123. *I Macc.* 11.38; *Diod.* 33.4.


125. *Diod.* 33.3

126. *I Macc.* 11.41.


130. *Diod.* 33.4.


132. *I Macc.* 11.54-56.


134. *I Macc.* 11.54-58.

135. A position which had previously been held by Hegemonides (*II Macc.* 13.24.) and Cenoebeus (*I Macc.* 16.35).
136 I Macc. 11.59.

137 As a son of Alexander Balas.

138 I Macc. 11.60.

139 Ibid. 11.62.


142 I Macc. 12.32-35.

143 Ibid. 12.35-38.

144 Ibid. 12.36.

145 Just. 36.3.9.

146 I Macc. 12.2-8.


151 Ginsburg's assumption which speaks of the alliance with Sparta being established because of its Jewish population is difficult to prove. Michael, Ginsburg, "Sparta and Judea" Classical Philology 29 (1934): 122-117. See also Moses Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, p. 86.

152 I Macc. 12.39-52.

154 Apparently in the territory on which Simon governed the Ladder of Tyre unto the border of Egypt. I Macc. 12.44-46.


156 I Macc. 13.8-9.

157 Previously as governor Simon placed there a Jewish garrison.

158 I Macc. 13.12.

159 As a result of internal pressure aiming to avoid claims that he did not do everything to bring about his brother's release.


163 I Macc. 13.36.

164 I Macc. 13.41-42: Lichtenstein, Negilat Taanith.

165 141/142 B.C.E.

166 Jonathan fought Gaza because of her support to Demetrius. I Macc. 11.62.


171 Diod. 33.28a.

173. We must suggest that the renewal of the friendship took place in 142 B.C.E. and not as the chronological sequence brought by *first Maccabees* in 140 B.C.E. *First Maccabees* stated that Demetrius promised Simon the highpriesthood after he heard about the great honour the Romans gave him. B. The letter of Locius directed to Demetrius. We can not assume that Locius would direct his letter to Demetrius after the last fall into captivity in 140/139 B.C.E. We must also bear in mind that L. Caecilius Metellus was consul in 142 B.C.E. and praetor 145 B.C.E.

174. Gazra the city that Georgias army escaped after they were defeated by Judah: *I Macc. 4.15*. This city was fortified by Bacchides. *I Macc. 9.52*.

175. *I Macc. 13.48*.

176. *I Macc. 13.51-53*.


178. *I Macc. 13.51*.

179. *I Macc. 10.9-10*.

180. *I Macc. 13.31-40*.

181. This aim was the main motive of Demetrius' campaign to the East, a campaign without military logic. *I Macc. 14.1*.

182. *I Macc. 14.8*.


184. *I Macc. 14.41*.


187 I *Macc.* 15.6.

188 See the Chapter on Parthia who despite its independence still used Seleucid coinage. Concerning Hasmonean coinage see Y. Meshorer and Ben David research which dismisses the claims that the coins of half a qekel and qekel from the first year until the fifth year could be attributed to Simon, but must be referred to the time of war between the Jews and Romans. Yaakov Meshorer, *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple, Tel Aviv: Am-Hassefer, 1967*), pp. 41-42.

Arye, Ben David, "When did the Maccabees Begin to Strike their First Coins", *PEQ* 104 (1972): 103-93.

On the importance of Sidetes promise see Wolf Virgin, "Maccabean History from Coins", *PEQ* 104 (1972): 104-110.

189 139/138 B.C.E.

190 This date confirms our numismatic material which support the assumption that he conquered Antioch and Tyre in the same year. See Theodore E. Newell, "The Seleucid Mint of Antioch" (New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1918), p. 81.


192 I *Macc.* 15.33. Simon or the author of first Maccabees raise an ideological historic motive which justified the Hasmonean conquest outside Judaea's boundaries. In other words, not with the right of power but with the power of right.


194 I *Macc.* 16.9.

195 Ibid. 15.37.


202 As a result of his good relationships with Alexander Balas.

203 By two commanders Athenobius and Cendebaius.


Although Josephus on Antiquities described it as willingly and part of mutual agreement, it is clear, that the military assistance was an obligation of a satellite state. See my work p.105 - 107 as well as compare to Jonathan's assistance to Demetrius II.

208 Part of a Parthian attempt to ease the military pressure of Sidetes on the Eastern frontier. Diod. 34.15: Just. 33.10.7. App. Syr. 68.

209 Just. 38.10.11.

210 Ibid. 39.1.2.


212 Ibid. 268-269.

213 Newell, The Seleucid Mint of Antioch, 84 5qq.


215 See John's first alliance with Rome.

216 This assumption supports the hypothesis that Judaea got the Senate's support all along Rome's interest matched with those of Judaea. In other words maintaining the status quo, and a weak Seleucid kingdom. See M. Stern, On the Relationship between Judaea and Rome, Zion 26. p. 6-12.
217 Joseph. Antiq. 13.256-266.

218 Compare to the situation when Rome forced the Seleucids to compensate Duomanes after magnesia. Polyb. 21.16a: Just. 31.8.8: App. Syr. 38: Diod. 29.10. Liv. 37.45.


220 Ibid: Just. 39.2.9.


223 Just. 39.3.2.


226 Ibid. 13.254.

227 Ibid. 13.258.

228 The aid of 6000 soldiers of Latirus to Cyzicenus took place during 107-108 B.C.E. A short time before Latirus was removed by his mother Cleopatra. This was later than the time of the coalition between Ptolemy and Hyrcanus as described in the Senate letter of alliance.


230 Ibid. 13.273.

231 We can attribute some of the credit to the large Jewish community (Antiq. 13.287) a good relationship was maintained during Yanai's reign. (Antiq. 13.354).


When Bacchides left Judaea: I Macc. 9.59.

Except Alexander Balas.

I Macc. 11.27: I Macc. 11.59.

I Macc. 10.6.

I Macc. 11.41.


Lysias, Bacchides and Sidetes also indicated the state of decline of the Seleucids. Operations usually handled by local commanders, were executed by the king himself. (Sidetes). On the other hand, we witness Judaea in the process to independence.

The campaigns in the East were carried out by Antiochus IV Demetrius II and Antiochus Sidetes (except Demetrius II) Sidetes and Epiphanes were powerful and influential kings with ambicious policies. During their reign the Hasmoneans were not provided with the political vacuum which enabled them to utilize and pave Judaea's way to independence.

CONCLUSION.


3The comparison between these two incidents can only emphasize the change in the Seleucid status in the international arena. However, we cannot ignore: the reign of Antiochus III, Antiochus IV, especially his victories over Egypt, or Antiochus VII recovery of power until 129 B.C.E. Can this period be categorized as weak?

4Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 13, 376, 390.

5Ibid. 13.273.

61 Maccabees 15.15-24. Rome's friendship with Judaea was one of the reasons for his promise of priesthood to Simon.

7Diod. 33:28a. Tryphon marks a turning point in the history of the Seleucid kingdom. He was the first king and not a member of the Royal family. This fact has great significance in Seleucid history. See chapter The Internal Struggles over the Crown.

81 Macc. 13.51.

9Ibid. 12.1.

10Strabo, Geography 16.756.

11Josephus, Antiquities 12.423.

12One must question all the available information concerning the internal struggle between the Hasmonean's and their supporters and the "Hellenistic party". While it is clear that our sources represented one side of the dispute - namely, the Hasmoneans. Therefore, the term used by the authors of 1 and II Maccabees namely "Hellenistic party" must be reexamined and, used in this thesis just to distinguish between them the Hasmoneans supporters, and their opponents.

14 I Macc. 7, 48-50.

15 Ibid. 8, 1-16.

16 Ibid. 10.47-69.


18 I Macc. 5.62-63.

19 Ibid. 4.41.


22 One must bear in mind that Schürer as well as Meyer and Kolbe, etc. studied the Second Temple era as the background to the uprise of Christianity.

23 Zeitlin, The Rise and the Fall of the Judean State, p. xxi.
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