Towards a Normative Christian Theology of Expressionism

Donna Hart

A Thesis in The Department of Religion

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada

March 1984

© Donna Hart, 1984
ABSTRACT

TOWARDS A NORMATIVE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF EXPRESSIONISM

Donna Hart, Ph.D. Religion
Concordia University, 1984.

The thesis deals with the meaning of artistic expression in a full and Christianly normative sense. It makes use of the perspective of Bernard Lonergan throughout: initial indications of that perspective are given in the Introduction and Glossary. It begins from the accepted notion of expressionism and goes on to show both the unwarranted limitations grounded in that usage and the helplessness of contemporary criticism in its efforts to discuss expression or objectification. It is an effort to elucidate the task of criticism in regard to artistic expression, and is a novel venture into the concrete operations required by Lonergan's detailing of the components of dialectic. Finally, it leads to a fully normative view of Christian expressionism relating to a trinitarian theology which takes its stand on the reality of the human subject as imago Dei, in the sense that the subject is creatively a reflection of divine expression.
PREFACE

This thesis originated from an interest in expressionist music in its narrow sense, in so far as it seemed to manifest a heightened problematic subjectivity which somehow reached beyond the secular. Gradually the scope of the thesis was enlarged so that a broad view of modernity emerged and the full range of aesthetic expression and its possibilities was included.

The form of the final version retains aspects of that growth and so the presentation is from a moving viewpoint. From a systematic perspective, one might have begun with the question of general foundational categories, but the present structure has the advantage of progressively revealing the need for such categories. Furthermore, it better illustrates the theological method which is a central aspect and topic of the thesis.

There is a necessary incompleteness of this work, relating both to the novelty of the method and the largeness of its topic. Therefore an initial attempt to make use of such an approach as functional specialization, particularly in the area of dialectics and foundations as is the case here, cannot but be somewhat tentative. Furthermore, however, the topic had to be large to illustrate fully the challenge of dialectics as
envisaged by Lonergan. Dialectic involves a personal felt response to the actual past as researched, interpreted, accounted for by historians, and indeed also criticized by dialecticians. As viewed by Lonergan, it represents a methodological invitation, particularly to theology, to break out of any narrowness to an empirical openness to the world. The thesis has risked the challenge of that openness in facing dialectically and foundationally the question, What might be an artistically adequate and Christo-centric orientation of the name expressionism? The result of that reflection is an indication of a powerfully suggestive trinitarian transposition of possibilities of artistic expression in the third stage of meaning. The final normative meaning of expressionism reached leaves critically behind its normally accepted meaning. Such a critical departure is analogous to the manner in which critical realism may critically assess "realism" as a particular tradition of artistry.

Since the thesis is written within Lonergan's paradigm for philosophy, theology and realism, the introduction seeks to make clear basic elements of that paradigm. Such a clarification has the obvious limitation, as Lonergan has remarked,


2 Ibid., p. 250.
of adequately expressing a meaning that can be achieved only by prolonged personal exercises. Still, it is of value in locating the thesis within an essential set of contexts of Lonergan's work. The introduction is complemented by an appended glossary.

I would like, in conclusion, to thank Professor Charles Davis of the Religious Studies Department of Concordia University for his patience and guidance. The initial efforts at formulating the thesis were confused and lengthy sketches of suspicions and half ideas. Only slowly did the definite direction of the final work emerge.

---

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE. CONTEXT FOR A TRANSPOSITION OF THE MEANING OF</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>EXPRESSIONISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Expressionism As Normally Conceived</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>The Structure of a Theology of Art</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Metaxic Reality</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>The Place of Criticism</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Relocation of the Problem of Expression</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO. ASSEMBLY AND DIALECTIC</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>The Emergent Subject in Dance</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Painting as the Plastic Means of Expression</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Sculpting as a Subjective Enterprise</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Musical Expression</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Lyric Literature</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>Pointers Towards a Self to be Expressed</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE. TOWARDS CATEGORIES OF HISTORY</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FOUR. PROBLEMATIC KEY GENERAL CATEGORIES OF</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>EXPRESSIONISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Difficulties and Strategy</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Objectivity and Subjectivity</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Artistic Expression</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Image, Symbol, Abstraction, Representation</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>The Artist as Concrete Intention</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>General Categorical Heuristics</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Context in Modern Theology</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Context from Method in Theology</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ontology of the Trinity in History</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Psychological Analogy</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>An Enlarged Ontology of the Trinity</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Expressionism in the Full Context</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX I. Glossary | 180 |

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 183 |
INTRODUCTION

Since this thesis is written within a particular paradigm for doing theology, that elaborated by Bernard Lonergan in the past three decades, some introductory indications of the basis of that paradigm are in order. Primarily, I wish to comment briefly on Lonergan's view of, and contribution, to philosophy. How that view is enlarged to become a perspective and strategy in theology will be a central topic in chapter one. In this introduction, therefore, only a generic notion of the enlargement will be given.

As Professor Crowe has pointed out in a series of works, 1 Lonergan's development of his meaning for philosophy has been a prolonged growth into and beyond Aristotle and Aquinas to a fundamentally open and praxis-oriented meaning of this activity. We restrict ourselves here to some brief helpful indications of that achievement.

First, there is Lonergan's mature view of philosophy as being a self-appropriation involving generalized empirical

---

method. This notion of a generalized empirical method was first introduced in his work *Insight*:

We have followed the common view that empirical science is concerned with sensibly verifiable laws and expectations. If it is true that essentially the same method could be applied to the data of consciousness, then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method, which only in its essentials is the same, be named a generalized empirical method.

This strategy underpins Lonergan's definition of metaphysics:

"The process to explicit metaphysics is primarily a process of self-knowledge..... the method of metaphysics is dictated by the self-affirming subject in the light of his pedagogically acquired self-knowledge"3. One could say that the empirical stress is just as pronounced in Lonergan's later work after *Insight*, and one is led to further clarification of the empirical character of these reflections:

Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.

---


3Ibid, pp. 397-8

This empirical character is a central feature of the effort in the present thesis: one must stay close to the realities of the various art forms if one is to appropriate adequately the procedures of the artist.

For many thinkers, there is a discomforting subjectivity about this specification of philosophy by Lonergan. To remove this discomfort, and to further clarify his contribution to contemporary thought, "the two central fruits of philosophic efforts should be briefly noted." The first fruit relates to the priority he gives to insight over concept: "The key issue is whether concepts result from understanding or understanding results from concepts." Resolving this issue, indeed, is the central topic of his work, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. The second fruit is his precise locating of judgement as the act by which the mind reaches reality: "the real is, what is; and 'what is,' is known in the rational act, judgement." This fruit is brought clearly into focus in the work Insight, where it forms the kernel of what Lonergan

---

5 We return to this topic in chapter four.


calls "the position" as opposed to counterpositions on the nature of reality, so that a judgement:

... will be a basic position, (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being (where being has been defined as the objective of the desire to know) ... and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection.

One may say that these two fruits are Lonergan's fundamental contribution to the theory of knowledge and of the objectivity of knowledge. Knowledge is seen to be a dynamic movement through the three levels of experience of the data both of sense and of consciousness, of what-questions reaching for insight and of is-questions reaching for judgement.

Further light on Lonergan's contribution may be had both by noting the views opposed to his contribution and by taking note of his claims regarding the compatibility of his position with the achievements of modern science.

Lonergan's stand on the priority of insight to concept not only is a stand against the prevalent tradition of conceptual analysis but it is also a rescuing of Thomas Aquinas from the Thomists. According to Lonergan, both conceptual analysis and the post-medieval scholastic tradition have their roots in the writings of Scotus:

The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas, understanding precedes

---

conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus, understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics. It is the latter position that gave Kant the analytic judgement.

And of course one may note that in so far as one assumes that conceptualization precedes understanding one may claim a need for the analysis of concepts.

Secondly, Lonergan's view of realism is one which he claims places him and St. Thomas outside the accepted spectrum of current views: one escapes that spectrum by discovering that "there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism, and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism".11

Finally, we may add Lonergan's illuminating claim that his perspective on knowing and reality squares with the structure of scientific procedures and results of these past centuries. This he argues succinctly in "The Isomorphism of Thomism and Scientific Thought"12, and Insight elaborates that claim.


Within the context of his view on knowing, Lonergan develops his analysis of action or doing, procedures of a fourth level of consciousness. The dynamism of what-and is-questions recurs on this level, reaching for value. The pinnacle of value reached is the gift of "being grasped by ultimate concern," which places the subject in the realm of faith, a reality which Lonergan distinguishes from creed. Lonergan's complex notion of theology as a functional specialist reflection will concern us in chapter one. Here it is best to relate his view briefly to a classic view associated with St. Augustine and St. Thomas. What Lonergan seeks to do is to structure the task of Fides Quaerens Intellectum in a way that is adequate to the modern problematic, but the fundamental task remains the same: "A theology mediates


14 See the substantial entry under gift in the index of Method in Theology.


16 Ibid, pp. 115-19.

between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."\(^{18}\)

A final point of clarification regards Lonergan's view of the total cultural matrix in terms of stages of meaning, since this view is central to the thesis. Systematically, the view depends on Lonergan's identification of three basic horizons: the horizon of common sense, the horizon of theory and the horizon of interiority.\(^{19}\) The horizon of interiority is reached through the self-appropriation that Lonergan identifies as philosophy. With this systematic view is associated a historical view of the emergence of these horizons, specifying three related stages of meaning.\(^{20}\) Early meaning is common sense meaning, prior to the emergence of science, identifiable broadly as the first stage of meaning. The identification is broad because the stages in fact overlap and intertwine. The second stage of meaning is associated with the emergence of science, most clearly identifiable in the West of the past millenium. This stage of meaning generates problems of meaning and method which call for the emergence of the third stage of meaning, in which issues of method move subjects to investigate procedures. These personal investigations move subjects from the merely

---


\(^{19}\) Ibid, pp. 81-85; 235-37.

spontaneous use of intelligence to an enlightened and controlled use of intelligence. "In the third stage the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority." Chapter three of the thesis will enlarge further on this topic.

Since Lonergan tends to take up standard philosophic terminology and give it a meaning peculiar to this system, further clarification of such peculiarities of meaning would seem to be in order. For this reason a short glossary of significant terms is added as an appendix.

---

CHAPTER I

CONTEXT FOR A TRANSPOSITION OF THE MEANING OF EXPRESSIONISM

This first chapter falls into five sections. A first section sketches briefly an aspiration evident in traditions of modern expressionism. It does so in a realist and indeed a theist fashion: but only in later chapters will the realism and theism emerge as non-naive and critical.

The following three sections consider three contexts of reflection on expressionism: the first two contexts are considered because they are seen as necessary contexts for an adequate discussion of the significance and direction of expressionism: these are the contexts provided by Bernard Lonergan's structuring of human studies in functional specialties, and the context provided by Eric Voegelin through his reflection on the history of western reason. The third context to be considered is that provided by modern criticism. This context is considered here only to reveal its basic inadequacy for dealing with the issue at hand. The inadequacy, however, will be more critically treated in the fourth chapter, when the grounds of a critical aesthetic realism will be discussed.

The final section of this chapter focuses on the results of these reflections and on the problem raised in the first section to reveal the overall direction of our discussion of the historical and religious significance of expressionism. In this chapter that revelation can be only tentative. Not
until chapter five can we attempt a comprehensive treatment of the theological transposition of expressionism.

Section I: Expressionism As Normally Conceived

The term "expressionism" became acceptable with regard particularly to a tradition of French painting in the early twentieth century, but in a still acceptable sense it is used in reference to Vincent Van Gogh, and we may start our move towards an ultimate fundamental and broader characterization there.

Van Gogh may be said to have moved from Impressionism in a direction opposite to that sought by Cézanne and Seurat. While these latter converted impressionism into a severe classicism, Van Gogh rejected the implicit limitations to the wholeness and freedom of the artist's reality. His Self-Portrait (1889) epitomizes the aesthetic reach of his spoken ideal: "I want to paint men and women with that something of the eternal which the halo used to symbolize." This ideal summarily expresses the positive content of a problematic expressionism which we wish to eventually place within the full context of a theology of stages of historical meaning. In the present section we wish to initiate the move to that larger proleptic view by noting a parallel reach for such full and novel expression across the modern aesthetic spectrum. What at this stage, and in the more elaborate

---

illustration of chapter two, may be considered as the metaphorical and hyperbolic reflections of great artists will hopefully (later we will see that this word too suffers a thematic transposition) be seen in our later chapters as an anticipation of a thematic of the epiphany of meaning in history. Read remarks, in the conclusion of his work on sculpture: "We have discovered that art has a biological function, that the artist, like the photosynthetic cells that absorb creative energy from cosmic rays, is the sensitive organ of an evolving consciousness - of man's progressive apprehension and understanding of his universe."²

Expressionism in the accepted sense is recognized as emerging with peculiar vitality in the German tradition, where "the Germanic temperament preferred digging down to the subterranean regions of the soul",³ and we find as articulate witness of problematic subjectivity in his art and in his ideals, the composer Arnold Schoenberg. Regularly he returns to the problem of the "crisis of sensibility" which has dogged European composers throughout this century by saying:

This century has been one of violent and unprecedented change, of ferment, revolution and ever-changing knowledge and beliefs. Man's attitude


to the whole cosmos has received a volcanic shock. Inevitably new spiritual forces and attitudes are constantly being generated, changed and re-formed, and the artist's sensibilities, too, are ever changing. Hence the "Crisis of Sensibility" which shook not only Italian music but also that of the whole western world, and indeed continues to do so. ⁴

And in a lecture on Mahler written in 1912 he comes close to expressing in commonsense terms what our thesis aims eventually to thematize within interiority: ⁵

In every case when human understanding tries to abstract from divine works the laws according to which they are constructed, it turns out that we find only laws which characterize our cognition through thinking and our power of imagination. We are moving in a circle. We always see and recognize only ourselves, only, at most, our own being, as often as we think we are describing the essence of a thing outside ourselves.

At issue here, as it is in the citation from Van Gogh, is the legitimacy, or even sanity, of secularism within art. And the lead to a resolution of the issue would seem to lie, not in a critical discussion of the arts within conventional techniques - we will return to this question in section four of this chapter - but in a felt participation in the self-reflec-
tive problematic reachings of the artist. I recall here a curious and suggestive remark made by Pierre Boulez, a noted contemporary composer, regarding James Joyce, particularly


regarding *Finnegans Wake*

It is not only the way the story is told that has been upset, but also that the novel, if one dares to put it this way, observes itself as a novel; and this results in a logic and cohesion of this prodigious technique that is constantly on the alert, creating new universes. It is in this way that music, as I see it, is not destined solely to "express" but must become aware of itself, become an object of its own reflection.

What Boulez says of Joyce and his work is taken by Richard Ellmann as the central characteristic of Joyce. He begins his massive biography of Joyce with the remark:

"Instead of allowing each day, pushed back by the next, to lapse into imprecise memory, he shapes again the experiences which have shaped him. He is at once the captive and the liberator. In turn, the process of reshaping experience becomes a part of his life, another of its recurrent events like rising or sleeping. The biographer must measure in each moment this participation of the artist in two simultaneous processes."

Joyce, indeed, incarnates the problematic drive towards adequate self-expression that we have already identified in Van Gogh and Schoenberg. The deficiencies of the drive and the sources of its problematic will be clarified when we come in chapter four to deal with the necessary differentiations of consciousness of a post-modern culture, and of the mediation of third-stage meaning expression.

---

7 Pierre Boulez, "Sonate, Que me veux-tu?", *Perspectives of New Music* (1), 1963, p. 32.


It is no wonder that as George Steiner points out in his *In Bluebeard's Castle*, "Nowhere do we find substantive examples of how a liberated, 'multi-dimensional' man would in fact re-structure his relations to reality, to that 'which is so'." 10

We may perhaps sum up the challenge implicit in the modernity of the arts, the sciences and the technologies in Thornton Wilder's words. He is, at the point, commenting on *Finnegans Wake*. He writes:

It will take its part in the emergence from parochialism and nationalism and the complacencies of "our system" and "our technological superiority". The terrible thing is to live in our twentieth century with nineteenth-century mentality. To be "out of phase" - that's what is blighting. That's what starves and frightens and shipwrecks so many souls. The realizations of new dimensions and new obligations pour in on us from the world of science, but we would rather retreat into the accustomed and the soothing. Joyce and Pound and Eliot have advanced into the new territory, they have shown us how understanding can reduce fear. The difficulties they present to readers are the exact counter-parts of the difficulties we experience in living at this time, and their triumphs are notification and guide to us as to where we may find clarification and strength.

Pound himself has been viewed as deficient in modernity, especially in the sense that, "Today, one feels that in many educated but imperfectly coherent lives that 'poetry of religious emotion' is being provided by music. The point is not easy to

---


demonstrate; it pertains to the interior climate of feeling."  

And Eliot has been criticised by Steiner for his particular sectarian sense of understanding religion (in particular, Christianity) as the core of a theory of culture, not in a far-reaching way as required by modernity, but in terms of severely limited horizons. Here, however, we cannot pursue these matters. Their discussion requires the larger contexts that we have indicated.

Briefly, then, so far we may say that there is a negative and a positive aspect to the long modern period of an aesthetic subjectivity, increasingly distorted by scientific and philosophic oversights. Negatively, the accumulating disorientations increasingly call forth warped and problematic aesthetic expression. But within that negativity there is the pressure towards an integrality of aesthetic expression, an integrality that stands in continuity with the religious and scientific reality of man. It is that integrality and continuity, in its present problematic intimations, that we wish to specify.

Section 2: The Structure of a Theology of Art

The present section seeks to contextualize systematically the problematic searchings of art intimated in the first section for which verbal discourse is peculiarly unsuited, and

---


underlying which one may discover inadequate epistemologies treating both the phenomenon of artistic expression and the symbolic presentation itself. It does so by drawing on the notion of functional specialization as conceived by Lonergan, so that what emerges is that foundational and critical issues in the arts are sublated into a new type of empirical, theological enterprise. In particular art criticism, which is the primary location of the problems of the first section, is seen to be adequate only in so far as it is located within Lonergan's functional specialty, dialectic. When thus located, the inadequacy of secular criticism as it has emerged in the west becomes apparent, and a normative notion of expressionism will emerge.

First we must summarily indicate what is meant by functional specialization in theology. It is an eight-fold collaborative structure grounded in the invariant four-levelled reality of human consciousness. Human history is the expression of those levels and the specialization in question results from the focusing of attention on the levels of that expression, first in its past achievement then in its future possibilities. So, eight specialties emerge in theology with names which both relate to past areas in theology and to the relevant aspect of human expression.

Thus, we have in theology:

1. Research; what makes available the relevant data.
2. Interpretation; which understands the meaning of the data or in other words hermeneutics.
3. History; which shows what was going forward beneath what was meant in what happened.

4. Dialectics; which aims ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint; and proceeds by acknowledging differences thereby discerning real and apparent differences and eliminating superfluous differences.

5. Foundations; which objectifies conversion, making it thematic and explicit, as well as presenting horizons and determining the meaning of doctrines in order for them to be apprehended.

6. Doctrines; which are concerned with judgments of fact and value leading to the horizons of Foundations, a clarification and development of History, a precise definition of Dialectics, and is an outgrowth of Interpretation while being based on Research.

7. Systematics; which works out appropriate systems of conceptualization, and removes apparent inconsistencies— it is a unified grasp of the inner consistency of doctrines and an analogy to familiar human experience.

8. Communications; which involves theology's external relations and is interdisciplinary in nature, achieving transpositions of theology so that religion becomes transcultural.

It is therefore possible to conceive of theology in two phases of (1) "input" and (2) "output"; in the first case, one must attend to the "word" as it is given in the four specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectics and secondly, one must be addressed with this
"word" in a second phase founded on the specialties of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and finally communications. Furthermore:

The first phase is mediating theology. It is research, interpretation, history, dialectic that introduce us to knowledge of the Body of Christ. But the second phase is mediated theology. It is knowledge of God and of all things as ordered to God, not indeed as God is known immediately (I Cor.13, 12), nor as he is known mediately through created nature, but as he is known mediately through the whole Christ, Head and members.

But the functional specializations of theology are not just a reorganization of the theological enterprise as commonly conceived. They are a structure for reflection on progress and decline in human history, and so also a structure for reflection on aesthetic achievement. Furthermore, in so far as theology becomes adequately empirical, one must expect the two reflections to merge or overlap. Finally, since the two specialties dialectic and foundations do not permit any degree of abstraction, in that they regard the concrete good critically, one is led to envisage an identity of reflection at that level. So, literary criticism or music criticism becomes an integral part of theology. This identification of criticism and theology, specifically dialectic, will require lengthy discussion since it goes against a tradition of secularism in the different fields of

aesthetics. But first let us draw out the parallel structures in an elementary fashion. This is done most conveniently by diagramming the structures of theological reflection and reflections within a particular art form together. We take as an illustrative art form the field of music. (See following page for diagram)

The parallel is powerfully suggestive and creative. Just as there is a set of problems in modern theology which are creatively linked by functional specialization, so within such a field as musicology there is a present confusion in the literature which can be removed by the introduction of functional specialization in that area. The present section, however, is directed merely at introducing the basic structure of reflection. The transition to the next section, however, is immanent in the diagram presented below. Theology is seen as attending to, and being mediated by, all types of conversion and centrally by religious conversion. Musicology has a central mediator in aesthetic conversion. But we have noted that the fourth and fifth levels of specialization merge into theology. Religious conversion, then, must both mediate and be attended to in, musicology. Returning to the central problem raised in section one, the total musical subject is expressed in music, and the total musical subject is sacred. We turn, then, to this issue in the following section, drawing on Eric Voegelin's critique of western secularism in terms of his acknowledgement of what
THEOLOGY:

- Reflection on Past
- Dialectics
- History
- Interpretation
- Research

MUSICOCOLOGY:

- Dialectics (criticism)
- Histories of Music
- Interpretation (analysis, etc.)
- Research (notation, instruments, performances, etc.)

CONVERSIONS (ALL TYPES)

ORIENTATION TOWARDS FUTURE

FOUNDATIONS

DOCTRINES

SYSTEMATICS

COMMUNICATIONS

CONVERSIONS ESPECIALLY AESTHETIC

FOUNDATIONS

DOCTRINES (BASIC MUSICAL PRINCIPLES)

SYSTEMATICS (THEORY)

COMMUNICATIONS (PERFORMANCES, ETC.)
may be called the sacrality of compact consciousness.

Section 3: Metaxic Reality

In this section we want to draw attention to key elements in the thought of Eric Voegelin. These elements will serve to reverse certain contemporary orientations in the field of aesthetics, philosophy and religious studies. The elements are especially present in their developed form in his work after 1970, and Voegelin has himself expressed his sense of a discontinuity in his searchings in the fourth volume of his series Order and History, entitled The Ecumenic Age. In order to provide a preliminary context we draw on two articles in which he expresses succinctly his views: "Reason: The Classic Experience" and "Equivalences of Experience". The first article focuses on the reality of man as "In-between" in a way that enriches Lonergan's view of religious conversion and that will later enable us to view secularist expressionism


as a paradox; the second article centers attention on the
grenacy of experience in a manner that reveals the lacuna in
the spectrum of critical positions that have emerged in
modern times.

Voegelin's inquiry into the concept of "metaxy" as
reach of totality has vast implications for the
"total being-ness" of the human subject. His belief in the
notion of Metaxy as the In-between character of existence
draws upon ancient classical thought (Aristotelian,
Platonic etc.), and his meaning is made clear by his con-
stant insistence that there is a tension created between
human reality or man's existence and the reality known to be
of a godly or divine status which is usually expressed by
the term Ultimacy, ultimate or divine ground. It is Voegelin's
contention (based upon the classic philosophers), that man
experiences himself as an unfinished "project" (to be quali-
fied) intentionally moving from his incomplete state of human
imperfection towards that completion and perfection offered by
a divine ground which moves him. He further claims that this
Metaxy or In-between dimension is not to be conceived in terms
of an empty space between the poles of tension created by
divine reality and man, rather it is the realm of the "spir-
tual" which invites a mutual intervention of human be-ing to
participate in the divine, and divine activity to be instru-
mental within human-ness. In addition, the Metaxy symbolizes
man's experience of himself as "noetic quest", or as the
embodiment of a dynamic structure questing towards an Unknown. More explicitly, man becomes aware of a "noesis" or cognitive consciousness at work within himself as the consciousness of questioning; his desire to know in turn intimates a kind of pre-cognitive unrest born out of wonder and a need to identify the Source of his existence as that from which he is evolving. This unrest speaks of a divine presence which gives it its direction, so that the unfolding of the "noetic consciousness" is experienced as a process of immortalizing whereby human thought aspires towards something beyond the things of its external world—something lying behind the surface level of sense perception, in Aristotelian terms, the Nous. For Aristotle, the Nous represented that divine ordering force which reveals itself within the psyche of concrete human beings and the universe at large, and which actualizes itself within noetic consciousness. The human subject as questioner and the divine intelligible force after which he seeks become participants in a divine-human encounter by the very act of questioning itself, and in turn each is brought to light as the luminosity and structure of consciousness. Man as "incarnate quest" becomes aware of a divine presence within, made manifest by the noetic structure of the psyche; therefore, the Metaxic consciousness may be described as a transition achieved by the psyche from

mortality to immortality. Indeed, the consciousness of questioning unproblematic intrinsic to the human subject finding itself in a state of ignorance and desiring knowledge becomes luminous to itself as a movement in the psyche towards that ground which is present in the psyche as its mover. The potential immortality offered by the divine presence in the Metaxy is either accepted or rejected by man according to his decision to follow the pull of the divine Nous or not - the psyche becoming the controlling factor by which the choice is to be made.

There is moreover an ordering force within man's psyche to be known as the reality of reason, a cognitively luminous center of order belonging to human existence. For the life of reason is not to be determined by the amount of information collected by the mind; instead, it is man's struggle in the Metaxy for an immortalization of the psychic structure by resisting those mortalizing forces known to exist as human passions, and overcoming what may be called the human subject's "apeirontic" lust for being in Time. Apeirontic refers to the Unlimited or that cosmic ground from which things are brought forth into being and to which they return, this, in contrast to the One or divine ground (presence) of which we have spoken that represents the formative force in all things to be identified with both wisdom (logos) and mind. An examination of the Metaxy or existence in the In-between characterized by opposing tensions (more specifically the
contrasting modalities of the divine and human, of immor-
tality and mortality, of reason and the passions, of perfec-
tion and imperfection) brings into question the mystery of
being itself; it follows that the reality of being-ness is
that participation of man's psyche in the Metaxy whose poles
are Apeiron (the Unlimited) and Nous (the Source of intelli-
gible order) and the possibility of these polarities becoming
intelligible to themselves through the human subject's poly-
morphic consciousness. Intelligibility of the Metaxic real-
ity as that In-between reality extending from the Nous to
the Apeiron is brought to consciousness via the several inte-
grally related levels of man's being, and this hierarchy of
being may be systematically formulated as follows:20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divine Nous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyche-Noetic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyche-Passions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Nature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetative Nature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorganic Nature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apeiron-Depth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arrows indicate movement within the metaxic sphere;
fulfilment or unfulfilment of its discovery by the individual

will depend upon any insights into his own subjectivity and understanding.

What emerges centrally from Voegelin's view is the illegitimacy of any dogmatic exclusion of any part of this range in the consideration of the human subject's experience and expression. The secular, then, is an abstraction which takes the heart out of history, and Voegelin argues that modern times have generated an aggregate of ideologies which have in common an egophantastic and radical misconception of human experience. 21

In the second article noted above, Voegelin enlarges on the metaxic constant within human experience and human history. "The search for the constant in history has been referred back from the symbols to the experiences, and from the experiences back to the depth of the psyche." 22 But the reference is always in danger of deformation by the system builder. "What is permanent in the history of mankind is not the symbols but man himself in his search of his humanity and its order", 23 but the system builder can isolate, reify, the symbols in a radical deformation of existence. "The


deformation, furthermore, can impose itself so massively on a man that he conforms to it and consequently deforms himself by making, deformed existence the model of true existence. And the philosopher who has made deformed existence his own, finally, can deform the historical field of experiences and symbols by imposing on it his model of deformation. Finally Voegelin notes that this model of déformation dominates the modern west: "it cannot be avoided by the philosopher in our time; it is the social field in which he is born, and it presses in on him from all sides." 

In the following section we will consider that deformation within a particular field of criticism in a manner that will lead us to seek another route in our efforts to understand expressionism in its full potentiality.

Section 4: The Place of Criticism

In section two we identified criticism normatively, within the context of Lonergan's work, as the fourth functional specialty. Contemporary criticism, however, is unaware of this normative possibility. In what way, then, could contemporary criticism be of value in seeking to identify the reality and potentiality of an adequate expressionism? The answer is implicit in the previous sections but a consideration of some

---


contemporary interests and problems of criticism here will help to illuminate and justify the direction in which we seek to go in the thesis. In chapter two we will broaden our consideration to all the aesthetic fields. Here we attend principally to criticism as it occurs in literature, with some reference to the field of music. This is a legitimate strategy in that new directions in criticism tend to emerge out of the field of literature: if we include dramatic expression it is by far the most ancient field, and since literature is itself highly articulate,26 (for the contrast of linguistic meaning and non-linguistic meaning, see B. Lonergan: Method in Theology, Chapter 3) it leads to a doubly articulate criticism. So, for example, the work of Lacan, which gives a new orientation to the Freudian study of language,27 had its first impact in the field of literature and gradually the influence spread to less articulate art forms such as the cinema.28 Again, developments in self-referential poetics, characteristic of Mallarmé and thematically present in Joyce, later becomes an

26 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter 3; especially Section 5 on Linguistic Meaning and Section 6 on Incarnate Meaning which discuss the embodiment of one by the other, of linguistic by the incarnate as a total realm of meaning in the broader sense. (pp. 70-73).


interest and aim within music and musicology.\textsuperscript{29}

What emerges from reflection on the variety of traditions and developments in literary criticism during this century is a conviction regarding the dominating and distorting presence of the Cartesian and Kantian problematic. The point is explicit in Rene Wellek's contention that the history of aesthetics is essentially a series of footnotes to Kant,\textsuperscript{30} and it is the implicit thread running through Frank Lentricchia's review of modern criticism.\textsuperscript{31} Lentricchia's work carries one right through from the early works of Northrop Frye to the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. What he reveals is a variety of unsuccessful efforts to escape the isolation of the Cartesian "cogito" while avoiding the threat of reinstating a naive traditionalism of author, text and reader. Discussing the early period, Lentricchia remarks "From Pater to T.S. Eliot no idea is more obsessively reiterated than that of the inaccessibly walled-off island of consciousness, unless it is the idea of the poem similarly described in splendid

\textsuperscript{29}The contemporary composer Karlheinz Stockhausen is a case in point with respect to his "moment-forms": see E. Salzman's Twentieth Century Music, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 178-9.


isolation. Reading, for Poulet, is quite simply the redemption of such tragic isolation." All the authors are crippled, like Culler, by the struggle to go beyond the Cartesian subject, and all, in one way or another, must admit with Levi-Strauss, "I am proceeding in the manner of Kantian philosophy." The central crisis is the need for "the objectivity of these classical attributes" of literature which seem to require the critic "to affirm that there is unmediated knowledge of the real; this, writes Nietzsche, "is certainly not the case". So, Lentricchia identifies "madness" in the work of Foucault as "surely in part an expression of his will to knowledge", and Lentricchia sums up in the same passage the central issue: "Long ago we learned not to yield to the lure of naive realism. It may be that the first order of critical business before us in the 1980's is to turn off the stereophonic sirens of naive idealism. But how is this to be done?"

---


33 Ibid, p. 111

34 Ibid, p. 127. See also p. 164

35 Ibid, p. 59

36 Ibid, p. 208

37 Ibid.
Certainly, what has been done so far is paradigmatic of all that Voegelin rejects: it is a dogmatomachy neglectful of experience. So, we find ourselves in agreement with the practicing critic R.P. Blackmur when he remarks "Epistemology is a great subject," and so is linguistics; but they come neither in first nor final places; the one is only a fragment of wisdom and the other only a fraction of the means of understanding". 38 We wish then to sidestep the obscurity of meaning 39 that marks the work even of such an acute mind as H.G. Gadamer: 40 we do so, not to avoid, but to


39 See B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter 3, specifically pp. 73-75. In fact, what I refer to here is elemental meaning in which the distinction between meaning and meant has not yet been reached, so that potentially, acts of meaning do not discern the difference between meaning and meant; but further, that formally acts of meaning still do not necessarily reach the signified, that even though the distinction has emerged, the exact status of the intended remains obscure or indeterminate. Certainly Gadamer strives for the fuller act of meaning, but his horizons of knowledge remain closed to those 'transcendental anticipations of history and reality in general that can be reached by reflection on the invariant dynamics of mind allowing for an emergence of both "truth and method" in a more comprehensive sense.

40 F. Lawrence, "Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan", Language Truth and Meaning, Ed. P. McShane, Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1970, pp. 167-218, brings out clearly the critical flaw in Gadamer. In the same volume, M. Lamb does the same for Dilthey, in his "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology" (pp. 115-167). In contrast with such critical considerations is the treatment of these authors by Josef Bleicher in his Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, c. 1980, (see chapters 1 and 5). The same obscurity of meaning regarding subject, object and history underlies all the authors from Betti to Ricoeur. "Historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory." (B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 175).
indicate another strategy of solution which is a more complex form of the strategy of getting the sceptic to talk. So, with C.S. Lewis, we wish to conduct an Experiment in Criticism\(^{41}\) in returning back from dogmas to experience. And again, the strategy and the return would seem to be a complex form of that noted by Bernard Lonergan:

...differences on the third, reality, can be reduced to differences about the first and second, knowledge and objectivity. Differences on the second, objectivity, can be reduced to differences on the first, cognitional theory. Finally, differences in cognitional theory can be resolved by bringing to light the contradiction between a mistaken cognitional theory and the actual performance of the mistaken theorist. To take the simplest instance, Hume thought the human mind to be a matter of impressions linked together by custom. But Hume's own mind was quite original. Therefore, Hume's own mind was not what Hume considered the human mind to be.\(^{42}\)

What we advocate, however, is not just a turn of the subject to subjective experience, such as a return of Hume to his own performance. What is needed is the full empiricability of the subject as aesthetic with all the possible enrichment of aesthetic history. In Lonergan's terms, what is needed is not isolated foundational debate, but the mediation of ever richer foundations through the implementation of the first four functional specialties.


\(^{42}\)B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 20-1.
Section 5: Relocation of the Problem of Expressionism

We are in a position now to place the problem of a theology of expressionism within a context which dictates the strategy of the present thesis. That strategy relates both to Voegelin's insistence on the metaxic reality of human experiences and to Lonergan's invitation, implicit in his delineation of functional specialization, to move out of undifferentiated and unempirical discussions of criticism. Such undifferentiated discussion, moreover, is characteristic both of theological and aesthetic criticism. So, even though one witnesses a kind of vortical movement of thought through descriptive analysis, one still finds a continuation of standard undifferentiated discussion in David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order. 43

The required shift moves one into the empirical and experiential tasks called research, interpretation and history, operations that can be carried out with the appearance of "philosophical neutrality" in a manner that removes epistemological debate - or dogmatomachy - from centre stage. The contrast between the two strategies can be brought out by considering Heidegger's approach to Van Gogh's painting as opposed to our own.

Heidegger brings to his response to, and analysis of, Van Gogh’s painting (the particular painting is a pair of peasant shoes set against a background of undefined space) all the apparatus of his explicit theorizing regarding Being, Time, Art and Truth. Van Gogh not only is isolated from the historical context, but is locked into the obscurantism of Heidegger’s descriptive analysis of the region of "the ontological ground of the merely ontic". Lentricchia notes that:

...as he (Heidegger) develops the issues it is clear that he means it when he says that truth must happen in art, and only in art; it seems impossible that he means to imply that the complicated processes of concealedness-unconcealedness, of the intimate opposing of world vs. earth, and of the difficult function of the rift (Riss) are all grasped silently and unself-consciously by folk intuition."46

To use a phrase of Lentricchia already quoted, there is a stereophonic siren in Heidegger’s approach that makes it impossible for him to experience and identify his own folk intuition.

In contrast, our discussion of artistic expression will proceed according to the dictates of Lonergan’s Method

---

44 The discussion is in Lentricchia, pp. 89-90.


46 Ibid, p. 90.

47 Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, p. 208.
in Theology. However, we do not, nor could we, intend to enter into the fields of research, interpretation or history in any systematic sense. Our strategy is analogous to that of F.E. Crowe in his The Word of God when he accepts the findings of traditional researchers and interpreters.\textsuperscript{48} We accept here traditional work done in research on history of art, work especially which does not centre its attention on epistemological issues - in contrast to the modern tendency as described in the previous section. Such work may be accused of the disorientation of naive realism but in fact it is dominated by a spontaneous realism which is healthy in that there is a spontaneous taken-for-grantedness of "the world mediated by meaning".\textsuperscript{49} In our attempt at dialectics to follow in chapter two - particularly focused on the two tasks of assembly and completion\textsuperscript{50} - this taken-for-grantedness will not be thematized. The thematization, indeed, is located further on in Lonergan's suggested procedure.\textsuperscript{51} Yet while the thematization is a later task, chapter two is not written from the perspective of naive realism. "The use of  


\textsuperscript{49}B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 77.  

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid, p. 250,  

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.
the general categories occurs in all functional specializations", and the general categories of critical realism are those being relied on in chapter two. The thematic presentation of those categories, particularly categories relating to history, subjectivity, symbol and objectivity, will preoccupy us in the third and fourth chapters. The fifth chapter will bring these thematizations to bear on the normative possibilities of expressionism in the third stage of meaning in the context of a theology of hope.

This indication of direction brings us to a precision of the transposition of the problematic and possibilities of expressionism that we are envisaging. There are two key features of the transposition, the first relating to the search for general categories of aesthetics, the second relating to special categories.

The first feature has to do with what Voegelin sees as a fad of this past century, the tendency to generate trivial and abstractive "-isms". One has only to glance through Jansen's massive History of Art to note the contrast between the great periods and directions of the artistic past, and the pretentiously named varieties of technique.

52 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 292.

that we inherit from nineteenth and twentieth century dis-
cussion of art. But the discussion itself regularly gives
the lie to, for example, supposedly opposing "-isms". Thus,
in analysing the achievement of the impressionists, Francois
Mathey notes:

Lionello Venturi said: "Renoir expresses all
the happiness, the vitality and the humour of
his subject; Monet the essence of things;
Degas the mastery, calculated in every detail;
Cézanne the grandeur, the subtlety, and the
science; Pissarro the rustic faith and the epic
breadth; Sisley the delicacy and respose".

Later Mathey remarks:

Impressionism contains within itself the seeds
of its decline, the basic contradiction between
an effective, rational technique - the logi-
cally perfect expression of the scientific
spirit - and an art form searching for the
immediate, spontaneous contact with the world
around it which appeals to the instinct and
rejects all method.

Several points are to be noted regarding these com-
ments. First of all, it is clear that "impressionism"
names a technique of artistic expression. Moreover this is
true of the various other "-isms" of the contemporary scene.
Secondly, there is evident unclarity in the effort to speci-
fy that technique: so, one may ask what precisely is meant
by the phrase "spontaneous contact with the world around it"

54 Francois Mathey, The World Of the Impressionists,

and thus reveal the obscurity regarding reality and objectivity indicated in section four of the present chapter. In some sense, we are in the presence of an alchemy of language in artistic discussion, when what is needed is a chemistry, a periodic table of precise general categories that would make possible progressive and collaborative work. Very evident illustrations of confusion and need are discussions and debates regarding realism in art and representational art. Aesthetics cannot leave behind confused metaphorical language without such issues as realism and representationalism being met at the most fundamental level. That is, however, the issue of chapter four. The more immediate point to note is a categorical transposition of language warranted both by the inner necessity of systematic clarity and by the implicit contradictoriness of present aesthetic usage. "Expressionism" is thus, with reasonable legitimacy, transposed from being a name for certain techniques to being a categorical designation of artistic achievement.

The second key feature of the direction we are taking has to do with the theology of divine expression particularly as imaged in man. This is a deeply problematic area.

---

56 This is the basic thesis of Professor Philip McShane regarding contemporary aesthetics: See his Shaping of the Foundations, 1974, ch. 2 and Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, 1979, ch. 4. Both books from Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
of contemporary theology, notwithstanding Lonergan's efforts of the fifties to retrieve the coherent view of Aquinas. "St. Thomas restricted the image to the principium verbi, verbum and amor of rational creatures. But in prevalent theological opinion there is as good an analogy in the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped in deepest obscurity."57 In chapter five we will pursue "the expression" of a Divine Word spoken in the silence of understanding in its possibility of generating a reflective Christian expressionism.

CHAPTER II.

ASSEMBLY AND DIALECTIC

The present chapter seeks both to further bring to light other meaningful nuances that Lndon gan has given to the functional specialty dialectic and to give indications of components in what he calls "assembly", components that have not regularly been appealed to in theology. What emerges from our researches is, first, a clearer view of the large task of scholarship which Lndon gan's strategy envisages, in particular in relation to the dialectic development of modern art, and art criticism. Moreover, the particularity of art is seen, not as a fringe of theology, but as central. Nor is this centrality something foreign to Lndon gan's own thinking. In an unpublished lecture on art, Lndon gan once remarked:

What I want to communicate in this talk on art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is an exploration of the potentialities of concrete living, that it is extremely important in our age when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on economics, politics and education, have been trying to remake man and have done not a little to make human life unlivable."

Moreover, a centrality of artistic reach is in harmony with Eric Voegelin's thinking. So, for example, in discussing openness to transcendence, he remarked:

---

Already in the nineteenth century a generation before Russell and Whitehead, there was a man who knew all these problems perfectly - Gustave Flaubert. Just look at his Tentation de Saint Antoine or his Bouvard et Pécuchet. He knew all about the perversions of gnosticism; he established a central connection between hérésie et cruauté - in its tragic form and its comic form. He knew, in Bouvard et Pécuchet, that such people had Haeckel for their bible as would have Hitler later. But who knows Flaubert? Who uses him as a source for understanding these matters? It's a very complicated cultural situation.

That cultural situation which fails to draw on the reach for aesthetic expression in modern man as a basic theological indication is implicitly criticised throughout this chapter. We draw attention to what might be called "lyric reaching" in various art forms, and we do so in a manner that clearly indicates the need for a communal theological undertaking of cultural retrieval. Thus, our sketchings in the different art forms will be selective, briefly indicative of "the histories written, and the events, statements, movements to which they refer." The sketchings fulfill our first purpose of opening up a field of central theological importance, but they also fulfill the function of placing the problem of expressionism concluded to at the end of chapter one into its proper historico-dialectic context.

The observations of sections 2 to 6 of pointers in the

---


lyric expression of the various arts, then, represent elements of what Lonergan technically calls assembly. The second component of dialectic is "completion"\(^4\), which Lonergan sees as meeting the basic issue of dialectic: 
"...the apprehension of values and disvalues is a task not of understanding but of intentional response",\(^5\) and this is the first task of dialectic.\(^6\) We will concern ourselves in more detail with this problem in section 7 of the present chapter. Briefly, the problem is indicated in Lonergan's statement: "Such (intentional) response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings."\(^7\)

What, then, of that response, if the aesthetic class have "become effete" and "the culture has become a slum?"\(^8\) Or, to return to Voegelin, how can there be a community of theologians capable of adequate "completion", if the modern context is one of patterns of fundamental disorientation?

Can we help them out of the pattern? In most cases you can't because what you call a pattern


\(^5\)Ibid, p. 245.

\(^6\)Ibid, p. 246.

\(^7\)Ibid, p. 245.

\(^8\)Ibid, p. 99.
is an attitude, an habituation of action, determined by all sort of things - for instance, by inertia, or by just plain stupidity: it's too difficult to get out of it - it's much easier to follow an attitude. Or, in really interesting cases, it is a question of l'homme revolte - the revolt against God - and you can't break it by explaining it to the man. There you get into the real metaphysical and religious questions of the "lost" soul. There are such people. Think of Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot. A man like Beckett is also one who knows perfectly well that all that agnosticism is blooming nonsense - but he can't get out of it. I don't know why.

We will discuss this issue in the conclusion of this chapter.

Lonergan specifies other elements of the dialectic process: comparison, reduction, classification, selection,\(^9\) by which eventually the dialectician reaches a grasp of basic genetic affinities in horizons of progress and decline. Some of these elements are implicit in the discussion of the sections to follow. Furthermore, Lonergan indicates that the dialectician should spell out the foundational position which influences his operation and selection.\(^11\) That spelling out will be the task of chapter four.

Finally, the religious issue will not be central to our considerations in this chapter. In the light of Voegelin's view of metaxy and of the emergency of western

---


\(^10\) B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 1972, p. 250.

\(^11\) Ibid.
man, it can be suspected that the data of our assembly are those of truncated religiosity.

Section 1: The Emergent Subject in Dance

We begin with some consideration of modern dance—dance since the end of the last century— for a variety of reasons. First of all, dance seems to have priority, both historically and as a cultural indicator. Langer makes this point regarding its indicative quality: "the dance often reaches the zenith of its development in the primitive stage of a culture when other arts are just dawning on its ethnic horizon."13 Langer also makes a case for a historical priority: dance is an expression of virtual power, an aesthetics of movement closely related to the genesis of the distinction between the sacred and profane concretely symbolized by the Magic Circle dances.15 Finally, Langer gives a third reason for beginning with dance, a reason we will develop in chapter three when we consider western man in the context of a theory of history. In her discussion of primitive dance, Langer remarks on "the great trauma that

12 We do not enter here into the Russian tradition, whose evolution begins in this same period.


14 Ibid, Chapter II.

15 Ibid, Chapter 12.
Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts - secularization. 16

Since our aim here is not total assembly, but the identification of problematic aesthetic expression in the modern subject, we restrict our considerations to two: a brief consideration of the decay of popular dance patterns in the past quarter-century; a lengthier review of aspects of problematic expression and innovation in professional dance as it has occurred since the end of the last century.

The decay of popular dance patterns is evidenced by the disorganized searchings for rhythms and counter-rhythms of dance particularly of the younger dance scene in these past decades. It brings to mind Langer's comments on dance as indicator. Certain characteristics of this shifting scene of popular dance may be noted, some of which recur in, or are sublated by, professional choreography.

A basic shift has been towards the separation of subjects and sexes, not merely physically but psychically. Such separation had been a traditional phenomenon: one may think of Greek traditional dancing, North American Indian dances or the Celtic dance tradition. Those separations, however, were stereotyped, ritual, patterned. The contemporary shifts were from such patterned stereotyped forms to

16 S. Langer, Feeling and Form, New York: Charles Scribner's, c. 1953, p. 201.
problematic lyricism: both sexes "doing their own thing", with spontaneous but paradoxically changed expression that at times is solitary self-expression. The solitary self-expression is regularly asymmetrical, possibly in continuity with what G. Simmel noted regarding the asymmetry of coquetry in the beginning of the century: the male dance patterns - white western is the type here considered - lack sophistication. But the primary aspect to note is the inner desire for some new subjectivity of dancing which would give expression to the subject's power beyond patterns of western socialization.

Let us turn now to instances in the development of dance as a modern professional art form. To discover the dance is to capture the sense of what bodily movement means or to seek the meaning which lies behind physical gesture performed by a human figure. No other individual was able to understand the need for this discovery better than Isadora Duncan, who explored the unlimited number of postures the body could assume and so allowed it to manifest itself in an infinitude of guises which revealed its innermost nature. For Duncan believed herself to be an instrument of unconfined motion or energy and she sought to express this ideal in unstructured ways never before attempted. A quotation

from Duncan, who made every effort to define her art-form, gives one a glimpse into the mind of a truly creative being: "My art is just an effort to express the truth of my being in gesture and movement. It has taken me long years to find even one absolutely true movement." Clearly, here Duncan is intimating that movement must spring from within, and that the dance involves a searching analysis and representation of human experience. Discovery of the dance in the light of Duncan's freedom of the moving limbs for the first time gives free reign to expressing the total individual. By the same token, Duncan's technique had the same flexibility, for it was not so much a technique as it was a mental attitude (disposition or posture) in approaching movement itself. Duncan's ability to find the appropriate visual and kinetic images to suit her needs in terms of the creative process was based on the influence of music which produces within one those sensations naturally translatable into movement. Beyond this, she strove for an abstract idealization of music by means of movement, believing that one would move in a perfectly balanced and artistic manner when listening to the inner, pulsating sounds of music relating to life. Duncan improvised to the music of renowned composers such as Wagner, Beethoven, and Chopin and in

examining her own movements decided that the origin of all movement was the "solar plexus", the central spring and crater of motor power. If Duncan had pursued her self-discovery even further, perhaps her individuality would have blossomed into a "mindful presence" defying all gravitational force, conscious intentionality shaping every step or gesture.

Another creative being who was destined to express her individuality in a new way was Loie Fuller, who conceived the dance as being essentially the natural reflex of the body to ideas. Fuller's ideas tended towards the pictorial and illustrational in so far as they sought to imitate natural phenomena in movement such as the dynamism of flame or of a butterfly; not only did she represent the ever-changing appearances of nature through the media of light and large areas of cloth, but in a very real way she penetrated to the innermost core of her own selfhood. For, she demonstrated that cloth animated by the human form moving through space could create plastic shapes manifesting the essence of "being-ness". Whereas Duncan's sheer physical expressiveness spoke of an existing person, namely herself, Fuller expressed herself by the exceptional sensitivity of her arm movements encased in yards of cloth. The use of flowing lightweight materials and imaginative lighting enabled her to create movement patterns that radiated out from herself, thus revealing the many postures of
self-existence. By a manipulation of lightweight materials and draperies she extended herself through special kinds of visualizations, thus becoming a radiant entity, a vision of the "Indwelling" itself. "A dancer must listen to his body and pay honour to it. Behind the movement lies this terrible, driving passion, this necessity. I won't settle for anything less."19 Thus spoke Martha Graham, another (American) innovator in the field of dance who became Duncan's heiress apparent and who was to make an outstanding contribution in terms of a new freedom of expression. In expanding the range of dance by virtue of giving it intellectual respectability, she developed the horizons of her medium into a new art form. Her discoveries with respect to physical action have changed our perceptions of the human body. It was Graham that declared that bodily movement never lies, and it is clear that her aim was to affirm life through movement, that whether the dance is narrative or abstract, movement is there to reveal human emotion. For Graham, movement was an articulation of some kind of total meaning. The emergence of a third stage of meaning with its mediation of integral subjectivity known as interiority, places issues concerning sacred and profane in a new context and one may be led to ask in what sense the dance is secular. That total

interior meaning, we would suggest, is one which speaks of the authenticity of "human-ness", of being human. Although her work slipped back and forth between the narrative and the abstract as her descriptive and poetical titles dictated (I have in mind the New Mexico works which include "Primitive Canticles", "Incantation", and "Dolorosa", all creations of 1931), there could be an exquisite fusion of the two approaches synthesizing an eagerness to explore new worlds of human nature in a very dramatic way; and then there could be the lyrical utterance, of a longing to be heard as an individual. Thus, Graham's dance "Frontier" of 1935:

. . . revealed a softness hitherto absent from her work. It combined nostalgia and warmth with formal precision. It was a solo of enormous power in which a single woman staked out an area of control in the center of an infinite plain through a sequence of carefully controlled movements. It combined the adventurousness of the pioneer with the vulnerability that accompanies such resolute colonizing efforts in a strange land.

While (Merce) Cunningham, Taylor and Nikolais analyse the fragmentation of our society and the inroads made by technology on art and nature, Graham's conception of the dance echoes the secular concerns of her era - the discoveries of psychologists, socio-political upheavals as well as intimations of nihilism characteristic of today's world-view.

More importantly, however, her art reflects the symbolic

---

presence within subjectivity which is appropriated within interiority and mediated by that appropriation.

Section 2: Painting as the Plastic Means of Expression

An outstanding figure bearing significance in terms of seeking a new modality of expressing himself visually was Van Gogh. One need only look at an early drawing by Van Gogh of the roots of a tree (April 1882) to realize his passionate empathy with nature. For him natural forms seem to become a direct extension of human emotion by virtue of the fact that he moulds or shapes them plastically to suit his own visionary conception. This interpretation seems to be confirmed in Van Gogh's own words stated in a letter of 1882 in which he comments: "I see in nature, for example, in trees, expression and, as it were a soul", and suggests that Van Gogh's drawings of gnarled trees convey a sense of near-human misery and wretchedness in the painful network of twisted roots and branches. More specifically, the very leaflessness of Van Gogh's trees may be considered a translation of the human soul bared in such a way as to reveal its innermost emotions; and indeed in the final analysis, the affective domain of the individual becomes brutally exposed as in the drawing "Sorrow" in which a despondent crouching figure is represented, and this state of human

despair is echoed by the small study of a tree found below the suffering woman manifesting the same patterns of form and discharges of feeling. Again, in Van Gogh's own words (taken from a letter written May 1, 1882, No. 195), there is an analogy to be noted between "Study (or Roots) of a Tree" and the figure study of "Sorrow" with its emphasis on the close echoing of human emotions perceived in trees and landscape: "The other drawing 'Roots', represent roots of trees in sandy soil. I have now tried to give the landscape the same feeling as the figure, as though clinging to the earth in the same convulsive and passionate manner and yet torn out of it by the gale." 22 Clearly, the images of anxiety one detects in Van Gogh's paintings stem from his desire to capture from the private universe of his own experience, a subjective intensity never before attained artistically. The vigor of brush-strokes and lines, the pulsing energy and vitality given simply by means of bold streaks of colour, the new and surprising harmonies produced, all combine to produce a new expressivity which speaks of the subject himself.

There was no one who symbolically embodied the state of man's alienation more profoundly than Edvard Munch (1863-1944) in his "The Scream (Cry)" of 1893. This pictorial realization of the anxiety or angst man experiences

as a creature isolated or divorced from himself, is composed of a writhing figure which emerges from the landscape as a convoluted form shouting out to be heard in a primordial fashion. The reverberations of the subject's voice made visible inasmuch as it pervades the landscape even as a stone thrown into still water causes centrifugal ripples, establish Munch's belief as asserted by H. Hesse when he is motivated to say

I can give you nothing
That has not already its
Being within yourself.
I can throw open to you
No picture-gallery but
Your own soul... I help you
To make your own world. 23
Visible. That is all.

Munch therefore creates visible sound waves resembling the mind's stream of consciousness - the individual's psychological dimension is penetrated and made explicit before our very eyes. For Munch, the task of art was none other than to express the inner world of the human subject, and this he does by whirling and restless brush-strokes, clashing colours, and the sheer force projected behind an intentional distortion of line. Munch was able to go beyond both naturalism and impressionism in painting with his symbology of Life's forces realistically presented in his "Frieze of Life" begun around 1888 implicitly proclaiming the message, that art as the antithesis of nature is man's urge to crystallize

23 H. Hesse; I am unable to pin down this particular reference.
or thematize the many experiential patterns which constitute the totality of his being.

With the Russian painter Kandinsky (1866-1944), the implications of the work of art as self-expression is brought to full fruition in as much as the artist carries on a purely personal dialogue or rather monologue in tune with his own internal conflicts and needs, no longer adhering to the dictates of an external world of nature as in the past. In formulating his doctrine of "inner necessity", Kandinsky conceived the art-form to be essentially an objectification or outward expression (externalization) which involves a mediation of total mind, an appreciation of significance, an idealization of the purely experiential pattern, so ultimately it may be said that:

Expressionism, which began by shifting emphasis from the object to be painted to the artist's own subjective interpretation, reached in Kandinsky the total negation of the object. In this respect he was of great inspiration to succeeding artists. The final phase of expressionism also became the beginning of an altogether new artistic concept in non-objective painting. Kandinsky was heralded by the following generation as the innovator of non-objective painting.....In his rejection of the representational aspects of art, Kandinsky cleared the way for new values in art. By experimenting with the possibility of an expressive - rather than a formalistic - art in the non-objective idiom, he threw out a challenge that performed a most valuable function in the history of modern art.

The evolution of expressionism then may be understood in terms of the process of self-appropriation; that is to say, the artist comes to know that the world is only meaningful in so far as it is an unfolding of himself as incarnate quest, and consequently the only true expression is that of self-expression or an exploration of the many horizons of subjectivity. Such exploration has been conducted in our present age of modernity in numerous experimental ways with respect to all the plastic arts; the revolutionary tendencies of avant-garde expressionism included within all innovative movements such as cubism, futurism and minimalism etc. are symptomatic of man's desire to reach a lyricism expressive of the total individual subject. The artist explores the potentialities of total human living with the result that the artefact is not merely an objectification of mind, but a searching objectification of man and his human possibilities. Are the searching and the objectification adequate, faithful to the totality of the human reality? It is this question that will carry us forward through the thesis.

Section 3: Sculpting as a Subjective Enterprise

It is clear that the nonfigurative images of modern sculpture have been an enigma to the ordinary spectator - and yet, the sculptor will claim that they are images of reality or meaningful constructions expressing a new and specifically modern form of consciousness. To reinforce his belief, the modern sculptor has stated:
I cannot help rejecting all repetitions of images already done, (that is to say) already worn out and ineffective. (and further)...I cannot help searching for new images and this I do, not for the sake of their novelty but for the sake of finding an expression of the new outlook on the world around me and the new insight into the forces of life and nature in me.

Such images it would seem go beyond the "sensus communis" (every-day or surface level) mode of perception in attempting to reveal much of the inner structure and organization of the material world before us, and very few can interpret and assimilate these poetical images, poetic in the sense that they are highly personalized visions. The development achieved within the medium of sculpture as an art-form made possible by modern processes and materials, has culminated in a general cultural phenomenon which the contemporary philosopher Ortega y Gasset has described as being a gradual movement towards the dehumanization of art. As a mark of modernity, this process of dehumanizing has taken place in all the arts, even literature, and to most people this development taking place in the arts signifies decay and is profoundly disturbing since it does not agree with their conception of art as a lived reality. However, to the artist, the change of direction within his art-medium (in this case sculpture) towards a more dissonant sensibility is indicative

---


of his experience of our present-day environment representative of the human condition — one of anxiety, mental anguish, and alienation. The artist is compelled to create the concrete image he does, not out of a sense of perversion, but to shock us into an awareness of ourselves when all around us there are signs of inhumanity characteristic of a mechanistic civilization. Thus, modern art is inhuman, but it is for a purpose; for, the artist cannot project a false consciousness by virtue of his imagery... instead, he must capture the authenticity of our situation, inasmuch as the territory we live in is a waste land, inhabited by hollow men...

We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
Our dried voices, when
We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless
As wind in dry grass
Or rat's feet over broken glass
In our dry cellar
Shape without form, shade without colour
Paralysed force, gesture without motion.

Inevitably, the artist is forced to create images of terror and despair born out of the artificial and synthetic mould we have cast for ourselves, therefore the synthetic materials the sculptor is now employing and the seemingly non-constructive world-view he has adopted.

Already, with August Rodin's (1840-1917) "The Gates of Hell" there emerges a totally new approach to the medium of

---

bronze, and indeed the human figure which displays numerous captivating poses is indicative of the process of ideation underway with respect to the subject's mindful presence. Every gesture and transitory change of pose is captured by Rodin in the early searching works (I have in mind "The Age of Bronze", "St. John the Baptist Preaching" and "Man with the Broken Nose", depicting strong realism) for the sole purpose of expressiveness alone, and the violently distorted poses we are exposed to in "The Gates of Hell" represent further reaches into the discovery of self-hood. Influenced by Dante's "Inferno" and other individual themes from the Divine Comedy supplemented by ideas from the poems of Baudelaire which he greatly admired, Rodin produced "The Gates of Hell" - isolated figures and groupings representative of thematic episodes with which he experimented at random for over more than thirty years. As Arnason puts it: "... The turbulence of the subjects involved inspired him to the exploration of expressionist violence in which the human figure was bent and twisted to the limits of endurance although with remarkably little actual naturalistic distortion."

It is evident that the "expressionist" distortions of the moulded figure as conceived by the contemporary sculptor and developed in the twentieth century evolved out of this violent

---

play upon the human instrument we witness in perhaps Rodin's greatest work; the concept of impermanency, change or metamorphosis becomes the over-riding vision of "The Gates..." portrayed by figures emerging or sinking into the matrix of the bronze itself and seems to signify the fragility of present-day subjectivity. Behind the message of "The, Gates..." one also senses a deeper meaning – man in quest of himself, the perennial philosophy of birth, decay and death followed by rebirth perpetuated by a profound eternity – the subversion of the individual in view of the quagmire that threatens to engulf the human form without hope of liberation. In any case, Rodin in this work becomes a precursor of what is to come within the realm of sculpture, a transitory figure who exploits the far-reaching possibilities of living on many levels of existence.

Another innovative figure in the sculptural realm was Alberto Giacometti (1901-1966) whose work makes articulate the state of man's existence arising out of the depths of modernity – that of alienation, not only in the sense of being isolated from others but from himself as well, in the sense of in no way knowing who he himself is. With his "Woman with her Throat Cut" (1932), a bronze construction of a dismembered female corpse lying in a very grotesque position, we can make a comparison with Picasso's "Seated Bather" of 1929 by reason of the intentional fragmentation applied in both cases intimating the truncated consciousness
both artists have perceived as symptomatic of the fact that man has neglected the enterprising notion of self-discovery; how our contemporary mode of living tends to fragment us into various unrelated parts so that a separation of mind and body has taken place. Between the years 1932-33 "The Palace at 4 a.m." was created, a structure of wooden rods outlining the shape of a house in which there is placed a woman dressed in an old-fashioned long gown standing before three tall rectangular panels and facing another raised panel with a long oval spoon shape attached to it which in turn secures a ball; a rectangular cage is partitioned off in another section in which hangs a spinal column suspended over the floor, and above all of this a narrow panel of glass is supported in a hanging position; in an upper rectangular-shaped window one views a prehistoric (skeletal) bird, a sort of pterodactyl which is isolated from the rest of the house.

... The effect, whether he sought it or not, is an overpowering sense of aloneness, although one may also read in the figures a quality of integrity rather than of alienation, something that enables them to survive like characters in a play of Samuel Beckett, even in a void, in an ultimate situation....

There is in "The Palace at 4 a.m." a haunting quality of mystery arising from the artist's sense of the loneliness of modern man whatever the associations and reminiscences involved might mean for him. Hammacher remarks in his

The Evolution of Modern Sculpture about this piece that:

...The work is extremely simple, but in this reduced figure and space is the condensation of thousands and thousands of rooms, passages, and courtyards with which Giacometti was in close contact and which he here sees at a distance, spaces in which human beings move without being aware of the connection between, on the one hand, "their" time (movement) and "their" space and, on the other, Time and Space...

Giacometti's objective it would seem, is to reduce man, object and space to a common denominator as if there was no longer any room for subjectivity, resulting in a depersonalization of the human subject. For Giacometti, man represented by his human figure in "The Palace..." loses awareness both of himself and the objects he has created; again, man seems to have lost both his self-esteem and more importantly his own identity. In shrinking the human form to thin elongated little figures, Giacometti seems to be pointing out that the integrity and dignity of individuality has been lost, and that the privacy of human space must once again be restored. Other innovative works include "Invisible Objects (Hands Holding the Void)" created between 1934-35 whereby an elongated figure half sitting on a chair-like structure holds nothing in its hands. Here, the desire seems to be to eliminate the object and to place emphasis on the human subject alone. With "Head of a Man on a Rod" (1947), one senses the performance of the primeval scream taking place (as in

---

Edvard Munch's "The Scream") where an alien creature unrecognisable as the human race finds himself lost in a hostile world. Finally, in his drawing of the critic "David Sylvester" (1960), one finds the portrait surrounded by a chaotic environment such that the person remains alone in a void with an aura of a destroyed world about him. Lastly, we may make known the modern sculptor's aesthetic aims by restating Henry Moore's words which anticipate the challenge of sculpting in the third stage of meaning: the sculptor "gets the solid shape, as it were, inside his head - he thinks of it, whatever its size, as if he were holding it completely enclosed in the hollow of his hand...he identifies himself with its center of gravity, its mass, its weight".31 One may note an echo of Aristotle's "sense in act is the sensible in act", such that for the sculptor of the third stage of meaning, the real statue is not "already-out-there".

Ultimately, what is determined by the sculptor if he is indeed an authentic creator, is that the symbolic presence within subjectivity is appropriated within interiority and mediated by that appropriation.

Section 4: Musical Expression

The 16th century composer Gesualdo de Venosa was noted for his procedure of constant modulation, a method of

continual progression from one key to another - the change of key either being to a closely related or remote modality depending upon its relationship to the initial or home key base - and for promoting an intentionally acentric tonality by virtue of perpetually shifting tonal centres depriving one of any feeling of finality at the end of each novel composition. In his day it acted as a powerful counter-thrust to tonal consolidation, and at the same time it paved the way for a wider conception of tonality. If a review of modern tonality suggests the opening up of the whole harmonic space so as to allow each of the twelve tones of the chromatic scale to become useable, one may extend this policy of liberation to the human subject as well, since modern music in its experimental nature leads both its creators and listeners in the vital direction of self-discovery, thus enlarging the boundaries of human space as well. For, beyond and above the temporality of audible music, lies a silentness which yet utters meaningful nuances ... projections of an unrealized, unappropriated subjectivity that longs to become concrete.

Yet:

Not until the twentieth century did the seeds of atonality sown in the sixteenth century bear fruit. And again an undeniable spiritual affinity connects the chromaticists of the Renaissance with the atonal composers of today. Geraldo da Venosa has never before been better understood than he is today. Nor has the disintegration of the medieval world into the warring powers of Reformation and Counter Reformation... ever found more fraternal comprehension
than \( \frac{1}{2} \) does in the torn and tortured world of today.

Even though sixteenth century and twentieth century atonality evade a clear and stable harmonic center, the sixteenth century remained basically faithful to a triadic concept of harmony while the twentieth has recognized the fact that radical atonality cannot grow on the soil of traditional harmony or on the groundlessness of a self-less and unmindful humanity who fears to know itself.

In his search for new forms of expression Richard Strauss (1864-1949) composed a symphonic fantasy inspired by the various sections of Nietzsche's book *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Rather than a literal translation of Nietzsche's ideas however, this tone poem completed in 1896 is more like a lyrical hymn to life instigated by the dithyrambic, ecstatic language we are asked to interpret when reading the lines (almost proverbial or aphoristic in style like biblical discourses) of Nietzsche's text. Basically, the challenge both Nietzsche and Strauss set for themselves in their respective media encompasses the riddle of what lies behind man's existence, his relationship to the world and to nature; in more depth the question becomes "Is there another side to existence? If so, what or where is this other side?" One may describe the score of "Zarathustra" as a mixture of worldliness and mysticism; the former because it speaks of the darker aspects

---

of man's alienation and loneliness and echoes the existential crisis man found himself in at the end of the 19th century, the latter since it portrays a sense of man's passionate longing or desire for intense communion with the cosmos and the quest of the human subject engulfed by the awe and wonder of the universe before him. Among many musical innovations to be acknowledged in *Zarathustra* preparing us for those atonal moments discernible in the one-act dramatic operas *Salome* and *Electra*, is the Fugue entitled *Of Science* which is one of the first illustrations of how to implement the twelve-note (tone) system. Later, in the tragedies *Salome* and *Electra* we find Strauss indulging in unrestrained orgies of dissonance and shifting tonal centers, both scores compelling him to cross over the harmonic line of demarcation into regions of cacophonous sound (the term "cacophonous" refers to an uncontrolled use of dissonance which is purposely designed to musically shock, surprise or create a mood or atmosphere of the unexpected) giving impetus to an experimental usage of atonality, (atonality suggesting no dependence on one major key with its closely-related chordal functions). It may be said that Strauss most assuredly had a very good reason for expanding the boundaries of sound for . . . His liquefactions of tonalities represent the farthest point reached by the psychologizing of tonal language. They are an advance into new realms of harmonic expression which
result from the idealistic wanderings of certain works..."33

This declaration indicates Strauss' concern for how far one could push the limits of expression to suit artistic needs; in his way of thinking it was more important to make the sounds come alive than to worry about key relationships - we may further add that he wished it to be known that the human subject is also alive projecting musical nuances of its own, but unaware of this strange fact. One talks of a work of art as being dynamic, alive, but it is the creator, perceiver, listener that is alive and coming to life as he makes the transition from identity to expression involved in objectification via the plastic means of art. Moreover, Strauss consented to piling the remotest tonalities on top of one another resulting in a complexity of sound somehow always appropriate for every situation and ultimately enhancing the music's dramatic possibilities; one may add that he wished to present the drama of human existence and to point out that the artist explores the potentialities of total human living. All living involves artistry, is dramatic, but art focuses in its objectification of purely experiential patterns a possibility of fuller living, more integral meaning. Depending on the state of a culture, that objectification can be expressive of a rich common meaning and a common aspiration,

or on the other hand, it can include elements of "shock", artistic isolation. What seems to motivate Strauss' dissonant style of writing - sonorities moving against one another in a contrapuntal fashion regardless of the vertical result, leading to polytonal and atonal modes of composition - was an awareness of the fragmented, truncated and fragile state of subjectivity breeding decay, emptiness and chaos without meaning or hope in the vacuum of 19th century despair. (Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard could relate to this void and the nihilism it represented.) While Salome (1905) may be described as a subterranean volcano about to erupt in psychological terms, Electra (completed in 1909) is a leap into an expansive abyss representing the dark noises of existence. Even Strauss has referred to the extreme limits of harmony he went to in Electra, the end-product being a shocking, sometimes atonal sonic realization arousing the passions. By releasing himself from the bonds of harmony in this work, Strauss made an immense advance towards an altogether new direction in music marked by the unusual combinations of sounds which are heard in Electra. The intensity of this one-act tragedy with its complex psychological depths is determined by the anti-human elements and forces at work within what can only be called a revolutionary and

---

34 In Donald Mitchell's, _The Language of Modern Music_, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, this element of shock and isolation in the case of Schoenberg is clearly illustrated.
monumental document for its time. "...Is this still music? The drawing of a sickly mind tormenting itself, the face of a being haunted by dreams and shaken by dread, reeking with blood and full of ghastly superstition, shows Strauss on the borders of musical naturalism...He flung wide the doors of expressionism."\textsuperscript{35}

Likewise, we see an analogous path taken by Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951) when expanding the boundaries of sound - for Schoenberg's pan-chromatic scheme (using all twelve tones of the scale) was instrumental in leading the composer to a freedom of uncompromising self-expression. After his string sextet \textit{Transfigured Night} composed in 1899, there is evidence of a largely unconscious and spontaneous expression of inner character or psychic existence which resonates with the intelligibility of two of Schoenberg's early introspective creations; the Second Quartet in f\# minor of 1908, and the monodrama \textit{Erwartung} (Expectation) completed in 1909. In the last two movements of the Second Quartet (and one must remember that Schoenberg studied the late quartets of Beethoven) Schoenberg employs "free tonality" as a liberating artistic mode in anticipating a discovery of atonal regions within the musical landscape. Certainly Schoenberg anticipated a liberation of consciousness within the contemporary scene, and his search for more

permissible paths in the medium of sound is made evident by the dramatic text he uses for the a-melodic tendencies of the Second Quartet - the poem *Transport* taken from Stefan George's *The Seventh Ring* which begins with the line "I feel the air from another planet". Performance of this work would engender modes of psychic liberation, and the self-attentive appreciation of such a work requires that such a performance be moved into the context of self-attentive methodology.

The monodrama *Erwartung* (Waiting) was the next appropriate step in Schoenberg's thinking, for the music of this score voices the change-over to "atonality", and the text itself breathes a realization of the need for a refined type of reflection on all the patterns of experience of contemporary society if man is to get to grips with his own renewal. (The libretto itself is a projection of the interior realm of one human being, a woman who soliloquizes about her lover enabling us to enter the private world of an individual which articulates the anguish of its existential condition.) Essentially, Schoenberg's twelve-tone opera *Moses and Aaron* (1931) is an expression of slowly formed inner feeling based upon the artist's conscious intentionality and reason as the operations of self-appropriation are given power to take over the creative enterprise. Here we not only witness the various guises and applications of twelve-tone technique, but Schoenberg also encounters the epistemological problematic of reaching beyond the image towards the notion or idea; for,
in his own strange way he was led to recognize the necessity of insight as a function not of outer circumstances but of inner condition, as the mediator, the hinge, or pivot between images and concepts. Thus insight is into the concrete world of sense and imagination so that the insightful resourcefulness of a Schoenberg explains why he was compelled to use his art as a metaphysical bridge to move from the concrete to the abstract.

Section 5: Lyric Literature

With the following statement from Klingsor's Last Summer, Hesse is able to predict the need for a "new key" or sensibility motivated by the lethargic state man finds himself in at the present time:

...we must die, we must be born again. The great turning point has come for us. It is the same everywhere: the great war, the change in art, the great collapse in the governments of the West. For us in old Europe everything we had that was good and our own has already died. Our fine-feathered Reason has become madness, our money is paper, our machines can do nothing but shoot and explode, our art is suicide. We are going under, friends; that is our destiny. Music in the Tsing Tse Key has begun.

Thus, Hesse moves us towards what he believes is the starting point for change; a return to ourselves, or rather a move towards the internal reality of thought. Again, in his letter to "Louis the Cruel", Klingsor pleads for a better understanding of his art:

The art we both practice still depends, as a professor would say, too much upon the object (how nice it would be to paint a picture puzzle). We are still—though in a somewhat free handwriting and a way that's upsetting enough to the bourgeois—painting things of "reality": people, trees, country fairs, railroads, landscapes. In that respect we're still obeying a convention. The bourgeois calls those things "real" which are seen and described pretty much the same way by everybody, or at least by many people. As soon as the summer is over, I have in mind to paint nothing but fantasies for a while, especially dreams.  

Such mindful attention to one's self prompts acknowledgement of a subjective presence previously ignored, and which is still being ignored in our present-day culture. Through the character of Klingsor Hesse could point out to his audience that something was wrong in the clockworks, a diagnosis which required of Klingsor the very unfamiliar task of self-examination so that he says "...But then, I feel it, I shall be turning inward and once again, as I did for a while as a young fellow, paint entirely from memory and imagination, make poems and spin dreams. That also needs to be done." The epitome of Hesse's message revolves around the subjective enterprise of slowly coming to appreciate one's self, of self-appropriation. Thus, he gives a description of Klingsor's "self-portrait" in line with his purpose:


38 Ibid, p. 175.
Like all of Klingsor's later works, this self-portrait can also be regarded from a wide variety of viewpoints. To some, especially those who did not know the painter personally, the picture is above all a symphony of colours, a marvelously harmonized tapestry that in spite of its brilliant hues give a sense of tranquillity and nobility. Others see in it a last bold and even desperate attempt to win freedom from the object...They say that this painting is reminiscent of nature only as some mountain ridges remind us of human faces, some branches of trees remind us of hands and legs - all very remotely, merely symbolically...analyzed and interpreted by the artist himself with unspiring psychological insight - an enormous confession, a ruthless, crying, moving, terrifying pecari. (As for the critics); they see in it a kind of monomaniac self-adoration, a blasphemous self-glorification, a kind of religious megalomania...39

Consequently, the work of art becomes a means of self-revelation both to its artist as well as to the beholder. Similarly in Klein and Wagner, Klein takes on a sort of Nietzschean role whereby an alternation between illusion and reality of the inner world becomes the main orientation of Hesse's novel-ette. Klein is forever driving inwards towards the abyss of himself, thus making a conscious differentiation between the common-sense world and the strangeness of his own existence; "...The theatre called 'Wagner' - was that not himself, was it not an invitation to enter into his own interior being, into the foreign land of his true self?"40


This contrasted with a desire to "cast himself back into the
dark womb out of which the Inconceivable forever and ever
expelled the transitory world of forms,"\textsuperscript{41} and reference is
continually made to Wagner's music (operatic drama) as a
sedative rather than a mode of illumination opening our eyes
to the truth; that Wagner's art was only valid insofar as
it was a presentation of the archetypal imagery of eternity.

In Thomas Mann's \textit{Dr. Faustus}, there is a continual
dialogue carried on between the artist-musician Adrian
Leeverkühn (really Arnold Schoenberg), and his friend as well
as confidante Serenus Zeitblom (Ph.D. Humanities) on the
nature of art. One passage is particularly poignant in which
both proceed to discuss what holds the work of art together:

\textit{...In art, at least, the subjective and objective
intertwine to the point of being indistinguishable,
and from the other, one proceeds to the character
of the subjective and objective; and genius is again awakened to spon-
taneity, dynamized, as we say; it speaks all at
once the language of the subjective. The musical
conventions today destroyed were not always so
objective, so objectively imposed. They were
crystallizations of living experiences and as
such long performed an office of vital importance:
the task of organization. Organization is
everything. Without it there is nothing, least of
all art. And it was aesthetic subjectivity that
took on the task, it undertook to organize the
work out of itself, in freedom. (Zeitblom comments)

You are thinking of Beethoven. (Leeverkühn continues...)

Of him and of the technical principle through which a
dominating subjectivity got hold of the musical

\textsuperscript{41}H. Hesse, \textit{Klein and Wagner}. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, c. 1970. p. 96
organization; I mean the development, or working out. The development itself had been a small part of the sonata, a modest republic of subjective illumination and dynamic. With Beethoven it becomes universal, becomes the center of the whole form, which, even where it is supposed to remain conventional, is absorbed by the subjective and is newly created in freedom.

Furthermore, Beethoven is spoken of frequently throughout the text as that rare being a breed apart in terms of his more creative compositional strategies applied to the musical art-form. The world of sound he created was made possible by an acute modality of hearing tuned in to the meaningful silence of subjective harmonies. When referring to the later works of Beethoven, Leverkuhn's theory teacher (and organist) Kretschmar says:

In the works of the last period they (art critics and friends) stood with heavy hearts before a process of dissolution or alienation, of a mounting into an air no longer familiar or safe to meddle with; even before a "plus ultra", wherein they had been able to see nothing else than a degeneration of tendencies previously present, an excess of introspection and speculation, an extravagance of minutiae and scientific musicality... And in just that very way Beethoven's art had outgrown itself, risen out of the habitable regions of tradition, even before the startled gaze of human eyes, into spheres of the entirely and utterly and nothing - but personal - an ego painfully isolated in the absolute, isolated too from sense by the loss of hearing; lonely prince of a realm of spirits, from whom now only a chilling breath issued to terrify his most willing contemporaries, standing as they did agast at these communications of which only at moments, only

---

by exception, they could understand anything at all. 43

And what he seems to be suggesting is that there was a turning inward, a movement towards the internal modes of consciousness, a mediation of an interiority which spoke of integrated subjectivity. Above and beyond the structural element of the composition is the vision and/or idea which acts as the sole expression of the invisible act of understanding; the theoretical activity of composing then becomes transformed to the objectification of a purely experiential pattern, so that Leverkühn ". . . The creator of 'Fausti Wehklage' can, in the previously organized material, unhampered, untroubled by the already given structure, yield himself to reflective subjectivity; and so this, his technically rigid work, a work of extreme calculation, is at the same time purely expressive." 44

Later, when referring to the Faustus Cantata, Leverkühn's most maturely conceived work, Zeitblom comments:

But precisely in the sense of résumé there are offered musical moments of the greatest conceivable possibility of expression: not as mechanical imitation or regression, of course; no, it is like a perfectly conscious control over all the "characters" of expressiveness which have ever been precipitated in the history of music, and which here, in a sort of alchemical process of distillation, have been refined to fundamental types of emotional significance, and crystallized... 45


44 Ibid, p. 468.

Expression, then, can only be lyrical in the sense that it issues forth from the individual subject, and the subject chooses the means or medium by which he is to present his inner vision, and this vision comprehends more than mere seeing. Further, as Leverkuhn's lecturer Kretschmar points out: "... 'Art strides on, and does so through the medium of the personality, which is the product of the tool of the time, and in which objective and subjective motives combined indistinguishably, each taking on the shape of the others'..."\(^4\)

Subsequently, the work of art creates an intersubjective realm and becomes a plastic projection of the subject's conscious intentionality. Moreover, the whole focus of Mann's novel revolves about a central theme - that the artist's creative power springs from early impressions and insightful notions of the intellect. Evidence of the intelligibility of art is echoed in certain passages, especially in one where Leverkuhn says:

\[\ldots\] Art is mind, and mind does not at all need to feel itself obligated to the community, to society - it may not, in my view, for the sake of its freedom, its nobility. An art that "goes in unto" the folk, which makes her own the needs of the crowd, of the little man, of small minds, arrives at wretchedness, and to make it her duty is the worst small-mindedness, and the murder of mind and spirit. And it is my conviction that mind, in its most audacious, unrestrained advance and researches, can, however unsuited to the masses, be certain in some indirect way to serve man - in the long run men.


\(^7\) Ibid, p. 311-12.
Mann goes a step farther in this regard when he has Zeitblom declare Leverkühn the true artist since, "...he gave to impermanent becoming the character of being; he believed in the image: a tranquilizing belief, so at least it seemed to me, which, adjusted to the image, would not let its composure be disturbed no matter how unearthly that image might be."  

The significance of the image or rather the importance of imagination and the mediation of mind for the artist comes across clearly in Joyce Cary's *The Horse's Mouth*, a story devoted to exploration of the artistic temperament, and certainly to expanding the horizons of mind. At one point, the main character Gulley Jimson who is a painter maintains when reflecting upon William Blake's symbolic and poetical thought "...Yes, I thought, there's Billy again." Handing me the truth. Even when I wouldn't take it. That's what he was saying all his life. A tear is an intellectual thing. And a joy. It's wisdom in vision. It's the prophetic eye in the loins. The passion of intelligence..." In fact, Cary's whole book is an observation upon the "inside of the outside" - that Blake's whole reason for existence was determined by the conception that the "outside is on the inside", and Jimson himself comments, "But what you get on the inside, I said to

---


myself, is the works - it's 'something that goes on going on.' Hold on to that, old boy, I said, for it's the facts of life. It's the apple in the dumpling. It's the jump in the 'old mosquito'. It's the kick in the old horse. It's the creation. And that's where it's leading me. Right up to that blasted picture of mine."  

50 As an author, Cary has the insight necessary to bring us back to ourselves, to allow us to return to ourselves through the perceptivity of the artist; thus it follows that imagination and understanding provide the basis for the subject's reality. Only solid forms of the imagination, or visions allow us "To see behind the turnips, to enter into each other's minds..."  

51 A return to ourselves, also therefore demands a return to the world of creative imagination and in this respect the artist leads the way:

"Because the world of imagination", I (Jimson) said to Nosy, "is the world of eternity", for, as Billy (Blake) says, "There exist in the eternal world the permanent realities or everything which we see reflected in the vegetable glass of Nature". And, I thought, in the works of Gulley Jimson. Such as red Eyes and green Adams, blue whales and spotted giraffes, twenty-three feet high. Lions, tigers, and all the dreams of prophets whose imagination sustains the creation, and recalls it from the grave of memory."  


51 Ibid, p. 213.  

52 Ibid, p. 283.
Finally, in an attempt to explain the artist's (painter's) task descriptively, Cary prompts Jimson to say - "...No, you want to start clear, with a clean canvas, and a bright new shining idea of vision or whatever you call the thing. A sort of coloured music of the mind".  

These selections of lyric expression within literature are expressive of an aesthetic problematic that parallels, and at times sublates, the problematic in other areas. It is not a problem of criticism - a second order field, which, as we noted in chapter one, is in need of fundamental grounding within genuine aesthetic experience and in functional specialization. It is a problem of humanity in a transitional period which must be specified more precisely in the next chapter of the thesis. Immediately, however, we wish to gather the range of indications given in this chapter into a coherent summation.

Section 6: Pointers Towards a Self to be Expressed

Our treatment of the various art forms has been sketchy, illustrative, even random to a point of non-discursiveness: and it has been so with definite purpose. Clearly, a single chapter aiming at an indication of a novel theological task, the assembly within dialectic of relevant

---


aesthetic expression, would necessarily be sketchy and inadequate: but it might well have had the inadequacy of a catalogue. The present sketch, however, had a precise aim in moving beyond catalogue to particular artists' intentions and expression. That aim was not only to indicate concretely the wealth of tension-in-existence present within modern aesthetic subjectivity in the complexity of that enterprise\(^{55}\) unfulfillable: the task of completion\(^{56}\) here in question is that task which requires the release of "the mass and momentum"\(^{57}\) of the theological subject's subjectivity towards a complexification and refinement that may ground the eventual envisagement of the mediated integrality of the religio-aesthetic subject in the third stage of meaning. The underlying view of history here requires the lengthy analysis of chapter three for its clarification. But it is necessary to focus on this single point here, for there is a massive contemporary vogue of "objectivity" not only in the sciences but also in aesthetics, which permits a scholarly detachment in the face of modern complexifications of subjectivity, the result of which is an


\(^{57}\) Ibid, p. 65.
absence of relevant transpositions and transformations of feeling.\textsuperscript{58} That scholarly detachment, in continuity with cultural neuroses such as those noted by Horney,\textsuperscript{59} breeds a view of history as non-genetic, of novel stages of meaning even in those who may use the language of progress. So, for example, Lewis Mumford, in his work \textit{The Transformations of Man},\textsuperscript{60} brings a wealth of erudition to the notion of "axial man", which will occupy us in chapter three, but fails to move personally to a subjective base of a transformation. So he concludes, "if belief in the next transformation of man required a detailed account of the immediate agents and means that will promote this growth, one might prudently forgo the task. That kind of prognosis lies beyond both imagination and predictive intelligence. But the goals of this world culture have been long plainly in view...".\textsuperscript{61} So he moves on to consider world cultural unification and regionalization in continuity with what might be called his own "truncated subjectivity".\textsuperscript{62}


\textsuperscript{60}\textit{Lewis Mumford, The Transformation of Man}, New York: Collier's Pub., 1956.

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid}, pp. 183-84.

This latter reference, Lonergan's work on "The Subject", expresses better than anything else the underlying problematic that this chapter has sought to indicate in an invitational fashion. Our indications have been of exceptional subjects whose tensions grounded a self-expression which was problematic, alienated, pathological, and in particular self-reflectively seeking more adequate expression. We might sum up our indications, indeed, in terms of James Joyce's self-appropriation with respect to his own life as the task expressed by Mallarmé "Il c'est promene, lisont au livre de lui meme, don't you know, reading the book of himself." 63 Lonergan gets to the root of the personal struggle by identifying the modern cultural context generated by the neglected subject, the truncated subject, the immanentist subject, the existential subject, and finally the alienated subject. 64 He concludes by noting, in a manner that echoes Voegelin's criticism of modernity in relation to the metaxy, 65 that "it is, then, no accident that a theatre of the absurd, a literature of the absurd, and philosophy of the absurd flourish in a culture in which there are theologians


65 See Chapter I, Section, 3, and Chapter III, Section 2.
to proclaim that God is dead", 66 and he goes on to note the ground of that absurdity and its proclamation in a new neglect and new truncation.

A central feature of the present chapter has been to draw attention to a fundamental strategy of countering that proclamation within theology. We have indicated at length the process of assembly by pointing to those who, in these past centuries, reach to and resonate a higher attunement to subjectivity. But there is a difficulty here, a difficulty which can be spelt out by a fundamentally significant remark of Lonergan "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feedback, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective". 67 A new neglect would consist in the exploitation by theology of such a linguistic — or more generally, as our assembly indicates, aesthetic — feed-back to the exclusion of personal subjective response. "Literary language...attempts to make up for lack of mutual presence", 68 and indeed this is the entire dynamic invitation of artistry, with the


68 Ibid, p. 72.
added dynamic invitation to self-appreciative presence in the contemporary sense. But theology can move that invitation aside by shifting the literary language back into a technical language of the self.\textsuperscript{69} Then what is excluded from theology is precisely the task of completion, and so in reality the entire functional specialty of dialectic. For without completion, assembly sinks back into history: there is absent the meeting and possible personal enlargement that is the essence of dialectic. Further, without completion, the further tasks within dialectic become technical and extrinsic exercises.

There is a further aspect to the tasks of assembly and completion which has reference to the failure of Mumford already mentioned. The assembly and completion involve the total object, history in its full concrete sense, and the total subject. Just as Mumford fails to reach towards the personal subjective base of the transformation of man, so he fails to envisage its parallel in history, the open and indeterminate reality of finality: "I have been indicating a parallel between incomplete knowing heading towards fuller knowing and an incomplete universe heading towards fuller being, and now I propose to employ the name, finality, to denote the objective member of the parallel".\textsuperscript{70} So, Mumford's


truncated subjectivity gives rise to a truncated view of history. A fuller subjectivity, as we shall see in the following chapter, generates a richer and more open perspective on axiality in history.
CHAPTER III

TOWARDS CATEGORIES OF HISTORY

Because of its novel nature as a theological task, "assembly" was attempted in an indicative fashion in chapter II. The attempt brings out, perhaps, the size of the collaborative effort required for a full scientific achievement. However, implicit in the attempt were categories of history, subjectivity and objectivity, rooted in the work of Lonergan, that are the ground both of the indication and of any full scale effort at collaboration. In this present chapter we wish to bring out those historical categories as they have emerged in reflection on total history in this century. They will prove essential to the adequate understanding of a total history of dramatic artistry in its movement from compactness\(^1\) to "second immediacy"\(^2\). The following chapter will go further towards the roots of these categories in dealing with authentic subjectivity and the related authentic patterns of objectivity and expression.

The problem then is that of general categories of


history that are empirical. It is necessary to note, however, that there is an underlying problem of history which is epistemological: "historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory". ³ This underlying problem, however, is postponed until chapter four. This postponement allows for the discussion of the traditional epistemological problem within the complex context accumulated in previous chapters. It resembles the strategy of Lonergan's Insight, where a thorough investigation of modern scientific knowledge is undertaken prior to raising the issue of subjectivity and objectivity.

Again, the nature of historical knowledge will not be discussed here. Lonergan's own treatment of that question forms part of our own presuppositions. ⁴ The focus of attention here, then, is the precise issue of the nature of history as a totality, as it has been discussed by certain significant twentieth century thinkers. Marxist historical aesthetic analysis is not being considered in this thesis. If it were to be discussed, it would be best done after the discussion of epistemological issues, for in them lie its fundamental


⁴Ibid., Chapter 8.
weakness.

We may begin by reflecting on the question as it was raised by Karl Jaspers. Jaspers puts aside the Christian faith of the Western World which believes that the appearance of the Son of God is the axis of world history, and sets out to discover empirically an axis acceptable to all men including Christians:

This axis would be situated at the point in history which gave birth to everything which, since then, man has been able to be, the point most overwhelmingly fruitful in fashioning humanity; its character would have to be, if not empirically cogent and evident, yet so convincing to empirical insight as to give rise to a common frame of historical self-comprehension for all peoples - for the West, for Asia, and for all men on earth, without regard to particular articles of faith. It would seem that this axis history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C., in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C...

Jaspers claims that the most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Thus, in China, India and the West:

Confucius and Lao-tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host of others; India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to scepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deuter-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance.

of Homer, of the philosophers - Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato - of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes.

Essentially the change was in reflection: thinking became its own object, and consciousness became conscious of itself. Consequently, man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his powerlessness. He asks radical questions and experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence. At the same time, the rationality and rationally clarified experience of man launched a struggle against myth (Jaspers says logos against mythos), and this over-all modification of humanity may be termed "spiritualisation".  

Man proved capable of contrasting himself inwardly with the entire universe. He discovered within himself the origin from which to raise himself above his own self and the world. In "speculative thought" he lifts himself up towards Being itself, which is apprehended without duality in the disappearance of subject and object, in the coincidence of opposites.

Jaspers advances his argument for selecting this axial period as the focal point for a structure of world history by giving a brief discussion of four factors which bear witness to the notion that the axial period becomes a pivotal point for the history of man. In the first instance, he maintains


7 Ibid, p. 3.

8 Ibid, p. 3.
that:

The "thousands of years old ancient civilizations" are everywhere brought to an end by the Axial Period, which melts them down, assimilates them or causes them to sink from view, irrespective of whether it was the same peoples or others that became the bearers of new cultural forms.

He adds: "Measured against the lucid humanity of the Axial Period, a strange veil seems to lie over the most ancient cultures preceding it, as though man had not yet really come to himself". 10 Secondly, he states:

Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Period, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Ever since then it has been the case that recollections and reawakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period - renaissances afford a spiritual impetus. Return to this beginning is the ever-recurrent event in China, India and the West. 11

Further, he declares:

The Axial Period commenced within spatial limitations, but it "became historically all-embracing". Any people that attained no part in the Axial Period remained "primitive", continued to live that unhistorical life which had been going on for tens or even hundreds of thousands of years. Men living outside the three regions of the Axial Period either remained apart or came into contact with one of these three centres of spiritual radiation. 12

He concludes that all human beings living after the Axial

12 Ibid.
Period either remain in a primitive state, or take part in the new course of events. The Axial Period gives world history the only structure and unity that has endured up until our own time.

Later, Jaspers poses questions regarding our own time and its problematic and moves to the suggestion that a second axial period is necessary and imminent. He associates that development into "The still veiled future"\textsuperscript{13} with the evolution of science and technology but also with the spiritual and speculative ethos that becomes widespread after the 18th century.

Europe's exceptional spiritual achievements from 1500 to 1800, that outshine science and technology - Michelangelo, Raphael, Leonardo, Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Goethe, Spinoza, Kant, Bach, Mozart - challenge comparison with the Axial Period of two and a half millennia earlier. Is a second Axial Period to be discerned in these later centuries?\textsuperscript{14}

But he also associates that necessary development with the concomitant problematic:

The prevailing sound and fury of findings relating to the conformation of the material world and to the twists and turns of the "enlightened" view of the world, so much talked about all over the globe, cannot blind us to the fact that science, which appears to be so widely current, is in fact the most deeply concealed rarity. For the most part, modern man as such does not know at all what science is; he has never really experienced what drives a man toward it. Scientists themselves, who continue to

\textsuperscript{13} Karl Jaspers, \textit{The Origin and Goal of History}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p. 75.
make discoveries in their own special fields -
unconsciously carrying on a little while longer a
movement that was set going by other forces - often
do not know what science is; they betray this in
their comportment outside that narrow field in which
they are still masters. Modern philosophers discuss
science as though they knew it, and then permit it
to degenerate into an historically passing ideological
error. Even philosophers of the stature of Hegel
know little or nothing about this science.15

The analogue, then, of our period is not the axial period but
rather "the age of the invention of tools and the use of
fire". So, he concludes that:

If there is to be a new Axial Period it can only
lie in the future, just as the first Axial Period
followed, after a long interval, the period of
foundation-laying discoveries which finally dif-
ferentiated human life from the animal kingdom:
the Promethean Age. This new Axial Period, which
perhaps stands before us and which could constitute
a single, world-embracing reality, is beyond our
powers of imagination. To anticipate it in phantasy
would mean to create it. No one can know what it
will bring.16

Lewis Mumford, in The Transformations of Man18 takes
up Jasper's challenge to conceive of history axially. His
first six chapters are in generic agreement with Jaspers, but
then he seeks to move forward to consider what he calls post-
historic man and some variety of world culture.19 His efforts

16 Ibid, p. 97.
17 Ibid, p. 97.
18 Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man, New York:
Collier Books, c. 1956.
19 Ibid, see Chapters 7 and 8.
bear witness to the difficulty noted by Jaspers and, as we will see when we discuss Lonergan's view, he fails to exploit the clues that Jaspers had given. He looks to a new spiritual enlightenment that would mediate man's mechanization through modern technology, rather than to a flowering within scientific man's problematic as Jaspers would have it.

In Toynbee's *Mankind and Mother Earth*, reference is made again to an axis age (c. 600-480 B.C.) in which five great seers made their appearance (Zarathustra, Deutero-Isaiah, the Buddha, Confucius, and Pythagoras), and which was a turning point in history. He disagrees with Jaspers however regarding the time span of the period:

On the strength of the contemporaneity of these five seers, the period spanned by their life times has been called by Karl Jaspers the *Axis Age*, i.e., an age that is the hinge on which human history has turned. Their appearance has in truth been a turning-point in the sense that, as has been noted above, they have continued to influence mankind down to the present day and are likely to go on influencing posterity by their example, even if their precepts cease to be articles of faith. However, if we are to think of human history in terms of an Axis Age - and this is, in itself, an illuminating concept - we must extend its time-span in both directions.

At the end of Volume Four entitled "The Ecumenic Age" from his series on *Order and History*, Eric Voegelin comments upon what Hegel has described as the "absolute epoch"

---


21 Ibid, p. 177.
and what Jaspers has referred to as the "axis-time" of world-history. It is Voegelin's contention that Hegel's absolute epoch was determined by the appearance of the Son of God, and in so far as God has revealed himself as Spirit or Geist through the Incarnation, such an event is the pivotal point around which the history of the world turns. Consequently, for Hegel, this meant that Self-consciousness had raised itself to the concept of absolute Spirit by having progressed through the various moments of his idealistic system. To a certain degree, Voegelin agrees with Hegel's interpretation of history as the unfolding processes of the divine order in man initiated by the reality of the Christ event when he says:

The "absolute epoch", understood as the event in which reality becomes luminous to itself as a process of transfiguration, is indeed the central issue in a philosophy of history. For without the noetic and pneumatic differentiations, there would not be a history in which man's humanity achieves its rational and spiritual consciousness, nor would there be a philosopher's intellect to be concerned with this intelligible structure in history. One does not have to accept Hegel's System, if one accepts his problem of the "absolute epoch" as valid. There remains, however, the question whether this epoch must be identified with the epiphany of Christ, or whether it should not be identified with some other event.

On the other hand, Voegelin points out that whereas Jaspers acknowledges Hegel's contribution to a proper definition of

---

history - that world-history becomes knowable when God had manifested himself as the Geist to the thinking Geist in man, of Mind which is the proper organ in which God is present to man - he (Jaspers) refuses to identify the absolute epoch with Christ since Christianity is not the faith of all mankind, but one faith among others. For Jaspers there is an axis of world-history that can be valid for all human beings, including Christians, and which is to be found empirically as the spiritual process that extends from ca. 800 to 200 B.C. with its locus impinging upon the year 500 when Confucius, the Buddha and Heraclitus were contemporaries. "This age brought the fundamental categories in which we think to this day; it laid the foundations of the world-religions in which men live to this day; in every sense the step into the Universal was taken." 23 It is Jaspers' concern to re-establish the absolute epoch as the center of a philosophy of history against for instance Toynbee's dissection of history into civilizations with autonomous internal courses; "One must, furthermore, acknowledge his categorization of the 'spiritual process', that had on and off attracted attention as an historical epoch, as the axis-times, as a feat of philosophical insight." 24 The problems that Jaspers encounters

23 E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, p. 310 (Original in Karl Jaspers, "Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte", Zurich, 1949, 18.)

24 Ibid, p. 311.
with respect to his construction of the axis-time, are generated by the fallacy of inducing historical events into a stream of world-time in which the spiritual process participates as in the case of Mumford's analysis of axial man. The main drive behind Voegelin's attempt to seize upon an authentic historical reality is his belief in a structure of human consciousness which becomes luminous for its own historicity, thus making an historical consciousness both possible and intelligible.

Voegelin adds several key elements to the search for general categories in history. In the first place, he notes in his large Introduction to this fourth volume of Order and History the significance of the event, and of the discovery of the event, of the shift from compact consciousness to differentiated consciousness in what Jaspers calls the axial period, and we will exploit this discovery shortly. But secondly he implicitly rejects Jaspers' two axial periods by questioning the meaning of modernity. So, in noting the parallel falsifications of history in the Sumerian King List and Hegel's Philosophy of History, Voegelin is led to ask: "And what is modern about the modern mind, one may ask, if Hegel, Comte, or Marx, in order to create an image of history that will support their ideological imperialism, still use

the same techniques for distorting the reality of history as their Sumerian predecessors. In a later context he remarks: "A 'modern age' in which the thinkers who ought to be philosophers prefer the role of imperial entrepreneurs will have to go through many convulsions before it has got rid of itself, together with the arrogance of its revolt, and found the way back to the dialogue of mankind with its humility."  

These searchings for a philosophic meaning of total history fall into place when located in the broad view of evolution and history that is available from the writings of Bernard Lonergan. Before dealing directly with Lonergan's view, however, comparisons between Lonergan's view and that of Voegelin will help towards indicating the richness of Lonergan's philosophy of history.

So, where Voegelin distinguishes between compact consciousness and noetic or pneumatic differentiations of consciousness - both of which are religious - Lonergan distinguishes a range of differentiations and sets of differentiations that we will enlarge on presently. Furthermore, where Voegelin indicates generally a dialectic of appearance and reappearance of that differentiation of consciousness that  


27 Ibid, 192.
might be named "metaxic" - a consciousness of the in-between character of human life - Lonergan's view would seem to lead to an account of a dialectic progress of differentiation paralleling Jasper's effort. So, while Lonergan's discussion of differentiations of consciousness in *Method in Theology*\(^{28}\) is regularly systemic, occasionally his treatment takes on a historical or genetic character,\(^{29}\) and then one has the impression of possible and probable (we will consider emergent probability presently) sequences of differentiations from primitive to present times and beyond. So, drawing on the two sections referred to, one comes to the notion of religiously differentiated consciousness emerging early - Lonergan refers here indeed to Eliade's treatment of shamanism and "archaic techniques of ecstasy".\(^{30}\) The next differentiation he lists in that same place is artistic differentiation, and one is led to recall the emergence of Greek drama out of religious contexts and the transition from the compact religio-aesthetic dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles to the relatively secular aesthetics of Euripides, who is


\(^{29}\)Ibid, particularly pp. 273-6; 303-5; *Doctrinal Pluralism*, pp. 12-22.

\(^{30}\)Ibid, p. 273.
called "the father of European drama", a point we will return to later. We would note here however that the differentiations on which this thesis focuses are those of religion and art, especially as their integration may be mediated by the contemporary differentiation of interiority.

Lonergan goes on to distinguish theoretical differentiation in its early mode - one may think of the period from Aristotle to post-medieval times - and in its modern mode in which it discards philosophy in the traditional sense. Scholarly differentiation Lonergan would associate most with the emergence of 19th century German historical studies. Finally, interiorly differentiated consciousness is a contemporary phenomenon, and here Lonergan seems to echo Jaspers in noting its emergence from the achievements and problematic of modern science.

Lonergan's later discussion adds the further refinement, due partly to regression and partly to the power of


33 Ibid, pp. 274 and 185.

34 Lonergan's early work Insight, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957) regularly notes that modern science has made possible refinements of interiority.

linguistic meaning, of post-systematic, post-scientific and post-scholarly meaning. 36 Religious differentiation in Lonergan corresponds closely to Voegelin's mètaxis differentiation, and grounds the distinction of secular and sacred to which we will return presently. What Voegelin fails to do is to exploit the evolution of modern science, scholarship and philosophy. In that sense Voegelin would fall under the general criticism expressed by Lonergan regarding churchmen in the face of modernity:

I have been indicating in summary fashion a series of fundamental changes that have come about in the last four centuries and a half. They modify man's image of himself in his world, his science and his conception of science, his history and his conception of history, his philosophy and his conception of philosophy. They involve three basic differentiations of consciousness, and all three are quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval Europe.

These changes have, in general, been resisted by Churchmen for two reasons. The first reason commonly has been that churchmen had no real apprehension of the nature of these changes. The second reason has been that these changes commonly have been accompanied by a lack of intellectual conversion and so were hostile to Christianity.

We turn immediately to Lonergan's view of history as a whole. It can conveniently be built up in four stages:

(1) a general theory which covers both natural and human history;


(2) a theory specific to stages of human meaning;

(3) a view of human temporality which would divide it into "two times" both ontogenetically and phylogenetically;

(4) a specifically Christian component that would relate history to the Trinitarian personalities.

The fourth stage will not be discussed in this chapter - it belongs properly to what Lonergan would call the area of special categories and it will be discussed in chapter five when a Christian aesthetics will be put in the framework of dialectic, foundations and history. The first stage will be briefly treated immediately. But the focus of our attention will be stages two and three. Following their treatment we will supplement Lonergan, in a manner that seeks to be faithful to his heuristics, from the works of R. Doran and M. Eliade, and conclude with a foundational synthesis of general categories of history.

Lonergan's general theory of history and evolution is basically contained in two places: in an early work on "Finality, Love, Marriage" and in chapters four and seven of Insight. Its basic heuristic has, however, received little attention by his followers, apart from some elaborations in the field of natural science in McShane's Randomness.

---

Statistics and Emergence. Here we are more interested in the general heuristic structure in its role as substructure of the evolution of meaning, of "outgoing of subject", indeed of expression.

The key elements of Lonergan's general view would seem to be three: a modernisation of Aristotle's view of matter and form that gives the lie to reductionism by indicating how a coincidental manifold of lower events or acts can be the matter of a higher form; a sublation of Darwin's view of chance variations and survivals into a precise heuristics of probability schedules; an identification of recurrent patterns as the keystones of evolutionary history. So Lonergan arrives at his general view: "Emergent probability is the successive realization in accord with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence."\[41\]

The illustrations of emergent schemes given both by Lonergan and McShane belong predominantly to the lower sciences. But indications are given of schemes closer to our

---


topic: schemes of recurrence of expression, schemes of recurrence mediated by ideas; schemes of recurrence under the openness of finality. The interest of the present thesis is the envisagement of possible and probable schemes of aesthetic expression mediated by ideas of "the intelligible in the profounder sense", and that envisagement requires an optimism in the openness of finality including especially "the need to evoke long intervals of time". One area of Lonergan’s work, a detailed analysis of the relevant schemes of economic progress, illustrates that long term optimism in a manner that lends plausibility to our own envisagement, to be detailed in chapters four and five. The long term optimism is succinctly expressed by the chapter-title of one of the main sources of Lonergan’s unpublished view "Ah Improbable Christian Vision and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million Years".

---


43 Ibid, pp. 208-11


and his view is echoed by first class economists such as Schumpeter and Keynes — is that the ideas of the relevant schemes have been absent from minds of economists in these past centuries, and are still absent. Business cycles did become a topic at the end of the nineteenth century, but only as things to be eliminated. While this field seems distant from the area of aesthetics there is an enlightening parallel. While "expressionism" became both a fact and a topic at the end of the nineteenth century, an adequate idea of expression was just as absent as the idea of natural economic rhythms. What is needed to make plausible and probable such ideas is "intentionality analysis", a reality belonging to a later stage of meaning. And this brings us to our next topic.

Laced into that substructure by later work is Lonergan's basic view of history as involving stages of meaning. Lonergan distinguishes three stages of meaning, a first stage which consists in "the development of language" and more generally of common sense meaning. One may parallel to this

---


50 Ibid, the central treatment is given in pp. 85-99. See also references above to "differentiation":

51 Ibid, pp. 86-90.
Jaspers' discussion of pre-axial technological development, and go further to note a parallel between Jaspers' axial period and Lonergan's discussion, based on Snell's work, of the Greek discovery of mind.

Lonergan writes of the second and third stages in a single section, speaking of the second emerging from the first by a splitting of meaning into common sense and theory, and of the third stage as being generated by the needs and problems of the second. Again there is a parallel to Jaspers' search for a second axial period, but Lonergan's treatment leaves the temporal sequence obscure. However, there is an earlier discussion of human temporality by Lonergan which helps us forward beyond both Jaspers and Method in Theology. It occurs in Lonergan's systematics of trinitarian theology when he deals with analogies between the temporal and eternal subject.

Lonergan's discussion is complicated by his search for analogies between the temporal and the eternal, but one lengthy quotation will serve to bring forth the insight that

---


53 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 93-96; see also 82-83.

54 I am indebted here to the Lonergan Institute at Regis College where there is an unpublished English translation of the relevant treatise, De Deo Trino, pars systematica, Rome: Gregorian Institute, 1964. The relevant section is Qxxi "Quaenam sit analogia subjecti temporalis et subjecti aeterni?"
is key to our derivation of generic historical categories.\textsuperscript{55}

Thirdly, the temporal subject is per accidens subject of his intellectual nature as actuated prior to his being the per se subject of this intellectual nature as actuated.

For whatever is said to be per se or per accidens is said to be such inasmuch as it comes to be either from the intention of the agent or beyond the intention of the agent. Now inasmuch as one considers the intention of that agent who created the nature of the temporal subject, who conserves it, and who applies it to its activity, then it is entirely clear that the intellectual nature of the temporal subject is per se actuated. On the other hand, inasmuch as one considers the intention of the temporal subject himself, it is also clear that the actuation of intellectual nature can not be intended by the temporal subject prior to that subject's knowing that he possesses an intellectual nature; and it is no less evident that a temporal subject can not know that he has an intellectual nature prior to the actuation of this very nature of his...\textsuperscript{56}

Once this is grasped, there comes to light the fact that the temporal subject is involved in two times: there is an earlier time in which it is on the basis of natural spontaneity that he is the subject of his actuated intellectual nature; and there is a later time in which he is the subject of his own actuated and to be actuated intellectual nature, not spontaneously, but knowingly, willingly, and through his own intention.

Lonergan's discussion in this section is very brief and only very generically suggestive of a view of concrete history. He certainly emphasizes the need for community and the influence of others in the genesis of a self-knowledge.

\textsuperscript{55}This key, and the relevant text of Lonergan, is discussed by Philip McShane "Middle Kingdom, Middle Man", Searching for Cultural Foundations, Ed. P. McShane, Washington: University Press of America, 1984.

\textsuperscript{56}Das Deo Trino, Qxxi.
which would mediate performance. But it is only by considering this key point both in the context of the earlier work *Insight*, and by the gradual process of slowly appropriating the slogan of its Introduction regarding the understanding of understanding as a fixed base, and by coming to grips with the context of the later historical perspective of the chapter on Meaning in *Method in Theology*, that is relevant to general categories of history, that the history of expression, emerges. Then what Lonergan speaks of in the context of trinitarian theology becomes clearly identifiable with what he later talks of as the transition to the third stage of meaning, or to the differentiation of consciousness of interiority. By bringing the two discussions together, however, one begins to see that the transition from the first to the third stage of meaning takes time and with the collaboration, within emergent probability, of many temporal subjects. So one finds a resolution to the debate regarding the axial period. The axial period becomes the period of splitting, of fragmentation, that extends from what Jaspers calls an axial period, down to our own times. Moreover, such a view of a lengthy problematic period is what is fundamentally suggested by Voegelin's

---


work in the fourth volume of *Order and History*.

What one is led to, then, is a view of history, indeed of the history of interiority and philosophy, as a movement from compactness through splitting or fragmentation towards a mediation of integration made possible by interiority. This mediation is our immediate topic but perhaps we are now in a position to read the following statement of Lonergan in its full phylogenetic and ontogenic significance:

It is only through the long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation that one can find one's way into interiority and achieve through self-appropriation a basis, a foundation, that is distinct from common sense and theory, that acknowledges their disparateness, that accounts for both and critically grounds them both.  

The question of mediated integration is taken up most specifically in a large range of works by Fr. Robert Doran.  

He draws on the works of Ricoeur, Jung, Becker, Otto Rank and

---


61 Other works by R. Doran include:

Lonergan:

... to predict that these guides through the labyrinthine ways of interiority will be principal among the makers of postmodern intentionality. For they came to know human desire with penetrating precision and exacting subtlety. Moreover they have opened that desire upon itself in its native spontaneity. Together, I believe, they render asymptotically possible the self-conscious recovery of intentionality which Paul Ricoeur calls a second, post-critical immediacy. 62

(In particular, Doran makes reference to Ricoeur's Freud and Philosophy, Yale, New Haven, 1970. See for instance page 496 of this work.) Doran's work to date has concentrated on the mediation of post-critical immediacy through a third-stage-meaning attention to one's dreams, but he indicates its larger significance for psychic wholeness. 63 Particularly relevant for our own thesis is his discussion of "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning". 64 Key to Doran's discussion is his notion of psychic conversion: "Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for internal communication through the recognition, understanding, and responsible negotiation of the elemental symbols that issue from the psychological depths especially in one's dreams. These symbols are dramatic


indicators of one's existential subjectivity." The role he attributes to psychic conversion is a transformation of history: "psychic conversion will further the socially, economically, culturally, and politically emancipatory and therapeutic potential of generalized empirical method, as well as its effects on one's personal freedom. It will thus function in an understanding and negotiation of the dialectic of history." Central to this task is the function of artistry: "An authentic dramatic artist has been healed by conversion in such a manner that the prior collaboration of intelligence and imagination in the selection for conscious discrimination of the images that are needed for the insightful, truthful, and loving construction of a work of dramatic art can go forward in inner freedom." And all this leads to a new specification of what Lonergan means by genuineness:

Genuineness in the third stage of meaning, then, promotes the harmonious cooperation of the self as it is and the self as it is objectified, known, apprehended through self-appropriation. It promotes a second naiveté, that in the limit


\[66\] Ibid, p. 151.

\[67\] Ibid, p. 155.

returns to "speech that has been instructed by the whole process of meaning" (Ricoeur's expression), an informed, post-critical, post-therapeutic naiveté.

The notion of second immediacy or, more fully, mediated integral authenticity, is enlarged in historical perspective by drawing on the work of Mircea Eliade. Eliade's study of the Sacred in primitive cultures helps towards bringing out what is implicit in Doran's work so as to clear the key features of a religious meta-aesthetics in the third stage of meaning. What we add here, then, is not an analysis of Eliade's position, but sufficient pointers from his work to help us towards adequate general categories of history. Moreover, these pointers are implicitly sublated hitherto within a critical realism and theism which remains to be discussed in the following chapter.

We may first note that Eliade's massive study, summed up in his books The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of Religion, and in The Myth of the Eternal Return does not in itself claim to be more than a pointer, one moreover which pivots on the question which is central to this thesis. So,


for example, writing of architecture Eliade notes, "It does not lie within our province to write the history of the desacralization of the human dwelling" and he goes on to note the focus of attention of the conclusion of his work: "We shall later have occasion to inquire whether this secularization of nature is final." Our own view, based on Lonergan's analysis of varieties of differentiated consciousness, is that a secularization of nature is final or legitimate only within the differentiation of consciousness that belongs to pure science - outside that pattern of consciousness it is a non-objective fragmentation. What Eliade's work does is to make clear what can be, or has to be, retrieved in a third stage of meaning. Moreover, while his treatment of the sacred is general, it lends itself to an interpretation of aesthetic sacrality in the stages of meaning. Indeed the structure of the book parallels Langer's fundamental work on art, Feeling and Form. Both works begin with a study of Space, move on to a study of Time, and conclude with a treatment of what may be called "literate objectification": for Eliade, myth, for Langer, Poesis. The point we wish to exploit emerges clearly in Eliade's treatment of habitation or


72Ibid, p. 51.
architecture - the equivalent of Langer's "ethnic domain". What he brings out is the spontaneous sacrality of compact consciousness. "The reader will soon realize that the sacred and the profane are two modes of being in the world, two existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history." The first mode of being has temporal priority, primitive man being compactly religious man, and his constructs, particularly his habitations, were images of a transcendent cosmos that were continuous with an elemental objectivity of sacredness:

Religious man's desire to live in the sacred is in fact equivalent to his desire to take up his abode in objective reality, not to let himself be paralysed by the never ceasing relativity of purely subjective experiences, to live in a real and effective world and not in an illusion. This behaviour is documented on every plane of religious man's existence, but it is particularly evident in his desire to move about only in a sanctified world, that is, in a sacred space.

The structuring of a space is integrally a "repetition of the cosmogony". It is a centre which is an image of the sacredly-centred cosmos. Nor does the plurality of centres generate a problem for compact consciousness.

---

74 Ibid, p. 28-29.
75 Ibid, p. 31.
The multiplicity, or even the infinity, of centers of the world raises no difficulty for religious thought. For it is not a matter of geometrical space, but of an existential and sacred space that has an entirely different structure, that admits an infinite number of breaks and admits an infinite number of communications with the transcendent.\footnote{M. Eliade, \textit{The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion}, New York: Harper, 1961, p. 57.}

Earlier, Eliade noted that "Religious architecture simply took over and developed the cosmological symbolism already present in the structure of primitive habitations"\footnote{Ibid, p. 54.}—and we might add, the other two structurings of space whose art forms are painting and sculpting. What we are interested in is not the development of religious architecture—a development and a differentiation which belongs to the second stage of meaning—but the early compact sacral meaning of primitive objectifications. An early Chinese dictionary notes that "to paint is to draw boundaries"\footnote{Chinese Painting, A. Skira and J. Cahill, New York: Rizzoli Pub., p. 11.} but the paradox of the primitive boundary-drawing is that it was not a separation, such as belongs to a later culture, of sacred and profane. It was, rather, a world within a sacred world. The culture in which we live, in fact, is that later culture, so that we can recognise of ourselves what Eliade says of the believer: "For a believer, the church shares in a different space from the street in which it stands...The threshold that
separates the two spaces already indicates the distance between two modes of being, the profane and the religious.\textsuperscript{79}

Eliade's treatment of time parallels the treatment of space, and the same basic insight recurs, an insight perhaps best expressed by Langer when she remarks, "the dance often reaches the zenith of its development in the primitive stage of a culture when other arts are just dawning on its ethnic horizon... the great trauma that Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts (is) secularization."\textsuperscript{80}

Finally, we will have something to say regarding "literate objectifications" only when we reach more precision on the issue of objectivity in chapter four. These few indications of compact religious consciousness, of course, are only pointers to the larger task.

To come to know the mental universe of homo religiose, we must above all take into account the men of these primitive societies. Now to us in this day their culture seems eccentric, if not positively aberrant; in any case it is difficult to grasp. But there is no other way of understanding a foreign mental universe than to place oneself inside it, at its very center, in order to progress from these to all the values that it possesses.\textsuperscript{81}


\textsuperscript{80}S. Langer, \textit{Feeling and Form}, New York: Scribners, 1953, p. ix.

What we wish to progress to, however, is an envisagement of religiosity and its aesthetic expression within history as a whole. And what a study of primitive compactness does is make more feasible an envisagement of a mediated integral consciousness in the third stage of meaning.

In the concluding part of The Myth of the Eternal Return, Eliade carries his discussion of historical perspective forward in a manner that dovetails with our present searchings. Eliade notes recent trends towards a myth of return in the midst of more evident movements of historicism, including movements associated with Marx. He concludes to the inadequacy of such movements, particularly historicism, for freeing man from the terror of history: "The terror of history becomes more and more intolerable from the viewpoints afforded by the various historicistic philosophies. For in them, of course, every historical event finds its full and only meaning in its realization alone."82 The man who reaches for a cyclic view fares better: "At least he retains the freedom to annul his faults, to wipe out the memory of his 'fall into history', and to make another attempt to escape definitively from time."83 Eliade here considers the possibility of escape from time through a unification of the real


83 Ibid, p. 158.
by knowledge\textsuperscript{84}, but finally takes a stand on the centrality of something like Christian Faith: indeed he concludes: "that Christianity is the 'religion' of modern man and historical man, of the man who simultaneously discovered personal freedom and continuous time (in place of cyclic time)."\textsuperscript{85} What Eliade concludes to here would seem, in fact, to be a fundamental need that can be met by our transposition of Voegelin's metaxic view of history.

We may now conclude this chapter by locating its contribution towards the total task. That location is done best by reference to Lonergan's short discussion of categories in Method in Theology.\textsuperscript{86} That discussion falls into two parts: one of general categories and one of special categories. The present chapter has focused on general categories of history and is particularly related to a specification of the different realms of meaning and the different worlds meant as a result of the various subjective operations promoted by the cognitive structures of mind; a recognition of the diverse heuristic structures constituting the individual as operator realizing specific goals, in particular the genetic and dialectical processes which culminate in the attainment of a self-knowledge

\textsuperscript{84}M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, 155.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{86}B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 285-291.
which speaks of a metaphysics encompassing total meaning of
the human subject. Finally, an account of both undifferentiated
and differentiated modes of consciousness has been taken into
consideration, wherein the case of the former, subjectivity
remains within the immediate world of experiencing or that of
commonsense, while the latter enables the subject to shift to
other realms of meaning such as theory, interiority, and trans-
cendence by his active performance of moving from one manner of
operation to another depending upon what faculty is required
and the situation imposed. In the following chapter we must go
back to more basic problems which relate to the different kinds
of conscious operation which take place within the four-levelled
reality of human consciousness (of experiencing, understanding,
reasoning, and deciding); the biological, aesthetic, intellectual,
dramatic, and religious patterns of experience underlying these
conscious operations, the discernment of the nature of the con-
sciousness activated at each level of knowing, as well as the
acknowledgement of the different procedures made manifest by
the various modalities of differentiated consciousness, such as
religion, art, theory, scholarship, interiority and their objec-
tives and finally to problems in the epistemology of knowledge
and of symbol. The fifth chapter will carry us into the search
for special theological categories.
CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMATIC KEY GENERAL CATEGORIES OF EXPRESSIONISM

"Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means." ¹

The present chapter faces a central difficulty which was raised in each of the previous chapters but postponed until now. That the difficulty is central is evident from the relationship between "expression" and "object" or "objectification": so, what is or might be meant by "expressionism" varies radically with the epistemological viewpoint of author or reader. Before tackling that central difficulty, however, we wish to locate that difficulty within the methodological difficulty of the thesis and of studies drawing on Lonergan generally. In a first section, then, entitled "Difficulties and Strategy", we will relate the epistemological difficulty to the problem presented by Lonergan's outline of a proper dialectic strategy in theology. Next, we will indicate the epistemological and foundational position which for us gives sufficient grounds for a fuller theology of expressionism. A

¹B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 239.
third section will enlarge on this in relation to aesthetic objectification or expression. Section four will seek to make foundational precisions regarding the nature of symbols. Section five will return to a specification of the concrete religious intention which is the artist and which also constitutes the members of the artist's audience. In a sixth section we will locate the previous reflection within a larger heuristic of general categories, putting chapter three's analysis of historical categories in a new context and preparing the way for a further extension of our reflections into the issue of special categories involving trinitarian theology in the final chapter.

Section I - Difficulties and Strategy

We noted above that the difficulty expressed by the initial quotation of this chapter, the epistemological difficulty, falls into a context of larger difficulties. These larger difficulties can be placed under two headings which are best suited to bring out both the nature of Lonergan's different suggestions regarding theological procedure and the strategy that we are led to adopt in this thesis. The first heading relates to Lonergan's first search for foundations of theology in the book Insight and the difficulty of arriving at what he calls there "the position"; the second heading relates to

the more concrete and complex strategy of arriving at a foundational position which comes in his later work *Method in Theology*, specifically through following his suggestions regarding the procedure of dialectic.

The difficulties of the second heading relate most immediately to the strategy of the present thesis so we begin with them.

Our aim in the thesis is to throw light on expressionism from the perspective of theology. As has been implied in previous chapters, and will become clearer through this chapter and the next, the expressionism we speak of is "concretely non-secular" and so it is clear that our reflections come under Lonergan's strategic definition of theology, "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix", and artistic expression is part of that matrix, inseparable even if distinguishable from both the total culture and religion. However, if the reflection is to be faithfully within the paradigm for theology presented by Lonergan then that reflection

---

3 This view parallels Voegelin's view of the universality of the experience of existential tension, which may in fact be unknown to the experiencing subject. See E. Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, pp. 40-4. Under the second heading we will have occasion to note Voegelin's epistemological weaknesses. From Lonergan's viewpoint this stand on non-secularity belongs to the full position (*Insight*, p. 388 extended by chapter 19).

has to be identifiable as a functional specialist contribution to the communal collaboration of eight functional specialties which mediate between the data on expressionism in history and the transformation of the perspective of expressionism through the fruit of communications as a specialty.\(^5\) From this fact one can go on to identify difficulties related to this heading. First one may ask about the procedure of the present thesis; does it remain faithful to the paradigm of theological method? It seems in fact to move from specialty to specialty without clear definition of transition.

So, chapter two was an effort to illustrate a particular part of the strategy of dialectic which falls under the title of "assembly".\(^6\) Chapter three on the other hand sought to arrive at some general theological categories regarding history as a whole, so it would seem to be predominantly a chapter on foundations yet clearly involving a good deal of dialectic considerations. What then of the paradigm? The answer is twofold.

The main direction of the thesis is foundational or methodological. It is the direction of the book *Method in Theology* itself, which seeks to define the general procedure whereas the thesis seeks to define the procedure in a particular subsection of the cultural matrix. Just as *Method in


\(^6\) Ibid. p. 250.
Theology requires illustrations in various specialties without detailed analysis, so the present work requires illustrations to ground larger foundational statements, and we may note an enlightening parallel with Lonergan's more precisely foundational effort in *Insight*, where the book is mainly direct speech, "*in oratione recta*", with occasional illustrative "clarification by contrast". Foundations, then, is the functional specialty which speaks directly of the total procedure - although the genesis of procedures or foundations is something that occurs in dialectic.

Here we note a further difficulty, and a related advantage of the strategy we adopted, or have been forced to adopt, in the thesis.

An examination of the literature associated with Lonergan studies leads to the conclusion that in fact little has been done within particular functional specialties; specifically there seems to be no precise foundational writing apart from Lonergan's own work. Almost all the essays written in the various Lonergan *Festschriften* are in an accepted controversial style, with only an occasional essay presenting some aspect of Lonergan's work, regularly *in oratione*

---

obliqua\textsuperscript{8}. The works of Professors D. Tracy\textsuperscript{9} and P. McShane\textsuperscript{10} seem closest to foundational, yet they are both predominantly in what might be called a randomly dialectic style, and the former's work has been critically received as lacking Lonergan's basic paradigm both in philosophy\textsuperscript{11} and in theology\textsuperscript{12}. However, McShane's work has, and is generally acknowledged to have\textsuperscript{13}, relevance to an enlargement of the foundations delineated by Lonergan, and we will have occasion to draw on it in later sections.

From this examination it is clear that we are not operating within a familiar paradigm, and so our strategy is


\textsuperscript{13} See Lamb, ed., *Creativity and Method*, references from index under McShane.
a two-pronged one (1) illustrative of the procedure of communal collaboration within functional specialization: specifically yielding foundational clarity regarding the procedure within dialectic from "assembly" to positional statements; (2) reaching within Lonergan's positional statement for a more precise treatment of the nature of symbolic objectification or expression.

This strategy was already hinted at in chapter two, when we proceeded to assemble instances of the shift to fundamental subjectivity from the history of art in these past centuries. But in the present context we can be more precise about our own strategy.

The full strategy of dialectic that Lonergan would propose for a theology of symbolic expression would involve the collaboration of a community committed to proceed along the lines indicated on page 250 of Method in Theology. A close reading of those lines reveals a complex procedure that is nonetheless precisely defined. Lines 1-14 specify a six-stages procedure to be done by a set of investigators (lines 16-17) to be completed by these same investigators in a manner defined by lines 20-28. This completion itself is two-staged, a distinction of positions and counterpositions (lines 20-

---


15 McShane regularly draws attention to this page as the key Lonergan strategy of redeeming the past; see McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", Lamb, ed., Creativity and Method, p. 544.
24), and a restructuring of the material in the light of such distinguishing (lines 24-28).

The strategy therefore is clear, but it is also clear that it is a program for a large group in longterm collaboration.\textsuperscript{16} The limitations of a single thesis require some cut back on that strategy. So it is that we are led to focus on only two areas of the strategy; an attempt at assembly (line 1, page 250) in chapter two; a partial indication of the positions involved in the two-stage strategy (lines 20-24, page 250) and some restructuring of the material which will appear when special theological categories have been introduced in chapter five.

Section 2: Objectivity and Subjectivity

We wish to arrive in this section at a precise statement of a position on subjectivity and objectivity which has the power of transforming and restructuring both discussions of expressionism and its actual aesthetic practice. We do so by moving forward to that statement through a series of contexts.

The first context we may name the context of difficulty. It is repeatedly adverted to by Lonergan, most

\textsuperscript{16}This is the thesis of F.E. Crowe, \textit{The Lonergan Enterprise}, Massachusetts: Cowley Pub., 1980. Crowe compares the enterprise to Bacon's \textit{Novum Organum}. 
explicitly in comments on Tertullian's and St. Augustine's difficulties regarding what is real:

Unfortunately, some people have the impression that while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing can be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one's spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is in the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real.

The difficulties of "the fear of idealism" are discussed by Lonergan further in discussions with Voegelin and Gadamer at a Conference in Toronto, where, he notes Plato's transition to that view as mediated by geometric definition—a point to which we will return. He further specifies the difficulty, and idealism as a half-way house, in a key passage in the Introduction to Insight:

From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, there is an intelligent

---

and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism.

A second context, related to this transition to and beyond the half-way house of idealism and to the difficulty of reaching a critical realism, is the context of modern science. The case that is made by the book *Insight* in its elaborate invitation to involvement in science is that such involvement supplies a "bridge",¹⁹ and that "modern science has made possible"²⁰ sharp distinctions, and more broadly, a modern version of what led Plato to idealism. Moreover one might add to this modern possibility of science a parallel possibility within the shift to a mediation of theory in the arts as exemplified by the music of Xenakis or the broad area of Op-art. The thesis would seem to be that one does not seriously shift to idealism without ideas that are scientific — be they the geometrical ideas of Euclid or the ideas of modern physics. So there is the tendency to opt for a half-way house between materialism and idealism on the part of theologians whose background is more literary and philosophical in the accepted sense. This would seem to be the case with a

---


scholar such as Tracy, if McShane's analysis is correct. But it would also seem to be the case with such scholars as Dilthey, Gadamer and Voegelin. One needs the mediation of a theoretic world to get one to the halfway house of idealism and beyond.

A third context relating to the transition to critical realism is the context of asking the meaning of "is it?" or "yes" both within the context of science, where the issue of verification is at stake, or within the context of ordinary judgement, where Lonergan would claim that the same process is operative. This is the context that is stressed by F.E. Crowe when he takes issue with modern theologians: "They cannot stop the word 'is'. Using it, they cannot forever refrain from asking what it means, not for more than five or ten thousand years anyway, much less if


they are willing to learn with and from tradition. It is the context on which Lonergan focuses both in his criticism of Leslie Dewar and in his "Insight: Preface to a Discussion." It is a context of discussion that is lacking in much contemporary discussion of objectivity, even among philosophers of science.

A fourth context relevant to the conception and solution of the epistemological problem is the imaginative presentation of that problem that lurks behind most discussions of it. Lonergan places that imaginative difficulty within a theoretic discussion of the principal notion of objectivity:

Sixthly, the principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. How does the knower get beyond himself to a known? The question is, we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to know himself and asks how he can know anything else. Our answer involves two elements. On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I am. Further, we contend that other judgements are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there arises knowledge of other

---


objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject.

Such a theoretic clarity benefits from diagrams.

One such diagram that conveniently represents the imaginative thinking especially of empiricists is the following:

```
Subject          ?          Object
```

But it occurs explicitly as representing a viewpoint in thinkers such as Voegelin. So, Webb presents the following diagram:

```
        V
----> R
        S
```

In the text Webb remarks:

The line with the arrowhead in this picture represents the tensions of existence both as experienced on the level of immediacy and as articulated in consciousness through the medium of symbolization. "R" stands for reality, in which the inquirer is immediately involved through his participation in existence and which he also comes to know reflectively. "S" (a lens) stands for symbol; this may take the

---


specific form of visual symbols, myths, ideas, philosophic propositions and so on.

Undoubtedly it would take a prolonged analysis of Voegelin to locate him on "Lonergan's line" of varieties of objectivity. However, what we are noting here is a cultural tendency to represent knowing as confrontational.

This leads us to note a fifth context, the context of Aristotelian and Thomist thought, where knowledge is knowledge by identity. This context is very evidently a source of Lonergan's own critical realism, and the subject of one of his lengthy studies. 30 Immediately here, however, we add a diagram, which we might call a counter-diagram, borrowed from McShane: 31

---


The inner box represents the process of knowing as involving three levels. One may note that the arrow is interior to the subject: the dynamism of wonder moves to is-saying without any confrontational tendency. The diagram suggestively brings out the Thomist-Lonergan thesis that truth, existence, reality is reached in true judgement.

By operating within a clarification of these contexts one may arrive at the critical positon that is stated on Insight, page 388. Before expressing that position in so far as it is necessary for our thesis, we may add a diagram of our own which conveniently brings together basic aspects of the above discussion:

Euclid Modern

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Image} & \text{Theory} & \text{"is"} \\
\text{empiricism} & \text{idealism} & \text{critical realism} \\
\end{array}
\]

The spectrum of incoherent realisms: Thomist, process philos., etc.

As Lonergan notes in Method in Theology\(^{32}\) his view on realism is presented compendiously in "Cognitiveal Structure", Collection, pages 230-42, and an even more compendious presentation here would be pointless. What we wish to bring

---

out are aspects of the objectivity, gleaned from our focus on contexts, that will clear away problems that are perennial in the discussion of image, symbol, abstraction, representation and expression. That will be the task of the following two sections.

Section 3: Artistic Expression

In the present section we wish to give such foundational indications of the nature of artistic expression as are relevant to the thesis. This, then, is not a summary of foundational aesthetics within critical realism but a highlighting of aspects that bear on the present work.

We draw on Lonergan’s brief foundational reflections on art as “the objectification of a purely experiential pattern”.33 Lonergan discusses the meaning of each word of this definition with precision: we wish to enlarge on some aspects of his discussion.

First let us consider the meaning of experiential. At first sight Lonergan would seem to restrict this to what he would call experience in the strict sense, that is, the field of sensibility. However, at a later stage he notes

33 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 61. Lonergan’s other considerations of art are in Insight, pp. 184-5, and in an unpublished lecture cited by McShane (Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations), in chapter nine which is devoted to foundational aesthetics.
that the artist "has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom" and he speaks of "the transformed subject in his transformed world". It would seem, then, that the field of sensibility, while distinguishable as a proper zone of art, and indeed as related to a proper transcendental, beauty, is the field within the incarnately meaning subject under "the very dynamism of intentional consciousness". Later we will examine in detail the concretely supernatural openness of this dynamism, but it is enlightening here to recall Voegelin's discussion of the primordial "experience of existential tension: it is a process (either more or less clear and well developed) ordered through its orientation towards a supreme pole of perfection". Moreover, as Voegelin puts it:

"The range of human experience is always present in the fulness of its dimensions", its clarity and explicitness, by which it is constituted as conscious experience, may vary considerably depending on the extent to which the

---


36 Ibid, p. 73.

37 Ibid.

implicit fulness of experience always present on the level of immediacy is allowed to unfold its dimensions in the symbolizations that mediate their presence on the level of consciousness." 39

The importance of Voegelin's remarks is that they seem to bring to light a problem, or at least a danger, in Lonergan. For Lonergan there is an artistic differentiation of consciousness among others 40 but there is such emphasis on differentiation that there seems to be a tendency towards separation noted above in our comment on "sensible experience" as prime candidate for "experiential pattern". Voegelin's view would seem to restore the balance: whatever else about artistic differentiation, what the artist expresses is an immediacy which is incarnate, the immediacy of incarnate spirit.

Lonergan's foundational remarks on art in Insight, which predate his view on differentiations of consciousness, are closer to this view, and to Voegelin's emphasis on "Question" as the fundamental expression of the dynamic of human experience. 41 There Lonergan speaks of art as


40 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, see Index under differentiation.

manifesting in its obscurity "its most generic meaning". 42 As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep". 43

In summary, then, we would consider the "experience" referred to in the definition of art as the total experience of the concrete subject but in a state of liberation. Again, we draw here on Lonergan: "Art is a twofold liberation", 44 a liberation from and a liberation to. This liberation is what is meant by the word "purely" - art, normatively, is not tainted by practical, scientific, or philosophic issues; it is free to express the fundamental dynamic of incarnate experience. Again, this second freedom, freedom to, seems insufficiently expressed by Lonergan, whereas Voegelin would emphasize this fundamental dynamic as being centrally metaxic.

The definition notes that what is objectified is a purely experiential pattern, so we turn our attention to the meaning of pattern. We accept Lonergan's brief description of patterns 45 as a starting point but we wish to go


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

beyond it in the light of our discussions of objectivity and subjectivity. First of all we recall the truth of the statement, borrowed from Jaspers, that the aim of expression is to express authentic subjectivity, and on our view objectivity is the achievement of such expression. In that sense objectivity is authentic subjectivity — where this is meant not in a metaphorical sense but in the sense of the Aristotelian-Thomist thesis of knowledge by intensional identity. The artistic deed goes beyond cognitional identity, but what it normatively expresses is the pattern of the subject's intentionality in history — one may think here of the pattern of Beethoven's intentionality throughout his nine symphonies, or the pattern of Turner's intentionality throughout his life of seascapes. And just as there is an isomorphism between knowing and being, so there would seem to be a larger isomorphism between the dynamic pattern of human intentionality and what it intends in that larger sense, which is story or history.

The pattern prior to "objectification", is elemental. It is the conscious performing of a "transformed


47 I would refer the reader here to Lonergan's notion of being as it is defined in relationship to man's dynamic questing to know which is given on page 348 of chapter XII of *Insight*, and further p. 450 which makes reference to the term isomorphism within the appropriate context.
subject in his transformed world". In the final section we can locate the structure of this elementality within a larger heuristic. It suffices for the moment to note that it is a pattern of electrons and chemicals and organs sublated into the intentionality of spirit.

Finally, there is the expression, the word (the larger meaning of this will be discussed in chapter five) of this intentionality. Here we must take care against the incursions of a naive realism. It is well here to read here in a new light what Lonergan has said about another pattern, the intellectual pattern of experience:

>The intellectual pattern of experience is supposed and expressed by our account of self-affirmation, of being, and of objectivity. But no man is born in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently; and when some other pattern is dominant, then the self of our self-affirmation seems quite different from one's actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal as Plato's noetic heaven, and objectivity spontaneously becomes a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are "really out there".

We have already written (and will return to the topic in chapter five) of the possibility of the artist mediating his artistry through a consciousness in the third stage of meaning. This quotation serves to bring out the difficulty. There is a spontaneous confrontationality labouring against this mediation. McShane brings out this difficulty when he

notes: "I might write here, with Susanne Langer, of the piano as a living presence in a room. I write then, meaning the real piano in the real room and its artistic import. But perhaps you find that spontaneously you think about the large brown object out there in the corner?" The elemental artistry is, in a sense, secure: it is the incarnate subject in a reach towards possibilities. But the objectification is made within the possibilities of an entrapment within naive realism. We have noted that this entrapment is highly lively within the philosophic community. But the artist lives in communication with such current philosophy, and so can regularly both spontaneously disorientate his work and misrepresent his achievement through the myth that artistic meaning is somehow "already out there". Problems relating to this disorientation will be discussed in the next section.

Section 4: Image, Symbol, Abstraction, Representation

Our objective is still foundational clarification in the mode of direct speech. That clarification is certainly helped by drawing on contemporary scholarship on the


subject, but it is a large task of dialectic to sift out the insights in these works from the disorientations of erroneous objectivities.

We can make a start here from Lonergan's earlier summary statement about image and symbol:

It will be well to distinguish between the image as image, the image as symbol, and the image as sign. The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical "known unknown". As sign, the image is linked with some interpretation, that offers to indicate the import of the image.

To keep this set of distinctions within our general foundational considerations of objectivity and subjectivity, one has to continually appeal to the principles of metaphysical equivalence as defined by Lonergan, especially that principle which regards the proper location of description:

When one is endeavouring to explain, one is orientated to the universe of being; one is setting up distinctions within being; one is relating distinct beings to one another; and one is relegating all the merely descriptive

---

51 See Doran's works for example as cited in chapter three, footnote 61.


elements in knowledge to particular instances of the case that arises when some being with senses and imagination is related through his senses and imagination to other beings.

This principle is the key to an adequate meaning of representation, and so of expression. The principle relates directly to the Aristotelian-Thomist thesis that the sense in act is the sensible in act but its power can be inoperative, as Lonergan notes, under the pressures of descriptive metaphysics. Such is the case, for example, in E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. What is regularly forgotten is the wisdom expressed by Plotinus when, on his deathbed, he refused to have his painting done on the grounds that there was no point in leaving behind an image of an image.

Returning to Lonergan's summary statement, one notes a neat distinction between image and symbol which is developed later in Method in Theology. But what is important is not


the distinction but their common location within the subject in their elementality. The image is a relating of a sensitive being, and the symbol is a relating which adds complexities of affects even to the fullest extent of an inner communication in subjectivity between mind and organic and psychic vitality. 59 But it is only a false objectivity that would relate that relating to objects known, loved, or aspired to, either treating that relating idealistically as somehow shadowing or naively as tending towards representation. "Once one enters upon the way of explanation by relating things to one another, one has stepped out of the path that yields valid representative images". 60 So, an explanatory methodology would locate discussions on art as representational or nonrepresentational (abstract, non-programmatic etc., depending on the art-form) as located within some variety of naive realism.

To clarify further the nature of artistry as expressive we must turn to the meaning of the word "abstract". In normal discussion of, say, painting abstract is opposed


to representational or realistic. The meaning of abstract
in such contexts would seem to coincide to some extent with
what Lonergan designates as a view of abstraction as lead-
ing to an "impoverished replica".61 Abstract painting then
"leaves out" realistic elements, or likeness to reality.
Lonergan gives an account of abstraction which is the oppo-
site of this, a view which he derives both from Aquinas62
and from self-attentive reflection on activities of under-
standing in science and art. It is a view of abstraction
as additive, as enriching:

Its first moment is an enriching anticipation of
an intelligibility to be added to sensible pres-
etations; there is something to be known by
insight. Its second moment is the erection of
heuristic structures and the attainment of in-
sight to reveal in the data what is variously
named as the significant, the relevant, the
important, the essential, the idea, the form.63

And in art that attainment is validated not by verification
but by the achievement of adequate expression: "the valid-
ation of the artistic idea is the artistic deed".64

61B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 87-89.

62See Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, index under
abstraction, especially apprehensive abstraction.

63B. Lohergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 88. See also pp. 30-1.

64Ibid, p. 185.
Already we have commented on a certain restrictiveness of some of Lonergan's texts on art. In the above quotation it is possible to see the same restrictiveness, namely, that the insight in art could be limited to "sensible presentations". We have seen also, however, that it is not incompatible with Lonergan — and indeed it seems necessary from the evidence of artistic creativity — to view the sensible presentations in their concreteness, and therefore as a presence of the subject. Furthermore, in continuity with our discussion of the history of art as involving a deepening of subjectivity relating to the third stage of meaning, one must consider "the second moment" mentioned by Lonergan as a moment that varies in history so that the heuristic structures of an artist in the third stage of meaning explicitly include this presence of the subject. What in Voegelin's terms is compact in the primitive experience, can be insightfully acknowledged to the limits of the subject's potentiality, thus to the limit of abstracting the metaxic reality of the subject in history.

These considerations give a new meaning to the emergence of abstractness in art in the modern period. It is a normative meaning in that it views the concrete reality of the subject within a theistic view of history, not the view of artistic subjects who are at present oriented both philosophically and culturally in a distorted view of their own
however, one can be clear that that "skillfull embodying" is an instrumental act of meaning, not a constitution of a "feelingful" art object but the constitution of a configuration of levels of reality (including the human in such art forms as dance, music, etc.) that is potential in a way that is analogous to a disposed diagram. It can call forth resonances of self-appreciative subjectivity in the adequate audience. We will return to this point in the final section, section six, of this chapter.

Section 5: The Artist as Concrete Intention

If one were to wonder why their basic categories in the last analysis seem to be rooted firmly within an imaginative context of "imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time" one cannot help suspecting that this in turn is a consequence of the fact that the meaning of "experience" on this model systematically excludes that any aspect or features of reality - even if such experience be strenuously not reduced to sense perception - is not intrinsically conditioned by space and time.

F. Lawrence's remark, and the article from which it is drawn help us towards our final specification of general categories of the experiencing artist. Lawrence is criticizing a wide range of theologians - people like Moltmann, Whitehead, Gadamer - for the deficiencies of their views of experience and symbolization. The article serves to bring


however, one can be clear that that "skillfull embodying" is an instrumental act of meaning, not a constitution of a "feelingful" art object but the constitution of a configuration of levels of reality (including the human in such art forms as dance, music, etc.) that is potential in a way that is analogous to a disposed diagram. It can call forth resonances of self-appreciative subjectivity in the adequate audience. We will return to this point in the final section, section six, of this chapter.

Section 5: The Artist as Concrete Intention

If one were to wonder why their basic categories in the last analysis seem to be rooted firmly within an imaginative context of "imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time" one cannot help suspecting that this in turn is a consequence of the fact that the meaning of "experience" on this model systematically excludes that any aspect or features of reality - even if such experience be strenuously not reduced to sense perception - is not intrinsically conditioned by space and time.

F. Lawrence's remark, and the article from which it is drawn help us towards our final specification of general categories of the experiencing artist. Lawrence is criticizing a wide range of theologians - people like Moltmann, Whitehead, Gadamer - for the deficiencies of their views of experience and symbolization. The article serves to bring


out the clear discontinuity between the contemporary theological debate and Lonergan's precise specification of the experience of the theologian - and of the artist - as spiritual in a precisely defined sense. That precision springs from the double clarity yielded by the activity of investigating direct understanding and reflective understanding. The work of grasping the meaning of reflective understanding - of "is" - has been discussed earlier in this context. Without that reflection on reflection, as Lawrence asserts in the text that follows, theologians remain in the grips of what Lonergan has called "The umbilical cord that tied (these thinkers) to the maternal imagination of man". As Fr. F. Crowe remarks in a brilliant analogy with gravitation: "As without that force orbiting ships lose their link with mother earth, so without the force of 'is' the theologian loses his one link with reality".

Yet Crowe's metaphor should not be taken as anything more than metaphor. What is discovered by the investigation is that there is no "link with reality", that knowledge is by identity, that the constitutive notion of being within the subject is potens omnia facere et fieri.


70 F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: on the Need for Theological Method", *Continuum*, 7 1969, p. 49.
Lonergan's discussion of the meaning of "spiritual" in *Insight* adds a clarity mediated by reflection on direct insight as it has occurred in modern science. This clarification begins early in the first chapter of the book where the revelation by modern science of what Lonergan calls the "empirical residue" is discussed, and it is enriched by the discussions of the early chapters, especially chapter five, on the meaning of space and time. Only when a metaphysics of proportionate being has been defined in chapter sixteen, does Lonergan introduce the precise notion of the spiritual: "the spiritual neither is constituted nor is conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue". In the text at that stage he summarily appeals to the two levels of investigation to which we have referred: to the level of abstraction from the residue that is magnificently illustrated especially by modern physics; to the lucid rational factuality reached by grasping the unconditioned. And he concludes that paragraph with a statement that could be taken to bring together much of what has been our aim throughout this chapter, indeed throughout this thesis so far: "But if insight and grasp of the unconditioned are constituted quite differently from the empirical residue, so also are the inquiry and critical reflection that lead to

---

them and the conception and judgement that result from
them and express them." Our search throughout has been
for a clarification of expression, and we see here a clari-
fication of subjectivity that reveals that subjectivity in
its transemprirical reach, a clarification moreover that adds
a wealth of modern science and precision to Voegelin's
effort to specify the in-between.

But, for completeness, and to prepare the way for a
study of special supernatural categories in chapter five, we
must draw out the full openness of the concrete intention
that is the human subject, and in particular the artist who
reaches towards expressing that intention. This larger open-
ness is discussed by Lonergan mainly in three articles,
"Existenz and Aggiornamento" and "Openness and Religious
Experience" and "The Natural Desire to See God" but it has
in fact been a constant theme of his work. Summarily it is
present in the statement "Implicit in human inquiry there is
a natural desire to know God by his essence". More method-
ologically it is stated in the ninth characteristic of trans-
cendental method: "the objects of theology do not lie

\[72\] B. Lonergan, *Insight*, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957.

\[73\] All reprinted in *Collection*, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New

\[74\] B. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", *Collection*,
1967, p. 249.
outside the transcendental field. For that field is unrestricted, and so outside it there is nothing at all... the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows, nor by what he can know, but by what he can ask about."  

From such statements we can now view in better light the discussion of art presented in Insight, especially the discussion of the deep-set wonder that is prior to answers; a wonder which art reveals in its elemental sweep.

Finally we note that while we stress here the noetic component of the concrete intention we do so precisely because it is difficult and neglected. The somatic component has already been considered and the function of symbol as a necessity of inner communication and harmony, and the final section here will seek to bring together these partial reflections in the full heuristic of general categories.

Section 6: General Categorical Heuristics

We have gradually accumulated elements for a Christian heuristics of expressionism in art. The heuristics is incomplete. Just as Lonergan would claim that a study of personal relations can be adequate only in the larger concrete context of the search for an achievement of faith, so we


77Ibid, p. 731.
would claim that an adequate reflection on expressionism within the Christian context must draw on special categories of trinitarian theology. Prior to considering those special categories we must gather the results of previous reflections in as large an indication of our general categories as is feasible within the work of a thesis.

Perhaps the best manner of giving that indication is to relate it to the strategy of Method in Theology. As we noted in chapter two, when we attempted one element in the programme of Dialectic, namely assembly, the full strategy is a structure for communal collaboration that would work towards the sublating of Lonergan's work in Insight on dialectic, in particular in our case of the heuristics of levels and sequences of modes of expression. "For the totality of modes of expression the upper blade is the assertion that there is a genetic process in which modes of expression move towards their specialization and differentiation on sharply distinguishable levels". 78 Within the limited scope of the thesis we have only been able to bring out one main sharp distinction which our discussion of "assembly" prepared the ground for: the distinction of art in the third stage of meaning or in the second time of the temporal subject in which that subject has a self-appreciation.

which grounds in him or her what Doran calls second immediacy. And it is that sharply distinguishable type of aesthetic subjectivity which we wish to consider in a full theological context of chapter five.

In relation to Lonergan's heuristic suggestions, then, we locate our present reflections within the meaning of pages 286-8 of Method in Theology. Moreover, as the above reference to Lonergan's discussion of Dialectic in Insight would indicate, we take that meaning as sublating the work of Insight. So, for instance, the view of expressionism that we are reaching for is one which falls into the context of emergent probability as we summarily indicated that context in chapter three. So it fits into the optimism of the context, an optimism grounded on the concrete possibilities immanent in large numbers and long intervals of time. And we will see in the final chapter that the optimism of emergent probability can be sublated in a trinitarian theology of hope.
CHAPTER V

SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF A CHRISTIAN EXPRESSIONISM

We do not drift through history with our backs to the future and our gaze returning ever and again to the origin, but we strive confidently towards the promised future.

The quotation with which we begin specifies a problem: basically how to conceive of the future. What we wish to do in this final chapter is to take up Moltmann's challenge in the context of Lonergan's special categories, a context which involves some invariants both of trinitarian theology and of human consciousness. This chapter crowns our efforts to develop an adequate perspective on expressionism in art. It rests on hypotheses about God developed by Lonergan over a series of works; in that sense it belongs to speculative theology. But Lonergan's distinguishing of functional specialties leads to the questions of speculative foundational theology and in a recent work two of his disciples give solid grounds for considering large areas of Lonergan's theological treatise as in fact foundational.² McShane indicates


that relative invariants of early systematic work may find their way into general or special categories. Further, Lawrence's pointing towards a new foundational language gives a context for our own efforts to give the word "expressionism" a meaning that would bring its significance into the constellation of a normative Christian foundational language. Here, then, we are asking questions that are novel, in that functional specialization is a new distinction in theology, and its fruits can be expected to add new dimensions of meaning and language.

We approach this issue in a series of enlarging contexts. A first context relates to our initial quotation: there is a context from modern theological discussion which asks about the future and about discontinuities with the past, be they radical or mild. This context is very briefly indicated in the first section. The second section focuses on a contribution to theology of Lonergan's Method in Theology. The third section focuses on the ontology of the trinity in history, an ontology that seems to be independent of any analogies of understanding the trinity. The fourth section deals with the psychological analogy for the trinity as it is

---


rooted in the New Testament, common to human experience, and an issue of human interest that has been specified in one particular area in the discussion of assembly in chapter two.

The fifth section discusses an enlarged ontology, which sublates the existential ontology of the third section into the field of psychological analogy, to speak of divine meaning in a precise sense as participated by finitude. The final, sixth, section brings these elements together in a synthetic view of the stages of meaning in history, and vindicates our view, expressed in the section on assembly: that there is a movement in these last centuries of art that asks about itself and its own achievement, or expression, in such a way as to pose methodological and theological issues that reveal itself to itself, or more generally and precisely that reveal the third stage of meaning.

Section I: Context in Modern Theology

What we wish to consider here, is not the context of theological debate in general, but those elements of modern debate which touch on issues that we hope to resolve and which also will be seen, in the concluding section, to parallel elements in modern aesthetics in their search for synthesis. The elements, then, in modern theology that we wish to note are tendencies within theologies of hope and of the future in general, as well as theologies that seek to relate trinitarian theology to historical process. It is not a
matter here of critical study but of simple location. We wish eventually to show that Lonergan's special categories and his trinitarian theology give a fundamental foundational thematic of aesthetic expression. But Lonergan's work seems to have emerged in isolation from current theology. We wish to locate it as response to contemporary aspirations.

Harvey Cox's essay "Tradition and the Future" notes the emergent stress within theology on the question of the meaning of the future. A major figure in this emergence is Ernst Bloch, and Cox quotes Bloch as claiming to have discovered a new continent the adequate charting of which still remains a task. There is stress in this emergent tradition on newness and discontinuity, as there is also in the related theologies: radical theology and the theology of hope, and later we will focus on a philosophic and trinitarian ground of this newness. In contrast with theology of hope, however, radical theology's newness does not seem to be a newness open to the divine. Fr. Robert Doran stresses this closed newness in his essay "Christ and the Psyche" where he notes

---


a parallel between Altizer and Jung: "...The drama of redemption is reversed: man redeems God from unconsciousness more radically than God redeems man from sin". Jung's own personal belief is revealed in posthumously published lecture notes compiled by disciples entitled, "Is Analytic Psychology a Religion? Notes on a talk given by C.G. Jung". In these notes dating from 1937 Jung reveals affinities with the later radical theology of Thomas J.J. Altizer, who, it is significant, "wrote his doctoral dissertation on Jung". Doran quotes at length from Jung, giving the mood of a newness in which God is dead, man alone alive, and the descent of spirit into matter complete. Earlier Doran notes Jung's view of the Trinity as archetypically incomplete, a view with which Professor David Burrell agrees and Doran notes the source of this view of incompleteness in a taking of analogies for the Trinity from nature. A central concern in the following sections will be to focus on an analogy that grounds a view of the Trinity as an abundant completeness expressed in history, in consciousness within history, and in the expression - particularly aesthetic expression - of human consciousness within history.


Within the traditions associated with Bloch and Moltmann there is an openness which we will sublate within that larger view, for the larger view will contain precisions within a trinitarian theology of a theology of hope. Furthermore, this larger context, both trinitarian and metaphysical, seems to be demanded by Moltmann:

When Moltmann shifts from his earlier stance in the Theologie der Hoffnung of regarding salvation history almost exclusively in terms of a dialectic of past promise and future fulfillment to his explicitly Trinitarian theology of the Cross, not only does he acknowledge the need for a movement from the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity... but he can boldly assert that it makes "no sense to enlist the 'end of metaphysics' proclaimed by Nietzsche".11

The previous chapter indicated a grounding of metaphysics and its expression in general categories. In the next section we will indicate a grounded metaphysics of trinitarian theology that can be enlarged into a theology of aesthetic expression and hope.

Section 2: Context from Method in Theology

The third set of special categories moves us from our loving to the loving source of our love. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future

destiny when we shall know, not in a glass darkly, but face to face.\textsuperscript{12}

The essential context for our discussion includes all that we have elaborated of general categories in the two preceding chapters. Those general categories are summarily expressed in Lonergan's treatment of Foundations.\textsuperscript{13} We wish here to add the context of special categories, particularly that third set indicated in the quotation above. However, there is an immediate difficulty in attempting this task. While the general categories are elaborately available in Lonergan's previous work \textit{Insight}, and that work is thoroughly footnoted by him in his discussion of those categories, the treatment of the special categories seems almost superficially descriptive. Yet this would not seem to be compatible with Lonergan's drive towards a foundations that would be a broad invariant metaphysics. It would seem, rather, that Lonergan wished to stay at the level of open indeterminate sketching, "the task of a methodologist",\textsuperscript{14} and this indeed is true of the final eighty pages of his book. Moreover, when the sketch given here is located in the context of Lonergan's other works, it proves to relate to what could be called a general


\textsuperscript{13}Ibid, pp. 286-8.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, p. 291.
invariant metaphysics of the supernatural.

A first clue to this comes from the parallel that Lonergan draws between the medieval doctrine on grace and a required doctrine grounded in intentionality. The medieval theoretic was an elaborate correlating of habits, acts and divine operations which Lonergan studied in a previous work, *Grace and Freedom* \(^{15}\) and synthesized in an unpublished systematic account, *De Ente Supernaturali*. \(^{16}\)

So, one must expect a parallel complexity in a foundational treatment grounded by intentionality. That suspicion is supported by the summary indication of the first set of categories. Their derivation has to have the same dependence on positive studies of interiority \(^{17}\) has, as the derivation of general categories in *Insight* have on the positive studies of the sciences. \(^{18}\)

Our interest here is to arrive at some specification

---


of "witness", a theology of the witness normative in art. But that theology requires an elaboration of the third set of categories. Furthermore, it seems plausible to look to Lonergan's own methodological reflections on the reality of the Trinity for clues to these special categories. From reflection on these sources two key elements emerge: an ontology of the Trinity in history, and a trinitarian specification, through what Lonergan calls the psychological analogy, of "our implicit intending of God in all our intending".

Section 3: Ontology of the Trinity in History

The clue to a correct ontology of the Trinity in history comes from Insight: "the theologian is under no necessity of reducing to the metaphysical elements, which suffice for an account of this world, such supernatural realities as the Incarnation, the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and the Beatific Vision".

What Lonergan has in mind here are attempts to

---


20 I refer namely to Lonergan's Two Volume Work De Deo Trino, Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964. I am dependent here on unpublished translations, but my references will be to the Latin versions.

account for such realities in terms of the union of constituents of finite being with infinite being such as was made by the theologian M. de la Taille earlier in this century. 

Lonergan's own method of dealing with the problem is to appeal to a general thesis regarding contingent truths about God. The thesis is proposed in *Insight* and is specified in more detail in Lonergan's Latin works.

In *Insight* Lonergan states:

> Every contingent predication concerning God also is an extrinsic denomination. In other words, God is intrinsically the same whether or not he understands, affirms, wills, causes this or that universe to be. If he does not, then God exists and nothing else exists. If he does, God exists and the universe in question exists; the two existences suffice for the truth of the judgements that God understands, affirms, wills, effects this universe.

Lonergan goes on to note that the contingent predication regarding God is eternal: so, for example, God eternally wills Alexander's horse Bucephalus to exist for a short period. This aspect of the thesis will be relevant when we come to consider aesthetic reality. But first we must add refinements relating to contingent truths about the divine persons.

The refined thesis emerges in two assertions. 

---

22 I am indebted here to a remark by Fr. F.E. Crowe; I have not been able to track down the reference.


first assertion extends the previous thesis to the three divine persons in their common operations of knowing, willing, creating: the reality of God is the sufficient constitutive reality, but a "convenient created term" is required for contingent truths. Lonergan adds however that the attribution to the divine persons is distinct:

Utterius, quae tribus pariter personis at tribuuntur, non confuse sed distincte iis sunt attribuenda. Sicut enim ordine quodam eadem essentiam habent Pater et Filius et Spiritus, ita pariter ordine quodam eadem scientiam, eadem volitionem, eadem potentiam habent Pater, Filius, et Spiritus. Porro, ubi adest ordo, deest confusio; si quidem ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio.25

The second assertion refines the basic thesis to handle truths about the particular divine persons, and reaches a conclusion which is the key to a theology of hope in the third stage of meaning.

First, the general thesis is extended without difficulty: if there is a contingent truth about a divine person, there must be a "convenient" - the English does not have the full strength of *conveniens* - i.e. suitable or proportionate, extrinsic finite reality for the objectivity of that truth. So, there is the truth that the Father sends the Son into history. That mission is constituted by the divine relation of origin: the extrinsic reality (not yet specified) is not constitutive of the mission. "Divinae personae missio

ita per divinam relationem originis constituitur ut tamen per modum conditionis consequentis convenientem ad extra terminum exigat. In the case of the mission in question, Lonergan discusses this issue more fully in De Constitutione Christi, (Gregorian Press, 1957, pp. 27 ff, 53 ff.) namely, the sending of the Son contingently, and considers the extrinsic term to be the traditional esse secundarium or what he calls the grace of union. But there is as yet no indication of "convenience". Only in the following question, Quaestio XXVI, does Lonergan seek out "convenient aspects" of such supernatural realities as the sending of the Son, the sending of the Spirit, and he does so in a richly suggestive manner that has been exploited by Fr. F.E. Crowe and dependent on Crowe, Professor P. McShane.

One might already suspect the line of his thought from his general consideration of the mission of the Son. The sending is somehow special to the father - not however in its efficiency, which is common to the Three, but, as we will

---


27 Crowe's main work here is a book published only for his students, The Most Holy Trinity, Toronto: Regis College, 1968. See especially chapters 6, 7 and 8.

speculate later, in some type of meaning. If the extrinsic term is to be "convenient", it should be somehow identifiably related to fatherhood.

What Lonergan does is to tackle what he considers to be the identity of absolutely supernatural realities in trinitarian terms. Already in *Insight* he had specified such realities in terms of a solution to the problem of evil:

Conceived negatively, they are absolutely supernatural, because there is no possible creature for which they would be natural solutions. Conceived positively, they are absolutely supernatural, because their sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself. Then faith includes objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding. Then hope is for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence. Then charity is the transport, the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that results from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God. 29

A transformation of this view of the supernatural virtues, to which we return in the final section, is made possible by Lonergan's discussion in the *Quaestio* we are considering, of convenient relatedness to the Trinity of the Supernatural realities which he specifies as absolute in this context as "quae nunquam informia inveniuntur, nempe, esse secundarium incarnacionis, gratia sanctificans, habitus caritatis, et lumen gloriae". 30 Faith and hope are here omitted, in the


tradition both of St. Paul and of St. Thomas: they are
virtues of temporality, virtues indeed which will be re-
lated to the stages of meaning in the light of Lonergan's
basic point here. That basic point depends on raising the
question of conveniently relating the four relations within
the Trinity with the four absolutely supernatural entities.
Lonergan's conclusion is brief and clear:

Quare, sine inconvenientia diceretur esse secun-
darium incarnationis esse participationem creatam
paternitatis, et ideo specialem relationem ad
Filium habere; gratiam sanctificantem esse
participationem spirationis activae, et ideo
specialem relationem ad Spiritum sanctum habere;
habitum caritatis esse participationem spiratio-
nis passivae, et ideo specialem relationem ad
Patrem et Filium habere; lumen gloriae esse
participationem filiationis, et ideo filios
adoptionis perfecte ad Patrem reducere.

Section 4: The Psychological Analogy

Briefly, the psychological analogy for the Trinity
derives from the fact that in the human mind there are pro-
cessions of two types, the procession of inner word of defi-
nition or judgement from understanding, and the procession
of love that is from word and understanding. In the human
mind those processions have two characteristics: a produc-
tive aspect, and an intelligible aspect. So, "The inner
word of defining not only is caused by but also is because

31 B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II),
 p. 235.
of the act of understanding". It is this second aspect that grounds the analogy. Our interest here is not in following through that analogy from intelligible emanations to relations to persons but in bringing out certain features of the analogue that lead to a more meaningful trinitarian theology of the finite. That aspect is perhaps best brought out by Professor McShane's effort to indicate popularly the ground of the analogy in four basic questions: "When did you last have a real conversation? When were you last understanding understood? When did you last speak? When did you last listen?" What McShane's questions bring out is the commonness of the analogue in human experience. The novelty relating to the analogue, however, is exploiting that experience by taking reflective self-possession of it: so, for example, not just adventing to the occurrence of understanding but moving through the prolonged reflection of self-appropriation that generates an understanding of understanding. This indeed is the novelty that we have associated


33The analysis is to be found in Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II). More succinctly, McShane, "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God", Theological Studies, 1962.

34P. McShane, Music That is Soundless, Washington: University Press of America, 1977, p. 1. This topic is developed by F. Lawrence, op. cit. footnote 2 above.
with the third stage of meaning. But we have also emphasized, in chapter two, the manner in which reflection on self and self-expression emerges, especially within active aesthetic experience, within a second, problematic stage of meaning. Lonergan's systematic treatise on the subject does not deal with this issue but in the conclusion of a doctrinal treatise on the emergence of trinitarian doctrines he discusses the commonness of the analogue and the different manners in which the relevant psychological elements are manifested. 35 There are four ways in which this occurs: privately, in immediate experience; publicly, in expression; technically and psychologically, in introspective descriptions; philosophically and systematically, in comprehensive explanation. Lonergan goes on to show in some detail that the new testament authors experienced the emanations, wrote of them in the common mode, even in the context of dealing with the preaching and hearing of the word of God, and in the context of treating of divine missions, in a manner that leads towards an acknowledgement of like emanations in God. 36

There would seem to be a movement originating here analogous to what Lonergan elsewhere discusses as "The Origin


36Ibid, pp. 279, 298.
Attention is drawn, through faith, in a tentative, problematic, almost spontaneous fashion to the meaning of common experience. In terms of the discussion of chapter three, it is a movement within the problematic second stage of meaning, but now associated with the mysteries expressed in, and by, the Incarnate Word. But the movement is not a cultural movement in the second stage, for its meaning belongs properly to the third stage of meaning or the second time of the temporal subject. That stage is a stage in which expression is mediated, by the cultured in society, through a self-possession: What we are beginning to identify here, however, is a higher self-possession in meaning mediated by Faith. Anticipating the direction in which we are going we may quote a key passage from Lonergan:

... in altiorem manuducimur, in qua nunc iam non secundum carnem Christum novimus, sed intus in nobis intelligibiliter secundum emanationem veritatis dicitur verbum nostrum verbi divini et secundum emanationem sanctitatis spiratur dilectio nostra divinae Dilectionis. Mittuntur enim divinæ personæ secundum ipsas earum processiones aeternas, ut nobis obviam fiant atque inhabitent secundum sijmiles processiones in nobis per gratiam productas.

Lonergan's own work would seem to indicate that the probability - in the emergent probability sense - of this being a common culture is at present not high. His initial

---


researches were done in a climate of opinion in which "There is as good an analogy to the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped up in deepest obscurity." 39 His work further shows the manner in which Aristotle's elucidation of the analogue in the human mind disappeared in the West, and the way in which Aquinas' view was clouded by the conceptualism of Scotus.

All this takes on larger meaning in terms of the three stages of meaning in history, and helps to make plausible our normative determination of a future expressionism mediated by this very understanding of history and revelation.

We may return, then, to the common experiences grounding the analogue in a more sober fashion, knowing, for example, that McShane's four questions, far from being simple, open up quite novel horizons. However, even the nominal identification of the questions with the divine persons enables us to shift from an ontology of the trinity to a psychology of the trinity. There is a proceeding in the trinity that is analogous to our speaking identifying the first person as speaker and the second persons as spoken; there is a further proceeding analogous to auditio, listening, which

identifies the third person as Listener. More recently, Lonergan has spoken of the third person as Approval.

Section 5: An Enlarged Ontology of the Trinity

The Word is Meaning in the universe, transforming our human meanings in the manner in which the old scholastics conceived gratia elevans... The Word was the one to become incarnate because he is Expression, Articulation, the Objectification and Formulation of Understanding...

This quotation from Fr. Crowe indicates the direction we wish to take to reach a rounded Christian view of expressionism.

First we should recall certain aspects of meaning sketched in the later works of Lonergan. The key points are made in a section on "The Elements of Meaning" in Method in Theology:

- Distinguish (1) sources, (2) acts and (3) terms of meaning. Sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended contents. Acts of meaning are

---

40 F. E. Crowe's "Complacency and Concern in the Writings of St. Thomas", Theological Studies, 1959, adds further specifications to this.

41 Question Session, Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June, 1982.

42 F. E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: on the Need for Theological Method", Continuum (7) 1969, p. 39

(1) potential (2) formal (3) full (4) constitutive or effective and (5) instrumental. In the potential act meaning is elemental. There has not yet been reached the distinction between meaning and meant... acts of sensing and understanding of themselves have only potential meaning.

The analogy for the Trinity that we treated summarily in the previous section enables us to think of the trinity as conscious subjects constituted by two processions within infinite understanding, generically named speaking and listening but nameable also - a tendency in Fr. Crowe's work - as expression and acceptance. Identifying the Word, as Crowe does, as Expression and Meaning, seems directly related to Lonergan's view that understanding of itself has only potential meaning. It is as if there would be no actual meaning in God if *per impossibile* there was no trinity in God. It is relevant to note here, as a basis of radical contrast with the potential meaning of human sensibility and understanding, the thesis that Lonergan discusses regarding the intimacy of processions in God. That thesis, pivoting on Aquinas' "*só magis unum*", brings out the unity of God and the adequacy of divine understanding. The necessity of human meaning, however, is a necessity of inadequacy. Later we will enlarge on this inadequacy to relate human expression to the "silence


of understanding" 46 in hope.

Relevant also to our final section is Lonergan's discussion of the question "Utrum Personae Divinae ad intradicant Ego, Tu". 47 There is in the divinity only one speaker; only the first person speaks. The second person is spoken. Furthermore, what is spoken is the totality of divine understanding: what is spoken is father and son and spirit and creation and all possibilities. This point is important in that it highlights the fact that there is no aspect of efficient dependence within the trinity, and also that the efficiency of the trinity in creation is the one operation of all three. So, when we are considering the finite participations in divine personality we are not considering some particular efficiency of the father or the son or the spirit: we are considering real relations of meaning affected in history by all three persons as one. 48 In this sense one may say that creation is natural, but meaning within involves the supernatural. Fr. Crowe exploits Lonergan's account of the supernatural realities to give a historical account of trinitarian meaning. Generically, it leads to a view of history as a drawing to the Father, absent

46 F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: one the Need for Theological Method", Contiguum (7), 1969, p. 42.


from history, through the initial presence of the Spirit (incognito as Fr. Crowe puts it) opening history for a fullness of time in which the Word becomes present, revealing and grounding the hope of adoption. Fr. Crowe does not develop in detail an ontology of the finite participations of divine personalities: indeed, he views Lonergan's account as problematic but richly suggestive. His discussion leads to a suspicion that there is a complex theology of the divine presence in history and the Eschaton that remains to be developed. But the general direction of his thought allows us to enlarge on our earlier consideration of stages of meaning: one can see, for instance, a correlation of the three stages of meaning with the three supernatural virtues in the order of charity, faith and hope. In particular, one can view the third stage of meaning as an emergence of explicit hope. By this is meant, and we recall here the discussion of "the second time of the temporal subject", a knowing of the unknown, a knowing of the absence of the Father through the mediation of self-appropriation in Faith. This is the key point that we wish to exploit in the final section.

Section 6: Expressionism in the Full Context

Understanding is in the world in his own way as "not yet" for us, as the goal of our hope..... the presence of the Word in the world...gives
support to human efforts towards creating meaning in the universe.

We gather up here the elements developed in the last three chapters to give a new foundational context for the assembly of historical tendencies of aesthetic expression of self-questioning. It seems best at this stage to express the context positively and normatively.

The Christian artist, cultured in the third stage of meaning - in second immediacy, then, to use the phrase borrowed from Doran in chapter three - would have as actual context the foundational perspective indicated in these sections and in the previous two chapters. He is not only an image of the Trinity, but knowingly an image of the Trinity, knowingly participating in the genesis of divine meaning that is history. Part of this knowing is a knowing, in the third stage of meaning sense, of the Word's sending of us - the Word existentially participating in the speaking of paternity - "sicut misit me Pater, ego mitto vos". 50

Outer expression is then mediated by the inner expression, an inner word of the Word in his eternal and historical relations. Central to that expression is an


understanding, by inverse insight, of the absence in history of the Father. But the absence is an absence in hope. That hope, as supernatural virtue, sublates the "elemental sweep" that we have already identified as central to artistic expression. The objectification of a purely experiential pattern which in general categories is expressive of possibilities is now mediated by special categories which give the work of art the character of an expression of hope. The artistic work has the fundamental quality of being outside the field of practicality and in that sense it has a quality of non-worldliness. While it is a differentiation of consciousness that is distinct from religious differentiation, the distinction does not warrant a separation. As we saw in treating of the history of Western art, the distinction in fact was used to ground a secularization in art, and this secularization was considered as an aspect of the fragmentation and alienation that belongs to the second stage of meaning. The third stage of meaning calls for an integration of consciousness on the part of those who are reflectively cultured. That "call" was identified as a historically-emergent process in chapter two where, under the rubric of "assembly", tendencies within


52This point was discussed in chapter three.
modern lyric expression were identified, tendencies which were recognized as reachings out of fragmentation towards a deeper and more authentic subjectivity. In the beginning of this chapter we identified briefly some tendencies within modern theology towards giving meaning to the future. Just as those tendencies lacked clarity due to the absence of the general categories in the horizons of the theologians, so the movements within aesthetic culture are unclear. In both cases there is needed the mediation of the general categories to make possible a clarification of direction and to exclude mythic views regarding objectification or the reality of the trinity's presence in history. The special categories as we have conceived them fall within this mediation of that "expression of hope" as the achievement of the Christian artist involves no mythic indetermination of the art work. That work is an instrumental meaning: it is not a naive extroversion of hope. The hope is an orientation of the aesthetic subject, and the artist's audience participates in that orientation through the inner presence of the acceptance that is a participation of the spirit. 53 The reach for significant form that is central to artistic expression becomes, for the Christian artist in the third stage of meaning, a knowing reaching for 

harmonious image, known to be inadequate in a radical fashion, of infinite self-understanding's expression.

In a recent article, Fr. P.E. Crowe suggests "the possibility of a fruitful analogy of the idea of the 'self-justifying'. There is self-justifying knowledge (Insight), self-justifying love (Method), and one may add the 'self-justifying joy' of the artistic experience (Insight, 184-85); this last needs its own investigation which I have not been able to undertake". We would hope that this present effort can be regarded as a contribution to that investigation, not only in the context of general categories which is Fr. Crowe's, but within the perspective of the special categories of Christian Theology.

APPENDIX I

Glossary

Abstract

Most commonly, the word is used in opposition to "concrete". Its meaning in the thesis comes both from Lonergan and from the meaning of "abstract expressionism". Abstract expressionism is a particular type of artistry that recognizes the dependence of expression on the artists' creative self rather than on imitation. This view coincides, at least descriptively with Lonergan's view of abstraction as enrichment (Insight, pp. 87-89) rather than impoverishment.

Assembly

The first step in the movement of dialectic. It requires that the dialectician bring together the fruits of the three previous specialties to which he or she is to respond in order to generate enlarged personal foundations. See further under Dialectic.

Categories

The categories with which the thesis deals, especially in chapters four and five, are those transcendental anticipations of history and reality in general that can be reached by reflection on the invariant dynamisms of mind as they remain in contact with ongoing empirical history. That contact is specified as generalized empirical method (see below). The categories are briefly indicated in Method in Theology, pp. 285-91.

Dialectic

The task of the dialectician is to draw on the results of the first three specialties in the systematic manner described on Method in Theology, p. 250, so as to arrive at an enlarged foundational perspective. Briefly, that effort involves a feelingful (Method in Theology, p. 246) screening of the result of searching into past meaning so as to arrive at normative indications of the future cultural matrix.
Expressionism

See above, under abstract. The thesis moves from the meaning given there to a normative determination of the fullest possible self-expression of the Christian artist. Starting, then, from the insights of a particular tradition of artistry, those insights are enlarged by means of general and special categories of Christian theology to point towards the enlightened expression by the artist of the *Imago Dei* that is constitutive of his creative self.

Foundations

LonerGAN's fifth function specialty. Its aim is the expression of general and special categories (see above) of reality. It can be seen (Method in Theology, 286-8) to sublate both Insight and the context of Method in Theology. It thus locates metaphysics within the large enterprise of the eight theological specialties. Foundations, then, has the task of defining theology's tasks methodologically, and within that task is a task of self-definition.

Generalized Empirical Method

Initially defined in Insight (p. 72) as empirical method applied to the data of consciousness, it is later more accurately defined:

"Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects", LonerGAN, "Religious Experience", Trinification of the World, Eds. T. Dunne and J.-M. Laport, Toronto, Regis College Press, 1978, pp. 84-96.

Meaning

In Insight, "meaning" is closer to the elementary sense "meaning seems to be a relation of sign to signified" (Insight, p. x: the issue of course is complex, as the indices to Insight and Method in Theology show, and would require a separate study). "Meaning" in Method in Theology is a fuller notion, expressed descriptively in the third chapter. See below, Stages of Meaning.
Philosophy

Lonergan's view of philosophy and its task is succinctly put in the following statement:

"Now the emergence of the autonomous sciences has repercussions on philosophy. Since the sciences between them undertake the explanation of all sensible data, one may conclude with the positivists that the function of philosophy is to announce that philosophy has nothing to say. Since philosophy has no theoretic function, one may conclude with the linguistic analysts that the function of philosophy is to work out a hermeneutics for the clarification of the local variety of everyday language. But there remains the possibility - and it is our option - that philosophy is neither a theory in the manner of science nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to Presocratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification." (Method in Theology, 94-5; see also Insight 390-401).

Stages of Meaning

Lonergan defines three stages of meaning as ideal constructs that are particularly apt in considering the Western Tradition (Method in Theology, p. 85):

"In the first stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where the theory is controlled by a logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority."

The thesis correlates these stages with a distinction Lonergan makes elsewhere between the first and second times of the human subject (De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, p. 198). These two times correspond to the difference between the spontaneity of the first stage of meaning and the control of meaning possible in the third stage of meaning. The second stage of meaning is then seen as a transition period of fragmentation, including the evolution of the sciences and arts with a problematic generative of the questions for the third stage of meaning.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Because of the wide-ranging nature of the thesis, the following bibliography has been restricted to works cited in the text.


Boulez, Pierre. "Sonate, Que me veux-tu?", Perspectives of New Music (1), 1963.


--------. "Complacency and Concern in the Writings of St. Thomas", Theological Studies, 1959.


--------. "Christologies: How Up-to-date is Yours?" Theological Studies xxix, 1968.


