Towards a Normative Christian Theology of Expressionism

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ABSTRACT

TOWARDS A NORMATIVE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF EXPRESSIONISM

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The thesis deals with the meaning of artistic expression in a full and Christianly normative sense. It makes use of the perspective of Bernard Lonergan throughout: initial indications of that perspective are given in the Introduction and Glossary. It begins from the accepted notion of expressionism and goes on to show both the unwarranted limitations grounded in that usage and the helplessness of contemporary criticism in its efforts to discuss expression or objectification. It is an effort to elucidate the task of criticism in regard to artistic expression, and is a novel venture into the concrete operations required by Lonergan's detailing of the components of dialectic. Finally, it leads to a fully normative view of Christian expressionism relating to a trinitarian theology which takes its stand on the reality of the human subject as _imago Dei_, in the sense that the subject is creatively a reflection of divine expression.

PREFACE

This thesis originated from an interest in expressionist music in its narrow sense, in so far as it seemed to manifest a heightened problematic subjectivity which somehow reached beyond the secular. Gradually the scope of the thesis was enlarged so that a broad view of modernity emerged and the full range of aesthetic expression and its possibilities was included.

The form of the final version retains aspects of that growth and so the presentation is from a moving viewpoint. From a systematic perspective, one might have begun with the question of general foundational categories, but the present structure has the advantage of progressively revealing the need for such categories. Furthermore, it better illustrates the theological method which is a central aspect and topic of the thesis.

There is a necessary incompleteness of this work, relating both to the novelty of the method and the largeness of its topic. Therefore an initial attempt to make use of such an approach as functional specialization, particularly in the area of dialectics and foundations as is the case here, cannot but be somewhat tentative. Furthermore, however, the topic had to be large to illustrate fully the challenge of dialectics as

envisaged by Lonergan. Dialectic involves a personal felt response[1] to the actual past as researched, interpreted, accounted for by historians, and indeed also critized by dialecticians.[2] As viewed by Lonergan, it represents a methodological invitation, particularly to theology, to break out of any narrowness to an empirical openness to the world. The thesis has risked the challenge of that openness in facing dialectically and foundationally the question, What might be an artistically adequate and Christo-centric orientation of the name expressionism? The result of that reflection is an indication of a powerfully suggestive trinitarian transposition of possibilities of artistic expression in the third stage of meaning. The final normative meaning of expressionism reached leaves critically behind its normally accepted meaning. Such a critical departure is analogous to the manner in which critical realism may critically assess "realism" as a particular tradition of artistry.

Since the thesis is written within Lonergan's paradigm for philosophy, theology and realism, the introduction seeks to make clear basic elements of that paradigm. Such a clarification has the obvious limitation, as Lonergan has remarked,

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[1]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 245-6.

[2]Ibid., p. 250.

of adequately expressing a meaning that can be achieved

only by prolonged personal exercises.[3] Still, it is of value

in locating the thesis within an essential set of contexts

of Lonergan's work. The introduction is complemented by an

appended glossary.

I would like, in conclusion, to thank Professor

Charles Davis of the Religious Studies Department of Concordia

University for his patience and guidance. The initial efforts

at formulating the thesis were confused and lengthy sketches

of suspicions and half ideas. Only slowly did the definite

direction of the final work emerge.

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[3]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 7, 17, 260.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Since this thesis is written within a particular paradigm for doing theology, that elaborated by Bernard Lonergan in the past three decades, some introductory indications of the basis of that paradigm are in order. Primarily, I wish to comment briefly here on Lonergan's view of, and contribution, to philosophy. How that view is enlarged to become a perspective and strategy in theology will be a central topic in chapter one. In this introduction, therefore, only a generic notion of the enlargement will be given.

As Professor Crowe has pointed out in a series of works,[1] Lonergan's development of his meaning for philosophy has been a prolonged growth into and beyond Aristotle and Aquinas to a fundamentally open and praxis-oriented meaning of this activity. We restrict ourselves here to some brief helpful indications of that achievement.

First, there is Lonergan's mature view of philosophy as being a self-appropriation involving generalized empirical

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[1]Fr. Crowe's earliest reflections on Lonergan's search for the meaning of philosophy and theology are in "The Origin and Goal of Insight," Sciences Ecclesiastiques (1958), pp. 263-295, most recently, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations", in Searching for Cultural Foundations, Ed. P. McShane, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 113-39.

method. This notion of a generalized empirical method was

first introduced in his work Insight:

> We have followed the common view that empirical
> science is concerned with sensibly verifiable laws
> and expectations. If it is true that essentially
> the same method could be applied to the data of
> consciousness, then respect for ordinary usage
> would require that a method, which only in its
> essentials is the same, be named a generalized
> empirical method.[2]

This strategy underpins Lonergan's definition of metaphysics:

"The process to explicit metaphysics is primarily a process

of self-knowledge..... the method of metaphysics is dictated

by the self-affirming subject in the light of his pedagogically

acquired self-knowledge"[3]. One could say that the empirical

stress is just as prounounced in Lonergan's later work after

Insight, and one is led to further clarification of the empirical

character of these reflections:

> Generalized empirical method operates on a combina-
> tion of both the data of sense and the data of
> consciousness: it does not treat of objects
> without taking into account the corresponding
> operations of the subject; it does not treat
> of the subject's operations without taking into
> account the corresponding objects.[4]

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[2]B. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Under-
standing, New York, Philosophical Library, 1958,
p. 72.

[3]Ibid, pp. 397-8

[4]B. Lonergan, "Religious Experience", Trinification
of the World, Ed. Dunne and LaPorte, Toronto: Regis
College, 1978, pp. 84-96.

This empirical character is a central feature of the effort
in the present thesis: one must stay close to the realities
of the various art forms if one is to appropriate adequately
the procedures of the artist.

For many thinkers, there is a discomforting subjectivity
about this specification of philosophy by Lonergan. To remove
this discomfort, and to further clarify his contribution to
contemporary thought, the two central fruits of philosophic
efforts should be briefly noted.[5] The first fruit relates to
the priority he gives to _insight_ over _concept_: "The key issue
is whether concepts result from understanding or understanding
results from concepts"[6]. Resolving this issue, indeed, is
the central topic of his work, _Verbum: Word and Idea in
Aquinas_[7]. The second fruit is his precise locating of judge-
ment as the act by which the mind reaches reality: "the
real is, what is; and 'what is,' is known in the rational
act, judgement."[8] This fruit is brought clearly into focus
in the work _Insight_, where it forms the kernel of what Lonergan

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[5]We return to this topic in chapter four.

[6]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 336.

[7]B. Lonergan, _Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas_,
Ed. D. Burrell, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1967.

[8]Ibid, p. 7.

calls "the position" as opposed to counterpositions on the nature of reality, so that a judgement:

> .. will be a basic position, (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being [where being has been defined as the objective of the desire to know]... and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection.[9]

One may say that these two fruits are Lonergan's fundamental contribution to the theory of knowledge and of the objectivity of knowledge. Knowledge is seen to be a dynamic movement through the three levels of experience of the data both of sense and of consciousness, of what-questions reaching for insight and of is-questions reaching for judgement.

Further light on Lonergan's contribution may be had both by noting the views opposed to his contribution and by taking note of his claims regarding the compatibility of his position with the achievements of modern science.

Lonergan's stand on the priority of insight to concept not only is a stand against the prevalent tradition of conceptual analysis but it is also a rescuing of Thomas Aquinas from the Thomists. According to Lonergan, both conceptual analysis and the post-medieval scholastic tradition have their roots in the writings of Scotus:

> The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas, understanding precedes

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[9]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, p. 388.

conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus,
understanding is preceded by conceptualization
which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics.
It is the latter position that gave Kant the
analytic judgement.[10]

And of course one may note that in so far as one assumes that
conceptualization precedes understanding one may claim a
need for the analysis of concepts.

Secondly, Lonergan's view of realism is one which he
claims places him and St. Thomas outside the accepted spec-
trum of current views: one escapes that spectrum by dis-
covering that "there are two quite different realisms, that
there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human,
that poses as a half-way house between materialism and
idealism, and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent
and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-
way house is idealism".[11]

Finally, we may add Lonergan's illuminating claim
that his perspective on knowing and reality squares with
the structure of scientific procedures and results of these
past centuries. This he argues succinctly in "The Iso-
morphism of Thomism and Scientific Thought"[12], and Insight
elaborates that claim.

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[10] B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 28.

[11] B. Lonergan, Insight, N.Y.: Philosophical Library,
1958, p. xxviii.

[12] B. Lonergan, Collection, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New York:
Herder & Herder, 1967, pp. 142-51.

Within the context of his view on knowing, Lonergan
develops his analysis of action or doing, procedures of a
fourth level of consciousness.[13] The dynamism of what-
and is- questions recurs on this level, reaching for value. The
pinnacle of value reached is the gift[14] of "being grasped
by ultimate concern"[15], which places the subject in the realm
of faith, a reality which Lonergan distinguishes from creed[16].
Lonergan's complex notion of theology as a functional specia-
list reflection will concern us in chapter one. Here it is
best to relate his view briefly to a classic view associated
with St. Augustine and St. Thomas[17]. What Lonergan seeks to
do is to structure the task of Fides Quaerens Intellectum in
a way that is adequate to the modern problematic, but the
fundamental task remains the same: "A theology mediates

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[13]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library,
1958, chapter 18; B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, chapter 2.

[14]See the substantial entry under gift in the index of
Method in Theology.

[15]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 106.

[16]Ibid, pp. 115-19.

[17]See Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding"
Collection, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New York: Herder & Herder,
1967, pp. 121-41.

between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."[18]

A final point of clarification regards Lonergan's view of the total cultural matrix in terms of stages of meaning, since this view is central to the thesis. Systematically, the view depends on Lonergan's identification of three basic horizons: the horizon of common sense, the horizon of theory and the horizon of interiority.[19] The horizon of interiority is reached through the self-appropriation that Lonergan identifies as philosophy. With this systematic view is associated a historical view of the emergence of these horizons, specifying three related stages of meaning.[20] Early meaning is common sense meaning, prior to the emergence of science, identifiable broadly as the first stage of meaning. The identification is broad because the stages in fact overlap and intertwine. The second stage of meaning is associated with the emergence of science, most clearly identifiable in the West of the past millenium. This stage of meaning generates problems of meaning and method which call for the emergence of the third stage of meaning, in which issues of method move subjects to investigate procedures. These personal investigations move subjects from the merely

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[18]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton, Longamn & Todd, 1972, p. xi.

[19]Ibid, pp. 81-85; 235-37.

[20]Ibid, pp. 85-99.

spontaneous use of intelligence to an enlightened and con-
trolled use of intelligence. "In the third stage the modes of
common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy
from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave
theory to science and take their stand on interiority."[21]
Chapter three of the thesis will enlarge further on this topic.

Since Lonergan tends to take up standard philosophic
terminology and give it a meaning peculiar to this system,
further clarification of such peculiarities of meaning would
seem to be in order. For this reason a short glossary of
significant terms is added as an appendix.

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[21]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 85.

CHAPTER I

CONTEXT FOR A TRANSPOSITION OF THE MEANING OF EXPRESSIONISM

This first chapter falls into five sections. A first section sketches briefly an aspiration evident in traditions of modern expressionism. It does so in a realist and indeed a theist fashion: but only in later chapters will the realism and theism emerge as non-naive and critical.

The following three sections consider three contexts of reflection on expressionism: the first two contexts are considered because they are seen as necessary contexts for an adequate discussion of the significance and direction of expressionism: these are the contexts provided by Bernard Lonergan's structuring of human studies in functional specialties, and the context provided by Eric Voegelin through his reflection on the history of western reason. The third context to be considered is that provided by modern criticism. This context is considered here only to reveal its basic inadequacy for dealing with the issue at hand. The inadequacy, however, will be more critically treated in the fourth chapter, when the grounds of a critical aesthetic realism will be discussed.

The final section of this chapter focuses on the results of these reflections and on the problem raised in the first section to reveal the overall direction of our discussion of the historical and religious significance of expressionism. In this chapter that revelation can be only tentative. Not

until chapter five can we attempt a comprehensive treatment
of the theological transposition of expressionism.

Section I: Expressionism As Normally Conceived

The term "expressionism" became acceptable with regard
particularly to a tradition of French painting in the early
twentieth century, but in a still acceptable sense it is used
in reference to Vincent Van Gogh, and we may start our move
towards an ultimate fundamental and broader characterization
there.

Van Gogh may be said to have moved from Impressionism
in a direction opposite to that sought by Cézanne and Seurat.
While these latter converted impressionism into a severe
classicism, Van Gogh rejected the implicit limitations to the
wholeness and freedom of the artist's reality. His Self-
Portrait (1889) epitomizes the aesthetic reach of his spoken
ideal: "I want to paint men and women with that something of
the eternal which the halo used to symbolize."[1] This ideal
summarily expresses the positive content of a problematic
expressionism which we wish to eventually place within the
full context of a theology of stages of historical meaning.
In the present section we wish to initiate the move to that
larger proleptic view by noting a parallel reach for such
full and novel expression across the modern aesthetic spec-
trum. What at this stage, and in the more elaborate

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[1]H.W. Janson, History of Art, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1974, p. 507.

illustration of chapter two, may be considered as the meta-
phorical and hyperbolic reflections of great artists will
hopefully (later we will see that this word too suffers a
thematic transposition) be seen in our later chapters as an
anticipation of a thematic of the epiphany of meaning in
history. Read remarks, in the conclusion of his work on
sculpture: "We have discovered that art has a biological
function, that the artist, like the photosynthetic cells
that absorb creative energy from cosmic rays, is the sensi-
tive organ of an evolving consciousness - of man's progressive
apprehension and understanding of his universe."[2]

Expressionism in the accepted sense is recognized
as emerging with peculiar vitality in the German tradition,
where "the Germanic temperament preferred digging down to
the subterranean regions of the soul",[3] and we find as artic-
ulate witness of problematic subjectivity in his art and in
his ideals, the composer Arnold Schoenberg. Regularly he
returns to the problem of the "crisis of sensibility" which
has dogged European composers throughout this century by
saying:

> This century has been one of violent and unprece-
> dented change, of ferment, revolution and ever-
> changing knowledge and beliefs. Man's attitude

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[2] Herbert Read, The Art of Sculpturing, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 122.

[3] J. Machlis, The Enjoyment of Music, New York: Norton,
1963, p. 351.

> , to the whole cosmos has received a volcanic
> shock. Inevitably new spiritual forces and
> attitudes are constantly being generated,
> changed and re-formed, and the artist's
> sensibilities, too, are ever changing. Hence
> the "Crisis of Sensibility" which shook not
> only Italian music but also that of the whole
> western world, and indeed continues to do so.[4]

And in a lecture on Mahler written in 1912 he comes close to
expressing in commonsense terms what our thesis aims eventually
to thematize within interiority:[5]

> In every case when human understanding tries to
> abstract from divine works the laws according to
> which they are constructed, it turns out that we
> find only laws which characterize our cognition
> through thinking and our power of imagination. We
> are moving in a circle. We always see and recognize
> only ourselves, only, at most, our own being, as
> often as we think we are describing the essence
> of a thing outside ourselves.[6]

At issue here, as it is in the citation from Van Gogh,
is the legitimacy, or even sanity, of secularism within art.
And the lead to a resolution of the issue would seem to lie, not
in a critical discussion of the arts within conventional tech-
niques - we will return to this question in section four of
this chapter - but in a felt participation in the self-reflec-
tive problematic reachings of the artist. I recall here a
curious and suggestive remark made by Pierre Boulez, a noted
contemporary composer, regarding James Joyce, particularly

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[4]Music in the Modern Age, Ed. F.W. Sternfeld, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, c. 1973, p. 285.

[5]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 273.

[6]Arnold Schoenberg, Style and Idea, London:
Philosophical Library, 1951, p. 11.

regarding <u>Finnegans Wake</u>:

> It is not only the way the story is told that has
> been upset, but also that the novel, if one dares
> to put it this way, observes itself as a novel;
> and this results in a logic and cohesion of this
> prodigious technique that is constantly on the
> alert, creating new universes. It is in this way
> that music, as I see it, is not destined solely
> to "express" but must become aware of itself,
> become an object of its own reflection.[7]

What Boulez says of Joyce and his work is taken by

Richard Ellmann as the central characteristic of Joyce. He

begins his massive biography of Joyce with the remark:

> Instead of allowing each day, pushed back by the
> next, to lapse into imprecise memory, he shapes
> again the experiences which have shaped him. He
> is at once the captive and the liberator. In
> turn, the process of reshaping experience becomes
> a part of his life, another of its recurrent
> events like rising or sleeping. The biographer
> must measure in each moment this participation
> of the artist in two simultaneous processes.[8]

Joyce, indeed, incarnates the problematic drive to-

wards adequate self-expression that we have already identi-

fied in Van Gogh and Schoenberg. The deficiencies of the

drive and the sources of its problematic will be clarified

when we come in chapter four to deal with the necessary

differentiations of consciousness[9] of a post-modern culture,

and of the mediation of third-stage meaning expression.

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[7]Pierre Boulez, "Sonate, Que me veux-tu?",
<u>Perspectives of New Music</u> (1), 1963, p. 32.

[8]R. Ellmann, <u>James Joyce</u>, Oxford: University
Press, 1959.

[9]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 273.

It is no wonder that as George Steiner points out in his _In Bluebeard's Castle_, "Nowhere do we find substantive examples of how a liberated, 'multi-dimensional' man would in fact re-structure his relations to reality, to that 'which is so',"[10]

We may perhaps sum up the challenge implicit in the modernity of the arts, the sciences and the technologies in Thornton Wilder's words. He is, at the point, commenting on _Finnegans Wake_. He writes:

> It will take its part in the emergence from paro-
> chialism and nationalism and the complacencies
> of "our system" and "our technological superiority".
> The terrible thing is to live in our twentieth
> century with nineteenth-century mentality. To be
> "out of phase" - that's what is blighting. That's
> what starves and frightens and shipwrecks so many
> souls. The realizations of new dimensions and
> new obligations pour in on us from the world of
> science, but we would rather retreat into the
> accustomed and the soothing. Joyce and Pound
> and Eliot have advanced into the new territory,
> they have shown us how understanding can reduce
> fear. The difficulties they present to readers
> are the exact counter-parts of the difficulties
> we experience in living at this time, and their
> triumphs are notification and guide to us as to
> where we may find clarification and strength.[11]

Pound himself has been viewed as deficient in modernity, especially in the sense that, "Today, one feels that in many educated but imperfectly coherent lives that 'poetry of religious emotion' is being provided by music. The point is not easy to

[10]G. Steiner, _In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Re-definition of Culture_, London: Faber & Faber, c. 1971, p. 105.

[11]_American Characteristics and Other Essays_, (Thornton Wilder), Ed. Donald Gallup, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1979, p. 180.

demonstrate; it pertains to the interior climate of feeling."[12]
And Eliot has been criticised by Steiner for his particular
sectarian sense of understanding religion (in particular, Chris-
tianity) as the core of a theory of culture, not in a far-
reaching way as required by modernity, but in terms of severely
limited horizons.[13] Here, however, we cannot pursue these mat-
ters. Their discussion requires the larger contexts that
we have indicated.

Briefly, then, so far we may say that there is a nega-
tive and a positive aspect to the long modern period of an
aesthetic subjectivity, increasingly distorted by scientific
and philosophic oversights. Negatively, the accumulating dis-
orientations increasingly call forth warped and problematic
aesthetic expression. But within that negativity there is the
pressure towards an integrality of aesthetic expression, an
integrality that stands in continuity with the religious and
scientific reality of man. It is that integrality and continu-
ity, in its present problematic intimations, that we wish to
specify.

Section 2: The Structure of a Theology of Art

The present section seeks to contextualize systemat-
ically the problematic searchings of art intimated in the first
section for which verbal discourse is peculiarly unsuited, and

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[12]G. Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle, London: Faber &
Faber, c. 1971, p. 93.

[13]T.S. Eliot, The Idea of Christianity, London:
Faber & Faber, 1939.

underlying which one may discover inadequate epistemologies treating both the phenomenon of artistic expression and the symbolic presentation itself. It does so by drawing on the notion of functional specialization as conceived by Lonergan,[14] so that what emerges is that foundational and critical issues in the arts are sublated into a new type of empirical, theological enterprise. In particular art criticism, which is the primary location of the problems of the first section, is seen to be adequate only in so far as it is located within Lonergan's functional specialty, dialectic. When thus located, the inadequacy of secular criticism as it has emerged in the west becomes apparent, and a normative notion of expressionism will emerge.

First we must summarily indicate what is meant by functional specialization in theology. It is an eight-fold collaborative structure grounded in the invariant four-levelled reality of   human consciousness. Human history is the expression of those levels and the specialization in question results from the focusing of attention on the levels of that expression, first in its past achievement then in its future possibilities. So, eight specialties emerge in theology with names which both relate to past areas in theology and to the relevant aspect of human expression.

Thus, we have in theology:

1. Research; what makes available the relevant data.

2. Interpretation; which understands the meaning of the data or in other words hermeneutics.

3. History; which shows what was going forward beneath what was meant in what happened.

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[14] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, Chapter V, p. 125.

4. Dialectics; which aims ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint; and proceeds by acknowledging differences thereby discerning real and apparent differences and eliminating superfluous differences.

5. Foundations; which objectifies conversion, making it thematic and explicit, as well as presenting horizons and determining the meaning of doctrines in order for them to be apprehended.

6. Doctrines; which are concerned with judgements of fact and value leading to the horizons of Foundations, a clarification and development of History, a precise definition of Dialectics, and is an outgrowth of Interpretation while being based on Research.

7. Systematics; which works out appropriate systems of conceptualization, and removes apparent inconsistencies - it is a unified grasp of the inner consistency of doctrines and an analogy to familiar human experience.

8. Communications; which involves theology's external relations and is interdisciplinary in nature, achieving transpositions of theology so that religion becomes transcultural.

It is therefore possible to conceive of theology in two phases of (1) "input" and (2) "output"; in the first case, one must attend to the "word" as it is given in the four specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectics and secondly, one must be addressed with this

"word" in a second phase founded on the specialties of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and finally communications. Furthermore:

> The first phase is mediating theology. It is research, interpretation, history, dialectic that introduce us to knowledge of the Body of Christ. But the second phase is mediated theology. It is knowledge of God and of all things as ordered to God, not indeed as God is known immediately (I Cor.13, 12), nor as he is known mediately through created nature, but as he is known mediately through the whole Christ, Head and members.[15]

But the functional specializations of theology are not just a reorganization of the theological enterprise as commonly conceived. They are a structure for reflection on progress and decline in human history, and so also a structure for reflection on aesthetic achievement. Furthermore, in so far as theology becomes adequately empirical, one must expect the two reflections to merge or overlap. Finally, since the two specialties dialectic and foundations do not permit any degree of abstraction, in that they regard the concrete good critically, one is led to envisage an identity of reflection at that level. So, literary criticism or music criticism becomes an integral part of theology. This identification of criticism and theology, specifically dialectic, will require lengthy discussion since it goes against a tradition of secularism in the different fields of

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[15]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, p. 135

aesthetics. But first let us draw out the parallel struc-
tures in an elementary fashion. This is done most con-
veniently by diagramming the structures of theological
reflection and reflections within a particular art form
together. We take as an illustrative art form the field
of music. (See following page for diagram)

The parallel is powerfully suggestive and creative.
Just as there is a set of problems in modern theology which
are creatively linked by functional specialization, so within
such a field as musicology there is a present confusion in
the literature which can be removed by the introduction of
functional specialization in that area. The present section,
however, is directed merely at introducing the basic struc-
ture of reflection. The transition to the next section,
however, is immanent in the diagram presented below. The-
ology is seen as attending to, and being mediated by, all
types of conversion and centrally by religious conversion.
Musicology has a central mediator in aesthetic conversion.
But we have noted that the fourth and fifth levels of spec-
ialization merge into theology. Religious conversion,
then, must both mediate and be attended to in, musicology.
Returning to the central problem raised in section one, the
total musical subject is expressed in music, and the total
musical subject is sacred. We turn, then, to this issue in
the following section, drawing on Eric Voegelin's critique
of western secularism in terms of his acknowledgement of what

THEOLOGY:

conversions (all types)

Reflection on Past　　　　　　　　Orientation
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Towards Future

Dialectics　　　　　　　　　　　　Foundations

History　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Doctrines

Interpretation　　　　　　　　　　Systematics

Research　　　　　　　　　　　　　Communications

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MUSICOLOGY:

conversions especially
　　　　　　　aesthetic

Dialectics　　　　　　　　　　　　Foundations
(criticism)

Histories of Music　　　　　　　　Doctrines
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(basic musical
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　principles)

Interpretation　　　　　　　　　　Systematics
(analysis, etc.)　　　　　　　　　(theory)

Research　　　　　　　　　　　　　Communications
(notation, instruments,　　　　　(performances, etc.)
performances, etc.)

may be called the sacrality of compact consciousness.

Section 3: Metaxic Reality

In this section we want to draw attention to key elements in the thought of Eric Voegelin. These elements will serve to reverse certain contemporary orientations in the field of aesthetics, philosophy and religious studies. The elements are especially present in their developed form in his work after 1970, and Voegelin has himself expressed his sense of a discontinuity in his searchings in the fourth volume of his series Order and History, entitled The Ecumenic Age.[16] In order to provide a preliminary context we draw on two articles in which he expresses succinctly his views: "Reason: The Classic Experience"[17] and "Equivalences of Experience".[18] The first article focuses on the reality of man as "In-between" in a way that enriches Lonergan's view of religious conversion and that will later enable us to view secularist expressionism

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[16] E. Voegelin. The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1974, pp. 1-54.

[17] E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", Southern Review, Louisiana State University Press, 1974.

[18] E. Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience", Eternita Storia, Vellecchi editore Finenze, 1970, pp. 215-234.

as a paradox; the second article centers attention on the
primacy of experience in a manner that reveals the lacuna
in the spectrum of critical positions that have emerged in
modern times.

Voegelin's inquiry into the concept of "metaxy" as
a reaching towards Ultimacy has vast implications for the
"total being-ness" of the human subject. His belief in the
notion of Metaxy as the In-between character of existence
draws upon ancient classical thought (Aristotelian,
Platonic etc.), and his meaning is made clear by his con-
stant insistence that there is a tension created between
human reality or man's existence and the reality known to be
of a godly or divine status which is usually expressed by
the term Ultimacy, ultimate or divine ground. It is Voegelin's
contention (based upon the classic philosophers), that man
experiences himself as an unfinished "project" (to be quali-
fied) intentionally moving from his incomplete state of human
imperfection towards that completion and perfection offered by
a divine ground which moves him. He further claims that this
Metaxy or In-between dimension is not to be conceived in terms
of an empty space between the poles of tension created by
divine reality and man, rather it is the realm of the "spiri-
tual" which invites a mutual intervention of human be-ing to
participate in the divine, and divine activity to be instru-
mental within human-ness. In addition, the Metaxy symbolizes
man's experience of himself as "noetic quest", or as the

embodiment of a dynamic structure questing towards an Un-
known. More explicitly, man becomes aware of a "noesis"
or cognitive consciousness at work within himself as the
consciousness of questioning; his desire to know in turn
intimates a kind of pre-cognitive unrest born out of wonder
and a need to identify the Source of his existence as that
from which he is evolving. This unrest speaks of a divine
presence which gives it its direction, so that the unfolding
of the "noetic consciousness"[19] is experienced as a process
of immortalizing whereby human thought aspires towards some-
thing beyond the things of its external world - something
lying behind the surface level of sense perception, in Aris-
totelian terms, the Nous. For Aristotle, the Nous represented
that divine ordering force which reveals itself within the
psyche of concrete human beings and the universe at large, and
which actualizes itself within noetic consciousness. The
human subject as questioner and the divine intelligible force
after which he seeks become participants in a divine-human
encounter by the very act of questioning itself, and in turn
each is brought to light as the luminosity and structure of
consciousness. Man as "incarnate quest" becomes aware of a
divine presence within, made manifest by the noetic structure
of the psyche; therefore, the Metaxic consciousness may be
described as a transition achieved by the psyche from

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[19] E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience",
<u>Southern Review</u>, Louisiana State Univeristy Press,
1974, p. 252.

mortality to immortality. Indeed, the consciousness of
questioning unrest intrinsic to the human subject finding
itself in a state of ignorance and desiring knowledge becomes
luminous to itself as a movement in the psyche towards that
ground which is present in the psyche as its mover. The po-
tential immortality offered by the divine presence in the
Metaxy is either accepted or rejected by man according to his
decision to follow the pull of the divine Nous or not - the
psyche becoming the controlling factor by which the choice is
to be made.

There is moreover an ordering force within man's psyche
to be known as the reality of reason, a cognitively luminous
center of order belonging to human existence. For the life
of reason is not to be determined by the amount of information
collected by the mind; instead, it is man's struggle in the
Metaxy for an immortalization of the psychic structure by
resisting those mortalizing forces known to exist as human
passions, and overcoming what may be called the human sub-
ject's "apeirontic" lust for being in Time. Apeirontic re-
fers to the Unlimited or that cosmic ground from which things
are brought forth into being and to which they return, this,
in contrast to the One or divine ground (presence) of which
we have spoken that represents the formative force in all
things to be identified with both wisdom (logos) and mind.
An examination of the Metaxy or existence in the In-between
characterized by opposing tensions (more specifically the

contrasting modalities of the divine and human, of immortality and mortality, of reason and the passions, of perfection and imperfection) brings into question the mystery of being itself; it follows that the reality of being-ness is that participation of man's psyche in the Metaxy whose poles are Apeiron (the Unlimited) and Nous (the Source of intelligible order) and the possibility of these polarities becoming intelligible to themselves through the human subject's polymorphic consciousness. Intelligibility of the Metaxic reality as that In-between reality extending from the Nous to the Apeiron is brought to consciousness via the several integrally related levels of man's being, and this hierarchy of being may be systematically formulated as follows:[20]

	Person	Society	History
Divine Nous			
Psyche-Noetic			
Psyche-Passions			
Animal Nature			
Vegetative Nature			
Inorganic Nature			
Apeiron-Depth			

The arrows indicate movement within the metaxic sphere; fulfilment or unfulfilment of its discovery by the individual

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[20] E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", p. 262.

will depend upon any insights into his own subjectivity and understanding.

What emerges centrally from Voegelin's view is the illegitimacy of any dogmatic exclusion of any part of this range in the consideration of the human subject's experience and expression. The secular, then, is an abstraction which takes the heart out of history, and Voegelin argues that modern times have generated an aggregate of ideologies which have in common an egophantic and radical misconception of human experience.[21]

In the second article noted above, Voegelin enlarges on the metaxic constant within human experience and human history. "The search for the constant in history has been referred back from the symbols to the experiences, and from the experiences back to the depth of the psyche."[22] But the reference is always in danger of deformation by the system builder. "What is permanent in the history of mankind is not the symbols but man himself in his search of his humanity and its order",[23] but the system builder can isolate, reify, the symbols in a radical deformation of existence. "The

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[21]While their language is less vigorous, both B. Lonergan in Method in Theology and M. Eliade in The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, New York: Harper, 1961, take an equivalent stand.

[22]E. Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience", Eternità e Storia, Vallecchi editore Finenze, 1970, p. 229.

[23]Ibid, p. 215.

deformation, furthermore, can impose itself so massively on a
man that he conforms to it and consequently deforms himself by
making, deformed existence the model of true existence. And
the philosopher who has made deformed existence his own, finally,
can deform the historical field of experiences and symbols by
imposing on it his model of deformation."[24] Finally Voegelin
notes that this model of deformation dominates the modern
west: "it cannot be avoided by the philosopher in our time;
it is the social field in which he is born, and it presses
in on him from all sides."[25]

In the following section we will consider that defor-
mation within a particular field of criticism in a manner that
will lead us to seek another route in our efforts to understand
expressionism in its full potentiality.

Section 4: The Place of Criticism

In section two we identified criticism normatively,
within the context of Lonergan's work, as the fourth functional
specialty. Contemporary criticism, however, is unaware of this
normative possibility. In what way, then, could contemporary
criticism be of value in seeking to identify the reality and
potentiality of an adequate expressionism? The answer is im-
plicit in the previous sections but a consideration of some

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[24]E. Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience", Eternita
e Storia, Vallecchi editore Finenze, 1970, p. 217

[25]Ibid, p. 219.

contemporary interests and problems of criticism here will
help to illuminate and justify the direction in which we seek
to go in the thesis. In chapter two we will broaden our con-
sideration to all the aesthetic fields. Here we attend prin-
cipally to criticism as it occurs in literature, with some
reference to the field of music. This is a legitimate strat-
egy in that new directions in criticism tend to emerge out of
the field of literature: if we include dramatic expression
it is by far the most ancient field, and since literature is
itself highly articulate,[26] (for the contrast of linguistic
meaning and non-linguistic meaning, see B. Lonergan Method in
Theology, Chapter 3) it leads to a doubly articulate criticism.
So, for example, the work of Lacan, which gives a new orienta-
tion to the Freudian study of language,[27] had its first impact
in the field of literature and gradually the influence spread
to less articulate art forms such as the cinema.[28] Again,
developments in self-referential poetries, characteristic of
Mallarmé and thematically present in Joyce, later becomes an

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[26] See Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter 3;
especially Section 5 on Linguistic Meaning and Section 6 on
Incarnate Meaning which discuss the embodiment of one by the
other, of linguistic by the incarnate as a total realm of mean-
ing in the broader sense. (pp. 70-73).

[27] See Lacan's work Ecrits I, Editions du Seuil, France:
1966, Chapter 3.

[28] I refer the reader to the evolution of the cinema
as an art-form, as treated by Ken Leish in his book Cinema,
Europa Verlag: 1974.

interest and aim within music and musicology.[29]

What emerges from reflection on the variety of trad-
itions and developments in literary criticism during this
century is a conviction regarding the dominating and distort-
ing presence of the Cartesian and Kantian problematic. The
point is explicit in Rene Wellek's contention that the his-
tory of aesthetics is essentially a series of footnotes to
Kant,[30] and it is the implicit thread running through Frank
Lentricchia's review of modern criticism.[31] Lentricchia's
work carries one right through from the early works of
Northrop Frye to the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida
and Michel Foucault. What he reveals is a variety of unsuc-
cessful efforts to escape the isolation of the Cartesian
"cogito" while avoiding the threat of reinstating a naive
traditionalism of author, text and reader. Discussing the
early period, Lentricchia remarks "From Pater to T.S. Eliot
no idea is more obsessively reiterated than that of the
inaccessibly walled-off island of consciousness, unless it
is the idea of the poem similarly described in splendid

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[29]The contemporary composer Karlheinz Stockhausen
is a case in point with respect to his "moment-forms":
see E. Salzman's Twentieth Century Music, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 178-9.

[30]"Aesthetics and Criticism", The Philosophy of Kant
and Our Modern World, Ed. C. Hendel, New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1957.

[31]Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, C. 1980.

isolation. Reading, for Poulet, is quite simply the redemp-
tion of such tragic isolation."[32] All the authors are
crippled, like Culler, by the struggle to go beyond the
Cartesian subject,[33] and all, in one way or another, must
admit with Levi-Strauss, "I am proceeding in the manner of
Kantian philosophy".[34] The central crisis is the need for
"the objectivity of these classical attributes" of litera-
ture which seem to require the critic "to affirm that there
is unmediated knowledge of the real; this, writes Nietzsche,
"is certainly not the case".[35] So, Lentricchia identifies
"madness" in the work of Foucault as "surely in part an ex-
pression of his will to knowledge",[36] and Lentricchia sums
up in the same passage the central issue: "Long ago we
learned not to yield to the lure of naive realism. It may
be that the first order of critical business before us in the
1980's is to turn off the stereophonic sirens of naive
idealism. But how is this to be done?"[37]

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[32] Frank Lentricchia, _After the New Criticism_,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, C. 1980, p. 78.

[33] Ibid, p. 111

[34] Ibid, p. 127. See also p. 164

[35] Ibid, p. 59

[36] Ibid, p. 208

[37] Ibid.

Certainly, what has been done so far is paradigmatic of all that Voegelin rejects: it is a dogmatomachy neglectful of experience. So, we find ourselves in agreement with the practicing critic R.P. Blackmur when he remarks "Epistemology is a great subject, and so is linguistics; but they come neither in first nor final places; the one is only a fragment of wisdom and the other only a fraction of the means of understanding".[38] We wish then to side-step the obscurity of meaning[39] that marks the work even of such an acute mind as H.G. Gadamer:[40] we do so, not to avoid, but to

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[38] R.P. Blackmur, "A Critic's Job of Work", Five Approaches of Literary Criticism, Ed. Wilbur Scott, New York: Collier Books, c. 1962, p. 334.

[39] See B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter 3, specifically pp. 73-75. In fact, what I refer to here is elemental meaning in which the distinction between meaning and meant has not yet been reached, so that potentially, acts of meaning do not discern the difference between meaning and meant; but further, that formally acts of meaning still do not necessarily reach the signified, that even though the distinction has emerged, the exact status of the intended remains obscure or indeterminate. Certainly Gadamer strives for the fuller act of meaning, but his horizons of knowledge remain closed to those transcendental anticipations of history and reality in general that can be reached by reflection on the invariant dynamisms of mind allowing for an emergence of both "truth and method" in a more comprehensive sense.

[40] F. Lawrence, "Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan", Language Truth and Meaning, Ed. P. McShane, Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1970, pp. 167-218, brings out clearly the critical flaw in Gadamer. In the same volume, M. Lamb does the same for Dilthey, in his "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology". (pp. 115-167). In contrast with such critical considerations is the treatment of these authors by Josef Bleicher in his Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, c. 1980, (see chapters 1 and 5). The same obscurity of meaning regarding subject, object and history underlies all the authors from Betti to Ricoeur. "Historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory." (B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 175).

indicate another strategy of solution which is a more com-
plex form of the strategy of getting the sceptic to talk.
So, with C.S. Lewis, we wish to conduct an _Experiment in
Criticism_[41] in returning back from dogmas to experience.
And again, the strategy and the return would seem to be a
complex form of that noted by Bernard Lonergan:

> . . .differences on the third, reality, can
> be reduced to differences about the first and
> second, knowledge and objectivity. Differences
> on the second, objectivity, can be reduced to
> differences on the first, cognitional theory.
> Finally, differences in cognitional theory
> can be resolved by bringing to light the
> contradiction between a mistaken cognitional
> theory and the actual performance of the mis-
> taken theorist. To take the simplest in-
> stance, Hume thought the human mind to be a
> matter of impressions linked together by
> custom. But Hume's own mind was quite
> original. Therefore, Hume's own mind was
> not what Hume considered the human mind to
> be.[42]

What we advocate, however, is not just a turn of the
subject to subjective experience, such as a return of Hume to
his own performance. What is needed is the full empiricality
of the subject as aesthetic with all the possible enrichment
of aesthetic history. In Lonergan's terms, what is needed is
not isolated foundational debate, but the mediation of ever
richer foundations through the implementation of the first
four functional specialties.

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[41]C.S. Lewis, _Experiment in Criticism_, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1961.

[42]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, pp. 20-1.

Section 5:   Relocation of the Problem of Expressionism

We are in a position now to place the problem of a theology of expressionism within a context which dictates the strategy of the present thesis. That strategy relates both to Voegelin's insistence on the metaxic reality of human experiences and to Lonergan's invitation, implicit in his delineation of functional specialization, to move out of undifferentiated and unempirical discussions of criticism. Such undifferentiated discussion, moreover, is characteristic both of theological and aesthetic criticism. So, even though one witnesses a kind of vortical movement of thought through descriptive analysis, one still finds a continuation of standard undifferentiated discussion in David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order.[43] The required shift moves one into the empirical and experiential tasks called research, interpretation and history, operations that can be carried out with the appearance of "philosophical neutrality" in a manner that removes epistemological debate - or dogmatomachy - from centre stage. The contrast between the two strategies can be brought out by considering Heidegger's approach to Van Gogh's painting as opposed to our own.

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[43]D. Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, New York: Seabury Press, 1975. For a detailed critique of Tracy's undifferentiated Whiteheadean realism see P. McShane, "The Core Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian", Trinification of the World, A Festschrift in Honour of F.E. Crowe, Ed. Dunne and Laporte, Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978, p. 91 ff.

Heidegger brings to his response to, and analysis

of, Van Gogh's painting (the particular painting is a pair

of peasant shoes set against a background of undefined

space)[44] all the apparatus of his explicit theorizing re-

garding Being, Time, Art and Truth. Van Gogh not only is

isolated from the historical context, but is locked into the ob-

scurantism of Heidegger's descriptive analysis of the region of "the

ontological ground of the merely ontic".[45] Lentricchia

notes that:

> . . .as he (Heidegger) develops the issues it is
> clear that he means it when he says that truth
> must happen in art, and only in art; it seems
> impossible that he means to imply that the com-
> plicated processes of concealedness-unconcealed-
> ness, of the intimate opposing of world vs.
> earth, and of the difficult function of the
> rift (Riss) are all grasped silently and un-
> self-consciously by folk intuition."[46]

To use a phrase of Lentricchia already quoted,[47] there is

a stereophonic siren in Heidegger's approach that makes it

impossible for him to experience and identify his own folk

intuition.

In contrast, our discussion of artistic expression

will proceed according to the dictates of Lonergan's Method

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[44]The discussion is in Lentricchia, pp. 89-90.

[45]Ibid., p. 90; italics his.

[46]Ibid, p. 90.

[47]Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism,
p. 208.

in Theology. However, we do not, nor could we, intend to

enter into the fields of research, interpretation or history

in any systematic sense. Our strategy is analogous to that

of F.E. Crowe in his The Word of God when he accepts the

findings of traditional researchers and interpreters.[48] We

accept here traditional work done in research on history of

art, work especially which does not centre its attention on

epistemological issues - in contrast to the modern tendency

as described in the previous section. Such work may be ac-

cused of the disorientation of naive realism but in fact it is

dominated by a spontaneous realism which is healthy in that

there is a spontaneous taken-for-grantedness of "the world

mediated by meaning".[49] In our attempt at dialectics to

follow in chapter two - particularly focused on the two tasks

of assembly and completion[50] - this taken-for-grantedness

will not be thematized. The thematization, indeed, is lo-

cated further on in Lonergan's suggested procedure.[51] Yet

while the thematization is a later task, chapter two is not

written from the perspective of naive realism. "The use of

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[48]F. Crowe, Theology of the Christian Word: A
Study in History, New York: Paulist Press, 1978, p. 4.

[49]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 77.

[50]Ibid, p. 250.

[51]Ibid.

the general categories occurs in all functional specializ-
ations",[52] and the general categories of critical realism
are those being relied on in chapter two. The thematic pres-
entation of those categories, particularly categories relat-
ing to history, subjectivity, symbol and objectivity, will
preoccupy us in the third and fourth chapters. The fifth
chapter will bring these thematizations to bear on the norm-
ative possibilities of expressionism in the third stage of
meaning in the context of a theology of hope.

This indication of direction brings us to a pre-
cision of the transposition of the problematic and possi-
bilities of expressionism that we are envisaging. There are
two key features of the transposition, the first relating to
the search for general categories of aesthetics, the second
relating to special categories.

The first feature has to do with what Voegelin sees
as a fad of this past century, the tendency to generate
trivial and abstractive "-isms".[53] One has only to glance
through Jansen's massive History of Art to note the contrast
between the great periods and directions of the artistic
past, and the pretentiously named varieties of technique

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[52]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 292.

[53]See Eric O'Connor, Conversations with Eric
Voegelin, Thomas More Institute Papers/76, Montreal,
1980.

that we inherit from nineteenth and twentieth century dis-

cussion of art. But the discussion itself regularly gives

the lie to, for example, supposedly opposing "-isms". Thus,

in analysing the achievement of the impressionists, Francois

Mathey notes:

> Lionello Venturi said: "Renoir expresses all
> the happiness, the vitality and the humour of
> his subject; Monet the essence of things;
> Degas the mastery, calculated in every detail;
> Cézanne the grandeur, the subtlety, and the
> science; Pissarro the rustic faith and the epic
> breadth; Sisley the delicacy and respose". [54]

Later Mathey remarks:

> Impressionism contains within itself the seeds
> of its decline, the basic contradiction between
> an effective, rational technique - the logi-
> cally perfect expression of the scientific
> spirit - and an art form searching for the
> immediate, spontaneous contact with the world
> around it which appeals to the instinct and
> rejects all method. [55]

Several points are to be noted regarding these com-

ments. First of all, it is clear that "impressionism"

names a technique of artistic expression. Moreover this is

true of the various other "-isms" of the contemporary scene.

Secondly, there is evident unclarity in the effort to speci-

fy that technique: so, one may ask what precisely is meant

by the phrase "spontaneous contact with the world around it"

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[54]Francois Mathey, _The World of the Impressionists_,
London: Thames and Hudson, 1966, p. 4.

[55]Ibid, p. 135.

and thus reveal the obscurity regarding reality and ob-
jectivity indicated in section four of the present chapter.
In some sense, we are in the presence of an alchemy of
language in artistic discussion, when what is needed is a
chemistry, a periodic table of precise general categories,
that would make possible progressive and collaborative
work.[56]   Very evident illustrations of confusion and need
are discussions and debates regarding realism in art and
representational art.   Aesthetics cannot leave behind con-
fused metaphorical language without such issues as realism
and representationalism being met at the most fundamental
level.   That is, however, the issue of chapter four.   The more
immediate point to note is a categorical transposition of
language warranted both by the inner necessity of systematic
clarity and by the implicit contradictoriness of present
aesthetic usage.   "Expressionism" is thus, with reasonable
legitimacy, transposed from being a name for certain tech-
niques to being a categorical designation of artistic achieve-
ment.

The second key feature of the direction we are tak-
ing has to do with the theology of divine expression particu-
larly as imaged in man.   This is a deeply problematic area

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[56]This is the basic thesis of Professor Philip
McShane regarding contemporary aesthetics: See his _Shaping_
of the Foundations, 1974, ch. 2 and _Lonergan's Challenge to_
the University and the Economy, 1979, ch. 4.   Both books
from Washington, D.C.:   University Press of America.

of contemporary theology, notwithstanding Lonergan's
efforts of the fifties to retrieve the coherent view of
Aquinas. "St. Thomas restricted the image to the _principium_
verbi, _verbum_ and _amor_ of rational creatures. But in pre-
valent theological opinion there is as good an analogy in
the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human
intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy
Spirit is wrapped in deepest obscurity."[57] In chapter five
we will pursue the expression of a Divine Word spoken in
the silence of understanding in its possibility of generating
a reflective Christian expressionism.

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[57]B. Lonergan, _Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas_,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 183.

CHAPTER II.

ASSEMBLY AND DIALECTIC

The present chapter seeks both to further bring to light
other meaningful nuances that Londergan has given to the func-
tional specialty dialectic and to give indications of components
in what he calls "assembly", components that have not regularly
been appealed to in theology. What emerges from our researches
is, first, a clearer view of the large task of scholarship
which Lonergan's strategy envisages, in particular in
relation to the dialectic development of modern art, and art
criticism. Moreover, the particularity of art is seen, not
as a fringe of theology, but as central. Nor is this cen-
trality something foreign to Lonergan's own thinking. In
an unpublished lecture on art, Lonergan once remarked:

> What I want to communicate in this talk on art
> is the notion that art is relevant to concrete
> living, that it is an exploration of the po-
> tentialities of concrete living, that it is
> extremely important in our age when philosophers
> for at least two centuries, through doctrines
> on economics, politics and education, have been
> trying to remake man and have done not a little
> to make human life unlivable.[1]

Moreover, a centrality of artistic reach is in harmony with
Eric Voegelin's thinking. So, for example, in discussing
openness to transcendence, he remarked:

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[1] P. McShane, _Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations_,
New York: Exposition Press, c. 1975, p. 77.

> Already in the nineteenth century a generation
> before Russell and Whitehead, there was a man
> who knew all these problems perfectly -
> Gustave Flaubert. Just look at his Tentation
> de Saint Antoine or his Bouvard et Pécuchet.
> He knew all about the perversions of gnosticism;
> he established a central connection between
> hérésie et cruauté - in its tragic form and its
> comic form. He knew, in Bouvard et Pécuchet,
> that such people had Haeckel for their bible
> as would have Hitler later. But who knows
> Flaubert? Who uses him as a source for under-
> standing these matters? It's a very complicated
> cultural situation.[2]

That cultural situation which fails to draw on the reach for

aesthetic expression in modern man as a basic theological

indication is implicitly criticised throughout this chapter.

We draw attention to what might be called "lyric reaching"

in various art forms, and we do so in a manner that clearly

indicates the need for a communal theological undertaking of

cultural retrieval. Thus, our sketchings in the different

art forms will be selective, briefly indicative of "the

histories written, and the events, statements, movements to

which they refer".[3] The sketchings fulfill our first purpose

of opening up a field of central theological importance, but

they also fulfill the function of placing the problem of ex-

pressionism concluded to at the end of chapter one into its

proper historico-dialectic context.

The observations of sections 2 to 6 of pointers in the

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[2]Eric O'Connor, Conversations with Eric Voegelin,
Thomas More Institute Papers/76, Montreal: 1980, p. 25.

[3]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 250.

lyric expression of the various arts, then, represent elements of what Lonergan technically calls assembly. The second component of dialectic is "completion"[4], which Lonergan sees as meeting the basic issue of dialectic: ". . .the apprehension of values and disvalues is a task not of understanding but of intentional response",[5] and this is the first task of dialectic.[6] We will concern ourselves in more detail with this problem in section 7 of the present chapter. Briefly, the problem is indicated in Lonergan's statement: "Such (intentional) response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings."[7]

What, then, of that response, if the aesthetic class have "become effete" and "the culture has become a slum?"[8] Or, to return to Voegelin, how can there be a community of theologians capable of adequate "completion", if the modern context is one of patterns of fundamental disorientation?

> Can we help them out of the pattern? In most
> cases you can't because what you call a pattern

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[4]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, p. 250.

[5]Ibid, p. 245.

[6]Ibid, p. 246.

[7]Ibid, p. 245

[8]Ibid, p. 99.

> is an attitude, an habituation of action,
> determined by all sort of things - for in-
> stance, by inertia, or by just plain stupid-
> ity: it's too difficult to get out of it -
> it's much easier to follow an attitude. Or,
> in really interesting cases, it is a question of
> l'homme revolte - the revolt against God - and
> you can't break it by explaining it to the man.
> There you get into the real metaphysical and re-
> ligious questions of the "lost" soul. There are
> such people. Think of Samuel Beckett's Waiting
> for Godot. A man like Beckett is also one who
> knows perfectly well that all that agnosticism
> is blooming nonsense - but he can't get out of
> it. I don't know why.[9]

We will discuss this issue in the conclusion of this chapter.

Lonergan specifies other elements of the dialectic

process: comparison, reduction, classification, selection,[10]

by which eventually the dialectician reaches a grasp of basic

genetic affinities in horizons of progress and decline.

Some of these elements are implicit in the discussion of the

sections to follow. Furthermore, Lonergan indicates that

the dialectician should spell out the foundational position

which influences his operation and selection.[11] That spell-

ing out will be the task of chapter, four.

Finally, the religious issue will not be central to

our considerations in this chapter. In the light of

Voegelin's view of metaxy and of the emergency of western

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[9]Eric O'Connor, Conversations with Eric Veogelin,
Thomas More Institute Papers/76, Montreal: 1980, p. 30.

[10]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 1972, p. 250.

[11]Ibid.

man, it can be suspected that the data of our assembly are those of truncated religiosity.

Section 1:   The Emergent Subject in Dance

We begin with some consideration of modern dance - dance since the end of the last century[12] - for a variety of reasons. First of all, dance seems to have priority, both historically and as a cultural indicator. Langer makes this point regarding its indicative quality: "the dance often reaches the zenith of its development in the primitive stage of a culture when other arts are just dawning on its ethnic horizon..."[13] Langer also makes a case for a historical priority: dance is an expression of virtual power,[14] an. aesthetics of movement closely related to the genesis of the distinction between the sacred and profane concretely symbolized by the Magic Circle dances.[15] Finally, Langer gives a third reason for beginning with dance, a reason we will develop in chapter three when we consider western man in the context of a theory of history. In her discussion of primitive dance, Langer remarks on "the great trauma that

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[12]We do not enter here into the Russian tradition, whose evolution begins in this same period.

[13]S. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, New York: Charles Scribner's, c. 1953, p.ix.

[14]Ibid, Chapter II.

[15]Ibid, Chapter 12.

Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts - secularization."[16]

Since our aim here is not total assembly, but the identification of problematic aesthetic expression in the modern subject, we restrict our considerations to two: a brief consideration of the decay of popular dance patterns in the past quarter century; a lengthier review of aspects of problematic expression and innovation in professional dance as it has occured since the end of the last century.

The decay of popular dance patterns is evidenced by the disorganized searchings for rhythms and counter-rhythms of dance particularly of the younger dance scene in these past decades. It brings to mind Langer's comments on dance as indicator. Certain characteristics of this shifting scene of popular dance may be noted, some of which recur in, or are sublated by, professional choreography.

A basic shift has been towards the separation of subjects and sexes, not merely physically but psychically. Such separation had been a traditional phenomenon: one may think of Greek traditional dancing, North American Indian dances or the Celtic dance tradition. Those separations, however, were stereotyped, ritual, patterned. The contemporary shifts were from such patterned stereotyped forms to

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[16]S. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, New York: Charles Scribner's, c. 1953, p. 201.

problematic lyricism: both sexes "doing their own thing",
with spontaneous but paradoxically changed expression that
at times is solitary self-expression. The solitary self-
expression is regularly assymetrical, possibly in continuity
with what G. Simmel noted regarding the assymetry of
coquetry in the beginning of the century:[17] the male dance
patterns - white western is the type here considered - lack
sophistication. But the primary aspect to note is the
inner desire for some new subjectivity of dancing which would
give expression to the subject's power beyond patterns of
western socialization.

Let us turn now to instances in the development of
dance as a modern professional art form. To discover the
dance is to capture the sense of what bodily movement means
or to seek the meaning which lies behind physical gesture
performed by a human figure. No other individual was able to
understand the need for this discovery better than Isadora
Duncan, who explored the unlimited number of postures the
body could assume and so allowed it to manifest itself in
an infinitude of guises which revealed its innermost nature.
For Duncan believed herself to be an instrument of uncon-
fined motion or energy and she sought to express this ideal
in unstructured ways never before attempted. A quotation

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[17]In "The Sociology of Sociability", Theories of
Society, Vols. I and II, Ed. Parsons and Sills. New York:
Free Press, 1961.

from Duncan, who made every effort to define her art-form,
gives one a glimpse into the mind of a truly creative
being: "My art is just an effort to express the truth of
my being in gesture and movement. It has taken me long years
to find even one absolutely true movement."[18] Clearly,
here Duncan is intimating that movement must spring from
within, and that the dance involves a searching analysis and
representation of human experience. Discovery of the dance
in the light of Duncan's freedom of the moving limbs for
the first time gives free reign to expressing the total indi-
vidual. By the same token, Duncan's technique had the same
flexibility, for it was not so much a technique as it was a
mental attitude (disposition or posture) in approaching
movement itself. Duncan's ability to find the appropriate
visual and kinetic images to suit her needs in terms of the
creative process was based on the influence of music which
produces within one those sensations naturally translatable
into movement. Beyond this, she strove for an abstract
idealization of music by means of movement, believing that
one would move in a perfectly balanced and artistic manner
when listening to the inner, pulsating sounds of music rela-
ting to life. Duncan improvised to the music of renowned
composers such as Wagner, Beethoven, and Chopin and in

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[18]Jan Murray, Dance Now, New York: Penguin Books
c. 1979, p. 68.

examining her own movements decided that the origin of all movement was the "solar plexus", the central spring and crater of motor power. If Duncan had pursued her self-discovery even further, perhaps her individuality would have blossomed into a"mindful presence" defying all gravitational force, conscious intentionality shaping every step or gesture.

Another creative being who was destined to express her individuality in a new way was Loie Fuller, who conceived the dance as being essentially the natural reflex of the body to ideas. Fuller's ideas tended towards the pictorial and illustrational in so far as they sought to imitate natural phenomena in movement such as the dynamism of flame or of a butterfly; not only did she represent the ever-changing appearances of nature through the media of light and large areas of cloth, but in a very real way she penetrated to the innermost core of her own selfhood. For, she demonstrated that cloth animated by the human form moving through space could create plastic shapes manifesting the essence of "being-ness". Whereas Duncan's sheer physi-cal expressiveness spoke of an existing person, namely herself, Fuller expressed herself by the exceptional sensitivity of her arm movements encased in yards of cloth. The use of flowing lightweight materials and imaginative lighting enabled her to create movement patterns that radiated out from herself, thus revealing the many postures of

self-existence. By a manipulation of lightweight materials and draperies she extended herself through special kinds of visualizations, thus becoming a radiant entity, a vision of the "Indwelling" itself. "A dancer must listen to his body and pay honour to it. Behind the movement lies this terrible, driving passion, this necessity. I won't settle for anything less."[19] Thus spoke Martha Graham, another (American) innovator in the field of dance who became Duncan's heiress apparent and who was to make an outstanding contribution in terms of a new freedom of expression. In expanding the range of dance by virtue of giving it intellectual respectability, she developed the horizons of her medium into a new art form. Her discoveries with respect to physical action have changed our perceptions of the human body. It was Graham that declared that bodily movement never lies, and it is clear that her aim was to affirm life through movement, that whether the dance is narrative or abstract, movement is there to reveal human emotion. For Graham, movement was an articulation of some kind of total meaning. The emergence of a third stage of meaning with its mediation of integral subjectivity known as interiority, places issues concerning sacred and profane in a new context and one may be led to ask in what sense the dance is secular. That total

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[19] Jan Murray, Dance Now, New York: Penguin Books, c. 1979, p. 68.

interior meaning, we would suggest, is one which speaks of the authenticity of "human-ness", of being human. Although her work slipped back and forth between the narrative and the abstract as her descriptive and poetical titles dictated (I have in mind the New Mexico works which include "Primitive Canticles", "Incantation", and "Dolorosa", all creations of 1931), there could be an exquisite fusion of the two approaches synthesizing an eagerness to explore new worlds of human nature in a very dramatic way; and then there could be the lyrical utterance, of a longing to be heard as an individual. Thus, Graham's dance "Frontier" of 1935:

> . . .revealed a softness hitherto absent from her work. It combined nostalgia and warmth with formal precision. It was a solo of enormous power in which a single woman staked out an area of control in the center of an infinite plain through a sequence of carefully controlled movements. It combined the adventurousness of the pioneer with the vulnerability that accompanies such resolute colonizing efforts in a strange land.[20]

While (Merce) Cunningham, Taylor and Nikolais analyse the fragmentation of our society and the inroads made by technology on art and nature, Graham's conception of the dance echoes the secular concerns of her era - the discoveries of psychologists, socio-political upheavals as well as intimations of nihilism characteristic of today's world-view. More importantly, however, her art reflects the symbolic

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[20]Don McDonagh, The Rise and Fall and Rise of Modern Dance, New York: New American Library, c. 1970, pp. 31-32.

presence within subjectivity which is appropriated within interiority and mediated by that appropriation.

Section 2: Painting as the Plastic Means of Expression

An outstanding figure bearing significance in terms of seeking a new modality of expressing himself visually was Van Gogh. One need only look at an early drawing by Van Gogh of the roots of a tree (April 1882) to realize his passionate empathy with nature. For him natural forms seem to become a direct extension of human emotion by virtue of the fact that he moulds or shapes them plastically to suit his own visionary conception. This interpretation seems to be confirmed in Van Gogh's own words stated in a letter of 1882 in which he comments: "I see in nature, for example, in trees, expression and, as it were a soul",[21] and suggests that Van Gogh's drawings of gnarled trees convey a sense of near-human misery and wretchedness in the painful network of twisted roots and branches. More specifically, the very leaflessness of Van Gogh's trees may be considered a translation of the human soul bared in such a way as to reveal its innermost emotions; and indeed in the final analysis, the affective domain of the individual becomes brutally exposed as in the drawing "Sorrow" in which a despondent crouching figure is represented, and this state of human

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[21]Van Gogh, Letter No. 242, Nov. (?) 1882. (Dear Theo, New York: Doubleday, 1969).

despair is echoed by the small study of a tree found below
the suffering woman manifesting the same patterns of form
and discharges of feeling. Again, in Van Gogh's own words
(taken from a letter written May 1, 1882, No. 195), there
is an analogy to be noted between "Study (or Roots) of a
Tree" and the figure study of "Sorrow" with its emphasis on
the close echoing of human emotions perceived in trees and
landscape: "The other drawing 'Roots', represent roots of
trees in sandy soil. I have now tried to give the landscape
the same feeling as the figure, as though clinging to the
earth in the same convulsive and passionate manner and yet
torn out of it by the gale."[22] Clearly, the images of an-
xiety one detects in Van Gogh's paintings stem from his
desire to capture from the private universe of his own ex-
perience, a subjective intensity never before attained ar-
tistically. The vigor of brush-strokes and lines, the pul-
sing energy and vitality given simply by means of bold
streaks of colour, the new and surprising harmonies produced,
all combine to produce a new expressivity which speaks of
the subject himself.

There was no one who symbolically embodied the
state of man's alienation more profoundly than Edvard Munch
(1863-1944) in his "The Scream (Cry)" of 1893. This pic-
torial realization of the anxiety or _angst_ man experiences

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[22]Van Gogh, Letter No. 195, May 1, 1882. (_Dear
Theo_, New York: Doubleday, 1969).

as a creature isolated or divorced from himself, is com-
posed of a writhing figure which emerges from the land-
scape as a convoluted form shouting out to be heard in a
primordial fashion. The reverberations of the subject's
voice made visible inasmuch as it pervades the landscape
even as a stone thrown into still water causes centrifugal
ripples, establish Munch's belief as asserted by H. Hesse
when he is motivated to say

> I can give you nothing
> That has not already its
> Being within yourself.
> I can throw open to you
> No picture-gallery but
> Your own soul... I help you
> To make your own world
> Visible. That is all.[23]

Munch therefore creates visible sound waves resembling the
mind's stream of consciousness - the individual's psycho-
logical dimension is penetrated and made explicit before our
very eyes. For Munch, the task of art was none other than
to express the inner world of the human subject, and this
he does by whirling and restless brush-strokes, clashing
colours, and the sheer force projected behind an intentional
distortion of line. Munch was able to go beyond both natu-
ralism and impressionism in painting with his symbology of
Life's forces realistically presented in his "Frieze of Life"
begun around 1888 implicitly proclaiming the message, that
art as the antithesis of nature is man's urge to crystallize

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[23]H. Hesse; I am unable to pin down this particular
reference.

or thematize the many experiential patterns which constitute the totality of his being.

With the Russian painter Kandinsky (1866-1944), the implications of the work of art as self-expression is brought to full fruition in as much as the artist carries on a purely personal dialogue or rather monologue in tune with his own internal conflicts and needs, no longer adhering to the dictates of an external world of nature as in the past. In formulating his doctrine of "inner necessity", Kandinsky conceived the art-form to be essentially an objectification or outward expression (externalization) which involves a mediation of total mind, an appreciation of significance, an idealization of the purely experiential pattern, so ultimately it may be said that:

> Expressionism, which began by shifting emphasis from the object to be painted to the artist's own subjective interpretation, reached in Kandinsky the total negation of the object. In this respect he was of great inspiration to succeeding artists. The final phase of expressionism also became the beginning of an altogether new artistic concept in non-objective painting. Kandinsky was heralded by the following generation as the innovator of non-objective painting.....In his rejection of the representational aspects of art, Kandinsky cleared the way for new values in art. By experimenting with the possibility of an expressive - rather than a formalistic - art in the non-objective idiom, he threw out a challenge that performed a most valuable function in the history of modern art.[24]

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[24]P. Selz, German Expressionist Painting, Los Angeles: University California Press, c. 1957, p. 232.

The evolution of expressionism then may be understood in terms of the process of self-appropriation; that is to say, the artist comes to know that the world is only meaningful in so far as it is an unfolding of himself as incarnate quest, and consequently the only true expression is that of self-expression or an exploration of the many horizons of subjectivity. Such exploration has been conducted in our present age of modernity in numerous experimental ways with respect to all the plastic arts; the revolutionary tendencies of avant-garde expressionism included within all innovative movements such as cubism, futurism and minimalism etc. are symptomatic of man's desire to reach a lyricism expressive of the total individual subject. The artist explores the potentialities of total human living with the result that the artefact is not merely an objectification of mind, but a searching objectification of man and his human possibilities. Are the searching and the objectification adequate, faithful to the totality of the human reality? It is this question that will carry us forward through the thesis.

Section 3: Sculpting as a Subjective Enterprise

It is clear that the nonfigurative images of modern sculpture have been an enigma to the ordinary spectator - and yet, the sculptor will claim that they are images of reality or meaningful constructions expressing a new and specifically modern form of consciousness. To reinforce his belief, the modern sculptor has stated:

> I cannot help rejecting all repetitions of images
> already done, (that is to say) already worn out
> and ineffective. (and further)...I cannot help
> searching for new images and this I do, not for
> the sake of their novelty but for the sake of
> finding an expression of the new outlook on the
> world around me and the new insight into the
> forces of life and nature in me.[25]

Such images it would seem go beyond the "sensus communis"

(every-day or surface level) mode of perception in attempting

to reveal much of the inner structure and organization of

the material world before us, and very few can interpret and

assimilate these poetical images, poetic in the sense that

they are highly personalized visions. The development achi-

eved within the medium of sculpture as an art-form made

possible by modern processes and materials, has culminated

in a general cultural phenomenon which the contemporary

philosopher Ortega y Gasset has described as being a gradual

movement towards the dehumanization of art.[26] As a mark of

modernity, this process of dehumanizing has taken place in

all the arts, even literature, and to most people this devel-

opment taking place in the arts signifies decay and is pro-

foundly disturbing since it does not agree with their concep-

tion of art as a lived reality. .However, to the artist, the

change of direction within his art-medium (in this case

sculpture) towards a more dissonant sensibility is indicative

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[25]J.J. Sweeney, _Lectures on Modern Art_, "Naum Gabo,
A Retrospective View of Constructive Art", N.Y.: Philoso-
phical Library, 1949, p. 83

[26]José Ortega y Gasset, _The Dehumanization of Art_,
Trans. Trask, New York: Doubleday, 1956.

of his/experience of our present-day environment representa-
tive of the human condition - one of anxiety, mental anguish,
and alienation. The artist is compelled to create the con-
crete image he does, not out of a sense of perversion, but to
shock us into an awareness of ourselves when all around us
there are signs of inhumanity characteristic of a mechanistic
civilization. Thus, modern art is inhuman, but it is for a
purpose; for, the artist cannot project a false conscious-
ness by virtue of his imagery...instead, he must capture
the authenticity of our situation, inasmuch as the territory
we live in is a waste land, inhabited by hollow men...

> We are the hollow men
> We are the stuffed men
> Leaning together
> Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
> Our dried voices, when
> We whisper together
> Are quiet and meaningless
> As wind in dry grass
> Or rat's feet over broken glass
> In our dry cellar
> Shape without form, shade without colour
> Paralysed force, gesture without motion.[27]

Inevitably, the artist is forced to create images of terror
and despair born out of the artificial and synthetic mould we
have cast for ourselves, therefore the synthetic materials
the sculptor is now employing and the seemingly non-construc-
tive world-view he has adopted.

Already, with August Rodin's (1840-1917) "The Gates
of Hell" there emerges a totally new approach to the medium of

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[27]T.S. Eliot, Selected Poems, "The Hollow Men"
(1925), London: Faber and Faber, 1967, p. 77.

bronze, and indeed the human figure which displays numerous
captivating poses is indicative of the process of ideation
underway with respect to the subject's mindful presence.
Every gesture and transitory change of pose is captured by
Rodin in the early searching works (I have in mind "The Age
of Bronze", "St. John the Baptist Preaching" and "Man with
the Broken Nose", (depicting strong realism) for the sole
purpose of expressiveness alone, and the violently distorted
poses we are exposed to in "The Gates of Hell" represent
further reaches into the discovery of self-hood. Influenced
by Dante's "Inferno" and other individual themes from the
Divine Comedy supplemented by ideas from the poems of Baude-
laire which he greatly admired, Rodin produced "The Gates of
Hell" - isolated figures and groupings representative of
thematic episodes with which he experimented at random for
over more than thirty years. As Arnason puts it: ". ...
The turbulence of the subjects involved inspired him to the.
exploration of expressionist violence in which the human
figure was bent and twisted to the limits of endurance al-
though with remarkably little actual naturalistic distor-
tion."[28]

It is evident that the "expressionist" distortions of the
moulded figure as conceived by the contemporary sculptor and
developed in the twentieth century evolved out of this violent

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[28]H.H. Arnason, History of Modern Art, New York:
Abrams, 1977, p. 66.

play upon the human instrument we witness in perhaps Rodin's greatest work; the concept of impermanency, change or meta-morphosis becomes the over-riding vision of "The Gates..." portrayed by figures emerging or sinking into the matrix of the bronze itself and seems to signify the fragility of present-day subjectivity. Behind the message of "The Gates..." one also senses a deeper meaning - man in quest of himself, the perennial philosophy of birth, decay and death followed by rebirth perpetuated by a profound eternity - the subver-sion of the individual in view of the quagmire that threatens to engulf the human form without hope of liberation. In any case, Rodin in this work becomes a precursor of what is to come within the realm of sculpture, a transitory figure who ex-ploits the far-reaching possibilities of living on many levels of existence.

Another innovative figure in the sculptural realm was Alberto Giacometti (1901-1966) whose work makes artic-ulate the state of man's existence arising out of the depths of modernity - that of alienation, not only in the sense of being isolated from others but from himself as well, in the sense of in no way knowing who he himself is. With his "Woman with her Throat Cut" (1932), a bronze construction of a dismembered female corpse lying in a very grotesque position, we can make a comparison with Picasso's "Seated Bather" of 1929 by reason of the intentional fragmentation applied in both cases intimating the truncated consciousness

both artists have perceived as symptomatic of the fact that
man has neglected the enterprising notion of self-discovery;
how our contemporary mode of living tends to fragment us into
various unrelated parts so that a separation of mind and body
has taken place. Between the years 1932-33 "The Palace at
4 a.m."was created, a structure of wooden rods outlining the
shape of a house in which there is placed a woman dressed in
an old-fashioned long gown standing before three tall rec-
tangular panels and facing another raised panel with a long
oval spoon shape attached to it which in turn secures a ball;
a rectangular cage is partitioned off in another section in
which hangs a spinal column suspended over the floor, and
above all of this a narrow panel of glass is supported in a
hanging position; in an upper rectangular-shaped window one
views a prehistoric (skeletal) bird, a sort of pterodactyl
which is isolated from the rest of the house.

> . .. .The effect, whether he sought it or not,
> is an overpowering sense of aloneness, although
> one may also read in the figures a quality of
> integrity rather than of alienation, something
> that enables them to survive like characters in
> a play of Samuel Beckett, even in a void, in an
> ultimate situation..."[29]

There is in "The Palace at 4 a.m." a haunting quality of
mystery arising from the artist's sense of the loneliness of
modern man whatever the associations and reminiscences in-
volved might mean for him. Hammacher remarks in his

[29]H.H. Arnason, History of Modern Art, New York:
Abrams, 1977, p. 402.

The Evolution of Modern Sculpture about this piece that:

> . . .The work is extremely simple, but in this
> reduced figure and space is the condensation of
> thousands and thousands of rooms, passages, and
> courtyards with which Giacometti was in close
> contact and which he here sees at a distance,
> spaces in which human beings move without being
> aware of the connection between, on the one hand,
> "their" time (movement) and "their" space and,
> on the other, Time and Space...[30]

Giacometti's objective it would seem, is to reduce man, ob-
ject and space to a common denominator as if there was no
longer any room for subjectivity, resulting in a depersonal-
ization of the human subject. For Giacometti, man represen-
ted by his human figure in "The Palace..." loses awareness
both of himself and the objects he has created; again, man
seems to have lost both his self-esteem and more importantly
his own identity. In shrinking the human form to thin elonga-
ted little figures, Giacometti seems to be pointing out that
the integrity and dignity of individuality has been lost,
and that the privacy of human space must once again be res-
tored. Other innovative works include "Invisible Objects
(Hands Holding the Void)" created between 1934-35 whereby
an elongated figure half sitting on a chair-like structure
holds nothing in its hands. Here, the desire seems to be to
eliminate the object and to place emphasis on the human sub-
ject alone. With "Head of a Man on a Rod" (1947), one senses
the performance of the primeval scream taking place (as in

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[30] H. Hammacher, The Evolution of Modern Sculpture,
New York: Abrams p. 241.

Edvard Munch's "The Scream") where an alien creature un-
recognisable as the human race finds himself lost in a hos-
tile world.   Finally, in his drawing of the critic "David
Sylvester" (1960), one finds the portrait surrounded by a
chaotic environment such that the person remains alone in a
void with an aura of a destroyed world about him.   Lastly,
we may make known the modern sculptor's aesthetic aims by
restating Henry Moore's words which anticipate the challenge
of sculpting in the third stage of meaning: the sculptor
"gets the solid shape, as it were, inside his head - he thinks
of it, whatever its size, as if he were holding it completely
enclosed in the hollow of his hand...he identifies himself
with its center of gravity, its mass, its weight".[31]   One
may note an echo of Aristotle's "sense in act is the sensi-
ble in act", such that for the sculptor of the third stage
of meaning, the real statue is not "already-out-there".
Ultimately, what is determined by the sculptor if he is indeed
an authentic creator, is that the symbolic presence within
subjectivity is appropriated within interiority and mediated
by that appropriation.

Section 4:   Musical Expression

The 16th century composer Gesualdo de Venosa was
noted for his procedure of constant modulation, a method of

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[31]Herbert Read, <u>The Art of Sculpting</u>, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 74.

continual progression from one key to another - the change
of key either being to a closely related or remote modality
depending upon its relationship to the initial or home key
base - and for promoting an intentionally acentric tonality
by virtue of perpetually shifting tonal centres depriving one
of any feeling of finality at the end of each novel compo-
sition.   In his day it acted as a powerful counter-thrust to
tonal consolidation, and at the same time it paved the way
for a wider conception of tonality.   If a review of modern
tonality suggests the opening up of the whole harmonic space
so as to allow each of the twelve tones of the chromatic
scale to become useable, one may extend this policy of lib-
eration to the human subject as well, since modern music in
its experimental nature leads both its creators and listeners
in the vital direction of self-discovery, thus enlarging the
boundaries of human space as well.   For, beyond and above the
temporality of audible music, lies a silentness which yet
utters meaningful nuances ...projections of an unrealized,
unappropriated subjectivity that longs to become concrete.
Yet:

> Not until the twentieth century did the seeds of
> atonality sown in the sixteenth century bear
> fruit.   And again an undeniable spiritual
> affinity connects the chromaticists of the
> Renaissance with the atonal composers of today.
> Gerualdo da Venosa has never before been better
> understood than he is today.   Nor has the
> disintegration of the medieval world into the
> warring powers of Reformation and Counter Reforma-
> tion... ever found more fraternal comprehnsion

than it does in the torn and tortured world of today.[32]

Even though sixteenth century and twentieth century atonality evade a clear and stable harmonic center, the sixteenth century remained basically faithful to a triadic concept of harmony while the twentieth has recognized the fact that radical atonality cannot grow on the soil of traditional harmony or on the groundlessness of a self-less and unmindful humanity who fears to know itself.

In his search for new forms of expression Richard Strauss (1864-1949) composed a symphonic fantasy inspired by the various sections of Nietzsche's book Also sprach Zarathustra. Rather than a literal translation of Nietzsche's ideas however, this tone poem completed in 1896 is more like a lyrical hymn to life instigated by the dithyrambic, ecstatic language we are asked to interpret when reading the lines (almost proverbial or aphoristic in style like biblical discourses) of Nietzsche's text. Basically, the challenge both Nietzsche and Strauss set for themselves in their respective media encompasses the riddle of what lies behind man's existence, his relationship to the world and to nature; in more depth the question becomes "Is there another side to existence? If so, what or where is this other side?" One may describe the score of "Zarathustra" as a mixture of worldliness and mysticism; the former because it speaks of the darker aspects

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[32]Edward Lowinsky, Tonality and Atonality in Sixteenth-Century Music, Los Angeles: University of California press, 1962, Chapter IV, p. 77.

of man's alienation and loneliness and echoes the existential crisis man found himself in at the end of the 19th century, the latter since it portrays a sense of man's passionate longing or desire for intense communion with the cosmos and the quest of the human subject engulfed by the awe and wonder of the universe before him. Among many musical innovations to be acknowledged in _Zarathustra_, "preparing us for those atonal moments discernible in the one-act dramatic operas _Salome_ and _Electra_, is the Fugue entitled _Of Science_ which is one of the first illustrations of how to implement the twelve-note (tone) system. Later, in the tragedies _Salome_ and _Electra_ we find Strauss indulging in unrestrained orgies of dissonance and shifting tonal centers, both scores compelling him to cross over the harmonic line of demarcation into regions of cacophonous sound (the term "cacophonous" refers to an uncontrolled use of dissonance which is purposely designed to musically shock, surprise or create a mood or atmosphere of the unexpected) giving impetus to an experimental usage of atonality, (atonality suggesting no dependence on one major key with its closely-related chordal functions). It may be said that Strauss most assuredly had a very good reason for expanding the boundaries of sound for: ". . . His liquefactions of tonalities represent the farthest point reached by the psychologizing of tonal language. They are an advance into new realms of harmonic expression which

result from the idealistic wanderings of certain works..."[33]
This declaration indicates Strauss' concern for how far one
could push the limits of expression to suit artistic needs;
in his way of thinking it was more important to make the sounds
come alive than to worry about key relationships - we may
further add that he wished it to be known that the human sub-
ject is also alive projecting musical nuances of its own,
but unaware of this strange fact. One talks of a work of art
as being dynamic, alive, but it is the creator, perceiver,
listener that is alive and coming to life as he makes the
transition from identity to expression involved in objecti-
fication via the plastic means of art. Moreover, Strauss
consented to piling the remotest tonalities on top of one
another resulting in a complexity of sound somehow always
appropriate for every situation and ultimately enhancing the
music's dramatic possibilities; one may add that he wished to
present the drama of human existence and to point out that the
artist explores the potentialities of total human living.
All living involves artistry, is dramatic, but art focuses in
its objectification of purely experiential patterns a possi-
bility of fuller living, more integral meaning. Depending
on the state of a culture, that objectification can be ex-
pressive of a rich common meaning and a common aspiration,

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[33]Ernst Krause, Richard Strauss: The Man and his Work,
London: Collet's Pub., 1955, p. 160.

or on the other hand, it can include elements of "shock",
artistic isolation.[34] What seems to motivate Strauss' dis-
sonant style of writing - sonorities moving against one an-
other in a contrapuntal fashion regardless of the vertical
result, leading to polytonal and atonal modes of composi-
tion - was an awareness of the fragmented, truncated and
fragile state of subjectivity breeding decay, emptiness and
chaos without meaning or hope in the vacuum of 19th century
despair. (Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard could relate to this
void and the nihilism it represented.) While Salome (1905)
may be described as a subterranean volcano about to erupt in
psychological terms, Electra (completed in 1909) is a leap
into an expansive abyss representing the dark noises of ex-
istence. Even Strauss has referred to the extreme limits of
harmony he went to in Electra, the end-product being a
shocking, sometimes atonal sonic realization arousing the
passions. By releasing himself from the bonds of harmony
in this work, Strauss made an immense advance towards an
altogether new direction in music marked by the unusual com-
binations of sounds which are heard in Electra. The inten-
sity of this one-act tragedy with its complex psychological
depths is determined by the anti-human elements and forces at
work within what can only be called a revolutionary and

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[34]In Donald Mitchell's, The Language of Modern Music,
London: Faber and Faber, 1966, this element of shock and isola-
tion in the case of Schoenberg is clearly illustrated.

monumental document for its time. "...Is this still music?
The drawing of a sickly mind tormenting itself, the face of
a being haunted by dreams and shaken by dread, reeking with
blood and full of ghastly superstition, shows Strauss on the
borders of musical naturalism...He flung wide the doors of
expressionism."[35]

Likewise, we see an analogous path taken by Arnold
Schoenberg (1874-1951) when expanding the boundaries of
sound - for Schoenberg's pan-chromatic scheme (using all
twelve tones of the scale) was instrumental in leading the
composer to a freedom of uncompromising self-expression.
After his string sextet Transfigured Night composed in 1899,
there is evidence of a largely unconscious and spontaneous
expression of inner character or psychic existence which
resonates with the intelligibility of two of Schoenberg's
early introspective creations; the Second Quartet in f#
minor of 1908, and the monodrama Erwartung (Expectation)
completed in 1909. In the last two movements of the Second
Quartet (and one must remember that Schoenberg studied the
late quartets of Beethoven) Schoenberg employs "free tonal-
ity" as a liberating artistic mode in anticipating a dis-
covery of atonal regions within the musical landscape. Cer-
tainly Schoenberg anticipated a liberation of consciousness
within the contemporary scene, and his search for more

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[35] Ernst Krause, Richard Strauss: The Man and his Work,
London: Collet's Pub., 1955, p. 310.

permissible paths in the medium of sound is made evident by
the dramatic text he uses for the a-melodic tendencies of the
Second Quartet - the poem Transport taken from Stefan
George's The Seventh Ring which begins with the line "I feel
the air from another planet". Performance of this work would
engender modes of psychic liberation, and the self-attentive
appreciation of such a work requires that such a performance
be moved into the context of self-attentive methodology.
The monodrama Erwartung (Waiting) was the next appropriate
step in Schoenberg's thinking, for the music of this score
voices the change-over to "atonality", and the text itself
breathes a realization of the need for a refined type of
reflection on all the patterns of experience of contemporary
society if man is to get to grips with his own renewal. (The
libretto itself is a projection of the interior realm of one
human being, a woman who soliloquizes about her lover ena-
bling us to enter the private world of an individual which
articulates the anguish of its existential condition.) Essen-
tially, Schoenberg's twelve-tone opera Moses and Aaron (1931)
is an expression of slowly formed inner feeling based upon
the artist's conscious intentionality and reason as the op-
erations of self-appropriation are given power to take over
the creative enterprise. Here we not only witness the various
guises and applications of twelve-tone technique, but Schoen-
berg also encounters the epistemological problematic of
reaching beyond the image towards the notion or idea; for,

in his own strange way he was led to recognize the necessity of insight as a function not of outer circumstances but of inner condition, as the mediator, the hinge, or pivot between images and concepts. Thus insight is into the concrete world of sense and imagination so that the insightful resourcefulness of a Schoenberg explains why he was compelled to use his art as a metaphysical bridge to move from the concrete to the abstract.

Section 5: Lyric Literature

With the following statement from <u>Klingsor's Last Summer</u>, Hesse is able to predict the need for a "new key" or sensibility motivated by the lethargic state man finds himself in at the present time:

> . . .we must die, we must be born again. The great turning point has come for us. It is the same everywhere: the great war, the change in art, the great collapse in the governments of the West. For us in old Europe everything we had that was good and our own has already died. Our fine-feathered Reason has become madness, our money is paper, our machines can do nothing but shoot and explode, our art is suicide. We are going under, friends; that is our destiny. Music in the Tsing Tse Key has begun.[36]

Thus, Hesse moves us towards what he believes is the starting point for change; a return to ourselves, or rather a move towards the internal reality of thought. Again, in his letter to "Louis the Cruel", Klingsor pleads for a better understanding of his art:

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[36]H. Hesse, <u>Klingsor's Last Summer</u>, Trans. Winston, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1970, pp. 160-1.

The art we both practice still depends, as a professor would say, too much upon the object (how nice it would be to paint a picture puzzle). We are still - though in a somewhat free handwriting and a way that's upsetting enough to the bourgeois - painting things of "reality": people, trees, country fairs, railroads, landscapes. In that respect we're still obeying a convention. The bourgeois calls those things "real" which are seen and described pretty much the same way by everybody,· or at least by many people. As soon as the summer is over, I have in mind to paint nothing but fantasies for a while, especially dreams.[37]

Such mindful attention to one's self prompts acknowledgement

of a subjective presence previously ignored, and which is

still being ignored in our present-day culture. Through the

character of Klingsor Hesse could point out to his audience

that something was wrong in the clockworks, a diagnosis which

required of Klingsor the very unfamiliar task of self-exam-

ination so that he says "...But then, I feel it, I shall be

turning inward and once again, as I did for a while as a young

fellow, paint entirely from memory and imagination, make

poems and spin dreams. That also needs to be done."[38] The

epitome of Hesse's message revolves around the subjective

enterprise of slowly coming to appreciate one's self, of

self-appropriation. Thus, he gives a description of

Klingsor's "self-portrait" in line with his purpose:

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[37]H. Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, Trans. Winston, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1970, p. 173.

[38]Ibid, p. 175.

Like all of Klingsor's later works, this self-
portrait can also be regarded from a wide variety
of viewpoints. To some, especially those who did
not know the painter personally, the picture is
above all a symphony of colours, a marvelously
harmonized tapestry that in spite of its brilliant
hues give a sense of tranquillity and nobility.
Others see in it a last bold and even desperate
attempt to win freedom from the object...They say
that this painting is reminiscent of nature only
as some mountain ridges remind us of human faces,
some branches of trees remind us of hands and legs -
all very remotely, merely symbolically...analyzed
and interpreted by the artist himself with un-
sparing psychological insight - an enormous con-
fession, a ruthless, crying, moving, terrifying
pecari. (As for the critics); they see in it a
kind of monomaniac self-adoration, a blasphemous
self-glorification, a kind of religious megalo-
mania...[39]

Consequently, the work of art becomes a means of self-revela-

tion both to its artist as well as to the beholder. Similarly

in _Klein and Wagner_, Klein takes on a sort of Nietzschean role

whereby an alternation between illusion and reality of the

inner world becomes the main orientation of Hesse's novel-

ette. Klein is forever driving inwards towards the abyss

of himself, thus making a conscious differentiation between

the common-sense world and the strangeness of his own

existence; "...The theatre called 'Wagner' - was that not

himself, was it not an invitation to enter into his own

interior being, into the foreign land of his true self?"[40]

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[39] H. Hesse, _Klingsor's Last Summer_, Trans. Winston,
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1970, p. 179.

[40] H. Hesse, _Klein and Wagner_, New York: Farrar.
Straus and Giroux, c. 1970, p. 98.

This contrasted with a desire to "cast himself back into the dark womb out of which the Inconceivable forever and ever expelled the transitory world of forms,"[41] and reference is continually made to Wagner's music (operatic drama) as a sedative rather than a mode of illumination opening our eyes to the truth; that Wagner's art was only valid insofar as it was a presentation of the archetypal imagery of eternity.

In Thomas Mann's Dr. Faustus, there is a continual dialogue carried on between the artist-musician Adrian Leverkühn (really Arnold Schoenberg), and his friend as well as confidante Serenus Zeitblom (Ph.D. Humanities) on the nature of art. One passage is particularly poignant in which both proceed to discuss what holds the work of art together:

> . . .In art, at least, the subjective and objective intertwine to the point of being indistinguishable, one proceeds from the other and takes the character of the other, the subjective precipitates as objective and by genius is again awaked to spontaneity, dynamized, as we say; it speaks all at once the language of the subjective. The musical conventions today destroyed were not always so objective, so objectively imposed. They were crystallizations of living experiences and as such long performed an office of vital importance: the task of organization. Organization is everything. Without it there is nothing, least of all art. And it was aesthetic subjectivity that took on the task, it undertook to organize the work out of itself, in freedom. (Zeitblom comments)
>
> You are thinking of Beethoven. (Leverkühn continues...)
>
> Of him and of the technical principle through which a dominating subjectivity got hold of the musical

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[41] H. Hesse, Klein and Wagner. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1970. p. 96

organization; I mean the development, or working
out. The development itself had been a small part of
the sonata, a modest republic of subjective illumina-
tion and dynamic. With Beethoven it becomes uni-
versal, becomes the center of the whole form, which,
even where it is supposed to remain conventional, is
absorbed by the subjective and is newly created in
freedom...[42]

Furthermore, Beethoven is spoken of frequently throughout the

text as that rare being a breed apart in terms of his more

creative compositional strategies applied to the musical art-

form. The world of sound he created was made possible by an

acute modality of hearing tuned in to the meaningful silence

of subjective harmonies. When referring to the later works

of Beethoven, Leverkühn's theory teacher (and organist)

Kretschmar says:

> . . .In the works of the last period they (art
> critics and friends) stood with heavy hearts before
> a process of dissolution or alienation, of a mount-
> ing into an air no longer familiar or safe to
> meddle with: even before a "plus ultra", wherein
> they had been able to see nothing else than a
> degeneration of tendencies previously present, an
> excess of introspection and speculation, an ex-
> travagance of minutiae and scientific musicality...
> And in just that very way Beethoven's art had
> outgrown itself, risen out of the habitable
> regions of tradition, even before the startled
> gaze of human eyes, into spheres of the entirely
> and utterly and nothing but personal - an ego
> painfully isolated in the absolute, isolated too
> from sense by the loss of hearing; lonely prince
> of a realm of spirits, from whom now only a
> chilling breath issued to terrify his most willing
> contemporaries, standing as they did aghast at
> these communications of which only at moments, only

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[42] Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, Trans. Lowe-Porter,
Great Britain: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., c. 1949,
p. 185.

by exception, they could understand anything at all. [43]

And what he seems to be suggesting is that there was a turning inward, a movement towards the internal modes of consciousness, a mediation of an interiority which spoke of integrated subjectivity. Above and beyond the structural element of the composition is the vision and/or idea which acts as the sole expression of the invisible act of understanding; the theoretical activity of composing then becomes transformed to the objectification of a purely experiential pattern, so that Leverkühn ". . .The creator of 'Fausti Weheklage' can, in the previously organized material, unhampered, untroubled by the already given structure, yield himself to reflective subjectivity; and so this, his technically rigid work, a work of extreme calculation, is at the same time purely expressive."[44] Later, when referring to the Faustus Cantata, Leverkühn's most maturely conceived work, Zeitblom comments:

> But precisely in the sense of résumé there are offered musical moments of the greatest conceivable possibility of expression: not as mechanical imitation or regression, of course; no, it is like a perfectly conscious control over all the "characters" of expressiveness which have ever been precipitated in the history of music, and which here, in a sort of alchemical process of distillation, have been refined to fundamental types of emotional significance, and crystallized...[45]

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[43]Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, Trans. Lowe-Porter, Great Britain: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., c. 1949, p. 54.

[44]Ibid, p. 468.

[45]Ibid, pp. 468-69.

Expression, then, can only be lyrical in the sense that it issues forth from the individual subject, and the subject chooses the means or medium by which he is to present his inner vision, and this vision comprehends more than mere seeing. Further, as Leverkühn's lecturer Kretschmar points out: ". . .'Art strides on, and does so through the medium of the personality, which is the product of the tool of the time, and in which objective and subjective motives combined indistinguishably, each taking on the shape of the others'..."[46] Subsequently, the work of art creates an intersubjective realm and becomes a plastic projection of the subject's conscious intentionality. Moreover, the whole focus of Mann's novel revolves about a central theme - that the artist's creative power springs from early impressions and insightful notions of the intellect. Evidence of the intelligibility of art is echoed in certain passages, especially in one where Leverkühn says:

> . . .Art is mind, and mind does not at all need to feel itself obligated to the community, to society - it may not, in my view, for the sake of its freedom, its nobility. An art that "goes in unto" the folk, which makes her own the needs of the crowd, of the little man, of small minds, arrives at wretchedness, and to make it her duty is the worst small-mindedness, and the murder of mind and spirit. And it is my conviction that mind, in its most audacious, unrestrained advance and researches, can, however unsuited to the masses, be certain in some indirect way to serve man - in the long run men.[47]

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[46] Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, Trans. Lowe-Porter, Great Britain: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., c. 1949, pp. 132-33.

[47] Ibid, p. 311-12.

Mann goes a step farther in this regard when he has
Zeitblom declare Leverkühn the true artist since, ". . .he
gave to impermanent becoming the character of being; he
believed in the image: a tranquillizing belief, so at least
it seemed to me, which, adjusted to the image, would not let
its composure be disturbed no matter how unearthly that
image might be..."[48]

The significance of the image or rather the importance
of imagination and the mediation of mind for the artist comes
across clearly in Joyce Cary's The Horse's Mouth, a story
devoted to exploration of the artistic temperament, and cer-
tainly to expanding the horizons of mind. At one point, the
main character Gulley Jimson who is a painter maintains when
reflecting upon William Blake's symbolic and poetical thought
"... .Yes, I thought, there's Billy again. Handing me the
truth. Even when I wouldn't take it. That's what he was say-
ing all his life. A tear is an intellectual thing. And a joy.
It's wisdom in vision. It's the prophetic eye in the loins.
The passion of intelligence..."[49] In fact, Cary's whole book
is an observation upon the "inside of the outside" - that
Blake's whole reason for existence was determined by the con-
ception that the "outside is on the inside", and Jimson him-
self comments, "But what you get on the inside, I said to

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[48]Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, Trans. Lowe-Porter,
Great Britain: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., c. 1949, p. 448.

[49]J. Cary, The Horse's Mouth, Great Britain: Hazell
Watson and Viney, c. 1944, p. 125.

myself, is the works - it's 'something that goes on going on.' Hold on to that, old boy, I said, for it's the facts of life. It's the apple in the dumpling. It's the jump in the 'old mosquito'. It's the kick in the old horse. It's the creation. And that's where it's leading me. Right up to that blasted picture of mine."[50] As an author, Cary has the insight necessary to bring us back to ourselves, to allow us to return to ourselves through the perceptivity of the artist; thus it follows that imagination and understanding provide the basis for the subject's reality. Only solid forms of the imagination, or visions allow us "To see behind the turnips, to enter into each other's minds..."[51] A return to ourselves, also therefore demands a return to the world of creative imagination and in this respect the artist leads the way:

> "Because the world of imagination", I (Jimson) said to Nosy, "is the world of eternity", For, as Billy (Blake) says, "There exist in the eternal world the permanent realities or everything which we see reflected in the vegetable glass of Nature". And, I thought, in the works of Gulley Jimson. Such as red Eyes and green Adams, blue whales and spotted giraffes, twenty-three feet high. Lions, tigers, and all the dreams of prophets whose imagination sustains the creation, and recalls it from the grave of memory."[52]

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[50] J. Cary, _The Horse's Mouth_, Great Britain: Hazell Watson and Viney, c. 1944, p. 124.

[51] Ibid, p. 213.

[52] Ibid, p. 283.

.Finally, in an attempt to explain the artist's (painter's) task descriptively, Cary prompts Jimson to say - ". . .No, you want to start clear, with a clean canvas, and a bright new shining idea of vision or whatever you call the thing.   A sort of coloured music of the mind".[53]

These selections of lyric expression within litera-ture are expressive of an aesthetic problematic that parallels, and at times sublates, the problematic in other areas. It is not a problem of criticism - a second order field, which, as we noted in chapter one, is in need of fundamental grounding within genuine aesthetic experience and in functional special-ization. It is a problem of humanity in a transitional period which must be specified more precisely in the next chapter of the thesis. Immediately, however, we wish to gather the range of indications given in this chapter into a coherent summation.

Section 6: Pointers Towards a Self to be Expressed

Our treatment of the various art forms has been sketchy, illustrative, even random to a point of non-discur-siveness: and it has been so with definite purpose. Clearly, a single chapter aiming at an indication of a novel[54] theo-logical task, the assembly within dialectic of relevant

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[53]J. Cary, The Horse's Mouth, Great Britain: Hazell Watson and Viney, c. 1944, pp. 208-209.

[54]On the novelty of the dialectic enterprise, see F. Crowe, Theology of the Christian Word: A Study in History, New York: Paulist Press, 1978.

aesthetic expression, would necessarily be sketchy and in-
adequate: but it might well have had the inadequacy of a cata-
logue. The present sketch, however, had a precise aim in
moving beyond catalogue to particular artists' intentions and
expression. That aim was not only to indicate concretely the
wealth of tension-in-existence present within modern aesthe-
tic subjectivity in the complexity of that enterprise[55] un-
fulfilable: the task of completion[56] here in question is that
task which requires the release of "the mass and momentum"[57]
of the theological subject's subjectivity towards a complexi-
fication and refinement that may ground the eventual envisage-
ment of the mediated integrality of the religio-aesthetic
subject in the third stage of meaning. The underlying view
of history here requires the lengthy analysis of chapter three
for its clarification. But it is necessary to focus on this
single point here, for there is a massive contemporary vogue of
"objectivity" not only in the sciences but also in aesthetics,
which permits a scholarly detachment in the face of modern
complexifications of subjectivity, the result of which is an

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[55]For an investigation into that enterprise, see also
F. Crowe, Theology of the Christian Word: A Study in History,
New York: Paulist Press, 1978.

[56]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 245-47.

[57]Ibid, p. 65.

absence of relevant transpositions and transformations of feeling.[58] That scholarly detachment, in continuity with cultural neuroses such as those noted by Horney,[59] breeds a view of history as non-genetic, of novel stages of meaning even in those who may use the language of progress. So, for example, Lewis Mumford, in his work The Transformations of Man,[60] brings a wealth of erudition to the notion of "axial man", which will occupy us in chapter three, but fails to move personally to a subjective base of a transformation. So he concludes, "if belief in the next transformation of man required a detailed account of the immediate agents and means that will promote this growth, one might prudently forgo the task. That kind of prognosis lies beyond both imagination and predictive intelligence. But the goals of this world culture have been long plainly in view...".[61] So he moves on to consider world cultural unification and regionalization in continuity with what might be called his own "truncated subjectivity".[62]

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[58] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 66 and 161.

[59] K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York: Norton, 1937.

[60] Lewis Mumford, The Transformation of Man, New York: Collier's Pub., 1956.

[61] Ibid, pp. 183-84.

[62] B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, Ed. W.J. Ryan & B. Tyrrell, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974.

This latter reference, Lonergan's work on "The Subject",
expresses better than anything else the underlying proble-
matic that this chapter has sought to indicate in an invita-
tory fashion. Our indications have been of exceptional sub-
jects whose tensions grounded a self-expression which was
problematic, alienated, pathological, and in particular self-
reflectively seeking more adequate expression. We might sum
up our indications, indeed, in terms of James Joyce's self-
appropriation with respect to his own life as the task ex-
pressed by Mallarmé "Il c'est promene, lisont au livre de lui
meme, don't you know, reading the book of himself."[63] Lonergan
gets to the root of the personal struggle by identifying the
modern cultural context generated by the neglected subject, the
truncated subject, the immanentist subject, the existential sub-
ject, and finally the alienated subject.[64] He concludes by not-
ing, in a manner that echoes Voegelin's criticism of modernity in
relation to the metaxy,[65] that "it is, then, no accident that a
theatre of the absurd, a literature of the absurd, and philosophy
of the absurd flourish in a culture in which there are theologians

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[63] J. Joyce, Ulysses, London: Bodley Head, 1954,
p. 175.

[64] B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, Ed. W.J. Ryan
and B. Tyrrell, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974,
pp. 69-85.

[65] See Chapter I, Section, 3, and Chapter III, Section
2.

to proclaim that God is dead",[66] and he goes on to note the ground of that absurdity and its proclamation in a new neglect and new truncation.

A central feature of the present chapter has been to draw attention to a fundamental strategy of countering that proclamation within theology. We have indicated at length the process of assembly by pointing to those who, in these past centuries, reach to and resonate a higher attunement to subjectivity. But there is a difficulty here, a difficulty which can be spelt out by a fundamentally significant remark of Lonergan "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feed-back, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective".[67] A new neglect would consist in the exploitation by theology of such a linguistic — or more generally, as our assembly indicates, aesthetic - feed-back to the exclusion of personal subjective response. "Literary language...attempts to make up for lack of mutual presence",[68] and indeed this is the entire dynamic invitation of artistry, with the

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[66]B. Lonergan, _A Second Collection_, Ed. W.J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974, p. 86.

[67]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 98, ftn. 34.

[68]Ibid, p. 72.

added dynamic invitation to self-appreciative presence in the contemporary sense. But theology can move that invitation aside by shifting the literary language back into a technical language of the self.[69] Then what is excluded from theology is precisely the task of completion, and so in reality the entire functional specialty of dialectic. For without completion, assembly sinks back into history: there is absent the meeting and possible personal enlargement that is the essence of dialectic. Further, without completion, the further tasks within dialectic become technical and extrinsic exercises.

There is a further aspect to the tasks of assembly and completion which has reference to the failure of Mumford already mentioned. The assembly and completion involve the total object, history in its full concrete sense, and the total subject. Just as Mumford fails to reach towards the personal subjective base of the transformation of man, so he fails to envisage its parallel in history, the open and indeterminate reality of finality: "I have been indicating a parallel between incomplete knowing heading towards fuller knowing and an incomplete universe heading towards fuller being, and now I propose to employ the name, finality, to denote the objective member of the parallel".[70] So, Mumford's

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[69]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 71-72.

[70]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, pp. 445-6.

truncated subjectivity gives rise to a truncated view of history. A fuller subjectivity, as we shall see in the following chapter, generates a richer and more open perspective on axiality in history.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS CATEGORIES OF HISTORY

Because of its novel nature as a theological task, "assembly" was attempted in an indicative fashion in chapter II. The attempt brings out, perhaps, the size of the collaborative effort required for a full scientific achievement. However, implicit in the attempt were categories of history, subjectivity and objectivity, rooted in the work of Lonergan, that are the ground both of the indication and of any full scale effort at collaboration. In this present chapter we wish to bring out those historical categories as they have emerged in reflection on total history in this century. They will prove essential to the adequate understanding of a total history of dramatic artistry in its movement from compactness[1] to "second immediacy"[2]. The following chapter will go further towards the roots of these categories in dealing with authentic subjectivity and the related authentic patterns of objectivity and expression.

The problem then is that of general categories of

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[1] Eric Voegelin, _The Ecumenic Age_, Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1974, Introduction.

[2] Robert Doran, "Aesthetics and the Opposites", "_Thought_", 1977, p. 119.

history that are empirical. It is necessary to note, however, that there is an underlying problem of history which is epistemological: "historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory".[3] This underlying problem, however, is postponed until chapter four. This postponement allows for the discussion of the traditional epistemological problem within the complex context accumulated in previous chapters. It resembles the strategy of Lonergan's Insight, where a thorough investigation of modern scientific knowledge is undertaken prior to raising the issue of subjectivity and objectivity.

Again, the nature of historical knowledge will not be discussed here. Lonergan's own treatment of that question forms part of our own presuppositions.[4] The focus of attention here, then, is the precise issue of the nature of history as a totality, as it has been discussed by certain significant twentieth century thinkers. Marxist historical aesthetic analysis is not being considered in this thesis. If it were to be discussed, it would be best done after the discussion of epistemological issues, for in them lie its fundamental

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[3] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 175.

[4] Ibid, Chapter 8.

weakness.

We may begin by reflecting on the question as it was raised by Karl Jaspers. Jaspers puts aside the Christian faith of the Western World which believes that the appearance of the Son of God is the axis of world history, and sets out to discover empirically an axis acceptable to all men including Christians:

> This axis would be situated at the point in history which gave birth to everything which, since then, man has been able to be, the point most over-whelmingly fruitful in fashioning humanity; its character would have to be, if not empirically cogent and evident, yet so convincing to empirical insight as to give rise to a common frame of historical self-comprehension for all peoples - for the West, for Asia, and for all men on earth, without regard to particular articles of faith. It would seem that this axis history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C., in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C...⁵

Jaspers claims that the most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Thus, in China, India and the West:

> Confucius and Lao-tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host of others; India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to scepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; in Iran Zarathrustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance

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⁵Karl Jaspers, _The Origin and Goal of History_, London: Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953, p. I.

of Homer, of the philosophers - Parmenides,
Heraclitus and Plato - of the tragedians,
Thucydides and Archimedes.[6]

Essentially the change was in reflection: thinking became its

own object, and consciousness became conscious of itself.

Consequently, man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of

himself and his powerlessness. He asks radical questions and

experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the

lucidity of transcendence. At the same time, the rationality

and rationally clarified experience of man launched a struggle

against myth (Jaspers says logos against mythos), and this

over-all modification of humanity may be termed "spiritual-

isation".[7]

> Man proved capable of contrasting himself inwardly
> with the entire universe. He discovered within
> himself the origin from which to raise himself
> above his own self and the world. In "speculative
> thought" he lifts himself up towards Being itself,
> which is apprehended without duality in the dis-
> appearance of subject and object, in the coincidence
> of opposites.[8]

Jaspers advances his argument for selecting this axial

period as the focal point for a structure of world history by

giving a brief discussion of four factors which bear witness

to the notion that the axial period becomes a pivotal point

for the history of man. In the first instance, he maintains

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[6]Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p. 2.

[7]Ibid, p. 3.

[8]Ibid, p. 3.

- that:

> The "thousands of years old ancient civiliza-
> tions" are everywhere brought to an end by the
> Axial Period, which melts them down, assimilates
> them or causes them to sink from view, irrespective
> of whether it was the same peoples or others that
> became the bearers of new cultural forms.[9]

He adds: "Measured against the lucid humanity of the Axial

Period, a strange veil seems to lie over the most ancient cul-

tures preceding it, as though man had not yet really come to

himself".[10]   Secondly, he states:

> Until today mankind has lived by what happened during
> the Axial Period, by what was thought and created
> during that period. In each new upward flight it
> returns in recollection to this period and is fired
> anew by it. Ever since then it has been the case
> that recollections and reawakenings of the poten-
> tialities of the Axial Period - renaissances -
> afford a spiritual impetus. Return to this begin-
> ning is the ever-recurrent event in China, India
> and the West.[11]

Further, he declares:

> The Axial Period commenced within spatial limita-
> tions, but it "became historically all-embracing".
> Any people that attained no part in the Axial
> Period remained "primitive", continued to live that
> unhistorical life which had been going on for tens
> or even hundreds of thousands of years. Men living
> outside the three regions of the Axial Period either
> remained apart or came into contact with one of these
> three centres of spiritual radiation.[12]

He concludes that all human beings living after the Axial

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[9]Karl Jaspers, _The Origin and Goal of History_, p. 6.

[10]Ibid, p. 7.

[11]Ibid, p. 7.

[12]Ibid.

Period either remain in a primitive state or take part in the new course of events. The Axial Period gives world history the only structure and unity that has endured up until our own time.

Later, Jaspers poses questions regarding our own time and its problematic and moves to the suggestion that a second axial period is necessary and imminent. He associates that development into "The still veiled future"[13] with the evolution of science and technology but also with the spiritual and speculative ethos that becomes widespread after the 18th century.

> Europe's exceptional spiritual achievements from 1500 to 1800, that outshine science and technology - Michelangelo, Raphael, Leonardo, Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Goethe, Spinoza, Kant, Bach, Mozart - challenge comparison with the Axial Period of two and a half millennia earlier. Is a second Axial Period to be discerned in these later centuries?[14]

But he also associates that necessary development with the concomitant problematic:

> The prevailing sound and fury of findings relating to the conformation of the material world and to the twists and turns of the "enlightened" view of the world, so much talked about all over the globe, cannot blind us to the fact that science, which appears to be so widely current, is in fact the most deeply concealed rarity. For the most part, modern man as such does not know at all what science is; he has never really experienced what drives a man toward it. Scientists themselves, who continue to

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[13] Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History,
p. 75.

[14] Ibid, p. 75.

> make discoveries in their own special fields -
> unconsciously carrying on a little while longer a
> movement that was set going by other forces - often
> do not know what science is; they betray this in
> their comportment outside that narrow field in which
> they are still masters. Modern philosophers discuss
> science as though they knew it, and then permit it
> to degenerate into an historically passing ideological
> error. Even philosophers of the stature of Hegel
> know little or nothing about this science.[15]

The analogue, then, of our period is not the axial period but

rather "the age of the invention of tools and the use of

fire".[16] So, he concludes that:

> If there is to be a new Axial Period it can only
> lie in the future, just as the first Axial Period
> followed, after a long interval, the period of
> foundation-laying discoveries which finally dif-
> ferentiated human life from the animal kingdom:
> the Promethean Age. This new Axial Period, which
> perhaps stands before us and which could constitute
> a single, world-embracing reality, is beyond our
> powers of imagination. To anticipate it in phantasy
> would mean to create it. No one can know what it
> will bring.[17]

Lewis Mumford, in The Transformations of Man[18] takes

up Jasper's challenge to conceive of history axially. His

first six chapters are in generic agreement with Jaspers, but

then he seeks to move forward to consider what he calls post-

historic man and some variety of world culture.[19] His efforts

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[15]Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p. 96.

[16]Ibid, p. 97.

[17]Ibid, p. 97.

[18]Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man, New York:
Collier Books, c. 1956.

[19]Ibid, see Chapters 7 and 8.

bear witness to the difficulty noted by Jaspers and, as we will see when we discuss Lonergan's view, he fails to exploit the clues that Jaspers had given. He looks to a new spiritual enlightenment that would mediate man's mechanization through modern technology, rather than to a flowering within scientific man's problematic as Jaspers would have it.

In Toynbee's <u>Mankind and Mother Earth</u>,[20] reference is made again to an axis age (c. 600-480 B.C.) in which five great seers made their appearance (Zarathustra, Deutero-Isaiah, the Buddha, Confucius, and Pythagoras), and which was a turning point in history. He disagrees with Jaspers however regarding the time span of the axial period:

> On the strength of the contemporaneity of these five seers, the period spanned by their life times has been called by Karl Jaspers the Axis Age, i.e., an age that is the hinge on which human history has turned. Their appearance has in truth been a turning-point in the sense that, as has been noted above, they have continued to influence mankind down to the present day and are likely to go on influencing posterity by their example, even if their precepts cease to be articles of Faith. However, if we are to think of human history in terms of an Axis Age - and this is, in itself, an illuminating concept - we must extend its time-span in both directions.[21]

At the end of Volume Four entitled "The Ecumenic Age" from his series on <u>Order and History</u>, Eric Voegelin comments upon what Hegel has described as the "absolute epoch"

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[20]A. Toynbee, <u>Mankind and Mother Earth</u>, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

[21]Ibid, p. 177.

and what Jaspers has referred to as the "axis-time" of
world-history. It is Voegelin's contention that Hegel's
absolute epoch was determined by the appearance of the Son
of God, and in so far as God has revealed himself as Spirit
or Geist through the Incarnation, such an event is the pivotal
point around which the history of the world turns. Conse-
quently, for Hegel, this meant that Self-consciousness had
raised itself to the concept of absolute Spirit by having
progressed through the various moments of his idealistic
system. To a certain degree, Voegelin agrees with Hegel's
interpretation of history as the unfolding processes of the
divine order in man initiated by the reality of the Christ
event when he says:

> The "absolute epoch", understood as the event in which
> reality becomes luminous to itself as a process of
> transfiguration, is indeed the central issue in a
> philosophy of history. For without the noetic and
> pneumatic differentiations, there would not be a
> history in which man's humanity achieves its
> rational and spiritual consciousness, nor would
> there be a philosopher's intellect to be concerned
> with this intelligible structure in history. One
> does not have to accept Hegel's System, if one accepts
> his problem of the "absolute epoch" as valid. There
> remains, however, the question whether this epoch
> must be identified with the epiphany of Christ, or
> whether it should not be identified with some other
> event.[22]

On the other hand, Voegelin points out that whereas Jaspers
acknowledges Hegel's contribution to a proper definition of

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[22] E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana:
Louisiana University Press, 1974, p. 309.

history - that world-history becomes, knowable when God had
manifested himself as the Geist to·the thinking Geist in man,
or Mind which is the proper organ in which God is present to
man - he (Jaspers) refuses to identify the absolute epoch
with Christ since Christianity is not the faith of all man-
kind, but one faith among others. For Jaspers there is an
axis of world-history that can be valid for all human beings,
including Christians, and which is to be found empirically
as the spiritual process that extends from ca. 800 to 200 B.C.
with its locus impinging upon the year 500 when Confucius.,
the Buddha and Heraclitus were contemporaries. "This age
brought the fundamental categories in which we think to this
day; it laid the foundations of the world-religions in
which men live to this day; in every sense the step into the
Universal was taken."[23] It is Jaspers' concern to re-estab-
lish the absolute epoch as the center of a philosophy of
history against for instance Toynbee's dissection of history
into civilizations with autonomous internal courses; "One
must, furthermore, acknowledge his categorization of the
'spiritual process', that had on and off attracted attention
as an historical epoch, as the axis-times, as a feat of
philosophical insight."[24] The problems that Jaspers encounters

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[23]E. Voegelin, _The Ecumenic Age_, p. 310 (Original
in Karl Jaspers, "Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte",
Zurich, 1949, 18.)

[24]Ibid, p. 311.

with respect to his construction of the axis-time, are generated by the fallacy of inducing historical events into a stream of world-time in which the spiritual process participates as in the case of Mumford's analysis of axial man. The main drive behind Voegelin's attempt to seize upon an authentic historical reality is his belief in a structure of human consciousness which becomes luminous for its own historicity, thus making an historical consciousness both possible and intelligible.

Voegelin adds several key elements to the search for general categories in history. In the first place, he notes in his large Introduction to this fourth volume of Order and History the significance of the event, and of the discovery of the event, of the shift from compact consciousness to differentiated consciousness in what Jaspers calls the axial period,[25] and we will exploit this discovery shortly. But secondly he implicitly rejects Jaspers' two axial periods by questioning the meaning of modernity. So, in noting the parallel falsifications of history in the Sumerian King List and Hegel's Philosophy of History, Voegelin is led to ask: "And what is modern about the modern mind, one may ask, if Hegel, Comte, or Marx, in order to create an image of history that will support their ideological imperialism, still use

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[25]E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1974, Introduction, passim.

the same techniques for distorting the reality of history as their Sumerian predecessors."[26] In a later context he remarks: "A 'modern age' in which the thinkers who ought to be philosophers prefer the role of imperial entrepreneurs will have to go through many convulsions before it has got rid of itself, together with the arrogance of its revolt, and found the way back to the dialogue of mankind with its humility."[27]

These searchings for a philosophic meaning of total history fall into place when located in the broad view of evolution and history that is available from the writings of Bernard Lonergan. Before dealing directly with Lonergan's view, however, comparisons between Lonergan's view and that of Voegelin will help towards indicating the richness of Lonergan's philosophy of history.

So, where Voegelin distinguishes between compact consciousness and noetic or pneumatic differentiations of consciousness - both of which are religious - Lonergan distinguishes a range of differentiations and sets of differentiations that we will enlarge on presently. Furthermore, where Voegelin indicates generally a dialectic of appearance and reappearance of that differentiation of consciousness that

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[26] E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1974, p. 68.

[27] Ibid, 192.

might be named "metaxic" - a consciousness of the in-between
character of human life - Lonergan's view would seem to lead
to an account of a dialectic progress of differentiation
paralleling Jasper's effort. So, while Lonergan's discussion
of differentiations of consciousness in Method in Theology[28]
is regularly systemic, occasionally his treatment takes on
a historical or genetic character,[29] and then one has the
impression of possible and probable (we will consider emer-
gent probability presently) sequences of differentiations
from primitive to present times and beyond. So, drawing on
the two sections referred to, one comes to the notion of
religiously differentiated consciousness emerging early -
Lonergan refers here indeed to Eliade's treatment of sham-
anism and "archaic techniques of ecstasy".[30] The next dif-
ferentiation he lists in that same place is artistic dif-
ferentiation, and one is led to recall the emergence of Greek
drama out of religious contexts and the transition from the
compact religio-aesthetic dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles
to the relatively secular aesthetics of Euripides, who is

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[28]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, c. 1972. See Index under Differentiation;
see also Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 12-22.

[29]Ibid, particularly pp. 273-6; 303-5; Doctrinal
Pluralism, pp. 12-22.

[30]Ibid, p. 273.

called "the father of European drama",[31] a point we will
return to later. We would note here however that the dif-
ferentiations on which this thesis focuses are those of
religion and art, especially as their integration may be
mediated by the contemporary differentiation of interiority.

Lonergan goes on to distinguish theoretical dif-
ferentiation in its early mode - one may think of the period
from Aristotle to post-medieval times - and in its modern mode
in which it discards philosophy in the traditional sense.[32]
Scholarly differentiation Lonergan would associate most with
the emergence of 19th century German historical studies.[33].
Finally, interiorly differentiated consciousness is a con-
temporary phenomenon, and here Lonergan seems to echo Jaspers
in noting its emergence from the achievements and problematic
of modern science.[34]

Lonergan's later discussion[35] adds the further refine-
ment, due partly to regression and partly to the power of

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[31]V. Tejera, Modes of Greek Thought, New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971, Chapters 1-3.

[32]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 274.

[33]Ibid, pp. 274 and 185.

[34]Lonergan's early work Insight, (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1957) regularly notes that modern
science has made possible refinements of interiority.

[35]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton
Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 303-5.

linguistic meaning, of post-systematic, post-scientific and post-scholarly meaning.[36] Religious differentiation in Lonergan corresponds closely to Voegelin's metaxic differentiation, and grounds the distinction of secular and sacred to which we will return presently. What Voegelin fails to do is to exploit the evolution of modern science, scholarship and philosophy. In that sense Voegelin would fall under the general criticism expressed by Lonergan regarding churchmen in the face of modernity:

> I have been indicating in summary fashion a series of
> fundamental changes that have come about in the last
> four centuries and a half. They modify man's image
> of himself in his world, his science and his concep-
> tion of science, his history and his conception of
> history, his philosophy and his conception of
> philosophy. They involve three basic differentia-
> tions of consciousness, and all three are quite
> beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval
> Europe.

> These changes have, in general, been resisted by
> Churchmen for two reasons. The first reason commonly
> has been that churchmen had no real apprehension of
> the nature of these changes. The second reason has
> been that these changes commonly have been accompanied
> by a lack of intellectual conversion and so were
> hostile to Christianity.[37]

We turn immediately to Lonergan's view of history as a whole. It can conveniently be built up in four stages:

(1) a general theory which covers both natural and human history;

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[36]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 304-5, see also pp. 97-99.

[37]Ibid, p. 317.

(2) a theory specific to stages of human meaning;

(3) a view of human temporality which would divide it into "two times" both ontogenetically and phylogenetically;

(4) a specifically Christian component that would relate history to the Trinitarian personalities.

The fourth stage will not be discussed in this chapter - it belongs properly to what Lonergan would call the area of special categories and it will be discussed in chapter five when a Christian aesthetics will be put in the framework of dialectic, foundations and history. The first stage will be briefly treated immediately. But the focus of our attention will be stages two and three. Following their treatment we will supplement Lonergan, in a manner that seeks to be faithful to his heuristics, from the works of R. Doran and M. Eliade, and conclude with a foundational synthesis of general categories of history.

Lonergan's general theory of history and evolution is basically contained in two places: in an early work on "Finality, Love, Marriage"[38] and in chapters four and seven of Insight. Its basic heuristic has, however, received little attention by his followers, apart from some elaborations in the field of natural science in McShane's Randomness,

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[38]B. Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage", pub. in Theological Studies, 1943; republished in Collection, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New York: Herder and Herder, 1967.

Statistics and Emergence.[39]   Here we are more interested in
the general heuristic structure in its role as substructure
of the evolution of meaning, of "outgoing of subject",[40]
indeed of expression.

The key elements of Lonergan's general view would
seem to be three: a modernisation of Aristotle's view of
matter and form that gives the lie to reductionism by in-
dicating how a coincidental manifold of lower events or acts
can be the matter of a higher form; a sublation of Darwin's
view of chance variations and survivals into a precise heu-
ristics of probability schedules; an identification of recur-
rent patterns as the keystones of evolutionary history. So
Lonergan arrives at his general view: "Emergent probability
is the successive realization in accord with successive
schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes
of recurrence."[41]

The illustrations of emergent schemes given both by
Lonergan and McShane belong predominantly to the lower sci-
ences. But indications are given of schemes closer to our

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[39]P. McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence,
Dublin: Gill MacMillan, 1970, the concluding chapters.

[40]P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations,
New York; Exposition Press, 1975, p. 105.

[41]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, pp. 125-6.

topic: schemes of recurrence of expression,[42] schemes of recurrence mediated by ideas;[43] schemes of recurrence under the openness of finality.[44] The interest of the present thesis is the envisagement of possible and probable schemes of aesthetic expression mediated by ideas of "the intelligible in the profounder sense",[45] and that envisagement requires an optimism in the openness of finality including especially "the need to evoke long intervals of time".[46] One area of Lonergan's work, a detailed analysis of the relevant schemes of economic progress, illustrates that long term optimism in a manner that lends plausibility to our own envisagement, to be detailed in chapters four and five. The long term optimism is succinctly expressed by the chapter-title of one of the main sources of Lonergan's unpublished view "An Improbable Christian Vision and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million Years".[47] What Lonergan brings out -

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[42]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 592-3.

[43]Ibid, pp. 208-11

[44]Ibid, pp. 447-8.

[45]Ibid, p. 647.

[46]Ibid, p. 127.

[47]The title of chapter six of McShane's Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979.

and his view is echoed by first class economists such as Schumpeter and Keynes - is that the _ideas_ of the relevant schemes have been absent from minds of economists in these past centuries, and are still absent. Business cycles did become a topic at the end of the nineteenth century, but only as things to be eliminated.[48] While this field seems distant from the area of aesthetics there is an enlightening parallel. While "expressionism" became both a fact and a topic at the end of the nineteenth century, an adequate idea of expression was just as absent as the idea of natural economic rhythms. What is needed to make plausible and probable such ideas is "intentionality analysis",[49] a reality belonging to a later stage of meaning. And this brings us to our next topic.

Laced into that substructure by later work is Lonergan's basic view of history as involving stages of meaning.[50] Lonergan distinguishes three stages of meaning, a first stage which consists in "the development of language"[51] and more generally of common sense meaning. One may parallel to this

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[48]P. McShane, _Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy_, Notre Dame: University Press of America, 1979. Chapters 6 and 7.

[49]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 212, 289.

[50]Ibid, the central treatment is given in pp. 85-99. See also references above to "differentiation":

[51]Ibid, pp. 86-90.

Jaspers' discussion of pre-axial technological development, and go further to note a parallel between Jaspers' axial period and Lonergan's discussion, based on Snell's work,[52] of the Greek discovery of mind.

Lonergan writes of the second and third stages in a single section, speaking of the second emerging from the first by a splitting of meaning into common sense and theory, and of the third stage as being generated by the needs and problems of the second.[53] Again there is a parallel to Jaspers' search for a second axial period, but Lonergan's treatment leaves the temporal sequence obscure. However, there is an earlier discussion of human temporality by Lonergan which helps us forward beyond both Jaspers and Method in Theology: it occurs in Lonergan's systematics of trinitarian theology when he deals with analogies between the temporal and eternal subject.[54]

Lonergan's discussion is complicated by his search for analogies between the temporal and the eternal, but one lengthy quotation will serve to bring forth the insight that

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[52]Bruno Snell, The Discovery of Mind, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960.

[53]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 93-96; see also 82-83.

[54]I am indebted here to the Lonergan Institute at Regis College where there is an unpublished English translation of the relevant treatise, De Deo Trino, pars systematica, Rome: Gregorian Institute, 1964. The relevant section is Qxxi "Quaenam sit analogia subjecti temporalis et subjecti aeterni?"

is key to our derivation of generic historical categories.[55]

> Thirdly, the temporal subject is <u>per accidens</u> subject
> of his intellectual nature as actuated prior to his
> being the <u>per se</u> subject of this intellectual nature
> as actuated.
>
> For whatever is said to be <u>per se</u> or <u>per accidens</u> is
> said to be such inasmuch as it comes to be either
> from the intention of the agent or beyond the inten-
> tion of the agent. Now inasmuch as one considers the
> intention of that agent who created the nature of the
> temporal subject, who conserves it, and who applies
> it to its activity, then it is entirely clear that
> the intellectual nature of the temporal subject is
> <u>per se</u> actuated. On the other hand, inasmuch as one
> considers the intention of the temporal subject him-
> self, it is also clear that the actuation of intel-
> lectual nature can not be intended by the temporal
> subject prior to that subject's knowing that he
> possesses an intellectual nature; and it is no less
> evident that a temporal subject can not know that he
> has an intellectual nature prior to the actuation
> of this very nature of his...
>
> Once this is grasped, there comes to light the fact
> that the temporal subject is involved in two times:
> there is an earlier time in which it is on the basis
> of natural spontaneity that he is the subject of his
> actuated intellectual nature: and there is a later time
> in which he is the subject of his own actuated and to
> be actuated intellectual nature, not spontaneously,
> but knowingly, willingly, and through his own inten-
> tion.[56]

Lonergan's discussion in this section is very brief

and only very generically suggestive of a view of concrete

history. He certainly emphasizes the need for community and

the influence of others in the genesis of a self-knowledge

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[55]This key, and the relevant text of Lonergan, is
discussed by Philip McShane "Middle Kingdom, Middle Man",
<u>Searching for Cultural Foundations</u>, Ed. P. McShane, Washington:
University Press of America, 1984.

[56]<u>De Deo Trino</u>, Qxxi.

which would mediate performance.[57]   But it is only by con-

sidering this key point both in the context of the earlier

work Insight, and by the gradual process of slowly appropriating

the slogan of its Introduction regarding the understanding of

understanding as a fixed base,[58] and by coming to grips with the

context of the later historical perspective of the chapter on

Meaning in Method in Theology, that is relevant to general

categories of history, that the history of expression, emerges.

Then what Lonergan speaks of in the context of trinitarian

theology becomes clearly identifiable with what he later talks

of as the transition to the third stage of meaning, or to

the differentiation of consciousness of interiority.   By

bringing the two discussions together, however, one begins

to see that the transition from the first to the third stage

of meaning takes time and with the collaboration, within emer-

gent probability, of many temporal subjects.   So one finds a

resolution to the debate regarding the axial period.[59]   The

axial period becomes the period of splitting, of fragmentation,

that extends from what Jaspers calls an axial period, down

to our own times.   Moreover, such a view of a lengthy prob-

lematic period is what is fundamentally suggested by Voegelin's

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[57]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, pp. 535 ff.

[58]Ibid, p. xxviii.

[59]Here again I am indebted to McShane, "Middle King-
dom, Middle Man", Searching for Cultural Foundations, Ed.
P. McShane, Washington: University Press of America, 1984.

work in the fourth volume of <u>Order and History</u>.

What one is led to, then, is a view of history, indeed of the history of interiority and philosophy, as a movement from compactness through splitting or fragmentation towards a mediation of integration made possible by interiority. This mediation is our immediate topic but perhaps we are now in a position to read the following statement of Lonergan in its full phylogenetic and ontogenetic significance:

> It is only through the long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation that one can find one's way into interiority and achieve through self-appropriation a basis, a foundation, that is distinct from common sense and theory, that acknowledges their disparateness, that accounts for both and critically grounds them both.[60]

The question of mediated integration is taken up most specifically in a large range of works by Fr. Robert Doran.[61] He draws on the works of Ricoeur, Jung, Becker, Otto Rank and

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[60]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, p. 85.

[61]Other works by R. Doran include:

"Psychic Conversion", <u>The Thomist</u> 41, 1977.
"Subject, Psyche, and Theology's Foundations", <u>Journal of Religion</u> 57, 1977.
"Christ, and the Psyche", <u>Trinification of the World</u>, Regis College, Toronto, 1978.
"Aesthetic Subjectivity and Generalized Empirical Method", <u>The Thomist</u> 43, 1979.
"Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: <u>Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences</u>, American Academy of Religion, Studies in Religion 25, Scholar's Press, Chicago, 1981.

Lonergan:

> . . . .to predict that these guides through the
> labyrinthine ways of interiority will be principal
> among the makers of postmodern intentionality.
> For they came to know human desire with penetrating
> precision and exacting subtlety. Moreover they
> have opened that desire upon itself in its native
> spontaneity. Together, I believe, they render
> asymptomatically possible the self-conscious
> recovery of intentionality which Paul Ricoeur calls
> a second, post-critical immediacy. [62]

(In particular, Doran makes reference to Ricoeur's _Freud and Philosophy_, Yale, New Haven, 1970. See for instance page 496 of this work.) Doran's work to date has concentrated on the mediation of post-critical immediacy through a third-stage-meaning attention to one's dreams, but he indicates its larger significance for psychic wholeness. [63] Particularly relevant for our own thesis is his discussion of "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning". [64] Key to Doran's discussion is his notion of psychic conversion: "Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for internal communication through the recognition, understanding, and responsible negotiation of the elemental symbols that issue from the psychological depths especially in one's dreams. These symbols are dramatic

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[62] R. Doran, "Aesthetics and the Opposites", _Thought_, 1977, p. 119.

[63] R. Doran, _Creativity and Method_, Ed. M. Lamb, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981.

[64] R. Doran, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning", 1978, Lonergan Workshop II, Ed. F. Lawrence, California: Scholar's Press, 1981.

indicators of one's existential subjectivity."[65] The role
he attributes to psychic conversion is a transformation of
history: "psychic conversion will further the socially,
economically, culturally, and politically emancipatory and
therapeutic potential of generalized empirical method, as
well as its effects on one's personal freedom. It will thus
function in an understanding and negotiation of the dialectic
of history."[66] Central to this task is the function of
artistry: "An authentic dramatic artist has been healed by
conversion in such a manner that the prior collaboration of
intelligence and imagination in the selection for conscious
discrimination of the images that are needed for the insight-
ful, truthful, and loving construction of a work of dramatic
art can go forward in inner freedom."[67] And all this leads to
a new specification of what Lonergan means by genuineness:[68]

> Genuineness in the third stage of meaning, then,
> promotes the harmonious cooperation of the self
> as it is and the self as it is objectified, known,
> apprehended through self-appropriation. It
> promotes a second naiveté, that in the limit

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[65]R. Doran, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of
Meaning", 1978, pp. 150-1.

[66]Ibid, p. 151.

[67]Ibid, p. 155.

[68]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, pp. 475-79.

returns to "speech that has been instructed by
the whole process of meaning" (Ricoeur's ex-
pression), an informed, post-critical, post-
therapeutic naivete.[69]

The notion of second immediacy or, more fully,
mediated integral authenticity, is enlarged in historical
perspective by drawing on the work of Mircea Eliade. Eliade's
study of the Sacred in primitive cultures helps towards
bringing out what is implicit in Doran's work so as to clear
the key features of a religious meta-aesthetics in the third
stage of meaning. What we add here, then, is not an analysis
of Eliade's position, but sufficient pointers from his work
to help us towards adequate general categories of history.
Moreover, these pointers are implicitly sublated hitherto
within a critical realism and theism which remains to be dis-
cussed in the following chapter.

We may first note that Eliade's massive study, summed
up in his books The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of
Religion, and in The Myth of the Eternal Return[70] does not in
itself claim to be more than a pointer, one moreover which
pivots on the question which is central to this thesis. So,

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[69] R. Doran, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of
Meaning", 1978, p. 178.

[70] M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature
of Religion, New York: Harper, 1961. We will also refer
later to Eliade's other comprehensive text relevant to this
topic: The Myth of the Eternal Return, Trans. W.R. Trask,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955.

for example, writing of architecture Eliade notes, "It does
not lie within our province to write the history of the
desacralization of the human dwelling"[71] and he goes on to
note the focus of attention of the conclusion of his work:
"We shall later have occasion to inquire whether this secul-
arization of nature is final."[72] Our own view, based on
Lonergan's analysis of varieties of differentiated conscious-
ness, is that a secularization of nature is final or legit-
imate only within the differentiation of consciousness that
belongs to pure science - outside that pattern of conscious-
ness it is a non-objective fragmentation. What Eliade's work
does is to make clear what can be, or has to be, retrieved in
a third stage of meaning. Moreover, while his treatment of the
sacred is general, it lends itself to an interpretation of
aesthetic sacrality in the stages of meaning. Indeed the
structure of the book parallels Langer's fundamental work on
art, Feeling and Form. Both works begin with a study of
Space, move on to a study of Time, and conclude with a treat-
ment of what may be called "literate objectification": for
Eliade, myth, for Langer, Poesis. The point we wish to ex-
ploit emerges clearly in Eliade's treatment of habitation or

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[71]M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature
Religion, New York, Harper, 1961, p. 50.

[72]Ibid, p. 51.

architecture -. the equivalent of Langer's "ethnic domain".
What he brings out is the spontaneous sacrality of compact
consciousness. "The reader will soon realize that the
sacred and the profane are two modes of being in the world,
two existential situations assumed by man in the course of
his history."[73] The first mode of being has temporal
priority, primitive man being compactly religious man, and
his constructs, particularly his habitations, were images of
a transcendent cosmos that were continuous with an elemental
objectivity of sacredness:

> Religious man's desire to live in the sacred is in
> fact equivalent to his desire to take up his abode
> in objective reality, not to let himself be paralysed
> by the never ceasing relativity of purely subjective
> experiences, to live in a real and effective world
> and not in an illusion. This behaviour is documented
> on every plane of religious man's existence, but
> it is particularly evident in his desire to move
> about only in a sanctified world, that is, in a
> sacred space.[74]

The structuring of a space is integrally a "repetition of the
cosmogony".[75] It is a centre which is an image of the
sacredly-centred cosmos. Nor does the plurality of centres
generate a problem for compact consciousness.

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[73]M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of Religion, New York: Harper, 1961, p.14, italics his.

[74]Ibid, p. 28-29.

[75]Ibid, p. 31.

> The multiplicity, or even the infinity, of centers
> of the world raises no difficulty for religious
> thought. For it is not a matter of geometrical space,
> but of an existential and sacred space that has an
> entirely different structure, that admits an
> infinite number of breaks and admits an infinite
> number of communications with the transcendent.[76]

Earlier, Eliade noted that "Religious architecture

simply took over and developed the cosmological symbolism

already present in the structure of primitive habitations "[77]

- and we might add, the other two structurings of space whose

art forms are painting and sculpting. What we are interested

in is not the development of religious architecture - a devel-

opment and a differentiation which belongs to the second stage

of meaning - but the early compact sacral meaning of primi-

tive objectifications. An early Chinese dictionary notes

that "to paint is to draw boundaries"[78] but the paradox of

the primitive boundary-drawing is that it was not a separa-

tion, such as belongs to a later culture, of sacred and pro-

fane. It was, rather, a world within a sacred world. The

culture in which we live, in fact, is that later culture, so

that we can recognise of ourselves what Eliade says of the

believer: "For a believer, the church shares in a different

space from the street in which it stands...The threshold that

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[76]M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature
of Religion, New York: Harper, 1961, p. 57.

[77]Ibid, p. 54.

[78]Chinese Painting, A. Skira and J. Cahill, New York:
Rizzoli Pub., p. 11.

separates the two spaces already indicates the distance between two modes of being, the profane and the religious."[79]

Eliade's treatment of time parallels the treatment of space, and the same basic insight recurs, an insight perhaps best expressed by Langer when she remarks, "the dance often reaches the zenith of its development in the primitive stage of a culture when other arts are just dawning on its ethnic horizon... the great trauma that Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts (is) secularization."[80] Finally, we will have something to say regarding "literate objectifications" only when we reach more precision on the issue of objectivity in chapter four. These few indications of compact religious consciousness, of course, are only pointers to the larger task.

> To come to know the mental universe of _homo relig-iousus_, we must above all take into account the men of these primitive societies. Now to us in this day their culture seems eccentric, if not positively aberrant; in any case it is difficult to grasp. But there is no other way of understanding a foreign mental universe than to place oneself _inside_ it, at its very center, in order to progress from these to all the values that it possesses.[81]

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[79] M. Eliade, _The Sacred and the Profane; the Nature of Religion_, New York: Harper, 1961, p. 25.

[80] S. Langer, _Feeling and Form_, New York: Scribners, 1953, p. ix.

[81] M. Eliade, _The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of Religion_, New York: Harper, 1961, p. 165.

What we wish to progress to, however, is an envisagement of religiosity and its aesthetic expression within history as a whole. And what a study of primitive compactness does is make more feasible an envisagement of a mediated integral consciousness in the third stage of meaning.

In the concluding part of The Myth of the Eternal Return, Eliade carries his discussion of historical perspective forward in a manner that dovetails with our present searchings. Eliade notes recent trends towards a myth of return in the midst of more evident movements of historicism, including movements associated with Marx. He concludes to the inadequacy of such movements, particularly historicism, for freeing man from the terror of history: "The terror of history becomes more and more intolerable from the viewpoints afforded by the various historicistic philosophies. For in them, of course, every historical event finds its full and only meaning in its realization alone."[82] The man who reaches for a cyclic view fares better: "At least he retains the freedom to annul his faults, to wipe out the memory of his 'fall into history', and to make another attempt to escape definitively from time."[83] Eliade here considers the possibility of escape from time through a unification of the real

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[82]M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, Trans. W.R. Trask, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955, pp. 149-50.

[83]Ibid, p. 158.

by knowledge[84], but finally takes a stand on the centrality
of something like Christian Faith: indeed he concludes:
"that Christianity is the 'religion' of modern man and histo-
rical man, of the man who simultaneously discovered personal
freedom and continuous time (in place of cyclic time)."[85]   What
Eliade concludes to here would seem, in fact, to be a funda-
mental need that can be met by our transposition of Voegelin's
metaxic view of history.

We may now conclude this chapter by locating its con-
tribution towards the total task. That location is done best
by reference to Lonergan's short discussion of categories in
Method in Theology.[86]   That discussion falls into two parts:
one of general categories and one of special categories. The
present chapter has focused on general categories of history
and is particularly related to a specification of the different
realms of meaning and the different worlds meant as a result of
the various subjective operations promoted by the cognitive
structures of mind; a recognition of the diverse heuristic
structures constituting the individual as operator realizing
specific goals, in particular the genetic and dialectical
processes which culminate in the attainment of a self-knowledge

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[84]M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, 155.

[85]Ibid, p. 161.

[86]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 285-291.

which speaks of a metaphysics encompassing total meaning of
the human subject. Finally, an account of both undifferentiated
and differentiated modes of consciousness has been taken into
consideration, wherein the case of the former, subjectivity
remains within the immediate world of experiencing or that of
commonsense, while the latter enables the subject to shift to
other realms of meaning such as theory, interiority, and trans-
cendence by his active performance of moving from one manner of
operation to another depending upon what faculty is required
and the situation imposed. In the following chapter we must go
back to more basic problems which relate to the different kinds
of conscious operation which take place within the four-levelled
reality of human consciousness (of experiencing, understanding,
reasoning, and deciding); the biological, aesthetic, intellectual,
dramatic and religious patterns of experience underlying these
conscious operations, the discernment of the nature of the con-
sciousness activated at each level of knowing, as well as the
acknowledgement of the different procedures made manifest by
the various modalities of differentiated consciousness, such as
religion, art, theory, scholarship, interiority and their objec-
tives and finally to problems in the epistemology of knowledge
and of symbol. The fifth chapter will carry us into the search
for special theological categories.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMATIC KEY GENERAL CATEGORIES OF EXPRESSIONISM

"Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means."[1]

The present chapter faces a central difficulty which was raised in each of the previous chapters but postponed until now. That the difficulty is central is evident from the relationship between "expression" and "object" or "objectification": so, what is or might be meant by "expressionism" varies radically with the epistemological viewpoint of author or reader. Before tackling that central difficulty, however, we wish to locate that difficulty within the methodological difficulty of the thesis and of studies drawing on Lonergan generally. In a first section, then, entitled "Difficulties and Strategy", we will relate the epistemological difficulty to the problem presented by Lonergan's outline of a proper dialectic strategy in theology. Next, we will indicate the epistemological and foundational position which for us gives sufficient grounds for a fuller theology of expressionism. A

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[1]B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 239.

third section will enlarge on this in relation to aesthetic
objectification or expression. Section four will seek to
make foundational precisions regarding the nature of symbols.
Section five will return to a specification of the concrete
religious intention which is the artist and which also con-
stitutes the members of the artist's audience. In a sixth
section we will locate the previous reflection within a larger
heuristic of general categories, putting chapter three's
analysis of historical categories in a new context and prepar-
ing the way for a further extension of our reflections into
the issue of special categories involving trinitarian theology
in the final chapter.

Section I - Difficulties and Strategy

We noted above that the difficulty expressed by the
initial quotation of this chapter, the epistemological diffi-
culty, falls into a context of larger difficulties. These
larger difficulties can be placed under two headings which are
best suited to bring out both the nature of Lonergan's different
suggestions regarding theological procedure and the strategy
that we are led to adopt in this thesis. The first heading
relates to Lonergan's first search for foundations of theology
in the book Insight and the difficulty of arriving at what he
calls there "the position"[2]; the second heading relates to

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[2]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 388.

the more concrete and complex strategy of arriving at a foundational position which comes in his later work Method in Theology, specifically through following his suggestions regarding the procedure of dialectic.

The difficulties of the second heading relate most immediately to the strategy of the present thesis so we begin with them.

Our aim in the thesis is to throw light on expressionism from the perspective of theology. As has been implied in previous chapters, and will become clearer through this chapter and the next, the expressionism we speak of is "concretely non-secular"[3] and so it is clear that our reflections come under Lonergan's strategic definition of theology, "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix",[4] and artistic expression is part of that matrix, inseparable even if distinguishable from both the total culture and religion. However, if the reflection is to be faithfully within the paradigm for theology presented by Lonergan then that reflection

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[3] This view parallels Voegelin's view of the universality of the experience of existential tension, which may in fact be unknown to the experiencing subject. See E. Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, pp. 40-4. Under the second heading we will have occasion to note Voegelin's epistemological weaknesses. From Lonergan's viewpoint this stand on non-secularity belongs to the full position (Insight, p. 388 extended by chapter 19).

[4] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. xi.

has to be identifiable as a functional specialist contribu-
tion to the communal collaboration of eight functional spec-
ialties which mediate between the data on expressionism in
history and the transformation of the perspective of express-
ionism through the fruit of communications as a specialty.[5]
From this fact one can go on to identify difficulties related
to this heading. First one may ask about the procedure of
the present thesis; does it remain faithful to the paradigm
of theological method? It seems in fact to move from spec-
ialty to specialty without clear definition of transition.
So, chapter two was an effort to illustrate a particular part
of the strategy of dialectic which falls under the title of
"assembly".[6] Chapter three on the other hand sought to arrive
at some general theological categories regarding history as
a whole, so it would seem to be predominantly a chapter on
foundations yet clearly involving a good deal of dialectic
considerations. What then of the paradigm? The answer is
twofold.

The main direction of the thesis is foundational or
methodological. It is the direction of the book Method in
Theology itself, which seeks to define the general procedure
whereas the thesis seeks to define the procedure in a partic-
ular subsection of the cultural matrix. Just as Method in

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[5]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton
Longman & Todd, 1972, pp. 136 and 355.

[6]Ibid. p. 250.

Theology requires illustrations in various specialties without detailed analysis, so the present work requires illustrations to ground larger foundational statements, and we may note an enlightening parallel with Lonergan's more precisely foundational effort in Insight, where the book is mainly direct speech, "in oratione recta",[7] with occasional illustrative "clarification by contrast". Foundations, then, is the functional specialty which speaks directly of the total procedure - although the genesis of procedures or foundations is something that occurs in dialectic.

Here we note a further difficulty, and a related advantage of the strategy we adopted, or have been forced to adopt, in the thesis.

An examination of the literature associated with Lonergan studies leads to the conclusion that in fact little has been done within particular functional specialties; specifically there seems to be no precise foundational writing apart from Lonergan's own work. Almost all the essays written in the various Lonergan Festschrifts are in an accepted controversial style, with only an occasional essay presenting some aspect of Lonergan's work, regularly in oratione

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[7]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 133.

obliqua[8]. The works of Professors D. Tracy[9] and P. McShane[10] seem closest to foundational, yet they are both predominantly in what might be called a randomly dialectic style, and the former's work has been critically received as lacking Lonergan's basic paradigm both in philosophy[11] and in theology[12]. However, McShane's work has, and is generally acknowledged to have[13], relevance to an enlargement of the foundations delineated by Lonergan, and we will have occasion to draw on it in later sections.

From this examination it is clear that we are not operating within a familiar paradigm, and so our strategy is

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[8] e.g., see F.E. Crowe, ed., _Spirit as Inquiry_, New York: Herder and Herder, 1964; P. McShane, ed., _Foundations of Theology_ and _Language Truth and Meaning_, Dublin: Gill MacMillan, 1971, 72; M. Lamb, ed., _Creativity and Method_, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981; F. Lawrence, Lonergan Workshop, Vols. 1, 2, New York: Scholars Press, 1978, 80.

[9] D. Tracy, _Blessed Rage for Order_, New York, Seabury Press, 1975.

[10] P. McShane, _The Shaping of the Foundations_, Notre Dame: University Press of America, 1977.

[11] See B. Lonergan, _Philosophy of God and Theology_, Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1973.

[12] F. Lawrence, "Method and Theology as Hermeneutical", M. Lamb (ed.), _Creativity and Method_, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981, pp. 86 ff.

[13] See Lamb, ed., _Creativity and Method_, references from index under _McShane_.

a two-pronged one (1) illustrative of the procedure of communal collaboration within functional specialization: specifically yielding foundational clarity regarding the procedure within dialectic from "assembly" to positional statements;[14]   (2) reaching within Lonergan's positional statement for a more precise treatment of the nature of symbolic objectification or expression.

This strategy was already hinted at in chapter two, when we proceeded to __assemble__ instances of the shift to fundamental subjectivity from the history of art in these past centuries. But in the present context we can be more precise about our own strategy.

The full strategy of dialectic that Lonergan would propose for a theology of symbolic expression would involve the collaboration of a community committed to proceed along the lines indicated on page 250 of __Method in Theology__.[15] A close reading of those lines reveals a complex procedure that is nonetheless precisely defined. Lines 1-14 specify a six-stages procedure to be done by a set of investigators (lines 16-17) to be completed by these same investigators in a manner defined by lines 20-28. This completion itself is two-staged, a distinction of positions and counterpositions (lines 20-

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[14] B. Lonergan, __Method in Theology__, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 250.

[15] McShane regularly draws attention to this page as the key Lonergan strategy of redeeming the past; see McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", Lamb, ed., __Creativity and Method__, p. 544.

24), and a restructuring of the material in the light of such distinguishing (lines 24-28).

The strategy therefore is clear, but it is also clear that it is a program for a large group in longterm collaboration.[16] The limitations of a single thesis require some cut back on that strategy. So it is that we are led to focus on only two areas of the strategy: an attempt at assembly (line 1, page 250) in chapter two; a partial indication of the positions involved in the two-stage strategy (lines 20-24, page 250) and some restructuring of the material which will appear when special theological categories have been introduced in chapter five.

Section 2: Objectivity and Subjectivity

We wish to arrive in this section at a precise statement of a position on subjectivity and objectivity which has the power of transforming and restructuring both discussions of expressionism and its actual aesthetic practice. We do so by moving forward to that statement through a series of contexts.

The first context we may name the context of difficulty. It is repeatedly adverted to by Lonergan, most

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[16]This is the thesis of F.E. Crowe, _The Lonergan Enterprise_, Massachusetts: Cowley Pub., 1980. Crowe compares the enterprise to Bacon's _Novum Organum_.

explicitly in comments on Tertullian's and St. Augustine's difficulties regarding what is real:

> Unfortunately, some people have the impression that while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing can be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one's spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is in the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real.[17]

The difficulties of "the fear of idealism" are discussed by Lonergan further in discussions with Voegelin and Gadamer at a Conference in Toronto, where, he notes Plato's transition to that view as mediated by geometric definition - a point to which we will return. He further specifies the difficulty, and idealism as a half-way house, in a key passage in the Introduction to _Insight_:

> From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, there there is an intelligent

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[17] Quoted from a talk of Lonergan's "Consciousness and the Trinity" (1964) by McShane, _Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations_, New York: Exposition Press, c. 1975, p. 9.

and reasonable realism between which and material-
ism the half-way house is idealism.[18]

A second context, related to this transition to and
beyond the half-way house of idealism and to the difficulty
of reaching a critical realism, is the context of modern
science. The case that is made by the book Insight in its
elaborate invitation to involvement in science is that such
involvement supplies a "bridge",[19] and that "modern science
has made possible"[20] sharp distinctions, and more broadly, a
modern version of what led Plato to idealism. Moreover one
might add to this modern possibility of science a parallel
possibility within the shift to a mediation of theory in the
arts as exemplified by the music of Xenakis or the broad area
of Op-art. The thesis would seem to be that one does not
seriously shift to idealism without ideas that are scientific -
be they the geometrical ideas of Euclid or the ideas of mod-
ern physics. So there is the tendency to opt for a half-way
house between materialism and idealism on the part of theolog-
ians whose background is more literary and philosophical in
the accepted sense. This would seem to be the case with a

[18]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. xxviii.

[19]B. Lonergan, Insight, p. 140. I am indebted through-
out this discussion to McShane, "Features of Generalized
Empirical Method", Lamb, op. cit., p. 543 ff.

[20]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 487.

scholar such as Tracy, if McShane's analysis is correct.[21]
But it would also seem to be the case with such scholars
as Dilthey, Gadamer and Voegelin.[22] One needs the mediation
of a theoretic world to get one to the halfway house of
idealism and beyond.

A third context relating to the transition to crit-
ical realism is the context of asking the meaning of "is
it?" or "yes" both within the context of science, where the
issue of verification is at stake, or within the context of
ordinary judgement, where Lonergan would claim that the
same process is operative.[23] This is the context that is
stressed by F.E. Crowe when he takes issue with modern theo-
logians: "They cannot stop the word 'is'. Using it, they
cannot forever refrain from asking what it means, not for
more than five or ten thousand years anyway, much less if,

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[21]See McShane's treatment of this issue in his
Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, New York: Exposition
Press, c. 1975, p. 39.

[22]On Gadamer, see Lawrence's article "Self-knowledge
and History in Gadamer and Lonergan" in Language, Truth and
Meaning, Ed. McShane, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1972, p. 167. On Dilthey, see Lamb's article "Wilhelm
Dilthey Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's
Meta-Methodology", p. 115 of same publication. On Voegelin,
see Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1981, pp. 52-207. We will
consider one aspect of Voegelin's reflective context
presently.

[23]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, Chapters 9-11.

they are willing to learn with and from tradition."[24] It

is the context on which Lonergan focuses both in his criti-

cism of Leslie Dewart[25] and in his "Insight: Preface to a

Discussion".[26] It is a context of discussion that is lack-

ing in much contemporary discussion of objectivity, even

among philosophers of science.

A fourth context relevant to the conception and

solution of the epistemological problem is the imaginative

presentation of that problem that lurks behind most dis-

cussions of it. Lonergan places that imaginative difficulty

within a theoretic discussion of the principal notion of

objectivity:

> Sixthly, the principal notion of objectivity solves
> the problem of transcendence. How does the knower
> get beyond himself to a known? The question is,
> we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to
> know himself and asks how he can know anything else.
> Our answer involves two elements. On the one hand,
> we contend that, while the knower may experience
> himself or think about himself without judging,
> still he cannot know himself until he makes the
> correct affirmation, I am. Further, we contend
> that other judgements are equally possible and
> reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry,
> and reflection there arises knowledge of other

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[24]F. E. Crowe, "Christologies: How Up-to-date is Yours?", _Theological Studies_ (xxix), 1968, p. 101.

[25]B. Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma", _A Second Collection_, Ed. W.J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, Phila- delphia: Westminster Press, 1974, pp. 14 + ff.

[26]See _Collection_, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New York: Herder and Herder, 1967, and especially pp. 160-163.

objects both as beings and as being other than
the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not
in going beyond a known knower, but in heading
for being within which there are positive
differences and, among such differences, the
difference between object and subject.[27]

Such a theoretic clarity benefits from diagrams.
One such diagram that conveniently represents the imagi-
native thinking especially of empiricists is the following:

But it occurs explicitly as representing a viewpoint in

thinkers such as Voegelin. So, Webb presents the following

diagram:[28]

In the text Webb remarks:

The line with the arrowhead in this picture
represents the tensions of existence both as
experienced on the level of immediacy and as
articulated in consciousness through the
medium of symbolization. "R" stands for reality,
in which the inquirer is immediately involved
through his participation in existence and which
he also comes to know reflectively. "S"
(a lens) stands for symbol; this may take the

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[27] B. Lonergan, _Insight_, p. 377, more existentially,
Collection, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New York: Herder and Herder,
1967, p. 237.

[28] E. Webb, _Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History_,
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, p. 101.

specific form of visual symbols, myths, ideas, philosophic propositions and so on.[29]

Undoubtedly it would take a prolonged analysis of Voegelin to locate him on "Lonergan's line" of varieties of objectivity. However, what we are noting here is a cultural tendency to represent knowing as confrontational.

This leads us to note a fifth context, the context of Aristotelian and Thomist thought, where knowledge is knowledge by identity. This context is very evidently a source of Lonergan's own critical realism, and the subject of one of his lengthy studies.[30] Immediately here, however, we add a diagram, which we might call a counter-diagram, borrowed from McShane:[31]

[29]E. Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, Seattke: University of Washington Press, 1981, p. 101.

[30] B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.

[31]P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, New York: Exposition Press, c. 1975, p. 41; see also p. 15.

The inner box represents the process of knowing as involving three levels. One may note that the arrow is interior to the subject: the dynamism of wonder moves to issaying without any confrontational tendency. The diagram suggestively brings out the Thomist-Lonergan thesis that truth, existence, reality is reached in true judgement.

By operating within a clarification of these contexts one may arrive at the critical positon that is stated on Insight, page 388. Before expressing that position in so far as it is necessary for our thesis, we may add a diagram of our own which conveniently brings together basic aspects of the above discussion:

Euclid Modern

(Insight, 274)

Image   Theory   "is"

empiricism   idealism   critical realism

(Insight, xxviii)

The spectrum of incoherent realisms: Thomist, process philos., etc.

As Lonergan notes in Method in Theology[32] his view on realism is presented compendiously in "Cognitional Structure", Collection, pages 230-42, and an even more compendious presentation here would be pointless. What we wish to bring

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[32] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 7, note 2.

out are aspects of the objectivity, gleaned from our focus
on contexts, that will clear away problems that are peren-
nial in the discussion of image, symbol, abstraction, repre-
sentation and expression. That will be the task of the
following two sections.

Section 3: Artistic Expression

In the present section we wish to give such founda-
tional indications of the nature of artistic expression as
are relevant to the thesis. This, then, is not a summary of
foundational aesthetics within critical realism but a high-
lighting of aspects that bear on the present work.

We draw on Lonergan's brief foundational reflections
on art as "the objectification of a purely experiential
pattern".[33] Lonergan discusses the meaning of each word of
this definition with precision: we wish to enlarge on some
aspects of his discussion.

First let us consider the meaning of experiential.
At first sight Lonergan would seem to restrict this to what
he would call experience in the strict sense, that is, the
field of sensibility. However, at a later stage he notes

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[33]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 61.   Lonergan's other considera-
tions of art are in Insight, pp. 184-5, and in an unpub-
lished lecture cited by McShane (Wealth of Self and Wealth
of Nations), in chapter nine which is devoted to foundational
aesthetics.

that the artist "has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom" and he speaks of "the transformed subject in his transformed world".[34] It would seem, then, that the field of sensibility, while distinguishable as a proper zone of art, and indeed as related to a proper transcendental, beauty,[35] is the field within the incarnately meaning[36] subject under "the very dynamism of intentional consciousness".[37] Later we will examine in detail the concretely supernatural openness of this dynamism, but it is enlightening here to recall Voegelin's discussion of the primordial "experience of existential tension: it is a process (either more or less clear and well developed) ordered through its orientation towards a supreme pole of perfection".[38] Moreover, as Voegelin puts it:

> "The range of human experience is always present in the fulness of its dimensions", its clarity and explicitness, by which it is constituted as <u>conscious experience</u>, may vary considerably depending on the extent to which the

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[34]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 63.

[35]Ibid, p. 13.

[36]Ibid, p. 73.

[37]Ibid.

[38]E. Webb, <u>Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History</u>, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, p. 90.

> implicit fulness of experience always present on
> the level of immediacy is allowed to unfold its
> dimensions in the symbolizations that mediate
> their presence on the level of consciousness".[39]

The importance of Voegelin's remarks is that they seem to bring to light a problem, or at least a danger, in Lonergan. For Lonergan there is an artistic differentiation of consciousness among others[40] but there is such emphasis on differentiation that there seems to be a tendency towards separation noted above in our comment on "sensible experience" as prime candidate for "experiential pattern". Voegelin's view would seem to restore the balance: whatever else about artistic differentiation, what the artist expresses is an immediacy which is incarnate, the immediacy of incarnate spirit.

Lonergan's foundational remarks on art in Insight, which predate his view on differentiations of consciousness, are closer to this view, and to Voegelin's emphasis on "Question" as the fundamental expression of the dynamic of human experience.[41] There Lonergan speaks of art as

[39]E. Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, pp. 90-91; the inner reference is to E. Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. I, p. 60.

[40]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, see index under differentiation.

[41]E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1974, final chapter.

manifesting in its obscurity "its most generic meaning".[42]
As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that
wonder in its elemental sweep".[43]

In summary, then, we would consider the "experience"
referred to in the definition of art as the total experience
of the concrete subject but in a state of liberation. Again,
we draw here on Lonergan: "Art is a twofold liberation",[44]
a liberation <u>from</u> and a liberation <u>to</u>. This liberation is
what is meant by the word "purely" - art, normatively, is not
tainted by practical, scientific, or philosophic issues;
it <u>is</u> free to express the fundamental dynamic of incarnate
experience. Again, this second freedom, freedom to, seems
insufficiently expressed by Lonergan, whereas Voegelin would
emphasize this fundamental dynamic as being centrally metaxic.

The definition notes that what is objectified is
a purely experiential pattern, so we turn our attention to
the meaning of pattern. We accept Lonergan's brief description
of patterns[45] as a starting point but we wish to go

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[42]B. Lonergan, <u>Insight</u>, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 185.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid.

[45]B. Lonergan, <u>Method in Theology</u>, London: Darton
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 61.

beyond it in the light of our discussions of objectivity and subjectivity. First of all we recall the truth of the statement, borrowed from Jaspers,[46] that the aim of expression is to express authentic subjectivity, and on our view objectivity is the achievement of such expression. In that sense objectivity is authentic subjectivity - where this is meant not in a metaphorical sense but in the sense of the Aristotelian-Thomist thesis of knowledge by intentional identity. The artistic deed goes beyond cognitional identity, but what it normatively expresses is the pattern of the subject's intentionality in history - one may think here of the pattern of Beethoven's intentionality throughout his nine symphonies, or the pattern of Turner's intentionality throughout his life of seascapes. And just as there is an isomorphism between knowing and being,[47] so there would seem to be a larger isomorphism between the dynamic pattern of human intentionality and what it intends in that larger sense, which is story or history.

The pattern prior to "objectification", is elemental. It is the conscious performing of a "transformed

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[46] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, pp. 262 and 265.

[47] I would refer the reader here to Lonergan's notion of being as it is defined in relationship to man's dynamic questing to know which is given on page 348 of chapter XII of Insight, and further p. 450 which makes reference to the term isomorphism within the appropriate context.

subject in his transformed world". In the final section we
can locate the structure of this elementality within a
larger heuristic. It suffices for the moment to note that
it is a pattern of electrons and chemicals and organs sub-
lated into the intentionality of spirit.

Finally, there is the expression, the word (the
larger meaning of this will be discussed in chapter five)
of this intentionality. Here we must take care against
the incursions of a naive realism. It is well here to read
here in a new light what Lonergan has said about another
pattern, the intellectual pattern of experience:

> The intellectual pattern of experience is supposed
> and expressed by our account of self-affirmation,
> of being, and of objectivity. But no man is born
> in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no
> one remains in it permanently; and when some
> other pattern is dominant, then the self of our
> self-affirmation seems quite different from one's
> actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal
> as Plato's noetic heaven, and objectivity spon-
> taneously becomes a matter of meeting persons and[48]
> dealing with things that are "really out there".

We have already written (and will return to the topic in
chapter five) of the possibility of the artist mediating
his artistry through a consciousness in the third stage of
meaning. This quotation serves to bring out the difficulty.
There is a spontaneous confrontationality labouring against
this mediation. McShane brings out this difficulty when he

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[48] B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 385.

notes: "I might write here, with Susanne Langer, of the piano as a living presence in a room. I write then, meaning the real piano in the real room and its artistic import. But perhaps you find that spontaneously you think about the large brown object out there in the corner?"[49] The elemental artistry is, in a sense, secure: it is the incarnate subject in a reach towards possibilities. But the objectification is made within the possibilities of an entrapment within naive realism. We have noted that this entrapment is highly lively within the philosophic community. But the artist lives in communication with such current philosophy, and so can regularly both spontaneously disorientate his work and misrepresent his achievement through the myth that artistic meaning is somehow "already out there".[50] Problems relating to this disorientation will be discussed in the next section.

Section 4: Image, Symbol, Abstraction, Representation

Our objective is still foundational clarification in the mode of direct speech. That clarification is certainly helped by drawing on contemporary scholarship on the

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[49] P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, New York: Exposition Press, c. 1975, p. 78.

[50] S. Langer, Feeling and Form, New York: Scribners, 1953.

subject,[51] but it is a large task of dialectic to sift out the insights in these works from the disorientations of erroneous objectivities.

We can make a start here from Lonergan's earlier summary statement about image and symbol:

> It will be well to distinguish between the image as image, the image as symbol, and the image as sign. The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical "known unknown". As sign, the image is linked with some interpretation that offers to indicate the import of the image.[52]

To keep this set of distinctions within our general foundational considerations of objectivity and subjectivity, one has to continually appeal to the principles of metaphysical equivalence as defined by Lonergan,[53] especially that principle which regards the proper location of description:

> When one is endeavouring to explain, one is orientated to the universe of being; one is setting up distinctions within being; one is relating distinct beings to one another; and one is relegating all the merely descriptive

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[51]See Doran's works for example as cited in chapter three, footnote 61.

[52]B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 533.

[53]Ibid, pp. 502-09.

> elements in knowledge to particular instances of
> the case that arises when some being with senses
> and imagination is related through his senses and
> imagination to other beings.[54]

This principle is the key to an adequate meaning of repre-

sentation, and so of expression. The principle relates

directly to the Aristotelian-Thomist thesis that the sense

in act is the sensible in act[55] but its power can be in-

operative, as Lonergan notes,[56] under the pressures of des-

criptive metaphysics. Such is the case, for example, in

E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology

of Pictorial Representation.[57] What is regularly forgotten

is the wisdom expressed by Plotinus when, on his deathbed,

he refused to have his painting done on the grounds that

there was no point in leaving behind an image of an image.

Returning to Lonergan's summary statement, one notes

a neat distinction between image and symbol which is developed

later in Method in Theology.[58] But what is important is not

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[54] B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 505.

[55] See Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, pp. 147-49, 188-89.

[56] B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 505.

[57] E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the
Psychology of Pictorial Representation, New York: Pantheon
Books, 1961.

[58] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 64 and ff.

the distinction but their common location within the subject in their elementality. The image is a relating of a sensitive being, and the symbol is a relating which adds complexities of affects even to the fullest extent of an inner communication in subjectivity between mind and organic and psychic vitality.[59] But it is only a false objectivity that would relate that relating to objects known, loved, or aspired to, either treating that relating idealistically as somehow shadowing or naively as tending towards representation. "Once one enters upon the way of explanation by relating things to one another, one has stepped out of the path that yields valid representative images".[60] So, an explanatory methodology would locate discussions on art as representational or nonrepresentational (abstract, non-programmatic etc., depending on the art-form) as located within some variety of naive realism.

To clarify further the nature of artistry as expressive we must turn to the meaning of the word "abstract". In normal discussion of, say, painting abstract is opposed

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[59] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 66.

[60] B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 250.

to representational or realistic. The meaning of abstract in such contexts would seem to coincide to some extent with what Lonergan designates as a view of abstraction as leading to an "impoverished replica".[61] Abstract painting then "leaves out" realistic elements, or likeness to reality. Lonergan gives an account of abstraction which is the opposite of this, a view which he derives both from Aquinas[62] and from self-attentive reflection on activities of understanding in science and art. It is a view of abstraction as additive, as enriching:

> Its first moment is an enriching anticipation of an intelligibility to be added to sensible presentations; there is something to be known by insight. Its second moment is the erection of heuristic structures and the attainment of insight to reveal in the data what is variously hamed as the significant, the relevant, the important, the essential, the idea, the form.[63]

And in art that attainment is validated not by verification but by the achievement of adequate expression: "the validation of the artistic idea is the artistic deed".[64]

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[61]B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 87-89.

[62]See Lonergan, _Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas_, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., 1967, index under _abstraction_, especially apprehensive abstraction.

[63]B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 88. See also pp. 30-1.

[64]Ibid, p. 185.

Already we have commented on a certain restrictive-
ness of some of Lonergan's texts on art. In the above quota-
tion it is possible to see the same restrictiveness, namely,
that the insight in art could be limited to "sensible
presentations". We have seen also, however, that it is not
incompatible with Lonergan - and indeed it seems necessary
from the evidence of artistic creativity - to view the
sensible presentations in their concreteness, and therefore
as a presence of the subject. Furthermore, in continuity
with our discussion of the history of art as involving a
deepening of subjectivity relating to the third stage of
meaning, one must consider "the second moment" mentioned by
Lonergan as a moment that varies in history so that the
heuristic structures of an artist in the third stage of mean-
ing explicitly include this presence of the subject. What
in Voegelin's terms is compact in the primitive experience,
can be insightfully acknowledged to the limits of the subject's
potentiality, thus to the limit of abstracting the metaxic
reality of the subject in history.

These considerations give a new meaning to the emer-
gence of abstractness in art in the modern period. It is
a normative meaning in that it views the concrete reality of
the subject within a theistic view of history, not the view
of artistic subjects who are at present oriented both philo-
sophically and culturally in a distorted view of their own

however, one can be clear that that "skillfull embodying"
is an instrumental act of meaning, not a constitution of a
"feelingful"[67] art object but the constitution of a config-
uration of levels of reality (including the human in such
art forms as dance, music, etc.) that is potential in a way
that is analogous to a disposed diagram. It can call forth
resonances of self-appreciative subjectivity in the ade-
quate audience. We will return to this point in the final
section, section six, of this chapter.

Section 5: The Artist as Concrete Intention

If one were to wonder why their basic categories
in the last analysis seem to be rooted firmly within
an imaginative context of "imaginable entities mov-
ing through imaginable processes in an imaginable
space-time" one cannot help suspecting that this in
turn is a consequence of the fact that the meaning
of "experience" on this model systematically excludes
that any aspect or features of reality - even if such
experience be strenuously not reduced to sense per-
ception - is not intrinsically conditioned by space
and time.[68]

F. Lawrence's remark, and the article from which it
is drawn help us towards our final specification of general
categories of the experiencing artist. Lawrence is crit-
icizing a wide range of theologians - people like Moltmann,
Whitehead, Gadamer - for the deficiences of their views of
experience and symbolization. The article serves to bring

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[67]S. Langer, _Feeling and Form_, New York: Scribners,
1953.

[68]F. Lawrence, "Method and Theology as Hermeneutical",
M. Lamb (ed.) _Creativity and Method_, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

however, one can be clear that that "skillfull embodying" is an instrumental act of meaning, not a constitution of a "feelingful"[67] art object but the constitution of a config-uration of levels of reality (including the human in such art forms as dance, music, etc.) that is potential in a way that is analogous to a disposed diagram. It can call forth resonances of self-appreciative subjectivity in the adequate audience. We will return to this point in the final section, section six, of this chapter.

Section 5: The Artist as Concrete Intention

> If one were to wonder why their basic categories in the last analysis seem to be rooted firmly within an imaginative context of "imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time" one cannot help suspecting that this in turn is a consequence of the fact that the meaning of "experience" on this model systematically excludes that any aspect or features of reality - even if such experience be strenuously not reduced to sense perception - is not intrinsically conditioned by space and time.[68]

F. Lawrence's remark, and the article from which it is drawn help us towards our final specification of general categories of the experiencing artist. Lawrence is criticizing a wide range of theologians - people like Moltmann, Whitehead, Gadamer - for the deficiences of their views of experience and symbolization. The article serves to bring

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[67]S. Langer, _Feeling and Form_, New York: Scribners, 1953.

[68]F. Lawrence, "Method and Theology as Hermeneutical", M. Lamb (ed.) _Creativity and Method_, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

out the clear discontinuity between the contemporary theological debate and Lonergan's precise specification of the experience of the theologian – and of the artist – as spiritual in a precisely defined sense. That precision springs from the double clarity yielded by the activity of investigating direct understanding and reflective understanding. The work of grasping the meaning of reflective understanding – of "is" – has been discussed earlier in this context. Without that reflection on reflection, as Lawrence asserts in the text that follows, theologians remain in the grips of what Lonergan has called "The umbilical cord that tied (these thinkers) to the maternal imagination of man".[69] As Fr. F. Crowe remarks in a brilliant analogy with gravitation: "As without that force orbiting ships lose their link with mother earth, so without the force of 'is' the theologian loses his one link with reality".[70]

Yet Crowe's metaphor should not be taken as anything more than metaphor. What is discovered by the investigation is that there is no "link with reality", that knowledge is by identity, that the constitutive notion of being within the subject is _potens omnia facere et fieri_.

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[69] B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. xxi.

[70] F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: on the Need for Theological Method", _Continuum_, 7 1969, p. 49.

Lonergan's discussion of the meaning of "spiritual" in *Insight* adds a clarity mediated by reflection on direct insight as it has occurred in modern science. This clarification begins early in the first chapter of the book where the revelation by modern science of what Lonergan calls the "empirical residue" is discussed, and it is enriched by the discussions of the early chapters, especially chapter five, on the meaning of space and time. Only when a metaphysics of proportionate being has been defined in chapter sixteen, does Lonergan introduce the precise notion of the spiritual: "the spiritual neither is constituted nor is conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue".[71] In the text at that stage he summarily appeals to the two levels of investigation to which we have referred: to the level of abstraction from the residue that is magnificiently illustrated especially by modern physics; to the lucid rational factualness reached by grasping the unconditioned. And he concludes that paragraph with a statement that could be taken to bring together much of what has been our aim throughout this chapter, indeed throughout this thesis so far: "But if insight and grasp of the unconditioned are constituted quite differently from the empirical residue, so also are the inquiry and critical reflection that lead to

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[71]B. Lonergan, *Insight*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 517.

them and the conception and judgement that result from
them and express them."[72] Our search throughout has been
for a clarification of expression, and we see here a clari-
fication of subjectivity that reveals that subjectivity in
its transempirical reach, a clarification moreover that adds
a wealth of modern science and precision to Voegelin's
effort to specify the in-between.

But, for completeness, and to prepare the way for a
study of special supernatural categories in chapter five, we
must draw out the full openness of the concrete intention
that is the human subject, and in particular the artist who
reaches towards expressing that intention. This larger open-
ness is discussed by Lonergan mainly in three articles,
"Existenz and Aggiornamento" and "Openness and Religious
Experience" and "The Natural Desire to See God"[73] but it has
in fact been a constant theme of his work. Summarily it is
present in the statement "Implicit in human inquiry there is
a natural desire to know God by his essence".[74] More method-
ologically it is stated in the ninth characteristic of trans-
cendental method: "the objects of theology do not lie

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[72] B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957.

[73] All reprinted in _Collection_, Ed. F.E. Crowe, New
York: Herder and Herder, 1967.

[74] B. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", _Collection_,
1967, p. 249.

outside the transcendental field. For that field is un-
restricted, and so outside it there is nothing at all...
the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows,
nor by what he can know, but by what he can ask about."[75]
From such statements we can now view in better light the dis-
cussion of art presented in Insight,[76] especially the dis-
cussion of the deep-set wonder that is prior to answers; a
wonder which art reveals in its elemental sweep.

Finally we note that while we stress here the noetic
component of the concrete intention we do so precisely be-
cause it is difficult and neglected. The somatic component
has already been considered and the function of symbol as a
necessity of inner communication and harmony, and the final
section here will seek to bring together these partial re-
flections in the full heuristic of general categories.

Section 6: General Categorical Heuristics

We have gradually accumulated elements for a Christian
heuristics of expressionism in art. The heuristics is incom-
plete. Just as Lonergan would claim that a study of personal
relations can be adequate only in the larger concrete con-
text of the search for an achievement of faith,[77] so we

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[75]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London, Darton
Longman & Todd, 1972, pp. 23-24.

[76]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philsophical
Library, 1957, p. 184-5.

[77]Ibid, p. 731.

would claim that an adequate reflection on expressionism within the Christian context must draw on special categories of trinitarian theology. Prior to considering those special categories we must gather the results of previous reflections in as large an indication of our general categories as is feasible within the work of a thesis.

Perhaps the best manner of giving that indication is to relate it to the strategy of Method in Theology. As we noted in chapter two, when we attempted one element in the programme of Dialectic, namely **assembly**, the full strategy is a structure for communal collaboration that would work towards the sublating of Lonergan's work in Insight on dialectic, in particular in our case of the heuristics of levels and sequences of modes of expression. "For the totality of modes of expression the upper blade is the assertion that there is a genetic process in which modes of expression move towards their specialization and differentiation on sharply distinguishable levels".[78] Within the limited scope of the thesis we have only been able to bring out one main sharp distinction which our discussion of "assembly" prepared the ground for: the distinction of art in the third stage of meaning or in the second time of the temporal subject in which that subject has a self-appreciation

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[78]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 578 and ff.

which grounds in him or her what Doran calls second im-
mediacy. And it is that sharply distinguishable type of
aesthetic subjectivity which we wish to consider in a full
theological context of chapter five.

In relation to Lonergan's heuristic suggestions,
then, we locate our present reflections within the meaning of
pages 286-8 of Method in Theology. Moreover, as the above
reference to Lonergan's discussion of Dialectic in Insight
would indicate, we take that meaning as sublating the work
of Insight. So, for instance, the view of expressionism
that we are reaching for is one which falls into the context
of emergent probability as we summarily indicated that context
in chapter three. So it fits into the optimism of the con-
text, an optimism grounded on the concrete possibilities
immanent in large numbers and long intervals of time. And
we will see in the final chapter that the optimism of emer-
gent probability can be sublated in a trinitarian theology
of hope.

CHAPTER V

SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF A CHRISTIAN EXPRESSIONISM

> We do not drift through history with our backs to
> the future and our gaze returning ever and again
> to the origin, but we strive confidently towards
> the promised future.[1]

The quotation with which we begin specifies a problem;
basically how to conceive of the future. What we wish to do
in this final chapter is to take up Moltmann's challenge in
the context of Lonergan's special categories, a context which
involves some invariants both of trinitarian theology and
of human consciousness. This chapter crowns our efforts to
develop an adequate perspective on expressionism in art. It
rests on hypotheses about God developed by Lonergan over a
series of works: in that sense it belongs to speculative
theology. But Lonergan's distinguishing of functional spec-
ialties leads to the questions of speculative foundational
theology and in a recent work two of his disciples give sol-
id grounds for considering large areas of Lonergan's theo-
logical treatise as in fact foundational.[2] McShane indicates

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[1] Jürgen Moltmann, _The Theology of Hope_, London, 1967,
p. 298.

[2] F. Lawrence, "Christian Conversion and Conversa-
tion"; and P. McShane, "Middle Kingdom Middle Man", _Searching
For Cultural Foundations_, Ed. P. McShane, Washington:
Universal Press of America, 1983.

that relative invariants of early systematic work may find
their way into general or special categories.[3] Further,
Lawrence's pointing towards a new foundational language
gives a context for our own efforts to give the word "ex-
pressionism" a meaning that would bring its significance
into the constellation of a normative Christian·founda-
tional language.[4] Here, then, we are asking questions that
are novel, in that functional specialization is a new dis-
tinction in theology, and its fruits can be expected to add
new dimensions of meaning and language.

    We approach this issue in a series of enlarging con-
texts. A first context relates to our initial quotation:
there is a context from modern theological discussion which
asks about the future and about discontinuities with the
past, be they radical or mild. This context is very briefly
indicated in the first section. The second section focuses
on a contribution to theology of Lonergan's Method in Theology.
The third. section focuses on the ontology of the trinity in
history, an ontology that seems to be independent of any
analogies of understanding the trinity. The fourth section
deals with the psychological analogy for the trinity as it is

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[3]F. Lawrence, "Christian Conversion and Conversation";
and P. McShane, "Middle Kingdom Middle Man", Searching For
Cultural Foundations, Ed. P. McShane, Washington: University
Press of America, 1983, footnote 65 of chapter one.

[4]Ibid, pp. 88 ff.

rooted in the New Testament, common to human experience, and an issue of human interest that has been specified in one particular area in the discussion of assembly in chapter two.

The fifth section discusses an enlarged ontology, which sublates the existential ontology of the third section into the field of psychological analogy, to speak of divine meaning in a precise sense as participated by finitude. The final, sixth, section brings these elements together in a synthetic view of the stages of meaning in history, and vindicates our view, expressed in the section on assembly: that there is a movement in these last centuries of art that asks about itself and its own achievement, or expression, in such a way as to pose methodological and theological issues that reveal itself to itself, or more generally and precisely that reveal the third stage of meaning.

Section I: Context in Modern Theology

What we wish to consider here, is not the context of theological debate in general, but those elements of modern debate which touch on issues that we hope to resolve and which also will be seen, in the concluding section, to parallel elements in modern aesthetics in their search for synthesis. The elements, then, in modern theology that we wish to note are tendencies within theologies of hope and of the future in general, as well as theologies that seek to relate trinitarian theology to historical process. It is not a

matter here of critical study but of simple location. We
wish eventually to show that Lonergan's special categories
and his trinitarian theology give a fundamental foundation-
al thematic of aesthetic expression. But Lonergan's work
seems to have emerged in isolation from current theology.
We wish to locate it as response to contemporary aspira-
tions.

Harvey Cox's essay "Tradition and the Future"[5] notes
the emergent stress within theology on the question of the
meaning of the future. A major figure in this emergence is
Ernst Bloch, and Cox quotes Bloch as claiming to have dis-
covered a new continent the adequate charting of which still
remains a task.[6] There is stress in this emergent tradition
on newness and discontinuity, as there is also in the related
theologies: radical theology and the theology of hope, and
later we will focus on a philosophic and trinitarian ground
of this newness. In contrast with theology of hope, however,
radical theology's newness does not seem to be a newness
open to the divine. Fr. Robert Doran stresses this closed
newness in his essay "Christ and the Psyche"[7] where he notes

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[5]H. Cox, "Tradition and the Future", Christianity and
Crisis, 27 (1967-68), pp. 218-220, 227-31.

[6]H. Cox, "Ernst Bloch and 'The Pull of the Future'",
New Theology (5), 1968, pp. 194-5.

[7]R. Doran, "Christ and the Psyche", Trinification of
the World, Toronto: Regis College, 1978.

a parallel between Altizer and Jung: ". . .The drama of redemption is reversed: man redeems God from unconsciousness more radically than God redeems man from sin". Jung's own personal belief is revealed in posthumously published lecture-notes compiled by disciples entitled, "Is Analytic Psychology a Religion? Notes on a talk given by C.G. Jung".[8] In these notes dating from 1937 Jung reveals affinities with the later radical theology of Thomas J.J. Altizer, who, it is significant, "wrote his doctoral dissertation on Jung".[9] Doran quotes at length from Jung, giving the mood of a newness in which God is dead, man alone alive, and the descent of spirit into matter complete. Earlier Doran notes Jung's view of the Trinity as archetypically incomplete, a view with which Professor David Burrell agrees[10] and Doran notes the source of this view of incompleteness in a taking of analogies for the Trinity from nature. A central concern in the following sections will be to focus on an analogy that grounds a view of the Trinity as an abundant completeness expressed in history, in consciousness within history, and in the expression - particularly aesthetic expression - of human consciousness within history.

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[8]Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought, 1972, pp. 144-48.

[9]R. Doran, "Christ and the Psyche", Trinification of the World, Toronto: Regis College, 1978, pp. 131-32.

[10]D. Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974, p. 231.

Within the traditions associated with Bloch and Moltmann there is an openness which we will sublate within that larger view, for the larger view will contain precisions within a trinitarian theology of a theology of hope. Furthermore, this larger context, both trinitarian and metaphysical, seems to be demanded by Moltmann:

> When Moltmann shifts from his earlier stance in the
> Theologie der Hoffnung of regarding salvation
> history almost exclusively in terms of a dialectic
> of past promise and future fulfillment to his ex-
> plicitly Trinitarian theology of the Cross, not
> only does he acknowledge the need for a movement
> from the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity
> . . . but he can boldly assert that it makes "no
> sense to enlist the 'end of metaphysics' proclaimed
> by Nietzsche".[11]

The previous chapter indicated a grounding of metaphysics and its expression in general categories. In the next section we will indicate a grounded metaphysics of trinitarian theology that can be enlarged into a theology of aesthetic expression and hope.

Section 2: Context from Method in Theology

> The third set of special categories moves us from
> our loving to the loving source of our love. The
> Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit
> intending of God in all our intending by speaking
> of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who
> redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and
> with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future

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[11]F. Lawrence, "Method and Theology as Hermeneutical", Ed. M. Lamb, Creativity and Method, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981, p. 90. Lawrence is quoting Moltmann, Der gekreuzigte Gott, Munich: Kaiser, 1972, pp. 203, 214.

destiny when we shall know, not in a glass darkly, but face to face.[12]

The essential context for our discussion includes all that we have elaborated of general categories in the two preceeding chapters. Those general categories are summarily expressed in Lonergan's treatment of Foundations.[13] We wish here to add the context of special categories, particularly that third set indicated in the quotation above. However, there is an immediate difficulty in attempting this task. While the general categories are elaborately available in Lonergan's previous work Insight, and that work is thoroughly footnoted by him in his discussion of those categories, the treatment of the special categories seems almost superficially descriptive. Yet this would not seem to be compatible with Lonergan's drive towards a foundations that would be a broad invariant metaphysics. It would seem, rather, that Lonergan wished to stay at the level of open indeterminate sketching, "the task of a methodologist",[14] and this indeed is true of the final eighty pages of his book. Moreover, when the sketch given here is located in the context of Lonergan's other works, it proves to relate to what could be called a general

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[12]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 291.

[13]Ibid, pp. 286-8.

[14]Ibid, p. 291.

invariant metaphysics of the supernatural.

A first clue to this comes from the parallel that Lonergan draws between the medieval doctrine on grace and a required doctrine grounded in intentionality analysis. The medieval theoretic was an elaborate correlating of habits, acts and divine operations which Lonergan studied in a previous work, Grace and Freedom[15] and synthesized in an unpublished systematic account, De Ente Supernatural₁.[16] So, one must expect a parallel complexity in a foundational treatment grounded by intentionality. That suspicion is supported by the summary indication of the first set of categories. Their derivation has to have the same dependence on positive studies of interiority[17] has, as the derivation of general categories in Insight have on the positive studies of the sciences.[18]

Our interest here is to arrive at some specification

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[15] B. Lonergan, Grace, and Freedom: Operative Grace, in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, c. 1971.

[16] B. Lonergan, De Ente Supernatural i, unpublished treatise, Rome, 1962, Lonergan Centre, Toronto: Regis College.

[17] B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 290.

[18] B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 505.

of "witness",[19] a theology of the witness normative in art.
But that theology requires an elaboration of the third set
of categories. Furthermore, it seems plausible to look to
Lonergan's own methodological reflections on the reality of
the Trinity for clues to these special categories.[20] From
reflection on these sources two key elements emerge: an
ontology of the Trinity in history, and a trinitarian speci-
fication, through what Lonergan calls the psychological
analogy, of "our implicit intending of God in all our inten-
ding".

Section 3: Ontology of the Trinity in History

The clue to a correct ontology of the Trinity in
history comes from Insight: "the theologian is under no
necessity of reducing to the metaphysical elements, which
suffice for an account of this world, such supernatural
realities as the Incarnation, the Indwelling of the Holy
Spirit, and the Beatific Vision".[21]

What Lonergan has in mind here are attempts to

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[19]B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 291.

[20]I refer namely to Lonergan's Two Volume Work De
Deo Trino, Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964. I am dependent
here on unpublished translations, but my references will be
to the Latin versions.

[21]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, p. 734.

account for such realities in terms of the union of consti-
tuents of finite being with infinite being such as was made
by the theologian M. de la Taille earlier in this century.[22]
Lonergan's own method of dealing with the problem is to
appeal to a general thesis regarding contingent truths about
God. The thesis is proposed in Insight and is specified in
more detail in Lonergan's Latin works.

> In Insight Lonergan states:
>
> Every contingent predication concerning God also
> is an extrinsic denomination. In other words, God
> is intrinsically the same whether or not he under-
> stands, affirms, wills, causes this or that universe
> to be. If he does not, then God exists and nothing
> else exists. If he does, God exists and the universe
> in question exists; the two existences suffice for
> the truth of the judgements that God understands,
> affirms, wills, effects this universe.[23]

Lonergan goes on to note that the contingent predic-
ation regarding God is eternal: so, for example, God eter-
nally wills Alexander's horse Bucephalus to exist for a short
period. This aspect of the thesis will be relevant when we
come to consider aesthetic reality. But first we must add
refinements relating to contingent truths about the divine
persons.

The refined thesis emerges in two assertions.[24] The

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[22]I am indebted here to a remark by Fr. F.E. Crowe;
I have not been able to track down the reference.

[23]B. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, pp. 661-2.

[24]B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II),
Assertum XVI, Ass. XVII, (pp. 219-226).

first assertion extends the previous thesis to the three
divine persons in their common operations of knowing, will-
ing, creating: the reality of God is the sufficient con-
stitutive reality, but a "convenient created term" is re-
quired for contingent truths. Lonergan adds however that the
attribution to the divine persons is distinct:

> Ulterius, quae tribus pariter personis at
> tribuuntur, non confuse sed distincte iis sunt
> attribuenda. Sicut enim ordine quodam eamdem
> essentiam habent Pater et Filius et Spiritus,
> ita pariter ordine quodam eamdem scientiam,
> eamdem volitionem, eamdem potentiam habent
> Pater, Filius, et Spiritus. Porro, ubi adest
> ordo, deest confusio; si quidem ubicumque
> est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio.[25]

The second assertion refines the basic thesis to
handle truths about the particular divine persons, and
reaches a conclusion which is the key to a theology of hope
in the third stage of meaning.

First, the general thesis is extended without diffi-
culty: if there is a contingent truth about a divine per-
son, there must be a "convenient" - the English does not have
the full strength of _conveniens_ - i.e. suitable or propor-
tionate, extrinsic finite reality for the objectivity of that
truth. So, there is the truth that the Father sends the Son
into history. That mission is constituted by the divine
relation of origin: the extrinsic reality (not yet specified)
is not constitutive of the mission. "Divinae personae missio

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[25] B. Lonergan, _De Deo Trino_, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II)
p. 220.

ita per divinam relationem originis constituitur ut tamen
per modum conditionis consequentis convenientem ad extra
terminum exigat".[26] In the case of the mission in question,
Lonergan discusses this issue more fully in De Constitutione
Christi, (Gregorian Press, 1957, pp. 27 ff, 53 ff.) namely,
the sending of the Son contingently, and considers the ex-
trinsic term to be the traditional esse secundarium or what
he calls the grace of union. But there is as yet no indica-
tion of "convenience". Only in the following question,
Quaestio XXVI, does Lonergan seek out "convenient aspects"
of such supernatural realities as the sending of the Son, the
sending of the Spirit, and he does so in a richly suggestive
manner that has been exploited by Fr. F.E. Crowe[27] and depen-
dent on Crowe, Professor P. McShane.[28]

One might already suspect the line of his thought
from his general consideration of the mission of the Son. The
sending is somehow special to the father - not however in its
efficiency, which is common to the Three, but, as we will

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[26]B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II),
p. 226.

[27]Crowe's main work here is a book published only for
his students, The Most Holy Trinity, Toronto: Regis College,
1968. See especially chapters 6, 7 and 8.

[28]See his Music that is Soundless, Washington:
University Press of America, 1978, especially chapters 5-7.

speculate later, in some type of meaning. If the extrinsic term is to be "convenient", it should be somehow identifiably related to fatherhood.

What Lonergan does is to tackle what he considers to be the identity of absolutely supernatural realities in trinitarian terms. Already in _Insight_ he had specified such realities in terms of a solution to the problem of evil:

> Conceived negatively, they are absolutely super-natural, because there is no possible creature for which they would be natural solutions. Conceived positively, they are absolutely supernatural, because their sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself. Then faith includes objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding. Then hope is for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence. Then charity is the transport, the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that results from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God.[29]

A transformation of this view of the supernatural virtues, to which we return in the final section, is made possible by Lonergan's discussion in the _Quaestio_ we are considering, of convenient relatedness to the Trinity of the Supernatural realities which he specifies as absolute in this context as "quae nunquam informia invenientur, nempe, esse secundarium incarnationis, gratia sanctificans, habitus caritatis, et lumen gloriae".[30] Faith and hope are here omitted, in the

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[29]B. Lonergan, _Insight_, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 725-6.

[30]B. Lonergan, _De Deo Trino_, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II), pp. 234-5.

tradition both of St. Paul and of St. Thomas: they are
virtues of temporality, virtues indeed which will be re-
lated to the stages of meaning in the light of Lonergan's
basic point here. That basic point depends on raising the
question of conveniently relating the four relations within
the Trinity with the four absolutely supernatural entities.
Lonergan's conclusion is brief and clear:

> Quare, sine inconvenientia diceretur esse secun-
> darium incarnationis esse participationem creatam
> paternitatis, et ideo specialem relationem ad
> Filium habere; gratiam sanctificantem esse
> participationem spirationis activae, et ideo
> specialem relationem ad Spiritum sanctum habere;
> habitum caritatis esse participationem spira-
> tionis passivae, et ideo specialem relationem ad
> Patrem et Filium habere; lumen gloriae esse
> participationem filiationis, et ideo filios
> adoptionis perfecte ad Patrem reducere.[31]

Section 4: The Psychological Analogy

Briefly, the psychological analogy for the Trinity
derives from the fact that in the human mind there are pro-
cessions of two types, the procession of inner word of defi-
nition or judgement from understanding, and the procession
of love that is from word and understanding. In the human
mind those processions have two characteristics: a produc-
tive aspect and an intelligible aspect. So, "The inner
word of defining not only is _caused_ _by_ but also is _because_

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[31]B. Lonergan, _De Deo Trino_, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II), p. 235.

<u>of</u> the act of understanding".[32]   It is this second aspect
that grounds the analogy. Our interest here is not in
following through that analogy from intelligible emanations
to relations to persons[33] but in bringing out certain fea-
tures of the analogue that lead to a more meaningful trini-
tarian theology of the finite. That aspect is perhaps best
brought out by Professor McShane's effort to indicate pop-
ularly the ground of the analogy in four basic questions:
"When did you last have a real conversation? When were you
last understanding understood? When did you last speak?
When did you last listen?"[34] What McShane's questions bring
out is the commonness of the analogue in human experience.
The novelty relating to the analogue, however, is exploiting
that experience by taking reflective self-possession of it:
so, for example, not just adverting to the occurrence of
understanding but moving through the prolonged reflection of
self-appropriation that generates an understanding of under-
standing. This indeed is the novelty that we have associated

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[32]B. Lonergan, <u>Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas</u>,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 199.

[33]The analysis is to be found in Lonergan, <u>De Deo
Trino</u>, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II). More succinctly,
McShane, "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God",
<u>Theological Studies</u>, 1962.

[34]P. McShane, <u>Music That is Soundless</u>, Washington:
University Press of America, 1977, p. 1. This topic is
developed by F. Lawrence, op. cit. footnote 2 above.

with the third stage of meaning. But we have also empha-
sized, in chapter two, the manner in which reflection on
self and self-expression emerges, especially within active
aesthetic experience, within a second, problematic stage of
meaning. Lonergan's systematic treatise on the subject
does not deal with this issue but in the conclusion of a
doctrinal treatise on the emergence of trinitarian doctrines
he discusses the commonness of the analogue and the different
manners in which the relevant psychological elements are
manifested.[35] There are four ways in which this occurs:
privately, in immediate experience; publicly, in expression;
technically and psychologically, in introspective descrip-
tions; philosophically and systematically, in comprehensive
explanation. Lonergan goes on to show in some detail that
the new testament authors experienced the emanations, wrote
of them in the common mode, even in the context of dealing
with the preaching and hearing of the word of God, and in
the context of treating of divine missions, in a manner
that leads towards an acknowledgement of like emanations
in God.[36]

There would seem to be a movement originating here
analogous to what Lonergan elsewhere discusses as "The Origin

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[35]B. Bonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Dogmatica, (Vol. I),
pp. 276-298.

[36]Ibid, pp. 279, 298.

of Christian Realism".[37] Attention is drawn, through faith,
in a tentative, problematic, almost spontaneous fashion to
the meaning of common experience. In terms of the discussion
of chapter three, it is a movement within the problematic
second stage of meaning, but now associated with the mysteries
expressed in, and by, the Incarnate Word. But the movement is
not a cultural movement in the second stage, for its meaning
belongs properly to the third stage of meaning or the second
time of the temporal subject. That stage is a stage in which
expression is mediated, by the cultured in society, through
a self-possession: What we are beginning to identify here,
however, is a higher self-possession in meaning mediated by
Faith. Anticipating the direction in which we are going we
may quote a key passage from Lonergan:

> . . .in altiorem manuducimur, in qua nunc iam non
> secundum carnem Christum novimus, sed intus in
> nobis intelligibiliter secundum emanationem veri-
> tatis dicitur verbum nostrum verbi divini et
> secundum emanationem sanctitatis spiratur dilectio
> nostra divinae Dilectionis. Mittuntur enim
> divinae personae secundum ipsas earum processiones
> aeternas, ut nobis obviam fiant atque inhabitent
> secundum similes processiones in nobis per gratiam
> productas.[38]

Lonergan's own work would seem to indicate that the
probability - in the emergent probability sense - of this be-
ing a common culture is at present not high. His initial

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[37]B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, Ed. W. Ryan and
B. Tyrell, Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1974, p. 239.

[38]B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II),
p. 255, 256.

researches were done in a climate of opinion in which "There is as good an analogy to the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped up in deepest obscurity."[39] His work further shows the manner in which Aristotle's elucidation of the analogue in the human mind disappeared in the West, and the way in which Aquinas' view was clouded by the conceptualism of Scotus.

All this takes on larger meaning in terms of the three stages of meaning in history, and helps to make plausible our normative determination of a future expressionism mediated by this very understanding of history and revelation.

We may return, then, to the common experiences grounding the analogue in a more sober fashion, knowing, for example, that McShane's four questions, far from being simple, open up quite novel horizons. However, even the nominal identification of the questions with the divine persons enables us to shift from an ontology of the trinity to a psychology of the trinity. There is a proceeding in the trinity that is analogous to our speaking identifying the first person as speaker and the second persons as spoken; there is a further proceeding analogous to _auditio_, listening, which

[39]B. Lonergan, _Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas_, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 183.

identifies the third person as Listener.[40] More recently,
Lonergan has spoken of the third person as Approval.[41]

Section 5: An Enlarged Ontology of the Trinity

> The Word is Meaning in the universe, transforming
> our human meanings in the manner in which the old,
> scholastics conceived gratia elevans...The Word
> was the one to become incarnate because he is
> Expression, Articulation, the Objectification and
> Formulation of Understanding...[42]

This quotation from Fr. Crowe indicates the direction
we wish to take to reach a rounded Christian view of expres-
sionism.

First we should recall certain aspects of meaning
sketched in the later works of Lonergan.[43] The key points
are made in a section on "The Elements of Meaning" in Method
in Theology:

> Distinguish (1) sources, (2) acts and (3) terms of
> meaning. Sources of meaning are all conscious acts
> and all intended contents. Acts of meaning are

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[40]F. E. Crowe's "Complacency and Concern in the Writings
of St. Thomas", Theological Studies, 1959, adds further
specifications to this.

[41]Question Session, Lonergan Workshop, Boston College,
June, 1982.

[42]F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the
Past: on the Need for Theological Method", Continuum (7)
1969, p. 39

[43]Lonergan's refined work on Meaning occurred during
his Roman period especially in the early sixties: cf.
F.E. Crowe, Introd., Spirit as Inquiry, New York: Herder and
Herder, 1964.

> (1) potential (2) formal (3) full (4) constitutive
> or effective and (5) instrumental. In the potential
> act meaning is elemental. There has not yet been
> reached the distinction between meaning and meant....
> acts of sensing and understanding of themselves have
> only potential meaning.[44]

The analogy for the Trinity that we treated summarily in the previous section enables us to think of the trinity as conscious subjects constituted by two processions within infinite understanding, generically named speaking and listening but nameable also - a tendency in Fr. Crowe's work - as expression and acceptance. Identifying the Word, as Crowe does, as Expression and Meaning, seems directly related to Lonergan's view that understanding of itself has only potential meaning. It is as if there would be no actual meaning in God if per impossibilem there was no trinity in God. It is relevant to note here, as a basis of radical contrast with the potential meaning of human sensibility and understanding, the thesis that Lonergan discusses[45] regarding the intimacy of processions in God. That thesis, pivoting on Aquinas' "eo magis unum", brings out the unity of God and the adequacy of divine understanding. The necessity of human meaning, however, is a necessity of inadequacy. Later we will enlarge on this inadequacy to relate human expression to the "silence

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[44] B. Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, pp. 73-74.

[45] B. Lonergan, _Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas_, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, pp. 198-9.

of understanding"[46] in hope.

Relevant also to our final section is Lonergan's discussion of the question "Utrum Personae Divinae ad intra dicant Ego, Tu".[47] There is in the divinity only one speaker; only the first person speaks. The second person is spoken. Furthermore, what is spoken is the totality of divine understanding: what is spoken is father and son and spirit and creation and all possibilities. This point is important in that it highlights the fact that there is no aspect of efficient dependence within the trinity, and also that the efficiency of the trinity in creation is the one operation of all three. So, when we are considering the finite participations in divine personality we are not considering some particular efficiency of the father or the son or the spirit: we are considering real relations of meaning effected in history by all three persons as one.[48] In this sense one may say that creation is natural, but meaning within involves the supernatural. Fr. Crowe exploits Lonergan's account of the supernatural realities to give a historical account of trinitarian meaning. Generically, it leads to a view of history as a drawing to the Father, absent

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[46]F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: one the Need for Theological Method", _Contiouum_ (7), 1969, p. 42.

[47]B. Lonergan, _De Deo Trino_, Pars Systematica, (Vol. II), p. 196.

[48]Ibid, p. 235.

from history, through the initial presence of the Spirit
(_incognito_ as Fr. Crowe puts it) opening history for a full-
ness of time in which the Word becomes present, revealing and
grounding the hope of adoption. Fr. Crowe does not develop
in detail an ontology of the finite participations of divine
personalities: indeed, he views Lonergan's account as prob-
lematic but richly suggestive. His discussion leads to a
suspicion that there is a complex theology of the divine
presence in history and the Eschaton that remains to be de-
veloped. But the general direction of his thought allows
us to enlarge on our earlier consideration of stages of
meaning: one can see, for instance, a correlation of the
three stages of meaning with the three supernatural virtues
in the order of charity, faith and hope. In particular, one
can view the third stage of meaning as an emergence of
explicit hope. By this is meant, and we recall here the dis-
cussion of "the second time of the temporal subject", a
knowing of the unknown, a knowing of the absence of the
Father through the mediation of self-appropriation in Faith.
This is the key point that we wish to exploit in the final
section.

Section 6: Expressionism in the Full Context

Understanding is in the world in his own way as
"not yet" for us, as the goal of our hope.....
the presence of the Word in the world...gives

support to human efforts towards creating mean-
ing in the universe.[49]

We gather up here the elements developed in the last
three chapters to give a new foundational context for the
assembly of historical tendencies of aesthetic expression
of self-questioning. It seems best at this stage to express
the context positively and normatively.

The Christian artist, cultured in the third stage of
meaning - in second immediacy, then, to use the phrase
borrowed from Doran in chapter three - would have as actual
context the foundational perspective indicated in these sec-
tions and in the previous two chapters. He is not only an
image of the Trinity, but knowingly an image of the Trinity,
knowingly participating in the genesis of divine meaning
that is history. Part of this knowing is a knowing, in
the third stage of meaning sense, of the Word's sending of
us - the Word existentially participating in the speaking of
paternity - "sicut misit me Pater, ego mitto vos".[50]

Outer expression is then mediated by the inner ex-
pression, an inner word of the Word in his eternal and
historical relations. Central to that expression is an

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[49]F. E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the
Past: on the Need for Theological Method", Continuum (7)
1969, p. 39.

[50]John 20, 21; discussed by Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars
Systematica, (Vol. II), pp. 289 ff.

understanding, by inverse insight,[51] of the absence in
history of the Father. But the absence is an absence in
hope. That hope, as supernatural virtue, sublates the
"elemental sweep" that we have already identified as central
to artistic expression. The objectification of a purely
experiential pattern which in general categories is expres-
sive of possibilities is now mediated by special categories
which give the work of art the character of an expression
of hope. The artistic work has the fundamental quality of
being outside the field of practicality and in that sense it
has a quality of non-worldliness. While it is a differentia-
tion of consciousness that is distinct from religious dif-
ferentiation, the distinction does not warrant a separa-
tion.[52] As we saw in treating of the history of Western
art, the distinction in fact was used to ground a seculari-
zation in art, and this secularization was considered as
an aspect of the fragmentation and alienation that belongs
to the second stage of meaning. The third stage of mean-
ing calls for an integration of consciousness on the part of
those who are reflectively cultured. That "call" was iden-
tified as a historically-emergent process in chapter two
where, under the rubric of "assembly", tendencies within

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[51]B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars Dogmatica, (Vol. I),
Chapter 5.

[52]This point was discussed in chapter three.

modern lyric expression were identified, tendencies which were recognized as reachings out of fragmentation towards a deeper and more authentic subjectivity. In the beginning of this chapter we identified briefly some tendencies within modern theology towards giving meaning to the future. Just as those tendencies lacked clarity due to the absence of the general categories in the horizons of the theologians, so the movements within aesthetic culture are unclear. In both cases there is needed the mediation of the general categories to make possible a clarification of direction and to exclude mythic views regarding objectification or the reality of the trinity's presence in history. The special categories as we have conceived them fall within this mediation of that "expression of hope" as the achievement of the Christian artist involves no mythic indetermination of the art work. That work is an instrumental meaning: it is not a naive extroversion of hope. The hope is an orientation of the aesthetic subject, and the artist's audience participates in that orientation through the inner presence of the acceptance that is a participation of the spirit.[53] The reach for significant form that is central to artistic expression becomes, for the Christian artist in the third stage of meaning, a knowing reaching for a

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[53]F.E. Crowe, "Pull of the Future and Link with the Past: on the Need for Theological Method", Continuum (7), 1969, p. 42.

harmonious image, known to be inadequate in a radical fashion, of infinite self-understanding's expression.

In a recent article, Fr. F.E. Crowe suggests "the possibility of a fruitful analogy of the idea of the 'self-justifying'. There is self-justifying knowledge (Insight), self-justifying love (Method), and one may add the 'self-justifying joy' of the artistic experience (Insight, 184-85); this last needs its own investigation which I have not been able to undertake".[54] We would hope that this present effort can be regarded as a contribution to that investigation, not only in the context of general categories which is Fr. Crowe's, but within the perspective of the special categories of Christian Theology.

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[54]F.E. Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations: The Early Years, 1940-59", Searching for Cultural Foundations, Ed. P. McShane, Washington: University Press of America, 1983.

APPENDIX I

Glossary

Abstract

Most commonly, the word is used in opposition to "concrete".
Its meaning in the thesis comes both from Lonergan and from
the meaning of "abstract expressionism". Abstract express-
ionism is a particular type of artistry that recognizes the
dependence of expression on the artists' creative self rather
than on imitation. This view coincides, at least des-
criptively with Lonergan's view of abstraction as enrichment
(Insight, pp. 87-89) rather than impoverishment.

Assembly

The first step in the movement of dialectic. It requires
that the dialectician bring together the fruits of the three
previous specialties to which he or she is to respond in
order to generate enlarged personal foundations. See further
under Dialectic.

Categories

The categories with which the thesis deals, especially in
chapters four and five, are those transcendental anticipations
of history and reality in general that can be reached by
reflection on the invariant dynamisms of mind as they remain
in contact with ongoing empirical history. That contact
is specified as generalized empirical method (see below). The
categories are briefly indicated in Method in Theology,
pp. 285-91.

Dialectic

The task of the dialectician is to draw on the results of the
first three specialties in the systematic manner described on
Method in Theology, p. 250, so as to arrive at an enlarged
foundational perspective. Briefly, that effort involves a
feelingful (Method in Theology. p. 246) screening of the result
of searching into past meaning so as to arrive at normative
indications of the future cultural matrix.

Expressionism

See above, under __abstract__. The thesis moves from the meaning
given there to a normative determination of the fullest possible
self-expression of the Christian artist. Starting, then, from
the insights of a particular tradition of artistry, those
insights are enlarged by means of general and special cate-
gories of Christian theology to point towards the enlightened
expression by the artist of the __imago Dei__ that is constitutive
of his creative self.

Foundations

Lonergan's fifth function specialty. Its aim is the ex-
pression of general and special categories (see above) of
reality. It can be seen (__Method in Theology__, 286-8) to sub-
late both __Insight__ and the context of __Method in Theology__.
It thus locates metaphysics within the large enterprize of
the eight theological specialties. Foundations, then, has
the task of defining theology's tasks methodologically, and
within that task is a task of self-definition.

Generalized Empirical Method

Initially defined in __Insight__ (p. 72) as empirical method
applied to the data of consciousness, it is later more ac-
curately defined:

"Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of
both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does
not treat of objects without taking into account the cor-
responding operations of the subject; it does not treat of
the subject's operations without taking into account the cor-
responding objects", Lonergan, "Religious Experience",
__Trinification of the World__, Eds. T. Dunne and J.-M. Laport,
Toronto, Regis College Press, 1978, pp. 84-96.

Meaning

In Insight, "meaning" is closer to the elementary sense "mean-
ing seems to be a relation of sign to signified" (__Insight__,
p. x: the issue of course is complex, as the indices to
__Insight__ and __Method in Theology__ show, and would require a
separate study). "Meaning" in __Method in Theology__ is a fuller
notion, expressed descriptively in the third chapter. See
below, __Stages of Meaning__.

Philosophy

Lonergan's view of philosophy and its task is succinctly put in the following statement:

"Now the emergenge of the autonomous sciences has repercussions on philosophy. Since the sciences between them undertake the explanation of all sensible data, one may conclude with the positivists that the function of philosophy is to announce that philosophy has nothing to say. Since philosophy has no theoretic function, one may conclude with the linguistic analysts that the function of philosophy is to work out a hermeneutics for the clarification of the local variety of everyday language. But there remains the possibility - and it is our option - that philosophy is neither a theory in the manner of science nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to Presocratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification." (Method in Theology, 94-5; see also Insight 390-401).

Stages of Meaning

Lonergan defines three stages of meaning as ideal constructs that are particularly apt in considering the Western Tradition (Method in Theology, p. 85):

"In the first stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where the theory is controlled by a logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority."

The thesis correlates these stages with a distinction Lonergan makes elsewhere between the first and second times of the human subject (De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, p. 198). These two times correspond to the difference between the spontaneity of the first stage of meaning and the control of meaning possible in the third stage of meaning. The second stage of meaning is then seen as a transition period of fragmentation, including the evolution of the sciences and arts with a problematic generative of the questions for the third stage of meaning.

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