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The Role of Transcendental Arguments in Searle's Inclusive Theory of Meaning

Rocci Luppicini

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Philosophy

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

April 21, 1998
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0-612-39435-2
Abstract

Rocci Luppicini

The Role of Transcendental Arguments in Searle's Inclusive Theory of Meaning

It is the contention of this thesis that the ongoing problems Searle has encountered trying to establish a theory of mental and linguistic meaning come from a failure to properly interpret the relation between his notion of 'Background' and his theory of Intentionality. The present thesis interprets Searle's theory of meaning as naturally following from this relation, the articulation of which relies on the use of transcendental arguments.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a line of defense for Searle's theory of meaning by demonstrating the applicability of transcendental arguments. This will be accomplished by appealing to a transcendental understanding made intelligible by concentrating on Searle's notion of Background. Once this is done, much of the existing criticisms of Searle's project can be more successfully addressed.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is threefold: (1) to provide an overview of Searle's key concepts used in articulating his theory of intentional meaning (i.e. Intentionality, Background, and mental causation), (2) to look at some of the major opposition to Searle's theory and to point out the theory's major shortcomings, (3) to make explicit the transcendental arguments implicit in Searle's project and to apply them to existing criticisms of Searle's theory of meaning. It is not the goal of this thesis to defend the use of transcendental arguments within philosophy of mind, but to demonstrate that the use of transcendental arguments could greatly benefit Searle if such arguments were found to be reliable.
Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: A Brief Overview of Searle's Theory of Meaning 6
1.1. Introduction To Searle's Notions of Intentionality and Conditions of Satisfaction 6
1.2. Introduction to Searle's Theory of Background 23
1.3. Introduction to Certain Fundamental Questions Surrounding Searle's General Thesis 36
1.4. The Relevance of Transcendental Arguments to Searle's Overall Project 37

Chapter 2: On Situating Meaning 40
2.1. Modes of Meaning: Searle's intentions vs. Habermas' communicative meaning 43
2.2. Levels of Meaning: Intentional States, Acts, Consequences, and Deeper Levels 50
2.2.1. Intentional Acts 53
2.2.2. Deeper Levels of Meaning 54
2.2.3. The Locus of Meaning 58

Chapter 3: Problematizing Searle's Theory of Meaning 61
3.1. Problems With Defining Intentionality 61
3.1.1. Content Theories of Intentionality 62
3.1.2. Object Theory of Intentionality 62
3.1.3. Contextual Account of Intentionality: Intentionality as Acquaintance 63
3.1.4. Grappling with Smith's Account of Intentionality 66
3.2  Apel on Searle  
3.3.  Alston on Conditions of Satisfaction  
3.4.  Other Problems with Searle's Notion of Background  

Chapter 4: Uncovering the Transcendental Arguments In Searle's Project  
4.1.  The Presence of Taylor's Transcendental Distinction In Searle's Theory  
4.2.  Addressing the Criticisms  
Conclusion  

68  
77  
79  
88  
89  
93  
95
The Role of Transcendental Arguments in Searle's Inclusive Theory of Meaning

The introduction of this thesis discusses the most crucial elements of John Searle's theory of meaning. The concepts developed by Searle have been revised and elaborated over the course of thirty years making the task of the introduction, of a search and retrieval operation, a challenging task. The information gathered in this section, sometimes self-evident, often not, is an attempt at getting Searle's theory of meaning right. Developed over a period of three decades, initial work was done in the domain of language and speech acts (Searle, 1969, 1979) while later work (Searle, 1983, 1980) was largely in the area of philosophy of mind with much effort made to integrate these two areas of interest (Searle, 1983, 1991). These various sources will all be drawn upon in the present work which seeks to grasp the relationship between these two aspects of Searle's work. Part of what makes Searle's approach to intentionality so difficult to follow is that it is intended to explain both Intentional states\(^1\) and speech acts. Searle complicates the situation by employing different terms when speaking of Intentional states and speech acts while insisting that there is a general connection between the two. An example of such a connection is the relation between propositional content and representational content which Searle believes to be identical but expressed at different levels, the first at the level of speech acts and the second at the level of intentional states. Another example of this is the connection between illocutionary force and psychological mode. Much of Searle's efforts in establishing such a connection between the Intentional states and speech acts involves an assimilation of previous vocabulary used in the theory of speech acts (e.g. illocutionary force, propositional content) with vocabulary taken from the philosophy of mind (i.e. representation, psychological mode). Much of the difficulty in following Searle's train of thought stems from not recognizing that Intentionality applies both at the level of speech

\(^1\) This thesis complies with Searle's conceptualization scheme pertaining to the use of certain terms. The terms, "Intentionality," "Intentional states," and "Background" will be capitalized throughout the thesis in accordance with Searle's own usage of the terms.
and Intentional states, only with different terminology being used. However, not all of the terminology is different and many key concepts used by Searle in his thesis of Intentionality are employed both when speaking of intentional states and speech acts (i.e. direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction).

Therefore, there are certain cautions that must be taken before beginning. First, Searle uses certain terminology already existing in the philosophical literature in novel ways that can create misunderstandings when interpreted in the traditional sense (e.g., Background expectations). Second, Searle's approach to defining key concepts is largely holistic. Often the same concepts are employed by Searle in different ways resulting in different explanations. This can easily give rise to illusory judgements of contradiction, inconsistency, and circularity in Searle's account where there may be none present.

The first section begins with a description of Searle's notions of Intentionality and related 'conditions of satisfaction.' In Searle's framework, these two concepts and their relation mark a position of extreme importance in the articulation of representation and linguistic meaning. The notion of conditions of satisfaction is used by Searle to work in conjunction with the Intentional acts and states in explaining meaning. Searle employs this notion to describe the structure of Intentionality, the structure of which is a unitary nature with multiple Intentional forms converging on a single propositional content. The way in which Searle goes about drawing together these various notions has serious implications for his overall theory of meaning.

Next follows a section on Searle's notion of Background along with a brief explanation of the role it plays within his overall theory of meaning. Searle's use of this concept is traced throughout his work. Finer points of the Background, such as local and deep distinctions further extend the discussion on Background.

The section, 'Introduction to Certain Fundamental Questions Surrounding Searle's General Thesis,' addresses certain fundamental questions that have been raised against Searle's theory, the implications of which are given serious consideration. The implication
of Searle's characterization of Background as non-representational are discussed. Following this, Searle's thesis is characterized as following a type of transcendental argumentation implicit in his general thesis of meaning. In the sections that follow, this characterization of Searle is supplemented, giving further support to the position that Searle's thesis follows a transcendental line of argumentation.

Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces the reader to Searle's theory of meaning in two ways, first by way of critical opposition, and second, by way of a structural outline. The first section, 'Modes of Meaning: Searle's intentions vs. Habermas' communicative meaning,' presents Searle's view on meaning alongside another view which Searle has invested efforts in opposing (see Lepore & Gulick 1991, 20). This section acts as a general introduction to the type of criticisms levied against Searle later in this thesis.

The last two sections of chapter 2 provide a schematic of what Searle wishes to encompass with his theory of meaning. This helps to better define Searle's position before moving on to any critical analysis. The last section, 'The locus of meaning,' is meant to convey to the reader just how broadly questions of meaning extend and also how difficult they are to answer. The last section of this chapter draws largely on the work of Charles Taylor to accomplish this.

Chapter 3 deals with the most crippling of the criticisms that have plagued Searle's work. It begins by looking at the most popular positions on Intentionality taken in modern philosophy along with problems associated with each. This plays an important role in distinguishing Searle's theory of Intentionality from others. Following this, Apel offers serious criticism of Searle's attempt to support a complete theory of language and mind, challenging the workability of Searle's unified theory of mind and language. The main thrust of Apel's argument is directed at Searle's uncoupling of meaning intention from communication intention. Specifically, Apel provides opposes Searle's use of mental intentions to account for linguistic meaning by appealing to the presence of validity conditions and then pointing out problems with Searle's use of 'conditions of satisfaction.'
Alston offers other criticisms of Searle's 'conditions of satisfaction,' associated with Searle's explanation of illocutionary act meaning. Alston believes 'conditions of satisfaction' to be ill-equipped to explain illocutionary acts. He recommends changing the representational orientation of the theory for a more communicative meaning orientation. The section on Audi is concerned less with criticizing and more with extending Searle's efforts in respects to the subject of internal causation. Audi delivers a more thorough treatment of the type of causal account Searle wishes to support. Audi's heightened consideration of questions concerning accounts of causality help fill in something of what Searle's work may be lacking, which, in turn offers a better grasp of the underlying Background that Searle has not been able to fully develop.

Chapter 4 provides an interpretation Searle's theory of meaning in terms of its transcendental structure. It begins by reiterating what makes Searle's theory of meaning open to transcendental claims and better secures this view by drawing on supporting evidence. Chapter 4 operates on the following premises posited earlier in the thesis:

First, Searle supports there being an underlying Background to individual experience which is a necessary condition for experience. This Background is qualified by Searle as being non-representational and mental.

Second, Searle's theory of meaning takes its necessary focal point to be representational experience. This is where Searle concentrates his investigation into the philosophy of mind.

Third, Searle believes there to be a subjective ontology of mind where Intentional states are intrinsic elements of experience with derived Intentional contents. Also present within this subjective ontology of mind are non-Intentional Background capacities distinct from Intentional states and acts but still considered to be mental. It is the separating of Background from the Intentional states that requires of Searle that a transcendental argument be used to establish their relation as Searle seeks to do in positing his theory of meaning. Much of the underlying goal throughout the discussion is to pull together a wide
range of philosophical concepts and address certain criticisms made against Searle by way of a transcendental deduction of his position. It is not the goal of this thesis to defend the use of transcendental arguments within philosophy of mind, but to demonstrate that the use of transcendental arguments could greatly benefit Searle, that is, if such arguments were found to be reliable.
Chapter 1: A Brief Overview of Searle’s Theory of Meaning

1.1. Introduction To Searle’s Notions of Intentionality and Conditions of Satisfaction

Defining intentionality has been a longtime interest of philosophers and varying interpretations have resulted in the process. It is for this reason that the term 'intentionality' must be specifically defined as to avoid any ambiguities that could arise.

Searle (1983) gives a preliminary account of Intentionality as a type of directedness where Intentionality is a property of some mental states and events by which they are directed at (or about) objects and states of affairs in the world. This is essentially the same as the historical formulation of Brentano. However, Searle adds to this conception of Intentionality as directedness by distinguishing levels of Intentionality. This 'being about' quality of Intentionality can be applied both to Intentional states and to Intentional acts. These levels of Intentionality occupy a position of importance for Searle in the mind and in experiencing the world, not only the sensory world but the world of language as well. For Searle, these language acts are as much a part of an individual's world of experience as are physical acts. In one place, Searle states, "there is a double level of Intentionality in the performance of illocutionary acts, a level of the Intentional state expressed in the performance of the act and a level of the intention to perform the act." (Searle 1983, 164)

In Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Searle views philosophy of language as embedded in a larger philosophy of mind. Therefore, questions of meaning and Intentionality also must be pursued in this larger framework. With this presupposition in mind, Searle goes to work laying out the defining features of Intentionality. These features are:

(1) Not all mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety, that are not Intentional.

(2) Intentionality is not the same as consciousness. Many conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation, and many Intentional states are not conscious,
e.g., I have many beliefs that I am not thinking about presently and I may never have thought of. Searle does not treat beliefs in memory as an inventory of beliefs. Rather, beliefs in memory are taken to be the mechanism for present performance.

(3) Searle distinguishes between Intentional states (i.e. desire for a beer) and Intentional acts (i.e. drinking beer). In many cases Intentional states (e.g., the desire to drink a beer) and the Intentional act (e.g., drinking a beer) are both present but not always. Individuals can be in an Intentional state even if there is no corresponding Intentional act (e.g., desiring a beer even though there is no beer to be found). This makes Intentionality a complex relation not reducible solely to a simple 'directedness' of the traditional perspective.

This is a rough sketch of the categories involved in Searle's notion of Intentionality. It does not address the propositional content being expressed in Intentional states and acts, nor what conditions are required for the expression of propositional content. This will require further elucidation. First, is the propositional content the same for both Intentional state (e.g., desire to drink beer) and Intentional acts (e.g., drinking a beer)? Second, how can there be an Intentional state with a propositional content in the case that there is no existing object be be directed at?

There is much confusion concerning the meaning of the term "proposition," what it includes and at what level(s) it operates. In the traditional doctrine of propositions, a proposition is an abstract object to which individuals are related by a psychological attitude, e.g., belief, fear. A single proposition can be the common object of various psychological attitudes for multiple individuals. Propositions also are expressible in language. Propositions, when expressed in sentences, usually contain a psychological verb followed by a that-clause. These sentences, in expressing a psychological attitude, are also considered include expressions of the proposition. The psychological state and its expression in language are referred to as propositional attitudes. Because many different propositional attitudes are possible with respect to the same proposition, it is a popular belief that a proposition can be represented as the shared meaning of multiple propositional
attitudes. This stance is often used in the area of philosophy of language when attempting to explain synonyms in language.

Searle's conception of propositions is to be distinguished from that of the traditional doctrine in many respects, and this separates him from much of the traditional discussion of propositions and arguments surrounding the traditional interpretation. This should not be taken simply as an evasive manoeuvre to avoid questions concerning propositions, since many new questions arise in the process which have to be dealt with. Just as Searle's thesis of Intentionality is designed to address both Intentional states and speech acts, so too is Searle's definition of "proposition" designed to apply to both Intentional states and speech acts. Searle believes that the relation between propositional content and illocutionary force at the level of speech acts exists at the level of Intentional states between representational content and psychological mode. For example, an order to pass a course and a hope to pass a course each have a certain propositional content (that a course will be passed) by various illocutionary forces (order, hope). The same is true of representational content with various psychological modes. In both cases, propositional and representational contents are not to be taken as abstract objects under Searle's program but as contents. This is quite different from the traditional view and must be elaborated on.

For Searle, what it is that makes a statement or a belief about something is the fact that each has a propositional or representational content and an illocutionary or psychological mode. Searle treats statements and beliefs as identical with the proposition construed. He distinguishes this from what he considers to be the muddled view where statements or beliefs are taken to describe relations between agents and propositions. This distinction can be better made with an example. In, "Dorothy believes in the witch," the traditional view would hold that there is a relation being described between Dorothy and the witch such that Dorothy's believing is directed at the witch. The problem Searle sees with this is that when the Intentional state (belief) is ascribed to Dorothy it is not she who is being related to the witch. Rather, it is her belief that is being related to that which is represented by her belief
(there is a witch). If it turns out that there is no such thing as witches the Intentional content in Searle’s case is still true (Dorothy believes in the witch), whereas, in the traditional view the relation fails.

In terms of representation, the Intentionality of language is derived from Intentionality of the Intentional states and not the reverse. Searle’s landmark Speech Act Theory describes the relationship between Intentional states and speech acts in terms of 'direction of fit' or the extent that some speech act successfully represents the Intentional state of an individual. Searle (1991) emphasizes that it is important to see that for every speech act that has a direction of fit the speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological state is satisfied, and the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical. What this means is that the Intentionality of speech acts is always derivative of the Intentional states with the success of speech acts being dependent on the success of this relation to Intentional states.

It is important here to qualify Searle’s use of "identical" to avoid any misinterpretation that could arise. In saying that the conditions of satisfaction for the speech act are identical with the conditions of satisfaction of the Intentional state, Searle appears to contradict his view that Intentional states are primary while speech acts are derivative. Following this line leads to a misunderstanding of Searle. The identicality of conditions of satisfaction within Intentional states and speech acts does not mean that the Intentional states and speech acts themselves are identical, only that their conditions of satisfaction are. This is an important distinction and can be made clearer through an analogy. Certain qualities which were present in the first Tiffany lamp that are present in modern day reproductions. The stained glass is placed in such an arrangement as to create the effect of nature’s growth and beauty within pieces of man-made decorative furniture. These designs set the tone for Art-Nouveau glasswork and many reproductions. The

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2 Searle’s view of language being derivative of Intentional states does not appear as an argument. Instead, the derivitiveness of language is a presuppositional assertion of Searle’s within his theory of meaning.
reproductions may employ the same procedures of fabrication and copy the same designs used by Lewis Tiffany, but the reproductions are not the originals. Despite seeming identical in their manufacturing procedures they are not the same lamps, otherwise it would make no difference to someone choosing a lamp at IKEA as opposed to choosing one from the Tiffany collection. There is an obvious difference between originals and that which is copied or derivative, one that goes beyond temporal relations. The point to make is that the identically of certain key features common to both the original and reproduction lamps does not make the lamps themselves identical. The analogy presented here is intended to point out that, for Searle, there is a difference to be drawn between the features of a thing and the thing itself. Searle applies this sort of reasoning in describing the relationship between the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states and the Intentional states themselves. For Searle, the fact that the conditions of satisfaction are within Intentional states and speech acts does not mean that the Intentional states and speech acts themselves are identical, only that their conditions of satisfaction are.

The present discussion of Searle's approach to Intentionality begins with the concept of 'direction of fit,' which comes from previous work done in speech act theory (Searle, 1979). In attempting to lay out a taxonomy of illocutionary acts Searle divides speech acts into assertive, directive and commissive classes. The assertive class includes speech acts such as statements, assertions, and convictions; the directive class includes speech acts such as orders and commands; and the commissive class includes speech acts such as promises and vows. Searle decides the class distinctions according to what it is that each type of speech act is purported to do. Searle makes these distinctions by looking at the propositional content in relation to the world. By the use of the term "world," Searle, in employing the notion of direction of fit, is not referring to the world as it really is but how the subject finds it to be according to his or her own intentional states. It is necessary

3 See Searle (1985) for a similar type argument used to argue against the possibility of there being computers that think for themselves. His analogy of 'The Chinese Room' was aimed at dispelling claims made by research on Artificial Intelligence.
to make clear that Searle is not claiming a relation between the propositional content of
speech acts and the world as it really is. Searle believes a brain in a vat could just as easily
make true assertions and give orders regardless of whether the real world conditions to
which the speech acts apply are actually the case or whether some mad scientist stimulated
the brain in the appropriate places in order to give the impression of something without that
something being the case in the real world. 4

For Searle, the propositional content of assertives is supposed to match the world in
some way, whereas, directives and commissives are not supposed to match the world5.
Rather, they are supposed to bring about changes in the world in order that the world can
match the propositional content of the speech act. Whenever a match is achieved between
the world and the commissive or directive, the speech acts are said to be fulfilled, whereas,
when no match is achieved the speech act is unfulfilled. Whenever a match is achieved
between the assertive speech act and the world, the assertive is said to be true, whereas a
failure to match results in a false assertive. For example, if a speaker says, "It is sunny,"
when, according to his belief in the world, it is sunny, then the statement is true. In
Searle's jargon, this represents a successful word-to-world direction of fit. If, on the other
hand, the speaker looks outside and sees that it is snowing and believes what he sees, then
the same statement would be false. This would be an unsuccessful word-to-world
direction of fit. If an order is given like, "Drop and give me twenty," and the speaker
believes the order is obeyed (e.g., he watches the person give him twenty, someone tells
him that it was done, etc.), then the order is said to succeed and when, according to the

4 Searle(1983, 154) says, "Even if I am a brain in a vat -- that is, even if all of my perceptions and actions
in the world are hallucinations, and the conditions of satisfaction of all my externally referring Intentional
states are, in fact, unsatisfied -- nonetheless, I do have the Intentional content that I have, and thus I
necessarily have exactly the same Background that I would have if I were not a brain in a vat and had that
particular Intentional content."

5 The terms, "word-to-world" and "world-to-word" could be easily interpreted as contradictory concepts
when comparing their usage in Searle (1969) with that of Searle (1983). There is a certain negligence in
Searle's work to explain concepts more than needed for the immediate task. In Searle (1969), it was not
necessary to distinguish what was entailed by the term "world" within a linguistic framework whereas, this
distinction does become important in Searle (1983). The apparent contradiction in terms represents a failure
of Searle to give the necessary revisionary explanations to previous work (Searle, 1969) which has been
built upon by supplementary work (Searle, 1983).
speaker, the order is not obeyed, then the order fails. In the first case of the order, the world-to-word direction of fit is successful and in the latter it is not.

The term direction of fit that is supposed to capture the relation between the speech acts and the world is believed by Searle to be applicable to the relation between the Intentional states and the world as well. With this Searle extends the taxonomy of illocutionary acts to the Intentional states as well. Searle believes that all Intentional states are not the same and they distinguish themselves from one another in terms of what it is they do, in much the way that speech acts distinguish themselves from each other. What Searle wants to demonstrate first is simply that all Intentional states are not alike. For example, a belief is typically a belief of or about something, whereas, a desire is not usually of or about anything, but rather is for something. A belief in the existence of asparagus is not the same as the desire for asparagus.

Searle believes there to be a relation between the Intentional states and speech acts in terms of what it is they both do. That is, much of what is going on within the Intentional states is identical to what is going on within speech acts. In addition, Searle believes there is an internal relation between Intentional states and speech acts with the Intentional states marking the sincerity condition of speech acts. What this sincerity condition entails is that when expressing some utterance like, "I love you," there is also the expression of the belief that I love you. If someone orders their dog to sit by saying, "Sit," there is also expressed the wish that the dog sit. This connection is described by Searle as internal and presupposed in the uttering of speech acts.

Searle (1983) uses Moore's paradox to make the presuppositional point about sincerity conditions. It would be logically odd to say, "I love you but I do not believe I love you," to say, "Sit but I do not wish for you to sit." The reason for the logical oddity is explained by the fact that the performance of speech acts at the same time expresses a corresponding Intentional state. By Searle's reasoning, saying "I love you," without asserting the corresponding intentional state is logically odd. In the case of insincerity, the
speech acts are explained by Searle as still occurring and expressing the corresponding Intentional state, only the speaker does not hold the Intentional state expressed.

The notion of direction of fit plays an important part in Searle's theory of Intentionality. First, as a classification scheme, the direction of fit attempts to differentiate between the various speech acts and between the various intentional states that are possible. Secondly, the notion of direction of fit can be used to describe a relation between the Intentional states and the speech acts. This is important since one of Searle's main goals in his theory of Intentionality is to demonstrate the relationship between mental and linguistic meaning. Thirdly, the direction of fit can be used to identify failures, failures of the direction of fit to be satisfied and failed relations between the intentional states and the speech acts (see examples above). This could prove useful for future intentional states.

The concept of conditions of satisfaction is a not an easy concept to grasp and will have to be approached from multiple angles with numerous examples to be made more clear. It simply is not the case that all philosophical concepts to be of value have to be definable from a single objective perspective and Searle's conditions of satisfaction are no exception.

To begin, the conditions of satisfaction are used by Searle to support Intentionality as applicable to both linguistic and mental phenomena. Like the notion of direction of fit, the notion of conditions of satisfaction is applied by Searle both to speech acts as well as Intentional states. Once more, the conditions of satisfaction are said to be applicable wherever there is a direction of fit. Searle believes that wherever speech acts or intentional states are expressed there are conditions of satisfaction to be met. Another way to put this is that in order to express oneself either linguistically or within an Intentional state, certain conditions of satisfaction are present corresponding to each expression. Some of these have already been covered in explaining the concept of direction of fit in drawing the connection between speech acts and intentional states. For example, statements and beliefs are said to have their conditions satisfied when they are true. According to Searle,
this occurs whenever the statement or the belief is believed. Orders and desires have their conditions satisfied whenever they are fulfilled. According to Searle, this occurs whenever orders and desires have been fulfilled from the point of view of the ordering or desiring subject. There are three points that can be discerned from this example that connects the notions of direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, intentional states, and speech acts.

These are:

1) Speech acts possessing a direction of fit have different conditions to be satisfied in specific ways (i.e., assertions have truth conditions while directives and commissives have conditions of fulfillment).

2) The possession of direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction that underlie the speech acts are also true of the Intentional states (i.e., beliefs and assertive speech acts have truth conditions while desires and commissive speech acts have conditions of fulfillment). This point is one of connectedness, or, as Searle puts it, of identically between the speech acts and Intentional states.

3) The identicality (connectness) of speech acts and Intentional states is not to be taken to mean that there is no difference separating speech acts from Intentional states. Identicality is not meant in this sense. Rather, it is the conditions of satisfaction that underlie speech acts and Intentional states which are identical for both Intentional states and speech acts. Conditions of satisfaction to be fulfilled originate in the Intentional states and only afterwards appear in the speech acts. This allows the distinction to be drawn between expressing something in an Intentional state and expressing something in a speech act. For some cases of Intentional states, no corresponding speech act will follow. For instance, people do not always say what they are thinking and sometimes people even fail to tell (speech act) the truth about what it is they believe (Intentional state). Searle expresses this by saying that the Intentional state represents the sincerity condition for the speech acts.

Viewing the conditions of satisfaction from the perspective above (that of relating Intentional states to the speech acts) reveals one important role that the conditions of
satisfaction play within Searle's thesis. They enable him to connect Intentional states and speech acts within the discussion of Intentionality, while at the same time, allowing him to drive a wedge between the two in order to preserve the role of origin (sincerity condition) which Searle wants to attribute to the Intentional states. From this perspective the conditions of satisfaction are fundamentally important.

The conditions of satisfaction can be considered from another angle by considering their role in representation. Explaining the conditions of satisfaction from this angle begins by questioning how the conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit of speech acts and Intentional states are related in respect to representation. The answer is simply this: any Intentional states and speech acts that can be attributed a propositional content and a direction of fit represent their conditions of satisfaction. According to Searle (1983), intentional states represent by having a propositional content in some psychological mode. Another way to put this is to say that representations consist of a propositional content and a psychological mode. Searle's conception of representation is different in many ways from that typically seen in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science literatures.

According to a typical representational thesis, knowledge of the mind as a representational system rests on knowledge of representational facts. That is to say, the mind and its mental facts can be described as the sum of all representational occurrences which function to provide information corresponding to their appropriate object(s) of experience.

From this initial qualification, a few general characteristics can be inferred. First, a mental representation refers to and provides information about object(s). Thus, objects (or the belief in objects) are required for representations to be made.

Second, the representational thesis is defined in terms of its information-providing function. This is demonstrated in two ways: first, by providing information about specific objects, and second, by supplying the intent for which this information is embedded.
Not all facts which convey information can be called representational facts. There are many facts about thoughts and experience that, although they may provide information about representational facts, are not representational facts themselves. Only information revealed through the successful execution of a system's intended function can be considered representational for that system.

Within Searle's content theory of Intentionality, a representation can not be a picture or image. Nor can it be a re-presentation of that which has already been presented. In fact, Searle does not believe a representation to be anything but a term for describing a set of logical processes carried out by the propositional content and psychological mode. These processes are responsible for determining the conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit respectively. It is just the case that what the propositional content does is to determine the set of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects and it is just the case that what the psychological mode does is to determine the direction of fit of the propositional content. As difficult as this may be to comprehend, this is Searle's position on the subject of representation. It is remarkably different from all others in the philosophy of mind literature.

There are at least two important things to draw from Searle's conception of representations. First, representations are not treated as ontological categories which convey information about existing facts in the world. Rather, representations are treated as descriptions of a set of logical processes involving propositional content and psychological mode. Second, the same logical processes that apply to the propositional content of Intentional states can be equally applied to speech acts since Searle's notion of representation is intended to cover both Intentional states and speech acts.

In addition, Searle describes the conditions of satisfaction as that quality which Intentional states must have in order to be the representations that they are. Wherever there is said to be a representation with a propositional content, there is already in place the conditions necessary to satisfy the propositional content. For example, in believing that
there is a tooth fairy, the content of the belief is that there is a tooth fairy and the condition of satisfaction is that there is a tooth fairy and not that money was found under one's pillow the day a tooth was removed. In the case of beliefs such as the tooth fairy example, the belief in fulfilling its condition of satisfaction is a true belief under Searle's program. This is not to say that the belief is empirically true (that there is a tooth fairy) but that the question does not come up. The Intentional state, in fulfilling itself, is a true belief, period.

Thus, Searle's conceptions of 'direction of fit' and 'conditions of satisfaction' (COS) occupy a position of importance both with respect to discussing the workings of Intentional states and with respect to his overall theory of meaning. It is crucial for the appreciation of Searle's theory to understand the contribution being made to Searle's overall theory of meaning. This can be accomplished by addressing COS from the following angles: (1) to explain what COS are, and (2) to explain the functional aspect of satisfying conditions within Intentional states and speech acts.

To begin, fulfilling the conditions of satisfaction for both the Intentional states and speech acts describes a certain relation between one's expression in acts and one's expression in the psychological states corresponding to such acts, a relation that Searle spends considerable effort to make explicit. The relation Searle wants to describe begins with the acknowledgement that Intentional states each have a certain propositional content. To the extent that this propositional content of Intentional states occurs in the expressed acts, the conditions of satisfaction can be said to be fulfilled within the Intentional states and their respective speech acts. This mutual fulfillment of the conditions of satisfaction describes a relation that Searle believes important to understand. Simply, COS represents to Searle the continuity (or lack of) between one's expressed acts and their underlying Intentional states.

In addition, Searle's use of COS has a functional aspect. COS does not only describe a relation that exists between the content of one's Intentional state and content of its respective Intentional act (e.g., speech act), but also accounts for other types of
relations. The relations described in this case are not of propositional content but of logical functioning and Searle employs a logical function relation to further the description of conditions of satisfaction. This logical function relation alludes to the fact that it is not a possibility within Searle's thesis that a single Intentional act could have different conditions of satisfaction for every Intentional state expressed. For example, in the case of an Intentional act such as witnessing a beautiful sunset, the conditions of satisfaction necessary for the perception of the sunset will be the same as the conditions of satisfaction necessary for other possible Intentional states pertaining to the Intentional act of witnessing a beautiful sunset (e.g., the memory of the sunset, the desire of the sunset, the belief of the sunset.). The propositional content of a single Intentional act can correspond to many Intentional states with the same COS applying. If it were the case that the content of a single Intentional act had unique conditions of satisfaction pertaining to each Intentional state then the amount of Intentional acts required would be staggering. A different intentional act would be required for each Intentional state experienced by the individual. Although Searle's overall theory of meaning does not depend on this logical function relation of the conditions of satisfaction, it does simplify the task of explaining the relation between the many possible Intentional states and the Intentional acts that take place.

Searle supports what can be called a 'unitary notion of conditions of satisfaction.' Searle considers the conditions of satisfaction to have a unitary structure where the same conditions can be applied to multiple subject states (i.e., desires, beliefs, etc.). Searle's reasoning is that the same Intentional act can apply to multiple Intentional states with the same conditions of satisfaction applying to the multiple Intentional states. For example, whether someone believes there to be a red bike or desires there to be a red bike (or simply desires the red bike), the propositional content treated by Searle is the same in each case (there is a red bike) regardless of the Intentional states being different states. This functionalistic use of propositional content supports a unitary notion of conditions of satisfaction. This can be seen in the following statement made by Searle:
Actually, once you grant that the same propositional content can be common to both a belief and a desire, it follows trivially that they both have the same conditions of satisfaction. I can both believe it to be the case and want it to be the case, e.g., that it is raining. These, therefore, have the same conditions of satisfaction. So, once you grant the possibility of sameness of content between both beliefs and desires, you already have granted a unitary notion of conditions of satisfaction applying to both beliefs and desires. (Lepore & Van Gulick 1991, 88).

What can be discerned from this statement is that Searle believes there to be a unitary structure to conditions of satisfaction which cover a wide range of Intentional states. To illustrate:

| Intentional States | perception | )
|                   | action | )
| prior intentions | memory | )
| desires | )
| beliefs | )

Unitary Structure of Conditions of Satisfaction

It must be made clear that the unitary structure of condition of satisfaction which assumes the sameness of propositional content in no way reduces the conditions of satisfaction to mere propositional contents. A superficial reading may interpret Searle's unitary notion of conditions of satisfaction as reducible to propositional content. From there, greater misinterpretations of Searle could arise. Conditions of satisfaction as mere propositional contents would provide little room for distinguishing the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states from the conditions of satisfaction present in speech acts. This interpretation is parasitic on the double level of Intentionality Searle upholds and not true to what Searle asserts.

The commensurability between the conditions of satisfaction and propositional content has no bearing on the distinction between conditions of satisfaction for Intentional states and the conditions of satisfaction for speech acts. Searle posits the notion of unitary conditions of satisfaction within the discussion of Intentional acts. The sameness of the conditions of satisfaction and the sameness of propositional content was intended to tie together a large array of possible Intentional states to single Intentional acts. Specifying the order of the COS is important because of the double level of Intentionality present within
Searle's theory. The unitary notion of conditions of satisfaction is specific to the Intentional states whose conditions of satisfaction relevant to the Intentional act in question can be fulfilled. Also, the conditions of satisfaction as a unitary notion could never be completely reduced to propositional content because the fact remains that despite the sameness in propositional content between various Intentional states, i.e., belief, desire, memory, the Intentional states are quite different from one another, e.g., the memory of Nazi Germany is not the same as the desire for Nazi Germany even though the propositional contents may be the same.

To summarize, Searle's combined account of Intentionality and COS is developed by way of supporting a double level of Intentionality which determines what satisfies conditions both in representations and in speech acts. Also, these conditions of satisfaction have a unitary structure with the same propositional content applying to multiple Intentional states. What can be added to this which is implicitly assumed in much of Searle's work corresponds to the status of COS in respect to questions of actual object reference. For Searle, COS do not describe the objects themselves but only the propositional content or contents of experience which may or may not correspond to the actual objects in the world. This point is fundamental to the appreciation of Searle's theory of meaning.

According to Searle, all Intentional states have propositional content which have their respective conditions of satisfaction to fulfill. These conditions of satisfaction are represented in different places as being both satisfied by the propositional content and determined by the propositional content. Searle (1983, 12) states, "Conditions of satisfaction are those conditions which, as determined by the Intentional content, must obtain if the state is to be satisfied. For this reason, the specification of the content is already a specification of the conditions of satisfaction."

Searle does say that the propositional content determines the conditions of satisfaction. It is questionable whether much of what has been attributed to the role of the conditions of satisfaction could not just as easily be explained by propositional content. If
this is the case then Searle's theory has a serious problem. It could turn out that the conditions of satisfaction and the propositional content are the same thing. Despite the fact that the conditions of satisfaction have been fully explained along with relevant other concepts (i.e., propositional content, psychological mode, direction of fit, and representation), the question can still be asked: what crucial work do they accomplish that the propositional content can not do on its own?

Overcoming this obstacle requires that the conditions of satisfaction be treated as something more than raw propositional content. Only then is it possible for the conditions of satisfaction be both determined by and satisfied by the same propositional content. First, Intentional states are such that they require there to be a propositional content. The propositional content then determines what the set of conditions of satisfaction must be. Searle states (1983, 13), "On my account, the Intentional content which determines the conditions of satisfaction is internal to the Intentional state: there is no way the agent can have a belief or a desire without it having its conditions of satisfaction."

Second, Intentional contents like beliefs and desires could not be were it not for their fulfilling conditions of satisfaction present within the Intentional state which the Intentional content too is within. Searle believes that the consciousness of the conditions of satisfaction is part of the conscious belief because the Intentional content is internal to the Intentional state. What appears to be happening is that within the Intentional state resides both the conditions of satisfaction and the intentional content. In the act of determining the conditions of satisfaction what the intentional content is doing is selecting which of the pre-existing conditions of satisfaction is to be part of the conscious content. What the conditions of satisfaction are has already been qualified by Searle. Conditions of satisfaction for beliefs are conditions of truth. Conditions of satisfaction for desire and fears are conditions of fulfillment. In each case, what the propositional content is selecting in determining the conditions of satisfaction is that which is necessary to its satisfaction. To illustrate:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of COS</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Propositional Component</td>
<td>truth/fulfillment conditions</td>
<td>determines COS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Logical Component</td>
<td>selection of COS</td>
<td>satisfies propos. content</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table provides a summary of the important feature of the notion of COS. Notice that there are both propositional and logical components pertaining to the COS. The propositional content consists of those truth/fulfillment conditions responsible for determining the COS. The logical component is responsible for satisfying the propositional content by selecting the COS appropriate to the propositional content. It may be that the role of the logical component is more difficult to grasp than the propositional component but that does not imply that the role it plays is not crucial.

There are multiple reasons for believing that COS have a logical function. If it were not the case that there was no pre-existing conditions of satisfaction, that is a set of logical processes involved in selecting appropriate conditions for each intentional content, then imagine the inconsistency that would arise. What would it be like for one's desires to have truth conditions instead of conditions of fulfillment or of beliefs from having conditions of satisfaction? It is unimaginable. It makes no sense to speak of fulfilled beliefs or true desires. Beliefs are true or untrue, desires are fulfilled or unfilled. There just seems to be a specificity involved to which something like a logical function is implied.

Secondly, there just is a consistency in the way that individuals use their intentional contents which would make it difficult to believe that there is not something like conditions of satisfaction at work so that beliefs are beliefs of something and are true or false, and that desires are desires are fulfilled or left unfulfilled. If intentional contents could not be used consistently communication with others would be unimaginable.

Thirdly, what it is that individuals can be conscious of when they are conscious of the conditions of satisfaction is its determined condition with respect to the propositional content. This is to say that individuals are only conscious of the COS pertaining to the
propositional content in question and not COS pertaining to any other propositional content. What one is not conscious of is the underlying conditions of satisfaction that are possible of Intentional states. If it were not for there being such conditions there would be no need for the propositional content to determine anything. There would be only propositional content. It is because there are differences between what it takes to satisfy desires and beliefs that there is a need for multiple possible conditions of satisfaction. Intentional contents such as: wishing for a day off, believing in the tooth fairy, fearing the sky will fall, and desiring an all day sucker could only be what they are because of the conditions of satisfaction allowing them to be so.

1.2. Introduction to Searle's Theory of Background

An individual's abilities, once acquired, do not simply fade away. Neither are actions performed over and over without cessation so as not to be lost. Rather, abilities are acquired and become part of each individual. The ability to walk, spit, drink from a fountain or do algorithms are all abilities. These abilities are stored away for future use in situations where such abilities are needed. That is just to say that an individual's ability to drink from a fountain will not be needed to solve a math problem but will be needed when there is a fountain nearby at a time when the individual is thirsty. How this relevancy is decided upon or how much influence these abilities will exercise over subsequent experiences are both complex questions that may be difficult to resolve. However, that there are such stored abilities in the background of individuals' ongoing lives seems to be pretty much a necessary fact. What is being spoken of here is simply the know-how that each individual gathers for himself or herself in the normal progression of life. It is with this curious subset of stored human experiences as abilities that John Searle is largely concerned within his philosophy of mind project.
Searle posits 'Background' to explain the emergence or coming into being of much of individuals' conscious mental lives by way of some set of capacities or enabling conditions. This can be seen in the following where Searle makes the following statement:

Intentional phenomenon such as meanings, interpretations, beliefs, desires, and experiences only function within a set of background capacities that are not themselves Intentional. Another way to state this thesis is to say that all representation, whether language, thought, or experience only succeeds in representing given a set of nonrepresentational capacities, (Searle 1991, 175).

Searle endows Background with the following characteristics:

1. Intentional states do not function autonomously. They do not determine conditions of satisfaction in isolation.

2. Each intentional state requires for its functioning a Network of other Intentional states. Conditions of satisfaction are determined relative to the Network.

3. Even the Network is not enough. The Network only functions relative to a set of Background capacities.

4. These capacities are not and can not be treated as more intentional states or as part of the content of any particular Intentional state.

5. The same intentional content can determine different conditions of satisfaction (such as truth conditions) relative to different Backgrounds, and relative to some Backgrounds it determines none at all (Searle 1992, 177).

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6 In Searle (1983), Network and Background were separated by construing Background in terms of capacities while the Network was considered to consist of Intentional states. The Network could be compared to a web of existing intentions that functioned as reference points to new intentions that occur. In this "inventory of mind" perspective intentional states were unconscious beliefs in the network distinguished from conscious beliefs of ongoing intentions. The problem arose when trying to separate what was a Background capacity from what was an unconscious intentional state. Without consciousness occupying any special role, the unconscious beliefs were difficult to pin down if possible at all. For that reason, Searle (1992) drops the inventory of the mind perspective of Network in favor of a 'conscious capacity' perspective. He states, "Instead of saying, "To have a belief, one has to have a lot of other beliefs," one should say, "To have a conscious thought, one has to have a capacity to generate a lot of other conscious thoughts. And these conscious thoughts all require further capacities for their application, p. 191." This streamlined Network hypothesis weeds out possible conflicting beliefs and reasserts the role of consciousness, if not in actual belief, at least in capacity. The rest of the excess baggage gets relocated by Searle to the Background as non-representational capacities.
Most of the above points are explicit in most of Searle's work with the exception of
the last proposition which cannot be so easily understood merely by looking at Searle's
explication of his theory of meaning. The fifth proposition can be made more clear by
referring to the previous table (p.20). In the previous table, the COS were not only
described as those conditions determined by the propositional content of one's Intentional
state, but also as that which are selected for propositional contents. The COS appropriate
to propositional contents are not always the same. The specification of COS is as much an
important consideration as is the propositional content. This specification is important
when considering the unitary structure of COS because not all propositional content will
have the same COS. It must be recognized that although there is a unitary structure of the
COS that these conditions can not be anything at all. For one, they are specific to their
intentional content. This intentional content too is restricted in certain ways. For instance,
not all beliefs nor all desires are present in one's Intentional states. Only those intentional
contents are present which are relevant to the individual's experiences. What the
Background represents is that which are the possibilities from which intentional contents
are formed. The Background is limited to the individual's experience and for this reason
the possibilities of COS are limited as well. Despite being determined by the intentional
content, this determination is limited, depending on the Background that precedes it.

Now that Searle's Background theses are laid out, a number of questions arise
concerning their orientation. First, are Background capacities that enable intentional
satisfaction easily discernable? Are they fixed independently of subject Intentionality (i.e.
historical forces, neurological/evolutionary history) or is there some degree of subject
selectivity involved?

Searle does not believe that individuals' Backgrounds are what he calls "fixed." Searle
means two things when he speaks of "fixed" Backgrounds. First, he means by
fixed that which is pre-determined for the individual independent of life experiences, a
background that could only be one way for an individual regardless of his or her life
trajectory. Searle is opposed to this. Second, there could be a fixed background with respect to all others in the population such that all individuals are endowed with the same Background capacities. Searle is also opposed to this sense of fixed for the reason that each individual has his or her own individual experiences which are never completely the same as anyone else's. That is, although there may be much overlap with what other individuals experience together within the same culture or community, each person's Background could never be exactly the same as another's. The reason for this is that each individual will have some experiences that others do not and this unique experience will become embedded in the Background giving rise to something slightly different than that which lies in any other person's Background. This uniqueness in individual's Background Searle refers to as local Background. The aspects of Background that appear fixed are what Searle refers to as deep Background (e.g., capacity to perceive object solidity) meaning that all individuals will have the same experience. However, this is not the complete Background but only one aspect of it. What is in the deep Background could not happen independent of individuals having experience. Therefore, Background could not possibly be fixed independent of experiences altogether. Remember that for Searle each person's experience is influenced by their respective Background. More will be said on this local-deep Background distinction in the discussion that follows but for now the point to make is that the Background is individualistic and could not be a completely fixed capacity independent of experience.\footnote{\textit{Kant} (1771, A13-14) opposes such a fixedness as well. Despite Kant's highly formalized theory, he supports that there could be no a priori category independent of experience, nor any transcendental argument used to discern a priori understanding were it not for the fact that there were also experiences.}

Even the truth conditions of the same literal meanings (postulate 5) will vary relative to the Background precondition. Searle points out, "Because each sentence is interpreted against a background of human capacities (abilities to engage in certain practices, know-hows, ways of doing things, etc.), and those capacities will fix different interpretations even though the literal meaning of the expression remains constant." (Searle 1992, 175)
Searle (postulate 4) excludes Background from the actual Intentional content for the reason that human capacities make possible a multiplicity of literal meanings that can not all be applied to the same Intentional content without confusion.

Searle wants to point to the huge discrepancies that exist between the literal meaning and the meaning conveyed. He supports the view that sentence meaning radically undermines the content of what is said and proposes that this gap be bridged by way of habitual expectations which supplement limited literal meaning. Searle states, "Words are inherently vague and descriptions are always incomplete. But further precision and completeness are added to understanding by the fact that meanings are supplemented with a set of habitual expectations." (Searle, 1992, 178). These 'habitual expectations,' are part of the Background and not part of the Intentional states. They mark a refinement of the Background thesis, a way of filling in some of the gap assumed to exist between literal meaning and the full force of meanings flowing from the Background.

By Searle's reasoning, literal meanings have the capacity to be improved upon (supplemented) by habitual expectations. He supports the view that while literal meaning determines truth conditions, they are always vague and their descriptions are always incomplete. It is by way of human expectations and assumptions that Searle believes individuals absorb a large portion of the total derived meaning. There needs to be a clarification of certain terms used by Searle to avoid any possible misunderstanding. Searle uses certain terms (e.g., habitual expectations, presuppositions, assumption) in a way not typically used. Typically, terms such as these are intentional terms possessing a directedness or an aboutness as well as containing representational content. Expectations are usually expectations of something and assumptions are usually assumptions of or about something.

However, Searle's uses of such terms is to be distinguished from the traditional use. Terms such as habitual expectation, assumption, and presupposition are not Intentional terms. As Searle uses these terms, there is no directedness or aboutness quality
that can be attributed. Nor can there be attributed to these terms any representational content. Searle's use of these terms is non-representational and more basic, closer to those employed by early animal learning research in psychology where conditioned rats were ascribed with expectations towards objects (e.g., cheese) which affected performance on repeated trials on some learning task. Searle (1983) expressed regret in the use of such terms but could find no better vocabulary available with which to express himself.

Assumptions, expectations, and presuppositions are all non-representational. That is not to say that nothing is taking place since even changes in animal performance on a conditioned learning experiment requires that something be different from one trial to the next. Certain neural pathways will be strengthened over others where there is a repetition in action. What non-representational means for Searle is that the content (whatever that turns out to be) can not be represented, representation being that which occurs only in an intentional state.

Despite serious opposition to Background (see Lepore & Gulick, 1991), reducing it to intentional phenomena is obviously problematic. The tendency do so marks a problem for the Background and its proper interpretation. For example, as adults we usually think of walking as being a very simple task. Just put one foot in front of the other and that is all there is to it. But getting it right required an incredible amount of effort in early childhood (e.g., how to distribute the weight on each leg, how far of a stride to take, how wide of a stance to take, where to look, etc.). It is only when we see old films of our own childhood or observe other children that we realize just how much went into being able to walk. The Background just does not seem a part of individuals' lives in many cases because so much progress is made from our early years. It is easy to imagine early capacities being glossed over altogether in favor of their immediate intentional states, especially in cases like walking for adults where much more time has been spent walking than has been spent learning to walk. The social psychology literature is filled with cases of bias in memory and judgement that individuals normally fall prey to (see Fiske and Taylor 1991 for a
complete review). The point to make is that questions pertaining to the Background can be easily passed over without philosophers paying the strictest of attention to them.

Searle extends even further the position of Background in asserting that individuals can be committed to propositional contents independently of having an Intentional state or being aware of such a commitment. For instance, Searle reasons that Background capacities commit him to believe that objects in the world are solid even without ever holding such a belief. It is simply taken for granted. For Searle this demonstrates how Background can play a role completely independent of intentional content or subject consciousness. He states, "The solidity is part of my Background presuppositions; it is not an intentional phenomenon at all unless it becomes a part of some theoretical inquiry, for example." (Searle 1992, 175). With respect to the distinguishing features of Background, an earlier Searle (1983) makes distinctions that are not to be found in later writings. Getting a grasp of the following distinctions is crucial for better understanding of what Searle believes to be a rough sketch of Background.

1) Background contains know-how. For Searle Intentional states presuppose the existence of certain kinds of know-how. Specifically, individuals have a knowledge of how things are (i.e. the solidity of objects) and the knowledge of how to do things (i.e. tying one's shoes).

2) Background can be broken down into local and deep Background. Local Backgrounds consist of those pre-intentional acts, scripted behaviors, and other capacities that most often have to do with particular cultural practices. Deep Background entails capacities that are generally common to all. For example, eating, walking, and accounting for the solidity of objects are part of individual's deep Background.

What reason is there to believe in the first place that there is such a thing as a Background lurking in the minds of individuals? What necessary role does such an entity play that can not be accounted by some other means not requiring the postulation of a separate entity?
Searle (1979) begins with the assumption that there is more involved in discerning the meaningfulness in language than can be accounted for by deriving only literal meaning. What Searle (1979) pursues, which is subsequently taken up in the initial argument for the existence of Background (1983), is an investigation into the relationship between literal meaning and other possible sources of non-literal meaning. The results of this investigation into the multiplicity of meaning in the domain of language led Searle to suggest that questions of meaning do not stop at literal meaning and that the meaning derived from language by human language users requires more than could be accounted for by the semantic content of language.

The method used by Searle is one that seeks to demonstrate the incompleteness of literal meaning in explaining the meaningfulness of everyday language usage. He accomplishes this by looking at the operation of a specific part of language in various usages. In the first case, Searle looks at the interpretable meaning of the same verb with the same literal meaning within multiple sentences. For example:

Dorothy lost her dog.
Jean-Luc lost his hair.
Rita lost some weight.

The verb 'lost' by itself has the same literal meaning in the above three sentences. In each case the the verb indicates the absence of something that was present before. But, despite having the same literal meaning, each verb is interpreted differently giving rise to a different meaning of the verb necessary for the proper understanding of each of the sentences. What this means is that the semantic content, despite being the same, is understood differently in each of the three sentences with different truth conditions implied in each case, according to Searle. This point is demonstrated if one attempts to treat the three cases of the verb 'lost' in the same way. It would be ridiculous to interpret how one's weight is lost in the same way one's dog would be lost. Human beings can not very well leave their weight somewhere as perhaps a snake would shed a layer of skin. Nor could one lose one's dog
as one would lose one's hair. It would be grotesque to imagine a dog growing from one's head and losing its body parts little by little.

One alternative to the necessity of Background that Searle considers is to extend the semantic capacities. It could just be the case that what Searle considers to be the role of the Background can be solved by an extension of semantic content. The problem Searle sees with this is that semantic content could be infinitely extended preventing any one interpretation from being decided on. The sentence, "Bring me a beer," by simply relying on the extendibility of semantic content would create difficulties for interpretation. Is the beer to be brought in a glass or a bowl? Is it to be brought inside a cat? Should it be brought to my house? There are infinite possibilities and no definite interpretation coming to the surface.

The point that can be drawn from this is that individuals' understanding goes beyond literal meaning. This can be discerned by approaching the situation from the opposite direction, where all components in language can be literally understood but where no meaning can be discerned. Searle (1983) demonstrates this in the following examples: Bill opened the mountain. Sally opened the grass.

Despite being grammatically correct sentences, all components literally meaningful, there is simply no way to coherently interpret each of these sentences as a whole. Searle's reasoning is that individuals have not the appropriate Background to properly understand. Individuals do not typically open mountains. Simply put, no definite interpretation can be made without there being in place the appropriate Background from which to make sense of encountered phrases.

Another case where Searle believes there to be some necessary non-linguistic Background is in the understanding of metaphors. There are no algorithmic rules for determining whether some utterance is to be understood literally or metaphorically. In the phrase, "He is the cream of the crop," it is safe to say that the person described is not a
vegetable but there is no algorithm for determining this. Nor is there an algorithm for calculating the values of metaphorical features of phrases since the interpretation of such features does not depend on there being any literal similarity between terms used. For example, the metaphorical meaning of "hot" in "hot-head" and "hot love affair" are quite different and not to be taken as the same. Neither is there a literal similarity between hot things and the character of heads or between hot things and the character of love affairs. In the absence of any underlying rules or principles, Searle believes it necessary for there to be non-representational Background capacities, without which people would not be able to interpret metaphorical meaning.

One way to demonstrate the existence of Background is by showing the actual effects created from its absence. Searle gives the following example where Intentional states fail to achieve their conditions of satisfaction because of a suspension of typical Background capacities. He states:

Suppose that when I attempt to swim I suddenly find that I am unable to. Having always been able to swim since childhood, I suddenly find that I am unable to make a single stroke. In this case one might say that two Intentional states have been frustrated. First, my intention to swim has been frustrated, and second, my belief that I am able to swim has been falsified. But the actual capacity to swim is neither an intention nor a belief. The actual capacity to swim, my ability to carry out certain physical movements, in this case has simply failed me." (Searle 1983, 155)

Background is separate from Intentional states and cannot be eliminated by some sort of reduction to Intentionality. Searle considers the possibility of collapsing or reducing the Background to the Intentional states. This, however, is not a good solution and falls on problems that have been addressed in philosophy of mind (see Dennett 1991 for a review) which Searle is well aware of. The problem, briefly stated, is that in order for there to be an explanation in terms of Intentionality, that is, in terms of representational content, it requires there being someone present to use the representations. This requires there being in place some mysterious homunculus to use the representations. This mysterious homunculus would have to come complete with its own Intentionality and representational contents in order to explain the representations in question. This leads to an infinite regress
problem. Even if the homunculus were to be made progressively stupider (Dennett's view) there are problems that remain such as what sense can be made of what a homunculus with half of an intentional state to use some representation or of a homunculus with an intentional state but only half of a representational content? Can half of a belief that the Earth is round make sense (the belief that the Earth is a semi-circle does not solve anything). Certainly not.

Another way to consider the same question would be to not attempt any breakdown of Intentional contents by way of homunculi and simply ignore the Background and the problems implied by what is required in using representations. The question is whether or not Intentional states could be applied without some sort of Background capacity. Let us consider a case of perception. If one travelled to the farthest corner of the Earth and perceived something that was never seen before, the act of perception could not take place were it not for at least minimal Background capacities such as the capacity to perceive objects three-dimensionally. On the contrary, it would be more likely, given that Intentional states are a specialized form of consciousness, that Background capacities could be applied without the need of intentional states. Undirected acts of consciousness such as a nervous twitch could occur repeatedly showing up in the neural arrangement in the brain and in behavior but without any Intentional state taking place.

Searle describes Background as consisting of various know-hows, know-how concerning how things are and know-how concerning how to do things. How is the Background construed as knowledge to be distinguished from other forms of knowledge-that? Is there any real distinction? Does the Background include propositional knowledge? If it does not then what exactly does it include? Background knowledge must somehow distinguish itself from propositional knowledge not to be found in the Background.

For Searle, the Background does have a mental content but does not include propositional knowledge. It consists of know-how which distinguishes itself from propositional knowledge. Know-how is not merely a form of knowledge-that which is
what typically is used to determine its propositional status. Firstly, propositional knowledge in accordance with both the traditional model as well as Searle’s own is relational (relating agents to propositions under the traditional model and relating Intentional states ascribed to agents to that which is represented by it), whereas, the Background know-how consists of non-representational capacities. Secondly, propositional knowledge within Searle’s view is applicable both to the Intentional states as well as the speech acts and is, therefore, representational. Background know-how is not representational.

That does not mean that know-how does not have its appropriate content. If Background was devoid of content then it would only consist of rules, or relational capacities. It would acquire a mysterious status which is not what Searle is after. For Searle, know-how would have to have a content in order that it be ingrained in the neural pathways in the brain. Similarly, the absence of propositional knowledge from Background does not require that know-how not be considered a conscious process. There are multiple reasons for this. First, for Searle, consciousness and Intentional states are not identical. Intentional states have to be directed, whereas consciousness does not have to be directed such as in cases of elation and nervousness. Second, Searle does not believe there to be unconscious processes except in cases of automated physiological activity (e.g., enzyme secretion, intestinal contractions). Certainly in cases like learning to ski (which Searle counts as Background know-how) consciousness as well as content can be attributed to know-how. What know-how includes is non-representational knowledge of how things are and how they are done. Of this know-how, some will be possessed by everyone (i.e., how to walk, how to chew, how to perceive objects three dimensionally), and some will not (i.e., the ability to pronounce words, etiquette, the necessary body positioning for a three point shot in basketball).

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Searle (1992) opposes the reasoning behind the traditional problem of dualism posited within the philosophical literature and what this dualism entails. Searle believes there to be no reason to hold that because something is physical, it is therefore non-mental. Searle believes the tendency to perceive a distinction of physical and mental result from the problematic vocabulary which persists within philosophical discussion. The apparent contradiction that seems to arise for Searle when speaking of mental content and neuronal states together is not contradictory to his own position.
To sum up briefly, Searle's notion of 'Background' can be attributed the following characteristics:

(1) It is non-representational and not to be treated as part of the intentional states.

(2) Searle believes Background can not be considered fixed in terms of being the same for all people. Nor does he believe that the Background is fixed absolutely independent of an individual's experiences. This is simply to say that there may be aspects of the Background that are the same for everyone (e.g., ability to perceive space), but that much of the Background is not the same for all people (e.g., ability of Eskimos to distinguish different types of snow). Finally, Searle believes that the meaning that emerges from the Background is not the same as the literal meaning. Instead, it is the individual's Background (largely in the form of habitual expectations) that supplements the literal meaning which Searle believes to be incomplete.

Accepting that there is a mental Background independent of propositional knowledge is difficult among sceptics and there could be a temptation to interpret Background know-how as representing a set of rules that explain everything that Searle does but without having to grant Background a mental content independent of propositional knowledge (see Lepore & Van Gulick 1991, 243). This would lead to confusion. Although rules are relied on largely in human experience, Background does not consist of rules but of capacities. For instance, in the course of learning a skill like freestyle wrestling, there are an incredible amount of rules governing movement and body positioning that can be followed. In performing a simple fireman's carry the center of gravity must be lowered as the lead leg is extended to the same side as the opponents arm is secured. At the same time the arm is secured the body is rotated and the lead leg drops to one knee as the free arm is hiked up between the opponents two legs in a forward throwing motion until the opponent is brought safely to his back. The rules for performing such a carry properly are practiced over and over until the skill is obtained and the rule becomes irrelevant. Practice makes perfect and after many repeated experiences of the same type the
wrestler does not think of each step or the rules involved but simply does it. According to Searle (1983), "The rules do not become 'wired in' as unconscious Intentional contents, but the repeated experiences create physical capacities, presumably realized as neural pathways, that make the rules simply irrelevant."

If Background consists of know-hows which are not simply applied rule structures but capacities, then more must be said of what the capacities are. Searle (1983) comes closer to describing the nature of Background by employing the "brain-in-the-vat" analogy. Even if it were the case for a brain in the vat that everything perceived was a hallucination with all conditions of satisfaction of the Intentional states left unsatisfied, both the Intentional content and the Background would be the same as if the brain was not in a vat and Intentional states were satisfied according to Searle. Searle does add that it would, however, not be possible for someone to have the Background they do have without a specific biological, social and physical history. What this discloses is that the Background capacities Searle supports are mental and do not depend on there being any specific relation between individuals and the world. This concludes the sketch of Background in Searle's thesis.

1.3. Introduction to Certain Fundamental Questions Surrounding Searle's General Thesis

Searle admits that his theory only provides a 'bare bones' understanding of his general account, which would be more complex after a more precise treatment. Searle also admits that there are social, institutional, and interpersonal constraints that require much more than the bare bones account he has presented. A glimpse at some of the main problems with Searle's account appear below.

Searle excludes Background from the actual Intentional content. He treats Background as non-representational and needing of separate treatment. He reasons that human capacities make possible a multiplicity of literal meanings that can not all be applied to the same Intentional content without confusion. However, even as a non-representational...
capacity, Background can still be interpreted in multiple ways that could conflict with Searle's account of Intentionality. It may very well turn out that individuals' Backgrounds are predetermined or fixed independently of individuals experiences. The predermination of Background readily lends itself to interpretations favoring linguistic or communicative forces in some determining role when it comes to questions of meaning. This alternative to Searle's account will be further elaborated in the next section and compared with Searle's own view if only to expand further the reach of Searle's theory.

On the other hand, it could also turn out that the relation between Background and Intentional states is not as close as Searle believes. The extent to which Searle can begin justifying his belief in the existence of any non-representational Background is not at all clear. Much of the motivation behind the next chapter is to allow Searle's theory of meaning the chance to test itself against other leading approaches, much of which appears elsewhere (see Lepore & Gulick, 1991). It is primarily around specific authors who have disputed Searle's credibility that the next chapter takes shape.

1.4. The Relevant Transcendental Arguments to Searle's Overall Project

The description of transcendental arguments was historically provided by Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" in The Critique of Pure Reason (1771) Transcendental deductions in this early treatment were taken to begin from some aspect of experience taken to be undoubttable and then move to conclusions concerning the necessary precondition for the possibility of experience given the initial undoubttable experiential fact. Transcendental arguments attempt to get at those essential features of experience without which individuals could not have the experiences typically had.

In this rough sketch of a transcendental argument, Searle links non-representative Background and other representational states in a way not touched on in previous work on the subject. Although Searle does not actively pursue a transcendental argument pertaining to his overall theory of meaning, he does sketch out a transcendental argument in
explaining the relevance of metaphysical realism (the belief that there is a real world) and conceptual relativity (the belief that we can only form a concept of the world within limitations and relative to our concept forming apparatus)\textsuperscript{9}. He states:

I have not in print, presented an argument for either of these (metaphysical realism and conceptual relativity) and it may be that they do not need argument. But at least a sketch of a transcendental argument can be given for the first (metaphysical realism) by saying that metaphysical realism is the condition of possibility of there being public discourse at all. In order that I should address you and say, e.g., "the cat is on the mat" I must presuppose an independently existing world of publicly accessible objects to which expressions like "the cat" and "the mat" are used to refer. A public language presupposes a public world. And when I address you in what I presuppose is a public language, a language which you can understand in the same way that I understand it, I also presuppose that there exists public objects of reference. In normal discourse, none of these "presupposition" takes the form of beliefs or even, strictly speaking, "presuppositions." They are part of what I call the Background; in the normal functioning of the Background such elements form the conditions of intelligible representation but are not themselves representations. (Lepore & Van Gulick 1991, 190).

Transcendental arguments operate by way of indispensability claims. They begin with some aspect of experience and then try to demonstrate how the conclusion is indispensable to the beginning assertion. What it is to be indispensable in this sense is not a mere empirical fact but a conceptual matter. It is not enough to state that because there is perception it is an indispensable fact that there is an eye. Rather, there is always perception of something and this being of something necessitates there being some conceptual quality attached to experiences of perception. That is, experiences (e.g., perception) are always experiences of something, this 'of something' quality is characteristic of what counts as an experience.

Like the historically significant Kantian project, Searle's transcendental argument relies on indispensability claims, the necessity of conceptual capacities, and having a beginning point in experience. It is in experience where all transcendental claims are anchored. Taylor (1995) provides a description of this brand of transcendental argument in

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\textsuperscript{9} It is noted that Searle's claim to metaphysical realism could be viewed as being at odds with the anti-realist Searlean claims appearing earlier in the thesis. This tension between realist and anti-realist claims are recognized.
the following statement, "The significance of the fact that transcendental arguments deploy indispensability claims about experience is that it gives us an unchallengeable starting point... For how can we formulate coherently the doubt that we have experiences?"

What makes Searle's theory of meaning open to transcendental claims can be simply stated. First, Searle believes that there is an underlying non-representational Background to individual experience necessary for and indespensable to experience. Second, Searle's theory of meaning takes as its focal point the realm of representational experience as an undoubtable starting point, placing emphasis on the importance of individual subjective experience via a theory of Intentionality. Within the framework of this theory Intentional states are intrinsic elements with derived intentional contents.

Thirdly, the necessary Background that underlies representational experience is non-representational and not to be considered part of the Intentional states or contents. This Background is mental and not to be confused with non-representational physical elements (i.e., brain states) which do not require transcendental deductions to be discerned. It is this separation of Background from the Intentional states and the need to connect them that requires a transcendental argument be used to get at the Background which Searle assumes to be connected with the Intentional states. The connection between the non-representational Background and the representational Intentional states is the pivotal assumption of Searle used to support his inclusive theory of meaning. The conclusion taking form of a transcendental argument is intended to demonstrate the existence of Background, without which Searle's efforts to give firm support to his unique theory of meaning would be in vain.
Chapter II: On Situating Meaning

What is fundamental to Searle's position is that questions of meaning cannot be exhausted through the analysis of communication. Searle believes that in many cases no communication at all is intended but that does not entail that nothing was meant. Speakers can often say things and mean what they say without necessarily intending to communicate anything to a listener. One merely has to think of some situation where some meaning is intended with the realization that no one will grasp it, such as in cases where sarcasm and inside jokes take place.

According to Searle, the fact that such instances exist demonstrates that there is meaning independent of one's intention to communicate. Searle believes that there is a core to meaningful utterances of which intentions to communicate are merely a part. To equate the essence of meaning solely with the intention to communicate is insufficient to define meaning under Searle's program.

Searle separates himself from typical Gricean accounts which seek to explain meaning solely in terms of intentions to communicate. He accomplishes this by separating 'intention to represent' from 'intention to communicate.' This separation of intention to represent from intention to communicate creates a double level of Intentionality where certain aspects of meaning distinguish themselves. Searle uses the case of lying as an example of how this double level of Intentionality operates. Following this example through is useful in the understanding of what Searle is trying to accomplish.

To begin, the structure of intentional states $S(p)$ and the structure of the speech acts $F(p)$ are taken by Searle to run parallel in most cases, with the conditions of satisfaction being the same$^{10}$. At this point the separation of 'intention to represent' from 'intention to communicate' is not obvious. When saying something and meaning what is said the intention to represent and the intention to communicate are the same. Where the two levels

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$^{10}$ $S(p)$ refers to the propositional content within an Intentional state and $F(p)$ refers to the propositional content within the illocutionary force of a speech act.
of intention become distinguished is where one of the conditions of satisfaction fail to become fulfilled. Searle believes Intentional states are the sincerity conditions which impose themselves on utterances. The most concise statement of Searle's position comes from Searle (1992) where he describes the relation as the imposing of conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states onto intentional acts. According to Searle, failures to satisfy conditions (e.g., failure to believe what one says) results in a lie.

There are both Intentions to represent and Intentions to express in speech acts. These intentions distinguish themselves by way of the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of their respective COS. Sometimes the COS of intention to represent (e.g., to believe that there is a tooth fairy) and the COS of the intention to express the belief in language (e.g., to assert that there is a tooth fairy) are both fulfilled, giving rise to a true belief and a true speech act corresponding to the belief. The fulfillment of both COS results in a true statement being uttered with respect to the belief. Other times, this does not happen. Sometimes the COS of the intention to represent (e.g., to believe that there is a tooth fairy) is fulfilled but the COS of the intention to express the belief in language (e.g., to assert that there is no tooth fairy) fails. The fulfillment of first COS and the failure of the second COS result in a lie being uttered with respect to the belief. What this supports is simply that there are two different levels of Intentionality and that sometimes they are in accordance with one another and other times they are not. Whatever the case may be, it is from looking that the COS that the two levels of Intentionality become evident.

The first occurrence of COS within an Intentional state carries through to the speech act the same COS and with it a sincerity condition. The sincerity condition that arises in speech acts allows one to discern whether or not the COS is fulfilled in the speech act with respect to the COS of the Intentional state. It is possible to successfully express oneself in language without expressing at the same time the representational state. Such is the case when people lie. It is for this reason that the COS of the speech acts are subject to a sincerity condition that determines the success or failure of the COS of the speech act. The
differentiation of Intentionality in the second case also serves to separate COS from propositional content which is a difficult to discern when the COS is fulfilled at both levels of Intentionality. The difference between the propositional content and the COS in the second case becomes apparent when considering propositional content at both levels of Intentionality in the case of telling a lie. In the case of telling a lie, there is a propositional content in the belief that there is a tooth fairy and in the assertion that there is not a tooth fairy while the COS is not fulfilled at both levels of Intentionality. Essentially, when something is said and meant, fulfilled conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states are imposed on the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts which result in true utterance with respect to the belief. However, in the case of lying one does not believe what one is saying, the fulfilled conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states are not fulfilled in the speech act. The result is a false utterance with respect to the belief.

One of the greatest advantages of supporting this double level of Intentionality is that it can be explained how meaningful statements can be made by speakers with intentions to communicate but without having to believe what is said. This is possible because there are conditions of satisfaction that remain present to the speaker's Intentional state despite being unfulfilled in the utterances themselves. This can be discerned in the following statement:

The speaker can succeed in making a statement even though the statement itself fails in achieving its truth conditions, its conditions of satisfaction, because in making the statement the speaker both intends to produce an utterance and intends that the utterance should have the condition of satisfaction. (Searle 1992, 87).

What this means is that statements can have their respective propositional content but that is not the same as having fulfilled their COS. The COS that arise within Intentional states are connected to the propositional content of the speech act by way of a sincerity condition. The sincerity condition is just a description of the congruency between the Intentional states and speech acts that follow from them. In the case of speech acts, it is the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the COS of the speech act with respect to the COS of the Intentional state.
which is of concern. It is not merely the success of making an utterance that the COS of speech acts are concerned. In many cases, successfully expressed speech acts fails to fulfill its COS regardless of having expressed some propositional content intended to be expressed by the speaker. The Intentional imposing of conditions of satisfaction on utterances can, for Searle, take place even though speakers do not believe what is being said. This does not, in Searle's view, prevent speakers from making meaningful statements. The two-fold use of 'conditions of satisfaction' is key in Searle's treatment.

2.1. Modes of Meaning: Searle's intentions vs. Habermas' communicative meaning

Because Intentionality is of such importance in the formation and articulation of speech acts, Searle's use of the term must be evaluated and contrasted with possible alternatives. What effect would another interpretation of Intentionality have and what could be gained (or lost) by accepting alternative interpretations?

Habermas' theory of meaning presupposes the existence of speech acts as well as the illocutionary forces involved in these acts. However, the meaning of the illocutionary forces that make up speech acts is restricted to communicating information to others in a social context. For Habermas it is the communicative intention that is of importance. That is not to say that reason or truth are without importance but that they take place among a community of speech act interlocuters. At this point a very important objection comes to the surface. If it is the case that the propositional content of the Intentional states is determined by the Background (Searle's belief) which results from at least some socialization, then how can Searle's theory of Intentionality be individualistic as Searle claims it to be? What has to be shown is that there are in fact considerable differences within the individualistic approach of Searle's that could not be accounted for by Habermas in even the best of circumstances. In order for this to be answered Habermas' approach should be looked at more closely in one of its applications. This provides not just a theoretical sketch of Habermas' notion of communicative intention but a practical application. Such an example
can be found in Habermas' *Discourse Ethics* (1989) where he reappropriates the Kantian theme of universality and seeks to imbed it within a dialectical framework, which acts as the moral determinate. He accomplishes this by treating human consciousness as that which is structured by language exchange within a normative structure of social interactions. Thus, a moral position is reached by way of public processes of interpretation rather than by individualistic reflection on one's own motives.

By shifting the question of universal morality from an individualistic to a public realm of determination, Habermas also shifts emphasis of universal constitutive meaning to the domain of social interactions, which he defines by their goal-oriented communicative processes and argumentative discourse.

Habermas' modified version of universal morality can be characterized by the following features:

1) Habermas advocates a communicative theory of meaning where validity and truth claims are decided by resolving normative rightness, which can be determined through discursive argumentation.

The basic unit of meaning is the illocutionary force of speech acts that structure social interaction. The mutual acceptance of any claims to normative rightness depend on the arguments and counterarguments that are offered and critically weighed during argumentative discourse in the public realm.

2) Habermas' universal theory operates on a transcendental and pragmatic level. At a transcendental level, Habermas attempts to demonstrate features of argumentative discourse that are unavoidable in understanding human relations and which all individuals are committed to. At a practical level, individuals have no choice but to participate in public discourse for it defines an essential part of all individuals' existence as socialized beings.

Habermas (1990), summarizes the generalized imperative that corresponds to his theory of argumentative discourse. He states, "All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of
everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternatives possibilities for regulation)."

3) The justification of Habermas' universal morality lies in accepting universality as a procedural principal of practical discourse. Habermas' notion of universality ('U') requires that each individual adopts the perspective of all others that are affected by the consequences of argumentative discourse. The types of questions that can be treated in such a manner are those that concern rightness and just regulation of social interactions involving all persons.

For Habermas, moral practices are social matters to be decided by discourse interactions of individually deliberating subjects. Thus, both individual will and community practices are taken into consideration by Habermas' universal theory of argumentative discourse. Habermas supports the causal role of socialization in shaping personal identity as well as the capacity of discourse to represent this. If Habermas opts for a solely internalist sense of Intentionality (i.e Searle's Intentional states) then the focal point would drift too far towards individual concerns, many of which may not be socialized or even socializable. This would undermine the importance Habermas attributes to social affairs and communicative practices.

The Intentionality assumed by Habermas differs significantly from Searle's interpretation. Habermas' omission of factors crucial to human psychology in interpreting Intentionality does not take into consideration uncommunicable Intentionality of Intentional states that makes up a part of every individual's life and on which Searle wants to place emphasis. These human psychological factors include beliefs, desires, and wishes among the Intentional states. Searle considers such factors as meaningful regardless of their expression or lack of expression in individuals' acts of expression. Sometimes it just is difficult to express in words all Intentionality due to situational constraints (i.e. normative conventions of conversation), not to mention language constraints.
Habermas (1992) contrasts what he believes to be Searle's Intentionalistic perspective of communicative meaning with his own intersubjectivist perspective. Under the Intentionalistic view the speaker succeeds when the addressee is able to recognize the intended meaning the speaker has when uttering some expression. As such, successful communication is marked by a transfer of ideas. Conversely, under the intersubjectivist's perspective the success of communication depends on the speaker reaching an 'understanding' with the addressee about something in the world that the speech act is about. The addressee has the choice of agreeing or disagreeing with the speaker, the achievement of 'mutual consensus' marking what Habermas considers to be a successful communication.

From this distinction drawn by Habermas, it seems obvious that meaning represents something completely different in the Intentionalistic conception from what it represents in the intersubjectivist conception. For one thing, the content of meaning under the Intentionalistic view is not tempered by a validation process. It simply is conveyed 'as is' whether the addressee agrees or does not. In contrast, the intersubjectivist view assumes there to be a validation process to which a speaker's expressions are subjected. However, there is a fundamental question and possible problem that arises for Intentionalistic programs because of this difference. How, without acknowledging a public process of validation (intersubjectivist strategy) can Intentionalistic accounts like Searle's account for the intersubjective and, often, the conventional meaning of expressions?

The way in which Searle accounts for the conventional meaning of expressions (Habermas correctly points out) is tied to assumptions of illocutionary meaning that some speaker conveys in uttering a speech act. These assumptions aim at the expression itself rather than just the speaker's intent. The complete understanding of speech acts requires that the speaker and addressee can recognize illocutionary force. The illocutionary force represents the meaning that some speaker conveys in a speech act by virtue of the type of act it is. Each speech act, be it a promise, an assertion, an order, or a request has a certain
Illocutionary force conveyed in virtue of being an act of some type (e.g., a promise). There is a temptation here to interpret conventional meaning and illocutionary force as the same thing, taking the recognition of conditions of satisfaction to be the recognition of conventional meaning. This would be to miss a very important distinction that is entrenched in Searle's work. The necessary conditions are the requirements that decide what kind (if any) of act is taking place but these conditions are not reducible to the speech acts and the discerning of conventional meaning. The conditions of satisfaction of intentional states are imposed on the conditions of satisfaction of utterances, the fulfillment of which results in a true utterance. Simply, to recognize the illocutionary force of a speech act is to recognize not only the conditions of satisfaction conveyed of a speech act but to recognize the conditions of satisfaction of the Intentional state that are presupposed. The conditions of satisfaction for different speech acts are specific to the Intentional states and their own conditions of satisfaction. Intentional states have certain conditions of satisfaction to be fulfilled in speech acts, the recognition of which is the recognition that there is more to speech acts that what can be accounted for by recourse to conventional meaning. There must be much similarity between what is contained within the Intentional states conveyed in a speech act and what is assumed to be conventional meaning of that speech act, otherwise communication would not be possible between people. However, that is a much different point than saying that what is contained within the Intentional states conveyed in a speech act and what is assumed to be conventional meaning of that speech act are the same. This is a fundamental point in Searle's position.

Illocutionary assumptions allow Searle to ground meaning in a propositional structure and then to tie this propositional structure to its users. By way of mentioned conditions of satisfaction that apply to speaker's expressions, the addressee can determine whether some state of affairs has been successfully represented by the speaker. Searle's intentionalistic approach appeals to conventional meaning and to relations in the world by way of illocutionary forces and the presence of conditions of satisfaction for speaker's
utterances. Searle's approach attempts to draw meaning from a broader framework of speaker intentions, states of affairs, and interpersonal relations.

Now that an Intentionalistic explanation of 'conventional meaning' has been offered (a very different one than that offered by an intersubjectivist perspective), another question emerges, that of commensurability. Given the very different ways that Intentionalistic and intersubjectivist perspectives construe communicative meaning, what sort of congruency can exist between them? Using Searle's reasoning to supplement or complement Habermas may be like trying to compare apples and oranges. What justification can be had for trying to do a comparative analysis of the two?

Searle himself does not see such a great opposition between his own Intentionalistic approach and that of Habermas' intersubjectivist theory. Instead, he believes them to be merely acting at different levels of communication. He states, "The "Intentionalistic" view of Intentionality is not in conflict with the "intersubjectivist" view of Speech Acts, rather the former is the condition of possibility of the latter," followed by, "Without speech acts there is no conversation." (Lepore & Gulick 1991, 90) Searle does not do as Habermas does, limiting questions of meaning to those which takes place in a social realm. Neither does he restrict questions of meaning to Intentional states. Instead, he takes note of the various levels of meaning that operate without trying to oppose one to the other.

The level that Searle concentrates his efforts on is at the level of speaker performance. In performing any speech act there are conditions (e.g., input-output, preparatory, sincerity, essential, etc.) to be fulfilled, the fulfillment of which gives rise to a taxonomy of illocutionary forces (e.g., assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives). Searle believes every illocutionary act has a purpose by virtue of being the type of act it is. The satisfaction of conditions are evaluated in terms of how the propositions fit the world and the proposition is represented by the individuals' Intentional states. And each type of act has its own particular assessment criteria. For example, statements can be evaluated in terms of being either true or false. They have what Searle
refers to as a word-to-world direction of fit, whereas, commissives or promises have a world-to-word direction of fit. They commit themselves to doing something or wanting something to be done.

Searle shares with Habermas the recognition that communication must somehow be evaluated on some dimension of validation but the two adopt very different validation processes. The difference lies in the authors' choice of communicative levels. While Habermas is interested in the overall 'mutual acceptability' of what is said to a group of already competent speakers and listeners, Searle concentrates on the more rudimentary questions of speaker competence to perform speech acts successfully. In other words, Habermas is interested in what's going on in the air when everything is up and running while Searle is stationed in the hangar going over the plane and doing repairs, many of which can only be done on the ground. Also, different validity processes may apply to different levels of communicative evaluation, neither of which has to be in conflict with the other. On the contrary, it could be an advantage in many situations to have the benefit of multiple validation processes. That way, there can be a gauging of communicative success at the level of speaker competence and at the later levels of communicative consensus. The exploration of speaker competence takes Searle all the way back to the intentionality of psychological states where satisfaction conditions are pursued at the more basic level of subjective intentions representing states of affairs. Searle states, "the very bare bones of the intention to state are the intention that one's utterance should be meaningful in the quite specific sense that it should be a representation of a state of affairs." (Lepore & Gulick, 1991, 92) Therefore, conditions of satisfaction at the most basic level correspond to psychological states which only later are applied at a semantic level. Searle states, "the notion of conditions of satisfaction helps us to elucidate semantic notions precisely because it is a psychological notion applied to semantics." (Lepore & Gulick, 1991, 92)

There does exist a real difference between Habermas and Searle in how they construe the underlying force driving speech acts. For Habermas, validity claims are
constitutive of all speech acts, meaning that what is deemed meaningful within some speech act will be decided on within a communicative framework where language users come together. The existence of illocutionary force for this author requires an intersubjective recognition of the normative context. This partly explains why Habermas sees communicative meaning bound to 'mutual consensus' of speaker and addressee(s), for without this normative context there could not be the intersubjective sharing that Habermas claims there to be. Searle believes that a consensualist validation of speech acts fails to grasp the meaning of speech acts by placing the validation process ahead of understanding. He says, "It is philosophically back to front to suppose that the validity claims provide a basis for the understanding of the phenomena of speech acts, rather it is the theory of speech acts that has to explain the validity claims." (Lepore & Gulick 1991, 94)

Searle does not deny that there is an existing context shared by individuals. Nor does he deny that this existing context is needed for the shaping of illocutionary acts. But Searle believes that this shared context is the social institution and not the propositional structure of the language used in social institutions as Habermas claims. With this, Searle attempts to draw the emphasis away from the structure of language and normative standards of communicative exchange, instead placing emphasis on the illocutionary point as discernable from the Intentional states by paying strict attention to the conditions of satisfaction.

2.2. Levels of Meaning: Intentional States, Acts, Consequences, and Deeper Levels

Questions of meaning analyzed in the present section focus not only on that which is attributable to the Background and intentional acts, but also on meaning attributable to the consequences of Intentional states, deeper (or hidden) levels of meaning as well as the relation that holds between these terms. This is meant to provide only a brief schematic of certain key components of Searle's own theory of meaning.
Generally speaking, there is a meaningfulness that can be attributed to consequences of actions and events. From an internalist perspective such as that of Searle, the consequences of interest are intentional consequences, that is, the experienced consequences within Intentional states. Individuals' actions (and also inactions) give rise to consequences. That is not to say that individuals have ultimate control over the consequences. There is no getting away from the fact that, often, experienced consequences are beyond an individual's control. For that matter, much of what can be considered to be the experienced consequences of actions and events in the world take place completely independent of human intervention. This general usage of consequence is not what Searle is primarily concerned with.

Searle's interest in consequences is tied up not in the actual events themselves that occur in the world but in the consequences that occur to individuals in experience. The extent to which these two are commensurable is pursued by Searle elsewhere and cannot be pursued here. For the purpose of this treatment it suffices to say that what Searle attributes as meaningful about experienced consequences is that which takes place within the subject's realm of experience. It is not the actual consequences that occur in the world but the experiencing of consequences that Searle believes to be important to the questions of meaning he is interested in. This corresponds with the orientation of Searle's theory of Intentionality towards the content of experience. For example, someone might desire that his wife be happy and buy her a stuffed idealist. The actual consequences may not please her at all, since the taxidermist was trying to get rid of old stock that was not very popular with the public. Still, the wife is happy just because of her husband's desire to think of her. The point is obvious, most people acknowledge it in colloquial speech when saying, "It's the thought that counts."

What Searle is primarily concerned with when considering the meaningfulness of consequences is that which is determined by the Intentional states. The experienced consequences being spoken of here are, for Searle, wrapped up in a discussion of
conditions of satisfaction and the degree to which these conditions of satisfaction are fulfilled, i.e., Searle's notion of 'direction of fit'. The actual consequences of what happens in the real world does not necessarily affect the consequences set out by the Intentional states. The absence of desired consequences cannot remove the intention towards such a consequence. For instance, sometimes what one intends to express in utterances or in actions turns out exactly as intended, other times it does not. Regardless of the outcome, the experience of consequences determined by the Intentional states are meaningful with respect to the experience of consequence. An objection could be levied that this makes no sense because Intentional states could not possibly have consequences, since only actions have consequences. How could the belief that the only philosophical discipline is Metaphysics have consequences? The answer to this objection is that there are obvious consequences. The individual in question may, thereafter, encounter many philosophers from other disciplines and not believe that they are doing any philosophy. That individual's belief may cut off a vibrant and diverse philosophical community as a result. The objection stems from a general misunderstanding that the only consequences are consequences of actions when it is clear from the above example that this is not the case.

Searle's account of meaning supports the view that taking one's experienced consequences of one's own Intentional states into consideration is important for sustaining subsequent meaningfulness in individual Intentional states, otherwise one would be left completely detached from the world. The experienced consequences that Searle is considering are those of the Intentional acts that arise from the Intentional states. It is by way of looking at the Intentional acts and how they relate to the Intentional states behind the acts that consequences are important. According to Searle's usage of consequences, the success and failures of consequences are important in adjusting subsequent intentional states and the meaning that is attributed to them. In this way, consequences make a
contribution to meaning which emerges in the future Intentional states and Intentional actions in individuals.

It is quite important in everyday life to consider the effects of experienced consequences on future Intentional states. The experienced consequences present in an individual's Intentional states also have consequences in intentional actions. For Searle, there is something important that comes from the carrying out of intentional actions where experienced consequences result. That in itself, provides a good reason for paying strict attention to experienced consequences. Besides preventing loss and reinforcing Intentional states of individuals (and the meaningfulness of such states), there is meaning that can only be derivable from the consequences of one's actions in experience. This ties in with Jerome Bruner (1990) in explicating the necessity of 'doing' in using language. He says: "Language is acquired not in the role of spectator but through use. Being "exposed" to a flow of language is not nearly so important as using it in the midst of "doing." Learning a language, to borrow from John Austin's celebrated phrase is learning how to do things with words." (Bruner 1990, 90)

2.2.1. Intentional Acts

The Intentional acts defined by Searle presuppose Intentional states and as such, assume the underlying Intentional states in its defining structure. Searle (1979, 1980, 1992) has been using a fairly simple distinction between Intentional states and intentional acts to account for the relation between original and derivative Intentionality. This distinction is simply the acknowledgement that people often can hold an Intentional state in their minds that can give rise to an Intentional act. However, this expressed act does not always fulfill the Intentional state. For example, consider how many times an attempt to convey some state of mind fails to do so. It just does not come out right. There is a struggle to express: to paint, to write, to speak, to express, in any means possible, what it is that lingers on the inside. Sometimes people express themselves fairly well. Often
people do not. Searle describes this relation as a 'direction of fit' which represents the extent to which an intentional state appears in the contents of Intentional acts.

However, one thing is certain in Searle, and that is the fact that merely performing the act is not enough for it to be meaningful to the individual. For instance, according to Searle a programmed robot can perform a number of designated actions but none of them would be meaningful to the robot. Individuals must act in such a way that performing the act in itself is meaningful to the individual. For this to be the case, the act must be intended or have some Intentional component.

The correlating of meaningful Intentional acts to underlying Intentional states and the Background conditions is not an entirely foreign path to take. In the case of language development, Jerome Bruner (1990) makes an appeal to intentions being in place in children even before the onset of language acquisition. As Bruner himself puts it, "Certain communicative functions or intentions are well in place before the child has mastered the formal language for expressing them linguistically." (Bruner 1990, 71) This represents another level of investigation where that which is internal to subjects is implicated before intentional acts (i.e. language) manifest themselves.

2.2.2. Deeper Levels of Meaning

This leads the discussion into contemplation of deeper levels of meaning that Searle has been referring to as contained within the Background. It must be taken into consideration that the level of meaning referred to here is meaning without a propositional content. This is quite unlike traditional views of meaning construed in terms of propositional content. These deeper levels of meaning are present in Searle's own position and must be grappled with in order to gain a full appreciation of his theory of meaning. As indicated previously in the thesis (see section on Background), Searle believes there are Background know-hows within each individual that develop through life and help make up a life. These know-hows are non-representational mental capacities presupposed by the
mental states and acts that are representational. Individuals are not merely blank slates to be understood at the level of discrete acts alone. Individuals have meaningful Backgrounds made up of unique repertoires of experiences which they have acquired in their lives. It is inevitable that Background comes into play. It is for this reason that attempts to exclude this level of meaning is an omission of much of what constitutes the human condition. At the same time there are certain problems that can be raised against Searle that have to be kept in mind. First, how is it that Background can be meaningful if it is non-representational? Second, what non-representational meaning can be articulated beyond giving a neurological account? Third, can Background, as a non-representational entity account for the representational aspects of the Intentional states and acts?

For Searle, Intentional states and acts begin as representational states while the Background is not a representational state even though it can be, at some point, be represented within an Intentional state. All this means is that a non-representational Background knowledge (e.g., the knowledge of how to tie one's shoes) can be described and represented within Intentional states. What separates the non-representational Background from other non-representational capacities such as neurological states is that the Background is mental. For Searle, this is the fundamental difference between the Background and other non-representational explanations. For example, it is possible to reenact the action of walking while paying strict attention to each underlying movement involved in the process. When adults are trying to explain to their children how something works, it is often valuable to break things down in such a way that the adult never had to before. This is because Background knowledge is mental and can be represented. This cannot be done with neurological states. There is just no way to represent what it is like for X neuron to fire at such an activity level having such an effect. Despite the real neural activity that Searle does agree is going on, there is just no mental content that can be represented. This is what separates the Background from other non-representational explanations as well as dispelling any misunderstanding encountered by those who assume
some relation of mutual necessity between representational and mental. This brings the
discussion to the second question concerning how it is that something that is non-
representational can effect something that is representational. This can be easily
demonstrated.

In cases where ongoing experiences have no relevance to an individual's
Background, one's Background is believed by Searle to be implicated in the individuals
disposition to new learning (i.e., one's disposition to accept or question new beliefs
formed). For example, if one is raised in a place where it is held that another race of people
is inferior and is forced to take a class where the professor is from that same race, it may
prove difficult to learn. Studies on information biases with respect to group membership
are commonplace in the psychological literature (see Fiske & Taylor, 1993). One type of
information bias referred to in the literature as an illusory correlation has been shown to
occur with no previous knowledge of the groups involved. This is extremely relevant to
the argument of Background since it involves judgements being made concerning some
target object without any actual experience of that object being judged. In a typical
experiment using the illusory correlation paradigm (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976), subjects
are shown a series of phrases describing a member from one of two possible groups. Each
phrase depicts either a positive or negative behavior: for example, "Joe, a member of group
A, sacrificed the child to the sungod." Of the total stimulus phrases presented, more
phrases would describe one of the two groups, but the proportion of phrases describing
positive and negative behaviors would be the same for both groups. For example, if group
A members performed 16 positive behaviors and 8 negative behaviors, group B members
would perform 8 positive behaviors and 4 negative behaviors. From this, proportions of
positive to negative behaviors can be seen as equivalent for group A (16+/8-) and group B
(8+/4-); therefore, no actual correlation exists between group membership and phrase
valence. The subjects are presented with the 36 stimulus phrases sequentially, in a random
order and told that testing for memory and judgement of the learned phrases would follow
the presentation. The results yielded an illusory correlation. Although there was no reason for forming any differential impressions for either group, subjects tend to overestimate the co-occurrence of the smaller group B together with the less frequently occurring event (negative behaviors). What this demonstrates is that individuals have certain predispositions to new learning because of Background capacities. The Background can be taken to have a content which influences new learning even in cases where the content of this Background is not explicitly relevant (e.g., in the case of forming illusory correlations of groups without any previous experience with the group in question).

Another example of this would be in learning a second instrument. It is often the case that learning to play a second instrument is easier after having already learned to play one, even one that seems completely dissimilar. There are certain fundamental skills that are attained in learning an instrument that can facilitate the learning of another, (e.g., the ability to read musical notes, the ability to follow changes in tempo, etc.). Often the disposition itself without the actual relevant experience can affect one's attitude towards new experiences that come about. With this in mind, the discussion of Background meaning branches off to consider other aspects of meaning that have an important contributing role. This will subsequently be referred to as higher-order meaning.

Higher-order meaning encompasses that which is meaningful but which may not be obvious to the individual in an intentional state. Such is often the relation between persons and society. Society is entered into, engaged in, and incorporated into individuals' personal backgrounds largely without the individual being consciously aware of many of the intricacies involved in such an attachment. This incorporation does not have to be considered as a hostile take over, but rather could be viewed as a natural assimilation of the many social practices that constitute one's social environment. Many of these social practices engaged in and which are a part of individuals' lives are not obvious to the agent. Therefore, they can be considered to be higher-order as well and a part of the meaningfulness that makes up individuals. In more recent writings (Searle, 1995), such
questions take a front seat as he seeks to further extend Background meaning into the social realm. For the purpose of this project, it will suffice to take note of this but to focus more on the basic contributing role of this higher-order level of meaning with respect to other levels of meaning that Searle also wants to emphasize. With this in mind, the locus of meaning in Searle's project can be better addressed.

2.2.3. The Locus of Meaning

If questions of meaning are to be of any interest then the locus of meaning must also be addressed. It is useful at this point to draw from relevant sources in the literature that attempt to grapple with the difficult question of pinpointing the locus of human meaning. Taylor's "Sources of the Self" is largely concerned with the locus of meaning in individuals' lives, which he feels is connected with changing conceptions held in society. For Taylor, background meaning is something to be retrieved and this retrieval process can vary greatly because the backgrounds themselves vary which gives rise to different senses of meaning. Individuals disagree on what constitutes 'fit objects'. For example, humility may be a fit object for the Christian tradition, whereas excellence would have been a fit object for individuals living in the Homeric period.

In Taylor's work as in Searle's, understanding the locus of meaning requires that one appreciate the importance of individual and group intentions, how they overlap and how they can be reconciled within an individual's life. The importance of private and public autonomy is developed in the Intentional thesis of Searle. Searle states," Collective Intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced or eliminated in favor of something else" (1995, 24). Individuals are acting agents aware of others as acting agents which gives rise to a sense of 'we' or 'us' as collective agents actual or potential. Each individual is capable of 'we-intending.' This aspect of Intentionality occurs within the minds of individuals but the representational content concerns the group as a whole. It can be considered a type of "general will" argument, but not one that is
meant to stand on its own. Searle's we-Intentionality or general will presupposes the
Background experiences with other individuals necessary for we-Intentionality to occur.
Searle's thesis of collective Intentionality is stated as follows. First, there really is such a
thing as collective intentional behavior that is not the same as the summation of individual
intentional behavior. Second, we-intentions cannot be analyzed into sets of I-intentions,
even I-intentions supplemented with belief, including mutual beliefs about the intentions of
other members of the group. Third, the thesis that we-intentions are a primitive form of
Intentionality, not reducible to I-intentions plus mutual beliefs, is consistent with these two
constraints. Fourth, collective Intentionality presupposes a Background sense of the other
as a candidate for cooperative agency; that is, it presupposes a sense of others as more than
mere conscious agents, indeed as actual or potential members of cooperative activity.
Fifth, the notion, and hence the theory, of Intentionality together with a certain conception
of the role of Background can accommodate collective intentions and actions (Searle 1992,
414). This is simply to say that a lot of the know-hows that have been discussed thus far
occur in a social realm and involve the coordinated activity of multiple individuals. There is
a difference in acquiring the know-how of etiquette necessary to eat in a restaurant and
acquiring the know-how to walk. The learning of proper etiquette is typically something
done in a social context (e.g., learning in North American culture that ladies are seated and
served first, have their cigarettes lit for them and do not pick up the check), whereas,
learning to ride a bicycle properly may not have required any social context).

The institutional structure consists of that which agents are or can be conscious of.
For Searle, this conscious capacity in respect to collective Intentionality is symbolism.
Symbolism is a conscious (also biological) capacity to mean something when expressing
oneself. The meaning derived from this capacity concerns that which goes beyond the
physical facts. According to Searle, if something has meaning, it has content, but not
necessarily propositional content. This content can express itself in language or other
forms of institutionalized structure. In many cases the expression is meaningful by virtue
of the symbolic capacity of conscious individuals. Thus, the institutional structure involves imposing meaning on mere brute facts, and with it those brute facts acquire a function and become representational. This capacity to symbolize is the fundamental precondition prior to all other institutional structures. Despite limiting meaning to the realm of subject experiences, what constitutes meaning for Searle is extensive. It draws meaning from the consequences of intentional states and acts, the Intentional states and acts themselves, and even from deeper levels of meaning derived from social institutional forces.
Chapter III: Problematizing Searle's Theory of Meaning

Searle's inclusive theory of meaning attempts to account for both linguistic and mental forms of Intentionality as well as non-intentional meaning described by a separate Background thesis. Searle's attempt to cover such a large domain of inquiry does not occur without much opposition. At this point certain reactions against Searle are considered which he himself has acknowledged elsewhere (see Lepore & Van Gulick 1991). What makes the reactions important is that they share certain similarities in their criticisms of Searle. The major criticisms that will be voiced and later addressed highlight the same problems with Searle approached from different areas of inquiry. Problems with Searle's notion of a double level of Intentionality, conditions of satisfaction, and the possibility of non-propositional knowledge represent the most devastating of the criticisms that will be covered. These problems all pertain to Searle's theory of Intentionality and its uncertain connection with a separate non-Intentional Background.

In what follows, problems of definition and application of Intentionality will be looked at so that subsequent criticisms can be better understood. The interpretation of Searle's theory in terms of a transcendental argument will be introduced in opposition to the criticisms against Searle's theory of meaning. However, there is not enough room to address all criticisms. In many cases, critics' problems with Searle articulate more general problems with the theory of Intentionality which need to be addressed. It allows aspects of Intentionality that are specifically crucial to Searle's thesis to be separated from those that are more general complaints about Intentionality and not as relevant to appreciating Searle's project.

3.1. Problems With Defining Intentionality

Defining Intentionality has been a longtime interest in philosophical discourse, with varying interpretations resulting in the process. It is for this reason that the term "Intentionality" must be specifically defined in the present study as to avoid any ambiguities
that could arise due to conflicting interpretations. The use of Intentionality in contemporary philosophical literature can be loosely defined as a property of mental states being directed towards something. What this exactly includes has generated a lengthy debate with no resolution in sight. Intentionality as 'directedness' includes, depending on the interpretation, only the object, the subject or neither. Below are some general divisions in the 'directedness' approach to Intentionality beginning with that of Searle. These include: content theories, object theories, contextual theories, and theories of acquaintance.

3.1.1. Content Theories of Intentionality

To support a content theory of intentionality is to believe there is something "in" an experience that gives it its intentional quality. That is not to say that all experience is Intentional since there are many experiences (i.e., non-directional anxiety, elation) that are not Intentional. Explaining Intentionality in terms of the content of experience places an emphasis on what lies in the propositional content of the experience itself rather than on what object (if any) that experience refers to. This can be summarized in two points. First, an experience is intentional—or has an intentional character—if and only if it has a content. Second, Intentional experiences are characterized by their directedness even if it is the case that what the experiences are directed to or are about does not exist.

Given the secondary status attributed to the role of the object, content theories are traditionally internalist accounts of Intentionality not requiring the mediation of external sources for the constitution of intentional experiences. For example, someone can have an Intentional experience of a giant pink octopus even though there may be no corresponding object for such experiences. Searle's, like Husserl's Intentional theory can be considered an elaborate content theory of Intentionality. Husserl's account of experience included hallucinations, phantasies, and empathy experiences.

3.1.2. Object Theory of Intentionality
An object account of Intentionality emphasizes the object rather than the content as responsible for the constitution of intentional experiences. This brand of Intentional theory attempts to cover much of the same phenomenal ground as content approaches but with a different emphasis placed on the locus of intentional experience. The experience of the giant pink octopus would be thought, under this approach, to possess no real content but still be considered an intentional experience by way of positing 'nonexistent', 'incomplete', or 'intentional' objects that can be considered independent of actual real objects. This approach is fraught with many pitfalls, not the least of which are the logical difficulties faced by speaking of Intentionality in terms of some nonexistent entity as Husserl did.

3.1.3. Contextual Account of Intentionality: Intentionality as Acquaintance

Contextual/externalist approaches have been followed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and more recently by Putnam. The first two approaches emphasize the contextual necessity of causal factors from historical sources and being in the world, while the latter embeds his externalist theory in 'indexical' meaning.

Contextual/externalist positions assign causal importance to the role of context in constituting intentional experiences. The context of experience includes the 'where' and 'when' of experience. What contextualist theories have in common is belief in the context's immediacy or direct influence on Intentional experiences. This is expressed by Smith (1989, 15), "An experience e depends, or is founded or grounded, on a condition c if and only if necessarily, e occurs only if c occurs. Alternatively, it is not possible that e occurs and c does not."

There is a significant difference between Smith's usage of context and Searle's notion of Background that has to be distinguished to avoid confusion. First, and most importantly, context is experienced directly. Its influence on intentional experience occurs at the same time as when the experience occurs. Searle's Background is quite different, its influence preceding the intentional experience. The influence of some Background know-
hows can come from something that was learned the week before or twenty years before. There is no immediacy involved where some context is matched with some Intentional content resulting in an acquaintance experience. Secondly, Background know-how and context can be easily distinguished because they do not always coincide. Background abilities are acquired over one's lifetime, and although they may come out some of the time in some specific context, there is no rule involved (e.g., sometimes when I'm alone I go through the motions of performing some body throw in freestyle wrestling but without any mat area or gymnasium acting as a context).

There are also differences between Searle and Smith on what it is that is being experienced when individuals are experiencing something. For Searle it is not the object but the propositional content that is essential to intentional experiences. This is very different from Smith. Smith includes indexical content, indexical context, and the object as necessary mediators of intentional relations of acquaintance in the following statement:

A person is acquainted with an object in having an experience if and only if the experience has a certain indexical content and that content in that experience prescribes, or is satisfied by, that object. Furthermore, by the conditions of satisfaction for that content the acquaintance depends on the context of the experience, (Smith 1989, 193).

Experiences of acquaintance for Smith represent a three-way interaction between the indexical components and the object. Acquaintances are supposed to be Intentional relations that emphasize direct or indexical awareness, i.e., this, you, or I are self evident11. As such, individuals are said to be aware or acquainted with experiences directly. Acquaintance experiences include perception of objects, inner awareness of oneself and one's experiences, and empathic perceptions of others. What this represents to intentional discourse is an attempt to include subject and object considerations in constructing intentional experiences.

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11 Smith uses direct and indexical interchangeably for simplicity but that in other philosophical contexts the two terms are distinguished
Smith (1989) provides a definition of the contextualist theory of acquaintance. It is presented in the following manner. "An acquainting experience is intentionally related to—successfully of or about—an object if and only if the object plays a proper role in the context of the experience, i.e., it stands in a proper contextual relation to the experience or to the subject." (Smith 1989, 151). How the object differentiates itself from the Intentional object is that the Intentional object is coordinated with what it is the intentional state is about. This is also how the Intentional objects differentiate themselves from one another. What Smith adds to the existing framework is an understanding of the pitfalls of content approaches by neglecting externals. Without an actual content, Smith warns that acquainting experiences may be contextually related to an object but fail to be an experience about the object. He emphasizes that acquainting experiences must have indexical content as well as contextualized objects if they are to be Intentional. To this indexical relation of context, Smith adds a dimension of causal dependency which appears in the following statement: an acquainting experience normally cannot occur unless the relevant contextual conditions hold. Thus, context is a necessary condition, representing for Smith a necessary precondition that both makes possible the acquainting experience (contextual relation) and which also represents a necessary part of the content of experience itself (intentional relation). As such, acquaintance theory attempts to account for both Intentional relations (content) and contextual relations by drawing Intentionality into a state of dependence on external situatedness. Smith believes this binding of Intentionality and context in experiences of acquaintances constitutes a metaphysics of experience. He states,"We may endorse internalism in the theory of Intentionality while in the metaphysics of experience we recognize a variety of ways in which experiences and intentional relations depend on different background conditions." (Smith, 1989, 201) Smith's approach within intentional discourse pivots on internalist notions of content in addition to externalist or contextualist notions of background and dependence. The result is separate theories of metaphysical experience and intentionality that come together in experiences of acquaintance.
Indexical awareness is treated by Smith as a direct awareness or cognitive awareness of something in the immediate presence or context of one's experience. Indexical awareness is treated by Smith in two respects. There is an indexical content which requires only that something in one's experience is indicated, while indexical awareness of context assumes that a successful intentional relation has been achieved where the object has satisfied the content of experience, thus drawing the subject, object and context into the experience of acquaintance. Smith's attempt to extend intentional theory takes more into consideration than previous object or content theories have managed. Smith believes individuals capable of experiencing the actual objects in the world but that a successful experience of acquaintance with the object depends on there being in place the appropriate indexical content and indexical context. Thus, Smith wants to advocate direct experience of the objects themselves but only upon satisfaction of other conditions. Smith, perhaps even more than Searle, could be considered to be a philosopher who wants his cake and eat it too, only it is a different cake. The flavor of Smith's cake is one where individuals are supposed to be able to retain the meaningfulness of intentional experiences while, at the same time, being able to experience the objects themselves.

3.1.4. Grappling with Smith's Account of Intentionality

The problems that arise with acquaintance theories of Intentionality begin with their reliance on the indexicality of intentional experience or intentional relations. The question must be asked, "What, in my experiences, do I ever know indexically?" In linguistics, words like 'I', 'You', and 'this' may refer to something directly within the context of a speech utterance. However, individual experiences can be much more complicated than this. For instance, I may know myself as 'I' directly in reference but what exactly is this I's content? Am I merely the sum of my experiences (or direct experiences), the sum of my states, the sum of my actions, or some hierarchical arrangement of importance that
corresponds to any of these possibilities? When I refer to myself do I only refer to myself or to the part of myself related to the present context.

A contextualist interpretation might try to reason that the context fixes the object in its satisfying of the content of experience. However, this is not a sufficient explanation. It may hold true within a linguistic framework where content and context is drastically restricted, but this may not hold for other experiences. Firstly, the experience of the self (I) in one specific context can have its meaning fixed by that single context. It is not indexical because the specificity of the reference "I" depends on much more than what a single context could fix. What this means is that the constitution of the referent "I" is made up of many experiences and a wide range of contexts, not only one. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine a direct relation between the propositional content and the object, despite any contextual influences. The reason is that it is not possible to have any direct experience of objects. For example, a child may go to a petting zoo where there are normally small animals to pet. If the child, after petting some animal gets a painful rash then the normal contextual meaning will not be very important. The child will simply not want to go near the petting zoo because of the child's personal Background that is quite independent of the contextual meaning. Not only that but the experience of the object in the eyes of the child will change (e.g. from nice sheepy experience to bad sheepy experience). It will change because of Background capacities that come out in ongoing experiences.

The contextualist approach has at least two failings apart from those mentioned above. First, the three-way interaction between indexical content, indexical context, and object requires a great deal to be assumed in order to satisfy an intentional experience. All the extra stipulations make it difficult to be taken seriously as an explanation of Intentional experience. Secondly, context just seems inadequate to provide an accurate account of intentional experience, the main reason being that not everyone will react in the same way within the same context. Everyone's Background capacities are not the same despite some
overlap. This conclusion is more in favor of Searle's approach than it is a contextualist interpretation.

3.2. Apel On Searle

Apel accuses Searle of supporting both a pragmatic structure of language and a cognitive structure of mind in different places as being responsible for language meaning. Apel believes these two positions in Searle's work contradict one another. The main thrust of Apel's argument is directed at Searle's uncoupling of meaning intention from communication intention (see Lepore and Van Gulick, 1991). Apel opposes Searle's (1983) attempt to use mental intentions to provide an account of linguistic meaning. In this critique, he points out a weakness in Searle's theory of meaning by challenging Searle's reliance on the mentalistic notion of 'conditions of satisfaction' for the explication of linguistic meaning.

To begin, Apel believes Searle's use of intentionality presupposes the existence of linguistic conventions. Here Apel follows two different trajectories in trying to demonstrate this point. First, Apel compares and contrasts Searle's theory of linguistic meaning (Searle 1) with Searle's theory of mind (Searle 2), pointing out certain problems which prevent the former from being derived from the latter in the way that Searle wants to do. Secondly, Apel focuses on Searle's classification of speech acts by trying to demonstrate how necessary conditions of satisfaction (Searle) presuppose linguistic conventions requiring validity claims to be made in order for satisfaction to occur. Apel's critical analysis points out certain weaknesses in Searle's philosophy. The necessity of underlying linguistic conventions and validity conditions argued for by Apel provide key insights that warrant consideration. The section of Apel's critical paper titled, "The Inadequacy of the Explication of Illocutionary Meaning in Concepts of "Conditions of Satisfaction of Intentional States"" addresses how Searle's 'conditions of satisfaction' are laid out at the level of speech acts as well as at the level of intentional states. Searle's
theory of Intentionality places the mind in the driver's seat of meaning, responsible both for creating and limiting the possible forms of meaning. Searle indicates this in the following: "The Intentionality of the mind not only creates the possibility of meaning, but it limits its forms. . . Another aim, then, of the analysis of meaning is to show how the possibilities and limitations derive from the intentionality of the mind." (Lepore & Van Gulick 1991, 166)

In Lepore and Van Gulick (1991), Apel describes Searle's account of meaning as a "unilateral reduction of the possible linguistic meanings to non-linguistic intentions of mind." (Lepore and Van Gulick, 1991, 40) Apel, in turn, describes how he sees the meaning of speech acts as flowing out of Searle's account. Apel picks up (accurately) Searle's grounding of a philosophy of language in an underlying philosophy of mind where the speakers' meaning is defined in terms of more primitive forms of non-linguistic intentionality. In language, this takes place by Intentional states positing the existence of facts. This, in turn, determines the conditions of satisfaction required by the speech act in asserting the fact. As such, it relies on the interpretation of the intentional content within the Intentional states which can fulfill the conditions of satisfaction of the asserted statement.

The problem arises when trying to derive a shared interpretation of phenomenal evidence. Apel believes that conditions of satisfaction require more than just an intentional conviction. Rather, an underlying linguistic meaning is required. As Apel puts it:

in respect of the *intersubjectively valid interpretability* of the phenomenal evidence, however, the imposition of conditions of satisfaction - and, before this, intentional content of consciousness of the conviction of an existing fact - is dependent on the linguistic proposition through which the intended proposition can be described. That is to say that the linguistically established meaning decides what I can mean, a fact of whose existence I am convinced, and in the case of its existence, as what I can point to. (Lepore & Van Gulick 1991, 41)

Apel believes Searle's conception of meaning as derived from intentional states is not an adequate explanation of utterance meaning. Rather, what is meant by speakers' utterances is simply a function of what the words mean. Apel wants to include both
propositional content and illocutionary force in the explanation of linguistic meaning. This can be discerned in the following statement:

It is not only in respect to facts in the propositional content of speech acts but also in respect to the so-called "illocutionary force" of our speech acts that all publicly valid meaning of our meaning-intentions is pre-determined by linguistic conventions. This pragmatic-communicative meaning of speech acts too can be preshaped through the corresponding sentences and phrases in terms of the semantics of a particular language. (Lepore & Gulick 1991, 41)

This is a strong anti-Searlean claim. It supports that there are facts concerning linguistic meaning that constrain the propositional content of exactly what illocutionary force is able to attach itself to the linguistic act. With this, Apel places illocutionary concerns within already conventionalized speech acts. The propositional content of speech acts is placed within a range of possible public meanings of communicative intentions. This is the view that Apel attributes to Searle in *Speech Acts*, where a propositional semantics and pragmatics of contextualized speech acts are integrated with each other and with the theory of intentionality. Apel traces out this relation in the following two passages of Searle:

There are, therefore, not two irreducibly distinct semantic studies, one a study of the meanings of sentences and one a study of the performance of speech acts. For just as it is part of our notion of the meaning of a sentence that a literal utterance of that sentence with that meaning in a certain context would be the performance of a particular speech act, so it is part of our notion of a speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of which in a certain context would in virtue of its (or their) meaning constitute a performance of that speech act. (Searle 1969, 17-18)

This is followed by:

Part of the meaning of an elementary sentence is that its literal utterance in a given context constitutes a performance or attempted performance of an illocutionary act of a particular force. Thus, for example, it is part of our meaning of the English sentence, "Is it raining?", that its successful literal and serious utterance constitutes the asking of a question as to whether it is raining, every complete sentence, even a one word sentence, has some indicator of illocutionary force; therefore, no semantical theory of language is complete without an illocutionary component. (Searle 1979, 7).

Apel attributes to Searle in the above passages the belief that the study of linguistic meaning includes the derivation of both semantic and performance meaning. Apel views Searle as combining the study of sentences and speech acts into one pragmatic study that takes both
into consideration. In the second passage, Apel attributes to Searle the belief that Illocutionary force plays a necessary role in the determination of language meaning because of the fact that literal utterances appear in different contexts in the performance of speech acts.

Apel believes that the theory of meaning quoted above contradicts Searle's later "Intentionality," which treats linguistic meaning as derivative of a more primitive philosophy of mind. Apel believes that the pragmatically motivated earlier Searle seen above is in serious contradiction with Searle's later theory of meaning as appears in "Intentionality." The reason for this is that the earlier work grounded speech acts in literal meaning but later work grounded the intentionality of speech acts in non-linguistic intentional states. This inferred contradiction stems from supporting, on the one hand, a presupposed illocutionary force for illocutionary acts in language and, on the other hand, a presupposed structure of intentional states responsible for determining intentional acts.

The problem with Apel's interpretation is that it represents a failure of understanding on certain key points in Searle that become clear only by reference to later work. Apel's interpretation of Searle in the first case is not incorrect but it fails to consider the context in which it took place. The meaning of the terms used by Searle were not exhaustively defined but only defined to the extent necessary to describe the relation between semantic and speech act meaning with respect to the varying contexts where speech acts are performed. This view is in no way inconsistent with later considerations of semantic meaning, performative meaning, and Illocutionary force. Rather, what is required it that the Searle's earliest work on a pragmatic speech act theory has to be supplemented by his later cognitive notion on illocutionary force. For instance, the illocutionary force of a speech utterance has certain conditions of satisfaction which are identical with the conditions of satisfaction for the Intentional state.

Apel's interpretation of Searle suffers from at least three problems. First, Apel fails to recognize the original nature of Intentionality within Searle's theory of meaning. Apel
argues only from the perspective of someone who has a language structure up and running, not digging deeper than what is necessary to describe the relation between semantic and performative meaning in the occurrence of sentences and speech acts, respectively. Apel does not recognize that the meaning of illocutionary force at the level of language begins at a more primate level of mind. The same goes for other supporting notions that begin in the Intentional states, such as conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit.

This leads Apel to a second problem of multiple interpretations of conditions of satisfaction. Apel criticizes the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states for their subjective bias (each person coming up with different understandings of what conditions of satisfaction are), using it as a reason for dismissing the role of Intentional states in determining linguistic meaning. Apel's article, "Intention and Linguistic Meaning" offers serious criticism in opposition to Searle's attempt to support a complete theory of language and mind. Specifically, Apel takes issue with how Intentional states in Searle's theory are supposed to give rise to any definable conditions of satisfaction to which speech acts must appeal. The problem is that the quality of subjectivity attributed to the conditions of satisfaction, whether intentional or linguistic, is identical and any criticism of the Intentional states applies to language as well. Apel's position is that linguistic acts are primary and that any explanation of conditions of satisfaction would be linguistic. This does not remove Apel from the reach of his own criticisms which apply to his own case as well as applying to Searle.

Lastly, Apel fails to recognize the role that a presuppositional Background can play in determining linguistic meaning by its influence on Intentional states and conditions of satisfaction. Apel's attempt to demonstrate that there is a linguistic meaningfulness which precedes the propositional content of Intentional states does not fully grasp the relevance of Searle's Background or else Apel would have realized a certain similarity in what it is that he and Searle are both doing. By failing to see that the Intentional states and conditions of satisfaction for Searle are grounded in a presuppositional Background (which, incidentally,
contains certain linguistic know-how as well), Apel spends considerable effort opposing Searle when much of what Apel and Searle are getting on about is the same. This can be seen where Apel tries to demonstrate the inadequacy of appealing solely to conditions of satisfaction for explanations of illocutionary meaning that he believes are tied to linguistic conventions. Apel makes the following argument, using as an example the propositional meaning, "that the door is to be opened" and differentiating it in terms of varying illocutionary acts:

in the case of a command, the expectation of a compliance which depends on the understanding of the illocutionary meaning implies that the door is opened because the command is respected as proper and issued by an authorized person; in the case of a request, the expectation of a compliance which depends on the understanding of the illocutionary meaning implies that the door is opened because the addressee considers the request worthy of fulfillment; in the case of a demand, the expectation of a compliance which depends on the understanding of the illocutionary meaning implies that the door is opened because the addressee considers the request legitimate; in the case of a compulsion, the expectation of compliance, because the addressee fears negative consequences for himself in the case of non-compliance. (Apel 1991, 44)

The considerable effort that Apel spends trying to demonstrate that there is more to illocutionary meaning than what can be determined by the conditions of satisfaction is nothing new to Searle, who insists on a presuppositional Background for all Intentional states and acts. Although the presuppositional structures seem to be quite different (for the moment at least), both authors are making such an appeal and Apel's failure to recognize this along with certain other features of Searle's program results in Apel's opposition losing some of its bite.

The presuppositional knowledge that Apel alluded to in his critique of Searle was linguistic. It was demonstrated that illocutionary meaning requires more than what can be explained solely by one's knowledge of conditions of satisfaction via Searle. There is a presuppositional structure to be reconciled with. Apel's presuppositional appeal to linguistic conventions represents an effective demonstration of this. Without detracting from the significance of Apel's critique, there are possibly other presuppositional structures implied in illocutionary meaning that Apel did not consider. Apel's use of 'expectations' to
point to presupposed linguistic conventions can also point to other presupposed structures, namely prior existing non-linguistic facts which could very well include Searle's Background thesis.

Commands, requests, demands, and compulsions are only meaningful when certain facts are present. Commands require an existing commander (person in a position of authority). Similarly, requests, demands and compulsions require there being a certain requester, demander, and compulsive person, respectively. Expectations of worth, legitimacy of requests, respected commands, and negative consequences (Apel's argument) are themselves tied to a network of existing elements that are implicated when performing a directive speech utterance.

For instance, a command is successfully given by someone believed to be in a position of authority that coincides with the uttering of such a command. This requires a specific situation. After all, not all commanders can command everything all the time. It requires not only the right person but also the right situation in order for everything to come together. In other words, it requires the right set of elements and that these elements occur at the appropriate time. Hence, comes the need for presuppositional facts and temporality. This is far from a complete account. It is only meant to provide a wedge into which one can further explore the question. To illustrate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presuppositional Structure Required For Command Directives</th>
<th>Presuppositional Structure (e.g., for command)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions</td>
<td>Expectation of 'proper command'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual Object</td>
<td>Expectation of authorized commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual Event</td>
<td>Expectation of appropriate command situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal Relation</td>
<td>Expectation of previous command</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Apel's linguistic qualification draws attention to specific expectations presupposed in the uttering of a command. However, there are other categories of presuppositional knowledge that Apel's argument does not address. In employing any command directive there are presupposed structures other than linguistic ones. The presuppositional object
and event qualification requires both the person uttering (what justifies the person making such an utterance) and the event (in what situation the command can be made)\textsuperscript{12}.

In addition, there are temporal relations that have to be considered. Some sort of temporal relation (wherever applicable) can make a key contribution to illocutionary meaning by its returning to (recalling of) previous instances associated with the uttered command and to previous know-hows of how things are and how to do things. It is a precondition of commands that there are temporal relations that contribute to the employment of a present command and to the illocutionary meaning. That is, uttering a present command will draw on knowledge of past commands made and of fundamental know-how necessary to even begin delivering commands. The fact that individuals can draw from previous sources for the issuing of ongoing present commands calls for something more than what can be attributed to presuppositional linguistic structure. All of the above-described categories that entail presuppositional structures could just as easily be considered part of the Background of individuals experience for uttering directives. The necessity of temporal relations presupposed in illocutionary acts requires something more than what Apel can account for using a presuppositional linguistic framework. For example, when Jacques Villeneuve made a statement to the press describing his experience of the winning race it involved more than his belief of crossing the finish line first. He probably had practiced on the course numerous times and knew which turns to take more slowly. He probably practiced under different weather conditions so he knew which tires to use in the race. He had to gauge the number of laps run with respect to the car's limitations so that pitstops could be optimally timed. If his experience of the race did not include these fine adjustments then he would not have won the race. His experience also included the experience of being in a car, the experience of motion, of synchronizing the

\textsuperscript{12} A more general factual qualification has been hinted at by Searle in "Foundations in Illocutionary Logic." Searle took note of the 'preparatory conditions' as necessary components of illocutionary meaning that are not directly concerned with intentional states and the determining of conditions of satisfaction for speech acts.
turning of the steering wheel with the movement of the car and the speed at which this can be done without flying off the track (this alone could have taken years of practice), and the shifting of gears to adjust the speed of the vehicle. What went into making up the experience of Villeneuve's winning race could have pulled together years of preparatory efforts, much of which he may only partially recollect. The mastering of more basic Background capacities such as perceptions of motion and the passage of time could have gone all the way back to playing with dinky cars when he was five or hiding after lunch when it was time to nap. The temporality that operates at fundamental levels of Intentional experience by relating to other Intentional experiences and to prior Background experience comes out at the level of illocutionary acts whenever something is expressed. This reinterpretation or filling in of Apel's criticism does not oppose linguistic presuppositions but only attempts to place them in a field among other (perhaps just as important) presuppositional facts which are embedded in individual Backgrounds. Interpreting illocutionary acts in such a way does not so much discover anything new, but rather attempts to better articulate what is already present.

This is a good example of the work of a transcendental argument, that of uncovering underlying presuppositional structures. The contention of this discussion will be that problems can be solved from within a transcendental stance for certain specific reasons. The problem of attributing formal qualities to a presupposition Background does not get off the ground without a transcendental argument (or something like it) since one is not conscious of the Background, although the Background is mental. Remember that for Searle, the qualities attributed to the Background are not the same as those attributed to the Intentional states. Background qualities are essential conditions and not intentional qualities. They distinguish themselves in this respect which allows Searle to maintain a strict separation between Background and what is considered to be part of the Intentional states. The usage of transcendental arguments here is not meant to be circular but progressive. The capacities spoken of by Searle are continuous with the normal
development of one's life. For example, Background capacities for standing up precede those capacities for tying one's shoe laces. The capacities are not static but dynamic and are acquired naturally over the course of one's life. The Background abilities in the above example precede the Intentional states that require such abilities. Certainly baby Villeneuve could not have imagined that navigating a vehicle could be so technical as he believes today. This progression was not only physical or mental but involved both, involving many trial-and-error adjustments. Baby Villeneuve's forgetting his toys outside may have led to their rusting away which led baby Villeneuve to learn how important it is to take care of cars, dinky and formula I.

3.3. Alston On Conditions of Satisfaction:

In Lepore and Gulick (1991), Alston focuses on what he believes to be short-sightedness in Searle's philosophical program. In explaining illocutionary acts, Alston offers a treatment of illocutionary acts alternative to that of Searle, one in which normative regulative elements are central features of illocutionary act performance.

Alston's criticism of Searle begins with Searle's idea of what constitutes the 'essential conditions' of an act. For Searle, uttering directives requires that there be necessary conditions that are responsible for differences between the types of illocutionary acts. Searle gives the following example for the case of promising that Alston later takes up. Searle (1969) states, "The essential feature of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation to perform a certain act. I think that this condition distinguishes promises (and other members of the same family such as vows) from other kinds of illocutionary acts." (Searle, 1969, 65) In the case of assertives the essential conditions would be the commitment to a belief in a certain act, while in the case of a request, the essential condition would be the desire of a certain act.

Alston believes there to be a problem in Searle's use of 'essential conditions' to explain illocutionary acts. Alston interprets the 'essential conditions' of promising as an
obligation of responsibility on the speaker to perform some act. He grants essential features a conventional status, with success tied to the performance of the act. As such, requests and assertives could not have analogous essential conditions to speak of in Alston's view. He rejects any essential conditions other than those pertaining to conventional obligations. Alston notes that requests can be made out of one's duty in the absence of any attempts to get some hearer to do anything specific. This point is easily seen in the case where someone requests another's attendance at some event (say a marriage) out of politeness rather than any real desire for that person's presence. In the case of assertives, Alston has difficulty in accepting Searle's use of essential conditions, the only convincing essential conditions being conventional in Alston's view. Alston believes the only essential conditions that could be had are the 'essential conditions' of promising as an obligation of responsibility on the speaker to perform some act. Alston's argument revolves around demonstrating the conflicting notions of essential conditions that Searle holds in Searle (1969) compared with a later Searle (1975). Alston states:

As for asserting or stating that p, Searle says in SA (p.66), that the essential condition is that the utterance "counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs." In TIA this becomes "a representation of how something is" (p.2). From the same article, "The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition" (p.12). This strikes me as quite a mixed bag. "Undertaking" and "commitment" sound like normative statuses engendered by the utterance, analogous to the obligation on the speaker engendered by the promise; while being a representation does not seem to carry that force, depending on how "representation" is to be understood here. (Alston 1991,68).

The above comments on Searle's 'essential conditions' seem (for Alston) to mark a misunderstanding that both Alston and Apel share, which is that Searle is being inconsistent with his earlier work on speech acts to endorse a view of representational meaning. This leads Alston falsely to reduce the significance of essential conditions to the category of speech acts, and then to reduce the status of essential conditions to that of conventional obligations to perform such an act. Therefore, for Alston, there are essential conditions when it comes to promises. All other speech act types lack this. One falsehood leads to another, and to the reduced significance of essential conditions Alston adds that
Searle's conditions of satisfaction suffer from an inadequacy of meaning intentions. In reinforcing his earlier doubt concerning the necessity of 'essential conditions', Alston places a restricted use on what can be considered proper conditions of satisfaction by distinguishing between intentions of obligation to an utterance from intentions of performing an illocutionary act.

3.4. Other Problems with Searle's Notion of Background

It is difficult enough to attempt any connection between a non-representational Background and representational Intentional states. This difficulty is only compounded by Searle's attempting to make the connection a causal one. A criticism that can be levied against Searle is that he seems to support a theory of Intentional causation while at the same time supporting a non-representational Background. The question is, how is it that Intentional states can be causally related to a non-representational Background? Is there not some serious problem with trying to support the idea of Intentional causation where there are non-representational causes?

The power of individual Backgrounds as constitutional elements within individuals' Intentional states has to be better articulated by further pursuing underlying elements. A more thorough explanation of underlying elements can be used to secure a more substantial understanding of individuals' mental lives and perhaps even a better understanding of the relation individuals' mental lives have with external happenings in the world. These considerations seem to be a natural part of individuals' mental lives and a logical consideration for a theory of meaning as broad as that which Searle presently supports.

Leaving the questionable status of Intentional causation aside (which deserves a separate treatment), Searle appeals to non-representational expectancies of Background and the presence of causal regularities as sufficient to substantiate claims of Intentional causality. Given the non-conventional approach to certain philosophical concepts that Searle takes, it is often difficult to imagine exactly what he means when using already
theory laden concepts. This leads to much confusion. What would constitute non-representational expectations is to be taken in a Skinnerian sense, that is, as a subject's tendency towards some stimulus over another within experience. Certain regularities in the experienced consequences give rise to tendencies that can affect future Intentional states (refer to section on consequences earlier in the paper). What Searle is lacking is some way of explaining how Background conditions connect to the level of Intentional experiences which he believes to have Intentional causes. One way to overcome this problem is by demonstrating that Background conditions are necessary for there to be some Intentional experience with an Intentional cause. This would entail finding evidence that Background conditions underlie the Intentional states.

In a recent paper, Audi (1995) speaks of a temporal dimension to mental causation and made an appeal to a type of 'sustaining causality.' This line of reasoning could be used to strengthen the understanding of Background as separate from, but connected to, Intentional experience. This claim concerning a temporal causal relation is what Audi calls the "triggering relation." However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to defend any particular account of causality. This would require a lengthy discussion. The purpose in the present context is merely to demonstrate that a causal connection between Searle's non-representational Background and the Intentional states is possible.

What is needed, however, is a simple qualification of what causal relations would require when speaking of Intentional states, which is different from speaking of causal relations in other contexts. Intentional causal relations occur only where there is some previous experience to be related to. Previous experience includes not only Intentional experience but that which allows one to relate those experiences. Where this is not the case, both events and thoughts may occur but without the Intentional causal relation. For example, one can do a specific Intentional action like lick an all-day sucker, the sucker being so good the first time it is licked again, the content of the experience of the first lick causing the second. In both cases the Background is implicated by its role in securing the
propositional contents needed for the Intentional causal relation. Even though it could have been the first all day sucker ever licked there is always a certain know-how present (e.g., know-how to hold an object tightly enough, know-how to stick out one's tongue to lick, etc.) and this know-how can be invoked at a time when needed. If it were not the case that there was some sort of triggering relation to sustain Intentional causal relations then the relations could never happen. Simply put, there just is no "knowledge that" without some "knowledge how" required to start the ball rolling.

The triggering relation is not merely about how know-how, by securing relations with representational contents, becomes implicated. Rather, the triggering relation could not take place were it not for a temporal relation between the Background and the Intentional states. That is, the know-how that is implicated in some representational content is always first. There would be no Intentional causal relation were it not for there being some concept of time required for first and next which applies to the relation of Intentional state to each other and to the underlying Background. One does not learn to lick a sucker before one learns how to grasp an object and when one does lick a sucker after having mastered how to grasp the sucker (sometimes after many trials), then there can be said to be a causal relation between the Background (e.g., grasping the sucker) and the Intentional state (e.g., desiring to lick the sucker).

This last point seems fairly clear but discussing the subject of transcendental arguments seem to block comprehension from the start. To try to reword the point in another way more integral with philosophy of mind literature, the existence of a prior cognition is a precondition for deriving a causal relation in a present representation. Not all cognition is representational and those cognitions that are present in the Background are mental and non-representational. It is only by way of prior cognitive processes that causal relations between representations can be had. Intentional causation is concerned with affirming representational relations. It is for this reason that any transcendental argument pertinent to Searle's theory would include temporal considerations as well, the reason being
that for any succession of experiences to be related there has to be some concept of before and after to discern an ordering of experiences. This concept has to be a precondition for the normal ordering of experiences.

The notion of Intentional causation is not widely accepted and it is a difficult thesis to support, its advocates (Searle included) encountering many difficulties in proving it by itself or by grounding it in something more secure (i.e., other forms of causal relation). Searle has this same problem and also the problem of making such considerations relevant to a thesis of Background which is crucial to the overall project. The way in which the triggering notion was used above provides a link between what seems to be disjointed concepts (Background and Intentional causation). The solution relates to the Searlean transcendental argument stated at the beginning of the thesis. The Background that underlies representational experience is non-representational and not to be considered part of the Intentional states or contents. It is this separation of Background from the Intentional states in terms of representation that requires a transcendental argument be used to connect with the Intentional states. The conclusion that Intentional causation requires other non-representational capacities to act as a triggering mechanism demonstrates the existence of Background. This triggering mechanism precedes the Intentional states and the manifestation of Intentional causation.

It could be objected that the non-representational Background is devoid of content and could not be considered a cause of Intentional states which have a content, the reason being that it makes no sense from the perspective of one holding an account of Intentional causation to speak of something without content (Background) causing something with content (Intentional state). The problem of content can be dealt with by considering the mechanism behind Intentional causation. Searle's account of Intentional causation begins with the experienced effects and the causes are discerned. Experiencing something as an effect requires both a propositional content and at least some rudimentary notion of causality. The ability to perceive something as an effect of something else requires a
concept with which to make the relation to something else. This something else (Background) entailed by the concept of causality would have a content by which it is connected to the concept in question. If it is the case that Intentional causation of the variety that Searle supports is true, then whatever causal relations result would require both causes and effects to have their own respective content enabling them to be related together. It is partly because Intentional causation requires a concept of causal relations that causes must have a content. That does not mean that this is true for all causes of causation, but it is the case for Searle’s account.

It could also be objected that the above example is not a causal relation at all but merely some sort of correlational or enabling relation. A causal relation could seem too strong a qualification for what best describes what is applicable to Searle’s theory. However there are reasons to believe otherwise. For one, the non-representational expectancies supported by Searle are not merely a set of existing conditions that enable other conditions to occur (e.g., the condition of having an arm enables one to reach), but are tendencies held by the individual within experiences that affect future Intentional states causally (e.g., the reaching for a Robertson screwdriver (as opposed to a Philips screwdriver) needed to fit a square screw is caused by the recognition that a Robertson is needed to fit the square headed screw. In this sense, at least some of what can be considered Background plays a role that goes beyond what is not to be understood as merely an enabling condition. Although it is true that certain enabling conditions are needed (e.g., concept of the solidity of objects), there is a difference between this and what is being discussed here. The difference is that an enabling condition can not cause Intentional states (effects) but that the Background can (e.g., the selection of the Robertson opposed to the Philips to fit a square hole is caused by previous experience of how sc ewdrivers work). A corollary of this is that enabling conditions are not necessarily a part of experience (e.g., a general concept of solidity lacks a specific content with respect to a specific experience), whereas the cause of one’s Intentional experience is a part of
experience itself and does possess a content. The necessity of content was discussed in the previous paragraph. What Searle does not do when discussing Intentional causation and what is done here is that causes and enabling conditions are separated in terms of their Background relation. The distinguishing of Background was began appears elsewhere in Searle's work (see Searle 1983, 144). Searle uses the local (Background of some people)-deep (Background of all people) to distinguish the Background in one way. The distinguishing of cause and enabling conditions with respect to Background lends itself to a similar type of distinction. To illustrate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Intentional state</td>
<td>Experience of walking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Shallow Background</td>
<td>Experience of first steps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Condition</td>
<td>Deep Background</td>
<td>Solidity of objects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, the question of causal relation is only raised with the onset of Intentional states which, for Searle, is represented as a first person perspective and the starting point of inquiry for mental life. And within the framework of one's own first person perspective there are not an array of possible conditions evident. There is merely the effect (i.e., the Intentional state) and whatever caused the effect. Although it is recognized from a third person perspective that there can be a number of enabling conditions listed which led to the effect experienced, Searle's account of Intentional causation is intended to be viewed from a first person perspective where experienced effects are experienced as causally connected to some previous experience. This is not to say that there are not problems with viewing causal relations in this way but that within the context that Searle is using causal relations, this appears to make the most sense.

Pulling the peanut gallery of critics together is not very difficult. It is obvious from the misunderstandings pointed out within the present text where each author went wrong in their interpretation of Searle. Apel's misunderstanding came about by failing to recognize the primitive nature of Intentionality. His pointing out of inconsistencies in Searle's project
were largely inconsistencies of his own and his failure to recognize certain facts concerning the nature of Intentionality. What Apel ends up acting on is a treatment of the conditions of satisfactions solely from the perspective of one who is already engaged in language exchanges. This makes it difficult to see the primitive origins that Searle is concerned with. Similarly, Alston’s contrast of Searle’s earlier work in speech act theory with that of later work in the philosophy of mind encounters much of the same difficulty as that of Apel’s critique in its failure to fully define certain key terms in the Searlean thesis. The significance of Alston’s pointing out of the inconsistencies in Searle’s progression of thought is completely obscured by a failure to notice the entire meaning that certain terms play in Searle’s project. Alston also is limited by his arguing solely from a linguistic framework failing to consider where it is that Searle is speaking from.

In earlier versions of this thesis, one of the greatest worries concerning Searle’s overall project was how it was possible for Searle to defend the thesis of Background as separate from and connected to the Intentional states which have propositional content when the Background itself is void of propositional content. This is perhaps the strongest reason thus far for the dismissal of Searle. The beginning of a response to this emphasizes the necessity of the Background to possess a content in order to be able to causally connected to the Intentional states, the main stipulation being that there is some cause and some effect to be connected causally.

What makes a transcendental argument indispensable is that the Background is never manifest except within the Intentional states, where its effects reside. Therefore, it is only within Intentional states that causes and effects come together, that is, where Background is manifest. It is only from this point where temporal relations crucial to the separation of Background from Intentional states can be discerned. It is also the starting point of the transcendental argument. Basically, the temporal relation that is needed in order to separate the Background from Intentional states can only be asserted in the co-occurrence of the Background and Intentional states. What this means is that even though
the Background precedes its respective Intentional state in actuality, the Background only becomes obvious to the individual once the Intentional state has occurred. The reason why a non-propositional mental content can be granted to the Background is that individuals can typically discern the cause of experienced effects within Intentional states. For example, an individual's Intentional state experienced when identifying the chords of a musical piece being played is recognized as caused by the initial learning of musical chords, the initial learning preceding the present Intentional experience. There could be no recognition of temporal relations within the Intentional states without something to relate them to and some way to relate them, that is, without some cause to relate the effects to and a concept of temporal relations that make the relating of cause and effect possible. *A Background with a content is needed to relate causally that which necessarily precedes Intentional states and a concept of temporal relations is needed to separate the Background from one's Intentional state.* The importance of the transcendental argument rests largely on this. In order for the Background to be supported, one begins in the Intentional states, where mental mental effects are experienced and the causes are discerned by recognizing temporal relations between the Background and the Intentional states. The same goes for the separation of Intentional states from one another. A concept of temporal relations is needed to discern to the cause of an Intentional state experienced (the effect). The experience of hatred of someone (the effect) when seeing that someone can be recognized by the individual as caused by something that preceded the hatred (e.g., seeing the other person beat his children in a shopping mall), this recognition requiring a concept of temporal relations. The concept of temporality used in the present context is a transcendental concept that connects one's experienced Intentional state (effect) with that which precedes the Intentional state (cause). The point to be made is that people discern cause and effect relations (of the sort discussed by Searle) everyday and this could not take place were it not for there being a certain transcendental understanding and certain concepts crucial to its operation.
It is useful to recapitulate the main points pertaining to the relevance of transcendental arguments to Searle's theory before turning to the final chapter. The work of a transcendental argument is to uncover underlying presuppositional structure. Searle's Background, to which Intentional states are connected, is a presuppositional structure that requires uncovering. Remember that for Searle, not all cognition is representational and those cognitions that are present in the Background are mental and non-representational. It is only by way of prior cognitive processes that later representations can be had. The transcendental argument pertinent to Searle's theory would include a concept of temporality. The reason is that for any succession of experiences to be related as Searle wishes to do there has to be some concept of before and after to discern an ordering of experiences. This concept has to be a precondition for the normal ordering of experiences. The concept of causality is another transcendental concept attributable to Searle. This concept could be used to better describe causal relations between Background and the Intentional states.
Chapter IV-Uncovering the Transcendental Arguments In Searle's Project

The direction of this project up until now has led to the hypothesis of the necessity of transcendental arguments to Searle's project in overcoming certain problems as well as trying to articulate the benefits that could come from using a transcendental argument. In addition, some preparatory work has been done in contribution to specifying the Searlean transcendental argument. Preliminary suggestions have been made, but it is hypothesized that a more complete characterization can be provided for the transcendental argument applicable to Searle's theory of meaning. With this in mind, this chapter focuses on a version of transcendental argument deemed to be the most relevant to Searle's project.

Despite the above-mentioned similarity with the Kantian project, the transcendental argument that makes itself applicable to Searle is to be distinguished from the traditional Kantian argument. The traditional transcendental argument employed by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason (1771) was an a priori argument concerned largely with the logical preconditions for experiences, with little attention directed at the realm of experience other than acknowledging its necessity for a priori knowledge. The transcendental argument presented in Searle's work could share the same fundamental a priori appeal but with greater acknowledgement of the role of experience. Although a priori appeals are independent of any particular experience, they could not be made were it not for there being experiences. The main difference between Kant's and Searle's a priori appeal is that the former a priori argument was concerned with only what occurs in experiences for all individuals whereas, the latter appeal is concerned just as much with the realm of experience (or the realm of sensibility in Kantian terminology) that varies from individual to individual. The distinction between shallow and deep Background in the previous section was used to make this point. Searle's use of the transcendental is directed at individuals' Backgrounds of experience independent of individual's representational states. It is largely the division between non-representational (Background) and representational aspects (Intentional states) of experience that the transcendental argument is intended to bridge. The
proof of this comes from the simultaneous emphasis Searle places on 'Background' as non-representational but also as comprised of individual experiences, the separation of the representation from the non-representational needing something like a transcendental deduction to explain the subject's deeper realm of experiences.

The purpose of the final sections in the thesis are threefold, (1) to further secure the Searlean transcendental argument by drawing similarities between Searle's approach and the approach taken by Charles Taylor, (2) to use insights from Taylor's work to better address the major criticisms against Searle discussed in this thesis, and (3) to demonstrate the usefulness of a transcendental interpretation of Searle's theory of meaning.

4.1. The Presence of Taylor's Transcendental Distinction In Searle's Theory

The previous mentioned points were intended to introduce the general characteristics concerning transcendental arguments. Below, an example of one formulation of a transcendental argument from Charles Taylor is discussed along with its relation to Searle's theory of meaning. A discussion of Taylor's 'background argument' is used as a demonstration of the extensiveness of transcendental arguments, linking together Searle and Taylor in this shared common ground of transcendental appeal. Taylor's insightful work can be applied to address some of the criticisms unable to be answered by Searle thus far.

Taylor's use of transcendental argument is exemplary in demonstrating how an individual's experience can be considered the starting point for transcendental departure. This is not meant to make transcendental arguments sound a posteriori but only to acknowledge the necessary starting point of transcendental arguments in the realm of experience. He attempts to articulate transcendental arguments by way of describing what is essential to experience in order for its being an experience at all. For Taylor, this essential feature of experience lies in experiencing something, for there is always some point to the activity experienced that is essential for the experience being of something.
Taylor defines human experience in terms of its essential feature of an activity having a point and also that individuals are aware of such a point. He (1995, 12) states, "An activity has a point. Qua having a point certain things are essential to it. That is, their absence would void the point of their activity." This is followed by, "Now the agent must have some insight into the point of his activity. The insight will not be total; some things will be hidden from him. But he must have some grasp of what he is doing, that grasp which is involved in doing it. What this amounts to will vary with different actions. But for some which involve a degree of consciousness and understanding, self-awareness is part of their point. For these, the point of the activity—the absence of which would void the point—must itself include the agent's awareness of the point." Taylor is sensitive to the ongoing debate in philosophy of mind over the nature of experience and carefully describes experience in terms of features of consciousness, awareness, and of having a point. His use of experience as individual activity sections off a specific category of experience that Taylor wants to invoke in making transcendental claims. Taylor submits that transcendental claims concerning what is necessary in most individuals' everyday activities are certain because of there being an underlying point to each activity, this point which must be 'grasped' for the activity to be carried out. The transcendental claims articulate the point or certain conditions of success or failure.

Searle and Taylor are remarkably similar in certain respects. First, Searle and Taylor stress the importance and irreducibility of subjective experience. Second, both philosophers believe it to be important to get at essential conditions, to probe deeper into that which underlies individuals' subjective experience. Both authors search for necessary mental conditions underlying subjective experience. This is markedly different from attempting to explain subjective experience in terms of a physical neurological substrate. Subjective experience is assumed to be certain, representing the beginning point for their transcendental argument. Third and most importantly, Taylor ties the purposefulness of experience to its transcendental claims which determine the success or failure of the
experience in a similar manner to Searle, whose 'conditions of satisfaction' specify success or failure of Intentional actions of conforming with the Intentional states. Both authors qualify the realm of experience with certain conditions to fulfill or which fail to be fulfilled. Taylor's usage of transcendental argument and Searle use of conditions of satisfaction are merely different terms used by the authors to represent their shared purpose of delving into the underlying conditions necessary for subjective experience.

The establishment of such a similarity in transcendental logic between Searle and Taylor is a strategic point by which Searle's theory of meaning can extend itself into a larger space of discussion, one in which social and linguistic criticisms previously discussed (i.e. Apel, Habermas) can be better addressed. From *Sources of the Self* (1989), Taylor's notion of 'framework' used to represent an individual's social background is used to bring out what underlies each person's individual and group intentions and moral obligations that a complete philosophy of mind would be interested in. Taylor's 'framework' can be used to extend and complement Searle's notion of 'Background' by demonstrating better than Searle has, the constitutive role of background as viewed from a social standpoint. This is done by extending background considerations into the social realm.

In *Sources of the Self* (1989) Taylor wants to get a descriptive account of social background in order to examine the role it exerts in individuals' lives. The background that Taylor wants to get at is a broader background which underlies the meaningfulness of a whole life. Taylor's broader background includes evaluative discriminations people make which both fall within and beyond individuals' personal inclinations. Of that which falls beyond individuals' personal inclinations, there are what Taylor calls 'strong evaluations' of an already existing standard which is independent of subject choice. He wants to draw attention to the many already existing standards of evaluation that are part of society and which do not originate in its present members. This is not to say that all people react to intuitions in the same way. Rather, intuitions are 'shaped' (Taylor's term) by cultures so
the reactions of people may differ from culture to culture. Searle would not disagree with this but would rather emphasize that similarities within and differences between cultures represent similarities and differences in the things (activities) people do and the way they will be done.

It could be objected that Taylor is only interested in the effects of culture imposing itself on the individual and not really concerned with the individual’s capacity independent of cultural effects. This could be used as ground to deny similarities with Searle and his use of a transcendental argument. However, the background itself can include both. Taylor is careful not to lose sight of the transcendental basis of his investigation. The culture (in Taylor’s view) may shape individuals reactions into a specific form, but the reactions exist before this. Taylor (1989) states, “Culture and upbringing may help to define the boundaries of the relevant ‘others’, but they don’t seem to create the basic reaction itself.” By this reasoning, one’s reactions include not only the reaction shaped by one’s culture but also the original intuitions that underly it. These underlying intuitions are an integral part of Searle’s Background.

Taylor’s notion of background properties is not merely empirical, a listing of reactions or behaviors. Within this background, intrinsic properties provide a fundamental base upon which individual responses take shape. It is upon individuals’ subjective experiences that articulations are made. This is the necessary starting point for articulating what he calls the ‘background picture’. The actual process of articulation for Taylor is how individuals ‘make sense’ of this background picture. He believes that ‘making sense’ means articulating what makes these responses appropriate, identifying what makes something a fit object for them and correlatively formulating more fully the nature of the response as well as spelling out what all this presupposes about ourselves and our situation in the world. Taylor’s explanation of individual backgrounds is based on transcendental argument with an emphasis on social background corresponding to the tradition which the
individual is part of. Searle's transcendental argument (outlined in Chapter I) does not have the same social appeal.

Taylor's transcendental claim is a useful tool to demonstrate both the necessity of transcendental arguments in explaining Background meaning of individuals as well as demonstrating that transcendental arguments can contain social as well as individual points. His notion of background and particular use of transcendental argument paint a very different picture of presuppositional background than Searle. While Searle's Background was immersed in terms of individual know-how, Taylor's background entails a social/cultural background that the individual has been exposed. This social/cultural dimension is something absent in most of Searle's work work with slight exception (see Searle, 1990, 1995).

4.2. Addressing the Criticisms:

In what follows, responses are made to the rejection of Intentionality in the determination of meaning. Responses are offered in an attempt at preserving representational meaning as a crucial element within an overall theory of meaning, namely, Searle's. Transcendental argument is used here to cushion the blows from the narrowing tendencies of a linguistic turn.

First, there was Alston with his refutation of Searle's 'essential conditions.' Alston reacts to Searle's failure of making explicit certain key features intended for use both at the level of representation and at the level of speech acts. Alston's response was to get rid of the representation talk, replacing it with fundamental appeals to communicative commitment. Without better articulation of how 'essential conditions' operate at the levels Searle believes them to operate at, Alston's suggestion seems the best bet.

As it stands, Alston believes Intentionality as a theory of meaning is deficient in certain respects and not able to account for the success and failure of illocutionary act performance required to determine meaning. What is required to get out of this
predicament is something binding that can link together Intentional meaning to illocutionary act performance which Alston doubts is possible (see section on Alston). This is something that Searle (up until now) has been unable to adequately respond to but that is fundamental to a transcendental argument.

What a well developed transcendental argument can do for Searle is to attempt to define essential conditions better than Searle has been able to do thus far. To begin with, what lies in the Background of experience for Searle is limited to acquired know-hows and prior experiences. All of these aspects are a part of the individual. It is all non-Intentional and non-representational (representations for Searle taking place within the Intentional states). Any essential conditions pertaining to illocutionary acts determined by Intentional states find very little in such an underlying Background to draw from, the determination of essential conditions finding very little non-represented material from which to draw conclusions.

The transcendental argument required in Searle's project as supplemented by Taylor could seek to articulate the presence of a presuppositional social structure within the Background of each individual. Taylor's notion of individual background paints a broader picture of presuppositional background than Searle. While Searle's Background concerned itself with one aspect of presuppositional background, Taylor's background entails more obvious social/cultural background of individuals. This is not to say that the articulation of Taylor's thesis does not require transcendental processes, only that it is somewhat easier to make obvious the underlying presuppositional structure because they are social in character and more easily discerned than certain other presuppositional structures (e.g., concepts of space and time) that are not so easy to discern from experience.

This thesis is not concerned with making a transcendental argument but only to demonstrate its usefulness in defending the Searlean theory of meaning given that transcendental arguments are found to be successful. Much of the structure behind illocutionary acts can be explained by way of a transcendental argument beginning in
Intentional experience and moving to conclusions of essential Background features of which social/cultural backgrounds are a part. The essential conditions of promising, asserting, and requesting that Searle has tried to make clear take on a new level of importance. Much of what has been offered as criticism in terms of presuppositional normative and linguistic structures could be considered a part of an individual's Background within the framework of a transcendental argument. It is the contention here that if a transcendental argument that takes on social concerns is posited, problems of illocutionary act specifications simply would not arise.

**Conclusion**

It can be concluded that a transcendental argument, if found to be an acceptable method, could be indispensable to Searle's inclusive theory of meaning because it provides a means by which to defend the Background thesis crucial to his general theory. Up until now the difficulty has been that the Background (the cause) is only manifest within the Intentional states (the effects). Essentially, a Background with a content is needed to relate causally to Intentional states and an account of temporal relations is needed to separate the contents of Background from the contents of Intentional states. The asserting of temporal relations responsible for the separation of the Background from the Intentional states requires at least the basic transcendental argument attributed to Searle in the first chapter. This basic argument does not even address the many criticisms levied against Searle but only better secures what his actual position is, a position which previously appeared incoherent in places. Some other criticisms against Searle stem from deep ingrained differences between Searle and other philosophers that may never be resolved.

The use of transcendental arguments to demonstrate the necessary relation of Intentional states to Background social/cultural presuppositions applied to the major criticisms levied against Searle was found to be possible. This was accomplished largely by drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. The main focus of the last round of addressing
criticisms was intended to provide a stronger defense for Searle’s multi-level theory of meaning by reinforcing the first transcendental claim attributed to Searle (see pages 37-39).

While Searle clearly articulates the more basic experiences of individual know-how within Background, Taylor speaks of the more publicly defined (but still individual) experiences within an individual’s Intentional states and presuppositional Background. This relation can be explained in terms of multiple transcendental arguments where Searle’s argument points to the most basic essential conditions while a broader social background is the result of another transcendental level (Taylor). Numerous similarities were drawn between Searle and Taylor, subsequently employing Taylor’s emphasis on presuppositional social/cultural features to defend Searle’s thesis against criticism. It has been strongly emphasized throughout this paper how transcendental arguments that carry questions of meaning to a social level by making visible (to borrow from Taylor) individual social backgrounds are key in dispelling certain misbeliefs directed towards Searle’s project, primarily those stemming from linguistic frameworks that have been up until now perhaps the greatest opposition to Searle’s project.

It was not the goal to defend the use of transcendental arguments within philosophy of mind but to demonstrate that transcendental arguments could greatly benefit Searle if it turns out that they are found to be valid. The discussion of Taylor’s transcendental argument was not intended to be necessarily attributed to Searle but rather to demonstrate the advantages that come with adapting a transcendental argument given certain types of philosophical interests unable to be articulated by other means. In a similar way, the use of a transcendental argument to better articulate the importance of the experience of temporality was intended to demonstrate another advantage of transcendental argumentation in addressing questions that Searle himself would have liked to address. How different

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13 Two subjects are crucial to consciousness, but I will have little to say about them because I do not yet fully understand them well enough. The first is temporality. Since Kant we have been aware of an asymmetry in the way that consciousness relates to space and time. Although we experience objects and events as both spatially extended and of a temporal duration, our consciousness itself is not experienced as spatial, though it is experienced as temporally extended. Indeed, the spatial metaphors for describing time seem almost inevitable for consciousness as well, as when we speak for example of the “stream of
transcendental arguments relate to one another is an interesting question but one that goes beyond the scope of this paper. In future work, it would be truly interesting to pursue the relations of other transcendental categories.

consciousness." Notoriously, phenomenological time does not exactly match real time, but I do not know how to account for the systematic character of the disparities. The second neglected top is society. I am convinced that the category of "other people" plays a special role in the structure of our conscious experiences, a role unlike that of objects and states of affairs; and I believe that this capacity for assigning a special status to the other loci of consciousness is both biologically based and is a Background presupposition for all forms of collective intentionality (Searle, 1990). But I do not yet know how to demonstrate these claims, nor how to analyze the structure of the social element in individual consciousness. (Searle 1992, 127)
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