formulation. On the philosophical level there follows an account of the work of Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Jürgen Habermas, both contemporary philosophers who have fashioned impressive theories of human cognition. Lonergan's placing the ultimate grounding of the truth of the human subject in a further intelligibility beyond being as proportionate to human knowing is found to reflect a Kantian orientation and Habermas's placing of the grounding within the intersubjective matrix of human being is found to reflect an Hegelian orientation.

Finally the study argues that this philosophical divergence carries over in contemporary theological endeavour, namely in Lonergan's own Method in Theology and the work of the so-called "political theologians," Johannes Baptist Metz and Helmut Peukert on the Catholic side and Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg on the Protestant side. Lonergan locates the ultimate grounding of the human subject in a "further intelligibility," whereas the political theologians attempt to establish a mediation of freedom and revelation within the historical horizon of human consciousness.

The study concludes by arguing that contemporary theology might benefit from more self-awareness of the philosophical undercurrents which very much shape its puzzling divergencies. As an example of the recovery of this self-awareness a brief discussion of the work of Eric Voegelin is given, not as a program of a new philosophical orthodoxy but as an example of orthopraxy.
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This study began as an inquiry into what was distinctive about the philosophy of Hegel as opposed to Kant. The background of this question was an interest in the problem of pluralism, namely, could any rationale be found for the present situation of mutually tolerant religious traditions and views of life? Or, is the current situation, which is largely the result of a conflux of historical forces, to be left as it is without any philosophical or theological grounding and therefore likely at any moment to be wrested or dissolved into a new pattern?

Hegel, of course, has much to say about this problem and furnishes a rationale for the maintenance of a pluralism under the aegis of a state open to that philosophical grounding of reality which is ultimately to be construed as the dimension of Absolute Spirit. Yet Hegel's mighty system draws its original impetus from the Kantian turn to the subject as an autonomous knower. Kant discerned that the knower is a creative agent in knowing reality, so that to speak of reality as real without a knower simply ignores the fact that only knowers concern themselves with reality and reality itself is precisely what they know. An "unknown" reality is simply not reality — it is chaos or the void.

Hegel attempted to solve not only the problem of the dynamic interrelation between knower and known but also the problem of why the distinction between the knower and the reality he knows should ever have existed. The latter problem is the problem of the theodicy: why is self-actualization so painful and wasteful? Why is there something "left over" from the knower which his knowing cannot encompass? For Kant the thing
left over turned out to be the thing-in-itself or its real reality — a conclusion Hegel regarded as self-contradictory. Yet Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself — which escapes being organized in our categories of knowledge — was the inescapable consequence of having a knower who did the organizing or the creative act of knowing rather than retaining the knower (as in the old metaphysics) as the passive recipient of forms of the knowability of reality.

The question therefore presented itself — is the price for having an autonomous knower an unknown reality, or if we aspire to, and claim to attain, a known reality, must we sacrifice the autonomy of the human subject who does the knowing? Now Hegel was one who claimed he had broken through the self-contradiction of having a knower who could never attain the reality to which his knowing was directed. But did he preserve the autonomy of the knower in the end? What is distinctive about Hegel is his self-conscious insistence that he retains the autonomy of the knower within his account of the reality which is knowable and known.

Now in this study I have not tried to refute Hegel's claim (for it has been ferociously assailed) so much as to present the basic dynamic of how he sees this achievement of all achievements is to be won. It is this paradigm which I claim grounds one basic stance in contemporary theology as represented by the work of the "political" theologians.

Hegel attempts to have both his subject and reality too by locating the subjective consciousness of the individual consciousness within the interpersonal or "intersubjective" consciousness of that consciousness which is constitutive of human social reality. And this dimension of the intersubjective, of ethical self-consciousness, is literally the
salvation of both the subject and the reality which initiates the saving action. It is, in Hegel's view, the salvation of both freedom and grace. That grace needs to be "saved" is perhaps at first glance strange (for grace is after all supposed to be uncreated and free and hence hardly in need of anything, any contribution to it on our part). Yet Hegel's essential insistence is that grace is a human experience — an experience, within the constitution of human knowing — and if it is an human experience, we as knowers are obliged either to save it or reject it as significant for human life. It is the incarnational principle further extended — God not only becomes man to save man but man is thereby given the task of saving God. And this modest task Hegel undertook.

Now to those who do not believe God is in need of being saved, Hegel's thought takes on the character of a rather gruesome joke — one that has had a ghastly effect on recent history. Yet to be fair to Hegel, Hegel saw himself not the saviour of God (plenty of theologians have that hidden agenda) so much as a philosopher who could furnish an account of the human attainment of self-consciousness which at the same time was the Absolute's own self-consciousness. Hegel approaches the self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit through the dimension of the ethical self-consciousness, the dimension of consciousness in which human subjects may participate as political beings, as members of the state. We identify this realm as the realm of the intersubjective, a breath-taking (or breath-giving) dimension after all, for what is this dimension in which we mutually participate and in which we communicate as full human subjects except our very access to and test of God's revelation? God has chosen to make his revelation known to us through
our own minds and our own spirit. God's revelation is indirect, for somehow human life and human history has been made salvific in and of itself.

And what of Kant? Why is it that his work has never succumbed to this overpowering resolution of all its inner difficulties? Again it is grace -- grace in the sense that Kant allows us to save that aspect of grace which Hegel appears to lose irrevocably, namely, its uncreated transcendence. There is a reality influencing human life which is not simply making use of human life to fulfill its own dynamic of self-consciousness.

Now here it may be objected that Kant is the last one to be connected with any retention of grace, for surely his confining religious experience into the moral strait jacket militates against this dimension of experience. Yet it is not the tedium of Kant's moral duty that I mean. Rather, I am speaking of his philosophical underpinning of the thing-in-itself. Kant's morality is a modest desire to rejoin the human race after the vision of such a transcendent reality and although his desire to belong to the human race "greatly does him credit" yet his significance for theological formulation rests upon his bringing the free human subject to the conscious appropriation of his freedom not only in the face of such a transcendent reality but precisely because of such a transcendent reality.

Kant's formulation, therefore, retains against the Hegelian critique a powerful inner apprehension of the ground rules of human experience, and specifically the ground rules of human freedom and the freedom of grace. Consequently, I see Lonergan's formulation not so
much controvcrting Kant as seeking to establish Kant's basic paradigm without either the relapse into moralism or the submergence of the subject into an engulfing principle of total unification of human and divine reality.

I want to make clear that I do not believe that any of the contemporary authors I discuss -- Lonergan on the Kantian side and Habermas, Metz and Peukert, Moltmann and Pannenberg, on the Hegelian side -- represents a parroting forth of either position. It is a question of identifying their basic orientation, of explaining why human reality is construed in such differing fashion. Habermas's development of the intersubjective I regard as philosophically the most consistent with Hegel's intention. And the political theologians seem deeply involved with arguing for the incarnational modality of grace. God has died as God and has chosen to give his saving grace through the modality of human life its thought and its history. It is in this sense that Moltmann sees the cross as the central incarnational act of God and Pannenberg, interested in our knowing God, stresses the indirect nature of revelation. Metz and Peukert for their part look at the human praxis of appropriating freedom and of communicative action as comprising our access to and test of revelatory content. Such activities are continuous with that praxis which is faith.

I concluded with Voegelin because he mediates between the "Hegelian" and "Kantian" positions. On the one hand, he is explicitly open to and appreciative of the work of Bernard Lonergan. Yet one can also speak of Voegelin as "Hegelian" because for him history, revelation and reason are made consistently mutually self-illuminating. Yet
because he certainly maintains the transcendent reality of the divine
ground and because he looks at Hegel as the great gnostic betrayer of
the tensions of human existence he certainly cannot be called Hegelian
without great qualification. Yet he can by no means be described as
Kantian or Lonerganian either; for revelation and reason are not
ultimately two distinct human experiences for him, but rather reason
itself is revelatory, and I doubt if Voegelin could accept the demarc-
ation of a general or special transcendent knowledge beyond the being
that is proportionate to human knowing which constitutes the field of
metaphysics as a science for Lonergan. It is probably more accurate to
look at both Hegel and Voegelin as attempting the same great task: to
give an account of the revelatory content of the historical development
of human philosophy. Thus they both share the programmatic sentence:
"Eternal being realizes itself in time." Voegelin, however, tries to
mediate a dynamic relation rather than propose a system.

The minimal aim of this study is to throw light upon the dimension
of the "intersubjective." That this dimension, signifying as it does
the dimension of interface and unitive bonding between conscious human
beings, enjoys ontological significance in Habermas's social theory is
no accident, and I have attempted to show why. And that this dimension
is made to be a dimension of human life prior to fully liberated human
existence in Lonergan's thought is again no accident. My aim here is
to uncover the "pre-history" of the word "intersubjective," so that we
may see what constellation of thought and concept accounts for its
origin. Words may have a certain inner significance and power of their
own and unless we turn our attention to what that power is, we will
find ourselves as much used by them as users of them.

My larger aim is to investigate what factors might contribute to healing the cleavage between philosophy and faith which so grievously afflicts contemporary Western consciousness. I must emphasize here that when I suggest that Lonergan ultimately argues that faith is the dimension for the grounding of the human subject on the grounds that one cannot deal with the dimension beyond the full existential subject through the competency of philosophical thought, I am not thereby suggesting he is somehow inferior to those who do try to encompass this dimension through the agency of philosophical thought. What I am suggesting is that Lonergan is respecting a demarcation first laid down in modern conceptual categories by Kant, and that this demarcation is one of intrinsic worth, even though it has not proved unassailable. And, conversely, when I suggest that Habermas and the "political theologians" do implicitly assent to Hegel's philosophical considerations of the dimension beyond the full existential human subject, I do not on that account consider them superior. Rather I merely hope to make explicit this assent. The question does arise, however, whether any mediation may be established between these two basic positions, and it is for this reason the study concludes with Voegelin's attempt to place faith and philosophy in a mutually grounding context. It is my hope that by exposing the inner dynamic of these two positions, I may throw light on their intrinsic worth and at the same time cast light on how we may approach in a new way the problem of reason and revelation.
INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to throw light upon the structure of contemporary theological formulation through an examination of two philosophical approaches to the problem of grounding the autonomy of the human subject. Kant and Hegel were the thinkers who introduced into contemporary consciousness the question of the human subject as an autonomous and self-directing knower whose self-direction must in addition be understood within a social context of fellow human beings. Our study begins therefore with an examination of the Kantian and Hegelian treatment of the subject and their respective decisions about the ultimate mode of grounding the reality of the free human subjectivity in its personal and social aspects.

This study, therefore, does not deal with the realm of faith versus the realm of philosophy as a primary topic but rather seeks to identify two ways in which human autonomy has received its ultimate authentication. Our aim is not to offer a conclusive definition of the domain of faith as opposed to the domain of philosophy, as if such domains could exist in the abstract, but rather to seek an understanding of the issue through the more basic inquiry into the way ultimate grounding is to be found for the mutually constitutive realities of human individual and human community. My way of giving the question of faith as opposed to philosophical knowledge a much needed frame of reference is to locate one crucial difference that exists between Kant
and Hegel concerning the scope and grounding of human subjectivity. Our purpose in the study is to suggest the permeating influence of the divergency between these two thinkers in the contemporary philosophical and theological scene.

Kant and Hegel reached divergent conclusions about our mode of cognitional access to the ultimate grounding of human subjectivity. Briefly, Kant leaves the demonstration that the human subject possesses an inherent finality and enjoys an authentic subsistence to the realm of faith. Kant's inquiry into the scope of human reason's competence led him to argue that we cannot attain philosophical knowledge of what may give human beings finality and permanence outside the bounds of their spatio-temporal existence. Hegel, however, did attempt a philosophical grounding for the project of human subjectivity, a project first conceptually achieved by Kant but left, according to Hegel, without any orientation within a reality that could be within the scope of a mutually communicable realm of knowledge. Hegel's attempt at absolute knowledge, even beyond the "love of knowledge" of all previous philosophy can be understood as this attempt to render completely accessible to human thought the certainty and the truth of this mutually communicable realm of knowledge. This mutually communicable realm turns out to be knowledge shared not only amongst all human subjects but also knowledge shared between human subjects and that "Spirit" whom we represent to ourselves as God.

It is Hegel's insistence that some immanently accessible grounding for Kantian subjectivity must be found which constitutes an important tension between their work. The dynamics of this tension I hope to
establish and illustrate in the first two chapters of this study. Hegel has alternately been condemned for subverting Kant’s achievement of the autonomy of the human subject by robbing the individual of any intrinsic significance and making him a mere moment of the self-realization of the cosmic spirit or Geist. ¹ On the other hand, Hegel has also been given credit for beginning the emphasis on the subject which has occupied contemporary philosophy, an emphasis which has gone beyond Kant’s Copernican revolution which “brought the subject into technical prominence while making only minimal concessions to its reality.”² Such a divergence of appraisal hints at the question which has informed the post-Kantian problematic of the grounding of the individual human subject which, on the one hand, must not subvert the autonomy of the subject but which also must be a dimension in some sense more inclusive or integrative of any particular embodiment of human subjectivity in an autonomous individual. I hope to demonstrate that this question continues to play its role in contemporary philosophical and theological formulations which more or less self-consciously take their point of departure from the Kantian turn. My purpose is to draw attention to both the unresolved dimension of this question and its persistence in these formulations. Its very persistence is a factor in the divergency in contemporary theological options.

¹See Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) for an excellent account of the origin of this opinion about Hegel.

The first two chapters of this study, then, concern themselves with the Kantian and Hegelian treatment of the human subject. The first chapter introduces the topic and attempts to delineate the nature of the contrast between Kant and Hegel. The second chapter takes up their respective political theory and attempts to show that their differing conclusions about how the reality of the human subject is to receive an ultimate grounding lead to a corresponding contrast in the way they construe the nature of human freedom and its relation to the political reality of the state. It is from this consideration of their political theory that we arrive at Kant's restrictive role for the civil state as an instrument of order and not a dimension of ethical existence. Hegel insisted, however, that it must be somehow an expression of ethical existence and his theory has led to the formulation of the concept of that dimension we tend to identify as the realm of the intersubjective.

After completing this discussion of Kant and Hegel, I then attempt to establish that the conceptual structures developed by Kant and Hegel in their respective grounding of human subjectivity persist first within the scope of contemporary philosophy (chapter three) and then within the scope of contemporary theology (chapter four). Here I do not pretend to present contemporary philosophical and theological thought in its completeness but to show the persistence of the Kantian and Hegelian conceptual structures within the scope of contemporary formulation. I argue that Lonergan's "further intelligibility" as the ultimate grounding for the human subject as he faces the fact of social and moral evil has affinities with the Kantian structure, for this further intelligibility cannot be considered scientifically proveable.
but only indicated by the intelligibility proper to the human knower and inquirer. When Habermas for his part attempts to ground the human allegiance to truth in the realm of human intersubjectivity I argue that he has drawn upon Hegel's own attempt to provide an objective and philosophically accessible sphere in which the intelligibility proper to the human knower and inquirer may find its larger orientation and foundation.

Turning in chapter four to the contemporary theological scene, I again do not pretend to present a complete account of its thought and vision but to identify an important factor operative within its scope. I therefore carry through with an examination of Lonergan's theological work and maintain that when he states that it is within the consciousness of the believer/theologian that the immanent levels of intentional consciousness find resolution with the realm of transcendence, he remains consistent with Kantian formulation. The political theologians, Johannes Baptist Metz and Helmut Peukert on the Catholic side and Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg on the Protestant side, can for their part be understood as using the Hegelian formulation in that they seek to ground human freedom and divine revelation not in a reality bestowed extraneously to human being but in a reality that is accessible to, as well as constitutive of, that being as created and self-creating. Our purpose in both the philosophical and theological sphere is to uncover the persistence of the Kantian and Hegelian conceptual structures so that when brought to the light of day they will not remain hidden determinates but be revealed as important factors in any intellectual apprehension of the grounding of the human subject in both divine and human community.
The conclusion is an attempt to broach a resolution of the issue between the Kantian and Hegelian formulations using the work of Eric Voegelin not so much as the "answer" but as an exemplar of what needs to be done. Voegelin's work itself makes sense only within the framework of the question of the grounding of the human subject in both divine and human community and without the question his work must appear as one more over-all resolution of the tensions of reality which make exhilarating and even ecstatic reading but whose effect vanishes as soon as one turns from the book to the contradictory intricacies of existence. Thus, much as Voegelin is severely critical of Hegel, Voegelin's recovery of the classic experience of reason as mediated through Plato and Aristotle attains a force of conviction only when situated within the question raised by Hegel as over against Kant and within the resultant construct of contemporary consciousness. His work then is advanced not as the new philosophical orthodoxy but as an "orthopraxy" — how to do it right if one is to begin at all.

If I have achieved anything by this study, I hope it is that I have shed light upon a word much used in the current discussion about the interpersonal reality of human life. This word is the word "intersubjective" whose usage is frequent but whose definition is vague. This study, in fact, attempts to relate the disparity of definition found between Lonergan and Habermas in their use of this word with the foundational divergency between Kant and Hegel. Lonergan uses the word "intersubjective" to describe a primary level of bonding between human beings, a bonding which exists in the spontaneous relationship of family, friends and communal feeling. Habermas, however, uses the
word to denote an ontological referent of human being, a referent which is nothing less than the basis of our allegiance to truth as that which constitutes the bond between human subjects. When one asks how two contemporary writers may use a common word in such a dissimilar fashion, one soon finds that the word has been made to mean what the author intends it to mean, "neither more nor less." Yet in making this word their servant, Lonergan and Habermas reveal who their masters are. For my argument is that in tracing the root of the divergency between these authors, we arrive back at the question of the divergency between the thought of Kant and Hegel.

This study, in fact, begins with the question of the divergency between Kant and Hegel. This question has merit both on its own grounds and, as I hope to show, on the grounds of being the necessary starting point for understanding the real significance of a contemporary disparity of usage of the word "intersubjective" in two very profound and yet dissimilar philosophers. Exactly in what way Hegel differs from Kant has often been asked and various praise or vilification has been awarded either according to predilection. My own answer to this question has been guided by two parallel questions: What is the divergency between Kant and Hegel as we examine their thought as expressed by these authors themselves? Does the contemporary divergency between Lonergan and Habermas, two philosophers who self-consciously work in the heritage of these philosophers, have anything

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3 "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." Humpty Dumpty to Alice in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass.
to do with that initial divergency? My argument is that the parallel
sets of divergencies are mutually illuminative and serve as a structure
by which these authors can all be interrelated.

My minimal aim, therefore, in this study is to identify the
structure of thought, the conceptual baggage, which accompanies such a
word as "intersubjective." My more grandiose ambition is to provide a
cue to the origin of the cleavage between faith and philosophy which
seems to afflict modern consciousness in a particularly acute way and
to make some small contribution towards its healing. Consciousness is
perhaps more fortunate than poor Humpty Dumpty, for it can find
re-integration. How well I achieve either of these aims must now be
proved.
PART I

THE KANTIAN AND HEGELIAN TREATMENT
OF THE SUBJECT
CHAPTER I

THE QUESTION OF SUBJECTIVITY AS A DETERMINING FACTOR OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY. THE QUESTION OF THE INTEGRITY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY AS OVER AGAINST SPINOZA AND KANT

The Kantian Framework

The Kantian and Hegelian philosophies present two quite different treatments of the nature of human freedom as determined by the autonomous human subject. The Hegelian philosophy, moreover, can be understood as a critique of the Kantian philosophy, which, in turn, has never succumbed to that critique. The difference between them has not resolved itself within Western consciousness even yet. This difference I shall argue helps determine why the vocabulary and emphasis of such a philosopher and theologian as Bernard Lonergan, who claims to complete the Copernican revolution only inadequately begun by Kant, is divergent from such "Hegelian" thinkers as the philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas and the theologians Johann Baptist Metz, Helmut Peukert, Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

Kant's philosophy is usually agreed to mark both a subjective turn and a critical turn in Western consciousness. The two terms are not identical. The subjective turn draws attention to the active role of the human knower in constituting the reality known. The human knower is not just a passive instrument onto whom an outer reality is impressed. Rather, human knowing is active as over against the reality it knows. It is the critical turn, however, that marks the full extent
of Kant's achievement. As Lewis White Beck points out, the subjective
turn or the "Copernican revolution" of human knowing might have been
contained within a heightened rationalism.1 It is Kant's attempt to
have reason place limits on the competency of reason, as developed in
the "Antinomies" of the Critique of Pure Reason, which took Kant's
thought to its most profound development. Through the antinomies Kant
was able to explain why reason could advance convincing arguments for
mutually contradictory conclusions: reason can show that the world has
a beginning in time, but that it also has no such beginning and no
limits in space; reason can show that every composite substance in the
world is made up of simple parts but that equally there nowhere exists
in the world anything simple; reason can show that freedom as a caus-
ality over above the laws of nature is possible but that equally there
can be no freedom, for everything must take place in accordance with
the laws of nature; reason can show that a being that is absolutely
necessary must exist but that equally there can be no absolutely
necessary being.2 Kant's critical turn examined the limits of reason
itself, for only by such a critique of pure reason could its ultimate
competency be assessed. Kant hoped that through his illumination of
human knowing the age-old alternatives that had bedevilled philosophy
would cease to be the absolute options for the mind either to accept

1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings
in Moral Philosophy, trans. and ed. with Introduction by Lewis White

2 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ed. Raymund Schmidt
referred to as Kritik.
Kant's critique led him to conclude that reason (understood as the general faculty of knowing) had a proficiency in broaching the realm of possible experience (phenomena) which could not be carried over into the realm of Ideas (noumena) which are beyond the realm of possible experience. The realm of the \textit{noumena} is the realm of the "thing-in-itself" (\textit{Ding-an-sich}) as opposed to the mere appearance of the thing in phenomenal reality. When we speak of the realm of phenomena we speak of the competence of the understanding (\textit{Verstand}) to apply its pure concepts (categories) to phenomena in accordance with the conditions of sensibility (\textit{Sinnlichkeit}). It is reason, however, (\textit{Verunft}), as distinct from the understanding and sensibility, i.e. as "pure", which goes beyond the concepts of experience and addresses itself to the realm of noumena. Reason in its transcendental ideas reaches its directly opposed or antinomic conclusions when its complete adequacy as the understanding to make synthetic a priori judgments in the world of phenomena is confused with its only regulative competency as "pure" reason to make these judgments in the world of noumena. That is to say, "pure" reason cannot establish constitutively the reality of unitary substance, the beginning of the world in time, the reality of human freedom or the existence of an absolute being, for within the realm of Ideas reason can establish these conclusions only as regulative principles for its thought, especially as this thought is directed to action. The world of the noumena or the \textit{Ding-an-sich} is thus "proved" by pure reason only as practical. Freedom is "proved" only in human action as it serves as the \textit{a priori} of morality.
Ideas, therefore, are not objects of possible experience but only concepts of pure reason which provide a rule for how the understanding is to be used when it confronts reality as a totality. Whereas the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories), if applied to appearances, can obtain the appropriate material for concepts of experience, the Ideas can never be so embodied in the concrete. Rather in them reason has only a "systematic unity" (systematische Einheit) which cannot match "the unity grounded in what is empirically possible" (empirische mögliche Einheit) which the understanding attains in empirical knowledge. The transcendental Ideas or pure concepts of reason provide light for reason in its regulative employment as

\[\text{ein Grundsatz der größtmöglichen Fortsetzung und Erweiterung der} \\
\text{Erfahrung, nach welchem keine empirische Grenze für absolute} \\
\text{Grenze gelten muss, also ein Prinzipium der Vernunft, welches,} \\
\text{als Regel, postuliert, was von uns im Regressus geschehen soll,} \\
\text{und nicht antizipiert, was im Objekte vor allem Regressus an sich} \\
\text{gegeben ist.}\]

a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience, allowing no empirical limit to hold as absolute. Thus it is a principle of reason which serves as a rule, postulating what we ought to do in the regress, but not anticipating what is present in the object as it is in itself, prior to all regress.

Further, an Idea of reason, when posited in existent reality, becomes an Ideal of reason. For example, the Idea gives the rule for virtue, but

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3 Kant, Kritik, A321 B378: "reine Vernunftbegriffe, oder transzendente Ideen ... den Verstandesgebrauch im Ganzen der gesamten Erfahrung nach Prinzipien bestimmen werden."

4 Ibid., A568 B596.

the Ideal gives "the Archetype" (Urbilde) which can be realized in the individual virtuous man. The Ideals serve as regulative principles for human action. They have a practical power beyond the merely conceptual rule which the principle of reason exercises over the "cosmological" Ideas which otherwise fall into the antinomic conclusions noted above about the magnitude of the world in time and space, the unity of its parts, the scope of causality beyond it and the relation of the unconditioned to it.

Kant argued, therefore, for a dualistic understanding of what we can know according to possible experience (the competency of the understanding) and what we can know about things-in-themselves (the merely regulative domain of reason). Understanding, however, can say only "what is, what has been, or what will be." Reason, however, can broach the question of the "ought" (das Sollen), for reason is the faculty of man which

ihre Gegenstände bloss nach Ideen erwägt und den Verstand dann bestimmt, er dann von seinen (zwar auch reinen) Begriffen einen empirischen Gebrauch macht.

views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.

Reason, therefore, although working in the causality of the Ideas,

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6 Kant, Kritik, A569 B597.
7 Ibid., A508 B536 - A567 B595.
8 Ibid., A547 B575.
9 Ibid. English text is the Smith translation.
determines the understanding from the vantage of the "ought." Through it reason exhibits an empirical character. The causality of the faculty of reason is nothing other than the human will. Here we see the origin of the dualism between the "is" and the "ought" which will serve as a problematic for Hegel's philosophy.

Because Kant's dualistic distinction between the realm of phenomena and the realm of noumena undergirds his conclusions about the competency of reason, it was precisely this distinction which soon came under attack. It was rejected as such by his "conservative" opponents who would not allow such a critique of reason. It was "completed" and subsumed in some higher principle by those who claimed to be his successors. Whatever the "rejections" or "completions", Kant's elaboration of his dualism between phenomena and noumena obviously remains a formulation of philosophical truth which is uniquely his own. It marks a new "turn" — subjective and critical — in the history of philosophy.

The right of Kant's successors, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, to claim that they respect the achievement of Kant has recently been challenged. We will concentrate on the example of Hegel. T. McFarland's Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition bestows "flesh and blood" on the intellectual situation at the end of the eighteenth and at the beginning


of the nineteenth century in Germany. McFarland provides ample documentation for the "Spinozistic Crescendo" that dominated the German intellectual situation of the time. McFarland produces the scenario in order that we may understand the tensions operative in Coleridge's thought, but his description has value in itself for the light it sheds upon the intellectual climate of this period. McFarland demonstrates how Kant's philosophy, although produced in isolation from this attraction for Spinoza which characterized the generation succeeding him, bequeathed a problem to this generation which, ironically, intensified its attraction to Spinoza's monism. This is the problem of the principle of connection (beyond mere external imposition) between one's a priori categories of the mind and objects outside the mind, between the noumena and the phenomena, between the Ding-an-sich and its phenomenal appearance. Kant's whole philosophy, however, insisted upon this dualistic structure of human cognition as over against external reality. McFarland narrates how the philosopher Jacobi was the first to perceive the threat that Spinoza's thought posed for any dualistic structuring of mind and reality, of God and world. Yet so great was that period's desire for a unitary principle of all reality, both divine and human, that Spinoza "seemed impeccably right in the Romantic rationale." Kant's work lost its cogency for the Romantic mind, and McFarland argues that just as Plotinus subsumed Plato into an "elegantly co-ordinated anti-Platonist pantheism", so Fichte, Schelling, Hegel

13 Ibid., p. 86.
and Schopenhauer, though declared disciples of Kant, converted Kant's thought into an anti-Kantian variant of Spinoism. McFarland organizes his evaluation of these philosophers around a distinction made by Coleridge between "I am" philosophy and "it is" philosophy. Philosophers who work from the "I am" position begin from the fact that the "human knower," the "lover of wisdom," is not a mere cipher of the physical laws governing the world but stands over against it in a position of freedom and creativity. Philosophers who work from the "it is" position perceive the vast complexity of the universe in which man lives and find it difficult to make any initial separation of man from this universe. The "I am" position builds from Plato in ancient and from Descartes in modern philosophy up to the achievement of Kant. The "it is" philosophy, conversely, can claim Aristotle, Locke, Mill and the major traditions of empiricism and experimental science on the one hand, and on the other hand, the pantheist tradition represented by Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and especially Spinoza whose philosophy "pursues the syntactic implication of the "it is" beyond the anchorage of the semantic, and thus may be defined as the ultimate expansion of the "it is" as the locus of reality?

McFarland presents Hegel as one among a number of contemporary philosophers who, following Spinoza, invalidated Kant's Ding-an-sich as existing independently from mind. In their hands philosophy is left

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14 Ibid., p. 91.
15 Ibid., p. 59.
16 Ibid., p. 61.
not with unknowable externality but with incompensurable internality or consciousness as its ultimate postulate. This internality could easily be transformed Spinozism since it merely is the relabelling of the monistic substance as "absolute ego," as did Fichte and Schelling, or as "absolute Idea," as did Hegel, or as "Will," as did Schopenhauer, and by describing all "things" as merely ideational variation of the hypostasized "ego" or "idea" or "will." 17

Hegel then stands under the general indictment of having undone the work of Kant by subsuming it in a covert moralism. Yet Hegel himself insisted that Kant had made a determinative contribution to his thought. Does Hegel's philosophy retain an essentially Kantian orientation? Perhaps one way we can resolve this problem is to examine Hegel's own evaluation of Kant's and Spinoza's philosophy. This examination will reveal Hegel's own attitude about his dependency on Kant and Spinoza.

Hegel's Discussion of Kant

For Hegel, the main point of the philosophy of Kant is that universality and necessity do not exist in external things but are a priori, that is, they rest on reason itself, and on reason as "self-conscious reason" (selbstbewusster Vernunft). 18 The source of universality and necessity is not our "external perception" (Wahrnehmen)

17 Ibid., p. 92.

but is the subject, "I" in my self-consciousness (333). Thus the standpoint of the philosophy of Kant in the first place is that thought, through its reasoning, has come to grasp itself as in itself absolute and concrete, free and ultimate, and in the second place, thought, determining itself within itself and concrete, is grasped as subjective (331).

Kant's philosophy also claims to be a critical philosophy because its aim is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge. Hegel complains that Kant approaches knowledge as an instrument whose nature and function man must learn before employing it.

Die Forderung ist also diese: man soll das Erkenntnisvermögen erkennen, ehe man erkennt; es ist dasselbe wie mit dem Schwimmenwollen, ehe man ins Wasser geht. (334)

The demand is therefore that one must know the faculties of knowledge, before one knows; it is the same as wanting to be able to swim before one goes into the water.

The investigation of the faculties of knowledge will never attain the knowledge it aims at, for it is already this knowledge; the investigation itself is an exercise in knowing.

Kant saw in the subjective determinations of thought, e.g. in those of cause and effect, an a priori capacity to bind together the differences which are present in the material which is given to us in experience. Hence Kant considered thought to be a synthetic activity and for him the main question of philosophy was "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" Hegel gives Kant great praise for his demonstration that thought is concrete in itself since thought has synthetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception (Wahrnehmung). That space and time are also a priori, i.e. in the
self-consciousness, is the great aspect of Kant's philosophy. Yet Hegel immediately faults Kant for his lack of scientific form: he uses expressions that are "barbarous" (quite an accusation for Hegel to be making) and remains confined by a psychological point of view and empirical methods (336-337).

Hegel then goes on to discuss one of Kant's barbarous expressions: Kant's description of his philosophy as "transcendental philosophy", that is to say, his philosophy as examining the conditions of possibility for knowledge but not claiming to be "transcendent" or ultimate knowledge in itself. Hegel finds this term particularly barbarous because by it Kant separates the faculty of knowledge from the thing-in-itself, so that universality and necessity are merely a subjective condition of knowledge. Reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth (338). Reason, according to Kant, requires perception and experience, a material empirically given, so that as subjectivity it may attain knowledge. If reason breaks free from the material empirically given, it transcends experience and then creates pure "whims and phantoms" (Hirngespinst). Reason then for Kant is hence not constitutive in knowledge but only regulative; it is the unity and rule for (the understanding as it applies its concepts to) the sensuous manifold (338). In this sense Kant's critique of reason, Hegel notes, is a critique that ascertains not the knowledge of objects but the knowledge of knowledge and its principles, its range and limitations, so that knowledge does not become "flighty" (Überfliegend) (339).

Hegel found Kant's philosophy "a good introduction into philosophy" (386). Yet for him it was "a complete philosophy of the
understanding which renounces reason" (385). To understand this statement we note again that Kant distinguished between sensibility, understanding and reason. The faculty of sense is purely receptive, the faculty of understanding is the faculty of concepts and pure reason is the faculty of Ideas, that is, of concepts applied to objects that are beyond experience. Reason in this sense can be a deceptive extension of the understanding that pushes its concepts beyond the limits of all possible experience. Ideas, then, if they are not to be deceptive, can never be constitutive, but only regulative, that is, they do not constitute of themselves the true but are nevertheless regulative in directing the understanding.

According to Hegel, Kant was the first to draw this distinction between the understanding and the reason (352). Hegel attacks Kant then for making reason possess nothing but formal unity for the methodical systematization of the knowledge of the understanding (363). Understanding for Kant is thought in finite relation; reason, by contrast, is thought which makes the unconditioned its object. Following Plato, Kant called the product of reason the Idea, and he understood by Idea the unconditioned, the infinite. The Idea for Kant, however, is merely the abstract universal, the indeterminate (352).

Hegel's most "Hegelian" comment about Kant's philosophy is that

Der mangel der Kantischen Philosophie liegt in dem Auseinanderfallen der Momente der absoluten Form; oder, von der andern Seite betrachtet, unser Verstand, unser Erkennen bildet einen Gegensatz gegen das Ansich: es fehlt das Negative, das aufgehobene Sollen, das nicht begriffen ist. (386)

The defect of Kant's philosophy consists in the falling asunder of the moments of the absolute form; or, regarded from the other side, our understanding, our knowledge, forms an
Hegel is referring to Kant's dualism of the determinations of thought as over against the things of the world to which thought addresses itself, the dualism being bridged or resolved by "an absolutely essential ought" (363; 384). Because Kant only hits on reason "by chance," (351) his progression from sensibility to understanding to reason never being demonstrated in its necessity, and because for Kant reason's fashioning of Ideas can never be really proven to relate to things-in-themselves but only to the subjective self-consciousness as such, his philosophy leaves us only with the realm of the "ought," the realm of the postulate, to make any connection between our thought and things as they really are in themselves. In the climax of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant goes beyond traditional metaphysics, which argued that one alternative of the antinomies must hold true, the other false (i.e., eternity of the world versus its having a beginning and end; matter either is made of units or is endlessly divisible; freedom versus necessity; absolute necessity of the conditioned world versus its pure contingency) and argues in his transcendental idealism that these contradictions do not belong to things in themselves. Rather the source of the contradictions is in our minds. Hegel accuses Kant of now making self-consciousness take up all contradictions into itself, just as once God was made to fill this role. Kant does so in order that things will not  

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19 English text taken from *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy III*, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 478. This text follows a different order than and contains additional material to the German text we have used.
contradict themselves. But by rescuing things from inner contradiction, the Kantian philosophy places the inner contradiction in self-consciousness. Geist (spirit or mind's creative principle) now becomes self-contradictory. Geist becomes disorder; self-consciousness becomes not unitive but disruptive.²⁰ Out of this dilemma comes Hegel's

²⁰ In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel offers an account of how self-consciousness works through to its full realization of itself as unitive with the self-consciousness of God as philosophically apprehended — Geist as absolute. Reason is Geist, spirit, when it is self-conscious of the truth of its reason. Reason as spirit approaches the self-consciousness of absolute Geist as human self-consciousness overcomes the inner contradictions of the spiritual formations to which it has given its allegiance in historical sequence: the ethical order and its abstract law; human culture as reconciling law and individuality, but as then splitting into the dichotomy of enlightenment and faith; the moral self-consciousness as overcoming this latter split. Reason as spirit discovers that its own self-consciousness is that by which all contradictions receive their word of reconciliation, namely, the self-consciousness of Geist as absolute. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 406.

How do we discover that what is obviously not "self-consciousness," namely, external reality, cannot be ultimately placed outside what self-consciousness itself is? We discover what self-consciousness really "is" when we move from consciousness and self-consciousness in its individual realizations to the further dimensions of reason and spirit. "Everything" is Geist in its self-alienation and consequent self-knowledge. What self-consciousness "is" is revealed in the phenomenological account of Geist as in Geist's ongoing moments each difference between (inner) knowledge and (external) truth is progressively cancelled. Spirit is neither the withdrawal of self-consciousness into pure inwardness nor the submergence of self-consciousness into substance; rather Geist "is this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content" (Phenomenology, p. 490). In science, the level of knowing beyond phenomenology, the moment of Geist unites the objective form of truth and the knowing self in an immediate unity (Phenomenology, p. 491). In absolute knowing the self-consciousness of Geist is no longer taken as a mere object of thought apprehended in picture thinking (Vorstellung) whose medium is religion. Self-consciousness ceases to throw up objects for itself but surmounts such externalization while apprehending that all externalization has its meaning for self-consciousness itself (Phenomenology, p. 479). At this stage of absolute knowing our knowledge of Geist as absolute is simultaneously the very self-knowledge of Geist.
solution: the categories have no truth in themselves; the unconditioned of reason has no truth in itself; only the unity of both as concrete possesses truth (359). This unity is laid hold of through the negative.

What Hegel means by the negative, the abrogation of the "ought," is worked out in his system, a system which he regarded as fulfilling Kant's true philosophic intention when purified of its empiric barbarism and made into "the true concrete, reality as determined through the indwelling concept; this is the adequate Idea, as Spinoza says" (381).

For Hegel, the concept, or Begriff, is the level of thought which has broken out of the realm of the merely subjective and yet has preserved that realm in its higher level of objectivity (362). In his discussion of the ontological proof of the existence of God, Kant stated that being is not a real predicate (Sein ist kein reales Prädikat), that is, it is never included in any concept as a concept. The concept of one hundred real dollars is exactly the same as one hundred imaginary dollars. The concept "one hundred dollars" is identical in both cases. Hegel calls such reasoning "a philosophy of finitude." For Hegel, "laying hold" of existence, Begreifen, is intrinsic to any concept as concept, Begriff. At the level of the "concept," Begriff, existence must be included or it is not concept — it is sense perception: "Wenn die Existenz nicht begriffen wird, so ist das das begrifflose, sinnlich-Wahrgenommenes; und das Begrifflose ist allerdings kein Begriff" (362). If one does not go after existence through the concept, one remains fixed at the level of Vorstellung, representational or "picture" thinking. Because Hegel uses "concept," Begriff, as encompassing ontological reality, and because its translation as "concept" or "notion" usually only obscures this
import, we will retain the German word Begriff to signify its ontological reality.

Kant himself did possess an "instinct" for the Begriff. Discussing Kant's arranging the categories in triads, Hegel states:

Es istgrosser Instinkt des Begriffes, dass er sagt: die erste Kategorie ist positiv; die zweite ist das Negative der ersten; das Dritte ist das Synthetische aus beiden. Die Form der Triplizität, die hier nur Schema ist, verbirgt in sich die absolute Form, den Begriff. (345)

It is a great instinct of the Begriff in that he says that the first category is positive; the second is the negative of the first; the third [element] is the synthesis of the two. The form of triplicity, which is here only a schema, conceals in itself the absolute Form, the Begriff.

Hegel finds everywhere in Kant

die Idee des Denkens, die absoluter Begriff an ihr selbst ist, den Unterschied, die Realität an ihr selbst hat. (384)

the Idea of thought, which is in itself absolute Begriff, which has in itself difference, reality.

Kant does approximate the Begriff according to Hegel first in his general idea of synthetic judgments a priori, that is, his positing of a universal which has difference in itself, and, second, in his triplicity "unspiritual though it was" of the three Critiques (theoretical reason, practical reason, and judgment as the unity of both), the triplicity of the triadic subdivisions under the categories, and the triplicity of the ideas of reason (reason resolving two antinomies). Kant exhibits everywhere thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which are the modalities of spirit by which it is spirit, as self-conscious in that it does so differentiate itself in such a way. Kant’s triplicity, however, was "unspiritual" because it lacked the negative, the negation of the negation, which more accurately describes Hegel’s method of binding thesis and antithesis. Kant’s
triadic patterns ending in synthesis always remained abstract and formal.

Hegel, as against Kant, argues that reason is able to give the understanding more than a formal unity, since truth resides neither in the one nor in the other but in the absolute Begriff, the unity of both as concrete. We are able to transcend the realm of the "ought," the realm of postulate and obligation, into the realm of freedom where our life is no longer under any coercion of duty but is a participation in the objectivity of the Begriff, an objectivity that allows escape from the prison of subjectivity which Kant has bequeathed us.

Hegel accuses Kant of returning us to the "unknown God" whom Paul made known to the Athenians. Kant's standpoint lacks mediation and only the general statement that God exists with the determination of being infinite, universal, and indeterminate is possible (383). No determinations of the Absolute are possible. For Hegel, however, the purpose of philosophy is to show how absolute form is the "concrete universal," which is the mediated unity of the conditioned and the unconditioned. Its mediated unity comes about through the negation of the particular and the negation of this negation. Self-consciousness, moreover, manifests its active "spirit" through this same process. The Absolute is this unitive spirit, Geist.

Hegel accuses Kant and Jacobi of having liberated the "sloth of reason" so that it is freed from every call to reflect, to penetrate to its own inward meaning, and to explore the depths of nature and spirit (384). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason established the "autocracy of the subjective reason," which, because it is abstract and without knowledge, has only subjective certainty and not objective truth. It is an
autocracy of subjective reason, moreover, which one can neither know nor justify. Nor need one know or justify it, for one's subjective freedom of conviction and certainty (subjektive Freiheit der Überzeugung und Gewissheit) holds good all round (384).

Hegel considers Kant's treatment of subjective freedom as seriously deficient. His aim is to attain a concept of freedom that is established objectively, a freedom that is grounded beyond the autocracy of subjective reason.

Here the question arises about the validity of Hegel's interpretation of Kant. We may cast our inquiry into the form of an examination of what Hegel meant by the autocracy of subjective reason in Kant. Hegel's conclusion about Kantian subjectivity can be cast into relief by Lonergan's statement that Kant's Copernican revolution "brought the subject into technical prominence while making only minimal concessions to its reality." At first glance Lonergan may appear to be directly contradicting Hegel, yet on further consideration we will see that both are aiming at a similar goal, a goal explicitly rejected as realizable by Kant. Kant declared it impossible to substantiate the "I" as anything more than "a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts": "ein blosses Bewusstsein, das alle Begriffe begleitet." Kant argues that beyond the logical meaning of the "I," that is, beyond our consciousness as a transcendental subject in which all our perceptions must


22 Kant, Kritik, A346 B404.
be found, we have no knowledge of the subject "in itself," which as substratum underlies this "I," as it does all our thoughts. Kant therefore concludes that to state that the "I" as a thinking being (soul) is substance and hence has everlasting duration can signify a substance only in idea and not in reality. To admit as knowledge such a statement as "Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance" would be to take a synthetic a priori proposition beyond the limits Kant demarcated for such judgments. Kant asserts that a priori synthetic propositions are possible and admissible only in relation to objects of possible experience and as principles of the possibility of this experience. The statement "Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance" adds to the concept (of a thinking being) a predicate (simplicity) which cannot be given in any experience. To admit this statement therefore would be to make such propositions "to things in general and to things in themselves" (auf Dinge überhaupt und an sich selbst) and put an end to his whole critique. Therefore Kant must insist that such a proposition is a postulate that is in accordance with the "principles of the practical employment of reason" (Grundsätzen des ... praktischen Vernunftgebrauchs) and counsel us to renounce the hope of comprehending from the merely theoretical knowledge of ourselves, the necessary continuance of our existence: "die notwendige Fortdauer unserer Existenz aus der bloss theoretischen Erkenntnis"

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23 Kant, Kritik, A350.

24 Ibid., A351.

25 Ibid., B410.
unserer selbst einzusehen."\textsuperscript{26}

Lorergan himself attempts to establish the possibility that we can know what the subject is without having to resume all the old methods of proof. Lorergan agrees with Kant that "bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things-in-themselves": "Körper blosse Erscheinungen unseres äusseren Sinnes, und nicht Dinge an sich selbst sind."\textsuperscript{27} Lorergan avoids the false step of the old time metaphysics of assuming that since the thinking subject is not corporeal we can on that account conclude that we can know what kind of an object it is. The immaterial soul of the old-time metaphysics remains locked in all the ambiguities of proving that it is the thing-in-itself "behind" the body. We do not arrive at what it is by merely defining it as "not-body."

That we can even reach the realm of "not-body" is precisely what has to be proved. Lorergan avoids the snare of this procedure. But unlike Kant, he does not confine knowledge to the phenomenal world — the world of bodies. Rather he attempts to examine what kind of thinking perceives the world as a collection of mutually distinct bodies and asks if there is another kind of thinking that can lead us beyond bodies as the "now" "there" "outside" "real." The kind of thinking that perceives the world as a series of bodies Lorergan calls "picture thinking" which means thinking in visual images. But "what is intended in questioning is not seen, intuited, perceived; it is as yet unknown; it is what we

\textsuperscript{26}Kant, \textit{Kritik}, B424-B426.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., A357.
do not know but seek to know.** Picture thinking can never encompass what is intended in human questioning. Now Lonergan identifies what is intended in questioning as being. Being is the objective of the pure desire to know. Out of the pure desire to know comes the spontaneously operative notion of being. Through the notion of being we ask the question, Is it? That question supposes some notion of being, a notion which is prior to each instance of our knowing being. Lonergan describes the notion of being as "the immanent, dynamic orientation of cognitional process."** The notion of being underpins all cognitional contents. It penetrates all cognitional contents as the "supreme heuristic notion." Further, it constitutes all contents as cognitional. Experience merely presents the matter to be known. Understanding can only define the matter to be known. But the mere thought still has to be affirmed in judgment and what judgment judges is the mere "Yes" or "No", the mere "is" or "is not."

Experience is for inquiring into being. Intelligence is for thinking out being. But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is known as being. Hence knowing is knowing being, yet the known is never mere being, just as judgment is never a mere "Yes" apart from any question that "Yes" answers.**

Because the desire to know is conscious intelligently (at the level of understanding) and rationally (at the level of judgment) we forma

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30 Ibid., p. 357.
notion of that desire's objective, namely a notion of being. It is a
notion of what we seek to know in our questioning. When we search
for what it is we are doing when we are knowing, when we search for
the dynamic orientation of cognitional process, we make the painful
breakthrough from knowing as picture thinking to knowing as a dynamic
structure which is comprised not of some single operation or activity
but is a whole whose parts are cognitional activities. 31

According to Lonergan, Kant never freed himself from picture
thinking: an "object" for him is what one "looks at." In picture
thinking one can have only sensitive intuition as immediately related
to objects. The understanding and the reason can be related to objects
only mediately; judgment is only a mediate knowledge of objects, a
representation of a representation. Reason is never related to objects
directly but only to the understanding, and through the understanding,
to the empirical use of reason itself. It follows then that the value
of our judgments and our reasoning can be no more than the value of our
intuitions. Kant provides no way of escape from this rather deflating
conclusion. The breakthrough from picture thinking is to discover that
human cognitional activities have as their object being. Unless that
breakthrough is made, "the intention of questioning, the notion of
being, is merely immanent, merely subjective." 32 Kant, according to
Lonergan, remained in an inescapably subjectivist stance towards that

31Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," Collection

32Lonergan, "The Subject," pp. 77-78.
which human being attempts to know when it engages in cognitive activity.

Lonergan attempts to "fill up" the deficiencies he perceives in Kant by making explicit the object of human cognitive activities, namely, being. It is from this perspective that he can define Kant as subjective. Although they approach it from vastly different perspectives, both Lonergan and Hegel have a similar goal, that is, to substantiate the reality of the human knower. Both begin their philosophy from a similar assessment of Kant as subjectivist. But both Hegel and Lonergan are interested not in abolishing Kant's human subject but in providing it with more adequate foundation.

Their common assessment of Kant may serve as a good point of departure for comparing Hegel and Lonergan. For as critical as Lonergan is of Kant, Kant's levels of sensibility, understanding, reason and the practical application of reason cannot help but appear as a paradigm for Lonergan's levels of human sensitivity, human intelligence, human judgment and human action that are sublated as levels of consciousness in the "existential subject" — the subject who by his own acts makes himself what he is to be.33 Although Lonergan feels that Kant has made human existence a ghost of the human intellect, he does not dismiss Kant's ground plan but seeks to endow human intelligence and reasonableness with the flesh and blood

33 Lonergan, "The Subject," pp. 79-80
of our actual pursuit after being. Human inquiry, argues Lonergan, is not motivated by the intellect's refraction onto itself but by its dynamism towards what is.

Lonergan states that the human subject's levels of consciousness are interrelated through "sublation". He recognizes his debt to Hegel

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34 Lonergan therefore does not locate human judgment as the middle term between the faculties of the understanding and the reason, as does Kant (Critique of Judgment, trans. by J. H. Bernard [New York: Hafner, 1961], p. 13). Rather, judgment is the activity of human reasonableness itself as it determines what is and what is not.

That Kant and Lonergan follow basically the same paradigm in elucidating the structure of human knowledge is illustrated by Giovanni Sala in his study Das Aprici in der menschlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971). Sala mitigates Lonergan's judgment that Kant never attained the subject. He notes that rather "die Hinwendung zum Subjekt ist das Formalprinzip des kantischen Denkens, wodurch Kant bis heute Anfang der Neuzeit geblieben ist. Dieses Prinzip, das die Richtung der kantischen Philosophie bestimmt, ist viel bedeutsamer als das tatsächlich ausgeführte System selbst, so, dass das Studium dieses Prinzips für das Herausstellen der Koordinaten des kulturellen Raumes, in dem wir uns heute befinden, unerlässlich ist" (p. 4).

Sala identifies the heart of this "principle" as the Aprici — the origin, the extent and the result of that meaning which constitutes human existence (den Ursprung, den Umfang, die Folgen jenes Seins, der die menschliche Existenz konstituirt). The study of the Aprici then is "das Studium des einsichtigen und rationalen Subjektes selbst, vor seiner Objektivation" (p. 9). Sala can proceed to make an exposition of Kant's thought which presents Lonergan's work as the attempt to resolve problems rising from Kant's formulation of knowledge as Anschauung, "taking a look," rather than a new departure in the study of human knowledge itself. Lonergan reaches insight as knowledge through the human subject as a knower who is not deceived that his activity of knowing has validity, just as Kant's transcendental deduction or justification locates our certainty of knowing in the unity of apperception — our understanding in its function as the conscious ground of unity of the pure law of understanding (p. 181). Both Kant and Lonergan advance to the knowledge of God from the certainty of the self-consciousness. The contrast to such an advance is made by Hegel who posited this advance as requiring an "objective stage" — which, for human being meant an advance through our social being — before reaching what is for the Kantian the unconditioned and for the Hegelian the Absolute.
for this concept although he dissociates himself from one aspect of Hegelian sublation, namely, the Hegelian view that the higher level of consciousness reconciles a contradiction in the lower. By sublation Lonergan means a lower level of consciousness being retained, preserved, yet transcended and completed by a higher. Thus, at the unconscious level, the subject is in a coma or a dreamless sleep. At the next level we have a minimal degree of consciousness and subjectivity when we are the helpless subjects of our dreams. Then, when awake, we are experimental subjects when we are subjects of lucid perception, imaginative projects, emotional and conative impulses and bodily action. We are intelligent subjects when sublating the experiential, when inquiring about our experience. We are rational subjects when, sublating the intelligent and experiential consciousness, we question our own understanding and judge this to be so and that not to be so. Finally, our rational consciousness is sublated by us as rational self-conscious subjects as we become deliberating, evaluating, deciding and acting subjects.  

Lonergan's exclusion of the aspect of reconciliation of contradiction from his "sublation" is all important, for sublation without the "moment of negative" is really a Kantian and not a Hegelian concept. Hegel himself pointed out its presence in Kant. And whereas Lonergan argues that Kant's philosophy was subjectivistic because the notion of being remains merely immanent throughout it, Hegel states

that Kant's philosophy allowed subjectivity an unfettered hold on human knowing because it never included the moment of negativity. Hegel's principle of negativity may, in fact, be understood in its "existential sense" as the principle by which one thing is one thing and not another thing. It is the "movement which posits and holds other being or external reality as something independent."\(^{36}\) It is the movement by which particular forms go under and pass over into others. On the cosmic level, it is the principle by which substance becomes subject as the cosmic Geist returns to itself as self-consciousness through positing itself through its opposite (external reality). Negativity thus is the principle behind history — the movement of being. It is history incorporated and raised into an ontological principle. One could argue that it is the obverse to the coin of being.\(^{37}\) That the coin of being has an obverse requires a phenomenology to ascertain, for we discover this obverse not directly but by considering how being is never "itself" but always "something else" before we can latch onto it as being. In other words, for Hegel, the grounding of human knowing in being is to give an objective to the pure desire to know which does not automatically rescue it from its subjective prison. The question of


\(^{37}\) It is the obverse in the sense that it is always the other side of the coin one is looking at. For a discussion of Hegel's argument in the Logic that "nothing" is the logical obverse of "being," see Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 209-216.
history as constitutive of human being will still remain unexplained.\(^{38}\)

Hegel's Discussion of Spinoza

To conclude this chapter, I will look at Hegel's evaluation of Spinoza both as a way of helping us understand more clearly what Hegel meant by negativity and as a way of demonstrating that Hegel self-consciously strove not to subvert Kant's achievement of subjectivity but to ground it in what he thought was a more adequate structure.

Hegel praised Kant for having approached Spinoza's "adequate Idea."\(^ {39}\) As we have noted above, McFarland places Hegel's work within the "Spinozistic crescendo" which took place in Germany during the last decade of the eighteenth and the opening decade of the nineteenth century. Fichte and Schelling took it upon themselves to complete Kant's philosophy in a way abhorrent to Kant himself.\(^ {40}\) McFarland argues that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, although very adept at casting out each other's monistic mote, were each blind to their own pantheistic beam.

Yet merely to lump these philosophers together as pantheists does tempt us to ignore how crucial Kant's work remained for them. And Hegel's discussion of Kant obscures his own debt to him. Hegel criticizes Kant for giving merely a "narrative"-account of the stages

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\(^{38}\) When, historically, has there ever been amongst humans "a pure desire to know?" How is this principle constituted historically?

\(^{39}\) Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III, p. 381. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.

\(^{40}\) McFarland, Coleridge, pp. 98-99.
in theoretic consciousness. Kant works in a psychological, i.e. historical manner and merely narrates the sequence of the faculties as sensibility, understanding and reason without developing this sequence from the Begriff, the concept as mediating their inner necessity (339). Kant's method leaves open the question of other human faculties "popping up" which may or may not be significant — mental telepathy, for instance. Kant, however, did make at least a descriptive statement of the moments of the whole and correctly determined and distinguished them. Thus Kant "is a good introduction into philosophy" (386). But Hegel wants more than narration; he wants the "true concrete," "reality as determined through the indwelling Begriff, or, as Spinoza says, the adequate Idea" (381). To determine what he means by these phrases we must turn to his observations on Spinoza. My argument is that only by understanding Hegel's strictures on Spinoza do we gain perspective on what element of Kant remained crucial for Hegel.

Hegel notes that Spinoza does away with the independence of the two extremes found in Descartes, namely, corporality and the thinking "I," and makes them moments of the one absolute existent reality (Wesen). For Spinozistic idealism what is true is that there is only one Substance whose attributes are thought and extension (nature). Only this absolute unity is real, is reality — only it is God (161). Thus, insofar as one begins to philosophize by bathing "in the ether of the one Substance in which all that one has held for true is annihilated," one must begin as a Spinozist. Spinoza's philosophy is the "negation of every particular to which every philosopher must have come; it is the liberation of spirit and its absolute foundation".
"Negation alles Besonderen, zu der jeder Philosoph gekommen sein muss; es ist die Befreiung des Geistes und seine absolute Grundlage" (165).

Hegel states that the only difference between his own philosophy and the Eleatic philosophy which Spinoza represents is the concrete individuality present in the modern world "in spirit throughout" through the agency of Christianity (165).

Hegel can see in Spinoza's first definition of the "cause of itself" the key to his own thought. For a cause of itself is a cause which, while it operates and separates an "other," at the same time produces only itself and in the very bringing of itself forth does away with this distinction: "Im Hervorbringen hebt sie den Unterschied zugleich auf; das Setzen ihrer als eines Anderen ist der Abfall und zugleich die Negation dieses Verlustes." Thus this cause of itself is simultaneously both a loss or privation and the negation of this loss. In representational thinking we think of the cause as producing something and the effect as something other than the cause. Here, however, the manifestation of the cause is immediately cancelled and yet preserved (unmittelbar aufgehoben); the cause of itself produces only itself. Such a thought is a fundamental Begriff in all speculative (as opposed to representational) thought. Had Spinoza developed what

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41 Hegel's term for "sublation" or "supersession" is Aufheben. Here we see how Hegel uses it to mean a cancellation and yet a preservation of what has been negated.

42 Note there is a similarity which remains to be explored between Hegel's movement from representational thinking (thought mixed with sensuous images) to the Begriff of speculative thought and Lonergan's movement from knowing as "picture thinking" to knowing as a dynamic structure whose object is being.
lay in his "cause of itself," substance with him would not have petri-
fi...
that which does not have its own existence, but is in another and is
conceived through that other. Here Hegel says Spinoza has identified
the universal (as Substance), the particular (as attribute) and the
individual (as mode) but did not deduce them but merely established
them as definitions (170; 186). Their inner connection or necessity
is missing. Therefore Spinoza has no place for true individuality or
subjectivity. Hegel’s charge against Spinoza is the direct opposite
of that against Kant.

Der Mangel des Spinozas ist, dass er das Dritte nur als Modus fasst,
as schlechte Einzelheit. Die wahrhafte Einzelheit, Individualität,
wahrhafte Subjektivität ist nicht nur Entfernung vom Allgemeinen,
das schlecht hin bestimmte; sondern es ist, als schlecht hin bestimmt,
das Fürsichselende, nur sich selbst Bestimmende, (170).

The defect of Spinoza is that he treats the third moment only as a
modality [of the one Substance], as a bad individuality. True
individuality, true subjectivity is not only achieving distance
from the universal in order to have something simply or absolutely
determined. But in so far as it is something which is completely
determined, the individual is something which exists in its own
right [Fürsichselende]; it is something which gives determinateness
only to itself.

Spinoza thus leaves no scope for any individual reality as subsistent in
itself. Far from being an atheism which denies God, Hegel designates
Spinoza’s philosophy as an "acosmism" — the cosmos is effectively sub-
sumed into the one Substance (163).

Hegel finds Spinoza’s philosophy inadequate because his distinc-
tions, while valid, remain external, since the negative is not known
in itself (185). Because Spinoza conceived of negation only in a one-
sided fashion (all determination implies negation) and because for him
only the one Substance was positive, and all else only modification of
this Substance, Spinoza had missed the principle of subjectivity,
individuality, personality (164). Thought has only the significance of the universal and not of self-consciousness (185). Hegel finds that Spinoza's weak point is that he misses the fact that individuation implies negation and not mere synthesis. To illustrate the relation of individuation and negation Hegel recalls Boehme's concept of the "Ichts" — the something which is opposed to the "Nichts" but is the negative of the "Nichts" — the "I=I," the being in its own right (das Fur-sich-Sein) which is true negativity (182; 194). Already we see that Hegel did not develop his thought simply through an adoption of Spinozism but depended on the "bold and speculative" thought of J. Boehme to underpin a critique of Spinoza. Spinoza's one Substance remains in its petrification and rigidity, for Spinoza's individual determinations in the form of determinations of the understanding "are not Boehme's originating spirits which energize and unfold into one another" (166). The moment of negativity is lacking to the reified motionlessness which characterizes Spinoza's Substance. There this Substance is the Idea taken only abstractly and not in its living reality (194). Spinoza's Substance is only the abstract unity which Geist has in itself (166).

In opposition to Spinoza Hegel wanted to save the principle of subjectivity, individuality and personality which Hegel formulated in his own system as "the moment of self-consciousness" insofar as it is both objective and particular (196). In this sense although Hegel saw Kant's teaching about subjectivity as seriously deficient, he nevertheless wished to retain this principle as absolutely essential. Hegel achieved this aim by his concept of the negation of the negation, a
principle totally absent in either Kant or Spinoza. Hegel does praise Kant for his triadic structures of consciousness, for his approach of thesis–antithesis–synthesis, yet he praises this only as a faint adumbration of the true pattern of reality into which the moment of negativity must be integrated. Without this moment Kant’s philosophy leaves human consciousness fixed in an inescapable subjectivity. Hegel does not use Spinoza to advance a fundamental objection to Kant’s thought so much as to provide its contradiction which as contradiction suffers from Kant’s deficiency in reverse: subjectivity instead of gaining autocracy is omitted altogether. Hegel identifies a principle which is equally absent in this pair of contradictions: the moment of the negative. Through this moment both Spinoza and Kant are cancelled out and yet preserved (aufheben) in Hegel. We cannot do justice to Hegel if we regard his philosophical system as an intellectual resolution of problems left unsolved by Kant through a well-administered dose of Spinozism. 43 Rather in Hegel’s principle of “the negation of the negation” we find a recasting of the whole Western philosophical tradition which drew not only on what we have come to call philosophy but also on German mysticism, which as exemplified by J. Boehme was made fully integral to philosophy’s goals. What is most striking is that

Hegel does not regard Boehme's contribution as anything else than philosophy. Boehme's ideas, even though produced "without the Begriff" and in the crudest way attain nevertheless an extreme depth by their union of the most absolute opposites (118). It is this reconciliation of opposites that Hegel saw as the purpose of his whole system — indeed of life itself. The

We turned to Hegel's account of Spinoza to elucidate what Hegel meant by negativity as the way substance is quickened into spirit and to show how Hegel strove to retain the achievement of Kantian subjectivity as over against Spinoza. We saw that in the work of Hegel and of Lonergan the question of subjectivity continues to play a determinate role. For our purposes now, Hegel's remarks about "freedom" in reference to Kant's philosophy, Spinoza's philosophy and his own are revealing. He criticizes Spinoza because his system is antagonistic to the liberty of the human subject (193). Spinoza saw all that is particular and individual as modifications of the one Substance and hence as possessing no absolute existence. All difference and determination are cast down into the abyss of annihilation but from this abyss nothing comes out (165). Freedom is not real and evil does not exist.

Hegel objected to Kant, on the other hand, for precisely the opposite reason, for the result of Kant's philosophy is that

Pierre Machery, Hegel ou Spinoza (Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 23ff, argues that it is the incorporation of teleology into his consideration of substance that divides Hegel's thought from Spinoza's philosophy. He correctly identifies Hegel's negation of the negation as this teleological principle.
"subjective freedom of conviction and certainty holds good all round" (384). This freedom has no principle by which it can be understood or justified. Hegel claimed to have laid hold of that principle through "the Idea [which] has within itself essential movement and vitality, the principle of freedom and therefore the principle of spirituality": "die Idee in ihr wesentlich Bewegung, Lebendigkeit enthält, das Prinzip der Freiheit und so das Prinzip der Geistigkeit in sich hat" (194).

The principle is identified as Geist.

Hegel's philosophy is distinguished then both from Spinoza and from Kant by its vindication of subjectivity on the one hand, and on the other by its subjugation of it to a principle by which it can be justified. This principle was developed in Hegel's Begriff which is the "concrete universal" in which the Idea includes within itself motion and vitality and moves not to greater levels of abstraction but towards the concrete reconciliation of opposites in a ceaselessly dynamic unity. Hegel's thought as over against both Kant and Spinoza attempts to incorporate "negation" in such a way that it is taken to its contradiction as "the negation of the negation" which as both affirmation and negation opens us onto "infinite form, spirituality and liberty" (194).

Participation in liberty for Hegel is a participation in spirituality or infinite form. Unlike Kant, Hegel deemed this infinite form to be within the grasp of philosophy. Both had an appreciation of the autonomy of the human subject, but Hegel's attempt to "sublate" (aufheben) this autonomy into a higher principle that he claimed was fully within the grasp of philosophy was a step Kant consciously
refused to take in his capacity as philosopher. I have argued that Hegel's higher principle cannot be understood merely as Spinozism, but is his own attempt to reconcile Spinoza as the "essential beginning of all philosophy" (165) and Kant as the "good introduction" (386) into philosophy. But there is no doubt that Hegel's attempt at reconciliation leaves a difference between his philosophy and Kant's which is one not just of degree but of complete reformulation of the constructs of human life.

Hegel aimed at a human freedom that was established in the objective order. He opposed it to Kant's idea of freedom as a correlate of man's subjectivity. With these two conceptions of freedom we have arrived at the two models of freedom that have dominated our contemporary world. If one follows Kant, one has to adopt the model of "tolerance" towards the subjectivity of others, for one's idea of God is fashioned by the reason which is irreducibly subjective. Following Hegel, one confronts a totally different structuring of man's possibility for objective knowledge and hence of the freedom that is possible for those who now can attain this knowledge. Hegel's analysis saw Kant as never attaining the elevation of subjective "spirit," Geist, to God except by postulate — by mere "ought." Hegel regarded the true concrete material that constitutes the notion of God as neither "being" as arrived at by the cosmological proof nor "action by design" as arrived at by the physico-theological proof, but Geist whose absolute characteristic is "the self-determining and self-realizing Begriff itself," that is to say, "effective reason" which is nothing other than freedom: "Geist, dessen absolute Bestimmung die wirksame Vernunft, d.i. der sich
Hegel's subjective Geist, since it is contrast to Kant's subjective approach to God through practical reason passes through the "moment" of negation, does come to arrive at a real ethical self-consciousness (objective Geist as opposed to the merely subjective Geist of individual self-consciousness). The objective reality of the ethical self-consciousness is the state. What allows Hegel this breathtaking freedom from Kant, this confident abrogation of the "ought" under whose yoke we lesser mortals must toll? We will try to explain Hegel's position by contrasting the political theory of Kant and Hegel.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTRAST IN THE POLITICAL THEORY OF KANT AND HEGEL.
THE HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF KANT AS THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF "INTELSUBJETIVITY"

Kant's Political Theory

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Kant and Hegel reached different conclusions about how human subjectivity is connected to the realm of the Idea, the realm of what is ultimately unconditioned for human life. For Kant, the source of unity was compelling — a priori and categorical — but it could not be deduced from the world we live in taken as a phenomenological reality. The source of unity lay therefore in an "ought" — a postulate — and Kant refused to allow theoretical reason the competence to "constitute" or "prove" this unity. The unity could only be proved by reason as practical, as it ordered life in action through the Ideas. Hegel, however, took the unity of Idea and subjectivity to be mediated through the principle of Geist, "spirit." Nature, moreover, which for both Kant and Hegel, was a force at odds with reason, was for Hegel capable of being reconciled with reason at this higher level of spirit.¹ Nature itself is made over to rationality through the rationality of human freedom. Human society is the culmination of the imparting of rationality to nature. Taylor

notes that Hegel's conception has some affinities with Plato, since it involves the idea of the cosmic order, but it also owes a great deal to Kant, since it is built on the requirement of radical autonomy.\(^2\)

Hegel's thought, then, can be grasped as an attempt to overcome Kant's dualism of reason as rational will as opposed to nature.

In order to understand the issue between Kant and Hegel more clearly, let us turn to a more detailed examination of each one's political theory. In our examination of Kant we will begin with how he understood the dichotomy between freedom and nature. We must begin by emphasizing that this dualism was not a stark polarity that operated mechanically throughout Kant's thought. Kant himself mitigates this dualism in his writings on history wherein he speaks of nature as something more than the nexus of immanent causality. Nature rather comes to signify the immanent strivings of Providence.\(^3\) Yet "Nature" concerns herself more with the welfare of the human race as a species than with the welfare of the individual as such. Although itself stemming from "Nature," the human possession of reason and of the possibility of freedom does not bring mankind into a greater harmony with the goodness that underlies Nature. Rather the individual's attainment of reason constitutes the "fall":

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 375.

Die Geschichte der Natur fängt also vom Guten an, denn sie ist das Werk Gottes; die Geschichte der Freiheit vom Bosen, denn sie ist Menschenwerk.\textsuperscript{4}

The history of nature therefore begins with good, for it is the work of God, while the history of freedom begins with wickedness, for it is the work of man.\textsuperscript{5}

For Kant, man's use of reason and his retention of innocence were mutually incompatible. Man's first use of reason was experiential and utterly ruinous of innocence, for now reason in its pristine weakness found itself in conflict with animality in all its power. Evils and, even worse, vices sprang up. Man's use of reason, therefore, by which he gained the possibility of freedom, was morally a disaster for the individual, but for the species as a whole it was a gain. Hence Kant saw improvement as occurring not so much in individuals as in the human species as a whole. The gradual improvement of the human species is what shows the hand of Providence in our history.

Der Mensch will Eintracht; aber die Nature weiss, dass, was für seine Gattung gut ist: sie will Zwietracht. Er will gemässlich und vergnügt leben; die Natur will aber, er soll aus der Lässigkeit und unthätigen Genügsamkeit hinaus sich in Arbeit und Mühseligkeiten stürzen, um dagegen auch Mittel auszufinden, sich kluglich wiederum aus den letztern heraus zu ziehen. Die natürlichen Triebsfedern dazu, die Quellen der Ungeselligkeit und des durchgängigen Widerstandes, daraus so viele Übel entspringen, die aber doch auch wieder zur neuen Anspannung der Kräfte, mithin zu mehrerer Entwicklung der Naturanlagen antreiben, verrathen also wohl die Anordnung eines weisen Schöpfers; und


Man wishes concord; but Nature knows better what is good for the race; she wills discord. He wishes to live comfortably and pleasantly; Nature wills that he should be plunged from sloth and passive contentment into labor and trouble, in order that he may find means of extricating himself from them. The natural urges to this, the sources of unsociableness and mutual opposition from which so many evils arise, drive men to new exertions of their forces and thus to the manifold development of their capacities. They thereby perhaps show the ordering of a wise Creator and not the hand of an evil spirit, who bungled in his great work or spoiled it out of envy.

Thus the problem of evil (and with it the problem of history) is transformed by Kant into the question of why human life should be condemned to such a course of painful self-actualization.

Although aiming at genuine morality as the final organizing principle of the state, Kant also advocates a "mechanism of nature" which in place of genuine morality can compel people to submit to coercive law. In this sense a good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected under a good constitution. Kant argues that the problem of organizing a state could be solved even for a nation of devils (ein Volk von Teufeln) provided that they possess understanding. The mechanism of nature organizes the conflict of wills in such a way that rational

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7 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," Kant on History, p. 16.

beings must compel themselves to submit to coercive laws. Kant argues this way because he regarded genuine morality — the ability of man to act from the notion of duty without reward — as a human reality which for now at least could not fully replace the imperfection of human nature. Therefore human nature must be constrained through external pressure to do that which reason prescribes through categorical law.

Kant's political theory, of course, is developed in conformity with the achievement of the Critique of Pure Reason in establishing the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments by which we can understand, the external world. Yet beyond even this achievement Kant sought to show that human knowledge cannot be confined ultimately to the world of possible experience which the synthetic a priori judgments explain. For this world can be taken as a totality, and if reason is to understand it as a totality it must speculate beyond any possible experience to find the unconditioned. Its speculation is based on the query: Is it reasonable to assume a purposiveness in the arrangement of nature in all its single aspects and an absence of purposiveness in its entirety?

As we saw in the previous chapter, it was the discovery of the antinomies that allowed Kant to argue that the supersensuous world must be something more than a mere extension of the world of appearances. If reason could be only theoretical reason it could never advance

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11 Kant, "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht," p. 25.
beyond the world of appearances. But reason demands that human agents as moral be free and yet as theoretical reason it seemingly does not permit such a possibility. It is this very antinomic tension in reason which indicates reason's broader competence as a faculty not exclusively devoted to cognition.\(^{12}\)

Now freedom is rescued by Kant by his demonstration that when reason deals with the moral aspect of existence, it addresses itself not to the world of appearances but to the world of things as they are in themselves (not to the phenomena but to the noumena). Reason can only adequately approach the world of things in themselves not as pure theoretical reason but rather as pure practical reason. It is not a different type of reason but the same reason as that of theory but whose modality of existence is human action.\(^{13}\)

The apriority of our knowledge of the possible world of experience is established by the understanding's categories which order the world. The apriority of our duty is established by the "categorical imperative" of a pure, but acting, reason — the general moral law by which we distinguish between duty as free moral agents and our natural desires as phenomenal beings.

Kant establishes, his political principles, upon the noumenal reality of man as a free agent. His political principles are embodied in a philosophy of right (Recht), the universally valid laws of


\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 15.
Justic. Kant's theory of right (ius) is an attempt to understand the summary principle of those laws which can be incorporated in external legislation: "Der Inbegriff der Gesetze, für welche eine äussere Gesetzgebung möglich ist, heisst die Rechtslehre (ius)." Kant advances his concept of right as a formal concept which is concerned with the relationship between the will of one person as a free agent and the will of another person as also a free agent. It is purely formal in that it applies only to "the form of the relationship between the two wills, in so far as they are treated simply as free," and it is interested as a theory "in whether the action of one of the two wills can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law": "der Form im Verhältniss der beiderseitigen Willkür, sofern sie bloss als frei betrachtet wird, und ob durch die Handlung eines von beiden sich mit der Freiheit des andern nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen vereinigen lasse." By this Kant means that the principles by which the two free wills can be related is strictly a priori to the incorporation of that relationship into the subjective will of any one free agent. The incorporation, that is, its realization in a subjective free agent, is not the property of the universal principle of right as such but of ethics. Ethics for Kant addresses itself to the incorporation of a priori principles in the subjective wills of free agents.


Universal principles, however, like the principle of right, must remain within their a priori dimension.

Also ist das allgemeine Rechtsgesetz: handle ausserlich so, dass der freie Gebrauch deiner Willkür mit der Freiheit von jedem nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen könne, zwar ein Gesetz, welches mir eine Verbindlichkeit auferlegt, aber ganz und gar nicht erwartet, noch weniger fordert, dass ich ganz um dieser Verbindlichkeit willen meine Freiheit auf jene Bedingungen selbst einschränken solle, sondern die Vernunft sagt nur, dass sie in ihrer Idee darauf eingeschränkt sei und von andern auch thätlich eingeschränkt werden dürfe; und dies sagt sie als ein Postulat, welches gar keines Beweises weiter fähig ist. — Wenn die Absicht nicht ist Tugend zu lehren, sondern nur, was recht sei, vorzutragen, so darf und soll man selbst nicht jenes Rechtsgesetz als Triebfeder der Handlung vorstellig machen. 17

Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law. And although this law imposes an obligation on me, it does not mean that I am in any way expected, far less required, to restrict my freedom myself to these conditions purely for the sake of this obligation. On the contrary, reason merely says individual freedom is restricted in this way by virtue of the idea behind it, and that it may also be actively restricted by others; and it states this as a postulate which does not admit of any further proof.

If it is not our intention to teach virtue, but only to state which is right, we may not and should not ourselves represent this law of right as a possible motive for actions. 18

Here Kant elaborates his reason for his separation of ethics from his treatment of right. The separation can be made because the principle of right is a formal principle which is a priori to its adoption by any one individual. Because it is such a formal principle, moreover, this principle allows "authority" to use coercion to prevent any hindrance of freedom by those who do not choose to conform to the a priori

17 Ibid., p. 231.

18 English translation taken from Kant's Political Writings, trans. H. Nisbet, pp. 133-134 (Italics are translator's).
principle through the development of a dependent ethical life.

Folglicherweise: wenn ein gewisser Gebrauch der Freiheit selbst ein Hinderniss der Freiheit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen (d.i. unrecht) ist, so ist der Zwang, der diesem entgegengesetzt wird, als Verhinderung eines Hindernisses der Freiheit mit der Freiheit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen zusammen stimmend, d. i. recht: mithin ist mit dem Rechte zugleich eine Befugniss, den, der ihm Abbruch thut, zu zwingen, nach dem Satze der Widerspruchs verknüpft.  

Consequently, if a certain use to which freedom is put is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e. if it is contrary to right), any coercion which is used against it will be a hindrance to a hindrance of freedom, and will thus be consonant with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it will be right. It thus follows by the law of contradiction that right entails the authority to apply coercion to anyone who infringes it.  

Kant can thus conclude that "right and authority to apply coercion are therefore one and the same thing": "Recht und Befugniss zu zwingen bedeuten also einerlei."  

Having established his theory of right as a universal principle of law, Kant can then proceed to regard the state as a union of a collectivity of human beings under rightful laws. The state's constitution is the formulation of this state of right under a unifying will. After discussing the three powers of the state (executive, legislative and judiciary) Kant concludes that the welfare of the state consists in the union of these powers. Yet "the welfare of the state" (das Heil des Staats) is not to be understood as synonymous with the well-being or happiness of the citizens. Rousseau's state of nature or

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19 Kant, "Metaphysik der Sitten," p. 231.

20 Kant's Political Writings, p. 134. (Italics are translator's).

a despotic regime could bring such a condition about perhaps more effectively. Rather the welfare of the state should be understood as depending on its approximation to the principles of right. It is reason (Vernunft) working through a categorical imperative which obliges us to make this approximation.22

Because the principle of right is anterior to the existence of any one state, Kant can argue not only for the concept of political right within a state but also for international right (the right of states in relation to each other) and finally for "cosmopolitan right." This ultimate right can envisage that all nations may unite for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the intercourse they may have with each other. It is through "cosmopolitan" right that Kant sees the possibility not merely for the regulation of war (as in international right) but for the extirpation of war itself. Perpetual peace is a possibility insofar as it can be derived a priori by reason from the absolute ideal of a rightful association of human beings under public laws.23

Kant's treatment of right as based on a priori principle and hence of universal consequence for any embodiment of right, be it individual person or individual state, is paralleled by his interest in treating human history not just as discrete phenomenal events but as a whole. Just as Kant was interested in what man's political existence signified in its universal extension (the political ordering of free...
wills), so we were interested in the significance of man's historical existence when considered as a whole, specifically as regards to the history of what makes humanity achieve its ultimate purpose as a free and rational creature. Kant discerned a progression in the history of freedom toward an international order of states which are guided both in their internal structures and in their mutual relations by the one and the same moral law. After leaving the pre-political life or "life of instinct," human history begins with the initial condition of "cultural freedom." Human culture allows the pursuit of subjective purposes, but given the unequal skill of individual human beings, human culture is sharply divided between those in luxury and those (the great majority) who lack even the necessities for life. Nature furthers her purpose, however, by a culture of discipline which consists in the freeing of the will from the despotism of desire. Out of the "splendid misery" of human culture nature brings about the condition of freedom that is to be found in the "civil community." The civil community is the achievement of the political reality of the state which is the whole which possesses the lawful authority to oppose the abuse of conflicting human freedoms. The development of our natural capacities requires not only this civil whole but also a "cosmopolitan whole," that is, a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously upon one another. Thus Kant sees the process of history as propelling us towards the "cosmopolitan republic," that is, a rule of law governing the freedom of states, and finally onto the "moral commonwealth," the

24 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 281-293.
moral unification of the human race.25 This prospectus is not presented as an inevitable outcome but as a possible development given the laws which have initiated the preliminary stages. Kant did not postulate the inevitable succession of each higher stage over its previous lower one but rather his philosophy of history was "an analysis and interpretation of human becoming and of human self-realization through an orientated process."26 Whether we will ever advance to the stage of the moral commonwealth of all states remains an open question. Nevertheless, the possibility at least for such an eventual development is contained implicitly in Kant's key concept of freedom upon which he builds both his theory of right and his philosophy of history.

For our purposes here it is important to note that Kant's concept of freedom as a universal law leads him to a consideration of international right and even of "cosmopolitan right" as implicit in the idea of freedom. He therefore makes the individual state count as only one social expression of what is a continuous development of human freedom. It is not necessarily the last or ultimate social expression of freedom. Thus the state for Kant is situated within an orientated process of moral development both internally (its inner constitution) and externally (as a cosmopolitan republic). Hegel, however, makes a distinction between civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) as such (the realm of individual wills in their social striving to attain property and their individual aims within the social complexity of society

25 Despland, Kant, p. 43.

26 Ibid., p. 44.
as a whole) and the state (Staat) as the sphere where freedom becomes an objective reality for all members of civil society through their unification of their individual aims to the common good as mediated by a constitution. Kant made no real distinction between "civil society" and "the state," for the state is merely the members of a people taken as a whole as they are related to each other "in right." Hegel, however, made this crucial distinction precisely to overcome Kant's separation of ethics from the consideration of any universal law of freedom between independent wills (right).

Because Hegel takes us on what even today remains a very strange journey, a journey into the very grounding of freedom itself, it is best for our purposes here to provide a map of where we are going. First I will attempt to convey just how Hegel envisaged the state as a dimension of ethical life that existed beyond moral postulate or categorical imperative. Second I will give an account of how Hegel's theory of the state allowed him to make a transition to his theory of religion. My final aim in this chapter is to explicate Hegel's account of the mutual interpenetration of the realities of state and religion. I will then try to make some conclusions based on these considerations about our contemporary conceptual structuring of "intersubjectivity."

**Hegel's Political Theory**

As we have just stated, Hegel made "civil society" a sphere that represented a lesser attainment of the "Idea of freedom" than that of the state. One way Hegel contrasted civil society and the state was by assigning the realm of the "moral" to civil society and that realm denoted by the German word *sittlich* to the state. Now etymologically
the word sittlich is identical to what is signified by the term 'moral'. Yet Hegel gives the German root sittlich a loaded meaning as over against the realm which the Latin root signifies. Hegel uses the term Moralität to refer to the subjective form of the will which characterizes civil society and the term Sittlichkeit to refer to the objective attainment of ethical life which characterizes the state. This contrast is unique to Hegel. Although they have identical etymologies (Moralität from the Latin mores, 'custom'; Sittlichkeit from the German Sitten, also 'custom') Hegel uses Sittlichkeit to designate an ethical achievement which is a difference of quality, not just of degree, from Moralität. 27 I will take Hegel's contrast between Moralität and Sittlichkeit as a heuristic device by which I hope to give a condensed, yet accurate account of Hegel's political theory. Because moreover, Sittlichkeit as a special word as contrasted to Moralität is unique to Hegel and because translating Sittlichkeit as 'ethical life' as opposed to Moralität as 'moral life' can at times remain a rather thin distinction, I will retain the term Sittlichkeit to designate this realm and when translating sittlich as 'ethical', as opposed to 'moral', I

27 Taylor, Hegel, p. 376.
will still usually draw attention to the original German behind it.28

The contrast between Sittlichkeit and Moralität is pivotal both for Hegel's attempt to ground ethical action in a realization of freedom that is beyond the gap between "ought" and "is" and for his explanation of how it is that we attain the full dimension of human ethical behaviour, that is, the fullest realization of human freedom. In Hegel's words:

Denn wenn die Moralität die Form des Willens überhaupt nach der Seite der Subjektivität ist, so ist die Sittlichkeit nicht bloss die subjektive Form und die Selbstbestimmung des Willens, sondern das, ihren Begriff, nämlich die Freiheit zum Inhalte zu haben.29

Morality is the form of the will in general on its subjective side. Ethical life is more than the subjective form and the

28 The current convention in scholarship on Hegel is to translate moralisch as 'moral' and sittlich as 'ethical'. The word 'ethical', of course, is derived from the Greek word for 'custom'. If only for the fact that the Greeks were vastly superior to the Romans in philosophy perhaps this would be justified. As it happens, both Sitte and the Greek word ethos are derived from the same Indo-European root *suēdh. (See G. Wahrig, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 1977, s.v. Sitte, c. 3403 and Liddel, Scott, Jones, Greek-English Dictionary, 1940, s.v. θε). Cf., Latin suesco, "p. 480.) So the equivalence of sittlich and 'ethical' is certainly pending there in our collective sub-conscious. What we must do, however, is to expand the usual notion of 'ethics' into the apprehension of an ontologically grounded source of direction for human behaviour. Thus it could offer criticism of any moral code. The situation is confused, however, because in current English usage 'ethics' signifies an artificial rather than a heart-felt code of behaviour. For example, one can follow a code of ethics in a profession but still behave immorally. Morality in English seems to have a larger connotation over ethics. "Being a gentleman or a lady", used to refer to a dimension over above any narrow moral code, but these are definitely out of style. Consequently, it is better simply to draw attention to Hegel's own distinction between moralisch and sittlich.

self-determination of the will; in addition it has as its content the concept of the will, namely freedom.\(^{30}\)

For Hegel, **Sittlichkeit** is the set of obligations we have as free agents to sustain society insofar as it is founded on the Idea, that is, upon Geist, spirit, as freedom. Human freedom, in other words, is purposive and not nihilistic. It is not free to undermine its own freedom. Thus **Sittlichkeit** enjoins on us the obligation to recognize human freedom for what it is and to bring about what already is. With morality, however, we have the opposite obligation: we have an obligation to realize something which does not exist. The world of the "ought" stands over against what "is." Hegel summed up his criticism of Kant in his assertion that Kant's philosophy remained a philosophy of morality only. Kant, in Hegel's opinion, never overcame the radical duality between human freedom and nature and thus remained always in the realm of the postulate.\(^{31}\) For his part, Hegel claimed to achieve this reconciliation of freedom and nature in his concept of **Sittlichkeit** which finds its concrete expression as the state. The state, insofar as it is founded on the Idea, represents nature's reconciliation with freedom in the actuality of human community. Taylor points out that for Hegel, the community is not what threatens to submerge the Individual into a

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mass non-entity but is that which gives the individual his opportunity to attain the highest level of freedom. In fact, Hegel's attempt to overcome the Kantian dualism of nature and freedom may be understood more precisely as an attempt to make the particular individual of the species as important as the species itself. He argues that the Begriff as actual, that is, the concept as faithfully presenting "what is", requires that the universal (genus) and the particular (species) cannot exist apart from the individual. Hence, for Hegel there could be no progress for the species unless it was realized in its individual members. Yet the individual members in turn can only realize this progress within the actuality of the universal, that is, within the reality of the state.

The state, therefore, can be characterized as the mode of "universal altruism." The altruism of the state is not the altruism of our subjective whim or religious fancy, however. It is not the altruism of the religious virtuoso. It is rather the altruism which is constitutive of every person's reality as a fully social being. Human freedom is not realized by our increasing alienation from human community, but, Hegel argues, whatever human freedom we possess has been constituted through human community. We must simply recognize what is.

Human social life, then, progresses towards the expression of man's Sittlichkeit in an ever more self-conscious way. And in this

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process Sittlichkeit does not negate our subjective autonomy but orients it within a more complete self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved as "the ethical spirit" (der sittliche Geist)\textsuperscript{34} progresses through the phases of Sittlichkeit. It begins with the initial or immediate phase of the family and progresses into the external social arrangement described by the term "civil society": an association of self-subsistent individuals brought about by their needs, by the legal system, and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. For Hegel, however, such an association remains only "abstract," for it can never approach the rationality that is concrete in the state. The unity which the family has lost in the phase of civil society is recovered at a higher level in the constitution of the state. It is recovered in the rationality (Vernünftigkeit) of the state. The state's Vernünftigkeit is the expression of a supra-individual embodiment of subjectivity — the "spiritual" reality of political society.\textsuperscript{35} Within the "ethical substance" (sittliche Substanz) of the state is found the unity of objective freedom and subjective freedom: the unity of the (objective) freedom of the universal or substantial will and of the (subjective) freedom of the individual will as it possesses its own particular knowledge and objectives. That is to say, the state is realized in


\textsuperscript{35}Taylor, Hegel, p. 161.
concrete expression by the union particular individuals achieve in their own particular knowledge and objectives with the objective grounding of their freedom and autonomy. Such is the content of the state's rationality. But the form of the state derives from the fact that its principle of action is not the subjective desires of its individual members but rather universal principles and laws: its principle of action is determined in the medium of thought. All this is to say that individuals are not the mindless instruments of the state but that the state's reality depends on the self-conscious recognition of individuals of their freedom as grounded in a dimension that is somehow larger than their own particular freedom. The state cannot subvert this freedom, for it presupposes its very existence. Therefore, because it is in the state that the unity of objective and subjective freedom is realized, it is in the state that the principle of reason (Vernunftigkeit) becomes concrete.

It is only insofar as an individual is a member of the state that he has "objectivity, truth and ethical life": "Objectivitat, Wahrheit, und Sittlichkeit."\(^{36}\) It is the individual's unification of himself with the state which constitutes the individual's true determination of himself as an individual.

**Hegel's Theory of Religion and the State**

Hegel's theory of the state, then, perceives an ongoing movement in our social attainment of an ethical (sittlich) self-consciousness. Yet, as Yerkes points out, for Hegel our self-consciousness as human

\(^{36}\) Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, par. 258, p. 399.
self-consciousness is fundamentally a religious self-consciousness. It is in this sense that we may understand Hegel's statement:

so ist die Religion für das Selbstbewusstsein die Basis der Sittlichkeit und des Staates.

thus for the self-consciousness religion is the "basis" of moral life [Sittlichkeit] and of the state.

Religion and the state are hence inseparable. Yet Hegel's very explanation of their inseparability carries with it a clarification of what religion is. First, Sittlichkeit is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness as self-consciousness achieves its "real presence" (wirklicher Gegenwart) as a nation and as the individuals of that nation. Second, because self-consciousness is free only insofar as it is certain of itself as possessing the content of truth as its indwelling spirit or substance, then if this certainty of self-consciousness that it possesses the content of truth as its substance is lacking, then "unfreedom" (Unfreiheit) marks the form of the relation between self-consciousness and the content of truth. And insofar as this relation between self-consciousness and the content of truth is lacking in religion, religion itself is "unfreedom" even though its implicit content is absolute spirit: "obgleich der an sich seelende Inhalt der Religion der absolute


38 Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes, par. 552, p. 356.

Geist ist.⁴⁰ In other words, although it is true that religion itself forms the basis for the development of self-consciousness, yet at the same time it is not immune from the truth that is revealed in that very development, namely, that self-consciousness's spirit or substance is the truth itself.⁴¹ And this development demonstrates that self-consciousness is actually immanent in the ethical principles religion embodies, so that these ethical principles now are not "up there" but "in us." Religion is not immune from the differentiation of consciousness. What it contains implicitly now becomes explicit, as self-consciousness finds that the truth that was once thought to be alien to it is actually nothing other than its own spirit and substance.

The process of the differentiation of consciousness as it has affected religion is demonstrated, according to Hegel, in the historical transformation of "holiness" as the underlying principle of the religious reality of Catholicism into the actuality of Sittlichkeit as the underlying principle of the religious reality represented by Protestantism. Hegel contrasts the holy life's three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience with their ethical (sittlich) counterparts of property, marriage, and the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the state. In a differentiated consciousness religion is realized not in vowing

⁴⁰ Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes, par. 552, pp. 355-356.

⁴¹ Hegel is here making his characteristic argument that we could not be self-conscious unless our thought existed in the actuality of truth. Our self-consciousness could never be the result of a series of false constructions of reality. If we do say that it is possibly the result of a series of false constructions, we are still testing consciousness by consciousness as self-consciousness and are back at the truth of consciousness once more.
ourselves to the purity and wholeness of a realm conceived as outside our existence but in fulfilling the ethical principles inherent in the vows as inherent to our own self-consciousness. Therefore there cannot be any absolute demarcation between what is God's and what is man's. As Hegel points out, it is not enough to say "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's." Rather the problem is to determine what it is that belongs to the secular authority. It is notorious, he notes, that both the secular authority and the ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything as their own. Hegel offers his solution:

Der göttliche Geist muss das Weltliche immanent durchdringen, so ist die Weisheit konkret darin und seine Berechtigung an ihm selbst bestimmt.

The divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it, and it carries the terms of its own justification.

In other words, Hegel's answer to the conundrum of what is Caesar's and what is God's is an attempt to formulate the principle by which both, though remaining distinct, must ultimately be informed. In the light of this principle it then becomes clear that one cannot have a free state and a servile religion together within the same social construct and that, alternately, it is a folly of our modern age, (eine Torheit neuerer Zeit), to try to alter a corrupt moral organization by altering its political constitution — to make a revolution without having made

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42 Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes, par. 552, p. 359.
43 Idi.
44 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, par. 552, p. 286.
a reformation. In other words, one cannot expect to have a perfect political constitution alongside a religion which has not a glimmer of the autonomous dignity of man. Similarly, the political constitution of itself does not create the ethical actuality of any given organization. One cannot legislate either religion or the state into good health. The state will not solve its problems by subsuming a slavish religion into its political constitution. Rather both state and religion must preserve their identity, an identity which is informed by a common principle.

And what is this informative principle? This is Hegel's "principle of spirit." This principle, as spirit, has as its characteristic that it is aware of its own essence, is implicitly in absolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. It is only in this principle that "the absolute possibility and necessity exists for the power of the state, religion, and the principles of philosophy to coincide in one." This principle has the culmination of its objective phase in Sittlichkeit, the "substantial" realization of free will out of its previous, more abstract, moments as law (Recht) and Moralität.

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\(^{45}\) Hegel, *Philosophie des Geistes*, par. 552, p. 360.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., par. 552, p. 364: "Nur in dem Prinzip des sein Wessen wissenden, des an sich absolut freien und in der Tätigkeit seines Befreiens seine Wirklichkeit habenden Geistes ist die absolute Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit vorhanden, dass Staatsmacht, Religion und die Prinzipien der Philosophie in eins zusammenfallen, die Verschönerung der Wirklichkeit überhaupt mit dem Geiste, des Staats mit dem religiösen Gewissen, in gleichen dem philosophischen Wissen sich vollbringt."

\(^{47}\) Ibid., par. 487, p. 306.
But over against the objective phase Hegel sets a final absolute sphere which he designates as absolute spirit. Objective spirit represents the realm of the absolute Idea only implicitly whereas absolute spirit attains the Idea beyond the scope of finitude.\(^{48}\) Religion, moreover, is a general designation for this supreme sphere.

Have we then suddenly come to an elevation of religion over the state? Hegel is interested ultimately in that common principle by which the fragments of our life — political power, religious conscience and philosophical consciousness — can be integrated. When Hegel speaks of that integration as such, he can speak only of "absolute" spirit because it is not their immanent content which interests him but rather the dynamic principle of relation by which they are to be connected to each other. But within this relation, because the state appears to be an explicit realization of what remains largely implicit in religion, the state therefore appears to assume the power of "discernment" over religion, just as the philosophy of spirit appears to obtain the final discernment over both religion and state together. Yet the state is not prior to religion as such but is intermediary to different phases of religion. It stands over against the religion of "unfreedom" that is religion which does not have the differentiated consciousness that the content of truth is the spirit or substance of self-consciousness. Yet religion which does come to this level of consciousness carries us from

\(^{48}\)Ibid., par. 483, p. 303: "Der objektive Geist ist die absolute Idee, aber nur an sich selend; indem er damit auf dem Boden der Endlichkeit ist, behält seine wirkliche Vernünftigkeit die Seite äusserlichen Erscheinens an ihr."

\(^{49}\)Ibid., par. 554, p. 366.
the phase of "objective spirit" , the realm of the state, onto the phase of "absolute spirit" in which our consciousness grasps all truth as the self-mediation of spirit.

Religion in its first phase represents an earlier, more implicit, form of human consciousness. This is religion of Vorstellung — religion as shaped by picture thinking or thinking representation. Such religion apprehends the infinite, but only in an implicit, undifferentiated way. The infinite is apprehended through a mixture of finite sensuous perceptions under the categorical forms of the understanding. By Vorstellung, then, Hegel means thought as mixed by sensuous recollection. Religious Vorstellung, in using appearances, attempts to represent the ultimate unifying principle and infinite ground which lie beyond those appearances. In this sense, human consciousness, because it aims for this underlying principle or ground, is primordially a religious consciousness. Man is essentially a religious being because he is a thinking being. 50

Religion of Vorstellung, of representational thinking, has not made its full transition to thought. It is philosophy which transforms representational thinking into thoughts free of their sensuous components. Moreover, because religion is the apprehension of the infinite, therefore when philosophy comes to treat religion, it has now passed beyond the sphere of subjective spirit (the individual as free) and the sphere of objective spirit (the state) into that of absolute spirit. The state as the embodiment of objective spirit, therefore,

50Yerkes, Christology of Hegel, pp. 89-97.
appears to be a transitory stage in the ongoing realization of the principle of spirit. As over against religion, which must first appear in "sensuous externality" and therefore must be "an agent for the oppression of the liberty of spirit and for the disruption of political life," the state manifests in itself a mediated level of consciousness, namely, substantial Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit becomes substantial when it is identical to the liberty of an independent self-consciousness. 51

Now these statements give us the proper context for understanding Hegel's statements about the state's regulation of church life. It is not so much that religion has been finally elevated over the state as that the state preserves religion by recognizing through its self-consciousness the necessity of both religion and state and therefore limits the churches, i.e. ecclesiastical authority, in their attempt to claim almost everything. For Hegel, the right to hold religious opinions was an aspect of our subjective identity, the subjective identity which characterizes civil society. The state, as the expression of Sittlichkeit, or the liberty of an independent self-consciousness, can maintain the unity of purpose by which the pluralism which characterizes civil society may both be maintained and yet not allowed to become all-pervasive and so overwhelmingly disruptive. Accordingly, Hegel asserts that a state can require all its citizens to belong to a church (for religion is an integrating factor in the state, implanting a sense of unity in the depths of human consciousness) and yet the state cannot go beyond this general prescription, for it cannot make the choice of the

51 Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes, par. 652, pp. 364-365. The idea of the state is "der substantiellen Sittlichkeit, mit welcher die Freiheit des für sich seienden Selbstbewusstseins identisch ist."
church for the individual. The state can only prescribe "some church or other" because the content of a religious faith is related to representational thinking (Vorstellung) into which the state cannot inject itself.\textsuperscript{52} The state, if its organization is well developed and mature, may even be strong enough to tolerate, i.e. will not be adversely affected by, such anti-state elements as Quakers and Anabaptists. Jews, moreover, have their civil rights from the very fact they are human beings. To exclude them from civil society is precisely to thwart a similarity of feeling and thought between them and the rest of society from arising and to confirm them in the very isolation for which they are reproached.\textsuperscript{53}

Now this view of the state as mediating amongst the churches shows that it possesses a conceptual superiority (in the Hegelian sense) which is a challenge for religious consciousness. Hegel felt that Protestant (Lutheran) Christianity could emulate this consciousness but only in a representational way, that is, in the mode of Vorstellung. Insofar as it was a church which relied on representational thought, it had to recognize its place not as independent from the state, but as "conceptually" subordinate to it. And yet, and this is essential, the ultimate connection between religion and the state is discerned not through the state's self-consciousness so much as through philosophical discernment, that is, through the principle of spirit which taken as absolute can only be explicated as the passage of objective spirit (the realm of the state) into absolute spirit (religion in general) as then explicated in

\textsuperscript{52} Hegel, \textit{Philosophie des Rechts}, p. 270, p. 420.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 421.
art, [revealed] religion and philosophy). What Hegel is trying to say, then, is not so much that the church is subordinated to the state, but that the church is subordinated to religion, religion being understood as the revealed religion of Christianity whose spirit is apprehended and explicated in philosophy. The state does not encompass religion but has the strange function of protecting it from the church insofar as ecclesiastical authority makes a claim to almost everything.

Here we see Hegel's unique resolution of the problem posed by the split that has developed in Western consciousness between the church as one reality as over against the phenomenon of religion as a distinct reality itself. The German Aufklärung differed from the Enlightenment of the philosophes in that it never understood religion as a mere function of what the churches were. Rather the German Aufklärung was influenced by the German pietist movement in its search to renew Christian spiritual life. Pietism thus introduced a way of seeing the Christian religion as something greater than any confessional aspect of it. The Aufklärung, of course, advocated a place for human reason which pietism rejected, yet within Germany religion and Enlightenment never became two utterly hostile camps as in France. Working within this context Hegel does not subordinate religion to the churches but rather sees the churches as a function of what religion is. If the churches are lacking, moreover, it is because they represent an implicit stage of religion, and, when society becomes more differentiated they become

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54 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 11-12.
an influence to oppress liberty of spirit. Hegel, however, did not follow the contemporary pattern of assigning the church and state only a limited sphere as over against the then liberated and liberating middle class civil society (as in Kant) but advanced the state as the organic reality which superseded, that is, preserved by providing a higher level of integration for, both civil society and church at one and the same time. It is the state which as the summation of human freedom mediates our access to absolute spirit, that is, spirit as fully self-conscious. Religion as philosophically explicated is our knowledge of the spirit’s self-knowledge.

Hegel’s theory of the state, therefore, brings us face to face with a resolution of many different and often contrary forces which operate at odds with each other in Western society. Hegel declared that the tensions defining these often contrary forces—political power, religion and philosophy—are not resolved within the ontological reality of the state but find their common resolution within the principle of spirit, of which the state is the objective, but not the absolute, realization. We see here a vast difference between Hegel’s view of the state and the Kantian formulation. For Kant, the state was not the realization of ethical reality but rather itself an agent of an a priori principle which stood over above "virtue," that is, individual adaptation of the a priori principle. For Hegel, however, the state was the realization and objective expression of the principle which

informed all principles, namely, spirit, Geist.

The Question of Intersubjectivity

The difference we have discerned between Kant and Hegel in their treatment of the state can be understood as a consequence of their treatment of human autonomy as manifested in the autonomous human subject. For Kant the social reality of the state is there not to make the citizens virtuous but to exercise coercion upon them, should they fail of virtue. The very coercive nature of "right" in Kant's theory recognizes an autonomy of the human subject which the state cannot inwardly transform but can only externally direct. Inward transformation is not the business of the state. That state, insofar as it rests upon "right" does have an anchor in an a priori reality, yet this reality, as a priori, does not depend upon any individual expression of itself for its validity. In other words, the dimension beyond the human subject for Kant was not a dimension of a transforming social reality but rather the dimension of transcendent faith. The purpose of the Kantian philosophy is precisely to open the human subject onto the vista of faith.

It is quite otherwise with Hegel. Hegel claimed to offer the human subject not the vista of faith but knowledge and within that knowledge a transforming social reality, the state. Now the state is not for Hegel the outer boundary of existence. Far from it. The state, as we have seen, is only one moment in the subject's attainment of absolute knowledge. The state as an expression of objective spirit depends ultimately upon its absolute phase of spirit as eternally self-knowing. Yet for all that, the state represents an accessible and possible mode of existence for the human subject, as subject. The state's ontological
reality allows subjectivity to cease being bound up within itself as solipsistic. It is the realm of subjectivity liberated to an ethical self-consciousness. This realm of transformed subjectivity is designated as Sittlichkeit, the realm of "free ethical subjectivity."\(^{56}\)

Now our argument up till now has led us through an understanding of Hegel as a philosopher who far from retreating from or abolishing Kant's authentication of the autonomy of the human subject rather retained this achievement while trying to orientate it within the dimensions of a larger cosmic order. Hegel, therefore, is unique in his retention of human subjectivity and his offering it a further dimension of immanent possibility through the reality of the state—a transforming social reality which satisfies the subject's striving for unification with "what is." It is this positing of an immanently accessible and transforming social reality which retains but somehow advances beyond the limits of human subjectivity that I will call the "Hegelian model." The "Kantian model," by contrast, sees the dimension beyond the self-conscious subject not as immanently accessible but as transcendent—the dimension whose reality is apprehended not through philosophical knowledge but through faith.

The Hegelian model, because it rests upon Hegel's theory of the state, has a more complex structuring than the Kantian. For because the state is the manifestation of the objective phase of spirit, a phase which is intermediary between the subjective spirit of the

\(^{56}\) The term "free ethical subjectivity" is not found as such in Hegel. I use it here, however, to designate his attempt to ground subjectivity in an ethical reality which guaranteed its freedom. This grounded reality takes subjectivity beyond itself while respecting it.
isolated self-conscious subject and the absolute self-knowing subject (God), Hegel's state as a transforming social reality serves a double purpose. It is both a statement about the ontological reality of human freedom as realized in our ethical life in the community and a critique of religion, particularly of "revelation." Because the state represents an attainment of consciousness (ethical self-consciousness) which is differentiated far beyond the level of consciousness which is certain of truth only in Vorstellungen or picture images, the consciousness or level of knowledge which accompanies the transforming social reality of the state therefore equips us for a science of religion. Within the dimension of ethical self-consciousness we know that religious images are inadequate and we know that the "postulate of holiness" has been replaced by Sittlichkeit, the "ethical life." This dimension of consciousness serves therefore not only as the uttermost realization of human freedom but also as our passage towards full religious truth. It is when ethical self-consciousness "tackles" religion that its certainty about religion as implicit truth is raised to its fullest explicit truth — the absolute phase of spirit as self-thinking thought. Ethical self-consciousness passes into absolute knowledge through its critique of religion. Therefore the Hegelian model can serve a dual role, either aspect of which can be emphasized. It can serve as a basis for an ontological grounding of human freedom in community and, because Hegel included its idea as intrinsic to any such grounding of human freedom, as a critique of religion, particularly religion which conveys its truth in Vorstellungen, revelatory picture images. Therefore, as we shall see, the Hegelian model can be set forth either primarily as a
defence of an immanently accessible social reality as the ultimate realization of human freedom or as the immanent criterion for a critique of religion, especially religion considered as revelation, which raises thought about God to knowledge. In our last chapter we will see how this double nuance can be applied to the contemporary theological scene.

In the next chapter I hope to show that both the Kantian and Hegelian models have continued to exert their influence in contemporary Western philosophical thought. As a way of demonstrating the persistence of these models, I will draw attention to the way that very contemporary and over-used word "intersubjectivity" has entered into our conceptual framework. Intersubjectivity arrived as a "problem" at the turn of our present century. As denoting the dimension of interconnection and communication between subjects it came to prominence as a "problem" within the neo-Kantian framework. It was of great concern to Husserl.\(^{57}\) This general problematic, I contend, was launched by Kant's

\(^{57}\) Interestingly enough, just as Kant's unresolved dilemma of human community as over against subjectivity brought forth Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, so the neo-Kantian dilemmas of intersubjectivity as over against the subject's intentionality of consciousness brought forth Heidegger's Being and Time, a phenomenology of being. Yet, because intersubjectivity is merely a pallid reflection of the reality of human community, Heidegger's Dasein in turn is a much more spectral retention of the autonomy of the human subject. In fact the human subject winds up being a mere moment of the intersubjective reality of language. Hegel's state at least, since it is the realization of human community, retains the autonomy of the human subject far more concretely than Heidegger. For Hegel, the unity of the human subject's self-consciousness with the ethical self-consciousness of the community is brought about in and through the subject. The subject does not become a mere cipher for an intersubjective reality such as language. We might describe the whole philosophical sequence between the Kantian framework and the Hegelian phenomenology in the genealogy: In the beginning was Intentionality and Intentionality begot Phenomenology. Phenomenology begot Socialism and Socialism spawned Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy rose up, however, and drowned its forebears in their own paper.
system management such that reflection becomes a property of the system rather than of its individual units or components. Habermas objects that no social system can be maintained if the maintenance needs of the system members are ignored. These system members of the particular system called human society require a rational identity for their group so that their own ego-identity has concrete communal significance. Habermas feels the solution to this problem lies in tying the new identity not to a territory but to a communication process in which identity formation takes place as continuous learning. This identity thus is not to be constructed in an over-all world view but in the elaboration and testing of an universalistic morality which can submit all previous traditions and used-up world views to critique. This group identity then is prospective rather than retrospective.

We have recounted Habermas' inquiry into the possibility of a rational grounding for contemporary society to show how Habermas uses the word "intersubjectivity" to refer to the realm of symbolic meaning that undergirds human knowing, life-experience and action. It is precisely this "realm" that Habermas attempts to defend in his work by showing that it is grounded in a communicative structure based on the fundamental norms of rational speech. Within his "universal pragmatics" or theory of communicative competence, Habermas identifies "dialogue-constitutive universals" which serve as the a priori of intersubjectivity, that is, they "generate and describe the form of intersubjectivity

9 Ibid., pp. 112-113.

10 Ibid., pp. 115-117.
which makes mutuality of understanding possible."\textsuperscript{11} Communicative competence relates to an ideal speech situation and is defined by the ideal speaker's mastery of the dialogue-constitutive universals, irrespective of actual restrictions under empirical conditions. Habermas distinguishes five classes of these dialogue-constitutive or pragmatic universals: pronouns, forms of address, deictic expressions, performative verbs (assert, promise, etc.) and non-performative verbs.\textsuperscript{12} Important for our purposes now, however, is not so much his classification and explication of these elements but his use of them to advance a theory of human communication which presupposes a quest for truth in every linguistic communication rather than, say, just an attempt to manipulate one's environment. According to Habermas, truth is the peculiar mode of existence of man:

 Yet it is evidently a fact of nature that the human species, confined to its socio-cultural form of life, can only reproduce itself through the medium of that most unnatural idea, truth, which necessarily begins with the counterfactual assumption that universal agreement is possible.\textsuperscript{13}

Habermas's reconstructive analysis of speech attempts to show that in every linguistic communication truth claims must be recognized. He develops his concept of "discourse" in which the truth of problematic opinions (theoretic discourse) and norms (practical discourse) can be


\textsuperscript{13}Jürgen Habermas, "Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973): 195.
redeemed. Truth is approached and appropriated by consensus. Yet we are not just trapped in making any consensus equal the truth, for in discourse we can move to increasingly reflected levels of redeeming problematic truth claims. What makes this freedom possible, this freedom to break out of a limited and limiting consensus Habermas attributes to the ideal speech situation which is presupposed by any given speech act. Unless we believed that our consensus were approaching the truth, that it could be a grounded consensus, anchored beyond its own circular definitions, the whole meaning of speech itself would be called into question. Habermas calls this grounding which every act of speech anticipates the ideal speech situation. This ideal speech situation is characterized by an absence of constraint on the participants, such that the result of the discussion will depend simply on the force of the better argument and not on accidental or systematic constraints on discussion.  

14 For Habermas, then, the structure of communication rests on a normative basis and because of this basis the realm of the intersubjective is not just an "enlarged subjectivity" but the human modality of participating in the possibility of an universal agreement rooted in truth. Thus Habermas can talk of "pure intersubjectivity" as that which is realized by the ideal speech situation.

Pure intersubjectivity is determined by a symmetrical relation between I and You (We and You), I and He (We and They). An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles demands that no side be privileged in the performance of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists only when there is complete symmetry in distribution of assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment, prescription and conformity, among the partners of communication.  


This pure intersubjectivity is an idealization. Yet the design of the ideal speech situation is implied in the structure of potential speech, "since all speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented towards the idea of truth." 16

Habermas's idea of pure intersubjectivity then seems to resemble Hegel's free ethical subjectivity insofar as it goes beyond the merely subjective into a dimension of that which really is, the dimension of truth, freedom and justice. This identification has to be made explicit because the word "intersubjective" itself has had only a rather recent history. The word, defined as "existing between conscious minds" does not appear in the original Oxford English Dictionary but only in the Supplement (1976) which lists its first use by James Ward in 1899 in the phrase "intersubjective intercourse." 17 The term seems to denote a peculiarly 20th century concern brought into prominence by the work of Husserl on the one hand, and by Carnap and Popper on the other.

Because as understood by Habermas it seems to denote the human modality of participating in truth and because Habermas works to free Hegel's philosophy from its idealism through Marx and conversely to free Marx's philosophy from its covert positivism through Hegel, I suggest that Habermas transforms Hegel's idealized state and Marx's (positivistic) classless society into the possibility and project of human intersubjectivity. Moreover, because this intersubjectivity seems to imply

16 Ibid., p. 372.

an immanent human access to what may be termed "salvific intelligibility" for human praxis, I suggest it is consistent with what I will call the "Hegelian model" in theology.

Habermas's development of a communicative ethic based on the norms of rational speech gives him a conceptual framework in which he can explicate the complex relationship of the individual human subject and his relation to his social world. For example, Habermas can both adopt and yet modify Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness so that they culminate not just in a privatized (monological) subject who knows how to mediate his actions through universal ethical principles but in a subject who, as a member of a "fictive world society," works towards the moral and political freedom inherent in the norms of rational speech. 18 Habermas argues that the justification of norms goes beyond their mere capacity to exhibit generalizability (Nominalism). Only at the level of an universal ethics of speech can the question of "true" need versus mistaken or false needs be raised and become the object of practical discourse. For the realm of truth to apply, the interiorized and monological principle must give way to the "communally followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively." 19 Thus Habermas adds a qualitatively different "seventh stage" to Kohlberg's six stages, a stage beyond the formalistic ethics of duty to an universal ethics of speech, which, from a "utopian perspective" allows us not just to accept


19 Ibid., p. 90.
traditional cultural contents as "stencils according to which needs are shaped" but to gain access to adequate interpretations for these needs. Through this medium our ego gains access to its inner nature. This inner nature, moreover, is not enslaved to the demands of ego autonomy, but precisely because ego autonomy must be responsive to truth, our internal nature, though a dependent ego, obtains free access to the interpretive possibilities of the cultural tradition.\textsuperscript{20}

The application of this communicative ethics to man's social being — his historical, intellectual and moral development — determines Habermas's "reconstruction of historical materialism." Habermas rejects the "traditional" historical materialist concept of the history of the species reconstructed as a developmental sequence of modes of production. He argues instead that the development of normative structures (mechanisms for regulating conflict, world views, identity formations) mediated by communicative action is the pacemaker of social evolution.\textsuperscript{21} Habermas grants that this communicative action is complemented by what is called purposive-rational action to make up the full rationalization process that determines social evolution. But whereas purposive-rational action is addressed to a rationalization of means (efficiency of technical means and the consistency of choice between suitable means) and hence signifies the heightening of productive forces, communicative action is "oriented to observing

\textsuperscript{20}Habermas, "Moral Development," p. 93.

\textsuperscript{21}Habermas, "The Development of Normative Structures" Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 120.
intersubjectively valid norms that link reciprocal expectations."\(^{22}\)
Habermas detects homologous structures of consciousness in ego development and social evolution which are manifested in and through the symbolic structures that underlie law and morality, world views (the intersubjectively constituted world), and the identities of persons and collectives. By homology Habermas means there is a concomitant development in the growth of interiority both in individual identity structure and social reality in which these individuals find themselves. Keeping in view the fact that social change occurs only through "constructive learning on the part of individuals,"\(^{23}\) Habermas argues that within the tension of the homology normative structures are not just functions of purposive-rational action manifested in the development of reproductive processes but are structures which possess an internal history which is explained only by the basic concepts of communicative action.\(^{24}\)

Habermas's recognition of homologous structures of consciousness in the histories of the individual and the species as manifested in the complexes of law and morality, world views, and collective identities, reflects his attempt to unite an ontogenetic theory of cognition development in the individual human knower with a concomitant recognition of the part social structures play in shaping identity, without submerging or reducing one to the other. In his attempt to reconstruct historical materialism on non-positivistic lines Habermas is careful to

\(^{22}\)Habermas, "Development of Normative Structures," p. 118.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 120.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., p. 117.
maintain the balance between man's participation in the social reality by which he is shaped and man's ability to learn constructively over against what a society up to then has learned derivatively through the previous contribution of its socialized individuals. In his attempt to explicate the complex relationship of human cognition and socialization, then, Habermas must submit Marx's concepts of the "history of the species," "social labor" and "modes of production" to this critical reconstruction which insists on incorporating the level of communicative action into man's cognitional and social being. It is always revealing to examine any thinker's account of how human history began. Such is the power of any "myth of origin" that it sums up the core of the author's perceptions about mankind. Habermas traces the development from the hominid level to the human level as deriving from the development of familial social structure in which males now played a constitutive role (rather than being mere adjuncts to the "family" of females and children). The development of the family came because the mode of production of the socially organized hunt created a new need for integration between the society of the male hunting band and the society of the plant-gathering females and the young, both of whom remained behind during hunting expeditions. The older hominid pattern of status dependent sexual relations was not equal to the new need for integration. Rather, "only a family system based on marriage and regulated descent permitted the adult male member to link — via the father role — a status in the male system of the hunting band with a status in the female and child system.

and thus

1. integrate functions of social labor with functions of nurture of the young, and moreover,
2. coordinate functions of male hunting with those of female gathering. 26

Thus although the hominid apes already possessed a symbolically mediated interaction, homo sapiens developed a social role system based on the intersubjective recognition of normed expectations. This system of social norms presupposed language.

The mediating term linking "social labor" (hunting, plant-gathering) to the "history of the species" is "mode of production." Marx used this concept to reconstruct the history of the species as "a discrete series of modes of production, which, in its developmental order, reveals the direction of social evolution." 27 Habermas submits the concept of mode of production to reconstruction by arguing that the species learns not only in the dimension of technically useful knowledge decisive for the development of productive forces (strategic action) but also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness decisive for structures of interaction (communicative action). In order to escape from reducing social development to a developmental sequence of modes of production, which, against the evidence, makes endogenous evolutionary advances mere functions of the development of productive forces, Habermas attempts to develop a genetic theory of action in which the tension of social subjects and social system can be maintained without

26 Habermas, "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," p. 136.

27 Ibid., p. 138.
collapsing one into the other. Noting that strictly speaking it is the personality system that is the bearer of the ontogenetic learning process (only social subjects can learn) nevertheless social systems, by drawing on the learning capacities of social subjects, can form new structures of order to solve steering problems that threaten their continued existence. In turn, social subjects acquire their competences not as isolated monads but by growing into the symbolic structures of their life-worlds. This development Habermas describes as three stages of communication:

1. the stage of symbolically mediated interaction: the meaning of the communicative symbol and of the action are reciprocally defined;
2. the stage of propositionally differentiated speech: actions are separated from norms;
3. the stage of argumentative speech: norms and roles appear as in need of justification — their validity can be contested or grounded with references.

The concepts used to describe these three stages can serve as concepts for a genetic theory of human action for which they can furnish the infrastructure for the action system itself. Habermas then correlates these three stages of interactive competence with the Piagetian stages of moral consciousness: the pre-conventional, the conventional, and the post-conventional, respectively. These stages of moral consciousness come into play insofar as action-conflicts in a society are regulated not through force or strategic means but on a consensual basis. They are embodied simultaneously in structures that mark the moral consciousness of the individual and the legal and moral system of society. Through this correlation of his concepts for a genetic theory of action

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28 Habermas, "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," p. 146.

29 Ibid., pp. 154–155.
with the stages of moral consciousness Habermas is able to evaluate levels of social integration in the way in which they present general structures which shape and guide human action, in the way in which they present the structures of their world views which are determinate for morality and law, and finally, in the way they present their structures of institutionalized law and of binding moral representations. Using this correlation he can evaluate the level of social integration in neolithic societies, early civilizations, developed civilizations and the modern age.

Throughout Habermas’s work, then, we see a constant attempt to correlate the development of individual ego-identity in its stages of moral consciousness with the "social system" in such a way that both retain a constitutive reality for mankind. Habermas’s argument against those who would overcome legitimation problems facing the modern state by merely submerging what the individual discerns as normative into what the system decrees as functionally normative stems from this same concern to preserve the homology between individual and social development without subverting either term. As we have seen, Habermas grounds his homologous structures of consciousness which exist in ego development and social evolution in structures of linguistically established intersubjectivity. In his critique of the Marxist tradition, Habermas introduces the level of communicative action as one essential rationalization process which, along with its complement, purposive rational

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action, constitutes the praxis that determines social evolution.
Because, moreover, communicative action is oriented to observing inter-subjectively valid norms that link reciprocal expectations, our attention is drawn to the validity basis of speech which it presupposes. In communicative action the universal validity claims of truth, rightness, and truthfulness, which participants in speech at least implicitly raise and reciprocally recognize, make possible the consensus without which there would be no human action in common. 32 Thus Habermas’s “intersubjectivity” as linguistically established is not just a pragmatic or functional consensus but is constituted because it clings to truth. Distorted communication implies the possibility, indeed is enabled, by the anticipation of undistorted communication. In other words, any common consensus or basis of communication amongst human subjects cannot be constructed solely on commonly-assented-to whims and delusions, for the formal conditions of possibility of the consensus imply validity claims which ultimately would controvert any common agreement to ignore them. Thus the formal conditions of intersubjectivity for Habermas presuppose an indestructible human allegiance to truth. Now this intersubjectivity serves as an immanent source of truth insofar as we are beings who employ speech in the same way as Hegel’s state as the realm of free ethical subjectivity (Sittlichkeit) serves as the source or truth insofar as the state is our self-consciousness in a true (substantial) dimension of freedom. It is this location of an immanent access to that ultimate grounding of truth which can undo the distortions of man’s subjectivistic

existence which I identify as the "Hegelian model" and contend that it has relevance for contemporary philosophy and theology.

Lonergan's Study of Human Understanding

In his work Insight, Lonergan also undertakes an examination of the intricate relationship between man's cognitional and social development. Lonergan's work attempts to show us that what we know is congruent with what is there to be known. This is not a tautology, for Lonergan seeks to show that our activity of knowing is directed not merely to imposing a pattern on a reality which in itself is unknowable and whose appearance only can be ordered by our cognitional structures, but to knowing this reality as what is there to be known. In other words, our knowing is not somehow outside the reality it seeks to know but somehow congruent with it. Therefore Lonergan's examination of human knowing cannot fail to take in man's social reality, for it is in that context that the adventure of human knowing begins.

The reality which we seek to know is approached by the structure of our knowing as it progresses from descriptive knowledge to explanatory knowledge. The congruency between our knowing and what is there to be known Lonergan calls the isomorphism that obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. 33 Lonergan explains this isomorphism between our knowing and what is there to be known by working out the dynamic structure of our knowing as it moves from the

procedure of description to the explanatory procedure of definition by relation. Now the movement from description to explanation must make use of data, and the human inquirer is confronted with both the data of sense and the data of consciousness. An important difference results between explanation based on the data of sense and explanation based on the data of consciousness. If one starts from the data of sense, one's explanatory procedure is never free from hypothesis. If one begins from the data of consciousness, however, one passes beyond the hypothetical. Lonergan argues that "explanation on the basis of consciousness can escape the merely supposed, the merely postulated, the merely inferred" (334). But explanation based on the data of consciousness escapes the limitation of possible future revision, for it is by the data of consciousness that we establish what constitutes revision. Thus "revision cannot revise its own presuppositions" (336). Thus the data of consciousness possess a finality as over against the data of sense certainty. It is accepting this finality about the data of consciousness that leads cognitional theory (what do we do when we know?) into epistemology (why is that knowing?). Lonergan's cognitional theory reaches its thing-itself by understanding itself as concrete unity in a process that is conscious empirically, intelligently, and rationally. Moreover, since every other known becomes known through this process no known could impugn the process without simultaneously impugning its own status as a known. (338-339)

In other words, our judgment about our cognitional process as such leads us into the realm of knowledge of the process, into epistemology. This knowledge is described as a "coalescence of judgments" (375).

The question remains, "What is it we know when we know — what is the content of our knowing?" This is the domain of metaphysics.
Lorergan answers that the content of our knowing is what is there to be known. In other words, Lorergan argues that our knowing knows not an abstracted construct of reality but reality as it is itself. Our knowing knows being (396). Lorergan defines being as "the objective of the pure desire to know" (348). It is the normative quality of the structure which this desire to know imposes upon our cognitional acts which allows us to approach heuristically the unknown contents of these acts. Metaphysics is the explanatory account of "the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being," that is, being that is proportionate to human knowing. Our knowledge, as knowledge of "what is there to be known" cannot tear the known out of its existence in reality, but can only judge it within the structure of its existence in reality. Because "knowing is knowing being" Lorergan concludes that "the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, as determined by the sciences and common sense, is knowledge of the organizing structure of proportionate being" (396). We do not therefore approach what is there to be known directly but in an heuristic structure which reveals the isomorphism between the knowing and the known, the isomorphism between our experience, understanding and judgment and the "metaphysical" elements of potency, form and act (486; 511-512). By identifying the dynamic structure of knowing with the structure of proportionate being, Lorergan can affirm that our knowing is a judgment of what is there to be known without making the "what is there to be known" a presupposition or abstraction from human knowledge itself. One approaches what is there to be known by knowing it. Our knowing it is sufficient to make it known. We do not have to postulate a "prior" knowability about it before we come to know it. The
metaphysical elements of potency, form and act do not hover above our experience, understanding and judgment but explain being as it is known in them.

Löpergan's Insight then is an invitation for us to explore the structure of our human knowing: to accept one's own intelligence and reasonableness and to stand by that acceptance (673). Löpergan takes us through this activity of human knowing—experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation—to our self-affirmation as knowers, for it is the peculiar quality of cognitional theory, as distinct from other theory, that it "reaches its thing-itself by understanding itself and affirming itself as concrete unity in a process that is conscious empirically, intelligently, and rationally" (338). Because of this quality, explanation based on the data of consciousness, as distinct from explanation based on the data of sense, can escape the limitation that it must always be provisional (335).

Löpergan's account of human cognition, then, is thoroughly experiential. It is not a mere list of human conditions but an attempt to show how those conditions have a dynamism that leads them to fulfill themselves. Hence the way Löpergan constructs his particular understanding of the relationship between human cognition and human social reality must be taken within the context of his overall project of having the reader appropriate his own intelligence and reasonableness.

Löpergan discerns two principles which mediate social events, namely human inter-subjectivity and practical common sense (217). By common sense Löpergan means the intervention of human intelligence in the ordering of human affairs (207-208). Man's practicality is not to
be confused with "animal impulse or with egoistic scheming" (212). Rather man's practicality is part of his dramatic pursuit of dignified living: "man is an artist" (212). Because man, moreover, grows up not as an isolated monad but as a member of an affectional community, the basis of human community is not the discovery of an idea but a spontaneous intersubjectivity.

By intersubjectivity Lonergan means first of all the foundational bonds of human interrelation which, even after civilization collapses, survive in the bonds of family, its circle of relatives, its accretion of friends; in its customs and folk-ways; in its basic arts and crafts and skills; in its language song and dance; and "most concretely of all in the inner psychology and radiating influence of women" (212). Within the linkage of the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense Lonergan locates the "dialectic of community": the spontaneous intersubjective individual strives to understand and wants to behave intelligently, and, inversely, intelligence would have nothing to put in order were there not the desires and fears, labors and satisfactions of individuals" (217-218). Within the opposition between the two principles Lonergan locates the "tension of community": the demands of the one may militate against the other.

It is important to note that on the individual plane Lonergan does not locate human egoism in the spontaneous demands of human intersubjectivity but in an incomplete development of intelligence which although striking out from an inherited mentality fails to allow complete free play to intelligent inquiry. The egistic solution has in fact to block the spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity which "are
commonly broader in their regard for others than is intelligent selfishness" (221).

The case is different, however, with what Lonergan calls "group bias." Whereas the egocistic individual bias has to overcome normal intersubjective feeling, group bias is supported by such feeling. Social groups develop an ethos "that at once subtly and flexibly provides concrete premises and norms for practical decisions" (222). Because in the dialectic of community there is the operation not only of practical common sense but also of human intersubjectivity, responses to the succession of changes that constitutes social progress are made by intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and interests of groups and "while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good of society" (223). Thus social groups are prone to have that "blind spot" for the insights that reveal their well-being to be excessive or their usefulness at an end.

Besides the bias of a group, Lonergan also identifies a "general bias" into which human common sense almost invariably falls through its incapacity to recognize that it too is a specialized development of human knowledge. As opposed to the shorter cycle of group bias, a "longer cycle" originating from the general bias of common sense turns upon the neglect of certain ideas to which common sense generally becomes impervious. The practicality of common sense remains indifferent to any idea which is not accompanied by the warrant of "insistent desire and contracting fears" (228).

Lonergan thus discerns that because the general bias of common
sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas, the social situation in the longer cycle deteriorates cumulatively. Detached and disinterested intelligence becomes increasingly socially irrelevant (philosophy is useless, religion is privatized) because it confronts a "social surd" which through the general bias of common sense is immanent in the social facts but is not accessible to the human intelligence (230). Following the growing domination of the social surd over every-day "objective reality" a surrender of human intelligence occurs both on the level of common sense, and, more seriously, on the speculative level, so that the man-made incoherence is now advanced as the normative pattern for the claims of intelligence. Within the various brands of modern totalitarianism, reality is defined as the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state (232). In the totalitarian integration of common sense practicality, theory is reduced to the "status of a myth that lingers on to represent the frustrated aspirations of detached and disinterested intelligence" (232).

What chance of escape from the longer cycle exists for us who operate for the most part within the confines of common sense? One scenario would be either total destruction through war or the emergence of a single world empire which, however, common sense would soon desert for the individual or group interest that it understands. Lonergan feels, however, that on the assumption of "emergent probability" we need not regard these scenarios as inevitable but must rather also remember that "the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal" (233). In this sense, then, the longer cycle is to be met "not by any
idea or set of ideas on the level of technology, economics or politics, but only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man's understanding and making of man" (233). This higher viewpoint "is the discovery, the logical expansion and the recognition of the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose" (234). Lonergan proposes that the higher principle to which common sense must submit is manifested in three aspects of human life: in the principle of human progress whose principle is liberty as opposed to human decline whose principle is bias; in the science of man which must overcome the difficulties of approaching the data of human consciousness; and finally, in human culture, the means by which man will meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle (234-236). Out of these resources Lonergan hopes for "a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored" (238). This cosmopolis is not a police force seeking to use ideas to ground the use of force but in its concern with the fundamental issue of the historical process tries to make operative "the ideas that, in the light of the general bias of common sense, are inoperative" (239). Thus cosmopolis is not a group denouncing other groups, nor a super-state ruling states, nor an organization that enrolls members, nor an academy that endorses opinions, nor a court that administers a legal code but "a
dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a
discovery of historical responsibilities" (241). It comes to minds pre-
pared by, but now disillusioned by, the old liberalism and Marxist
analysis. "It is the higher synthesis of the liberal thesis and the
Marxist antithesis" (241). It stands on the basic analysis of the
"compound-in-tension that is man" and therefore its chief characteristic
is that it is not easy because it must try to settle the almost insol-
able problem that general bias represents and to check and reverse the
longer cycle of decline. Lonergan does not pretend to reach a full
solution in his volume Insight but in at least approaching it, he enlists
two allies: common sense, which, although in its practicality institutes
the general bias out of which the longer cycle maintains its impetus,
nevertheless in its judgments "tends to be profoundly sane." Secondly,
dialectical analysis, operating from the fact that the refusal of insight
always betrays itself, can "discover and expose both the past refusals
and the tactics of contemporary resistance to enlightenment" (242).

Lonergan then proceeds to uncover the structure of human knowing
so that our access to this "dimension of consciousness" that is cos-
mopolis is at least unhindered by false notions about what it is to
know. Lonergan works from a distinction between a thing as a "unity,
whole, identity" or "an intelligible unity grasped as individual" and a
body as an "already out there now real." A thing, as thing, is appre-
hended by intelligent procedure. Hence "no thing, itself, no thing as
explained, can be imagined." Anything considered as a thing itself,
stands within a pattern of intelligible relations and offers no foothold
for imagination (250). A body, however, as "out," and "there," and
"now" and "real" has the meaning of its terms fixed solely by elements within sensitive experience and so without any use of intelligent and reasonable questions and answers (254).

This distinction is crucial for Lonergan, for through it we can escape the tyranny of a theory of knowledge which approaches knowing as "taking a look out there." Lonergan's enterprise thus has profound similarities to the work of Kant, although Lonergan severely criticizes Kant for not having freed himself sufficiently from the idea that "taking a look" could be valid human knowing (414). Whether Lonergan is fair in his assessment of Kant (that, for example, Kant's thing-in-itself was what Lonergan meant by body [254]) is open to dispute. What is significant, however, is Lonergan's attempt to complete rather than subvert Kant (389, 538). Lonergan's "pedagogy," moreover, is that of Kant: whereas Hegel refused to discuss the knower and the known separately, Lonergan does separate knower and known, giving the known an "heuristic structure" by which the knower can always go beyond any given known.  

We gain access to things, then, on our level of intelligence (272). Having brought us up to the realization that there are no things within things (electrons, for example, exist as conjugates and not as things within the "thing", atom) Lonergan then seeks to orientate intelligence

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within the general structure of our cognitional process. Intelligence presupposes the initial level of experience. Intelligence consists in acts of inquiry, understanding and formulation (272). It abstracts from the material element Lonergan calls the empirical residue: the individual, the continuum, particular times and places, and the non-systematic divergence of actual frequency from probable expectations (311).

Intelligence, moreover, is complemented by the further level of reflection on which there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude, and the probability that is not a frequency but a quality of judgment (273). In this third level of reflective insight, reflective understanding transforms the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned into the status of what Lonergan calls a "virtually unconditioned" (280). The virtually unconditioned is something that has conditions but these conditions are fulfilled. It is the realm of facts. Judgment has to do with facts. Lonergan attempts to defend the realm of the existential, the factual, the virtually unconditioned, setting up Hegel as the foil who represents its denial (373). This further level of judgment, then, because it answers the question "yes" or "no" represents the level of affirming or denying, assenting or dissenting, agreeing or disagreeing (272-275). Judgment refers to the "is" or "is not" and whereas experience is for inquiring into being, intelligence for thinking out being, by judgment being is known (357).

Lonergan's purpose in Insight, then, is to explicate being as that which grounds the structure of knowing as experience, intelligence and reflection. Being, defined as the objective of the pure desire to know, (348) the notion of which must provide the cognitional process.
with its immanent, dynamic orientation (354). Metaphysics for Lonergan, then, is presented as the science of being as proportionate to our structure of knowing. His cognitional theory seeks to answer the question, "What am I doing when I am knowing?"; his epistemology seeks to answer the question, "Why is doing that knowing?"; and his metaphysics seeks to answer, "What do I know when I do that?" Thus our knowing consists of human experience, intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. Doing that is knowing because the rational conscious asks, "Am I a knower?" and cannot without incoherence answer this question "No." Self-affirmation is the judgment of the fact that I am a knower. And what we know when we are knowing is being as proportionate to our structure of knowing. Further, an ethics based on the notion of the good parallels the method of metaphysics based on the notion of being, for ethics represents the prolongation of the dynamic structure of knowing into human doing. The empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject (599).

As science, metaphysics prescinds from the question of transcendent being (534) yet Lonergan ends the book with a discussion of transcendent knowledge based on an extrapolation from the basis of proportionate being. Lonergan states that because being is completely universal and completely concrete, and, because apart from it, there is nothing, knowledge of what being is cannot be had in anything less than an act of understanding everything about everything (643). Although

man cannot enjoy the unrestricted act of understanding required to answer the question, "What is being?" Lonergan still maintains that he can determine a number of the features of the answer by proceeding on the side of the subject from restricted to unrestricted understanding and on the side of the object from the structure of proportionate being to the transcendent idea of being (644).

As a whole Lonergan's Insight is an attempt to substantiate the "dimension of consciousness" that might break the grip of the long cycle over man's social existence. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant shows that all arguments for the existence of God go back to the ontological proof and that because the ontological proof grants reason a power beyond demonstrable proof (in the theoretical sense) it is groundless. Now against Kant Lonergan demolishes Kant's "demonstrable proof" by showing that knowing has nothing to do with "taking a look." We do not know by looking but by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. But Lonergan, in rejecting Kant's premise, does not undertake to refurbish an ontological argument for the existence of God as transcendent being. Rather he substantiates the intention of Kant's restriction. This substantiation is precisely his metaphysics of proportionate being. By this we attain to a scientific knowledge of being that is proportionate to human knowing. Lonergan does not seek to prove that God exists so much as to prove that man exists. He seeks to argue that man has a quality that establishes him as a "thing," a matter of fact, that is not just a conjugate form in, say, the flux of nature or the happenstance of atoms. His work may be characterized in all seriousness as "an ontological argument for the existence of man," i.e. man is
a knower because he cannot not know that he is a knower. L. rgan's basic divergence from Kant is that self-affirmation goes beyond a unity of apperception to a judgment of fact. The self-negation of the knower as knower is incoherent (342). Therefore in this sense the answer whether correct judgments occur is the act of making one (319).

L. rgan traces how the human subject moves through empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness to ethical rational self-consciousness because being is the to-be-experienced, understood, judged, and, as the source of value, to-be-loved (613-615). Being is known in our knowing and our doing. The way we know and do reveals the structure of being. In other words, it is not our knowing that creates the structure of our knowing or makes that structure dynamic but the objective of our knowing. This objective L. rgan calls being. His theme ultimately is the advance from the dynamic structure of knowing to a consideration of what finality this structure may possess and so to a consideration of the possibility of the subject's affirmation of God in belief. Moreover, the subject is not constituted full subject through his participation in the realm which other full subjects attain (Hegel's Sittlichkeit or free ethical-subjectivity and Habermas's intersubjectivity) so much as through man's central form which "seems to be the point of transition from the material to the spiritual" (519). Man's companion in existence is being and it is through being's intelligibility that he can communicate with other subjects. L. rgan certainly recognizes that man is intrinsically a social animal but maintains that in him there is "the tension and opposition between the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, and, on the other hand, attached interested, and narrow
sensitivity and intersubjectivity" (631). Man has an incapacity for sustained development that divides and disorientates cognitional activity. Thus the problem of liberation is not primarily social, for the general distortion or "bias" that overtakes common sense and produces the social surd as opposed to the social situation is a result, not a cause. It is a result of the fact that although man's intelligence, reasonableness, and willingness proceed from a detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, they stand in opposition and tension with sensitive and intersubjective attachment, interest, and exclusiveness and suffer from that tension a cumulative bias that increasingly distorts immanent development, its outward products, and the outer conditions under which the immanent development occurs (630). The solution for the problem of liberation then lies in a "still higher integration of human living." The solution must take people as they are and not suppress the problem, but respect and work through man's intelligence, reasonableness and freedom to a higher integration in the realm of beings (633).

How is this higher integration of being accessible? In Method, Lonergan suggests that ultimately "faith has the power of undoing decline."\textsuperscript{37} By faith, Lonergan refers to the "fourth stage of the argument" which, beyond the three previous stages of cognitional theory, epistemology and the metaphysics of proportionate being, is concerned with human knowledge of transcendent being (640). Here we see Lonergan's quest for explanation resumed on the highest level. Merely

\textsuperscript{37} Lonergan, Method, p. 117.
to stay with the virtually unconditioned matters of fact which our judgments grasp is to try to account for one happening by appealing to another, and on and on, and so is ultimately to talk about nothing (552-653). If one stays within the limits of proportionate being, one is confronted at every turn with mere matters of fact with no possible explanation. Hence if there is proportionate being, and being is intelligible, then Lonergan argues that we reach the negative conclusion that "knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded" (655). Transcendent being must have two attributes: it must be formally unconditioned as opposed to being contingent in any respect and, on the other hand, besides being self-explanatory, it must be capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything else (655).

Lonergan's understanding of efficient causality is an attempt to maintain the intelligibility of conditioned being which, as being, has to be intelligible. Because mere contingency is apart from being, the ultimate ground of the universe cannot be contingent, cannot be necessitated by the contingent universe, and cannot, on the other hand, be arbitrary, for then no explanation could be given to what results from it (i.e. contingent being). Since "what is neither necessary nor arbitrary yet intelligible and a value, is what proceeds freely from the reasonable choice of a rational consciousness," (657) transcendent being must possess these qualities.

Lonergan proceeds to discuss the notion of God working from his previously developed notion of being whose content is an unrestricted act of understanding that primarily understands itself and consequently grasps every other intelligibility. Hence, for Lonergan, it is "one
and the same thing to understand what being is and to understand what God is" (658). Loneran develops all other divine attributes from the notion of an unrestricted act of understanding and hence, for him, since he defines being by its relation to intelligence, intelligence, not being, is logically first among divine attributes (677).

Having developed the notion of God in his chapter on "General Transcendent Knowledge" as that which answers the basic questions raised by proportionate being, Loneran then goes on to confront the problem of evil as the absence of intelligibility and to consider "what God is or has been doing about the fact of evil" (687). Here, once again, after the enormous effort of elaborating on his four stages of the argument, Loneran returns his attention to man's social dilemma that is represented by the social surd as the compounding of man's progress with man's decline. The inconsistency of rational self-consciousness which, as bad will is manifested in the social surd, the impotence of common sense, and the endlessly multiplied philosophies, are, however, not just merely a cul-de-sac for human progress, but a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness (692). This rule is not a necessary but a statistical rule and although freedom remains intact, man's rational self-consciousness is frustrated with the burden of responsibility for sins it could avoid but does not (694). Loneran, in projecting a solution, notes that evil only becomes a "problem" and not a mere fact when one attempts to reconcile it with the goodness of God. If God is good, moreover, then there is not only a problem of evil, but also a solution. In his presentation of the heuristic structure, Loneran argues that the process which produces the social surd, that is, the
process in which living always takes priority over the knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to follow knowledge, can only be reversed through the conjugate forms of charity, hope and belief which could constitute a higher integration of human activity. In its cognitional aspect the solution will consist in a new and higher collaboration of men in the pursuit of truth. This collaboration will be not simply a collaboration of men with one another, but "basically man's co-operation with God in solving man's problem of evil" (719).

Faith, as a transcendent belief, will be man's entry into the new and higher collaboration and, as an act, faith will be an assent of intellect to truths transmitted through this collaboration and will be motivated by man's reliance on the truthfulness of God (720).

Loregan argues that because the higher integration goes beyond the minimal essentials of every "religious" solution, the higher integration will be grounded beyond man's familiar range in the absolutely transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act of understanding (725). This tension between the "familiar" and "the higher integration" in regard to the individual consciousness is manifested as an inner tension and opposition and in regard to our social and cultural existence is manifested in the dialectical unfolding of human living and human history (726): A humanism in revolt against the proffered supernatural solution ultimately rests upon "man's proud content to be just a man," but the tragedy of this position, if the supernatural solution is the redemption of human possibility, is that "to be just a man is what man cannot be" (729).

We have reviewed Loregan's project into transcendent being to
convey the full sweep of his work *Insight*. Yet our main purpose is to emphasize Lonergan's philosophical achievement and to point out the boundaries Lonergan sets to philosophical achievement as such. My phrase describing Lonergan's philosophical work as an ontological proof for the existence of man is meant to emphasize that Lonergan attempts a comprehensive answer to the question of whether there is anything really different about man as man from all other aspects of the universe. Lonergan's answer to the question is not to ask man to jump out from his shadow to look at himself but to examine the conditions of possibility of the question itself. Man knows himself as a knower. The "Lonerganian Insight" is one carried through and enriched from the one launched by Kant: that knowledge is to be identified with criticizing activity rather than with criticized materials and that this criticizing activity is grounded not in just the immanent structure of the mind but in the orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness towards an unrestricted objective (360). In other words, through an analysis of this objective as being, Lonergan allows the human mind to break out of its fear that truth may just be an imposed construction onto reality into the conviction that truth is a relation of knowing to being. Being is what is known truly (552). Lonergan's ontological proof of man anchors man in a self-consciousness that can trust its knowing because that knowing is not just the animal knowing of "taking a look" but a knowing by which that self-consciousness itself is constituted and therefore it cannot coherently be impugned. Without this knowing self-consciousness itself would have to be denied but since it could only be denied "self-consciously," the project becomes incoherent and invites
reversal. Lonergan makes his metaphysics explicit only at the point when we are able to take into account that "cognitional activity operates within heuristic structures towards goals that are isomorphic with the structures" (400). In this way Lonergan maintains that our knowledge derives not from a set of pre-given truths about truth but is mediated through our very quest for truth itself. Metaphysics merely points out that this quest is mediated by certain structures which participate in unfolding intelligibility.

In his discussion of the longer cycle, Lonergan mentioned the "two allies" to be enlisted in overcoming the problem of the longer cycle of decline: common sense in its judgments and dialectical analysis (242). Lonergan attempts to "arm" these allies by providing grounds upon which the human knower can engage in a process of self-affirmation which will lead him first to a science of proportionate being (whatever is to be known by human experience, intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation) and, second, to the possibility of transcendent knowledge, that is, knowledge that goes beyond the domain of proportionate being. Lonergan sees the higher integration of human living as deriving from knowledge that is transcendent. Thus Lonergan's journey through proportionate being, although affirming man in his self-consciousness as a knower who can reach self-affirmation as a subject and demonstrating that any counter-position which denies self-consciousness can only do so as a counter-position which invites reversal, does not of itself furnish man with sufficient equipment to overcome the distortion embedded in his social existence. Nevertheless, the higher integration must build on this foundation and Lonergan's delimitation of this foundation as
scientifically accessible yet ultimately inadequate for the completion of the human project is one aspect of what marks him out as honouring what I have called "the Kantian model." The access to the "further intelligibility" (694), to the higher collaboration of man in the pursuit of truth is through faith which, as transcendental belief, makes man a participant in the new and higher collaboration in which God is the initiator and the principal agent (719-720):

It is within the context of this "further intelligibility" that we must understand Lonergan's statement that cosmopolis is not a group or a super-state or an organization or an academy or a court but "a dimension of consciousness." Within this series there is a disjunction between the list of human groups (group, super-state, etc.) and the final term, "dimension of consciousness." Perhaps within the disjunction of this list of human groups versus a dimension of consciousness it is easiest to put the question: how is one to gain access to this dimension of consciousness? Is it individually revealed or socially mediated? Does one gain access to this consciousness by identifying with any particular social body or does one align oneself only after the fact of attaining this dimension of consciousness? In other words, is this dimension of consciousness, which implies not only collaboration with other men but collaboration with God, itself constitutive of the new integration? In Method, Lonergan states that faith is our access to transcendent value. Without it, the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. "But in the light of faith," continues Lonergan, "originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe." 38

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In this sense, "it is not argument but religious faith that will liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons."\textsuperscript{39}

Our interest in this section is in Lonergan as a philosopher. It is easy to submerge his philosophical achievement in his theological reflections because he grants philosophical achievement only a circumscribed efficacy in undoing the distortions of the human situation. Just as much as Habermas (and Marx), Lonergan's aim is to restore to reason its practicality. But his restoration of "practical reason" honours a strict demarcation between faith and reason which is not operative in Habermas, who, however, does not for his part merely dismiss the realm of faith but tries to incorporate its significance within his own attempt to reconstruct a practical reason. We shall explore the "theological implications" of this difference in approach in the next chapter. Now we are attempting to formulate what exactly is the difference between them.

Lonergan's analysis of human knowing rests on a perception of how man's common sense is trapped by its own practicality but still has access to a degree of liberation through an adequate cognitional theory, which, when considered as the knowing of a knower, is explicated as a metaphysics of proportionate being. This metaphysics serves as the "explanation" of knowing and in explicating the heuristic structure of the known as isomorphic with the structures of our knowing, it does not claim a pre-given status for itself as a knowing pre-given over above our knowing but "explains" why no such pre-given structure could exist.

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 117.
This it cannot do itself in the light of given presuppositions but only in the light of what happens when human knowers know. Although in this way we break out into a freedom of knowing, whose objective is being, whose content in turn is determined by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, and, after affirmation, by nothing else (560), nevertheless this liberation, although necessary, is not sufficient to arrest the decline of the longer cycle. The metaphysics of proportionate being allows man to maintain himself securely as a "knowing matter of fact." He does not have to remain haunted by the fear that he is an unstable excrescence of nature thrust up by its mysterious force but soon to be reabsorbed into the fomenting chaos. Man as intelligent is not to fear that he is deluding himself about the facts because once he knows how he affirms facts, he cannot without incoherence affirm the fact that there are no facts. Yet Lonergan goes further beyond this philosophical bedrock to suggest that given the dynamic structure of human knowing, we cannot merely regard evil as a mere fact, for evil results from the maladaptation of the will to intelligence (691). This maladaptation, as embodied in the social surd, threatens cumulative ruin. This maladaptation is not just a fact as other facts, for it represents the inherent destruction of all facts. It is that by which no fact can stand. Thus the fact of evil, if it can cause us the horror we feel at the prospect of our own annihilation, cannot be treated as a "mere" fact. We either must accept the annihilation or argue that it is not the whole story. The fact of evil can be "tamed" into a "problem" if there is an intelligibility which it cannot master. This intelligibility is not that of proportionate being but that of transcendent being.
Thus Lonergan's vindication of human-knowing is not presented as the means by which the fact of evil can be undone. Rather, the situation is the reverse. Evil possesses ultimately the power to dispose of human knowing. It is only by access to an intelligibility that is not mastered by evil that Lonergan sees any hope of halting the decline increasingly compounded by the social surd. The initiative, moreover, lies with the "further intelligibility" and not with ours. Our access to it comes not out of ourselves but from its grace. Because Lonergan feels the work of stopping the decline will be achieved not by the instrumentality of human action itself but, by those subjects who achieve a level of consciousness that is not mediated by human knowing as such, he seems to respect the Kantian delimitation of the subject's access to an immanently liberating dimension of consciousness. For Lonergan, it is not a question of a leap from subjectivity to an intersubjectivity which somehow mediates an immanently salvific intelligibility but of a leap from man as an individual human knower to a subject cooperating with other subjects, which cooperation is mediated by a further intelligibility whose attainment is logically prior to and constitutive of this cooperation itself.

And what shall we say of Habermas in contrast? It is obvious that our access to salvific intelligibility remains a human possibility that is a possibility we possess as an integral aspect of ourselves as human, for, from his viewpoint, our access to this salvific intelligibility must be integrally human because through it we have been constituted human in the first place. Our access to this salvific intelligibility is congruent with our access to the formal conditions of
intersubjectivity.

Both, Lonergan and Habermas attempt to account for the whole sweep of human social and intellectual history and to provide some indication of how its positive features should be fulfilled. They do not disagree on the scope or the complexity of the problem but on how the intelligibility that will determine a solution is mediated to us and how we gain access to it. The Hegelian "insight," as opposed to Kant, argued that salvific intelligibility could not be considered as qualitatively extraneous to human history because it had entered into the dynamic by which human consciousness had constituted itself. Thus our access to that salvific intelligibility is somehow congruent with the intimate construct of our consciousness, for they were constituted in dialectic with that intelligibility. Taken to the extreme the Kantian model is a "transcendence with a vengeance" and the Hegelian model is "incarnation with a vengeance." The transcendent vengeance is against our access to man as participating in the divine; the incarnational vengeance is against our access to God as God participating in man.

Is it fair to use the concept "salvific intelligibility" in reference to Habermas's work? I argue that this term does not distort the essential construct of his thought for it is evident that Habermas, just as much as Lonergan, looks for a way in which distorted intersubjectivity may be overcome and he grounds his hope (rational anticipation) for a solution in the fact that this distorted intersubjectivity has as its presupposition an intersubjectivity that is grounded in the fundamental norms of rational speech. Habermas's universal pragmatics reconstructs how our participation in speech is inherently linked with
a series of validity claims (truth, rightness, and truthfulness) which we raise in any speech act. But if we raise them, do we have access to them? It is to ground our access to them that Habermas develops his consensus theory of truth whose conclusion is that any consensus is "saved" from being just an arbitrary face put onto reality through its anticipation of the intelligibility of the grounded consensus. Without this intelligibility a "true" consensus could never be reached and through it every inadequate consensus is doomed to break down. For Habermas, humans are "creatures of truth" quite literally and materially. It is not just a picturesque statement about the longing of the human heart. According to Habermas, our being materially creatures of truth accounts for the development of man's social history. In his reconstruction of historical materialism, he argues that the human species learns not only in the dimension of technically useful knowledge but also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness (communicative action) precisely in order to escape the materialistic cliché of reducing social development to the mechanistic sequence of modes of production. Habermas attempts instead a genetic theory of action which attempts to describe the evolution of man as a progress through the three stages of communication: the level of symbolically mediated interaction; the level of propositionally differentiated speech; the level of argumentative speech, which serve as the infrastructure of the action system itself and which can be linked with the three Piagetian stages of moral consciousness: the preconventional, the conventional and the post-conventional. 40 Through this linkage, Habermas can offer

40 See above, p. 94.
a description of human cognitive and moral development that is mediated by an immanently fixed adherence to truth.

Lonergan does not utterly despair of human progress. But Habermas attempts a universal ethics of speech which allows human consciousness an access to truth that grounds moral and political freedom. At his seventh stage of moral consciousness, the principle of justification of norms is "no longer the monological applicable principle of generalizability but the communally followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively." Because Habermas sees a qualitative difference between the subject who can only represent his true interests to himself monologically and the subject who can make these monological interests the objects of practical discourse in a communal procedure, I argue that Habermas follows the basically Hegelian model of taking subjectivity into a higher, yet still immanently accessible, realm characterized by Hegel, for example, as Sittlichkeit -- free ethical subjectivity.

Lonergan is certainly aware of the need to progress beyond the monological subject. Lonergan is also aware that there is a qualitative difference between what the monological subject can know and what he needs to know. Yet for Lonergan, the "solution" is not mediated by history but by a higher order of intelligibility which can be approached through historical intelligibility but which is logically prior to it. Like Kant, Lonergan seems to argue that philosophically one can arrive at the subject and nothing more. What to do about the subject is a further project, not strictly encompassed by speculative reason.

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My purpose has been to show the more than trivial persistence of a fundamental cleavage between Kant and Hegel in the work of the contemporary philosophers Habermas and Lonergan. Habermas argues that when we consider that by which human history has been constituted as human we do in fact progress philosophically beyond the subject. Our consciousness about the subject is mediated by history. Our access to this consciousness "about," and hence "above" the subject cannot necessitate a leap out of history, for that would imply a violation of this consciousness' constitutive principle. Habermas provides us with the immanent grounds of how human history has progress and a rational anticipation (hope) of its universal fulfillment. The reality of the realm of the intersubjective is the confirmation of this progression. This basic line of argument, I call the Hegelian model.

Lonergan would argue, however, that our consciousness "about" and hence "above" the human subject must be grounded ultimately in an intelligibility logically prior to human history, for philosophical speculation beyond the level of the human subject always begs the question of who or what is doing the speculating — a human subject or a more-than-"human-subject"—subject? Does the speculator have to wind up pretending he is God? What access can any subject claim to a realm more encompassing than the subjectivity by which he is constituted as human subject?

Both viewpoints rest on unassailable, but hopefully, incomplete argumentation. There is no doubt that there is immanently accessible human consciousness "above" and "beyond" the realm of subjectivity. Habermas presents the modality of our access in this realm as the realm
of the intersubjective. Our access to this realm must be historically available for history has been constituted by the access. Lønnergan provides us with no access to this consciousness beyond human subjectivity except for a leap out of history. His work betrays "transcendence with a vengeance": the world cannot provide any access to salvific intelligibility. Yet Habermas's deficiency arises out of his very vindication of an immanent salvific intelligibility. For now it is all access. Is ultimate reality nothing more than the access to it—or must not that to which our access tends have an intelligibility prior to the constitution of the access itself? From the complementary nature of these insufficiencies, we may suspect each encompasses a reality which must be retained and incorporated in a higher level of integration if we are to attain a completely luminous account of man's higher integration in a realm beyond the level of the monological subject.
CHAPTER IV

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE KANTIAN AND HEGELIAN MODELS IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY: LONERGAN AND THE GERMAN POLITICAL THEOLOGIANS

Lonergan’s Method in Theology

In the previous chapter we saw how the demarcation of the realm beyond human subjectivity as philosophically inaccessible (Kant) and as philosophically accessible (Hegel) was preserved in the contemporary philosophical work of Lonergan and Habermas respectively. Now I would like to turn our attention to the way this demarcation is carried through in the "Kantian" theological work of Lonergan and the "Hegelian" theological work of the "political theologians": Metz and Peukert on the Catholic side and Moltmann and Pannenberg on the Protestant side. Our treatment of these authors, of course, will be illustrative rather than exhaustive, but we hope, nonetheless, to identify the effect their respective philosophical underpinning has on their work. The alternative philosophical decision made between Kant and Hegel requires that the theological task be formulated in quite strikingly different ways and it is my contention that the often puzzling divergence amongst these theologians can be explicated according to the construct of the decision made. From the philosophical side we saw differing decisions made about the scope and possibility of human freedom and liberation from distress. Now from the theological side, we will perceive corresponding decisions about the scope and possibility of revelation.
Lonergan develops his concept of the scope and possibility of revelation in his *Method in Theology*, a work built on the formulations achieved in the previous work *Insight*. Lonergan's *Method* is both a consolidation of the "four stages of the argument" worked out in *Insight* and a theological reflection upon them. This consolidation is achieved by Lonergan's discussion of *interiority* as the mode in which human intentional consciousness becomes self-reflective. The theological reflection upon this consolidation is formulated in his discussion of *religious*, *moral* and *intellectual conversion* as the condition of possibility by which the human functional specialties of research, interpretation, history and dialectic may be taken up through the mediating specialty "foundations" into the more strictly theological functional specialties of doctrines, systematics, and communications.

First a word about the work as a whole. Lonergan divides the work into two sections, "Background" and "Foreground." In "Background" he presents an account of meaning as historically mediated from the world of common sense, through the world of theory (Greek metaphysics) to the contemporary achievement of the world of interiority. One attains the realm of interiority when one is confronted with the three basic questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?\(^1\) These three questions launch the first three of the four stages of the argument in *Insight*.\(^2\)

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Insight, therefore, is a concrete expression of the appropriation of interiority. Interiority provides a foundation that is distinct from common sense and theory. It is distinct from both of them in that in it one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory "to the appropriation of one's own interiority, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities."\(^3\) It is the heightening of the intentional consciousness by which one attends not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts. Thus interiority is able to recognize and account for the disparateness between common sense and theory and critically ground them both.\(^4\) It is only through the realm of interiority that differentiated consciousness can understand itself and so explain the nature and the complementary purposes of different patterns of cognitional activity.\(^5\)

Lornergan speaks of the "systematic exigence" which separates the realm of common sense from the realm of theory. The systematic exigence raises questions about the intrinsic properties of things whose answers common sense cannot supply or comprehend, for these answers can only be made in the context of theory. Similarly, the "critical exigence" forces us to examine the ultimate relationship and validity of both common sense and theory. This examination can be made neither from the vantage of common sense nor from the vantage of theory but only of interiority. Finally, because to human inquiry there is an unrestricted

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\(^3\) Lornergan, Method, p. 83.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 85.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 115. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
demand for intelligibility, this "transcendent exigence" leads us beyond the world of common sense, theory and interiority to "the realm in which God is known and loved" (84). This realm was approached in the fourth stage of the argument of Insight. Lonergan thus identifies four realms of meaning: the realms of common sense, theory, interiority and the realm in which we deal with the question of God. The question of God lies within man's horizon and is implicit in all our questioning. The "being in love with God" which fulfills our conscious intentionality is the fruit of God's grace (103-107).

Now in contrast to the four realms of meaning, Lonergan names only three stages of meaning as historically mediated: common sense, theory and interiority (85-99). These three stages have emerged in history. The realm of transcendence is never identified as a "stage" of meaning that has emerged historically. The question of God has been implicit in all our questioning and therefore we cannot say that God can only be approached after the acquisition of the required number of stages of meaning. Such a placing of the question of God so strictly prior to the formation of the stages of meaning reflects a Kantian, not a Hegelian, frame of reference, for Hegel argued that the question of God is somehow embedded within the historical process itself. The horizon in which the question has meaning is a historical horizon and is somehow constitutive of the question itself. The question of God in turn is constitutive of what man's horizon can encompass. For Kant and Lonergan, however, the world of man's horizon and its proper intelligibility is ultimately delimited. The question of God may occur within this horizon but its response lies in the dimension of "further
intelligibility," the dimension of faith and grace.

Lonergan's account of human knowing in the first section of Method matches the progression he developed in Insight which worked from an account of theoretical science and common sense (insight as activity) up to the self-affirmation of the knower (insight as knowledge). This knowledge in turn opened up the possibility of general transcendent knowledge. In the second section of Method, the "Foreground," Lonergan repeats the same sweep of his account of human knowing while at the same time integrating it into an added dimension of consciousness: the dimension achieved by religious, moral and intellectual conversion.

Of Lonergan's eight functional specialties, the pivotal specialty of human intellectual activity appears to be "foundations," the specialty which, for one thing, mediates from the world of common sense and theory (research, interpretation, history and dialectic) to the personal stance of "methodical theology," that is, a theology which operates from the world of interiority rather than from the less undifferentiated world of common sense and theory. This theology, moreover, as theology, operates from an interiority not merely oriented to the human good but informed as well by a dimension not intrinsically in its possession, namely, the free love of God. Interiority gains this added foundation in conversion: religious, intellectual and moral alignment of ourselves with self-transcendence. This added dimension is not achieved by our own act, but by the love with which God floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (278). It is a being in love in an unrestricted fashion (106). This "being in love" works a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality that a theologian is (270). Through turning to the
world of interiority as "graced" by religious, moral and intellectual conversion, theology, in the functional specialty "foundations," can take what was achieved in the common sense world and the theoretical world of research, interpretation, history and dialectic and can fashion from it the "theological" specialties of "doctrines," "systematics," and "communications," all of which three are re-fashioned in the transition from theoretical to methodical theology. The specialty doctrines uses foundations to select from among the multiple choices presented by the functional specialty, dialectic, those which are consistent with and coherent with the achievement of interiority as further illuminated by religious, moral and intellectual conversion. This is "methodological doctrine": (295, 298). Systematics then seeks an understanding of the religious realities affirmed in doctrines. It is in doctrines, moreover, that one undertakes the evaluation of history: for example, I presume, one could test the view or assertion that the Christ-event is a true manifestation of the love of God by asking how such an assertion conforms to interiority under the guidance of religious, moral and
intellectual conversion. In systematics one attempts to understand what this consistency or inconsistency with interiority so illuminated must imply for our apprehension of the truth in the way our age approaches it (350). Communications then aims at communicating this understanding through a self-conscious methodology which can reflect and incorporate into itself the stages of meaning through which human history has passed as a whole and through which various groups and individuals in their particular history have passed and are passing. Communications thus is able to address these groups and individuals at their particular stage of passage.

Lonergan's Method, therefore, explores in a self-conscious way the world of "insight as knowledge" or the "world of interiority" and

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6 Note that the question of a circular trap arises here, for if the Christ-event is constitutive of one's concept of interiority under the guidance of religious, moral and intellectual conversion, then one cannot use the resultant concept of interiority under the guidance of religious, moral and intellectual conversion to test the validity of the Christ-event. It was precisely this circular process that Hegel wished to escape, for the Christ-event historically has been constitutive of our consciousness and therefore how are we to test its validity? For we cannot use the consciousness which it has constituted to test it, for then we are using an identity to test itself. It will, of course, always match. Hegel therefore developed his test by non-identity, that is, his dialectic. Moreover, the fact that our consciousness could encompass this dialectic, meant that it has a dynamism by which it can break out of a circularly fixed pattern of consciousness into a more encompassing state of consciousness which is self-authenticating. One can, moreover, reflect philosophically, and hence retrospectively, on this consciousness which is self-authenticating as the utmost limit of human freedom. One cannot capture this freedom, however, for then one is back matching identity against identity. In terms of revelation, one can comprehend it philosophically, but can never capture it. Obviously the very idea of "capturing" "freedom" is self-contradictory, although modern secular society is constructed around the attempt.

The other way out of the circular process is a revelatory positivism which takes the circle out of human identity and non-identity and argues "God is God because he is God." Such a positivism, though protecting revelation's freedom, fails to ground it in human experience.
attempts to show that arrival at this stage of meaning causes theology to undergo a re-orientation from the world of theory into that of interiority. This world of interiority is the world which can consciously reflect on the three questions which underpin Insight but which are only brought to explicit formulation in the hindsight offered by the completion of that work. As we have noted, these three questions, What am I doing when I am knowing?, Why is doing that knowing? and What do I know when I do it? are the turning point "from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one's own interiority, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities" (83). With this attention upon interiority the subject attains differentiated consciousness whose unity is "not the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, but the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift from any one to any other" (84). Man, moreover, can find basic fulfilment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory and interiority "into the realm in which God is known and loved" (84).

Being in love with God, states Lonergan, is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality (105). Man's achievement of authenticity is a self-transcendence which, moving from questions of intelligence and reflection as cognitive self-transcendence to questions of decision, becomes a moral self-transcendence which attains actuality when one falls in love. Being in love with God, moreover, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. This being in love is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness, on the level beyond that of experience, intelligence, and judgement and on the level of deliberating,
making judgments of value, deciding, acting responsibly and freely (107). Out of this religious love comes knowledge and it is this knowledge Lonergan calls faith (115). As we have stated above, faith for Lonergan has the power of undoing human decline.

Lonergan's Method, however, reveals an ambiguity about how human access to revelation as over against the source of revelation itself are related to each other, an ambiguity about how we can approach and test this interrelation. Briefly put, for Lonergan, human access to revelation and the source revelation itself are related in the self-consciousness of the believer/theologian, yet how this mode of resolving the ambiguity of this relationship can be meaningful to anyone except the isolated believer/theologian in whom it occurs remains the point at issue for contemporary theology since Kant. According to Lonergan, the source of religious expression comes from the realm of transcendence as a prior word mediated not by meaning but by the word of immediacy, the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe (112). Yet Lonergan also accounts for how "mortal man can develop what he would not know unless God had revealed it" (302) by the historical "ongoing discovery of mind" (319) or, in other words, by the ongoing differentiation of consciousness. What contributes to this differentiation as the emerging of the realm of interiority can be evaluated as good and the "good" is what in fact does contribute to this ongoing process. Lonergan thus can conclude that "the intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process" (319). Yet this intelligibility, as salvific, appears to be in the
historical process but not of it.\(^7\) Lonergan's account of the four realms of meaning (81-85) is ultimately geared to establish a possibility for grounding the "permanence of meaning" which a dogma as dogma is meant to preserve and convey. The first three realms of meaning --- common sense, theory, and interiority, can be historicized as three progressive stages in meaning (85). They appear, however, to be undergirded continuously by the fourth realm, that of transcendence (265-266). This fourth realm, then fixes not just the permanence of meaning of any particular dogma but the permanence of meaning itself. This permanence of meaning is the equivalent of the "doctrine about doctrines" of the first Vatican Council which Lonergan now explicates from the vantage of his account of the human world of interiority. This undergirding permanence of meaning, then, is mediated by the realm of transcendence.

Because Lonergan feels that evil has the ability to undo meaning (the intelligibility achieved by the realm of proportionate being cannot withstand evil's refusal of intelligibility) Lonergan thus makes permanence of meaning something which is not accessible to our "unalmed" world of interiority. Permanence of meaning is available to interiority only as it is "graced" by religious, moral and intellectual conversion. The world of common sense and theoretical science extend up through the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history and dialectic.

\(^7\)Making this distinction does not solve but rather begs the question we are asking. The question is how do we know salvific intelligibility is in history but not of it? Does not the distinction itself (not of but in history) exist "in and of" history? Historical experience is somehow constitutive of our experience of a "beyond" historical experience. We will speculate on this "somehow" in our concluding chapter.
Theology, working from the experience of falling in love with God in an unrestricted way, uses its foundational specialty, foundations, to fashion the theological specialties of doctrines, systematics and communications. Foundations is the spiritual discernment which keeps counter-positions from infiltrating doctrines, systematics and communications. And discernment and grounding of the permanence of meaning is an achievement of the theological specialty "doctrines." Doctrines are formulated only after the event of conversion. Permanence of meaning, therefore, is theological rather than philosophical achievement. Doctrines, of course, have an immanent aspect, but the immanent test of any doctrine as doctrine is whether it does in fact contribute to permanence of meaning, which meaning, as derived from the realm of the transcendent, does not seem to be strictly historical. The radical delimitation of the certainty offered by the human realms of common sense, theory, and interiority which, however, at the same time constitute our access to what we could not know unless God revealed it, leaves an ambiguity about how the relation between the human horizon and the transcendent is to be mediated. Lonergan seems to suggest that this mediation occurs in the consciousness of the believer/theologian. It is a dynamic state of consciousness which is an experience of mystery. It is not the consciousness which accompanies the first three levels of intentional consciousness, namely, experiencing, understanding and judging. Rather it is the type of consciousness on the fourth level of intentional consciousness: it deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. As Lonergan states: 
the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the apex animae. (107)

This taking over is a broadening, deepening, heightening, enriching but not a superseding of the ground and root and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It is the consciousness that is ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. (107)

The problem, however, is whether this modality of freedom is meaningful to anyone except the individual subject who possesses it in his conscious intentionality.

One test of the Kantian model was a certain formulation of human freedom. For Kant, it rose out of the possibility and project of human subjectivity. Kant indicated that the human subject's range of knowledge was limited to appearances but that his completeness as a subject allowed and, in fact, compelled him into the realm of pure reason whose transcendental employment is directed towards three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.\(^8\)

Freedom is not philosophically demonstrable but philosophically indicated. It is realizable in those who can formulate it in their transcendental use of pure reason and apply it to their social situation. Now I contend that Lonergan follows a similar paradigm even if it is one he claims he substantiates more adequately on the side of the subject. Lonergan does not see philosophy as such as being able to establish the project of human freedom. Indeed, he warns that by itself it can trap us in a

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solipsism from which we cannot find any means of escape if we remain within its possibilities. In *Dogmatic Pluralism*, Lonergan identifies six stages of confining constitutive meaning within its proper bounds — in other words, six stages of what he defines as demythologization. These stages mark the historical progression of the intellectual activity most significant in various epochs in human history: the stage of the re-interpretation of myth (e.g. the Old Testament); the philosophic stage (the Greeks); the theoplogical stage (the analogical use of philosophy); the scientific stage (Copernicus, Darwin, Freud); the scholarly stage (hermeneutics and critical history) and finally the sixth stage of post-scholastic theology. These stages are sequential, even if they overlap. The sixth stage of demythologization, post-scholastic theology, which comprehends in itself the five previous stages, represents the last stage in the ongrowing growth of understanding, knowledge and wisdom desired by the first Vatican Council. Yet, this growth seems contained within the consciousness of the post-scholastic theologian. In *Method*, Lonergan states that conversion is a total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love. Lonergan's conversion, enacted on the fourth level of human consciousness, is to be conceived not as an act of will which presupposes

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10Ibid., p. 69.
the metaphorical context of a faculty psychology but as an act of conscience within the context of intensionality analysis. Decision on the fourth level of rational self-consciousness is responsible and free — the work not of will but of conscience — and "indeed, when a conversion, the work of a good conscience" (269). Through conversion one can exercise a "vertical liberty" to change one's horizon that has been conferred by one's social group. Although it is only within the social group that elements accumulate and although only with century-old traditions do notable developments occur, nevertheless the profundity of conversion calls for a wisdom that a social group does not easily attain or maintain. Hence, conversion involves more than a change of horizon: one begins to belong to a different social group, or, if one's group remains the same, then one begins to belong to it in a new way. The "qualitative difference" hence is locked in the illuminated conscience of the one who has undergone religious, moral and intellectual conversion. The qualitative difference does rely to a great extent on developments that are maintained through tradition and the social group but in itself it can launch forth from these social groups, for it is not embodied or contained within them but is embodied in the conscience of the one who experiences conversion.

The locating of this qualitative leap to "good conscience" within the consciousness of the subject I have designated as consistent with the Kantian model. Yet a difficulty arises. For if it is in our self-consciousness that the ambiguity between paths to goodness and goodness itself, between access to revelation and the source of revelation itself, between interiority and transcendence, is resolved, then do we not
ultimately lose any grounding or access to what the subjects have achieved? For by what criterion do we distinguish their achievement from illusion, for the particular quality of self-consciousness is that it is uniquely only one subject’s self-consciousness. It is the one aspect which cannot be shared without dissolution. Hegel asked whether there was a way in which some sharing could take place without that dissolution. Whether this project of communication is in itself feasible is again open to dispute, yet we must not forget the question from which it derives. Self-consciousness does represent the bed-rock of the subject as subject and perhaps we can proceed no further than the subject’s self-consciousness without self-contradictory madness. Yet the question must be remembered: what does there exist finally to unite my self-consciousness, which can never be self-consciousness unless it is uniquely my self-consciousness inextricably bound up with me, with your self-consciousness, which in turn is self-consciousness only because it is uniquely your self-consciousness inextricably bound up with you. Through the subject’s levels of consciousness — unconscious (pure potential), dreaming, experiential, intelligent, rational, — which culminate in rational self-consciousness, we come to intend the good and attain the freedom without which the good cannot be determined.\(^\text{11}\) This

\(^{11}\) Bernard J. F. Lohengan, "The Subject," A Second Collection (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1974), p. 80. A Kantian would argue, I believe, that the only place where the relation between human interiority/differentiation of consciousness and transcendence becomes self-conscious is in a self-conscious subject. Hegel asked whether the relation could become self-conscious in and for itself, that is, an expression of subjectivity that was inclusive of and yet a grounding for individual particular subjectivities. His argument rests upon the fact that subject/object, transcendent/immanent are always defined in terms of each other. That we are conscious of this mutual definition implies that we have access to a dimension which grounds this consciousness. This dimension is Geist.
level of freedom is related to the transcendental notion of the good. This freedom is the bed-rock that Kant struck, and Lonergan has substantiated in his metaphysics of proportionate being. Yet the "Hegelian" question remains. Is there a further dimension of freedom, a freedom of inter-relating subjects? Or is every extraneous subject subsumed in the subject-in-question's orientation toward the good? He may be quite decently treated in this orientation but is his freedom respected?

Because Lonergan does in fact see the intersubjective aspect of human existence as secondary to and as conditioned by the subject's orientation towards the transcendental notion of the good and, in the case of the converted subject, towards God's gift of grace, I see him as honouring the boundaries respected by Kant. Kant decided that drilling into the bed-rock could only serve to crack the foundations.

The German Political Theologians

Interpreting Lonergan as one who respects Kant's delineation of the project of freedom as it is accessible to man does, I believe, cast light on the structure of his thought. Now I would like to go more deeply into the "Hegelian" question about a further dimension of freedom, a question whose formulation has had momentous effect on the history of philosophical thought as well as social reality. In Hegelian terms that sentence is wrongly put. Social reality, in fact, has not been "influenced by" an abstract question, but has aimed for a dimension of freedom, of which the question is the derived aspect. This dimension of freedom, for the Hegelian, is substantive, not the theoretical question about it. This substantive dimension of freedom, which Hegel called \textit{Sittlichkeit} (free ethical subjectivity) and Habermas intersubjectivity,
is the affirmation of the possibility of communication between the individual units of self-consciousness known as subjects. For Lonergan, following Kant, our access to salvific intelligibility is achieved within individual units of self-consciousness (subjects) who are turned towards the basic fulfillment of their humanity by religious, moral and intellectual conversion. Over against Kant, Hegel argued that a subject comes to self-consciousness in recognition of another and in the other's recognition of him.\textsuperscript{12} Hegel attempted to achieve a further dimension of freedom — the freedom of the self-conscious units to communicate, which communication "revealed" an immanent accessibility to salvific intelligibility. This uniting of a further dimension of human freedom with an immanent access to salvific intelligibility, I have called the Hegelian model. Now I would like to turn our attention to how that model is also operative in contemporary theology.

Because the Hegelian model correlates the modality of a salvific intelligibility (the source of revelation's self-communication) to which we have an immanent access with the modality of human freedom's most extensive constitution, those theologians who follow the trend of this correlation can approach it either from the one or other modality. Among the "political" theologians," some are concerned primarily with the modality of the source of revelation's immanent self-communication as an immanent salvific intelligibility. These represent the "Protestant" side — for the question of revelation has always been the problematic question for Protestantism. By this I mean that the

\textsuperscript{12} Helmut Peukert, \textit{Wissenschaftstheorie-Handlungstheorie-Fundamentale Theologie} (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1976), p. 274.
Protestant experience has originated from the question of what can count for revelation and how it can be tested. Revelation then is not a "given" in Protestant experience but is that which is to be proved. Within this accent falls the work of Moltmann and Pannenberg. Other political theologians are concerned, however, with the question of human freedom's most extensive constitution. These represent the "Catholic side" — for the question of freedom has always been the problematic question for Catholicism. By this I mean Catholic experience has originated in accepting an authoritative revelation as its "common sense," but the project of human freedom remains problematic within such an acceptance. Thus, although the two are ultimately interrelated, "revelation" tends to be the visible problem for Protestants, and "freedom" the visible problem for Catholics. Within the Catholic accent, then, falls the work of Metz and Peukert. To show that this overall characterization allows us to include these diverse theologians within the Hegelian model and moreover to show where their particular emphasis falls within the construct of that model, I must briefly explicate the essential constructs of their work. To achieve this end, I will examine Metz's Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft\textsuperscript{13} and Peukert's Wissenschaftstheorie-Handlungstheorie-Fundamentale Theologie as representing substantially the "Catholic side" of the question the Hegelian model seeks to resolve.

\textsuperscript{13}Johannes Baptist Metz, Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Studien zu einer praktischen Fundamentaltheologie (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1977).
and Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* and *The Crucified God* and Pannenberg's work leading up to *Theology and the Philosophy of Science* as representing substantially the "Protestant" side of the question the Hegelian model seeks to resolve. This question, as I have stated, is about whether after human subjectivity there exists a further dimension which can ground the free communication amongst human subjects, which very grounding as an immanent permanence of meaning is our access to and test of God's revelation.

**The Catholic Problematic of Freedom**

From the "Catholic" side, as I have suggested, the question of freedom appears to be the overriding question dominating the theologians who work within the Hegelian model. Working then within this problematic of freedom, the Catholic theologian Metz attempts to develop a "political theology of the subject." In his work, *Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Metz, like Lonergan, recognizes that scholasticism as a framework for theology is obsolete. The Enlightenment instead becomes the "locus theologicus" in which Christianity becomes generally accessible to reason (vernunftig) and world historical. Metz attempts an "enlightenment of the enlightenment" to overcome the "crisis elements" of the enlightenment whereby religion became strictly privatized and

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17 Metz, *Glaube*, p. 24. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
served as an ornament of the private life of the bourgeois citizen and whereby tradition and authority met sharp rejection. Although reason was no longer understood as subjectless or freed from its practical dimension, this new reason of the enlightenment was elitist in that it was the preserve of the land-holding classes and its "praxis" was largely that of the market.

In his political theology of the subject Metz attempts to relate the subject not to a private world of his own cultivation but to society. He does not seek to throw out the individual as such, but to use the principle of bourgeois individuation as an integral and necessary element in working towards the recognition of the universal right of all to exercise their role as subject (solidarische Subjektsein aller) (42).

"Praxis" and "subject" are the leading concepts in Metz's concept of political theology as a practical fundamental theology. By the primacy of praxis Metz does not mean a practical application of previously attained abstract theory, but a dialectic of theory and praxis in which both serve as constitutive elements of each other. As an example, Metz notes that in every Christology Christ must be so thought of that he is never just "thought of," for every Christology realizes its truth in the praxis of imitation (praxis der Nachfolge) (48).

Metz's attempt to achieve an "enlightenment of the enlightenment" leads him to rehabilitate "religion" as a liberating force within man's historical and social life. He criticizes Barth and Bonhoeffer for having preserved a concept of religion as purely a "natural" phenomenon through their severe separation of religion and faith (41). For Metz,
however, religion and man's being constituted as subject (Subjektwerdung) belong inseparably together and the social crisis of our time is synchronous with our contemporary crisis in religion (66). Christianity is a "religion" for Metz, in that its aim is to struggle for the constitution of every human person as subject (subjektsein aller). Nothing would make religion guiltier than not to take part in this struggle (68).

Metz attempts to bypass the totalitarian aspect of Marxist thought which arises from its fusion of the meaning of history and political praxis. But he uses Marx's concept of praxis as integral to his thought to escape the abstract quality of Hegel's "world spirit," "nature" and "universal humanity," all of which remain locked in his idealism (101-102). The very fact, however, that Metz tries to mediate the content of revelation through religion as the means of approach to the "free subjectivity" or the subjektsein aller demonstrates how he has adopted what I have called the "Hegelian insight": the recognition that God's revelation is not granted directly to each human individual in isolation from every other individual but is mediated by, in its very act of constituting, the realm which today we call the realm of intersubjectivity understood in Habermas's sense. Metz aims for that dimension in which all are subjects in a solidarity which indicates the possibility of their mutual communication. Our access to this dimension is not thought of as achieved through Hegel's absolute knowledge, but as achieved through a reality much more immediate to the way human reality is constituted, namely, human praxis. Yet this re-orientation of Hegel's thought, adopted from Marx's critique of Hegel and further developed by the critical theory of Habermas, does not seem to be used to subvert Hegel's basic
insight but to ground it more adequately in the immanent process of human reality. God's revelation is mediated through the praxis by which this dimension of freedom in which all are subject is constituted. God's incarnational reality is mediated through this dimension of freedom. Praxis is not a "proof" of God's participation in suffering but its realization in such a way that God's presence makes the world of man's striving and suffering possess a meaning which it had not hitherto. The "proof" of love is not the demonstration that love is within the realm of human conception and possibility. Rather the "proof" is the event of love itself conquering its restrictions of time and place, its restriction of weakness and doubt, so that the world now possesses a new element which requires explanation. Metz therefore defines faith as a "praxis" which understands itself as the hoping solidarity in the God of Jesus Christ as the God of both the living and the dead.

As against Adorno and Habermas, Metz argues that any construction of reality as encompassing only that which is encompassed by the theory-praxis dialectic fails to deal with the history of suffering (107-108). There can be no dialectical resolution of the redemption event and the non-identity of suffering. Rather only a narrative resolution is possible (110). Hence, Metz strives for the recovery of apocalyptic as the telling forth of the narrative of God's future. Within this narrative resolution God appears in the memory of suffering as the eschatological free subject and meaning of history as a whole. The memory does not designate a politically identifiable subject of universal history. Rather the meaning and goal of total history stand under the "eschatological proviso" of God (102).
Metz's understanding of the Christian "religion" under the categories of memory, narration and solidarity emphasizes how man's social existence is inherently connected with our apprehension of God's revelation. I have argued that Hegel, unlike Kant, was convinced that man's subjectivity could find both structure and liberation within what he in his idealism called the state — the objective union of the subjective and objective aspect of the Begriff, the universal substance of reason — and what we have come to call in non-idealistic terms, the realm of intersubjectivity or the social. Metz's work, Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, connects the attainment of the subjektsein aller with the modality of God's revelatory purpose. True, God's revelatory purpose is always larger than any specific attainment of human solidarity in the free mutual communication of subjects, yet the praxis which constitutes this solidarity is one continuous reality with the praxis which is faith. It is continuous because it constitutes, and is constituted by, that dimension of freedom which at the one and same time is our liberation beyond isolated subjectivity and our immanent test and approach to God's revelation. Metz's work, then, I contend explicates its project for human freedom within a Hegelian context.

The work of the Catholic theologian, Helmut Peukert, works even more explicitly within the problematic of human freedom as the ultimate end of man's social history. We have mentioned that the dimension of freedom beyond human subjectivity is meant to ground the possibility of

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human communication. It is natural, therefore, that those working within the Hegelian possibility should turn their attention to language and speech as paramount human attributes which establish communication between human subjects. The twentieth century has largely been a century in which philosophic attention has been turned to these human attributes. In his book, Wissenschaftstheorie-Handlungstheorie-Fundamentale Theologie, Peukert attempts to demonstrate that a theory of communicative action is the point of convergence for theology on the one hand, and a philosophy of human knowledge or science (Wissenschaftstheorie) on the other. For the purposes of our account we will confine our remarks to Peukert's evaluation of Habermas's theory of communicative action.

Since we have ourselves reviewed Habermas's theory of communicative action in the previous chapter, we will merely note here that Peukert sees in this theory the search for a universal solidarity in freedom as the ultimate goal for human life (273). Yet Peukert says this theory cannot take into any real account the lack of solidarity amongst human beings which has characterized the human historical process. Even granting the validity of Habermas's theory, we are faced with the problem of how this solidarity can ever be realized concretely in history. Peukert argues that the theory of communicative action cannot encompass the full universal solidarity of free human subjects, for its theory of immanent freedom cannot confer meaning on the individual life and death of the subjects who constitute human history. Can the oppressed and the victims of history have a constitutive status in that

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19 Peukert, Wissenschaftstheorie, p. 15. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
history? Peukert argues that the theory of communicative action as an immanent theory of human freedom cannot achieve a solidarity for all human subjects, for its theory of intersubjectivity regards death merely as an isolation and hence, because for it only that is real which is encompassed by this intersubjectivity, death, by definition, is annihilation. Peukert's aim is to show that we are not obliged rationally to identify death with annihilation. The immanent theory of freedom cannot stave off the question of absolute freedom. The concept of praxis which underlies this immanent theory of freedom Peukert sees as the incarnational aspect of our human reality — praxis, unlike theory, is that which encompasses the temporal, the finite, and the human action carried out in solidarity. Theology, as incarnational, therefore departs from finite freedom and transcends to absolute freedom not in an abstract way but in the concrete way of a liberating reality which thinks of the relation of finite and absolute freedom only in the modality of human intersubjectivity. Thus this theology, as praxis, as fully incarnational, can think of the liberation of subjects from finite freedom to absolute freedom only as that liberation is embodied in the search to realize freedom (288).

Peukert's fundamental theology grounds the solidarity of human action as an anamnetic solidarity by which the suffering and death of God's little ones will not be forgotten but will be preserved and grounded in the same absolute freedom which grounds human intersubjectivity. The Judeo-Christian tradition bears witness to the same reality which is experienced in the constitutive and fundamental experiences of communicative action (288). His fundamental theology
is both a theory of this communicative action, which preserves the memory of those who are lost in a solidarity unto death, and a theory of the reality which is experienced and opened up in this action (288).

Peukert’s basic question is how in communicative action can one undertake reciprocal action that can survive the death of one partner. One option is to hypostatize “communicative action” so that the human subjects are merely its carriers until its final triumph in history. Yet this option effectively undermines the present possibility of freedom for those who never attain this triumph. Thus we are led to the option of re-approaching the question of God as that reality which saves the "other" in communicative action from being subordinated to the exigencies of the action and annihilated in death. At the same time, this saving reality makes possible our temporal mortal existence without which no finite freedom would be possible (311).

Peukert thus attempts to break through the hypostatization which he detects in Herbert Mead’s concept of society (241) and in Habermas’s concept of freedom. For we may sacrifice our lives for freedom, but unless that act is "free" our sacrifice adds nothing qualitatively to the history of freedom. Even human freedom can become an idol requiring the blood of innocent victims. Precisely because Peukert is interested in the full salvific significance of the "other" for our constitution of self-consciousness, he therefore takes up the Hegelian question about the possibility of communication between units of self-consciousness (subjects) in its deepest implications. This possibility is realized in the realm of intersubjectivity. This realm, understood as our immanent access to salvific intelligibility, has a double aspect.
one aspect this access, insofar as it is access for human being to salvific intelligibility, is constituted by praxis, that is, by the self-constitution of the human species. The realm of intersubjectivity thus is not an abstract realm which represents a theoretical statement about the social world of humanity but is the concrete embodiment of man's realization of his own humanity. From the other aspect, this access, insofar as it is access from finite freedom to absolute freedom, sees salvific intelligibility as both the possibility for human praxis as human and at the same time as that which grounds what is attained and mediated beyond the self-defeat implied by a merely immanent human freedom.

Here arises the question of how the salvific intelligibility which grounds what is intersubjectively attained and mediated is to be conceived. It obviously must be approached through the dimension of intersubjectivity, yet it remains to be seen how that approach is to be given conceptual content. Is our theology to be an entirely negative one which insists solely on keeping open the question of God as absolute freedom or can salvific intelligibility be "filled in" with concrete content. For although God cannot be described, the concept of absolute freedom cannot be left entirely without positive formulation. As stated above, according to the "Hegelian model," our access to a further dimension of freedom, the freedom by which human subjects can communicate with each other in solidarity represents at the same time our approach to and test of revelation. The Catholic authors, Metz and Peukert, were concerned with how this dimension of freedom raises the question of God. How revelation is to be spoken of as this dimension of freedom has drawn
the attention of the Protestant theologians, Moltmann and Pannenberg. Moltmann attempts a trinitarian critique of theism such that we cannot speak of "God's reality" and "our reality" but only of "trinitarian reality." Pannenberg's treatment of revelation as history strives to formulate the question of God as the "power of the future." We will discuss the work of these authors in turn.

The Protestant Problematic of Revelation

Moltmann's Theology of Hope was written to reintroduce into theology a fundamental social and political dimension. To achieve this end, Moltmann argues that eschatology represents the basic determination of the biblical experience. As over against previous theology, Moltmann contends that precisely because eschatology had been made a private affair between man and God, the Bible lost its social significance. Moltmann traces the development of religion's privatization back to Kant's transcendental reduction of eschatology to the question of morality. Later Protestant theology accepted this reduction without examining how it had been made. Even Barth's dialectical theology, which tried to break the mould of liberal moralistic Protestantism, still did not appreciate this aspect of God's revelatory "method." God as revealed in Christ was to be accepted by private conversion rather than perceived as fulfilling past history and opening up the possibility of a new future both for the believer and the world (54-58).

Moltmann argues in Theology of Hope that the Old Testament was

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20 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 47. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
constructed around God's promises to his people and that the New Testament is not only a testimony to the fulfillment of those promises but is a testimony that those promises have a future. In this sense the church is to be an Exodus church which is present in the world and calls into question any aspect of the world which denies the future realization of God's promise by substituting itself for that promise (124-133).

Moltmann felt, however, that this theology of hope was not entirely successful as a political theology because it did not deal with the negativity that characterizes our world and its existence. His theology of hope was too "positive" — it sought to call the world's self-deification into question and yet did not confront the dark side of alienation and estrangement. Hence Moltmann's theology of the cross — The Crucified God — was written in order to satisfy this question.

The work, The Crucified God, begins with the question of the church's relation to the world. The church is composed of like-minded people. Do they adapt to or try to change the world? Moltmann says that it is wrong to construct the alternative in this way. In a Hegelian manner he says that the alien world is somehow necessary for the church's own cure — contraria contrariis curantur. God is needed by, and needs, non-God. 21

Hence Moltmann says that a theology of the cross does not portray the cross as the culmination of Christ's ministry in a final moral victory but rather as its complete failure and desolation. In this sense the theology of the cross serves as the critique of the kerygma

21 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p. 27. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
of Jesus. The discrepancy between the content of Jesus' preaching or kerygma and the content of the church's preaching or kerygma about Jesus can only be resolved through a theology of the cross which admits the full negation of Jesus' kerygma of the approaching Kingdom (119). In the same way the resurrection is meaningless without the crucifixion: without the absolute loss it represents. For the cross represents the eschatological trial of Jesus in which the question is asked whether righteousness can ever become a creative principle within the process of human history. Only by the cross could righteousness forego its claim for vindication and revenge and be opened up, that is, be newly created, as a creative principle (177-178). Therefore for Moltmann, the theology of the cross represents God's full identification with this human world even in its utter abandonment by God. This participation by God in what is abandoned by God Moltmann works out in trinitarian terms. In fact, he sees the whole of reality as participating in this inner life of the Trinity. God the Son experiences the absolute abandonment that only he as God could experience and God the Father experiences the grief of the Son's abandonment (243-245). For Moltmann, Jesus' cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou abandoned me," must represent the absolute end of all theism and makes either trinitarian theology or no theology the only options. Christian theology is neither theistic nor atheistic but trinitarian, because the Christian faith in the resurrection as God's confirmation and new future of this world makes righteousness now truly creative in the outpouring of the Spirit (249-252). So immersed is the world in this dynamism of the Trinity that Moltmann suggests that the
term "God" is possible only as a retrospective description of the trinitarian drama (247).

Because of this drama a new psychological and political liberation is open to man. Man is condemned to worship neither an angry father figure, nor wrathful king, nor an absolute political power. In this way Moltmann feels he can work through Freud's classification of religions as attempts to overcome the Oedipal complex (306). Similarly, because God's reality is trinitarian, no one political order can be identified with God because God is not one in that sense. Thus Moltmann can offer a critique of all "civil religion" and its attempt to hold political subjects in bondage to the state which pretends to be and is legitimated as the concrete mediation of the divine will (323-329).

Thus Moltmann's theology of the cross attempts to develop and complete his theology of hope by introducing the element of negativity into the structure of Christian experience and by the trinitarian drama as a resolution of that negativity. The presentation of the world as totally immersed in the dynamism of the Trinity I contend fits in the "Protestant" concern to show how revelation is to be understood as congruent with the dimension of freedom which exist between full self-conscious subjects (intersubjectivity). According to Moltmann, our participation in the trinitarian drama is our access to psychological and political liberation. The cross becomes the central incarnational act of God. It is an act not of divine unapproachable transcendence but of

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22 Cf. Hegel's argument that philosophy can apprehend freedom (and God) only retrospectively. The implications of Hegel's conclusion are discussed in the concluding chapter.
divine praxis — suffering. Because the word "God" becomes possible only
as a retrospective description of this praxis, the totally immanent
nature of God's revelation is preserved while still left free. Like
freedom, it can only be "captured" in retrospect. Our immanent access
to salvific intelligibility is preserved while salvific intelligibility
is itself explicated in its theological dimension.

Now let us turn to Pannenberg's formulation of the "problematic
of revelation." In his programmatic work, *Revelation as History*,
Pannenberg undertook to defend the thesis that the biblical tradition
does not attest to a direct self-revelation of God but rather to his
indirect self-revelation through the modality of history. In his
"Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation" found in this work,
Pannenberg draws on the exegetical work of Rolf Rendtorff, "The Concept
of Revelation in Ancient Israel" (pp. 23-53) and of Ulrich Wilkens,
"The Understanding of Revelation Within the History of Primitive
Christianity" (pp. 55-122). From these investigations Pannenberg con-
cludes that the self-revelation of God in the biblical witnesses is not
of a direct type in the sense of a theophany but is indirect and brought
about by means of the historical acts of God. The character of these
acts, moreover, is not simply that of being in the past but rather that
of being in the present experience of the Spirit and pointing to the
future of salvation. That is to say, because revelation is indirect,
its full meaning is linked necessarily to the end of history. Its very

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23 Wolfhart Pannenberg in association with Rolf Rendtorff, Trutz
Rendtorff, and Ulrich Wilkens, *Revelation as History*, tran. David
character as indirect necessitates the question of the end. From the biblical witness we learn that God is indirectly revealed in the fate of Jesus (129). Yet although the essence of God is from everlasting to everlasting the same, it does have a history in time. It is only in the course of this history that the tribal God of the Israelites proves himself to be the one true God. Yet the indirectness of God's self-revelation implies that revelation does not have its place in the beginning, but at the end of history. The proof of revelation in the strict and ultimate sense will be made only at the end of history. Yet in the fate of Jesus, the end of history is experienced as an anticipation.

In the fate of Jesus as the anticipation of the end of all history, God is revealed as the one God of all mankind, Jew and Gentile, who had been expected since the time of the prophets (134).

If I understand Pannenberg's argument, it is here that we find the explanation of how the fate of Jesus can be presented as the anticipation of the end of all history. Revelation as revelation (i.e. indirect) can only be comprehended at the end of time. Yet in the Christ event, the end of all history is anticipated. The Christ event was a "fact" of anticipation. Any event, such as the Christ event, can only become "strictly" revelatory by its connection with the end of all history. And what the Christ event tells us about the end time is that it has been anticipated within our history. Revelation, in other words, because it is indirect, has its content shaped by an immanent principle; what it communicates now about the end of all history. It is within the tension between "now" and "then" encompassed by this principle that we understand the resurrection as a historical event.
In his third dogmatic thesis Pannenberg concludes from what has been stated above that the revelation of the biblical God in his activity is not "secret or mysterious." Revelation is not to be put into contrast to, or even conflict with, natural knowledge. Such a construing of revelation distorts historical revelation "into a gnostic knowledge of secrets" (135). The event which Paul witnessed, that is, the revelation of God in the fate of Jesus as the Crucified One (II Cor. 4:6) took place totally within the realm of that which is humbly visible. It is a revelation that is "available to all" (136).

Now Pannenberg also adds that "to say that the knowledge of revelation is not supernatural does not mean that man is only confirming what he knows through the force of his own intellect" (137). No one comes to the knowledge of God — or to the knowledge of anything for that matter — by his own reason and strength. Yet our access to this knowledge is not through a supplement to reason but through "using reason in order to see correctly" (137). What Pannenberg seems to argue is that it is not a supplement to reason that is in question in revelation but reason's own transformation (self-constitution) through events. As he states, a person does not bring faith to the event, as though faith were the basis of finding the revelation of God in the history of Israel and of Jesus Christ. Rather, it is through "an open appropriation of these events that true faith is sparked." Is faith then subsumed into the knowledge of God's revelation in the events that demonstrate his deity? No, because "faith has to do with the future" (138). Faith then is not directed towards believing in an event in the past. Rather it departs from the fact (taken to be, reasonably and reliably true) that in the
fate of Jesus of Nazareth, God has been revealed to all men. The
Christian risks his trust, life, and future on this fact (138). His
faith, then, departing from a presupposition which must be as certain
as possible for him, is oriented to the future.

Because the witness of the New Testament is that with the
resurrection of Jesus the end of history has occurred in prolepsis, we
come through the biblical experience of reality as history to a concep-
tion of reality that is larger than, and inclusive of, the Greek concep-
tion of the cosmos as reality. History can accept cosmic reflection as
an element within it. Furthermore,

the God who is revealed out of the totality of history in this
indirect way would also be the dominant answer to the philos-
ophical question of God. (142)

I find that such an approach to revelation as accessible to human reason
correctly transformed by historical events culminating in the resurrec-
tion a most thoroughly consistent formulation of the Hegelian construct
of a dimension of grounding of human freedom and history which, as our
access to salvific intelligibility, provides the criterion for our con-
cept of revelation. From this construct we may conclude that if revela-
tion is to mean anything to us in more than a privately appropriated
way, there must be an immanent approach to and test of it, which, at the
same time, leaves the essential initiative of revelation not with man
but with God. Pannenberg attempts to overcome the objections to Hegel's
conception of universal history as an indirect revelation of God by the
knowledge attained through biblical exegesis since the time of Hegel
(16-19). To the objections that, first, one specific event in history
cannot have absolute meaning as history, and, second, if history is to
be the totality of revelation, we must expect a development in the facts themselves, he argues that the Christ event is precisely that historical event in which both the absolute meaning of history and its uttermost factual development are anticipated.

If, moreover, knowledge of revelation is not supernaturally "inspired" but attained through reason correctly transformed, then statements about revelation are in the class of science and not of subjective faith. Pannenberg's latest major work, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, attempts to validate just this proposition. In this work, Pannenberg attempts to establish theology as a methodically organized body of knowledge which possesses intelligible truth claims which can be critically tested. Pannenberg works towards such a grounding of theology as a science after an elaborate recounting of recent theories about the nature and extent of human knowledge. Habermas is one author who becomes pivotal for Pannenberg's approach to theology as a discipline of valid and accessible human knowledge.

In agreement with Habermas, Pannenberg argues that only in anticipation of the totality of history can one escape being controlled by the tyranny of tradition. Yet although he agrees with Habermas that only anticipation of the semantic whole can avoid tyranny by any part of it, yet he cannot accept Habermas's confining of meaning to society and his not allowing any question of the meaning beyond society's structure to count as valid. Using his contextual definition of meaning, Pannenberg argues questions of meaning must take in the whole of reality even beyond

Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, pp. 185-205. Subsequent references in the text are to this work.
the social. These questions, then, are quasi-religious or religious (206-224).

Using the framework of this inquiry, Pannenberg then proceeds in the second section of his work to examine the nature of theology. Theology must be not a theology or science of Christianity, but a science of God, because it addresses the problem of reality as a whole (265). God for Pannenberg is thus understood as the all-determining reality (283; 302-303).

Pannenberg's theological work seems to have developed in reaction to Barth. Pannenberg takes up Scholz's critique of Barth's claim that his theology was "scientific" because it corresponded to its subject matter. Scholz argued that for any body of knowledge to claim to be scientific, it had to fulfill three criteria. It must be capable of being put into propositions. Its subject matter must cohere. There must be a "control" — a way of testing the propositions (270-271).

Pannenberg, after looking at the history of theology, finds that it has never met these conditions. Theology as the science of God can only approach its subject where statements about God as the all-determining reality have been made — namely in the historical religions which recognize God and man as subjects. Thus, for Pannenberg, theology must become a science of religion, and by becoming a science of religion, it can meet Scholz's criteria (313-314; 326ff). First its subject matter coheres, for it examines the indirect self-communication of the divine reality as expressed as anticipations about the totality of reality as a whole in the historical religions. Second, because its method is indirect, it will always be cast into propositions. Because it seeks
after the implicit understanding of an all-determining reality in any construct of reality as a whole, it will always be the proposition that remains to be stated about that construct. Finally, Pannenberg argues there is an element of control possible about the propositions of theology because they are "third level hypotheses": hypotheses about hypotheses about hypotheses (333). By this, I think Pannenberg means the following structure:

- God as all-determining reality – first level hypotheses;
- religious expressions – second level hypotheses;
- theological statements – third level hypotheses.

Theological statements can be "controlled" by testing how well they communicate what religious expressions are trying to say about the ultimate all-determining reality. They are scientific because what they treat (the indirect self-communication of the divine reality) is accessible to all. What they treat (indirect self-communication of the divine reality) moreover, encompasses both human and divine aspects of reality. Because it is indirect we have access to it. Because it is the indirect self-communication of the divine reality, we cannot encompass its source. Theology as a science is made to occupy a doubly directed dimension very much like the dual dimension of the Hegelian objective spirit which both grounds human history and is our access to divine reality.

Using this approach Pannenberg argues for a complete re-orientation of the discipline of theology. What is needed now is not a Christian theology but a "theology of Christianity." In other words, theology has the prior status in terms of access to knowledge. Christianity then is to be subjected to an immanent test which theology as a science now
mediates: Christianity's priority must be measured by how well it has communicated God as the all-determining reality. God, for Pannenberg, then, is never an object of study — God always remains a problem about which the science of theology attempts to form hypotheses (299-300).

Pannenberg's attempt to establish theology as a science is directed to helping the world find some way of communicating about religious expressions that will allow a new unity out of the religious pluralism which we all take for granted but whose foundation remains only tenuously established.

Pannenberg's attempt to develop theology as a science of God which employs an indirect method of testing religious expressions about God as the all-determining reality is fully consistent with his earlier development of revelation as history and, in fact, is a consequence of that development. Here, again, we see the concern for an approach to and test of revelation that can be accessible to all. Theology becomes the science of religion. Such a concern I have maintained is consistent with the Hegelian manner of treating revelation as mediated by that dimension of freedom which is qualitatively beyond human subjectivity but is still the culmination of human possibility, for it is that possibility (immanently) transformed by the divine. Hegel was accused of robbing God of his divine sovereignty and Pannenberg it appears suffers the same accusation. By defining God in such immanent terms as the "power of the future," and the "all-determining reality," Pannenberg is thought to rob God of his positive role as revealer. 25 Yet Pannenberg theologically is

not concerned with God as he is in himself but with our knowledge about him. Because this question is indirect, his writing about it is sometimes as tortured and as painful as Hegel's. Yet it is on this question that Pannenberg's project must be evaluated. His work itself, as theology, operates in the rarified atmosphere of a third level hypothesis. Theologically, it must be evaluated insofar as it substantiates and does not undermine the other two levels. Our purpose here has been to throw light on Pannenberg's work by locating it within the Hegelian construct of revelation.

Our concern has been not only to suggest a general persistence of Kant and Hegel as theological models but to consider specifically the question of how these respective philosophers worked to ground the final autonomy of the human subject. Lonergan, I believe, argues that only in the realm of transcendency does the human subject attain a freedom from the irrationality of evil which overmasters human life as confined to the immanent levels of human knowing and doing. It is perhaps ironic that the theologian who argues the limitation of philosophical knowledge for giving an ultimately adequate liberation for the human subject is the one who has done his philosophical homework most thoroughly. The integrated sweep of Lonergan's work is like a house built upon rock. Yet, I believe a question can still be raised to Lonergan concerning the dimension in which the human subject finally comes to ground his autonomy as a subject. Is the journey to full rational self-consciousness finally a journey out of history even though history has been constitutive of that journey itself? Lonergan appears to treat history more as a pre-condition for salvation than as an intrinsic mode of God's salvific activity itself.
For their part the political theologians, working from the vantage of the mutual critique of Hegel and Marx that has been carried on in the "critical theory" of such authors as Habermas, agree that the grounding of the human subject is accessible to and constituted by human knowing and doing. The dimension of this grounding, the dimension of "free ethical subjectivity," our unitive social bond, is our test of and access to revelation. Metz and Peukert address themselves to the full implication of this dimension of being for the worth of every human subject as realized in human social reality. Their attention is not directed only to the grounding of the individual subject as such, but also to the significance of the individual subject as a member of the historical process considered as a whole. The subject's freedom can be construed only historically in the fullest sense. But what, they ask, is history's fullest sense? And what dimension does that add to human freedom, the freedom of each and every human subject? It is here they raise the question of God.

Similarly, Moltmann and Pannenberg address themselves to this question about the meaning of the whole of history but treat it from the vantage of the problematic of revelation. For Moltmann, the trinitarian formulation of Christian faith accepts God only as broken on the cross of history, as indwelling and creative of that history. For Pannenberg, God's revelation as history, essentially indirect, allows us access to that revelation on a scientific basis. Our approach to the significance of history as a whole is through a pivotal event within that history, namely, the resurrection of Christ. We see the political theologians, therefore, as generally accepting a historically mediated and constituted scheme of human freedom and divine revelation which then is pushed
to its "breaking point" or "cross" so that the very process validates the question of God.

The question that can be directed to the political theologians, of course, is whether their question about the significance of history as a whole does not arise from a dimension of awareness that simply cannot be reduced to historical proportions without its complete evacuation of meaning. Can one say history means "this" rather than "that" without some vantage point inherently beyond the incompleteness of temporal existence? Can incompleteness indicate anything else than exactly its incompleteness?

We see then that the (Kantian) attempt to ground human autonomy in the dimension beyond the proper scope of philosophy raises a question as to the significance of history and the (Hegelian) attempt to ground human autonomy within the scope of philosophy itself raises a question about how we are to establish a credible vantage point in order to identify what is significant and salvific within that knowing and doing which is human history. Hegel, a great philosopher, decided that the vantage point could only be retrospective, but that is hardly the intention of Marx or the political theologians. Through our discussion of the problem of grounding the autonomy of the human subject, we find we have come up against those great issues of faith and reason, eternity and temporality, transcendence and immanence. In our conclusion, I will attempt to structure a response to these great issues by asking if there is a way in which the respective insights of the Kantian and Hegelian positions can be integrated in a creative tension. My discussion begins by examining Hegel's insistence that his vantage point of absolute knowledge was limited to retrospective discernment.
CONCLUSION

Hegelian Speculative Knowledge as Retrospective

In our survey of the contemporary theological scene we have argued that two of its most significant achievements, namely the transcendental theology of Lonergan and the political theology of Metz, Peukert, Moltmann and Pannenberg, derive their opposition to each other by their respective reliance on the Kantian and Hegelian models of treating the human subject. Now we must ask whether our discernment of the dynamism of these models brings us to a fuller perception of how the question after 'true knowledge of God' should be structured. For both models may be looked at as representing decisions about God. With Kant it is the decision to respect the freedom of God's grace. With Hegel, it is the decision to assert our access to God as certain: God as creator is not alien to his creation but his creation must in some definable sense be what God is himself. Facing these two decisions and confronted with their achievements, we may ask whether they can be reconciled in a structure whose dynamism is even more inclusive than the exclusive elements of their divergent decisions.

Let us proceed by reviewing once more Hegel's criticism of Kant. Kant left the subject in the face of an "unknown God." Then we will ask whether Hegel's criticism, although justified in its critical thrust, does not bring us through the "system" to a certainty at such a cost that we forsake our original goal. In this sense we may see that Hegel's
absolute exclusion of faith may not be so absolute after all.

First then we will look at Kant. Kant's philosophy, as we saw, defined the competency of reason not in order to do away with faith, but precisely to allow its possibility. Yet because Kant allowed us to approach noumenal reality only through reason as active, through practical reason, he left the human subject to direct his action to a God who by definition must remain unknown. And, as Hegel objects, to leave God as unknown does not affect God so much as to rob subjectivity of any grounding, so that it is thrown back onto itself. Kant, however, did allow us as human subjects to "work" ourselves out of our prison of all encompassing subjectivity (here Kant may be seen as presenting the "ontology" of the Protestant work ethic) through the modality of our reason as it is incarnated in human action as human. Man constitutes himself as man from minute to minute, from action to action which, as human, is always moral action (done under the a priori of freedom).

Yet as Hegel discerned, although man may so constitute himself from minute to minute through his reason as practical, man still does not have any way of being certain about the continuity of his being. The minutes of action are slices of reality whose continuity is forever unknown. Ultimately, therefore, human reason may be practical in any direction whatsoever. It is for that reason that Hegel argued that any maxim, or its opposite, can be justified through the Kantian criterion.¹

It was to discover a source of continuity for the minute by

minute constitution of man through action that Hegel undertook his exami-
ination of the development of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*. This
continuity, identified as "spirit," Hegel comes to discern through the
ever widening complexity of consciousness as it encounters what is at
first not its own consciousness and which then at a deeper level of
unity becomes identical with its "other" as self-consciousness: Spirit
emerges as the self-consciousness of reason; reason as "spirit" is
"conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself."²

For Hegel, then, the human subject has continuity because the
subject is a vehicle of spirit. Hegel situates the subjectivity of the
individual self-consciousness within the objective reality of the state,
the actuality of concrete freedom."³ The spirit as objective attains
the level of ethical self-consciousness through human subjects in a
social reality, a supra-individual reality. The spirit's full self-
knowledge, however, comes not in the dimension of the state but in the
phase of absolute spirit, wherein spirit as fully self-conscious is
apprehended through the subject's philosophical comprehension of
revealed religion.

When religion, absolute truth, has been comprehended not in
Vorstellungen but in pure thought — through the Begriff or Concept,
the human subject has won his way out of the ambivalence of faith, for
ever. Yet as Hegel himself discerns, the community (Gemeinde) of those

²Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, p. 313.

Karl Markus Michel, B. 7/: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*
who possess the Begriff can never have more than an abstract universality over against the rest of humanity. The price of Hegel's continuity, of substance quickened to spirit, is achieved at the price of a discontinuous humanity. Hegel notes that at the very time when such a philosophy as his is needed (when speculative justification by means of the Begriff is needed) then this very need marks a diremption in society already beyond repair. For now "in immediate consciousness, that is, in the world of reality, the unity of the outer and inner is no longer at hand and in faith (Glaube) nothing is justified."4 Philosophy has replaced not religion; it is true, but faith:

Der Philosophie ist der Vorwurf gemacht worden, sie stelle sich über die Religion; dies ist aber schon dem Faktum nach falsch, denn sie hat nur diesen und keinen anderen Inhalt, aber die gibt ihn in der Form des Denkens; sie stellt sich so nur über die Form des Glaubens, der Inhalt ist derselbe. 5

Philosophy has been reproached with setting itself above religion; this, however, is false as an actual matter of fact, for it possesses this particular content only and no other, though it presents it in the form of thought; it sets itself merely above the form of faith, the content is the same in both cases. 6

The people therefore are left desolate:

Wenn den Armen nicht mehr das Evangelium gepredigt wird, wenn das Splz dummm geworden und alle Grundfesten stillschweigend hinweggenommen sind, dann weiss das Volk, für dessen gedrungen

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5Ibid., p. 341.

bleibende Vernunft die Wahrheit nur in der Vorstellung sein kann, dem Drang seines Innern nicht mehr zu helfen.

When the Gospel is no longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its savour, and all the foundations have been tacitly removed, then the people, for whose ever solid reason truth can exist only in a pictorial conception [Vorstellung], no longer know how to assist the impulses and emotions they feel within them.

Hegel notes: it is now a time when love has been perverted to mere pleasure which makes itself immune to sorrow. The poor are deserted by their teachers. The teachers can fill their time with their personal talents and achievements, but their work is really only an exercise in frivolity. The substantial kernel of the people cannot find its satisfaction there.

Hegel is forced to conclude that the actual present-day world must itself find its way out of this state of disruption, for to deal with its problem is not the immediate practical business and concern of philosophy.

We see then that although Hegel claimed to locate the source of continuity for human life, he despaired of seeing its culmination realized in a concrete human community. Because the time requires speculative judgment, that is, the replacement of faith by philosophy, those who are "poor in spirit" in the strict Hegelian sense are left desolate. Those who possess the Begriff cannot pretend that they approach the truth of religion through faith, for they possess this knowledge as absolute knowledge. A return to the level of Vorstellung upon which

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7 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, p. 343.
faith operates, is impossible for those in the realm of the Begriff. Those with the beatific vision cannot operate any longer in the categories of faith. Faith is absolutely excluded for them.

Why is faith now so absolutely excluded? Here we come to the "crux" of Hegel's system: Hegel makes the beatific vision of the Begriff occur in temporal existence. And its only possible moment, therefore, is a past moment. Hegel's speculative justification of revealed religion leaves him no choice except to cast what faith achieves in the present (i.e. theodicy) into the past. Philosophy can look only at where the spirit has just been. All up to now may be a reconciliation of spirit with its contradiction of non-spirit, but it is only as each moment passes that we can say "all up to now is a reconciliation." We are always an instant ahead of "all up to now." Therefore "all up to now" is a past moment. Therefore the object of faith as knowledge, that is, the theodicy as known insofar as spirit is never overwhelmed by the contradiction of non-spirit, is encapsulated into a retrospective vision of where God has been, but now, no longer, is. The realm of the objective spirit as manifested by the state and the realm of absolute spirit are indeed possible and accessible. Yet this possibility and accessibility somehow turn out to belong to the past tense. Philosophy for Hegel exists only in the past tense. Hence the problem. For Hegel, for the state and absolute spirit to have entered into our consciousness means that they have already been here. Consequently, Hegel talks of the state and of the absolute as present before us. Yet that talk is mere illusion. Hegel, being conscientious, always dissipates the illusion himself, notably in his preface to the Philosophy of Right and in the
concluding paragraphs of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. As over against Kant, Hegel demonstrates that freedom and God are both possible and accessible to us (philosophically) insofar as we are what God is. Yet Hegel fixes this possibility and accessibility into what I may call the "retrospective capsule." It is as if reality were a coin encased in a solid plastic block. One can now see the coin from any angle, but is the coin any longer a real coin? Is it not a past coin?

It is not what Hegel thinks about freedom and God that is defective, or even what he thinks about the truth as the substance of the self-consciousness, so much as his imprisonment of what thought thinks about in the retrospective capsule. The "concrete universal" can only be apprehended as each moment of its concreteness and its justification is past. Through the Begriff we may see the inner reconciliation of all things and God's justice in it, but we can only see it as already over. For Hegel, man is free but what he has thought is not. Thought does not open up the world but closes it in. The owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk when the reality of the day that is to be understood has reached its completion. Now Hegel shows that what thought is and what God and freedom are is one continuous reality. Hence God and freedom are possible and accessible to us. Yet because thought for Hegel is retrospective, God and freedom become a lump that falls on our head. Freedom and God become past possibilities only.

If Hegel leaves us imprisoned in the past, is it then necessary to jettison his system and return to the Kantian dimension of faith? Here I hope to point a way beyond this severe alternative which has hounded philosophical thought. Hegel's criticism that Kant's
embracing of being again it is objected that although being as a final hypostasis satisfies the structures of the human mind, being as really self-subsistent must possess a dimension outside the mind which does not allow it to be shut up in the mind quite so conveniently. It is the "gap" between being as a concept and being as being that can never be overcome by making being an hypostasis, for being as a hypostasis is a creation of the mind, a secondary creation which can never accomplish the primary unity of being as thought with being as "being" to which it aspires. Shades of Hegel! Being always flees before, behind, above or underneath being as a mere concept, as a secondary creation of the mind. Therefore, as Hegel perceived, being as an hypostasis is exactly equivalent to the concept of nothing.\(^20\)

For Voegelin, the experience of philosophy is an experience between the poles of temporal and eternal being. Philosophy, he makes clear, is the experience of the tension. It is not objective cognition either of the poles or of the tension itself.

From the temporal pole the tension is experienced as a loving and hopeful urge toward the divine eternity, from the pole of eternal being as a call and irruption of grace. In the course of the experience neither does eternal being become intelligible as an object in time nor is the experiencing soul transfigured from temporal into eternal being.\(^21\)

Because it is not of itself objective cognition, of the poles or of the tension itself, but is rather itself: the tension between non-objective

\(^20\)The concept of nothing is exactly the same as the concept of being because the concept of nothing is not "real" nothing; the concept of nothing is "quite something."

poles of being, the experience of the Metaxy as the source of philosophy does appear to be an event in being without a subject. What makes the event happen? It is not the human mind and it is not "being itself." The subject of philosophical experience is man but man at the same time is created subject of the noetic experience through the experience itself. It is this complex dynamism which the Metaxy represents.

How does this formulation of the Metaxy help us with the dichotomy between our access to salvific intelligibility and the priority of that intelligibility to this access, or, in more compact formulation, the dichotomy between reason (what we seem to share with the priority of salvific intelligibility) and faith (what has always turned out to be the modality of our access to salvific intelligibility)? Through the Metaxy as the experience of the "tension of being," a way is formulated in which the poles of the experience — temporality and eternity — do not become objectified but are defined by the experience itself. And Voegelin approaches this experience not through relating together an objectified "reason" and an objectified "faith" but through the interrelation of the human experience of history and philosophy which have been constitutive of what we recognize as "reason" and "faith." Furthermore, if we understand by history that which addresses itself to the realm of access to salvific intelligibility and by philosophy that which addresses itself to the realm of the priority of that intelligibility to access to it, then we will see that the interrelationship of history and philosophy provides a clue to our own problem of relating our access to salvific intelligibility as a historical experience with that intelligibility as apprehended through philosophy as prior to and constitutive of that.
access itself. The domain of faith is really the experience of history as it approaches salvific intelligibility and the domain of reason is the experience of philosophy as it apprehends salvific intelligibility as it is in itself. But reason does not ever come to replace faith (annihilate history) as it does in Hegel. Nor does faith subsume reason (the ultimate option for the Kantian), but both are mutually constitutive.

Voegelin develops four relations between history and philosophy through which the dynamism of the Metaxy can be explicated more fully. On one side, philosophy is both a phenomenon of history and a constituent of history. On the other side, history is a constituent of philosophy and is also a field of phenomena for philosophical investigation.\textsuperscript{22}

Within this set of interrelations Voegelin works to the conclusion that the event of philosophy is not a discovery of objects that until then were unknown, but a discovery of "relations of order in a reality that was also known to the primary experience of the cosmos."\textsuperscript{23} The event of philosophy thus does not uncover an objectified reality that was previously inaccessible. Philosophical experience signifies these relations of order through its experience of "being." Thus we can approach an understanding of being again not as an object but as a "context of order in which are placed all experienced complexes of reality after the dissociation of the cosmos, and which, before the dissociation were placed in the context of the cosmic order."\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}Voegelin, "Eternal Being in Time," pp. 117-118.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 134.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 135.
term being is an index of the new order, now achieving an ontological meaning as opposed to the cosmological meaning it possessed in the context of the cosmic primary experience.

Because philosophy does not uncover a new object but rather relations of order already present in compact undifferentiated form, philosophy is nothing less than the field of history recognized as the field of tension between the phenomena in which "eternal being realizes itself in time." Philosophy is the event of being — that is, the event in which a relation of order between the eternal and the temporal is discovered. Within this relation of order we now have the conceptual tool to construct the "material philosophy of history" in which Voegelin hopes to explicate a context of order for the entire globe which now in its interconnection forms the contemporary field of tension.25

Voegelin's interrelation of philosophical and historical experience offers through its mediating In-Between, the Metaxy, a corresponding interrelation of the phenomenon of our access to salvific intelligibility (history) and the phenomenon of that intelligibility itself (philosophy). If we interpret Voegelin in this way, it allows us to interpret him correctly as someone who has not just retreated from the horrors of modern culture into the purity of the classical world but as someone who is very much meeting the distortions of the modern world on their own ground. This Voegelin's work is a severe criticism of Hegel and yet at the same time Voegelin's thought is deeply "Hegelian" in that he is as passionately devoted to explicating the experience of

philosophy, the experience of reason, as a revelatory event as Hegel ever was. Voegelin's work may be understood as an attempt to open Hegel's thought to the mystery of the future. And if we see it in this way then Hegel's Sittlichkeit as free ethical subjectivity or as the realm of the intersubjective becomes itself not a closed pattern of experience but an open experience of the Metaxy. The realm of the intersubjective is indeed our access to and test of the content of revelation: "by their fruits you shall know them." Hegel's truth of consciousness is certainly the way we approach the realm of the intersubjective and also, I suspect, the way in which we may meet the fundamental problem of ontology noted by Voegelin, namely, how is it one can date the process of the Metaxy without placing the experience of the Metaxy — the experience of the "flowing presence" of eternal being — into the world and its time.\(^{26}\) Hegel, in saying that we do have access to the spirit as it enjoys its own self-consciousness, was attempting to formulate the same tension which Voegelin attempts to encompass in this problem of ontology. But Hegel saw the whole certainty of our consciousness as past, and therefore the whole process was "dated." It could do nothing else except lapse back into our world and its time. Marx carried out this program. Yet Voegelin, through the Metaxy, attempts to open Hegel's certainty out of itself and its imprisonment to the past. He argues that although the process can be dated, it is a process which is open to that by which its very temporality itself is created, namely, the intelligibility which is prior to

\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 132.
and constitutive of our access to it.

Therefore it is the Metaxy that reason provides a grounding for faith without enlarging itself to engulf it. And faith at the same time cannot "sublimate" itself at the expense of the experience of reason which it presupposes. Within the structure of the Metaxy, Voegelin discerns the dynamism which shapes human consciousness. As I suggested, it has affinities with Hegel's own structuring of the formation of consciousness. For Hegel, the role of the "Metaxy" was performed by the state as the realm of the ethical self-consciousness. The state is the intermediate reality between subjective spirit and absolute spirit:

subjective spirit  —  objective spirit  —  absolute spirit
(individual self-consciousness) (the state)

For Hegel, the state was the In-Between in which the human world and the divine world met. Voegelin thus does not invent an original structure for the formation of consciousness. Rather, he wrests the Hegelian structure out of its imprisonment to an hypostasized self-consciousness.
and therewith out of its imprisonment to the past. 27

The Recovery of Faith

In conclusion, I would also like to point out that Lonergan and Habermas have their own "In-Between" whose structure manifests difficulties which Voegelin avoids. I identify within Lonergan a triadic structure composed of the three elements

the material; — the subject — God

constituted by

the empirical residue

wherein the subject mediates between the poles of the imperfectly intelligible (the sensible) and the perfectly intelligible. Lonergan sees

27 About human political reality (Voegelin's chief concern), Voegelin makes the following programmatic statement:

The experience of concrete-human order, too, is not knowledge of an object but itself a tension, insofar as man experiences himself as ordered through the tension to the divine ground of his existence. ("The Consciousness of the Ground," in Anamnesis, p. 147). Now this remark about the state is very reminiscent of Hegel's own philosophy of the state as a dimension transcending confessional and religious barriers yet at the same time as a dimension orientated towards a reality more "absolute" than itself. Voegelin's theory, just as much as Hegel's, goes beyond the reality we know as the "secular state." This prospect may seem shocking, but if Habermas is correct, the secular state, which after all did need some legitimation from the capital of its traditional values, will be brought increasingly into crisis as the power of its traditionally grounded values is increasingly exhausted. The "secular state" as we have known it — and it has been the best, although imperfect, embodiment of human autonomy and freedom that the world has experienced — is confronted with increasingly insoluble contradictions in accounting for the purpose of its existence. Voegelin therefore at least provides a programmatic statement of hope which takes the problem of order beyond Hegel's narrow theory of the state as the ultimate dimension of concrete human order into a philosophy of political order whose contemporary field of tension is the whole earth itself. It is a philosophy of order, moreover, which offers an alternative to the secular state which does not abandon us to despotism, or, even worse, cybernetic control. If human beings are constituted by their participation in reason as a revelatory event, then it is not an advance in order to replace, oppression with terror.
the subject as launched out of the intersubjective world of immediacy and even beyond the social surd, should intelligibility undo its grasp. Yet by enlarging the subject to fill the "In-Between" (rather than as with Voegelin, the mutual participation of human in divine and divine in human) Lonergan tends to preserve rather than overcome the mutual opposition between material world and God which the Metaxy is meant to sublate. By placing the subject in the central position, Lonergan makes his Metaxy an ahistorical reality, for the subject appears to be launched out of the dimension of history. It is not that Lonergan denies a historical formation for the subject. It is just that this formation never really takes on a positive role. Lonergan's subject appears a solitary figure. He makes it on his own as he strengthens his intelligent faculties over against his intersubjective conditioning of family, friends, and nation, all of which produce his individual and social bias. The subject's pure desire to know leads him beyond the realm of proportionate being. The subject may find help from philosophy, art, etc. but it is he who must measure these achievements over against the objective of the pure desire to know (being).

Lonergan's difficulties in granting history a positive role may reside in his structuring the movement of existence as a movement towards fuller intelligibility. The difficulty with construing the sum total of existence as the fullness of intelligibility is that the question then arises why there ever should be imperfect intelligibility. Hegel gave an answer and accounted it a theodicy: the spirit comes to self-consciousness through its imperfect particular realizations. Lonergan does not wish to pay the Hegelian price. He refuses the
question, for the imperfectly intelligible obviously is not open to full intelligible explication. Yet the question cannot be denied, for it is a question we perversely keep on asking, and the reason we keep on asking it is because the Metaxy does not include only our passage out of history but our passage within history. We therefore ask about the significance of the whole process in both its unintelligible and intelligible aspects alike. We ask after the significance of history as the whole which is the fusion of the unintelligible and intelligible.

Because Lonergan sees the Metaxy as filled by "the subject" in its passage out of history, which, after all, must always remain conditioned by the imperfectly sensible, Lonergan never fully accords man's cumulative historical achievement a positive value in itself. Yet it is from this cumulative achievement that "the subject" has emerged. The community of noetic consciousness is not just an ahistorical intelligibility, for it is a consciousness that has been achieved within history. It is this historical aspect of consciousness which is lost when the Metaxy is conceived as a moment in tension between degrees of intelligibility. Rather, the Metaxy must encompass both man's intelligibility and his history at the same time. This is why Voegelin sees it as a meeting of all of man with the divine. The subject never

28 Evil then for Voegelin is not so much a refusal of intelligibility before which being as proportionate to human knowledge is helpless but in a refusal to recognize the context of order (being) which is revealed through the divine pull on human noetic consciousness. It is a refusal also of intelligibility, but of intelligibility as a result of the divine pull on our noetic consciousness. It is first of all a refusal to respond to the pull of the source towards this intelligibility. Human destiny is undone just as much by all the refusals as by the "intentional" crimes. Therein lies both our despair and maybe the hope for corporate healing through the very persistence of the patience of the source of intelligibility.
approaches the divine or the "further intelligibility" as an isolated monad but as a member of a noetic community. His approach is always formulated in the constructs of that noetic community. Lomergan, for example, determines his own approach within the constructs of the noetic community of Western consciousness, particularly as elucidated by Kant. The subject of course is not confined within this noetic community, but nevertheless only within its questions can he form his own questions about the further intelligibility. Lomergan in fact makes the community of full noetic consciousness the domain not of the intelligibility proper to proportionate being but of the "further intelligibility." It is the domain of post-scholastic theology. Yet this domain must also be seen as historically, mediated for it provides the presuppositions for the question after further intelligibility. By making "the subject" as such the content of the Metaxy, Lomergan in fact obscures the fact that it is within the Metaxy itself that the noetic community is constituted. It is constituted through the very meeting of rational self-consciousness with the domain of "further intelligibility" so that the faith that results is grounded. "The subject" does not fill the Metaxy, but rather the unity of subjects in the community of their noetic consciousness. The community is formed
through the openness of human life to the divine.  

Habermas also possesses a triadic structure whose middle term serves as a "Metaxy." The structure can be construed as

the real community of language — argumentative reasoning — ideal community of language
(life praxis of social systems)

or, in another formulation,

29 Lonergan defines being by its relation to intelligence. The idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding that primarily understood itself and consequently grasped every other intelligibility. (Insight, p. 657). Thus the idea of being leads to the notion of God and the affirmation of his existence. Lonergan's conception of God is that of an unrestricted act of understanding; in Thomist terminology he chooses God as ipsum intelligere to be logically prior to God as ipsum esse subsistens. (Insight, p. 677).

Voegelin, as we saw, makes being not a relation to intelligence but a context of order, an index of the new order as apprehended by philosophy out of the primary cosmic experience. Being then is an infusion of intelligence, but from a "beyond" intelligence. In Thomist terminology, Voegelin seems to choose God as ipsum esse subsistens to be logically first among the divine attributes. Our reflections tend to support this side of the Thomist debate. Lonergan makes the statement:

For the real is being, and apart from being there is nothing. Being is not known without reasonable affirmation, and existence is the respect in which being is known precisely inasmuch as it is affirmed reasonably. Hence it is one and the same thing to say that God is real, that he is an object of reasonable affirmation, and that he exists. (Insight, p. 669).

Being is not known without reasonable affirmation but the question is, does reasonable affirmation encompass it as if it were an "object?" Surely this is the debate between Anselm and Thomas. Voegelin argues that being is not an object but rather a context of order. The formulation of God as pure esse as opposed to pure intelligibility is precisely an attempt to affirm God not as an object of thought but as the non-objective origin of objects of thought (entia).

These reflections lead me to argue for a continuity of thought from Augustine-Anselm-Kant-Lonergan insofar as they see intelligibility as grounded not in being but in a further intelligibility which itself grounds being; and a line of continuity through St. Thomas-Hegel-Voegelin insofar as they see intelligibility as grounded in being as a non-objectifiable source of intelligibility, that is, as respectively esse, or Geist, or being as a context of order.
distorted intersubjectivity — Speech Act — pure intersubjectivity (fascism?)

I suggest that the ideal speech situation draws on human speakers much in the same way as the divine draws on human seekers after truth in Voegelin. Habermas also speaks of the anticipation of the ideal speech situation and the redemption of truth claims. Habermas presents this structure, of course, as fully immanent and continuous. The two outer poles seen in Hegel, that of particular subjectivity (subjective spirit) and of the universal subject (absolute spirit) are collapsed into the middle term of intersubjectivity which is made inclusive of all reality. The price of this immanentization, however, seems to be granting the fundamental norms of rational speech a hypostatic quality. When all reality is collapsed into the middle term, when the middle term is made the content and boundary of revelation rather than the approach to and test of revelation, then some quality, be it reason, or rationality, or tradition, or even the Metaxy itself assumes a covertly divinized form. In Lonzergan's terms, it is a counter-position which because of some inherent self-contradiction invites reversal.

Similarly, our major criticism of the "political theologians" is that they tend to work exclusively in the dimension of our access to salvific intelligibility to the exclusion of the "beyond," that is, the source of that intelligibility itself. Thus on the Protestant side, Moltmann works at the immanence of the Trinitarian experience and Pannenberg at the accessibility of theology as a science. Yet the question of the grounding for the immanence of the Trinity and for science is not raised, as if the experience of reason were a totally immanent affair. Similarly, on the Catholic side, Peukert and Metz
work for the full stature and being of the "subject" and both, it is true, keep the subject open to the transcendent. But that dimension is either construed negatively (the question of the loss of our communicative partners for Peukert) or is extraneously and irrationally introduced (Metz's rehabilitation of apocalyptic) and is not embedded in the very communicative structure which supports the subject on his journey towards the transcendent as constitutive of his temporal human being. It is not that these theologians neglect this dimension so much as pose questions about how it is to be integrated as a constitutive moment (grounded) in their own expositions of human being as encountering the presence of God in our temporal life.

Voegelin's perception that human consciousness has been constituted within the dynamism of the Metaxy between human and divine does, I feel, help us to reconstruct a grounding for faith. Voegelin's structure provides us with the paradigm of how noetic consciousness—reason—"works": it forms itself within the tension between two poles, however conceived. But the formal paradigm itself must not be mistaken for all of reality. It is not the paradigm that is important so much as the experience on which it imposes an order. This experience is the historical formation of human consciousness. Reflection on the divine aspect of the experience of the Metaxy is the task of theology. Reflection on its human aspect is the task of the "human sciences." Both obviously cannot be done in isolation from each other. And neither one can be expanded to subsume the other. Faith can be grounded, then, as long as both faith and reason are recognized as mutually validating in the dynamism of the Metaxy.
In other words, as against the political theologians, theology cannot be completely immanentized without the loss of its basic referent. And as against the Kantian solution, theology cannot be directed towards a purely transcendent referent, for such a referent is simply not available except as a totally vacuous entity which can be of no help for the formation of human life and consciousness. Now none of the theologians I have discussed fall into such a simple characterization. Both Lonergan and the political theologians do not let themselves be confined to the model they seem to adopt as their point of departure. They are not always aware, however, of what they are struggling to escape. My plea is that we do become more self-conscious about the constructs of our basic starting points.

Faith can be grounded, then, not by its expansion to cover a reality which then becomes all its own (Kantian extreme) nor by the expansion of its ground (reason) to subsume what it is meant to support (Hegelian extreme). Either position taken as absolute "invites reversal." Rather, reason as "living" in the dimension of the Metaxy cannot expand to fill the whole of the structure between human and divine, but as it serves in the creation of consciousness it faces a dimension which it grounds but never subsumes — the dimension of faith as human consciousness looks in hope to what is to come. Otherwise, if reason prevails, death becomes the great evil in life. Death as the prospect before us (it's all that reason can see when it looks forward) takes on all-encompassing proportions and human life then becomes structured upon doing everything to flee from it. If faith prevails as grounded by reason, however, sin, not death, becomes the great evil in life. Then we do not take to flee
the terms of existence or the "order of being" but try to come closer to its fuller expression. Sin demands the price of guilt, it is true, and guilt is very unfashionable in the world of reason. Yet guilt is the very first benighted starrin of hope.

For this reason, then, we find Voegelin's reconstruction of the Metaxy helpful in pointing out the way beyond the impasse represented by Lonérgan's and Habermas's philosophy, an impasse between the Kantian and Hegelian models. Voegelin himself returns us from the abstruse reality of the "intersubjective" to the question of what constitutes human community. As he points out, we must be wary of the words we adopt.

"Altruism" for example was Comte's terminology for love debased to a purely immanent reality. 30 "Intersubjectivity" strikes me as a similar debasement of the reality of human community. Situated within the dynamic reality of the Metaxy, we hope intersubjectivity may leave off its spectral condition and take on the flesh and blood of human community. Seeing Hegel's deficiencies in the light of Voegelin's recovery of the classical experience of reason, we hope that a grounding for faith is shown to be not only a feasible but a crucial enterprise for human existence. There is no question today of dismantling Kant or Hegel. Rather, the task is to win through the deficiencies of their thought to a more secure attainment and retention of the very goals they set themselves.

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