THE SIGNIFICANT HEART OF EVERYTHING:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY AND CONTEXT
OF JAMES JOYCE'S CONCEPT OF EPIPHANY

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ABSTRACT

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Joyce's concept of the epiphany was central to his own understanding of the nature of art and the function of the artist. Intimately associated with the aesthetic described in Stephen Hero, the Portrait, and his early critical writings, epiphany is at once the culmination of the process of aesthetic apprehension and selection, and the starting point for the process of artistic reproduction. Although it shares attributes with Romanticism and Symbolism, the concept is firmly rooted in Joyce's Catholic background and is essentially sacramental in his perspective, as a comparison with the aesthetic of Gérard Manley Hopkins makes clear. This thesis examines the concept in relation to its sources, to the influences which helped to shape it, and to Joyce's art in an attempt to establish a context in which the concept may be understood.
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A.M.D.G.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty years, Joyce's concept of the epiphany and the question of its value as an aid to the understanding of Joyce's art have been so much discussed that the relative simplicity of its nature and function has tended to become obscured by the sheer number and variety of critical positions advanced. It is not the purpose of this thesis, then, to argue for a new interpretation of the concept, but rather to collate the available information about the epiphany, its origin and sources, and Joyce's views on art and the artist in an attempt to suggest possible answers to the questions raised by critical debate, and to establish a valid context in which the concept may be understood.

As O.A. Silverman has noted, it was Harry Levin, working with the manuscript of Stephen Hero before its publication in 1944, who first discussed the term epiphany in 1947, in his James Joyce: A Critical Introduction. Accurately observing that the "doctrines [of epiphany] informs all of Joyce's work . . . ," Levin stated,

O.A. Silverman, ed., Epiphanies (Buffalo: Lockwood Memorial Library, 1956), pp. ix-x. This text contains the twenty-two manuscript "Epiphanies" found at the University of Buffalo. Another eighteen are at Cornell University, and in 1965, Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain published all forty together for the first time in The Workshop of Dedalus (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1965). It is interesting to note that the total number of Epiphanies was probably considerably higher than forty, as Scholes and Kain suggest: Mr. [Peter] Spielberg noticed that on the versos of [the manuscript sheets at Buffalo] were numbers, ranging from 1 to 71 . . . . That the numbers . . . go as high as (71), with no. (65) datable precisely to 11 April 1903, indicates that the total number was, in the seventies, or possibly somewhat higher. (Scholes and Kain, pp. 4-5)
An epiphany is a spiritual manifestation, more especially the original manifestation of Christ to the Magi. There are such moments in store for all of us, Joyce believed, if we but discern them. Sometimes, amid the most encumbered circumstances, it suddenly happens that the veil is lifted, the burthen of the mystery laid bare, and the ultimate secret of things made manifest.\(^2\)

To the reader seeking such moments in Joyce's works, Levin suggested, "Listen for the single word that tells the whole story. Look for the simple gesture that reveals a complex set of relationships."\(^3\)

When \textit{Stephen Hero} was finally published, Theodore Spencer, in his introduction, advised the reader to turn to pp. 210 ff. for an explanation of Joyce's theory of epiphany; for the purposes of further discussion, we would do well to do as requested:

[Stephen] was passing through Eccles' St one evening, . . . when a trivial incident set him composing some ardent verses which he entitled a "Vilanelle of the Temptress." A young lady was standing on the steps of one of those brown brick houses which seem the very incarnation of Irish paralysis. A young gentleman was leaning on the rusty railings of the area. Stephen as he passed on his quest heard the following fragment of colloquy out of which he received an impression keen enough to affect his sensitiveness very severely.

The Young Lady -- (dawling discreetly) . . . O, yes . . . I was . . . at the . . . cha . . . pel . . .

The Young Gentleman -- (inaudibly) . . . I . . .

\(^2\)Harry Levin, James Joyce; A Critical Introduction (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1941), pp. 28, 27.

\(^3\)Levin, p. 28.
(again inaudibly) . . . I . . . 
The Young Lady -- (softly) . . . 0 . . . but you're . . . ve . . . ry . . . wick . . . ed . . .

This triviality made him think of collecting many such moments together in a book of epiphanies. By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. He told Cranly that the clock of the Ballast Office was capable of an epiphany . . .

- Imagine my glimpses at the clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment the focus is reached the object is epiphanised. It is just in this epiphany that I find the third, the supreme quality of beauty.

From here Stephen moves into a discussion of epiphany in the perception of the beautiful, which closely parallels the aesthetic discussion in A Portrait, but which concludes:

This is the moment which I call epiphany. First we recognise that the object is one integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, when the relation of parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its wholeness, leaps to us from the vestments of its appearance. The

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James Joyce, Stephen Hero, ed. John J. Slocum and Herbert Cahoon (New York: New Directions, 1963), pp. 210-11. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text.
soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany.

(Stephen Hero, p. 213)

Epiphany, then, denotes both that moment wherein the whatness, the "quidditas," or essential nature and being, of an object, event, gesture, word, phrase, or "phase" of mind -- no matter how insignificant the object of perception may seem at a casual glance -- is suddenly and wholly apprehended by the perceiving consciousness, as well as the experience of that perception. It should be noted here that an epiphany is a manifestation of beauty only when "the relation of parts is exquisite"; the term applies to aesthetic apprehension only through an extension of its more general meaning: "a sudden spiritual manifestation" of the essence of any object of perception.

These passages also indicate that the function of the artist is to "record these epiphanies with extreme care." The use of the word "record" here might seem to contradict the earlier indication that an epiphany can prompt the creation of art like the "Vilanelle of the Temptress"; indeed, Scholes and Kain have asserted that this statement clearly indicates that epiphany "was not a matter of artistic creation but only of apprehension and recording . . . . For [Joyce, epiphany] had reference to life only, not to art."[^5] This problem is resolved, however, when we recall that earlier in Stephen Hero it is stated that the function of the artist is to "disentangle the subtle soul of the image from

its mesh of defining circumstances most exactly and re-emboby it in artistic circumstances chosen as the most exact for it, in its new office as a constituent part of an artistic whole (Stephen Hero, p. 78). Thus, the "extreme care" with which epiphanies must be "recorded" refers not to the literal transcription of an experience, but rather to "most exact" perception and the careful choice of "most exact" artistic circumstances; the artist's job is "to bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them that the quick intelligence may go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered" (Stephen Hero, p. 78). As the forty extant manuscript epiphanies indicate, Joyce took this dictum quite seriously, for he not only recorded epiphanies, but carefully re-embodied them in Stephen Hero, A Portrait, and Ulysses. Critics have, understandably, made much of these passages, and have applied them to Joyce's practice to uncover "techniques" of epiphany. Irene Hendry Chayes, whose article, "Joyce's Epiphanies," remains one of the most valuable and detailed studies of the concept, has distinguished four such techniques. The first two forms of epiphany, according to Chayes, are the "moment of revelation without its narrative base," that is, the isolated revelation such as is common in literature "from Wordsworth's experiences in the presence of mountains, leechgatherers and the lights about Westminster Bridge" onwards, and the epiphany in which "we are first aware of an effect on the beholder -- Stephen, or ourselves through Stephen -- not of an objectively apprehensible
quality in the thing revealed." Chayes then discusses what she terms the "process of formal disintegration," or the "distillation technique." This involves "the division of a whole character into its separate parts" and the recombination of those parts in such a way that in the apprehension of characteristic types, the reader perceives not individuals, but "generalities resynthesized from individuals." Finally, Chayes examines the technique by which:

A character is broken down into its separate parts, as it is under the "distillation" technique, but only one or two of the detached "parts" . . . , a detail of figure or expression, an item of clothing -- are recombined. Although it is free of irrelevancies, the quidditas represented by the recombination is not the quidditas of a generality but an individual; its function is to identify rather than to abstract.

William T. Noon, who defines epiphany as "a formulation through metaphor or symbol of some luminous aspect of human experience, some highly significant facet of most intimate and personal reality, some particularly radiant point to the meaning of existence," has said of the concept that by the time Joyce was writing *Finnegans Wake*, "the *Stephen Hero* theory of epiphany . . . becomes substantially modified by a theory of epiphany as a verbal strategy or symbolic technique of verbal art, to capture the 'inside true inwardsness of reality'. . . .

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7 Chayes, pp. 211-12.

8 Chayes, p. 216.

S.L. Goldberg, who agrees in principle with Noon's definition, holds that, as a literary technique employed by Joyce, epiphany is not a moment or experience, but "the dramatic" or (as it has sometimes been called) the 'constitutive' symbol, the literary unit in which a meaning is realized," but he wisely goes on to caution that we must "grasp Joyce's rejection of all theories that treat art as representative symbol, i.e., a sign standing for some reality other than it itself enacts, and understand the term 'symbol' in [the] sense of a realizing or enacting unit of meaning (either within a work, or, by extension, the work as a whole)." 

While these are essentially accurate evaluations of how the concept of epiphany provided Joyce with a method, it must be pointed out that Goldberg's identification of epiphany and symbol is based, not on Joyce's usage -- for he does not equate the two -- but on an extension of that usage. Yet this same identification has been made both by Marvin Magalaner and Richard M. Kain, who hold that Stephen's explanation of epiphany "is a rather complicated way for Joyce to say that he would present beauty in symbolic form," and who further simplify by stating, "In essence, it may be put thus: radiance equals epiphany"

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10 Noon, p. 159.

11 S.L. Goldberg, The Classical Temper: A Study of James Joyce's "Ulysses" (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 90. C.H. Peake (James Joyce, The Citizen and the Artist [Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 1977]) also argues that the object of an epiphany cannot stand as a symbol of something other than itself: "... when Stephen says that 'the clock of the Ballast Office was capable of an epiphany,' he certainly does not mean that it could become a symbol of something else; he means that, at the right moment, its own essential nature could be wholly, intensely and instantly apprehended as though brought into 'exact focus'..." (p. 9).
equals symbol,"\textsuperscript{12} and by Dorothy Van Ghent, who sees epiphany as "an image, sensuously apprehended and emotionally vibrant, which communicates instantaneously the meaning of experience."\textsuperscript{13} These views mistake the cause for the effect; Noon is much closer to the truth when he calls epiphany "a formulation through metaphor or symbol of some luminous aspect of . . . experience" (my italics). In short, the revelation derived from a moment of epiphany may be artistically rendered through the use of symbols and images, and the result of apprehending a symbol may be an epiphany, but as Morris Beja has accurately and succinctly stated it, "The epiphany per se is not a symbol or image, though it may arise from one."\textsuperscript{14}

Beja, whose \textit{Epiphany in the Modern Novel} is the most extensive study of the epiphany as a literary concept, analyzes Stephen's definition of epiphany as "a sudden spiritual manifestation," discussing each term of the definition individually. Observing that Joyce's comments repeatedly "stress the instantaneous character of revelation," Beja points out another false identification: "... despite Joyce's use of the word 'sudden', it has become fashionable to speak of one or another of his entire works as 'an' epiphany," and Beja objects that "the average short story -- and certainly any novel -- simply cannot 'be' epiphanies, for they cannot be 'experienced' or apprehended immediately."\textsuperscript{15} Joyce's works, then, contain epiphanies and may provide for them, but cannot.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[15] Beja, p. 73.
\end{footnotes}
in themselves, be regarded as such.

Beja then moves on to consider the word "spiritual", and observes that its use should in no way be taken as an indication that an epiphany is a religious experience; he explains:

... whenever [Joyce] uses the word "spiritual", he seems to refer to the world of emotions, art, intuition -- in terms of his aesthetic theory all that cannot be analyzed. ... In Joyce's usage the word "spiritual" need not have a religious reference, and the phrase "spiritual manifestation" is more a figure of speech than an actual sign of religious feeling. It is true that Joyce, like Stephen, was never completely able to break away from the Catholicism of his youth, but it is quite another thing to say that he retained his faith.\footnote{Beja, p. 75.}

To this point Beja is quite correct, but when he goes on to insist that "epiphany is non-Catholic," he has overstated the case, for Joyce's concept of epiphany, and the aesthetic that is intimately associated with that concept, is fundamentally and characteristically Catholic in its method and point of view, as we shall see in our final chapter. Though its intent is not specifically religious, Joyce's is a Catholic art.

Epiphany, then, is a "sudden spiritual manifestation"; whether the product of a state of heightened awareness and receptivity, or as Hugh Kenner has observed, "the reward of intense contemplation,"\footnote{Hugh Kenner, Dublin's Joyce (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956), p. 147.} epiphany is that moment in which the essential nature of whatever is perceived is suddenly and wholly apprehended. The term may also be taken to denote the experience of such a "delicate" and "evanescent" moment,
such a moment or experience, or what is derived from the experience, rendered dramatically in artistic circumstances, and finally (when the word is capitalized), the manuscript Epiphanies which Joyce recorded.

But before we can discuss Joyce's concept in detail, we must first address several related issues in order to establish the assumptions upon which that discussion will be based, and consider various possible sources for and influences on the epiphany so that the concept may be regarded in its proper context. Finally, we will consider the epiphany in relation to the aesthetic theories of Gerard Manley Hopkins. By comparing and contrasting the aesthetic positions of Joyce and Hopkins, we will attempt to clarify the often noted but seldom discussed relationship between them, and establish precisely what the epiphany is and is not intended to accomplish.
II

The student of the epiphany is faced with a fearsome dilemma when he confronts the critical mêlée that has ensued from discussion of the concept and its meaning and implications for Joyce's art, for the debate has raised several minor issues which, far from being peripheral, demand attention if one is to place one's discussion in any valid context. These preliminary questions concern whether the concept of the epiphany had any measurable effect on the production of Joyce's creative works, and whether the epiphany, if it did guide Joyce's creative processes, can to any extent be employed as a critical aid in the determination of his aesthetic method and intent; whether the epiphany is a part of a consistent aesthetic system, and indeed, whether any such system was ever successfully formulated by Joyce or adhered to for any considerable span of time; and finally, the extent to which Joyce's aesthetic is "applied Aquinas". As with the larger question of the precise nature and function of the epiphany, the critics have yet to reach a consensus on most of these issues.

As we have observed, it was in 1941 that Lévin first called attention to the concept of epiphany. The same year, in an article on Stephen Hero, and later in his introduction to the first edition of that work, Theodore Spencer wrote that Joyce's theory of the epiphany seemed to him to be "central to an understanding of Joyce as a writer, and we might describe his successive works as illustrations, intensifications and enlargements of this theory." And when, in 1946, Irene

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Theodore Spencer, "Stephen Hero: The Unpublished Manuscript of James Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man", The Southern Review, VII (1941), 185. His introduction to Stephen Hero (N.Y.: New Directions, 1944), is a revised version of this article.
Hendry Chayes stated, 

[Stephen's] esthetic is actually Joyce's, which he followed faithfully in his own literary method. Just how closely method and principle were related in Joyce's work is shown by his little-noticed theory of epiphanies.  

she ensured that the theory would never again be little-noticed. She also caused a stir by commenting that, 

The theory of epiphanies, presented as Stephen's, is bound up with the three cardinal esthetic principles, or conditions of beauty, that he expounds to Lynch in one of their dialogues in the Portrait.

Since this pronouncement, few critics have discussed the epiphany as a concept distinct from the aesthetic discussion in Stephen Hero, although several critics concur with Scholes that the epiphany has no relation to the discussion in the Portrait.

For the most part, the trend in "epiphany criticism" has been to recognize, with Spencer and Chayes, that the epiphany is vitally important to the understanding of Joyce's art. S.L. Goldberg has stated that

this concept is central to all his subsequent thinking about art and its relations with life, his understanding of his own activity as an artist and his whole conception of its meaning and value.

But Goldberg qualifies this statement by claiming that although his art embodies his developing understanding of the term, and although the art of the Portrait

\[Chayes, p. 204.\]

\[Chayes, p. 205.\]

\[Goldberg, pp. 51-52.\]
implies a fully mature grasp of what it involves, it is not until Ulysses that he can show Stenhen reaching even a proper theoretical grasp of it.  

Morris Beja agrees that the epiphany is of central importance not only in Joyce's concept of the function of the artist, but in his theories of aesthetics, too . . . " but like Goldberg, he qualifies his support of this position, feeling that the relationship of epiphany to his views on art and beauty has occasionally been over-emphasized, and sight has been lost of its far more meaningful and fundamental relationship with all experience, aesthetic and nonaesthetic.

For this reason he concludes that it is a distortion to look at epiphany primarily in the context of Joyce's aesthetic theories rather than primarily in the context of his novels, for epiphany is, as I have said, an element in all human experiences.

Florence Walzl's stand on the importance of the epiphany for Joyce and for critics is unequivocal: Since Joyce used scholastic and liturgical terms in various contexts, it is my view that a study of their original meaning stands to illuminate rather than obscure, his definition and to clarify his own later practices in fiction.

In her most important contribution to this study, Walzl states that in fact, the epiphany directly influenced Joyce's method of writing.

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5 Goldberg, pp. 52.
6 Beja, pp. 79-80.
short stories and that *Dubliners* is the result of this influence. Others have commented on the effect the epiphany had on Joyce's works; according to Beja, it is responsible for:

- his concentration on apparently trivial incidents;
- his structural reliance on key scenes of revelation;
- the way these or other scenes or events bring together a number of his most important themes; his emphasis on the recollection of previous scenes or events; the special way he chooses some images as leitmotifs over others, which in turn is related to his own peculiar handling of the stream of consciousness and its apparently incongruous associations; and his radical changes in the traditional short story.

Dölf Sørensen has stated that Joyce's "early notion of realism can be explained in connection with his epiphanies," and Homer Obed Brown holds that "The realism of the *Dubliners* stories implies a dualistic split between observer and observed, spirit and matter, mind and body," and he goes on to state that, "This split is implicit in the form of the work, but stated in Stephen's theory of the epiphany."

Robert Scholes finds precisely the same dichotomy implicit in the theory, and this is one of the reasons he is among the very few critics who find the importance of the epiphany to have been vastly over-

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8 Walzl, "The Liturgy of the Epiphany Season and the Epiphanies of Joyce," *PMLA*, 80 (1965), 440. Walzl is careful to distinguish, however, between epiphanies and *epicleti*, which is the liturgical name Joyce actually gave to the stories in *Dubliners*, so that, while her point is that the epiphany influenced Joyce's technique, she is not claiming, as many others have done, that these stories are epiphanies (p. 437).

9 Beja, p. 93.


rated. In everything he has written on the subject, Scholes condemns the view that the epiphany, as an aesthetic notion, had any effect on Joyce's writing. Because he feels that "the term 'Epiphany' as all too commonly used in discussion of *Dubliners* and Joyce's other fiction has nothing to do with the term as Joyce himself used it," he insists that "it has become an obstacle to understanding, an arid formula for cranking out unnecessary interpretations." He therefore suggests that the term be used only to designate those little bits of prose which Joyce himself gave the name to, as we find them in their raw and inartistic state. As a term to be used in the criticism of Joyce's art itself, I would like to see it abandoned entirely.

Schole's statements have not gone unchallenged. Apart from Walzl, who engaged in a debate with Scholes in the pages of the *PMLA*, Sidney Feshbach and Beja have individually considered and rejected most of Scholes's contentions. Feshbach responds to the suggestion that Joyce intended the term to refer only to a "genre" by stating that this is refuted by Joyce himself, "for his [Joyce's] definition -- given by Stephen in *Stephen Hero* -- also describes a process of esthetic apprehension. . . ." Beja refutes several of Scholes's claims, the most

12Richard M. Adams, in *James Joyce: Common Sense and Beyond*, (New York: Random House, 1966, also sees the epiphany as being of less importance than critics have considered it. (pp. 87-89) And Zack R. Bowen has suggested that the diary entries at the end of the Portrait "are an attempt . . . to question the validity of the concept of epiphanies . . ." ("Epiphanies, Stephen's Diary and Narrative Perspective, " *James Joyce Quarterly*, 16 [1979], 485.
14Ibid., 154.
15Scholes, "Joyce and the Epiphany; The Key to the Labyrinth?" *The Sewanee Review*, 72 (1963), 76.
important of which is the claim that the concept should be abandoned since that is precisely what Joyce did with it.

Scholes tries to prove that critics have placed too much emphasis on epiphany by claiming that Joyce himself abandoned it, since it "seems never to have been in his recorded thoughts" after Stephen Hero, except for one comment in Ulysses. For what it is worth, however, that is not true -- we have a number of interesting remarks in revealing contexts in Finnegans Wake . . . . Moreover, it was about the time Joyce started Ulysses that he wrote Giacomo Joyce, which was about as close as he ever came to fulfilling his original desire to compose a volume of "epiphanies".

Scholes also implies that since fewer of [the] early epiphanies reappear in Ulysses than in the Portrait, and fewer there than in Stephen Hero, the mature Joyce was placing less importance on his old theory. But surely the significant fact is not that only four or five appear in Ulysses, but that after so many years any of the original epiphanies still appear at all.17

There is, in fact, considerable evidence that Joyce neither rejected nor lost interest in the epiphany. Joseph Prescott provides but one example when he writes:

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17 Beja, p. 84. Beja states that four or five of the manuscript epiphanies are used in Ulysses; Scholes and Kain identify five: no. 5 (their numbering) on U. 670 (Random House edition), no. 21 (U. 100), no. 33 (U. 42), no. 34 (U. 581), and no. 38 (U. 347-48). Silverman has suggested (Epiphanies, p. 26) that a sixth, no. 16, is used by Joyce on U. 45, but this must be regarded as merely conjecture, for the resemblance is but vague. Silverman also suggests that no. 34 is used, not only on U. 581, but also on U. 27-28, and the resemblance here is more obvious. So the total number of epiphanies appearing in Ulysses is actually five or six used six or seven times.
Significant of Joyce's continued appreciation of epiphanies is the following observation by Frank Budgen:

In the course of many talks with Joyce in Zurich I found that for him human character was best displayed -- I had almost said completely displayed -- in the commonest acts of life. 18

Furthermore, Beja's assertion that Giacomo Joyce -- like Epiphanies, an unpublished manuscript -- is close to a "volume of 'epiphanies'" leads to an interesting speculation, for the paragraphs that comprise that work are, in style and content, very much like the manuscript epiphanies, so much so that they appear to be a later derivative of the early epiphanies. Compare, for example, Epiphany 39:

She stands, her book held lightly at her breast, reading the lesson. Against the dark stuff of her dress her face, mild-featured with downcast eyes, rise softly outlined in light; and from a folded cap, set carelessly forward, a tassel falls along her brown ringletted hair... 19

with

She raises her arms in an effort to hook at the nape of her neck a gown of black veiling. She cannot: no, she cannot. She moves backwards towards me mutely. I raise my arms to help her; her arms fall...

19 Scholes and Kain, p. 49.
20 James Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, ed. Richard Ellmann, (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), 7.1. (The first number refers to the page, the second to the paragraph). Subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text.
She walks before me along the corridor and as she walks a dark coil of her hair slowly uncoils and falls. Slowly uncoiling, falling hair. (GJ, 11.1)

Both in the Epiphanies and in these paragraphs, we find the same present tense narrative in the same dreamlike voice. Like the Epiphanies, the paragraphs are -- or seem to be, for some of the incidents described were probably invented -- carefully observed and recorded "slices of life". Each paragraph, like an Epiphany, stands alone (as Joyce presents them) but unlike the Epiphanies there is a progression from one to another. As in the narrative Epiphany -- which is to be distinguished from the purely lyric or the dialogue, or dramatic, Epiphanies -- the first lines of these paragraphs set an immediate tone, mood or sense of time or place. For example, Epiphany 28 begins, "A moonless night under which the waves gleam feebly," and a similar paragraph in Giacomo Joyce begins, "Moving mists on the hill as I look upward from night and mud" (GJ, 6.1). And common too, is the imagery and content; in both the Epiphanies and the paragraphs, there is an abundance of both night and sunlight, of sense impressions of colours, smells, and textures, as well as a common interest in the "vulgar" activities of the "human crowd". Consider the close relation between "The human crowd swarms in the enclosure..." and "A symphony of smells fuses the mass of huddled human forms..." (GJ, 12.3). In all of these examples, we find the same simple syntax and although the diction is often more simple and direct in the Epiphanies, the subject matter and the treatment it receives in both is remarkably similar.

In short, then, it is likely that Joyce was not only interested in, but was actually still recording epiphanies at the time he was beginning

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Scholes and Kain, p. 42; Epiphany 32.
Ulysses. And it is even more interesting to note that just as he incorporated the manuscript Epiphanies into his published works, Joyce incorporated much of Giacomo Joyce into both the Portrait and Ulysses. One "Epiphany" from Giacomo Joyce which appears in a revised form in Ulysses is

Trieste is waking rawly; raw sunlight over its huddled-browntiled roofs, testudoform; a multitude of prostrate bugs await a national deliverance. Belluomo rises from the bed of his wife's lover's wife: the busy housewife is astir, sloe-eyed, a saucer of acetic acid in her hand. . . . (GJ, 8.2)

The passage in Ulysses is more effective, but not radically different:

Paris rawly waking, crude sunlight on her lemon streets. Moist pith of farls of bread, the froggreen wormwood, her matin incense, court the air. Belluomo rises from the bed of his wife's lover's wife. the kerchiefed housewife is astir, a saucer of acetic acid in her hands. 22

Thus, there are, in a sense, more "epiphanies" in Ulysses then either Scholes and Kain or Silverman have indicated.

Undaunted by the fact that Joyce still used epiphanies in writing Ulysses, a few critics, Scholes foremost among them, insist nevertheless on considering the passage in that novel which mentions epiphanies as a condemnation of the theory. Scholes says of the passage that it "ought to embarrass epiphanizing critics more than it has in the past." 23

22 James Joyce, Ulysses. (New York: Random House, 1934, reset and corrected, 1961), p. 42. Subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text. One of the original epiphanies appears on the same page; see note 17. 23 Scholes, "Joyce and the Epiphany," 72. Sørensen, too, feels that the irony in this passage indicates Joyce's rejection of the theory (p. 7), and Silverman has commented that the view that the theory is just "youthful self-consciousness playing with words" is, in part, substantiated by the fact that "the passage. . . is clearly self-deprecatory." (p. xiii).
passage in question reads:

Reading two pages apiece of seven books every night, eh? I was young. You bowed to yourself in the mirror, stepping forward to applause earnestly, striking face. Hurray for the God-damned idiot! Hray! No-one saw: tell no-one. Books you were going to write with letters for titles. Have you read his? O yes, but I prefer Q. Yes, but W is wonderful. O yes, W. Remember your epiphanies on green oval leaves, deeply deep, copies to be sent if you died to all the great libraries of the world, including Alexandria? Someone was to read them there after a few thousand years, a mahamanyantara. Pico della Mirandola like. Ay, very like a whale. When one reads these strange pages of one long gone one feels at one with one who once . . . (U, 40)

The critical tendency to see these lines as a condemnation of the epiphany fails to recognize that the object of the irony here is Stephen himself, and that what is belittled is his youthful, and to this point unjustified, artistic pretension, pretension that would have him step forward earnestly to undeserved applause. The passage is indeed self-deprecatory, and while it is true that the books with letters for titles are mocked, they are not the primary target of either Stephen's or Joyce's irony, and there is nothing to indicate that there is any scorn for either the idea of the epiphany or the epiphanies themselves; the scorn is, rather, for the egotism that saw them as "deeply deep", that assumed that they would still be read (that he would be remembered) after "a few thousand years", and for the immature arrogance that would send "copies . . . to all the great libraries of the world" if he died. Joyce did, in fact, suggest such a thing to his brother prior to his first trip to Paris.

24Richard Ellmann, James Joyce, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 113. "Joyce informed Stanislaus that, in case of his untimely death, copies of both his verses and epiphanies should be sent to all the great libraries of the world, the Vatican not excepted."
and if the more mature Joyce is commenting at all on himself here, the comment is on his attitude and not his ideas. Thus, both the true intent of the passage, and more importantly, the fact that at least five of the epiphanies that Stephen mentions are contained in the novel in which they are allegedly condemned should prompt us to think very carefully about the wisdom of accepting Scholes's assertions.

Before passing on to a consideration of the epiphany itself, the various critical positions on several other minor issues must be considered. As has already been pointed out, the majority of epiphany critics associate the concept with Joyce's aesthetic theory. Hugh Kenner has stated that "Every detail of Joyce's aesthetic speculations is oriented toward the epiphany..."[25] There are those, however,—and Kenner is among them— who consider that Joyce did not agree with the theory as Stephen presents it, and some who feel that Joyce, in truth, had no system of aesthetics worked out. Sörenson concedes that there is a "clear and important connection" between Joyce's thoughts about art and the structure of his works, but he feels that "Joyce's aesthetic theory is not a theory in the strict sense of the word. He never pro-
pounded a complete, consistent aesthetic theory..."[26] However, as we shall see, Joyce's ideas about art are bound up together and complement one another, and when considered in such a relation; they do indeed form a consistent, if imperfect, whole. A.D. Hope has observed accurately that "the theory, although by no means complete, can be regarded as an attempt at a coherent system."[27] And Haskell M. Block considers this

[26] Sörenson, p. 3.
whole as a critical theory which "must be considered a necessary prelude to [Joyce's] practice." Joyce himself must have felt that he was developing a workable, coherent aesthetic system, and certainly that was his intent, for in a letter of 20 March 1903 (it should be recalled that the one epiphany that bears a date is marked 11 April 1903, so the epiphany and aesthetic coincide temporally), he announced that he intended to have his theory published: "My book of songs will be published in the spring of 1907. My first comedy about five years later. My 'Esthetic' about five years later again."  

Critical opinion on the extent to which Joyce agreed with Stephen's formulation of the aesthetic is split virtually in half, but it seems most likely that Joyce's theory accords with that of Stephen in both Stephen Hero and the Portrait. As Hope has noted, "... there is plenty to show that Joyce did hold these views at the age at which Stephen is represented to be, and there is no reason to think he ever changed them." And David Jones's position is equally sensible, pointing out that, "If Joyce did not take Stephen's theory seriously, he did maintain an uncanny consistency." In short, as there is no real evidence to show that Joyce ever rejected the theory, it seems reasonable to work under the assumption that he agreed with it, and as we shall see, this was indeed the case.

Kenner, however, is one among others, who does see reason to

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30 Hope, p. 183.
doubt Stephen as a spokesman for Joyce, for his by now well-known view is that Stephen is presented as an ironic figure whose aesthetic is incomplete because he is so. He states that "Stephen's esthetic . . . is inclined to be Neoplatonist rather than Aristotelian, but Stephen's esthetic is not Joyce's." 32 This is so, according to Kenner, because Stephen's aesthetic is entirely subjective, whereas Joyce's is not. But, as will become clear, Stephen's aesthetic is, in fact, neither subjectivist nor relativist, although Stephen himself is rather too subjective for Joyce. Be that as it may, Stephen's aesthetic is certainly not Neoplatonic, for Stephen firmly rejects this sort of transcendental aesthetic, stating that claritas has nothing to do with "symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow . . . ." 34 And Kenner undermines his position entirely when he quotes these very lines as proof that Joyce rejected Neoplatonism; 34 in short, Kenner, too, is willing to quote Stephen as a spokesman for Joyce when it suits him to do so.

Those who reject the idea that Stephen's theory is also Joyce's

32 Kenner, "The Portrait in Perspective," in Connolly, p. 43. Goldberg has stated that, "The aesthetic in the Portrait is not as it stands to be taken as Joyce's own. It leaves out too much, and what it leaves out are precisely the moral responsibilities Stephen still has to learn that his vocation entails." (p. 33). And Darcy O'Brien in his The Conscience of Joyce, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), asserts that "If Joyce himself entertained for a time the aesthetic theory which he attributes to Stephen, he must either have believed in it halfheartedly or soon rejected the heart of it" (p. 33)

33 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Text, Criticism, and Notes, ed. Chester G. Anderson, (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 213. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text.

34 Kenner, Dublin's Joyce, pp. 137-38.
generally hold that the purpose of the aesthetic discussion is purely dramatic: to shed light on Stephen rather than on the nature of aesthetic apprehension. Frederick Link has stated somewhat too emphatically that "the theory is aesthetically worthless except as it illuminates the theme of the novel and the character of its proponent." Obviously, this is one of the functions of the theory in the novel; Stephen, as an introspective, self-conscious artist must consider the principle of what he will do, and it is essential to a portrait of the young artist to show him doing so; the theory is part of Stephen's development. And it is also true that there is irony in Joyce's portrayal of Stephen here: irony that is particularly aimed at Stephen's youthful arrogance. But the purpose of the aesthetic discussion is not purely dramatic, for its implications give us the key to Joyce's intentions in writing the novel.

If we take the view that Joyce did indeed accept the aesthetic theory formulated by Stephen in both Stephen Hero and the Portrait, and further admit that, as Goldberg puts it, "the notion of... 'epiphany'..."35

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35 Frederick M. Link, "The Aesthetics of Stephen Dedalus," Papers on Language and Literature, 11 (1966), 146. Link's contention is based on his view that Stephen's aesthetic is nothing more than "a symptom of his now suppressed religious and sexual conflict, sublimated into philosophy." (143-44). C.H. Peake, states that Stephen's "borrowings from logic and philosophy belong to his manner rather than his content." (p. 63) and Goldberg has stated that "to examine the theory is largely to examine Stephen as a dramatic character." (p. 41). Finally, Edward Brandabur, in his article "Stephen's Aesthetic in A Portrait," in The Celtic Cross, ed. Ray Browne et al. (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), sees the purpose of the aesthetic discussion as being to "render the quidditas of Stephen" (p. 11), but here even Brandabur uses an aspect of the aesthetic to discuss a part of the novel.
is essential to any aesthetic attributable to Joyce himself, we must explain the fact that the concept is omitted from the aesthetic discussion in the Portrait. Numerous critics have put forth suggestions to explain this; Scholes insists that it was Joyce's intention to "strengthen" Stephen's aesthetic position by the "elimination of the troublesome and confusing theory of the epiphany." This is in direct opposition to Kenner's view that Stephen's position is purposely weakened by Joyce's omission of the "crucial doctrine" of the epiphany. If one shares or accepts either Scholes's antipathy toward the epiphany or Kenner's toward Stephen, one must accept as well the reasons they suggest for Joyce's omission, for their suggestions stem directly from and act in support of these antipathies. It is advisable, therefore, to consider other, less biased views than these. Rudd Fleming feels that the epiphany is too symbolic or transcendental in that it implies "a dynamic movement of vision through, or beyond the thing itself," and William T. Noon finds that the epiphany is too lyrical for Stephen, while Kate Harrison feels that the epiphany was removed because it implies a loss of self: by the epiphanic process the individual is subsumed into the universal. The epiphany, however, is neither transcendental, as we have noted, nor lyrical according to Joyce's categories, and, contrary to Harrison's claim, it implies

36 Goldberg, p. 44.
37 Scholes, "Joyce and the Epiphany," 72.
38 Kenner, Dublin's Joyce, p. 137; see also "The Portrait in Perspective", p. 43.
40 Noon, p. 66.
41 Kate Harrison, "The Portrait Epiphany," The James Joyce Quarterly, 8 (1971), 145.
a union of the subjective observer with the objective world rather than a loss of self, so while these explanations are more objective than either Scholes's or Kenner's, they are similarly inadequate.

C.H. Peake suggests biographical reasons for the epiphany's absence; after quoting Joyce's statement that Nora had "made [him] a man," Peake asserts that:

The relationship with Nora and the choice of voluntary exile in 1904 now represented for Joyce the attainment of his maturity. He could no longer see the ambitious young man who had begun the novel as a mature figure. . . . With such a change in his conception of what had matured him, Joyce could hardly accept the Stephen Hero image of the artist heroically making himself . . . .

So, according to Peake, Joyce removed from the Portrait many of the best elements in Stephen Hero, especially those which show Stephen in a less cold, more sympathetic light. . . . [including] the theory of the epiphany, with its implication of a vital contact between the artist and the life about him . . . .

But, as has been stated, Stephen's aesthetic is neither subjectivist nor relativist, recognizing as it does the vital contact Peake mentions. Furthermore, it is the term "epiphany" and not the concept that Joyce removes from the Portrait, for, despite its nominal absence, the concept, as we shall see in the next chapter, underlies the aesthetic discussion in that novel.43

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42 Peake, p. 61.

43 To hold to this view is, as is evident from the above critical survey, and as Harrison has noted, "to diverge sharply from the critical mainstream, which tends to argue for the necessary exclusion of the concept from A Portrait" (142).
It is by virtue of its recognition of this fact that the argument of David Jones has the most force. Jones points out that in *Stephen Hero*

the "soul" of an object is also referred to synonymously as *claritas, quidditas, whatness,* and as being radiant; the very same synonyms are retained in *A Portrait*, only the term "soul" has been dropped . . . .

and he concludes that this is because it was "Joyce's intention . . . to obviate marketplace connotations and explications" of the term "soul". 44 It is for this same reason that the term "epiphany" is not included in the *Portrait* discussion. In *Stephen Hero*, Stephen defines epiphany as a "sudden spiritual manifestation", and though, as Jones points out, "spiritual" refers quite simply to "the Aristotelian and Aquinan concept of the immateriality of the object as it is known in the mind", it was this "unsavoury connotation of 'epiphany' [that] forced its deletion in rewriting . . . . 45 Joyce was quite right to eliminate these terms, as is evidenced by the fact that many studies of the manuscript which contains them -- and which was never published by Joyce -- have resulted in dangerous misinterpretation of his intended meaning.

Finally, the question of Joyce's relation to Aquinas must be considered. The most extensive study of this relation is that of William Noon, who concludes that whereas Joyce understood and followed Aquinas, Stephen distorts his meaning, and that his aesthetic therefore is not to be confused with that of Joyce. On the other hand, Block, who identifies Stephen's aesthetic with Joyce's, feels that "the theoretical formu-

44 Jones, 302.
45 Jones, 303.
lation of Joyce's aesthetic rigidly followed Thomistic principles.\textsuperscript{46} Maurice Beebe agrees to some extent with Block, stating that "Joyce follows the form of certain Scholastic principles", but he warns that Joyce "by denying the premises upon which they are based, distorts the meaning."\textsuperscript{47} J. Mitchell Morse does not see any such distortion and insists that "Joyce himself, in the Portrait, called his own aesthetics 'applied Aquinas', and ... this was literally true."\textsuperscript{48}

It should be pointed out that it is not in the Portrait, but in Stephen Hero that Joyce calls his aesthetic "applied Aquinas" (SH, 77); in the Portrait, the epithet is attributed by Stephen to MacAlister: "MacAlister... would call my esthetic theory 'applied Aquinas'" (Port., 209). This fact, along with one other, gives some indication that the term is only partially applicable. The "other" significant fact is that in the Stephen Hero manuscript, "applied Aquinas" is one of the many phrases and passages that, according to Spencer in his introduction, Joyce "slashed strokes beside, under or across" with a crayon. Spencer's speculation is that Joyce did this because "he did not like them and intended to change them or get rid of them."\textsuperscript{49} In this case, it is most probable that Joyce was concerned about the accuracy of the phrase, for though he uses it once again in the Portrait, he attributes it to MacAlister. Since MacAlister has already accused Stephen of "intellectual crankery", Joyce's transference of the remark to him implies his awareness that his

\textsuperscript{46} Block, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{47} Maurice Beebe, "Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics," in Connolly, p. 273.
\textsuperscript{49} Spencer, Stephen Hero, p. 18.
aesthetic might appear to be no more than Aquinas' ideas on the psychology of apprehension and intellection applied to aesthetics. But Joyce makes it clear, in The Portrait, that he did not stop where Aquinas would have left him. When Stephen states that

So far as this side of esthetic philosophy [i.e., the epistemology of art] extends, Aquinas will carry me all along the line. When we come to the phenomena of artistic conception, artistic gestation, and artistic reproduction [i.e., the creative process] I require a new terminology and a new personal experience. (Portrait, p. 209)

he indicates clearly that his, and Joyce's, aesthetic is not, and cannot be, merely "applied Aquinas". Although founded solidly on Thomistic principles and ideas, the aesthetic goes farther than Aquinas, as it must, simply because, on the one hand, Joyce rejected the theological premises of scholasticism, and on the other, Aquinas was not interested in either the process of artistic creation, or the application of his ideas to literary aesthetics. This, however, should not lead us to believe that Joyce ever had either a cause or the desire to abandon Aquinas. Educated as a Catholic, Joyce could not help being profoundly affected by Aquinas, for his thought completely permeates Catholic doctrinal teaching on psychology and epistemology; therefore, Aquinas

50 Cf. Stephen Hero, p. 77: "[Stephen] had a genuine predisposition in favour of all but the premises of scholasticism".

51 As Noon points out, "it is of special importance for students of letters to keep in mind that the traditional Thomist texts on art and beauty ... have relevance for literature only insofar as they are 'applied'. Suggestive as some of the texts may be in themselves, it is advisable for the literary student to remember that Aquinas did not know the text of Aristotle's Poetics (nor the text of Plotinus' Enneads), and that he was far more interested in philosophical and theological science than in literature as an art" (Noon, pp. 19-20).
and Catholic doctrine form the basis for the assumptions Joyce makes about the nature of being and the aesthetic apprehension of that being, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, Joyce's epiphanic aesthetic is closely allied to the Aquinan theory of claritas pulcri, the radiance of beauty. Thus, we must not take either the position that Joyce's aesthetic is purely Aquinan, for it is more than that, or the position that when Joyce leaves Aquinas behind he has completely abandoned him. Aquinas, in spirit at least, is present whenever Joyce speaks or thinks about art, for, as we shall see, Joyce's is a Catholic art.

The preceding discussion of the more important minor issues is meant to establish clearly the assumptions upon which our discussion of the nature and function of the epiphany will rest. To summarize then, it is my contention that the epiphany is a concept which greatly influenced and guided the production of Joyce's works and that he never abandoned the concept, which, properly understood, can indeed serve as a valuable critical tool; that the epiphany is the keystone of an aesthetic system which, though never completely formulated on paper, was for Joyce a coherent and consistent whole to which he continued to adhere in writing Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, though less self-consciously there than in his earlier works; that the epiphany underlies the aesthetic theory propounded in the Portrait and that Stephen, both there and in Stephen Hero, can, for the most part, be taken as a spokesman for Joyce; and, finally, that Joyce's thoughts about art, though they go beyond Aquinas, are consistently based on the ideas of the Angelic Doctor.
It is essential in a discussion of the Joycean epiphany to consider the sources from which Joyce may have derived the concept, as well as the influences that helped to shape it, for Joyce was certainly not alone in his interest in moments of sudden spiritual manifestation.

We have already considered briefly the influence of Aquinas, and shall have the opportunity to do so once again, but since it cannot reasonably be argued that Aquinas was responsible for the concept itself, it is far more helpful to examine several more direct sources for the epiphany.

The earliest indication of a possible source was given by Oliver St. John Gogarty, who suggested that:

*Probably Fr. Darlington had taught him, as an aside in his Latin class -- for Joyce knew no Greek -- that "Epiphany" meant "a showing forth". So he recorded under "Epiphany" any showing forth of the mind by which he considered one gave oneself away.*

Joseph Prescott has said of this suggestion, however, that it "must be regarded as no more than a guess," and further argued that "It seems at least likely that Joyce got his information from Skeat's *Etymological Dictionary*, which the autobiographical Stephen 'read . . . by the hour'." But, as Beja has pointed out, Joyce needed to know neither Greek nor Skeat to know the meaning of epiphany:

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1 Oliver St. John Gogarty, *As I was Going Down Sackville Street* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1937), p. 295.
2 Prescott, 346.
... the word of course refers to the manifestation of Christ on the twelfth day, January 6, the Feast of the Epiphany. The word would therefore necessarily have been known to the young Joyce, and as a Catholic he need not have waited ... to learn its meaning "as an aside in his Latin class." 

This important point is supported and substantiated by the work of Florence Walzl, who holds that "the many epiphanies (i.e., the numerous manifestations of divinity in the life of Jesus) in the liturgy of the Church year" constitute a primary source for the Joycean epiphany, and she notes the special importance of the liturgy of the Epiphany season:

Both in liturgy and Joyce the epiphany is a process of enlightenment. The Epiphany season Masses indicate it to be a sudden spiritual illumination ... Throughout the entire season a seeking for spiritual enlightenment is enjoined upon the worshipper. Significantly, Joyce describes the process of epiphany as a seeking for spiritual perspective or light.

Walzl also points out that as a Christian Joyce must certainly have known that the term "epiphany" had, early on in Christian history, "developed a religious denotation as ... a revelation of inner significance by means of outward appearance," and since it is, as we have noted, also the name for those moments when Christ's essence was revealed -- specifically, to the Magi, at His baptism, and at

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3 Beja, p. 71 Beja observes in passing that Joyce might also have become aware of the meaning of the word through study of the Oxford English Dictionary.


5 Walzl, 436.
Cana -- "epiphany" is a perfectly apt term for Joyce to have applied to a phenomenon by the process of which the essence of a being is revealed to the observer. Thus, it is likely that, above all other possible sources, the immense influence upon Joyce of his Catholic background is primarily responsible for his notion of the epiphany; indeed, Beja has gone so far as to state that "attempts to determine sources other than the ecclesiastical one for Joyce's application of [the term 'epiphany] have been unconvincing."6

This statement, however, must be modified in the light of Frank Zingrone's valuable article on Joyce and Gabriele D'Annunzio, which argues most convincingly that D'Annunzio's *Il Fuoco* (1900) (*The Flame of Life* [1906]) constitutes an important source for Joyce's use of the epiphany as a literary concept.

Stanislaus Joyce tells us that his brother considered *Il Fuoco* to be "the highest achievement of the novel to date" and discussed it "in lively disputes", 7 and, according to Richard Ellmann, D'Annunzio was often "acknowledged by Joyce as a formative influence."8 Zingrone states, "Simply put, Joyce took over from *Il Fuoco* . . . both the concept and the artistic development of the epiphany."9 This may be a rather extreme

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6Beja, p. 71.
8Ellmann, *Selected Letters*, p. 304 n. In James Joyce, Ellmann relates that at "his last examination in Italian at University College [1902] . . . [Joyce] was ill prepared in the factual material on which he was questioned, but he had studied D'Annunzio so closely that he could imitate his manner, and the examiners, after some disagreement, passed him" (p. 61).
assertion, but there is nevertheless an obvious and suggestive connection between Joyce and D'Annunzio's novel in that the first of the two sections into which the book is divided is entitled "L'Epifania Del Fuoco", "The Epiphany of the Flame", and, significantly, in his notes for Stephen Hero, Joyce refers to the "Epiphany of Thornton", the "Epiphany of Hell", and the "Epiphany of Mr. Tate". Furthermore, as Zingrone points out, Stelio Effrena, the poet-hero of Il Fuoco, a thinly disguised D'Annunzio, lives his life as a succession of "epiphanies of flame". These epiphanies invariably occur in context with fire, or, in particular instances, with lightning flashes in which the essential "whatness" of things and events is revealed to the poet.

It is precisely this same emphasis on the revelation of whatness that characterizes the Joycean epiphany. Zingrone also notes the fact that just as Stelio's moments are "lightning flashes", Stephen's thoughts processes are described as "a dusk of doubt and self-mistrust lit up at moments by the lightnings of intuition..." (Portrait, p. 177).

Since Joyce had read Il Fuoco by, at the latest, 1902, it is quite likely that D'Annunzio was at least partly responsible for his use of the term "epiphany".

Another possible source, suggested by Noon, is Maurice De Wulf's "Les Théories Esthétiques propres à saint Thomas", which appeared in 1895 and which Joyce, while in Paris, "if not earlier... would presumably have read", for the essay "was recognized at once as an important step in the direction of constructing a contemporary aesthetic along Thomist

10 Scholes and Kain, pp. 68, 69, 71.
11 Zingrone, 254.
12 Zingrone, 255.
lines. Noon begins by stating that "it seems at least likely that in first writing epiphany Joyce was playing on the French épiphénomène (that which at certain times attaches itself as if inevitably, though momentarily, to some other phenomenon)" -- as, in the epiphanic moment, for example, a response on the part of the perceiver is a phenomenon that "attaches itself" to the act of perception -- and he goes on to state that the Stephen Hero account of epiphany coincides in so many respects with De Wulf's description of the épiphénomène esthétique that it is difficult not to detect a correspondence between the two formulations.

According to De Wulf, Aquinas' most important contribution to aesthetic philosophy was his recognition of the importance of the subjective element in aesthetic apprehension; whereas "la philosophie ancienne n'a pas accordé à l'impression esthétique l'importance qu'elle mérite," Aquinas recognized that "l'esthétique n'appartient pas tout entière à la metaphysique, elle remplit aussi un chapitre de psychologie." For Aquinas, then,

13 Noon, pp. 13, 71. The possibility that Joyce derived much of his aesthetic from De Wulf is also suggested by Curran (p. 37) although he does not mention epiphany. The close coincidence of De Wulf's explanation of Aquinas' aesthetics and Joyce's epiphany indicates not only a possible source for the concept, but also the enormous influence of Aquinas on Joyce's aesthetic and the extent to which the epiphany agrees with the Thomistic theory. The most extensive study of the relationship between the aesthetic notions of Joyce & Aquinas is, of course, Noon's.

14 Noon, p. 7.

beau, et cette perception devient la source d'une jouissance. Dans les âmes d'artistes, cette jouissance tient de l'événement.

It is this "jouissance" -- "le second phénomène [following and attached to the act of perception] qu'on retrouve dans toute impression du beau" -- that De Wulf terms "l'épiphénomène esthétique". In De Wulf's explanation, which does indeed resemble Stephen's description of the epiphany in both Stephen Hero and A Portrait, "l'épiphénomène esthétique" is the product of the perception of the claritas of the object contemplated, which De Wulf defines as "la manifestation de l'objet au sujet", and which is associated by Aquinas with "resplendentia formae", that is, the substantial form of the object, its soul, shining forth from the object or "made to shine forth from the artist's work." Similarly, for Stephen, and, by association, for Joyce, claritas is the quidditas of the object, "its soul, its whatness", shining forth to the perceiving consciousness, its very being as radiant, and epiphany is the sudden apprehension of that radiance:

This is the moment which I call epiphany. First we recognise that the object is one integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, when the relation of parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of

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16 De Wulf, 342.
17 De Wulf, 345.
its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany. (Stephen Hero, p. 213)

Although Joyce does not use the word in A Portrait, there is clearly no difference between "epiphany", wherein, says Stephen, "I find the third, the supreme quality of beauty" (Stephen Hero, p. 211), and that instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance [claritas] of the esthetic image, [the object as perceived by the subjective mind] is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by [the object's] wholeness and fascinated by its harmony . . . .

an instant which Stephen calls "the luminous silent stásis of esthetic pleasure . . . . [an] enchantment of the heart" (Portrait, p. 213), which recalls De Wulf's statement that "cette jouissance tient de l'environnement".

Strictly speaking, Joyce deviates from Aquinas (and De Wulf) in equating "soul", or substantial form, with "whatness", or quidditas, which is substantial form together with matter, and as we have noted, he steps around this snare by deleting the term "soul" from the formulation in the Portrait. To avoid this confusion, we might do well to consider that what Joyce means by quidditas is not substantial, but "existential form," the ultimate existential and objective reality of a being, that which in Finnegans Wake he calls the "Ding hvad i id est." 21 As Noon

19 Noon, p. 52.
20 It should noted that this definition of quidditas as existential form, the objective reality of an object, is not intended to suggest Kant's notion of the "thing-in-itself", which denotes the noumenal, almost ideal essence of the object, its "real" and unknowable reality.
21 Finnegans Wake (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 611. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text. The passage from which this quotation is taken is essentially yet another explanation of epiphany.
points out, whereas

Thomists in general insist on the "real" distinction between the essence (or the quiddity, whatness) of a thing and its existence. Stephen . . . places his emphasis on the quiddity or essence as actuated, as "existential", as a structurally intelligible whole belonging to that order where "existence is prime among perfections." 22

This difference has led Noon and others to suggest that what Joyce means is something more like the Scotian concept of haecceitas, or "thisness", 23 but the haecceitas of a thing is its principle of individuation, not its essence, and is traditionally associated with the Divine Creative Will. Even before a thing achieves existence, it possesses a fully differentiated individuality in the mind of God; thus, it is God's will which determines that this thing will be entirely unique and individual. 24 This clearly cannot be Joyce's "whatness", for he insists that what is perceived is not "the divine purpose in anything" (Portrait, p. 213). For Joyce, "whatness" is simply the existential being of a thing, the integral thing as such in itself it is.

Despite this and other differences carefully detailed by Noon,

22 Noon, p. 49. Noon is quoting here from the Summa Theologicae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, I, question 6, article 3.

23 Noon, p. 51: "What Stephen seems to mean by claritas may have been expressed better by the haecceitas of Duns Scotus than by the quidditas of Aquinas". See also Goldberg, p. 74: "What Stephen means is something like haecceitas, the individual this-ness of an object", and Beebe, who states that Joyce "confused" quidditas and haecceitas, pp. 285-86.

24 Cf. Christopher Devlin, S.J., ed., The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 239: "... the individuality of a being [its haecceitas] is a distinct intention both in God's mind and in his will, whether or not he gives it actual existence".
the fact remains that for Aquinas (as his position is stated by De Wulf) as for Joyce, "the objective aspect of beauty is completed by the subjective aspect, or the impression which the beautiful produces within us", the epiphany or épiphanême produced when the "order, and above all the form of the being... shine[s] forth to the mind" — when the object's "soul, its whatness, leaps to us"—and shows or manifests itself to the perceiver "in trues coloribus resplendent with sextuple gloria of light actually retained, untisintus, inside [it]..." (Finnegans Wake, p. 611). Clearly, then, the epiphanic aesthetic set forth in both Stephen Hero and A Portrait cannot be regarded as either subjectivist or relativist, for the perceiver neither imposes nor projects aesthetic value onto the object; instead, he discovers and responds to the objective qualities of wholeness and harmony, or integritas and consonantia, the "relation of parts" which constitutes the thing's intrinsic beauty. Nor, conversely, can the aesthetic be regarded as objectivist in the extreme, as Sørensen insists. Holding that the epiphany implies "total objectivity and passivity on the part of the beholder", Sørensen goes on to state,

This lack of active involvement is not only an early Joycean feature, but is more a sign of immaturity... Joyce only pays attention to the ontological aspects of beauty: the beauty as the object radiates it and which may or may not be perceived.26

But far from implying a "lack of active involvement," epiphany requires the active participation of the beholder, as Stephen makes clear when

26 Sørensen, pp. 7, 10.
he describes the act of aesthetic apprehension as "the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus" and goes on to state that "the object is epiphanised" only when that "focus is reached" (Stephen Hero, p. 211). Goldberg is clearly mistaken when he asserts that Stephen "never clarifies the relation of the objective and subjective aspects of the epiphany ..." 27 for Stephen insists that for beauty to exist, "the most satisfying relations of the sensible must ... correspond to the necessary phases of artistic apprehension" (Portrait, p. 211; my italics). Without the perceiver, though there may be radiance, there can be no epiphany, for it is the perceiving mind that actively "grapples", "analyses", "synthesises", "recognises", "discovers", and "apprehends" the "relations [in the object] which satisfy and coincide with the stages ... of all esthetic apprehension" (Portrait, p. 209). Thus, epiphany is the result of an intimate relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, of a momentary union of subject and object, just as for De Wulf,

Beauty ... does not belong exclusively to things as the Greeks thought, nor to the subject alone who reacts and enjoys, as some contemporary philosophers maintain. But it is as if we were midway between object and subject, and consists in a correspondence between the two. 28

As Beja has noted,

In their different ways, the neo-Thomists and the

27 Goldberg, p. 52.

28 De Wulf, Medieval Philosophy, p. 138. Cf. Peake, p. 65: "The merit of [Joyce's] theory is that it places beauty not merely in the external object or image (which would leave unexplained why different cultures find different things beautiful) nor simply in the eye of the beholder (which would rule out any concept of 'universal beauty'): beauty is manifested in a relationship between observer and observed, governed by the fundamental character of human apprehension."
Phenomenologists... stress the attempt to unite the subjective and objective worlds. In terms of Stephen Dedalus' aesthetics, such a unity is achieved at the moment of epiphany.\textsuperscript{29}

This, then, is the theory of claritas pulcri which De Wulf called the key to Thomist aesthetics,\textsuperscript{30} and which is equally central to Joyce's aesthetic of the epiphany. Thus, De Wulf's article appears to constitute a source not only for the concept of epiphany, but, because the two formulations are so similar, for the form Stephen's explanation takes as well.

While it is not an easy task to determine Joyce's sources for the epiphany, it is yet more difficult to trace the various influences that helped to shape the essential nature of the concept.

The origins of the epiphany are to be found, as Beja has indicated, in the "main tradition of such moments which begins on the road to Damascus with Paul; for, in the West, the moment of vision is a Christian phenomenon, with only a few real antecedents in classical or Hebraic literature."\textsuperscript{31} However, though it is rooted in a Christian tradition, Joyce's moment is secular rather than religious, and, his personal rejection of the Church aside, this is primarily due to the enormous influence of the Romantic movement on those who came after, for, as Beja points out, it is with the Romantics that an evolution "from the moment of divine revelation of Augustine to the 'sécular' epiphany" begins.\textsuperscript{32} M.H. Abrams explains:

\textsuperscript{29}Beja, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{30}De Wulf, "Les Théories... ," 341: "On peut dire que la théorie du resplendissement du beau est une clef de voûte de l'esthétique thomiste. Vers elle tout converge... ."

\textsuperscript{31}Beja, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{32}Beja, p. 32.
It is a historical commonplace that the course of Western thought since the Renaissance has been one of progressive secularization, but it is easy to mistake the way in which that process took place. Secular thinkers have no more been able to work free of the centuries—old Judeo-Christian culture than Christian theologians were able to work free of their inheritance of classical and pagan thought. The process ... has not been the deletion and replacement of religious ideas but rather the assimilation and reinterpretation of religious ideas, as constitutive elements in a world view founded on secular premises. Much of what distinguishes writers I call "Romantic" derives from the fact that they undertook, whatever their religious creed or lack of creed, to save traditional concepts, schemes, and values which had been based on the relation of the Creator to his creature and creation, but to reformulate them within the prevailing two-term system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind or consciousness and its trans-action with nature.\footnote{M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism; Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1971), p. 13.}
to be found.

The most often-noted Romantic predecessor of the Joycean epiphany is the Wordsworthian "spot of time", and Joyce's self-professed admiration for Wordsworth hints at a possible influence. 34 Abrams has commented that the epiphany "shares attributes with the Wordsworthian Moment (the charismatic revelation in the commonplace or trivial object)"; 35 this emphasis on vision arising from the perception of the trivial, the common, or the vulgar is one of the more important of these shared attributes. In his "Preface" to the Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth indicates that his aim "was to choose incidents and situations from common life, and to relate or describe them, . . . throw [inq] over them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual way. . . ." 36 Similarly, the pages in Stephen Hero which describe the epiphany make it clear that the epiphany arises from a "trivial incident"; it is a "triviality" which makes Stephen "think of collecting many such moments together in a book of epiphanies" that would arise from "the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself" (Stephen Hero, p. 211). And, like Joyce, Wordsworth recorded the moments that arose from such causes; as Beja notes,

34 In a letter to Stanislaus (2 or 3. [?] May 1905), Joyce wrote, "In my history of literature I have given the highest palms to Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Shelley", (Selected Letters, p. 62), and the following month he wrote, "I think Wordsworth of all English men of letters best deserves your word 'genius'" (Selected Letters, p. 63). It is interesting to note, as Abrams does, that Joyce made these remarks at "the very time when [he] was working on Stephen-Hero, wherein he identified and analyzed 'moments' of epiphany" (Abrams, p. 421).

35 Abrams, p. 42.

"Many of Wordsworth's best-known poems -- 'Resolution and Independence', 'Stepping Westward', 'I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud', 'The Solitary Reaper' -- are records of epiphanies ...". 37

An important difference between the epiphany and the Wordsworthian moment that must be noted is that, unlike Joyce, Wordsworth saw the revelatory moment as sometimes having the quality of a transcendental experience:

Wordsworth is far from regarding his moments of illumination as completely secular, ... and sometimes he even hints, as in 'Resolution and Independence', that his experience may have come to him 'by peculiar grace,/ A leading from above, a something given'. 38

This essentially Protestant view of inspiration differs radically from Joyce's more Catholic notion that revelation is primarily the result of intense observation, of "groping" for a focus, as opposed to a "leading from above". 39

Nevertheless, in the passage in The Prelude which describes Wordsworth's "spots of time", and which Beja has called Wordsworth's "exposition of what almost amounts to a theory of epiphany", 40 we find that, as in Joyce, an important emphasis is on the effect of the epiphanic experience upon the observer:

There are in our existence spots of time
That with distinct pre-eminence retain

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37 Beja, p. 33.
38 Beja, p. 33.
39 This point is discussed more fully in Chapter IV of the present text.
40 Beja, p. 33.
A renovating virtue, whence, 
our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repaired;
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced,
That penetrates, enables us to mount,
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen.41

In these moments, as David Perkins has observed, the observer receives
"a profounder sense of oneness with the external universe,"42 just
as in the epiphany, as was indicated earlier, the process is one through
which the observer is united with the objective world he perceives.

Another difference here, though, is that whereas for Joyce the
epiphanic process involves the observation of an object and the subsequent
perception of its essence, Wordsworth's moments involve a projection
of the self onto nature, by which process the poet sees his own emotional
state objectified.43 Consider, for example, the experience related by
the poet in the lines immediately following his description of the "spots
of time". "Stumbling on" alone, he comes to a spot "where in former
times/ A murderer had been hung in iron chains" (Bk. XII, 11. 235-236);
and fleeing, he sees a girl bearing " a pitcher on her head":

It was, in truth,
An ordinary sight; but I should need
Colours and words that are unknown to man,
To paint the visionary dreaminess
Which, while I looked all round for my lost guide,

41William Wordsworth, The Prelude or Growth of a Poet's Mind, ed.
Ernest de Selincourt, 2nd ed. rev. Helen Darbishire (Oxford: Oxford
references will be to this edition and will be included in the text.

42David Perkins, The Quest for Permanence: The Symbolism of Wordsworth,
Shelley and Keats (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965),
p. 59.

43Perkins, p. 58.
Invested moorland waste, and naked pool,
The beacon crowning the lone eminence,
The female and her garments vexed and tossed
By the strong wind. (ll. 253-261)

The dreariness he perceives in the landscape is a projection of his own emotional state, rather than an innate feature of external reality, just as the "spirit of pleasure and youth's golden gleam" which falls on the same landscape when, "in the blessed hours/ Of early love, the loved on at [his] side", the poet roamed "in daily presence of this scene" (ll. 261-266) is a projection of the spirit of pleasure within him.

Nevertheless, in both Wordsworth and Joyce, the observer is "renovated" by the sense of union between subject and object he derives from the epiphany or "spot of time", and it is here that the similarity primarily rests.

Another poetic movement often cited, particularly by W.Y. Tindall, as having had an influence on the nature of the Joycean epiphany is that of the Symbolists. The relationship between Joyce and this movement is complex, and it is difficult to establish the extent of its influence upon him. Richard Ellmann has stated that

Among [Arthur] Symons' later contributions to the movement, not the least was his benevolent assistance to Joyce in finding him a publisher for Chamber Music. That book, Joyce's first, belonged to Symons' own type of symbolistic verse, as George Moore perceived.\(^{44}\)

Tindall, who agrees with this view of Chamber Music, sees the influence

as being so extensive that he calls "epiphany" "an ecclesiastical term for symbolism," and while this is essentially an accurate evaluation, it requires some qualification.

It has long been recognized that Joyce knew the works of Baudelaire, Verlaine, Mallarmé, Rimbaud and Maeterlinck well enough to discuss their ideas and even recite some of their works by heart, and there can be little doubt that he also knew Symons' book on Symbolism and that it expanded his knowledge of the ideas espoused by the movement. Tindall points out that "Stephen's recollection of Gerard de Nerval, leading his lobster down the street by a bright blue ribbon could only have come from Arthur Symons' Symbolist Movement in Literature," and Karl Beckson tells us that, according to Mary Colum, the book was "widely read by undergraduates in Ireland at the turn of the century."

The aims of the epiphany are often very close to those of Symbolism, close enough, at times, to suggest a possible influence. For example, we have already noted that the epiphany unites the subjective observer with the objective world; Joyce told Arthur Power that as a modern writer, his aim was to "create a new fusion between the exterior world and our contemporary selves." Similarly, as Beckson points out, the "symbolist viewpoint tries to meet head on the problem of the dualism between subject and object which has so worried past philosophers and

45 William York Tindall, James Joyce: His Way of Interpreting the Modern World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 120. For his discussion of Chamber Music, see pp. 116-117.

46 Tindall, pp. 109-110.


48 Beckson, 222.

aestheticians;" in symbolism, he continues, "absolute dualism", as Charles Feidelson, Jr. points out, is abandoned, and 'subject and object fade before the unitive reality created by the symbolic medium... (Symbolism and American Literature, pp. 52-53).50

Another similarity is to be found in a common insistence on perceiving the essence of whatever is observed. Symons calls Symbolism an "endeavour to disengage the ultimate essence, the soul, of whatever exists and can be realised by the consciousness,"51 and in Stephen Hero, it is clearly indicated that the function of the artist is to "disentangle the subtle soul of the image from its mesh of defining circumstances most exactly..." (Stephen Hero, p. 78), to "pierce to the significant heart of everything" (p. 38), and this is precisely what the epiphany enables him to do. Like the Symbolists, Joyce strove to free the essence of the image from both its traditional associations, as did Wordsworth, and its context in material reality so that it could be "re-embodied" by the power of the imagination in an artistic context "chosen as the most exact for it in its new office" as a symbol. This context would then allow the reader, like the artist before him, to "bend upon these present things and... go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered" (Stephen Hero, p. 78). The artist does not impose a meaning on the image so that it becomes a symbol of something outside itself, but rather, by presenting the image dramatically, in a chosen context and without comment, permits the reader his own epiphany, a moment in which the soul, the essence of the image, "leaps" to him "from the vestment of its appearance," (Stephen Hero, p. 78). The fact that Joyce never comments on the significance of

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50 Beja, p. 69.  
51 Symons, p. 5.
a given image allied him with the Symbolist emphasis on suggestion and evocation as opposed to direct statement. As Tindall points out, he shares their inclination to use "concrete images [and]... harmonious interaction among images, rhythm, and sound", rather than simple narrative description, to embody reality.52

But it should be noted that while the Symbolists strove to create, through the use of symbols, "a literature in which the visible is no longer a reality," and in which one is lead "through beautiful things to the external beauty,"53 Joyce was interested in the essences that are within and not beyond the reality of the objective world. He did not seek, as did the Symbolists, to evoke an ideal realm, but to permit "these present things" to show their essences. While it is true that "For Joyce, as for Baudelaire, common reality became a storehouse of symbols awaiting apprehension,"54 this does not mean that the epiphany is another form of Baudelairean "correspondence". According to Tindall,

To Baudelaire, nature was little more than a repository of symbols for things beyond it or inside him or he knew not where. Since the symbol unites matter and spirit, inner and outer, time and eternity, correspondence seemed a better word for it.55

But as we have seen, Joyce rejected the idea that "the supreme quality of beauty [was] a light from some other world, the idea of which matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol". (Portrait,

52Tindall, p. 108
53Symons, pp. 2-3, 4.
54Tindall, p. 120.
55Tindall, p. 108.
Thus, for Joyce, the symbol revealed only actually existent essences and not ideal forms or truths. The essences he sought to present were not "beyond [nature] or inside [him]"; they were within nature, masked, it is true, by the "vestment of appearance", but there nonetheless, awaiting apprehension. Joyce did not desire, as did Baudelaire and the other Symbolists, to "By the power of physical symbols... call down parts of heaven..." nor is the epiphany a means to accomplish this. Therefore, while the epiphany shares many attributes with, and may indeed have been influenced to some extent by Symbolist poetics, it would be misleading to refer to it as a purely Symbolist concept.

Another important influence that has been suggested is that of Walter Pater. In their discussion of Joyce's intellectual and aesthetic milieu, Scholes and Kain cite a passage from Pater's "The School of Giorgione" in which they see "a line of thought suggested which must have contributed to Joyce's development of the theory of the 'Epiphany'".

Now it is part of the ideality of the highest sort of dramatic poetry, that it presents us with a kind of profoundly significant and animated instants, a mere gesture, a look, a smile, perhaps -- some brief and wholly concrete moment -- into which, however, all the motives, all the interests and effects of a long history, have condensed themselves, and which seem to absorb past and future in an intense consciousness of the present. Such ideal instants the school of Giorgione selects, with its admirable tact, from

56. Tindall, p. 108
57. Scholes and Kain, p. 257.
that feverish, tumultuously colored world of the old citizens of Venice -- exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fullness of existence, and which are like some consummate extract or quintessence of life.

Here, as in Joyce, we find an emphasis on the revelation of an essence through a triviality, "a mere gesture, a look, a smile," and the same insistence that the highest poetry embodies these instants. Other critics who have cited Pater as an influence include Gerald Monsman, the foremost critic of Pater, who has stated:

That moment of revelation that Joyce described in "Mangan" and the Portrait as "less than the pulsation of an artery, [but] equal in its period and value to six thousand years", derives from Blake's Milton via Pater's "pulses" - "pulsations" - imagery in the "Conclusion" [to the Renaissance];

Robert M. Scotto, has pointed out Pater's idiosyncratic diction in Stephen's description of the epiphanic moment as "delicate and evanescent"; and, finally, Beja, who has astutely noted that Stuart Gilbert goes too far when he says that Pater's "sharp impressions, exquisite moments are identical with what Joyce called 'epiphanies'; but certainly Hugh Kenner's claim that the characterization of Stephen "parodies" Pater fails

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to recognize a genuine influence. It should be noted, however, that critics have overlooked a particularly interesting and suggestive passage in Marius which could well have contributed to Joyce's exposition of the theory of the epiphany in Stephen Hero, if not to the theory itself:

It seemed just then as if the desire of the artist in him -- that old longing to produce -- might be satisfied by the exact and literal transcript of what was then passing around him, in simple prose, arresting the desirable moment as it passed, and prolonging its life a little.

If we compare this to a strikingly similar passage in Stephen Hero --

He believed that it was for the man of letters

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62 Walter Pate, Marius The Epicurean; His Sensations and Ideas, Vol. I (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1910); p. 164. All subsequent references are to this edition. Critics have also failed to note that in 1919 or 1920, Joyce transcribed seven passages from Marius (Vol. I) into his notebook. The James Joyce Archive (General Editor, Michael Grodon [New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1978]) reproduces the notebook in the volume Notes, Criticism, Translations, and Miscellaneous Writings, Vol. II (ed. Hans Walter Gabler, pp. 384-6), but does not identify the passages. For what it is worth, the passage quoted above is not among those Joyce did copy out, which are: pp. 106-107, "They comprehended a multitude...[to]...well-remembered roses..." pp. 161-162, "Down the dewy paths...[to]...a wild picture drawn from Virgil;" p. 173, "The temple...[to]...freely among them;" p. 177, "Marius could distinguish...[to]...purple curtains;" p. 191, "The nostrils, and mouth...[to]...with the spirit;" p. 211, "The discourse ended...[to]...yellow and red;" and p. 239, "It might be almost...[to]...as if it were a stocking."
[which, for Joyce, denotes nothing less than "literary artist"] to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.63

(Stephen Hero, p. 211)

we find in both an emphasis on the care with which these moments must be recorded, just as, earlier in Stephen Hero, Joyce emphasizes that the "subtle soul of the image" must be "disentangled" "most exactly", and we find the same consciousness of the ephemeral nature of the moment expressed in Stephen Hero, in characteristically Paterian language. Furthermore, if we examine the manuscript epiphanies, those moments that Joyce did record, we find that they are written, as Pater suggests they should be, "in simple prose".

That Joyce knew Pater's work well enough and early enough to have been influenced in his development of the epiphany is indicated by the fact that in "The Day of the Rabblement" (1901), he accuses George Moore of misquoting Pater, and in "James Clarence Mangan" (1902), he quotes from Pater's "A Prince of Court Painters".64 Stanislaus Joyce, in fact, records that at the time he was writing Stephen Hero, Joyce told him that "his ambition in life [was] to burn with a hard and gem-like

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63 My emphasis on Joyce's definition of "man of letters" as "literary artist" is prompted by Scholes's assertion that the epiphany "is no way related to the creative process" because, "Even the recording of the phenomenon can be done by a 'man of letters'. No artist is required" (Joyce and the Epiphany, 71). That the "man of letters" is an artist is clearly indicated by the fact that in attributing to Wordsworth the title of "genius", Joyce refers to him as a "man of letters", and by Stephen's, conclusion "that nature had designed him for a man of letters" (Stephen Hero, p. 209).

64 James Joyce, The Critical Writing of James Joyce, ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann (New York: Viking Press, 1967), pp. 71, 78. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text. The editors are mistaken in identifying the source of Joyce's quotation from Pater as "A Prince of Court Poets" (p. 78n.).
ecstasy", which is, of course, a reference to Pater's "Conclusion".

Pater's, then, is one of the stronger influences on the nature of the
Joycean epiphany.

One final, and most extravagant, suggestion that must be noted
is that of Dölf Sörensen, who claims that Joyce's theory of the epiphany
"may well have been influenced by Gerald [sic] Manley Hopkins" and his
notion of "inscape". While anything is possible, chronology dictates
that this suggestion be approached with cautious doubt, for Hopkins
died just seven years after Joyce was born, and his poetry was not
published until 1918, well after Joyce's theory of the epiphany had
settled itself in his mind, so that such an influence is, if not entirely
impossible, at least highly unlikely, and Sörensen exposes himself to
further criticism by leaving his claim completely unsubstantiated.

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65 Stanislaus Joyce, The Complete Dublin Diary of Stanislaus Joyce,
p. 46. For further evidence of the extent of Joyce's familiarity with
works of Pater, see Wilson, pp. 163-178.

66 Sörensen, p. 7. A possible explanation for Sörensen's improbable
contention is that it may be the result of his misreading a passage
in Noon to which he refers the reader in a note; there, Noon states:
Hopkins, it is true, came to Dublin in 1884, fourteen years before Joyce's time, but so far as traditions go, fourteen years is not a very long time, and so far as Joyce was "influenced" by the Scholastic atmosphere of the College, he cannot have been totally unaware of the rather stormy history of Scholasticism which the preceding fourteen years had written [and] A Page of Irish History hints suggestively at Hopkins' relation to that tradition . . . (pp. 6-7).

Noon's only point here is that the form of Joyce's Scholasticism may
have been influenced indirectly by what there remained at the College
of Hopkins's interest in Duns Scotus, whose views often contradicted
those of Aquinas, as we shall see in the next chapter, but, although
he does acknowledge an affinity between the epiphany and Hopkins's
ideas of "instress" and "inscape", Noon at no point indicates that
Hopkins could have directly affected the development of the epiphany.
While we cannot reasonably view Hopkins as an influence on the epiphany, it is nevertheless true that his ideas of "instress" and "inscape" bear such marked resemblances to Joyce's concept that it is helpful to our understanding of the epiphany to consider it in the light of what amounts to Hopkins's aesthetic theory, for, despite the fact that one was primarily a novelist and the other a poet, as Anthony Burgess has observed, "Both men pursued the same end out of the same temperament;"

They were independently and one ahead of the other, on the same track ... and ... were led to a common view of art because of a common belief in the power of ordinary life to burst forth -- suddenly and miraculously -- with a revelation of truth.\(^67\)

While critical attention has not ignored this relationship, it has yet to consider it in any detail, and as we shall see, a comparison of the epiphany to the aesthetic notions of Hopkins provides a most effective means to demonstrate clearly what the Joycean epiphany is, and is not, intended to accomplish.

\(^67\)Anthony Burgess, Joysprick: An Introduction to the Language of James Joyce (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 1973), p. 91; and Here Comes Everybody: An Introduction to James Joyce for the Ordinary Reader (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1965), p. 120.
Several critics have commented on the resemblance between the aesthetic notions of Joyce and Hopkins, although with the exception of a few brief articles, notably Sister Marian Sharples's "Hopkins and Joyce: A Point of Similarity" (Renaissance, 19 [1967], 156-160), this relationship has yet to be examined in any detail, and among those critics who have commented, there is little agreement as to which aspects of Hopkins's aesthetic resemble which of Joyce's. For example, Noon and Tindall agree that Joyce's epiphany "is not unlike what the Scotist-minded Hopkins meant by his formally patterned 'inscapes' of individual being," while for Beja,

Epiphany is not the same as inscape, but can perhaps be roughly identified with the other essential aspect of Hopkins's aesthetics -- instress . . . [which is,] as [W.H.] Gardner claims, . . . "often the sensation of inscape -- a quasi-mystical illumination, a sudden perception of that deeper pattern, order and unity which gives meaning to external forms." If this definition is correct, then I believe we can associate instress with epiphany, which is not inscape but its manifestation, its revelation, its experience . . .

As Beja admits, his association of instress with epiphany depends, as do all such associations, upon the accuracy of a definition, and for this reason, if we are to determine with any degree of accuracy the extent of the similarities between the aesthetics of Hopkins and Joyce,

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1 Noon, p. 62. Tindall, after stating that "radiance is epiphany," maintains that "Stephen's radiance or showing forth is not unlike the 'inscape' of Gerard Manley Hopkins . . . " (The Literary Symbol, p. 242).

2 Beja, p. 44.
we must first define "inscape", "instress", and the verb "to selve", and discuss in some detail the metaphysical and epistemological ideas which underlie Hopkins's aesthetic. As in the case of the epiphany, while there is a general agreement among critics that these terms are vital to Hopkins's aesthetic and therefore to an understanding of his aims in his poetry, critical opinion is divided over their meanings, a result, no doubt, of the various contexts in which Hopkins employed them in his journals, notes and letters, which, when taken together, seem to imply more than a simple definition will allow.

The term "inscape" often appears in Hopkins's prose, though never in his poetry, and it is generally agreed that it is derived from such analogous compounds as "landscape" and "seascape". While we may be virtually certain that the coinage is Hopkins's own, it is also possible that it is a derivative of the obscure "inshape", which the O.E.D. defines as "internal form", and which, again according to the O.E.D., was employed as early as 1587 in Arthur Golding's translation of Philippe de Mornay's "A Woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian Religion."

While there were no contemporary editions of this work available to Hopkins, he may well have had occasion to read an earlier edition while an undergraduate, and the two following sentences cited by the O.E.D. are, when compared to Hopkins's use of "inscape", at least suggestive:

> Socrates...taught that God is a minde, and that in the same there is a certaine Inshape, which Inshape as in respect of God, is the knowledge which God hathe of himselfe,

and, "This marke is...of the very substance and inshape of Religion."

In an attempt to define "inscape", W.A.M. Peters has stated:

> Bearing in mind [the meaning of "scape" as "the
reflection made by a sensible object in our senses and on our mind. ... I infer that "in-scape" is the outward reflection of the inner nature of a thing, or a sensible copy or representation of its individual essence [in a work of art]; and thus I define inscape as the unified complex of those sensible qualities of an object that strike us as inseparably belonging to and most typical of that object, so that through the knowledge of this unified complex of sense-data we may gain an insight into the individual essence of the object.

In short, inscape is "a direct sensible manifestation of the entity that makes a thing one and individual." This view, which, as Beja has noted, seems to be the most widely accepted, is shared by both J. Hillis Miller, who calls inscape the "design or pattern which is the perceptible sign of the unique individuality of a thing ... the manifestation of an inner, organic unity," and goes on to agree with Peters that the term "can refer to the willed design of a human artifact as well as to the pattern into which natural objects fall without any human intervention," and Gardner, who defines inscape as "that 'individually-distinctive' form (made up of various sense-data) which constitutes the rich and revealing 'oneness' of the natural object." Yet Gardner also calls inscape "that deeper pattern, order, and unity which gives meaning to external forms," and thus raises

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4 Beja, p. 44.
an important question, for whereas his first definition indicates that
inscape is sensible form, the external reflection of inner form, his
second implies that inscape is instead, or perhaps also, the inner form
that determines external form. Austin Warren has suggested that inscape
"moves through some range of meaning: from sense-perceived pattern
to inner form," and Raymond V. Schoder supports this view, holding that,
depending on the context, inscape can signify either external or internal
form. Hopkins himself seems to offer support for both meanings, indica-
ing at one point that inscape is sensible form -- "as air, melody, is
what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so
design, pattern or what I am in the habit of calling 'inscape' is what
I above all aim at in poetry" -- and at another associating it with
inner essence -- "for in the world, besides natures or essences or 'inscapes'
... there is still something else -- fact or fate." Though it
could be argued that in the former instance he is speaking of inscape
in art and in the latter of inscape in nature, Hopkins does not seem to
have distinguished to any significant degree between the two, for he

7 Austin Warren, "Instress of Inscape," in Victorian Literature:

8 Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., "An Interpretive Glossary of Difficult
Words in the Poems," in Immortal Diamond: Studies in Gerard Manley Hopkins,
der points out that although the word "inscape" does "nor occur in the Poems,
"it is very common in the prose works, and both so bothersome and so frequent-
ly referred to that it seems well to indicate ... its meaning" (p. 216).

9 The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges, 2nd ed.,
p. 66. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be
included in the text.

10 The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed.,
All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included
in the text.
often speaks of the latter as design or pattern as well.

A possible explanation for this apparent ambiguity becomes clear if we consider Marjorie D. Coogan’s objection to Peters’s identification of inscape as “the unified complex of . . . sensible qualities” of an object. If, as Peters asserts, inscape is only a sensible manifestation of “the entity that makes a thing one and individual,” then what is perceived is only the “complex of sense-data,” a mere “reflection of the inner nature” of the object, and while that reflection does provide an “insight” into the essence of the thing, it does not provide a direct knowledge of that essence. But, as is clear from Hopkins’s journals, one can, in his view, have a direct knowledge of an object in its ultimate form as a concrete reality, which suggests that both the sensible and the intelligible qualities of the object—its external form (matter) and its inner essence (substantial form)—are perceived and known at once. It is for this reason that Coogan, arguing, as she assumes Hopkins to have done, from the Scotian view of the act of perception, accurately concludes that inscape must be a complex of both sensible and intelligible qualities.

Scotus describes a “first act” [of knowledge] in which the intelligence and the senses, simultaneously acting, grasp the immediate reality of the concrete, singular object. This first act is intuitive, neither intellectual only nor sensitive only, but both at once. Such a compound of what for the Scholastics are two distinct modes of epistemological relationship: the knowledge of the intellect, which being immaterial can know only form, and perception by the senses, which being material are aware only of the concrete—such a compound is made possible by Scotus’ defining the ultimate determination of the being, its haecceitas,
as proper neither to matter alone nor to form alone, but to both.\textsuperscript{11}

Coogan therefore associates inscape with \textit{haecceitas} and thus defines it as "the individualizing difference restricting the specific form of a being and finally determining its essential individuality," in short, "the objectively-existing individuality of an object."\textsuperscript{12}

Critics have expended much time and ink demonstrating that inscape is very different from the scholastic notion of \textit{quidditas}, that is, the essential nature or ultimate form of a being, composed, as we noted in our discussion of De Wulf's \textit{épiphénomène esthétique}, of substantial form together with matter, and have concluded, like Coogan, that inscape is much closer to Duns Scotus' \textit{haecceitas}, that is, the individuating principle which renders each entity distinct and unique. Miller asserts that

\begin{quote}
[Hopkins] had always felt that one knew in the act of perception not, \ldots the mere \textit{quidditas} of the object \ldots but its distinctive individuality \ldots In the Scotian doctrine of the \textit{haecceitas} or individualized form \ldots Hopkins found his own deepest apprehension of the world systematized.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Peters is more specific, stating that "inscape precisely covers what Scotus calls \textit{haecceitas} \ldots .."\textsuperscript{14} Yet, despite the critical support

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{11}Marjorie D. Coogan, "Inscape and Instress; Further Analogies with Scotus," \textit{PMLA}, 65 (1950), 70.
\textsuperscript{12}Coogan, pp. 65, 71.
\textsuperscript{13}Miller, 302-3.
\end{flushright}
this position, has received, inscape, though it is both sensible and intelligible, is simply not the same as haecceitas.

Strictly speaking, haecceitas is the individuating principle which determines the being of each entity; inscape, however, is not that which determines being, but rather, the pattern of being determined by the individuating principle. Moreover, as a principle of individuation, haecceitas is possessed by each being even before that being attains existence as a phenomenon in the world -- "Self...is prior to [a thing's] being" (Sermons, p. 146); it is therefore independent of phenomenal existence and is intrinsic and, more importantly, immutable. Inscape, on the other hand, is not immutable, for in his journal, Hopkins records that upon seeing an ashtree felled he "wished to die and not to see the inscapes of the world destroyed any more," and at another point he notes that snow restores to the trees he observes "the inscapes they had lost." If inscape were haecceitas, it could be neither "destroyed" nor "lost", nor could it be increased, and yet Hopkins notes that "motion multiplies inscape" (Journals, p. 199). Again, if inscape were haecceitas, every existent thing would have to have an inscape, and yet Hopkins frequently observes that some paintings are quite without inscape. This is not to say that Hopkins was not fascinated by distinctive individuality, but only that inscape is not the same thing. Indeed, in his Comments on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, Hopkins refers to his selfbeing, his distinctive individuality, as "stress of pitch," and later asks, "Is not this pitch or whatever we call it then the same as Scotus's ecceitas [sic]?"

15 The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Humphry House and completed by Graham Storey (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 230, 196. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will be included in the text.
(Sermons, pp. 123, 151); as Devlin points out in a note, Hopkins identifies 'inscape' with 'nature' as distinct from 'pitch' which is identified with haecceitas. This disposes of Fr. Peter's conclusion: 'Inscape precisely covers what Scotus calls haecceitas'" (Sermons, p. 293).

Nor is there any reason to expect inscape to be identical to haecceitas, as some critics, noting Hopkins's fondness for Scotus, seem to do, for, despite that fondness -- Scotus was, after all, for Hopkins, "of reality the rarest-veined unraveller" -- Hopkins did not derive from him the concept of inscape, which he had formulated prior to discovering Scotus. He quite simply found in Scotus a kindred spirit, someone who shared, and gave philosophical authority to, his fascination with individually distinctive being.

Having established that inscape is not haecceitas, let us examine the possibility that it might more nearly resemble quidditas or whatness. Again, Hopkins associates inscape with "natures or essences", and these terms are simply synonyms for quidditas. Furthermore, we must consider that inscape is associated by Hopkins with a thing's being, its real existence in the phenomenal world. In his essay on Parmenides, Hopkins writes:

... the phenomenal world ... is the brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle/ of two principles

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17 Hopkins first refers to inscape in his essay on Parmenides (1868), and it is not until 1872 that he writes, "After the examinations we went for our holiday out to Douglas in the Isle of Man Aug. 3. At this time I had first begun to get hold of the copy of Scotus on the Sentences [of Peter Lombard] in the Baddeley Library and was flush with a new stroke of enthusiasm" (Journals, p. 221).
which meet in the scape of everything -- Being . . .
and Not-Being . . . . The two may be called degrees
of siding in the scale of Being . . . . The inscape
[of a thing] will be the proportion of the mixture.

(Journals, p. 130)

Thus, inscape is the degree to which a thing possesses being, the
perceptible and knowable pattern or form of that thing's existence as
a phenomenon in the here and now. Without inscape, a thing will have,
or appear to have no being, for it will lack integrity; it will be
incomplete. Now whereas haecceitas determines but is independent of
being, quidditas, in Hopkins's view, being form and matter together and
therefore both sensible and intelligible, is that which renders a thing
existent and apprehensible by us; as he insists, "a bare self (or haecceitas),
to which no nature (or quidditas) has yet been added, which is not
clothed in or overlaid with a nature, is indeed nothing, a zero, in the
score or account of existence . . . "(Sermons, p. 146). Inscape is that
nature or essence or quidditas, a thing's being as a being.

This should not be taken to mean that inscape "precisely covers"
what Aquinas calls quidditas, for, as we observed of Joyce's "whatness",
whereas Aquinas and the Scholastics in general regard quidditas as some-
thing distinct from mere existence, and therefore immutable, Hopkins's
"natures or essences" are actuated, existential beings, subject to the
flux he acknowledges in "Spring and Fall", "That Nature is a Heraclitean
Fire", and "The Leaden Echo and The Golden Echo". Inscape, like Joyce's
quidditas, denotes the existential form of an entity, the pattern or form
of a thing's being as an object in the world of existence, the "Ding hva
in'itself id [really] est." While both Hopkins and Joyce mean something
very like quidditas, neither conception of the idea conforms precisely
to what the scholastic term is meant to designate, nor is this surprising,
for each of them was more concerned with coming to a personal understanding of the ontological metaphysics which necessarily underlie a theory of aesthetic apprehension than in mastering the subtleties of scholastic philosophy.

Inscape, then, is here defined as that intrinsic complex of distinct sensible and intelligible qualities which constitutes the essential design, pattern, or form of every individually existent being -- including the work of art, which can both possess and represent an inscape -- and which functions as a principle of order, symmetry, and unity -- "All the world is full of inscape and chance ["the intrinsic possibility which things have" (Sermons, p. 123)] left free to act falls into an order as well as purpose . . ." (Journals, p. 23) -- to provide each being with the wholeness and harmony of part to part required for independent existence. Given this definition, it is clear that inscape and epiphany are not interchangeable terms, for while inscape corresponds to what Joyce calls whatness, epiphany denotes the moment or experience of apprehending that whatness. However, Hopkins also employed "inscape" as a verb, and here, as we shall see, there is a certain correspondence between inscape and epiphany.

Peters states, "The verb to inscape means to catch the inscape of an object...", and offers the following passage as evidence to support his definition: 18

Sham fight on the Common, 7000 men, chiefly volunteers. Went up in the morning to get an impression but it was too soon, however got this -- caught that inscape in the horse that you see in the pediment especially and other bas reliefs of the Parthenon and even which

18 Peters, pp. 4-5.
Sophocles had felt and expresses in two choruses of the *Oedipus Coloneus*, running on the likeness of a horse to a breaker, a wave of sea curling over. I looked at the groin or the flank and saw how the set of the hair symmetrically flowed outwards from it to all parts of the body, so that, following what one may *inscape* the whole beast very simply.

*(Journals*, pp. 241-42; my italics)

*Inscape*, then, may signify not only the pattern of a thing's being, but also the act of perceiving that pattern, and Hopkins's use of the phrase "caught that inscape" suggests that the word "caught" in the first line of "The Windhover" -- "I caught this morning morning's minion" (*Poems*, p. 69) -- may be glossed as "inscaped" or "perceived the pattern of being" in and of the Falcon.

Peters cites another passage to support this reading of *inscape*, which, while it does lend credence to the above definition, suggests another meaning as well:

... before I had always taken the sunset and the sun as quite out of gauge with each other, as indeed physically they are, for the eye after looking at the sun is blunted to everything else and if you look at the sunset you must cover the sun, but today I *inscaped* them together and *made* the sun the true eye and ace of the whole, as it is.

*(Journals*, p. 196; my italics)

Here, *inscape* may mean either to perceive, or "catch", the inscapes of both the sun and the sunset at once, or, given the emphasis on *made* to make one inscape of two, that is, to create by an act of will one unified pattern from what are normally perceived as being two distinct

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19 Peters, p. 5.
inscapes. The implication of the opposition between the phrases "as indeed physically they are" and "as it is" is that due to our imperfect senses, the true inscapes of the world cannot always be perceived, and that this problem can be overcome only through an act of creative vision deliberately achieved through intense contemplation, which allows the observer to transcend the limitations of sensory perception.

Finally, R.K.R. Thornton has observed that in addition to meaning "to grasp the pattern of", inscape can also mean "to show the pattern of", as when the artist reproduces an inscape in a work of art. Thus, as a verb, inscape may be defined in three related ways: primarily, it means to perceive the pattern of a thing's being, and secondarily, to show that pattern by reproducing it in a work of art, and, to create an entirely new complex of sensible and intelligible qualities.

In *Stephen Hero*, Stephen twice uses the verb form of *epiphany*, *epiphane*, once as a transitive, and once as an intransitive verb. As a transitive verb, *epiphane* means to perceive the whatness of:

> Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment the focus is reached the object is epiphaneised.

(*Stephen Hero*, p. 217)

In this sense, *epiphane* corresponds exactly with the primary meaning of *inscape*; there is virtually no difference between the two words. As an intransitive verb, the word is used by Stephen to denote the revelation,

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21 As critics have used the word, *epiphane* often corresponds with the second meaning of *inscape*, to show an essence by reproducing it in a work of art, but Joyce himself never used the word in this way.
or yielding up, by the object of its essence to the perceiver:

Having finished his argument Stephen walked on in silence. He felt Cranly's hostility and he accused himself of having cheapened the eternal images of beauty. For the first time, too, he felt slightly awkward in his friend's company and to restore a mood of flippant familiarity he glanced up at the clock of the Ballast Office and smiled.

- It has not epiphonised yet, he said.

(Stephen/ Hero, p. 213)

In this instance, the usage is both metaphoric and slightly ironic, metaphoric because, for Joyce, inanimate objects are actively involved in the aesthetic process, and ironic because Stephen's intent here is to "restore a mood of flippant familiarity." It should not be inferred, however, that Joyce does not take seriously this meaning of epiphonise, for the word is metaphoric only when it is applied to objects, and it must be borne in mind here that epiphany refers to the perception of beauty only by an extension of its primary meaning. If the radiant essence of a being is unified and harmonious, the sudden apprehension of that essence will be an aesthetic experience. But Stephen's definition of epiphany as "as sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself" clearly indicates that unlike objects, human beings can, through some seemingly trivial act, reveal the essence of their being, or epiphonise. In this sense, epiphonise comes very close to what Hopkins means by the verb to selve.

We have already noted that, for Hopkins, "a bare self, to which no nature has been added, which is not yet clothed in or overlaid with a nature, is indeed nothing, a zero, in the score or account of existence" (Sermons, p. 146). Far from being a given, self is something that must
be attained; self must ultimately become itself: "self or personality then truly comes into being with the accession of nature" (Sermons, p. 151). This "coming into being", which is "the whole function" of every entity (Sermons, p. 151), is "selving", and to achieve this selving, to fulfill that function, each being must assert its individual nature by doing or being that which it is. Thus, for Hopkins, as Miller points out, "Selfhood is not a static possession, but an activity . . . " and selving is, as Paul Mariani accurately defines it, "the concomitant action of existence and of individualizing a predetermined nature." In this assertion of self, each thing reveals its essential nature, its quidditas or inscape, and, in short, epiphanises:

"Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves -- goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

"As kingfishers . . . ;" (Poems, p. 90)

This is not to say that selving is the same as epiphanising; indeed, the revelation of essence is only an effect of selving. In becoming itself, each thing becomes that which God intends it to be -- "Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is" (Poems, p. 90) -- and thus gives glory to the Creator. Whereas for Joyce a person may or may not epiphanise, Hopkin's view is that each thing must selve, since that is its purpose -- "for that I came." More importantly, while epiphanising requires the active participation of an observer, selving is achieved independently by non-human

22 Miller, 296.
beings through the simple fact of their existence (since they can do nothing but what they are), and by man through the conscious assertion of his free will. For Hopkins, then, selving has the quality of a moral choice. As Miller explains:

if man can mean to give God glory, he can, necessarily, mean not to give him glory. His complete fulfillment of his nature, the selving for which he came, is radically contingent. If the full accomplishment of his being puts him "beyond all visible creatures", so also he can, because of his free will and its accompanying self-consciousness utterly fail to be, in a way no other of God's creatures can. 24

Thus, while selving involves epiphanising, epiphanising does not necessarily entail selving, and the two terms cannot be used interchangeably.

As we observed earlier in this chapter, Beja identifies epiphany not with inscape, but with the intimately associated concept of instress. As defined by Hopkins's usage, critics agree, instress has two specific meanings as a noun, which, as Peters points out, can be distinguished as cause and effect.

As a cause, instress is that intrinsic "force which keeps a thing in existence," "the energy of being by which [as Hopkins states it] 'all things are upheld'," 25 and which is an extension of God's creative and sustaining power. Thus, if inscape is the pattern of a thing's being, instress is the inner "stress" or pressure, that which in his spiritual writings Hopkins calls "stress of pitch", which shapes that pattern;

24 Miller, 296-97.
25 Peters, pp. 13-14. To this definition Gardner adds, "that natural (but ultimately supernatural) stress which determines an inscape and keeps it in being" (Poems and Prose, p. xx).
it is, as Miller observes, "the true source of inscape."\textsuperscript{26} It is as a direct result of instress, then, that each inscape is distinctively individual. Coogan is incorrect, (due to her insistence that inscape is \textit{haecceitas}) when she states that instress is "a principle of pressure existing in the inscape by virtue of its distinctiveness,"\textsuperscript{27} instead, instress is the principle of pressure which \textit{causes} each inscape to be distinctive, as Hopkins makes clear in his \textit{Journal} when he asks, "And what is this running instress, . . . which unmistakeably distinguishes and individualises things?" (p. 215). It is instress and not inscape, then, which is the principle of individuation, the \textit{haecceitas} of Scotus: "Is not this pitch or whatever we call it then the same as Scotus' \textit{ecceitas}?" (\textit{Sermons}, p. 151).

However, Hopkins uses \textit{instress} to denote not merely the cause of inscape, but also the result of intense contemplation of that inscape, and it is this second meaning of the word which corresponds to Joyce's epiphany. As Peters explains, "in the act of perception the inscape is known first and in this grasp of the inscape is felt the stress of being behind."\textsuperscript{28} This stress, or energy of being, the thing's instress, will, as Hopkins puts it, "flame out, like shining from shook foil" (\textit{Poems}, p. 66), and the very being of the object will appear as radiant. The perception of this radiance, the result of inscaping the object, is instress, "the specifically individual impression the object makes on man," or, as Gardner defines it, "the \textit{sensation} of inscape -- a quasi-mystical

\textsuperscript{26}Miller, 301. Cf. Thornton, p. 21: "The pattern of a thing was its' inscape, so that the force which made the pattern was its 'instress'.'

\textsuperscript{27}Coogan, 71; my italics.

\textsuperscript{28}Peters, p. 14.
illumination, a sudden perception ...", in short, an epiphany, "a sudden spiritual manifestation." Thus, while the verb inscape denotes the act of perceiving the wholeness of a thing, instress, like epiphany, denotes the result of that perception; for both Hopkins and Joyce, intense contemplation leads to a moment in which the whole being of an object is "luminously apprehended" and the observer sees that it is "that thing which it is."

For both men too, this moment is profoundly affective, producing what Stephen terms "the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, ... the enchantment of the heart." As Miller observes of Hopkins, their ... grasp of the external world in the dynamic moment of instress [or epiphany] is as much emotional as intellectual. It is a total possession of the object [and hence, according to Joyce's definition, the moment is "static"] by the thinking, feeling, sensing subject. The object is internalized [instressed or epiphanised] by the subject. Hence, Hopkins speaks repeatedly of instress as something deeply felt, not merely intellectually realized. ...  

Of course, when we come to the instress or epiphany of natural objects, there is an important difference between the two concepts, for what Hopkins ultimately knows in a moment of instress is the omnipotence and omnipresence of God, for "The world is charged with the grandeur of God" (Poems, p. 66), charged with His spiritual energy or instress. In apprehending the essential being of whatever is perceived, Hopkins apprehends Christ, who is in and part of every creature, "for Christ plays in ten thousand places, / Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not

29 Peters, p. 15; Gardner, Poems and Prose, p. xxi.
30 Miller, 304-5.
his/ To the Father . . . " (Poems, p. 90), and it is from this particular apprehension that much of his joy is derived. For Hopkins, as Gardner observes, there are two kinds of beauty, "immortal beauty", the spiritual beauty of God's power and love which is to be found in the instress of everything in nature, and "mortal beauty", which is purely aesthetic beauty.31 For Joyce, however, there is only "mortal" beauty, and the epiphany of a natural object has no explicit theological implications.

Despite this difference, however, the joy occasioned by both an instress and an epiphany is, to a great extent, a consequence of an intimate relationship between subject and object, whether the object be natural or a work of art. Like the epiphany, the moment of instress is neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective, but consists in a relation, a momentary closure of the gap between subject and object.

To return to Miller,

In the moment of perception a "stem of stress" [Hopkins's phrase] is created between subject and object to which the subject contributes as much as does the object . . . [for only] if the beholder is able to return stress for stress will the moment of knowledge, the moment of coalescence of subject and object take place.32

It is through these crucial moments of union that both Hopkins and Joyce are able to affirm the "ineluctable modality of the visible" (Ulysses, p. 37), the real existence of the objective world, and at the same time draw close to that world, avoiding the snare of sterile solipsism with which Stephen must cope in A Portrait and Ulysses, solipsism which would,

32 Miller, 304.
as Joyce recognized, prevent the artist from reading the "signatures of all things" (Ulysses, p. 37), and, ultimately, from affirming life with the same "Yes" that concludes Ulysses. As Hopkins writes,

I have often felt when I am in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is. (Journals, p. 127)

But, he goes on, such affirmations are impossible without the "stem of stress between us and things to bear us out and carry the mind over . . ."); without this sense of union,

we might not and could not say / Blood is red /
but only / This blood is red / or / The last blood
I saw was red / nor even that, for in later language,
not only universals would not be true but the copula would break down even in particular judgements. (Journals, p. 127)

In short, we could never say, "It is." In this sense, both instress and epiphany are at the same time the culmination of the process of aesthetic apprehension and the starting point for the process of artistic creation, the moments of "artistic conception" which precede "artistic reproduction", for it is in these moments that the artist comes to understand and assimilate his material.

Having considered each component of Hopkins's aesthetic in relation to the concept of epiphany, we can now delineate precisely the correspondences that exist between the two aesthetic theories.

In "On the Origin of Beauty," Hopkins insists that for beauty to exist, "there is a relation between the parts of the thing to each other and again of the parts to the whole, which must be duly kept" and that this relation is one of unity and harmony (Journals, p. 97). As we
have already seen, the principle of unity and harmony in an object is its inscape, that which Hopkins calls "the very soul of art" ([Correspondence, p. 135]), and "the essential and only lasting thing" in art. Similarly, for Joyce, beauty consists in "wholeness and symmetry", a "harmonious" and "exquisite" "relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part of parts or of any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part" ([Portrait, p. 206]), which unity and harmony is provided for by the integritas, or "wholeness" -- the thing apprehended as "selfbounded and selfcontented", -- and consonantia, or harmony -- the thing apprehended as "complex, multiple, divisible, separable, made up of its parts, the result of its parts and their sum, harmonious" ([Portrait, p. 212]) -- inherent in the quidditas of a beautiful object. Thus, the term inscape corresponds precisely to what Joyce calls integritas, consonantia, and quidditas. Joyce's next phase is the apprehension of claritas, the very being of the object, its quidditas apprehended as radiant, and this Hopkins calls the "flaming out" of the instress of the object.

Finally, for both men, once these qualities have been discovered through intense contemplation, through "groping" for "an exact focus", the beholder sees the thing for what it is, knows it immediately and entirely, and is united with it in a moment of instress or epiphany. At this moment, "the subtle soul of the image" (of the object as internalized, epiphanised, or instressed) has been "disentangled" "from its mesh of defining circumstances most exactly", and the artist is prepared to "re-embody it in artistic circumstances" so that the reader can, in turn, experience his own "sudden spiritual" moment. For both Hopkins and

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Joyce then the artistic temper is what Stephen calls the "classical temper", which seeks to "pierce to the significant heart of everything", to "bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them that the quick intelligence may go beyond them [beyond the simple fact of their existence] to their meaning [their whatness] which is still unuttered" (Stephen Hero, p. 78). Whatever name one ascribes to the moment, epiphany or instress, it is here that the "twin faculties" of the artist, the selective and the reproductive, meet.

We noted earlier that the possibility that Hopkins's aesthetic of inscape and instress in any way influenced the epiphanic aesthetic is, at best, remote, and yet the close relationship between the two is not to be dismissed as mere coincidence, for the sensibility and intellectual temperament underlying each is predominantly Catholic, and it is largely in the tradition of Catholic thought that these aesthetic theories find their common ground. As we have seen, both theories are firmly rooted in scholastic natural theology, the foundation of Catholic philosophical thought. But the influence of Catholicism was more than intellectual, for it instilled in Hopkins and Joyce a special way of seeing the world, a sacramental perspective.

Of Hopkins's Catholicism there can, for course, be no doubt, for even prior to his conversion, he was a High Church Anglican, or Anglo-Catholic; and, as for Joyce, despite whatever animosities he may have felt for the Church, its profound impact on him is beyond question. Mary Colum has said, "I have never known anyone with a mind so fundamentally Catholic in structure as Joyce's own or one on whom the Church, its ceremonies, symbols, and theological declarations had made such an impress." As Geddes MacGregor has observed,

No apostate was ever more irrevocably captivated by the Church from which the apostasy took place. Catholicism was so embedded in his mind that he could never wholly escape the pattern.  

If we are to describe the aesthetic theories of Hopkins and Joyce as Catholic, we must first establish the difference between a Catholic and a Protestant, or more properly, an evangelical Protestant aesthetic.

As the Church's "embassy of nimble pleaders" tells Stephen: "The Puritan, the Calvinist, the Lutheran were inimical to art and to exuberant beauty; the Catholic was the friend of him who professed to interpret or divulge the beautiful" (Stephen Hero, p. 205). This is not to say that Catholicism encourages an attitude of "Art for Art's sake", for, as in the Portrait and its prototype, the Church's representatives are quick to warn of the spiritual dangers inherent in such a view (hence Hopkins's misgivings about the value of "mortal beauty"); nevertheless, the Church has always encouraged the production and appreciation of the beautiful, surrounding its followers from an early age with both iconographic and decorative art and the notion of "Art for Art's sake" did arise in a largely Catholic milieu. Catholicism then is more conducive to the formulation of an aesthetic view that concerns itself with beauty, "the splendour of truth", and "the holy spirit of joy" (Critical Writings, p. 83).

35Geddes MacGrigor, "Artistic Theory in James Joyce," in Connolly, p. 224. In the Portrait, Cranly makes the same observation about Stephen: "It is a curious thing, do you know, ... how your mind is supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve" (Portrait, p. 240).

36Catholic here denotes those churches which emphasize the spiritual value of sacraments and ritual - the Roman Catholic, The Orthodox, and the High Anglican (Anglo-Catholic) churches - while Protestant denotes any Christian Church which does not recognize sacraments as a means of attaining salvation.
than is, the more "antique" Protestant view that art must "instruct, elevate, and amuse" (Critical Writings, p. 43).

Furthermore, whereas the Protestant view is that faith is a gift from God, meted out to certain select individuals according to God's will, Catholicism, as we have noted before, encourages the faithful to actively seek faith and understanding through a process of intense contemplation. Accordingly, a Protestant aesthetic is one in which inspiration and revelation are viewed, as Wordsworth puts it, as "a leading from above," while a Catholic aesthetic emphasizes the revelation of truth as a reward for active seeking on the part of the beholder, and it is precisely this view that characterizes the aesthetics of Hopkins and Joyce.

But where Catholicism differs most from Protestantism, and what so fundamentally affected the aesthetic view of Hopkins and Joyce, is the Catholic emphasis on the sacraments and their accompanying rituals. A sacrament is a visible sign of God's love and omnipresence through which one may achieve a state of grace characterized by a sense of joy and harmony between the self and all that is not the self; the sacramental process is one of affirmation, reconciliation, and bonding. For Hopkins, all of nature was a visible sign through which, when the sign had been apprehended through the process of instress, he drew near to God and all that He created; as he wrote of a brass bell, "I know the beauty of Our Lord by it" (Journals, p. 199). For Joyce, the world was filled with signs, not of God, but of beauty and truth, and of the significance of even the most apparently trivial (as Ulysses makes abundantly clear), and these signs could be apprehended in sacramental moments of epiphany. His view of the world was, as he wrote in Finnegans Wake, "panepiphanal". In both these aesthetics then, the selective faculty approaches the world
in a way that is sacramental and characteristically Catholic; the importance of the sacramental temper is, however, not limited to the selective faculty, for it explains as well Hopkins's and Joyce's views of the function of the artist and dictates the nature of their reproductive faculties. Both men sought not only to apprehend, but, to create visible signs by transmuting their experience into sacraments of life.

For Hopkins, "matter and meaning is essential" to poetry, "but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake." Thus, he required of the reader the same intensity of vision with which the poet had selected his material: "the inscape must be dwelt on" (Journals, p. 289). His use of peculiar, compressed diction and syntax, and his fondness for sound patterning and rhythm stem from his desire to create intricate and highly individual new inscakes which, once contemplated and apprehended, could lead the reader to a moment of instress in which, given the "matter and meaning" with which each of his shapes is supported, he could experience a sacramental sense of union with the poem and the poet, and with the world of inscakes and its creator. Creating out of his epiphanic experience of the world, Hopkins constructed poems which correspond precisely to St. Augustine's definition of a sacrament: "they bear a similitude to those things of which they are Sacraments; they are celebrations commemorating an event in such a way that what is signified is perceived." 37 What Hopkins's sacraments commemorate is God's all-pervasive beauty and his own experience of that beauty; they are dedicated "to the Greater.

Glory of God.

Joyce's epiphanic aesthetic functions for him in very much the same way, and though, of course, his primary aim is aesthetic and not religious, his method is based on the sacramental process, as he repeatedly makes clear in his early essays and in the Portrait. As Van Ghent has pointed out, Joyce's is "essentially a religious interpretation of the nature of reality and of the artist's function." 38

Joyce's brother recalls that Joyce once asked him,

"Don't you think, . . . . there is a certain resemblance between the mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to do? I mean that I am trying in my [art] to give people some kind of intellectual pleasure or spiritual enjoyment by converting the bread of everyday life into something that has a permanent artistic life of its own . . . for their mental, moral, and spiritual uplift. . . ." 39

And in the Portrait, Stephen sees himself as "a priest of eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life" (Portrait, p. 221). Here we find the epiphanic process restated in terms of the sacrament of the Eucharist, and for good reason. For Joyce, the highest form of art was the dramatic form, wherein "life is purified in and reprojected from the human imagination," and the process by which this is achieved, the epiphanic process, he calls the "mystery of esthetic" (Portrait, p. 215), recalling the phrase "the mystery of . . . .

38 Van Ghent, p. 72. Unfortunately, Van Ghent does not elaborate on this point; Florence Walzl has noted that Joyce "believed the artist's creative act was analogous to the eucharistic change effected by the priest" and stated that this view "had its probable origin in the Mass" (437), and Levin observes that the "reader of Joyce is continually reminded of the analogy between the role of the artist and the priestly office" (p. 28).

39 Stanislaus Joyce, My Brother's Keeper, pp. 103-4.
the Mass."

As Joyce would have been aware, the words "mystery" and "sacrament" are essentially synonymous. The artist then produces works of art which, like religious sacraments, are not epiphanies in themselves, but which can, in a moment of epiphany, "arrest" the participant (the reader), and, as Joyce insists art must, unite him with the human condition (Critical Writings, p. 144); Joyce's aesthetic sacraments commemorate and stand as visible manifestations of "the everlasting hopes, desires and hates of us" (Critical Writings, p. 410), affirming life as the Eucharist affirms Christ's love.

In the Portrait, Joyce emphasizes the sacramental nature of his aesthetic by verbally linking the scene in which Stephen ponders a call to the priesthood with the final, exultant lines of the novel, and by similarly linking Stephen's view of himself as an artist before his epiphany on the beach to that of himself afterward.

Prior to Stephen's epiphany, as we are told that "In vague sacrificial or sacramental acts alone his will seemed drawn to go forth to encounter reality . . .," but that his "destiny was to be elusive of social or religious orders" (Portrait, pp. 159, 162; my italics). Afterwards, on the beach, he hears his name called, "the name of the fabulous artificer," and sees himself as "the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being" (p. 169), and here we find the "mystery of esthetic", described in purely secular terms. Then, "alone . . . unheeded, happy and near to the wild . . ."

40 Quinn, p. 806: "The word 'sacrament' is . . . the English equivalent of the Latin sacramentum, which, in turn, is one of the ways in which the Greek word for 'mystery' was rendered . . ., [and] its religious use is paralle.
heart of life," Stephen perceives the "gayclad lightclad figures of children and girls." As he focuses his "spiritual eye" on one of the figures, his mind takes in the simple image of a girl, which his imagination then transmutes "into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird:

Her long-sheen bare legs were delicate as a crane's and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller and soft-hued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips, where the white fringes of her drawers were kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind her. Her bosom was as a bird's soft and slight, slight and soft as the breast of some darkplumaged dove. (Portrait, p. 171)

Through this imaginative transformation is revealed her quidditas, "the wonder of mortal beauty;" "Her image had passed into his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy" and Stephen is moved "to recreate life out of life" (p. 172). Here, in describing the effect of the experience upon Stephen, Joyce uses religious diction for the first time since before the epiphany.

Later, in the aesthetic discussion in which Stephen comes to an intellectual understanding of what he has learned intuitively through his epiphany, he describes just such a moment of "holy silence" as an instant of "luminous silent stasis", "wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended . . ." and when he concludes, "The esthetic image in the dramatic form is life purified in and reprojected from the human imagination," the reader is reminded, as Stephen is reminded at an unconscious level, of his "reprojection" of the girl on the beach as a seabird. That Stephen is here recalling his epiphany and feeling its immense effect on him is clearly
indicated by the fact that, as the scene closes, his arrogant aloofness softens, and he perceives his "beloved" in much the same way he had perceived the bird-girl: "And if he judged her harshly? If her life were a simple rosary of hours, her life simple and strange as a bird's life, gay in the morning, restless all day, tired at sundown? Her heart simple and wilful as a bird's heart?" (p. 216). It is this recollection of what he regards to be a "holy" experience that alters Stephen's view of the esthetic process, and it becomes the "mystery of esthetic", a "sacramental act" through which he might encounter reality.

The next morning, he awakes to "an enchantment of the heart", and in this epiphanic moment his beloved's "strange wilful heart" is reprojected as "rose and ardent light"; she becomes the "lure of the fallen seraphim," the material out of which Stephen begins to create a villanelle. Creation becomes a sacramental act, and Stephen's feeling before his epiphany on the beach that he "would never swing the thurible before the tabernacle as a priest" (p. 162) is transformed into an image of the earth as a "swinging swaying censer, a ball of incense" (p. 218) which he wields in his poem to commemorate the object of his inspiration. In his aesthetic experience, Stephen's new view of the artistic process transforms his view of himself, and "the artist forging . . . out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being" is now described in sacramental terms, becoming a priest of

In Stephen Hero, the "trivial incident" which leads Stephen to explain epiphany also "set him composing some ardent verses which he entitled a "Villanelle of the Temptress" (p. 211); that Joyce should refer to the subject of the villanelle in A Portrait as "the temptress of Stephen's villanelle" (p. 223) suggests that, together with the aesthetic discussion, this section is a revised version of the less dramatic explanation of epiphany in Stephen Hero.
eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into
the radiant body of everliving life" (p. 221). He has discovered the
new terminology he required to explain the process of "artistic reproduc-
tion".

This new perception of the artist's sacramental function is, for
Stephen, a "memorable phase of the mind" which sparks another epiphany
in which he apprehends the "radiant image of the eucharist," and Joyce's
choice of words here is intended to remind us yet again that the process
of aesthetic perception culminates in the apprehension of "the clear
radiance of the esthetic image." That the creative process stems from
this apprehension is reinforced by the fact that this "radiant image",
"united" by the imagination with "his bitter and despairing thoughts,"
immediately provides Stephen with the final two tercets of his villanelle.
But it is not until he allows this epiphany to draw him away from his
bitter thoughts into a eucharistic moment of sympathetic union with "the
temptress of his villanelle" that he is able to complete the poem. As
he does so, his heart is filled with "a tender compassion", and, "like
a cloud of vapour or like waters circumfluent in space the liquid letters
of speech, symbols of the element of mystery, flowed forth over his brain"
(p. 223), and he is able to write the last two lines. Again we find the
word "mystery" employed as image is transmuted into art, and to emphasize
the relation between this eucharistic transformation and Stephen's percep-
tion of himself as priest, Joyce adds the word "element", which, in context
with "mystery", signifies the bread and wine which the priest transmutes
into Christ's body and blood. 42

42 Cf. "A Portrait of the Artist" (the brief essay which served as the
first draft of Stephen Hero and the Portrait): "he bent upon his handiwork,
bringing together the mysterious elements ... "(Portrait [Viking Critical
Thus, just as the retreat Stephen undergoes earlier in the novel leads him to embrace for a time the Catholic religion, his epiphany on the beach, its explication in the aesthetic discussion, and the resulting epiphany of the "temptress" and the creative act it prompts lead him to understand and accept his vocation as an artist. After the religious experience, Stephen is moved to receive the Sacraments; after his aesthetic experiences, he is moved to create them. As the novel concludes, Stephen, having learned how, goes forth "to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience" in "sacramental acts" which, when he is ready (for his is as yet a novitiate), will allow him to create "the uncreated conscience" of his race.
Conclusion

In this thesis, we have seen that Joyce's concept of epiphany is central to his understanding of the process of aesthetic apprehension and creation and of his function as an artist, and that properly understood, the concept provides insight into what Joyce's art is intended to accomplish.

On one level, the concept, as we have seen in our discussion of the Portrait, served Joyce as a structural device through which a character, his growing awareness of himself or his surroundings, an environment, or a condition could be dramatically rendered. On another level, the operation of the epiphanic aesthetic process allowed Joyce to transmute as much of his experience as he chose -- and a vast majority of his material is drawn from this source -- into aesthetic sacraments, works of art in which the reader is forced to encounter the reality of experience, in which life is recreated out of life. Because of his view that any image or impression "re-embodied" or reprojected in carefully selected dramatic contexts could provide a moment of insight and sympathetic union between the reader and the artist, his art, and his materials, no portion of the "daily bread of experience" was too insignificant to become an element in a commémoration of "the everlasting hopes, desires and hates of us," as is evident in Ulysses.

In the Portrait, Joyce dramatically renders the implications of epiphany for the artist; in Ulysses he extends those implications from the aesthetic to the ethical realm, for there Stephen comes to understand that "in sacramental moments of epiphany he can unite spiritually not only with the objective world, but more importantly, with the selves that
populate that world. In Bloom's kitchen, Stephen accepts Bloom's hospitality "seriously as they [drink] in jocose serious silence Epps's massproduct, the creature cocoa" (*Ulysses*, p. 677); they share in the product of the Mass, the eucharist, and in that communion, they are united, at one. They become "Stoom" and "Blephen" (p. 682) sitting in sacramental silence, "each contemning the other in both mirrors of the reciprocal flesh of their his nothis fellowfaces" (p. 703).

Epiphany then provides not only a means for the artist to create, but also a way of interacting with humanity.

The function of the epiphany is to unite man with humanity, to reconcile him with life, just as it allowed Joyce to reconcile his religious and artistic selves. In the brief essay, "A Portrait of the Artist", Joyce wrote of the character who would become Stephen,

... little by little he began to be conscious of the beauty of mortal conditions. He remembered a sentence in Augustine -- "It was manifested unto me that those things are good which yet are corrupted; which neither if they were supremely good, nor unless they were good could be corrupted: for had they been supremely good they would have been incorruptible but if they were not good there would be nothing in them which could be corrupted." A philosophy of reconciliation...

("A Portrait of the Artist" in *Portrait*, p. 263)

As all of his works make clear, so was it also manifested unto Joyce, and this is the philosophic view underlying the epiphanic aesthetic. The purpose of Joyce's art is reconciliation:

... to reunite the children of the spirit, jealous and long-divided, to reunite them against fraud and principality. A thousand eternities were
to be reaffirmed, divine knowledge was to be restored.

(in Portrait, p. 261)

It is precisely this reconciliation and reaffirmation for which the epiphany provides.
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