THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN PSYCHOANALYSIS:
THE VIEW OF ROY SCHAER

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A Thesis
in
The Faculty
of
Arts and Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montréal, Québec, Canada

February 1984
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ABSTRACT

THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
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This thesis attempts to clarify and assess the linguistic turn in psychoanalysis, as reflected in Roy Schafer's program to establish a new language for psychoanalysis, leveled at supplanting Freud's metapsychology.

Chapter 1 places Schafer's action language within the context of the external and internal critique of Freudian metapsychology, and isolates the critical problem issuing from this metapsychology, to which Schafer advances his 'new' language as a solution.

Chapter 2 sets Schafer's 'new' language against what he takes as the 'old' language of psychoanalysis. Here, attention is drawn to the logical and semantic features of both Schafer's action language and Freud's metapsychological language.

Chapter 3 exhibits the foundation on which Schafer makes his linguistic turn, elucidating the three-tiered strategy which underpins his crucial claim that his own action language comprises an adequate alternative to Freudian metapsychology.

Chapters 4 and 5 offer an assessment of the three-tiered strategy, deployed by Schafer, in his essay at executing the linguistic turn in psychoanalysis.
A paradox is a flag which declares a discovery - not a new continent nor a cure for pneumonia but a discovery in the familiar - but often it is also the Blue Peter of a new voyage. For often we don't properly understand a paradox until, beginning by regarding it literally, we have noted objections to it and held to it because of the reasons for it, and again noted objections and again held to it, and have come by this route to a state where we are no longer driven to assert it or to deny it. There's no short cut to this; for if before treating a paradox and its denial as incompatible and arguing for a win we say 'No doubt there's much in both' this leaves us entirely vague as to what is in either. No - the journey to the new freedom is mostly long and arduous, the work of bringing to light and setting in order with respect to one another what drives us to accept, and what forces us to deny, a paradox, what makes it so fascinating, so attractive and so repugnant, may fairly take a long time.

John Wisdom
(Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p. 178)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the following persons, who read the manuscript (each in view of his area of expertise) and helped me avoid errors of fact and perspective.

Stanley G. French, the adviser responsible for my major area of study, viz. philosophy.

John Drysdale, an adviser responsible for one of my minor areas of study, viz. critical theory.

The late Douglas Levin, an adviser responsible for the other of my minor areas of study, viz. psychoanalysis.

The insights and suggestions of my advisers have made the thesis better. Needless to say, none of them is to be held in any way responsible for any of the inadequacies or errors that may appear in this thesis.

My deep appreciation goes to Cheryl Grant, who guided the manuscript through numerous revisions, assisting in its editing and assuming full responsibility for its typing.
DEDICATION

For Douglas Levin
(1921-1984)

LAST VOYAGE.

From this shore, he set his dreams to sea in a passing ship, his ignorance their only ballast against the waves. On that other shore, his dreams were freed to skirt the cliffs and plow the brown crust of earth into fields, gardens, lush with the greens of silence.

Grell V. Grant
And for Cheryl,
who is the center of my life's compass,
the keel of my still precarious dream,
the persistent star, forever, illuminating
my earth.
ABBREVIATIONS.


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem

Psychoanalysis has been prone to challenges from the outside; in particular, from philosophy. Here this challenge has assumed various forms. On the question of the empirical validation of the theory, Nagel argues: "Freudian theory does not seem to me to satisfy two requirements, which any theory must satisfy if it is to be capable of empirical validation." That is:

In the first place, it must be possible to deduce determinate consequences from the assumptions of theory, so that one can decide on the basis of logical considerations, and prior to the examination of any empirical data, whether or not an alleged consequence of the theory is indeed implied by the latter. For unless this requirement is fulfilled, the theory has no definite content, and questions as to what the theory asserts cannot be settled except by recourse to some privileged authority or arbitrary caprice. In the second place, even though the theoretical notions are not explicitly defined by way of overt empirical procedures and observable traits of things, nevertheless at least some theoretical notions must be tied down to fairly definite and unambiguously specified observable materials, by way of rules of procedure variously called 'correspondence rules', 'coordinating definitions', and 'operational definitions'. For if this condition is not satisfied, the theory can have no determinate consequences about empirical subject matter. An immediate corollary to these requirements is that since a consistent theory cannot imply two incompatible consequences, a credible theory must not only be confirmed by observational evidence, but it must also be capable of being negated by such evidence. In short, a theory must not be formulated in such a manner that
it can always be construed and manipulated so as to explain whatever the actual facts are, no matter whether controlled observation shows one state of affairs to obtain or its opposite.

Nagel concludes: "In respect to both of these requirements, however, Freudian theory in general and metapsychology in particular, seem to me to suffer from serious shortcomings." And concerning the claim of psychoanalysis to therapeutic success, Scriven writes:

[There] are difficulties, not primarily for us in testing psychoanalysis but for psychoanalysis in justifying its claims; for the testing comes after the claims are made. Without any attempt to deal with the difficulties mentioned, how in the name of Roger Bacon could a psychoanalyst imagine that his own hopelessly contaminated, uncontrolled, unfollowed-up, unvalidated, unformalized estimation of success has ever established a single cure as being his own work? At least the people who claim that the earth is flat are giving a nearly correct account of a large part of their experience.

"But," he continues, "we may say this. Just insofar as an objective test of improvement is possible - so far we can check on this claim of psychoanalysis and so far as we cannot in this way verify their therapeutic claims, so far we must be clear that there is no reason at all to believe in them."

Here blows are struck both at the level of theory, where resides the problem of validation; and at the level of practice, where resides the problem of therapeutic success.

Here, on the one hand, questions are raised - e.g. by Rubinstein and Kennedy, respectively - concerning the confirmation of the theory of unconscious motivation and that of the universality of the Oedipus complex.
other, questions are raised - e.g. by Grunbaum and Eagle, respectively - as regards the clinical validation of psychoanalytic therapy\textsuperscript{10} and the veridicality and therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalytic interpretations.\textsuperscript{11} Such has been the traditional challenge to psychoanalysis, issuing in the main from outside the discipline.

More recently, however, there has been a challenge to psychoanalysis from within;\textsuperscript{12} in particular from Roy Schafer, who, as Meissner writes, "over the course of the last decade has been evolving a critique and reassessment of psychoanalytic thinking and theory which raises profoundly important questions about the basic options available to psychoanalysis."\textsuperscript{13} Schafer's challenge has been expressed in his book, \textit{A New Language for Psychoanalysis}, where he argues that adoption of his action language (AL) would provide a solution to a problem which besets Freudian metapsychology (MP). The troublesome features of Freud's metapsychology (MP) are, for Schafer, expressed in Freud's commitment to an outmoded, eclectic language, structured around dualistic-mechanistic rules.

For Schafer, Freud's metapsychology (MP) is committed to two troublesome assumptions: i) a theory of mind, which issues from Cartesian dualism and requires the assimilation of talk about minds to talk about bodies; and ii) a theory of explanation, which issues from Newtonian mechanics and generates an account of human action in terms of causes, rather than in terms of reasons. These two features of (MP) lead, in psychoanalysis, to what Schafer calls the problem of discrepancy between theory and practice. Let us see how, for Schafer, this problem arises, by considering the
following list.

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The 'discrepancy problem', for Schafer, is this: the practitioners in psychoanalysis are involved in the investigation of A1-I1, but spend their energies examining A2-I2. And the source of the problem is this: the practitioners in question embrace Freud's (MP), which generates rules in terms of assumptions (i) and (ii), requiring that items in the column on the left be translated into those in the column on the right; viz. A1 into A2, B1 into B2 and so forth, on the assumption that "'understanding', 'meaning', 'reasons' and suchlike," which comprise the first column, "are to be regarded merely as subjective mental contents, not yet 'objectified' in the language of scientific causality," which comprises the second column.

(NL, 108-9)

Now Schafer is suggesting that the 'discrepancy problem' arises, if we fail to see, as practitioners of Freudian psychoanalysis do, that the items in the first column are to be analyzed intra-systemically, by reference to other items in the same column; rather, than extra-systemically, by reference to items in the second column,
as Freud's (MP) requires. The metapsychologists' failure to see this gives rise to the 'discrepancy problem'. This, then, is the problem. As Schafer contends: "the modes of thought and the terms I am calling into question are those that refer to abstract or non-substantive ideas in substantive, animistic, or anthropomorphic terms." (NL, 124)

And the solution, for Schafer, is the elimination of this archaic language, namely (MP), from theoretical discourse (NL, 170) and the replacing of it with his (AL), which is grounded in theses, diametrically opposed to the theories, viz. (i) and (ii), that Freud's (MP) presuppose. Rather "the context of action language is a universe of action by people, actions which by definition are meaningful and goal-directed, actions which have reasons rather than determinants." (NL, 142) Indeed "references to causality are inconsistent with psychoanalytic explanation." (NL, 195)

What, then, is the basis of Schafer's solution to the 'discrepancy problem'? If theories (i) and (ii) above, the truth of which Freud's (MP) presupposes, lead to a problem for psychoanalysis, then it is the theories, the truth of which (AL) presupposes, that offer a solution to this problem. The theories in question are: iii) Wittgensteinian theses and iv) Rylean theses. Schafer turns to (iii) and (iv) for, as we might put it in this context, linguistic, philosophical contrasts that a) entail the falsity of theories (i) and (ii) and thus the inadequacy of (MP's) extra-systemic approach, and
b) entail the truth of (AL's) assumptions concerning actions and reasons, and thus, the adequacy of (AL's) intra-systemic approach.

In brief, Schafer's solution to the 'discrepancy problem' turns on the advancing of his action language as an effective and systematic alternative to Freud's dualistic-mechanistic metapsychology (MP). Herein is embodied the linguistic turn in psychoanalysis.

Having shown something of the thrust of the linguistic turn in psychoanalysis, the question remains: wherein lies the import of the turn? It inheres in this: that Schafer's linguistic turn entails an attempt to supplant Freud's (MP), introducing as it does a new paradigm in psychoanalysis, rather than undertaking to revise or modify the Freudian framework. His aim is "to find a fundamental reorientation to theorizing." (NL, 112) He thus rejects, as comprising 'stopgap' procedures, the efforts of theorists within psychoanalysis leveled at utilizing "supplementary concepts" or "newly employed familiar concepts," (NL, 112) in order to close the gap "between theory and observation or application." (NL, 112)

Schafer's treatment of such 'stopgap concepts' as 'the adaptive ego, identity, and self' is instructive, serving to throw into relief the import of his linguistic turn for psychoanalysis. He a) characterizes this triad of concepts as being used by theorists to graft the agent,
the active human being, into the framework of Freud's dualistic-mechanistic metapsychology. He b) rejects this use of the concepts as involving theoretical inconsistencies and as lapsing into anthropomorphism or reification. (NL, 112-119)

Hence, Schafer sees "the adaptive ego" as being used to include "just what the decorum of natural science conceptualizing is designed to exclude, namely the sentient, self-determining, choice-making, responsible, active human being." (NL, 112) Again, concerning "identity," he writes: it enables "the psychoanalytic therapist to feel that it is all right once again to think about oneself and others as people who do things rather than as organisms or apparatus with functions - while yet retaining Freudian insights!" (NL, 115) And, finally, he takes the concept of self as generating a vocabulary which "mixes two different types of discourse," namely a "phenomenological, experiential" language with a "structural-energetic metapsychological" language. (NL, 116)

In brief, for Schafer, the introduction of these concepts into metapsychological discourse represents: 1) a reification and anthropomorphization of subjective experience, and 2) an abortive attempt "to inject the person as agent into a natural science model." (NL, 116) That is, the attempt at reconstruction, in Schafer's view, fails.

It is noteworthy here that whereas the aforesaid attempt at reconstruction is similar to that of Habermas in point of aim, these two approaches part company in point of method. The
aim in both cases is to bridge the gap between Freudian meta-
psychology and psychoanalytic therapy. Habermas, not unlike
the revisionist theoreticians within psychoanalysis, wants to
tie Freudian metapsychology to "the interpretation of muted
and distorted texts." Viz. to "bring metapsychology closer
to the psychoanalytic process itself." (NL, 119) But their
strategy, as we saw, is to introduce supplementary concepts
such as the adaptive ego, identity and self; whereas, that
of Habermas is to jettison Freud's "energy-distribution model,"
while retaining the other features of Freud's (MP), expressed
in the structural, dynamic and genetic points of view, repudiated,
as will be seen, by Schafer.

Schafer regards the above attempt at reconstruction,
undertaken within psychoanalysis, as transitional in nature;
and, thus, as anticipating his own action language. This
tempt "may be seen as a move toward new theoretical models
suitable for human beings and their actions," (NL, 115) and,
hence, as "more appropriate to the clinical analytic situation."
(NL, 20) But, ultimately, for Schafer, this strategy miscarries,
"owing to the continuing use of mechanistic-organismic modes of
thought." (NL, 102) It miscarries because, as a program it
seeks, not to go beyond Freud's dualistic-mechanistic (MP) as
does Schafer's action language (AL), but to find "something
better and yet something Freudian in nature."
(NL, 21) As
an "unsuccessful Freudian effort to inbue a natural science
theory with experiential vividness or excitement," (NL, 118)
it represents a failure to take the linguistic turn. Schafer takes this turn, the significance of which lies in this: it entails a paradigm shift within psychoanalysis.

1.2 The Prospectus

On the one hand, I have discussed the nature of the 'discrepancy problem' that, for Schafer, besets psychoanalysis; and have shown how, in Schafer's view, it is generated by the significance of Cartesian dualism and Newtonian mechanics for (MP). On the other, I have underscored Schafer's solution, based as it is in his linguistic turn—his appealing to Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses as entailing (in the end) the inadequacy of Freud's (MP) and the adequacy of his—Schafer's—own (AL). I turn, now, to a consideration of the features of the linguistic turn as characterized above.

I shall address myself, in particular, to the questions:

1) What are the details of Schafer's account of Freud's metapsychology (MP)?

2) What are the details of Schafer's account of his own action language (AL)?

3) What are the details of Schafer's argument for affording his (AL) as comprising an adequate alternative to (MP)?

These will be the concern of Chapters 2 and 3.

When I turn, in Chapters 4 and 5, to the language of Schafer's argument, I shall, in discussing his strategy, isolate the backing (premises) relevant to his central claim (conclusion); viz. that his (AL) comprises an effective and
systematic alternative to Freud's (MP). I shall, moreover, consider whether this backing yields a sound argument, issuing indeed from veridical premises; and, again, whether, independently of its backing, the claim is true.

Schafer's action language (AL), has received a number of critical treatments, none of which adequately exploits the possibility of affording an internal critique of his (AL).

In distinguishing internal from external criticism (in philosophy), John Charlesworth writes:

Criticism may be either of an internal or an external kind. In other words, one may show the need to adopt another standpoint by exposing the inadequacy of a philosophical position in terms of the position itself. Or one may criticize a position in a completely external and mechanical way, condemning it simply because it does not measure up to one's own criteria. This latter type of criticism... is very satisfying to the critic but unfortunately convinces no one else.\(^{19}\)

The criticism of Schafer's action language, found within psychoanalysis, is largely of the external kind. Following Modell,\(^{20}\) the major objections to Schafer's (AL) may be summarized thus:

1) Schafer's (AL) excludes the reference to multiple determinants (or causality), made possible by Freud's (MP).

2) Schafer's (AL) excludes the reference to the unconscious (and, thus to the process of repression), made possible by Freud's (MP).

3) Schafer's (AL) excludes the reference to the genesis (the history or development) of the agent, made possible by Freud's (MP).

These criticisms are based on criteria, generated by the very same metapsychological framework - viz. Freud's (MP) - that Schafer, in advancing his (AL), seeks to discard.
And, as such, these critical efforts would, on Schafer's view, be less than convincing. What seems to have gone unnoticed in these critical treatments is this: that Schafer's (AL) is open to a critical assessment in terms of criteria, which (AL) itself generates. And it is against the backdrop of such criteria that I propose to elucidate and assess Schafer's linguistic turn in psychoanalysis.

Schafer's linguistic turn represents a constructive challenge to Freud's (MP), providing not merely a critique of (MP), but also a bold and intricate substitute for it. As the psychoanalyst W.W. Meissner writes:

Many critics have pointed out the inherent difficulties in metapsychology. But we have as yet had no thinker courageous or imaginative enough to take the further step of delineating an effective and useful alternative to the language of metapsychology. Schafer has taken that further step, and he has done it creatively, imaginatively, and quite effectively.21

Accordingly, Schafer's effort requires a thorough and careful treatment. In view of its intricacy and boldness, in examining it one must be comprehensive. Here, underlying my interest in being comprehensive, is a reservation issued by Meissner himself concerning his review of Schafer's work:

"Schafer's argument is so far-reaching and full of implication that it is an embarrassment to even try to comment on it in such brief compass."22

The importance of Schafer's linguistic turn should be obvious.23 He "proposes that psychoanalysis requires a revolution
to integrate the 'I' properly into its theory." And he
"suggests that his 'action language' is that revolutionary
paradigmatic alternative." If (AL) is correct, it must
alter our whole outlook on psychoanalytic theory and therapy.
It is time, therefore, to examine (by means of a detailed
internal critique) whether it does indeed provide a viable
alternative perspective on analytic concepts and experience
to that of Freudian metapsychology; whether, in fact, it can
be shown to reflect more adequately the complexities of
psychoanalytic data.
CHAPTER 2

THE ANALYSIS: PART A

2.0 Introductory

Schafer's program of providing a new language for psychoanalysis is better understood if we see it against the background of the old language of psychoanalysis. A considerable part of Schafer's program comprises an attack, either explicit or implicit, on the old language. In Chapter 2, therefore, I wish, within the framework of Schafer's program, to draw attention to the semantic and logical structure of both Schafer's action language (AL) and Freud's metapsychological language (MP). I shall begin with an analysis of Schafer's account of Freud's (MP). Subsequently, I shall focus on Schafer's account of his own (AL).

2.1 Schafer's Account of Freudian Metapsychology

The twin pivots upon which Schafer's account of Freudian metapsychology (MP) turns are the commitments he perceives in Freud to i) Cartesian dualism, and ii) Newtonian mechanics. Here, (i) is reflected, as Meissner writes, in Freud's speaking of "the various psychic structures or topographic systems and even instinctual drives and energies as though they were purposes, meaning-creating, choice-making, and action-oriented entities." And (ii) is expressed, as Swanson puts it, in
Freud's attempt to "explain subjective experiences (and behavior) in terms of a causal agent, not simply rename them."

Here Freud's commitment to (i) is seen as leading him to speak of the ego as "a unified and irreducible agency, a fixed and homogeneous entity that engages in action." (NL, 218) While his commitment to (ii) is seen as leading him to assume "that each action must be triggered by something," namely, "causal motives that somehow precede, underlie, trigger, and guide action." (NL, 232)

Schafer says,

1) Thus it is that to stop using Freud's theoretical language is to alter radically our relations with this most intricate, intimate, pervasive, and consequential set of mental categories and operations as well as with language traditions that long antedate the tradition of Newtonian [and], Cartesian models of mind within which Freud fashioned his eclectic mode of conceptualization. (NL, 6)

2) ...it is not necessary to assume that an action, in the sense of whatever is carried out behaviorally, spoken, or thought, must have been prepared by some immediately preceding mental activity that sets the stage for that action. It is common to assume that specific mental activity must be based on a preparatory phase. Freud and analysts after him have assumed that mental activity is first carried out unconsciously or preconsciously and is raised to consciousness or invested with conscious quality only by a special additional act - the direction toward it of attention and ofness. We all assume that we could not perform a motoric action without first intending it and thinking what to do, and that we could not remember a fact or a tune without first having a motive to do so and also having been carrying it around with us somehow and somewhere 'in mind'. These assumptions have been convincingly disputed by Ryle. Ryle has demonstrated as well their being derivatives of the Cartesian model of mind. (NL, 225-6)
3) A distinguishing feature of Freud’s commitment to conceptualize and explain phenomena in the terms of natural science is his invoking Newtonian forces to explain the workings of the psychic apparatus. For Freud, forces move the mind as they move physical bodies in the environment. He gave formal recognition to this feature of his thinking by setting up the psychodynamic point of view, along with the economic and the structural, as an indispensable constituent of psychoanalytic explanation. (NL, 194)

In Schafer’s approach to (MP), theory T comprises an (MP) iff T:

a) involves a language (as in (1)), which
b) expresses psychological propositions, in terms of Cartesian dualism (as in (2)), and
c) expresses explanatory propositions, in terms of Newtonian mechanics (as in (3)).

Here thus (MP) is an (a) that has features (b) and (c). Here, qua language, (MP) comprises a set of rules, expressing a notation, which requires us to view old phenomena in new ways; and, which, as Wisdom says, "in order to reveal to us things about ourselves modify and sophisticate our conceptions..." using "familiar words not with a disregard of established usage but not in bondage to it."³ For Schafer, that Freud partially grasped this view of the language of metapsychology can be seen in Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, where he writes: "we seek not merely to describe and to clarify phenomena, but to understand them as an interplay of forces in the mind.... We are concerned with a dynamic view of mental phenomena... the phenomena that are perceived must yield... to trends which are only hypothetical."⁴ Let us consider these features (MPb) and (MPc) - in order, bearing in mind that they are
2.1.1 Dualism

Let us consider first (MPb). It, as presented by Schafer, includes the following two main items:

A) There are M-properties, such as psychological states and processes. Here the mind is pictured as "a matter of places, currents, quantities, barriers and interactions - in short, as a spatial entity containing other localizable entities and processes." (NL, 162)

B) M-terms refer to (and describe) M-properties (where M-terms include: M-verbs such as 'thinking', M-nouns such as 'thought', M-adjectives such as 'unconscious', and M-adverbs such as 'unconsciously'). That is, M-terms are definable in relation to M-properties. Here there is the use of "nouns and adjectives to refer to psychological processes, events, etc.," (NL, 9) as expressed in such phrases "as 'a strong ego', 'the dynamic unconscious', 'the inner world', 'libidinal energy', 'rigid defense, an intense emotion', 'autonomous ego functions', and 'instinctual drive'." (NL, 9)

We can gain further access to (MPb), by considering the following remarks of Schafer's:

4) ...we psychoanalysts accept and use the idea that one emotion may be used as a defense against another; for example, we believe that love may defend against hate, rage against fear, and euphoria against depression. When we think of the defending emotion as a wall,
a facade, or a screen, we are envisioning the
defense as being somehow vertical in space;
when we think of the defending emotion as a
layer, on the order of a blanket, a lid, or
some other cover, we are envisioning it as
being horizontal; and when we think of it as
a coating or wrapping, perhaps as atmosphere,
we are envisioning it as some kind of surround-
ing or medium the nature of which may be thermal,
oral, oceanic, etc.. (NL, 323)

5) ...self and identity are commonly treated as
motivational-structural entities on the order of
"the ego," in which regard they suffer the same
reification that has afflicted Freud's concepts
of psychic structure. Thus, self and identity
have been spoken of as though they are spaces,
places, substances, agencies, independent minds,
forces, and so forth. (NL, 193)

6) As metapsychologists, we seem to imply, though
we would not openly avow, that the person is
always more than one individual. We imply
this multiplicity of individuals constituting
one person in this way: we set up a number of
agencies or divisions within the person's so-
called mental apparatus and speak as though
each of them functions in the manner of an
individual in that it has a circumscribed set
of objectives, a certain type and amount of
energy, and a strategy and influence. (NL, 235)

As Schafer sees it, in (4) M-properties are spatialized;
seen as having location. "We speak of thoughts, feelings,
motives, traits and suchlike as though they had the properties
of things, such as extension, location and momentum...."
(NL, 124) In (5) the self is reified, regarded as an entity,
a thing. Here we imply "that there is a subject or agent
who exists or can exist apart from his or her mind." (NL, 132)
And, finally, in (6) the mind is compartmentalized and
anthropomorphized. Here "we all think of levels and layers;
we all resort to underlying factors or causes; we all speak of
'hierarchic' arrangements, surfaces, and depths." (NL, 161)

These tendencies toward spatializing, reifying and anthropomorphizing the mind are found in Freud, who, as White indicates, speaks of "the psychic apparatus" which contains "three 'regions' ('realms', 'provinces'), or 'entities' or 'formations', called the 'id', the 'ego' and the 'super-ego'." Here, the mind is "divided into various 'mental provinces', 'agencies', 'regions' or 'systems', in which operate 'energies' or 'forces' that are called 'instincts' and 'ideas'." Such tendencies are seen in Freud's _An Outline of Psychoanalysis_, where his stated purpose is to form "a general picture of the psychical apparatus, of the portions, organs and agencies of which it is composed, of the forces which operate in it, and of the functions which its different portions perform."8

On this account thus (MPb) informs Freud's reduction of "the agent to anthropomorphized ego functions." As Schafer points out

Freud often [anthropomorphized] the psychic structures, the topographic systems, the primary and secondary processes, the great principles, and the instinctual drives and energies; he spoke of all of these as if they were purposive, meaning-creating, choice-making, action-oriented entities, which is to say, as if they were minds within the mind, or homunculi. (NL, 104)

In brief, Freud assumed that "there was a person loose in the apparatus, a mastermind working the mechanism." (NL, 110)

This assumption is called 'the ghost in the machine' by Gilbert Ryle in his important book _The Concept of Mind_. (NL, 110)
And following Ryle, Schafer dubs it "the mover of the mental apparatus." (NL, 110)

In view of the above, (MPb) can be formulated as follows:

D1) For every actor a, and every action A, 'a does $A^1$' or 'a does $A^2$' iff 'A$^3$ acts upon a', where i) $A^1$ refers to M-properties such as thought and feeling or A-properties such as behavior and deeds; and $A^3$ refers to unconscious regulatory structures or processes. And ii) statements of the form 'a does $A^1$' cannot be translated without residue, into statements of the form 'a does $A^2$'.

2.1.2 Mechanics

Next (MPc). It comprises Freud’s criterion for determining what constitutes an adequate explanation of human actions. This, as presented by Schafer, is:

E1) The event 'a does A' has been explained under (E1) iff (E1) specifies jointly: i) the sufficient condition for 'a's doing A' and ii) the necessary condition for 'a's doing A'. And for Freud M-properties satisfy these conditions. We shall gain access to (MPc) by considering the following remarks of Schafer's:

7) According to the physicochemical and biological rules of language that Freud followed, understanding depends upon our invoking hypothetical substantive entities that create, initiate, regulate, or modify other and qualitatively different entities. Thus, as traditional psychoanalytic conceptualizers, we might say that the energy of instinctual drives prompts fantasies
and motoric acts of love and hate. In the same manner, we might say that a mechanism of defense wards off the demands or pressures of a repressed impulse. (NL, 14)

8) Like instinctual drive, motive is used to imply an agent-like propulsive entity existing and acting in some kind of mental space. For we do speak of a motive, the motive, underlying motives, having or lacking a motive, weak motives, and hierarchies of motives. Motive is also used to imply a force whose application eventuates inexplicably in manifestations or resultant that are qualitatively different from it, such as thoughts, emotions, and performances. When we use motive in these ways, we impose three conditions on our thinking about the relevant phenomena: that we must speak in terms of substantives (thought, emotion, behavior), that we must treat each of these substantives as an entity distinct from the others, and that we must understand these entities to exist only as expressions or consequences of underlying motives. The motive is set up as a necessary influential entity that exists apart from and prior to thoughts, emotions and deeds. (NL, 197)

9) We have continued to think, with Freud, of energies, forces, structures, and so forth as acting on the person rather than as metaphoric approaches to actions of a person. (NL, 153)

10) 1. His repression of this dangerous impulse was too weak to prevent it from gaining consciousness.

2. The conflict between her id and ego was so evenly balanced as to cause a paralysis of thought, affect, and behavior. (NL, 206)

On Schafer’s account, in (7) understanding is tied to knowledge of the causal antecedents of action, is “centered around cause,” (NL, 203) "motivational preconditions." (NL, 201) These motivational preconditions are specified in Freud’s psychodynamic, economic and structural points of view, which, for him, constitute the indispensable elements of psychoanalytic explanation. (NL, 194-5) In (8)
are indicated the elements of explanation. "From [this] point of view thoughts, feelings, and behavior are to be considered the manifestation and resultants of... interacting mental forces." (NL, 195) These forces are characterized in terms of instinctual drives, impulses, psychic energy, discharges and resultants. (NL, 194-5)

In (9) explanation is envisioned as providing "the conditions in the absence of which the specific action would not be performed and in the presence of which it must be performed." (NL, 205) Finally, in (10) we are offered paradigm cases of (MPC); viz. (El) types of explanation.

For Schafer thus (MPC) finds expression in Freud's positing "the Newtonian idea of psychodynamics," (NL, 196) according to which "nothing would change were it not for the application of forces," in this case, "mental forces." (NL, 202) And, as Schafer points out "it is inconsistent with this type of scientific language to speak of intentions, meaning, reasons or subjective experience." (NL, 103) Hence:

In line with this strategy, reasons become forces, emphases become energies, activity becomes function, thoughts become representations, affects become discharges or signals, deeds become resultants, and particular ways of struggling with the inevitable diversity of intentions, feelings, and situations become structures, mechanisms, and adaptations. (NL, 103)

Here Freud's metapsychological point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomena contain propositions concerning the psychological forces, energies and structures involved in the phenomena. (NL, 194-5)
Accepting (MPC), Freud must needs "explain psychological events in terms of forces, forces being causes or determinants that are necessary in a mechanical or Newtonian universe. Against this backdrop, "subjective experience, meaning, action, and so forth are merely phenomena which require translation into mechanistic terms in order to be endowed with theoretical significance." (NL, 227)

Here psychoanalysts emphasize "the idea of psychodynamic causes or motivational preconditions of actions," (NL, 201) while de-emphasizing the subject's "reasons, which are features of his or her personal world of meaning and goals." (NL, 205) Thus, "we have continued to think, with Freud, of energies, forces, structures, and so forth, as acting on the person rather than as metaphoric approaches to actions of a person." (NL, 153)

In view of the above, (MPC) can be formulated thus:

D2) For every actor a and every action A, and every cause C, the explicandum 'a does A' is explicated iff the explicans takes the form 'a does A, given C'; where i) C constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for A, ii) C and A are logically distinct actions, iii) C renders A appropriate from a's point of view, and iv) C renders A intelligible for us.
2.2 Schafer's Account of Action Language

Underlying Schafer's approach to Freud's (MP) is his sense that it, as seen in (MPb) and (MPC), contains "age-old modes of thought, which must be set aside." (NL, 7) For Schafer, the inevitable direction of such thinking is, as Meissner writes, "toward reifications and anthropomorphisms - as though the mind was divided up into a series of lesser minds, to each of which is attributed intentions, goals; characteristics, and qualities."10 And setting aside these archaic modes of thought, Schafer proceeds to introduce as a replacement, his new action language (AL).11 In his words:

I have chosen to attempt to develop an alternative to the eclectic language of mechanism, force, structure, etc... (NL, 7)

...all I am proposing is that we make this action language explicit, and codify and develop it, while sloughing off the remainder, which is rampant anthropomorphism, however austere we may express it. (NL, 15)

In Schafer's (AL) there is a shift from invoking "propulsive entities as the initiators and sustainers of action" to an analysis of action and its various modes. (NL, 14) Here as Meissner indicates, Schafer attempts to supplant "a psychology of many minor subagencies acting upon and interacting with each other to bring about the complex psychic resultants" with "a psychology of the personal agent who performs many actions..."12 On this score, the following remarks of Schafer's are instructive:
11) 'Say everything that comes to mind,' and its variants, 'What does that bring to mind?,' 'What comes to mind?,' and 'What occurs to you?' I submit that these questions involve a temporary collusion on the analyst's part with the analysand's strategy of disclaiming action. I say so on the basis of the following action-language considerations: a (ideas are not entities that transport themselves to places called 'mind'); b (nor do they transport other similar entities into places called 'mind'); c (ideas do not 'happen to' the thinker); and d (the mind is not something other than what the person thinks, feels, wishes, says, and carries out.) (NL, 147)

12) ...a representative (partial) analytic interpretation might be: a ('Because you are afraid to criticize me openly,) b (you keep emphasizing that you couldn't like and admire me more.) Notice that the language is entirely an action language. The analyst addresses the analysand neither as c (a mind in which thoughts and feelings happen) nor as d (an apparatus in which mechanisms operate,) but as e (a person who acts knowingly and emotionally.) Were one to say, f ('You have a fear that impulses to criticize me will rise up in you, and this fear makes you act as if you have only liking and admiration for me,) one would be carrying over into interpretation the disclaiming language of the question. (NL, 149)

Here, in (11), in opposition to Freud's (MPb), Schafer holds (a), (b), (c) and (d) rejecting both the notion of "a mover... hidden in the mental apparatus" (NL, 115) and the corresponding attempt "to set up a mind within the mind...." (NL, 214) This attempt is rejected as being part of an approach which seeks "to understand and explain psychic phenomena in terms of entities, processes, structures, drives and forces, impulses, motives, functions, etc., which populate the mental world." 13 And, in (12), in opposition to Freud's (MPc), for the explicandum (b) Schafer offers as
an explicans (a), (a reason), instead of (f) - (a cause). He thus takes (a) as appropriately presupposing (e), (an agent), rather than (c) and (d), (a mind and mental apparatus), as (f), (the explanation required by Freud's (MPb)), mistakenly does. Here "...if we work with reasons rather than causes, and if actions and their situations are correlative, then explanation (the answer to the question 'Why') can only be designation of action in other terms." (NL, 370) Thus, for Schafer, there is no mental apparatus; there are no psychic entities, populating the mind; rather "there is," as Meissner puts it, "only the human being who is a personal agent performing actions for specifiable reasons, with specific goals, and directed to the attainment of specific ends."^{14}

In Schafer's approach to (AL), theory T comprises an (AL), iff T:

a) involves a language, which

b) with its emphasis on action (as in (11)) entails the negation of (MPb), and

c) with its emphasis on reasons (as in (12)) entails the negation of (MPc).

Here thus (AL) is an (a), that has features (b) and (c). Let us consider these features - (ALb) and (ALc) - in order, bearing in mind that they are central to Schafer's (AL).
2.2.1 **Action**

Firstly (ALb). It, as presented by Schafer, includes the following items:

1) There are no M-properties, such as psychological states and processes. "'Consciously' now becomes a way of doing things; the word 'conscious' is understood to refer, not to a system, an organ of the mind, or a quality of thought, but to a mode of doing the action of thinking or some other action." (NL, 226)

2) There are A-properties, such as covert and overt behavior. "We must understand the word action to include all private psychological activity that can be made public through gesture and speech, as well as all initially public activity that has some goal directed or symbolic properties." (NL, 9-10)

3) M-terms (not unlike A-terms) refer to A-properties. That is, M-terms are definable in terms of A-properties. "Like the noun anger, however, the noun guilt is, within the framework of action language, an unsatisfactory designation of the phenomena to which it pertains. The phenomena now must be rendered as ways of acting, namely guiltily." (NL, 284)

Schafer's (ALb) finds expression in his fundamental rule of action-language. This is, as Schafer puts it:

R1) We shall regard each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth to be called action, and shall designate each action by an active verb stating its nature
and by an adverb (or adverbial locution), when applicable, stating the mode of this action. (NL, 9)

Or:

One shall regard every psychological process, event, experience, response, or other item of behavior as an action, and one shall designate it by an active verb and, when appropriate and useful, by an adverb or an adverbial locution that states the mode of this action. (NL, pp. 363-4)

This rule abolishes the use of nouns and adjectives to refer to psychological entities, processes and events. "Thus, we should not use such phrases as 'a strong ego', 'the dynamic unconscious', 'the inner world', 'libidinal energy', 'rigid defense', 'an intense emotion', 'autonomous ego function' and 'instinctual drive'." (NL, 9) Inasmuch as the use of such substantive expressions has led psychoanalysts to speak of the mind as a substance, "Schafer insists that the new language should rule out such verbal expressions."15 Schafer offers the following as exemplifying the kind of translation that (R1) requires:

13) a) Consciousness
  is translated by (logically equivalent to)
  b) "a mode of doing the action of thinking
     or any other action" (NL, 226)

14) a) To see or to remember
    either is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "to do an action" (NL, 139)

15) a) To wish
    translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "to engage in a certain kind of action" (NL, 15)

16) a) Mind
    translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "something we do" (NL, 133)
Also embodied in (ALb) are two corollaries of (R1), themselves rules. Consider:

R2) When speaking of any aspect of psychological activity or action, we shall no longer refer to location, movement, direction, sheer quantity, and the like, for these terms are suitable only for things and thinglike entities. (NL, 10)

This rule eliminates the spatialization and reification of mind. "Thus, we shall not speak of internalization except in the sense of a person imagining his or her incorporating something;" and, this because, "as there is no other conceivable inside than the imaginary one there can be no other conceivable movement to this inside." (NL, 10-11) Moreover, "we shall not speak of psychological depth, impulses that underlie actions... and the like." (NL, 11).

Consider next:

R3) We shall give up the idea that there are special classes of processes that prepare or propel mental activity, that is to say, classes that are qualitatively different from the mental activity they prepare or propel; for now everything is an action. (NL, 13)

This rule forestalls attempts to compartmentalize and anthropomorphize the mind. "Consequently, if we discern prestages of a specific action in which we are interested, we shall regard them as being merely preliminary actions that make possible the final action in question." (NL, 13)

In any case "whether we view it as preliminary or constitutive, it is action itself that we take as our subject and not some force or agency that impels action or makes action possible." (NL, 13)
It is noteworthy that (ALb), (as seen in rules (1-3)), implies "as the correct approach to the emotions foregoing the use of substantives in making emotion-statements and employing for this purpose only verbs and adverbs or adverbia locutions." (NL, 271) In short, "emotions are not to be rendered as actions or modes of action." (NL, 271) Schafer offers us the following illustrations:

17) a) Happiness
    is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "doing actions happily; while doing them, to smile, laugh, sing and dance..." (NL, 277)

18) a) Love
    is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "to act lovingly" (NL, 279)

19) a) Anger
    is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "acting angrily: tensing muscles, clenching teeth, biting fiercely, hitting, scolding, thinking of attack... and so on and so forth" (NL, 283)

20) a) Guilt
    is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "acting guiltily: thinking of oneself as immoral, punishing oneself, trying to bring about a 'punishing' by some agency in one's environment" (NL, 283-4)

21) a) Fear
    is translated by (logically equivalent to)
    b) "acting fearfully: to be restless, to develop ideas of fleeing... or else attacking... to make movement to attack or escape" (NL, 285)

Schafer thinks translations of this sort (13-21) correct, because they appropriately implement (ALb). As he points out:

In the present connection, we are all used to and secure in the world in which we treat emotion as an it, an entity with a name of its own and adjectively designated properties of its own. We are used to personifying emotions and 'coping
with them' as with people or creatures or spirits. Equally, we are used to and secure in the idea that emotions have ineffable or ultimately inaccessible aspects that can only be suggested or approximated by more or less witty, earthy, or fanciful metaphors and other devices of colorful speech and the arts. Now, however, there would be nothing to which one could in any sense at all gain access; there is only something one does. (NL, 272)

Schafer thus enjoins psychoanalysts to free themselves from their inappropriate talk about mind in substantive terms, by excluding from psychoanalytic discourse the use of substantive expressions, including nouns and adjectives; while adopting a new language of verbs and adverbs or their equivalents. "Thus we do not speak of fear, but rather of acting fearfully; we do not speak of anxiety, but rather of acting anxiously; we do not speak of the unconscious, but rather of actions performed unconsciously."16

Given the above, (ALb) can be formulated as follows:

D3) For every actor a, and every action A, 'a does A \(^1\) iff 'a does A \(^2\)' where i) A \(^1\) refers to M-properties, such as thinking and feeling and A \(^2\) refers to A-properties such as behaving thus and so. And ii) statements of the form 'a does A \(^1\)', can be translated, without residue into statements of the form 'a does A \(^2\').

2.2.2 Reasons

Second (ALc). It comprises Schafer's criterion for determining what counts as an adequate explanation for human actions. This is:
E2) An A-property, 'a does A', has been explained under (E2) iff (E2) designates the reason(s) (R) for a's doing (A).
And for Schafer A-properties (but not M-properties) satisfy this consideration. Two cases follow (each involving an action (A) and its true redescription(s): the reason(s) (R)), which are advanced by Schafer as exemplifying (E2). These are:

CASE 1

A: The boy made fun of the girl when she sat down to urinate.

R: Upon being confronted by the genital difference between himself and the girl, he thought anxiously of his being castrated, and by ridiculing the girl as defective, he avoided thinking consciously, fearfully, and excitedly of this frightening eventuality. That is why. (NL, 204)

CASE 2

A: He was impotent when he attempted sexual intercourse.

R: Unconsciously, he viewed intercourse as a filthy and destructive invasion of his mother's womb, and still unconsciously, he anticipated that he would react in a most painfully guilty and self-destructive way to his performing that action; not being in a predominantly genital sexual situation and intimate personal relationship, and not being engaged in sexual actions in a predominantly unthreatened, exciting, and pleasurable mode, he did not perform potently. That is why. These are his reasons. (NL, 204)

Here there is an instantiation of X, such that (in both cases 1 and 2) 'a's doing A' = 'a's doing R'. Note "in this approach, we rely on reasons - reasons that are, in essence, redescriptions that make actions comprehensible." (NL, 204) Here "explanation is cast in terms of reasons, intentions, and meanings with the consequence that the causes of action, precisely because they reflect the natural science approach, are ruled out of court."
The implications of this for Schafer's (ALc) are:

1. (A) and (R) refer in this context to the same action.

2. An explanation under (E2) of 'a does A' is a redescrip-
tion of (A) in terms of (R).

3. (R) indicates how (A) could have been justified from
a's point of view.

4. (R) renders 'a's doing A' intelligible, comprehensible
to us.

But how for Schafer does the (E2) type explanation,
defining as it does his (ALc), render human actions intelligible?

He elaborates:

Using action language, one no longer explains behavior
and mental processes in terms of the forces of psycho-
dynamics or the influence of underlying motives.
Instead, one answers why-questions in terms of reasons.
Essentially, in giving reasons for particular actions,
that is, in explaining them, one restates these actions
in a way that makes them more comprehensible. A reason
is either another vantage point from which to view and
define an action and its context or a statement more
consistent with an existing vantage point. It may
involve a shift to another level of abstraction for
the designation of actions. The new designation serves
interests other than those which dictated the initial
version of the action in question. This kind of explanation
continues to set forth significant features of the analy-
sand's psychic reality. In this view the traditional
distinction between description and explanation is discarded.
(NL, 210)

Here, for Schafer, any reference to causes and other
propulsive entities, which function as initiators and sus-
tainers of action, is ruled out, because, "the modes of actions
and the need for understanding are adequately satisfied by
relating those actions to the reasons the personal agent has
to perform them." Schafer's (ALc) might be further illuminated
by considering the following lists:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1</th>
<th>He cheated</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>Greedily (NL, 202)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>He pretends to be friendly</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>He believes himself to be unlovable (NL, 327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>He persistently engages in acting grouchily</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>He thinks that he has been slighted by a man to whom he has turned for parental approval (NL, 348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>He acts depressively</td>
<td>D2</td>
<td>He hates those he loves and wants them dead (NL, 305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>You keep emphasizing that you admire me</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>You are afraid to criticize me openly (NL, 149)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these lists, the first column contains examples of action (A) and the second contains types of reasons (R). Now Schafer takes any (A) (say A1) as being explained, when that (A) (i.e. A1) is restated or redescribed in terms of an (R), (in this case) A. And it is his (Alc) that imposes such a condition, requiring as it does, that the correct approach to A-properties is to explain them not on the basis of their causal antecedents; since contra Freud's (Mpc), they have none; but in terms of their reasons, which function as redescriptions of the A-properties themselves. As Schafer points out:

Thus the four terms — meaning, action, reason, and situation — are aspects of the psychological mode of considering human activity, and they co-define or co-constitute each other. In contrast, the other four terms — cause, condition, determinant, and force — when used in psychology, express a subhumanizing or dehumanizing mode of considering human activity as though it were the workings of a machine. (NL, 232)
In light of the above, (ALc) can be formulated as follows:

D4) For every actor a, and every action A and every reason R, the explicandum 'a does A' is explicated iff the explicans takes the form 'a does A, for R', where i) (A) - (R), for doing (A) is, in these circumstances, doing (R); ii) (R) renders (A) appropriate from a's point of view, and iii) (R) renders (A) intelligible for us.

We have considered both the details of Schafer's account of Freud's (MP) and the details of his account of his own (AL). Here two points are noteworthy, before we pass to a consideration of Schafer's argument for advancing his (AL) as comprising an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP).

1) There is what might be called Schafer's incompatibilist thesis. Schafer sees his (AL) as being diametrically opposed to, as being incompatible with, Freud's (MP).

2) There is what might be called Schafer's foundationalist thesis. Schafer in his (AL) is not rejecting psychoanalysis en bloc; rather, he is shifting it from the mechanistic-biological basis that (MP) requires to a psychological foundation.

With respect to (1), Schafer writes:

For the most part [psychodynamic] terms are inherently inconsistent with the rules of action language.... Although some are compatible with these rules, they are either too narrow (intention) or not within the same frame of reference (disposition); and some of them are essentially irrelevant and confusing when used as motivation words (intentionality, function).

(NL, 200-1)
For Schafer, thus, one cannot at once accept: a) metaphysicology, with its reductionist explanation of action in non-action terms, and b) action language, which explains action, by designating "actions and their modes through the right selection of verbs and adverbs." (NL, 201)

With respect to (2), Schafer writes:

On our part, we analysts must dare to believe that being true to Freud's discoveries need not involve adhering to his metaphysicology or to any psychobiological metatheory. We must be open to the idea that other psychological languages are not only possible, but also might even facilitate the achievement of a better understanding of the role of unconsciously carried on infantile sexuality and aggression in human existence. (NL, 154)

For Schafer, thus, one can at once: a) accept psychoanalysis as expressed (say) in Freud's discoveries concerning the role of sexuality and aggression in human life, and b) shift these discoveries from their grounding in Freud's psychobiological metatheory (MP) to a foundation in a psychological metatheory (AL).

2.3 Recapitulation

We began our elucidation of the semantic and logical structure of the old (MP) and the new (AL) language of psychoanalysis, by analyzing Schafer's characterization of both (MP) and (AL) as:

1) Languages, each entailing:

2) A theory of mind, with (MP) involving a stress on Cartesian dualism, and (AL) requiring a shift to an
emphasis on action and its modes; and

3) A theory of explanation, with (MP) involving a
stress on Newtonian mechanics, and (AL) requiring a shift
to an emphasis on reason.

Subsequently, we provided formulae for interpreting
both the theory of mind and the theory of explanation at the
core of (MP) and (AL), respectively. And, further we situated
Schafer's program in relation to his incompatibilist and
fundamentalist theses.

2.4 Appendix to 2: Main Abbreviations

In sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2:

"MPa" for "metapsychology qua language"
"MPb" for "metapsychology qua theory of mind"
"MPc" for "metapsychology qua theory of explanation"
"M-properties" for "psychological states and processes"
"M-terms" for "terms definable in relation to M-properties"
"E" for "explanation", as in "E1"
"D" for "definition", as in "D1" and "D"

In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2:

"ALb" for "action language qua theory of mind"
"ALc" for "action language qua theory of explanation"
"A-properties" for "covert and overt behavior"
"A-terms" for "terms definable in relation to A-properties"
"R" for "rule" as in "R1", "R2" and "R3"
CHAPTER 3

THE ANALYSIS: PART B

3.0 Introductory

The claim central to Schafer's enterprise is that his (AL) is "more consistently applicable, more coherent, and more useful" than Freud's (MP). (NL, 372) That is, that (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP). But does Schafer present an argument which constitutes a proof for his claim. He does, invoking linguistic, philosophical contrasts drawn by Wittgenstein and Ryle.¹ On this basis, he presents an argued case for a change of language, involving a three-tiered strategy.

3.1 The Features of Schafer's Strategy

In what follows I shall elucidate the logical features of Schafer's backing for his central claim by tracing the steps in Schafer's strategy; bringing out, in the process, Schafer's use of Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses.

3.1.1 The First Tier

The first step in Schafer's strategy is to show that (MP) is a language, paralleling Schafer's (AL). To this end, Schafer invokes a contrast drawn by Wittgenstein between
philosophy and natural science, according to which the method of philosophy is essentially a priori, comprising a system of linguistic rules, whereas the method of science is essentially empirical, entailing a complex of truth-value propositions.  

Now in line with this contrast Schafer holds that, like his (AL), Freud's (MP) is "not a natural science" (NL, 362) but "a philosophical enterprise." (NL, ix) Of course, while the language rules of (MP) are centered around structures (mind) and determinants (causes), those of (AL) are centered around reasons. As Schafer writes:

Adopting these alternatives, one does not give up trying to understand and explain human activity systematically. The only question is how one is to do it, that is, what rules one is to follow and how.... (NL, 203)

The two sets of rules with which we are most concerned here are those that center around causes and those that center around reasons: (NL, 203)

But what, for Schafer, is the function of these rules, which define (MP) no less than (AL) as a language. It is this: rules are a precondition for

i) achieving a systematic approach to knowing anything, including knowing anything psychoanalytically (NL, 4)

ii) establishing criteria for the following: what shall count as facts, factual coherence... ascriptive limits... consistency and relevance in our psychological discussions: (NL, 4)

Rules then, for Schafer, are a condition for the
possibility of psychoanalytic discourse. And in this discourse statements involve either: a) the expression of psychoanalytic principles, or b) the application of such principles.

Of the former, Schafer says:

The propositions I am advancing are not descriptive, empirical propositions; they are definitions or rules that establish the logic of this psychological language. (NL, 139)

Of the latter, he writes:

...there are no phenomena accessible to us in which the subject has not already played a part. The very statement of these phenomena, must already subscribe to some language rules, rules that establish the kind of reality within which phenomena may be stated. (NL, 201)

That is, "it is all a matter of the rules of language used, not of the facts." (NL, 226-7)

Schafer's deployment of Wittgenstein's contrast, in developing his characterization of Freud's (MP) as a language paralleling his (AL), is captured in the following passage:

In referring to metapsychology as a language, I am following Wittgenstein's conception of language as a set of rules for saying things of the sort that constitute or communicate a version of reality or a world. Here, I shall note two important points only in passing: one is that the words constitute and communicate have the same meaning in this context (Pears 1969), and the other is that, for psychoanalytic purposes, the idea of reality must be understood to include psychic reality, too. (NL, 4)

3.1.2 The Second Tier

The second step in Schafer's strategy is to show that Freud's (MP) is inadequate. The source of its inadequacy is,
for Schafer, this, that (MP) rests both on: 1) a mistaken theory of mind, and 2) a mistaken theory of explanation. Let us take these in turn.

1) The mistaken theory of mind issues from Cartesian dualism, and finds expression in (MP) thus: For every actor \( a \), and every action \( A \), 'a does \( A^1 \)' or 'a does \( A^2 \)' iff '\( A^3 \) acts upon \( a \)', where i) \( A^1 \) refers to \( M \)-properties such as thought and feeling or \( A \)-properties such as behavior and deeds; and \( A^3 \) refers to unconscious regulatory structures or processes. And ii) statements of the form 'a does \( A^1 \)' cannot be translated without residue, into statements of the form 'a does \( A^2 \).

2) The mistaken theory of explanation issues from Newtonian mechanics, and finds expression in (MP) thus: For every actor \( a \) and every action \( A \), and every cause \( C \), the explicandum 'a does \( A \)' is explicated iff the explicans takes the form 'a does \( A \), given \( C \)'; where i) \( C \) constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for \( A \), ii) \( C \) and \( A \) are logically distinct actions, iii) \( C \) renders \( A \) appropriate from a's point of view, and iv) \( C \) renders \( A \) intelligible for us.

In attempting to establish (1) Schafer draws upon a contrast found in Ryle between talk about minds and talk about bodies, where: a) to assimilate talk about minds to talk about bodies is to commit a category mistake, and b) to speak of mental events as preparations for bodily
events is to fall prey to an infinite regress.²

Schafer contends, in view of this contrast, that Freud's (MP) is inadequate. It is inadequate, in this instance, because, given its Cartesian features, it both commits the category mistake in (a), and falls prey to the infinite regress in (b).

With respect to the first error, Schafer says regarding analysts' talk about 'the mind',

Where is a thought? We can locate neural structures, glands, muscles, and chemicals in space, but where is a dream, a self-reproach, an introject? If one answers, 'In the mind,' one can be making a meaningful statement in only one sense of mind, namely, mind as an abstraction that includes thinking among its referents. In this sense, there is no question of spatial localization. To argue otherwise about 'in the mind' is to be guilty of reification, that is, to be mistaking abstractions for things. For mind itself is not anywhere.... (NL, 159)

And, concerning their talk about resistance, he writes:

Sometimes one encounters the proposition that it is the analytic process that the analysand is resisting. Freud spoke of analysis as a process that is set going by the analyst and then takes its own course (1913a, p.130). But this is only a manner of speaking, for, in using it, one is personifying the abstract concept of process in much the same way that one might personify other abstractions, say fate, love, or history, and in the same way that one might speak of 'the resistance,' as I mentioned earlier. Logically, the analysand can only resist specific pressures that are among the complex and extended series of interactions that constitute the analytic process. She cannot resist the process itself. To say that one can do so is to commit what Ryle (1949) called a category mistake.... (NL, 216)

With respect to the second error, Schafer says:

...it is not necessary to assume that an action, in the sense of whatever is carried out behaviorally,
spoken, or thought, must have been prepared by some immediately preceding mental activity that sets the stage for that action. It is common to assume that specific mental activity must be based on a preparatory phase. Freud and analysts after him have assumed that mental activity is first carried out unconsciously or preconsciously and is raised to consciousness or invested with conscious quality only by a special additional act - the direction toward it of attention catheexis. (NL, 225)

But, Schafer contends "these assumptions entail an infinite regress...." Since "if a thought spoken aloud or to oneself requires its own preparation, then the preparation itself, being mental in some aspect, also requires its own preparation - and the infinite regress is launched." (NL, 226)

In attempting to establish (2) Schafer draws upon a contrast found in Wittgenstein between reasons and causes, where, as Schafer puts it: 5 "causes are the conditions under which one will perform a certain action, while reasons are the statements one makes in answer to the question why one has performed a certain action." (NL, 229)

Schafer contends, in view of this contrast, that Freud's (MP) is inadequate. It is inadequate, in this instance, because, given its Newtonian features it offends against this distinction, by explaining human actions in terms of causes, rather than in terms of reasons. "In this approach, subjective experience, meaning, action, and so forth are merely phenomena which require translation into mechanistic terms in order to be endowed with theoretical significance." (NL, 227) But, as Schafer argues:
...references to causality are inconsistent with psychoanalytic explanation; for logically the ideas cause and psychodynamics imply each other, both of them following from a precommitment to explanation along Newtonian lines. The idea of action is free of these implications. (NL, 195)

3.1.3 The Third Tier

Having established the inadequacy of Freud's (MP) by invoking linguistic, philosophical contrasts found in Wittgenstein and Ryle, Schafer proceeds, on the strength of his incompatibilist thesis, to exemplify his (AL), by applying it to a variety of cases. His efforts here yield, for example, the following list:

1A. It was an old anger you finally got out.
1B. You finally acted angrily after all this time.

2A. You broke through the internal barriers against your feelings of love.
2B. You finally did not refrain from acting lovingly.

3A. Your chronic deep sense of worthlessness comes from the condemning inner voice of your mother.
3B. You regularly imagine your mother's voice condemning you, and agreeing with it, regard yourself as being essentially worthless.

4A. Your underlying reason for being superficial is to avoid the shame about your past that haunts you.
4B. The unacknowledged but crucial reason why you dwell on obvious or trivial matters is this: if you did not do so, you would be shaming yourself about your past, over and over again; your contrived obviousness and triviality is your alternative to doing so.
Consider the left column, which contains explanations of the sort required by Freud's (MP). For Schafer, statements here, used by analysts, involve "spatial metaphors" which function i) "to designate mental actions" and ii) to "objectively describe how mental actions are performed." (NL, 172) This way of speaking reinforces the false view in the analysand that "one's being a person is essentially an account of spatial locations." (NL, 173) Such talk, as a consequence, is undertaken "only at great expense to rational understanding." (NL, 173) This, for Schafer, is a dualistic and mechanistic discourse: referring "...to inside [and] outside, structures and its variants (barriers, limits, boundaries, etc.), introjection and introject, and affects as moving or moveable quantities that are implicitly objectlike and animate." (NL, 174) That is, this discourse, required by Freud's (MP), and exemplified by the items in the first column, pictures the "mind as a matter of places, currents, quantities, barriers, and interactions - in short, as a spatial entity containing other localizable entities and processes." (NL, 162)

Consider next the right column. It contains translations of the sort required by Schafer's (AL). As renderings
or statements contained in the left column, they serve to reinforce the correct view in the analysand that being a person is essentially "an account of the kinds of actions that one performs." (NL, 173) This - that is, (AL) - is "the ideal language for interpretation" since it avoids "treating actions as spatial and personalized entities." (NL, 174) Indeed, the emphasis here is on "designating actions and modes of actions." (NL, 198) Consequently, in view of the discourse required by (AL), and embodied in the second column, "the analyst addresses the analysand neither as a mind in which thoughts and feelings happen nor as an apparatus in which mechanisms operate, but as a person who acts knowingly and emotionally." (NL, 149)

Such, then, is Schafer's three-tiered strategy, grounded in Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses, and deployed in Schafer's effort to establish his central claim that his (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP).

3.2 The Structure of Schafer's Argument

Having elucidated the logical features of Schafer's strategy, isolating three tiers, figuring in this strategy, I shall now exhibit the main and supporting arguments underpinning it.
3.2.1 The Main Argument

The main argument underpinning Schaefer's strategy may be exhibited in premise-conclusion format as follows:

P1) Qua language, (MP) is inadequate.

P2) If, qua language, (MP) is inadequate, then (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP).

Therefore:

C3) (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP).

The following two points should further elucidate Schaefer's reasoning, here.

i) As exhibited, (P1) involves a complex proposition, whose elements are:

P.1.1) (MP) is a language

P.1.2) (MP) is inadequate

Now in Schaefer's strategy the truth of these dual components of (P1), and thus the truth of (P1) itself, is seen as being entailed by certain linguistic, philosophical contrasts. These sub-arguments may be displayed thus.

3.2.2 The Supporting Arguments

First, the sub-argument for (P.1.1):

P.1.1a) If there is a linguistic, philosophical contrast, which entails that (MP), no less than (AL), is a language, then (MP) is a language.
P.1.1b) There is a linguistic, philosophical contrast (drawn by Wittgenstein), which entails that (MP), no less than (AL), is a language.

Therefore:

P.1.1) (MP) is a language.

Second, the sub-argument for (P.1.2):

P.1.2a) If there are linguistic, philosophical contrasts, which entail at once the inadequacy of (MP) and thus the adequacy of (AL), then (MP) is inadequate.

P.1.2b) There are linguistic, philosophical contrasts (drawn by Ryle and Wittgenstein, respectively) which entail at once the inadequacy of (MP) and thus the adequacy of (AL).

Therefore:

P.1.2) (MP) is inadequate.

ii) In (P2) is carried a logical point, reflected in Schafer's incompatibilist thesis. The incompatibilist thesis marks a distinction between (MP), in relation to which it is inconsistent to speak of reasons, since it centers around causes (NL, 103), and (AL), which, since it centers around reasons, rules out causes in principle. (NL, 340)

Hence (P2) expresses a logical point which amounts to this: that (AL) in focusing on reasons and (MP) in focusing on causes, posit fundamentally opposing procedures for characterizing and explaining human actions, based on logically incompatible assumptions. Thus, the truth of the presuppositions of the one establishes its adequacy, and
thus the falsity of the presuppositions of the other, and so its inadequacy. The logical hiatus, here, is entailed, in Schafer's view, by the incommensurability of reasons and causes, and by the respective emphases of (AL) on the former and (MP) on the latter. For Schafer, the inadequate stress of (MP), given its false assumptions about the nature of action and explanation, augurs the adequacy of the stress of his own (AL). Schafer's reasoning here, in connection with (P2), may be exhibited as follows:

P.2.1) If explanations in terms of a) reasons and b) causes are incommensurable, then given the falsity of (MP's) assumptions about the importance of (b) for the understanding of human action, (MP) is inadequate, and (AL) which, by contrast, stresses the importance of (a) for the understanding of human action, is adequate.

P.2.2) Explanations in terms of (a) reasons and (b) causes are incommensurable. (The incompatibilist thesis)

Therefore:

P.2.3) Given the falsity of (MP's) assumptions about the importance of (b) for the understanding of human action, (MP) is inadequate, and (AL) which, by contrast, stresses the importance of (a) for the understanding of human actions, is adequate.

Therefore:

P.2) If, qua language, (MP) is inadequate; then, (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP).

Such, then, is the structure of the main and sub-arguments informing Schafer's strategy. Let us turn now to a critique of this strategy.
3.3 Recapitulation

We undertook to elucidate the logical features of the strategy Schafer deploys, in his effort to support the claim fundamental to his whole enterprise; namely, that his (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP). To this end, we:

1) isolated three tiers, which, figure in Schafer's strategy, drawing attention to Schafer's use of Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses; and

2) displayed, in light of (1), the principle and ancillary arguments underpinning Schafer's strategy.

3.4 Appendix to 3: Main Abbreviations

In section 3.1.2:

"A" for "action"
"a" for "actor"
"C" for "cause"

In sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2

"P" for "premise", as in "P1" and "P2"
"c" for "conclusion", as in "C3"
"MPb" for "metapsychology qua theory of mind"
"MPC" for "metapsychology qua theory of explanation"
"M-properties" for "psychological states and processes"
"M-terms" for "terms definable in relation to M-properties"
"E" for "explanation", as in "E1"
"D" for "definition", as in "D1" and "D2"
CHAPTER 4

THE CRITIQUE

4.0 Introductory

We must now assess the strategy, deployed by Schafer, in his attempt to establish the claim central to his program, namely, that his (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP), that his (AL), as contrasted with Freud's (MP) is useful (therapeutically efficacious) and systematic (theoretically sound). In appraising Schafer's strategy, we shall focus both on the backing (premises) relevant to his central claim (conclusion) and on the claim itself. Here, we shall ask not only whether this backing yields a sound argument, issuing indeed from veridical premises, but also whether independently of its backing, the claim is true.

4.1 The Main Argument

As a prelude to putting these questions, let us restate the main argument underpinning Schafer's strategy. The argument runs thus:

P1) \textit{qua} language, (MP) is inadequate

P2) If, \textit{qua} language, (MP) is inadequate, then (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP)

Therefore:

C3) (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP).
It is noteworthy that (P1) involves a complex proposition, whose elements are:

P1.1)  (MP) is a language
P1.2)  (MP) is inadequate

We are now in a position to begin our appraisal of the main argument informing Schafer's strategy.

4.2 The First Premise

This premise, as we have seen, is a compound proposition, containing twin claims; thus, it may be divided into (P1.1) and (P1.2). Schafer's support for his claim that Freud's (MP) is a language (P1.1) rests on the application of a linguistic, philosophical contrast, which he takes as entailing that Freud's (MP) no less than his - Schafer's - own (AL) is a language.1 Whereas Schafer's support for his claim that Freud's (MP) is inadequate (P1.2) rests on the application of two linguistic, philosophical contrasts, which he takes as at once entailing the inadequacy of Freud's (MP) and the adequacy of his - Schafer's - own (AL).2

There are some very serious worries about Schafer's application of these three contrasts, in support of his premise 1. But, first, a note about the contrasts themselves. There are:
C1) A contrast found in Wittgenstein between science and philosophy. This contrast is drawn frequently by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein writes:

Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.³

Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.⁴

The point here, in brief, is this: that the philosopher's questions do not entail "claims to know, supported by evidence, as scientific claims are supportable."⁵ Rather "the philosopher's questions are conceptual, and that means he approaches reality through language."⁶ The aim in view of (C1), then, is to mark this distinction: "the method of philosophy is essentially a priori, the method of science is essentially empirical."⁷

C2) A contrast found in Ryle between mind talk and behavior talk. Ryle's view on the failure of Cartesianism to observe this contrast is this:

It is... a category-mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."
The contrast requires a) that we do not treat, as
does Cartesianism, "disposition terms such as 'believe',
'voluntary', or 'angry', as if they denote private mental
occurrences."\textsuperscript{10} Here "to say we have a certain disposition...
is to assert, simply, that our conduct is 'law-like', in that
it follows a regular pattern."\textsuperscript{11} And b) that we do not treat,
as does Cartesianism, the "intelligent conduct of serial
operations" as entailing this:

...the agent must have had from the start a plan or
programme of what he is to do and he must continuously
consult this plan as he progresses.\textsuperscript{12}

For "constructing and consulting plans are themselves
serial operations intelligently and consecutively prosecuted"
and "it would be absurd to suggest that an infinite series
of serial operations must precede the intelligent performance
of any serial operation."\textsuperscript{13} Such, then, is the thrust of (C2).

C3) A contrast found in Wittgenstein between
reasons and causes.\textsuperscript{14} Wittgenstein's
contrast has become almost a commonplace
among philosophers. Wittgenstein writes:

But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion?...
One might rather say, I feel that the letters are the
reason why I read such-and-such. For if someone asks
me 'Why do you read such-and-such?' - I justify my
reading by the letters which are there.\textsuperscript{15}

...giving the reason why one acts in a particular way
does not involve finding the causes of one's actions
(by frequent observations of the conditions under which
they arise).\textsuperscript{16}

This approach marks a distinction between talk about
actions in view of the agent's reasons for acting and talk
about actions in terms of the stimuli, which trigger a
response on the part of the agent. Thus explaining a) why a man lies on a particular patch of grass is quite different from explaining b) why a woman blushes. Here, (b), unlike (a), does not take place in accordance with the agent's reasons; it is something that happens to the agent rather than (as in (a)) something that the agent does.

Hence, understanding in the case of (a) requires that we cite "the statements one makes in answer to the question why one has performed a certain action." (NL, 229) Whereas understanding in the case of (b) requires that we "state the conditions under which one will perform a certain action." (NL, 229) And in the case of (b) the condition might comprise someone's mentioning the young man the woman secretly loves. Here, however, we are prone to error. As Wittgenstein puts it:

The double use of the word 'why', asking for the cause and asking for the motive, together with the idea that we can know, and not only conjecture, our motives, gives rise to the confusion that a motive is a cause of which we are immediately aware, a cause 'seen from the inside', or a cause experienced.17

The contrast — (C3) — requires, then, that we do not assimilate reasons to causes; viz. that we do not reduce reason explanations to causal explanations.

In brief, three linguistic-philosophical contrasts underpin Schafer's claim that, qua language, his (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP). These, as was seen, are:
C1) A contrast found in Wittgenstein between science and philosophy.

C2) A contrast found in Ryle between mind talk and behavior talk. And,

C3) A contrast found in Wittgenstein between reasons and causes.

Next, there is the matter of Schafer floundering in his use of these contrasts.

Schafer's conception of his theories as having derived from Wittgenstein and Ryle should not obscure the ambiguities and tensions that exist between Schafer's (AL) and the contrasts of the latter two thinkers.

Schafer seems on one level to use the contrasts appropriately and on the other level to make moves that the contrasts disallow. Schafer's use of Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses is, thus, not always a perspicacious one. He often appears to: i) misapply the contrast or ii) misunderstand the contrast.

I have divided his misuses into two sets. The first set I have labeled misapplications. Here Schafer's use of the contrasts requires assumptions that are inconsistent with the contrasts themselves. The second set I have labeled misunderstandings. Here Schafer's use of the contrasts overlooks the upshot of the contrasts for gainsaying his own (AL). Let us consider these two sets of misuses in turn.
4.2.1 Misapplications

Schafer's seemingly incoherent use of the science/philosophy contrast (C1) is expressed thus. He accepts (C1) (and this is the appropriate use) to disengage his (AL) from disputes as to whether psychoanalysis is either empty (irrefutable) or false (refutable). However, he proceeds under the aegis of (C1) to develop (and so to misuse the contrast) an ideal language (AL), which defines or constitutes the world, and which is prescriptive rather than descriptive with respect to ordinary discourse. (NL, 363-373)

Schafer's latter use of (C1) presupposes, wrongly, that for Wittgenstein this sort of linguistic enterprise (AL) is legitimate and thus free of linguistic confusion. But for Wittgenstein the role of philosophy is not to construct such languages, for its task is not positive, but therapeutic. "Our language continuously ties new knots in our thinking." 18 Thus, for Wittgenstein, if it is not the task of philosophy to build languages such as (AL), then, its task is to disentangle the knots that such a language may tie in our thinking.

Here, thus, in seeking to establish that Freud's (MP) no less than his - Schafer's - own (AL) 'is a language (Pl.1), Schafer assumes that (C1) (the contrast between science and philosophy) is conclusive. In speaking of (MP) as a language, Schafer has in mind a philosophical theory, embodying a set of language rules, "a systematic approach to knowing anything." (NL, 4) Here, Schafer attempts to show that Freud's view that his (MP) comprises a science is mistaken, since (C1) entails his - Schafer's - view that both (MP) and (AL) are languages.
However Schafer's use of this contrast is valid only if it is assumed that

A1) For some theory T, if T is a philosophical theory, then T is not based on linguistic confusion.

But the alternative expressed in (A1) viz. assumption 1) is excluded by (C1). To be sure, Wittgenstein shows (as Schafer stresses) that philosophical discourse is governed by, or embodies a complex of rules. On this score Wittgenstein observes:

The philosopher is concerned with language in the same way as we talk about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing the physical properties.¹⁹

However, Wittgenstein also shows (as Schafer misses) that philosophical discourse is based upon linguistic confusion. Here, in undertaking philosophical therapy, Wittgenstein's strategy is to bring the philosopher to see "that his difficulties stem from the fact that his questions are based on linguistic confusions, that he is led to ask them only because he has yielded to the temptation to exemplify expressions outside the context which gives them their meaning."²⁰

Second, in seeking to establish that Freud's (MP) is inadequate (P1.2), Schafer assumes that both (C2) (the mind talk/behavior talk contrast) and (C3) (the reasons/causes contrast) are conclusive. But as was the case with his use of (C1) (the science/philosophy contrast), Schafer employs (C2) and (C3) in an ostensibly incoherent manner.

Hence, Schafer accepts (C2) (for legitimate use) to drive a wedge between his own (AL) and Freud's (MP). However, he then (and this signals the illegitimate use) proceeds 1) to define (AL) as including achievements — viz. seeing
and remembering — or to assimilate such achievements to actions — viz. looking and hunting; and ii) to argue that we ought not to take achievements as measuring performances. (LI, 197-198) But surely I score a success, if my looking ends in my seeing.²¹ Schafer's latter use of (C2), presupposes, wrongly, that, for Ryle, this kind of assimilating of achievements to performances is legitimate.

Again, Schafer accepts (C3) (for legitimate use) to drive a wedge between causal explanations and reason explanations. However he then proceeds (illegitimately) to blunt the contrast by redefining causes, contra Wittgenstein, in psychological rather than linguistic/behavioral terms. (NL, 230) In Wittgenstein's approach, there is a focus "on the rule-bound nature of language and the social character of rules."²² But Schafer's latter use of (C3), presupposes wrongly that, for Wittgenstein, this kind of disassociation of reason from the linguistic/behavioral context — of rules which comprise forms of life — is legitimate. Let us pursue the matter of Schafer's use of (C2) and (C3) in a more (logically) detailed manner.

Concerning (C2), Schafer takes it as at once entailing the inadequacy of (MP) and the adequacy of (AL). For Schafer (MP) presupposes the truth of Cartesian dualism, which results in (MP's) being committed to i) assimilating talk about minds to talk about bodies, and ii) requiring that talk about various stages of behavior be linked to talk about earlier stages of preparatory mental activity. Whereas, (AL) holds iii) that "mind is something we do" (NL, 113) and iv) that "each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior [is] some kind of activity, henceforth to be called action." (NL, 9)
Here, Schafer attempts to show both that (C2) entails that Freud's (MP) is inadequate, since the theory which it presupposes is false, committing in (i) a category mistake, and leading in (ii) to an infinite regress; and that (C2) entails that Schafer's (AL) is adequate, resting as it does on (iii) and (iv). Yet Schafer's use of this contrast is valid only if it is assumed that

'A2) For any $\emptyset$, if $\emptyset$ is a case of 'Xing', then $\emptyset$ is a performance (an action), where for 'Xing' may be substituted verbs such as 'seeing' or 'remembering'. (NL, 139)

However, for Ryle (A2) (viz. assumption 2) is mistaken. He not only shows (as Schafer stresses) that there are errors attendant upon (i) and (ii), but also (as Schafer misses) that not every case of 'Xing' is a case of acting. He holds, for example, that 'see' and 'remember' are not process words or activity words; they do not denote actions or reactions; rather, they are achievement words. These words are "used to report success or failure in the performance of a task, rather than to report the performance itself." That is: words such as 'see' or 'remember' do "have an importance in our talk about the mind, but these verbs... do not refer to activities going on at all." In brief, for Ryle, to 'see', not unlike to 'remember', is "parallel to winning a race, as distinct from running one." 25

Now, as was the case with (C2), Schafer takes (C3) as at once entailing the inadequacy of Freud's (MP) and the
adequacy of his - Schafer's - own (AL). For Schafer (MP) presupposes the truth of Newtonian mechanics, which result in (MP's) being committed to i) explaining human action in terms of causes, and ii) reducing reasons to causes, in accounting for such action. Whereas (AL) holds iii) that human actions must be explained in terms of reasons - "reasons that are, in essence, redescriptions that make actions comprehensible," (NL, 204) and iv) that "references to causality are inconsistent with psychoanalytic explanation," (NL, 195) in light of which explanations of human action are answers to why-questions. restate within the context of psychoanalysis. (NL, 203-4) However, Schafer's use of this contrast is valid only if it is assumed that

A3) For any action A, A is meaningful independent of (and thus can be explained without reference to) a social network of rules and practices.

But (C3) fixes our understanding of action (and its explanation) at a point which excludes (A3) (viz. assumption 3). No doubt Wittgenstein (as Schafer stresses) marks off reasons from causes, and cautions us against reducing the former to the latter when explaining human actions. Yet Wittgenstein also holds (as Schafer misses) that reasons and meaning presuppose a network of rules; that, since actions are rule-governed, to explain an action is to refer it to some set of norms, standards, or practices in terms of which the action is described and thereby rendered intelligible. On this view, action is understood only within the larger framework of a form of life,
viz. within "the context of practices in which rules are obeyed, criteria employed [and] policies... observed." 27

4.2.2 Misunderstandings

First, when invoking (Cl), in his attempt to establish his claim that Freud's (MP) no less than his (AL) is a language, Schafer fails to see that (Cl) has the consequence of showing false his own (AL). For, (AL) presupposes

Al) For some theory T, if T is a philosophical theory, then T is based on linguistic confusion.

In view of (Al), Schafer attributes an altogether positive role to his own philosophical language. He writes:

...I am developing a clinically useful and systematic alternative to metapsychology. (NL, xi)

My project of devising an action language to serve as a new language for psychoanalysis falls within the great and arduous tradition of systematic and clinically oriented psychoanalytic thinking.... (NL, xi)

But (Al) offends against (Cl), which Schafer takes as conclusive. For the upshot of (Cl) is that linguistic confusion plays a central role in the formulation of philosophical theories. "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling not when it is doing its work." 28 Indeed, given (Cl), Schafer's (AL) may be analyzed as being based upon a linguistic confusion, in which doings are assimilated to actions. This is captured in the following:
...to think of something is to do an action; to see or remember something is to do an action; to be silent or otherwise inactive is as much an action as to say something or to walk somewhere. (NL, 139)

Attendant upon Schafer's linguistic confusion, his failure to observe the distinction between doing and acting, there is lost the practical, everyday contrasts between: i) thought and action, ii) achievement and performance, and iii) passivity and activity.

Second, when deploying (C2) and (C3), in his effort to support his claim that Freud's (MP) is inadequate, Schafer fails to see that both (C2) and (C3) have the consequence of showing false his own (AL).

Given Schafer's acceptance of (C2) and (C3) as conclusive, it follows that his (AL) is inadequate, since (AL) presupposes both that

A2) For any φ, if φ is a case of 'Xing', then φ is a performance (an action), where for 'Xing' may be substituted verbs such as 'seeing' and 'remembering' (NL, 139)

And

A3) For any action A, A is meaningful independent of (and thus can be explained without reference to) a social network of rules and practices.

In line with (A2), Schafer concludes:

"Only these human phenomena are not actions that are bodily changes, motoric or otherwise, that take place essentially as normal or pathological neuro-physiological processes. (NL, 139)

But (A2) violates the distinction built into (C2), essential to which is the view that there are cases of 'Xing' which count as achievements, not as performances (actions)."
Here 'seeing' and 'remembering' are achievement verbs, like 'finding' or 'winning', and indicate the scoring of an investigational success.

In line with (A3), Schafer holds

[Action language] does the same type of explanatory job that psychic determinism and other physiochemical and biological language rules are supposed to do....

(NL, 211)

...its interpretations concern human beings engaged in actions in various modes, particularly in the unconscious, infantile psychosexual, aggressive, and defensive modes. (NL, 362)

But (A3) violates the distinction contained in (C3), crucial to which is the position: that it is essential in the explanation of human actions that such actions be seen as rule-governed and thus as occurring against a backdrop of norms and practices, which render them - the actions - intelligible.

Now the point here amounts to this: in seeking to establish his (P.1), viz. the claim that Freud's (MP) no less than Schafer's own (AL) is a language, Schafer accepts as conclusive and so applies (C1), (C2) and (C3), each of which has the unintended but fatal consequence of showing false an assumption - (A1), (A2) and (A3) respectively - central to his own (AL); and thus, of entailing the inadequacy of (AL) itself.
4.3 The Second Premise

Premise 2 embodies Schafer's incompatibilist thesis which involves the claim that (AL's) reason explanations and (MP's) causal explanations are mutually exclusive. Here, for Schafer, "references to causality are inconsistent with psychoanalytic explanation." (NL, 195) Indeed explanation, in this instance, must refer to reasons – viz. "the statement one makes in answer to the question why one has performed a certain action." (NL, 229)

In what follows, I propose 1) to consider an argument, embodied in Apel's (and Habermas') complementarity thesis, in favour of the necessity of providing causal explanations – of human action – of the sort required by Freud's (MP); and 2), to show that (AL's) reason explanations far from being diametrically opposed to (MP's) causal explanations are, in effect, masked explanations of the latter type.

4.3.1 Complementarity

In view of Apel's and Habermas' complementarity thesis, Schafer's incompatibilist thesis rests on the mistaken assumption that:

a) the agent's self-understanding is complete.

Against (a), Apel holds: there are factors of human history, which:
...are not, as motives, subjectively transparent but are merely factually effective and can only be analysed by means of a quasi-objective explanatory science. While Habermas contends:

Psychoanalysis... achieves more than a mere treatment of symptoms, because it certainly does grasp causal connections... at a point 'which has been made accessible to us by some very remarkable circumstances.' This is precisely the point where language and behavior are pathologically deformed by the causality of split-off symbols and repressed motives. If (a) were the case, then reason explanations would be the only source of truth about an agent's actions. If, to paraphrase Apel, the agent was completely lucid about his intentions, then his actions would be rendered wholly transparent by the clarification of his reasons for acting.

But, whereas a reason explanation is the source of truth about an agent's actions, his actions are not thus rendered wholly transparent. For such explanations exclude references to

b) i) causal connections, and ii) causally determined reified processes.

By contrast, Freud's (MP) provides causal explanations of (ii) within the context of (i). Here: (i) comprises the framework of energetic and structural concepts jettisoned by Schafer - viz. 'split-off motives' and 'split-off symbols'. These represent "motivational compulsions that have become independent of their context, that proceed from need dispositions that are not sanctioned by society." And (ii) comprises the
agent's pseudo-nature or second-nature; viz. his 'compulsive processes' or his 'abnormal modes of speech and behavior'. In connection with (b), Apel writes:

...the ambiguity of symbols in psychoanalysis is... the object of quasi-causal and quasi-functional explanation in terms of a quasi-nomological theory of energetic processes.

While, on this score, Habermas says:

...the causal connection between the original scene, defense, and symptom is... anchored in the... spontaneously generated invariance of life history, represented by the repetition compulsion....

Such an approach to explanation posits (i) as providing a framework for the causal explication of (ii). In this approach, an essential element of psychoanalytic explanation is its vocabulary of causes, which accounts for the agent's self-objectification (as seen in the expression of his unconscious in repetition-compulsion), by linking it with a miscarried self-formative process, a fractured individual life-history. Here:

The meaning of observed actions, symbols, etc., can only be adequately understood in terms of the underlying unconscious factors which caused the actor to act as he or she did... systematic reference must be made to experiences which are initially opaque to the patient.

This kind of emphasis has the consequence of
c) deepening the agent's self-understanding.

For it goes beyond the agent's "understanding of the world and himself and does not merely emphatically reconstruct... his inner experiences." Causal explanations pierce the
facade of reasons to retrieve unconscious wishes and motivations. Causes are stressed, here, only in the interest of understanding the agent better than he understands himself and thereby potentially increasing his self-understanding. But Schafer contends that this kind of stress 1) "establishes a world in which there could never be an analysand," (NL, 211) and 2) leads to "a subhumanizing and dehumanizing mode of considering human activity as though it were the workings of a machine." (NL, 232)

But Schafer is doubly wrong here. First, far from eliminating or negating the agent, the kind of explanation proffered by Freud's (MP) effects the agent's self-recovery, insofar as it brings him to "reflect on his symptoms as offshoots of his own action." Second, the goal of this kind of explanation is not to control the agent as an objectified process, but rather to render his actions fully transparent. Thus, as Apel writes:

...when the therapy is entirely successful the very causes of compulsive behavior which were supposed by quasi-causal explanation, are eliminated, with the aid of the reflective-self-application of that explanation by its subject-object.

Or, as Habermas puts it: "psychoanalysis "proves its explanatory power in self-reflection, in which an objectification that is both understood and explained is also overcome." Thus, in appropriating the psychoanalytic explanation, the agent at once sees his (say) compulsive behavior as caused and the agent eclipses, qua causal process, the miscarriage or rupture from
which his compulsion issued.

In light of Apel's and Habermas' complementarity thesis, thus, Schafer's incompatibilist thesis — and thus his premise 2 — is false. For in advancing explanations of the agent's actions, the analyst must go beyond merely elucidating the agent's reasons, if such explanations are to play a role in emancipating the agent from split-off forces, which, functioning as causal determinants, exert an unacknowledged influence over him.

4.3.2 Ambivalence

In Schafer's program of developing a new language for psychoanalysis (AL) to supplant the old language (MP), two quite different points are meant by, or given as the meaning of, 'explanation'. The one point is that to explain an agent's action is to cite his reasons for acting. This yields a reason explanation of the type, in Schafer's view, offered by his own (AL). The other point is that to explain an agent's action is to cite the causes which are preconditions for his acting. This yields a causal explanation of the type, as Schafer holds, advanced by Freud's (MP).

Whereas (AL) represents, in appearance, a shift from explanation in terms of causes, as proffered by (MP), to explanations in terms of the agent's reasons, (AL), in reality, comprises a reclassification of causes with reasons. Thus,
(AL) speaks about reasons in the psychoanalytic vocabulary of causes, rather than in the intentionalistic vocabulary of the agent. That Schafer's (AL) is thus haunted by the specter of Freud's (MP) can be seen in the ambivalence that marks Schafer's program. This ambivalence is expressed in:

1) Schafer's oscillation between incompatible theses, and
2) Schafer's forcing on to reason explanations features that attach to causal explanations. Let us consider these in turn.

1) Schafer speaks throughout one phase of his program, of the need for 'another language' to replace Freud's (MP), and of his having "chosen to attempt to develop an alternative" to (MP). (NL, 7) During this phase, he writes:

   a) I took a strong stand against the established view that Freud's metapsychology must remain the language of psychoanalytic theory, and I began my argument in favor of action language as an alternative. (NL, 19)

   In a similar vein, he says:

   I intend to show that at its very best this metapsychology does not stand up to close scrutiny; for only by reaching this goal, and not by pointing out the short-comings of lesser or derivative or more problematic efforts, may one justifiably take the stand that what we have been used to working with is not good enough and that alternatives must be developed. (NL, 20)

At this juncture, Schafer makes it clear that Freud's (MP) is systematically and clinically flawed and thus must be supplanted by his - Schafer's - (AL).

Further, in inveighing against the reductionistic tendencies of (MP), he contends:
b) It is inconsistent with this type of scientific language to speak of reasons... reasons become forces.... (NL, 103)

It is herein, for Schafer, that Freud's (MP) is fatally flawed, since its reductionism gives rise to the 'discrepancy problem' in psychoanalysis, where metapsychologists who are in the analytic situation specifically concerned with subjective experience, translate such experience into the language of functions and causes.

Next, during this phase of his program, Schafer contends that (AL) explicates the agent's actions from his point of view, by exhibiting his reasons for acting. Schafer's (AL), thus, refers not to

c) the conditions under which one will perform an action; but to the statements one makes in answer to the question why one has performed a certain action. (NL, 229)

Surely (c) no less than (b) and (a) are central to, or constitute essential features of, Schafer's program.

However, during a subsequent phase of his program, he writes:

a¹) subtraction is not the point of my project: its point is redefinition, which means that we shall be working with a revised conception of psychoanalytic theory, not a lesser conception of it. (NL, 124)

But this is at variance with his (a), which entails that his (AL) is intended to supplant (MP) simpliciter. Rejecting (MP) now, becomes refining features of it.

Here, too, Schafer concedes that

b¹) Any systematic language entails a limiting and reductive approach to the manifold possibilities
of constituting (not 'representing') phenomena. Thus, those who object to any such limiting and reduction are, in effect, objecting to any systematic thinking at all. (NL 373)

Yet this is out of step with his (b), which implies that reductionism is a fatal defect present in Freud's (MP) and absent from his (AL). Now we are told that this worrisome feature, or defect, necessarily inheres in both (MP) and (AL).

Again, during this subsequent phase of his program, Schafer holds that reason explanations involve

\[c^1\]... a shift of conceptual organization such that the action to be explained is subsumed under some other term... thus an apparently aggressive action may be explained as a sexual one... (NL, 203)

This, finally, is incompatible with his (c), which defines (AL's) concerns as structured around the agent's reasons, as advanced in justification of his actions. Indeed, in view of (c^1): A) what is referred to in a reason explanation is not the reason offered by the agent for his action; but, rather the real reason, compresent with the former reason, and yielded in this case, by the psychoanalytic vantage point. And B) what is designated in this context as a reason explanation is, in effect, a disguised causal explanation. But, more on this latter point, below.

2) Schafer, in executing his program, relates to reason explanations features that express causal explanations. For here, under the guise of Schafer's claim that the set of reason explanations includes those of his (AL) and excludes
those of Freud's (MP), the following transpires:

i) Reason, as action, is defined in terms of situation. "Thus these four terms—meaning, action, reason and situation... co-define or co-constitute each other." (NL, 232).

ii) Situation is linked to regularities, involving 'law-like behavior'. Thus "there is a fundamental assumption on which we base explanation in terms of reasons. This assumption is that whenever one sees oneself as being in the same situation, one will react in the same way," (NL, 231) or "under certain conditions, people perform certain emotion-actions or act in certain emotion-modes." (NL, 339)

iii) Regularities are situated within the psychoanalytic context, where reasons are established by (say) restating the action and situation "from the vantage point of castration anxiety" or "as being unconscious incestuous." (NL, 204)

iv) The psychoanalytic context is imbued with a principle of determinism according to which "one must always seek to establish reasons of human activity—the reasons why people do the things they do... and the reasons why they do them in the way they do, e.g. unconsciously, emotionally, or only in fantasy." (NL, 228)

The mechanism generating this sequence (i-iv) is Schafer's reworking of language. Thus he curtails the application of the word 'cause' and substitutes for its present application that of the word 'reason'; so that the word 'reason' begins to apply to those factors, to which the word 'cause' applies in the repudiated (MP). Here reason explanations are given the features and function of causal explanations.

Now, to the degree that Schafer's program, is marked by the ambivalence expressed in (1) and (2), to the degree, that is, that reasons are made to assume the features and function of causes, to that degree the cleavage between (AL) and (MP),
that Schafer's incompatibilist thesis posits, is cancelled out. Given this, his premise 2, which requires such an opposition, is false.

4.4 The Conclusion

(AL) comprises an adequate alternative to (MP).

In assessing (MP), Schafer says:

As the official metalanguage of theoretical psychoanalysis, metapsychology has always received the lion's share of creative and critical attention, and so it has evolved into a complex set of rules governing the choice and use of terms and the framing and interrelating of propositions about human development and conflict. Many features and consequences of this set of rules lack clarity, consistency, and necessity or relevance.... (NL, 362)

No doubt clarity and consistency are, for Schafer, theoretical values present in his own (AL), and thus reflecting its adequacy, but absent from Freud's (MP), and so revealing its inadequacy. But Schafer is wrong here. For, if Freud's (MP) is flawed by 1) ambiguity, 2) incoherence, and 3) inconsistency, then, Schafer's (AL) is no less flawed. In what follows, I shall bring out just these features (1) and (2) of Schafer's (AL), having already revealed (3) elsewhere.

4.4.1 Ambiguity

Schafer fails to command a clear view of the character of his own program. He saddles himself with incompatible descriptions of what he is doing. Thus his deployment and description of his (AL) leaves it ambiguous as to whether (AL)
is i) a factual doctrine, open to refutation (of the sort which disestablishes empirical theories), in which observation and experiment play a part; or ii) a linguistic doctrine, concerned with definitions and the formal consequences of definitions. This ambiguity is expressed in at least three ways.

Case 1. The ambiguity in this case centers around the questions as to whether or not (AL) expresses truth-value propositions about the world. Here we find Schafer committed to both:

a) As a set of rules for saying things, a language is not subject to tests of truth or falsity; viz. neither metapsychology nor action language is true or false. (NL, 372)

b) ...action language is truer than metapsychology. (NL, 372)

His commitment to (a) yields the view that Schafer's (AL) expresses a set of semantic claims involving i) his definition of the terms 'action' and 'emotion', and ii) his inferences from (i) concerning such locutions as 'a strong ego' (NL, 9) and 'I feel' (NL, 290), respectively. In keeping with this view Schafer writes:

...in undertaking this project I am not required to present an empirical psychology of specific emotions; rather, I must define and work out the principal problems involved in using action language consistently in discussing emotions. (NL, 267)

Such passages, and the bulk of Schafer's attendant analyses, indicate that Schafer's (AL) evolves a language of emotions structured, not around empirical questions about the
facts of our emotional life, but, rather, around linguistic questions about the meanings conveyed by the concept of emotion.

By contrast, Schafer's commitment to (b) yields the view that his (AL) expresses a set of truth-value propositions, involving an empirical investigation of the emotions, an investigation in which observation plays a decisive role. In this connection, he acknowledges:

It might be argued that to follow the action rules would be to eliminate any basis for deciding on the truth value of propositions concerning emotion. One might insist that, before one can legitimately say of any emotion-proposition that it is objective or true, one must be able to point to some it to which the emotion-words correspond. (NL, 273)

And, subsequently, he concedes: "the it to which the verb and adverbs correspond is the set of actions and modes in question; establishing these, we establish what the emotion is." (NL, 273)

Here Schafer proceeds in a manner which indicates that his (AL) is vulnerable to challenges concerning its truth or falsity.

It is in his oscillating thus between (a) and (b) that Schafer leaves it ambiguous as to whether (AL) constitutes a (i) linguistic, or a (ii) factual, doctrine.

Case 2. The ambiguity in this case centers around the issue as to whether (AL) is (iii) a theory as to the nature of the mind, central to which is the claim that "there are no conscious states or processes or private objects;" viz. 51 metaphysical behaviorism. Or, on the other hand, (iv) a
doctrine as to the nature or function of talk about the mind, in view of which "the meaning of mind predicated... can be analyzed without remainder into statements about... publicly observable behavior," viz. logical (or analytic) behaviorism. \(^{52}\)

Now, on the one hand, Schafer writes:

c) One shall regard every psychological process, event, experience, response, or other item of behavior as an action, and one shall designate it by an active verb or an adverbial locution that states the mode of this action. \(^{(NL, 363-4)}\)

The sentiment here and elsewhere is that:

...we shall not use the verb to have in relation to psychological activity, for, in using it, we should be implying that things and thinglike entities are the referents of psychological propositions. \(^{(NL, 11)}\)

Schafer's acceptance of (c), marks off his (AL) from (iii), and indicates that (AL) attempts to provide (in the manner of (iv)) behavioral criteria for the application of psychological terms, assuming that psychological expressions can be translated, without loss of meaning, into behavioral expressions. Schafer's procedure here takes as preeminent the question: what are the behavioral criteria for the application of locutions such as 'x is afraid' and 'x is angry'? Here questions of this sort are answered in terms of 'x's behavior' (viz. x's action and its modes), yielding a reduction of psychological language to relevant behavioral criteria. \(^{(NL, 277-292)}\)

Yet, on the other hand, Schafer urges that:

d) ...the mind is something we do... \(^{(NL, 133)}\) e.g., thought is silent speech... I should say silenced speech. \(^{(NL, 138)}\)
Accordingly, he claims that:

Mind is itself not anywhere... It is a pure abstraction; viz. where is a thought? We can locate neural structures, glands, muscles, and chemicals in space, but where is a dream, a self-reproach, an introject? (NL, 159)

Schafer's acceptance of (d) points up a contrast between his (AL) and (iv), which signals that (AL) attempts to provide (in the manner of (iii)) explanations of psychological phenomena by reference to behavior, on the assumption that psychological phenomena are nothing but behavioral states and processes. Schafer's procedure here takes it as a fact that what one regards as mental states or processes are nonexistent. This yields, in his (AL), a reduction of psychology to the investigation of data, gleaned from the observation of behavior.

Doubtless, Schafer misconstrues what he is doing in executing his program, he wavers between advocating (c) and advocating (d), leaving it ambiguous as to whether his (AL) is comprised of (iii) or of (iv).

Case 3. The ambiguity, in this instance, arises in connection with the issue as to whether (AL) is v) concerned "with the description of language as it actually is," viz. descriptive linguistics; or vi) "with the proposal of a logically superior conceptual system as an alternative to it," viz. legislative linguistics. The former concern (v) yields reportive analyses, reflecting what we mean when we say such and such. Whereas the latter concern (vi) yields
stipulative analyses, reflecting what we ought to mean when we say such and such. 55

Now Schafer takes the position that

e) ...we shall have to compose this alternative language out of words which, through common use, we have already endowed, even though not always as richly, with significant and extensive personal connotations. (NL, 6)

Further, he holds that

...we shall have to codify certain usages that are familiar, direct, evocative, and plastic.... (NL, 6)

Here (e) pictures (AL) as providing (within the framework of descriptive linguistics), analyses, based on an observation of how we ordinarily use certain words. Thus, reflecting (e) are such repertive analyses as:

1. ...in saying, 'I feel like playing tennis' one is likely to mean, 'I would do a lot to play,' 'it would please me to play.' 'I'm eager to play,' 'I'm looking for a chance to play,' 'I hope I'll get a chance to play,' or, finally, by indirection, 'Would you like to play?' (NL, 289)

2. ...in certain contexts one says, 'I feel like crying,' when one means, 'But for the consideration that this or that problem would arise if I cried, I would cry.' (NL, 290)

3. When we say, 'I am pleased,' 'He was sad,' or 'They'll be sorry,' we are using to be as a linking verb between the subject and an emotion-adjective. (NL, 292)

In fine, (e) and its attendant analyses (1-3) indicate that (AL) involves the determination of how psychological terms are, in fact, used in pertinent language games, revealing, rather than changing, the meaning of such terms, as used in this context.
But elsewhere Schafer adopts the contrary view. He
claims that

f) The propositions I am advancing are not descriptive,
empirical propositions; they are definitions or
rules that establish the logic of this psychological
language. (NL, 139)

This view is allied with the following:

The separation of emotional experience from action and
situation is untenable... this interpenetration or
codefinition of action, situation, and emotion is not
empirical; it is conceptual, logical, a priori.
Consequently, the assumption of invariant connections or
lawful connections must be rejected in principle.
(NL, 340)

Here (f) represents (AL) as offering (within the framework
of legislative linguistics), analyses, the aim of which is to,
correct the language we presently use (ordinary usage), by
adumbrating alternative ways of speaking. Thus expressing
(f) are such stipulative analyses as:

1. ...we do speak of states of happiness, confusion,
despair, frenzy, hypomania, and so on.... In action
language, however, we would simply speak of certain
actual or conditional, overt or covert emotion-
actions and emotion-modes that may be observed or
inferred repeatedly, continuously, regularly, predict-
dably, or something of that sort. (NL, 307)

2. We say of fear that it grips us, strikes us, betrays
us, paralyzes us, and overw helms us.... In contrast,
we render fear in action terms through the adverb
fearfully and the verb to fear. (NL, 285)

3. ...in action language, the only proper emotion-words
are verbs and adverbs, we must reject the idea that
there is some entity called emotion to be experienced.
The idea of subjective experience of emotion can refer
only to one or both of two things: actions, including
the action of thinking about emotion-actions and action-
modes, and modes of action.... (NL, 301)
In brief, (f) and its ancillary analyses (1-3) indicate that (AL) involves the imposition of a general theory of the meaning of psychological terms upon pertinent language games as they are actually played, changing, rather than revealing the meaning of such terms, when they are used in this context.

But (e) and (f) pull Schäfer's (AL) in divergent directions. The former (e) commits (AL) to offering elucidations of the sort 'when we say... we mean...'. Whereas the latter (f) commits (AL) to providing analyses of the form: 'When we say... we ought to mean...'. Indeed, Schäfer's implementation of his program is marked by an oscillation between (e) and (f), leaving it ambiguous as to whether his (AL) requires the practice of (v) descriptive, or (vi) legislative, linguistics.

4.4.2 Incoherence

"By no accepted definition can action language be considered a theory. It is a method of organizing and presenting data. The theories here are those of Ryle and Wittgenstein, particularly the latter's codefinition of action, meaning, reason, and situation." Although true, this statement of analyst Alvin Frank's should not lead us to overlook the fact that there are two kinds of theory embodied in Schäfer's program. These are:

1) Those theories derived, as Frank indicates, from linguistic philosophy - viz. Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses. And

2) Those theories derived, consistent with Schäfer's foundationalist thesis, from Freudian psychoanalysis.

On occasion Schäfer creates the appearance that, on the basis of (1), he is both: i) rejecting (2) and ii) developing
his action language as an alternative (theoretical and therapeutic) to (2). It is (i) that provides the backdrop for Schafer's Wittgensteinian and Rylean critiques of Freud's (MP), of transitional theories in psychoanalysis, and of ordinary discourse. It is (ii) that provides the context for Schafer's translations of clinical data in terms of his (AL) and for his imposing his (AL) on clinical material.

Schafer's procedure here - as reflected in (i) and (ii) - should not conceal the fact, often unacknowledged by Schafer, that in attempting to execute his program, he draws perhaps inordinately, upon (2). Consider here the following.

a) The boy made fun of the girl when she sat down to urinate. (NL, 203)

b) He was laughing because she forgot to put the toilet seat in place before she sat down to urinate.

c) He giggled, pointed and sneered at the girl when she sat down to urinate.

d) He was avoiding thinking consciously, fearfully, and excitedly of his being castrated himself. (NL, 204)

Here we ought not to miss two features. The first feature is that i) both in style and content Schafer's analyses of the sort a) into b) and a) into c), derive from Wittgenstein and Ryle. Schafer's analysis of (a) into (b) issues from Wittgenstein's reasons/causes contrast, where reasons are explicated in terms of justification. Whereas Schafer's analysis of (a) into (c) issues from Ryle's mind talk/behavior talk contrast, where mental states and processes are explicated
in terms of actions. Here, in both cases, explanation is tantamount to redescription; either in terms of the reason offered by the agent for his action, or in terms of overt behavior.

And the second feature is that ii) Schafer's analysis of a) into d) has the Wittgensteinian or Rylean style of clarification by translation or redescription, but a Freudian content: in this case the theory of the Oedipus complex. But Schafer employs other such theories. For example, the theory of incest, in the following translation of e) into f):

e) He was impotent when he attempted sexual intercourse. (NL, 204)

f) Unconsciously he viewed intercourse as a filthy and destructive invasion of his mother's womb... (NL, 204)

If we miss the shift from the former (i) to the latter (ii) kind of analyses, as Schafer does on occasion; then, given Schafer's commitment to (1), viz. linguistic philosophy, we might be led into thinking that Schafer's break with (2), viz. Freudian psychoanalysis, is far more radical than it is in reality.

It is Schafer's oscillating between (i) and (ii) that has led to the puzzlement of analysts such as Frank, who wonders: "How can one understand Schafer's ambiguities and alternating emphases?" Frank perceives the effects of this oscillation in Schafer's work thus:
First, he is clearly enthusiastic and unambivalent regarding action language's application to the data of the clinical situation. Then he extends his compelling arguments to its actual use with patients as the language of interpretation (and as everyday language). Suddenly he pulls himself short and assumes a conservative posture consistent with current ideas of correct technical attitudes and practices. He cannot, however, maintain the conservative posture. In no time at all he again considers the clinical possibilities of his innovative and radical approach.

Puzzlement of the sort experienced by Frank when approaching Schafer's work is removed, if we see Schafer not as Frank saw him (and as he tends to see himself) as drawing on "contemporary philosophical studies of action concepts, mind and existence;" (LI, 8) but, contrariwise, as executing a project based, it would seem, incoherently on incompatible analysis (i) and (ii), required by his commitment to both:

1) Those theories derived, as Frank indicates, from linguistic philosophy - viz. Wittgensteinian and Rylean theses. And

2) Those theories derived, consistent with Schafer's foundationalist thesis, from Freudian psychoanalysis.

The tension between (1) and (2) is experienced by Schafer (and transmitted to analysts such as Frank), whenever Schafer in view of his (2) proceeds to offer analyses of the form (a) into (d) or (e) into (f). For, here Schafer begins to feel the constraints of (1) and its requirement of analyses of the form (a) into (b) and (a) into (c). And so Schafer recoils, disappointing the reader such as Frank.
And thus Schafer continues to advance and retreat, to offer the analysis (the translation) and to withhold it; to approach the object (the Freudian (MP)) and to withdraw from it.

4.4.3 Alternating Emphases

Schafer's conception of his theories as having derived from Wittgenstein and Ryle should not obscure the parallels between his approach and that of Habermas. Although Schafer disavows any substantive link with the phenomenological/hermeneutic approach (LI, 7), there are methodological parallels between Schafer's approach and that of Habermas as reflected in the latter's 'depth hermeneutic' reconstruction of Freudian psychoanalysis. In our continuing attempt at assessing Schafer's (AL), we shall consider the alternating emphases between it and Habermas' reconstruction, in point of psychoanalysis. We shall compare these two approaches in view of their conceptions of the following:

1) psychoanalysis as derived from clinical/descriptive data; and

2) psychoanalysis as involving narrative explanation/structure

4.4.3.1 Psychoanalysis As Derived From Clinical/Descriptive Data

For Schafer, psychoanalysis is grounded in a data language—viz. (AL). The data for (AL), its starting point, is "a person
who does things, a being who performs a great variety of actions." (LI, 187) The role of the analyst here, for Schafer, is obvious: "one describes actions." (LI, 187) And

In doing so, one uses verbs and adverbs to describe the person doing things. One renounces both the use of mentalistic nouns, such as structure, function, force and drive, and the use of the adjectives that qualify these nouns, such as weak, strong, autonomous and rigid. (LI, 188)

The question that guides the analyst's descriptions here is: "What is this person doing?" Of the things that the analysand can be described as doing, these are: i) mental acts, such as remembering, wishing, and believing (LI, 189), and ii) emotional acts, such as loving passionately or hating inhibitedly (LI, 188). For Schafer, psychoanalysis, so conceived, excludes Freud's (MP), since psychoanalysis requires a rigorous description and interpretation of its clinical data. Here, the nature of psychoanalysis "can only be obscured by the adoption of a preestablished metatheory based on mechanistic concepts far removed from practice; which is the kind of metatheory that metapsychology items from." (LI, 176)

Two critical points issue from Schafer's remarks here. And whereas Schafer sees the first as entailing the second, Habermas would reject the second, while accepting the first. The two points are:

a) psychoanalysis must stay close to its data base; and

b) metapsychology plays no role in the description and interpretation of clinical data
First (a). For Habermas psychoanalysis derives from data yielded by the communication between analyst and analysand. In this dialogue i) the analysand's account of his behavior "include meanings which remain opaque due to distortion and repression;" and ii) the analysand possesses fragmentary information about himself.

The analyst's role, given (i) and (ii), is to develop a general interpretation with a view to removing the opacity in (i) and filling the gaps in (ii). Here "with a generalized narrative schema as a background, the physician attempts to combine the fragmentary information obtained in the analytic dialogue and to offer suggestions for a story that the patient himself cannot tell." Here, a generalized narrative structure makes it possible for the analyst to give interpretations, geared to reconstructing the analysand's life history, and thus to lifting its opacity and healing its ruptures.

Second (b). But for Habermas — and here he parts company with Schafer — it is the utilization of Freud's (MP) that provides the narrative structure on the strength of which the analysand's ruptured self-formative process is reconstructed. For Habermas, thus:

Only the metapsychologically founded and systematically generalized history of infantile development with its typical developmental variants puts the physician in the position of so combining the fragmentary information obtained in analytic dialogue that he can reconstruct the gaps of memory and hypothetically anticipate the experience of reflection of which the patient is at first incapable.
Hence, both Schafer and Habermas see psychoanalysis as issuing from a data base yielded by the analytic dialogue. However, Schafer holds that Freud's (MP) (unlike Schafer's (AL)) plays no theoretically sound or therapeutically useful role with respect to this data base (since the data base logically excludes (MP)). 62 Whereas, Habermas considers (MP) as a prerequisite for the therapeutic development of dialogue, given the initial data base (which logically presupposes (MP)).

4.4.3.2. Psychoanalysis As Involving Narrative Explanation/Structure

For Schafer, in psychoanalysis a narrative structure is constructed in view of i) a personal past and ii) a present subjective world; both, as required by Schafer's (AL), are comprised of actions. "In this comprehensive sense of action, both setting aims and pursuing them are actions; both sitting still and moving are actions; both remembering and repressing are actions." (LI, 19)

The personal past (i) is a Freudian past - viz. "organized around personal versions of the major and typical sexual and aggressive conflicts of early childhood." (LI, 9) The principles of organization here are the child's bodily categories: Such categories are based on organs (mouth, anus, genitalia), substances (feces, urine, milk, blood), movements (sucking, fingering, straining, falling), and contacts (kissing, clinging, hitting). (LI, 9)
Likewise, the present subjective world (ii), is the Freudian present — viz. a present appropriated through the use of Freudian categories. It is "the psychic reality the psychoanalyst takes up under the aspects of transference, resistance and acting out." (LI, 15)

But an interpretative circle obtains between (i) and (ii). For knowledge of (i) presupposes knowledge concerning (ii); whereas knowledge of (ii) requires information about (i). Thus, the analyst uses (psychoanalytic) knowledge, in one or another of its versions, when listening to the analysand, thinking what that person is likely to have gone through in order to have arrived at his or her present distinctive plight. But at the same time the analyst is already conceiving that present plight in terms that reflect the psychoanalytic account of human development. (LI, 12)

Hence the principles that Schafer hopes to formulate, complete, and justify by the investigation into the analysand's life history are already employed during, or are involved in the investigation itself. "For, working within the Freudian circle, one cannot investigate and interpret the present subjective world without the understanding to be gained through historical investigation and interpretation." (LI, 15)

However, thinking within the Freudian circle does not presuppose, but rather excludes, reference to causality. "Thinking historically, we do not say an agent is causally motivated to perform some action by all the relevant factors in the historical background of that action." On the contrary, "speaking of the historical factors that we consider relevant
to the event, we do not designate them as the causes of the agent's action." Rather "we use them to define the actions, say, as a belated and displaced revenge on a younger sibling."

(LI, 56)

In brief, for Schafer, a) psychoanalysis provides a narrative structure which includes (i) a personal past and (ii) a present subjective world, where, in view of the Freudian-interpretative circle, (i) and (ii) methodologically imply (or require) each other. And b) the psychoanalytic narrative structure excludes any reference to causality. Let us pass now to a consideration of Habermas' relation to (a) and (b).

For Habermas, psychoanalysis provides a systematically generalized narrative, which is historical. It "is a systematically generalized history of psychodynamic development that serves as a 'narrative foil' for the reconstruction of individual life histories." Such a narrative structure is made possible by Freudian metapsychology, which permits

the representation of conflicts in terms of the defense mechanisms, and of personality structures in terms of the relations between ego, id and super ego.

Against the backdrop of metapsychology, a narrative structure is developed, which "must be used in each case as an interpretative scheme for an individual's life history in order to find the original scene of his unmastered conflict."

If for Habermas there is a nexus between the developing of a narrative structure and the application of metapsychology; then, for him, there exists a further link between the application
of metapsychology and the understanding of the individual case history in terms of causal connections. Thus, in explaining the analysand's symptoms, the analyst relates his interpretations to "an assumed causal connection," which "exists between a past conflict situation and compulsively repeated reactions in the present (symptoms)." Here, in contrast to hermeneutic explanation, adequate explanation in psychoanalysis can only be developed on the strength of explanations involving causal connections. Thus, Habermas, in attempting to unite "linguistic, analysis with the psychological investigation of causal connections," turns to Freudian metapsychology, which, for him, "unfolds the logic of interpretation in the analytic situation of dialogue."

In fine, both Schafer and Habermas i) see psychoanalysis as derived from a clinical data base, and ii) consider the development of narrative structures as indispensable to psychoanalysis. Yet there are crucial differences between these two thinkers. These are:

1) On the question of the relationship of psychoanalysis to its data base, Schafer holds that (MP) (unlike (AL)) disengages psychoanalysis from its data base. Whereas, for Habermas (MP) organizes and provides the logic of interpretation for the data base of psychoanalysis. And,

2) On the question as to the nature of narrative structures Schafer holds that narrative structures (as generated by (AL)) exclude references to causality. Whereas, for Habermas, narrative structures (as generated by (MP)) include references to causality.
Schafer's ambivalence toward the tensions and dilemmas that exist within psychoanalysis was perceived by Douglas Levin, who, on this score, said: "... unresolved dilemmas and paradoxes... exist (will always exist) in science."\(^{72}\) I think Levin saw the failure of Schafer's enterprise - the irrelevance of his (AL) - in terms of its retreating from the attempt to develop psychoanalytic knowledge by relating to, and working through, its inherent subject/object tension, as does 'say) Habermas. In this vein, Grolnick, an analyst, writes:

As a theorist, Schafer seems to be among the least traditional of the reactive analysts.... By trying to circumvent the will, determinism, and natural versus cultural - science controversies, he tends to subvert the developing dialectic... though inevitably his rather antipodal work will serve as a stimulus to others.\(^{73}\)

By contrast Habermas (and Apel), as a theorist, advances a principle of complementarity, which issues in the view that: "the fact that psychoanalytic constructions are themselves interpretations demonstrates a certain kinship with the hermeneutic method."\(^{74}\) Whereas "the fact that these constructions can function as explanatory hypotheses with regard to symptoms indicates an affinity with causal analytic methods."\(^{75}\)

4.5 Recapitulation

To the end of assessing the strategy Schafer deploys in his attempt to establish the claim that his (AL) comprises an adequate alternative to Freud's (MP), we fastened on the main
argument underpinning Schafer's strategy. Accordingly, we set ourselves the task of considering these queries:

1) Is the main argument sound?

2) Is the main argument's conclusion, independently of the issues raised in (1), true?

And we found that, both (1) and (2) are to be answered in the negative. It emerged, thus, that the backing for Schafer's claim is inadequate and that the claim itself is false.

4.6 Appendix to 4: Main Abbreviations

In sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2

"C" for "contrast", as in "C1", "C2" and "C3"
"A" for "assumption", as in "A1"; "A2" and "A3"
"T" for "theory"

In sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2

"S" for "systematically", as in S-relevant
"C" for "clinically", as in C-relevant
"C" for "criterion", as in "C1" and "C2"
CHAPTER 5

EPILOGUE: A DIAGNOSIS

...philosophical statements mislead when by the use of like expressions for different cases, they suggest likenesses which do not exist, and by the use of different expressions for like cases, they conceal likenesses which do exist. (John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p. 41)

Schafer's action language embodies his attempt to execute a linguistic turn in psychoanalysis structured around philosophical contrasts gleaned from Wittgenstein and Ryle. In taking the linguistic turn, Schafer seeks to deal with the 'discrepancy problem' in psychoanalysis, by going beyond psychoanalytic revisionists, who, in their effort to bridge the gap between Freudian metapsychology and the therapeutic process, offer something new but something Freudian in nature. Unlike the revisionists, Schafer undertakes to jettison Freudian metapsychology simpliciter. But, as was seen in my critique above, Schafer's program proves abortive.

But the failure of his program may be linked, in the end, to two residual defects.

1) Underlying Schafer's program of providing a new language for psychoanalysis is a complex of views about the nature of his (AL). Not the least significant of these views are:

a) Action language establishes the facts, in advancing its translations; e.g. "the it to which the verbs and adverbs correspond in the set of actions and modes in question; establishing these we establish what emotion is." (NL, 273)
b) Action language specifies the facts; e.g. (AL) "makes it possible to specify in a relatively unambiguous... way... psychological facts and relations." (NL, 123)

c) Action language constitutes the facts; e.g. (AL) involves rules which "establish what shall count as facts." (NL, 4)

d) Action language codifies the facts; e.g. "the type of... locutions I am emphasizing are widely used anyway; my aim is to systematize them as an action language." (NL, 175)

These tensions, not unlike those exhibited in my critique above, mar Schafer's program, and are to be explained, in the end, by reference to a fundamental defect, initiated by Schafer's commitment to two mutually incompatible assumptions about the relationship between his (AL) and the world. These are:

R1) The ultimate psychological facts, once clearly known, provide criteria of the form into which the (AL) must be cast.

R2) The (AL), once clearly formulated, parallels, or reflects the structure of the ultimate psychological facts.

Here, whereas (a) and (c) and (b) and (d), respectively, are compatible; (a) and (b) and (c) and (d), respectively, are not. And this result is linked with (R1) and (R2) thus: whereas (R1) requires (b) and (d); (R2) requires (a) and (c).

The tensions in question are thus generated by Schafer's commitment to both (R1) and (R2).

ii) What cuts across Schafer's alternating emphasis on (R1) and (R2), respectively, is this: the belief that the
alternate psychological facts are action and its modes.

And here Schafer saddles himself with a commitment to behaviorism, which he attempts to mask, since it undercuts his claim that his (AL) solves the 'discrepancy problem' generated in psychoanalysis by Freud's (MP). Schafer attempts to obviate this defect, by masking his commitment thus. He marks off his (AL) from behaviorism in terms of his (AL's) requiring, in explanation, a shift to 'psychic reality', while it transpires that a) 'psychic reality' is coextensive with 'situation', (NL, 231) and b) situation admits of a characterization in causal terms. For

...there cannot be more than one reaction to one situation and... there cannot be more than a relatively narrow range of similar reactions to a group of relatively similar situations. (NL, 231)

And this constitutes a commitment to behaviorism, which Schafer, himself, perceives as entailing, in explanation, a shift from meaning to causes. (NL, 89)

Given this, Schafer's characterization of transitional theoretical programs in psychoanalysis is equally apposite to his own (AL):

...they are responsive to the shortcomings of the established language, and they amount to searches for, and the partial achievement of, something better and yet something Freudian in nature. (NL, 20-1)
Although Schafer fails in his effort to situate psychoanalysis within the parameters of linguistic, philosophical theses, the content of his (AL) and his concern to evolve an alternative grounding for (MP) raise real possibilities for further inquiry. Aspects of such an inquiry should include:

i) Increasing concern in psychoanalytic discourse with the active subject, "an agency that stands outside of the play of psychic forces and the elimination of functions and mechanisms." The concept of the person, as a purposive agent, an integrative entity, is a necessary feature of the psychoanalytic framework. Indeed

the interpreting analyst does not address himself to a mechanism, but to a person as a human being. Similarly, it is not ego as structure or organization of functions that enters into a therapeutic alliance, but rather the integral person. [This] concept [is] necessary to psychoanalysis....

Schafer's action language offers a model for the systematic inclusion of the concept of personhood into psychoanalytic discourse. Here, "as an account of human behaviour which accommodates such concepts as 'action', 'self', and 'responsibility', Schafer's analysis points in a direction which psychoanalytic thinking must take...."

ii) Sustained effort at evolving a descriptive account of the therapeutic structure, process and experience, which transcends the dualistic-mechanistic heritage, in psychoanalysis. On this score, Meissner writes:
Schafer's argument demonstrates convincingly that successful rethinking of psychoanalytic concepts requires a return to the data with the resource of a descriptive language and with formulated rules for the systematic application of that language.

Thus embedded in (AL) is a perspective on analytic experience, entailing "a return to and clarification of descriptive data," which "cannot help but exercise a healthy, modifying and corrective influence on psychoanalytic theory."

Emerging attempts to map new parameters for a cross-discipline dialogue between psychoanalysis and philosophy. This dialogue should pivot on alternative conceptions of the relevance of philosophy to psychoanalysis, on divergent views as to the role of philosophy in the formulation and solution of problems arising in psychoanalysis. Marcia Cavell Aufhauser welcomes Schafer's "implicit invitation to philosophers to join [this] conversation." Embodied in my thesis, is my response, qua philosopher, to Schafer's invitation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1. This challenge "...lies squarely within the tradition of normative philosophy of science." That is, it proceeds on the assumption "that it is possible to extract from actual scientific practice (historical or contemporary) norms for what should count as good science (or science at all) and that it is a legitimate contribution to the enterprise of science to attempt to use these norms in the assessment of particular cases of putative scientific practice. Within this framework, participants in the discussion can, of course, disagree vehemently about what the relevant norms are (witness the Popper-Grunbaum debate). Furthermore, having once fixed on a set of relevant norms, they can also dispute whether a particular, putatively scientific endeavor, such as psychoanalysis, does or does not satisfy these norms." Barbara Von Eckardt, "On Evaluating the Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 10 (October 1981), pp. 570-572.

2. For an extensive discussion of the various forms of this challenge, and a list of the main antagonist, see Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1959), which captures the earlier discussion of the 1950s and '60s; and the Nous, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (September 1980), Special Issue on Psychoanalysis, which underscores features of the current discussion, central to which is the Popper-Grunbaum debate, where "Karl Popper claims that psychoanalysis cannot be falsified and, hence, that it is not a science;" whereas "Adolf Grunbaum argues that some psychoanalytic hypotheses can be falsified and thus that Popper's criteria should be abandoned for his more stringent 'neo-Baconian' ones. By Grunbaum's criteria psychoanalysis has only an exceedingly weak warrant to claim scientific status." Jane Flax, "Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Science: Critique or Resistance?", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 10 (October 1981), pp. 561-569.

4. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
5. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Ibid., p. 249.


12. For a good example of recent discussion, expressing a challenge to psychoanalysis from within, see: Psychology Versus Metapsychology: Psychoanalytic Essays in Memory of George S. Klein, eds. Merton M. Gill and Philip S. Holzman (New York: International Universities Press, 1976). See also "Two Theories or One? Or None?" by Alvin Frank, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1979), pp. 169-207, for an attempt to undercut the challenge in question.


15. Ibid., p. 247.

16. The Cartesian and Newtonian features of Freud's (MP) will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

17. Schafer's deployment of Wittgensteinian and Rylean these's will be investigated in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

18. The linguistic, philosophical features of Schafer's (AL) will be considered in detail in Chapter 2.


22. Ibid., p. 307
23. Schafer's essay at evoking linguistic philosophy with a view to formulating and solving problems emerging in psychoanalysis (which I have dubbed as his linguistic turn), is reflected both in Schafer's A New Language for Psychoanalysis, a collection of papers written between 1970 and 1975 with some editorial changes; and in his Language and Insight. The Sigmund Freud Memorial Lectures 1975-1976, University College London (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978). The latter book does not "add substantially to the basic argument" of the former. Rather "it extends the range of topics to which Schafer applies his new approach." (R. Holt, "Review," The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (July 1979), p. 498.)

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. THE ANALYSIS: PART A


5. As a further example of the spatialization of mind, Schafer offers us Freud's treatment of affects in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety," Stand. ed., Vol. 20 (London: Hogarth Press). In Schafer's view, this kind of spatialization also informs the structural hypothesis, developed in Freud's "The Ego and the Id," Stand. ed., Vol. 19 (London: Hogarth Press). This hypothesis Schafer considers an 'archaic invention'. (NL, 162)


7. Ibid., p. 38.

9. Here Freud invokes "Newtonian forces to explain the workings of the psychic apparatus." That is, assuming that "forces move the mind as they move physical bodies in the environment," he sets up "the psychodynamic point of view, along with the economic and the structural, as an indispensable constituent of psychoanalytic explanation." (NL, 194) These points of view are described by Ernest R. Hilgard thus:

a) The Dynamic Point of View. This is perhaps the most widely understood aspect of psychoanalysis, and gives psychoanalysis its designation as a dynamic psychology. The general psychoanalytic propositions of the dynamic point of view employ the concepts of unconscious forces and conflicts, and the concept of drive or instinct. Contemporary psychoanalysts commonly refer only to the two specific innate drives of sex and aggression; other drives (if any) are thought to be derivatives of these.

b) The Economic Point of View. This is the point of view that all behavior is regulated by psychological energy, and concerns the principles by which psychological energy is disposed of. The term 'economic' means 'economical', that is, that psychological energies operate along paths of least effort, leading toward tension reduction and homeostasis.

c) The Structural Point of View. The structural point of view replaced the earlier topographic one. When Freud introduced the tripartite division of id, ego, and superego to displace (or supplement) the emphasis upon unconscious, preconscious, and conscious topography. More recently there has developed within classical psychoanalysis an emphasis known as ego-psychology in which various kinds of structure are proposed: e.g., defense-, control-, and means-structures. ("The Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis," The Freudian Paradigm, ed. Mujeeb-ur-Rahman (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1977), pp. 234-235.)


11. On the question as to whether (AL) per se represents a theory or a methodology, Alvin Frank writes: "By no accepted definition can action language be considered a theory. It is a method of organizing and presenting data. The theories here are those of Ryle and Wittgenstein..." "Two Theories or One? or None?", Journal of The American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1979), p. 200.


13. Ibid., p. 303.


15. Ibid., p. 304.

16. Ibid., p. 304.
17. Reasons (R) are, for Schafer, redescriptions of actions (A). "Essentially, in giving reasons for particular actions, that is, in explaining them, one restates these actions in a way that makes them more comprehensible" (NL, 210). Here (A), an action performed consciously, is rendered more comprehensible, by dint of its true redescription(s), the defensive action(s), performed unconsciously, namely: (R). Such redescriptions, in revealing that 'a's doing A' = 'a's doing R', establishes what the actor is 'really doing' (NL, 204). Consider the following descriptions:

(la) Jones is compulsively washing his hands.
(lb) Jones is undoing his wish to destroy his father.

Schafer holds that (la) = (lb); and that, as a true redescription of (la), (lb) comprises a reason for (la), elucidating (la) for us, no less than for Jones. Here thus: i) the only action that (la) consists in is (lb). For 'Jones' doing (la)' is, in these circumstances, his doing (lb). And ii) the question 'why is Jones doing (la)?' is intelligibly answered by 'Jones is doing (lb)', the latter providing us with the reason for his doing the former.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. THE ANALYSIS: PART B

1. For the view of analyst Alvin Frank concerning the nexus between Schafer’s (AL) and the theories of Wittgenstein and Ryle, see above, notes to Chapter 2, N. 11.

2. This contrast of Wittgenstein’s between science and philosophy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It is noteworthy that (AL) tends to embody a view of language more closely aligned with that of the Tractatus than with that of the Investigations. Yet it is the latter, not the former, text from which Schafer claims to derive his (AL). If Schafer misreads the latter text, he errs, perhaps, in his use of the former text as the prism through which to view the latter.

3. These twin features of Freud’s (MP) are elucidated in Chapter 2.

4. This contrast of Ryle’s between talk about minds and talk about bodies is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4.
5. This contrast of Wittgenstein's between reasons and causes is pursued further in Chapter 4.

6. For a discussion of Schafer's incompatibilist thesis, together with his foundationalist thesis, see above, Chapter 2, section 2.2. And, for a critique of Schafer's incompatibilist thesis, see below, Chapter 4, section 4.3.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 4. THE CRITIQUE

1. See, above, Chapter 3.
2. See, above, Chapter 3.
8. For a critique of this contrast, see C.W.K. Mundle, A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), section VI.


13. Ibid., p. 169.

14. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding this contrast, and a list of the main antagonists, see items included above in Notes to Chapter 3, N. 7.


17. Ibid., p. 15.


25. White, op. cit., p. 54.


29. For a discussion of Schafer's incompatibilist thesis, together with his foundationalist thesis, see above, Chapter 2, section 2.2; and Chapter 3, section 3.2.

30. Embodied in the complementarity thesis is the view that "...scientific, causal explanation, on the one hand, and the systematic understanding of meaningful human texts, institutions, and actions, on the other, are in fact complementary" John M. Connolly, "Review," Mind, Vol. XC, No. 360 (October 1981), p. 628.

31. "Following Habermas, Apel distinguishes three fundamental categorical 'cognitive interests':

a) the interest in manipulation and control of the environment;

b) the interest in communication with other human beings;

c) the interest in freeing oneself from constraints in the way of understanding oneself and communicating with others.

The distinction between (a) and (b) is used to differentiate the conceptual structures and methodologies of, on the one hand, natural science (which deals with natural laws) and social science (which deals with normative rules) and, on the other hand, different kinds of social science - those which focus directly on normative rules and those which are 'quasi-
naturalistic" ('quasi', because their naturalisticallystudied regularities presuppose an underlying rule-governed structure). These distinctions destroy the 'unity of science' advocated by positivist and Popperian philosophies of science. But Apel hopes to introduce a new conception of the unity of science based on interest (c), which is to be expressed in a 'critical-emancipatory', social science standing in a dialectical relationship to the naturalistic establishment of laws and the hermeneutic elucidation of normative rules. An essential feature of this conception is what Apel calls 'complementarity'. Peter Winch, "Apel's Transcendental Pragmatics", Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences, ed. S.C. Brown (Sussex: Harvester Press; New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 52-53.


35. Habermas, op. cit., p. 271.

36. Ibid., p. 271.


38. Habermas, op. cit., p. 271.

39. Apel, "Types of Social Science," p. 44.

40. Habermas, op. cit., p. 271.


42. Habermas, op. cit., p. 271.


44. Apel, Towards a Transformation, p. 68.


46. Apel, "Types of Social Science," p. 44.

47. Habermas, op. cit., p. 272.

48. It is noteworthy that divergent approaches to and conceptions of psychoanalysis mark the disparate programs of Schäfer, on the one hand, and Apel and Habermas, on the other. Thus, Schäfer rejects Freud's (MP) as being modelled on i) positivistically oriented sciences, such as Newtonian mechanics, and supplants it with his own (AL), which is in effect a ii) hermeneutically oriented science. Whereas, Habermas and Apel undertake to correct Freud's scientific misunderstanding of psychoanalysis in terms of (i), by exhibiting (as grounded in Freud's methodology) a conception of psychoanalysis as a (iii) critical science, incorporating or mediating (i) and (ii).
49. See, section 4.3.


52. Ibid., p. 48.


57. For a discussion of Schafer's Incompatibilist Thesis, see above, pp. 34-35.


62. It would appear that there is an incoherence, embedded in Schafer's (AL), which undercuts (AL's) claim to clinical relevance. This incoherence is generated by Schafer's employment of two significantly different criteria for therapeutic relevance. It is expressed on the one hand, in Schafer's alternatively: i) repudiating (MP) as therapeutically ineffective, and ii) reintroducing (MP) as playing a central role in therapeutic discourse. And, on the other, in his alternatively: iii) introducing (AL) as being therapeutically efficacious, and iv) disengaging (AL) from a central role in therapeutic discourse. (NL, 12, 20, 125, 174, 232)
63. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 203.
64. Ibid., p. 203.
65. Habermas, op. cit., p. 258.
70. Ibid., p. 254.
71. These causal connections are sometimes described by Habermas as embodying a 'quasi-causality'. In speaking thus, Habermas is not denying the existence and role of causes as operative in rupturing the self-formative process. Hence:
1) Habermas uses the term 'quasi-causes' to mark off repressed motives, impulses, instincts; namely, "split off symbols and defended against motives," which "unfold their force over the heads of subjects, compelling substitute gratifications and symbolization." (Habermas, op. cit., p. 255.)
2) These causes presuppose, or operate within, a normative context, in which they "make themselves noticeable as disturbances of habitual interactions: as compulsions, lies and the inability to correspond to expectations that have been made socially obligatory." (Ibid., p. 255.)
3) The linguistic mediation - viz. genetic explanation - of these causes lends to their being symbolically understood and thereby transcended. For 'quasi-causality' operates through the symbolic means of the mind, and thus can be overcome through the process of self-reflection. (Ibid., p. 255.)
72. This point was made by Dr. Levin in correspondence.
74. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 201.
75. Ibid., p. 201.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5. EPILOGUE: A DIAGNOSIS

1. For a discussion of Schafer's reduction of reason explanations to causal explanations, see above, section 4.3.2.
3. Ibid., p. 82.
6. Ibid., p. 308.
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