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The New Democratic Party in Québec, 1957-1963: "Une fausse fenêtre"

David H.E. Garon

A Thesis in The Department of History

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University Montréal, Québec

August 1990

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ABSTRACT

The New Democratic Party in Québec, 1957-1963:
"Une fausse fenètre"

David H.E. Garon

This thesis describes and analyzes the development of the Québec section of New Democratic Party from the inception of the New Party idea. It emphasizes Québec nationalism, lack of support from organized labour, and internal organizational difficulties as factors in the party's electoral failure and subsequent division in 1963. The author contends that, in Québec, the NDP was a "fausse fenêtre" - a fake window - added merely to complete the façade of an allegedly new pan-Canadian party which was actually a regional party based on support in Ontario and Saskatchewan.

The essay consists of one chapter of contextual material, followed by an historiographical chapter on previous literature specifically related to the New Democratic Party in Québec. In this chapter the limitations of the previous literature are explored and the themes for revision are identified. Four chapters of historical narrative and one conclusive chapter follow. These chapters are based on research in six party and labour archives, as well as a variety of newspapers and secondary sources, and constitute a significant revision and/or qualification of previous interpretations of the NDP's development in Québec.
Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to several people without whom this work could not have been completed. My wife, Marie Gauthier, played the most important rôle by supporting the project over several years. She was later joined in this by David Van Fraassen and Gregory Baum.

Dr. Van Nus has always been patient and good-humoured. John Laffey has also been extremely helpful. Cameron Nish and Stephen Scheinberg, members of my committee, suggested many valuable changes to my original draft. Many longtime friends in the department of history have provided intellectual and moral support.

I also remember the many kind and helpful people working in the Public Archives of Canada, the Service des Archives at UQAM, the Rare Book Room at McGill, and in the Concordia libraries' microform section without whose patience and cooperation essential primary work could not have been done. Many others might be named, but I have already been warned that my manuscript is too long.
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Conseil Provisoire of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec, August, 1961
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACECFC</td>
<td>Association des commissaires d'écoles de langue française du Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIQ</td>
<td>Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cooperative Commonwealth Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Canadian Congress of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Canadian Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conseil provisoire of the NPDQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Comité d'organisation provisoire of the NPDQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>Confédération des syndicats nationaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (later CSN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTQ</td>
<td>Fédération des travailleurs du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUIQ</td>
<td>Fédération des unions industrielles du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNP</td>
<td>National Committee for the New Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>New Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPDQ</td>
<td>Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Parti social-démocratique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSQ</td>
<td>Parti socialiste du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCNP</td>
<td>Québec Committee for the New Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIN</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Trades and Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPWA</td>
<td>United Packinghouse Workers of America (Packinghouse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USWA</td>
<td>United Steelworkers of America (Steel)</td>
</tr>
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Introduction

This study began under the direction of Dr. Walter Van Nus as a relatively brief research essay covering internal crises in the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec from the federal election of April 8, 1963, through the splitting of the party at the "congrès d'orientation" on June 30. The research essay was based on material from the Oliver papers, Boudreau papers, and NPDQ papers. In the preparation of that essay, significant factual and interpretative questions were raised by a close critical review of the main secondary source in the field, David Sherwood's unpublished M.A. thesis (McGill, 1965), "The New Democratic Party in French Canada 1961-1965". It was evident that a general revision was in order.

The present work concerns the history of the New Party in Québec in the period from the 1958 decision of the CCF and Canadian Labour Congress to create it through aftermath of the 1962 federal election. The emphasis is primarily on the Québec party, but its history seems inextricable from that of the federal party in this period. With rediscovery of Doig's "The NDP «Congress of Orientation» in Québec" in The Marxist Quarterly\(^1\) and Perron-Blanchette's hitherto

completely unremarked thesis on the Parti Socialiste du Québec,² which cover the events of 1963 in more accurate detail than Sherwood, it seemed plausible to focus on the preparations for and early experience of the NDP in Québec. The reader will note that Chapter Two also contains considerable new material on party activity in 1963 in the context of a critical discussion of the secondary literature.

This essay argues that there were two fundamental purposes inherent in the New Party process. The publicly stated purpose, often repeated by Knowles, Lewis and others, was to create a new and truly pan-Canadian political party which would encompass organized workers, elements of the left wing of the Liberal party, and a new base of support in Québec. In brief, it was claimed that the New Party was conceived to overcome the failings of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and bring a left-of-centre (but not socialist) majority to power in Ottawa. After the decision was made by the Canadian Labour Congress and the federal CCF to move on this design in 1958, a serious and often successful effort was certainly made to attract the financial support of international and pan-Canadian union leaders, though the support of their members was another matter. On the surface at least, the thousands of members of New Party

clubs in 1961 seemed to indicate that the effort to penetrate the Liberal left had been real and to a degree, successful. As for Québec, there was no way to put a good face on the results. Even Carl Hamilton, secretary of the National Committee for the New Party, had to admit on the eve of the federal founding convention in 1961 that the New Party organizing drive had failed there.

The chief purpose of this essay is to explore the reasons why the New Party organizing drive failed in Québec and how the pattern of that failure continued into the 1962 federal election campaign here. The key to understanding that failure is to identify the substantive agenda of the NCNP - its purposes as revealed by actions, as opposed to its publicly announced objectives. The NDP as a tactic was not primarily intended to address the historic failings of the CCF in Québec - its image of being essentially an alien movement, its Protestant social gospel discourse, its strongly anglophone flavour, its instinctive centralism and incomprehension of the necessity of a nationalist appeal for the Québécois. After all, every successful "third" party in Québec since the 1880's has been nationalist and even indépendantiste. The substantive agenda of the NCNP did not address these issues. Instead, it was evidently chiefly concerned with the refinancing of the CCF in Ontario and ensuring the continued existence of a mainly Ontario- and
western-based federal parliamentary caucus which would represent the interests of pan-Canadian labour. The creation of the Québec Committee for the New Party and the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec was not occasioned by any local imperative, but by the priorities of the NCNP elsewhere. The NPDQ was installed here to maintain the fiction of a pan-Canadian party at a time when the Québec political culture was changing dramatically and a new form of left-wing nationalism was developing. A number of left-wing nationalists took a serious interest in the party until 1963, when the Québec section was split on the initiative of the federalist faction.

The chief characteristics of the NDP model, as developed from lessons of the Saskatchewan and Ontario CCF experience, were a populist political style rooted in an exclusively anglophone Protestant social gospel tradition, an organic relationship with CLC-affiliated unions as a funding base, and an organic party structure at the federal level. The NDP was unable to apply this model to Québec with success because it was developed without reference to the political realities here. Even federalists in the NPDQ eventually demanded significant alterations to the federal party constitution in 1963. However, the long CCF history of writing Québec off and the strong western and Ontario bias of the structure and dynamics of the "new" party prevented it from reacting to the
imperatives of rapid change in Québec.

The structure and dynamics of labour organizations in Canada also played a crucial rôle in the failure of the NDP as a pan-Canadian party and of the NPDQ. This rôle and its ramifications have traditionally been understated or ignored in the labour, CCF and NDP literature. The pan-Canadian labour movement, with an international anglophone history and a secular or Protestant discourse alien to Québec, had never been able to achieve the overwhelming hegemonic position here that it enjoyed in the other nine provinces by 1961. Instead, it was locked in competition with a provincial industrial union federation (the CTCC/CSN) whose history and discourse was almost exclusively francophone and Catholic. The independent and often competitive development of the CSN unions tended to prevent the leadership of the pan-Canadian labour organizations and their CCF-NDP allies from learning much about the political realities of life in Québec outside the Montréal area.

Industrial union organizations were normally the elements in provincial labour federations and the CLC most sympathetic to the NDP outside of Québec, but because of the division in Québec industrial unions in the FTQ were overwhelmed by the conservative trade unions with their "cap in hand" tradition and unfortunate history of cooperation
with the Union Nationale. The raiding struggle between pan-Canadian unions and the CSN became increasingly politicized after 1960, with the CSN basing its appeal on a left-wing nationalist stance which FTQ affiliates had difficulty opposing. Indeed, some FTQ affiliates such as Steel probably assumed a nationalist position as a defensive maneuver. This ideological turmoil was reflected within the NPDQ where the powerful official FTQ element on the Conseil Provisoire was solidly federalist, and militants out of the CSN and some former FUIQ industrial unions (such as Steel and Woodworkers) were prominent in the nationalist camp.

In summary, the NDP failed in Québec because the real objectives of the party had nothing to do with making electoral progress in Québec, and the most influential supporters of the party operated without reference to the political realities here. Québec was merely a sideshow.
1: The "Révolution tranquille" observed

The purpose of the present chapter is to identify and criticize a selection of analytical literature pertinent to the context in which the NPDQ was conceived and in which it failed, in order to situate the story of the party in a broader context than is permitted by the limited and unsophisticated secondary literature on the organization as such. Four approaches are reviewed: the context of the development of left-wing nationalism; a sophisticated neo-federalist analysis of the roots of neo-nationalism in Québec; a discussion of the rôle of the Catholic Church in the modernization process; and an account of the development of the CTCC/CSN to 1960.

A. A critique from the intellectual left

Sheila Hodgins' and Henry Milner's *The Decolonization of Québec: A Study in Left-Wing Nationalism* (1973) commences with a discussion of the objective bases of Québec's political condition. The authors contended that Québec was in economic and political thrall to the United States, which treated other countries according to its own needs and norms of behaviour. A monopoly capitalist state, America was dominated by its owning class and their servants, the
managerial classes. There was no conspiracy to oppress workers in this system but rather a structural exigency. Monopoly capitalism was forever generating surpluses for which investment opportunities and consumer markets had to be found and organized along American lines. Competition was through advertising, not prices; advertising imputed values, impacting the colony's political culture by forestalling domestic alternatives which might meet real needs but did not increase consumption.

Advertising could not create a sufficiently voracious consumer market to keep monopoly capitalism in profitable equilibrium. The state had to grow to absorb, redistribute and/or destroy the surplus. Government and industry cooperated to create new needs, and, with commercial control of the means of orientation (media, publishing, "mass culture", religion), produced a homogenization of class and ethnic cultures. The "consumers" or workers had no organ commensurate with those of the state or monopoly corporations to protect their interests since the union movement in the American metropolis was dominated by Gompersism. The setting of Québec was thus overwhelmingly colonial.¹

The authors asked why Québec reacted differently to modernization and incorporation into the metropolis compared to English Canada. The obvious reason was a profound cultural difference, but there were many objective factors including a very rapid rate of industrialization after 1945, and the radical transformation of the means of orientation with the development of Radio-Canada and rural electrification. With the centralized media came the voice of neo-liberal criticism and examples from outside Québec of alternative developmental choices. The traditional prestige of the intelligentsia catapulted a new type of intellectual into the forefront of the popular political mind. From powerful positions in the media (Pelletier, Laporte, Lévesque), the burgeoning trade unions (Marchand, Pelletier again), and the growing education sector (Trudeau, Jacques-Yvan Morin) intellectuals could direct the social forces gathering strength in the Fifties.\(^2\)

The authors suggest that an ideological dialectic operated from the Thirties through the Fifties and Sixties.

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The rejection of left-wing ideology was followed by the rejection of right-wing ideology; conservative nationalism was followed by anti-nationalist neo-liberalism in the Fifties. Left-wing nationalism was a synthesis of the two streams when anti-nationalism (of the Cité Libre sort) failed about 1964. Certainly in the later history of the PSD and early NPDQ there is evidence of a nationalist left emerging from among the neo-liberal critics of the Duplessis régime. Indeed, in some respects it is this very dialectical process which produced the divisions in the NPDQ prior to 1963. Federalist intellectuals in the NPDQ such as Oliver and Taylor shared the ideological assumptions of the anti-nationalist neo-liberals. On the other hand, conservative nationalism had at least a temporary rebirth during the Sixties in the Créditiste movement, and neo-liberal anti-nationalism as represented by Pierre Trudeau retained very significant political currency in Québec at the federal level for twenty years after Hodgins and Milner suggest it failed. The ideological picture is thus rather more blurred than they might want to believe.

Hodgins and Milner specifically acknowledge the influence of Gramsci's theories about culture and

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communications on their analysis. Gramsci's understanding of the rôle of the means of orientation, combined with his special emphasis on the independence of the cultural superstructure from direct, immediate influence by rapidly changing economic modalities, give him a special relevance in Québec. For example, the authors suggest his considerations of the rôle of the Catholic Church in Italy were paralleled by developments in Québec where the Church also fostered associationism in the Catholic union movement. That movement eventually developed a secular class consciousness and broke free from clerical authority, becoming left-wing in the process.  

The Milners' application of Gramsci produced a fairly supple interpretation of ideological phenomena; however, the works of Baum and Rouillard (discussed below) shows that the Milners' interpretation of the rôle of the Catholic Church in the transition to a modern society is simplistic and inaccurate. There was far more continuity and less conflict in the secularization process than they intimated. Moreover, the persistent importance of paradigmatic political and ethical thought is a clear indication that the pattern and structure of institutional Catholic socio-political

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orientation remained, but the place of the Church in this process was being replaced by government, mass media and organized labour. Catholic dogma was slowly being replaced by a diverse mix of left- and right-wing neo-nationalist dogmas. This reality imposed contradictions on the NPDQ, for the francophones in the party would naturally tend to a more ideological kind of politics as opposed to the pure-and-simple electoralism of the federal NDP. In fact, it can be argued that the ideological development of the NPDQ paralleled ideological struggles between and within the FTQ and CSN. The priority placed on the search for the correct political formula by those Québec francophone New Democrats not attached to the FTQ was thus normative, but it inevitably ran afoul of the unquestioned empiricism and machine politics of the federal party. The NDP was itself a child of the Gompersist "international" (American) labour movement, and in that sense its rather artificial presence in Québec and unwillingness to adapt to what became consensual nationalist demands by 1962 were merely further manifestations of the colonialism inhering in the pan-Canadian labour movement.

At the time their work was written, Hodgins and Milner had doubts about the linking of the national and social
questions, and they concluded that while it was only via a conjunction with workers that the nationalist faction of the bourgeoisie could succeed to power, this conjunction was fraught with contradictions and should be avoided by workers' organizations. Nevertheless, they failed to explain the bases for the nationalist orientation of Québec unions. Throughout the Sixties and Seventies the CSN and FTQ played an increasingly important rôle in the socio-political orientation and mobilization of their members, particularly on the national question. It was the nationalist orientation of labour elements, imposed in part by internecine struggles within the movement, which effectively created the "gauche nationale" of the NPDQ (see narrative chapters below). Surely the Sixties-era raiding battles between the nationalist and exclusively Québec-based CSN and the international unions of the FTQ (of which the NPDQ's difficulties form a part) constitute a part of the decolonization struggle! A profound failure to appreciate the importance of labour politics compromises the utility of this work, and leads to an excessive emphasis on highbrow

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6 Henry Milner later became probably the most prominent anglophone in the Parti Québécois. In the late Seventies and early Eighties, Milner attempted to get the Socialist International to accept the PQ as a regular member (see various issues of the SI quarterly Socialist Affairs for the period). The PQ's application was blocked at SI council by representatives of the New Democratic Party (usually Robin Sears and Ed Broadbent) until the infamous public sector wage clawbacks imposed under Bill 111 in 1982 finally made the party's social democratic pose untenable.
"strategic" analyses which fail to account for tactical realities.
B. From a federalist perspective

The major theme of McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1976) is the impact of Quebec nationalism on the legitimacy of the federal polity. They proposed to answer two questions: could or should Quebec's relationship to Canada be altered, and could state and social structures in Quebec withstand the social cleavages then apparent? The nexus of their work is federalist, but it is nonetheless a useful and recent study.

The authors noted that the Lesage régime led the electorate to have very high expectations of the Quebec state. These expectations were rooted in and exacerbated inter-ethnic and inter-class conflict. One source of conflict was the failure of the Liberals to make any real headway towards economic sovereignty. By 1966 the successful educational reforms began to produce a large class of critical, under-employed technocrats who saw their future in the service of state organisms and enterprises because of the persistent refusal of English Canadian and other foreign

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corporations to adapt.  

This dissatisfaction made the weak electoral position of the Liberals untenable by 1966. Lesage received 52% of the vote in 1960, and did slightly better in 1962 - but when the anglophone Liberal vote was subtracted (about 14%) it became clear that less than half of the francophones favoured "rattrapage". Certainly major responsibility for the close Liberal victory of 1960 could be attributed to Barrette's caretaker leadership of a collapsing Union Nationale. The 1966 defeat of the Liberals can be accounted for by the defection of about 9% of the vote to the nationalist parties (the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale and Parti Socialiste du Québec on the left, and the Ralliement National on the right) on some of the grounds described above, plus a rural reaction against the Liberals foreshadowed by the Créditiste vote in the 1962, 1963 and 1965 federal elections. The Liberals actually received 47% of the vote in 1966 to the UN's 40%, but because of the concentration of the Liberal vote in urban ridings the UN formed the government.  

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McRoberts and Posgate concluded that paradoxically it was the forces unleashed by modernization, abetted by the Liberal government, which actually triggered the defeat of that government. The Lesage régime set in motion an escalation of political conflict which eventually included the rise of the Parti Québécois and of left-syndicalism. The broad modernizing agenda of the "révolution tranquille" rendered the provincial state central to political life in Québec by drawing social and economic agencies under its aegis, thus politicizing conflicts which had formerly been settled in other arenas. Québec's ties with Canada were mainly formal, legal, concerned a shared political and economic élite, and were utterly rejected by a major portion of the Québec élite - but that was not new. Elites themselves were under assault from other social classes. The rigidity of the federal government on constitutional questions escalated the level of conflict still further.10

It was during the expansive overture to this escalation in 1962 and 1963 - at the moment of the nationalization of Hydro-Québec and against the background of the first wave of Felquisté activity - that federalist and nationalist Québec

New Democrats parted company. The work of McRoberts and Posgate provides some information which helps account for the timing of the crisis in the NPDQ, in identifying the new expectations and central importance of the Québec state, and in identifying the failure of the Lesage régime to make other than symbolic gestures towards economic sovereignty.

The foreign character of Québec capitalism led the dispossessed naturally to suspicion of capitalists and a statist economic agenda, if not to socialism. A certain segment of nationalist opinion saw socialism as the most positive rationale for this increasing state rôle in the economy. Economic sovereignty was a matter of cardinal importance to the RIN as well as to the NPDQ's "gauche nationale", and most especially to its CSN-affiliated members. In the early Sixties, issues in the federal NDP were defined in Ottawa (the Bomarc missile issue) or in Regina (medicare). In Québec, the political culture was almost exclusively concerned with the modernization of the society and the expansion of the powers of the provincial state to support that effort. This was reflected in the

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11 It is on this very point that Charles Taylor, a McGill philosophy professor, Citélibriste and a leading neo-federalist figure in the NPDQ, parted company with the "gauche nationale". See, for example, Charles Taylor, "La révolution futile, ou les avatars de la pensée globale," Cité Libre, August-September, 1964, p. 10-20.
ideological dichotomy within the NDPQ. The "gauche nationale" saw the status of Québec as the central federal issue, but federal party officials thought otherwise. The "gauche nationale" was part of a broad francophone consensus busily making Québec as independent of the Canadian state and economy as possible; the response of the federal party leadership was purge them.

In January, 1984, Kenneth McRoberts returned to these issues in "The sources of neo-nationalism in Québec," which appeared in the journal Ethnic and Racial Studies for that month, and was subsequently reprinted in 1987 in Michael Behiels' collection, Québec Since 1945. McRoberts asserted that the neo-nationalism of the "révolution tranquille" was qualitatively different from previous manifestations in that its ideology was territorial as opposed to pan-Canadian, secular as opposed to Catholic, industrial as opposed to ruralist, and social-democratic as opposed to conservative. Nevertheless, its ties to the old nationalist forms were profound. The author examined a number of structural elements in an effort to account for the neo-nationalist phenomenon.12

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Why was there such a qualitative change? Arguing that "...Confederation was not seriously challenged during its first nine decades...", McRoberts noted that the long quiescence of the politically puissant francophone minority had been based on elaborate if piecemeal political accommodation in the federal system. Yet despite their power - Québécois accounted for between a third and a quarter of the seats in the federal House - until the Pearson-Trudeau era francophones had tended to be confined to secondary political rôles. Only in the Québec provincial government had francophones been more than marginal. Decisions of the federal House were based throughout on a simple majority of votes as opposed to an organic notion of legitimacy, denying any special consideration to the francophone minority. Francophones held no veto, and francophonie was effectively contained within Québec. This resulted in a long series of major political divisions involving abuse of the francophone minority interest: for example, the treatment of Riel in 1885, the rôle of Canada in the wars of the Empire, and the conscription crises of the world wars.\footnote{Kenneth McRoberts, "The sources of neo-nationalism in Québec," in M. Behiels, ed., Québec Since 1945, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987, p. 82-84.}

A system of double majorities, in which the two nations' interests would be placed on an equal footing, was termed by
McRoberts "consociationalism". McRoberts argued that the only time in Canadian history when consociational politics prevailed was under the United Canadas. Balance enforced accommodation by granting each element an effective veto.\textsuperscript{14} The federal structure established in 1867, far from eliminating tensions between the two nations, increased the possibility of a growing nationalism. The minority increasingly focussed on its own territory and provincial state. A range of longstanding jurisdictional disputes was greatly exacerbated by the centralization process which accompanied Canada's participation in World War II, and the application of Keynesian economic management techniques by the federal state. However, the response of the neo-nationalists went far beyond simple "containment" of the federal state.

Negative interpretations of the economic relationship between the two nations were integral to neo-nationalist ideology. McRoberts used various methods to demonstrate that Québec had never been deliberately rendered an internal colony of Canada. Instead, genuine structural deficiencies of the Québec economy vis-à-vis Ontario - its preponderance of service rather than production industries, and its

\textsuperscript{14} Cameron Nish has pointed out that the double majority was not consistently observed during the Union period.
relatively weaker resource base, for example - led to an inferior position. McRoberts argued that these disadvantages were not the result of federal action.\textsuperscript{15}

McRoberts suggested that Québec played several different economic rôles. In terms of the American "core", Québec was a "semi-periphery"; Ontario was in a similar position. American dominance was based on technological supremacy. Québec's performance in terms of personal income and employment was inferior to the western provinces, but superior to the Maritimes. However, for all other economic indices it was superior to both. This was particularly true of local manufacturing, regional trade in manufactured products, and the location of corporate head offices. For these regions, Québec was a "core". McRoberts suggested this resulted from historic federal transportation, tariff, and energy policies. Montréal's history of commercial banking and mercantile trade also played an important rôle.\textsuperscript{16}

The Ontario-Québec relationship reflected history and geography. Ontario's performance in personal incomes and


employment had been superior to Québec's for 150 years. A much higher proportion of the Ontario labour force was engaged in manufacturing. However, Québec's industrial production tended to be more labour-intensive than that of Ontario. There had been a gradual but considerable loss of head offices to Toronto, especially in the case of financial institutions. Federal policy had generally favoured manufacturing in central Canada, but perhaps historically Québec had not acted as aggressively as Ontario in exploiting its opportunities.

McRoberts reviewed theories explaining Québec's relative economic weakness. Some writers suggested that its inferiority was linked to its cultural particularities. Others argued that Ontario's superior resource base and relatively better access to American markets in the industrial midwest (Windsor's economy being a case in point) gave it a competitive advantage from the outset. Tom Naylor contended that unlike Ontario, Québec was controlled by a British-oriented financial-mercantile bourgeoisie which shunned local manufacturing. Another explanation for Québec's position had been that agriculture was commercialized earlier in Ontario. In turn, this produced local capital for industrialization earlier. Québec's land had been exhausted due to unsophisticated farming techniques,
and its commercial viability was historically lower.

None of these arguments made sense to McRoberts. In the past the most powerful commercial and financial élites in the country had made Montréal their base, and the Montréal bourgeoisie was heavily involved in local manufacturing by the 1840's and 1850's. He argued that this offset the cultural factors. In the nineteenth century Québec was present in industrial markets in New England and upstate New York, tending to balance Ontario's midwestern connection. As for the relationship between commercial agriculture and industrial capital, Québec manufacturing developed independently of the agricultural market economy. Its capitalization and development were linked to the export trade. Such Québec industries as shoemaking, textiles, and the production of metal goods were both capital-intensive and based on exploitation of cheap semi-skilled labour.

The key element was the technology used in the respective provinces' development. In Ontario, it was American. In Québec, it was mainly British, and American technology soon outstripped it. "...In fact, it is changes in the relative positions of these world cores, the decline of Great Britain and the ascendancy of the United States, that can best explain why Ontario rather than Québec has the
giant share of core functions within the Canadian economy."\textsuperscript{17} Ontario's midwestern market connection was far more dynamic than the New England industrial base, which soon fell into technological obsolescence. Direct investment in branch plants tended to be closer to the midwestern steel and automotive industries (Windsor again). Ontario thus acquired a heavier manufacturing base than Québec, more high-paying jobs and a larger, more skilled labour force. This drew capital and head offices from Montréal to Toronto.

McRoberts summarized his discussion of the economic question by stating unequivocally that Québec was not historically exploited by other Canadian regions. Moreover, Québec-Ontario relations could not explain the timing of neo-nationalism in the later 1950's. Québec's economic disadvantages did not suddenly begin after the Second World War. He found congruency between Québec's position as a close second to Ontario in economic and political functions of the federal system. However, new tension was engendered by the combination of new industrialization in western Canada and the decline of Québec's industrial base. In this respect Québec's situation was typical of aging eastern North

American industrial regions. 18

McRoberts found that the Parti Québécois' "sovereignty-association" project reflected the fact that Québec was not an economic colony of Canada. The PQ program sought to maintain continuity in economic relations with other Canadian regions while gaining more control of the state. Lévesque's movement was hardly anti-American, but it was anti-English Canadian in terms of its economic projects in finance, transport, and communications. The resource extraction and manufacturing sectors were American-controlled; United States capital was used extensively in the articulation of nationalist initiatives. The primary objective was to enhance the rôle of francophones internally:

...while some of the economic initiatives [of the "révolution tranquille"] were clearly linked to reducing Québec's disadvantage vis-à-vis Ontario, such as the creation of a public steel mill complex in 1967 to break Ontario's monopoly of steel production, other initiatives such as the nationalization of privately-owned hydro-electrical firms or the expansion of state support for French-Canadian owned enterprises (through the Société Générale de Financement) were more directly concerned with strengthening the rôle of Francophones within the Québec economy. Thus "l'épanouissement" of the Québec nation involved more than simply the elimination of its regional

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economic disadvantage.  

McRoberts felt the rôle of economic factors in the rise of neo-nationalism was unclear. He suggested relations with the United States have not fed neo-nationalism. Complex economic relations between Québec and other Canadian regions mitigated nationalist economic policy and "souverainisme". There had to be other reasons for the growth of neo-nationalism at the particular historical moment of the "révolution tranquille".

McRoberts next turned to the question of the cultural division of labour. This was an old state of affairs in Québec. It originated with the change of metropoli ("cores") after 1763, the staples trade, and mercantilism. Canal and railway development in the middle nineteenth century reinforced anglophone economic dominance. Francophones continued to dominate religious, legal, and medical services to their own communities. They also dominated the later provincial legislature and civil service. However, anglophones continued to dominate commerce, finance and industry in Québec after 1867. The distribution of powers in the British North America Act protected the traditional

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rôle of the petit-bourgeois francophone élite. Post-Confederation industrialization made the cultural division of labour even more acute.

McRoberts suggested it was not until after 1960 that one could speak accurately of a Québécois bourgeoisie, the growth of which was greatly assisted by the Lesage régime and succeeding Québec governments. Emigration of anglophone capitalists after 1960 reduced the prestige and importance of the minority and facilitated the decline of the cultural division of labour. These conditions had a long history, and the tensions created by the cultural division of labour were not in themselves a sufficient explanation of neo-nationalism.  

McRoberts next examined the rôle of the emergent technocratic middle class. Urbanization and the massive development of secondary industries resulting from the Second World War made the structural weaknesses of the Québec economy and the cultural division of labour abundantly clear. Within a decade of V-E Day, intellectuals, professionals, and labour leaders had become critical of the limitations of social and health service institutions based on the Catholic

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Church. They called for secularization, modernization, and public control of education, social policy, and health care. They identified the need for economic diversification to eliminate Québec's historic disadvantages vis-à-vis Ontario. First Sauvé and then Lesage moved to implement this agenda. Neo-nationalism became the official state ideology, dominating politics for more than twenty years. What were the bases of this ideological hegemony?

It was only in the mid-twentieth century... that the potential for a neo-nationalist movement was finally realized. A "new middle class" of Francophones emerged, which had a strong commitment to state intervention and which argued that the circumstances in which Francophones had been placed dictated that this intervention be through the Québec state. As a result, during the 1960s and 1970s the politics of Québec (and to a large extent Canada as a whole) were dominated by the drive to transform the Québec provincial state into a national state.²¹

McRoberts suggests the desire for independence was rooted mainly among intellectuals, the "creators and disseminators of culture". They had a vital interest in linguistic questions. The technical professionals (engineers, economists, pharmacists, etc.) were also nationalist. Francophone capitalists tended to be

federalist, but those involved with state financial enterprises or the Caisses Populaires tended to be more nationalist. Unfortunately, he fails to explain why so many labour activists were nationalists - eventually even those associated with pan-Canadian or international unions.²²

The chief value of McRoberts' work to the present essay is in its review of historic tensions between Québec and the rest of Canada, and its accounting for the origin of neo-nationalism chiefly in new elements of the technical and professional middle class, and among intellectuals, whose social rôle was changing in the postwar world. On the other hand, though McRoberts introduces social science jargon and acknowledges Wallerstein's notion of the world-capitalist economy, his work seems to be merely a restatement of the traditional liberal neo-federalist²³ critique. Unlike Charles Taylor or other members of the Cité Libre équipe, at first glance McRoberts does not deny the historicity of neo-


²³ For the purposes of this work, neo-federalism is defined as any position on the British North America Act or on relations between francophones and anglophones in Canada which seeks to provide a renewed rationale - whether more or less centralist - for the federal arrangement. Neo-federalists are characteristically liberal in their general tendency, and are generally associated with the doctrine of non-territorial multiculturalism.
nationalism. Yet part of his purpose in citing historical events, paradoxically, seems to be to deny their motivating quality. Because McRoberts believed that Québécois did not advocate independence after the conscription crisis of 1918, this wound to the body politic is considered unimportant. He conveniently ignored the Québécois reaction to the notion of conscription in the Second World War - massive bloody riots and the radicalism of the Bloc populaire. The heritage of the Bloc populaire lived on after the war in the labour struggles of the fifties, in the Parti Social Démocratique, various transient left-wing groupings, the Lesage Liberal party, the RIN, the "gauche nationale" of the NPDQ, and the PSQ.

McRoberts focusses narrowly on the public image of the Lesage Liberals and later the Parti Québécois as the sole bearers of neo-nationalist ideology, as if left-wing nationalism had no pre-history which included the PSD and


25 For example, Michel Chartrand - variously president and leader of the Parti Sociale Démocratique (Québec CCF), vice-president of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec, and president of the Parti Socialiste du Québec - had a been a leading Bloc populaire militant and had a long career as a union organizer.
the NPDQ. This is the view of an outsider. The PQ was formed as a coalition of forces. It included former Duplessistes and members of the Créditiste Ralliement Nationale, and on the left, it attracted Néo-Démocrates like Camille Laurin, Denis Lazure and Jacques Yvan-Morin, ex-RINistes like Bourgault and members of lesser groups. Neonalism knew many forms. Some were more left wing and anti-American, or more conservative and theocratic, than the PQ's particular brand. These positions were not the preserve of irrelevant "groupuscules" either, as an examination of CSN positions on foreign ownership between 1970 and 1976 will show.

McRoberts asserts that economic relations with the United States did not feed neo-nationalism. Paradoxically, he describes in some detail how Québec's economic disadvantages were linked to American technological dominance, American investment in Ontario branch plants, and Ontario's integration into the American midwestern industrial complex. He ignores the fact that chief among Duplessis' clients were American aluminum and steel cartels. The understanding of these elements by Québec intellectuals contributed a definite anti-American element to neo-nationalism, particularly in the ideological discourse of organized labour which is of such importance to the early
development of the NPDQ.

It was not only ideology which was multi-faceted. McRoberts ignores certain external political questions essential to understanding the mood of Québec in the early Sixties. In the same historical moment as "maîtres chez nous" and the birth of the FLQ, the first serious recession since 1945 gripped the country, and Diefenbaker was cavalier about francophone representation in his cabinet and even his caucus. In relations with America, Canadian governments fell and rose on the Bomarc nuclear missile question, a key issue in the 1963 federal election in Québec. Kennedy presided over the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis, and the work of black human rights activists like Martin Luther King demonstrated the brutality of American racism to the world - including Québec.

McRoberts' work has a Whiggish quality in spite of a pretense of examining the "longue durée". He obscures the character and causality of neo-nationalism, and attempts to substitute the notion of an uneasy peace between francophones and anglophones for the old Whiggish notion of an orderly evolution. But there are more nuances and tensions in the relationship than he admits. And nowhere are these tensions more obvious than in the early Québec NDP, which was a kind
of anticipatory cockpit of the nationalist-federalist struggles of the Seventies.
C. A different view on the Church

In the winter 1986-1987 issue of the periodical Cross Currents, Catholic theologian and sociologist Gregory Baum published "Catholicism and Secularization in Québec," a look at the applicability of David Martin's general theory of secularization to Québec.\(^{26}\) Martin has argued that religion affects the modernization process in a traditional society, and that there are significant qualitative differences in the guidance which Catholicism and Protestantism respectively provide. Protestantism generally produced pluralism, tolerance, and democratic cooperation among interest groups. This last quality had the effect of "cumulatively legitimating" society as a whole despite real cleavages. Pluralism also permitted secularization without overt hostility to religion.

By contrast, the Catholic tradition allowed little room for dissent. This resulted in competing critical totalities. Catholicism has generally identified itself with conservative resistance to modernization, creating an alternative progressive camp. Examples of such experience include France, Spain, Italy, and Cuba. However, there were

exceptions: Poland, Ireland, and Belgium. Poland and Ireland were divided nations subjugated by foreign empires, in which Catholicism became the symbol of identity and resistance. For these countries, Martin argues that modernization was accomplished with the aid of the Church in suppressing dissent. In Belgium of the Eighteen-Thirties, nationalist liberals and nationalist Catholics united against their respective foes - Louis-Philippe's France and Protestant Holland. Catholicism became part of the bedrock of Belgian identity.  

Baum sought to test Martin's hypothesis in Québec. Asserting that modernization was accomplished in Québec without a cultural schism over religion, Baum likens the early phase of industrialization and urbanization in Québec - 1900-1950 - to the Polish and Irish models of modernization through authoritarian consensus, supported by the Church. The subsequent "révolution tranquille" is paralleled in the Belgian model. For example:

...while hostile to the reigning order in Québec Cité Libre remained wholly within the Catholic ambit. It looked toward the Catholic intellectual avant-garde in France, especially to Emmanuel Mounier, the founder and editor of Esprit, who advocated a new, more positive Catholic

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approach to modernity. Esprit warned Catholics against the traditional identification with the conservative forces in society; because of its sympathy with socialism, Esprit defended the right of government to protect the common good, interfere with the free market and assure a greater share for the poor in the wealth of society. Whatever the personal faith of the contributors to Cité Libre may have been, they certainly presented themselves as proponents of a modernizing and secularizing movement soundly rooted in Catholic faith.\textsuperscript{28}

The Québec Catholic Church lost institutional powers in education, health care, and welfare, and about 50% of its members during the "révolution tranquille". Nevertheless, there was no cultural schism - no opposition of two mutually exclusive totalities - because of the confluence of progressive nationalism\textsuperscript{29} and the effects of Vatican Council II. Progressives did not have to give up their Catholicism. Baum writes:

\ldots Catholics were able to oppose the old, authoritarian Church to the new, conciliar Church, the static Catholicism of the past to the dynamic Catholicism of the present. The harsh language of repudiation that usually accompanies a secular, liberal, modernizing movement in a Catholic society did not shock these Catholics, for they too


\textsuperscript{29} For a discussion of the development of progressive nationalism in Québec, see Jean-Marc Léger, "Aspects of French Canadian Nationalism," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 310-329.
repudiated the past. Catholic principles, formulated as the Vatican Council held its sessions, allowed Catholics to participate in the secularization movement of the Quiet Revolution. They welcomed the exclusion of the Church from institutional involvement in education, health and welfare; recognized the appropriateness of the Church's loss of its ideological monopoly; and approved of the new social pluralism and liberalism.  

The Dominican Order in Québec launched a new monthly review, Maintenant, addressed to a broad readership. Its major theme was pluralism, and it took a critical but positive approach to the "révolution tranquille." Many associated with Maintenant became active Lesage Liberals and, later, Péquistes. There was also a little book which appeared in 1960, Les Insolences du Frère Untel (The Impertinences of Brother Anonymous), which attacked political corruption, the abysmal quality of public instruction, the irrelevance of the conservative Church, and the declining quality of French in Québec.  

Cardinal Léger, Archbishop of Montréal, once a conservative member of the hierarchy, turned away from the old ways to become a spokesman for the new concept of Catholicism at the Vatican Council, and "...came to believe that "service" was the word best able to express


the Church's mission in the modern world...". His new direction symbolized support for the new Québec.

Baum's most powerful example of the changed rôle of Catholicism in Québec is that of the educational reform of 1964. The legislation to create an education ministry was developed in dialogue with the Catholic bishops. They supported it because confessionality was retained, chaplains remained in the schools, religious instruction was maintained, and the bishops had a place on a consultative council in the ministry. At the same time, the state was able to achieve the expansion and modernization of services it saw as essential to "rattrapage". Compromise and pluralism were characteristic of the secularization process of the "révolution tranquille." In spite of the institutional dominance of the Church under the Duplessiste system, Baum claims there was no political anti-clericalism. "No party or candidate seeking election for public office, low or high, has so much as made an anti-ecclesiastical remark in the hope of gaining support."²³³

Three aspects of this article are important to the

current study. One is the negation of the traditional assertion of an almost totalitarian dogmatic tendency in French Canadian intellectual culture, allegedly deriving from Catholic dogmatism. During the "révolution tranquille" this hoary critique was repeated in the pages of Cité Libre by neo-federalists like the NDP's Charles Taylor, himself a Catholic. Baum shows that the Catholic hierarchy had in fact already moved toward pluralism by 1960. No dogmatism was driving policy in the Lesage government. The educational reforms, achieved by negotiation and accommodation, demonstrate the willingness of Paul Gérin-Lajoie (the first education minister) to adopt pragmatic solutions. Second, by 1960 Catholic doctrine had itself become more flexible, more accepting of current progressive trends (for example, socialism), so that such movements were not forced to define themselves in opposition to Catholic social doctrine but could accommodate and be accommodated.

Third, Baum has shown that, for the most part, key modernizations were accomplished in Québec with the official support and agreement of the Catholic Church. For the purposes of the present essay, the lack of conflict between the modernizing state and the Church is yet another indication that the nationalist agenda was largely consensual in Québec and that it was the neo-federalist agenda that was socially marginal.
D. Québec labour on the eve

The important monograph by Jacques Rouillard of the Université de Montréal, "Major changes in the Confédération des travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, 1940-1960," originally appeared in Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française in December, 1980. Rouillard provides an invaluable look at the ideological and organizational development of the CTCC (CSN) in these years. The monograph presents very useful background information for the analyses of ideological conflict contained in this essay.

Rouillard reiterates the traditional contention that the famous CTCC strike against Johns-Manville at Asbestos in 1949 marked a turning point in the development of CTCC ideology. Catholic corporatism, which had been the ideology of the union centre since its founding in 1921, had been discredited by association with the Mussolini and Vichy régimes. After 1945, the CTCC turned instead to "business reform", which was in fact cooperative management shared by labour and capital. This was a central issue for the company at Asbestos, particularly in the early phase of the dispute. Management

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feared that the union was attempting to invade its traditional prerogatives. The union saw itself as trying to forge bonds of human unity across class barriers and permanently overcome alienation. This theme appeared in several other important strikes of the period, such as that of the Lachine textile workers (1947), and the Shawinigan aluminum workers (1951). Soon enough it became clear to the CTCC that management resistance to cooperative management was implacable, and in 1953 the concept was abandoned. It was replaced by what Rouillard calls "liberal humanism":

...the liberal ideas, which had until recently been rejected because they sprang from the French revolution, no longer provoked the same censure. French Catholic thinkers such as J. Maritain, E. Mounier, and Father Delos and journals such as Esprit, Témoignage Chrétien, and Economie et Humanisme were all strong influences on French Canada's social thinkers. Several of these Catholics "of the left", as they were later called, drew their inspiration from personalism, a doctrine that proposed a happy co-existence between the autonomy and social responsibility of individuals.

Rejecting individualism because it advocates inner directedness, personalism on the contrary encourages individuals to open themselves to others and to fit into a natural community. There is nothing very new about this aspect of personalist thinking in relation to the traditional teachings of the Church. This trend did open up new vistas, however, by proposing as a "fundamental affirmation" the existence of free and creative

persons. Although Mounier denied proposing "the freedom of liberalism," he nevertheless set forth the autonomy of persons as a postulate to this thinking and promoted freedom of choice, notions that were foreign to the traditional philosophy of the Church for whom freedom, far from being of value, was considered to originate from the weakness of human nature. These new ways of thinking influenced the younger generation of clerics and laity of postwar Québec who no longer displayed the same fears about the ideals of freedom and democracy. They were making a distinct effort to broaden the autonomy of the temporal sphere and to draw the Church closer to political and social democracy.  

The preamble to the CTCC constitution was revised along these lines in 1951, the first ideological revision in thirty years. Political liberty, egalitarianism, and religious pluralism were all parts of the new philosophy of the CTCC. The 1958 and 1960 revisions were even more progressive, with calls for economic planning to democratize and humanize capitalism, and the demand to orient production to meet genuine human needs rather than profit. However, the unwillingness of capitalists to accept corporatism, "business reform," or "liberal humanism" by the mid-Sixties led the CSN further left to endorse democratic socialism.

Confessionality was both a rallying point and a handicap

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for the CTCC. Besides its name, the confessionality of the CTCC consisted of three elements: the presence of chaplains for the central organization and affiliated unions, the promotion of Catholic social doctrine, and the constitutional disabilities of non-Catholic members. This last involved the ineligibility of non-Catholic members to hold union offices or vote in union meetings, but it was not in fact as significant a problem as might be imagined. Few non-Catholics joined CTCC unions, and those who did - mainly from the Montréal area - were fully tolerated in spite of the constitution.

During the massive organizing drives of the Second World War period confessionality was a definite handicap in competition with the non-denominational Canadian Congress of Labour and Trades and Labour Congress unions, particularly in the ethnically heterogeneous and highly industrialized Montréal region. Rouillard describes how, as early as 1942, an enquiry headed by Cardinal Villeneuve proposed abolition of discriminatory constitutional clauses. New federal labour legislation after 1943 forced many non-Catholics into CTCC unions. After the government forcibly deconfessionalized four unions, the CTCC's definition of confessionality was reduced to mere compliance with Catholic social doctrine rather than actual membership in the Church. Nevertheless,
confessionality continued to handicap CTCC recruiting drives into the later Fifties. But by 1959, Québec's Catholic bishops were assuring the CTCC that they would not oppose changes in the nature and degree of its confessionality, and that the union was in fact autonomous and its social objectives were acceptably close to Catholic doctrine.\(^{37}\) The cooperative behaviour of the Catholic hierarchy coincides with Baum's analysis, and further reinforces the conclusion that conflict and contradiction between the Church and the modernizers was quite insignificant.

By the mid-Fifties, the general movement toward labour unity — the creation of the CLC and the FTQ — threw the problems of the CTCC into high relief. Rouillard reports that new university-trained cadres and an increasingly anti-capitalist ideology combined with a taut political atmosphere to create a more secular type of militancy in the CTCC. Before the war, the CTCC had accounted for but 17% of days lost due to strikes although it represented 33% of Québec's organized workers. Although the pre-war CTCC has traditionally been viewed as more cooperative with employers and less militant than the TLC, CCL and international unions

as a result of its corporatist ideology, Rouillard suggests an alternative explanation. His own detailed research on the 1921-1930 period has shown that the CTCC was almost as militant (if strike days are any measure of militancy) as the other union centrals. The CTCC affiliates were primarily industrial-type unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. During the Great Depression and into the war period, the trade unions - with their more skilled, strategic and powerful members - struck more often and with greater impact than the CTCC unions.38

However, after the war the CTCC's strike rate doubled to 34% of total work days lost, while it represented 33% of the union workers. This was aided by a central strike fund established in 1949.39 For its trouble the reinvigorated CTCC was denounced as Communist by the TLC unions in the Fédération provinciale du travail du Québec (FPTQ), which accounted for 79% of non-CTCC union locals in the province in 1955. In contrast, the small Fédération des unions industrielles du Québec (FUIQ) was friendly to the CTCC.


39 The FTQ only established its central strike fund in 1957; Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 370-373.
Founded in 1952 to regroup the CIO and CCL industrial unions plus the Alliance des Professeurs de Montréal, the FUIQ shared many ideological concerns with the CTCC. Much smaller than the FPTQ, in 1955 it represented only 21% of non-CTCC locals in the province. This of course reflected the division of industrial unions into two camps. Nevertheless, the two industrial union centres collaborated closely in active and defiant opposition to Duplessis' union-busting while the conservative FPTQ trade unions went "cap in hand" to the Union Nationale. The two industrial union centres frequently assisted one another's strikes financially.\textsuperscript{40}

Rouillard then develops two important new contentions. He states that in 1956 it first appeared that the FUIQ and CTCC would merge under the aegis of the CLC without the FPTQ trade unions. He says:

...But it was not up to the Québec [FUIQ] unionists to decide; rather, the choice depended on decisions made in the US between the AFL and CIO and their Canadian counterparts, the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL).\textsuperscript{41}


\textsuperscript{41} Jacques Rouillard, "Major changes in the Confédération des travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, 1940-1960," reprinted in translation in M. Behiels, Québec Since 1945, Toronto: Copp Clark
The contentions are plausible, and consistent with the feebleness and lack of organizational independence of the FTQ as described by other commentators.\(^{42}\) They may reflect a bias in favour of the AFoL-CIO model in the early structural behaviour of the CLC. State labour federations in the United States are probably not as important to their labour culture as provincial federations are in Canada. The CTCC must have stood out in sharp contrast to both the weak FPTQ and the tiny FUIQ, and probably looked much more like a large international union district to the CLC officials than the provincial federations they were then familiar with.

In light of this, it comes as no surprise that the CTCC in 1956 proposed to affiliate directly to the CLC as a national (pan-Canadian) union, subsuming all its affiliates in a major internal change and surrendering its denominational character. Unfortunately, at the 1956 CTCC convention there was no consensus even for this position which would at the least have left the CTCC with an independent corporate existence within the CLC. At the 1957 CTCC convention the principle of pan-Canadian labour unity

\(^{42}\) See, for example, Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 369-384.
was confirmed but demands on the CLC were increased. The CTCC would now seek to retain its ideological independence and extant internal structure and would refuse any links with the new Fédération des travailleurs du Québec. Even this position was barely approved by a vote of 204 to 189, indicating that no consensus had been achieved.

In a riposte, at its 1958 convention the CLC refused its executive the right to negotiate an agreement with the CTCC without the prior consent of those international unions involved in jurisdictional conflicts with the CTCC. Rouillard suggests that this is a policy made in the United States reflecting the arrogance of the internationals and the weakness of the CLC. One must remember that this was the same Winnipeg congress of the CLC which approved the New Party resolution. A few months later the Canadian Labour Congress' appeal for all labour groups to cooperate in the New Party project was rejected by the 1958 CTCC congress.

In 1959 the CLC began to insist that it could not accommodate the CTCC as a single national union, and that it had no choice but to require CTCC unions to affiliate to the internationals in the FTQ. In the interests of unity, the CTCC prepared to concede on a range of jurisdictional conflicts and on the question of affiliation with the FTQ,
at least at the district labour council level. Nevertheless, negotiations finally collapsed in 1961 - the same year the New Democratic Party was founded.43

Rouillard's work is of great importance to the effort to account for the failure of the New Democratic Party in Québec. This article provides invaluable evidence on the evolution of Catholic influence in the CTCC/CSN, and of the ideological conflicts among the three union centres in the Fifties, conflicts which impinged heavily on their reaction to the New Party proposal and its close association with the Canadian Labour Congress and affiliated unions. In exposing the process of unity negotiations between the CTCC and the CLC, Rouillard has provided an explanation of the subsequent severe raiding struggles between the CSN and FTQ during the early NDP period. He has also shown that the CTCC leadership was ideologically first among union groups in the drive for a new Québec, and as such was inevitably associated with the nationalist project. Nationalism was a key element in the raiding struggle, and the major stumbling block for the NPDQ.

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E. Summary

Hodgins and Milner contribute three important concepts to our understanding of the context in which the NPDQ operated. First, they identify the crucial rôle of the Catholic Church as a means of orientation, even on the left where its influence took the form of support for the creation of a Catholic labour movement. Second, they identify and describe the evolution of the ideological dialectic in Québec from the Thirties through the Sixties. In doing so, they show that neo-liberal anti-nationalism was a negation of Duplessis' conservative nationalism and really belonged to the Duplessis era. It was transformed by its authors (notably Trudeau) in the early Sixties into liberal neo-federalism as they sought to negate the statist nationalism which had become consensual after 1960. This particular confrontation was inevitable as the unity of liberal and left forces imposed by Duplessisme gradually broke down and they divided along the lines of the national question between 1960 and 1968. Federalists in the NPDQ and the NDP refused to recognize this division as important and natural for the Québécois. Third, Hodgins and Milner were among the earliest commentators to recognize the importance of the shift in mass communications media during the Fifties and early Sixties to political change in Québec. Television was a powerful new
factor, and it made the career of René Lévesque and was an essential component in the Créditiste breakthrough in 1962. This question has not yet been sufficiently explored.\textsuperscript{44}

McRoberts and Posgate contribute another part of the picture by attempting to explain the sources and timing of the "révolution tranquille". They identified a range of historic francophone grievances. Francophone interests had been abused by the federal state since 1867; Québec's socio-economic position was historically inferior to Ontario's; the cultural division of labour persisted in Québec until after 1960. Against this smouldering background, McRoberts accounted for the rise of neo-nationalism as a product of social tensions imposed by social change (the rise of the technocratic francophone middle class), rapid urbanization and industrial development after the Second World War. The new middle class demanded the laicization and modernization of health, education and social services through the intervention of an expanded and renovated provincial state. As far as the development of the NPDQ is concerned, these issues and arguments are certainly prominent. McRoberts suggests that the desire for independence was generally

\textsuperscript{44} See Marc Raboy, \textit{Movements and Messages: Media and Radical Politics in Québec}, trans. David Homel, Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984, especially Chapters 1 and 2, for some discussion of this question. Raboy's book is very useful but there is a need for a more thorough study.
limited to the intellectuals and technical professionals. The material in the following essay reinforces that impression - the most passionate nationalists in the NPDQ tended to be university-trained labour leaders (for example, Pierre Vadeboncoeur) and academics (like Jacques-Yvan Morin). Though their analysis is flawed in a number of ways, McRoberts and Posgate nevertheless provide useful context for consideration of the forces at work in and around the NPDQ.

Taken together, Baum and Rouillard demonstrate the close linkage between the evolution of the rôle of the Catholic Church and the implementation of the agenda of "révolution tranquille". This understanding is a precondition to comprehension of the inability of the CCF-PSD or NDP discourse to make much ideological headway among progressive Québécois.Certain constants in the liberal, socialist and federalist analyses of nationalism and social change in Québec are also successfully challenged by their work. Among these constants are the notion of a "globalist", static and authoritarian Catholic social ideology; the notion of conflict in the secularization process; and the notions that the petit-bourgeois nationalism of the Lesage Liberals and the Parti Québécois was a monolith and that it monopolized the ideological development of Québécois in those years. These notions, shared to a great extent by McRoberts and
Posgate, must be discarded, or at the least greatly attenuated and nuanced, if a more profound understanding of the "révolution tranquille" is to be achieved. And it is only in the terms of such a detailed and complex vision that a more realistic image of the rôle and development of the NDP and NPDQ can be created.

Baum and Rouillard contribute to a new and sympathetic interpretation of the "révolution tranquille" which emphasizes at once ideological continuities and the great complexity of Québec's political and social constellation. It is this perspective which is most useful to any examination of the rôle of the NDP in Québec between 1958 and 1961, because it is predicated on the recognition that the "révolution tranquille" consisted of many profound changes in political, social and economic thought in Québec across the ideological and institutional spectrum. There were many "revolutions tranquille", and there was one within the PSD-NPDQ in the years examined by this essay. It was inextricably connected with fundamental changes in the orientation of the CSN, the FTQ, and francophone intellectuals in general, and has a legitimate place in any serious enquiry into the process which created contemporary Québec.
A critical historical literature on the "révolution tranquille", with particular reference to the labour movement, has yet to develop. There have been a number of official histories, but as seen elsewhere in this essay such works are hardly trustworthy accounts. Rouillard has an FPTQ project under way, and Julien Bélanger of Laval is preparing a thesis on the career of Michel Chartrand. However, as Rouillard himself has stated there remains a paucity of Québec labour literature for this period. The expansion of this literature is essential.
2: Secondary sources on the NDPQ

For the period under consideration there is limited material available on the NDPQ. David Sherwood's "The New Democratic Party and French Canada 1961-1965" is a Master's thesis which was presented to the Economics and Political Science Department at McGill in 1966. It is the most important secondary source for this period in the history of the NDPQ, cited by Desmond Morton (NDP: Social Democracy in Canada, Toronto, Hakkert, 1977), Ivan Avakumovic (Socialism in Canada, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1978), André Lamoureux (Le NPD et le Québec 1958-1985, Montréal, Editions du Parc, 1985) and in numerous other works. It is a basic document of NDP history, and its context and content are thus of paramount importance not only to the history of the Québec party but to that of the federal party.

A. Oliver, Sherwood and the official story

Sherwood's thesis director was Michael Oliver, the first federal president of the New Democratic Party (1961-1963) and later Director of Research for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1964-1967). Oliver obtained his doctorate in political science from McGill in 1956, and was subsequently a professor of political science and Vice-
President Academic (1967-1972) there.\(^1\) When Sherwood wrote his thesis (between March and December, 1965), he was an employee of the Commission working directly for Oliver in Ottawa. Sherwood's thesis was based largely on Oliver's papers. He also claims to have conducted several interviews with major actors like Michel Chartrand and Jacques-Yvan Morin. The thesis itself was funded as a study for the Commission.\(^2,3\)

Oliver was a staunch federalist. His views on the national question are of significance in any quest to understand Sherwood. Oliver's dissertation was entitled "The Social and Political Ideas of French Canadian Nationalists, 1920-1945", and was presented in September, 1956. Contributions to his work came from André Laurendeau (Le Devoir), Pierre Trudeau (Cité Libre), and Jean Gérin-Lajoie

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\(^3\) Sherwood subsequently joined External Affairs' African service in 1966 and spent twenty years overseas. He is now an official of the Civil Service Commission in Ottawa. These details were obtained in a telephone interview between the author and David Sherwood on February 25, 1986.
(Steelworkers), among others. Although the general content of his study is beyond the purview of the present enquiry, his view of Québec in 1956 is pertinent to his later actions in the NDP and his editing of Sherwood's thesis.

In 1956 Oliver recognized the primacy of nationalism in Québec's political culture:

French Canadian politics are the politics of nationalism. Even when the particular issue being discussed is to all appearances far removed from questions of French Canadian survival, the consciousness of a particular viewpoint, different from that of other Canadians and from that of the rest of North America, is never absent. This is not a recent phenomenon, but since the end of the First World War, it has become increasingly evident. In French Canada, nationalism has been the matrix which gives the essential form to politics, just as it has been in contemporary Africa and Asia. Significant movements are nationalist primarily; radicalism, Marxism or reaction are only secondary characteristics.\(^4\)

Oliver believed that this understanding was an essential precondition to any comprehension of the "paradoxical extremes of French Canadian thought", which allowed nationalism to be appropriated by left and right. He suggested that Catholicism might be more basic than nationalism, and that only social movements able to operate in a Catholic cultural context could be successful. Oliver

described the differences between French-Canadian and "political" English-Canadian nationalism: the latter sought primarily the preservation of its state rather than ethnic survival, although it shared a tendency to oversimplify political life and placed little emphasis on social and economic questions. However, a consistent recognition that the just resolution of such questions were intrinsic to Canadian survival was characteristic of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.5

Oliver argued that an important obstacle frustrating a broader consensus for social development had been the bicultural, binational character of the Canadian state, and that the traditional federal Liberal and Conservative parties had been incapable of movement on this point practically since Confederation. Oliver suggested that a "new party" - like the CCF - might be better able to break through to progress. Arguing that French Canadians have more respect for political action from principle than for brokerage, he reiterated the point that the CCF was the only Canadian party which was ideologically motivated. He asked whether the aims of those working for social, political and economic justice in Québec were compatible with similar objectives in English

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...There can be little doubt in the mind of the English Canadian left, in the CCF for example, that the problem of cooperation with such groups [he cites intellectuals involved with Le Devoir and Cité Libre, and the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour] presents immense difficulty. The chief problems are those posed by the basic French Canadian nationalism which is retained, in varying degrees, in conjunction with desires for social reform...

The ideological bases of the francophone left were quite different from those in English Canada. Oliver noted that Laurendeau and others sited themselves in the Catholic "personalist" tradition of Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, humanist, organic, and certainly not materialist. In contrast, a central theme which anglophone socialism inherited from Fabianism was "rationalization", economic efficiency, and in general the notion of a reflex relationship between competent management of the material world and the creation of preconditions for social justice. He admitted that perhaps 1956 was too early to speak of a

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6 Michael Oliver, "The Social and Political Ideas of French Canadian Nationalists 1920-1945", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Montréal: McGill University, 1956, p. v, p. 326. Oliver seems to have forgotten that the Communists were also ideologically motivated.

convergence between these movements.\(^8\)

Oliver also considered the question of institutional support for left-wing movements in Québec. He identified the Confédération des Travailleurs Canadiens et Catholiques (renamed in 1960 the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux), the Fédération des Unions Industrielles du Québec (CCL), and the Fédération du Travail du Québec (TLC) as possible agents.\(^9\) If the entire Québec labour movement affiliated to the Canadian Labour Congress, the prospects of the left would improve, but of course the Gompers tradition still lay heavily on the movement. However, new cadres in the labour movement were more ideologically open and sophisticated.\(^10\)

...There are signs, however, that an intellectual leadership group, susceptible to left-wing ideology, is already more closely integrated with Quebec unions than is the case in the rest of Canada or the United States. MM. Gerard Picard and Jean Marchand... of the CTCC, are products of the Laval social science faculty; M. Jean Gérin-Lajoie, a Rhodes scholar, is a Quebec organizer for

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\(^9\) The latter two organizations merged in 1957 to become the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), an affiliate of the Canadian Labour Congress which itself resulted from the merger of the Trades and Labour Congress (American Federation of Labour in Canada) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (Congress of Industrial Organizations affiliate in Canada).

the United Steelworkers of America.\textsuperscript{11}

Oliver understood that for the CCF to make headway in Québec, a redefinition of federalism and the principle of economic decentralization would have to take important new places in party thought. The initiative for renewed federalism had to come from English Canada and it could come most readily from the left, where a fruitful cooperation between the two ethnicities was possible. If this happened, "the nature of party competition in Canadian politics could not long remain unchanged."\textsuperscript{12}

Oliver's analysis and prognosis was quite significant in the light of the evolution of the Québec and federal NDP, the federal Liberal party, and of federal linguistic and constitutional policy. He understood that the old brokerage policies were discredited in Québec, and that a new alignment was developing. Likewise, he identified an opportunity for a redefined decentralist and biculturalist pan-Canadian left to work with progressive francophones in building a new consensus. He also recognized the importance of pan-Canadian labour unity for such a project. And, he had already


identified Québec nationalism as the obstacle to the unity of the pan-Canadian left, rather than the prejudices and in comprehensiveness of anglophone leftists and their imperialist habits of mind. In his later career - and he had a great influence on the development of the Canadian left until at least 1968 - he followed many of the imperatives of his 1956 analysis.

It was fundamentally flawed. Social currents did not flow in the courses he anticipated. For example, Oliver underestimated the pace of secularization and the precipitous decline of the Catholic church as a means of social and political orientation in Québec over the following decade. This may have to do with the avowed "personalism" of the Cité Libre group with which he was associated, or his own Anglican activism of the mid-Fifties. In 1956 Oliver also misunderstood the liberal character of the Cité Libre ideology.\footnote{13}

His expressions of faith in the possibilities of the CCF were little more than wishful thinking. In 1956, the party was at its nadir almost everywhere except Saskatchewan. Lewis and other members of the party leadership recognized

\footnote{13 For a useful exposition of the Cité Libre ideology, see Denis Monière (trans. Richard Howard), \textit{Ideologies in Québec: The historical development}, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 244-249.}
this and were already preparing to launch the New Party idea at the 1958 Canadian Labour Congress convention. In Québec, the left—including the Parti Social Démocratique (Québec CCF), led by Thérèse Casgrain and Frank Scott—was shattered and feeble; the party had an unfortunate reputation for refusing to participate in broad spectrum coalitions of the left, and for annihilating attempts to create alternative left nationalist parties at the provincial level. In 1956 the CCF was recovering from yet another series of major anti-francophone gaffes committed by federal caucus members from the west. The labour picture was hardly as bright as Oliver painted it, with major questions of autonomy and jurisdiction dividing the new Canadian Labour Congress from the CTCC (later the CSN). The CLC's Québec affiliates were ideologically and structurally divided. Nevertheless, the analysis in his dissertation remained the substance of his personal political program, and Oliver had opportunities rarely given to anyone in history to implement such a


15 Gérard Bergeron, "Political Parties in Quebec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 365; In the 1952 provincial election the CCF received 1% of the popular vote, and in 1956 it dropped to 0.5%. Bergeron suggested "...it is precisely the inability of the PSD [Québec CCF] to don a provincial guise which makes it unacceptable in Québec...".

program.

In November, 1963, Michael Oliver published an article in *Canadian Forum*, in a sense bringing his 1956 position up to date. The article was originally published in the internal journal of the Canadian section of United Steelworkers of America, in August, 1963. It is reasonable to surmise that it was prepared in June or July, 1963 - just prior to or after the NPDQ split. As such it reflects Oliver's views on nationalism and federalism at a particularly acute moment in his career, providing further clues to his agenda as Sherwood's editor, mentor and patron.

In "Confederation and Québec," Oliver suggested that there had been a revolution in expectations among French-Canadians, one particularly marked since 1961. The passionate desire for a more independent Québec state - marked by multiple terrorist bombings in his own upper Westmount 17 - was but one aspect of a genuine social revolution wrought by industrialization, urbanization, expanded educational opportunities, and the impact of mass communications technologies, particularly television. The expectations of a typically North American urban population were supplanting the quiescence of the old parochial,

17 Oliver then lived at 631 Grosvenor in Westmount, between Westmount Avenue and the Boulevard. See Oliver papers, Pope-Oliver, June 14, 1963.
agrarian and Catholic Québec identity.¹⁸

Most of us who live in Québec have for two years been aware that we were entering into a period of great stress. The few who were inclined to dismiss French Canadian unrest as fleeting and superficial have had an abrupt awakening... French Canadians have revised their expectations from Confederation: English Canadians, in Québec at least, must do the same. So far, the changes in the world of Westmount are not too striking: slight shudders when one posts a letter, a rush of young executives to French conversation classes. But no one there thinks that the old, snug days will return quickly.

...If the good life means a comfortable city home, a car, an executive job and a part in planning and executing big corporate projects, then Westmount and St. James Street have new significance. ...when Westmount affluence becomes everyone's goal, when more and more people aspire to St. James Street jobs, when many are developing the skills and the outlook which make them confident they can handle the command posts of a modern American community, then the fact that these are occupied largely by English Canadians has explosive potential.¹⁹

Oliver represented the objective of the nationalist movement as that of replacing the anglophone bourgeoisie at the levers of economic power on St. James Street, and nothing more. He went on to analyze the logic of the advocates of independence: the pace of change was too slow, so there had to be hostile forces at work. The nationalists argued that


"...the relationship to English Canada is the barrier to Utopia; political independence will clear the way."

Oliver suggested a tripartite program to preserve Confederation. First, genuine progress had to be made towards biculturalism and bilingualism across Canada. Although he had hopes for the success of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism\textsuperscript{21} in this respect, he did not feel that current efforts to create a bilingual federal civil service would do much to relieve the feelings of injustice amongst francophones. He argued that the elements of Section 133 of the British North America Act imposing bilingual courts and legislatures on the federal and Québec governments ought to be extended to include all provincial governments. In this respect, education constituted a serious jurisdictional problem. Oliver lauded Pierre Trudeau's suggestion for entrenchment of a right to education in either official language in a new constitution.

Second, there had to be fundamental alterations in the quality of federal-provincial relations - a "cooperative federalism" based on consultation, good faith, and mutual respect. Oliver proposed an additional Royal Commission on


\textsuperscript{21} It had been set up by the Pearson government at the end of July, 1963.
the problems and practice of federalism, adding that perhaps the Tremblay Commission of 1954 ought to have been heeded in this respect. He then enumerated Québec's current agenda on devolution and noted that Québec's political requirements far exceeded those of other provinces. This could be accommodated by granting the right to Québec to opt out of joint programs, and by creating a quasi-judicial organic Confederation Council to keep divisive issues under surveillance, advise the governments on appropriate action, and if necessary veto legislation from any level which threatened the bi-national relationship. Finally, Canada had to recover a sense of national purpose. He said, "...There is little doubt that the farther Canada goes along the path of biculturalism the less radical will be the changes needed in our federal structure...."22

Michael Oliver's 1963 position was ultimately conservative, seeking to preserve or return to a "snug" status quo ante the neo-nationalist movement, although his views had changed little since 1956. His interpretation of the objectives of the nationalist movement as essentially envious, careerist, materialist, and bourgeois, given his personal acquaintance with "social nationalists" like Jean-Marc Léger and those in the NPDQ and PSQ, was oversimplified.

His reference to the "old, snug days" for the anglophone élite in Westmount before 1960 reflects at best a paternalistic attitude towards francophones, and at worst an imperialist outlook.

Oliver's role in the events Sherwood was to "record" and his political position did not bode well for frankness, veracity or fairness in Sherwood's study. Moreover, the impression darkens when the list of formal and informal "editors" of the study is exposed. In Oliver's papers23 there is an untitled memorandum on government of Canada letterhead dated June 9, 1965, from one Nancy Doull to David Sherwood. Doull was a longtime party activist based in Halifax,24 a former Nova Scotia NDP staff member, and later like Sherwood a researcher for the RCBB in Oliver's section in Ottawa.25 The memorandum was an eleven page expurgation of a draft of Sherwood's thesis, with notations for changes in almost every section. Extensive alterations, involving interpretations of fact, were imported practically verbatim into the final draft. For example, the following comments

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23 The papers of Michael Kelway Oliver, from his work as the first federal president of the New Democratic Party and in some related activities, are held in the Rare Book Room at McGill University.

24 Personal letter, Ian McKay (Queen's) to David Garon, January 1, 1988.

appear on page 6 of Doull's memorandum, and are repeated, almost verbatim, on pages 62 and 63 of Sherwood:

I do not think many delegates [to the founding convention of the NDP] thought that "the CCF's centralist image" was being dropped. They were aware of the positive change from a rigid socialism (on questions like the nationalizing of banks and utilities) founded on the notion that capitalism was inherently rotten, to a more open view of world changes which allowed that virtue was not impossible within democratic capitalism. Many speakers laboured the point that it was democracy that was important and this was about as close as anyone dared come to saying that if choice were necessary we chose our democratic freedoms over socialist doctrine any day of the week. Partly from such recollections of expressed enthusiasm for parliamentary democracy I am sure few thought about the party as giving up its centralism. Certainly there were the constitutional provisions for some provincial autonomy -- but this was the better to produce a true federal consensus. So far as the program went however, the essay does not convey the prominence that a federal investment board, Canadian development fund, location of industry direction and the implied federal authority in financing free education, guaranteeing employment and in the nation-wide Medicare plan - that these ideas had in the Convention.

And to page 68-69 in Sherwood's final version, from pages 6-7 of Doull:

...The demand that the word "national" be everywhere deleted etc. took the delegates by surprise. The only person ready to oppose it, and this most eloquently, was Eugene Forsey: his impassioned speech... convinced many delegates that the matter was just as serious as the Québec delegation made it sound. ...About the convention response to this motion I would say (1) most delegates had no idea what (constitutional and political) was involved in supporting it; (2) most
delegates, convinced by Forsey's outburst that one had to take a stand, used the vote to demonstrate their support for events in French-Canada per se. It should be seen as a pro-Québec gesture, not more. (For most of us it was the first occasion for "taking a stand" on Québec. The argument was that if this is all they want — and one could well imagine what an irritant that word "national" was, used as we English mostly use it, meaning us — then it is easily given. Let's give it.)

Sherwood does not identify the source of this material in his thesis — he simply includes it as his own, more or less verbatim. These comments concern important questions for the history of the Québec party's relationship with Douglas and the federal party, and Sherwood's interpretation is largely based on the opinions of an anglophone former party functionary from Nova Scotia, opinions not questioned by his thesis advisor, Michael Oliver.

Research in the Canadian Labour Congress papers has revealed evidence of strong influence on Sherwood's work from William Dodge, then executive vice-president of the Congress, a person of predictably formidable influence in the New Democratic Party, and a former president of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Québec. Dodge was involved in subverting an attempt by left-wing nationalists in the Fédération des Unions Industrielles du Québec (CCL affiliate) to create a provincial social-democratic party independent of the CCF in 1954 and 1955. Rather than permit this, Dodge brought together CCF sympathizers and so-called "neutralists"
at the union centre's convention to defeat the motion:  

...the real issue was that the original text of the manifesto called for the establishment of a new political movement. Mme. Casgrain and I [representing the CCF on the committee examining the proposal] did not object to this, but found it extraordinary that this movement was to ignore entirely the existence of the CCF. We simply would not agree and I told the committee I would submit a minority report on this point to the convention. The other members of the committee, with Pierre Elliott Trudeau advising them, apparently believed that my point of view would carry the convention. They tried to talk me out of it in a lengthy session. I stubbornly insisted that the manifesto recognize the CCF as a participating group in any realignment arrangement. Finally, they gave in... My position was that I was determined not to see the CCF disappear until I was sure something reasonably viable would remain in its place.

Dodge loaned his personal papers to Sherwood to provide material for chapters on the CCF and early Québec Committee for the New Party. On November 2, 1965, Sherwood returned the files with drafts of the chapters.

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26 André Lamoureux, Le NPD et le Québec 1958-1985, Montréal: Editions du Parc, 1985, p. 72. At the 1954 FUIQ convention, a committee was created to prepare a manifesto declaring the rights of organized workers and citizens of Québec. The members were Dodge, Charles Devlin, Jacques-Victor Morin, Philippe Vaillancourt, and Roméo Mathieu. The last three played major rôles in the NPDQ. Only Dodge opposed the creation of a party in response to draconian anti-labour legislation then being enacted by Duplessis; the document was presented to the 1955 convention of the FUIQ, and the formation of a provincial labour party was a central theme. Morin and Vaillancourt were later members of the "gauche nationale".


28 CLC papers, Dodge files, manuscript note, Sherwood-Dodge, November 2, 1965.
Dodge addressed a five-page typescript letter to Sherwood at the RCBB's Ottawa offices. He proposed extensive revisions to Sherwood's interpretation of the CCF-New Party Committee period. A week later, writing on RCBB letterhead, Sherwood replied that "...Regarding errors of interpretation, a careful re-evaluation of the chapter is obviously required. At present I am dealing with another study... but nevertheless hope to be able to send you a revised draft of the whole NDP study early in the New Year. Perhaps we could meet to discuss the revised chapter then."° Oliver wrote to Dodge on December 14, saying, "Your letter to David Sherwood is an excellent piece of history... Please rest assured that I will see that your remarks are given full weight in the final version of the Sherwood study.""°

Added to this is a major technical shortcoming: few facts or quotations can be verified without reference to archival collections. Besides newspaper articles and a few press releases, nothing is footnoted. The papers of Oliver, Dodge, and former Québec CCF president Harry Pope, claimed throughout as documentary sources, were not identified in supporting footnotes. Material relating to the verification of interviews is not available through McGill or anywhere

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30 CLC papers, Dodge files, Oliver-Dodge, December 14, 1965.
else.

In an early portion of his work Sherwood states that the Québec Committee for the New Party (QCNP), and its successor after the federal founding convention of 1961, the NPDQ's Conseil Provisoire (CP), were too small and committed their meagre resources to the attraction of radical intellectuals. Sherwood describes how the CP was frequently subject to criticism from various elements of the francophone print media over the national question and ideological orientation in general. Sherwood argues that many leading francophone Néo-Démocrates were further left than the federal party, far more decentralist, and had no mass rank-and-file membership support. Ottawa headquarters would not underwrite provincial campaigns and the party was too small to be taken seriously by the CSN. The FTQ, nominally supportive, mostly paid lip service to the NPDQ to satisfy the Canadian Labour Congress.

In Chapter V, entitled "The Background for Dispute -- The NDP in Quebec from the Fall of 1961 to Summer 1962,"


Sherwood discusses the operations of the Conseil Provisoire. He asserts that during the autumn of 1961, in the aftermath of the federal founding convention,

...emphasis was placed on orientation and policy, rather than on organization and recruitment. Plans for the Québec founding convention which was to be the fruition of the Council's work were postponed because of the approach of the federal election in June, 1962. Because of the party's limited resources, these events were mutually exclusive. Instead of the convention, campaign meetings were arranged; instead of setting up a fairly broad-based fees and dues-paying membership, a search for candidates was instigated and the scant finances of the party were committed to the election campaign.\(^{33}\)

There are obvious non-sequiturs in this description. Sherwood asserts that organization was given low priority by a CPP more interested in orientation and policy questions (meaning nationalist formulae), yet the provincial convention was admittedly delayed by the commitment to federal electoral activity. Monique Perron-Blanchette, whose properly-documented thesis on the development of the Parti Socialiste du Québec is reviewed below, gives a very different account of these issues. The provincial founding convention, originally set for February 16-18, 1962, at the CP meeting of September 14, 1961, had its scheduling referred to the executive committee of the CP on the motion of the chief

Québec organizer (then Jean-Claude Lebel) at the same meeting. Lebel asked for a delay, because, as he explained, holding a convention before organizing constituency associations made less sense than recruiting members and creating a party and then holding a convention.\[34\] Sherwood's assertion that the federal campaign and the provincial convention were mutually exclusive events rings a little false, as the federal party and the FTQ would provide the bulk of the funds for the 1962 and 1963 campaigns. The problem, as shown in chapters six and seven below, lay elsewhere — partly in the feeble finances of the provincial party, where the FTQ had proved not so forthcoming as CLC affiliates elsewhere in Canada. Sherwood went on to say in the same section that:

The fact that the Québec Provisional Council [CP] failed to establish itself formally in convention, and was to constantly postpone this event, produced a chain reaction. The failure left the door open to endless discussion and debate and rendered the Québec NDP vulnerable to division by nationalistic pressures. As more time passed it became increasingly difficult to hold a founding convention, growing differences within the Québec council providing a more permanent obstacle than the 1962 federal election.\[35\]


The CP resumed preparations for a founding convention on September 15, 1962. This convention was scheduled to take place in Québec City on the weekend of March 22-24, 1963. All was in place - the preliminary working groups had made their final reports to the CP meeting of February 2, 1963 - when the Diefenbaker minority government fell and a new federal election was called for April 8th. The nationalist element put aside its differences with the federal party and went on the campaign trail, again delaying its convention - more than ever essential to resolve divisions in the party.\(^{36}\) In large measure, it was due to the heavy campaigning demands of the federal interest - a pair of two-month campaigns occurring in a span of less than one calendar year - that the provincial founding convention was repeatedly delayed.

Perhaps the most damning example of Sherwood's obfuscation is his account of the furor raised by a speech given by federal NDP leader Tommy Douglas to the Osgoode Hall Legal and Literary Society in Toronto on January 15, 1962. Sherwood reports that Oliver and David Lewis collaborated in the preparation of this text, entitled "Canadian Unity and

the Constitution." The synthesis of the actual document contained in Sherwood is very brief and not very illuminating.38 Below are excerpts, with full contextual material, taken from the official NDP press release dated January 15, 1962; the portions in bold type indicate phrases or comments with which the Québec party leadership would have been expected to take issue:

...A constitution is the framework within which a nation lives and moves and has its being. It is therefore imperative that the Canadian people fully appreciate the effects of any changes that are made.

Douglas acknowledges but single nation and a single people.

...I would....advocate that a Bill of Rights be incorporated into the Constitution and that it be so entrenched that no change could be made without the consent of all the legislatures and the Parliament of Canada. Such a Bill of Rights should contain the basic freedoms of religion [Douglas elsewhere in the speech identified education with religion because it affects fundamental rights with respect to religious instruction], speech, press, assembly, and association...


...If our constitution is to be that of a democracy, then it must recognize the voice of the majority as the voice of the nation with regard to non-fundamental powers [fundamental powers are enumerated elsewhere as official language policy, education, and the constitutional amendment formula]. No single province can have the power of veto over the democratically expressed will of the majority...

In this excerpt Douglas proposes the federalization of civil rights, an amendment formula which effectively institutionalizes anglophone domination, asserts a majoritarian dominance, and denies Québec a veto. This flies in the face of the "two nations" thesis adopted at the 1961 convention.

Three fields come immediately to mind in which it would be unwise to close the door to the possibility of transferring powers from one level of government [provincial] to another [federal].

(a) National Labour Code. ...the federal government can sponsor a federal-provincial agreement on labour standards. It can take the initiative in securing assent by all the provinces to concurrent legislation which would result in a consistent National Labour Code. But it should also be possible for the Canadian people to decide on a transfer of jurisdiction to the federal government if economic and social developments require it.

(b) Social Security Legislation. ...in a federal state like Canada's, provincial administration and a broad area of provincial responsibility are necessary, and, indeed, desirable. But this cannot be made the excuse for perpetuating inequalities. Nor can it be permitted to obstruct those constitutional amendments which the welfare of Canada may demand...
Douglas proposed major new federal interventions in the provincial domain. This might have had some appeal outside Québec. However, in Québec such a position was positively antediluvian. For example, Douglas' proposed federalization of social security would have deprived the Québec state of an important source of nationally-controlled investment capital in the form of pension premiums. Lesage later obtained control of these monies in 1964 and used them for a range of nationalist economic projects.

...The world trend is toward international planning and integration which will eventually lead man to evolve an effective means of making possible the rule of law on this earth. In such a context an exclusive emphasis on provincial autonomy is surely out of keeping with the forces that are working for international peace and cooperation.

...By all means let us have the power to amend our constitution, but in the process let us not lose sight of the fact that a constitution is only of value if it contributes to effective governmental action and to Canadian unity and thus facilitates national progress.

Douglas dissociates provincial autonomists from the progressive movement and then returns to the "single nation" terminology.\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) This interpretation is consistent with Douglas' known views. For example, in 1958 he said, "I've never been a provincial rightist; I've never believed that provinces are sovereign powers, and I completely reject the compact theory of Confederation." Lewis H. Thomas, ed., The Making of a Socialist: The Recollections of T.C. Douglas, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1982, p. 201.
Sherwood's account of the Québec party's reaction to this speech is as follows:

To the minds of some of the members of the Québec party it appeared that the special respect secured for French Canada in the NDP programme at the founding convention had been forgotten. Jean-Claude Lebel [chief organizer for Québec] felt this particularly strongly and his position as organizer in the Québec party was one that carried influence. He was the first to voice publicly dissatisfaction [sic]... Lebel expressed his feelings at a public meeting in Mont-Joli, Québec, concerning the recent speech by Mr. Douglas. What he said was reported in the press, Mr. Douglas first being made aware of the incident when his attention was drawn to an article that appeared in the [Regina] Leader-Post. Lebel was reported as saying:

There is no question of secession at this moment but I am among the dissatisfied members of the Québec wing.

Lebel particularly objected to the fact that Douglas allegedly viewed the opinion of the majority as identical to the will of the country in questions of constitutional amendment. This view would then condone the imposition of Constitutional Amendments without special consideration for Québec... Douglas did not discuss amendment procedures explicitly in his speech given in Toronto on January 15th. However, he did mention that any amending procedures which were adopted should receive the approval of a "cross section" of the Canadian people.

The public repudiation of the leader of the NDP resulted in a special meeting of the executive committee of the Québec party on Monday, January 22nd. Perhaps spurred by Lebel's lead, Michel Chartrand [vice-president] showed no reserve in allowing the press to latch on to his criticisms. By this time the allegations against Mr. Douglas included a charge that he had referred to the "Canadian nation" while the official line of the party ostensibly recognized two nations. This was not exactly correct. Mr. Douglas referred to
"Canada".  

Comparison of the detailed excerpts from Douglas' speech given above with Sherwood's account demonstrates that the latter simply lied. The press release for the speech was available and in fact was used by him and cited in a rare footnote. Another press release issued on January 27 by the NDP federal council — couched as a response to the Diefenbaker government's proposals for a constitutional amendment formula — reiterated the essence of Douglas' speech of January 15.  

This fact does not appear in Sherwood's narrative.

Sherwood claims that "the official line of the party ostensibly recognized two nations." This implies that the meaning taken by the Québec party was a superficial one, and possibly false or overdrawn. The pertinent section of the amended program adopted at the 1961 convention as a result of the action of the Québec delegation read as follows:

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42 For more on what was actually adopted, see the coverage of the 1961 convention in Chapter Four below.
The New Party proclaims its faith in the federal system, the only one which assures joint development of the two nations originally associated in the formation of Canadian society, as well as the development of other ethnic groups in Canada. The Canadian constitution guarantees the protection of the national identity of French-Canadians and the expansion of their culture. The New Party will maintain and respect all these guarantees. Canadian federalism must ensure the protection of cultural, religious and other democratic rights, permitting a vigorous and balanced expansion of the country in general and assuring provincial autonomy...  

It would seem from this that the NDP had adopted the concept of a Canada consisting of two nations coexisting in a federal state, with a number of less significant ethnic components which did not merit identification as nations. However, the implications of the program were subject to differing interpretations. Two FTQ-CLC press releases dating from the 1961 convention do help to illustrate this question of differing interpretations: From "New Party for even newer Canada than forecasters expected," by Noël Pérusse, Public Relations Director, FTQ, August 4, 1961:

Going beyond the hopes of the most optimistic among the interim leaders of the movement who tried to satisfy the nationalistic aspirations of Québec, the convention recognized the bi-national character of the Confederative Pact, committed itself to fully maintaining and respecting the constitutional guarantees granted the French Canadians and went so far as to completely replace the word "national"


44 CLC papers, Dodge files.
by the word "federal" in its constitution, so as to recognize that Canada is not comprised of only one nation.

That concept of the bi-national character of the Confederation Pact has very serious implications for a political party whose main concern is economic planning. When they confirmed the principle of provincial autonomy—particularly for the Province of Québec—they implied a theory of decentralization of planning which the supporters of economic guidance have not yet adopted.

The convention even granted a demand from Québec, the application of which could considerably complicate the task of a central administration anxious to implement planning policies. This is a possibility that a provincial government could refuse to participate in a joint project without losing the share of federal monies it would have been granted, had it taken part in such a project.

...the French-speaking delegates amended the draft constitution so as to recognize the federal character of the New Party. They wanted to indicate in such a way that their contribution to New Party activities would be on the same basis as Québec's contribution to federal-provincial projects; in other words that it would be based on a perfect equality of rights and on respect for the respective characteristics of the two nations which built Canada.

And from "Co-operative federalism and idea in Canadian politics," dated August 4, 1961:

...delegates voted by a large margin to strike out the word "national" wherever it appears in the constitution and substitute the word "federal" wherever possible.

The action was taken on the recommendation of the constitution committee after Québec delegates protested the word "national" failed to convey the federal and bi-cultural character of Canada.

45 CLC papers, Dodge files.
J.H. Brockelbank, committee chairman and minister of natural resources in the Saskatchewan CCF government, said the change was not a case of any province seceding from confederation but the use of a word.

In English-speaking areas of Canada, Brockelbank continued, the word "nation" or "national" meant "our country, Canada." But in French Canada, it carried another meaning -- that of a people of common ancestry and common culture.

"They don't think of it as having to do with political boundaries....In that part of Canada, it is confusing and maybe even offensive."

The understanding of the two nations concept and of the use of the word "nation" was thus clear even to a leading Saskatchewan party official - why not to Oliver, Lewis, and Douglas?

There are numerous points at which Sherwood reveals bias against the nationalists in the party. Sherwood states that the autonomy of provincial parties within the NDP federation did not satisfy the nationalists who sought a completely separate Québec party as "an emotional and individually felt imperative". He describes the nationalists as "irrational" and "socially marginal". Yet the sociology of the federalist group within the CP was practically identical - university professors, union officials, and petits-bourgeois.\(^46\)

The deliberate suppression and misrepresentation of information damaging to the federal leadership reflects the "official" quality of Sherwood's work. Why would Oliver desire the suppression of such information in his student's work? Perhaps because the work would be presented to the RCBB Commissioners and he naturally wanted to place himself in the best political light. Perhaps he did not want to be seen by the Commissioners and the public as having badly mishandled the national question in his rôle as federal president of the NDP, and as a political scientist whose special branch of knowledge was the political outlook of French Canadian nationalists. Thus he had his student depict the NPDQ leadership's reaction as unreasonable. Perhaps, given the general hostility in this work and among the ideological apparatus of bi-culturalism towards nationalists, it was important to construe events so as to create a negative image.

There is evidence to suggest that Oliver had a personal motive to purge the "gauche nationale" from the NPDQ in June, 1963. Since March of that year, a new and violent nationalist organization had appeared in Québec - the Front de Libération du Québec. The FLQ was founded in February,

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1963, by three activists in the Rassemblement pour l'indépendence nationale (RIN) who were also active in another left-wing nationalist group, the Action socialiste pour l'indépendence du Québec (ASIQ). Raymond Villeneuve, a 19-year-old bakery worker, was one of the original three Felquistes and he gave the FLQ its name. Villeneuve was also a member of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec and was publicly associated with the "gauche nationale." In early June Villeneuve was arrested along with 22 others, and in the autumn he was one of four people convicted in the death of Wilfrid O'Neil, the night watchman at the Canadian Army recruiting centre then on Sherbrooke Street near McGill. O'Neil was killed by an FLQ bomb on the night of April 20, 1963, planted by Villeneuve and his companions. Villeneuve served four years and was paroled in 1967.

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48 In March, 1963, ASIQ published a journal (L'indépendantiste) in preparation for the founding convention of the NPDQ. Richard Fidler of Hull kindly provided a copy of this journal from his collection to this writer. Several members of the "gauche nationale" published articles outlining their positions in this journal, including Pierre Vadeboncoeur, Jacques-Yvan Morin, André L'Heureux, and Michel Chartrand.

49 Louis Fournier, FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement, Toronto: NC Press, 1984, p. 28-29. Fournier's book is based in part on RCMP Security Service files. Only a month before he founded the FLQ, Villeneuve was among 21 NPDQ nationalists who signed a declaration of the "gauche nationale" which appeared in Le Devoir (January 7, 1963, p. 3). Others included Chartrand, J-Y Morin, Vadeboncoeur, Réginald Boisvert, Michel Forest, J-V Morin, Marcel Rioux and Gilles Rochette. The declaration was a response to an FTQ attack on the "gauche nationale" and its open desire to separate the NPDQ from the federal NDP.
Perhaps most significantly for our story, Raymond Villeneuve had also been involved in the ten Westmount mailbox bombings. There were ten bombs consisting of four sticks of dynamite each. Five exploded simultaneously in the early hours of the morning of Friday, May 17, 1963, while five were damaged when dropped in the mailboxes. Sergeant Walter Leja of the Canadian Army disarmed two but was tragically maimed by the third. The last two, which did not explode independently, were themselves blown up by the army on site.\textsuperscript{50} Thérèse Casgrain, Frank Scott, Charles Taylor, Michael Oliver, and their families - Westmount residents all - lived within a few blocks of those bombings.\textsuperscript{51}

The simple association between the Felquiste Villeneuve and the gauche nationale, which would have been known to

\textsuperscript{50} Louis Fournier, \textit{FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement}, Toronto: NC Press, 1984, p. 36-41; Gabriel Hudon, \textit{Ce n'était qu'un début}, Montréal: Editions Parti Pris, 1977, p. 131. Hudon was one of Villeneuve's two original companions in the FLQ. The immediate motive for the bombings may have been Westmount's decision to host a military display by the Royal Montréal Regiment on May 14 after it had been cancelled by Verdun's mayor due to numerous bomb threats. See \textit{The Westmount Examiner}, May 17, 1963, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{51} Leja was injured by a bomb which was dropped at the corner of Lansdowne and Westmount Boulevard, near Oliver's Grosvenor house; another exploded at the corner of Clarke and St. Catherine, less than five blocks from the homes of Taylor, Scott or Casgrain. Their home addresses for the period were obtained from various archival sources. See also \textit{The Westmount Examiner}, May 24, 1963, p. 1.
Oliver by June 7,52 was probably enough to provoke him and the rest to attempt a purge. However, on June 13 an NDPQ press release appeared on the front page of Le Devoir under a headline reading, "The NDP: the actions of Lesage, Lapalme and Saulnier more than justify violence". Québec attorney-general Claude Wagner had publicly denounced all independantistes as criminals and held them responsible for the bombings. There had been brutal violations of the civil rights and persons of the accused and their counsel. Among other things, some of the prisoners had been held for ten days without being able to contact anyone. To this the NDPQ took great exception,suggesting that democracy was more profoundly threatened by the actions of the authorities than by the accused. The release defended the bombings as desperate acts spurred by "...neo-colonialist economic, political and social exploitation and cultural genocide in the guise of bilingualism... [and] false democracy..."53 The statement raised a storm of criticism, even from the usually friendly André Laurendeau of Le Devoir. As for the federal leadership, Harry Pope, then executive assistant to Douglas, wrote to Oliver on June 14:

52 On June 7, June 10, and June 12, 1963, Robert Prittie, the NDP Member of Parliament for Burnaby-Richmond, queried Pearson’s Minister of Justice, Lionel Chevrier, about press reports of alleged police brutality and detentions without trial in the FLQ case. See Hansard for these dates, pages 777, 843, and 970.

...I know that it must be becoming increasingly hard to talk to the Provincial New Democrats who seem to be trying to ride the separatist wave more and more... Tommy just told me he would make no statement, leaving this to you. However, Tommy did say to me that he thought the provincial executive's choice of language was "asinine" and that if this sort of stuff continued - and got into the English-language press - he would be forced publicly to disassociate himself from it.

In my view the sooner a separate (but I hope NOT separatist!) provincial socialist party is founded in Québec the better. The Québec wing of the federal New Democratic Party would then go about its business in cooperation with the rest of the party and the Québec provincial socialist party could blast off to its heart's content. Of course, I could expect many if not most active socialists would be members of both parties. Pierre Vadeboncoeur, who, I am quite sure, would wish to be in the provincial party only, would at last be at home in a party that was not full of les maudits anglais!

Despite the fact that Sherwood cites the gauche nationale manifesto published in Le Devoir on January 7, 1963, and despite the fact Sherwood was writing only two years after the Westmount bombings under the direction of a man who had been at least indirectly one of the intended victims, Villeneuve and his acts - a matter of public record - do not appear anywhere in Sherwood's work. Did Oliver want to try to dissociate the NDP from FLQ terrorism in Sherwood's

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54 Oliver papers, Pope-Oliver, June 14, 1963.

quasi-official history? Did Oliver want to prevent the response of the Westmount professors from becoming the subject of historical speculation? Was it that Oliver feared that discussion of Villeneuve would have shown that the "gauche nationale" did not conceal its objectives, and that Sherwood's "ambush" theory (discussed below) was false? Certainly he had not forgotten the bombs when he was reading the drafts of Sherwood's thesis in 1965. In the midst of a major terror campaign which included the spectacular bombing of the Montréal Stock Exchange at Place Victoria, Westmount Town Hall - across the street from the church where Oliver's father had been rector - was bombed on July 1, 1965.56

Sherwood goes to considerable pains to give the impression that the federalists were "ambushed" by a nationalist conspiracy. He wrote:

...With the NDP staff in the nationalist camp, it was no accident that some of the members whom they had recently recruited, and who were to be present at the orientation convention as delegates, should share their nationalist views. ...the balance between the two tendencies in the NDP Provisional Council had been upset. The federalists had allowed the administration of the party to drift unchecked.

...L'Heureux [associate federal secretary] had the task of arranging the orientation convention, which would presumably lead to the split of the party, while he was still on the federal NDP payroll... At this time, on the eve of the orientation convention, L'Heureux was fully behind the nationalists although his statement of position never seemed to be particularly clear...

L'Heureux's handling of this "tâche délicate"... contributed to the ambiguity of his position. For quite a time both the nationalists and the federalists within the NDP Provisional Council had believed him to be within their ranks. Then the federalists slowly became aware that André L'Heureux had drifted into the nationalist camp while at the same time they woke up to the fact that the administrative and organizational machinery of the Quebec NDP was under the control of the nationalists. By then effective remedial action was impossible.

...there was every indication that a split would take place. It seemed that all had been arranged in advance. ⁵⁷

In fact, when the "congrès d'orientation" convened the federalists had been observing the "gauche nationale" and preparing for months. On the weekend of January 19-20, 1963, L'Heureux himself warned the federal executive of what was coming. Oliver, Douglas, Lewis, Knowles, Picard, Grier, and Pope were all in attendance:

André L'Heureux pointed out that a serious difference of opinion had arisen within the provisional Council over the relationship between the Quebec party and the federal movement. Three alternative proposals were being considered: (1)

a provincial party as provided under Article X of the federal constitution, (2) two wings of the party, one for provincial elections and the other for federal elections, (3) an independent Quebec party identified mainly with provincial issues and coming into some form of relationship with the federal party at the time of federal elections.

He reported it was likely 2 separate recommendations would be made to the founding convention along the lines of alternatives 1 and 3. It was suggested that the wording of Article X was sufficiently flexible to permit the development of a Quebec party with sufficient independence to devote attention to provincial problems but at the same time remain within the overall structure of the federal movement. In reply, André L'Heureux suggested that the main impetus for severing any formal organic link with the federal movement was an historical and political reason and not really a question of disagreement with the provisions of Article X.

It was agreed that the Executive should be further informed of developments within Quebec and no official step should be taken at this time. The members of the Executive resident in Quebec were asked to keep in touch with developments on a day to day basis.58

This information did not go unnoticed. Two weeks after the federal election, there was a meeting of the executive council of the FTQ at North Hatley, Québec. Oliver, speaking on behalf of Douglas and Lewis as well as himself, had the FTQ leadership adopt a very firm and detailed position on the structural options, which was to establish an NPDQ which was constitutionally identical to the other nine provincial sections of the NDP, and to press for the amendment of

Article X of the federal party constitution to permit greater programmatic independence to all provincial sections. The FTQ representatives in the NPDQ were thereafter bound by this position, which could not and did not result in changes to the structure of the federal and Québec party to fully conform to local conditions.  

The National Director of the Steelworkers, William Mahoney, made it his business to keep tabs on the activity of Steel officials Emile Boudreau and Jean-Claude Lebel (members of the "gauche nationale"), and CLC political education official Philippe Vaillancourt. Mahoney surreptitiously collected minutes of "gauche nationale" caucus meetings, had them translated into English, and circulated them to CLC officials and others like Bill Dodge. Dodge had himself been trying to frustrate

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59 CLC papers, Dodge files, Provost to Gérin-Lajoie, four page typescript letter, May 2, 1963. This particular development is one of the clearest demonstrations of the labour and party élites' insistence on the implementation of the "universally-applicable" NDP model in Québec.

60 Lebel left the employ of the federal NDP as chief organizer in Québec and became an organizer for Steel on October 1, 1962. Steel papers, Boudreau-Cotterill, September 21, 1962, two pages typescript.

61 CLC papers, Dodge files, Mahoney-Dodge, June 4, 1963, plus attachments (translation of a convocation for a meeting on May 24, and of informal minutes of the same meeting; three pages).
Vaillancourt's Québec party activities since June 25, 1962. Mahoney went so far as to attempt to intimidate Boudreau and Lebel by threatening to fire them if they did not cease to work for the objectives of the "gauche nationale". Following a meeting of various officers of the CLC and international unions in Montréal on June 4, Mahoney sent the following letter to Lebel:

The meeting reinforced my concern about the state of confusion with respect to political action in the Province of Québec. Because of that confusion you are instructed to stop your political activities and confine your attention to Steel Labor [a publication], public relations and the translation of articles for Information [another publication].

It has also come to my attention that you are functioning as secretary of a caucus to press the views of Emile [Boudreau] and yourself and a few other people as to the form our political action should take in Québec. You are certainly free to take any kind of action you like politically and have a perfect right to do so. If you are going to be employed by our union, however, we have a right to expect that your activities will assist in avoiding confusion and creating unity in the

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62 CLC papers, Dodge files, four page manuscript document, untitled, marked "Bring up June 25/62". This document consists of cryptic notes on the contending factions in the NPDQ. Describing Daoust as "on knife edge", it contains such tantalizing phrases as, "Group now in control will remain undisturbed so long as there is no substantial base. If we can get substantial group of TU [trade unionists] and some constituency org - money from UTWA [textile workers' union]... See Mathieu first - what about Vaillancourt... Swerdlow [CLC national political education director] to make sure Vaillancourt steps up education and is not to take any new party activities...".

63 CLC papers, Dodge files, copy of letter from Mahoney to Lebel, June 4, 1963, 2 pages typescript; also in Steel papers in Lebel's personal file.
labour movement...

...We are not prepared to pay people to set up rump caucuses outside the regularly constituted bodies of the labour movement.

...I insist... that anyone employed by this office promote the policies of our union in the regular way and not contravene decisions properly arrived at by setting up extra machinery.

After the meeting of your special caucus [of the "gauche nationale"] called for Tuesday, June 4, I would expect that you would either cease your activities with them or with us. We cannot take responsibility for creating more chaos in Québec than already exists. If the decisions of the Federation [FTQ] are given a responsible and reasonable trial and do not work out, then they may be changed in an orderly way.

Failure to permit any decisions to be arrived at or any practical steps to be taken is simply to perpetuate confusion and to create justifiable doubts in the minds of our members whether we are competent to give any clear-cut leadership.64

In the end Lebel did not respond to this intimidation. He held his ground and supported Boudreau and the "gauche nationale" at the convention, but the federalists managed to split the party and effectively expel the nationalists.

Still not satisfied, following the "congrès d'orientation" Mahoney sent the following letter to Pat Burke, Director of Steel's District 5 (Québec) and Boudreau's boss:

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64 CLC papers, Dodge files, copy of letter from Mahoney to Lebel, June 4, 1963, 2 pages typescript; also in Steel papers in Lebel's personal file.
As you know, we got Lebel on our payroll through the initiative of Emile [Boudreau]; we had no chance to assess him before he was hired. I am not happy about doing things this way.

You know, too, that I wrote Lebel on June 4 and told him very plainly that we could not have anyone on our payroll as a representative setting himself up as a focal point for twisting not only the policy of our union but the policy of the Québec Federation of Labour which our people participate in making.

What your are going to do with Emile remains your responsibility. I just want it absolutely clear that, no matter how many problems it causes, if Lebel continues his shenanigans he will be looking for another job.

It is easy enough to be made a fool of by someone over whom we have no control; it is irresponsible to allow it to be done by people on our own payroll.

I understand that André L'Heureux resigned as associate secretary of the NDP in order to carry out personal views in conflict with those of the organization which hired him. This would seem a good principle for our employees to follow.

You can show this letter to Lebel or Emile if you think that would be of any value.65

Lebel resigned from his Steel position about three months later.66

When the "congrès d'orientation" finally took place at the end of June, 1963, the party split. Sherwood attacked

65 Steel papers, copy of Mahoney-Burke, July 9, 1963, one page typescript. My emphasis.

66 Steel papers, copy of Lebel-Burke, October 14, 1963.
the structures report presented to the "congrès d'orientation" as biased against the federalists. This report defined three possible constitutional options for the Québec party to choose among. First, the NPDQ could be set up on the same structural basis as New Democratic provincial parties elsewhere. This option was identified in the report and on the floor of the convention as the status quo. ⁶⁷ Another possibility was the establishment of an NPDQ which operated in the federal context only, with a separate party (the Parti Socialiste du Québec) occupying the provincial field. The third option was the creation of a PSQ which occupied both the federal and provincial fields in Québec. It would be independent of but associated with the federal NDP, and the NDP would not run candidates in Québec at either level. This third option was the original conception of what the PSQ was to have been. These are the only logical variations! The congress, open to all party members (such meetings can be "packed" readily), decided first on option three. The following morning, the federalists rallied and split the party along the lines of option two. ⁶⁸ ⁶⁹

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⁶⁷ Article X of the 1961 federal NDP constitution reads: "Each province of Canada shall have a provincial constitution and programme, provided that the said constitution and programme are not in conflict with the principles of the federal party or this constitution." This was altered at the August, 1963, federal convention in Regina on the motion of the Québec delegation to provide more programmatic liberty to the provincial sections.

Sherwood's detailed coverage ends shortly after this event, with the assertion that the split on June 30 was interpreted as bitter and final. And with a discussion of the rôle played by the Québec delegation at the 1963 federal convention in Regina. At Regina, Oliver and other members of the Québec NDP delegation fought for changes in Article X of the federal party constitution to provide provincial sections with much greater programmatic autonomy than the 1961 document had allowed. The earlier version had insisted that provincial sections' constitutions and programmes not conflict with those of the federal party. The 1963 amendment deleted all references to programmatic consistency. This had been part of the federalists' plan to accommodate the "gauche nationale" within a regular NDP provincial section.

According to Sherwood, Oliver hoped for an official link between the PSQ and the NDP. To this end, Oliver allegedly

University, 1965, p. 135-152.

69 From August, 1961 through July, 1963, the federal NDP was a federation of provincial parties; one could only join a provincial party. After the "congrès d'orientation", it became possible to join a provincial section of the federal party directly - but only in Québec. Generally provincial parties reorganize themselves along federal constituency lines about 18 months prior to federal elections, and then revert to provincial structure. The NPDQ was the only anomaly in this respect - being a "federal" provincial section only (!).

informed the secretary of the PSQ, André L'Heureux, that the president of the PSQ could be a member of the federal council of the New Democratic Party, and that any accredited delegate could outline the PSQ's position from the floor during the debate on Article X. Sherwood suggested that "...considering the type of settlement reached at the orientation convention it should have come as no surprise that the PSQ did not care to act on this offer." Sherwood implied that Oliver made an offer to accord PSQ executives and delegates the status of official representatives of an NDP provincial section in Québec, and that the PSQ representatives were so contrary that they did not take up Oliver's offer.

In fact, it was the secretary of the PSQ, André L'Heureux, who on August 2, 1961, formally requested a special place on the convention agenda for a representative of the PSQ to explain recent events in Québec and the orientation of the new provincial party. Oliver informed


72 Oliver papers, manuscript draft of a telegram, Oliver-L'Heureux, n.d. The full text is as follows: "Re your letter August 2. Federal executive asked me to reply first that PSQ president is member of council and can explain position there Sunday [at the federal council meeting] stop Second that PSQ president is member of constitutional committee and can explain position there Monday stop Third that any accredited delegate sympathetic to PSQ can explain position from convention floor during debate on amendment to Article X of Constitution [signed] Michael Oliver."
the federal executive of this request during its pre-convention meeting in Regina on August 3, and it was refused. He was instructed to reply to L'Heureux refusing the special agenda item, citing the following facts: first, that Fernand Daoust, president of the PSQ, was already a regular member of the NDP federal council and could present the PSQ position to the council in that capacity; second, Daoust as a member of the Constitution committee could raise problems before that committee; and third, that any accredited delegate could present the PSQ's position from the floor during the debate on Article X. However, Emile Boudreau of the United Steelworkers, a leading figure in the PSQ, was unable to obtain accreditation precisely because of his support for the nationalist option.

Oliver refused to recognize the independent existence of the PSQ as the equivalent in Québec of an NDP provincial section, despite the initiative taken by the federalists (led by Oliver) to split the venues at the Québec convention. As

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74 NDP papers, Boudreau-Grier, July 16, 1963; Boudreau-Grier, July 25, 1963. In the second letter, Boudreau says, "I know, of course, that getting a credentials [sic] can always be arranged and in normal circumstances this would not worry me too much but I also know that because of: a) my membership in the Québec PSQ and; b) the non-official status of our riding association, some of my friends would be only too glad to challenge my eligibility as a delegate."
far as Oliver and the federal executive were concerned, the PSQ was not the equivalent of an NDP provincial section in Québec, it had no official existence in terms of the federal NDP, and there was no NDP provincial section in Québec. The documents supporting this interpretation come from Oliver's personal papers at McGill; Oliver himself was the key communicator.

The extent to which Oliver acted with the support of the federal leadership and the party old guard, even at the end of his term as federal president, is confirmed by letters between Oliver, Lewis and Grier on the question of who would succeed to the presidency at the 1963 convention. On July 26, 1963, federal secretary Terry Grier wrote to Michael Oliver urging him to reconsider his decision not to run for re-election as president at the forthcoming Regina convention:

I have discussed with you, Tommy [Douglas] and David [Lewis], the names of various people who might succeed you. Among them were Charles Taylor, Tom Berger, Harry Crowe, Romeo Mathieu, Gerard Picard, Walter Pitman, George Cadbury and Fred Dowling.

All these people and others besides are disqualified for one or more of the following reasons:

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75 Curiously, since there had been no PSD convention since 1958 and no provincial NDP had been created, PSQ vice-president Michel Chartrand was probably technically the leader of the only provincial party in Québec with which the NDP had an official relationship - the PSD!
1. Distance from Ottawa.
2. Not bilingual.
3. Little experience at the federal level.
4. Lack of entrée into certain circles.
5. Name not known in movement.
6. Name not exciting to anyone.
7. Not a strong enough personality.
8. Not having confidence of Mr. Douglas.
9. No close knowledge of what has happened to the federal party organization in the past two years.
10. Will require lengthy period of "breaking in."

The only two people who do qualify in these and many other respects are yourself and David. In Tommy's words, "either Mike or David has got to be persuaded".

I am aware that your overwhelming predisposition is not to stand, for all kinds of valid reasons. The same is equally true for David.

But as you well know, the party is going to go through some heavy weather in the next two years - perhaps heavier than we have encountered to date. Strains are beginning to develop which were not apparent even six months ago.

Our administrative and organizational structure will simply not be able to cope without the active backing of the strongest and best possible President. This is no time for us to start accepting substitutes in top leadership positions.

In view of this, Mike, I am asking you to reconsider your decision. Though I have not spoken to Tommy or David about this letter, I know that they join me in this request.

Why you, rather than David? For largely the same reasons which prevailed at the Founding Convention plus the fact that, other things being equal, it would be better not to make a change.

I am asking that you reconsider your decision on the following basis - that Oliver as President and David Lewis as Vice-president arrange between them a clearly spelled out sharing of the time-consuming responsibilities. As Secretary, I will
cheerfully undertake any extra work necessary to ensure that such an arrangement works out in practice. Given the closeness of you, David and Tommy, I see no reason why it should not.  

The assumption that any suitable arrangement could be readily managed on the convention floor at Regina is obvious. Lewis' support for Oliver was expressed in another letter to the party president on June 14:

...I believe I should tell you now that I don't think it would be desirable either for you not to continue or for me to take on the job.

...I think it would be wrong from the point of view of party image for me to come back as President after you had served only one term. It seems to me that if there was the need for a new face in that position in 1961, as there was, the same still holds true as far as some of the old-guard people like myself are concerned.

In the end, Oliver demurred and did not run again, perhaps because he saw no advantage in continuing as party president, or perhaps because the Liberals had offered him the position of Director of Research for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which Pearson announced on July 22.

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76 NDP papers, copy of a letter, Grier-Oliver (copy to Lewis), July 26, 1963. The fact that this letter was sent to Oliver three weeks after he had effected the schism in Québec strongly supports the interpretation that the split in the Québec party was supported by the federal leadership as a whole.

77 NDP papers, Grier's copy of a letter from Lewis to Oliver, June 14, 1963.
B. Perron-Blanchette and the PSQ

Monique Perron-Blanchette's 1978 Master's thesis in history, *Un essai de socialisme au Québec: le Parti Socialiste du Québec*, prepared at Université de Sherbrooke, provides documented coverage of the NPDQ from August, 1961, through August, 1963. It is not referred to in any published work known to this writer. Her work for our period is based on the papers of Fernand Daoust, who was variously a member of the program committee of the NPDQ Conseil Provisoire, president of the CP, member of the NDP's federal council, and president of the Conseil Provisoire of the PSQ. He was a longtime leader of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (CLC-FTQ) and of the FTQ itself. She makes no references to even the usual secondary literature on the NDP, and none to Sherwood. One of her key theses is that the national question was pursued - by federalists and the "gauche nationale" - at the expense of the development of democratic socialism in Québec.\(^78\)

The first chapter of Perron-Blanchette covers activities of the NPDQ from the federal founding convention (July 31-August 4, 1961) to the aftermath of the 1963 federal general election. In this section, contradicting Sherwood's

assertions, she demonstrates that the option for a fully independent Québec socialist party occupying the federal and provincial fields was mooted by the Conseil Provisoire's constitution subcommittee\(^79\) as early as October 23, 1961, in a document prepared for a founding convention scheduled for February 16-18, 1962. The thirty-member CP included Michael Oliver (federal president of the NDP), Harry Pope (Tommy Douglas' executive assistant and former president of the PSD), Thérèse Casgrain, and ten representatives of the FTQ, most of whom were associated with the federalist tendency.\(^80\) Sherwood argues that federalists were overwhelmed by a nationalist conspiracy to split the party in 1963 of which they were fundamentally unaware.\(^81\) Citing CP minutes, Perron-Blanchette describes the subcommittee's report on December 9, 1961:

...they had taken into account the inanity of preparing a constitution when the nature of the party to be governed by it had not yet been determined. For the first time, the problem of autonomy, that is of nationalism versus federalism, was raised clearly and in writing. In effect, the

\(^79\) The constitution subcommittee of the Conseil Provisoire included Philippe Vaillancourt, CLC director of political education for Québec; Jacques-Victor Morin, representing the former PSD (Québec CCF) interest, and Réginald Boisvert, a Citélibriste and a poet as well as a New Party club militant.


constitution subcommittee frankly raised the question whether the NPDQ would be an independent provincial party or one affiliated to the federal NDP.

The subcommittee, observing that it was of the highest importance that the party be actively involved in provincial politics, recommended the creation of separate federal and provincial parties. They noted that problems of recruitment were posed by the fact that the membership seemed already divided into two mutually exclusive camps.\(^{82}\)

Between this meeting and the Conseil Provisoire meeting of July 6, 1962, Perron-Blanchette describes the party as marking time.\(^{83}\) In fact, the NPDQ leadership — including the "gauche nationale" — was first preoccupied with Douglas' speech of January 15, 1962, (see the discussion of Sherwood above) and then the federal election campaign which ended on June 18, 1962. Thus the same issues as discussed at the December, 1961, meeting were still on the agenda eight months later.

In September, 1962, the Conseil Provisoire set March 22-24, 1963, as the new date for the convention. Against


the background of the stormy provincial election campaign ("Maîtres chez nous" was the Liberal slogan, and the key issue was the nationalization of hydro-electricity), the committees returned to their work. Discussion papers were presented to the CP at meetings between December 15, 1962, and February 2, 1963. During this period there was an open and public debate between the federalist FTQ members of the Conseil Provisoire and the "gaucne nationale" over the orientation of the party in the pages of Le Monde Ouvrier and Le Devoir.\textsuperscript{84} André L'Heureux, associate federal secretary, also described the issues raised by the reports of the committees in detail at the federal executive meeting in Ottawa on January 19-20, 1963. Olivier, Douglas, Lewis, Picard, and Pope were all present at this meeting.\textsuperscript{85} These reports included document "B-1" of the "congrès d'orientation", which outlined the option for a unitary and independent PSQ occupying the federal and provincial planes. At the Conseil Provisoire meeting of February 2, L'Heureux advocated that the CP formally endorse one of the three options - the unitary and independent PSQ, a split party, or a regular NDP provincial section. However, the CP distributed all three discussion documents to the membership without endorsing any position, preferring to remain

\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Le Devoir, January 7, 1963, p. 3.

neutral. All of this contradicts Sherwood's "ambush" theory.

At an emergency meeting of NPDQ officers on February 9, L'Heureux obtained an indefinite delay of the convention until after the federal election of April 8, which had just been called. He also asked them to adopt a position on the national question to keep things clear, and they declared themselves in favour of an "associate-state" (sovereignty-association) as proposed by Michel Chartrand (NPDQ vice-president), Jacques-Yvan Morin (member of the CP), and André L'Heureux. This position was consistent with the discussion document which supported the split-party option. Then, for a second time in less than one year, after extended and open discussion of the need for a clear orientation of the provincial venue, the "gauche nationale" again plunged into a federal election campaign.

The second section of Perron-Blanchette's work is a very detailed discussion of the "congrès d'orientation", but there are few substantive differences between her account and that of Doig, upon which Sherwood is also based. She does contradict Sherwood's charge that the Sunday morning session

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was packed by nationalists, indicating instead that it was the federalists' ranks which seemed swollen.\textsuperscript{88}

The third chapter, which covers the period between July 1, 1963, and the PSQ founding convention at Quebec City in November of that year, provides insight into the devolution of the relationship between the two parties. Perron-Blanchette notes that though conciliatory public remarks were made by Oliver and Fernand Daoust (president of the Conseil Provisoire of the PSQ) following the convention, stating a desire for cooperation and even reunification in the middle term, within a few weeks the NPDQ had started to revise its opinion of the PSQ.\textsuperscript{89} On July 19 the NPDQ Comité d'organisation provisoire\textsuperscript{90} issued a circular letter to the membership which indicated that it was inappropriate "...to consider the NDP and PSQ as two socialist parties, divided only by tactical considerations"\textsuperscript{91}. The COP asserted that a schism had taken place over a fundamental question - that of federalism versus nationalism.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{88} Monique Perron-Blanchette, "Le PSQ: un essai de socialisme au Québec", Sherbrooke: Université de Sherbrooke, 1978, p. 47.


\textsuperscript{90} Hereinafter referred to as COP. It replaced the Conseil provisoire on July 1, 1963.

\textsuperscript{91} NPDQ papers, "Un message de comité d'organisation du NPD du Québec," July 19, 1963, also cited from Daoust papers by Perron-Blanchette, p. 53-54; my translation.
\end{footnotesize}
Perron-Blanchette describes the immediate reaction of the nationalist left as euphoric, and how some locals of the International Woodworkers were quick to express their support. However, despite high enthusiasm, the general feeling was of anxiety. This is borne out by numerous contemporary press reports. Anxiety was heightened by the approach of the federal NDP convention, slated for Regina in the first days of August. According to the author, the convention objective of the Québec delegates was to amend Article X of the federal NDP constitution to provide all provincial sections with full programmatic autonomy (previously provincial programs were not permitted to conflict with the federal program). The objectives of this action were to satisfy the FTQ, maintain the credibility of the federalists within the Québec movement, and create grounds for a rapprochement with the PSQ, or at least for the eventual creation of an NDP provincial section in Québec which could outflank the PSQ. In this effort the Québec delegation was successful.

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93 CLC papers, Dodge files, Provost to Gérin-Lajoie, four page typescript letter, May 2, 1963. This letter outlines exactly what the official FTQ group within the party would pursue as its objective on the party structures question. See also the discussion above on Sherwood.
According to Perron-Blanchette, the other crucial issue of the federal convention for the Québec delegation was whether Canada was to remain in a nuclear-armed NATO. The PSQ manifesto of July 23, 1963, utterly rejected Canada's participation in NATO under these terms. This had been a major issue for progressives in Québec before and after the federal election in April. Federalist Charles Taylor and nationalist Pierre Vadeboncoeur had both defended the anti-nuclear position in the public debate. Strangely, Perron-Blanchette argues that "...at the time of the debate on the participation of Canada in a nuclear-armed NATO, the Québec delegates had nothing to say on the subject and had, it seemed, simply endorsed the federal approval of the project...". This is the more peculiar when one realizes that Taylor was present as a delegate from the Mount Royal riding association. In December, 1963, Taylor explained the outcome:

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...The substance of the policy is this: Canada will remain in NATO as long as the alliance does not become a vehicle for the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to Germany. The NDP is therefore strongly opposed to the multilateral nuclear strike force. Our basic aim in NATO is to bring about disengagement, particularly withdrawal of nuclear weapons from central Europe, and eventually the disbanding of NATO and the Warsaw pact. Our opposition to nuclear weapons for Canada remains entire.  

Perron-Blanchette suggests that this became an important stumbling-block to a rapprochement with the PSQ. Her logic is contradictory. If programmatic independence from the federal NDP was crucial to a rapprochement with the PSQ, and this was achieved in the amendment of Article X at Regina, why would the federal party's position on NATO make any substantial difference? On the other hand, perhaps the amendment of Article X had become irrelevant after the schism and the NATO question had importance because it reflected the ideological gap between the parties. In any event, her interpretation of this question is not supported by documentation.

The relationship between the PSQ and the NPDQ deteriorated during the autumn of 1963. Perron-Blanchette notes two attacks on the PSQ by the NPDQ's labour allies,

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the Conseil du Travail du Montréal (FTQ) and the political education and action committee of the FTQ. In mid-October, speaking on behalf of its member unions, the CTM formally endorsed the Lesage Liberals. Later, a statement by the FTQ committee just prior to the PSQ founding convention reminded union members that the FTQ had never endorsed the PSQ, that it was "...neither an outgrowth, an extension, nor a provincial section of the NDP..." but the result of a schism, and that no union member attending the convention was an official spokesperson for the FTQ.99 Unfortunately, Perron-Blanchette says nothing about the process which produced these statements.

As for the NDP, federal party vice-president David Lewis attacked the PSQ at a meeting in Montréal on October 28, claiming that it had caused an immense rift between the people of Québec and the NDP, accusing it of parochialism, and suggesting that any cooperation between the two parties was useless if it did not take place within a federal association. At the same meeting, Charles Taylor asserted that the federalist socialism of the NDP and the nationalist socialism of the PSQ were incompatible. Perron-Blanchette interprets these remarks as clear evidence that Lewis and Taylor, on behalf of the NDP and NPDQ leadership, sought to

annihilate any hope of a rapprochement between the two parties.¹⁰⁰

Perron-Blanchette does a competent job of demonstrating her main thesis. Her work indicates that from late 1961 until the "congrès d'orientation" in 1963, the "gauche nationale" had pressed for decentralization or some form of separation of the Québec section from the federal NDP. In general this is consistent with Sherwood's work, save for the refutation of his "ambush" theory. A brief period followed in which the split was represented as a compromise by both the federalists and nationalists. Sherwood and Perron-Blanchette agree, incorrectly as it turns out, that this period persisted through the federal convention. From the critique of Sherwood above, and from Perron-Blanchette's work on the evolution of the PSQ-NPDQ relationship through the autumn of 1963, it appears that the federalist faction of the NPDQ, their FTQ allies, and the federal NDP leadership collaborated to make the rift permanent from mid-July, 1963.

Despite limited research, Perron-Blanchette's is probably the best account of the NPDQ from its inception through the schism. That it has languished in total obscurity for ten years is a comment on the sad state of

historiographical curiosity among not only those few scholars interested in the NPDQ, but also on a similar failing among historians of the federal party.
The most recent secondary work on the NPDQ and the only published source is André Lamoureux's *Le NPD et le Québec: 1958-1985*, published in Montréal by Editions du Parc in September, 1985, coincidental with the latest provincial founding convention of the NPDQ. Lamoureux is a CEGEP professor of political science, and the work is an extension of his Master's thesis which was prepared at Université du Québec à Montréal under the direction of Roch Denis. Lamoureux's thesis was entitled *La fondation du Nouveau Parti Démocratique en 1961 et la question nationale au Canada*, and covered the period from 1958 to 1961. His work was based on federal NDP papers at the Public Archives in Ottawa, on Fernand Daoust's papers, and on NDP and NPDQ papers held in the archives of the FTQ. Sherwood is cited as the major secondary source for the 1961-1965 period, and Lamoureux makes no reference to Perron-Blanchette.

A little more than half of the book concerns the early period from 1958 to 1965. In the first sixty pages, Lamoureux discusses the conjuncture of the later 1950's to set the stage for the appearance of the NDP and NPDQ. He

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then turns to a discussion of the New Party period in Québec and Canada (1958-1961), and follows this with a more specific discussion of the history of the Québec party.

About fifty pages are directly devoted to the history of the party between 1961 and 1963. Lamoureux recounts early conflicts (April-July, 1961) between nationalist elements in the Québec Committee for the New Party (later transformed into the Conseil Provisoire) and the National Committee for the New Party (replaced by the federal council of the New Democratic Party) over the position of the federal party on the national question. The information contained in this section complements details in Perron-Blanchette to further refute Sherwood's "ambush" theory; the nationalists never concealed their purposes. This portion of narrative is supported by documents and newspaper articles.  

Nevertheless, Lamoureux fails to raise any historiographical issue with Sherwood in this or any other part of the book. He describes the founding convention of the NDP in Ottawa (July 31-August 4, 1961) and the francophone media's reaction. This part of his work is based very heavily on newspaper reports.

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Lamoureux superficially summarizes the period from August, 1961, through January 15, 1962, without identifying any source for his information; one can only surmise that it was Sherwood, whose coverage of this period is also sketchy. He discusses the Douglas speech in Toronto, though he does not point out Sherwood's misrepresentations. Without analyzing the results of the 1962 and 1963 federal general elections or providing any details at all on the period from February 20, 1962, to late February, 1963, he turns his attention to the schism. There is no detailed discussion of the "congrès d'orientation". His account is apparently derived from that of Roch Denis, who based his narrative on Sherwood. The entire work lacks detail.

Lamoureux's chief contribution is his conjunctural description, particularly his attempt to establish the historical pedigree of the "gauche nationale" and the desire for an independent Québec socialist party at the provincial level. Between 1954 and 1957 efforts were made within the Fédération des Unions Industrielles du Québec and FTQ to establish a provincial social democratic party independent of the CCF with assistance from liberal intellectuals. This was resulted from the escalation of political conflict

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between the Duplessis regime and the Québec labour movement, and from the ineffectual record of the provincial Liberal opposition. Virtually the same group who had promoted this provincial social democratic party could be found in the PSQ leadership ranks on July 1, 1963.\textsuperscript{107} There was nothing anomalous, surprising or discontinuous about their behaviour.

D. Summary

Reviewing the secondary literature on the NPDQ has revealed numerous shortcomings. First, the sources share an exclusively "political" character; they do not consider finance and organization in a meaningful way. Second, none address the rôle played by labour in the NPDQ in a critical way, nor is there an attempt to compare the Québec experience with that of other provinces. Third, there is no acknowledgement that the broader history of the federal party - in terms of its leadership, internal struggles, and obsessions - impinges on the Québec party. This is particularly inexcusable on Lamoureux's part; he worked in the federal NDP papers. Fourth, the review has shown that the English and French language scholarship on the NPDQ has not yet been properly synthesized. Perron-Blanchette did not read Sherwood; Lamoureux did not read Perron-Blanchette. Fifth, until now, no one has treated Sherwood's work as part of the historical debate despite (for example) Lamoureux's obvious recognition of the problem of Sherwood's description of the Douglas speech controversy. Sixth, there is little awareness in any of this work of the importance of certain external factors such as the activities of the Front de Libération du Québec. There is much room for revision.

A. Background

The creation of a political combination by Canadian labour and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation was mooted as early as 1954, during negotiations between the Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress for the establishment of the Canadian Labour Congress. In part, the desire to organize politically reflected the recognition that the CCF had been in decline for a decade. One cause of its decline was the prosperity Canada enjoyed following the war's end, eliminating some of the grounds for protest which the CCF had articulated. The CCF's progress was also frustrated to a certain extent as the paranoiac anti-socialism which characterized American political culture in this period penetrated Canadian political life as well. Critics of the CCF often falsely associated it with Soviet Communism. Added to this was a permanent financial crisis, the party being forced to rely on a declining or increasingly indifferent membership base for funds.

Another reason for the CLC's leadership to advance a political project was the presence of conservative trade unionists in the ranks. The industrial union centre, the
Canadian Congress of Labour, had shared many ideological assumptions with the CCF; the Gompersist Trades and Labour Congress, now subsumed in the CLC, had very different ideas.\(^1\) Another right-wing influence was the New Brunswick Federation of Labour, which continued its traditional endorsement of the Conservative party well into the early Sixties\(^2\), and whose behaviour cast doubt on the "formal" commitment of the other Maritime labour federations.\(^3\) If the CLC was to fund a political party, that political party would have to present a more centrist image than that of the CCF.

The performance of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in the federal general elections of June 10, 1957, and March 31, 1958, must have been an object lesson to those working for the New Party concept. In 1957, the CCF's popular vote remained stable (as compared to 1953) at 11%. However, the party's popularity fell in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan (where it lost one seat), and Nova Scotia, where the CCF lost the Cape Breton seat it had held since 1940. The CCF vote remained stable in Manitoba, where


\(^3\) Ian McKay (Queen's) commented that the support of the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour remained largely formal until recently. McKay-Garon, October 13, 1988.
the party gained two seats, probably due to three-way races in which Liberal candidates lost support to the Tories. Gains were also recorded in Ontario, where the popular vote rose one per cent and two additional CCF parliamentarians were elected. Overall, the CCF federal caucus increased from 23 to 25 members.4

Running in 21 ridings of 75 in Québec, the Parti Social Démocratique (the Québec section of the CCF) received 27,409 votes in 1957, accounting for 1.5% of the popular vote. Eighty-eight per cent of this vote was concentrated in 18 Montréal ridings, while fifty-nine per cent of the off-island vote was in Thérèse Casgrain's riding of Villeneuve. The PSD received 1,312 votes in the other two ridings contested outside Montréal. The party could not even muster sufficient strength to put names on the ballot in every constituency, making it impossible to know what basic PSD vote did exist and continuing a long-standing credibility problem.5

The 1958 election took place only nine months later.

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5 Analysis based on election results reported in Le Devoir, June 12, 1957, p. 7; and on the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Twenty-Third General Election - 1957, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958, p. v-viii.
The CCF only dropped from 11% of the popular vote to 9%, but it lost 17 of the 25 seats it held at dissolution. In the west, the CCF lost three of seven seats in British Columbia (while increasing its popular vote!), nine out of ten seats in Saskatchewan, and all five seats in Manitoba. Ontario remained stable with three seats.\(^6\)

In Québec, the Parti Social Démocratique ran in 29 of 75 ridings. Nineteen Montréal-area ridings were contested. Organizers lamented the fact that the party was so broke it was a struggle just to pay the candidates' deposits, and there was no money for newspaper advertising at all.\(^7\) The total vote obtained was 44,545, or 2.2% of the votes cast. Nearly 60% of this vote was concentrated on the island of Montréal, with another 18% concentrated in party leader Michel Chartrand's off-island riding of Lapointe. In nine other contests in the rest of Québec the PSD received only 9,825 votes.\(^8\) Needless to say, the PSD as usual failed to elect anyone. Nowhere did a PSD candidate even finish second.

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B. Problems of the Québec labour movement

Following the 1958 election, it took more than three years for the CCF and the CLC to create the New Democratic Party. In Québec problems with organized labour were peculiarly acute. Some 316,000 persons or about 21% of Québec's labour force were union members at the time, a proportion roughly similar to the federal average. The Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (Canadian Labour Congress affiliate) counted about two-thirds of all union members in the province, and the remainder were mostly members of the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques et Canadiens, later the CSN.

Several problems faced the labour movement. First, there was powerful opposition to its normal development and to orderly union activity at various levels inside the organizations. Following the Asbestos strike of 1949, the labour movement had faced systematic union busting by management and the Union Nationale. The usual tactic was illegal dismissal of union leaders, resulting in extended litigation. Fines for violations were only $100 per incident, and guilty employers were not obliged to rehire the union leaders. In the meantime the local would disintegrate. Alternatively, the union would launch an
immediate and illegal strike, at which point the Labour Relations Board would decertify the union. During legal strikes, the provincial police - on the direct orders of the premier - would defend strikebreakers. Gérard Dion noted in 1958 that:

...It is not surprising if some leaders feel at times that only direct political action can produce a remedy. They hesitate, however, to press for this because none of the existing provincial political parties inspires their confidence or offers them suitable guarantees. Moreover, the distribution of constituencies is such that the labour vote is frequently overshadowed by that of the rural population. Furthermore, it does not appear that the total union membership is prepared to follow its leaders into the political arena.

Thus pessimism reigned, and some feared that to press for change would risk even more abuse.

The second problem facing Québec labour was a lack of unity. The AFofL-CIO and CLC mergers apparently highlighted the unity of labour elsewhere in North America. Under similar conditions in Québec, labour's house remained badly divided. The Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (CLC) seemed an arbitrary and artificial grouping, created in part


10 Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Spring, 1958, p. 373.
on the initiative of pan-Canadian unions from the respective Trades and Labour Congress and Canadian Congress of Labour centres in Québec, plus a number of unions directly chartered by federal union centres. It had no permanent paid staff, not even officers: its officers were all officials of member unions and paid by them. Affiliation to the FTQ remained optional. Educational functions were left to the affiliates, over which the centre had no authority. Affiliated unions did not have to prove how many members they had, even when membership figures were used as the basis for apportioning delegates at its annual convention. This situation may have been linked to the domination of the first FTQ convention by the ex-TLC unions, in that it was possible to inflate delegations from some of the smaller trade unions. There was no contact between affiliates below the level of the central; instead, they were in contact with their Québec, Canadian and American headquarters. This permitted serious programmatic disparity between affiliates.11

In 1958 the central was controlled by officials of the conservative former TLC trade unions, as the former locals of the Fédération des Unions Industrielles du Québec (FUIQ),

11 Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 374. This state of affairs also tended to discourage communication between the affiliates (below the level of the FTQ executive) which could affect the policy of the centre.
a short-lived umbrella organization for CCL-CIO industrial unions such as Steel, Auto Workers, Mine Workers, and Packinghouse Workers, were a minority. At the 1957 FTQ founding convention the former FUIQ leadership was systematically excluded from office. All movement toward a formal relationship with the CTCC were suppressed. The hostility of the former TLC unions towards the CTCC was legendary. For example, in January, 1957, FTQ affiliates collaborated with the employer and the Union Nationale to break a CTCC organizing drive in Baie Comeau.

Conservative dominance and the fact that all FTQ officers served at least two masters - the FTQ and their own union - meant it was nearly impossible to discuss anything important without risking a major crisis. It also tended to produce hot rhetoric without meaningful consequences, and many reversals of position by the leadership.12 During the Murdochville strike in early 1957,

...the president of the QFL [Roger Provost] in an inflammatory speech declared war on the Duplessis government and laid down a policy of direct and immediate political action. Two months later, the same man at the QFL annual convention, with the same vehemence, urged the delegates to restrict themselves for the moment to a program of political education. His decision was approved by

12 Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 374-376.
the QFL... because the QFL membership was not prepared to go any further.\textsuperscript{13}

The problems of the CTCC were very different and more obvious, and had placed it in stasis since 1955. The CTCC was divided by ideological rather than interest-oriented factions. This had to do with its origins as a Catholic social movement committed to independent Canadian unions. By 1958, secularization was well advanced and discrimination against non-Catholic members had generally ended. However, the commitment to Catholic doctrine remained in the constitution and was a source of division. Some members argued that full secularization was essential for growth in the Montréal area, where the wholly secular FTQ was strong in a labour force of very mixed ethnicity and religious affiliation. Others regarded abandonment of the doctrinal element as betrayal of the broader ethical and social purposes of their movement.

The CTCC's 100,000-member organization was highly decentralized, with regional councils all over the province, duplication of services, and some very small and ineffectual individual unions. Decentralization was popular among middle

and lower cadres, who opposed reorganization to protect their autonomy. For the same reasons they opposed affiliation of the CTCC to the CLC. On the other hand, the CTCC was a much more cohesive organization than the FTQ or its predecessors and had a paid central staff supporting the work of its officers.¹⁴

Long locked in struggle with the TLC and CCL unions, many in the CTCC viewed affiliation to the CLC as a potentially disastrous error. In 1955, the CTCC approved labour unity in principle; in 1956, it rejected amalgamation with the FTQ and adopted the principle of direct affiliation to the CLC to preserve its special character. A joint CLC-CTCC committee developed an implementation report for this purpose, but the effort was aborted in 1957 and only the principle of unity was retained. Meanwhile, some member unions threatened secession if affiliation was implemented, while others threatened to leave if it was not! The main constituency favouring affiliation was in Montréal and in certain heavy industries where competition with the FTQ was important. Direct CLC affiliation would probably end FTQ raiding of CTCC locals. The opposition to affiliation was rooted in unions representing workers in local labour markets

(for example, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean) where FTQ pressure was limited and the need to organize non-Catholics and non-francophones was minimal, and among those cadres who were especially embittered by the struggle against the FTQ unions.

Certain common problems also afflicted the movement. Rapid industrial expansion had swollen the ranks, but little political education had taken place. Meanwhile, the leadership became increasingly intellectually sophisticated. In many respects, it was socially and politically far ahead of the membership. This caused serious mobilization and solidarity problems, and the only solution was education.\footnote{Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 381-384.}
C. Québec labour, the PSD, and the New Party project

In the midst of Québec's labour turmoil, the April 1958 convention of the Canadian Labour Congress was held in Winnipeg and approved the concept of a "new party" to be created in collaboration with the CCF and other progressive groups such as farmers' unions and cooperatives. A small number of delegates, identified with the right wing of the CLC, opposed the New Party project; the leading opponent of the New Party project from Québec was Louis Laberge, head of the FTQ's Montréal Labour Council and later longtime president of the FTQ. Laberge argued in 1958 that the partisan undertaking was prematuré and that a lengthy period of political education was required before one could reasonably expect the membership to support such a party. Laberge was later a member of the Conseil Provisoire of the NPDQ (1961-1963) and in 1965 was elected vice-president of the federal party. Perhaps Laberge recognized that he had to at least formally support the CLC's political project in order to protect his career. Or did Laberge believe that he had to become involved in order to have some control over events in Québec? Certainly he never acted to implement the kind of extensive political education required to convince the FTQ's membership to support the NDP.
At its meeting in May, 1958, the CCF National Council accepted the CLC's offer, including the creation of a CLC-CCF joint committee (later the National Committee for the New Party), and prepared a resolution on the subject for their impending federal convention. The CCF convention of July 1958 (held in Montréal) duly approved the project with the caveat that the process of creating the New Party include the CTCC. The inclusion of the CTCC was on the motion of Michel Chartrand, then leader of the PSD and a CTCC (CSN) activist.¹⁶

A joint CLC-CCF committee was duly formed in the autumn of 1958 to begin organizing the New Party. It consisted of nine CCF representatives and nine CLC representatives. There were never any official representatives from the CTCC on this committee, despite the convention resolution. This was to be expected in light of the state of unity negotiations between the CLC-FTQ and the CTCC. Despite CTCC president Roger Mathieu's public acceptance of an invitation from CLC-FTQ to participate the founding of the party and the writing

¹⁶ André Lamoureux, Le NPD et le Québec, 1958-1985, Montréal: Editions du Parc, 1985, p. 61-64. The resolution is reproduced in full on p. 63. The pertinent portion (my translation) reads: "...the CCF convention authorizes its National Council and National Executive to meet with the leaders of the Canadian Labour Congress, those of the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada, the agricultural organizations and other interested groups and asks them to present a report to the next national convention of the party or at a special convention to this end..."
of its program in November, 1959, the CTCC did not actually take part. Many leading figures in the Catholic labour movement feared the retaliation of the Union Nationale should it be re-elected in 1960. As well, Jean Marchand, the powerful general secretary of the CTCC, denounced the idea of a labour party because of its supposed appeal to class, and endorsed the Lesage Liberals as the best vehicle for progressive purposes at the time.\textsuperscript{17}

Within the FTQ there was also opposition to the New Party developments, centred mainly in the Building Trades Council of Montréal led by Edouard Larose. Larose was a vice-president of the FTQ (1958-1960).\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, at the FTQ convention of December, 1958, the delegates voted 444 to six to support the New Party project. The terms of the resolution indicated that their motives were first, to create a movement to take action consistent with that of the CLC with respect to the federal jurisdiction, and second to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of the people of Québec in fields such as education, fiscal policy, and others. But on May 3, 1959, a meeting of FTQ representatives and business agents were still noting the urgency of political action and

\textsuperscript{17} Jean Marchand, "L'évolution des partis," \textit{Cité Libre}, December 1960, p. 18-19.

of accelerating political education in all sectors of the labour movement. Following this meeting, a joint PSD-FTQ committee was established to get the New Party project in motion.\(^{19}\) This committee proved ineffective, partly because several participants were opposed to the New Party idea!\(^{20}\)

It was finally replaced by the Québec Committee for the New Party in July, 1960, at the urging of Harry Pope (president of the PSD from early 1960\(^{21}\) and later federal NDP leader T.C. Douglas's executive assistant) and Bill Dodge (vice-president, Canadian Labour Congress). Sherwood wrote: "In early 1960, Harry Pope, an ex-army officer, was elected president of the PSD, while Michel Chartrand was re-elected...

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\(^{20}\) CLC papers, Dodge files, Pope-Dodge, April 20, 1960. Pope wrote that, "...It is essential that all on this committee be in accord with the idea of the New Party - not like the old committee. Also the PSD members on the committee must NOT come from the minority in the FTQ opposed to Roger Provost [president, FTQ]. Without him we ain't alive. From PSD I suggest: Chartrand, Pope, Forest, Vadboncoeur [sic], Oliver, Cy Durocher...". He also recommended Mme. Casgrain be included. This suggests Emile Boudreau (USWA and president of the PSD) and Jacques-Victor Morin (UPW), having been dropped from the committee, were opposed to the New Party and/or Provost - probably the latter. See also references to Dodge, J-V Morin, and the "Joliette manifesto" in the discussion of Sherwood in Chapter Two above.

leader of the party...". There is no evidence of a PSD convention at this time. In light of other statements by Pope and later developments, it appears that at a PSD provincial council meeting, probably in late February or early March, Boudreau was replaced by Pope. Pope was a former major in the Canadian Army who had retired in 1959 at age 36 to become an advisor to the NCNP and CCF on defence in Ottawa. His great-grandfather was W.H. Pope, Prince Edward Island's father of Confederation; his grandfather was Sir Joseph Pope, undersecretary of State under Sir John A. Macdonald; his great-uncle, J.C. Pope, had been premier of the Island; his father was a lieutenant-general in the Army, and later served in the diplomatic corps.22 Harry Pope was a most patrician catch for the New Party, and a rather odd man to become president of the PSD. Resident in Ottawa, during his involvement with the Québec section he was conveniently associated with the Hull riding association. However, when Pope finally ran for public office on the NDP ticket in the 1962 federal election he contested Calgary-North! One suspects the illustrious Major Pope was installed as president of the Québec section by the federal interest, perhaps because the embryonic nationalist group (of which Boudreau was a member) did not share the same conception of the New Party as the federal leadership.

By late 1959, the National Committee for the New Party consisted of equal elements representing the CCF, CLC, and the "New Party Clubs," which were supposedly non-territorial associations of "liberally-minded" individuals disenchanted with Pearson's party and interested in a new venue. The only agricultural organizations which affiliated to the NCNP were from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The New Party Club (NPC) element was always the weakest element in the triad, but it represented the attempt of the new alignment to go beyond the stagnating political clientele of the labour movement and the CCF.

The New Party organizing drive got under way relatively late in Québec, despite the attempt of the Canadian Labour Congress to stimulate interest by holding its first New Party conference in Montréal in September 1958. On behalf of the NCNP Frank Scott began searching for a full-time Québec organizer as early as April, 1959. He even interviewed René Lévesque, organizer of the recent Radio-Canada producers' strike, for the job in early July of that year. Curiously,

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24 Dodge files, CLC papers, manuscript notes on the agenda of the CLC-CCF joint committee meeting of April 26, 1959, and Scott-Dodge, July 9, 1959. Ironically, Scott remarked that he "...would rather settle for a solid Trade Unionist than for the TV
newspaper accounts of the PSD convention in Montréal, held on the weekend of May 16-18, 1959, are silent on the question of the New Party.  

By May, 1960, across Canada there were 30 New Party clubs with a total of about 9,000 members. However, in Québec the situation was different. On April 20, 1960, Pope wrote to Dodge at the CLC that the Québec Committee for the New Party (QCNP) had still not been established. Pope said:

...New Party work has not yet even started in Québec. We must concentrate on getting the New Party off the ground above all else. We are already a year late... Even if we finally get rolling with the New Party in Québec, we still won't get far until we have labour unity. What pressure can you [Dodge, as vice-president of the CLC] exert on the FTQ to really sit down with the CTCC? ...a political party exists to get into power and unless the New Party is launched in Québec with strong and united labour backing plus the support of all the rest of the left, we might as well stay in bed.  

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25 Le Devoir, May 19, 1959, p. 1. Chartrand was re-elected provincial leader, and Emile Boudreau of the Steelworkers was re-elected president; vice-presidents included Thérèse Casgrain (herself a former provincial leader) and Cy Durocher. One hundred delegates attended, representing a claimed 1,000 members. Federal CCF parliamentary leader Hazen Argue addressed the delegates in French.

26 Dodge files, CLC papers; manuscript letter, Pope-Dodge, April 20, 1960.
Pope proposed that the FTQ component of the tripartite QCNP (PSD-CCF, FTQ, New Party Clubs) should consist of supporters of FTQ president Roger Provost. The PSD-CCF representatives he suggested were Michel Chartrand (PSD leader and a CTCC activist), Michel Forest (PSD secretary, an employee), Pierre Vadeboncoeur (a CTCC official and longtime PSD militant), and himself. The NP or "liberally-minded" element should include Pierre Trudeau and Jean-Robert Ouellet (UPW). A staff of two organizers plus two secretaries were required, but where the necessary $25-30,000 per year would come from to fund the office and organization was still a mystery. Pope noted that the FTQ had already refused to support the PSD in the impending 1960 Québec election. He informed Dodge that,

"...I intend recommending to the Provincial Council on 7-8 May in Québec that we NOT try to field 25 candidates to get TV and radio time but simply fight where we have a chance, e.g. Lac St. Jean. For the PSD to go directly from another complete electoral disaster into all-out work for the New Party would be a mistake. Because we are so weak in Québec and do NOT yet have FTQ support, a pause would be good. Our situation is entirely different from Nova Scotia. N.P. work has not yet even started in Québec. We must concentrate on getting the N.P. off the ground above all else."

See references to the FTQ and Provost in the discussion of Rouillard (Chapter 1) above; also, see Gérard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Québec," University of Toronto Quarterly, Spring, 1958, p. 373-376. Provost was hardly to be counted as an enthusiastic supporter of the PSD or the NP project.
We are already a year late.\textsuperscript{28}

The PSD council members rejected his recommendation, affirming their wholehearted intention to continue playing a rôle on the provincial scene. But they referred the final decision to the party executive in light of certain potential financial problems,\textsuperscript{29} and the executive decided not to contest the 1960 election at all.

The defeat of the Union N\'ationale on June 22, 1960, was a moment of enormous historical significance in Qu\'ebec. Lesage's Liberals obtained 52\% of the vote and formed a majority government. The election released social forces which Duplessisme had held back for more than a decade. Analyzing the results in \textit{Cit\'e Libre}, Pierre Trudeau noted that only five per cent of electors had changed allegiance and in the absence of third parties it had been the weakness of the UN under Barrette combined with the appearance of renewal in Lesage's party that had brought about the change in government. Despite Chartrand's call to electors to spoil their ballots\textsuperscript{30}, 85\% of the voters had gone to the polls to

\textsuperscript{28} CLC papers, Dodge files, Pope-Dodge, April 20, 1960.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Le Devoir}, May 10, 1960, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Le Devoir}, June 9, 1960, p. 1. Chartrand said that, for the first time since 1935, the PSD would not contest the provincial election. The party was broke and wanted to put all its resources
give the Liberals a 4% edge in popular vote over the UN.  

Trudeau took pains to show how this small majority of swing votes could have been lost. In five key ridings (including René Lévesque's in Laurier), had the Communists and PSD run candidates as successfully (!) as in 1956, the Liberals would have lost the seats and the election. Trudeau hypothesized that, had the PSD participated with the Liberals and the Ligue d'Action Civique in a "union des forces démocratiques" (a progressive cartel against the UN), it might have obtained seats for itself and assisted in defeating the government. The PSD's refusal to participate in such a cartel, and the evident advantage its absence provided to progressive forces in the election, suggested to Trudeau that "...the socialists have probably disappeared from the provincial scene for quite some time to come."

Assuming the decline of the Union Nationale, Trudeau was concerned about what form progressive opposition to the Liberals would take. He suggested that Cité Libre and Le Devoir had important rôles to play, but something more was

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required. The New Party would be a long time in the making. Without a viable provincial section, the federal New Party would be unreal in Québec. Trudeau continued: "...If thus the conditions for the establishment of the New Party in Québec do not exist, it's useless to act as if they do; it's necessary to begin by creating them here and not to follow the priorities established in other provinces...". Trudeau left to the QCNP the task of creating the political conditions necessary for the New Party's success at the provincial level.

Two weeks after the election, Pope reported the reaction of the Québec Committee for the New Party:

There was general satisfaction with the results of the Québec election and with the decision of the SDP [PSD] not to contest this election. If we had contested it, all we could have managed to do would be to allow the UN to hold on to power for a few months. This would have been bad for Québec and Canada and disastrous [sic] for the SDP. The fact that the first election that the New Party will have to fight will probably be a federal one is looked upon as a favourable development since Socialism has always been more acceptable in Québec in federal politics than in provincial.33


33 Dodge files, CLC papers, Pope-Dodge, July 7, 1960.
D. Activities of the Québec Committee for the New Party

On July 5, the Québec Committee for the New Party, which then consisted of two six-person elements representing the FTQ and the PSD, met at FTQ headquarters in Montréal. The QCNP approved the hiring of Jean-Claude Lebel of Québec City as the New Party organizer for Québec (the position Scott offered to Lévesque the previous summer) and immediately assigned him the task of raising $15,000 to finance his own organizational work over the following six months!

At the July 5 meeting it had been decided to proceed with the drafting of a constitution and rules for the affiliation of New Party clubs. On August 5, the QCNP adopted a constitution permitting the FTQ and PSD five committee representatives each, and allowed five members each to potential affiliates such as the CTCC, the Union des Cultivateurs Catholiques and the Conseil Supérieur des

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34 The FTQ group in the QCNP was led by Provost, the president of the federation; Jean Gérin-Lajoie, the vice-president and a leader of the United Steelworkers in Québec; and Yvan Legault of the United Packinghouse Workers. The PSD element was led by Chartrand and Pope. Michel Forest, secretary of the PSD (an employee), acted as secretary for the QCNP.

35 Dodge files, CLC papers, Pope-Dodge, July 7, 1960. Lebel's nomination was subsequently confirmed by the NCNP at its meeting of July 8-9. Dodge files, CLC papers, "Minutes of the National Committee for the New Party Meeting of July 8-9, 1960," dated July 11, 1960, prepared by Carl Hamilton, secretary, NCNP.
Coopératives du Québec. Allowance was also made to grant seats to additional FTQ affiliates, PSD, and New Party club representatives.\textsuperscript{36}

With respect to the New Party clubs of the "liberally-minded", the QCNP was prepared to recognize four different types with a minimum membership of six required for recognition. Clubs might be formed of members of a single union local, or of members of a national (pan-Canadian) or international union.\textsuperscript{37} A New Party club might also be formed by persons living in a county or region, or by members of the same professional, ethnic or cultural group. The function of the New Party club was to respond to study papers on programme prepared under the auspices of the NCNP and QCNP, and to formulate recommendations to be sent to the QCNP; to recruit and educate members; and to prepare for the federal and provincial founding conventions. Perhaps the most interesting aspects of the constitution are three of the

\textsuperscript{36} Dodge files, CLC papers, "Constitution of the [Québec] Provincial Committee for the New Party as adopted by the meeting of August 2, 1960," marked "Received Oct 24 1960".

\textsuperscript{37} One wonders where this clause left CTCC/CSN supporters of the New Party, who did not belong to "national" (pan-Canadian) or "international" (American) unions. Perhaps that was the point, since this document was drafted by Roger Provost, president of the FTQ. See Dodge files, CLC papers, Pope-Dodge, July 7, 1960; also, Dodge files, "Constitution of the [Québec] Provincial Committee for the New Party as adopted by the meeting of August 2, 1960", marked "Received Oct. 24 1960".
seven "Regulations" for New Party clubs:

(1) Each club must refrain from delaying the affiliation to the New Party of the association to which one or more of its members belong.

(2) It must also refrain from imposing an affiliation without due consideration.

(4) Every club is forbidden to place on the agenda for its meetings matters which relate to the internal policies of an association.\(^{38}\)

It seems peculiar that a new political party, struggling to organize in what had always been a political desert for its predecessor, should show such extravagant concern for the independence of other "associations" to which New Party club members might belong. The author of the regulations for the New Party clubs was Roger Provost, president of the FTQ.\(^{39}\) Obviously the "associations" referred to were locals or provincial districts of FTQ affiliates whose support for the PSD or CCF had rarely been noticeable in the past. Provost must have feared that union partisans of the New Party might get out of control, and issues within their locals or districts might end up on the political agenda. Provost seemed to indicate by this


\(^{39}\) Dodge files, CLC papers, Pope-Dodge, July 7, 1960.
document that he was prepared to tolerate New Party organizing as long as it did not interfere with "business as usual" in his federation.

The QCNP met again on September 13, 1960, at the FTQ headquarters in Montréal. The meeting was chaired by Harry Pope and included nine participants. Representatives of the NCNP included Thérèse Casgrain and Carl Hamilton. Oddly, there was no mention of the forthcoming Labelle federal by-election announced the day before. Hamilton reported on the progress of the NCNP to date, and brought two events to the attention of the QCNP members - the federal New Party policy conference to be held in Montréal on December 3-4, 1960, and the founding convention of the federal New Party, to be held in Ottawa from July 31 to August 4, 1961. The objective of a provincial policy conference during the autumn, adopted at the July meeting, was dropped.

Though absent, Jean-Claude Lebel (federal NP organizer) and Philippe Vaillancourt (regional director of political education for the CLC; to be a member of the FTQ delegation) were co-opted onto the QCNP. A "comité des trois" - consisting of three members each from the FTQ, PSD and NCNP

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40 Le Devoir, September 12, 1960, p. 2, 3.
components, plus organizer Jean-Claude Lebel – was struck to elaborate a detailed organizational plan for Québec and to report to the next meeting of the QCNP.

In discussions on labour affiliation, the QCNP asked the NCNP to approach the CSN concerning possible resumption of talks on participation in the NP, but then curiously suggested that the FTQ's director of public relations, Noel Perusse, be charged with preparing the letter. Why were negotiations with an exclusively Québec-based labour federation referred to the federal level? The facts that an FTQ official was charged with the communication, and that the prestige of the CLC officials on the NCNP was invoked, suggested that this was an inter-union matter of some delicacy. Interestingly, the question of representation for the CSN on the QCNP was tabled to the next meeting. At the same time it was suggested that the FTQ send a letter to its affiliates recalling resolutions passed favouring political action, in order to encourage locals to form political action committees and directing them to contact Lebel for

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41 The other 9 members were: FTQ – Provost, Vaillancourt and Pérusse; PSD – Pope, J-V Morin, and Forest; NCNP – Hamilton, Terry Grier, and Des Sparham. None of the NCNP representatives were Québec representatives, and Hamilton was a party official. Sparham was head of the New Party clubs organization (that is, neither CCF nor CLC). Grier was a New Party club man as well. Dodge files, CLC papers, minutes, "Comité des trois," October 4, 1960, prepared by Michel Forest, secretary.
information on the New Party.\textsuperscript{42} No mention was made of a concerted internal FTQ campaign of political education and recruitment, and none was likely in light of Provost's hesitant "regulations" governing New Party clubs.

At the following QCNP meeting on October 4 the CSN question was again tabled. Subcommittees to organize the provincial founding convention and on federal electoral prospects were established. Both subcommittees were to report by December 6. The election of subcommittees on finance and publications was tabled to the October 20 meeting. Casgrain and Lebel reported on contacts they had made with francophone intellectuals sympathetic to the New Party idea, and tentatively announced a meeting with such people on November 5. Vaillancourt and Lebel reported that weekend regional meetings to promote the party in places such as Hull, Abitibi, and Lac St. Jean were in the process of organization.

The "comité des trois," struck at the September 13 meeting, delivered its recommendations to the QCNP meeting of October 4. Their report was not a detailed organizational plan to carry the New Party to fruition in

\textsuperscript{42} Dodge files, CLC papers, minutes, "Comité provincial du Nouveau Parti," meeting of 13 September, 1960, prepared by Michel Forest, secretary.
Québec. Instead, it was a two-page document which dealt with housekeeping matters and made vague "recommendations" without discussing how they might be implemented. It called for the closing of the PSD office and the merging of staff functions between the PSD (Forest) and QCNP (Lebel) at a new location as a moneysaving measure. Surely this minor administrative matter could have been resolved without the involvement of NCNP functionaries. Under the promising rubric of organizational recommendations, the committee called for the affiliation of union locals, for the formation of New Party clubs within union locals, and for the formation of NP clubs in regions without PSD associations or where a sympathetic group existed outside the PSD association. It further called for the renewal of PSD memberships and the continuing activity of existing PSD clubs. It said nothing about how these objectives were going to be accomplished, who was to be responsible for their execution, or where the money would come from to pay for staff, expenses, and materials. In fairness, at the FTQ convention of November, 1960, a resolution proposed by Provost and others was adopted calling for a subscription drive to collect $1 per affiliated union member (a potential $235,000). About three hundred delegates also signed party

43 Le Devoir, November 19, 1960, p. 2. This resolution was consistent with an internal fundraising drive initiated by the CLC leadership in consultation with the NCNP at about the same time.
cards at this convention. However, as subsequent chapters will show the FTQ never delivered on this pledge.

As for the provincial founding convention, the committee simply recommended that the date be fixed as soon as possible and that three publications - a draft programme, a draft constitution, and a booklet introducing the Nouveau Parti du Québec - be prepared. Its recommendations on preparations for the federal election, expected in 1962 or 1963, were limited to suggesting that the NCNP consult the QCNP prior to settling on a strategy for the federal campaign.45

While it is important that general administrative outlines were established, this is not the report one would expect from this subcommittee of the QCNP less than ten months from the date of the founding convention of the federal party. It was, and is, not enough to wish for organization. One must set objectives and then identify the means. Considering the authors of this report included two future federal secretaries of the New Democratic Party

See Le Devoir, November 28, 1960, p. 3.


45 Dodge files, CLC papers, minutes, "Comité des trois," meeting of October 4, 1960, prepared by Michel Forest, secretary.
(Hamilton and Grier) and one of the two most important labour leaders in Québec (Provost), this was not very impressive. It reflected the reality described by André Laurendeau in a Le Devoir editorial on January 3, 1961:

In 1961, the New Party still appears to be an act of faith, a decision taken at the heights which still awaits the complex ratification of many bases.

It requires that the unions enter much more directly into political action. It requires a response to the call for cooperation with other social groups. It requires that the PSD allows itself to be absorbed by a much larger entity. All of this must still be accomplished; but neither the heart or the guts are there. One sees the New Party without actually meeting it or feeling its presence. It creates no waves. It has essence but no being...

I speak of what is happening in French Canada. It is perhaps different from what is going on in the rest of the country, at least west of Ottawa. One has the impression that the birth of the New Party in Québec reflects a desire for continuity: "If it's going to happen everywhere else, why not in French Canada." This "why not" lacks dynamism and the promise of a genuine life for the party here. The New Party has the air of a fake window ["fausse fenêtre"] in Québec, installed to respond to the need for symmetry alone. It finds among us neither its discourse nor its spokespersons. See from the outside, it appears to be the political version of a translation bureau...

In the New Party, the Québec coach is an empty coach, coupled to a locomotive the destination of which nobody knows.\footnote{Le Devoir, January 3, 1961, p. 4. My translation.}
On October 19, 1960, an interview with PSD president Harry Pope appeared in *Le Devoir*, datelined Ottawa. It was remarkable in light of the New Party's obvious decision not to participate in the federal by-election in Labelle on October 31. It was also a candid admission that New Party leaders had no intention of promoting a provincial New Party in Québec. Pope believed that the social purposes of the Lesage government were "very close to those promoted by the federal New Party," and that the presence of René Lévesque, whom Pope regarded as "of the left", proved that the Québec Liberals and the federal NP were pursuing "practically the same objectives." Pope indicated that the QCNP would concentrate all its efforts on federal issues and would only enter provincial politics if the Lesage government "deviates from its programme." The lack of labour unity in Québec and the absence of active support from the CSN for the New Party remained the major stumbling blocks to successful political action at the provincial level.  

Either Pope believed that there was no room to the left of the Liberals for a provincial party, or he was afraid that a provincial New Party on the left of Lesage would be too far left and too nationalist to be tolerated by the centrists and anglophones in the federal New Party. His line on supporting

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the Liberals until they deviated from their reform program was the same advocated by Trudeau.\textsuperscript{48} The question of labour unity was important, but here Pope was using it to inveigh against the practicality of entering the provincial venue - while at the same time, and in an effort to appeal to the same Québec electorate, he was complacent about proceeding with only the formal support of the FTQ. As subsequent evidence shows, Pope's outlook certainly did not represent a consensus of Québec New Party opinion, particularly among francophone intellectuals like Marcel Rioux and Pierre Vadeboncœur.

Even at the federal level, the QCNP was already failing to exploit opportunities such as the federal by-elections. In mid-September the federal cabinet had announced four by-elections to take place on October 31, 1960, in Ontario, Québec and New Brunswick. The Ontario Committee for the New Party and the NCNP were promoting candidates in Niagara and Peterborough, but nothing was happening in Labelle.\textsuperscript{49} The


Québec constituency, encompassing Laurentian communities around Mont-Laurier and within reasonable driving distance of Montréal, was not a stable Liberal or Tory seat, having changed hands in 1949, 1953, and 1957. A Le Devoir report concluded that "In the Ontario ridings, one expects that the two old parties will retain their positions. Interest will thus be concentrated on Royal, an old Tory riding, and even more on Labelle, a riding which is in the habit of making sensational changes in direction."50 Labelle was obviously an opportunity for the promoters of the New Party to show credibility by pooling their resources in making a strong bid for a seat in Québec. When those federal by-elections finally took place, Walter Pitman had been elected in Peterborough as the first New Party Member of Parliament.

In Niagara, the New Party candidate finished third against a victorious Liberal candidate who was to be a star of the Pearson Liberal party - Judy Lamarche.51 With a light voter turnout (about 15,000) Labelle changed hands once again, becoming a Liberal seat. In Royal, also with a small turnout, the New Brunswick Committee for the New Party had left the CCF to run a sacrifice candidate - poor Wheaton got


only 392 votes!\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Le Devoir}, November 1, 1960, p. 1.
E. Two conferences and a debate

As 1960 drew to a close, two conferences were held in Montréal to stimulate interest in the New Party project. One took place under QCNP auspices on November 26 and was designed to attract French-Canadian intellectuals. The principle speakers were Marcel Rioux (Carleton University), Gérard Filion (Le Devoir), Gérard Picard (NCNP, CSN), Thérèse Casgrain (NCNP), and Pierre Vadeboncoeur (CSN). Some 100 persons attended. The speeches showed that Pope had not represented all the activists in his interview in October, and help demonstrate that the lines were already hardening on the national question nine months before the founding federal convention.

Pierre Vadeboncoeur, a lawyer, joined the CCF in 1954 and had been an early Citélibriste but had long disagreed with the liberalism of Pelletier and Trudeau. Earlier in 1960, he had fought to organize the workers at Canadian British Aluminium on the Côte-Nord on behalf of the CSN. There he was forced to witness the "disgusting" collusion of the English and American bosses, the corrupt Union Nationale government, and the CLC-FTQ unions in keeping the CSN out. Always staunchly anticapitalist, this experience provoked a strong nationalist response in him. At the QCNP conference,
Vadeboncoeur stated that democratic socialists did not share the "euphoria of June 22", pointing to the Liberals' links to capitalist élites. He denounced self-proclaimed leftists who tried to operate inside Lesage's party, the moderation of *Le Devoir* editor André Laurendeau and his own employer, the CSN, and the hidden Liberal agenda of the Citélibristes. According the Vadeboncoeur, the nationalist upsurge had only just begun and might lead to independence.\(^{53}\)

From the chair, Rioux suggested to the meeting that the provincial political situation had so evolved that the principal opposition would now have to come from the left, not from the moribund Union Nationale. Suggesting that Lesage's cautious attitude on educational laicization and public funding was reminiscent of Duplessis', Rioux castigated the left wing of the Liberal party (normally considered to be led by René Lévesque) for permitting this state of affairs. Rioux envisaged the provincial New Party as a means of continuing and expanding the gains of the "révolution tranquille." In particular, the struggle for deconfessionalization of education, health care and social services had only just been joined and Rioux saw the Lesage

government as being very timid in the face of ecclesiastical opposition. The secular socialists of the New Party could break the wall of courtesy and intimidation which seemed to be preventing progress on this front.

Rioux later commented that the New Party would have to have a programme consistent with the culture, perspective and aspirations of French-Canadians. The party would have to be radical, as there was no room left in the centre; it was not until the Québec Liberals adopted a relatively aggressive program that they were elected. And that radicalism should probably take the form of anticlericalism, as the pace of laicization in education and other social services was much too slow.\textsuperscript{54} Rioux's position on this question was greatly reinforced by the Jesuits' failed attempt to charter two new Catholic universities in the autumn of 1960. This was vigorously opposed by a host of lay intellectuals.\textsuperscript{55}

Rioux was not entirely comfortable with Québec nationalism as a theme for the new alignment. This theme had traditionally been associated with the right, and since


\textsuperscript{55} See, for example \textit{Le Devoir}, October 29, 1960, p. 3, and various other issues in October and November.
1945 at least most progressive Québécois had spent their political energies resisting that right. However, he was prepared to characterize the spirit of this earlier period as "provincialism" in common with Laval political scientist Gérard Bergeron. Provincialism was reactive, inward-looking; nationalism was liberating and dominating, and the new élites in Québec who carried it forward were increasingly open to the world.

Rioux already doubted that anglophones within the QCNP and pan-Canadian organizations promoting the federal New Party would be willing to tolerate a Québec section carving out a place for itself on the left wing of the provincial political spectrum of 1960. The ideological character of the New Party process - for example, the elimination even of the terminology of socialism, and the deliberate attempt to recruit the "liberally minded" (whatever that means) - gave Rioux valid reason for concern. If space was to be made for a Québec New Party section at the provincial level, it would have to be further left than the Liberals, but the entire tendency of the New Party effort was towards the political centre. The conference sponsored the following week by the National Committee for the New Party was to demonstrate this.
On December 3-4, 1960, the NCNP hosted an orientation conference in Montréal on the program and constitution of the New Party. Some 400 people attended this conference, which was intended to serve union cadres, intellectuals, and ranking party activists in Ontario, Québec, the Maritimes and Newfoundland. Leading figures present included the two contenders for the federal NP leadership, Hazen Argue (federal CCF leader) and T.C. Douglas (premier of Saskatchewan), Gérard Picard (NCNP; CSN), Stanley Knowles (NCNP; CLC), Claude Jodoin (CLC; NCNP), and David Lewis (NCNP; National President, CCF). Lewis led several closed sessions on the draft party constitution—on the "national" party in the federal system, the provincial party in the federal system, provincial organization, and riding organization. Le Devoir reported that:

The national president of the CCF party declared yesterday that the ten provincial parties which will be created in the ten Canadian provinces will be completely autonomous and will have complete freedom to consider problems in provincial jurisdictions and apply solutions appropriate to those problems according to the desires of the population of their provinces.

...[Lewis added] we must first recognize the existence of several cultures in Canada and recognize equally the bilingual character of the Canadian nation.56

Having asserted the equality of multiculturalism with the existence of two major linguistic groups, Lewis emphasized the importance of the protection of minority rights, especially in the education field, in all provinces. He argued that the New Party should be a model of respect for the rights of minorities, of cultural differences, of religious and of educational pluralism. Himself a member of a religious and cultural minority and brought up as an anglophone in Québec, Lewis' insistence on the primacy of minority rights - even to the extent of suggesting that universalized federal principles should be imposed in exclusive provincial jurisdictions - was not a surprise. That he chose to articulate it in Jean Lesage's Québec and at a moment when the New Party program was supposed to be fluid was perhaps inopportune. It was perhaps also a sign of things to come, despite his insistence on the programmatic autonomy of the future New Party provincial sections in matters of provincial jurisdiction.

Lewis' view of federal policy was in conflict with the positions articulated by Rioux and Vadeboncoeur. But it was not just with francophone intellectuals that Lewis and the federal party establishment were to have trouble. In urging francophones at the FTQ convention (November 19-20, 1960) to participate actively in the formation of the New Party,
Fernand Daoust of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers had interpreted the rôle of New Party as one of defending and articulating the interests of francophones. Daoust said:

The new party will be successful at the national level if it assumes a fair attitude on the claims and hopes of French Canada. It is essential that the citizens of Québec make their views known in Ottawa, affirming our belief in the duality of cultures, of languages, and to demonstrate to the other delegations [to the federal New Party founding convention] the true face of French Canada. The new party must recognize and make the rest of the Canadian nation understand the French fact in Québec...\(^{57}\)

At the meeting of the National Committee for the New Party held in Ottawa on January 27-28, 1961, Michael Oliver was seated as an alternate for Frank Scott to represent the CCF on the NCNP.\(^{58}\) The New Party club process, supposed to come to fruition in July, had still not taken off and the NCNP was wringing its hands over how to push NP club


\(^{58}\) This is the earliest mention of Oliver found in official party or CLC papers. He had authored articles in *Cité Libre*, and had an influential friend in his McGill colleague and Westmount neighbour Frank Scott. Oliver's greatest claim to fame in the New Party period was his contribution to *Social Purpose for Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), an "updated" version of *Social Planning for Canada*, the League for Social Reconstruction manifesto first published in the Thirties under Scott's editorship. Oliver's progress in six months from an alternate on the NCNP to the first federal president of the NDP was remarkable, and probably reflected Scott's prestige and the desire for new bilingual people as much as Oliver's talent.
organization forward. Action on the provincial level was lagging, especially in Alberta, the Maritimes and Québec. Alberta and the Maritime provinces lacked full time NCNP organizers. In Québec, despite the presence of Lebel, the problem was most acute and the NCNP executive was "...authorized to call a special meeting of key leaders in the New Party development to consider an expanded program of promotion in French speaking communities." The question of New Party club activity in unions had still not been settled even at the NCNP level, let alone in response to Provost's caveats in Québec. As for the CSN, its New Party rôle had by this time been reduced to the mere possibility of sending "fraternal" delegates (friendly observers) to the federal founding convention.\(^5^9\) Obviously hope of including the CSN inside the New Party had faltered.

Despite the persistent organizational weakness of the QCNP, there was sustained intellectual interest in the New Party in Québec. The January, 1961, issue of Cité Libre contained two articles on the New Party. One was Marcel Rioux's article, which called for the establishment of a radical-left New Party at the provincial level, and important portions of it have already been cited above. The other was

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the editorial, "La Restauration," signed by the "équipe" but probably authored by Trudeau. In "Socialisme, cléricalisme et nouveau parti," Rioux argued that the success of the Liberals in 1960 had created the circumstances and the necessity for the establishment of the provincial New Party. He stated bluntly that for democratic socialists the mere facts of the death of Duplessis or the accession to power of Lesage did not represent any liberation. A socialist political analysis had to be based on the actual situation, and that was the continuing domination of Québec by the bourgeoisie. The argument that the advent of a left-wing party would sap the strength of the Liberals and return the Union Nationale to power may have been valid in June, 1960, but to insist that it was still valid in 1961 was false. Rioux cited the disarray in the UN caused by the defeat and the resignation of its leader, the defection of numerous patronage-seeking ex-Duplessistes to the Liberals, and a general destabilization of the old political system as reasons to believe that the right wing monster was on its death-bed. Iconoclasm had become the political order of the day, and it was performing a democratic duty to feed and fortify its most radical strains.

Rioux insisted that for the Liberals to be forced to carry out their electoral commitments, the seat of opposition
had to be someplace other than under Daniel Johnson in the Assembly. The UN would do everything in its power to retard the process of laicization, the key to social progress. On the other side of the question, the work of newspapers, labour leaders and intellectuals against Duplessis had been admirable, but not very effective against a government entrenched in power. A left political party was essential—the structure demanded it. Gérard Filion of *Le Devoir* had warned New Party supporters that they might have to spend a generation in opposition at the Québec level, but Rioux asked why certain commentators tried to make a virtue out of only an alleged necessity by actively discouraging the development of a provincial socialist party. He argued that it was possible for Québec to progress very rapidly to a high stage of democratic development, in which the electoral choices were between genuine socio-economic alternatives. Within the limits of existing Catholic humanist ideology, particularly as articulated by the leadership of the CSN, there was certainly room for democratic socialism (as the CSN was to demonstrate in the later Sixties).  

The explicit purpose of "La Restauration" was to officially distance *Cité Libre* from Rioux's position on the  

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provincial New Party. While the équipe agreed with the necessity in Québec of a powerful left wing party, they did not believe that it was possible to create such a party in January 1961. They pointed out that those who had spent a generation in opposition were finally seeing their ideas and their friends in power, and they were unready to begin a new opposition. Perhaps in a year or two the situation might be different, but there was no reason why a new party should be founded in Québec because some people in other provinces had decided to found new parties. Indeed, there had been efforts to found a new party during the late Fifties but it was the PSD and the FTQ (then allied with Duplessis) who opposed them then!^{61}

The following month Michael Oliver took issue with this argument. Oliver noted that the editorial had given the incorrect impression that almost everyone working on the magazine was of the same opinion except Rioux. He then straddled the fence by saying that, while he understood the resentment of those who had tried to build the "union des forces démocratiques," he also understood the motives of those who wanted to concentrate their activities on the New Party. Oliver suggested that it was perhaps time to leave these experiences and get on with political life. He

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expressed disappointment that it was apparently out of pique that certain Citélibristes were refusing to support the New Party.\footnote{Michael Oliver, "Réponse à «La restauration»", Cité Libre, February 1961, p. 14-15.}

The public debate took place in print, but there was also at least one official opportunity for a very select group of intellectuals to confront one another directly (and in secret) on these questions. On February 4, 1961, a closed meeting was held at offices of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees in Montréal between representatives of the QCNP (including Lebel, Oliver, and Pérusse) and certain specially-invited persons. The meeting had been organized by Marcel Rioux, was chaired by Jacques-Victor Morin, and Michel Forest as usual acted as secretary. Among the sixteen people who actually attended were Albert Breton and Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The Citélibristes were much in evidence. The discussion began with general agreement on the rejection of the separatist option. On the other hand, most agreed that the New Party would have no future if it did not respond to the national aspirations of French Canadians. Some participants were afraid that this nationalist preoccupation on the left would not be able to forestall nationalism-socialism, and the New Party would be incapable of barring
the way to a neo-fascist movement. After some discussion on economic and social policy it was agreed that the terms "autonomist" and "provincialist" better represented the position of the participants than the term "nationalist".

Rioux asked the participants what rôle left-wing Québec intellectuals could play in the New Party which was about to be founded. It was suggested that the New Party would not truly exist in Québec unless French-Canadian intellectuals decided to participate. Could they let this historic opportunity pass, and was it not their duty as French-Canadian intellectuals to be involved and to influence the party's orientation? Someone then reminded the meeting of the feeble attitude of the PSD towards the federal CCF.

Another participant said that while the New Party might be useful at the federal level, the provincial New Party would not be viable in the contemporary social and historical context of Québec. For the foreseeable future, the NP would not have a serious chance of gaining a mass base at the provincial level. While some people were ready to support the federal NP, at the provincial level they had more confidence in the idea of reforming the Liberal party, and might even organize a left-wing group with such an objective. Still other participants pointed out that many NP militants,
especially the labour people, would never support such a strategy inasmuch as most were primarily interested in provincial politics, and most political education in the labour movement was against the old parties. It was said that most union workers had voted Liberal unenthusiastically, and seeing the mess Lesage was making of medicare, were already available as a mass base to the NP at the provincial level.\textsuperscript{63} Forest summed up the discussion as follows:

\begin{quote}
...the participants seemed to pursue the same basic political objectives and understood the importance of supporting the New Party at the federal level. But a certain group had doubts about founding a provincial party; according to them, in the current context, it was a stillborn party.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

In light of later developments and Oliver’s rôle therein, the fact that certain Citélibristes — and obviously it was one of those liberals who raised the possibility that a nationalist Nouveau Parti du Québec would be unable to forestall national-socialism — opposed the development of a

\textsuperscript{63} Dodge files, CLC papers, "Compte-rendu confidentiel de la réunion tenue le samedi 4 février, à la Fraternité Canadienne des Employés de Chemin de fer, sur le thème: La gauche et le Nouveau Parti," prepared by Michel Forest.

\textsuperscript{64} Dodge files, CLC papers, "Compte-rendu confidentiel de la réunion tenue le samedi 4 février, à la Fraternité Canadienne des Employés de Chemin de fer, sur le thème: La gauche et le Nouveau Parti," prepared by Michel Forest. My translation.
new provincial party is highly suggestive. That others besides Harry Pope favoured collaboration with the Lesage Liberals showed Oliver that a coalition between progressive intellectuals in both nations could possibly be achieved at the federal level, but that the provincial venue might be something of an albatross for the federal New Party in Québec. The divided labour movement and the very hesitant attitude of the FTQ, evidenced elsewhere, did not augur well for a provincial party. Neither did threatening statements originating with Jean Lesage and his labour minister the following month. Lamoureux tells this story:

In Québec, in the month of March 1961, new premier Jean Lesage publicly made veiled threats against unions involved in the process of founding the New Party: "I must draw your attention to the fact that this may involve difficulties for your movement." In the same vein, the minister of Labour of the Lesage government [René Hamel] explained the nature of the possible obstacles; he explained that political action by unions might raise "difficulties" in the application of the Rand formula.

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65 See Pierre Trudeau, "Notes sur l'élection provinciale," Cité Libre, June-July 1960, p. 12-13. He attacked the PSD for not cooperating in the "union des forces démocratiques" he had promoted since 1958, and effectively endorsed the Liberals in the 1960 provincial election. See also Pierre Trudeau, "L'élection de 22 juin 1960," Cité Libre, August-September, 1960, p. 3-8. Here Trudeau suggested that the left must support the Liberals.

This was a significant threat. The Québec Committee for the New Party continued to face serious organizational problems into 1961. For example, it never achieved financial self-sufficiency despite the apparent enthusiasm of the FTQ - now dampened somewhat by the threats of the Lesage government. The PSD had always been financially weak, and the QCNP's requirement that Lebel raise $15,000 to cover their operations in the second half of 1960 had never been met. But the situation was much worse. For example, in January, 1961, some 81% of the QCNP's very meagre funds came from federal New Party sources. Its total receipts from all sources for that month, six months from the federal founding convention, were $859.01, not including the organizer's salary. Only about $80 were actually spent that month on what could be called organizational work.67 Thus the QCNP was virtually entirely dependent on the dubious support of the FTQ and its affiliates, or whatever money and resources could be provided by the NCNP and CLC.

A political party without money - money for organization, money for propaganda, money to maintain élan among the leadership, staff and militants - is nothing. In May, 1961, the PSD would be due to hold its biennial

convention, but it would not. All energies would be directed to the preparations for the federal founding convention. However, the full effect of the party's financial weakness would not be obvious until after the federal founding convention.
F. Summary

With the federal founding convention rapidly approaching, the situation in Québec was not promising. Most of the problems had to do with timing and delays. Though the federal New Party process was launched as early as July, 1958, it did not get under way in Québec until two full years later and then only on the initiative of federal NCNP officials like William Dodge. Was there ever a real chance that the NDP could acquire a solid base in Québec? It was probably not difficult to believe in such a possibility in the summer of 1958. The federal election (March, 1958) had shown that the people of Québec were ready to make an historic break with the Liberal party, and it was not certain that the Conservative vote was "hard". There was an apparent trend to unity in the labour movement indicated by the CLC merger and the CTCC-CLC talks, and among CCFers only a handful of anglophone labour insiders knew the truth. Pent up by fourteen years of Duplessisme, liberal and other progressive forces in Québec seemed to be flowing along the same course. Lesage's Liberals had not yet co-opted those progressive forces, nationalism was discredited in its most obvious conservative form, and it had also apparently been mitigated by progressive themes in so-called social
nationalism.\textsuperscript{68} Thus for a season Canadian social democrats could dream of a truly pan-Canadian party.

If there was a genuine possibility for a breakthrough in Québec it was very limited. If the summer of 1958 really was the moment, it was quickly gone. The fragile character of the coalition of progressive forces from the centre to the left opposed to Duplessis and the historic marginality of the CCF-PSD in Québec did not augur well. Réal Caouette began to exploit rising Québécois discontent with Diefenbaker's government, in part linked to a deepening recession which began that year. Soon Lesage would gather together the progressive forces to fight the 1960 provincial campaign, and for nearly six years he would bind them together in his drive to modernize the Québec state. When at last the federal NDP was founded, in August, 1961, it was already too late.

This delay had been caused in part by the state of the labour movement in Québec: the FTQ, ephemeral, conservative, trying to shake off the legacy of the "cap-in-hand" Duplessis years and yet not accepting the militancy of the industrial

\textsuperscript{68} For a detailed explanation of the concept of "social nationalism," see Jean-Marc Léger, "Aspects of French Canadian Nationalism," \textit{University of Toronto Quarterly}, Spring, 1958, p. 310-329.
unions; the progressively evolving CSN, trying again and again to achieve unity with the CLC and FTQ, but finally being rejected and having to search for a basis on which to compete effectively with the FTQ. It must be remembered that the CSN had to see the New Party as a CLC and to a lesser extent an FTQ project. Neither Québec labour organization, despite the participation of some of their most important officers (Roger Provost and Gérard Picard), genuinely worked for the success of the New Party in Québec. The FTQ's support, repeatedly given with seeming enthusiasm, was merely formal. Without financing from the labour movement, the QCNP could only be the moribund PSD under another name.

Yet even this generated interest, attracting the energies of people like Marcel Rioux and Pierre Vadeboncoeur who saw the chance for a new departure with or without immediate labour support. These men wanted a left-wing provincial party, and were prepared for it to be nationalist and even anti-clerical. Since the Liberals had put on a progressive coat, the provincial New Party would have to be further to the left. But the entire trend of the New Party process was centrist, and as early as October, 1960, ideological centrists like Harry Pope began to speak of splitting the federal and provincial venues of the New Party in Québec, at the expense of the provincial field and to the
benefit of Lesage. One of the reasons for the development of this position had been the delayed start of the New Party process in Québec; had it commenced in 1958 with proper FTQ funding, the notion of a split venue would probably never have been discussed, as the PSD had traditionally presented candidates in provincial elections. The spectrum which did develop - a rump right and a broad centre-left encompassing all the other progressive parliamentary elements - was to have a destructive effect inside the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec, where the right-wing federalist social democrats sought to leave provincial politics to the broad provincial Liberal coalition and the left-wing nationalists wanted to challenge it.

Thus the debate over whether to act on the provincial level took on a left-right character, as those who felt the Liberals would never go far enough demanded and worked for a provincial party and those who favoured the Liberals tried to frustrate it. Predictably in the Québec of 1960, the argument rapidly took on nationalist-federalist overtones, with public declarations by the leading actors on both sides being made throughout the fall and winter of 1960-1961. Debate over whether there was to be a Québec New Party at all seemed to continue almost to the moment the federal founding convention was brought to order! The mainstream
Citélibristes, like Trudeau, weighed into this debate against the provincial venue - but they were bourgeois centrists, liberal and anti-nationalist, and so this is no surprise. They also attacked the timing of the Québec New Party effort as a function of other people's priorities, which it largely was by 1960.

The neglect of the Labelle by-election was a political surprise. It could have directed everyone's energies to the federal venue and provided much-needed publicity. The PSD did not run in Labelle in 1957 or 1958, so its potential was unknown. The by-election was a chance to find out. By not participating in this federal campaign, the ideological centrists revealed that their option was hollow by showing their organizational weakness to the public. It was frivolous for Pope to speak of running only in federal elections on October 19 and then to give up a federal by-election without a fight on October 31! The NCNP also shared responsibility for this error; they were certainly active in Peterborough and Niagara. Perhaps, too, they were afraid of defeat in Labelle, although Lewis as president of the federal party must have sanctioned the CCF candidacy in Royal. Was New Brunswick simply unimportant?

These by-elections were classic examples of the
traditional abandonment of most of the country east of the Ottawa River by the CCF and NDP. The party and its analysts have wondered for 56 years why Québec did not respond to their appeal. Their response to electoral and organizational failure has been to ask why Québec is so unreceptive to the CCF-NDP message. The real problem is that the CCF-NDP refused to adapt itself to the peculiar ideological and organizational requirements in the respective provincial and regional political cultures of the east. They have behaved as if the eastern electorate failed the party by not electing somebody.
4: To the Founding Convention

A. June heat

As the federal founding convention drew near, debate over the national question intensified inside the New Party.

On June 6, 1961, a manifesto on "la question nationale canadienne française" was published in Le Devoir. The May issue of Le Monde Ouvrier contained an article suggesting there was little or no support for independence among union leaders or the rank and file in Québec. Nineteen Québec activists including several union officials\(^1\) responded with a detailed rebuttal to the FTQ report. To them Canada was formed of two distinct nations, and the British North America Act was a pact between those nations. The concentration of one nation in a single province explained the paramount importance of provincial rights because "...the negation of the rights of the province of Québec was the equivalent of the violation of the national and democratic rights of French

\(^1\) They were: Jean-Marie Bédard (Woodworkers), Gisèle Bergeron, Jean Billard, Reginald Boisvert (Steel), Robert Cédillot, Michel Chartrand (CSN/PSD), Willie Fortin (Packinghouse), Claudette Côté, Fernand Daoust (OCAW), Michel Forest (PSD/QCNP), Raymond Lapointe (Packinghouse), Jacqueline Lavoie, Roméo Mathieu (Packinghouse), Jacques-Victor Morin (Packinghouse), Huquette Plamondon (Packinghouse; vice-president, CLC), Jean-Pierre Richard, Gilles Rochette, Janine Théoret, and André Thibaudeau (FTQ). Le Devoir, June 6, 1961, p. 2.
Canadians." After a century of frustration on the federal level, French Canadians regarded the provincial state of Québec as the expression of their nationhood and believed that Confederation was not immutable. They noted that socialists had always recognized the right of national self-determination, and, if Confederation became untenable, there was always the option of an independent, socialist Lower Canadian state. The manifesto ended with a call for all those who hoped for genuine economic, political, social, and national democracy to unite with the signatories for the victory of common ideals.²

Their manifesto was published at the height of the first "Chaput affair". On June 7, the QCNP issued a press release concerning Dr. Marcel Chaput, a scientific researcher employed by the National Defence Research Council, and the outspoken vice-president of the recently-formed Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN). In late May Dr. J.E. Keystone, deputy chairman of the NDRC, threatened Chaput with the loss of his job should he persist in separatist agitation. Chaput's response was to go public with Keystone's letter, making it an issue of freedom of speech. In the fracas that followed, Bert Herridge, the CCF MP for Kootenay-

West, spoke up in the Commons in defence of Chaput's civil rights. The QCNP congratulated Herridge on his quick response and defended Chaput's rights to work and to speak freely. Chaput was described as having "had the courage to exercise his right as a citizen in publicly expressing his opinion in spite of undue pressures exerted against him". The QCNP denounced Keystone's letter as arbitrary, contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and intolerable.³

On June 9, NP leadership candidate T.C. Douglas found himself in trouble. At the federal convention of the Association des commissaires d'écoles catholiques de langue francaise du Canada (ACECFC) in Ottawa, a report from Saskatchewan charged that "centralist and socialist" legislation, such as the "Larger School Units Act" which had consolidated school districts, had prejudiced the status of the francophone and Catholic minority in the province. This issue had been raised by Paul Sauriol in Le Devoir as early as February, when he suggested it contained a cautionary lesson for francophones supporting Douglas.⁴ Sauriol again

³ Dodge files, CLC papers, QCNP press release, "Dans l'affaire Chaput le Nouveau Parti s'oppose a toute action arbitraire," June 7, 1961. My translation. Lebel, as the official spokesperson for the QCNP, was probably the author.

⁴ Le Devoir, February 7, 1961, p. 4.
raised the issue on June 9, noting that: "...The New Party wants to present candidates in Québec, and the French-Canadian electorate will not be impressed by a party leader who so unjustly treated the French-Canadian minority he governed for 16 years."\(^5\)

Douglas quickly called a press conference and denied that this was the case. He said that Pinsonneault, the author of the report, was the first person he knew of who had such complaints, and claimed that no official complaints of this kind had ever been made. He admitted that the Saskatchewan Catholic school commissioners had requested that their rights be specifically protected at the municipal level in the course of a major reorganization of the school system then going on, and that this had been agreed to. Douglas also informed the press that for the first time in the autumn of 1960 the Catholic school commissioners had requested that subsidies given to the separate primary schools be extended to separate secondary institutions as well. This question was still subject to negotiations. He pointed out that the "Larger School Units Act" had been passed in 1943 by the Liberals, not by his government, but that he and the CCF had supported it. Virtually the entire implementation of this law had taken place under his premiership. Finally, Douglas

offered to host an informal enquiry into the state of Catholic and French-language education in Saskatchewan.  

The following week ACECFC representatives took Douglas up on his offer, which had also been extended to Gérard Filion of *Le Devoir*. President Paul Desrosiers of the ACECFC told the press on June 12 that he had formally complained to the Douglas government about the effect of the "Larger School Units Act" on June 4, 1959. The law provided for the merging of school boards. As francophones obtained services on the basis of control of the local boards, consolidation meant they lost their right to public funding for a primary education in their own language. They had lost their right to a secondary Catholic and/or French language education in 1909 and the CCF had never attempted to restore it. There were 55,000 francophone Catholics in Saskatchewan in 1961. Raymond Denis, another ACECFC representative, noted that Hazen Argue had already spoken in favour of the rights of the francophone minority while Douglas had not.  

The question continued to dog Douglas right through the summer. On July 29, two days before the New Party convention opened, an exchange of letters was published in *Le Devoir*.  

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On July 15, a Saskatchewan lawyer, J.G. Crépeau, had charged that Rolland Pinsonneault and Raymond Denis of the ACECFC had deliberately chosen to attack Douglas during his leadership campaign tour. Pinsonneault responded that ACECFC did not organize federal conventions to coincide with the travel plans of politicians. Even if his public statements annoyed Douglas, Pinsonneault asserted that he had a responsibility to his community and he intended to honour it. Crépeau claimed that a francophone board in Willow Bunch, Saskatchewan, had been saved by Douglas' intervention. Pinsonneault reported that it had been preserved following the report of a commission of enquiry appointed by then-education minister Woodrow Lloyd. Douglas was not involved. Pinsonneault described how he had attacked centralization and elimination of francophone boards repeatedly, especially before members of the government, without effect. He then cited eight examples of francophone public institutions which were suppressed by the Douglas government, including hospitals and welfare institutions as well as schools.⁸

In the same issue of *Le Devoir*, Père François Marcotte of Redvers, Saskatchewan, reported the refusal of the education ministry to accommodate 36 francophone students in his community. The result was that they had to travel to

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another francophone community to be educated in French. Their parents were forced to pay transportation, room and board, and $100 each for tuition fees. Marcotte's letter was supported by a similar letter published in English from Reverend R.L. Temple. Evidently Douglas' repudiation of Pinsonneault's charges was questionable, and his government's administration of the "Larger School Units Act" was causing at least the perception of injustice among Saskatchewan's francophones. The debate leading up to the convention may have damaged Douglas' credibility among Québec delegates, and helps explain their support of Hazen Argue for the party leadership. The report of the commission of enquiry which Douglas offered would confirm the ACECFC's charges in the autumn, with predictable results among francophones.  

While this was going on and the QCNP was making final preparations to adopt resolutions for the federal convention, Le Devoir published results of a poll conducted in May among 4,100 respondents on the independence of Québec. While relatively crude - only Le Devoir readers were solicited, for example - it was nevertheless an important indicator of what the potential francophone clientele of the New Party was thinking. Approximately 75% of the respondents believed independence to be desirable and practicable. Among a

typical NDP clientele—professionals, students, artists, and blue collar workers—support for independence stood at nearly 80%. Fifty-five per cent of the respondents were in these four groups.\(^{10}\) The results of this poll would not be ignored by the QCNP.

A few days before the QCNP policy conference, the FTQ issued a press release on Confederation and provincial rights asserting that Canada was formed of two nations—the French Canadian nation and the English Canadian nation—and that the British North America Act was a pact between those nations. Because one of the two nations was concentrated in a single province, "...the negation of the rights of the province of Québec was the equivalent of a violation of the national and democratic rights of French Canadians." After more than a century of frustrations and anxieties with the federal government, "...French Canadians increasingly considered the Québec provincial state as the juridical and political expression of their national existence."\(^{11}\) The press release continued:

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\(^{10}\) *Le Devoir*, June 10, 1961, p. 3. My translation.

\(^{11}\) Dodge files, CLC papers, FTQ press release, "Déclaration de la Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec sur la Confédération et les droits provinciaux," June 12, 1961. My translation. Provost must have been involved in drafting such an important document.
Social democrats traditionally recognize the right of nations to self-determination. That is to say, hypothetically, if Confederation became uninhabitable for French Canadians, obviously the question of a social democratic state of Québec would arise.

Certainly we are not yet at such a point and we are convinced that we will never get there. The workers of Québec believe the current malaise can be explained by the fact that the traditional parties have simultaneously sabotaged Confederation and the Québec provincial state. Workers feel that Québec has not yet made full use of its prerogatives within the framework of Confederation. They are convinced that the New Party, free from the influence of native and foreign money power, and alone capable of responding to popular hopes, may, by implementing necessary changes, relaunch Confederation. They are equally convinced that the Québec provincial New Party will rebuild and reorient the provincial state and at last fully develop its jurisdictions in natural resources, economic planning, education, health care, labour law, etc.12

The FTQ supported Québec's claim to national self-determination, and even suggested that an independent social-democratic state was a possible alternative to an untenable Confederation. Evidently the FTQ leadership understood the full implications of the two nations concept, two months before the founding convention of the New Democratic Party adopted it. Caveats aside, the FTQ asserted support for the New Party precisely because it implied a new, more powerful, more autonomous Québec provincial state active in

jurisdictions dear to the old CCF centralists and Oliver, Lewis and Douglas even in 1962 - natural resources, economic planning, social policy, and labour law.\textsuperscript{13}

This statement on the New Party and the national question did not reflect the attitude of all the constituent groups in the FTQ. On June 13, the chair of the Québec Labour Council, Jean-Baptiste Hurens, survived a vote of confidence caused by his outspoken criticism of any attempt to officially endorse the New Party. Hurens refused to permit political discussions and the official support of any party because he felt that it was injurious to a labour movement whose membership encompassed all political orientations. He had previously expressed this attitude at the November, 1960, FTQ convention, describing himself as a Liberal. FTQ president Roger Provost publically attacked Hurens for not carrying out the democratic responsibilities imposed on him by the CLC and FTQ charters. He also charged Hurens with systematically sabotaging the official policy of the labour movement to the advantage of the old parties.\textsuperscript{14} Surely Hurens was not alone in his dissidence, as labour

\textsuperscript{13} See discussion of Sherwood's account of Douglas' speech in January, 1962, in Chapter Two above.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Le Devoir}, June 15, 1961, p. 5.
affiliation figures demonstrated.  

On June 14 Lebel issued a press release in the name of the QCNP entitled "Le Nouveau Parti proposera une charte des droits provinciaux." The purpose of the meeting at Université de Montréal was to clarify the position of the Québec delegation to the federal founding convention. Lebel explained that the discussion paper to be submitted to participants was predicated on "...a binational interpretation of the Confederative pact...". Subjects for review would include tax sharing, equalization grants, joint federal-provincial programmes, monetary and fiscal policy, etc. Lebel said, "...We will propose new formulas for cooperation, based on equality, which will reconcile the exigencies of federalism and the democratization of our economic life." The discussion paper authored by the QCNP placed priority on questions of federal aid to education, patriation of the constitution, reform of the Supreme Court, and the replacement of the Senate.  

From discussions at the meeting on June 17-18 at

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15 See the discussion of the makeup of the Québec delegation to the federal convention below.

Université de Montréal, the delegation to the federal founding convention was to understand and articulate Québec's objectives in areas of federal policymaking which impinged on the provincial sphere. It was also expected that the meeting would consider proposals on the structure of the new federal party. A general invitation was issued to all members of the PSD, the New Party clubs, and affiliated groups. In addition, 73 people were specially invited to attend. These special invitees were mainly FTQ officials and active PSD veterans, but the list also included others such as Robert Cliche (who had refused a seat on the NCNP in March), Claude Morin and Jacques-Yvan Morin (both of later PQ fame). No attempt was made to keep federalists from attending. Among federalists specially invited with the agreement and active involvement of Dodge, Pérusse (FTQ), and Thérèse Casgrain, had been Yvan Legault (FTQ), Roméo Mathieu (FTQ), Michael Oliver, Gérard Picard (CSN), Harry Pope, Roger Provost (FTQ), and Frank Scott.

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Speaking at the opening of the two-day conference, Lebel stated:

The objective to attain, it seems to me, is to assure to French Canadians an equality of means by comparison with the rest of Canada. Without this, demands for the recognition of rights, however justified and fundamental they may be, will be impossible and will constitute a diversion. This will be true even if these rights are the object of theoretical confirmations which appear ineluctable and which none contest...

It is obviously a question of a renewed federalism which rests on an interpretation of the constitution according to which Confederation is much more a pact between two nations than a pact between several provinces. This interpretation is also that which seems closest to the aspirations of the majority of French Canadians at the moment...

The importance of reaching agreement on this definition comes from the fact that otherwise the province of Québec will never accept federalism...

Lebel impugned the old parties for exploiting the conflicts in federal-provincial relations for electoral ends rather than seeking solutions to them. He suggested that those active in federal politics since 1918 had been mostly centralists, while those active provincially had been mainly autonomists. This situation created a virtual impasse.

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between Ottawa and Québec City. The best interests of all Canadians required cooperation. While their governments fought each other, the country lost control of its natural resources to Americans. Nevertheless, Lebel suggested that in 1961, more than ever before, people realized their common enemy was "...a capitalism without frontiers, without laws, and without scruples...".  

The QCNP's recommendations to the conference participants on federal-provincial relations were contained in an untitled five-page document. There were three general headings under which detailed suggestions were made. The first was "Confederation and democratic planning." In this section, the centralization of ownership of the means of production in fewer and increasingly foreign hands was deplored. The replacement of private centralization with public centralization in Ottawa was rejected. In its place, decentralized economic control with the federal and provincial governments assuming complementary rôles was suggested. A federal-provincial planning bureau would coordinate policies at both levels, and would have as its primary objectives full employment, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and economic independence. The

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bureau would consist of experts from both levels of government whose mandate would be to ensure coherence in the global planning process. The bureau would also eliminate the past tradition of unilateral decisions by Ottawa in matters such as tax sharing, equalization payments, and joint programmes. Provincial governments would retain the right to opt out of joint programmes with full compensation.

The next section was entitled "Confederation and education." The document stated unequivocally that provincial jurisdiction over education was of paramount cultural importance to Québec. It was recommended that, in the case of federal intervention in education, provinces be given a choice between three alternatives: first, to accept federal aid and participate in the proposed joint programme; second, to refuse the proposed joint programme but receive funds equal to those which would have been received had the province agreed to participate ("opting out with full compensation"); last, the province could alternatively collect equivalent revenue for the program from its taxpayers, who would pay a commensurately lower federal income tax. Finally, it was stated that the federal government had to take up its constitutional responsibility to protect the educational rights of francophone minorities outside Québec, and that the standard of comparison had to
be Québec's treatment of its anglophone minority. Douglas' own Saskatchewan, for one, had not met that standard.

The last section was headed "Confederation and the reform of political institutions". It recommended patriation of the constitution and abolition of the federal right of disallowance and its replacement by a bill of rights acceptable to the provinces. The Senate was to be replaced by an organic-elective Confederation Council. Two-thirds of the Councillors would be elected on provincial general election days; the remaining third would be elected on federal election day. The new body would retain the Senate's powers, and, in addition, Supreme Court appointments would become its prerogative rather than that of the federal cabinet.21

Changes to the draft of the New Party constitution were also proposed. In the original draft only one federal secretary was envisaged. The federal secretary was the highest ranking paid party official. The paid position of "associate" federal secretary was demanded. One of the two officials would have to be a francophone, and the other would

have to be bilingual. The word "national" in the federal party constitution was to be replaced by the word "federal", a natural corollary of the two nations thesis. Jean-Marie Bédard of the Woodworkers22 proposed that Québec's right to self-determination and secession be written into the federal party constitution. However, he was convinced to withdraw the motion by the leaders of the QCNP. They argued that recognition of French Canada as a nation automatically implied recognition of its right to self-determination.23 Unfortunately Bédard's concern for clarity was to be justified by subsequent events.

The resolutions adopted at the weekend conference were referred24 to the NCNP executive later in June. QCNP

22 Later a leader of the Parti Socialiste du Québec.

23 André Lamoureux, Le NPD et le Québec, 1958-1985, Montréal: Editions du Parc, 1985, p. 102. Sherwood denies that resolutions were presented at this conference, and that amendments to the programme and constitution were withdrawn as out of order. He cites a report on page 1 of Le Devoir of June 19, 1961, stating, "The article describes the withdrawing of the motion." The article actually described the conference as "stating clearly" (énoncer) that Confederation was a pact between two nations. The text was substantially that of the QCNP document on federal-provincial relations passed by the conference. See David Sherwood, "The NDP in French Canada, 1961-1965", unpublished M.A. thesis, Montréal: McGill University, 1965, p. 56.

24 Dodge files, CLC papers, "Résolutions présentées au congrès de fondation du Nouveau Parti par le comité du Nouveau Parti de la province de Québec," five pages, n.d. The Québec submissions were late. June 16 was the cutoff date, the Québec documents were accepted anyway. See NCNP, The New Party: Draft Constitution, Ottawa: NCNP, 1961, p. 5.
nationalists had not concealed their outlook. The detailed program to implement the two nations thesis, as official resolutions of the QCNP to the founding federal convention, made the position of the Québec organization very clear. Though they may have disagreed, federalists who attended the conference at Université de Montréal were aware of its outcome and of the identities of nationalists such as Lebel. To avoid any misunderstanding, Harry Pope sent a letter on June 22, 1961, to eight high ranking members of the NCNP including Douglas, Lewis, Knowles, and Hamilton. He wrote:

I would like to underline in the firmest manner possible that an exact understanding of the bi-national issue by English Canadians is vital for the success of the New Party in Québec... ...in the past two or three years considerable dissatisfaction has developed in Québec concerning the actual functioning of Confederation. The intellectual leaders of French Canada, those who form opinion, will support the New Party only if it clearly demonstrates wholehearted respect for the federal system and expresses this in the plainest manner possible. From their point of view, the recognition of the bi-national character of Canada will permit a greater Canadian unity, nothing less. If the English Canadian majority at the founding convention accepts as a point of departure the surprising [surprenante] affirmation of Canada as a bi-national state, then the New Party will have a chance of success in Québec. However, if the English Canadian majority at the founding convention rejects that resolution which I support, then in this case, I can assure you that the New Party will never get off the ground in Québec.

It is for this reason that I ask you to read with the closest possible attention the documents which you will shortly be sent by the Québec
Committee for the New Party.  


26 A sidelight on how far news of positions adopted by the QCNP travelled in two weeks is afforded by a letter from Arthur Lower, then 72, to Stanley Knowles, dated July 1, 1961. Disturbed by what he perceived as pressure coming from the Québec section for the New Party to recognize Québec's "right of secession", Lower felt that this "...would mean the smash-up, after some delay, of the Canadian experiment. Right of secession would certainly be pressed, and soon changed into desire for secession and intention to secede. How we would get past that without the gravest of crises I do not know... I doubt if Canada could be torn apart either without Civil War. And since civil war would be virtually identical with racial war, there would be no means of healing the breach once it was effected." Lower felt English Canada would then fall into American hands. But even Lower had to admit that French-Canadians were "second-besters" living on terms defined by English-Canadians in a false partnership. Dodge files, CLC papers, copy Lower-Knowles, July 1, 1961.
B. Final preparations for the convention

The NCNP met in Ottawa on July 6. Casgrain, Scott, and Oliver reported on the resolutions adopted at the QCNP conference. The NCNP created a "subcommittee on Québec proposals" consisting of Oliver, Scott, and three others to meet with representatives of the QCNP "...to draft appropriate resolutions for consideration by the Administrative Committee [NCNP executive] and presentation to the convention program committee." In fact, this committee was to see what could be negotiated with the QCNP. The NCNP then amended the draft constitution by requiring that either the national president or associate national president be French-speaking, and that the other be English-speaking. However, the QCNP's demand for a francophone associate federal secretaryship was tabled and "...The Committee was of the opinion that this proposal should be rejected." 27

The NCNP also nominated numerous officers and committees of the forthcoming convention at this meeting. These appointments were to be ratified by the delegates on July 31. From Québec, Roger Provost (FTQ) was nominated for co-

chairman of the convention and Oliver for chairman of the program committee, while Gérard Picard (past president of the CSN, an individual member of the NCNP) was nominated for deputy chairman of the constitution committee. Meanwhile, the CSN's formal participation in the founding convention was reduced from sending "fraternal delegates" to simple "observers".  

There was one meeting between the representatives of the NCNP and the QCNP on July 13. Québec's resolutions on the draft program were placed in the hands of the Oliver's convention program committee which developed certain changes to the Québec resolutions by July 24. This committee consisted of three other anglophones and a francophone secretary. Predictably, some changes involved addition of references to multiculturalism rather than exclusive emphasis on the bi-national thesis. The program committee dropped the proposed replacement of the Senate by an organic Confederation Council. There were also minor changes in

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29 CLC papers, Dodge files, document, typescript, "Résolutions présentées au congrès de fondation du Nouveau Parti par le comité du Nouveau Parti de la province de Québec," five pages, n.d.
phraseology.\textsuperscript{30} This version was presented to the NCNP meeting on July 29-30. According to all accounts opposition within the NCNP to even this watered-down version of Québec's attempt to render the program consistent with the two nations thesis was stormy.\textsuperscript{31} The NCNP reconsidered the francophone associate federal secretaryship and decided to accept the amendment after all.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless, most QCNP amendments to the constitution were rejected by the constitution subcommittee, which included Roger Provost of the FTQ. The essence of these amendments would reappear on the floor once the convention got under way.

The last meeting of the NCNP was extremely important. It concluded the three-year period of party construction, and it laid groundwork for the first months of the New Democratic Party. Carl Hamilton, secretary of the NCNP, 

\textsuperscript{30} CLC papers, Dodge files, document, typescript, "Amendements proposés aux résolutions de la province de Québec," four pages, dated "Comité provincial 24 juillet, 1961."

\textsuperscript{31} André Lamoureux, \textit{Le NPD et le Québec, 1958-1985}, Montréal: Editions du Parc, 1985, p. 107-108. Minutes cryptically describe the debate and its outcome: "The report of the subcommittee which had been appointed to consider proposals by the Quebec New Party Committee concerning Program and Constitution, was fully discussed. Various proposed amendments were referred back to the subcommittee for further consideration." Even the compromise proposed by Oliver was unacceptable. CLC papers, Dodge files, minutes, National Committee for the New Party meeting, July 29-30, 1961.

\textsuperscript{32} CLC papers, Dodge files, minutes, National Committee for the New Party meeting, July 29-30, 1961.
prepared planning documents for the benefit of the new leadership. A memorandum entitled "Some Key Problems" is of great interest:

The proposals that follow are presented on the assumption that the New Party must adopt a "go-for-broke" policy in its first year. Assuming a Federal election in June, 1962, our task becomes one of maximizing our potential in less than a year.

There seems to me to be two compelling arguments for this approach. First, it was the prospect held out to encourage Tommy Douglas to accept the leadership. He can only do his best if our people are thoroughly imbued with an "all-out" psychology. Second, any suggestion of a "slow build-up" approach has in my view, no reality in the politics of North America in the 1960's. The voters simply will not wait for us to become a force at some later date.

...it appears to me that we should concentrate on the following as prime objectives of the Convention:

(1) no reasonable person thinks labour is going to dominate. The problem may be the reverse. It is vital that key labour leaders be seen to be active participants.

(2) CCF leadership should be downplayed somewhat if necessary to assure that no impression is created of "just the CCF warmed over".

(3) the new party club people should be deliberately thrust forward.

(c) assuring that the public be clear that this party is the Canadian party of the moderate left with a fresh approach to policy and democratic participation in politics. The dogmatists and extremists should be seen as having only marginal influence. This impression may best be created by well-planned use of the periods covered by T.V. The debates should be organized to make certain
that the best people speak before the cameras...\(^{33}\)

Hamilton feared that unreasonable people, dogmatists, extremists and those who felt that the CCF should play a very visible role in the New Party founding convention might have a damaging effect on the image of "moderation", and he suggested the process be closely managed to avoid such problems. His admission that commitments were made to Douglas by the NCNP in order to get him to run for the leadership is rather damning.

Hamilton defined four issues to be discussed before the cameras at the convention, including the nature of affiliated union membership ("to answer criticisms... on union domination"), foreign policy ("to allay fears about neutralism"), unemployment and economic planning, and federalism and education ("to emphasize French-Canadian participation and our appreciation of a bi-cultural Canada").\(^{34}\) He then stated:


...In the composition of the slate of officers, I consider the following factors vital:

(a) that at least one labour leader at, or close to, the center of CLC affairs be among the top ten.

(b) that at least two or three experienced CCF leaders, who have been close to national New Party developments, should be among the top ten. Care must be taken not to go too far in sacrificing experience to newness for the critical period ahead.

...The surest way to avoid uncertainties in this regard is, in my opinion, to have top union officers also officers of the party...35

In a party which was attempting to project "a fresh approach to policy and democratic participation in politics," this talk of slates and the obvious confidence that NCNP personnel could closely manage the election of the leadership of the entire federal party seems curious. Hamilton then proposed that 250,000 affiliated members and 75,000 individual members be the recruitment objective for the ensuing five months. There were only 40,000 members of the CCF, so he was proposing a massive increase. New Party clubs are not mentioned as a source of individual members, reinforcing an impression of the ephemeral quality of these organizations.36 After certain budgetary prognostications,

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Hamilton provided capsule reports on the state of organization in each province:

A few generalizations about the rôle of the National party in the provinces is herewith proposed...

(a) In Saskatchewan there is obviously a special situation and the only rôle of the National movement would appear to be to assure that the terms agreed upon by the CCF and the SFL [Saskatchewan Federation of Labour] are carried out. We have a request from the SFL to intercede to this end.

(d) In Québec the New Party has made no substantial impact. In my opinion our problems have not only not been solved, they have not really been tackled. Perhaps there is no immediate solution, but we ought to have no illusions that here is our greatest single problem. 37

The "special situation" in Saskatchewan was the resistance of the CCF to labour affiliation and the entire New Party enterprise. 38 Indeed, the Saskatchewan CCF did not abandon its old name until after its 1964 electoral defeat. Hamilton's admission that the New Party organizing effort had failed in Québec is quite illuminating, particularly considering the heated debate on Québec's


resolutions at the same meeting.

On the same weekend Hamilton submitted "Some Key Problems" to the NCNP, Jean-Marc Léger asked in Le Devoir what the face of the New Party would be like. Would it actually acknowledge the bi-national character of Canada, and adopt a structure and modes of action translating that recognition into reality? Léger noted that contradictory claims on the New Party - for the right of national self-determination for francophones, and for protection of minority rights - posed a fundamental problem, particularly for the Québec delegates. He argued that the criteria of provincial autonomy, genuine equality for the two languages (rather than merely official translation), and numerical equality for the two nations in the instances of the New Party were the criteria by which it would be judged. If the position articulated by the "gauche nationale" in the preceding year was adopted by the party, it would have the confidence of many francophones. If not, Léger suggested that the only recourse would be the independence of the Québec wing.39

The QCNP began selecting nominees for federal positions as early as its meeting of May 13, 1961. The first slate

proposed by the Québec committee favoured Gérard Picard, former president of the CSN, as the first president of the federal party. The QCNP's first choices for the two vice-presidential positions to be informally allotted to Québec were Réginald Boisvert, a union official and Citélibriste; Denis Lazure; and Camille Laurin. Their first choices for federal council were Chartrand, Casgrain, and Oliver. However, by the time the convention was under way, Oliver was the nominee of the Québec delegate caucus for federal party president with Picard as associate president. The Québec section was reduced to a single federal vice-presidency; Mathieu of the Packinghouse Workers was the nominee of the general Québec delegation and the Québec labour delegation for this post.

The makeup of the 123-person Québec delegation to the federal founding convention is of interest. There were 13

40 Dodge files, CLC papers, Forest-Hamilton, May 19, 1961, and attachment.

41 CLC papers, MacDonald files, "A tous les délégués," typescript memorandum of one page dated Wednesday, August 2, 1961, and signed with the initials "J.L.", indicating Jean-Claude Lebel.

42 The figure, based on delegates' lists found in the CLC papers, includes 15 delegates from affiliated unions and one labour council, six delegates from Québec representing the federal and provincial CCF executives and councils, four delegates representing the QCNP, 47 delegates representing PSD-CCF riding associations in Québec, 35 delegates representing Québec New Party clubs, four delegates who were members of the NCNP, eleven delegates who sat on convention committees, and the co-chairman of the convention.
direct representatives of affiliated unions from Québec, among whom seven were from the United Packinghouse Workers Montréal-area locals. There were three delegates from Québec locals of the Textile Workers' Union of America in various regions, and the other three union delegates were from the Montréal-area locals of the International Union of Electrical Workers, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and the International Woodworkers of America. The Trois Rivières labour council was represented by one delegate and an alternate. Other Québec delegates with labour connections included Yvan Legault (FTQ), René Rondou (FTQ), and Phillipe Vaillancourt (CLC), all of whom sat for the QCNP. There were also six FTQ delegates accredited to committees on the constitution, credentials, and publicity, and to the office of sergeant-at-arms. FTQ president Roger Provost co-chaired the convention. Thus at least 34 delegates (about 27% of the delegation) were connected with the FTQ.

The question of Québec New Party club delegates is

Twenty-two alternates have been counted as full delegates. A small number of additional Québec delegates may have attended - half a dozen PSD executives who might have had delegate status by right of office apparently did not attend. On page 62 of "The NDP in French Canada", Sherwood claims "about 190" delegates to the founding convention from Québec. There is no evidence to support Sherwood's claim of an additional 67 delegates, a difference of more than 50%! Lamoureux cites a figure of 167 from Gad Horowitz' Canadian Labour in Politics, but this figure is equally inexplicable.
fascinating. The QCNP constitution of August 2, 1960, stipulated that a New Party club could be recognized with as few as six members. Thus the 23 Québec New Party clubs represented at the founding convention - if they were duly constituted, and that is an important caveat - represented as few as 138 members. Of 37 Québec New Party club delegates from 23 clubs, there were ten from clubs consisting of members of seven different local unions. Without further research it is impossible to know if any of the other clubs were similarly organized. For example, Fernand Daoust of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers sat for the New Party "Club Louis-Joseph Papineau", but we do not know whether this was a union-based club. The clubs dissolved after the federal founding convention.

Chartrand sat for the federal CCF executive and council, and Vadeboncoeur and two others sat for the Québec CCF (PSD) council. Forty-one PSD riding associations sent delegates, although some of these were obviously "parachuted" by the QCNP or NCNP. For example, Terry Grier (future federal  

43 CLC papers, Dodge files, "Constitution of the [Québec] Provincial Committee for the New Party as adopted by the meeting of August 2, 1960," marked "Received Oct 24 1960", p. 4. Other information in the archives indicates that there was no New Party club activity in Québec as late as January, 1961. At the end of March, 1961, the NCNP was still searching for an NP club representative from Québec to sit on the Committee and offered the seat to Robert Cliche, who refused. CLC papers, Dodge files, copy of a telegram, Lebel-Casgrain, March 25, 1961.
secretary and entirely Ontario-based) represented the Sherbrooke PSD riding association while his wife sat for the Shefford PSD riding association. The wife of the president of the PSD, Emile Boudreau of the United Steelworkers of America, sat for a New Party club from Rouyn. Of the 106 delegates who actually represented Québec labour, Québec New Party clubs, or the various PSD groups and organs, about 80 were identifiable as francophones.

...In the month of May, 1961, the New Party of Québec already counted nearly 10,000 members. Some 1,600 members came from New Party clubs, two-thirds of which were in Montréal, and some 7,000 to 8,000 were "affiliates," union members and principally those of the FTQ. Progress was particularly marked in the two months preceding the [federal] founding convention. For example, on June 2, 1961, 47 FTQ locals had affiliated themselves to the New Party. The majority were from sectors such as food services, metallurgy, and textiles... 44

On July 28, 1961, Le Devoir reported that going into the convention the Québec section had 55 affiliated locals as well as 85 New Party clubs with more than 3,000 members. Recruiting 1,400 new individual members in seven hot summer weeks would be an astounding achievement. Frankly, this seems to be a gross exaggeration, considering that of the claimed 85 NP clubs only 23 sent delegates to Ottawa. The

figure of 1,600 individual members appears more plausible in light of later NDPQ membership reports. 45

Lamoureux's figure of seven to eight thousand affiliated union members on the eve of the federal founding convention is inconsistent with official NDP tallies in later 1961 and early 1962. For example, on November 24, 1961, six or seven months after publication of the New Party News report from which Lamoureux obtained his numbers, official NDP reports indicate that only 2,469 union members in 12 locals of three unions had affiliated. Nine of these locals, counting 73% of the total members, were located in Montréal. Seventy-one per cent of the affiliated members belong to a single union - the United Packinghouse Workers of America. 46 For Canada as a whole, 63,825 union members had affiliated to the NDP by December 12, 1961, with 84% or 53,224 coming from Ontario.

The FTQ's proportion of the CLC effort contributed less than four per cent of the total number of affiliated union

45 Federal NDP papers, files on the Québec section, document "Effectifs du parti: le 1er septembre 1962." There were 2,028 individual members on that date, perhaps reflecting the impact of the June 18 federal election.

46 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, confidential NDP report, "Québec locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of November 24, 1961."
members, and ranked with the performances of the Alberta and Manitoba Federations of Labour.\textsuperscript{47} The figure of 7,034 was only attained at the time of the June 18, 1962 federal election. By that time, 43 locals had affiliated but; thirty-four of these were in Montréal, accounting for 5,991 members or 85% of the Québec total. The UPWA and Steel accounted for 4,793 members or 68% of the total.\textsuperscript{48} At that time there were approximately 235,000 members of the FTQ and about 125,000 members of the CSN. The New Democratic Party, nearly a year after its federal founding convention, had attracted about one per cent of the FTQ, or about half of one per cent of the Québec labour movement!\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, this was the result of three years of joint action with the FTQ! As usual, the party was engaging in internal and external propaganda when they gave out those numbers in the spring and summer of 1961.

The country as a whole was indifferent to the New Party.

In the year preceding the founding convention several polls

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item CLC papers, Political Education Department files, confidential NDP report, "Locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of December 12, 1961 - summary by province."
\item CLC papers, Political Education Department files, confidential NDP report, "Québec locals affiliated as of July 2, 1962."
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion showed that no more than 4% of Québec voters favoured the New Party. In mid-June, Gallup reported that support for the New Party across Canada was at only 11%. The federal party had suffered a four-point drop between January (20%) and June (16%) in the four western provinces, and a similar increase to 15% in Ontario. A tendency toward concentration of support in Ontario may have reflected the reluctance of western CCF partisans to support the New Party50 and the increasing complacency of prairie farm organizations, as well as new political activism among industrial unions in Ontario.51

50 For example, in a federal by-election in Esquimalt-Saanich on May 31, 1961, the New Party finished third after the Tories and Liberals. In 1958 the CCF had been second. This must have been quite embarrassing to the NCNP. See Pauline Jewett, "Voting in the 1960 federal by-elections at Peterborough and Niagara Falls: who voted New Party and why?", in John Courtney, ed., Voting in Canada, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 66.

51 Le Devoir, July 28, 1961, p. 12. Unfortunately, the numbers for the Maritimes and Newfoundland were not reported in the article.
C. The New Party convention

The convention opened in Ottawa on Monday, July 31, 1961. Approximately 1700 delegates were in attendance. The largest delegations were from Ontario with about seven hundred, and Saskatchewan with about three hundred. Québec's delegation ranked with that of British Columbia.\textsuperscript{52} Desmond Morton wrote that "...Careful predictions about attendance helped ensure that union delegates were outnumbered by CCF and New Party club representatives. Of the 1,801 accredited delegates, 631 came from union locals, 710 from the CCF and 318 from clubs. The balance included M.P.'s, M.L.A.'s, members of CCF councils, labour federations and the NCNP." The tone of "Some Key Problems" and other evidence cited above supports a rather different interpretation - that attendance was watched to ensure that the CCF delegates were in a minority (949 to 710). Morton does not mention that many of the New Party clubs were fronts for union affiliates which could not obtain official support from their locals; instead, he suggests that they represented only professionals and farmers.\textsuperscript{53}


On the first day the draft constitution was recommended by the NCNP to the delegates for adoption. It retained throughout the references to "nation" and "national" to which the QCNP had objected. After failing to amend this aspect of the draft constitution, the Québécois delegates met in a four-hour caucus that evening to consider their options. They decided to return to the convention floor the following morning, ask leave of the delegates to reconsider the draft constitution, and propose the following motion:

Whereas Canadians of French origin constitute a distinct nation and their definition of the term "national" cannot be applied to the totality of the Canadian population nor to a party or organizations hoping to represent the totality of the said population;

Whereas the term "national" applied to the New Party appears to the overwhelming majority of French-Canadians to be the reflection of an uncomprehending attitude, if not an assimilative attitude, towards the French-Canadian nation;

Whereas under these circumstances, the overwhelming majority of French-Canadians would violently reject a New Party called "national", as noted in the recent declarations of the New Party conference in Montréal and of the FTQ, as well as the recent resolution adopted by the [Québec] Provincial Committee for the New Party;

We the undersigned delegates to the founding convention of the New Party demand that the terms "country" or "Canada" be everywhere substituted for the term "nation" and the terms "federal" or "Canadian" be everywhere substituted for the term

"national", where, in the draft constitution of the New Party, these terms apply to the party itself, to its councils, committees, or conventions.\footnote{\textit{Le Devoir}, August 2, 1961, p. 1. My translation.}

On Tuesday morning the delegates agreed to reopen the question of the party constitution and a vigorous debate ensued. Chartrand was the chief spokesperson for Québec, and spoke passionately of his nation as a "...phenomenon which had endured for three centuries and had not yet expired."\footnote{Quoted in André Lamoureux, \textit{Le NPD et le Québec, 1958-1985}, Montréal: Editions du Parc, 1985, p. 113. My translation.} The motion was supported by several anglophone delegates, among whom was Hazen Argue. Argue suggested that the future of the New Party would be directly linked to the understanding it developed for the special situation of Québec. He noted that francophones did not want special treatment but rather equal treatment. He called for unanimous support for the Québec resolution. Douglas was absent during the entire debate, and did not take any position on the Québec resolution.\footnote{\textit{Le Devoir}, August 3, 1961, p. 2.}

Opposition to the Québec resolution came from Eugene Forsey, then director of research for the Canadian Labour Congress. Forsey, a founding member of the CCF and the
League for Social Reconstruction, attacked the resolution as an absurd play on words and embarrassingly divisive for Canadian identity.\(^{58}\) Nancy Doull, who was a Nova Scotia delegate to the convention and a personal acquaintance of Forsey's, gives this version of events:

...The demand that the word "national" be everywhere deleted etc. took the delegates by surprise. The only person ready to oppose it, and this most eloquently, was Eugene Forsey: his impassioned speech, his plea to the convention not to take this frightful step, (I do not remember his words, of course) convinced many delegates that the matter was just as serious as the Québec delegation made it sound. The hitherto inert tables of Québec delegates came to life suddenly during this debate (mostly during the Convention they seemed to be in agitated conversation among themselves.)

About the Convention response to this motion I would say (1) most delegates had no idea what (constitutional and political) was involved in supporting it; (2) most delegates, convinced by Forsey's outburst that one had to take a stand, used the vote to demonstrate their support for events in French-Canada per se. It should be seen as a pro-Québec gesture, not more. (For most of us it was the first occasion for "taking a stand" on Québec. The argument was that if this is all they want - and one could well imagine what an irritant that word "national" was, used as we English mostly use it, meaning us - then it is easily given. Let's give it.)

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I would have said that Forsey made it quite clear on the spot that he would not join a party that supported a two-nation theory... I remember that he was terribly distressed.\footnote{Oliver papers, copy of Doull-Sherwood, June 9, 1965. See discussion of Doull's role in Sherwood's work in Chapter Two above. Doull's account of the understanding of the resolution on the part of anglophone delegates contradicts public statements by the QCNP, warnings from Pope to the NCNP, and negotiations between the representatives of the NCNP and the QCNP. The FTQ press releases cited in Chapter Two in the discussion of Sherwood make clear that Chartrand was not alone in believing that the two nations thesis had been implicitly adopted.}

Following the presentation of the Québec resolutions and some argument, the convention constitution committee (co-chaired by J.H. Brockelbank of the Saskatchewan CCF and by Gérard Picard) moved that the resolution be considered by the committee and this was duly adopted. On Thursday, the constitution committee reported to the convention, recommending that the terms "national," "national party", "national council", "national executive", "national office", "national youth section", and "national" as used to identify officers, be eliminated from the constitution. In their place, no modifier, or, where essential, the term "federal," would be applied.\footnote{Le Devoir, August 4, 1961, p. 2, p. 10.} The report of the convention committee did not include the argumentation portion of the Québec resolution and these elements were not adopted by the convention. Unfortunately this allowed a certain ambiguity,
permitting some to claim as Doull does that this was simply a matter of wording and did not involve recognition of the two nations thesis.

In the debate on the program the Québec delegation secured a clearer definition of the federal party's intentions towards Québec. On Wednesday, August 2, they succeeded in amending elements of the federal party program concerning federalism, federal-provincial relations, opting out, and a bi-national Canada. The amended text of the program in these areas was published on page 2 of Le Devoir the next morning:

The New Party proclaims its faith in the federal system, the only one which assures joint development of the two nations originally associated in the formation of Canadian society, as well as the development of other ethnic groups in Canada. The Canadian constitution guarantees the protection of the national identity of French-Canadians and the expansion of their culture. The New Party will maintain and respect all these guarantees. Canadian federalism must ensure the protection of cultural, religious and other democratic rights, permitting a vigorous and balanced expansion of the country in general and assuring provincial autonomy. The New Party holds that social and economic planning must be the result of the concerted action of all levels of government. It therefore relies on close collaboration between governments to coordinate their planning and administration for the purpose of establishing Canadian norms and minima.
For federalism to be a reality as well as a legal principle, each government must control sufficient revenue to permit it to execute its constitutional responsibilities. One of the fundamental functions of the federal state is to divide wealth and revenue in collaboration with the provinces, so that each will have comparable means to carry out their constitutional obligations. The New Party holds that in a federal system equalization payments are the best means of attaining this objective. There must be more frequent recourse to unconditional payments of this kind and these payments must eventually replace conditional subsidies. The New Party will work constantly for the joint participation of the federal and provincial governments in the financing of programmes for the general welfare of Canadians, but it insists that this participation must be the result of negotiations and free consultation between the governments and not the product of a unilateral decision. It holds that every province must be free to opt out of joint programs, but that this must not delay the implementation of such programs by other provinces and the federal government. Nevertheless, in all areas of policy involving education, language and similar rights mentioned in the British North America Act, provinces which do not participate in joint programs will not renounce their right to equivalent funds.\textsuperscript{61}

The New Party had thus explicitly adopted the two nations thesis and pronounced itself in favour of a major decentralization of power and revenue. It called for a new spirit of cooperation and free negotiation in federal-provincial relations, but it did not envisage any alterations in the constitution itself. It also called for a qualified

\textsuperscript{61} My translation.
acceptance of "opting out". Thus the party programme was both progressive and conservative on the constitution.

There were other apparent gains for Québec in the course of the convention. Oliver was elected the first federal president of the New Democratic Party; Picard was the first associate federal president. The "official" slate of five vice-presidents included David Lewis, Walter Young, and three other male anglophones. Roméo Mathieu (Packinghouse) managed to break the slate in defeating Young, and so Québec held three officers' posts. Of 15 federal councillors elected at the federal convention, Québec managed to obtain three seats for Thérèse Casgrain, Réginald Boisvert (Steel) and Gilles Rochette (New Party clubs, youth).

Six of 23 party officials elected at the federal convention were from Québec. However, twenty councillors would be delegated by the provincial sections, and, in addition, provincial NDP leaders, presidents, and secretaries

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62 Interestingly, in the health care field, the Canadian Labour Congress faced a struggle with the FTQ which wanted to take a position reserving for Québec all rights to opt out. The FTQ was told bluntly by Jodoin and others that this was unacceptable. CLC papers, Dodge files, five page typescript document, "Minutes of a meeting between CLC and QFL", December 12, 1961.

63 That is, the slate originating with the NCNP.

(a total of 30 councillors), five representatives of the youth section, and even some high ranking party staff (the federal secretary and associate-secretary) had the right to vote at the four council meetings which usually took place between conventions. Even with additional councillors appointed at the provincial level, the Conseil Provisoire of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec (which the QCNP now became) would not have much influence on a federal council massively dominated by Ontario, Saskatchewan, British Columbia and the federal party officials. Their total representation as Québec proper (that is, representatives other than those elected by federal convention) was five out of 83 federal councillors. And it was federal council's interpretation of the party programme and statutes - not the construction placed on them by the Québec section - which would be the official version at least until the summer of 1963.65

Reaction in Québec was mixed. The 235,000-member FTQ issued a press release on August 11, in which president Roger Provost predicted that "...practically all the members of his federation would give their total support to the New

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Democratic Party..." in the next federal election! Provost lauded the NDP's full employment policy, internal democracy, commitment to decentralized economic planning and recognition of provincial rights, and its respect for the rights of French-Canadians, and concluded by saying:

It's a unique opportunity for the working classes to snatch power from a capitalist oligarchy which has given us nothing but unemployment, insecurity, corruption and war. It's an occasion which will not repeat itself in the next 25 or 50 years, and that is why I am convinced the workers of Québec will give almost unanimous support to the NDP.66

The CSN "rejoiced" at the advent of a party based on the working class and sharing many of the union confederation's objectives. It congratulated the NDP on the quality of its internal democracy (!), witnessed by two official observers from the confederation. As might be expected, the CSN reiterated its neutrality. While indicating that it would tolerate NDP activity among affiliated organizations it warned members they must not compromise the general interests of the confederation in the pursuit of partisan purposes. "The CSN added that the New Democratic Party did not have a monopoly of ideas, good

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faith, or concern for public good."\textsuperscript{67}

The editorial reactions of the two most important Montréal dailies, \textit{La Presse} and \textit{Le Devoir}, were mixed. Guy Lamarque warned in \textit{La Presse} that the largest part of the work of building the NDP in Québec was still to come. Alluding to the popularity of Lesage's government, Lamarque noted that the NPDQ would be attempting to innovate in a political culture where renewal was already well advanced. He doubted that English Canadian delegates were returning home from the convention bearing the earnest lesson that Canada was in fact made up of two nations, though they were probably better informed about the needs of Québec.\textsuperscript{68}

In \textit{Le Devoir}, Jean-Marc Léger acknowledged the NDP's recognition of the bi-national character of the country and congratulated Québec delegates for "clarity, perseverance and national consciousness." He wrote: "...Here, perhaps, is the dawn of the national left [gauche nationale] which we have so long needed to finally put an end to that divorce between the "social" and the "national" which has so heavily mortgaged our recent political history and which \textit{Le Devoir}..."


has constantly denounced as vain and dangerous...". However, Léger admitted that anglophone delegates had only reluctantly agreed to Québec's demands and probably solely for electoral reasons. He saw the negative reaction of the anglophone media to the two nations thesis as a cause for concern about the good faith of anglophones. Nevertheless, for the first time a political party recognized two nations. Léger congratulated Picard, Mathieu and Chartrand for their work and suggested that Québécois might have confidence in them to ensure that the NDP kept to the spirit of the Québec resolutions. Léger stated:

It is a "national" party which the French-Canadian elements of the New Democratic Party must henceforth construct primarily in Québec, but this party must logically embrace with time all French-Canadians who eventually, from one end of the country to the other, would join it. If there are two nations, there should be two national parties, cooperating in a federal council. The French-Canadian element must demand that equality be respected in fact, particularly in the conception and editing of fundamental policy documentation. Refusing to be a translation bureau, the francophone group must not agree to more than general principles and common objectives. Each of the two national parties must develop its own program in terms of its outlook and needs, especially inasmuch as the anglophone element seems much more conservative than the French-speaking group.
The experience of the New Party will be decisive in terms of the possibilities of cooperation in equality; if the experience is a failure, we have the right to expect that the French-Canadian left will suffer all the consequences. 69

E. Summary

There are several important conclusions to be drawn from the experience of the Québec delegation at the convention. Lamoureux as well as a number of contemporary observers concluded that the convention was a success for Québec, but a closer examination reveals a less promising result. Though some of the wording of the party constitution was modified to suit the two nations thesis, the thesis itself did not form a part of the constitution nor was any kind of bi-national constitutional structure created in conformity with the concept. Structurally, the New Democratic Party reflected the nature of Confederation itself: Québec remained a province like the others. The NDP failed to adapt to the actual political culture.

On the other hand, the two nations thesis was adopted as part of the program. The program was subject to interpretation by both Federal Council, in which Québec would


always be a small minority\textsuperscript{72}, and by the federal leader - and Douglas, known to have rejected the bi-national "compact" theory of Confederation and an open opponent of provincial rights,\textsuperscript{73} was obviously not Québec's candidate. Thus the "victories" were empty. This interpretation is reinforced by the observations of Nancy Doull cited above, and by a remark from Donald MacDonald, then NDP leader in Ontario: "In spite of the adjective "federal" imposed on it by the Québec delegation, the party will be national in scope, that's what's important."\textsuperscript{74} Douglas' speech of January 15, 1962, referred to in Chapter Two above, which was written by Lewis and Oliver, also demonstrated that the resolutions were meaningless. And there would be other examples. One might also be tempted to interpret the election of Oliver and

\textsuperscript{72} Twelve of 83 federal council seats were held by Québec New Democrats 1961-1963. Six of these councillors were elected by the federal convention and one (André L'Heureux, associate federal secretary) was appointed by the federal executive in January, 1962. Only five actually came from the Québec party and served its interests exclusively. Articles VI.1 and VII.1 of the 1961 federal party constitution define the openings filled by the Ottawa convention and the formation of the Conseil Provisoire of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec. See National Committee for the New Party, \textit{The New Party: Draft Constitution}, Ottawa: NCNP, 1961, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{73} In 1958 Douglas said, "I've never been a provincial rightist; I've never believed that provinces are sovereign powers, and I completely repudiate the compact theory of Confederation." Lewis H. Thomas, ed., \textit{The Making of a Socialist: The Recollections of T.C. Douglas}, Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1982, p. 201.

Picard to the two top posts as evidence of good faith on the part of the anglophone delegates. But their presence, as "representatives of Québec", legitimized the leadership and a party constitutional structure which denied the two nations thesis and the dynamic of which was strongly anglophone and exclusively federalist - even centralist.

As noted at the end of Chapter Three, the very late start to the New Party process in Québec had produced a left-nationalist conjuncture, most pronounced among francophones interested in the provincial venue. The majority of the Québec delegation to the federal convention, which included people like Chartrand and Daoust, had thus found natural allies among the left dissidents in the party, and especially in Hazen Argue's corner among the unrepentant left-wing CCF delegates. In general the dissidents were soundly defeated by the party élite, the union delegations, and the New Party club liberals. Argue was stopped by the active resistance of most of the NCNP and the political support they controlled. Thanks to their orchestration of the election of a very senior CCF leader like Douglas, the convention had demonstrated to party activists on the losing side that the New Democratic Party was neither particularly new nor particularly democratic. The triumph of Douglas, unilingual and carrying the damaging baggage of the Saskatchewan schools
question, was a disaster for the Québec delegation. Not only had it been badly defeated in opposing Douglas, but now it had to put up with a federal leader who would be difficult to defend at home. How could they defend the party's official position on bilingualism and bi-culturalism in Québec while publicly supporting a unilingual federal leader with a questionable record on francophone minority rights?

Thus the Québec delegation returned home from the convention checked on all fronts. It returned to a Québec where FTQ support remained ephemeral, the CSN was becoming hostile, and popular support had peaked at four per cent. It returned to an increasingly tense and nationalist Québec with only the most hollow of commitments from the federal party on the national question. It had still not settled the question of whether to create a provincial party, and it still had no money. It had a unilingual leader who was an embarrassment in francophone Québec, and it had incurred his hostility by supporting his rival. And, it had to prepare for a crucial first federal election expected in less than a year.
5: The Rain of Error

A. Introduction

There were several political events during the remaining months of 1961 and in early 1962 which embarrassed the federal and Québec parties, provoked the "gauche nationale", and contributed to its desire to establish a Québec party autonomous from the NDP. At this time the party's Québec problems chiefly resulted from public statements related to constitutional reform and the rôle of francophones in Canadian society by members of the actual and traditional leadership of the Canadian Labour Congress, Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, and the federal New Democratic Party. The purpose of the following chapter is to permit a more complete understanding of the relations between the federal and provincial parties, and of the internal and external political dynamics growing out of those relations.

The narrative below deals primarily with Le Devoir reports of these statements and reactions to them as reported in the same newspaper. The choice of Le Devoir as a source was based on the level of critical political engagement among its editorialists, André Laurendeau, Gérard Filion, and Jean-Marc Léger. Their views ranged from neo-federalist to independentist. They had shown considerable interest in the
formation of the New Party and were well acquainted with the local personalities. The continuing high priority accorded to reportage and commentary on the NDP and NPDQ reflected their interest in and concern with the development of the left in Québec during the autumn and winter of 1961–1962.
B. A difficult autumn

The long train of gaffes began right on the floor of the New Party convention, in the form of Eugene Forsey's opposition to the use of the word "federal" in lieu of "national".¹ Forsey wrote numerous letters on this point to the editors of Le Devoir in August, September, and October, 1961. Well known in party and labour circles, Forsey had been a lifelong CCFer, closely associated with the earliest adherents of the party like Scott, Woodsworth, and Lewis. As a high ranking CLC official he commanded attention inside and outside the party. His public hostility to the two nations concept was an embarrassment to partisans of the NDP in Québec, and surely was viewed at best as ridiculous and at worst as insulting by Québec nationalists. In provoking nationalist responses from André Laurendeau, Forsey also gave rise to Laurendeau's attacks on the party's shaky two nations position.

On August 29, this letter from Forsey was published in Le Devoir:

¹ Forsey was the research director of the Canadian Labour Congress and had been one of the founding members of the League for Social Reconstruction and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.
I have absolutely no objection if Canadians who speak French call themselves a "nation" in the ethnic and cultural sense, as has long been done in the United Kingdom by the Scottish and the Welsh. But when one says to me that there is no Canadian nation, that all that exists is a French-Canadian nation and an English-Canadian nation in a bi-national state, I appeal to the words of Cartier, of Langevin, of Taché, of Belleau in the Confederation Debates, 1865. You will find in their speeches not a single word, not a syllable, not the least suggestion of "two nations" in a "bi-national state". But you will repeatedly find there expressions like these: "a new nation, a new and powerful nation, a new nationality, a great nation," always used in respect of the proposed Confederation. Is it that Cartier, Langevin, Taché, Belleau, were promoting "the dogma of anglo-Canadian supremacy"? I say precisely what they have said: I demand only the preservation of the Canadian nation which they wanted to create; I protest only against the liquidation of their work."

Having rejected the notion of two nations in any legal or sovereign sense, Forsey ridiculed the NDP's use of "federal" by citing a host of federal (!) government organizations which used the word "national" such as Canadian National Railways, the National Research Council, etc. On September 9, André Laurendeau directly rebuked Forsey in a Le Devoir editorial entitled, "Le Canada: deux nations." Laurendeau wrote:

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Mr. Eugene Forsey doesn't like the fact that we believe in the existence of two nations in Canada. He teases us: what would you call the CNR, he asks us. If there was only this question to resolve, it would be easy: "les chemins de fer canadiens" [Canadian railways] quickly expresses the reality. The difficulty in our country's vocabulary comes where the state and the nation coincide - or supposedly coincide. "Nation" has come to have political and legal significance: those who reject a shared decline, reflecting cultural and social realities which bind a human community together. Thus it is more exact, more truthful, to speak of a French-Canadian nation than a Canadian nation...

Yet another new sign of an increasingly evident necessity: that of rethinking federalism.³

Laurendeau described how federal NDP president Michael Oliver had recently articulated the two nations thesis in a magazine article, contradicting Forsey. Laurendeau pointed out the difficulties in making the two nations concept concrete in a federation in which every province but one was dominated by one of the two nations. Despite Oliver's public optimism, the editor of Le Devoir could foresee only the destruction of the francophone minority or that of the federal state.⁴ Forsey's concern with the wording of the party's constitution had thus provided the occasion for a critical examination and rejection of the NDP president's argument.

⁴ Le Devoir, September 9, 1961, p. 4.
Forsey again took up the cudgels on September 18. While he did not object to francophones identifying themselves as a nation in the ethnic and cultural sense, he nevertheless wrote:

...What I do not like, in effect, is that you deny the existence of the Canadian nation founded 94 years ago by the Fathers of Confederation.

...Like Mr. Oliver, I accept the idea of a bilingual state. I do not accept the theory of Confederation as "a pact between two nations", which is inconsistent with historical truth... Nobody in the debate on Confederation made mention of "two nations"...  

Forsey attacked the notion that French Canada was coincident with Québec and that English Canada was coincident with the other provinces and territories ("territorial bilingualism"). Citing the presence of the anglophone minority in Québec and francophone minorities in other provinces, he asked "...shall we assist in a new expulsion of Acadians from Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and francophones of the west, to Québec territory (augmented, obviously, by considerable portions of New Brunswick and Ontario)?"  

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5 Le Devoir, September 18, 1961, p. 4. My translation. Defenders of this position ignore the fact that "Canadian" nationality was a political rationalization invented for Confederation by the colonial élites in the 1860's, not a genuine cultural phenomenon preceding demands for autonomy. Canada was created, not born. In contrast, the Québécois had been evolving their national sense for nearly two centuries when this artificial "nationality" was coined.
Laurendeau responded to this letter on the same page. Admitting that it was probably unfair for francophones to seek to impose their definition of "nation" on anglophones (as they had great difficulty seeing the question from a francophone perspective), Laurendeau concluded that unfortunately such incomprehension might be fatal for Confederation. The "Canadian nation" Forsey defended was an oppressive and fundamentally unequal legal and political framework which was rapidly losing legitimacy in Québec. It was driving ever larger numbers of French Canadians to place their faith in an autonomous Québec. The debate over whether yesterday the British North America Act was a pact between two nations was unimportant. What was important was whether today or tomorrow a new and more just agreement could be reached between the two nations. Laurendeau still believed in federalism, but serious work was required by the partners to find a solution to the problems of the country.\(^6\)

A month later, Forsey called a press conference to declare that he had finally decided not to be a member of the NDP because the word "national" had been removed from its constitution.\(^7\) Even out of the party, Forsey continued

\(^6\) *Le Devoir*, September 18, 1961, p. 4.

\(^7\) *Le Devoir*, October 19, 1961, p. 6.
to publicly attack the two nations concept.\textsuperscript{8}

On September 5, 1961, the thirty members of the Conseil Provisoire (CP) of the Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec met in Montréal. Each element - the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec, the Parti Social Démocratique, and the New Party clubs - was represented by ten members. The personnel of the CP was little different from that of the Québec Committee for the New Party which had ceased to exist at the end of the federal founding convention. Roméo Mathieu of the Packinghouse Workers (UPW) was elected to the chair, while Michel Chartrand, leader of the PSD, and Me. Jacques Duguay of the New Party clubs, were elected vice-presidents. These three led an executive totalling nine members, organized along the same tripartite theme. The CP established five subcommittees at this meeting: on programme, organization, finance, constitution, and publicity.\textsuperscript{9}

At this meeting, chief provincial organizer Jean-Claude Lebel analyzed the organizational challenge facing the CP. Nothing had yet been accomplished; the two key events in the

\textsuperscript{8} See his speech to the 1961 Congress on Canadian Affairs (November 15-18) in The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure?, Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1962, p. 55-70. At the height of the 1962 federal campaign, Forsey publicly attacked "two nations" at the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association on June 9.

\textsuperscript{9} See Appendix A.
near term were the impending federal election, expected in late 1962 or early 1963, and the provincial founding convention, scheduled for February 16-18, 1962. The logical first step was to proceed to the establishment of NPDQ riding associations which would provide the basis to organize both the convention and the election campaign. Noting that the NPDQ had been established in a vacuum of ideas, leadership, and services, Lebel proposed a central communications or liaison structure between the CP and local organizations and militants. He also proposed a political education committee. However, neither of these goals were acted upon.\textsuperscript{10}

The new party had a wide range of constitutional and policy options to choose from. Among the members of the CP there was a great divergence of views. Article X of the 1961 federal party constitution, governing both program and constitution, required that provincial parties remain broadly consistent with the federal party. In order to remain within the NDP association of provincial parties, the NPDQ's response to the rising tide of Québec nationalism would have to lie between two contradictory poles of federal NDP policy: on one hand, the reaffirmation of federalism, and on the other, the undefined two nations concept. Thus the two key subcommittees were program and constitution.

Almost immediately after the first meeting of the Conseil Provisoire, a serious political problem arose in the form of T.C. Douglas' influence on a federal-provincial conference of attorneys-general which took place in Ottawa on September 9-12, 1961. Douglas remained the CCF premier of Saskatchewan until November, 1961 - three full months after he was elected leader of the federal NDP. Since the preceding January, the sole obstacle to a general agreement leading to the patriation of the British North America Act had been the position of the Saskatchewan government. Douglas' problem hinged on differences with the Lesage government over the application of the proposed amending formula to the property and civil rights clauses. Québec proposed that these clauses be treated similarly to those on official languages, educational rights, etc., in requiring that the unanimous consent of all provinces would have to be obtained in order to amend them. While this could permit the rejection of official bilingualism by other provinces, it would prevent the deterioration of the situation in Québec by providing the provincial government with an effective veto over implementation of federal civil rights legislation which would abrogate the province's sovereignty on linguistic questions. Douglas, in the classic CCF tradition, sought to protect the rights of the provinces to cede powers to Ottawa!
Arguing that the advance of social legislation might one day require that the provinces cede their authority in this field to Ottawa, Saskatchewan proposed that in property and civil rights matters a simple majority of provinces should rule, but that Québec be given the right to escape ("se soustraire") from constitutional amendments thus arrived at. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, speaking for Québec, refused this proposal on the grounds that he did not want Québec to be treated as an exception.11 Instead, he proposed that Article 94 of the constitution could be amended by a two-thirds majority of the provinces representing a simple majority of Canadians. Article 94 in its original form granted to Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia the right to cede powers to the federal government. Under Québec's proposal, this right would be extended to all provinces and the federal government would also be empowered to transfer jurisdictions to the provinces. Saskatchewan did not immediately agree, suggesting that only four provinces representing a majority of Canadians should be required to approve amendments.12

Ultimately Saskatchewan gave way to pressure from the other provinces and accepted a formula requiring the agreement of all eleven governments to amend the


constitution. The formula also called for the agreement of at least four provinces representing 55% of the population for the delegation of a specific jurisdiction from one parliament to another. This delegation could be revoked unilaterally. Québec specifically insisted that the federal government surrender its exclusive right to amend its own authority, an exclusivity only granted by the courts in 1949.

Needless to say, the so-called "Fulton formula" (after Diefenbaker's justice minister; later "Fulton-Favreau", to include Pearson's justice minister 1963-1965) was not to succeed. On the other hand, Douglas' government had placed itself in direct and public opposition to a popular Québec government on a sensitive aspect of the national question.

Against the unfortunate background of Forsey's dissent from the two nations thesis and Douglas' open centralism, the NPDQ programme subcommittee made an interim report to a Conseil Provisoire meeting on October 23, 1961. They declared that "...it was the responsibility of the future provincial party to choose between options which were more or less autonomist than those envisaged by the QCNP and the Québec delegation to the Ottawa convention in 1961."\(^{13}\) While this debate continued inside the NPDQ, in mid-October Premier Lesage announced that by-elections would be held on

December 14 in Chambly, a changeable riding, and Jacques-Cartier (on the West Island), a traditional Liberal stronghold. These by-elections had been occasioned by the deaths of Robert Théberge, MLA, and the Hon. Charles Kirkland, MLA, both Liberals.\(^{14}\)

On Saturday, October 21, *Le Devoir* reported that the NPDQ would be making a decision the following Monday evening on whether it would be presenting candidates. Michel Forest, secretary of the "provincial party", reported that the NPDQ electoral organization was still in its early stages and that opinion was divided on whether to contest the by-elections.\(^{15}\) However, on October 24 it was reported that the decision would be delayed for 15 days to allow the Conseil Provisoire to consult with the riding associations. It was further explained that the leadership of the NPDQ and PSD was preoccupied with preparing a draft programme and constitution for the Québec founding convention to be held early in 1962. "...Because of this situation, it appears unlikely that the NDP will present candidates in the forthcoming by-elections."\(^{16}\) For Chambly, this was confirmed following a

\(^{14}\) *Le Devoir*, October 19, 1961, p. 1. The same report indicated that Jean Marchand's name was being considered as a possibility for the Liberal nomination in Chambly.

\(^{15}\) *Le Devoir*, October 21, 1961, p. 3.

riding association meeting on November 10.\textsuperscript{17} In the end these two by-elections were contested only among Liberals; in the confused aftermath of its 1960 defeat, the Union Nationale was still in such disarray that it was unable to present candidates.

It was not only in Québec that New Democrats were poorly organized. On November 23 \textit{Le Devoir} reported that two forthcoming federal by-elections – Nicolet-Yamaska (Québec) and Mackenzie (North West Territories) – would not be contested by the NDP. However, a federal NDP spokesperson considered a third race – Waterloo-South (Ontario) – to be viable.\textsuperscript{18} The organizational opportunities offered to the NPDQ by the two provincial campaigns and the federal by-election campaign were lost, as in the case of the Labelle by-election on October 31, 1960.

The autumn of 1961 had already been full of embarrassments for the NPDQ, but the worst was to come. November, 1961, began with a series of public statements by

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Le Devoir}, November 13, 1961, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Le Devoir}, November 23, 1961, p. 14. Subsequently, the CCF lost a by-election in the Saskatchewan provincial riding of Weyburn on December 13, 1961; this vote was occasioned by Douglas' resignation to devote himself to his responsibilities as federal leader, and the result was a little embarrassing. The Ontario NDP also failed in five by-elections (including at least one in metropolitan Toronto) on January 18, 1962. Desmond Morton, \textit{NDP: The Dream of Power}, Toronto: Hakkert, 1977, p. 34.
Québec and federal party stalwarts on the national question. The first public intervention was a talk given by representatives of the Conseil Provisoire to students at Université de Montréal on November 7. Jean-Claude Lebel (Québec organizer) was accompanied by Jean Gérin-Lajoie (Steel) and Me. Jacques Duguay (New Party Clubs). Lebel announced that, as a democratic party reflecting the changing needs and objectives of ordinary Québécois, the NPDQ might eventually take a position favouring the independence of Québec.\footnote{CSN president Jean Marchand took an equivalent position in a television interview on November 10, saying, "...If we can see that separatism is a means of improving workers' standards of living, from the economic and social point of view, I cannot say that we would oppose it." My translation. Le Devoir, November 11, 1961, p. 3.} At the time, promoting independence was perhaps a simplistic and unhelpful response. Too many social and economic ills were being charged against federalism alone. Monopoly capitalism also had to bear a heavy part of the burden. Further, Lebel underlined the importance of the two nations thesis adopted at the federal convention, and of the concept of cooperative federalism articulated in the program of the NDP.

Duguay described the federal party's position on social security, medicare, and education, and noted that questions of jurisdiction would be dealt with at the forthcoming provincial convention. Gérin-Lajoie called for genuine
democratic economic planning at all levels, denouncing both federal and provincial gestures in this area and citing the chaotic state of investment in the Québec health care system as an example of the problem. All three reiterated the importance of decentralization and protection of provincial autonomy.  

These concerns were echoed on November 8 in a spirited defense of the two nations thesis by CLC Vice-President William Dodge at the Windsor convention of the Ontario Federation of Labour, in part as a response to Forsey's three months of attacks. Dodge indicated that the 'francophones' deep sense of grievance over their treatment outside Québec and by Ottawa was largely justified. Like Lebel, he did not believe that independence was the objective of most Québécois nor did he believe that the preservation of Canadian unity was their exclusive responsibility. He spoke favourably of pan-Canadian bilingualism and suggested that the francophone component was perhaps the key to retaining Canadian cultural and political sovereignty. On November 10, speaking to students at McGill, federal party president Michael Oliver expressed essentially the same views, adding that provinces should have the right to opt out of joint programs with full

compensation.\textsuperscript{21} 

It would seem that the official NDP message on Québec was finally getting out, and it was being couched in terms which showed some understanding of events in the province. However, the little progress made in the first ten days of November was shortly to be wiped out by Douglas' political baggage and the very public airing of an offensive view of Québec by a leading NDP Member of Parliament from Ontario.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Le Devoir}, November 9, 1961, p. 1; November 11, 1961, p. 3.
C. Saskatchewan schools and "Lili St-Cyr"

On November 15, Tommy Douglas' record on French-language education in Saskatchewan was the subject of a lengthy article in Le Devoir entitled, "The accusations against Premier Douglas were justified: French Canadians have an inadequate educational system in Saskatchewan." During public discussion of the question in June, Douglas had invited representatives of the Association des commissaires d'écoles catholiques de langue française and a number of Québec journalists and others to visit Saskatchewan and judge for themselves whether the 1944 "Larger School Units Act" had been disadvantageous for francophones. The Le Devoir article concluded that the law had been disastrous for francophone education, and that Douglas was apparently ignorant of what was going on in his own province's education system.

There were three key problems for francophones in Saskatchewan's education system: first, French-speaking parishes were broken up between the larger school districts, forcing the children into centralized English-only secular schools outside their parishes. Second, Catholic separate schools were morally obliged to accept students from outside their local parishes. However, they received no grants-in-aid from the ministry or the larger secular schools for these

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students, whose parents paid no rates for schools outside
their home parishes. Third, because of centralization an
increasing number of anglophone children were entering
Catholic separate schools in which francophones had formerly
enjoyed a local majority, swamping the francophone population
and bringing about the elimination of French in the schools.
Also, in contrast with the professionalization of the
anglophone sector, the Catholic separate school commissioners
were unable to devote their full time to school affairs and
there was no money for a professional administration which
could function as a lobby. Yet another problem was that
publicly-funded Catholic separate secondary schools had been
prohibited since 1907, preventing creation of a French-
language secondary school under the local rubric of a
Catholic separate secondary school.

In view of these difficulties, the education minister,
Allan Blakeney, was reportedly open to suggestions concerning
reforms to accommodate the Catholic minority without
sacrificing the efficiencies and economies stemming from
centralization. Creation of a number of centralized Catholic
secondary schools was one option the minister was
considering, but it would not solve the problem of French-
language instruction. Virtually everywhere, anglophone
Catholics outnumbered francophone Catholics, who were also
dispersed at the northern and southern extremities of the
province. Special action from a well-informed government was required, and this seemed unlikely under the CCF. Characterizing the Saskatchewan situation as probably the worst in Canada for a francophone minority, Gérard Filion judged the effect of Douglas' education policies:

It is such injustices which feed the sense of frustration and hostility of French Canadians towards Ottawa and towards the other provinces. It is from this that the separatist sentiment springs. If the situation is not corrected in the coming generation, it will end up causing very grave problems in the country...

...it is essential to denounce injustice. It is necessary to make it known at times, even inconvenient times, in order to create a feeling of guilt in English Canada. It is English Canada which is responsible for separatism and in the long run it is to English Canada that it will bring the most harm. If Québec breaks the links of Confederation, the repercussions will be more serious in Ontario and on the Prairies than in Québec where an abundance of natural resources and the ease of communications are in our favour, whereas Ontario, without access to the sea, would be reduced to the miserable existence of countries without windows on the world.  

For the third time in five months, Douglas' government had embarrassed the party in Québec and reduced the credibility of the party's statements on renewed federalism. Douglas apparently made no public effort at damage control in response to this report.

On the day after the article on the Saskatchewan schools question appeared in *Le Devoir*, the Congress on Canadian Affairs opened at Université Laval in Sainte-Foy (Québec City). Organized by the Association générale des étudiants de l'université Laval, the theme of the Congress was "The Canadian experiment, success or failure?" Those invited to speak included Michael Oliver and Douglas Fisher for the NDP, and a host of others including the premier of Québec, E. Davie Fulton (Diefenbaker's justice minister), René Lévesque, Mason Wade, Gérard Pelletier, and the outspoken president of the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale, Marcel Chaput.

Even before it convened the Congress was immersed in nationalist controversy. Douglas Harkness, Diefenbaker's defence minister, upheld the refusal of the National Research Council's anglophone administrators to give a day's unpaid leave to Marcel Chaput to attend and speak on separatism. Chaput's work as a chemist, they said, was "indispensable". This was something of a repetition of the NRC's failed attempt to discipline Chaput in June. Since that time, he had been effectively boycotted by the administrators - they would not assign any work to him.²⁵ While there were civil

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service regulations prohibiting partisan electoral activity on the part of federal employees, Chaput was not involved in electoral activity. The RIN did not become a political party until 1963.

Chaput went to the Congress anyway. Harkness responded by giving public notice that the "indispensable" Chaput would be suspended for fourteen days from his job effective November 20. André Laurendeau summarized the effect of this rather silly situation by stating that "...The suspension of Mr. Chaput will doubtless serve extremist attitudes; the government has wrongfully used a minor incident to try to liquidate, without owning up to its real motives, a separatist civil servant."^26

These events and nationalist addresses from Chaput, Lesage and Lévesque created a taut atmosphere at the Congress. That week Douglas had been found wanting on the Saskatchewan schools question, and the second "Chaput affair" saw no official intervention by Douglas or any New Democratic parliamentarians to defend Chaput's civil rights.^27


^27 At the Congress, Oliver charged the government with "unpardonable pettiness". Congress on Canadian Affairs, The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure?, Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1962, p. 133. On December 14, Le Devoir reported on page 8 that Roméo Mathieu, as president of the NPDQ, had demanded the resignation of Chaput's superior, Dr. John
Continuing his public attacks on NDP policy, Eugene Forsey spoke at the Congress and gave a predictable speech on the "unreality" of two nations. But it was Ontario NDP Member of Parliament Douglas Fisher who really brought the house down in Québec that fateful month. Fisher spoke to the Congress on its closing day, November 18:

...If I was speaking to my constituents or anybody from Sudbury westward, trying to explain what little I know about the French Canadians, their reaction would be: "Well, what has the French Canadian to offer us, that we should be so excited about "bonne entente" and learning the French language and so on?" And I wonder what they would say about French-Canadian culture? I suppose for us the greatest impact of French-Canadian culture has been made by Maurice Richard and Lili St-Cyr. We did have Gisèle, of course, but she became Gisèle McKenzie and went off to the United States. I wonder whether we are to be fascinated by your marvelous police tradition, the magnificence of your telegraphers, the ingenuity that I witnessed when I was looking into the operation of the Jacques-Cartier bridge in Montreal... I wonder if we are to be impressed with your tradition of literary censorship, or whether your educational system has a great deal to offer in a society where technocracy is becoming so much more important...

What is it that you have that we need so badly? I have difficulty in understanding what it is that you have that we need, when I try to make a good case for you to the people in my part of the country. Now if my argument was seriously accepted, we might become the separatists or the secessionists...

Keyston.

...if I could conclude with an exhortation to any French Canadians who are here or who have any sense of responsibility to the rest of us out there, it would be this: come to us and prove to us - those of us who are not bumping up against you in Montreal or Ottawa - come to us and prove to us that you have a great deal to offer and to show to us, in this country that we believe we are developing. You will have to prove to us that a provincial economy is a wonderful thing. You will have to prove to us really that you have very much to offer us, and that as a consequence we should become bilingual and have bilingual cheques, a unique flag, and all that kind of stuff.  

Evidently Fisher had not understood or subscribed to cooperative federalism as adopted by the founding convention, despite having cooperated with Michel Chartrand in supporting Hazen Argue for the leadership. Moreover, on the preceding day Michael Oliver had defended the party's neo-federalist position on the Congress platform, largely in response to Chaput.  

Clearly there was fundamental disunity among the federal leadership on how to deal with Québec nationalism, and how (or even if) to promote the development of the party here.


Fisher's remarks unleashed a torrent of criticism in Québec. At the Congress itself he was sharply attacked by Murray Ballantyne, an opinion leader in Catholic anglophone Québec, and by the federal Conservative MP for Roberval, Jean-Noel Tremblay, as well as by a number of students. On November 22, it was announced that at its next meeting the Hull riding association would call on the federal executive to expel Fisher from the party. Trying to reassure students at Université de Montréal on the same day, Michel Forest, secretary of the Conseil Provisoire, stated his belief that the NPDQ would be more radical than the federal party in recognizing the right of French-Canadians to self-determination. Associate defence minister Pierre Sévigny, speaking at Sir George Williams University, denounced Fisher as an "imbecile," "pathetically pretentious," and a "born fool".31

Nearly a full week after the offending speech, Douglas held a press conference on the national question on Friday, November 25. He did not deal with Fisher's remarks or respond to the conclusions of the inquiry on the Saskatchewan schools question. Instead, he discussed Canadian unity. Douglas suggested that the wave of separatism in Québec was rooted in the economic pressures resulting from the deepening

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recession, likening it to regionalist sentiments in the west and the Maritimes during the Great Depression. Claiming that under an NDP government Chaput would not be fired, he recounted how the CCF government in Saskatchewan had granted full partisan political rights to provincial civil servants. Douglas reiterated the official party position that provinces should have the right to opt out of joint federal-provincial programmes with full compensation; that new public economic planning should be undertaken jointly by both levels of government; and that there were two nations in Canada. Though no longer premier of Saskatchewan, he criticized Lesage's demand for a constitutional veto for Québec as excessive from a Saskatchewan perspective. Douglas failed to effect any specific damage control in terms of the Fisher affair or the Saskatchewan schools question.

It took two weeks, but Oliver finally responded to Fisher before the Québec convention of the United Packinghouse Workers in Montréal on November 29. Oliver denied that Fisher's remarks had anything to do with NDP policy or the outlook of the federal officers on the rôle and contribution of Québec in the building of Canada, and, like Douglas, he reiterated the party's position on two

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32 *Le Devoir*, November 25, 1961, p. 1. One wonders what his definition of the legitimate interest of the French Canadian nation was, and how that interest could be expressed constitutionally.
nations and cooperative federalism. The NPDQ executive did not regard Douglas' statement or Oliver's disavowal as sufficient responses to the Fisher problem. Meeting on December 1, they resolved that disciplinary measures should be taken by the next federal council meeting against Fisher for violating a fundamental tenet of the federal party program. This was described as the concept that "...Canadian unity depended upon the equal recognition of and respect for the two principal cultures of our country." The resolution also demanded that the federal executive publicly dissociate itself from Fisher's position. However, apparently nothing was done publicly during the month of December in this respect, despite the fact that in the week before Christmas Douglas made a speaking tour in Québec. The federal council meeting was scheduled for late January.

It was against this background that the NPDQ's constitution subcommittee reported to the Conseil Provisoire meeting on December 9, 1961. This subcommittee consisted of Philippe Vaillancourt, director of political education for the FTQ sitting for the PSD; Jacques-Victor Morin, also an

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35 *Le Devoir*, December 14, 1961, p. 8. Douglas was to speak to various groups that week, including representatives of the FTQ and CSN and the assembled Conseil Provisoire of the NPDQ. As for Fisher, nothing was ever done to meet the demands of the Québec New Democrats.
FTQ militant sitting for the PSD; and Réginald Boisvert, a Citélibriste and poet sitting for the New Party Clubs. Perron-Blanchette reports that:

...they had taken into account the inanity of preparing a constitution when the nature of the party to be governed by it had not yet been determined. For the first time, the problem of autonomy, that is, of nationalism versus federalism, was raised clearly and in writing. In effect, the constitution subcommittee raised frankly the question whether the NPDQ would be an independent provincial party or one affiliated to the federal NDP.\(^{36}\)

The subcommittee recognized two well-marked tendencies in the membership, reflecting increasing pressures imposed by the national question. One group was exclusively interested in provincial political action; the other was preoccupied with the federal venue. The subcommittee felt that this double orientation presented serious recruitment problems. The party did not intend to sit on the sidelines in the midst of the national renewal of French Canada. It was essential for French Canadians, and particularly those in the NDP, to take a strong position on the national question to be respected by other Canadians. They concluded that separate parties in the Québec and federal fields ought to be set up, paralleling the Liberal model.

The schism was now open, but there were forces in the party which would not allow its resolution; these questions were still on the agenda of the Conseil Provisoire meeting of July 6, 1962.\textsuperscript{37} Obviously the founding convention of the NPDQ could not take place prior to the federal election, as a breach on the national question before the NDP had contested its first federal election would have been an unmitigated disaster. It was in the federal party's interest that officials like Oliver, Picard and Mathieu, and their FTQ allies like Provost, Rondou, and Pérusse, delay an open confrontation.

The NPDQ thus greeted 1962 in a very unfortunate condition. Since practically the day the federal founding convention closed, the Québec party had been continuously embarrassed and disappointed by the federal party leadership and members of the CCF old guard. Organizationally, it was so feeble that it had been unable to run candidates in the

\textsuperscript{37} Monique Perron-Blanchette, "Un essai de socialisme au Québec: le PSQ", unpublished MA thesis, Sherbrooke: Université de Sherbrooke, 1978, p. 16-17. Sherwood claims that the Québec convention was postponed because it and the 1962 federal election were mutually exclusive events, given the NPDQ's resources. However, Diefenbaker had a majority, the election was called in April, 1962, and prior to the various subcommittee reports the convention had been firmly scheduled for February. Sherwood admits that postponement of the convention and the presence of McGill professors Oliver, Taylor, and Weldon "suspended" the nationalist influence of Vadeboncoeur and Rioux. David Sherwood, "The NDP and French Canada, 1961-1965", unpublished MA thesis, Montréal: McGill University, 1965, p. 79-81.
provincial and federal by-elections in and around Montréal. With a federal election anticipated in 1962, to move forward the NPDQ would have to repair the political damage already done, press ahead with electoral organization, and expand its active membership and revenue base.
D. Labour and the NDPQ

On the surface, the party's relationship with CLC affiliates in Québec continued to be cordial. Even in the midst of that fateful November, the FTQ had reaffirmed its support for the NDP and re-elected many "friends" of the party like Roger Provost (president), Jean Gérin-Lajoie (vice-president), and Fernand Daoust (vice-president) to leading posts. The fundamental split in the Québec labour movement was intensifying, however. The interminable unity talks among the CSN, FTQ and CLC had failed. On September 17, 1961, Jean Marchand called for the extension of the "authentically Canadian" CSN into the rest of Canada. Marchand was threatening to launch a major raiding campaign against CLC affiliates across the country, in part in response to recent attempts by the FTQ to capture CSN locals. The problem had become so serious that Marchand himself authored a resolution passed by the 1961 congress of the CSN which called for the formation of a joint CLC-FTQ-CSN "ethics committee" to find general ways to end the raiding problem, and even to adjudicate specific jurisdictional problems. The

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38 *Le Devoir*, November 27, 1961, p. 18. Remarkably, Roger Provost was acclaimed as FTQ president for the seventh term in a row. In fact, such was the satisfaction of the workers with the candidates presented that only three of twenty posts were contested...
FTQ reacted favourably to this proposal, but despite occasional efforts at solidarity, the raiding problem became increasingly severe.

The growing rivalry between Québec's union centres during the early Sixties, exacerbated by nationalist appeals, could only damage the NDP's chances of support among CSN workers. It was inevitably seen as the party of the FTQ and CLC, despite the presence of Gérard Picard in the associate-presidency. Indeed, the association of CSN activists like Pierre Vadeboncoeur and Michel Chartrand with the "gauche nationale" and its desire for a autonomous, nationalist party in Québec was surely not coincidental. Nationalism was increasingly their union's stock-in-trade. On the other

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40 CLC officials were still trying to negotiating a code of ethics with the CSN 21 months later; CLC papers, Dodge files, typescript memorandum, Dodge-Jodoin and others, one page, June 26, 1962. From July, 1963 to April, 1965, the FTQ lost 13,000 members to the CSN; CLC papers, Jodoin files, copy of Robindaine-Bastien, 13 page typescript report, April 1, 1965. During eight months in 1964-65, a campaign to combat CSN raiding cost the CLC-FTQ and affiliates $45,000; CLC papers, MacDonald files; also in the MacDonald files, one page letter, typescript, MacDonald-officers of national and international affiliates, January 14, 1965. CLC president Jodoin described the CSN's appeal as being "...based upon present separatist tendencies in the Province of Québec and peculiarly designed to permit attacks upon international and national unions alike because of "foreign control", meaning of course, control from outside of the Province of Québec;" CLC files, Jodoin papers, draft letter to national and international union leaders, three pages typescript, June 4, 1964.

hand, in this period neo-federalism was a necessary position for ambitious officials of pan-Canadian and international unions regrouped in the FTQ; Québec nationalism had not yet become respectable in the FTQ or in the Canadian district offices of the internationals. This contradiction - between what the internal politics of the internationals demanded and the threat posed by the nationalist raiding appeal of the CSN - may have been the source of many factional conflicts within the NPDQ. Significantly, among the varied FTQ affiliates it was a major industrial union, the Québec district of the Steelworkers, which was most outspokenly nationalist in this period; Pat Burke and Emile Boudreau (also a supporter of an autonomous Québec party) may have seen that they had the most to lose from the similarly-organized CSN's progress and sought to protect themselves from nationalist-inspired raiding. Similar motives may have inspired industrial unionists Jean-Marie Bédard (Woodworkers) and Fernand Daoust (Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers), both of whom were quite nationalist.

By December 12, 1961, 63,825 union members in 230 locals

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42 Le Devoir, April 6, 1962, p. 1. Speaking to the annual meeting of Steel in Vancouver, Québec district director Pat Burke argued that Québec was a nation with the right to self-determination, and openly discussed competition with the CSN on the national question. Burke declared that to succeed in Québec "...the NDP had to be the instrument of expression and expansion of the national identity of French Canada." Le Devoir, April 6, 1962, p. 9. My translation.
across Canada had affiliated to NDP, producing nearly $2000 in monthly revenue for the federal party. The Ontario NDP led in affiliations, with over 83% of affiliated union members belonging to that section and contributing over $1000 per month in revenue to the provincial party.43 These numbers fell far below the expectations of the National Committee for the New Party on the eve of the 1961 federal convention. Apparently Carl Hamilton (national secretary of the NCNP) then believed that 250,000 union members could be recruited by January 1, 1962, providing a monthly revenue to the federal party of approximately $7500.44 The projected hiring by late 1961 of additional staff in research and public relations, and of federal organizers specializing in women's and youth issues and recruitment, were predicated on the success of this financial plan.45

At this time Québec's proportion of pan-Canadian labour affiliations to the NDP was under 4%. By the end of 1961,

43 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, confidential document, "Locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of December 12, 1961 - summary by province."

44 CLC papers, Dodge files, typescript document, four pages, n.d., "Draft outline of fall plans." This could only have been prepared by the national secretary of the NCNP. The same numbers appear in a different context in another document from the same archive, "Some key problems," n.d., initialled "CH" (Carl Hamilton).

45 CLC papers, Dodge files, typescript NCNP document, four pages, "Staff and budget", n.d. This document is associated with others prepared by Hamilton discussed in this chapter.
only 2,469 Québec union members in twelve locals had affiliated to the NPDQ; 74% were located in Montréal, and 71% belonged to a single union - the United Packinghouse Workers (CLC-FTQ).\footnote{CLC papers, Political Education Department files, document, "Québec locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of November 24, 1961", one page.} The revenue contributed by these affiliated members amounted to $123.45 per month, of which 60% was transferred to the federal party per the arrangements negotiated through the CLC and NDP federal council.\footnote{CLC papers, Dodge files, Knowles-Forest, August 29, 1961.} This left less than $50 per month for the NPDQ! The salary paid to a federal organizer in Québec was over $700 per month.\footnote{NDP papers, volume 431, Hamilton-L'Heureux, October 27, 1961.} The NPDQ's organization was thus still dependent on irregular grants-in-aid from a struggling federal party and increasingly embattled FTQ unions, or from its very small base of individual members.\footnote{The only official source found by this researcher on individual NPDQ membership for 1962 indicates that nine months later, on September 1, 1962, the NPDQ still had only 2,028 individual members. This was in the aftermath of the first federal campaign waged by the NDP. NDP papers, volume 454, five page typescript document, "Effectifs du parti: 1er septembre 1962."}
E. Douglas repudiates "two nations"

Douglas again embarrassed the Québec party early in the New Year. On Monday, January 15, Douglas spoke to the Osgoode Hall Legal and Literary Society in Toronto on "Canadian Unity and the Constitution". Michael Oliver and David Lewis apparently collaborated in the preparation of the text. In his speech, Douglas repeatedly referred to Canada as a single nation, in clear conflict with the federal program. Lamenting the decline of the federal power, he called for the federalization of civil rights, health, education and welfare, labour law, and social security legislation - all primary provincial jurisdictions particularly dear to Québec. Douglas even proposed a constitutional amendment formula which would have institutionalized majoritarian anglophone domination and denied Québec a veto. Finally, he depicted provincial autonomists as reactionaries. The general argument of the speech seems very similar to the Saskatchewan position outlined at the constitutional conference in September, 1961,

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51 CLC papers, Dodge files, NDP press release, "Partial text of a speech by T.C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, to the Osgoode Hall Legal and Literary Society, King Edward Hotel, Toronto, January 15, 1962." Details are quoted in Chapter Two above. The bulk of the text of this document was published in Le Devoir, January 16, 1962, p. 12, p. 2, so it was common knowledge among Néo-Démocrates within a few days.
and was indeed in the old CCF centralist tradition.

Reaction in Québec was strong. Many in the NPDQ felt that Québec's achievements at the founding convention had been repudiated by Douglas. Among francophones, only Gérard Picard of the CSN (associate federal president of the NDP) publicly defended Douglas and then only on the question of a federalized labour code. 52 With the events of the autumn still fresh in their minds, the NPDQ leadership felt compelled to act. In the week following Douglas' speech Jean-Claude Lebel (chief NDP organizer in Québec) made his deep dissatisfaction known to the media, particularly concerning Douglas' vision of a majoritarian constitutional amendment process.

These events were debated at a special meeting of the NPDQ executive committee on January 22. Chartrand was highly critical of Douglas' insistence that Canada was a single nation. He stated that a constitution had to originate in a sovereign people and all constitutional amendments had to be ratified by plebiscite to be legitimate. Chartrand promised that he would indeed become a separatist if a new constitution prevented the growth and development of the French-Canadian nation within the federal state. Chartrand warned the federal party by saying, "...if Mr. Douglas does

not recognize our point of view, I will oppose the affiliation of the Québec NDP to the federal New Democratic Party." Responding to questions concerning a rumoured split within the NPDQ Conseil Provisoire, Chartrand said there was not yet a question of disassociation from the federal party or the founding of an independent party because the NPDQ had not yet been founded.\textsuperscript{53} The Parti Social Démocratique, however feeble, had never been wrapped up, and Chartrand was still its titular leader as well as being a vice-president of the ephemeral NPDQ.

Two days later NDP House leader Hazen Argue made front page news in Québec. In his response to the Speech from the Throne, Argue attacked Diefenbaker's government for not giving sufficient priority to Québec in the Cabinet and in its failure even to issue bilingual cheques.\textsuperscript{54} However, despite Argue's effort to redress the balance and repair some of the damage inflicted by Douglas' latest gaffe, a senior NDP Member of Parliament from British Columbia apparently reiterated Fisher's position the very next day. Claiming to echo the opinion of most British Columbians, Erhart "Ernie"


Regier suggested in the Commons "...that if the French Canadians of Québec want to separate themselves from the rest of Canada, the inhabitants of British Columbia would not place obstacles in their path." Then a press release on January 27 from in the name of the NDP federal council - couched as a response to the Diefenbaker government's proposals for a constitutional amendment formula - reiterated the essence of Douglas' speech.56

Even Le Devoir's Jean-Marc Léger got directly involved in this question on January 25 in a fascinating editorial entitled, "Mr. Douglas imposes a choice on the Québec NDP". Léger noted that there had been a serious malaise in the NPDQ for several months, one which had been accentuated by disappointment with Douglas' repudiation of the two nations thesis. Léger took particular issue with Douglas' insistence on majoritarianism, centralism, and repeated denials of the two nations concept. He criticized the centralism in the speech as a remnant of the CCF tradition, a political outlook which had no roots and received little sympathy in Québec. Léger noted with satisfaction that nationalism was on the


rise here, and that it was high time the left took notice of its progressive associations. Léger continued:

...Mr. Douglas' declaration has appeared at a moment when the Québec NDP is not yet officially launched, when the "provincial section" has not been officially constituted. The elements of the problem have been profoundly altered. Among Québec New Democrats there already existed a tendency which supported the creation of a strictly French-Canadian left-wing party, still ideologically very close to the NDP and cooperating closely with it on the federal level. One may suppose that the shock of Mr. Douglas' words will give new life to this tendency. After the declarations of the federal leader, one would have to be very naive, or singularly indifferent to the fate of French Canada, to continue to build a "great federal party" in which the Québec group would be nothing more than a provincial section like the others...

Faced with the new political conjunction in Québec, the French-Canadian element of the NDP must make a decisive choice (especially in the aftermath of Mr. Douglas' speech), a choice which may have grave consequences for the future of the forces of the left here. Conditions on the electoral scene perhaps do not appear propitious for the appearance of a party of the left. But the rhythm of evolution in Québec is accelerating; the new nationalism is strongly aware that an alliance with the right would be an imposture and a fraud. But it would never accept a left-wing organization which was not resolutely nationalist. Tomorrow, a French-Canadian party of the left may play a determining rôle in the building of a new society in Québec...\(^{57}\)

Léger suggested the creation of a party of the "gauche nationale" which might occupy the federal field as well as the provincial. For a Québec nationalist and man of the left

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like Léger, this was a sensible concept because it proposed a political structure which reflected its natural, human constituency rather than the arbitrary constitutional framework of Confederation: one people, one party.

Polarization continued. The controversy over Douglas' speech continued on the evening of January 26, when the Conseil Provisoire met in Montréal to draft a response. The principles contained in this response were those which the Conseil intended to defend at the founding convention of the NPDQ, still apparently scheduled for mid-February. The CP supported patriation of the constitution, and suggested it would present an opportunity to establish the equality in law of the two nations originally associated in Confederation. Reaffirming the French-Canadian nation's right to self-determination, the Conseil stated that Douglas needed to make further "explanations" on how he proposed to guarantee the rights of Québec in a new amending process. The Conseil adopted the principle that the provincial state of Québec was the most perfect expression of the French-Canadian nation, and any transfer of authority away from Québec placed the existence of the French-Canadian nation in danger. 58

58 Le Devoir, January 27, 1962, p. 3.
Douglas apparently responded to the Conseil Provisoire in Vancouver a few days later, saying that the Québec separatist movement posed the most important problem in Canada. "Numerous serious observers believe that this movement is destroying the very foundation of our country... It is urgent to fully reform Confederation and to reconsider the relationship between the two nations forming the basic association within Confederation."\(^{59}\) This was a sign that Douglas and those around him were finally trying to come to terms with the damage they had done in Québec since the convention. On the other hand, Douglas' sudden recognition that separatism was the "problem" seems to have been primarily designed to appeal to worried anglophones. Why else discuss this in Vancouver, of all places? If he wanted to appeal to Québec, he ought to have done it in Québec and he ought to have addressed the problematic attitude of English-Canadians and the federal state towards Québec. Instead, Douglas rather conservatively characterized the most advanced expressions of Québec nationalist grievance by terming the movement destructive to the foundations of Canada.

The nationalist movement - which dominated the political

discourse of the provincial Liberals and the Union Nationale as well as the "gauche nationale" - was not about Canada. It was about Québec and the survival of French Canadian culture, inside or outside Canada. Although there were differences of degree and of detail, there was considerable consensus among Québec political leaders on the high priority of the national question and the need for greater autonomy for the provincial State. If Douglas and the federal NDP wanted to attract francophone leftists, they would have to internalize this and accept that their constitutional proposals would have to be rooted in respect for the legitimate concerns of a newly-conscious Québec. However, Douglas' Saskatchewan baggage and his speech in Toronto showed that it would be difficult if not impossible for him (and his closest advisors) to understand or sympathize with the leading Québécois in his own party.

The federal New Democrats were not alone in this period in suffering from internal contradictions on the constitutional question. In 1962, the leaders of the four major federal parties were all anglophones and all from west of the Ottawa River. Diefenbaker's insensitivity to Québec led him to major losses in the general election, a minority government, and dependence on the support of Social Credit until the defeat of 1963. The federal Social Credit party itself split over the national question in May, 1963. As
for Pearson's Liberals, they were continually looking for a constitutional formula and a new cadre of leadership from Québec during this period. The federal Liberal party and the federal State did not again achieve stability until a new Canadian design had been drawn from the work of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, and the "three doves" (Trudeau, Marchand and Pelletier) had taken over the leadership of the federal Liberal party after 1965.\textsuperscript{60} Stability was achieved in part by co-opting new leadership from Québec which could be sold in much of the rest of country, which had finally responded to the pressure from Québec for change.

Douglas' shift in attention at Vancouver was at least partially traceable to a general presumption that Diefenbaker would be calling a federal election within the next few months,\textsuperscript{61} and somehow "Tommy" and his colleagues had to try to create an environment in which some progress could be made in Québec. Such progress was, after all, a key public motivation for the creation of the NDP, although many recent

\textsuperscript{60} It could be argued that one of the functions of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission was to identify and coopt French-Canadian intellectuals into the Commission-defined neofederalist project of the Liberal government. Trudeau's progress from public support for the NPDQ to Liberal leader suggests such an interpretation. If so, Michael Oliver served Pearson and the Liberals well as Director of Research for the Commission.

\textsuperscript{61} See, for example, a speculative article from Canadian Press in Le Devoir, February 5, 1962, p. 7, which suggested April as a distinct possibility. The writ was issued on April 18, and the election took place on June 18.
acts by the federal party leadership seriously reduced the credibility of that argument.

Another claimed purpose of the NDP was to attract the left wing of the Liberal party. The Liberals had already launched their pre-election campaign, with Pearson making a major public policy statement on January 30 in Ottawa. Pearson had declared himself in favour of continuing Canada's non-nuclear rôle in NATO, and had called for full employment and a public health insurance scheme. The Liberal leader had also already taken a neo-federalist program on the road.\textsuperscript{62}

The pressure was on Douglas and the federal NDP to get the Québec business under control and get on with the pre-election campaign.

Meanwhile, the NDP was in virtually total disarray in Québec. The CCF centralist tradition, hopefully laid to rest at the Ottawa convention with the establishment of the two nations thesis as party policy, had come back to haunt the NPDQ in the persons of Forsey, Douglas, Fisher, and Regier. The promise of expanded membership, organizational development and financial stability held out by the involvement of labour had not yet been fulfilled in Québec. A new willingness to listen to and accommodate Québec,

represented by the election of Michael Oliver and Gérard Picard to the presidency of the federal party, had already been betrayed before the party was a year old. And while Québec was in the midst of its greatest period of social transformation, the NPDQ was sidelined by a schizophrenic struggle between an essentially anglophone and pan-Canadian neo-federalism and the autonomist purposes of the "gauche nationale". Could the party quickly find a solution which would permit the dreamed-of breakthrough in the coming federal election?
6: A First Campaign

A. Political desperation and another crisis

By the time the House had been in session a few weeks, it was clear to the federal NDP leadership that a general election was coming in 1962. They now had to scramble to get some détente with the nationalists in the party in order to maintain a "window" in Québec. The nationalists might have been unattractive to Oliver and the rest, but they made up a large and very active part of the NPDQ. Further confrontation had to be avoided at least until after the federal election. Due in mid-February, the founding convention of the NPDQ might have been disastrous. On February 5 it was announced that the Québec convention had been delayed indefinitely "...to permit activists and leaders of the NDP to dedicate all their efforts to preparations for the next election."¹ Nationalist activity did not immediately cease in the NPDQ, however; on February 14, the Jeunesse Néo-Démocrate at Université de Montréal held a public meeting to debate the merits of continued association with the federal party and the rôle of the NPDQ at the

provincial level.\(^2\)

Evidently orders had come down to clear the decks for the first NDP federal campaign, and one potentially positive association was the "special relationship" between the FTQ and the NDP. On February 3, in consultation with party officials including Jean-Claude Lebel, the FTQ established an NPDQ organization committee consisting of representatives from all unions affiliated with the FTQ. This FTQ-NPDQ organization committee would function as a subcommittee of the political education and action committee of the provincial union centre. Its purpose was to accelerate recruitment within the FTQ and its affiliated organizations, and to mobilize union resources for the election. However, a ranking union official took the opportunity to attack separatism as reactionary and distance the NDP from the epithet "socialist".\(^3\) The FTQ element thus positioned itself in the organizational and political centre of the NPDQ on both the national and social questions — a convenient place to be in a federal election.

Back in Ottawa, on February 14 Douglas took up one of

\(^2\) Oliver papers, typescript notice of meeting, one page, headed "JEUNES DEMOCRATES DU QUEBEC," n.d., signed Claude Ricard.

\(^3\) *Le Devoir*, February 5, 1962, p. 7. The official was Philippe Vaillancourt, director of education and political action for the FTQ and a member of the Conseil Provisoire.
his favourite themes as premier of Saskatchewan and leader of the federal NDP. Public health insurance had been a major political preoccupation for Douglas in recent years, and it was one of the key issues on which the NDP fought its 1962 federal campaign. Critical of the commission of enquiry appointed by the Diefenbaker government for including only representatives of doctors and insurance companies, Douglas lamented the fact that neither farmers nor workers were represented there. He promised that an NDP federal government would assist the provinces in implementing public health insurance by paying 60% of the costs financed from income taxes.  

4 Mathieu and the Conseil Provisoire followed this statement on February 17 by supporting Lesage's attempt to implement public health insurance and reorganize health services in Québec, and deploring apparent attempts by conservative Catholic hospital administrators to sabotage the implementation of the new system.  

These public interventions were evidently the beginning of an offensive to improve the image of the NDP in Québec. The bitter debate over the national question had already done serious damage. Douglas and Mathieu apparently hoped to mend damage and take the initiative by making a major policy statement on federalism and biculturalism in Montréal on

February 20. But before they got their chance, Hazen Argue called a press conference in Regina and left the party on February 18.

Argue's resignation followed a weekend meeting of the Saskatchewan CCF provincial council which he had attended along with Douglas. Loss of the well-known House leader and 17-year Parliamentary veteran inflicted further damage on the party's weakened image. Argue was the only MP from the Prairies who was not a Tory. At his press conference, he was critical of the NDP for being heavily funded and dominated by certain elements of the labour movement, and lamented the passing of the CCF.⁶

There was some justice to his charge of labour domination. In a frankly electoralist party, the funding of campaign and administrative operations is extremely important. It is the financiers who receive political deference. With the creation of the federal NDP, the individual member of a provincial section became far less important as a federal party revenue source (and by implication less important overall) than he or she had been in the CCF. Prior to 1963 there were no individual members of the federal NDP, only members of provincial sections.

In the Saskatchewan party, which refused to convert itself into an NDP section until it was out of power in 1964, the financial foundation remained the contributions of individual members. In Ontario and British Columbia, most of the money now came from labour, either in monthly payments or in special grants at election time. Financial dominance and real power in the federal party was passing from the Saskatchewan CCF grass-roots membership and organization to professional militants in mainly Ontario-based labour organizations, the federal caucus, and Ottawa-based party functionaries. To illustrate the trend, affiliated (union) membership fees rose from 11.5% ($5634.31) of total national office receipts in 1960 to 44.7% ($63338.56) by 1964, a more than elevenfold real increase! In 1960, national membership fees accounted for 59.4% ($29102.44) of receipts; by 1964, they had fallen to 26.4% ($37408.01), reflecting a real dollar increase of less than 29%. Overall dollar revenue increased over 289% in this period, from $48994 to $141697. In a period of powerful and rapid growth, revenue from individual memberships remained relatively stable, while revenue from institutional labour sources increased dramatically. 7 This was hardly a democratic tendency, nor did it bode well for the NDPQ considering the importance of

non-CLC unions in Québec and the politics of the division of the labour movement.

At the time of Argue's departure, Le Devoir's Clément Brown reminded his readers of the ideological conflict between the democratic socialists of the CCF, led by Argue, and the liberalism of the CLC and New Party components of the NDP at the federal founding convention.⁸ Ideological conflict, the internal power shift, as well as simmering resentment against Knowles (a vice-president of the CLC), Lewis (closely associated in his legal work with the labour bureaucracy) and Douglas (for acts committed during the New Party period), may better explain Argue's departure. On February 23, welcomed by Lester Pearson and supported by his old friend Ross Thatcher (the Saskatchewan Liberal leader and also a former CCF MP) Argue took a seat on the Liberal benches.⁹

It was thus in a renewed atmosphere of controversy and internal division that Douglas and Mathieu, flanked by Oliver and Picard, made their joint statement on federalism and


⁹ Le Devoir, February 24, 1962, p. 1. Curiously, it was at this moment that Eugene Forsey decided to publicly "defend" the NDP against Argue's charge that it was dominated by labour. Forsey estimated that the NDP would be receiving about $330,000 a year from various local and federal offices of unions, but the CLC itself did not donate one penny to the party. Le Devoir, February 26, 1962, p. 6.
bic平ulturalism on February 20. It read:

Canadians must face the fact that, almost a hundred years after Confederation, our federal-provincial and French-English relations continue to be seriously unsettled and unsatisfactory. The New Democratic Party believes that we must not permit this situation to drift until it gets out of hand. We believe that there is urgent need for a thorough study of our experience of Canadian federalism and for a careful rethinking of the relations between the two nations which together make up the basic partnership in Confederation.

To this end, the federal and Québec executives of the New Democratic Party propose that a Federal-Provincial Commission on Canadian Federalism and Bi-Culturalism be immediately constituted...

It is little short of disastrous for the Diefenbaker government to attempt to force through a formula for constitutional amendment which has been worked out in secret sessions, before public opinion has been either informed or expressed. The Prime Minister's rejection of the suggestion by a leading newspaper editor for a Royal Commission on bilingualism [André Laurendeau; Le Devoir, January 20, 1962, p. 4] was another indication of the Conservative government's total lack of appreciation of the depth and importance of the questions facing Canadians to-day...

The New Democratic Party believes that a new approach is necessary on the important problem of Canada's unity. We believe that the Program adopted at our founding convention, with its pioneering conception of co-operative federalism, presents such a new approach. True Canadian unity depends on equal recognition and respect for both the main cultures of our country and this is the basis on which the New Democratic proposals are formulated...10

10 CLC papers, Dodge files, NDP press release, three pages typescript, "Joint statement issued by Mr. T.C. Douglas, leader, New Democratic Party, and M. Roméo Mathieu, president, Conseil Provisoire du Nouveau Parti Démocratique de la province du Québec at the Mount Royal Hotel, Montréal, 1 PM, February 20, 1962."
What a change a month can make! Now there was no talk of centralization, of federalization of provincial jurisdictions, of a single Canadian nation. Instead, Douglas and Mathieu called for an urgent effort to find a neo-federalist solution to the national question. On the other hand, they did not recognize the coincidence of one nationality with one province; they made no commitment to decentralize or to grant "special status" to Québec; and, they did not acknowledge the historic grievances of French Canada which stimulated separatist opinion. Indeed, the vague language of the statement seems designed to avoid political pitfalls such as the unequivocal definition of Canada as a bi-national and bicultural state - thus the references to "two nations which together make up the basic partnership," and to "both the main cultures of our country." The Douglas-Mathieu text also contains an attack on the Liberals' "usual divisive tactics of saying one thing in Québec and something entirely different elsewhere in Canada."

But what about Douglas' speech in Toronto? Hadn't Douglas said one thing in Toronto, and now another in Montréal?

Considering that Laurendeau had mooted the idea a month previously in the midst of the uproar over Douglas' speech in Toronto,¹¹ this call for a Commission was not particularly

bold or original. Laurendeau's proposal for a royal commission on bilingualism, made exactly a calendar month previously, had the following objectives:

1. To find out what Canadians from coast to coast think of the subject. That would perhaps be a good way to lance the abscess. We might as well stop kidding ourselves; there is nothing to lose from knowing the truth. This way individual citizens, different groups, associations, and provinces would have a chance to say how English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians react to the question.

2. To study very closely how countries like Belgium and Switzerland which are faced with the same problems are dealing with them.

3. To examine, again very closely, the rôle played by the two languages in the federal civil service.

...there is a growing unrest among French Canadians which is becoming more and more acute. Do people think that it is so unimportant that it can be left to degenerate indefinitely. At the present time no one is doing anything about it except the separatists; the others are content to say that Confederation should be reformed. But nobody says how or to what extent. It is time for action from those who believe in the future of Canada under certain fundamental conditions.

At stake is the French language, the language spoken by nearly a third of the population of Canada. At stake is the participation of nearly a third of Canadian people in the life and administration of the central government...

Paris, history reminds us, was worth a mass. Perhaps Canada is worth a royal commission.\(\textsuperscript{12}\)

So federal New Democrats had been reading the newspapers.

Douglas and Mathieu suggested twelve Commissioners. The francophones they recommended included Laurendeau, Gérard Pelletier, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Jean Marchand, and Claude Jodoin.\textsuperscript{13} Pelletier and Trudeau were neo-federalist liberals who expressed varying degrees of impatience with Québec nationalism. Marchand was wearing nationalist colours at the time in his raiding struggle with the FTQ, but by 1965 he would join the other two "doves" in a neo-federalist bid for power. Jodoin, of course, was the highest-ranking Canadian member of the continental labour élite and had a clear stake in the neo-federalist cause. Laurendeau was seeking a compromise, and his great integrity would lend credibility to the Commission (as it eventually did to Pearson's Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).

Was the Douglas-Mathieu proposal a successful effort to regain some initiative in Québec? It is difficult to know. Curiously, this proposal was not an issue upon which the NDP or the NPDQ chose to fight the federal election in Québec.

\textsuperscript{13} The other nominees were: F.R. Scott; Jean-Louis Gagnon, editor of \textit{Le Nouveau Journal}; W.L. Morton, University of Manitoba; N. Mackenzie, president of UBC; Kurt Swinton, Encyclopaedia Britannica of Canada; H. Read, the Dean of Law at Dalhousie; and Blair Fraser, editor of \textit{MacLean's}.
Indeed, in the media little was heard about this through polling day on June 18. The key themes of the 1962 NDP federal campaign, in Québec as elsewhere, were public health insurance and the question of whether Canada should accept nuclear weapons as a function of its NATO rôle. Bi-culturalism and renewed federalism seem to have been relatively unimportant in the federal campaign and only slightly more prominent in the Québec campaign. They may have been viewed as dangerous to party unity in the rest of the country. On the other hand, that Chartrand, Lebel, Boudreau and Daoust were at least initially willing to run federally suggests the "gauche nationale" saw the Douglas-Mathieu proposal as a positive gesture, however small. The fact that this was the first general election faced by the NPDQ at any level must have been an important element in the decision of the "gauche nationale" to participate. Chartrand's and Daoust's candidacies were announced by Mathieu on February 21. Soon after, Daoust confirmed that he would run in Maisonneuve-Rosemont and that Douglas would speak at his nomination meeting on March 7. Evidently Daoust

14 Oliver began promoting these two themes in Québec as early as February 26, in a talk given to the students of Loyola College on "humanism, fraternity and peace". He also discussed the Douglas-Mathieu proposal. Le Devoir, February 27, 1962, p. 3.

had been promised high political and organizational priority. At this time Lebel announced that nomination meetings would be held in Notre-Dame-de-Grace, St-Henri, Laval, and Verdun by March 29. Another indication that the NDP federal leadership was girding for an election was the announcement on March 16 that CLC vice-president Stanley Knowles had resigned his Congress post to run again in the long-time CCF seat of Winnipeg North Centre, which he had lost in 1958 after thirteen years' incumbency.16

B. The pre-campaign period

In Québec the pre-election campaign of all four major federal parties began in earnest in the first weeks of March, with visits by Diefenbaker, Pearson, Thompson and Douglas to Montréal. On March 10 Le Devoir published an interview with Douglas on bilingualism in the federal civil service. He argued that the time had come for a genuinely bilingual civil service. Douglas said:

The current method of translation is a legacy of colonialism. A civil servant receives a communication in French, and then has it translated into English by the translation service. After having finally understood what his correspondent wants, he sends his response — also via the translation service. This is an illogical system which greatly reduces the efficiency of civil servants and public administration, and it's very expensive.

In each ministry, in each department, in each service, there ought to be French-speaking Canadians and English-speaking Canadians able to understand the language of citizens contacting them and able to respond in that language.

Douglas reiterated his proposal for a royal commission to examine such questions. Then he turned his guns on the Tories for their complete refusal to face the realities of the national question. The Liberal record did not escape

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17 Le Devoir, March 6, 1961, p. 12. The article describes the itineraries of the four leaders.

censure either: Douglas attacked Pearson, Paul Martin, Jack Pickersgill and others for not acting on bilingualism, the flag, or even as petty a question as bilingual government cheques during twenty-two unbroken years of Liberal rule under King and St. Laurent.\(^{19}\)

Nine days later Douglas held a press conference in Ottawa in which he discussed his personal campaign plans and attacked Hazen Argue. He also announced that the NDP had already recruited 150,000 unionists, half of its objective of 300,000.\(^{20}\) The NDP's labour friends had been extremely busy preparing for the election. On December 12, 1961 - less than four months previously - only 63,825 union members held affiliated memberships in the New Democratic Party.\(^{21}\) By January 31, 1962, the number had soared by 42% to 90,951, with an actual increase of 27,126 members in about seven weeks! However, seventy-eight per cent of the new members were in 86 Ontario locals. Added to the previous totals, Ontario now controlled 82% of the total affiliated union membership in the NDP. The next most important province in union membership was Manitoba, with only 4,270 members or

\(^{19}\) Le Devoir, March 10, 1962, p. 2.


\(^{21}\) CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, "Confidential: locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of December 12, 1961, summary by province," one page.
less than 5% of the Canadian total on January 31, 1962.22

By March 31, the Canadian total had jumped again to 152,660, a 60% increase over January. These memberships were generating a monthly revenue for the federal party of about $4,600.23 Progress was being made in other provinces besides Ontario, which nevertheless accounted for 70% of union members affiliated to the NDP and whose provincial party was receiving a monthly revenue of about $2100.00 on this basis. The greatest leap forward had been in British Columbia, where the numbers rose from 600 on January 31 to 24,036 on March 31! The Pacific coast province now accounted for a respectable 16% of the Canadian total.24

In Québec, the CLC-FTQ recruitment drive also had some effect though numbers remained small. On December 12, 1961, the NPDQ had 2,469 affiliated union members; by January 31,

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22 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, one page, "Confidential: summary of unions affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of January 31, 1962."

23 Expenditures by the federal party office during the 1962 campaign totalled $116,332, over 25 times the monthly revenue from affiliations. Additional funds were granted directly by pan-Canadian unions. Desmond Morton, NDP: Social Democracy in Canada, Toronto: Hakkert, 1977, p. 35.

24 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, one page, "Confidential: locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of March 31, 1962." Affiliated union members amounted to 15% of the million CLC members. If this proportion had been extended to Québec, there would have been about 35,000 FTQ members and a potential 16,000 CSN members.
this had increased to 3,179 (a 29% jump) with 710 new members from seven locals. Recruitment then became extremely active. By March 31, the Québec total reached 5,454 (up 72%) with 2,275 new members from 15 locals. Sixty-eight per cent of this increase came from four Steel locals in Montréal. Another 20% came from seven Packinghouse locals, all but one in Montréal.25 At the end of February, eighty-nine per cent of union members affiliated to the NPDQ were located in Montréal; forty-four per cent were Packinghouse Workers, and forty-one per cent were Steelworkers.26 While a considerable improvement, these numbers were producing a monthly revenue of only about $100 for the Québec party.

Even 5,454 CLC-affiliated unionists represented only 2.3% of the FTQ's estimated 235,000 members and 1.6% of the total union membership in the province.27 To match the CLC's overall performance the FTQ would have had to deliver another 30,000 members! And, even at the end of March, Québec only accounted for 3.6% of the total number of union members.

25 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, one page, "Confidential: Québec locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party from January 31 to February 28, 1962; supplementary list."

26 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, two pages, "Confidential: Québec locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of February 28, 1962."

affiliated to the NDP across Canada. At about the time of Douglas' statement to the press, Québec fell third in union recruitment, behind Ontario (106,119) and British Columbia (24,036); next after Québec came Manitoba (5,322), Alberta (3,896), Nova Scotia (2,855), Saskatchewan (2,773), Newfoundland (1,091), New Brunswick (764), and Prince Edward Island (350). The four Atlantic provinces as a region accounted for almost as many affiliated union members (5,060) at this time as did much more populous Québec or the traditional CCF base of Manitoba, and ran ahead of Saskatchewan and Alberta. Ninety-three per cent of trade union members affiliated to the NDP at this time lived west of the Ottawa River.28

The performance of FTQ cadres in delivering their Québec membership was not very impressive. The reliability of those it had recruited to the party was also doubtful. Fernand Bourret of Le Devoir commented:

...Affiliation decisions are taken during union meetings where only a handful of members are present. Of course, those absent and dissident members can always officially advise the union that they do not want to support the NDP or participate in its financing. That's the "contracting out" formula. But most dissidents do not want to provoke the ire of the majority of their union's activists while others do not want to reveal their

28 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, one page, "Confidential: locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of March 31, 1962."
political opinions.\footnote{29}

Because the FTQ failed to reach a unity accord with the CSN, going into the 1962 federal election the party remained cut off from 32% of the union members in Québec, Picard's presence notwithstanding. The CSN consisted primarily of industrial unions, tending to be more progressive (and nationalist) than the craft unions dominating the FTQ and perhaps favourable to the sort of political action the NDP might have offered. The loss of the CSN was a very considerable one.

The CSN issue surfaced at the 1962 convention of the Canadian Labour Congress in Vancouver, just prior to the issuing of the writs for the federal election. Some Québec delegates proposed that the CSN be admitted unconditionally to the CLC as a "national" (pan-Canadian) union centre in order to avoid having to resolve jurisdictional conflicts with competing pan-Canadian unions. On the eve of the federal campaign, Jean-Marie Bédard of the Woodworkers said that "...the actual division of union forces in Québec prevents the unions from playing their true rôle and it will be impossible to found the NDP in Québec without the participation of the CSN. The NDP will not be born in Québec if the CSN stands aloof." Needless to say, the resolution

\footnote{29} \textit{Le Devoir}, April 26, 1962, p.4. My translation.
was rejected and the entire question was referred once again to a committee "for study". The CLC committee which rejected the resolution did not include a single person from Québec.³⁰

Even with more than five thousand FTQ union members carrying NDP membership cards, it was unlikely that the NPDQ would be able to raise much more than five or six thousand dollars in a special election levy, typically $1 per member. In this campaign, the party would have had to create constituency organizations outside the Montréal area pretty much from the ground up. The most effective way to do this would have been to have some local union cadres seconded to the NPDQ for the duration of pre-election and election campaign. The very heavy concentration of affiliated members in the Montréal area meant that the party's ability to piggyback expansion of the electoral organization on union structures would be severely limited. Conversely, one might expect the Montréal-area organization to be more than adequate and certainly a substantial improvement over 1958. Shortly before Douglas' press conference, there were only six widely separated affiliated locals off the Island of Montréal, split among the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, the United Packinghouse Workers of America, the United Steelworkers of America, the Textile Workers Union of America, and the International

Woodworkers of America. They averaged 164 members each. At this level of membership, they were unlikely to be able to afford the seconding of a full-time cadre to the NPDQ for an extended period of time, or even to make significant cash donations or "loans" of space and materials. The concentration of affiliated members in Montréal was also a function of the regional limitations of the FTQ's organization.

The next major public intervention by a federal party spokesperson in Québec came at the Laval constituency association meeting on March 25. Oliver addressed the meeting at which Steelworker Louis-Philippe Lecours was nominated, suggesting that in the forthcoming election Canadians would have a choice between the "traditional right", represented by the Liberals and Conservatives in the service of the "financial oligarchy", or for the democratically-elected candidates of "a genuine party of the left" which "favours the equality of the two races making up the country", the New Democratic Party. Le Devoir editorialist Gérard Filion responded directly to Oliver's speech, asking whether the New Democratic Party really

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31 CLC papers, Political Education Department files, typescript document, two pages, "Confidential: Québec locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of February 28, 1962."

represented the left. In terms of the Tories and Liberals, it seemed true; but in comparison with the European left, the NDP seemed squarely centrist, akin to the liberal French Radical Party. The NDP was to the right of the CCF. Indeed, it appeared to Filion that NDP centrism had largely muzzled the genuine left in Canada, discredited because of its electoral failures. Filion characterized the real choice as one between the status quo and a progressive party, ready to undertake certain gradual reforms. He went on:

...the way the CCF has evolved with the transformation of Canadian society is striking. Radical at the outset, little by little it dropped many of its positions to reach fusion in a party more reformist than revolutionary. This evolution indicates a keen sense of political reality among the party leadership. The party has refused to dig in its heels before the resistance or incomprehension of the electorate. The electorate is moving to the right; let us move to the right to meet them. It is thus that thirty years later, the same political formation finds itself defending positions which it would have vigourously attacked a generation ago.  

Filion saw that it was in federal-provincial relations that the NDP couldn't find its balance. "No one has any illusions about the sentiments of an important wing of this party in the matter of provincial autonomy," he wrote. "Accustomed to conceive of social security solely as the function of immense organizations created and controlled by

Ottawa, they have difficulty admitting the competence of the
provinces to take concrete steps to protect the security of
workers and citizens." Filion noted that another tendency,
favouring more provincial autonomy, was also growing, and
that at nearly every NDP meeting these two factions collided
but were usually united in compromise. Filion concluded:

...It is in any case amusing that a party
whose doctrine only a few years ago was strongly
centralist today counts separatist elements in its
ranks. It unites, on the level of the social
question, people who cannot agree on the political
[national] question. This internal contradiction
has not produced major confrontations in the party
as yet, mainly because of the tact of its leaders
and the great freedom of thought granted to its
members. But one really wonders whether, if ever
elected to power, the NDP would be brought down by
those forces which may yet lead to a bitter
schism.34

Even if the traditional discipline of the left and a
forthcoming election forced all factions in the NPDQ to put
a good public face on the internal situation, Le Devoir
was not going to let the contradictions go unremarked. Less than
a week later, an article on how the disoriented Québec left
was painfully finding its way appeared on the front page.
Reporting on a colloquium of Québec Young New Democrats held
on the weekend of March 31-April 1, Fernand Bourret described
the increasing discomfort of nationalists within the NPDQ.
Consistent with Filion's description of the contradiction

above, Pierre Vadeboncoeur of the Conseil Provisoire suggested that French-Canadians in Québec were not only interested in socialism because it had the potential to resolve the problem of economic alienation. Socialism and socialists were only acceptable if they were nationalists as well. Vadeboncoeur forecast that the socialist party which would be set up in Québec would be autonomous and resolutely nationalist, a party of the "révolution nationale" which might not have anything in common with the New Democratic Party. 35

In his remarks at the colloquium, Conseil Provisoire secretary Michel Forest hesitated to go as far as Vadeboncoeur. He noted that French-Canadians had traditionally voted Liberal in federal elections because they perceived the Liberals as defending their national interests. Shifting allegiance to the Tories in 1958, they had been bitterly disappointed. In this conjuncture, Forest affirmed that the Québec left had to be resolutely nationalist, but he stopped short of calling for the creation of a party independent of the NDP.

35 Speaking at his nomination meeting in Lac St. Jean on April 1, Jean-Claude Lebel echoed Vadeboncoeur's argument. Lebel deplored the domination of the "French-Canadian" economy by American or English-Canadian interests, and contended that there could be no national liberation without economic liberation. Le Devoir, April 2, 1962, p. 6.
The neo-federalist perspective was represented by Noel Péruasse (FTQ, Conseil Provisoire) and Charles Taylor (Mount Royal NDP) at this colloquium. Péruasse denounced all nationalists as essentially right wing, and argued that nationalism and socialism were mutually exclusive. Taylor declared that separatism would not solve the basic problems of French Canadians such as education and economic exploitation. He rejected the contention that Québec's exploited condition was the fault of anglophones since 1867, arguing that it was due in large measure to the emigration of the francophone élite after 1763 and a long history of poor-quality education.36

C. The 1962 NDP campaign in Québec

The dissolution was announced April 17, with the vote to take place on June 18. Soon after campaigning began it became evident that the federal leader and the Québec party leadership were speaking with somewhat different voices. Differing regional emphases would be normal and expected, but the key difference between the campaign in Québec and that of the federal leader hinged, not surprisingly, on the handling of the national question. For the Québec leadership - people like Daoust and Chartrand - issues such as medicare, nuclear weapons, and economic autonomy were inextricably connected to the struggle of the Québécois to survive and develop. Douglas was remarkably silent on the national question throughout the campaign.\(^{37}\) Perhaps the federal leadership realized that with a unilingual leader who had an awkward record on the national question, they would do well to steer clear of the debate. And there would certainly be enough to keep Douglas busy with his personal political baggage, given the gathering storm over medicare in Saskatchewan.

\(^{37}\) This writer could find no evidence that Douglas addressed the question from February until the mass rally in Montréal on June 11 (reported in *Le Devoir*, June 12, 1962, p. 1, 2). On June 2 Laurendeau commented that the national question seemed to have been "forgotten" by all parties (*Le Devoir*, June 2, 1962, p. 1). Douglas received 80% of the press coverage accorded to the NDP in Québec. See Léon Dion, "The Election in the Province of Québec," in John Meisel, ed., *Papers on the 1962 Election*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 110.
On April 24 Daoust reminded the Laurier nomination meeting that only the NDP had recognized the "equal rights of the two nations". He said:

The first loyalty of the Québec Members of Parliament is to the interests of the French-Canadian people. There, where we need statesmen, we have sent opportunists who always place partisan interests before everything, who have been the gravediggers [fossoyeurs] of the national aspirations of the people of Québec.38

Even Oliver described the NDP as "the only party which recognized the equality of the two nations". On the weekend of May 5-6 he issued a press release responding to an invitation from the Société St-Jean-Baptiste for candidates and parties to make known their position concerning the French-Canadian nation. In the release he reviewed the neo-federalism of the NDP constitutional amendments adopted at the founding convention, the Douglas-Mathieu proposal for an inquiry into bilingualism and federalism, and Douglas' repeated calls for a truly bilingual federal civil service. However, he then had the effrontery to quote at length from the resolution on self-determination for the French-Canadian nation adopted by the Conseil Provisoire of the NPDQ on January 25. This resolution was the critical response of the "gauche nationale" to Douglas' speech to the Osgoode Hall

Legal and Literary Society on January 15! Evidently Oliver decided that it was occasionally convenient to use the language of his nationalist opponents.\(^{39}\)

Michel Chartrand also made two major interventions in the campaign. In mid-May, he spoke to the Labelle riding association nomination meeting about one of the key issues in the federal NDP campaign strategy—uncompromising opposition to Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons as part of her NATO duties. Chartrand argued that the election of a Liberal or Conservative federal government might result in the acceptance of these weapons for deployment on Canadian territory or by Canadian forces serving NATO in Europe. He argued such a move would provide yet another reason to exercise Québec's right to self-determination. Daoust, also at the meeting, noted that Liberals had broken their promises about peace and war to French Canadians in 1942 and there was no reason to believe they would not do it again in 1962. The unsigned *Le Devoir* article which reported these remarks contained this closing paragraph:

It is well known that there is a strong likelihood that Messrs. Chartrand and Daoust will run for the leadership of the Québec NDP. It seems that many leading NDP figures and activists share their opinion on the secession of Québec in the advent that the federal government would use or stockpile nuclear weapons.  

This was powerful political linkage at a time of enormous international tension, when the débâcle of the Bay of Pigs had just been witnessed and the Berlin Wall had recently gone up.

Chartrand returned to this question about a week later, attacking Pearson for taking a trip to Washington ("looking for instructions on nuclear weapons") on the eve of the federal election and noting that the Tories were sending contradictory messages. He also attacked the old-line parties for making Canada servile to the United States in economic and military terms. Chartrand took the opportunity to suggest once again that if the two nations concept was not respected inside the federal party as well as the federal state, Québec New Democrats would have no choice but to refuse to support the federal party. After this event little more was heard from him for the remainder of the


campaign and he did not run for federal office in 1962.

Predictable problems dogged the campaign in Québec. On May 23 Fernand Bourret wrote that following Douglas' first campaign round in Québec, "...it is manifestly clear that the chances that the NDP will elect even a single MP [from Québec] on 18 June are practically nil." Bourret suggested that the significance of the support offered by pan-Canadian labour organizations and the FTQ to the NDPQ had been greatly overestimated. Attending numerous nomination meetings, he met few militants other than nominees, organizers and union cadres already known for their NDP work. A full month after the writ had been issued, Bourret had seen little evidence of active mass support from workers. Even with Douglas as guest speaker, nomination meetings were poorly attended. For example, one riding with 1,500 affiliated Steelworkers was only able to assemble 150 persons, including regular individual members, for the nomination meeting. Bourret wrote:

...the Québec social democrats had an opportunity to found a provincial wing, which would have given them leaders, developed their structures and personnel, and defined the programme with which to launch into the battle.

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42 Le Devoir, May 23, 1962, p. 1. My translation. Perhaps poor attendance at meetings where Douglas was a speaker could be accounted for by the fact that he did not speak French.
Torn between its socialist, nationalist, and labour elements, the NDP let the opportunity pass only to launch itself blindly into the election campaign, instead of giving itself a provincial framework, constituency organizers, [and] an uncontested leader. The Québec NDP seems to want to proceed in reverse, using the election to find a broader membership base, to set up constituency electoral organizations, and an embryonic provincial organization whose mission it will be to prepare the founding congress a year from now.

As for the support given to the NDP by the CLC and the FTQ, nobody can really evaluate that yet. It is not grand public declarations that will make unionized workers aware of the NDP programme, discuss it, and approve it.

If union organizers and party leaders do not take on the task of meeting with members of union locals, if political education remains the responsibility of a few leaders and does not trickle down to the mass of workers, all efforts will be in vain.

In addition, in Québec any mass political movement would have to involve the support of the CSN, its leaders, and its local units.

For well-known reasons, the CSN remains aloof save for a few groups and certain leaders, such as the Montréal Central Council and Gérard Picard, Jean-Paul Robillard and a few others.

For all these reasons, the NDP does not seem to be on the road to achieving electoral success on June 18.\(^43\)

Bourret confirmed that FTQ support for the NPDQ was very soft in 1962. A meeting of 260 staff members, union representatives, business agents, and organizers of the FTQ and its affiliates took place on the weekend of May 5-6 at Ste-Marguerite. The primary purpose of this meeting was to

consider the nature and extent of the support to be provided by Québec's CLC-affiliated unions to the federal NDP campaign effort. The results were disappointing. A handful of FTQ officials constituted the bulk of the full-time NPDQ campaign staff, including Julien Major and Fernand Daoust in Montréal, Jean Philip and Robert Dean (later prominent in the Parti Québécois) in Estrie, and René Rondou and Roméo Mathieu in the Joliette region. Other direct support included symbolic campaigning by high-ranking officials at factory gates in the Montréal area, an official call to member unions to support the party made on May 18 and again on June 3, and a special fundraising effort among about 70 cadres that delivered about $5000. Portions of the text of the FTQ declaration on May 18 are instructive:

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The executive committee of the FTQ explained that the recommendation [to work for and vote for the NDP] was not binding on unionized workers. "If we have the right," they explained, "to solicit the collective support of the workers for the NDP, the individual votes of workers, which remain secret, are always and irrevocably an act of personal conscience."

The union leaders invited enthusiastic partisans of the NDP "to avoid the example of the old parties, to abstain from all intimidation, all moral coercion, all tendencies to abuse or corrupt the consciences of others." They reminded their militants that on the morning of June 19, "a good unionized worker who might have voted for the old parties would remain just as good a unionized worker and would continue to command the respect of all."47

The impression given by the document is that the FTQ leadership was as usual much more concerned with avoiding internal conflict over partisan questions than about the progress the NDP might make in Québec.

The CSN had again been rejected by the internationals at the April CLC convention, so no significant assistance would be coming from that quarter. Nevertheless, with former CSN president Gérard Picard as associate-president of the federal NDP one might have hoped that relations would remain at least polite between the union centre and the party.

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47 CLC papers, Dodge files, "Un précédent syndical au Québec," FTQ press release dated May 13, 1962, 2 pages. My translation. The release identified the FTQ executive committee as Roger Provost (president), Edouard Larose (vice-president), Jean Gérin-Lajoie (vice-president), John Purdie (secretary), and André Thibaudeau (treasurer).
Unfortunately, Douglas and the party sustained serious embarrassment at the hands of the CSN in Québec City on Victoria Day weekend. On May 20 NDP organizers had secured the use of two rooms in a CSN union hall for a meeting and subsequent press conference with Douglas, his candidates and his organizers. The Québec Central Council of the CSN, representing 90 unions and 20,000 workers, was also holding its annual meeting in the building. While Douglas was busy at the NDP meeting, André L'Heureux, the associate federal secretary of the NDP, approached the chair of the Council, Raymond Parent, with a view to arranging for Douglas to address the delegates to the Council meeting.

A motion was made from the floor to invite Douglas to address the 200-odd CSN delegates for about three minutes. A raucous debate immediately broke out. Several delegates got up and began to walk out. Others angrily invoked an article of the Council's constitution, which, consistent with that of the CSN, forbade any political activity on the part of the Council. Still others argued that it was simply civility to permit Douglas to address the meeting, and that it committed no one. This argument was greeted with a roar of outrage. Ruling from the chair, Parent interpreted the constitution as prohibiting any discussion of partisan

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48 It was later reported that the CSN Québec Central Council was one of two such organs dominated by Créditistes! *Le Devoir*, June 28, 1962, p. 1, p. 2.
political questions during Council meetings. The leader of the "political arm of labour" was thus forbidden even to speak to a group of CSN members for three minutes.\footnote{Le Devoir, May 21, 1962, p. 1; May 22, 1962, p. 1-2. These articles appeared in boxes on the front pages, alongside other coverage of Douglas' campaigning in Québec. Evidently Michel Chartrand, a CSN militant, also spoke at the NDP meeting. Le Devoir, May 22, 1962, p. 2, p. 15.}

Ironically, the public agendas of the CSN and FTQ for the federal election were virtually identical. When asked by Le Devoir in early May which issues should be foremost in the federal campaign, the leaders of the two major Québec union centres provided almost the same list: unemployment, peace, the economy, and the constitution. While the FTQ's Provost endorsed the NDP, the CSN's Marchand warned workers to judge all the parties with care.\footnote{Le Devoir, May 3, 1962, p. 1-2.} The NPDQ might have been better advised to have continued the CCF/PSD tradition and avoided direct affiliation with either competing union centre, concentrating instead on using political and organizational rather than institutional means to recruit individual activists from all sympathetic organizations. The NDP model of direct affiliation with CLC union centres in each province was proving costly in Québec.

As for local campaigning, there was virtually no coverage of the forty NDP Québec constituency campaigns by
Le Devoir or other media. Léon Dion, in a detailed study of media coverage of the 1962 campaign in Québec, commented:

As for the NDP, it was found impossible to discover any candidate who had aroused the attention of the newspapers. At the end we chose M. Fernand Daoust who was given four short columns in La Presse and one in Le Soleil and Mme. Thérèse Casgrain who received three short columns in La Presse and none in Le Soleil. Both were ignored by the Star. Although Mr. Douglas, being the leader of a party whose influence and dynamism were very low in Québec, was given only about 20 per cent of the space attributed in our newspapers to both Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Pearson, he received about 80 per cent of the total space allocated to the three NDP candidates. 51

Dion suggests that the NDP did not conduct a dynamic campaign and that the leader, failing to stress the party's capacity for government, showed he felt beaten from the start and that he believed the NDP had no chance in Québec. The Québec party was hardly able to afford newspaper advertising, heavily used by the two major parties in the last phase of the 1962 campaign. Dion reports that his sample papers ran 352 partisan advertisements from the date the writ was issued until Saturday, June 16, the last publication day before the vote. Seventy-eight per cent of these advertisements appeared in the last two weeks of the campaign. The Liberals

51 Léon Dion, "The Election in the Province of Québec," in John Meisel, ed., Papers on the 1962 Election, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, p. 111. Dion's method was to examine column footage in an arbitrary selection of three newspapers. These papers were Le Soleil of Québec and La Presse and the Star of Montréal.
purchased 66% of the total advertising space, while the NDP purchased a mere three per cent. The NDPQ spent $18,700 on publicity in the 1962 campaign, mainly for printing and the Atwater rally. Seventeen per cent of the publicity budget was contributed by the federal party. Of the total Québec campaign budget of $35,200, about $13,500 came from labour sources and another equivalent amount was provided by donations from less than 150 individual members who gave from $5 to $500 each. Twenty-five of the forty Québec candidates' deposits were paid through the central office by the federal party, indicating the financial weakness of the party at the constituency level.

The Créditistes concentrated their propaganda in the Québec City area and rural regions like Lac-St-Jean, Saguenay, the Côte-Nord, Nouveau-Québec, Abitibi-Temiscamingue and the Eastern Townships, running ads in regional newspapers and magazines, in Le Soleil and L'Action and using local television extensively. Between the


incident with the Québec Central Council of the CSN on May 20 and the NDP's mass rally in Montréal on June 11, the NDP apparently disappeared from the Québec media for nearly three weeks.

The climax of the NDP campaign in Québec, such as it was, took the form of a mass rally at Atwater Market on the evening of Monday, June 11. It ended about a week of large partisan rallies in Québec. Réal Caouette, Robert Thompson, W.A.C. Bennett and the Créditistes occupied Atwater Market with 2000 supporters on June 3; on June 9 Pearson addressed 1200 Liberals in Québec City, while Diefenbaker competed directly with the NDP rally the following Monday evening with one of his own attended by 3500 Montréal Tories.\(^{55}\) Pearson and Diefenbaker addressed their audiences in French as well as English.

The NDP rally, one of a series organized across Canada for Douglas, began with a motorcade from Lafontaine Park through the city centre to the farmers' market on Atwater Street in a western working-class district of Montréal. The number of participating vehicles was estimated at between 1000 and 1500. Those in the motorcade joined with other NDP supporters to swell the crowd at the Market to 3000 -

probably the largest crowd of local New Democrats and their sympathizers assembled in Québec to that time.\(^{56}\)

Accompanied by many of the party's candidates in Montréal and the regions of Québec, Douglas spoke on a range of issues. He reiterated his February commitment in detail, promising a genuinely bilingual federal civil service and an improvement in federal-provincial relations via "cooperative federalism", opting-out, and a new régime of tax sharing, and setting forth once again the rationale for a Royal Commission on Federalism and Biculturalism. Douglas also spoke on public health insurance, on economic justice, and on peace and disarmament. It was for his position on the latter questions that he was most frequently applauded. At this rally, the most important and most public moment of the Québec campaign, Douglas spoke entirely in English, arguing that he would not speak in French simply to win votes!\(^{57}\)

One must wonder what Douglas might have considered as a sufficient reason to speak in French to a Montréal crowd.

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\(^{56}\) *Le Devoir*, June 12, 1962, p. 1-2. This report indicated 1000 cars. Desmond Morton indicates that other news sources reported that as many as 1500 cars were in the motorcade. The rally was organized by the FTQ and its affiliates at a cost of $5000, all of which was in the end borne by the NDP (including a $3000 printing bill). These bills were still not settled when the 1963 federal election campaign began. NDP papers, L'Heureux-Park, February 11, 1963, two pages typescript.

\(^{57}\) *Le Devoir*, June 12, 1962, p. 2.
Two minor events remained before the voting on the following Monday. On June 14, it was announced that a manifesto in support of the NDP and its policies was circulating among intellectuals. Its signatories included Marcel Rioux, Jacques Henripin and eight other academics; a number of poets and authors, including Réginald Boisvert; Gilles Vigneault, Renée Claude, and seven other members of the Union des Artistes; and a number of others from the arts and journalism. And - at almost the last possible moment - on Friday, June 15, the Montréal Central Council of the CSN endorsed the NDP. Now all that remained was a weekend of last-ditch campaigning in the ridings and on Monday, the voting.

When the votes were counted on the evening of June 18, it could be seen that the NDP had failed in all but one of the thirty-three Maritime constituencies and in all seventy-five Québec constituencies. The NDP held one seat of the 108 in the five provinces east of the Ottawa River, where over seven million Canadians lived. The results of the election were disappointing to those who had worked for four


59 *Le Devoir*, June 15, 1962, p. 6. Perhaps this was the result of Picard’s influence; perhaps it was an effect of the fear generated by the anticipated Créditiste breakthrough.

years in the hope that the performance of the New Democratic Party, with its added labour and New Party liberal components, would greatly exceed that of the CCF. Over seven elections, the federal CCF caucus had averaged 16 members; in its first test, the NDP elected 19 Members of Parliament, up from seven at dissolution. The all-time high for the CCF came in the 1945 election, when it elected 28 MP's in a House of 245 (about 11% of the seats with 11% of the vote). At that time the CCF managed to elect only one MP (in Nova Scotia) in all of central and Atlantic Canada. Between 1953 and 1957, the CCF caucus had included 23 members; in 1957-58, 25 members. 61

In terms of parliamentary seats, the party barely recovered from its losses of 1957-58. Hazen Argue, the sole Saskatchewan CCF survivor of the 1958 Diefenbaker sweep, held his seat as a Liberal; all the NDP candidates in the province, including Douglas, were defeated. The CCF-NDP popular vote in Saskatchewan crashed from 28% in 1958 to 22% in 1962, while the Conservatives received 50% of the vote. 62


62 After forming the Saskatchewan provincial government in 1944, the federal CCF had typically elected ten or more federal MP's in the province in a field anywhere from 17 to 21 seats. Between 1945 and 1957, the popular vote in federal elections had averaged about 39%. These numbers crashed in 1958 to 28% and in 1962 to 22%. Based on data tables in Hugh Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada, Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 163.
Elsewhere in the west, the party essentially recovered its pre-1958 strength, electing ten members from British Columbia and two from Manitoba. As usual, the CCF-NDP was unable to elect anyone in Alberta, and its popular vote there fell just below the historic CCF average of ten per cent.

New elements in the NDP as compared to the CCF were chiefly concentrated in Ontario. It was there that the party was expected to make great new progress over the CCF. The NDP elected six MP's, up from three at dissolution, and garnered 17% of the popular vote. The CCF had averaged about 13% of the popular vote in Ontario over five elections, including a 1949 peak of 15%, so the improvement in mass support was not dramatic. The attempt to create a broader ideological base for the New Party by attracting liberals had apparently failed. The NDP did manage to double the number of seats held by the CCF between 1957 and 1962, and this can reasonably be attributed to labour's contribution to improvements in campaign financing and organization over the CCF. 63

The Atlantic Provinces, where the process of creating the NDP had been at least as feeble and confused as it had been in Québec, were generally an unfertile field for the

NDP. There were marginal improvements in the popular vote over 1958, but once again only Nova Scotia actually sent an NDP member to Ottawa in 1962. The NDP received 10% of the popular vote in Nova Scotia that year, up from 5% in 1958. However, over six elections the average Nova Scotia CCF popular vote had run at about 8% and had peaked at 17% in 1945, so once again the NDP had simply recovered lost ground. The CCF traditionally received two to four per cent of the popular vote on Prince Edward Island; it did not run any candidates there in 1958; and it received 5% there in 1962. In New Brunswick and Newfoundland the NDP popular vote ran at 5%. In these three provinces there was an "improvement", but one so small as to be irrelevant.64

64 Based on data tables in Hugh Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada, Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 156-159. Thorburn did not break down the "Other" vote in New Brunswick or Newfoundland prior to 1962.
D. Summary

In Québec, none of the 40 NDP candidates were successful. However, the NDP popular vote was more than double that of 1958, reaching a total of 93,005 ballots. The NDP's percentage of the Québec vote also doubled, from 2.2% in 1958 to 4.4% in 1962. Part of the increase was due to the fact that the NDP ran in eleven more ridings than the PSD did in 1958, including an additional two on the Island of Montréal. The bulk of the NDP gains were made on the Island, with an increase from 26,727 votes in 1958 to 72,732 votes in 1962 - nearly a threefold increase. Over 78% of the Québec NDP vote was concentrated in the 21 Montréal ridings, up from 60% in 1958, despite an increased appeal to off-Island voters. Even more significantly, 95% of the province-wide increase (46,005 of 48,460 new NDP votes) was on the Island. Seventy-nine per cent of the total number of NDP votes cast on the Island in 1962 were in ten ridings.\(^{65}\)

Eight of these ridings, accounting for nearly 51% of the NDP vote in the province, were located in or directly adjacent to the city core. From the outset, the NDP was a heavily

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\(^{65}\) These were: Mercier, candidate G. Caron, 9408 votes; Notre-Dame-de-Grace, candidate G. Gifford, 7545 votes; Jacques-Cartier-LaSalle, candidate J-C Tremblay, 7029 votes; Mount Royal, candidate C. Taylor, 6351 votes; Maisonneuve-Rosemont, candidate F. Daoust, 6092 votes; Laval, candidate L-P Lecours, 5665 votes; Outremont-St-Jean, candidate T. Casgrain, 4326 votes; Dollard, candidate Emile Boudreau, 4302 votes; Verdun, candidate I. Blais, 3312 votes; and Papineau, candidate V. Desjardins, 3164 votes. None finished even second.
Montréal-based party, to an even greater extent than the PSD had been.\textsuperscript{66}

The improved electoral performance in Montréal ridings and the increased concentration of NDP vote in the city are probably most directly attributable to local improvements in campaign funding and organization resulting from labour participation, and improvements in the organizational efficiency of the federal party office in Ottawa. Peter Regenstreif and others have suggested that the popularity of the NDP in Montréal was closely linked with its position on nuclear weapons, citing results in heavily bourgeois constituencies with large anglophone populations like Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, Mount Royal, and Saint Lawrence-Saint George (now Westmount). The argument is that the NDP was able to make inroads into a class which "...is generally and actively concerned with national affairs."\textsuperscript{67} However, this argument does not explain the equally strong appeal of the NDP in at least seven other Montréal constituencies with very different ethnic and socio-economic profiles. The nuclear issue was thus probably of purely local significance in the upscale

\textsuperscript{66} Québec electoral statistics are drawn from or based on analyses of official returns for 1957, 1958, and 1962 (Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, etc.), and details reported in Le Devoir: June 11, 1957, p. 6; April 1, 1958, p. 1, p. 6; June 20, 1962, p. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{67} S. Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada, Toronto: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1965, p. 129.
anglophone ridings.

Given the extreme weakness of the campaign (as described by Dion above) and the previously muddled political performance during the "rain of error", ideology and policy probably played only a vague rôle in the decisions of most NDP voters beyond the upscale anglophone ridings. The Ontario experience described above suggests that the muting of social democratic ideology in the NDP in order to attract the "liberally-minded" was not a successful tactic. Indirectly, the impact of about two years of extraordinary and very public political activity among local social democrats in preparing the launching of the federal NDP (and in arguing over the launching of the NPDQ), and the remarkably sympathetic publicity provided by Le Devoir, were probably more substantial influences. But there was a much more significant conjunctural factor - the political bankruptcy of the Liberals and Tories, and the desire of the voters for an alternative. From a detailed examination of election results in four strong NDP ridings - Notre-Dame-de-Grace, Jacques-Cartier-LaSalle, Mount Royal, and Maisonneuve-Rosemont - it appears that the NDP's gains took place largely at the expense of the Conservatives, and in a number of ridings NDP candidates functioned as spoilers against Tory incumbents. Thus it appears that in the city, the NDP fulfilled the same function that Maurice Pinard
suggested for the Créditistes in the rest of Québec - that of an alternative to returning to the hegemonic Liberal party for those who had in 1958 voted Conservative against the Liberals. 68

Pinard noted that many union activists (especially in the CSN) worked actively for Caouette's party rather than the NDP. 69 He found that only five per cent of union workers were willing to follow the advice of their union leaders in political matters, perhaps reflecting the non-partisan traditions of the Québec labour movement. Pinard also remarked upon the low level of class consciousness among workers (which, if better developed, might have lent itself to a social-democratic critique), which was in part encouraged by the old corporatist social Catholicism of the CSN. Pinard wrote:

Only toward the end of the 1962 campaign did the central leaders of the main French-Canadian labor union, the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (C.S.N.), become worried by the Social

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69 This assertion was confirmed by Fernand Bourret in Le Devoir (June 28, 1962, p. 1, p. 2). The CSN Central Councils in Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean and Québec City were dominated by Créditistes, much to Jean Marchand's horror.
Credit's growing popularity among workers; its president publicly warned the workers of the contradictions between the Social Credit's and labor union's philosophies. But it was too late by that time: many local leaders of the union had already passed over to the Social Credit party and had even become its enthusiastic organizers in some districts...  

The Créditistes had spent four long years organizing in rural districts where resentment against a wide range of social problems had been fermenting, and were able to benefit from twenty years of agitation by the non-partisan Union des Electeurs. Their image was one of strength in rural ridings where neglected, impoverished and angry people were looking for an alternative to the discredited old-line parties. The NDP, like its predecessor party, was unable to field a full slate of candidates and of the forty it succeeded in nominating, twenty-one ran in ridings on the Island of Montréal.  

The party was clearly dominated by Montréal anglophones and their intellectual and political

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70 Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics, Montréal: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1975, p. 97-98. The public anxiety of CSN leaders over Créditiste penetration presented an opportunity for the NDP, but the tension and hostility between the FTQ, internationals and CSN was evidently too great to permit a more positive relationship between the party and the CSN.

71 It was remarkable that after four years of organizational opportunities and with the "support" of several thousand FTQ members and nearly 2000 individual members, the party could not recruit 75 federal candidates in Québec. Among the "missing candidates" were federalist stalwarts Oliver, Pope, Mathieu, and Picard, as well as Chartrand, Rioux, and Vadeboncoeur - but then the latter never claimed to be particularly interested in the federal venue.
preoccupations. The left-wing party lacked credibility at many levels, and did not even give many potential supporters the opportunity to vote NDP.

Pinard tried to account for the failure of the NDP by suggesting that the "monolithic conservative ideology" of the francophone élites, preoccupied with Catholic and nationalist themes, prevented the emergence of a viable left-wing leadership cadre. This is a facile argument which ignores the socialist potential inherent in the left-wing Catholic humanism pervading the CTCC/CSN leadership and the Citélibristes in the Fifties. It also relieves the NDP leadership and the union movement of their political responsibilities. The potential material and human resources available to the left were considerable, as the later histories of the federal Liberal party and of the Parti Québécois show. Pinard weakens his own argument when he qualifies his research results on the issue of working class consciousness:

...Insofar as the working man was concerned, class consciousness may not have been very developed, but it was no less developed than in other places on this continent where the workers had not yet been mobilized in class parties through class organizations. There are in fact indications that, had it been presented with leftist alternatives of some strength, the French-Canadian working class could have responded favorably to
No one could reasonably claim that the NDP ought to have made a massive breakthrough in Québec in 1962. The utter incomprehension of the rapid social and ideological evolution of Québec on the part of federal party and pan-Canadian union leaders created internal political contradictions in the NDP. The failure of the CLC to bring the CSN into the fold was probably the most costly error of all, and one which had nothing to do with the "monolithic conservative ideology" of the francophone élites. Most likely, it can be chalked up to the arrogance and paternalism of the international unions. Yet leading nationalists in the Québec party like Chartrand, Boudreau and Daoust were willing to work for the federal party in 1962. The internal political arguments were largely set aside in that campaign.

Outside of Montréal, the number of NDP/PSD candidates increased from the ten of 1958 to a total of nineteen. Increased numbers of candidates did not, unfortunately, translate into improved electoral performance. In 1958, the nine PSD candidates had received a total of 18,234 votes; in 1962, the nineteen NDP candidates received 20,273 votes. Fifty-four per cent of that 1962 vote was concentrated in

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five widely-separated ridings, leaving the other fourteen with an average of less than 700 votes each. The comparatively poor showing of the NDP outside Montréal despite increased appeals to the population can probably be charged against the Créditiste breakthrough. However, in at least one instance the NDP foolishly sacrificed a considerable amount of support — the south shore riding of Lapointe, where Michel Chartrand had obtained over 8000 votes in 1958, was not contested by the NDP in 1962. The victor in Lapointe, a riding with a large union population, was Créditiste Gilles Grégoire, by 4941 votes over the Liberal incumbent.

Federally and provincially, the NDP was an institutional party rather than a movement, very much a creature of the CLC unions in material terms. Even without CSN support, the NDP, FTQ and the international unions might have created a genuine mass party in Québec between 1958 and 1962. What they seem

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73 These were: St-Jean-Iberville-Napierville, candidate Fernand Roy, 3734 votes; Terrebonne, candidate Jean Philip, 2495 votes; Longueuil, candidate Reginald Lauzier, 2405 votes; Québec-Sud, candidate J-P Gagnon, 1296 votes; and Hull, candidate Hubert Boyer, 1026 votes. None of these candidates finished second either.

74 Le Devoir, June 28, 1962, p. 2. See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the 1957 and 1958 results. Logically, the 1957 and 1958 results ought to have provided a guide to selecting continuing constituency targets in preparation for the 1962 campaign. Best results had been obtained in Lapointe (8,051 votes), Jacques-Cartier-LaSalle (3,343 votes), and Longueuil (2,496 votes). These ridings were not given high priority in 1962.
to have done is slightly enhance the old CCF "window" on Québec. This was done to placate those who had attacked the CCF as a regional party, and to meet the vaguely-felt requirements of a neo-federalist aesthetic originating with Oliver and subtly reflective of the internal careerist politics of the internationals. Effective political organizations - whether conservative, liberal, or social-democratic - are created by deliberate decisions and with generous applications of money, information and labour. Somebody makes the decisions and the resources have to come from somewhere. The creation of a viable party in Québec would have required steadfast political will, the mobilization of considerable resources over an extended period, and the application of sophisticated political intelligence, all of which were strikingly absent in the New Party process in Québec and in the dynamics of the relationship between the NDP and Québec labour.

At the organizational level, the fledgling federal party "organization" - less than a year old at the time of the federal election, broke, dominated by Ontario and western elements, inexperienced in Québec - simply did not have the human and material resources required to design, introduce and market an appropriate version of the NDP in Québec. The only potentially sympathetic institutions in a position to undertake this task were the FTQ and the international unions
with locals and districts in Québec. Unfortunately, the very loose organizational structure of the FTQ, its internal ideological struggles, its raiding struggle with the CSN, and its concentration in and around Montréal combined to preempt its rôle as the chief institutional agency parenting the new party from the outset. Internationals such as Steel and Packinghouse made very significant contributions to such NDP activity as there was, and their leaders were personally prominent in the party - Boudreau and Mathieu are only two examples. However, they too had other preoccupations, particularly in responding to the CSN challenge. Without a genuine institutional commitment to parent the party between the commencement of the New Party process in 1958 and the federal election of 1962, the Québec party simply languished in obscurity and its organizational stagnation fed the factional infighting.

At the political level, Oliver and Picard might have educated the federal leadership about the realities of ideology, nationalism and the labour movement in Québec. The Douglas-Mathieu proposal for a royal commission was a belated example of such political intelligence, but it was neither original, profound nor effective. During the period between the federal founding convention and the first federal election, party officers in a position to know better always seemed to be reacting to gaffes on the part of the anglophone
federal leadership. They ought to have been educating them and the rest of the party about the realities of Québec's political and union culture, but evidently they did not see this as their mission. Douglas' English-only speech at the Montréal rally on June 11 was a case in point. Douglas himself was not much of an asset to the party in Québec. The party apparently never recovered from the "rain of error".

Oliver, Picard and Mathieu apparently saw their mission as one of controlling and frustrating the "gauche nationale" which, despite a marked tendency to hyperbole, was much more attuned to the profound changes in the mentality of progressive Québécois. Oliver, Picard and other federal officers from Québec also chose to selectively ignore the published advice of certain progressive nationalist intellectuals like Rioux, Laurendeau and Léger while courting neo-federalist liberals like Trudeau. Although it was officially delayed for organizational reasons connected with the imminent federal campaign, the founding convention of the provincial section might have resolved many of the problems which otherwise continued to smoulder. It was obviously delayed in the interest of the federal venue. Perhaps another motivation for the delay was the fact that Oliver's credibility as an interpreter of francophone interests to the federal leadership had been badly damaged in the affair of Douglas' Toronto speech. The delayed convention and imminent
federal campaign left the provincial organizational structure and the political motivation of many activists in limbo, and permitted the federal party organization to control events.
7: Epilogue and Conclusion

A. Epilogue

Far from being the hoped-for breakthrough, the June 18 election results showed that even Saskatchewan voters had rejected the party. Between 1957 and 1962, the CCF-NDP share of the Saskatchewan popular vote at the federal level had fallen from 36% to 22%. In the 1957 federal election, an estimated 141,000 Saskatchewan voters supported the CCF; in 1958, that number fell by nearly 30,000. Four years later, only about 94,000 Saskatchewan voters continued to support the NDP on June 18; and, in another federal election on April 8, 1963, that number dropped below 78,000. In six years the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP lost over 63,000 supporters or nearly half its popular support. Douglas had done well to get out. He would have to leave Saskatchewan permanently to win a federal seat in Ottawa.

Losses in Saskatchewan between 1957 and 1962 (47,000 votes) roughly equalled the total NDP vote in Alberta in 1962, or the increase achieved in Québec 1958–1962. Across Canada, in 1957 the CCF received 11% of the popular vote, or the support of 735,000 Canadians; in 1958, the CCF got 9% or 662,000 votes; and in 1962, the NDP got 14% or about
1,088,000. The NDP's gains over the last CCF result came primarily in Ontario, where it acquired over 183,000 new voters (accounting for 43% of the overall federal increase). In 1962 Ontario accounted for approximately 43% of all federal NDP support, up from about 36% in 1957 and 1958. Saskatchewan, which had formerly provided about 20% of the CCF vote, was reduced to less than 9% in 1962. These numbers demonstrate a shift away from the rapidly declining Saskatchewan voting base to Ontario, where the voting base expanded dramatically. Union affiliations grew during the campaign, with an increase of 18% across Canada between March 31 and June 30, 1962, for a total of 180,398 affiliated union members. Seventy per cent (124,310) of affiliated union members were in Ontario on June 30, 1962. Combined with the Ontario-centred benefits of union affiliation, the election results confirmed that the financial, organizational, and political centre of the NDP would henceforth be in that province.

Douglas, Knowles, Lewis and nine other NDP federal

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1 Percentages from the summary table in Hugh Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 155-167. Thorburn's summary statistics are expressed as actual vote count drawing on quantitative data in the various Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer for Canada, 1957-1962. Thorburn reported that between the federal elections of June 18, 1962 and April 8, 1963, the Ontario vote dropped from 17% to 16% and the federal vote dropped from 14% to 13%. The Québec vote went from 4% to 7%.
caucus members and officials gave a report to the CLC executive council on the state of the party on the afternoon of December 12, 1962. Douglas, now an MP, reported that the federal caucus members "were not anxious for an early election," recognizing the need to organize, raise funds, and acquire a parliamentary profile. He said that "...the Party's main job was to get Parliament to face up to the two main problems - unemployment and lack of economic growth."

Douglas estimated that a federal election would take place in late April or May, and that the NDP would run from 210 to 240 candidates. Federal secretary Terry Grier, appointed by Oliver in July, echoed the leader's organizational concerns. He said:

...the party was having a difficult time financially, despite the fact that most provinces were carrying out financial drives. The recent federal election, the likelihood of another federal election in 1963, provincial elections in PEI, Newfoundland, Quebec and Manitoba, the strong possibility of an election in Ontario during 1963, the Medicare dispute in Saskatchewan, a number of by-elections - have and will impose a heavy strain on the party membership...

In the four months following August 31, 1962, the New Democratic Party had run up a deficit of $15,000. In this

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2 Oliver papers, three page typescript document, "Draft minutes of a meeting between CLC Executive Council and representatives of the New Democratic Party," December 12, 1962, prepared by Terry Grier on December 18.
period the federal party received $51,000 ($8,500 from memberships) and spent $66,000. Six months after the election, the federal NDP still owed $68,500 to its creditors.\footnote{NDP papers, typescript document, "New Democratic Party - Minutes of Federal Executive Meeting - Woodsworth House, Ottawa - January 19-20, 1963," especially the Treasurer's report on pages 2-3.}

In Québec, the campaign brought little but disappointment. The NDP's failure to deliver any real improvement over the traditional CCF performance in English Canada as well as in Québec did nothing to encourage a more conciliatory atmosphere. Douglas' personal failure must have sapped what little credibility he had in the eyes of Daoust, Chartrand and others in the nationalist left. The fact that Douglas subsequently obtained a Commons seat courtesy of Erhart Regier, known for views as abominable as those of Fisher, could not have enhanced his image among the "gauche nationale".\footnote{See David Lewis, The Good Fight, Toronto: MacMillan, 1981, p. 464-466, for a description of a previous (1955) "rain of error" in which Regier played a part.}

The federal campaign strained the NPDQ. The NPDQ's financial statement of September 6, 1962, indicated a monthly revenue of $3811.29, including a subsidy of $1234.95 from the
federal party. Some $1216.83 was spent in debt service (for the 1962 federal campaign) and $1523.92 was used to cover operating expenses, leaving a surplus of $228.37. The Québec party was about $8800 in debt.\footnote{NPDQ papers, "Financial statement as at 6 September 1962", one page typescript.} In terms of membership, on September 1, 1962, there were 7948 affiliated union members and 2028 individual members in Québec. The NPDQ acquired an additional 1565 affiliated union members in the course of the campaign, for a total of 7,019 or 3.8\% of the NDP total on June 30.\footnote{CLC papers, Political Education Department files, "Locals affiliated to the New Democratic Party as of June 30, 1962 - provincial summary," one page typescript, n.d.} This figure represented about 2\% of union members in Québec, and about 3\% of the FTQ's membership. Eighty-five per cent of the NPDQ's affiliated union members were in the Montréal area; 35\% were from Steel and 33\% were from Packinghouse.\footnote{CLC papers, Political Education Department files, "New Democratic Party - Quebec Locals Affiliated as of July 2, 1962," two pages typescript, n.d.}
B. The question of anglophone hegemony

The individual membership of the NPDQ in 1962 could be divided into a large group concentrated in twenty-one constituencies in the Montréal area, and a small group dispersed over the other fifty-four constituencies in Québec. Sixty-four per cent of individual members (1290) were concentrated in 21 Montréal-area constituencies; 41% (532) of these Montréal-area members were anglophones. Fourteen Montréal ridings had recognized constituency associations with executives. The ten largest riding associations in the Montréal area accounted for 76% (976) of the members; 49% (473) of the membership in these top ten ridings were anglophones. Among the top five ridings, which accounted for 37% (473) of the total membership in the 21 Montréal-area constituencies, 54% (256) of the members were anglophones. Five of the top ten ridings had majority anglophone memberships. The remaining 314 Montréal-area members were

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8 The top ten ridings were: Mercier (150 members, 21 anglophones); Mont-Royal (128 members, 101 anglophones); Notre-Dame-de-Grâce (109 members, 92 anglophones); Laval (94 members, 12 anglophones); Verdun (86 members, 30 anglophones); St-Laurent-St-Georges (79 members, 65 anglophones); Jacques-Cartier-Lasalle (75 members, 37 anglophones); Outremont-St-Jean (73 members, 41 anglophones); St-Antoine-Westmount (70 members, 48 anglophones); Dollard (66 members, 26 anglophones). Data drawn from NDP papers, five page typescript document, "Effectifs du parti: le 1er septembre 1962," n.d. This document breaks the membership down into anglophone and francophone components by region and riding association.
spread over 11 constituencies, with 99 members concentrated in the two ridings of St-Henri (55 members, 5 anglophones) and Maisonneuve-Rosemont (44 members, 9 anglophones). The other nine ridings had 31 members or less, including one with 13.

Of 635 members in the other 54 ridings in Québec, only 15% were anglophones. There was only one riding "outside" Montréal which could compare with the top ten in the city, and that was suburban Longueuil (68 members, 14 anglophones) - about five minutes' drive south from Montréal over the Jacques-Cartier bridge. In eighteen ridings there were fewer than ten members of the party, and in another fourteen there were no New Democrats at all. This explains why only 40 NDP candidates were nominated in 1962. Among the twenty-one remaining, the bright spots were the four ridings of the Québec City region (103 members, 2 anglophones), Labelle (53 members), Lac St-Jean (50 members), and St-Jean-Iberville-Napierville (53 members, 3 anglophones). Gatineau (23 members, 18 anglophones) and Pontiac-Témiscamingue (24 members, 22 anglophones), both in the Hull-Outaouais region, were the only ridings outside of Montréal which were dominated by anglophones.\(^9\)

In terms of effective internal political activity, the continuing domination of the party's Montréal-centred membership was unavoidable. A very large number of these members were anglophones. Beyond Montréal, the party was largely irrelevant, with substantial numbers of members in only about a half-dozen widely dispersed constituencies. Power and influence in the organization was divided between leading figures in the largest Montréal constituencies (people like Charles Taylor), federal party officers resident in Québec (like Oliver), and Montréal-based elements of Steel, Packinghouse, and the FTQ. These numbers and the absence of CSN participation indicate that the chiefly francophone hinterland of Québec was essentially unrepresented in the party. This was not likely to induce the NPDQ to develop an internal consensus relevant to French Québec in the "révolution tranquille". It would produce two warring camps, one federalist and dominated by anglophones and their allies in the international unions, and the other nationalist and dominated by francophones, with leadership from the CSN and former FUIQ industrial unions. Serious organizational work in the hinterland would have brought in new elements, largely francophone, nationalist, and probably associated with the CSN, which would have upset the stalemate. Geographic expansion of the party's base was not
in the political interest of the federalist faction, which included the representatives of the federal party instances and most of the FTQ officials, and controlled the major sources of funding. The organization and financial subcommittees of the Conseil Provisoire were both dominated from the outset by federalists.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} The organization subcommittee had seven voting members, five of whom Sherwood identified as federalists; the financial subcommittee had six voting members: three were federalists. David Sherwood, "The NDP in French Canada 1961-1965", unpublished MA thesis, Montréal: McGill University, 1965, p. 78, p. 109.
C. "New"? "Democratic"?

The transition from the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation to the New Democratic Party did not create a "new" pan-Canadian party. The National Committee for the New Party produced a political design for the parliamentary retrenchment of the CCF's oldest guard (for example, Douglas, Knowles and Lewis), supported by the money of unions newly consolidated in the Canadian Labour Congress. The NDP tactic succeeded in more or less restoring the position the CCF federal caucus had held prior to 1958, though it shifted the base away from Saskatchewan.11 The NDP tactic did not extend to the articulation of a genuinely new political idea, it did not create a new progressive consensus, and it failed to deliver an electoral breakthrough in Québec or anywhere else.

The NDP electoral tactic was essentially conservative. From the outset, the NCNP and the CLC unions took for granted that the political setting created by the other parties, the British North America Act, and parliamentary institutions would define the total context of the party's activities.

This conservative position was a crucial rationale, expressed by Douglas, Lewis and others, for the successful co-optation of the "aristocracy of labour". It was also an effect of the complacency and inertia of the most important component of the CCF, Saskatchewan's 17-year-old government. It was on the basis of a greatly broadened electoral success encompassing Québec that the NDP design was packaged and sold to the remainder of the CCF. And Douglas, Oliver, Lewis and the rest weren't very good at delivering that electoral success. Even party insider Desmond Morton wrote of 1962 that:

...The New Party experiment had failed. The NDP had lost the farmer's support without collecting the workers. A Gallup survey after the election reported that voters from trade union homes had split twenty-three per cent for the NDP, twenty-five per cent for the Conservatives and an overwhelming thirty-eight per cent for the Liberals...

In the April 8, 1963, federal election, only 21% of union workers supported the NDP and the loss went to the Conservatives. In the preceding decade, CCF-NDP support among unionized workers had declined drastically - from a

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high of 34.2% in 1949 to an all-time low of 12.1% in 1958. The formation of the NDP was accompanied by a doubling in the union vote by 1962, but the party had still not fully returned to the 1949 CCF high by 1968. At that time only 30.9% of organized workers supported the NDP. In general this figure represents a return to the best levels of CCF performance - but no better.\footnote{N.H. Chi and G.C. Perlin, "The New Democratic Party: A Party in Transition," in Hugh Thorburn, ed., \textit{Party Politics in Canada}, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979, p. 179.}

After the founding of the NDP, the federal party leadership was freed of the need to cultivate the financial and political support of even the traditional CCF mass base in the west and Ontario. The organic structure of the federal party, necessitated by a financing scheme based on affiliation votes in local unions, permitted the group around Douglas and Lewis to focus attention on an unchallenged defensive electoralist concept of politics, including full internalization of the doctrine of parliamentary rather than popular sovereignty. This structure also forestalled open debate at the federal level over the contradictions of the two nations thesis and the conflict in the NPDQ. The new constitution insulated the leadership from these and other conflicts. Thus insulated, they did not need or want to adapt to the rapid political changes of the early Sixties.
which were then largely driven by events in Québec. The NDP's behaviour can be contrasted with that of the federal Liberals. Badly wounded by Québec's discontent in 1958, the Liberals learned from their errors. They saw the danger of not finding a viable neo-federalist response to the demands of Québec in the fate of the Créditistes and the NPDQ. Within a few short months of assuming office in 1963 Pearson set up the central neo-federalist ideological apparatus, the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, which systematically altered the terms of the debate on the national question by propagating the notion of non-territorial multiculturalism. By 1965 the Liberals had managed to co-opt the only viable federalist component in francophone Québec, Trudeau and his circle.

For a genuine federalist the claims of the Québec nationalist movement are really questions about Canada, and this questioning ought not to have been "contained" in the NPDQ. The subsequent split in the NPDQ in 1963 reflected the determination of the federal NDP to prevent the purpose and legitimacy of its presence in Québec from becoming the subject of debate at an otherwise carefully-orchestrated federal convention. One can reasonably argue that the chief historical influence of the CCF and NDP presence in Québec has been to act as a prophylaxis against the formation of a
viable and genuinely Québécois socialist movement. It has done so by repeatedly dividing the Québec movement on the national question, rather than fostering left unity in Québec and a more realistic division at the federal level. The Québec labour movement remains similarly divided, although the FTQ became "officially" nationalist (it openly supported the Parti Québécois until 1985, and endorsed the PQ in the 1989 round), probably in response to the CSN raiding threat. It has never been sufficiently nationalist to break with the CLC or the internationals and stand alone or merge with the CSN. Continuing division and posturing in the labour movement is undeniably a major factor contributing to the failure of the NDP model in Québec.

The organic structure guaranteed excessive influence for the NDP's union financiers. Unlike most members of federal council, most union officials involved with the party were professional militants. Many were permanently attached to the Canadian headquarters of their unions in Ottawa.

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15 For example, after the 1963 schism there were three parties on the left in Québec: the NPDQ, federalist-social democratic; the PSQ, socialist-nationalist; and the RIN, nationalist-socialist. The only available labour support (FTQ) went exclusively (and really in principle only) to the NPDQ, and the nationalism of the other groups was used as an excuse by the FTQ to refuse financial assistance. The "federalized" NPDQ provided the leaders of pan-Canadian and international union districts in the FTQ with a means of avoiding serious political conflict with their colleagues outside Québec.
These headquarters provided them with resources, such as research staff, to support and guide the development of the NDP. The members of the labour élite who sat on federal council were positioned to influence the caucus and many federal officers on a daily basis. That élite was clearly out of political step with its own rank and file and failed to effect changes in union political education programs to correct the problem. Consistent minority levels of NDP support among unionized workers in successive elections prove this contention.¹⁶

D. The NDP as a political prophylaxis

The strongest union base for the NPDQ was, not surprisingly, in former FUIQ industrial unions like Steel and Packinghouse. The CSN's potential support for a new social-democratic party was strongly suggested by its pre-FTQ history of amicable cooperation with the FUIQ unions, its increasingly secular and left-wing ideological orientation, and the presence in the NDP of important CSN militants such as Picard, Chartrand, and Vadeboncoeur. The CSN was lost to the NDP because the FTQ international unions refused to allow the CSN to enter the CLC as a stand-alone pan-Canadian union. Officers from conservative unions which dominated the provincial CLC affiliate were thus made responsible for the promotion of the NDP and NPDQ, with predictable results. It seems that neither the politicians of the CCF-NDP nor the leadership of the CLC and its affiliates could understand and accept that conditions in Québec were unique and required a flexible organizational and policy response. The NDP model failed in Québec, just as the old CCF model had. And there is not much evidence of a learning process.

The CCF-NDP was utilized by relatively conservative elements in the leadership of the union movement as a means
of ideological control over the membership. Official support for the NDP supposedly precluded all other possibilities and made it possible to impose silence on left or Québec nationalist dissidents. Political purges were apparently never carried out against union officials who supported the old-line bourgeois parties - certainly not in many FTQ unions, which had frequently collaborated with the Union Nationale (into 1960) and employers to keep the CSN out. The muted social democracy of the CCF and to an even greater extent the liberal reformism of the NDP were ideologically safe for the international unions. At the height of the Cold War they were able to present the ideology of the NDP as harmless to their American headquarters, which meant that the new party was obviously pretty tame. Usually control was applied to situations where Communist influence threatened the stability of the labour élite, but it also happened at least twice in the context of Québec nationalism. The scuttling of the attempt by FUIQ activists to create a provincial labour party independent of the moribund CCF in 1955, and the repudiation and isolation of the PSQ - backed by elements of former FUIQ unions like Steel and the Woodworkers - by the NDP and FTQ in 1963,¹⁷ are both linked to the unalloyed federalism of the CCL and CLC élites and

their desire to impose political discipline on their members and cadres.

This was yet another example of the special significance of the CCF-NDP model. In the Québec instance, the model was used repeatedly by the federalist labour élite to abort attempts by Québécois union activists to create a native left-wing party reflecting nationalist concerns. The refusal of the FTQ and most of its affiliated international unions to provide support for an adaptation of the social-democratic model designed to meet the needs of the local political conjunction condemned the NDP, NPDQ, and PSQ to failure. This approach pre-empted any successful appeal to the CSN for support, even when Marchand was concerned about the threat of Créditiste penetration in the CSN during and following the 1962 federal election. ¹⁸

¹⁸ The consistent refusal of the FTQ to contribute to a provincial party, combined with the inability of the NPDQ to gain CSN support at its October, 1962, convention, made it impossible for the party to contest the November, 1962, Québec election. See also David Sherwood, "The NDP in French Canada 1961-1965", unpublished MA thesis, Montréal: McGill University, 1965, p. 103-106.
E. Quebec ideology and the NDP

At a broader ideological level, the NDP model was inappropriate to Quebec because it failed to take account of ethnic and religious biases in its message, and to develop and express a message in Quebec appropriate to the ideological vocabulary of the local French-speaking Catholic culture. Gramsci wrote:

...Every social group [class], coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc. ... 19

The only example of an "organic" progressive working-class organization speaking in a peculiarly Quebec vocabulary - that of a left-wing Catholic humanism - in this period was the CSN. The FTQ and its affiliates were organizations motivated by an imported secular and liberal continental labour ideology foreign to much of francophone Quebec. By

1961, the NDP had abandoned the moral indictment of capitalist economic organization - but this was precisely the direction the CSN was headed in.

Oliver clearly understood this when he wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1956, but he got lost somewhere along the way:

French Canadian politics are the politics of nationalism. Even when the particular issue being discussed is to all appearances far removed from questions of French Canadian survival, the consciousness of a particular viewpoint, different from that of other Canadians and from that of the rest of North America, is never absent. This is not a recent phenomenon, but since the end of the First World War, it has become increasingly evident. In French Canada, nationalism has been the matrix which gives the essential form to politics, just as it has been in contemporary Africa and Asia. Significant movements are nationalist primarily; radicalism, Marxism or reaction are only secondary characteristics.  

Oliver accepted that an understanding that nationalism was primordial was an essential precondition to any comprehension of the "paradoxical extremes of French Canadian thought", which allowed nationalism to be appropriated by left and right. He suggested that Catholicism might be more basic than nationalism, and that only social movements able

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to operate in a Catholic cultural context could be successful.²¹ Ironically, in his 1956 analysis Oliver differed little from the later historical analysis of his "gauche nationale" foe out of the CSN, Pierre Vadeboncoeur.²² But in the crisis period of the early Sixties, what Oliver had learned at the feet of André Laurendeau, Jean-Marc Léger, and Michel Chartrand gave way to the more deeply felt imperatives of his rôle as a traditional intellectual and a member of his ethnic class, rationalized in the liberal neo-federalism of the Citélibristes.

After 1960 the artificial unity imposed on liberal, social-democratic, and progressive union elements by Duplessisme exploded, and the tinder was the debate over the pace and objectives of the drive for modernization. As the structure of Union Nationale clientelism collapsed, the progressive forces naturally dissolved into at least three elements: the neo-federalist liberals, most of whom ended up in the federal Liberal party; the nationalist liberals, most of whom ended up in the provincial Liberal party; and the nationalist left, which was mostly divided between the NPDQ's


relatively moderate "gauche nationale" and the staunchly separatist RIN. Each of these elements represented the ideological objectives of different class élites. The neofederalist liberals were largely drawn from among the traditional intellectuals. The new technocratic middle class produced most of the nationalist liberals, social democrats and socialists in the Québec Liberal party (Lévesque), the "gauche nationale" (Rioux, Vadeboncoeur), and the RIN (Bourgault, Chaput). However, there was also a working-class component in the "gauche nationale" which arose from the FTQ industrial unions (Boudreau, Lebel, Daoust, Bédard) and the CSN (Chartrand).

For too long, the CCF and NDP were willing to listen to Québec anglophones like Lewis, Scott, Oliver and Taylor, who built or tried to build careers on "interpreting" the desires of the Québécois. For the most part, despite their social democratic avocation, such intellectuals were associated with anglophone institutional powers in Québec and Canada (such as the TLC-CCL/CLC, McGill, the Anglican hierarchy, and the Westmount bourgeoisie). With the possible exception of Lewis, they fall into the group Gramsci calls the "traditional intellectuals". They acted as ideological filters. Oliver and Taylor made it their business to attempt to discredit the views of their critics in the Québec left.
and to present a neo-federalist position in purporting to "represent" Québec in the federal NDP and to the pan-Canadian labour movement. The New Party's political strategy in Québec seems to have been largely based on the 1956 prognostications of Oliver. Such was the pace of conjunctural change in those days that Oliver's analyses were outdated by mid-1958, when Lesage began to revitalize the provincial Liberal party and the Créditistes appeared on the scene. When incontrovertible evidence of Oliver's error appeared in the form of the rise of the "gauche nationale" and its critique, the federal leadership attempted to check its progress in the party by adopting Laurendeau's proposal for an inquiry into bilingualism and federalism. However, Oliver must have anticipated that this tactic would not have much long-term effect.

The membership of the "gauche nationale" seems to fit Gramsci's definition of "organic intellectuals", particularly if Rioux's concept of "ethnic class" is applied.\textsuperscript{23} Living in a very dynamic political culture, the "gauche nationale" sought to relate its practical political activities to its

\textsuperscript{23} Marcel Rioux, "Conscience ethnique et conscience de classe au Québec," Recherches sociographiques, V. 6, No. 1, 1965, p. 23-32. Following the Marxist sociologist Georges Gurvitch, Rioux argues that the Québécois constitute an oppressed "ethnic class".
analysis and class experience, not merely facilitate the installation of a Québec "branch plant" of a party designed in Regina, Toronto, and Ottawa. It was very significant that the leadership of the "gauche nationale" emerged from the former FUIQ (Daoust, Boudreau), the CSN (Chartrand, Vadeboncoeur), and even the Bloc Populaire (Léger, Chartrand). In a conservative and minority Catholic culture, the secularization of dogma led naturally to a more systematic, radical and nationalist ideology than the English liberal empiricist and Protestant traditions produced west of the Ottawa; the Marxist influence on Chartrand, Rioux and Vadeboncoeur was fairly obvious. This was a kind of socialism not much seen in the CCF/NDP since the Thirties.

Oliver, Taylor and the others were grafted onto the Québec political context as servants of their social and ethnic classes, and their instincts come as no surprise. A possible anomaly is the rôle of certain francophone FTQ officials like Mathieu of the Packinghouse Workers. Hubert Guindon, in accounting for the motivations of federalist francophones (including the curiously schizophrenic politics of Jean Marchand) during the Fifties and early Sixties, notes:
...Minorities are often known to internalize the majority's view of themselves, and when people from a minority want to chart a career in the majority setting [such as the Canadian Labour Congress and the internationals, or the federal state], it is a necessary precondition that they adopt the common mindset.\(^{24}\)

In 1963 Oliver and his FTQ allies provoked the division of the Québec section in order to purge "their" federal party of precisely those elements which were most progressive and fundamentally Québécois (FTQ industrial union leaders like Daoust and Boudreau and CSN militants like Chartrand and Vadeboncoeur). When the split took place, the NDP had already been operating in Québec for five years without reference to the political, social, economic and national-ethnic realities. The NDP model was developed from 1958 to 1961 without meaningful influence from the "gauche nationale". Despite repeated attempts to alter that model, it remained essentially as defined by the imperatives of the Ontario and Saskatchewan party élites.

The political techniques applied to the formation of the NDP reflected its liberal-idealistic and bourgeois-parliamentary preconceptions. There was no genuine

opportunity for debate about what kind of politics the new party was to offer internally, in or out of Parliament, or in the various regional political cultures. The New Party conferences were mainly a dialogue among those who already held power in the CCF and the labour movement; the New Party component was window-dressing to "prove" the rightward ideological shift to the conservative trade unions and media, to "justify" it to the left wing of the CCF on the grounds that the voting base would expand, and to "balance" the new direct control of the federal party by the unions and party officials. The New Party component effectively disappeared in 1961 and its representatives were not much heard from thereafter.
F. The Ottawa River thesis

The Ottawa River has been an enduring boundary for the CCF-NDP for over fifty years, despite the fact that there are "white" regions of Ontario and Alberta and "pink" portions of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The party has only formed the official opposition in one of the five eastern provinces once, in Nova Scotia. Traditionally, this has been explained away by party leaders (like David Lewis and Michael Oliver, for example) by pointing to the inherent conservatism of the east, often ascribed to Catholic influence, or to the exceptional qualities of the west. This tradition has also viewed the challenges posed by the national question in Québec and Maritime underdevelopment and dependence as fundamentally discrete in origin and import.

It might be useful to compare the Québec and Maritime experiences and judge the applicability of the CCF-NDP model of social democratic electoralism from a new perspective. Such a comparative study is justified by many common socio-economic realities: underdevelopment and dependence; rural decline and the influence of the new postwar staples; poverty, clientelism and patronage; and last but not least, the common experience of social Catholicism (the CSN and the Antigonish movement). Such a study would throw light on the
contradictions of the CCF-NDP centralist tradition, derived from the party's British ideological origins. The decentralist claims pressed by the "révolution tranquille" and "Maritime Rights" called this approach into profound doubt, and both were resisted by the party.

A more satisfying analysis of the CCF-NDP failure must surely take into account not just the grossly undertheorized "conservatism" of Canada east of the Ottawa but the inability of the party to understand the language of politics - literally in the case of Québec, metaphorically in the case of the Maritimes. If we are right to suspect that there are formidable legacies of underdevelopment, clientelism, and cynicism throughout the East, we may wonder about how adequate a CCF-NDP strategy of pure and simple electoralism could ever be. Eastern voters have often voted for massive social changes and have supported governments (such as Louis Robichaud's) whose reforms were as profound as those undertaken by western social democrats, they have sustained a wide range of populist and nationalist movements, and some of the country's most radical and innovative unions, but they have proved relatively unimpressed by the transformative potential of social democracy, and perhaps rightly so... Addressing the political and social problems that made "re-Confederation" seem an urgent priority to both Québécois and Maritimers never became a CCF priority.  

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25 The Ottawa River thesis is an idea still in its infancy. My own interest in the concept comes from correspondence and conversation with Dr. Ian McKay of the history department at Queen's University, who has done some work on the question. There is no published material on the Ottawa River thesis as yet. The quotation is from his unpublished commentary on papers by Messrs. Frank Milligan (Ph.D., Alberta) and Michael Earle (M.A., Dalhousie), prepared for a session on the CCF and NDP east of the Ottawa River which took place at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Université Laval, on June 3, 1989.
To the example of Robichaud we could readily add those of Lesage and Lévesque; and in light of the contents of the present essay, the "re-Confederation" the NDP was willing to pursue was hopelessly compromised by the CCF centralist tradition. Maurice Pinard and several Citélibristes usefully documented the long-term demographic and economic crisis in postwar rural Québec, and used this to explain the Créditiste phenomenon among other things; surely there was something of this in the persistence of Union Nationale clientelism and patronage in the Forties and Fifties. Here in Québec, we are accustomed to thinking of ourselves as central Canadians, linked to Ontario. Perhaps we have had more in common with our neighbours on the Gulf of St. Lawrence than with those to the west.

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G. Summary

The political and institutional dynamics which crippled and ultimately split the NPDQ and forestalled any advance of the federal NDP into Québec had developed during the New Party period. These tensions had peaked as early as December, 1961, when the subcommittees of the Conseil Provisoire made their preliminary reports and began urging a separate Québec party; and in January, 1962, when Douglas publicly repudiated the two nations thesis. The 1962 election campaign led to a temporary rapprochement, but in the aftermath of the failure of the NDP there was no reason for the nationalists to change their stance. The autumn of 1962 was spent by the Conseil Provisoire in an abortive attempt to gain CSN support for NPDQ participation in the Québec election, and in organizing for the founding convention in March, 1963. The 1963 federal campaign delayed this convention, and when it finally took place the nationalists were effectively expelled from the party in the guise of a compromise. Given the positions expressed by representatives of the federalist and nationalist elements at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962, and their relative positions of power, such a result was inevitable.

Was the NPDQ "une fausse fenêtre", as Andrée Laurendeau
suggested at the time? Did the dominant federalist element ever intend there to be a Québec party? It is fairly clear that the federalist element, which included the FTQ representatives and almost all those associated with federal party instances from Québec except for Rochette and L'Heureux, preferred to leave the provincial field to the Liberals. The FTQ exercised a financial veto against provincial action on at least three occasions - in the elections of 1960 and 1962, and in the formation of the Parti Socialiste du Québec in 1963. They and the other federalists did little or nothing to facilitate the creation of a provincially-oriented party, and the 1963 split marks the departure of the majority of those interested in Québec provincial politics from the NDP (including the only people who could be described as "organic intellectuals" in terms of Gramsci and Rioux).

This pattern leaves one wondering how the federal party leadership supposed it was to going to have access to what was happening in Québec at a time in its history when all eyes were on Québec City, not Ottawa. Evidently the easy if dubious answer was via the anglophone pale in Québec and

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28 See, for example, the interview with PSD president Harry Pope in *Le Devoir*, October 19, 1960, p. 3, p. 6, cited in detail in chapter four above.
careerists in the FTQ. This was not coincidental: Québec anglophones reassuringly spoke the same Protestant political language as the rest of the party, and of course there was the long history of "traditional intellectuals" from McGill participating in the CCF (Scott, Lewis, Forsey, Gordon...). Likewise, as Guindon has suggested, francophones making careers in the pan-Canadian and international labour apparatus (like Claude Jodoin) were going to do their very best to reassuringly imitate the political language of their anglophone colleagues.

The ideological responses to Québec nationalism developed by the anglophone "traditional intellectuals" like Oliver and their francophone allies like Trudeau were predictably defensive. It is tragic that the federal leadership of the New Democratic Party chose to accept their conservative position as the legitimate interpretation of the needs of Québec. This choice precluded any evolution which would have made the NDP a genuinely pan-Canadian party, in part because as the national question never became federalized in the NDP the party was unable to learn anything. The likes of Oliver simply engaged in yea-saying. It also set up the organizationally feeble NDP in direct confrontation with the hegemonic party at the federal level
in Québec - the Liberal party. Ultimately, when the neo-federalists (including Oliver) wanted power they went to that party.

Laurendeau was right. The NPDQ was "une fausse fenêtre", a fake window added to balance out the apparent picture of a new pan-Canadian party. It was a peculiar window, one which tended to be locked on the federalist side. It was forced open only once by Québec - during the founding convention, when the Québec caucus was able to place a mitigated version of the two nations thesis in the programme but not in the party constitution. After that it was sealed and opaque, and it opened only for the imposition of federal party ideas, leaders and purposes on the Québec scene.

Despite the overwhelming political contradictions and the array of hostile forces which surrounded the NPDQ, it must be said that between 1962 and 1965 the base of popular support in Québec, as expressed by the federal vote, rose

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29 The negative pattern of political behaviour derived from the structural dynamics of the 1958-1962 period - that of ignoring francophones and directing Québec operations from an anglophone centralist perspective - has persisted to this day, with predictable results. See the very frank analysis of the disastrous 1988 federal campaign in Québec by the co-president of the NPDQ, Pierre Graveline, in "A Missed Rendez-vous", Our Times, May, 1989, p. 16-17.
from about 98,000 to over 244,000. This was the first pinnacle of NPDQ support, which declined to about 165,000 thereafter for about fifteen years.30 This meant that in Québec about 100,000 more people were willing to vote NDP in 1965 than had voted CCF in Saskatchewan in 1957! Despite the gaffes and blank incomprehension of the federal leadership, lack of financial wherewithal, feeble organization, and the failure to apply sophisticated political intelligence to the construction of the party and its program, the comparatively progressive message of the NPDQ had some appeal in Québec. One can only lament what might have been, had the federal leadership chosen to listen rather than to talk.

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A Note on Primary Sources

The present study involved the use of a wider array of primary sources (archives) than any previous history of the New Democratic Party in Québec for the period. This was necessary because the official NDP and NPDQ papers are incomplete. In particular, the Québec party papers are lacking in crucial financial and membership data. The broader and indirect research work imposed by this situation helped illustrate the interdependence of the labour and party elements. The archives found to be useful include those of the Québec party and of Emile Boudreau of the Québec District of the Steelworkers, held by the Service des Archives of the Université du Québec à Montréal in Montréal; the federal NDP papers, the Canadian Labour Congress papers (on microfilm), and the United Steelworkers of America papers, held at the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa; and the personal papers of Michael Oliver, held in the Rare Book Room at McGill University in Montréal. At the time when the research for this essay was conducted, permanent finding aids had been completed only for the papers of the federal NDP and those of Michael Oliver.

Cross-referencing between differing collections was particularly profitable, and the CLC papers were a virtual mother-lode of hard data and frank political correspondence.
Often what was missing from one particular archive was as suggestive as what was found in it and where.

As for newspapers, *Le Devoir* was an invaluable source for a rich range of material. No previous researcher seems to have bothered to sit through a few days of microfilm scanning. This is most unfortunate, because the intense interest in the NDP shared by Jean-Marc Léger, Fernand Bourret, and André Laurendeau resulted in remarkably comprehensive reporting on the party over several years. *Le Devoir* was particularly important as a source of information on the previously obscure train of political gaffes committed by the federal party in late 1961 and early 1962, a key to understanding later developments in the NPDQ. *Cité Libre* has also not been much used by previous researchers in this area, and it is an essential guide to the political and philosophical positions of many of the actors.
Appendix

THE NPQ CONSEIL PROVISOIRE, AUTUMN, 1961

Executive Committee

FTQ Roméo Mathieu
FTQ Roger Provost
FTQ Philippe Vaillancourt
NPC Gilles Duguay
NPC Reginald Boisvert
NPC Jean Dufresne
PSD Michel Chartrand
PSD Michel Forest
PSD Emile Boudreau
PSD Jacques-Victor Morin

Programme Subcommittee

FTQ Fernand Daoust
FTQ Jean-Gérin Lajoie
FTQ René Rondou
NDP Michael Oliver
NPC Jack Weldon
NPC Marcel Rioux
NPC Jacques Mackay
PSD Pierre Vadeboncoeur
PSD Michel Forest*

Organization Subcommittee

FTQ Roméo Mathieu*
FTQ Jean Phillip
FTQ Roger Provost*
NPC Claude Rondeau
PSD Michel Chartrand*
PSD Thérèse Casgrain
PSD Harry Pope
Jean-Claude Lebel*

Finance Subcommittee

FTQ Yvan Legault
FTQ Aldo Caluori
NDP Gérard Picard
NPC Gilles Duguay*
NPC Gilles Rochette
PSD Emile Boudreau*
Jean-Claude Lebel*

Constitution Subcommittee

NPC Réginald Boisvert*
PSD Jacques-Victor Morin*
PSD Philippe Vaillancourt*

Publicity Subcommittee

FTQ Noel Péruesse
NPC Jean Dufresne
PSD Jean-Pierre Fournier

* Members of the Executive Committee.¹