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Antipatriotism and Patriotism:  
The Changing Political Thought  
of Gustave Hervé from 1905 to 1914

Stephen W. MacDonald

A Thesis  
in  
The Department  
of  
History

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts at  
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ABSTRACT

Antipatriotism and Patriotism: The Changing Political Thought of Gustave Hervé from 1905 to 1914

Stephen W. MacDonald

The two basic tenets of French socialist Gustave Hervé's political philosophy--internationalism and pacifism--underwent major changes in the decade before the First World War. Before 1912, Hervé had constantly denounced patriotism, arguing that society's poor had no interest in defending existing nations, that class ties transcended those artificial national boundaries based on race, ethnicity, or language. His pacifism at this time was vehemently antimilitaristic and insurrectionary: the crisis engendered by the threat of war, he declared, should be used to further the social revolution.

By 1912, Hervé's pacifism had come to emphasize preventing war, especially that war between France and Germany portended by the unresolved question of Alsace-Lorraine. Hervé had also dropped his antipatriotic stance; he now advocated defending France if she were attacked by an aggressive Germany. The antipatriot had turned patriot.

As war threatened in 1914, Hervé reiterated his position: France must be defended if attacked. The actual outbreak of war intensified his patriotism and brought about another fundamental change in his pacifism: European peace could only be attained by crushing Prussian militarism. "Peace through conquest" now characterized his pacifism.

Within a few years, Gustave Hervé, once an antipatriot and insurrectionist, had become an ardent nationalist and republican. This thesis examines his change...
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Describing the reaction of French and German socialists to the outbreak of war, Gustave Hervé once observed:

La guerre déclarée, les uns et les autres, entraînés par le courant nationaliste et patriotique, sentirent que toute résistance était impossible.
Et pour la plupart, ils prirent le fusil.
Cette impuissance radicale de l'Internationale non seulement à faire la grève militaire, mais même à la tenter, même à en esquisser le premier geste, montre mieux que tout le reste, combien était superficiel le mouvement internationaliste d'alors.¹

It is a fitting description of how almost all European socialists responded to the call to arms when the First World War erupted in the summer of 1914. The confused and confusing atmosphere in the days leading up to the war led socialists of every nation to believe that the other side was the aggressor, that they themselves were being wronged and had to defend their country; for no matter how repressive their own system of government was, it was being attacked by another less advanced. Republican France, for all its flaws, must be saved from the hobnailed boot of Prussian militarism. Imperial Germany could not bow to despotic, backward, Tsarist Russia. Even a Russian socialist could feel the need "to protect justice and civilization" from the "German peril."²

The Second Socialist International, despite its avowals of internationalism and pacifism, fell right into line with the vast majority of Europeans, whose patriotic, nationalist fervor launched them enthusiastically into the war.
It is ironic that Hervé's observation pertains to the French and German 'ists' reaction to the First World War, for it is not that to which he refers. The passage, published in 1910 in Hervé's *L'Internationalisme*, actually describes how French and German socialists responded to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Hervé thought of *L'Internationalisme* as an objective history, not a polemic work; nevertheless, when he wrote those words, it was his hope and belief that they would not apply the next time war broke out between European powers: he did not intend his words to be prescient. That they were, and that they applied especially to Hervé himself, are further ironies.

Before the First World War, Hervé had been the most radical of antipatriots and antimilitarists. Once war had begun, his patriotism was indisputable, his pacifism conditional. To see just how complete his turnabout was, one need only compare his prewar statements with those he wrote after the start of the war. A declaration from November 1906 exemplifies Hervé's early prewar position:

Nous ne sommes pas de patriotes et nous ne pouvons l'être, étant socialistes. . . . *L*e patriotism est un lien entre les classes bourgeoises de chaque pays. . . . *N*os compatriotes, ce ne sont pas les bourgeois de France; notre patrie, c'est notre classe.⁴

In October of 1914, his attitude was completely different:

La réconciliation nationale est faite à tel point
Hervé's antimilitarism also underwent an extreme change over the years. In January of 1907, he wrote the following:

Les seules guerres où nous ayons quelque chose à gagner sont, non les guerres de peuples à peuple, mais les guerres de classes, c'est-à-dire les guerres civiles, les révoltés armées des pauvres contre les riches.  

By November of 1914, Hervé no longer supported class war: he now favoured war against aggressive Prussian militarism and was rejecting proposals for peace:

Plus nous avons été pacifistes hier, plus nous voulons de la guerre aujourd'hui pour guérir à tout jamais l'Europe du militarisme, de ses pompes et de ses œuvres.

La guerre est une injure à l'humanité. . . .

C'est justement pour cela qu'à l'heure actuelle, la paix avec les gens qui ont déchaîné sur le monde cette horreur, serait une injure à la raison humaine.  

These passages, accurate in that they reflect the completeness of Hervé's philosophical reversal, do not intend to imply that it was sudden. Hervé did not become a patriot only after the war had started: two years before, he had
recanted what was once the foundation of his political thought—the general strike and insurrection to prevent war—and, late in July 1914, he reiterated this position. War did not bring about Hervé's belief that the nation must be defended, but war did intensify it. His tone became more belligerent, his stand firmer.

Hervé's pacifism, the other important tenet of his philosophy, was closely interwoven with his position on patriotism. His views on how—indeed on why—to keep the peace in Europe had also undergone a dramatic change before 1914. Hervé had once seen the threat of war as an opportunity to revolt, to try to overthrow the existing social structure, to replace capitalist society with collectivist society; by 1912, having dropped his insurrectional policy, Hervé considered war as something to be avoided at all costs, not as a catalyst for revolution. And war, he argued—at least war between France and Germany—could only be prevented by resolving the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

But unlike his position on patriotism, which was essentially unchanged, and only heightened, by the war, Hervé's pacifism did change fundamentally when war erupted. Obviously, one who advocates preventing war cannot go on calling for its prevention once territory has been invaded, shots have been fired, and soldiers have been killed; so it was natural that Hervé, having earlier announced his support for defending the nation, would not now advocate laying down arms or fraternizing with the enemy. But his pacifism vanished:
not only must France regain her prewar borders, not only must she take back Alsace-Lorraine to avenge the humiliation of 1871, she must march into Berlin and crush Prussian militarism once and for ever. Hervé's pacifism had gone from "peace through insurrection" to "peace through prevention" to "peace through conquest," all within the period of four years.

This thesis will trace Hervé's political thought from 1905 through to the end of 1914—what it was, how it changed, what the change meant, why Hervé was considered an apostate, and whether this view is justified. The focus will be on Hervé's antipatriotism and internationalism, his antimilitarism and pacifism, and his insurrectionism. His changing views will be evaluated within the context of European socialism, but more emphasis will be placed on whether his philosophy was intrinsically consistent: was Hervé's reaction to the outbreak of war predictable or at least explicable?

Review of the Literature

The historical literature on Gustave Hervé is scanty. There is a dearth of substantial work focussing on his thought, and even many general histories of French or European socialism of the period before the First World War deem him worthy of only passing reference. In standard works by Merle Fainsod\(^9\) and Georges Haupt,\(^10\) for example, he is scarcely mentioned, and never in any detail. When Madeleine Rebérioux\(^11\) and Jolyon Howorth\(^12\) discuss the three main leaders of the French socialist party (known as the Section Française de l'Inter-
nationale Ouvrière, or SFIO) they mean Jean Jaurès, Jules Guesde, and Édouard Vaillant. (It can certainly be argued that Hervé was not a leader in the traditional sense of the word—a widely respected person of competence, charisma, or both—but without doubt he represented a particular, not insignificant faction within the SFIO; in fact, this blend of dogmatic antipatriotism and vehement antimilitarism bore his name: "l'hervéisme.") Daniel Ligou, who referred to Hervé as "toujours excessif" and suggested he was an "agent provocateur," says that no SFIO leader took Hervé very seriously.13 The influence of Hervé's philosophy was fleeting, according to A. Rosmer:

L'hervéisme, malgré son insurrectionnalisme appuyé surtout par des violences verbales, malgré l'influence réelle qu'il exerça pour un temps sur de bons militants ouvriers, ne provoqua qu'une effervescence superficielle et passagère. Démagogie et aventurisme. Il n'en restera rien.14

Max Nomad made his opinion of Hervé clear. He saw him as

an irresponsible half-fanatic and half-mountebank, who enjoyed the plaudits of the ultra-radicals and was ready to suffer imprisonment for the pleasure of posing as a sincere ultra-revolutionary "insurrectionist."15

James Joll was no less blunt in his assessment. To Joll, Hervé was an

hysterical schoolmaster who seems to have been
taken more seriously by those who did not know him than by those who did. Jaurès once said that Hervé and [German socialist August] Bebel agreed on one thing—their overestimation of Hervé. Certainly the violence of his anti-patriotism and the subversive nature of his propaganda was of considerable embarrassment to the party leaders who did not hesitate to point out his inconsistencies.\textsuperscript{16}

Joll's assessment of Hervé's importance was that he "provided enemies of socialism with new weapons."\textsuperscript{17}

Other scholars are less critical. Ancoine Perrier refers to Hervé as a "brilliant polémiste."\textsuperscript{18} Rébérioux, while calling Hervé the "impetuous editor of a weekly with a reputation for hot-headedness," nevertheless says that his "anti-militarism made him popular and, as a likeable commercial traveller for Free Thought, he made anti-militarism popular."\textsuperscript{19}

Among his contemporaries, too, Hervé had his detractors and admirers. In a speech at the Socialist International Congress at Stuttgart, Germany, in 1907, Rosa Luxemburg warned against "such reactionary excesses as Hervéïsm" and referred to him as an "enfant terrible."\textsuperscript{20} At the 1907 SFIO Congress, Emmanuel Lévy, a fellow socialist, criticized Hervé's doctrine, claiming that

la doctrine anti-patriotique d'Hervé n'est que le pendant de la doctrine nationaliste et qu'elle n'est qu'une transposition de la doctrine pacifiste bourgeoise. Il n'y a pas d'homme moins socialiste ici qu'Hervé.\textsuperscript{21}
The great French socialist Jean Jaurès was also critical.

In 1905, he wrote:

Du point de vue de la Révolution social l'affirmation d'Hervé, sous sa forme générale, absolue et abstraite, est la plus enfantine et la plus réactionnaire qui se puisse imaginer.²²

In another article, he denounced Hervé's philosophy in a number of ways, calling it "le détestable et absurde paradox," "la pauvre et puérile formule," and "cette doctrine inconsistante ou rétrograde."²³ Jaurès declared that Hervé's policy of refusing to defend the nation no matter who the attacker ignored that wars can be of either a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary character. To allow the nation to be defeated by a more backward regime would be "une abdication révolutionnaire encore plus qu'une abdication nationale."²⁴ If the nation were not defended, gains that had already been achieved through evolutionary, parliamentary socialism would be threatened:

La crise d'une grande guerre bouleverserait cette évolution. Ou elle refoulerait le socialisme et la classe ouvrière submergée sous le flot sanglant des passions chauvines, ou elle porterait révolutionnairement au pouvoir une minorité prolétarienne audacieuse qui brusquerait la marche des événements. Mais comment cette Révolution ouvrière pourrait-elle se défendre si elle ne défendait pas l'existence nationale qui lui sert de base? Ainsi, dans la thèse du citoyen Hervé, il y a deux éléments grossièrement contradictoires: l'idée de la resignation
passive à l'invasion, et l'idée d'une Révolution sociale nécessairement active et qui confondrait la patrie et le prolétariat s'excluent et se détruisent l'une l'autre.\textsuperscript{25}

Parliamentary socialists were not the only ones who rejected Hervé's ideas: revolutionary socialists did so as well. Lenin considered the Hervéist policy which he encountered at the Stuttgart Congress naïve. He criticized Hervé's position that all wars should be answered by a general strike. What Hervé forgot, Lenin argued, was that wars are inherent in capitalist society and cannot be prevented. Moreover, a single response to war ignored the unique conditions of each crisis, which demanded a unique response:

The choice of the means of struggle depends on these conditions, and the struggle must consist . . . not in merely replacing war by peace, but in replacing capitalism by socialism. The essential thing is not just . . . prevent war breaking out, but to use the crisis evoked by a war to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{26}

Lenin's criticism raises an important question regarding the nature of Hervé's antimilitarist philosophy, a question which may help clarify Hervé's conversion to patriotism: did he indeed advocate insurrection only to prevent war, or did he also advocate taking advantage of war to further the revolution? Lenin suggests the former. This question will be discussed below.

Lenin did praise Hervéism for one thing--its radicalism.
Frustrated by the peaceful, parliamentary methods of many European socialists, Lenin congratulated Hervé for preaching direct action:

Underlying all the semi-anarchist absurdities of Hervéism was the correct practical notion of giving an impulse to socialism in the sense of not being confined to merely parliamentary means of struggle, of developing among the masses the consciousness of the need to adopt revolutionary methods in connection with the crises that war inevitably brings in its train—in the sense, finally, of spreading among the masses a keener consciousness of international working-class solidarity and of the falsity of bourgeois patriotism.27

There were contemporaries of Hervé who did support his views, though they tend to be obscure individuals, not like Hervé's better-known and more numerous detractors. Two such supporters—E. Belfort Bax and Guy Bowman—were involved in the English translation of Leur Patrie (My Country, Right or Wrong), the book most representative of Hervé's early anti-patriotism. Bax, in his preface to this work, praises Hervé's "logical consistency" and "honest enthusiasm" and lauds "the noble protest of Hervé against that fraudulent counterfeit of a moral principle which is called in the present day patriotism."28 Bowman, who translated the book, suggests that Hervé was merely a spokesman for the peasants of his department, the Yonne:
The doctrine of anti-patriotism, ... or Hervéism, ... originated not in this one man's brain, but in the villages of l'Yonne. Hervé has but found the formulae to express it and to present it to public opinion. 29

Bowman extolled the abrasive style which so infuriated Hervé's opponents:

He has troubled peaceful digestions, stirred up stagnant waters and revealed the filth they concealed, and upset skilful combinations. He has compelled some to declare themselves, others to hold their peace; he has forced many to think. He has put embarrassing questions with the boldness which is so distinctive of his character, questions which others scarcely dared touch upon, content to confide their solution to the more and more remote future. He has been beaten from pillar to post by one party and another, who have, when it served their purpose, made him a scapegoat, after having endowed him with infamy and covered him with shame. 30

The esteem in which Bax and Bowman held Hervé was, in a sense, the logical complement to the contempt which so many others felt for him; he tended to arouse strong emotions, sometimes of empathy, more often of antipathy. Thus many scholars disdained Hervé, choosing to dismiss him with derogatory adjectives rather than analyze his ideas.

To this point, the comments about Hervé have referred to his early, antipatriotic ideology. They have been presented not to show who respected him and who did not, nor to
imply that the commentators were unaware of his later position, but to demonstrate that Hervé's philosophy has been more often a recipient of almost reflexive venom or veneration than of careful analysis. There are those, of course, who must have scorned him even more for having changed his views, for being a turncoat as well as a fanatic, a renegade as well as a demagogue; there are also those who have studied Hervé's ideological turnabout and sought to explain it. Yet even among the latter are few who have done so in detail.

Mark Weitz is an example; he defends Hervé's early views objectively:

Hervé's position, while radical, was not illogical. If one believed that the bourgeois state offered nothing to the workers, and if one believed that it was the duty of socialism to make a revolution; if one believed in the solidarity of workers of all countries and if one believed that wars were fought by workers for the benefit of capitalists and imperialists; then the only consistent socialist response to bourgeois war was opposition and revolution. The trouble was that the French Socialist Party did not accept all the assumptions listed above.\textsuperscript{31}

But in trying to summarize Hervé's career in a few pages, Weitz not surprisingly overlooks a crucial period—the couple of years before the First World War, when Hervé declared unequivocally that he considered an insurrection impossible. As such, Hervé's patriotic reaction to the war comes as a surprise to Weitz, who says it "can only be described as
astonishing.\textsuperscript{32} Weitz does not try to determine why Hervé made the switch; the piece is, after all, just a brief biographical introduction, and does not pretend to be more. So he offers a very general explanation, ending with a psychological interpretation of Hervé's switch which, for all its simplicity, may not be far off the mark:

\begin{quote}
What caused the transformation? Unfortunately, that is a question impossible to answer here. The history of the left is studded with radicals who grew into moderates and/or reactionaries. Syndicalists seemed particularly vulnerable. It is curious, however, how often it is the most virulent radical who becomes the most virulent reactionary. Perhaps Hervé's greatest commitment was not to a political movement at all but rather to his own anger which he never stopped expressing.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Harold R. Weinstein argues that Hervé had once held more patriotic, republican views, and only in 1904, when he began to be influenced by anarchists, did he start to become undemocratic.\textsuperscript{34} Before 1904,

Hervé sought to reconcile patriotism and socialism by stripping patriotism of its nonrepublican and aggressive aspects. . . . He asserted that the Socialists were internationalists like "the patriots of '93": they denounced colonial wars and a war of revenge against Germany; they demanded arbitration; and if the French government undertook an aggressive war, the Socialists would revolt.

In 1912, Hervé's antipatriotism and insurrectionism began to
decline. The waning danger of war in Europe (due to the settling of the 1911 Morrocan crisis), the recognition that socialist gains could be made through parliament, and the need to fight those reactionary groups, such as nationalists and monarchists, that had begun to flourish in France—these, according to Weinstein, were Hervé's reasons for returning to the patriotic, republican views he had held before 1904.36

But these explanations are inadequate. To say that the prospect of war in Europe was abating in 1912 is at best questionable: the 1911 Morrocan crisis and the first Balkan War in 1912 had alert observers concerned. Moreover, fighting reactionary groups was not incompatible with antipatriotism; and Hervé's growing acceptance of parliamentary methods was more a result of his change than a cause of it.

Paul Mazgaj describes Hervé's influence between 1906 and the war as "little short of remarkable." Of La Guerre Sociale, which Hervé edited, he writes:

The influence of this paper, and of Hervé in particular, in the prewar years has been admitted, however grudgingly, by both contemporaries and later historians. The Guerre sociale, more than any single syndicalist publication, and more than many combined, was a favorite source of information for those syndicalists who bothered to read more than the large-circulation dailies.38

Mazgaj, then, considers Hervé more syndicalist than socialist and implies that his appeal was more to syndicalists than to socialists. Hervé's distaste for the Republic, though, had
made him an unwilling ally of the reactionaries, and, Mazgaj argues, it was the rise of anti-Semitism which, in 1911, helped convince Hervé that the Republic was in need of defense.\(^{39}\) Syndicalists rejected his new positions, and began to disassociate themselves from 'old' Hervéism, dismissing it as "excess without a counterweight, without equilibrium. It is propaganda without a base."\(^{40}\) Thus Hervé had gradually evolved towards an acceptance of the Republic. Mazgaj says that Hervé's "accommodation with the Republic came piecemeal, but when completed it was so total as to leave his closest associates incredulous."\(^{41}\)

Michel Baumont has a different interpretation of Hervé's behavior upon the outbreak of war. Far from becoming a raging chauvinist, Hervé maintained his internationalist hopes, sympathy and understanding for the enemy, and an attitude of constructive criticism towards his own government, all while supporting the need to defend 'la Patrie'. Baumont's article studies Hervé's _La Patrie en Danger_, a collection of his articles from _La Guerre Sociale_ covering the period from 1 July 1914 to 1 November 1914. During this period, Baumont writes,

> Hervé est resté fidèle à son idéal internationaliste et manifeste en face des exagérations du chauvinisme de fermes indignations: s'il est pour la défense nationale, c'est afin de garantir son pays de l'esclavage impérialiste.\(^{42}\)

He goes on to paint a glowing picture of Hervé at this time, describing him as
un tendre; . . . un coeur tolérant, mais capable de s'indigner encore contre les "calotins"; un démocrate qui respecte les valeurs humaines, même sous le drapeau ennemi, ce qui ne l'empêche pas de traiter avec vigueur des camarades socialistes qui ont cessé de lui plaire; un optimiste, qui songe à la grande victoire des peuples et des petits, aux États-Unis d'Europe. . . . De moins en moins socialiste et de plus en plus jacobin, toujours suspecte d'individualisme anarchique, tel nous apparaît Hervé en ce premier été de guerre. 43

Baumont's portrait is accurate but, for our purposes, irrelevant. The point is not that Hervé's patriotism was tempered with compassion, nor that his call to defend the nation did not blind him to its errors or infamies; the point is that he advocated patriotism at all. Baumont argues that Hervé remained faithful to his internationalist ideal; but Hervé's position had by then become 'internationalism--with France leading the way', a prospect likely to discomfort those foreigners who chanced to recall Napoleon. Hervé may have become a liberal, tolerant, compassionate republican, but he had become a republican.

Roland Stromberg does recognize the change in Hervé's ideology, but seems ambivalent about whether it was predictable. He states that, in general, European socialists had never renounced defending their nations if attacked, but he cites Hervé as an example of the internationalist, insurrectionist doctrine which the socialists, as a whole, rejected. He does point out that Hervé had, two years before the war,
renounced using the general strike as a means to prevent war; yet he still considers Hervé's "conversion to passionate patriotism" as "one of the most remarkable stories of 1914." Stromberg draws parallels between Hervé's career and that of Hervé's idol, "the great nineteenth-century revolutionary, [Louis Auguste] Blanqui, [each] turning from insurrectionist to patriot when he saw La patrie en danger." He is not critical of Hervé's turnabout; indeed, he defends the patriotic reaction of all European socialists to the outbreak of war:

The French and German socialists could have decided on and coordinated a strike against the war; they failed to do so because they believed in defensive war, and each side thought its posture was defensive. The subsequent allegations of the postwar far left, that the socialists had grown slack, were eaten by "opportunism," had become "lackeys of capitalism," etc., is at best the juggling of words, itself highly opportunistic not to say devious.

Stromberg portrays Hervé as a hopeful pacifist, a reluctant but resigned patriot, but not an insurrectionist, on the eve of the war. Why, then, does he consider Hervé's turnabout "remarkable"?

Gustave Hervé left few people—whether contemporaries or historians—indifferent. Though he could inspire esteem, he more often provoked scorn. To the many contemporaries who did not take him seriously, he was a gadfly; to those who did, he was a danger. His radical views frightened representatives
of all political persuasions: conservatives and reactionaries feared his anticlericalism and antimilitarism; republicans and many socialists feared his insurrectionism; and socialists who did believe in the need eventually to replace the bourgeois regime with socialism feared Hervé's strident style would threaten the gains they could make and had already made through parliament and stoke the fires of reaction. Given Hervé's past, it is not surprising that many were skeptical about his conversion to patriotism.

Among historians, Hervé fared no better. Many standard histories of French and European socialism of the prewar period virtually disregard him. He is often dismissed in a line or two, usually with a disparaging adjective which pretends to explain him or justifies ignoring him. Even those historians mentioned who have considered Hervéism in more depth have usually done so in the context of something or someone else—Weitz in a brief introduction to a sampling of works on militarism, Weinstein in a book on Jean Jaurès, Mazgaj in a book on revolutionary syndicalism, and Stromberg in an article encompassing the whole European socialist movement and its reaction to the war. Only Baumont's article focussed on Hervé.

Why did Hervé elicit such disrespect among historians? For one thing, European socialists have, as a whole, often been reproved for their ineffectual response to the First World War, for the enthusiasm with which they went into battle. Hervé's reaction was similar; but since he went from
an antipatriotism more extreme than most to a patriotism more extreme (indeed, he would later become a reactionary), historians deemed his ideology, perhaps justifiably, more superficial.

There may be more to historians' disdain for Hervé, however, than just his abrasiveness and his dogmatism. Unlike those of many other socialists, Hervé's words and writings often appealed directly to the masses. His work lacked the eloquence of Jaurès, the intellectual rigor of Lenin. But while Jaurès and Lenin and so many others spoke to those who would lead the masses, Hervé spoke to the masses themselves. He spoke directly to the peasants via a series of pamphlets in dialogue form (published first as *Le Collectivisme* then, in a slightly different form, as a series of three pamphlets called, collectively, *Les Propos Révolutionnaires*). In these, "le socialiste" would explain to "le paysan" about the ills of capitalist society and the cures offered by collectivist society--how it would work and why it was to the peasants' advantage to support the struggle towards it. Through these pamphlets, Hervé hoped to gain at best the peasants' support, at worst their neutrality. Of course, these dialogues were also primers aimed at the workers, describing collectivist society and how to achieve it in concrete, practical terms, not in the esoteric generalities often used by socialists.

Yet it is the esoterica which so many scholars of intellectual history find interesting. For all his ornately
radical language, Hervé was prosaic. His early ideology consisted of a few dogmas stressed over and over; he saw things in black and white, with few nuances. Hervé spoke first to the barely literate, only secondarily to intellectuals. He once differentiated between the Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT), which comprised only workers, and the Socialist Party, which he described like this:

C'est un groupement de gens de même opinion, quelle que soit leur profession: c'est le parti de ceux qui, ouvriers ou paysans, ouvriers manuels ou intellectuels, riches ou pauvres, croient que le meilleur moyen d'assurer le bonheur de l'humanité, à l'époque actuelle, c'est de socialiser les moyens de productions et d'échange. 47

For many socialists, this diverse group was the intended audience: its members crossed boundaries of class and learning, and it is where historians, as intellectuals, might be found. Hervé's audience was primarily the CGT, formed of a class whence historians may have arisen, but where, by definition, none are to be found.

Historians must deal with the ever present danger of hindsight. Hindsight often leads us, if only subconsciously, to consider the actions of historical figures in light of what we know happened next: the course of history appears logical, perhaps even inevitable. Though a valuable tool, which allows us to see connections and trends that the actors of history cannot, hindsight can colour our perceptions not
only of why certain events occurred, but of what actually did occur: we might think the effect must have had certain causes. In Hervé's case, for example, it is tempting to argue that since he underwent such a complete ideological turnabout, his earlier views must necessarily have been superficial, built on a flimsy foundation.

But doctrines aimed at a simple people in simple terms are not necessarily simplistic; the medium may have obscured the message. And changing one's views can be considered adapting to changing conditions as easily as it can be considered forsaking one's principles.

As we search through Hervé's early thought for portents of his later thought, we must be careful not to allow our hindsight to magnify them out of proportion. Thus James Joll, when he writes of Hervé's alleged anti-German feeling:

The hatred of Germany, which, after 1914, was to turn him into as hysterical a chauvinist as he had once been pacifist, was already a predominant motive with him. 48

Joll takes Hervé's criticism of German socialists and workers out of context, assuming it reveals an anti-German streak. Care must be taken with statements taken out of context, especially with Hervé: his dogmatism, his constant repetition of the same phrases, and his narrow focus render such statements even less relevant than usual.

Perhaps it is fitting to launch into a discussion of Gustave Hervé's political thought bearing in mind a more
sympathetic picture of him—a picture of a misunderstood, passionate man, searching for something to believe in.

Here is Victor Meric's description:

Pour les uns, c'est un vendu, livré pieds et poings liés à la bourgeoisie qui le paie. Pour d'autres, il ne cède qu'à la vanité et à la manie du scandale.... La vérité, c'est qu'on le connait fort mal.... Gustave Hervé est un homme qui passe sa vie à chercher "sa vérité". Chaque fois, il croit l'avoir trouvée et il fonce avec toute l'ardeur brutale de son tempérament. Jadis, c'était la Révolution qui l'appelait. Il s'y donna avec passion, consentit à tous les sacrifices. Aujourd'hui, c'est la Patrie qui lui fait de l'œil. Il se jette dans ses bras, avec le même emportement. 49

Given the disrespect with which so many scholars treat Hervé, one may ask whether his thought warrants further study. It is tempting, but misleading, to argue that Hervé was prewar European socialism in a microcosm. The pendulum of socialist thought swung from internationalism to nationalism; Hervé's pendulum did so as well, though its arc was exaggerated. But Hervé's political philosophy differed from that of most European socialists not just in vehemence, but in kind: it comprised elements of anarcho-syndicalism and extreme antipatriotism which few socialists espoused. Hervé did not typify European socialism before the First World War.

But even if Hervé's thought itself is superficial and unimportant, the issues with which he was concerned were not.
The questions of nationalism and internationalism are critical to the study of the First World War. Indeed, they have been critical to the entire history of the twentieth century and are likely to remain so into the twenty-first. Even today, as Europe both unites (the European Economic Community; the reuniting of Germany) and divides (independence movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), as smoldering Pan-Arab nationalism threatens to flare up in the Middle East, the question of how people choose to govern themselves--of what constitutes a nation--remains important.

It is not the aim of this thesis to examine nationalism and internationalism per se; but Hervé's transformation from ardent antipatriotism to ardent patriotism is an extreme example of a common occurrence, and a study of his political philosophy may shed a glimmer of light on the dark mystery of nationalism.

* * * * *

Since we are discussing how Hervé's philosophy changed over the years, it is best to approach the topic in roughly chronological order. For the period we are studying--from 1905 to 1914--his thought can be divided into three categories: first, the early, radically antipatriotic years; second, his initial change, with a focus on the book L'Alsace-Lorraine, published in 1913; third, the month before the war and the first few months of the war, when his patriotism
was indisputable. After this examination of his changing thought, we will try to determine whether his old philosophy contained within it the seeds of his new philosophy, or whether his change was a complete break from the past.

Hervé's Early Views: Antipatriotism and Antimilitarism

Antipatriotism and antimilitarism were the two principal tenets of Hervé's early doctrine. Some observers believed that Hervé's antimilitarism, in particular, superseded his socialist ideals. Gerhart Niemeyer states that Hervé "seemed to be inflamed more with a passion for peace than for the establishment of socialism." 50 Lenin complained that Hervé-ists "are capable of forgetting socialism for the sake of anti-militarism." 51

No doubt Hervé wrote and spoke forcefully of antimilitarism, but not at the expense of socialism. In his Propos Révolutionnaires, mentioned above, he clearly delineated what he believed to be wrong with capitalist society, the nature of the collectivist society which would replace it, and how to effect the change. It is not necessary to describe Hervé's vision of socialist, collectivist society in great detail, for we are not focussing on that part of his thought; a brief outline will suffice.

Collectivism and the Role of Socialists

Hervé subscribed to the fundamental assumption of social-
ist thought—that a society based on private property necessarily created class divisions, and that these classes were in perpetual conflict:

Une société basée sur la propriété individuelle des moyens de travail et sur la libre concurrence est une mêlée, une bataille, où les mieux armés battent forcément ceux qui ont un armement inférieur, où le fort est toujours sûr de se rattraper sur le faible, quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du législateur pour protéger celui-ci.\textsuperscript{52}

To change individual attitudes was not the answer: the rich were no more inherently evil than the poor were inherently good. The fault lay in the structure of society:

Nous savons fort bien que si ceux qui sont pauvres actuellement étaient à la place des riches, ils se conduiraient absolument de la même façon qu'eux; nous savons qu'il y a de bons riches et de mauvais pauvres; c'est contre l'organisation même de la Société que nous sommes furieux.\textsuperscript{53}

Collectivist society would replace private ownership with public ownership. Hervé defined collectivism like this:

[Le collectivisme] consiste précisément à socialiser, c'est-à-dire à mettre en commun les instruments de travail (terre, mines, ateliers, usines), et les instruments d'échange (banques et magasins), et à la place du désordre, du gâchis qu'on appelle la libre concurrence, organiser intelligemment, méthodiquement, le travail en commun.\textsuperscript{54}
Like production, consumption would be organized through society: citizens would receive "les bons de consommation," booklets of coupons which were exchangeable for a variety of consumer goods. But Hervé emphasized that this method of production and consumption did not intend to dictate what citizens could or could not buy:

En régime collectiviste, la production se fera en commun mais la consommation restera individuelle... [L]e collectivisme veut seulement la socialization, c'est-à-dire la mise en commun des instruments de production et d'échange, et nullement la mise en commun de ce qui sert à chacun dans la vie ordinaire.

The political organization of society would be controlled by the workers themselves. The basic unit would be the trade union, or "syndicat," a grouping of workers from the same profession. Each local "syndicat" would combine in two ways: first, with the "syndicats" of other professions from the same city or region, to form the Bourse du Travail; second, with other "syndicats" of the same profession from other regions of the country, to form a Fédération Nationale d'Industrie. All the Bourses du Travail and Fédérations Nationale d'Industrie would combine to form the Confédération Générale du Travail—the CGT mentioned above—at the head of which would be the Comité Confédéral, comprising a delegate from each Fédération Nationale and Bourse du Travail.
The structure and institutions are not themselves important for our discussion; what is important to remember is that political power is in the hands of the workers.

This social revolution, this advance towards collectivist society, would be possible—in industrial areas, at least—once three conditions had been met: first, anti-militarist propaganda had been intensified; second, workers and day-labourers on large estates had been convinced to join the CGT and had accepted the idea of a general strike; third, the neutrality of the peasants, through propaganda, had been assured.58

This last condition may exemplify a subtle difference between Hervé and other socialists: Hervé emphasized the role of the peasants in the revolution, and much of his propaganda sought to calm their fears, fears perhaps aroused by other socialists, whose talk of a society run by workers may have disquieted the peasants. Hervé assured the peasants that socialist society would not tamper with their attachment to the land:

Nous connaissons votre amour de la terre; votre passion pour elle; votre individualisme farouche; nous ne voulons pas commettre la folie de heurter ces instincts profonds, encore si vivaces, et de vous soulever contre nous, les travailleurs des ville; ce serait la ruine de toutes nos espérances, l'écrasement dans l'oeuf de tous nos projets d'avenir.59
Hervé used the argot of socialism less frequently than many other socialists. Though he did use the terms "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat," he wrote more often of "rich" and "poor."

Advocacy of the trade union as the basis of society, propaganda aimed at peasants as well as workers, frequent substitution of "rich" and "poor" for "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat"--it is not surprising that many observers have accused Hervé of having anarchist or syndicalist tendencies. Yet Hervé defies easy classification. Louis Levine dismissed Hervé's "theoretical contributions... to the philosophy of the [syndicalist] movement" as "slight." Hervé disliked the terms "anarchists" and "Marxists"; he preferred to call the former "revolutionary socialists," the latter "parliamentary socialists." Furthermore, he did not believe any one faction of the socialist movement had all the answers: a number of groups could and should be involved. Much of his support lay behind the CGT. Critical of the Socialist Party--the SFIO--for having adopted too much of a parliamentary posture, he referred to the CGT as "la seule organisation un peu puissante où il reste encore un peu d'esprit révolutionnaire." A strong CGT could press employers for significant reforms, Hervé argued: "C'est la puissance de l'organisation syndicale ouvrière, et non point la bonne volonté des Parlements, qui peut imposer au patronat des améliorations sérieuses." But the CGT was also essential to the struggle for socialism,
for within it were the structural foundations of the new society: "C'est la C.G.T. qui constitue les cadres, et ses syndicats les cellules de la société future." The CGT embodied the spirit of revolt:

Par une heureuse combinaison de l'esprit socialiste, qui est un esprit d'organisation et de l'esprit communiste-anarchiste qui est un esprit de critique et de révolte, la C.G.T. est arrivée à grouper l'élite des militants du parti socialiste et l'élite des militants ouvriers élèves à l'école des penseurs anarchistes.

Ce n'est plus un parti de légalité, un parti parlementaire.

C'est un parti ouvrier vraiment révolutionnaire, par sa composition, par sa fin et par ses moyens.

Hervé called the CGT's doctrine "revolutionary syndicalism," and described it like this:

Une doctrine nouvelle ... qui est bien dans son essence, du socialisme révolutionnaire, mais qui n'est ni le socialisme trop électoral du Parti socialiste, ni l'anarchisme trop littéraire ou trop nuageux de certains cénacles anarchistes.

But however much the CGT was the soul of the revolution, however important its structural idiosyncrasies were to collectivist society, it was, by itself, inadequate: its membership was restricted to salaried workers, so it missed out on those contributions offered by revolutionary elements from other sectors of society.
Foremost among these other elements was the Socialist Party. Hervé believed its role, inside and especially outside parliament, was to spread revolutionary propaganda:

Le parti socialiste . . . doit être le porte-parole, le porte-drapeau des révoltés; c'est d'abord une organisation de propagande, d'agitation et d'opposition intransigeante dans tout le pays. . . .

[N]ous n'attachons aux succès électoraux qu'une médiocre importance. . . . Ce que nous demandons à nos candidats, c'est . . . de dire, sans réserves ni réticence, ce que nous pensons du gâchis social actuel, et ce que nous voulons mettre à la place.69

Hervé did indeed have a dim view of parliament; he believed true revolutionaries belonged in the streets, agitating, stirring up revolt:

L'élu révolutionnaire à mes yeux, n'est autre chose qu'un délégué à la propagande.
Sa place n'est pas au Parlement. . . .

[S]a place est dans le pays, à propager notre idéal et à souffler aux masses avachies l'esprit de révolte.
Par des meetings, par des manifestations dans la rue, le Parti . . . devrait faire une agitation violente, chaque fois qu'une occasion propice se présente.70

But the Socialist Party should not limit its activities to propaganda: it must prepare for the revolution practically too:
Mais ... le rôle de nos militants ne doit pas se borner à la propagande.

Ils doivent être prêts à l'action révolutionnaire, être prêts à risquer, quand il faudra, quand l'occasion en vaudra la peine, leur liberté et même leur vie. ...

Le rôle du Parti socialiste doit être d'étudier et de préparer les moyens matériels sans lesquels les occasions nous trouveraient pris au dépourvu.

Au besoin, si cette étude et ces préparatifs demandent une organisation secrète, notre parti saurait organiser ou laisser se développer, à côté de lui, une organisation de combat qui se préoccuperait des besognes nécessaires, en période troublée. 71

Interestingly, the revolutionary party Hervé envisioned resembles Lenin's vanguard party: a small, committed elite whose propaganda and direct action could take advantage of those situations in which the potential for 'insurrection already lay. General strikes and international wars were two such situations:

Une grève générale, une guerre internationale, avec la secousse nerveuse qu'elles donneraient à cette masse, seront probablement les occasions de la Révolution sociale, et celle-ci peut réussir si la minorité de militants conscients sait, en temps calme, donner à la masse l'impression que le collectivisme est réalisable et désirable pour elle. 72

Mass support for the initial insurrection was not essential.
As long as the masses were neutral, the revolutionary elite needed only minor support. (Indeed, the Bolshevik Revolution would later demonstrate this.) Once the revolution had been achieved, the majority would fall into line and defend it:

Les Révolutions—l'expérience le prouve—se font toujours par la minorité. . . .

La majorité était pour l'Empire sous l'Empire; elle est républicaine sous le République; elle sera socialiste sous la Sociale.

Quand la Révolution sera faite, l'ordre social nouveau sera défendu par une majorité aussi écrasante et conservatrice que le régime actuel, devenu l'ancien régime.73

Still, the more support for the insurrection, the less violent it need be. "Plus nous serons nombreux," Hervé wrote, "plus nous serons forts et moins nous aurons besoin de recourir à la violence."74

The emphasis on insurrection was an essential element of Hervé's early thought, one which frustrated and angered many of his colleagues. Hervé argued that socialists must choose between the opposing tactics of reform and revolution:

Il faut choisir entre les deux tactiques: la conquête électorale des pouvoirs publics, avec ses petits profits, mais aussi avec ses dangers d'émasculisation; ou la conquête révolutionnaire, insurrectionnelle des pouvoirs publics et des moyens de production, avec ses souffrances, ses douleurs,
Though he warned against the dangers of adopting the passive attitude of reformism, he was not so impractical that he would refuse reforms that had been won. At an SFIO Congress in 1910, he showed this, but once again stressed the importance of insurrection:

Je suis pour les réformes, je suis pour les retraites ouvrières; je suis pour toutes les réformes qui me semblent autre chose que des caricatures de réformes; je suis pour toutes les réformes qui ne sentent pas le piège pour la classe ouvrière.

[Mais] je me place toujours à mon point de vue d'insurrectionnel, je crois, moi, que la Révolution ne se fera, après une période d'organisation évidemment, ne se fera que par la violence, par la grève générale insurrectionnelle.

Hervé knew his insurrectional views put him in a minority. European socialism had over the years become increasingly reformist. Hervé described the state of the Socialist International in 1909:

Depuis 1889, date de sa reconstitution, jusqu'à maintenant (1909), l'Internationale n'a cessé d'évoluer vers le socialisme électoral et parlementaire.

On parle bien encore de Révolution, mais la Révolution est conçue comme une sorte de Réforme totale, couronnement d'une série de réformes
partielles, qui substituera par voie parlementaire l'ordre socialiste au désordre capitaliste. . . .

[\textit{P}our le moment, le caractère électoral, parlementaire, légalitaire de l'Internationale socialiste est indéniable.\textsuperscript{77}]

But, Hervé argued, socialism's increased influence in parliament and among the masses allowed it to be even more revolutionary: more firmly established, more confident of the support of the masses, socialists should be \underline{more radical}: "We may dare in 1905 what we did not dare in 1891."\textsuperscript{78}

This insurrection needed planning, according to Hervé. The conditions under which an uprising might take place could be spontaneous, but the uprising itself could not:

\textit{Une insurrection ne s'improvise pas; un insurrection improvisée, non préparée, risque de dégénérer en une simple boucherie. . . .
La grève générale--grève des bras croisés--ne peut durer longtemps sans être étouffée, ou sans dégénérer en une grève révolutionnaire; et il n'y a guère de grève révolutionnaire sans l'organisation de combat.\textsuperscript{79}}

Insurrectionism runs as a common thread throughout the principal tenets of Hervé's early political thought--antimilitarism and antipatriotism.

\textbf{Antipatriotism and Antimilitarism}

If the establishment of a collectivist, socialist society was Hervé's goal, then antipatriotism and antimilitarism
were the means to that goal. These two ideological elements of Hervéist thought were the extreme versions of two international socialist fundamentals: antipatriotism of internationalism, and antimilitarism of pacifism. Many European socialists paid lip service to the Hervéist forms; few actually espoused them.

Internationalism was the logical extension of the Marxian pronouncement that "the working men have no country." The development of international capitalism created a situation wherein class ties across national boundaries were considered stronger and more important than ties between different classes within a single nation: nations had ceased to be relevant. Hervé saw the progression towards internationalism as a step in political evolution:

L'internationalisme n'est autre chose que l'aspiration instinctive ou réfléchie du monde moderne vers des formes politiques supérieures aux patries actuelles; c'est la tendance à abaisser toutes les frontières tracées par l'histoire pour faire vivre l'humanité reconciliée en une patrie unique qui s'étendra à toute la terre, où les nations d'aujourd'hui ne seront plus que des provinces et des divisions administratives de la grande patrie universelle.

[L']internationalisme n'est pas une vague doctrine sortie un beau matin du cerveau fumeux de quelqu'un SOCIALISTE désirieux de troubler la digestion de ses contemporains; mais un état de choses et un état d'esprit, sortis des entrailles mêmes de notre civilisation capitaliste.
The goal of socialists and their followers was to promote this internationalism, which Hervé envisioned as a federation of European states—a United States of Europe:

We shall establish the free European federation, the first step towards that grand federation of humanity, in which the principalities of to-day will lose themselves, as the petty provinces of old lost themselves in the formation of the France, the England, the Germany of modern times. 82

Socialist internationalism fostered pacifism: it recognized the common concerns of the working class and promoted these across boundaries, both geographical and psychological. The political institution of this philosophy, the Second Socialist International, was, Hervé wrote in 1909, the greatest force for peace in the world:

Ce qui est sûr, c'est que par le nombre de ses adeptes en tous pays, surtout en Allemagne, en Autriche, en Italie, en France et en Russie, par la menace de Révolution sociale qu'elle fait planer sur les dirigeants qui déchaîneraient une guerre, par la lutte qu'elle mène partout contre l'esprit chauvin et l'esprit militariste, l'Internationale socialiste actuelle, malgré son insuffisance, est dès maintenant le meilleur rempart de la paix dans le monde. 83

But the internationalism hinted at in the Communist Manifesto was not antipatriotic—it allowed for and accepted nations:
Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.  

So it was with international socialism. Its internationalism, for the most part, did not extend to the more radical form of antipatriotism. Thus the pacifism of the Second International, unlike that of the First, threatened to become a milder, bourgeois pacifism:

Pour des raisons qui semblent en bonne partie des raisons électorales, l'internationalisme intransigeant d'autrefois a dégénéré en un pacifisme humanitaire, hostile à la guerre, au militarisme à outrance, à l'emploi de l'armée dans les grèves, mais fort éloigné de l'anti-patriotisme ou tout au moins de l'a-patriotisme des premiers internationaux.

It was this diluted pacifism which Hervé disliked and denounced.

Hervé stood for antipatriotism and its attendant pacifism—a vehement antimilitarism. He denounced patriotism as "the great obstacle to the diffusion of Socialism, ... [and] the most powerful obstacle that stands in the way of the Social Revolution." According to Hervé, "the class struggle and the communion of classes in the love of a common Country"—internationalism and patriotism—were "irreconcilable ideas."

Hervé did not deny that people could have an emotional
attachment to a land--a land where they were born and raised, where they toiled, where, perhaps, their family had lived for generations. But he believed this feeling, which he called "steeple-patriotism," could be but a local phenomenon, that it could not extend to include those whom one has never met, even if one shared with those others a common language and political system:

The love of the native village is a natural feeling almost inborn in man's breast; but the love of the Country, of the great Countries where chance caused us to be born, is an acquired, factitious, artificial sentiment. 88

Patriotism was of value only to the possessing classes; it helped maintain the present capitalist system by preventing the development of supranational working-class consciousness:

It is good, it is useful, it is indispensable for the leading classes that the peoples they shear be profoundly convinced that the interests of the rich and of the poor are identical in every nation. 89

To counter patriotism, Hervé proffered antipatriotism. Where the patriot felt love for his country, Hervé felt abomination; where the patriot saw his country as the motherland, Hervé saw it as an uncaring stepmother. Of course the bourgeois are patriotic, Hervé would say, their country has been kind to them. But why should the workers and peasants share this love, when the country has done nothing for them?
Hervé argued that antipatriotism was not random hatred but organized opposition:

Antipatriotism is not a "sort of anarchism," or a "secondary action," but one of the most effective forms of "direct action" against the capitalist class, and at the same time a practical, didactic method of developing in the proletarian masses a full and un-clouded class-consciousness. 90

The basic element of Hervé's antipatriotism—the one which provoked the most controversy, the one which led many internationalists to reject Hervéism—was that the differences between the present capitalist countries were so insignificant as to be negligible, that no country was worth defending from invasion by another:

Without denying the superiority of the republican over the monarchical form, [we Socialists] consider the political differences as secondary when they cover similar economic forms. . . .

We . . . will only fight to bring about (or to defend when we have got it) a social organisation superior to the others not only in its political form, but in the mode of production and distribution of wealth.

Therefore we will not fight to defend existing Countries; but we will fight when we need to bring about the Socialist regime, or to defend it as soon as we have succeeded in establishing it.

It follows therefrom that the republican patriots admit foreign war, but as a last resort, it is true to say, to defend the existing Country, whereas we admit one war only: the civil war, the social
war, the class war, the only war which at the present time, in Twentieth Century Europe, might bring some real profit to the exploited of all countries.91

If such a statement was a blasphemy to republican patriots, it was little less shocking to most French socialists. The Republic may have its faults, they argued, but France was the country of the Revolution, the revolutionary country—witness 1789, 1830, 1848, 1870-71—the country of Liberté, Egalité, et Fraternité! Was Hervé suggesting that French socialists should not care if France were invaded by a less politically advanced country, such as Germany? Yes, he was:

All the French proletariat would have to lose by a German annexation would be a small political superiority; and that loss would not be without compensation. It would be compensated for by the fall of a frontier; it would be compensated for by the possibility of its giving a hand to the German proletariat in its constant struggle against its Kaiser....

Likewise the German proletariat would have almost nothing to lose from annexation by Russia.92

Hervé describes why he sees no reason for French socialists or workers to defend France:

The belief seems to be that if we should to-morrow become subjects of the Kaiser, all our political liberties would vanish, and with them the right to
speak our mother tongue. What an idea! Perhaps you are not aware that universal suffrage exists in Germany for the elections to the Reichstag; that the labor unions are twice as strong there as here; that the number of public meetings across the Rhine is as great as on this side; that the German Socialist dailies are even more "red" than the polite Socialist journals of France.

[D]esist then from flourishing the apparition of the Kaiser before us, to whom it is indifferent whether we are French or Germans. To be victims of enforced idleness or of exploitation, to be as our peasants are, shackled with mortgages or victims of the sheriff's sale, whether under the French or the German system, to be subject to the requisitions of a French advocate-general or a German one, to be turned inside out by French or German police, to be shot down in case of strike by French or German soldiers, what does it matter to us, the countryless ones?  

These countryless, these "sans-patries," claimed that "should a war break out between France and England or Germany, it would be but the capitalists of each cudgeling each other for the markets of the world. Therefore, whosoever might be the apparent aggressor, not a musket would we shoulder."

Hervé also justified not defending the nation because of the difficulty in determining which country is the aggressor: "Il est impossible, dans la pratique, aux intéressés, de savoir en temps utile quel est l'agresseur véritable." His antimilitarist viewpoint can be summed up in a simple phrase: "Whoever be the aggressor, rather insurrection than
A frequent target of Hervé's antimilitarist barbs was the standing army, which he referred to as "700,000 parasites, qui consomment beaucoup sans rien produire, en attendant qu'ils détruisent." The standing army, Hervé argued, was simply a tool of the wealthy in capitalist society, used to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie at home and abroad--against striking workers in the factories, and against foreigners in unlawfully-acquired colonial territories:

L'armée permanente c'est le chien de garde indispensable de notre société de libre concurrence et de propriété individuelle. Tant que la grande industrie produira d'une façon dérégulée, mettant aux prises aux colonies les capitalistes des différentes nations en quête de débouchés, il faudra des armées coloniales et des armées métropolitaines nombreuses, car une guerre est toujours à craindre à propos de débouchés coloniaux.

Et tant que dans les centres industriels les instruments de travail seront aux mains de Compagnies richissimes, tant que des milliers et des milliers de travailleurs manuels seront comme les serfs taillables et corvéables de ces Compagnies, il faudra une solide armée permanente, un formidable chien de garde, pour doubler la gendarmerie."

A standing army was by its very nature aggressive because it was capable of quickly launching an offensive against a foreign neighbour. Hervé favoured replacing the standing army with a citizen's militia, a purely defensive force, one inca-
pable of attack, and one less easily able to suppress an insurrection. 99

But it was unlikely that the present regime would dissolve the standing army and replace it with a citizen's militia, so how were Hervéists to deal with the military as it was? How should they react if war were declared? Hervé did not advocate refusing military service altogether; it was better to join and agitate from within the military. In the best circumstances, reservists would be armed but refuse to go, and would "seize public powers and instruments of work," but Hervé dismissed this as unlikely and impractical. More likely was another scenario: the military strike, with the reservists deserting under the flag. 100

Hervé, a bit naïvely, assumed that the desertion of the reservists would win the support of parents:

As much as the advice to desert in time of peace would alienate from us the mass of parents, so much would the advice to desert in time of war gain us the sympathies of the fathers and mothers, however little our Socialist and Internationalist propaganda may have touched upon them. 101

It was also his wish that "internationalist and anti-patriotic anti-militarism may soon become the uniting link between the peasant masses and the proletariat of the towns." 102

But responsibility for the revolution lay also in the masses, whose acts of sabotage were necessary to gain the support of the military:
Pour que la troupe passe, un jour de grève générale ou d'insurrection, du côté du peuple--et nous savons tous que si elle ne passe pas de notre côté, c'est pour nous la défaite--il faut que dans le civil il se produise des émeutes; il faut que les téléphones, les télégraphes, les chemins de fer, qui sont comme le système nerveux du régime actuel, soient paralysés par un énergique sabotage; que la machine gouvernementale soit détraquée.\textsuperscript{103}

Such revolutionary activity would not be for naught; it would not be crushed by an invading army. For Hervé believed that revolution in France would inspire workers elsewhere, and the revolution would spread:

Quand le socialisme triomphera en France, il est archiprobable ou bien qu'il triomphera dans tous les grands pays du monde, soumis au régime capitaliste, ou bien qu'il sera tellement prêt d'y triompher, que les gouvernements bourgeois qui y domineront ne commettront pas l'imprudence de provoquer un soulèvement des socialistes de leur pays, en nous attaquant.\textsuperscript{104}

A summary of Hervé's early antipatriotic and antimilitarist philosophy can best be summed up by Hervé himself, in the resolution (which was defeated) he proposed at the Stuttgart Socialist International Congress in 1907:

Considering,
That it does not matter to proletarians under what national and governmental ticket the capitalists exploit them;
That the interest of the working class is exclusively the struggle against international capitalism;

The Congress,

Rejects bourgeois and governmental patriotism which upholds the lying affirmation of the existence of a community of interests amongst all inhabitants of the same Country. It declares that it is the duty of Socialists in all Countries to fight only for such objects as will bring about the collectivist or communistic régime, and defend it once they have built it up, and

Calls upon all comrades, in view of the diplomatic incidents which, coming from all quarters, threaten European peace, to answer any declaration of war, from whatever side it may come, by military strike and insurrection.\textsuperscript{105}

Omens of Change?

Now that Hervé's early philosophy has been described, we can examine certain parts of it to see if it contained any omens of change, any portents of his later patriotism. Inconsistencies in Hervé's thought did exist, and they will be discussed to determine if they did foreshadow his later views. But they must be considered with caution; they must be seen in perspective. To take a particular phrase out of context just to make it fit one's opinion of Hervé does justice to neither Hervé nor the historian.

We referred above to a case in which historian James Joll accused Hervé, perhaps unfairly, of hating Germany.
Certainly, Hervé could be critical of German socialists, whom he often thought of as being insufficiently radical. In 1907, for example, Hervé wrote of them

... que les socialistes allemands sont de bons patriotes, qu'ils veulent une armée de milices, qu'au surplus, ils sont pour la solution des conflits entre nations par l'arbitrage international—tout comme nos bons bourgeois pacifistes—et qu'enfin, si j'étais chez eux, ils m'expulseraient du parti comme anarchiste. 106

In the same article, he wrote, "Il est temps que l'on sache que le grand danger pour la paix de l'Europe, c'est ... la prudence excessive du parti-frère d'Allemagne." 107 Later that year, after the Stuttgart Congress, Hervé seemed concerned that the German socialists would not uphold the resolution passed at the Congress, a resolution more radical than the one the Germans had proposed:

Ce dont il faut que nos camarades allemands se pénètrent bien, en tout cas, c'est que les résolutions du Congrès n'ont de valeur que si on les applique sérieusement.

Si nos camarades allemands, après comme avant Stuttgart, se contentaient de se regarder le nombril et de bien voter, ils ne tiendraient pas la promesse qu'ils nous ont faite, discrètement, mais clairement. 108

These statements show not a hatred of German socialists but a mistrust of them. Hervé doubted their willingness to
revolt should war be declared; in this, he was justified.

But Hervé was just as critical of French socialists, of socialists from all nations. Hervé's antipatriotic views put him in a minority, and he quite rightly doubted the willingness to revolt of many socialists. If the Germans appeared to be singled out, it was not because they were slightly more conservative than most socialists, but because Germany was the likeliest opponent of France should war break out. Still, Hervé claimed to have faith in the German socialists:

Il est vrai que par tempérament le peuple allemand est moins combatif, moins frondeur et moins révolutionnaire que le peuple français; qu'il est trop caporalisé; mais quand ils s'est trouvé chez un peuple des centaines de militants pour affronter la prison au temps de la persécution bismarckienne, il s'en trouve bien autant pour la braver en intensifiant la propagande antimilitariste; et quand il s'est trouvé dans une nation des milliers de jeunes gens en 1813, en 1814 et en 1871 pour se faire tuer bravement pour l'idée de la patrie et de l'unité allemande, il ne faut pas désespérer d'en trouver pour la révolution sociale le jour où nos idées auront un peu pénétré les couches profondes de l'Allemagne ouvrière. 109

Related to the argument that German socialists were not radical enough is another which may have foreshadowed Hervé's change: the question of preparedness. Hervé often qualified his insurrectional statements with a condition—that the
propagandist message has been received by the people, that they are ready to revolt. The qualification was rarely threatening: he did not write "We will rise up only when we are ready." But he did imply that such preparedness was necessary for an insurrection to be possible. In 1907, for example, Hervé wrote:

Nous sommes des révolutionnaires, qui nous moquons de la légalité actuelle: nous ne la subissons que parce que nous ne sommes pas assez forts pour la briser; et nous la briserons par la grève générale le jour où nous aurons suffisament propagé l'esprit de révolte et l'idéal collectiviste dans le prolétariat des villes, et désarmé l'ennemi par notre propagande anti-militariste.¹¹⁰ (Emphasis added)

Earlier that year, he had written

Le jour où les préoccupations électorales n'aveugleront plus les États-majors socialistes d'Allemagne et de France, les socialistes des deux pays seront unanimes à proclamer avec moi qu'en aucun cas le devoir prolétarien et internationaliste ne peut consister pour des socialistes français et allemands à s'entr'égorgier.¹¹¹ (Emphasis added)

In a 1905 speech, Hervé said

Our propaganda, pushed simultaneously on both sides of the border, will lead, not to an invasion or a dismemberment of your country by the German army, but to a simultaneous arising of the proletariat of both French and German, against their exploiters.¹¹²
Such a statement leaves unclear what would happen if the propaganda were not pushed simultaneously. Other writings are interspersed with such conditional phrases as "... one may be sure that the day the German Social-Democracy shall have resolved to adhere to our anti-patriotic tactic ..." and "... if the International decides to answer in all countries a declaration of war by insurrection ... "

Yet he could be more direct, too:

As long as the proletarian remains patriot, 
... so long will it be impossible to obtain from the proletariat the revolutionary resolutions which alone can put an end to international wars.114

And, in another example:

Nous ne sommes encore, dans nos organisation syndicales et dans nos groupements socialistes ou anarchistes, ni assez nombreux, ni assez audacieux pour leur faire payer cher, dès aujourd'hui, leurs crapuleries républicaines.115

Some of Hervé's statements suggest that the threat of an insurrection was used merely to prevent war, that it was a pacifist measure to be used only if war were unleashed by bellicose bourgeois governments. He claimed that the threat of insurrection in the event of war was "the only practicable and infallible means of curing governments of their war-like inclinations."116 Another time, he was less
equivocal:

Our threat is nothing more . . . than a conditional one. . . . [I]t depends on the exploiting class whether our threat is put into execution.

Yes, so much the worse for the exploiters of France or Germany if they commit the crime of letting slip the dogs of an international war. 117

To argue, however, that Hervé's threat of insurrection was intended only as a means to prevent war, that he did not support revolt otherwise, is to argue that Hervé's antimilitarism absorbed his antipatriotism, when in fact it was the other way around. Hervé's early antimilitarism was not so much a threat to prevent war as it was a means to provoke a revolution by taking advantage of war.

Perhaps the most telling ambiguity in Hervé's early philosophy is that of what type of nation should be defended in the event of war. For the most part, Hervé argued against defending existing countries. He did so from two angles: first, workers who are being exploited should not care which country's bourgeoisie is doing the exploiting; second, "defensive" wars cannot be justified because--in the heat of the moment when war erupts, with bellicose chauvinists of each side pointing accusing fingers--it is impossible to determine who the aggressor is.

The first of these raises a question: at what point is a country worth defending? Hervé was clear about not defending bourgeois regimes:
If we have to risk our lives, of which we have but one apiece, we shall risk them, not to defend your nationalities for you, but rather to found the Socialist nation which we already carry, graven in our brains. . . .

If, by exception, a war between nations becomes of interest to us, it is because, beneath the appearance of international strife, it is seen to be at bottom a civil war, a war of classes. . . .

[But] a Socialist mother-country . . . would be beautiful enough and good enough to warrant our taking arms to defend it whether against invasion or against bourgeois intrigue. 118

If one were to split hairs, one could argue that, in another example, Hervé is less specific that the nation worthy of defense be socialist:

Nous détestons les patries actuelles, qui sont des marâtres pour nous.

Mais si nous vivions dans un régime nous assurant le bien-être et la liberté à tous, nous n'hésiterions évidemment pas à la défendre contre une agression. 119

The second of Hervé's arguments against defending the nation— that one cannot fight a defensive war because one can never be sure of the aggressor—implies that if the aggressor were known, a war might be warranted. Indeed, there is an instance where, in 1901, Hervé had written an article justifying national defense "in case of unjustified aggression on the part of a neighbouring despot." 120 But in 1904, Hervé denounced this, his own earlier position, and claimed his views
since then had undergone "an evolution . . . in the way of antipatriotism."\textsuperscript{121}

But all these ambiguities in Hervé's thought—the need for preparedness; the idea that the insurrection was a means only to prevent war; the double-edged question of what type of regime is worth defending, and under what circumstances—all these seeming omens of change can be explained away if one accepts at face value Hervé's oft-repeated declaration that under no circumstances is a capitalist regime worth defending. Even if the seeds of insurrection had not yet been sown; even if the insurrection was only to prevent war, and war had already begun; even if the attacking nation was less advanced politically than the defending nation; even if the other nation was without doubt the aggressor—it did not matter. The capitalist regime was not worth defending. The differences between any two capitalist regimes were insignificant. In only one case was it in the interest of the masses to defend their nation:

\textldots when, having made a triumphant revolution against their leaders, the oppressed class having jumped at the throat of the oppressing class—then, if the oppressive class, in order to defend its threatened or lost privileges, calls to its help the foreign leading classes, then, but not until then, is there some interest for the common people to repulse the foreigner.\textsuperscript{122}

Such a statement is unequivocal. Hervé's early philosophy, for all its ambiguities, admitted no possibility of
defending the Republic; only a socialist society would warrant protection. But it is a short philosophical step from this position to one that justifies defending a liberal democratic society from attack by a reactionary aggressor. Hervé took this step well before the First World War. It is to this phase of his political thought we now turn.

The Change: L'Alsace-Lorraine

By 1913, with the publication of L'Alsace-Lorraine, it was obvious that Hervé's views had changed. He no longer despised his country; he no longer espoused insurrection. He was still nominally an antimilitarist, but "pacificist" now better described him. He was still an internationalist, but no longer an antipatriot. He who had once favoured sabotaging the French military effort by mass desertion and a general strike, now declared that if the Germans were not going to revolt, neither would the French, and, furthermore, that the idea of insurrection had never been considered:

Il n'a jamais été dans la pensée d'un seul socialiste français de paralyser la mobilisation française du moment que les socialistes allemands ne pouvaient prendre l'engagement ferme de paralyser de leur côté la mobilisation allemande. 123

Small wonder the change was met with derision by some, such as Pierre Monatte:

Tired people, disgusted with the movement, have
thrown themselves aside; others have cynically become turncoats. Yes, the whole Hervéist demagoguery could not lead to anything else. 124

Others, like Leon Boll, the editor of a liberal democrat paper, Le Journal d'Alsace-Lorraine, welcomed the change:

Il est parmi les socialistes français un homme qui, il y a quelque temps seulement, ne nous aurait inspiré, à nous Alsaciens-Lorrains, aucune confiance et qu'une heureuse évolution a porté à voir dans notre pays et dans la question d'Alsace-Lorraine la pierre angulaire de la paix européenne. Cet homme, c'est l'internationaliste et l'anti-militariste Hervé! 125

In this section, we will examine Hervé's change--what it consisted of, why it happened, what it meant, and what Hervé's new concerns were.

The Rejection of Insurrection and the Recognition of Patriotism

The basis of Hervé's new position was his recognition that a simultaneous insurrection by French and German socialists would not occur, at least not at the start of war, and that this must be admitted:

Il y avait un premier moyen pour nous, socialistes français et socialistes allemands, un moyen désespéré d'empêcher la guerre fratrique dont nous menace le conflit austro-russe... c'était l'insurrection simultanée, des deux côtés, de la frontière. Il crève les yeux aujourd'hui que
cette insurrection, que nous tenterons sûrement à la fin de la guerre, des deux côtés, nous ne la ferons pas au début des hostilités. Nous ne sommes prêts ni les uns ni les autres. .. \( \text{[}\text{]} \) n ne fait pas une insurrection, à une heure aussi redoutable, sans l'avoir préparée. Si douloureuse que soit cette constatation, il faut avoir le courage et l'honnêteté de la faire.\(^{126}\)

The sad truth was that socialist propaganda had not yet penetrated mass consciousness: "Encore une fois, même dans les villes,--sauf dans quelques centres très avancés,--le socialisme internationaliste est loin d'avoir conquis toute la classe ouvrière."\(^{127}\) More specifically, Hervé implied that it was the Germans who were unprepared for insurrection, and that the French would not revolt alone:

La Social-démocratie allemande ne s'engage pas à faire l'insurrection le jour de la mobilisation; ce qui, par là même, interdit aux socialistes français de la tenter de leur côté, sous peine de saboter la mobilisation française seule, et de travailler uniquement pour le roi de Prusse.\(^{128}\)

Hervé's rejection of unilateral insurrection as a response to war meant that he would have to advocate defending the Republic if it were attacked. Consequently, he began to show signs of accepting patriotism and nationalism--not just his own, but that of others, too:

Tant il est vrai qu'au fond de chaque internationaliste, il y a un patriote révolutionnaire qui
sommeille, et ... tant il est vrai que nous re-
trouvons la patrie au fond de chacun de nous. 129

Hervé's admission of his own patriotism included a glori-
fication of France's revolutionary past, a position commonly
adopted by French socialists to justify defending the Re-
public:

Certes, comme tous les hommes, si international-
istes qu'ils soient, j'ai une tendresse senti-
mentale, instinctive, pour le pays où le hasard
m'a fait naître, d'autant plus qu'il m'a fait
naître dans un pays pour lequel tous les ré-
volutionnaires qui n'y sont pas nés ont une
secrète inclination, à cause de son passé ré-
volutionnaire, de ses institutions démocratiques,
de sa liberté de penser et de la liberté de ses
moeurs. 130

Hervé had, in his earlier views, recognized an instinctive,
sentimental attachment to the land of one's birth, but he
had argued that this "steeple patriotism," a local phenomenon,
did not extend to love of the nation as a whole. Now he be-
lieved it did.

Hervé's newly-recognized patriotism included a re-
evaluation of certain Marxist dogmas. He now accepted the
role emotions played in international conflicts; wars were
not fought merely for economic reasons:

Les divergences d'intérêts économiques sont une
cause évidente de conflit: qui le nie?
Mais comment peut-on être myope ou aveugle au
point de ne pas voir que l'on ne se bat pas sur-
tout pour des questions d'intérêt, mais pour des
questions de sentiment? A côté des crimes contre
la propriété, il y a, dans la vie des peuples,
comme dans celle des particuliers, les crimes
passionnels, de beaucoup les plus fréquents.

On se bat rarement pour des questions de gros
sous: les affaires d'argent, entre nations, peuvent
se régler facilement par des marchés. . . . Les
affaires qui s'arrangent plus difficilement, ce
sont les affaires d'orgueil, de vanité, d'amour-
propre, de sentiment. 131

Emotion, sentiment, character, . . . Hervé now wrote
of, even glorified, these intangible . . . is focus had shifted
from class to nation, to peoples. Indeed, he had, in his
early thought, recognized that different nations had different
characters, different temperaments. 132 But now he magnified
these. Here he argues that Alsace, despite its predominantly
German-speaking population, was in spirit as French as Lor-
raïne, perhaps even more so:

Son coeur n'est-il pas aussi français que celui
de la Lorraine? Et son esprit ne l'est-il pas
davantage peut-être? Le pays le plus français
des deux, n'est-ce pas celui qui ressemble le
plus à la France par son esprit gouailleur et
frondeur, par sa gaité et sa bonne humeur sour-
riantes, par ses traditions et son esprit pro-
fondément démocratiques? Et, à tous ces rapports,
l'Alsace n'est-elle pas plus vraiment française
que la Lorraine? 133
Is it significant that Hervé writes of the spirit of Alsace, not the spirit of the people of Alsace? Attributing human characteristics to a land, emphasizing the intangible qualities of a people—indeed, speaking of "a people" rather than "a class"—these were symptoms of Hervé's new-found patriotism.

Peace at All Costs

Just as Hervé's antipatriotism was supplanted by an internationalism based increasingly on patriotism, so his insurrectional antimilitarism gave way to a conciliatory pacifism. He still advocated dismantling the standing army and replacing it by a militia; he still called for the defense of a socialist republic should one be established.\textsuperscript{134} He was still an antimilitarist, denouncing war:

\textit{Ce livre n'est que la suite logique de la campagne que je poursuis, depuis que j'ai l'âge d'homme, contre la barbarie militariste et contre la guerre internationale, ces deux hontes de notre civilisation.}\textsuperscript{135}

But both his content and his style had changed. War was no longer to be used as a catalyst to insurrection; it was now a horror to be avoided at all costs. His attitude had become accommodating, reflecting his desire to do just about anything to prevent war.

Hervé was prescient about the coming war. He saw that it could be sparked by a minor incident: "La paix, aujourd'hui, est à la merci d'un incident de frontière, d'une
maladresse ou d'une brutalité, d'expression d'un diplo-
mate." He recognized how precarious Belgium's neutrality
was. And, unlike the many who thought, when the war broke
out, that it would be short and glorious, Hervé saw what a
nightmare it would be:

L'imagination reculée d'épouvante à la pensée de
l'horreur que serait une nouvelle guerre franco-
allemagne, avec les armes modernes; à la pensée
des ruines commerciales, industrielles et financi-
ières qu'elle entraînerait aujourd'hui où l'Alle-
magne ni la France ne sont pas les nations agri-
ocles qu'elles étaient il y a 42 ans.

On a raison de dire que la guerre de 70-71 n'a
été qu'un jeu d'enfants à côté de ce que serait
cette nouvelle catastrophe.

It was this recognition of the horrific nature of modern
warfare which led him to adopt a position of "peace at all
costs." His attitude towards Germany became conciliatory,
and he began to write of his admiration for Germany so much
that one might say he doth protest too much. He told of how,
as a professor of history, he glorified German exploits as
much as French. He regretted his past harsh judgments of
German socialists, especially at the Stuttgart Congress.
He distinguished between the temperament of France and that
of Germany, but he praised them both:

Mais l'intime préférence que je puis avoir pour la
France, pour son clair génie latin, pour sa grâce
artistique et pour sa belle flamme d'idéalisme, ne
m'empêche pas d'avoir une profonde affection et une grande admiration pour l'Allemagne, pour l'esprit sérieux, méthodique et discipliné de la laborieuse et savant Allemagne. 141

He even went so far as to praise the German emperor:

Il est plutôt francophile; peut-être parce qu'il sent qu'il n'est pas impopulaire—personnellement—en dehors de son titre d'empereur, à la majorité du peuple français.

Il vient de montrer par son rôle pacifique dans la crise des Balkans, qu'il ne tient pas à souiller son règne par la plus déshonorante des guerres, ni à compromettre son trône, comme le fit chez Napoléon III, dans un aventure toujours aléatoire.

C'est un homme avec lequel le gouvernement français peut parler, même de l'Alsace-Lorraine, si la camarilla qui l'entoure, qui l'enveloppe, ne parvient pas à empêcher la conversation. 142

But Hervé's new "peace at all costs" attitude seemed to be selectively pacifistic: he wanted to prevent war between France and Germany. For example, he accepted and sympathized with German imperialist ambitions:

À l'Angleterre, l'Afrique orientale et l'Afrique australe, du Cap à Alexandrie; à la France resterait ainsi toute l'Afrique du Nord; mais à l'Allemagne aussi sa place sous le soleil d'Afrique; à elle l'immense bassin du Congo. 143

Furthermore, he argued that a Franco-German conciliation would permit Germany to concentrate her forces against the Slavic
threat to the east:

C'est la possibilité pour l'Allemagne de détacher la France de cette alliance cosaque à laquelle nous sommes rivés tant que la question d'Alsace-Lorraine ne sera pas résolue; la possibilité pour elle de concentrer ses forces militaires contre le danger slave, un danger véritable pour elle tant que la succession de l'homme malade de Vienne ne sera pas liquidée et que la Russie sera gouvernée par des camarillas panslavistes.  

The powderkeg awaited a spark, and Hervé saw Alsace-Lorraine as the likeliest source of that spark. To defuse the tension between France and Germany required settling the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

The Settlement of Alsace-Lorraine

In 1905, Hervé, referring to the people of Alsace-Lorraine, had written:

If they had not been stultified beforehand with patriotic prejudices, they would soon have discovered (they are discovering it!) that exploitation and sweating in Germany or in France is about the same thing for a poor devil.

Ironically, he still believed, in 1913, that Alsace-Lorraine could live as well under French as under German rule. The difference was that he did not say so scornfully. The early Hervé meant that the people of Alsace-Lorraine would be subject to the same repression; the Hervé of 1913 meant that
they could have the same liberty. He had accepted the bourgeois systems of government--systems whose overthrow he would have called for even three years earlier--and his solutions to the problem of Alsace-Lorraine were suitably bourgeois.

The region of Alsace-Lorraine had been a point of contention between France and Germany for a long time, especially since the Franco-Prussian War, when Germany took possession of it. Many French believed the region belonged to France, that she must take it back from Germany and avenge the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian War. This attitude, called "la revanche," had for years poisoned Franco-German relations, and Hervé claimed that the two countries could not coexist peacefully until the question of who should govern Alsace-Lorraine was resolved.

It was a difficult question. Hervé said that each country had a case for saying that Alsace-Lorraine belonged to it: Germany had feudal and monarchical rights, France had rights based on republicanism and the self-determination of peoples. The revanche-minded French had no right to be self-righteous about their claim to the region, Hervé said--not while France refused the right of self-determination to her colonies.

Hervé believed that a discussion between the two countries on this issue could not take place until Germany was a democracy, and that the danger of war was great until it became one:
Impossible aux Hohenzollern d'accepter le point de vue juridique français sans se renier. Impossible à la République française d'accepter le point de vue juridique allemand sans se dés-honorérer.

Quand l'Allemagne sera devenue une démocratie comme la France, une discussion de droit pourrait se concevoir, car alors les deux peuples parleraient au nom des mêmes principes: mais quand serait-elle une démocratie? D'ici là, la catastrophe a malheureusement le temps de se produire et d'ensanglanter l'Europe. 148

But this did not preclude offering solutions to the problem. Hervé warned that the Alsace-Lorraine question had become a life-or-death issue for the Socialist International, that this organization should seek to resolve it. 149 Nevertheless, most of his suggestions were directed towards the governments of France and Germany.

Hervé delineated what he saw as the wishes of the people of Alsace-Lorraine:

1° qu'ils sont opposés à toute guerre de revanche . . . ; 2° qu'ils ne demandent pas à redevenir Français, qu'ils demandent uniquement à se gouverner eux-mêmes, en restant dans l'État fédéral allemand, où ils ont leurs intérêts économiques, mais à se gouverner eux-mêmes, de préférence sous la forme républicaine. 150

These two conditions were important in that they directly opposed the wishes of the French chauvinists, who wanted to bring Alsace-Lorraine back under French rule forcibly. Yet
Hervé argued that even most of the French bourgeoisie was against revanche:

La revanche! Il y a longtemps que la bourgeoisie française, moitié par crainte de l'Allemagne, moitié par cette horreur de nouvelles boucheries qui est la marque des esprits civilisés, y a renoncé. 151

Hervé, too, dismissed revanche. But he also claimed that allowing the people of Alsace-Lorraine to decide their own fate, without the French government being involved, would leave all sides unsatisfied, and the tension between France and Germany would continue:

Il ne s'agit point d'imposer l'autonomie à l'Alsace-Lorraine à la pointe des baïonnettes, il s'agit de l'obtenir par un geste qui permettrait le désarmement en Europe. Si à l'heure actuelle les Alsaciens-Lorrains obtenaient, sans que le Gouvernement français obtienne une satisfaction morale, leur autonomie par leurs propres efforts, la question du rapprochement avec l'Allemagne n'aurait pas fait un pas. La question du rapprochement avec l'Allemagne aura fait un pas le jour où le Gouvernement allemand, qui a certains intérêts à obtenir lui-même le désarmement du côté français, consentira à faire, par une sorte de réparation morale du coup de force accompli il y a quarante-deux ans, le geste qu'on veut lui faire faire. 152

In the book _L'Alsace-Lorraine_, Hervé proposed a number of solutions to the problem. They can be summarized as follows: 153
1° La solution minimum: Alsace-Lorraine becomes an autonomous republic and remains within the German empire; German stocks are allowed to be registered on la Bourse de Paris.

2° Une solution boîteuse: Alsace receives republican autonomy within Germany; Lorraine goes to France; Germany receives a French colony.

3° La solution maximum: France gets Alsace-Lorraine; Germany receives the French Congo, French rights to buy the Belgian Congo, and, if necessary, German stocks on la Bourse.

4° La solution moyenne: Alsace-Lorraine becomes a neutral country; Germany gets whatever it takes of the following for Alsace-Lorraine to be granted that neutrality—the French Congo, French rights to buy the Belgian Congo, the Belgian Congo after France has bought it back, and German stocks on la Bourse.

The conditions themselves are not important for our discussion. What is astonishing is Hervé's complete acceptance of bourgeois notions of property, legality, diplomacy, and imperialism. The man who had once scorned the very idea of countries now advocated trading colonies as if they were postage stamps. The man who had once denounced capitalism and espoused collectivist society was now using the Paris Stock Exchange as a bargaining tool. That Hervé's political philosophy had changed was undeniable. It is time to examine the reasons for that change.
Reasons for the Change

Simply put, Hervé's views changed because he no longer believed simultaneous insurrection was possible. He had underestimated the strength and extent of the patriotic feeling of the masses. A tide of nationalism, a "wind of madness" which had swept over France in the winter of 1912-1913, had convinced him that an insurrection could no nothing to prevent war:

Nous avons senti, l'hiver dernier, passer sur nos têtes ce vent de folie, qu'un étranger ne perçoit pas, mais qui donne le vertige à tous ceux qui sont de notre race, si mobile, si nerveuse, si impressionnable, si inflammable.

Il était si fort ce vent de folie, que nous, qui croyions jusqu'ici pouvoir déclencher une insurrection contre les gouvernants qui oseraient tenter la sanglante aventure, nous avons eu l'impression terrifiante que--faute d'organisation méthodique, faute d'union entre nous, faute de discipline, faute surtout d'avoir la certitude que de l'autre côté de la frontière on en ferait autant--nous ne pourrions, du moins le jour de la déclaration de guerre, rien empêcher, rien, rien.154

War in the Balkans, a manifestation of greater problems in that region--nationalist uprisings, unleashed by the recent death of one empire (the Ottoman) and the impending death of another (the Austrian); the ever-present threat of war between Austria and Russia--this, Hervé claimed, was what had made him fear for peace in Europe. He wrote of "la guerre
menaçante qui, des Balkans, pouvait d'un moment à l'autre se déchaîner sur l'Europe,"155 of "les guerres nationales qui viennent sous nos yeux d'ensanglanter les Balkans--en attendant qu'elles ensanglantent peut-être l'Europe centrale."156

He warned:

Après la curée dans laquelle les races slaves ont dépecé vivant l'homme malade de Constantinople, nous voyons venir la curée où les mêmes races slaves dépeceront l'homme malade de Vienne.157

The problem was that France and Germany were drawn into the mess in the Balkans through alliances--Germany to Austria, France to Russia:

C'est l'antagonisme austro-russe qui est actuellement le principal danger de conflagration entre la France et l'Allemagne... On ne se battra pas entre Français et Allemands pour savoir à qui en définitive restera l'Alsace-Lorraine; on se battra pour satisfaire l'orgueil ou les ambitions des Habsbourg d'Autriche et les Romanoff de Saint-Pétersbourg.158

So if the Balkan situation was going to draw France into war with Germany, why does Hervé emphasize solving the question of Alsace-Lorraine? On this, he is unclear. Perhaps Hervé thought that if Franco-German tensions were eased, France was less likely to become involved in a Balkan conflict because France's alliance with Russia was defensive. He confirmed this on the eve of the war:
Il faut que ... nous disions bien haut que nous sommes prêts à tenir nos engagements, mais que nous n'irons pas au delà de ce que nous avons promis, jamais, de suivre la Russie dans les guerres d'agression qu'il lui plaira d'entreprendre pour la sauvegarde de son prestige.

Plutôt la rupture de notre alliance défensive avec la Russie que la honte de la suivre dans une guerre offensive contre l'Autriche.\textsuperscript{159}

But there are deeper questions to be answered. Why did the Balkan situation convince Hervé that insurrection was futile? How did it relate to the influence of socialism in the more developed countries? Even if Hervé had dropped the idea of insurrection, why was he now talking of negotiating a settlement of Alsace-Lorraine? Why had his focus shifted from socialist to bourgeois means of preventing war? What brought about his conversion to patriotism? These questions will be considered below, in a later section. We now turn to a discussion of Hervé's position on the eve of the war and after the war had started.

**Hervé's Later Views:**
**La Patrie est en Danger!**

Two hypotheses were presented at the beginning of this thesis: first, that Hervé's attitude towards defending the nation had changed two years before the war and was merely reiterated when war broke out; second, that Hervé's pacifism did change fundamentally when the war broke out. In the days leading up to the war, Hervé indeed still favoured just about
anything—except insurrection and a general strike—that could prevent it. Once war had begun, however, his pacifism became aggressive: peace could only be achieved once Prussian militarism had been crushed, and Hervé rejected any other attempts to end the war.

On these two issues, Hervé was clear. But on so many others, he was not. He showed signs of being a republican, but he claimed still to be a socialist; he may well have been both. He said he was still an internationalist, but he glorified individual nations, and even races. He had certainly renounced insurrection as a means to prevent war, but he talked of insurrection at the end of the war; then, to contradict this, he spoke of class collaboration and a "union nationale."

The reader will be forgiven if he or she finds Hervé's wartime declarations confusing.

**On the Eve of War**

On 1 August 1914, Hervé wrote that socialism had two missions: to prevent the war, and, if unable to do so, to save the country from invasion. Hervé desperately wanted to keep peace. He supported diplomatic solutions, hoping the leaders of the nations involved would see reason and not unleash the dogs of war. He even went so far as to compliment Kaiser Wilhelm II, calling him, likely for the last time, a man of peace. He still wrote with ardour of the insurrection—the simultaneous insurrection—which one day would
demonstrate the unwillingness of the people to butcher each other; but this was not that time:

Certes, pas un socialiste, pas un syndicaliste ne renonce à réaliser un jour, quand tous les peuples seront prêts pour une action concertée et simultanée, sa menace de soulever en même temps, dans toute l'Europe, les peuples contre l'horreur des boucheries internationales.

Pas un n'a renié la pensée généreuse de sauver l'Europe du déshonneur et de la ruine en dressant un jour—quand dans tous les pays le prolétariat sera prêt—contre la guerre menaçante, l'ensemble des forces prolétariennes du monde civilisé.

Mais le jour d'une action concertée et simultanée n'est malheureusement pas encore arrivé!162

He lamented the inability of international socialism to have prepared this insurrection:

Hélas! notre beau rêve de grève générale internationale contre la guerre, où est-il? ... 

[N]os ailes se sont brisées au choc des dures réalités et nous voilà retombés sur le sol, chacun sur notre sol natal, avec la seule préoccupation, pour le moment, de le défendre comme firent nos aîeux, contre les brutalités de l'invasion.

Pour le malheur de l'humanité, notre pauvre Internationale socialiste n'est pas encore capable de poignarder la guerre!163

So France must be defended, and Hervé called on all members of the political left to save it:
Amis socialistes, amis syndicalistes, amis anarchistes, qui n'êtes pas seulement l'avant-garde idéaliste de l'humanité, mais qui êtes encore le nerf et la conscience de l'armée française, la patrie est en danger!

La patrie de la Révolution est en danger! 164

Inspired, perhaps, by the recent martyrdom of Jean Jaurès (Jaurès, tragically, had been assassinated the night of 31 July 1914), Hervé even offered himself to the cause, despite his age (43) and poor eyesight. 165

Insurrection, though, was out. Despite Hervé's earlier renunciation of this tactic, the French government still considered him dangerous enough to be included on a list of radicals—called "Le Carnet B"—to be closely watched should war appear likely. Historian Jean-Jacques Becker writes that the French government believed there was a real risk of mobilization being hindered, even if not completely sabotaged. 166

But Becker argues that Hervé's position, at least his earlier insurrectionism, was not that influential within the SFIO, and that the chances French socialists would sabotage mobilization were slim:

Il apparaît donc bien que si la tendance "insurrectionnaliste" de Gustave Hervé, malgré tout un peu en marge du Parti socialiste, a pris les positions les plus catégoriques, le Parti, tout en se dressant vigoureusement contre le danger de guerre, n'a suivi les Hervéistes que de façon prudente et limitée et a gardé à son action une allure pondérée,
de sorte qu'on ne peut pas sans excès l'accuser de vouloir saboter une mobilisation éventuelle. 167

Unquestionably, Hervé would not be hindering mobilization. He told of how, despite its faults, the republic still had qualities worth defending:

Malgré nos justes griefs contre la patrie actuelle qui reste, sous son étiquette républicaine, une marâtre si dure pour la classe ouvrière, nous l'aimons, à notre façon, pour les germes de liberté intellectuelle et de justice sociale que nos ainés ont déposés en ses flancs. 168

If there remained any doubt, Hervé dispelled it in an article entitled "Ni Insurrection! Ni Grève Générale!", written on 29 July 1914. In it, he wrote that while socialists and their followers had not forever forsaken using the general strike to combat militarism, they would not be using it in this case:

Nous avons reculé, oui, reculé d'abord parce que nous avons fait la constatation à l'époque de la guerre des Balkans, que nous étions très loin, nous ici, en France, du degré de préparation et d'organisation qui nous aurait permis de tenter avec quelque chance de réussite ce coup de force révolutionnaire: que chacun se tâte; que chacun se demande si, à l'heure actuelle un coup de force révolutionnaire aurait la moindre chance d'aboutir en France!

Mais nous avons reculé surtout parce qu'à la même époque, lors de cette alerte, nous avons
acquis la certitude que les socialistes autrichiens et les socialistes allemands seraient encore moins en état que nous de faire la moindre tentative de grève générale insurrectionnelle. . . .

Il ne s'agit pas de dire que la guerre finie, nous déposerons les armes, à Berlin, à Paris, à Saint-Pétersbourg, à Vienne, à Rome, à Londres sans régler quelques vieux comptes, avec le régime de désordre et d'injustice capitaliste et avec les partis conservateurs et nationalistes qui auront été responsables de la boucherie.

Il s'agit de dire très haut, parce que c'est la vérité, d'abord, parce que c'est notre intérêt politique, ensuite, que, dans les circonstances actuelles, nous ne saboterons pas la défense nationale. 169

And in another article written the same day, Hervé reiterated that, since insurrection was impossible, international socialists had but one duty if war could not be stopped--to defend the country of Revolution:

Si la catastrophe se produit, dans l'impuissance constatée où nous sommes, nous socialistes de toute l'Europe, d'empêcher la guerre par une grève générale insurrectionnelle concertée et déclanchée en même temps dans tous les pays, nous ne connaissons qu'un devoir--nous les socialistes internationalistes--c'est de défendre le foyer de liberté, que nos pères, les révolutionnaires de 1789, de 1792, de 1848 et de 1870 et de la Commune ont créé au prix de tant d'efforts et de tant de sang!

Entre l'Allemagne Impériale et la France Républicaine, pas d'hésitation, notre choix est fait. Vive la France républicaine et socialiste! 170
Hervé's unequivocal renunciation of insurrection on the eve of war was more than just vociferous righteousness. He wanted to make his position clear not only to other socialists but to the French government. Workers had been staging peaceful demonstrations against war, and the authorities had been cracking down on them. Hervé criticized the government, claiming "son attitude à l'égard de la class ouvrière constitue en ce moment un véritable sabotage de la défense nationale, un crime contre la patrie."\(^1\) But he also criticized the SFIO and the CGT for inviting this repression upon them by not publicly renouncing the insurrectionary general strike:

Tant qu'il craindra que nous tentions une telle grève, qui, de toute évidence, serait à l'heure actuelle un sabotage criminel de la défense nationale, comment veut-on qu'il traite nos meetings, nos projets de manifestations dans la rue, avec quelque douceur?\(^2\)

Hervé's patriotic stance and his repudiation of insurrection were simply confirmations of the change he had made two years earlier. His pacifism, however, changed with the outbreak of war. Peace could now only come about with the crushing of Prussian militarism, and Hervé's writings during the first few months of the war exemplified his new position.
The Crusade

Throughout the first few months of the war, Hervé maintained a critical attitude towards certain parts of the French war effort. He criticized the inefficiency and disorganization of the medical treatment of the wounded; he discussed and disagreed with certain decisions by the military strategists; he denounced extremely chauvinistic attitudes and the treatment of foreigners—especially Germans and Austrians—in France. Not infrequently, parts of his articles were suppressed by the censors.

But he never questioned the need to fight the war. This was more than just a war to defend France; it was a moral crusade:

Le républicain libre penseur ou socialiste qui meurt sur le champ de bataille trouve en sa conscience, au moment suprême, de puissantes consolations.

Il sait qu'il est le soldat de la paix, qu'il meurt en combattant la bête noire de tous les républicains et de tous les socialistes: le militarisme et la guerre; il sait qu'en démolissant le militarisme prussien, c'est le militarisme tout entier, c'est la guerre elle-même qu'il frappe au coeur. . . .

Pour les nôtres, la guerre d'aujourd'hui n'est pas seulement une guerre de défense nationale: elle est devenue une sorte de guerre sociale, de croisade démocratique et républicaine pour la liberté et la paix de l'Europe.
Even with Tsarist Russia on their side, the Allies were on the side of right:

Malgré la présence de la Russie dans le camp des alliés, la France, l'Angleterre et l'héroïque Belgique représentent, en face de la caste militaire austro-hongroise et de l'impérialisme teuton, la Civilisation, le Droit et la Justice. \(^{174}\)

When there was word of German atrocities in Belgium and in France—notably the torching of the cathedral at Reims—Hervé spoke of "reprisals": the intentional safeguarding of German historical and cultural buildings. France must take the moral high ground:

Je veux que notre attitude en Allemagne soit tellement différente de celle des Allemands en France et en Belgique que les pierres elles-mêmes reconnaissent que notre victoire est la victoire de la civilisation. \(^{175}\)

He wrote that the allies—the French, the British, the Belgians—represented "l'élite de la race humaine, intellectuellement et moralement." \(^{176}\) And it was not long before he was suggesting that God was on their side: "Et les alliés nous pleuvent du ciel, comme si le Père Éternel était avec nous." \(^{177}\)

It was not just France's history—as the land of revolution, as the Republic—that convinced Hervé that France was on the side of right. Though Hervé had once claimed that it was impossible to tell which side was the aggressor when war
broke out, he was now convinced that France had done everything in her power to prevent the war. Even before war had been declared, he argued that no socialist would think of staging an insurrection or general strike "en présence de l'attitude sincèrement pacifique de notre gouvernement dans le conflit européen." 178 Once war had begun, Hervé was still sure that the French government had been pacifistic:

Le gouvernement a fait l'impossible ... pour empêcher la catastrophe. ... Pour montrer ses intentions pacifiques, il a reculé toutes nos troupes à 10 kilomètres de la frontière, pendant toutes les négociations qui ont précédé la rupture. 179

Hervé was not alone in his assessment. Historian Alfred Cobban corroborated Hervé's view of the French government's desire for peace:

The 1914 election proved that even in the existing state of international tension French opinion was profoundly pacific and non-aggressive.

France could only stand by and watch passively the moves on the international board that were pushing her helplessly and inexorably into war. That the most pacific Chamber the country had ever known should have led France into a world war was ironic. 180

Hervé not only blamed the German government for its aggressive attitude; he criticized German socialists for not having
supported the efforts of French socialists to prevent war years before:

Pendant des années, nous vous avons suppliés, si la guerre éclatait sans que nos gouvernements aillent devant le Tribunal de la paix régler leurs différends, de nous engager les uns vis-à-vis des autres à répondre à une déclaration de guerre par la grève générale et l'insurrection de chaque côté de la frontière: vous nous avez ri au nez.

Nous vous avons supplié alors de poser devant la conscience du peuple allemand la question d'Alsace-Lorraine, de régler à l'amiable avec nous cette question douloureuse et dangereuse, pour nous permettre de nous dégager, nous de l'alliance russe qui était une garantie contre une nouvelle mutilation de votre part, vous de l'alliance autrichienne, qui devait fatalement vous amener à un conflit avec la Russie: vous nous avez ri au nez.¹⁸¹

Hervé went further, stating that German socialists, for not having attempted to prevent war with a general strike, were "cowardly"¹⁸² and lacked "un peu ... d'estomac."¹⁸³

Yet Hervé was not expressing any latent anti-German sentiment; he distinguished between ordinary Germans—even some German socialists—and the Prussian militarism he abominated. Just before the war broke out, he wrote:

Si nous nous battons, que le peuple allemand sache que ce n'est pas à lui que nous en voulons, mais à la caste militaire prussienne qui aura déchainé l'ouragan.¹⁸⁴
Even once war had begun, he maintained this position:

Ne voit-on pas que le seul moyen de diminuer la durée de la guerre, c'est de crier partout que nous faisons une distinction entre le peuple allemand, et son gouvernement, c'est d'essayer de détacher le peuple allemand, qui a subi la guerre, de la clique militaire prussienne qui l'a voulue et préméditée? 185

Not only was Prussian militarism to blame for the present war, Hervé suggested, but it had been suffocating the whole of Europe since the Franco-Prussian War: "Depuis quarante-quatre ans, l'Europe entière étouffait, et l'Allemagne avec elle, sous la cuirasse écrasante et ruineuse que la caste militaire allemande lui imposait." 186 Hervé rejected the idea of a settled peace; the only way to end the war, to achieve a lasting peace, was to crush this militarism forever:

La paix, nous l'accorderons, mais quand nous serons à Berlin, pas avant, quand nous aurons cassé les reirs à votre militarisme que vous avez été impuissants à mater vous-mêmes, et en ayant bien soin de prendre quelques précautions pour vous mettre tous--puisque vous vous êtes solidarisés dans le crime avec vos gouvernants--hors d'état de troubler de longtemps la paix de l'Europe.

Car vous n'imaginez pas sans doute que vous n'allez pas payer cher ce que vous avez fait à cette héroïque Belgique? 187

Still, he did not believe in holding a grudge against the German people. While he recommended that Belgium receive
large indemnities once war was over, he warned against imposing an abusive peace, presaging (though underestimating, by about thirty years, German impatience) the era of Adolph Hitler: "Si nous abusons de notre victoire comme Napoléon Ier, dans cinquante ans l'Allemagne voudra sa revanche et ce sera la guerre éternelle." 189

Not surprisingly, Hervé oversimplified the reasons for the outbreak of war. German aggression was far from being the only or even the main cause of the First World War; France was not without blame. Cobban's suggestion that France was an innocent bystander, dragged into the war against its will, is also simplistic. That significant elements of French society wanted war is undeniable. "Revanche" was still on the minds of many French citizens in 1914.

**Something For Everyone**

Hervé's tone of moral rectitude and his assurance that the Allies would prevail made it seem that his change, from antipatriotism to patriotism, from insurrectional antimilitarism to crusading pacifism, was total. Certainly he was now a patriot; certainly his pacifism was now of a conquering kind. Yet his articles in *La Guerre Sociale* still showed him adopting a variety of political stances. Some complemented each other; many others were contradictory. The Hervé of mid-to-late 1914 cannot be so easily categorized.

Two years before the war, Hervé had justified defending France. The coming of war both intensified and broadened his
patriotism. He now recognized and accepted the whole idea of nationalism, not merely as it applied to France. The United States of Europe, his international federation of the people of Europe, was still an ideal; but now nations, not CGT cells, were to be its building blocks:

Et quand nous aurons fondé sur le Droit des nations, des petites comme des grandes, l'Europe nouvelle et la paix internationale, en prenant des garanties contre tout retour offensif du militarisme ... 190

Hervé now wrote glowingly of individuals whose names were synonymous with nationalism, such as the nineteenth-century Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi:

Son âme immortelle est en nous, comme est en nous, à cette heure suprême, l'âme de tous ceux, quelle que soit leur nationalité, qui ont souffert pour la liberté des nations et pour le droit humain.191

Nationalism was to be glorified. Hervé rejected the Marxist belief that capitalism had led to the war; rather, he said, the war had been caused by the suppression by the powerful of legitimate nationalist movements:

En réalité, la guerre actuelle a pour son cause non le régime capitaliste, mais le lamentable état politique de l'Europe, où des peuples, parce qu'ils sont forts, s'opposent à la réalisation des aspirations nationales les plus légitimes de peuples plus faibles, qui ont le même droit qu'eux à la vie, et où certaines castes, pour conserver leur prestige, refusent de faire droit à ces aspirations
nationales.192

Hervé had once argued that class ties cut across national boundaries, rendering countries irrelevant. His new belief was that nationalism cut across classes—it would be the glue uniting France in the postwar world:

Disparues, ou du moins dépouillées de leur venin, les vieilles passions politiques, religieuses et sociales d'avant la guerre!
Lequel des riches osera, à l'avenir, refuser sa part des bienfaits et des richesses de la patrie à cette classe ouvrière qui a su si bien prendre sa part des dangers et des souffrances?
Lequel des plus pauvres osera nier qu'il y avait une belle flamme d'idéalisme dans cette bourgeoisie dont les fils, abandonnant gaïment leur bien-être et leur luxe, acceptèrent joyeusement la vie des tranchées et affrontèrent la mort si gaillardement? 193

Hervé threw his support and that of the left behind postwar class collaboration:

La belle concorde nationale dont vous avez été les témoins, aux premiers jours de la mobilisation, s'est maintenue et se maintiendra jusqu'à la fin de la guerre, et, si ça dépend de nous,--les énergumènes de l'extrême gauche,--même après la guerre.194

Race was a basic tenet of Hervé's emphasis on nationalism. New nations should logically be formed along racial and ethnic
lines. Back in 1905, Hervé had preferred a socialist society, which ignored race, language, and ethnicity:

Socialism groups men, poor against rich, class against class, without taking into account the differences of race and language, and over and above the frontiers traced by history. 195

In 1910, Hervé had cited Switzerland as an example of "la forme fédérative," a model society which cut across racial and linguistic lines; 196 in 1913, he had offered it again as proof that "les races latine et germaine n'ont entre elles aucune antipathie originelle." 197

The wartime Hervé now believed that race was the basis of a nation. He criticized Austria-Hungary as

ce monstre contre nature, cette salade de peuples qui est tout, excepté une nation, cette monarchie hybride qui resterait un abcès purulent au coeur de l'Europe du vingtième siècle, comme la Turquie, pour les mêmes raisons, le fut pour l'Europe du dix-neuvième siècle. 198

All peoples should unite! All should join with their own kind! Hervé declares, as he slices up the European ethnic pie and dishes out the pieces:

Italiens, Trente et Trieste vont venir rejoindre la noble patrie italienne!
Roumains, vos frères de Transylvanie vous ser-ont rendus!
Serbes, vos frères de Bosnie, d'Herzégovine et
de Croatie vont être délivrés!

Hongrois, le grand rêve de Kossuth va se réaliser: la Hongrie va recouvrer son indépendance avec la République!

Tchèques de Bohême, de Moravie et de Silésie, demain votre République tchèque se dressera libre du joug allemand que vous subissiez depuis cinq siècles.

Polonais, la Pologne est à demi sortie de son tombeau, et elle va ressusciter d'entre les morts.

Juifs, je ne sais si Sion, un jour, revivra, mais vous avez entendu la bonne nouvelle: vos frères vont recevoir, même en Russie, l'égalité civile et politique!

Bonne chance, armée des nations!
En avant, pour les États-Unis d'Europe! 199

Even postwar Germany should repatriate its ethnic Germans, Hervé writes, in a paragraph which would comfort Hitler:

Mais quand l'Allemagne aura été amputée des provinces non allemandes qu'elle a volées, l'Alsace-Lorraine, le Schlesvig danois et la Pologne prussienne, quand le peuple allemand aura vomi ses Hohenzollern, on voit mal l'Angleterre et la France assez folles pour refuser à la confédération germanique reconstituée sous une forme républicaine les dix millions d'Allemands d'Autriche qui lui reviennent de droit. 200

Omens of racist thought appear; Hervé suggests that an indirect cause of the war may have been a low French birthrate:

Quelle belle race que la nôtre, mon ôeux, tout de même!
Et comme c'est stupide qu'une race pareille, dans ce dernier demi-siècle, ait omis, ou presque, de faire des enfants, au point que sa faible natalité'est peut-être une des causes indirectes de la guerre actuelle!  

And Hervé the antimilitarist had begun to speak of the military prestige of France:

La République est assise, et bien assise, et quand elle aura réparé les fautes de la monarchie impériale, rendu à la France l'Alsace-Lorraine et le prestige militaire que l'Empire lui avait fait perdre, elle sera fondée sur le roc.

Yet through all this nationalist rhetoric shone rays, however faint, of Hervé's internationalism. It was not the antipatriotic internationalism of old, as we have surely seen; but he still hoped for a federation of European nations--his United States of Europe. Thus the French flag was now the equal of, but had not yet transcended, that of the International:

Le drapeau tricolore porte dans ces plus glorieux les mêmes espérances qu'il portait à Valmy, et ... aujourd'hui il ... semble aussi beau, aussi sublime que le drapeau rouge de notre Internationale!

The flag of the Socialist International, Hervé wrote, "malgré la tempête, reste pour nous le symbole de toutes nos espérances d'humanité et l'emblème de la future fraternité uni-
verselle!" Society's downtrodden masses had renounced nothing, Hervé declared,

ni le syndicalisme, ni le socialisme, ni l'internationalisme, ni la libre-pensée! ... [N]ous les gueux, nous sommes les héritiers naturels de toutes les richesses intellectuelles et morales que la France des mécènes, des parpaillots et des encyclopédistes a produites depuis Rabelais jusqu'à Renan et Zola, en passant par Voltaire, Diderot et Condorcet.

Nous avons reçu en dépôt de nos ancêtres qui était à Valmy ... les Droits de l'homme et le Droit des nations, ces évangiles des temps modernes.

Ils nous ont légué la tâche sublime de fonder la paix dans le monde, de briser tous les militarismes, de renverser tous les trônes, de supprimer tous les privilèges de naissance. ... [D]ans nos congrès socialistes et syndicalistes les nôtres, instituteurs ou ouvriers, continueront à crier très haut leur rêve de justice sociale et de paix internationale,—car nous continuerons, après ces horreurs, à crier plus haut que jamais notre haine de la guerre.205

The socialist society had not been forgotten. Hervé still envisioned cities where communal property had replaced private property:

Dans la cité de mes rêves, il n'y aura plus de propriétaires d'immeubles, de propriétaires privés du moins; les maisons d'habitation--et bien d'autres choses encore--seront propriétés commu-
nales. Les villes administreront leurs maisons d'habitation comme beaucoup d'entre elles adminis-
trent déjà, en divers pays leurs services des eaux, de l'éclairage, de voirie, des transports en commun.206

Hervé had no regrets either about the internationalist stance that the socialists had adopted before the war. Here he defends it:

Notre internationalisme, une erreur? Une erreur d'avoir voulu extirper le chauvinisme et les haines internationales du coeur de tous les ouvriers de toutes les nations pour tâcher d'empêcher des guerres pareilles à celles qui avaient ensanglanté le XIXe siècle? Une erreur d'avoir prêché aux ouvriers de toute l'Europe la fraternité, pour essayer d'orienter les différentes nations vers la fédéra-
tion des États-Unis d'Europe? . . .

Pacifistes et internationalistes hier, nous ser-
on pacifistes et internationalistes demain, quand nous aurons arraché les griffes au militarisme et au nationalisme allemands.

C'est parce qu'ils sont des pacifistes acharnés que nos amis socialistes qui sont au front sont les plus enragés à combattre le militarisme austro-
allemand, qui est la clef de voûte du militarisme européen.

C'est parce qu'ils sont des internationalistes fanatiques qu'ils seront les derniers à consentir qu'on fasse quartier au pangermanisme, qui est la forme la plus odieuse et la plus répugnante des nationalismes européens. . . .

Tous les Français, demain, à commencer par les généraux, les officiers et les soldats, qui auront
Thus the wartime Gustave Hervé. He could write as passionately about nationalism as about internationalism. He suggested that all races, all peoples, should unite with their own kind to form nations, but that these nations, great and small alike, join together in a federated United States of Europe. Despite his focus on race and ethnicity as the new means by which to group people, he still wrote of "les gueux" and their place in society, of their being the natural heirs to the French intellectual and cultural tradition of rebelliousness. He declared that Germany should be allowed to repatriate the ethnic Germans of Austria after the war, but he warned of the dangers of Pan-Germanism. On the eve of war, he wrote that he still believed in an insurrection—someday—by "des forces prolétariennes du monde civilisé," later, he claimed to be for "la concorde nationale" after the war. He could speak as a liberal republican in favour of parliamentarism, yet he could announce, in an article entitled "Vive le Tsar!", that "Nicholas II est capable de devenir un nouveau tsar libérateur!"

Hervé's wartime statements can be bewildering. Certainly, a number of his positions were incompatible; others appeared to be contradictory, but can be explicable, depending
on one's interpretation. His nationalism can be reconciled with his internationalism if one accepts that Hervé's nations, based on race and ethnicity, were just the basic components of his larger federal system.

The vehemence, even by Hervé's standards, of some of his wartime articles (in which exclamation marks abound) can be attributed to the mere fact of their having been written during the war, when even the coolest of heads can be incited to passionate outburst.

We are left, then, with a man whose views changed significantly within a decade--most of that change having occurred before the war, the great event of the era--but whose new positions contained elements, however distorted, of the old. In the final section of this thesis, these changes will be examined to determine whether there was any logic to them.

Conclusions

The two principal tenets of Gustave Hervé's early political philosophy--antipatriotic internationalism and anti-militarist pacifism--underwent major changes in the decade before the First World War. The first change, in 1912, was the most significant: it arose from Hervé's growing doubt of successfully staging an insurrectionary general strike. His early position had been one of extreme antipatriotism: he had espoused not defending the bourgeois regime under any circumstances. Only once a socialist collectivist society had been achieved should the masses take up arms in its de-
fense, Hervé had argued. A military and civilian general strike could hasten the establishment of such a society if the bourgeois nation were attacked. Hervé's willingness to revolt rather than wage war was internationalist in considering supranational class ties stronger than national ties; it was pacifistic in refusing to condone the slaughter of fellow though foreign workers and peasants to benefit the rich capitalst class. The idea of insurrection had been basic both to Hervé's internationalism and his pacifism—in attaining an international socialist society, and as a means to prevent war.

So when, in 1912, Hervé became convinced that an insurrection was impossible, his internationalism and pacifism changed. He declared that if the other side (for all intents and purposes, the Germans) could not or would not stage a general strike, then he could not condone one in France. Hervé, while still claiming to be an internationalist, to retain hope for an insurrection someday—but not now—had become a patriot, stating that if France were attacked, she must be defended.

Though Hervé remained a pacifist, the nature of his pacifism changed. His early position had been one best described by his statement "Whoever be the aggressor, rather insurrection than war!" Now he adopted an attitude of "Anything to prevent war, but war if all fails." The impossibility of insurrection, which, he now stressed, must be simultaneous, meant that a Franco-German entente had to be negotiated. The main obstacle was the lingering issue of which country, if
either, should govern the Alsace-Lorraine region, once French, but at that time under German rule. Hervé proffered many practical solutions, all intended to ease the tensions between the two countries, none likely to satisfy either government. The solutions Hervé proposed showed his acceptance of bourgeois notions of legality and property; Hervé the collectivist socialist showed definite signs of becoming a republican as well as a patriot.

As war threatened and then erupted in 1914, Hervé's philosophy changed once again. His recently-arrived-at patriotism remained essentially unchanged, but it did intensify. Even before war began, he announced unequivocally, to the many who still doubted him, that he was wholly against an insurrectionary general strike and wholly for defending "la Patrie." He claimed still to be an internationalist—and was, if one considers internationalist his talk about the United States of Europe. Yet even this he envisioned as a federation of nations based on ethnicity and race, not on class as he had once hoped.

While Hervé's patriotic position had not changed fundamentally from what it had been in 1912, his pacifism had. He did, even on the eve of the war, urge the French and German governments and people to do everything possible to prevent its outbreak—everything except attempt an insurrection. Once war did begin, however, he could not go on calling for preventive measures; but his new stance was not one which might be expected of someone who had been such an ardent
advocate of peace. He did not favour a quick and fair peace settlement, whether it was or was not possible that early in the war. Hervé now believed the only way to achieve European peace was to conquer Germany and rid it of Prussian militarism. His tone had become sanctimonious; his patriotism had hardened into chauvinism. France had to right the historical wrong done to it in 1871 and bring Alsace-Lorraine back into its fold. It was leading its allies on a moral crusade, a crusade of Right, Justice, and Civilization. The idea of France liberating Europe had a slightly Napoleonic ring to it. Hervé's pacifism had become "peace through conquest."

Yet the Hervé of the second half of 1914 would now and then show signs of having kept or revived his earlier views. He was critical of certain parts of the French war effort. He would pardon German atrocities, arguing that the soldiers of all nations were capable of acting the same way in times of war. He distinguished between the Prussian militarist caste, which was responsible for the war, and the German people, who, in defending their country, were only doing what was natural. But this in itself—tacit acceptance of the defense of the nation—showed just how much he had changed.

Hervé did not try to pretend that he had not changed; nor did he try to excuse his past. At the SFIO Congress in January 1914, he defended his radical, belligerent past, and even implied that he was still a man of action:

Vous représentez, vous autres, une des forces de
notre Parti: la doctrine, la doctrine que je rai
darfois, quand on en abuse, mais dont je sens bien
la nécessité pour marquer la direction aux masses
qui nous suivent.

Et moi, je représente, avec mes défauts d'homme
et de journaliste, cette autre chose non moins néc-
essaire, dont on se préoccupe surtout de cet autre
côté de notre Parti (le côté jauresiste): le sou-
ci d'action immédiate.

Vous êtes la doctrine avec ce qu'elle a de figé
et d'immuable.

Je suis l'action, avec ce qu'elle a de fébrile,
avec ce que la vie peut comporter d'agitation et
d'incohérence. 212

Hervé did not discount his old theories, but he did admit to
being wrong about one crucial factor: he had overestimated
the extent to which each side--but particularly the German
side--was prepared to stage an insurrectionary general strike.
Indeed, the issue of the simultaneity of insurrection is per-
haps the key to determining whether Hervé's switch was expli-
cable or justifiable.

Hervé's early position regarding this issue was unclear.
He had not stated that insurrection must be simultaneous, but
much of what he wrote implied that it would be. He seemed
confident that revolutionary propaganda was being spread
equally on both sides of the French-German border: if one
side staged an insurrection when attacked, then surely the
other must follow. He did at times admit that socialists
had a long way to go, that their influence, while growing,
was not yet such that the majority of the people was on their
side. This admission in itself suggests that since insurrection had not been properly prepared, it should not be attempted. Even Hervé's declaration "Whoever be the aggressor, rather insurrection than war!" can be ambiguous as regards what to do if insurrection is impossible.

It can also be argued that Hervé saw insurrection only as a means to prevent war. He once declared: "Our threat is nothing more . . . than a conditional one. . . . It depends on the exploiting class whether our threat is put into execution." (See note 117). Such a statement can be seen to say that insurrection would not be attempted other than as a response to war.

Moreover, Hervé, speaking in 1913, said that not only did he advocate defending France if Germany were the aggressor, but that he had held this position for the last ten years:

Si le gouvernement allemand refuse, nous saurons alors de quel côté est la civilisation et, j'ai beau ne pas être un fougueux nationaliste, bien que je sois devenu réactionnaire, paraît-il, j'avoue, et je tiens à le dire, et je le dis depuis dix ans, je dis que si le gouvernement français, que si la nation française, que si l'État Français, même avec toutes ses imperfections, avait cette supériorité sur le régime allemand, qu'il accepterait d'inscrire l'arbitrage pour tous les cas dans sa constitution, que si la guerre éclatait, c'est le gouvernement allemand qui serait l'agresseur, et je saurais alors ce qui me resterait à faire.²¹³ (Emphasis added)
But these two suggestions—that the insurrection must be simultaneous, and that Hervé would support the defense of France if Germany were the aggressor—are contradicted by a number of his early statements. He had once declared "Whoever be the aggressor, rather insurrection than war"; how could he now claim to have argued for ten years that France must defend herself against an aggressive Germany? Nor does this statement reconcile with his early declaration that living under French or German rule made little difference to the masses. He once said that in times of impending war it was impossible to tell which country was the aggressor; how could he now be so certain it was Germany, even a year before the war began? And, given his early antipatriotism, why should it matter? If the insurrection was only a threat, only used to scare capitalist society away from starting a war, why had Hervé delineated so clearly the nature and structure of a collectivist society? He had once said that only a small group, a revolutionary elite, was needed to carry out the revolution; why should he consider socialism's millions of supporters, even if not a majority of the population, insufficient for the task? He feared the nationalist wind of madness which had overtaken the Balkans. Surely the socialist movements of France and Germany were more advanced than those of the Balkans; surely socialism had entered mass consciousness to a greater degree in the industrialized West than it had in the less-developed East.

Despite the ambiguities apparent in his early declara-
tions, it is difficult to argue convincingly that Hervé had always been a latent patriot or bourgeois republican. Nor had his change been stimulated by any cataclysmic event. The outburst of nationalism in the Balkans may have made him apprehensive, but was that reason enough to succumb to it? To give up the cause of socialism through insurrection?

Perhaps Hervé's early antipatriotic internationalism was constructed on a faulty intellectual foundation. It was built from below rather than from above; it was based on small, local cells rather than large, all-encompassing international organizations. Was the Socialist International anything more to him than a convenient forum from which to spread his propaganda?

Hervé's outlook did have some truly internationalist characteristics. He did envision these local cells joining together to form a large federation. He did accept and applaud modern countries like Switzerland, where different ethnic and linguistic groups lived together peacefully. He even advocated adoption of a universal second language--Esperanto--to make communication between different peoples easier. 214

But though his outlook was not entirely localist, it was essentially so. Like the nationalism he once despised, Hervé's localism was based on an irrational, instinctive emotion: the love of the land of one's birth and upbringing, which he called "steeple patriotism". And if nationalism's focus is narrow and exclusionist, that of localism is more so.
Even Hervé's later United States of Europe was exclusionist, grouping people according to race and ethnicity, as though populations were homogeneous and concentrated, not diverse and scattered. Hervé did not recognize that its principle of self-determination of nations inevitably brings different peoples into conflict. His United States of Europe, in its later incarnation, may have been as much a convenient justification of his nationalism as a sincere attempt to promote internationalism.

It is possible, then, that Hervé's early philosophy of antipatriotic internationalism and antimilitaristic pacifism contained the seeds of its own destruction—that his later patriotic stance was not surprising because the foundation of his internationalism was weak. His conduct after the First World War suggests that his patriotism had deep roots.

Yet these roots were far from obvious: few of Hervé's early contemporaries would have predicted that he would become a patriot. Though elements of his early philosophy were ambiguous, its fervently antipatriotic nature cannot be denied. One must not focus on pools of ambiguity in a sea of explicit dogmatism. Similarly, to label Hervé's thought simplistic does not render simple explanations for the change—that it was due to latent anti-German feeling, that it was merely the latest stage through which a dogmatic mind was passing—valid.

Such approaches are facile. Elements of Hervé's early antipatriotism may have betokened the change itself, but not
its completeness. Gustave Hervé's ideological turnabout, however gradually it occurred, must be considered unforeseeable and remarkable.
Notes

The books *La Patrie en Danger* and *Après la Marne*, which together cover the period from 1 July 1914 to 1 Feb 1915, are compilations of Hervé's articles in *La Guerre Sociale*. References to these books give dates of the articles cited as well as page numbers in the books.


3 **Int.**, Préface, p. vii.


6 *La Guerre Sociale*, 16-22 Jan 1907; hereafter cited as **GS**.

7 Gustave Hervé, *Après la Marne* (Paris: Bibliothèque des Ouvrages Documentaires, 1915), 11 Nov 1914, p. 43; here-
after cited as AM.

8 PD, 29 July 1914, pp. 22-24.


17 Joll, p. 114.


22 L'Humanité, 17 May 1905.
23 L'Humanité, 4 Aug 1905.
24 L'Humanité, 4 Aug 1905.
25 L'Humanité, 4 Aug 1905.


27 Lenin (I), p. 73.

28 E. Belfort Bax, Preface to Gustave Hervé's My Country, Right or Wrong, trans. Guy Bowman (London: Fifield, 1910), pp. 1-2. This is a translation of Hervé's Leur Patrie, which was first published in 1905. It will hereafter be cited as MCRW.

29 Guy Bowman, Translator's Introduction to Hervé's MCRW, p. 10.
Bowman, in MCRW, pp. 5-6.


Weitz, p. 9.

Weitz, pp. 10-11.


Weinstein, pp. 173-177.


Mazgaj, p. 214.

Mazgaj, pp. 162-165.

Mazgaj, p. 209.

Mazgaj, p. 200.


Baumont, p. 163.


Stromberg, p. 280.

Stromberg, p. 284.

48 Joll, p. 134.


55 *RS*, pp. 10-11.

56 *RS*, p. 24.

57 *RS*. The following description derives from pp. 3-4.

58 *GS*, 30 Oct-5 Nov 1907.

59 *RS*, p. 19.


62 Int., p. 139.

63 GS, 23-29 Jan 1907.

64 VR, p. 18.

65 VR, p. 28.

66 GS, 31 July-6 Aug 1907.

67 GS, 31 July-6 Aug 1907.

68 VR, p. 28.

69 VR, p. 25.


71 VR, pp. 26-27.

72 VR, p. 30.

73 VR, pp. 30-31.

74 VR, p. 31.

75 GS, 23-29 Jan 1907.


77 Int., pp. 139-140.

78 MCRW, p. 207.

79 GS, 4-10 Sept 1907.


81 Int., p. 5; Préface, p. vii.

Int., p. 150.


Int., pp. 141-142.

MCRW, p. 100.

MCRW, p. 131.

MCRW, p. 93.

MCRW, p. 94.

AP, Preface, p. v.

MCRW, p. 21.

MCRW, p. 140.

AP, pp. 18-19.

AP, pp. 19-20.

GS, 8-14 May 1907.

MCRW, p. 134.

DS, p. 11.

Coll., p. 9.

MCRW, pp. 146-147.

MCRW. The preceding derives from pp. 154-158.

MCRW, pp. 158-159.

MCRW, p. 219.

VR, p. 27.

RS, p. 12.

MCRW, as cited in Appendix, p. 250.
106 GS, 8-14 May 1907.
107 GS, 8-14 May 1907.
108 GS, 4-10 Sept 1907.
109 GS, 28 Aug-3 Sept 1907.
110 GS, 6-12 Nov 1907.
111 GS, 2-8 Oct 1907.
112 AP, p. 25.
113 MCRW, pp. 190, 192.
114 MCRW, p. 135.
118 AP, pp. 20-21.
119 RS, p. 12.
120 MCRW, pp. 222-230.
121 MCRW, p. 225.
122 MCRW, p. 103.
124 Pierre Monatte, "La CGT a-t-elle rectifié son tir?" in Vie Ouvrière, 93 (Aug 1913), 129-139, cited in Mazgaj, pp. 210-211.
125 as cited in AL, pp. 162-163.
126 AL, pp. 97-98.
127 AL, p. 42.
128 AL, Préface, p. 9.
129 AL, p. 35.
130 AL, Préface, p. 10.
131 AL, pp. 157-158.
132 MCRW, Preface, p. 20.
133 AL, p. 134.
134 AL, pp. 15-16.
135 AL, Préface, p. 5.
136 AL, p. 45.
137 AL, p. 171.
138 AL, p. 19.
139 AL, Préface, pp. 5-6.
140 AL, p. 93, note 1.
141 AL, Préface, p. 10.
142 AL, pp. 105-106.
143 AL, p. 139.
144 AL, p. 128.
146 AL, pp. 107-113.
147 AL, p. 112.
148 AL, pp. 112-113.
149 AL, p. 95.
151 AL, p. 40.
152 10ème Congrès, p. 311.
153 AL, pp. 123-144.
154 AL, p. 97.

181 AM, 24 Jan 1915, p. 296.
182 AM, 27 Dec 1914, p. 200.
183 AM, 5 Dec 1914, p. 126.
184 PD, 31 July 1914, p. 36.
185 PD, 5 Oct 1914, p. 253.
186 AM, 25 Dec 1914, p. 192.
188 AM, 1 Jan 1915, p. 214.
189 PD, 12 Oct 1914, p. 277.
190 AM, 2 Jan 1915, p. 219.
191 PD, 18 Aug 1914, p. 95.
192 AM, 22 Jan 1915, p. 289.
194 PD, 19 Oct 1914, p. 302.
195 MCRW, Preface, p. 20.
196 Int., p. 176.
197 AL, p. 170,
198 AM, 24 Jan 1915, p. 297.
199 PD, 22 Aug 1914, pp. 111-112.
200 PD, 20 Sept 1914, p. 197.
201 PD, 21 Oct 1914, p. 312.
202 AM, 24 Dec 1914, p. 188.
203 PD, 4 Aug 1914, pp. 47-49.
204 PD, 13 Sept 1914, p. 174.


208 **PD**, 30 July 1914, p. 33.


210 **AM**, 20 Dec 1914, p. 177.

211 **PD**, 12 Sept 1914, p. 171.


213 10ème Congrès, p. 260.

214 **Int.**, Chapter X.
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