NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilamage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.
Habermas on Weber: The Structure of Modernity, the Content of Modernization and the Diagnosis of the Times

Joseba I. Esteban

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Philosophy

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August 1992

© Joseba I. Esteban
The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

Abstract

Habermas on Weber: The Structure of Modernity, the Content of Modernization and the Diagnosis of the Times
Joseba I. Esteban

This thesis analyzes Habermas's reconstruction of Weber's theory of rationalization as it is exposed in The Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas argues that Weber failed to distinguish the structural aspects of modernity (the differentiation of the cognitive, ethical, and expressive rationalities) and the content of the historical course of modernization (the institutionalization of purposive-instrumental rationality at the expenses of the normative and the expressive ways of argumentation and action).

The aim of this thesis is to show that Habermas's criticism is not solely based on the theoretical shortcomings of Weber's account of rationalization. Rather, it will be shown that the element of the diagnosis of the times not only is a crucial element in Weber's theory of rationalization but also articulates Habermas's response to Weber.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Philosophy Department for its support and Dr. Zeman and Dr. Drysdale for helping me to discover the work of Habermas and Weber.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROCESS OF RESEARCH AND THE ARGUMENT...1

II. BUILDING THE ROAD TO MODERNITY.................................16
  II.2. The Double Structure of Modernity: Rationalized......16
        Lifeworld and Institutional Modernization.
  II.3. Structure versus Content: Logic and Dynamic of......32
        Development.
  II.4. Description of Modernity as a Structure..............37
  II.5. A Critical Approach......................................57

III. HABERMAS' CRITIQUE OF WEBER.................................66
  III.1. Introduction............................................66
  III.2. Weber's Reaction Against the Enlightened Philosophy
        of History..................................................69
  III.3. Outlining Modernity: The Three Value Spheres......77
  III.4. The Concept of Rationality...............................86
  III.5. Symbolic Rationalization: The Disenchantment of the
        World......................................................90
  III.6. Societal Rationalization: The Protestant Ethic......97

IV. DIAGNOSIS, PERSPECTIVE, AND THE INTEREST OF
    PRACTICAL REASON.........................................118
IV.1. Developmental Theories as Oriented to an Understanding of the Present........................................ 118

IV.2. Locating Standpoints........................................... 124
  IV.2.1. Weber's Individualistic Platform............... 124
  IV.2.2. Intertwined Perspectives: Habermas and the Rational Arena of Intersubjectivity.............. 138

IV.2.3. Habermas Facing Weber. The Vanishing Point.. 148

IV.3. Methodology: The Objectification of the Perspective.......................................................... 156

V. CONCLUSION. DIAGNOSIS OF THE TIMES:

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION........................................... 167

V.1. Diagnosis and Social Development......................... 167

V.2. The Citizen as Client and Consumer....................... 173

V.3. Organization and Personality.............................. 176

V.4. Organization and Culture................................... 183

V.5. Organization of Society................................... 195

NOTES................................................................. 199

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................... 216
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. JURGEN HABERMAS' WORKS


PDM The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987)


2. MAX WEBER'S WORKS


As Max Weber noted, motivation for research in the cultural sciences does not arise from purely theoretical reasons. Behind such investigations, there stands a close relationship between the object to be investigated and the practical interests of the researcher and of his social group. The resolution of the research project does not only purport to amend particular deficiencies of a theory, to develop a thread of inquiry not yet fully exploited, or to demonstrate the logical contradictions of such theory. Cultural constructions— from theories to legal regulations— become objects of study because their analysis can illuminate a portion of the social reality in which we live.

Behind Habermas's use of complicated theoretical arguments in his critique of Weber, there stands not just the interest of saving rationality from a restricted definition in instrumental terms alone; there is also the aim to see contemporary social reality with less a rigid outlook. For Max Weber, instrumental rationality was the "locus" where modern society was built. But then one needs to ask, how could Weber construct such an ideal type of rationality that comprehends all social reality, from the erotic to the bureaucratic? And for that matter, how could Adorno and Horkheimer made such an exhausting effort to bridle the morality of the Enlightenment to Sade's Juliette? Their perceptions of the present play an important role in their theory constructions and permit us to
understand the breadth of their analysis. After reaching this conviction, one realizes that Habermas’s critique of Weber has to be seen from the perspective of an overcoming of the image of society that Weber and the Frankfurters projected. This overcoming implies a diagnosis of the times in which modernity could have more aspects than the one-sidedly appreciation of Weber, Adorno and Horkheimer. In the context of this thesis, the relevance of the diagnostic element is also shaped by the "elective affinities" that this element has with modernity itself. The modern epoch has laid down the frame in which questions about the present and evaluative measurements of the "Zeitgeist" have come to the forefront. In this very same sense, sociology was born out of this preoccupation for, as Weber would say after Goethe, the "demands of the moment". Methodological elements in Weber and Habermas point to the procedure of "understanding" as having a normative function built into it that "filters" our social perceptions. Thus social theory can be said to be motivated by a critical interpretation of the state of affairs that shape our social life.

Before going any further, we should state the reason why Weber’s theory of rationalization is so central in The Theory of Communicative Action. Weber had connected the problematic of purposive rationality, the historical rationalization of society, the cultural disenchantment of the world, the lack of substantive rationality, the disquieting phenomenon of
bureaucracy, and the contemporary social pathologies in such a way that it was not possible to separate one from another. The three elements to which the above list can be reduced—rationality, the socio-historical rationalization, and the pathologies of modern times—are also at the bottom of Habermas' theory and implied in the subtitles of his two volumes. However, they have a different sense and it is this difference of meaning that we aim to explain in this thesis. Habermas maintains that if the concept of rationality is widened, social rationalization could be seen from two sides, that is, from the cultural and from the economic-administrative rationalization. Modern society as we know it today moves around the centres of gravity established by the economic-institutional complexes whose purposive rationality has displaced the rationality contained in modern culture. Modern pathologies arise for Habermas from this disequilibrium produced by the centrality of our performances in the economic-administrative areas which have made communicative rationality socially unexploited and dangerously restricted.

Now we can see the one-sided account of Weber and the double-sided account of Habermas from the perspective of their diagnoses of times and beyond a purely theoretical standpoint. The argument of this thesis begins to take form. Its object of study consists in explaining that Habermas's overcoming of Weber's theory is to be understood from the former's diagnosis of a modernized society that was not employing its potential
against the monolithic diagnosis given by Weber. It might seem that the thesis' object of study is concerned with a way of reading Habermas's critique of Weber that would make clearer not only the importance of Weber's work for Habermas's theory but also the importance of the diagnostic element and the subsequent claims of practical reason in theory construction. But at the same time, Weber and Habermas embody two very characteristic ways of making contemporary diagnosis. In the former's work, the theme of decline along with a quite nihilistic "pathos" are the two mechanisms of signification of his diagnosis. Weber is on that score a representative of the cultural critics of the first half of this century who took up the motifs of the "decay" of Western civilization and its concomitant rationalism. Weber did not fall, however, into the temptation of a refusal of our civilization that in some cases is seen as the "history of a mistake". Habermas's diagnosis is more constructive. It points out the dangers of the moment as well as it opens a line of reasoning where the normative could be confronted with the factual thus keeping a positive stance toward the present that in no way is seen as a devaluation of a previous golden period. These two forms of diagnosis embody much of today's intellectual exercise that has the present as its target. Thus, the object of this thesis also implies an inquiry about the diagnosis of the times that is obliquely posited by way of Weber's and Habermas's examples. When the research has as its object a diagnosis of
the times, one has to decide beforehand which of these two approaches will serve as the guiding thread of research. This decision is of an ethical kind. It is reached on the basis of normative expectations and should be responsibly met by estimating the consequences that that diagnosis could have in students, philosophers, social scientists, cultural critics, psychologists, journalists, and from this point on, the public in general. Although this thesis will have none of those consequences, we cannot hide our alignment with Habermas's approach. However, this should not prevent us from criticizing some elements of Habermas's theory.

A "casual" expression of Habermas made me realize the weight of that practical decision in theory construction. Habermas starts his first volume of the TCA by a preliminary specification of the concept of rationality. He says that if we analyze rationality from the perspective of the noncommunicative employment of knowledge (whose correlate would be teleological action), "we make a prior decision" for the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality. If we start from the "communicative employment of propositional knowledge in assertions- Habermas continues-, we make a prior decision for a wider concept of rationality connected with ancient conceptions of 'logos'." Habermas's choice of an ancient conception to defend modernity could not be justified solely by the explanatory power of this concept to decipher social interaction. Social interaction through communicative means is
the normative element for Habermas. On the other hand, Weber seemed to have made a prior decision for the first type of concept although this assertion needs to be qualified. Weber opens his *Economy and Society* by stating that the rationality of action is simply an ideal construction, a methodological presupposition that serves the sociologist to follow the course of action by understanding the actor's intentions minimizing ambiguity. However, this methodological assumption does not involve "a belief in the actual predominance of rational elements in human life."² This element of the irrationality of life along with the diagnosis of an overrationalized social world capture the thrust of Weber's diagnosis. In sum, the object of the thesis is to deal with the force behind those "prior decisions" by placing that force as the focus of my critical interpretation of Habermas's critique of Weber.

Once the argument is embryonically shaped, there are two alternatives. First, we can start by explaining both Habermas's and Weber's diagnoses and proceed in a deductive manner. In proceeding in this way, one has to begin by identifying the "explanandum" (Habermas's critique of Weber) and then one defines the "explanans" (the diagnosis of the times) and makes the necessary connections between the elements of both logical terms. This way of presentation would be analogical to those detective novels where murderer, murder, and the police are on the scene since page one.
The second alternative follows Habermas's presentation allowing ourselves the introduction of certain changes. This way of presenting the argument is more adequate for two reasons. First, it is more respectful towards Habermas's inductive "crescendo" in which we deal with Weber's major theoretical elements and we finish by reaching the conclusion that is given by a reformulation of Weber's diagnosis of the times. This is the more classical detective-like search in which the elements and their connection with new elements are revealed step by step and the detective ends by giving his own impression about the case. This analogy already borders the second reason. This inductive procedure is more in tune with our own reading of Habermas's critique. The element of the diagnosis of the times as key of that critique is not something that one finds in the beginning. It is the result of a - wrong or right- process of making sense out of a part of a theory important for the theory itself. In short, this way of presentation reflects more faithfully Habermas's exposition as well as the very process of the search for an argument.

Now we can delineate the basic features of the thesis by indicating the items of the table of contents. The problem that we immediately meet once we want to elaborate the argument is that Habermas is using in his critique of Weber not only the previous pages of the TCA. Perhaps more importantly, it is his developmental theory that is implicitly contrasted with the developmental account of Weber. And the
explicit clarification of Habermas's developmental account implies going through the fundamentals of his own theory. Habermas's way of reconstructing the development towards modernity is the theme of first chapter of this thesis. Habermas's implicit critique of Weber's developmental account is based on the distinction of system and lifeworld. We feel that the exposition should start by accounting for this difference between the communicative web of human groups (lifeworld) and its forms of economic and administrative organization (system). Moreover, this distinction acquires a special relevance in modernity since it is in this period where the "uncoupling"- the estrangement- of the material reproduction of life (system) and the reproduction of the cultural world (lifeworld) becomes for Habermas an irretrievable phenomenon. Once the economy surpasses the household unit of production to become a free market, and once the state assumes the tasks of administering society, the two forms of action, that in the context of the lifeworld and that in the context of the system, are sharply dissociated. This will serve Habermas as the founding element of his diagnosis of the times that will be measured by the influence of systemic integration in areas that have to be restricted to communicative interaction. This is the subject of the first section of the second chapter.

In fact, the distinction between a realm of symbolic communication that advances through learning processes, and a
realm of the modes of production and administration is crucial to understand Habermas’s developmental account. He refers to the "structure" of a worldview, as the symbolic space that determines the normative ways in which social actors base their relationships. As said above, the structures develop by learning processes. To take an example, the reverence for authority of the pre-Enlightened world determines what is conceived as just and unjust in such a way that the subject of justice cannot but accept the verdict of the authority. Modernity makes possible an egalitarian conception of justice because our vision of the natural world has been objectified and because our conception of the ethical subject does not depend on heteronomous laws. Habermas refers to "content" as the historical process by which the economic and administrative forces have used or have hampered the use of that normative world that is at hand in every epoch. The free market could not be thinkable without that objectification of nature and without the birth of the individual. However, that free market could make irrelevant that egalitarian concept of justice if the market logic were pervasively applied. That pervasiveness, put it in a historical light, is the object of analysis of the content of modernization. If the balance is negative for the application of the concept of justice, then it becomes possible to contrast structural modernity with the content of modernization in a diagnostic way. The logic of development shows the changes in the structures of worldviews.
The dynamics of development shows how the influence of the two subsystems— the economy and the state— in the historical realization of the possibilities that the structure of a worldview makes available. Structure and logic of development, content and dynamics will be the concepts to be clarified in the second section of the first chapter.

Once we have delineated Habermas’s two-level account of development, we will be dealing with the description of the structure of modernity, that is, we will give an account of how moderns conceive the realms of nature, society and culture and how a model of social interaction based on an intersubjective rationality becomes central to the modern worldview. This part, the fourth section of the first chapter, has certain significance since the normative ideals and the structure of modernity have an intimate link.

In the last section, we will revise the possible connection between logics and dynamics. Also, we will inquire on the separation between lifeworld and system. If that separation is meant by Habermas as more than a analytical distinction, then we will meet a sort of antinomy. For the project of modernity, that is, the further democratization of society, implies that the will of the citizenship is to be institutionalized, thus having an effect on the administration, and an indirect effect on the economy through the regulative intervention of the state in the economic cycle. In this way, a diagnosis of the times will be based on
the democratic deficit of modern society in respect to its potential. Habermas's defense of modernity is based on these premises. But if system and lifeworld do not or should not touch each other, then the defense of the lifeworld against economic and administrative imperatives would not imply that the norms agreed upon by the members of the lifeworld should be institutionalized. Rather, the members of the lifeworld will try to preserve their area of communication against systemic imperatives. It seems as if the democratization of society would be centered in the lifeworld without having any consequences in the state and the economy. The diagnosis of the times would take the form of a measurement of systemic elements introduced into the lifeworld. Since the project of democratization as defined above and the self-preservative strategy of the lifeworld do not coincide in their position towards the system, we meet the antinomy. In fact, Habermas's strategy seems to be split between the two ways of the antinomy.

The second chapter follows quite faithfully the order of Habermas's critique of Weber as exposed in the TCA. Habermas introduces Weber's work by pointing out his anti-evolutionist views. Habermas presents Weber's views against the background of the radically opposed Enlightenment philosophy of history. Habermas does not endorse the latter although he retains certain of its traits. Habermas concludes by pointing to a paradox. Though Weber's anti-evolutionist views are evident in
his theory, the structure of his history of rationalization has a conspicuous developmental character. Habermas will try to maintain the structure of the theory and will introduce the distinctions dealt with above in order to widen the concept of (instrumental) rationality to which Weber arrived. This is the general strategy as conceived by Habermas with which we shall be dealing in the introduction to the second chapter. The reaction of Weber against the Enlightened philosophy of history is treated in the second section.

The third section discusses the characterization of modernity by Weber as the irreconcilable strife between the value spheres of science, morality, and aesthetics. This strife is for Habermas a consequence of the imbalanced social employment of the instrumental, the ethical, and the aesthetic rationalities, not an effect of the nature of those three rationalities. The fourth section on the concept of rationality follows from the third. Once Habermas has overcome the alleged incompatibility between rationalities, he goes on to suggest that the cognitive, the ethical, and the expressive meet in communicative action. In that way, the concept of rationality as such cannot be reduced to the cognitive-instrumental aspect only. For Weber, the strife between the different spheres of value was the price to pay for the disappearance of the unified metaphysical-religious worldview. A fragmented modernity was at the end of a process of "disenchantment of the world". For Habermas, the
rationalization of worldviews makes possible a communicative rationality whose last word does not belong to an uncritical tradition but to the participants in a dialogue aiming at consensus. Weber's thesis of the disenchantment of the world as well as Habermas's change of direction will be treated in section five.

Section six touches the well-known Weberian thesis of the Protestant ethic. For Weber, a religious motivation lent the force to the institutionalization of an instrumental stance not only towards the domination of nature but towards life generally speaking. Habermas seems to counterattack by pointing out the diminishing force of labour in our contemporary society. If we replace the production by the communicative paradigm, the controversial thesis of the Protestant ethic loses its force and the diagnosis shifts from the labour conditions to the health of communicative practices.

The last section deals with one of the most thought-provoking elements of Weber's theory, that of the rationalization of law. In this topic the employment of a calculative rationality, the scientific treatment of justice, bureaucracy, and the formal neutralization of value come together making of Weber's diagnosis of modern law a privileged locus to understand his broader social diagnosis. Habermas notices the dense web of legal regulations in which our lives develop. But the delineation of far-reaching legal
policies obey in modernity the basic democratic principles conveyed in the constitutions of all democratic countries. This topic, already shaping Habermas's rearticulation of Weber's diagnosis, closes what can be considered the core segment of the thesis.

Chapter four functions in the plan of this thesis as an introduction to the conclusion. This introduction deals with all the elements that a diagnosis must have if it is meant to explain contemporary phenomena in an argumentative way so that we can enter into dialogue with that diagnosis. In the first section we place again Habermas's and Weber's developmental theories in the direction of their diagnoses. We begin the second section by locating the perspectives, that is, the normative expectations of the diagnosticians from which diagnoses are performed. Weber's perception of modernity as an impersonal iron cage was motivated by a contrasting picture of a liberal individualism whose subject was the sole source of meaning. Habermas's move to intersubjectivity allows him to switch over to the social lifeworld of communicators whose well-being functions as the normative background of its diagnosis.

In section three we attempt to show how a diagnosis does not need to be equated with a subjectivistic perception of the social world. To begin with, the intellectual should not be considered under the influence of the paradigm of consciousness whereby he would appear as the source of meaning
in a chaotic world. He should not try to take over the pulpit. The intellectual is himself a product of his times. He is an instance where different pieces of the social world converge. Furthermore, there is a methodological line that, coming from Dilthey until reaching Habermas himself, has approached the question of the present as an essential part of the cultural sciences.

Finally, we arrive at the conclusion of the thesis. In the first section we point out Habermas's perspective towards Weber's diagnosis as well as signal those critical elements (worked out in II.5) that we will be using to put Habermas's diagnosis in a critical light. Section two deals with the descriptive sketch delineated by Habermas about the contemporary relationships of the citizen with the state (client) and with the market (consumer). After this description, we recuperate Weber's thesis of the bureaucratization of society. Bringing together Habermas's and Weber's as well as our critical interpretations, we will analyze the effects that the organizational structure of our present social reality have on the three components of the lifeworld: Personality (V.1.), culture (V.2.), and society (V.3.).
II. BUILDING THE ROAD TO MODERNITY: HABERMAS'S STRUCTURAL STAGES

II.1. The Double Structure of Modernity: Rationalized Lifeworld and Institutional Modernization.

Communicative action has been conceived by Habermas as a dialogical process in which members of the given group are trying to solve practical matters. This process is guided by argumentative logic and the best argument is reaffirmed consensually. But even then the binding value of such identification is always subject to "revision by some new circumstances.

Communicative processes do not start from a "zero degree" of interpretation. The initial communicative situation implies a knowledge shared among the participants as a point of departure. In Husserl's steps, Habermas calls this point the "lifeworld." Instead of giving a full account of the "lifeworld" as the horizon of historical experience—history is here contemplated from the viewpoint of the everyday happenings of the society members—against which the communicative action takes place, we will concentrate on how the post-traditional modernity affects that lifeworld which has been initially defined as the accumulation of the "interpretative work of preceding generations."

Habermas views the lifeworld as a set of assumptions securing the preliminary consensus on the initial definition of the situation. To grasp the practical problem that is to be
solved in the process of communication demands that the participants share a common interpretation of the initial situation in which the problem is posed. The preunderstanding of the situation is furnished by the common horizon of experience that provides semantic conditions, normative expectations, and accepted ways of presentation.

The concept of lifeworld is connected with the concept of worldview ("Weltanschauung"). Habermas uses this concept, central for the Heidelberg School of Neo-Kantianism³, and re-interprets it as that system of symbols that organize reality in a particular fashion. The meaning complexes that form such a system build the value orientations of those who share the same worldview. A "Weltanschauung" contains the "ethos", as Kroner puts it⁴, that grounds the stance towards the world of those involved in it. In other words, it delineates the space of normative action that the members of that meaningful system consider as valid. Habermas defines worldviews as "the cultural interpretative systems...that reflect the background knowledge of social groups and guarantee an interconnection among the multiplicity of their action orientations⁵." For Habermas, a worldview lays down the framework without which social interaction would not be possible.

Prior to modernity, the interpretative tools were supplied by the meaning conservation performed by tradition. However, since modernity broke the authority of tradition, the lifeworld becomes more and more dependent on the critical
establishment of the semantic, normative, and expressive definitions of the initial situation:

The more the worldview that furnishes the cultural stock of knowledge is decentered, the less the need for understanding is covered in advance by an interpreted lifeworld immune of critique, and the more this need has to be met by the interpretative accomplishments of the participants themselves, that is, by way of risky (because rationally motivated) agreement, the more frequently we can expect rational orientations. Thus for the time being we can characterize the rationalization of the lifeworld in the dimension "normatively ascribed agreement" versus "communicative achieved understanding." 6

The results of this rationalization of the lifeworld can be seen from the viewpoint of its three structural components—taking up Parsons's analytical distinction between culture, society, and personality—as a gain in the "degree of freedom". 7 While cultural traditions are viewed as subject to constant critical revisions, which in turn entails the growth in reflexivity, social norms become discursively established beyond the contents of traditional commands and thus gain universal character. At the level of personality, the individual becomes increasingly free to shape its own life project.

F. Dallmayr points out that with the criticism of traditionally determined background assumptions, "the lifeworld is bound to be not only weakened but steadily eclipsed and finally absorbed by world -concepts." In his view, if consistently pursued, this trend would dissolve the lifeworld as such. However, the lifeworld is one of the
pillars of communicative action and the domain of life experiences that must be safeguarded against the imperatives of the economy and the state. Thus its dissolution would weaken all communicative processes and would deprive us of the normative standards of Habermas's diagnosis of the times centred on the preservation of interpersonal relations free from the imperatives of the economic and administrative rationalities.

The problem posed by Dallmayr can be solved in the following way. To begin with, critique—called by Habermas a "discontinuous tool"—is exercised when a norm itself becomes problematic. Taken as a whole, that is, as the systematic criticism of tradition by modernity, what modernity undermines is the force of authority of tradition and the uncritical acceptance of conventions. Modernity establishes the intercommunicative network as the mode for securing semantic continuity. Not all signifieds must be called into question; rather, what differentiates modernity from conventional worlds is the fact that they can be exposed to critique.

Habermas contends that modernity has substituted the well-defined contents of tradition by a formal framework that is not situation-dependant. Furthermore, it could also be said that modern lifeworlds create their own "traditions", however ephemeral. These become universalized due to the cosmopolitan character of modern culture. The media have
decisively contributed to this expansion of processes of communication beyond concrete situations and exclusively local connotations. As a result, the presence of those processes has a more global character. Since rationalized lifeworlds have a normative "content" - a normativity without which communicative action is not possible as such - based on the formal ideals of reciprocity, respect of the autonomy of the others, immanent solidarity, and so on, global processes of communications in a world where ethical-practical problems are, to a high degree, also "global", can secure the maintenance of those valid normative ideals in larger areas of interaction.

In response to Dallmayr it could be then claimed that to understand the lifeworld solely as the link with the value contents of preceding generations would weaken its position. Instead, we prefer to speak about a frame of consensually guaranteed assumptions (subject to critical test) that connect formally with the "tradition" of modernity.

Insofar as we take into account the interests that decide the particular employment of media - the ego- or group-oriented demands that are thrown into the arena of communicative action - this somehow naive picture of communication remains only a regulative ideal (moreover, a too-often-dismissed one). Habermas holds that once interests are filtered into communicative action, this latter becomes a strategic action, that is, it becomes an attempt to influence
in various ways the rational choice of others.

So far we have concentrated on the problem of symbolic reproduction of society. However, if we do not want to restrict ourselves to the idealism of the meaning fabric of the world, the articulation of the problem requires the incorporation of a perspective of the material reproduction of life as well; the meaning structure of interaction has to be connected with the institutional setting in which such actions take place. Habermas writes:

Once again suspicion is cast on the purism of a purely communicative reason—this time on an abstract description of rationalized lifeworlds that does not take into account the constraints of material reproduction. In order to defuse this suspicion, we have to show that the theory of communication can contribute to explaining how it is that in the modern period an economy organized in the form of markets is functionally intermeshed with a state that has a monopoly on power, how it gains autonomy as a piece of norm-free sociality over against the lifeworld, and it opposes its own imperatives based on system maintenance to the rational imperatives of the lifeworld."

Modernization has progressively separated the economic and administrative core of society from the sphere of social-communicative interaction. On the other hand, the rationalization of meaning complexes has made it possible for communicative action between responsible and autonomous social members to become the way of solving consensually practical problems. Habermas is now confronted with a double task. Firstly, he has to deal with the realm of material reproduction which has become a value-free domain of action. The self-regulated market is socially channelled through the
unproductive state administration, which in its turn has a "subsidiary" role in respect to the market. And secondly, Habermas must give an account of the structure—the "ethos"—of the modern worldview that has enhanced the rationality of social interaction, now intersubjectively coordinated.

The theoretical project becomes thus double-sided. First, there exists a distinction between the cultural background of communication (lifeworld) and the material reproduction of life (systems); Habermas sees one aspect of modernity in the "uncoupling" of these two elements. The value fabric of the lifeworld gets detached from the systemic network of the economy and the state. The lifeworld ceases to be subject to equitable argumentation and is now governed by the steering media of money and power. If my interpretation is correct here, Habermas's system theoretic approach allows him to see systemic domains of action as unproblematically ruled by concerns of efficiency and wealth production. The danger becomes manifest when systemic imperatives deny value considerations in action domains that should be value-oriented. When the mechanisms of communicative interaction are replaced by systemic mechanisms, the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld—always reproduced through linguistic communication—is substantially jeopardized: "The mediatization (underline by J.E.) of the lifeworld assumes the form of a colonization."12 Systemic rationality should not be built into the process of meaning reproduction because
instrumental rationality does not work communicatively. If instrumental rationality substitutes communication, the very process of meaning reproduction is at risk.

Second, Habermas is bound to give an account of how the modern worldview (which is the condition of possibility of communicative action) has been brought about through the development of structures of meaning. This is what he calls the internalist line of research. However, the explanation of worldview developments has to take into account also the way in which the systemic conditions of the material reproduction of life have influenced the direction of symbolic shifts and condensations. This is the external or causal line of inquiry. The articulation of these two lines of inquiry is done by what Habermas calls "rational reconstruction".  

The separation of lifeworld and system appears on the methodological level as a distinction between internal and external lines of inquiry and is connected with the dialectic between the ideal and material interests set forth by the Neo-Kantians. I will deal with this Neo-Kantian problematic in some length since it will help us to understand a basic theoretical difference between Habermas and Weber.

It was against the background of Neo-Kantian philosophy of value that Weber attempted to explain both historical processes as well as individual actions by taking up the concept of the actualization of value. For Neo-Kantians, ideal - symbolic elements and material needs intermeshed in
social actions. Social actors, themselves immersed in a fabric of values, aim at satisfying their needs. Values ground the steering normativity by which social actors ought to fulfil their material necessities in certain particular ways. Neo-Kantians held that material interests are transformed into social forces when they conform to the value expectations of a given society. In its turn, the social presence of values depends on their relation to material expectations of social actors: The process of value and material legitimation runs in both directions.

Habermas claims that

we would fail from the start to grasp Weber's theory of rationalization if we did not explain the sociological concept of an order of life ("Lebensordnung") with the help of the philosophical concept of the actualization of value.16

Social relevance of certain values calls for their institutionalization. Institutions, from the family to law, are in turn legitimized precisely by the social relevance of the values they embody. In Habermas's words, "interests have to be tied to ideas if the institutions in which they are expressed are to be lasting."17 Schluchter rightly points out that Weber "is dealing not with an autonomous logic of the ideas as such but with the dynamics ("Eigenlogik") of actualized ideas, which always require interests and institutions."18

An order of life, i.e., a particular and consistent way of acting crystallizes around the institutionalization of
values. Protestantism is institutionalized in the economy and leads to an ascetic mode of life. Bureaucracy, despite Weber's depiction of it as a value desert, could not be explained without taking into account the institutionalization of the values of efficiency, regularity, calculability, and so on, although it is true that they can be in no sense considered as 'ultimate.' Questions arise as to how bureaucracy has become a historical form of organization whose structure seems to grow stronger and stronger, as to how specifically modernity has detached economic and administrative institutions (linked to the material reproduction of life) from a substantive value anchoring, and as to what is the influence of the subsequent order of life- or "lifestyles"- on the social actors involved in them. Of course, these questions stand at the core of Weber's and Habermas's theories.

Habermas conceives of social reality as composed by the symbolic and material realms, much as Neo-Kantians did. The "two-level structure of society", which is central to TCA, is to be connected with the Neo-Kantian emphasis on the distinction between the domain of material needs and the realm of symbols. However, while for the Neo-Kantians the combination of the two areas accounts for the functioning of society, Habermas's version of that functioning is somehow different. To begin with, his point of departure is modernity, where the interrelation of the two realms has become more and more difficult. Consequently, his problem has two aspects. On
the one hand, he sees as inevitable the separation of administrative or economic areas from value considerations. In this sense, modernity means a break of value from instrumental rationality (a thesis laid out by Weber), against the previous absence of such differentiation in the primitive, imperial, theocratic, or monarchical societies. On the other hand, Habermas sees the danger in the dynamic development of that break as ultimately leading towards the instrumentalization of society. This is why, against his functionalist partner Luhmann, he cannot view value-legitimation of institutions as wholly unnecessary.

Weber, for his part, thought that the eclipse of values by the dynamics of interests led precisely to modernity, where a war of self-interested competence took place within the framework of an impersonal bureaucratic domination. Though Habermas seems to think that the break of the two rationalities is necessary step of development and the source of an undesirable social instrumentalization, the separation of these two rationalities— the systemic and the communicative— would not produce such undesirable "side-effects" if both would structure social action upon their own respective contexts. On the other hand, Weber is convinced that the very break by which modernity is characterized implies necessarily the instrumental colonization of all domains of life as well.

In modern societies, different functional subsystems such
as the state, the economy, family, science, education, and so on, are governed by different criteria: wealth distribution and conflict solution, profit, social value reproduction, logico-empirical truth, and personality development. It is the possibility of integrating all these different criteria that becomes a problem. To solve it, the rationality of one element of that structure should encroach on the rationality of others. It appears that the purposive-instrumental rationality has been placed at the centre of the structure, overshadowing the value rationality of other domains of life.

Institutional modernization is embodied in the autonomous lawfulness of a self-regulating market. As Weber rightly pointed out, such an enterprise is separated from the household. The state administration endorses the values of efficacy and calculability (but not that of profit), building steadily the bureaucratic machine; its function resides not in producing wealth but in providing the infrastructure (from roads to legal services) for the workings of the economy and for the needs of the citizens. In order to do so, it collects taxes from both business enterprises and private persons. Habermas writes:

The state develops and guarantees civil law, the monetary mechanism, and certain infrastructures—overall prerequisites for the continued existence of a depoliticized economic process set free from moral norms and orientations to use value.19

To sum up, the material reproduction of life becomes detached from the normativity of symbolic reproduction; as
mentioned above, Habermas calls it the "uncoupling" of system and lifeworld.

In recent times, the social-welfare state purported to intervene in the economic cycle as well as in the life of the citizens so that the benefits of a free economy would go back, at least partly, to all the strata of society via state administration: "Underlying this—writes Habermas—was the democratic idea that society could exercise an influence over itself by the neutral means of political-administrative power."20 This could be understood as an attempt to lessen the severity of such "uncoupling" between the lifeworld and the system. The result has been, however, an overloaded administration that has treated life problems of the citizens with the cold gaze of a bureaucracy allied with functional scientism21. For Habermas, the root of problem is the belief that the lifeworld can be channelled through the systemic administration—thus combining the two rationalities—without deforming it. Instead, he proposes to form such public spheres that could embody the expectations of the lifeworld:

Centers of concentrated communication that arise spontaneously out of microdomains of everyday practice can develop in autonomous public spheres and consolidate as self-supporting higher-level intersubjectivities only to the degree that the lifeworld potential for self-organization and for the self-organized use of the means of communication are utilized.22

At this point, Habermas seems to consider the relation between system and lifeworld as one of total separation—not of relative autonomy. But if this is so, how are the values,
decisions, and expectations of the public sphere to be institutionalized? What is the precise role of the market and of the administration beyond being the cause of lifeworld deformations? Does not this total separation pave the way for a lack of public control over the institutions? Should not the public sphere be the correcting mechanism of the increasingly self-enclosed institutions of the market and the administration? We shall be dealing with these question in our critical approach below.

Habermas assigns to the economy and the administration the roles of providing and distributing physical resources. The function of the market and the administration is the maintenance of a system understood in quasi-biological terms. The attributions of the system stop here. Once the system trespasses this threshold, there begins the "colonization" of the lifeworld by systemic rationality. The thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld means that the procedures of systemic rationality enter into the area of communicative rationality, the strength of which then declines in favour of strategic and instrumental rationalities (both included in the system). This poses an essential threat to the lifeworld itself since symbolic reproduction cannot rely on its own medium of transmission (communication). As a result, social relationships lose their binding normativity and become a set of relations motivated by interests. This situation cannot but lead to substantial "impoverishment" of the
meaning fabric of the world.

As much as this colonization thesis provides some description of our social "status quo", the struggle between system and lifeworld is not properly conceived of. If these two rationalities were so radically detached, there would remain no possibility of an interplay between them allowing to orient the lifeworld expectations towards pragmatic issues, permeating the institutions with the democratic-communicative thrust of the public sphere. The project of a participatory democracy that Habermas seems to endorse implies a "colonization", so to speak, of the system by the lifeworld. Since Habermas does not renounce Weber's (and Parsons's) "institutionalization of value" through different domains of action such as the scientific, legal, or artistic "enterprises" clearly distinct from the pure administrative-market functioning (without being possible for those domains of action to avoid neither administrative distribution nor market interests), system and lifeworld touch each others through certain elements.

The previous discussion has to be considered in the context of Habermas's defense of modernity. He wants on the one hand to salvage the rationalized lifeworld since it is the condition of possibility of communicative action (and the ethical social interaction implied in it). On the other hand, he points to the imperatives of an autonomous market and state (autonomy that has become possible for first time in
modernity), and its subsequent steering mechanisms of money and power, as the causes of the present lack of implementation of communicative action in the social fabric. However, it should be noted that there is a certain contradiction between Habermas’s intention to recuperate the project of modernity and the idea that the systemic imperatives make it impossible to institutionalize (at the level of democratic-state institutions) the values of modernity.

To achieve a better understanding of this specifically modern project that Habermas wants to keep alive, we have to deal with what he calls the structure of modernity, that is, the formal-conceptual space where ethical modernity finds its place. Such structure has to be separated from the actual content of modernization that impedes the realization of ethical possibilities contained in it. This first separation finds a parallel in his developmental account of evolution, through separation, of the structures of consciousness (logics) towards modernity, and the historical processes (dynamics); mediated by interests of different kinds, modern society has failed to exploit the potential contained in the modern structure of consciousness. Habermas views structural logics as the development of symbolic networks that compound a lifeworld, whereas he conceives of the system dynamics as that which have stopped the virtual employment of the structural potential. Thus, the estrangement of lifeworld and system has an analogy, on the methodological level, in the
very distinctions on which Habermas bases his critique of Weber. The clarification of these methodological distinctions as well as their application to Habermas's developmental outline will be the themes of our two next sections.

II.2. Structure versus Content: Logics and Dynamics of Development.

To understand the theoretical grounding of the distinction between logics and dynamics development, structure and content, it will be useful to make some preliminary remarks on the concepts of structure, stage, and learning processes. Our focus will be mainly on Piaget's structural theory, since Habermas, time and again, acknowledges his debts to it.

For Piaget, structure is not an entity but a rational-epistemological construct that enhances the intelligibility of reality24. The notions of actuality and possibility are central to this concept of structure: the actual is the concretization of one possibility from among a whole set of them. A structure is self-regulating; its functioning is based on the following principles: the principle of non-contradiction between its elements, the principle of self-identity of structure, and "the less frequently cited principle according to which the end result is independent of the route taken"25. This means that the stage of the structure achieved is not a necessary causal effect of the process of
its formation.

The principle of identity does not solidify the structure in a determinate state. According to Piaget, there is a logic of transformation by which an increasing complexity of the relation between the elements of the structure generates a qualitative leap: "The emphasis is placed on the fact that human structures do not arise out of nothing and that the structures as generated pass from a simpler to a more complex structure." This logic of transformation accounts for the ensuing stages which, in the development of the ego, are a consequence of the solution given to the increase in complexity, a solution that would not have been possible without a concomitant learning process. Learning processes consist in the acquisition of formal capabilities that intensify the ego’s growth in maturation (the internal line) and a better adaptation to the environment (the external line). McCarthy, after Piaget and Habermas, defines the concept of stage as follows:

Stages are constructed wholes that differ qualitatively from one another; phase-specific schemata can be ordered in a invariant and hierarchically structured sequence; no later phase can be attained before earlier ones have been passed through, and elements of earlier phases are preserved, transformed, and reintegrated in the later.37

In sum, structures of development are conceived as stages whose transformation is provoked by complexity and resolved by learning abilities. Notably, this schema has a formal character and is somehow independent of the contingent content
that can fill a particular stage-structure.

Habermas wants to transpose this schema (used originally by Piaget to explain the ego's development) to the social level. The question that immediately arises is: Can societies learn? For Habermas, the individual is not an isolated monad. His learning processes are tied to the social environment and to the symbolic network in which that individual is immersed. Thus only socialized subjects can learn. Habermas continues:

But social systems can, by exploiting the learning capacities of socialized subjects, form new structures in order to solve critical steering problems. To this extent, the evolutionary learning process of societies is dependent on the competences of the individuals that belong to them.\textsuperscript{28}

Habermas views the relation between the cognitive development of socialized individuals and the societal development as a "circular process." A principle of organization, that is, a stage of evolution, determines the conceptual-interpretative stage of that structure as well as the institutional core that corresponds to it. It also determines the range of possibilities that can be actualized, the changes that are possible, and the direction that the social complexity is taking.\textsuperscript{29} As we can see, the concepts of possibilities, actuality, the maturational-internal and the adaptative-external as forces of transformation, and so on, appear in a way analogous to the concept of structure dealt with above.

Habermas's social stages corresponds to Piaget's logic of
structural stages. It is plausible to conclude that for Habermas it is crucial to have a clear idea of the organization principle in which we operate since it shows the desirable changes to be accomplished on the socio-practical level. It is not surprising then that his defense of modernity is grounded on the potential, on the desirable possibilities, that can be actualized in order to improve the social-ethical life. We cannot go further at this point since we need to know what are the possibilities that the structure of modernity is offering us and what makes them so desirable.

If we are to salvage the potential of modernity we have to explain first why we should be still "tempted" by the project of modernity while the disasters of contemporary history still appear on the television screens of our homes, or when we are inclined to see social reality as an entity in process of self-destruction because of its entropic dynamics. In short, Habermas has to explain how it is possible to separate structural evolution from factual history, or to provide a satisfactory answer for those who think that the terror of Robespierre and the ideals of the French Revolution have an internal link.

Such an explanatory attempt requires Habermas to deal with the notion of evolutionary stages that grounds them in the learning process. The development of learning abilities means above all the acquisition of a competence⁴⁰. Though Habermas remarks that competences, at the social level, are
channelled within the "scientific-technological and moral-practical" domains, one could easily conclude from it that society can enhance its competence in knowing its own structure, in diagnosing critically its own problems, in judging according to formal and more inclusive terms, in heightening the aesthetic life of its members. (Again we are describing society from the perspective of the "sons and daughters" of modernity.) These competences are not dependent upon specific contents; they are formal capabilities that can be used in different contexts. Thus the structure formed by the relations of formal competences can be separated from the context-specific contents of cultural traditions, they are "universally binding." The set of competences in relation with each other within the same structure indicate a correlative stage of consciousness.

A competence, Habermas argues, "has no history but a development; a competence is acquired." We can reconstruct the development of those structural competences by abstracting them from their actual realization in history, that is, from the failure to exploit those possibilities in a ethical way. This separation corresponds to that between logics and dynamics of development:

If we distinguish the plane of structural possibilities (learning-levels) from the plane of factual processes then the two causalities can be clarified with a change of explanatory perspectives. The emergence of a new historical event can be explained by reference to contingent peripheral conditions and to the challenge posed by structurally open possibilities.
The logic of development says nothing about the mechanisms of development which dynamically result in historical happenings. Again, this distinction follows closely Piaget’s transformational structures. The functional elements of the state and the economy are the external factors that determine the historical course. However, logics and dynamics—the two causalities parallel to the two rationalities of system and lifeworld—are not entirely alien to each other: The logical space embraces possibilities as well as certain ways of actualizing one of those possibilities. There is a certain ambivalence in Habermas as to what is the specific weight of the two causalities. Though historical causality is contingent, the range of contingency that can be actualized is marked by the logical space of social consciousness.

Once we have laid down the theoretical basis that permits Habermas to distinguish logics from dynamics of development, we can start analyzing the structure of modernity. To do so, we will review Habermas’s interpretation of Piaget’s stage theory—in particular his application to the evolution of societies—as well as Kohlberg’s moral-developmental theory.

II.4. Description of Modernity as a Structure

Habermas’ exploration of genetic psychology has been motivated by his attempt to explain the sequential transformations of the worldview structures. As mentioned above, Piaget conceives the stages of the ego development as
structures characterized by the increase of the formal capabilities of thinking.

Piaget distinguishes among states of development that are characterized not in terms of new contents but in terms of structurally described levels of learning ability. It might be a matter of something similar in the emergence of new structures of worldviews."33

The shift from one worldview to another cannot be explained by a change in their contents. It is the way of constructing concepts that undergoes transformation: "It is not this or that reason but the kind of reason which is no longer convincing."34

Piaget conceives the ego development as a learning process in which the child gradually differentiates the external world, the moral system of norms, and the world of subjective experience. Cognitive development means for Habermas and Piaget "the decentration of an egocentric understanding."35 This catch-phrase requires more attention since it is crucial for the understanding of Habermas's conception of modernity.

Drawing upon the works of Levi-Strauss and Godelier,16 Habermas stresses the confusion between the natural and the socio-cultural worlds characteristic of the "primitive" societies. An anthropomorphic nature is "drawn into the communicative network of social subjects," whereas culture is "naturalized and reified and absorbed into the objective nexus of operations of anonymous powers."37 The confusion of natural and cultural categories signifies a "deficient
differentiation between language and world ... As a result the concept of the world is dogmatically invested with a specific content that is withdrawn from rational discussion and thus from criticism." Myth tells the members of a group how to interpret events in a comprehensive fashion that is always exemplary. The "totalizing power" of myth does not differentiate between things to be manipulated and speaking subjects. Therefore, myth is unable to demarcate the realms of teleological and communicative action, the areas of "instrumental intervention in objectively given situations, on the one hand, and the establishment of interpersonal relation, on the other."

It is important to note that Habermas's description of myth is based on modern consciousness; in this respect he is not following Levi-Strauss's analytical strategy of "freezing" a structure through synchronic oppositional pairs. The consequence of this synchronic "freezing" in Levi-Strauss is the suspension of judgement as to whether a given society is "more developed" than others. Since for him, neolithic and modern societies would simply have different structures, such a difference on its own would not be sufficient to form a value judgement. Habermas, on the other hand, does not posit his oppositional pairs from within the world of myth but rather from an external perspective of the modern man reconstructing a system long overcome. If we reverse the reading order of the passages above, we will have a picture of
modernity as a worldview characterized by the distinction of the natural and cultural worlds, of instrumental and communicative action in which a linguistically mediated criticism has won over dogmatism.

Habermas goes on to say that the "basic conceptual space of religious-metaphysical conceptions of world order... (blends) together ontic, normative, and expressive aspects" under a highest principle (Being, Nature, Reason, God) in the hierarchy of principles. Contrary to it, through the history, the objective, moral-ethical, and expressive worlds have become increasingly differentiated (or not totally fused, as in myth). Scholastic philosophy—in particular that of Thomas Aquinas—may in this respect be interpreted as a delineation of a reason that is operationally distinct from revelation. Although the former must be subordinated to the dogmatism of the latter—and to the authority that embodies it—the separation can be already perceived. Modern philosophy begins when Descartes brings to the foreground subjectivity which is sharply distinguished from the objective world, though God as a creator of sense links both these worlds from above. In Kant, the three moments of theory, ethics, and judgement still appear as belonging to a formal conception of reason that, however, has renounced the ideal of grasping the world in its totality. In Enlightenment, art "retains its aura", the legal representations are still tied to the metaphysical concepts of Nature and Reason (which are not
specifically differentiated from each other\textsuperscript{42}) that ground the rational natural law. The historical and social worlds are interpreted as advancing toward a "telos" induced by a natural movement.\textsuperscript{43} Finally, "an ethics of conviction remains tied to the context of traditions, however subjectivized."\textsuperscript{44}

The entering into the modern world entails:

(a) The distillation of a world concept, abstracted from a single point of view, for the totality of normatively regulated interpersonal relations; (b) the differentiation of a purely ethical attitude, in which the agent can follow and criticize norms; (c) the development of a concept of person that is at once universalistic and individualistic with its correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, and so forth.\textsuperscript{45}

The substitution for the traditional world by the modern structure of consciousness pushes aside authority and ritual actions whose power is shifted "to a consensus that is not merely reproduced but achieved, that is, brought about communicatively."\textsuperscript{46}

The intersubjective rationality which stands at the centre of communicative action displaces the original modern position, where the subject of the Enlightenment was endowed with the epistemological power to order and control the world by scientific and technological means. It is here where the critiques of the overdominating epistemological subject performed by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse or Foucault, just to name a few, should be located. For them, the classical modern aim at domination of the physical world by the subject (the vanishing point of everything) was more than a sign of
arrogance: it has become a political project by which social life is reduced to a role of the object of rationalization which can be controlled by the interests of the hegemonic social group.

For Habermas, the critique of this "totalizing" subjectivity—so in this sense "mythical" as Adorno and Horkheimer pointed out in the _Dialectical of Enlightenment_—should not forsake the reflectiveness of rationality that now must be fallible. It is here where a reconstruction of the intersubjective paradigm history of modes of thought, based on the viewpoint of the three modern value spheres (science, normativity, and art), acquires some theoretical legitimacy. The advancement of natural and social sciences make us realize that the subject is not as "compact" as one could have believed in the 18th century. The birth of sociology, political economy, linguistics, etc., segmented even further the fragmented reality of the modern world. Though the resulting different perspectives do not remain isolated but interconnected with each other in different ways, "totality" is no longer available.49

In this new situation, philosophy becomes useful as a means for orienting the research and for legitimizing the findings of science: it becomes methodology. Philosophy of science makes manifest that the logic of hypothesis-corroboration depends ultimately on how successfully that corroboration confronts the logic of the counterexample—
scientific rationality becomes fallibilistic. Its traditional claims on absolute truth are now viewed either as an anachronism or as representing the remnants of dogmatic positivism uncritically trusting itself without even attempting to test its own assumptions. At the same time, science applies reflection on its procedures, that is, it turns to be philosophical in the same way as a self-reflective modern art blurs its limits with theory. Since the beginning of this century, scientific rationality has become aware of the fictitious character of its "naturality," of the attempted integration of Nature and Reason by the Enlightenment. The community of scientists as well as political and economic interests are now considered active members of the scientific enterprise and, to a high degree, they dictate the route to be taken.

Leaving aside the institutional character of science, the rationality of the community of scientists points to its intersubjective character and to its unavoidable communicative medium. In fact, it is not possible to project a scenario of a community of scientists without taking into account the linguistic-the fallible exchange of statements. The logic of scientific research goes beyond the model of cognitive-monological scientist, searching for the corroboration of his hypotheses. Scientific rationality is now grounded on the rational standards consensually established by the scientific community. The meaning of interdisciplinarity can be taken in
an analogous way: The different branches of sciences are viewed as aiming at an interscientific consensus; they contrast their respective perspectives and apply the research results from one discipline to another; and they seek an inter-illumination of modes of thinking.

Not having ultimate and heteronomously founded values, modern human beings cannot but confront the tasks of creating their world of normative standards in a critical reflexive way. If these standards are to have a binding force, they have to result from a rational-intersubjective process. Equally, art not only leaves behind the religious or courtly restraints but also its transcendent thrust. Modernism applies self-reflection to its own formal devices as well. As early as 1913, Duchamp, with the exhibition of his first "ready-made"\(^50\), already remarks critically the relativity of artistic values as dependent on the artistic community of not only artists, but also critics, institutions, art dealers, and even a growing audience increasingly aware of the mechanisms behind art. Artistic values are not any longer absolute, do not depend on the monological genius, but are agreed upon: they are established by intersubjective procedures.

The three value domains of modernity (science, ethics, and art) now hold intersubjectivity as an operative principle. The change of paradigm becomes clear. The monological-epistemological subject becomes "plurilogical" through the three moments of reason, each of them with their own standards
of validity. At the bottom of this paradigm change stands the communicative, responsible, autonomous, and socially-orientated actor of modern society:

Fundamental to the paradigm of mutual understanding is, rather, the performative attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate their plans for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world. When ego carries out a speech act and alter takes up a position with regard to it, the parties in an interpersonal relationship. The latter is structured by the system of reciprocally interlocked perspectives among speakers, hearers, and non-participants who happen to be present at the time.31

Once the idea of totality has faded away, philosophy faces the task of reconstructing the foundations of intersubjective-dialogical rationality with a pragmatic intent, that is, with an orientation to social action. It is in the communication paradigm that Habermas finds the theoretico-practical locus capable of grounding the theory of social action which could claim to be critical. And as far as we think that an unconstrained dialogue between members of civil society could function as a regulative ideal, this claim can be indeed substantiated. The theory shows its critical face when we can compare the actual communicative restrictions with its ideal. It is at this very point that Habermas's theory of communicative action finds its proper place.

However, counterexamples to such reconstruction are easy to find. The "cultural significance" (to use Weber's expression) of the theoretical directions that I proposed can be put into question by pointing out that within philosophy
scolasticism is still a strong field where a large number of researchers are involved, that the work of some scientists is still performed in isolation, that religion has an enormous influence on the actions of individuals, that some members of the artistic community do contemplate individual talent as the only value to be taken into account. This reconstruction has some relevance, however, to the extent that explains some of the current phenomena and to the degree that those phenomena are expected to set a precedent in the future development of the different domains.

On the other side, just to give an example, in recent times Christian religion has also been subject to revisions, reforming the ritual in a way which has moved from the authoritative power of the priest to the communication among the members of the church. Such change is usually interpreted as a sign of "modernization." On the other hand, dogmatic and conventional elements without which religion would not exist as such, still abound. But in general terms, it is plausible to think that the further the interactive communication advances, the more is felt the cultural modernization of life.

Taking again the thread of normative development, it is unavoidable to mention that the scheme of social evolution serves Habermas to grasp the moral stage of modernity. Morality and is interconnected with communicative action in modernity because both presuppose autonomous subjects. Moral autonomy is characteristically a modern phenomenon. The work
of Lawrence Kohlberg, merging the findings of Piaget's cognitive psychology with the development of moral consciousness, has provided a grounding for Habermas' theory of communicative competence and its unequivocal ethical thrust, which we will discuss later.

The very point of departure can be found in the idea that the moral stages have a link with the stages of interactive competence (in the case of Habermas, in respect to communicative interaction). Habermas identifies those stages as

Structures that mark the moral consciousness of the individual and the legal and moral system of society. They comprise the core domain of the aforementioned general action structures— the representations of justice crystallizing around the reciprocity relation that underlines all interaction. 57

Habermas once more leaps here from the moral subject to the morality of society. (In fact, Kohlberg combines the two levels in his outline of moral development as well.)

In summary, the progress through the stages can be outlined as follows53:

I. Preconventional level. The child is responsive to "good-bad" labels, but the response is conditioned by the anticipation of pain or pleasure. This level has two stages

(a) The punishment and obedience orientation. Actions are determined by their physical consequences, not by their value or meaning. (b) The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action is what satisfies one's own needs. Elements of fairness
appear under the aspect of an exchange of favours.

II. **Conventional level.** The normative duties linked to family, group and nation become central for an individual whose attitude is one of conformity and of active maintaining of the social order. The two stages of this level are: (3) **The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.** Good behaviour is what pleases or helps other and is approved by them. (4) **The "law and order" orientation.** The respect for authority and for the social order becomes the key-rule of action.

III. **Postconventional, autonomous or principled level.** The moral subject accepts moral principles independently of his belonging to social groups. Stage (5): **The social-contract legalistic orientation,** generally utilitarian. Right action must be in accordance with the individual rights agreed upon by all members of society; constitutional democracies belong to this context. The "legal point of view" is emphasized but law itself is changeable according to social needs. Stage (6) **The universal ethical principle orientation.** Right action is viewed under consciously chosen ethical principles which are comprehensive, universal, and consistent. The principles of equality, human rights, and the dignity of the individual become relevant; the ethical imperative belongs to this context.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make all the connections between development of the psyche, moral
development, language acquisition and use of linguistic competence. However, it is important to see how communicative action depends on a decentered worldview and on an autonomous speaking subject able to interact in certain fashion which corresponds to the postconventional stage. In other words, Habermas views communicative action and modernity as internally correlated. Since stage theories imply a development of the rationality potential, communicative rationality is then plausible when worldviews and the values contained in them are able to orient rationally the action of the subjects.

The "competent members of modern societies" have an intuitive knowledge about what the rules of discourse should be. In a social milieu where the last word will never belong to any type of mythical or religious authority, the participants in discourse cannot but rely immanently on their own moral responsibility. Participants in such discourse are accountable for the satisfactory resolution of a practical problem by means of argumentation (the force of the better argument). Moreover, they have to reach an agreement so that all the actors could be involved in the coordination of social actions. This, in its turn, presupposes a conception of society as an open field of intersubjectivity beyond egocentric interests. As well, it implies the mutual recognition of the participants as free and competent members, able to criticize existing norms by critical-rational means.
The communicative action characterized in this way matches all the characteristics of the last stages of Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories. Thus the task of salvaging modernity requires on Habermas's part an enormous theoretical effort that would turn worthless if Piaget's theory were falsified.

In the second volume of his TCA, Habermas goes further and grounds the connection between communicative action and modernity anthropologically as well, drawing upon the work of Mead and Durkheim. In modernity the mechanism of social integration changes from being founded on a shared closed system of values to being based on linguistic interaction. Mead calls this process the "linguistification of the sacred" and understands the evolution of language as going from communication through gestures to signal language (symbolically mediated interaction) to propositionally differentiated speech: "The key is the change from symbolically mediated gestures to grammatical speech." Only when the structure of speech acts is well-formed, communicative action can take place:

It is only at the level of grammatical speech that an agreement can take on the form of communicatively achieved consensus... Language takes over the functions of achieving understanding, coordinating action, and socializing individuals, and thus becomes the medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization take place.

For Mead, the autonomous subject can share a formal universal discourse freed from narrow particularities and grounded on universal values.
If we now summarize the upper stages of development corresponding to personality, morality, and society, we will have an outline of what Habermas understands by modernity. To begin with, modernity means the demarcation of the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds. The universalistic stage (Piaget) accounts for a subject that is able to test critically the validity of norms taking the arguments of others as having in principle the same degree of acceptability as its own rational justifications. This paves the way for a communicative rationality as the ground where practical matters are to be solved. This argumentative procedure requires from the moral subject his choosing of formal-universal principles of action (postconventional stage 6 of Kohlberg's theory) free from the imperatives of tradition-bounded contents and, in that sense, adaptable to various communicative situations.

At the social level, those stages are reflected in universalistic conceptions of the law, in democratic constitutions (postconventional stage 5 of Kohlberg's theory) and in the formation of a civil society that expresses its intersubjective judgements in the domain of a public sphere free in principle from egocentric interests and, again, from the burden of tradition, since this tradition can be at times the source of prejudices that could distort free and equal communication.

Habermas's neo-evolutionism has been attacked from different fronts. McCarthy points out that Piaget's theory was developed on the basis of tests made by the "Genevan children", i.e., by middle-class and well-schooled children of a country like Switzerland. Since Habermas claims that Piaget's theory is the empirical footing of his theory, such limited basis should "relativize" his universalism in a consistent manner. It is to be remarked that Habermas is not afraid that by agreeing with Kohlberg, he might commit the naturalistic fallacy. Kohlberg writes: "Any conception of what moral judgement ought to be must rest on an adequate conception of what is. The fact that our conception of the moral "works" empirically is important its philosophical adequacy." Habermas is here in a difficult situation. On one hand, he claims that behind the writing of The Theory of Communicative Action stands the purpose of laying down the normative yardsticks for social criticism. On the other hand, he wants to ground those normative criteria empirically and therefore takes up the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Given the logics of scientific research, what would happen if those empirical theories are falsified or if instead we arrive at other ones with more explanatory power? Since the delineation of the cultural and ethical project of modernity laid out by Habermas corresponds to the higher stages, do we have to throw out the (obviously unfinished) ethical project of modernity?
If we respond negatively, we are falling into "decisionism", as Habermas says. That is, we do not have an empirically backed argument for our choice of the ethicality derived from modernity.

It is my contention that we can avoid these difficulties by dispensing with the empirical proof; this can be done by appealing to Weber's concept of the ethics of responsibility. We could measure in advance the possible consequences of ethical and political choices; such possible consequences would determine the degree of responsibility of those choices. Of course, this implies the endorsement of the regulative ideas of justice and freedom or the welfare for all. However, this endorsement should not posit problems. On the positive side, the very procedure of testing in advance the consequences of action seems to be in tune with the functioning of social sciences: prediction (and not only corroboration) is at the centre of this kind of science.

Following with some "classical" criticisms, Agnes Heller, after remarking that Habermas has not freed himself from teleology, finds it difficult to accept progress as rationalization after a century caught up in permanent turmoil. Moreover, she adds, "we cannot weigh gains against losses, for losses are incommensurable." This type of criticism, often addressed to Habermas's theory, consciously ignores the distinction logics-dynamics. The tragedies of an epoch, it is said, cannot be redeemed by the potential of a
culture that has been proven inefficient. Such criticism also ignores the fact that these tragedies, if confronted with the normativity that is thinkable in the very same period, acquire an more revolting contour.

Generally speaking, critics feel uneasy about the strong separation between logics and dynamics of development, structure and content, lifeworld and system. Time and again, Habermas has underlined that those are analytical distinctions. It is not difficult to see in those separations a critical strategy that by comparative means criticizes the actual by reference to the potential, the modern world mediated by interests of different kinds by reference to the ethical domain of human communication which has become possible with modernity. This critical strategy has a certain relationship with Hegel's concept of immanent critique later used by Marx.62

In order to arrive at practical questions, I would like to criticize Habermas's separations on theoretical grounds. Before starting I need to make clear that I am assuming a parallel between lifeworld-structure-logics on the one side, and system-content-dynamics on the other. Habermas holds that the lifeworld forms the symbolic fabric of which the structure of a worldview is made. The evolution of symbolic structures is grasped according to an internal logics increasingly separated from external conditions. He also contends that society is formed by institutional contexts of action that
determine historically the formal structure of a worldview in certain particular ways (contents). The dynamics of evolution show how the institutional restraints (linked to the material reproduction of life) have shaped societies in concrete historical realizations.

We can formulate our own criticism as follows: Habermas holds that the lifeworld, the symbolic structure, reproduces itself (in modernity) by means of communicative interaction. With Parsons, Habermas distinguishes three structural components in the lifeworld: culture, society, and personality. The reproduction processes guarantee the cognitive connection between the situation and the knowledge of preceding generations. It also stabilizes group identities and ensures that "individual life histories are in harmony with collective forms of life."63 It can be implied then that analytically we can always—in all the moments of the development of worldviews—have access to the structure of the lifeworld cleaned from systemic elements. But Habermas concedes that external imperatives also determine the actualization of possibilities. If we take for granted that beyond the analytical distinction social processes have always been conditioned (at least partially) by material or systemic interests, then we cannot know how the lifeworld has reproduced itself without the systemic actions. In other words, we should realize that a stage, say modernity, has come about by means of a symbolic development and by the force of
interest. This is something already implied in the Neo-Kantian dialectic between ideas and interests. In other words, there is no possible way for a structure to be developing according to a inner logics which has never acted alone. The structural laws of transformation rely on the actualization of possibilities.

Habermas's organization principle works in the same way: once we are on a structural stage, there are some "ideal" possibilities that are "materially" actualized while, at the same time, as the systemic complexity increases, the old organization principle becomes unable to support that complexity. This means that the "two causalities" are in a developmental connection, i.e., that the linguistic reproduction of the lifeworld is subject to certain social institutions (in the wider sense), which depend on the evolution of system organizations, from the family's small business to the suburban service centre. In short, the reproduction of the lifeworld depends on institutional settings which depend in turn, as the Neo-Kantians would point out, on the values available to be actualized and "produced" culturally.

In a case of a specific stage, we can abstract from the structure and situational realization of the possibilities contained in that structure. But if we are to draw a developmental line we cannot always do so since the logic of structural change also depends on systemic dynamics: we have
a structure that is systematically actualized thus forming a social stage, and if we then move towards the next structure we carry with us elements of the system already inscribed in the formation of that new structure. Habermas argues that

Only this new form of social integration (tribe, empire, nation, and so on) in which the new learning level that is to be explained according to a logic of development is expressed, makes possible a further increase of system complexity, for example, the social use of production forces, the formation of new forms of society, new media, etc. Here functionalistic analysis has its place: it can explain why individual societies on a given level of development chose different development variants, why for example the same organization principle (the family) has been stamped respectively in one of the different forms matri- or patri- or bilinear relationship systems. ⁶⁴

We need to remind ourselves that Habermas considers functionalism to be adequate to explain systemic processes. ⁶⁵ Taking the example above, it is clear that if the "selection" of patrilinear family pattern— as a "selection" decisive as to the direction to move forward— has been determined by systemic imperatives, then it is virtually impossible to abstract the logic of such social integration form from its transformational dynamics.

The pragmatic dynamics of structure transformation has been in fact at the core of a large number of structuralist theories. To begin with Saussurre, he conceived the forward movement from the "logic" proper to a linguistic stage as caused by the dynamic-factual use of language by the speakers. The concept of structure developed by Piaget and analyzed above would point in the same direction: the child does not
develop only internally but also through adaptation to the external environment. As applied to Habermas's theory, this can be taken in two ways. First, we can agree with Charles Taylor that the structure of society is being constantly renewed by practice; Habermas would agree that "an explanation at the structural level must always be supplemented by reference to contexts of action." Second, the interdependence between logics and dynamics serves as a way of criticizing Habermas's radical separation between lifeworld and systemic forces.

I will take the second path by reappropriating an idea put forth by Fred R. Dallmayr. Dallmayr argues that the logical structures postulated by Habermas have a "non-empirical and formal transcendental" character. If this is so, he continues,

they necessarily have the timeless or transtemporal (and thus non-developmental) character of a priori principles; in this sense, however, the relationship between patterns and contingent historical events becomes an unresolved and irresoluble antinomy.

Dallmayr also points out that developmental theories of this kind (Piaget's or Kohlberg's) rely on undialectical paradigms. At the highest level of moral, personal, and social developments there seems to be no conflict or contradiction as prevalent forces. Maturity means the denial of contradictions thus positing a strong model of personal identity without the "shadows" that usually inhabit it. The definition of the concept of stage given above (cf. McCarthy)
implied certain preservation of earlier stages. But Habermas, at least analytically, separates the stages in such a way that stage B does not contain anything from its antecedent A. This is the reason why Habermas cannot follow the traces of mythical remnants which are attached to human actions in modernity through the idolization of commodities and events such as sports, in the same vein as Barthes did [7]. Nor he can appreciate that the metaphysical-religious worldview is an important constitutive part of the Western world whose influence on social actions can be still perceived. Habermas disregards this fact. Modernity's constitution is conceived by him as the elimination of religious traces in the same ways the religious-metaphysical world supposedly eliminated any mythical remnants underlining as constitutive of modernity the latter's ideological detachment. While Habermas can see a gain in the "degree of freedom" resulting from this process, Weber thought that the loss of the unitary worldview provided by religious-metaphysical worldview was in part responsible for the precarious state of modernity.

Furthermore, Dallmayr points out that the "compact" characterization of stages obliges Habermas to give an undialectical account of development, including his conception of interplay between system and lifeworld. The essential antithesis (in modernity) between the two terms impedes the establishment of such interplay: the "uncoupling" can never be solved dialectically. In fact, if stage theories of this type
are undialectical, as Dallmayr claims, the separation between system and lifeworld would be irreversible unless a radical change occurs. In what follows, we shall take a closer look at this issue.

As mentioned above, in Habermas's view the project of the welfare state failed not because of contingent or historical factors but because of its very attempt to regulate forms of life through administrative measures. In other words, if we do not want to run the risk of distorting symbolic reproduction, communicative interaction should never take place in the context of systemic dynamics. Forms of life cannot be created from above, but if we do not consider the possibility of introducing elements of the lifeworld in the administrative agenda (so variable according the different political choices), and if we do not see how the administration (beginning by the municipal governments) cannot take care of the claims and interests of the public sphere, then we will never arrive at a successful and desirable and consensually reached "institutionalization of value" which is the core of any social-democratic project. This seems to be Habermas's normative-political claim. His theory only makes sense as far as the system can be brought closer to the lifeworld and as long as the communicability of the latter can be reintroduced in the former. Or is the lifeworld constantly and essentially in danger due to the systemic evil? If it were so, it would be difficult to figure
out how the claims of civil society could have at all any effect on large contexts of social action. The realization of the project of modernity in society requires the context of system. Otherwise we would have only a community of enlightened and just speakers on the one hand, and rather frightening economic and administrative organizations on the other. The key-question is to know to what extent Habermas’s still adheres to the organization principle developed in his previous works. Habermas stated in "History and Evolution":

The organizational principle of a society circumscribes ranges of possibility; in particular, it determines within which structures changes in the system of institutions are possible; to what extent the available productive capacities can be socially utilized or development of new productive forces can be stimulated.73

In fact, this principle states that a "new societal level of learning" can be institutionalized.74 The meaning structure can have an effect on the institutional world. Habermas needs this premise, since without it there would be no possibility for the project of modernity to be realized.

Habermas’s more recent work thus gives the impression of certain ambiguity on this issue. On the one hand, he does not deny the desirability of such "institutionalization of value". On the other, he sometimes sees administration as irreversibly uncoupled from the civil life:

Modern societies attain a level of system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connected with one another via de- linguistified media of communication: these
systemic mechanisms— for example, money—steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of their moral-political foundations.75

How can the moral-political foundations be reconciled with the administration—since the introduction of high value expectations in the economy would lead to an exhaustive planification and thus to a predictable bureaucratization? How can the reconciliation, implied in the project or potential of modernity, be achieved if the two subsystems (the economy and the state) should not interfere in the lifeworld and if the lifeworld cannot interfere in them? We are clearly facing here a dangerous impasse and Habermas’s stance borders on an "essentialist" position: power always seems to pollute (or distort) a previous and virginal state of human interaction.76

Habermas’s interpreter and critic, McCarthy, argues that when Habermas sees as unavoidable not to break with certain imperatives of the "system maintenance",77 he concedes too much to the systemic approach. McCarthy brings thus to the fore an aspect that does not need to be viewed only negatively.

To begin with, we are confronted with a problem of a degree. A democratic society should function on the basis a process of decision-making that involving all those affected by it. This tenet, of course, is akin to the very workings of communicative action. Now the current system-complexity needs
to avoid the public discussion on every single matter. McCarthy asks why will we need a differentiated systemic apparatus if we hold as valid the democratization of society as a whole? Habermas replies: Because of the complexity of society. We need a legitimized system and its unambiguous openness to the questions posed by civil society. The key-question is, however, where we should draw the line between the decisions that belong to the systemic institutions and those which belong to the citizenry. Unfortunately, Habermas hampers once again the feasibility of such democratization of society when he claims that "there is an indissoluble tension" between capitalism and democracy." Thus on one hand, Habermas talks about overcoming of capitalism through a pervasive democratization of society, on the other hand, the system complexity that he acknowledges would render impossible all the efforts towards such democratization. The impasse is not removed. The possibility of the classical solution proposed by the social-democrats—from Keynes to Galbraith—does not seem to be out of play in any way. This solution neither dismisses the dynamic elements of the economic value-free sphere of action nor renounces to the intervention of a legitimised administration.

The main problem, as Habermas is himself aware of it, is rooted in the actuality of a public sphere whose signs of activity are alarmingly scarce. He would argue that the exhaustion of the public sphere has been produced by system
imperatives. One then wonders how a value-free systemic network has been able to introduce the individualistic and soft-hedonistic values (or egocentric in Piaget’s sense and perhaps conventional in Kohlberg’s theory) that have petrified the public sphere. We also need to analyze whether the recent movements against racism, for sexual equality, etc., and their reflection in administrative measures can be interpreted as a victory of the pressures of the lifeworld over the system. There is also ambiguity in a political utilization of the word "lifeworld". If Habermas means by that the link with the traditional roots that, however critically revised, cohere social groups, how can this term be applied in contexts where social groups are made up by members whose cultural backgrounds are not only alien to each other but also historically confronted?

We can conclude by rethinking this tension in another light. If the distinction between system-lifeworld has, above all, an analytical character, then we can use it to mark the thresholds which separate the public sphere from the administration. It would serve to diagnose and keep in check the overattributions of the systemic apparatus that tend to gain grounds commonly viewed as belonging to the communicative life of citizens. It would be then a diagnostic indicator of the bureaucratization of society. Habermas, of course, also contemplates this possibility though, as said above, if the application of the analytical distinction results in a real
incompatibility of system and lifeworld, then Habermas is denying their interplay to solve specific problems. Rather, he is taking Weber's and Adorno's and Horkheimer's way in which the "administered society" was conceived as a matter of fact whose overcoming would imply the farewell to the rationalistic basis of our society. If this is so, how could the ethical potential of modernity be implemented? By demolishing modern society?

When Habermas criticizes Weber's work, he concentrates his attention on the problem of ethical potential and on modern culture broadly speaking. The structure of modern consciousness becomes a thread along which Habermas contends with Weber's theory of social rationalization.

Habermas's critique is based on an assumption that the institutional rationalization studied by Weber has not reached yet its final and total stage, that it can still be permeated by the political rationality of modernity.
III. HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE OF WEBER

III.1. Introduction

From the very onset of his analysis, Habermas brings forth the anti-evolutionist views of Weber. His attempt aims to reconstruct the latter's developmental account by reversing the fateful direction taken by Weber. This approach had been previously taken by Wolfgang Schluchter in *The Rise of Western Rationalism*. Schluchter, in turn, acknowledges his debts to Habermas's theory of evolution.

Schluchter points out that Weber's understanding of his own task can be termed as "comparatistic". Historical comparative sociology rules out any attempt to differentiate between "lower" and "higher" stages. Such terms, if used, we might add, would somehow imply value judgements and this was something that Weber, successfully or not, tried to avoid. Insofar as anti-evolutionism also implies a negative value judgement on historical developments, it is possible to say that he did not succeed.

For Weber, historical sequences were analytical constructs, products of theoretical concept formation that do not exist in reality. Furthermore, he wanted to privilege the individuality of historical phenomena against overgeneralizations. But Schluchter contends that an evolutionary perspective is nevertheless built into Weber's approach to the emergence of Western rationalism. Weber posited an inner force—rationalization—that was
progressively eroding the mythical and the religious metaphysical worldviews. This inner force could not have been conceived by Weber without the Neo-Kantian theory of the ideal and the material interests. At the end, however, he grants more historical power to the ideas. In Schluchter's interpretation:

(For Weber) Western rationalization was not only dependent on world views, but was on that level determined endogenously; it was not a series of historical concatenations, accidents or interests constellations but the very result of an "inner necessity" on the level of ideas. This necessity arose in ancient Judaism and reached its logical conclusion in ascetic Protestantism. After Weber discovered the inner necessity for the sequence of ideas, he allegedly lost interest in analyzing the cumulative process.

Schluchter concludes that while the comparatist element cannot be denied in Weber's account, there is also a "inner evolutionary force" that is built into his theory. Habermas and Schluchter somehow endorse the idea that all developmental theories, as far as they are developmental, always have a evolutionary core. In so doing, they take for granted that evolution goes far beyond the realm of value-judgements and lies on the side of the empirical. If one claims that evolution is an empirical trend- and the recourse to empirical theories like Piaget's puts Habermas in this position- then one is inserting a type of natural movement in that development that, despite Habermas's distinction between worldviews development and concrete history, bears all the traces of a philosophy of history.
We have to consider Weber's anti-evolutionism from the viewpoint of his analysis of the present. We have to see Weber's work as an effort to understand his own times. And this understanding, with all its dark tones, was fashioned on the basis of Weber's value judgements on how a society ought to be. In this way, we can make sense of the views on history that he took from the preceding generation of German scholars. In turn, their views were negatively based on a reaction against the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment.

In this chapter I follow the structure of Habermas's critique as exposed in the first volume. The structure and the initial setting of the problems have been fundamentally preserved though slightly modified. The order of this thesis and that of the TCA run, in most of the parts, parallel. As far as it concerns the content, we have introduced some new elements where we felt that they would clarify Habermas's critique, while leaving aside some others. However, given the usual thesis format and limits, this has to be more an exposition of Habermas's critique than a comparative study. The trajectory goes then from the "anti-philosophy of history" from which Weber constructs his theory of rationalization to its main themes: the description of modernity as three distinct value spheres, the concept of rationality, the disenchantment of the world, the Protestant ethic thesis and the assessment of modern law.
III.2. Weber's Reaction Against the Enlightenment Philosophy of History.

The Enlightenment stressed the value of scientific rationality as the sole means of knowing (against religion) nature and human nature, the latter being just a part of the former. The thinkers of Enlightenment maintained that the history of human nature was progressing towards the full realization of the capabilities of humanity. History was to be understood in the same way as nature, that is, by means of scientific method. The outcome of this understanding was a history fathomed as a cumulative and self-correcting process and endowed with an immanent "telos" pointing to the maturity of the human species. Kant writes:

Human actions, like every other natural event, are determined by universal laws (...) History is concerned with narrating appearances (...) What seems chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the standpoint of human race as a whole, to be steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.²

The steady evolution of reason is reflected in the mirror of history. The present becomes the privileged historical point of historical chain since it is where humanity has grown enough to be enthusiastically aware of its potential. The future is the temporal instance for a virtually endless improvement. The indispensability of the study of history lies in its capacity to show the moral course of humanity. Once the trend of such a course has been discovered, the human being becomes able to favour its progress. Moral-practical
advancement is then fostered by knowledge.

Habermas begins his analysis by situating Weber against a intellectual climate— that of the second wave of German Romanticism— marked by its espousal of a historicism which pursued a refutation of the basic tenets of the Enlightenment¹. The analysis of Weber’s anti-evolutionism starts with the following four references, to be used as guidelines for my own discussion as well:

1. The Attack on Evolutionary Determinism. Weber shows here the influence of the German Historical School (above all Ranke and Droysen). Ranke doubted that evolution could be measured in all its fields in the same way. In the 16th century, Ranke says, the religious preoccupations were so important that literature was relegated to a second place.

(One could add that Ranke equally should have not applied this statement to all parts of the world alike.) In the 18th century, moral-practical ideas obscured the art of the time. —Such split of multidirectional cultural fields reminds us of Weber’s conception of a differentiated modernity, with its economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual spheres.

Ranke’s subsequent suspicion about the idea of progress proved itself of importance as well. In his view, it was not possible to trace a progressive line in morality (unlike in Kohlberg’s or Habermas’s theories) that would be capable of establishing a "superior" or "inferior" morality according
to the evolution of a trend. 4

Droysen, following Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, developed the concept of historical understanding ("Verstehen"). For him, historical individualities must be understood from the whole (or universal history) whereas the whole is to be understood from the concrete historical instances; this same principle can be used to define also Weber's own research program. Historical life is endowed with freedom and responsibility, that is, with an ethical content which requires a special method (the "understanding" of the cultural sciences) in contrast to the natural sciences of the organic world. (This separation stands against the "positivism" of the Enlightenment.)

Dilthey took up the distinction between the types of science and developed it in psychological terms: empathy with the historical object was to be the method of understanding. Habermas argues that the separation between natural and cultural sciences, so pervasive in Neo-Kantian circles, meant "the discrediting of any attempt to discover laws of development for a naturalistically interpreted culture." 6 Instead, historical analysis was to show structural constellations of meaning, where internal connections between the elements were referred by Weber as "elective affinities." 7

While rejecting the teleological philosophy of history that Kant himself delineated, in reference to methodology Weber remained within a Kantian framework. For him, historical
explanations arise out of our practical-situational interests. Historical reality is uncomprehensible in all its complexity; the causes and factors to which we attribute certain significance depend on the aspects that we want to clarify. With Weber's sociological history in mind, we could say that the explanation of a historical event depends on its significance in the course of the universal process of rationalization. This significance is given by the practical interest of understanding a rationalized present.

Although Weber ascribed causal weight to the symbolic structure in historical explanations, he did not distinguish between logic and dynamic of development in the way Habermas does. However, both assume that sociology is to explain "the structural forms of action" as Weber puts it. Weber did contemplate an interplay (or elective affinity) between logic and dynamic in this way:

At some point economic conditions tend to become causally important, and often decisive, for almost all social groups, at least those which have major cultural significance; conversely, the economy is usually influenced by the autonomous structure of social action within which it exists.

On his part, Habermas tries to explain how communicative action has become possible and what hampers its implementation. In this sense, he has to differentiate the logic of conceptual frameworks from the dynamics of economic and administrative constraints to possible communication. Weber hoped to explain how the purposive-instrumental
rationality characteristic of the administrative and economic contexts of action had made impossible (in an irrecoverable manner) brotherly communication within society. In this sense, he had to make clear how the dynamics of rationalization had destroyed the basis of value rationality. The differences in the (preset) goals determine the differences in the way of arriving at them
. The logic of scientific research (in the natural sciences) is not structurally very different: The scientist tries to prove a "fact" that he has identified hypothetically in advance.

2. The Refutation of Ethical Naturalism. Kant demarcated the realm of nature from the domain of morality and freedom. This distinction of the "is" from the "ought" becomes by the same token one of main concerns of Neo-Kantians, including Rickert and Lask. The Neo-Kantian dualistic methodology of science—that is, the cultural and the natural sciences—reflects this demarcation. Weber combined this methodological position with his aim of building (successfully or not) a sociology that could grasp values without valuation, that is, without value judgments attached to sociological descriptions. In Habermas's interpretation, the concepts of evolution and progress meant thus for him the introduction of normative concepts into an empirical science; Weber thought that evolution is a concept based on a "teleological error" which posits the inevitability of progress as ontological.

Weber's developmental account was not founded on idea that there is a
natural movement in history. Contingency was one his premises which was however obscured by his stress on historical fate, a fate which he endowed with extremely negative connotations-grounded on value judgements- as it is manifested in his diagnosis of the times. Reality and value (that is, disappearance of value) in the end went hand in hand, thus breaking the principle of the "is"-"ought" separation. To what extent his diagnosis of the times compromised his scientific "objectivity" (Weber's brackets) is something that will be treated in some detail in the next chapter.

Habermas stays close to the naturalistic fallacy as stated in our critical discussion above. On the other hand, he is well aware that the taking of a position is unavoidable where social realities (beyond those functional elements which strictly belong to the "system's maintenance") are involved.

3. The Mistrust of Universalism. Weber, Habermas argues, "adopted a cautiously universalist position"[12], for he held that rationalization could be tested in all the world religions, although only in the West it coalesced into a form of rationalism affecting on the whole social life. We can find the confirmation of Habermas' view in Weber's own text:

(Any researcher) studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared that (as we like to think) lie in line of development having universal (Weber's emphasis) significance and value.[13]

Habermas is right in remarking that in the contemporary
rationality characteristic of the administrative and economic contexts of action had made impossible (in an irrecoverable manner) brotherly communication within society. In this sense, he had to make clear how the dynamics of rationalization had destroyed the basis of value rationality. The differences in the (preset) goals determine the differences in the way of arriving at them. The logic of scientific research (in the natural sciences) is not structurally very different: The scientist tries to prove a "fact" that he has identified hypothetically in advance.

2. The Refutation of Ethical Naturalism. Kant demarcated the realm of nature from the domain of morality and freedom. This distinction of the "is" from the "ought" becomes by the same token one of main concerns of Neo-Kantians, including Rickert and Lask. The Neo-Kantian dualistic methodology of science—that is, the cultural and the natural sciences—reflects this demarcation. Weber combined this methodological position with his aim of building (successfully or not) a sociology that could grasp values without valuation, that is, without value judgments attached to sociological descriptions. In Habermas's interpretation, the concepts of evolution and progress meant thus for him the introduction of normative concepts into an empirical science; Weber thought that evolution is a concept based on a "teleological error" which posits the inevitability of progress as ontological. Weber's developmental account was not founded on idea that there is a
natural movement in history. Contingency was one of his premises which was however obscured by his stress on historical fate, a fate which he endowed with extremely negative connotations-grounded on value judgements— as it is manifested in his diagnosis of the times. Reality and value (that is, disappearance of value) in the end went hand in hand, thus breaking the principle of the "is"—"ought" separation. To what extent his diagnosis of the times compromised his scientific "objectivity" (Weber's brackets) is something that will be treated in some detail in the next chapter. Habermas stays close to the naturalistic fallacy as stated in our critical discussion above. On the other hand, he is well aware that the taking of a position is unavoidable where social realities (beyond those functional elements which strictly belong to the "system's maintenance") are involved.

3. The Mistrust of Universalism. Weber, Habermas argues, "adopted a cautiously universalistic position"\(^{12}\), for he held that rationalization could be tested in all the world religions, although only in the West it coalesced into a form of rationalism affecting on the whole social life. We can find the confirmation of Habermas' view in Weber's own text:

(Any researcher) studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared that (as we like to think) lie in line of development having universal (Weber's emphasis) significance and value.\(^{13}\)

Habermas is right in remarking that in the contemporary
language of criticism, universalism is acting as an inner theoretical drive or "subtext". In this sense, Habermas and Weber are following the same project, that is, the emergence of rationalistic modernity. However, there is a key difference. Habermas thinks that the structure of modern action rationality is an event which began to take shape in the Renaissance whereas Weber holds that the ritual of the "primitive" man (performed in order to obtain a desired state of affairs) and the businessman's calculation of means-ends (profit) maintain a similar formal structure of rationality.

4. The Rejection of Optimistic Rationalism. Weber's appraisal of the natural sciences runs in the opposite direction to those of the Enlightenment philosophers who boldly thought that science will eliminate even the problem of death. For him, the lack of value considerations in the instrumental workings of scientific rationality was symptomatic of an epoch.

The point to grasp is how those points of reference determine Weber's picture of modernity, in a way similar to the one in which Habermas's own reconstructive effort finishes in a depiction of a modernity as a worldview structure, as well as administrative-economic complex. Weber's rejection of the evolutionary paradigm was the obvious consequence of his understanding of the times. It is clear that when one thinks that the present cannot be apprehended as an improvement of
social life in relation to its previous forms, all
 evolutionism must be avoided. In Weber, the apprehension of
 the times and his anti-evolutionism took a radical
 formulation.

 To be sure, the objections to ethical naturalism were
 motivated by theoretical reasons. This cannot hide the fact
 that the separation between the "is" and "ought" creates a
 theoretical space enabling us to grasp the times as a defeat
 of the humanistic all-encompassing culture at the hands of a
 scientific culture centred on the material reproduction of
 life. While this kind of criticism was very much alive since
 the end of the 19th century, it reached its powerful
 formulation in Husserl’s Crisis. It still motivates the
 current criticism that brings up the paradox of a humanistic
 Enlightenment as finally falling prey to its scientism.

 Viewed from Europe, a negative vision of times meant that
 the European cultural model was not worthy to be
 "exported" any longer. In this respect, the crisis of the
 European consciousness coincides with a mistrust towards any
 type of universalism and with the ensuing intensification of
 cultural relativism. If my interpretation is correct, Weber
 saw Europe as advancing to its own destruction, activated by
 the entropic movement of its own cultural assumptions, a view
 that is not freed from a nihilistic teleology whose
 representative is of course Nietzsche (an influence on Weber
 to be noted). Optimism was not allowed on these grounds.
Kafka, a contemporary of Weber whose interests curiously match with Weber's own, said once to Max Brod that the men of his time were God's suicidal thoughts. "Is there any hope?", Brod replied. "Oh yes,- followed Kafka- there is plenty of hope, but not for us." This passage captures the post-WWI European intellectual climate.

Now we will analyze how Habermas- an intellectual who fights between the nightmare of modernization and the possible redemption of a cultural-ethical modernity- counters Weber's theoretical description of modernity. We have to remind ourselves once more that Habermas's criticism could not be possible without the distinctions structure-content, logico-dynamic, and lifeworld-system.


Weber conceived of Western rationalism as a wide constellation of phenomena, ranging from the specialized and self-referential jurisprudence to the pictorial perspective of the Renaissance. The starting point of such rationalization process would be virtually impossible to identify since Weber conceptualized the universal history as the history of rationalization (that in Habermas's case would be translated in a double "development of rationality" and "dynamics of societal rationalization".). Nonetheless, there are historical periods in which rationalization undergoes dramatic impulses. At the level of worldviews the attempts of a nascent theodicy
in explaining God's distribution of material justice
( fortunes) delegitimized the religious view by which material
suffering was due to the sinful actions. An embryonic
bourgeoisie felt that its work had to be recognized as much as
its sins, thus putting into question the divine blessing of an
indolent aristocracy. At the level of society, Weber analyzed
how those merchants started to gather in the medieval cities,
serving not only as the sites of religious congregations but
as the administrative and economic centres as well. At the
personality level, the role of the Protestant ethic becomes
the unavoidable point of reference for understanding of
methodical rationalization of the individual life.

Modernity means for Weber the breaking of a previous
unified metaphysical-worldview into the economic, political,
aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual sphere. Thus in modernity,
there can no longer be a unifying principle which would derive
all those spheres from the same premises. Instead, every
sphere follows an "internal and lawful autonomy," standing
"in irreconcilable conflict" against the others. The cause
of this separation is of course the rationalization which
ultimately undermines religious explanations and substitutes
for them scientific causality.

Habermas rightly points out that Weber "designates as
rationalization every expansion of empirical knowledge, of
predictive capacity, of instrumental and organizational
mastery of empirical processes." Habermas comprises various
Weberian value spheres into three corresponding to Kant's moments of reason: the scientific-cognitive, the moral-legal, and the expressive-artistic. Habermas argues that, in his attempt to explain the emergence of modern society, Weber concentrated on the Protestant ethic and its subsequent economic ethos while overlooking the role of modern science. This "stands in peculiar contrast to the central role that the structure of scientific thought plays in the analytical comprehension of forms of rationality." Habermas refers here to the Weberian "elective affinity" between the calculation, prediction, and so on, characteristic for the scientific method and the economic and bureaucratic rationalities. We must qualify this criticism by stressing that while Weber might not have attributed much weight to science in the ontogenesis of modern society, he gave the central role to the marriage between science and economy. On purely empirical grounds, the mutual help between science and economy on the one hand, and science and the state on the other, seems unquestionable in modern societies. However, Habermas's criticism becomes understandable if we take into account that (a) science is a learning process that helps to differentiate the objective (its own field) from the intersubjective-communicative and from the subjective worlds; (b) we distinguish science as knowledge (logic) from the dynamics of the systemic utilization of science. By the same token, Habermas's criticism is only plausible to the extent to which
the research centres can be detached from private interests or from the imperatives of the state.

In my view, Weber's attempt was here double-headed. At the level of ideas, he wished to conceptualize the purposiveness and the lack of value questioning of the scientific work as the key-image to fathom society as a whole. At the level of interests, Weber was not describing an empirical fact that was (and unlike theories or hypotheses) irrefutable as such. Habermas cannot accept the first side of Weber's pair, since there would not be room left for a nonpurposive and value-rational communicative action; rather, scientific purposiveness alone would mean its eradication. As to the second side, Habermas's distinction between logic and dynamic is clearly insufficient. In fact, the logic of scientific research has been always to a large degree dependent upon the interests of the economy and the state. To put it in another fashion, the advancement of scientific knowledge—even in university settings—has often taken the route of researching the problems dictated by the economic and administrative interests. Viewed in a more dialectical fashion, one could agree with Habermas's principle of organization (referred to above): a learning process—in this case the crucial development of science—determines to what extent the productive forces can be heightened. On the other hand, the productive and distributive forces define the specific direction of the scientific learning processes. On
these grounds, it is theoretically possible to grasp the logical status and the development of science in a evolutionary way, just as the classical books on the history of philosophy present a system of thought as having overcome the preceding one. However, the account of the role of science in society must necessarily take into account the dynamics of interest, at least in modern times. A good example might be the development of the sciences linked to space technology. This, of course, calls for a democratic control of those "imperatives" which can direct the inner or autonomous dynamics of the state.

Habermas goes on to analyze Weber's views on the two other value spheres, the artistic and the moral-legal. Weber perceived modern art as a formal, self-enclosed, and internally lawful domain that has lost the plasticity typical for the religious-inspired artworks. (Obviously, Weber ignores here the lengthy period in which art was the vassal of the monarchial state.) On the other hand, Weber continues, art has substituted for religion since "it provides a salvation from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical and practical rationalism." Habermas comments that for Weber the development of art plays as little a role in the sociological explanation of the rationalization of society as the history of science does. Unlike science that has become a productive force, art cannot even speed up these processes.

For Habermas, art enters into the stream of learning processes
and develops the ability of the subject to creatively present his inner world. Placing himself in the line of the modernist tradition, Habermas positively values the autonomy of art which has freed, according to him, subjectivity from the constraints of churches and the kings. The rigidity with which Habermas differentiates the three value spheres—which "form one syndrome" in communicative action—obstructs the connection that Weber clearly saw between modernism and aestheticism. Modernists began by imposing a rigorous reflection on the formal means. When modernism came to its peak within the trend of Abstract Expressionism, art was considered—as Adorno himself did—as the only sphere with enough substantivity to redeem the individual and even the society as a whole. For the very same reason, Habermas cannot come to grips with the fact that significant segments of the art of the last thirty years have merged the cognitive and the ethical experiences within the aesthetic arena though his views on this issue are highly ambiguous.

Habermas rightly observes that Weber the value sphere which became central in Weber's analysis of modernity was the moral-legal one. The strength of the Protestant ethic and its modern secularization thesis accounts for the rationalization of individual conduct. Since social action, as we will see later, is for Weber nothing else but the sum of individuals actions, he could transpose the individual rationalization to the social level. The legal system was in his analysis
conceived as a deductive-rationalistic machine (modern jurisprudence) buttressing the bureaucratic functioning through the enactment of laws. Habermas cannot but remark that the step from traditional, religious-bounded morality to one based on universalistic principles (see Kohlberg's postconventional stage above) means a dramatic improvement as far as the humanity's acceptance of its own responsibility is concerned. The formal ethics (of the "Kantian type") opens at the same time the way for a consensual legitimation of the legal basis of society. Of course, formal ethics as well as consensually legitimized law are only possible within the modern structure of consciousness whose content, in respect to the law, can take the weight given by the interests of money and power. To what extent is consensual legitimation possible today, considering the separation of the legality (as a part of the administrative system) and the lifeworld, depends (in Habermas's theory) on the degree of importance that we attribute to that separation. In other words, law cannot exist without an administrative setting.

Weber could not see the potential of modern ethics and law since (a) he thought that an ethic of brotherliness must necessarily be anchored in religion; (b) he adopted a positivistic-legalistic that obstructs the distinction between legality and legitimacy. In sum, Weber saw such separation of value-spheres as a negative trend that made impossible the ethical recuperation of the times under the
tenet of brotherliness.²⁵ Political action is trapped in the impersonality of bureaucracy that systematically dismisses personal conflicts. The formality of modern art neglects a content that could convey that paradigmatic ethic. Modern eroticism is described as individual-intellectual pleasure with all possible adornments in it: individual pleasure runs counter brotherly feelings. Finally, the intellectual elites have created an aristocracy that is "based on the possession of rational culture and independent of all personal qualities of man."²⁶ The modern individual has to wage with all this contradictory forces, without being able of integrate them in his personality. This point is crucial for the understanding of Weber’s diagnosis, posited, as Habermas says, in "existential-individualistic terms."

For Habermas, the structure of modern consciousness allows to establish the formal parameters of justice, on the basis of a consensual agreement communicatively achieved (ideally) without the pressures of egocentric interests. As we have already seen, for Weber, it is the very dynamics of modernity that makes botherliness impossible. For Habermas, it is the structural space of modernity that permits us to think about a true democratic justice. The advancement of knowledge means the enhancement of certain ethical ideas—equality, responsibility, and the like. This philosophical position is called by Habermas "cognitivist ethics."²⁷

There seems to be an asymmetry between Weber’s emphasis
on the ethical rationalization as the "cause" of modern rationalism and the total rationalization of society. Neither could the degrees of rationalization be measured in one and the same way, as Ranke argued elsewhere, nor should the evaluation of rationalization should posited in the same terms in all the aspects of modern life. Nevertheless, ethical rationality—scarce in these times—deserves some positive treatment. For Habermas, the rational subject—a product of the rationalization of beliefs—cannot overcome egocentric interests. His autonomous individuals cannot but rely on their rationality to solve ethical problems. Against Weber, it could be argued that the diffuse feeling of (i.e. brotherliness), provided by the religious worldviews, does not presuppose a higher ethical standard in reference to the universalistic concept of justice worked out in the tradition of the Enlightenment. From the viewpoints of history and of ideas, it does not seem to be a contradiction between such feeling of community brotherliness and political domination based on privilege and sanctioned by religion. Privilege is precisely what is contradictory to the universal concept of justice.

Once the general problematic of modernity has been set up as the autonomy of the three spheres (and before going to a more detailed analysis of Habermas critique of Weber’s cultural, societal, and ethical-legal rationalization) we need to clarify Habermas’s central attack on Weber’s concept of rationality.
III.4. The Concept of Rationality

When Lujo Brentano replied to Weber by saying that Protestant asceticism consisted in a "rationalization toward an irrational mode of life", the latter's response was:

He is, in fact, quite correct. A thing is never rational in itself, but only from a particular point of view. For the unbeliever every religious way of life is irrational, for the hedonist every ascetic standard, no matter whether measured with respect to its particular basic values, that opposing asceticism is a rationalization. If this essay makes any contribution at all, may it be to bring out the complexity of the only superficially simple concept of rationality.²⁸

If Weber considers rationality to be a relative concept that changes depending upon particular standpoints, the question that immediately arises is: From what perspective did Weber undertake his analysis of rationalization? This question becomes even more important when we realize that in the construction of ideal types the subjectivity of the researcher intervenes through the selection of the characteristics of the phenomenon that will form a particular ideal type. In my view, these issues can only be answered by taking into account the role of his diagnosis of the times. It is due to this factor that Weber equated the modern instrumental rationality with rationality as such; for him, and from an ideal typical point of view, the only instance of rationality employed in action (within modernity) was that of instrumentality.

Habermas chooses to bring up the "internal contradictions" he finds in Weber's "complex, but unclarified concept of rationality."²⁹ As he points out, Weber started out
by drawing a preliminary distinction between theoretical and practical rationality. The former aims to master the world through conceptual construction. Intellectual strata, from sorcerers to scientific researchers, are responsible for this organization of reality that does have— for Weber and Habermas— an "indirect" influence on action insofar as action is grounded on the normativity contained in worldviews. The latter, practical rationality, involves the calculation of ends to means. Ends can be rationally established or blindly accepted; the distinction is not always clear-cut. If we take as an example an economic action, we can say that the abstract end is always profit (success), though the Calvinist entrepreneur acted having in mind the idea of salvation. Furthermore, the selection of immediate ends takes much of the activity of economic planning. Weber says: "If anything, the most essential aspect of economic action is the prudent choice between ends."30

For Weber, practical rationality has some other important features: The ends always are established on the grounds of personal interests while regularity and predictability are the key-stones of economic planning. Technique amounts in this context to the regular and reproducible employment of means regarding some preestablished ends. Having all these features in mind, we can arrive at the plausible conclusion that economic activity is the realm from which Weber constructed his practical-rational type. The elective affinities with
theoretical rationality are based on the fact that regularity and predictability are those of Newton's physics. But perhaps the most important consequence is that practical rationality—
we have to remind ourselves here of the concept of the
"actualization of value"—creates a distinctive life style:
"As a result of their activities, all "civic strata"—in particular merchants, artisans, traders—show a definite tendency to order their ways of life in a self-interested, practical-rational manner."^{31}

Habermas asks for a more explicit articulation of a difference between theoretical rationalization (the logics of knowledge) and the instances of practical rationality. In effect, such articulation was essential to Weber's research programme: one only has to think that the Protestant ethic is the cause of Calvinists's practicality. Still, Habermas does so because for him there is a direct correlation between higher learning processes and the competence of acting rationally. Weber talks of the modern formalization of symbol systems (science, formal law, and so on) as the condition of possibility of the rationality of action, very much in the way Habermas does, though with an opposite purpose. Habermas contends that the formalization of the contents of tradition—the aspect analyzed by Weber—and distinctiveness of the structure of modern consciousness are not identical sides of the same phenomenon. To put it clearly, the symbolic structure of modernity implies formalization but formalization alone
does not amount to modernity. Modernity means a "categorial breakthrough": it is not the formality of reasoning but the kind of reason, again with Piaget, that defines the modern structural stage. Modern rationality is not only the result of formalization but the consequence of the way we see the world as composed of the objective, intersubjective, and subjective moments.

Thus, modernity cannot be reduced, as Weber attempted to do it, to instrumental-purposive rationality found at work within the fields of the economy and the administration but it has a distinctive feature in the form of the ethical and expressive potential, characteristic for the decentred understanding of the world. Furthermore, this decentration creates space for instrumental reason that is thus confined within the domain of the human intervention in the objective world. Ethical rationality finds its place in communicative action. Expression has as its locus the personal presentation to society as well as art. Thus, the decentration of the structure of modernity means the separation of the three value spheres, containing the formal standards of truth, truthfulness, and authenticity. In Habermas's view, when Weber analyzed those value spheres, he concentrated on the specific content of each of them in a particular moment; thus he missed considering formally the structure with different moments of rationality each of them having their distinctive validity claims.
Following Habermas's critical assessment, we will now deal with the problem of symbolic rationalization (the thesis of the disenchantment of the world) and the thesis of the Protestant ethic (where societal and personal rationalization complement each other). Finally, we want to arrive at a preliminary analysis of Habermas's critique of Weber's diagnosis of the times through the thesis of the rationalization of the law.

III.5. Symbolic Rationalization: The Disenchantment of the World

As mentioned above, since values determine the social, group, or individual ends to which the actor is oriented, the cultural rationalization carried out by the intellectual strata influences the rationalization of action. This is based on the dialectic of ideas and interests. As Habermas notes, since personal interest guides the area of action belonging to the instrumental-purposive rationality, Weber conceived it as relatively free from the influence of socially binding values. However, even this type of self-interested rational action must be carried out according to certain procedures that are seen as legitimate.

Time and again, Habermas warns us that in the analysis of the development of worldview "constellations of validity from constellations of causality"—i.e., logics and dynamics, the internal and the external line of inquiry—must
not be confused. With the help of Rainer Dohert, his former fellow in the Max Planck Institute, Habermas contends that Weber did not distinguish

The substantive problematic that guides rationalization and the structures of consciousness that result from the ethical rationalization of worldviews. Whereas the contents of worldviews reflect various solutions to the theodicy problem, the structural aspects appear as we shall see, in the "attitudes towards the world which are determined by formal world-concepts. If one separates structure from content in this way, the interplay of ideas and interests can be analyzed quite well in connection with the material Weber laid out.35

If we do distinguish structure from content, we can see the problem of disenchantment as a formal-universal phenomenon of de-magification36 that has taken different contents, depending on the external factors around different cultural contexts.

According to Habermas, Weber approached disenchantment from the viewpoint of ethical rationalization (leaving aside the history of science and art), wishing to explain genetically the rise of capitalism on the basis of its "ethos". Once the social power of purposive-instrumental rationality is identified as the cause of the two diagnostic theses-the loss of meaning and the loss of freedom-, capitalism can be equated with modernity. However, Habermas sees the marriage of capitalism and modernity as a result of the factual historical course. Capitalism is only one of the structural possibilities of modernity and for this very reason unthinkable without the structure of modernity, the
one which was actualized from the range of social, ethical, economic and expressive alternatives that modernity made available. Habermas says: "Weber did not hesitate to equate this particular historical form of rationalization with the rationalization of society as such." 37

From this perspective, Habermas can reconstruct the thesis of disenchantment from the context of the development of the learning process. If viewed from this internal line— that Habermas privileges over the external, thus revealing once more his attempt at salvaging the project and not the actuality of modernity—the process of disenchantment would appear as follows.

1. The Substantive Aspects

A. The Theme. In the transition from feudal to modern society, religious rationalization is prompted by the need of the new classes to offer an explanation for the distribution of fortunes and for the problem of individual suffering. In Habermas's view, this has to be explained by virtue of the development of the ideas of justice. The stage is difficult to identify according to Kohlberg's theory, for the conventional stage in which we are supposed to be at this point implies a justification of the "status quo" while theodicy undermines the religious legitimation of aristocracy. This point of development could be a threshold period of structural formation, leading to the postcoventional stage spanning over five centuries (from the 13th century to the "era of
constitutions", that is, the 18th century). Here we would follow Kohlberg in deliberately "confusing" the content of symbolic rationalization with the structure of worldviews.

B. Theocentric versus Cosmocentric Worldviews. This opposition distinguishes Occidental from Oriental worldviews. For Weber, Occidentals think of themselves as "instruments of God" whereas Orientals try to enter into divine course of deliverance. The "instrumental" attitude is crucial for understanding of the Protestant ethic.

C. World Affirmation versus World Rejection. For the Judeo-Christian religions this world is just a suffering passage which one can survive by having the hope of salvation. Buddhism and Hinduism also reject this world from which their believers wished to fly. Confucianism and Taoism - as well as Greek philosophy, as Habermas reminds us - endow this world with positive value.

2. Structural Aspects

Habermas's initial assumption is that Weber's analysis of disenchantment can be analyzed from the structural aspect of symbolic systems, shaping the attitudes toward the world of those involved in them.

A. Mystic Flight from the World versus Ascetic Mastery of the World. The rejection of the world results in dualism. This world is the ground where the believer tests himself in order to gain the eternal bliss of the other world. This dualism allows an objectification of this world that is not found in
the mystic attitude unable to distinguish the two worlds. The dualist believer tries to master the objective world for the religious purpose of salvation. Dualism, and the subsequent objective concept of this world, opens structurally the space for ethical rationalization:

An ethical rationalized worldview presents the world (a) as the field of practical activity in general, (b) as a stage upon which the actor can ethically fail, (c) as the totality of situations that are to be judged according to "ultimate" moral principles and mastered in accord with the criteria of moral judgements, and (d) as a domain of objects and occasions of ethical conduct. The objectified world stands over against the basic moral norms and the moral conscience of fallible subjects, as something outside, external.38

Habermas's strategy consists at this point in defining of the religious-metaphysical worldview that still covers all possible realities under one principle (God or Being), while at the same time, as the quote shows, that worldview already begins to differentiate (though still in a blurred fashion) the objective, ethical, and subjective worlds. Since it was the condition for possibility of instrumental rationality's implementation in larger social areas, this theological-metaphysical stage, enabling us to look objectively at the world, was crucial for Weber as well. The difference, however, resides in Weber's understanding of such a situation: he thought that instead of distinguishing the three worlds, this process would lead to a valueless uniformization. Since Weber was still thinking in structural terms, he viewed the connection between dualism, Protestant ethic, mastery of the
world, modern secularization, and modern "iron cage" as the transformation of a structure formed by the constellation of phenomena referred to as Western rationalism. In comparison with Habermas, he did not "abstract" the historical content from the structure.

B. Theoretical Contemplation of the World versus Practical Adjustment to the World. The practical approach to life can be found in the affirmative Oriental religions (Confucianism and Taoism) as well as in the Judeo-Christian dualistic tradition. The theoretical contemplation would correspond to Hinduism or Buddhism as well as — Habermas adds — to Greek metaphysics. Occidental civilization has to be understood from the articulation of the practical attitude with the mastering-objectivating attitude. This articulation is the base of instrumental action. In contrast, Chinese religions seek adjustment to the world rather than mastery.

In sum, for Habermas the disenchantment of the world leads to the differentiation of the value spheres of modernity, which in its turn accounts for a decentration of the subject in the cognitive-instrumental, ethical-intersubjective, and expressive attitudes. It is not only the contents of wordviews that have undergone substantial change but also the formal-decentred approach of a subject moving within an increasingly formal and self-centred world.

Weber conceived of this process of symbolic rationalization as the unilinear elimination of magical
elements. Habermas, on the other hand, stresses that there is a qualitative leap in this process that genetically explains modernity as such. In Habermas’s view, Weber reduced his analysis to the ethical aspect, thus dismissing the cognitive development—the learning process—that is to be identified as the cause of ethical rationalization. In other words, Weber connected disenchantment with value rationalization. Symbols were for him important as far as the values contained in them influence human conduct. In his conception, symbol was value. Habermas sees disenchantment as a cognitive rationalization that has an important influence on course of human conduct—this is one of the basic tenets of the "cognitive ethics" that he endorses. Symbol has for Habermas a cognitive as well as an axiological meaning. The differences between their respective conceptions of symbol explain why Weber stresses the causal importance of the Protestant ethic in the formation of modernity and why Habermas stresses the ethical aspect and the emergence of modern science. It is implicit in Habermas’s reception of Piaget’s and Kolhberg’s theories that it is the cognitive aspect that prompts ethical development.

III.6. Societal Rationalization: The Protestant Ethic

Weber’s analysis concerns the institutionalization of purposive—instrumental action. In order to explain this institutionalization of "universal significance" (even though it has been more prominent in the West), Weber thought it
unavoidable to investigate the ethics of ultimate ends founded on personal salvation that motivationally anchored the social implementation of purposive-rational action.

This main thesis of Protestant ethics has been attacked from different fronts. Some of Weber's critics doubted about its historical accuracy since also Catholic countries, such as Belgium, experienced capitalistic phenomena similar to those in Protestant countries. Others suspected that Weber put too much causal weight on a thesis with a rather thin explanatory potential. Habermas aligns himself with this second line of criticism. It is to be remarked that Habermas cannot give too much causal importance to the Protestant ethic because of a logical question. For him, Protestantism helped in the consolidation of the principle of subjectivity: "Against faith in the authority of preaching and tradition, Protestantism asserted the authority of the subject relying upon his own insight: The host was simply dough, the relics of the saints mere bones." In other words, Protestantism is a part of the wider formation of the modern structures of consciousness. Consequently, Habermas seems to be asking Weber: If Protestantism is only a part, how could it explain the whole? How does the Protestant Ethic become logically possible because of the formation of modern structures of consciousness and at the same time can it be the sole cause of this formation? These are the questions which stand at the core of Habermas's criticism. Moreover, Weber's
epistemological pluralism suggests that he might not have considered this thesis as having an absolute value. For him, it was an explanation, perhaps partial, to be tested, improved, or rejected.

Before turning to Habermas's criticism in some detail, let us summarize the Protestant ethics (in its Calvinist variant) and compare its conception with the "ethos" of modern economy. For Calvin, only the absolute will of God can save the believer, never the latter's efforts in leading a pious life. Calvinism put the believer in a state of incertitude since no one could have been sure of being elected. Paradoxically enough, if one believed oneself to possess the signs of election, then he had to lead an exemplary and disciplined life: any sign of weakness could be interpreted as the proof of not being one of the chosen. Success, that is, practical-rational accomplishment, was for the Calvinists the most important sign of election.

The Calvinist was bound to lead an ascetic life that prevented him from spending the profit of his business. Accumulation was the key-word of capitalism in its initial phase, and this was reflected methodically in the rational bookkeeping of the forerunners of capitalism. The moral accountability of the Protestant was also cumulative; because of his personal relation with God, he could not employ confession to initiate the Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, and forgiveness. In this way, the Protestant kept a moral
bookkeeping of his deeds: Calculation was the pervading criterium in the economic as well as in moral sphere. Weber, of course, is using the structural affinities method.

Schluchter points out that

In Weber's view, ascetic Protestantism combines five characteristics which up to the Reformation no other salvation movement had successfully fused in Asia or the West: theocentrism, asceticism, inner-worldliness, personal sanctification and virtuosity. Only this combination produces the religious motivation for world mastery.\textsuperscript{41}

However, the development of scientific rationality (somehow privileged because of its connection with the mastery of the world) was to push religion to "the realm of the irrational." Ascetic uniformization found an elective affinity in the standardization of production. Once religion has lost its convincing power, the work ethic is secularized along the lines of Franklin's utilitarianism.\textsuperscript{42} Weber draws the following conclusion:

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of the monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of modern economic order.\textsuperscript{43}

Weber's step from the individual to the societal order is not entirely justified. Again, it seems as if the sum of the individual orientations would construct the "spirit" that rules the economic-social activities of a society. Weber is then using an inductive model that would have to be supplemented by deductive approach by which the traits of a particular society—its institutional values or even its
regulations—would also orient social (and not merely individual and self-interested) conduct.

Habermas reads the process of secularization in another fashion. When Weber refers to the isolation of the modern individual as the result of the work ethic, he is pointing, according to Habermas, to a fact that belongs to the dynamics of development: social labour under capitalistic conditions becomes one of the sources of alienation and of anomic disturbances of personality. But we also can see the process of disenchantment (in which Protestantism can be thought as a step) as moving towards a differentiation of an ethical sphere that conceptualizes the world "as the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations within which the autonomously acting individual can morally prove himself." According to Habermas, it is significant that Weber chose the Calvinist sect. Weber generalized from a particular case in order to prove, we can suppose, his theses on modernity built in advance. Habermas points to the fact that Protestant sects nearly contemporary of Calvinism, such as the Anabaptists, developed a brotherly and "rationalized" ethics close to socialist tendencies. For Habermas, a bourgeois moral consciousness detached from the Church, as it was set up in the 18th century, also proves that a principled ethics does not need to depend on religion. Weber uses here a premise that he never tries to prove. This premise says that an ethic of brotherliness, or even a principled ethics as
such, can only survive in religious contexts.

Furthermore, the separation of an ethical sphere from the compact space of the religious-metaphysical worldview leaves room for value-free (economic-administrative) areas in which strategic action can prevail without interfering with ethical communication. Whether or not strategic action actually does interfere in interpersonal relations, that remains an empirical question which Habermas is ready to answer in the affirmative. It follows, however, that societal rationalization cannot be considered as the causal effect of an ethical secularization. On the contrary, it is the secularization of worldviews that allows the delineation of distinct areas for "brotherly"- or simply based on solidarity- communication and for a material reproduction of life guided by instrumental-purposive action.

In my view, Habermas is right when he says that "ber should have explained why he believed that a principled ethics based on brotherliness can only be thought within the framework of salvation religions". In respect to the value-anchoring of labour, which is the central idea of the Protestant ethic, the disagreement between Weber and Habermas is symptomatic of their theoretical differences. Weber sees labour as individual meaningful labour at whose heart stands the "calling", be this religious or not. The beliefs of the individual ground the material activity in a particular way. This activity is grasped through the model of the atomistic
subject. The sum of individuals acting in such a particular way establishes the grounds for a generalization. The value consciousness of the labourer is at the bottom of the economic edifice which is built in modernity by a paradoxical meaningless and impersonal calling. The idea of an economic "ethos" points in this direction—and hence towards the modernity as a "spiritless" and "monstrous" form of capitalism. Habermas's views on labour are indicative of his difficulties in separating the domain of the lifeworld from that of the system. For him, labour is the place where the value that the worker attaches to his activity meets the imperatives of the material reproduction. Labour, "as an action belongs to the lifeworld of the producers, as a performance is the functional nexus of the capitalist enterprise and of the economic system as a whole."46 The problem is, as Marx pointed out, that the labourer now sells his work force as a commodity. This means that the systemic imperatives have won over the lifeworld. The labourer cannot "make sense" of his sensuous activity—if there is such in a service-oriented economy—any longer. If lifeworld and system are completely detached and if labour is now a commodity affair of the system, the diagnosis must take a rather negative form since labour is at the bottom of the functioning of any society. Up to this point, Marx, Weber and Habermas seem to agree as to the setting of the problem. But Habermas takes a dramatic distance from the tradition of praxis
philosophy and from Weber. The accomplishment of the project of modernity cannot only consist in the improvement of labour relations, even though we can suppose that the ethical paradigm of equity, responsibility, and so on, must have a determinant influence on the sphere of labour. The point is, however, that the modern ethical paradigm does not come from the labour sphere but from the domain of communication. At this point, what Habermas calls "the obsolescence of the production paradigm" has to be introduced. Human practice cannot reduced to labour nor must the emancipatory agenda be focused only on the change of the labour relations. In other words, labour activity cannot be put at the centre of human action: "It is the form of interaction processes that must be altered if one wants to discover practically what the members of a society want and what they should do in their common interest." 

There are two conclusions to be drawn. First, Habermas is dangerously reducing the application of communicative action to the sphere of lifeworld. He again seems to want to fence off the lifeworld from any admixture of systemic elements. If labour is a part of both system and lifeworld and if both are separated, one cannot conceive how Habermas would try to ameliorate this sphere. If it is true that value activities are in most of cases located in the sphere of leisure and not in that of labour, it is also true that the mechanisms of communicative action should be felt in the part of labour that
correspond to the system. The task of unions is not to be dismissed but enhanced as Habermas probably thinks.

The second observation deals with the function of labour in our society. The paradigm of labour is theoretically as well as empirically insufficient to grasp the complexity of human action. This, however, should not invalidate the specific weight of labour in the present time. The change of a society based on production to our society where production does not need as much labour force as before, has its consequences. The fact that legions of young people place in labour their meaningful hopes is in a way akin to Weber's description of the professional calling and of the frustrations attached to it in difficult times. He was not mistaken in considering the "ethos" of material reproduction as a key factor on which sometimes depend the health or the malaise of the symbolic life even though ideas were at the beginning of a particular mode of production. Labour assures identity within society. The lack of a specific place in the labour system produces disturbances that go from the typical cases of anomie to broader problems of societal integration. Today, Weber's description of profession as the "meaningful" knot of social life is rather accurate: at this point only a confidence in the labour conditions can generate the energy needed to be involved in projects concerning the highly desirable project of a recuperation of the public sphere and of the public life. Paraphrasing Habermas's quote above, it
would not be surprising to find out that the common practical interest of our society would be the improvement of the labour conditions or, in a large number of cases, simply the creation of those conditions. Labour is a sphere where lifeworldly and systemic elements should appear together. The domain of law is another sphere where functioning and value anchoring also (should) intermesh in a consistent way.


Habermas's starting question can be formulated as follows: To what extent is it possible to see the conception of natural law worked out in the Enlightenment as a genetic factor in the "spirit" of modernity?

According to Habermas, Weber cannot see modern law as a contributing factor to the emergence of modernity; he can only contemplate it as a result of the dynamics of modernization. To begin with, Weber, argues Habermas, cannot trace back modern law to a specific process of de-magification because it has had a secular character from its beginnings. This statement must be somehow qualified for Weber pointed out the importance of a civil, lay, and anti-traditional Roman law. Weber could not relate the emergence of modern law to the loss of force of religion. However, he could relate it to a broader process of rationalization: one only has to read the pages in which he talks of the reception of Roman law by modern and university-trained jurists. Nonetheless, Weber believes that
there is a break between natural and modern law. Natural law is the substantive source of legitimacy and lays down the basis for rational agreement. Positive modern law works through enactment as the basic rule of law-making. Habermas argues that Weber falls prey to legal positivism since he is implying an identification of legality with legitimation.

Habermas's assessment is not entirely fair. Weber clearly saw that natural law grounds the standards of positive law. Perhaps Weber was indeed influenced by the legalistic positivism of his time. However, it is plausible to think that when he identified legality and legitimacy, he was in fact describing a trend. An analogy with the situation of the administration of justice would show what is the state and the specific direction of this trend:

The conception of the modern judge as an automaton into which the files and the costs are thrown in order that it may spill forth the verdict at the bottom along with the reasons, read mechanically from codified paragraphs - this conception is angrily rejected, perhaps because a certain approximation to this type is implied by a consistent bureaucratization of justice. In the field of court procedure there are areas in which the bureaucratic judge is directly held to "individualizing" procedures by the legislator.32

Weber's analysis of modern law has all the marks of his social diagnosis: formal-modern law rejects value-substantive rationality (loss of meaning) and regulates the instrumentality of the bureaucratic and economic domains of action (connected to the loss of freedom). Modern law lacks substantivity because it operates through formal relations
between laws that are established by a caste of specialists. Jurisprudence becomes a law-finding "technology" backed by casuistry. As a result of modern jurisprudence, new laws are generally obtained "through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of meaning." The modern tendency points also to reducing the particularities of the individual case in contrast to traditional law, in which the context of application was so "familiar" as to judge the person itself and not the legal offense. This "impersonality", however, can be seen as a step forward a more universal, egalitarian conception of law based on consensually achieved principles.

For Weber, the formalization of law impedes the introduction of moral motives into legal reasoning. Law is concerned in modernity with the regulation of economic conflicts and with the internal functioning of the bureaucracy. Having in mind that administrative as well as economic activities disregard value considerations and that those action domains have a definite predominance in modern society, it follows that law serves as a "neutral" or "value-free" medium of action coordination. Does this "neutrality" amounts to consider modern law as positivistically "founded" on a lack of normativity? Weber, according to Kronman, was quite ambiguous on this issue. On the one hand, modern legal order is based on the ideas of freedom and equality. Individuals are free to arrange contracts with other citizens. That contract is agreed upon the supposition that
all persons are equally responsible before the law and hold the same rights. Weber, argues Kronman, seems to view positively the moral foundations of modern law. However, Weber's diagnosis of modernity is stated in the negative because, in Kronman's words,

despite the very very extensive formal freedom which the modern legal order confers on every individual, material circumstances - in particular, the distribution of wealth and the conditions of work- deprive these formal elements of their meaning o value. 56

Weber's position here is not only akin to that of Marx but also to that of Habermas: the actual material constraints of modernity, argues Weber, deny the possibility of actualizing the modern normative foundations.

However, Weber also holds that modern legality, and its concomitant impersonal equality, hampers the rising of responsible and charismatic politicians. Modern legalism is thus anti-normative since the normative model is now for Weber the strong personality without which charismatic leadership is not possible 57. For Kronman, Weber does not favour one of these two ways of criticizing of modernity, both found in sociology of law: Weber's thinking is in this respect clearly antinomical. However, it is possible to argue that Weber did endorse more consistently the second alternative in other parts of his work, paradigmatically in "Politics as a Vocation" but also in PE as we shall see later.

Habermas's line of argumentation, as we mentioned, is in tune with the first alternative while criticizes the threads
implied in the view that modern law has to be necessarily conceived as a crucial determinant in the growth of bureaucratic domination. For Habermas, Weber's mistakes reside in considering law from the narrow perspective of its instrumentalization:

Weber considers law primarily as a sphere which, like the provision of material goods or the struggle for legitimate power is open to formal rationalization. Here, once again, the confusion between value contents and validity claims comes to his aid. The rationalization of the legal order could be viewed exclusively under the aspect of purposive rationality— in the same way as the economic and political administrative order—only if there existed an internal interconnection between the abstract value-standard of the law, that is, the "rightness" of norms, on the one hand, and value matters such as wealth and power, on the other. 58

Habermas is again supposing the distinction of the areas of material and value reproduction. If we separate or abstract value reproduction from the imperatives of wealth and power, and if we take into account that we are in a postconventional stage of moral development, we arrive at the conclusion that the validity claim of rightness can be consensually established through discussion. If we think that modern law is totally dependent upon wealth and power motivation, we are falling again in the conjunction between the structure of modernity and the content of modernization. Moreover, the decentration of subject along with the decentration of the world into value spheres makes it possible for that subject to have an instrumental-purposive attitude in economic action that is regulated by civil law. But civil law has to be
normatively achieved through the validity of principles with an intersubjective binding force:

It is only within normatively established limits that legal subjects are permitted to act purposively-rationally without concern for conventions. Thus for the institutionalization of purposive-rational action, a kind of normative consensus is required, which stands under the idea of free (discursive) agreement and autonomous (willed) enactment. 59

Two relevant points must be underlined in this quote. First, the idea that once tradition has ceased to be the source of legitimation, the postconventional structure of consciousness becomes the space where legal norms are the result of a critical justification, open to further criticism. The second point deals with the problem of enactment. Since the crucial problem of legitimation is at stake, we will treat this issue more extensively.

Let us agree with Habermas on Weber's positivism. Or better, let us argue with Habermas against the equation of legitimacy and legality. From a purely empirical position, political power can be seen as the taking over office motivated by personal or group interests. The problem is that politicians are the representatives of civil society and should legislate on the basis of the interests of that civil society. Of course, civil society as a whole is not exempted from conflict. Rather, it is the source of conflict. Laws should then lay down the limits of action and the general-formal procedures to solve conflicts. But if power is interpreted in positivistic terms, it becomes sheer domination
in which no political justification is required. Laws become the simple enactment of laws for the advantage of the dominant group. This way of legislating dangerously resembles the procedure of postwar dictatorships, especially in Europe.

Weber falls in a false dilemma, akin to positivistic legal theories: He thinks that substantive and positive law, value and instrumental rationality are incompatible. Thus, a "purely formal natural law" is for him a contradiction. In his view, nature and reason are the only possible sources of substantivity for natural law; the particular laws must be deduced from those two metaphysical entities. Habermas argues that "nature" and "reason" have certainly strong metaphysical connotations. However, the theorists of natural law in the 18th century laid down a contractualism that, if taken formally, allows the introduction of the intersubjective agreement as the ruling procedure:

With the model of a contract through which all legal associates, after rationally weighing their interests, regulate their common life as free and equal partners, modern natural law theorists were the first to meet the demand for a procedural grounding of law, that is, for a justification by principles whose validity could in turn be criticized. To this extent, "nature" and "reason" do not stand in this context for some metaphysical contents or other; rather, they circumscribe formal conditions which an agreement must satisfy if it is to be rational."

Habermas has explained the step from natural to modern law by removing the naturalistic and foundationalistic overtones of Enlightened theories of law. At the same time, he conceives of natural law as a contributing factor in the
genesis of modernity that would have as much import as the Protestant ethic.

In this way, laws are used by citizens as means for solving private conflicts of interests (private law). Hence the link of civil law with the market. They serve also to regulate those activities between the citizens and the state (public law). Weber thinks that the distinction between private-public law becomes possible only after the bureaucratization process has taken place in modernity. For the distinction private-public law presupposes "the conceptual separation of the "state", as an abstract bearer of sovereign prerogatives and the creator of legal norms"61, something remote from the personal authority of the pre-bureaucratic (especially from patrimonial and feudal) structures of domination. The bureaucratic form of domination enacts laws with the purpose of maintaining the "status quo".

However, legal enactment does not need to have always a negative sense of a forceful imposition. It would be unfunctional to discuss and justify consensually every regulation of the state since it would stop the administration of justice as such. Enactment helps to carry out the workings of the legal apparatus of a legitimized government. Moreover, every enactment must regard a principled responsibility and is reversible and open to criticism at all times.62 Thus the "raison d'état" does not substitute for intersubjective agreement as the grounding principle. On the other hand, the
world of values reflected in the conception of rights, limits, and duties is consensually defined in constitutions. They function as the bridge between a "de-moralized" legal sphere and a "de-institutionalized morality".

Interestingly enough, it is in the legal sphere where Habermas recovers the conception of the interaction between values and state institutions. Of course, this problematic is unavoidable if one does not want to fall into positivism. Here Habermas aligns himself with the Enlightened democratic tradition whose project would be as desirable as still potentially available but not achieved. This is highly significant since the legal sphere has been historically the domain where power and money have figured prominently. However, Habermas does not want to conceive law exclusively as the regulations which organize or coordinate the different functions of the material reproduction of life. Law could be viewed in that way as a subsystem which articulates the two other subsystems (the state and the economy). This is what Weber had in mind when he "confused" legality and legitimacy. Whether a functionalistic-positivistic picture of the legal system corresponds to reality or not remains something to be proved empirically. Habermas straightforwardly denies the accuracy of that picture: "The assumption... that validity claims could be withdrawn without any noteworthy consequences for the stability of the legal system in the consciousness of the system's member, is empirically untenable."63
The crucial point is to see to what extent the legal system embodies the ideal justice found in the modern worldview structure. Law contextualizes morality: the ideals of the latter are applied through the former. In other words, morality and law stand in a relation as justification and application.

Habermas says that when the traditional world of norms becomes problematic, justice is justified according to principles which are in turn based on the universalizability of interests. At this point, we are on level 5 of Kohlberg's outline. At stage 6, the emphasis lies on the correctness of the procedure for justifying norms more than on the content of those norms. In respect to law, stage 5 would correspond to the delineation of basic rights and duties while stage 6 would be linked to a formal procedural law that stresses deontological aspects. Procedural law does not have a negative sense since its functioning is analogous to the procedure of communicative action. The diagnostic problem is again to know if law is made according to that democratic-procedural orientation. As Rasmussen points out, the viability of a formal procedural law based on postconventional conceptions of justice depends on the realization of democracy. It follows that as far as the functioning of society is not as democratic as the very idea of modern democracy suggests, procedural law will be faulty in the same way democracy is in actuality.

Habermas's and Weber's analyses of law constitute a
master- clue to analyze their respective socio-historical diagnoses. Weber’s emphasis on formality and enactment of modern law is directly linked to the two theses of the loss of meaning and the loss of freedom. Habermas takes the legislation on two fundamental institutions for the reproduction of the lifeworld, the family and the school, to demonstrate the thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld.

He calls this form of colonization " juridification":

The expression ‘juridification’ (‘Verechtlichung’) refers quite generally to the tendency toward an increase in formal (or positive, written) law that can be observed in modern society. We can distinguish here between the expansion of law, that is the legal regulation of new, hitherto informally regulated social matters, from the increasing density of law, that is, the specialized breakdown of global statements of the legally relevant facts (‘Rechstaatbestände’) into more detailed statements.66

In short, law becomes the means of an interventionist state that organizes the areas of lifeworld through a network of agencies that take care of the dysfunctions produced by the systemic imperatives. Anomie, the forgotten elderly, the welfare of the child, and the organization of student rights are formalized according to administrative dispositions that impede the consensual discussion of those matters by the members of society. Legislation then blocks discussion and the lifeworld— which is the source of legitimization of the law— takes on a passive role that makes it defenceless in face of that detailed body of regulations.

The thesis of juridification resembles strikingly Weber’s
iron cage. The dystopic image of a state intruding in the most intimate aspects of the life of its citizens has a long literary history. As in those literary works, Habermas's and Weber's reveal paradigmatically the normative background by negative means. For Weber, the power of legal experts along with the subsequent legal enactments means that the functioning state cannot depend any longer on a unique political leadership able to endow with meaning the civil life of the citizens. Habermas seems to think that the law should be applied through general and rather wide dispositions in consonance with the autonomous civil subjects that are able to build and follow them guided by their universal moral consciousness. The density of regulations characteristic of the welfare state would be an unnecessary content-filling that ignores the potential of modern universalistic laws. On the one hand, Habermas would be endorsing a kind of liberalism which always aims to keep in check the excessive role of the state no less in the economic sphere than in the private life. On the other, he is pointing to the danger of overlegislation in institutions crucial to the functioning of social life. If seen from a another viewpoint, juridification could not only be a symptom of the deteriorated fabric of the lifeworld; it can put forth the idea of the autonomy of decentralized powers more in connection with the life of the citizens where their activity and decisions could have stronger force.

Habermas's and Weber's analyses of the state of the law
introduce us to their diagnoses of the times. Law is the "locus" where the morality acquires an organizational-pragmatic orientations. In turn, deficiencies in its functioning are contrasted with its normative inspiration. Diagnostic inquiries combine the description of a social situation with its contrast in the mirror of normativity. In both cases, functioning and the ideal performativity derived from the normative expectations stand one in face of the other. By no means, however, should those expectations be as high as to put in peril the very idea of a plausible improvement of society. Nor should the dynamics of the state of affairs should delay or simply abolish idea of a normative reconditioning. These are to be the threads of our analysis of Habermas's and Weber's diagnoses of the times.
IV. DIAGNOSIS, PERSPECTIVE, AND THE INTEREST OF PRACTICAL REASON.

IV.1. Developmental Theories as Oriented to an Understanding of the Present.

"Enthusiasm", as Kant named it, was the mood of the philosophers of the Enlightenment towards their times. Hegel made of present, of the new age opened by modernity, the centre of all reflection. Beyond the Romantic fascination with historical golden ages but not unfamiliar with utopian thought, sociology was born out of the interest of grasping the problems of the epoch. The sociologists who moved beyond the influence of Comte's positivism and beyond Kant's enthusiastic feelings departed from the idea that the "moment" was always in deficit with relation to a normative ideal of society. That comparison was the ground to diagnose the disturbances of a present conceived consequently in terms of crisis. Before (and after) a functionalism that treats social distresses as a variable to be neutralized in order to keep social equilibrium, sociology was a "science of crisis".

Modernity, conceived as the acute consciousness of the moment, and sociology correspond to each other. Kolakowski, among many others, suggests that modernity means the "demise of historical man", that is, the idea that "no validity may be accepted, justified or explained by reference to history." If this is so, we have to find the reason why Weber and Habermas have taken such great efforts in constructing
developmental theories that virtually cover the whole record of humanity in order to explain our (a-historical) consciousness of the present.

Weber's work can be taken as a paradigmatic case of developmental theories oriented to the understanding of the present. Cultural disenchantment at the hands of rationalization was in the same track as the more encompassing rationalization of society as such. Modernity, seen from a stance far from a Enlightened enthusiasm, meant not the demise of historical man but the demise of Weber's normative concept of man. Weber's diagnosis has a critical explanatory character. Modernity meant for him the impossibility of reaching a social ideal based on responsible individuals acting in a value-rational manner. This situation was worsened by the appreciation that modernity had destroyed the ethic of brotherliness that the trend of the times had made irretrievable. In short, sociology's focus was to be the finding of the cause of an unethical situation. That cause was the process of rationalization which was a historical phenomenon, so in that sense it was available for a retrospective analysis. Sociology was then practiced by an implicit comparison between an ethical ideal and an unethical present.

If Weber's attempts aim to show how an ethical ideal has become negligible, Habermas's efforts want to show how the ideal of modernity has become possible, that is, thinkable.
Modernity is for him a logical space that has become available after a process of rationalization of worldviews along with a rationalization of the means of material reproduction. That rationalization of culture has made possible forms of interaction communicatively structured. Those forms of interaction include in themselves the ethical project of a society ruled by the democratic will of citizens that are determined to solve their problems by the sole appeal to the best rational argument consensually ratified. This ethical project has a date of birth, so to speak, at the level of the development of ideas. It also has a history whose events have denied that project: the project of modernity has remained in the shadows of possibility. This is why he distinguishes evolution from history. And this is why he defends the phase of evolution known as modernity from the concrete happenings of modernization. Again, the present is measured against an ethical ideal that paradoxically belongs to our epoch but that we cannot realize because of the prevalence of strategic action that treats persons as means for interests and as parts of the systemic environment. In short, Habermas's developmental theory is the account of the pitiful split between modernity and a pathological modernization. As he wrote, "crisis" has a medical etymology. Its diagnosis points to pathological states. But sociology shows again the "pathos" as well as the ethical cure. It is a science of crisis with a practical intent. As Kortian suggests, this
position implies to hold the Kantian tenet by which theoretical reason must be put in the service of practical reason: Theory cannot be separated from practice.\(^1\) The following quote reveals in a clear fashion Habermas's understanding of his work:

Evolution theoretical statements about contemporary social formations have an immediately practical reference insofar as they serve for the diagnosis of developmental problems. Thus the requisite restriction to retrospective explanations of historical material is abandoned in favor of a retrospective that is predesigned from the perspectives of action... The time-diagnostic application of evolutionary theories is meaningful only in the framework of a discursive will formation that is, in practical argumentation in which the issue is to be given in a determined situation certain strategies and norms of action rather than others will be chosen by certain actors.\(^4\)

In short, theoretical diagnosis serves as a point of departure for a process of public discussion with practical consequences. Theory is used to clarify the situation and to set the initial terms for discussion. It is a tool dependent upon its service to help action definition. But we are supposing that diagnostic theories can be "objectively" constructed and that contradicts our prior analysis by which they contain an ethical alternative built into the very process of theory construction. Habermas maintains that social theories include an "unexpressed...guiding preunderstanding of the overall contemporary situation."\(^5\) It is that preunderstanding that reveals the perspective from which those theories are constructed. Theory construction implies a
conceptualization of reality that necessarily leaves out certain traits of social reality. This was the main concern of Weber when he constructed his theory of ideal types. If the very elaboration of theoretical concepts is related to the subjectivity of the researcher, the diagnostic conclusion will intensify that subjectivity now endowed with the force of an ethical option open to counterarguments, that is, to criticism. For this reason, Weber conceives a crucial moment in research when "the scientific investigator becomes silent and the evaluating and acting person begins to speak."⁶ He follows that it is an obligation of the researchers "to keep the reader and themselves sharply aware at every moment of the standards by which they judge reality and from which the value-judgement is derived."⁷

In order to understand the breadth of Habermas's and Weber's diagnoses we need to place them on the perspective from which they were performed. Perspective stands here for the conceptions of both theorists on the ethical subject or on the well-being of society. It is against the background of those ideals that diagnoses take place. These perspectives will be treated in the first section. On the other side, the concept of perspective has a very specific place in both Habermas's and Weber's methodology. It is not a subjectivity gone wild that makes theory a whim. Interpretative methodologies guide research in such a way that the very interpretative action has to accommodate itself to the rigour
of certain procedures. These procedures enhance the reflexivity of the subject and make the conclusions available to critique. We shall be dealing with these methodological aspects in the second section. Finally, I would like to mention that the subject - that is, the researcher - is not here considered as a unique and always "original" source. Everyone is a product of his times. Events, historical possibilities, social forms and the like, constitute the horizon of a critical subjectivity. The expression "critical subjectivity" already denotes an object of critique that focuses on the environment of which the subject is a part. The critical attribute also implies that the subject is not placed on a fixed point but that it has to move as far as the object of critique - the times - moves and changes. Thus, by critically interpreting his environment, the researcher also includes himself in the very object of critique. Placing the two diagnoses in perspective and analysing the methodology that permits to include a perspective (against positivism) in the analysis will shed the necessary light to explain why Habermas has reappropriated Weber's diagnosis in his own terms. What follows is an exposition of the first two points. The third falls under the very question of the diagnosis of the times with which we shall be dealing by way of conclusion.
IV.2. Locating Standpoints.

IV.2.1. Weber's Individualistic Platform

We will analyze Weber's evaluative background by bringing to the fore his normative views on the individual, on liberalism, on the idea of nation and on democracy. The choice is not arbitrary. The importance of the individual runs through his political views, is built into his sociology and ultimately prompts his diagnosis of the times as loss of individual freedom and as loss of the individual's ability to create meaning.

In this sense, we have to remind that Weber's theory of action departs from a subjective endowment of meaning. As pointed out in our introduction, Weber's definition of social action is not analytically distinct from an individual action that takes into consideration the possible response of others. The endowment of meaning is an individual affair. And this must be analyzed from the standpoint of Weber's crucial conception of individuality.

Weber's attacks on a modern culture that was privileging individual experience and "sensation" were derived from a normative concept of personality based on asceticism. Sensualism was for him the sign of the times by which the hope of a value-rationally motivated individual was nearly eclipsed. In "Science as a Vocation" he writes: "Personality is only possessed in the realm of science by the man who serves the needs of his subject," and this is true not only of
science." In fact, his ideal of "Persoenlichkeit" was "the individual who acted on purely individual values transcending sensuous existence." If a person has chosen some ultimate values - a "subject", one could say -, he has to dedicate his efforts - the "calling" - to build his whole meaningful life on those values. Brubaker finds three ideal traits in Weber's concept of personality: dignity, constancy, autonomy. Dignity stands for the type of values with which the person organizes his own life. Constancy means the steady relationship with those values. Autonomy, to be sure a trait inspired by Weber's idealist influence, consists in the capability of choosing freely among those values that will structure a life-project.

The "inward turn" of the modern subject toward the authenticity of feeling that ultimately leads for Weber to bohemianism was on the contrary pole to the responsible and ascetic individual. Given the impossibility of rational decision between values, the irrational choice of the subject could make us see him as absorbed in an absurd task. Lujo Brentano's appreciation by which the Calvinist ascetic-methodical way of life contained an irrepressible irrational character gains some relevance here. Weber's agreement is to be explained by his Nietzschean concept of the value-creative individuality along with a fascination by the value endurance of the Calvinist. The act of choice is, on the one hand, the expression of that individuality. The devotion to that choice
is the sign of his ascetic purity. Protestantism meant the radicalization of individual consciousness led by a permanent moral self-testing. The very Protestant conception of God also bears the radicalization of His person-like attributes. Scaff points out that Weber felt attracted by the Calvinist's unity of life, by his balance of accounts: "self-responsibility and providence, loneliness and grace." In Nietzschean terms, we could also speak of the lonesome and heroic Zarathustra following his own destiny.

The election of values as pure decision was impossible to be objectively grounded. Notwithstanding this, freedom was a necessary condition to be able to decide. This freedom was to have consequences for Weber’s theories. Liebersohn interprets the commitment of the scientist and the teacher to the "value-freedom" commandment in this way: Value-freedom was thought to reduce the influence of the teacher on their students who were to decide for themselves what value-judgments follow certain scientific facts. Liebersohn writes: "Value-freedom was supposed to enable "Persoenlichkeiten" to choose their own values, without censorship by any authority."

The unity of life grounded on values represented a difficult task in a fragmented modernity. Weber’s fears were focused on the explosion of values into small pieces that were manufactured for the utilitarian convenience of the modern subject. The irreconcilable conflict between value spheres
would make of the scientist a "heartless specialist", of the lawyer a bureaucrat, and of the artist an intellectualized sensualist with no value horizon. Scaff calls the cultural epoch in which Weber lived "the age of subjectivistic culture". This subjectivism was to enhance the sensibility for perspectivism. Again, the centre gravitates towards the subject, towards his feelings or towards his responsibility. Aesthetes or ascetic heroes: those were for Weber the roles to be played in the epoch of perspectivistic culture. The ascetic hero needed an integrated self, a mastery of its own personality that ran counter to the modern pluridemonistic world. This perspectivism had a role in Weber's methodology as we shall see later. "Cultural relevances", as Rickert would put it, or "significant phenomena to be explained" were keys in the development of Weber's sociology.

The political arena was also for Weber the locus for individual moral testing. "Politics as a Vocation" shows us the type of person Weber would like to see in power. In a rough sketch, this person needs a charismatic force to lead the masses while putting his charisma in the service of an ideal. This ideal founds and motivates his political calling. The political calling must be structured by a responsibility which makes the politician accountable for his acts. "Passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion" are for Weber the three cardinal virtues in politics. The sense of proportion refers to psychological
qualities such as inner concentration and calmness. It provides, says Weber, distance to things and persons. Paradoxically, that distance can be called also "rational control" while passion would be for Weber a kind of inner force motivation. The creative factor in society, argues Weber, is the free initiative of the individual and this applies to economics as well as to politics.

Political modernity obstructs individualistic politics as much as the positing of true ideals. Bureaucracy not only marks the functioning of the state but also that of political parties. These latter are converted into machines that instrumentally consider a campaign as a method of simple vote-grabbing. Inside the party machine we found job-hunters that live off politics and not live for a true ideal. In sum, the very functioning of parties obstructs the rise of political leaders able to give some value direction to a program.

Viewed from the ideal types of domination proposed by Weber, traditional domination based on the force of custom is impossible in modernity because rationalization erodes the legitimation of persons by custom. On the other hand, modernity is precisely characterized by legal domination based on the rule of positive laws available for expert bureaucrats. Is charismatic domination the alternative to traditional and legal domination? No such positive alternative is found in Weber. The dynamics of charisma, seen at first as a force to stop bureaucracy, are doomed to undergo something that Weber
called "routinization" or "depersonalization". Personal charisma concentrated on the king moves to the royal family that automatically gives charisma to the heir already traditionally legitimized. Institutions such as the old Chinese empire were also routinized sources of charisma. It would be mistaken to think that charisma has been eliminated in modernity. Today institutional charisma in key-offices is a common phenomenon that not always takes into account the public recognition of the individual, recognition that by definition is the source of charisma. In short, Weber is caught between his praise of a creative politics and his acknowledgement of the force of regularity. The bleak landscape associated with the figure of Weber comes to the foreground again. Was he, as Mommsen says, a "liberal in despair"?

Weber's conception of the creative individual as the dynamic force of society matches with the basics of the liberal credo. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows how his father was already a notable among German liberals to whom Weber himself was largely committed. But an uniforming, depersonalizing, and uncreative modernity means a substantial threat for liberalism though liberalism seems to be a part of the "spirit" of modernity.

In more concrete political terms, Weber wanted to coordinate the emerging industrial society with a politics with spirit. It was not an easy task. Industrial monopolies
were growing rapidly. They needed a bureaucratic infrastructure to carry out their businesses. This monopolistic capitalism rendered the liberal principle of free initiative rather obsolete. The dependence of the economy on the familial unit as producer, in a way akin to the genesis of capitalist spirit, was already a part of history. But Weber's views still were coloured by classical liberalism:

He defended a capitalist system of liberal character, one that guaranteed a maximum of free competition on the economic as well as the social level. Not a stagnating, but an expanding capitalist system with a high degree of social mobility was his ideal.⁶

In sum, Weber wanted to enhance the dynamic elements of capitalism not its bureaucratic tendencies. This view was no less classical: A liberal combination of economic "laissez-faire" with a restriction of state intervention. And again, it must be pointed out that the dynamics of competition was mainly the cause of the growth of industrial and merchant companies and of its subsequent bureaucratization. However, liberalism provided a value horizon. Honesty in business, commitment to an enterprise and hard work were a crucial parts in Weber's typification of "Persoenlichkeit".

There is an expression in the quote above that should not be missed. This expression reads "the expanding capitalist system". At first glance, it can sound as a redundancy because expansionism is inherent to the very logic of capitalism. In Weber's context, this expression acquires an unsuspected relevance. For Weber wanted the destiny of Germany to be that
of a strong industrial nation within the international order and with economic and political interests outside its borderline. This leads us to the thorny question of Weber's nationalism.

Gerth and Mills argue that Weber's Neo-Kantian dialectic of ideas and interests prevented him from positing Hegelian historical concepts such as "national character" or the well-known "Volkgeist" so dear to the Romantically inspired (and strongly conservative) German historiographers of the nineteenth century.17 Those "spiritual" concepts were too constricted for an intermeshing of ideal and material interests that obliges us to see society in a more dynamic way and to subsequently hold a methodology based on a pluralistic analysis of factors.

Gerth says, in another context, that the development of rationalization as the determinant of history has obvious Hegelian connotations.18 The fact is that for Weber capitalism had a Western and, by extension, universal significance. Some interpreters have balanced this universality with a more contextual reading of the PE by which Weber implicitly accuses Germans of being excessively rooted in Lutheranism thus lacking the impetus of other Protestant nations. Lutheranism still encourages a strong sense of communality, and respect for one's superior, two anti-individualistic tendencies.19

Weber was active in the German National Liberalism at the turning of the century. As already mentioned, his father was
an important figure within this movement. Why Germans could be so attached to nationalist feelings remains, in a first moment, a puzzle. If the sentiment of German culture was long since formed, Germany, as we know it today, was split into thirty-nine states by 1831. Moreover, Germany was largely dependent on an agricultural economy and its bourgeois class was merely embryonic if compared to that of France or of England. Prussia was a bureaucratic state with militaristic overtones. The industrial revolution did not come until the seventies of the past century. German nationalism now can be explained by the late advent of modernity to Germany, an arrival that had more impact in the forms of economic and administrative organization than in the functioning of social life.

Mommsen suggests that for Weber the national idea was an "ultimate value". Was this because the "national idea" ran counter the uniformization of capitalism? The indications point in another direction. It was Weber's dream to see Germany at the same level as the English whose example he remarked on so many occasions.

Liebersohn notes that Weber's nationalism was not nostalgic in character. Against Toennies's idea of an ideal organic community ("Gemeinschaft") shaped by a common bond prior to individual wills, he held a national idea based on the access of Germany to the most contemporary scene. Kalberg also warns us", as noted above that the concept of
"Entzauberung" (disenchantment) has no nostalgic connotations. Liebersohn states Weber's credo in this way:

"In place of a Gemeinschaft he imagined a nation of heroic individualists unified by common political experiences and strengthened by imperial expansion, economic competition, and the struggle for cultural hegemony."22

Strangely enough, Weber's nationalism was based on a "realist" perception of the times. The economic life of capitalism is founded on a permanent strife under the form of competition. The task of the nation was then to safeguard its interests through the use of power. One has to remind that Weber defined the state as a "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."23 The restriction of the use of force to the hinterland was somehow overlooked two lines ahead this quote: "'Politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state."24

What was legitimate in the use of force between states? Mommsen phrases Weber's imperialistic yearning in this way:

"He declared a successful expansion, among other things, to be a necessary pre-condition for the upkeep of the high living standards of the masses of the population."25 It is not for us to comment on this problematic idea; not at least in this expository part of this thesis. It enables us, however, to imagine the kind of "legitimation" that Weber had in mind.
The nationalist ideas are part of the "first Weber". To what extent he conserved some of those ideas later on—after the First War, for example—deserves more space than is available to us here. He always criticized biological—that is, race-oriented—trends within nationalism so much in fashion in Germany and elsewhere in Europe at the turning of the century. If we follow Mommsen, Weber still maintained hopes in the "Imperial Germany".

The force of his critique of "zoological nationalism"—as Weber named it in a fortunate expression—was lessened by his ideal of nation based on the unity of language, culture and state. And everybody that jumps from "national culture"—a very recent invention—to state organization can be considered as hopelessly nationalist and, in this sense, not a "zoologist" but surely a naturalist that wants to make a closed unity between territory, language, and political power.

Nationalism makes of difference a totality that often bears totalitarian traits. At the bottom of this totality, there appears the concept of unity covering destiny, tasks, or another attributions such as honour, pride, and similar sentiments that belong to the persons. In much of the nationalist discourse, this "category-mistake" leaps from the individual to a nation without apparent justification. The question that arises in reference to Weber is: to what extent was the nation conceived by him as an individual entity? Can we say that Weber thought of Germany as having a "calling",
a heroic task to be accomplished with responsibility, a "legitimate" desire to have power and wealth? Overinterpretation here is dangerous because every reader must have by now Nazism in his mind. To see in Weber a would-be advocate of such ideology would be entirely misleading. To think that he thought of the nation as an individual unit is surely more plausible: "If one believes that it is at all expedient to distinguish national sentiments as something homogeneous as specifically set apart, one can do so only by referring to a tendency toward an autonomous state." Is not this autonomy based on a false analogy with the autonomy of the individual?

Weber's views on democracy will serve us to have a better understanding of the sort of society he wanted. He thought that democratization could help to minimize the power of bureaucracy. The reasoning behind this assertion runs as follows: The "demos" must be governed by an elected ruler; the elected ruler must have charismatic power to lead the masses and to carry his ideals through; elections put a continuous pressure on the leader who cannot free himself from his tasks; so the democratic procedure guarantees the obligatory resignation of a leader who has lost his charisma; thus, it avoids the "routinization of charisma" and stops bureaucratization.

Weber's defense of democracy lies on arguments derived from his positivistic conception of power. A legitimated
government is not that which rules on the basis of the needs of a civil society furnished with means of expression. Commenting on the appropriateness of elections to obstruct bureaucratic mandates, Weber claims that democracy seeks "to replace the arbitrary disposition of the hierarchically superordinate 'master' by the equally arbitrary disposition of the governed, or rather the party bosses dominating them." Why the disposition of the governed is to be called "arbitrary"? Because Weber's individualistic position prevents him from believing in a consensually defined political will of the "governed". The "will of the people", he says, is a "fiction". However, that will seems to be no less fictional than the meaning-creator individual endowed with charismatic force and able to govern for the civil society - to be sure, another fiction for Weber - but without necessarily having to hear its voice. And this is so because for Weber voices are always individual and the sum of them would be simply noise, a noise that, as such, the leader cannot hear. In short, Weber's conception of value conflict and its subsequent decisionism makes him doubt the possibility of a consensual resolution. Values are not only individually and "irrationally" chosen. They stand in an irreconcilable strife. Values are personally embodied. So the relations between individuals cannot be less irreconcilable. This is why he conceives of power as the monopoly of the use of force. By concentrating force in political power, the permanent strife
which constitutes civil life is avoided.

The functions that Weber assigns to parliaments are indicative of his views on democracy. For him, the parliament is not a legislative body that represents the members and groups that constitute civil society. Their functions are fundamentally two: The training arena for charismatic leaders and the keeping in check of political leaders that tend stay in power endlessly thus creating bureaucracy around them. Plebiscitary democracy has no value for Weber as a substantive way of political life for substantivity, in modernity, is an individual and heroic task. When Weber traces the political lines of the "Archiv" group in his "'Objectivity'...", he refers to what we might call a democratization of welfare and culture. He says that the contributors of the journal have "set as their goal the protection of the physical well-being of the laboring masses and the increase of the latter's share of the material and intellectual values of our culture." Interpreted from Weber’s liberalism this would mean that the conditions for the free competition among individuals must depart from an equal situation in such a way that the most able members of the masses could shine according to their possibilities.

The picture of social life conceived by Weber contrasts sharply with that of Habermas. They both have a crucial importance in the way in which their diagnosis of the times are to be interpreted. We shall deal with this later. What
follows is an exposition of Habermas's conception of social life. Emphasis will be given to stressed the shift intersubjectivity taken by Habermas in respect to the decisionistic subjectivism of Weber.

IV.2.2 Intertwined Perspectives: Habermas and the Rational Arena of Intersubjectivity.

For Habermas, the constitution of personality cannot be separated from the acquisition of language. Piaget's developmental account of the increasing symbolic participation of the person comes immediately to our minds. But there is something more radical about the linguistic structure of human beings. Language has communication as its "telos". If the person is linguistically formed, the other pole of communication is already constituting him. Language is unmistakably social because it is essentially communicative. Thus human beings are socially constituted, structured in themselves by the communicative other. In this vein, Levinas talks of the Other as constitutive of the ego for we have to respond ethically at the linguistic request of the Other and, as beings-in-the-world-, there is no way of "bracketing" this communicative relationship. In the same vein also, Lacan conceives of personality as structured by the realm of the Symbolic. The Symbolic is prior to the subject; it is already there. By our participation in it, we become members of a family, society, and culture. Meaning is presented to us
according to our linguistic nature. It is linguistically formed, interpreted and reinterpreted by us. So it is from the very beginning an intersubjective affair that reproduces itself by our communicative performances. Habermas defines personality in this way: "By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity." The definition turns out to be circular: personality means the competences without which the person would not be such.

With the coming of modernity, the elements of the structure of the lifeworld become more and more differentiated. In societies cohered by the force of myth, person, culture and society - the three elements of the lifeworld - were unidirectionally commanded by that mythical force. In modernity it is easier "to discern the simultaneous growth of the autonomous individual subject and his dependence on interpersonal relationships and social ties." Personal identity depends on, and it is formed by, communicative relations and by the social bonds that we establish through them. This is why the once powerful epistemological subjectivity has been displaced by a moral subject. For we need morality to defend the fragility (and the inviolability) of a personal identity dependent on and formed, to great extent, by others, and we need the same morality to defend the
network of communicative relations on which we, as linguistic creatures, depend.

The process of personality formation follows adaptative patterns while it develops the person's symbolic aptitudes. This access to the symbolic makes the individual responsible for the other subjects assembled in the symbolic realm. Symbolic growth runs parallel with the growth of the degree of the person's responsibility and autonomy until we reach Kolhberg's description of a person able to choose principles, such as justice or the equality of human rights, based on their logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.

But communicative action not only depends on its immanent ethics. It also depends on the symbolic structure formed by interrelated meanings that is part of the lifeworld. We call that symbolic structure "culture", which is defined by Habermas as "the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world." The stock of knowledge is provided by previous interpretations of happenings as well as it is furnished by science. Knowledge puts us consciously in contact with the world in which and about which we communicate. The cognitive subject (and not only the ethical) is needed in communicative action. But the cognitive subject is also intersubjectively structured. For it is not formed by a relationship of a monological mind and a
thing but consists in a participation in the web of interpretations intersubjectively constructed and in a scientific knowledge no less dependent on previous theories. We renovate and reproduce culture by communicative means. Our link with past interpretations guarantees semantic continuity and coherence of the knowledge to be used.

Habermas defines society, the third component of the lifeworld, as the "legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups and thereby secure solidarity." The new situations arising in the social space can be solved satisfactorily by an appeal to those orders that have been intersubjectively agreed upon.

If I have sketched again Habermas's conception of intersubjectivity it is to compare it with the diametrically opposed conception of Weber. Consequently, the diagnostic theses of Weber, whose expressions, "loss of meaning" and "loss of freedom", Habermas retains, cannot possibly have the same connotations. It is cultural meaning and social freedom of which Habermas talks, though, of course, the first and most tragic symptoms of those losses are seen at the individual level.

Modernity has important effects on the structure of the lifeworld. Cultural traditions are put under constant critical revisions given that their contents are virtually effaced by that critical exercise. Legitimate orders are focused on the formal procedures to keep social ties stable. They are formal
because they cannot rely on the contents of tradition which have been critically revised. We finally reach an ego able to freely choose his life project. In short: "Modernity means the increasing reflexivity of culture, the generalization of values and norms, and the heightened individuation of socialized subjects."\textsuperscript{35}

This equilibrated version of a lifeworld where a critical culture along with formal and open social norms and free and responsible subjects is one side of "normative content of modernity". The balanced employment of cognitive-instrumental, moral-legal, and expressive-artistic resources in our social construction of life would be the other part. This balanced employment of rationalities refers to the subject as well as to a social macrosubject.

In order to make more concrete this formalized account, we will inquire about the connections that this schema might have with the "public sphere", something that has been on the theoretical target of Habermas since the very beginning of his work. Hopefully, these connections will allow us to give a more explicit political content to the communicative paradigm. And thus we will be able to contrast our (mostly political) account of Weber with Habermas's views on social life.

We shall begin by giving a summary account of what Habermas understands by the "public sphere."\textsuperscript{36} It refers to a mechanism formed by private persons, gathered in a public body, whose roles are (1) to discuss public concerns affecting
the well-being of common social life as well as (2) the critique and democratic control of government performances. The model of a public sphere has its origins in the democratic ideal of an unrestricted discussion where the "steering-factors" coming from the two subsystems have no effects. This is so because the members of the public sphere, when they act like participants in it, leave their private economic interests and their also private legal disputes aside. Public discussion is meant to establish the validity of the normative structures that ground social interaction. On the other hand, the members have to be in an independent relationship with the state if they are to criticize their performances. General accessibility and elimination of privileges are necessary conditions of possibility for the public sphere.

The philosophical embodiment of this ideal type, the public sphere, comes from Kant's concept of "publicity", elaborated in his political writings. The public use of reason must serve a double purpose: as civil enlightenment and as bridge between politics and morality. In other words, it consists in the critical formation of a public opinion always open to further critical corrections. The legitimate exercise of politics cannot do, on the other hand, without taking into account this structure. The public use of reason has a communicative structure. The members engaged in discussion express their aims that coalesced into a consensually constructed public opinion that is to be hopefully
institutionalized. Publicity also implies that the state has the obligation of making all its proceedings available to the public's analysis if necessary.

The public sphere is an objective mediation between society and the state. The improvement of public life needs the self-reflective performance of the public sphere. This self-reflectiveness implies, as said before, distance from the state. The members of the public sphere do not want a "share" of power. They want to observe and criticize state performances from the outside. This distance guarantees its criticism and its autonomy. Historically, it was born in the eighteenth century out of the interests of the bourgeois class. The model above described corresponds to the liberal public sphere. It also corresponds to the self-image of liberal society whose economic basis have, historically speaking, betrayed that conceptual self-understanding. Hegel already noted that the antagonistic civil society is to be integrated by political force. Not surprisingly, Marx described the liberal public sphere as false consciousness and as mask that serves the interests of the bourgeois class. Habermas finds also an important historical contradiction:

The fully developed bourgeois public sphere was based on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form a public: the role of property owners and the roles of human beings pure and simple.\(^8\)

It is not that persons could not leave their interests while discussing in the public arena. It is rather that not
all pure and simple human beings were property owners. Thus the liberal public sphere had restricted accessibility.

In fact, this liberal model had a connection with a mode of production that still was dependent on the familial unit. In the nineteenth century, the expansion of the market makes of economic claims a matter of general and public interest. To make those claims public was the role of the worker's movement. The inequalities produced by a self-regulating market find expression in a political form. The public sphere becomes a field for the competition of different interests. History shows us that these tensions relieve the initial communicative reasoning that ruled, however ideally, the public sphere now transformed into a battlefield on which one moves strategically.

Parties and unions become the rulers of the public sphere. They deal directly with the state or with the economic power. The public sphere is relieved from its critical functions that are publicly performed by its representatives. The welfare state means a more radical weakening of the critical functions of the public sphere. Publicity has now the purpose of legitimating power by the acknowledgement of a client and consumer who has given up his critical functions and is now ostracized into the passive role of the "loyal" citizen.

But we are advancing Habermas's diagnosis of the times. What should concern us at this point is the relationship
between the communicative model proposed by Habermas in the TCA and the concept of public sphere as a more concrete normative model of social life. Habermas argues that the public sphere is a "fiction", but is a positive fiction by which individual interests are put into the horizon of a political intersubjectivity. It is a fiction that grounds democratic legitimation and that is reflected on constitutions. The public sphere is a bourgeois "category" from which we can abstract its historical content. This strategy of abstracting the historical content in order to conserve the structure is already familiar to us. If we do so, we can see a structural public sphere formed in modernity and inseparable from it that is constructed on the basis of these principles: discursivity, its subsequent rationality (and its subsequent consensuality), the discussion of social norms and the universality that guides not only the access to that public sphere but also the norms agreed upon.

If we now insert our previous description of a modern lifeworld into our description of the concept of public sphere, we obtain the following result. The public sphere implies a participant with a rational ego able to enter into a process of reaching an agreement. The contribution (or expression) of the participant is crucial as well as his respect for the arguments of the others. This participant is by the same token responsibly willing to accept the bond of that agreement. The discursive process depends on a common
culture that furnishes us with a interpretative definition of the initial situation. The discussion is finally aimed at the establishment of legitimate orders by which the members are coordinated by a political morality that reinforces social ties and solidarity relations. In sum, the concept of public sphere couples with the picture of a balanced lifeworld. The concept of public sphere stands then for an exemplary model of social interaction. It reinforces also the discourse ethics proposed by Habermas. In those ethical procedures the interest of the individual is taking into account thus moving from Kant to a more utilitarian trend. However, the individual interest gets socially objectified in the universalizable resolution after discussion, a resolution akin to the formation of public opinion. In this sense, it also has an "elective affinity" with the contractual model elaborated in the Enlightenment (see section on rationalization of law above). Last but not least, the public sphere demands from the participant citizen to leave outside his private economic claims as well as his right to dispute legally the possible differences between the citizens. These citizens affirm their distance with the state apparatus because of their critical function. In sum, the public sphere is distinct and alien to the two subsystems of a depoliticized economy and of an administrative state.

If we consider all these elements it is not difficult to see what normative model of social life Habermas has in mind. It becomes clear that behind Habermas's defensive attitude-
that is, the preservation of the lifeworld toward systemic colonization—there is a positive project. Before dealing with that positive project, we have to contrast, in a synoptic way, the social model of Weber with that of Habermas.

IV.2.3. Habermas Facing Weber. The Vanishing Point.

Weber wants a social world directed by ultimate values. At first, it seems that this social world could be composed atomistically by responsible subjects who individually espouse values accepted freely or even "created" by them. The Calvinist subject matches with the ideal of strong personality exemplarized in his unfailing commitment to values. However, the Calvinist’s constancy comes from a closed worldview about which he cannot doubt. In modernity, this unified worldview has broken into conflictive value spheres. Weber fears the subject’s incapability of coping with such "polytheistic" fragmentation without surrendering to sensualism or to specialization. This fragmentation constitutes a serious menace to social life. Furthermore, social life has national connotations since the hopes of a nation somehow can cohere the multiplicity of individual directions. The nation needs a charismatic leader who can give meaning to political life. Bureaucracy constitutes the most serious threat to this meaningful political life. Democracy is a positive measure (more than the value anchoring) for the dynamism that could stop the spiralling of bureaucratic growth, since the
plebiscitary procedure puts the leaders under constant testing. Between the top space taken by the leaders (or negatively by bureaucrats) and the lower masses, there seems to be no substantive middle ground for Weber.

This substantive middle ground is the normative space where Habermas puts his hopes. Social life acquires the connotation of a realm of communicative interaction. This realm has a double function. First, it watches over the performances of politicians whose legitimation is owed to that very public sphere. Second, its members discuss the correctness of binding norms beyond the economic interests that everyone could have. This normative social life is indeed akin to an ethical "good life" if it is not just the very same thing. The responsible subjects do not need exterior forms of domination because they are able to define the social norms that respond to their social needs. They only need the infrastructure provided by public administration. Domination is by contrast the key word of Weber's vision of social world. The successive forms of social life are characterized by the type of domination that gives coherence to the unruly elements of society. Indeed, there seems to be a quasimetaphysical Weberian vision of society as a battlefield where a few (prophets, military, kings, bureaucrats, and so on) fight for holding privilege against the dominated others who fight in turn (if they are not successfully dominated in periods of change and crisis) to diminish or to take over that
privilege. This necessary domination prevents Weber from conceiving a social life based on mutual understanding.

Not only this total asymmetry on the issue of domination separates Habermas from Weber. Something that we can call not just the perspective but the "vanishing point" of their theories cannot come to coincide in the same spot. In Weber's case, that vanishing point has been characterized as fate while Habermas's points to a utopian locus that does not necessarily imply a new attempt at social engineering.

Weber's fatalism has many sides to it. To begin with, one cannot ignore his many references to "fate". The PE finishes with a literary note by which we are admonished of the "icy darkness" that lies ahead of us. "Science as a Vocation" also ends by pointing out that "the fate of our times" is determined by a further rationalization provoked by the fateful impulsion of the disenchantment of the world. Weber goes on to enumerate the things irretrievably lost such as brotherliness, the sublime values that before shaped "public life", and the like. Is this fate a trend of history that ultimately will freeze humanity in the alluded icy darkness? Fate would function in Weber's account of rationalization as a historico-metaphysical entity not exempted from evil tones. Kronman points out the following paradox:

His description of the rationalization process as a fateful destiny seems to be a contradiction in terms: reason means understanding and control, while fate implies domination by uncontrollable powers. How can reason itself be a fate? This is the fundamental question that any reader of Weber
is eventually led to ask. 39

But should we ask if Weber's fatalism has been somehow overstated? The fact is that his description of modernity and his normative ideals seems to be in contradiction. If modernity means not only loss but eventually disappearance of meaning, and if freedom to choose is a mirage in the iron cage, then it could be reasonable to follow that indeed Weber felt that a total eclipse provoked by the increasing rationalization of life was the predictable consequence. Fate also appears as predestination in the life of the Calvinist. His destiny depends upon God's decision, a decision that he does not know even if he has to act as if he belonged to the elected. This element was, in Liebersohn's opinion 40, not very dear to Weber. If the Calvinist managed to put this element in the service of hard work and improvement, others, convinced by the force of fate, would consider useless any kind of effort. And this could not be more opposed to his view of personality. In more historical terms, G. Roth suggests that in the absence of a belief in determinism and evolutionism, Weber left the historical course open-ended. What is more, his concept of "elective affinities" makes us think of the contingent configuration of crucial phenomena, and point to a certain irrationality in history. Fate, if considered in terms of regularity, would endow history with a certain "logos". This "rational" principle-"rational" in the form of fate- is absent in Weber. However, we should
balance this lack of determinism with the collapse of Weber’s ideals if these are contrasted with his description of modernity. Scaff has put it in this way: "The attempt to ‘advance’ this culture from the standpoint of its own assumptions... is only to advance further along the path of modern discontents."^41

Does Habermas’s have theory something similar to an utopian horizon? Benhabib argues that the model of communication action calls for implementation. We should not simply wait for the logics of evolution until we reach that realization because the systemic dynamics are more likely to hamper it. Thus, argues Benhabib, the full functioning of a communicative community points to an utopian break that she calls "transfiguration."^42 On the other hand, Habermas has repeatedly denied that the "ideal speech situation" would convey a utopian content. For him, it seems to be more a regulative— theoretical advice that enables him to reconstruct the process of communication in an undistorted manner.

In another direction, Wellmer sees that our democratic tradition has an inherent utopian perspective that puts on the centre forms of organization gravitating around mutual recognition. Furthermore, action coordination gets normatively shaped within that tradition by consensual means.^43 Wellmer’s indications bring us closer to our analysis of Habermas’s concept of public sphere and connects with Habermas’s defense of the unfinished project of modernity. Habermas writes that
the

utopia of reason formed in the Enlightenment was persistently contradicted by the realities of bourgeois life and shown to be a bourgeois ideology. But it was never a mere illusion; it was an objective illusion that arose from the structures of differentiated lifeworlds which, while certainly limited in class-specific ways, were nonetheless rationalized.44

In another context, and after mentioning the failure of the technological utopia, Habermas insists that "utopian energies as such are not withdrawing from historical consciousness". Rather, what has come to an end is a particular utopia that in the past crystallized around the potential of a society based on social labor.45 In fact, the utopian horizon of which Habermas talks seems to be focused on the project of modernity centred on social communication. Habermas aims to change the paradigm of liberated social labour by that of undistorted social communication. However, Habermas's work explicit indications for the construction of a new society are not found. The project of modernity is not a utopia in the classical sense. It "only" strives for accomplishing a potential that is already there. It does not lead us to a "non-place". This project that we already have at hand serves to perform an immanent critique with a pathologically modernized society. The actual is thus contrasted with the concept. And the result of that contrast outlines a diagnosis of the times. Forms of free agreement are, as Wellmer says,

Already embodied and recognized in the democratic
institutions, the legitimacy principles and the self-interpretations of modern industrial societies; for this reason alone a critical analysis of modern societies can share a normative ground with its object of analysis and can assume the form of an immanent critique.\textsuperscript{46}

Weber could not perform this immanent critique because as the above quote from Scaff shows, modernity itself was under suspicion. Habermas holds that this lack of differentiation between project and actuality is the cause whereby Weber equated capitalism, modern rationalization, and modernity as such. Thus he could not distinguish between the historical content of modernization and the structure of modernity with its implicit political ideals. In a crucial passage, Habermas says that the projection of a non-pathological modernity can be theoretically grasped by following a "counterfactual line of inquiry."\textsuperscript{47} If closed for the positivist sociologist, this counterfactual avenue is open for a sociology, like that of Weber, that internally reconstructs meaning developments. To follow this line implies apprehending "in concreto" the "possibilities of expanding cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive knowledge-possibilities that are grounded 'in abstracto' through the modern understanding of the world."\textsuperscript{48} These possibilities would be developed in an ideal modernity thus pursuing a "non-selective pattern of rationalization". A selective pattern takes place when one of the constitutive elements of the modern world (instrumentality, autonomous morality, and subjective expression) does not have
any structure-forming effect on society as a whole, or when at (at least) one sphere predominates to such extent that it subjects life-orders to a form of rationality that is alien to them.49

This pattern clearly corresponds to the actual process of modernization in which the instrumental-purposive rationality—and the "life-order" inherent in it—has colonized the other aspects of rationality. Habermas rebukes Weber for not having followed this line. It has to be said that if Weber's methodology allowed this counterfactual reconstruction, neither his anti-evolutionism nor his identification of modernity as such as the cause of a negative situation permitted it. Weber thought that the loss of meaning and freedom were not side-effects of modernization but effects of modernity. Habermas maintains, as we said earlier, the expressions "loss of meaning" and "loss of freedom. Loss from what? From a balanced modernity where the three rationalities have their own domains of application so where goal-achievement (instrumentality) meaning (social-ethical communication) and freedom of the individual do not contradict each other.

Before going to our critical exposition of Habermas' and Weber's diagnoses, we will pursue a last step. It deals with the methodology that allows the theoretical objectification of those perspectives. This objectification gives theoretical validity to a diagnosis that otherwise could be seen as a mere subjectivistic exercise. By this theoretical validity we can enter into an argumentative dialogue with those diagnoses.
IV.3. Methodology: The Objectification of the Perspective.

The following pages reconstruct a methodological line that runs from Dilthey's "Verstehen" to Habermas's articulation of hermeneutics and functionalism. It aims to show a common thread, more than the discrepancies between their representatives, that aims to shed light on the present situation. Once we have delineated the perspectives from which Habermas and Weber will perform their diagnoses, we need to examine the methodological strategies that make those perspectives and their subsequent diagnoses understandable for us, theoretically valid and open to further revisions. Given that these diagnoses have an unmistakable interpretative character, we need to show the conceptual logic behind those interpretations.

Introduced by Droysen (whose influence on Weber has been pointed out in section II), the methodological element of "Verstehen" (understanding) acquires with Dilthey a definite formulation. Dilthey's initial question deals with our mode of access to the historical lived experience. Of course, this experience cannot be known by us as such. What we have at hand is a composite of laws, religions, buildings, cultural systems out of which we have to determine how people acted, conceived life-plans, and were active in occupations. Our access to those cultural artifacts and modes of life comes from the introduction of our own experience into those "expressions" of history. This introduction of our experience into the past
objectifications of thought is called "Verstehen". Thus we can only make sense of history from our present situation. Our understanding is motivated as well as conceptually mediated by our present needs. Texts, systems of thought, or religious practices are relevant as far as they can illuminate aspects of our present.50 As Walter Benjamin says on "Verstehen", we come to recognize the value of the historical "works" through their "afterlife".51

Rickert, another major influence on Weber, connects with this problematic of historical relevances to which he calls "value relevances". There are according to Rickert three steps by which it is possible to demonstrate the value relevance of a historical phenomenon. (1) It has to be shown that the historical actors held a strong commitment to certain values by which we have a better understanding of their actions. (2) Those values must reflect the general concerns of a culture; never isolated individual cases. (3) The historical investigation can never take a position on those values. This would constitute a "valuation". It must rather relate them to the object of research in a theoretical fashion. In sum, Rickert lays down a methodology that runs counter to positivism since it gives a central importance to the effect of values in human conduct. But this methodology does not allow for the value-judgements of the theorist. Those value-judgements are to be made a posteriori, that is, outside of science. Value-relevancies are intrinsic to the object and not
dependent on the epoch of the community of researchers. The reconstitution of the object must be grounded on the values of the historical actors and not on value expectations of the theorist. As we shall see later, this mode of research would be impossible for Habermas since the theorist cannot deal with values without evaluating them.

Weber acknowledges the contributions of Dilthey and Rickert, albeit with some reservations. Weber criticizes Dilthey’s conception of "Verstehen" because of the intuitionism implied in it. The establishment of a scientific inquiry requires independent criteria to judge the correctness of any intuition. Here Weber agrees with Rickert. But he inserts the problematic of the cultural relevances for the context of present:

The values that define value relevances are "our" values, and "we" are modern Western scientists, the bearers of the values that define the subject matter, problems, aims, and methods of the cultural sciences. Culture is defined by reference to cultural meaning ("Kulturbedeutung"), and the cultural meaning is understood as the significance that "we" ascribe to a phenomenon because of its relevance to values.5

Weber finds that the value relevances of the historical actors are an infinite manifold that has to be reduced to a research object. This reduction is accomplished by "ideal types". The researcher selects the traits he thinks the most characteristic of the object under research. Now Weber wants to give empirical credentials to sociology by leave aside the values of the researcher: these are a "matter of faith" and
not something that should influence science. Commenting on Ranke, Weber sums up his methodology as "interpreting known facts according to known viewpoints." As Habermas notes, despite Weber's ability to carry out his project with a strong empirical orientation,

Knowledge terminates in the explication of a meaning that has practical significance for life, thus in "making something understandable". With this goal in mind, it is the procedure of explanation rather than that of the interpretative understanding of meaning that is relegated to a subordinate methodological status.

Furthermore, one should ask for the motivation force behind any research, for the reason why a community of researchers decide to take a specific direction. He writes in "'Objectivity':

In social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by "practical" questions. Hence the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values.

It would be misleading to charge all load of the decision to the subjectivistic will of the researcher, although Weber often toys with the idea of the influencing "Persoenlichkeit" of the researcher. He follows by saying that the interest in economics shared by his contemporaries is motivated by a relevant social problem: the scarcity of means. This has a "cultural significance" because it affects—especially in the Germany of the time, thinks Weber—all domains of life. We can conclude by saying that it is the age that makes certain
problematic relevant. One object becomes of interest by its capacity to illuminate our contemporaneity and the historical researcher should trace as far as possible the individual features that are seen as still having significant influence on culture. The problem of rationalization, the genesis of capitalism, the delineation of modernity and its subsequent forms of life fit into Weber's research program because they are "contemporaneously significant". Modernity, as defined by Weber, is an ideal type constructed by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. In this sense, the construction of this type includes a preliminary diagnosis of the present. Habermas thinks that Weber built into his history of rationalization his diagnosis: "Weber prejudiced this question in such a way that processes of societal rationalization could come into view only from the standpoint of purposive rationality."57

Horkheimer places himself, as Weber, in the tradition of German Idealism, although he points out that Kant concentrated on the activity of mind "forgetting" the material-sensorial activity in the Marxian sense—that is, labour. In the "Postscript" to his programmatic "Traditional and Critical Theory", he reminds us that critique is not identical with its object. But this is so because critique is the device opposite to theoretical strategies (namely, positivism) that duplicate the structure of domination without evaluating it. However, concepts must have a "relation to the fundamental situations
of the age." But the critical " differendum" grants the active role of the theory in the advancement to fairer forms of life.

Traditional theory, according to Horkheimer, is separated from " praxis". Its representatives describe the world—Descartes deductively, Husserl phenomenologically— or try to master it instrumentally as Bacon. But if theory is separated from practice it becomes a fetish. The critical researcher is not a disinterested actor but is always a part of the object of study. He cannot rise above the times because his perceptions are mediated by the social categories produced by social reality. However, he can see the " negative forces" that point to the contradictions of society and that allow us to see social reality in the light of its possibilities, one thing fully exploited by Habermas.

Gadamer distinguishes three stages in the " the act of understanding": " subtilitas intelligendi" (understanding), " subtilitas explicandi" (interpretation), and " subtilitas applicandi" (application). He writes the following on the moment of application: " Understanding always involves something like the application of the text to be understood to the present situation of the interpreter." The interpretation of laws aims to shed light on specific problems. The cognition of the text—its correct interpretation— does not only include the following of hermeneutic rules. The text is meaningful as far as we
overcome the "alienation of meaning" produced by the historical distance and we can do so by the normative application of the text to what is presently the case. Gadamer says: "The meaning of a law that emerges in its normative application is fundamentally no different from the meaning reached in textual interpretation." In sum, Gadamer stresses the normative application of hermeneutics, a normativity that cannot be separated from the present.

Habermas is as critical of as he is in debt with Gadamer's hermeneutics. His critique has several aspects. First, Habermas argues that Gadamer confers a disproportionate weight to the tradition. In fact, he is so bounded within it that all possible critical elements nearly vanish. Second, Gadamer reduces hermeneutics to culturally institutionalized texts. In tune with Wittgenstein, we need a hermeneutics of ordinary language that can elucidate human action. Social life is linguistically coordinated; so the hermeneutic task is converted into a sociolinguistic self-reflection. The social scientist takes part in the phenomenon he is analyzing as a "virtual participant". His description of de facto course of action depends on his rational interpretation. This rational interpretation assesses the reasons and grounds that have prompted the phenomenon under research. And reasons are inseparable from their argumentative nature. Thus the social scientist enters into an interpretative dialogue with the object of research. This argumentative interpretation requires
from the interpreter the taking of a position: "We cannot understand reasons without evaluating them." The interpreter includes himself in the object of interpretation that is seen against the light of the practical- evaluative background of the social scientist.

Now we encounter a fundamental problem in interpretative sociology. If we deal with the part of reality that is available to us hermeneutically- and that is the symbolic fabric of the lifeworld- we miss the objective conditions for communication that are out of reach of the intuitive knowledge of the participants in communication. If we do not take into consideration "systemic mechanisms", we will see society as a cooperative process of interpretation. And then we are accepting three "fictions". First, society will work solely on the basis of the responsible decisions of those involved in communication. Second, we will affirm the independence of culture from external constraints. Third, we take for granted "the transparency of communication in the horizon of unrestricted possibilities of mutual understanding", "and this does not correspond with reality.

We need to explain the factors that produce "distortion" of communication. As mentioned before, that distortion is produced by systemic elements- or "steering media"- of money and power. Functionalism comes in our aid to approach the effects of the systemic media on communication. What should we take from functionalism? First, it can help us to determine
the actual constraints on communication. Related to this task, it serves to apprehend the movements of the system. According to functionalist theory, social reality is made of a self-regulating system always seeking equilibrium. This maintenance of systemic equilibrium is necessary to secure the regularity of the processes of material reproduction. However, the growing necessities of the system can take over environments in principle communicatively structured. For instance, the discussion of a new set of laws with distinctive significance for a specific context would have to take into account the opinion of the citizens consulted on that issue or. But if the new set of laws becomes at some point necessary for the functioning of an administration in a risky situation, this latter will obviate the long process of consensual will-formation and will enact the set of laws without previous consultation. The legitimacy of that decision would be in itself a matter of discussion. The danger comes to the forefront when the enactment of crucial dispositions becomes a rule necessary for the maintenance of the administrative equilibrium. The danger consists also in thinking that the process of discussion is unnecessary since society will be indifferent to the way of enacting the crucial dispositions of social life if the system guarantees its own equilibrium. This latter position corresponds to the functionalist reason that Habermas criticizes. The statement of goal values and goal states cannot do without an interpretative effort, for values
are not available to a purely empirical explanation. What functionalist systems theory can do is to analyze the conditions that would lead to the realization of those goals. Here economics or organization theory cannot be substituted, since they expound the characteristics of those external conditions.

In sum, Habermas's methodology reflects the double structure of society. Evolution has uncoupled lifeworld and system. Modernity, the epoch where the uncoupling has taken place, needs a double analytical device in order to diagnose the confrontation and the distribution of attributions of both the system and the lifeworld. The diagnosis of the times will be based on the effects that systemic expansion has on the lifeworld. If we are to grasp the movements of the system seeking equilibrium and trying to colonize the lifeworld, we need to go beyond the realm of hermeneutics and operate within the scope of systems theory.

Habermas's position is akin to Weber's. Both try to combine empirical and interpretative factors in sociological analysis and both try to measure the weight of the ideal and material interests in that analysis. Habermas's definition of "rational reconstruction", deliberately given in the context of his analysis of Weber's work, reads:

The work of rational reconstruction concerns itself with internal relations of meaning and validity, with the aim of placing the structures of worldviews in a developmental-logic order and arranging the contents in a typology. On the other hand, empirical- that is, sociological- analysis is
directed to the external determinants of the contents of worldviews and to questions concerning the dynamics of development. 46

In an ideal situation, functionalist analysis would make sense as far as it displays the conditions for the equilibrium of material reproduction of life and as long as allows undistorted communicative processes. The current situation has then to be contrasted with that ideal scenario.
V. CONCLUSION. DIAGNOSES OF THE TIMES: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION

V.1. Diagnosis and Social Development.

The general setting that Habermas conceives for the analysis of Weber's diagnosis is not surprising. Habermas keeps the lines of Weber's argument and much of the latter's vocabulary. However, he tries to make fruitful the distinction system-lifeworld for the analysis of the contemporary outcome of the process of rationalization. We are then bound to take into account our critique of that distinction (see section II.7.) and to articulate it with the analysis of Habermas's and Weber's perspective carried out in the last section. It is against the background of that articulation that we can understand and criticize Habermas' diagnosis. I will re-state the basic findings of our previous analysis in the following three points:

1. While analyzing the thesis of the uncoupling system-lifeworld, we found a tension between this uncoupling and the project of the democratization of society. If Habermas emphasizes the radical separation between the two terms as the inevitable product of social evolution, then he is bound to take a "conservative" stance. This stance aims to preserve the lifeworld from the force of systemic advances. Moreover, the radical separation of system and lifeworld denies the possibility of institutionalization of the agreements on norms and related issues that have taken place after discussion in the arena of the public sphere. This is a very important
element in a possible process of social democratization.

That the economy has become a depoliticized domain does not lead us to think of political power in the same terms. For the idea of depoliticized political would be as discouraging as unrealistic. Political power can influence in some degree in the functioning of administration through programs, restructuration of departments, distribution of budget, and so on. Political power can also have an influence, however limited, in the economic cycle. A strategy oriented towards the democratization of society cannot only defend the lifeworld against a possible loss; this strategy must activate the public sphere and enhance the institutionalization of its agreements as well. It must also, of course, keep in check the workings of the administration that is thus obliged to leave its secretism.

2. The strategy of a conservation of the lifeworld leads to a paradox. The normative model of the lifeworld in based on an even utilization of the instrumental, the ethical, and the aesthetic rationalities. But Habermas obviously starts from the (easily graspable) premise that this is not the case. If this is so, what is the meaning of preserving something already damaged? Would it not be better to have a practical ideal that serves as the direction for action based on an reactivation of a balanced lifeworld? This is a regulative ideal not a utopian program. But it connects with the project of modernity that Habermas wants to accomplish.
3. This project of the democratization of society cannot do without a paradigm based on intersubjectivity. By this model, and beyond Weber's individualism, we avoid a type of normativity in which charismatic leaders guided by ultimate values try to take over power. At the same time, democracy is not a mere device to stop the bureaucratization of political leader. It should be a model for forms of organization and action coordination. The emphasis on intersubjectivity also diminishes the role of national cultures—an invention of the past century—that cannot keep up with the new globalism of culture. Nations as such depend politically as well as economically on larger contexts. Political internationalism is becoming a fact in a part of Europe and could be a way to solve conflicts in the other parts of the world.

The existentialist character of Weber's diagnosis must be replaced by introducing the "social", that is, the intersubjective political body as the centre of that diagnosis. This account is not simply a critique of Weber. It is rather motivated by the perception of a change of the times.

Now we can begin to delineate the basic lines of Habermas's evaluation of Weber's diagnosis. How can the thesis of bureaucratization be inserted into the development of rationalization as conceived by Habermas? From a systemic perspective, modernity is composed of a depoliticized market and of an unproductive state that legally organizes commerce.
Capitalism and modern administration are also the two key-phenomena for Weber. This latter does not conceive capitalism from the perspective of the institutionalization of wage labour. For Weber, it is the institutionalization of a conduct religiously inspired that counts in the first place. Social integration comes before systemic integration. As in Habermas's principle of organization, the structure of a worldview allows for the realization of systemic possibilities; the system is not the "producer"—as in Marx—of cultural forms. It follows that from the perspective of an structural analysis we should be able to grasp how that worldview makes room for the free market and for the administrative state. As stated above, Weber analyzed the Protestant sects to demonstrate how capitalistic economic action had become possible. Habermas remarks that a depoliticized market and the legal body that regulates it would not be possible without post-traditional forms of consciousness. Law is thus detached from the realm of custom and can adapt itself to an economy that no longer relies on the traditional will of the Prince. Habermas aligns himself with Weber's strategy in a first moment. For Habermas, Weber's work captures the development of media-steered subsystems from the viewpoint of the lifeworld. In studying ethical attitudes, Weber discovered that evolutionary learning processes began with a rationalization of the lifeworld that first affected culture and personality structures and only then took hold of institutional orders.
Given the similarities of strategies, where do the differences between Habermas and Weber start? It seems that Habermas describes the situation as stated above, while Weber would see it as process of formation of the iron cage. But if Habermas can describe in quite neutral terms all this process, where does the pathological modernization begin? Habermas seems to think that Weber performed his diagnosis from the perspective of the lifeworld but constructed his theory of rationalization without making the distinction system-lifeworld. Habermas claims that this "fault" impeded him from considering other forms of rationality beyond purposiveness. It is not rationalization which is the cause of the negative diagnosis; it is the dominance and advance of systemic rationality at the expenses of communicatively structured contexts of action. While Weber thinks that the cause of the loss of meaning has to be attributed to a process of cultural rationalization, Habermas holds that this rationalization of worldviews permits dialogical intersubjectivity as knot of social interaction. While Weber sees the loss of freedom as intrinsically linked to societal rationalization, Habermas puts the weight not on the process of rationalization but on the predominance of systemic rationality over communicative rationality on areas where the latter should be the sole way of interaction.

As we claimed above, the difference between the two diagnoses becomes clearer by taking into the perspectives, the
models of subjectivity and intersubjectivity behind Habermas’s and Weber’s work. The former gives the impression that he wants to overcome Weber’s analysis on purely theoretical grounds. This contradicts his methodology. And what would be the purpose of an overcoming of a diagnosis of times in purely theoretical terms? It would lose all the practicality that has motivated it: It would not be a diagnosis.

For Habermas, neither of the two theses that compose Weber’s diagnosis has become "any less relevant in the six or seven decades since he formulated them." Weber thought that the bureaucratic phenomenon was at the bottom of the two diagnostic theses. For Habermas, an overloaded and overreaching bureaucracy embodies the influence of systemic rationality on social life. But it should be noted that Habermas cannot dismiss either modern administration or the depoliticized market for they are part of the modern stage as such. They are not "essential" in the constitution of modern pathologies. These latter are a matter of degree given by the threshold in which modern administration - if speaking of bureaucratization- begins to take hold of communicative domains of life. Consequently, the most adequate theoretical strategy for this reappropriation of Weber’s diagnosis consists in seizing the effects of bureaucratization on the three constituting elements of the lifeworld- personality, culture, and society. Nonetheless, Habermas widens the concept of bureaucratization in order to include the settings, from
factories to offices, where the production of material life takes place. Given the structural complexity of these settings, they are also bound to be affected by problems of bureaucratization. In this sense, "organizations" would include the administration as well as the settings named above. Thus, Habermas point of departure is stated in the following sentence: "Social reality seems to shrink down to an objectified organizational reality cut loose from normative ties." But before going to that analysis it will be helpful to resume Habermas's description of the current relationships between citizens, the state, and the market.

V.2. The Citizen as Client and Consumer

Habermas lays down a descriptive scheme of the current relations between social actors and systemic contexts of actions. The institutional orders of the lifeworld are formed by the private sphere and the public sphere. The former is constituted by the familial unit. The latter is akin to Hegel's civil society where the links between individuals are externally objectified. These two spheres, the private as well as the public, can only dispense of communicative action at the expense of their annihilation. Now what is their relationship with the system? The private sphere connects with the economy through the households. The family is the unit of the material reproduction of life. The state provides the infrastructure of public life— from roads to cultural and
educational financing- and expects to get back legitimation in exchange from its organizational role.

From the perspective of the system, economic enterprises take labour power and give income in exchange while they provide goods and services that can satisfy the demand of private persons. The state sticks to its organizational role in exchange for taxes and makes political decisions in exchange for mass loyalty.

From the perspective of the lifeworld, the private person becomes an employee and a consumer in reference to the economy, and a client and a citizen in reference to the state. When the employee or the client enter into systemic contexts, they leave automatically their lifeworld at the door, so to speak. This occurs because the person has to adapt to systemic environments ruled by purposive rationality. From Habermas's theory, this should not cause any serious problems as far as the system does not interfere in the social life outside the system. The modern citizen should then be able to act in a systemic way in the corresponding contexts and communicatively in lifeworld contexts. But, if my interpretation is correct, Habermas holds that the ubiquitous presence of a colonizing system creates a routine on the would-be participants in communicative action that forcefully neglect this latter way as means of social interaction. The activity of the public sphere diminishes because the citizen assumes the role of client that bargains in an instrumental way with state
agencies. Furthermore, this bargaining is carried out either by individuals or by groups of interests. There is no indication of a public sphere as such. The performance of the client is purposive and adapted to a systemic milieu that renews itself according to internal problems of maintenance; it does not need to hear the normative claims of a body of public opinion that, on the other hand, it does not coalesce as such a body. The aspirations that arise in the weakened public sphere can be (at best) systemically shaped in the form of objectives, strategies, goals and concepts alike used by bureaucracy to "redefine" and "make viable" those with the aim of "implementing" them. It is not a question of semantics. Despite the dryness of this vocabulary, its use would be appropriate as far as it reaches the goal of ideal realization. Rather, the problem is that, from a Weberian and Habermasian perspective, once those ideals and claims enter into the bureaucratic machine, they become victims of what we can conceive as an entropic movement that makes them gradually disappear. And the cause of this entropy is the complex web of bureaucratic machinery. Furthermore, the pressure on individuals and groups to act in a purposive way robs them of the choice of expressing themselves in a communicative manner that appears as totally out of context. Bureaucracy becomes an essential threat either to the project of a democratization of society or to a kind of Weberian "grand politics".

The consumer's preferences show a way of life. The
systemic appropriation of those preferences gets noticeable when the consumption of goods is entirely an object of marketing. The conscious choice of a lifestyle based on a kind of substantive rationality becomes a mirage. The public sphere cannot aspire to reach something akin to a binding ethical good life that would be at the base of politics. Instead groups are defined by their participation in the goods market. The acquisition of certain type of goods becomes the sign of a certain type of life. Persons become identifiable by the things they buy, not by their participation in a failing public life: the shopping mall menaces to replace the last remnants of the "agora". But again the problem seems to be one of degree. If we took for granted that this event has already happened, our hopes for a democratization of society would be utterly futile.


The recognition of the contributions of the person to the administrative and economic enterprises are, from a systemic viewpoint, a suitable way of reinforcing the motivation of employees. On the other hand, the person cannot but follow the regulations which are always worked out from above. The individual development of the intellectual and sensible capacities cannot be taken into account in those formal and rather large organizations. Organizations are indifferent to the lifeworld of their employees: "For a business enterprise,
the private life-contexts of all his employees become part of the environment." It follows, in Habermas' view, that the rationality of the subsystems is something distinct from the rationality of the persons working in a systemic environment. The former rationality tries to integrate the latter as a variable of its processes.

Weber saw bureaucratic rationality as the result of the sum of purposive individual orientations. Weber privileged the viewpoint of a person who was aimlessly following, as expressed in the last pages of the PE, a professional calling devoid of value. For Weber, bureaucracy works "without regard of persons". The bureaucratic official acts, in turn, "without hatred or passion, and hence affection or enthusiasm." Some Weberians argue that formal-instrumental rationality can rule all the life orientations of the social actor. Calvinist entrepreneurs built capitalism in an analogous. Kalberg points out that "formally rational patterns generally fail, however, to characterize the action of these persons in their personal relationships, in their capacities as parents, or in their choice of hobbies." In fact, Weber contemplated prognostically the possibility of a "disciplinization as a universal phenomenon." Kalberg goes on to say that only substantive rationality has the potential to introduce methodical ways of life. Calvinists could orient the whole of their lives towards work because they were rewarded by "psychological" premiums. Today's emphasis on
position is founded on the very mechanism of "psychological premium". People devote their lives to their career because the social rewards received in exchange are psychologically satisfying. The humanistic ideal of realization has been replaced by success or has shifted towards the field of "bohemianism", as we shall see later on. This change has already been noticed in theory. Some current psychoanalytical trends propose to displace sex as central category by centering on professional accomplishment as the key to personal self-esteem and stability. If we put professional realization in the context of a megaorganization, the situation takes ironic as well as pathetic tones. On the other hand, the perspective of personal achievement is enhanced in modernity because the religious hopes in another life have eclipsed in favour of a more radical valuation of this life. With Habermas, we can see that the rationality of the organization will treat this ambition as a mere factor to be taken into account for the functioning of the machine. Now this machine has here certain "holistic" connotations. For sometimes- and now we would agree with Weber- that machine cannot do without the dynamic element of a circle of personalities that innovate the workings of an organization, however limited would be the margin for innovation. If we do not count on this dynamic element, in however a general way, the capabilities to give a willed direction to some changes-political or economic- would be drastically restrained.
There is another line of inquiry that connects with Kalberg's interpretation of Weber. If the organization cannot monopolize the whole life of the individual, personal realization could be achieved through a expansion of personal capabilities in the leisure time that reaches beyond a restrictive "professional calling". Some social critics have seen an optimistic horizon in this age of massive unemployment. The person gets more and more detached from his productive role in an postproductivistic epoch. Leisure gives the opportunity of choosing a way of life by developing the potentialities that the individual thinks as more adequate to his personality.

This alternative supposes that the welfare state and its subsequent network of social services can afford leisure for all, or they implying that the structure of society has to be changed radically. This change is not in sight and its possible consequences would have to be taken seriously in consideration. The economic opulence (or its rather stoic counterpart) that this society of leisure implies seems to be far from reality even in the Western world. Instead, the decrease of social services plunge the unemployed in desperate poverty situations. At best, the administration converts the unemployed into dependent people who cannot exploit the autonomy and the richness of choice that modernity allows for.

In the present times, the individual distresses derived from the unemployment situations are felt everywhere. In the
liberal public sphere, the category of "property owner" seemed unproblematic. This turned out not to be case, as Marx and Habermas noted. Today citizenship is to a great extent defined by the professional occupation. Moreover, it seems as if the unemployed would be willing to take part in the system that rejects it. This tension has no less consequences for personality than Weber's lack of professional value anchoring or Habermas's indifference of the system in respect to the lifeworld of the individual. Living in a society built on the work ethic, and in little need of human workforce, individuals undergo strong distresses that are treated by the therapeutic "apparatus" provided by the administration and not exempted from bureaucratic traits: "life becomes a psychodrama."\textsuperscript{10} The network of therapy takes over the autonomy of the already isolated individual. In this way, he becomes unable to have an active participation in public life. Here, the paradox of a modernization that obstructs the formation of a modern personal identity becomes extremely acute.

This age of leisure has another side. From a more strict Habermasian and Weberian perspective, we should connect this problematic with the question of "bohemianism". The predominance of systemic imperatives within our society forces the individual to adopt conforming attitudes towards larger and larger systemic contexts of action. Habermas and Weber seem to agree on this point: this enlargement of the organizational structure of society runs counter to the
plasticity of social life located on the lifeworld. As a result of that systemic power, lifestyles are progressively reduced to a pervading uniformity. Modernity promised a public life where differences are respected and taken into account when social rules are consensually compromised. Such consensual construction of social life would exemplify the communicative rationality of modernity. But, as said above, the pressure of systemic adaptation has visible effects on the structure of personality. Individual life projects are rationalized on the basis of a calculation of factors which all bear systemic traits. Career, formation of families, and so on, seem to be accepted uncritically as a functional obligation towards oneself and towards society at large.

The predictable reaction against this rational pressure is what Habermas calls "bohemianism" and Weber, in a more general way, "sensualism". For Weber, sensualism is a consequence of the lack of a unitary transcendental horizon and the subsequent value conflict that defines modernity. The individual is caught between the conflicting forces of instrumentality, ethicality, sensuality. Weber reduces the options to two. Either one enters into the iron cage or one escapes from it. Both alternatives run counter to possibility of an ethical life. In fact, for Weber that possibility was not available in modernity. Kalberg comments that for Weber the type of person to whom ethical claims are alien could scarcely master his reality consciously and direct action consistently. Instead, such persons remained subject to the random or, in Weber’s
terms, to the "irrational flow of interests"."

For Habermas, it is the ever-present obligation of performing in systemic contexts, and not the nature of the three rationalities that provokes bohemianism: the individual sees in bohemianism an alternative to the instrumentalization of life and to the subsequent lack of ethical horizon.

Habermas and Weber take bohemian attitudes as "side-effects" of modernization more or less harmful to a personality structure based on the capability of responsible choice (freedom) and ethical relationship (meaning). Now one cannot but point out how bohemian attitudes based on a renunciation to construct or reconstruct a common social life are caught in inconsequential ways of life. The bohemian is often immersed in a dynamic that leads to the most painful marginalization. At times, he can be the victim of neo-religious waves flirting with mysticism. As a general phenomenon, bohemianism is transformed into a commodity suitable for the young. The "youth industry" manufactures maverick icons whose paraphernalia is converted into one of the most lucrative businesses of the current times. Weber was right when in "Science as a Vocation" he fathomed the cult of personal experience as "an idol". The idolatry of the self, so recurrent in modern times, results in a devaluation of social life that of course reverts against the interests of a subject that cannot neglect the others.

Specialists, sensualists, the functionally unfit,
clients, and consumers seem to form the modern landscape on the individual level. Neither of these role models, nor their possible combinations, correspond to the figure of the citizen able to participate in public discussions. Perhaps our ideal typification of these roles makes us blind to the idea that those models do not exhaust the real performances of individuals. Perhaps this diagnosis, in the wake of Habermas and Weber, has overlooked the "negative forces" that within the wide movement of civil rights are working in the direction of a more distributive justice. However, this typification "in the negative mode" serves at least to diagnose what models would not help to advance in the realization of the political and ethical project of modernity.


Habermas argues that organizations need to free themselves from the meaning fabric of the lifeworld of their members in order to enhance performativity: "Organizations use ideological neutrality to escape the force of traditions that would otherwise restrict the scope and the sovereign exercise of their competence to shape their own programs." It is not surprising that economic enterprises try to elude meaning complexes. We should realize that the alluded neutrality is a part of the autonomy granted to economy by the modern principle of organization. This autonomy is needed once the market has trespassed the limits of the household as
economic unit. This attachment of the economy to the household, from the agrarian milieu to the Protestant small entrepreneur, is the element that connected value and material reproduction in a substantive way.

On the other side, the separation of the state from the life of the citizens is a more distressing phenomenon. Even when we consider ourselves simply as clients, the strength of our demands is constricted by an administration that formalizes them to the point of becoming a mere bureaucratic affair. In modernity, the state is caught up in a difficult role: it must regulate a value-free economy and must seek the public legitimation that comes from people’s cultural fabric. Social-democratic theory solves this problem by using the redistributive role of the state to diminish the unequal distribution of wealth. The problem is to know whether that redistribution is directed towards the amelioration of life conditions (so that it could ameliorate indirectly the meaning fabric of the lifeworld) or if it is just a functional matter of minimizing conflict. The fact is that the welfare state, originally coming from social-democratic tendencies, has privileged a treatment of culture as something to be objectified by experts. And this has a double sense. Either problems of adjustment between the cultural background (in the broader sense) of social actors and the pressure of systemic performances are to be treated by the therapeutic apparatus, or culture, in the sense of cultural forms, is
something to be subsidized with the aim of legitimizing administrative policies.

Weber said that "all 'culture' appears as man's emancipation from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life. For this very reason culture's very step forward seems condemned to an ever more devastating senselessness." No wonder that if Weber locates the paradigm of sense in natural life, not only modern organizations but modern culture-formalist, self-enclosed and rootless, he would argue—would appear as the empire of senselessness. Such a drastic diagnosis puts Weber in a position of refusal that blinds any attempt to capture the meaning of modern culture. Moreover, it has to be recalled that technologically applicable science—the major cultural phenomenon of modernity—runs for Weber against meaning reproduction.

Habermas's perspective is quite different. For him, the functioning the organizations require the neutralization of the life of value. The thesis of "cultural impoverishment", Habermas's phrasing for "loss of meaning", is to be introduced in this context. Habermas points out the weight of our current culture of specialists whose knowledge is used by the two subsystems without reaching the level of the lifeworld:

What accrues to a culture by virtue of specialized work and reflection does not come as a matter of course into the possession of everyday practice. Rather, cultural rationalization brings with it the danger that a lifeworld devalued in its traditional substance will become impoverished.
Habermas sees danger in the devaluation of tradition because this latter has a "binding power" that secures social interaction. Habermas fears that this tradition will be supplanted in the long run not by another type of culture but by a knowledge that has become a functional part of the system. Habermas only mentions tradition in such a positive way when he points out the impact of the systemic constraints on the lifeworld. For when he reconstructs the evolution of the cultural systems of interpretation, the emphasis is placed on the criticism of modernity over tradition.

"Tradition" can take different meanings. The authority of tradition in the cultural sense would be related to the type of conventional and predemocratic domination embodied in the religious and monarchical powers. This is what Weber called "traditional domination". Tradition means the continuity of forms of life whose force is continuously eroded by critical force of modern consciousness.

From a diagnostic perspective, the question arises as to the degree in which communicative action depends today on a lifeworld that is decisively constituted by those "vital traditions" to which Habermas refers. Should we take the universalistic, formal, and cosmopolitan worldview as the source of validity (so intense in Habermas' defence of modernity) or the endangered lifeworld communities that have a substantial connection with the past? Is it possible to achieve communicative understanding between participants
living in the same contexts and with apparently different cultural backgrounds? Is it possible to have an exchange of ideas between distanced public spheres that learn from other's political experiences? Are not the forums of opinion formation becoming larger with the aid of the media? We respond in the affirmative to these questions. Habermas's universalism could be applied here: certain universal ideals are to be interpreted within particular contexts. Modernity's freedom of movement creates contingent contexts of communication: only universal ideals can serve as "binding force" in those contexts. Now, can it be said that the "tradition" of a universalist culture is being impoverished in its more genuine contents? This question can take a more precise formulation: what is left from the Enlightenment humanist tradition? It seems plausible to think that the two forms of life brought about by the economic and state organization, and embodied in the client and the consumer, could be deteriorating the humanist culture to the degree that it would seem at times from another period. Weber thought, despite the quote above, that bureaucracy was annihilating the force of authentic "Kulturmenschen"; Habermas holds that the force of the system is annihilating the cultural web of the lifeworld. What these two positions have in common is the positing of an exterior element that is causing damage to the health of a culture.

Adorno and Horkheimer took the other direction: The system is producing cultural forms, specifically "modern" for
them, that have self-destructing effects on the "classical" modern culture. We can leave aside here the thorny question, central in Adorno and Horkheimer, of the connection between mass culture and the Enlightenment. We will concentrate on some of their motifs and on the idea that the organizational structure of society is behind the production of culture. Adorno and Horkheimer open their "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" with a clear allusion to Weber that sets the tone of the paper:

The sociological thesis that the loss of support of objectively established religion, the dissolution of the last remnants of precapitalism, together with technological and social differentiation or specialization, have led to cultural chaos is disproved every day; for culture now impresses the same stamp on everything.¹⁸

Uniformity, the key-category of the paper and an unmistakable Weberian motif, repeats itself in movies, radio, magazines, and architecture. The technologically induced massification of culture carries with it a massive demand for cultural products. For technology can accelerate and reproduce cultural items endlessly,¹⁹ and it is the market what creates the demand and not viceversa. Thus culture becomes an organizational and rationalized affair: centres of production, management, distribution, and so on. In a Weberian fashion, they think that this rationalized culture creates an order of life that empties the hopes for the consecution of substantive ways of living. Mass culture shows the traits of the project of domination that is behind reason. And reason cannot be
separated from its forms of organization. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the radio shaped Nazism as a mass phenomenon, just as the printing press created the individual point of view and shaped the Reformation.²⁰

In the current times, the public is turned into passive consumers who do not have the freedom of selecting their cultural products for consumption. The world of leisure becomes programmed, uniform, a way of introducing the logic of domination in all areas of life: "Real life is becoming indistinguishable from movies"²¹, and movies forge the illusion that veils the consciousness of the real conditions of life. Culture industry creates life, a life that is at the hands of film producers.

Of course, the discussion of these rather questionable arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis. We are more interested in the way of setting the problem. The lifeworld’s reproduction in our contemporary society cannot circumvent the reproductive means of mass communications. And the network of communications that form our "global village" need the organizational system mentioned by Adorno of Horkheimer. Not only the physical channels of communication but also the information that fills those channels depends, in most cases, on large corporations. The new phenomenon to be accounted for is the pervasiveness of organized mass culture in daily life in contrast to the "disorganized" popular culture of preceding centuries. The universality of the media erode
cultural traditions and, at the same time, makes available particular cultural manifestations to universal audiences. If the media rely on organizations, and if the media reproduce to a considerable extent the lifeworld, the relation between communication, organization and lifeworld becomes crucial. Any attempt to further advance in the accomplishment of the project of modernity cannot avoid a serious analysis of what has turned to be a crucial element in the life of the private citizen and in the strategy of politics.

Habermas's analysis dealt with above conjured up the image of the employee or the state client that had to adapt to systemic contexts. In so doing, he had left behind his lifeworld. If we follow the image by way of flashback, we have to imagine what kind of lifeworld that person has left behind. We realize that the organization of culture has entered into the individual before this latter has entered into systemic action domains. The system has broken into the (reproduction of the) lifeworld before the system can neutralize that very lifeworld. We cannot abstract the lifeworld from the culture of the persons that form it. If we do so, we fall into another sort of "hermeneutic idealism". For the lifeworld in which communication is free from constraints should not be fathomed in naturalistic terms. The ideal of communication free from constraints is today inseparable from the ideal of media communication free from interests. Whether this is today realizable or whether it is a regulative ideal that tends to
democratize mass media is not an easy question.

The reproduction of culture depends on the new means of information. Mass culture has proven to be an international symbolic binding power whose effects are beyond the predictive reach of large corporations. It is not clear then how mass culture can be at the service of an economic class or of a power which is conceived in holistic terms. Taking a more liberal position, one would argue that the conflict of interests between private economic groups and public political groups shows that analyses linking holistically mass culture to a unified project are hopelessly partial. They are also illuminating because they underline the factor of interests that moves the media world. On this issue, a functionalist analysis of the type proposed by Habermas would help to delineate the pressures on the potentiality of the media.

Habermas remarks how consensus on the journalistic professional code, to put an example, is an operational factor working apparently well. When this code is not followed, the fault is often remarked by competing media. The fact is that if we would have followed Adorno's and Horkheimer's prognostic trend, the project of total domination would have been finished by now given the development of mass culture and communications since the publication of their paper in 1946. This does not seem to be case. The interpretation of mass culture depends, as Habermas says, on groups which can turn the "ideologized" message around if this latter is
interpreted against the background of their own subcultures.

On the other hand, the administration has a crucial role in supporting "higher" forms of culture and those forms have long since taken an international shape. This support gives legitimation to the administration, as Habermas notes. It is also a source of income since the industry of culture and tourism go now hand in hand and often belong to the same department in city halls administrations. The fact is that "monumental culture" has very little impact, if any, on everyday practices. It has become a secularized object of reverence.

Habermas's analysis of these issues wants to put an optimistic note to the negative tradition of the Frankfurt School. He is aware that the credibility of his theory of communication in this age of information implies considering electronic means of communication as possible allies in an electronically communicated world. Habermas is also fully aware of the employment of those means by the "steering factors" of money and power that turn the processes of reaching agreements by responsible actors into a mirage. He stresses, however, the potentiality of electronic networks whose communicative condensation could help, if linked substantively to the lifeworld, to enlarge contexts of communication. It remains an open question to which extent communication media affect the structure of the subject. Mark Poster writes: "In electronically mediated communications,
subjects float, suspended between points of objectivity, being constituted and reconstituted in different configurations in relation to the discursive arrangement of the occasion." But, paradoxically, we need a more compact subject if we still maintain the hope that communicational networks can work in some cases – in state owned networks and in the so-called "alternative" media, for example – democratically. The responsible speaking subject able to take definite positions would have serious problems dealing with this suspension of points of reference that are formed by contingent discourses beyond the consensual will of the communication process participants. This tension shows that Habermas’s theory of communication must take into account elements of information theories. Communication cannot function without the response of a participant. Information is in principle a civil right that connects with the Kantian concept of "publicity". But the actual networks of communication can avoid the response of the receiver relegating him to a passive role. If this distinction between communication and information is valid, an informed subject able to communicate and willing to enter into dialogue with others, arises in the horizon of normativity.

From a Habermasian perspective, the question arises as to how can this democratic functioning be possible from the theoretical perspective of a total separation of system and lifeworld. That those networks, if they are to have a broad field of operations, need to be structured by means of rather
large organizations seems to be out of question. Democratization would mean control of the public sphere on its own means of communication organizationally structured. If this is so, institutional orders and lifeworld should not be, from a normative point of view, detached.

It would be interesting to carry out a Weberian inspired analysis of this new society of electronic communication. Could this society be characterized by an elective affinity between the speed of communication and the mobility of the capital flow in a parallel way as the Calvinist solitary communication with God prompted him to personal accumulation? Could the age of information mean a radicalization of specialized knowledge by which persons occupy more specific positions? Would it be possible to speak of an informational mode of domination in which the traits of bureaucratic domination are retained and intensified? Would this type of domination function under an extreme pattern of formal rationality? Unfortunately, we have no space to answer these Weberian questions—somehow taken by Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s analysis—that run counter to the hope for a democratic control of media communications and counter our diagnosis of communications networks as not pervasively oriented to the purpose of domination.

V.5. Organization and Society.

System and lifeworld, systemic and social integration, argues Habermas, do not stand in "hierarchical" but in
"opposite" relationship. Communicative action is partially replaced by strategic action as soon as the systemic steering media enter into play. But these media cannot colonize wildly the lifeworld. They need the support of formal law—the regulation of interpersonal relations systemically and beyond communication—to get into lifeworld domains. The effects of this colonization of the lifeworld by means of formal law is double. First, it amounts to a formal regulation of social life that hampers public discussion because the matters in question are already legislated by means of enactment more than by public discussion on social norms. Second, law, by the same token, is detached from ethical motives that come from the public arena of discussion and is absorbed in the structure of the system. Habermas puts it in this way:

Modern compulsory law is uncoupled from ethical motives; it functions as a means for demarcating areas of legitimate choice for private legal persons and the scopes of legal competence for officeholders (for incumbent of organized power positions generally) ... The law no longer starts from previously existing structures of communication.\(^N\)

It has to be noted that from the viewpoint of the logical evolution of worldviews, the massive regulation of life—what Habermas calls "juridification"—falls under the structural space of modernity. Juridification implies that the normative force of tradition has disappeared. By the same token, the regulation of life puts all the citizens at the same level by rather formal-abstract formula that consistently avoid the particular case. In short:
The juridification of social relations requires a high degree of value generalization, an extensive loosening of action from normative contexts, and splitting up of concrete ethical life into morality and legality.  

Value generalization makes possible the holding of universal rights; but legalistic universalization has detrimental effects on areas of the lifeworld that need to keep active the concreteness of ethical life. The legalistic domination of which Weber spoke penetrates in crucial institutions where social relations and normative attitudes get decisively shaped, among them, family and education.

Habermas's brilliant analysis of these issues begins by noting that juridification means in this context, in the first place, recognition of legal rights. The child's rights are to be observed against parents' traditional-patriarchal and absolutist custody. Wives's and students's rights are also enhanced against a legality that rules against the threads of the patriarchal family. The destiny of the child after the breaking of a marriage is at the hands of courts that calculate the resources of the contending parts and decide upon that information. The student formalizes his relationship with the teacher. This latter performs his task according to a concise set of attributions. Moreover, the definition of educational policies fall under the responsibilities of a bureaucracy created "ad hoc". Disputes between men and women who freely share their lives are mediated by legal arguments. The communicative way of settling disagreements is relieved in
favour of the appeal to the law. It seems as if the only way of handling a dispute has to go through the files cabinets of lawyers and judges. Of course, the legislation on the child’s rights, the enhancement of the student’s power over the teacher, and the progressive family law which has been worked out in the latest years represent significant advances of society in the direction of the principle of equa. justice. But Habermas is pointing to the "constitutive" role that the dense assortment of laws play in social life. These laws do not aim at solving cases where the communicative process have been broken so that by the "regulative" use of those laws communication can get started again or definitely abandoned. Laws increasingly mould essential social roles that are in that way functionally defined.

Perhaps this constant appeal to the law that is collapsing the administration of justice reveals the climate of irreconcilable antagonism felt between the members of civil society. Rights associations are created and dismantled in a rapid manner. Sometimes we confront situations where a number of associations voicing the same civic claims fight against each other for rather inconsequential disagreements. It seems as if the antagonistic character of civil society, to put it with Hegel, would dissipate the traces of a communicative public sphere. The social contract becomes more and more difficult which prompts the state to take over the functions of coordination with the purpose of minimizing conflict.
At the same time, the state is more and more detached from the citizenship. The citizen undergoes a kind of disenchantment towards its own democratic system that can be proven by its lack of social performance—see the rates of participation in elections. Once citizens realize that the demands of their lifeworld cannot break into the organizational apparatus, they withdraw from the public sphere that steadily becomes a void. As it is often said, the citizen has been replaced by the elector. Electors loyally furnish the state with the legitimation that they only can give.

Despite Habermas's attempt to rescue the project of modernity from the attacks of neo-conservative and the anarchistic heirs of a Nietzschean great refusal, his diagnosis, as that of Weber, has more shadows than lights. Social life is for them at the hands of economic enterprises and of government agencies. Against this situation, only the re-enchantment of the citizenship and the deepening of the democratic model will do. And these constitute for us the key-elements of the heritage of modernity.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. TCA I, 10.
Chapter II

1. Habermas's concept differs from Husserl's. He argues that Husserl "shipwrecked" in the Cartesian Meditations for he constructed it from the viewpoint of "monological production of the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld," TCA II, 129. It is interesting to compare Habermas's appraisal of Husserl's concept with the following one: "The world we live in is a practical world, a world that is shared because of our shared intentions." Up to this point Habermas seems to be right, but then it is added: "Husserl saw the self-determination of the "I" as a part of the self-determination of civilization itself." See Dallas Laskey, "Husserl as a Humanistic Moralist." Phenomenology Information Bulletin 7 (1983) 40-52, 50-51. Civilization, one can suppose, is formed for something more than the sum of monological intentionalities. In that sense, the "I" would be already structured within an intersubjective horizon and this would be constitutive part of ego. What can be argued, however, is that Husserl, to my knowledge, does not take up the linguistic formation of intersubjectivity, something that is essential to Habermas' theory and that is inspired by Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations. See also on Husserl's "lifeworld and monadology" Fred Dallmayr, The Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985) 42-48.

2. TCA I, 70.


5. TCA I, 43.

6. TCA I, 70.
7. See on this topic, PDM, 345 ff.


9. See below V.4.


11. PDM, 349.

12. TCA II, 196.

13. See below, IV.3.

14. See TCA I, 186 ff.

15. According to Weber "not ideas, but material and ideal interests" determine the course of social events: "Very frequently— he continues— the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest." SPWR, 280.

16. TCA I, 186.

17. TCA, 189.


19. CES, 189.

20. PDM, 361.


22. PDM, 364.

23. The second volume of the TCA deals extensively with this topic. See especially the pages on Parsons's work, 199-299.


26. Ibid.


28. CES, 154.


30. Of course, the concept of competence is related to Chomsky's work upon which Habermas constructs his "universal pragmatics." Chomsky separates linguistic competence (that is universal and innate and awaits for development through the life of human beings) and performance or the actual use of language in a specific situation. In the words of the father of structuralism, F. de Sausurre, this corresponds "langue" and "parole" or, roughly, the set of linguistic norms that involve all the speakers of a language and the individual-concrete speech acts. However, Habermas tries to bridge the gap between the two terms, competence and an pragmatic realization of that competence through speech acts: "The assumption is that communicative competence has just as universal core as linguistic competence. A general theory of speech acts would thus describe exactly that system of rules that adult speakers master insofar as they can satisfy the conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances-no matter to which particular language the sentences belong and in which accidental contexts the utterances are embedded." CES, . Again, the pragmatic structure of language is independent from the content of speech acts.


32. Ibid., 31.

33. TCA I, 68.

34. Ibid.

35. TCA I, 69.

36. See, TCA I, 43 ff.

37. TCA I, 47.

38. TCA I, 49, 51.

39. TCA I, 48.
40. TCA I, 203.

41. For a useful scheme of the characteristics of the religious-metaphysical worldview, see W. Schluchter, *The Rise...* op. cit., 160.


43. See page 67 below.

44. TCA II, 195.

45. TCA I, 212-13.

46. TCA II, 89.


49. Martin Jay has explored the traces of holism in Habermas's thought. The concept of a background lifeworld would be one trace, as well as certain aspects of his theory of evolution. See "Jürgen Habermas and the Reconstruction of Marxist Holism" in: *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 462-509.

50. The "ready-made" is an object of daily use that is displaced to an artistic environment (a gallery or a museum) thus "becoming" an object of art. Behind Duchamp's strategy there was a critical-conceptual strategy by which he wanted to underline the loss of the category of quality as an artistic "must" and the appropriation of that category by museum curators and art dealers who ultimately decide the "good" and the "bad". Nonetheless, in my opinion, Duchamp's strategy also can be taken as a way of pointing out that (artistic) value is in modernity decided intersubjectively, that is, not only by curators and dealers but also by critics and the public and those who onstitut the artistic community. Thus there is no intrinsic value of the artwork as such:
that value depends on its context and reception. Duchamp's first "ready-made," a bicycle wheel called, quite "originally", Bicycle Wheel, was exposed in 1913. Public attention was drawn to Duchamp's "ready-mades" when his Fountain was rejected by the selection committee in the Independents Exhibition in New York in 1914.

51. PDM, 297.

52. MCCA, 156.


54. Just in passing it would be useful to mention the two ethical principles of communicative action: (1) Principle of universalization: "For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each person affected must be such that all affected can accept them freely." (2) Principle of discourse ethics: "Every valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they could take part in practical discourse." See MCCA, 120-121.

55. TCA II, 46.

56. TCA II, 73.

57. TCA II, 283.


59. Kolhberg, "From 'Is' to 'Ought'" op. cit., 222.

60. Weber deals with the concept of the ethics of responsibility in "Politics as a Vocation". The person who acts responsibly "has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action", 120. We can say then that it is a rational principle implied by the ethical assessment of the possible consequences of action.

62. See below IV.2.3. for an elaboration on Habermas and the concept of immanent critique.

63. TCA II, 141. On the lifeworld reproduction, see TCA II, 140-145.

64. Habermas, "History and Evolution" op. cit., 32.

65. See below IV.3.


69. Dallmayr is in fact taking up the criticisms brought up by Klaus Riegel, see Dallmayr, ibid., 204 ff.

70. See ibid., 204-205


73. Habermas, "History and Evolution," op. cit. 39

74. See ibid.

75. TCA II, 154.

76. Perhaps this could be a remnant of Frankfurt School's and more particularly Marcuse's Rousseau-like naturalism. See Clement Rosset's critique of Marcuse in which he discusses the "revolutionary naturalism" of latter and its subsequent mysticism based on the repression of a natural and free "state of grace". L'Anti-nature (Paris: P.U.F., 1971), 297-303.

78. See McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy..." 126.

79. TCA II, 344 ff.

Chapter III


3. See TCA I, 153-156.


5. To my knowledge, the only book available in English by Droysen is Outline of the Principles of History. Trans. E. Benjamin Andrews. (Boston: (s.n.), 1897).

6. TCA I, 153.

7. On the topic of the "elective affinities", see the remarkable article by R. H. Howe, "Max Weber's Elective Affinities: Sociology within the Bounds of Pure Reason". American Journal of Sociology 84 (1978) 366-385. Howe traces the history of the concept from the chemistry of the 17th century to Weber passing through Goethe and Kant. Howe gives us the definition of the "law of affinity" found in the philosophical dictionaries of Weber's time: "The Law of (A)ffinity (principle of the continuity of forms) bids a continuous transition from every single species to every other via the stepwise increase in multiplicity (Kant)," 371. He follows (now in reference to Weber): "only as the logic of the interrelationships of networks of meanings, of possible actions, could elective affinity extend across the diversity of Weber's usage, from the elective affinity of concrete forms of social action with concrete economic forms to the elective affinity of similar ideals." 382.

8. Weber writes: "History has to do exclusively with the causal explanation of those "elements" and "aspects" of the event in question which are, from certain points of view (underline ours), of "general significance" and on that account of historical interest." "The Logic of Historical Explanation" in Max Weber: Selections in Translation. Ed. by W.G. Ruciman. Trans. by E. Matthews. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

For a very interesting critique (in functionalist terms) of Weber's historical causality see Gabriel Kolko: "A Critique of Max

9. Weber, E&S, p. 341. See also IV.3. below


12. TCA I, 155.


15. See for this topic, *SPWR*, 267-301.

16. RRWD, 328.

17. TCA I, 159.

18. Ibid.

19. This example is taken from Habermas's "History and Evolution", op. cit., 16 ff.

20. This is what today we would call modernism. However, the Germany of Weber's time also saw artistic tendencies, such as Dadaism and all its sequels, that cannot be categorized under the title of modernism. P. Burger has distinguished modernity as the autonomous and self-reflective art from avant-garde as the movements which tried to think on the artistic institution and on the production of artistic value. See Peter Burger, *The Theory of Avant-Garde*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

21. RRWD, 342.

22. TCA I, 161.

23. Habermas writes: "In communicative action the creative moment of the linguistic constitution of the world forms one syndrom (sic) with cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and the expressive moments of the intramundane linguistic functions of representation, interpersonal relation, and subjective expression." PDM, 339.
24. Habermas's defense of modernism, that is, of the autonomy of art in respect to ethical and cognitive claims can be read in his "Modernity versus Postmodernity, New German Critique 22 (1981) 3-14. On the other he holds that "Today, however, post-avant garde art is characterized by a remarkable combination of realistic and politically engaged art forms that raise cognitive and moral-practical factors to the level of richness of form which was liberated by the avant-garde" "The Dialectics of Rationalization, " interview with Axel Honneth, Eberhard Knöder- Bunte and Arno Widman: Telos (49) 5-31, 10. See also, TCA II, 398.

25. In the RRWD Weber adopts the strategy, from the beginning to the end of the paper, of analyzing the autonomous value spheres from the viewpoint of their "contribution" to the erasure of that paradigmatic ethic of brotherliness.

26. RRWD, 355.

27. Because the value-spheres have their own independent logics, argues Habermas, there is an autonomous profane discourse on ethics. See TCA I, 230. In note 25, p.436, Habermas includes himself in the cognitivist approach to ethics along with Baier, Hare, Singer, Rawls, Lorenzen, Kambartel, and Apel. In MCCA he writes: "As for myself, I hold the view that normative rightness must be regarded as a claim to validity that is analogous to a truth claim. This is captured by the term 'cognitivist ethics.' A cognitivist ethics must answer the question of how to justify normative statements." 200.

28. PE, 194.n.9.

29. TCA I, 143.


32. See for this topic TCA I, 175-176.

33. See TCA I, 186.

34. TCA I, 195.

35. TCA I, 196.

36. Stephen Kalberg warns us that "Entzauberung" means, literally, de-magification. "Disenchantment, a far more general term that conjures up images of a romanticist yearning for the
'Gemeinschaft' and an earlier and 'simpler' world has not slightest relationship with Weber's usage of 'Entzauberung'." See S. Kalberg, op. cit, n.2, 1143.

37. TCA I, 221.

38. TCA I, 206.

39. The Protestant Ethic Thesis has been attacked since the very moment in which Weber made it public. A recent good interpretation can be found in Gordon Marshall's _In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Thesis._ (London: Hutchinson, 1982).

40. PDM, 17.


42. Weber writes: "All Franklin's moral attitudes are coloured with utilitarianism. Honesty is useful, because it assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality, and that is the reason they are virtues. A logical deduction would be that where, for instance, the appearance of honesty serves the same purpose, that would suffice, and a necessary surplus of virtue would evidently appear to Franklin's eyes as improductive waste." PE, 52.

43. PE, 181.

44. TCA I, 226.

45. See TCA I, 229.

46. TCA II, 335.

47. See, "On the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm", PDM, 79-82.

48. PDM, 82.

49. See SV for a bleak description of the young aspiring scholars.

50. See E&S, 852 ff.


52. FMW, 219-220.

53. Weber writes that in jurisprudence: "Formal judgements are rendered... not by subsumption under rational concepts, but by drawing on 'analogies' and by depending upon and interpreting concrete 'precedents'. This is 'empirical justice'... (that) can be sublimated and rationalized into a 'technology'." FMW, 216.
55. Schuchter writes in his brilliant chapter on Weber's conception of law: "Rationalization implies that questions of fact and of law are separated and that the latter are treated from two viewpoints: the legally relevant facts and the relevant principles... A law that cannot transcend the 'irrationality of the individual case' is not calculable. In classifying the concrete fact, it does not take into account general criteria, and in subsuming the fact it disregards norms." The Rise..., op. cit., 90.


57. See IV.2.1 below

58. TCA I, 251.

59. TCA I, 256.

60. TCA I, 264.

61. E&S, 998.

62. Schuchter points out that enactment, to be sure, implies always an element of arbitrariness and of imposition over segments of civil society that do not agree upon it. The achievement of an unanimous consensus is virtually impossible. But he follows: "Once religious revelation and sacred tradition and also the charisma of reason- he is referring to the deduced natural law- have disappeared, the basic rules of law, which reflect the relative ideas of justice, must be viewed as agreed upon in some sense- they appear under the regulative idea of an unanimous consent. Therefore, every enactment can be discussed from the viewpoint of the ethic of responsibility." The Rise... op.cit., 55.

63. TCA I, 269.

64. MCCA, 167.


66. TCA II, 357.

Chapter IV

2. Habermas opens his *Legitimation Crisis* with an analysis of the concept of crisis.


4. Habermas, "History and Evolution", 44.

5. On the Logic..., 44.


11. On the other hand, Weber's SPWR can be seen as an example of how individualistic concepts are introduced into the analysis. The influence of the "virtuoso" as a religious moral example, the reevaluation of "suffering" in individual terms, and so on, show how rationalization and individualization go for Weber hand in hand.


14. PV, 115.


17. In the introduction of the editors, *FMW*, 65.

19. This idea is taken from Liebersohn’s Fate and Utopia, op. cit., 104.


21. See note 37 of the third chapter above.

22. Liebersohn, Fate and Utopia, op. cit., 79.

23. PV, 78.

24. PV, 78.


27. FMW, 179.

28. See E&S 266 ff.


30. "'Objectivity'...", 62.

31. TCA II, 138.

32. MCCA, 199.

33. TCA II, 138. See also PDM, 343 ff.

34. Ibid.

35. PDM, 345.


37. See Habermas, The Structural Transformation... op. cit. 102-107. Kant’s term is "Publizitat" and refers to the obligation of the power holders of explaining to the members of the public sphere the decisions they make.
38. Ibid., 56.


40. See Liebersohn, Fate and Utopia, 106-107.

41. Scaff, Fleeing the Iron Cage, op. cit., 95.

42. See Sheyla Benhabib's Norm, Utopia and Critique ": Study on the Foundations of Critical Theory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 186). Pages 327 ff. are the more decisive on this topic.


44. TCA II, 329.


46. A. Wellmer," Reason, Utopia, and Enlightenment" op. cit., 52. This immanent critique applies to Habermas' critique of pathological modernization in respect to the project of modernity. However, Andrew Buchwalter seems to be right when commenting on the broader theory of communicative action, and noting the radical split between goal-oriented (systemic) and communicative rationalities, says: "Immanent critique evaluates reality in terms of intrinsic principles of rationality. This requirement is not met in a framework that seeks only to balance two contrasting principles of rationality." See, A. Buchwalter, "Hegel, Marx, and the Concept of Immanent Critique" in: Journal of Philosophy 29:2 (1991) 253-279. See also, A. Montefiori's and Charles Taylor's introduction to G. Kortian's Metacritique, op. cit.

47. See TCA I, 220.

48. Ibid.

49. TCA I, 240.


52. I am following Guy Oakes, Rickert and Weber, op.cit. 78-90.

53. " 'Objectivity'...", 82.
54. "'Objectivity'...", 112.


56. "'Objectivity'..."

57. TCA I, 273.


60. Ibid., 274.

61. Ibid., 277.

62. See On the Logic..., 143-170.

63. On Habermas's elaboration of "Verstehen", see TCA I, 112 ff.

64. Habermas, "Questions and Counterquestions," in: Habermas and Modernity op. cit., 204.

65. TCA II, 149. See on the three fictions of "Verstehende" sociology, 149 ff.

66. TCA I, 197.

Chapter V

1. TCA II, 316.

2. TCA II, 301.

3. TCA II, 308.

4. See TCA II, 318 ff.

5. TCA II, 308.


8. Weber’s text reads: "When the rationalization of the means of satisfaction of all political as well as social needs will be completed, disciplinization as a universal phenomenon will make an irresistible headway in every sphere of human life." E&S, 1156-7.


10. This sentence belongs to Harum Farocki, a filmmaker who belongs to the New German Cinema movement and whose arguments often fit with those of the Frankfurt School. See his film, How to Live in the Federal Republic of Germany (Original title: Leben: BRD). (Regie, Buch, Schnitt Co-Produktion, 1990), as good illustration of Habermas’s "juridication" thesis. See also, TCA II, 363.


12. See SV, 137.

13. TCA II, 308.

14. RRWD, 356.

15. See graph TCA II, 143.


17. TCA II, 326.


19. It is unavoidable to mention here Benjamin’s opposite vision of the application of technology to art. This application would bring the de-auratization, that is, the democratization of the artistic experience. See Benjamin’s "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in: Illuminations. Edited by Hannah Arendt. Trans. by Henry Zohn. (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 217-252.


21. Ibid. 126.

22. See TCA II, 389 ff.


25. TCA II, 317.

26. See TCA II, 368 ff. He contextualizes his analysis in now defunct Federal Republic of Germany.

27. See TCA II, 366 for the distinction of the "constitutive" and the "regulative" use of laws.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

I. Jürgen Habermas

I.1. Books


I.2. Book edited by Habermas


I.3. Compilations on Habermas's Work (they include Habermas's responses).


I.4. Papers


"History and Evolution,": Telos 39 (1979), 5-44.


"A Post-script to Knowledge and Interests,": Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973), 157-189.


I.5. Interviews


II. Max Weber


From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills
editors. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946)
The Methodology of Social Sciences Trans. by E.A. Shils and
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical

Secondary Sources
II.1. On Habermas
Appel, Karl O. Toward a Transformation of Philosophy. Trans.
Glyn Adey and David Frisby. (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1980).
Benhabib, Sheyla. Norm, Critique and Utopia. A study on the
Foundations of Critical Theory. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
---. "Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory,": Telos
49 (1981) 39-59
---. "Rationality and Social Action,": Philosophical Forum
XII (1981), 356-75.
Culler, Jonathan. "Communicative Competence and Normative
Force,": New German Critique 35 (1985), 133-144.
Dallmayr, Fred. Polis and Praxis: Exercises in Contemporary
---. The Twilight of Subjectivity. A Contribution to Post-Individualist Politics. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1985)


Jay, Martin. Socialism Fin-de-Siecle and Other Essays. (New York: Routledge, 1988).


Thompson, John B. Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the


II.2. On Weber


Wolfgang Schluchter. *The Rise of Western Rationalism. Max