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EMERGENT INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES TO
WESTERN CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

Rosalind Boyd

A Thesis in the Humanities Programme

Presented in partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

April 1995

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ABSTRACT

EMERGENT INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES TO WESTERN CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

Rosalind Boyd, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 1995

The main objective of this project is to trace the various intellectual challenges which have emerged in the post-independence era of former colonial societies of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as responses to the imposed Western cultural hegemony, the acknowledged legacy of imperialist penetration over the last 500 years. My hypothesis is that the emergent intellectuals or new intellectual formations — incipient and fragmented though they may be in these societies — suggest a fundamental restructuring of world thought which is contributing to the lifting of a "hegemonic hold" (Goonatilake) as a process towards authentic emancipation and a new social order.

Although there is considerable evidence of Western cultural hegemony in various domains of these societies, I examine these emergent intellectuals as forums of resistance in three different discourses: educational institutions, especially universities in post-colonial societies; narrative art, with an emphasis on fiction writing; and political praxis, drawn from contemporary post-colonial movements.
Each of the three discourses represents aspects of different tendencies in the global process towards the quest for "authentic liberation". To further nuance and delineate these tendencies, I analyze in greater depth the work of three emergent intellectuals reflective of dominant alternative processes corresponding to each of the three discourses selected: first, the work of Susantha Goonatilake, a Sri Lankan engineer and sociologist; secondly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, a Kenyan writer and former lecturer of English literature; and thirdly, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda and revolutionary leader of a national political movement in the post-independence period.

As a global intellectual study, this work has a broad canvas. The conceptual notions and processes of analysis suggested in the work of Raymond Williams and Antonio Gramsci are used to circumscribe the boundaries of the broad framework. Imperialism resulted in an abrupt cutting off of cultural processes that have led to massive distortions, mutations, and "aborted discoveries" within post-colonial societies. I am asserting as active process a new consciousness that is emerging in contemporary post-colonial societies and I tell that story, as much as possible, from the perspective of the liberating process.
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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this research is to trace the various intellectual challenges which have emerged in the post-independence era of former colonial societies of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as responses to the imposed Western cultural hegemony, the acknowledged legacy of imperialist penetration over the last 500 years. My hypothesis is that the emergent intellectuals or new intellectual formations -- incipient and fragmented though they may be in these post-colonial societies -- suggest a fundamental restructuring of world thought which is contributing to the lifting of a "hegemonic hold" (Goonatilake) as a process towards authentic emancipation and a new social order. Although there is considerable evidence of Western cultural hegemony in various domains of these societies, I examine these emergent intellectuals as forms of resistance in three different discourses: educational institutions, especially universities in post-colonial societies; narrative art, with an emphasis on fiction writing; and political praxis, drawn from contemporary post-colonial movements.
Each of the three discourses represents aspects of different tendencies in the global process towards the quest for "authentic liberation". To further nuance and delineate these tendencies, I analyze in greater depth the work of three emergent intellectuals reflective of dominant alternative processes corresponding to each of the three discourses selected: first, the work of Susantha Goonatilake, a Sri Lankan engineer and sociologist who was for many years the director of research at the Peoples Bank (since 1989 he has been in self-exile) and has published a substantial number of publications; secondly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, a Kenyan writer and former lecturer of English literature (also living in self-exile since the early 1980s) with a substantial body of published work; and thirdly, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda and revolutionary leader of a national political movement in the post-independence struggle whose speeches, interviews and conversations will be examined.

The three individuals are not randomly chosen nor are they simply case studies. Rather, they represent various tendencies in the emergent intellectual processes, what Raymond Williams calls "illustrative instances" (1981, 34), towards possible counter-hegemonic formations. They are revealed not as individuals but as forms of "evidence" in the processes to be reworked and reinterpreted within the broad theoretical framework of this thesis. In that sense, they
express the discourse of a collective consciousness in the struggle of resistance (see Mohanty and Cocks) to the hegemonic or dominant Western culture, in the struggle to "decolonize the mind".

**Conceptual Framework**

As a global intellectual study, this work has a broad canvas. Consequently, the terminology and processes suggested by Raymond Williams are appropriate within our inquiry. In particular, Williams' conceptual notions of dominant, residual, archaic and emergent processes circumscribe the boundaries of the broad framework. In addition, I draw upon Williams' idea of culture as "whole social processes" that "deeply saturate the consciousness of societies" and exist within relation to systems of power and influence. What I am interpreting is the brutal cultural penetration of colonialism or imperialism by the West (Europe, Britain and more recently America) over 500 years and I am focusing on the responses to this legacy, the cultural practices echoed in the three discourses. Imperialism resulted in an abrupt cutting off of cultural processes that have led to massive distortions, mutations, and "aborted discoveries" within post-colonial societies. I am asserting as active process a new consciousness that is emerging in contemporary post-colonial
societies, and I tell, as much as possible, that story from the perspective of the liberating process.

It is important to underscore that alternatives to the Western paradigm are not necessarily "liberating". Borrowing from Williams, I suggest that various residual cultural tendencies which are anti-Western are not in fact liberating. Furthermore, I stress that there has been a diversity of effects as we are dealing with simultaneous and uneven processes. Any confusion with static polarization or simplistic choice between Western and indigenous cultures has to be carefully avoided. I am—not suggesting that the traditional is part of an idyllic past nor is Western society the embodiment of all that is evil. The processes are much more complex, particularly as there has been constant intermingling. However, my study is dealing with dominant Western processes, what becomes institutionalized and carried as the hegemonic practice.

Apart from Williams, several other theorists contribute to this broad conceptual framework and feed into various streams of understanding. Susantha Goonatilake's seminal work Crippled Minds informs the entire thesis. Mikhail Bakhtin in his notions of language, the origin of the novel, "heteroglossia", and consciousness as social activity alters my readings of fictional texts. Antonio Gramsci dominates my
conception of the formation of intellectuals, of hegemony and revolutionary party. Rajni Kothari as a political theorist and social activist enlarges the analytical framework of what constitutes political. Edward Said's deciphering of the "misapprehension of the sources of authority" helps me to negate certain texts altogether from the body of this study. Finally, The Oppositional Imagination by Joan Cocks assisted me in bringing this thesis to a close. I came to this text long after I had started the thesis and sharpened my conceptual notions as a result.

Methodology

This study, though empirically grounded, does not fit into a positivistic or empiricist tradition. The broad outlines of sociology's holistic and comparative methodology are drawn upon, thus with processes and tendencies rather than finite products shaping the broad interpretations that I am asserting. Paradoxically, I select that part of sociology which is useful to challenge the narrowness of most academic disciplines. The approach is clearly interdisciplinary and stresses the importance of understanding the historical legacy while essentially being a contemporary study interweaving social, political and cultural phenomena within post-colonial societies. In this respect, "illustrative instances" or
"historical moments" rooted in social reality feed into and interrelate with the working interpretations. For example, the three emergent individuals are selected as illustrations of a wider movement of intellectual processes, i.e. tendencies in the process of emergent post-colonial intellectual formations.

New sources are being published all the time particularly reinforcing or documenting that part of my thesis which supports the assertion of Western cultural hegemony. There are several works which have come to my attention since 1988 when I wrote the proposal for this thesis that should be mentioned as they served to strengthen my analysis: Samir Amin's two works, Eurocentrism (1989) and Delinking (1985), the collective work of G.G Joseph et al in Race and Class, and Edward Said's article in Race and Class as well as his more recent text, Culture and Imperialism (1993). What is more difficult to document is the formation of emergent intellectuals and their processes of thought that I am asserting and tracing. My working base for that part of the thesis comes essentially from two decades of discussions, observations, experiences, "experiential knowledge" that is difficult to document. I also rely on ephemeral or shadow literature; that is, literature which may be published in post-colonial societies, the so-called "Third World", and not given validation or authority in the Western institutions.
The authority for my central arguments is thus often from elusive sources. I found myself often caught within the tension between the need to document, to provide careful analysis and the informal, hidden dimensions of my own inner knowledge base and thought processes over time.

Nevertheless, the documentation for this research does include published writings as well as discussions, correspondence and conversations (rather than structured interviews) with hundreds of Third World intellectuals over the past two decades. The richness of this vast dialogue blends into the entire study and saturates my analysis in often unidentifiable ways. In addition, site visits form an integral part of my authority. I spent all of 1983 visiting universities, research institutes and development projects in Sri Lanka, India, Senegal and Mexico. In 1987, similar field investigations took place in Tanzania and Uganda. Again, in 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1994 in Uganda, additional and wider field investigations and discussions were conducted. In 1991 and 1992, I conducted field investigations in South Africa and several countries of southern Africa. In 1992, I also made a research tour in El Salvador.

During these site visits, I entered into open-ended dialogues with many leading critical intellectuals whose ideas
Impinge on this study, especially with the three principal intellectuals who form the core of my working interpretation and on-going analyses presented in the thesis. These discussions have seeped into my analysis in an unconscious way that is often difficult to document fully. However, they are there just below the surface as material for understanding the basis of resistance thought.

In relation to the three discourses that form the core of the study, my identifiable sources are the following (while recognizing again the frailty of organizing thought processes): the educational chapter with its focus on the work of Goonatilake uses his published materials, personal conversations and field observations which included many visits to several universities in these societies. I also use published critiques by critical intellectuals (notably, Ake, Asad, Barongo, Mafeje and Stavenhagen). The historical record of colonial penetration into the academy persists and is illustrated in several key works (notably, Ashby, Carnoy and Goonatilake).

The section dealing with the second discourse, narrative art, analyzes a range of published fiction and literary commentary by post-colonial writers (Achebe, Harris, Lamming, Ngugi and Soyinka). More specifically, the work and challenges of Ngugi are traced in detail in an attempt to reveal the
processes of emancipatory consciousness, of liberation from the hegemonic.

Finally, the section dealing with the discourse on political praxis focuses on the post-colonial political discourse of those leaders who have come to power following some decades of independence, whose discourse and praxis is born out of the legacy of anti-colonial nationalism, but in search of a second independence for their societies. The ideas and political praxis of the movements associated with Rawlings of Ghana, Sankara of Burkina Faso, Bishop of Grenada and more specifically Museveni of Uganda are discussed in this chapter. It draws on Museveni's published pamphlets and speeches as well as personal conversations with Museveni. The most original contribution will relate to the conversations and observations made particularly over the last six years of Museveni's political praxis.

Organization of the Thesis

There are five chapters in the body of the thesis. Chapter 1 focuses on cultural hegemony, how it is defined by Gramsci and Williams, and how it applies to the overall hypothesis. This is the theoretical backdrop. This chapter sets the stage for the three discursive practices that are discussed in more systematic detail in the following chapters.
Chapter 2 examines the production of knowledge, the organizational legitimacy, systems of authority in higher education in post-colonial societies, with a detailed examination of Goonatilake's contribution to this debate. Chapter 3 analyzes narrative art or fiction writing as an emancipatory practice in post-colonial societies and through the tracing of the evolution of Ngugi's creative thinking, especially the debates around linguistic praxis and "decolonization of the mind", analyzes the potential for the formation of liberation from Western cultural hegemony. Chapter 4 discusses post-colonial political praxis and its discourse in an attempt to suggest an emergent political discourse that has its legacy in some aspects of anti-colonialism but is distinct from it in that it is not just oppositional to the colonial or imperialist presence. This chapter is suggestive of processes leading to significant new formations of political practice which are giving shape to new political systems through the concept of the political movement rather than party politics.

Chapter 5, as a concluding statement, focuses on the liberating process common to the three discourses which is fracturing Western cultural hegemony and opening up the possibilities of new intellectual formations in post-colonial societies. Altered forms of consciousness are identified in this process through the discussion of specific emergent
intellectuals. The central question posed by this study is: do these new formations constitute a significant break and freedom from the hegemony?

Challenges of the Thesis

Several challenges have presented themselves in writing this thesis. Most pervasive was the need to keep active the sense that I am dealing with processes, simultaneous and uneven, in the analysis, to avoid any simplistic polarization between the evil West and an idyllic past in pre-colonial societies. The emergent intellectuals are not returning to the past as some static "museum piece" but rather are searching for the roots of a new consciousness, organically expressed. A second related but distinct challenge of this thesis was to ensure that the writing captures the diversity of the social processes at work in these societies, the uneven effects of colonialism's legacy, where "neither cultures nor historical situations" are monolithic. Thirdly, as I got deeper into the writing of the thesis, it was apparent that emergent intellectual formations implied dealing with the intellectual linkages and intermingling of cultures that cannot be easily separated out or disaggregated.
Finally, my overriding challenge was to write this study from the perspective of the liberating process, of those who resist the crush of the "descending heel" (Rushdie). In other words to ask the academy to accept a subversive act: to accept the work of a critically engaged scholar not simply a dispassionate observer which calls into question the foundation of the academy itself as a cultural hegemonic institution. The broad global canvas is there with the inter-illumination between the imperialist cultures and cultures of the subjugated peoples. What we attempt to do is to write a part of the text of the conquered peoples, the discourse of the alternative voices, the voices of resistance to the imperial domination. However, in this process, our sub-text is the imperialist discourse and its narratives that cannot be left out. What I am attempting to do is to shift the terrain. The selectivity or choice often leads to summary and generalization which is counterbalanced by our more detailed focus on the three discourses with their three illustrative representations.

**Note on Terminology**

Throughout the thesis, there were many terms that presented problems because they are often used in the literature and in popular parlance with differing meanings. Most terms vary widely in their usage and meaning over time.
I reject any fixed meaning and tend to alter meanings in their context with appropriate explanations in the text. Invariably the contradictory nature of the terms or notions are revealed. "Third World", for instance, has been viewed as pejorative by many post-colonial writers for its association with being "third rate" in a linear trajectory towards modern. However, I use the term often interchangeably with "post-colonial societies" with no sense of this pejorative meaning. "Western" is often conflated to mean a geographical context; my sense of the word is more as an ideological construct with definite meanings associated with imperialism, capitalism and the grand "civilizing mission" toward the modern consumer society. "Resistance" is used in the sense of challenging particularly the dominant or hegemonic, but, as I illustrate, it is not always transforming in the sense of liberating. "Discourse" is used to signify the collective terrain of layered meanings spoken, believed and practiced within a given context and carries within it some sense of historical memory. Finally, in spite of the pressure to standardize editorial usage of either "we" or "I", I have used both in the text as both feel comfortable in different contexts.
Chapter 1

CULTURAL HEGEMONY

I learned the reality of hegemony, I learned the saturating power of the structure of feeling of a given society, as much from my own mind and my own experience as from observing the lives of others. All through our lives, if we make the effort, we uncover layers of this kind of alien formation within ourselves, and deep in ourselves... I know that there is a profoundly necessary job to do in relation to the processes of cultural hegemony itself. I believe that the system of meanings and values which a capitalist society has generated has to be defeated in general and in detail by the most sustained kinds of intellectual and educational work. This is a cultural process I call the "long revolution" and in calling it the "long revolution" I meant that it was a genuine struggle which was part of the necessary battles for democracy and of economic victory for the organized working class. People change, it is true, in struggle and by action. Anything as deep as a dominant structure of feeling is only changed by active new experience.

Williams, "You're a Marxist, Aren't You?".
(in Parekh, 239)

Introduction

European colonial penetration into the societies of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America over the past 500 years has been a complex and often brutal process of conquest. While it passed through many historical phases and stages riddled within paradoxical and complicated processes,
one of the most persistent legacies observable in contemporary post-colonial societies is the cultural hegemony of dominant Western intellectual traditions and practices. Western cultural hegemony corresponds to this implantation and spread of European capitalism in its conquest of the world. During that process, a "new world" culture developed -- European or Western or capitalist -- breaking with its ideological past (feudalism) and reconstructing itself on "mythical foundations" of universality and "false continuity" (Amin, 1989, xi and 89-92). Culture in this sense is understood as "whole lived social processes" (Williams, 1977, 109); hegemony, "as deeply saturating the consciousness of a society" (Williams, 1980, 37).

The systematic conquest of these societies was part of a "global political project" (Amin, 1989, 75) by Europe, based on unprecedented European arrogance and racism which undermined and delegitimized "whole cultures" of indigenous peoples (see also Goonatilake's Crippled Minds). Even with nominal independence and other forms of cultural resistance, the legacy of colonial culture persists in the institutionalized and dominant practices of most domains of post-colonial societies, as transplanted, imitative and dependent patterns with the resulting mimicry and sterile stifling of creativity. Before considering Western cultural hegemony in the three domains -- education, narrative art and
politics -- that have been selected as the core domains for this study, a clearer theoretical understanding of hegemony and of culture needs to be elaborated. Both notions are the subject of a vast literature which often contradicts itself; for our purposes we are heavily dependent on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci as explored by Raymond Williams and others.

Understanding Hegemony

The concept or notion of "hegemony" is most often associated with Antonio Gramsci. Certainly after the translation into English of his *Prison Notebooks* in 1971, there began a whole range of uses and interpretations, some often incorrect, that came into popular parlance.¹ A careful study of Gramsci's writings illuminates our understanding of conquest and human emancipation, the central concerns of this thesis. Anderson's essay "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", which remains one of the most respected interpretations of Gramsci's work in English, points out that no term has been so freely invoked as "hegemony". He traces the evolution of the meaning of the concept in Gramsci's own writings as it "recurs in a multitude of different contexts" (18) in *Prison Notebooks*. Anderson relates that the concept's history predates Gramsci, in frequent use by Plekhanov and other Russian Marxists in the 1880s (15ff.). He takes great pains
to distinguish hegemony from the term "domination" in the sense of coercive force or dictatorship, and he illustrates its metamorphoses "from the social alliances of the proletariat in the East towards the structures of bourgeois power in the West" (25), thus contributing to our "differential analysis of the structures of bourgeois power" (20).

Williams illustrates that hegemony goes beyond mere ideology as "not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as practically organized by specific and dominant meanings and values" (1977, 109). He cites this understanding as Gramsci's great contribution, i.e. sensing the depth of its penetration rather than simply seeing it as ideology which constitutes some abstract "worldview". It is "the powerful cultural emphasis that the idea of hegemony acquired in Gramsci's work combined with his theoretical application of it to the traditional ruling classes, to produce a new Marxist theory of intellectuals" (Anderson, 21), that is useful for our purposes in understanding the legacy of Western cultural hegemony in post-colonial societies.

The hegemonic process, as Williams reminds us, "is in practice full of contradictions and of unresolved conflicts" (1977, 118). It should not be viewed as achieving "total
control" or in any way being "complete". Consciousness is effected by life experiences, what Gramsci termed "common sense", as well as coercion or absorption of the dominant. The first leads to a consciousness of one's own social reality at odds with the dominant, while the latter results in the subjugated groups participating in the dominant. The result theoretically and practically is often an actively fragmented consciousness as we shall illustrate in the formation of intellectuals in post-colonial societies.

Furthermore, our usage of hegemony is more than what Gouldner would describe as "background assumptions". According to Gouldner (29), background assumptions are embedded in a theory's postulations like "silent partners" in the theoretical enterprise. They provide some of the bases of choice and the invisible cement for linking together postulations. While background assumptions are the hidden interpretations of social reality or "the concealment function of ideology" (Abercrombie, 1980, 114) in terms of Marx, hegemony constitutes much wider and deeper processes that are self-generating, particularly through the practices of a "dominant and effective culture" which are found in its institutions, traditions and intellectual formations.

Our focus is on the role of intellectuals or intellectual formations, particularly "emergent" intellectuals in relation
to Western cultural hegemony in post-colonial societies. Therefore, several conceptual notions about intellectuals in relation to hegemony need to be elaborated at a theoretical level. While our concern is with intellectuals who critically engage the dominant culture in ideological struggle to form counter-hegemonic groups or classes or new formations in post-colonial societies, the broader framework in which to locate these intellectuals and alternative processes has to be outlined. Not all post-colonial intellectuals engage in this critical process. In fact, most are actively part of the hegemonic, not surprisingly because the "true condition of hegemony is effective self-identification with the hegemonic forms" (Williams, 1977, 118). As we shall illustrate, this "self-identification" is the basis of the "mimicry" evident in the post-colonial period (see also Memmi, especially 119ff.)

Defining Intellectuals

Our usage of intellectuals is developed from the understanding given primarily by Williams (1981, 214-27) and Gramsci (5-23), who viewed intellectuals as critical in the workings of modern society. While recognizing the contradictions and ambiguities within Gramsci's usage of "intellectuals", due in part to the fragmentary and exploratory nature of Prison Notebook, some general clarity or
coherence can be extrapolated for the purposes of this study.² At the outset, Williams reminds us that Gramsci's usage of "intellectual" is much wider than the normal usage: "All men (sic) are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men (sic) have in society the function of intellectuals." It is this emphasis on fulfilling a particular "function" in society that circumscribes the "maximum limit" on his idea of the intellectual. He finds the distinguishing criterion in "the system of relations in which these activities . . . have their place within the general complex of social relations" (8). From this criterion, two distinct categories of intellectuals emerge, what Gramsci terms the "traditional" intellectuals and the "organic" intellectuals.

According to Gramsci, "organic" intellectuals, unlike Mannheim's notion of the "free-floating, unattached intellectuals," are subsumed within a social group or class, serving its interests and organizing its activities (see also Williams, 1981, 214-16). "Traditional intellectuals", he suggests, "put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group" (7). However, Gramsci essentially denies any social autonomy to intellectuals. Such autonomy, he believes, is a conceptualization characteristic of "idealist philosophy" (7). Mannheim himself following Alfred Weber's notion of "a socially unattached intelligentsia" refers to "these
unattached intellectuals" as "the archetypical apologists, 'ideologists' who are masters at providing a basis and backing for the political designs whose services they enter, whatever these may be" (Mannheim, 1970, 118 and 1966, 153-64; also discussed in Williams, 1981, 221-24). Gramsci argues that the importance of any rising class or fundamental group is "its struggle to assimilate and conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals" while "simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals" (10).

In the course of our study, this notion becomes elaborated whereby the "traditional intellectuals" are those attached to the ruling powers and the institutions established during colonialism, particularly the educational institutions, a primary mode of transferring this cultural hegemony. As Williams points out, traditional intellectuals "are in older and more diverse and often indirect class relations" (1981, 216).

Emergent intellectuals, following Gramsci's notion of "organic" intellectuals, are those whose discursive practices produce new meanings, ideas and concepts, representing a break or rupture with the existing order. Throughout our analysis, we tend to equate emergent intellectuals and organic intellectuals, even though we recognize that organic intellectuals may be organic to the ruling class or the
dominant culture. Emergent intellectuals are engaged in emancipatory practices in society and are actively struggling to change the dominant culture. Traditional intellectuals are involved in reproducing the accepted norms and values also in an active way but primarily to reaffirm the dominant.

We are using these two broad categories of intellectuals in order to locate the new formations within post-colonial societies. We also recognize the fluidity of the complex cultural processes in which intellectual formations are shaped within these societies. Gramsci relates, for example, that "a person of peasant origin who becomes an 'intellectual' generally thereby ceases to be organically linked to his class of origin" (5). Similarly, in our analysis, intellectuals in post-colonial societies are actively engaged in cultural practices which may shift their location as intellectuals. Some theoretical elaboration of how we arrive at formations is therefore needed.

Intellectual Formations

Again summarizing Williams, "Formations . . . may be seen to occur, typically, at points of transition and intersection within a complex social history" (1981, 85). In our study, the post-colonial period represents this complex
historical moment in which the legacy of hegemonic practices and meanings infused through colonialism are being eroded by new challenges which are beginning to take shape as formations, though they are not yet fully formed. We define formations as "those effective movements and tendencies, in intellectual and artistic life, which have significant and sometimes decisive influence on the active development of a culture, and which have a variable and often oblique relation to formal institutions" (Williams, 1977, 117).

It is the relationship of emergent formations to formal institutions that constitutes a key consideration of our investigation. These intellectual formations are emerging in post-colonial societies as they actively challenge the legacy of formal institutions (be it the university or the state) which were instituted during the imperialist onslaught and continue to be part of the active process. Unlike formal institutions, formations are more illusive in our analyses as they do yet correspond to an easily identifiable entity or formal association with clear characteristics. Instead, they are defined through the complex and often contradictory processes and tendencies that we are able to observe as present in various post-colonial societies.

In addition, we shall see that the emergent formations in post-colonial societies are inversely connected to the growing
uncertainty in the dominant Western paradigms within Western societies themselves. In an article appearing in Review, Goonatilake suggests that "after nearly five centuries of cultural certainty, Europe and European civilization is in a crisis of confidence. Self-doubt has crept in" (1982c, 434). This self-doubt is resulting in a lifting of the hegemony, and contributing to the potential liberation of intellectual thinking and creative ideas emerging within post-colonial societies. Several other intellectuals concur with Goonatilake's transitional crisis or point of intersection (Capra, Gouldner and Wallerstein). We are suggesting that this moment of transition is both internal to the processes in post-colonial societies themselves and also linked to the global process internal to the hegemonic, what Williams would identify as a "change in the internal structure of the dominant" (1981, 73).

We also need to understand the basis of formations in terms of organized intellectual activity with some collective coherence rather than simply as personal intellectual responses. Again, we turn to Gramsci for some theoretical clarity. Gramsci firmly believes in the importance of commitment through "organic participation", what he calls the "emotional bond" between the intellectuals and the people-nation or popolo nazione (418). Organic intellectuals can be "organic" to any social group or class. However, organic
intellectuals required to challenge the dominant culture or the dominant ruling class differ profoundly from those who endorse it. Gramsci stresses the importance of the revolutionary party as the "mechanism critical to turning the working class into qualified political intellectuals" (16). For Gramsci, the party "accomplishes its function more completely and organically than the state does" (16). He does not seem to be suggesting that every organic intellectual must be a member of the party. And certainly, in the course of our elaboration of intellectual formations in post-colonial societies, we do not see the organized party as a necessary mechanism for confronting the hegemony. However, what we do extrapolate from Gramsci's analyses and our own observations is the need for some form of organized intellectual activity as direzione or leadership that is connected to the peoples' aspirations. Again, it is this meaning that permeates our understanding of emergent intellectuals in post-colonial societies, particularly when we discuss the way in which intellectuals confront institutionalized knowledge or confront the institution of the state.

Simon has suggested that the word direzione (leadership) is used interchangeably with egemonia (hegemony) by Gramsci (21). For our purposes, we understand that aspect of leadership or direction as hegemony when it is lived and
practiced as part of the processes of social organization (for example, the movement) rather than as simply a ruling class or political force. Consequently, as we shall see in the three discourses of education, literature and politics, replacing the ruling colonizers with an indigenous leadership, as often happened during the early independence period, did not eliminate Western cultural hegemony. The relationship between the new emergent intellectual formations that we analyze, and cultural hegemony, covers much wider and deeper terrain in the post-colonial period.

The struggles to transform the colonial intrusion as cultural hegemony began with intellectual challenges in the earliest historical periods and continue till today. Our emphasis is on how they continue to relate to a wide area of contemporary social processes, often part of hidden dimensions in daily reality. The legacy of the practices had been so internalized and were so pervasive that their effects require more fundamental understanding of counter-hegemonies as new forms of alternative practices. The dual notion of Western cultural hegemony as legacy and as continued active processes today is what we are analytically trying to freeze in order to understand the complex responses and struggles towards liberation. There are numerous intellectuals who are outside the so-called "Western cultural tradition" in post-colonial societies. Our concern, however, is with those who challenge
the dominant cultural processes that are associated with Western hegemony.

Implied in our understanding of hegemonic and its relationship to intellectual formations is an analytical or theoretical sense of culture which also requires further elaboration from the vast literature. We are again using Gramsci's and Williams' interpretations for a basic understanding of culture throughout this study.

Elaborating Culture

The complexity of the cultural processes actively practiced in post-colonial societies can be captured in a broad theoretical sense with Williams' notions of "dominant", "residual" and "emergent" (Williams, 1977, 121-27). They are in fact to be viewed as interactive processes which relate unevenly and simultaneously, rather than in linear stages. Thus in asserting the "dominant" colonial cultural penetration over 500 years, we also recognize the dynamic interactive residual and emergent processes at any given moment, as expressed alternatives to the dominant. "Residual" involves the "reaching back to those meanings and values which were created in actual societies and actual situations in the past, . . . areas . . . which the dominant culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, represses, or even cannot recognize"
(1977, 123-24). Residual, again following Williams, is distinguished from "archaic" in that the latter "is wholly recognized as an element of the past . . . to be consciously 'revived'. . . . The residual, by definition, has been effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present" (1977, 122).

As we shall see in Chapter 4, for example, the political discourse or debates over nationalism resurface again and again as part of the "residual" within the "emergent" post-colonial discourse. Such a process is significantly different from the "archaic" revival of discourses which may also be alternatives to the dominant but are not liberating. For example, the return to fossilized constructions of "African traditions" or "Asian traditions" to justify certain practices that are not emancipatory. We are concerned to elaborate those residual processes that are emergent in a sense of liberating.

Extending Gramsci's interpretation, Williams defines culture as "signifying systems" and "discursive practices" through which "a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored" (1981, 13). As stated earlier, culture is not merely a system but rather a wholly lived
process. In any given society "there is a central system of practices, meanings and values, which we can properly call dominant and effective" (1981, 38), and it is these that we describe as hegemonic processes.

Two points are essential to underscore in relation to these processes: first, that the Western tradition is neither singular nor homogenous but there is some coherence in its effects on the colonized or subjugated peoples; secondly, that "what has been handed to us in the colonial world as 'the Western tradition' is none other than the standpoint of the dominant classes in the West" (Mamdani, 1990, 361). In spite of the complexities and contradictions in the so-called "Western cultural tradition", the coherence in its effects results in part from the assumption, implicit or otherwise, of "the West" as the universal or primary reference point in theoretical discourse (Mohanty 1988).

While "Western tradition" has, paradoxically, what Nandy calls a "critical self", a dissenting tradition which protests especially against the "modern West", the colonized world received and continues to receive primarily the dominant Western tradition. Nandy, especially in The Intimate Enemy (xii–xvii), provides an insightful discussion of the complexity of the contradictory phenomenon that "Western tradition" represents. It is possible, Nandy suggests, "to opt
for a non-West which itself is a construction of the West" (1983, xii). Similarly, there have been Western intellectuals who all along went against the dominant stream. "The standard opponents of the West . . . are not outside the dominant model of universalism. They have been integrated within the dominant consciousness -- typecast, if you like -- as ornamental dissenters" (1983, xiv). In addition, the colonizers' effects are so deeply implanted in "the sphere of the psyche", in the ideology and cultural practices, that long after they have physically departed their legacy remains even more aggressively (see also Alvares for the emphasis on this point).

"Colonizers . . . came from complex societies with heterogeneous cultural and ethical traditions" (Nandy, 1983, 12). However, they built the legitimacy for colonialism by selecting what practices, meanings and discourse of the West would be transplanted. Over long periods of colonial history with all these recognized complexities and contradictions, the deliberate effects of what Williams calls the "selective tradition" shaped the legacy of post-colonial culture in profound ways. Williams defines a "selective tradition" as "an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification" (1977, 115). What we understand and can observe even
empirically is that the indigenous cultural practices, meanings and discourse of the "colonized peoples" were consistently marginalized, negated or excluded. The colonizers selectively implanted their culture of superiority through all domains of the colonized societies, but particularly through its transplanted institutions and language. Thus it is primarily in those domains that we shall explore the counter-hegemonic cultural responses through emergent formations in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

It is also this notion of "selective tradition" by the dominant culture that puts into question the benign ideas of "cultural mingling" or "cultural borrowing". Certainly, as we shall document in each of the discourses, "borrowing" continues to go on even in the sphere of emergent intellectual practices. The new formations, while striving to break with the Western cultural hegemonic effects, continue to exist within the Western cultural practices -- be it the university, the novel form or the political organization of the state. While our alternative or oppositional initiatives are "in practice tied to the hegemonic", the contradictory nature of that intermingling must be identified. On the one hand, the dominant will tolerate or even incorporate these alternatives in order to maintain continued dominance and control. On the other hand, there will be authentic breaks, what Goonatilake frequently refers to as "fissures in the imposed system", that
will place cultural practices outside the limits of the hegemonic.

What we are suggesting, then, are processes different from those of Edward Said, whose work, though useful and insightful in many parts of our study, places far more stress on the "intermingling" of cultures. Like Said, we acknowledge that "the history of all cultures is the history of cultural borrowings" (1993, 217), but the processes of incorporation, of assimilation and of gaining legitimacy, suggest that "intermingling" or "borrowing" is embedded in power struggles which are seldom benign. At some levels, Said acknowledged the relationship between power and knowledge. However, in his attempt to avoid what he calls "nativist sentiment buttressed by some variety of native ideology to combat" imperialism and Western cultural hegemony, and to "work out of what might be called a decentered consciousness", Said continues to assert the "connectedness" of all things -- "no one today is purely one thing" (1993, 336) -- to counterpoise his legitimate fear of divisiveness, separation and continued conflict. What he seems to be doing is opting for an act of faith in this "connectedness", perhaps in part because of his own location in the West. Certainly, his intellectual analysis does not always take him to the point of "intermingling" that he continues to assert. 6
We are primarily concerned with emergent intellectuals located within post-colonial societies while cognizant of the broader global processes to which they relate. How are their emancipatory practices expressed within these contexts? What are the bases of new intellectual formations and counter-hegemonic processes? Understanding the complexity of alternative or oppositional processes at a theoretical level, again through the readings of Gramsci and Williams, assists us in this regard.

Alternative and Oppositional Processes

Williams cites as a major problem distinguishing "between alternative and oppositional initiatives and contributions which are made within or against a specific hegemony" (1977, 114). As we have seen above in discussing the notion of dissent, the limits on opposition are frequently set by the hegemonic which is "adaptive, extensive, and incorporative" (Williams, 1977, 114). However, we are interested in the tendencies towards "the authentic breaks" which occur under specific social conditions, often as we shall see, as tentative and suggestive rather than as actual or finite.

As we are aware, "there is always a social basis for elements of the cultural process that are alternative or oppositional to the dominant elements" (Williams, 1977, 124).
While these elements face enormous pressures from the hegemonic, the evolution of another consciousness that leads to the alternative, often first as pre-emergent expressions, "active and pressing but not yet fully articulated" (Williams, 1977, 126) is what concerns us. We shall explore the forms of resistance or alternative expressions rooted in the levels of consciousness or "structures of feelings" in real material conditions. In terms of post-colonial societies, it is primarily the consciousness of exclusion, marginalization or negation in relation to the dominant, what Williams understands as "practical consciousness", as "what is actually being lived" (Williams, 1977, 131). Received interpretations by the dominant cultural processes are consciously in tension with practical experiences and meanings to produce new embryonic intellectual formations.

As we shall illustrate in the examination of our three representative emergent intellectuals, there are various processes at work at different moments, in different historical contexts that help situate these oppositional or alternative expressions. For example, when these intellectuals move from activity as a traditional intellectual expressing an alternative narrative (such as Ngugi's early novels in English within the university) to active oppositional process which affirms a cultural break with the dominant (such as Ngugi writing and practicing his emancipatory narrative in Gukiyu),
the emancipatory practice becomes a threat as it challenges the existing structures of the hegemonic in a fundamental way. It becomes a cultural practice outside the limits of the hegemonic and is no longer even to be incorporated within the dissenting tradition of Western culture itself, in part because it exists outside the actual language practiced by the hegemonic. To further delineate this notion, we want to discuss the relationship of culture and language as it impinges on our study.

Language and Culture

Central to our concept of culture is language, language particularly as "actual social practice" or "practical consciousness". Marx and Engels state: "Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness" (quoted in Williams, 1977, 29). Our reading of the works of Mikhail Bakhtin sheds light on the debate surrounding language choice in relation to cultural hegemony which surfaces again and again in post-colonial societies. While recognizing its importance in all of the domains, we treat the question of language in Chapter 3 where writers debate how language in practice impinges on the struggle to confront "a hegemony in the fibres of the self" (Williams, 1977, 212). Bakhtin's importance, particularly in Marx's circles, but as Morson points out also among liberals (84), is that he reasserted the
importance of language as an "activity" rather than simply as "expression" or a "formal system". Bakhtin "reconsidered the whole problem of language within a general Marxist orientation" (Williams, 1977, 35). Language whether spoken or written is "the product of a complex social situation in which real or potential audiences, earlier and possible later utterances, habits and 'genres' of speech and writing, and a variety of other complex social factors shape all utterances from the outset" (Morson, 83). The social fact of language challenges both formalism and the subjectivist idea of the "inner psyche". In attempting to understand "inner" speech as practical consciousness, this internalized grasp of reality "derives its meaning from signs" which are in an active social relationship.

In terms of understanding Western cultural hegemony, we know that colonial cultural intrusion brought with it the imperialist language, certainly as formal "outer" speech in all dominant domains of public life, which carries over as "activity" in post-colonial societies. That "alien" language is intertwined with notions of the "alien" culture. What becomes evident in most post-colonial societies is that there is simultaneously an "authoritative discourse" and an "internally persuasive discourse" (Holquist, 342-48). Bakhtin suggests that "authoritative discourse" embodies various meanings, such as "authority", "acknowledged truths", "the
official line" and "located in a distanced zone"; "internally persuasive discourse" is the area of our consciousness which "awakens new and independent words, . . . it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition" (345). He states that "(t)he struggle and dialogic interrelationship of these two categories of ideological discourse are what usually determine the history of an individual ideological consciousness" (342).

Without undoing the vital nuances of Bakhtin's meaning, we interpret "authoritative discourse" as the complex process related to the transmitted colonial or imperialist discourses while the "internally persuasive discourse" as the process corresponding to the languages, discourses or utterances of resistance and liberation of the subjugated peoples in post-colonial societies. What we attempt to unravel is how the two are "dialogized" as practical consciousness and activity in the sense of Bakhtin's "dialogic imagination" where the range of voices or contact zones are continually in struggle. Such an analytical understanding of Bakhtin's notions provides insight into the intellectual's social self as representative in the process of struggle to liberate from the hegemonic."
Conclusion

We now want to locate in summary form how Western cultural hegemony specifically impinges on the three domains -- education, narrative art and politics -- examined in the remaining chapters. Educational institutions, particularly universities and their institutionalized knowledge, are the site for entrenched Western cultural hegemonic processes to be challenged by emergent intellectuals in post-colonial societies. In the domain of narrative art or fiction writing, use of the hegemonic language becomes the key challenge for emergent intellectuals located in post-colonial societies. Finally, in the domain of politics, the dominant discourse of Western forms of state organization and notions of democracy become the critical challenges for intellectuals involved in emancipatory practices.

We attempted in this opening chapter, first, to understand "cultural hegemony" as a general theoretical concept, and secondly, to situate Western cultural hegemony as a specific process within post-colonial societies. Our concern in this study is to assert the presence of Western cultural hegemonic processes and then, in the remaining chapters to elaborate three specific areas in which new intellectual formations are challenging this hegemony.
The challenges come in the form of emancipatory processes, resistance or alternatives in the age-old quest for authentic liberation. However, the specific historical intrusion of colonialism, instituted and instituting within societies of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, becomes the context for our contemporary study of emergent intellectual formations in the post-colonial period. We are asserting the legacy of the imperialist experience, primarily of Britain, France and more recently U.S., over long periods of time and in complex situations. While a myriad of cultural specificity and differences can be identified, we believe that there is some coherence and cultural centrality in the imperialist experience.

We have seen that the hegemonic process is revealed in its relationships to other processes, identified by Williams as "residual" and "emergent", which work simultaneously within any cultural situation. While Western cultural hegemony is itself a contradictory phenomenon in that aspects of the colonial experience can often be seen to have improved the lives of subjugated peoples or that it provides for dissent, our concern is with the dominant hegemonic processes that have disadvantaged peoples, that have marginalized whole knowledge systems of subjugated peoples, that have stifled creative thinking and that have devalued their life meanings and values in a fundamental way. Similarly, we recognize the complexity
of the cultural processes we are asserting and that not all peoples, not even all intellectuals, in post-colonial societies are engaged with the hegemony of Western culture. However, our focus is on those who are struggling with this hegemonic process and to elaborate how.

Our emphasis is on the processes and tendencies that are shaping emergent intellectual formations in post-colonial societies in such a way as to constitute a break with the Western cultural hegemony. While recognizing the pervasiveness of dominant hegemonic processes, we have chosen to focus on three specific domains in which the hegemonic process is being challenged. We are interested to know whether the "creation of a new stratum of intellectuals" (Gramsci, 9) will result in the needed transformation of post-colonial societies. We now want to turn to the first domain of challenge, that of education, to illustrate how new intellectual formations are being suggested in contemporary post-colonial societies.
ENDNOTES


2. Simon, 20; Nemeth, 17; and Anderson, 6: all speak of the "tentative and provisional character" of Prison Notebooks which makes a definitive understanding of Gramsci's work impossible. The fragmentary and unfinished nature of his work, like that of Bakhtin's, gives it the richness that allows me to interpret and use this work in post-colonial settings.

3. As well, we are not following Said's classification of "colonial intellectuals" and "post-colonial intellectuals". Our focus is on the new intellectual formations of the post-colonial period. However, we are cognizant of the significant intellectual challenges during the earliest phases of colonial conquest in all of these societies; and conversely, that there continues to be a "colonial cultural ambience . . . far beyond the moment of decolonization" (Ahmad, 204 and Alvares).

4. The article by Goonatilake (1982b) critiquing the claims by the Sarvodaya Movement to embrace basic Buddhist values for a non-Western path to development offers one such example. See also Hobsbawm and Ranger for an elaboration of the notions related to "invented tradition".

5. See, for example, Orientalism in which he discusses cultural exchange within the context of unequal power relations.

6. See Ahmad, especially "Orientalism and After: Ambivalence and Metropolitan Location in the Work of Edward Said" (159-219), for one of the most systematic critiques of Said's work.

7. We recognize certain parallels here to the emergence of feminist intellectuals, see especially the work of Smith (1987, 140-43).

8. We also acknowledge some early insights found in the work of Mead in understanding the self and society.
Chapter 2

EDUCATION AND GOONATILAKE: "A Particular Conditioning"

Knowledge is a method of perceiving reality and a particular structure of knowledge is related to particular systems of perceiving social reality as well as of controlling that reality. The universities act as transmitters of knowledge and in the case of dependent countries are agents of reproduction of foreign curricula thus helping to establish a particular conditioning.

Goonatilake, Crippled Minds. (189)

Introduction

When discussing the "complexity of hegemony", Raymond Williams states that "educational institutions are usually the main agencies of the transmission of an effective dominant culture" (1980, 39). Hegemony following Gramsci, as we have analyzed in the previous chapter, is not mere opinion or simple manipulation. It constitutes a process of "deeply saturating the consciousness", permeating all practices and expectations, not least of all institutions. This chapter will begin by examining universities in Third World societies as agencies transmitting the "effective dominant culture", and then it will focus on new intellectual formations within post-colonial societies that challenge Western cultural hegemony in these institutions and, consequently, challenge
dominant Western paradigms as institutionalized knowledge. I shall then examine the critical thinking of Susantha Goonatilake to illustrate the process of resistance of an emergent intellectual to this institutionalized knowledge.

Defining Institutionalized Knowledge

According to Freidson, institutionalized knowledge or formal knowledge is distinguished as "specialized knowledge that is developed and sustained in . . . higher education, organized into disciplines, and subject to a process of rationalization" (225). However, this knowledge is not to be seen as some "fixed set of ideas or propositions . . . that is then mechanically employed by its agents" (217). Knowledge transmission and reception are full of complex and often contradictory processes, even when located within hegemonic institutions. As an active process, there may develop a tension between what is "authoritative" received wisdom and "another consciousness" located in practical reality. Knowledge is continually adapted and even transformed by its interpreters. Furthermore, institutionalized knowledge, the full baggage of what constitutes "legitimate" knowledge in the institutions, is not neutral nor is it in a passive relationship with those being taught, its interpreters. It is part of the cultural-intellectual process of selectivity and exclusion reproduced
in these institutions during the process of imperialist expansion. Dominant cultural authority and legitimacy rested in the West and what was instituted as "knowledge" is connected to -- though not necessarily a function of -- the economic and political power of the West.

To unravel the levels of complexity, we need to recall that Gramsci, in his sections on education in Prison Notebooks, suggests that one develops a critical perspective of "institutionalized knowledge" in order to challenge it not to assimilate it, despite the cooptive pressures of the dominant. He also tells us that there is an "active and creative" (42) relationship between what is being taught and the student. In this sense knowledge has a dynamic, transformative quality for the learner. Gramsci's notion of hegemony suggests that organic intellectuals committed to this critical aim must understand the dominant ruling culture and its ideology as embodied in its institutions in order to transform it. And certainly the critical tendency, the tradition of dissent, as we have seen illustrated in Chapter 1, is very much part of the Western intellectual tradition which has also been transplanted. We are therefore dealing with a complexity of phenomenon in this thesis, whereby Western traditions of rationality have a process of dissent within their traditions, which enables cooptation and control of opposition ideas, values and meanings. However, for over
three decades now, there has been a growing literature which attests to the stifling of creativity as a result of transplanted Western paradigms dominating institutionalized knowledge (see Ake, Goonatilake, Carnoy and Altbach and Kelly among others) in the educational institutions of post-colonial societies.

**Historical Context (the establishment of universities)**

Our analysis of universities first locates the historical context in which universities were established and then attempts to explain how and why they continue to persist as bastions of Western culture. It is important to recall that between 1500 and 1900, many regions of the world were under European domination. The legacy of colonial plunder and European penetration is deeply rooted in post-colonial societies, as has been discussed in the previous chapter and thoroughly documented in several books by Goonatilake (particularly in *Crippled Minds*), Chatterjee (1986), Amin (1989), Rodney (1972), Jallée (1966), Abdel-Malek (1985), among others. These writers illustrate how indigenous systems of knowledge and learning in former colonies were delegitimized, devalued or more often thought simply not to exist.
Christian missionaries, emphasizing Western moral education, and European colonizers, needing low-grade civil servants, proceeded to inculcate "superior" European or Western norms, values and practices to the "ignorant" Africans or Asians. Educational institutions were essentially set up to serve the needs of the colonizers (well-documented in Kelly and Altbach, *Education and Colonialism*), to the advantage of the ruling class to ensure social control and authority. The "legitimate" superior systems of knowledge were conveyed as those from the West. History, all forms of inventions, scientific discoveries and creativity were selectively confirmed to be born in the West (Goonatilake, 1985). The general historical context in which most universities in the Third World were established was one of overt imperial domination by Western systems of knowledge.

Sir Eric Ashby in his classic works, *African Universities and Western Tradition* and (with Mary Anderson) *Universities: British, Indian and African*, has recounted how Western models of universities were exported to the colonies with the same narrow assumptions that existed in the West: institutions are to be detached from the state; to be narrowly specialized in their content and to be restricted to the elite (Ashby, 1964, 12). In most instances, they were authoritarian structures established to ensure continued control by the ruling classes (Carnoy). Debates between humanistic and
utilitarian systems of education were part of the on-going process to "liberalize" the institution. Similarly, there were debates, particularly leading up to independence, between the expatriate staff at universities who sought to keep universities autonomous and free from state interference, and then those who favoured what came to be known as "indigenization" of the staff and more involvement by the state in linking the university to the independence or anti-colonial movements. While the latter tendency won out in most circumstances, the result was a change in appearance but not in substance nor in the formal organization of the universities. The university "continued to be largely a copy of the Western university and it became a basic problem to develop an independent culture under these conditions" (Rajaoson quoted in Abdel-Malek, 1985, 17).

Several universities were established in India in the 19th century. In Latin America, "universities were founded by Iberians in Mexico and Peru" as early as 1551 (Goonatilake, 1982, 149). In Africa, for example, Fourah Bay College in Sierre Leone was founded along with various religious institutions as pre-colonial sites for learning. However, most African, Asian and Latin American universities, as we know them today, were established after World War II, on the eve of nominal independence for most colonial societies. From their beginning, it was consciously stated by the colonialists that
universities were there to ensure an indigenous ruling class, essentially Western in values, norms and behaviour. In fact, more than one colonialist stated that "we must ... form a class of interpreters ... Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" (cited in Goonatilake, 1982, 92). Ashby reminds us that in the discussions to establish the universities in African countries, the educated "been-to" Africans, those who had studied abroad, also argued strongly for a replica of the British university at its best (1966, 79).

Not surprisingly, the colonizers had done their job well to ensure that the colonized participate in their own colonization, establishing what came to be referred to as "Brown Sahibs", "Black Frenchmen" or "Afro-Saxons". These are the "mimic men" who were most often mocked in fiction (see especially the work of Naipaul). They were thoroughly imbibed with Western norms, values and behaviour while condescending to indigenous knowledge or beliefs which, when it did exist within the context of the universities, was as the colonizer conceived it not as it actually was.¹

There was no self-projected image of colonized history or culture within the universities during this early stage. What was dominant, as related so convincingly in Said's Orientalism, which was built on Anouar Abdel-Malek's earlier
formulation of this dominating framework of knowledge (see his "Orientalism in Crisis," ) was a construct, "a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness and later, Western Empire" (Said, 3). Re-interpreting and re-affirming a history from the perspective of the colonized only began to take shape and gain validity during the post-colonial period.²

An effective and dominant culture is dependent on a real social process, a process of incorporation (Williams, 1980, 39). In this situation, Williams tells us, the dominant culture chooses selectively which practices and meanings are to be given importance and which are to be neglected and excluded. The colonizers as carriers of an effective dominant culture -- "Western, European and capitalist" as stated in Samir Amin's Eurocentrism -- had perpetuated a process that is "continually active and adjusting". They legitimized themselves over centuries by destroying the sense of culture and history of those colonized (Memmi, 91-92), and imposing selectively elements of dominant culture. They educated an elite, ruling class to carry on the tasks of spreading this dominant culture even when they were not going to be directly involved after the nominal independence of these countries.¹
This is not to suggest that resistance did not occur at earlier stages. History is replete with examples of resistance to cultural domination but what we are discussing very specifically are the systems of dominant institutionalized knowledge in higher institutions. Dorsinville reminds us

Des individus, 'sélectionnés' pour l'assimilation, pour remplir le rôle de modèles sociaux, se tournent contre leurs 'bienfaiteurs' et utilisent la langue apprise comme parole pour témoigner contre le colonisateur en faveur de ces masses pour lesquelles ils ne devaient avoir que mépris. 4 (18)

Similarly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, discussed more fully in Chapter 3, elaborates some of the attempts, in the 1960s on the eve of independence, to "indigenize" the staff and curricula -- to place African professors on the staff and African literature in the curriculum -- at the University of Nairobi in Kenya and Makerere University in Uganda. This resistance took the form of an awareness of the imitative nature of the institutionalized knowledge and the exclusion of local social realities, particularly during the period of protracted anti-colonial struggles in most of these societies.

Institutionalized knowledge within the universities in its origin was imitative of what existed within the universities of Britain, France, or Belgium, the former colonizers. Ashby reminds us that Africans, or at least those with any say in the matter, would have been indignant at
anything less (1966, 79). There are some isolated exceptions, such as Annie Besant and others (cited in Goonatilake, 1982, 93) who proposed actual content from indigenous knowledge as part of the curricula, but their suggestions were generally defeated. In addition, universities were not monolithic: there were some which offered attempts at "critical breakthroughs", such as Jawaharlal Nehru University (discussed in Goonatilake, 1982, 106) and others in Africa which attempted to adapt to local political situations. For example, the University of Dar es Salaam became somewhat more egalitarian as a reflection of the socialist orientation of the state after independence (Morrison 1976 and Barkan 1975). Similarly, some disciplines were represented by a strong challenge to dominant Western paradigms during the early independent years (see Campbell 1985; Resnick, especially the chapters by Saul and Rodney; and our Chapter 4 for additional discussion about the teachings of Walter Rodney at the University of Dar es Salaam).

In spite of these modifications to local situations, universities remained essentially Western in orientation, content and ethos. Barkan in his examination of universities in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda states that the African university "has not attempted to create its own identity and academic traditions, preferring instead to imitate those found in the land of the former colonial power" (1). Similarly,
Goonatilake reminds us that "the Indian university today remains largely a transplantation of Western curricula" (1982, 93). To a large extent with variations in emphasis from country to country, this situation persists today.

The corpus of institutionalized knowledge transmitted into post-colonial universities is dominated by mainstream paradigms of Western thought (the "effective dominant culture" of the colonizer). "No sustained independent school or paradigm has emerged" (Goonatilake, 1982, 106). Any form of indigenous Third World organic understanding or knowledge -- expressing their reality, their needs, their perceptions -- is largely ignored, marginalized or excluded. Transplanted, imitative and dependent patterns of thinking from the West continue to dominate in the universities. Goonatilake summarizes by stating that "what became subsequently the 'social sciences' and what is learnt as such in non-metropolitan countries are but some of the questions and some of the answers produced over the last few centuries in the West" (1982, 190).

In spite of three decades of nominal independence and attempts at indigenization of the teaching staff, the universities continue to reflect and transmit the values, norms and behaviour of dominant Western paradigms. The selective tradition at work in the universities, excluding or
ignoring local realities, echoes the continued dominance of Western paradigms in content for all disciplines. Legitimacy is determined not through local approval or validation but by the Western (metropolitan) intellectual practices, the former colonizers' knowledge/traditions or the current strains of neo-colonialism (the American paradigms). Whether it is in scholarship, research, teaching or institutional organization of the universities in post-colonial societies, meanings and practices are transmitted from the West. And the West's dominant knowledge, as is well-documented in numerous works (Said, Goonatilake, Amin, Asad and Copans), is Eurocentric.\(^5\)

Joseph et al illustrate how "(t)he categories and approaches used in European academia help to maintain the political and intellectual superiority of Europe. The continuing presence of such academic constructs is a by-product of a widespread Eurocentric bias in the production, dissemination and evaluation of knowledge" (Joseph, 1).

Institutionalized education throughout most of post-colonial Africa, after

a century or more of colonial domination and tutelage . . . has had but one aim and direction -- to make Europeans out of Africans in their speech, thought, attitudes and behaviour . . . The processes . . . simply mean(s) the internationalisation of European knowledge without serious regard for the knowledge and culture and the past and present civilisations and philosophies of the African peoples. (Turum-Barima, 92)
Not surprisingly, the consequences of such a process have contributed to the formation and entrenchment of irrelevant, unsuited traditional intellectuals who have generally identified with the ruling elite and thus the Western bourgeois capitalist class (Goonatilake, 1982, 100-111).

Goonatilake speaks about these contextual conditions in which Third World intellectuals "are imprisoned within a set of paradigms that are established elsewhere, a system of legitimization and reward that is determined elsewhere, and a system of science which is by nature imitative and noncreative" (1982a, 433). Others elaborate "the emergence of the phenomenon of 'intellectual captivity' among the educated elite in the former colonial cultures" (Joseph, 3). This 'intellectual captivity', they state, "is marked by unthinking imitation of the West, an incapacity to raise and solve original problems and a failure to generate concepts which are relevant and productive in the local context" (4). Knowledge continues to be imitative of Western institutionalized knowledge, serving the interests and transmitting the values of the Westernized ruling elite (see also Joon-Chien). Inherited patterns of behaviour and established institutions from the colonial past continue, related to vested interests of elite groups within the Third World which depend for their continued power and influence on their links with the culture of the West. Together with this
historical legacy being continually adjusted but not broken is the persistent use of the colonial language which binds the universities through a neo-colonial dependency and perpetuates the "effective dominant culture."

Elaborating the Challenges

According to Goonatilake,

breaking down these prison walls demands recognition of their existence, of the reasons for their existence, and the twin processes of legitimization and disqualification. Breaking out implies a rejection of the preemptive perceptions of the handed-down Western tradition . . . and a reconnection with the valid inquiries of the hitherto ignored heritage. (1982a, 434).

Challenges or alternatives to this process of hegemony are emerging very faintly within the universities: the simultaneous processes which Williams describes as "residual" and "emergent" are largely occurring outside the universities in autonomous research centres (for example, the Centre for Basic Research in Uganda or the Research Department of Peoples Bank in Sri Lanka or Lokayan in India) and other intellectual groupings, such as the African Political Science Association which has been stressing the development of alternative paradigms more creatively derived from examining and legitimizing the experiences, thoughts, meanings and practices of the societies in which they live.
In this respect, the establishment of the independent social science research network, the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa or CODESRIA as it is more commonly known in the early 1970s was of particular importance. With offices in Dakar, CODESRIA grouped many exiled African intellectuals who were unable to work in their own countries due to the intolerance of dissent, often both by the state and the university. Other intellectuals in their countries looked to CODESRIA as an important network which struggled to be a space or an opening where "Africans could define their own parameters, agenda and terms" with the stated conviction "that African social sciences must engage in fundamental research on Africa and that this required active involvement in conceptualisation and theorisation of the African problem" (Mkandawire, 17).

They sought to break or at least to challenge the monopolies by the intellectual centres of Paris, London and New York. Challenges took various forms, notably what was referred to as the "Resistance Front" which "resisted not only the political and economic domination of Africa by European powers, but questioned the pervasive hegemony of the former colonial powers on different aspects of African societies" (Mkandawire, 14). Another active debate focused around the "indigenization" of social sciences in Africa ranging from "know thyself" to the "the problem of reconciling the
'universal' with the specificity of the African experience" and in the process overcoming "the burden of received knowledge" (17-18). Not surprisingly, their direct alternative or oppositional discourse took on political overtones and they have frequently found themselves in conflict with the state or the university institution.

One such example of particular interest is the experience of the leading intellectual and active member of CODESRIA, Mahmood Mamdani based at Makerere University in Uganda. After peace was restored to Uganda in 1986 following the take-over of power by a guerrilla movement (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the political context in Uganda during this period), there was strong pressure by the Western-educated university elite to return Makerere to its "old glory". However, Makerere was now situated within an altered political context and many found its worn-out imitative vision of the British tradition inappropriate to the new post-colonial realities. A pocket of resistance within Makerere had been centred around the work of the Group for the Study of Labour under the direction of Mamdani. He and the others in the Study Group found it increasingly difficult to continue their alternative intellectual work within the confines of the university. After years of isolation and often petty bureaucratic harassment within the university, in 1990, Mamdani resigned from the University and transformed the Study
Group into the Centre for Basic Research, an autonomous progressive centre for alternative intellectuals engaged in challenging the basic Western paradigms which have been the imitative framework for analyzing their societies. It is essential for Mamdani to examine African realities and to draw understanding from that experience (discussed more fully below).

Paradoxically, at the political moment when the post-colonial state in Uganda is more open to alternative discourse (see The Kampala Declaration on Academic Freedom, 1990), the university there continues to be locked into hegemonic Western cultural praxis. In a recent article about democracy, Mamdani states that "received theories of democracy often clash with contemporary African realities" (1992, 313). He goes on to suggest that the "Tension between theoretical assumptions and existing realities can either lead to sterile attempts to enforce textbook solutions or to rich, creative reflection" (313). He, like many others educated in the "Western tradition", has broken from the university institution to pursue his creative work in other forums.

Let us now turn to examine the way in which other Third World intellectuals are in the process of transforming or challenging the institutionalized knowledge or existing body of knowledge focusing on the social sciences. As stated, some
of this work does enter the universities but it is seldom dominant and generally takes place in associations or institutions (autonomous research centres) or formations outside the university. In addition, the examples we give are in no way exhaustive; they are meant to be illustrative of the tendencies we see in the new emergent formations within the regions of the Third World as a response to the dominance of Western paradigms.

Emergent Intellectual Formations

Before proceeding, several conceptual notions must be recalled from our discussions of intellectual formations in Chapter 1. We are concerned with emergent intellectual formations which critically challenge the dominant cultural paradigms. The distinction between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals as reviewed in Chapter 1 and discussed in Gramsci and Williams is our basic framework for examining intellectuals. In the post-colonial societies we are discussing, traditional intellectuals were those who taught the "established canons" from the West, thereby carrying out the continued mission of the colonialists. Organic intellectuals are those who attach themselves to the struggles of the community, peasants and workers, to attempt to form counter-hegemonic practices and break with the imperialist legacy within the cultural domain.
Within the Third World, there is a discernable process towards new formations of intellectuals who are actively engaged in challenging the legacy of imperialist penetration -- Western cultural hegemony. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, to confront that process often requires an alliance between shifting traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. We now want to illustrate how this emergent process works in the educational domain.

In spite of this entrenched hegemony of Western capitalist culture reflected in the dominant transplanted modes of thought and institutionalized as "the existing body of knowledge" within post-colonial societies, new formations or groupings can be traced through a range of selective intellectual responses corresponding to what Williams calls "discursive practices" or "signifying signals" (1981, 207-8). Whether or not these intellectual responses constitute a "new intellectual class" is questionable. But there is, unquestionably, an identifiable intellectual movement, comprising a network of formations, emerging within all regions of the Third World. Williams reminds us of the difficulties of analyzing formations (especially "alternative" or "oppositional" formations), as opposed to formally established institutions which have a clear corpus of characteristics (see Williams, 1981, 69-70).
This movement, though incipient and fragmented, suggests common tendencies in its search for an "authentic liberation" and a discarding of the "suffocating blanket" (Goonatilake). The new formations or groupings are also evolving concurrently with the internal break or fracture within the Western hegemony itself (evidenced in part by intense self-doubt in the West, discussed in Capra and Goonatilake). Furthermore, to arrive at a fuller understanding of these new formations, it must be emphasized that this process of intellectual transformation or restructuring is taking place on a world scale, and that these formations are part of other simultaneous though uneven processes.

The context of these new formations is a crisis in the contemporary system of world knowledge which no longer provides adequate explanations and often results in a profound intellectual impasse. Old certainties of Enlightenment have given way to intense doubting. The doubt being expressed in the global modes of thinking that have dominated all intellectual life, is resulting in a lifting of the hegemony in post-colonial societies, with a potential liberation of intellectual commitment and creative thinking. Goonatilake has written that

After nearly five centuries of cultural certainty, Europe and European civilization is in a crisis of confidence. Self-doubt has crept in. This potentially can liberate Third World scientists and intellectuals
from the oppressive hand of certainty, from the imitative science they follow. It also gives them opportunities to be creative and to attempt to solve these problems of science at the most fundamental level. (1982a, 434).

Unknown to Goonatilake, the African philosopher Paulin J. Hountondji had written just a few years earlier:

The real problem is to liberate the creativity of our people, to liberate it by giving it the means to be put effectively into practice, beginning with open inquiry and proceeding through free discussion in which the most diverse theories can be formed and rejected. When all is said and done, philosophy in the active sense of the word is at first nothing but that: a great public debate to which everybody contributes. Everything else follows -- everything, including science. (Quoted in Copans, 1985, 37).

Whether in social sciences or physical sciences, studies now abound reflecting these uncertainties. Many texts from the 1960s onward bear witness to this breakdown in intellectual consensus, especially in the social sciences. But it is important to recall the difficulties that this incipient knowledge of resistance has had in challenging the deeply entrenched institutionalized knowledge. The entire form of organization of knowledge production and reproduction within the universities as disciplines, departments, associations, journals, scholarly classifications and so on, cannot easily be dislodged. Williams discusses universities as "privileged cultural institutions" which "can be seen as indispensable instruments of production of the ideas and practices of an
authoritative order, . . . even when . . . they include minority elements of dissent or opposition" (1981, 225). As we have demonstrated, there is a powerful connection between dominant knowledge institutionalized within the universities and then dominant, entrenched political culture that is linked to the historical processes of Western imperialism. Pertinent to our analysis or inquiry is whether the "civilization project of the West" (Abdel-Malek's term) or "the global political project" (Amin's term) has reached an impasse.

It is within such an historical conjuncture or impasse that new formations emerge or may be signalled by what Williams calls "pre-emergent" formations in the process towards transformation or breakthrough, although they are not to be taken as mechanical linear developments. There is a fluidity, perhaps best captured in the notion of discontinuities, to these intellectual groupings through processes such that intellectuals contribute to the precursor emergence and then may develop as emergent intellectuals themselves or even return to the role of "traditional" intellectuals.

For our analysis of the processes towards new intellectual formations, several critical studies by Third World academics or "traditional intellectuals" can be cited.
as important precursors or pre-emergent indicators. Recalling that "The transmission of formal packages of knowledge through the curriculum of universities is through the content matter of individual disciplines" (Goonatilake, 1982, 189), these studies critique the foundations or origins of each discipline to demonstrate the "intimate connection" between social and economic circumstances in the West and prevailing paradigms within each discipline. These studies systematically link the institutionalized knowledge or dominant knowledge in the disciplines of the social sciences to the ideologies of colonialism or imperialism thereby challenging the basis of each discipline. Goonatilake has done extensive deconstruction to illustrate the inappropriateness of the basic tenets in the fields of sociology, economics and anthropology (Ibid, 196-213).

Similarly, Talal Asad has edited a series of essays in Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter which unmask anthropology's historical links to imperialism and the colonialists' agenda. The Ugandan intellectual, Yolamu Barongo in Political Science in Africa: A Critical Review, and the Nigerian Claude Ake in Political Science as Imperialism, both provide a wealth of evidence to denude political science and to link its original theories to the imperialist mission. The Egyptian economist, Samir Amin, has taken on economics, particularly "development economics" in much the same way as
the Turkish economist, Ayse Trak; and the South African, Archie Mafeje, queried sociology in his article "The New Sociology, Strictly for Europeans". Many other texts provide this systematic critique of institutionalized knowledge systems that are intimately tied to hegemonic Western cultural processes.¹⁰

What unites these intellectuals to the new movement is their rejection of much of the last three decades of conceptualization and their common intellectual quest to be freed from the inherited methodological paradigms and thematic concerns of dominant Western and more recently American social sciences. Various other texts which critique each of the disciplines of the social sciences began to emerge around the 1960s (see also Ganguli, Alvarezes and Stavenhagen among others). Scepticism about the epistemological foundations of our so-called "universal knowledge systems", instituted into the world university and scholarly system between about 1850 and 1960, has grown enormously since that time.

Much of this fundamental questioning is rooted in the awareness that the dominant institutionalized knowledge is an excluding knowledge, based on an exclusive experience and yet presents itself as universal. Consequently, the most interesting challenges are coming from "peoples" who observed
their absence, their exclusion from the dominant knowledge system: peoples of post-colonial societies. Or if they were present, they were there as a construct or invention of the West, boxed within the paradigms of the Western hegemonic discourse.

Mamdani illustrates the paradoxical problems of confronting dominant Western paradigms in his short piece "A Glimpse at African Studies, Made in USA" (1990, 7-11). He traces the way Africanists -- those based in the USA studying Africa but he could also be describing those in Africa who work uncritically within the framework of Western paradigms -- have liberally borrowed paradigms from Comparative Studies shifting from the language of "modernization", "nation-building", "tribalism" and even "ethnicity" to that of "dependencia" and more recently the "paradigm structures around the polarity state vs civil society". He asserts that "No matter what its merits, at its inception the paradigm is an attempt to read reality . . . reality is read from the paradigm" (8, my emphasis). At the heart of the problem for Mamdani is the distance of the Africanists from African reality, from the real struggles of real social forces on the continent. But those same paradigms dominate the disciplines within the African universities themselves. It is what Goonatilake describes as "intellectual mapping from the centres of dominance" (1982, 215) that must be challenged.
Elaborating the New Formations

Critical studies similar to those described above continue to be produced and contribute to the process of intellectual transformation which can be characterized more concretely under four broad tendencies in which representative Third World emergent intellectuals constituting "new formations" can be identified. These tendencies are in no way exhaustive but rather are grouped as illustrative of the general transformative processes that I am suggesting. Unlike the precursors of "traditional intellectuals" described earlier, most of these emergent or organic intellectuals, though often educated in Western schools and imbibed with Western culture, do not carry out their "discursive practices" within the universities; they are more actively tied to their societies, often "attached to and serving a social class" (in most cases the peasants and growing urban working class). Yet, it is important to point out that there is often an "alliance" (as Gramsci advocates in Prison Notebooks, 330 and 418) between those traditional intellectuals in the universities and these "organic intellectuals" seen as a necessary process to change or transform institutionalized knowledge. The consequence of their "oppositional" as opposed to "alternative" praxis has often been exile (for example, Ngugi and Goonatilake are now in exile) and even assassination (in the case of the Guyanese intellectual Walter Rodney).
The four dominant intellectual tendencies in the process of emergent formations can be described as follows.

1. A fundamental questioning of Western rationality and the central tenets of Western philosophy. All of these intellectuals -- Pathé Diagne, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, Ashis Nandy, Mamdani, Goonatilake, Chatterjee and so on -- understand that dominant Western paradigms transplanted to their societies as rooted in imperialism, have distorted and falsified interpretations of knowledge. As well they identify overt racism in the works of most social thinkers on which Western philosophical thought and culture are based. For example, Hume and Hegel are singled out for fierce attack by Ngugi and Goonatilake, most likely unknown to each other.

2. A re-interpretation of the history of the indigenous peoples (the colonized) and revalidating their cultural praxis. Two prominent examples are Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa and Goonatilake's Aborted Discovery. Additional specific examples include the rewriting of Mau Mau history (see Kanogo's Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau) and other anti-colonial struggles from the perspective of the subjugated peoples; the Sub-altern Studies in India, especially the texts of Ranajit Guha, Romila Thapar and Partha Chatterjee; the fiction writing of Ngugi, especially Petals of
Blood, and other writers; and the restoration of the ancient kingdoms, in political praxis (see the discussion of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in Chapter 4 below). Much of this intellectual work also serves as a force to re-interpret the dominant view of the colonizer's historical narratives.

3. A search to unearth marginalized or ignored forms of conceptualization and indigenous systems of thought. This work involves validating indigenous systems of knowledge but not as artefacts or constructs of the West's view or an "Orientalism" in the sense of Said. The works of Nandy, Diagne, and Goonatilake can again be cited as contributors to this tendency. We shall also discuss this tendency in the political discourse of Yoweri Museveni in Chapter 4. Cheikh Anta Diop, Paulin Hountondjii, V. Mudimbe and Amilcar Cabral have all contributed to asserting indigenous knowledge systems as a challenge to the dominant discourse.

4. An advocation, after a long process of intellectual angst, of "total disengagement" from the Western knowledge system, intellectually and practically. Ngugi in Decolonising the Mind abandons writing in English, the Western imperialist's cultural tool; and Samir Amin in Delinking and Eurocentrism advocates a break with the Western capitalist culture if Third World societies are ever to liberate themselves, economically, politically and culturally. Other intellectuals are grouped
around *Voice of the Voiceless* in Sri Lanka or linked to similar types of indigenous organizations in various post-colonial societies outside the hegemonic domain.

The four tendencies described here suggest the dominant characteristics of the emergent intellectual formations -- the counter-hegemonic processes -- in the process towards real transformation of the existing body of institutionalized knowledge. The individuals or works cited are not isolated examples but are reflective of a wider movement of intellectual activity taking place throughout the diverse regions of the Third World. The process of elaboration continues to be assisted by "traditional" intellectuals as pockets of resistance within the formal institutions where the existing body of knowledge in the social sciences is slowly being dislodged. Paradoxically, the process is also assisted by the critical tendency and the tradition of dissent which is intrinsic to Western intellectual thought itself. That accounts for some of the popularity of Marxism to most of the emergent intellectuals as it represented one of the few intellectual tendencies that was oppositional and/or alternative within the Western intellectual tendencies but was never dominant (see Goonatilake, *Crippled Minds*, 1982, Nandy and Alvares who reflect on this point). However, alternatives are often incorporated or coopted in order to be neutralized (Edward Said's work *Orientalism* explores this idea) and this
process results in no significant change in the dominant paradigms. To some extent much of the imitative work of Marxism has suffered this fate.

What I have attempted to delineate above is a wider, more fundamental break with the dominant modes of cultural practice which has set in process a network of new intellectual formations (though not a class in itself as "intellectuals" following Gramsci and Williams are subsumed within a class). A new philosophical basis for understanding these societies and interpreting world order -- goals of social sciences -- is gradually emerging to displace Western cultural hegemony, though it is still a process in flux and has not as yet significantly dislodged the existing body of knowledge or mainstream institutionalized knowledge. While there are not yet fully formed alternative conceptual frameworks, the current deluge of books highlighting the complex processes of how power, knowledge and culture interact attests to the shifting tendencies. See, for example, Dominating Knowledges: Development, Culture and Resistance, which raises important questions about the superiority of certain knowledge claims and epistemological issues in our struggle to know.

Within the post-colonial societies, the bridgers or transformers -- those that present the pre-emergent challenges -- who also contribute to the new formations are usually
educated in the Western traditions and are often part of the
elite that is so disconnected from its organic intellectual
roots. How then do these critical intellectuals or dissenters
break from their formation? We have attempted to analyze the
character of the responses to the constant tension or
ambiguity expressed by those who are part of the new
intellectual formations. Similarly, we have attempted above
to outline broadly what these Third World intellectuals
"signified", accomplished, or practiced in their discourses
to make them part of these "emergent formations". To deepen
our understanding of these intellectual tendencies, I now
focus on the critical thinking of a leading intellectual
within post-colonial societies, namely Susantha Goonatilake.

**Susantha Goonatilake: Transforming Knowledge**

Susantha Goonatilake, a trained engineer and sociologist,
was formerly Director of the Research Department of the
Peoples Bank in Sri Lanka. He is currently in self-exile in
New York as he fears assassination by the death squads who
threatened him and his wife because of their independent
intellectual position on human rights abuses by the
instruments of the state (army, politicians, judiciary, etc.).
Throughout the above discussion, I have referred to his
thinking, and I now want to give his texts more systematic
analysis in order to reinforce the theoretical importance of
the general problematic or argument developed in this part of
my thesis.

In addition to various published and unpublished papers
as well as several meetings and discussions with him over the
last 15 years, I interpret his point of view through his major
works, *Crippled Minds: An Exploration into Colonial Culture*
and *Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the Third
World*.

In both these texts, Goonatilake demonstrates a thorough
knowledge of the classical Western social thinkers and
analyzes the hegemonic imposition of Western intellectual
traditions on post-colonial societies in comprehensive detail.
He shows how an ideology is formed, "selectively chosen by a
process of legitimization with Europe and [what he calls] its
settler-bastions in the Americas". He demonstrates how the
ideas of the Western colonizer were often similar to that of
the so-called indigenous societies: for example, the thoughts
of David Hume and the Buddha regarding the self are similar;
the views about personal psyche as defined by Freud, Adler and
Jung are similar to those of the unconscious found in many
South Asian schools of thought (extract from paper cited in
Abdel-Malek, 1985, 2). And yet, it was only the Western
tradition that gained legitimacy or validation. He also
suggests that the recent worldwide tendencies present a challenge to the hegemonic Western situation as they are "symptomatic of a deep crisis of confidence of Western civilisation . . . a crisis in conceptualisation in both social theory and culture" (Ibid, 5 and discussed above). In order to understand his points of dissent in relation to existing Western paradigms, let us now examine in detail the main ideas contained in the two texts.

Crippled Minds

The principal thesis running through this book is that "culture emanating from the dominant metropolitan centres has spread rapidly and has today enveloped the rest of the world in a suffocating blanket" (jacket flap). Consequently the arts, drama, architecture, consumer products, life styles as well as the formal sciences of the rest of the world (in the non-metropolitan or post-colonial societies) are being rapidly delegitimized, and in their place is being substituted an essentially unitary framework for perceiving the world. The book then explores the spread of this colonial culture, its mechanics and processes.

According to Goonatilake, before the sixteenth century he world of culture had been manifold, with wide regional differences: with the onset of colonialism, the many rapidly began turning into one and the European economic hegemony
which enveloped Asia, Latin America and Africa gave rise to particular forms of colonial culture in these continents. The nature of the cultural blanket itself changed as the dominant countries moved through the stages of mercantile capitalism and industrial capitalism to today's transnational capitalism.

The book documents the respective changes in colonial culture in the three continents corresponding to the different economic phases of the metropolitan countries. It also records the responses in the colonized countries to these impositions -- the local strategies of cultural opposition or resistance as well as of collaboration. A central theme in the book is that the culture that arose in the metropolitan countries, including its sciences and technologies, is not a universal culture but a particular one. It is particular to the specific economic and social histories of the dominant countries, and therefore its culture as well as its sciences have stamped on them the mark of this particular history.

Pre-colonial History

Goonatilake focuses here, as he does elsewhere, on the problems of pre-colonial history. In most instances, dominant Western history of other societies does not recognize or accords varying importance to the existence of a pre-colonial history of any cultural significance. Goonatilake reminds us of the socio-political environment of the pre-colonial period
with its rich cultural regions of traditions going back five thousand years with constant contact with the West. He sets this in juxtaposition with the tremendous ignorance by conquerors of this vast culture. Colonial culture arises from the imposition of European-derived culture on those regions of Asia, Africa and the Americas dominated over the last five centuries. Only through understanding this legacy, and to some extent re-discovering it through re-interpretation, can the hegemonic culture of post-colonial societies be understood.

According to Goonatilake, the evolution of the European-dominated world economy began in the fifteenth century with a limited knowledge of other cultures and unparalleled racist arrogance; the first phase of colonial plunder was characterized by barbaric greed and brutality to acquire the wealth particularly of the Americas. He stresses that the internal development though similar in its processes resulted in an unequal pattern of development. He reminds us that the colonizers' culture whether British, Spanish, French or Portuguese was not static nor monolithic: social change was taking place in the form of the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution or the American Revolution. Simultaneously, during this period, philosophical concepts such as time, ego, privatization, and individuality were introduced into European thought. But racial bias was rampant among the intelligentsia at this time and can be found in the major European
philosophers (he cites David Hume's racism to substantiate his point, 1982, 75).

Paradoxically, significant elements of non-European culture went into the making of European culture (part of the expected process of "absorption" by the dominant culture). He cites examples of "literally hundreds of cultural artefacts taken from the periphery that found acceptance in the centre, to be re-transmitted later to other parts of the periphery as part of the European cultural thrust" (1982, 69). Trak (1983) also has elaborated on this intellectual process in relation to selective validation of what appears to originate in the West. More recently, Gauri Viswanathan's work, Masks of Conquest cited in Said (1993, 42), confirms the intellectual point that Goonatilake so insightfully documented. Her analysis is one example among many during the so-called "second phase of colonialism", the classic age of imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century.

It is this second phase of colonialism, according to Goonatilake and echoed by many other emergent intellectuals, that is the most significant in understanding the hegemonic hold on institutionalized knowledge that carries through to today. This phase

included an attempt to spread not only Christianity . . . but also western values through the education of the ruling strata in English, as method of cultural
control. The curriculum and formal education now became the major carriers of cultural colonisation in the new economic relationship that required educated service classes in the form of functionaries and clerks to man the colonial apparatus. (1982, 90-91).

As discussed earlier, it was in this context that most universities were founded in colonial societies. The university was introduced "almost in complete defiance of the existing social order regulating the everyday life of an ancient people" (Trivedi quoted in Goonatilake, 1982, 93). The main function, for example of the Indian university, was considered to be a transmission of Western knowledge. Any attempt to include an essentially Indian viewpoint was rejected for it was believed that "the promotion of local culture would be a retrograde step" (1982, 93). According to Goonatilake, various attempts to redefine (Curzon, for example) or to modify the declared policy to create universities in the image of the West have not changed the dominance or prestige of Western disciplines. "The Indian university today remains largely a transplantation of western curricula specially in the sciences and philosophy" (1982, 93).

The Elite or Middle Classes

Goonatilake emphasizes that a key element in the absorption and transmission of neo-colonial culture, which is in fact what characterizes post-colonial societies, is understandably the middle classes or the elite of these
countries. He points out that it is largely a "service" middle class and not a bourgeois class in the strict sense of industrial capitalism. Entry was controlled largely by access to Western education. He notes that the conditions initially were not conducive to the middle class becoming a "critical" intelligentsia. Formal learning and knowledge acquisition of a mimicking kind produced a very superficial Westernization, "with no relation to organic life". Such an intellectual, "being a creation of a mimicked education with a desire for social mobility through education, has generally little need for an intrinsic intellectual or cultural orientation" (1982, 103). Knowledge in the post-colonial societies is reduced to a formal ritual. As it is transplanted and imitative, it is always fragmented and often outdated when used in the post-colonial society. The dependent intellectual therefore often "forages in a superficial manner in search of legitimization and gamesmanship" (1982, 105); gamesmanship because of a lack of attachment to any deeply believed set of intellectual values and traditions. Although attempts at some "critical breakthroughs" have begun, this is not the usual or dominant pattern. The questioning tradition in Western sociology and the uncertainty in this subject in metropole centres have assisted this process. But as yet, "no sustained independent school or paradigm" has emerged.
What we begin to discern in Goonatilake is first that the conception of pre-colonial societies as dynamic, vibrant and rich in cultural heritage is at odds with the dominant Western paradigm. Following from this, any form of indigenous knowledge was either outrightly rejected or was at the very least marginal to "legitimate" Western education. The intelligentsia in these post-colonial societies mimics Western values, Western education and Western thinking. For Goonatilake, many of the dominant philosophers of Western societies are part of a racist legacy; their thinking evolves from socio-economic and historical circumstances well-known but in need of re-interpretation from the perspective of the colonized. Such a process has worked essentially to distance Goonatilake from major Western social thought which is still dominated by Judeo-Christian beliefs and concepts.

He points out that Marxism, for example, was never an acceptable part of a Western dominant paradigm and cites the difficulties in having Marxism as a legitimate part of social sciences. He is quick to remind us that "classical Marxism (that is the Marxism of Marx and even the derivative of Lenin) is highly Eurocentric". Interestingly, however, he acknowledges that throughout his work and especially in Crippled Minds, he is able to remove the particularistic European orientation from Marxism in order to use Marxist tools to study the dynamics of non-European societies (323).
Goonatilake uses two approaches to dissent from the supremacy of Western philosophers or philosophy. First, as mentioned earlier, he systematically identifies points of similarity between Western thinkers and ancient non-European ideas. Clearly, he is not the only intellectual to do this, but this section of our chapter is examining his work for tendencies that are part of a worldwide intellectual movement of restructuring. By so doing, he demonstrates how non-European philosophers or thinking has been discarded or ignored even when it is similar or essentially congruent with Western philosophy. Secondly, he calls upon a wealth of past literature and new studies that attest to the profound sophistication of classical thinkers of post-colonial societies, thinkers that have not been known or have been ignored in institutionalized knowledge.

Social science as taught in the universities does not acknowledge or incorporate these philosophical traditions in any systematic way. Metropolitan and colonial structures of thought are still used for perceiving reality. Consequently what we see in the mainstream social sciences as an aim or goal for post-colonial societies is the modern Western industrial complex. Whether it is Rostow's "stages of take-off" or sociology's study of "advanced societies" or anthropology's study of the "primitive", the implicit norm for
dominant social sciences that is being transferred and systematically taught as legitimate knowledge in the universities of post-colonial societies is clearly one of reinforcing the Western model of progress and growth (see also, Alvares, 7 and 216 where he describes the ideological package that infused the Western economic paradigm of Rostow).^{12}

Goonatilake finds that only the marginal tendency of Marxism presents any challenge to this dominant assumption and even within Marxism or at least recent interpretations of Marxism for determining a society's goals or economic aspirations gives prominence to what is "modern" or "industrial" and hence Western.

It is in this context that the tragedy of systems of knowledge unsuited for analyzing post-colonial societies is so clearly evident. Most post-colonial societies are agricultural societies; most of the population of post-colonial societies are "semi-peasant", "semi-proletariat" or some type of agricultural worker, constituting what might be best termed a "rural working class" (Cohen, 23). The social reality that one witnesses in the shanty-towns or in the destructive face of increased urbanization as well as in the countryside of most post-colonial societies is far from the mythical and static
traditional peasant society. Cohen suggests that "the scholars' reserve" to see and conceptualize "a new working class of considerable dimensions" (21) relates to the complexity of the phenomenon being observed. While this may be so, following Goonatilake and others (notably Mafeje in "The New Sociology: Strictly for Europeans"), the explanations may also be found in the persistence of the Eurocentric paradigms used for sociological explanations in these societies. Cohen does note that "a working class in the countryside . . . has not been adequately theorised, either politically or sociologically" (23). The conceptual norm or model continues to be a modern industrial society based on the historical development of European societies. The explanations also rest in the way in which the structures of power operate to reinforce the entrenched framework of knowledge.¹³

There rests a disjunction then between the dominant Western paradigms as reflected in the sociological concepts and the observable indigenous reality. Social and economic policies are based on analyses given by the "educated" predominantly Westernized middle classes. They have attempted to impose their solutions for the ills of these societies from the perspective of Western paradigms for over three decades. Sadly, they continue to do so even today.¹⁴ As we have illustrated above, Goonatilake's Crippled Minds is
representative of a broad range of intellectual points of challenge to that process.

Aborted Discovery

Finally, another important area of dissent for Goonatilake in relation to the dominant Western paradigm is that concerning technology and science as formal knowledge systems. Consistent with dominant Western thinking, the dominant paradigm asserts that science and technology are Western inventions; "primitive societies have no knowledge of science". Goonatilake, as would be expected, makes a major contribution in dispelling this assertion, particularly in his book Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the Third World, which "defines science as not necessarily solely coincident with the scientific practice of Europe and America today or in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the time when the scientific revolution is said to have taken root in Europe" (1). For Goonatilake, science must be thought of in the wider sense, "as the search for valid explanations of physical reality".

In this book, there is considerable overlap with the material presented in Crippled Minds, in particular his emphasis on pre-colonial history as it has been re-interpreted over the last decade or so. Goonatilake asserts that the scientific pursuit has existed throughout history, "not only
in the classical civilizations of China, South Asia and the Middle East but also in smaller social entities -- even those at a tribal level". This view takes issue with the dominant history of science which traces the development "from the Greeks, through the Romans, medieval Europeans and the Arabs, to the post-Renaissance modern Europeans". According to Goonatilake, until the colonial period, the scientific search particularly in Asia (but in other post-colonial societies as well) "yielded vast storehouses of valid knowledge. Recent research has begun to unearth these and has thus disproved the simplistic view that traces the development of science as a cumulative process within only the Western context." While the bulk of his analysis and references are taken from South Asia, he believes it is sufficient to confront the process at a worldwide level (Alvares gives examples from Africa, based primarily on Davidson's work, and Latin America, 38-45).

Goonatilake documents the existence of South Asia's own distinct science and technology, a "cumulative knowledge", prior to colonization, and how it anticipated the West at both the mundane and the theoretical level. According to Goonatilake, there was an interpenetration of science and culture at a number of levels. For example, Indian plastic surgery was initially developed to rebuild noses chopped off as a punishment, while acoustics and phonetics were developed because of the need for "correct" recitation of religious
texts. An effective smallpox vaccination existed in the pre-colonial times, and it was from India, Goonatilake claims, that the stirrup came.

Science and technology in South Asia had a sound theoretical foundation derived from a search for systems of reality that was serious, rich and sophisticated. The major Ayurvedic texts, for example, contained large stores of codified knowledge based on a thoroughgoing scientific discipline with a realistic approach to nature. In Aborted Discovery, Goonatilake details the way in which Western imperialism manifested itself from the 18th century on, by intellectually devaluing and delegitimizing South Asia's own science and technology. We also learn that Europe's Industrial Revolution had been fuelled by "borrowing" from non-Western science and technology, although never clearly identified as such. "The new hegemonic scientific culture that emerged spread to the rest of the world, and soon it was virtually declared legitimate and necessary for non-European countries . . . Large amounts of valid, relevant knowledge in non-European regions became delegitimised" (1982a, 429).

What we discover once again in Goonatilake's systematic and detailed analyses is not simply the cultural bias of the historiography of science but also the way in which the process of undermining was aided by scientists in India and
elsewhere who collaborated just as they do today. He does not stop simply at revisionist history which attempts to transfer scientific recognition from the West to the Third World. Rather, he stresses the need to legitimize Western knowledge in terms of past South Asian knowledge. He asks: "What are the possibilities of finding alternatives that would allow Third World civilisations once again to enter the stream of advancing knowledge?" (1985, 149).

Recent Works

Goonatilake's more recent works include Technology Independence: The Asian Experience (1993) and Evolution of Information: Lineages in Gene, Culture and Artefact (1991). Both these texts continue to stress the ways in which technologies have been deeply embedded in social and cultural history. Building on his earlier research, Goonatilake has also brought to light the research program of a network of younger Indian scientists, for example, who are engaged in the "most promising and potentially fruitful attempts at bringing in inflows into current Western disciplinary impasses" (1992b, 258). He continues to assert that "the spread of (European) knowledge as the only legitimised one across the globe . . . has also meant that curtailment of earlier knowledge traditions in many parts of the world. In
the course of the spread of modern science, he suggests, these traditions were often de-legitimized and cognitively 'lost' to science" (Ibid, 242).

However, in the ten years since he wrote *Crippled Minds* and *Aborted Discovery*, new research programs using indigenous knowledge have gained some space, some legitimacy particularly in India but within other post-colonial societies as well. He discusses the way in which they examine the foundations of theoretical sciences from a non-Western perspective. He describes the work of the Chilean scientist, Francisco Varela and others on the 'embodied mind' as a "very good example of an appropriate and rigorous use of Eastern concepts for a Western intellectual impasse" (1992b, 259). What is quite remarkable is the "number of serious researchers with impeccable credentials in the Western tradition who have turned to (such projects) in the prime of their life" (Ibid). On the one hand, Goonatilake continues to link this process of using indigenous knowledge to the space created by the self-doubt or impasse in Western certainties. Other intellectuals whom we examined also make this link but tend to stress more overtly the power struggle over knowledges as a counter-force to Western cultural hegemony.¹⁶

On the other hand, Goonatilake believes that Western science will remain dominant and that other knowledges will
enrich and enlarge but not supplant Western science (Personal interview, November 1993). He has no illusions about the power of Western science. What is important is to unleash the creativity of Third World scientists, to unshackle them from "the intellectual captivity" or imprisonment within their own environment, to allow new discoveries by working within the regional cultures of indigenous knowledges. He continues to acknowledge the liberating tendency within the Western tradition and sees the ascendency and validation of knowledges from other cultures as related to Western impasses. At this juncture, he places value on the validation or legitimacy that knowledges from other cultures are increasingly receiving whether in their own right or as a result of self-doubt in Western systems of knowledge. He concludes by saying

Just as forest peoples possess much knowledge of plants and animals that is valid and useful, regional civilizations possess stores of elaborate knowledge on a wide variety of topics. They will be increasingly opened up, foraged for valid uses and what is worthwhile, opportunistically used. The operative word should be 'opportunistically', to guard against a mere romantic and reactionary return to assumed past golden ages of civilizations. (1992a, 260).

While Goonatilake takes a realistic view of the power of Western science, he still remains hopeful that other knowledge bases will impact on the possibilities of breakthroughs and creativity. However, it is important to point out that Western
researchers usually lack this indigenous knowledge and seldom have access to it, as they usually do not speak local languages and have limited experiential knowledge which is gained when you live within the day to day practice of a culture.

Conclusion

By focusing on the dissenting ideas of one post-colonial intellectual, namely Susantha Goonatilake, we have attempted to underscore the formative stage of fracturing in the hegemonic dominance of Western institutionalized knowledge that is taking place in post-colonial societies. Goonatilake's work demonstrates the various critical intellectual tendencies that are emerging as a challenge to the "suffocating blanket" of Western dominance. These tendencies have not yet crystallized into a school or identifiable body of thought which we could neatly classify; often intellectuals from different regions unknown to each other express similar points of dissent to the dominant paradigm. What we suggest is that there is a common groping among intellectuals and researchers in or from post-colonial societies, searching in the same broad directions to break out of the dependent and imitative patterns of thinking that continue to form the main body of institutionalized knowledge in the universities. It is this search for a redefinition
which forms part of a worldwide restructuring of modes of thinking. Are new conceptual initiatives possible?

Goonatilake suggests that Third World intellectuals whether in Africa, Asia or Latin America "are imprisoned within a set of paradigms that are established elsewhere, a system of legitimation and reward that is determined elsewhere, and a system of science which is by nature imitative and noncreative" (1982a, 433). Breaking out of this imprisonment implies for Goonatilake "a rejection of the preemptive perceptions of the handed-down Western tradition . . . and a reconnection with the valid inquiries of the hitherto ignored heritage of . . . scientific and intellectual knowledge" (1992b, 263) within their societies. He also suggests that this process is assisted by the expressions of doubt -- "lifting of certainty" -- within Western thought itself.

Fundamental to Goonatilake's dissent is an understanding of the vast knowledge in pre-colonial history. However, this is only a first step in altering one's perceptions on "legitimized knowledge". He does not wish to suggest a simplistic substitute or exchange of Western for Asian or African or Latin American. His words "aborted" and "crippled" are suggestive of the detachment from indigenous organic knowledge that has taken place, particularly from the 19th
century on. In the search for reconnection, he considers and rejects complete disengagement from Western systems of thought. Similarly, he differentiates earlier nationalist thinkers who wanted a syncretic amalgam of 'East' and 'West' from the new critical literature, the new awareness which is rooted in a thorough "historical perception of the structural links between the two (cultures) in order to overcome them by social and cultural measures" (1985, 151).

Goonatilake describes alternative social structures of sciences that are emerging, processes of social detachment and reattachment, new orientations, means of rearranging the given patterns, and "how patterns of enquiry from the vast store of the non-European past could be integrated into new creative scientific endeavours" (1985, 166). We see in his work, and the wide range of others from the three regions, a body of critical works in which a new discourse is taking place.

The premise of this chapter has been that universities in post-colonial societies, especially in their dominant institutionalized knowledge and their curricula within their various disciplines, are imitative and stifling of creativity for post-colonial intellectuals. They are primarily transplanted dominant modes of Western thought and knowledge systems. We examined in a general way how this cultural hegemony was implanted within the universities over centuries
of imperialist plunder, but particularly during the colonial period, and thereby de-legitimized or marginalized indigenous knowledge. Tracing the evolution of the challenges or forms of resistance to this institutionalized knowledge through selected identifiable texts lead us to suggest that there is an incipient network or formation of emergent intellectuals scattered within post-colonial societies evolving new knowledge systems. However, this intellectual work has yet to dislodge the basic canons of institutionalized knowledge. Instead, these challenges are taking place at independent research centres or groupings of intellectuals outside the universities. We concluded the chapter by examining more closely the texts of Susantha Goonatilake, an emergent intellectual attempting to resist the stifling effect of hegemonic Western cultural traditions. Where Goonatilake stands in the whole process of emergent formations and challenges to the hegemony will be analyzed in the final chapter as we view the three discourses together. We now want to turn to our second area of discourse that serves as a challenge to Western cultural hegemony: narrative art, especially in the form of fiction writing and, particularly in the works of the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o.
ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Memmi, particularly "Mythical Portrait of the Colonized" (79-89), as well as Goonatilake and Carnoy or the novel The Mimic Men by Naipaul for an expansion of this idea.

2. There were earlier intellectual efforts but their influence or presence within the university curricula was minimal. When it did begin to enter, it anticipated the work of Gayatri Chakvavorty Spivak and other writers concerned with the problem of cultural representation in the contemporary post-modern literature.

3. In many cases, however, they were directly involved. See Alvares (7) where he notes that "American experts sat on committees to formulate the First Indian Five Year Plan", as one of many such examples that continue up to today.

4. My translation: "Individuals, 'selected' for assimilation, in order to fill the role of the social models, turned against their 'benefactors' and used the acquired language to testify against the colonizer in favour of the masses for whom they had come to have only contempt".

5. "The underlying assumption of this general perspective . . . is that there is a world order of knowledge paralleling the world economic order" (Goonatilake, 1982a, 416). "The key point in the creation of a colonial [or neo-colonial] structure of knowledge was the emergence, in the sixteenth century, of the European-dominated colonial world" (417). "Eurocentrism has, in varying degrees, permeated all social science disciplines" and "grew out of the historical process of western colonial and economic dominance" (Joseph, 1).

6. The work of Lokayan in India also a forum of intellectuals and political activists could have served to illustrate the point we are asserting. It was established in the early 1970s at the same time as a host of other disaffected intellectuals in all regions of the post-colonial societies sought to establish alternative forums. See their publication, the Lokayan Bulletin.

7. Another important tendency recognizing the nature of the intellectual impasse termed "a massive worldwide drifting" (quoted from the pamphlet of the Fernand Braudel Centre, October 1993) is to be found with Wallerstein and several
other leading intellectuals connected with the Braudel Centre who have established the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Similar to Goonatilake and many of the post-colonial intellectuals, they recognize "that the present structure of the social sciences creates unreasonable blocks to intellectuals development and the consequent need for some restructuring".

While our study does not focus on their work or that of Western intellectuals challenging the dominant paradigms, it is significant to note their contribution. Their claims, however, to a "worldwide" intellectual restructuring might be questioned. Again, coming from the centre, we see this appropriation of the "worldwide terrain" and are reminded of the problem of "universalising" addressed by Williams, Said and others. Said states that "what has never taken place is an epistemological critique of the connection between a historicism which has expanded and developed enough to include antithetical attitudes such as ideologies of western imperialism and critiques of imperialism . . . and the actual practice of imperialism" (1985, 11).

8. This point is well-documented in Goonatilake's Crippled Minds, which refers to such works as Morris Kline, Mathematics, The Loss of Certainty (Oxford University Press, 1980) and a host of other texts.

9. By "intellectual consensus", I am not implying that there were no debates or various schools within the social sciences. However, the overall context for these debates was a predominance of Western paradigms which draw their origins from the Western, European political and social theorists and their experience. Even Marxism, which has never been a dominant paradigm, is rooted in Eurocentric thinking of Hegelian thought. See also, U. Kalpagam's review of Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance in which she states that "We can do nothing but agree with Hegel that history has decided irrevocably in favour of the Western world to provide the context and categories for exploring all other traditions of thoughts" (Economic and Political Weekly, 16-23 May 1992, 1070).

10. Said in "Orientalism Reconsidered" (especially, 13-14) and in Culture and Imperialism refers extensively to these intellectuals and their texts.

11. And it is here that we witness a parallel experience of women intellectuals, among "peoples" who read their absence, along with aboriginals, the disadvantaged and the marginalized poor. Feminist discourse which addresses women's discovery of their suppressed creativity can be found in Tillie Olsen's Silences and the works of Adrienne Rich. Similarly the notion
that women possess a creativity stifled by patriarchy can be found in the works of Mary Daly Gyn-Ecology and Andrea Dworkin Women Hating among others. There is a parallel struggle of emergent intellectuals in Third World societies and women: both have been historically excluded from the dominant discourses and their emancipation relates to inserting their experience in reinterpretations of history. See also the work of Harding.

12. Several of the papers summarized in Abdel-Malek (1985) as well as the essays in Schuurman support this assertion.

13. The article "Democratising the Terms of Discourse" is one of the most insightful analyses of how the paradigms continue to be used in the post-colonial period.

14. See my discussion in Chapter 4, especially concerning the paradigm embedded in structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and other neo-liberal notions which are still dominant in the institutional knowledge systems.

15. In the last decade, there has been an increased number of centres devoted to validating indigenous knowledge in all of the post-colonial regions. One of the most noted is the Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor which is linked through the Centre for International Research and Advisory Networks based in The Netherlands.

16. See Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered" (13) where he lists a number of "theoretical projects undertaken out of similar impulses as those fuelling the anti-Orientalist critique" — Hanna Batatu, Raymond Williams, Ranajit Guha (Subaltern Studies), Eqbal Ahmad, Tariq Ali, Romila Thapar, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Parth Mitter are all mentioned.
Chapter 3

NARRATIVE ART AND NGUGI: "Delinking" through Language

Any Kenyan writer worth that name can only hold to the position of Tagore vis-a-vis the centrality of our national languages in our literature. This may sound strange coming from the lips of one who has been writing novels, plays and stories in a foreign language for the last seventeen years... Believe me when I say that I often write from the depths of personal anguish... My seventeen years of writing in a foreign language has not brought us anywhere near the foundations of a true Kenyan literature for Kenyan people... I (call) on Kenyan writers to return to the sources of their beings in the languages of their peasant mothers and fathers, to thoroughly immerse themselves in the rural community life of our people, and to seek inspiration from the daily rhythms of life and problems of the peasants.

Ngugi, Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary. (182)

Introduction

The term "narrative art" is used in this chapter to cover the range of imaginative texts -- plays, novels and cultural criticism -- that have been produced, particularly in the post-colonial period, by emergent intellectuals in these societies. Fiction writing, as a production of self and collective consciousness, presents a paradoxical challenge for post-colonial writers. How do they extricate themselves from a consciousness formed and circumscribed though the process of
Western cultural penetration? The novel genre adopted by most post-colonial fiction writers is itself a "Western" tool, a tool developed outside the narrative art of these societies. Language used by the post-colonial writers that we shall discuss in this chapter is language of the former colonizers, be it English or French. What sort of challenge does this present to the emergent intellectuals?

The theoretical notions suggested by the literary and social critics, Raymond Williams, Mikhail Bakhtin and Edward Said, influence my understanding and analyses of emergent cultural processes infusing narrative art.¹ The first part of this chapter explores the responses of selected post-colonial writers to Western cultural hegemony and focuses on the debates about the choice of language, the novel form and the resistance texts, as well as other aspects that are seen as vital in the liberating process for those engaged in the practice of narrative art. How do post-colonial fiction writers as emergent intellectuals break with -- or reconcile their resistance to -- this worldwide hegemonic cultural hold? While the processes and trends that we illustrate pertain to most emergent post-colonial fiction writing, our emphasis will be on the narrative art of selected African, Asian and Caribbean writers.
The second part of the chapter will look more closely at the work of one post-colonial writer, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, to illustrate the discursive practice of writing as a complex process for confronting "a hegemony in the fibres of the self" (Williams 1977, 212) and affirming an alternative cultural vision. Similar to our explorations of the thinking of Susantha Goonatilake, we shall examine Ngugi's evolution not in an individualistic sense but as illustrative of the multiple processes in the collective consciousness rooted in the resistance imagination. Like Cocks and Mohanty, we view the continuous struggle against the hegemonic, which in narrative art is often illustrated through the discourse of the text, as shaping a resistance or oppositional imagination.

While there are wide differences in the experiences and writings of post-colonial writers of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, they share the common context of resistance to what Salman Rushdie describes as the "descending heel" (1987, 12). Rushdie writes that

those of us who did not have our origins in the countries of the mighty West, or North, had something in common -- not, certainly, anything as simplistic as a unified 'third world' outlook, but at least some knowledge of what weakness was like, some awareness of the view from underneath, and of how it felt to be there, on the bottom, looking up at the descending heel.
This then is the context for the representative narratives of "subject peoples" emerging from the imperial fold, resistance narratives which respond to Western cultural dominance.

Narrative art, as story telling, is an important tool in the liberation quest to decolonize the saturated consciousness. "The construction of a text disrupting imperialism's authorized version was begun long ago within the political and intellectual cultures of colonial liberation movements" (Parry, 27). The counter-discourses found in post-colonial writing assert another identity, another reality and another history, shifting and challenging the imperial version. Paradoxically, post-colonial emergent discourses contain aspects of the narrative image of the hegemonic experience that the colonial or even neo-colonial discourse does not. As the Filipino literary critic, Epifanio San Juan stated:

The process of "reading" Western hegemony generates its complementary act of "writing" by the subjugated native as creative reappropriation, a reorientation of old forms given new content or substance by this catastrophe of bondage, witness to transgression and deliverance. These two dimensions of cultural interaction are integral parts of the Third World experience, polarities of one historical event. (1992, x, emphasis added)

What we witness in most post-colonial narratives is that their imaginative expressions even while resisting the hegemony invariably represent its image. As we shall illustrate from
the work of Ngugi, the complexity of the liberation process as revealed through writing resistance texts necessitates some construction of that hegemonic "other". Implied in this interactive process is a contextual location situating narrative art within actual societies, which we now want to discuss.

Literature in Society

It is important to examine the role that narrative art plays in the struggle between resistance and hegemony in post-colonial societies. Before situating that role, some conception of literature must be elaborated, particularly that conception as seen by writers within the ideological struggles which have been influenced to a large extent, quite understandably, by the Marxist tradition. Early writers and even more recent writers acknowledge that there is no uniformly agreed upon conception even within the Marxist tradition for whom the question of resistance is central. Most post-colonial writers agree that literature is not some "privileged set of texts which exemplify a universal and eternal aesthetic form of cognition" (Bennett, 15). Raymond Williams in Marxism and Literature states that literature is not a concept but rather a cultural practice within a specific and historical context, one cultural practice among many (1977, 45, 206-212). Eagleton in Literary Theory: An
Introduction suggests that literature is distinguished by its use of language in particular ways, those particular ways suggestive of ideology and power (1983, 22). Bakhtin, especially in his essay "Discourses in the Novel", takes this notion further in defining the novel as "speaking person and his (sic) discourses", "a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized", so literature as languages as active practical consciousness, suggestive of ideological worldviews (Holquist, 259-359, 262).

Literature functions as a process of articulating ways of seeing oneself within a societal context; it is essentially part of one's cultural expression. In the context of post-colonial writers where the struggle is to liberate oneself from the colonial and neo-colonial hegemonic grip, the narrative texts of several post-colonial writers illustrate this process through what Bakhtin analyzes as "dialogic tension between two languages and two belief systems" (314). At work in the process is the discourse of liberation from a structured coherent colonial context. Literature in this context of resistance to Western cultural hegemony takes sides; it cannot be objective in the sense of outside the struggle. Third World writers belong to a particular class, race, gender and historical experience. They are born in a real political/historical context and their texts are a product of actual social processes.
As the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano stated at the 1981 Toronto Congress of the Writer and Human Rights: "We were not born on the moon. By that I mean we don't live in the seventh heaven. We come from a tormented part of the globe, and we are living in an historical period that hits us quite hard" (Galeano, 14). Echoing a viewpoint common among many post-colonial writers, he went on to say: "I do not share the view of those who claim for the writer a kind of privileged freedom, a sort of sacred status in society, unconnected with the freedom of other workers" (15).

However, we are not asserting here "that all Third World texts are necessarily this or that" (Ahmad, 105). Unlike Jameson, who has a category "Third World literature", and Said, who uses the historical divide for post-colonial writers, we tend to agree more with the nuances introduced by Ahmad. Our focus is on those post-colonial writers whose cultural practice as an emancipatory process begins to signal a rupture or a break in the hegemonic cultural hold.

These are the writers who, like other emergent intellectuals of post-colonial societies, face severe consequences as their cultural practice is regarded by the authorities as subversive. For them, the debate about context, location and migrancy takes on added immediacy and meaning. Many of the post-colonial writers we are dealing with, those
that are part of the discourse of emergent intellectuals, live in exile, either for political reasons (facing censorship or imprisonment) or for economic reasons (not able to get published or to make a living). Some writers go to other countries but remain within their regions. For example, the Kenyan female writer, Tsitsi Dangarembga, living in Zimbabwe relates how her mother advised her not to romanticize home where she has been jailed and censored. By remaining within the African region, she speaks about learning to create new homes through her imagination due to the interconnectedness of her struggle with global emancipation (Summarized from CBC Radio program, 29 May 1994). The Nigerian writer, Buchi Emecheta, has faced this predicament by living half the year in Nigeria and the other half in England. The Somalian writer, Nuruddin Farah, discusses why he lives mainly in Africa in his interview with Maya Jaggi published in 1989 in Third World Quarterly.

If I am living in Africa (but exiled from Somalia) ... I suffer the same troubles, the same food shortages, the same power cuts ... . In fiction you do not need to have experienced a place or a time first-hand in order to write about it ... . But you have to know what to re-create, and the experience of Africa helps me consolidate my knowledge of the situation. (187)

Farah, like many other writers, does not view his physical absence as exile. According to him, he is "not the one who is in exile; it is the leaderships, the dictators of Africa that
are in exile" (183) as they are the ones disconnected from the struggles of their people.

Writers from the Caribbean and Central America face this sense of place with varying anguish and turmoil. The Salvadorean writer, Manlio Argüeta, who writes powerful novels of military brutality and peasant resistance, has lived for over a decade exiled in Costa Rica. Two well-known Caribbean writers, Derek Walcott and George Lamming, both commute between "metropolitan centres" and the Caribbean. Walcott is more permanently based in the U.S. yet works from what he describes as the imaginative landscape of Caribbean. For him, that is the "imaginary map following the contour of memory" (Montreal Reading, 23 September 1985). He has never viewed himself as an "exile" in the political sense as he is able to return to the Caribbean when he chooses. However, Walcott has frequently written about an aspect of this difficulty of place, homelessness and wandering (see especially his poems in The Gulf and The Fortunate Traveller).

Like many other post-colonial writers, especially from the more tormented countries of Africa and Asia, Ngugi has lived in forced exile since his year of imprisonment. As we shall discuss in the second part of this chapter, it was his involvement in popular-based community theatre in the Kenyan villages and his work in a language (Gikuyu) and imagery
understood by ordinary peasants that resulted in his imprisonment. Emergent intellectuals who directly link their cultural practice as an emancipatory process confront this situation again and again.

The struggle of most emergent post-colonial writers with the hegemony means a struggle with the context of their oppressive society as a legacy of colonial impositions, such that their cultural practice of writing often forces them paradoxically to be removed from that setting. The texts they create usually challenge the authoritative version and assert an alternative definition of themselves. Years of hegemonic penetration has attempted to displace the awareness of self, the sense of history, the configuration of ways of being. Writing becomes an important process towards a counter-hegemonic force. As Ngugi reminds us in Decolonising the Mind, Europe has stolen "the treasures of the mind" (1986, xii). Literature becomes an active struggle for a new consciousness through re-presenting and recasting lost histories. One of the most difficult dilemmas faced by most post-colonial writers, who in the sense of Gramsci can be seen as the vanguard of the necessary intellectual stratum for establishing counter-hegemonies, is the language they write in and its connection to their society.
Choosing Language

The issue of language choice for post-colonial writers of narrative art throughout Asia, Africa and the Caribbean was levels of complexity that have haunted them since the first stirring of their expressions in imaginative texts. Culture expressed through the imposition of the colonizer's language was used in each of these regions, whether in the educational system, as we have examined in the previous chapter, or in national formal spheres of the state. That situation still persists. And yet in the daily experience of the peasants or in what we might describe as the early intimate personal sphere (the imaginative territory experienced by subjugated peoples) of the educated elite, the indigenous language was present as a lingua franca, a daily living experience. That consciousness, that identity, that lived reality was subjected to a variety of assaults: punishment for speaking an indigenous language, inculcation of the so-called superior writers of the "Western tradition", and devaluation of those personal lived practices associated with indigenous culture. Consequently the responses by post-colonial writers to the hegemonic imperial language within the discourse of narrative art have a complexity and range throughout each of the regions which we shall now summarize as it also relates to their cultural identity.
There were important debates about language during the anti-colonial period leading to independence and then immediately after independence often tied up with notions of nationalism and culture itself. Use of the metropolitan languages — English, French or Portuguese — went hand and hand with the elite nationalism of this stage. Not that there was an absence of other imaginative writings in regional languages. There were indigenous language writers whose works either were pushed aside or entered the discourse simply as "folkloric" or "artifacts". Here I am thinking of the works in Yoruba and Swahili as well as the vast works of imaginative writings published in Hindi, Urdu, Bengali and other regional languages. Ngugi drew attention to this contradiction when, during a Conference of African Writers in the early 1960s held in Kampala, Uganda, he noted that those who wrote in African languages had been excluded (1986, 5-6).

During the post-colonial period that we are examining, the political contest over use of the colonizers' language appears to have become even more intense. "The language debate . . . seems to rage with unabated strength, and the support for writing in indigenous languages has if, anything, become stronger" (Petersen, 16). From a reading of the debates in each of the regions, it parallels both the recognition of continued imperial cultural hegemony manifested in a different form in spite of nominal independence and the quest for
authentic liberation from this continued "hegemonic hold". Ngugi's position, which we shall discuss more closely in the second section of this chapter, is to reject writing in the imperialist language (in his case English) and to reconnect with that intimate indigenous language (in his case Gikuyu).

Other writers, while concurring with Ngugi's ultimate goal of liberation, continue to write in English and are not dissuaded from the essential task of using literature to expose the "rotten underbelly of a society" (Soyinka quoted in Petersen, 19) as well as believing in their power to influence. In confronting the legacy of colonialism and describing himself as an engaged writer, Soyinka dismisses language as the criterion of classification. Instead he asserts the importance of "self-liberation" through the cultural experiences specific to daily locality (1978, 64-67).

Caribbean writers, too, though they have lost their ancestral language, are faced with intense debates about language. One of the classic debates in the Caribbean is reflected in the opposing positions asserted by Lamming and Naipaul, whose texts span the anti-colonial period up to the present with an interesting evolution regarding language reflected in their texts. Although Naipaul's early narrative novels (10 works from 1960s to 1970s) parody language use, he later crossed over to embrace the "British" language and to
affirm his belief that the Caribbean has no culture. Lamming, however, finds the Caribbean has a vibrant culture and language, especially in patois or Creole, which is eminently suited for novel writing. From his earliest texts (1953), Lamming demonstrates his argument for the use of Creole, the authentic Caribbean culture which needs to be affirmed through writing in the language of the people.

Another Caribbean writer, the Guyanese Wilson Harris, argues that

a current may be invoked in the fabric of the imagination that runs much deeper than the language of the so-called imperialist exploiter by which so-called subject peoples have been conditioned . . . . I am not at all engaged in a politics of protest against the language of the so-called imperialist master. History within my mixed antecedents, across conflicting generations, has brought the supreme blessing of a language I genuinely love. A living language is a medium for which one must be profoundly grateful. English, in which I write my novels, is my native language not because of historical imposition or accident but because of numinous proportions that sustain originality within a living text. I do not believe any area of the world is historyless or a product of absolute historical accident. There are complex flaws in all cultures that led to the breakdown of homogeneous societies on every continent. . . . They give to the imagination a memory that seems to belong to the future, as though the genesis of the imagination is ceaselessly unfinished. (1990, 176)

Counterpoising this position of Harris, and moving to the region of Asia, the Filipino writer, San Juan writes that "the question of language -- of replacing English with a 'national' language -- appears today as the most crucial site of cultural-political struggle in the Philippines" (1992, 5). He
also discusses how writers of narrative art in the Philippines constantly struggled with the inculcation of Western cultural hegemony through the English language. Confronted by a long history of American occupation and colonization from 1898 until the present in spite of nominal independence, he cites the importance of the English language as one of the most powerful instruments used "by the United States to subjugate the Philippines" (1992, 4). In the context of the Philippines, the debate about an authentic indigenous national language has been favoured as a means not only of resistance but also of affirmation of "popular self-determination". This accounts for the "popularizing of 'Pilipino'" by the clandestine armed resistance movement, the New People's Army, within its liberated areas (1992, 7).

But San Juan also makes the point that beyond the relationship of domination through language, the strategy shifted to one of a relationship of exchange of services through language, thus establishing "a reciprocal commitment" to the colonizer's language. Thus, the involvement of the "subjugated peoples" over long periods of time through culture and the use of the colonizers' language (even after nominal independence and removal of the occupiers) ensured and continues to ensure their complicity in their own subordination.

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However, in examining the texts *Subversions of Desire* by Nick Joaquin or *The Laughter of My Father* and *America in the Heart* by Carlos Bulosan and other leading Filipino writers in English, San Juan recounts the "signs", the images which are indigenous in spite of the use of the colonizers' language. Whether it is the rhythm of Filipino oral storytelling or the contextualizing of the lived experience of Filipino peasants, the complexity of utterance appropriated within the language of English is transformed in the text to suggest a stage of confrontation, an oppositional motif with the hegemonic.

An examination of these debates by selected post-colonial writers from each of the regions shows the centrality of the issue of language that emergent imaginative writers continue to face. We see also the complexity and variety of responses, ranging from complete rejection of the imperial language (Ngugi and others) to intermingling or transforming the language through local use sometimes referred to as "indigenization" (Achebe, Lamming and others) to subordination of the issue of language altogether (Harris, Soyinka and others). We now want to see how these emergent writers use form and text in their narrative art when confronting Western cultural hegemony.
Form and Text

Form, text and language are not easily disentangled. However, in general, poetry and drama lend themselves more easily to writing in indigenous languages. Poetry in particular seems to be a more intimate form in which to write. Even Soyinka writes poetry in Yoruba. Some critics connect this to the roots of "orature", a term coined by the Ugandan linguist and literary critic, Pio Zirimu, and used to refer to oral traditions practiced in written literature (Ngugi, 1972, 70). Others discuss the long history of poetry that was present in pre-colonial cultures. While our emphasis is primarily on the resistance text in novel and drama form written in English, song-poems have been a form of defiance in all of the regions we are discussing. In fact, song-poems were banned by the colonialist in East Africa during the anti-colonial struggles (Ngugi, 1972, 69). In the second part of this chapter, we shall examine Ngugi's narrative art, a play, that resulted in his imprisonment by the Kenyan authorities long after nominal independence.

As mentioned earlier in the discussion on language, Soyinka believes that fiction is a form of self-liberation and must show Africa as an "authentic cultural entity" discerned through "positive apprehension" (1976, viii) or "self-apprehension of the African World" (1976, x). His major
narrative texts all written in English (Ake, The Swamp Dwellers and even the play Kongi's Harvest) are set in Western Nigeria, portraying the life of a people nearly destroyed by the onslaught of Western imperialism. His texts make extensive use of Yoruba material and form. Similarly, Chinua Achebe's texts, particularly Things Fall Apart which is set in pre-colonial Igbo society, are concerned with the cultural clash between active resistance to the processes of European imposition of capitalist structures onto a communal peasant village society. Achebe believes that the responsibility of a writer in the context of the Third World is essentially pedagogical, "to restore our past which has been devalued and debased by years of colonial domination and plunder" (1989, 49). The novel form and resistance text are integral to Achebe's emancipatory practice and quest. Most of his narrative art is engaged in restoring the African past by "representing African history". However, Achebe still wrestles with how to distance himself from Western cultural hegemony. For example, and in contrast to Ngugi, he continues to write in English but he restricts himself to attending only conferences in the African continent (Wastberg in Petersen, 20).

The narrative texts of writers in post-colonial societies portray the dialogic struggle between Western cultural hegemony and peoples' resistance as protest or as affirmation.
There are wide variations in these texts moving from regions of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. However, a careful scrutiny of selected resistance texts in the post-colonial period reveals three basic and at times overlapping tendencies in the cultural production. First, there is the restoration of the "subjugated peoples" lives as subjects, to portray their daily life struggles, to write the landscape of the indigenous people within the full backdrop of their indigenous community (Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, early Naipaul and Soyinka's *Ake*). Secondly, there are those narratives which establish an alternative version of the historical experience, which as Achebe noted "re-present" histories, which subordinate or ignore the imperial version (*Arqueta's One Day of Life*, Ngugi's *Petals of Blood* and Ousmane's *God's Bits of Wood*). Finally, there are those texts which display their resistance not through protest but through affirmation of indigenous culture, though not in any idealized sense (*Farah's From a Crooked Rib*, Mariama Bâ's *So Long a Letter* and Amadi's *Estrangement*). The South African writer, Ndebele, believes that the affirmation of one's culture ought to be the more dominant emancipatory practice for fiction writers (Peterson, 205-218). What I am suggesting are three loosely-defined categories of resistance text which place narrative art within the emergent cultural tendency. When we examine more closely the text of Ngugi's *Petals of Blood* in the second part of this
chapter, a more detailed understanding of the resistance text will be illustrated.

Narrative art can be -- and is being -- used consciously as a liberating tool toward a counter-hegemonic force reflective of true peoples' history. Regardless of whether the form is the novel, a Western "tool", or in the imperial language, what appears to emerge from most post-colonial writers in the regions of post-colonial societies is their adjustment to their texts as part of that intellectual stratum pushing societies' consciousness towards a new sense of self. The creative impulses are, in the texts mentioned above as illustrative examples, rooted in the peoples' resistance culture. Literature can and does in these texts echo the struggle to break with the imposed hegemonic processes while re-presenting and recasting lost history.

Recalling again Bakhtin's discussion of the origin of the novel, which was "powerfully affected by a very specific rupture in the history of European civilization" when imperialism brought about "international and interlingual contacts" leading to a polyglot world (Holquist, 11), the novel form and resistance text employed by post-colonial writers can be seen in a new light. Bakhtin also emphasizes that the novel is the stuff of "common folk" (20) and not "an ultimate bourgeois creation or the reproduction of that
class", as is often asserted. What is interesting for our analysis of the novel as a post-colonial tool of liberation is also Bakhtin's notion that the "novel structures itself in a zone of direct contact with developing reality" (332). He views the novel as a "diversity of social speech types . . . and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized" (262). It is this meaning of the novel form -- common utterance, polyglot, structured within dialogic tensions -- that in my view enables it to be a legitimate tool for the emancipatory practice through writing in narrative art.

These resistance texts are the products of emergent intellectuals who, in Gramsci's sense, can be seen as the vanguard of the necessary intellectual stratum for establishing the counter-hegemony; those writers who together with others serve as the leaders of a new consciousness and praxis. Their texts can serve to dislodge the institutionalized texts in the schools, the universities and other institutions. In Writers in Politics, Ngugi sets out a role for literature in these institutions that reflects the need for people to control the definition of themselves if they are going to achieve national liberation. He states: "Imperialism can never develop a people or its country . . . Cultural imperialism . . . distorts a people's vision of history and of the reality of the world around them" (1981, 37). Even for Ngugi, these novels of resistance were a
temporary historical necessity to consolidate this critical intellectual stratum.

There are, of course, contradictory variations in how post-colonial writers interpret their roles.' Neil Lazarus, in *Resistance in Post-Colonial African Literature*, while primarily tracing the evolution of the Ghanaian novelist, Ayi Kwei Armah, examines the claims made by other African writers about their role as teachers or visionaries (Soyinka and Achebe) and as political activists building solidarity with the masses (Ngugi). Writers, as emergent intellectuals, belong to a vanguard in Gramsci's sense, whether they recognize it or not. How deeply they can rupture the "saturated consciousness" through their narrative art is the continual challenge.

Bearing in mind the central notions of language, form and text that enter the discursive practices of most post-colonial writers in their narrative art, we now want to look more systematically at the work of one writer, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, in the process of formation as an emergent intellectual. How has he defined his break with Western cultural hegemony?

**Reading Ngugi wa Thiong'o**

A detailed exploration of the evolution of Ngugi wa Thiong'o's narrative art takes one on a journey from "James
Ngugi", the traditional intellectual (described in Chapter 1), carrying out his practice of writing and teaching in English, to "Ngugi", emergent intellectual, resolving his deep personal struggle by bidding "farewell to English as a vehicle for any of (his imaginative) writings." This exploration will focus on a variety of genres that constitute his narrative art: the conventional novel (both its written text and spontaneous utterances will be analyzed), his drama, and his other cultural writings. Ngugi is one of the most prolific post-colonial writers and has been studied or written about by countless literary critics. How does Ngugi in his practice of writing imaginative texts illustrate the post-colonial emergent intellectual's response to Western cultural hegemony?

Ngugi was born into a large peasant family in Limuru, Kenya, in 1938. He spoke Gikuyu as he "worked in the fields", and he took part in Gikuyu story-telling as a child (Ngugi, 1986, 10). He grew up in East Africa during the period of the anti-colonial struggles and experienced first-hand both the "humiliating experiences" of the colonial school system as well as the ultimate triumph of Kenya's independence under Kenyatta. He was educated by "traditional intellectuals" first at Makerere University College in Kampala (then affiliated with the University of London) and later at the University of Leeds. Yet, contestation with the colonial culture, an alien culture, was an integral part of Ngugi's early experience.
Living as squatters, Ngugi's family "were what the Gikuyu call ahoi, a word which connotes absolute dispossession" of their land (Gikandi, 149). One of his brothers and other relatives were actively involved in the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, popularly known as the Mau Mau, which challenged the colonialists' rule in the 1950s. So while Ngugi attended the best elite colonial schools, intended to shape his consciousness into a good "Afro-Saxon" writer, the other reality alive in his daily experience and reflected in his early narratives was that of resistance.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, at the time of the struggle for independence and immediately after, as well as being a lecturer in universities in East Africa, England and the United States, he wrote several novels published in the Heinemann African Writers Series (the most noted being, Weep Not, Child, A Grain of Wheat, The River Between and Petals of Blood) and plays (The Black Hermit and The Trial of Dedan Kimathi). During this period, the African Writers Series itself became an institution propelling African voices and narratives to intermingle with dominant Western literary texts, albeit marginally, as comparative literature or Commonwealth literature. But simultaneous to these "successes", Ngugi was continually expressing his doubts about his narrative practice, as were many other "been-tos" who had lived and worked abroad in the former colonizer's language and
institutions. As early as 1962, at a Conference of African Writers of English Expression at Makerere, Ngugi recalled the exclusion of those African writers who wrote in African languages, such as Shabaan Robert, the poet in Kiswahili and Chief Fagunwa who had written six novels in Yoruba.

For Ngugi, language is "both a means of communication and a carrier of culture" (1986, 13). He believes that "Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world" (1986, 16). Writing out of the material reality of the struggles of the Kenyan peasantry over land and their proletarianization, Ngugi was increasingly conscious of the betrayal of bourgeois nationalism, the declining standard of living of his people, and the overpowering consumerism eroding traditional values and culture. "Literature does not grow or develop in a vacuum; it is given impetus, shape, direction and even area of concern by social, political and economic forces in a particular society. The relationship between creative literature and these other forces cannot be ignored" (1982, xv).

Ngugi recognized a similar sense of uprootedness or an awareness of being outside of the dominant colonial or imperial culture in the narrative art of other post-colonial
writers during this period. George Lamming's *The Pleasures of Exile* and Orlando Patterson's *An Absence of Ruins*, Caribbean novels he discussed in *Homecoming*, both contained narratives of a quest for roots, for authentic identity which was severed through their colonial education that separated them from their communal or familial experience. The predicament, the tension of educated middle-class writers with their organic daily life experience, was often expressed in narratives of humour and irony by post-colonial writers. A classic parody found in *The Mimic Men* was V. S. Naipaul's character, Singh, a failed politician exiled in imperial London. Similarly, Ngugi was conscious, in the texts of other post-colonial writers, of their narratives as "resisting European colonialism".  

But whom was Ngugi addressing in these early narratives of resistance? To what extent was Ngugi now a "traditional intellectual" who was himself linked to the bourgeois nationalist elite, the ruling class? To what extent had this son of rural peasants betrayed his origins? Had he indeed been assimilated by the process of colonial Western education? His writings to this point, though in content about the anguish of African colonialism for the villagers, the brutalities of the anti-colonial struggles and the rural/urban pulls that confront the educated African, were all written in English in a novel format (or as drama in English) that could
be appreciated only by the bourgeois ruling class linked to Western colonial or neo-colonial culture. He recognized that his intellectual practice was inaccessible to the workers and peasants for whom he was struggling.

During the 1970s, Ngugi began a more intense search for a way out of his paradoxical situation: on the one hand, deeply committed to the liberation of his people and on the other, participating daily -- at least implicitly -- in the entrenchment of the ruling bourgeoisie through his teaching and writing in English inaccessible to the majority peasantry who lived under the hegemony of the Westernized capitalist class. Ngugi summarizes this period in the following passage:

For me, it was a decade of tremendous change: towards the end, I had ceased being a teacher and had become a student at the feet of the Kenyan peasant and workers. The result was my departure from Afro-Saxon literature in order to reconnect myself to the patriotic traditions . . . and culture rooted among the people. (1981, 2)

Here, Gramsci's notion of commitment and emotional bond (418) as discussed earlier are relevant. Ngugi like so many others who are part of this post-colonial intellectual movement became "reconnected" in the sense of becoming in praxis actively committed to the achievement of a counter-hegemonic discourse. This discourse affirmed the dignity of the peasantry as the labouring class and also reasserted the dignity of the historical past from their perspective. Consistent with Gramsci's notion of organic intellectuals is
Ngugi's rejection of the "intrinsic nature of his intellectual activities" (8) and his assessment of the importance of "the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations" (8).

The process involving the formation of organic intellectuals in post-colonial societies is complex indeed. Ngugi in his early writings had always been committed to the struggles of liberation for the peasantry. But only when he shifted from English to Gikuyu did he assert his break with the cultural hegemony which circumscribed the limits of his writing. It is important to understand the distinction between intrinsic revolutionary content resisting the imperial authority and then that which shifts to a praxis of connecting more organically with the liberation struggle. Before examining that transitional moment in Ngugi's evolution, let us examine some of the content in his early writings which attempts a resolution to the ideological conflicts he identifies.

Problems of Content

Ngugi's narrative art has always been aligned with the peasants and workers who are constantly resisting the powerful
imperialist forces. Even in Ngugi's earliest novels, Weep not, child (1964), The River Between (1965) or A Grain of Wheat (1967), where his narrative reflects the ambiguity of the struggle against the colonial culture, his writing is a vehicle for countering the years of institutional European discourses, literature which had little to do with his reality and only served to impose an alien culture, an alien way of viewing the world. His play, The Black Hermit, which was written and produced in 1962 to commemorate Uganda's independence and to celebrate "a break with the past" echoes the dilemma of independence knowing the historical legacy that colonialism had left. One of the village elders questions this independence: "Look at our country since Independence. Where is the land? Where is the food? Where are the schools for our children? . . . We are told about roads, about hospitals; but which hungry man wants a road?" (13-14). Again, in Weep Not, Child, Ngugi narrates the struggle between the two worlds shaped by colonialism and its resistance, a struggle personified in the character of Njoroge. The River Between is also a text of cultural struggle but here Ngugi's characters explore the possibility of Western cultural practices and meanings being "Africanized". The narrative unfolds around the issue of female circumcision set within the discourses of nationalism, being defined by African traditions, and colonialism, defined by their mission of "modernity" or "civilization" for Africa. Ngugi's portrayal
of these tensions at this point in his writing appears to be unresolved in his main character, Waiyaki, and his rejection of the "tribal purity" echoed by Kabonyi in The River Between. "For Waiyaki knew that not all the ways of the white man were bad. Even his religion was not essentially bad. Some good, some truth shone through" (141). Other characters, like Muthoni "had the courage to attempt a reconciliation of the many forces that wanted to control her" (142).

Understanding the imperial force as part of the African reality, Ngugi also gives us British colonial characters whose discourse often echoes the determination of their "civilizing mission". John Thompson, in A Grain of Wheat, "saw himself as a man with destiny, a man poised for great things in the future . . . enthusiastic about the British Mission in the World" (53). And in this mission, Ngugi recognizes that there were always African collaborators, reminiscent of Naipaul's "mimic men". "Here were two Africans who in dress, in speech and in intellectual power were no different from the British . . . (They) seemed proud of their British heritage and tradition" (53). Even in his quest to restore the dignity of the African self, Ngugi's image is not derived from an idealized notion. Instead, he understood the complexities born from the actual Kenya context of a predominately agricultural society of peasants devastated by colonialism which brought with it the values and practices of foreign capitalists.
However, Ngugi saw such traditional intellectuals working in the languages, the institutions and cultures of the Western hegemony, as the ultimate contradiction. In fact, traditional intellectuals even with a revolutionary critical perspective could be seen as legitimizing that hegemony by providing the basis for claiming democratic pluralism. Dissent is permitted but what becomes the outer limit? While different social-political contexts play a part, in Kenya, in 1976, it was Ngugi's shift into radical praxis -- popular grassroots dramatizations in Gikuyu predominately with women in the villages and towns as part of a peoples' movement -- that resulted in his confinement "to a dungeon in Kam-it-i maximum security prison" for over a year and his eventual exile in England where he still lives. How do we explain this transitional process within the writings of this post-colonial writer, moving as he does from resistance texts reflecting the ambiguities around nationalism to texts asserting the discourse of liberation?

Identifying the Transitional Moment

Ngugi has gradually moved from seeing the resistance text written in English as being a necessary transitional stage to assist the educated bourgeois class in restoring their dignity, to abandoning the use of English in his narrative art
all together in order to connect directly with the peasants and workers. According to Ngugi, literature, if it is to play the essential role of resistance and even cultural affirmation, must be aimed at awakening the workers and peasants, the masses who overwhelming do not speak or read English. They cannot be excluded from the debate, from the discourse of struggle toward national liberation. It was his play *Ngaahika Ndeenda* (*I Will Marry When I Want*) written in Gikuyu with and for the peasants and workers, that led to his year-long imprisonment in 1978. For Ngugi, it is precisely when writers open out African languages to the real links in the struggles of peasants and workers that they will meet their biggest challenge. For to the comprador-ruling regimes, their real enemy is an awakened peasantry and working class. A writer who tries to communicate the message of revolutionary unity and hope in the languages of the people becomes a subversive character. (1986, 30)

It is this experience that reaffirmed for Ngugi the centrality of language as the liberating tool in the resistance struggle.

Understanding this transitional moment in Ngugi’s struggle with the tentacles of Western cultural hegemony is vital to our understanding of the processes towards a break with the "suffocating blanket". Ngugi has explained that the work with the women and men of the Kamiruthu Community Education and Cultural Centre was crucial in his break with past *praxis*, especially writing novels and drama in English. He had been a writer in the English language at the university
and doing what he regarded as good work for over a decade. However, it was while working with the peasants and workers in theatre that his "perspective on many things changed in a basic way, not just in an intellectual way, that made me break with that past" (Interview with Suad Sharaboni 1988).

In Decolonising the Mind, he states that Kamiruthu "was decisive in my actual break with my past praxis, in the area of fiction and theatre" (xii). Although the process started earlier, he related that "as a result of this participation (in the theatre group), I saw a different relationship to my language and to African languages as vehicles of self-expression, reflecting a far wider experience" (Sharaboni 1988). It led to the firm belief "that only Kenyan people can develop themselves, only Kenyan people can change their situation; that no outsider will ever change the conditions for us" (Sharaboni 1988). For Ngugi, the crux of his liberating process is to cease using the English language, the language of the imperialists as one can never experience liberation or break from Western cultural hegemony otherwise. Language is so essential not just for communication but as a carrier of culture in the sense of values and meanings, inherited and present. For Ngugi, the moment of realization was that the workers and peasantry must be included through language in the liberating intellectual cultural process as language is central to people's definition of themselves. He
laments a neo-colonial situation in which even now "Europe is stealing the treasures of the mind to enrich their languages and cultures" (1986, xii).

For Ngugi, writing in African languages per se is not sufficient; narrative art must carry the content of the peoples' resistance struggle. Only when these two are joined -- indigenous language and resistance content -- will an emergent writer through emancipatory practice make the necessary break with Western cultural hegemony and reconnect with the full, inclusive organic self rooted in his environment and peoples' culture. The process of Ngugi.'s increasing unease about writing in the English language climaxed in Petals of Blood, his last full-length novel written in English (1986, 72). For an understanding of the complexity of the processes that Ngugi was experiencing (which also troubles many other post-colonial writers), we want now to use the theoretical notions of Mikhail Bakhtin to scrutinize the text of his last English novel for its resistance content. Our choice of Bakhtin is not random. Like Ngugi, Bakhtin asserted the importance of language as lived meaning that is ideologically saturated. In addition, as discussed earlier, he outlined the historical origins of the novel in the time of great rupture in European civilization, i.e. in the time of imperialism which brought Europe in contact with other languages and cultures. Hence, according to
Bakhtin, the novel is multi-languaged with its origins in common utterances and lived experience ("Discourse in the Novel").

**Viewing a Resistance Text**

According to Bakhtin, "heteroglossia" is the notion of multiple voices, dialogized within the text. These "voices" or "character discourses" are viewed as "socio-ideological languages" in an open-ended process where there is no central authority. Even the authorial or narrative voice when it is present does not take a hegemonic position; it is one discourse among many, echoing different meanings in different contexts. However this does not mean that the author does not take sides. Within each "character zone" or "zones of contact", a dialogic tension emerges between what Bakhtin calls "authoritative discourse" and "internally persuasive discourse" (Holquist, 342-48). Bakhtin characterizes these discourses as simultaneous ideological processes in struggle or dialogic relationship to set out an individual ideological consciousness: this is "language as the material of competing ideologies" (Hirschkop, 93). "Every utterance . . . is connected with a speaker, an ideological situation, social interests and a social context" (93). As in Williams (1977, 35-36), it is this "sociality of the utterance" that leads Bakhtin to reject any notion of "individual consciousness".

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For an understanding of narrative art which "dialogizes" between cultural hegemony and emergent processes, I shall analyze how Bakhtin's notions of heteroglossia and dialogism operate within Ngugi's text *Petals of Blood*. Without ridding Bakhtin of vital nuances of meaning, for our analysis, the authoritative discourses in multi-contexts are the processes of ideological consciousness from imperialistic ruling class penetration refracted (NOT reflected) by the colonial or neo-colonial discourses characterized by the "distanced zone", the "institutionalized imposed authority", all that comprises in an active sense the discourses of the inherited colonial authority. The internally persuasive discourses, on the other hand, are part of the indigenous peoples' discourses of struggle -- marginalized, without authority, creatively active as a social process to effect "practical consciousness" (Williams, 1977, 37). At work in the process is the discourse of liberation from a structured context; in Bakhtin's words "dialogic tension between two languages and two belief systems" (314).

In the actual political context of the Kenyan struggle to liberate its people from the parasitic ruling class and to develop a new consciousness, the seminal work *Petals of Blood* offers within its text this dialogic tension, between the voices of resistance -- Karega, Abdulla and other lesser character zones -- and those of Chui, Kimeria and Mzigo, who
echo the discourse of the dominating imperialist forces. The literary text is for Ngugi an important tool for consciousness-raising: "voices" like those of Karega and even Joseph, the young school boy, contain the quest for the "true" history of Kenya's people. What we see in this text is Ngugi's clearer resolution of the tension of imperialism through the affirmation of a new consciousness beyond national independence.

*Petals of Blood* is set in the Kenyan village of Ilmorog, a village that is transformed in the course of the novel from a peaceful pastoral settlement, an African peasant agrarian economy, into a seat of capitalist investment, where there emerges a parasitic bourgeois class, where peasants are dispossessed of their land, and a general pauperization of the peasantry takes place. The text is thus set in the cultural context of conflict between African peasant resistance to capitalist penetration, to so-called "modernization" or "development". We witness in the narrative the confrontation between indigenous Gikuyu society and capitalist or neo-colonial cultures (i.e. Western cultural hegemony). Finally, in the novel, out of the peoples' struggle against the imperialist onslaught, a new democratic socialist alternative emerges. Karega is the central consciousness or character zone for this vision of "a more humane world in which the inherited inventive genius of man in culture and
science from all ages and climes would be not the monopoly of a few, but for the use of all" (303).

How do we witness this process of dialogic tension and heteroglossia within the cultural struggles as set out in the text? There are four principal protagonists or character zones of dialogic contact -- Munira, Wanja, Abdulla and Karega. Munira is the respected teacher at Ilmorog who, while appearing to have "authority" as a teacher, expresses an on-going anguish about the destruction of traditional Ilmorog dialogized in various cultural contexts. He speaks in discourses of pride in the African village setting, wants the students to be well-acquainted with nature in the village and discourages them from scorning their village environment in preference for "modernization". In fact, it is during Munira's nature class that the significance of the motif "petals of blood" (from Derek Walcott's poem The Swamp) is revealed: the theng'eta plant was traditionally used for purification ceremonies and is thus held as sacred. In the course of the novel's unfolding, the plant is like the peasantry, debased as an object of exploitation in capitalist society, used for making liquor at the Ilmorog Brewery which is established in the process of "capitalist investment". But Munira's multiple discourses in the end reflect a discourse of false consciousness (what Williams would call "residual" discourse). In his final embrace with fanaticism and quest
for African spiritual purity, Munira sets fire to Wanja's brothel in an attempt to kill her, as she is a symbol for him of a Jezebel "embrace of evil". Suspecting a liaison between her and Karega, he wants to kill her in order to protect Karega, who is the hope for Ilmorog's future in resistance against the parasitic capitalists.

Wanja, another main centre of discourse, in the unfolding of the narrative transforms from being a young innocent village girl to a prostitute and brothel owner. She is in constant struggle between the discourses of authority, the neo-colonial parasitic class represented by Chui, Kimeria and Mzigo, who are her clients and then other discourses in different zones of contact. We know from her tender relationship with Abdulla, the one-legged bar owner and her deep passion for Karega, the young man from Limuru, who rejects the subservient ideology of colonial education (symbolized by his dropping out of Siriana School) and actively organizes the workers of the brewery to resist exploitation, that, in spite of external appearances of having sold out, Wanja struggles internally to counter the "hold" of authoritative discourse. She recognizes her responsibility in choosing sides. "The choice put one on this or that side of the line-up in the battlefield" (328). She finally sides with the discourse of resistance when she kills Kimeria, her corrupt benefactor and lover who was also responsible for
leading her into prostitution. "She could not now return to a previous state of innocence. But she could do something about her present circumstances. . . . She would invite Mzigo, Chui and Kimeria: she would then introduce Abdulla, in his rags, as her rightful man. She would then expose Kimeria" (328). Although her plan unfolds differently, she asserts her final act of resistance.

Abdulla is another principal voice or character zone illustrating the heteroglossia of this novel. He is a former Mau Mau leader who lost a leg in the anti-colonial struggle and constantly attempts to resist the seduction of the parasitic capitalists, who gradually destroy the dignity of the peasants' way of life. He "would keep alive memories of hope and bitterness" (201). Throughout the novel, there is an authorial or narrative voice dialogized with imperialism and colonial forces, in retelling the story of Mau Mau's national liberation movement, challenging the "authoritative texts" which portray this movement as terrorist. Even Abdulla's amputated limb is testimony to the sacrifices that the peasantry has had to make in its struggles against colonialism and for independence. At the height of capitalist triumph in the "new Ilmorog", Abdulla is reduced to a singing drunken beggar and believed he "would regain the right to call himself a man" (316) only when he had killed Kimeria. Abdulla's son, Joseph, redeems his discourse of resistance by acquiring the
important quest for knowledge of Africa's "real" past, its "authentic" heroes. Kept at first by Abdulla from attending school, he later attends and does so well that he even "found a place in Siriana!" (310). But Joseph is not seduced by the discourse of imperialist authority. He tells Abdulla that

(when I grow up and finish school and university I want to be like you: I would like to feel proud that I had done something for our people. You fought for the political independence of this country: I would like to contribute to the liberation of the people of this country. I have been reading a lot about Mau Mau: I hope that one day we shall make Karuna-ini, where Kimathi was born, and Othaya, where J.M. was born, national shrines. (340)

Finally, Karega, the young idealist from Limuru, is the zone of discourse for socialist liberation, organizing the workers to resist the exploitation by capitalists like Chui, Kimeria and Mzigo. They are representatives of the parasitic ruling class dialogized in multiple situation/discourses with Wanja, Karega and Abdulla, voices of resistance. Karega is imprisoned for organizing the workers to strike and is suspected by the authorities of setting fire to Wanja's brothel where the three (Chui, Kimeria and Mzigo) are killed. He identifies firmly with the workers and peasants in a future socialist society, and significantly opted for being self-taught through a progressive lawyer rather than succumbing to the institutionalized authority of Siriana School, in the process confronting that cultural hegemony.
His vision is contrasted to that of Wanja's cunning which for him was too ruthless, and it could only lead to despair and self- or mutual annihilation. For what was the point of a world in which one could only be clean by wiping his dirt and shit and urine on others? . . . The true lesson of history: that the so-called victims, the poor, the downtrodden, the masses, had always struggled with spears and arrows, with their hands and songs of courage and hope, to end their oppression and exploitation: that they would continue struggling until the kingdom came: a world in which goodness and beauty and strength and courage would be seen not in how cunning one can be, not in how much power to oppress one possessed, but only in one's contribution in creating a more humane world. (303)

What I have described above is illustrated in multiple voices, in the speech of the various character zones, through "heteroglossia". Significantly, too, Ngugi exposes in character zones -- especially Rev. Jerrod and Inspector Godfrey -- the church, educational system and the law (all inherited colonial institutions of authority) as mechanisms for propagation and protection of the ruling class. It is through the discourses and languages of these two characters and others that Ngugi shows them to be serving the ideology of the ruling class which is capitalist, anti-Kenyan and parasitic.

The multiple voices or discourses set in various character zones constantly dialogized between authoritative colonial or imperialist discourses and that of Gikuyu society provide an excellent context for illustrating the validity of
Bakhtin's heteroglossia in an actual cultural sense. We are given multiple ways of viewing, languages and discourses that are ideologically refracted from actual struggles in the context of one small village in Kenya. Various ideologies or languages are reflected in the character zones. In the end of the novel, Karega prepares to carry his struggle for organized workers and regaining the rights of the peasantry in the new setting. He does not want to return to the past as some "museum piece". He states that "we must not preserve our past as a museum" (323) but rather to build a new consciousness, a new awareness for a democratic socialist culture.

There can be no doubt of the revolutionary content of this novel and of many of Ngugi's earlier novels written in English. But Ngugi's deep personal anguish was that the "peasants whose struggles fed the novel would never read it" (1986, 72). To complete the break with the hegemony, to move from the transitional phase to a complete break to "decolonise the mind" required for Ngugi a break with writing in the English language. He began his first novel in Gikuyu language, Citaani Mutharabaini (translated into English as Devil on the Cross) while in prison in 1978. "Gikuyu language did not have a significant tradition of novel or fiction writing" (1986, 74), and those who had attempted such a tradition had been suppressed. Ngugi had to find an appropriate "fiction
language" with which to communicate with his targeted audience, the workers and peasants. The intricacies of the challenges presented are described in his essay "The Language of African Fiction" in Decolonising the Mind. While Ngugi recognizes the ambiguities of his break with his earlier praxis, he is "convinced that it (African fiction) will find its form and character through its reconnection with the mainstream of the struggles of African people against imperialism and its rooting itself in the rich oral traditions of the peasantry" (1986, 86). Ultimately, for the emergent writer of narrative art, it is "the search for a liberating perspective within which to see ourselves clearly in relationship to ourselves and to other selves in the universe" (1986, 87). With all the contradictions of the processes, Ngugi stands firm that narrative art practiced through one's own indigenous language felt in the fibres of the self and with a clear choice of anti-imperialist content directed at the masses, will lead to a real break with Western cultural hegemony.

At present, Ngugi continues to write his narrative texts in Gikuyu while exiled in London. In 1983/84 he wrote Matigara, a novel about returning from exile. In the process, he queried the possible connection between prison and exile (1993, 106). The novel was first published in Gikuyu in Kenya in 1986. Soon after, when the peasants began talking about a
man named Matigara who had returned to demand truth and justice, the novel was banned. Not before, the story goes, the President of Kenya, who heard about Matigara, had ordered his arrest (1993, 157). Ngugi longs to return to East Africa but acknowledges that writing in Gikuyu from London helps him to reconnect more intimately to that imaginative landscape. He also is encouraged by the continued importance given to Kiswahili which enables cross border communication in an authentic African language. He continues to see decolonizing the saturated consciousness by using African languages and asserting the long established culture of resistance (1993, 170-72). For Ngugi, this is the process towards the authentic break from the hegemonic.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to illustrate the complexity of the processes for uncovering the formation of emergent intellectuals among post-colonial writers of narrative art. How have they confronted the "suffocating blanket"? How have they confronted the "hegemony in the fibres of the self"? We have seen that the complexity is made more acute by those who give primacy to language as a tool of culture. We have demonstrated, using Bakhtin's analytical notion of "heteroglossia" for examining the various voices of their
characters, how writers respond to the hegemony in their texts.

While the resistance text continues to be the dominant cultural practice for responding to the hegemonic process, increasingly some writers are asserting the importance of the resistance text as affirmation and self-knowledge rather than simply protest literature (Ndebele in Petersen, 205-218). For more than three decades into the post-colonial period, writers have challenged Western hegemonic cultural intervention through their emancipatory practice of narrative art. As the transitional or emergent processes gain more concrete shape, language choices and indigenous cultural affirmation remain vitally important to the new consciousness.

In looking closely at the evolution of Ngugi wa Thiong'o's work over the three decades, we were able to situate more specifically the complexity of the processes involved. Paradoxically, exiled in London, he writes his novels and plays in Gikuyu while others, like Achebe, Armah and Farah, all living in African countries, do not see the necessity of writing their text in their indigenous languages. As so beautifully stated in the earlier quotes by the Guyanese writer, Harris, and the Filipino literary critic, San Juan, Jr., many post-colonial emergent writers are deeply convinced by the transformative powers of the imagination as they
confront the hegemony even when continuing to write in the imperialist language.

Fiction writing is an emancipatory practice that is relevant to the formation of emergent writers who comprise an important group in the formation of emergent post-colonial intellectuals that we are identifying in this study. We now want to turn to the third discourse of analysis, the political sphere, where emergent post-colonial intellectuals can also be identified through the new tendencies that are taking shape.
ENDNOTES


3. There are many texts from all regions of post-colonial societies that examine these debates about language in the face of national independence. See especially, Fanon 1969, McCulloch 1983 discussing Cabral and Chatterjee 1986 discussing Gandhi. It is also interesting to recall Gramsci's discussion of language in the context of national unity. He questioned "the existing swarm of dialects" on the continent of Africa and favoured using a common language, English (21).

4. This literature often does not deal with Western hegemonic cultural intrusion. See Ahmad's discussion of Urdu literature (113-18), especially his comment "I cannot think of a single novel in Urdu between 1935 and 1947, the crucial year leading up to decolonization, which is in any direct or exclusive way about 'the experience of colonialism and imperialism'" (118). For a different perspective on the language debate in discussing Filipino literature written in Filipina, see San Juan, Jr. (1992, 222-24) where he emphasizes that any writer in the Philippines "has to address the problem of U.S. imperial domination in all areas of life" (223).

5. Farah, in the Jaggi interview, discusses Somali poetry as having a long tradition. Ahmad discusses the long and great tradition of Urdu poetry before prose writing came about (113).

6. The appropriation of the novel as a "bourgeois" form follows a gradual process from the 17th century to the 19th century. Today, feminist writers, for example, discuss "the limits of the conventional bourgeois novel" and cite "poetry and drama" as "better fitted for the revolutionary task" (Finn, 58-59).

7. See Molara Ogundipe-Leslie's essay "The Female Writer and her Commitment" (Jones et al, 5-12) for some of the dilemmas that African female writers face about their roles as writers.
8. See Sicherman for a comprehensive list of Ngugi's work and secondary sources published up to 1989. Without appearing too parochial, I find one of the most valuable collections interpreting Ngugi's work is the edited book by the Canadian literary critic Killam (1984). The article by Ross Kidd is also an excellent analyses of Ngugi's work with the popular theatre.

9. By 1989, works by Ngugi had been translated into Shona and Kiswahili as well as 22 non-African languages (Sicherman, xi).

10. In Homecoming, Ngugi discusses the four early novels of Chinua Achebe -- Things Fall Apart, Arrow of God, No Longer at Ease, and A Man of the People -- "as helping his society to regain i:s belief in itself and to put away the complexes of years of denigration and self-denigration" (44).

11. In 1966, he says that he "had reached a point of crisis where I felt that I could not continue writing in English; that if writing in English and thus depriving a large section of the Kenyan masses of the results of my creative imagination was my only alternative, I would stop writing all together" (1981, 182).

12. See Jennifer Evans, "Women and Resistance in Ngugi's Devil on the Cross" (Jones et al, 131-39) for an excellent analysis of this novel whose main heroine, Wariinga, belongs to the female tradition of struggle and resistance in Kenya.
Chapter 4

POLITICAL PRAXIS AND MUSEVENI:
A Search for a "Second Independence"

We take exception to the view that the mode of democracy practised in a select group of countries is the only legitimate democracy. We find considerable danger and paradox in the attempt to prescribe, in a virtual dictatorial and intolerant fashion, a prefabricated and, presumably, the only brand of democracy. . . . The acceptance of cultural variety is, in our view, not inconsistent with the yearning for universal human freedom, nor is it an escape mechanism for tyrants to impose dictatorships upon their peoples. It is simply a recognition of the fundamental forces at work in different parts of the world at different times.


Introduction

The most overt expression of a continuing Western hegemony is, in the political sphere, the colonial state which most post-colonial societies of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America inherited when they gained nominal independence. The historical expansion of Western colonialism into these societies altered their forms of political organization in various and complex ways. The anti-colonial nationalist struggles which dominated the early part of the
twentieth century focused on peoples gaining control of their own states and their societies. While these were important forms of resistance to the dominant Western hegemony and led to nominal political independence for most of these countries by the 1960s, the inherited legacy of colonial intervention was much deeper than the nationalist response understood.2

In attempting to account for such a situation, this chapter focuses on the political praxis and discourse of political leaders who have come to power after several years of independence within post-colonial societies. This generation of leaders share the legacy of the anti-colonial nationalist struggles illustrated in the political thinking of Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kaunda, Kenyatta, Sukarno and Bandaranaike, among others. However, the new post-colonial leaders belong to a different historical moment -- increasingly referred to as the struggle for a "second independence" (Schmitz and Hutchful, vi) -- in the search for political liberation of their peoples. The political praxis and surrounding discourse of the political movements associated with Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, Maurice Bishop in Grenada and more specifically Yoweri Museveni in Uganda will be the focus of this chapter, and we shall demonstrate their resistance to the continued hegemony of the West.
This wave of new leaders in search of a "second independence" or "genuine independence" recognized the betrayals and failures of the early independence years. They recognized that independence did not result in better living standards for their peoples; that the situation within many post-colonial societies was one of authoritarian governments, military dictatorships and corrupt states unable to fulfil the promises of liberation. Through most of the first 25 years following independence, the post-colonial state, particularly in Africa, has been "an authoritarian control structure pre-occupied with political survival and the material interests of those who control it" (Ninsin quoted in Allen, 193).

The anti-colonial movements embodied courageous struggles and dedicated work of many great leaders and resulted in nominal independence for most of these states in the 1950s and 1960s, but Western dominance in the political sphere and in political discourse remained deeply embedded. In addition, all of these so-called new states continued to echo the old economic order. They continued to be the primary producers of raw materials and semi-processed commodities tied into the imperial powers in much the same way as in pre-independence years. By the mid-20th century, each of these states experienced decolonization in an overt political sense; yet structurally their political economies had altered only modestly. According to most analysts and observers, what
really emerged was neo-colonialism or a modified form of imperialism.

Defining Political

We are using "political" in the sense of state power, political organizations and institutions as well as its wider sense of whole social processes within society (Slater, 107 in Schuurman), particularly as we are circumscribing our analysis in this chapter in relation to emergent political leaders. Their political praxis and discourse are revealed both in terms of their consciousness stated through language and their actions taken as a critical response to the institutionalized and everyday experience of cultural hegemony. Political discourses in this sense are interconnected within a complex web of social and economic processes, and are not "some autonomous notion that can be split off from other levels". In addition, our analysis suggests that the new political moment is itself in the process of redefining the content of politics "at a time of a new and different phase in the structure of world domination" (Kothari, 1988, 52). As Kothari reminds us,

The whole question of new forms of organisation and expression of politics needs to be located in the larger context of a world in transformation. They need to be understood as part of a whole range of attempts at redefining the content of politics on the part of hitherto peripheral and marginalised strata of a large number of societies. (Ibid, 52)
"New stirrings of consciousness" and "an urge to find new creative spaces in what is fundamentally a conflict-ridden social situation" combine with a "startling incapacity of regimes and power structures (parties, unions, development agencies) in coping with the new agenda" (Ibid, 52). What we sense globally is a continued process of entrenchment of world dominance, particularly through international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, while simultaneously pockets of resistance throughout the world in the form often of new emergent movements (women, indigenous peoples, peace and environmental). These are clearly political activities but outside the narrow limits of the old political structures such as the party system.

There is a political process at work globally in various local settings which does not yet have an adequate political theory. We shall return to this point, and particularly Kothari's formulation, when discussing the emerging political system of the "movement" in the second part of this chapter. It is in Uganda where we identify an attempt to merge the notion of the social movement which resides outside the state, in society so to speak, and the notion of the political system as part of the state structure. The political "movement" in this context signals a rupture with old political forms inherited from the colonial hegemonic state.
Framing the Political Processes

There is considerable diversity in the processes and experiences within the historical struggles of post-colonial peoples that we are discussing. Grenada, Ghana, India and Uganda have an obvious diversity in their political cultures and histories which cannot be swept away. However, in the elaboration of the political discourse and praxis of this new wave of emergent leadership, there are some commonalities which allow us to outline the new formations and evaluate whether they pose a fundamental challenge to Western hegemony. Are they "emergent" in the sense of offering "new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship" (Williams, 1977, 123)? Are they "substantially alternative or oppositional" to dominant culture or "merely novel" (Ibid.)? The analytical complexity of these processes of resistance arises as they are uneven, discontinuous, and overlapping; often by virtue of being "emergent", they are not fully formed, not "fixed products" (128) in the sense that dominant or archaic or even residual will be. What we are dealing with here is "thinking which is indeed social and material, but . . . in an embryonic phase before it can become fully . . . defined" (131). In addition, this oppositional or alternative process -- the discourse and praxis of resistance to the dominant -- that we shall elaborate often involves aspects of the "residual", that is meanings and values from
the past that developed out of actual situations of the subordinated cultures but were marginalized or undervalued or not even recognized by the dominant culture.

Before examining these new emergent formations in the leadership of post-colonial societies, we are able to locate some of the precursors, the antecedents which served in some respects as seeds in the sense of Williams referred to as "pre-emergence" (Williams, 1977, 126) similar to what we illustrated in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. They are the important aspects of the "residual" within the emergent. What we are identifying here then are those processes which were formed in the past situations and have carried on as an active cultural process into the present. For example, we are referring to the political thinking of the anti-colonial nationalists and that of the first wave of leaders in post-colonial societies as resistance discourse -- oppositional or alternative which is sometimes liberating, sometimes not -- to attempt to situate the processes and tendencies that are antecedents to the discourse and praxis of the new emergent leaders.

**Precursors to Emergent Political Discourse**

In broad terms the dominant political thinking emanating from these societies in response to Western cultural hegemony
involves three bodies of political discourse, not necessarily in linear order and varying from country to country while corresponding to phases of historical struggles. First, we identify the discourse arising from the anti-colonial nationalists who fought for independence from colonial rule; secondly, the discourse and praxis characterizing the period of optimism immediately following nominal independence which gradually degenerated into autocratic political praxis; and thirdly, the discourse of post-colonial emancipatory movements which we are characterizing as "emergent" political discourse. The difficulty we face in elaborating the tendencies in the political praxis and discourse of the first (anti-colonial nationalists) and the second tiers (elite-nationalist, neo-colonialist and authoritarian) before focusing on the third tier (post-colonial emancipatory movements) of political leaders, is that these are not linear movements of thought nor do they correspond precisely to an historical progression. We are dealing with the interpenetration of different sets of intellectual currents at widely different historical moments.³

Furthermore, it is important to re-emphasize that the responses to colonial culture have varied according to the nature of the geographical area of origin of the intelligentsia and the particular region's socio-economic structures, the nature of the colonising process, the period of incorporation into the total world cultural system, as well as the past traditions of geographical origin itself. The colonised world therefore divides itself into three broad areas, Africa, Latin America and Asia, with possibly a Caribbean variant. (Goonatilake, 1982, 131)
Anti-Colonial Nationalism

The discourse of the anti-colonial nationalists was clearly oppositional and anti-imperialist. However, as we shall see later, it was seldom understood as anti-Western in the sense of being against the "modernizing" or "civilizing" mission. Similar to the mimicry that we discussed in Chapter 2 in establishing the university as a British replica, the early political leaders wanted to duplicate the "modern" state. More frequently, the discourse was anti-colonial and nationalist in the sense of against the control of the state by foreign imperial powers. "Thus nationalist thinking is necessarily a struggle with an entire body of systematic knowledge, a struggle that is political at the same time as it is intellectual. . . . ; it is also a positive discourse which seeks to replace the structure of colonial power with a new order, that of national power" (Chatterjee, 42).

Anti-colonial praxis reflected a broad range of forms of resistance: from armed struggles and religious uprisings in many societies, particularly in Africa, to struggles around labour where strikes and a variety of protest demonstrations were used, especially evident in the 1930s throughout the Caribbean (Eric Williams 1970). However, most colonial states witnessed the victory of the liberal compromise in the immediate political independence moment where they agreed to retain the political forms and institutions inherited from the
colonizers, especially the Westminster parliamentary model. From the evidence illustrated in earlier chapters, it is not surprising to observe that the Westernized educated elites were often the first inheritors of power, some as collaborators but more often than not they were nationalists caught in the dilemma brilliantly captured in Chatterjee. He points out that the anti-colonial discourses were addressed both to 'the people' . . . and to the colonial masters . . . (and) sought to demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world. Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based. (30)

These "contradictory elements", which are analyzed in the anti-colonial nationalist discourses in historical stages of India by Chatterjee from the period of Gandhi through to the early independence period of Nehru, were played out in varying forms in independence struggles throughout the colonial world and, as we shall see later on in this chapter, continue to be a major challenge for contemporary emergent political leaders.
Furthermore, as Copans points out for Africa, anti-colonial nationalists like Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and others even conceived of class struggle as an anti-imperialist struggle, so we find no precise reference in their writings to specific indigenous classes (Copans, 29). A notable exception was Amilcar Cabral who "rejects a simplistic anti-imperialist view and tries to understand indigenous ethnic realities without automatically using the Marxist model of pre-capitalist societies" (Copans, 29-30). This point becomes uppermost in contemporary post-colonial societies as they seek to work out ethnic divisions.

In addition, anti-colonial nationalist discourse with the notable exception of Mahatma Gandhi of India, was not challenging the dominant cultural notions of "progress" and "modernization". According to Chatterjee, Gandhi's discourse rests outside of the nationalist conceptual frameworks of his day (93). He is reassessed as providing only "on the surface" a critique of Western civilization (85ff). According to Chatterjee, "what appears on surface as a critique of Western civilization is, therefore, a total moral critique of the fundamental aspects of civil society. It is not, at this level, a critique of Western culture or religion" (93). He attacked those aspects of civil society that had become increasingly secular, self-indulgent, with "limitless desire
for ever-increased production and ever-greater consumption, and the spirit of ruthless competitiveness" (87).

In fact, anti-colonial discourse was often neither anti-capitalist nor liberating from the Western cultural norms. The primary political objective was certainly to establish a sovereign national state. However, anti-colonial nationalists were not necessarily interested in transformation or in a fundamental break with the established order. With few exceptions, they sought to establish a modern, industrial state imitative of the West's "progress".\textsuperscript{5} Whether we are discussing Nkrumah in Ghana, early N. Manley in Jamaica or Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka, the modernization project was a dominant element of the anti-colonial nationalist discourse. It was the modernizing nationalists who won out. And, as we shall see later, within the contemporary political discourse, modernization continues to stand on firm ground and presents the biggest challenge to emergent political leaders. It is this dilemma of seeking modernization while wanting to break with the legacy of cultural hegemonic processes of the West that has to be confronted.

Of course there were other diverse intellectual currents which intermingled within the early nationalist discourses and which can be viewed as "residual", in the sense of Williams, within emergent post-colonial political discourse and
contemporary political praxis. Lewis (1985) identifies three
dominant but distinct belief systems operating in the
Caribbean "that have indeed swept over the region with all the
force of a tropical hurricane: ... anti-colonial and post-
colonial nationalism; Black Power and négritude; and Marxism-
Leninism" (23). The currents of Black Power and négritude
emerged in a tension with the imitative nationalists, the
Black Sahib, the Black Frenchmen and the Afro-Saxons. Sweeping
across the globe as a simultaneous process was this discourse
of "Black is Beautiful" which expressed "a new pride in being
Black, a new awareness of the African heritage, a new race
consciousness as denial of the old European racial
stereotypes, a new interest in black history" (Lewis, 29).
Similarly, Aimé Césaire's négritude captured the discourse of
many early nationalists, particularly Senghor and others in
Africa.

However, a critical discourse expressing the limitations
of this "rising ethnic consciousness" was also present during
this early period, particularly in the works of Frantz Fanon.
"Fanon's well-known critique of négritude is rooted in his
inability to agree with the celebration of Negro primitivism,
which leads to a culte du nègre reifying particular cultural
traits into a new transcendentalist racism" (Lewis, 31). His
views are worth recalling and will enter our discussions of
ethnicity among contemporary emergent political leaders. As we
shall see later, ethnicity and national unity are central issues of contemporary emergent political leaders.  

Fanon was also one of the earliest intellectuals to underscore the limits of anti-colonial nationalism from a revolutionary perspective, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. In his *Wretched of the Earth*, he argues that nationalism was an important mobilizing point for the anti-imperialist or anti-colonial struggles; yet when the nationalists take power their mission "has nothing to do with transforming the nation" (122). Reviewing again some of his early warnings where he observes that nationalism or national liberation movements often lack social programmatic content, he predicts increased repression, continued poverty and even in Africa a return of tribalism.  

There was much validity in these early warnings which were not heeded. Again, in the struggle of modernizing versus revolutionary strategy in political discourse and praxis, the former held the upper hand, and as we shall see later, continued as the dominant Western hegemonic paradigm. This may explain why Fanon's discourse was marginalized in the dominant Western hegemonic project.

Another important aspect of the precursors' discourse, which is still around as residual or archaic in contemporary post-colonial emergent process, can be found in the work of
those, during the period from 1920s through to 1950s, whose intellectual response to European domination was the advocacy of internationalizing resistance. Here, we are able to identify, for example, the non-aligned movement or the Pan-African movement and the writings of C.L.R. James, especially his influential *Black Jacobins*, a study of the slave revolt of Haiti, and his *A History of Negro Revolt*, both published in 1938. Marcus Garvey, William Du Bois and George Padmore are other important intellectuals during this anti-colonial period who called on dominated peoples to unite internationally in their struggle against imperialism (Campbell 1985).

Finally, anti-colonial discourse had constantly to deal with the way in which the dominant culture was able to appropriate and often neutralize their discourse and praxis. Anti-colonial struggles were constantly undermined and appropriated by the dominant culture often characterized as terrorist struggles. Re-interpretation of these historical struggles became uppermost in the contemporary post-colonial period. The need to assert another narrative, another historical view was affirmed. 8

There were many ways in which the dominant culture of the West was able to control or incorporate its opposition: we witness at a political level the same processes we saw at work in Chapter 2 where the educational system was imitative of
Western ideology. Former colonial powers through the transplanted Western educational system and cultural baggage were able to ensure that the immediate ruling elite would carry on the imperial cultural praxis in their political institutions. Generally the political leadership upon independence maintained an imitative Western political state simply changing the faces of those who ran it.

Nominal Independence

After nominal independence, there followed a period of post-colonial leadership in the 1960s and 1970s, initially buoyed with optimism and high expectations. There is a considerable literature now trying to analyze what went wrong in those early independent years. While the early post-independence leadership took a variety of forms and was often rhetorically still anti-imperialist, the dominant political culture was characterized by continued economic dependence on the West and imitative Western political institutions of nation-states while becoming increasingly authoritarian, oppressive and corrupt. The shape of the post-colonial state was imitative of what had been imposed by the colonial masters and sought to establish modernization at the expense of the agricultural base of these societies.

Following the initial optimism of the early nationalists at independence, this second phase of leadership was also
often dominated by the rhetoric between capitalism and socialism as the route to the modern state for Third World countries. Hence, the leadership of these countries were seen to be in an alliance with the West or with the U.S.S.R echoing the politics of the Cold War struggle. Third World countries were seldom seen to be genuinely non-aligned even though there were important organizations to encourage such non-alignment; they seldom had the power or clout needed to sustain their momentum. Often they identified either with the camp of state socialism or communism or in the camp of Western capitalism. As such the dominant political discourse and praxis were defined by the former colonizers, located within the boundaries of the imitative paradigms of Western political thinking and praxis.

Recalling again, the processes that we are examining are complex, uneven and often contradictory, the dominant discourse in relation to these societies continued to be characterized by Western models of development, Western intellectual paradigms asserting the primacy of "modern societies" and industrialization and Western notions of "governance". Two aspects of this dominant discourse -- modernization and dependency -- need to be sketched before we turn to the praxis and discourse of emergent intellectuals in the formation of new post-colonial leaders who are offering -- or have attempted to offer (both Bishop and Sankara have been
assassinated) -- a break from the Western cultural hegemony in their political processes towards authentic liberation.

*Development Discourse*

What permeates this discourse is concern for development, development not as some academic field but as a mode of political intervention in post-colonial independent societies. What we often observe is that even the more intellectually progressive forces are drawn into the dominant Western theoretical political debates. "Development in the Third World," writes Munck,

is the overarching referent of all political discourse. . . . Modernisation theory was unambiguously and directly an expression and agent of the then-hegemonic US imperialism. For its part, dependency theory was, "in the last instance", a justification and tool of a revolutionary strategy. (Munck in Schuurman, 113-14)

In other words, at the moment of our "second independence", development discourse debates relate to options for political strategies. The anti-colonial discourse and praxis gave birth to two competing political theories -- modernization and dependency -- that are the basis of the dominant political strategies that continue within the discourse of post-colonial political leaders today. They face a choice between modernization which is integration within the capitalist system and a continuation structurally of the colonial relationship (writ modern), and delinking or breaking away,
which is the revolutionary strategy, the seeds of which are to be found in the analysis made by dependency theorists (Cardosa and Faletto, Frank, and O'Donnell).

Modernization and industrialization were integral parts of the nationalist discourse. Modernization theory actually grew out of the sociological distinction between community and society that was then constructed around the dichotomy of tradition and modernity. Dependency theory was a critique of modernization theory. As a sustained oppositional discourse with very specific features, especially rejecting this dichotomy, dependency theory continues to be relevant for contemporary emergent political leaders. Some of the key features -- the structurally dependent economy tied to global capitalism, the foreign debt as also a factor of financial and technological dependency and the marginalization of the productive forces or the labouring poor from the "fruits" of development -- actually affirmed that there was continued underdevelopment in the independence years rather than any development.

This period of overt authoritarianism and militarism, which to a large extent in most post-colonial states is still with us, began to fracture at the end of the 1980s in some African and Latin American countries. By the end of the 1980s, "authoritarian regimes were being challenged all over Africa
and popular demonstrations for liberalisation and democracy were widespread. In 1989, 38 of the 45 countries of Africa were under autocratic, military or one party rule" (Ake, 1991, 14). In Latin America, the process of demilitarization proceeded in the late 1980s. Chile, Peru and even El Salvador, where a peace accord was signed after 12 years of civil war, were witnessing fractures in the authoritarian repressive state.

As the hegemonic political structures begin to unravel, the question is: "what will replace them". Clearly the dominant tendencies in the political discourse at this time continue to be modernization and the neo-liberal economic reforms, within a capitalist global context of Western cultural hegemony. Currently these activities rely less on the imposition by the state and more through civil society, reflecting how deeply Western cultural hegemonic processes have saturated these societies. Simultaneously, there is a strong pull to accept neo-liberal notions of reform, economically through structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) and politically by imposing or coercing countries to democratize in the imitation of the Western democracies. Williams analyzes the mastery of the capitalist social order at "implanting a deep assent to capitalism even in a period of its most evident economic failures" (1983, 254). What becomes complex in the process is distinguishing between genuine
popular demands for some form of democracy and then the imposed concepts or paradigms of the West which led to a shallow mimicry in the political discourse and praxis.

Characterizing the Contemporary Political Challenges

Having elaborated the dominant discourse of the anti-colonial nationalists and the early tendencies of post-independence leadership, let us now characterize the third phase of resistance to Western political hegemony as seen in the discourse and praxis of the political movements associated with Rawlings in Ghana, Sankara in Burkina Faso, Bishop in Grenada and Museveni in Uganda. Before focusing on the specific tendencies of Museveni, I shall elaborate the general trends in the political thinking of these selected leaders who appear to signify a more fundamental challenge to Western political hegemony. We have sought to illustrate the antecedents of emergent intellectual political thinking in the earlier part of this chapter in order to suggest the diversity of "precursor" tendencies that existed and continue to permeate contemporary thought, but in a worsening and changed socio-economic and political context.

Again, there is a need to stress these are uneven, overlapping processes, not three distinct formations in which I have chosen to organize the political discourses and praxis.
I am delineating what has been the apparent political resistance in discourse and praxis as possible counter-hegemonic formations to dominant Western cultural hegemony.

There are five dominant components in the discourse and praxis of this "emergent" political leadership which can be outlined similarly to the typology given in Chapter 2. Here, however, we are dealing with the political realm while earlier our typology developed as a counterpoint to institutionalized knowledge.

Political Parties Versus the Movement

First, these emergent political leaders are engaged in questioning or refuting the dominant Western interpretation of what constitutes a democratic polity or a democratic process. This questioning is exemplified in the notion of the "movement" as opposed to political parties as the main form of political organization in the society. Interesting seeds of this thinking can be found earlier, especially in Gandhi's discussions about the difficulties of a national movement (Chatterjee, 101). But the new paradigm of the "movement" in the post-independence period has to be distinguished from the concept of the nationalist movement. Nationalists did see the limitations of the inherited political party system and often opted for a one-party state as opposed to a more open "no-party democracy" in the form of the movement."
Other political challenges came in countries as diverse as Mauritius, Grenada and Ghana, all developing political movements which were programmatic movements for change (in the sense of Fanon) in the post-colonial period as an alternative to the political parties. We can recognize the tension between the old and the new emergent form of alternative political organization in several illustrations. The Mauritian Militant Movement in Mauritius started by three young intellectuals (P. Berenger, D. Virashawmy, and J. Jeerooburkhan) split over the issue of becoming a political party to take state power or remaining a movement. The main issue for the New Jewel Movement in Grenada was the internal quarrelling about Marxism-Leninism as a wholesale imported paradigm in rigid imitative fashion (i.e. Bernard Coard faction) versus the more creative, liberating tendencies of the movement notion, exemplified by Maurice Bishop (Clark 1987). As we shall illustrate in our discussions in the second part of this chapter, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda under Yoweri Museveni challenges the limitations of the party system as the only form of democratic political organization. Similarly, in Ghana, Rawlings who came to power twice leading a military coup with populist rhetoric, each time with "provisional agenda" towards democracy, objects to the multiparty system as "inappropriate". The emergent political discourse is always dealing with the decay of the hegemonic
Western liberal Westminster political system bequeathed by the departing colonial authorities and the recognition that the political party through nationalism lost sight of the social element in the change process (Kothari 1982).

Entwined with this questioning of the bequeathed political system is the ethnic composition of these societies which many contemporary emergent leaders see as a source of deep division when parties are aligned along ethnic lines. During the early independence period, opportunistic political leaders continually manipulated ethnic identification with political party allegiance which resulted in violent internal conflicts. Early nationalists introduced the one-party state to alleviate this conflict. New emergent leaders have searched for an alternative paradigm in the "movement". An important notion of the movement is that power originates "in society" rather than in the rule of the political state over society. This distinction becomes particularly important when we examine Museveni's taking of power through peoples' support for the guerrilla movement rather than a coup d'état.

Internal Realities

Another component of the new emergent political leadership is their stress on analyzing the realities on the ground, particularly the importance of the rural population and their conditions. These societies are predominately
peasant/agricultural mono-commodity economies tied into the international economic system. While many of the earlier nationalists saw this objective condition, that discourse was marginalized by the elite nationalists who took control of the nominally independent state in collaboration with Western hegemonic cultural ways of viewing, emphasizing modernization through industrialization.\textsuperscript{10}

The consequence of the renewed emphasis on the peasantry as a form of social organization becomes reflected in the political system envisioned by these new emergent political leaders. Whether in Ghana under Rawlings, Uganda under Museveni, Burkina Faso under Sankara or Grenada under Bishop, each instituted a form of decentralized political organization at the community or village level, with modifications from their understanding of their population as predominately rural.

\textit{Indigenous Political Forms}

In some cases, this understanding of objective conditions has led to a return to some form of indigenous political organization. Rawlings' use of the assemblies is an attempt to reconcile pre-colonial forms of organization (monarchy, chiefs and other traditional leaders) with the contemporary quest to improve the livelihood of his people. On the surface, this idea may not appear to be significantly different from the use
of chiefs or indirect rule by colonizers (see Adas, 46) in African countries or in Asia, for example, the use of village panchayats in India. However, upon closer examination of these contemporary political organizational attempts, they appear more organically rooted and systematically practiced involving a bottom up rather than top down approach. They assert more political control on local forms of political organization at the village or grassroots level (for example, the Resistance Committees in Uganda, the district assemblies in Ghana and other similar systems of popular local organization in India, Sri Lanka, and Burkina Faso).

Most post-colonial emergent leaders have recognized the failures of their inherited political systems. Their search for alternatives often leads them to re-examine the aborted organizational forms that were undermined or not valued by the political leadership in the colonial period nor immediately after colonialism in the so-called "neo-colonial period". Rajni Kothari suggests that "archaic institutions can be gradually transformed by the adoption of a new value system" (203). He, like Williams, discusses the notion of infusing institutions with a new form of practice, through different values and belief systems such that they become living institutions where the culture of popular participation becomes operative (201-203). This process is the thrust of what is being attempted by the emergent leadership of the
movements referred to above. The challenge arises when these movements try to reconcile their praxis with the inherited state structures and institutions.

Ambiguous Relationship with the West

Another tendency running through the discourse and praxis of emergent political leaders is their ambiguous relationship with the West. Unlike the early nationalist discourse, they do not locate their problems solely within the framework of anti-imperialism. The complexity of the socio-political and economic contexts in which leaders found their societies required much deeper internal analyses. Faced with an artificial state, inherited and inappropriate political institutions together with a lop-sided economy and debt which tied them into the world economic system, most political leaders in this second phase of post-independence had only two dominant choices. Either they could continue along within the framework of the modern global economy (i.e. the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the institutions of Western hegemony) to bail them out of their worsening poverty or they could attempt to develop a self-reliant independent economy and state. Their praxis is essentially framed within the limits of these two dominant tendencies.

In spite of radical populist rhetoric, even this "emergent leadership" recognizes it needs to make an
accommodation with the West especially in the economic sphere. Both Ghana and Uganda after some initial reluctance agreed to the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) under the insistence of the IMF and World Bank in spite of their prescriptions being based on mainstream Western orthodox economics derived from dominant Western economic theories. The difference between these new economic policies and the previous ones was that the earlier economic policies were urban biased and nearly ruined the agriculture sector to favour the resources needed for the urban import-substituting industries and urban consumers. Now SAPs emphasize the peasantry and their agricultural needs but reduce the power and role of the state (Loxley 1988). Not surprisingly, these policies, though an alternative to what was advocated previously, are also based on erroneous assumptions about these societies.

Non-elite Inclusiveness

Finally, another component evident in the political thinking and praxis of this emergent intellectual leadership is their attempt at inclusiveness, at enlarging the space for what constitutes the political system. There appears to be an engagement of the previously marginalized sectors through a different paradigm of analysis. Here, emergent political intellectuals ambiguously engage locally with global alternative intellectual tendencies, where notions of social justice, equality, concern for inclusion of women, justice for
women, peoples' movements and popular participation permeate the dominant discourse. What this signals is an attempt at a fundamental break with politics of elite-nationalists that was inherited upon independence and carried on in the early years of post-colonial independence. How sustaining this can be as a new political system is the current challenge, especially for Uganda.

In summary, we have elaborated here the general lines of challenges that a new strata of post-colonial political leaders cum intellectuals in the sense of Gramsci's notion of intellectuals as 'direzione' -- intellectuals as organizers with a "capacity to direct . . . men (sic) in the context of social life (Entwistle, 114) -- have begun to express in their political discourse and praxis. Unlike the intellectuals in educational institutions discussed in Chapter 2 and the writers discussed in Chapter 3, there are not many political leaders who are able to be in state power and then continue to challenge the dominant Western hegemonic process in the political sphere. We do however recognize the possibilities in the emergent discourse and praxis of Yoweri Museveni which we now want to examine in a systematic way in relation to the tendencies that we have observed in a general way.
Yoweri Museveni: Emergent Political Discourse and Praxis

Having elaborated the antecedents within the earlier political discourse of resistance and illustrated the five major tendencies in the new formations of emergent political leaders challenging this dominant Western hegemony, we now want to attempt a more systematic examination of the discourse and praxis of one particular political leader cum intellectual in the sense of Gramsci's 'dirigente', Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Museveni is the current President of Uganda who took power in 1986 as the leader of a revolutionary guerrilla movement, the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/NRA), two decades after nominal independence granted by the British in 1962. The five-year protracted guerrilla war waged from inside Uganda by Museveni and the NRA set a precedent for Africa. "Such a change of government under armed popular pressure rather than by a coup d'état has never before been achieved in Africa" (Brittain, 51). To some, this signalled the emergence of a different type of discourse and practice once in power. The guerrilla movement had peoples' support such that power originated in the society rather than just a change in state power as occurs with coup d'état.

By focusing on Museveni's political thinking within a particular contemporary context, we shall be able to delineate those attributes which distinguish his emancipatory discourse.
within the post-colonial society from earlier antecedents and analyze whether this thinking represents a fundamental break with the old political order and the hegemonic colonial paradigmatic discourse. I shall first sketch Museveni's background and briefly set the context of the socio-economic and political moment of Uganda in the post-colonial period. Then I shall examine in a more systematic way Museveni's political discourse and praxis as illustrative of a response to Western cultural hegemony. It is interesting to note at the outset that Museveni distinguishes himself from Rawlings and Bishop as they, he asserts, defined their struggle within the Western hegemonic context and "saw everything in East-West terms" (Personal interview, August 1990).

Museveni's Background

Museveni was born in the rural area of southwest Uganda (Ankole), where both his parents were rural people; his father, who has till this day a formidable influence on his thinking, is a cattlekeeper in the tradition of the pastoral Bahima people. Museveni travelled considerable distance by foot to attend primary school and recalls in these early years using a stick to write his lessons in the dusty earth while seated on the ground (Personal interview, April 1992). An amazing accomplishment, he suggested in that same interview, that that small boy could become President of his country.
Later, he attended Ntare Secondary School in Mbarara town and then graduated from the University of Dar-es-Salaam with a degree in political science in March 1970.

Unlike other universities, especially Makerere in Uganda from which he had decided not to attend, Dar had an interesting anti-imperialist and even strong revolutionary teaching staff (see Campbell's unpublished paper and Resnick discussed in Chapter 2). In addition to the personal influence of Walter Rodney who was teaching at the University (see his article in Resnick, 71-84; and Alpers and Fontaine), Museveni acknowledges the influence of the writings of Fanon, Lenin, Mao Zedong and Marx as well as more "liberal Western thinkers like (John) Galbraith" during his three years at Dar (Personal interviews, September 1988, September 1990 and April 1992; see also his book of Speeches, 1992, 16).

Museveni was thus being formed to some extent both by the dominant discourse within Western political thinking and also its counter-hegemonic tendencies. As well, he was the elected student leader of the University Students African Revolutionary Force (USARF) and drew inspiration from practical guerrilla training with the revolutionary socialist party, FRELIMO which during his student days was fighting an armed struggle for the independence of Mozambique. From his first contact with Western behaviour, norms and values,
Museveni demonstrated an early rebelliousness (Personal interview, September 1988). He recalled how local authorities had devalued his peoples' cultural ways in preference for the ways of colonizers in a cattle dispute. While still visibly angry, he related their attempts to displace his pastoral peoples from their traditional grazing lands by ranching schemes set up by the colonialist and carried on by chiefs and independence political leaders who understood little about life among the peasantry and pastoral peoples.

Museveni did not go for higher studies abroad. It is significant that he, like many emergent political leaders that I have been discussing, has never lived for any extended period within Western countries. This is in contrast to the early anti-colonial nationalists who often spent many years abroad, often in the imperial colonial country. Although he had visited England and Sweden for brief periods during the 1980s civil war, he first came to North America only after he took power in 1986. From early 1971 until 1979, he lived in exile primarily in Tanzania and Mozambique from where he organized various opposition struggles to liberate Uganda from state terror under Idi Amin.

Museveni was educated in the institutions dominated by the "traditional intellectuals", by those "who put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social
group" (Gramsci, 7), the imitators, the Western-educated elite but he appears not to have assimilated their dominant paradigms. We have seen, to some extent, how his early alternative discourse was reinforced by that tendency within Dar. What we see in Museveni over more than two decades of exchange is a constant ambivalence towards the West, an inner struggle to deal with the dominant hegemonic forces which devalue his indigenous cultural understanding (Williams' notion of "confronting the hegemony in the fibres of the self") and yet a desire to move his people from a state of what he still refers to as "backwardness". The quest for him entails an understanding and openness to the internal workings of Western political systems and their global hegemonic context.

When asked what went wrong in post-colonial societies, in those early years of independence, he asserts that the paradigms of development for our societies were Western, whether from the Left or the Right and they were often not suited for solving our societies' problems because they did not grow out of an understanding of the historical, social and economic realities of these societies. Museveni often states that there must first be a "correct analysis of your society" before you are able to embark on solutions. Some leaders, he goes on to say, were stating correctly their problems, but the dominance of the anti-imperialist struggle formulated in Cold
War terms, that of the Westerners themselves, often clouded the analysis of their actual realities (Personal interviews, September 1988 and September 1990). Hence the limits of the paradigmatic boundaries were still defined by Western discourse, i.e. how the West was theorizing and analyzing their situations.¹⁵

Museveni is an organic intellectual linked to the rural people and their landscape of discourse but wanting to liberate his people through transformation of their economic plight, of the productive forces. His establishment of the National Resistance Movement, initially a group of intellectuals and peasants, in the 1980s while fighting a civil war from inside the "bush" suggests that he understood well the importance of commitment through "organic participation", of what Gramsci calls the "emotional bond" between the intellectuals (Museveni and the NRM) and the people-nation or popolo nazione (418).

Earlier, in 1978, just one year before he and other opposition groups succeeded in overthrowing Idi Amin, he explained his personal evolution in the following way:

In 1969 . . . I was still in the process of finding myself ideologically. One of my most pronounced short-comings in the ideological field at that time was my anti-whitism -- anybody white was to me, prima facie, suspect. . . . The base of such an attitude was the Black-powerism which was in ascendency in the United
States at that (time). Fortunately, it was a transient stage for me as well as for a number of other African revolutionaries. We owe this biggest (debt) in this to FRELIMO. (Personal letter to me from Museveni dated 3 January 1978.)

Later in the same letter, he goes on to state that

Ever since I finished University in 1970 (March), I ceased being a student campus politician . . . and had to come to the grim task of winning mass support for our programme of emancipating our people from exploitation and suppression by the neo-colonial state (first, Obote's and later Amin's). I participated in the so-called party elections of Obote's UPC of October 1970 . . . Soon after . . . Amin staged his neo-colonial backed coup of January 1971. At that time, I had been working in the President's office as a research officer. I promptly resigned and entered Tanzania on the 27th of January 1971, two days after the coup. I do not think that I shall ever be more proud of any decision than that decision . . . Since that time we have taken the armed road against Amin's regime.

Two points surrounding Museveni's emerging doubts are contained in these sections from his letter. Museveni identifies the limitations of ethnicity or race as a form of political liberation, similar to Fanon's critique of négritude and Black Powerism as lacking programmatic content. Secondly, his scepticism of party politics as an organizational form in Uganda is evident. He saw the corrupt and the imitative nature of the party system that was imposed on Uganda and manipulated by the elite nationalists. As well, he was able to recognize the fragility of a state that could result in an ignorant army officer, trained by the British, taking power in his country.
and devastating his peoples lives. Both regimes -- that of Obote and of Amin -- were for him the continuation of the legacy of colonialism. How to break from that hegemony in the political sphere became his pre-eminent concern.

Contextualizing Uganda’s Political Moment

From the time of independence in 1962 up to 1986, Ugandans experienced increasing political decay, corruption and state terror such that at the take-over of power in January 1986 by the NRM/NRA under the leadership of Museveni, Uganda's entire political infrastructure had disintegrated. Uganda's immediate post-colonial experience was not untypical of other post-colonial societies; it was just more extreme. Ghana, for instance, has never experienced the level of political violence and human rights abuse what Uganda witnessed. Important political analyses of Uganda during the early post-colonial period are contained in the works of Jorgensen (1981), Mamdani (1976) and Rupesinghe (1989). The optimism of the early anti-colonial nationalists was completely shattered during the first twenty-five years of Uganda’s independence.

Upon independence in 1962, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda was designated President and Milton Obote of the Uganda
People's Congress (UPC) formed a coalition government with the conservative Kabaka Yekka Party. Elite nationalists were in control of the state, and not long after, in 1966, Obote suspended the Constitution, abolished the kingdoms and forced the Kabaka into exile. Obote, a Northern, used brutal force to ensure his supremacy. By 1969, he had declared a one-party state and introduced what he called the "Declaration of the Common Man's Charter". Divisions between those who came from the North and those from the South were evident throughout these early years. In spite of the Northerners being in power, the Southern regions were benefiting more from development. Colonial prejudices which meant colonial preferences were also still evident. Northerners were thought to be better suited for the army (they were generally said to be taller) while Southerners were brought into the civil service and profited from preferred educational system. The legacy of the colonialists selected intervention along tribal lines carried over into the early independence years and caused deeper and deeper rifts.

In 1971, the brutal coup by Idi Amin, while Obote was out of the country, led to years of state terror and devastation of the entire economy. First, the 1972 expulsion of the Asian population, and then, the 1975 Land Reform Decree which displaced peasants from their land and resulted in open land-grabbing and absentee landlordism.
In 1979, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNFL), a loose coalition of Ugandan exile groups, including both Obote and Museveni, joined with the Tanzanian army to oust Idi Amin and his brutal accomplices. There followed a shaky year, still riddled with terror and disappearances, until the crisis of the 1980 national elections which by most observers' accounts were a complete sham. When Obote and the UPC were declared victorious, Museveni and 26 of his initial followers organized the NRA and began a protracted guerrilla war to rid Uganda of continued terrorizing of the civilian population by state forces. By all accounts, the civil war from 1981-1986 resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, disappearances, displaced peoples and devastated whole villages. The terror of "Obote II's regime" (and that of Tito Okello) was described as worse than that of Amin's dictatorship. Ethnic hatred towards those of Banyarwanda, Baganda, and other southern groups by Obote's northerners was rampant during these five years, as had gone on since independence.

The cause of Uganda's years of turmoil are many, found primarily in its colonial roots and its legacy of political institutions, the unbalanced state of the economy and land ownership patterns. Cultivated ethnic divisions, those between the northern regions and the south, which were often reflected in the presence of tribal-based armies and tribal or religious-affiliated political parties, are agreed by analysts
to be the central reasons for Uganda's violence. The colonial experience instilled political and economic divisions within the artificially-created state that continue to burden the country up till today.

Since January 1986, when the NRM/NRA took power, Ugandans have witnessed a gradual return to peace in their country. While the legacy of a culture of violence has to be continually confronted in the stages of reconciliation and rebuilding, signs of progress towards building the conditions for a democratic polity and a sustainable peace have become increasingly apparent. Uganda has moved from being the pariah of the international community where it had 10 governments in 26 years, only two of which were elected, to being a stable society gradually experiencing a new reality. The NRM's main objectives are contained in the Ten-Point Programme developed while they were still fighting in the bush. However, it is its original model of a political system emphasizing "no-party democracy" or "the movement" that has captured the attention of political analysts and commentators. Is the "movement" as a state institution capable of replacing party politics in such a way as to fracture the inherited colonial state? Does this attempt, this new political praxis, signal a breakthrough which does not yet have a theoretical or paradigmatic basis?
What is different now in the emancipatory discourse of Museveni and the NRM? Does the discourse and praxis of the National Resistance Movement exemplified by Museveni offer a more fundamental challenge to the Western hegemonic legacy? In order to answer these questions, we now want to examine Museveni's discourse and praxis in more detail.

**Elaborating Museveni's Emergent Political Discourse**

Museveni's political thinking can be grouped into five different components loosely corresponding to the general tendencies described in the first section of this chapter. This analysis is based mainly on personal interviews and observations conducted in Uganda between 1988 up to 1994 as well as from his speeches. To some extent, these are the key issues that all post-colonial societies have to address in order to liberate their peoples from poverty and Western cultural hegemony yet very few are doing so. Most political leaders are tied into the Western cultural and economic political ethos or vision with evident growing impoverishment within their societies. However, we have elaborated some of the general tendencies that are emerging among the second phase of post-colonial leaders. We now want to illustrate more concretely how these processes and tendencies play out in
the specific political discourse and praxis of Museveni in the context of contemporary Uganda.

Political Parties Versus the Movement

Like other former British colonies, Uganda upon independence inherited the same liberal democratic Westminster political system derived from Western political and social theory. One of its primary operational mechanisms is the use of multiparty in competitive organized political form.17 Museveni's main political response has been to establish the "movement" or "no-party democracy" as the dominant form of political organization in the transitional period. He asserts that the imposed Western political institutions from colonial days have been the root cause of political violence and continued "backwardness" of Ugandans. In Uganda, he states, parties were tied up with ethnic divisions and caused over three decades of upheaval in our societies. He believes that by not allowing parties as an organizing force yet clearly permitting oppositional ideas and dissent, you are pursuing no-party democracy. Various political persuasions are expressed and are part of the existing government yet they are not under the banner or organizing principle of a political party. Instead, former Amin people, former Obote politicians and former Democratic Party members are part of the broad-based National Resistance Council (equivalent to Parliament) and the NRM government in various capacities. Over time, he
believes, they will shed their ethnic allegiances especially if a new middle class or entrepreneurial class develops to improve the economic situation with indigenous capital (Personal interviews, September 1990 and April 1992).

When the coup in Burundi took place in October 1993 following their multiparty elections in June 1993, Museveni was quoted as saying that foreign pressure for multiparty elections tied to granting of aid was in part responsible for the coup.

'I was never sure multiparty democracy would work in Burundi'. . . . "The (ethnic) problems in Burundi are well known," he said, adding that these were ignored by Western countries using aid to press Africans to embrace multiparty democracy. 'Western nations have a missionary notion of transplanting their models to Africa," he said. (The Globe and Mail, 23 October 1993)

Museveni thinks that the Western countries are "misguided" in wanting to impose their style of democracy on post-colonial societies. He laments that they know that these countries link their party politics to ethnic divisions and yet they keep insisting on that definition of democracy. Unknown to Museveni, other political analysts, notably the Nicaraguan Andres Pérez has written that Western institutions and their theoretical establishment have an "ahistorical and legalistic view of democracy" which implies transplanting Western notions of democracy and using elections as a form of conflict
resolution. According to Perez, "Promoting the use of elections and other formal mechanisms of conflict resolution in socially fragmented and politically polarized societies . . . might even be counterproductive" (97).

Museveni's own definition of democracy is outlined in the Ten-Point Programme of the NRM:

In our case for democracy to be meaningful and not a mockery, it must contain three elements: Parliamentary democracy, popular democracy and a decent level of living for every Ugandan. In other words, there should be an elected parliament, elected at regular intervals and such elections must be free of corruption and manipulation of the population . . . Democracy in politics however is not possible without a reasonable level of living for all people of Uganda. An illiterate, sick, superstitious Ugandan does not take part in the political life of the country even when there is formal democracy. It is normally the local elite, pandering to the various schemes of the unprincipled factions of the national elite, that manipulate the population on behalf of the latter with bribes, misinformation, taking advantage of their ignorance. Therefore, the NRM must think of democracy in a total context of real emancipation. (7-9)

The above statement was written while Museveni was still in the "bush" fighting the guerrilla war. In subsequent interviews, he has returned to his conception of democracy. While he continued to speak of the above three elements as the essence of democracy, he expanded on what irritates him about the West in insisting on their multiparty democracy.

What I find difficult to agree with the West about is to say that a certain form of democratic participation is
the only form . . . We should let the forms be determined by the existing social conditions. I know that in the West they think that multiparty democracy -- democracy expressed in multiparty form -- is the only form of democracy. I don't think that this is correct. I do not think that multiparty democracy is applicable in a pre-industrial society like ours where there are no (sic) sufficient horizontal linkages in society, where the only forms of stratification are vertical. Tribe A, tribe B, tribe C, no horizontal linkages between these tribes. I therefore think in this type of situation we ought to go for the essence of democracy, regular elections, free press, no restriction on participation but the form should be left for the society to decide. In time, these societies will metamorphose into a new form and into a new society which will permit the different forms of democracy. But as of now, we prefer "mass democracy" as opposed to multiparty democracy. Mass democracy means democracy without parties or it you like, "no-party democracy" . . . The people in Uganda are the ones against parties. The peasants are against parties . . . It is just the elite who on an opportunist basis want to use the very vertical stratifications to get some constituency. Base yourself on tribe, base yourself on religion . . . (Personal interview, April 1992)

What emerges as an alternative is the concept of the "movement" (as opposed to political parties) as the main form of political organization in Ugandan society during what is referred to as a transitional period, a period which may be seen to be challenging the Western cultural hegemony with its transplanted political institutions. The Western colonial legacy when political parties were imposed cannot be easily obliterated. In addition to its continued advocacy by the dominant Western theoretical establishment, academics, human rights activists and major international financial institutions, the colonial discourse still has its Ugandan proponents. They are particularly among the Western-educated
elite who continue to control the political system and the state in spite of the fact that the majority of the population, about 87% of the 17.6 million peoples, are from the peasantry. However, proponents of multiparty politics do not want the issue of the multiparties versus the movement to be put to a referendum (as stipulated in the DRAFT Constitution, December 1992) many believe "because they know that the people will reject them" (The Guardian Weekly, 4 October 1994, and personal interviews).

Political parties continue to exist in Uganda but they are suspended from active political participation. Everyone is part of the National Resistance Movement regardless of their past party affiliations. Candidates stand for elections on the basis of their personal merit in their local community. For the first time in 14 years, national elections were held in March 1994 for the Constituent Assembly which will decide on the future political system for Uganda among other issues. What was apparent in this election was that the legacy of the old political party affiliations was active just below the surface and that the national election was in fact a test of the peoples' support for the Movement.

Many African observers of course question Museveni's concept of democracy. The Zimbabwean Kempton Makamkure takes issue with what he calls "Museveni's denial of the ethnic
factor". Makamkure believes that once you accept the ethnic factor, it ceases to be a problem. He sees Museveni as making a serious mistake in this denial. "One day", he said, "Uganda will explode because Museveni is trying to pretend artificially that there are no ethnic divisions". From my careful observations and discussions with Museveni, I believe that he has misunderstood his position. Of course, he realizes that there are ethnic divisions. In fact, this is precisely why he objects to a multiparty system in Uganda and to Western countries dictating multiparty elections.

Another political theorist and leading Ugandan intellectual discussed earlier, Mahmood Mamdani, dismisses the notion of the "movement", especially as spelled out in the December 1992 Draft Constitution as "the introduction of a single party through the back door" ("Movement or Parties: Which Way Uganda?", The New Vision, 16 February 1993). By making all Ugandans members of the movement, "the 'movement' will really be an organisation of leaders". And, he states, "the consensus this Movement will guarantee will be the result of a legal compulsion, not shared convictions. It will, in fact, be based on a denial of the right to organise in opposition to the policies of this 'movement'". According to Mamdani, "we need to reverse the direction of the colonial reform that brought us an unaccountable party system." Mamdani does not however support the multiparty system.
Museveni counters that what is needed is co-operation between the groups that have been previously divided. The NRM government is in fact a broad-based coalition of different political tendencies, often previously identified with different political parties. The "movement" system, he asserts, promotes co-operation and maximum participation in the governing process by all groups. "Our understanding", he states, "is that the word party is uni-ideological, while a movement is multi-ideological." Given sufficient time to continue the process under guided leadership, he believes an alternative political system will emerge appropriate to the needs of the Ugandan people.

Flowing from Museveni's criticisms of political parties as tied to ethnicity and offseting the inherited definition of these societies and their peoples through the colonizers' perception, especially the introduction of the notion of "tribes" in favoured antagonistic relationships under colonialism, the NRC under Museveni has passed the Anti-sectarian Law in 1989. In the early independence years, political praxis was based on the preferences instituted along tribal lines by the colonizers. The law is designed to quell the upsurge of ethnicity over time to permit the necessary period of healing and development outside of these ethnic divisions. Museveni advocates a contemporary African non-
Western cultural political entity, which will be a "detribalized society". However, his biggest challenge remains how to deal with the legacy of ethnic division manipulated and cultivated during the colonial period which continues to be deep-rooted till today. He links the detribalized nation to the development of other social forces in society, such as the development of industries in an integrated self-sustaining economy. "We are at the periphery of the industrialized world", he asserts, "we are not subsistence as we used to be, but we are not fully integrated in the modern money economy either" (Personal interview, September 1990).

Internal Realities

Museveni though himself formed in the anti-imperialist discourse places more stress on understanding the internal realities of society in order to pursue an emancipatory course. While he pays respect to the nationalist and independence movements, he believes that "independence was hijacked" in part because of the incorrect "diagnosis of our societies. In most cases, we ended up with neo-colonialism". To understand the internal reality of the social organization of society, the "real objective conditions" is paramount in his liberation process. "We cannot keep blaming external factors", he states,

In Uganda when we took government in 1986, we never paid heed to this business of leftist or rightist politics
because we knew that according to our own analysis, all these categorizations were false. They were not scientifically determined, they were just following European models. In Europe . . . there is real social stratification but here it is a different story. The main class are the peasants. There is a middle class in the sense of professionals and people of that kind, but not industrial producers. And some of these middle class, maybe an elite would be a better term, are sons of peasants. Me, I am middle class, but my father is a peasant . . . But we are all living in a pre-industrial culture here. (Personal interview, September 1990)

The complexity of the society Museveni is analyzing becomes apparent in the above quotation. He sees himself as still linked to his rural culture and yet as an intellectual educated into the "middle class". My own sense of his use of "elite" or "middle class" is closer to that of Gramsci when he discusses the direzione leadership as an "elite" (5 and 334). However, what is critical in our analysis is that he is not part of an elite that is divorced in language or in culture from his origins.

When he identifies the structural distortions inherited from colonialism, he cites the distortions in the economy as the

low level of technology and the lack of integration between different economic sectors. Another characteristic of a dislocated economy is the total reliance, for convertible currency earnings, on the export of unprocessed raw materials which continue to lose value as science discovers substitutes for them. (Museveni, 1990, i)
Understanding the internal realities places his analysis in an often contradictory relationship with his liberation pursuit. On the one hand, he recognizes the hegemonic process that has lead to this distorted economic situation; on the other, he sees the way out of this quagmire as linked to transforming the structural distortions through modernization and building the industrial sectors integrated with agricultural development. Is this a break from the Western hegemonic process?

*Indigenous Political Forms*

One of the difficult dilemmas faced by emergent post-colonial leaders is the need to revalorize indigenous political cultural organizations while attempting to build a modern state. The process of decolonization involves the reaffirming of traditional political systems that were aborted or ignored. Museveni's response to this need within Uganda is to allow traditional cultural entities, such as the kingdoms, to continue as "support for cultural revival" in the sense of "our devalued traditions" and "to commemorate our ancestors". He is pragmatic about their role as a mobilizer and yet resolute about not glorifying their past. He often recalls that "the era of the kings was not a golden age. They did not defend us against the colonialists; instead, they collaborated with them".
Museveni confronts their ambiguity within the modern state differently from contemporary advocates who see the revival of traditional cultural institutions as a result of the failure of the post-colonial modern European state and an attempt to recover an important cultural identity usurped by the colonizers. Museveni acknowledges that they were often manipulated in colonial times and then often ruthlessly treated by early nationalists like Obote, who had them banned, exiled and expelled. However, he sees the kingdoms as an "archaic" institution in the sense of Williams, and not a liberating force or in anyway to be involved in politics. He does not believe that the modern state has even happened in Uganda; he sees Uganda as still in a pre-industrial stage as a tribal society. What he advocates is the transformation of this society into a modern industrial society based on a mixed economy and no-party democracy.

Another aspect of this re-examination of indigenous forms, which results from devaluing of indigenous forms of resolution to political conflict that existed in pre-colonial societies, is Museveni's use of traditional African forms of participation in decision-making. He does this through "mass participation" meetings at the grassroots, listening to the stories of people and giving legitimacy to their viewpoints. Meetings at the grassroots Resistance Committee level serve as a counter-force to elite power,
especially that of the Westernized elite. One can dismiss this notion as simply replay of old-style communalism or one can see it as an attempt to capture a traditional African mode of discourse and consensus-building residual in the contemporary political context.

Museveni believes that a leader must assist in policy formulation: help in "inspection, moving around, seeing what is happening, but most of all he should help in mobilization. Talking to people. Talking, talking, talking, talking. That's how the consensus should be generated and maintained" (Personal interview, September 1990). Observation of his movements from 1988 until 1994 confirm that that is his designated praxis. He has formed a broad-based government in which formerly politically hostile factions were brought together under the unifying influence of the NRM. Having them within the government is preferable to continued fighting which "will drain our resources and continue to set us back in terms of development", he affirms (Personal interview, September 1990).

Similarly, in 1988, after many years absence from Uganda, I witnessed President Museveni in discussions with cattlekeepers from the Ankole area who were outlining their problems with squatters, fencing of ranches and thus lack of access to grazing land and water for their cattle. The
discussion took place in the local language and later he suggested that the influence of his father's teachings and practices was still with him. From this and several other encounters, I could see that Museveni's continued organic connection to the rural people in the changing African cultural context contributes to his continuous paradoxical space. His form of leadership is not to be viewed as some romantic notion of a bygone past, when chiefs consulted their subjects. In fact, Museveni has often stated that one must be guarded against romanticizing the traditional African ancestors. However, his complex and often seemingly contradictory viewpoints and praxis suggest his continual working through the hegemonic process.

Non-elite Inclusiveness

In most cases, the colonial state was a rigid centralized power imposed on societies, which made it easier to manipulate and tie into the Western imperial power. Only a small urbanized or Westernized elite generally participated in the state or government. Museveni's response to the problems of the inherited centralized state has been to favour the decentralization of power through the establishment of the Resistance Committee (RC) system. The RCs are the organized mechanism to ensure popular grassroots participation in the state. Each of the 39 districts is divided into five administrative zones: RCI at the village level; RC II at the
Parish level; RC III at sub-county; RC IV at county; and RC V at the district level. There are nine elected seats on each RC with a designated seat for a woman on each of the committees. The RC system brought a new sense of decentralization conceived in terms of power which engaged the rural communities, where resources, decision-making and even judicial judgements are possible at a local rural level. National unity is achieved through the elected representatives from each of the districts to the National Resistance Council (NRC), equivalent to the Parliament.

In order to ensure women's representation in the NRC, each district also elects a woman's representative. Consistent with the agitation for women globally, in Uganda since 1986 women have for the first time become included in all aspects of the reconstruction process. Museveni himself is a strong advocate for women's inclusion in running the state. He appointed a woman as the only Minister of Agriculture in any African country. Similarly he appointed a woman to the sensitive position of Minister for the North. More recently, he and the NRM have appointed a woman as the first Vice-President of Uganda. Some have suggested these moves as political opportunism. However, my discussions and observations with him on the "woman question" suggest a genuine belief in the need for inclusion of all peoples in the democratic process.
What distinguishes his "inclusiveness" from earlier nationalists, particularly in relation to women, social justice, press freedom and human rights issues, is his all-encompassing approach. Even with all its limitations, institutionalizing rural participation in the state political system challenges the hegemonic colonial state. For him, the contemporary democratic movement in most post-colonial societies is simply another stage of the independence movement that was "hi-jacked". Women regard him as a strong advocate of their rights as do the disabled, the elderly and most importantly the rural peasants who were all included in a pro-active way during the 1994 national Constituent Assembly elections.\textsuperscript{20} Though he frequently quarrels with journalists, Uganda has one of the freest and most active medias in any post-colonial society. To date, his praxis of openness, inclusiveness and tolerance has matched his discourse in these areas.

Museveni is realistic and pragmatic enough to know that international power relations depend on modern education, fluency in the colonizer's language and understanding of Western culture. How to reconcile these forces in the context of liberating his society becomes the challenge.\textsuperscript{21} He is organically linked to his people, respecting its culture and reaffirming some of its lost values and meanings. But he is also part of the intellectual political elite in this new
period of post-colonial societies' evolution towards a "second independence". However, from my observations, he is not part of that elite in Africa which "is, in linguistic terms, completely uprooted from the peoples of Africa and tied to the West" (Ngugi, 1993, 38).

**Ambiguous Relationship with the West**

Museveni displays an inner tension with Western hegemony and often expresses this ambiguity with the West through humour. He refers to the BBC as "your European radio", or the British court system still used in Uganda as "white peoples' court system" or the multi-party political system as "Western peoples' political system imposed on us by the donors who do not understand our societies". In fact, he believes that "white people, Western people do not understand Africa. They have a distorted image of Africa which they must correct and it is the equal responsibility of Africans to correct this distorted image" (Personal interview, April 1992). As we saw in Chapter 3, using Bakhtin's notion of parody as a form of resistance to the dominant, Museveni's humour can be seen as resistance discourse.

On the more controversial move of accepting SAPs, Museveni is equally ambiguous. In 1987, there was simply no money, he states. We had to go the international financial markets but on our own terms.

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Without money, we have got the problem of transformation of our economy. The IMF talks of structural adjustment, but there is nothing structural about what they are doing. It is simply manipulating monetary laws. But the structural things are what we are doing. Changing a pre-industrial society into an industrial one, that's real structural transformation. (Personal interview, September 1990)

What is evident here is Museveni's goal to transform this "pre-industrial culture" to "a society based on industrial culture". However, he adds, almost as an afterthought, that "there are some of our old tribal habits that are compatible with modern society, but the aim is transformation all the same". How this discourse and praxis differs from the early nationalists goal of modernization and industrialization will be addressed in our conclusion. Does it signify a break with the political hegemonic domination of the West?

Through the stages of Museveni's political development, reflected in his discourse and praxis from a rebellious youth concerned about his peoples' cattlekeeping practices to radical student leader to guerrilla leader and finally to Head of State, Museveni has to date continued to pursue an emancipatory praxis with apparent contradictions, especially in the sphere of the economy. However, he does not appear to have betrayed his class or social base. The NRM Ten-point Programme for reconstruction of the state echoes his understanding of the complexities that liberation from the legacy of colonialism still presents. However, his
commitment, his organic links and his praxis all reveal an emergent political discourse intent on lifting his people from poverty and "backwardness" (his word). The most critical problem that he continues to face, reminiscent of Gramsci's concern for Italy, is how to achieve national unity while pursuing the hegemony of the labouring people, i.e. the peasantry who constitute over 85% of the population. According to Museveni,

the phenomenon of development has got nothing to do with wearing neckties and driving fast cars. Scientifically defined, it entails the transformation of productive forces, namely science, technology and managerial skills. Failure to do so is tantamount to vulnerability to being dominated by nature and foreigners.

We tend to position Museveni's discourse and praxis on the edge of a break with Western cultural hegemony in its mimicry and imitative form. And yet, it does not signify a break; certainly, he does not advocate "delinking". His search for a real independence or a "second independence" sees him continually confronting the legacy of the the colonial political institutions while at the same time wanting to build a modern, industrial society. Prosperity or progress or modernity still gets defined within the Western hegemonic terrain.
Conclusion

We have posed the question in this chapter as to whether there is a significant break in or challenge to the Western colonial cultural legacy in the political sphere that can be detected by analyzing selectively the political discourse and praxis -- aspects of what we have called the "second independence" -- of post-colonial political leaders, Bishop, Sankara, Rawlings and especially Museveni. Does their oppositional or alternative discourse and praxis signify new meanings, new practices and new relationships with the dominant culture?

Precursors to this emergent discourse were found in the anti-colonial and nationalist discourse, particularly in the thinking of Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral whose emphasis on social programmatic content was reaffirmed in the post-colonial period. Liberation is increasingly analyzed through the reality of the internal objective conditions that are the legacy of colonial penetration. A central concern, growing out of the contradictory notion of nationalism and implanted during the colonial period, is ethnic division. Ethnicity, which is so often manipulated within the modern political system of multiparties, is identified as the root cause of violent political conflict in post-colonial societies.
Ethnicity, too, is a contradictory phenomenon. In the search to reassert one's identity which was emasculated during the colonial period, ethnic or race assertions become more active in the process. Emergent political leaders view such an upsurge as counter to the development of needed national unity. Paradoxically, the search for liberation from colonial hegemony leads to fracturing or removing the dominant -- whether imperialist or ruling class -- while simultaneously tending to introduce more active elements of difference.

Two dominant tendencies appear to be transforming the political sphere, particularly in post-colonial societies. On the one hand, the popular participation impulse where new stirrings and consciousness are widening the space as to what constitutes political. This appears to be a direct engagement and alternative to the elite-nationalism that excluded and narrowed the sphere of the political. On the other hand, the "civilization project" to be modern and progress appears integral to the emergent political discourse of post-colonial leaders. The challenge is to put in practice the popular demands for inclusion, for liberation from poverty while not being assimilated or trapped into the narrow modern, capitalist consumer society.

One of the most interesting features emerging from these political debates is the notion of the "movement" as a form of
political organization within the state. This notion has its political theorists (Kothari and Sheth) who analyze the emergence of the movement as linked to the search for a political alternative to the corrupt, fragile state system imposed by the departing colonialist and to the assertion of political power through popular participation at the grassroots. In addition, the movement organization serves as a counterpoint to political parties which were seen to be divisive and is central to the political praxis and discourse of the emergent political leaders, particularly Museveni of Uganda. Museveni and the NRM in Uganda's attempt at a second independence have evolved the movement political system as open-ended and inclusive. In their search for broad-based politics and what Kothari would similarly call the "common front", as another emerging political alternative, that process has produced the active political movement in Uganda. Unlike the one-party state of the early elite nationalists, particularly under Obote, the movement is multi-ideological in that different political tendencies are encouraged. In that sense, the movement attempts to accentuate national unity without encouraging a central state system. Integral to the movement political system is the decentralization of power, through the RC system in Uganda.

Finally, as we see in the Ugandan case through the political thinking of Museveni, the contemporary notion of the
movement while linked to the liberation process of the nationalist movements or the independence movements differs from them by not being based solely on anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism. In other words, it does not define itself within the framework of the cultural hegemonic terrain of Western colonialism. The movement as an emancipatory political praxis arose out of the rejection of the internal political terror and near anarchy by elite nationalists and other "neo-colonialists". It is an alternative to ethnic division but defined through social programmatic content, particularly the NRM's Ten-point Programme. The movement as part of the state system and not resting outside of it as in the case of social movements presents one of the most original tendencies for a breakthrough as an alternative political system. How the movement political system can sustain itself in order to transform the inherited state becomes a primary challenge for emergent political leaders in their search for a second independence.

Another component or tendency in the emergent political leadership discourse is the re-examination of pre-colonial political institutions for their residual relevance to contemporary political systems. Devaluing pre-colonial forms of political organization under colonialism and during the early period of elite nationalists has prompted a worldwide resurgence of indigenous political forms. At times, these
institutions may be liberating (for example, the panchayats in India). However, in other cases, this tendency has led to archaic institutions being reasserted. The most obvious is the reinstitution of kingdoms in several post-colonial countries, especially in Uganda. Kingdoms are regarded by emergent political leaders, and certainly by Museveni, as an important cultural entity to pay respect to the ancestors but ought not to be given power within the emerging modern political state. In that sense, kingdoms are an archaic institution without emancipatory potential in the political sphere.

Emergent political leaders have a firm grasp of dominant alternative political thinking that is part of the new consciousness and transformation tendencies worldwide. Liberating their societies from the destructive cultural forces that have saturated them since colonial times is not an easy task. Their challenge is to link their "modern project" with the counter-culture or counter-hegemonic forces within the West and within other post-colonial societies. As we have attempted to illustrate, there are emergent political leaders who are on the edge of this break. We now want to examine in our concluding chapter these emerging intellectual formations in the three domains in a comparative way. Do their intellectual challenges present an emancipatory potential for post-colonial societies and break from the hegemony?
ENDNOTES

1. There is a considerable literature which deals with the state and various combinations of state organizations imposed by the colonizers. See for Africa, the books by Arrighi and Saul 1973; Bayart 1992; Bernstein and Campbell 1985; Gutkind and Wallerstein 1976; Leys 1974; Mamdani 1976; and Shivji 1976; for Asia, see Kothari 1970 and 1976; and for Latin America and Caribbean, see Rodney 1981; E. Williams 1970; Frank 1967 and Petras 1973.

2. See Genoud, 1969 for an early exposé and insightful understanding of the limits of the anti-colonial nationalist response.

3. For example, a range of very early popular uprisings as forms of resistance to colonial intervention especially in the 18th and 19th centuries is also important antecedent resistance discourse. As long as there has been subjugations of peoples in this long imperialist conquest, there has been resistance. See the work of Ranajit Guha and others such as Chatterjee, Adas, Ellis, Kanongo, Ranger and Redmond, who are involved in reassessing the historical record of early anti-colonial uprisings. As this thesis focuses primarily on contemporary post-colonial resistance discourse, I want simply to acknowledge the importance of this early discourse and praxis of insurgency. Adas, for example, analyzes five rebellions spanning over 100 years within various regions where European colonialists attempted to impose their political hegemony.

4. We cite this point for two reasons. First, it becomes increasingly important to analyze internal realities and formations within states for contemporary emergent intellectuals, such as Museveni. Secondly, it also suggests that Marxism as a discourse of resistance was limited, especially as it had little to say about race and ethnicity, says Lewis. In fact, Nandy goes further and states that Marx's views "contributed to the racist world view and ethnocentrism that underlay colonialism" (1983, 13).

5. Again, see Genoud for a discussion of the contradictions in Nkrumah's modernization policy in Ghana or Leys for a discussion of Kenya and Kenyatta or Wilson regarding the process of modernization in Sri Lanka.

6. See also the critique of négritude by Depestre citing its narrowness and ahistorical essentialism. There is also a link to be made with Museveni's early critique of "Black Powerism" contained in his letter to me in 1978, cited in the second
part of this chapter when discussing the early roots of his understanding of the limits of the "ethnic thing".

7. There is a vast literature on the limits of nationalism. Two books may be mentioned which draw attention to the main issues we are highlighting: Fanon's Wretched of the Earth and Munck's The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism, especially 110-12.

8. The Mau Mau struggle as re-interpreted by Kanogo, discussed more fully in the previous chapter, illustrates just one example of many in this distortion of peoples' struggles by the hegemonic culture.

9. Kothari's discussion (1982) of the non-party political formations suggests that there is a new political climate which is attempting to locate the foundations for an alternative polity in a seemingly contradictory process of a "tottering state" and the demands from below for a more decentralized system.

10. Gandhi most ardently recognized that "the largest popular element of the nation was the peasantry" (Chatterjee, 100). However, his discourse though remaining residual was marginalized by the dominant elite nationalists who took power.

11. These contradictory tendencies for Ghana under Rawlings are well presented in Rothchild 1991. This book concludes that after a succession of military regimes with brief efforts at civilian rule, Ghana's economy was in ruin. Because there were no other acceptable alternatives, Ghana like Uganda later succumbed to the pressure to accept SAPs. Jeffries in that book believes "that despite Rawlings's ostentatious personal anti-capitalist sentiments all too commonplace throughout Africa, his popularity in Ghana is singularly personal and not programmatic". Others do not see him as anti-capitalist at all.

12. Korten 1990 lists seven hypocritical assumptions that riddle the key policy prescriptions recommended under structural adjustment (56). Essentially, the theoretical assumptions are based on an industrial country model found in the West.

13. Gandhi, Nehru and Kenyatta all lived abroad. Nkrumah, for example, had lived for 12 years in the U.K and U.S.A. before he took power in Ghana (see Nkrumah 1968).

14. Similar to what we demonstrated in the previous chapter, the location of exiled intellectuals often determines the degree of continued organic involvement in liberation
struggles. Political intellectuals, exiled but remaining within their regions, are more likely to be organically connected to the struggles of their people when compared with those who opt to live in exile in a country in the West. The latter often construct a mythical notion of their country or as Benedict Anderson refers to it "imagined communities".

15. Chatterjee also makes this point in his discussions of anti-colonial nationalists whom, he states, used the framework of the colonizers own discourse.

16. For more detailed assessments of Museveni and the NRM once in power, see the articles by Boyd (1989) and Mamdani (1988).

17. See Mamdani 1992, especially 313-15 for a discussion of the introduction of multiparty politics in most African countries at the time of independence which resulted in the "simplistic equating of a multiparty system with democracy" or "pluralism".

18. Several of the points that Museveni has discussed privately with me over the years have also appeared in published interviews. See for example, the interview by Chief Ad'Obe Obe "A Revolutionary with a Cause" which appeared in Africa Forum (1:2, 1991).

19. "Mass" is used here in the sense of the common people, the marginalized poor and not as some amorphous undifferentiated group.

20. See the 1994 Report on the Constituent Assembly elections by the International Women's Observer Group of which Boyd was the co-ordinator.

21. In his small book The Path of Liberation, Museveni asks: "liberation against what?" He responds by stating: "The liberation of our people from all forms of domination by, first of all, nature, by fellow men, and liberation from ignorance and superstition. . . . The African people have lived for years in bondage under foreign rulers. . . . When a man elsewhere is going into conquering the mysteries of outer space, we are unable to solve the most elementary problems . . . We are unable to get for ourselves, independently, clean water, solve energy problems or stop our children from dying of preventable diseases" (i).

22. See also the sections "Whose Law?" and "Liberating Law" in Museveni's Speeches, 36-37.
Chapter 5
CONCLUSION: Intellectuals on the Edge

Theoretical Implications of the Study

We have sought in this study to elaborate the new intellectual formations that are emerging in post-colonial societies as a response to Western cultural hegemonic practices. Social and intellectual processes act and react in real situations of struggle and ferment. The emergent intellectual tendencies that we have analyzed in our three domains of inquiry -- education, narrative art and political praxis -- suggest that some intellectual restructuring is taking place in post-colonial societies, which is connected to the restructuring that is emerging globally. There is a perceived transformation of the established intellectual order which has for so long asserted the dominance of Western rationality and Eurocentric processes of thought. The challenges that are unhinging or fracturing that dominant discourse are coming from the so-called "marginal cultural orders" (Cocks, 29), those sites of intellectual actuality that dominant Western culture has consistently denied, ignored or suppressed.
While the dimensions of hegemonic power through imperialist conquest are numerous and most overtly demonstrated in the economic and political sphere, our inquiry has asserted the importance of cultural practices and processes as especially active and key in post-colonial societies' quest for liberation. Our cultural emphasis stems from the theoretical understanding of Gramsci, Williams and Said, and is grounded by our actual observations and discussions in post-colonial societies. Such hegemonic processes are seldom direct or coercive but rather are exerted over the areas of societies' identifications, meanings and values. The dominant discourse as dominant culture has all the advantages of being deeply entrenched over time, highly diffused into the cultural habits of daily life and of ensuring the collaboration of those that are marginal or subjugated.

But as Williams and Said remind us, no hegemonic process is all-inclusive. "There is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society" (Said 1983, 246-47). Part of that process is unconscious and unknowable. It is an "urge", an "impulse" or a spark to provoke resistance that resides in the experiences and thoughts, the "practical consciousness" born out of experiential knowledge and not consistent with received wisdom or officialdom. Bakhtin's notion of "internally persuasive
discourse", discourse that is outside of "official consciousness" works as the theoretical underpinning for our understanding of the actualities that are in process in post-colonial societies. There is a range of other experiences, other ways of viewing, and another sense of cultural processes that are actively part of post-colonial societies and are the "enabling condition of resistance" (Cocks, 65).

These other "languages and cultures" may live residually over a long period of time only to reassert themselves actively in the present. Such processes may also be in contradictory relationships at different historical times. What we have identified are tendencies and processes that are not easily classifiable as they are still in process. The struggle for liberation from the hegemonic process is still in process in post-colonial societies. However, what is evident are the fragmentary tendencies here and there that led us to new intellectual formations that are taking shape, particularly in three separate but overlapping domains.

Comparing our Three Domains of Inquiry

Within each of the three cultural domains, we were able to identify a range of tendencies in intellectual processes that are indeed challenging Western cultural hegemonic processes. At first, we illustrated the general tendencies
that were emerging to give shape to new emergent intellectual formations within post-colonial societies. Then, we focused on specific intellectuals as "illuminative instances" in order to ground our analysis more concretely. They are viewed as representations of the collective consciousness of resistance and affirmation.

In the educational sphere, institutionalized knowledge, the canons of dominant Western culture that permeate post-colonial universities, is being slowly eroded by pockets of resistance within the universities and other systematic intellectual alternatives. The process is not yet as active within the hegemonic institution itself as it is outside of it. There are networks of intellectuals in all regions of post-colonial societies who are in associations or autonomous centres and who are validating other ways of viewing, other forms of authority for their analysis, and are giving new meanings to indigenous cultural orders. Susantha Goonatilake has done this in a systematic way through his published texts, such as Crippled Minds and Aborted Discovery. More recently, he has also been able to identify active networks of intellectuals who are affirming indigenous forms of scientific knowledge, what he refers to as "regional civilizations", that are slowly emerging from within post-colonial societies as contemporary active phenomena and not as "fossilized" knowledge.
Similarly, we have identified a range of tendencies that are evident in writers who are attempting to confront the hegemony in the fibres of the self through narrative art. While these tendencies are various, complex and even at times contradictory within the resistance text itself, our focus on the emancipatory process of Ngugi wa Thiong'o led us to the central issue of language. Fundamental to his break with Western cultural hegemonic processes is his break with the imperialist language that saturated his consciousness even in the process to construct the liberating text. But unlike Goonatilake, who sees other knowledges will enrich and enlarge but not supplant the dominant Western knowledge systems, Ngugi asserts a more intimate connection between his thought processes and his action of writing. His intellectual choice is to write in Gikuyu to affirm his personal liberation and his connection to the struggles of the workers and peasantry to liberate themselves from neo-colonialism. And yet, paradoxically, he like Goonatilake lives in forced exile within the imperialist terrain.

Our third domain of inquiry, the political sphere of cultural hegemonic practice and discourse, appears in many ways the most complex and the most contradictory to illustrate. Yet, in the end, the emancipatory discourse and practice of Yoweri Museveni we would judge to be the closest to a break with Western cultural hegemonic process when
comparing the three representative intellectuals. All three of the domains reach back into the past meanings and values of their indigenous cultures in order to assert another interpretation of history, one that places central value on the indigenous experiences and processes of post-colonial peoples. And yet, Museveni is the least touched by the cultural hegemonic terrain, in part because of his continuous location within his society which affords him a more truly organic connection with indigenous cultural meanings, values and orders. While he has an ambiguous relationship with the West, it is a shallow and mythical West that he confronts not one that has saturated his way of viewing. His self-identification is unrelentingly rooted within his African cultural ways without having an unrealistic sense of his ancestral past or his pragmatic need to deal with Western hegemonic processes.

Museveni, however, is a strong advocate of continued use and teaching of African languages which, according to him, contain the wisdom and teachings of the ancestors linking to an organic understanding of nature and the environment. Unlike Ngugi who makes a conscious intellectual choice to delink through language in order to break, Museveni does not see his core sensibility as infused with Western values and norms. The intimate connection between his thought and action, even though seemingly within a Western hegemonic cultural framework
of the inherited colonial state, suggests in part what Ahmad alluded to, that his praxis is only marginally relating to the dominant Western cultural processes. However, it is evident that he is increasingly drawn into the dominant discourse of the West as he attempts a transition of the political system in Uganda and of the economic productive forces.

The dynamic of the processes that I have outlined and analyzed in this thesis does not always lead to predictable results. There are discontinuities, contradictions and paradoxes in the processes that suggest not a deterministic or mechanical outcome. The three "illustrative instances" have not always maintained their liberating or emancipatory praxis. Both Ngugi and Goonatilake live in self-imposed exile in the West as they fear for their lives if they returned to their homeland. Museveni has tried to distance himself and his movement from the neo-colonial policies and practices as refracted by the international community which is dominated by Western hegemonic practices, trying to remain consistent with the broad elements of the NRM Ten-Point Programme. But the reality of his situation is that there are still, after eight years in power, only broad hints of this transition. Neo-colonial or imperialist or Western hegemonic tendencies still dominate the practices and values of the everyday Ugandans such that Museveni himself as part of the dirigente leadership stratum is increasingly at odds with that society.
Paradoxically, his greatest obstacle is to exercise an emancipatory praxis through discourse within Ugandan society itself.

For example, while he restored the cultural institutions as a way of affirming indigenous culture that was previously devalued, he did not expect that the process would lead to archaic institutions, institutions that he believes are part of Uganda's "backwardness", wanting to assert themselves as part of the political power. Can he and other political intellectuals continue to assist in asserting a counter-hegemonic discourse that will break with the cultural hegemonic meanings and interpretations that infuse his society?

Our challenge has been to illustrate the intellectual tendencies and resulting intellectual formations that are emerging as alternatives to the old, established order. Yet, our intellectual formations are in some sense only "at the very edge of semantic availability" (Williams, 1971, 134). They are fragmented, showing themselves only "in process" and often simply suggestive. The contradictory signals from our three representative intellectuals of these emergent intellectual formations make any definitive pronouncement on their break with the hegemonic difficult. Rather, we conclude by acknowledging that these intellectuals, and the emergent
intellectual formations of which they are part, are occupying ambivalent terrain, neither predominantly hegemonic nor suggestive of a breakthrough. However, the ambivalent terrain as a form of intellectual tension is itself suggestive of the opportunity for a breakthrough.

Ambivalent Terrain

The global cultural project is still very active in the form of "modernity" which is defined primarily by consumerism and capitalism or industrialization. Counter-hegemonic forces, especially in the form of social movements, are part of global challenges to this narrow, exclusive meaning of "modernity". There are various other worldwide counter-tendencies that are connected to internal resistance processes within post-colonial societies. They are not visible nor easily classifiable but they are there active in the processes that we have described. Sometimes residual, it is resistance that has consistently shown itself in different discourses around nationalism and liberation movements, discourse that has unearthed hidden meanings and interpretations to historical events previously interpreted only by the hegemonic, discourse that continually is rediscovering the values and wisdom in indigenous systems of knowledge.
What makes the struggle for liberation from Western cultural hegemonic processes take place on "ambivalent terrain" is that on the one hand, these new intellectual formations identify liberation as part of being modern, being progressive. They want their societies to be lifted from poverty, for their peoples to receive universal education, and to benefit from the well-being as full citizens of their societies, with meaningful histories, values and self-identifications related to their indigenous cultures. In other words, they want "modernity" to be infused with some other values apart from capitalism and consumerism.

On the other hand, "modernity" has its consequences, to borrow from the title of the book by Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. The environmental or ecological degradation, the corruption of the nation-state as a political system, and the increased militarization of the state are all intimately connected to industrialization processes which have dominated the modern era. All of our new intellectual formations look to a future that sees their post-colonial societies developed and prosperous, yet they are wary of the dominant model given, the Western industrial complex. "When we speak of modernity, however, we refer to institutional transformations that have their origins in the West. How far is modernity distinctively Western?" (Giddens, 1990, 174). Herein lies the question to
our ambivalent terrain in which our three emergent intellectuals situate themselves.

Is it possible to pursue an emancipatory quest, a quest for liberating human potential from the suffocating blanket of Western cultural hegemony and still pursue "modern" goals and values? What will be the intellectual structure of the cultural affirmation that lies beyond resistance struggles? We will have learned something of such affirmation by locating Goonatilake, Ngugi and Museveni, all of whom have asserted the self-identification of their knowledge systems, their cultural meanings and values in a transformed and transforming context.
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