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Two French Threats to North America, 1760-1783, as Seen by British Colonial Officials

Peter Macfarlane

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

History

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada

March 1999

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Abstract

Two French Threats to North America, 1760-1783,
as Seen by British Colonial Officials

Peter Macfarlane

This thesis considers two aspects of colonial history which never seem to have been
given the appropriate amount of attention in overall histories of the time period involved,
1763-1783. The first subject deals with the failure of British policy for the territories west
of the 1763 Proclamation Line. The events which led up to Pontiac's 1763 rebellion are
covered, beginning with the surrender of New France by the Marquis de Vaudreuil to
General Amherst on September 8th, 1760. Attention is given to the rebellion itself,
followed by an account of the difficulties experienced by the British in their efforts to
occupy the Illinois Country. The efforts of Major-General Gage, the Commander in Chief,
to obtain firm policy directives are also covered. The second subject is General
Haldimand's defence of Canada, 1778-1783. In addition to the perceived French threat to
Canada, the multitude of problems Haldimand also had to deal with are presented, not
the least of which were his communications with England, together with the unreliability of
his overland contacts with General Clinton, which took his agents through hostile territory.
Particular attention has been given to the successful deception of Haldimand by
Washington as to the objective of his 1779 campaign. Finally, the last two chapters of
the thesis are devoted to the Haldimand Negotiations with Vermont which took place
between 1780 and 1782. Their purpose was to try to entice that [at the time] independent
republic to rejoin the British empire.
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PREFACE

In 1961, on the Saturday before Labor Day, I drove the Pennsylvania Turnpike from just east of Pittsburgh to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Whilst I vaguely remembered from my junior matriculation history that the British had captured Fort Duquesne in 1758, I knew nothing of the difficulties General Forbes had experienced in transporting his army and supplies across the Appalachians. Whether the Turnpike follows the route of the old Forbes Road, I know not, but I still recall the undulations of the route, and can imagine the tremendous challenge Forbes must have faced.

Later that year I found myself in South Bend, Indiana, on business, and recall stopping my car to go to take a look at an Historic Marker. It announced that a French Explorer [La Salle, I think] had passed that way in 1679 [as far as I recall]. My reaction was:

How in the dickens did he get here? We are hundreds of miles from Montreal.

At the time circumstances were such that the concept of studying for a degree in history was conspicuous by its absence.

Having by now settled into the routine of living in and working out of New York City, I found myself from time to time visiting a colleague who was living in Old Tappan, New Jersey. On various occasions we patronized a hostelry called
'The Speech House,' where he took great delight on our first visit in pointing out to me the upstairs room where the British spy Major André had spent the night before he was hung. Forbes, La Salle and André, these three names, in one way or another, all play a part in the thesis that follows.

Returning to Canada in 1964, I found myself early the next year a member of a Canadian Government Trade Mission to the Far East. One of the trade commissioners at the Singapore post was named Hazen and I remember his remarking how his family had been one of those which had migrated to Canada from the United States at the close of the Revolutionary War. Yet another name that was destined to appear in this thesis. By now, the reader may realize that individual occasions seem to have been conspiring in my life to lead to the document that follows.

The other significant event in the 1960s that plays a part in what follows was my first visit to Fort Ticonderoga. What I remember particularly was driving the car to the top of the mountain to which Burgoyne's engineers dragged guns in 1777, whence they could lob cannon balls down into the fort below, which was a sitting duck of a target.

Two significant events took place in the second half of the 1970s. In 1976, I enrolled in evening classes in French and Spanish at Concordia University and, in the following year, I applied for admission to the Honours program in the History Department. The other happening arose as a result of
wanderings in my automobile around northern Vermont; now and again I would run across historic markers which stated that the Bayley-Hazen Military Road passed by here [or words to that effect]. After numerous unsuccessful enquiries in the Burlington area, my recollection is that it was in the library at Essex Junction that I discovered the route of the road lay to the east of the Green Mountains.

The road began at a place which today is called Wells River; it was not continued beyond Hazen's Notch, where there is a marker to indicate its termination point. The plan had been to continue the road to St. John's Quebec, via Swanton, Vermont; work on it ceased in 1779 when, among other things, it was realized the British could just as easily send scouting parties down the road as the Americans could send them northwards. There is more than one reference to this road in The Haldimand Papers. Between Ryegate and Mosquitoville there is a nine-mile straight stretch which just takes no account of the contours of the land, in the fashion of the roads of the Roman Empire.

For a variety of reasons, little activity took place in the 1980s, as far as visits to places and sites of historic interest were concerned. However, I do remember sitting outside the Valcour Inn [just south of Plattsburgh, New York] one October evening in 1984 and remarking to my companion all of a sudden:

Good heavens! from here to that island over there is where Benedict Arnold drew up his fleet in 1776.

Once again, that eerie feeling that somehow I was meant to visit the place!
By 1992, I had decided that if I were to be accepted for the graduate history program, I wanted to investigate some aspect[s] of colonial North American history between 1763 and 1783 in general and of Quebec in particular. I had arrived in Montreal from England in 1959, and before departing in 1961 to spend three years in the United States, the province of Quebec had begun to show signs of increasing activity in the realm of nationalist feelings. The death of Maurice Duplessis in August 1960 would seem to have opened the door to a more open display of them. I had never understood why the presence of a strong Franco-Québécois axis had not been more evident. In my naiveness, I had always assumed that France would have wanted to reacquire Quebec had opportunity ever presented itself. The only time some Frenchmen did was between 1778 and 1783.

In any case, having been accepted for the graduate program, the years from 1992 have seen a return visit to a different section of the Bayley-Hazen road, two visits to Ile aux Noix, quite a few to Chambly and St. John's, a visit to Fort Ticonderoga, as well as a long delayed trip to Crown Point in 1997, which served to emphasize the strategic importance of its position. The preceding recollections have assisted me to prepare the Introduction to the thesis which follows.
INTRODUCTION

Much have I travelled in the realms of gold,
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen; [1]

My initial thesis subject was intended to be: "The French Threat to Canada, 1763-1783, As Seen by the British Governors." Because France and Spain felt humiliated by the terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, they began to plan a war of 'revanche' against England almost as soon as the ink was dry on the treaty. My preconceived vision was of a Canada swarming with French agents despatched from 1763 onwards.

Although Choiseul, France's foreign minister, did send French agents to the British colonies between 1763 and 1768, the last one being the Baron de Kalb, nothing resulted from the intelligence they had gathered. Indeed, when de Kalb returned to France in 1768, he found the foreign minister's enthusiasm for attempting to stir up trouble in the colonies had waned, probably because he was entertaining the possibility of an invasion of England instead. With that end in view, between 1768 and 1770, he sent two agents on separate occasions to spy out the English coast and to recommend a suitable place for a landing. [2]

After further reading I discovered that there had indeed been a French threat to British North America, but that it had come from the French settlers in the west, beyond what was to become the 1763 Proclamation Line. The most
important studies of this topic were H.H. Peckham's *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* [1947] and Jack Sosin's article on "The French Settlements in British Policy for the North American Interior, 1760-1774" in *The Canadian Historical Review* [1958].

But in general, this western threat appears to have gotten very short thrift in scholarly historical books on British rule in Canada. In his seminal work, *The Old Province of Quebec* [1933], A.L. Burt devoted little attention to Pontiac, arguing the latter's rebellion was not a part of Canadian history. My contention is that since the Quebec Act of 1774 restored to Quebec the boundaries that essentially belonged to it before the 1763 Treaty of Paris, his book would have been strengthened had he done so. Of course, it has to be conceded that Burt began his research in the early 1920s; Peckham's book was almost a generation later, by which date many more volumes of papers pertaining to the 1760-1783 period had been edited and published.

Interwoven with Pontiac's uprising is the fact of the failure of the British attempt to employ a standing army to govern the newly acquired territories west of the 1763 Proclamation Line. In this context, Sosin's article led me to informative and interesting correspondence in *The Journal of Jeffrey Amherst*, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, and *The Correspondence of General Gage*. It became clear that however successful Amherst had been in directing
the armies that drove the French from North America, his policies, when it came to dealing with the Indians, were those of a dunderhead. Amherst's arrogance, racial prejudice, and failure to either appreciate or understand the intelligence reports he received from the field made a significant contribution to the failure of British policy.

Although Amherst had departed for England in November 1763, never to set foot on the North American continent again, such was the extent of Indian discontent that the British were facing a full-blown Indian uprising by 1773. The difficulties of dealing with realities in the west are clearly revealed in the correspondence of Amherst's successor [Major General Gage]. The years 1760 to 1770 saw seven different British ministries and progressive restriction on the budget assigned to manage the Western territories. How could a consistent policy have been developed for the North American colonies, especially in view of the fact that the turnaround time for correspondence was at the very least four months?

The first part of the thesis deals with these challenges and the failure of British policy for the North American Interior. An effort has been made to understand the British political party system at this time, and to examine the various ministries and British foreign policy from 1763 to the end of the Revolutionary War. Although Britain had won the Seven Years' War
resoundingly, because of the inept diplomacy initiated by George III late in 1760, it promptly proceeded to lose the peace and found itself without any strong ally in Europe through 1783. [3]

Although the French threat was marginal from 1763-1778, the confusion and lack of direction in British policy had serious consequences for the administration of the colonies and made the British position more vulnerable than it need have been. One graphic example occurred in 1775, the year in which the Quebec Act came into force. By the end of that year, Montreal had surrendered to invading American forces and Quebec City was under siege. At the end of the following June [1776], the army of the rebellious colonies had been driven out of Canada; Governor Carleton and his considerable forces reached Crown Point on Lake Champlain by November and then retired to winter quarters in Canada. The following year saw the failure of Burgoyne's campaign, culminating in the surrender of his army at Saratoga [October 1777].

Although Carleton resigned the governorship of Canada in 1777, it was not until the end of June 1778 that his successor, General Haldimand, arrived at Quebec to take up his duties. The previous February France had openly sided with the rebelling colonists. As a consequence, there were those in Quebec who arose out of their fifteen year torpor, and began to dream of returning to French allegiance. For some, this dream was encouraged by the
presence of the French nobleman, the Marquis de Lafayette, who was serving as a Major General in the American forces, and who constantly expressed his desire to lead a French army in an invasion of Canada. Although the fulfilment of this wish was not in the cards, Lafayette was an important asset to the Americans in the presentation of their cause to the French court. Their subsequent adulation of him after peace was achieved is an indication of the important contribution he had made to their cause in the War of Independence. [4]

Nevertheless, in hindsight, it is clear that French policy, whatever the rebelling colonies may have thought about conquering and acquiring Canada, was to assist them to acquire their independence within their territorial boundaries at the beginning of their struggle. Expansion of territory was not in the cards. It was obvious Vergennes sensed intuitively the potential threat of American imperialism. Strive for British retention of Canada and let the ancient enemy bear the ensuing cost! [5]

Whatever the reality, there is no doubt that Governor Haldimand took the French threat seriously, as indicated by the documentary evidence in the primary sources. Yet, once again, there did not appear to be sufficient information to justify a full thesis on this subject. By extending the scope of the research, however, it was possible to contextualize Haldimand's handling of
this situation in relation to other phantom threats and initiatives with which he had to deal.

These were Washington's 1779 campaign in which, in masterful fashion, he deceived Haldimand as to its real objective. The other was Haldimand's negotiations with Vermont, at that time an independent republic. The object of the negotiations was to entice Vermont to rejoin the British empire. Haldimand's instructions to undertake them had come from London, and I think it fair to say he was promised a fair amount of latitude in the conduct of said negotiations. The second part of the thesis therefore deals with three topics pertaining to Haldimand's governorship during the period 1778-1783, namely, the French threat as seen by him, Washington's 1779 campaign and the Haldimand negotiations with Vermont.

Volume III of *A History of the Organization, Development and Services of the Military and Naval Forces of Canada* [1919-1920] is an account of Haldimand's stewardship as governor. Furthermore, it is endowed with more than two hundred and fifty illustrative documents culled from primary sources. These documents were the foundation stone both of my work on the French threat as seen by Haldimand and the British point of view on the negotiations with Vermont.

Washington's deception of Haldimand with regard to his 1779 campaign
was based on the account in John Oliver Dendy's dissertation on Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada, 1778-1784 [1972] which, in turn, led to The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 [1931 onwards]. Washington managed to keep Haldimand guessing as to which of the five potential invasion threats was the real one. Volume XIX of the same set [printed 1937] also revealed that Washington was aware that something was about to transpire between the British and Vermont.

The account of the Haldimand Negotiations has been based on an address given by Henry Steele Wardner to a public meeting of the Vermont Historical Society on the subject published in the Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, New Series, Vol. II [1931]. Reinforcing the information contained in this address was corroborating detail in Volume III of A History of the Organization, etc.

Obviously, to feel confident to deal with the particular subjects discussed in the whole thesis, it proved necessary to acquire a somewhat broader appreciation of North American colonial history, more especially that of the Franco-British struggle for mastery of the continent east of the Mississippi. I began by looking at the Iroquois and the significance of their relationships with both the British and the French, and especially the importance of the Covenant Chain to the former. More important than the War of the Spanish Succession
[Queen Anne's War] and the War of the Austrian Succession [King George's War] was the part played by the Indians in the clashes between the British and the French in the Ohio Valley after the 1748 treaty which ended King George's War. These clashes led to the Seven Year's War [French-Indian War], a war which both the British and French initially made strong efforts to avoid. [6]

With regard to the second part, there were many subjects on which it was felt necessary to acquire a good working knowledge. The first was an appreciation of Quebec history in general from 1775 to 1785. Secondly, the sequence of military events from the 1775 capture of Ticonderoga by the colonists to Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in October 1777 had to be understood in the broader context of military events in New York and the Northern Department as a whole. By examining the interplay of events in England, France, Spain and North America, it was possible to develop a wider, transnational and transcontinental appreciation of the war and the complicated manoeuvering that went on with respect to the peace negotiations. [7]

My decision to look into the two main topics considered, namely the trouble caused by the French settlers west of the Proclamation Line and the French threat as seen by Haldimand during his governorship evolved as corollaries of the topic I had originally intended to investigate. As James Henretta pointed out in Salutary Neglect: Colonial Administration under the
Duke of Newcastle [1972], the evidence is clear that Britain, under George II, was too involved with Europe to realize how conditions were changing in North America. During his long tenure of office as Secretary of State for Southern Affairs, Newcastle adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards the colonies, as a result of which the British government appears to have been caught off guard when it tried to start running the much expanded empire on a tight reign from London after the 1763 Treaty of Paris.

Amherst himself contributed to the 1763 situation when, in the 1760 Montreal surrender terms, he allowed the French to hold on to their properties, a concession that remained unaltered in the subsequent peace treaty. Allowing this was reasonable enough for that part of Quebec where a French majority was settled, but was to cause havoc where the French were settled in Indian territory. Furthermore, the reduction of the boundaries of Quebec was a mistake as was the failure to give Murray command of the troops stationed in Quebec even if, in that capacity, he had had to report to Gage. The majority of the evidence points to a complete failure of British colonial and, in many cases, foreign policy after 1763. After all, between 1763 and 1783, Britain found itself without a major ally in Europe. In its previous eighteenth century wars with France, the Balance of Power concept had prevailed.

What is revealed by examining the second subject is that the British
never appeared to be able to formulate policies that, on an overall basis, stood up to vigorous analyses. Their failure to rock the boat between 1776 and 1778 with the French, when surely their intelligence must have alerted them to the activities of Beaumarchais, is an indication of inept diplomacy. And then the Canadian campaign of 1776, which could have ended the troubles, was only half-successful in the sense that although it cleared Canada of rebelling colonial troops, it was delayed long enough so that it proved inadvisable to occupy Ticonderoga in November of that year, even if it had been feasible.

The main topic of the second subject, namely, the French threat to Canada as seen by Haldimand, involves two givens. The first one is that the navigation of the St. Lawrence was closed from the beginning of December until May. The only routes open were overland from Halifax or New York. Consequently, whereas Clinton in New York received his despatches from England on a regular basis, Haldimand in Quebec City was limited to the season from May [at the earliest] to October, assuming any overland agent despatched with information did not make it. The second is that Haldimand appeared to have often received intelligence reports that conflicted, many of which were based on hearsay. There is also no doubt that Haldimand had the problem of dealing with what was obviously an effective 'Fifth Column,' on which it proved extremely difficult to obtain convincing proof of treason. [8]
Nevertheless, it would seem that Haldimand treated suspects with a velvet
glove rather than a mailed fist.

With regard to Washington's 1779 campaign, his letter of January that
year indicates the woeful state to which the resources of the colonies had been
reduced. In the same year, the grandiose French-Spanish plans for an
invasion of England flopped. Fortunately for the Americans Lafayette had
returned to Europe and had held an important appointment in the invasion
army. Once this army had been disbanded, the Marquis had aided the
colonies' cause by lobbying effectively and successfully for military aid to be
sent to North America in 1780. He was disappointed he was not appointed to
the command of the French expedition, but his relatively junior rank in the
French army precluded such an appointment.

Two hundred years later, I think the jury is still out on the aims of the
Vermonters who were responsible for conducting the Haldimand Negotiations.
Were they sincere or did they just want the unofficial truce they obtained for the
1781 campaigning season? It would seem that there was a sharp division
between Vermonters who lived east and west of the Green Mountains. The
Connecticut River [to the east] ran south; to the west the Richelieu River flowed
north out of Lake Champlain into Canada. The negotiations were conducted,
under the cloak of arranging an exchange of prisoners, by those living to the
west, for whom the natural route for their exports was north into Canada.

In view of the attitude of the western Vermonters after the 1783 peace treaty, when they lobbied Haldimand vigorously for the right to trade with Quebec, my opinion is that they were sincere. However, Haldimand's hands were tied by the terms of the peace treaty which ceded the territory in which Vermont was situated to the United States. Significantly, although Vermont was admitted to the United States in 1791, it was not until 1822, when the Champlain-Hudson canal was completed, that it obtained an easy route to the south for its exports. Furthermore, in spite of what the British were reputedly offering via Haldimand's negotiators, my further opinion is that Vermont's terms for readmission to the British Empire would have been such that no British parliament would have agreed to them. As an example, I am convinced Vermont would never have agreed to the appointment of a British governor appointed from London, although there is evidence that Ethan Allen and Philip Skene were good friends in the 1760s, and Skene at one time might have been acceptable.

This thesis is a journey back into colonial history. Many of the topics have been dealt with more than adequately on an individual basis. The glory days of these efforts would have appeared to be the 1960s extending into the 1970s. It is important to appreciate that it was at the end of the 1950s when
the infallibility of Francis Parkman's accounts of the one hundred and fifty year-old Franco-British struggle for supremacy on the North American continent were first challenged. One can make a plausible case that the opening salvo was fired by the late Professor Eccles in the paper he gave at the 1958 Canadian Historical Association Annual meeting at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, entitled 'The History of New France According to Frances Parkman.' But other colonial historians quickly followed, including Guy Frégault [1969], James A. Henretta [1972], Roland Lamontagne [1962], Gustave Lanctot [1965], George F.G. Stanley [1968], and Ian K. Steele [1969].

What I have tried to do is to revisit this topic by exploring the primary documents on my own and focusing on episodes that have tended to be marginalized in the secondary literature. By analyzing these admittedly discrete and discontinuous events, I hope to reveal further events in the pattern of British imperial arrogance and unpreparedness that others have described. Although the motives and agency of the colonists and Amerindians cannot be ignored, the British government proved incapable of developing a policy that would have enabled it to consolidate the gains of the Seven Years' War. In short, through arrogance, inadvertence and miscommunication the British shot themselves in the foot.

This introduction began with a quote from John Keats. It is appropriate
to end it with one from William Shakespeare, namely:

'There's a Divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough hew them how we will.' [9]

Although Shakespeare doubtless had individuals in mind, the outcome of events in North America in the 1780s suggests that his aphorism applies to countries as well.
End Notes

1. John Keats, 'On First Looking into Chapman's Homer.'


8. The principle characters detained by Haldimand in 1779 were Pierre de Sales Laterrière, Valentin Jautaud and Flory Mesplet. Of a supposed fourth, Michel Voyer, practically nothing is known according to A.L. Burt. The careers of Jautaud and Mesplet are dealt with in DCR, vol. IV [1979], on pp. 390-391, and pp. 532-534, respectively; that of Laterrière occupies pp. 735-738 in vol. V [1983]. The following year François Cazeau, Pierre du Calvet, Charles Hay and Boyer Pillon were arrested. DCR vol. IV devotes space to Hay [p. 336], Pillon [p. 229], and du Calvet [pp. 227-232].

Details of the career of Cazeau may be found in vol. V [pp. 173-174], which also contains reference to Pillon on p. 893. The first five pages of Chapter 13 of Burt's The Old Province of Quebec deal with the reasons for these detentions.

CHAPTER ONE

On September 8, 1760, the Marquis de Vaudreuil and Major-General Jeffrey Amherst signed the Articles of Capitulation that detailed the terms under which New France was surrendered to the British. It is important to appreciate the fact that the French colony of Louisiana, which had its own governor, was not included in the surrender terms and remained a combatant in the war. According to G.F.G. Stanley, the above articles "included the surrender not only of Canada and Acadia, but also the western posts and the Illinois." [1] I contend that Stanley was in error when he wrote that 'the Illinois' was included.

What is surprising about his statement is that 'the Illinois' is not referred to in subject articles. Article II refers to:

The troops and militia who are in garrison in the town of Montreal,... [2]

Similarly, Article III refers to:

The troops and militia who are in garrison in the Fort of Jacques Cartier, and in the Island of St. Helen, and other forts... [3]

and later to:

The troops who are in our posts situated on our frontiers, on the side of Acadia, at Detroit, Michilimaquinac, and other posts, ... [4]

In neither of the above articles are the territorial limits of Canada defined' nor are 'our posts situated on our frontiers.' What is important about this is that
Boundary between Canada and Louisiana
'the Illinois' was a part of Louisiana and was administered from New Orleans, the capital of that colony.

Prior to 1717, the Illinois country had been within the jurisdiction of Quebec; in 1717, over the bitter opposition of Philippe de Vaudreuil, the then governor-general in Quebec City, the Company of the West assumed control of 'the Illinois,' and it was annexed to Louisiana. In 1721, Louisiana was divided into nine districts, one of which was known as the Illinois district. Furthermore, as C.E. Carter writes:

About 1720 Fort de Chartres was completed and became thereafter the seat of government during the French regime. [5]

In 1731, Louisiana, together with its Illinois dependency, became a royal province. Quoting Carter again:

It remained in this status until the close of the Seven Years’ War, when that portion east of the Mississippi was ceded to England as a part of Canada. [6]

Carter omitted to mention that the island on which the city of New Orleans stood was excluded and that the boundary ran via the Iberville River, and the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the Gulf of Mexico.

What is important to this thesis is the boundary between Canada and Louisiana during the French regime. Carter, quoting Thomas Pownall, states:

The boundary between Canada and Louisiana during the French regime was approximately the 40th parallel. This left the French settlement Ouiatanon to the Quebec government while Post
Vincennes on the lower Wabash River was in Louisiana. [7] Since Louisiana was a separate colony with its own governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil could not include its territory in the 1760 surrender terms he signed. The unconquered French of Louisiana had every right to continue to prosecute the war against the British, including the right to encourage Indian tribes to harass the latter.

For the French of Canada to have engaged in such activities would have been a violation of the terms of the 8 September 1760 capitulation. In eighteenth century warfare, at least until the colonial revolt of 1775, both sides were expected to adhere to the agreed terms of a capitulation as a point of honor. For its part, the colonial government of Louisiana did not receive the official news that France had signed a peace treaty [the Treaty of Paris] with England on February 10th, 1763 until 24th September of that year.

But in the meantime, those who are best described as Canadian French were more than guilty of inciting Indian tribes to rise up against the British, if the sources of the latter approximate to anything like the truth. What is more, the seeds of the tribal dissatisfaction that blossomed in 1763 into excessive violence would appear to have been sown in 1760. To a more than passing extent, the British made substantial contributions to their own eventual discomfiture because of their unwillingness to meet those Indian tribes who had
operated within the French orbit on the 'middle ground.'

The main culprit was Jeffrey Amherst, the British Commander in Chief. He was the main culprit because his contempt for the Indian was echoed to a large extent by many of the officers on his headquarters staff who had not seen action in the field. Until the Montreal surrender signing ceremony in 1760, Amherst had tended to heed the advice of Sir William Johnson, the northern superintendent for Indian affairs; however, once the fighting with the French was over, and the troops to be repatriated to France sent on their way, Amherst began to show his true colours where Indians were concerned. Conversely, the pro-Indian attitude and policies of the Marquis de Vaudreuil leads one to wonder to what extent he was responsible for sowing the seeds of Indian discontent that grew into full bloom in 1763.

In 1998, it is no longer possible to adhere to Francis Parkman's version of Pontiac's rebellion at Detroit in May 1763. Revisionist thinking on the subject began to crystallize in 1947, when Pontiac and the Indian Uprising by Howard H. Peckham appeared. A 1990s interpretation of the events of 1763 and subsequent years is given by Richard White in The Middle Ground.

According to this author:

Pontiac's rebellion was not the beginning of a racially foreordained Indian demise; it was the beginning of the restoration of the middle ground. [8]
The gestation period of the eventual rebellion took place between the signing of the Canadian surrender document in 1760 and the eventual cession of Canada to Britain in February 1763. White attributes the revolt to three causes. First of all, the Indians were not able to ally themselves in a united confederation which would have enabled them to resist British occupation of their lands. Secondly, the British failed to take on the role of 'fathers' or 'brothers' to the Indian tribes. Thirdly, the Indians had been led to believe by French sources that their Onontio father was on the point of returning from across the sea.

White points out that:

Because the documents from this period are overwhelmingly British - by the very people the French, Iroquois, and Algonquians wished to keep in the dark - the politics behind the eventual revolt emerges as a puzzle with pieces missing and with the remaining pieces purposefully mismatched. [9]

Indians gave contradictory accounts when interviewed; their accounts implicated or blamed someone else, i.e. other Indians [or Frenchmen]; these, in turn, either denied everything or came up with completely new versions of the same set of events. However, White goes on to relate how between 1761 and 1763 the reality of the various conspiracies was indicated by the telltale wampum belts that conveyed the messages from village to village. [10]
During these two years [1761 to 1763], war belts originated from four different sources, which were the Illinois country, Detroit, the Seneca town of Chenussio and the missions around Montreal. White states that the Chenussio and Detroit belts were primarily Indian in origin, whatever encouragement French sources may have offered. [11] However, he is also adamant that the Illinois and Montreal belts originated with the French. [12]

Suffice it to say that Amherst was warned a year before the Pontiac uprising, as is indicated in the following extract from his letter to Sir William Johnson dated New York, 17th March, 1762:

A Few days ago I received a letter from Maj. Gladwin, Informing me of a Discovery he had made of the Evil Intentions of the Indians, stirred up thereto, by the Priests and Jesuits: [13]

Later in the same letter Amherst wrote:

...and have only to Observe, that if there Should be any Truth in the Affair, the Priests as well as the Indians, are greater fools than ever I took them for, as any attempt to Disturb Us at this time must only end in their own destruction; [14]

Although Canada had been surrendered, England and France were still at war and England had declared war on Spain in January 1762.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the French left behind them, after the surrender of Canada, such a deliberate legacy among the Indian tribes that the
latter would be a continual thorn in the side of the English. White points out that:

As early as 1758, Vaudreuil was planning to summon all the tribes of the pays d'en haut to Montreal for a last-ditch defense of Canada against the English. [15]

In 1760, the French attempted to organize Indian resistance against the English, and out of these efforts grew what White describes as the Montreal plot, which was supposedly kept alive by M. Longueil, traders and the clergy. [16]

The Montreal belts continued to circulate, and gathered momentum as French Canadians spread rumors among the Indians of the return of Onontio. White has it that the main Indian instigators were the Caughnawaga Mohawks and the Ottawa, who were subsequently joined by the Mississaugas, Fox, Sioux and others. [17] Throughout 1761 and 1762 the English ran across evidence that something was brewing but do not appear to have been able to pin down exactly what, so that Gage eventually attributed the reports to a few discontented Indians. As has been stated earlier, those accused of being part of the Montreal plot, when questioned by the British, found it convenient either to deny outright their participation [the French traders] or to blame someone else [the Caughnawaga Mohawks blamed the Chenussio Senecas]. [19] It
would appear that Pontiac's rebellion at Detroit in May 1763 may well have been the culmination of what has been described above as the 'Montreal Plot.'

White refers also to belts originating in the Illinois country which was an isolated outpost of Louisiana, and consequently at war with Britain until at least September 1763, when official news of the Treaty of Paris reached New Orleans. Once again, White details a sequence of events that supposedly took place. The French gave a belt to the Weas in the spring of 1762, at which time:

...the French desperately needed Algonquin aid to maintain their last two weak bastions of resistance against the English: the Illinois country and the Cherokees. [20]

However, White also refers to there being no official records in the surviving French correspondence of any attempt to encourage an Indian rebellion. Nevertheless, Amherst had received two reports from Crogan of the French at the Illinois stirring up the western Indian nations. [21]

The nuances and complexities of this reconstruction of reality stands in sharp contrast to British accounts of the same set of events:

In British accounts, the various belts - Iroquois, Algonquin, and French - tend to merge into a single conspiracy, but the movements actually remained largely distinct. [22]

That the natives were indeed restless is corroborated by the following words [dated July 29th, 1762] of Lieutenant Jenkins, commanding at Fort Ouiatenon
to Major Gladwin, Commandant at Detroit:

Two days ago the Bearer arrived from the Illinois, who assures me that the People in that part of the world are for a quiet life, I mean the French but he says the Indians wanted the Commanding Officer to come and attack these posts, which he refused. The English-woman that is along with him, told me the Canadians were advising the Indians to murder us all in these posts, but that they would not be seen in it themselves'....[23]

The warning signs were definitely there for the British to heed.

The following extract from intelligence received at

Michilimackinac, dated July 11, 1763, is a further indication of the

restlessness of the natives:

...with an Indian called the Grand Sota at their head, are much disaffected to the English interest and threaten to renew the War. They have been at the Illinois, and received large Presents privately from the French, and is to attempt their first stroke at Mitchilimacina. [24]

It would be no overstatement to say that the Indian tribes were far from happy at the replacement of the French garrisons at the trading posts by British ones. The Indians had expected the British to continue the policies of the French in the treatment they received [some of the details of this treatment will be described shortly], but to their amazement and consternation they came to realize this was not going to happen.

It was stated earlier that 'the seeds of the tribal dissatisfaction that blossomed in 1763 into excessive violence would appear to have
been sown in 1760.' In August of that year there was a conference at Fort Pitt attended by over one thousand Indians from the West. At this conference:

A message from General Amherst was read which promised restoration of the disrupted trade and assured the Indians that the British had no designs on their land. Even then Amherst's armies were closing in on Montreal. [25]

Part of Peckham's summing up of Amherst is as follows:

His lack of imagination was no handicap in fighting this war, although it became a fatal weakness in the task of pacifying the French-allied Indians. He never learned to understand them and he would not listen to the advice of his able subordinates, [26]

The day after the capitulation at Montreal, September 9, 1760, Amherst selected Major Robert Rogers to lead two companies of his Rangers to occupy Detroit and the western Great Lakes forts, including Michilimackinac.

It would appear that the British occupation of Detroit proceeded smoothly, at least as far as the Indians were concerned. They remembered only too well the promises of Amherst read to them the previous August at Fort Pitt. The takeover took place at noon on November 29, 1760. Captain François de Bellestre, the French commander, had, however, 'put one over on the British' by illegally sending off to New Orleans a detachment of regulars and militia under
Captain La Chapelle. [27] At the ceremony surrendering the fort, the oath of allegiance was administered to the assembled French inhabitants, who were also asked to surrender their arms.

After the successful occupation of Detroit, Major Rogers despatched two parties of Rangers to the southwest, the one to take possession of Fort Miami at the head of the Maumee River and the other to occupy Fort Ouiatenon on the Wabash River. Rogers himself tried to push on to Fort Michilimackinac, situated on the strait between Lakes Huron and Michigan, but he and his party were turned back by the ice. He departed from Detroit for Fort Pitt [where he arrived on January 23, 1761] on December 23, 1760, leaving Captain Campbell in command there.

To understand some of the fundamental causes of Pontiac's Rebellion at Detroit, it is necessary to have an appreciation of the manner in which the French used to treat the local Indians, and then to compare the methods of the French with those resulting from the policies introduced by Amherst. French policy began with the custom of giving the Indians presents which the latter had come to regard as the equivalent of rent for the Indian land the French were occupying. The Indians had also experienced no difficulty in obtaining ammunition from
the latter for hunting and making war on southern tribes. Consequently, it was not unnatural for the Indians to expect the British would continue such treatment; the latter were not disposed, however, to continue such policies.

On 1st February, 1761, Amherst wrote to Sir William Johnson a long letter in which, among other things, he asked the advice of the latter on the subject of trade with the Indians at Detroit as follows:

...I should therefore be much Obliged to you for Such hints, as may Enable me to Establish this trade upon a lasting and good foundation, by Acquainting me with what Commodities it will be most proper to Send among those Indians;....any Other hints and Observations, that You will be pleased to add to these for the Government of the Indians, and the maintenance of this great and important post of the Detroit and its natural commerce with the Subject, I shall receive with pleasure, and give a due consideration. [28]

Johnson's reply was dated the 12th of the same month and in it, in addition to the enclosure of a list of suggested trading goods, the following words are worthy of note:

it has always been Customary; it is very necessary, and will always be Expected by the Indians that the Commanding Officer of Every Post have it in his power to supply them in Case of Necessity with a Little Cloathing, Some arms and ammunition to hunt with; also some provisions on their Journey homewards, as well as a smith to repair their arms and working utensils and ca. [29]

If the British intended to follow in the footsteps of the French in their
dealings with the Indians, Johnson certainly left Amherst in no doubt as to what would be expected of them.

Also enclosed with this letter was Indian Intelligence from George Crogan which had been received at Detroit the previous December [1760]; the basis of the report was that the Governor of Louisiana had agreed to help the Cherokees in their war against the English. The Cherokees in turn said they had been promised support by the Chactaws and were seeking aid from several other Indian nations.

Crogan's comments at the end of his communication are worthy of note:

How far the above Intelligence may be depended on I can't pretend to say. But I am of Opinion as the Cherokees, are Natural Enemies of the Western Indians that the French will not get any Nation that lives on the Ohio; or the Lakes; from the Illinois Upwards, to Join the Cherokees; not even the Shawaneis, whom I take to be the worst people this way at present. [30]

On the basis of this report, although Canada may have been surrendered by Vaudreuil, the French of Louisiana were still in the fight and it would behove Amherst to take note. The war was still on; Pontiac's Rebellion was two years in the future.

Amherst's reply to Johnson is dated February 22nd; it is considered worthwhile to deal with it at some length because its contents, on which future British policy towards the Indians was to be based, provided one of the causes of the serious troubles the former
were to experience with the latter over the upcoming years.

Amherst wrote:

with regard to furnishing the latter, with a little Cloathing, some arms and ammunition to hunt with, that is all very well in Cases of Necessity; but as, when the Intended Trade is once Established they will able to supply themselves with these, from the Traders, for their furrs, I do not see why the Crown should be put to that Expence. [31]

He continued:

I am not neither for giving them any Provisions; when they find they can get it on Asking for, they will grow remiss in their hunting, which Should Industriously be avoided; for so long as their minds are Intent on business they will not have leisure to hatch mischief. [32]

He went on to say he had no objection to the Indians having a gunsmith for repairing their arms and acknowledged receipt of the Intelligence enclosed with Johnson's letter.

It was to be another two years and a half before Amherst left North America. His contribution to the souring of relations with the Indians has been dealt with in detail. The French could not have had better support in their continuing to make trouble for the English than from some of the policies Amherst laid out for dealing with the Indian tribes. The following words of Sir William Johnson written on March 10th, 1761 to Daniel Claus, are most appropriate:

Gen'd. Amherst does not understand being at an expence now for
Indn. management in that part [i.e. Detroit], but that they purchase wgt. they want for Skins and furrs. These are his Sentiments. Int nos, he is not at all a friend of Indn. wgt. I am afraid may have bad consequences one time or other, especially so, if ever that Country be given back. [33]

And so by the spring of 1761 the groundwork had been laid for the Detroit Indians to find the new British regime not at all to their liking.

Later in the year, on September 28th, 1761, British troops arrived at Fort Michilimackinac which had been abandoned by the French in the fall of 1760. In violation of the terms of Canada's surrender, the French commandant, Captain de Beaujeu had departed for Fort de Chartres, situated on the Mississippi in the Illinois Country, with his garrison.

There the party remained, only to make trouble in the future.

It was during the following year, especially after their return from their winter hunting, that the Indian tribes of Detroit came to learn gradually the real nature of Amherst's policy towards them. On 3 July 1762, Captain Campbell wrote to Colonel Bouquet at Fort Pitt:

The Indians are a good deal elevated on the news of a Spanish war and daily reports spread amongst them that the French and Spaniards are soon to retake Quebec, etc. This goes from one nation to another, and it is impossible to prevent it. I assure you they only want a good opportunity to fall upon us if they had encouragement from an enemy. [34]

As has been emphasized previously, the war was still on; the capitulation of Canada had been but one victory for the British, although
a great one. Amherst's policy towards the Indians was playing into the hands of the French who remained and who refused to accept the way things had turned out. They were longing for a reversal of fortunes. The tragedy was that Campbell at Detroit was aware of the situation; unfortunately, his Commander-in-Chief appears to have been incapable of appreciating how potentially explosive the situation was.

The Indians were gullible; they knew nothing of Europe and its affairs. The French who remained fed them reports of a new French expedition being on its way to recapture Quebec and Montreal. They told the Indians the English had plans for their extermination, pointing to their being deprived of ammunition so that they would be incapable of defending themselves. [35]

On August 26th, 1762, Major Gladwin arrived to take over command at Detroit. He thought all was quiet where the Indians were concerned as summer turned into fall. However, he appears not to have learned of an Indian Council which had occurred in the summer and which was reported to George Crogan at Pittsburgh on September 28th, who in turn passed it on to Johnson and Amherst. The gist of this account was:

that this Council [supposedly a great Council held at the Ottawa Town above Detroit in the summer of 1762] was kept a great
secret from all Indians Except those of the greatest note amongst their Nations, that Two French men came down with the Indians who came from above Mechelemackinac in Indian Dress. [36]

Amherst dismissed the information with the comment he could see nothing of consequence in it. [37] Peckham comments:

It is difficult to resist the temptation to see Pontiac's hand in this council. The Ottawas had always been most attached to the French and were least cordial to the English. Within a few short months he was to emerge as the leader of those Indians who hated the English and wanted to restore the French. [38]

According to Peckham, the probable instigators of the summer conference were the two Frenchman rather than Pontiac.

The more one delves into the Johnson Papers, the more one cannot help but feel that the British had enough warnings via their Indian intelligence system to alert them to the fact that all was far from well in their relations with the Indian tribes. On December 10th, 1762, George Crogan wrote to Colonel Bouquet advising him of information received from his agent, Alexander McKee, who had spent time with the Shawnee. Reference is made to conversations with several principal warriors of the Senecas, Delawares and Shawnees:

...all which made no scruple of confessing the Belt mentioned in Mr. McKee's Intelligence and say that it's the Belt Given to the Wawaughtonnes (Quiatonons) last Spring by the French Officer at the Illinois. [39]

Later in the same letter Crogan writes:
It's Lucky that those Indians, and the Indians over the Lakes, are not upon good Terms with Each Other at present; however, if any of them should Break with Us, it must End in a General Indian War with Us. [40]

A copy of this letter was sent by Colonel Bouquet to Sir William Johnson on January 10th, 1763. Within four months Pontiac's Revolt had broken out [7th May 1763].

When news of the troubles in the West reached Amherst from Colonel Bouquet in early June he did order precautionary troop movements on receipt of the information. Nevertheless, Amherst was very sceptical as to the accuracy of the reports. The Bouquet Papers convey very pithily his fundamental attitude towards Indians:

...for I am fully convinced the only true method of treating those savages is to keep them in proper subjection and punish without exception the transgressors. [41]

Indeed, the attitude and words of a conqueror - the concept that the Indians might consider the British as trespassers on their lands was beyond Amherst's comprehension.

The attitudes of the general were diametrically opposed to those of Johnson, Crogan and Stuart [the Indian Superintendent for the tribes south of the Ohio], but such was his arrogance that 'he thought he knew better how to deal with them.' On 12th June, he wrote to Sir William Johnson to acquaint him with the situation and to advise him of the
NORTH AMERICA 1763-1774

- **British possessions 1758**
- **Louisiana, secretly ceded to Spain by France in 1763. Britain accepted Spanish rule**
- **Only remaining French possession in North America, following the Treaty of Paris, 1763**
- **Royal provinces and Indian Reserve established by George III from former French possessions 1763-1764, and from Spanish Florida**
- **The Province of Quebec as enlarged by the Quebec Act of 1774. By this Act the British Parliament alienated the Thirteen Colonies by cutting off their hinterland**
- **Area of George III's Indian Reserve in which the Indians negotiated Treaties throwing open the reserve to settlers from the thirteen colonies 1767-1771. The settlers hoped to set up two new colonies Vandalia (1769) and Transylvania (1775) but both were resented by the older colonies, and failed after independence**

- **Legend:**
  - 3 Miles
  - 200 Miles
precautionary troop movement he had ordered. Enclosed with the letter were copies of Colonel Bouquet's communications, but the following sentence from Amherst's letter to Johnson provides an indication of how out of touch the general was with the situation in Indian Country:

The last part of the Intelligence seems to be greatly Exaggerated, as I Cannot Entertain a thought that they have been able to Cut off the Garrison of the Detroit, or any of the posts where Officers were stationed. [42]

Just as the onlooker is reputed to see most of the game, so the Officer on the spot ordinarily has a much better appreciation of the local situation than the Commanding General back at Headquarters.

A blow-by-blow account of Pontiac's siege of Detroit is not called for here; suffice it to say that the eventual article of capitulation he signed was dated October 31, 1763. The siege had lasted five months less a week. It seems ironic that he subsequently escaped punishment for all the trouble he had caused. For what had begun as a local conspiracy at Detroit developed into a more general uprising which almost resulted in the destruction of all British influence beyond the 1763 Proclamation Line. In one way, the disturbances may be regarded as an uncoordinated war for Indian Independence, with the North American French cheering the braves on from the sidelines.

On November 17, 1763, Amherst embarked for England; Major
General Gage had been ordered down from Montreal to assume command in his place. Amherst was destined never to return to the North American continent. The victories of 1759 and 1760 were more than three years in the past. People have short memories. He had become the general who had failed to subdue the Indian revolt in the West.

Having won the war, Britain had promptly proceeded to lose the peace, so anxious were the British negotiators to conclude a treaty with that adroit, skilful, diplomat Choiseul, the French Foreign Minister. Choiseul therefore was able to downplay British military successes and to outmanoeuvre the British generally.

Looking back at the Treaty of Paris as it affected North America, one can argue that the main concern of the British negotiators seems to have been to achieve clearly defined boundaries. This resulted in their obtaining all of North America east of the Mississippi River, with the exception of New Orleans and its surrounding district, but even there the delineation of boundaries was clear. The North American Indians, of course, were not represented at the negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Paris, yet much of the land that was being horse-traded was theirs.

The restoration of its West Indian islands to France in exchange for
Canada ensured that the northern and western boundaries of the colonies no longer faced any threat from France. And in economic terms the London sugar interests did not wish to see cheaper sugar from the more efficient French West Indian sugar-producing islands flooding the domestic market.

Choiseul had no qualms about writing off Canada; on May 17th, 1762, he wrote to Ossun, the French ambassador in Madrid:

Nous perdons il est vrai le Canada, mais nous nous mettrons en état de jouir et de profiter de l'avantage inestimable du Pacte de Famille que cette guerre nous a procuré et qui est plus intéressant mille fois pour la France que la Colonie du Canada. [43]

Maybe the last words belong to professor Steele, who wrote in 1994:

Britain had conducted a war that humiliated, then made a peace that alienated allies but did not limit France's power to seek revenge. [44]

Within twenty years, France was to obtain that revenge.
Chapter One


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. Ibid., p. 6, note 11.


9. Ibid., p. 275.

10. Ibid., p. 276.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. A detailed explanation of the origin of these belts is given by White in his footnote 13, p. 276 of The Middle Ground, with appropriate multi-references to The Papers of Sir William Johnson.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p. 57.

27. Ibid., p. 63.


29. Ibid., p. 331.

30. Ibid., p. 337.

31. Ibid., p. 345.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 354.

34. Peckham, Pontiac, p. 93, note 1.

35. Ibid., p. 94.


37. Peckham, Pontiac, p. 96.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid.


CHAPTER TWO

It is no overstatement to advance the point of view that the existence of the French settlements at Vincennes and in the Illinois country made a substantial contribution to the difficulties Britain experienced between 1760 and 1774 in arriving at a policy for that part of the North American interior north of the Ohio River, and east of the Mississippi. The basic cause was the important concession made in the 1760 Capitulation signed in Montreal, whereby, under Articles 37 and 38, the French inhabitants were guaranteed both their possessions and property. [1]

The definitive Treaty of Paris was signed on February 10, 1763. The articles referred to in the previous paragraph were not rescinded in the treaty and so, as a consequence, continued in effect. This was to cause all sorts of difficulties for the British throughout the decade and beyond. The settlers at Vincennes in essence rebuked Gage in the early 1770s in a memorial to him where they pointed out that land grants had been made to them as French subjects, prior to the Treaty of Paris and before the agreements by the British with the tribes restricting settlement. As far as the Vincennes settlers were concerned, they held legal title to the land they occupied.

In fairness to the British, one has to acknowledge that when they were developing their policy for the North American interior from February 1763 until
the eventual proclamation of October 7th that year, they were well aware of the
bad press they had received at the beginning of the Seven Years' War as a
result of the expulsion of the Acadians from their lands in 1755. In his
communication of May 5th, 1763 to the Lords of Trade, [2] among the things
then proposed by the Earl of Egremont, Pitt's successor at the southern
department, was to limit the area of Canada and reserve the interior for the
immediate use of the Indians.

In his continuing correspondence with the Board of Trade that summer,
Egremont expressed opposition to the concept of leaving the interior outside
the jurisdiction of any civil government. Although the territory should be
reserved for the use of the natives, he made the suggestion to the Lords of
Trade in July that the Indian country should be assigned to the government of
Quebec. [3] The Board of Trade did not agree. In their report of August 5th,
the Board suggested the Commander in Chief, North America, should be
commissioned to exercise jurisdiction over the interior. This would enable him
to have criminals and fugitives sent to their respective colonies where they
could be dealt with as appropriate. [4]

The sudden death of Egremont that month led to a political crisis. When
things eventually got sorted out, the new southern department secretary, the
Earl of Halifax, took up the problem of the interior again in September. He
agreed with the Board of Trade's August recommendation against granting jurisdiction over the interior to Quebec. The recommendation to commission the Commander in Chief to govern the interior was not acted upon at that time.

One of the functions of the military posts located beyond the Proclamation settlement line was, nevertheless, to maintain the legal authority of government there. The provisions of the 1763 Proclamation did not include one for the satisfactory exercise of legal jurisdiction by the commanding officers. However, there was one for the apprehension and extradition of criminals from the colonies taking refuge in Indian reservation territory. [5] Nevertheless, there was no method to punish crimes committed by civilians in the interior.

To deal with this situation outlined in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, Gage recommended to Halifax a clause be added to the Mutiny Act providing for the trial of accused persons by court martial for crimes committed in areas where the civil judicature had not been established. [6] The 1765 Mutiny Act contained provision for the arrest and confinement of accused persons by the officers at the posts. However, they were to be sent to the colonies for trial in civil courts - a time-consuming operation when one considers both the distances involved and the weather in winter.

The reputed part the French settlers at Detroit played in Pontiac's
rebellion is worthy of attention. One has to appreciate that they had taken the oath of allegiance to the British king almost thirty months before the troubles began. H.H. Peckham makes the point that the Indians were not acquainted with the diplomatic niceties observed by European governments:

...which would prevent the French court from countenancing a savage uprising undertaken to restore French dominion while a defeated France was seeking peace with Britain. [7]

Nevertheless, Peckham is convinced that one of the contributing factors to the uprising was the urgings and promises of the French, although, as he writes:

The evidence of French instigation is indirect, yet fairly conclusive. We do not know it from French sources, but both British and Indians blamed the French, and their accusations can not be laid entirely to prejudice in the one case or the desire to exculpate themselves in the other. [8]

Referring to the fact that several Detroit 'habitants' were 'friendly to Pontiac's aim, if not his methods,' Peckham comments:

They hoped to hide their collaboration with the Indians so that if the British mustered enough strength to take revenge only the Indians would suffer. [9]

There was a conference of French and Indian leaders called by Pontiac at the house of Antoine Cuillerier on 10th May. This Frenchman, the brother-in-law of Captain de Bellestre, the late French commander, and Jacques Godfroy, another attendee, were soon to espouse openly the Indian cause.
On 18th May, Pontiac called a council of the Indian chiefs, which was also attended by many 'habitants,' at which he said:

I have resolved to send the Illinois some of our French brothers with some Indians to carry our war belts and our words to our father, Mons. de Neyon, and ask him to send us a French officer for a commandant to guide us and replace the English. [10]

The French were asked to write on Pontiac's behalf since he could neither read nor write. What Pontiac was actually seeking was a French officer skilled in siege warfare since the Indian chief had come to realize that if the fort was not starved into surrender the only alternative was to conduct an effective siege.

The French took the opportunity to consult among themselves, resulting in a brief note to the Illinois commandant in which was written:

These couriers bear to you the talks of the nations here....the English on their part never gave us occasion....Instruct us what we can do. We look upon you as protectors and mediators who would be willing to employ themselves efficaciously to pacify two contending parties who threaten us with an unexampled desolation. [11]

The Frenchmen assigned by Pontiac to the delegation were 'all of them sympathetic with Indian aims and ready to be of aid.' They set out the next morning.

On May 25th, addressing some discontented 'habitants' who had complained to him about their treatment by the Indians, Pontiac said:

No, my brothers, I am the same French Pontiac who helped you
seventeen years ago' I am French, and I want to die French, and I repeat that it is altogether your interests and mine that I avenge. [12]

The words quoted above should leave no doubt in the reader's mind as to where Pontiac's sympathies and allegiance lay. Later in his address to these 'habitants,' he said he did not demand their assistance because he knew they could not give it; he sought from them only provisions for himself and his followers.

He did have one further request, however, as follows:

...but I ask that our women may have permission to raise our corn upon your fields and fallow lands. By allowing this you will oblige us greatly. [13]

As an orator, Pontiac must have been silver-tongued; the Frenchmen agreed to what he had asked of them and:

...that very afternoon a number of squaws began work in the cornfields. Some of the French even ploughed fields for their planting. [14]

However, there were mitigating circumstances; these 'habitants' were living outside the fort and thus found themselves 'between a rock and a hard place.'

By the end of June, it had been demonstrated to Pontiac that the fort at Detroit could not only maintain itself, but also that it could obtain reinforcements and supplies. On July 1, he addressed a meeting of the heads of the French families, with a war belt in his hand, and told them to choose one
side or the other, accusing them of reporting to the English all the Indians did and said. Among his words were

If you are French, accept this war belt for yourselves, or your young men, and join us; if you are English, we declare war upon you,...[15]

The upshot was that several French families transferred themselves to the confines of the fort, having no wish to take up arms.

The May delegation to the Illinois returned on July 26th with replies to both the 'habitants' and the Indians. The former were advised by Major Neyon de Villiers, the commandant at Fort de Chartres, to abstain from taking any part in the hostilities. Pontiac was told it was not possible to send him any aid at that time because of rumors of a signed peace treaty between France and Great Britain. Villiers had sent couriers to New Orleans to verify the precise state of affairs. If it turned out there was in fact no treaty, then he would do what he could.

On the morning of July 29th, Captain James Dalyell arrived with a reinforcement of 260 men, a larger detachment than that commanded by Major Gladwin within the fort. Dalyell was an aide-de-camp to Amherst. The French allies of Pontiac tried to persuade him that the reinforcements were in fact a ruse by Gladwin, who had sent the men out in the night fog to return at daybreak in order to deceive the Indians. The motivation of these 'habitants'
was fear that the reinforcements might have an intimidating effect on Pontiac; if Pontiac were to call off the siege, they would be in deep trouble. Although the Indian chief may not have been able either to read or to write, he could count and knew that more men had arrived than had been inside the fort.

Dalyell, who was well connected in England, a younger son of a baronet, was ambitious and would seem to have been an English version of the Marquis de Lafayette, with the exception that the latter had far more military savoir-faire. In any event, on 30th July, Dalyell persuaded Gladwin, against the latter's better judgement, to allow him to lead an attack on Pontiac's encampment. This duly took place in the early morning of the 31st. The British were routed at Bloody Bridge [Parent's Creek] where Pontiac waited for them. His French allies had alerted him of the forthcoming attack even before the troops had left the fort. According to Peckham, they had been 'tipped off' by their brethren on the inside. [16]

The siege of Detroit dragged on through August; on September 2nd two Frenchmen arrived, having departed from Fort de Chartres in the first week of August. They advised that, as of the time of their leaving, no news existed of any peace treaty having been signed. They added further that the Fort de Chartres commandant had furnished the Weas with lead and powder. Pontiac presumably grabbed at this straw as justifying the continuing of the siege. On
September 9th, Pontiac sent a further appeal to Fort de Chartres asking again for French aid. A Shawnee Chief named Charlot Kaské was given a belt and a letter to carry to Major de Villiers. The chance of a possible peace treaty having been signed was not taken into account.

The hopes of Pontiac were kept alive when a Frenchman arrived from the Illinois between October 17 and October 20th. The news he brought was that a detachment of French troops under Captain de Beaujeu could be expected; accompanying this force would be forty packhorses loaded with ammunition and goods. This was just not true. As Peckham writes:

This lie appeared to be the last subterfuge of the renegade French to keep the war going awhile longer. [17]

The French inhabitants still living outside the fort could see the wind had changed direction and began to trim their sails accordingly.

They started to send supplies into the fort. The obvious renegades, who had sided openly with Pontiac, foresaw the game would soon be up and began to drift off to the Wabash country and the Illinois, along with any ill-gotten gains they may have acquired. The 'coup de grace' fell on Pontiac the night of October 29th. Cadet Dequindre arrived from the Illinois with letters from De Villiers addressed to Pontiac, to the French, and to Major Gladwin. These letters advised them of the peace concluded between England and France. Similar letters had been delivered by Dequindre to the tribes on the Wabash as
he passed through their territories en route to Detroit.

Pertinent in the letter to Pontiac would appear to be the following extracts:

...The French King has not given away your land; he has ceded only that which was his....The French will never abandon their children and will always supply them from the far side of the Mississippi. [18]

De Villiers advised the French residents that a peace treaty had indeed been signed. As soon as British troops arrived, he was to deliver up Fort de Chartres to them. The 'habitants' should accept 'the fact of the peace' any who did not wish to live under English rule were welcome to retire to the west bank of the Mississippi. His letter did not contain anything addressed to any of those who had actively supported Pontiac and his Indians about the folly of their having done so.

Entering the fort on October 30th, Dequindre delivered De Villiers' letter to Gladwin. Basically, the Illinois commandant said he had acted right away on receiving formal notice of the peace treaty and its contents. Messages to keep the Indian tribes calm had been sent out. As soon as the proper British authorities arrived, he was ready to deliver up his fort to them. It would be another two years before they did arrive.

On October 31st, 1763, Pontiac affixed his mark to the note of capitulation he had dictated. Gladwin learned on November 10th that he
intended to set out with Dequindre for the Illinois within the next day or two. As things turned out, Pontiac spent the winter on the Maumee River, setting out for the Illinois in March 1764. Based on Peckham's brief account of the way he took stock of his situation over the winter, by the end of it Pontiac had every intention of resuming the war.

The attitudes of the following two British military commanders as to the cause of Pontiac's rebellion are interesting. Not surprisingly, they believed the French inhabitants were, at least in part, to blame. Amherst commented in his journal:

> It is not impossible the French traders may have gone too great lengths in trying to engross the trade to themselves and to exclude totally the British merchants. [20]

On the other hand, Gage was convinced of collusion between the Canadians and Indians who had been aroused by reports spread by the French that the British intention was to take away their lands from them. [21] In practice, of course, whatever the government in London may have decreed, this was what was destined to happen.

Such attitudes resulted in the most extreme reaction from one British official. Colonel William Eyre, chief military engineer in America, in a long letter to Sir William Johnson, dated New York, 7th January 1764, wrote the following:

> However I would remove every Canadian from all our posts to the
inhabited Parts of Canada, as also the Priests, to prevent their doing Mischief: I wish the same could be done with respect to those at the Illinois, but these the Indians, I am afraid would not allow to be sent from thence -... [22]

This suggestion was taken up by Governor Murray of Quebec; he recommended to Halifax that 'all the French inhabitants in the interior be evacuated to the settled area of the northern province.' [23] Nothing was done to implement this rather drastic suggestion. As has been pointed out it was probably not permissible because of treaty commitments.

General Gage would appear to have thought deeply about the implications of Pontiac's rebellion. Prior to his departure for the United Kingdom in November 1763, Amherst had ordered the reoccupation of all the interior forts. [24] On the other hand, Gage had come to appreciate the fact that isolated garrisons in the interior were very vulnerable to Indian assaults. The policy he felt that should be adopted was the establishment of military colonies on the frontier at Niagara and Fort Pitt - there was already one at Detroit. This was expressed in a letter to Halifax from New York, dated April 14th, 1764, as follows:

The tract of land ceded to the King round Niagara may be useful hereafter. I desired Sir William Johnson to demand that Tract, as I meant likewise to demand another considerable Tract round Fort Pitt, whenever Peace shall be made with the Savages of that District. [25]
The underlying concept, apart from the military one, was that the cost of supplying the forts would be reduced considerably as many of the provisions that were currently shipped there would eventually be able to be supplied locally.

Legal jurisdiction over French inhabitants in the interior was finally established as a result of the amendments to the Mutiny Act made in the Mutiny Act of 1765 [5 Geo. III, c. 13]. [26] However, the Indian tribes living there did not take kindly to the concept of the English supplanting the French. In his letter of May 24th, 1765 to the Lords of Trade, Sir William Johnson wrote of an incident concerning the Miami tribe and a rescue party, led by a Frenchman, despatched from Detroit to negotiate the release of a soldier from the fort who had been taken prisoner that March by some Miamis:

...this party was way laid & made prisoners by the Miamis at some distance from their town, and but for the regard these Indians have for all French men, they would have been probably put to Death,...& severely reprimanding the Frenchman for going on any business for the English, telling him that his nation w'd shortly punish him, that the French were coming with two great armys against the English, & that their [the Indians] taking ye Prisoner was only a prelude to what they would shortly do, [27]

The peace treaty of Paris by now was two years old.
PONTIAC WAR
AND
BRITISH WEST
1763-1775

Drawn under the supervision of Louise Phelps Kellogg
END NOTES

Chapter Two


2. Ibid., pps. 93-96.


4. Ibid., note 34.

5. Ibid., p. 194.


8. Ibid., p. 105.

9. Ibid., p. 137.

10. Ibid., p. 146, note 1.

11. Ibid., p. 149, note 3.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 191.

16. Ibid., p. 205.

17. Ibid., p. 235.
18. Ibid., p. 236.


24. Ibid., note 46.


CHAPTER THREE

In the spring of 1765, General Gage had learned that the Indian tribes in the interior were being supplied with goods not only by the French in the Illinois, but also by those west of the Mississippi. The danger thus existed of an alliance between the French and the natives, unless the British were able to take over this trade; the consequence of another French-Indian alliance would be the endangering of the security of the interior. [1]

In his May 24th, 1765, letter to the Lords of Trade, Sir William Johnson suggested that the Governor at New Orleans and the Commandant of the Illinois either secretly promoted or turned a blind eye to the provoking actions of the French living among the Indians. Further on still, Sir William wrote:

Several French Familys, of the worst sort, live at ye Miamis, several at Wawiaghtanon, & in short at all the places where they formerly had posts, or trading houses, and such is the ignorance, or credulity of the Indians, that altho they may find themselves repeatedly deceived, such reports will still gain credit, from their blind partiality of the French. The possession of the Illinois would in some measure tho' not absolutely check their villainy. [2]

As a result of a dangerous, but eventually successful, journey by George Crogan, a deputy of Johnson, Fort Chartres in the Illinois country was eventually occupied in September 1765, thirty months after the official end of hostilities. Earlier attempts undertaken by both the Ohio and Mississippi rivers had not been successful because of Indian hostility in which Charlot Kaské had played a prominent role. En route, Crogan, had stopped at Vincennes; however, such
was the hostile attitude of the Indian tribes in the Wabash Valley that no attempt was made to locate troops there.

Life had been made much more difficult for Thomas Gage to carry out his duties as a result of a minute of the Treasury Board, dated November 28th, 1764, to which he refers, as follows, in a March 10th, 1765 letter to Sir William Johnson:

I don't know whether you received a Minute of the Treasury dated the 28th of Nov'. last from the Board of Trade or any other office. But I have received orders to incur no Expence, till first approved by the King. Your Department is not yet fixed by King or Parliament. Till that happens, other Means must be used to carry on the Service. I have a sort of Latitude for Extraordinary and sudden Emergencys, which is to draw Bills upon the treasury and on no other Persons whatever. [3]

That summer, Gage's difficulties were increased as a result of demands from colonial governors for the support of troops to maintain public order as a result of anticipated disturbances resulting from the passage of the Stamp Act. An example of such a request is that contained in Lieutenant-Governor Colden's letter to General Gage dated Spring Hill, Sep'. 2d, 1765. [4]

By the spring of 1766, retrenchment had become the order of the day, but the problem of the Illinois country loomed as large as ever. In a letter to Conway, dated March 28th, 1766, Gage refers to the abandonment of farms there by inhabitants to go over to the new French settlements on the west bank of the Mississippi. He goes on to write:
If I may presume to give my Opinion further on this Matter, I would humbly propose, that a Military Governor should be appointed for the Illinois as soon as possible; The Distance of that Country from any of the Provinces being about Fourteen Hundred Miles, makes its Dependance on any of them impracticable, and from its Vicinity to the French Settlements, no other than a Military Government would answer our Purposes [5]

In other words, he was returning again to the concept he had suggested for Forts Pitt and Niagara to Halifax two years but previously on which no action had been taken.

The uncertain political situation in England militated against any quick solution to the problem of finding enough revenue to support both the military and political demands of the North American situation, especially after the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766. One may say without hesitation that the situation dragged on throughout 1767, and did not sort itself out until the Earl of Hillsborough was admitted to the cabinet at the end of the year as the newly created Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The eventual decision of the British cabinet was not forthcoming until the middle of March, 1768. Essentially it involved the transferring of the control of the commercial relations with the Indian tribes to the colonies. Fort Chartres or some other post in the Illinois country was to be kept, as was Fort Pitt; however, Gage was mandated to prepare a report on the state of these fortifications. Writing to Johnson on August 7th, 1768, Gage observed:

The only posts now to be maintained are Missilimakinac, Detroit
and Niagara with Forts Pitt and Chartres. The two last yet under Consideration whether to be abandoned or not. The Posts are the great and constant Drains of Cash for Indian Presents. The two last I have mentioned, equal the Expenses of half the rest of your whole department. [6]

The previous June [June 16th, 1768], Gage had made the following suggestions to Hillsborough re the Illinois country; the special problems it presented were caused by the influence of the French with the resultant drain on the fur trade as a result of many of the cargoes finding their way down river to New Orleans.

The comments of Gage were:

From what has been represented, your Lordship will perceive, I am not of the Opinion that a Post at the Illinois will be productive of Advantages equal to the Expence of Supporting it. And that the keeping up of Fort-Pitt should depend upon the having or not having a Military Establishment at the Illinois. [7]

He went on to propose that 'all the Inhabitants in that Country should be collected in one village' together with a governor and appointed council; the community would be supplied with priests appointed by the Bishop of Quebec; the Bishop would however be answerable for their behaviour.

Later in the letter Gage proposed:

That the troops should remain till the Government is formed and put in Motion, and then dismantle Fort-Chartres, if not before destroyed by the River, and withdraw. Being in a Manner governed by themselves, I apprehend the People would prefer it
either to a Spanish or French Government; and they would be Kept in Subjection to his Majesty. [8]

No decision was made by George III for three years, which takes us up to 1771.

The saga of Fort Chartres in the Illinois was brought to an end by Mother Nature. The annual flood waters of the Mississippi, in essence, eroded its walls away gradually each year. Hillsborough wrote to Gage on December 4th, 1771:

The King's Servants however unanimously, concur in Opinion, that, considering the many Disadvantages which have been represented to attend the Situation of Fort Chartres in every respect, and the little chance there is of preventing its destruction by the ravages of the Mississippi, it ought to be abandoned; and therefore I am commanded by the King to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure that you should give the necessary Orders for that purpose and for a Reduction of all the Establishments incident to that Post at such time as you shall think it can be effected with the greatest Facility and Convenience. [9]

Nine months later, on September 2nd, 1772, Gage wrote to Barrington from New York:

I am to acquaint your Lordship that Major Hamilton is arrived at Fort Pitt from the Illinois with the Companies of the 18th Regiment and has only left a Detachment of fifty men at Kaskaskies under the Command of Captain Lord. Fort Chartres is destroyed, and I am endeavoring to get all the ordnance and Stores from Fort Pitt in the hopes of razing that Fort also before Winter. [10]

Fort Chartres, from the point of view of the monies spent to take it over from the French, had indeed proved to be a white elephant. The British
occupation of it had lasted all of seven years.

The inhabitants of the Illinois had never been what one might call co-operative, dutiful subjects. Gage had reported to Hillsborough in 1768 that when an attempt had been made to form them into regular companies of militia:

They shewed a remarkable Spirit of Disaffection on the Occasion, declaring they were not obliged to appear in Arms, from the Oath of Allegiance and Fidelity they had taken; that it would give Umbrage to the Indians, who had no Quarrel with them as they were Frenchmen and they were determined to remain Neuter, whatever Nations we were at War with, either civilised or Savage. [11]

The fact that Captain Forbes eventually arrayed them into regular companies does not conceal the mindset of these inhabitants as well as the pro-French attitude of the Indians with which the British had to contend.

Gage’s letter to Hillsborough announcing the destruction of Fort Chartres was dated September 2nd, 1772. Hillsborough’s letter ordering its abandonment was dated December 4th, 1771. The question of what to do with the inhabitants of the Illinois was considered in this same letter. Hillsborough wrote:

I have always thought and am still of Opinion that the thing most to be wished for in respect to the Illinois District would be the Removal of the Inhabitants to situations within the Limits of Quebec or of some other established Colony;... [12]
However, the minister went on to acknowledge that this solution was not feasible and proceeded to ask Gage for his thoughts on how to deal with the inhabitants of the Illinois.

Gage took up the matter in his letter of March 4th, 1772 to Hillsborough. Pointing out that any attempt to remove the French would only result in their moving to the west bank of the Mississippi [the Spanish shore], he went on to write:

It cannot be suggested that a regular Constitutional Government can be established amongst a few people who are Settled and Scattered in a far distant Desert, of more hurt than use. They don't deserve so much attention nor Expence, nor should any Measures be taken to increase the settlement; but on the Contrary, Encouragement given those already there, to retire into some of the Provinces. [13]

He continued by suggesting the appointment of a governor and a judge with the concurrence of the inhabitants, writing:

...and I would propose to begin it in the Manner the Most pleasing to them, by appointing such Persons their governor and Judge as they would most approve of to be their Rulers; to whom some general Instructions may be given for their Manner of proceedings. [14]

Meanwhile, in August 1772, Hillsborough resigned both his offices [he was also president of the Board of Trade] because he could not reconcile himself to a plan of settlement on the Ohio. [15]

That the French inhabitants in the interior generally presented Gage with an ongoing headache may be seen from the following observations in his
letter [private] to Barrington dated March 4, 1769:

These cursed French Settlements with the Strolling French and Canadians, who Seat themselves in almost every Indian Village, give a great deal of Trouble. Whether it proceeds from a natural Enmity to Us, or a desire to Monopolize all the Trade in their own Hands, is not Material; But they are continually raising Jealousies in the minds of the Indians, and have spirited them up to such a Degree, that they have Murthered Several of our traders. To add to these Inconveniences, the French have Settlements on the Mississippi Opposite the Illinois, who keep up a Correspondence with those in the king’s Terrortys. [16]

Vincennes was a settlement where the problem was a severe one; this was compounded by the fact there was no military establishment there and, as a consequence, no legal authority. In a letter to Hillsborough on January 6th, 1769, Gage wrote:

Your Lordship will also receive herewith, a State of the Settlements in the Illinois, and of St. Vincent on the Ouabache. This last Settlement has increased in a very short time in a manner that is Surprising. I find that Strollers and Vagabonds from Canada, Detroit, Illinois and other Places, have assembled there, to live a lazy kind of Indian Life, or taken shelter there from Justice. [17]

Two months later, Gage wrote the following to the same minister:

it is to be wished there were no Settlements whatever in the Indian Country, but as they are established and form their Situation and Circumstances we are obliged to let them continue armed, as well for the Purposes of personal Defence against the Savages as to contribute to their food and Livelihood by hunting... [18]

And so the situation continued to deteriorate.

Writing to Sir William Johnson on August 6th that year,
General Gage observed:

You have inclosed a Speech of Lieu't. Colonel Wilkins to the Indians of the Ouabache of whom he makes great Complaint, as also Extracts from his Letters which have any Relation to our late Quarrell with those Indians, whom he supposes to be excited to Mischief by the French Settlers at St. Vincent, and possibly with good reason. [19]

Sir William Johnson made two fundamental points in a letter of 30th August to General Gage; the first was:

I shall only observe farther theron that when the Indians are ill disposed they make use of a thousand little Circumstances in Justification of their Conduct; - But the real Cause is founded on their aversion to us, their regard for the French, and their not partaking of favors equal to their Expectations, however unreasonable all this may appear. [20]

In other words, the Indians did not like the English, but they had positive feelings for the French. The second point was:

This last is one of the Consequences of allowing a Trade at large in the Indian Country which I long ago observed to Government would be monopolized by the French to the exclusion of others, this we now find from the Conduct and declaration of the Indians, and the reports from all Quarters is actually the Case - [21]

The import of this statement would appear to be that the trading situation in the Indian Country had gotten completely out of hand in spite of the fact that Sir William Johnson had forewarned the government what would be the outcome of its policy.

However, there was at least one post commander who suspected the French much more than the Indians. He was Captain James
Stevenson, of the 60th regiment, in command at Detroit. In his letter to Sir William Johnson dated 18th December 1770, referring to a complaint of the Wyandats that the French had encroached on their lands, he wrote:

I could wish justice might be done them, for take the Indians with all their faults, and I give them infinitely the preference to the Rascally Race of French in this settlement. [22]

In his postscript to the letter, he referred to several French families having slipped away to the Miamis under a pretence to trade, but in practice they were prevailing on these Indians to make them land grants on which they intended to settle. Captain Stevenson went on to observe:

If they are allow'd to go on at this rate our back settlements will feel the effects of it whenever we have a war with France. [23]

Between the two of them, the French settlers and the Indians provided the British with plenty of headaches.

The following October, General Gage advised Sir William Johnson that:

The French traders are thick upon the ouabache, and it is Natural to suspect that they instigate the Indians against us to keep the Trade to themselves, and besides I am informed, that the Settlement formed by the vagabond French at Post Vincent, increases so much, as to require them to be kept under some Government, or to be dislodged. [24]
In his reply, dated November 16th, 1771, Sir William commented on the situation at Post Vincent as follows:

I fear that it will be a difficult task to remove those at Post Vincent, but especially as they encrease fast I think it not a little dangerous that they stay there. It not being possible in my opinion to keep them under proper Government in such a Situation, and with Such Inclination. [25]

In December 1771, Hillsborough wrote the following to Gage:

but as it is evident that the settlement forming at the post of St. Vincent is in every respect of the most dangerous tendency and must have the effect to keep us entangled in perpetual Dispute and Quarrel with the Indians; It is His Majesty's Pleasure that you give notice to the Inhabitants of that Place forthwith to retire from it, ... [26]

Gage acknowledged this instruction in his letter of March 4th, 1772 to Hillsborough, writing:

The People settled at Post St. Vincent shall be informed of the King's Pleasure that they retire from thence. [27]

However, Hillsborough's successor and Gage were in for a big surprise.

The general followed up on April 8th, 1772 by issuing a proclamation that complied with his instructions. Because of the distances involved, it was not until the following December that Gage received a communication from the inhabitants at Vincennes via Captain Lord, commanding at Kaskaskia in the Illinois country, asserting that they held their lands by title; furthermore, they offered to send two delegates to Gage with evidence to back up their claim. The general
wrote to Sir William Johnson on the matter on the 15th December 1772;
in his reply dated January 1st, the latter wrote:

I imagined that the Indians about the Ouabache would interest
themselves strongly in Favor of the French Settlers, what Title the
latter can claim by I am at a loss to conjecture. An Indian Title in
that Country could not be admitted without establishing a very
dangerous precedent, and as to one from the French Gov't. tho
they latterly grew liberal for their Grants, I have never yet heard
that they made any in that Country. [28]

When Gage wrote to Dartmouth on January 6th, he had to inform him
the promised delegates had not yet appeared.

The delicate situation prevailing at the Ouabache is made clear
by the following words in the letter which referred to a message sent to
the Indians at the same time as the evacuation order was being
delivered to the French settlers:

..., and the Messenger was in Danger of his Life from a few
Savages, who on the Report of a Man's being come to turn away
the white People, demanded that he should be delivered up to
them, but he fortunately secreted himself till they were
pacifyed. [29]

Dartmouth wrote to Gage on March 3rd, 1773, acknowledging the
danger of leaving Illinois and the Wabash without a government, and
ordering him to remain in command in North America and not to return to
England for consultation until the question of the legality of Haldimand's
acting as Commander in Chief in his absence had been settled. [30]

Gage eventually left for England in June 1773.
By the middle of 1773, relations with the Indian tribes had degenerated to an alarming level. Apart from encroachments on their lands, the tribes were very dissatisfied with the far from satisfactory state of the Indian trade. The control of this trade had been returned to the colonies in 1768, but, five years later, the colonial assemblies had failed to develop an overall uniform system for carrying it out that was acceptable to the tribes. Sir William Johnson had written to Dartmouth at the end of 1772 as follows with regard to the southern Indians:

but their present obvious tendence is to form such an alliance as may enable them to act offensively against us, and so far intimidate the Six Nations and their fast friends, as to prevent their taking any part in our quarell,... [31]

The possibility of a general Indian war had to be given serious consideration as Dartmouth acknowledged in his reply to Johnson dated April 10th, 1773:

Every circumstance stated in your letter, induces an apprehension, that such a plan of confederacy is in greater maturity than I first conceived, and that we may probably be soon involved in the dreadful consequences of an Indian War. [32]

Coupled with the activities of the dissatisfied colonists, the secretary of state had more than enough on his plate.

The way out of its difficulties with regard to the interior that the British government took was to extend the boundaries of the colony of Quebec [by the Quebec Act passed in June 1774] to include the area north and west of the Ohio River. A.L. Burt points out that the government in England 'recognized
the impossibility of making the governor at Quebec directly responsible for the control of the vast interior.' [33] As a consequence, four satellite governments were to be set up at Michilimackinac, Detroit, Vincennes on the Wabash, and Kaskaskia. However, the Quebec Act came into force on May 1st, 1775; subsequent events that month interfered with the four designated lieutenant governors taking over their duties. It does seem that the British government made an honest attempt in the Quebec Act to set up a form of government in the interior which may well have proven acceptable to the French inhabitants there, had not the American revolution broken out.

The lieutenant governor appointed to Vincennes was Edward Abbott; he arrived there in May 1777, up until which time the settlement would appear to have had to fend for itself. The designated appointee to the Illinois country was Mathew Johnson; he never reached there. In the meantime, the country was run by Philippe François Rastel, Chevalier de Rocheblave, 'an old French officer of great energy who had been temporarily put in charge of Kaskaskia.' [34]

This settlement was occupied by George Rogers Clark in July 1778; Abbott had abandoned Vincennes the previous February. The following December, Hamilton, the lieutenant governor at Detroit, occupied Vincennes, which, in turn, was recaptured by Clark in February 1779; the French villagers
refused to fight and Hamilton was taken prisoner. However, Clark was not
strong enough to follow up on his conquests which he was forced to abandon
in 1780 and 1781. [35]
END NOTES

Chapter Three


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., p. 619.


18. Ibid., p. 220.

20. Ibid., p. 150.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 1040.

23. Ibid., p. 1041.


25. Ibid., p. 319.


32. Ibid., p. 360.


34. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

The governor of Quebec was Guy Carleton who had spent four years in England [1770-1774] assisting the British government to prepare and pass the legislation. One of the more important provisions of the act was the restoration to the jurisdiction of Quebec of the old boundaries of New France. This action caused a great uproar in the colonies to the south who, unjustly, placed the Quebec Act into the same category as the Coercive Acts, legislation directed against Massachusetts in particular.

General Gage, the British Commander-in-Chief in America, run into serious trouble on April 19th, 1775, when he sent a strong detachment of troops to seize a large cache of ammunition and weapons believed to be hidden at Concord, Massachusetts. The foray from Boston was a disaster; the eventual outcome was the pinning down of the British Army in that city by the Massachusetts Militia.

More reverses for the British followed in May. Early that month a group of the Green Mountain Boys from Vermont, and a detachment of the Connecticut Militia, under the joint command of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, captured Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain. Subsequently, Arnold raided St. John on the Richelieu River capturing an armed sloop, and Allen made an abortive attempt against Montreal.

The concern of the New England colonies about who controlled Canada
is explicable when one realizes that, prior to 1760, France had been able to attack them from only one direction. In 1775, the Americans realized that Britain could attack them both from Canada and from the east by sea. The Continental Congress had adopted a non-importation agreement of British goods in retaliation for the Coercive Acts. The merchants of Canada realized they faced ruin if they adhered to the non-importation agreement, for, as Burt points out:

...the French operating up the Mississippi would immediately capture the fur trade of the upper country. [1]

Initially, Congress did not view with favor the seizure of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

However, by August 1775, the Philadelphia Congress had done a volte-face, and had decided to opt for an invasion of Canada. Suffice it to say that, by November 2nd, the Americans had captured St. Jean on the Richelieu after a gallant defence by the garrison. This forced Carleton to evacuate Montreal; the fleet that carried the military stores and provisions was forced to surrender by the Americans who had occupied Sorel, where the Richelieu River flows into the St. Lawrence. Nevertheless, Carleton managed to escape to Quebec, where he landed on November 19th.

The lieutenant governor, Cramahé, had already acted energetically to prepare for the defense of the city since, in addition to the invasion by Lake
Champlain and the Richelieu River, a force under Benedict Arnold had appeared before Quebec in early November, having ascended the Kennebec River, traversed the high land, and descended to the St. Lawrence via the Chaudière [river]. By December 6th, Quebec was under siege, Arnold having been joined by a force from Montreal under the command of Montgomery who had led the Lake Champlain invasion army. However, to put the 1775-1776 siege of Quebec into perspective, one has to appreciate that:

The forces which closed in to take Quebec were actually weaker in number than those which were mustered to defend it. [2]

Furthermore, there were sufficient supplies in the city to last until the following May.

On the morning of December 31st, the besiegers attempted to take the city by storm. They did not succeed and Montgomery was killed. Burt suggests:

The importance of this event has sometimes been over-estimated. The ultimate fate of Canada was not at stake. The armament that Britain sent in the spring was strong enough to blow out of Quebec any force that the Americans could have placed in it had they captured it during the winter. [3]

The vanguard of the British relief force arrived at Quebec on the 6th May. The army of reinforcements, the whole of which arrived by early June, was commanded by Major General John Burgoyne. On Tuesday, 18th June, the American army left St. Jean in the evening just as the last of the fleeing
Americans rowed out of musket range.

Carleton had not acted with the vigor he could and should have when it came to booting the Americans bag and baggage out of Canada. Instead, he treated prisoners like erring schoolchildren, sending them home on condition they promised not to serve again. Burt is rather severe in his judgement of the governor's handling of the 1776 campaign:

Carleton's inaction when the Americans were scrambling to get out of the country ruined the campaign of 1776 and possibly altered the outcome of the war. [4]

Because he had to build a fleet of fighting vessels and transports, Carleton was not able to sail south from Ile aux Noix with his army until October 4th. On the thirteenth, just north of Crown Point, he completed the destruction of the fleet that Arnold had constructed at Skanesborough during the summer. The next day British soldiers took possession of the burned ruins of that fortress. By this time, General Gates had nine thousand men at Ticonderoga. Carleton did not give serious consideration to the concept of a winter occupation of Crown Point, and on November 2nd retired northwards with his army to winter in Canada.

It was decided in England during the summer of 1776 that, because of a question of seniority [Carleton was senior to Howe, the British army commander in New York], Carleton could not command an army that was intended to move to the south of Quebec and into Howe's territory. The ship
intended to carry this news to Carleton did not manage to deliver it in 1776, in spite of three attempts to enter the St. Lawrence and reach Quebec City.

The consequence of these events was that Carleton did not learn that he was not to command the invasion army from Quebec until Burgoyne, who had returned to England for the winter, arrived at Quebec in the spring of 1777 with the news he had been appointed to lead the army. Carleton bore a personal antipathy towards Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the American Colonies, and so used these tidings as the reason for tendering his resignation, which was accepted without hesitation. However, to Carleton's credit, he ensured Burgoyne received every assistance in making his preparations to lead the invasion army.

Meanwhile, the British had to find a successor to Carleton and the choice was Frederick Haldimand, who had already spent many, many years in North America in the service of Britain. He had been advised of his appointment in August 1777 and had set out late in September for Canada. However, once again, the clerk of the weather did not view Canada favorably, and the frigate in which Haldimand was travelling had to turn back in October because of contrary winds. He retired to his native Switzerland for the winter, returning to England in April 1778.

It is not an exaggeration to write that the Marquis de Lafayette was almost certainly the foremost advocate of a French invasion of Canada during
the American Revolutionary War. Consequently, it is worthwhile to devote some space to the reason for his motivation in this regard.

Lafayette was born on 6 September 1757; nearly two years later his father was killed at the Battle of Minden [1 August 1759], as a result of which he developed an obsessive hatred for England and the English. His mother died on 3 April 1770; the following month he inherited a large fortune from his grandfather. Three years later, he became a lieutenant in the Noailles Dragoons, and two years after that, while stationed at Metz, he attended a dinner given by the Comte de Broglie, commander of his regiment, at which the Duke of Gloucester spoke of the American revolt against the British. Lafayette also became a Freemason in that year [1775].

The following April [1776] the French government decided to send secret aid to the Americans. In November, Lafayette was introduced by Broglie to the Baron de Kalb [who had been sent to America as a secret agent by the Duc de Choiseul in 1768], who in turn took him to Silas Deane, a U.S. representative in Paris. One of Deane's functions was to recruit French army officers for the fledgling forces of the rebelling colonies.

The great need of the colonial army was for artificers, but Deane tended to go overboard and commission any French officer who came to him with a plausible tale. On 7 December 1776, Lafayette signed an agreement with Silas Deane, part of which read as follows:
...His high Birth, his Alliances, the great Dignities which his Family holds at this Court, his considerable Estates in this Realm, his personal merit, his Reputation, his Disinterestedness, and above all his Zeal for the Liberty of our Provinces, have only been able to engage me to promise him the Rank of Major General in the name of the United States. [5]

On 27 July 1777, Lafayette arrived at Philadelphia, his ship 'La Victoire' having made a landfall at North Island, South Carolina, on the thirteenth of the previous month.

The French officers who had preceded the Marquis de Lafayette had not left a very good impression on the U.S. Congress. As a consequence, he received such a cool welcome from that body that it bore the appearance of a dismissal. However, he persuaded the delegates sent to interview him to return to Congress and to read to the representatives the following note:

After the sacrifices I have made, I have the right to exact two favors: one is to serve at my own expense, and the other is to begin to serve as a volunteer. [6]

The novelty of the Lafayette approach appealed to them, and the outcome was that the Marquis was appointed a major general without command on 31 July. On September 15, the Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied Lafayette across the Atlantic, was also made a major general.

Between August 25 and September 11, the Marquis took part in the operations against the British army, which had invaded via Chesapeake Bay with the object of capturing Philadelphia. On the latter date he was wounded in
the leg at the Battle of Brandywine. From then until October 18th he was in hospital recuperating, whence he joined Washington's headquarters the following day. From November 20th to November 28th he was seconded to serve with General Greene in New Jersey, and commanded with distinction at a skirmish with a British Army unit at Gloucester [opposite Philadelphia]. For Lafayette, the outcome was most rewarding; he was given the command of a division [the Virginians] on December 1, 1777.

The following January [the twenty-third], Lafayette was chosen by Congress to lead a winter incursion into Canada via Lake Champlain. After destroying the shipping at St. Jean on the Richelieu river, the expedition was to attack Montreal and perform as the situation demanded. Between January 28th and February 5th he travelled to York, where he discussed the proposed campaign with Congress and the Board of War, and then returned to Valley Forge. As a possible forerunner of things to come, Lafayette managed to obtain from Congress commissions for six French officers in a resolution dated February 2nd, 1778, part of which stated:

...and are moreover recommended by the Marquis to be employed under him agreeable to their respective ranks in the intended incursion into Canada, the said officers to be appointed to the command only of such Canadians as may be embodied in Canada ...[7]

It was also decided that the Baron de Kalb be directed to 'follow the Marquis on the said expedition in case Genl. Washington shall judge it proper.'
A letter Lafayette wrote to his wife the following day from York contains the following observation:

It will be sufficient for you to know that Canada is oppressed by the English [and (between us) it has had no reason to be satisfied with the Americans]. [8]

Later in the letter he writes:

The idea of liberating all of New France and freeing it from a heavy yoke is too splendid to stop there. Then my army would be greatly enlarged, and it would be augmented by Frenchmen. [A great many French officers are accompanying me there, and I feel very glorious at their head.] [9]

Between February 7th and the 17th he was en route from Valley Forge to Albany, New York, where he was destined to meet with severe disappointment at the lack of preparation for the proposed incursion.

Within two days Lafayette had decided the Canadian expedition was not feasible, pouring forth his severe displeasure in a private letter from Albany to Henry Laurens [President of Congress] dated 19th February 1778. He wrote, among other things:

I can not give up all ideas of penetrating into Canada, but I give up this of going there this winter upon the ice. I will take further informations. I'll try further exertions, I confess that I am exasperated to the utmost degree, and was I certain to carry the least point, whatever might happen, I should go on - but, sir, you'll see such a difference between what was promised to me and what I have found, that indeed nothing appears to be done. [10]

He nevertheless proceeded to assume command at Albany with General Arnold's blessing, and by default [Arnold and Lincoln were recuperating from
wounds and thus were not fit for active duty]. [11] Lafayette remained in
command at Albany until the end of the month; on 31 March, he left that place
and resumed command of his division at Valley Forge.

The preceding February 6th the Americans had signed two treaties with
France in Paris. The one was a treaty of commerce and friendship, and the
other a formal alliance. This news did not reach America until the end of April.
However, on 13th March, the French Ambassador in London informed Lord
Weymouth of the first treaty but kept quiet about the second one. In any case, a
treaty of commerce and friendship involved the recognition of the independence
of the rebelling colonies; the inevitable consequence was the recall, that same
day, of Lord Stormont, the British Ambassador, from Paris. What also has to be
recognized is that the British government knew all about both treaties, having
received every detail of their contents from William Bancroft, Secretary to the
American Commissioners in Paris, who was a British spy.

At this juncture it is important to appreciate that the ink had scarcely dried
on the 1763 Treaty of Paris when France began to make preparations for a war
of 'revanche' against England. It nevertheless has often caused the writer to ask
himself how one colonial power which was a monarchy could support the revolt
of the colonies of another monarchy. Surely, the inevitable consequence would
be rebellion in its own colonies? This question became all the more intriguing
when one considered the background of the French foreign minister whose
policy led France into the War of American Independence on the side of the rebellious colonies.

To quote Orville T. Murphy:

Vergennes was a devoted absolute monarchist. [12]

According to Murphy:

Vergennes's life revolved around the traditional preoccupations of the aristocracy: service to the King and preservation of family strength and status,... [13]

Murphy suggested that it never occurred to the foreign minister that the destiny of his monarch 'could be worked out in any arena but that of war and international politics.' Fundamental in Vergennes's values was loyalty to his monarch. Nevertheless, flexibility was one of his hallmarks as a diplomat, and he was quite prepared to employ the tool of political subversion of legitimate governments in the furtherance of his country's interests. As French ambassador to the Porte [1755-68], he established contacts with Hungarian rebels who were, if necessary, to be supported against Maria Theresa. In 1772, he assisted Gustavus III, King of Sweden, to overthrow that country's legitimate government by coup d'état. And so when appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs by Louis XVI in 1774, he was not without experience in fomenting trouble. How, then, did he reconcile his support of the rebelling British colonies?

One of the main possibilities that France had to consider was the possible replacement of Lord North by the 'francophile Chatham.' The latter would
make a deal with the Americans and the two parties would then join together and turn on France. However, to justify French support of the British colonies the question that had to be answered was:

Was there a precedent, a historical analogy [to the situation existing in 1777-1778][14]

As things were to turn out, England herself provided the answer. In February 1775, a speaker in the House of Commons had compared the situation then prevailing in America with the Wars of Independence in the Netherlands in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The conclusion of the speaker, Governor George Johnstone, was:

In comparing the probability of events, can any man say Great Britain has such a prospect of victory in the contest as Spain might have then expected? Yet we know the event, and how that mighty empire was rent in pieces. The present resolution hurries us into that situation, from which there is no retreatings. [15]

In the autumn of 1776, the analogy of America to the Netherlands entered into the correspondence of Vergennes. The mental gymnastics had taken place.

One of the consequences of the non-arrival of Haldimand in 1777 was that it was Carleton who had to make preparations to deal with the winter 1777-1778 invasion threat commanded by Lafayette. The surrender of Burgoyne had left the Canadian population with a feeling that the province was defenceless. The governor began his preparations by ordering Brigadier MacLean to destroy the forts at Mt. Independence and Ticonderoga, as well as
the houses from there to the north on the banks of Lake Champlain as far as Ile aux Noix. [16] In January 1778, Carleton received word that invasion preparations were under way in Albany and as a consequence he made his troop dispositions accordingly, posting them along the Richelieu river between Sorel and St. Jean. [17] At the end of the month, militiamen were put on alert to hold themselves in readiness.

At the beginning of February [February 7th], Hertel de Rouville, fils, reported [presumably to Carleton], that three armies were marching on the province. [18] One month later, the rumour was being spread by repatriated prisoners that the American army was preparing to attack Canada. Carleton proceeded to St. Jean and orders were given to call up one-third of the militia in the districts of Three Rivers and Montreal. This was done and then the news came through that the expedition from the south was not now going to take place. [19] One positive result of the false alarm was that the governor became convinced that the attitude of the population had improved compared to what it had been during the 1775-1776 invasion.

Having spent the 1777-1778 winter in his native Switzerland, Haldimand returned to England in April. Germain had written to him on the 19th March advising him of the 'offensive proceedings of the Court of France.' [20] Writing to Germain from Curzon Street on April 14th, Haldimand opened his letter as follows:
As it can scarcely be doubted that Canada will be the principal object of the designs of the French as well as of the Rebels I must express my hopes that the Army now in that Country be reinforced to a number that shall enable me to provide against all events and I submit it to His Majesty whether it would not be most advantageous to His Service that the Military Powers of the Commander in Chief in Canada be entirely unlimited. [21]

On April 16th, Germain advised Haldimand that reinforcements of German troops were being sent to Canada, that Canadian troops could be raised if he deemed it expedient, and instructed him what to do in the event he should find himself having to repel an attack on the province. [22] However, one of the contents of this letter was to prohibit Haldimand from conducting offensive operations.

Haldimand arrived at Quebec on June 26th, 1778; his voyage from Portsmouth had taken eight weeks. He came ashore the following day at noon. On 30th June, he caused a Proclamation to be issued under 'my Hand and Seal at arms,' in which he basically advised everyone involved he was now 'Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over the Province of Quebec and Territories depending thereon, in America.' [23] In his letter No. 1 to Germain, dated Quebec, 25th July, 1778, Haldimand made the following telling point regarding intelligence, which was to hold true as long as hostilities lasted:

I am assured that the Intelligence brought in by scouting Parties, Royalists, or Deserters, has hitherto in General proved far wide of the Truth, and no Wonder, considering the Lies circulated through every Part of America,... [24]
It would seem he was under no illusions about the magnitude of the task that faced him.

The 1778 North American campaigning season was taken up with the evacuation of the British army, based in Philadelphia, from that city to New York. By electing to march across New Jersey, the British avoided a possible confrontation between its army transports and the French fleet under d'Estaing that had sailed on April 12th for America from Toulon. Having investigated Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware estuary, the French ships had anchored outside the bar at Sandy Hook on July 11th. The inferior British fleet had been drawn up inside just before their arrival. Their pilots considered the French vessels drew too much water for them to be navigated safely over the bar, and so the fleet sailed off to Rhode Island via Boston.

The combined Franco-American attempt to oust the British from the above island did not succeed. The French fleet was anchored offshore, and operations by the American General Sullivan had begun, a part of his attacking force being under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, when Lord Howe appeared with a strengthened British fleet. D'Estaing sailed to give battle, a gale blew up, the French retired to Boston for repairs to their damaged ships, and Howe likewise was forced to return to New York. The move of the French ships from Rhode Island displeased General Sullivan and Lafayette found himself called upon to smooth ruffled American feathers. The first Franco-
American attempt at Joint Operations had not succeeded. Three years later it would be a different story.

Returning now to Lafayette and his wish to lead an invasion of Canada, he was again, in 1778, and subsequently in 1779, 1780, and also in 1782 and 1783, to 'propose grand invasions of Canada by combined French and American land and naval forces.' [25] On 13 October 1778, Lafayette requested leave from Congress to return to France; this request was granted by that body eight days later. He subsequently sailed in the thirty-six gun frigate 'Alliance' on 11 January 1779. During the fall of 1778 Congress had proposed a joint Franco-American expedition against Canada and had expressed its wish to see Lafayette put in charge of it. As he wrote in his 1779 memoir:

That plan was later postponed because the general [Washington] did not expect to have the means to carry it through. [26]

It would appear, however, that this was far from the whole story.

A French naval squadron had arrived at Rhode Island the previous July. The behaviour of the French vice-admiral d'Estaing, and the crews of his squadron, had met with the general approbation of the New Englanders, Congress and Washington. However, it seemed to be the general feeling throughout the colonies that their great need at that particular time was for
ships only. It was felt 'that the appearance of a French army would alarm the people.' [27]
END NOTES

Chapter Four

1. Burt, *The Old Province*, vol. I, p. 188.

2. Ibid., p. 201.

3. Ibid., p. 205.

4. Ibid., p. 218.


6. Ibid., p. 11.


8. Ibid., p. 275, Lafayette to Adrienne de Noailles de Lafayette, February 3, 1778 at York.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 297, Lafayette to Henry Laurens, Albany the 19th February 1778.

11. Ibid., p. 298, no. 9.


13. Ibid., pp. 119-120.

14. *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe*, 'Vergennes, the United States and History: or What’s in a Name?' by Richard Rhodes Crout, p. 104.

15. Ibid., p. 105, no. 10.
16. Lanctot, G. *Canada and the American Revolution* [Montreal: translated by Margaret M. Cameron, p. 171, no. 59].

17. Ibid., no. 61.


27. Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

On October 15th, 1778, Haldimand wrote to Germain from his camp at Sorel. Looking to the future, among the points he stressed were:

All the Accounts which I have received from the Rebel Colonies agree that the reduction of Canada is looked upon there as so essentially requisite to them before they can consider themselves secure, that it has been declared to the People by the Congress, as I make no doubt your Lordship has seen, they are not to expect Peace until they have accomplished this indispensable work. [1]

and, referring to the Canadians:

I have judged it highly requisite to observe the utmost caution not to make demands that from exciting murmurs might lead them to a Declaration of sentiments which the French Alliance with the Rebels has undoubtedly raised in a number of those who in regard to the Rebellion were unquestionably attached to Government. [2]

During the upcoming months, Haldimand was going to have to second guess Washington as to where the latter was going to strike, if anywhere, in the northern district of the old British military command as it existed prior to the outbreak of the revolution.

George Clark had been received enthusiastically by the Canadians at Kaskaskia in the Illinois Country the previous July, and the subsequent surrender of Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton at Vincennes on February 23rd, 1779 exposed the reduced garrison at Detroit to attack by the rebels. Should it fall, then the trade with the western tribes would be forfeited. A successful
attack on Niagara would have the same result, but this post would be a more
had no local subsistence base and was dependent on the forwarding of
supplies from the lower province. Moreover, the commandant there had to face
the prospect of having to feed two to three thousand Indians during the winter.
The supply situation there had been aggravated by the desertion of the
habitant crews of the last bateaux convoy of the 1778 season.

As far as the Franco-American alliance was concerned, the main
problem as Haldimand saw it was how much it would increase habitant support
for any move into Quebec from south of the border. This situation was not
made any easier by the perceived attitude of the Indians living along the St.
François River. On 17th October, Haldimand issued his instructions to Major
Christopher Carleton as to the object of the expedition he was to lead to Otter
Creek, the waters of which flowed into Lake Champlain. [3] Writing to Germain
on 21st November, Haldimand reported on the expedition as follows:

The Party suffered no loss whatever and executed with great
success the purport of their expedition. Major Carleton, the
Officer who commanded, informs me in his report, "I can venture
to assure Your Excellency that we have completely destroyed
Four Months provisions for Twelve Thousand Men." [4]

Major Carleton was the nephew of the former governor, now Sir Guy Carleton.

To add to Haldimand's worries, an intercepted letter from Captain
Clément Gosselin, a habitant serving in the American army, to his wife living at
Ste. Anne du Sud below Quebec, and dated 29th October, contained the
following disquieting information:

Monsieur Le Compte d'Estin high admiral of France is with us with 12,000 men of troops, he has taken from the English, 22 war vessels 13 of 64 pieces of cannon and 14 of 56 pieces and 13 frigates loaded with munitions and provisions (provision de bouche). Monsieur Le Compte d'Estin, Mon Seigneur Le Duc de Chartres are at Boston with their fleets in order to enter Canada in the early spring... [5]

In an undated letter from General H. Watson Powell, probably written in late January 1779, Haldimand was advised:

I am informed that a report prevails at Montreal that some Indians are arrived at St. Francois from Albany who give an account that ten thousand rebels are assembling there, who are intended to invade this Province under the command of the Marquis de Fayette. [6]

Whether or not Gosselin and the Indians believed what the former had written and the latter were saying has not been corroborated. However, it is known that the information forwarded by both of them was not true. Moreover, whether or not the reports were deliberate, wilful, and conscious attempts to confuse and mislead Haldimand is not known either. What is more, Lafayette sailed for France on board 'L'Alliance' on January 11th 1779. Obviously, Haldimand was in the position of playing a game of 'Blind Man's Bluff.'

Any concentration of military force at Albany for the purpose of an invasion of Canada would naturally have intended to move north via the traditional Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Lake Champlain route. But there was also a conflicting proposed plan with regard to an invasion of the lower
province, although it was developed later in the 1778-1779 winter. On March 6th, Washington wrote to Colonel Moses Hazen. The letter began:

Immediately upon receipt hereof you are to proceed with your regiment to Coos [on the Connecticut River]. You are to march in three divisions for the benefit of covering your men, at Night....Upon your arrival at Newbury, you will know of Genl. Bayley what plan he has on foot for intelligence from Canada; and take such measures to obtain fresh advices as seem best adapted to the end. [7]

Later in the same letter he wrote:

On your March, but in a more pointed manner when you approach Newbury inform yourself with some degree of certainty whether the Inhabitants would give much aid, by their personal services, in an Expedition by the way of Co'os against Canada, if they could have a well grounded hope of a French fleet and Army appearing in the St. Lawrence to co-operate with them. [8]

Washington the great deceiver!

Washington had already decided that such were his limited resources that the most effective use he could make of them in the 1779 campaigning season was to attack the Six Nations. Early in the war the American general had not considered frontier raids an important fact in the overall scheme of things. However, the Indian raids had resulted in his acknowledging that the overall strategic picture was being affected by the local disturbances these raids created. General Schuyler had suggested proceeding up the Mohawk river to launch the attack. Washington's letter of March 21, 1779 to the general is most enlightening: towards the end of it he wrote:
Every day's experience exhibits our finances in a more unpromising light and enforces the necessity of economy in our public expenditures. [9]

Earlier in the letter he had written of his great deception plan in answer to Schuyler's proposal re the Mohawk River route:

But the chief objection I have to the measure is, that I should be under no small apprehension from the enemy's force in Canada. It is true we are endeavouring by demonstration of an expedition into that province to induce them to keep their force at home, and with a view to this, as well as the jealousies which have been given on the side of Lake Champlain, I have been trying to create others by the way of Co'os. Though I hope these expedients will have the effect intended, yet we cannot sufficiently rely upon their success. The enemy's intelligence of our resources movements may be such as to apprise them of our real design. [10]

These decoy campaigns were intended to cause Haldimand to retain his forces in the lower province, thus preventing him from coming to the aid of the Six Nations. If Washington's plans came to fruition, then the faith and trust of the Indians in the British would be correspondingly reduced.

Writing to Sir Henry Clinton on 26th May, 1779, Haldimand emphasised his wish to establish a Post at Oswego during the summer:

...because I know it will be the most essential means of securing the fidelity of the Indians in General whom the rebels are now very Industrious to gain as you will see by the inclosed letter from the Marquis de la Fayette, this with Count d'Estaing's Proclamation dated the 28th October, 1778, and other Papers of a similar nature are spread amongst them, and several, even of the Chiefs, are either become neuter or have discovered an inclination to act against us. [11]
Another letter to Clinton, bearing the same date, referred to reports from the Mohawk River, from Albany and from the Kenebeck as differing in particulars:

...but they all agree that in each of these situations Bateaux are building and Troops assembling and that a proportion of these troops are French. I do not believe that their numbers are formidable, and what are reported to be French, I take only to be Vagabonds they have picked up in America, or more probably the Continental Troops in French Uniforms. [12]

Sifting the intelligence reports he received must have caused Haldimand and his Staff the greatest of concern. What to believe, what to discount and what reports to put aside in case subsequent ones confirmed their veracity, must have been the occasion of ongoing headaches.

Yet again, in a letter of the same date, Haldimand advised Brigadier General Maclean:

The treaty of the Colonies in Rebellion with France and the appearance of one of its Fleets upon the American Coast have operated a very Powerfull Change upon the weak and ignorant People of this Country, where the many adherents to the Cause of Rebellion have spread among us D'Estaing's Proclamation, dated Boston, October 28, 1778 and also the Marquis de la Fayette's of the 18th Decemr to the Canadian Savages adds to our difficulties. [13]

There is no doubt that the loyalty of the Quebec population and the attitudes of the Indian Tribes were matters to which Haldimand had to pay constant attention. Shortly afterwards, in a letter to Germain, dated 7th June 1779, the Governor wrote:
The Turbulent and seditious Behaviour of a Cabal at Montreal has also laid me under the necessity of confining two Frenchmen there, whose names are Mesplet and Jautard,...I heartily lament that those who misbehaved in 1775 and 1776, were not severely punished, it was easy then, but now difficult,... [14]

This would appear to have been a veiled criticism of the lenient policies adopted by Governor Carleton in 1775 and 1776.

This need for concern about the attitude of the habitants was reinforced still further when Haldimand received a letter dated 14th June from Francis Le Maistre sent from Montreal. Near the end of it, La Maistre wrote:

My observations on the disposition of the inhabitants leads me to believe that if the rebels penetrate into the province without being accompanied by a French force they will find among the Canadians more spectators than agents. [15]

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the prospect of closer affinity with France was playing mind games with the habitants. Closer ties to the rebellious colonists, whose behaviour had not endeared them to the habitants in 1775 and 1776, appealed only to a minority. Sit on the fence and support the winner would appear to have been the watchword.

Later the same month [18th June 1779], Haldimand wrote a 'secret' letter to Germain. The success of Washington's deception strategy is revealed in the letter's first sentence:

Since my letter to Your Lordship of Novr. 18th, various Intelligence has been received from the Neighbouring Colonies of the Preparations making there to invade us by Detroit, the Mohawk River, Lake Champlain and St. Francois and I have daily the
mortification of discovering that the disaffected People receive earlier Intelligence of the State of affairs in all quarters than I can possibly obtain which has been the means of persuading all Ranks of men that a French Fleet will come up the St. Lawrence in the course of this summer,... [16]

The significant thing about this extract from the letter which was, after all, marked 'secret', is that none of the possible invasion targets mentioned included the real objective, the Indian Country. However, in fairness to Haldimand, it has to be mentioned that he had been advised by Germain in a letter dated Whitehall, 16th April 1779 that:

Intelligence from France mention an intention to send some Troops, with Ships of War up the River St. Lawrence this summer, with a View to promoting a Rising among the Canadians and assist an Expedition meditated by the Rebels, and I think proper to acquaint you of it, that you may pay proper attention to the Safety of Quebec, altho' I cannot say I think they will venture to carry the project into execution. [17]

One has to assume that Germain was conscientiously attempting to cover all bases; he did, after all, issue a disclaimer in the last sentence, but, surely, British Intelligence Reports had revealed that France and Spain were planning to attempt a full-scale invasion of England that summer.

However, it was not until August 7th, 1779 that Lord Sandwich wrote from the Admiralty to Haldimand that:

..., we have therefore sent you a Ship of 24 Guns to winter with you, which us all we can spare at present, at which your surprise will cease when you know we are in daily expectation of an invasion from France and are at the eve of an action for the Sovereignty of the Sea against the Combined Fleets of France and Spain. [18]
The action to which Sandwich referred never took place; fortunately for England the Spanish Fleet was late keeping its rendezvous with the French Fleet; there was further delay caused by the two fleets having to agree on an acceptable signal code to both, and eventually sickness in both fleets necessitated their dispersal.

Washington had originally offered the command of the Indian Country expedition to General Gates with the understanding that if Gates did not accept, then it should devolve upon Major General John Sullivan. In his letter to Sullivan dated March 6th, 1779, Washington wrote:

It will be a great point gained if we can, by false alarms, keep the force already in Canada from affording any timely assistance to the Savages, Refugees and those people against whom the blow is levelled. [19]

Reference has already been made to this deception plan. As events turned out, Haldimand was misled by an initial expedition led by Colonel Van Schaick against the Onondaga. This left from Fort Stanwix and took place between April 19th and 24th.

As far as the main expedition was concerned, there were two forces; the smaller of 2000 men under General James Clinton ascended the Mohawk River in the boats constructed at Stillwater [which had led Haldimand to believe an invasion of Canada via Lake Champlain might be in the cards] to Canajoharie. Thence, between June 17 and August 22nd, they made their way to Tioga [Fort
Sullivan] on the New York-Pennsylvania border. The larger force of 3500 men under General Sullivan set out from Easton, on the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border, on June 17th and reached Tioga on August 11th. The two armies defeated a force of Rangers and Iroquois, estimated by Sullivan to number 1500, at Newtown, N.Y., close to the Pennsylvania border, on the 29th August, 1779, whence they proceeded to destroy corn crops and fruit trees as well as burning Iroquois houses to the ground. [20]

Looking back on this 1779 campaign, it is interesting to note that John Butler of Butler's rangers, who operated out of Niagara, had reported uneasiness among the Six Nations in mid-February that 'they were to be the object of a rebel visit early in the new year.' [21] An unknown loyalist reported in mid-March that there would be a strike through the Six Nations territory, though not necessarily as far as Niagara. [22] This is possibly why the April 1779 move of Colonel Van Schaick against the Onondaga was considered as having been the cause of Indian unease.

It was not until two days after the battle at Newton that Haldimand appointed Sir John Johnson to command a force to go to the aid of the Six nations. The necessary orders for the expedition went out early in September and the Indian agents were instructed to persuade as many Canadian Mohawk Indians as possible as well as warriors from the Seven nations of Canada to join it. [23] In the end, these efforts were of no avail because Sullivan began to
withdraw from the Indian territory in the third week of September, even before
Johnson had reached Carleton Island. Conceivably, Sullivan had received word
of the relief expedition and began to retire as a consequence.

The last mention of Lafayette was that he had sailed for France from
Boston, aboard the frigate 'L'Alliance,' on January 11th, 1779. The ship arrived
at Brest the following February 6th. [24] Whilst Washington was engaged in
deceiving Haldimand as to the objective of his 1779 campaign, in March [March
3rd], Lafayette had been named lieutenant-commander of the king’s Dragoons
with the rank of 'mestre de camp.' [25] Subsequently, he asked to be taken into
consideration for an appointment to the army that was being assembled in
Normandy for the joint French-Spanish expedition against England. On June
13th, he was made aide-maréchal-général-des-logis under Vaux, the
commander of this army.

In a letter to the Comte de Vergennes from Le Havre, dated July 3rd,
Lafayette wrote:

The plan for American operations which you requested from me,
Monsieur le Comte, is so dependent on present circumstances that
I had better wait a few days....In the winter we might give Bermuda
to the Americans and await the opening of the campaign in the
Antilles or Boston. Rhode Island, New York or Canada might be
the objective that we make known to Congress. The real and most
important objective would be an attack on Halifax in which New
England would assist us. [26]

Here was outlined briefly the plan Lafayette was to forward to Vergennes the
subsequent July 18th. His arguments were the result of his experience in America; Idzerda writes:

[They] were influential in the French ministry's decision, in late January 1780, to send to America the fleet and the 4000 troops that were to be so decisive for the American cause. [27]

The fact that the plan for the invasion of England had failed inevitably also played a significant part in this French decision.

Lafayette wrote to the Comte de Maurepas on the same subject the following January 25th, 1780. In a letter to the Comte de Vergennes dated February 2nd, 1780, Lafayette lobbied strenuously for command of the French corps to be sent to North America viz.:

Conclusion 1. I believe that it is better to give me this corps. 2. If it is not given to me, I must leave immediately with the resources I request. [28]

Lafayette's comparatively junior rank in the French Army precluded his being given this command. Nevertheless, he was mandated to carry the news of the French military support to Congress and Washington. On March 5th, he was given written instructions from Vergennes; [29] the following day, Gabriel de Sartine communicated to him the dispositions which had been made by the Navy Department for the operation. [30] On March 13th, Lafayette sailed for Boston on 'l'Hermoine;' the ship had to return to port with a broken main yard, but got away again on March 20th and arrived in Boston harbor on April 27th. The French fleet and expeditionary force, commanded by M. le Chevalier de Ternay
and the Comte de Rochambeau, respectively, sailed from Brest on May 2nd, 1780.

On 19th May, Washington wrote to Lafayette from the Continental Army Headquarters at Morris Town, New Jersey. Relative to Canada he wrote:

We talked of a Proclamation to the Canadians. It is not already done, I think it ought not to be delayed. It should be in your own name and have as much as possible an air of probability [31]

He goes on to suggest that Lafayette write two proclamations and that:

In both proclamations you should hold yourself up as a French and American officer charged both by the King of France and by Congress with a commission to address them upon this occasion.....The more mystery in this business the better. [32]

It would appear that Washington was repeating the tactics he had used to deceive Haldimand with regard to the objective of his 1779 campaign. In the event, Lafayette was to write but one proclamation, dated around May 25th. [33]

Meanwhile, Lafayette wrote to the Comte de Vergennes from Philadelphia on May 20th. With regard to Canada and, referring to the forthcoming arrival of the French troops, he wrote:

If at the end of autumn the troops do not receive orders to report to the West Indies where they could take the offensive [such orders would have to be given in advance], I imagine that not being able to employ them elsewhere, we shall undertake with them the conquest of Canada. General Washington told me to have some hopes for this plan, and I believe I can be quite certain in anticipating that project for a winter campaign. [34]

On the 25th, Lafayette wrote to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who had succeeded
Gérard as the French diplomatic representative to the rebelling colonies; his letter dealt with the proclamation to the Canadians and stated clearly Washington's intent as to the purpose it should serve:

I have the honor to inform you, Monsieur le Chevalier, that in order to mislead the enemy on the aim of our expedition, General Washington wishes me to draft a proclamation to the inhabitants of Canada. This document will be printed in the greatest secrecy, but we shall take care to pass it on to New York. As for the other copies, except for the one for New York, they will be thrown in the fire on the arrival of the French troops; thus I can say all that I please in a work destined never to appear. [35]

Deception! Duplicity! Dissimulation!

In his reply dated Philadelphia, June 5, 1780, La Luzerne reminded Lafayette firmly but gently of the aims of French policy:

I believe, sir, I should be very frank with you in regard to an expedition against Canada. We consider the project of freeing that province as one of the most advantageous that may be undertaken for the Thirteen States. If we examine the plan, the goal, and the present circumstances of the confederation, however, we must agree that we are not in a position to concern ourselves with a foreign goal. As long as the southern states are in imminent danger, we would very likely provoke their complaints, discontent, and perhaps even defection if we were to devote ourselves to a foreign expedition. It is surely not with the intention of subjecting Canada to the Thirteen States that you think of this expedition....I believe, therefore, that it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the object of the alliance and the aid sent by the king is to liberate the Thirteen States. [36]

France would appear to have anticipated the future imperialistic ambitions of the United States even before the United Kingdom had acknowledged their political independence from the mother country.
With regard to Lafayette's proclamation itself, its tentative date has been set at 25 May 1780. A translation of it appears on pages 36 and 38 of volume III of Idzerda's *Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution* series; its importance to this thesis is the fact that a draft of it was forwarded on June 4th by George Washington to Benedict Arnold in Philadelphia. The latter was instructed to find a suitable discreet printer who could produce a proof sheet quickly and subsequently supply at least 500 copies. The proof sheet was forwarded to Washington on June 7th. The same day Arnold communicated the contents of the proclamation to the British. On August 31st, General Clinton sent a translated copy to Germain. [37]
On 30th June, Lafayette replied to La Luzerne's letter of June 5th; on the subject of Canada he wrote:

I have felt obliged to delay my reply to you about Canada for several days. I have read to General Washington what you wrote me. The ideas of subjugating that country and of conquering it with the intention of giving it back are equally distasteful; on the other hand, the independence of the Canadians would be a matter of great concern for the tranquillity of the United States. [38]

Even today, over two hundred years later, one detects an intolerant attitude by the future United States, especially when one takes into account the relative populations of even Quebec vis à vis New York and New England. Surely the future United States had not overlooked the relative pacificity of Quebec's habitants since 1763! They had had enough of war. The French expeditionary force led by Rochambeau and Ternay was destined to arrive off Newport, Rhode Island, on 10th July 1780.

Later in that same letter dated 30th June, Lafayette advised La Luzerne:

On the subject of Canada, Monsieur le Chevalier, since we are not concerned with it at the moment, I am going to send there some persons assigned to bring us news, who if they are taken will serve to put the enemy on the wrong scent. [39]

The persons sent were Captain Clement Gosselin and Lieutenant Pierre Boileau of the Second Canadian regiment.

In a further letter to La Luzerne dated 4th July, 1780, Lafayette wrote:

Mes deux espions de Canada sont partis cette nuit, et j'ai l'honneur
de vous envoyer copie de leur instructions. Comme ils prendront
un petit parti avec eux, ils facheront en cas de malheur de reclamer
le caractere d'officiers...Nos recrues ne viennent pas, Monsieur le
Chevalier; on dit cependant que l'on se met en marche, mais j'ai
grande envie de les voir en personne pour savoir sur quoi nous
devans compter. [40]

The general instructions were dated July 1st. In general, the mission of the two
agents was:

...to secure information respecting the forces of the enemy in
Canada and of the Canadian militia, the attitude of the Canadians,
the resources of the country, fortifications, artillery, etc. [41]

The destination of Gosselin was Quebec City and its environs, that of Boileau
Montreal. The troops, whose non-arrival Lafayette was bemoaning, arrived off
Rhode Island on 10th July, as has already been mentioned.

The priority plan of the Franco-American alliance for the 1780
campaigning season was to drive the British from New York City. However, to
stand any reasonable chance of success, such a plan necessitated the alliance
enjoyed a naval superiority. Within two days of the arrival of Ternay's fleet,

Washington was writing to one John Mercereau:

That the pilots give very discouraging accounts of being able to
carry the heavy french ships into the Hook. If that cannot be
effected either Canada or South Carolina will be immediately
attempted. [42]

What is interesting but mystifying is that D'Estaing had experienced the same
difficulty two years previously. Was there no internal communication within the
French Navy? Ten days later, in a letter to Lafayette, Washington commented:

As I speak to you in confidence, I am sorry to find that the objections made by Mr. De Ternay are of a nature to prevent his entering the harbour, notwithstanding any superiority he will probably have....But I should hope, whenever he had a decisive superiority he might possess the port; and certainly without this our operations must be infinitely more precarious, and in success much less decisive [43]

And so the future of the potential plans for attacking New York rested with De Ternay.

What is relevant to any realistic appreciation of the 1780 campaign season are the following two sentences from Lee Kennett's *The French Forces in America, 1780-1783*:

There was a widening gap between what the army required and what the navy would carry. On the evening of March 26th, Rochambeau and Ternay sat down with their aides and split the expedition. [44]

This splitting of the expedition resulted in 1780 ending up as a non-campaigning season for the Franco-American forces in the sense of military activity in the north. However, for the sake of completeness, one should add:

The Continental army had suffered costly defeats at Camden and Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780, and Benedict Arnold's treason had nearly given Britain the strategically important post at West Point. [45]

And, in essence, that was what happened militarily. It only remains to state that
the second batch of French troops never arrived in North America. By the time they were embarked and ready to sail the British navy blockade had their transports and escort ships bottled up in Brest. Washington was aware of this by August 26th, 1780, and noted in his letter of that date to President Joseph Reed that, even if the port were opened, the second division would not sail before August, 'which (with a good passage) will make it October before they arrive upon this Coast.' [46]
END NOTES

Chapter Five


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. vol. 132, pp. 34. The story of Otter Creek is told in Otter Creek: The Indian Road [1990] by James E. Petersen. A comprehensive and scholarly account of Carleton's 1778 raid can be found in Carleton's Raid by Paul A. and Ida H. Washington [1979].

4. Ibid., vol. 54, pp. 61-63.

5. Ibid., vol. 176, p. 7.

6. Ibid., vol. 133, p. 57.


8. Ibid., p. 205.


10. Ibid., p. 269.


13. Ibid., vol. 150, p. 7.


15. Ibid., vol. 72, p. 17.

17. Ibid., vol. 161, p. 28.

18. Ibid., vol. 49, p. 86.


22. Ibid., note 38.

23. Ibid., p. 171, note 21.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p. 224.

28. Ibid., p. 352.

29. Ibid., p. 364.

30. Ibid., p. 369.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 28.

35. Ibid., p. 35.
36. Ibid., p. 52.
37. Ibid., p. 39 [top].
38. Ibid., p. 62.
39. Ibid., p. 65.
41. Ibid., p. 361, note 73.
43. Ibid., p. 236.
46. Fitzpatrick, Writings of George, Washington to President Joseph Reed, August 26th, 1780, vol. XIX [June 1937], p. 441.
CHAPTER SIX

Lord George Germain wrote to Haldimand as follows from Whitehall on 17th March 1780:

The drawing over the Inhabitants of the Country they call Vermont to the British Cause appears a matter of such vast Importance for the safety of Canada and as affording the means of annoying the Northern Revolted Provinces that I think it right to repeat to you the King's wishes that you may be able to Effect it though it should be attended with a considerable expense. [1]

This of course added one more problem to those Haldimand already faced and "The Haldimand Negotiations with Vermont" will be dealt with in the next chapter.

A letter from Major Christopher Carleton of the same date, from Fort St. Johns, added to his preoccupations. Haldimand was advised:

Mr. Hazen with his Regiment is expected shortly at Cohoes to finish the Road [the military road from Newbury, Vt. to St. Johns]. Military Provisions have been forming all winter on the River Connecticut which is to be transported to the Blockhouses as soon as the Road is begun upon...[2]

On a cursory look it has not been possible to find corroborating intelligence of this information but, as is to be noted, the letter goes to underline the problems Haldimand faced in assessing information presented to him in this case, obviously in good faith, predicated on Major Carleton's previous record.

It would seem that it was not until early June [June 9th] that Haldimand received information that he could entertain seriously. On May 2nd, General
Knyphausen wrote from New York to Brigadier General McLean that:

The Pearl Frigate is just arrived from England with Dispatches of the 15th March by which I learn that a large Armament was then fitting out at Brest, consisting of several Ships of the Line and a considerable Body of Land Forces, from different circumstances there is reason to believe that either Halifax, Newfoundland or Canada is their object they were expected to sail the end of March or beginning of April. [3]

Two days later, Knyphausen wrote in cypher to Haldimand on the same subject, a letter which Haldimand received on 3rd July. Additional vital information the letter contained was:

The Rebels who knew of the French armament before the arrival of the pearl frigate give out that it is bound by concert with Washington to the attack of this Place. [4]

Halifax, Newfoundland, Quebec or New York, how was Haldimand to act?

Presumably, he had to assume Canada was the target.

However, on 25th June, Haldimand had received a letter from General Robertson, also stationed in New York, which referred to the same set of dispatches; nevertheless, Robertson, referring to the rebels, commented:

I conclude from the state of their magazines, temper and weakness that they have no intention of invading Canada this summer, that even if their french allys were to attack you by the river an army from these provinces could not move in force to their assistance. [5]

He continues the letter by describing a possible scenario which might leave France the ruling power in America, but then essentially discounts this concept by writing:
But I'm told that Franklyn dictates the french measures, in that case the storm is surely directed against this place... [6]

This indicates clearly the problems Haldimand faced when it came to assessing the intelligence reports he received. On June 9th, 1780, the Knyphausen information that he received indicated Quebec as a possible destination of the French force. This was confirmed by the letter sent to him in cypher by General Knyphausen that he received on July 3rd. And yet, on June 25th, the letter he received from General Robertson pointed very strongly towards New York as being the major objective. One recalls to mind the old childhood use of the petals on a flower - he/she loves me, he/she loves me not. Did the grown man Haldimand roll the dice instead?

On September 5th, he received yet another letter on the subject of the destination of the French expedition from Sir Henry Clinton, dated New York, 6th July. This contained information from the Minister in England, dated May 3rd, and Haldimand was advised:

Monsieur Ternay is supposed to have sailed about the 3rd May with seven ships of the line and from 20 to 25 Transports ..., having on board five thousand two hundred land Forces and that their destination is still supposed to be Canada, by Information I have received here the french armament will assemble at rhode Island a division of which will proceed under the command of the Marquis de Fayette by Connecticut River and No. 4 across the lake to Saint Johns, the other by the river saint Lawrence. [7]

As has been recorded in the previous chapter, the expedition sailed on May 2nd.

On July 6th, Haldimand wrote in cypher to Knyphausen, acknowledging
receipt of the latter's communication dated May 3rd. In his P.S., Haldimand implicitly acknowledged New York as a possible target, where he wrote:

I have some Batteaux Ready upon Lake Champlain to make a diversion in your favor should a french fleet appear in your Quarter, but want of Provisions will make it impossible to do more than to allarm the Enemy in the neighbourhood of Crown Point. [8]

Provisions were the main bugbear of Haldimand [after the number of troops at his disposal] from his arrival in 1778 until 17th August 1782, when he advised the Earl of Shelburne:

I have the Honor to inform Your Lordship that Hostilities on our Part are now effectually stopped thro'out this Province. [9]

The shortage of provisions delayed his re-establishment of a Post at Oswego, most necessary in Haldimand's eyes to placate and re-assure the tribes of the Six Nations still loyal to Britain.

Five days after his 6th July 1780 letter to Knyphausen, Haldimand wrote to Robertson in New York and repeated what he had written to Knyphausen about a diversionary expedition to Crown Point should it be necessary.

However, elsewhere in the letter he wrote:

I am making every preparation in my Power to guard against an event of which those letters were to caution me, heartily concurring in your opinion that the Interest of France would make this Province the object of her Attempts which would be facilitated by almost a general Revolt of the Inhabitants. [10]

It would appear that, more than fifteen years after the Peace of Paris, Haldimand had failed to come to terms with the fact that France was more interested in the
wealth-producing islands of the West Indies than Quebec - neither had General Robertson in New York for that matter!

Haldimand repeated the sentiments about the possibility of France becoming the ruling power in America in a July 12th letter to Germain:

Many Letters have Been circulated amongst the Inhabitants persuading them that an Invasion by the French is certainly intended this Summer, a measure which would appear to be the Interest of that Nation as this Province might be kept without giving jealousy to the others and in Time upon a Division of States might leave France the ruling power in America - but I hope the opportunity is lost from their not having made the attempt last Fall and the subsequent Successes of his Majesty's Arms will render it a dangerous undertaking. [11]

Later in the same letter the governor wrote:

...so if the blow should be directed against Canada and that our Victuallers arrive before it falls, I cannot say that I am very apprehensive for the Consequences, particularly as the motions of the French Fleet are so carefully watched over. [12]

Haldimand would appear to have been in an unaccustomed optimistic mood when he penned this dispatch. The summer campaigning season of 1780 saw British fortunes in North American at their zenith.

Twelve days later [July 24th], Francis McLean wrote to Haldimand from Halifax advising him that he had heard from Sir Henry Clinton to the effect that the French Armament was destined for Canada. However, McLean went on to add:

It is, however, proper to inform Your excellency that since his writing that Letter I have certain Accounts that several of our
Frigates fell in with the French Armament near the entrance to the Chesapeake... they were then standing to the Northward, and the General Conjecture was that they were bound to Rhode Island. [13]

On the same subject, Germain wrote to Haldimand on August 8th advising him that it was thought Boston was the destination of the French Fleet, and also that the French had given up on any plans to send a Force into the St. Lawrence during 1780. Further on in the letter he wrote:

...and could you by any means induce the Vermont People to put themselves under the King's Protection, it would be a most essential service at this time. [14]

Germain does not appear to have been aware at that time that things had begun to move along on this matter, as the account of 'The Haldimand Negotiations' will detail.

By September 9th, Haldimand was aware that the French Expedition had arrived at Rhode Island the previous July 12th, Clinton's advice of the fact having been despatched from New York the 14th August. [15] On September 9th, Clinton wrote again in cypher to Haldimand advising him that the second part of the French Expedition was expected hourly. He went on to say that this news helped Washington greatly to complete and augment his army. With regard to the plans of the enemy, Clinton wrote:

The operations of the enemy appear to be still intended against this place but it is highly probable they will renew their intentions of attacking Canada by number four as early next year as the season will permit, should the second French reinforcement arrive I will endeavour to send you immediate notice of it. [16]
Haldimand received this information on October 18th.

On September 17th, one finds Haldimand writing to Germain, apparently accepting that there would be no invasion attempt by the French via the St. Lawrence in 1780, but nevertheless still worried about Lafayette and an invasion by land. In the letter he wrote:

Sir Henry Clinton has not mentioned the arrival of Admiral Graves but Report affirms that he has Blocked up the French at Rhode Island, this will render an Attempt against Canada by water this year impossible, yet from the Preparations formerly made by the Rebels and Monsieur de la Fayette, it is probable they may invade it by land for I have every day more Reason to be confirmed in the opinion I gave Your Lordship in my letter of the 14th of last September [1779] and I have undoubted proofs that they have emissaries continually in the Country but are particular at present. [17]

One recalls that Lafayette had sent Boileau and Gosselin to Canada to spy in the Montreal and Quebec City regions; they had departed on July 4th.

That same date [Sept. 17th] Admiral Edwards had written to Haldimand from St. John's, Newfoundland, and referred to the capture of the Mercury Packet on 3rd September. Henry Laurens, a late President of the American Congress, had been taken prisoner along with a great numbers of Papers:

among which there being one of the highest importance to the Governors of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Canada to be acquainted with, I hereby enclose you a copy of it for your Information. [18]

The document called for a five-part invasion of Canada in the 1781 campaign.
Not surprisingly, the extract called for French aid:

In order then to secure as far as Human Wisdom can provide, the Reduction of those Places, Aid must be obtained from France - Suppose a Body of From 4 to 5000 French Troops sail from Brest in the beginning of May under Convoy of 4 ships of the Line and 4 frigates, their object to be avowed, but their Cloathing Stores etc. such as designate them for the West Indies. [19]

The extract goes on to suggest that the reduction of Canada might be sufficiently completed by the middle of August 1781 that the French warships might proceed to the Investiture of Halifax; and should that place fall as a result of a land attack by American troops assisted by the militia of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, then:

the Troops might either proceed against Newfoundland, or remain in Garrison until the next Spring, at which time that Conquest might be compleated - [20]

It would appear to be sufficient to comment that the document was the Report of a Committee of Congress [i.e. Politicians]; nowhere in the extract is there any reference to an input from the American military or for that matter Rochambeau. It is suggested that to carry out the five-point plan of attack, and to continue to contain Clinton in New York, would have involved the levying of such a number of troops that it would have been impossible to attain that number. Furthermore, where were the required Provisions to come from?

The last letter of 1780 from Haldimand to Germain is dated November 28th. However, Haldimand must have been very busy on October 25th when
mention is made of three separate letters. One of them dealt with the change in attitude of the clergy since 1775, and especially since 1778 when France entered the fray. Haldimand wrote:

I am well aware that since France was known to take part in the Contest and since the Address of Comte d'Estaing and a Letter of Monsieur de la Fayette to the Canadians and Indians have been circulated in the Province many of the priests have changed their opinions and in case of another invasion would, I am afraid, adopt another System of Conduct. [21]

Much of the second letter is concerned with the hoarding of wheat by the Traders and the steps the governor took to counteract it. However, he also wrote as regards the Quebec Act:

On the other hand, the Quebec Act alone has prevented the Emissaries of France and the Rebellious Colonies from succeeding in their efforts to withdraw the Canadian Clergy and Noblesse from their allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain. [22]

It seems to the writer that Haldimand was here being inconsistent because he had previously questioned the loyalty of many of the priests. Towards the end of the letter his pessimism increased:

The Province is surrounded by Enemies from without and as happens in all Civil Wars is infected with Spies and Secret Enemies from within. [23]

Haldimand would appear to have been a very perplexed man in October 1780.

He wrote yet a third letter on October 25th which was kept open until he was able to add a P.S. on November 22nd, where he was able to give a brief
account of an expedition to the Mohawk River under Sir John Johnson. The letter marked 'Private' of that date was accompanied by three enclosures, namely, the suggested plan for the 1781 campaign captured with Henry Laurens, a copy of a translation of the Marquis de la Fayette's Proclamation inviting the Canadians to revolt, and the reply of the Comte de Rochambeau [dated August 20th, 1780] to the Deputies of the Indian Nations who had visited him at Newport. With regard to the behaviour and disposition of the inhabitants of the Province he wrote:

[they i.e. the behaviour and disposition] make it beyond a doubt to a nice Observer that we have little to expect from their Assistance in Military Operations, and that they have learned to consider the arrival of the Fleet as an Event that will certainly happen, and that is Equally sure their efforts to reconquer the province will be successful. [24]

Haldimand announced that he was going to prepare to counter the threat by attempting the formation of several Canadian companies [of militia] during the winter, and placing them under the command of such officers as appeared to him to be reliable. The exhausted state of his Provisions had prevented him from attempting this sooner.

Haldimand continued by discounting the probability of success should the rebels attack either Detroit or Niagara. On the subject of Lakes Erie and Ontario he wrote:
Nor does the Enemy seem fully apprised of the Difficulties He has to surmount before he renders Himself Master of the Navigation of the Lakes Erie and Ontario. [25]

He pointed out the forces available to maintain naval superiority on both lakes.

What worried him were the operations proposed by the enemy at Oswego which, if they materialised:

are more formidable and much better calculated to ensure them Success than any other Part of their Plan, not only from its favorable Situation for building, but the awe it must create thro'out the whole Six Nations indians. [26]

He announced his intention of taking possession of Oswego early in the Spring, his Provisions situation permitting. He dealt with the question two paragraphs later, writing:

For it is absolutely necessary always to have more than a Twelvemonths in Store, in the Upper Posts; otherwise the least attack in any Quarter which might delay that Transport, [presumably the one from Europe], would throw the Garrisons there entirely at the Mercy of the Enemy. [27]

He then advised that the late Harvest in Canada had been a good one, implying that this would give him a temporary cushion on the question of Provisions.

Haldimand went on to detail his customary plea for reinforcements:

I therefore beg Leave to request in the most Earnest manner, that a Reinforcement of British Troops may be sent here very Early in the Spring to consist of, at least, 2 or 3000 men, and it is absolutely necessary that they bring with them 12 months Provisions, and the demands of Ordnance and engineers Stores, which were ordered for 1780. [28]

In the opinion of this writer, Haldimand then went on to diminish the chances of
his receiving a sympathetic hearing from Germain by writing later in the same paragraph:

Could I persuade myself that in Case of an Attack the Canadians would stand neuter, I think I could defend this Province with a less Force - but when I see the Common People influenced by their old Prejudice and all Ranks so totally blind to their true Interests, as not to wish a long Continuance of their present happy Government, I am led to believe that the Appearance of our Enemy [presumably France] would be followed by the Revolt of a great part of the Province. [29]

Returning to the subject of provisions, Haldimand's penultimate paragraph referred to the erection of new storehouses at Côteau-du-Lac and the completion of a 'Compleat Canal' by which a most tedious and laborious passage up a 'Violent Rapid' could be avoided. This was the first canal constructed in Canada. The work was supervised by a Lieutenant Twiss, another Swiss.

The remainder of Haldimand's correspondence for the year 1780 that has been read does not appear to contain anything of great import. In a letter of November 3rd to Governor Hughes he wrote:

The great success that has attended His Majesty's Arms in the Southern Parts of America will render ye efforts of France and the Rebel Congress in all probability to make themselves masters of the northern parts. They have already taken some steps which point that way. [30]

From where Haldimand sat, eternal vigilance had to be the watchword. Looking at the above citation over two hundred years later, one would have thought the
main preoccupation of 'France and the Rebel Congress' would have been to
restore the situation in the 'Southern Parts of America.' The correspondence of
Lafayette and Washington would indicate that this was indeed the case.

Writing to Sir Henry Clinton on November 15, Haldimand said:

This scarcity [of Provision] which the Victuallers not arriving must
unavoidably occasion may have a very fatal effect with the Indians
and frustrate my hopes of increasing my strength by new levies
which I shall not be able to support. [31]

And so, the hopes Haldimand had expressed in his October 25th [private] letter
to Germain re levies had been dashed before a month had elapsed. The rebels
had obviously had a field day with the August 1780 victualling fleet destined for
Quebec. The following day [November 16th] Haldimand wrote again to Clinton
on the subject of sedition within the Province and the contacts Benedict Arnold
must have made in 1775-1776 whilst in Canada. At the end of the third
paragraph he came to the point when he wrote:

I should think he will not hesitate candidly to give Your excellency
every Information in his Power, by which a discovery may be made
and a stop put to the Intercourse which certainly subsists between
this Province and the Principals in rebellion. [32]

That the frontier was 'porous' there is no doubt, but the following question poses
itself, namely, 'Did Haldimand appreciate that it operated both ways?' If such had
not been the case, Justus Sherwood would not have been able to operate
Haldimand's Secret Service operation out of the Loyal Blockhouse on South
Hero Island [now part of Vermont].
In what was probably his last letter of the year to Germain, dated Quebec, 28th November 1780, Haldimand wrote:

"Every day gives me more and more reason to think that an Invasion is intended early in the Summer. The more the affairs of the enemy are desperate in the Southern Colonies, the more they will find it necessary to use every effort to make themselves Masters of Canada, it is their last resource, and if their efforts should succeed, they would soon recover their losses to the Southward." [33]

However, once again the need for reinforcements was stressed:

"Your Lordship will see the necessity of sending the reinforcement which I mentioned in my former Dispatches and which I hope will consist of British regiments, if I can be enabled to establish a strong post at Oswego, of which from want of Provisions and now despair, and after garrisoning Quebec, have a Body of men sufficient to oppose the enemy upon their penetrating into the Country, by the bay of Misissiqui or St. Francois, or at least to cover St. Johns, Chambly, and Sorel, I hope every attempt on the part of the Enemy will be frustrated." [34]

And so, once again in Haldimand's eyes, a satisfactory defence of Quebec depended upon men and provisions. Towards the end of his letter Haldimand turned again to the internal threat as he perceived it:

"I am certain there is frequent intercourse by letter or message between the French or Rebel Generals in Rhode Island and some of the Priests and Jesuits assisted by some disaffected old subjects whom, with all my industry I could not discover. And tho' the Noblesse will probably behave well, I make no doubt there are many Inhabitants, in each Parish." [35]

Two hundred years or more later, one asks oneself the question 'if the situation
was as Haldimand described it above, then why did he not declare Martial Law?'

Surely, he had the authority!
END NOTES

Chapter Six

3. Ibid., vol. 147, p. 154.
4. Ibid., vol. 147, pps. 155-6.
5. Ibid., vol. 147, pps. 167-9.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., vol. 147, p. 183.
8. Ibid., vol. 147, pps. 187-8.
12. Ibid.
16. Ibid., vol. 147, pp. 234-235.

20. Ibid., p. 184.


22. Ibid., pp. 270-278.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.


31. Ibid., vol. 147, pp. 272-275.

32. Ibid., vol. 147, pp. 278-280.

33. Ibid., vol. 57-2, pp. 309-314.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.
CHAPTER SEVEN

In his letter of 17th March 1780 to Haldimand, Lord George Germain referred to "The drawing over the Inhabitants of the Country they call Vermont to the British Cause.' Yet curiously, histories of Canada would appear to say little about them.

A.L. Burt devotes but one page in total to the negotiations, considering them to be a part of:

...the history of the American republic rather than to the history of Canada. Canada was concerned only in the temporary effect of the negotiations - the local cessation of hostilities. [1]

This writer disagrees with Burt because what negotiations there were, were directed by Haldimand from Canadian soil. Whether the Vermonters intended the purpose of the negotiations to be solely to play Britain off against America will be left for the reader to decide. This writer contends it was not quite as simple as that. Had it not been for the British surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, then the ultimate outcome remains open to speculation. It was not until eight years after the 1783 treaty of peace that Vermont was admitted to the Union as the fourteenth state.

However, it would appear, according to Burt, that:

Germain thought they [the people of Vermont] might be redeemed, and in the spring of 1779 he ordered the
commander-in-chief in New York and the governor of Quebec to draw them back into the British Empire. [2]

Corroboration of this statement is to be found in an address given by one Henry Steele Wardner to the Vermont Historical Society on January 20th, 1931. Part of his address contained the following words:

Our Vermont historians point out as the beginning of British overtures to Vermont a letter written to Ethan Allen under date of March 30th, 1780, by Colonel Beverly Robinson, a Loyalist officer of the British Army stationed in southern New York. That letter proposed that Vermont by changing sides might be constituted as a separate British province with a military organisation under Allen's command. The letter was received and never answered. As a matter of fact, General Sir Henry Clinton in the previous year had sent to Ethan Allen oral messages of similar tenor. [3]

Wardner goes on to add shortly afterwards:

third, because not until I obtained from the British Record Office in London in 1922, a photostat of Captain Justus Sherwood's official report of his initial diplomatic conference with Ethan Allen has any historian included that document in any of the several treatises on the Haldimand Negotiations. [4]

In the summer of 1780 Governor Chittenden:

had signed and forwarded to Congress a letter declaring that unless Congress would support Vermont's claims as an independent State Vermont would have no reason to continue at war with Great Britain and would be at liberty to agree to terms of peace. [5]

Such an event could deprive the rebels of the Connecticut River invasion route.

From what follows it has to be appreciated that Ethan Allen was known to George Washington; they had met face to face in May 1778. It would appear
Allen's Captivity Containing His Voyage and Travels:

I soon fell into company with col. Sheldon [of the light horse] who in a polite and obliging manner, accompanied me to headquarters Valley Forge, where I was courteously received by gen. Washington, with peculiar marks of his approbation and esteem, and was introduced to most of the generals and many of the principal officers of the army, who treated me with respect, and after having offered Gen. Washington my further service, in behalf of my country, as soon as my health [which was very much impaired] would admit, and obtain his license to return home, I took leave of his excellency and set out with gen. Gates and his suit for Fish Kill, where we arrived the latter end of May. [6]

Based on the above citation, Ethan Allen had taken, verbally at least, in front of General Washington, an oath of allegiance to the rebelling colonies.

However, just over two years later, one finds Washington writing to one John Mercereau the following:

Sir: I last night rec'd yours of the 8th with the two letters from your correspondent in New York; desire him to enquire very particularly into the truth of Allen's having been in, and if he finds it to have been so, to endeavour to find out the plan of operations concerted between him and the enemy in New York. [7]

It would appear that:

"Amicus Reipublicae" [alias of the American spy, Abraham Bancker] had reported [July 4th] that Col. Ethan Allen was in New York City negotiating with the British. [8]

One somehow gets the feeling that Washington's intelligence service produced better results than the corresponding efforts of the British. There is no doubt that correspondence between Haldimand and Clinton by land often did not get through. And so it may be concluded that Washington knew something was
going on between the British and Vermont even before Ethan Allen met with Justus Sherwood at Castleton, Vermont, in the autumn of 1780. In any case, Ethan Allen and Washington were in direct correspondence on the subject of the exchanging of and the treatment of prisoners of war by Haldimand in August 1780. [9]

At the autumn meeting between Ethan Allen and Justus Sherwood, the latter, acting for General Haldimand and under his detailed instructions, discussed fully with Allen what were, according to Henry Steele Wardner, the same proposals that General Clinton and Colonel Robinson had already made in New York City in June/July? The ostensible reason for the visit of Sherwood, who had come under a flag of truce, was to discuss an exchange of prisoners of war in response to a communication sent to General Haldimand by Governor Chittenden. What was in fact discussed was:

the idea of Vermont's becoming a British province with the assurance that Vermont's land titles would be protected against New York's claims... [10]

Allen went as far as committing himself to the concept 'that if Congress should finally take a stand in favor of New York and against Vermont, Vermont would declare herself a neutral power.' [11]

The one point on which Haldimand and Ethan Allen were in complete agreement was that should Vermont secure representation in Congress, then all discussion was off. This would appear to be an appropriate place to cite from
three letters written by George Washington on 6th November 1780. To

Governor George Clinton he wrote:

Your Excellency will perceive by the inclosed to Genl. Schuyler,
under flying seal, that I have given discretionary powers to seize
and secure a certain person [i.e. Col. Ethan Allen] should it upon
further investigation of circumstances appear necessary. I am etc. [12]

General Philip Schuyler was advised as follows:

I confess all circumstances and previous informations considered
that matters in a certain quarter carry a very suspicious face [i.e.
Col. Ethan Allen's suspected negotiations with the British]. Should
it appear, upon further investigation, that there are good grounds
for present suspicions, you will conceive measures with Brig. Gen'l.
Clinton [to whom I have written upon the subject without mentioning
names] to seize and secure with as much secrecy and as suddenly
as possible the person in question [i.e. Allen] with his papers....Nothing
but the most palpable proofs ought to warrant the seizure
of his person; but a variety of means may be fallen upon to
cumvent and defeat their plans, when you have a regular force
to depend upon. [13]

In the relevant letter to Brigadier General James Clinton

Washington wrote:

From some circumstances there is reason to apprehend
Treachery in the northern Quarter. I have therefore desired
General Schuyler to consult with you and upon a further
investigation if it should appear necessary to secure a certain
person [i.e. Col. Ethan Allen], you are to concert measures for
having him apprehended suddenly and sent down the Country
under a proper guard. You need not be cautioned against
lisping the most distant hint of this business. I am ... [14]
According to Wardner:

In fact, on the Vermont records, the exchange of prisoners is the only subject mentioned in relation to Sherwood's visit. [15]

Whether in view of Washington's specific instruction to General Schuyler, this would have justified the detention of Ethan Allen would appear to be a matter for speculation.

A vital fact to keep in mind is that, as a result of Sherwood's visit, it had been possible for Ethan Allen to arrange a temporary truce between Canada and Vermont. The result was that the few Vermont troops under arms were able to go home; the burden on the finances of the State was lightened as a consequence. However, it is possible, if not probable, that news of Sherwood's tête à tête with Ethan Allen at Castleton had been leaked and this had led to the letters of Washington detailed in the previous paragraph. [16]

Five days after the date of these Washington letters Sherwood set out to return within British lines; he was accompanied by Ira Allen, Ethan's brother, and Joseph Fay. Reverting again to Wardner's address:

On the third day of the Journey, November 13, 1780, Sherwood produced from where he had hidden them the written proposals of General Haldimand. After his companions had read them, the paper was burned,...[17]

The ostensible purpose of the trip had been to meet with Major Christopher Carleton at either Crown Point or St. John's to negotiate a cartel for the exchange of prisoners. Having satisfied themselves, whilst Sherwood
proceeded north to Quebec, Allen and Fay returned southwards with the lame excuse that the state of the ice on Lake Champlain had prevented them from completing their trip. However, they were able to confirm to Ethan Allen the veracity of what Sherwood had said about the offers of General Haldimand.

During the winter of 1780-81, Governor Chittenden put pressure on New York and the four New England states on the question of Vermont's relation to the thirteen American states. His letters to Connecticut and Rhode Island sought their help in obtaining Vermont's entry into the American union, at the same time intimating that, unless this were granted, Vermont might be forced to come to terms with Great Britain. Wardner suggests that Ethan Allen had promised this during his talks with Justus Sherwood at Castleton. In any case, Washington received a copy of each letter.

By March 1781, Ethan Allen was on the spot. Rumors of Vermont's clandestine negotiations with Haldimand had spread to England and France as well as over the North American continent. Charges of disloyalty against Allen filed in the Vermont legislature culminated in his resigning his commission as a brigadier-general, although the cases were never tried to conclusion. Colonel Beverley Robinson had just sent him a second letter and one Seth Warner asked him to his face if he had been receiving letters from the enemy. The quick-thinking Allen eventually admitted it and sent copies of both letters to the President of Congress saying they were the only ones he had received, and that
they had never been answered. The Castleton talks with Sherwood were very
cjudently not mentioned. A very convenient 'lapsis memoriae.'!

In May, Ira Allen went to Canada under a flag of truce not for the
professed purpose of negotiating a prisoner exchange but, in fact, to continue
the Ethan Allen-Justus Sherwood negotiations. The discussions took place at
Isle-aux-Noix. The positions of the two sides were that Britain wanted Vermont
to negotiate to become a British province whereas Vermont wished to negotiate
its neutrality. According to Wardner, a message from Haldimand soon arrived to
the effect that:

As I have not authority to make any treaty of neutrality, I cannot
agree to any. The state of Vermont must either be united in
constituted liberty with Great Britain, or continue at enmity with
it. [18]

The best Allen could obtain was a suspension of hostilities until after the end of
a summer session of the Vermont legislature. In fact, there were no hostilities
between the British and Vermont during the summer of 1781. In view of the
distrust of the British, occasioned by the exhibition of the letters of Col. Beverley
Robinson, Ira Allen had negotiated very well. Furthermore, Vermont's General
Assembly was successfully led to believe Allen had only treated for the
exchange of prisoners.

Haldimand's report to Germain on the Isle-aux-Noix negotiations is
contained in a 'Most Private' letter dated July 8th, 1781. Haldimand enclosed
with this letter regularly minuted extracts from a journal of what passed at the meeting and observed:

....from all which your Lordship will be induced to form various conjectures and probably be at a loss to see into the real intentions of that designing People. - I am apprehensive the Flag was sent merely to cause a jealousy on the part of Congress and to intimidate that Assembly into Compliance with a Union upon the Independent Terms they contend for, from a belief Vermont is in treaty with us. This opinion is strengthened from a persuasion that whatever they profess, they are in their Hearts inveterate Rebels and, if once united with Congress, would be very formidable Enemies, having been from their early contests with their neighbouring Provinces continually in Arms. They are in every respect better provided than the Continental troops and in their principles more determined. [19]

Nevertheless, Haldimand does not appear to have been too downcast as a result of the meeting, for later in the same letter he observed:

....notwithstanding these circumstances from the sensibility with which Your Lordship will perceive by the latter part of the Journal, Mr. Allen [Ira] seemed impressed and the candor of his Professions upon taking leave, I still hope for success and Your Lordship may depend that neither money nor pains shall on my part be wanting to accomplish it. [20]

The aims of the British at this time would appear to be far easier to discern than to fathom those of the Vermont negotiators.

Writing from New York on 23rd July 1781, Clinton said, among other things:

If a Reunion of Vermont with the Mother Country can be effected it must be productive of happy consequences but I confess my suspicions of those People as well as Your excellency. [21]
and, later in the letter:

I have not received the least Intimation from home relative to the Intentions of Government with respect to Your Province, But the enclosed Extract of a Letter which I received lately from the Minister will shew you what those of the Court of France are in regard to Canada. [22]

The intentions of the Court of France to which Clinton referred would appear to be those contained in a May 4th [secret] letter from Germain to Haldimand in which he wrote:

I have received certain Information that the French Court have given orders to M. de Lucerne to dissuade the Congress from making an Attack on Canada until they had driven the King's Troops out of the Thirteen Provinces. [23]

It should be noted that Haldimand replied to this letter on 23rd October 1781. [24] This indicated one of the fundamental problems of this war, namely the time it took to communicate between Whitehall and New York, as well as Whitehall and Quebec City, the latter being aggravated by the navigation of the St. Lawrence River.

It was at the beginning of August that a copy or duplicate of a letter from Germain to Clinton [written in February 1781], that was intended for Haldimand, found its way into the hands of American newspapers and was published in early August. The tell-tale words were:

The return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance is an event of the utmost importance to the King's Affairs. [25]

As might be imagined, not only were the Allens and their co-conspirators
disconcerted but also the members of Congress. Chittenden's purported statements to an emissary from Washington were to the effect that the State had been deserted by its neighbours and, as a consequence, found itself having to treat with the British in order to prevent invasion by enemy troops; furthermore, Vermont refused utterly to submit to New York. [26] Wardner goes on to suggest that the semi-disclosure of the Canadian intrigue had apparently improved Vermont's standing with Congress.

It would appear that Ira Allen had written to Haldimand on July 10th, predicting that:

Vermont would take care to render impossible any coalition between herself and Congress, that Vermont's September elections would put friends of the British Government completely in control of the State's policy, and that thus what he termed 'a revolution' in favor of Great Britain would be accomplished. [27]

Furthermore, Joseph Fay spent two to three weeks, under the guise of a Vermont commissioner to exchange prisoners, on board a British vessel on Lake Champlain during July and August, spending most of his time discussing how Vermont might become a British province. During this time he wrote a letter to Haldimand corroborating what Ira Allen had written to him on the 10th July. Fay also wrote to Haldimand on August 9th that those influential men in Vermont, who were aware of the negotiations with the British, had freely subscribed their names to a paper that signified their approval. [28] This was what Haldimand had wanted to hear for a long time to convince himself he was not dealing only
with the two Allens and Fay. Haldimand was far from happy that Fay had not brought the paper with him.

The signers of the paper:

...approved Ira Allen's communications to General Haldimand and Captain Sherwood purporting an intention of this State's becoming a British province, and that such a course was necessary as a political measure to prevent British invasion, and in the meantime to strengthen the state against any insult until Vermont received better treatment from the United States or get a seat in Congress. [29]

This was obviously an attempt to play both ends against the middle or, in another set of words, to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. Eventually, the contents of the paper were transmitted to General Haldimand in September 1781. He appears to have seen them as essentially confirming those of the meeting between Sherwood and Ethan Allen almost a year before.

Meanwhile, Haldimand had written in cypher to Sir Henry Clinton on August 2nd:

This is an extract of a letter I prepared to send together with a full account of all that has passed in the Affair of Vermont....and in the mean time acquaint you that it appears to me infinitely more Dangerous to yield to the Delays urged by that People than to bring them to a declaration since from the best Information these delays are only to gain time to strengthen themselves to Act no doubt in co-operation with Congress - they are busy forming Magazines, have raised a considerable number of men, and in a few months will be an important Ally or a formidable enemy to either side, from the whole tenor of their Conduct I cannot think they will adopt ours....To carry on the Deception Ethan has quitted the Service but Ira goes Commissioner to Congress instead of coming here with the Flag - This is to avoid the Test of a
Discovery, I think it cannot fail to produce. [30]

The same day saw Clinton despatch a letter to Haldimand in which he wrote:

- the french and Rebels only wait for a Reinforcement from the
  West Indies to make an Attack upon this Post which I certainly
  think they will attempt upon its arrival and it is hourly expected.... I
  need not therefore say of how much consequence a diversion upon
  the Frontiers of this Province and the Speedy decision of Vermont
  in our favor would be. - [31]

It would not be too long before Cornwallis would be defending Yorktown in a
foreshadowed effort to keep the British army of the south intact as a fighting force.

By September 3rd, Haldimand had acquired a far more optimistic attitude.

In a letter to Dr. Smyth, Sherwood’s nominal deputy in the secret service
operations from the Loyal Blockhouse, he wrote:

Vermont Assembly is to meet the 1st. Octr. - I shall send a large
Detachment about that time to take Post and remain while the
season will permit at Crown Point....I have strong hopes from the
Assurances of those in whose Loyalty and Knowledge I have the
greatest confidence that this step will produce a favorable decision
in the affairs of Vermont. [32]

This letter was dated Quebec, 3rd September 1781 and forwarded to Dr. Smyth
on the seventeenth of that month.
Chapter Seven


2. Ibid., p. 9.


4. Ibid., p. 10.

5. Ibid., p. 11.


8. Ibid., p. 161, note 37.


11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., pps. 304-305.


16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 15.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 17.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 18.
31. Ibid., pp. 331-332.
32. Ibid., p. 341.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The elections that were held in Vermont in September 1781 did not produce a Legislative Assembly with a majority favoring reunion with Britain. However, neither was it a body that was pro-Congress. The next step taken by Vermont [Ira Allen and Joseph Fay] was to propose in writing to the British commissioners in a meeting at Skanesborough that Haldimand issue a proclamation whilst the Vermont Assembly was in session announcing the terms on which Vermont would be accepted as a British province.

Haldimand referred to these Skanesborough conversations in an October 1st letter to Sir Henry Clinton wherein he wrote;

My agents are returned from their conference with Ira Allen and Major Fay and I hereby enclose Continuation of their Proceedings from No. 22 to 33. These and conversations [I am forbid to commit to Paper,] which passed between those Gentn. have almost, if not entirely removed my suspicions of Allen's Party - but I see with much concern that the wished for Revolution very little depends on their Interest, at least, as things are at present circumstanced. The Prejudice of a great Majority of the Populace and the prevailing Influence of Congress are too powerful to admit of a change [within any given time from one to three years] by negotiation.

The leading men in our Interest advise as a last Resource my issuing a Proclamation confirming to Vermont the late assumed Territory and other Privileges [contained in a letter marked A] thinking that from the late refusal of these by Congress, the Populace may be inclined to accept of Terms from Government.... In this Faith I shall issue the Proclamation, worded with as much Caution as Consistent, with my hopes of its Success - ...[1]

When the new Vermont Legislature met for its October session, its General
Assembly decided it was not in Vermont's interest to consider the proposals that the American Congress had put forward. So far, so good as far as the British were concerned. Then came the surrender at Yorktown [19th October] and, as subsequent events were to prove, with it the virtual end of the British hopes of winning their struggle with the rebelling colonies.

There was also at this time the accidental death of Sergeant Tupper of the Vermont scouts; they and the British scouts had been carrying on what may best be described as a 'Phoney War.' Colonel Barry St. Leger of the British forces, stationed at Ticonderoga, sent Tupper's belongings to Governor Chittenden together with a note of regret and apology. At the same time three Vermont officers, General Enos, Colonel Fletcher and Colonel Wallbridge also sent Chittenden their reports of the incident. News of St. Leger's action 'got out'; as his action had been unusual, to say the least, it was decided by Ira Allen to suppress the reports of the Vermont officers and forge new ones which contained nothing to reveal the amicable relations existing between Vermont and Great Britain; it was these forged reports which were read to the Vermont Legislature. [2]

To further protect themselves, what may best be described as the 'peace with Britain' conspirators in Vermont drew up a further document which, according to Wardner:

...did expressly approve Ira Allen's use of his best policy by
feigning or endeavoring to make the British representatives believe that Vermont desired to make a treaty of peace with Great Britain. In short, it was a declaration of a scheme to defraud. [3]

The purpose of this piece of paper was to convince one Nathaniel Chipman, a young lawyer who later became Chief Justice of Vermont's Supreme Court and who was, in Wardner's opinion, the composer of the letter signed by Chittenden and sent to General Washington under the date of November 14th, 1781.

The gist of the letter appears to have been that Vermont was committed to the American cause but such was its exposed position geographically, it had been deemed expedient for the state to appear to view with favor certain proposals received from General Haldimand. The letter further stated that Ira Allen and Joseph Fay had gone north solely to make a cartel for the exchange of prisoners and sought to give the impression:

that Vermont's representatives never did more than to listen with politeness and pretend to be sympathetic when Sherwood and other British officers mentioned the idea of Vermont's returning to British allegiance. [4]

And yet, it was the Vermonters themselves who had advised Haldimand to issue a Proclamation.

Washington's reply to Chittenden's letter of November 14th was dated Philadelphia, January 1, 1782. In it, Washington wrote:

I will only add a few Words, upon the subject of the negociations which have been arrived on between you and the Enemy in Canada and in New York. I will take it for granted, as you assert it, that they were so far innocent that there never was any serious
intention of joining Great Britain in their attempts to subjugate your Country; [5]

Writing of the terms offered by Congress the previous August with regard to the boundaries under which Vermont would be recognized as a state, he said:

If you are sincere in your professions, these will be additional motives for accepting the terms which have been offered [and which appear to me equitable]; and thereby convincing the common Enemy, that all their expectations of disunion are vain, and that they have been worsted at their Weapon, deception. [6]

Vermont's Legislature followed Washington's advice, but Congress once more refused to recognize her as a state. The war had been effectively won with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. By relinquishing the lands on the east and west that had been taken over, Vermont weakened her negotiating position and gained nothing in return.

Meanwhile, on November 14, 1781 Haldimand had expressed his anxiety to Clinton about the state of affairs in the Chesapeake, in which he wrote:

On that Event the Conduct of Vermont will turn, if unfortunate, she will be our most dangerous enemy, otherwise Affairs are in a good train - The Detachment under Col. St. Leger has had every effect I could expect. The Vermonters appear conciliated and a large Body of the Enemy are drawn from all Quarters to Albany - But these Efforts will prove feeble unattended to the Southward. [7]

Nine days later, Haldimand penned a Most Secret letter to Lord George Germain in which he discussed what was, in essence, the state of affairs in the Province. He referred to the reports of the bad state of affairs in the south [i.e. the Chesapeake] and observed:
...it will not be difficult for the Congress to engage them [i.e. The Inhabitants on the Frontiers of Canada]...to join a Kind of a Crusade in order to subdue this Country. The People of Vermont, notwithstanding the inclinations which many amongst them have to Shake off the Tyranny of the Congress, may find themselves under the necessity to make great and Zealous exertions against us in order to wipe off the Suspicious which from many circumstances cannot but be entertained against them. [8]

One poses oneself the question as to whether Haldimand appreciated when he wrote the above that the relationship between Canada and Vermont was destined to demand his close attention for two more years to come.

On February 22nd, 1782, Clinton sent Haldimand some intelligence received from William Smith, Chief Justice of New York, who had advised him:

"About a fortnight since an Intelligent person from Connecticut suggested that the Rebels talked of an Attack in the Spring on New York, he had strong suspicions of a preparation to invade Canada, and yesterday I learnt by a direct channel that General Schuyler said to one of his Confidents and yet our friend that Lafayette went to France to propose that project and that they were waiting to Know the Result." [9]

As Haldimand's reply, dated April 28th, shows this information was received on April 6th. Moreover, in the same reply, acknowledgment was made of the receipt of a further letter from Clinton, dated March 10th, on April 15th. This second communication apparently:

...urged him to make a demonstration in force on the frontier of Vermont for the purpose of influencing the negotiations which were still in progress with the inhabitants of that state and coercing them into neutrality. [10]

With regard to the request for a demonstration on the frontier, Haldimand wrote:
The Moment I can form any Certain Judgement that this Province is not to be Attacked by the River, ... Aggreeable to Lafayette's Proposal communicated in Your Letter I shall not fail appearing with as great a Force as my strength and circumstances will admit of upon the Frontiers for the Purpose expressed in His Lordship's Letter. [11]

He continued by pointing out the threat that existed from the ability of the multitude of Militia [presumably that of New York] under arms ready to turn out at an hour's notice.

Later in the letter, concerning the situation as regards Vermont,

Haldimand wrote:

I with much concern refer Your Excellency to a late Rebel News Paper printed at Fish Kill wherein all that has passed in my Negotiation with Vermont and as communicated to you is related. This proves that our Confidence has somewhere been betrayed and God Knows what bad Effects it may have in that Affair particulary if Allen and Fay have been sincere. [12]

Haldimand went on to ask that he should not be left as the sole channel for Vermont's conducting its relations with the British. He indicated he had sent an envoy to Allen about the end of February to learn:

...what had passed in Congress relative to Vermont Affairs, the Messenger was taken on his way out but fortunately destroyed his Dispatch. [13]

According to Wardner, Ethan Allen wrote that Vermonter were:

...now fully enraged with Congress and that he would do all in his power to make Vermont a British province. [14]

Later on the same page of the report of Wardner's speech, it is recorded:
As late as July 11, 1782, in the City of Quebec, an agent — some believe him to have been Ira Allen: others believe him to have been Jacob Lansing - submitted in writing to General Haldimand a proposal in the alleged behalf of Governor Chittenden and his Council that Vermont would unite with Great Britain on condition that the treaty be kept secret until troops could be raised to defend the alliance. Haldimand was inclined to acquiesce. [15] 

However, compared to the overall world-wide situation of which Haldimand almost certainly did not possess detailed information, the negotiations with Vermont were but one item. In accordance with his instructions from London, and his communications with Clinton, he had done what he had been told to do.

The surrender at Yorktown had had its consequences and on February 9th, 1782, Lord George Germain had left office. For the short time that existed before the fall of the North Ministry he had been succeeded by Wellbore Ellis. North had announced the resignation of his ministry on March 20th, that of Rockingham had taken office on March 27th. The responsibility for North America had passed to the Earl of Shelburne. [16]

The Earl wrote a 'Most Secret' letter to Haldimand dated April 22nd, 1782; the latter acknowledged its receipt in a letter from Quebec dated 17th July. With regard to the situation concerning Vermont, Shelburne wrote:

I have the honor to enclose to you the Address of the House of Commons to the King together with his Answer and two Resolutions. You will see by these that the King's Servants are bound as much as they are not only to avoid all Measures of offensive War but in truth every Act that carries the appearance of attempting to reduce the Revolted Colonies to Obedience by Force.
I need not observe to you that the Offer made in your Proclamation published among the Vermontese is totally repugnant to these Resolutions. [17]

Nevertheless, the noble Earl went on to add when making reference to the Vermontese:

In all events it will be a Service of considerable Importance to gain their Confidence and Affection and make them preserve their Neutrality. But in this and many other cases, your own Prudence will prove a better Instruction than any I can give you, and will engage you to seize Advantages which may offer by open and Honourable means avoiding the least Appearance of Insidiousness. [18]

This letter to this writer exemplifies an example of giving responsibility without appropriate authority.

Mention of Vermont in Haldimand's reply is conspicuous by its absence except that he referred curtly to the receipt of the Address of the House of Commons to the King, His Majesty's Answer and the two resolutions, and permitted himself to observe:

...and your Lordship may rely on my strict observance of the System adopted and pointed to therein. [19]

However, there was an additional matter of a personal nature on Haldimand's mind at this time. It was the fact that Sir Guy Carleton, an officer who had always been his junior in rank, had been appointed to succeed Clinton in New York.

Writing again to Shelburne one month later [17th August 1782],
Haldimand informed him:

    I have the Honor to inform Your Lordship that Hostilities on our
    Part are now effectually stopped thro'out this Province. [20].

On the subject of Vermont he wrote:

    A large Scout has lately been sent by the Province of New York to
    prevent all Communication between this Country and the
    Southward and with Vermont of whom they have become very
    Jealous. Altho' this scout deprives me of useful Intelligence and
    might be easily cut off I shall by no means attempt it... [21]

In a postscript he advised Shelburne that he had learned Albany had received a
visit from Washington in the company of a large body of cavalry. The frontier
posts had been inspected. Haldimand surmised:

    I am persuaded that his Excursion was occasioned by a Report
    conveyed to the Colonies, [on my forming a Magazine of
    Provisions for the intended Detachment to Vermont], that an
    Expedition was on Foot from this Province to favor Vermont, or
    against Albany, in which case he would have raised the militia and
    in 48 hours have collected a numerous Army. [22]

Meanwhile, negotiations had begun in Paris between Britain and the rebelling
colonies and, on November 30th, 1782, a temporary treaty of peace was signed
between Britain and the United States of America. In the definitive treaty signed
a year later, Vermont found herself within the boundaries of the territory ceded
by Britain to those new United States. [23]

    The epilogue to "The Haldimand Negotiations" with Vermont is revealed
by the following account:

    Information of the conclusion of a 'definitive treaty' of peace was
Information of the conclusion of a 'definitive treaty' of peace was not received at Quebec until September 19 [1784]. [24]

That Haldimand had been left in the dark with regard to Vermont for over a year may be deduced from this [unsigned] letter to him dated Whitehall, 8 August 1783, wherein it was written:

I have received your Letters, Nos. 28 and 29, containing an application for Instructions with regard to the conduct you are to pursue in case the State of Vermont should be attacked and you should be called upon for your support or that demands should be made upon you for supplies of Ammunition. As these Letters are dated before you could have received information of the signing of the Provisional Articles of Peace it must now be unnecessary to observe to you that consistent with The Treaty before mentioned no assistance can be given to the Inhabitants of that State to enable them to act against the Americas... [25]

Vermont had been left to its own devices. Perfidious Albion? Not really; in accordance with the accepted standards among the European Great Powers of the eighteenth century, her interests were as expendable to Britain as those of Quebec were to France in 1763. The definitive Peace Treaty was signed at Paris on September 3, 1783.

It is now appropriate to consider how Governor Haldimand was advised of and dealt with perceived Franco-American threats to Canada during 1781 and up until 17th August 1782, when he advised the Earl of Shelburne that hostilities on the part of the British forces in Canada had effectually ceased. The point at which to commence would appear to be a letter to Haldimand from Germain, dated May 4, 1781, in which the latter wrote:
I have received certain information that the French Court have
given orders to M. de Lucerne to dissuade the Congress from
making an attack on Canada until they had driven the King's
Troops out of the Thirteen Provinces. As therefore you will have
nothing to apprehend for the safety of your own Government, you
will have it more in your power to co-operate with Sir Henry Clinton
in reducing the revolting provinces... [26]

By the time this letter reached Haldimand late in July, he had received what was
tantamount to corroborating information from other sources. However, at about
the same time, he received what was claimed to be an intercepted letter from
Schuyler to Washington, dated July 15th, the content of which suggested attacks
on Quebec via Coos on the Connecticut River and the St. Lawrence. [27]

Germain wrote to Haldimand on 26th July advising him:

> All the intelligence we have received of the designs of the enemy
> leave Canada out of their plan and therefore you will have nothing
to apprehend for the safety of the Province. [28]

Five days later, because Germain had left for the country, William Knox, private
secretary at the Colonial Office, wrote a Most Secret letter to Haldimand to
advise him of the following:

> ...the most certain and precise intelligence has been received of
> the plan and intentions of the enemy. The French Court have
> absolutely refused to send any more troops to the continent, they
> have put Mr. Rochambeau under Washington's order but with the
> exception of not making detachments from his army. In
> consequence of a meeting between Washington and the French
> General and Admiral... This intelligence, which may be entirely
> relied on, will fully prove to you that no attempt will be made by
> France or the Rebels on the side of Canada and leaves you
> entirely Master of your own operations and to carry on what
> Enterprises you may judge proper to undertake on the frontiers of
the Revolted Provinces in Co-operation with and support of the Southern Army, and in pursuance of the great Object of the War, the restoration of the Constitution. [29]

This information was received by Haldimand in September. The logical conclusion would appear to be that Clinton's Intelligence had been able to learn what had transpired at the Wetherfield, Connecticut, conference between Rochambeau and Washington between May 21 and May 23. The information nevertheless took four months to reach Haldimand [via London]. In any case, that was an extremely fast time.

Haldimand's final words on the situation in Canada, as he saw it, as winter approached in 1781, would appear to have been those of his Most Secret letter to Germain dated 23rd November 1781. Relative to the prospect of an invasion in 1782 he wrote:

From many Observations which I have made and many steps which the enemy have taken during this Summer there is Reason to apprehend that the Plan of Attack found among Lawrence's Papers will be renewed and prosecuted early next Spring....Many letters are in the same stile and are plain indications of some design against this Province in which France cannot now that the provinces of Virginia and Carolina are recovered, refuse to give assistance to the Congress.' [30]

One can appreciate and understand Haldimand's letter; it was his duty and responsibility to report the situations as he saw them. This question inevitably poses itself:

Did Haldimand appreciate that, at that time, the wealth of the West Indies was of far more concern to the warring Colonial Powers than Quebec?
But, even if he did not, his responsibility was to hold Canada; consequently, it was the responsibility of the British government to provide him with adequate men and matériel to fulfil the task that had been assigned their Canadian governor.

Like the sword of Damocles, the invasion threats continued to hang over Haldimand's head in 1782. Clinton wrote a letter to him on February 22nd, which he received on April 6th. In it, Clinton passed on the following information:

"About a fortnight since an intelligent person from Connecticut suggested that tho the rebels talked of an Attack in the Spring on New York, he had strong suspicions of a preparation to invade Canada, and yesterday I learnt by a direct channel that General Schuyler said to one of his Confidants and yet our friend that La Fayette went to France to propose that project and that they were waiting to Know the result." [31]

In the same letter was this information from prisoners who had been returned to Detroit after their capture at Vincennes:

...some of the Rebel Officers say that there will be an expedition by the Allied Forces against Canada the ensuing summer, [i.e. 1782] and it's asserted the Rebels have agreed to give the French Canada in case the combined Forces of the French and Rebels should be successful enough to reduce it. [32]

Such was the attitude of the French inhabitants of Canada that Haldimand had no option but to take seriously the concept of a restoration of the province to France. However, we know now, two hundred years later, that such an
acquisition was the last thing Vergennes either wished for or wanted.

Haldimand wrote to Clinton on 5th March to report on the findings of his latest scouting expeditions, which were:

that Preparations are making at and in the neighbourhood of Albany which indicate a renewal of the enemy’s design against this Province upon the plan discovered by the Capture of Mr. Lawrence...The conduct of the Canadians obviously discovers that they are in Early Expectation of some revolution from which they expect to derive Advantage...[33]

The Earl of Shelburne, who had succeeded Germain on the fall of North's ministry in March 1782, wrote a Most Secret letter to Haldimand dated April 22nd. Its opening sentence could only have served to increase the state of readiness of the province to repel an invasion:

Sir,
Undoubted Intelligence is received that an Armament is now preparing at Brest for America. it is said to be destined against Quebec and is to consist of Six thousand Troops conveyed by a considerable naval Force;...[34]

Haldimand's acknowledgement of and reply to this letter is dated 17th July. [35] It is also to be noted, as has been previously stated, that Shelburne's letter instructed Haldimand to cease and desist from all offensive operations. In his 17th July reply Haldimand acknowledged this message had been received and understood and would be carried out. He reported in his Most Secret to Shelburne, dated Quebec, August 17th, 1782,

I have the Honor to inform Your Lordship that Hostilities on our Part are now effectually stoped thro'out this Province...[36]
Before concluding, and for the sake of completeness, one must take a last look at what the French and rebel forces were up to in 1782.

On December 23, 1781, Lafayette had sailed for France on board 'L'Alliance;' the purpose of his visit was:

to persuade the French to assure America of military aid for a campaign in 1782. [37]

It would seem reasonable to assume that it was to this news that Clinton was referring in his February 22nd, 1782 letter to Haldimand. However, in October 1781 the French had begun to organize a major convoy, under the code name Convoy 4R, to ferry 20,000 'tonneaux' of supplies to satisfy the needs of its North American army; once again it would seem not unreasonable to deduce that this was the convoy to which Shelburne was referring in his April 22nd, 1782 letter to Haldimand.

Lee Kennett states:

It had been loaded and then unloaded again, so that men, supplies, or ships could be directed to a more critical point - and this innumerable times. The Ministry of Marine kept the convoy on its schedules for over a year. [38]

He goes on to add.

As for Convoy 4R, by October 1782, its cargo was in a 'pitiable state.'...The following month the convoy was canceled for good. [39]

Meanwhile, Washington wrote a memorandum at Newburgh on May 1, 1782, in
which he mused on possible objectives for the 1782 campaign. On the question of Canada he wrote:

If an Expedition into this country should be adopted, from choice or necessity; it must be conducted either by Land wholly, or by Land and Water conjointly, according to circumstances. The last is to be preferred but the former may do; [40]

Commenting on the Land and water proposal, he stated:

...; and, that the Expedition may be undertaken with out a moments unnecessary delay, and the earlier the better, as the French fleet in the St. Lawrence will intercept Succours and Supplies by Water to the enemy; if any should be attempted. [41]

One would have thought it was already too late in May 1782 to plan a coordinated land/water campaign.

Rochambeau and Washington met at Philadelphia on July 19th, 1782.

The latter's account began as follows:

Having no data, upon which a plan of Campaign can be determined, I could only give opinions upon certain Hypothesis. These His Excellency Count De Rochambeau has had an opportunity of examining fully. [42]

With regard to Canada, the most succinct observations are those of Lee Kennett's:

Washington once more raised the possibility of an expedition into Canada, and Rochambeau once more ruled it out. He would have to wait for instructions and for money. [43]

By the end of September, Washington was writing to Brigadier General Jacob Bayley [September 29, 1782]:

As to the military Intentions of the Enemy, whatever they might have been some Time ago, I believe they are now suspended on your Quarter as well as in other parts. [44]

Suffice it to write in conclusion that Rochambeau's troops sailed from Boston for the West Indies on December 24th, 1782.
EPILOGUE

On October 24th, 1782, Lafayette accepted the position of quartermaster general of a Franco-Spanish expeditionary force mobilizing at Cadiz. Of this force, the responsibility for its command was in the hands of D'Estaing. Of it, Jonathan Dull wrote:

Over 12,000 French troops were collected at Cadiz, Lafayette arrived to accompany the fleet as the future governor of Jamaica,...[45]

Not surprisingly, the irrepressible Lafayette, would appear to have had other ideas. In a letter to the President of Congress from Cadiz on February 5th, 1783, he wrote:

Nay it Had Lately Been Granted, Whilst Count D'Estaing Acted Elsewhere, that I Should Enter St. Laurens River at the Head of a french Corps....But Independent of Personal Gratifications, it is Known that I Ever Was Bent Upon the Addition of Canada to the United States. [46]

The Anglo-American peace preliminaries had been signed in Paris on 30 November 1782. Vergennes was aware of the terms. Did he deliberately keep Lafayette in the dark?
END NOTES

Chapter Eight and Epilogue

1. Ibid., vol. 147, pp. 374-377.


3. Ibid., p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 23.


6. Ibid., p. 422.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


20. Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 199-204.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


30. Ibid., vol. 19, pp. 268-274.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., vol. 148, pp. 16-19.

34. PAC, *Colonial Office Records*, vol. 19, pp. 257-263.

35. Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 163-167.

36. Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 199-204.


39. Ibid.


41. Ibid., p. 213.

42. Ibid., p. 433.


46. Idzerda [ed.], *Lafayette in the Age*, vol. V, p. 84.
CONCLUSION

In addition to General Sullivan's 1779 campaign against the Iroquois tribes friendly to the British, the foregoing thesis deals with four other topics: namely, the British policy towards the Indian tribes living beyond the 1763 Proclamation Line; the threat to Quebec from France that did not materialize, as seen by General Haldimand; the negotiations that were carried on by General Haldimand's officials with representatives from Vermont, whose purpose was to discuss the possibility of that republic's becoming a part of the British Empire again; and, lastly, the designs of the rebellious colonies on the Province of Quebec.

As has been shown, the British policy towards the Indians failed because they were so antagonized by the failure of the British to live up to the promises made to them at Fort Pitt in the summer of 1760 that they kept hoping for the return of the French, more especially after news of the entry of Spain into the war on the side of France began to spread among them. Documentary evidence from primary sources showed that the Indian tribes preferred to have the French living among them as opposed to the British. The last resort of the latter was the passage of the Quebec Act; the colonies chose to see this act as an extension to the Coercive Acts, especially as one of its results would be to prevent their expansion to the westward, particularly in the lands north of the hio River.

Once France joined the rebellious colonies as an active participant in the
war on their side, coupled with the presence of the Marquis de Lafayette in North America as a volunteer Major General serving in the Continental Army, the concept of an invasion of Canada sponsored by France loomed large in Haldimand's calculations. This threat did not materialize because it was not the policy of Vergennes to encourage the colonies to acquire territory beyond the boundaries they occupied when they entered into a state of rebellion. This has led me to conclude that Vergennes sensed intuitively the future imperialistic ambitions of the United States, under whatever cloak they would be hidden. Of course, the fact that the eventual aims would be economic in addition to territorial could not have been foreseen at that time.

The Haldimand Negotiations with Vermont did not succeed firstly because the plans for a return to living under the British Flag did not enjoy the support of a majority of Vermont voters. The elections in the fall of 1781, in spite of the forecasts of the Vermont negotiators who were in favor of it, did not return the majority they had anticipated. What did result, however, was an anti-Continental Congress body of elected representatives. Then came the British surrender at Yorktown, which put the final nail in the coffin.

To complete the process, the British yielded to the United States, by the 1783 treaty of Versailles, the territory within which the Republic of Vermont was situated. It is inconceivable to imagine that the United States would have allowed British sovereignty to have extended down the eastern bank of Lake
Champlain to as far as, say, Skenesborough, i.e. south of Ticonderoga. Had the United States not been ceded this land, then there is little doubt they would have maintained many 'agents provocateurs' in the territory.

The Americans did not succeed in Quebec because a majority of the inhabitants was not sufficiently disenchanted to wish to be rid of the British. In 1763, British policy was to make the province English-speaking and Protestant. The 1774 Quebec Act did not grant it an assembly; it was obviously intended the province should become French-speaking and Catholic. The 'habitant' had kept his language and his religion.

Furthermore, the behaviour of the American forces in 1775 and 1776 - once the initial euphoria had waned and the city of Quebec had been defended successfully - left much to be desired and most of the 'habitants' had no wish to see their reappearance. Nevertheless, until at least 1778, the acquisition of Canada was a 'sine qua non' of American terms for peace. Once France entered the war, the American plans for conquering Quebec took into account a significant military contribution from France. One could speculate to eternity as to what would have been the outcome if a significant number of French soldiers in French uniforms had reappeared on Quebec territory.
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