Schizophrenia as Metaphor: ‘Madness’ and the Cinematic Asylum

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ABSTRACT

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Schizophrenia has been described as one of the most severe and enigmatic of mental disorders. It is thus both a disease in bio-medical terms and a trope prevalent within popular culture. This thesis explores schizophrenia as a metaphor in film, examining its historical antecedents, its bio-medical definitions and its idiomatic uses. It is my argument that cultural, theoretical and bio-medical uses of schizophrenia inform our understandings and misunderstandings of this disease. Tuning into schizophrenia's increasing frequency in modern parlance prompted my primary research question: How is schizophrenia deployed metaphorically in film? I discuss the paradoxes implicit in using schizophrenia as metaphor through a.) a discussion of the idea of metaphor, and b.) through a brief recounting of the history of madness, but primarily through c.) an interrogation of three dominant metaphors that my research reveals. These include: schizophrenia as monstrosity, schizophrenia as a way to describe a divided self, and schizophrenia as a divine gift. An exploration of experimental documentaries by Arthur Lipsett reveals an alternative way of expressing the illness, and thinking through the poetic dimensions of communication.
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Introduction

Imagine you are seated in your favorite movie theatre watching a recent popular film. The reel has been rolling for twenty minutes, the plot is advancing and you hear a diagnosis of schizophrenia being given to the main character. What images come to mind? An axe murderer? A wildman? A patient? A split personality? A tortured soul? The word ‘schizophrenia’ conjures up multiple images and ideas particularly when thought of in visual terms. Schizophrenia has been described as “the most severe and enigmatic of mental disorders” but has also been adopted as the “quintessential form of madness in our time” (Sass 13). It is thus both a disease in bio-medical terms and a trope prevalent within popular culture. This thesis explores schizophrenia as a metaphor in film, examining its historical antecedents, its bio-medical definitions and its idiomatic uses. It is my argument that cultural, theoretical and bio-medical uses of schizophrenia inform our understandings and misunderstandings of this disease.

The portrayal of schizophrenia is not limited to popular films. It is also apparent in postmodern theory, political rhetoric and everyday speech. Former Minister of Canadian Foreign Affairs John Manley used schizophrenia as a metaphor for contradiction and duality during a post-9/11 briefing. Speaking on behalf of Canada’s federal government, he said “our message is necessarily schizophrenic. On the one hand, we're recognizing the gravity of the situation...And yet on the other hand, we're encouraging people to try to resume their lives as normal” (Murphy, “National Anxiety”). People regularly use “schizophrenic” in everyday speech and it crops up consistently in academic texts. Madness and Modernism (1994), Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), and numerous essays from The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on
Postmodern Culture (1983) employ schizophrenia as a central metaphor to discuss postmodern thought. Norman K. Denzin uses schizophrenia to describe "the death of the centered subject as the object of theoretical-artistic analysis" (Images of Postmodern Society 43). Louis Sass uses schizophrenia as a vehicle to talk about modernism and culture, while for Fredric Jameson, schizophrenia signifies the aesthetic disinterest characteristic of postmodern narrative art. Jean Baudrillard, to the contrary, argues the experience of schizophrenia connotes a subject besieged by mass media imagery. Postmodern theory would have us believe we are all "schizos" and that a media saturated postmodern era is our disease. The only oppressive simulacra traversing my psyche are the questionable uses of this disease as a metaphor and the limitations of it as a metaphoric impasse.

Tuning into schizophrenia's increasing frequency in modern parlance prompted my primary research question: How is schizophrenia deployed metaphorically in film? Where does effective analogy end and catachresis begin? Here, I have used the term 'catachresis' to mean the misuse of a term in a specific context. The term catachresis is used in the rhetorical tradition to refer to the use of "an idiom to fill a gap in the lexicon" (Ortony 25). In other words, catachresis refers to the use of the wrong word for a given context; it is the forced and often paradoxical use of a figure of speech.

By entering into a dialogue with these queries, I will discuss the paradoxes implicit in using schizophrenia as metaphor through a) a discussion of the idea of metaphor, and b) through a brief recounting of the history of madness, but primarily through c) an interrogation of three dominant metaphors that my research reveals. These
include: schizophrenia as monstrosity, schizophrenia as a way to describe a divided self, and schizophrenia’s association with prophetic or creative genius.

The friction between the clinical definition of schizophrenia and its creative application as a metaphor in film thus demands investigation. According to the Schizophrenia Society of Canada, schizophrenia is a treatable biochemical brain disorder that strikes 1 in 100 people and manifests itself usually between 16 and 30 years of age. When untreated, an individual with schizophrenia has difficulty distinguishing reality from fantasy. He or she develops a change in thinking, behavior, and perceptions, which is indicated by a combination of positive and negative symptoms. Positive symptoms are abnormal experiences including hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking and disorganized speech. These symptoms are often treated with anti-psychotic medication. Negative symptoms are the losses of normal behavior associated with emotions, creativity, interest and activity. Negative symptoms result in apathy, flattening of affect and social withdrawal. Depending on the severity of one’s illness, these symptoms may persist despite taking medication to treat the disease. Living with schizophrenia may be equated to having a chronic disease such as diabetes or Alzheimer’s, except that it is far more prevalent in the world population (Chovil, “Relative Prevalence” link). How does this definition of a disease morph into everyday language?

This is not to suggest that schizophrenia as a disease is a singular experience. Like many diseases, its symptoms vary from person to person. Some people may not hear voices but will possess a deep sense of paranoia and/or experience delusions. For this

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1 The terms positive and negative are borrowed from psychiatric discourse. Here, the word positive is used to mean an “excess” or “distortion” of normal functions, while negative is used to refer to a “restriction” or “loss” of normal functions (DSM-IV-TR 299). Generally, positive symptoms are those which may be taken away with medication, and negative symptoms are those which persist despite taking medication.
reason, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Text Version (DSM-IV-TR) (2000) outlines various subtypes of the illness. If these subtypes are part of the core meaning of schizophrenia, one must question what schizophrenia can signify if it does not have a cardinal symptom. Granted, schizophrenia’s definition has changed dramatically over the course of the last century because its cause has yet to be confirmed. An increasing use of ‘schizophrenic’ in political rhetoric and everyday speech, in particular film, indicates its three dominant metaphoric associations may not subside any time soon. How then, do we understand its widespread usage? Should we challenge it? Is it possible or desirable to ban the use of metaphors altogether, which are integral to human communication and basic human thought? After all, to propose such a solution is to silence human communication.

Linguists, rhetorical strategists and others argue that all communication is metaphorical, given that metaphor unites two different objects or ideas that are inherently similar on at least one level. For example, as Elaine Scarry’s work indicates, it is difficult to share the experience of pain with others, to describe the “objectlessness” or “complete absence of referential content” of pain; one must resort to metaphor to convey his or her subjective experience [i.e. - I felt a stabbing pain in my side.] (161-2; chapter 5). Thus, to propose speaking about schizophrenia in solely scientific terms would be to push public discussion of the disease to a place it once occupied: behind a silent veil of shame and embarrassment. Scientific and medical languages must also avail themselves of metaphors to understand the symptoms patients describe. This has been widely looked at in pain research. Scientific and medical languages also use metaphors to describe new
ailments. For example, the term, ‘schizophrenia,’ was originally created as a metaphor for the disorganized thinking characteristic of the disease.

Coined by Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) ‘schizophrenia’ is a compound metaphor. The first root, schizo, translates into English to mean splitting or disassociated while the second root, phrenia, comes from the Greek term phrenos and means diaphragm.² For ancient Greeks, mind and soul were equated. The combined concept was believed to be located within the diaphragm. Bleuler knew the mind was located in the brain, but chose the term as homage to ancient Greek thought, to Kraepelin and to Freud, “whose Greek terms reflected Viennese fascination with the tradition of Greek neo-classicism and the readings, not of Latin myth, but of the ‘more original’ world of Greek mythology” (Gilman, Disease and Representation 11). With the birth of its name, schizophrenia began swirling in a tide pool of fantastical ideas.

Hopefully, my research problematic is becoming clear. While I certainly would not censor the uses of a popular idiom, I do advocate understanding a.) its history within art and mythology, b.) its history in an ongoing and changing clinical context, and c.) that we analyze and consider the effectivity of these idiomatic uses. In other words, I advocate the responsible, compassionate use of language. Investigating the paradoxes and

² From Greek Latin, the word ‘schizophrenia’ translates into English to mean splitting (schizo) of the cognitive functions (phrenia); however, since Bleuler’s infamous 1911 monograph Dementia Praecox; or the Group of Schizophrenias, the term has been misinterpreted as ‘split mind’ and/or ‘split personality,’ which is not what Bleuler intended. In an effort to understand the symptomology of the illness, Bleuler perceived a loosening of associations as the most prominent symptom. His monograph moves the illness from a somatic category to a more psychological one by noting the “splitting of ideas” and of the mind’s cognitive and emotional function (Bleuler qtd. in Andreasen and Flaum 33). Andreasen and Flaum return to Bleuler’s concept of splitting off and reinstate how the disease causes one to split from emotion, pleasure and contact with others. These details have been interpreted as the splitting of personality and/or the splitting of one’s sense of self. This explains the widespread misconception of schizophrenia as multiple personality disorder or more correctly, Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). During the mid-twentieth century anti-psychiatrists such as R.D. Laing reinforced this view by promoting the illness as the “divided self.”
contradictions in the metaphoric uses of schizophrenia, I advocate a vision of schizophrenia as, first and foremost, a disease.

Methodology

In order to make this argument, this thesis employs three methodological strategies. First, I conceptually explore the different academic and competing definitions of metaphor itself. Secondly, I offer a history of madness as well as a history of the three metaphors that have come to dominate portrayals of schizophrenia. The first dominant metaphor encompasses schizophrenia as monstrosity, as a form of bestial madness that leads to violence. This metaphoric association portrays people with schizophrenia (PWS) as inhuman. The second metaphor involves schizophrenia becoming a description for the divided self. With this metaphor, PWS are perceived as human but they are split between good and evil, rational and irrational, which can also be interpreted as tending toward violent behavior (i.e. - when one is not behaving as oneself, he or she performs irrational and impulsive acts). The third metaphor sees schizophrenia in relation to religious possession and/or as creative, prophetic, mathematical genius. I will historicize these dominant metaphors. Thirdly, I carry out a close textual reading of different films that are, in some ways, paradigmatic of these dominant metaphoric positions. Here, it is important to note that these dominant metaphors emerged after watching and pursuing a filmographic analysis of dozens of films. The close textual readings that I present in this thesis illuminate how the metaphoric process works.

These visual texts serve as my case studies. Robert E. Stake identifies three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. For Stake, an intrinsic case study
emerges from a particular case (237). An *instrumental case study* involves examining a particular case "to provide insight into an issue or refinement of a theory" (Ibid.). A *collective case study*, as the name suggests, examines "a number of cases jointly in order to inquire into the phenomenon, population or general condition" (Ibid.). Collective case studies are instrumental in providing insight into a particular phenomenon. In this thesis, it will be used to provide insight into schizophrenia and to refine my theory that there are three dominant schizophrenia metaphors operating in the culture of film. In other words, what I offer here is a collective case study of schizophrenia as a metaphor in the cinema. I am pursuing a collective case study of this particular phenomenon.

To consider schizophrenia as a metaphor, I analyze the visual vocabulary in which it is used. Norman Fairclough advises analysts focusing on metaphor to examine "the ideological and political import of particular metaphors, and conflicts between alternative metaphors" (77). Fairclough outlines the following goals for considering metaphor:

> The objective is to characterize the metaphors used in the discourse sample, in contrast to metaphors used for similar meanings elsewhere, and determine what factors (cultural, ideological, etc.) determine the choice of metaphor. The effect of metaphors upon thinking and practice should also be considered. (237)

I aim to achieve these goals in each chapter. Chapter One thus discusses the concept of metaphor and provides an overview of the history of madness. I begin by exploring the way metaphor has been theorized to discuss the complexity of this concept. Here, I probe contemporary metaphor theories put forth by Susan Sontag, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Paul Ricoeur, Robert L. Ivie, I. A. Richards, and Kenneth Burke. I move toward
understanding how schizophrenia is a metaphor and I historicize the illness in order to expose its mythic qualities.

Chapter Two investigates schizophrenia as monstrosity in popular horror films *The Cell* (Tarsem Singh, 2000), and *Spider* (David Cronenberg, 2002). By examining these films, I explore how the diseased body is employed as a figure for deviance, decay and the dregs of our society. In Chapter Three, I investigate the use of schizophrenia as a description for a divided self. Using *Fight Club* (David Fincher, 1999), and *Me, Myself and Irene* (Bobby Farrelly, Peter Farrelly, 2000) as vantage points, I explore how films employ a philosophical understanding of the concept. Much like Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s theory of schizophrenia, *Fight Club* is an idealized, romanticized view of the disease. Both *Me, Myself and Irene* and *Fight Club* exploit schizophrenia as a metaphor for division, contradiction, and unpredictable rage. Chapter Four explores schizophrenia as a state akin to prophecy as well as genius in relation to popular thriller film *Donnie Darko* (Richard Kelly, 2001). And finally, Chapter Five considers how Arthur Lipsett’s experimental documentaries give voice to the experience of schizophrenia. I conclude my thesis by addressing the effectiveness of metaphor as a theoretical concept for analyzing visual texts and by reflecting on the impact that schizophrenia metaphors have on the disease and society.

A Final Word on the Ethics and Politics of Naming

When referring to people with the disease, I follow the suit of AIDS activists who have self identified as PWAs (people with AIDS), which displaces the common metaphor of AIDS victim (Zita Grover qtd. in Crimp 26). In this thesis, people with schizophrenia
are referred to as PWS. I insist on descriptions that refrain from using 'schizophrenic' to describe the people who have the disease because schizophrenia is something you have, not something you are. Individuals are dehumanized when labels define them as their disease rather than describing their illness as a fluctuating psychiatric condition. Classification of a cognitive disorder does not characterize a person.³

Where possible I use the terms 'mental ill health' instead of 'mental illness' for two reasons. Firstly, the expression 'mental illness' perpetuates the division between reason/unreason, sanity/insanity that has persisted since the Enlightenment and secondly, because the idea of illness separates the healthy from unhealthy. Our commonality as human beings is that health is something that everybody tends to be concerned about.

And finally, I use the terms 'mad', 'madness', 'insane' and 'insanity' not for their popular colloquial meanings as metaphors for unwanted conduct (i.e. - wildly out of control, nonsensical, impulsive or extreme situations and behaviors) - but for historical continuity. Since various mental disorders were not differentiated from one another until the eighteenth century and schizophrenia was not named until 1908, schizophrenia was included under general terms of 'madness' and 'insanity.' Given the emphasis I place on history, and for the sake of clarity, I will continue to use these terms in this thesis.

³ In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV), the American Psychiatric Association writes: "A common misconception is that a classification of mental disorders classifies people, when actually what are being classified are disorders that people have. For this reason, the text of DSM-IV... avoids the use of such expressions as 'a schizophrenic'... and instead uses the more accurate, but admittedly more cumbersome, 'an individual with schizophrenia'" (273).
Chapter 1: Schizophrenia as Metaphor

Divisiveness, dichotomy, duality, aesthetic disinterest, fragmentation of theories, multiplicity characteristic of our postmodern era, “the postmodern condition”, modernity, both freedom and permanent stasis, mainstream pop culture and avant garde shock, mass media production, desire, uncontrollability, consumerism, capitalism, modernity, deviant fictional antagonists, the last American presidential campaign, a disorganized professor, a subject, an object, an obliteration. Over the course of the twentieth century, schizophrenia has evolved to embody all of these concepts, as the appropriation of psychiatric language occurs with increasing frequency in popular, political and aesthetic discourse. How could such diverse ideas possibly be signified by the single metaphor - schizophrenia? The answer to this question lies within the complexity of metaphor itself.

Since antiquity, rhetoricians have identified four ‘master tropes’ that they have deemed to be the most important figures of speech. These master tropes include metonymy, synecdoche, irony and metaphor. The latter trope comes from the Greek term, ‘metaphora,’ which translates into English to mean transference (meta, meaning ‘over,’ and pherein, ‘to carry’). It makes a comparison between two seemingly related objects or ideas and thus, is an association through similarity; but, it also refers to the symbolic dimensions of language, it is essentially subjective, and a highly complex concept. To borrow Umberto Eco’s words, metaphor “defies every encyclopedic entry” (87).

In its classical context, “metaphor is a trope of resemblance which, along with other figures of speech, adorns the essential features of discourse” (Ivie 240). According to Aristotle, “the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others, it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor
implies an eye for resemblance” (De Poetica 322 BC). Aristotle’s definition of metaphor consists of giving a thing “a name that belongs to something else.” ⁴ Seemingly simplistic, this treatment of metaphor has been expanded since antiquity by rhetoricians, theorists and linguists, particularly in the last three decades. Until the twentieth century, metaphor was regarded primarily for its role in poetry and rhetoric. Now it is viewed as fundamental to all knowledge. Interestingly, Aristotle’s teacher - Plato - suggested these ideas in ancient Greece but Aristotle’s view persisted throughout the ages.

Recent models of metaphor range from Aristotle’s comparative view to Mark Johnson and George Lakoff’s conceptual theory. The classical conception of metaphor as a tool utilized to achieve certain effects has been replaced by a view that metaphor is “integral to language itself” (Stacey 49). Today, it “is the omnipresent principle of language” (Richards 92-93). As Kenneth Burke argues, “every perspective requires metaphor, implicit or explicit for its organizational base.’...No mere rhetorical ornament, metaphor is instead the linguistic origin of our most compelling arguments” (qtd. in Ivie: 240).

Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual model links metaphor to the functioning of the mind and body. In their text, Metaphors We Live By, they assert metaphor has evolved beyond its rhetorical function as a form of speech to become a form of thought:

Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. (3)

They argue that if mundane concepts such as time, dates, change, and states of being are represented metaphorically, then the way we think and talk about the world is largely influenced by metaphor. In other words, human thought and language are fundamentally

metaphorical. Based on these contemporary notions of metaphor, approaching the limitations of various schizophrenia metaphors seems impossible. After all, metaphors have been part of science since the ancient Greeks, and the physical, social and biological sciences were built on metaphors. Even the word schizophrenia is metaphorical.

The word *schizophrenia* was constructed over one hundred and fifty years, beginning with Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum’s 1863 labels *hebephrenia*, which translates from Greek into English to mean the frenzy of youth and *catatonia*, which translates into English as “tension against.” These diagnostic labels made way for Emil Kraepelin’s creation of the psychiatric term *dementia praecox* during 1896 and Eugen Bleuler’s construction of *schizophrenia* in 1908. All of these terms were used to refer to the same illness.

As homage to the history of science, nineteenth century scientists were expected to use Greek roots and affixes to name their inventions and discoveries, while avoiding the vernacular (Sarbin, “Metaphors of Unwanted” 306). For example, to make the study of mental health more scientific, they created the metaphor, ‘psychopathology’ to describe their practice (Ibid.). Psychopathologists viewed the mind as a complex machine that required naming its parts and malfunctions in mechanistic terms (Ibid.). In order to understand the inner ‘workings’ of the mind, medical practitioners observed people brought to their hospitals and clinics, then concocted words to help classify diseases of the mind. The metaphors used to describe diseases of the mind were doubly metaphoric because patients used metaphors to describe their psychological experiences. If the foundational concepts of psychology include soul, mind, emotions and intellect, psychology then, is also informed largely by metaphor as these concepts come from
"metaphorical modes of comprehending human experience."5 Using metaphors placed illnesses into an already existing scientific framework and highlighted the most important characteristics of different diseases.

Schizophrenia is an example of one such metaphor. Like many scientific terms from that period, it is a neologism, which means it was meant to fill a gap in vocabulary. This gap existed because there was not adequate literal language to describe complicated and at one time, largely misunderstood diseases. Schizophrenia began as a psychiatric perspective on an illness but due to its multi-symptomatic nature, it quickly evolved to embody many different ideas.

Over the course of the twentieth century, a name that began as a figure of speech became a word that signified a specific disease. Theodore Sarbin labels the process through which figurative speech becomes literal language a "metaphor-to-myth transformation."6 Sarbin attests the continued use of a specific word, as a substantive without the "reminders" that it is a metaphor, leads to a shift in the word's original meaning ("Metaphors of Unwanted Conduct" 306). If literal language is where dead metaphors end up after they have repeatedly and ritualistically been used in a specific way, schizophrenia is literal language for a specific condition. How then, has it evolved to mean more than just an illness?

In his 1977 and 1979 texts, Paul Ricoeur points to the definition of metaphor as not only the transference of a name from one object to another but also as the transference of predicates or descriptions so that anything associated with the original

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5 For a larger discussion of these ideas see Leary 14.

term may be applied to the new referent.\textsuperscript{7} Convention, then, plays a huge part in our understanding of metaphor:

Metaphor is constituted...by the attribution to one thing of a name or description that belongs by convention to something else. Although the problem of reference is a thorny one, it is nevertheless commonly assumed that descriptions as well as names are assigned to things by social practice rather than discovered through some sort of raw experience [...]. (Leary 6)

Hence, if schizophrenia was historically associated by convention with offensive behavior, and/or a split mind regardless of its intended definition, it will be transferred with these meanings in mind.

This transformative process through which a word evolves to represent concepts other than its historical meanings is something Ricoeur contends occurs because of the phenomenology of metaphor itself. He considers metaphor “the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality” (The Rule of Metaphor 7). In other words, metaphor functions both to define and redefine the meaning of words. Furthering this idea of redefining meaning, Jackie Stacey informs us “all forms of tropes, figurative language, involve some kind of ‘turn’, ‘conversion,’ or ‘deviation’” (49). For example, when illness is used as a metaphor in academic or journalistic discourse, the texts produce new meanings for the word, ‘schizophrenia.’

Taking schizophrenia out of psychiatric discourse and using it as a metaphor in other discourses is an act of catachresis.\textsuperscript{8} Here, I have used catachresis to mean the


\textsuperscript{8} The comparison view is ineffectual for examining these gaps. One must use an interaction view as proposed by Max Black (1979) and developed more extensively by Sternberg et al. (1979).
misuse of a term in a particular context; a forced and paradoxical figure of speech. Susan Sontag explores the use of disease metaphors as catachresis in her text, *Illness as Metaphor*. She focuses on the use of the term ‘cancer’ as an adjective in everyday and literary discourse and how this usage imposes the horror of cancer onto other things; thereby, equating cancer with invasion and abnormality. I would contend that schizophrenia has replaced cancer as a dominant disease metaphor in this era. Since science has yet to pinpoint the exact cause of this disease, it remains an elusive entity that feeds the imaginations of those who use the terms, ‘schizophrenia,’ ‘schizophrenic,’ ‘schizoid,’ and the slang expression, ‘schiz out.’

While my own work is indebted to Sontag’s theoretical model Sontag’s text is problematic because her writing contradicts itself, inescapably using metaphor to argue against it. As such, her work reflects the tremendous difficulty that exists in generating meaning without recourse to metaphors. Medical anthropologist Susan DiGiacomo critiques Sontag’s insistence that cancer is just a bio-medical disease (117), stating “the afflicted person is thus transformed from an integrated and functioning adult into a collection of diseased body parts” (120). In her view, metaphors like cancer and schizophrenia are also illnesses. Instead of being metaphorized illnesses, they are “pathologized tropes” (126). In other words, the illnesses that Sontag and I strive to liberate are metaphors that happen to be signifiers for disease. Likewise, in their essay, “Speaking Truth to Illness: Metaphors, Reification, and a Pedagogy for Patients,” Nancy Schepet-Hughes and Margaret E. Lock argue Sontag’s ideas are a retreat from meaning and an attempt to strip the illness metaphor of its “double,” that is, its cultural representation (“Speaking Truth,”137-139):
...the metaphors, the cultural images and representations of the “master” diseases of our time – cancer, heart disease, schizophrenia, AIDS- are more ugly than sublime, more degrading than elevating, more exploitative than consoling. In short the societal and cultural responses to disease create a second illness in addition to the original affliction, what we are calling the “double”: the layers of stigma, rejection, fear, and exclusion that attach to particularly dreaded diseases. This happens the moment we say to ourselves and to each other, ‘this person is schizophrenic’[...]. (Ibid. 137)

According to these scholars, schizophrenia is already a metaphor. They express the danger in transforming such a metaphor into a disease as that “would imply the ‘unmaking’ of our own assumptive world and its culture bound definitions of reality” (“Mindful Body” 30).

DiGiacomo, and Schepé-Hughes and Locke view Sontag’s analysis as an argument against polysemy because it proposes withdrawing or reverting back to an objective medicalization of illness that views it as no less or more than a disease. DiGiacomo writes:

No one ever experiences [illness] as the uncontrolled proliferation of abnormal cells. Indeed, we can experience anything at all only through and by means of culturally constructed and socially reproduced structures of metaphor and meaning. (117)

DiGiacomo’s constructivist perspective insists it is impossible to understand any experience without using metaphors. Despite DiGiacomo’s and Schepé-Hughes and Locke’s arguments, Sontag shares these views. She aligns her writing with Aristotle’s non-constructivist perspective, but paradoxically admits that “one cannot think without metaphors” and that “all thinking is interpretation” (AIDS and Its Metaphors 5). These are constructivist sentiments much like those put forth by DiGiacomo, Schepé-Hughes and Locke.
Constructivism and non-constructivism comprise the two broad categories of metaphor theory while live and dead metaphors are the broadest divisions of the metaphor concept (Ortony 2). Constructivism insists that the objective world is constructed through human knowledge and language to compose a created reality. Theorists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson fall into this camp. Their theory is a macroscopic view of metaphor whereas those ascribing to a non-constructivism perspective take a microscopic approach. Non-constructivism indicates reality exists independently of language and knowledge and it may be “precisely described through the medium of language” (Ortony 1). To take a microscopic view means to examine specific sentences independent of one another, while taking a macroscopic view is to acknowledge that all human thought and action is metaphorical. In this thesis I will take a macroscopic approach because it emphasizes the larger systems that emanate from sentence level or root metaphors.

To consider the dominant schizophrenia metaphors as forced figures of speech, I will use both I.A. Richards’ model of metaphor and Max Black’s interaction theory which is part of semantics. In Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) Richards sees metaphor as having two main parts: the “tenor” and a “vehicle.” The “tenor” is the initial subject (i.e. - monstrosity) while the “vehicle” is the metaphorical term used to carry or convey the tenor (i.e. - schizophrenia). These two ideas come together at a point of similarity called the ground. Their dissimilarity is the tension. I am primarily interested in this latter concept. Furthermore, Richards uses the term “interaction” to describe metaphor (93). He writes, “two thoughts of different things” interact to produce a “resultant meaning” (96). This interaction affects the meaning of both elements (94).
Expanding on Richards’ theory, Black names the metaphoric tenor as the “principal subject” and the vehicle as the “subsidiary subject.” He suggests the meaning of metaphor results from the interaction between the two subjects. In other words, meaning emerges from selecting, organizing, emphasizing, and suppressing certain features of the subsidiary subject and imposing them onto the principal subject (Black 44-45). When investigating the use of metaphor in my case studies, I will consider which aspects of schizophrenia are selected, emphasized, organized and suppressed to understand how it is used in popular films.

Douglas Berggren argues this process of construing meaning that occurs with Black’s and Richard’s theories, not only transforms the meanings of subsidiary and principal subjects but creates a new referent that “cannot be reduced to either of its interacting components” (244). In other words, the metaphor’s allegorical extension is transformed into a “myth” (Ibid.). He says myth “is a believed absurdity, believed because the absurdity goes unrecognized” (Ibid.) Following Turbayne (1962), Berggren suggests myth results when the “construing subject is mistaken for or equated with the subject construed” (Ibid.).

Similarly, Sarbin sees metaphor as transforming into what he calls “myth.” That is, a word undergoes a shift in meaning, when the reminders that it is a metaphor are removed. Sarbin writes: “What was once a figure of speech [is] transformed into a believed-in entity, a thing with properties and powers” (“Metaphors of Unwanted” 306). This happens when the term ‘schizophrenia’ is used outside of psychiatric discourse. The word flows from psychiatric discourse where it is a metaphor to describe a specific disease into popular discourse like films where it takes on new meanings because its
history is absent. In addition to becoming a “believed-in” entity, the schizophrenia metaphor becomes a myth, in the Barthesian sense of the term. According to Roland Barthes:

Myth is a type of speech. Of course, it is not any type: language needs special conditions in order to become myth...myth is a system of communication...it is a message. This allows one to perceive that myth cannot possibly be an object, a concept, or an idea; it is mode of signification, a form. (109)

Myth is a “mode of writing or representation” that hides or “naturalizes” dominant ideologies in a given culture (Barthes 110; 129). Barthes claims “the world supplies myth with an historical reality that myth transforms into a natural image of reality” (129). Naturalness camouflages power structures, encourages conformity to dominant views, and disguises the myth’s deeply historical and political nature. In this light, it is important to excavate myth’s historical reality to understand it.

Feminist theorist Angela Carter states that denying myths their historicity makes them politically problematic. In The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography, she argues that extracting words and figures from their social contexts and ignoring individual relationships “falsely universalizes” human experience and creates “archetypes.” Carter explains archetype as a category of being that is defined in opposition to another category of being (Carter 9). She uses the term to refer to the division between male and female genders but her ideas may be applied here to the strong oppositional relationship between categories of being sane or insane. For Carter anonymity is integral to the process of creating archetypes. Cinema is conducive to creating archetypes because it facilitates anonymous engagement with the oppositional Other. Viewers enter a darkened space to anonymously view or witness a narrative film
that speaks about schizophrenia in a particular way. Relationships between individuals are absent as viewers watch the distorted fictional relationship between mentally well and mentally unwell people in the movie. This anonymous engagement “precludes the expression of ourselves...We become voyeurs...the act does not acknowledge the participation of the individual” (Carter 8). The complexity of human relations is lost as we distance ourselves through the ontological experience of watching film. Since most narrative films are shot from the perspective of the mentally well gaze, mentally unwell subjects are viewed as Other and an “us” and “them” dichotomy is established. When watching movies, audience members assume anonymous roles of either mentally healthy or mentally ill as they view the text.

Before launching into a discussion of how popular films construct schizophrenia by way of three dominant metaphors, I will briefly historicize the illness to provide a better understanding of how it was perceived throughout history. This will help clarify what aspects are selected or suppressed when it is used as a metaphor. Historicizing schizophrenia will begin to illuminate its figurative uses as myths.

For this history, I draw mainly from Michel Foucault’s text, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1965) because he emphasizes the importance of the past for understanding present-day views. Foucault’s archeology of historical referents points to an absence of the voice of madness from history and draws attention to the politics of language. His archeological approach is similar to Barthes’ dissection of myths and my view of metaphor as historically determined. Foucault and Barthes advocate excavating or de-mythologizing concepts to shed light on hidden details
that inform present definitions and to restore the social context from which schizophrenia metaphors are removed. Their work gives voice to madness.

**A Brief History of Schizophrenia**

Around 1400 B.C.E. evidence of schizophrenia was documented in a “Hindu fragment from the Ayur-Veda” that describes “a condition, brought on by devils, in which the afflicted is ‘gluttonous, filthy, walks about naked, has lost his memory, and moves about in an uneasy manner’” (Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock 418). The earliest acknowledgment of the disease points to its connection with Satan.

Ancient Romans and Greeks also believed that people with schizophrenia (PWS) were possessed by demons but treated them with “religious ceremonies and kindness” (Rowan Wilson et al. 66) When the Roman Empire fell, social institutions collapsed, leaving many PWS uncared for and destined for a life hiding in the woods (Rowan Wilson et al. 66). Some people were taken in by monasteries where treatment consisted of prayers, faith healing and exorcisms while others literally perished on the borders of societies that turned a blind eye to their suffering (Ibid.). During this time, “Greek and Roman authorities coined metaphors to help communicate about perplexing and unwanted conduct” (Sarbin, “Metaphors of Unwanted” 325).

During the Middle Ages, society continued to believe their mentally ill citizens were possessed by the devil. Faith in Christianity was waning. Wars, Black Death and societal chaos spawned epidemics of madness by triggering post–traumatic stress, anxiety disorders and other mental health problems. Delusions caused masses of people to dance in the streets. In an effort to establish social control, The Inquisition deemed all madmen ‘wizards’ and all madwomen ‘witches.’ They actively pursued these people in mass witch
hunts. If caught, the sought after prey were tortured to expel the devil from their beings. Should this fail, they were burned at the stake. Approximately 7000 ‘witches’ were burned in Treves “over a period of several years; in Geneva over 500 were burned in 1515 alone” (Rowan Wilson et al. 66).

In addition to being perceived as a manifestation of the devil, schizophrenia was associated with death during the medieval period (Foucault 15ff). Paintings from that era portray mental illnesses as a death of the mind, which also meant a death of the body for most people (Foucault vi). Mental ill health inspired poetry, song, and visual art but the images themselves were haunted with “the Fall and the Will of God, the Beast and the Metamorphosis” (Foucault xii), and the beastly animal spirit believed to be inherent in human nature. This subject matter disturbed the imagination of many and resulted in haunting visual language that reflected humanity’s anxiety about losing its reason.

By the end of the Middle Ages, a general apprehension surrounding madness resulted in various forms of expulsion and exclusion. As Leprosy vanished from the Western world, society turned towards madness as its new social problem. When lazar houses emptied of their lepers, people were eager to refill the rooms with its new social issue. Mental health problems replaced leprosy as a scapegoat for fear, anxiety and immorality (Foucault vi, 3ff) and “as the madman had replaced the leper, the mentally ill person was now a subhuman and beastly scapegoat; hence the need to protect others” (Barchilon qtd. in Foucault vii).

Conversely, Renaissance civilization viewed psychiatric disorders from a humanist perspective. PWS were part of everyday society. Poetry, Shakespearean tragedies and art rejuvenated an interest in folly as a complex social phenomenon and
intriguing part of the human condition. Folly was thought to exist in humans rather than indicate humanity’s impending doom while madness was considered the truth of knowledge, that reason is itself mad (Horrocks and Jevtic 41). This shift in perception reflects a shift from fear to wonderment and intrigue with the diseased mind.

Renaissance painters were inspired by the thought of mad people in search of their reason and created “ships of fools” in their art (Foucault 7). While there are no records of ships of fools being sent to sea,⁹ Renaissance art helps explain the contemporary association of mental ill health with movement, journey and freedom. This romanticized perspective views madness as an adventurous, free-spirited way of thinking and living. It was also during this period that the relationship between animals and humans were reversed. Prior to this period, animals were viewed as the “values of humanity” but during the Renaissance:

> The beast is set free; it escapes the world of legend and moral illustration to acquire a fantastic nature of its own. And by an astonishing reversal, it is now the animal that will stalk man, capture him, and reveal him to his own truth. Impossible animals, issuing from a demented imagination, become the secret nature of man; and when on the Last Day sinful man appears in his hideous nakedness, we see that he has the monstrous shape of a delirious animal...Animality has escaped domestication by human symbols and values; and it is animality that reveals the dark rage, the sterile madness that lie in men’s hearts. (Foucault 21)

Animality signified madness. Foucault writes: “the animality that rages in madness dispossesses man of what is specifically human in him” and it is “considered as the sign – indeed, as the very essence – of disease” (74). Further to these ideas, Renaissance peoples believed there was a ‘stone of folly’ in the ‘fool’s’ head. Surgeons convinced patients these stones caused madness, and proceeded to remove chunks of brain matter for their own research. This cure compromised the intelligence and general awareness of mad

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⁹ This detail is discussed at length by H.C. Erik Midelfort, Colin Gordon and Peter Sedgwick.
people, thus sedating them into a controllable state. The madman’s animal nature was subdued.

The Romantic view that unreason equaled absolute freedom threatened classical society. Madness reminded common folk of their potential to embody unreason or irrationality. ‘Ships of fools’ became hospitals. No longer considered a sign of wisdom, unreason was buried within the walls of the asylum. As unreason, madness constituted the negativity of reason. It was “non-being” (Foucault 93). By containing and hiding madness society suggested it did not exist.

As secular authority replaced religious power, care for psychiatric patients became the responsibility of society. Beginning with the creation of the Hôpital General in 1657, mad people were amputated from healthy communities. Michel Foucault labels this period the “Great Confinement” (38ff). There was a shift from an imaginary freedom that mental illness inspired during the Renaissance to separation of mentally ill people through incarceration (Foucault 66). Anyone who violated his or her obligation/responsibility to the social world was deemed mentally unfit and locked away. Inside the asylum, patients were imprisoned alongside criminals of their day, chained like animals to the floor and ultimately, exploited as popular entertainment.

Treatment arrived in the form of violence as wardens beat the inmates while doctors bled, blistered and purged their patients in the name of therapy. Since the mad person was part animal, it was believed his or her animal nature protected them “from whatever might be fragile, precarious, or sickly...The animal solidity of madness, and that density it borrows from the blind world of beasts, inured the madman to hunger, heat, cold, pain” (Foucault 74). Institutions like Bedlam, which is a London monastery
officially named St. Mary of Bethlehem, were sadistic environments. The society that was designated to care for their sick paid to witness the torture. Amidst this spectacle, humans were literally reduced to beasts. Since the Great Confinement was also a time of economic crisis, bourgeois authorities viewed incarceration as the best method to control economic problems such as begging, idleness and unemployment. Control involved being arrested and forced into an asylum where people worked without fair pay or freedom. Hospitals were transformed into factories as administrators assumed labor would abolish poverty and provide moral enhancement in their communities.

Incarceration resulted in sweeping classification of people. Madness, idleness, debauchery, venereal diseases and old age were clumped together as equal embodiments of unreason. Citizens who exhibited the above mentioned attributes were forced into confinement because the bourgeois establishment deemed their behavior offensive in public space. Incarceration was a way of maintaining moral order and eliminating from the social order, figures that did not have a place within it. Values that motivated The Great Confinement are echoed in current views of mental ill health as choice, laziness and an economic burden.\(^{10}\)

In this climate, schizophrenia was viewed as a social problem rather than an illness in need of treatment (Foucault 66ff). The madman was regarded as someone who was socially corrupt rather than someone who was ill (Foucault 70). Since labor was

\(^{10}\) Christopher Jencks estimates that 1.2 million people become homeless each year, many of whom resume residency within a short period but he claims there are 600,000 people homeless on any given night in America (136-137). Of these people, 35-40% have schizophrenia. Yet, we live in a society which views homeless people as filthy, violent, morally wayward, lazy wanderers. These views emerge from the nineteenth and early twentieth century when homeless people were said to be hobos (who "work and wander"), tramps (who "dream and wander"), or bums (who "drink and wander"). See Ben Reitman quoted in Anderson 87. These titles were replaced with "transients" during the late 1960's. Since that time, intolerance for homelessness has been reflected in the creation of anti-sleeping laws, anti-loitering laws, neighborhood sweeps, and transit system regulations. Would such action incur if society thought these people were sick?
connected to strong morals and civil law, people who could not work, such as PWS, were regarded as shameful and scandalous (Ibid.). There was a “shift in the consciousness of evil” (Foucault 66). During the Classical period, mental illnesses like schizophrenia became the epitome of malevolence and disgrace.

Active persecution of earlier times resumed during the Enlightenment as insanity was considered just punishment for having lived a wicked life. Moral reformers proved mental ill health was a moral issue with quotes from the bible (Ezekiel, 13: 7-9). Once considered the economic authority, psychiatry turned to healing the mind. The ‘mad’ person became a ‘patient’ who was incarcerated in ‘care’ and underwent a treatment based on reason, morality and psychological remedies (Foucault 159ff).

Dr. Philippe Pinel and Quaker Tuke were pivotal figures on this front. They initiated moral reform. In England, Tuke created moral education as a type of therapy while in France, Pinel was freeing his psychiatric patients. Men who had been shackled for years in cells below ground at Bicêtre emerged to see the light of day. Pinel liberated Salpetrière - the female equivalent of Bicêtre - three years later in 1796. ‘Liberating the insane’ reinforced the correlation between having a psychiatric condition and experiencing liberty. Backed by the Romantic view that unreason means experiencing absolute freedom, this gesture set the stage for a view of schizophrenia as free thinking, prophetic and an insightful experience. These Romantic ideas were championed by philosophers, anti-psychiatrists and filmmakers during the twentieth century.

By the 1880’s, madness was beginning to be viewed as involuntary and perhaps a curable or at least, treatable disorder. For the first time, the mind began to be thought of
as an organ instead of an ethereal entity that resembled the soul.\textsuperscript{11} At last, the idea of mental illness as a moral concern began to dissipate.

Nonetheless, the morality issue resurfaced mid-twentieth century when anti-psychiatrists proposed schizophrenia was a socially constructed form of deviance. They rejected the medical model of mental illness and argued psychiatry was a form of social control. More recently, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction toward a biomedical model that suggests mental illnesses are primarily biologically based. Since the 1970’s, biochemical, genetic models have dominated the dialogue on schizophrenia and remain with us today. With these scientific and technological advancements, consumers of psychiatric care have returned to public space and are in the midst of restoring voice to a condition that was oppressed throughout most of history.\textsuperscript{12}

Traditionally considered a form of possession, witchery, moral punishment, and absolute freedom, it is no wonder schizophrenia is associated with concepts other than what Bleuler had intended. Its mystifications include a relationship with deviance, evil, emotion, idleness, ethereal qualities, sleepwalking, shame, beast-like, inhuman, above-human qualities, and non-being. As such, schizophrenia is transferred onto various tenors with these associations in mind.

\textsuperscript{11} For this reason, I refer to the mind as part of the body instead of as a separate entity as it was once believed. Western metaphysics is based on a mind/body split. Descartes solidified the distinction between mind and body in 1644 (1644/1911c, esp. pp. 221-2) and explained all bodily functioning including emotion and behavior in mechanistic terms. This was common during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but as the authors of DSM-IV state, “...the distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders is a reductionist anachronism of mind/body dualism” (xxi). To separate the mind and body in this discussion is to deny that schizophrenia is bio-chemically based. Or as Antonin Artaud so eloquently suggests, schizophrenia is an illness of both mind and body because it causes suffering in the spirit and the flesh. See Artaud, “Umbilical Limbo” in Collected Works, vol. 1. When untreated, deterioration associated with schizophrenia is visible in the general physical appearance of the body.

\textsuperscript{12} The term “consumer” is commonly used in psychiatric discourse as well as by advocacy groups and people who are mentally unwell.
Bleuler’s metaphor cultivated popular fantasy and manifested itself in surrealist art and other forms of popular culture shortly after it was coined. As a matter of fact, it has been argued by Louis Sass and others that the entire movement of modernism was concerned with the cognitive experience of this disease:

Modernism explored the generalized mental experience, so there was, within Modernism, an intellectual and artistic undercurrent which explored the particular mental experience of schizophrenia. The process begins in diaries and clinical accounts of schizophrenia at the turn of the century, is given energy by Surrealists, is formalized and legitimated by aesthetic theories and formal psychology in the 1920s, and reaches its earliest (and perhaps greatest) culmination in the 1930s in the work of William Faulkner. (Toomey ii)

Combined with its etiology in psychiatric discourse, schizophrenia’s many uses infuse the term with new meanings and associations. Today, the term is commonly used by journalists to describe dramatic contrasts in various states of affair, tossed around as a popular joke – when the comic says “I am schizophrenic…and so am I” - and often seen in popular films that equate the concept with multiple personality disorder. As schizophrenia becomes increasingly popular in public, aesthetic and academic discourse, it metaphorically continues to take on new definitions.

These slippages between metaphorical and literal language makes finding an essence of the term a difficult, if not impossible task. If we follow Burke’s definition of metaphor, schizophrenia’s multiple meanings and uses are the only way to illuminate its ‘truth’ (Grammar of Motives 503-504); if we take up Sontag’s theory, using schizophrenia as a metaphor is an act of catachresis, that is, the misuse of the term for a specific context. Taking either approach cannot deny that schizophrenia’s many meanings affect how people experience their disease:
As long as a particular disease is treated as an evil, invincible predator, not just a disease, most people with... [a particular disease] will indeed be demoralized by learning what disease they have. The solution is hardly to stop telling...patients the truth, but to rectify the conception of disease, to de-mythicize it. (Illness as Metaphor 7)

Following Sontag and Barthes, I will approach “schizophrenia as a metaphor” with a view to “de-mythicize” it in the following chapters.

If we return to Plato’s pragmatic philosophy of science, which suggests our scientific theories are “likely stories” (Timaeus ca. 355 B.C./ 1961c), schizophrenia is one such likely story. It is a metaphor through which we see the illness. It is a filter that is layered with the evolution of a metaphorical name as well as the history of a psychiatric concept. As an idiom, schizophrenia tells us more about social and historical developments than it does about the illness or people who have it. In following chapters I will explore how schizophrenia metaphors are paradoxical and ironic; how they construct meanings and hierarchical positions in the world.
Chapter 2: Monstrosity

*Madness in the classical period... is rooted in the threats of bestiality – a bestiality completely dominated by predatory and murderous instincts. To entrust madness to nature would be, an uncontrolled reversal, to abandon it to that fury of anti-nature.*

- Michel Foucault

*Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 193*

A man with decayed teeth and shaggy hair screams in agony as he hoists his body into the air with chains and steel hooks pierced through his flesh. The skin is tearing, the sounds suggest pain, and the person with schizophrenia is being exploited. This fictional character is named Carl Stargher. He is a bestial, necrophilic, and sadistic antagonist at the center of popular movie, *The Cell* (Tarsem Singh, 2000). Part of his character development involves diagnosing him with “schizophrenia,” which is a key element in the plot as it is the primary subject through which monstrosity and deviance is conveyed.

By textually analyzing *The Cell* and *Spider* (David Cronenberg, 2002), I will interrogate how monstrosity becomes a dominant schizophrenia metaphor in this era. This metaphor of monstrosity has a history, a history that portrays PWS as homicidal.

Films that incorporate this disease as a plot device or place it at the centre of their narratives could almost comprise a genre onto their own. They begin in the 1940’s and cut across every other genre including experimental documentaries such as *Gordon’s Head* (Clive Holden, 1993), horror movies like *Schizoid* (David Paulson, 1988), and quasi-biographies such as *Shine* (Scott Hicks, 1996). Generally, representations of PWS range from socially incompetent victim to romantic freedom fighter, although schizophrenia’s cinematic debut involved being a catalyst for aggressive behavior in thriller films such as *Mine Own Executioner* (Anthony Kimmins, 1947) and *Possessed* (Curtis Bernhardt, 1947). Notable exceptions are two films with much more sympathetic portrayals of the disease. *The Snake Pit* (Anatole Litvak, 1948) seriously investigated the
horrors inside the asylum and Through The Glass Darkly (Ingmar Bergman, 1961) explored schizophrenia's impact on the family. The latter film presents its heroine with the condition as ordinary, its plot draws on realism, and his representation of this illness is fairly accurate.

Schizophrenia disappeared from cinema screens during the nineteen fifties and reappeared with a vengeance in the sixties as a seed for violence in Repulsion (Roman Polanski, 1963), Lilith (Robert Rossen, 1964), and The Boston Strangler (Richard Fleischer, 1968). Evidently, filmic portrayals evoking empathy and concern from viewing audiences quickly returned to representations of violent antagonists. Approximately half of the films about schizophrenia show aggressive action by their "ill" main characters and in almost all movies, that action is murder. Where do our associations come from?

Cultural artifacts throughout history consistently depict mental ill health as an embodiment or consequence of evil. Fossils dating over 500,000 years ago show evidence of trephination, which is a surgical procedure that involves cutting open circular pieces of the skull to release evil spirits (Hinshaw and Cicchetti 562; Petersen 60-61). During the antiquities, madness was viewed as giving into one's "lawless wild-beast nature" (Plato, Republic 830-31). Similarly, Greek mythology tells stories of people who go mad after behaving poorly. Mental ill health was related to being morally wayward and innately primitive. The bible insists madness is just punishment for being wicked:

The Lord shall smite thee with madness, blindness and astonishment of heart. (Deuteronomy 28:28 qtd. in Wahl, Media Madness 115)

Woodcuts from the Middle Ages and Renaissance depict starvation, torture, exorcisms and burning 'witches' as ways to rid them of their evil spirits and satanic influences.
Since these types of rituals were practiced the world over, believing mental health problems are manifestations of evil was a dominant worldview.

Art historical references showing mad people as wildly out of control are "found everywhere from medieval religious art depicting the objects of Christ's cure to contemporary comic strips illustrating uncontrolled rage" (Gilman, Disease and Representation 11). Various forms of literature throughout history including Greek tragedies (i.e. - Hercules), Shakespearian dramas (i.e. - King Lear, Hamlet, Macbeth, and Othello), Edgar Allen Poe's horrific stories, and contemporary plays such as Mouse Trap, all use insanity as justification for disordered violence. These writings consistently illuminate: "rationality is sane; violence is mad" (Croyden Smith 64).

A visual history of schizophrenia also shows how the concept has evolved to become a stand-in for violence. Madness was the subject of art long before it was a subject of psychiatry, which did not develop until the Enlightenment. In attempting to portray mental illnesses before psychiatry emerged, artists, novelists, and playwrights used imaginary and fictional elements to create their versions of insanity.\(^\text{13}\) These caricatures evolved into conventional modes of representation or easily recognizable visual cues that Sander L. Gilman calls "icons of madness." They are socially acceptable signifiers typically used by artists to show mental disorder and are found in religious images dating back to the tenth century (Seeing the Insane 1).

\(^{13}\text{In his text, Seeing the Insane: A Cultural History of Madness and Art in the Western World, Gilman takes an historical look at the complex association between psychiatry and portraiture. He uses woodcuts, engravings, drawings, paintings, sculptures, lithographs and photographs from the period between the middle ages and the end of the nineteenth century to show how the portrayal of stereotypes has both reflected and shaped the perception of people who are mentally ill. His writing explores the social aspects of mental illness and stereotyping.}\)
Artistically rendered icons were used as medical-scientific documentation to identify different cognitive disorders. By the end of the eighteenth century, it was commonplace to diagnose a psychiatric patient based on his or her physical appearance and medical artists were hired to work in psychiatric institutions. As mental illnesses are not apparent on the flesh, artists exaggerated features in their portraits to make various disorders identifiable. Health professionals paying artists instructed them to do so. Naturally, artistic attempts to visually represent that which cannot be seen resulted in psychiatric drawings resembling artistic imagery or "icons of madness."\(^{14}\) Thus, contemporary images of schizophrenia (i.e. – in films) are part of a continuum of mental illness representation that began in art history and psychiatry.\(^{15}\) To borrow Gilman’s words, “the iconography of insanity is as much the iconography of medicine as it is that of art” (Seeing the Insane 21).

Let us examine one such image that was created in the arts but influenced medical drawings: Nebuchadnezzar (1795). William Blake’s monoprint of the former Babylonian ruler, who reigned during 605-562 B.C.E., shows him naked and crawling on all fours through foliage. His fingers and toes are transformed by the artist into talons. As legend has it, Nebuchadnezzar was mentally unwell (Daniel 4:33). This portrait of madness clearly depicts the mad person as a beast and implies that the development of a mental illness (the loss of reason) renders us animals (without reason). Nineteenth century artists often mimicked Nebuchadnezzar’s disheveled appearance in psychiatric drawings. These images reinforced the view that the ‘madman’ is also a ‘wild’ man.

\(^{14}\) For further discussion on this topic, see Gilman, Seeing the Insane or Gilman, Disease and Representation.

\(^{15}\) Since there was no differentiation between mental illnesses until late nineteenth century, representations of schizophrenia are found amongst general representations of ‘insanity.’
Comparing mentally unwell humans to animals was not a new phenomenon when Blake painted Nebuchadnezzar. Writers since Aristotle have considered the possibility that humans' physical attributes are indicators of intelligence, emotion and personality. They used animals as a guide to compare the two species (Gilman, Seeing the Insane 58ff). For example, Giovanni Battista della Porta established different physiognomonic types by comparing renderings of humans with illustrations of animals (De Humana Physiognomonia, 1586 and numerous other editions). Later, during the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin used photographs to show a continuum of expression throughout the evolution from animals to humans in his seminal study, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872).

Based on these findings, psychiatrists began studying patients' physiognomy to determine predominant temper and character (Gilman, Seeing the Insane; Sheon).

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16 Gilman, Seeing the Insane 58.
Eighteenth century Swiss theologian Johann Caspar Lavater (1741 - 1801) popularized this type of study and by the beginning of the nineteenth century it was a standard form of psychology called phrenology, which thought that various parts of our cognitive and emotional abilities were located in the brain, and that "reading" the lumps on people's heads as well as head shapes could predict behavior.\textsuperscript{17} Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso adopted phrenology to forecast and control criminal behavior, insisting that certain physical attributes (i.e. - jaw size), which he termed "stigmata," were indicators of sociopathy and psychopathology (Gilman, \textit{Difference and Pathology} 69). Lombroso spent years studying the "degeneracy" of prostitutes, criminals and mentally ill people to prove they were a sub-class of human beings (Ibid. 156-157). Today, his name is commonly allied with notions of "degeneration" and the "born criminal type," which can be identified just by "looking" at the subject (Lindner ix). Hence, Lombroso's phrenology correlated mental ill health, animal-like attributes and criminal behavior.

While Lombroso's ideas dominated German forensic psychiatry during the late nineteenth century, his theory was scientifically discredited early in the twentieth. Nevertheless, Lombroso's legacy of associations lives on. Collections of diagnostic and criminal images still inspire creators of so-called 'insane' subjects (Wahl, \textit{Media Madness} 116-117). Thriller and horror films continue Lombroso's tradition by using visuals (i.e. - manipulating the character with schizophrenia's physical features) to indicate derangement, often giving characters animal qualities. Consider the images of Spider constructing webs (\textit{Spider}), Charlie frothing at the mouth while he changes personalities (\textit{Me, Myself, and Irene}, Farrelly Brothers, 2000), Carl as a horned ram (\textit{The

\textsuperscript{17} For further discussion see Gilman, \textit{Seeing the Insane} 62 ff and Lavater.
Cell), and the title of *Julien Donkey-Boy* (Harmony Korine, 1999). Such visual and linguistic cues imply that these characters lack emotion and conscience, have a less than human intelligence, rely on their instincts, and are more likely to commit criminal acts. As Foucault writes "it is animality that reveals the dark rage, the sterile madness that lie in men’s hearts" (21).

![Image](image.png)

*Fig. 2. An example of an “icon of madness.” Charles Bell’s “Madness” from his *Essays on the Anatomy of Expression* (London: Longman, et al., 1806).*

Since metaphors are culturally dependent, shifts in socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural issues cause changes in our understanding of metaphors (van Dijk). In the discourse of schizophrenia, these modifications include an evolving psychiatric discourse, medical advancements, de-institutionalization and changing social values. These changes have influenced the monstrosity metaphor.
Believing PWS are inherently dangerous is connected to the history of psychiatric institutions. Consider for a moment the asylum, a word that means “sanctuary.” Asylums were originally created to protect and care for people who could not care for themselves. They were places “of refuge for debtors and others fleeing prosecution, but between the 17th century and the 19th it took on its more particular meaning, reflecting a perceived need to protect the insane from society and vice versa” (Goldin). In order to expand caregivers’ authority and to justify the manner in which they provided care - through sadistic forms of restraint - hospital superintendents insisted their patients were extremely violent. They argued that some patients were so dangerous, long-term treatment - or more accurately, confinement - was the only solution. By advocating their patients were dangerous, medical officials secured their employment and the fate of institutions (Wahl, Media Madness 118ff).

Later in the history of psychiatric asylums, hospital officials again exaggerated the agitated nature of patients to avoid lawsuits initiated by people who were allegedly injured by patients released from care. Institutions erred on the side of caution by insisting patients were more aggressive than they actually were and that they should remain institutionalized. This sent public messages that mental health problems and violence are correlated (Wahl, Media Madness 120). In reality, most patients were not the perpetrators of aggression but the victims of brutality as doctors tried to beat, burn and shock the ‘madness’ out of them.

When schizophrenia films began to depict the illness as synonymous with criminality, the mid-twentieth century movement called anti-psychiatry was in full force. Led by R. D. Laing in England, Franco Basaglia in Italy, and Thomas Szasz in the United

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18 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 71. For a history of the asylum see Goldin.
States, anti-psychiatry attacked traditional psychiatry as a medical field and promoted an anti-hierarchical attitude within the psychiatric institution. Their views challenged whether mental ill health was biologically based. Laing suggested “there is no such ‘condition’ as ‘schizophrenia,’ but the label is a social fact and the social fact a political event” (Laing’s italics, The Politics of Experience 12).

Throughout the twentieth century, Laing, Szasz, Howard Saul Becker, Edwin M. Lemert, and Thomas J. Scheff espoused a sociological theory of schizophrenia, which maintains the condition is a social role and a form of deviance. American psychoanalyst Thomas Szasz purported that schizophrenia is not a disease at all and that mental illnesses are only the masks that some people wear.\(^{19}\) This theory suggests patients are not sick and that mental ill health should be regarded as social performance. Gerald Grob, who wrote about the history of psychiatric care in the United States, explains the belief that mental illnesses were “willful violation of certain natural laws that governed human behavior”:

> Psychiatrists tended to interpret insanity as an inevitable consequence of behavioral patterns that departed from their own normative model of behavior...Disease – irrespective of its particular manifestations – was perceived to follow violation of natural, that is conventional behavior, and was therefore seen to be related in part to immorality, vice and filth. (qtd. in Wahl, Media Madness 205fn6)

Scientific terminology also influenced perceptions that mental ill health had something to do with immorality. At one time, deterioration of the nervous system was referred to as “degeneration” while the people who suffered from it were called “degenerates” (Gilman You Degenerate!) Abnormal brain shapes and sizes led to “abnormal psychology” and thus, abnormal or unnatural behavior. Moreover, from the

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\(^{19}\) In The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and The Manufacture of Madness (1970), Szasz insists mental illnesses do not exist. During the same year that The Myth of Mental Illness was published, sociologist Erving Goffman’s text, Asylums, was also released. Like Szasz, Goffman was critical of the psychiatric establishment and claimed patients became psychotic as a result of being hospitalized.
late eighteenth century onward, mental illnesses were thought of as emotional disorders. It is no coincidence that ‘mad’ also means angry; hence, the association between madness and rage or violence.

One of schizophrenia’s most prominent symptoms - disorganized thinking - manifests itself as disorganized behavior when left untreated. Since schizophrenia affects behavior, the illness was originally considered a violation of societal norms; thus, the term ‘schizophrenia’ became a metaphor for unwanted social behavior (Sarbin, “Metaphors,” 300-330). Schizophrenia as a metaphor for unpredictable behavior was created to understand the illness and help society deal with specific types of conduct.

Today, schizophrenia is regarded by medical practitioners as a metaphor for disease – a cognitive disorder that is not brought on by a subject, but which afflicts him or her – however it continues to be regarded as a metaphor for offensive behavior within our society; hence the slang expression: “S/he schiz-ed out!” This is also evident in schizophrenia’s use as a metaphor for deviance in popular films. Contemporary cultural artifacts like popular films continue to draw on these historical references using schizophrenia as a stand-in for monstrous criminal behavior. Consider The Cell, a sci-fi thriller about exploring the mind and motivations of a serial killer who is labeled “schizophrenic.” Mass murderer Carl Stargher (Vincent D’Onofrio) abducts women and imprisons them in a glass cell that slowly fills with water over a 40-hour period. After drowning the victim, he bleaches her body, removes her organs and ritualistically

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20 What is more, there was an error in translating Bleuler’s monograph from French to English, which led to an association of schizophrenia with ‘bizarre’, which directly influenced how Western culture perceived the illness. Bizarre even became a psychiatric term for a while. See Gilman’s essay “Seeing the Schizophrenic: On the Bizarre in Psychiatry and Art,” in Disease and Representation 231. Visually rendering the disease as bizarre directly fuels the idea that it leads toward unusual or inexplicable behavior.
transforms her remains into a life-size doll. He then proceeds to masochistically raise his body over the corpse with chains and steel hooks so he can masturbate while dangling overhead. Once Carl is completely satisfied, he disposes of her body and stalks his next victim.

Psychiatric illness is coupled with monstrosity throughout the film. Contorting his body and roaring like an animal, Carl is overwhelmed by his condition. He reaches for his pills and collapses into an unconscious state. Carl is taken to an institute where doctors diagnose him as having “a type of schizophrenia,” which is proffered as the reason for his behavior and current condition. Not only does the screenplay identify the illness, it develops the concept and the plot revolves around delving inside the diseased mind. Carl is referred to as a “sick fuck,” “a madman,” and as someone who is “freakin’ out” throughout the narrative. Even the title is a reference to brain chemistry.

In keeping with scientific, medical notions, the plot introduces a psychotherapist named Catherine Deanne (Jennifer Lopez) to help solve the murder case. Catherine collaborates with neurological experts on a cutting edge technology that allows access to the thoughts of comatose patients. By connecting her body to a futuristic neurological transfer system, Catherine is able to enter into Carl’s mind and traverse his psyche, which is a surreal, sado-masochistic and gruesome landscape. This futuristic “therapy” system is required to find Carl’s latest victim.

The remaining two-thirds of The Cell are comprised of Catherine’s journey through Carl’s mindscape. Inside Carl’s thoughts, trespassers are tortured by having their intestines wrenched out; a horse is rapidly spliced into multiple pieces while still alive; and there is a predominant use of the color red to signify blood, pain, violence and death.
Brutality is strategically woven into Carl’s unconscious. Within Carl’s subconscious, viewers are able to witness his innermost desires and the horizon of an ailing mind. The landscape is surreal and his thoughts are horrific. Women are bound and tortured. Carl envisions himself as a beast with ram’s horns that takes pleasure in butchering his female victims. He growls in domination over Catherine as she invades his territory. Collapsing into a coma, debased and subhuman, he retreats into his lair. By labeling the main character as having this brain disorder, the storyline provides a motive for his actions and capitalizes on the opportunity to use a ‘sick’ mind as a primary setting. Like many other schizophrenia films that fall within the horror and thriller genres, The Cell employs the disease as a motive for excessively cruel behavior. Director Tarsem Singh uses the person with schizophrenia as a stand-in for a homicidal maniac, an unhinged predator.

When Carl is ‘attacked’ by his illness, he appears as though he is being possessed. His voice morphs into a demonic groan as his body spasms uncontrollably. In his mind, Carl envisions himself as Satan. Adorned in red satin robes and sporting ghoulish black nails and teeth, Carl is the deviant King of his own malicious domain while Catherine’s pursuit of his inner secrets is nothing short of a witch hunt. Upon capture, the only way to purge him of satanic spirits is to murder him in a grisly blood and guts scene. He is satanically possessed.

In addition to bestial and satanic references, Singh appropriates aspects of surrealism to enhance his monstrosity metaphor. The Surrealists spent considerable time exploring unconscious phenomenon to uncover the deeper truths of human nature. Their pursuit of the subconscious was based on Freud’s theory that dream images provide quick access to one’s “unconscious thoughts and desire” (Hedges xvi). Similarly, Singh uses
the mind or dreamscape as a way to unlock Carl’s unconscious world and to excavate a diseased psyche. It becomes his principal setting.


Within Carl’s dream world, Singh alludes to art by Salvador Dali, Escher, Hans Bellmer and Joel-Peter Witkin to emphasize Carl’s twisted monstrosity. The corpses within Carl’s mind are similar to sculptures made by Polish-French Surrealist Hans Bellmer (1902-1975) during the 1930’s. Bellmer built and photographed life-size dolls in suggestive, violent postures to construct fetishistic and pornographic images. The doll’s “limbs could be splayed, bent, and combined at will, which made it an excellent vehicle for images of sexual fantasy centered on rape and violence” (Hughes 252). Bellmer also photographed real women bound tightly in string so that their skin appears amorphous and various limbs are hidden. As feminist critics of surrealism have argued, Bellmer reduces the female form to a heap of bulging flesh. His prurient representations resemble Singh’s depiction of Carl’s victims. Automaton women presented in the first dream
sequence of The Cell recall Bellmer’s dolls as well as a sense of uncanny, which is evoked by their dubious animate/inanimate states. Theatrical constructions, mutant forms and automaton women are also appropriated from work by contemporary photographer Joel-Peter Witkin (b. 1937). Witkin’s surreal photos of costumed and restrained female forms are stylistically imitated in The Cell. Witkin’s images are used to augment Singh’s sado-masochistic montage. What is more, in the audio commentary of the DVD version of The Cell, Singh comments on the “pieces of different monsters” that he borrows to construct Carl’s character.21 By portraying Carl as an ugly fiend whose true self only emerges in a dream world, Singh translates Francisco Goya’s musings - that “the sleep of reason breeds monsters”—22 - into visual form. Singh appropriates elements of Bellmer’s, Witkin’s, and Goya’s art to amplify shock in The Cell, but ends up doing a disservice to their art. He decontextualizes these artists’ words and creations from the complexity of their larger lifeworks, decontextualizes them, and reduces them by making them ‘literal.’

Fig. 5. Joel-Peter Witkin, Mother and Child, 1979, Gelatin Silver Print. <http://www.correnticalde.com/joelpeterwitkin/>


22 The Sleep of Reason Breeds Monsters (1798) is the title of an etching by Spanish painter, Francisco Goya. From the Los Caprichos series, Metropolitan Museum, New York.
The Cell is not the first horror film to employ schizophrenia as a metaphor for the monstrously criminal. The movie is homage to several slasher films that use schizophrenia as a plot device, including Schizo (Pete Walker, 1977), Schizoid (David Paulson, 1988), and Schizophreniac: The Whore Wrangler (Ron Atkins, 1998). Schizo uses schizophrenia as a metaphor for split personality disorder, whereby one personality is in the habit of slaying friends and relatives while the other personality is oblivious to such actions; Schizoid does not mention schizophrenia beyond the title but conflict centers around solving a serial murder case; and Schizophreniac uses the illness to explain the actions of its necrophilic, misogynistic antagonist. These movies’ horrific storylines about human slaughter illuminate filmmakers’ preferred meanings of “schizo” “schizoid” and “schizophrenic.” Like its predecessors, The Cell exploits schizophrenia as an explanation for otherwise inexplicable behavior.

On one hand it seems unreasonable to textually analyze a fictional narrative about monstrosity. A giddy satanic fiend giggling throughout a torture scene is hard to take seriously. In fact, the entire movie dances in the realm of ridiculousness. As a sci-fi thriller, the narrative is intentionally unrealistic, the futuristic “therapy” method does not exist and Carl’s “type of schizophrenia,” that is labeled “whalen’s infraction,” is fictional. His symptoms are not anything like the subtypes of schizophrenia found in the world. Gory allusions to other slasher, splatter and meat movies transport the narrative out of the everyday while nailing down its intention to shock and repel.23 Even Singh refers to his

23 One of The Cell’s Art Directors, Michael Manson, discusses animating their contemporary art quotations to amplify shock value (Blair, par. 31).
film as “theatrical opera” and frequently notes how “ridiculous” it is. I would argue that *The Cell* fails as a film because of its literal and crude use of the metaphor of schizophrenia as bestiality: there is no room left for moral debate, nothing is left to the imagination. *Spider* (David Cronenberg, 2002) on the other hand, is another recent horror film that employs similar schizophrenia metaphors, but is much more complex in its use of these associations.

Based on a fictional novel by Patrick McGrath, *Spider* is about a man’s journey into his past after he is released from a psychiatric asylum where he has spent the last twenty years. Dennis Clegg (whom we later learn was nicknamed Spider by his mother) appears on a train platform as a frightened character, muttering non-stop to himself. For Spider, post-institutionalization involves staying at a group home in the same neighborhood where he grew up.

Spider is presented as an unkempt, illiterate, inarticulate man who limps around the neighborhood in lonely despair. He is introverted, desperate and alone. His limited ability to use language and incoherency suggests he is an idiot or imbecile, much like the fools that inspired art during the Romantic era. Ambling around East London, Clegg tries to piece together his memories and sort through his past. His recollection consists of an alcoholic father, an over-pleasing mother and a bar whore whom he believes takes his mother’s place.

Spider is convinced his father murdered his mom to romp with the whore. To avenge the death of his mother, Spider kills the new lover. Deluded by his schizophrenia, young Spider thought the bar whore was trying to replace his mom, living in their home, wearing his mother’s clothes and serving up meals of cooked eel. His efforts to kill the

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whose result in killing his mother. Suspense is heightened by the fact that the story is told
from Spider’s perspective and based on a hazy memory.

In the present, Spider has a hard time controlling his murderous impulses. Late
one evening, he enters his sleeping landlord’s bedroom and swings a mallet close to her
head. The same sequence is used in previews but is accompanied by a voice-over
questioning, “Spider, what have you done?” Based on the preview alone, Spider is
presented as a malevolent, untrustworthy character. Somewhat like The Cell, this film
transforms schizophrenia into a metaphor for unpredictable brutality however it differs
from The Cell in that the metaphor is less reductive. Spider has bestial qualities but his
character is not a totalizing equivalence of man and beast.

Schizophrenia is integral to the plot, as it is the reason for Spider’s deluded state,
the cause of his incarceration and present psychological condition. Tight close-ups of the
main character’s face stress his inner turmoil. The tagline from the official trailer is “the
only thing worse than losing your mind, is finding it again.” Other paratextual material
surrounding the film’s release, including previews, advertisements, critical reviews and
descriptions of the film in entertainment newspapers, highlight schizophrenia.25
Moreover, Spider’s predominantly grey-green palate signifies an institutional setting. It
reminds viewers that Spider is a patient who has recently emerged from a psychiatric
hospital. When these colors appear, the viewer gets a sense that by looking through the
cinematic window, one is also peering through the bars of the asylum.

25 See Katadotia “David Cronenberg Crawls into the Mind of a Schizophrenic.” Also see Hays “Fear
Factors” in which the author writes: “Cronenberg tackles the difficult task of representing schizophrenia…”
(21). See the Production Notes or the Interview with Cronenberg on the official “Spider” website
<http://www.spiderthemovie.com/>. See as well the cover of ICI, which shows a still from the film and a
caption that reads “Spider: Schizo Cronenberg.” What is more, stills from the official website show a
splintered image of Spider.
When *Spider* is considered in the light of Cronenberg’s other films such as *Rabid* (1979), *Videodrome* (1981), *Shivers* (1975) and *The Fly* (1986), it is about abnormal psychology, human identity and what happens to the body when it is invaded by something inhuman. In this context, schizophrenia is an alien manifestation in the body. This is supported by Spider’s name, which implies he is non-human and by Cronenberg’s inclusion of a recurring web-motif, which connotes the diseased mind is delicate, fragmented and a trap. If spiders use webs to instinctively trap and kill other insects, the diseased mind is metaphorically implied to be a natural means of capturing and killing prey. Paradoxically, the web-motif that mirrors Spider’s mind speaks about a beautiful fragility. Unlike Carl’s grotesquely rendered psyche, which impels him to be an aggressor, Spider is presented as a victim of his delicate, barely clinging together cognitive state.

The spider is an effective sign for madness and evil as it has an historical connection to both concepts. Fifteenth century woodcuts depicting exorcizisms of mental illnesses show dragons with female breasts, toads, blood, fumes, and *spiders* leaving the bodies of the possessed. Thus, spiders were synonymous with evil entities that needed to be purged from the body. Denis Clegg becomes an allegorical incarnation of possessing this form of evil. When the movie is advertised and promoted as a thriller before its release, one sees an association also made in light of Cronenberg’s oeuvre, which is comprised largely of horror films. Unlike other horror movies, the pace of *Spider* is fairly slow and gore is entirely absent. But then again, perhaps a methodical slow pace and meticulously clean murder is exactly the way spiders slay their victims. *Spider* ends with its main character returning to the institution because he poses a threat to others and is
unable to cope in society. This leaves viewers with the implied conclusion that PWS are better off institutionalized because they are socially incompetent and dangerous to themselves and others.

While Singh uses schizophrenia as a vantage point to produce horrific imagery, Cronenberg uses it as a plot device to generate suspense. While Cronenberg's vision is more complex, both directors exploit this specific condition to legitimize the depiction of violent behavior in their films. Ironically, the vast majority of people with schizophrenia are not violent at all. There is a very small percentage of people with schizophrenia, who, when un-medicated and psychotic, may be more likely to commit violent acts than the general population. DSM-IV informs us that "major predictors of violent behavior are male gender, younger age, past history of violence, noncompliance with anti-psychotic medication, and excessive substance use" (1994: 304). Contrary to what many people believe, schizophrenia does not induce violent behavior and most people with schizophrenia are not violent at all, especially if they are receiving the appropriate neuroleptic medication.26 Moreover, a recent study by the Calgary World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research and Training in Mental Health found that "there is no compelling scientific evidence to suggest that mental illness causes violence."27

Consider the following statistics: "95% of homicides are committed by 'normal' people with no mental illness" (Macnair par.4). Only 10.4% of the federal male inmate

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27 Emphasis in the original. Health Canada's study Mental Illness and Violence reports the strongest predictor of violence and criminality is a past history of violence and criminality (x).
population suffers from some form of schizophrenia, while 29.8% have depression and 55.6% have anxiety disorders ("More Suicides" 8). Only 4% of homicides are committed by people who are seriously mentally ill (Ibid. 8). A massive wave of killings did not follow de-institutionalization. In fact, people with schizophrenia are more of a danger to themselves than others with 40% attempting suicide over the course of their lifetimes and up to 25% succeeding (Ibid. 8). The chief executive officer of the Canadian Mental Health Association, Pamela G. Hines, contends that "an individual suffering from schizophrenia is 2,000 times more likely to harm themselves than they are to harm someone else" (14). Moreover, people with schizophrenia are more often victims of violence than perpetrators of such acts, yet 57% of the population believe that they are to be feared (Hines 14). People with schizophrenia rarely victimize other people, yet every person who lives with the illness suffers from defamation and discrimination.28

As discussed in chapter one, Richards and Black suggests that effective metaphors have a degree of similarity between tenor and vehicle: they must share a point of similarity or ground. The lack of similarity between tenor (monstrosity, violence) and vehicle (schizophrenia) indicates a paradox that speaks volumes about the societies that have produced, and as Ricoeur suggests, have conventionalized this metaphoric association. A continual resurfacing of the monstrosity metaphor indicates our fear of falling out of reason, of becoming beast, which we thus name "schizophrenia." Films

28 Hinshaw and Cicchetti discuss the danger of these views. They state: "a fundamental reaction to deviant behavior has been one of fear, castigation, and derision, regardless of worldview and when such perspectives also incorporate the view that individuals with mental disturbances are sub-human, extreme practices of exclusion, including torture and even extermination are not far behind" (561).
incorporating this metaphoric association are manifestations of this anxiety. It is a
metaphor that promotes social exclusion.

Metaphor is about “constructing our reality in one way rather than another”
(Fairclough 194). Choosing schizophrenia as a vehicle to convey deranged criminality
and violence speaks about our anxieties around “the tenuousness of life” (Gilman,
Disease and Representation 11-12). Unfortunately, such anxieties can result in, as Sander
L. Gilman writes, scape-goating those who come to represent these fears:

The “mad,” especially in the incarnation of the aggressive mad, are one of
the most common focuses for the general anxiety felt by all members of
society, an anxiety tied to the perceived tenuousness of life. If I am afraid
that I am to be attacked, have my goods stolen, lose my status in society, I
do not want this fear to be universal, pervading every moment of my life. I
want to know who is going to steal my hard-won status. So each society
selects a certain number of categories onto which it projects its
anxieties...in Western society, these categories include Jews, Blacks,
Women, Homosexuals, Madmen, Gypsies, and others we designate as
“different”...Our response to the perceived aggressiveness of the
mad...reassures us. We have localized our fear. We know who is
dangerous. We respond correctly and we have control over our world.
(Ibid.)

As I have tried to illustrate, schizophrenia has been conventionally associated with
monstrosity, deviance and criminality. The Cell and Spider avail of these pre-existing
associations. They follow conventional portrayals, which sensationalize violent crimes by
people with this illness.29 Figurative demons are transformed into literal representations
of monsters to signify the disease. The metaphoric process construes the meaning of both
elements and we are left with a view of the “schizophrenic” as an “evil fiend.”

29 A tragic example is American Andrea Yates who is currently serving a life sentence in Texas for
drowning her five children while she was experiencing acute psychosis, a symptom of her schizophrenia.
Yates thought by killing her kids, she could save them from Satan. Success stories, even everyday stories,
rarely make the news. For example, respected psychiatrist and researcher from Washington University, Dr.
Carol North, began hearing voices when she was sixteen years old and continues to live with the illness.
Yates is the sensationalized face while North is one of many hidden faces of schizophrenia.
Chapter 3: *Divided Self*

Schizophrenia is often deployed as a battle between the two sides of the Self, transforming “the schizophrenic” into a figure for the irreconcilable duality existing in a single individual. Often a struggle ensues between emotion and intellect, good and evil, or passion and rationality. Recall movies discussed in the previous chapter. While the dominant metaphor is schizophrenia as monstrosity, these films also employ a notion of schizophrenia as “The Divided Self.” The Cell’s “psychotherapist” describes Carl as having a “dominant side versus [a] positive side,” which is expressed through his character splitting between evil adult and innocent inner child. Spider oscillates between memories of who he was as a child and who he has become. In addition to the films already discussed, various filmmakers have attempted to evoke what they believe is a “schizophrenic” perspective with a multi-image method in *The Boston Strangler* (Richard Fleischer, 1968), unusually high and low angles in *Fisher King* (Terry Gilliam, 1991), and fragmented shots in *Images* (Robert Altman 1972). These techniques portray their protagonists as subjects with multiple selves. In an effort to understand how schizophrenia becomes a metaphor for a divided self in this era, I will textually analyze *Me, Myself and Irene* (Bobby Farrelly, Peter Farrelly, 2000) and *Fight Club* (David Fincher, 1999) but first I will give a brief history of this dominant metaphor.

As discussed previously, schizophrenia’s name is a metaphor for splitting (schizo) brain functioning (phrenia). Eugen Bleuler chose the term after observing his patients’ mental faculties were not operating in synch with one another (Petersen 89). In his 1911 monograph, Bleuler notes the “splitting of ideas” when referring to the mind’s emotional and cognitive functioning (Bleuler qtd. in Andreasen and Flaum. 33). Unfortunately, the
Greek word ‘schizo’ from Bleuler’s ‘schizophrenia’ also means ‘dissociated’ and has been interpreted as dissociating of personalities instead of cognitive and emotional functioning, as was intended.

Fig. 6. Egon Schiele, Prophets. 1911, Oil on Canvas, 50 x 100 cm, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, Vienna, Austria.

This concept of schizophrenia has influenced artists and intellectuals on a number of fronts. The most telling influence the illness had on popular fantasy is reflected in paintings by Austrian artist Egon Schiele (1890-1918).\(^{30}\) In 1911, the same year that schizophrenia was named, Schiele produced several double headed self-portraits including Self Portrait with Black Vase (1911), The Self-Seers I, The Self-Seers II (also cited as Death and Man) (1911), Prophets (1911), and a year later, The Hermits (1912). These two-headed images illuminate how schizophrenia was perceived.\(^{31}\) While the Self-Seers series (including Self-Seers I, Self-Seers II, and Prophets) may have begun as “an essay on autoeroticism...[the work] soon became an expression of the divided self” (Comini 81). In other words, there are no classical mythological referents that show schizophrenia as a divided self. It is a more recent metaphoric association.

\(^{30}\) In “In Vienna (Where Else?), a Show on Art and Insanity,” Jane Perlez describes Schiele as “a sane artist fascinated by the concept of madness and in particular the bold body language of hysteric” (E2).

\(^{31}\) Comini informs her readers newspaper critics “delighted in calling Schiele the ‘Freud-student’ and in analyzing his portraits as examples of ‘dementia praecox’”, which is schizophrenia’s former name (183).
Around mid-twentieth century, anti-psychiatrists embraced the concept to advance their political agendas. R. D. Laing announced our society was ‘mad’ and schizophrenia was a healthy response to living in a corrupt world. He argued people who claimed to have it were adapting their behavior to cope with environmental stressors:

*Without exception* the experience and behavior that gets labeled schizophrenic is *a special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unliveable situation.* (Laing’s italics, *The Politics of Experience* 95-100)

Laing’s text, *The Divided Self* (1960), attempts to explain schizophrenia with existentialist philosophy. He reinterprets the various subtypes of the illness and proposes that they are ways of being in the world. In other words, Laing uses Bleuler’s medical term to advocate schizophrenia as a splitting or separation of the Self to cope with reality (*Divided Self*). In his text, Laing removes schizophrenia from medical science jargon to stress the splitting of the “object” or “schizophrenic.” As Sander L. Gilman notes, Laing’s ideas drew from objects-relations theory, nevertheless, they contributed
significantly to twentieth-century notions of the illness as a severing of one’s sense of being or one’s sense of self (Disease and Representation 223).

The black comedy Me, Myself and Irene is a rather literal interpretation of this theory of schizophrenia as a division of the self. The plot is about an exceedingly nice Rhode Island State Trooper named Charlie Bailygates (Jim Carrey) who suddenly develops a foul-mouthed, aggressive alter ego named Hank. Conflict revolves around Charlie trying to bring his two personalities together. The character’s divided self is explained as “advanced, delusional, involuntary schizophrenia with narcissistic rage.”

The movie is set up as a story with an accompanying male voice-over. An omniscient narrator informs the audience that Charlie never dealt with the fact that his wife left him for another man. Suppressing his pain and denying that his three black sons are not his biological offspring, Charlie snaps into his alternate personality and wrecks havoc on the local town. After visiting “a team of highly trained head doctors,” Charlie discovers he has “a major screw loose… a split personality, a schizo.” Throughout the movie, characters refer to him as a “schizo” and his personality swings between nice guy and lewd trickster. These two personalities represent a division between rational and irrational, good and bad, civilized and barbaric qualities in a single human being, brought on by external circumstances that cause him “to snap.”

Charlie’s divided self is the central plot device and the paratextual materials promoting the movie highlight the division in his character. Advertisements for the film show Carrey’s head split in two halves - one side smiling while the other side sports a sinister grin. The accompanying text reads: “From Gentle to Mental.” Other promotional materials include t-shirts with “I am schizo” printed on the front and “so am I” on the
back; coffee cups with dividers down the middle so that both sides of the split personality may drink different beverages; and bottles of jelly beans with instructions that read: “Take one pill every six hours for advanced delusional schizophrenia with involuntary narcissistic rage.” Even the title implies a splitting of experience.

Notions of a divided self are enhanced by the fact that the directors chose Jim Carrey to act as Charlie/Hank. Carrey has starred in numerous roles that involve living two radically different realities or identities. In The Majestic (Frank Darabont, 2001) Carrey plays a screenwriter who loses his memory and becomes a war hero; in The Mask (Chuck Russell, 1994) Carrey transforms from mild-mannered bank clerk to the Norse God of mischief; in Batman Forever (Joel Schumacher, 1995) Carrey plays an undervalued employee who turns into a dangerous, quizzical trickster; in Bruce Almighty (Tom Shadyac, 2003) Carrey is both average guy Bruce Nolan and an incarnation of God; and in The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998) Carrey plays a man who lives in a separate reality from everyone else.

The division in Charlie’s character emulates a split between reason and unreason, not necessarily associated with schizophrenia, that dates back to the beginnings of the Enlightenment. As Foucault demonstrates, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this duality of reason began to be regarded as reversals of human nature. Because of the traditional association of the Enlightenment notion of reason with the figure of “MAN”, women were perceived to be mad more often than men while developing a mental illness implied a regression to childish thought, primitive behavior and intellectual ineptitude.32 By positing these qualities in dualistic terms, one side of the

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32 More than one million American women, so-called ‘madwives’ were institutionalized during the mid-twentieth century because they resisted narrow cultural norms. In her documentary, Means of Grace,
dualism is promoted while the other is devalued. These 'other terms,' signifying regression, primitivism, and stupidity become the hallmark of schizophrenia as division.

Carrey's signature histrionic acting style enhances the reversals that supposedly ensue from having this brain disease. When morphing in and out of personalities, Charlie salivates heavily, contorts his face, spits, sputters, and jerks his body in uncontrollable movements. He is a body, and a face, where one aspect of his personality – his rational, in control self, on the side of authority and the law – is instantly threatened by 'lawlessness.' Such depiction encourages the metaphor of schizophrenia as a struggle between control and chaos, between the figure of the lawful parent and asocial, unruly child – a self divided.

Such a perspective of schizophrenia is not uncommon. In fact, it is inscribed in our 'common-sense' dictionary definition of the term. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines schizophrenia as "split personality" (1132). Merriam-Webster's also defines schizophrenia as an adjective or adverb that means "contradictory or antagonistic qualities or attitudes" (1041). While dictionaries are not the authority on word meanings, they reflect how a culture views words. Norman Fairclough notes:

...it is of limited value to think of a language as having a vocabulary which is documented in 'the' dictionary, because there are a great many overlapping and competing vocabularies corresponding to different domains, institutions, practices, values, and perspectives. (76)

Me, Myself and Irene is an example of a common-sense notion embodied in the dictionary definition of schizophrenia as a divided self. Conniving Hank oozes of director J. Clements challenges whether these women were ill or simply resisted social expectations. She revisits her mother, Ann Clements Congers' diary entries that account what it is like to be a psychiatric patient.

33 Split personality is also defined as "schizophrenia" on p. 1132.
antagonistic attributes. While racing along the highway in a stolen vehicle, he pounds the steering wheel with his fist, head bangs to heavy metal music as terrified Irene sits in the passenger seat wielding a lawn dart for protection. Hank tries to drown a little girl, exposes himself to elderly ladies, bursts into temper tantrums, degrades lesbian women, mocks an albino teenager, and shouts at a four-year-old “What the fuck are you staring at?” Hank is impulsive, unpredictable and aggressive. He is the complete opposite of Charlie, a figure of ‘respect’ for law and order. The differences between these characters illustrate our colloquial understanding of schizophrenia as a state of being simultaneously in control and out of control. This view sees the ‘in control self’ as threatening to burst out of control at any moment.

It has been proposed by psychiatrists Ming T. Tsuang and Stephen V. Faraone that this everyday understanding of schizophrenia originates in Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel *Strange Case: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886). Tsuang and Faraone suggest two dominant views of schizophrenia emerged after Stevenson’s novel was published in the 1880s. These views include schizophrenia as a manifestation of an evil other self and as split personality:

The term is normally misused in one of two ways. The first is due quite simply to a tendency to equate mind with personality; hence the schizophrenic is viewed as someone with two or more (for objects can split into any number of fragments) distinct personalities. Such a concept is inherently disturbing but its prevalence undoubtedly owes much to the popularity on both sides of the Atlantic of Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, a horror story of a man who deliberately cultivates by use of a potion a second personality possessed of great personal magnetism but a still greater capacity for rapacious evil. Although written in 1886, exactly 10 years before the first serious research into schizophrenia commenced, this book — quite bizarrely — served much of the twentieth-century public with their model of the typical schizophrenic. Deviating freely from the actual content of the book, they believed that
sufferers of the condition were for the most part ordinary people who could uncontrollably turn into violent or even murderous villains...

...As science discovered more about the true nature of schizophrenia, the popular picture changed to portray [it] as a more benign form of 'split personality', which renders the sufferer incapable of consistent thought or behavior. At this time the term seems to have entered our common vocabulary as a metaphor for indecision, irrationality, or inconsistency. (5-6)

The "psychiatric patient" who has a violent alter-ego has become a standard theme in movies - from The Untamable (Herbert Blache, 1923) to Schizo (Pete Walker, 1977).34 Countless films about split personality disorder label their characters as having schizophrenia; are described in film reviews as "schizophrenia films;" and cross-referenced under "schizophrenia" in the Corel All Movie Guide (1995). Most of these are thrillers that feature violent characters who split between good and evil. This shows how the two illnesses are perceived to be synonymous and involve not only division but lawless disorder.

The "schizo" as a law abiding citizen with the potential for its opposite, stems from the belief that there are two kinds of madness: one passive, one aggressive. Again, this depiction is rooted in the Enlightenment. In Renaissance Europe, "a broad distinction was made between the two main types of insane patient, the peaceable and the violent" (Goldin). Take for example, Caius Gabriel Cibber's seventeenth century sculptures, Melancholy and Raving Madness (1680), which adorned the entrance to the Royal Bethlem Hospital (Bedlam) in London. One figure is passive while the other struggles with clenched fists against his chains. The passive figure hides its hands and recoils its body from the viewer while the "raving mad" figure is fully exposed, his muscles tense, taut, ready for action. The latter's fury is barely contained by his chains or reigns of

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34 The promotional poster for Schizo reads: "Schizophrenia: When the left hand doesn't know who the right hand is killing."
psychiatry. Wrenching his mouth open, his inanimate form wails with silent abomination.

The importance of these figures as icons of madness is noted by Sander L. Gilman:

The fine line that divides art from the reality of mental illness was breeched in 1680 by Caius Gabriel Cibber in the two statues he carved for the portal of Bethlem Asylum...the statues provided a fixed, aesthetic representation of madness. It is the polarity implicit in the balance of the two types of insanity, which creates the "sweet Proportion." 35

Bitter sweet, I might add, for the division between the peaceably insane and the disorderly insane seems to be part of our contemporary inheritance. If Charlie’s two sides exemplify this struggle between law and disorder his personalities are depicted in dualistic terms as polar opposites that struggle to overpower one another. His divided character personifies the struggle between rational and irrational while the story comments on the horrid consequences that would ensue if irrationality were to win the battle.

Fig. 8. Caius Gabriel Cibber, Melancholy and Raving Madness, 1676, portland stone, Victoria and Albert Museum, London.

While Me, Myself and Irene is a literal interpretation of theories of ‘the divided self’ which promotes the need to contain unreason within social order, then the film Fight Club takes another stance in this battle of the divided self. The plot of Fight Club gives us

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a visionary character who rejects capitalism and offers an alternative method of living that is opposed to fueling the capitalist machine. Unlike *Me, Myself and Irene*, it is the other side of dualism that is glorified - lawless disorder becomes a battle for liberty (i.e. - social norms are depicted as a problem). In *Fight Club*, we are given a character whose schizophrenia symptoms produce an alter-ego named Tyler.

The nameless narrator (Edward Norton) is satirized as an upper middle-class, Ikea-loving consumer. Plagued by insomnia and frustrated with his dead end job as a recall coordinator for an automobile company, the narrator begins going to self-help meetings. Discovering that they help him sleep, the narrator quickly becomes addicted to many different groups, attending under different guises including Cornelius, Rupert, and Travis.

Arriving home one evening, the narrator discovers his apartment exploding in flames and decides to abandon his entire lifestyle as a consummate shopper. He goes to live with his new friend, Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt). Together, they create a machismo underground world of violence that replaces his need for self-help groups. This all male domain of brutality and self-destruction is a way of obtaining strength, becoming “God,” achieving “enlightenment.” This ritualistic event is called “Fight Club” and its members are bound by secrecy. It is presented as a male form of spirituality, like a “Pentecostal service” after which they feel “saved.” The goal is to overpower one’s opponent, to feel “alive.” The narrator informs the audience, “After fighting, everything else in your life

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36 For the most part, Edward Norton’s character is nameless; although, he uses different names (i.e. - Rupert, Travis, Cornelius) while attending various self-help support groups and at one point, he refers to himself as “Jack.” The official website for the movie calls him “Jack” <http://www.foxmovies.com/fightclub> but for the purposes of this text, I will refer to him as the nameless narrator.
has got the volume turned down. You can deal with anything.” Fight Club is the narrator’s primary coping mechanism - and a hallucination.

Tyler and the narrator reject the terms of capitalism and consumerism by living in a dilapidated hotel and by starting a soap business for which they steal human fat from a liposuction clinic to make glycerin soap and nitroglycerine bombs. The home-made bombs are used to blow up symbols of money and power such as credit card company buildings. As the narrative proceeds, Fight Club’s members are recruited into Tyler’s and the narrator’s home where they are trained to participate in a mission. Men are assigned tasks to destroy symbols of the capitalist machine. They create a billboard that says you can fertilize your lawn with motor oil; beat on new cars with baseball bats; recreate airline safety pamphlets that contain cartoon images of highly panicked passengers; cause a power outage at a local mall; and blow-up a computer software store. One assignment consists of “destroy[ing] a piece of corporate art and trash[ing] a franchise coffee bar.”

Towards the end of the film, the audience learns that the nameless narrator is Tyler Durden and the visual representation of Tyler played by Brad Pitt is merely a hallucination. The narrator yells: “You’re a voice in my head. You’re a fucking hallucination.” As the story is told from the narrator’s perspective, including using direct address to speak to the audience, viewers do not realize the narrator is hallucinating until the end of the film. Since the audience is deceived about reality in the same manner as the narrator, the symptomology of schizophrenia is inscribed in the movie.

In addition to having both auditory and visual hallucinations, many details point to the narrator’s schizophrenia. He has an incessant voice in his head that tells him what to say and do; a deep sense of paranoia; complete disregard for his physical appearance
and an inability to decipher reality from fantasy. What is more, the director uses a recurring medical motif to comment on his cognitive state. The opening sequence is shot using a scope, or medical camera to record the interior of the body. Viewers journey backwards along neural pathways inside the brain and exit so they are peering into a close-up of the narrator’s sweating and terrified face. This opening sequence is echoed later in a scene involving the same movement along the wires of a ticking time bomb. A parallel is created between the main character’s state of mind and a bomb waiting to explode. Moreover, the movement of these images highlights the narrative as a journey through Norton’s psyche.

Details from the dialogue also point to the narrator’s mental health. His girlfriend Marla Singer (Helena Bonham Carter) tells him he is “insane” and that he “has very serious emotional problems for which he should seek professional help.” Tyler tells him he “looks like a crazy person” and calls him “psycho-boy.” His boss refers to him as a “crazy shit.” The narrator insinuates he is abnormal when he says, “most normal people will do anything to avoid a fight” and a character discloses the creator of Fight Club “was born in a mental institution.” In other words, the screenplay highlights the narrator as mentally unwell as we become witnesses to his psychotic episodes and delusional thinking.

The strategic use of color reinforces this division between ‘reality’ and ‘hallucination.’ The narrator’s ‘reality’ is highlighted by blue colors including his boss’ cornflower blue tie, Marla’s blue dress, and the blue glow of a slide presentation in his workplace. His hallucinations are accented with red details such as Tyler’s signature red leather jacket and red sports car. When the narrator first contacts Tyler from a pay phone,
whirling red lights from a police vehicle may be seen in the reflections of the telephone booth. When they meet at a local bar, emphasis is placed on the red glow of the bar sign. As the narrator leaves the bar, completely immersed in conversation with his imaginary friend, the blue glow of reality may be seen glinting through the swinging doors of the bar behind them to signify that the narrator has exited reality. A crimson red dominates the next scene as blood is spilled from the narrator’s fight with his hallucinatory counterpart.\textsuperscript{37} The narrator’s battle with his double is a fight between social norms, depicted as ‘bad’ and anarchy depicted as liberty and therefore ‘good.’

Narrator/Tyler exemplifies Laing’s idea of the divided self by radically splitting into “an embodied self” and “unembodied self” that “descend into a vortex of non-being in order to avoid being” (93). In other words, the narrator is presented as having schizophrenia but the storyline implies he has two sides to his personality – conscientious follower (Norton) and anarchist Durden (Pitt) – that he develops to survive an oppressive, stultifying reality. He is both good and bad guy, feminine and masculine, embodied by the same person.

Such notions of a self-divided between passion and reason is embodied in a different way in Freudian psychology: the narrator of Fight Club is both ego (Norton) and alter-ego (Durden) or rather id and super-ego. According to Freud “the ego stands for reason and circumspection while the id stands for untamed passions” and the superego “holds up certain norms of behavior,” (Freud “The Structure of the Unconscious”). As the anti-social, irrational, juvenile, amoral, and aggressive personality, Pitt is the alter-ego, the imaginary id, the narrator’s double. Norton acts as his rational ‘male’ side while Pitt plays the irrational ‘female’ part of his character; “Norton is the up-tight superego,

\textsuperscript{37} Attention to red could also be interpreted as the colors of hell where Tyler rears as the devil.
and Pitt is his rambunctious id” (Sternbergh). Gritty brawl scenes speak about the two sides battling to overpower one another. Thus, *Fight Club* is about the conflict between rational and irrational, a conflict that is implied to cause some people to slip into ‘insanity.’

Fight Club’s glorification of the anarchist hero battling against social constraints, embodied in the narrator’s two-sided character, is similar to both Laing’s “schizophrenic,” who separates from oneself to cope with reality and to the schizoid subject found in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1977). According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, capitalism, fascism and communism are what make us sick. Capitalism, for example, is a social machine that produces schizophrenia and within this model, schizophrenia becomes a philosophical concept used to critique capitalism, cultural formations and social relations. It is a method or style of thinking and living that involves rejecting constricting social norms, being anti-homogenous, anti-ego, fighting against power and resisting hierarchical structures. It also involves “ego-loss” and becoming “non-human” (*Deleuze and Guattari* xxii).

Like Laing’s theory, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is predicated on the idea that schizophrenia is a dividing or splitting of experience brought on by external constraints and norms. In their text, the person with schizophrenia is a “schizo,” that desires, produces and resists all oppressive power flows in society. Notably, their “schizos” are “binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations” (Ibid., 5). Deleuze and Guattari speak about schizophrenia’s “two-ness” (1) and the “poles of delirium” — schizophrenia and paranoia — that translate into complimentary yet contradictory “poles of desire” (Ibid., 105). The juxtaposition of
Tyler’s pink scarf with his aggressive male behavior is the type of irony that might be classified by these philosophers as one of the film’s “schizoid” qualities.

In Anti-Oedipus, the logic of schizophrenia is marked by a multiplicity of divisions that unfold. Instead of possessing a logic that consists of “either/or,” (either the Self or Other) the “schizo’s” logic goes by “either...or...or” (either the Self or Other or different Other). In Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, it is this type of logic that gives birth to new ideas. Thus, schizophrenia is a mode or style of thinking that involves a fissuring of ideas that are also innovative, contradictory, paradoxical and surface with varying intensities. Deleuze and Guattari envision how this type of thinking functions in the political domain to overthrow established orders and propose introducing schizophrenia into discourse, thought and action. They encourage everyone from lone individuals to militant groups to embrace this revolutionary mindset. For them, schizophrenia possesses the potential to revolutionize social relations, culture and western society. In other words, becoming “schizophrenic” means revolting against power, being unpredictable, rebelling, and mobilizing free-thought, desire, and paradoxical thinking. It is a revolutionary force: “The schizo is not revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process—in terms of which the schizo is merely the interruption, or continuation in the void—is the potential for revolution” (341).

This two-fold revolutionary schizoid subject is present in Fight Club. By desiring capitalism and freedom from it, acting violently and with reason, Fight Club’s narrator exemplifies the binary and contradictory actions of the “schizo.” Like the schizo, Narrator/Tyler is a “universal producer,” unaffected by reality, an orphan, a free-thinking radical urban nomad that desires, is free, fractured and has multiple experiences (Deleuze
and Guattari 7). Hence, the nameless narrator reifies the conceptual persona\footnote{Conceptual personae are the characters produced by philosophical texts. Goodchild defines conceptual persona as "a style of thinking: a way of creating concepts and tracing a plane" (217). Goodchild says the purpose of Deleuze and Guattari's work is to trace a plane of immanence, create concepts, and invent conceptual personae.} found in \textit{Anti-Oedipus}.\footnote{Vincent Van Gogh is said to have had schizophrenia. See Schizophrenia Society of Ontario.}

Having the illness is the primary reason Narrator/Tyler is able to envision an alternative lifestyle that is opposed to capitalism and consumerism. It is the revolutionary catalyst. Tyler tells the narrator "people see themselves as they would like to be. They don’t have the \textit{courage that you have} to just run with it." Tyler implies that the narrator’s schizophrenia is what gives him the courage to be radical. Thus, the concept is presented as a revolutionary force. It helps the narrator envision an alternate lifestyle and to mobilize an entire army of anti-capitalist followers. Attending to his schizophrenia means becoming revolutionary and attaining freedom.

Like the "schizo," the narrator and his vision are glorified while the hallucinatory space that he occupies is honored as an ideal world. The film ends with the narrator’s foiled attempted suicide and a spectacular display of capitalist symbols crashing to the earth. Massive buildings collapse across the cityscape as the narrator and Marla look on. Presumably, it is a hallucination. As blood drips from his desecrated ear, one cannot help but recall Van Gogh,\footnote{Vincent Van Gogh is said to have had schizophrenia. See Schizophrenia Society of Ontario.} his creative vision and ability to depict the world in a unique light. There is no indication that the narrator will seek treatment, he is not sick, he is not a 'patient.' He is "at a very strange time in [his] life." As he stands in his boxer shorts, gun in hand, blood oozing from his skull, he tells Marla "I’m really okay. Trust me."
Everything’s going to be fine.” The screen fades as an upbeat song entitled, “Where is My Mind?” performed by the Pixies pumps through the theatre.

Presenting the narrator as Durden/Tyler, self divided contains schizophrenia within a dualism where the hierarchy of value is reversed from that in Me, Myself and Irene. Using schizophrenia as a figure for the “schizo” suggests the illness is a spontaneous or unpredictable form of desire, that people who have it are free from social coding, and that they have “the power” to instantiate social change - they become strong-willed, neo-Romantic freedom fighters. Postmodern culture glorifies this “schizo” Subject.

Off-screen, those who develop the bio-medical schizophrenia are hardly in a position to spark revolution. He or she may undergo an unexpected, radical transformation but the process is only temporary and generally, the disease does not usually make PWS do ground-breaking things. This is due to schizophrenia’s negative symptoms, which include loss of activity, creativity, interest, motivation, and desire. These symptoms cause PWS to have difficulty experiencing pleasure and initiating goal-directed behavior. Negative symptoms make schizophrenia a weak metaphor for the spontaneous and revolutionary behavior of the schizoid subject.

Just as Deleuze and Guattari mislabel their bipolar subject as a “schizo,” Fight Club confuses its split personality character with a person who has schizophrenia, and Me, Myself and Irene mislabels its dual character as having this disease. This representation of the illness as a self divided is a metaphor for a struggle of law and disorder; of individual freedom versus social constraint.
Me, Myself and Irene and Fight Club present split personality disorder as schizophrenia. It is a comparative view that sees metaphor as the presentation of one thing in terms of another, giving a thing "a name that belongs to something else."\(^ {40} \) For example, Charlie is diagnosed with "schizophrenia" but is depicted as having two distinct personalities. Scriptwriters blatantly confuse two entirely different disorders. This is the paradoxical part of the divided self metaphor: schizophrenia is a psychiatric illness while split or multiple personality disorder (more accurately called Dissociative Identity Disorder [DID]) is an unrelated psychological condition.\(^ {41} \)

While the clinical definition of schizophrenia as a brain illness involves a disorder of thought - whose symptoms include paranoia, delusions, psychosis, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized or catatonic behavior and negative symptoms such as flattening of affect, social withdrawal and apathy - there is no splitting of personalities, between the subject and object, between me and not-me, between the world and Self.

\(^ {40} \) Aristotle (1924:1457b6-9) qtd. in Sontag, Aids and Its Metaphors 5.

\(^ {41} \) Over the course of the last century, borderline personality disorder, autism and Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) have been confused with schizophrenia. Borderline, schizotypal and schizoid are "personality disorders," which are "enduring patterns of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of an individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress and impairment" (DSM-IV, 4th ed.: 1994: 629). These disorders are entirely different from and less function-imparing than schizophrenia, which is a disease that makes it difficult for a person to tell the difference between reality and fantasy, to think logically, to have normal emotional responses to others, and to behave normally in social situations.

DID, which is most often confused with schizophrenia in popular culture, is characterized by the development of distinct and separate personalities within one individual who forgets or is unaware of the different facets of the Self. According to the DSM-IV (text version, 2000), DID is characterized by "the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states that recurrently take control of [the individual's] behavior. There is an inability to recall important information, the extent to which is too great to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness" (526). This symptomology is entirely different from the symptomology of schizophrenia in which positive and negative symptoms are integral. An individual with schizophrenia does not have different personalities.

Unlike schizophrenia, DID is usually caused by a traumatic event in one's childhood that the person deals with later in life by developing alternate personalities to suppress the pain of their past. Each personality is unaware of the other personality's behavior. For this reason, DID has more to do with a fissuring of experience than schizophrenia, which involves a single experience of the world that is inundated with many different bits of sensory information. Unlike DID, schizophrenia is not caused by external factors.
Simply put, there is no multiplicity or duality associated with schizophrenia. In this light, the metaphor of schizophrenia as the divided self may be a recent historical convention, but it is incongruous if one considers the question of tenor, vehicle, and ground. The distance between tenor (disorder) and vehicle (schizophrenia) is immense; yet, the divided self metaphor resonates because we are able to make a conceptual leap based on preconceived ideas that come from a history, already discussed.

Believing schizophrenia is DID informs its usage as an adjective for contradiction, disunity and ambivalence in newspaper shorthand, cartoons, advertising, television shows, other movies, and on packaging for children’s toys (Wahl, Media Madness). It bolsters journalists’ and political rhetoricians’ use of the term to mean dramatic contrasts, inconsistency, paradoxical attitudes or antagonistic motives. As a divided self, schizophrenia becomes a privileged term in postmodern thought:

...the Postmodern text offers multiple, sometimes contradictory subject positions, which are often metaphorically described as ‘schizophrenic’. Thus, a basic Postmodern interpretive schema might be: interpret any fragmentation, contradiction or disunity as a symbol for, and a manifestation of, the schizophrenia of Postmodern culture. (Peterson 180)

Unfortunately schizophrenia has nothing to do with a divided self and unlike the majority of technical scientific terms, which rarely “find their way into everyday speech,” this term and its variants are commonly used in the vernacular (Tsuang and Faraone 5). These colloquial and philosophical meanings over-determine bio-medical descriptions of the disease. As Wahl argues in Media Madness:

Almost two-thirds (62%) of the lay respondents to a 1987 survey about the symptoms, causes, and treatments of schizophrenia identified multiple personality as a common symptom of schizophrenia, which suggests that the public has effectively picked up what the media convey. There is wide misunderstanding of schizophrenia as multiple personality, and it is no accident that the erroneous idea shared by the public corresponds to the
While *Me, Myself and Irene* parodies the conflict between rational and irrational parts of the divided self, *Fight Club* celebrates the differences between the two. *Fight Club* draws from philosophical ideas while *Me, Myself and Irene* is constructed from a colloquial understanding of the concept. However, both films are visual interpretations of the literal meaning of Bleuler's scientific metaphor for disease. They are also literal interpretations of Laing's anti-psychiatric metaphor for "a divided self."

This 'literalization' of the metaphor of illness transforms metaphor into myth. Sarbin writes:

> ...under subtle or open ideological pressure, descriptive metaphors become myths. Once a myth becomes part of the fabric of a civilization's system of beliefs, it guides thought and action, and thus it inevitably militates against the introduction of alternative metaphors. (Ibid.)

Metaphoric usages transform the disease into a mythic subject, instantiating ossified figurative meanings.

The metaphorical extensions of schizophrenia as a divided self create what medical anthropologist Susan M. DiGiacomo calls an "excess of meaning that denatures and even denies experience" (117). As Thomas Sarbin suggests, this may discourage "the creation and acceptance of more apt and more humane metaphors..." ("Metaphors of Unwanted" 325). Recall Plato's comment that scientific theories are "likely stories." *Me, Myself and Irene* and *Fight Club* are visual renderings of an outmoded "likely story" – that of the divided self torn between law and disorder. As such, they are instances of one generation's metaphor becoming the next generation's myth (Sarbin, "Anxiety" 632).
Chapter 4: *Divine Gift*

Creativity, enlightened states of mind and madness have a long history together. For centuries, people have tried to correlate these concepts by studying the art of people deemed insane (i.e. - The Prinzhorn Collection) and scrutinizing the lives of artists whose work is visionary (i.e. - Vincent Van Gogh). This fascination is part of a Romantic legacy that “tends to conflate notions of creativity, madness, genius, and freedom” (Petersen 227). Cesare Lombroso drew analogies between art by people labeled “insane,” “geniuses,” and “saints” in his text, *Geniuses and Madness* (1864) (Gilman, *Difference and Pathology* 221ff). Anti-psychiatrist R.D. Laing advocated people with mental illness are seers and artists (*Divided Self;* Boyers and Orrill).

Popular films continue to present their characters with schizophrenia in this light. I will employ *Donnie Darko* (Richard Kelly, 2001) as a vantage point to discuss schizophrenia as a metaphor for a ‘gift’ in contemporary cultural depictions of the disease. *Donnie Darko* is exemplary because it incorporates all four dimensions of this romanticized view, including schizophrenia as prophecy (i.e. – spirituality or holiness), as divine gift, as higher state of enlightenment, and as a dream state that allows one to tap into the unconscious. This chapter uncovers how schizophrenia becomes a metaphor for these ideas. It begins with the history of these romantic notions.

Just over twenty years ago, Andrew Croyden Smith proposed that four theories of schizophrenia dominated the twentieth century. As Smith suggests, they “are different from each other, but overlap” (137). He identifies these theories as neurological, psychiatric, sociological and prophetic. This latter theory:

...sees madness as at least sometimes akin to prophecy, offering comments and sometimes the most profound insight into society and the
human condition. This is an offshoot of the sociological theory, for it ignores the possibility of illness, and regards prophecy as a social institution...The tradition of divine madness is ancient and widespread [...]. (Croyden Smith 139)

The idea that mental illness in general and schizophrenia in particular is a divine or exalted state of creative consciousness derives from the second millennium B.C.E. What we now call schizophrenia was then regarded as a relationship with the divine. As Julian Jaynes’ research in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind suggests, prehistoric people listened to their inner voices to guide their thoughts and actions. Anyone who actually heard voices was appointed as a prophet or oracle.

Ancient Greek thought also viewed certain mad people as visionaries. In Timaeus, Plato writes: “no man in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspirations” (Plato 71E-72A qtd. in Jaynes 340). To put it differently, one must be out of their wits or out of one’s mind to achieve clarity and revelation. Plato maintained there were uncreative or unproductive forms of madness as well as divine forms whereby possession could lead to mystical insights (Plato Phaedrus 427-348 BC: 244-5). He writes:

...madness, provided it comes as a gift from heaven, is the channel by which we receive the greatest blessings. ... If a man comes to the door of poetry untouched by the madness of the Muses, believing that technique alone will make him a great poet, he and his sane compositions never reach perfection, but are utterly eclipsed by the performances of the inspired madman. (qtd. in Meyers 318)

In Plato’s view, creative madness resulted from the gods working through the mad person. Instead of being possessed by demons, mad people were possessed by muses and their ‘visions’ were regarded as divine gifts.

In biblical times, divine intervention (i.e. — having visions or hearing voices) constituted someone as either a prophet or messiah. The Old Testament is littered with
descriptions of revelation that would now be categorized as schizophrenia. For example, Hebrew prophet Ezekiel of the 6th century B.C.E heard voices, had visions of God, made pronouncements on behalf of the Lord, held peculiar postures for extended periods of time, and saw symbolism in almost everything (Croyden Smith 167).

Similarly, King Henry VI saw visions of Christ, heard the voices of saints and used his ‘prophecies’ to rule England during the fifteenth century. “Messiahs” besieged the sixteenth century Book of Revelation and generally, it was believed that one could receive messages from God or other deities. In fact, much of Christian religion is built on hearing voices from invisible entities (Croyden Smith).

In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment philosophers including Locke, Hume, and Voltaire disputed holiness, supernatural powers, and demonic possession as explanations for mental ill health (Croyden Smith 78ff). They replaced long-standing views with the idea that mental illness is an individual phenomenon, weakness and misfortune (Ibid.). This encouraged other educated people to explain mental ill health in terms of morality, overindulgence, appropriate and inappropriate social behavior (Ibid.). Within psychiatric institutions, however, mental illnesses were considered diseases of the soul, the consequence of having excessive amounts of emotion. It was thought that possessing too much “passion” led to delirium, a form of “transcendence” (Foucault 158).

Memoirs of a Nervous Illness, which appeared in the late nineteenth century, bolstered these views. Written by German jurist Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911), this autobiography recounts his experiences with schizophrenia, including his perception of himself as a receptacle of divine gifts:

After all, I too am only a human being and therefore limited to the confines of human understanding; but one thing I am certain of, namely
that I have come infinitely closer to the truth than human beings who have not received divine intervention. (41)

Schreber's words support views of madness as both divine inspiration and an enlightened state of consciousness whereby the person who is mad is closer to "truth."

Adding to these notions, Eugen Bleuler's infamous monograph quotes one of Foersterling's patients saying, "I am a human being just like you, even though I am not a human being." If schizophrenia as a metaphor for monstrosity suggests that PWS are sub-human, then this metaphoric version suggests PWS become 'above-human' or divine. At the same time Bleuler's monograph was published, Egon Schiele's schizophrenia inspired self-portraits appeared with titles such as Prophets and Self-Seers II (Perlez E2; Conini 84, 183; Schroder 60). Schiele frequently painted himself as saints, martyrs, and Christ, which shows his conviction to self-sacrifice (Lacnit) and his view of himself as divine. This is held up by the fact that Schiele depicts himself without eyes. Comini proposes that these eyeless images denote a seer in a "somnambulistic state" (Comini 83), which also implies a connection between dreaming and 'seeing.'

Dreaming is a reference to classical madness (Foucault 101ff). Plato describes an experience similar to what we now call schizophrenia as a perpetual dreaming in Theaetetus (158). During the late eighteenth century, hospital administrators considered mental ill health a type of dreaming, with psychosis as a form of sleepwalking, and delirium as a type of "quasi-sleep" that required "awakening" the patient with music or terror (Foucault 184ff). In fact, "many authors have likened the psychotic state to a dream — Jung was especially eloquent on this topic. But these dreams are usually closer to

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42 Bleuler borrowed this quote from Foersterling (1904). See Bleuler 54 and Sass 285.

43 Schiele is quoted in Comini as saying, "I am the most perfect of the perfect; I am divine!" (186).
nightmares than otherwise" (Cermansky 9). Louis Sass says madness and sleeping are both “assumed to be a twin of death, a darkening or dampening of the (rational) soul that deprives the soul of its most essential feature, its lucidity” (3). In other words, dreaming is part of irrationality and unreason.

![Fig. 9. Egon Schiele, Self Seers II. 1911, Oil on Canvas, 80 x 80 cm, Leopold Museum, Privatstiftung, Vienna, Austria.](image-url)

During mid-twentieth century, anti-psychiatrists like R. D. Laing used Bleuler’s monograph as leverage to revive the notion that people who have brain disorders are more enlightened members of society. Laing took an existential approach to understanding Bleuler’s medical term and said that if the human race survives, people will look back at our present era as an “Age of Darkness...They will see that what we call ‘schizophrenia’ was one of the forms in which, often through quite ordinary people,
the light began to break through the cracks in our all-too-closed minds” (Politics of Experience 129). As Sander Gilman writes of this depiction:

A cult of the “schizophrenic as seer” evolved from Laing’s work - both indirectly, as in a series of novels and plays about the inner world of the schizophrenic... and in the work of Laing’s collaborators... Laing’s view dominated the popular understanding of the illness during the 1960s. (Gilman, Disease and Representation 224)

Laing suggested schizophrenia was a transcendental experience and people who have it are “enlightened” because they reject societal conventions. Connected to Laing’s hypothesis of “the divided self” discussed in the previous chapter, this version of the disease presents PWS as prophetic rebels rising up against an oppressive bourgeoisie (Divided Self; Boyers and Orrill). The person with schizophrenia becomes a ‘rebel-visionary.’

In addition to the view of schizophrenia as a higher state of enlightenment, many theorists and artists consider the disease, as well as other forms of ‘insanity,’ as a revelatory journey. Foucault describes literary, musical and artistic renderings of these imaginary ideas, which appeared during the Renaissance (7ff). Painters, such as Hieronymus Bosch, were inspired by the thought of mad people in “search of their reason” and created “ships of fools” in their art (Foucault 9, 8). The ship itself became a “motif of the soul” with “spiritual sails so that the breath of God may bring it to port” (Ibid., 12). Similar sentiments are echoed during the twentieth century, when Gregory Bateson describes the person with schizophrenia “embarking on a voyage” and returning “with insights different from those of the inhabitants who never embarked on such a voyage” (xiii). These allusions to ‘journey’ imply that the disease carries the subject on a quest that leads to philosophical ‘visions’ or insights.
Contemporary theorist Louis Sass describes PWS feeling “closer to truth and illumination” (6) while Dr. Solomon Snyder says that their utterances are “laden to overflowing with profound philosophical queries” (5). Psychiatrist Karl Jaspers contends that this illness brings on “processes of religious or metaphysical revelation” (284) and that when PWS lose touch with reality, “they have grasped the profoundest of meanings; concepts such as timelessness, world, God and death become enormous revelations which when the state has subsided cannot be reproduced or described in any way” (115). Furthermore, Laing uses a quote by his friend, Jesse Watkins, as leverage for this ‘madness as enlightenment’ theory. Watkins describes his experience amidst a psychotic episode as follows:

I was also aware of a - um - a higher sphere as it were. I mean, I’m rather [cautious about] using some of these phrases because they are used so many times - you know, people talk about spheres and all that sort of thing, but - er - the only thing that I felt ... er - a deeper experience than just looking at the thing... an awareness of - um - of another sphere, another layer of existence lying above the - not only the antechamber but the present - lying above the two of them, a sort of three-layered-um existence... (Laing, Politics of Experience 154-55)

Watkins’ comments reveal a heightened sense of spirituality, or perception that is not connected to Christian terms but to the notion of having a ‘higher power.’ In other words, it seems as though PWS experience a heightened sense of awareness that allows them to see into other ‘spheres’ when they are on the ‘journey’ of psychosis.

In summary, schizophrenia as a state akin to prophecy has a long and variegated history. The disease was initially viewed as a channel for communicating with the gods and evolved into a sign that the gods were speaking or working through mad individuals. This lead to a view of PWS as divinely inspired and their illnesses as creative/intellectual “gifts,” which resulted in theorists such as Lombroso to seeking resemblances in art by
saints, geniuses and madmen, which lead him to conclude that genius is allied to
madness. He declared the visions of saints, prophets and seers were the outcome of
disordered brains. Artists and writers fancied madness as a type of journey, from which
mentally unwell people returned with great philosophical insights. These views set the
stage for a psychiatric perspective of delirium as a form of “transcendence” and the
twentieth-century notion initiated by the anti-psychiatrists that PWS are rebel-visionaries
because they “see” the “madness” of society. Extending from these ideas is the notion
that PWS have a heightened sense of awareness somewhat like a dream in which they can
foresee things that the average person cannot. These romanticized archetypes culminate
into a view of schizophrenia as an exalted state of consciousness, or of “seeing.” It is a
Romantic way to regard the illness that may be a comforting thought for people who are
on the outside trying to understand this disease.

Emblematic of this metaphor of schizophrenia as prophetic or divine is the
popular science fiction film Donnie Darko, which begins with its main character
awakening from a dream. The entire narrative revolves around Donnie’s
dream/psychosis, in which he hallucinates about a ghoulish man-sized rabbit named
Frank that enables him to see into the future. Donnie’s foresight is explained as
“schizophrenia” and he is portrayed as a seer. He proves to have prophetic talent when he
cheats death early in the film and when he chooses death at the end of the narrative.
While dreaming, Donnie forecasts future events, which include the death of his family
members and girlfriend Gretchen. By reversing time and allowing himself to be
accidentally killed early in the film, Donnie reverses the catastrophic events and saves his
loved ones. Thus, Donnie is a hero by the end of the film. What is more, he prophesies
his role as a hero before the heroic act. When Gretchen comments on his name making him sound like “some sort of superhero,” Donnie responds with: “What makes you think I’m not?”

Donnie’s character follows traditional views of madness as a sign of creativity and brilliance. His highly intelligent character receives Iowa Test Scores that are “intimidating,” he understands theories about time travel, and he tells Gretchen he would like to become an author or artist. Moreover, he sees through the conservative, morality laden education he receives at Middlesex School.

Details in the mise-en-scène imply Donnie has divine power. Director Richard Kelly uses a dolly shot to film the character exiting from a movie theatre so that the audience catches a glimpse of the movie playing inside: a double bill featuring The Last Temptation of Christ (Martin Scorsese, 1988), which is about Jesus as a tormented, fearful man, uncertain about life and confused about whether the voices and visions he experiences are coming from God or Satan. The reference points to a parallel between the two movies and their main characters. This is supported by the fact that both Donnie and Jesus battle with fear and temptation, are constantly misunderstood by others, and ultimately die to save other people. They both have visions of talking animals (i.e. – the rabbit in Donnie Darko, the snake and the lion in The Last Temptation), are paranoid that they are being followed, and hear voices. What is more, they are both able to tap into their unconscious to predict future events, which leads others to believe that they are “mad.” In The Last Temptation, a man from Nazareth commands people in the community to “Go get someone from [Jesus’s] family to take him away, he’s insane.”
Both films have a cyclical time structure that allows their main characters to see into the future. This time structure begins and ends with the main character ‘awakening’ - Donnie awakens on a deserted road and Christ awakens on the cross - to discover that he has escaped death. On their respective journeys into their dream worlds, both characters have the opportunity to see what life would be like if they did not die. This revelatory journey allows each character to see the horrors of the future. To offset these unfavorable times to come, Jesus and Donnie must choose between dying as a Messiah or living life as an ordinary man. Both characters choose to change their own and other people’s destinies by orchestrating their own deaths. Thus, they are Saviors. Each man’s decision to sacrifice himself is marked by thunder crackling, the sky opening, and the future changing forever.

Donnie Darko’s cyclical time and inclusion of intertitles that state both the date and number of days “left,” are important details to my claim that Donnie is a Christ figure. At the beginning of the film, Frank tells Donnie that the world will come to an end in “Twenty-eight days. Six hours. Forty-two minutes. Twelve seconds.” The Christian celebration known as Advent also has twenty-eight days and signifies the countdown until the coming of Christ. Advent is celebrated four weeks before Christmas Day and is a time when Catholics “prepare themselves spiritually for the Lord” (Steinmetz, Par. 1). Likewise, Donnie Darko is set up so that the plot is a countdown of days until the main character reveals he is a Savior.

Donnie personifies ancient views of divine powers because he creates the wormhole that will reverse catastrophic events; he refers to himself as “Deux Ex Machina,” which means ‘God from the machine’; and his thoughts are pervaded by a
giant hare, which is a common symbol for not only madness\textsuperscript{44} but immortality, self-sacrifice, and heavenly saints (Tucker). Frank’s question - “Why are you wearing that stupid man suit?” reinforces this point. Donnie is above-human or divine. Like Scorsese’s Jesus, this ‘Christ figure’ is perceived to be God in human form.

Donnie is also an amalgam of contemporary notions of schizophrenia as an enlightened visionary. Not only is he an average youth that identifies easily with other kids, stands up for other students, and is a leader amongst his friends, he is a rebel-visionary characteristic of Laing’s “enlightened schizophrenic.” When Donnie is prompted by his hallucination, he rises from a deep sleep, finds an axe and calmly walks over to Middlesex to vandalize school property, a symbol of bourgeois power. Donnie challenges oppressive power structures when he questions Mrs. Farmer’s religious indoctrination; calls revered motivational speaker Mr. Jim Cunningham a “fucking anti-Christ” in front of an auditorium filled with students and teachers; and burns Cunningham’s house down to expose him as a pedophile. Since Donnie is presented as more ‘sane’ than the school officials, the motivational speaker and the school bullies, he exemplifies Laing’s archetypal visionary. He rebels against the limiting values of a domineering society; he transcends its ‘madness.’ Gary Jules’ rendition of the song “Mad World” (originally by Tears for Fears) playing at the end of the movie highlights these ideas. The lyrics include:

\begin{verbatim}
And I find it kind of funny
I find it kind of sad
The dreams in which I’m dying are the best I’ve ever had
I find it hard to tell you
I find it hard to take
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{44} Seventeenth-century German doctors referred to madness as “hare fever” (Gilman, Seeing the Insane 40). Pictorial representations such as the German broadside attributed to Matthaus Rembold are literal interpretations of the German proverb: “One is covered with a hare and fed by a fool” (Ibid., 41).
When people run in circles its a very
Mad world
Mad world
Enlarging your world

The words, "mad world" and "people run[ning] in circles," resonate with Laing’s view of PWS as "sane" and society as "mad." The reference to dreaming suggests "madness" is an enlightened state of mind in which the "I" envisions him or herself "dying" as a way to "enlarge" the world or to make it a better place.

Donnie Darko’s portrayal of the ‘genius denounced as madman’ aligns with other Hollywood portrayals. Science fiction film Twelve Monkeys (Terry Gilliam, 1995) labels its main character, who has unique vision, as a “schizophrenic.” The film opens with the following statement:

"...5 billion people will die from a deadly virus in 1997...the survivors will abandon the surface of the planet...once again the animals will rule the world...”

Excerpts from interviews with clinically diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, April 12, 1990, Baltimore County Hospital.

The “paranoid schizophrenic” is a man from the future (named James Cole) who travels into the past in search of a cure for an epidemic that ravishes the earth. His efforts to tell people about the world altering events and time travel result in him being diagnosed with schizophrenia and institutionalized. Like Donnie Darko and The Last Temptation of Christ, Twelve Monkeys has a cyclical time structure and the main character with schizophrenia “foresees” the future in a “dream.” Cole rescues the earth and thus, he is also a Savior.

Since Donnie’s, Jesus’ and James’ visions of the future turn out to be foresight, these narratives demonstrate what some people consider an hallucination (therapist Dr. Thurman/Man from Nazareth/ Psychiatrist) is another person’s (Donnie/ Jesus/ James)
alternative and insightful take on reality. These films highlight Croyden Smith’s argument that what constitutes ‘altered behavior’ and ‘divine intervention’ varies across time and place. He writes:

An outstanding schizoid man in ancient Palestine was shaped by social expectations into being a mystical prophet of his people. A lowly citizen of Britain in the twentieth century who fasts, prays and pronounces messages revealed to him from God is confronted by alarm in everyone around him, and only psychiatrists have a suggestion as to what to do with such a wayward man. His symptoms start being disabling and resembling those of schizophrenia. (Croyden Smith 91)

Croyden Smith says identifying a “madman” depends on the definition of “madness” (69). Thus, perceiving schizophrenia as prophetic, enlightened, or creative insanity depends largely on who is defining it.43 For the most part, our culture, dominated by a scientific worldview, sees prophetic claims and grandiose delusions as merely signs of brain disorder, however this metaphor for schizophrenia persists, and continues to be an engaging theme in popular films. Consider the award-winning film, A Beautiful Mind (Ron Howard, 2002) and its portrayal of brilliant mathematician John Nash, or Shine (Scott Hicks, 1996), which chronicles the life of musical genius David Helfgott. Both films celebrate schizophrenia as a gift. A Beautiful Mind honors Nash’s discovery in mathematics that garnered the Nobel Prize, and accentuates the fact that his “beautiful” yet diseased mind produced it. Similarly, Shine focuses on David Helfgott’s collapse into schizophrenia and his ability to transcend its debilitating effects to attain musical greatness.

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43 For example, in contemporary culture, anthropologists have discovered schizophrenia-like behavior used for specific social functions in traditional tribal and indigenous cultures that practice healing rituals, shamanism, voodooism, and witchcraft. These findings indicate that many non-western cultures view symptoms of schizophrenia as an intense spiritual experience rather than sickness; while “psychosis is typically feared and punished in our society, other cultures may value altered states of mind, at least in some contexts. Witness, for example, the authoritative role given to shamans in African societies” (Hiaashaw and Cicchetti 569; Croyden Smith; Murphy).
Another film that romanticizes schizophrenia as a divine gift is fictional narrative *Caveman’s Valentine* (Kasi Lemmons, 2001), which depicts a musical virtuoso called “Caveman” who is both a homeless person and clairvoyant that helps solve a murder case with his heightened sense of perception. Like Nash and Helfgott, Caveman is romanticized as a tortured genius with exceptional sensitivity, creativity and innovative thought. All three characters are crippled by their intellect and simultaneously driven mad by their abilities. Like *Donnie Darko*, these films portray their subjects as inspired madmen and depict the illness as genius, as gift.

The former two films - *A Beautiful Mind* and *Shine* - are quasi-biographies. I say “quasi” because the details of Helfgott’s and Nash’s life add narrative elements to the films that make the behavior of their characters more palatable. For example, Helfgott never collapsed or ‘snapped’ into schizophrenia after performing a concerto, nor was his father responsible for making him ill, as the film suggests,\(^4\) and Nash’s hallucinations did not consist of people. Including an abusive father in *Shine* somehow rationalizes Helfgott’s illness while Nash’s people-hallucinations are more convincing for viewers than say, the aliens he really hallucinated about. Had the producers of *A Beautiful Mind* included aliens, the strategic ‘duping’ of the audience would have been hard to achieve. It is this intentional deception that makes audiences empathize with Nash. Quasi-factual details enhance the filmmakers’ messages that these men are not merely ‘mad’ but treasures in our society.

These movies glorify the power of the irrational mind - they are not necessarily unsympathetic portrayals. They reflect continuing fascination with madness as a potentially divine gift. Unlike films discussed in other chapters, these narratives focus on

\(^4\) Helfgott did not have an abusive father who ‘induced’ his schizophrenia. These elements are fiction.
how illness may impact the rest of society, not just the world of PWS. They highlight unreason as a valuable part of our society and exemplify "the belief that suffering can give us extraordinary powers and is a necessary even indispensable component of creativity" (Meyers 318). In other words, this metaphor of schizophrenia as a divine gift redeems 'madness' when and if it is linked to creativity and genius.

Authors since the antiquities - from Plato to Sophocles to Mann - have explored the idea that "disease is the price to pay for artistic insight" (Meyers 318). The subtext is that the well-being of PWS is a fair exchange for divine art, literature, poetry, mathematical or musical genius, for seeing reality in a unique way. In this light, being a Romantic genius means being a sacrificial victim. The main characters sacrifice their minds to produce some of the greatest gifts in our society. We see that a loss of sanity produces brilliance and we are fascinated by the notion of an aspiring savage. In other words, we cherish artistic and intellectual gifts but not the people who produce them. The importance of the gift, in terms of advancing mathematics, music, etc., overshadows the disabling effects of disease. A vision of this illness as a gift excludes the fact that it can be disabling: PWS experience diminished desire and motivation, are lethargic, and are unable to make decisions or initiate goal-directed behavior. Schizophrenia induces a lack of productivity and the absence of desire, which completely opposes a view of PWS as flourishing with creativity and insight. What is more, people like Nash and Helfgott produced their greatest works before they became ill.

The possibility of enlightenment through madness seems plausible as PWS may be convinced that they are having prophecies during psychosis; although, from a biomedical point of view, this is called a delusion (DSM-IV-TR 297). More than just a
feeling, emotion, or perception, a delusion is a “belief” that is “idiosyncratic” and “preoccupying” (italics in the original, Croyden Smith 30; 34). This sensation leads PWS to believe they are receiving messages from God or other spiritual entities. It makes “the person feel as though they are being taken over by some outside force, such as aliens, computers or evil spirits” (Macnair, Par. 11). These delusions have “overwhelming explanatory power” for PWS and “[are] pregnant with associated meanings” (Croyden Smith 68):

Mystery is clarified, problems solved and life explained...It is pathological in form because it is peculiar, unique to the patient and regarded as bizarre by all other people. (Ibid.)

To an outside observer, delusions make the disease seem as though it is a gift of prophecy, insightfulness, creativity or genius. Although, as I have shown, the metaphor of the diseased mind as a gift is paradoxical, and here it is worth considering the idea not only as a metaphor, but as a metaphor that is embedded in archetypes.

Romanticized archetypes are “consolatory” myths. Angela Carter argues myths are nothing more than “consolatory nonsense” that “obscure the real conditions of life” and “dull the pain of particular circumstances” (5). For example, appointing PWS as visionary rebels may soothe our social conscience when we see those ‘seers’ on the streets and do not ask why they are there. In this hypothetical situation, myth functions, as Gilman argues, to keep one’s guilt about social relations with an oppositional ‘Other’ at bay. By positioning illness as separate from ourselves, do we not convince ourselves that our own mental health is unassailable? While comforting, consolatory myths ignore the reality and specificity of this disease. In this case, creation of archetypes by the
mentally well result in disconnected de-individuated representations. The real PWS are lost under these ideals.

In summary, there are four dimensions to a romanticized view of schizophrenia - spiritual prophecy, creative or intellectual gift, philosophical insight, and a heightened sense of perception that allows one to be in touch with the future or a "higher sphere." *Donnie Darko* is exemplary in that it embodies all four elements or dimensions of this view. It could be considered the pinnacle of a romanticized perspective of schizophrenia as a metaphor for a divine gift. A discussion of this particular metaphor is important because it illustrates yet another way of perceiving or understanding schizophrenia that is rooted in history and continues today. The next chapter explores films created by a person with this disease: experimental documentary filmmaker Arthur Lipsett. His work and life defy dominant metaphors of monstrosity, division and enlightened genius put forth by Hollywood films.
Chapter 5: "Ontological Unhinging"47: Lipsett’s Perspective

Imagine an eye unruled by man-made laws of perspective, an eye unjudged by compositional logic, an eye which does not respond to the name of everything but which must know each object encountered in life through an adventure of perception.

—Stan Brakhage
Metaphors on Vision

Arthur Lipsett’s experimental documentaries disclose his thought processes and challenge viewers to experience his reality. If the camera is the eye as Stan Brakhage suggests, Lipsett’s films provide rare insight into how one might see the world when living with schizophrenia. As ontological journeys, Lipsett’s films speak volumes about his unique perspective. He uses the film medium to give voice to his way of perceiving the world, through primarily auditory hallucinations. A close reading of Fluxes (1968), Free Fall (1964), 21-87 (1962), and Very Nice, Very Nice (1961) illuminates how Lipsett’s work challenges dominant metaphors and how he differs from the archetypical ‘schizophrenic’ characterizations evoked by popular Hollywood films. Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the films, a discussion of Lipsett’s disease is warranted.

Lipsett’s schizophrenia is discussed in a number of texts. In Michael Dancsok’s dissertation, Transcending the Documentary: The Films of Arthur Lipsett, one of Lipsett’s psychologists is quoted as saying:

Lipsett was diagnosed with chronic or paranoid schizophrenia...He had auditory hallucinations, which were, sometimes, a great comfort to him. When they were nice, he loved them. And when they were nasty they were tormenting him. (55)

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47 I borrow this quote from Louis Sass who refers to the disease of schizophrenia as “ontological unhinging” in his text Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought (285). Sass describes paranoid delusions as “not primarily concerned with the content of reality---with issues existing within the world...but...an ontological unhinging that nullifies reality by reducing everything to a troubling and insistent process of “seeing” (Ibid.).
Details from Lois Siegel’s articles, a conversation with Lipsett’s girlfriend, and an interview with filmmaker Tanya Ballantyne (Tree), also make reference to his illness. Siegel describes Lipsett’s disregard for his physical appearance, his paranoia, hallucinations, restlessness, self-medication with recreational drugs, and inability to block out sounds. Lipsett’s girlfriend of eleven years, Judith Sandiforth, remembers him insisting “everything had a sound or a force field...Inanimate objects had symbolic importance for him” (Sandiforth qtd. in Siegel “Clown Outside” 11). She recalls him purchasing “industrial ear-protectors because he couldn’t bear hearing things... At first he got them because of noisy neighbors, then he began to wear them all the time” (Ibid.). In an interview with Dancsok, Ballantyne describes Lipsett striking and holding poses for long periods of time, wearing layers of winter clothing in the summer and taping his fingers together in particular Buddhist mantra positions - for “protection” (Dancsok, Transcending the Documentary 54). I am not suggesting in the analysis that follows, that Lipsett’s films need be explained as the result of his disease. I do suggest that knowing Lipsett had schizophrenia opens up yet another way to interpret his complex and evocative work. His films give new meaning to how we understand schizophrenia that does not fit with dominant metaphors.

Imagine a black and white image of a wolf wandering through its natural environment accompanied by a male voice-over commenting “the werewolf instinctively seeks to kill the thing it loves best.” Images quickly shift to a clip of laboratory chimps doing tasks and a different voice stating something completely unrelated. This haphazard montage of images and sounds continues throughout the duration of the piece. The entire sequence seems disorganized, disconnected, perhaps even fragmented. Sounds consist
almost entirely of voices that do not match the imagistic mouths moving. French voices switch to English, dramatic voices change to cartoon-ish, male, then female, random and omniscient. A voice morphs into an unintelligible groan and then tunes in again. This is Fluxes (1968), Lipsett’s experimental documentary. Like most of Lipsett’s films, it is an unwitting depiction of the phenomenological experience of schizophrenia, an experience that forces people into a reality-fantasy abyss:

Hallucinations are reported by approximately 75% of schizophrenics, with 90% being auditory, and 40% visual (There is some overlap as some sufferers have both auditory and visual). Auditory hallucinations may be voices that whisper to the person, command them to do things, comment on their actions, suggest courses of action. The voices may be from people they know (a dead relative) or strangers. Visual hallucinations can be bizarre and frightening, even threatening. They may see things such as snakes crawling from skulls, blood dripping from people, creatures coming from walls. Less common are tactile hallucinations in which the patient feels bugs and ants crawling over or under their skin. (Wood)

The inability to distinguish between actuality and the unreal is one of schizophrenia’s most prominent symptoms, and a hallmark of Lipsett’s technique as a filmmaker. Lipsett blurs the division between reality and fiction by mixing dramatic footage with bits and pieces of non-fiction films. Employing found images and sounds discarded at the National Film Board of Canada (NFB), where he was employed, Lipsett takes pieces of reality (i.e. - newsreels, television shows, his own photos, educational films, other actuality images) and reorders them into a filmic collage to convey his own disturbed experience of reality. By deconstructing actuality images and creating different meanings for them, Lipsett throws ‘reality’ into question.

Lipsett’s innovative pairing of still images to sound interrupts passive engagement with an explosion of expression. Every object seems to take on symbolic importance and sounds are snatches of the everyday. Images include snippets of moving film sequences,
juxtaposed with stills and a plenitude of differing sounds, many of which are voices. Like
the hallucinatory experience of schizophrenia, the sound aspect of Lipsett’s films
dominate the visual element. In fact, Lipsett created the sound pieces before adding
actuality images (Dancsok 51).

Listen to the soundscape in Fluxes (1968): A knocking on a door is followed by
“What?” A female voice-over moans “Oh I’m going to miss you,” another voice
responds, “Oh I hope so.” A telephone rings. A French voice saying “Vous êtes très
gentil…” is followed by an English voice questioning “How do you feel?” A telephone
rings. “Are you kidding?” A different voice warns “And if you don’t touch this box while
you’re doing it.” A doorbell buzzes. “Are there any clues?” Laughter. A woman’s voice
pleads “What should I say? Should I say, ‘Father, save me’?” A doorbell buzzes. An
authoritative male voice says “Savagery, terror, peril beyond the imagination of men. It’s
about 50/50. You will get to know the unpredictable world. This is a man’s world where
only the strong survive.” A confused male voice stutters “With the-the interest in the fa-
farm, the two together, I-I-I’m working th-the difficulties…I didn’t come here for my-my
honeymoon, I’m here looking at the falls.” A man’s voice counts “deux, quatre, zero…”
A different man screams “Fire alert!” There is a sense of urgency, desperation and
consistent auditory bombardment.

A pulsing heart, static, a voice morphing into an inaudible groan, operatic singing,
a sudden change of sound as if someone abruptly changed a radio station, laughter,
singing, a sincere voice imploring, “Do you realize that hundreds of thousands in your
kingdom are slowly starving? This is the time. Think of yourself, your power.” A whistle
squeals. Sonar signals. Laughing. A voice questioning, “Is that the reason you often stay
here in your room in the morning?" A different voice muses, "He's not well liked at all." Another voice says, "Let's get out of here." A frantic voice yells, "We're breaking up, we're going down." A gasping, a groan, a voice hissing, "you know you won't be able to take over the planet," fearful voices, distressed voices, mocking voices, voices that fade into static and tune in again. In Fluxes, multiple, random, omniscient voices threaten, discourage and even belittle the listener just as they do when PWS experience auditory hallucinations.

While voices tend to dominate Lipsett's soundscapes, other sounds like Gregorian chanting, drumming, choir music, laughter, children crying, animals roaring, rockets rumbling, static, explosions, a crackling sound, music from different cultures, and operatic singing also pervade his work. His evocative soundscapes submerse the viewer/listener into a pseudo schizophrenia state whereby the receiver of pervasive sounds and fleeting images is entirely immersed in the sensory experience. The listener is unable to locate the source of the voices, which use direct address and at times make reference to the listener. At other times, these voices converse with one another. The voices' ever-changing nature yet ongoing presence in Fluxes reflects the state of flux that schizophrenia induces, while the cyclical structure and rhythm of Fluxes evokes an eternal pattern of illness that is characteristic of this disease.

Lipsett strived to convey the content of his psyche. Abandoning conventional filmic time and space, Lipsett juxtaposed contradictory images and sounds. Disconnection disrupts passive engagement as viewers are met with an onslaught of sensory information - otherwise banal objects and situations take on allegorical meaning.
Marked by a superficial chaos, Lipsett’s work conveys the sensory overload of schizophrenia. The content of the voices reinforces this idea.

Throughout *Fluxes*, the voices instruct, “Deliver a message,” “Here’s what you have to do,” “Now listen closely,” “You also know we won’t be able to take over the earth without a fight.” Since hallucinations are culturally dependent, people in our culture often believe these messages are coming from icons such as God, the devil, computers or space aliens. Furthermore, the voices that pervade PWS’s psyches cause them to believe they are messengers for higher beings, incarnations of Christ or other historical figures. These beliefs are clinically referred to as ‘delusions of grandeur.’ As people who have schizophrenia are unable to differentiate between reality and unreality, they truly believe that they are receiving instructions from invisible entities.

Delusions of grandeur are evoked by the following sequence from *Fluxes*. A male voice warns: “We come from a hungry planet. We raid other planets...for our own survival.” Airplane sounds are heard as if one is gearing to take off. “The war has reduced our population to a mere handful. It is typical that YOU earth people refuse to believe in the superiority of any world but your own.” An image of a chimpanzee dressed in a space suit glint on and off the screen as a different voice affirms “power transfer to begin immediately.”

This latter comment has an uncanny resemblance to the details in Judge Schreber’s autobiography, which is essentially a memoir of his experiences with schizophrenia. Schreber describes “rays” entering his consciousness and zapping his genitals, “souls” entering his body and seeing through his very eyes, otherworldly beings, like little men or “alien souls” that open and close his eyelids. He also speaks of
“miracles,” rays that are the “nerves of God” and rays that attach themselves to stars in a process of “tieving-to-celestial-bodies” (Schreber). Likewise, Lipsett’s voices evoke otherworldly beings invading one’s cognitive space. In his proposals Lipsett explains the composition of his films in terms of “area deities” that “radiate a sphere of influence” (Dancsok Transcending the Documentary 90).

As mentioned, people with schizophrenia often develop a fascination with outer space. Lipsett incorporates recurring images of rockets launching, satellites orbiting the earth, shooting stars, airplane sounds as if an aircraft is gearing to take off and continual references to planet earth. In addition to these images and sounds there are numerous references to Armageddon. This is a common delusion amongst people who have schizophrenia (Frosch 321). For example, Schreber expressed fears that the world was going to disappear after a massive earthquake and that he would be the soul survivor because of his ability to predict the future (Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, 1955). The same world destruction fantasies are expressed with Lipsett’s war footage including mushroom clouds, bombs dropping, and his inclusion of rockets launching into outer space to escape earthly catastrophes. The viewer is left with an overall sense of impending doom.

When someone begins hearing instructions and messages from invisible entities, one would assume that person questions whether these entities actually exist - a theme that is pervasive throughout Lipsett’s work. In 21-87 (1962), conversations about God and the Book of Revelation are accompanied by an image of an angel statue, a male voice-over stating, “Your number is…,” a female voice questioning her own faith, an audience awed by light glinting through the trees, human forms silhouetted against a light
source to connote the body moving toward the light of heaven, and figures moving upward on an escalator to allegorically imply a similar ascension.

Furthermore, religious motifs are prevalent in all of Lipsett’s films and transcending reality is a common theme. Lipsett’s proposals consistently echo G. I. Gurdjieff, whose philosophy stresses the interconnectivity of everything in the universe, and concentrates on the idea of transcendence. In a proposal for 21-87, Lipsett says he hopes his method of filmmaking would allow the audience to “transcend” both the reality represented in the images and our “experiences of the known world.” What is more, in a letter to Kit Carson regarding 21-87, Lipsett says he hoped to create a “multi-reality situation” and mentions The Tibetan Book of the Dead as a major influence. In the introduction to The Tibetan Book of the Dead or The After Death Experiences on the Bardo Plane, Lama Anagarik Govinda writes “…the Buddhist is alert to all possibilities of existence and to all aspects of reality” (xii). Clearly Lipsett worked to convey not simply a singular experience, but multiple realities – an experience that is unique to being in the midst of schizophrenia. Experiencing multiple realities is the ontological aspect of this disease.

Another common theme is a heightened sense of skepticism - one might even say paranoia, about science and medicine. In Fluxes, in which Lipsett uses images of scientists peering through microscopes, hundreds of men in suits at a meeting, soldiers

48 Lipsett qtd. from his proposal for 21-87, Production files, National Film Board of Canada Archives, Montreal, 1962.


50 Lipsett constantly references “reality” and his experiences of multiple realities in his proposals and letters. See Lipsett, letter to Tom Daly, letter to Kit Carson and proposal for Landscapes (N-Zone), Production Files, National Film Board of Canada Archives, Montreal.
marching in tune with one another, a captain smirking as he stares into the camera, more men in black suits. There is a continual visual reference to the brain or head with images of a doctor measuring the length of a woman’s head, several doctors attaching a subject’s head to numerous wires and mechanical devices, a second image of measuring a Grecian bust, restrictive apparatuses imposed on different bodies and a recurring cartoon sequence that depicts mass creation of bulbous shaped heads. Their anonymous creator jams teeth into each one as they are pumped out on an assembly line. In addition to these visuals, a voice commands “Rip out the brain.” A deep sense of paranoia and fear about our ‘Creator’ and the medical institution is pervasive.

Furthering these ideas, both 21-87 and Free Fall (1964) question the motives of science and medicine by focusing on the body in relation to symbols from both disciplines. 21-87 begins with x-ray sounds even before the viewer sees any images. The first still depicts a human skull which cuts to an acrobat performing tricks, which cuts to hands sawing into a cadaver, which cuts to a robot performing human tasks. In Free Fall, Lipsett creates a parallel between humans and laboratory chimpanzees by juxtaposing stills of closely cropped human faces with closely cropped images of chimpanzee’s faces. Lipsett incorporates tight close-ups of different people’s eyes. A woman’s eyes, a chimp’s eyes, a baby’s sleeping eyes, surreal eyes, a totem pole’s painted eyes, a house being demolished and a voice commenting on “the last remnants of a crumbling civilization” expresses fear about becoming a primary subject of scientific study or observation. A final image of a frog croaking humorously remarks on how the human species is reduced to laboratory specimens with advancing scientific practices. One gets a clear sense of medicine reducing the body to a site of scientific investigation.
Not only does 21-87 convey fears about being an object of observation but it also expresses a sense of panic about being in the subject position of a patient. A woman’s fraught voice is heard pleading “Take me to a place where I have freedom, I’m a human being and I want to feel free and do things as I please. The same things you want to do. I am a human being...” She is cut off by an elderly woman’s voice confessing “When I get on a bus, I have a feeling that everyone is looking at me.” The image cuts from a somber looking elderly woman waiting for a bus to a boy laughing hysterically by a waterfront but the viewer is unable to hear his laughter. The next voice reports “We used occupational therapy.” This is cut off by a different man’s voice pleading “Can I go back? Can I go back?” A cautious male voice observes “they become aware of some sort of force behind this apparent mask, which we see in front of us.” A man says “I find it terrible warm here. Doctor, have mercy on my soul.” To which the other male voice responds “No. It’s too late.” A woman is seen grimacing. Rumbling is heard. A voice-over says “Into the strange twisted bronze columns, it was a faith that praises men...”

This last voice implies a movement towards death. In fact, many of the images accompanying 21-87’s sound track emphasize religious rituals and dying. A creaking gate opening is paired with an image of a female model turning towards a light source so that she is almost entirely enveloped by it. A male voice saying “The body of our Lord Jesus Christ” is combined with documentary footage of a young boy burning alive. A different male voice prompting, “Belief. Repeat: God” is followed by a church choir singing hymns. Laboured breathing. Dancers moving frantically. Gun shots are heard. Acrobatics are seen. Sound vanishes completely as people with solemn faces arrive at the top of an escalator that has been moving upward. Silence. Different variations of light
flicker on the screen. Amidst the light, a man appears holding his hands in a prayer position. The entire film sends a bleak message about dissolving faith and fear of medical institutions.

Combining the provocative auditory component with the images' symbolic content draw us into Lipsett's perceptual experience, yet can also be understood as being a metaphorical commentary on specific themes in the contemporary world. In this sense, it is not that his films are a metaphor for schizophrenia but depictions of how someone with schizophrenia may perceive our world. This is revealed in Lipsett's proposals, which indicate that his films have narrative structures, replete with conflict, climax, and resolution. What may appear to be "disordered film[s] about disorder" (Jones 83), are actually highly controlled, symbolically loaded works of art. According to Lipsett's proposals, he intended for his films to be subversive, satirical critiques on culture, science and the human condition.\footnote{51 Lipsett qtd. in production files, National Film Board of Canada Archives, Montreal.} The originally unrelated images and sounds may seem disconnected but they speak to one another and thus, Lipsett's films contest the view that they are merely chaos and that his 'madness' is unreason. Foucault critiques the Classical view of madness as unreason in his text *Madness and Civilization*. He claims that as unreason, madness constitutes the negativity of reason, nothingness, a "manifestation of non-being" (Foucault 115). The richness of Lipsett's work contradicts this definition and illustrates how a 'mad' state of being is a state of abounding sensory perception. In the light of Foucault, Lipsett's films blur the sharp division between reason and unreason that launched during the Classical era.
Thematic threads weaving throughout Lipsett’s films include challenging the legitimacy of medical-scientific models for studying human experience, the indifference of humankind, and exiting earthly life. Ascending up and away from earth is promulgated every time Lipsett incorporates a rocket blasting off into the skies. Images of sending chimpanzees into space (Fluxes), acrobatics (Free Fall), and costumes (21-87), suggest all action is performative, all human beings are circus spectators. Very Nice, Very Nice’s final display of bombing by American Air Force planes, applause, and a voice-over exclaiming “Bravo! Very nice, very nice” satirizes our indifference to tragedy.

While these are themes common to human existence, they are also directly related to the history of madness. For example, Free Fall, 21-87, and Fluxes satirize our technologically focused culture while also speaking about scientific, genetic and biological discourses that tend to dominate discussions about schizophrenia in the latter part of the twentieth century. Lipsett acknowledges the languages of reason that have dominated the history of mental disease throughout the ages (Foucault). To borrow the words of a voice from Free Fall, “We have a cell – a living cell.”

As Lipsett continued to create, his films became increasingly desolate. Images grew progressively more frenetic as voices became increasingly more threatening and distressed. Frenetic images, haphazard noises devoid of meaning, glimmers of an overwhelming reality - it is as if the films themselves are indexical markers of Lipsett’s schizophrenia slipping further into a desperate chaos with each psychotic episode.

In the production dossier for Free Fall, Lipsett writes: “I cannot tell whether I am seeing or hearing – I feel taste, and smell sound- it’s all one – I myself am the tone.”

His experiences inspired his film practice, and the two meshed together. To borrow

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52 Lipsett quotes Siegfried Kraucaur from Kraucaur 192.
Claude Levi-Strauss' words, "when the mind is left to commune with itself and no longer has to come to terms with objects, it is in a sense reduced to imitating itself as object" (qtd. in Sass 258). Lipsett was "imitating" his mindscape in his art. A frenetic, shocking sensory overload with a feverish pace, shifting sounds and mocking laughter was Lipsett's art and his reality. It eventually became overwhelming. Tormented by its fervour, Lipsett achieved freedom through tragic means. In April of 1986, Dr. Carpenter found Lipsett hanging in his apartment (Dancsok, Transcending the Documentary 56).

Lipsett's films are a testament to his vision. They bear witness to his inner world of schizophrenia and his vision of the outer world in which he lived. This is not to say that Lipsett's films are solely about schizophrenia or that they escape speaking about broader issues. They have many themes, one of which happens to be this disease. Unlike filmmakers discussed in previous chapters, Lipsett comments on schizophrenia from the unique position of having the disease. His voice comes from the space in between the long-standing division between reason and unreason that has persisted since the antiquities. His is the silent or absent voice in the history of insanity and finally, it speaks – but only if we know that he was afflicted with a disease that affects cognition.

His position as subject, his choice of medium, and his montage techniques, which bring together images from the world around him to create another perceptual sense, challenge the archetypes discussed throughout the thesis. In contrast to narrative films,

\[53\] Michel Foucault discusses how the history of madness excludes the voice of madness itself in his text Madness and Civilization, which is a history of the social context in which madness developed and of the imaginary ideas it inspired. It reveals the social experience of madness during the Enlightenment. Foucault proves there is no objective knowledge of mental illness, only the recording of certain experiences that are documented with a language of reason. While impossible to write the history of madness from the perspective of the mad individual, Foucault writes from the space in between the mad and those who label them as such. He writes from the position of division itself. In other words, Foucault listens to the voice between scientific and philosophic discourse, the silent voice of madness that exists beyond the language of scientific reason, the voice that says the experience of madness was put into social practice.
which use intertextuality to generate meanings by drawing on the appropriated texts (i.e. — quoting surrealist art to enhance shock value in *The Cell*), Lipsett uses the logic of intertextuality to express his state of being. He reorders documentary and newsreel footage that may resemble similar images found in narrative films, to speak about the raw experience of his chaotic psychological state. By using actuality images, Lipsett incorporates historical referents or artifacts from a language of reason to subvert the viewing experience that would normally be associated with such images. Lipsett thus subverts the objective nature of documentary as a genre that “offers access to a shared, historical construct...access to the world” and presents his viewer with a world (Nichols 109), one that is not shared by many people, “a world beyond normal consciousness and perception.”

Unlike the fictional narratives discussed in earlier chapters, Lipsett’s visual metaphors poetically transform snippets of reality instead of calling upon tired historical icons that try to universalize the singularity of this experience. Rather than building on past representations of schizophrenia, Lipsett constructs his films from his personal experience of how the disease transforms perception. Instead of using schizophrenia as a metaphor for something else — bestiality, a mind divided, creative genius — he uses the film language, including a collage technique to juxtapose disparate images and sounds, to create another means to understand and share his disease. His chosen ‘type of speech’ is “counter-mythical” (Barthes 134). Lipsett’s films do not draw upon the typical stock of

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54 Lipsett qtd. from the proposal for *Free Fall*, production files, National Film Board of Canada Archives, Montreal.
cultural images of the disease, the popular metaphoric positions of monstrosity, division or prophecy. His life and films defy the archetypes presented by Hollywood films.

If Lipsett’s films are poetic portrayals of the world by way of schizophrenia that challenge dominant metaphors, responses to his films can be seen as indicative of our perceptions of this illness. Much like Lipsett’s illness, his films were misunderstood by those he worked with at the NFB (Dancsok 48ff). Fellow filmmaker Fortner Anderson says Lipsett was incapable of producing anything “normal” (Ibid. 54). Lipsett’s art was largely misunderstood, dismissed as unimportant and/or confusing. For the most part, a general audience simply did not understand what it was he was trying to convey. Although, after viewing a televised version of Very Nice, Very Nice one woman equated it to a “horror picture” and decided a more fitting title would be “Hell.”

In 1964, the NFB abandoned the Unit system and developed a programming committee that “endorsed the films that they felt had merit” (Dancsok 57; Jones 111-136). As most people on the committee could not understand what Lipsett’s proposals were about, he received little support for producing his art (Dancsok 48ff, 57). This led to the slow demise of his film practice. Marginalized, unwanted by programming committees at the NFB, largely misunderstood, yet completely fascinating, Lipsett, his films and his illness remain an enigma. Even in more recent times, some people are puzzled by the fact that he had schizophrenia. For example, while Michael Dancsok has

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55 Since Lipsett’s innovative style of filmmaking, or ‘found film’, bridged avant-garde and documentary filmmaking, he changed the way filmmakers thought about film, and thus his work could be considered a sign of genius. In this manner, Lipsett could be said to embody the romantic genius archetype except he is not the ‘sacrificial victim’ exemplified by the visionaries of Hollywood films.

56 Edith Beckwith qtd. from her letter to the National Film Board dated November 17, 1962.
made an important contribution to our knowledge of Lipsett’s psychiatric record, he still “didn’t think he had it”\textsuperscript{57}:

His work seemed too structured, calculating, funny, and positive. I wasn’t sure how Arthur could make such strong art with such a debilitating disease like schizophrenia with no medication in the period he was the most prolific. (Ibid.)

Similarly, Amelia Does, who is currently working on a screenplay about Lipsett’s life for CBC’s \textit{Life and Times} and whose website summarizes Lipsett’s biography and films, was reluctant to acknowledge that Lipsett had schizophrenia. She quickly defended his work by stating it was “too simple to say Lipsett was schizophrenic.”\textsuperscript{58} In fact, I agree with her, Lipsett was not “schizophrenic,” he \textit{had} schizophrenia.

This debate about whether to reveal his condition is interesting as it reveals our inability to comprehend that people with schizophrenia can be valuable, productive members of society. Despite their schizophrenia, people who have it can produce intelligent, imaginative, philosophical and sophisticated work. Having schizophrenia does not undermine the quality of Lipsett’s work, discount the fact that he was a brilliant filmmaker or deny that his accomplishments had an impact on the history of film. He was a gifted filmmaker despite the fact that he had schizophrenia, making him a voice for people who have the condition. A general lack of public awareness of the cognitive dimensions of schizophrenia as a disease influences the critical reception of Lipsett’s work. Does, for example, understood my comment that Lipsett \textit{had} schizophrenia as “Lipsett’s work \textit{is} schizophrenic,” which is an entirely different idea. It is as if by stating Lipsett had schizophrenia, I was also making a reductive comment, implying that his

\textsuperscript{57} Michael Dancsok, quoted in an e-mail to the author on May 21, 2003.

\textsuperscript{58} Amelia Does, quoted in an e-mail to the author on August 14, 2003.
work was a regression to brutish skill and unintelligent thought. For these reasons, she quickly rushed to his defense.

For people who believe schizophrenia is 'insanity', Lipsett's art could be considered 'insane.' To suggest Lipsett produced 'insane art' connotes notions of "art brut," "primitive skills," and work that is "excluded from the established art world" (West 230). In this light, it is no wonder Does defended Lipsett as his work is multi-layered, highly sophisticated and extremely important in the history of film. The question then must be is schizophrenia 'insanity'? And if so, why is it that we think of insanity as a lesser state of being? Or a state whereby the person suffering is incapable of intelligent thought? Let the answers to these questions emerge from the myths discussed in previous chapters. The following people also had or have schizophrenia: American surgeon William Chester Minor, who compiled the Oxford English dictionary while spending thirty seven years in a psychiatric hospital; Syd Barrett - one of the founders of pop group Pink Floyd; legendary Russian ballet dancer Vaslov Nijinsky; Green Bay Packers football star Lionel Aldridge; St. Paul; St. Theresa of Avila; the founder of the Quakers George Fox; King Henry the VI; and Friedrich Hölderlin (NAMI; Begley 50; Petersen 153).59 Vincent Van Gogh is also said to have had the illness (Schizophrenia Society of Ontario). He interpreted his hallucinations as mystical revelation that inspired him to paint, and is quoted as saying "the more I become decomposed, the more sick and fragmented I am, the more I become an artist" (Vernon and Baughman 413).

Likewise, Lipsett was ill and an imaginative, inspired artist. To admit, this is different than romanticizing the disease as a metaphor for inspired genius. Not everyone

59 As an interesting aside, Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and James Joyce are "said to have had near relatives with schizophrenia" (Hare 1587).
who has or had schizophrenia produces brilliant art, but Lipsett did produce art that was steeped in nuances about culture and the human condition. It would be difficult to say that an all-encompassing experience like schizophrenia did not influence his creations or that they are not one of the many themes. Thus, Lipsett’s films inadvertently achieve two objectives. Firstly, they indicate that people with schizophrenia can be valuable members of society that can be productive under the most adverse conditions imaginable. Secondly, they give voice to the experience of having this brain disorder and thus, to the silent body of people who live with it.

Media scholar Greg Philo insists “those who have experienced mental distress are likely to remain ‘invisible’ unless they become active participants in the production process and use the medium …to create images of themselves” (Glasgow Media Group 36). In order to change dominant representations of schizophrenia, people with the illness must gain access to the tools necessary to create their own representations. Without intending to achieve that goal, Lipsett’s films are a powerful and compelling voice for schizophrenia. Poetically rendering his experience with visual metaphors sends myths into exile. The silence of madness is broken with his art.
Under the Eyes of Reason: Continuing Madhouse Tourism

The schizophrenic is the vehicle of a postmodern tug-of-war used to test how far a figure stretches before it tears.

— Amy Jean Petersen

The Subject of Schizophrenia: Anamnesis of a Metaphor, 217

Throughout this thesis, schizophrenia emerges as disease, language and tattered icon. Delving inside its metaphoric applications, I uncovered the conventions and social contexts that influence its figurative meanings. I began my thesis by following Barthes and historicizing schizophrenia to call attention to its mythic status and to illustrate how it has been perceived throughout history, a history that Foucault would say informs the present. I then used a multi-disciplinary approach to explore the cultural and ideological factors influencing the construction of three predominant metaphors: monstrosity, a divided self and divine gift. Now, I will briefly deploy my own imaginative power to speculate on how these metaphors may compromise the well-being of people who have real, non-metaphorical pain associated with the illness.

Since principal and subsidiary subjects are mapped onto one another through the metaphoric process, schizophrenia becomes equivalent to the concepts it is intended to convey. If schizophrenia is demonic possession or immoral behavior, would legislators vote to support schizophrenia research? Would an insurance company cover one’s medication if the executive believed mental illnesses are behaviorally based? How would the police treat people with schizophrenia if they believed their condition was synonymous with impulsive violent behavior?

If mass media is the public’s primary source of information regarding mental health (Wahl, Media Madness), Hollywood-produced schizophrenia metaphors can color
perceptions of this disease. Films that use the concept as a stand-in for deranged criminality could possibly sway jurors sitting in on a case that involves a psychiatric defense. Incorporating mental health problems into the fabric of a thriller so that schizophrenia is synonymous with aggression may affect some people’s willingness to allow a group home to be built in their neighborhood or a day treatment facility to be established in their community.

If mental illnesses cause people to be enlightened members of society as Donnie Darko implies, why should we treat them with therapy or medication? Views like these help to undermine the importance of psychiatry, psychiatric hospitals, outreach programs and research funding. Since PWS become social texts onto which deviance, decay and romantic fantasies are transferred, these filmic portrayals, work to discourage them from seeking help and/or discourage friends and family from visiting loved ones on a psychiatric ward. They could influence an employers’ decision to hire a person with a mental health problem or to provide mental health coverage on a group insurance plan. In short, dominant metaphors aid separation, discrimination and shaming of people who are infinitely connected with the disease.

As myths (Barthes) that “falsely universalize” (Carter) human experience and produce unjust relations of power in society, metaphors are damaging. Using and viewing disease metaphors allow voyeurs to position themselves as “healthy” and thus, in opposition to both “disease” and “death” (Sontag, Illness as Metaphor 72, 74-75). The

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60 For example, Wahl found that an overwhelming 86% of his research respondents identified “popular movies about mentally ill killers as a major contributor” to public perceptions regarding mental health (Media Madness 97). Likewise, in researching whether “conditions such as schizophrenia were believed to be associated with violence,” The Glasgow Media Group discovered that “forty per cent of the people in the audience sample believed this to be so; giving the media as the source of their beliefs…the power of media images had apparently been so great that beliefs derived from the media could overwhelm knowledge which came from direct experience” (xiv).
binary relationship between mentally well and mentally unwell sends a symbolic message about values, power, superiority, and worth. These "interconnected systems of meaning" include a society's way of life, the processes that construct that way of life and a system of values (Turner 48). As a cultural product and social practice, films produce and reproduce a society's "system of meanings" (Ibid.).

The *Film Studies Dictionary* notes that "Hollywood is a major contributor to common-sense notions about questions of gender, race, sexuality and the economics of capitalism" (48). I would like to add mental illness to these common-sense ideas. As purveyors of discourses about disease, Hollywood films have the power to affect attitudes toward schizophrenia and generate cultural consciousness around the illness. Film metaphors help to constitute our everyday knowledge, and thus affect thinking and practice. To quote an *LA Times* film critic, Hollywood film "may be mindless, but that doesn't mean it isn't affecting minds" (Turan 7).

Films constitute subject positions by asking their viewers to adopt a specific perspective while viewing the text. Most films discussed ask their audiences to adopt the position of mentally well voyeur, watching PWS reduced to three dominant metaphors that instill fear, anxiety or a false sense of admiration. Lipsett's films ask the viewer to assume the position of the person with schizophrenia. He takes viewers on his personal journey, using the elements of film as his voice. His film art is non-metaphorical in the sense that it is not mythic. Yet, it is poetic, expressive association, unmythic and thus, imaginative. It counters the popular schizophrenia metaphors, and thus counters archetypes in our society.
As myths, these metaphors perpetuate an unbalanced relationship between sane and insane people and continue the tired division between reason and unreason, sanity and insanity in Western culture: a division that ignores the voice of mental illness. Continual use of schizophrenia as subhuman, above human, split personality or enlightened genius, constitute a symbolic message about the place in our society that a person with a mental health issue should and does possess.

Patterns of portrayal become patterns for self-definition. Using disease metaphors increases the suffering of those who are ill by increasing their stress: “dehumanization bleeds, as it were (or rather hemorrhages) into all areas of describing the Self” (Petersen 71). Read the words of one man who has schizophrenia:

When I was told I was schizophrenic, I was very intimidated by it - I thought I was some sort of monster. I didn't actually feel like a monster, but when they said I was schizophrenic, I just couldn't believe it … It's just such a hell of word, you know and it's got a hell of a stigma … I just thought it was Jekyll and Hyde…what was blasting through my head was you'll never get a job, you'll never get a job…you'll have nowhere to live. It was just going through my head, kill yourself. (Philo 171-172)

Personal experiences are buried under the multiple uses of one’s disease. The “excess of meanings,” that the metaphoric process produces, are mostly “humbling, demeaning, and grossly stigmatizing. The disease and its double force the patient, now twice victimized, further into the cage of his or her illness: shunned, silenced, and shamed in addition to being very sick” (Schepker-Hughes and Lock, “Speaking Truth” 137). Dominant metaphors, whether they are degrading or romanticizing, reflect a lack of recognition for the seriousness and painfulness of experiencing this harrowing psychological state. They trivialize the suffering of millions of people and their plight with prolonged ill health. They reduce people to their disease. They no longer have schizophrenia - they are
'schizophrenics.' When dominant metaphors translate into dominant archetypes, it becomes clear how metaphorizing schizophrenia degrades, demoralizes and/or ostracizes real people.

On a micro level, schizophrenia metaphors may discourage people from seeking help when research has shown that early diagnosis is crucial for improving long-term outcomes as the condition worsens with each psychotic episode. Illness metaphors may prevent families from extending support to their loved ones; may prevent the person who has the illness from receiving adequate housing; could create difficulties for them as they try to obtain jobs; cause distress, social isolation; or stir difficulties in the workplace. On a macro level, this disease metaphor operates as a social force that perpetuates existing ignorance regarding schizophrenia, and creates barriers for organizations committed to educating mainstream society about the illness.

Throughout the thesis, I argue that using schizophrenia as a metaphor for monstrosity, division, and prophecy, are acts of catachresis because they are forced and paradoxical figures of speech. In addition to the ideas already discussed, there are two major points that show its paradoxical nature. Firstly, this particular disease is not apparent on or under the skin like other ailments. It manifests itself in behavioral and emotional symptoms and thus, is largely invisible to other people. How do people who are not ill metaphorize a deeply personal and principally non-visible concept with visual language? Filmmakers, who are not in the subject position of PWS, are forced to borrow perspectives from those who are often invested in their own agendas (i.e. – police officers, philosophers, phrenologists, anti-psychiatrists, etc.) to create their films. These various perspectives paint highly problematic understandings of schizophrenia.
Secondly, a traditional view of metaphor indicates it is a creative device that has a heuristic function - to present that which is abstract in familiar terms - but schizophrenia is not commonly understood subject matter. Illness metaphors are frequently used because “health is something everyone is presumed to know about” and illnesses that remain “mysterious” are more likely to be used as metaphors (Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor* 72; 57; 60). Since the bio-medical understanding of schizophrenia is elusive to most people, it has huge figurative potential. Although, as Petersen points out, “schizophrenia is so radically *un*understood that it ranks as the anti-pragmatic metaphor that makes an object less graspable” (79).

It is not my argument that we must de-poeticize disease. That would after all deny the phenomenological experiences associated with various ailments. However, I do advocate remembering that in addition to being a popular idiom, schizophrenia remains a medical term used to describe a disease. Unlike the words ‘crazy,’ ‘insane’ and ‘mad,’ which have also been appropriated for widespread use, schizophrenia refers to a specific disease. Terms like ‘crazy’ are generally accepted as colloquial language because they do not target a specific group of people.

If schizophrenia continues to circulate widely in everyday, cinematic and academic discourse, perhaps this is because schizophrenia metaphors do not risk “social or political resistance from the targeted group” (Petersen 91). Schizophrenia as a metaphor circulates without resistance when it becomes myth – then it is “a language that does not want to die” (Barthes 133). It “ripens” (Ibid. 149). Sontag asserts “metaphors cannot be distanced just by abstaining from them. They have to be exposed, criticized, belabored, used up” (182).
In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault writes, “so many diverse meanings are established beneath the surface of the image that it presents only an enigmatic face” (20). It is this enigmatic face that fascinates. Voyeurs are captivated by Carl, Spider, and Donnie, awed by characters like John Nash, Helfgott, Caveman, and amused by comedic characters like Charlie. Paying an admission fee, audiences enter a controlled environment to stare at the exoticism of the unknown. In some instances, viewers venture inside the mind of the person who is mentally unwell (i.e. – *The Cell*), so that they too, may become inquisitors of the patient, excavating the mad psyche.

If films are allegorical tales, paying to peer through the cinematic window at PWS is essentially a contemporary form of “madhouse tourism” (Klein 244). Eighteenth century peoples paid pennies to peek through the bars of the asylum at patients held captive “like exotic animals in a menagerie” (Klein 244). It was a popular form of entertainment for the bourgeoisie:\footnote{61}

Madness had become a thing to look at: no longer a monster inside oneself, but an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from which man had long since been suppressed. (Foucault 70)

Patients were reduced to specimens for observation, zoo animals on display. Voyeuristic pleasure was particularly heightened if the subject was agitated or chained to his or her cell. Keepers would make them “perform” by prodding their crumpled bodies with long sticks, spraying them with water or flicking them with their whips (Foucault 69).

The madhouse created a physical divide between reason and unreason. Patients held in darkened cells below ground served as visual reminders of what it meant to embody irrationality:

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\footnote{61} Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Seeing the Insane* 52-57; Hinshaw and Cicchetti 563ff; Karp 2-24.
During the classical period madness was shown but on the other side of bars; if present, it was at a distance, under the eyes of a reason that no longer felt any relation to it and that would not compromise itself by too close a resemblance. (Foucault 70)

Likewise, visitors to the cinematic asylum are fascinated by difference and reassured by its confinement within the parameters of a fictional text. Voyeurs inadvertently participate in creating archetypes by paying to attend and view films about schizophrenia, which facilitates the spectacle of madness.

Dominant schizophrenia metaphors tell us more about the evolution of Western culture than they do about disease - "sickness is a form of communication...through which nature, society and culture speak simultaneously" (Schepers-Hughes and Locke, "Mindful Body" 30). When schizophrenia is uttered in visual terms, nature speaks about a harrowing physiological condition, society says those with the disease should remain outside, and history says it has always been that way. Today, schizophrenia's many figurative meanings are thriving.62 It inspires contemporary filmmakers just as it inspired artists of the past. Popular films reveal this ongoing fascination with and misunderstanding of brain disease and thus, speak more about a public mind than a mentally ill one. Schizophrenia continues to be a social practice and the voice of madness remains a mere whisper.

62 On the big screen, schizophrenia metaphors are occurring with increasing frequency. Seven fictional films placed the illness at the centre of their narratives during 2001 alone.
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Teiji and Cherei Ito. (USA 1985), 52 min.
Dumb and Dumber. Dir. Peter Farrelly. Warner Bros., USA, 1994
Free Fall. Dir. Arthur Lipsett. NFB, Canada, 9 min. 15 s, 1964.
Gordon's Head. Dir. Clive Holden. 22 April 2003
Julien Donkey-Boy. Dir. Harmony Korine. Independent Pictures, Canada, 100 min.,
1999.
min., 1947.
Me, Myself, and Irene. Dir. Bobby Farrelly, Peter Farrelly. Twentieth Century Fox, USA,
Schizophreniae: The Whore Mangler. Dir. Ron Atkins. E. I. Independent Cinema, USA,
80 min., 1998.
The Boston Strangler. Dir. Richard Fleischer. Twentieth Century Fox, USA, 116 min.,
1968.
Appendix 1: Arthur Lipsett’s Films

*Films discussed in the thesis are referenced above in the filmography.

A Trip Down Memory Lane. Dir. Arthur Lipsett. NFB, Canada, 12 min. 40s, 1965.
Fear and Horror. Dir. Arthur Lipsett. NFB, Canada, 12 min. 48s, 1965.
Hors d’oeuvres (Foot Clip). Dir. Gerald Potterton, Robert Verrall, Arthur Lipsett, Derek Lamb, Jeff Hale, Kaj Pindal. NFB, Canada, 7 min. 23s, 1960.
N-Zone. Dir. Arthur Lipsett. NFB, Canada. 45 min. 28s, 1970.
The Experimental Film. Dir. Arthur Lipsett. NFB, Canada, 27 min. 48s, 1962.
Appendix 2: More Schizophrenia Films

Comedy
Schizopolis. The Criterion Collection, USA, 96 min., 1996.
The End. Dir. Burt Reynolds. MGM, USA, 100 min., 1978.

Dramatic Films
Dare to Love. Dir. Armand Mastroianni. USA, 97 min., 1995.
The Other. Dir. Robert Wiene. Germany, 90 min., 1930.
Documentaries


Dialogues with Madwomen. Point of View. 87 min., 1994.


Hamster PSA. Dir. James Gunn II. USA, 3 min., 1997.


Me and My Brother. Dir. Robert Frank. USA, 1965-68.


Educational Films

A Voyage Through Turbulence: Impact of Schizophrenia on the Family. Spectrum Mental Health Clinic, Dr. Sylvia Geist. 84 min.


I’m Still Here: The Truth About Schizophrenia. NARSAD. 67 min., 1996.


Madness: In Two Minds. PBS, USA, 58 min., 1991.


Horror/ Thriller Films/ Sci-Fi


Schizoid [also Psychopath]. 1965.

Schizoid. 1972


The Untamable (also called The Two Souled Woman). Dir. Herbert Blache. Grapevine Video, USA, 65 min., 1923.


Action Films