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People's perception of others' experienced emotions as a function of the others' status

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of
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Abstract

People's perception of others' experienced emotions as a function of the others' status

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Concordia University, 1999

High- relative to low-status individuals have greater prestige and are provided greater deference. The present research addressed the hypotheses that the status of individuals determines for others a) the likelihood of the individuals encountering specified emotion-eliciting situations, and b) the emotions they will experience following their encounter of the elicitors. In Study 1, participants rated the likelihood of high and low-status individuals encountering specific emotion-eliciting situations. As expected, participants considered lower status individuals as more likely to encounter the negative elicitors of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness, along with surprise elicitors. Higher status individuals were perceived as more likely to encounter the happiness elicitors. Results for the love elicitors were mainly in keeping with expectations that high- and low-status individuals are perceived as equally likely to encounter love elicitors. In Studies 2 and 3, participants rated the emotional experience of high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the negative and positive elicitors considered in Study 1, and surprise. Participants perceived that following the encounter of negative elicitors, high- relative to low-status individuals experience more anger, disgust, and surprise. No difference emerged in participants' perception of high- and low-status individuals' emotional experience following their encounter of surprise elicitors. Participants perceived that following the encounter of positive elicitors low- relative to high-status individuals

experience more fear and surprise. Study 4 addressed an alternative explanation for the results of Studies 2 and 3. With few exceptions, a group conflict perspective was not capable of explaining the results of Studies 2 and 3. Overall, the present studies further clarify how the status of individuals affects how they are perceived by others. Peoples' perceptions of high- and low-status individuals' emotional experience seem best explained from a perspective that considers both the potency of the emotion experienced and the status of the individual who is described to have encountered an elicitor.

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A major focus in social psychology has been emotional experience and the process which leads to it. Of particular interest has been the identification of situational factors that may lead people to experience different emotions (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). Consistency has been found across cultures with regard to which emotion will be experienced following a particular situation (e.g., Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986). These consistencies are assumed to be reflected in peoples' knowledge. Peoples' implicit or unspoken knowledge of emotions is believed to be universal (Plutchik, 1980). The theoretical focus in much of this earlier research in social psychology was on the identification of distinguishing and overlapping features of emotional experience, not on the individual social actor. Alternatively, research (e.g., Roseman, 1984) as well as day-to-day experiences, would suggest that not all individuals experience the same emotion following the encounter of a particular situation. The present research shifts attention to the actor, and does so with a social perception methodology. The present research focuses on how people perceive the emotions that others may experience as a function of the others' status. Status was selected as a social context factor as it defines in many respects people's social and psychological lives.

Universal antecedents of emotion

Scherer and his colleagues have completed systematic research on universal antecedents of emotion (Scherer et al., 1986). The participants in their studies were asked to provide verbal reports of recalled emotional situations that they have experienced, including details of the eliciting situations. While the elicitors that were produced were broad in range, they maintained a similar theme. The seemingly predictable and singular

pathway for determining experienced emotion was attributed to a pre-determined sequence through which organisms progress by detecting a stimulus which is considered potentially significant and therefore requires processing (Scherer, 1984a, 1984b).

Singularity of emotional experience

Scherer's model parallels others in that when an underlying theme is recognized, for example, harm or benefit, a pre-determined emotion is believed to be experienced (see also Ekman, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Scherer (1994a) recognizes that some events are universal in terms of the emotions they elicit, that is, certain external situations make life better or worse for human beings. Given the resemblance between peoples' internal body structure, emotional responses to important environmental events are believed to be similar across individuals (Ellsworth, 1994; Frijda, 1994). Ellsworth (1994) notes that with universal antecedents the expected positive or negative valence of the experienced emotion is reliably observed (see also Ellsworth, 1994; Lazarus, 1994). In contrast, specifying the experienced emotion beyond its expected valence has not been very evident. When one begins to analyze more complex emotions (e.g., shame), knowledge of culture specific factors of the individual will assist in determining the nature of the eliciting event (Scherer, 1994a).

Abstract elicitors and basic emotions

The universalistic approach lacks the ability to explain the link between the full range of situations and the richness of experienced emotions as it only addresses abstract situations and simple or basic emotions.

Limitations of abstract elicitors. Abstract situations lack detail (Lazarus, 1994). Consider for example the fear antecedent of encountering an immediate, concrete, and

overwhelming physical danger. The abstract level at which such an eliciting situation is described does not take into account how antecedents can vary in idiosyncratic ways in terms of the individual, social group, or culture (Ekman, 1994). In addition, a particular individual's elicitors related to the experience of a specific emotion can be quite different from the abstract elicitors which are considered universal for emotion (Ekman, 1984).

Limitations of basic emotions. Simple or basic emotions represent only a subset of those emotions which can be experienced (Scherer, 1994a). It has been argued that basic emotions are associated with specific biological structures and they are believed to be more likely found across cultures and species (Ekman, 1992; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). Basic emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, and sadness are thought to follow from basic eliciting themes. Complex emotions, such as guilt and shame, follow eliciting situations in which norms, values, and cultural practices become important factors (Scherer, 1994a). From an empirical perspective, with a concentration on basic emotions, one would search for universals in expression, physiology, and in the antecedent events (Ortony & Turner, 1990). For example, fear may account for the reaction of flight or immobility following the appraisal of an inescapable threat.

Issues surrounding basic emotions. A number of issues have arisen in the research on basic emotions. One such issue has been the identification of specific basic emotions. There is no certainty as to the exact number of basic emotions (Clore, Schwartz, & Conway, 1994; Ortony & Turner, 1990). There has been considerable variability in the lists that have been published by researchers in this area. The number of basic emotions has included six (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), eight (Plutchik, 1980), and ten (Izard, 1971). In

addition, Clore et al. (1994) note that some of the terms designated as basic emotions, for example, interest (Izard, 1971), have been considered questionable as to whether they qualify as emotions (Clore & Ortony, 1988). Nevertheless, good agreement has been noted with regard to the basic nature of some emotions (e.g., anger and fear, Clore et al., 1994).

Prototype approach versus a classical definition of emotion

The prototype approach is concerned with how people mentally represent categories (Rosch, 1973a; 1973b). The prototype approach is rooted in the view that many categories of language are vague in nature and it has been used in the area of emotions (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987). The lack of clarity or "fuzziness" by which categories are best defined suggests that emotion categories do not have sharp boundaries, thus it would be unlikely that emotions would be defined by a classical definition (Fehr & Russell, 1984). Fehr and Russell (1984) considered that a classical definition would entail that "concepts can be precisely defined by one or more individually necessary and jointly sufficient features" (p. 465). As such, each category member should have all the defining features of the category and by consequence, should be easily distinguished from non-group members (Russell, 1991).

Benefits of a prototypical representation of emotion

Emotion categories are better characterised by a gradual, but specifiable transition from membership to non-membership (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Russell, 1980; 1991). The fuzzy category of emotion can be defined by "a prototype - an abstract image or set of features representing the best, most representative, most typical example of the category" (p. 1062; Shaver et al., 1987). Different antecedent situations are part of the prototype for a specific emotion and can have varying degrees of resemblance to one another. These situations also

vary in their proximal relationship to the core features of the emotion prototype (Kelley, 1983; Shaver et al., 1987). The prototype approach also allows for the hierarchical relations between emotions to be addressed. Shaver et al. (1987) identified anger, fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love as basic prototype emotions. For everyday purposes, basic levels of categorization are used (p. 201; Rosch, 1978). The basic level of categorization "makes sharp enough distinctions between ordinary categories of objects and events but without referring to details that are unnecessary given the purpose at hand" (see also Schwartz & Shaver, 1987). In addition, viewing emotion categories from a hierarchical perspective allows for an individual to make finer distinctions within an emotion category (Schwartz & Shaver, 1987). For example, at the subordinate level fear could be subdivided into apprehension and panic (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Russell, 1991). Results suggested that as terms progressed from peripheral (e.g., respect) to central (e.g., happiness) members of the prototype, there was increased agreement as to whether a term was an emotion.

The appraisal process

Cognitive appraisal allows individuals to attach personal significance to an event, that is, individuals react to their interpretation of a situation rather than the situation itself (Arnold, 1960; Epstein, 1984; Frijda, 1993b; Lazarus, 1994; Lazarus et al., 1970; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1988; Shaver et al., 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). A situation and its features are evaluated by the actor with regard to their appetitive or aversive quality (Clore, 1994; Roseman, 1984) and in terms of relevance to the actor's goals, needs, or concerns (Frijda, 1993b, 1994; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus et al., 1970; Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 1988,

1994b; Shaver et al., 1987).

Appraisal theory and emotional experience

In the prototype approach, a variety of eliciting situations are associated with a respective emotion. This is similar to appraisal theory which considers that a specific emotional experience can follow the encounter of a number of elicitors. The correspondence between an eliciting situation and what emotions people experience is determined by the particular manner in which the situation is appraised by the individual. An individual engages in the process of cognitive appraisal after encountering an eliciting situation and prior to their experiencing an emotion. Frijda (1993b), Lazarus, Averill, and Opton (1970), and Roseman (1984) believe emotions can occur anytime after the process of appraisal has been initiated.

Emotional experience as an outcome of appraisal

The appraisal approach allows for individuals to experience a number of emotions (Frijda, 1993a; Lazarus, 1994; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). An individual can experience different emotions following the encounter of the same situation as a result of the situation being appraised differently. In addition, an event can evoke an emotion at one point in time but have no, little, or a greater emotional consequence at another point in time. An event can evoke an emotion in one individual but not in another if the event is appraised differently. Finally, two or more individuals who have perceived different events in the same manner have been noted to have experienced the same emotion (Roseman, 1991).

Limitations of past research on the appraisal process

Past research in the area of appraisal has been noted to have paid little direct attention to the context of the situation (e.g., home, work) or the characteristics of the individual (e.g., status, occupation, gender) who has experienced the emotion (Manstead & Tetlock,

1989). Appraisal theory has instead focused on the individual's appraisal of a situation, in the abstract. Nevertheless, the appraisal approach has allowed researchers to examine how a particular stimulus can mean one thing to one individual and be viewed completely differently by another individual, for example, the breakup of a long-term relationship (Frijda, 1994; Roseman, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). The early 1980s saw a surge in the number of researchers who sought to add to the information dealing with appraisal criteria in hopes of identifying the elicitors of emotions and the manner in which emotions are differentiated (e.g., Roseman, 1984).

Scherer's stimulus evaluation check process

A good example of the appraisal process is Scherer's (1984a; 1984b; 1988) stimulus evaluation check process. The stimulus evaluation check process was divided into five stages. In the first three stages, individuals evaluate a stimulus in terms of its novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal significance. In the last two stages, individuals determine their ability to cope with the stimulus and whether the stimulus is compatible with their own internalized norms or standards. To illustrate the stimulus evaluation check process, Scherer and his colleagues (e.g., Scherer, Summerfield, & Wallbott, 1983) have used abstract events as examples of emotion antecedents. Scherer explains that in developing his model he assumed that stages pertinent to the survival of individuals must occur and that these stages must be capable of verification early in the stimulus evaluation check process (Scherer, 1984a).

Stages of the stimulus evaluation check process

In the novelty check stage, individuals determine whether the elicitor was expected or unexpected at a general level as it pertains to the suddenness, familiarity, and

predictability of the event. In the intrinsic pleasantness check stage, individuals determine whether the eliciting event induces approach or avoidance tendencies independent of the event's relevance to their motives or goals. In the goal significance check stage, individuals evaluate a stimulus in terms of whether it serves to advance or hinder their achieving a specific goal or need which they consider high in priority at that time, identify the consistency of their actual state with their expected state, identify the likelihood of an event occurring, and determine the urgency with which an appropriate behavioral response is perceived to be required. The fourth stage is the coping potential check. In this stage, individuals determine the cause of the elicitor, their ability to "control - the likelihood that an event can be prevented or brought about or its consequences changed by natural events known to the individual" and the power available to them, that is, "the likelihood that the individual is actually able (either by his own means or with the help of others) to influence a potentially controllable event" (p. 103; Scherer, 1988). In addition, in this stage individuals determine their ability to cope with the final outcome as a result of internally restructuring goals or priorities. In the last stage, the compatibility with standards check, individuals determine whether their reactions to the elicitor will be in keeping with their own self-concept and social norms and in what manner.

Understanding emotional experience by way of the stimulus evaluation check process

Scherer claims that separate emotional experiences can theoretically be understood in terms of the stages in his stimulus evaluation check process (see also Epstein, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987). For example, the experience of surprise can change to anger when an individual in the third stage perceives an unexpected obstacle to their goal or need. The degree to which individuals progress through Scherer's process is achieved through

maturity. That is, as individuals mature they become capable of experiencing more complex emotions. For example, he notes that the age of onset at which surprise is experienced is between 1-3 years whereas the age of onset for contempt is between 15-18 years (Scherer, 1984a). These findings suggest that differentiation of antecedent situations through experienced emotions is a consequence of the maturation process (Scherer, 1984a).

Self- and social perception of emotion

Past research on universal antecedents, emotion prototypes or basic emotions, and the appraisal process has focused largely on individuals' self-perception of emotion. Recent research has demonstrated that similar elements are involved in the social perception of emotion. Shaver and colleagues (1987; Study 2) have shown that people's understanding of the underlying relation between the eliciting situation and individuals' emotional experience is essentially the same in cases of self-perception and social perception.

Empirical evidence demonstrating the similarity between self- and social perception

In Shaver et al.'s research, participants in one (self-perception) condition provided descriptions of actual emotion episodes in which they had been involved. The participants were asked to provide a detailed recounting of the emotion episode, its duration, the method of resolution, and what caused it to change or subside. Participants in a second (social perception) condition were asked to provide their perception of typical emotion episodes. That is, the participants were asked their impressions of what typically happens when someone becomes afraid, sad, angry, joyful, or loving. Overall, participants' descriptions for self- and social perception were found to be similar which suggests that a

generic script-like representation exists for the basic emotions that were addressed in Shaver et al.'s research.

Perceived power

In the area of self-perception, individuals' position of strength or weakness, that is, their power, has been recognized as an important dimension in the appraisal process of eliciting situations (Roseman, 1984).

Roseman's conceptualization of power

The dimension of legitimacy was one of the original five dimensions described in Roseman's 1979 study (as cited in Roseman, 1984). Legitimacy was later replaced by power in his 1984 revision. Power was defined on a continuum which ranged from weak to strong. Power reflected the amount of strength an individual believed the self to possess in a given situation.

Roseman's appraisal model

In his 1984 revision, Roseman hypothesized that individuals who believe themselves to have great social power will experience frustration when faced with an event that is inconsistent with their motives. In addition, when individuals perceive that another person has caused a motive-inconsistent event the experienced emotion will be anger. In contrast, the theory states, less powerful individuals will experience fear when confronted by a motive-inconsistent event that results in an uncertain outcome. In addition, when individuals perceive the outcome as certain they will experience sadness, distress, or disgust. Furthermore, when weaker individuals are confronted by a motive-inconsistent event that is believed to be caused by another person, the individuals will experience dislike.

Testing Roseman's model of appraisal. Roseman et al. (1990) addressed the analysis of his appraisal model for six of these emotions (excluding dislike) as well as other emotions. Participants were asked to recall situations in which they had experienced each of the emotions. They were then asked to rate the aspect of the event which had led to their feeling the respective emotion in terms of five appraisal dimension measures. Results from this study indicated the appraisal dimension of power did not differentiate between the experienced emotions.

Revising Roseman's model of appraisal. In later work, Roseman and his colleagues (see Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996) compared and tested several alternative appraisal theories. Their results led to suggested revisions of appraisal theories. Specific to the power dimension Roseman et al. (1996) stated that the most prominent feature was not an appraisal of one's own power. They posited that what differentiates emotional experience is an individual's perceived ability to control or change the stimulus. As a result of their work, Roseman et al. (1996) offered a more comprehensive and empirically grounded revision of Roseman's (1984) emotion system. In their revision, they hypothesized that when an individual who perceives the self to have low control potential experiences a motive-inconsistent event, the emotions experienced are fear, distress, and sadness. In contrast, they hypothesized that when an individual who perceives the self to have high control potential experiences a motive-inconsistent event, the emotions experienced are disgust and frustration. In addition, when a motive-inconsistent event is experienced by an individual who perceives the self to have low control potential and who believes the event to be caused by another, the emotion experienced is dislike. In contrast, when a motive-inconsistent event is experienced by an individual who perceives the self to have high

control potential and who believes the event as caused by another, the emotions experienced are anger and contempt. The dimension of power is important in Roseman's view of the appraisal model in that it assists in discriminating between the emotions that certain individuals are expected to experience.

Perceived status

The present research focuses on peoples' perceptions of others' experienced emotions following their encounter of emotion-eliciting situations. One of the factors that may influence how people perceive others' emotions is through the perceived status of the observed individual.

Defining status

Status differences are a characteristic of peoples' social lives and are an underlying dimension in social structure (Lonner, 1980). Higher status individuals have more prestige, are more frequently the object of others' deference, and have more power to control their own and others' outcomes (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Kemper, 1978, 1984; Ng, 1980; Thibaut & Riecken, 1955). This manner of characterizing status is the one adopted by Conway, Pizzamiglio, and Mount (1996). Conway et al. (1996) differentiated status by using markers such as priority access to resources while keeping status independent of occupation, social role, and gender cues. The approach used by Conway et al. (1996) to differentiate status will also be employed in this research.

Target emotions

The current studies address seven emotions: anger, fear, disgust, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love. Six of these emotions are prototypical emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love) identified by Shaver et al. (1987) and they are considered to

occupy the basic level of the emotion category. These six emotions are in keeping with researchers' past work wherein basic emotions were identified (e.g., Epstein, 1984; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Izard, 1991). Shaver et al. (1987) acknowledged difficulties in including the term "surprise" as an emotion (see also Izard, 1977; Roseman, 1984). The rationale behind the inclusion of surprise was that it had been so often designated as a basic emotion term by emotion theorists. The present research will also study peoples' perceptions of disgust. The emotion of disgust was included to address specific issues (Smith, 1993) that are elaborated below. The emotion of disgust has been shown by Shaver et al. (1987) to be a particular subcategory of anger: "in the adult emotion lexicon it becomes metaphorically transformed into a type of anger akin to contempt" (p. 1069; see also Russell & Fehr, 1994). In the past, disgust has been considered to be a basic emotion by many emotion theorists as a result of its association with a distinct facial expression and connection to innate reactions to bad tastes and smells (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, Sorensen, & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; Izard, 1977).

The present studies

Similar to the work of Conway et al. (1996) the present research investigated how the status of an individual affects peoples' perceptions of that individual. The central proposition of the present research was that people would endorse different intensities of experienced emotion for individuals of high- and low-status following their encounter of emotion-eliciting events, and that these discrepancies would be linked to the individual's status. In order to adequately examine this difference in endorsement it was necessary to conduct a preliminary study. Study 1 examined the way in which an individual's status may influence others' beliefs regarding the perceived likelihood of that individual

encountering different emotion-eliciting situations. Studies 2 and 3 addressed participants' perception of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the same eliciting situations. Study 4 addressed participants' perceptions as to who caused the elicitors encountered by individuals of high- and low-status. The elicitors were for the seven emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love. The emotion-eliciting situations which are addressed in the present research are those which may occur in everyday social contexts and in which status may play a role.

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to address the hypothesis that low- and high-status individuals are perceived by people to be differentially exposed to emotion-eliciting situations. Low- as compared to high-status individuals are less privileged and have less control over the outcome of situations (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Ng, 1980; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990). High- as compared to low-status individuals are considered happier (Kemper, 1978; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987), to prefer to belong to the high-status group (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987), and to expect pleasant events to be directed to oneself (Kemper, 1978; Smith-Lovin, 1990). By their social position, low-status individuals are considered to have less control over their outcomes and subject to the behavior of high-status others. A potential consequence is that of high-status individuals subjecting low-status individuals to unfair, inappropriate, and aggressive (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955) behavior. In addition, higher status individuals, by the framework they impose, are considered to define the activities and choices of those with lower status (Hewitt, 1991).

Hypotheses

The rationale of Study 1 is that people are aware of the relative advantages,

disadvantages, and constraints facing low- and high-status individuals. Consequently, it was hypothesized that low- relative to high-status individuals are perceived to more frequently experience elicitors which elicit anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise (e.g., the fear elicitor of anticipating social rejection); high- relative to low-status individuals are perceived to more frequently experience elicitors which elicit happiness (e.g., receiving respect). Finally, no status effect was expected for participants' judgements regarding the occurrence of eliciting situations of love for high- and low-status individuals. Love is an emotion that is felt especially toward partners and family members (Fehr, 1988), which are relationships that are generally defined within one (socioeconomic) status group (Argyle, 1994).

Source of elicitors

The elicitors for Study 1 were mainly based on the prototype research of Shaver et al. (1987). Other sources were used to compliment this work and to provide a base for the creation of the remaining situations (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1996; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Scherer, 1988; Shaver et al., 1987; Smith, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited at the Concordia University cafeterias. Recruitment of students occurred in the two on-campus cafeterias frequented mainly by undergraduate students. Students were randomly approached, with the exclusion of students who were studying or had congregated in groups greater than three. Students were then asked whether they were willing to take part in research which involved their perception of low-

and high-status individuals encountering specific elicitors. Of the students who were approached, 12 refused to complete the questionnaire. A consent form was completed by each student prior to the completion of the questionnaire (see Appendix A). Two of the students who had originally agreed to participate returned questionnaires that were largely incomplete. As a consequence, these questionnaires were discarded. Usable questionnaires were completed by a total of 144 participants (72 men, 72 women). Mean age of the participants was 24.6 years; range was 18 to 71.

Procedure

Twenty-four descriptions of emotion-eliciting situations were developed. On the basis of Shaver et al.'s (1987) work on emotion prototypes, four elicitors were developed for each of the following emotions: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and love. The emotions of disgust and surprise were not considered prototypes in the work of Shaver and his colleagues. The emotion of disgust was not addressed as a prototype in Shaver et al.'s (1987) work because of its being subsumed under the anger prototype. Disgust was retained in the present research due to the view that considers high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more disgust as a result of high-status individuals having higher standards of cleanliness and morality (Smith, 1993). The emotion of surprise was identified with reservation as a prototype by Shaver et al. (1987; Study 1) in their work on the hierarchical structure of the emotion domain. In the subsequent studies, Shaver and his colleagues (1987) did not pursue the emotion of surprise as an emotion prototype. The emotion of surprise was retained in the present research due to its relevance to control over one's surrounding life events, and as a consequence to status. Only two elicitors were developed in the present research for the emotions of disgust and surprise.

Table 1 provides the elicitors that were presented in Study 1. In addition, Table 1 provides those items of Shaver et al. (1987) from which these situations were derived. The items which were included in Study 1 partially or fully address most of the elicitors which were identified by Shaver et al. (1987; 4 of 6 for anger; 5 of 7 for fear; 5 of 8 for sadness; 6 of 9 for happiness; 4 of 6 for love). In selecting elicitors from Shaver et al.'s (1987) work, situations considered nonsocial, highly personal, extreme, idiosyncratic, unlikely to be related to one emotion, or ambiguous in relation to prototype were excluded. Eliciting situations judged as nonsocial included being alone (e.g., walking alone) and being in the dark, both of which belonged to the fear prototype. Eliciting situations judged as highly personal included death of a loved one and loss of a valued relationship/separation, both of which belonged to the sadness prototype. Eliciting situations judged as extreme included threat of death (which belonged to the fear prototype), death of a loved one (of the sadness prototype), and experiencing highly pleasurable stimuli or sensations (of the happiness prototype). Eliciting situations judged as idiosyncratic included empathy with someone who is sad, hurt, etc. (which belonged to the sadness prototype) and predisposition to anger, either because of previous similar or related experiences or because of stress, overload, fatigue, etc. (of the anger prototype). Eliciting situations judged as unlikely to be related to one emotion included: violation of an expectation/things not working out as planned (which belongs to the anger prototype but seemed too closely associated to the surprise prototype), receiving a wonderful surprise (of the happiness prototype but too closely associated to the surprise prototype), receiving love (of the happiness prototype but too closely associated to the love prototype), and O (other) offers/provides something that P (person) wants, needs, likes (of the love prototype but

Table 1

Elicitors of emotion presented to participants in Study 1, corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987), and selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Selection Frequency				Corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987)
	Low	High	χ^2	p	
	n	n			
Anger					
Be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be**	46	25	6.21	.013	Real or threatened physical or psychological pain AND Judgment that the situation is illegitimate, unfair, contrary to what ought to be
Be wronged in a situation and consequently lose status or respect***	35	37	0.06	ns	Reversal or sudden loss of power, status, or respect; insult
Feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation**	59	13	29.39	.001	Judgment that the situation is illegitimate, unfair, contrary to what ought to be
Find that his/her execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another***	25	44	5.23	.023	Frustration or interruption of a goal-directed activity
Disgust*					
Experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature**	48	22	9.66	.002	

(Table continues)

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of emotion presented to participants in Study 1, corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987), and selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Selection Frequency				Corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987)
	Low	High	χ^2	p	
	n	n			
Encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive***	38	33	0.35	ns	
Fear					
Anticipate losing control or competence***	32	38	0.51	ns	Loss of control or competence
Anticipate social rejection**	61	11	34.72	.001	Threat of social rejection
Be threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment**	40	31	1.14	ns	Threat of harm or death AND Being in a novel, unfamiliar situation
Face a possible loss or a failure***	42	27	3.26	ns	Possibility of loss or failure

(Table continues)

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of emotion presented to participants in Study 1, corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987), and selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Selection Frequency				Corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987)
	Low	High	χ^2	p	
	n	n			
Sadness					
Be in unfortunate circumstances and be helpless to change them***	64	8	43.55	.001	Discovering that one is powerless, helpless, impotent AND Reality falling short of expectations; things being worse than anticipated
Have experienced an undesirable event**	59	10	34.80	.001	An undesirable outcome; getting what was not wanted; a negative surprise
Have experienced social rejection or exclusion***	61	9	38.63	.001	Rejection, exclusion, disapproval
Not get something that he/she had wanted or wished for**	59	13	29.39	.001	Not getting what was wanted, wished for, striven for, etc.
Surprise*					
Encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another**	48	21	10.56	.002	
Encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another***	46	25	6.21	.013	

(Table continues)

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of emotion presented to participants in Study 1, corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987), and selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Selection Frequency				Corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987)
	Low	High	χ^2	p	
	n	n			
Happiness					
Be accepted by others***	18	54	18.00	.001	Being accepted, belonging
Find that things have turned out better than expected***	42	30	2.00	ns	Reality exceeding expectations; things being better than expected
Get something that he/she wanted or had worked hard for**	23	48	8.80	.003	Task success, achievement AND A desirable outcome; getting what was wanted AND Getting something that was striven for, worried about, etc.
Receive respect**	2	70	64.22	.001	Receiving esteem, respect, praise
Love					
Be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another**	32	37	0.36	ns	P [Person] finds O [Other] attractive (physically and/or psychologically)
Enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person**	29	40	1.75	ns	Exceptionally good communication

(Table continues)

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of emotion presented to participants in Study 1, corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987), and selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Selection Frequency				Corresponding items from Shaver et al. (1987)
	Low	High	χ^2	p	
	n	n			
Feel open and trusting in another person's presence***	45	24	6.39	.012	O [Other] inspires openness, trust, security, etc. in P [Person]
Share a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person***	43	28	3.17	ns	Having spent a lot of time together, having shared experiences

Note: Fluctuation in n are due to missing data.
* Items for surprise and disgust were not derived from the work of Shaver et al. (1987).
** Elicitors of Set A; *** Elicitors of Set B

too closely associated to the happiness prototype). Eliciting situations considered ambiguous in relation to prototype included: P knows/realizes that O loves, needs, appreciates him/her and O inspires security in P (both ambiguous in their reference to the love prototype).

For the emotions of disgust and surprise, only two elicitors were created due to the seemingly more narrow range of situations in which these emotions occur. The emotion of disgust may result from situations that elicit physical or moral repulsiveness (Elias, 1978; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994, 1996; Smith, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The emotion of surprise may result following situations that elicit novelty, unfamiliarity, but especially unexpectedness (Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1988). The items for disgust and surprise are included in Table 1.

The 24 descriptions were divided into two sets of 12 (Set A and Set B) according to the following procedure. For each set, twelve descriptions were randomly selected from the entire 24, with the constraint that the number of descriptions for each of the seven emotions was equal in each group. Each set contained two elicitors for each of the following emotions: anger, fear, happiness, love, and sadness, and one description each for disgust and surprise. Each set of 12 descriptions was presented on a separate form. Any one participant was provided one form (Set A or Set B). Order of presentation was counterbalanced both for the descriptions of eliciting situations and for the emotion terms. Half of the male and half of the female participants were asked to complete one of the three different versions of one form (see Appendix B). The remaining participants were asked to complete one of the three versions of the other form (see Appendix C). Participants were asked to read each of the 12 descriptions and to indicate whether they

believed that a described situation would be more likely to occur to a high- or low-status individual. Response format was forced choice (high- or low-status). Status was defined as "People who have higher status have more prestige and power. For example, they hold better social positions." No other information was provided to participants regarding status.

Results of pre-test

A pre-test served to verify that people would associate the elicitors provided in Study 1 with the corresponding emotions. The elicitors of Study 1 were derived in research in which participants were asked to describe instances in which they had experienced specific emotions (Shaver et al., 1987). In the pre-test, one hundred forty-four participants (72 men, 72 women) were recruited in a manner identical to that of Study 1. Students were asked whether they were willing to take part in research which involved their perception of emotions and the different situations in which emotions are experienced. Of the students that were approached 14 refused to complete the questionnaire. A consent form was completed by each student prior to the questionnaire being completed (see Appendix D). Mean age of the participants in the pre-test was 23.8 years; range was 18 to 51.

In the pre-test, six versions of the questionnaire were created. Half of the participants were asked to complete one of the three versions of the first form which contained 12 of the 24 descriptions of the eliciting situations (Set A; see Appendix E). Each of the remaining participants were asked to complete one of the three versions of the second form which included the remaining 12 descriptions (Set B; see Appendix F). Across questionnaire versions, order of presentation was counterbalanced both for the description of eliciting situations and for the emotion terms. Participants were asked to read the 12 descriptions of the elicitors and to indicate the one emotion (of anger, disgust,

sadness, fear, surprise, happiness, and love) they believed an individual would feel having experienced each situation. The questionnaire began as follows: "Different emotions are felt in different situations." Instructions then varied by gender. Male participants were provided male targets while female participants were provided female targets. This was done in order to avoid cross-gender effects. For example, instructions for men continued as follows: "For each of the situations listed below, please decide the one emotion that a person (let's call him Jack) in that situation is most likely to feel" (see Appendix E). Two additional male targets (i.e., John, Paul) were utilized for the two remaining versions of the questionnaires provided to men. For female participants, female targets (i.e., Anne, Jane, and Mary; see Appendix F) were provided.

In the pre-test, results generally corresponded to those expected from Shaver et al. (1987).

Negative elicitors. For the negatively valenced elicitors of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness, participants selected the corresponding emotion at least 50% of the time when they were presented with the eliciting situations. Percentages were 63.41%, 62.50%, 57.59%, and 53.71%, for anger, disgust, fear, and sadness, respectively. When the corresponding negative emotion was not chosen for these same negative elicitors, most of the remaining participants selected another of the negative emotions. The choice of surprise, happiness, or love for the negative eliciting situations occurred very infrequently (percent ranging from 1.39 to 4.87). These results are considered acceptable given that the status hypotheses of Study 1 involving the eliciting situations for anger, disgust, fear and sadness are identical.

Surprise elicitors. The surprise elicitors were considered to reflect the emotion of surprise by 66.03% of the participants. The remaining participants selected a positive (5.69%)

or a negative (28.27%) emotion as the resulting experienced emotion following a target being exposed to a surprise eliciting situation. Frequency analyses on participants' responses for surprise vs. all other emotions combined was significant only for the emotion-eliciting situation of " encounters an unexpected circumstance caused by another," χ^2 (1, N = 72) = 22.22, p < .0001.

Positive elicitors. For the elicitors of happiness, most participants (82.98%) selected the corresponding emotion. The pattern of frequencies for happiness vs. all other emotions combined was significant for each of the emotion-eliciting situations of happiness: "receives respect," χ^2 (1, N = 72) = 34.72, p < .0001; "gets something that he wanted or had worked hard for," χ^2 (1, N = 72) = 64.22, p < .0001; "finds that things have turned out better than expected," χ^2 (1, N = 72) = 10.89, p < .001; and "is accepted by others," χ^2 (1, N = 72) = 26.89, p < .0001. The participants who did not identify happiness for the happiness items selected love (7.98%) and surprise (7.99%). Participants' responses to the elicitors of love were split between love (46.18%) and happiness (50.35%). Analyses on frequency of participants who chose love versus happiness revealed no significant difference for any of the emotion-eliciting situations of love. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Shaver et al. (1987) explained that the core features of their love prototype were more related to companionate love rather than passionate love (see also Hatfield & Rapson, 1993). They noted their core construct of love to more closely approximate descriptions of different kinds of close relationships. Romantic love which includes additional features such as passion and sexual attraction was captured under a different subordinate category. This subcluster was considered to contain noncore features of the love prototype. Overall, results of the pre-test were acceptable excepting those for the elicitors for love.

In Study 1, the questionnaire began as follows: "People who have higher status have more prestige and power. For example, they hold better social positions." As noted above, there was no other information provided to define status. Instructions then varied by participant gender. To avoid cross-gender effects, male participants were presented male targets: "For each item, decide whether the situation is more likely to occur to a low-status man or high-status man" (see Appendix B). For the female participants, the target "woman" was substituted for "man" (see Appendix C). Participants indicated their choice for each item.

Results and Discussion

Overall, results were consistent with expectations (see Table 1).

Negative elicitors

Situations that elicit negative emotions, that is, anger, disgust, fear, and sadness were believed by participants to occur more to low- as compared to high-status individuals. For these elicitors nearly all of the results which were significant were in the expected direction: anger (2 of 3 significant status differences), disgust (1 of 1), fear (1 of 1), and sadness (4 of 4).

Anger. For the elicitors of anger, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to "be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be" and to "feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation." Contrary to expectations the item "find that his/her execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another" was perceived by participants as more likely to occur to high- relative to low-status individuals. This result may be explained by participants having perceived the defining of plans and goals as more likely to be in the

domain of high- relative to low-status individuals.

Disgust. For the elicitors of disgust, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to "experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature."

Fear. For the elicitors of fear, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to "anticipate social rejection."

Sadness. All of the elicitors created for sadness were perceived by participants as more likely to occur to low- relative to high-status individuals. More specifically, participants considered low- relative to high-status individuals to more frequently "not get something that he/she had wanted or wished for," "have experienced an undesirable event," "be in unfortunate circumstances and be helpless to change them," and "have experienced social rejection or exclusion."

Conclusion for results of negative elicitors. The findings for the negative elicitors are consistent with work that has found high- relative to low-status individuals are considered more privileged (Kemper, 1978) and therefore less likely to encounter negative events. In addition, the findings for the negative elicitors of anger and disgust are consistent with work that has shown low-status individuals are subjected to the unfair, inappropriate, and aggressive behaviors of high-status individuals (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955).

Surprise elicitors

Consider next the situations that elicit surprise. These situations were perceived by participants as more likely to occur to low- relative to high-status individuals. More specifically, participants considered low- relative to high-status individuals to more frequently "encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another" and "encounter a

new, unfamiliar situation caused by another." This finding is consistent with the view that low-status individuals have less control over the outcome of situations (Dépret & Fiske, 1993).

Positive elicitors

Consider next the situations that elicit the emotions of happiness and love.

Happiness. The results for the elicitors of happiness were as expected. Participants rated elicitors for the emotion of happiness to be more likely to occur to high- as compared to low-status individuals (3 of 4). More specifically, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as more likely to "receive respect," "get something that he/she wanted or had worked hard for," and "be accepted by others." These findings are consistent with the view that high-status individuals expect pleasant events as more likely to occur to them (Kemper, 1978).

Love. Contrary to expectation, one elicitor of love was perceived to occur more to low- relative to high-status individuals. More specifically, participants considered low-relative to high-status individuals to more frequently "feel open and trusting in another person's presence." This result may be explained by work that has demonstrated that low-status individuals are perceived to be more interpersonally oriented and thus more likely to share feelings (Conway et al., 1996). In addition, the fact that a significant difference emerged in participants' perception of high- relative to low-status individuals to encounter this elicitor may be attributed to the specific nature of this elicitor. The occurrence of such a situation may provide the other a greater understanding of the individual's nature, personality, strengths, and weaknesses thereby placing the individual in a vulnerable position. In order to maintain their desired social standing high-status individuals may

become more private and less likely to disclose any shortcomings as such disclosures may result in a loss of potency (Betcher & Pollack, 1993; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987).

Overall conclusion

In sum, these results, with few exceptions, support the hypotheses that observers believe that low-status individuals are more likely to encounter situations which elicit anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise. In contrast, high-status individuals are considered more likely to encounter situations which elicit happiness.

Studies 2 and 3

Study 1 demonstrated that people seem to believe that low- relative to high-status individuals are more frequently exposed to a range of situations which may elicit negatively valenced emotions and surprise. In contrast, people seem to believe that a range of situations which elicit happiness are more likely to occur to high- relative to low-status individuals. Finally, people perceived high- and low-status individuals as equally likely to encounter a love elicitor.

At the same time, participants in Study 1 did not show any of the elicitors to be restricted in their occurrence solely to individuals of a particular status level. It seems reasonable to assume that people in general, just as participants in Study 1, believe that all the elicitors of Study 1 can to some extent occur to any individual. With this assumption, my concern is which emotions observers believe low- and high-status individuals would experience as a result of encountering each of the 24 described eliciting situations of Study 1. Study 2 addressed people's perceptions of how low- and high-status individuals react emotionally to each of the 24 eliciting situations. These reactions are considered in terms of the seven emotions examined in Study 1. Separate hypotheses for Study 2 were derived for

these emotions. While the methodology of Study 2 differed from that of Study 1, the focus remained on the general construct of status. Study 3 was a conceptual replication of Study 2, however, a slightly modified manipulation was provided to participants.

Perceptions of experienced anger, disgust, fear, and sadness

Findings in Study 1 suggest that people perceive low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing more anger, disgust, fear, and sadness as a result of their being perceived as encountering more negative social situations. Study 2 addresses a different issue regarding these four emotions. Study 2 focused on peoples' perceptions of the extent to which low- and high-status individuals experience each of these four emotions in response to each of the elicitors of Study 1. Separate hypotheses were developed for anger, disgust, fear, and sadness based on the potency levels of these emotions (Shaver et al., 1987). It was hypothesized that high- relative to low-status individuals would be perceived to experience more anger and disgust when faced with a negative or a surprise situation. This hypothesis was advanced for all of the negative situations of Study 1 as opposed to only those situations which are elicitors of anger and disgust. As well, when low-status individuals are faced with any of the negative or surprise eliciting situations of Study 1, it was hypothesized in Study 2 that they would be perceived to experience more fear and sadness than would high-status individuals. In response to the encounter of a positive elicitor the expectation was that high- relative to low-status individuals would not experience different levels of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness.

The present hypotheses are consistent with emotion theory and actual emotional experience. From a theoretical perspective anger and frustration have been considered more likely to be experienced by those individuals who perceive themselves as strong and when the negative event experienced is believed to have been caused by an individual that

can be punished (Averill, 1982; Berkowitz, 1962; Clore et al., 1994; de Rivera, 1981; Ellsworth, 1994; Kemper, 1978; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Plutchik & Landau, 1973; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990; Roseman, 1984; Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 1988; Smith-Lovin, 1990; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Individuals who perceive themselves as weak and unable to control the source of the negative eliciting situation are considered more likely to experience fear and sadness rather than frustration, or to experience dislike towards the other instead of anger (Berkowitz, 1962, 1993; Clore et al., 1994; Plutchik & Landau, 1973; Roseman et al., 1990, 1996; Scherer, 1988). The work of Roseman et al. (1990) did not provide empirical support for this theoretical position. However, there is support that anger is felt by individuals who perceive themselves as capable of controlling an elicitor or when the elicitor was caused by another (Roseman et al., 1996), or who feel stronger than others (Roseman, 1984).

These hypotheses are also consistent with Smith's (1993) view with regards to both anger and disgust. Smith claimed that in a situation of conflict between low- and high-status individuals, high- as compared to low-status individuals would be more likely to experience anger. For disgust, Smith's argument would suggest that given the same unpleasant situation, a high-status individual would experience more disgust than would a low-status individual. Smith stated that high as compared to low-status individuals are considered more likely to feel disgust due to low-status individuals being "perceived to violate ingroup standards of cleanliness or morality" (p. 310; Smith, 1993). This perception would suggest that low- and high-status individuals maintain different standards. Low- relative to high-status individuals would require a more severe situation to experience disgust, given low-status individuals being associated with lower levels of

morality and cleanliness (see also Izard, 1977).

Dimensional representation of emotions

In the present research, a three-dimensional representation of emotion is taken. Past research has addressed how emotions might be most accurately differentiated in terms of dimensional representation. Shaver et al.'s (1987) analyses of their selected 135 emotion terms suggested that a three-dimensional representation (evaluation, potency, and activity) provided a good fit to the data. The three-dimensional representation was considered statistically justifiable and highly interpretable. In their discussion Shaver et al. (1987) addressed both the two-dimensional (evaluation and activity; e.g., Russell, 1979; 1980) and three-dimensional (e.g., Morgan & Heise, 1988) representations of emotion identified by previous researchers. Other researchers have noted the importance of the potency dimension in emotion representation. Morgan and Heise (1988) found that the potency dimension allowed for differentiation of flight- and fight-based emotions (e.g., fear and anger, see also Harrison, 1986). Furthermore, the potency dimension was considered particularly beneficial in differentiating negative emotions (see also MacKinnon & Keating, 1989). The weaknesses of the two-dimensional representation have also been noted by other researchers (e.g., MacKinnon & Keating, 1989; Morgan & Heise, 1988; Russell & Mehrabian, 1974, 1977). Shaver et al.'s (1987) three-dimensional representation of evaluation, potency, and activity was found to correspond well with the results of previous investigators (e.g., Bush, 1973; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Russell, 1978, Study 1; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977; Schlosberg, 1954). Shaver et al. (1987) considered that the greatest benefit of moving from a two- to a three-dimensional representation is that the latter is more informative as a

representation of emotion.

Affect control theory

The hypotheses established in the present research for the negative emotions parallel the conceptualization of experienced negative emotions as asserted by proponents of affect control theory (cf. Smith-Lovin & Heise, 1988; Smith-Lovin, 1990; 1991). Affect control theory posits that "people perceive and create events to maintain the meanings evoked by their definition of a situation" (p. 144; Smith-Lovin, 1991). Affect control theory employs the dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity (Osgood et al., 1957) to define the identity of the actor, the action, and the recipient of the action (Heise, 1979). The focus of affect control theory has been on predicting the impact of an action on the perceived identities of both the actor and the recipient of the action. Affect control theory hypothesizes that a number of possibilities can emerge following the occurrence of an event (e.g., Heise, 1979). An event can result in the confirmation of the actor's and the recipient's identities. In the event that an action is considered to differ from the preconceived notion of the actor and the recipient, one of two possibilities is entertained. On the one hand, the actor or recipient can produce a restorative act whose aim is to reaffirm impressions. On the other hand, an event may produce massive impression-change such that reidentification of the actor, the recipient, or both may lead to a redefinition of the situation.

Affect control model of emotion. Further work on control theory has led to an affect control model of emotion (Smith-Lovin & Heise, 1988). Within this model emotions are considered to represent "the degree and kind of confirmation or disconfirmation of identities that is occurring" (p. 244; Smith-Lovin, 1990). Expectations for emotional

experience have been developed through the use of a computer simulation program (Heise, 1989). The affect control model of emotion posits that negative events will lead to negative transient impressions and thereby the experience of negative emotions (Smith-Lovin, 1990; 1991; cf. Heise & Thomas, 1989). In addition, considering the potency of individuals' identities is believed to further specify emotional experience (cf. MacKinnon & Heise, 1993). High-potent negative emotions like fury are expected to be experienced by high-status individuals as a consequence of their powerful identity that is associated with their social position (Smith-Lovin, 1990). In addition, less potent negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, and depression are expected to be experienced by low-status individuals due to their holding relatively powerless positions.

Perceptions of experienced surprise

In Study 1, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as more likely to encounter positive elicitors. High- relative to low-status individuals are believed to expect pleasant events to be directed to oneself (Kemper, 1978; Smith-Lovin, 1990). In addition, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to encounter negative events. Past research has also demonstrated low-status individuals as being subjected to unfair, inappropriate, and aggressive behavior from high-status individuals (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955). As such, in Study 2 it was expected that participants would perceive high-status individuals as experiencing more surprise following their encounter of a negative situation than they would perceive to be experienced by a low-status individual. As well, it was expected that participants would perceive low-status individuals as experiencing more surprise following their encounter of a positive situation than they would perceive to be experienced by high-status individuals.

Consider next the surprise elicitors. In Study 1, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to encounter a surprise elicitor. However, in Study 2 participants were asked to indicate the amount of surprise experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals following their encounter of the same surprise elicitors. According to the first stage of Scherer's (1984a) stimulus evaluation check process a stimulus is evaluated with regards to its level of novelty or unexpectedness. Scherer considers this stage to occur in all individuals in much the same fashion as does an orientation reflex. Roseman's (Roseman et al., 1996) appraisal model asserts that it is the unexpected nature of the event which elicits surprise. In addition, Roseman's model does not consider that the control potential of an individual affects the experience of surprise following an unexpected situation. As such, no difference in the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a surprise elicitor was expected.

Perceptions of experienced happiness and love

Study 2 involved participants being presented with high- and low-status targets who were exposed to all of the positive emotion-eliciting situations. In Study 1, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as more likely to encounter eliciting situations for happiness. In Study 2, no difference in participants' perception was expected for the amount of happiness experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a positive situation. In addition, following the encounter of a negative or a surprise elicitor it was not expected that high- relative to low-status individuals would experience differing amounts of happiness. The rationale is that happiness does not seem to be considered upsetting or inappropriate by any individual by

whom it is experienced (Hochschild, 1979; Kemper, 1978; Sommers, 1984) and is regarded as low in potency (Shaver et al., 1987). Rather happiness is considered normative and generally conveys the message that the situation is secure and desirable and requires no change in the individual's course of action (Sommers, 1984). In addition, happiness is not associated with an experience of assertion of power or control, interpersonal conflict, competition, or subordination. The emotion of happiness was still addressed owing to its being a prototypical emotion (Shaver et al., 1987).

No difference in participants' perception was expected for the amount of love experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a positive situation. This expectation was based on the finding that love is typically felt for a partner or family member (Fehr, 1988). These relationships are typically defined within one socioeconomic group for an individual (Argyle, 1994) and thereby not considered to be constrained by the status hierarchy. In Study 2, the impression that the high- and low-status individuals were segregated was conveyed to participants in the description of the culture: sexual relations and marriage were forbidden to occur between individuals of different status. Consequently, to the extent people are sensitive to these features of love no status effect was expected. The emotion of love was still addressed owing to its being a prototypical emotion (Shaver et al., 1987). In addition, following the encounter of a negative or a surprise elicitor, it was not expected that high- relative to low-status individuals would experience differing amounts of love.

Method

The approach used in Study 2 to instantiate status was adopted from Conway et al. (1996; Study 4). Participants were provided a minimal instantiation of status, one that was

independent of age, gender, occupations, and social roles. Status groups were distinguished only in terms of status markers such as personal ornamentation, location and colour of housing, and preferential access to resources (such as food). This approach was deemed effective as categorization of individuals into groups by observers is considered to require minimal manipulation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1981; Tajfel, 1970; Wilder, 1981). The culture consisted of a low- and a high-status group. Status level was ascribed, not achieved. After being presented the description of the culture, participants were then asked to what degree each of the seven emotions (as per Study 1) would be felt by either the low- or high-status individuals following their being exposed to each of the 24 eliciting situations. Study 3 was a conceptual replication of Study 2. In Study 3, a different culture (Conway et al., 1996; Study 3) was used as the stimulus to demonstrate that the results of Study 2 cannot be attributed to specific aspects of the culture. The descriptions of the cultures in Studies 2 and 3 were loosely based on anthropological research and included material that was fictitious (e.g., the existence of the two groups).

Participants

Participants in Studies 2 and 3 were undergraduate students recruited from a booth on the Concordia University campus. Students were offered the opportunity to win raffled cash prizes in exchange for completing a packet of questionnaires (none of these questionnaires were related to the present studies). Potential participants consisted of those students who expressed interest in participating in future paid research by providing their name and telephone number (see Appendix G). Additional participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes. For these studies any students who were enrolled in psychology classes beyond the introductory level, who had taken part in similar research projects, or whose native

tongue was not English were excluded. One to four participants were present at each 45 minute session. Each participant was paid $8. In Study 2, there were 20 male and 40 female participants. Mean age was 24.1 years; range was 18 to 52. In Study 3, there were 43 male and 38 female participants. Mean age was 25.8 years; range was 17 to 48.

Procedure

In Study 2, the experimenter read a cover story which described the experiment as dealing with the first impressions that individuals have when they come in contact with the people of a new culture (see Appendix H). A consent form was then completed by each participant (see Appendix I). Participants in Study 2 were then provided an audiotaped description of a culture that consisted of a high- and a low-status group (see Appendix J). Each description was presented twice to participants over a set of headphones. The description was repeated to ensure familiarity of the material. Participants were informed that they could take notes if they so desired. The audiotape provided details of a culture consisting of the high-status Ngwani and the low-status Gunada. Both status groups included men and women. The status groups were distinguished only in terms of status markers such as personal ornamentation, location and colour of housing, and preferential access to resources (such as food). No information was provided in regard to personality characteristics or style of social behaviour, nor was there any indication of intergroup conflict. Cultural mythology (i.e., whether a group was directly vs. indirectly descended from the first man and woman which the gods had created from twigs and clay) served as the basis for the differing status levels. In present day, features that served to distinguish high- and low-status groups were that the high-status Ngwani relative to the low-status Gunada lived in huts "clustered around a larger hut in the centre of the village" and whose hut

roofs had leaves that provided a deep green as compared to pale green colour of the roofs of the Gunada's huts. The Ngwani possessed ornaments that were "delicately woven from fine fibre threads with interesting geometric designs," "seen as holding the land for the gods," "entitled to the best of the hunt and the best of the crop," and "seen as being in closer contact with the spirits."

In Study 3, the experimenter read the same cover story as in Study 2 except for slight modifications (see Appendix K). A consent form was then completed by each participant (see Appendix I). In Study 3, there was again a high-status group (Bwisi) and a low-status group (Mwangai; see Appendix L). For the culture described in Study 3, historical happenstance (i.e., point in time of migration to the island following the occurrence of a natural disaster) served as the basis for the differing status levels. In present day, features that served to distinguish high- and low-status groups were that the high-status Bwisi relative to the low-status Mwangai had huts "a little further inland, under the protection of palm trees and closer to the cultivated gardens" and whose hut roofs were thatched with a special kind of grass giving their hut's roofs a characteristic deep red color as compared to the pale yellow of the roofs of the Mwangai's huts. The Bwisi were described as having coverings "usually made of intricately woven grass," often holding "central roles in the tribe's dances and songs," and "are entitled to the best part of the fish catch and the crops."

The 24 descriptions of the eliciting situations of Study 1 were again utilized and were provided to each participant. In total, eight versions of the questionnaire were prepared. In each case the questionnaire read as follows: "For individuals in this culture, different emotions may be felt in different situations. For each of the situations listed, please

decide how much each emotion is felt by a _____ in that situation." (see Appendix M). The space was filled with a group name. For half of the participants in Study 2, 12 of the elicitors (Set A) were presented as having occurred to the high-status Ngwani. Participants were asked to what degree each of the seven emotions would be experienced by the Ngwani following their having been exposed to each situation. Participants indicated their responses for each of the seven emotions on separate 5-point scales with endpoints labeled none at all (1) and a great deal (5). The other 12 elicitors (Set B) were also provided to the same participants but they were asked to what degree each emotion would be experienced by the low-status Gunada following their having been exposed to each of the elicitors. For the other half of the participants the pairing of elicitors to status level was reversed. Presentation of the status groups was counterbalanced across questionnaire versions as were the order of the seven emotion scales. In Study 3, the identical method was adopted.

A manipulation check (see Appendixes N and O) was administered to participants in both studies after they had completed the questionnaire: "How much power does the typical _____ have to influence others?" and "How much power does the typical _____ have to choose and pursue their own activities and interests?" The space was filled with a group name with the names of the cultures representing the status groups being counterbalanced across questionnaires. Participants responded on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled not at all (1) and a great deal (7). Participants were then asked to indicate in a forced choice manner which of the two described groups held higher status. Participants were debriefed (see Appendix P) and paid $8 for their participation.

Results

Participants' perceptions of experienced emotions to eliciting situations

In each of Studies 2 and 3, the two distinct sets of elicitors (Set A and Set B) were analyzed separately and required parallel analyses of participants' ratings of experienced emotion. The basic design was a three-way mixed design of status by elicitor type by emotion type with repeated measures on the second and third factors. For each set of elicitors, one ANOVA was conducted to address participants' perceptions of the negative emotions and surprise experienced in response to the negative elicitors; a second analysis was conducted to address participants' perceptions of the positive emotions experienced in response to the negative elicitors; a third analysis was conducted to address participants' perceptions of surprise and the negative emotions experienced in response to the surprise elicitor; a fourth analysis was conducted to address participants' perceptions of the positive emotions experienced in response to the surprise elicitor, a fifth analysis was conducted to address participants' perceptions of the positive emotions and surprise experienced in response to the positive elicitors; a final analysis was conducted to address participants' perceptions of the negative emotions experienced in response to the positive elicitors.

For the two negative elicitors of anger, a mean score was calculated for participants' perceived experience of anger. Means were similarly calculated for ratings of perceived experience of disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love respectively. The same approach was adopted for the two negative elicitors of fear and the two negative elicitors of sadness. The same approach was used for the two positive elicitors of happiness and the two positive elicitors of love.

For the disgust and surprise elicitors, it was not necessary to calculate a mean for the perceived experienced emotions as there was only one disgust and one surprise elicitor, respectively.

Study 2

Data screening

Three cases were deleted because their scores were outliers in univariate analyses on 20% of the variables. Univariate outliers were scores that differed from the mean by more than three standard deviations. Remaining outliers were adjusted to the mean plus or minus three standard deviations. Following these adjustments and deletions, there were no multivariate within-cell outliers identified at a Mahalanobis distance with $p < .001$ (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Some variables were moderately skewed. Whereas transformation of skewed variables is generally recommended, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) note that if the skew of variables is both similar and moderate, transformation will result in only marginal improvements in analysis. Glass, Peckham, and Sanders (1972) in their review on violations of assumptions in ANOVA found skewness to have only a slight effect on level of significance or power. Another reason for not adjusting for skew was that transforming a portion of the variables would subsequently affect the analyses that included variables that had not been transformed. As such, no adjustments for skew were made.

Preliminary analyses with gender as a between subjects factor

Preliminary analyses with participant gender as a between subjects factor were conducted. Very few effects emerged and these are reported below. For the remaining analyses gender was collapsed across participants.

Manipulation Check

Participants perceived high- (M = 5.39, SD = 1.24) relative to low-status (M = 2.68, SD = 0.95) individuals as having more power to influence others, $t(57) = 13.19$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived high- (M = 5.36, SD = 1.48) relative to low-status (M = 3.35, SD = 1.29) individuals as having more power to choose and pursue their own activities and interests, $t(57) = 7.85$, $p < .0005$. All respondents but one correctly identified the high-status group on the forced choice item. Nevertheless, the data set from this participant was included in all data analyses.

Ratings of experienced emotion for the negative, surprise, and positive elicitors

Means for the seven experienced emotions were calculated for each type of elicitor. Preliminary analyses were conducted across status levels to identify overall trends in the data. Overall, with few exceptions, participants perceived individuals would experience most intensely the emotion that identified the type of eliciting situation (see Appendix Q). Exceptions are as follows. For the sadness elicitors of Set A, participants perceived the emotion of anger as being most experienced by both high- and low-status individuals (see Appendix Q1). In addition, for the love elicitors of Sets A and B, participants perceived the emotion of happiness as being most experienced by both high- and low-status individuals (see Appendixes Q1 and Q2). The results for the love elicitors are consistent with those of Study 1, in which participants chose the emotion of happiness as frequently as they did the emotion of love when asked to identify the emotion that people would experience following their encounter of a love elicitor.

Prior to addressing the hypotheses of this study, analyses were conducted to confirm that overall participants perceived more of the negative emotions as being

experienced by both high- and low-status individuals when faced with negative as compared to either the surprise or positive elicitors. In addition, analyses were conducted to confirm that overall participants perceived more surprise as being experienced by both high- and low-status individuals when faced with the surprise elicitor as compared to either the negative or positive elicitors. Analyses were also performed to determine whether participants perceived more of the positive emotions as being experienced by both high- and low-status individuals when faced with positive as compared to either the negative or surprise elicitors. This approach parallels one taken by Roseman (1991).

Set A. For the negative elicitors, an overall mean score was computed for the negative emotions experienced (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness), the positive emotions experienced (happiness and love), as well as for the surprise experienced. Means were similarly calculated for the surprise and positive elicitors. For the negative elicitors participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience negative emotions ($M = 3.27$, $SD = .68$) more than positive emotions ($M = 1.52$, $SD = .50$), $t(57) = 14.96$, $p < .0005$. Participants did not perceive a difference in the amount of negative emotions and surprise ($M = 3.18$, $SD = .80$; $t < 1$) experienced by both the high- and low-status individuals. This suggests that overall participants perceived that when a high- or a low-status individual is faced with a negative elicitor they would experience the emotion of surprise to a degree similar to which they experienced the negative emotions.

For the surprise elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.22$) more than negative emotions ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.11$), $t(57) = 8.69$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise more than positive emotions ($M = 2.23$,

SD = 1.25), t(57) = 8.71, p < .0005.

For the positive elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions (M = 3.99, SD = .60) more than negative emotions (M = 1.33, SD = .36) t(57) = 26.26, p < .0005. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions more than surprise (M = 2.27, SD = .84), t(57) = 14.84, p < .0005.

Set B. Overall, the results of the elicitors from Set B were in line with those of Set A. More specifically, for the negative elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience negative emotions (M = 3.28, SD = .65) more than positive emotions (M = 1.52, SD = .45), t(57) = 16.45, p < .0005. Participants did not perceive a difference in the amount of negative emotions and surprise (M = 3.15, SD = .78; t < 1) experienced by both the high- and low-status individuals.

For the surprise elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise (M = 3.61, SD = .80) more than negative emotions (M = 2.68, SD = 1.02), t(57) = 6.00, p < .0005. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise more than positive emotions (M = 2.09, SD = 1.20), t(57) = 7.62, p < .0005.

For the positive elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions (M = 4.14, SD = .52) more than negative emotions (M = 1.32, SD = .30), t(57) = 32.97, p < .0005. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions more than surprise (M = 2.44, SD = .72), t(57) = 15.52, p < .0005.

Ratings of experienced negative emotions and surprise for the negative elicitors

The following analyses addressed the experimental hypotheses. A summary of the results that emerged from the ANOVAs conducted on the data in Study 2 are provided in Table 2. For each Set of elicitors, A and B, separate analyses were conducted. All t-tests are two-tailed unless specified otherwise.

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise). The hypothesis was that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling more anger, disgust, and surprise in reaction to negative elicitors. In addition, it was hypothesized that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less fear and sadness in reaction to negative elicitors. Thus, the expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Bartlett-Box and Box's M results addressed the assumption of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the 20 dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .003 to 1.000 with the exception of one variable). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(210, 9028) = 1.52$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (210, N = 57) = 330.86$, $p < .0005$ (Stevens, 1996), indicating that the hypothesis of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices should be rejected. The Bartlett's tests (Stevens, 1996) and Box's M (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) are extremely sensitive tests of the homogeneity of the variance-covariance assumption, however, Glass et al. (1972), in their review, note that the F statistic is robust against heterogeneous variances when group sizes are equal.

Table 2

Summary of the two-way Status x Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on data of Study 2

Elicitor set	Experienced Elicitor / Perceived Emotion		High-status	No difference	Low-status
A	negative	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	*anger, disgust* *surprise*	fear, sadness	
B	negative	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	*anger* *surprise*[a]	disgust fear, sadness	
A	negative	positive		*happiness, love*	
B	negative	positive		*happiness, love*	
A	surprise	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise		anger, disgust fear, sadness *surprise*	
B	surprise	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	*anger*[a]	disgust sadness *surprise*	*fear*[a]
A^{men}	surprise	positive		*happiness, love*	
A^{women}	surprise	positive		*happiness, love*	
B	surprise	positive		*happiness, love*	
A	positive	positive surprise		*happiness, love*	*surprise*
B	positive	positive surprise		*happiness, love*	*surprise*

(Table continues)

Table 2 (cont'd)

Summary of the two-way Status x Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on data of Study 2

A	positive	negative (HP)* negative (LP)**		*anger, disgust* *fear, sadness*	
B	positive	negative (HP)* negative (LP)**		*anger, disgust*	fear, sadness

Note: Table 2 summarizes the results for the two-way Status by Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on the data of Study 2. The first column from the left identifies the elicitor sets for which the data were analyzed. The rows identified as Elicitor sets A^{men} and A^{women} represent those analyses which are reported separately because a gender difference emerged. The second column (Experienced Elicitor / Perceived Emotion) presents the type of elicitor which high- and low-status individuals were described as having encountered. Also included in this column are the experienced emotions on which the analysis focused. The third column (High-status) indicates those emotions which participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing to a greater intensity. The fourth column (No difference) indicates those emotions which participants perceived as being experienced to a similar intensity by high- and low-status individuals. The fifth column (Low-status) indicates those emotions which participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing to a greater intensity. Italicized emotions, in columns three to five, represent the results which were consistent with expectations. Non-italicized emotions, in columns three to five, represent the results which did not confirm expectations.

* HP: High-potent negative emotions; ** LP: Low-potent negative emotions

[a] one-tailed t-test

Stevens (1996) adds that in such situations there is a slight reduction in statistical power.

Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor and emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the two-way interaction between elicitor and emotion and the three-way status by elicitor by emotion interaction, and an adjusted univariate F value was considered (Stevens, 1996).

The results of the ANOVA with status as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on the negative elicitors and emotion are as follows (see Appendix R; Table 1). Analyses revealed a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = 5.52$, $p = .022$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$). Participants perceived high- ($M = 3.44$, $SD = .49$) relative to low-status ($M = 3.05$, $SD = .74$) individuals as experiencing more emotion. A significant Elicitor main effect was also found ($F(3, 165) = 9.34$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .15$). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(4, 220) = 10.83$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$).

The expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(4, 220) = 6.14$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the negative elicitors. The comparisons revealed that consistent with expectations, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger, disgust, and surprise following their encounter of a negative elicitor (see Table 3). Because these comparisons were planned it was not necessary to correct for the higher probability of a Type I error (Keppel, 1991;

Table 3

Ratings of emotions experienced for the negative elicitors of Set A in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Anger	3.35	.89	27	3.81	.69	30	+2.17*
Disgust	2.92	.96	27	3.59	.62	30	+3.19**
Fear	2.95	.85	27	2.97	.55	30	+.07
Sadness	3.22	.88	27	3.28	.79	30	+.26
Surprise	2.80	.81	27	3.53	.62	30	+3.83***
Happiness	1.47	.52	27	1.34	.34	30	-1.06
Love	1.77	.75	27	1.50	.48	30	-1.63

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Pagano, 1981; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, comparisons were constrained to those which were hypothetically meaningful and theoretically focused (Cone & Foster, 1996; Keppel, 1991). Contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of fear and sadness experienced by high- and low-status individuals was found. The Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($\underline{F}(12, 660) = 1.73$, $\underline{p} > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). As such, the expected findings for anger, disgust, and surprise emerged across all the negative elicitors of Set A.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($\underline{F}(12, 660) = 13.32$, $\underline{p} < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .20$). This interaction did not involve status, however, the finding supports the notion that, in general, each of the negative elicitors of Set A elicited its corresponding negative emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise). The expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the 20 dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $\underline{p}s > .001$ ($\underline{p}s$ ranging from .014 to .990). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $\underline{F}(210, 9028) = 1.27$, $\underline{p} < .0005$ and χ^2 (210, $\underline{N} = 57$) = 227.07, $\underline{p} < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor and emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser

estimator for the two-way interaction between elicitor and emotion and the three-way status by elicitor by emotion interaction, and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

In contrast to Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = .56$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$; see Appendix R; Table 2). Also, in contrast to Set A, the Elicitor main effect was not found to be significant ($F(3, 165) = 2.23$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(4, 220) = 8.62$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$). In addition, as in Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(4, 220) = 5.44$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the negative elicitors. As in Set A, the comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger (see Table 4). A marginal effect was considered significant using a one-tailed t-test. Results of the one-tailed t-test indicated participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more surprise. Contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of disgust, fear, and sadness experienced by high- and low-status individuals was found. In contrast to Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(8.30, 456.74) = 2.11$, $p = .032$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$). To determine the nature of the three-way interaction, multiple independent t-tests were performed for the anger, disgust, fear, and sadness elicitors on participants' ratings of experienced anger, disgust, surprise, fear, and sadness to more clearly delineate the effect of each of the negative elicitors on participants perceived experience of the negative

Table 4

Ratings of emotions experienced for the negative elicitors of Set B in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Anger	3.31	.75	30	3.76	.86	27	+2.07*
Disgust	3.20	.72	30	3.44	.91	27	+1.11
Fear	3.09	.92	30	2.93	.66	27	-.77
Sadness	3.39	.73	30	3.15	.71	27	-1.23
Surprise	2.98	.70	30	3.34	.85	27	+1.75*[a]
Happiness	1.40	.37	30	1.44	.45	27	+.29
Love	1.59	.45	30	1.66	.61	27	+.47

* $p < .05$
[a] one-tailed t-test

emotions and surprise. Because these comparisons were post hoc, a Bonferroni adjustment for 20 comparisons was employed ($\alpha = .0025$; Clark, 1992; Keppel, 1991; Pedhazur, 1982; Stevens, 1996; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The only difference that emerged was in the amount of fear perceived to be experienced in response to the disgust elicitor (see Appendix S; Tables 1-4). High- relative to low-status individuals were perceived as experiencing less amounts of fear in response to the disgust elicitor. In sum, only the expected status effect for anger and surprise emerged; means were in a direction consistent with hypotheses.

Finally, both the Status x Elicitor interaction ($F(3, 165) = 7.00$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$) and the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(8.30, 456.74) = 28.76$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .34$) were significant. The former interaction was not of interest in that it did not distinguish between participants' perceptions of respective emotions. The latter interaction did not involve status, however, the finding supports the notion that each of the negative elicitors of Set B elicited its corresponding negative emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Ratings of experienced happiness and love for the negative elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (happiness and love). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high-relative to low-status individuals after encountering a negative elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .005 to .716).

Results of the Box's M test were significant, $\underline{F}(36, 9935) = 2.45$, $\underline{p} < .0005$ and χ^2 (36, $\underline{N}$ = 55) = 88.41, $\underline{p} < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor and the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($\underline{F}(1, 55) = 2.22$, $\underline{p} > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$; see Appendix R; Table 3). The Elicitor main effect was significant ($\underline{F}(3, 165) = 4.22$, $\underline{p} = .007$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($\underline{F}(1, 55) = 18.41$, $\underline{p} < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .25$). There were no significant interactions (see Table 3).

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (happiness and love). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results showed that the variance of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .092 to .861 with the exception of one variable), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the six dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were significant, $\underline{F}(36, 9935) = 1.77$, $\underline{p} = .003$ and χ^2 (36, $\underline{N}$ = 55) = 64.03, $\underline{p} = .003$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor and the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

As in Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($\underline{F}(1, 55) = .16$,

$p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix R; Table 4). In contrast to Set A, the Elicitor main effect was not significant ($F(3, 165) = 2.46$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(1, 55) = 28.35$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .34$). Also as in Set A, there were no significant interactions (see Table 4).

Ratings of experienced surprise and negative emotions for the surprise elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (surprise, anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypothesis was that people would not perceive high- and low-status individuals as feeling different amounts of surprise following their encounter of the surprise elicitors. In addition, it was hypothesized that people would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling more anger and disgust in reaction to surprise elicitors. Finally, it was hypothesized that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less fear and sadness in reaction to surprise elicitors. Thus, the expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of two of the five dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps $> .001$ (ps = .003 and .045). Results of the Box's M test were significant, with both the F approximation, $F(15, 11875) = 3.03$, $p < .0005$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (15, N = 57) = 45.44$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = .05$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix R; Table 5). The Emotion main effect was significant ($F(4,$

220) = 22.33, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .29$). The expected Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(4, 220) = .23$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned (Cone & Foster, 1993; Keppel, 1991; Pagano, 1981; Pedhazur, 1982; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Comparisons were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors (see Table 5). Consistent with expectations, no difference emerged in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals. Contrary to expectation, no difference emerged in participants' perceptions of the amount of negative emotions experienced between high- relative to low-status individuals.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (surprise, anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of two of the five dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ ($ps = .212$ and .746). Results of the Box's M test were significant, with both the F approximation, $F(15, 11875) = 2.10$, $p = .007$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (15, N = 57) = 31.62$, $p = .007$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to not have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the emotion main effect and the two-way interaction between status and emotion and an adjusted univariate

Table 5

Ratings of surprise and negative emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set A in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Surprise	3.78	1.60	27	3.83	.75	30	+.17
Anger	2.70	1.68	27	2.73	.94	30	+.08
Disgust	2.48	1.81	27	2.70	.75	30	+.61
Fear	2.63	1.45	27	2.73	.98	30	+.32
Sadness	2.52	1.78	27	2.43	.90	30	-.23

F value was considered.

As in Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = .01$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix R; Table 6). Also, as in Set A, the Emotion main effect was significant ($F(2.15, 118.30) = 20.61$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .27$). In contrast to Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(2.15, 118.30) = 3.27$, $p = .038$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors (see Table 6). Consistent with expectations, no difference emerged in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals. Contrary to expectation, no difference emerged in participants' perception of the amount of negative emotions experienced between high- relative to low-status individuals. Marginal effects were considered significant using a one-tailed t-test. Results of the one-tailed t-tests indicated participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more anger and less fear.

Ratings of experienced positive emotions for the surprise elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (happiness and love). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a surprise elicitor. The Status x Emotion interaction was found to be qualified by participant gender ($F(2.21, 117.00) = 3.00$, $p = .049$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$).

Male participants. Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the two

Table 6

Ratings of emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set B in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Surprise	3.70	.70	30	3.52	.89	27	-.86
Anger	2.33	.80	30	3.00	1.68	27	+1.94*[a]
Disgust	2.37	.89	30	2.37	1.71	27	.00
Fear	3.50	1.04	30	3.00	1.11	27	-1.75*[a]
Sadness	2.50	.90	30	2.41	1.72	27	-.26
Happiness	2.13	.68	30	2.15	1.63	27	+.05
Love	2.07	.74	30	2.00	1.62	27	-.20

* $p < .05$
[a] one-tailed t-test

dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(3, 16700) = .49$, $p > .05$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (3, N = 19) = 1.46$, $p > .05$.

Analyses did not reveal the Status or Emotion main effects nor the Status x Emotion interaction to be significant (see Appendix R; Table 7). The means of participants' ratings of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors were still considered given that the comparisons had been planned. The comparisons did not reveal male participants to have perceived a difference in the amount of emotions experienced between high- and low-status individuals (see Table 7).

Female participants. Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of one of the two dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $p > .001$ (the exception $p = .001$). Results of the Box's M test were significant, with both the F approximation, $F(3, 233280) = 3.64$, $p = .012$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (3, N = 38) = 10.94$, $p = .012$.

As for the male participants, analyses did not reveal the Status or Emotion main effects nor the Status x Emotion interaction to be significant (see Appendix R; Table 8). The means of participants' ratings of the emotion experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors were still considered given that the comparisons had been planned. The comparisons did not reveal female participants to have perceived a difference in the amount of emotions experienced between high- and low-status individuals (see Table 8).

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion

Table 7

Male participants' ratings of positive emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set A in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Happiness	2.13	1.13	8	2.45	1.03	11	+.66
Love	2.00	1.20	8	2.36	.81	11	+.79

Table 8

Female participants' ratings of positive emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set A in Study 2 by status

	Status Level						
	Low			High			
Emotions Experienced	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Happiness	2.37	1.77	19	2.26	.87	19	-.23
Love	2.26	1.94	19	1.95	.85	19	-.65

(happiness and love). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the two dependent variables did not exceed $ps > .001$. Results of the Box's M test were significant, with both the F approximation, $F(3, 870850) = 7.33$, $p < .0005$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (3, N = 57) = 22.00$, $p < .0005$. No significant effects emerged (see Appendix R; Table 9). The means of participants' ratings of the emotion experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors were still considered given that the comparisons had been planned. The comparisons did not reveal participants to have perceived a difference in the amount of emotions experienced between high- and low-status individuals (see Table 6).

Ratings of experienced positive emotions and surprise for the positive elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness vs. love) and Emotion (happiness, love, and surprise). The hypothesis was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less surprise in reaction to positive elicitors. In addition, no difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a positive elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the six dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .044 to .604 with the exception of one variable), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the six dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(21, 10854) = 1.54$, $p > .05$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (21, N = 57) = 32.51$, $p > .05$.

Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the emotion main effect and the two-way interaction between status and emotion, and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($\underline{F}(1, 55) = 3.43$, $\underline{p} > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$; see Appendix R; Table 10). The Elicitor main effect was not significant ($\underline{F}(1,55) = 1.57$, $\underline{p} > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($\underline{F}(1.32, 72.58) = 199.64$, $\underline{p} < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .78$). The expected Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($\underline{F}(1.32, 72.58) = 1.76$, $\underline{p} > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Planned comparisons ($\underline{t}$-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. Consistent with expectations, the comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less surprise (see Table 9). Also, consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of happiness and love. The Status x Emotion interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($\underline{F}(2, 110) = 6.05$, $\underline{p} = .003$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$). To determine the nature of the three-way interaction, multiple independent $\underline{t}$-tests were performed for the happiness and love elicitors on participants' ratings of experienced

Table 9

Ratings of emotions experienced for the positive elicitors of Set A in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Happiness	4.28	.55	27	4.18	.49	30	-.75
Love	3.88	.83	27	3.66	.65	30	-1.13
Surprise	2.52	1.01	27	2.04	.58	30	-2.20*
Anger	1.19	.36	27	1.29	.41	30	+.94
Disgust	1.15	.25	27	1.27	.37	30	+1.41
Fear	1.53	.60	27	1.48	.45	30	-.38
Sadness	1.27	.39	27	1.44	.47	30	+1.51

* $p < .05$

happiness, love, and surprise to more clearly delineate the effect of each of the positive elicitors on participants perceived experience of the positive emotions and surprise. Because these comparisons were post hoc, a Bonferroni adjustment for six comparisons was employed ($\alpha = .008$). The only difference that emerged was in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced in response to the happiness elicitors (see Appendix T; Tables 1-2). High- relative to low-status individuals were perceived as experiencing less surprise in response to the happiness elicitors. The mean difference in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals for the love elicitors was consistent with the hypothesis but failed to reach significance.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(2, 110) = 16.04$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .23$). This interaction did not involve status, however, it supports the notion that each of the positive elicitors of Set A were more likely to have elicited its corresponding positive emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness vs. love) and Emotion (happiness, love, and surprise). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results showed that the variances of the six dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .382 to .618), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the six dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(21, 10854) = 1.09$, $p > .05$,

and χ^2 approximation, χ^2 (21, N = 57) = 22.88, p > .05. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the emotion main effect and the two-way interaction between status and emotion, and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

As for Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect (F(1, 55) = 3.43, p > .05, partial η^2 = .06; see Appendix R; Table 11). In contrast to Set A, a significant Elicitor main effect was found (F(1,55) = 4.15, p = .047, partial η^2 = .07). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect (F(1.33, 73.19) = 247.18, p < .0005, partial η^2 = .82). In contrast to Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant (F(1.33, 73.19) = 9.22, p = .001, partial η^2 = .14). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. The comparisons revealed that consistent with expectations participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less surprise (see Table 10). Also, consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of happiness and love. In contrast to Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor (F(2, 110) = .66, p > .05, partial η^2 = .01). As such, the expected findings for surprise, happiness, and love emerged across all of the positive

Table 10

Ratings of emotions experienced for the positive elicitors of Set B in Study 2 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Happiness	4.35	.46	30	4.32	.47	27	-.29
Love	3.93	.63	30	3.98	.68	27	+.28
Surprise	2.76	.77	30	2.09	.47	27	-3.90***
Anger	1.20	.33	30	1.19	.34	27	-.06
Disgust	1.23	.33	30	1.18	.26	27	-.73
Fear	1.68	.59	30	1.31	.37	27	-2.86**
Sadness	1.46	.43	30	1.25	.30	27	-2.11*

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

elicitor types.

Finally, as in Set A, the only other significant result was the two-way interaction between Elicitor by Emotion ($F(2, 110) = 23.88$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .30$). This interaction did not involve status, however, it supports the notion that each of the positive elicitors of Set B were more likely to have elicited its corresponding positive emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Ratings of experienced anger, disgust, fear, and sadness for the positive elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness and love) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a positive elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .078 to .883 with the exception of one variable). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(36, 9935) = 3.09$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 55) = 111.76$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of emotion and the elicitor by emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = .77$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$; see Appendix R; Table 12). The Elicitor main effect was significant ($F(1, 55) = 5.94$, $p = .018$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$). There was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(3, 165) = 15.11$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .22$). The Status x Emotion interaction was not

significant ($F(3, 165) = 2.01$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. The comparisons revealed that consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness (see Table 9). The three-way interaction involving Elicitor was not significant ($F(3, 165) = .35$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$). As such, these findings for anger, disgust, fear, and sadness emerged across all of the positive elicitors. There were no other significant effects.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness and love) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .010 to .686). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(36, 9935) = 2.28$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 55) = 82.43$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor by emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the main effect of emotion and the two-way interaction between status and emotion and an

adjusted univariate F value was considered.

In contrast to Set A, analyses revealed a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 55) = 4.57$, $p = .037$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$; see Appendix R; Table 13). As in Set A, the Elicitor main effect was significant ($F(1, 55) = 4.66$, $p = .035$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$). Also, as in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(1.93, 106.31) = 13.04$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .19$). In contrast to Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(1.93, 106.31) = 4.59$, $p = .013$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. The comparisons revealed that consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of anger and disgust (see Table 10). Contrary to expectation, participants did perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear and sadness. As in Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(3, 165) = 1.81$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). As such, these findings for anger and disgust emerged across all of the positive elicitors. There were no other significant effects.

Study 3

Data screening

Three cases were deleted because their scores were outliers in univariate analyses on 20% of the variables. Univariate outliers were scores that differed from the mean by more than three standard deviations. Remaining outliers were adjusted to the mean plus or minus three standard deviations. Two multivariate within-cell outliers were identified at a

Mahalanobis distance, with $p < .001$, and deleted from any additional analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Some of the variables were identified as moderately skewed but left untransformed (Glass et al., 1972; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).

Preliminary analyses with gender as a between subjects factor

Preliminary analyses with participant gender as a between subjects factor were conducted. No effects emerged. As such analyses were conducted with participants' gender collapsed.

Manipulation Check

Participants perceived high- ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 1.37$) relative to low-status ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 1.13$) individuals as having more power to influence others, $t(76) = 11.72$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived high- ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.62$) relative to low-status ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.37$) individuals as having more power to choose and pursue their own activities and interests, $t(76) = 7.36$, $p < .0005$. All respondents but two correctly identified the high-status group on the forced choice item. Nevertheless, the data sets from these two participants were included in all data analyses.

Ratings of experienced emotion for the negative, surprise, and positive elicitors

As in Study 2, means for the seven experienced emotions were calculated for each type of elicitor. Preliminary analyses were conducted across status levels to identify overall trends in the data. Overall, with few exceptions, participants perceived individuals would experience most intensely the emotion that identified the type of eliciting situation (see Appendix U). Exceptions are as follows. For the disgust elicitor of Set A, participants perceived the emotion of anger as being most experienced by both high- and low-status individuals (see Appendix U1). In addition, for the love elicitors of Sets A and B,

participants perceived the emotion of happiness as being most experienced by both high- and low-status individuals (see Appendixes U1 and U2).

Set A. For the negative elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience negative emotions (M = 3.32, SD = .58) more than positive emotions (M = 1.37, SD = .40), $t(76) = 24.50$, $p < .0005$. Participants did not perceive a difference in the amount of negative emotions and surprise (M = 3.23, SD = .78; $t < 1$) experienced by both the high- and low-status individuals.

For the surprise elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise (M = 3.66, SD = .84) more than negative emotions (M = 2.46, SD = .71), $t(76) = 10.78$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise more than positive emotions (M = 1.97, SD = .84), $t(76) = 13.80$, $p < .0005$.

For the positive elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions (M = 4.06, SD = .52) more than negative emotions (M = 1.34, SD = .36), $t(76) = 36.11$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions more than surprise (M = 2.34, SD = .66), $t(76) = 20.32$, $p < .0005$.

Set B. Overall, the results of the elicitors from Set B were in line with those of Set A. More specifically, for the negative elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience negative emotions (M = 3.33, SD = .49) more than positive emotions (M = 1.38, SD = .39), $t(76) = 28.39$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience the negative emotions more than surprise (M = 3.19, SD = .69), $t(76) = 2.29$, $p = .025$.

For the surprise elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise (M = 3.72, SD = .96) more than negative emotions (M = 2.26, SD = .73), $t(76) = 12.30$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience surprise more than positive emotions (M = 3.72, SD = .96), $t(76) = 13.98$, $p < .0005$.

For the positive elicitors, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions (M = 4.02, SD = .57) more than negative emotions (M = 1.26, SD = .33), $t(76) = 34.08$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived both high- and low-status individuals to experience positive emotions more than surprise (M = 2.42, SD = .61), $t(76) = 18.67$, $p < .0005$.

Ratings of experienced negative emotions and surprise for the negative elicitors

The following analyses addressed the experimental hypotheses. A summary of the results that emerged from the ANOVAs conducted on the data in Study 3 are provided in Table 11. For each Set of elicitors, A and B, separate analyses were conducted. All t-tests are two-tailed unless specified otherwise.

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise). The hypothesis was that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling more anger, disgust, and surprise in reaction to negative elicitors. In addition, it was hypothesized that people perceive low- relative to high-status individuals as feeling more fear and sadness in reaction to negative elicitors. Thus, the expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Table 11

Summary of the two-way Status x Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on data of Study 3

Elicitor set	Experienced Elicitor / Perceived Emotion		High-status	No difference	Low-status
A	negative	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	*anger, disgust* *surprise*	fear, sadness	
B	negative	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	*anger*	disgust sadness surprise	*fear*
A	negative	positive		*happiness*	love[a]
B	negative	positive		*happiness, love*	
A	surprise	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise	surprise	anger, disgust fear, sadness	
B	surprise	negative (HP)* negative (LP)** surprise		anger, disgust sadness *surprise*	*fear*
A	surprise	positive		*happiness, love*	
B	surprise	positive		*happiness, love*	
A	positive	positive surprise		*happiness, love*	*surprise*
B	positive	positive surprise		*happiness, love*	*surprise*

(Table continues)

Table 11 (cont'd)

Summary of the two-way Status x Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on data of Study 3

A	positive	negative (HP)* negative (LP)**		*anger, disgust* *sadness*	fear
B	positive	negative (HP)* negative (LP)**		*anger, disgust* *sadness*	fear

Note: Table 11 summarizes the results for the two-way Status by Emotion interactions for the ANOVAs performed on the data of Study 3. The first column from the left identifies the elicitor sets for which the data were analyzed. The second column (Experienced Elicitor / Perceived Emotion) presents the type of elicitor which high- and low-status individuals were described as having encountered. Also included in this column are the experienced emotions on which the analysis focused. The third column (High-status) indicates those emotions which participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing to a greater intensity. The fourth column (No difference) indicates those emotions which participants perceived as being experienced to a similar intensity by high- and low-status individuals. The fifth column (Low-status) indicates those emotions which participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing to a greater intensity. Italicized emotions, in columns three to five, represent the results which were consistent with expectations. Non-italicized emotions, in columns three to five, represent the results which did not confirm expectations.

* HP: High-potent negative emotions; ** LP: Low-potent negative emotions

[a] one-tailed t-test

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the 20 dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .124 to .985). Results of the Box's M test were not significant, $F(210, 16735) = 1.13$, $p > .05$ and $\chi^2 (210, N = 74) = 241.09$, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor, emotion, and elicitor by emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses revealed a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = 6.59$, $p = .012$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$; see Appendix V; Table 1). Participants perceived high- ($M = 3.46$, $SD = .57$) relative to low-status ($M = 3.14$, $SD = .53$) individuals as experiencing more emotion. A significant Elicitor main effect was also found ($F(3, 222) = 31.53$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .30$). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(4, 296) = 14.71$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$). The expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(4, 296) = 10.66$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .13$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the negative elicitors. Consistent with expectations, the comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger, disgust, and surprise (see Table 12). Contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of fear and sadness experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals was found. The Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(12, 888) = 1.74$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$). As such, the expected findings for anger, disgust, and surprise emerged across all of the negative elicitor types of Set A.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction

Table 12

Ratings of emotions experienced for the negative elicitors of Set A in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Anger	3.45	.70	38	3.87	.64	38	+2.72**
Disgust	3.03	.90	38	3.46	.83	38	+2.18*
Fear	2.99	.77	38	3.04	.79	38	+.24
Sadness	3.44	.67	38	3.28	.63	38	-1.08
Surprise	2.78	.64	38	3.65	.64	38	+5.97***
Happiness	1.35	.41	38	1.26	.31	38	-1.10
Love	1.53	.58	38	1.34	.34	38	-1.80*[a]

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

[a] one-tailed t-test

($F(12, 888) = 25.01$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .25$). This interaction did not involve status, however, the finding supports the notion that, in general, each of the negative elicitors of Set A were more likely to have elicited its corresponding negative emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise). The expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the 20 dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps $> .001$ (ps ranging from .035 to .985 with the exception of one variable where $p = .001$). Results of the Box's M test were not significant, $F(210, 16735) = 1.11$, $p > .05$ and χ^2 (210, $N = 74$) = 237.22, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor and emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the two-way interaction between elicitor and emotion and the three-way status by elicitor by emotion interaction and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

In contrast to Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = .01$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$, see Appendix V; Table 2). As in Set A, the Elicitor main effect was significant ($F(3, 222) = 5.01$, $p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$). Also, as in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(4, 296) = 15.95$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 =$

.18). In addition, as in Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(4, 296) = 6.07$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the negative elicitors. The comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger and less fear (see Table 13). Contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of disgust, surprise, and sadness experienced by high- and low-status individuals was found. As in Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(7.17, 530.32) = 1.49$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$). As such, the expected findings for anger and fear emerged across all the negative elicitors.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(7.17, 530.32) = 52.29$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .41$). This interaction did not involve status, however, it supports the notion that each of the negative elicitors of Set B elicited its corresponding negative emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Ratings of experienced happiness and love for the negative elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (happiness and love). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a negative elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .004 to .908 with the

Table 13

Ratings of emotions experienced for the negative elicitors of Set B in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Anger	3.47	.66	38	3.83	.60	38	+2.48*
Disgust	3.25	.73	38	3.32	.72	38	+.41
Fear	3.21	.64	38	2.90	.59	38	-2.21*
Sadness	3.44	.56	38	3.23	.66	38	-1.50
Surprise	3.12	.59	38	3.26	.78	38	+.93
Happiness	1.32	.31	38	1.30	.40	38	-.28
Love	1.40	.37	38	1.50	.58	38	+.92

* $p < .05$

exception of one variable where $p = .001$). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(36, 18425) = 2.70$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 74) = 97.33$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the elicitor by emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the two-way interaction between elicitor and emotion and the three-way status by elicitor by emotion interaction and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = 2.48$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$; see Appendix V; Table 3). The Elicitor main effect was significant ($F(3, 222) = 6.20$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(1, 74) = 16.39$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .18$). There were no significant interactions. The Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(1, 74) = 2.62$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned (Cone & Foster, 1993; Keppel, 1991; Pagano, 1981; Pedhazur, 1982; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Comparisons were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals (see Table 12). Consistent with expectations, no difference emerged in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness experienced by high- and low-status individuals. A marginal effect was considered significant using a one-tailed t-test. Results of the one-tailed t-test indicated participants perceived high- relative

to low-status individuals as experiencing less love.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and Emotion (happiness and love). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results showed that the variance of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .003 to .667). Results of the Box's M test were not significant, $F(36, 18425) = 1.38$, $p > .05$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 74) = 49.68$, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the elicitor and the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

As in Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = .19$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix V; Table 4). In contrast to Set A, the Elicitor main effect was not significant ($F(3, 222) = 2.09$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(1, 74) = 13.21$, $p = .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .15$). Also as in Set A, there were no significant interactions (see Table 13).

Ratings of experienced surprise and negative emotions for the surprise elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (surprise, anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypothesis was that people would not perceive high- and low-status individuals as feeling different amounts of surprise following their encounter of the surprise elicitors. In addition, it was hypothesized that people would perceive high-

relative to low-status individuals as feeling more anger and disgust in reaction to surprise elicitors. Finally, it was hypothesized that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less fear and sadness in reaction to surprise elicitors. Thus, the expectation was of a significant status by emotion interaction.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the five dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .038 to .594), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the five dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(15, 22048) = 1.21$, $p > .05$ and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (15, N = 76) = 18.10$, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to not have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the emotion main effect and the two-way interaction between status and emotion and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = .65$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$; see Appendix V; Table 5). The Emotion main effect was significant ($F(3.47, 256.84) = 45.80$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .38$). The expected Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(3.47, 256.84) = 2.42$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Comparisons were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors. Contrary to expectation, t-tests revealed

participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more surprise (see Table 14). Also contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals was found.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (surprise, anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypothesis were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the five dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with $ps > .001$ (ps ranging from .101 to .737), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the five dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(15, 22048) = .77$, $p > .05$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (15, N = 76) = 11.51$, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

As in Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = .17$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix V; Table 6). Also, as in Set A, the Emotion main effect was significant ($F(4, 296) = 77.31$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .51$). As in Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(4, 296) = 1.54$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Comparisons were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the surprise elicitors. Consistent with

Table 14

Ratings of emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set A in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Surprise	3.45	.89	38	3.87	.74	38	+2.24*
Anger	2.42	1.13	38	2.58	.83	38	+.70
Disgust	2.37	1.03	38	2.34	.94	38	-.12
Fear	2.55	.92	38	2.82	.65	38	+1.44
Sadness	2.42	1.00	38	2.18	.73	38	-1.18
Happiness	2.03	.75	38	2.11	1.35	38	+.31
Love	1.87	.84	38	1.89	.69	38	+.15

* $p < .05$

expectations, t-tests participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear (see Table 15). In addition, consistent with expectation, no difference emerged in participants' perception of the amount of surprise experienced between high- and low-status individuals. Contrary to expectation, no difference in participants' perception of the amount of anger, disgust, and sadness experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals was found.

Ratings of experienced positive emotions for the surprise elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (happiness and love). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a surprise elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated the variance of the two dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps = .001 and .223. Results of the Box's M test were significant, with both the F approximation, $F(3, 985679) = 7.73$, $p < .0005$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (3, N = 76) = 23.18$, $p < .0005$. Analyses did not reveal any significant effects (see Appendix V; Table 7).

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a two-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Emotion (happiness and love). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variance of the six dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps = .422 and .987. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(3, 985679) = .35$, $p > .05$, and χ^2

Table 15

Ratings of emotions experienced for the surprise elicitors of Set B in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Surprise	3.74	.83	38	3.71	1.09	38	-.12
Anger	2.16	1.00	38	2.24	1.13	38	+.32
Disgust	2.00	.96	38	2.00	1.01	38	.00
Fear	3.18	.77	38	2.74	.92	38	-2.30*
Sadness	1.84	.89	38	1.92	.94	38	+.38
Happiness	2.18	.90	38	1.92	.78	38	-1.36
Love	1.87	.81	38	1.68	.81	38	-.99

* $p < .05$

approximation, χ^2 (3, N = 76) = 1.06, p > .05. Analyses revealed a significant Emotion main effect (F(1, 74) = 10.99, p < .001, partial η^2 = .13). Analyses did not reveal any other significant effects (see Appendix V; Table 8).

Ratings of experienced positive emotions and surprise for the positive elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness vs. love) and Emotion (happiness, love, and surprise). The hypothesis was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less surprise in reaction to positive elicitors. In addition, no difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a positive elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results showed that the variances of the six dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .264 to .800), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the six dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, F(21, 20140) = 1.21, p > .05, and χ^2 approximation, χ^2 (21, N = 74) = 25.45, p > .05. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion and the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met (ε > .70; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect (F(1, 74) = 3.81, p > .05, partial η^2 = .05; see Appendix V; Table 9). The Elicitor main effect was significant (F(1,74) = 17.15, p < .0005, partial η^2 = .12). Finally, there was a significant Emotion main effect (F(2, 148) = 320.18, p < .0005, partial η^2 = .81). The expected Status x

Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(2, 148) = 1.95$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. Consistent with expectations, the comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less surprise (see Table 16). Also, consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of happiness and love. The Status x Emotion interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(2, 148) = 5.81$, $p = .004$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$). To determine the nature of the three-way interaction, multiple independent t-tests were performed for the happiness and love elicitors on participants' ratings of experienced happiness, love, and surprise to more clearly delineate the effect of each of the positive elicitors on participants perceived experience of the positive emotions and surprise. Because these comparisons were post hoc, a Bonferroni adjustment for six comparisons was employed ($\alpha = .008$). The only difference that emerged was in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced in response to the happiness elicitors (see Appendix W; Tables 1-2). High- relative to low-status individuals were perceived as experiencing less surprise in response to the happiness elicitors. The mean difference in participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals for the love elicitors was consistent with the hypothesis but failed to reach significance.

Finally, both the Status x Elicitor interaction ($F(1, 74) = 17.78$, $p < .0005$, partial

Table 16

Ratings of emotions experienced for the positive elicitors of Set A in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Happiness	4.36	.54	38	4.32	.42	38	-.36
Love	3.88	.66	38	3.68	.70	38	-1.26
Surprise	2.52	.64	38	2.16	.64	38	-2.48*
Anger	1.24	.40	38	1.13	.24	38	-1.49
Disgust	1.31	.50	38	1.19	.26	38	-1.29
Fear	1.73	.57	38	1.39	.47	38	-2.80**
Sadness	1.45	.47	38	1.28	.37	38	-1.69

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

η^2 = .19) and the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(2, 148) = 29.04$, $p < .0005$, partial η^2 = .28) were significant. The former interaction was not of interest in that it did not distinguish between participants perceptions of respective emotions. The latter interaction did not involve status, however, the finding supports the notion that each of the positive elicitors of Set A were more likely to have elicited its corresponding positive emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness vs. love) and Emotion (happiness, love, and surprise). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results showed that the variances of the six dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .169 to .988), with varying degrees of heterogeneity among the six dependent variables. Results of the Box's M test were not significant, with both the F approximation, $F(21, 20140) = 1.06$, $p > .05$, and χ^2 approximation, $\chi^2 (21, N = 74) = 22.36$, $p > .05$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on whether the common covariance matrix had met a pattern of sphericity on tests involving the emotion and the elicitor by emotion within-subject effects indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

As in Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = 1.24$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$; see Appendix V; Table 10). In contrast to Set A, the Elicitor main effect was not significant ($F(1,74) = .18$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(2, 148) = 271.99$, $p < .0005$, partial η^2 = .79). Also, as in Set A, the expected Status x Emotion interaction was not significant ($F(2,$

148) = 1.63, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$). The means of participants' ratings of high- and low-status individuals were still examined given that the comparisons had been planned. Planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. Consistent with expectations, the comparisons revealed participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less surprise (see Table 17). Also, consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of happiness and love. The Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(2, 148) = 1.01$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$). As such, the expected findings for surprise, happiness, and love emerged across all of the positive elicitor types.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(2, 148) = 79.89$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .52$). This interaction did not involve status, however, it supports the notion that each of the positive elicitors of Set B were more likely to have elicited its corresponding positive emotion more intensely than the other emotions.

Ratings of experienced anger, disgust, fear, and sadness for the positive elicitors

Set A. Data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status Level (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness and love) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). No difference was expected in participants' perceptions of the amount of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals after encountering a positive elicitor.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the eight dependent variables

Table 17

Ratings of emotions experienced for the positive elicitors of Set B in Study 3 by status

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Happiness	4.31	.51	38	4.26	.61	38	-.36
Love	3.76	.67	38	3.74	.74	38	-.12
Surprise	2.57	.60	38	2.28	.60	38	-2.13*
Anger	1.11	.17	38	1.18	.36	38	+1.12
Disgust	1.14	.19	38	1.21	.38	38	+1.05
Fear	1.52	.54	38	1.29	.43	38	-2.05*
Sadness	1.29	.36	38	1.30	.50	38	+.13

* $p < .05$

was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .003 to .598 with the exception of one variable where $p < .001$). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(36, 18425) = 2.44$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 74) = 88.04$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of emotion and the elicitor by emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996).

Analyses did reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = 5.06$, $p = .028$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$; see Appendix V; Table 11). Participants perceived high- ($M = 1.25$, $SD = .29$) relative to low-status ($M = 1.43$, $SD = .41$) individuals as experiencing less emotion. The Elicitor main effect was not significant ($F(1, 74) = 3.77$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$). There was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(3, 222) = 29.06$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .28$). The Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(3, 222) = 2.86$, $p = .038$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$). Planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. The comparisons revealed that consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of anger, disgust, and sadness (see Table 16). Contrary to expectation, participants did perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear. The Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(3, 222) = .51$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$). As such, these findings for anger, disgust, and sadness emerged across all of the positive elicitor types.

Finally, the only other significant result was the Elicitor x Emotion interaction ($F(3, 222) = 15.96$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .18$). This interaction was not of interest for

this study in that it did not involve status.

Set B. As for Set A, data were examined within a three-way mixed ANOVA with Status Level (High vs. Low) as a between subjects factor and repeated measures on Elicitor (happiness and love) and Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness). The hypotheses were as for Set A.

Bartlett-Box results indicated that the variances of the eight dependent variables was adequate at the univariate level, with ps > .001 (ps ranging from .018 to .178 with the exception of three variables where $p \leq .001$). Results of the Box's M test were significant, $F(36, 18425) = 2.81$, $p < .0005$ and $\chi^2 (36, N = 74) = 101.32$, $p < .0005$. Tests of sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator on tests involving the within-subject effects of elicitor by emotion indicated this assumption to have been met ($\varepsilon > .70$; Stevens, 1996). However, the assumption of sphericity was not considered tenable for tests involving the emotion within-subjects effect. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimator for the main effect of emotion and the two-way interaction between status and emotion and an adjusted univariate F value was considered.

In contrast to Set A, analyses did not reveal a significant Status main effect ($F(1, 74) = .06$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$; see Appendix V; Table 12). Also, in contrast to Set A, the Elicitor main effect was significant ($F(1, 74) = 9.70$, $p = .003$, partial $\eta^2 = .12$). As in Set A, there was a significant Emotion main effect ($F(1.98, 146.57) = 20.47$, $p < .0005$, partial $\eta^2 = .22$). Also, as in Set A, the Status x Emotion interaction was significant ($F(1.98, 146.57) = 7.60$, $p = .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$). To address the interaction, planned comparisons (t-tests) were made between participants' perceptions of the emotions

experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors. The comparisons revealed participants did not perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of anger, disgust, and sadness (see Table 17). Contrary to expectation, participants did perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear. The Status x Emotion interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving Elicitor ($F(3, 222) = .29$, $p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 < .01$). As such, these findings for anger, disgust, and sadness emerged across all of the positive elicitors. There were no other significant effects.

Discussion

The results of Studies 2 and 3 were mainly consistent with expectations. Results can be understood in the broad context that having a specified social standing defines the emotions which are considered common and acceptable for that individual to feel (Smith-Lovin, 1990).

Negative elicitors

Consider the negative elicitors of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness.

Perceived experience of anger and disgust. For the emotions of anger and disgust, which are considered potent negative emotions, the expectation was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger and disgust following their encounter of negative elicitors. Consistent with expectations, results indicated that participants in both Studies 2 and 3 perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger when faced with negative elicitors. The results for the emotion of disgust were also as expected but status differences emerged in only two of the four comparisons that were made for elicitor sets across the status groups

of Studies 2 and 3.

Perceived experience of fear and sadness. Consider in turn the results for the emotions of fear and sadness, which are less potent negative emotions than are anger and disgust. The expectation for the emotions of fear and sadness was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear and sadness when faced with negative elicitors. Contrary to expectation, results indicated that, in general, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different levels of fear and sadness when faced with negative elicitors. In only one of the eight comparisons that were made for elicitors sets across the status groups of Studies 2 and 3 did a status difference emerge. In that analysis, results were as expected, in that participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear when faced with negative elicitors.

Perceived experience of surprise. For the emotion of surprise, the expectation was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more surprise when faced with negative elicitors. The results for the emotion of surprise were as expected; status differences emerged in three of the four comparisons that were made for elicitor sets across the status groups of Studies 2 and 3. As expected, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more surprise following their encounter of negative elicitors.

Perceived experience of happiness and love. For the emotions of happiness and love, the expectation was that participants would not perceive a difference in the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with negative elicitors. An unexpected status difference emerged in one of the four comparisons

that were made for love. In that analysis, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less love when faced with negative elicitors. As expected, no status differences emerged in participants' perceptions of the happiness experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with negative elicitors.

Summary of results for the negative elicitors. Overall, the findings for the negative elicitors suggest that when high- and low-status individuals encounter negative events, people, as expected, do consider these individuals' emotional reactions to be defined by the status hierarchy. In general, when a status difference emerged, people perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more anger, disgust, and surprise following their encounter of a negative elicitor.

Surprise elicitors

Consider next the perceived emotions for the surprise elicitors.

Perceived experience of anger and disgust. For the emotions of anger and disgust, which are considered potent negative emotions, the expectation was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger and disgust following their encounter of the same surprise elicitor. Contrary to expectation, results indicated that, in general, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different levels of anger and disgust when faced with surprise elicitors. In only one of the eight comparisons that were made for elicitors sets across the status groups of Studies 2 and 3 did a status difference emerge. In that analysis, results were as expected, in that participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more anger when faced with surprise elicitors.

Perceived experience of fear and sadness. Consider in turn the results for the emotions of fear and sadness, which are less potent negative emotions than are anger and disgust. The expectation for the emotions of fear and sadness was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear and sadness when faced with the same surprise elicitor. Contrary to expectation, results indicated that, in general, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different levels of fear and sadness when faced with the same surprise elicitor. A status difference emerged in only two of the eight comparisons that were made for the fear and sadness elicitor sets across the status groups of Studies 2 and 3. In these instances, as expected, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less fear when faced with a surprise elicitor.

Perceived experience of surprise. For the emotion of surprise, the expectation was that participants would not perceive high- and low-status individuals as experiencing different amounts of surprise when faced with a surprise elicitor. For three of the four comparisons, this was the case. Contrary to expectation, a status difference emerged in one of the four comparisons that were made for elicitor sets across the status groups of Studies 2 and 3. Following the encounter of the surprise elicitor of Set B ("encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another"), participants in Study 3 perceived that a high- relative to a low-status individual would experience more surprise. As such, the results for participants' perceptions of high- and low-status individuals experience of surprise following the encounter of a surprise elicitor were mainly in keeping with expectations.

Perceived experience of happiness and love. For the emotions of happiness and love, the expectation was that participants would not perceive a difference in the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with a surprise elicitor. Indeed, as expected, no status differences emerged in participants' perceptions of the happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with a surprise elicitor.

Summary of results for the surprise elicitors. Overall, the findings for the surprise elicitors suggest that when high- and low-status individuals encounter surprising events, people do not consider these individuals' emotional reactions as defined by the status hierarchy.

Positive elicitors

Consider next the perceived emotions for the positive elicitors of happiness and love.

Perceived experience of happiness and love. For the emotions of happiness and love, the expectation was that participants would not perceive a difference in the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with positive elicitors. Indeed, as expected, no status differences emerged in participants' perceptions of the happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with positive elicitors.

Perceived experience of surprise. For surprise, the expectation was that participants would perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing less surprise when faced with positive elicitors. As expected, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as feeling less surprise when faced with positive elicitors. These findings for surprise are consistent with those of Study 1. In Study 1, participants

perceived positive elicitors as more likely to occur to high- relative to low-status individuals. A consequence would be that participants in Studies 2 and 3 would perceive high-status individuals as feeling less surprise in reaction to positive elicitors.

Perceived experience of anger and disgust. For the emotions of anger and disgust, which are considered potent negative emotions, the expectation was that participants would not perceive a difference in the amount of these negative emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with positive elicitors. Results were consistent with expectations. Results indicated that participants in both Studies 2 and 3 did not perceive these emotions as being differentially experienced by high- and low-status individuals.

Perceived experience of fear and sadness. Consider in turn the results for the emotions of fear and sadness, which are less potent negative emotions than are anger and disgust. The expectation for the emotions of fear and sadness was that participants would not perceive a difference in the amount of the low-potent negative emotions of fear and sadness experienced by high- and low-status individuals when faced with positive elicitors. Contrary to expectations, participants' perceived the amounts of fear and sadness experienced by high- and low-status individuals following a positive elicitor to differ. For the emotion of fear, status differences emerged in three of the four comparisons that were made across elicitor sets for the status groups of Studies 2 and 3. For the emotion of sadness, a status difference emerged in one of the four comparisons that was made across elicitor sets for the status groups of Studies 2 and 3. These results indicated that when a status difference emerged, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing more fear and sadness when faced with positive elicitors. These findings,

while unexpected, may be linked to the expectations surrounding low-status individuals experience of surprise when faced with a positive elicitor. As noted above, low- relative to high-status individuals were perceived as feeling more surprise when faced with positive elicitors. The indication that more surprise is perceived to be experienced by low- relative to high-status individuals when faced with positive elicitors may be linked to low-status individuals being perceived to experience feelings of insecurity and uncertainty as to whether the positive event is considered deserved or calls for reciprocation. Given the individual's low-status, emotions of fear and sadness may be experienced as a result of their perceived inability to pay back such positive intentions. These results were consistent with the general theoretical framework that high- relative to low-status individuals are more likely to experience potent emotions, while low- relative to high-status individuals are more likely to experience less potent emotions (Heise, 1979; Smith-Lovin, 1990). Nevertheless, the nature of this finding was unexpected such that the difference in low- relative to high-status individuals experience of the low-potent emotions followed their encounter of a positive elicitor.

Summary of results for the positive elicitors. Overall, the findings for the positive elicitors suggest that when high- and low-status individuals encounter positive events, people, as expected, do consider these individuals' emotional reactions to be defined by the status hierarchy. In general, when a status difference emerged, people perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience less surprise following their encounter of a positive elicitor. An unexpected finding was that following the encounter of positive events, people also consider the amount of the low-potent negative emotions, fear and sadness, to be defined by the status hierarchy. When a status difference emerged, people perceived low- relative to high-status

individuals to experience more fear and sadness following their encounter of a positive elicitor.

Overall summary

Most of the results in Studies 2 and 3 were as expected. As expected, when a status difference emerged, participants considered that high- relative to low-status individuals experience more of the high-potent negative emotions of anger and disgust following their encounter of a negative or surprise elicitor. Also as expected, when a status difference emerged, participants considered that low- relative to high-status individuals experience more of the low-potent negative emotion of fear following their encounter of a negative or surprise elicitor. Unexpectedly, a status difference emerged which indicated that participants considered low-relative to high status individuals experience more of the low-potent negative emotions of fear and sadness following their encounter of a positive elicitor. In conclusion, as expected, the results of Studies 2 and 3 indicated that high- relative to low-status individuals were not perceived by participants as simply experiencing more of the high-potent negative emotions of anger and disgust when faced with any type of elicitor. In addition, and also as expected, results indicated that low- relative to high-status individuals were not perceived by participants as simply experiencing more of the low-potent negative emotions of fear and sadness when faced with any type of elicitor. For the emotion of surprise, when a status difference emerged, participants, as expected, perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more surprise when faced with a negative or surprise elicitor, whereas low- relative to high-status individuals were perceived to experience more surprise when faced with a positive elicitor. In general, consistent with expectations, no difference in the amount of happiness and love experienced was perceived to exist between high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of negative, surprise, or positive elicitors.

Study 4

Study 4 addressed an alternative, group conflict, explanation based on people's social perception of groups of the results of Studies 2 and 3. Previous research on the interaction between members of two groups has demonstrated that individuals in the identified groups assume competition and conflict to exist between the members of the two groups (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). How observers consider the interaction between the members of two groups has been shown to function in much the same manner. For example, Wilder (1978; Study 1) had participants read a summary of a civil suit. Participants were then informed they would be viewing a videotape which contained the opinions of four individuals concerning the legal case. The opinions participants would hear would be the respective individuals' initial reactions to the legal case. In one (one-group) condition, participants were informed that the discussants belonged to the same group (J). In another (two-groups) condition, participants were informed that two groups (J and K) were equally represented by the discussants. That is, half the discussants were described as belonging to group J and the other half of the discussants were described as belonging to group K. All participants viewed the identical videotape. Participants in the one-group condition were asked to listen to the opinions of group member one of the "J" group. Participants in the one-group condition were then asked to predict the opinion of "group member three." Participants in the two-group condition were also asked to listen to the opinions of group member one of the "J" group. Participants in the two-groups condition were asked to predict the opinion of "group member one of the K group" (who was the same confederate as group member three (of the J group) in the one-group condition). In the condition in which the discussants were described as belonging to one group, participants expected that "group member three" would agree with the opinion expressed by "group

member one." In the condition in which the discussants were described as belonging to two groups, participants perceived that "group member one of the K group" would disagree with the opinion expressed by "group member one of the J group."

People have been shown to make unspoken inferences to determine the causes and consequences of actions (Singer & Ferreira, 1983; van den Broek, 1990). People have been found to fill in ambiguities and details based on their stereotypes of the target individual they are observing (Dunning & Sherman, 1997). How two groups are perceived by observers may have implications for participants' perceptions of the emotions experienced in Studies 2 and 3. Consider the findings in Studies 2 and 3. When a status difference emerged for the negative elicitors, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more of the high-potent negative emotions of anger and disgust, as well as surprise. The alternative group conflict account of these findings is that when a participant is presented a situation wherein a high-status individual is faced with a negative elicitor, the participant would assume that the elicitor was caused by a low-status group member, resulting in the high-status individual being surprised by the occurrence of the event and experiencing the high-potent emotions of anger and disgust. The experience of anger by high-status individuals may reflect an assertion of authority (cf. Averill, 1982). Next consider that in Studies 2 and 3, the expectation was that low- relative to high-status individuals would be perceived by participants to experience more of the low potent emotions of fear and sadness after facing a negative elicitor. In general, no status difference emerged for the experience of the low-potent negative emotions of fear and sadness in reaction to the negative elicitors. Nevertheless, the group conflict account is that when a participant perceives a low-status individual as faced with a negative elicitor, the participant would assume that the elicitor was caused by a high-status

group member resulting in the low-status individual experiencing the low-potent emotions of fear and sadness.

Other findings in Studies 2 and 3 indicated that when a status difference emerged for the surprise elicitors, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more anger, more surprise, and less fear. In contrast, the alternative account from a group conflict perspective is that participants will perceive the surprise elicitors occurring to one individual as being caused by a member of the other group. As such, the group conflict perspective leads to the expectation in Study 4 that when a participant perceives a high-status individual as faced with a surprise elicitor, the person would assume that the elicitor was caused by a low-status group member, resulting in the high-status individual being perceived by participants as experiencing surprise along with the high-potent emotions of anger and disgust. As well, it follows that when a person perceives a low-status individual faced with a surprise elicitor, the person would assume that the elicitor was caused by a high-status group member, resulting in the low-status individual being perceived by participants as experiencing surprise along with the low-potent emotions of fear and sadness.

When a status difference emerged, for the positive elicitors of Studies 2 and 3, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing more of the negative emotions of fear and sadness, and surprise. A group conflict perspective implies that when a positive elicitor is encountered by an individual the positive elicitor would be perceived by participants to have been caused by a member of the same group resulting in the individual not feeling threatened. As such, the expectation would not be of high- and low-status individuals experiencing different amounts of the negative emotions, surprise, or the positive emotions.

In sum, the group conflict perspective expectation for both the negative and surprise elicitors was for cross-status effects. Negative and surprise elicitors that occur to one individual would be perceived as originating from a member of the other group. In addition, for the positive elicitors that occur to one individual the expectation was that participants would perceive an individual who belongs to the same status group as more likely to have caused the event. Nevertheless, as noted above, a group conflict perspective cannot account for the elevated fear and sadness ratings made for low-status individuals for the positive elicitors.

Method

Participants

Participants in Study 4 were undergraduate students recruited in the same manner as in Study 2. In Study 4, there were 35 male and 36 female participants. Mean age was 26.6 years; range was 18 to 69.

Procedure

As in Study 2, the experimenter read a cover story which described the experiments dealing with the first impressions that individuals make when they come in contact with the people of a new culture (see Appendix H). Participants then completed a consent form (see Appendix I). The procedure for Study 4 was identical to that of Study 2 up to the administration of the dependent measure.

For Study 4, the 24 descriptions of the eliciting situations of Study 1 were again utilized. For half of the participants, the questionnaire read as follows: "Individuals in this culture may encounter different situations. For each of the situations listed, please decide whether the situation encountered by a Gunada is more likely to have been caused by another Gunada or more likely to have been caused by a Ngwani." (see Appendix X). These

instructions were followed by the elicitors of Set A. Participants indicated whether the elicitor's cause or source was more likely a Gunada (1), equally likely (2), or more likely a Ngwani (3). After responding to the elicitors of Set A, participants were provided the following instructions: "You have just answered questions as to how likely situations a Gunada encounters may have been caused by another Gunada or a Ngwani. You will be now presented with a different set of situations which have occurred to a Ngwani. This time you will be asked whether each situation was more likely to have been caused by another Ngwani or more likely to have been caused by a Gunada." These instructions were then followed by the elicitors of Set B. Participants again indicated their responses in a manner identical to that described above. For the other half of the participants the pairing of elicitors to status level was reversed. Order of presentation of the status groups was counterbalanced.

A manipulation check (see Appendix N) was administered to participants after they had completed the questionnaire. Participants were then debriefed (see Appendix Y) and paid $8 for their participation.

Results

Manipulation Check

Participants perceived high- ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 1.25$) relative to low-status ($M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.13$) individuals as having more power to influence others, $t(71) = 12.70$, $p < .0005$. In addition, participants perceived high- ($M = 5.62$, $SD = 1.41$) relative to low-status ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 1.50$) individuals as having more power to choose and pursue their own activities and interests, $t(71) = 8.47$, $p < .0005$. All respondents but one correctly identified the high-status group on the forced choice item.

Perceived cause of elicitors

Participants' perceptions of an elicitor's cause were analyzed using a χ^2 test of the independence of categorical variables (Pagano, 1981; Runyon & Haber, 1984). For the elicitors of Sets A and B, participants' responses were analyzed to determine whether there existed across status a difference in the perceived cause of an elicitor (see Tables 18 and 19).

Set A

Expectations of perceived cause of the negative and surprise elicitors. In terms of the group conflict perspective, the expectation for both the negative and surprise elicitors was for cross-status effects. More specifically, when either a negative or surprise elicitor was described as having occurred to a high-status individual, the expectation from a group conflict perspective was that people would be more likely to endorse the choice of a low-status individual as the originator of the elicitor than would be expected by chance. In contrast, when either a negative or surprise elicitor was described as having occurred to a low-status individual, the expectation from a group conflict perspective was that people would be more likely to endorse the choice of a high-status individual as the originator of the elicitor than would be expected by chance.

Perceived cause of the negative elicitors. Overall, results for the negative elicitors of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness of Set A were somewhat consistent with expectations derived from the group conflict perspective (see Table 18). Consider that for four of the seven negative elicitors a significant cross-status effect did emerge. Participants' responses suggested that given two anger elicitors and one disgust elicitor of Set A, participants were more likely to perceive a low-status individual as more likely to have caused these

Table 18

Elicitors of Set A presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low Source Selection			Target Status Level: High Source Selection			χ^2
	Low	Equal	High	Low	Equal	High	
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Anger							
Be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be	7	18	10	**18**	10	8	7.28*
Feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation	**1**	19	15	**12**	16	8	11.69**
Disgust							
Experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature	**1**	26	8	**10**	22	4	8.99*
Fear							
Be threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment	1	21	13	5	24	7	4.70

(Table continues)

Table 18 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of Set A presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low Source Selection			Target Status Level: High Source Selection			χ^2
	Low	Equal	High	Low	Equal	High	
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Anticipate social rejection	**0**	5	*30*	**13**	7	*16*	17.52**
Sadness							
Not get something that he/she had wanted or wished for	4	21	10	9	18	9	2.18
Have experienced an undesirable event	1	27	7	8	22	6	5.89
Surprise							
Encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another	3	26	6	10	22	4	4.48
Happiness							
Receive respect	27	8	**0**	21	10	**5**	6.10*

(Table continues)

Table 18 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of Set A presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low Source Selection			Target Status Level: High Source Selection			χ^2
	Low	Equal	High	Low	Equal	High	
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Get something that he/she wanted or had worked hard for	7	17	11	3	14	19	4.06
Love							
Enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person	*18*	14	**3**	*1*	8	**27**	36.00**
Be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another	*16*	18	**1**	*2*	10	**24**	34.15**

Note: Low = more likely a Gunada; Equal = equally likely; High = more likely a Ngwani

Bolded numbers represent those columns which were noted to contribute most to a significant χ^2 statistic.

Italicized numbers represent those columns which were noted to contribute second most to a significant χ^2 statistic.

Total N = 71.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 19

Elicitors of Set B presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low — Source Selection: Low	Low — Equal	Low — High	High — Low	High — Equal	High — High	χ^2
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Anger							
Find that his/her execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another	2	16	18	2	18	15	0.37
Be wronged in a situation and consequently lose status or respect	6	18	12	2	15	18	2.53
Disgust							
Encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive	*3*	25	**8**	*12*	23	**0**	13.47**
Fear							
Anticipate losing control or competence	4	15	17	5	17	13	0.77

(Table continues)

Table 19 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of Set B presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low Source Selection			Target Status Level: High Source Selection			χ^2
	Low	Equal	High	Low	Equal	High	
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Face a possible loss or a failure	5	22	9	3	20	12	0.94
Sadness							
Be in unfortunate circumstances and be helpless to change them	2	16	18	4	21	10	3.58
Have experienced social rejection or exclusion	5	4	27	5	8	22	1.87
Surprise							
Encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another	**1**	22	*13*	**12**	21	*2*	17.36**
Happiness							
Find that things have turned out better than expected	**9**	19	*8*	**2**	15	*18*	8.74**

(Table continues)

Table 19 (Cont'd)

Elicitors of Set B presented to participants in Study 4 and perceived cause or source with selection frequency by status

Elicitors	Target Status Level: Low — Source Selection: Low	Low — Equal	Low — High	High — Low	High — Equal	High — High	χ^2
	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Be accepted by others	**25**	9	*2*	**4**	18	*13*	26.28**
Love							
Share a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person	**33**	2	*1*	**1**	11	*23*	56.80**
Feel open and trusting in another person's presence	**28**	6	*2*	**3**	14	*18*	35.57**

Note: Low = more likely a Gunada; Equal = equally likely; High = more likely a Ngwani

Bolded numbers represent those columns which were noted to contribute most to a significant χ^2 statistic.

Italicized numbers represent those columns which were noted to contribute second most to a significant χ^2 statistic.

Total N = 71.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

elicitors to a high-status individual than to another low-status individual. For the fear elicitor of "anticipate social rejection" participants' responses suggested that they perceived a low-status individual as more likely to have caused this fear elicitor to a high-status individual than to another low-status individual. In addition, participants' responses suggested that they perceived a high-status individual as more likely to have caused this fear elicitor to a low-status individual than to another high-status individual. For the three remaining negative elicitors, the pattern of participants' responses did not support a group conflict perspective.

Consider the results for the negative elicitors in more detail. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were significant for the anger elicitors of "be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be" and "feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation"; for the disgust elicitor of "experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature"; and the fear elicitor of "anticipate social rejection." For the anger elicitor of "be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be," 61.7% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants' selecting a low-status individual as the originator. For the angry elicitor of "feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation," 76.8% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants' selecting a low-status individual as the originator. For the disgust elicitor of "experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature," 79.0% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants' selecting a low-status individual as the originator. For the fear elicitor of "anticipate social rejection," 72.0% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants' selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 26.5% of the χ^2

statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants' selecting a high-status individual as the originator. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were not significant for the three negative elicitors of "be threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment" (fear elicitor), "not get something that he/she had wanted or wished for" (sadness elicitor), and "have experienced an undesirable event" (sadness elicitor).

Perceived cause of the surprise elicitor. The χ^2 statistic on the pattern of participants' responses as to the originator of the surprise elicitor "encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another" of Set A was not significant (see Table 18). As such, participants' pattern of responses when a low- or a high-status individual were described as having encountered the surprise elicitor of Set A were inconsistent with a group conflict perspective.

Expectations of perceived cause of the positive elicitors. From a group conflict perspective, the expectation for the cause of positive elicitors was for a same status group member. More specifically, when a positive elicitor was described as having occurred to a high-status individual, the expectation from a group conflict perspective was that people would be more likely to endorse the choice of another high-status individual as the originator of the elicitor than would be expected by chance. In contrast, when a positive elicitor was described as having occurred to a low-status individual, the expectation from a group conflict perspective was that people would be more likely to endorse the choice of another low-status individual as the originator of the elicitor than would be expected by chance.

Perceived cause of the positive elicitors. Overall, results for the positive elicitors of happiness and love of Set A were somewhat consistent with expectations derived from the group conflict perspective (see Table 18). Consider that for three of the four positive elicitors a significant same status effect emerged. Participants' responses suggested that given the happiness elicitor of "receive respect" of Set A, participants were more likely to perceive a high-status individual as more likely to have caused this elicitor to another high-status individual than to a low-status individual. For the two love elicitors, participants' responses suggested that given these two love elicitors of "enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person" and "be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another" participants were more likely to perceive a high-status individual as more likely to have caused this elicitor to another high-status individual than to a low-status individual. In addition, given these same two love elicitors participants were more likely to perceive a low-status individual as more likely to have caused this elicitor to another low-status individual than to a high-status individual. For the remaining happiness elicitor, the pattern of participants' responses did not support a group conflict perspective.

Consider the results for the positive elicitors in more detail. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were significant for high- and low-status individuals described as faced with the happiness elicitor of "receive respect"; and the love elicitors of "enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person" and "be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another." Consider first the results for the happiness elicitor. For the happiness elicitor of "receive respect," 82.0% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the

originator. For the love elicitor of "enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person," 51.6% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator while 43.3% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator. For the love elicitor of "be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another," 59.8% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator while 32.8% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were not significant for the happiness elicitor of "get something that he/she wanted or had worked hard for."

Set B

Expectations of perceived cause of the negative and surprise elicitors. In terms of the group conflict perspective the expectation for both the negative and surprise elicitors of Set B were similar to those of Set A.

Perceived cause of the negative elicitors. Overall, results for the negative elicitors of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness of Set B were mainly inconsistent with expectations derived from the group conflict perspective (see Table 19). Consider that for only one of the seven negative elicitors of Set B did a significant cross-status effect emerge. The significant effect emerged for the disgust elicitor of "encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive," participants responses suggested that they perceived a high-status individual as more likely to have caused this disgust elicitor to a low-status individual than to another high-status individual. In addition, participants responses suggested that they perceived a low-status individual as more likely to have

caused this disgust elicitor to a high-status individual than to another low-status individual. For the six remaining negative elicitors, the pattern of participants' responses did not support a group conflict perspective.

Consider the results for the negative elicitors in more detail. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were significant only in the case of the disgust elicitor of "encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive." For this disgust elicitor, 57.6% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator while 42.1% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were not significant for the angry elicitors of "find that his/her execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another" and "be wronged in a situation and consequently lose status or respect"; the fear elicitors of "anticipate losing control or competence" and "face a possible loss or a failure"; and the sadness elicitors of "be in unfortunate circumstances and be helpless to change them" and "have experienced social rejection or exclusion."

Perceived cause of the surprise elicitor. Participants' perceptions of the cause of the surprise elicitor "encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another" were consistent with a group conflict perspective (see Table 19). Participants' responses suggested that they perceived a low-status individual as more likely to have caused this surprise elicitor to a high-status individual than to another low-status individual. In addition, participants' responses suggested that they perceived a high-status individual as more likely to have caused this surprise elicitor to a low-status individual than to another high-status individual. More specifically, frequency analyses of participants' responses of

this surprise elicitor indicated that 55.4% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 44.6% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator.

Expectations of perceived cause of the positive elicitors. In terms of the group conflict perspective the expectation for the cause of positive elicitors of Set B were similar to those of Set A.

Perceived cause of the positive elicitors. Overall, results for the positive elicitors of happiness and love of Set B were consistent with expectations derived from a group conflict perspective (see Table 19). Participants' responses suggested that given the positive elicitors of Set B, participants were more likely to have perceived a low-status individual as more likely to have caused each of these positive elicitors to another low-status individual than to a high-status individual. In addition, participants responses suggested that given the positive elicitors of Set B, participants were more likely to have perceived a high-status individual as more likely to have caused each of these positive elicitors to another high-status individual than to a low-status individual.

Consider the results of the positive elicitors of Set B in more detail. Frequency analyses of participants' responses were significant for the happiness elicitors of "find things have turned out better than expected" and "be accepted by others"; and the love elicitors of "share a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person" and "feel open and trusting in another person's presence." Consider first the results for the happiness elicitors. For the happiness elicitor of "find things have turned out better than expected," 48.1% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants

selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 47.6% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator. For the happiness elicitor of "be accepted by others," 55.7% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 31.8% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator. For the love elicitor of "share a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person," 51.7% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 36.8% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator. For the love elicitor of "feel open and trusting in another person's presence," 54.9% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a low-status individual as the originator while 35.6% of the χ^2 statistic was contributed by the pattern of participants selecting a high-status individual as the originator.

Discussion

Overall, the results for the negative and surprise elicitors of Sets A and B differed from those of the positive elicitors of Sets A and B.

Negative elicitors

Consider first the results for the negative elicitors. In sum, of the 14 relevant comparisons for the negative elicitors, only five revealed cross-status effects. Analyses revealed few cross-status effects wherein the cause of an event to one person was perceived by participants to have been a member of the other status group. Consider the few cross-status effects that did emerge. Of the negative elicitors of Set A, participants

perceived a cross-status effect to exist for high- and low-status individuals described as having encountered the two anger elicitors of "be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be" and "feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation"; for the one disgust elicitor of "experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature"; and for one of the two the fear elicitors, that is, "anticipate social rejection." Of the negative elicitors of Set B, participants perceived a cross-status effect to exist when high- and low-status individuals were described as having encountered the one disgust elicitor of "encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive." These five results were consistent with a group conflict perspective wherein the expectation following a negative elicitor was for cross-status effects. Participants did not perceive a cross-status effect to exist for high- and low-status individuals described as having encountered the two anger elicitors of Set B, one of the two fear elicitors of Set A, both fear elicitors of Set B, and the two sadness elicitors of Set A, and the two sadness elicitors of Set B. Overall, the findings for the negative elicitors are not consistent with a group conflict perspective.

Surprise elicitors

Consider next the surprise elicitors of Sets A and B. Results indicated that participants perceived the surprise elicitor of Set B, "encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another," to have been caused by a cross-status individual, thereby the group conflict perspective was supported. The result for the surprise elicitor of Set A, "encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another," was not significant, thereby the group conflict perspective was not supported. As such, the results for the surprise elicitors did not provide overwhelming support for a group conflict perspective.

Positive elicitors

Consider next the ratings for the positive elicitors of Sets A and B. In summary, when a positive elicitor was described as having occurred to a low- or a high-status individual, participants' responses indicated they perceived seven of the eight positive elicitors in Sets A and B to have originated from a same status group member. As such, the results for the positive elicitors of Sets A and B were mainly in keeping with a group conflict perspective.

Conclusion

In conclusion, results for the negative and surprise elicitors of Sets A and B demonstrated few cross-status effects. Overall, results for the positive elicitors were in favor of a group conflict perspective. When a positive elicitor was described as having been encountered by high- and low-status individuals participants perceived same status individuals as more likely to have been the cause in seven of the eight analyses.

In concert, the results for Study 4 were not consistent with a group conflict perspective. From a group conflict perspective it would be expected that when negative and surprise events occur the cause is perceived to be an individual from the other status group. This was not systematically observed in Study 4. In most instances, results from Study 4 did not indicate that participants perceived members of the opposite status groups to be the cause of negative and surprise elicitors. As such, participants did not perceive that group conflict existed between the high- and low-status groups as described in Study 4. Indeed, there was no evidence provided for such conflict. In addition, it would be expected from a group conflict perspective that when a positive event occurs, an individual from the same status group would be perceived as the cause. In Study 4, the

results for the positive elicitors were in favor of a group conflict perspective.

Given the discrepancy in the group conflict perspective's ability to account for the outcomes for the positive elicitors, as compared to the negative and surprise elicitors, an alternate explanation for participants' perceptions of the cause of the positive elicitors is offered. It would seem plausible to offer the explanation that greater expression of positive elicitors intra-group comes as a result of the high degree of proximity and interaction between members of one's own group. Same group members have favorable attitudes towards one another (Hamilton, 1979), treat one another as equal (Wilder, 1986), judge each other as possessing positive traits (Hamilton, 1979; Wilder, 1981; 1986), and as possessing similar beliefs (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Smith, 1993; Wilder, 1981; 1984; 1986). Similar attitudes have been found to lead to attraction between people (Newcomb, 1956; see also Cappella & Palmer, 1990). In addition, similarity of attitudes leads to individuals experiencing positive affect while discrepancy between attitudes leads to individuals experiencing negative affect (cf. Newcomb, 1961; Orive, 1988). Because people are most interested in having others validate their own views they are more likely to turn to those they believe share similar attitudes (cf. Baron & Byrne, 1997). Mutual liking and positive interpersonal behavior are greater between individuals where positive evaluation exists (cf. Curtis & Miller, 1986).

General Discussion

Results of the studies of the present research will be briefly reviewed. Implications that emerged as a consequence of the findings in these studies will then be addressed.

Results of Study 1

Study 1 addressed how an individual's status level affects people's perceptions as

to how likely that individual will encounter different emotion-eliciting situations. Consider the results of the elicitors for the negative emotions and surprise. People perceived that high- as compared to low-status individuals are less likely to be exposed to those situations which elicit anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise. These results are consistent with the notion that high- relative to low-status individuals have more prestige (Kemper, 1978) and have more power to control their own and others' outcomes (Dépret & Fiske, 1993). These results are also congruent with the notion that an individual of high-status is more privileged (Kemper, 1978) and more likely to hold better social positions.

Consider next the results of the elicitors for the positive emotions. Results were as expected for the happiness elicitors and consistent with those for the negative elicitors in that people perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as more likely to encounter those situations which elicit happiness. The results for the love elicitors were mainly congruent with expectations that participants' would perceive high- and low-status individuals as equally likely to encounter a love elicitor. The results for the love elicitors are consistent with work that has found love relationships to be defined between individuals of a same status group (Argyle, 1994). As such, the occurrence of a love elicitor is not considered by people to be necessarily determined by one's social standing. In conclusion, results from Study 1 suggest that people perceive lower status individuals as more likely to encounter negative events and less likely to encounter happy events. In addition, peoples' perceptions that there exists an increased likelihood of low- relative to high-status individuals encountering a surprise elicitor is consistent with the view that lower status individuals are perceived to wield less control over their own and others'

outcomes (cf. Dépret & Fiske, 1993).

Results of Studies 2 and 3

Studies 2 and 3 addressed people's perceptions of the emotions that high- and low-status individuals would experience following their encounter of emotion-eliciting situations.

Negative elicitors. Consider first the results for the negative elicitors. Consistent with expectations, when a status difference emerged, participants perceived that the potency of the negative emotions that were experienced by high- and low-status individuals was determined by the individual's status level. More specifically, the more potent negative emotions of anger and disgust were perceived by participants to be experienced more by the high- relative to the low-status individuals following the encounter of a negative elicitor. In addition, the less potent negative emotion of fear was perceived by participants to be experienced more by the low- relative to the high-status individuals following their encounter of a negative elicitor. However, the latter finding cannot be considered reliable given that it emerged in only one of the four analyses.

Consider next participants' perceptions of the amount of surprise experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a negative elicitor. When a status difference emerged, participants perceived that a high- relative to a low-status individual would experience more surprise. This finding suggests that participants perceived the occurrence of the negative elicitors considered in this study to be unexpected from a high-status individual's point of view. In addition, this result is congruent with those of Study 1 which indicated that people perceive high- relative to low-status individuals are less likely to encounter negative elicitors. As such, participants

in Studies 2 and 3 seemed to exhibit an expectancy bias for the occurrence of negative elicitors. Also, consistent with expectations, participants in Studies 2 and 3 did not generally perceive different amounts of the positive emotions to be experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a negative elicitor. Overall, participants rated the experience of positive emotions following negative elicitors as very low.

Surprise elicitors. Consider next the results for the surprise elicitors of Studies 2 and 3. Overall, few status effects emerged. In general, participants did not perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different amounts of surprise following their encounter of a surprise elicitor. Nor did participants perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different amounts of positive emotions following their encounter of a surprise elicitor. Contrary to expectations, participants did not generally perceive high- and low-status individuals to experience different amounts of negative emotions following their encounter of a surprise elicitor. In summary, these results suggest that following the encounter of a surprise elicitor, high- and low-status individuals are perceived by people to not differ in their emotional experiences with regard to the emotions considered in the present studies. The findings that people did not perceive a status difference for the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following a surprise elicitor is in keeping with the conceptualization that surprise is experienced early in the appraisal process. It would appear that when an individual is described as having encountered a surprise elicitor participants perceived the experience of surprise to be the primary reaction. The amount of experienced surprise is not considered to differ between high- and low-status individuals as a result of a surprise elicitor being

defined by its unexpected nature (Roseman et al., 1996). It is only later in the appraisal process that surprise changes to other emotions in order to differentiate the emotional state of individuals (e.g., Scherer, 1984a).

Positive elicitors. Next, consider the results for the positive elicitors of Studies 2 and 3. Consistent with expectations, participants did not perceive the amount of positive emotions experienced by high- relative to low-status individuals to differ following their encounter of a positive elicitor. Past work has found happiness to be a benign emotion (Sommers, 1984) and to have a low potency rating (Shaver et al., 1987). The experience of happiness is generally considered appropriate by whomever experiences it, regardless of status. In addition, love is considered an emotion that is typically felt towards close others (e.g., Fehr, 1988) within one socioeconomic group (Argyle, 1994), thereby leaving it unaffected by the status hierarchy. The results for the amount of surprise experienced following the encounter of a positive elicitor were also consistent with expectations. Participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as experiencing more surprise following their encounter of a positive elicitor. This finding suggests that participants perceived the occurrence of the positive elicitors considered in these studies to be unexpected from a low-status individual's point of view. These results were congruent with those of Study 1 in which participants perceived that a happiness elicitor would more likely be encountered by a high- relative to a low-status individual. As such, participants in Studies 2 and 3 seemed to consider the existence of an expectancy bias for the occurrence of the positive elicitors considered in these studies. The finding that the encounter of the love elicitors were considered more surprising by low- relative to high-status individuals was unexpected given love is considered to be felt most between

individuals of one status group (Argyle, 1994). Nevertheless, the finding that participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals to experience more surprise following the love elicitors considered in these studies was congruent with participants' perceptions of the love elicitors in the pre-test. In the pre-test, participants endorsed with almost equal frequency the emotions of love and happiness when asked to identify the emotion experienced following the encounter of the love elicitors considered in this research. Finally, consistent with expectations, participants in Studies 2 and 3 did not perceive different amounts of the high-potent negative emotions to be experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors considered in this research. Overall, participants rated the experience of negative emotions following positive elicitors as very low.

Results of Study 4

Studies 2 and 3 were based on the hypotheses that the emotions an individual experiences are associated with that individual's potency level (cf. Shaver et al., 1987). It was on the basis of this model that the expectations for Studies 2 and 3 regarding participants' perceptions of emotional experience by low- and high-status individuals following their encounter of the elicitors were derived. For example, a negative event that was described as having been encountered by a high-status individual was expected to result in participants perceiving the high-status individuals to experience the high-potent negative emotion of anger. Study 4 was conducted to address an alternative explanation to the results of Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 addressed people's perceptions regarding the cause of elicitors. Hypotheses were developed from a group conflict perspective (e.g., Wilder, 1978).

Negative and surprise elicitors. Consider first participants' perceptions of the causes of the negative and surprise elicitors. If the group conflict perspective could account for the results of Studies 2 and 3, then the results of Study 4 would be that when a negative or a surprise elicitor is encountered by a member of one status group, people would perceive a member of the other status group as having been its cause. In fact, results in Study 4 indicated that when a negative or a surprise elicitor was described as having been encountered by a member of one status group, people in general did not perceive a member of the other status group as most likely being its cause.

Positive elicitors. Consider next participants' perceptions of the cause of the positive elicitors in Study 4. If the group conflict perspective could account for the results of Studies 2 and 3, then the results of Study 4 would be that when a positive elicitor is encountered by a member of one group, people would perceive a member of the same status group as having been its cause. Results of Study 4 were in favor of a group conflict perspective existing in the case of the happiness and love elicitors considered in this study. Of the eight analyses completed, seven clearly emerged in favor of a group conflict perspective. Analyses of the love elicitors indicated that for all of the comparisons, participants perceived a member of the same status group as having been its cause. The findings for the love elicitors are also consistent with the notion that love is felt most between individuals of one status group (Argyle, 1994).

While in favor of a group conflict perspective, participants' perceptions of the cause of the positive elicitors are also in line with the notion that the experience of a positive emotion is generally considered to be appropriate (cf. Sommers, 1984), and thereby, the experience of a positive emotion is not considered inappropriate by either

high- or low-status individuals. As a result, it would seem plausible that participants may have perceived that the cause of the positive elicitors was either a member of the same or opposite status group.

The general trend in Study 4 was that positive elicitors are seen by people as caused by a same status individual. It does not assist in explaining why participants in Studies 2 and 3 sometimes perceived that the encounter of a positive elicitor would result in low- relative to high-status individuals experiencing more of the low-potent negative emotion of fear. This latter trend could be considered in terms of Scherer's (1984a) stimulus evaluation check process model of appraisal. In the fifth stage of the process, an individual assesses whether an event is consistent with aspects of their own internal standards such as real or ideal self-concept. Scherer states that events that are not compatible with one's self-concept lead to the individual experiencing negative emotions such as embarrassment, shame, or guilt. Given the existence of this stage in the stimulus evaluation check process it would seem plausible that if an event is not perceived to be in keeping with the self-concept of a low-status individual the emotion that is perceived to be experienced would be the low-potent negative emotion of fear.

The finding that people perceived lower status individuals to experience more fear following their encounter of a positive elicitor may also be considered in terms of Swann's (1990) theory of self-verification. Swann's work was influenced by theories of self-enhancement (e.g., Shrauger, 1975) and self-consistency (e.g., Lecky, 1961). Self-enhancement theory suggests that people attempt to promote the idea that they are good and worthwhile individuals. Self-consistency theory argues that people pursue feedback which validates their self-beliefs irrespective of whether these beliefs are positive or

negative. Swann's theory of self-verification advances the notion maintained by the self-consistency advocates. Self-verification theory adds that people feel inclined to validate their self-perceptions in order to help support their perception of the world as being predictable and controllable. This stance assumes that people are more motivated by a need for prediction and control than for a desire of self-enhancement. Swann believes that events which are congruent with a person's self-perception maximize predictability and control and tend to fortify the person's feelings of security. In contrast, events that are perceived by an individual as conflicting with that individual's self-perception are believed to instill fear. Given this position one might argue that congruent with Swann's conceptualization a low-status individual that encounters a positive elicitor would experience more fear than would a high-status individual as a result of the event being considered unexpected and not in keeping with the self-perceptions of the low-status individual. Notwithstanding the status difference that emerged in the amount of fear participants perceived to be experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their encounter of a positive elicitor, participants endorsed happiness as the emotion that was experienced most by low- and high-status individuals following their encounter of the positive elicitors.

Perceived experienced emotions

The present studies addressed people's perception of others' experienced emotions as a function of the others' status. Perceptions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, and love were addressed. All but disgust are considered prototypes in lay representation of emotion (Shaver et al., 1987). The question arises as to whether the present results hold for the range of emotions represented by the prototypes identified by

Shaver et al. For example, Shaver et al. (1987) identified 33 emotions as belonging to the happiness prototype. Do people perceive the experience of these emotions in the same manner as was found in the present research for the emotion of happiness? The answer is likely to be yes for most of these emotions, as the prototype captures the core characteristics of these emotions (Shaver et al., 1987). There are also likely to be exceptions. Two exceptions might be pride and triumph, because they do not belong to the core subcluster which defines the happiness prototype. The features of the core subcluster belonging to the happiness prototype suggest feelings of cheer and contentment. In contrast, pride and triumph appear to reflect positively on the self. People may perceive high- relative to low-status individuals as experiencing more pride and triumph given these terms are associated with a sense of potency. As such, results may differ for pride and triumph when compared to those found in the present research in which participants were asked to consider the amount of happiness experienced by low- and high-status individuals.

In examining the full list of emotions of Shaver et al. (1987), other possible exceptions to the pattern of results defined by the prototypical emotions can be identified. Another exception may occur with emotions included in the love prototype. For example, the love emotions of arousal, desire, lust, passion, and infatuation are associated with noncore features of Shaver et al.'s love prototype. These noncore features appear to be associated with passionate love as compared to the core features of the love prototype which are associated with compassionate love (see also Hatfield & Rapson, 1993). If low-status individuals are generally construed as more physical and sensual (cf. Torgovnick, 1990), they may be perceived as more likely than high-status individuals to experience

emotions which identify one as lustful and infatuated. In sum, pride, triumph, arousal, desire, lust, passion, and infatuation emerge as possible exceptions in the Shaver et al. (1987) list of 134 emotions. These exceptions would not be considered to reveal the same pattern of results as found here for their respective prototypical emotions.

Emotion-eliciting situations

Another question that may be considered is whether the present results generalize to the range of emotion-eliciting situations represented by the respective basic emotion prototypes (Shaver et al., 1987). The present research addressed those elicitors of Shaver et al. (1987) which were considered as more socially relevant to status interactions. For example, there are eight elicitors identified for the prototype which defines the emotion of sadness by Shaver et al. (1987). Five of the eight elicitors were considered to be socially relevant to status interactions and thus adopted in the present research. Do people perceive the reactions of high- and low-status individuals to the remaining sadness elicitors in the same manner as found for the sadness elicitors that were considered for the present research? The answer is likely to be no. For example, one of the sadness elicitors which was not considered was the "death of a loved one." This elicitor was excluded as it was considered highly personal. The participants' perception of high- relative to low-status individual's reactions to this elicitor would not be expected to differ. The rationale for this expectation would be in line with those for the elicitors of the emotion of love. As with the love elicitors no difference in the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals following their being faced with the "death of a loved one" would be expected due to the elicitor's implied nature of being constrained to one's immediate social network. A similar rationale would apply to the other emotion-elicitors that were excluded.

Implications

The present research has focused on peoples' perceptions of the emotion experienced by individuals following their encounter of the negative, positive, and surprise elicitors considered in this research. Peoples' descriptions for social- and self-perception have been found to be similar (Shaver et al., 1987). As such, findings of the present research may have a number of implications for universal antecedents of emotion, the dimensional representation of emotion, the affect control model of emotion, appraisal theory, the position of surprise as an emotion term, and whether one's status biases the perception of emotional experience.

Universal antecedents of emotion

The results of the present research indicate that evidence for the existence of universal antecedents for negative emotions is not straightforward. Expectations from a universal approach would be that people would perceive the same negative emotions to be experienced by individuals described as encountering the same negative situation. Results of Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence of universal antecedents for negative emotions in that people perceived the potency of the negative emotions that are experienced by individuals following their encounter of a negative elicitor to parallel the individual's own status level.

Results of Studies 2 and 3 also suggest the experience of surprise to be associated with the status of the individual who encounters the eliciting event. Participants in Study 1 perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to encounter negative elicitors. As such, it followed in Studies 2 and 3 that when a status difference emerged, participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals to experience more surprise

following the encounter of a negative elicitor. In addition, when a status difference emerged for the positive elicitors, participants perceived low- relative to high-status individuals to experience more surprise. This finding is in keeping with the results of Study 1 that participants perceived high- relative to low-status individuals as more likely to encounter a happy elicitor.

Support was found for the existence of universal antecedents for the positive emotions considered in this research. Overall, in Studies 2 and 3 people did not perceive the high- and low-status individuals to experience different amounts of the same positive emotions following their encounter of the same negative, positive, and surprise elicitors.

Advantage of a three-dimensional representation of emotion

The findings of the present research suggest that a three-dimensional representation of emotions is advantageous when compared to a two-dimensional representation of emotion. Results indicate that people perceived high- and low-status individuals to experience negative emotions with different intensities following the high- and low-status individuals having encountered negative elicitors. High- relative to low-status individuals were considered to experience more of the high-potent negative emotions of anger and disgust. Furthermore, in Studies 2 and 3, people perceived that following the encounter of a positive elicitor low- relative to high-status individuals would experience more of the low-potent negative emotion of fear. Emotional representation that includes the potency dimension allows for greater understanding of peoples' perceived emotional experience (Shaver et al., 1987). For example, the potency dimension assists in understanding why emotions such as anger and fear are perceived by people to be experienced to different degrees by high- and low-status individuals. The three-

dimensional representation of emotion is considered preferred over that of the two-dimensional representation of emotion (Shaver et al., 1987). The three-dimensional representation has been found to be particularly beneficial in differentiating between negative emotions (MacKinnon & Keating, 1989; Morgan & Heise, 1988). In particular, the potency dimension allows for the differentiation of emotions such as (high-potent) anger and (low-potent) fear (Morgan & Heise, 1988).

Affect control model of emotion

Results of the present research are mixed as to how well they conform to an affect control model of emotion. In Studies 2 and 3, participants perceived that high- relative to low-status individuals experience more of the high-potent negative emotions following their encounter of a negative elicitor. As such, these results are consistent with an affect control model of emotion which posits high-status individuals will feel high-potent negative emotions (Smith-Lovin, 1990; 1991). In contrast, participants' perceptions of low-status individuals emotional experience following their encounter of a negative elicitor were not in keeping with an affect control model of emotion. If the results of Studies 2 and 3 were to be consistent with an affect control model of emotion then participants should have perceived low-status individuals to experience more of the low-potent negative emotions of fear and sadness. In fact, this was not the case. Consider next the unexpected results of participants having perceived low-status individuals to experience more fear following their encounter of a positive elicitor. From an affect control model of emotion, when a low-status individual encounters a positive elicitor the expectation is for the individual to experience an "especially positive emotion" (p. 245; Smith-Lovin, 1990). The emotion experienced by a low-status individual is considered a consequence of that

individual's impression being experienced as more positive than the individual's identity. In addition, high-status individuals would simply take the occurrence of a positive event to be their due (Smith-Lovin, 1990; 1991).

Appraisal theory

The manner in which a stimulus is appraised by an individual determines emotional experience. In situations of self- and social perception, Shaver et al. (1987) have demonstrated that peoples' emotional experience and peoples' perceptions of emotional experience have been fairly similar. It follows that one could argue that the appraisal process functions in a similar manner in circumstances involving self- and social-perception. Expectations derived from an appraisal perspective would posit that the interpretation of the same negative events would be perceived by people to result in the experience of the same negative emotions. In addition, expectations from an appraisal perspective would posit that the interpretation of the same positive events would be perceived by people to result in the experience of the same positive emotions.

Status is a consequential appraisal dimension. Roseman et al. (1996) and Scherer (1984b) consider power a relevant component in the appraisal process. Power is related to an individual's perceived ability to control the event or to change or avoid the event. The individual's perceived coping potential is considered to define the emotion the individual will experience (cf. Roseman et al., 1996). Roseman and Scherer have been pursuing supporting evidence for the impact of the power dimension on emotional experience. While the evidence that has been found is encouraging, it nevertheless remains weak. Work by Roseman et al. (1990) did not find that the appraisal dimension of power was capable of differentiating between an individual's experienced emotions. The power

dimension was later reconsidered (Roseman et al., 1996) such that a comparison of one's own power and the controllability of the stimulus was found to influence one's emotional experience. Scherer (1997) tested the effectiveness of his stimulus evaluation check process model to discriminate between the seven emotions of joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt. His findings indicated that the coping ability variable which encompassed an individual's perceived control, power, and adjustment for coping potential discriminated joy and anger as having higher perceived coping ability than the other five emotions whereas fear and sadness were characterized as having much lower perceived coping ability than the other five emotions. While these results were promising, comparison of the different stimulus evaluation check stages suggested the coping ability and the unexpectedness stages to have the least discriminant power.

Including status as a dimension in the appraisal process has implications for emotional experience as theorized by Roseman et al. (1996). Knowledge of an individual's status implies awareness of the individual's power. Nevertheless, considering emotional experience from a status perspective would result in expectations that would at times differ from those of Roseman et al. (1996). For example, following the encounter of a negative elicitor, Roseman et al's (1996) model predicts an individual with high-control potential would experience guilt and shame while an individual with low-control potential would experience regret. In the current research, people perceived that the potency of the negative emotions individuals experience will parallel their status level. Given the latter, it would be expected that the experience of guilt and shame would be greater for low- relative to high-status individuals. This expectation is contrary to Roseman et al's (1996) model and is based on these emotions having a low potency rating (Shaver et al., 1987).

Results from the present research would at times be incapable of being predicted by Roseman's and Scherer's conceptualizations of the appraisal process. Nevertheless, the findings of the present research parallel Roseman's and Scherer's conceptualizations in that the present research has demonstrated that the status an individual is perceived to wield was shown to affect the emotion believed to be experienced. In much the same manner, Roseman and Scherer have demonstrated that different emotions will be experienced as a consequence of the power an individual perceives the self to hold (cf. Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1997).

Is surprise an emotion?

In Study 1, people perceived low- relative to high-status individuals as more likely to encounter a negative elicitor whereas high- relative to low-status individuals were perceived as more likely to encounter a positive elicitor. In Studies 2 and 3, people perceived low- relative to high-status individuals to experience more surprise following their encounter of a positive elicitor whereas high- relative to low-status individuals were perceived to experience more surprise following their encounter of a negative elicitor. These results are consistent with the view that surprise is a cognitive state that follows an individual's encounter of an event that is considered unexpected in nature (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1989). Surprise is considered to be experienced early in the appraisal process in response to an assessment of the event's level of novelty (Scherer, 1984a) and some theorists have argued that surprise should be considered neutral with respect to valence (Ortony et al., 1989). It is following this initial reaction that the experience of surprise is transformed into a positive or negative emotion when an event is determined to be appetitive or aversive in nature (Roseman, 1984; see also Scherer, 1984a). Such

conceptualizations of the term surprise would indicate that it not be considered an emotion. Findings in the present research indicate that surprise, while perceived to be experienced following the encounter of a surprise elicitor, can also occur following the occurrence of both positive and negative events. As such, one might argue that surprise has a valence that can vary between positive and negative. In conclusion, results with regard to the position of surprise as an emotion remain equivocal.

Expectations due to status

In Studies 2 and 3, people perceived that the potency of the negative emotions experienced by individuals for negative events paralleled their status level. The results of the present research raise the question as to whether peoples' perceptions in everyday life are biased and as a result maintain status differences. The implication is that even though high- and low-status individuals may react to an elicitor in the same manner, being aware of the individual's status may still affect the emotion people perceive the individual to experience. One example of such a bias existing was demonstrated in work by Condry and Condry (1976). They provided all their participants with the identical videotape of an infant reacting to several emotionally arousing toys (e.g., teddy bear). They found that the manner in which people interpreted an infant's emotional reactions depended on the gender label they were provided. For example, when the infant reacted negatively to a jack-in-the-box toy by being startled and crying the infant labeled as male as compared to the infant labeled as female was perceived by people as expressing more anger whereas the infant labeled as female as compared to the infant labeled as male was perceived as expressing more fear. A large number of studies followed the work of Condry and Condry (1976). Stemn and Karraker (1989) reviewed these studies to assess the effects of gender

labels on peoples' ratings of an infant's traits and characteristics and the way in which people interacted with the infant in addition to the toys that people chose for the infant. Overall findings were that people did not consciously believe that they perceived a male- or a female-labeled infant differently. Nevertheless, people were found to behave differently towards the infant (e.g., number of vocalizations, amount of nurturant play) as a result of a given gender label. These various results demonstrated that peoples' perception and behavior are affected by gender stereotypes even though people did not believe this to be the case. As such, peoples' perception of the emotions experienced by high- and low-status individuals may serve to maintain an individual's respective status level. Individuals with potent identities have been noted to behave in a powerful manner (Heise, 1979). The need to act in a specific manner has been considered a method of validating one's belonging to a certain status group (Linton, 1945). For example, the expression of anger is often perceived as an attempt to regulate others' behavior and as an assertion of authority (Averill, 1982). In addition, the expression of fear is perceived by others to signal withdrawal from the environment or passivity (Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Shaver et al., 1987). The present research suggests that people assume such differences, and related research suggests that status related perceptions may be biased in everyday life.

Conclusion

The present research has examined peoples' social perception of emotional experience. Status was found to affect peoples' social perception of emotional experience following individuals' encounter of the negative, positive, and surprise elicitors considered in this research. People seem to hold complex representations of status. This

understanding likely rests on a range of experience that includes observing others and oneself holding positions of varying status in relationships negotiated with others (Shibutani, 1961) in the home, workplace, and other domains. The present research and that of Conway et al. (1996) indicate that people differentially associate personality characteristics and experienced emotions to individuals of differing status. For example, in the present research, people perceived higher status individuals as more privileged in that they are considered to encounter more positive elicitors and are believed to be more in control of their own and others' outcomes thus legitimizing their elevated social position. In addition, people perceived higher status individuals as experiencing potent negative emotions following their encounter of negative elicitors.

Some of the findings from the present research are consistent with previous conceptualization of emotional experience. Results indicated that participants did not perceive that the amount of happiness and love experienced by high- and low-status individuals differed following their encounter of the negative, surprise, and positive elicitors (cf. Sommers, 1984). In addition, the encounter of surprise elicitors did not result in participants perceiving a difference to exist in the emotional experiences of high- and low-status individuals (cf. Roseman et al., 1996). Nevertheless, certain findings proved to be distinctive. High- relative to low-status individuals were perceived to experience more anger following the encounter of any category of negative elicitors, rather than following their encounter of solely anger elicitors. An unexpected finding was that low- relative to high-status individuals were perceived to experience more fear following their encounter of the positive elicitors. This finding suggests that a consistency bias exists in social perception similar to that which exists in self-perception (Swann, 1990).

Strength of the present findings. The approach taken in the present research was one intended to establish experimental realism for participants. The present research is acknowledged to be contrived and thereby not an exact analogue to a real-life situation. The present methodology assisted in controlling for confounds, for example, experimenter demand, that may otherwise have interfered with the social judgment task undertaken by participants in the present research. Having control over the saliency of the manipulation permitted the experimenter increased control over the experimental setting. The present methodology allowed for a clearer interpretation as to the influence of others' status on peoples' perceptions. Internal validity was confirmed through manipulation checks whereby participants accurately acknowledged the respective status levels of the described groups. In addition, the present research was considered internally valid (see Carlsmith, Ellsworth, & Aronson, 1976) due to the significant difference between peoples' perceptions of high- and low-status individuals' emotional experience following their encounter of the elicitors used in this research. Study 2 was systematically replicated by Study 3 in which the culture was varied. Results from the two studies were internally coherent, which suggests increased likelihood as to the generality of the present findings. The broad age range of the participants along with the degree of experimental realism in the present research assisted in establishing external validity.

Suggestions for future research. Future research may look at advancing the present findings in a number of ways. The present research was necessary to establish status as a consequential appraisal dimension. This finding has implications for specific markers of status. Using similar methodology as was used in Studies 2 and 3, Di Fazio, Nunes, and Conway (1998) did not find people to perceive a difference in others' experienced

emotions as a result of their specified gender, however, one future direction of investigation is within the framework of social identity theory. In regard to emotion, one could examine a variety of status markers, such as age, occupation, and race. A second avenue for investigation is through the use of an experimental method that is higher in mundane realism. For example, mundane realism could be increased by using a methodology that has participants judge the emotional reactions of targets that have multiple status markers. An approach that more closely approximates real-life situations would allow for the saliency of the status markers to fluctuate. Such an approach would limit the amount of control or knowledge the experimenter would have over the status markers that are in operation.

Increased generality of the present findings could be achieved by increasing the heterogeneity of the sample or by investigating other emotions, for example, those emotions comprised within Shaver et al's (1987) prototypes. Finally, the present research was conducted from a social perception perspective. Shaver et al. (1987) have noted similarities in the functioning of the appraisal process in cases of social and self-perception. In addition, work by Roseman (see Roseman et al., 1996) has implicitly demonstrated status as being a viable appraisal dimension in studies done from a self-perception perspective. As such, one possible avenue in which the area of self-perception research could proceed would be to focus on those prototypical emotions identified by Shaver et al. (1987). The empirically derived eliciting situations for the prototype emotions could be presented to participants in order to provide increased control over the experimental setting.

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Appendix A

Consent form for Study 1

Consent Form. cf1

The attached questionnaire is concerned with peoples' perceptions of individuals of different status

This is to state that I have agreed to complete this questionnaire for Roberto Di Fazio, M.Sc., Kevin Nunes, and Dr. Michael Conway of the Psychology Department at Concordia University. I understand that all my responses are confidential and I am free to discontinue my participation at any time.

Date: _____

_____ Participant's Signature

_____ Investigator's Signature

Appendix B

Set A elicitors for Study 1 - Male example

SCEN-A.1M

People who have higher status have more prestige and power For example, they hold better social positions. Please read each item. For each, decide whether the situation is more likely to occur to a low-status man or a high-status man. Indicate your choice with a check mark. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

		Please check **one only**	
	Who is more likely to ...	**Low status man**	**High status man**
1.	receive respect?	____	____
2.	be harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and consider this contrary to what ought to be?	____	____
3.	enjoy exceptionally good communication with a special other person?	____	____
4.	experience an event that is bad or rotten in nature?	____	____
5	feel wronged and treated unfairly in a situation?	____	____
6	get something that he wanted or had worked hard for?	____	____
7	not get something that he had wanted or wished for?	____	____
8.	encounter an unexpected circumstance caused by another?	____	____
9	be threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment?	____	____
10	have experienced an undesirable event?	____	____
11.	anticipate social rejection?	____	____
12.	be attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another?	____	____

Appendix C

Set B elicitors for Study 1 - Female example

SCEN-B.1F

People who have higher status have more prestige and power. For example, they typically hold better social positions. Please read each item. For each, decide whether the situation is more likely to occur to a low-status woman or a high-status woman. Indicate your choice with a check mark. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

		Please check **one only**	
	Who is more likely to ...	**Low status woman**	**High status woman**
1.	share a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person?	____	____
2.	encounter a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive?	____	____
3.	find that things have turned out better than expected?	____	____
4.	anticipate losing control or competence?	____	____
5.	encounter a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another?	____	____
6.	be in unfortunate circumstances and be helpless to change them?	____	____
7.	have experienced social rejection or exclusion?	____	____
8.	find that her execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another?	____	____
9.	face a possible loss or a failure?	____	____
10.	feel open and trusting in another person's presence?	____	____
11.	be wronged in a situation and consequently lose status or respect?	____	____
12.	be accepted by others?	____	____

Appendix D

Consent form for pre-test

Consent Form. cf2

The attached questionnaire is concerned with the different emotions a person may feel in different situations.

This is to state that I have agreed to complete this questionnaire for Roberto Di Fazio, M.Sc., Kevin Nunes, and Dr. Michael Conway of the Psychology Department at Concordia University. I understand that all my responses are confidential and I am free to discontinue my participation at any time.

Date: _____

_____ Participant's Signature

_____ Investigator's Signature

Appendix E

Set A elicitors for pre-test - Male example

EMOT-A.1M

Different emotions are felt in different situations. For each of the situations listed below, please **decide the one emotion** that a person (let's call him Jack) in that situation is **most likely to feel**. Please put a check mark beside your one choice for each situation. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

1. Jack receives respect. Jack feels ....
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

2. Jack is harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and considers this contrary to what ought to be. Jack feels ...
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

3. Jack enjoys exceptionally good communication with a special other person. Jack feels ...
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

4. Jack experiences an event that is bad or rotten in nature. Jack feels ....
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

5. Jack feels wronged and treated unfairly in a situation. Jack feels ...
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

6. Jack gets something that he wanted or had worked hard for. Jack feels ....
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

7. Jack did not get something that he had wanted or wished for. Jack feels
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

8. Jack encounters an unexpected circumstance caused by another. Jack feels ..
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

9. Jack is threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment. Jack feels ...
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

10. Jack has experienced an undesirable event. Jack feels
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

11. Jack anticipates social rejection. Jack feels ....
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

12. Jack is attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another. Jack feels ....
___ fear ___ love ___ sadness ___ surprise ___ happiness ___ disgust ___ anger

Appendix F

Set B elicitors for pre-test - Female example

EMOT-B.1F

Different emotions are felt in different situations. For each of the situations listed below, please **decide the one emotion** that a person (let's call her Jane) in that situation is **most likely to feel**. Please put a check mark beside your one choice for each situation. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

1. Jane shares a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

2. Jane encounters a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

3. Jane finds that things have turned out better than expected. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

4. Jane anticipates losing control or competence. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

5 Jane encounters a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

6. Jane is in unfortunate circumstances and is helpless to change them. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

7 Jane has experienced social rejection or exclusion. Jane feels
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

8 Jane's execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another person. Jane feels
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

9. Jane faces a possible loss or failure. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

10 Jane feels open and trusting in another person's presence. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

11 Jane is wronged in a situation and consequently loses status or respect. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

12. Jane is accepted by others. Jane feels ....
___ anger ___ happiness ___ sadness ___ love ___ disgust ___ surprise ___ fear

Appendix G

Future contact sheet

FUTURE CONTACT SHEET

Your responses to the questionnaires in this packet are confidential and your identity is protected by the use of code numbers. However, if you might be interested in participating in future paid research related to the questionnaires, you can indicate this by completing this section below.

Please note that providing this information does not commit you to future participation. It only indicates that you are willing to be contacted. This contact, should it occur, will take place no later than December 1996.

You are not required to complete the information below in order to be eligible for the prize drawing.

NAME (please print) _____

TELEPHONE _____

BEST TIMES TO CONTACT YOU _____

_____

SIGNATURE _____

This sheet will be removed from all packets so that confidentiality is more readily maintained.

Appendix H

Cover story for Study 2

INSTRUCTIONS

We are interested in the "first impressions" that individuals make when they come in contact with the people of a new group, people they have never met before. In this case the new group is a culture living in some remote corner of the world. Our main focus of interest is people's impressions of other individuals on the basis of initial or preliminary information. For example, anthropologists visit remote cultures and often form an impression of the members of these cultures after only a few hours contact with the culture and limited interaction with the individuals themselves. What we want to know is what would be your impression of the members of a culture if you were to come in contact with one of these cultures and have a limited amount of information at your disposal. This is not a test of memory, and there are no **right and wrong answers**. There are just impressions and opinions. We are interested in your impressions.

We will ask you to listen twice to the taped description of one of these cultures. The passage will detail the life of the Ngwani and the Gunada, who form a society living in the Amazonian jungle. The passage is drawn from the book Our Primitive Contemporaries, written by David Murdock. We would like you to listen to the passage twice so that you can get a good impression of the culture. We have recorded the passage twice, so you don't have to rewind the tape. While listening to the recording, you may take notes if you wish.

Appendix I

Consent form for Study 2

CONSENT FORM

STUDY ON REMOTE CULTURES

This is to state that I agree to participate in research conducted by Roberto Di Fazio, M.Sc. and Dr. Michael Conway of the Psychology Department at Concordia University. I understand and agree to the following:

* I will be listening to a short taped description of a remote culture, and I will be asked to answer some questions regarding my impressions of that culture.

* All the responses I provide in this study are strictly confidential.

* I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation at any time during the experiment without giving notice and without negative consequences.

* My participation in this project will last approximately 45 minutes.

* I will be paid $8.00 for my participation.

* The data averaged across many people who participate in this study may be published in a scientific journal.

I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THIS AGREEMENT AND I UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENT; THEREFORE I FREELY CONSENT AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

SIGNATURE: _____

DATE: _____

INVESTIGATOR'S SIGNATURE: _____

Appendix J

Description for participants of Study 2

Description of a culture presented to participants in Study 2

Explicit references to status are italicized.

The community lives in the remoter region of the Amazonian jungle, just beyond the borders of Brazil. Here, the flooded lowlands begin to rise slowly towards the Andes, although the altitude is still only a few hundred feet above sea level. Torrential rains occur frequently in the early morning and mid-afternoon, but despite the dampness, the heat is not excessive. Fresh breezes, frequent thunderstorms, and heavy evaporation maintain the temperature at an average 28^0 C.

The members of the community work neither metal, stone, nor leather. Many tools, utensils, and containers are fashioned from animal teeth, wood, fibre, leaves, and the shells of wild fruits and nuts. The community engages in some commerce with the local government and traders, exchanging woven baskets and other handcrafts that they make themselves for pottery, fabric, clothing, metal pots, and leather goods made by others.

In terms of the housing, community members live in huts that are simple structures built of wood and thatched leaves. The huts are built away from the river with a number of pathways leading from the river to the village. The members of the village obtain food from hunting, fishing, and collecting various wild fruits and plants. They depend largely on hunting for their meat foods, securing large game such as deer and tapirs with light spears of cane, their tips dipped in poison. The poison does not make the meat dangerous to eat. For smaller game, such as birds and monkeys, a blowgun is used, the tip of the dart filled with a poison taken from the curare plant. In addition to hunting, the community members also catch fish using a variety of methods. They also collect wild fruits and nuts, eggs from nests, and catch frogs, snakes, and lizards when larger game is hard to find. In addition,

there are a number of small plantations in the jungle where the village members cultivate maize, yams, sweet potatoes, peanuts, peppers, pineapples, and tobacco.

The community is composed of two distinct groups: the Ngwani and the Gunada. Folklore tells of how the gods fashioned the first man and woman from twigs and clay. The gods were so pleased with their work that they decided to make a whole people. Although both groups are from the same racial stock and are almost identical in physical characteristics, tradition holds that the Ngwani are the direct descendants of the first man and woman. The Ngwani hold a higher *status* in the society. According to common belief, the Gunada are not direct descendants of the first family: this seems to be tied to the fact that the Gunada hold a lower *status* than the Ngwani. The difference in *status* is evident upon entering the village: the Gunada huts are on the outer peripheral edge of the village while the huts of the Ngwani are clustered around a larger hut in the centre of the village. This larger hut is used for gatherings of the community. Another noticeable difference is that the leaves used in the roofs of the Ngwani huts are from a different tree that gives the roofs of their huts a characteristic deep green colour: this colour contrasts with the pale green of the roofs of the Gunada huts.

Clothing is functional: men wear a simple loincloth around their waist which they seem to wear continuously. Women wear simple dresses of light fabric. In addition to the clothing, both men and women wear many ornaments. The Ngwani wear more ornaments than the Gunada. Tight bands are worn on the upper arms of the men and on the ankles and upper calves of the women. These bands are delicately woven from fine fibre threads with interesting geometric designs. The designs on the bands of the Ngwani are more complex and are woven with threads dipped in red and black dyes. In contrast, the simpler

designs worn by the Gunada are woven with threads dipped in white and black dyes. Necklaces are made with shells, teeth, bone discs, and coloured seeds. Traditionally, the Ngwani wear a line of deep red dye across their foreheads.

The activities in the community are shared. Much of the time is spent in search and preparation of food. After bathing in the river at dawn, the village members disperse to hunt and fish and to work in the fields. The Ngwani are seen as holding the land for the gods even though both the Ngwani and the Gunada work side by side in the fields. Usually another bath is taken in the river at sundown and then the members of the community gather in the communal hut for the principal meal of the day. As part of their privileges, the Ngwani are entitled to the best of the hunt and the best of the crop: however, great care is taken to ensure that everyone has enough to eat.

The tribe's religious beliefs centre around a number of gods, including both celestial and terrestrial gods. They also believe that all objects, both animate and inanimate, possess a spirit, which can either be good or evil. According to the beliefs of the community, the Ngwani are seen as being in closer contact with the spirits. The members of the community also have a strong belief in magic.

Many of the traditional ways of life are transmitted through songs and dances. Some songs are quite lengthy and tell the history of the people. Many of the dances seem to re-enact important community events. The hunt is a central theme in many of the dances.

Because the Ngwani hold a higher *status* and the Gunada a lower one, intermarriage and sexual contact between the two groups is strictly forbidden. Other types of social interaction are allowed. The members of the two groups interact on a daily basis

in farming, gathering, and hunting, and preparing food. Marriages are monogamous, but adultery is not unknown. Chastity is expected of the unmarried. The prevalent family unit is the nuclear family, but the extended family has a lot of influence.

The tribe is led by a council that is composed of the elders of both the Ngwani and the Gunada. This council is responsible for taking decisions which affect the whole village.

Appendix K

Cover story for Study 3

INSTRUCTIONS

We are interested in the "first impressions" that individuals make when they come in contact with the people of a new group, people they have never met before. In this case the new group is a culture living in some remote corner of the world. Our main focus of interest is people's impressions of other individuals on the basis of initial or preliminary information. For example, anthropologists visit remote cultures and often form an impression of the members of these cultures after only a few hours contact with the culture and limited interaction with the individuals themselves. What we want to know is what would be your impression of the members of a culture if you were to come in contact with one of these cultures and have a limited amount of information at your disposal. This is not a test of memory, and there are no **right and wrong answers**. There are just impressions and opinions. We are interested in your impressions.

We will ask you to listen twice to the taped description of one of these cultures. The passage will detail the life of the Bwisi and the Mwangai, who form a society living in the Western Pacific ocean. The passage is drawn from the book Cultures Around the World, written by William Lessa. We would like you to listen to the passage twice so that you can get a good impression of the culture. We have recorded the passage twice, so you don't have to rewind the tape. While listening to the recording, you may take notes if you wish.

Appendix L

Description for participants of Study 3

Description of a culture presented to participants in Study 3

Explicit references to status are italicized.

The tribe lives in an atoll belonging to the group of the Carolines, in the western Pacific ocean. The tiny, flat islands making up the atoll encircle one of the deeper lagoons of the Pacific. The marine life found in it constitute the main source of livelihood of the native culture. The temperature is constantly warm, with a yearly average of 83^0 F, and the relative humidity is also high. The population of this small atoll counts only about 600 individuals. Technology is not very advanced: The utensils, containers, and dinnerware used by the natives are fashioned from wood, shell, and carapaces, with the addition of metal and pottery introduced by Western contact. However, even before these contacts, native carpenters have been able to fashion good looms, houses and superb canoes. The habitations are simple structures built of wood and thatched grass clustered together.

The economy of the island rises very rarely above the subsistence level, and the natives spend the majority of their time obtaining enough to eat. The soil is not very fertile and doesn't support much variety of vegetation, which in turn prevents the support of much wildlife. The small size of the islands, the main one being only 2.80 square miles, is also an obstacle to the development of a strong agriculture. However, a few staple foodstuffs are cultivated, the most important and valued being coconut, taro, sweet potato, and bread fruit. Crops of minor importance are bananas, sugar cane and squash. Some variety is added to the diet by gathering reef fauna and the products of wild plants and trees. The main source of food is fishing, which is mainly done in the lagoon, using a variety of fishing methods and apparatus, and occasional angling, torch light and underwater fishing, and fish gathering. The importance of fishing is testified by the number

of ceremonies surrounding its practice, and by the number of songs and dances which have fishing as the central theme.

The society is composed of two distinct groups who arrived on the island at different time periods and who now form one society. They are believed to have originated in nearby islands and to have been obliged to migrate to the atoll because of natural disaster, probably a typhoon. The first group to inhabit the island was the Bwisi. The Bwisi hold a higher *status* in this society. The second group to seek refuge on the islands was the Mwangai: they hold a lower *status*. The physical characteristics of the two groups are almost identical, but there is some variation among individuals of both groups. It is believed that they came from common racial stock, closely related to the Polynesians. The difference in *status* is visible from the earliest contacts with the tribe: As one approaches the village, the cluster of Mwangai huts is clearly visible closer to the shoreline, while the Bwisi huts are a little further inland, under the protection of palm trees and closer to the cultivated gardens. In addition, the roofs of Bwisi huts are thatched with a special kind of grass which gives them a characteristic deep red colour: in turn, this colour contrasts with the pale yellow of the roofs on the Mwangai's huts.

Because of the small size of the islands and the population, much of the everyday activities such as agriculture, fishing and cooking are done communally. Much of the time is spent in search and preparation of food, and the most festive moment of the day is in the evening meal, when all villagers gather around the earth pits to enjoy supper. As part of their privileges, the Bwisi are entitled to the best part of the fish catch and the crops: however, great care is taken to ensure that everyone has enough to eat.

The religious beliefs of this culture are very eclectic: They believe in a diversity of

celestial and terrestrial gods, animalistic spirits, and also in magic and in the art of predicting the future by looking at omens. As in many other pre-literate societies, many of the traditional ways of life are transmitted through songs and dances. The Bwisi often hold central roles in the tribe's dances and songs.

Because the Bwisi hold a higher *status* and the Mwangai a lower one, intermarriage and sexual contact between the two are strictly forbidden, but other types of social interaction are allowed. The members of the two groups interact on a daily basis during their activities in agriculture, fishing and gathering. Both men and women are quite modest: they always cover their genital areas, and are careful never to be seen naked in front of an individual of the opposite sex or of children. The coverings of Bwisi are usually made of intricately woven grass, but the Mwangai wear garments of simpler manufacture. Despite their modesty, the people are pretty permissive where it comes to sexual relations, which are considered very enjoyable and necessary for procreation. Various festivals during the year allow adolescents to remain alone with a member of the opposite sex and explore their sexuality. Marriages are monogamous, but adultery is very common in this society. Infidelity is frowned upon: however, no steps are taken to prevent it, and the sanctions are mild or nonexistent. Sexual hospitality, the lending of one's wife to another man, is occasionally practiced and is considered a kind gesture to visitors, but this custom is always practiced with the wife's consent. Incest is strictly forbidden. The prevalent family unit is the nuclear family, but the extended family has a lot of influence. The political structure is not very rigid: the council of the elders, composed by both Bwisi and Mwangai is responsible for making decisions which affect the whole village. The functions of the village chief are largely ceremonial, although the chief oversees the council of the

elders, and acts as an impartial judge when disputes arise.

Appendix M

Eliciting situations - perceived emotions questionnaire for Study 2

Questionnaire

You have heard a brief description of a remote culture. As indicated to you earlier, we are interested in your impressions of the two groups in that culture. You will now be asked a number of questions. Your responses will be confidential.

Each question is followed by a scale of numbers. To indicate your answer, please circle the appropriate number on the scale. For example, if you are asked how hungry you were, you could answer like this:

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

to indicate that you are somewhat hungry.
Please turn to the next page.

SCN.flwupA1

For individuals in this culture, different emotions may be felt in different situations. For each of the situations listed, please decide how much **each emotion** is felt by a **Gunada** in that situation. Please indicate your answer by circling the number on the scale which represents your response. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

A Gunada receives respect. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada is harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and considers this contrary to what ought to be. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada enjoys exceptionally good communication with a special other person. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada experiences an event that is bad or rotten in nature. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada feels wronged and treated unfairly in a situation. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada gets something that they wanted or had worked hard for. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada did not get something that they had wanted or wished for. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada encounters an unexpected circumstance caused by another. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada is threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada has experienced an undesirable event. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada anticipates social rejection. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Gunada is attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another. The Gunada feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

You have just answered questions of how a **Gunada** might feel in a number of different situations. Now you will be asked how much **each emotion** is felt by a **Ngwani** in a **different set of situations**. Again, please indicate your answer by circling the number on the scale which represents your response. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

A Ngwani shares a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani encounters a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

For a Ngwani, things have turned out better than expected. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani anticipates losing control or competence. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani encounters a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani is in unfortunate circumstances and is helpless to change them. The Ngwani feels ....

	1	2	3	4	5
fear	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
love	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
sadness	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
surprise	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
happiness	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
disgust	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal
anger	not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani has experienced social rejection or exclusion. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani's execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another person. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani faces a possible loss or failure. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani feels open and trusting in another person's presence. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani is wronged in a situation, and consequently loses status or respect. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

A Ngwani is accepted by others. The Ngwani feels ....

fear

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

love

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

sadness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

surprise

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

happiness

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

disgust

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

anger

1	2	3	4	5
not at all	very little	somewhat	quite a bit	a great deal

Appendix N

Manipulation check for Study 2

We are interested in how the following questions pertain to the typical Ngwani and the typical Gunada. Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the scale which follows each item. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

1 How much power does the typical Gunada have to choose and pursue their own activities and interests?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

2 How much power does the typical Ngwani have to choose and pursue their own activities and interests?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

3 How much power does the typical Gunada have to influence others?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

4 How much power does the typical Ngwani have to influence others?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

5 When faced with a problem, how much does the typical Gunada turn to close others for help and reassurance?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

6 When faced with a problem, how much does the typical Ngwani turn to close others for help and reassurance?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

... For the following question, please circle only one group.

Which group holds higher status?

Gunada Ngwani

Appendix O

Manipulation check for Study 3

We are interested in how the following questions pertain to the typical Bwisi and the typical Mwangai. Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the scale which follows each item. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

1 How much power does the typical Mwangai have to influence others?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

2 How much power does the typical Bwisi have to influence others?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

3 How much power does the typical Mwangai have to choose and pursue their own activities and interests?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

4 How much power does the typical Bwisi have to choose and pursue their own activities and interests?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

5 When faced with a problem, how much does the typical Mwangai turn to close others for help and reassurance?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

6 When faced with a problem, how much does the typical Bwisi turn to close others for help and reassurance?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
none at all	very little	somewhat		quite a bit	a lot	a great deal

... For the following question, please circle only one group

Which group holds higher status?

Mwangai Bwisi

Appendix P

Debriefings for Studies 2 and 3

FEEDBACK

Do you have any comments or questions on any aspect of this study?

First, I would like to thank you very much for taking the time to come and participate in our research. We really appreciate your input and your comments. without your help, we simply could not conduct any research. Next, I would like to tell you more about the experiment and what kind of questions we were trying to answer.

Many researchers in the field of social psychology have been interested in the study of "emotions" Researchers have looked at how different situations can lead to different emotions. You were asked about the Ngwani and the Gunada and the different situations they were in. For each of the situations you were asked how much either the Ngwani or the Gunada, in the particular situation, would feel emotions such as, anger and happiness. For example, a situation you were asked about was finding the execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another person. Some people were given this situation and asked what a Ngwani would feel. Other people were given the same situation but asked what a Gunada would feel. We are interested in whether people's judgments of what a Ngwani or what a Gunada will feel would differ. The big difference there is the two tribes' status levels. The Ngwani are high-status individuals and the Gunada are low-status individuals. What we think is that for a situation such as, finding the execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another person, that the Ngwani would feel the more potent negative emotion of anger because of their having high-status. In contrast, we think that the Gunada, who are low-status, would be more likely to feel the less potent negative emotion of sadness. We think this is likely to be the case because people believe that higher status individuals are less likely to have negative events occur to them. In addition, when a negative event does occur to high-status individuals they are more likely than low-status individuals to express their displeasure in an open manner, such as through anger. On the other hand, low-status individuals are more likely to be disappointed but at the same time to repress their feelings, such as through sadness. So I've given you one example of a situation that deals with anger and sadness. Other situations could deal with different combinations of emotions. (For example, experiencing an unfair event, and consequently losing status or respect. This situation may lead to anger for a high-status individual and sadness in a low-status individual)

To see whether social status influences people's perceptions of emotionality, we asked you to rate your impressions of a remote culture living on a group of islands located in the Amazonian jungle. The culture is exactly as we described it, however, we added the description of the high and the low status groups to find out what people considered to be the likelihood of each group to experience emotions in a given situation. After we have completed data collection, we will analyze it to see whether or not it supports our hypothesis that given the same situation low-status individuals are considered more likely than high-status individuals to experience negative emotions. If you would like to know the results of the study, please write your name and address on this envelope and we will send you a copy of our findings once data analysis is complete. Do you have any

questions?

Once more, thank you very much for having participated in the study. We would really appreciate that you not discuss any aspect of this experiment with anyone else until we have finished running subjects, that is, until the end of March 1997. It is very important for our study that people are not aware of our hypothesis before participation.

Appendix Q

Ratings of experienced emotion for the negative, surprise, and positive elicitors of Sets A and B for Study 2

Table Q1

Mean Amount of each emotion experienced with respect to type of elicitor for Set A for Study 2

Emotion Experienced	Type of Elicitor													
	Anger		Disgust		Fear		Sadness		Surprise		Happiness		Love	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Anger	**3.94**	82	3 53	1 10	3 40	1 03	**3.51**	96	2 72	1 33	1 22	45	1 27	49
Disgust	3 61	92	**3.56**	1 23	2 99	1 05	2 93	1 02	2 60	1 35	1 19	34	1 23	46
Fear	2 79	84	2 91	1 02	**3.70**	88	2 44	87	2 68	1 21	1 34	41	1 66	77
Sadness	3 33	85	3 18	1 12	3 23	96	3 28	97	2 47	1 38	1 26	42	1 46	63
Surprise	3 33	93	3 09	1 24	3 26	96	3 06	1 02	**3.81**	1 22	2 36	1 06	2 18	98
Happiness	1 33	45	1 40	62	1 33	44	1 54	64	2 32	1 27	**4.26**	65	**4.18**	62
Love	1 58	67	1 63	82	1 54	71	1 77	89	2 14	1 33	3 47	1 01	4 06	66

Table Q2

Mean Amount of each emotion experienced with respect to type of elicitor for Set B for Study 2

Emotion Experienced	Type of Elicitor													
	Anger		Disgust		Fear		Sadness		Surprise		Happiness		Love	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Anger	**3.67**	1 00	3 49	1 09	3 33	1 02	3 60	97	2 65	1 33	1 14	36	1 25	49
Disgust	3 18	99	**4.07**	94	2 94	1 08	3 09	1 00	2 37	1 33	1 19	35	1 22	38
Fear	2.75	94	2 39	1 15	**3.50**	1 03	3 41	1 05	3 26	1 09	1 47	61	1 54	59
Sadness	3 25	89	2 75	1 09	3 37	79	**3.73**	84	2 46	1 34	1 25	37	1 47	51
Surprise	3 18	94	3 39	1 24	2 94	98	3 11	1 04	**3.61**	80	2 75	84	2 13	87
Happiness	1 49	59	1 33	55	1 48	69	1 37	54	2 14	1 22	**4.37**	54	**4.30**	53
Love	1 69	75	1 51	60	1 70	73	1 59	59	2 04	1 22	3 80	84	4 11	63

Appendix R

ANOVA source tables (1-13) for Study 2

Source Table R1

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise in Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	42 33	1	42 33	5 52	022	09
Within Cells	422 13	55	7 68			
Elicitor	19 48	3	6 49	9 34	0005	15
Status x Elicitor	79	3	26	38	769	01
Within Cells	114 74	165	70			
Emotion	45 44	4	11 36	10 38	0005	17
Status x Emotion	25 75	4	6 44	6 14	0005	10
Within Cells	230 72	220	1 05			
Elicitor x Emotion	64 75	7 97	5 40	13 32	0005	20
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	8 42	7 97	70	1 73	089	03
Within Cells	267 28	438 09	40			

Source Table R2

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise in Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	4 67	1	4 67	56	457	01
Within Cells	457 64	55	8 32			
Elicitor	6 58	3	2 19	2 23	087	04
Status x Elicitor	20 64	3	6 88	7 00	0005	11
Within Cells	162 16	165	98			
Emotion	34 47	4	8 62	8 62	0005	14
Status x Emotion	21 75	4	5 44	5 44	0005	09
Within Cells	220 14	220	1 00			
Elicitor x Emotion	126 46	8 30	10 54	28 76	0005	34
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	9 26	8 30	77	2 11	032	04
Within Cells	241 87	456 74	37			

Source Table R3

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	4 33	1	4 33	2 22	142	04
Within Cells	107 28	55	1 95			
Elicitor	3 55	3	1 18	4 22	007	07
Status x Elicitor	1 26	3	42	1 50	216	03
Within Cells	46 24	165	28			
Emotion	6 22	1	6 22	18 41	0005	25
Status x Emotion	62	1	62	1 83	182	03
Within Cells	18 59	55	34			
Elicitor x Emotion	02	3	01	05	984	001
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	86	3	29	2 16	094	04
Within Cells	21 92	165	13			

Source Table R4

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	27	1	27	16	687	003
Within Cells	89 07	55	1 62			
Elicitor	2 54	3	85	2 46	065	04
Status x Elicitor	55	3	18	53	661	01
Within Cells	56 79	165	34			
Emotion	4 77	1	4 77	28 35	0005	34
Status x Emotion	03	1	03	20	654	004
Within Cells	9 26	55	17			
Elicitor x Emotion	04	3	01	08	969	002
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	12	3	04	28	837	01
Within Cells	24 18	165	15			

Source Table R5

The 2 (Status) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	30	1	30	05	819	001
Within Cells	308 41	55	5 61			
Emotion	66 27	4	16 57	22 33	0005	29
Status x Emotion	70	4	17	23	919	004
Within Cells	163 23	220	74			

Source Table R6

The 2 (Status) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	03	1	03	01	930	005
Within Cells	214 97	55	3 91			
Emotion	65 77	2 15	16 44	20 61	0005	27
Status x Emotion	10 43	2 15	2 61	3 27	038	06
Within Cells	175 52	118 30	80			

Source Table R7

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions for Males of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	1 11	1	1 11	59	454	03
Within Cells	32 26	17	1 90			
Emotion	11	1	11	47	502	03
Status x Emotion	00	1	00	01	915	001
Within Cells	3 89	17	23			

Source Table R8

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions for Females of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	84	1	84	21	647	01
Within Cells	141 79	36	3 94			
Emotion	84	1	84	3 39	074	09
Status x Emotion	21	1	21	85	364	02
Within Cells	8 95	36	25			

Source Table R9

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	02	1	02	01	936	005
Within Cells	161 10	55	2 93			
Emotion	33	1	33	3 20	079	06
Status x Emotion	05	1	05	46	500	01
Within Cells	5 64	55	10			

Source Table R10

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 3 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions and surprise of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	6 08	1	1 77	3 43	069	06
Within Cells	97 46	55	6 08			
Elicitor	93	1	93	1 57	215	03
Status x Elicitor	1 29	1	1 29	2 18	146	04
Within Cells	32 65	55	59			
Emotion	235 48	1 32	117 74	199 64	0005	78
Status x Emotion	2 08	1 32	1 04	1 76	188	03
Within Cells	64 87	72 58	59			
Elicitor x Emotion	10 51	2	5 26	16 04	0005	23
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	3 97	2	1 98	6 05	003	10
Within Cells	36 05	110	33			

Source Table R11

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 3 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions and surprise of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	4 04	1	4 04	3 43	070	06
Within Cells	64 78	55	1 18			
Elicitor	1 29	1	1 29	4 15	047	07
Status x Elicitor	21	1	21	66	421	01
Within Cells	17 15	55	31			
Emotion	232 06	1 33	116 03	247 18	0005	82
Status x Emotion	8 66	1 33	4 33	9 22	001	14
Within Cells	51 64	73 19	47			
Elicitor x Emotion	12 43	2	6 22	23 88	0005	30
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	34	2	17	66	518	01
Within Cells	28 64	110	26			

Source Table R12

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 4 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	80	1	80	77	384	01
Within Cells	57 23	55	1 04			
Elicitor	2 65	1	2 65	5 94	018	10
Status x Elicitor	48	1	48	1 08	303	02
Within Cells	24 48	55	45			
Emotion	5 97	3	1 99	15 11	0005	22
Status x Emotion	80	3	27	2 01	114	04
Within Cells	21 75	165	13			
Elicitor x Emotion	1 47	3	49	6 14	001	10
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	08	3	03	35	791	01
Within Cells	13 18	165	08			

Source Table R13

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 4 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions of Study 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	2 99	1	2 99	4 57	037	08
Within Cells	36 06	55	66			
Elicitor	1 25	1	1 25	4 66	035	08
Status x Elicitor	13	1	13	49	487	01
Within Cells	14 75	55	27			
Emotion	6 79	1 93	2 26	13 04	0005	19
Status x Emotion	2 39	1 93	80	4 59	013	08
Within Cells	28 65	106 31	17			
Elicitor x Emotion	53	3	18	2 42	068	04
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	40	3	13	1 81	148	03
Within Cells	12 08	165	07			

Appendix S

Tables (1-4) of the mean differences of participants perceived negative and surprise experienced emotions for the anger, disgust, fear, and sadness elicitors of Set B for Study 2

Table S1

Ratings of emotions experienced by status level for the anger elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Anger	3 40	1 02	30	3 96	91	27	-2 19
Disgust	3 03	98	30	3 33	1 00	27	-1 14
Surprise	2 85	81	30	3 56	94	27	+3 03
Fear	2 78	93	30	2 72	96	27	- 24
Sadness	3 30	94	30	3 20	85	27	- 40

Table S2

Ratings of emotions experienced by status level for the disgust elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Anger	3 37	1 38	30	3 63	1 21	27	+ 91
Disgust	4 00	87	30	4 15	1 03	27	+ 59
Surprise	3 53	1 38	30	3 22	1 05	27	- 95
Fear	2.87	1.14	30	1 85	91	27	-3 70*
Sadness	3 10	92	30	2.37	1 15	27	-2 66

** p < 0025

Table S3

Ratings of emotions experienced by status level for the fear elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Anger	3 07	84	30	3 63	1 13	27	+2.15
Disgust	2 78	94	30	3 11	1 21	27	+1 15
Surprise	2 65	71	30	3 26	1 15	27	+2 44
Fear	3 33	1 14	30	3 69	88	27	+1 29
Sadness	3 40	82	30	3 33	76	27	- 32

Table S4

Ratings of emotions experienced by status level for the sadness elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Anger	3 42	85	30	3 80	1 06	27	+1 50
Disgust	3 00	92	30	3 19	1 09	27	+ 69
Surprise	2 90	90	30	3 33	1 14	27	+1 59
Fear	3 38	1 01	30	3 44	1 21	27	+ 22
Sadness	3 75	85	30	3 70	85	27	- 21

Appendix T

Tables (1-2) of the mean difference of participants perceived surprise and positive experienced emotions for happiness and love elicitors of Set A for Study 2

Table T1

Ratings of surprise and positive emotions experienced by status level for the happiness elicitors of Set A

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Surprise	2.83	1.14	27	1.93	.77	30	-3.51*
Happiness	4.28	.73	27	4.25	.58	30	-.16
Love	3.60	1.16	27	3.35	.86	30	-.90

* $p < .008$

Table T2

Ratings of surprise and positive emotions experienced by status level for the love elicitors of Set A

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Surprise	2.20	1.26	27	2.15	67	30	-.20
Happiness	4.28	66	27	4.10	59	30	-1.08
Love	4.17	71	27	3.97	62	30	-1.14

Appendix U

Ratings of experienced emotion for the negative, surprise, and positive elicitors of Sets A and B for Study 3

Table U1

Mean Amount of each emotion experienced with respect to type of elicitor for Set A for Study 3

Emotion Experienced	Type of Elicitor													
	Anger		Disgust		Fear		Sadness		Surprise		Happiness		Love	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Anger	**4.15**	71	**3.63**	91	3 52	89	3 33	80	2 50	99	1 19	42	1 17	34
Disgust	3 57	1 07	3 54	1 10	2 89	1 02	2 99	97	2 36	98	1 29	49	1 21	42
Fear	2 95	96	2 86	1 15	**3.82**	89	2 43	87	2 68	80	1 41	55	1 72	73
Sadness	3 44	80	3 38	95	3 20	77	**3.40**	80	2 30	88	1 29	46	1 44	54
Surprise	3 36	96	3 24	92	3 32	94	2 95	89	**3.66**	84	2 41	87	2 27	73
Happiness	1 24	40	1 30	49	1 27	43	1 40	45	2 07	1 09	**4.29**	65	**4.40**	53
Love	1 34	49	1 45	72	1 41	49	1 55	60	1 88	77	3 40	95	4 15	65

Table U2

Mean Amount of each emotion experienced with respect to type of elicitor for Set B for Study 3

Emotion Experienced	Type of Elicitor													
	Anger		Disgust		Fear		Sadness		Surprise		Happiness		Love	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Anger	**3.99**	79	3 42	1 04	3 55	74	3 63	93	2 20	1 06	1 08	25	1 22	47
Disgust	3.22	99	**4.18**	89	2 87	95	2 88	96	2 00	98	1 15	34	1 20	38
Fear	2.76	89	2 26	1 04	**3.58**	84	3 63	91	2 96	87	1 33	55	1 48	62
Sadness	3.36	80	2 67	1 01	3 35	80	**3.98**	74	1 88	91	1 21	40	1 38	58
Surprise	3.15	87	3 55	1 04	2 91	90	3 15	97	**3.72**	96	2 83	77	2 01	74
Happiness	1 28	44	1 29	49	1 41	51	1 27	38	2 05	85	**4.30**	69	**4.28**	60
Love	1 43	58	1 40	61	1 50	61	1 47	63	1 78	81	3 38	92	4 13	73

Appendix V

ANOVA source tables (1-12) for Study 3

Source Table V1

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise in Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	39 49	1	39 49	6 59	012	08
Within Cells	443 35	74	5 99			
Elicitor	45 89	3	15 30	31 53	0005	30
Status x Elicitor	1 58	3	53	1 09	355	02
Within Cells	107 68	222	49			
Emotion	67 43	4	16 86	14 71	0005	17
Status x Emotion	48 84	4	12 21	10 66	0005	13
Within Cells	339 10	296	1 15			
Elicitor x Emotion	99 72	12	8 31	25 01	0005	25
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	6 92	12	58	1 74	055	02
Within Cells	295 08	888	33			

Source Table V2

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise in Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	04	1	04	01	927	001
Within Cells	364 50	74	4 93			
Elicitor	12 26	3	4 09	5 01	002	06
Status x Elicitor	4 57	3	1 52	1 87	136	03
Within Cells	181 20	222	82			
Emotion	59 24	4	14 81	15 95	0005	18
Status x Emotion	22 55	4	5 64	6 07	0005	08
Within Cells	274 88	296	93			
Elicitor x Emotion	271 18	7 17	22 60	52 29	0005	41
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	7 74	7 17	65	1 49	165	02
Within Cells	383 80	530 32	43			

Source Table V3

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	3 18	1	3 18	2 48	119	03
Within Cells	94 98	74	1 28			
Elicitor	2 67	3	89	6 20	0005	08
Status x Elicitor	31	3	10	71	546	01
Within Cells	31 84	222	14			
Emotion	2 63	1	2 63	16 39	0005	18
Status x Emotion	42	1	42	2 62	110	03
Within Cells	11 88	74	16			
Elicitor x Emotion	08	2 09	03	36	704	01
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	30	2 09	10	1 33	268	02
Within Cells	16 08	154 38	08			

Source Table V4

The 2 (Status) x 4 (Elicitor) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the negative elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	24	1	24	19	663	003
Within Cells	91 37	74	1 23			
Elicitor	1 18	3	39	2 09	102	03
Status x Elicitor	1 46	3	49	2 60	053	03
Within Cells	41 73	222	19			
Emotion	2 90	1	2 90	13 21	001	15
Status x Emotion	59	1	59	2 70	104	04
Within Cells	16 25	74	22			
Elicitor x Emotion	29	3	10	1 10	352	02
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	42	3	14	1 58	195	02
Within Cells	19 78	222	09			

Source Table V5

The 2 (Status) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	1 27	1	1 27	65	424	01
Within Cells	146 13	74	1 97			
Emotion	93 83	3 47	23 46	45 80	0005	38
Status x Emotion	4 96	3 47	1 24	2 42	057	03
Within Cells	151 61	256 84	51			

Source Table V6

The 2 (Status) x 5 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions and surprise of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	38	1	38	17	680	002
Within Cells	163 97	74	2 22			
Emotion	183 89	4	45 97	77 31	0005	51
Status x Emotion	3 67	4	92	1 54	189	02
Within Cells	176 03	296	59			

Source Table V7

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	11	1	11	08	777	001
Within Cells	96 79	74	1 31			
Emotion	1 29	1	1 29	2 67	106	04
Status x Emotion	03	1	03	05	816	001
Within Cells	35 68	74	48			

Source Table V8

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the surprise elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	1 90	1	1 90	1 73	193	02
Within Cells	81 49	74	1 10			
Emotion	2 90	1	2 90	10 99	001	13
Status x Emotion	06	1	06	22	637	003
Within Cells	19 54	74	26			

Source Table V9

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 3 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions and surprise of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	4 54	1	4 54	3 81	055	05
Within Cells	88 08	74	1 19			
Elicitor	6 51	1	6 51	17 15	0005	12
Status x Elicitor	6 75	1	6 75	17 78	0005	19
Within Cells	28 11	74	38			
Emotion	324 25	2	162 13	320 18	0005	81
Status x Emotion	1 97	2	99	1 95	146	03
Within Cells	74 94	148	51			
Elicitor x Emotion	16 01	2	8 00	29 04	0005	28
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	3 20	2	1 60	5 81	004	07
Within Cells	40 79	148	28			

Source Table V10

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 3 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced positive emotions and surprise of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	1 60	1	1 60	1 24	269	02
Within Cells	95 24	74	1 29			
Elicitor	08	1	08	18	671	002
Status x Elicitor	79	1	79	1 83	180	02
Within Cells	32 05	74	43			
Emotion	280 57	2	140 28	271 99	0005	79
Status x Emotion	1 68	2	84	1 63	200	02
Within Cells	76 33	148	52			
Elicitor x Emotion	46 98	2	23 49	79 89	0005	52
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	59	2	30	1 01	367	01
Within Cells	43 51	148	29			

Source Table V11

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 4 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set A and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	5 07	1	5 07	5 06	028	06
Within Cells	74 14	74	1 00			
Elicitor	1 24	1	1 24	3 77	056	05
Status x Elicitor	07	1	07	21	648	003
Within Cells	24 41	74	33			
Emotion	12 70	3	4 23	29 06	0005	28
Status x Emotion	1 25	3	42	2 86	038	04
Within Cells	32 33	222	15			
Elicitor x Emotion	3 51	3	1 17	15 96	0005	18
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	11	3	04	51	673	007
Within Cells	16 28	222	07			

Source Table V12

The 2 (Status) x 2 (Elicitor) x 4 (Emotion) Between-Within ANOVA

for the positive elicitors of Set B and participants' perceived experienced negative emotions of Study 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	partial η^2
Status	05	1	05	06	813	001
Within Cells	65 46	74	88			
Elicitor	2 57	1	2 57	9 70	003	12
Status x Elicitor	00	1	00	01	906	001
Within Cells	19 59	74	26			
Emotion	6 39	1 98	2 13	20 47	0005	22
Status x Emotion	2 37	1 98	79	7 60	001	09
Within Cells	23 09	146 57	10			
Elicitor x Emotion	27	3	09	1 09	354	02
Status x Elicitor x Emotion	07	3	02	29	831	004
Within Cells	18 62	222				

Appendix W

Tables (1-2) of the mean difference of participants perceived surprise and positive experienced emotions for happiness and love elicitors of Set B for Study 3

Table W1

Ratings of surprise and positive emotions experienced by status level for the happiness elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level: Low M	Low SD	Low n	High M	High SD	High n	t
Surprise	2.83	74	38	1.99	78	38	-4.82*
Happiness	4.37	69	38	4.21	58	38	-1.08
Love	3.57	98	38	3.24	91	38	-1.52

* $p < .008$

Table W2

Ratings of surprise and positive emotions experienced by status level for the love elicitors of Set B

Emotions Experienced	Status Level						
	Low			High			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Surprise	2.21	75	38	2.33	72	38	-.70
Happiness	4.36	57	38	4.43	50	38	-.65
Love	4.18	62	38	4.12	69	38	.44

Appendix X

Eliciting situations – perceived cause questionnaire for Study 4

Questionnaire

You have heard a brief description of a remote culture. As indicated to you earlier, we are interested in your impressions of the two groups in that culture. You will now be asked a number of questions. Your responses will be confidential.

Each question is followed by a scale of numbers. To indicate your answer, please circle the appropriate number on the scale.

Please turn to the next page.

SITN/1-12G/13-24N

Individuals in this culture may encounter different situations. For each of the situations listed, please decide whether the situation encountered by a **Gunada** is more likely to have been caused by another **Gunada** or more likely to have been caused by a **Ngwani**. Please indicate your answer by circling the number on the scale which represents your response. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

A Gunada receives respect. From whom?

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada is harmed, be it physically or psychologically, by another and considers this contrary to what ought to be. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada enjoys exceptionally good communication with a special other person. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada experiences an event that is bad or rotten in nature. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada feels wronged and treated unfairly in a situation. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada gets something that they wanted or had worked hard for. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada did not get something that they had wanted or wished for. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada encounters an unexpected circumstance caused by another. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada is threatened by physical harm in an unfamiliar or unpredictable environment. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada has experienced an undesirable event. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada anticipates social rejection. By whom?

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Gunada is attracted (physically and/or psychologically) to another. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

You have just answered questions as to how likely situations a **Gunada** encounters may have been caused by another **Gunada** or a **Ngwani**. You will be now presented with a **different set of situations** which have occurred to a **Ngwani**. This time you will be asked whether each situation was more likely to have been caused by another **Ngwani** or more likely to have been caused by a **Gunada**. Again, please indicate your answer by circling the number on the scale which represents your response. If you are not sure, please give us your best guess.

A Ngwani shares a lot of time or special experiences with a special other person. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani encounters a situation in which someone else did something physically repulsive. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

For a Ngwani, things have turned out better than expected. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani anticipates losing control or competence. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani encounters a new, unfamiliar situation caused by another. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani is in unfortunate circumstances and is helpless to change them. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani has experienced social rejection or exclusion. By whom?

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani's execution of a plan or attainment of a goal is interfered with by another person. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani faces a possible loss or failure. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani feels open and trusting in another person's presence. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani is wronged in a situation, and consequently loses status or respect. The individual who caused this situation is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

A Ngwani is accepted by another. The other individual is ....

1	2	3
more likely a Gunada	equally likely	more likely a Ngwani

Appendix Y

Debriefing for Study 4

FEEDBACK

Do you have any comments or questions on any aspect of this study?

First, I would like to thank you very much for taking the time to come and participate in our research. We really appreciate your input and your comments: without your help, we simply could not conduct any research. Next, I would like to tell you more about the experiment and what kind of questions we were trying to answer.

In this study, you might have noticed that the big difference between the two tribes is their status levels. The Ngwani are high-status individuals and the Gunada are low-status individuals. In previous research we found that, when faced with a negative situation, high-status individuals are seen as feeling more anger, whereas low-status individuals are seen as feeling more fear. Why might this be? When presented with a high-status individual encountering a negative situation such as being interfered with, maybe people think that the situation was caused by a low-status person. Conversely, when presented with a low-status person being interfered with, maybe people think that the situation was caused by a high-status person. People may see a high-status person as more free to express displeasure in an open manner, such as through anger, when the cause of that displeasure is a low-status person. On the other hand, low-status individuals may be seen as less free to express anger, when the cause of that displeasure is a high-status person. We asked you to fill out the first questionnaire to get a clearer picture of how people perceive these situations.

To see how social status influences people's perceptions of others, we asked you to rate your impressions of a remote culture living in the Amazonian jungle. The culture is exactly as we described it, however, we added the description of the high- and the low-status groups. After we have completed data collection, we will perform the necessary analyses. If you would like to know the results of the study, please write your name and address on this envelope and we will send you a copy of our findings once data analysis is complete. Do you have any questions?

Once more, thank you very much for having participated in the study. We would really appreciate that you <u>not discuss any aspect</u> of this experiment with anyone else until we have finished running subjects, that is, until the end of April 1998. It is very important for our study that people are not aware of our hypothesis before participation.