Mediating Transgressions:  
The Global Justice Movement and Canadian News Media

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A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Communication Studies

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Media Studies at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August 2004

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Abstract
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The focus of this thesis is the problematic, paradoxical relationship between the mass media and social movements. It is about how news media practices naturalize the hegemonic status quo, containing dissent and incorporating it into this ideological space. In Chapter 1, I lay out the theoretical framework upon which my analysis is based, examining the notion of the news media as a discursive battleground through the lenses of media studies, political economy, newsmaking theory, and Foucauldian theories of discourse and power. Chapter 2 begins with an exploration of the global justice movement – its origins, its analysis – as this context is imperative in conducting a critical discourse analysis. Drawing on print news media coverage of the movement, I then go on to explore how this movement is represented within mainstream Canadian newspapers, asking specifically how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted this movement’s access to this discursive battleground. Chapter 3 addresses one of the most contentious questions within the movement – how does “symbolic violence” (acts against property not people) get covered within news media, and, what are the effects of this? – analyzing whether the price of entry to this sphere is the re-presentation of events in such a way that smashed windows and graffiti are the only images portrayed, or, whether activists benefit from the space created by symbolic violence. To conclude, I discuss possible interventions for both activists and researchers that, in light of this project, may be useful in waging discursive resistance.
Acknowledgements

A project of this size can never be considered fully one’s own. It is the culmination of many years of education both in the university and in the streets. To acknowledge all that helped me along my way with this project is therefore not an easy task. The first is, of course, my parents, as it is they who raised me to believe that I could do anything I set my mind to. Thanks to Mom and Dad, and to Rick, my brother, for always encouraging me to set my sights high. Thanks as well to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for having decided, at just the right time, to begin offering scholarships to Master’s students; it is this financial aid that allowed me to dedicate time to this project. I am also deeply thankful for the guidance of my supervisor, Chantal Nadeau—thank you for pushing me forward with your vigorous comments, and for mentoring me as your research assistant, allowing me to discover the queer (and not so queer) Nation. Thanks to Leslie Regan Shade, as well, for her words of encouragement and swiftness with her keyboard, and to all the other professors who crossed my path at ConU. Because this thesis is one which contemplates activism and social justice, I must also acknowledge all of the activists that have crossed my path over the years, and especially those in Montreal. While I hid away writing, the emails and stories that came my way about the struggles in the streets are what prodded me forward, convincing me that this project was necessary. Among these are my friends at CMAQ, particularly those who spent countless hours discussing research with me (a big hug especially to Frederic). I must also thank all of those who engaged in discussions with me on media and activism, pushing me forward in my ideas and sharing theirs as well: Josée, Aziz, Tamara, Barbara, Natalie, Patrick, Tom, and many others. And thank you to those who helped with grammar and translation: Clara and Benjamin. Lastly, but of course not least, I must thank my best friend and love, Mélanie. From media committees to protests, to farm chores and Foxy, you have been beside me every step of the way, inspiring me, supporting me, and enjoying life by my side—Merci!
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Introduction

The struggle for legitimacy and recognition lies at the heart of social movements. Efforts to persuade, convince, and to effect change depend on the strength of a movement’s voice—how loudly it echoes; how far it reaches; how seriously it is taken. Within social movements, these discourses are conceived and developed in many spaces and many ways, from one-to-one dialogues to the production of written and visual media. One of these sites of discursive formation is the mainstream media, where the rationales and analyses of activists are launched into the public sphere, with the hopes that their seeds will take hold, helping the movement ripen, grow, and, ideally, bear the fruit of social change.

Yet this, of course, is an idealized depiction, one which presents the mainstream media as a site for dialogue between the marginalized and the politically powerful. Depictions of mainstream media are not as optimistic within critical social movements (CSMs). Instead, they are cynical accounts, wherein the corporate media are not seen as being open and democratic spaces where all discourses are recognized as legitimate, but as spaces to which some have unlimited access and others do not. Many activists view

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1 By “mainstream” or “mass” media I am referring to means of communication (films, television, newspapers, or radio) that disseminate information, ideas, and attitudes to a vast number of people. Mass media, which is most often corporate owned and run, provides information that is created by few and disseminated to many, with the goal of making profit; I thus also refer to it as “corporate media.”

2 Although many academics use the term “new social movements” when discussing the global justice movement (Melucci 1992; Uzelman 2002; among others), I have chosen to move slightly away from this term, as it is loaded with many debates on the difference between “new” and “old” social movements as well as layers of sociological theory that I cannot engage with here. I therefore prefer to use term “critical social movements” (CSMs). This term is used by Hackett and Carroll (2004) to describe “movements committed to empowerment of the marginalized, movements that challenge the hegemonies of dominant groups and institutions.” The social movement being examined within this thesis is the global justice movement, the history and context of which will be outlined in Chapter 2.
the corporate media as spaces of misrepresentation, hyper-sensationalism, and infotainment, not of dialogue and democracy.

Alternative media, ranging from pamphlets to newspapers, pirate radio, and Websites, is increasingly part of the activist toolkit, as groups choose to create their own media and transmit their messages. These media are becoming increasingly successful; however, their intention is neither to replace mainstream media nor to compete with it. They do not seek to distribute on a mass level or to develop corporate monopolies. They operate parallel to mass media, offering an alternative source of information and empowering those involved in reclaiming the tools of communication. The prominence, and thus importance, of mainstream media in our culture remains despite perceptions of the corporate media as “a formidable obstacle to movements seeking social and environmental justice” (Uzelman 2002, 3) and despite the existence of alternative media. What also remains, then, is the problem of how CSMs face this “formidable obstacle.”

The focus of this thesis is the problematic, paradoxical relationship between the mass media and social movements; a relationship that neither activists nor academics can ignore. It is about how media practices naturalize the hegemonic status quo, containing dissent and incorporating it back into this ideological space. What happens, I ask, when radical discourses are mass mediated? Are there spaces within the media in which these discourses can take hold, or does their mediation result in the removal of “explosive content from gestures and meanings which contest the capitalist order” (Plant 1992, 79)?

The debates surrounding media within activist communities are complex, bringing up issues such as whether to work with corporate media, how to get their attention, and how to make sure that activists are not portrayed as terrorists, hooligans,
or irrational. More specifically, heated discussions occur around the use of direct action, civil disobedience, and transgressive tactics and of how they are re-presented within the news media. Some facets of the movement prohibit all controversial tactics (such as illegal blockades and marches, or property damage), claiming that although these tactics draw in media attention they rob the movement of legitimacy. After September 11, 2001, they argued that all tactics must be “peaceful” and “non-violent” or the media and State will frame the movement as “terrorist.” Other facets of the movement refuse to accede to potentially “bad” media coverage, choosing instead to use transgressive tactics in order to radicalize discourses and to develop new strategies for getting the message through mass media filters.

These discussions within the global justice movement reinforce Todd Gitlin’s warning that media representations of a movement become imbedded in it. He contends that:

In the late twentieth century, political movements feel called upon to rely on large-scale communications in order to 

*mutter*, to say who they are and what they intend to publics they want to sway, but in the process they become “newsworthy” only by submitting to the implicit rules of newsmaking, by conforming to journalistic notions (themselves imbedded in history) of what a “story” is, what an “event” is, what a “protest” is. The processed image tends then to be more “the movement”... (Gitlin 2003, 3)

Mediated-images play into a movement’s self-perception as they are played back to them in news coverage, affecting what tactics activists take up in their struggles. Moreover, media dynamics “tend to exacerbate divisions in movements” (Kielbowicz & Scherer 1986, 87), fuelling fears that media representations will hinder the movement’s success. Debates on tactics, which often fall into discussions on “violence” and “non-violence”
and whether to accept a "diversity of tactics," often fail to take media dynamics into account.

Rather than taking these debates for granted, I seek to reinterpret them, re-defining their parameters, and taking cultural, social, political, and economic factors into account. If the effects of the "mediation" of movements have such potentially significant impacts, they need to be teased out and examined in order to understand what the trade off is for activists when they decide to seek media attention, as well as how they can benefit these interactions, rather than perish at the hands of journalists. Furthermore, this type of examination may add to the current debates around the need for media democratization, illustrating the need for changes to current media structures which privilege certain voices and re-produce hegemonic social relations.

With these factors in mind, I lay out the theoretical framework upon which my analysis is based in Chapter 1, examining the importance of news media discourse for CSMs through the lens of media studies, political economy, newsmaking theory, and Foucauldian theories of discourse and power. In Chapter 2, I begin with an exploration of the global justice movement – its origins, its analysis – as this context is imperative in conducting a critical discourse analysis. Drawing on print news media coverage of the movement, I then go on to explore how this movement is represented within mainstream newspapers, asking specifically how the 'war on terror' has impacted this movement's representation within the mass media. Pre-September 11 academics such as Rojecki (2002) and Deluca and Peeples (2002) argued that the global justice movement experienced relatively 'positive' representation within the mass media; I examine how the introduction of discourses of terror has affected this. I seek to document the discursive
challenges faced by the mobilisation for global justice in this new political climate, attempting to determine how the "widened media space" Rojecki speaks of has changed form, with new lines of demarcation determining how social movements are framed.

Using this context as a basis, questions around tactics, "violence," and "non-violence" are re-visited. Post-September 11, debates around the use of confrontational tactics became increasingly heated within the movement, as the fear of being labelled "terrorist" or the "enemy within" threatened to paralyze the global justice movement. With this in mind, in Chapter 3 I have chosen to address one of the most contentious questions within the movement—how does "symbolic violence" (acts against property not people) get covered within news media, and what are the effects of this? This choice came out of what may be called my intrigue, or perhaps discomfort, with Deluca and Peeples' (2002) suggestion that symbolic violence is necessary for activists to gain entry into the mediated public sphere. I therefore question whether the price of entry to this sphere is the re-presentation of events in such a way that smashed windows and graffiti are the only images portrayed, or whether activists benefit from the space created by symbolic violence.

The function of spectacle and of symbolic violence as tactics has not been addressed at length in academic accounts of this movement. Whereas Gitlin, writing in 1980, addressed what happened when the "fringes" of a movement engaged in transgressive tactics, he, nor others, has questioned how these "fringe" groups relate to media. I therefore examine the contemporary split between radical and reformist activists (although this split is nothing new), the tactics they take up in their struggles, and how they each occupy different spaces within the orders of discourse within society and the
news media. Using this discussion as a basis, I delve into the issue of the role of symbolic violence in protest, analysing news media coverage in order to broaden the debate. Once again, the territory is not simply black, or white, but full of shades of grey. It is these shades of grey that I explore.

Finally, because this project is one with the objective of not only understanding how the politics of speech affect social movement actors, but also is a type of intervention, it concludes with a discussion of what can be done. I discuss what the observations presented in this thesis mean for activist communities and researchers, outlining strategies that, in light of this project, may be useful in waging discursive resistance, and briefly explore further avenues for research. I take inspiration from the following words by Elizabeth Grosz, from her book *Space, Time, and Persuasion*:

In refusing to seek answers, and in continuing to pose questions as aporias, as paradoxes—that is, to insist that they have no readily available solutions—is to face the task, not of revolution, i.e., the overthrow of the old (whether capitalism, patriarchy, binary oppositions, or prevailing models of radicality) but, less romantically, or glamourously, endless negotiation, the equation of one's life with struggle, a wearying ideal but one perhaps that can make us less invested in any one struggle and more capable to bearing up to continuous effort to go against the relentless forces of sameness, more inventive in the kinds of subversion we seek, and more joyous the kinds of struggle that we choose to be called into. (qtd in Deluca 1999, xiii)

*i.i Notes on method*

The decision to examine mass media and social movements arises partly out of my involvement in social movements and is fuelled by a need to understand the significance of mainstream news media discourse for CSMs. This project was inspired by the many debates in activist circles on whether or not to “work with” mainstream media. Despite my involvement within CSMs, which ranges from participating in media committees,
alternative media projects, and in various collectives, to the giving of workshops to activists on how to relate to the mainstream media, I chose not to recount these experiences, nor to engage in a diary-style of writing. Instead, I approached the subject as a communications researcher. In pulling this debate into an academic context, and momentarily out of the activist context where the time to indulge in lengthy debate often lacks, I developed an analysis that is informed by, and hopefully informs, two separate, yet sometimes overlapping, worlds—that of the academe and of grassroots activism.

It is also important to note that the global justice movement was not the only mass movement entering the mediascape during this period, nor can it be separated from past movements, as it no doubt draws on the experience and analysis of various political movements. During the time period I am addressing, a large peace movement mobilized around the war on Iraq and received large amounts of media coverage. Some of this coverage included discussions on how the “anti-globalization” movement was transforming into the first peace movement of the twentieth century. However, I chose not to focus on this movement because I sought to examine the space allotted to movements that present a challenge to State policies. Because of the Canadian government’s official non-participation in the war on Iraq, the peace movement in Canada cannot be identified as formally opposing the State. This movement was in fact framed in the media as being representative of Canadian values and Canada’s role as peacekeeper.

In order to discuss larger theoretical questions relating to the function of the news media as a discursive battleground, this study consists of examinations of Canadian print media coverage of the global justice movement. I begin with the theoretical context
(Chapter 1) and then go on to address theoretical and political inquiries that I have
determined as significant through both my review of the literature on this topic as well as
through personal observations and research (Chapters 2 and 3). Rather than do a
chronological study of all newspapers for a given period, I chose ‘moments’ through
which to theorize the discursive struggles engaged in by CSMs within the mass media.
Once I decided which moments to use, I then proceeded to gather news articles around
these events, either through on-line databases (using key words and dates) or through
cipping newspaper articles while events were taking place. I searched Canadian
newspapers, both in English and French, including the National Post, Globe and Mail and
for specific cases, the newspapers geographically closest to the events.

Unlike other studies on the media coverage of this movement, I was not seeking
to uncover all the discourses that arise in coverage but instead looked to newspapers to
help me address some of the questions and queries outlined above. For example, in
Chapter 2, my intent was to monitor the ways in which the movement was discussed as
well as any connections that were made between the movement and “terror” within the
first two years following September 11, 2001. I therefore began by collecting articles that
mentioned “anti-globalization” and “terrorism,” which helped me uncover several events
that relate to the impact of the “war on terror” on dissent. Once I uncovered the case of
the G8 protests near Calgary as being significant, for example, I then focused on
gathering and analyzing national and local coverage of this case. In Chapter 3, I
proceeded differently, knowing from the start that I wanted to focus on the anti-WTO
protests in Montreal. For this case, I looked closely at the immense amount of coverage
locally, but also, although briefly, at the coverage that was garnered nationally, in order to determine at what point the event was considered “news” on a national level.

Other cases within the thesis were chosen as examples to aid in theorizing certain phenomena within the media, such as the importance of the visual and the spectacular. I have also been conscious of not reproducing systems of exclusion (despite the fact that this study is Canada-centric), and attempt to acknowledge underrepresented groups, such as immigrants and refugees, and use a few examples from little known activist groups, such as the radical queer group the Pink Panthers. Whereas theorists such as Hackett, Gitlin, Keilbowicz & Scherer, and Raboy address questions around the framing of social movements, they do not specifically link the politics of speech in our society with those within the media. This thesis is an attempt to push analyses of social movements and media in this direction; this decision is manifested in my choice to examine how discourse marks out positions for speakers, constructing relations between them, and naturalizes dominant discourses.

My methodology is also marked by this choice. I approached this project through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA), a methodology developed to address how inequalities (such as racism and sexism) are manifested within discourse. In the words of Henry and Tator, CDA “provides a tool for deconstructing the ideologies of the mass media and other elite groups, and for identifying and defining social, economic, and historical power relations between dominant and subordinate groups;” it is a “multidisciplinary approach to the study of language use and communication in the context of cultural production” (2002, 72). Because method is in this case inseparable from theory, CDA informs both the theoretical framework of my thesis as well as the
methodological framework that I used to interpret news discourse. CDA is a methodology that links this interest in language and ideology to research that is critical of the current social order. CDA is used to uncover or expose these discourses with the view that the language, semantics, and rhetoric used, the information used and left out of a text, among other factors, are linked to broader cultural contexts. It is the study of the multiple levels of meaning in a text; it is an examination of the intended meanings of a text through an analysis of what is said and what is not and of the implications of these features of discourse. CDA looks at the communicative, social, and cultural uses of language. Systems of discourse order and influence human experience; access to channels of communication is not homogenous to all and discourse is increasingly hegemonic. It can function as domination and oppression, raising questions from researchers interested in the emancipatory qualities of qualitative research.

As Henry and Tator, among others, point out, "'[M]any critical discourse analysts ... are motivated in their work by the desire to produce counter or oppositional discourses that provide alternative ways of interpreting, understanding, and interacting with the world'" (2002, 73). On a broader and more social level, the purpose of this study is a politically motivated one; this is illustrated in the decision to use a methodology that is influenced by the desire of feminists and the theorists of the Frankfurt school to move away from positivism and towards endeavours that are openly political. CDA seeks to expose inequalities and the way in which those inequalities are perpetuated through discourse. In doing so, the hope is to not only describe the world but to play a part in changing it. Through this mapping of discourses that arise in media coverage of the global justice movement, I hope to provide movement actors with knowledge about
media structures that will then enable them to design tools through which to be more successful in their challenging of dominant discourses whether through the development of media campaigns or alternative methods of representation. Overall, I seek to, in the words of Alberto Melucci, "force power out into the open and give it a shape and a face" (1996, 1).
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework: News Media and Critical Social Movements

The organization of a mobilization against the WTO mini-ministerial in the summer of 2003 in Montreal provoked an article in *The Montreal Mirror* that focused neither on the protests nor the issues at stake, but rather on how activists are “mastering the info blitz.” The Popular Mobilization Against the WTO had announced a press conference within hours of news that the hotel hosting the meetings had cancelled the reservations, a move which impressed journalist Patrick Lejtenyi. He writes: “The speed at which the protesters… organized and alerted the press signals not only a growing media-savvy but also a sophisticated network of information gathering and distribution.” Lejtenyi’s observation points to the increased use of media monitoring and media relations in activist communities.

Despite the fact that it is not taken for granted that all groups want to engage with the media, many are jumping into this realm, albeit tentatively. The reasons why activists engage with media may or may not be more complex than the fact that they are “trying to get the message out.” Yet, activists often recognize the consequences of missing the opportunity to do a live interview with a television news network, or of an article that portrays activists in a negative light, or of a misquoting of their words. Part of “mastering the info blitz” therefore also requires an understanding of how the “info blitz” works, from the levels of political economy, to the traditions of newsmaking, and

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how the politics of speech function to exclude some voices while amplifying others. This chapter is an attempt to move towards this mastering, examining how the news media serves as an ideological battleground, why critical social movements need media attention, and why this need represents a struggle over meaning and representation.

1.1 The Whole World is Watching:  
The Precarious Relationship between Mass Media and Social Movements

The roles of social movements in contemporary society are often idealized. In a political climate where citizens are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with electoral politics, social movements are seen as the source of pressure needed to ensure that states act in the interests of “the people.” Equally, they are seen as communicating the messages of the marginalized, advocating for changes in a patriarchal, imperialist, and capitalist system. This is done through the creation of “new systems of meaning which make visible to a society as a whole that new conflicts and issues have emerged” (Diani & Everman 1992, 9). The struggles of social movements are articulated within discourse, as “hegemonic struggle takes place to a significant extent in discourse, where the ‘stakes’ include the structuring of orders of discourse as well as other dimensions of hegemonies” (Fairclough 1995, 96).

The roles of social movements in our society must therefore be seen as being linked to those of communications media. As eloquently stated by Gamson:

What does it mean when demonstrators chant, “The whole world is watching?” It means that they matter—that they are making history. The media spotlight validates the fact that they are important players. Conversely, a demonstration with no media coverage at all is a nonevent, unlikely to have any positive influence on either mobilizing potential challengers or influencing any target. No news is bad news. (Gamson 1995, 94)
If this is indeed the case, it is imperative that critical social movements engage in public communication in order to build a movement and effect social change.

Recognizing this, Gamson and Wolfsfeld theorize the media-movement relationship. In their article “Movements and media as interacting systems,” they outline “the power and dependency aspects of this relationship” (1993, 115). They delineate three major purposes for which movements need the news media, which are extremely useful in understanding why “media discourse remains indispensable for most movements” (115). They are: mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement. CSMs need to access public communication, which for Gamson and Wolfsfeld include the movement’s own publications, to attract support and to mobilize their constituency (116). The first of these – mobilization – is addressed by Hackett and Carroll (2004): “To mobilise politically – to attract wide support – CSMs must gain standing – visibility – in the public domain. They must define issues, name problems, and offer solutions in ways that connect personal experience and public discourse.” For example, if a social justice group wishes to build a mass mobilization around what they see as the exploitative policies of the International Monetary Fund, they must voice these concerns publicly, which includes developing language and analysis that the public will understand, thus convincing them to join the struggle.

Yet, beyond “needing the media to convey a message to their constituency, movements need media for validation… The media spotlight validates the fact that the movement is an important player” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993, 116). Media coverage of activism can be said to play into a movement’s vision of itself, legitimizing its existence to itself as well as to society. Activists are often avid news-clippers, gathering up articles
in which their organization is mentioned as proof that they are making a difference, that they are acknowledged within the public sphere. Yet just as a news article can be validating, it can also be injurious, fuelling arguments between groups or misrepresenting a viewpoint.

Finally, movements need media coverage to “broaden the scope of conflict”—“[m]aking a conflict more public offers an opportunity for the movement to improve its relative power compared to that of its antagonist” (116). The media acts as a space where social justice groups can react to public statements made by government officials, thus pressuring them to be more specific or to go further in responding to a social problem. AIDS activists, for example, may respond to a government report on services for people suffering from AIDS, pointed out the report’s gaps and making suggestions for improvement. Or, groups can struggle to get an issue identified as a problem. Feminists in the 1970s, for example, brought forth the term ‘spousal abuse’ in order to name a certain type of violence against women and to get it recognized as something to be addressed. It is through creating discourses around spousal abuse that this issue was moved forward.

Media therefore serve as a space in which movements present their grievances to a larger audience in order to legitimate their analysis, and to gain political prominence and support. These statements on why social movements need media are echoed in the work of Gitlin (2003; original in 1980), Gamson (1995), and Kielbowicz and Scherer

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4 Although I speak here of corporate media, the role of alternative media and computer mediated communications are also very important to these movements in that they provide participants with the ability to circulate information without the mass media filter. For more on the role of alternative media in social movements, see Downing (2001); Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi (1997); Cleaver (1999); Atton (2000b); Uzelman (2002).
(1986). Although it is clear that social movements are dependent on media, Gamson and Wolfsfeld also point out that this relationship is co-dependent (although the media have the upper hand)—the media need movements because they provide colourful copy, photo opportunities, and “drama, conflict, and action” (1993, 116).

Gamson and Wolfsfeld describe the above aspects of the media-movement relationship as the “structural” aspects of the media-movement relationship, to which they add one major cultural aspect—the negotiation over meaning (1993, 117). As Stuart Hall says in his essay on ideology, “We can think of many pertinent historical examples where the conduct of social struggle depended, at a particular moment, precisely on the effective disarticulation of certain key terms, e.g. ‘democracy,’ the ‘rule of law,’ ‘civil rights,’ ‘the nation,’ ‘the people,’ ‘Mankind,’ from their previous couplings, and their extrapolation to new meanings, representing the emergence of new political subjects” (Hall 1998, 1061). How peace movements define “peace” differs from how States and international bodies define it; their struggle therefore becomes centered on re-defining, reclaiming, and promoting peace discourse. Peace movements around the war on Iraq, for example, were struggling to reclaim the words “freedom” and “democracy,” which were used by George W. Bush to rationalize the occupation of Iraq.

Therefore, social movements need media for the mobilization, validation, and expansion of their struggles and it is within the mass media that these struggles occur. The media must therefore be theorized as a site of ideological struggle: “[M]ovements make strategic uses of the media for various counter-hegemonic practices, which include critique of existing social and material conditions, disruption of dominant discourses, codes and identities, and articulation of alternatives, whether in the form of new codes, identities
and ways of life, or progressive state policies” (italics theirs, Carroll and Ratner 1999, 2). Yet as many theorists have pointed out, some institutions and individuals have greater access to meaning-making than others. As Nick Couldry points out:

“Symbolic power” – that is, “the power of constructing reality” (Bourdieu, 1991: 163-170), one’s own reality and that of others – is primarily concentrated in one sector of society, not evenly distributed. This has been an everyday fact of life in most societies, but it takes a particular form in contemporary mediated societies, where symbolic power is concentrated particularly, although not of course exclusively, in media institutions, so that the uneven distribution of symbolic resources results in the overwhelming reality of media power. (2000a, 110)

This symbolic power, which as Couldry points out is taken-for-granted and concentrated in the hands of media institutions, makes meaning-making (speaking and being listened to) a complex task. The following section will examine how news traditions and structures reinforce symbolic power and the politics of speech, specifically in regards to CSMs.

1.2 News Media and the Unruly Subject

Like social movements, news media are often seen in ideal terms. They are considered by some to be a public service, and society’s fourth estate to others. News garners immense power from this perception that it is objective (Rojecki 1999, 16) and that “truth” is “the news reporter’s stock in trade” (Allan 1998, 121). Those who study news from a critical perspective challenge the notion of objectivity, arguing that news both reflects and constructs “reality” and social structures (Tuchman 1972). News is therefore a manufactured product; it does not represent an imperfect reflection of our world, but is a representation of it that has passed through several ideological filters (Hackett et. al.

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5 See for example Kidd (n.d.); Hackett (1991; 2000); Couldry (2000a); Atton (2002); Rojecki (1999); and Fairclough (1995).
2000), one of these being the journalist. Yet whatever the motivations of media personnel, the social function of the media “is to legitimize and reproduce existing asymmetrical power relationships by putting across the voices of the powerful as if they were the voices of ‘common sense’” (Fairclough 1995, 63). News, in effect, then, functions as a tool of hegemony, reinforcing and naturalizing society’s dominant ideologies.⁶

The construction of news discourse must be seen in complex terms, as constituting a space that absorbs and influences the discourses of many sources of power. Yet, the news media has “a weight of its own”— “its logic, principles, or trajectory cannot be explained simply as the result of some external force” (Hackett 1991, 74). How these media represent social movements is therefore a result of several factors, from the influence of society’s dominant ideologies to the political economy of newsmaking, to journalistic routines and traditions, to the politics of speech.

1.2.1 Convergence, Concentration, and Conglomerates: The Political Economy of Newsmaking

An examination of the political economy of news media in North America illustrates clearly that news media are businesses, owned by a small number of elites, whose aims are to attract high-class income readers that can then be sold to advertisers in order to

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⁶ I am drawing here on Gramsci’s conception of ideology, defined as: “a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life” (Gramsci 1971, 328). It is something that naturalizes certain conceptions of the world and that functions to keep certain classes dominant over others. Because hegemony requires the consent of the dominated and the “naturalization” of certain discourses into “common sense” (12), the discourses of the dominated may often be the same as that of the dominant class. Discourse, as an ideological practice, becomes the site of the (re)production of this consent. It is a political practice that “establishes, sustains and changes power relations”; it is a practice that “constitutes, naturalizes, sustains, and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations” (Fairclough 1992, 67).
make profit (Smythe 1981); audiences are therefore not considered thinkers but consumers. There are two main issues that have been identified by those who study the political economy of communication—convergence and concentration of ownership and the commodification of information. The second of these is related to how news media gain the capital needed to carry out their business, although some profit is gained by those who purchase newspapers or pay for cable, in large, news agencies rely on money from advertisers in order to produce news. This translates into news being a business venture rather than a service provision. “Since the 1980s, the dominant media have increasingly helped to naturalize and popularize the ideology of market liberalism, with its tenets of privatization, trade liberalism, and deregulation. Politically, corporations in the telecommunications, finance and information media sectors have been important players in the drive to expand and entrench market liberal policies” (Hackett 2000, 62).

As information is translated into a tradable commodity, being in the information business, so to speak, then becomes about determining what types of information are profitable, on both a local and global scale.

If certain types of information (such as the sensational) sell more copies of newspapers, it becomes, according to this profit-driven logic, in the interest of those in the news business to seek to create more of this type of information. This has led to what has become commonly referred to as “infotainment,” where information is transformed into entertainment through spectacular images, lively narration, gossip, and conflict and its resolution. Fox refers to this as “sensationspeak”—that which “titillates us with verbal, visual, and aural jolts per minute, trivializing nearly everything it touches” (2001, 5). If there are more people drawn to the consumption of news (and some would argue
that the public is more drawn to consuming infotainment than news presented with less sensational factors, whereas others argue that people actually want more information and less entertainment) a newspapers’ sales rates remain high and therefore more advertisers are attracted to purchasing advertising space (this is what Dallas Smythe (1981) refers to as audience as commodity). Without advertisers, much of what we know as mass communications media would not exist because of high costs of production and distribution.

Convergence and the concentration of ownership within the media industry add another layer to the political economy of news. Convergence, a term that is used to refer to the owning of several media outlets (often crossing boundaries of Internet, television, and other media) by one media institution, includes cross ownership (for example the same company owning newspapers and television stations) and often the ownership of news companies as well as entertainment ones (Cooper & Miljan 2003). The term ‘concentration of ownership’ is used to explain how one person or company often owns many media companies. This can be illustrated on a material level. In Canada the concentration of media ownership is astounding.² In Quebec, for example, Quebecor Inc. owns 15 daily newspapers, 151 weeklies, 17 magazines, 11 television stations, 7 radio stations, one cable distributor, and 11 private websites. In addition, they control 9 publishing companies, 170 video clubs, and 8 distributing companies. Quebecor Inc. also owns 160 print distribution companies in 17 countries, which makes it the most

² For some information on the issues around concentration of media ownership in Canada, go to the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting website: www.friends.ca.
important commercial printer in the world. This is what is known as ‘synergy’ or vertical concentration.

This represents a significant barrier for social movements. Because of their limited resources and the high costs associated with producing and distributing both print and electronic media, their access to audiences is greatly mediated by institutions with capitalist goals. “Commercial, advertising dependent media privilege consumerism over other social values, the minority of affluent consumers over the less well-heeled, and increasingly, depoliticised infotainment over public affairs information” (Hackett 2000, 62). News media are thus more likely to focus on isolated events associated with social movements than to discuss broad social change.

Economic structures set limits on the ideologies and commonsense understandings that circulate as ways of making sense of the world, without determining them mechanically. The fact that media networks are capitalist corporations does not automatically decree the precise frame of a report on anti-capitalist points of view, but it does preclude continuing, emphatic reports that would embrace this as the most reasonable framework for the solution to social problems (Gitlin 2000, 10). If a social movement’s message is explicitly anti-capitalist, for example, it is encouraging the audience to not consume, which goes fundamentally against the purpose of corporate media. If audiences do not consume, advertisers do not purchase advertising space, and the media can no longer function as a profitable business. Furthermore, as stressed by

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8 This information was compiled with information from: “La concentration de la presse à l’ère de la "convergence": Dossier remis à la Commission de la culture de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec” written by Lavoie, Marie-Hélène, with the help of Daniel Giroux. Numbers may have changed since this document’s publication, but nevertheless remain indicative of the amount of concentration of ownership in Canada.
James Winters (1997) in his study of the impact of concentration of media ownership, those who own Canadian news media hold to extremely conservative ideologies that influence content.

The political economy of news in Canada can therefore be seen as a barrier that limits the access of voices that seek to challenge the status quo. As Henry and Tator (2002) state: “The media are corporatist in nature, and this places an organizational clamp on the kind of news they produce—often at the cost of conventional social values” (51). And, more specifically, many CSWs, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, include the challenging of concentration of media ownership as part of their agenda, thus installing another barrier between them and news media owners.

1.2.2 Selecting, Combining, and Quoting: Newsmaking Traditions and Routines

The second aspect of the news media structures that complicates critical social movements’ access to this sphere is that of news-making traditions and routines. “The routines of journalism, set within the economic and political interests of news organizations, normally and regularly combine to select certain visions of reality over others” (Gitlin 2000, 4). Deeply imbedded within these traditions are rules about who can speak as well as what they speak and how. The values of “objectivity” and “balance” are deeply imbedded journalistic values that shape who is interviewed, how much weight their opinions have, and how stories are written.

Oppositional voices are not totally excluded from this space, but play a role in reinforcing the notion of “balance,” providing “both sides” of a story, and in presenting a good story, by representing conflict (and its resolution or containment) and providing
the drama needed to create news that serves as entertainment. According to Stuart Hall, the role of the notion of "balance" in media (particularly television) is to maintain the prevailing definition of the political order:

In one and the same moment, it expresses and contains conflict. It reproduces unwittingly the structure of institutionalized class conflicts on which the system depends. It thereby legitimates the prevailing structure of interests, while scrupulously observing 'balance between the parties.' It also, incidentally, offers a favourable image of the system as a system, as open to conflict and to alternative points of view. It is this last twist which keeps the structure flexible and credible. (1974, 22)

When placed in opposition to dominant voices, opposition voices are in danger of being absorbed within news discourse, serving to uphold the system's credibility rather than pushing it to the point of change.

Yet, as Hackett stresses, hegemonic ideology is not fixed in capitalist societies, it must respond to social movements and historical contexts; therefore "the possibility of radical change can never be entirely precluded" (1991, 59). But social movements must struggle to be recognized as being newsworthy before any change is possible. Traditions of news selection deeply influence what is considered as "news," and, as Hackett also explains, news is a process of selection and construction that are imbedded in routines of news organizations (1991, 76). Story selection is therefore based on various factors as to what makes a story 'news' and is one of the ideological aspects of news discourse. Some of these factors are: timeliness; the novel or weird; political relevance; ongoing theme or story; violation of morality codes (scandal); drama, conflict, death, injury, destruction, social or environmental harm; threshold (affecting a large number of people); human interest; elites/celebrities; local; and wars that threaten or involve superpowers. These criteria for news selection are further complicated by the categorization of news within
newspapers, into sections such as local news, world news, entertainment, sports, and classified. What happens, we must ask, when a story is both locally and globally-oriented, as are many of the issues addressed by CSMS? Their place within news structures is precarious. Take for example a common mass mobilization strategy within the global justice movement—the organizing of simultaneous actions in many places (for example 50 cities in 10 different countries) to address the global policies of the World Trade Organization. Is this a local story or a national one or an international one? If activists customize the action to point out local effects of these policies, this further complicates this problem of categorization.

Within these guidelines for the selection of news also comes that of being visually interesting by providing interesting images (whether for television or newspapers). This factor is significant when we realize how news is extremely image-centred. Having an opinion or analysis of an issue is not enough, there must be an event (the value of timeliness) that illustrates why the issue is pressing (drama), and this event must be visually interesting (providing a picture that communicates what the event was like). Images have affective value, thus adding entertainment value to a news cast or article. Visually spectacular events therefore are more newsworthy in that they add to the entertainment value of news.⁹

Other aspects of news traditions and routines also come into play in the selection of news, from factors such as news deadlines, space, and the hierarchies among staff. The journalist, columnist, or editorialist who writes the story impacts not only how it is written but also the space that it occupies within the news. Editorials, for example, are

⁹ This aspect of news selection will be further discussed in chapter 3.
the space for outspoken political opinion within a paper. English-language dailies have un-signed editorials, which serve to create a “voice of God” effect, in that the opinion presented there is presented as not belonging to anyone, but as standing for the entire newspaper. Columnists and invited opinion writers also participate in the section of newspapers where ‘opinions’ are allowed. Columnists such as Chantal Hebert, whose voice has been broadcast in diverse media over the past 10 years, from Le Devoir to the Toronto Star to the National Post, Radio-Canada, and Télé-Québec, occupy spaces of discursive privilege within media in Canada. Her opinion on political issues therefore carries more political weight than someone who is not a journalist-celebrity.

Naomi Klein is another example of a journalist-celebrity who occupies a specific political role within Canadian newspapers, as she has been affiliated with the global justice movement since publishing her book No Logo, and is seen as the voice of ‘the left’ within the Globe and Mail and other newspaper that accept this point of view. Klein is seen as being a participant within the movement, yet the space she occupies is much more than that of activist. Klein has garnered a significant amount of legitimacy within the media and occupies a place of privilege in that she can voice her observations through her columns. As well, she has attained celebrity status, which helps sell newspapers (thus making her a profitable addition), but that also makes it harder for newspapers to exclude her voice altogether. Yet, because she has become a symbol of the movement, some writers or political figures launch their discursive attacks at her instead of at the movement.

The space that certain voices occupy within newspapers is therefore one in which many factors come into play, such as newsmaking traditions and routines. But what the
examples of Hebert and Klein show is that struggles over meaning that occur around news discourse are not exclusively played out within the discursive forms, but that the struggle occurs over access to this space in the first place (Hall 1998). Stuart Hall articulates this:

[T]he difference between those accredited witnesses and spokesman who had a privileged access, as of right, to the world of public discourse and whose statements carried the representativeness and authority which permitted them to establish the primary framework or terms of an argument; as contrasted with those who had to struggle to gain access to the world of public discourse at all; whose 'definitions' were always more partial, fragmentary, and deligitimated; and who, when they did gain access, had to perform with the established terms of the problematic in play. (italics his, 1061)

Those who hold less power in our society, such as those presenting oppositional views, must therefore struggle to be considered as legitimate sources for the news story in question, and they must understand how to present this story. Sources must be available within a certain timeframe (in order to abide by journalistic deadlines), they must be dressed 'respectably,' and they must not be overly angry or emotional but must sound 'rational.'

In addition, because journalists are seeking quotes and sound bites, those interviewed by journalists are more likely to have their words cited (and thus their analysis presented in their own words), if they speak in tight, quotable sentences that can fit into short articles or two-and-a-half minute news holes. Those who regularly have access to the media, such as politicians or their media relations assistants, become professionals when it comes to news-speak and to "spinning" their news in a way that journalists are likely to quote. This gives them an advantage, above and beyond, the fact that those in institutional positions are almost always placed "higher" (near the beginning) of a story, which in the world of news-making means that their words have a
greater value than the others quoted in the story, particularly those who fall within the last few paragraphs.

1.2.3 Orders of Discourse and the Politics of Speech, or, Not Everyone Has the Right to Speak of Everything Whatsoever

The political economy and traditions of newsmaking both draw on and reinforce the politics of speech in our society. Politics that determine which voices have legitimacy, and which do not, are significant in shaping movement-media relationships. Examining news discourses offers some insight into how the politics of speech are played out; they determine who has access to “symbolic power” (Couldry 2000a) and therefore access to the power of constructing reality. Foucault refers to the politics of speech as the “orders of discourse” that exist in society in general and materialize in news media. Foucault’s theories are particularly useful in that he very clearly links discourse to power. For Foucault, power is linked to knowledge, and thus to discourse. In his essay “The order of discourse” (1981), Foucault outlines three “procedures of exclusion” that have been created and maintained by dominant institutions in order to protect their power base (discourse). These three principles are useful in conceptualizing how certain people, groups, and classes are barred from engaging in discourse or in discursive resistance within the news media.

If we follow Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, which theorizes that systems of power are maintained by “persuasion from above and consent from below” (Hackett

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10 It is also important to note that Foucault’s conception of power also includes the notion that power is not inherently negative, or dominating, that power is “not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points” (1995, 94). Foucault’s analysis reminds us that power is not one-sided, concentrated in the hands of a few, but that it comes from multiple places, and that it is also in the hands of those who resist the structures of domination in our society.
Foucault’s procedures of exclusion can illustrate how discourse is protected, assisting persuasion and thwarting dissent. The principles of exclusion that Foucault outlines are: the forbidden speech, the division of madness, and the will to truth. He is not speaking necessarily of whom gains access to representation within the news media, yet the news media can be theorized as space to which people are excluded, and as one of the institutions that supports exclusion.

The first principle is that of the forbidden speech, or what Foucault sometimes simply calls “prohibition,” which relates to who has the right to speak and when. As Foucault says: “we know quite well that we do not have the right to say everything, that we cannot speak of just anything in any circumstances whatsoever, and that not everyone has the right to speak of everything whatsoever” (1981, 52). Prohibition is tightest around sexuality and politics, he says. To relate this to social movements, it is clear that those fighting for environmental protection, women’s rights, workers rights, etc. are not those who have the power to speak what they want, when, and where. When it comes to news stories, for example, journalists give voice to those in power—state officials, “experts,” etc—and occasionally those in social movements. But the voices of those struggling for change are often barred from speaking their mind on an issue; they are prohibited access to this discursive space.

Social movement actors therefore must spend great amounts of resources (time, money, and energy) if they want to get their voices heard within prominent discursive spaces. Often, they by-pass this and create their own discursive spaces, such as alternative media, in which their voices have priority. Yet it is unfortunately the case that the discourses formed in these spaces often do not penetrate the dominant spheres of
representation, or take longer to do so. These discourses are prohibited because, as Melucci says, they indicate that there are problems with the system (1996, 12). Hall argues that institutions (he is speaking primarily of broadcasters) experience the "double-bind" (1974, 26) of needing to show openness to dissent in order to retain credibility, yet also needing to prove that everything is under control. In order to retain their credibility, dominant media or institutions must give access to accounts which lie outside the consensus, but the moment institutions do so, they immediately endanger themselves with their critics, who attack them for unwittingly tipping the balance of public feeling against the political order. They open themselves up "to the strategies of both sides which are struggling to win a hearing for their interpretations in order to redefine the situations in which they are acting in a more favourable way" (Hall 1974, 26).

Prohibition is a tricky hegemonic game, in which domination and consent must be balanced through the cooptation of activist struggles in order to show that everything is "under control." In the Prison notebooks, Gramsci comments on the difficulty of transmitting different conceptions of the world. He says "new conceptions have an extremely unstable position among the popular masses; particularly when they are in contrast with orthodox convictions (which themselves can be new) conforming socially to the general interests of the ruling class" (Gramsci 1971, 339). The blocking of, rejection or co-optation of the threat of change, which is what social movements represent, is a type of prohibition in that dominant institutions use the discourse of social movements in order to reinforce the hegemonic order, diverting it from its intended purpose of challenging the status quo.
The second principle of exclusion is the division of madness. As Foucault outlines, the division between reason and madness arose in the depths of the middle-ages. Since then, “the madman has been the one whose discourse cannot have the same currency as others” (1981, 53). In other words, if you are seen to be without reason, or as 'mad,' your discourse is devalued. In media coverage of social movements, activists are often portrayed as being “crazy,” out of control, or as being reasonless. One of the main ways in which this is accomplished is in the portrayal of radical activists at mass demonstrations as “causing riots” or as being “rock-throwing anarchists” or as out of control. By describing activists in this way, they are rejected as valid speakers of truth; they are without reason, and thus without the power to define. Part of the struggle over discourse is therefore the struggle to prove that they are reasonable, that they are not overly emotional, radical, hysterical, or mad. Those who are considered part of the mad within social movements are divided from those who are reasonable within the media, society, and within movements themselves. Their discursive resistance becomes ineffective because what they say has no value. The principle of madness is often paired with that of prohibition, as madness is often used to justify prohibition.

The final principle of exclusion is the will to truth. The opposition between true and false is historically constituted, dating back centuries, and “governs our will to know;” it is a “system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system” (Foucault 1981, 54). Our will to know the “truth” has grown immensely in the past century and has become institutionalized in the major institutions in our society.

This will to truth, like the other systems of exclusion, rests on institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by a whole strata of practices, such as
pedagogy, of course; and the system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now. But it is also renewed, no doubt more profoundly, by the way in which knowledge is put to work, valorized, distributed, and in a sense attributed in a society. (1981, 55)

News media, as discussed above, is seen as space of objectivity and truth, and derives significant discursive power from this perception.

Much of what we do in our society is driven by this will to truth—research, watching the news, personal conversations. Truth has the ultimate value. It is therefore no surprise that one of the main goals of social movements is to disseminate their knowledge. For example, a campaign against the World Trade Organization will always have popular education and media components. These serve in helping to spread what activists consider as being the “truth” about the WTO—they outline the privatization of services, environmental degradation, unfair immigration policies. The will to have people understand their point of view is immense. Yet this is a complicated process because the will to truth is underpinned by the weight of tradition and authority. Beliefs held for decades (a recent example is that of the definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman) are difficult to disrupt; those who hold authority in society, such as politicians, hold discursive power. The will to truth is time-bound, drawing from current values and hierarchies of power, and draws on citationality, the fact that words and ideas gain power through repetition.

Yet according to Foucault, the knowledges that occur outside of this system of power based on tradition and authority is where truth exists in its purest form—in subjugated knowledges. These are “knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scienticity” (Foucault 1982,
82). He places importance on these types of knowledges because he realizes that "truth" resides in the broader interpretation of all philosophies, not just that of the dominant structure. This is why Foucault engages in discourse analysis—in order to understand the structures of power, but also to uncover the knowledges that he sees as being closer to "truth."

The act of communicating analysis about the world is one of challenging dominant discourses, and is not, in fact, an easy task. The struggle between institutions such as the state or the WTO and social movements is a struggle over who has the right information, over who holds the "truth" about a situation. If social movements succeed in changing the way something is perceived or talked about, they have won a part of this battle. This type of success is difficult, although not impossible. The structures of knowledge in our society give some speakers privilege over others, which we have seen in the discussions on prohibition and madness above. As Foucault says, "It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is 'in the true' only by obeying the rules of a discursive 'policing' which one has to reactivate in each of one's discourses. The discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse" (1981, 61). Thus, in order for social movements to have their "truth" heard, they must abide by the rules of discursive policing, which may mean engaging with dominant communication structures. One of the ways in which this is done, I would argue, is by attempting to insert their "truths" (which may come in many forms from many different directions and contexts) into the accepted realm of news media. This is a realm in which it is sometimes acceptable for new discourses to be formulated, although
they are always attributed, in quotation marks and with the speaker's name, thus linking them ultimately to structures of power that privilege certain voices over others.

We must be careful when discussing social movements and exclusion because although Foucault's theorizing on the order of discourse helps us to understand that discourse is always linked to structures of power, we must also remember that Foucault also points out that power is multifaceted and everywhere, which is the pitfall of his argument. There are many types of social movements in our society, and each group may approach the "regimes of truth" from different angles and attempt to replace that truth with their own version of it. As feminist Patricia Hill Collins argues:

No one group possesses the theory or methodology that allows it to discover the absolute "truth" or, worse yet, proclaim its theories and methodologies as the universal norm evaluating other groups' experiences. Given that groups are unequal in power in making themselves heard, dominant groups have a vested interest in suppressing the knowledge produced by subordinate groups. (1990, n.p.)

The study of social movements and their attempts to articulate subjugated knowledges is important in understanding how society maintains structures of power and orders of discourse, but as Hill Collins articulates, there are limits to any theory or method, for they are always imbedded in relations of power.

The discourse analysis presented in the following Chapters of this thesis is an attempt to examine the politics of speech with regards to a specific political movement within a certain context. It is an attempt to theorize the status of social actors within the orders of discourse found within news media. Because discourse is where the power lies in our society, it is extremely important that social movement actors have a good understanding of the way in which ideology, hegemony, and language are tied together. The orders of discourse in our society constitute a constructed system, meaning that
there are fissures within it, in which resistance can take hold. Discourse analysis is thus an important task, for if done with a critical perspective, it can help to uncover and expose discourses of domination, thus forcing power out into the open. As Foucault writes: "discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized" (1981, 53).
Chapter 2

Mediating Dissent Post-9/11: The Global Justice Movement and Discourses of Terror

The events of September 11, 2001, were the first chapter in a mediated story that still glosses the front page of newspapers on an almost daily basis. Each day as Canadians reach for their morning paper, they are also turning a page of the book entitled The War on Terror. It is a book filled with fear, twists, turns, orange alerts, stories of the detainment of immigrant men, chapters on Saddam, Al-Qaeda, and any possible ‘threats to security.’ The power imbedded in the words “terrorism,” “weapons of mass destruction,” and “us” is linked to the amount of the ink and airtime devoted to this branded war. These discourses of terrorism have not only changed the media climate in Canada, but have also served to maintain a climate of fear that has aided in gaining the consent of Western peoples and in creating a climate in which Canadians think twice before voicing their critiques of the status quo.

Recognizing how deeply these discourses of terrorism have penetrated Canadian mass media and framed the way many issues are discussed, I seek to understand the mediascape in which the global justice movement emerged and the effects of the events of 9/11 on this environment. Central to this is the following question: How have discourses of terrorism affected the framing of dissent within mass news media? My

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11 This chapter is a re-working of my unpublished paper entitled “Mediating dissent post-9/11: Anti-neoliberal globalization activism and discourses of terrorism,” presented at the Justice, Culture, and Terror Conference, University of Saskatoon, September 12, 2003.

12 I use “9/11” in this paper when speaking of the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001, in order to point to the fact that this was not simply a day in history, but that it has become a phenomenon, a myth, a symbol.
starting point is an article by Andrew Rojecki on post-Cold War social movements and the media, in which he argues that the "anti-globalization" movement has experienced a "widened media space for dissent" (2002, 166), in comparison with previous social movements, such as anti-nuclear activism in the 1980s. Although there are many examples of the criminalization of dissent post-9/11, I seek to document the discursive challenges faced by the mobilization for global justice in this new political climate. This chapter is not a complete map of all the media coverage since 9/11, nor is it an outline of all the effects of 9/11 on voices of dissent in Canada. Yet, I feel that it is necessary to point out that post 9/11 some of the most intense repression has been experienced by immigrants, refugees, and people of colour.\(^{13}\) Although I cannot examine these issues at length here, I will touch on them with regards to how political dissent has been treated within Canada, specifically with regards to the separation of enemies and allies into the category of "with us or against us."

Before delving into specific examples, I begin this chapter by outlining the context of the global justice movement. As stressed by many critical discourse analysts, social, historical and political context are extremely important because they influence the way power relations become embedded in discourse (Henry and Tator (2002); Wodak & Fairclough (1997); Menz (1989); and others). Teun Van Dijk, a well-known Dutch

\(^{13}\) Within the weeks that followed 9/11 Canadians of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and Arab decent faced racism across Canada. "Less than ten days after September 11, racist attacks had occurred on mosques in St Catherines and Oshawa, while a Hindu Samaj Temple in Hamilton was firebombed in a display of a frightening combination of xenophobia and fanaticism" (Stainsby 2004). With regards to immigrants and refugees, the case of Adil Charaoui serves as a telling example of the repression of immigrants post-9/11. Charaoui, a Canadian landed immigrant of Moroccan heritage, has been held since May 21, 2003. He was declared a "national threat to security" on the basis of secret evidence. See: www.adilinfo.org and www.zerra.net/freemohamed/news.php for information on the 5 men detained in Canada under “security certificates.” See also the Canadian Council for Refugees: www.web.net/~ccr/keyissues.htm.
discourse analyst outlines the importance of context: “Discourse analysis of news is not limited to textual structures. We have seen that these structures express or signal various underlying meanings, opinions, and ideologies. In order to show how these underlying meanings are related to the text, we need an analysis of the cognitive, social, political, and cultural context” (1991, 161). I thus begin with the context for this movement against capitalist globalization, briefly outlining the effects of 9/11 on this process itself. I will then examine the rise of discourses of terrorism, the climate of fear they evoke, and the effects of this on the movement’s discursive resistance.

2.1 The Globalization of Neoliberal Capitalism and the Globalization of Resistance

The phase of globalization we are currently experiencing, known as neoliberal, capitalist, or corporate globalization, has been unfolding over the past one hundred years, gaining a firm hold after the end of the Cold War and with the advent of international trade agreements and the rise of communications technologies. The end of the Cold War is significant because it signified the fall of capitalism’s ideological and economic opposition – socialism – and the opening of previously blocked markets. Socialism’s failure signified for many the superiority of neoliberal capitalism as “the way.” To quote Lisa Duggan, an American historian:

This “neo”liberalism is usually presented not as a particular set of interests and political interventions, but as a kind of nonpolitics—as a way of being reasonable, and of promoting universally desirable forms of economic expansion and democratic government around the globe. Who could be against greater wealth and democracy? Especially since the fall of the Soviet empire by the end of the 1980s, neoliberals have argued that all alternatives to the U.S. model have failed—fascism, communism, socialism, even the relatively mild forms of the welfare state advocated by social democrats, labor movements, and Keynesians. (2003, 10)
Under the "logic" of neoliberalism, international trade markets expanded at an incredible rate in the eighties and early nineties, aided by the increasing presence of information technologies, and state sovereignty was diminished through the signing of trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (both in 1994). The power of corporations increased, based on access to cheaper materials and labour, and on the liberalization of markets. In particular, the advent of free trade has brought about the globalization of communications industries, from the proliferation of the telecommunications industry to the mass-export of cultural products such as books, television shows, and film.

This period was also marked by a new wave of imperialist colonization as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank put pressure on developing nations, seen as being excluded from participation in the global economy, to deregulate and privatize services, engage in agribusiness, and open their borders to foreign goods and technologies. As many scholars have pointed out (Raboy 2002; Rojectki 2002), one of the major characteristics of this wave of globalization is the decrease in the power of nation states and the increase in power of transnational organizations (such as the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank). "Whereas they once made policy autonomously in the full range of areas of public concern, nation-states now negotiate on behalf of their constituencies in various fora where transnational policy issues are discussed and decided" (Raboy 2002, 114). This new world order has brought many issues to the forefront of politics in the global village, such as that of whether "the marketplace will seek its own solutions independent of the public interest" (114) or whether national
governments will be able to act individually to address problems. This very tension between the market place and local sovereignty is at the heart of many critiques of neoliberal globalization and of the social movements that have joined together to ask a fundamental question—do people come before profit?

This question brings to our attention the fact that profit is not blind to colour, race, sex, and class; these aspects of society are swept to the side with arguments that all the world’s people will benefit from trade. Within neoliberalism material wealth and politics are organized “in terms of race, class, gender and sexuality as well as economic class and nationality, or ethnicity and religion” (italics hers, Duggan 2003, 3). Certain identity groups, nations, etc, benefit from the re-ordering of the economic sphere, while others have less access to things such as job stability and good working conditions, health care, or housing and food. The gap between Northern and Southern countries has grown, as has the gap between the rich and the poor. Neoliberalism’s effects on such a diverse spectrum of society has led to the rise of a global social movement made up of groups from all disadvantaged and struggling populations, from the South to the North, from Indigenous peoples to union groups.

This critical social movement is known to many under the name “anti-globalization”—a label that I will not use here because it is a misnomer, one which social movement actors have been trying to evade since it was coined.14 The imposition of the

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14 In an article in the New Left Review, activist and anthropologist David Graeber criticizes journalists, academics, and even progressive writers, for failing to see the basis of the movement, beyond the term “anti-globalization,” which he says is still being used “for no particularly good reason” (2002, 61). He declares, in obvious frustration: “This may be the result of sheer ignorance, or of relying on what might be gleaned from such overtly hostile sources such as the New York Times; then again most of what’s written even in progressive outlets seems largely to miss the point—or at least, rarely focuses on what participants in the movement really think it’s about” (61). Similarly, in her book Fierce and Windows, Naomi Klein reiterates several times that this movement is not “anti-
“anti-globalization” label, which Bennett (2003) calls the “anti-globalization frame,” must be recognized as linked to dominant ideologies. Bennett quotes ATTAC\(^{15}\) activist Susan George saying that she rejects this frame “as an insultingly poor account of global activism” (163). This movement, which actively opposes neoliberalism and corporate capitalism, is seen as a threat to the dominant social order. Thus, in order to contain the movement, governments and corporate media institutions acknowledge the movement’s existence, yet attempt to limit its access to power by robbing its actors of legitimacy by describing them as “anti-everything,” as violent, and as anarchists, an often misunderstood and dismissed tradition of political thought that garners little respect (Graeber 2002). This movement is not against globalization, but against the aspects of globalization that are based on the exploitation of the majority of the world’s peoples by the capitalist agenda of a few countries, driven by multinational corporations and aided by international organizations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. This movement describes itself as for the globalization of solidarity, justice, and self-determination; I will thus refer to it either as the mobilization for global justice, or the global justice movement.

The mass protests in Seattle in November of 1999 are often heralded as the coming-out party of this movement that in fact began much earlier. This is a movement that has its roots in Southern mobilizations opposing the structural adjustment policies

\(^{15}\) ATTAC (L'Association pour une Taxation des Transactions financières pour L'Aide aux Citoyens, or - Association for the taxation of financial transactions for the benefit of citizenry) is an association that was started in France in 1998 that has local chapters in France and Quebec. Their main objective is to lobby for the implementation of the so-called Tobin Tax, a small tax to be levied on international currency transactions. See: www.france.attac.org.
of the IMF, the anti-trade movements of the 80s and 90s, the Zapatista movement in Mexico\textsuperscript{16} (whose first mass uprising hit the world stage on January 1, 1994, the day NAFTA came into effect), and elements of the human rights, feminist, anti-imperialist, and environmental movements.\textsuperscript{17} What happened in Seattle was the revelation of a broad and diverse transnational movement opposing the expansion of neoliberal global economic policies (Smith 2002, 207) and linking many social movements together; a coming-out that was much facilitated by the use of computer-mediated communication (from email to Web sites) and by the copious amount of attention from corporate media. “The ‘Battle in Seattle’ and its predecessor campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and ‘fast track’ authorization represented some of the first major popular challenges in the United States to these policies” (207).

This joining together of popular movements, from issue-based to identity-based movements, into a “movement of movements” marked a significant change in the nature of social movements globally. Socialists, anarchists, feminists, environmentalists, unionists, and more, joined together against neoliberal globalization. Thus as the twentieth century ended, and as neoliberal globalization was marking its presence on a global scale, the Seattle protests marked the globalization of resistance and of solidarity. In the few years that followed, this global movement gained strength, linking movements in the South with those in the North, and rearing its multiple faces at major meetings of

\textsuperscript{16} For more detailed information on the Zapatistas, see Jeffries (2001), Cleaver (1999), Ford & Gil (2001), Klein (2002) or go to www.ezln.org.

\textsuperscript{17} The links this movement has with others cannot be underestimated. Because it is a coalition of various groups and movements working on diverse issues, the global justice movement draws on the experiences, analysis, strategies, and tactics of many historical and contemporary groups and movements. It draws on feminist movements for its analysis around sexism, for example, and on the anti-imperialist movements in India and elsewhere for strategies around decolonization, all while adapting analyses and strategies to contemporary and geographically specific contexts.
the global elite, from meetings of the WTO in Seattle, to the popular rebellion in Argentina (December 2001), to the collapse of WTO talks in Cancun (September 2003). What sets this movement out from others was, and is, the diversity of tactics that materialize during mass protests, from the organizing of union marches 50,000 people strong, to the use of Black Bloc tactics, which has included property damage aimed at various symbolic targets of capitalism, to street theatre, ranging from Radical Cheerleaders to the Raging Grannies. This movement’s ability to mutate quickly and to adopt new struggles and tactics was illustrated after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., after which global justice activists quickly organized to oppose terrorism, war, and occupation, linking militarization with neoliberal globalization.\(^{18}\)

2.2 The Rise of the Global Justice Movement and Discursive Openings

Many discussions about the movement have sought to explore the why and the how of this mobilization for global justice, attempting to articulate the conditions that led to its growth and fertilization and to determine what sets it apart from other social movements, such as the peace movements of the 1960s or the women’s or environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on political economy and resource mobilization theory, Andrew Rojecki outlines three major interacting advantages for the coalition making up this movement against neoliberal globalization to explain its swift rise and expansion. He argues that the global justice movement “gains its

\(^{18}\) Within 48 hours of the attacks on the U.S., Montreal global justice activists gathered at a community centre to discuss the implications of the attacks, to discuss U.S. foreign policy, and to prepare to support people in their city that were being targeted by racist attacks. For commentary on the movement’s mobilization around war and militarization, see Klein (2002); Matas, Robert. “Activists aiming at war.” \textit{Globe and Mail}, 22 Sept 2001; and, Mills, Andrew. “From pillagers -- to peaceniks: Sept. 11 has turned the anti-globalization forces behind the Battle of Seattle into the first peace movement of the 21st century.” \textit{The Ottawa Citizen}, 22 June 2002: B1.
first significant structural advantage by the existence of elite dissensus at both domestic and international levels, driven in part by public worry about the local consequences of globalization” and also by the limited ability of trade ministers to negotiate agreements, “particularly under the pressures imposed by highly visible protests” (2002, 155-156). One recent example of this dissensus was at the September 2003 WTO negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, where representatives of poor countries walked out after refusing to sign a deal that cut agriculture subsidies in rich countries only slightly.\(^{19}\) This break-down in discussions, which was not a first for the WTO, illustrates divisions and disaccord within international government bodies, particularly between rich and poor countries. The protests and campaigns around these types of meetings highlight this split, using it to prove that global governing structures like the WTO work to the benefit of Western countries and to the detriment of the world’s marginalized populations. This disaccord, then, can be seen as offering a discursive advantage for social movements by providing a wide opening within which to insert their analysis and explanation.

The second condition for the movement’s rise set out by Rojecki is the end of the Cold War, and the third is the availability of the Internet, which “offers under-resourced interest groups with tools that provide extraordinary leverage for mobilization and organization” (157). These two conditions are also of particular interest in terms of media and discursive opportunities. The rise of Internet has been particularly useful to activists who have often faced financial barriers to creating their own media. This movement has benefited from thousands of Websites dedicated to the various issues and analysis reassembled under the Global Justice banner. As well, computer-mediated

communications have made it cheaper and easier for activists to communicate with their own colleagues as well as to work with people in other cities and in other countries. Computer-mediated communication has been heralded as one of the main organizing tools of global justice activists, a tool which makes it possible to organize mass demonstrations with activists from various regions gathering in one place as well as simultaneous demonstrations across the globe.

For Rojecki, the end of the Cold War also meant a more favourable environment for large-scale activism in that it offers two “rhetorical advantages” for the global justice movement. As mentioned above, the fall of the Soviet empire meant that capitalism reined above all other alternatives. On a rhetorical level, then,

the elimination of the Soviet Union as a long-standing symbol of repression and the economic system it championed deprives conservative opponents of a dependable ideologically-based platform for launching their attacks on dissident movements. During the cold war, the yoking of deeply antidemocratic values to a rival economic system enabled a host of facile rhetorical appeals that conflated the political with the economic and permitted an effortless association of one with the other. (Rojecki 2002, 156)

A second rhetorical advantage post-Cold War was that elites are deprived of using crisis and security risks as a predictable reactionary strike at the opposition. Cold War movements, such as the movement against nuclear weapons, struggled against being associated with communism, and being considered enemies of the state and anti-patriotic. These facile, but powerful, charges against social movement actors also fell with the fall of the Soviet Union. According to Rojecki, new social movements thus have a discursive advantage in that they are not constantly defending themselves against “red scare” charges.

20 For more on how the media covered the Cold war peace movements see Hackett (1991) and Rojecki (1999).
In order to test his theory that the global justice movement is experiencing a widened discursive space, Rojecki undertook an analysis of the media coverage of two streams of media content, news and editorial, on the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle. His findings were that “mainstream media news took care to distinguish the central message of the protesters from the minority of participants intent on sheer disruption” and that it “did not mount an assault on the credibility or knowledgeability of its participants” (162) and that editorial commentaries revealed “anything but a monolithic approach to economic globalization or to its antagonists” (166). Rojecki’s main conclusion is that the global justice movement has experienced an unprecedented “widened media space for dissent” (166) and that movement actors’ analysis of globalization was therefore more likely to be heard within protests such as those in Seattle in 1999, which his media analysis of these events shows. This conclusion is intended to explain why the global justice movement became so well-known and so large within such a short period of time. When paired with the analysis presented in Chapter 1, which outlines how important discursive spaces are to social movements, it is clear that a widened media space for dissent is no doubt a significant advantage for the global justice movement.

Deluca and Peeples (2002) also come to the conclusion that the media treats this movement more favourably than the movements of the 60s and 70s. Yet within their examination of the media coverage of the battle of Seattle, their explanation of this relates to the relationship between the highly visual tactics of activists, and, more
specifically, on the use of symbolic violence\(^{21}\) by protestors. The discursive advantage garnered by activists is therefore linked with their ability to attract media attention through the use of spectacle.

What we can draw from both Rojecki and Deluca and Peeples is that there are therefore political, economic, and discursive conditions that have led to the rise of this mobilization for global justice, from the fall of “red scare” discourses, to the rise of information technologies, and the development of spectacular tactics that draw in media attention. Yet this widened space must not be celebrated too quickly, for both of these articles do not take 9/11 into account. Rojecki concludes his article by saying that the events of 9/11 may have had the effect of reconfiguring this widened media space. The shifts in the movement immediately post-9/11, from the organizing of peace marches to the cancelling of protests scheduled in the weeks following 9/11, indicate that these events had an effect on the actions of activists. The analysis that flourished post 9/11 linked “analysis of corporate power, international financial institutions, and U.S. dominance in many parts of the world” (Duggan 2003, 69). Yet, as Duggan also points out, even though this analysis deepened, the U.S. government PR spinners and “corporate media conglomerates focused on the threat of terrorism from Muslim fundamentalists, government surveillance escalated, and a crackdown on dissent worked to discredit the other analyses of the meanings of 9/11 as ‘unpatriotic’” (69). As we will see, the trends Duggan discusses are also present in Canada’s post-9/11 political

\(^{21}\) Deluca and Peeples define symbolic violence as “acts directed toward property, not people, and designed to attract media attention” (2002, 138). This statement is highly controversial within the movement, as many groups and activists argue that the use of violence within the movement is damaging to its image. Deluca and Peeples’ conclusion will therefore be examined more closely Chapter 3.
landscape, as analyses of globalization and the U.S. empire's role in it were developed, the space allotted to dissent within the corporate media became constrained by discourses of terror.

2.3 September 11th and the Fast-Tracking of Neoliberal Globalization

In the Middle East, as elsewhere, for the U.S. regime, "freedom" means free markets, free trade and investment, and freedom for U.S. capital to do what it likes, where it likes, whenever it likes. While its armed forces wage a brutal colonial war of occupation, reshaping Iraq into a neoliberal playground for U.S. corporations, a living hell for Iraqis, and a model market showcase state for other Middle Eastern countries to imitate, its trade policies march militaristically throughout the region. (Choudry 2004)

The events of 9/11 may or may not be classified as a consequence of neoliberal globalization, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon undoubtedly brought us into a new phase of globalization, one deeply entwined with the "war on terror." The immediate reaction of some commentators to 9/11 was that globalization was over, that borders would come back to life, blocking previously "free" trade. In an often quoted article in the Financial Times, Stephen Roach says: "The footprints of globalization have left an obvious and important mark on the economic landscape during the past decade. But the terrorist attacks of September 11 and their aftermath may bring about its demise."22 Equally, the "anti-globalization" movement was declared "dead" and, in the words of Clifford Orwin, a University of Toronto political science professor, writing in the National Post, "toast" and "so-yesterday,"23 as though it was merely a trend.

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These commentaries are dramatic and speculative, but they indicate the questions that were being asked regarding the state of the world economy and of the social movements putting pressure on the existing global order and on the ideology of capitalism. Now, almost three years later, we know that neither of these speculations was correct—the effects of 9/11 did not include the permanent closure of borders for goods, neither did it mean the end to mass protests against global institutions. Yet it did signify a shift in the process of neoliberal globalization in that the “war on terrorism” served as a tool through which to advance neoliberal globalization in the promotion of freedom through consumption and through the attempt at fast tracking free trade agreements, all while closing borders to immigrants and refugees, and in escalating militarization both globally and locally.

For some, the attack on the Twin Towers symbolized an attack not only on the U.S., but also on capitalist ideologies. Discourses linking consumption to patriotism quickly took hold post-9/11 as Americans, Canadians, and the British were told repeatedly by their governments that consumption is vitally important.24 In a September 28, 2001, front page article in the National Post, Jill Vardy and Chris Wattie describe Jean Chrétiens as following the U.S. and British examples and encouraging Canadians to face down terrorism by opening their wallets, by taking advantage of low interest rates, and by traveling.25 The message in the news was that the attackers had targeted symbols of capitalism; therefore, the collective response must be to show them that capitalism is strong and will thrive. Discourses of patriotism served to overshadow any attention

placed on the ways in which Western over-consumption affects the planet, displacing peoples, and damaging the environment. In an analysis of media coverage of the global justice movement in the UK, Wahl-Jorgensen comments on these pro-shopping news articles: “Good citizenship, these stories imply, consist of consuming to get the economy back on an even keel, rather than participating in politics… They reduce citizens to consumers, who want to go about their daily lives without any inconvenience, and have no need to know about political events” (2003, 138). In the early days after 9/11, true freedom meant shopping, not politics or critical thinking. These discourses no doubt existed pre-9/11, but in this period of insecurity amongst North Americans, they gained strength.

At the same time as this pro-shopping discourse was circulating, certain factions of the U.S. government were calling for reduced capital gains tax and sought to fast track the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). These consumption and trade-related post-9/11 actions on the behalf of these western leaders sent the message that capitalism and trade are solutions to terrorism. As Naomi Klein said in an October 2001 commentary published in her book *Fetters and Windows*—“the battle lines have been drawn: trade equals freedom, anti-trade equals fascism” (2002, 239).

Alongside these pro-consumption and pro-trade discourses arose anti-immigrant (specifically anti-Arab) discourses, which were institutionalized in many levels of anti-terrorist legislation. Many immigrants and refugees in Canada, and to a greater extent in the U.S., face racial profiling, detention, deportation, law enforcement, brutality, exploitation, and slave-wage conditions. At the same time, immigration policies serve to strengthen Fortress North America, an empire based upon the dispossession of
Indigenous land, and the closing of borders to people seeking security. The building of Fortress North America must be recognized as linked to the goals of neoliberal globalization, in which capital and goods flow freely on a global scale, but borders are closed to immigrants and refugees. Just as the free-market ideology limits the roles of governments, it thrives on the increased role of governments in promoting national security.

"Security exceptions" in trade agreements ensure that the free trade rules do not apply to government actions taken for national security—including maintaining and arming a powerful military establishment. The special treatment of security roles of the state combined with the limits on its social and regulatory roles is a powerful mix that creates the conditions for war—and provides the means to wage it. (Staples 2003, n.p.)

The attempted expansion of Western conceptions of "freedom" and "democracy" is identified by global justice activists as a form of imperialism, one enabled through post-9/11 discourses such as the use of the infamous search for "weapons of mass destruction" and the need to defeat the "axis of evil." These discourses served as cover-ups for this round of the expansion of Western empires, placing the attention on potential security threats and off of the search for oil, profits, and the expansion of Western capitalism.

Militarization, one of the most significant outcomes of 9/11, must be seen as linked to economic globalization. To quote Thomas Friedman:

The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Without America on duty, there will be no America Online. (qtd. in Perelman 2003, 35)

Just as with past waves of colonization, Western nations have learned that powerful empires require powerful military protection. This requires the protection of corporate
interests abroad, leading to U.S. militaries entering South Asia, Columbia, and the Middle East. At home, protection has been institutionalized in the U.S. Patriot Act, which gave federal agents greater domestic surveillance powers, and in Canada's anti-terrorist legislation (Bill C36, the Anti-Terrorism Act; Bill C35 An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act; and Bill C-42 the Public Safety Act).26

In the past three years, we have witnessed the uses of discourses of terrorism to promote limitless consumption, to rationalize the closing of borders, the promotion of trade, and increased militarization. Through the war on terror, Western countries have succeeded in promoting their free market ideology both at home and abroad, through attempts at fast tracking the FTAA and in expanding the American empire into the Middle East and elsewhere. This has led to an increase of many of the global inequalities that social movement actors have sought to expose and to rectify, making this a time where the ability to present a critique of global power structures is needed more than ever.

2.4 The Media, the Global Justice Movement, and Discourses of Terror

"Suddenly the anti-globalization movement was linked to terrorism," says Mr. Ayres [a professor of political science at St. Michael's College in Burlington Vermont]. "The twin towers were symbols of global capitalism, which

26 These three legislations have multiple clauses. For example, Bill C-36 contains a widened definition of what constitutes a terrorist act or a terrorist group. According to the website of the CBC documentary "Security Threat": "The new law [also] gives police more freedom to use wiretaps and make arrests. Electronic surveillance can now occur for as long as one year (previously only 3 months) and the suspect doesn't have to be told about the surveillance for as long as three years after it has taken place." Charitable organizations are also mentioned in the legislation, which seeks to track the funding of terrorist groups and organizations. The legislation also allows the Canadian government to store DNA samples of suspected terrorists and to keep lists of organizations and people that they are affiliated with. Bill C-42 introduced security measures for the control of explosives and the transfer of sensitive technologies, and allows the establishment of "temporary military zones," and gives designated CSIS and RCMP access to airline data. See also Panitch (2002) for an examination of these laws in relation to protest.
led some people to claim – ridiculously – that al-Qaeda is an anti-globalization group.” (Mills, The Ottawa Citizen, 2002)²⁷

What was it about the events of 9/11 that made so many activists and commentators realize very quickly that one of the consequences from 9/11 would be the classification of activism as terrorism? Graeber also articulates this fear: “[T]hings do look very frightening. Governments who were desperately scrambling for some way to convince the public we [global justice activists] were terrorists even before September 11 now feel they’ve been given carte blanche; there is little doubt that a lot of good people are about to suffer terrible repression” (2002, 70). Perhaps it was the fact that our world has seen this type of witch-hunt before, during the Cold War, when it was referred to as the “red scare.” In order to assess the state of the global justice movement post 9/11, it is necessary to return to the conditions for its growth outlined earlier and thus to the importance of mediated spaces for social movement success. If the post-Cold War widened media space for dissent was especially important for this movement, it is necessary to examine the state of the mediated public sphere and to ask whether the rise of the war on terror has had an impact on this space. This assessment can be made through an examination of the mainstream media climate in Canada, particularly in news coverage of both the war on terror and of the global justice movement.

Canada’s mediascape was not necessarily ideal before 9/11, with many critiques being waged against the news media climate, from studies outlining racism in Canada’s press (Henry & Tator 2002) to the many discussions on concentration of ownership and

²⁷ Mills, Andrew. “From pillagers to peaceniks: Sept. 11 has turned the anti-globalization forces behind the Battle of Seattle into the first peace movement of the 21st century.” The Ottawa Citizen, 22 June 2002: B1.
media convergence (Raboy 2002; Hackett 2002). Yet despite critiques and scepticism, the shock that most people experienced on hearing the news of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers made them turn on their televisions or radios in search of information and explanations. Network news outlets, from Global to CBC, responded to this need by filling every second of airtime with newspeak, which because of the lack of information available often amounted to the repetition of nothing. As media analyst Danny Schechter says in his book *Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror*, “the more you watched the less you knew” (2003, 14).

We had entered the culture of war, one described extremely well by John Lockard, a writer for the American online magazine *Bad Subjects*:

The war occasions more than the war; it is a beginning of progressive regimentalization. It supplies rationales of repression, demands for the subordination of counter-argument, delimitations between permissible speech and silence that knows its place. War culture is speech in its own right, one that functions in rhetoric of demand and conquest. (2003, n.p.)

Since the beginning of the war on terror, war speak has dominated the mediascape. The news media, especially television news, has been repeating a vicious cycle—the introduction of a new crisis (from anthrax to orange alerts, to SARS and West Nile Virus), followed by the coverage of public hysteria, and constant attempts to appease through information on the present crisis. If one also examines George W. Bush’s actions and speeches, he is working on the same cycle of hysteria creation and appeasement, the creation of enemies – the Axis of Evil – and of saviours – the Coalition of the Willing.

The war on terror has overshadowed much of what most would consider news, leaving many stories in the dark, underreported, and others extremely over-reported. To
quote Naomi Klein: “Terrorism doesn’t just blow up things; it blasts every other issue off the political map.”

Discourses of terrorism have taken over the mediascape in Canada, creating perhaps what might be one of the longest ongoing stories in journalism’s history. As reported by the International Federation of Journalists in a report on 9/11 and journalism:

[W]ar is rarely good news for journalism. While journalists and media staff take terrible risks to get their story, governments on all sides seek to influence media coverage to suit their own political and strategic interests. The post-September 11 media crisis is seen everywhere. From Australia to Zimbabwe, via Colombia, Russia, the United States and Uganda, politicians have rushed to raise the standard of “anti-terrorism” against their political opponents, and have tried to stifle free journalism along the way. (White 2003, 2)

The overarching frame of the war on terror changed the landscape of Canadian newsmaking, from the pressures on journalists during the war on Iraq, to the increased tolerance of overt racism in the media, to the lack of coverage of major human rights cases to the silencing and vilification of dissenting voices.

These somewhat broad observations of the Canadian mediascape post-9/11 offer some indications that media space for dissent has been affected. A closer examination of the actual media coverage of the global justice movement shows further instances of this closure. Focusing specifically on the effects of this changed mediascape on the global justice movement, I will here discuss two main discursive frames – the us/Them frame, and the “enemy within” frame – that have impacted the media’s coverage of the global

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justice movement, drawing on several key moments where this movement entered the mediated public sphere.

The most significant discursive impact of 9/11 is the recuperation of one of the most crucial elements of Cold War ideology, what Robert Hackett calls the “manichean division of the world into us and them” (1993, 125). This discursive frame was resurrected in George W. Bush’s much publicized “you’re either with us or against us” speech, less then ten days after September 11, 2001. It was enacted in boycotts against France, in the war on Iraq, and many other events. The “us” defined as lovers of freedom, as patriots to the U.S. empire, as lovers of shopping and the Christian God; the “them” as haters of the U.S., of freedom, democracy, capitalism, and as members of “fundamentalist” Islamic religions. It is a gendered us/them, as Janice Haaken points out: “In the political choreographing of the war on terrorism, Muslim men are cast in the role of the ‘bad’ patriarchs and the United States in the role of the ‘good’ protectors, the guardians of women’s freedom” (2002, n.p.). It is an us/them that reproduces and naturalizes racist and sexist dichotomies, thus maintaining the hegemonic status quo and limiting the transgression of the dichotomy. Within the media, the us/them frame was dominant post-9/11, and does not only touch articles about 9/11 or the “war on terror,” but also articles about the global justice movement in which the word “terrorism” was often used and activists were accused of being on the side of the terrorists.

Within Canada, it became clear very quickly in early October 2001 that all discourse was not welcome post 9/11. First, there was the commotion around the Concordia Student Union handbook entitled Uprising, which included several articles about the global justice movement and presented a critical analysis of global capitalism.
and U.S. imperialism. Newspapers across the country reported on this story, in which B'nai Brith publicly accused Concordia students as being affiliated with Al-Qaeda because of a poem calling for revolution and a critique of the U.S.\textsuperscript{30} Whereas student activism often goes unnoticed in the mainstream press, the Concordia handbook made national news, where students were framed as being part of the “them” because of imagery and analysis that was obviously not politically acceptable post-9/11. Anti-American equalled Al Qaeda, equalled anti-capitalist terrorist.

The second incident, which happened a week after the first, was the vilification of University of British Columbia professor Dr. Sunera Thobani after a speech she made at a government-sponsored conference in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{31} Within her speech, Thobani spoke of the need for a strong anti-racist and women’s movement in the aftermath of 9/11 as racist incidents were occurring across the country and racial profiling used at the borders. The phrase “American foreign policy is soaked in blood,” taken out of context, was flung across the news sparking a barrage of hate calls and emails made to Thobani. Whereas feminist conferences rarely get attention in the media, the coverage of Thobani’s speech was immense and lengthy. She was accused of being an “ungrateful immigrant” and a “traitor,” \textsuperscript{32} which was ironic considering that she predicted that immigrants would be treated as “them” and as the “enemy within” post 9/11. In her initial speech, she said:


\textsuperscript{31} See Thobani (2002).

They hate freedom we are told. Every person of colour, and I would want to say also every aboriginal person, will recognize that language. The language of us versus them, of civilization versus the forces of darkness; this language is rooted in the colonial legacy. It was used to justify our colonization by Europe. ... (2002, 65)

And she warned that "[i]nevitably, and very depressingly, Canada is of course turning to the enemy within—immigrants and refugees. Tighter immigration laws, all the right-wing forces in this country are calling for that kind of approach" (68). The front-page image of Thobani's "angry" visage would not be forgotten as Thobani became one of the first victims of the us/them and enemy within discourses that she predicted.

These two early examples of the us/them discourse in Canadian media sent the message that to be critical of the U.S. and its policies meant that you were excluded from the "us" and thus in danger of being labelled a terrorist and becoming the subject of an RCMP investigation. Within coverage of the global justice movement, there are other examples of the us/them discursive frame over the next few years. An example from last year, which demonstrates that these discourses are still prominent, was the large amount of coverage allotted to the June 2003 CSIS report, in which CSIS names anti-globalization activists as potential terrorist threats. This was reported on in almost every daily newspaper in Canada, which is not unacceptable considering the public's right to know what CSIS's priorities are for the coming year. What is more troubling about the news stories is that although the term "anti-globalization" is only mentioned in one sentence of CSIS's extensive annual report, it is this aspect of the report that made it into

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33 On October 2, 2001, on the front page of the National Post, Thobani's image appeared beside a photo of Giuliani who is cited as arguing "you are either with civilization or with terrorists."

34 The article written by Bruce Cheadle of the Canadian Press ("CSIS cites domestic lobbies in terrorism report." The Halifax Herald, 6 June 2003), which was printed in many Canadian dailies, from Halifax, to Niagara Falls. See also: CBC, "Protest groups possible security threat: CSIS." CBC News, 6 June 2003.
the headlines and that garnered the most space in media reports.\textsuperscript{35} Ironically, the very same week that this story hit the news, so did a story in which Canada's international trade minister, Pierre Pettigrew declared the end of the "anti-globalization" movement.\textsuperscript{36} Despite this contradiction on behalf of Canadian government departments and agencies, the CSIS list has been used as an excuse for racial profiling and questionable arrests and detainments. The Montreal protests against the WTO mini-ministerial meetings July 28-30, 2003, illustrated that not only was Pettigrew incorrect in stating that the movement had "completely disappeared," but also exemplified the normalization of police repression. Over 240 people (including journalists, tourists, and passers-by) were arrested in Montreal as they gathered (after the dispersion of a march that police had declared "illegal") in an area that protest organizers had declared a "green zone," meaning an area for rest, popular education, and training.\textsuperscript{37}

It is essential to note that CSIS's labelling of activists as potential terrorists did not pass through the media completely unchallenged, as figures such as Jack Layton and Bill Moore-Kilgannon of the Council of Canadians were quoted as being opposed to the legislation.\textsuperscript{38} Yet, the number of articles that appeared nationally that did not question the linking of these groups with terrorism was much greater than those that did. What does this mean for the global justice movement? The news value of balance ensured that

\textsuperscript{35} The CSIS report states the following: "Terrorism in Canada can be divided into four categories: religious extremism (with Islamic extremism being the most serious threat at present); state-sponsored terrorism (exemplified by the current regime in Iran); secessionist violence (for example, Sikh extremism and separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Turkey and other countries); and domestic extremism (including, but not limited to, certain elements of animal-rights, anti-globalization and white supremacist groups)."

\textsuperscript{36} Pettigrew is quoted in Perreaux's article as saying: "I draw great satisfaction out of the fact that the phenomenon of anti-globalization has completely disappeared." Perreaux, Les. "International trade minister pronounces end of anti-globalization movement." \textit{Canadian Press}, June 06 2003.

\textsuperscript{37} This mobilization will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{38} "Protest groups possible security threat: CSIS." \textit{CBC News}, 6 June 2003.
activists were given space within which to react to this classification and to voice their fears about being thought of as terrorists and potentially being targeted by CSIC or the anti-terrorist legislation. Yet, what must be pointed out here is that Moore-Kilgannon and Layton are well-known left-wing political figures in Canada, ones who stand as legitimate activists in the eyes of Canadians (Layton was leader of the NDP at this time). Within the coverage of CSIS’s report, anti-capitalist, anarchist, or any other more radical activists were never given space within the media to comment on this report. This is significant in that it is these groups specifically who are most likely to be the targets of CSIS’s agenda; yet it is left-wing politicians and the more reformist and non-direct action oriented activists who speak on their behalf. The media coverage of this report gives us some insights into who in this movement is sought after for comments on such reports, indicating that some activists have more legitimacy within the eyes of the media than others. Within the activist community, there are groups and activists who are seen as more “us” than others, placing them higher up within the orders of discourse, and thus making them more likely to be called upon to react to such reports.

This example also illustrates how, although CSIS labels “anti-globalization” activists as “them,” activists may be neither “us” nor “them”—their position within the dichotomy is precarious. Just as within the Cold War where anti-nuclear weapons activists were neither for the Soviet Union nor the U.S., global justice actors are neither for those who attacked the U.S. nor are they pro-U.S. The movement is thus left confronting both sides, since neither side represents the interests of the basic rights of all people globally. There are many questions that arise through this coverage, such as whether dissent equals terrorism and whether the “with us or against us” discourse will
continue to frame all dissent in Canada or if certain groups will be shielded from its effects by their institutional structures and reputations.

The CSIS report also exemplifies another discursive frame that is prevalent in the media, which is touched on by Sunera Thobani (in the quote above) and what Robert Hackett calls "the enemy within" (1993, 19). The "enemy within" frame is inseparable from us/them discourses. This discursive frame begs the question—are there any of "them" among "us"? After 9/11, there was a strong fear that Canada would be charged with some of the responsibility for the terrorist attacks. American critiques of Canada's security systems led to an influx of money into Canada's security budget and also put pressure on the Canadian government to silence critiques of American foreign policy. Enemy within discourses arose in several moments, two of which I will discuss here: the introduction of Canada's anti-terrorist legislation (Bill C36, the Anti-Terrorism Act; Bill C35 An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act; and Bill C-42 the Public Safety Act) and in the preparations for the G8 Summit in Kananaskis and the coverage of the protests.

The anti-terrorist legislation, Canada's contribution to Fortress North America, is one way in which the Canadian government sought to prove its commitment to the "us" by changing the laws in order to allow them to detain and criminalize any persons identified as the enemy within and to give CSIS more power in its surveillance of

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39 In the December 2001 federal budget the military budget was increased by 1.2-billion, with 300-million going to replacing hardware and equipment. Most of the increase was directed to paying for the "war on terror" and for preparing Canada for nuclear and biological attacks. These increases were seen as too low by many critics, including the NDP. Yet, in addition to these increases, CSIS's budget was increased by 334-million (a 32% increase) and the RCMP were given 567-million, both to fund anti-terrorist activities. Furthermore, 1-billion was promised (over a five year period) for screening immigrants, refugees, and travelers as well as detaining and deporting those seen as being a "security threat." In total, the budget included $6.5 billion for security, emergency preparedness and the military. See: http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2001/budlist01_e.htm.
Canadians. The anti-terrorism bills symbolized the institutionalization of the early links of the pro-justice movement with terrorism. To quote Chantal Hebert:

The anti-globalization movement is another leading candidate for [an] incidental catch of the new legislation. The recent Quebec City Summit of the Americas has demonstrated that the movement is host to a violent strain. And now, at least one Liberal backbencher hopes openly that the federal legislation can be used to go after the young anarchists who have been turning international summits into armed sieges.\

This quote indicates only some of the debate that took place within the columns of journalist-celebrities, and in editorials and articles about the legislation, which covered many aspects of it from the potential uses of the new legislation, on the lack of a definition of "terrorist" within Canadian law, and on potential repercussions for the global justice movement. This debate was extensive within the media, and illustrates the concern that many felt over the possible uses of this new legislation. The news coverage of this legislation illustrates what may be seen as a fairly wide space for debate on the criminalization of dissent within Canada and on the question of whether "anti-globalization" protestors, or more specifically the "anarchists" within their ranks, should be classified as terrorists.

Yet, despite this debate, which was seen by some as being of a rare quality, there was also criticism by people such as Naomi Klein as to the amount of attention given to Bill C-36 and the lack of that given to Bill C-35. It is, she argues in a commentary in the Globe and Mail, easy to pretend that the right dissent will not be

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jeopardized under C-36 until you look at Bill C-35 in accordance with Bill C-36, which provides an all together different picture. She says that on “the surface, all the bill does is expand the definition of an ‘internationally protected person,’ those foreign dignitaries who are granted diplomatic immunity when they come to town.”43 But when you add Bill C-35, Klein argues, which “states that anyone who commits ‘a violent attack on the official premises, private accommodation or means of transport of an internationally protected person that is likely to endanger [that person's] life or liberty’ has committed a terrorist act,” it becomes more clear how the legislation could be used against anyone protesting outside a meeting of members of the G8 or WTO. The lack of debate in the media around Bill C-35 represents a short-sightedness within the media with regards to the new legislation’s effect on global justice activists. Although movement actors’ voices are at times represented in the coverage of Bill C-36, they once again come from respected activist-celebrities such as Naomi Klein, or others from institutional NGOs and not from grassroots or radical groups.

There was also an extraordinary amount of editorial coverage in favour of the bill that attempted to dismiss fears of the criminalization of dissent, thus framing social movement actors as being unnecessarily insecure. The enemy within frame is inherent in the coverage of the anti-terror legislation because this coverage is essentially a debate on who should be considered the enemy within and whether legislation exists with which to “protect” Canadians from these “enemies.” The lack of discussion within this coverage on what ‘anti-globalization’ might mean again signifies the lack of understanding within

the media as to what the global justice movement represents and the lack of legitimacy given to individuals or groups that are neither “us” nor “them.”

The next page in this story is when the opportunity arose for this type of legislation to be enacted—the June 2002 Kananaskis meeting of the G8. The coverage of the G8 in Kananaskis begins by framing the protests as a law and order problem. In examining the pre-meeting media coverage of this event, the use of media by the RCMP and Canadian governments was extensive comes across as threats to activists. According to Steven Reid, writing in the Calgary Herald, the security forces for the G-8 Summit would be the largest ever in Canada because September 11 attacks changed rules for protecting world leaders.44 There are articles stating that RCMP were cleared to use “lethal force,”45 that “hooligans” and “vandals”46 were not welcome in Calgary and would be dealt with by a Calgary police “rapid deployment team,” and that 9/11 only temporarily distracted activists (as though this was the intention behind the terrorist attacks) but CSIS was announcing that “anarchists” would be going to Calgary.47 What we see in the coverage of the G8 pre-meeting are discussions on the location of the event, security measures, and an overall sentiment of attempts to discourage protestors from coming to Calgary. In one of the first articles written about the event, Mark Read

writes: “Deputy Chief Hanson says 450 of Calgary’s 1,420 police officers will be assigned to “specific” G-8 duties. These could include protecting journalists and minor summit delegates stationed in the city, securing key summit-related sites in Calgary and infiltrating and surveying protest groups.”\(^4\)\(^8\) Articles discussing preparations for the summit discuss the need to protect the summit from terrorists and protestors, leading to the conflation of the two. Other articles mention police intention to allow protestors to exercise their democratic rights, just so long as peaceful protests are not “hijacked” by more radical activists. This type of comment, while somewhat reassuring, in that it purports advocating for democracy, serves to separate “good” protestors from “bad” protestors, indicating that even if some protestors are “peaceful” and “good” there is still a danger of the enemy within. Because the protests are framed as a law and order issue, one linked to the war on terror (which itself overtook much of the G8 meeting agenda), those protesting are denied legitimacy. As one activist said to the *Calgary Herald*, "If you're in opposition or you even question that, you're an enemy of the state."\(^4\)\(^9\)

During the actual summit itself, activists protested in what could be described as a very creative, non-confrontational, yet almost fluffy way. There were a few articles in the *Calgary Herald* that did discuss the issues that activists were seeking to address, but these issues were framed in narratives that mocked the ways that activists organize, from quoting their unity statements and trivializing both these and the ways that decisions were made at meetings. The actual protests themselves were very low-key and non-confrontational. Activists held knit-ins and protested naked in front of the GAP

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\(^{49}\) Reid, Mark. “Activists planning city core chaos: Calgary won't be cowed: mayor.” *Calgary Herald*, 18 June 2002: A1
chanting “I’d rather go naked than wear GAP.”\textsuperscript{50} Chosen forms of protest indicated activists’ fear of being seen as hooligans or anarchists. Consequently, media coverage of their actions did not present them seriously, but instead portrays the activists as being silly, trivial, and irrelevant.\textsuperscript{51} The few that participated in direct action or civil disobedience did not make it into the news. The comments that global justice movement actors made to the media were framed in such a way as to attempt to gain legitimacy for their actions as they argued not as to why they were against the G8 but instead as to why they should have the right to protest. In the coverage of the G8 summit protests, there is very little space given to the “why” of the movement, to the issues brought forward by the activists, or to voices representing transgression and dissent.

Whereas pre-9/11 there is some documentation that the voices of activists were present in the media articulating their point of view, although the coverage was far from ideal, it seems that post-9/11 activists’ access to the media is reserved for responding to the latest charges against them and for attempting to legitimize the movement and their right to speak. The enemy then becomes represented within the movement itself as the media frames anti-capitalist and anarchist activists as the enemy within the movement, as illustrated above in the good protestor/bad protestor dichotomy. The coverage of the

\textsuperscript{50} These anti-Gap activists used a slogan that was bound to draw in attention because of its use of the slogan from the well-known PETA campaign featuring celebrities saying “I’d rather go naked than wear fur.” Because the PETA slogan embodied an analysis of issues around cruelty and clothing, the anti-Gap group was able to send the message without using celebrities or saying much at all. Media-savvy groups, such as PETA and Greenpeace, serve as examples for activists as how to use the media in their campaigns. See Nadeau (2001, 148).

G8 summit can be seen as a messy mix of discourses as police and journalists struggled to discuss issues of security, terrorism, and protest. What is notable is that light is shed on Deluca and Peeples’ theory on symbolic violence, the spectacular, and media coverage. Media coverage focused heavily on the threat of violence before the protest, but during the extremely peaceful demonstrations, media coverage was not extensive on a national level, and in the coverage received protestors are not presented as serious or confrontational enough to present a strong message to world leaders.

2.5 A Narrowed Mediascape and the Future of Dissent

What can be drawn from the above analysis is that the Canadian mediascape has no doubt changed post-9/11, as has the face of neoliberal globalization. The “war on terror” brings with it a new definition of who the ideological opponents are, one which includes activists who are critical of the status quo. This has led to a shift in how global justice activists are treated within the media. More attention is paid as to whether activists are the “enemy within” than is given to the issues that they seek to highlight, and greater space is given to state authorities than to social movement groups and individuals. This is extremely significant in that it illustrates that these individuals and groups are being excluded from the power of naming, a power which is concentrated in media institutions and which cannot be neglected in critical media analysis (Couldry 2002, 24). As George Monbiot said following 9/11: “Dissent is most necessary just when it is hardest to voice” (2001).

In the news content analyzed above, there is little space for naming, and what space is achieved is not for naming, but for defending the right to protest, to name, to
dissent. With the G8 protests, for example, the focus was on security measures before the event and on the lack of violence during the event. The issues, the analysis, are missing. Instead, protest is defined as not as simply a law and order problem but as a problem of terrorism, so much so that CSIS names global justice activists as terrorist threats, as do National Post editorials. There has therefore been a shift away from what Rojecki identified as a “widened media space for dissent” to a media space which is defined by discourses of terror, us/them, and the enemy within. The global justice movement is thus framed in terms of terrorism and of potential violence. Whereas, as illustrated by Deluca and Peeples (2002), violence was definitely a topic of discussion with regards to the movement pre-9/11, post 9/11 it became an obsession. As Naomi Klein points out, “[a]fter September 11, politicians and pundits around the world began spinning the terrorist attacks as part of a continuum of anti-American and anti-corporate violence: first the Starbucks window, then, presumably, the World Trade Centre” (Klein 2002, 238).

What changed was not only the way that this movement was discussed in the media but also how the movement saw itself, its actions, and even its purpose. As Gitlin stressed in his book The Whole World is Watching media representations of a movement are reabsorbed by it. As discourses of terror and of violence dominated media coverage of the global justice movement, debates within the movement around the question of “violence” as a tactic grew more intense. Activists cancelled protests, re-evaluated their strategies, became anti-war protesters in some cases, and, as illustrated in the G9 Summit protests in Calgary, tried to seem as non-violent as possible, shedding their clothes and taking up knitting. This type of reflection is seen in Jen Couch’s article “So the party is
over? The global justice movement after September 11” (2002), where she reflects on how the tactics used pre-9/11 “now seemed somewhat inappropriate” (49) and reflects on the limitations and possibilities and challenges provided by “such a radically altered political landscape (50). Prominent activists, like the well-known Canadian feminist Judy Rebick, took a step back and tried to analyze the situation. As she said in a commentary written in November in 2001:

   In a polarizing climate of fear where any critical viewpoint faces immediate and vicious attack, the times are very tough for any movement for social change. But the danger is greatest for the anti-globalization movement both because it has been the most visible and effective movement for change and because its strength lies in an uneasy coalition of diverse forces. (Rebick 2001)

In this commentary Rebick examines the state of both “wings” of the movement, the reformist and the radical,\(^{52}\) noticing that the gap between them had grown. Yet her commentary is mostly focused on tactics in the “new reality post September 11 where promising non-violence is even more important,” and she begs radical activists to alter their tactics and discourses as a response to 9/11.

Discourses of terrorism therefore can be seen as having a direct effect on the tactics that activists used within their mobilizations. Therefore, whereas this closure in the media with regards to discourses of dissent can be related to the rise of discourses of terrorism, it may also be linked to the change in the tactics used by global justice activists. The fear of being associated with terrorism is propagated through news stories that link terrorism with activism and this fear translated into the abandoning of tactics that were successful in pushing marginalized discourses into the corporate media space, such as the breaking of windows or the use of confrontational and transgressive tactics,

\(^{52}\) This split will be discussed in Chapter 3.
such as uncivil disobedience and direct action. The next chapter of this thesis will delve further into these observations, drawing out some of the questions about the role of symbolic violence in the global justice movement, examining splits within the movement between activists that are for a diversity of tactics and those that are not, as well as examining what happened in July 2003 when Montreal activists chose to take up these abandoned tactics and develop new ones in their struggle against the WTO.
Chapter 3

Symbolic Violence and the Mediation of Transgression: Smashed Windows, Riot Gear, and Newsprint

"Smash it and they will come" should perhaps be the mantra of media committees within the global justice movement. Of all the media-attention-grabbing tactics in the activist toolkit, the smashing of a window, pushing over of a fence, or any other disruption of private property are actions that often make the front page, thus attracting attention to the movement. To quote Deluca and Peeples, who write about the 1999 protests in Seattle:

To think that the WTO protests would have been lead stories and would have received extensive airtime without symbolic violence... is to neglect the dynamics of the news media. Far from discrediting or drowning out the message of the WTO protester, the symbolic violence generated extensive media coverage an airing of the issues. (2002, 140)

Yet, to think that symbolic violence has but positive repercussions is to neglect the dynamics of social movements. Tactics – specifically those seen as being “radical” or “violent” -- are often the centre of debate and controversy within the global justice movement, where those who commit property damage are accused of hijacking protests, ruining the public image of the movement, and, in extreme cases of criticism, of being a genuine cancer within the movement. They are referred to as “vandals,” “young anarchists,” or, post-9/11 “terrorists,” and are accused of being “radical apolitical fringe

53 A shorter and earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Canadian Communication Association’s annual conference, held in Winnipeg, June 3-5, 2004. Many thanks to all those who gave feedback.

54 This cancer analogy was used by an Agence France Press journalist (qtd. in Depuis-Déri 2003, 26).
groups” who have nothing to do with community organizing and infiltrate protests with the sole goal of perpetrating violence.

Depuis-Déri refers to these types of representations as “pure and simple lies” (2003, 50). Using interviews with people who have participated in Black Bloc strategies, to inform his analysis, Depuis-Déri paints a portrait of these activists as anything but apolitical, and as activists who use transgressive tactics in order to radicalize the discourses around capitalism and globalization. He says: “For Black Blocs and their allies, non-violent actions no longer suffice in being heard on the political scene and there is an urgency, facing the extent of capitalist power, to say violently ‘ya basta!,’ enough’s enough!” (Depuis-Déri 2003, 27). The uses of tactics that involve property damage, or other transgressions of private property and public space are sure to grab the attention of the public, governments, corporate elites, social movement actors, and, of course, the media. Tactics of transgression are radical, pushing the system to its limits, demanding change, thus heightening the intensity, the immediacy of certain issues.

Since the first North American mass protests against neoliberal globalization in Seattle of 1999, tactics have developed, changed, as have ways of talking about them. In order to tease out the observations made in Chapter 2 regarding the use of “violent” tactics in the movement post-9/11, this chapter will examine the function of, and debate around, transgressive tactics within the global justice movement. In order to address the question of violence an understanding of tactics is necessary. This chapter will therefore begin with a section on the movement’s diversity with regards to tactics, reframing the

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55 *My translation* Original: “des mensonges pur et simple.”
56 *My translation* Original: “Pour les Black Blocs et leurs alliés, les actions non-violents ne suffisent plus pour se faire entendre sur la scène politique et il y a urgence, devant l’étendue du pouvoir des capitalistes, de dire violemment ‘ya basta!, ‘ça suffit!’”
discussion of “violent” tactics and thus shifting the debate to one about transgressive and non-transgressive tactics. Using this as a springboard, I will then examine the space transgressive tactics are given within the news media. This is an important area of inquiry and reflection with regards to this movement because the debates around transgressive tactics and the media portrayals of them are weighing it down, and, at times, they threaten to splinter the movement irreparably, or simply to serve as a diversion from the actual issues at stake.

3.1 Reform versus Transgression: 
Splits within the Global Justice Movement

As mentioned earlier, this critical social movement is also referred to as a movement of movements, or a network of networks. Its form is fluid, always adapting. Activists’ analyses differ depending on the context in which they are working and on their personal and collective ideas and goals; this is one of the strengths of the global justice movement. As Bennett states: “This vast web of global protest is also impressive in its capacity to continuously refigure itself around shifting issues, protest events, and political adversaries” (2003a, 143). Some activists are openly anti-capitalist whereas others advocate the reform of capitalism; some focus on environmental destruction, others on capitalist globalization’s effects on women. The tactics and targets that activists choose relate back to their analysis of globalization and to their affinities with feminist, socialist, or other philosophies and ideologies. In his book *Activism: Direct Action, Hacktivism, and the Future of Society*, Tim Jordan outlines some of the different forms that activism takes within these movements. He makes an important distinction between what he calls “activism” and “activism!” in order to understand different activist movements; he is one
of the few contemporary writers to theorize this distinction in terms of the global justice movement, although it is a split that has been seen in past movements.\(^{57}\) It is important to examine because the latter types of tactics are of particular interest in the examination of violence within protest movements.

For Jordan, activism is different from activism in two ways. Firstly, activism is about transgression, whereas activism seeks to reform the current system, while keeping it intact. Jordan explains:

Transgression is an assault on the way social norms, beliefs, inequalities and oppressions are reproduced. The opposite to transgressive social change is political action to generate a different world that is, simultaneously, a confirmation of the existing one. In other words, any change also reaffirms that society goes on as before. Changes in the law, however radical, reaffirm the process of legal change itself and legitimate the institutions of representative government that produce it. In contrast, transgression may produce a different world, creating new ways of making change. Revolutionary movements seek not new legislation, but new forms of democracy and new ways of making laws. (2002, 32-33)

On the ground, within social movement communities, this separation is often referred to as reform versus revolution, and the later is described as pro-direct action and diversity of tactics\(^{58}\) or as anarchist, depending on the context.\(^{59}\) An example of this in “practice”

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\(^{57}\) The split between those seeking revolution or reform is not new. It was particularly present in 19th and twentieth-century debates around communism and social democracy, where the first believed that only a revolution would transform capitalism, those advocating the second argued that it could be reformed through democratic means. (See: Berger 2002) Anarchism can also be seen as a branch that stemmed from this debate in that anarchists rejected communism because it maintained power in the hands of authority (the State). It is not surprising, then, that radical (revolutionary) aspects of the global justice movement draw on anarchism in their rejection of reformist tactics.

\(^{58}\) The reform versus revolution split (as it is commonly referred to in the movement) is seldom discussed in academic accounts of this movement. It is discussed briefly by Hayduk (2003), Depuis-Déri (2003), and McNally (2002). This debate often takes place under the guise of debates over whether to accept a “diversity of tactics,” which for more radical activists means that all forms of resistance are accepted (as long as they follow the principle of “respect for life”) ranging from popular education to direct action. Diversity of tactics is seen as a way of respecting individual autonomy. Less radical (reformist) activists see diversity of tactics as giving a bad image to the movement, as inciting violence, etc. Furthermore, the few academics who have looked at media coverage of this movement fail to discuss this split even though they discuss media discourse around “anarchists” and “violence” such as Rojecki (2002); Deluca & Peeples (2002); and Boyes (2003).
would be the different types of opposition to the WTO—reformist groups and individuals that seek to reform this institution, whereas revolutionary or transgressive groups and individuals aim to dismantle it completely.

However, this separation is not always clear. As Jordan points out, it is an analytic distinction. Many movements embody both forms of activism, yet he uses this distinction because he sees transgression as necessary: “The ethics of the future can only come from transgression, from reaching beyond current ways of negotiating social conflict and resolving differences” (37). Jordan is not the only one to see transgression as important in social movements. Graeber calls the transgressive aspects of the movement anarchist. He says: “Anarchism is the heart of the movement, its soul; the source of most of what’s new and hopeful about it” (2002, 62). The use of direct action and its refusal to engage in a politics of appeal to governments, and its preference for physical interference with the state’s power are what is hopeful about anarchism. If hegemony functions through the consent of the masses, then anarchism is about withdrawing this consent. It is a politics based on “imagining things and bringing them into being” (Graeber 2003, 73).

To restate, the split between reformist and transgressive, radical and non-radical, or anarchist and non-anarchist is in some ways very analytic and not so clear-cut in practice. Some groups work within the current system in order to achieve better living conditions for the time being, while also using tactics of transgression. For the purpose

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59 These groups are often polarized not only because of their tactics, but because of the ways that they organize. NGOs, for example, are hierarchical organizations with one person (quite often a white middle-class male) defined as president or leader, and can be seen as reproducing corporate or governmental structures. Collectives, on the other hand, have roots in feminism and anarchism and organize non-hierarchically, attempting to avoid reproducing the inequalities they criticize.
of this current discussion, the grey areas are not so important, nor is it necessary to divide all types of activist struggles into two piles. Yet, what is important is the idea of transgression and the tactics that it implies. Tactics of resistance that are seen as transgressive, such as direct action and civil disobedience, and that are carried out with the distinct intention of transgressing social boundaries are important to discuss because these tactics are those which are most controversial within the movement and in relation to media coverage. As we saw in Chapter two, it is these types of tactics that have been seriously questioned post-9/11. Yet if they are what is most hopeful about the movement, debates around their function and utility are necessary in developing strategies for social change in the current context of laws that criminalize dissent and a media climate that is hinged on discourses of terror.

3.2 “I Will Not Obey” – Tactics of Transgression, Disruption, and Micorevolution

The recent film *The Fourth World War*, by Big Noise Tactical Films, follows global justice struggles in several countries, from Mexico, to South Africa, Argentina to Palestine. In each country, activists focus on different yet similar issues, ranging from frustration with economic policies to the rights of indigenous peoples to land and self-governance. Despite the diversity of struggles, one clear message that was portrayed through many of the images of resistance was—“I will not obey!” This message of Ya Basta, or Enough’s Enough, was transmitted across the pain and suffering and through the actions of the people. This film illustrates that this movement is indeed global, that links are being made across issues and kilometres, and that transgressive tactics are

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60 See www.bignoisetactical.org.
becoming used increasingly both in the North and the South. An examination of what these transgressive tactics are, as well as the purposes they serve in activists’ toolboxes, aids in the understanding of splits within the movement as well as the movement’s potential for creating change. Transgressive tactics, from direct action\(^{61}\) to civil disobedience\(^{62}\) have concrete purposes within transgressive or radical\(^{63}\) (as I will hereafter refer to this segment of the movement) segments of the movement beyond those discussed above.

Radical social actors are working to dismantle a system that they do not see as legitimate; their choices of actions are connected to this, a simple example being that they refuse to apply for permits for demonstrations. For these activists, asking for a permit is seen as not only legitimizing the institution handing it out, but also as reinforcing the fact that public streets do not belong to the public. Instead, radical activist groups march when they want, where they want, often crying out the slogan “Whose streets? Our streets!”—thus illustrating how their march is within itself an act of revolt, the refusal to consent to the rules and regulations of dominating institutions.

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\(^{61}\) “Direct action means a shift to actions that stop what is wrong, rather than simply having the faith that moral superiority will lead, somehow to change… Activists take something that is happening in society that they object to and then try to prevent it” (Jordan 2002, 61-62). Direct action therefore does not rely on or lobby the authorities to change situations; direct action is intended to have a direct effect, rather than working on simply a symbolic or communicative level. In addressing homelessness, for example, direct action would not entail simply lobbying the government to provide housing; instead, it could include occupying an abandoned building to create immediate housing for those on the streets.

\(^{62}\) Civil disobedience is a non-violent act of breaking a law or decision to call attention to a particular law, decision, or policy with questionable morality or legitimacy. It is, in effect, the withdrawal of consent or obedience from the system. It is a symbolic action, designed to draw attention to the issue in question, and is often developed with gaining media attention in mind.

\(^{63}\) The term radical, often wrongly associated with fundamentalism or fanaticism, comes from the Latin word meaning “root.” Facing a problem with a radical approach therefore implies seeking its causes at the roots themselves and not at the surface.
In some cases, activists’ actions respond to practical needs, in others they are used as “mind bombs” – actions intended send a specific message to the public – and in yet other cases they are directed at specific targets in order to disrupt their activities or to send a message of discontent. Tactics range from creative resistance, such as street theatre and art, to direct action, which entails acting directly to address the issue of concern, to civil disobedience and protest tactics, such as forming offensive blocs within protests who dress in padded costumes and create a barrier between the police and protestors.\(^{64}\) These are constantly developing and changing, drawing on past social movements and inventing new types of actions.

Actions must also be linked to policing, the State’s tool for maintaining “order,” containing dissent, and enforcing consent. In some cases, affinity groups\(^{65}\) organize secretly and carry out actions under the cover of the night in order to avoid being caught by police. In other cases, groups use certain tactics to purposely confuse the police, for example marching snakelike through a city rather than using a pre-determined route, or to block police access to a demonstration, for example by creating structural barriers that prohibit quick police access. The role of the police in relation to social movements is a contradictory one. In the book *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western*

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\(^{64}\) The tactics known as white overall tactics, used by groups such as the WOMBLES (White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles) in the UK, Monos Blancos (or “white monkeys”) in Spain and South America, and Ya Basta (or Tute Bianche) in Italy and New York, are used as offensive “forces” in demonstrations, or as Vanderford (2003, 16) describes them “a mountain of bodieds that advances seeking the least harm possible to itself.” The members of these groups, clad in extravagant armour and costumes, push their way through police barricades or create a barrier between the police and protestors. The tactic functions on two levels—practically, it protects protestors from police attacks, and symbolically it works with street theatre in order to expose the war-like nature of police-protestor confrontations. See Graeber (2002), Vanderford (2003), or Jordan (2002, 74-79) for more on these tactics.

\(^{65}\) An affinity group is a small group of activists (generally 4 to 10) who come together with a basis of trust (they usually know each other) in order to organize actions. Affinity groups are not open collectives, but use collective decision-making models (such as consensus) in their organizing.
Societies (della Porta & Reiter 1998), the authors discuss how with regards to demonstrations in democratic societies, the police have two different, often contradictory purposes—to keep the peace, and to defend citizens’ right to protest. These purposes are often reiterated by police spokespersons when speaking to the media.

In the eyes of activists, the police are often a source of excessive repression, in their use of excessive violence, from beating protestors with batons to spraying large amounts of tear gas and pepper spray, or arresting protestors on trumped-up charges (Coalition Contre la Brutalité Policière 2003). They are seen as an arm of the State that seeks to control political transgression, turning it into a crime, instead of a legitimate political challenge. The police, at times, become as much a part of what protestors are struggling against as the more obvious neoliberal institutions (such as the WTO or World Bank). In events such as Quebec City’s Summit of the Americas, physical structures (in this case a 5 kilometre-long steel fence) are put up in order to keep protestors away from the site where world leaders are meeting. In these cases, the structure itself becomes a symbol of the lack of democracy and transparency in global governance, and frames protestors as potential terrorists or criminals. In organizing actions, activists must therefore take police tactics into account, as they obstruct transgression.

Activists are also, no doubt, acting to gain the attention of and to influence the leaders of the state. As Jordan argues, “Mass protests, riots, civil disobedience, tunnels and tree-houses are the public face of activisml, the moments when activists try to make themselves and their ethics unavoidable” (Jordan 2002, 53). In taking to the streets or
breaking laws, activists are pointing to the lack of options faced by a country’s inhabitants to influence their own futures and the country’s political decisions. Because activists do not have access to state figures in terms of dialogue, the media is that place where debates take place. It is logical then, that activists seek to develop strategies and tactics that will make their analysis heard within this sphere for debate. If the question of who has continual access to news media coverage is taken into account, activists’ use of transgressive tactics can be understood as a way of making their presence known in a potentially one-sided debate on issues of interest to the population.

On the subject of the purpose that transgressive tactics serve in radical activism, it is important also to comment, however briefly, on the function that transgressive tactics serve within activist groups and collectives. This is summed up well by Depuis-Déri in his book *Black bloc*:

Direct actions are also conceived as skirmishes that permit those who participate to send a message onto the public stage and to feel stronger, freer, to deviate from passive citizenship, which encourages liberalism, and to become political agents. These skirmishes are as much *microrevolutions* through which activists free themselves, at the risk of their bodies, space (the street) and time (a few hours) necessary to live momentarily an intense political experience outside of the norms established by the State. (2003, 29)

The purpose that transgressive tactics serve in radical movements is also deeply connected to activists’ sense of power and identity. For people who spend countless

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66 I am purposefully avoiding the term “citizen” here as I see it as being exclusive, often not taking into account people inhabiting a country who do not have access to voting, which is seen as being a defining factor of “democracy.”

67 *My translation.* Original: “Les actions directes sont aussi conçues comme des escarmouches qui permettent à ceux et celles qui y participant d’envoyer un message sur la scène publique et de se sentir plus fortes, plus libres, de sortir de la passivité citoyenne qu’encourage la libéralisme et de devenir des agents politiques. Ces escarmouches sont autant de *microrévolutions* par lesquelles les manifestants libèrent, au péril de leur corps, l’espace (la rue) et le temps (quelques heures) nécessaire pour vivre momentanément une expérience politique forte en dehors des normes établies par l’État.”
hours organizing around social justice issues, direct action, civil disobedience, or creative resistance serve to reinforce senses of solidarity with other activists and to empower their sense that change is possible. In struggles against systems of power that seem infinite in their ability to absorb critique and use it to maintain hegemonic relations, transgressive actions push the limits of these relations, illustrating the withdrawal of consent.

3.3 Transgressive Tactics as Media Magnets

Transgressive or disruptive tactics may also be discussed in relation to news media structures. In discussing how movements strive to accommodate newsmaking processes, Kielbowicz and Scherer comment on how in attempting to gain attention groups are forced to use one of two postures, in terms of communication strategies: “escalating their rhetoric and actions to remain newsworthy or becoming an established and legitimated news source” (1986, 85). Some groups therefore turn to spectacular events and radicalized discourses, while others mimic institutional models of media relations.

This is illustrated in an examination of reformist groups, such as OXFAM or the Council of Canadians, who are more likely to use traditional means for gaining media attention, such as the dissemination of press releases responding to events or State policies. They follow the same path as official sources, such as the police or the government, in that they usually have communications departments who monitor news daily, write press releases, and organize press conferences. NGOs and reformist groups therefore work at building relationships with the media, and because they are stable and often linked to the state through funding that serves to legitimate their activities, they are
also seen as reliable sources. Because of their structures, which often include offices and permanent paid employees, they are accessible to journalists. They often also have larger budgets for advertising and for the creation and distribution of promotional and educational materials, ranging from Websites to pamphlets and newsletters.

Grassroots groups do not profit from these types of structures, and although a wide range of organizations and groups may fall under the same “global justice banner,” “the more conservative branches enjoy a marked advantage in making news, especially news that is not treated by the media in a trivial fashion” (Reynolds 1982, qtd. in Kielbowicz & Scherer 1986, 87). Radical groups often organize in collectives that may or may not be permanent; they seldom have offices and their workers are almost always unpaid. When events or issues arise, these groups have a much more difficult time accessing the news media. Technologies such as websites, email, and cell phones have improved this, but not that significantly. Many activist groups create alternative media, from radio documentaries to flyers and occasionally small journals, but their ability to circulate these widely is inhibited by the expense of printing and distribution. The Indymedia network,68 and other on-line projects, have been invaluable to global justice activists in that they do not face the same costs associated with print media and are based on principles of participatory communication, which eliminates the need to generate content, as this is provided by the activists themselves.

Yet however important these media sources are to activist movements, they are still limited in several ways; for instance not all people have access to the Internet. Furthermore, activist media is often criticized as being limited in that their audiences are

68 For more on Indymedia see Downing (2003); Uzelman (2002); Langlois (2004).
constituted mostly of the converted—those who are already aware of the issues and support or are involved in the movement. Radical points of view are therefore in danger of remaining marginal if activists do not find ways to gain access to media that is distributed more widely. Activists are seldom sought out or reached by journalists, but instead are in a position where they must make journalists aware of their existence, creating opportunities for media coverage instead of being called upon to respond to events or issues. Transgressive actions can be seen as a means to this end.

In their article “Image events, the public sphere, and argumentative practice: The case of radical environmental groups,” Delicath and Deluca examine what they call “image events”—“staged acts of protest designed for media dissemination” (2003, 315). They theorize that these are a central argumentative practice of radical ecology groups, and, I would argue, of radical global justice groups as well. For Delicath and Deluca, image events are a “postmodern form of argument that employs acts of protest to deliver images as argumentative fragments that serve as invention resources for public deliberation” (317). Because of their effectiveness in transmitting messages that shift the responsibility for decoding and argument construction to the audience (317), image events are seen as a superior form of argument building and as a way of pushing discourse into the public sphere. Yet, in this privileging of the image, spoken and written discourse is severely demoted. In their paper analyzing the media coverage of the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO demonstrations, Deluca and Peeples (2002) argue that critique must be made through spectacle, instead of positing critique against the corporate spectacle (they are referring here to the use of photo opportunities etc. by corporate and government elites). Although this analysis points out the importance of using the image to get and
maintain media attention, Deluca and Peeples are arguing that the critique made through verbal or written discourse is completely overshadowed. What I would argue instead, is that the image itself helps groups to gain access to the media, acts as an argument, and that, in addition, it helps create space for verbal or written arguments.

An example which illustrates this is an image event staged by the Montreal queer collective the Pink Panthers on March 7, 2004, when the radical group marched in the yearly International Women's Day march organized by the Quebec Women's Federation, an institutional coalition of women's groups. In order to assert their presence in this largely reformist and labour march, the anarchist Pink Panthers⁶⁹ and their allies formed a Pink Bloc by wearing pink balaclavas, carrying placards and banners with radical messages, and handing out small flyers briefly outlining their analysis. This creative action may not seem transgressive, yet when put into context, which in this case is a highly reform-oriented march, the Pink Panthers tactic of mimicking Black Bloc tactics were seen by some as unwelcome and threatening. It was a subversion of the media and public obsession and fear of the Black Bloc, which was useful in creating an opening for a non-reformist analysis of the oppression of queers, women, and sex workers.

Within the march this group was flooded with media attention, even though the goal of this group was not to attract media attention but instead to radicalize the discourses present at this event. They had not sent out a press release or even intended to do media interviews. Yet in a march largely lacking color or visually interesting images, the Pink Panthers garnered much of the media attention because of their theatrical antics

⁶⁹ See: www.lespantheresroses.org.
(tossing around pink pompoms and holding a kiss-in\textsuperscript{70}) and visual appeal. The following day, there was a picture of one of the members of the Pink Panthers on the cover of one of the Montreal dailies,\textsuperscript{71} and later that week there were pictures in three other prominent weekly newspapers. The \textit{Canadian Press}, CTV, and \textit{Radio Canada's Network de l'Information} also all mentioned or showed the group. This action illustrates that transgressive images are important in gaining media attention; in the march of thousands, a small contingent of 40 people managed to grab and hold the media spotlight. Yet what is also significant is that the photo on the front page of \textit{La Presse} had a two-line explanation of what the Pink Panthers are, and that there was a paragraph outlining their argument further, as well as identifying them as radical and as anarchists. The Pink Panther's image-worthy appearance helped them attain media coverage, but it also required that the news media articulate who these balaclava-wearing individuals were, which illustrates that the image made way for the critique. Perhaps for some audience members the image remains most significant, yet it is also what helps them remember who the group is and what they are struggling for.

The organizing of spectacular events is therefore a tactic that creates an opening within news media, into which groups can insert their analysis. The relationship between transgressive tactics and media events must be seen as linked. The dramatic sells newspapers, this is not disputable. "Full of twisted hope of snapping up images of violence that make them big money, the media follow demonstrations far more closely since Seattle and they grant more space to 'antiglobalization' discourse" (Depuis-Déri

\textsuperscript{70} The "kiss-in" tactic is one used by previous queer groups such as Queer Nation.

The explosions of “violence” in Seattle may therefore be seen as having acquired more symbolic capital for social movements with regards to whether they are considered newsworthy. The potential that large numbers of people participate in a mobilization or protest and the use of transgressive tactics may mean that media outlets are more likely to give space to social movements in the media, out of the fear that if they do not foresee the need for this they will be left out in the rain while other outlets benefit from the audiences that this type of news attracts. The use of transgressive tactics creates, in some cases, media events which signal to the media that the group exists, and creates an opportunity for groups to spread their message. It would seem that for radical groups, transgressive tactics are necessary in order to grab the news media’s attention, due to news traditions and structures that define protests as news only when something out of the ordinary happens—such as an extremely large number of people, “violence,” a large number of arrests, or spectacular images of some sort.

3.4 “The Hooligans are in Town”: Media Coverage of Symbolic Violence

The cover of the *Journal de Montréal* on July 29, 2003, sums up what many activists hate about the media. There is a photo of an activist (one commonly described as a ‘black clad’ young man) smashing the window of the GAP with a trash can. Superimposed on the image are the words: “Les voyous sont en ville!” (*The hooligans are in town!*). That day, several windows were smashed by a few of the over 800 anti-WTO activists who marched through Montreal’s downtown streets, playing a cat and mouse game with well

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72 *My translation:* Original: “Plein d’un espoir vicieux de pouvoir croquer des images d’une violence qui leur est si financièrement rentable, les médias suivent de beaucoup plus près les manifestations depuis Seattle et ils accordent une plus grande place au discours ‘antimondialisation.’”
over 5000 police, many sporting riot gear. When it comes to addressing the question of "violence" within protests and the media coverage of it, there are few clear answers. One activist or academic will argue that symbolic violence (acts committed against property not people) is necessary to attract media attention, whereas others remain focussed on what type of media coverage ensues. Yet, even if broken windows make good copy for newspapers in that they fulfill news criteria of being spectacular and entertaining, do they make good copy for a movement that is trying to share their analysis? Some argue that violence overshadows the issues and that it alienates potential sympathizers, whereas others argue that the fact that certain groups or individuals are willing to put their bodies on the line (in terms of physical safety or danger of arrest) illustrates how important the issue is.

Although certain tactics may help activists to gain media attention or to bring attention to the urgent nature of a situation, discourses of violence sometimes overshadow transgression, the purpose of which is not to create a climate of fear but to redefine power. The purpose of this discussion is not to prove that either of these is correct, because they are not two inseparable visions. Instead, what I seek to do is to delve deeper, not simply arguing that symbolic violence is good or bad, but to examine instead the position that it occupies as a tactic within the movement and as a subject for news coverage.

"Protesters threaten to disrupt...." is a common news headline before demonstrations occur. For example, in the media coverage of the July 2004 anti-WTO mobilization, activists held two press conferences before any placards were lifted, in

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order to state publicly why the WTO was not welcome in Montreal and to present their promise to disrupt the meetings.\textsuperscript{74} The Popular Mobilization Against the WTO (hereafter referred to as the Popular Mobilization) announced publicly that they united on a basis of being anti-capitalist and pro-diversity of tactics, among other principles such as the respect for life. In issuing a wide call-out for autonomous actions to be carried out during the protests, these activists made their intent to use transgressive tactics during part of the mobilization (on two out of five days of action) quite clear. As Melanie Sylvestre, a Popular Mobilization spokesperson, was quoted as saying in \textit{La Presse}, "We are not talking about a pacifist mobilization here. We are going to organize a massive resistance with the goal of disrupting and cancelling the event... Anything is possible."\textsuperscript{75} The possibility of transgression drew media attention to this fact, and the Popular Mobilization was therefore presented as posing a threat to the WTO meeting. For the news media, this threat of transgression necessarily translated as the threat of violence. Articles centered on this aspect of the mobilization, rather than on the \textit{why} of the event,\textsuperscript{76} and included statements like the following: "there is the risk that [Montreal]..."

\textsuperscript{74}See the Popular Mobilization Against the WTO’s organizing page at: http://montreal.resist.ca/materials/index.shtml.


\textsuperscript{76} The \textit{why} of the event was not ignored completely but it was presented as an aside in articles rather than as the lead or the main frame of the article. The article by Allard cited above also contained the sentence: "We also want to ‘denounce the WTO, resist it’s inhuman politics and promote an alternative vision that instead puts the emphasis on the self-determination of peoples, dignity and global justice, say the activists.’ (\textit{My translation}. Original: "On veut ainsi ‘dénoncer l’OMC, résister à ses politiques inhumaines et promouvoir une vision alternative qui met plutôt l’emphase sur l’autodétermination des peuples, la dignité et la justice globale,’ disent les militants.”
will resemble a real battlefield" and this quote from Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew: "Security concerns are always important of course (sic). However, before such groups use violent means to shut down the meetings, perhaps they should turn to what we're trying to do for developing nations." Pettigrew's statements turn attention away from the activists' concerns and onto violence, painting the WTO as helping poor nations and the activists as violent and unconcerned with these issues.

When discourses of violence come out, are all other discourses eclipsed? Or, do they create spaces for debate which would not otherwise exist? Within the global justice movement, in both the radical and reformist "wings," the use of violence is often a subject of debate or disaccord. Violence is not frequently defined within these debates, and it is often the case that one activist's definition of violence differs greatly from another's. "Violent" has been used to describe everything from graffiti on sidewalks, to the smashing of windows, to the throwing of tear gas canisters back to their origin (police lines). Yet in the opinion of some activists and groups, the smashing of a window is seen as a violent act, but one that is low on the scale of gravity, with the taking of life being the most serious. And in yet other cases, the destruction of private property is not labelled as violence at all. Participants in the Seattle 1999 Black Bloc articulate this position in their communiqué:

We contend that property destruction is not a violent activity unless it destroys lives or causes pain in the process. By this definition, private property – especially corporate private property – is itself infinitely more violent than any action taken against it. ... When we smash a window, we aim to destroy the

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thin veneer of legitimacy that surrounds private property rights. At the same time, we exorcize that set of violent and destructive social relationships which has been imbued in almost everything around us. By "destroying" private property, we convert its limited exchange value into an expanded use value. A storefront window becomes a vent to let some fresh air into the oppressive atmosphere of a retail outlet (at least until the police decide to tear-gas a nearby road blockade). A newspaper box becomes a tool for creating such vents or a small blockade for the reclamation of public space or an object to improve one's vantage point by standing on it. A dumpster becomes an obstruction to a phalanx of rioting cops and a source of heat and light. A building facade becomes a message board to record brainstorm ideas for a better world. (ACME Collective 1999)

This excerpt provides some idea of what type of controversial actions are being taken up by radical activists, as well as discourses that redefine property damage as liberating and creative. For this Black Bloc contingent, their actions against private property were intended to carry the message that private property itself is illegitimate and oppressive. In this communiqué they also lay out what property they damaged and why.

For activist and academic Ward Churchill, the question as to whether these situations are "violent" is redundant, arguing that the context within which people are demonstrating is violent in that they are there to point out the links between the corporate and state violence that leads to hundreds of thousands and even millions of deaths. Arguing against conceptions of non-violence, he says, "the context is violent, that's why you're there, so it's by no means, no matter what you do, going to be a non-violent context." Yet in order to be effective, a definition of violence must be put forward. W.A. Gamson suggests that violence is "deliberate physical injury to property or persons" (1975, 74). I hesitate at using this definition of violence when discussing the global justice movement because within this movement violence against people is not

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considered a plausible tactic, although self-defence is. I therefore prefer the term “symbolic violence,” which is also used by Deluca and Peeples (2002) because “violent” acts undertaken by radical activists are often “symbolic” in that they target specific symbols of capitalism in order to bring attention to them. The spray painting or smashing of a GAP window, for example, brings attention to the exploitative practices of corporations; the throwing back of tear gas canisters at police to the repressive actions of the state. They are not acts of violence against people, but take the form of property damage or defensive actions responding to police use of rubber bullets, tear gas, and physical violence. This distinction must also be made in order to contrast symbolic violence with terrorism, which includes the threat of or use of violence against persons in order to forcefully influence governments.

When it comes to media coverage of symbolic violence, the discourses of activists on both sides of the debate become entangled with those of the police, politicians, and diverse ranges of activists, illustrating that the debates are not only between activists and the State, but also between activists themselves. But are transgressive tactics enough for radical groups to attract media attention? In other words, do media structures require demonstrations to contain symbolic violence in order to be considered important? As discussed above, tactics can be considered as a way for radical groups to gain access to the media. Yet, even if an event is spectacular, media outlets soon become bored with repetition. As the anti-war demonstrations around the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq showed, one large demo is interesting visually, but by the third or fourth, the mass mobilization is no longer “new” and therefore is not news. Yet, if property damage ensues, the demonstration is sure to get news coverage.
This can be understood through the comparison of two demonstrations of equal size (approximately 1000 people) around similar issues—one against the WTO ministerial meeting taking place in Montreal in July 2004, and the other a September 2004 demonstration in Montreal against the FTAA summit in Miami. The one difference was that in the first, the Ministers were meeting in Montreal and the second was part of many simultaneous demonstrations taking place world-wide; yet it is arguable whether the news value of “local” is more important than that of “grandeur” (the significant number of similar demonstrations taking place). The July 2004 mobilization consisted of five days of activities, ranging from a teach-in to a demonstration branded as “WTO’s in town? Shut it down!” Whereas some of the media coverage of this mobilization, in Montreal specifically, occurred over a month’s time, the coverage of these protests exploded on the second day of street protests when confrontational tactics were used, such as the creation of barriers on streets using construction material, graffiti, the breaking of windows, and the use of snake march tactics, which serve to confuse police as to which route the march will take. The day after these tactics were used, and after 240 people were arrested over 2 kilometres away from the protests zone for what was framed in some news coverage as police repression, there were articles and editorials in newspapers from Vancouver,80 to Edmonton81 and Halifax, as well as in the national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post.82 All local papers had more than

80 There were articles before July 29, 2003, in the Vancouver Sun that were focused on the Popular Mobilization’s early press conferences and after the day of property damage several articles were written on the WTO meetings in Montreal.
81 The Edmonton Journal contained many articles relating the transgressive actions specifically, including an extensive debate on the role of democracy in protests and the use of violence within protests, with the overall tone being in favour of activists.
82 It was not until after transgressive tactics were used that the WTO meetings were given more than one inch of space within the National Post.
four articles or columns dedicated to the events and several images. In total, in the four main newspapers in Montreal on July 29, 2004, there were over 23 articles and 29 photographs dedicated to coverage of the protests and the WTO meetings.

Comparably, in November of that same year, approximately 1000 people snake-marched through the streets of Montreal to protest the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas meeting that was happening in Miami. This protest included the transgressive tactic of Reclaim the Streets83 that was cut short because of police presence, but no other transgressive tactics or symbolic violence were used, besides some graffiti and dancing. This protest received only a few inches of coverage in the newspapers of Montreal.

Transgressive tactics such as property damage therefore have much more media capital than tactics such as blockades. A demonstration’s capacity to attract media attention is hinged on the violence question. I refer to it as a question, because it is one that is present before activists even gather to carry out an action. At a press conference for the Popular Mobilization on June 25, one month before the above demonstration occurred, a journalist from the Canadian Press diverted questions away from the spokespersons descriptions of the reasons for the mobilization against the WTO, by asking: “Will there be violence?” This question would be repeated many times in the weeks before any protests were staged. Discourses of violence must therefore be seen as embedded within the “logic” of news coverage of protests. Whereas some people may ask “Is it a protest if the media are not present?” journalists are asking “Will there be

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83 Reclaim the streets is a type of action that arose in the early 1990s in Britain; the basic concept is applied in diverse circumstances. It is basically the “temporary appropriation of public space using bodies, creativity, and music” (Hamm 2002) with the goal of emphasizing that streets are public space and of claiming this public space for something other than commerce (Thomchick 2002).
violence?” putting the emphasis on the issue of whether a protest is a protest at all (in the eyes of news editors) without the presence of symbolic violence.

This is demonstrated in Francis Depuis-Déri’s discussion of media fascination with violence in his book *Black Bloc*, where he discusses his role as a commentator/analyst for Radio Canada television’s Réseau de l’Information (RDI) (2003, 55). Depuis-Déri recounts his experience at the G8 Summit in Calgary in June 2002, where, as discussed in Chapter 2, there was no violence even though there was a radical activist and Black Bloc presence. According to Depuis-Déri, one of the station’s producers asked him day and night whether he anticipated an explosion of violence within the next few hours. During production meetings, the decision of where to place cameras and vehicles was decided based on, among other factors, where direct actions were most likely to occur. “A dynamic has therefore been created between media coverage of ‘antiglobalization’ demonstrations and the direct actions of Black Blooms and their allies, and if violence can give the movement a bad image or twist the message in some way (which in any case would stay plural without violence), it also and above all attracts the cameras and microphones of the media” (Depuis-Déri 2003, 56).

### 3.5 Symbolic Violence and the Politics of Speech

An argument that often arises in debates regarding the use of symbolic violence in social movements is that the media coverage that is gained through the use of violence is “bad” coverage that is detrimental for the movement. Yet examining news coverage of

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84 *My translation. Original: “Il s’est donc créé une relation dynamique entre la visibilité médiatique des manifestations ‘antimondialisation’ et les actions directes des Black Blooms et leurs alliés, et si la violence peut donner une mauvaise image du mouvement ou détourner en partie le message (qui de toute façon resterait pluriel même sans violence), elle attire aussi et surtout les caméras et les micros des médias.”*
protests, it is clear that this blanket statement does not reflect what is happening in news coverage. The most apparent observation when examining media coverage of protests involving symbolic violence is that the symbolic violence usually serves as the lead in that it is the hook that draws readers in. The image of a masked protestor breaking a storefront window or spray painting a message on the side of a building is more common than wide-angle shots representing the entire protest and its diversity. What follows from these images and the focus on property damage are discourses of law and order that present protest as an issue of crime not politics. Within the news coverage of the anti-WTO protests in Montreal, the front pages of newspapers were dedicated to the symbolic violence, and inside the covers, a plethora of discourses were presented. Some of the discussion focused on the property damage. Spokespeople for the Popular Mobilization stepped in to address the violence question themselves and were given space within the media for their discourse. An article from the Montreal Gazette reads:

Protest organizer Stefan Christoff said the businesses that were targeted represent the type of global capitalism perpetrated by the WTO. The real violence is done by the WTO, he said, charging that it stands in the way of generic AIDS drugs reaching patients in Africa. "So millions face death. That's much more violent than a couple of broken windows."85

Politicians also stepped in to have their say, attempting to see-saw public opinion to the side of law and order. In the media coverage of the anti-WTO demonstrations, Pierre Pettigrew, the Minister of Trade, retorted in the above article that he was disappointed that some demonstrators had resorted to violence, adding that they had lost "a lot of credibility" for their causes. He is quoted as saying: "I like softwood lumber, as

you know, but not when protestors use it to break windows." Did the activists have credibility with Pettigrew in the first place? Or, was this his attempt to tell the public that the use of property damage should result in loss of credibility? A few days earlier Pettigrew's discourse had been less humorous when he accused demonstrators of hurting developing nations and being irresponsible in their hopes to shut down the meetings. The *Canadian Press* version of these comments reads:

> But Pettigrew warned them that they won't succeed against tight security. "If they want to stop us, fine, good luck," Pettigrew told a news conference. "I trust the police of Montreal but they (protestors) should bear the responsibility that what they're trying to do is really to screw the African cotton farmers and the African HIV victims as well."

The State's official response to activists' tactics here borrows the discourse of activists whose press release speaks directly to the issues of farmers and HIV victims in relation to the policies of the WTO, and comes across as a genuine attempt to make them appear to be the criminals in this situation. Instead of acknowledging their right to protest, Pettigrew points out that security measures are in place. Added to this is voice of the police commander, Pierre Cadieux, who backs Pettigrew up outlining how the forces have been preparing for months—"We're ready for any scenario."

These official discourses of law and order have been present in other global justice demonstrations, where State officials are often quoted in the news as commending the police or RCMP for their maintaining of order. In some cases these

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86 Ibid.
congratulations are even extended to union leaders for having brought their own “peace keepers” to the march. These discourses serve to pull attention away from the injustices committed by the State and to suggest that activists have no legitimate concerns. As shown in Chapter 2, discourses of “the enemy within” that paint activists as deviant, abound in Canadian news representations of activists. Their presence works to maintain the hegemonic order; it upholds ideas of who the “good guys” and the “bad guys” are, or who is “us” and “them.”

Discourses of law and order construct “protests as a problem of policing” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2003, 131). In media coverage of protests, police use of surveillance, physical violence, and chemical and military weapons (from pepper-spray to rubber bullets) is often neglected. The American media-monitoring group FAIR’s media analysis90 of the Seattle protests confirms this, stating that mainstream media outlets preferred to frame police repression as a response to “anarchists” breaking windows or as a preventative tactic to avert looting, even though there are many accounts of the demonstrations which show that police use of gas and rubber bullets began before symbolic violence occurred. The interpretation of the protest spectacle as the police (good) against protestors (bad) frames the situation as one of threat and reassurance. According to Endelman, social control is exercised through this construction of the political spectacle— “[p]roblems, enemies, crises, and leaders are constantly being constructed and reconstructed to create a series of threats and reassurances” (qtd. in Gamson 1995, 96). The danger here is that dissent and collective action can be used to reinforce the hegemonic worldview by “helping political elites in their construction of a stable enemy

90 Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting; see the report at http://www.fair.org/extra/0003/pepperspray.html.
or threat that justifies their policies and provides a legitimation for political repression” (qtd. in Gamson 1995, 96).

Yet discourses of law and order are not necessarily stable or predictable. One remarkable case where police repression was highly criticized during the Montreal anti-WTO protests was in the Montreal newspaper *La Presse*. The front page photo was of police repression, not activist violence, and several articles accuse the police of irresponsible policing.91 In this coverage, the law and order frame is still present, but those arrested are framed as victims, not criminals. This is unrepresentative of the rest of the news coverage around these protests, but in analyzing the articles closely, it is clear why. During the arrest of 240 people at least one hour after the demonstration had dispersed, one of *La Presse*’s journalists was handcuffed and arrested as well, along with a prominent reformist and Québec provincial election candidate Amir Khadir, who was there as a volunteer medic. The newspaper’s coverage of these events attack police behaviour because their journalist, Nicolas Bérubé, was arrested. The paper describes the symbolic violence as “isolated acts of vandalism”92 and includes a commentary and an article denouncing police actions.93

This blatant criticism of police tactics is influential, for the police dedicate a lot of energy to media relations. Gary T. Marx argues that media has a role of moderating police behaviour. He says: “The symbolic importance of always being in control is given lesser importance than the harm that might befall police, demonstrators, and third

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92 Ibid.
parties and the longer negative consequences that might flow from media accounts of police violence" (1998, 257). The presence of cameras and media is seen by activists as a form of protection from police violence, and the case described here, the media bashing of police actions served to remind the police of the power of media, or at least to warn them to never again "mistakenly" arrest a journalist.

Attention to discourses of violence and of law and order cannot be neglected because it is these discourses, among others, which illustrate how the politics of speech play out in our society. If dissent is framed in the media as a crime, activists are not only prohibited from carrying out their protests and actions, but are also prohibited from speaking truth. Their speech drops within the orders of discourse as they are framed as irrational, as mad. Foucault's theories around discourse and power discussed in Chapter 1 come into play here, as activists are rejected as emotional, riotous, mad, and are prohibited from defining their world.

Walh-Jorgensen (drawing on Foucault) calls this the "incitement to silence" (2003, 131). Discourses of law and order are a mechanism of this incitement:

Such discourses discipline the population by, on the one hand, excluding the unruly elements that refuse normalization and, on the other hand, setting out clear rules for how to behave to avoid exclusion. Discourses of law and order also legitimize the police as the apparatus of surveillance and coercion that will guarantee a citizenry of "docile bodies" (Foucault 1991, p.135) safe from violence. (135)

The cloaking of dissent in discourses of law and order serves to transform transgressive acts, controlling their disruptive potential. With activists framed as an enemy that the State controls, discourses of violence effectively serve to co-opt and absorb dissent back into the system. They work to create a climate of fear that makes the absorption of dissent acceptable and necessary in the eyes of the population. Dissent is co-opted,
recuperated, and absorbed into hegemony, robbing it its potential; all while enhancing the system's appearance of stability and strength and thus enforcing consent. The recuperation of dissent is subtle, yet effective, taking criticism of the system and enlisting it in its support (Plant 1992, 75).

There is a glaring irony here—activists are required to provide a spectacle in order to gain significant attention from news media, but when they provide this spectacle, the coverage that follows functions to hush their voices, framing their political struggle as a law and order issue. It would seem then, that symbolic violence functions to rob activists of their legitimacy and to attract "bad" media coverage. Yet what happens in news coverage is more complex than this. While discourses of law and order may function to absorb radical discourses and to divest certain radical activists of discursive legitimacy (which is hard to prove without studying audience reception), there are discursive openings created for other speakers who may not receive space otherwise or who are "higher up" in the orders of discourse. As shown above, even while activists may not be able to speak at length about police repression, journalists may, in certain circumstances, use their privileged space as public commentators to denounce police actions (or, in other circumstances, activists’ actions).

Within the articles that I analyzed, the images of the broken windows were predominant, yet there was so much space allocated to reporting on these protests that much more than these images slipped in. Deluca and Peeples point out that violence gains media attention for movements might not otherwise get, drawing attention to non-violent as well as "violent" elements within it. They say:

Yes violence is disturbing. But for people excluded by governmental structures and corporate power, symbolic protest violence is an effective way to make it
onto the public screen and speak to that power. Such symbolic protest violence is often a necessary prerequisite to highlight the non-violent elements of a movement that might otherwise be marginalized in the daily struggle for media coverage. (2002, 144)

What Deluca and Peeples are suggesting is that violent tactics create spaces for reformist aspects of the movement to voice their analysis. As argued above, transgressive tactics create spaces for discourses which might not otherwise be recognized, including radical and reformist points of view. To push this further, the existence of violence in a demonstration may rob radical activists’ discourse of their legitimacy (which is difficult to prove without studying audience reception) but it actually may also serve to give reformist groups space and legitimacy.

Within the media coverage of the global justice movement there are often full articles allocated to NGOs and other reformist groups. These take the form of opinion columns written by these groups themselves (which means they have a significant rhetorical advantage in not having their voices mediated or edited extensively), articles devoted to covering what the less-radical groups think about the issues, and finally letters to the editors or quotes by groups or individuals responding to the violence, which may be critical of the actions or police repression. Just as not all radical activists use transgressive tactics, not all activists denounce radical actions in the streets, in fact at times, even if windows have been smashed, these same organizations stand with radical activists, especially if there has been excessive police repression. When articles profiling or including the opinion of reformist groups appear, the legitimacy of these groups or individuals is not challenged because they did not participate in the radical actions. They benefit from the media spotlight. They are also in a better position to criticize police
repression because they, supposedly, are not biased through involvement in the demonstration itself.

To use the coverage of the July 2004 anti-WTO protests in Montreal as an example once more, the day after the property damage occurred, full articles were dedicated to NGO concerns, specifically the issue of the availability of AIDS drugs in Africa and agricultural policies. Two days after the property damage there was an opinion piece in the *Globe and Mail* written by Oxfam's Rikey Steward in which she says, "Unlike some of the protestors, we've been trying to work with the WTO to reach a global agreement on fair trade... But our patience is wearing thin." The *Globe and Mail* also published an op-ed by Yves Engler, one of the organizers within the Popular Mobilization, who wrote as an individual not as a representative of the coalition, in which he says: "People probably smash windows out of testosterone-driven, juvenile anger. The reasons other people destroy countries' and even entire continents' economies are more obscure. Which should concern us more?" Despite how his piece goes on to lay out why protesters "rage" against the WTO, his opening line serves to rob his own discourse (along with those within the Popular Mobilization) of legitimacy by blaming their transgression on "testosterone-driven, juvenile anger." His op-ed reveals his split with the group, whose spokespersons refused to comment on a personal level regarding the broken windows, but instead focused (in interviews with journalists) on

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discussing the targets of property damage and the police repression. Furthermore, Engler’s short bio at the end of the piece says not only that he is a member of the Popular Mobilization but also that he is “writing a book on student activism at Concordia University,” a small addition to his piece that legitimates him as an “intellectual” or “expert.”

All of these articles, which are only a few examples of this type of coverage, illustrate how the discursive space opened up for reformist groups or individual activists after the confrontational demonstrations. They represent the “experts” within the movement, and along with movement intellectuals or journalist celebrities, such as Naomi Klein in Canada or George Monbiot in the UK. These groups, therefore, can be seen as gaining legitimacy and not being subjected to the incitement to silence. As Chris Atton says: “Geopolitics, corporate and governmental critiques and ideological discourse remain issues for experts, whether the papers’ own or the movement’s (self-appointed or “mainstreamed”) spokespeople” (Atton 2002, 502). “Experts” are therefore incited to speak at length, whereas radical activists, who seriously threaten the status quo, are reduced to sound-bites.

There is also a space created within the news media for “official” (whether governmental, corporate, or from international bodies) responses to the protests. This makes sense considering that the news value of balance requires that both sides of an argument be presented. Furthermore, official responses have significant legitimacy within the news media. As opposed to radical activists, state officials are seldom prohibited from speaking. Yet, in respect to activist concerns, politicians often ignore them or hold consultations in which reformist groups are invited to put their concerns
on the table in what is often criticized as a spectacle—a media event which presents politicians as listening to citizen concerns as long as media cameras are present, but that does not lead to any concrete response to their concerns. When a demonstration has a significant impact with regards to gaining media attention, some of the coverage focuses on responding to the symbolic violence, as shown above, but journalists also push those being protested against to respond to activist concerns. Whereas in some cases state officials turn the questions around, accusing protestors of being “globophobes” or of hurting people they are trying to help, they are nonetheless forced to publicly address activists concerns. Yet in other cases there are whole articles in which issues pushed forward by activists are addressed by journalists in interviews with officials, without mention of the symbolic violence or protest groups.

This is evidenced in the anti-WTO protest coverage in which officials were forced to respond publicly to activists’ concerns outside of the constructed “community consultation” space. The news media thus became the space for a discursive battle between the two points of view without those concerned ever being in the same room. Radical tactics provided the spectacle needed to grab the attention of journalists, editors, and the public, thus pushing this mediated argument forward. The result is an intense discursive battle among the State, WTO officials, and their supporters, and those on the side of social change.

This analysis of the media coverage of symbolic violence illustrates how the politics of speech function in our society. Media structures prove to be contradictory

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when it comes to transgressive and “violent” tactics, requiring that activists communicate through spectacle and then mediating this spectacle in such a way that radical discourses are undermined by discourses of law and order. The above analysis shows that in some ways activists are playing with news values to the best of their ability in order to draw attention to their causes, yet the same structures that require that they provide certain images also work to de-radicalize their message. With the news media being one of the only places where radical activists can engage in discursive battles with the State and corporate powers, this contradiction is problematic. The media is invaluable for activists, leaving them confused as to whether the entanglement with the media helped their cause or hurt it. Yet because media coverage cannot be predetermined, activists cannot base their choice of tactics on how the media will respond. If they do not engage in transgressive tactics simply because “bad” media coverage may ensue, they lose before the discursive battle has even a chance to begin.

Yet despite how the uses of discourses of violence and of law and order threaten to silence radical voices, I have to conclude that the activists of the Popular Mobilization Against the WTO did not lose the struggle. Certain voices may indeed have been robbed of legitimacy, but these were not those who were asked to speak in the first place. Those carrying out acts of symbolic violence communicated through their acts… the smashing of the GAP’s window spoke to labour issues, the defacing of the army recruitment centre spoke to increased militarization and the war on Iraq, the 240 people arrested spoke to the clamping down on political dissent by the state. Spokespeople for the protests spoke to the symbolic violence, to the issues driving the protests, as well as to the police repression. Alongside this we see NGOs, unions, and left-wing political parties
stepping in to address their concerns around the government's consultation process and the consequences of its policies, as well as the criminalization of dissent. Officials were pushed to react to questions initiated by activists, with journalists acting as mediators. With the amount of discussion and debate that six smashed windows created, is the question that needs to be asked really: "And what if the protests had been 'peaceful'?"

What has begun in the past few years, and what must continue, is the refusal of activists to engage in horizontal fighting over tactics, although some discussion and debate is necessary. Transgression remains what is hopeful about the movement in that it is the contestation of the State's power through the withdrawal of consent, and must therefore not be abandoned, but re-invented and re-used. One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the use of transgressive tactics by certain groups does not result in the entire movement losing its legitimacy. Reformist groups in particular have profited immensely from the use of transgressive tactics by more radical activists. The hostility that comes from this part of the movement has in some cases diminished in the past few years as reformists realize that separating themselves from more radical facets of the movements does not help the movement grow stronger. This was illustrated in the case of the arguments against the anti-terrorist legislation (Chapter 2), where many activists voiced their disapproval of legislation which was most likely to affect activists who engage in transgression. This show of solidarity is noteworthy because those who have more discursive legitimacy within the news media used this legitimacy to denounce potentially repressive legislation. Instead of focusing on debates and questions regarding tactics, what needs to be addressed is the fact that media and political structures are
mechanisms of an incitement to silence that require that windows get smashed and the riot gear be donned in order to have social justice issues placed on the agenda.
Conclusion

The mediations of discourse are inescapable and it is in them that the power and domination against which the revolutionary struggles are really exercised. (Plant 1992, 109-110)

This thesis is not about two separate sets of practices—those of the media and those of the global justice movement. It is about struggle. It is about how media practices naturalize the hegemonic status quo, containing dissent and incorporating it into this ideological space. This phenomenon is far from new. In the 1960s, the French Situationists expressed fear over the recuperation of dissent back into the “spectacle.” What happens, they asked, in a society in which “the individual’s own gestures are no longer his own, but rather those of someone else who represents them to him” (Debord 1990, qtd. in Plant 1992, 76)? The Situationists’ analysis was based on the disturbing observation that “the most radical of gestures are somehow absorbed within the existing structures of power” (Plant 1992, 108).

The analysis presented within this thesis is about the mass media’s role in maintaining hegemony; it is about how radical gestures, when mediated, lose some of their radical potential as they are transformed from political and cultural moments into consumer commodities. Our spectacular society, on the one hand, requires that radical activists engage with the affective, the spectacular, the visual, and at times with symbolic violence, in order to get noticed. Yet, on the other hand, as we have seen, the most radical actions get neutralized, recuperated back into hegemonic structures by discourses of us/them, the enemy within, and of law and order, and by the orders of discourse within corporate news media and larger society.
The politics of speech in our society, as well as the ways in which radical actions are presented and re-presented in the corporate media, work in such a way as to either block dissenting voices completely or to “remove explosive content from gestures and meanings which contest the capitalist order” (Plant 1992, 79). Although there are gaps within the mass media in which radical discourses sometimes take hold, the overall picture shows a mediascape in which certain voices are privileged over others (such as NGO voices over anti-capitalist ones) and in which dissent is used to reinforce the status quo, on one hand by de-legitimizing “unruly elements that refuse normalization, and, on the other hand, setting out clear rules for how to behave to avoid exclusion” (Walh-Jorgensen 2003, 135).

This is not to suggest that radical social change is impossible, nor to suggest that transgressive tactics do not succeed in radicalizing discourses, nor that the actions and discourses of reformists are entirely ineffective. Keeping in mind Graeber’s and Jordan’s affirmations that the anarchist and transgressive aspects of this movement are what is hopeful about it, this thesis has been an attempt to expose some of the mechanisms underlying the politics of speech in our society in order to, hopefully, shed light on the spaces in which resistance can take hold.

Yet in order for resistance to flourish, the various movements that comprise the global justice movement must develop theories and practices that address media power. As is illustrated in the analysis of globalization put forward by the movement (Chapter 2), globalization is viewed as an economic process that affects society, an analysis which often fails to take the culture industries into account. Media and public communication have been theorized within this thesis as an important tool for the growth and survival
of social movements, a tool which is not just about socio-economics, but also, and perhaps primarily, about access to systems of meaning-making. One major aspect of globalization has been the globalization of cultural production, within which the activities of meaning-production are increasingly distant from sites of reception (Raboy et. al. 1994, 304). Yet, analyses around neoliberal globalization often neglect cultural aspects, such as questions of identity, such as gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality (Duggan 2003), and of ideas, art, and communication. Discourses around the homogenization of culture, colonization, and imperialism exist, but are not often enough linked to critiques of the culture industries, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank's policies on culture, communications, and information technologies, and the role of communications media (both local and transnational) in globalization. This thesis has been an attempt to discuss one aspect of the cultural industries – that of meaning-making and access to discursive spaces – illustrating how globalization has led to the homogenization of information, not to its diversification, thus widening the gaps between those with discursive legitimacy and those without.

Within the past few years, participants in the global justice movement have been placing an increasing amount of attention on media relations and on the creation of alternative and autonomous media within social movements. This is significant. However, the road is yet long. There are several important factors that need to be addressed if this journey towards a better understanding and use of discursive resistance, the culture industries, and media power is to be successful.

To begin with, institutional NGOs and reformist groups must analyze and acknowledge the relative space of privilege that conservative voices (along with
traditionally privileged voices of men, whites, heterosexuals, and the middle and upper classes) have within media. In denouncing radical tactics and discourses, these more conservative facets of the movement are playing a role in reinforcing society's orders of discourse, which have reproduced themselves within the global justice movement. In calling radical activists “apolitical anarchists” or the “cancer within the movement,” certain activists and groups are silencing these activists, robbing their actions and words of legitimacy. In examining the position of radical discourses in our society, social movement actors therefore cannot criticize media structures only, however large their role may be in reproducing and naturalizing the status quo, but must also look inside their communities of resistance. Within the global justice movement access to meaning-making does not occur on even ground; those with greater financial resources and discursive legitimacy benefit within media-movement relationships and in gaining access to public discourse. They do not simply benefit on a general day-to-day basis, but specifically within large-scale mobilizations where transgressive tactics are used, as is shown in the media coverage analyzed within this thesis. Groups that criticise those who engage in transgression must acknowledge how transgressive actions actually widen media spaces for social justice discourses. This is not to say that these groups can not be critical of transgressive tactics, but instead that they move away from blanket statements that accuse radical activists of ruining the image of the movement, of attracting “bad” media coverage of the movement, and of alienating potential sympathisers.

As this thesis has shown, post-9/11 the tendency to equate radical activists with terrorists grew within the media and within official government reports. The media and public's obsession with the “violent” aspects of the global justice movement escalated as
well, as even prominent activists, such as Judy Rebick, begged radical activists to reconsider their use of “violent” tactics. These discourses of “violence” must shift. To quote Leo Panitch:

September 11, it is said, has changed everything. However true this might be—and I tend to think that it is not very true at all—one thing that it certainly should have changed is the loose manner in which violence as an adjective has been appended to anti-globalization protests. ... This fails to register the fact that precisely what characterizes the anti-globalization movement, in contrast with earlier ones on the European and North-American left, is the explicit eschewal, even among its most militant elements, of both armed revolutionary struggle and terrorism... as a means of affecting change in the advanced capitalist countries. (italics his, 2002, 40)

The label of “violent” in regards to transgressive tactics must therefore be avoided in describing the actions of radical activists. More accurate words such as “property damage” or “self defence” should be used instead in discussing the breaking of windows or the throwing of tear gas canisters back at the police. Furthermore, the debate on “violence” should be deepened with new questions. For example, instead of demanding that radical activists abandon transgressive tactics, why not ask instead: Why does property damage disturb people more than the policies of the WTO that effectively result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people? Are windows more important than people? And, how can activists develop new tactics that help to transmit messages successfully?

Radical activists must equally analyze their role within systems of meaning-making, both in relation to other groups and in relation to corporate media structures. The reticence on behalf of radical activists to engage with corporate media comes partially from their frustration with being misrepresented in past media reports, but more fundamentally from their refusal to engage with dominant structures (in the form of lobbying etc), because they see engaging with these structures as legitimizing the authority of these institutions. Radical activists in North America have increasingly
deviated from this standpoint and engaged with corporate media because of their realization that the “revolution will be televised,” or in other words, that engaging in public discursive battlegrounds, such as the news media, is important for the growth of the movement.

The July 2003 anti-WTO protests in Montreal are an excellent example of radical activists “mastering the info blitz.” 97 These activists did not refuse to engage with corporate media, but instead sought to find ways of collectively pooling knowledge and resources and of working with mass media in an intelligent way, conscious of the power-imbalance. The Popular Mobilization Against the WTO had a media committee comprised of 10 seasoned activists who wrote press releases, held press conferences, and succeeded in garnering massive amounts of publicity for their cause. Whereas groups have been successful in gaining media attention for certain campaigns, this is a unique example of the development of media communication strategies around mass demonstrations. Activists must continue to consciously develop tactics for dealing with mass media and to share these horizontally. Research, such as that presented within this thesis, can be helpful in achieving this end.

Despite these advances in consciousness around working with corporate media, participants in the global justice movement, whether radical, reformist, neither or in-between, have yet to incorporate critiques of corporate media within their struggles. I therefore echo Hackett’s declaration that activists need to take back the media. He says, “The progressive project of redistributing wealth and power within (or against) global capitalism will necessarily have to confront and challenge the corporate media system”

(2000, 61). As this thesis has shown, CSMs are engaging in meaning production and struggles over discourse; hence a stronger challenge is needed against hierarchies of access to public communication, the commodification of information, as well as the concentration of media ownership.

Therefore, what I suggest here are not reforms that could be made to corporate media structures, but instead changes in the way CSMs view media and the culture industries. Corporate media structures cannot be viewed simply as a tool to use within mobilizations, but must instead be seen as a central mechanism within global capitalism, one that reinforces inequalities and that presents a significant barrier to social change. Although mass media can be useful tools at times in the advancement of social movements, activists must heed Audre Lorde’s warning — The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. Corporate media structures both support and benefit from capitalism; they are businesses bent on making a profit, not on changing the status quo. Mainstream media reinforces political apathy and discourages political engagement, and if the global justice movement is committed to changing the world, its participants must struggle to reclaim and to create spaces in which various publics and counterpublics can participate in communication and culture, and therefore in politics.

As a result, groups, organizations, and individuals within the global justice movement must make efforts not only to understand how politics of speech are played out in society, and their roles within this, but also as to how they can act to change or replace the media structures that naturalize them. A critique of media power, not just of media representations, is essential. For example, queer activists can not limit their critique to one that targets stereotypes of queers that are homophobic within the media,
but must also critique media structures (including mainstream "queer" media) that are homophobic and heterosexist at the root, naturalizing a certain type of sexuality, privileging heterosexual voices, and leading to the commodification of queer bodies.

Efforts to challenge media power are often referred to as "media democratization" and take many forms, such as lobbying governments for stronger policies around media monopolies, to academic studies which study the effects of media power, to the creation of alternative forms of communication. Since a diversity of tactics brings strength to any movement, how each facet of the movement participates in the movement for media democratization will relate back to their analysis of global capitalism. What is important is that despite differing visions of how to democratize the media, each should take into account of their position within the orders of discourse and make a commitment to avoid re-creating these hierarchies of access within new forms of communication.

The creation and development of alternative communications projects is no doubt one of the strongest parts of the current media democratization movement, where critics of corporate media have subverted dominant media by creating their own. Therefore in addition to Hackett's insistence that activists take back the media we must also add the Indymedia call for activists to be the media. In the most radical of cases, autonomous media projects seek not only to provide a space for information that is an "alternative" to that which is found in mass media, but also to create media that breakdown the hierarchies of access to meaning-making.

The global project of Indymedia is an excellent example of this type of participatory communication, where anyone who has access to the Internet can submit
articles, sound or video clips, as well as comment on the content submitted by others, thus breaking down traditional forms of one-way communication. Projects like Indymedia illustrate the need for Temporary Autonomous Zones, which include alternative public spheres, places where activists can communicate, build ideas, practices, and tactics. The TAZ is defined as a place or activity “in which for awhile people may live and work as though many of capitalism’s priorities and the state’s restrictions do not apply” (Downing 2003, 249), and presents the possibility of revolution through the creation of spaces in which to propose, develop, and live out alternatives. Alternative and autonomous media serve as TAZs for CSM participants in that they provide a space in which discursive resistance can be developed without the effects of re-presentation, mediation, and recuperation typical of mass media structures.

Yet despite the importance of these spaces, this thesis has shown that the power concentrated within corporate media structures can not be ignored. One of the current challenges for alternative media makers and activists is to not only “preach to the converted” but to create pathways through which the ideas and discourses developed within autonomous spaces can find their way into the mainstream. This does not mean abandoning alternative media projects; nor does it mean transforming them into media that target mass audiences and rely on advertising dollars. Energy must be put into supporting these alternative media, into learning about how communications work, and into engaging with mainstream journalists from an informed standpoint. Examples of this happening are visible within the mediascape. One example is a journalist at

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98 The question of access to the Internet is problematic within Indymedia, but these groups are moving out of this medium and into video, audio, and print.
99 This term was coined and developed by Hakim Bey (1991). See also Jamming the Media by Gareth Branwyn (1997).
Montreal's newspaper *La Presse* who often uses the Indymedia Quebec website when searching for story ideas. In May of 2004, her visit to the site led to a breaking front-page story in *La Presse* about a Quebec activist who had been arrested and beaten in Mexico.\(^{100}\) Following this, she received permission from the editors to write a two-page, Section A, article on anarchist media in Montreal.\(^{101}\) This case illustrates that alternative media, and thus activist discourses, are increasingly becoming legitimate sources of information for the mainstream. Slowly, they are moving out of marginal roles within the mediascape and are gaining legitimacy on their own terms.

Despite the dominant point of view that audiences are apathetic and apolitical, the recent success of documentaries, such as Michael Moore's *Farenheit 9/11* (U.S.A., 2004), has also shown that audiences are hungry for political information. Although *Farenheit 9/11* also engages in techniques of infotainment, the overall message pushes audiences to stop being apolitical and to get out there and act, whether by voting or other means, and to seek out information for themselves instead of eating up whatever corporate news networks spoon-feed them.

Although this thesis has privileged, and critiqued, the media as a space that is imperative for social movements, it must be pointed out that the mediation of CSMs has let to the creation of the spectacle of social justice activism, a commodity image that can, in the words of Plant, “only be watched and enjoyed at a distance, from where it appears glamorous and desirable” (1992, 10). Media is society's resource for representing itself, but the world can not be changed through representation only; true change will come

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only through participation. Unlike Deluca and Peeples (2002) who privilege dissemination over dialogue, this thesis stresses the importance of discourse and of peoples' right to communicate. Both of these, while existing within mediated spaces, must also take place within communities of resistance, whether through events or face-to-face dialogue. Activists must continue to be visible within their communities, as it is also through contact and direct connections with resistance that people will feel compelled to join the struggle. I therefore share, with theorists like Fraser (1992), Chambers (1995), and Kidd (2003), the hope that activists will continue to strive for the ideal public or counterpublic sphere(s), or commons, in which all voices have access to participating in politics. All members of society should actively seek to harness the power contained within communications media, to engage face-to-face communication, to build new tactics of contestation and resistance, and to develop, in the words of Julia Kristeva, "a fundamental version of freedom: not freedom to change or to succeed, but freedom to revolt, to call things into question" (2003, 12).

Research is one of the tools that can be used to harness this power. With regards to research and media studies, this thesis has brought to light some of the challenges faced by social movements in transmitting their message, yet there is still much work to be done on this subject. This analysis presented within this thesis is limited by gaps in communications research. Research is much needed, for example, on how the work of journalists has been affected by concentration of media ownership, as well as on how their political opinions (and that of their editors and publishers) influence how news is framed. This thesis is also limited in that it neglects the question of reception. Although I have discussed the consequences of certain discursive frames, such as the "enemy
within,” on social movements, without studying audience reception it is not possible to theorize the impact of these frames on the opinions of audiences. Future studies could therefore focus on audiences in order to determine how political actions, ranging from the smashing of windows to the mass protest, are viewed by audiences, as well as on how the way a story is framed and what discourses are used affects this.

Finally, one of the most important issues that this thesis has discussed, and perhaps has touched only the tip of the iceberg, is that of society’s symbolic resources and the unequal distribution of symbolic power. Feminists have been attempting to address this question for the many 20 years, arguing against positivist discourses that divide knowledge into the “rational” (legitimate) and the “irrational.” This thesis has shown that these orders of discourse still exist and that some segments of the population have more power to “speak truth” than others and that radical discourses are naturalized and thus neutralized. Further research must therefore be done in order to develop theories and practices that address unequal access to society’s symbolic resources. This requires not only examining current media structures, but primarily what Bourdieu calls “symbolic power”—“the power of constructing reality” (qtd. in Couldry 2002).

At a time when it is increasingly difficult to do so, we must research and critique these imbalances, examining not only those discourses which are prominent, but also those which are marginalized and excluded. This means placing greater importance on the communicative practices of marginalized groups, including those of activists, which occur within mainstream spaces (such as newspapers) and within marginalized spaces (such as alternative media). It is through these examinations that we can continue to build understandings of symbolic power, and thus continue to contest it.
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