

**CULTURE, TRAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY IN MULTI-CULTURAL MONTREAL**

Mitchell Cohen

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ABSTRACT

Culture, Training and Negotiations:
A Cross-Cultural Study in Multi-Cultural Montreal

Mitchell Cohen

Peaceful and cooperative negotiation is difficult at the best of times. While both sides of the negotiation table may want to bargain and reach mutually beneficial outcomes, negotiations are usually confrontational environments. Negotiators may also not see the benefits that a more cooperative negotiation strategy would bring. An objective of this study is to examine how negotiators can behave cooperatively and reach mutually beneficial outcomes.

Business is internationalizing and the Canadian population is getting more culturally diverse. Conflict due to cultural differences may rise due to this diversification. Hofstede (1980) provided evidence that differences in cultural values affect behaviours. These different values and behaviours may result in different negotiation tactics that may make cooperation more difficult. This study also investigates how differences in individualism-collectivism may affect negotiation styles and outcomes.

Research has found that knowledge and experience may make a difference in reaching mutually beneficial outcomes. Therefore, this study explores the effectiveness of training negotiators to be more cooperative when negotiating thus reaching more integrative outcomes.

Results of the laboratory study found trust was related to higher cooperation, lower competitiveness and higher outcome integrativeness. Collectivist negotiators were less competitive and reached more integrative outcomes than their individualist counterparts. Training and experience was found to decrease competitive behaviour and increase the integrativeness of negotiation outcome, providing evidence that training and experience may therefore be used to overcome cultural predispositions that may impede reaching mutually beneficial outcomes. Implications for research and management are discussed.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Peaceful and cooperative negotiation is not easy to achieve. Negotiators may start negotiating with the intent of bargaining and reaching mutually beneficial outcomes, but may end up competing and reaching more distributive outcomes. Negotiations can also be competitive environments because negotiators may not see the benefits that a more cooperative negotiation strategy would bring. An objective of this study is to examine how negotiators can behave cooperatively and reach mutually beneficial outcomes.

Business is globalizing and the Canadian population seems to be getting more culturally diverse. There has been very little negotiation research carried out in Canada or specifically on the multicultural aspects of the Canadian population. This study expands on the literature by doing so. Canada is a mosaic of cultures from all over the world. It is therefore important to better understand how various cultures negotiate and do business within Canada. Conflict may rise due to the increase likelihood for cross-cultural interaction. Moreover, Hofstede (1980) provided evidence that differences in cultural values effect behaviours. These different values and behaviours attributes may result in different negotiation tactics that may make cooperation more difficult. This study will therefore attempt to provide evidence for cross-cultural predispositions affecting negotiation strategies and negotiation outcomes across various cultures within Canada. This could also be useful to Canadian businesses when people from various cultural backgrounds negotiate on their behalf.

Negotiation and conflict management are important topics for businesses and researchers alike, both locally and internationally. Understanding the mechanisms

through which conflict is resolved is crucial for improving our comprehension of why negotiations succeed or fail. Negotiation is further complicated now that businesses are increasingly 'going global'. As Canadian businesses internationalize and interact with more and more cultures, the importance of understanding how cultural attributes affect the negotiation process and its outcomes becomes even more critical. There is evidence, for example, that Japanese negotiators treat in-group members, defined as people that share attributes that contribute to one's positive social identity (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988), differently than out-group members (e.g. American negotiators) that may make cooperation and integrative outcomes more difficult for individualist negotiators and easier for collectivist negotiators (Lituchy, 1997).

Increasing our understanding of other cultural predispositions that ease or hinder the negotiation process would be of interest to management researchers since more conflict may arise from increased intercultural business interaction. International management and cross-cultural negotiation can improve if we recognize that people from various cultures bring with them a set of attributes that need addressing for desired negotiation outcomes to be attained. Therefore, the following research questions are addressed: 1) How does individualism-collectivism affect negotiation styles and the integrativeness of negotiation outcomes in a multicultural Canadian context?; 2) How do untrained, inexperienced negotiators bargain differently than experienced, trained negotiators?; 3) Do individual differences in personality predispose negotiators to use different negotiation styles and reach different negotiation outcomes as a result?; and 4) If negotiators have a cooperative motivational orientation, and negotiate more cooperatively, will this lead to an increase of trust?

First, this paper will review literature on the cultural dimension individualism-collectivism, negotiation training and experience and trust and how they relate to a cooperative negotiation strategy and integrative outcomes. Then, a model and hypotheses will be forwarded based on previous literature, which suggests that beliefs and attitudes affect negotiation strategies, culture affects beliefs and attitudes and that it may be possible to train a negotiator to reach integrative outcomes. Moreover, training and personality are examined in cross-cultural negotiations. Each of these constructs will be examined in more detail below and their hypothesized relations are represented in Figure 1. First, two types of negotiation outcomes, distributive and integrative, will be discussed in terms of the benefits of different types of negotiation outcomes. The next section will examine the relationship between cooperativeness as a negotiation strategy and the outcomes reached using this strategy. A comparison between cooperativeness and other strategies is also given. Trust is then examined as a possible precursor to cooperation and integrative outcomes. Negotiation experience and training, culture and personality are then examined respectively, in terms of their affects on levels of negotiator trust, cooperativeness and integrativeness of outcomes.

Methodology and results will then be presented followed by discussion. Possible future research options will then be forwarded followed by a conclusion.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Negotiation Outcomes

Walton and McKersie (1965) first categorized negotiation based on two different types of outcome: distributive and integrative. Distributive outcomes are those where one side wins at the other side's expense resulting in a win-lose situation. An integrative outcome is one in which both sides reach a settlement and improve their respective situations, resulting in a win-win situation (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). A classic example comparing the two outcomes is that of two sisters deciding how to divide an orange. One sister wanted the peel for cooking and the other wanted the juice. They agree to cut it in half, reaching a purely distributive, fixed-sum outcome. They did not perceive the potential for different priorities for the orange, and thus did not share enough information, or they would have realized by peeling the orange, they could have reached an integrative agreement. They mistakenly overlooked an outcome where both sisters would have got exactly what they wanted, thus reaching an optimal, integrative agreement (Follett, 1940).

Integrative negotiation outcomes are the focus of much research attention, but have been seen as difficult and ineffective when applied to an actual dispute (Lytle, Brett & Shapiro, 1999). Distributive outcomes, on the other hand, are typically viewed as suboptimal solutions, especially when there is perceived common ground, defined as a negotiators assessment of the potential for finding outcome alternatives that are beneficial to both negotiating parties. Integrative agreements are more viable when there is

perceived common ground. According to Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994), perceived common ground is greatest when the party's own aspirations are low, the party's perception of the other's aspiration are low and the perceived potential for alternatives mutually beneficial to both parties (integrative solutions) is high.

Most conflict situations requiring negotiation have the potential for integrative agreements that 'expand the pie' rather than being purely win-lose, fixed-pie negotiations (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Integrative settlements are preferred over distributive agreements because they allow negotiators to find mutually acceptable outcomes that may have otherwise ended in an impasse, are more stable over the long-term, aid in cultivating relations between the negotiating parties, and promote the well-being of the community as a whole (Rubin et al., 1994). The type of outcome reached is largely determined by the negotiation strategy used.

Negotiation Strategy

There are several different strategies one can use when negotiating with another individual. The problem solving strategy can be viewed as one where both parties collaborate with each other, sharing information to reach a more integrative outcome. Sharing information is widely believed to increase the likelihood of an integrative negotiated outcome (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson & Pillutla, 1999; Rubin, et al., 1994; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Neale & Bazerman, 1991).

Moreover, Thompson (1991) provided evidence of a relationship between information sharing and integrative outcomes, comparing negotiators who were

instructed to either seek or provide information about their priorities to their counterparts with negotiators who did not receive any instructions to either provide or seek information. Dyads that included a negotiator who sought or provided information reached more integrative outcomes than dyads that did not have one information-providing or seeking negotiator. Dyads in the control condition, with no instruction to either provide or seek information, spontaneously exchanged information only 7% of the time, suggesting that they either did not perceive the potential benefit of sharing information or felt that the other party would use the information opportunistically and claim more value (Thompson, 1991).

The choice of negotiation strategy can be influenced by negotiator perception of possible outcomes. If a negotiator does not believe integrative agreements are achievable, a negotiator will most probably not choose a problem solving, cooperative strategy, since the negotiator will think he or she is negotiating for the same resources, consequently not seeing any benefit in collaborating. Moreover, problem solving involves identifying the issues that divides the negotiating parties and working on a solution that both sides would find mutually acceptable or even desirable (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994). However, negotiators tend to assume that the other negotiating party has the same priorities resulting in the perception that there are few mutually beneficial alternatives. If both negotiators fail to realize that they have different evaluations of the importance of each of the issues being negotiated, then negotiators will choose a negotiating strategy that would not allow for the possibility of an integrative solution (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

The use of cooperative strategies is necessary to reach integrative outcomes (Raiffa, 1982). Setting overall goals, disassociating people from the problem, inquiring about the negotiating partner's needs and priorities and suggesting solutions that are mutually beneficial to both parties (Fisher & Brown, 1988; Thompson, 1991). There is evidence that cooperative strategies lead to integrative outcomes and high joint gains (Pruitt, 1983). It is therefore hypothesized that:

H 1: The more cooperative the negotiation strategy, the more integrative the outcome.

However, cooperativeness may be dependent on trust between negotiating parties. In the next section, the literature on trust and its impact on negotiation strategy and outcome are discussed.

Trust

Trust has been interpreted as impacting negotiation in very different ways, from a personality trait perspective comparing high trusters with low trusters and the differences in their negotiation strategies to trust as a temporary state in a negotiation context (Ross & Lacroix, 1996). A nominal amount of trust, defined as a feeling of belief in the reliability and integrity of another person, seems necessary for any negotiation transaction to take place (Ross & LaCroix, 1996).

Research based on trust as a temporary state (rather than a more stable personality trait) has offered three ways in which trust is built during negotiation: 1) as derived from a motivational orientation to cooperate and/or cooperative behaviour; 2) as following

from other's predictable behaviour; 3) as based on a negotiator's problem-solving strategy (Ross & LaCroix, 1996). This study focuses on the first theory of trust as derived from a cooperative motivational orientation, which views cooperative or competitive behaviours as operationalizations of cognitive trust or distrust. If both negotiators are motivationally oriented to cooperate, then they should demonstrate cooperative behaviours which should then lead to a reinforcement of trust (Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Furthermore, according to Ross and Lacroix (1996), a person's motivation orientation can be based on either situational variables or underlying social value orientations. In this study, a situational approach to trust is examined.

Motivation orientation refers to a negotiator's attitude towards another party (Deutsch, 1960). A negotiator has a cooperative motivation orientation if he or she is concerned with the other's well-being as well as his or her own and a competitive motivation orientation if he or she wants to be more successful than the other at the other's expense (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Deutsch (1960) found negotiators with cooperative motivation orientations cooperated more and reach more integrative outcomes than negotiators with competitive motivation orientations. Furthermore, trusting bargainers generally negotiate more cooperatively than less trusting, more suspicious bargainers (Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Negotiators collect information and determine whether the other negotiating party can be trusted or is likely to be devious and misleading. In order for a negotiator to use a strategy that would make him or her vulnerable to the other party (e.g. a cooperative strategy would require sharing of information that could be used against the sharer), he or

she would need to feel confident that the strategy will not be used against him or her. Otherwise, the negotiator will not share information and will avoid options that would increase the chances of being exploited by the other (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).

Moreover, even if negotiators perceive common ground, they may not choose a cooperative negotiating strategy if either feels the other will exploit the information shared in cooperating, and not reciprocate the cooperation. Trust should therefore be secured at the outset of negotiation. Otherwise, cooperation will deteriorate and the result will be distributive. It is therefore hypothesized that:

H 2(a): the higher the trust, the more cooperative the negotiation strategy.

H 2(b): the higher the trust, the more integrative the negotiation outcome.

Trust in another is one aspect that may lead to more cooperation and more mutually beneficial outcomes. Negotiation experience is another factor that may aid a negotiator to avoid fixed-sum assumptions and allow a negotiator to see the potential for integrative negotiation and outcomes. The next section will review the literature on negotiator experience and training and its effect on bargaining strategies and outcomes.

Negotiation Experience and Training

It is a well accepted belief that those who negotiate for a living should fare well or at least better at novel negotiating tasks than novice negotiators (Thompson, 1990). Moreover, negotiation tactics and strategies chosen by negotiators are affected by the amount of knowledge negotiators have of negotiation strategy (Carroll & Payne, 1991).

The integrativeness of negotiation outcomes has also been shown to improve when negotiators were given knowledge of strategy in the form of tactical descriptions (Weingart, Hyder & Prietula, 1996).

There is evidence that expert negotiators outperform amateurs in novel, integrative negotiation tasks (Neale & Northcraft, 1991). There is also ample evidence for negotiating experience mediating the integrativeness of a negotiation outcome (Thompson, 1990; 1991). The experts in a study conducted by Thompson (1990) reached agreements that were more integrative than those of the amateurs. Moreover, the perception that there is common ground can be enhanced through experience, which may allow negotiators to see the integrative potential of a negotiation and therefore, the benefits of integrative solutions to maximize the integrative potential (Rubin, et al., 1994).

Thompson (1990) also found experienced negotiators claimed more than 50% of the available resources more often when negotiating with inexperienced bargainers than when negotiating with opponents with one previous bargaining experience. Furthermore, joint outcomes significantly improved when inexperienced negotiators had a single negotiating experience suggesting that development of integrative solutions is highly interdependent and that some experience may be necessary to achieve highly integrative agreements (Thompson, 1990). However, negotiators reached optimal agreements in some stages, but not necessarily in subsequent stages of Thompson's study. According to Thompson (1990) this may suggest that negotiators accidentally reached integrative agreements rather than because of prior experience. If negotiators purposely reached

integrative agreements, it is assumed that they would continue to reach such agreements in later negotiations, but this did not occur.

Perhaps learning or training to be integrative rather than simply 'gaining experience', will result in more collaborative, integrative outcomes. If negotiators were to be trained that integrative agreements are not only achievable, and that although it may seem that they are competing for the same resources, higher gains can still be achieved through the use of cooperation and creating value, rather than competing and claiming value, then suboptimal agreements may be avoided.

A negotiator seeks to claim value and create value (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Both require accurate evaluations of the amount of resources that are being divided and of the interests of both negotiating parties. Thompson and Hastie (1991) measured perceptions and the accuracy of priority and compatibility judgments. Negotiators were more likely to assume the other party had the same evaluation of issue importance and thus a fixed amount of resources (fixed-sum error). Furthermore, negotiators who learnt of the integrative potential of the issues early in the negotiation (negotiators with a low error score early in the negotiation) had higher payoffs than late learners. Fixed-sum error was also found to be related to lower pay-offs. Negotiation training may decrease the likelihood of fixed-sum error and increase priority and compatibility judgment simply due to the understanding that it is in a negotiator's best interest to avoid fixed-sum error and more actively seek perceived common ground. If negotiators were training to look for perceived common ground, and told that integrative outcomes are superior to distributive agreements and that collaborating is often the key to reaching integrative

outcomes, then it may be easier for trained negotiators to reach integrative outcomes than non-trained counterparts.

Negotiation training is a huge industry. Despite its growth in recent years, there is very little research on its effectiveness and the results of such training (Coleman & Lim, 2001). Johnson and Johnson (2000) developed conflict resolution training they called Teaching Students to be Peacemakers and successfully trained students from preschool through high school to manage negotiation constructively in three steps: 1) they learn that conflict can have several advantageous outcomes when managed constructively; 2) they learn how to negotiate integrative outcomes by describing what they want and how they feel and why, taking the other's perspective, coming up with three different courses of action, then formalizing the best option with a handshake; and 3) they are taught how to mediate classmate disputes. Peacemaker training continues throughout the school year as students practice mediating the conflict of others and teachers' continue to refine their negotiation skills. The training typically lasts for 20 hours over several weeks and is taught to all the students in a school. Research on the peacemaker program found that all untrained students would opt for a distributive strategy when in a conflict situation that had the potential for either a distributive or integrative outcome. Trained students would primarily use a problem-solving, integrative strategy to resolve their conflict. It is therefore hypothesized that:

H 3(a): The more training a negotiator has, the more cooperative they will be.

H 3(b): The more training a negotiator has, the more integrative the outcome he or she will reach.

Culture can also play an important role in negotiator behaviour. The following section will review literature on the effects culture, and more specifically, individualism-collectivism plays in negotiation strategy and outcomes.

Culture

International negotiation experts realize that negotiators on both sides of a conflict bring with them a set of cultural beliefs and attitudes that must be taken into account to avoid unnecessary conflict (Chang, 2003). These cultural attributes can also contribute to one's overall negotiation strategy.

According to Hui and Triandis (1986), a culture with a majority of collectivists can be considered to be collective. A majority of individualists would result in an individualist culture. Canadians and Americans are typically more individualist while Chinese and Japanese are typically more collectivist (Hofstede, 1980)

The essence of individualism-collectivism results from the individual's ideas, beliefs, attitudes and feelings that comprises individualism-collectivism and should be viewed as a cluster of beliefs and behaviours, which fall under seven categories (Hui & Triandis, 1996, p.229). Four of these categories are particularly relevant to negotiations: (1) Consideration of implications (costs and benefits) of one's own decisions and/or actions for other people; (2) Sharing of material resources; (3) Sharing of outcomes; and (4) Feeling of involvement in others' lives.

According to the first category, Individualists base their actions on whether or not it leads to personal gain whereas collectivists consider a wider collective when deciding how to act.

The second category defines collectivists as maintainers of social networks through the sharing of material resources. Collectivists reciprocate loans, borrowing and giving in order to maintain social relationships. Individualists, conversely, place great importance on autonomy and self-reliance.

The third category regards collectivists as believing they are interconnected with others. One's misconduct harms many. Whereas an individualist views him or herself as being relatively insulated from others, whose actions do not affect anyone else. An individualist can get away with doing what he or she wants without needing to consider others while a collectivist would feel accountable to others for his or her behaviour.

The last category views collectivists as sharing others' successes and failures because they are involved in other people's lives. An individualist, on the other hand, is separated from the whole. Hui and Triandis (1986) summarize these categories as a sense of "concern", of oneness with others, and a sensitivity to the ties and relationships one has with others and a propensity to think of others. Collectivists' concern for others results from the belief that we all affect one another, regardless of intent, and therefore we have no choice but to consider one another. This increased connectedness and concern for others can increase the likelihood that a collectivist negotiator will seek negotiation strategies that build relationships and result in more mutually beneficial outcomes.

According to Wagner (1995), individual differences in individualism-collectivism should lead to variation in the level of cooperation in group situations. Individualists whose focus is on personal gains would only cooperate if it's in their best interests to do so and if they could not reach similar gains by working alone. Collectivists, however, would strive to better group performance and well-being disregarding their own personal gains. It has been shown that negotiators with high individualism tend to be less cooperative and reach a less integrative (more distributive) outcome than if one or both negotiators of a negotiating dyad were highly collectivist (Lituchy, 1997). Moreover, Wagner (1995) in his study of 492 college students, provided evidence of collectivists who felt reliant on the group and were more cooperative and of individualists who felt independent and self-reliant and were less likely to be cooperative. It is therefore hypothesized that:

H 4(a): the higher the collectivism, the more cooperative the negotiation strategy.

H 4(b): the higher the collectivism, the more integrative the outcome.

Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998) posit that norms in collectivist societies provide strong evidence that a target's motives in a bargaining situation are unselfish and lead to the development of trust. Collectivist societies discourage independent goal attainment with members of society deferring their personal interests in favour of those of the in-group (Triandis, et al., 1988). Since both members of an exchange are likely to be members of the same in-group, the prevalence of group rewards and the value associated with group efforts combined with negative consequences associated with individual goal attainment at the expense of the group suggests that targets will not only act in their own

best interests, but also in those of the trustor's. In sum, selfless goal attainment associated with a collectivist culture should lead to trust as defined by a motivation to cooperate. It is therefore suggested that:

H 4(c): the higher the collectivism, the higher the trust.

Negotiation strategies, according to Shell (2001), are fairly constant clusters of behaviour that are driven by personality. The next section will review the research that has been carried out attempting to link personality with negotiation strategies and outcomes.

Personality

Differences in negotiator's personalities can affect negotiation processes and outcomes (Greenhalgh, Neslin & Gilkey, 1985). Personality differences should be recognized as having the potential to prevent a negotiator from applying the appropriate negotiation strategy to a given negotiation situation (Antonioni, 1998) or "predispose him or her toward the use of specific conflict-handling modes" (Thomas, 1976; p. 926). Past research has shown mixed results in linking personality with conflict styles which led some researchers to question the predictive value personality has in determining negotiation style. For example, researchers found a relationship between personality measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the five conflict management styles (Chanine & Schneer, 1984; Kilmann & Thomas, 1975). Others have not found strong support relating personality to negotiation styles (Jones & Melcher, 1982) or personality

to negotiation outcomes (Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt & Carnavale, 1993).

These mixed results have led some to question the relationship between personality and negotiation behaviour and outcomes. However, the lack of support may simply be due to the differences in how personality was measured by past researchers, with many choosing to focus on a variety of personality traits rather than on a more comprehensive model of personality structure (Antonioni, 1998). For example, Chanin and Schneer (1984) measured personality using Jungian dimensions, decision-making (thinking-feeling) and orientation (extroversion-introversion). According to Rubin and Brown's (1975) review of research in the 1960s and 1970s, only 9 of 16 experiments successfully linked authoritarianism with negotiator behaviour, in which negotiators who were less authoritarian were more cooperative than negotiators who were more authoritarian. Early studies on the link between Machiavellianism and negotiator cooperation and negotiation outcomes are equally confusing and inconclusive. Greenhalgh, et al. (1985) found a link between personality and negotiation outcomes but defined personality by measuring 31 personality constructs and factoring them into 10 personality dimensions. Clearly, a consensus is needed on how researchers measure personality before any sense can be made from the mixed results.

Personality psychologists developed the Five-Factor Model of personality to move the research on personality away from studying personality as a hodgepodge of unrelated traits (Lewicky, Saunders, Minton, & Barry, 2003). The "Big-Five", as they are also called, include (Barrick and Mount, 1991, pp3-5): 1) Extraversion – being sociable, assertive, talkative; 2) Agreeableness – being flexible, cooperative, trusting; 3) Conscientiousness – being responsible, organized, achievement oriented; 4) Emotional

stability – being secure, confident, not anxious; and 5) Openness – being imaginative, broad-minded, curious.

According to Antonioni (1998) and Barry and Friedman (1998), the Big-Five personality factors can predict a strategy that promotes integrative outcomes. A highly extraverted personality will have the desire, the social skills, the confidence and the assertiveness that may be needed when working with others. Assertiveness is also necessary for a negotiator to cooperate and integrate, allowing individuals to defend their needs while respecting other's needs. Mills, Robey, & Smith (1985) found highly extraverted project managers preferred a cooperative negotiation style. Agreeableness, by definition, is the tendency for one to cooperative, considerate and trusting of others. Agreeableness was associated with problem solving when male police officers were placed in various conflict scenarios (Van de Vliert & Euwema, 1994). Conscientious persons tend to be quite unwavering and regimented when they are working towards a goal. This may result in adequate preparation for problem solving strategies and searching for mutually beneficial and satisfactory outcomes.

Lastly, negotiators must not get aggravated or easily disheartened while remaining alert, attentive and concerned for the other's positions (Antonioni, 1998). Emotional stability should promote a relaxed atmosphere, thus allowing a positive relationship to form across the negotiating table, increasing the probability that both negotiators will work together to eliminate the conflict and find mutually acceptable outcomes.

Barry and Friedman (1998) did not find any evidence linking Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Conscientiousness with the integrativeness of negotiated outcomes.

Antonioni (1998) used two samples, one of students and one of managers, and found extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness were associated with a more integrative negotiating strategy for the students sample and found only extraversion and conscientiousness were positively related to a more integrative negotiating strategy in the manager sample. However, Antonioni (1998) did not measure whether extraversion, conscientiousness, and / or openness were associated with negotiation outcome integrativeness. The following hypotheses were therefore tested:

H 5-1(a): The higher the negotiator's extraversion score, the more cooperative and the less competitive the negotiator;

H 5-1(b) The higher the negotiator's extraversion score, the more integrative the outcome;

H 5-2(a) The higher the negotiator's agreeableness score, the more integrative the outcome;

H 5-2(b): The higher the negotiator's agreeableness score, the more cooperative and the less competitive the negotiator;

Hyp 5-3(a) The higher the negotiator's conscientiousness score, the more integrative the outcome;

H 5-3(b) The higher the negotiator's conscientiousness score, the more cooperative and the less competitive the negotiator;

H 5-4(a): The higher the negotiator's openness score, the more cooperative and the less competitive the negotiator;

H 5-4(b) The higher the negotiator's openness score, the more integrative the outcome;

H 5-5(a): The higher the negotiator's emotional stability score, the more cooperative and the less competitive the negotiator;

H 5-5(b) The higher the negotiator's emotional stability score, the more integrative the outcome.

The literature review examined previous research leading to the proposed hypotheses. Collectivist negotiators should be more trusting than individualist negotiator and more trusting negotiators should be more cooperative, less competitive and reach more integrative outcomes. Moreover, personality differences, collectivism and training and experience should all increase the likelihood that cooperative negotiation strategies are used, decrease the likelihood that competitive strategies are used and lead to more integrative outcomes. The method section follows, providing information on the sample, negotiation exercises and procedure.

3. METHOD

Sample

One hundred and thirty seven Concordia University undergraduates participated in this study. More specifically, thirty three (25 female and 8 male) students enrolled in an undergraduate Negotiations class and 104 (41 male and 60 female, 3 missing values) undergraduate volunteers recruited through an Organizational Behaviour class subject pool participated in this study and were given class credit (up to two percent) towards their final grade. Fifty-one participants (37%) were born in Canada and forty-nine

participants were born in China (36%) and thirty-seven participants were born in other countries (27 %). The undergraduate volunteers, used as the control group, came to a classroom at a prearranged time. The Negotiation students completed the tasks as part of their class exercises. All participants were informed of the anonymity of their responses and were fully debriefed as to the nature of the study after their participation. This study received approval from the University Human Research Ethics Committee.

Negotiation Exercises

Three separate negotiation exercises with the potential for integrative outcomes were used. The first exercise, Pemberton's Dilemma (Lewicky, et al., 2003, 518-520), is a Pemberton's dilemma role play involving the managers of two stores in the town of Pemberton, the corner store and the country market. Both managers had 12 turns to decide whether their store would stay opened or closed on the following Sunday. Due to city bylaws, if both stores remained open, they would be heavily fined and would lose money for that week (- \$20000). However, if one store stay open and the other closed, the open store would reap all the profits (+ \$40000) while the store that closed would incur a loss (- \$40000). If both stores remained closed, it would be 'business as usual', and both would make their regular profits for the rest of the week (+ \$20000). Subjects were instructed to try and maximize their profits. Both managers had to indicate at the same time whether they were voting to stay open or closed for the Sunday of that week for each round. After a 5-minute planning stage, the first 4 rounds of voting took place with a minute of planning between each round. Participants were instructed to not speak

during any of the planning stages. Managers were then allowed to negotiate for 5 minutes after the fourth round. Rounds 5 to 8 and 9 to 12 were analogous to rounds 1 to 4, with a minute to plan given between each round, and a 5 minute negotiation round given after round 8. Participants were also instructed that Rounds 4, 8 and 12 were worth double, triple and quadruple their original amounts, respectively.

The second negotiation exercise, Universal Computer Company I (Lewicky, et al., 2003, 526-529), was also a role play in which the negotiators were randomly assigned to the role of the plant manager of one of two vertically integrated companies, Crawley or Phillips. Both managers were given role information and background information on the Universal Computer Company and its quality control problem. The Crawley plant produces modules for use by the Phillips plant. However, many of the modules that Phillips plant receives from Crawley are found to be faulty by the Phillips plant. Expenses for repairing faulty modules and how to handle the repairs of faulty modules were negotiated by both parties for 30 minutes, during which the final settlement agreement was completed.

The third negotiation exercise, Town of Tamarack (Lewicky, et al., 2003, 531-533), involved negotiators being randomly assigned to be a representative of the Tamarack Town Council or the top management group of the Twin Lakes Mining Company. Participants were given role and background information. Negotiators were also given either a Town or a Mine payoff schedule and they were instructed to keep their payoff schedule confidential. The subjects negotiated a total of 5 issues: 1) Site of next mine; 2) Restoration of consumed mines; 3) Air quality – Road maintenance; 4) Air quality – Paving dirt roads; and 5) Tax rate on company land. Each issue had 5 options,

with a different point value for each. Both parties were instructed to obtain a minimum number of points for their final agreement on all 5 issues. Both parties were given forty minutes to negotiate and come to a final agreement.

Procedure

All participants received a self-report questionnaire (see Appendix A) assessing individualism / collectivism, personality, attitudes towards negotiation partners, negotiation styles, and demographic information. Upon completion of the questionnaire, the subjects received background information concerning the negotiation and specific role information. Subjects then participated in one of the dyadic negotiation exercises. Students were recruited using Organizational Behaviour subject pools to participate in one of three negotiation tasks as control groups. The negotiation class students completed all three negotiation tasks on subsequent dates and received negotiation training in between the tasks (throughout the course). Since the negotiation students participate in all 3 negotiation exercises, they receive a combination of experience and training while non-negotiation students (control group) only participate in one exercise and therefore did not receive any negotiation training or experience. Training included lectures and assignments, as well as negotiation role plays and case studies.

Subjects who were the same on the Individualism-Collectivism items (Wagner, 1995) were paired up to form individualist or collectivist dyads (Ind-Ind or Col-Col). Subjects whose Ind/Col scores are opposite were paired up to form mixed culture dyads (Ind-Col).

When a final outcome was reached, participants were given a post-negotiation questionnaire (Appendix B, C & D for Exercises 1, 2 and 3, respectively) assessing negotiation strategy, trust in their negotiation partner and the negotiation knowledge. Subjects were then debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study. Questionnaires remained anonymous.

Variables

Means, standard deviations, reliabilities and correlations are presented in Table 1.

Individualism and collectivism. Individualism / collectivism (Ind/col) was measured using items from a scale developed by Wagner (1995) measuring personal independence and self-reliance from Erez and Earley (1987) and four items from Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca (1988); items assessing the value attributed with working alone using two items from Wagner and Moch (1986) and one item from Erez and Earley (1998), and items measuring beliefs of the effects personal pursuits have on group productivity using three items from Wagner and Moch (1986); $\alpha = .827$ for the whole study).

Trust. The level of trust negotiators had for their partners, the level of trust they felt their partners had for them and the level of trust they felt they exhibited was assessed by asking “How much did you trust the other person in this negotiation?”, “How much do you think the other person trusted you?” and “I was trustworthy” ($\alpha = .89$ for exercise 1).

Personality. The Big-Five Personality Assessment Questionnaire (International Personality Item Pool, 2001 and Goldberg, 1999) was used. Participants rate how accurately each of the 50 items accurately describes themselves on Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability and Openness to Experience on a Likert scale from 1 = very inaccurate to 5 = very accurate.

Strategy. Participants were asked to what degree they thought they were cooperative and competitive using the following items (on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = to no extent, and 7 = to a very great extent): I was competitive; He/she was competitive; I was cooperative; He/she was cooperative (Neale, Northcraft & Earley, 1994); Did you discuss your reasons for the value (or lack of) of each option for all the issues?; To what extent did you share information relating to the relative point value for each option? A copy of the complete pre-negotiation and post-negotiation questionnaires can be found in Appendix A and B, respectively ($\alpha = .89$ for cooperativeness, exercise 1 and $\alpha = .671$ for competitiveness, exercise 1) .

Negotiated Outcome. The integrativeness of the negotiated agreement was assessed using joint profit in the case of Pemberton's Dilemma and total points for the Town of Tamarack exercise (see Lewicky, et al., 2003). The Universal Computer Company's outcomes were qualitative. Outcomes were assessed for their integrativeness based on a predefined scale from 1 (distributive) to 7 (integrative). The scale was defined as follows: 1 = somewhat distributive agreement; 2 = mostly distributive agreement; 3 = purely distributive agreement; one or two issues were not agreed upon; part of agreement left undecided (possibly to be decided by manager/ supervisor); 4 = purely distributive agreement; fixed pie split down the middle; 5 = mostly distributive

agreement (some integration); some expanding of the pie; 6 = a somewhat integrative agreement; somewhat detailed outcome that required some cooperation; above average expanding of the pie; and 7 = reached a highly integrative agreement with high complexity; required high level of cooperation. Zero was given to dyads who could not reach an agreement.

4. RESULTS

Demographics and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The 137 participants ranged in age from 18 to 37 ($m = 24.18$). The Canadian subjects (37%) responded with a mean Ind/Col score of 4.48. The Chinese subjects (36%) responded with a mean Ind/Col score of 4.35. Thirty-seven participants were born in other countries (27 %).

Test of Hypotheses

Chi-squares were used to test the hypotheses. Summary of the results are presented in Table 2. Exercises 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Hypothesis 1, which stated, the more cooperative or less competitive the negotiation behaviour, the more integrative the outcome, was supported for Exercise 1 ($\chi^2 = 7.02$, $p > .01$ for cooperate; $\chi^2 = 4.73$, $p < .05$ for compete) and Exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 71.82$, $p < .001$) for competitiveness.

Hypothesis 2(a), which stated, the higher the trust, the more cooperative or less competitive the negotiation behaviour, was supported in Exercise 1 ($\chi^2 = 24.96$, $p < .001$ cooperative; $\chi^2 = 3.78$, $p < .05$ for compete); and in Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 5.65$, $p < .05$ for cooperate; $\chi^2 = 3.83$, $p < .05$). Hypothesis 2(b) which stated, the higher the trust, the more integrative the negotiation outcome was also supported for Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 4.61$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 3(a), which stated, the more experience and training a negotiator has, the more cooperative and less competitive they will be, was significant for Exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 4.41$, $p < .05$ for compete) and for Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 3.32$, $p < .06$ for cooperative; $\chi^2 = 13.37$, $p < .001$ for competition). Hypothesis 3(b), which stated, the more experience a negotiator has, the more integrative the outcome he or she will reach, was supported for Exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 19.37$, $p < .05$) and Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 4.71$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 4(a), which stated, the higher the collectivism, the more cooperative the negotiation behaviour was partially supported. Collective Chinese were less competitive than the Individualist Canadians in Exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 7.51$, $p < .01$) and Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 4.13$, $p < .05$). Collectivism had a direct effect on integrativeness of outcome Hypothesis 4(b), in Exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 37.82$, $p < .01$) and Exercise 3 ($\chi^2 = 6.92$, $p < .05$). Hypothesis 4(c) which stated, the higher the collectivism, the higher the trust, was not supported.

Hypothesis 5-1(a) which stated, the higher the negotiator's extraversion score, the more cooperative the negotiator was not supported. Hypothesis 5-1(b) which stated the higher the negotiator's extraversion score, the more integrative the outcome was not supported. Hypothesis 5-2(a) which stated the higher the negotiator's agreeableness score, the more integrative the outcome was supported for exercise 1 ($\chi^2 = 13.929$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 5-2(b) which stated the higher the negotiator's agreeableness score, the more cooperative the negotiator was supported for exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 14.225$, $p < .10$). Hypothesis 5-3(a) which stated the higher the negotiator's conscientiousness score, the more integrative the outcome was not supported. Hypothesis 5-3(b) which stated the higher the negotiator's conscientiousness score, the more cooperative the negotiator was not supported. Hypothesis 5-4(a) which stated the higher the negotiator's openness score, the more cooperative the negotiator was supported for exercise 1 ($\chi^2 = 30.072$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 5-4(b) which stated the higher the negotiator's openness score, the more integrative the outcome was not supported. Hypothesis 5-5(a) which stated the higher the negotiator's emotional stability score, the more cooperative the negotiator was supported for exercise 2 ($\chi^2 = 39.875$, $p < .05$). Hypothesis 5-5(b) which stated the higher the negotiator's emotional stability score, the more integrative the outcome was not supported.

Theoretical Negotiation Model

Next, the Theoretical Negotiation Model is tested using regression analyses. Model One (exercise 1 before training), Model Two (exercise 2 during training) and Model Three (exercise 3 after longitudinal training) are presented in Tables Six through Eight and Figures Two through Four respectively. Personality hypotheses were inconclusive in chi-square analyses and were therefore dropped from the final Models 1 through 2 (Figures 2-4). Country of birth (Country Born) was entered as a control

variable. Where significant, it was included in the models representing the regression analyses.

As can be seen before training (Table 6, Figure 2), Trust had a significant effect on Cooperative ($t=2.46, p<.01$) and Competitive Strategies ($t=-2.29, p<.05$) and Integrative Outcomes ($t=4.43, p<.001$). During Training (Table 7, Figure 3), Training ($t=-4.20, p<.001$; $t=-1.67, p=.10$) and Country Born ($t=-2.18, p<.05$; $t=2.00, p<.05$) affected Trust and Competitive Behaviors; and Trust affected Cooperative Strategies ($t=3.12, p<.01$).

After the completion of the training program (Table 8, Figure 4), Trust still affected Cooperative ($t=4.08, p<.001$) and Competitive Strategies ($t=-2.21, p<.05$); while Training had a significant effect on the Competitive Strategies ($t=-2.70, p<.01$) and Integrativeness of the outcome ($t=1.88, p<.10$), as hypothesized. A summary of results is presented in Table 2 and discussed in Chapter 6.

5. DISCUSSION

The regression analyses provide support for the hypothesized model (figure 1). Regression analyses for exercise 1, 2 and 3 are represented in Figures 2, 3 and 4. The results of hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 1. Personality was dropped from our hypothesized research model due to inconclusive results in the Chi-squared tests. More cooperative strategies leading to a more integrative outcome was supported for all three exercises, providing more support for the notion that cooperation leads to both negotiators benefiting more than they would if they were to compete, as found by Lituchy

(1997). A higher level of trust led to more cooperative or less competitive negotiation behaviour, further supporting earlier research (Rubin & Brown, 1975). This provides more evidence of trust as a requirement for cooperation to occur between negotiators. Trust also led to a more integrative negotiation outcome.

A more experienced negotiator was less competitive and more cooperative. We did not expect cooperative strategies or integrative outcomes for Exercise 1 since the negotiation students had not yet received any training and this was their first in-class negotiation. Exercise 2 was the participants' second negotiation exercise and was given at the midway point of the class, and can therefore be considered as given during training while Exercise 3 was given near the end of the class and is considered as given after training. Experienced, trained negotiators reached more integrative outcomes in Exercises 2 and 3, suggesting that some combination of training and experience allows negotiators to realize the potential for more favourable, mutually beneficial outcomes and tend to negotiate to reach them, consistent with Thompson (1991).

Negotiation training may have served to correct misperceptions that are common among naïve negotiators that tend to lead to suboptimal outcomes. Johnson and Johnson (2000) are one of the few negotiation researchers to have explicitly measured negotiation training effectiveness in terms of increasing cooperativeness. The present study provides further evidence of the usefulness of training in teaching negotiators to reach more integrative outcomes.

Barry and Friedman (1998) did not find evidence linking Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Conscientiousness with integrative outcomes and Antonioni found evidence linking Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Openness with more

cooperativeness. This study did not support previous findings although previous research is somewhat inconclusive. More agreeable negotiators were more cooperative for exercise 1 and reached more integrative outcomes for exercise 2. Higher openness was related with higher cooperativeness for exercise 1 and more integrative outcomes for exercise 2. These results are also inconclusive.

Results did not support a relationship between training and an increase in cooperation. This can be due to the nature of the study. Perhaps respondents were more accurate about their degree of competitiveness but not about their degree of cooperation. A decrease in competitiveness may have been easier for respondents to gauge than an increase in cooperativeness since strategies that hinder a smooth resolution may be more obvious than strategies that allow for a relationship-building resolution to be reached. The self-report nature of the responses may also be why we found significant differences for competitiveness but not for cooperation or trust; respondents may be less accurate about these perceptions.

Similar to previous research, collectivism resulted in less competitive strategies, (Lituchy, 1997 and Wagner, 1995), suggesting that collectivists were not purely self-interested than individualists when bargaining for the available resources. This notion is further supported by the positive relationship between collectivism and a higher level of trust and a more integrative outcome (Hypothesis 4(a) and (b)). Individualists, however, seemed to negotiate for personal gains, at the expense of the group, indicated by the lower integrativeness of individualist negotiators' outcomes. Findings may be generalized to other multi-cultural settings and other cross-cultural dyadic negotiations.

These findings, along with the significant relationship between training and integrative outcomes suggest that an individualist's predisposition towards competitiveness and distributive outcomes can be alleviated through the use of training negotiators to be more cooperative.

Future Research

Future research should use more rigorous and more specific training (Black & Mendenhall, 1989). The negotiations class used for this study covered a broad range of negotiation topics that may not have sufficiently focused on the benefits of cooperation when negotiating and reaching integrative outcomes. Research should also look at other cultural and personality dimensions to see whether they affect negotiation behaviour and outcomes. Little research has been conducted on other cultural variables and inconclusive results have stemmed from research on the Big-Five model of Personality (Antonioni, 1998; Barry & Friedman, 1998). It may be that there are other cultural or personality attributes that are affecting negotiation behaviour and outcomes that were not taken into account in this study.

Lastly, compared to self-report, this study could have used a less subjective measure of negotiation strategy by video-taping negotiators and having several raters assess their level of cooperation by watching entire negotiation. Inter-rater reliability could then ensure that the behaviour assessments are accurate.

Moreover, the dual-concern model (Thomas, 1976) is another method that may be better at gauging a negotiator's strategy than directly asking the degree of

competitiveness and cooperativeness. According to the Dual Concern Model, the choice of strategy used is based upon the degree of concern the negotiator has for his or her own outcome (concern about party's outcomes) and the degree of concern the negotiator has for the other's outcome (Thomas, 1976). If the concern for both is high, then the negotiator would choose a problem solving strategy. If concerns about party's outcomes are high and other's outcomes is low, a competing strategy would be most likely used. Low concern about party's outcomes and high concern about other party's outcomes would likely result in a yielding strategy (giving in to other's concerns). A low concern for both party and other's outcomes would most likely result in an avoiding strategy being chosen (Thomas, 1976). However, the degree of concern is based on cognitions (Thomas, 1976) while a direct measure of negotiation strategy was more desirable. However, due to the possible issues with measuring cooperation in the present study, future research should perhaps assess negotiation strategies more indirectly, using the dual-concern model. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, training might need to be more concise and focus more on cooperativeness and integrativeness in order to see improvements in the level of negotiator cooperativeness. Teaching methods that more specifically foster the creation of value may allow negotiators to realize the potential for integrative strategies and outcomes and more accurately perceive increases in cooperativeness.

Much of the negotiation literature refers to training and experience as one construct. The limitations of an in-class experimental group did not allow this to be rectified. Training effects could be compared with the effects that experience alone has on negotiation strategy and outcomes reached with the effects of both training and

experience. This could be useful in shedding more light on some factors that may aid in cross-cultural conflict management. Effects of training and experience on individualist negotiators will therefore be compared with the effects on collectivist negotiators. This will allow those in the field of conflict management to better understand whether those interested in increasing the integrativeness of negotiation behaviour and outcomes should focus on either training or negotiation or a combination of the two.

Conclusion

Overall, this study provides further evidence of culture or more specifically, the individualism-collectivism cultural attribute, accurately predicting variations in negotiation strategies and outcomes. Training and experience also resulted in less competitiveness and more integrativeness. Perhaps, negotiators can truly overcome their predispositions towards self-interest at the expense of another and the misperceptions that may lead to a preference for distributive outcomes through a combination of experience and training to allow for the negotiation process to become one that fosters relationships and seeks the creation of value and the sharing of resources so that all negotiating parties can benefit. Moreover, as shown in this study, perhaps individualists, who are more likely to compete for resources and reach distributive agreements can be trained to think not only of themselves in a negotiation, but seek to maximize the profits of both negotiating parties.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	α	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Age	24.18	4.55		1.000													
2 Gender	1.63	.483		.049	1.000												
3 Ind / Col	4.50	.675	.827	-.019	.094	1.000											
4 Trust exercise1	5.59	1.30	.890	.038	.227	-.099	1.000										
5 Trust exercise2	4.31	.788	.810	.212	.068	-.118	.447	1.000									
6 Trust exercise3	5.03	.890	.873	.062	.051	.115	-.114		1.000								
7 Coop exercise1	5.75	.976	.671	.015	.087	.008	.378**	.284	.253	1.000							
8 Coop exercise2	5.46	.706	.638	.094	-.215	-.041	-.088	.170	.440*	.230	1.000						
9 Coop exercise3	5.47	.819	.763	.105	-.046	.047	-.410*	-.091	.222	.155	.531**	1.000					
10 Comp exercise1	3.57	1.64	.633	.178	.065	-.164	-.173	.177	.214	-.374**	.182	.105	1.000				
11 Comp exercise2	4.00	1.47	.577	-.017	-.385**	-.211	-.351	-.042	-.292	-.044	.071	-.284	-.388	1.000			
12 Comp exercise3	3.73	1.34	.705	-.027	-.259*	-.052	.213	-.065	-.355**	-.009	-.242	-.235	-.221	.423*	1.000		
13 Integrate exercise1	4.41	2.26		.095	.111	-.046	.641**	.064	-.088	.470**	-.101	-.302	-.259*	-.163	.152	1.000	
14 Integrate exercise2	4.83	1.03		.026	-.021	-.128	.303	.097	-.315	-.455*	-.031	-.135	-.246	-.053	.192	.426	1.000
15 Integrate exercise3	5.07	1.69		.041	.091	-.073	-.319	.353	.158	.057	-.026	-.021	-.030	.447*	-.113	-.110	-.346

^a Cronbach alpha

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2: Summary of Results

H1	strategy - outcome	supported, exercises 1 & 2
H2(a)	trust - strategy	supported, exercises 1 & 3
H2(b)	trust - outcome	supported, exercise 3
H3(a)	experience/training - strategy	fully supported
H3(b)	experience/training - outcome	fully supported
H4(a)	collectivism - strategy	not supported
H4(b)	collectivism - outcome	supported, exercises 2 & 3
H4(c)	collectivism - trust	not supported
H5-1(a)	extraversion - strategy	not supported
H5-1(b)	extraversion - outcome	not supported
H5-2(a)	agreeableness - strategy	supported, exercise 1
H5-2(b)	agreeableness - outcome	supported, exercise 2
H5-3(a)	conscientiousness - strategy	not supported
H5-3(b)	conscientiousness - outcome	not supported
H5-4(a)	openness - strategy	supported, exercise 1
H5-4(b)	openness - outcome	supported, exercise 2
H5-5(a)	emotional stability - strategy	not supported
H5-5(b)	emotional stability - outcome	not supported

Table 3: Exercise 1 Crosstab Analyses

	Chi-Sq	Df
Trust v Cooperate	24.960***	1
Trust v Compete	3.782*	1
Cooperate v Integrative	7.020**	1
Compete v Integrative	4.725*	1

*p < .05 (2-tailed), **p < .01 (2-tailed), ***p < .001 (2-tailed)

Table 4: Exercise 2 Crosstab Analyses

	Chi-Sq	df
Country of Birth v Competitiveness	7.514**	1
Training v Trust	4.286*	1
Training v Competitiveness	4.141*	1
Training v Integrativeness	19.370*	9
Ind/Col Group v Integrativeness	37.818**	18
Compete v Integrativeness	71.815***	25

*p <.05 (2-tailed), **p <.01(2-tailed), ***p <.001(2-tailed)

Table 5: Exercise 3 Crosstab Analyses

	Chi-Sq	df
Born v Competitiveness	4.129*	1
Training v Cooperativeness	3.315+	1
Training v Competitiveness	13.374***	1
Training v Integrativeness	4.710*	1
Trust v Cooperativeness	5.648*	1
Trust v Competitiveness	3.830*	1
Trust v Integrativeness	4.605*	1
IndCol v Integrativeness	6.922*	

+p<.10, *p<.05 (2-tailed), **p<.01(2-tailed), *** p<.001(2-tailed)

Table 6: Regression Analyses Exercise 1

DV	IV	R ²	Sum of Sq	Df	F	Beta	T
Trust		.033	3.63	3	.525		
	Training					-.239	-1.06
	Country Born					-.275	-1.24
	Collectivism					.025	.166
Cooperate		.172	9.74	4	2.23 p=.08		
Behavior	Training					-.062	-.291
	Country Born					-.237	-1.13
	Collectivism					-.013	-.093
	Trust					.348	2.46 p<.01
Compete		.150	15.23	4	1.90 p=.12		
Behavior	Training					.109	.505
	Country Born					.213	1.00
	Collectivism					-.088	-.620
	Trust					-.327	-2.29 p<.05
Integrative		.500	115.29	6	6.49 p<.001		
Outcome	Training					.065	.388
	Country Born					.035	.206
	Collectivism					-.061	-.520
	Trust					.581	4.43 p<.001
	Cooperate					.185	1.42
	Compete					-.055	-.433

Table 7: Regression Analyses Exercise 2

DV	IV	R ²	Sum of Sq	Df	F	Beta	T
Trust		.398	24.33	3	7.72		
	Training					-.653	-4.20 p<.001
	Country Born					-.332	-2.18 p<.03
	Collectivism					-.186	-1.39
Cooperate		.306	6.93	4	3.75 p=.013		
Behavior	Training					.209	1.01
	Country Born					.022	.125
	Collectivism					-.15	-1.0
	Trust					.57	3.12 p<.01
Compete		.377	32.17	4	5.13 p=.002		
Behavior	Training					-.328	-1.67 p=.106
	Country Born					.335	2.00 p<.05
	Collectivism					.235	1.65 p=.10
	Trust					.100	.57
Integrative		.074	3.97	6	.426		
Outcome	Training					.065	.833
	Country Born					-.014	-.062
	Collectivism					-.093	-.491
	Trust					.320	1.28
	Cooperate					-.228	-1.12
	Compete					.027	.127

Table 8: Regression Analyses Exercise 3

DV	IV		Sum of Sq	Df	F	Beta	T
Trust		.025	.759	3	.269		
	Training					-.170	-.877
	Country Born					-.106	-.523
	Collectivism					-.022	-.118
Cooperate		.371	7.69	4	4.42 p=.006		
Behavior	Training					.243	1.52
	Country Born					.102	.615
	Collectivism					.077	.509
	Trust					.599	4.08 p<.001
Compete		.362	18.06	4	4.26 p=.008		
Behavior	Training					-.435	-2.70 p<.01
	Country Born					.194	1.16
	Collectivism					.148	.97
	Trust					-.326	-2.21 p<.05
Integrative		.256	19.82	4	2.22 p<.06		
Outcome	Training					.315	1.88 p<.07
	Country Born					.231	1.20
	Collectivism					-.235	-1.34
	Trust					-.290	-1.38


Figure 1: Theoretical Negotiation Model

Figure 2: Regression Model Exercise 1






Figure 3: Regression Model Exercise 2

Figure 4: Regression Model Exercise 3

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ID: _____
Partner ID: _____
Time Start: _____
Finish: _____

Appendix A: Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire

Cross-cultural Negotiation

PART I

Please think of an ideal job—disregarding your present job, if you have one. In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to ... (Please circle one answer in each line across based on the following scale):

- 1 = of utmost (the most) importance
 2 = very important
 3 = of moderate importance
 4 = of little importance
 5 = of very little or no importance

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. have sufficient time left for your personal life or family life | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. have a good working relationship with your direct superior | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. have security of employment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. work with people who cooperate well with one another | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decision | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. have an element of variety and adventure in the job | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

In your private life, how important is each of the following to you?
 (Please circle one answer for each statement below).

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9. Personal steadiness and stability | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. Thrift (being careful with your money) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. Persistence (perseverance) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Respect for tradition | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. Ordering relationships by status and observing this order | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14. Having a sense of shame | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 15. Reciprocation of greetings, favors, and gifts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 16. Protecting your "face"
("saving face"; protecting oneself from shame) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

17. How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?

1. Never 2. Seldom 3. Sometimes 4. Usually 5. Always

6. I don't have a job

18. How frequently, in your experience, are subordinates afraid to express disagreement with their superiors?

1. Very rare 2. Seldom 3. Sometimes 4. Frequently 5. Very frequently

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (Please circle one answer in each line)

- 1 = strongly agree
 2 = agree
 3 = undecided
 4 = disagree
 5 = strongly disagree

19. Most people can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5
20. One can be a good manager without having precise answers to most questions that subordinates may raise about their work	1	2	3	4	5
21. An organization structures in which certain subordinates have two bosses should be avoided at all costs	1	2	3	4	5
22. Competition between employees usually does more harm than good	1	2	3	4	5
23. A company's or organization's rules should not be broken—not even when the employee thinks it is in the company's best interests	1	2	3	4	5
24. When people have failed in life it is often their own fault	1	2	3	4	5

PART II

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (Please circle one answer for each statement below).

- 1 = strongly disagree
 2 = disagree
 3 = disagree somewhat
 4 = undecided
 5 = agree somewhat
 6 = agree
 7 = strongly agree

1. Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. To be superior a person must stand alone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. If you want something done right, you've got to do it yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. What happens to me is my own doing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. In the long run the only person you can count on is yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Winning is everything	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. I feel that winning is important in both work and games	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Success is the most important thing in life	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- 1 = strongly disagree
 2 = disagree
 3 = disagree somewhat
 4 = undecided
 5 = agree somewhat
 6 = agree
 7 = strongly agree

9.	It annoys me when other people perform better than I do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.	Doing your best isn't enough; it is important to win	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.	I prefer to work with others in a group than working alone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12.	Given the choice, I would rather do a job where I can work alone rather than doing a job where I have to work with others in a group	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13.	Working with a group is better than working alone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14.	People should be made aware that if they are going to be part of a group then they are sometimes going to have to do things they don't want to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15.	People who belong to a group should realize that they're not always going to get what they personally want	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16.	People in a group should realize that they sometimes are going to have to make sacrifices for the sake of the group as a whole	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17.	People in a group should be willing to make sacrifice for the sake of the group's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18.	A group is more productive when its members do what they want to do rather than what the group wants them to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19.	A group is more efficient when its members do what they think is best rather than doing what the group wants them to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20.	A group is more productive when its members follow their own interests and concerns	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

PART III

The following questions are designed to measure your responses to your perceptions of human behaviour in situations of bargaining and negotiation. For each statement, please indicate how much the statement is *characteristic of you* on the following scale (there are no right or wrong answers):

- 1 = Strongly uncharacteristic
- 2 = Moderately uncharacteristic
- 3 = Mildly uncharacteristic
- 4 = Neutral, no opinion
- 5 = Mildly characteristic
- 6 = Moderately characteristic
- 7 = Strongly characteristic

Rate each statement on the seven-point scale by writing in one number closest to your personal judgment of yourself:

- _____ 1. I am sincere and trustworthy at all times. I will not lie, for whatever ends.
- _____ 2. I would refuse to bug (place a listening device in) the room of my opponent.
- _____ 3. I don't particularly care what people think of me. Getting what I want is more important than making friends
- _____ 4. I am uncomfortable in situations where the rules are ambiguous (unclear) and there are few precedents.
- _____ 5. I prefer to deal with others on a one-to-one basis rather than as a group.
- _____ 6. I can lie effectively. I can maintain a poker face (no facial expression) when I am not telling the truth.
- _____ 7. I pride myself on being highly principled. I am willing to stand by those principles no matter what the cost.
- _____ 8. I am a patient person. As long as an agreement is finally reached, I do not mind slow-moving arguments.
- _____ 9. I am a good judge of character. When I am being deceived, I can spot it quickly.
- _____ 10. My sense of humor is one of my biggest assets.
- _____ 11. I have above-average empathy for the views and feelings of others.
- _____ 12. I can look at emotional issues in a dispassionate way. I can argue strenuously for my point of view, but I put the dispute aside when the argument is over.
- _____ 13. I tend to hold grudges.
- _____ 14. Criticism doesn't usually bother me. Any time you take a stand, people are bound to disagree, and it's all right for them to let you know they don't like your stand.
- _____ 15. I like power. I want it for myself, to do with what I want. In situations where I must share power I strive to increase my power base, and lessen that of my co-power holder.
- _____ 16. I like to share power. It is better for two or more to have power than it is for power to be in just one person's hands. The balance of shared power is important to effective functioning of any organization because it forces participation in decision making.
- _____ 17. I enjoy trying to persuade others to my point of view.

Appendix B: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire Study 1

7 pages

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

ID: _____
Partner ID: _____
Time Start: _____
Finish: _____

1. What is your first (native) language? English _____ French _____
Other _____ specify _____
2. What language did you negotiate in? _____
3. How long have you known your negotiation partner? _____ months _____ years

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

4. _____ To what extent did you share information about your situation?
5. _____ Overall, to what extent do you feel the other person shared information with you during this negotiation?
6. _____ How much did you trust the other person in this negotiation?
7. _____ How much do you think the other person trusted you?
8. _____ How well do you know your negotiation partner?

Think about your behaviours and attitudes during the negotiation. To what extent is each of the following statements descriptive of you? Please indicate your responses in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ I was competitive.
2. ____ I was cooperative.
3. ____ I was concerned for the other person's outcome only, not my own.
4. ____ I was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ I was concerned for my own outcome only.
6. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcomes regardless of my partner's outcomes.
7. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcome relative to my partner's outcome.
8. ____ I tried to maximize my partner's outcome, regardless of my own outcome.
9. ____ I tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ I was trustworthy.

With regard to the negotiations, to what extent do you think each of the following statements is descriptive of the person with whom you negotiated? Please use this scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ He/she was competitive.
2. ____ He/she was cooperative.
3. ____ He/she was concerned for my outcome only, not his/her own.
4. ____ He/she was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ He/she was concerned for his/her own outcome only.
6. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcomes regardless of my outcomes.
7. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcome relative to my outcome.
8. ____ He/she tried to maximize my outcome, regardless of his/her own outcome.
9. ____ He/she tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ He/she was trustworthy.

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided.

1. How fair was the agreement to you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair			Fair			Fair

2. How fair was the agreement to the other negotiator?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair			Fair			Fair

3. How satisfied are you with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied			Satisfied			Satisfied

4. How satisfied do you think the other player was with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied			Satisfied			Satisfied

5. How much control did you have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No			Some			Total
Control				Control		Control

6. How much control did the other player have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No			Some			Total
Control				Control		Control

1. The pursuit of only a singular, substantive goal often tends to support the choice of a competitive strategy.
A) True
B) False

2. What differences can lead parties to assume a particular frame?
A) value differences
B) differences in personality
C) power differences
D) differences in the background and social context of the negotiators
E) all of the above

3. Distributive bargaining strategies and tactics are useful when a negotiator wants to maximize the value obtained in a single deal.
A) True
B) False

4. In integrative negotiation, the goals of the parties are mutually exclusive.
A) True
B) False

5. "Expanding the pie" as a method of generating alternative solutions is a complex process, as it requires much more detailed information about the other party than do other methods.
A) True
B) False

6. Although there is no guarantee that trust will lead to collaboration, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that mistrust inhibits collaboration.
A) True
B) False

7. A joint goal is one in which
A) all parties share the result equally.
B) the parties work toward a common end but benefit differently.
C) individuals with different personal goals agree to combine them in a collective effort.
D) all parties work together to achieve some output that will be shared.
E) All of the above are characteristics of a common goal.

8. A zero-sum situation is a situation in which individuals are so linked together that there is a positive correlation between their goal attainments.
- A) True
 - B) False
9. The four levels of conflict are: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup.
- A) True
 - B) False
10. The words "bargaining" and "negotiation" are
- A) mutually exclusive.
 - B) interchangeable.
 - C) not related.
 - D) interdependent.
 - E) None of the above.
11. Which is not a characteristic of a negotiation or bargaining situation?
- A) conflict between parties
 - B) two or more parties involved
 - C) an established set of rules
 - D) a voluntary process
 - E) None of the above are characteristics of a negotiation.
12. A situation in which solutions exist so that both parties can do well in the negotiation is a _____ situation.
- A) mutual gains
 - B) win-lose
 - C) zero-sum
 - D) win-win
 - E) None of the above.
13. BATNA stands for
- A) best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
 - B) best assignment to a negotiated agreement.
 - C) best alternative to a negative agreement.
 - D) best alternative to a negative assignment.
 - E) BATNA stands for none of the above.

14. In the Dual Concerns Model, the level of concern for the individual's own outcomes and the level of concern for the other's outcomes are referred to as the
- A) cooperativeness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - B) the assertiveness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - C) the competitiveness dimension and the aggressiveness dimension.
 - D) the cooperativeness dimension and the assertiveness dimension.
 - E) None of the above.
15. An individual who pursues his or her own outcome strongly and shows little concern for whether the other party obtains his or her desired outcome is using the _____ strategy.
- A) yielding
 - B) compromising
 - C) contending
 - D) problem solving
 - E) None of the above.

Appendix C: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire Study 2

7 pages

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

ID:	_____
Partner ID:	_____
Time Start:	_____
Finish:	_____

1. What is your first (native) language? English _____ French _____
Other ____ specify _____
2. What language did you negotiate in? _____
3. How long have you known your negotiation partner? ____ months ____ years

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

4. ____ To what extent did you share information about your situation?
5. ____ Overall, to what extent do you feel the other person shared information with you during this negotiation?
6. ____ How much did you trust the other person in this negotiation?
7. ____ How much do you think the other person trusted you?
8. ____ How well do you know your negotiation partner?
9. ____ Did you discuss inspection of the modules?
10. ____ Did you discuss company policy regarding quality?
11. ____ How confident are you that the final agreement will please the VP of manufacturing?

Think about your behaviours and attitudes during the negotiation. To what extent is each of the following statements descriptive of you? Please indicate your responses in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ I was competitive.
2. ____ I was cooperative.
3. ____ I was concerned for the other person's outcome only, not my own.
4. ____ I was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ I was concerned for my own outcome only.
6. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcomes regardless of my partner's outcomes.
7. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcome relative to my partner's outcome.
8. ____ I tried to maximize my partner's outcome, regardless of my own outcome.
9. ____ I tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ I was trustworthy.

With regard to the negotiations, to what extent do you think each of the following statements is descriptive of the person with whom you negotiated? Please use this scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ He/she was competitive.
2. ____ He/she was cooperative.
3. ____ He/she was concerned for my outcome only, not his/her own.
4. ____ He/she was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ He/she was concerned for his/her own outcome only.
6. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcomes regardless of my outcomes.
7. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcome relative to my outcome.
8. ____ He/she tried to maximize my outcome, regardless of his/her own outcome.
9. ____ He/she tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ He/she was trustworthy.

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided.

1. How fair was the agreement to you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair		Fair			Fair	

2. How fair was the agreement to the other negotiator?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair		Fair			Fair	

3. How satisfied are you with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied		Satisfied			Satisfied	

4. How satisfied do you think the other player was with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied		Satisfied			Satisfied	

5. How much control did you have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No		Some			Total	
Control		Control			Control	

6. How much control did the other player have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No		Some			Total	
Control		Control			Control	

1. The pursuit of only a singular, substantive goal often tends to support the choice of a competitive strategy.
 - A) True
 - B) False

2. What differences can lead parties to assume a particular frame?
 - A) value differences
 - B) differences in personality
 - C) power differences
 - D) differences in the background and social context of the negotiators
 - E) all of the above

3. Distributive bargaining strategies and tactics are useful when a negotiator wants to maximize the value obtained in a single deal.
 - A) True
 - B) False

4. In integrative negotiation, the goals of the parties are mutually exclusive.
 - A) True
 - B) False

5. "Expanding the pie" as a method of generating alternative solutions is a complex process, as it requires much more detailed information about the other party than do other methods.
 - A) True
 - B) False

6. Although there is no guarantee that trust will lead to collaboration, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that mistrust inhibits collaboration.
 - A) True
 - B) False

7. A joint goal is one in which
 - A) all parties share the result equally.
 - B) the parties work toward a common end but benefit differently.
 - C) individuals with different personal goals agree to combine them in a collective effort.
 - D) all parties work together to achieve some output that will be shared.
 - E) All of the above are characteristics of a common goal.

8. A zero-sum situation is a situation in which individuals are so linked together that there is a positive correlation between their goal attainments.
- A) True
 - B) False
9. The four levels of conflict are: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup.
- A) True
 - B) False
10. The words "bargaining" and "negotiation" are
- A) mutually exclusive.
 - B) interchangeable.
 - C) not related.
 - D) interdependent.
 - E) None of the above.
11. Which is not a characteristic of a negotiation or bargaining situation?
- A) conflict between parties
 - B) two or more parties involved
 - C) an established set of rules
 - D) a voluntary process
 - E) None of the above are characteristics of a negotiation.
12. A situation in which solutions exist so that both parties can do well in the negotiation is a _____ situation.
- A) mutual gains
 - B) win-lose
 - C) zero-sum
 - D) win-win
 - E) None of the above.
13. BATNA stands for
- A) best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
 - B) best assignment to a negotiated agreement.
 - C) best alternative to a negative agreement.
 - D) best alternative to a negative assignment.
 - E) BATNA stands for none of the above.

14. In the Dual Concerns Model, the level of concern for the individual's own outcomes and the level of concern for the other's outcomes are referred to as the
- A) cooperativeness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - B) the assertiveness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - C) the competitiveness dimension and the aggressiveness dimension.
 - D) the cooperativeness dimension and the assertiveness dimension.
 - E) None of the above.
15. An individual who pursues his or her own outcome strongly and shows little concern for whether the other party obtains his or her desired outcome is using the _____ strategy.
- A) yielding
 - B) compromising
 - C) contending
 - D) problem solving
 - E) None of the above.

Appendix D: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire Study 3

7 pages

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

ID: _____
Partner ID: _____
Time Start: _____
Finish: _____

1. What is your first (native) language? English _____ French _____
Other ____ specify _____
2. What language did you negotiate in? _____
3. How long have you known your negotiation partner? ____ months ____ years

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

4. ____ To what extent did you share information about your situation?
5. ____ Overall, to what extent do you feel the other person shared information with you during this negotiation?
6. ____ How much did you trust the other person in this negotiation?
7. ____ How much do you think the other person trusted you?
8. ____ How well do you know your negotiation partner?
9. ____ Did you discuss your reasons for the value (or lack of) of each option for all the issues?
10. ____ To what extent did you share information relating to the relative point value for each option?
11. ____ To what extent did you discuss each issue as part of a complete package deal?

Think about your behaviours and attitudes during the negotiation. To what extent is each of the following statements descriptive of you? Please indicate your responses in the space provided, using the scale given below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ I was competitive.
2. ____ I was cooperative.
3. ____ I was concerned for the other person's outcome only, not my own.
4. ____ I was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ I was concerned for my own outcome only.
6. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcomes regardless of my partner's outcomes.
7. ____ I tried to maximize my own outcome relative to my partner's outcome.
8. ____ I tried to maximize my partner's outcome, regardless of my own outcome.
9. ____ I tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ I was trustworthy.

With regard to the negotiations, to what extent do you think each of the following statements is descriptive of the person with whom you negotiated? Please use this scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To no Extent	To a Very Little Extent	To A Little Extent	Not Sure About The Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent

1. ____ He/she was competitive.
2. ____ He/she was cooperative.
3. ____ He/she was concerned for my outcome only, not his/her own.
4. ____ He/she was concerned for the joint outcome, mine and his/hers.
5. ____ He/she was concerned for his/her own outcome only.
6. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcomes regardless of my outcomes.
7. ____ He/she tried to maximize his/her own outcome relative to my outcome.
8. ____ He/she tried to maximize my outcome, regardless of his/her own outcome.
9. ____ He/she tried to maximize our joint outcome, that is, the sum of my own and my partner's outcome.
10. ____ He/she was trustworthy.

Think about the negotiation exercise you just completed. Please answer the following questions by indicating your response in the space provided.

1. How fair was the agreement to you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair			Fair			Fair

2. How fair was the agreement to the other negotiator?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Fair			Fair			Fair

3. How satisfied are you with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied			Satisfied			Satisfied

4. How satisfied do you think the other player was with the agreement/outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Totally		Somewhat			Not at all	
Satisfied			Satisfied			Satisfied

5. How much control did you have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No			Some			Total
Control				Control		Control

6. How much control did the other player have over the outcome?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No			Some			Total
Control				Control		Control

1. The pursuit of only a singular, substantive goal often tends to support the choice of a competitive strategy.
A) True
B) False

2. What differences can lead parties to assume a particular frame?
A) value differences
B) differences in personality
C) power differences
D) differences in the background and social context of the negotiators
E) all of the above

3. Distributive bargaining strategies and tactics are useful when a negotiator wants to maximize the value obtained in a single deal.
A) True
B) False

4. In integrative negotiation, the goals of the parties are mutually exclusive.
A) True
B) False

5. "Expanding the pie" as a method of generating alternative solutions is a complex process, as it requires much more detailed information about the other party than do other methods.
A) True
B) False

6. Although there is no guarantee that trust will lead to collaboration, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that mistrust inhibits collaboration.
A) True
B) False

7. A joint goal is one in which
A) all parties share the result equally.
B) the parties work toward a common end but benefit differently.
C) individuals with different personal goals agree to combine them in a collective effort.
D) all parties work together to achieve some output that will be shared.
E) All of the above are characteristics of a common goal.

8. A zero-sum situation is a situation in which individuals are so linked together that there is a positive correlation between their goal attainments.
- A) True
 - B) False
9. The four levels of conflict are: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup.
- A) True
 - B) False
10. The words "bargaining" and "negotiation" are
- A) mutually exclusive.
 - B) interchangeable.
 - C) not related.
 - D) interdependent.
 - E) None of the above.
11. Which is not a characteristic of a negotiation or bargaining situation?
- A) conflict between parties
 - B) two or more parties involved
 - C) an established set of rules
 - D) a voluntary process
 - E) None of the above are characteristics of a negotiation.
12. A situation in which solutions exist so that both parties can do well in the negotiation is a _____ situation.
- A) mutual gains
 - B) win-lose
 - C) zero-sum
 - D) win-win
 - E) None of the above.
13. BATNA stands for
- A) best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
 - B) best assignment to a negotiated agreement.
 - C) best alternative to a negative agreement.
 - D) best alternative to a negative assignment.
 - E) BATNA stands for none of the above.

14. In the Dual Concerns Model, the level of concern for the individual's own outcomes and the level of concern for the other's outcomes are referred to as the
- A) cooperativeness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - B) the assertiveness dimension and the competitiveness dimension.
 - C) the competitiveness dimension and the aggressiveness dimension.
 - D) the cooperativeness dimension and the assertiveness dimension.
 - E) None of the above.
15. An individual who pursues his or her own outcome strongly and shows little concern for whether the other party obtains his or her desired outcome is using the _____ strategy.
- A) yielding
 - B) compromising
 - C) contending
 - D) problem solving
 - E) None of the above.