

Decision Making in Humanitarian Intervention

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ABSTRACT

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This research question seeks to explore when the United States will engage in armed humanitarian intervention. To investigate this question the thesis will seek to examine whether the United States humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 was a costly international moral action. This will be achieved by applying Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape's Sainly Logroll Model to President Bush (1989-1993) and President Clinton's (1993-2001) decision making process in the Somalia case study. The purpose of the research question is to conclude if Kaufmann and Pape's Sainly Logroll Model is appropriate for explaining the decision making behind the United States humanitarian intervention policy. The study ends with an analysis of the policy repercussions of the United States experience in Somalia and its influence on the governments' subsequent humanitarian policy towards Rwanda in 1994.

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INTRODUCTION

“...although states have been intervening for the purpose [humanitarian intervention] for the last two centuries, whom they protect and how they intervene to do so have both changed. States now entertain claims from non-white, non-Christian people who previously would not have registers on their consciousness, and, when they intervene they will do so now only with the multilaterally with authorization form an international organization.”¹

Since the end of the Cold War growing numbers of humanitarian disasters have occurred causing massive human suffering and abuses. In response the international community initiated military interventions to protect international human rights norms in order to maintain global peace and security. For some the international community, represented by the United Nations (UN), is not intervening enough. While for others it is intervening too much. These humanitarian interventions challenge traditional sovereignty norms, risk the lives of the intervening soldiers, potentially destabilize the target country further and ultimately threaten the credibility of the international community if the intervention is unsuccessful. The withdrawal of international forces from Somalia in 1993 highlighted the negative consequences of an unsuccessful intervention, raising doubts about the determination of the international community to follow through on its humanitarian rhetoric. Comparatively if the international community does not intervene in a humanitarian disaster it risks becoming a ‘complicit bystander in massacre, ethnic cleaning and even genocide.’² Failures to intervene, as demonstrated by the Rwanda case in 1994 raises further questions about the international community’s actual commitment to upholding universal human rights. At a domestic level humanitarian intervention poses

¹ Finnemore, 2003, p. 7.

² ICISSb, 2001, p. 5.

a difficult policy dilemma for leaders and policymakers. Although humanitarian interventions meant to relieve human suffering are vocally supported by domestic populations, they are also high risk, costly, and devoid of traditional national interests. For any national government the deployment of soldiers overseas in an altruistic foreign policy to protect the citizens of another state is a politically hazardous affair. Yet getting national governments to provide political, financial, military and material to support humanitarian interventions is an essential step towards moving from humanitarian rhetoric to action.

The United States (US) has played a pivotal role in the majority of military interventions in the 1990s and claimed to do so for humanitarian reasons. In December 1992, nearly a year after the humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq and within a month of losing the Presidential election to Bill Clinton, President Bush initiated the humanitarian intervention 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia to create a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The proposition is that if one can understand the decision making process, political motivations and context behind the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia, then one can gain valuable insight into how the US might respond to future humanitarian emergencies.

Within this context this research question seeks to explore when the US would engage in humanitarian intervention. The thesis will take Kaufmann and Pape's Sainly Logroll Model (SLM), based on British anti-slavery policy from 1807 to 1867 and apply it to the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992.³ By applying the model to the case study the aim is to identify and explain the decision making process that led to the humanitarian intervention. The successfully application of the SLM to the Somalia case

³ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 1.

study would suggest that one could with greater probability predict when the US will deploy troops in a future humanitarian intervention.

Kaufmann and Pape's research suggests that traditional international relations theories do not explain why the British government adopted a costly foreign policy such as anti-slavery. So the authors developed the SLM with the intent to explain when a state might undertake a costly and moral policy. Kaufmann and Pape proposed that their model depended on a combination of domestic political conditions and ideals to generate a costly moral policy. In particular the authors argued that two key requirements are necessary for a policy to be considered a costly international moral action (CIMA). The primary requirement is the creation of a broad domestic political coalition to lobby for and maintain a costly international policy. Additionally the political coalition and the general population need to comprehend and be willing to pay the costs involved in an expensive altruistic foreign policy endeavor.

The SLM will first be applied to the US domestic political situation during December 1992 in order to discover the context and motivation behind President Bush's decision to deploy 'Operation Restore Hope.' By applying the SLM the aim is to discover if the President's decision can be considered a CIMA. Next the SLM will be extended beyond the author's original design to look at whether the model can explain the circumstances within which the US abandoned its policy in Somalia. By applying the SLM to President Clinton's decision to withdraw troops and disengage from Somalia in October 1993 the aim is to identify the conditions that were most influential in reversing US foreign policy.

The research question is important because it seeks to explain the decision making process that led to the US's costly humanitarian foreign policy. To be able to identify the precursor conditions and ethical standards necessary to generate a broad political coalition around a humanitarian issue, will generate the possibility of predicting how the US may respond to future humanitarian disasters. If Kaufman and Pape's model can be applied to a modern day case study, then the model may be generalizable to other cases studies, countries and time periods.

The value of using the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia as a case study is twofold. In the post-Cold War period the US's hegemonic position, combined with its military strength, implies that it has the greatest potential to successfully respond to international humanitarian disasters. Additionally Somalia's complex humanitarian emergency of 1992 is noteworthy because it represents only the second humanitarian intervention (after Northern Iraq), by both the US and the UN since the end of the Cold War.⁴ Finally the case study is noteworthy because most literature on military intervention is informed by *realpolitik* notions, where strong states intervene in weak states for geostrategic and economic interests. This contemporary perspective makes the Somalia case even more interesting as members of the US administration opposed the intervention precisely on the grounds that no vital US interest was at stake.

An *armed humanitarian intervention* is defined for the purposes of this thesis as a military action taken by a state or coalition of states to protect civilians other than their own in a foreign country or jurisdiction.⁵ This intervention can occur with or without the

⁴ UNITAF (US) & UNOSOM I & II (UN).

⁵ Finnemore defined humanitarian intervention as the deployment of military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man made violence. Welsh defines it as coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive

sanction of the host government. For example in Iraq in 1991 the intervention on behalf of the Kurds was not sanctioned by Baghdad. Comparatively, in Somalia after the assassination of the President contemporary belief is that the national government no longer existed, therefore no central authority existed to politically respond to the intervention.⁶ Finally a humanitarian intervention does not fall under the definition of peacekeeping, as peacekeeping occurs with the consent of the parties in any given conflict. Specifically, in a humanitarian intervention the intervener faces a hostile environment when trying to respond to a human rights crisis.⁷ A *costly international moral action* as defined by Kaufmann and Pape is one that is not only explicitly justified on moral grounds, but one which also incurs a loss in 'material interest' for the citizens of the acting state. The authors measure the cost of material interest in their model in terms of financial/economic wealth, national security, and loss of life.⁸ A *complex emergency* is described as a combination of an internal conflict with large scale displacement of people, a fragile or failing economic, and no or partially functioning political and social institutions.⁹ The resultant cycles of famine and mass urbanization (from refugees) are exacerbated by war, which in turn contributes to the depth of the complex emergency as epitomized by Somalia in 1992.¹⁰

human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering. Welsh, 2004, p. 3. Other similar definitions are given by: Finnemore, 2003, p. 53; Lowenheim, 2003, p. 24; Haas, 1999, p. 63; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 115.

⁶ Haas argues that Somalia started as a consensual humanitarian operation for the US however once resistance and casualties were encountered it became imposed in nature. Haas is considering the consensual parties to be the warring factions in the civil war. It is debatable whether these entities could be considered to have a popular mandate. Haas, 1999, p. 63.

⁷ An armed intervention entails the introduction or deployment of new or additional combat forces to an area for specific purposes, beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for national interests. Haas, 1999, p. 20 & 62.

⁸ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 633.

⁹ Adelman, 2002, p. 9; Weiss, 2000, p 4.

¹⁰ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p 4.

The finding of this thesis is that Kaufmann and Pape's SLM successfully explained the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992. The SLM effectively explained President Bush's decision making process, by identifying the role played by normative humanitarian ideals and six domestic political conditions which generated a broad political coalition. The case study shows that the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia is a CIMA. This is because the US Executive, Legislator, Pentagon, relief NGOs community and the US public were willing to form a non-reciprocal logroll for the advancement of a moral policy action, where there was no apparent national interest at stake and yet accepting the associated costs. This finding is significant because contemporary thought suggests that states almost never pursue expensive international moral policies. By effectively applying Kaufmann and Pape's model to the US's humanitarian policy the thesis shows that the SLM may be applied to modern day humanitarian case.

The SLM is also successfully extended beyond the authors' original design to show that the model can explain the US's subsequent abandonment of its CIMA policy. By identifying the changes in values of the original six antecedent conditions the case study shows how the integrity of the authors SLM was reversed resulting in the US abandoning its CIMA. The application of the SLM to the US Somalia case study also concludes that the 'domestic moral reform' component of the SLM needs to be modified in order to successfully apply the model to modern day cases of humanitarian intervention. The authors premise that individuals are only motivated to support a costly foreign policy because of their belief that their society is morally corrupt and in need of reform are not substantiated by the Somalia case study. Instead the US Somalia case

study shows that US society was motivated by humanitarian ideals and was willing to pay the costs of their government's policy.

Finally this thesis is not a study of humanitarian intervention law, humanitarian ethics, or an examination of the various forms of military interventions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace making. The thesis will include the following five areas of discussion. The second chapter consists of a literature review of the main international relations theories and how they explain the occurrence of humanitarian interventions. The third chapter presents Kaufmann and Pape's SLM and an arrow diagram of the model. The fourth chapter reviews the state of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s in order to address the changes in the political environment in the post-Cold War, and the normative context of the humanitarian debate. The fifth chapter outlines the components of the research design to establish the framework for the case study investigation. Finally the sixth chapter applies the SLM to the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The chapter will conclude by analyzing the influence that the United States experience in Somalia on the country's subsequent response to the Rwanda humanitarian disaster in 1994.

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

Realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism offer different paradigms and prescriptions in the study of international relations. Each theory has a unique normative foundation, values certain ideas and principles over others, and provides us with very different explanations about what drives humanitarian interventions. In the context of the British anti-slavery case Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape found that these theories of international relations did not sufficiently explain what motivated a state to adopt a humanitarian policy that would have tangible costs for the state in terms of economic wealth, national security and soldiers' lives. To remedy this, the authors developed a model to explain when and why states might pursue a CIMA; they called their model the Sainly Logroll Model. What follows is a discussion of realist, liberal institutionalist and constructivist theories and how they influence humanitarian policies, like the British anti-slavery policy of the nineteenth century and humanitarian intervention policy of the twentieth century.

The following literature review will occur in three chapters. This first chapter will incorporate a theoretical literature review. The theoretical literature review will contain three sections covering realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist theory, and will show how each theory influences humanitarian interventionist policy. The second chapter will diagrammatically detail Kaufmann and Pape's SLM and delineate the components of the model. The third chapter in the literature review will examine the changes in the international political environment and international normative context in humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. The complete literature review is designed to establish a

comprehensive framework within which to undertake the empirical research of the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992.

2.1 Realism

Realism perceives international politics as characterized by conflict and competition, where states struggle against one another in an anarchic system, exemplified by the Hobbesian state of nature.¹¹ This form of anarchy does not necessarily imply lawlessness or chaos; instead it reflects the absence of a formal system of international governance.¹² This international anarchy is seen as the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states.¹³ The supposition is that in such a system there is no central authority that is capable of regulating the international community and therefore states need to provide their own security.¹⁴ Within this environment nation states are the principal actors and they use their own capabilities and resources to achieve their objectives and maintain their security.¹⁵ Kenneth Waltz describes this system as a 'Self-help' system.¹⁶ In this international system where security is not assured, the 'survival motive' is considered by realists to be the singularly most important motivating factor and basis of all state action.¹⁷ Walter Carlsnaes cites Hans Morgenthau's summation of the nature of realism

¹¹ Hobbes coined the term, 'war of all against all.' Teson, 2003, p. 98.

¹² Brown, 2001, p. 4; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001, p. 35.

¹³ Grieco, 1988, p. 488. In such a system the ordering principle is anarchy, which is interpreted as the absence of higher government above states. Nye, 1988, p. 241.

¹⁴ Holsti, 1999, p. 67; Nye, 1988, p. 241.

¹⁵ Under Realism states are taken as the unitary constituent actors of the international system. Waltz, 1989, p. 42.

¹⁶ Waltz, 1978, p. 111; Brown, 2001, p. 46. In a self-help system Waltz posits that states that do not help themselves or who are less effective the others will not prosper and on the contrary open themselves up to danger from other states. Waltz, 1978, p. 118.

¹⁷ The premise of the survival motive is that states seek to ensure their survival first and foremost and then by virtue of their assured existence they can achieve secondary or complementary goals. Waltz, 1978, p. 91-92. Further to this states are sensitive to any erosion in their relative capabilities, which is considered to

when he described it as ‘... the inherent and immutable self-interested nature of human beings, when faced with a structure of international anarchy, results in states maximizing one thing, power.’¹⁸ Carlsnaes argues that by linking this view of power with national interest, Morgenthau sought to provide a universal explanation for the behaviour of states.¹⁹ A state’s primary foreign policy tool within the anarchic international system is military might, and this power is considered to be based predominantly on economic performance. Military power is advocated as the ultimate source and measure of a state’s power and security.²⁰

In the realist system the moral imperative of a state’s political leader is considered to be the survival of the state and the pursuit of its national interest. In tune with this rationale, Jennifer Welsh reiterates the classic realist notion of ‘raison d’etat,’ which is that the proper function of the state and the primary responsibility of the statesman is to protect and further national interest.²¹ The definitive end state of realist theory is that political leaders should only utilize military capabilities when national interests are at stake. Therefore within the realist perspective it is difficult to reconcile a humanitarian intervention in a case where there is no national interest stake.²² Fernando Teson reaffirms the notion that policy actions such as intervention are only justified when they advance the national interest and that all foreign policy actions are rationalized by this standard.

be the basis for their security and independence in an anarchical, self help international context. Grieco, 1988, p. 498.

¹⁸ Carlsnaes, 2002, p. 333.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 333.

²⁰ Morgenthau and Thompson, 1993, p. 90.

²¹ Welsh, 2004, p. 58.

²² DiPrizio, 2002, p. 16-18.

2.2 Realism and Humanitarian Intervention

Many authors conclude that realist theory can only explain the appearance of humanitarianism in the policies of a state as a smoke screen for self-interested national policy.²³ Similarly Kaufmann and Pape argue that realism will only acknowledge a foreign policy action motivated on moral grounds if it serves as political camouflage for a policy driven by self interest. In their case study the other major powers of the time, the US and France interpreted the British anti-slavery policy as aimed not at the moral issue of emancipating the slaves, but instead as a power play to increase British control over the sea trade routes amongst other things.²⁴ The authors cite two specific reasons why realism does not explain the anti-slavery policy. Firstly that realism would not support pursuing a policy action that would result in conflict with a more powerful state. Secondly realism does not support a policy that would inherently diminish the states relative economic wealth.²⁵ Therefore in the realist perspective there is no justification for why Britain undertook its anti-slavery policy action when it caused conflict with the US and France and incurred a tangible cost in applying the policy.

Kaufmann and Pape do propose a scenario when realism can reconcile the anti-slavery policy, it necessitates that the British public and politicians were unaware that the policy was having deleterious economic and security effects. However, Kaufmann and

²³ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 14.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 638.

²⁵ The anti-slavery policy in actuality, lead to both diplomatic and military conflicts with the other major maritime powers of the time including France, the United States, Spain and Brazil. The economic cost of Britain's anti-slavery policy is estimated at 1.8% of national income over sixty years from 1808 to 1867. Ibid., p. 634.

Pape's investigation provides ample evidence to the contrary, showing that Britons were both aware of, and willfully paid for the costs of their government's CIMA.²⁶

In a contemporary example Robert DiPrizio proposes that realist theory can 'neither predict nor recommend US post-Cold War humanitarian interventions' based on the traditional principles of realism.²⁷ DiPrizio argues that the only way realism can reconcile the possibility of humanitarian action, is if the use of force is in the pursuit of humanitarian goals has associated benefits such as the promotion of human rights, regional security and good international relations.²⁸ The author acknowledges that this idea is controversial for realists as it entertains principles outside of the standard realist definition of self preservation and balance of power politics. Similarly, Teson argues that a moderate realist might in some cases contend that maximizing the national interest is a necessary but not sufficient reason to justify a policy action.²⁹ He proposes that there is scope to consider that a moderate realist might justify a CIMA when it is motivated by a combination of national interest and moral principles.³⁰ This combination of motives explanation may explain Britain's motivation to follow a CIMA and may be the rationale behind the US's humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. This interpretation is supported

²⁶ First the abolitionists policy platform publicly acknowledge that costs would be incurred by following the policy. Second a government compensation package was legislated on to reimburse the British slave owners. Third Britons paid the extra sugar duty for 'free labour' sugar and finally, both in the public media and through diplomatic channels the British were made aware of the conflict generated by their anti-slavery policy. Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 639-640.

²⁷ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 17.

²⁸ DiPrizio uses the term of 'milieu goals' in order to describe these associate benefits. Arnold Wolfer first used this term to talk about the benefits of following a humanitarian policy, such as international prestige, credibility, promoting order, and advancing social values and norms, all of which he proposed conditioned social behaviour to the benefit of democracy, market economics and international co operation. See Arnold Wolfer, 1962, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press.

²⁹ Teson, 1998, p. 49.

³⁰ Teson adds that such justification is however dependant on the degree of 'necessity' and 'proportionality' that is applicable to such a use of force. Teson suggests that acts of intervention satisfy the requirement of necessity only if no less intrusive means are available to achieve the same goal. Additionally, that proportionality involves calculating the costs and benefits of an intervention. Teson, 1998, p. 49 & 64.

by The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report of 2001 when it suggests that ‘mixed motives’ were the norm, when it proposed that a combination of national interest and humanitarian motive were behind the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s.³¹

In terms of interests Martha Finnemore argues that the common problem with traditional formulations of national interests is that they are indeterminate.³² By this she means that when evidence from past humanitarian interventions is examined, it indicates that in any given case a very reasonable set of national interests justifying intervention along with another equally plausible set rationalizing a nonintervention policy. Finnemore proposes that if one looked at past patterns of intervention across the international system that one can see that a shift in the formulation of state interests has occurred. Her argument is that realist doctrine has not sufficiently evolved to explain this shift and thus continues to be unable to explain the adoption of costly international moral policy where no overt national interest is at stake.³³ In short the best hope for humanitarian intervention under realist approach remains where there is a ‘... happy coincidence where the promotion of national security also defends human rights.’³⁴

To conclude, realist theory doesn’t provide a compelling answer to why a state would follow a policy of CIMA such as humanitarian intervention, when their material national interests are not at stake. Realist ideology does not re-conceptualize national interest beyond the tenets of maximizing state power and security. Therefore the realist

³¹ ICISS, 2001a, p. 211.

³² Finnemore, 2003, p. 5.

³³ Ibid., p. 5. Finnemore would argue that realist analyses fails to explain where modern day state incentives and interests come from, therefore realism is flawed when it comes to explaining CIMA, Ibid, p. 83.

³⁴ Wheeler, 2000, p. 30. Allan Buchanan similarly reinforces that according to realist theory, the structure of the international system precludes moral action except where it happens to be congruent with state interests. Buchanan, 2003, p. 149.

definition of national interests remains inelastic. Realist doctrine can only explain cases of humanitarian intervention, as a guise for self-interested foreign policy. This point is reiterated by Joseph Nye, when he noted that how states define their interests and how their interests change over time has always been a weak area in realist theory.³⁵

2.3 Liberalism and Liberal Institutionalism

Michael Doyle noted that where realists see a state of competitive war between states, liberals see the possibility of cooperative peace among independent states.³⁶ In framing the difference between realism and liberalism Alexander Wendt suggests that the former placed primacy in the international anarchic system and the latter emphasised the importance of individuals within the domestic political system.³⁷ Within this theoretical framework Doyle notes that the aim of the state and the individual in liberal philosophy goes beyond security to the protection and promotion of individual rights.³⁸ Liberalism is therefore considered a domestic theory that extols the core principles of freedom of the individual, individual rights, private property, and representative government.³⁹ Within this system state interests are considered to be the specific products of competing sub-state actors, and furthermore that all these agents are engaged in the domestic political process in order to achieve their own aims.⁴⁰ The incentive for individuals to act in the domestic setting is materially motivated in the liberal doctrine, and thus the representative state is an aggregation of these self interests expressed at a national level.

³⁵ Nye, 1988, p. 238.

³⁶ Doyle, 1997, p. 206.

³⁷ Wendt, 1999, p. 248.

³⁸ Doyle, 1997, p. 211.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 208.

⁴⁰ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 18.

Subsequently, within the liberal perspective national interests are not determined by the ‘anarchic nature of international relations,’ but instead are the product of the domestic features of the state.⁴¹ While liberalism emphasises the role of domestic factors in shaping national interests, it acknowledges that once these preferences are formed that they are then subject to the exogenous pressures and constraints of the international system.⁴² Liberalism recognizes that neither international nor domestic decision making processes can operate independently, however liberalism ultimately places primacy in the decision making process on domestic factors.

John Locke and Jeremy Bentham are considered to be the founders of liberal institutionalism. Locke proposes that the primary duty of the state is to protect national security and uphold the liberal principles of ‘life, liberty and property,’ for which its citizens elected the government.⁴³ Within this framework liberal institutionalism like liberalism advocates the promotion of democracy, and the protection of human rights as central considerations in a state’s foreign policy formulation.⁴⁴ Liberal institutionalism posits that states should actively promote the development of international institutions in order to assist the state in forwarding its individual policy aims in the interdependent international arena. The hypothesis being that the uncertainty of the anarchic system can be reduced by developing international organizations that allow individual states to overcome international uncertainty and policy constraints.⁴⁵ At the international level Thomas Weiss proposes that trans-national institutions provide a ‘conflict mitigating’

⁴¹ Teson, 1998, p. 65.

⁴² Wendt, 1999, p. 31. In short liberalism emphasis domestic politics, but does so within a structural approach to the international system. Wendt, 1999, p. 249.

⁴³ Doyle, 1997, p. 215.

⁴⁴ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 19.

⁴⁵ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 18. Liberal institutionalists acknowledge the realist contentions that anarchy constrains states ability to act. Liberal Institutionalists argue that this restriction can be mitigated through international institutions and co-operation between states. Grieco, 1988, p. 486.

role, whereby institutionalized decision making procedures generate greater interstate cooperation by increasing transparency in the systems.⁴⁶ These international bodies serve in the capacity of a central authority in the international political arena.⁴⁷ Peter Katzenstein notes the example of the European Union when he suggests there is a particularly ‘dense set of institutions that facilitate problems of coordination.’ The author argues that sophisticated institutions play an important role in the ‘redefinition of interests’ which then help to modify member state behaviour.⁴⁸ Similarly, Weiss argues that liberal institutionalism can mediate successfully between state’s narrowly defined interests to influence the conception of vital interest.⁴⁹

Liberal institutionalism, like realism, identifies the state as the key actor in the international system.⁵⁰ While liberal institutionalism accepts states as the primary actors in the international system, it also advocates the importance of societal actors, and transnational organizations in the political system, such as international government organizations, non governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and international media outlets.⁵¹ All these entities interact at domestic and international levels to influence and generate policy.

Humanitarians argue that international institutions can advance humanitarian ideals by reflecting domestic societal humanitarian values and by codifying these normative principles at the international level.⁵² The hypothesis is that by facilitating and entrenching these new normative principles, institutions can help shape the interests of

⁴⁶ Weiss, 2000, p. 15.

⁴⁷ Finnemore, 2003, p. 72.

⁴⁸ Katzenstein, 1996, p. 518.

⁴⁹ Weiss, 2000, p. 161.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

⁵¹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 18.

⁵² Carlsnaes, 2002, p. 340.

actors at both international and domestic levels and influence their conceptualisation of national interest.⁵³

However the authors argue that liberal institutionalism provides a better explanation than realism to why a state might follow a policy of CIMA. They argue that international institutions embody internationally accepted norms, and can facilitate international cooperation in the implementation and monitoring of these norms. The UN and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one such example of internationally codified norms. Kaufmann and Pape propose that liberal institutionalism is successful in facilitating international cooperation and disseminating universal norms by two means. Firstly because international institutions like the UN increase transparency in the decision making process at the international level, this transparency generates confidence by reducing suspicion among states. Therefore there is less likelihood that a humanitarian intervention may be construed as a deceptive cover for a state's self-interested foreign policy. Secondly the central authority role of international institutions like the UN allows for better monitoring of humanitarian norms and reduces free-riding by states within the international system.⁵⁴

Kaufmann and Pape argue that liberal institutionalism can not fully explain the motivation behind the British anti-slavery policy. In the British anti-slavery case it is evident that the international community did not share Britain's normative stance on the issue. The principal reason for this is that the empirical evidence of the time showed that slavery was generally accepted as a legitimate economic practice and established social

⁵³ Finnemore, 1996b, p. 154.

⁵⁴ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 640.

norm.⁵⁵ Hence global slavery was supported multilaterally and legitimised by international law. In actuality, Britain's pursuit of its anti-slavery policy was in contravention of most commonly accepted international norms espoused by international treaties at the time.⁵⁶ In this anti-slavery case international institutions did not reflect the norms or morals of the British state.

2.4 Liberal Institutionalism and Humanitarian Intervention

DiPrizio proposes that liberal institutionalism with its emphasis on international institutional cooperation and conflict prevention has a lot to contribute to understanding the source of humanitarian interventions.⁵⁷ It is questionable however whether or not international institutions with enshrined moral norms such as the UN can on their own actualize a humanitarian intervention. The UN can facilitate agreement on a resolution but it is limited by its inadequate resources to enforce resolutions. Therefore it depends on the willing participation of member states to endorse resolutions that reflect the institutions Charter mandate. International institutions like the UN rely heavily on their member states and when those member states are divided or ambivalent it is difficult to enforce UN Security Council resolution.⁵⁸ Hence the UN's authority lies not in the generation and application of force, but instead in its role of legitimizing such uses of force to the international community.

⁵⁵ The slave trade was not only accepted as a universal norm, but also regarded at the time as compatible with economic progress. Eltis, 1987, p. 4. Ray suggests that slavery was thought to of an immutable part of human nature. Ray, 1989, p. 439.

⁵⁶ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 640.

⁵⁷ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 18.

⁵⁸ ICISS, 2001a, p. 208.

Furthermore DiPrizio questions whether international institutions such as the UN have any influence on member states. The author contends that prior to 1992 the US resisted pressure from the UN, NGOs, and the global media to intervene in Bosnia and Somalia.⁵⁹ DiPrizio suggests that the formulation of humanitarian interventionist policies in the US during the 1990s was for the most part ‘...worked out at the domestic level on an ad hoc basis and that it [US] made little effort to facilitate a more institutionalised international response.’⁶⁰ In addition Finnemore argues that even after the US did intervene in Somalia in 1992 that the US administration continued to resist policy pressure from the UN.⁶¹ Therefore how much influence international institutions have on states’ intervention policies is indeterminate.

The converse is true for states seeking to influence UN policy. Through liberal institutionalism states seeking legitimacy for interventionist policies, can gain authority through the UN’s Security Council. States purposefully seek to advance and gain legitimacy for their foreign policy by appealing to the UN Charter.⁶² This fact is reiterated by Finnemore when she acknowledges that states proactively look for legitimacy and endorsement from the UN for their use of force.⁶³ Conversely, although the UN Secretary-General sits at the Security Council, the UN is hampered by a lack of means and resources to enforce resolutions, for this reason it is dependent on the Security

⁵⁹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 60.

⁶⁰ DiPrizio suggests that in his Kosovo and Bosnia case studies that US action was not determined by actions or pressures emanating from transnational institutions like the UN or the mass media. DiPrizio, 2002, p. 19.

⁶¹ Finnemore notes that the US administration resisted UN pressure to expand its remit of their humanitarian mission Somalia. Specifically, the US opposed the UN’s wish for the whole country to be pacified and to undertake state building and democratization mandate. Although this is the contemporary perception of the relationship between the UN and US, Clarke and Herbst argue that in reality the US generated most of the UN Security Council resolutions that pertained to nation-building task. Finnemore, 2003, p. 55. Clarke and Herbst, 1997, p. 241.

⁶² Wheeler, 2004, p. 49.

⁶³ Finnemore, 2003, p. 22.

Council to actualize humanitarian interventions. As a result it is doubtful that there is any equity in the degree and effectiveness of policy pressure which resonates between sovereign states and international institutions like the UN.

In summary liberal institutionalism does facilitate international cooperation by increasing confidence through transparency in the decision making process and reducing free-riding in the international system. It can also contribute by legitimating and facilitating cooperation between states to undertake humanitarian interventions. However to be effective, international institutions depend on their member states resources and political backing in order to realize humanitarian interventions. Hence one can conclude that nation states retain the decision making authority over any humanitarian objectives set by the international institutions.⁶⁴ Contemporary thought suggests that these member states continue to be motivated by materially based national interests. Liberal institutionalism may advance normative values on the international stage, codify human rights norms, facilitate cooperation, reduce transaction costs, increase transparency and increase confidence in the international political arena, but these factors do not guarantee that a state or coalition of states will have an interest in championing a humanitarian intervention.

⁶⁴ ICISS, 2001a, p. 208. Wendt proposed that the significance of international institutions and international laws remain inconclusive, especially with regard to the extent they counter a states national interest motivations. Wendt, 1999, p. 2.

2.5 Constructivism

Of the three international relations theories which Kaufmann and Pape researched, they suggest that constructivism holds the greatest explanatory power for explaining CIMA.⁶⁵ Nicholas Onuf contended that constructivism explanatory utility lay in the premise that people live in a world of their own making and not one that is predetermined by systemic non-human forces.⁶⁶ John Ruggie proposes that constructivism is about human consciousness and that interests are a matter of social construction.⁶⁷ Finnemore posits that constructivism is concerned with the influence of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values in political life. She opposes the idea that these things are based solely on calculations of self interest.⁶⁸ John Searle referred to the clearest distinction in constructivist theory by suggesting that ‘...the difference was between ‘brute facts’, where the world which can be considered independent of human action and ‘social facts’ which owe their existence to socially established conventions.’⁶⁹ Wendt extols the preeminent importance of ideas in society, in which he proposes actors and interests are firmly embedded.⁷⁰ Hence constructivism is forwarded as an alternative way of studying international relations that goes beyond the assumption that under all circumstances rational egoists seek to maximize their security.⁷¹

Kaufmann and Pape present constructivism as a superior explanation for the motives and interests behind government policy. They contest that constructivism can

⁶⁵ The Kaufmann and Pape postulated that present constructivist empirical work is incomplete because it can only explain moral efforts that have a low costs and do not offer greater insight into more expensive moral policy projects. Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 632.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁷ Ruggie, 1998, p. 856.

⁶⁸ Finnemore, 1996a, p. 15.

⁶⁹ Brown, 2001, p. 52.

⁷⁰ Wendt, 1999, p. 193.

⁷¹ Brown, 2001, p. 57.

conceptualize 'interest' as a continually evolving variable based on human ideation. Constructivism's ability to redefine national interests can explain why a state might advance a humanitarian policy based on humanitarian ideals.⁷² Welsh reaffirms this notion when he proposes that constructivism offers a better explanation of how national interests are variable and constructed by numerous ideational forces both inside and outside the state.⁷³

Wendt argues that there are two basic tenets to constructivism. First the structures of human associations are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. Second the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.⁷⁴ Hence the core of constructivist theory therefore is centred on the role of ideas and norms. Based on these ideas and norms the possibility exists to generate new state national interests around humanitarian ideals. The comparative utility of the constructivist perspective therefore is that it does not assume that national interests or human actions are predetermined.⁷⁵ Consequently constructivist theory has the flexibility of assigning new interests to both British governments in the nineteenth century and the US administrations in the twentieth century. As a result it is conceivable that the redefinition of state interests might go beyond economic and security imperatives to advocate humanitarian imperatives. However as Wendt points out, international relations theory is not wholly divisible. In terms of the realist perspective

⁷² Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 641.

⁷³ Welsh, 2004, p. 59.

⁷⁴ Wendt, 1999, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Ruggie argues that Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism treat the identity and interests of actors as exogenous and given. Ruggie, 1998, p. 862.

Wendt proposes that although domestic norms and laws govern state politics, self-interest and coercion still persist in international politics.⁷⁶

Constructivism is considered to be influential on two levels, the individual actor and international polity level.⁷⁷ It works at the individual level by socializing actors to new ideas. This socialization causes individuals to internalize new ideals, with the idea that after a certain time a critical mass is reached which then creates a new normative context in society. Finnemore argues that this normative evolution also occurs in parallel at the structural level where international institutions adopt, promote, regulate and enforce new normative standards advanced by states and agents.⁷⁸ The contention is that national interests are redefined by pressure from both below and above, from the agent and also the structural level. This evolution of ideas at both levels is seen as a powerful shaper of human behaviour. The premise being that these factors can both constrain and shape actor's behaviour in the political arena.⁷⁹ Finnemore concedes that the extent to which international institutions and international laws counter individual state policy motivated by national interest is indeterminate.⁸⁰ However Finnemore remains optimistic that it is plausible that humanitarian interventionist policies can be legitimately promoted and based on something other than egotistical self-interest.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Wendt, 1999, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 879.

⁷⁸ Finnemore notes that states are entrenched in international social relations networks, and that these networks shape a state's perception of the world and its role in it. The argument being that a state can be socialised by the international system to behave in a specific way. Finnemore, 1996a, p. 2.

⁷⁹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 19.

⁸⁰ Wendt, 1999, p. 2.

⁸¹ Finnemore argues that humanitarian intervention cannot be understood apart from the changing normative context in which it occurs. Therefore a new normative understanding where all human beings merited military protection, would justify a humanitarian interventionist policy. Finnemore, 1996b, p. 154-155.

Kaufmann and Pape suggest in their research that transnationalism and cosmopolitan schools of thought, interpreted through the constructivist approach can best explain the development of humanitarian ideals in society. They propose that these philosophies are responsible for the adoption of the British anti-slavery policy, and therefore can be the source for realizing CIMA. Cosmopolitan philosophy proposes that the diffusion of principled ideas is consistent with a cosmopolitan moral ethic. This cosmopolitan ethic is defined as ‘... the idea that human beings are of equal inherent worth and that moral obligations of individuals to each other stem from their common membership in the community of mankind, which overrides obligations to narrower communities such as church, class, race, or state.’⁸² Ethan Nadelmann proposes that the benefit of cosmopolitan theory for humanitarianism is that it transcends the states remit over citizens, thereby depoliticizing individuals and advocating the existence of an international society of human beings who share common moral bonds.⁸³ Similarly David Lumsdaine argues that there is a greater sense of worldwide human solidarity and moral responsibility, which has led to a significant revision of the international system based on the recognition of moral obligation.⁸⁴ Finnemore believes that it was European egalitarian social movements in the nineteenth and twentieth century which first spread such universal truths about the nature and equality of human beings. The supposition is that the anti-slavery norm was one of the first such humanitarian norms to emerge in human history.⁸⁵

⁸² Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 641.

⁸³ Nadelmann suggests that there is growing acknowledgement by states that all individuals are entitled to basic protection of life, property and contract. Nadelmann, 1990, p. 483 & 484.

⁸⁴ Lumsdaine was primarily addressing foreign aid which he proposed was a reflection of the ‘moral vision’ of Western countries. Lumsdaine, 1993, p. 290.

⁸⁵ Finnemore went on to argue that such core normative changes to the conception of humanity promoted other such norms and social change in general. Finnemore, 1996b, p. 174.

The second philosophy Kaufmann and Pape applied was transnationalism suggests that moral principles and norms are advocated internationally by transnational agents and that these ideals are spread by 'transnational advocacy networks.'⁸⁶ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink coined the term transnational advocacy networks, and defined it as the '... structured interaction between non state actors, states, and international organizations in the form of networks that share common ideals and therein seek to influence policy.'⁸⁷ Nadelmann in the same vein talked about 'transnational moral entrepreneurs', which he defined as transnational non governmental organizations who sought to mobilize public and political support around issues with the intent to influence national interests of governments.⁸⁸ The primary role of these networks and entrepreneurs is to lobby domestic and foreign publics, and political elites, in order to shape the political agenda to better reflect new values.⁸⁹ The concept of transnationalism is that new ideas will be diffused so widely and effectively, that they become internalised and create a new normative environment. The intent is that these new normative standards are then reflected in government policy.

Both cosmopolitanism and transnationalism provide compelling reasons for explaining the British anti-slavery policy when interpreted through the constructivist approach. Nevertheless, Kaufmann and Pape discounted the theories practical influence on the policy. Instead suggesting that the anti-slavery policy was spawned more by religious imperatives, than cosmopolitan universal norms and that the policies political

⁸⁶ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 641.

⁸⁷ Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 1 & 46.

⁸⁸ Nadelmann suggests that 'The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society' was the first transnational moral entrepreneur to play a significant role in world politics. Nadelmann, 1990, p. 482 & 495.

⁸⁹ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 641; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 2.

momentum was more a reflection of 'luck in coalition formation' than the development of a national moral consensus.⁹⁰

2.6 Constructivism and Humanitarian Intervention

The construction of national interest as variable allows individual and state interests to evolve over time and thus potentially accommodate more selfless policy aims such as humanitarianism. However Kaufmann and Pape propose that although constructivist theory provided greater insight into the evolution of the humanitarian values, it is not a complete explanation. The problem the authors suggest is two-fold. First their case study did not show that a new cosmopolitan universal human rights ethic was adopted by British society in the nineteenth century. Second, the anti-slavery movement was completely home grown and did not exhibit any transnational components, which reinforced their finding that there is no transnational lobby working to abolish slavery.⁹¹ The question that is not reconciled by constructivism is whether or not these ideals of humanity and morality changed the social normative context in 1807 Britain or was it something more materially driven, for example economic factors.

On one side of the debate Keck and Sikkink argue that material factors like economics cannot explain the demise of slavery. Instead they placed the onus on religious and humanitarian factors.⁹² Furthermore James Ray suggests that the disappearance of slavery is proof to imply that '...ethical constraints and moral progress' do have an

⁹⁰ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 643.

⁹¹ Kaufmann and Pape argued that the British abolitionists were driven more by parochial religious and political imperatives than by cosmopolitan or universalistic concerns, and they propose that the Dissenter's succeed in getting their policy agenda executed less by creating a national moral consensus and more because of luck in coalition formation opportunities. Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 643.

⁹² Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 42.

impact on international politics.⁹³ Finnemore proposes that the abolition of the slave trade in the nineteenth century was an essential component in the process of universalizing ‘humanity.’⁹⁴

Comparatively, Nadelmann questions whether it is ever possible to determine if ‘... those who conform to a particular norm do so because they believe the norm is just and should be followed, or because adherence to the norm coincides with their other principal interests.’⁹⁵ In support of this ulterior motive Ray suggests that there are many plausible ‘economistic’ interpretations of the demise of slavery. For example he proposes that slavery ended for two primary reasons. First he suggests that slave owners, through their own volition, realized that slave labour was becoming relatively unprofitable. Second Ray cites an argument by Eric Williams that suggests that while British capitalism depended on production in the West Indies, ‘... that they [Briton] ignored or defended it [slavery],’ in other words the government remained policy neutral on slavery. However once the region was no longer of economic benefit to Britain ‘... they [Briton] destroyed West Indian slavery as a first step in the destruction of the West Indian monopoly.’⁹⁶ Leo D’Anjou argues that slavery as an institution was predominately economically motivated and a component part of the mercantilist economic system.⁹⁷ Nadelmann highlights Adam Smith’s critique of the mercantilist system by noting Smith’s contention that slavery was ultimately a highly inefficient economic system and that its replacement by other forms of labour was a natural progression.⁹⁸ In line with the

⁹³ Ray, 1989, p. 421 & p. 439.

⁹⁴ Finnemore, 1998b, p. 170.

⁹⁵ Nadelmann, 1990, p. 480.

⁹⁶ Ray, 1989, p. 410; D’Anjou, 1996, p. 71.

⁹⁷ D’Anjou, 1996, p. 97.

⁹⁸ Nadelmann, 1990, p. 493; Ray, 1989, p. 409; D’Anjou, 1996, p. 99.

economic imperative David Eltis pointed out that there is a profound incompatibility between British economic self interest and its anti-slavery policy.⁹⁹ Given these perspectives there is a strong argument to suggest that economic factors were the true driving force behind the anti-slavery policy. This inference pre-empts the logic of the constructivist argument that new humanitarian ideals motivated the British policy.

In a more contemporary period DiPrizio proposes that his research into humanitarian interventions in the 1990s did not support a constructivist explanation for interventionist policies. He suggests that although humanitarian concerns motivated decision makers in some of the cases, in general he believes that there is ‘... little direct link between spreading international norms of human rights and U.S. decision making in these cases [Northern Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo].’¹⁰⁰ Similar to Kaufmann and Pape’s findings in the anti-slavery case study, DiPrizio proposes that constructivism can both support and oppose humanitarian intervention policies. For example constructivism can explain why states interests can evolve to include human rights norms, however the theory can not guarantee that individuals or states will comply with that norm. Although centuries apart the anti-slavery and humanitarian intervention case studies are similar in that it is difficult to differentiate between whether the policy was driven by a new normative value system or simply as a response to more self-interested motives, like power politics or economic development. Ultimately the question that has to be reconciled by constructivism in terms of humanitarian intervention is whether or not it is informed by universal humanitarian principles or material interest.

⁹⁹ Eltis, 1987, p. 15.

¹⁰⁰ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 20.

Conclusion

In the end Kaufmann and Pape argue that realism and liberal institutionalism focused too much on states' material interests while failing to offer insight into the motivation and source of policies of CIMA. The impasse for these theoretical explanations is located in their inability to justify incurring tangible loss in the advancement of a policy which does not have interest dividends for the state. Finnemore captures the problem when she suggests that because both realist and liberal theories define state interests in geopolitical and economic terms, they cannot provide an explanation to why a state would accept the costs of a humanitarian intervention policy when its national interests are not at stake.¹⁰¹ The constructivist way around this impasse is to see interests as variable, hence making it possible for national interests to be redefined over time through the evolution of ideas and accepted standards of behaviour. This organic nature of constructivist theory makes it possible for one to redefine states' national interests and therefore explain why humanitarian advocates, the public and politicians are willing to incur high costs to enact an international moral policy. Nevertheless, constructivist theory remains problematic as an explanation, as it does not differentiate between whether the motivating factor behind a policy is driven by a normative principle of humanitarianism or simply as a response to a more self-interested motive, like power politics.

Britain's effort to suppress the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century is important because it is considered by the authors to be the most expensive costly international foreign policy and one of the few cases of CIMA ever pursued. Due to the inability of international relations theories to convincingly explain the British anti-slavery

¹⁰¹ Finnemore, 2003, p. 22; Finnemore, 1996a, p. 143. Past UN Security Council humanitarian resolutions have shown that states are normally hesitant to commit soldiers to situations where no significant national interests are involved. ICISS, 2001, p. 211.

policy Kaufmann and Pape generated their own model. The authors thus formulated the SLM as an alternative model for understanding the role of domestic political conditions in the generation of political coalitions, with the aim of bringing about a costly international moral policy. Kaufmann and Pape postulate that in order to gain greater insight into the motivation behind policies of CIMA, there needs to be greater emphasis on how normative ideals evolve and how domestic political dimensions interact.¹⁰² Today Kaufmann and Pape suggest that unilateral humanitarian military interventions are examples of CIMA. Specifically they propose that when a state adopts a policy of humanitarian intervention with no strategic or economic interest at stake, that policy qualifies as a CIMA.¹⁰³ What follows is a detailed review of Kaufmann and Pape's alternative explanation, the SLM.

¹⁰² Kaufmann and Pape, 1993, p. 664.

¹⁰³ Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 633.

Chapter 3

SAINTLY LOGROLL MODEL

This second part of the literature review will diagrammatically detail Kaufmann and Pape's SLM in order to identify the variables involved. In doing so the arrow diagram will delineate the model six proposed domestic political conditions necessary for a decision making process to lead to political cooperation. When Kaufmann and Pape sought to investigate the question of when states pursue CIMA, they investigated Britain's effort to suppress the Atlantic slave trade from 1807 to 1867. This anti-slavery case study was selected by the authors because they consider it to be the most expensive international moral effort in modern history. One of their research conclusions is that states almost never pursue expensive international moral policies. As examined in the theoretical literature review the authors felt that existing theories of international relations did not sufficiently explain the interest motivating the British anti-slavery policy. In response the authors formulated the SLM as an alternative theoretical explanation to why a state would adopt a CIMA. Even though Kaufmann and Pape's model was constructed around a case study from the nineteenth century, it remains important because it delineates a set of domestic political conditions that can induce political cooperation around an issue such as a CIMA i.e. anti-slavery policy. In order to investigate whether the SLM has such an explanatory power, this part of the review will detail the construction and rationale of the model in order to frame the empirical research in the next chapter. The aim being to see if one can apply the model to the domestic US decision making processes that occurred during the Somalia humanitarian crisis in 1992.

First of all what follows is a summation of the authors definition of CIMA, an interpretation of the SLM in the form of an arrow diagram, and an analysis of the SLM.

Kaufmann and Pape defined CIMA as a policy that advances a moral principle rather than a selfish interest. The authors acknowledge the difficulty separating moral interest from self interest and in response propose that a costly moral action has to be justified on moral grounds, in addition to damaging the material interests of the acting state in terms of wealth, loss of life, or national security.¹⁰⁴ Their definition also requires that citizenry must recognize and acknowledge the real costs of their government's policy.

The SLM title links the union of morally motivated actors called saints, and the activity of political cooperation in the form of logrolling. In the British anti-slavery campaign the saints were right wing evangelical Anglican personalities called Dissenters. These Dissenters champion the anti-slavery campaign for two main reasons. First they believed that domestic political reform was needed to combat domestic political corruption. Second, the Dissenters considered slavery to be immoral and against God's will.¹⁰⁵ In order to reconcile the religious nuances of the Dissenters' motivations with modern day secularism, this thesis will seek to show that the "Saints" in the 1990s were simple actors motivated by a moral distinction between right and wrong.

¹⁰⁴ The economic cost of Britain's anti-slavery policy is estimated at 1.8% of national income over sixty years from 1808 to 1867; the effort to suppress the slave trade lead to an estimated loss of 5000 service men's lives, many suffered by the Royal Navy as it was stationed off the West African Coast; and finally in terms of national security the anti-slavery policy lead to both diplomatic and military conflicts with the other major maritime powers of the time such as France, the United States, Spain and Brazil, Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 635-636; Ray, 1989, p. 411; Nadelmann, 1990, p. 492.


¹⁰⁵ The Protestant Dissenter movement preached that all humans were capable of reason and therein salvation. By virtue of this premise slavery was condemned because slaves were capable of reason and hence salvation. Kaufmann and Pape acknowledge that the Dissenters 'zeal' for action was based on a mixed set of motivations like ending corruption, religious oppression, and autocratic rule, as well as slavery. Without addressing all these society ills it was felt that God would punish everyone on England unless they 'combated these evils.' Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 646; Nadelmann, 1990, p. 497; Ray, 1989, p. 413.

3.1 Kaufmann and Pape's Sainly Logroll Model

Kaufmann and Pape's SLM is constructed using three assigned and three implied antecedent conditions. The first explicit condition reflects the political needs of the ruling elite. Specifically, the more precarious their standing in the domestic political balance of power system the greater their incentive to cooperate. The second condition speaks to the political needs of elites for legitimacy. The supposition is that if political elites are in need of legitimacy, it is possible for them to gain it through association with morally motivated saints. The third condition is the ability of a saintly faction to form a coalition. The viability of this coalition formation depends on the extent to which saints can ally with other political actors from across the political spectrum, in order to gain the critical mass needed to bring about their desired end state. These conditions are illustrated in the Sainly Logroll Model Arrow Diagram, as conditions 3, 4, and 5 (see Diagram 1. p. 34). In order for the model to be logically complete the SLM further necessitates three further implied conditions. The first of these implied conditions is that a moral issue has to exist in order to motivate agents to act i.e. slavery or a humanitarian crisis. The second condition requires that there be a saintly faction in existence in the first place in order to adopt the moral campaign i.e. the Dissenters or humanitarians. The final inferred condition is the political willingness on the part of elites to cooperate in a political coalition. This condition is vital, because CIMA are reliant on the willing participation of political elites in a non reciprocal relationship. These three implied conditions are illustrated by conditions 1, 2, and 3 in Diagram 1. The completed arrow diagram illustrates six conditions that generate the Independent Variable (IV) which is the degree of political coalition in the form of a saintly logroll. The degree of the IV is reflected by

the size of the political coalition that is generated to champion the moral issue. The IV in turn influences the degree of the Dependent Variable (DV) which in the British case was the anti-slavery policy. The degree, scope and mandate of the DV depends on the causal power of the IV. For example a weak political coalition (IV) might only generate a government policy that mandates financial support to a humanitarian crisis, whereas a strong political coalition (IV) might authorize finance, and material resources as well as a troop deployment in support of the government policy.

Diagram 1: SAINTLY LOGROLL MODEL ARROW DIAGRAM



Shaded spheres:
Kaufmann and Pape's
three explicit conditions
that create a saintly
logroll.

White spheres: Three
implied conditions
necessary to complete the
saintly logroll.

Kaufmann and Pape's investigation of the anti-slavery case study deduced that there are two overall components that needed to be satisfied for the creation of a CIMA. The first component was that public and political commitment needed to be generated in order to support the costly foreign policy strategy. To generate this volume of support Kaufmann and Pape propose that citizenry must see a policy as part of a 'domestic moral reform.' The premise is that if individuals believe amongst other things that their society is morally corrupt, they will be more likely to support a costly foreign policy action. Evidence suggests that the Dissenters rationale was that by paying high costs in moralistic foreign policy the domestic ills of the state would be rectified. The authors propose that without the existence of such a domestic moral reform component to generate mass public commitment to a universalistic ethic such as anti-slavery, the adoption of a costly moral policy would have been extremely difficult.¹⁰⁶ This theme of domestic moral reform is problematic because it is contextually bound to nineteenth century Britain and the anti-slavery policy. Therefore it does not easily apply to modern day cases of humanitarian intervention. Consequently in the Somalia case study the existence of a saintly faction will simply be represented by humanitarian advocates who are motivated by humanitarian principles.

The second component addresses the importance of favorable domestic political conditions to establish the context for generating a CIMA. Specifically, Kaufmann and Pape argue that successful political cooperation depends on whether or not the domestic balance of political power disposes mainstream political parties to work with morally motivated advocates. Political cooperation is the key activity on which the successful

¹⁰⁶ Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 632. The theme of this proposed universal ethic is something that Nicholas Wheeler addresses in his book: Nicholas Wheeler (2000), *Saving Strangers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England and New York.

ratification of costly international moral policies depends. The authors note that the degree of political cooperation does not have to lead to an electoral majority, but it does have to be of sufficient momentum and power to garner a national policy of humanitarian intervention. The logroll method is offered by Kaufmann and Pape as the vehicle through which this political cooperation is developed. In essence logrolling is the practice by which groups of representatives cooperate in order to pass each other's policies.¹⁰⁷ Thomas Stratmann posits that the incentive to engage in the exchange of votes in legislatures has existed ever since the advent of political communities.¹⁰⁸ This kind of political cooperation however has always occurred under accepted norms of universality and reciprocity, whereby participants implicitly logroll across issues and party lines in order to guarantee majority support for proposals. Sainly logrolling is differentiated from mainstream political logrolling, because it is a form of political cooperation that does not involve any form of reciprocal support for the political parties that participate.¹⁰⁹ Consequently the essential and core activity on which the SLM depends is the formation of a non-reciprocal political coalition.

To conclude, Kaufmann and Pape constructed the SLM in response to existing international relations theories failure to explain the British anti-slavery case. The authors findings were that there needed to be greater theoretical emphasis placed on ideational factors and how domestic political conditions interacted to generate CIMA.¹¹⁰ The authors suggest that the key to utilizing the SLM is to answer three questions; first how did the moral impulse for action originate, and why were the moral activists prepared to

¹⁰⁷ McCubbin and Sullivan, 1987, p. 133 & p. 416.

¹⁰⁸ Stratmann, 1997, p. 322.

¹⁰⁹ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 632.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 1993, p. 664.

pay the high costs necessary to carry out their program. Second how were political decisions to pursue the international moral policies reached. Third to what extent were the policy decisions influenced by transnational interaction.¹¹¹ These questions will be answered in the conclusion of the empirical research when Kaufmann and Pape's model is applied to the US Somalia case study. The next and final part of the literature review will chart the changes in the international normative context and political environment that influenced humanitarian interventions in the 1990s.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 643.

Chapter 4

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE 1990s

This third and final part of the literature review will establish the political environment and normative context within which humanitarian interventions occurred in the 1990s. This review is intended to establish the political conditions and normative context within which to examine the domestic decision making process in the US that generated its humanitarian policy towards Somalia. The complete literature review will establish the theoretical and contextual framework from which to launch into applying Kaufmann and Pape's model to the US humanitarian case study.

Outlining the changes in the state of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s is important for several reasons. The first reason is because it delineates the changes that occurred in the political context after the end of the Cold War, changes which had ramifications on both the domestic political level and also the international level for the US. The post-Cold War political dynamics had considerable implications for the way states made domestic political decisions about humanitarian interventionist policies. Secondly, a new balance of power within its Security Council led to a renewal of the importance of the UN and an increased political willingness to utilize humanitarian interventionist policies. Specifically, new interpretations of the UN Charter by members of the Security Council legitimized humanitarian interventions in the name of global peace and security. Finally, the reinterpretation of the UN Charter and the apparent greater willingness of states like the US to intervene overseas for humanitarian reasons can be inferred in part, to have originated from greater domestic political support for the

protection of international human rights standards. A normative review of human rights is necessary because of the significant role which humanitarian ideals played in influencing individuals like President Bush, President Clinton and also the greater American public. Domestic political support is significant to the humanitarian debate, because it has been shown to motivated national politicians to forward UN resolutions against those in breach of humanitarian values.¹¹² This normative review will also examine the historic and contemporary role of sovereignty in the humanitarian intervention debate. This analysis is important because within the humanitarian intervention debate the clash is primarily between humanitarian human rights advocates and those wishing to protect traditional sovereign rights. The victor in this policy battle will usually dictate the content of the international community's humanitarian response in any given case. The difficulty of generating policy responses in light of this normative conflict is reflected by the tension in the UN Charter, which is supposed to simultaneously uphold both state sovereignty and protect human rights.

This literature review will establish the political conditions and normative context within which the US decision making process occurred in three main sections. The first section will detail the political changes that occurred after the Cold War in order to set the political environment within which the US found itself in the 1990s. The second section will examine the changes in the normative context in international relations, by looking at the evolution of human rights norms and the principle of sovereignty, as two prominent pillars of humanitarian intervention debate. The final section will look at the UN and how its Charter has been interpreted by the Security Council, of which the US is a prominent member, to justify humanitarian interventions.

¹¹² DiPrizio, 2002, p. 12.

4.1 Political change; the post-Cold War period.

The political changes that occurred after the Cold War influenced not only the balance of power internationally but also the dynamics of domestic politics within states. In the immediate post-Cold War years, states made foreign policy decisions in an environment which lacked the once clear foreign policy reference points of the Cold War.¹¹³ For the US in particular Haass suggests that there is no longer any overarching foreign policy doctrine by which US administrations can take guidance.¹¹⁴ At the same time by the early 1990s intra state conflicts in the Balkans and Africa were resulting in massive humanitarian disasters. Two notable examples of such humanitarian crisis were in Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994. Divergent state foreign policies and delayed UN and international response to these situations illustrated early on how the most significant problem in responding to humanitarian disasters was a lack of coherent policy.¹¹⁵ Specifically, Keren and Sylvan suggest that the problem is that policy formulation tended to mimic the theoretical divisions in international relations theory, and hence in the field of humanitarian intervention there is a significant discrepancy between theory and practice.¹¹⁶

The international humanitarian community which formulates responses is considered to be composed of governmental, institutional, non governmental and individual actors.¹¹⁷ In the 1990s this international humanitarian community responded to

¹¹³ Clinton, 2004, p. 554. Colin Powell noted of the US Foreign policy situation at the time that '... we faced a world so far without a new structure or a new set of rules.' Powell, 1996, p. 587-88.

¹¹⁴ Haas, 1999, p. 2.

¹¹⁵ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 182.

¹¹⁶ See Adelman and Suhrke, '*Early Warning and Conflict Management*.'; Keren and Sylvan, 2002, p. 14; Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 182; ICISS, 2001, p. 5.

¹¹⁷ Weiss acknowledges that the term international humanitarian community does not completely represent the diversity of interests and perspectives held by the various actors. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 2.

an unprecedented number of complex emergencies.¹¹⁸ These complex emergencies occurred where internal conflicts combined with large-scale displacement of people in an environment of failing economic, political and social institutions all contribute to creating unique conditions for a humanitarian disaster. Somalia in 1992 is a classic example of the devastating influence which repeated cycles of famine and war can have on a country.¹¹⁹ As outlined in the Appendix 2: Authorizations for Military Interventions in the 1990s, below, there are nine distinct cases where the Security Council voted on resolutions for humanitarian interventions during the period 1991 to 2000; Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-5), Somalia (1992-3), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (1994), Albania (1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Kosovo (1998-1999), and East Timor (1999).¹²⁰

Reflecting the significant amount of international involvement in intra state conflicts, Lyons and Mastanduno point out that the legitimization process for international interventions has actually become more complicated as the number of states and the disparity between these states in the global community has increased. Furthermore within such an asymmetrical international context interventions necessitated a universal stamp of approval, a stamp which Lyons and Mastanduno argue can only be provided by the UN.¹²¹ This exclusive authority of the UN is considered to be because of its universal recognition as the only organisation that is capable of independently legitimating humanitarian interventions.¹²² The pivotal role of the UN in responding to

¹¹⁸ Adelman highlights that Africa accounts for a disproportionate share of genocides, famines, coup d'états, civil wars, and plagues. He notes that 16 of 35 of the worlds civil wars being waged today [2002] and half the complex emergencies occur on the continent of Africa. Adelman, 2002, p. 9; Mayall, 2004, p. 121.

¹¹⁹ These conditions were predominately evident in African disasters; however other countries like Bosnia and Iraq shared some of the same precipitous conditions. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 4.

¹²⁰ The year in brackets notes the year the UN resolution was past. Roberts, 2004, p. 81.

¹²¹ Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 8.

¹²² Ibid., p. 10.

international humanitarian crises in the early 1990s subsequently led to an unprecedented revitalization of the institution after the Cold War.¹²³

Humanitarian policy before and after the Cold War

Onuf notes how during the Cold War the symmetrically opposed superpowers maintained spheres of influence, which they regulated in part by means of interventionist policies. The superpowers justified these interventions by claims to the ‘common good.’ This Bipolar international situation created a form of Cold War stability, whereby less powerful states abided by the superpowers wishes or risked intervention.¹²⁴ Jack Donnelly postulates that during the Cold War the US and Soviet Union regularly engaged in ‘anti humanitarian intervention,’ and suggests that there are ‘...extraordinarily few instances of humanitarian intervention in the past century,’ by either superpower.¹²⁵ This Cold War stability changed in 1989 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ It was in this new international context, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of US hegemony, that humanitarian intervention became a prominent issue for both the UN and US.¹²⁷ Finnemore argues that the only legitimate form of intervention in the post-Cold War world is by multiple states acting under an international mandate from the UN to enforce a universal normative standard of human protection. For some humanitarians this political change offered the potential for a new domestic and international policy precedence whereby humanitarian issues would be a central concern for states.¹²⁸

¹²³ Onuf, 1995, p. 53.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

¹²⁵ Donnelly, 1995, p. 118.

¹²⁶ Onuf, 1995, p. 51.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 53.

¹²⁸ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 23.

Since 1989 the international community has increasingly had to deal with domestic and international pressure to intervene militarily to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian abuses.¹²⁹ Finnemore proposes that the primary question related to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s is ‘what interests intervening states could possibly be pursuing.’ She notes that humanitarianism has been used by states throughout history to justify overseas intervention. However in the 1990s it is argued that more evolved human rights values have been adopted by civil society and that this has created a new domestic political interest in most states. This new normative standard has in turn prompted politicians and states to seek UN sanction for multilateral armed interventionist policy to protect human rights.¹³⁰ Finnemore argues that evolving humanitarian norms have shaped new patterns of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. In particular she argues that three things have changed. The first is the conceptualization of who is human. Second the method by which states intervene has changed, and third the military goals, have changed the definition of a successful intervention.¹³¹ The redefinition of humanity and the methodology behind generating an interventionist policy will be address in section 4.2. The third change in military goals during interventions will be addressed in the US case study during the empirical research in chapter six.

In conclusion, the abrupt end to Cold War stability in 1989 forced the international community to confront a new set of international relations dynamics and foreign policy problems. The Cold War had for a great part focused domestic attention and simplified US foreign policy and the process by which it was formulated. James Scott points out that with the end of the Cold War the number of reliable and recognized

¹²⁹ Finnemore, 2003, p. 52.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

foreign policy reference points that once guided US domestic policy formulation were eliminated from the international landscape.¹³² Tony Lake, the former foreign policy advisor to President Clinton also reminisced about the simplicity of the Cold War period, when he said ‘Sometimes I really miss the Cold War,’ referring to the new foreign policy dilemmas that confronted the Clinton administration in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.¹³³ Nevertheless the 1990s marked a decade where US military interventions were to become more common and more complicated as the decade progressed.¹³⁴

These changes in the international political context are important because they influenced the domestic policy dynamics of individual states like the US and in so doing altered the context within which domestic decision making occurred. Specifically with the end of military competition and the ideological battle between the superpowers, US public and political attention turned to domestic issues. The domestic US focus was on taking advantage of the peace dividend promised by the end of the Cold War. This new focus on domestic issues in the US was summed up by the renowned 1992 Clinton Presidential campaign slogan ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ Contrary to the presumed isolationist trend in the 1990s, as the decade continued consecutive US administrations were pressured both by domestic public opinion and international agencies, to take the lead and address international humanitarian crisis in far off places such as Somalia. One reason for the increase in public pressure for humanitarian action can be explained by the evolution of human rights standards and their normative adoption by individuals, states, and international institutions like the UN.¹³⁵

¹³² Scott, 1998, p. 5.

¹³³ Clinton, 2004, p. 554.

¹³⁴ Haas, 1999, p. 2; Shattuck, 2003, p. 5.

¹³⁵ See public opinion poll data Appendix 7: PIPA Poll – Humanitarian Intervention in Africa.

4.2 Normative Change; evolving human rights versus sovereignty norm

This review will examine how and why human rights and sovereignty as normative standards have come into conflict during the formulation of humanitarian interventions. The examination of the evolution of human rights is necessary because it will show how humanitarian values, as reflected in the early British anti-slavery policy of the nineteenth century, have evolved over time to be codified in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and gained popular domestic political support. A subsequent review of sovereignty's historical role as the basis of the international community will delineate its normative position of the humanitarian intervention debate.

This section will be addressed in three stages. The first stage will track the evolution of human rights, and its influence on domestic and international policy formulations. The second stage will look at the historical role of the sovereignty norm and its present standing in international relations. The final stage will address the relationship between the protection of human rights norm and state sovereignty norm. The aim is to examine whether a normative shift in importance towards human rights norms against the traditional significance of the sovereignty norm in international relations has occurred.

Human rights

Many humanitarian advocates propose that human rights norms have been the key to garnering domestic political support for humanitarian policies and motivating governments to seek interventionist policies under UN auspices. The nine UN resolutions of the 1990s would indicate that there is a greater willingness on the part of states to seek UN approval for humanitarian interventionist policies. The supposition is that there is has

been an increase in popular domestic political support for human rights which has motivated politicians to act. The human rights review will first cover a brief historical outline of its normative evolution. Second it will discuss how the interpretation and application of human rights have changed from the Cold War to the 1990s and finally how the rise in the normative value of human rights has clashed with sovereignty's traditional primacy. The aim is to show how domestic political support for the protection of human rights as a normative standard of behaviour, has motivated national humanitarian policies and emboldened politicians to forward resolutions at the UN, against those in breach of these values.¹³⁶

Historically the spread of humanitarianism and human rights, as reflected by the demise of slavery, is believed to have been first codified and institutionalized in the West during the late nineteenth century.¹³⁷ Finnemore argues that the increased adoption of human rights standards by both domestic and international society in the twentieth century resulted in the normative acceptance that all humans were worthy of protection, just as much as those populations in the West. She posits that the descriptive expansion and application of the term 'humanity' subsequently influenced international interventionist policy formulation. This evolution and adoption of human rights standards is evidenced the codification of human rights in international institutions like the League of Nations and the UN.

In 1948 the UN formally adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which promoted the legitimacy of the rights of individuals.¹³⁸ However, it should be noted that the declaration had no enforcement or monitoring mechanism as it did not have

¹³⁶ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 12.

¹³⁷ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 17.

¹³⁸ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 25; Roberts, 2004, p. 75.

the status of a formal treaty.¹³⁹ During the Cold War years Lyons and Mastanduno point out, that in practice human rights were continually violated by governments, despite their international obligations to abide by treaties, not least of all the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁴⁰ Specifically, James Mayall notes that the strategic imperatives of the superpowers during the Cold War was often pushed considerations of human rights ‘... into the shadows.’¹⁴¹ This hypocritical behaviour by states in the international system during the Cold War period continued in the 1990s to generate suspicion over interventionist policy in the international community. This divisiveness predominantly occurred between the Security Council’s permanent five members and developing or non-aligned members of the General Assembly.¹⁴² Suffice to say most developing countries continue to interpret interventionist policy in the name of human rights as ultimately a guise for self-interested foreign policy by the dominant members of the Security Council.

As evidenced by the seven humanitarian interventions in the defence of human rights in the 1990s, human rights norms constitute an important pillar in the international community’s decision making process. The watershed case for humanitarian intervention for the protection of human rights is considered to be the 1991 Security Council instituted ‘Operation Provide Comfort,’ in Northern Iraq.¹⁴³ DiPrizio suggests that this intervention to protect the Kurds established the policy precedent that sparked the post-Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention. A debate where many international actors

¹³⁹ Krasner, 1999, p. 31.

¹⁴⁰ Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 5.

¹⁴¹ Mayall, 2004, p. 127.

¹⁴² Weiss and Collins argue that this distrust is apparent today by the lack of consensus in the international forum when policies of intervention based on the advocacy of human rights are tabled in the UN. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 22.

¹⁴³ Roberts, 2004, p. 81.

believed a 'new world order,' was conceived in which humanitarian issues would be a central concern for domestic governments and the UN alike.¹⁴⁴ This optimism seemed to be even more justified when just a year later in 1992, when UN resolution 794 explicitly used the word 'humanitarian' eighteen times in its authorization of a US led humanitarian intervention in Somalia.¹⁴⁵ This optimism however is mitigated by the realist perspective which interprets such advances in human rights norms as 'merely a manifestation of the preferences of the powerful.'¹⁴⁶

In general one can conclude that in twentieth century there has been greater emphasis on human rights and the humanitarian dimension of international relations overall. This is evidenced by the Security Council greater willingness to interpret humanitarian abuses and crises as threats to international peace and security, and therefore justified international military action in response. By voting on such humanitarian intervention the Security Council placed the competing interests of human rights protection against those of the targeted state's sovereign right of non interference. Thus the new humanitarian optimism of the 1990s still needed to be reconciled with the founding principle of the international system - the norm of sovereignty.

Sovereignty

Some observers like Finnemore suggest that there has been a shift in the importance of sovereignty and its role in the international community, not least because of the challenge of new human rights norms. Other observers like Weiss and Chopra who have done work in this area suggest that sovereignty remains an important part of the

¹⁴⁴ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 23.

¹⁴⁵ Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 207; ICISS, 2001, p. 10.

¹⁴⁶ Krasner, 1999, p. 3.

'lexicon of international relations.'¹⁴⁷ This review of the sovereignty norm will first comprise a brief historical review. Second it will address the contemporary importance of sovereignty in international relations. Finally, it will outline the current debate between the historical principle of sovereignty and the present need for interventionist policy to curb humanitarian disasters.

Historically state sovereignty has been the cornerstone of interstate relations and thus international order.¹⁴⁸ The substance of sovereignty is considered to be tied very closely to the principle of non-intervention in the international system.¹⁴⁹ The origin of sovereignty as a founding principle of the international community can be dated back to the Thirty Years' War in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. The Westphalian settlement rested on the principle of the sovereign autonomy of each state and the equality of all states in the international system.¹⁵⁰ Later in 1933 the Montevideo Convention codified the criterion by which a country could gain formally recognized sovereign statehood in the international system.¹⁵¹ This convention delineated the normative principle of a state's sovereign autonomy and enshrined the principle of non-intervention in the international system.¹⁵² The post-1945 international system as represented by the UN and its Charter were both based on these early paradigms. As Robert Jackson points out even

¹⁴⁷ Weiss and Chopra, 1995, p. 100.

¹⁴⁸ ICISS, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Onuf, 1971, p. 224.

¹⁵⁰ The settlement of Westphalia was designed to find a way where independent states could enjoy sovereignty over their populations and territory while still perusing their national interest in the international system without negatively affecting that system by producing renewed conflict. Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 5 & p. 9; Krasner, 1995, p. 234.

¹⁵¹ The first prerequisite was that the state had a defined territory. The second was that it had a population, which occupied that territory, and thirdly it had an effective government, which could credibly enforce authority over its land and population. Adelman, 2002, p. 5; ICISS, 2001, p. 6.

¹⁵² Adelman notes that even in 1933 that the international system was mindful enough to add a qualifier to the convention, which was that a state was entitled to its sovereign autonomy only as long as it abided by the rules of the international system. This caveat then provided justification for international interventions in cases where global peace and security, were perceived as being threaten. Adelman, 2002, p. 6; Weiss and Chopra, 1995, p. 97.

today membership of the international community as represented by the UN continues to be based on ‘... membership through sovereign state succession.’¹⁵³ Therefore, abiding by the realist and liberal institutional perspective of international relations the international system continues to be ‘state centric.’¹⁵⁴

Many authors within the interventionist debate argue that the institution of the sovereign state continues to be a critical pillar on which the international system works.¹⁵⁵ Similarly, Onuf reaffirms the historical notion that the sovereignty of nation states remains the constitutive corner stone of the modern world and that this sovereignty implies freedom from interference from other actors.¹⁵⁶ However, even though Onuf is an advocate of sovereignty’s primacy in the international system, he did hypothesize that by 1989 sovereignty’s conceptual stability would be challenged in the post-Cold War order.¹⁵⁷

On a more cautious note authors like Katzenstein questions the centrality of the institution of sovereignty today and ask whether it continues to be a defining characteristic of the international system.¹⁵⁸ The former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali publicly remarked in 1992 that, “The time of absolute Sovereignty... has passed: its theory was never matched by reality.”¹⁵⁹ The literature on sovereignty in the 1990s summarizes three general areas of limitation to the ideal of sovereignty, which taken together serves to raise plausible doubts about sovereignty’s continued primacy in

¹⁵³ Jackson, 1995, p. 69.

¹⁵⁴ As per the Westphalian ideal these nation states have exclusive jurisdiction over the land and peoples within its territory. Adelman, 2002, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵ Shue acknowledges that while the autonomy and power of states is at the national level that the rules that constitute those same states remains located at the international level. Shue, 2004, p. 20.

¹⁵⁶ Onuf, 1995, p. 43.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁵⁸ Katzenstein, 1996, p. 516.

¹⁵⁹ Empirically the argument is that sovereignty has been routinely violated by the more powerful states in the international community since its inception. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, in ICISS, 2001, p. 5.

the international system. First, according to the application of Chapter VII, sovereignty is not a barrier to action taken by the Security Council when it is responding to ‘... a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.’ Therefore, both in theory and practice state sovereignty has yielded to the global demand for international peace and security, as interpreted by the Security Council.¹⁶⁰ Second, international treaties and other such agreements, require states to abide by certain behavioural standards. For example by signing the UN Charter member states are obliged to abide by common standards in economic, social, cultural and humanitarian policy. Furthermore, by virtue of their participation these countries authorize the UN to intervene in the regulation of domestic policy areas, which would once have been considered solely the jurisdiction of the national government. Finally, it is commonly believed that traditional sovereignty is being eroded by the trend towards globalization, whereby economic, cultural, and environmental issues have taken on a transnational component.¹⁶¹ Although this last point is highly contentious, there is ample evidence to show that the first two limitations to modern day sovereignty are quite valid.

The contemporary debate between the historical principle of sovereignty and the present need for interventionist policy to curb humanitarian disasters was internationally addressed by the present UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1991, when he proposed that there were ‘two concepts of sovereignty,’ in the modern world. The first concept is oriented towards the primacy of states and the second towards the primacy of people;

¹⁶⁰ ICISS, 2001, p. 7.

¹⁶¹ Furthermore Adelman proposes that the exogenous forces created by globalization are undermining the strength and autonomy of the nation state. Adelman, 2002, p. 7; ICISS, 2001, p. 8.

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.¹⁶²

The Secretary-General is not discounting the importance of the principle of sovereignty to the mechanics of the international system. Instead he is advocating a more humane perspective of sovereignty, one where ‘people’s sovereignty’ takes primacy over a ‘sovereign’s sovereignty’. These sentiments generated the current debate based on an approach called ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’¹⁶³ This theory reconciles sovereignty with intervention by acknowledging that it is a state’s responsibility first and foremost to protect its citizens. However, the theory suggests that should a state fail to exercise this responsibility, that the principle of non-intervention yields to the international community’s responsibility to protect those citizens.¹⁶⁴

To summarize the international community still continues to be fundamentally based on a community of sovereign states and thus the principle of sovereignty remains the constitutive bedrock of the international relations.¹⁶⁵ In addition, as Donnelly posits most of the fundamental norms, rules, and practices of international system continue to rest on the premise of state sovereignty.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, Lyons and Mastanduno argue that what has shifted is the international community’s authority and political will to a

¹⁶² Annan, 1999, in ICISS, 2001, p. 11.

¹⁶³ The approach was first coined by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng. ICISS, 2001, p. 11; Wheeler, 2004, p. 37.

¹⁶⁴ Wheeler, 2004, p. 37; ICISS, 2001, p. 11.

¹⁶⁵ Jackson argues that it is a myth that the predominance of the sovereignty system is under siege in the post-Cold War period. Jackson, 1995, p. 62.

¹⁶⁶ Donnelly, 1995, p. 118.

point where the international community is more likely than ever before to overrule individual state sovereignty. The authors suggest that this is exemplified by the unprecedented increase in international interventions throughout the 1990s which have consistently contravened the sovereign rights of targeted state.¹⁶⁷ However Katzenstein, Lyons and Mastanduno conclude that it is premature to suggest that the international system is moving beyond the constitutive sovereignty of the nation state.¹⁶⁸ Thus many authors agree with Howard Adelman when he suggests that state sovereignty remains the most important constituent of the international system, and presently that ‘... there is no other real game in town.’¹⁶⁹

Human rights versus sovereignty norm

What is apparent from the literature review is that human rights have evolved to play an important part in domestic and international politics, but equally that sovereignty remains a recognized cornerstone and defining principle of the international community. However it is still important to identify which normative value takes precedence in the humanitarian intervention debate, as it influences the form of policy response which the international community takes to humanitarian disasters. In answering this question Jackson proposes that the historical international relations status quo persists, whereby traditional sovereignty and non-intervention norms dominate international affairs. Furthermore he goes on to suggest that it is ‘unpromising’ that a humanitarian norm will ever override the current normative status quo.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 265.

¹⁶⁸ Katzenstein, 1996, p. 507; Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 265.

¹⁶⁹ Adelman, 2002, p. 11.

¹⁷⁰ Jackson argues that sovereignty and non-intervention continue to be the dominant international norms, hence he suggests that the onus is on advocates of interventionism to justify their position. Jackson, 1995, p. 80.

Opposed to Jackson, Finnemore supports the idea of a normative shift between human rights and sovereignty in the post-Cold War period. She concedes that historically international humanitarian policies have been bound to sovereign and human rights norms and that these norms are essential parts of a ‘... highly structured social context.’¹⁷¹ Furthermore she claims that since 1989 humanitarian claims have more often ‘trumped’ those of sovereignty claims in the decision making process of both by individual states like the US and the UN in terms of humanitarian intervention.¹⁷² It is commonly argued that a shift in the relative importance between the universal human rights and sovereignty norm is evidenced by the increased number of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. Interventions Finnemore argues prioritized the protection of human rights and over the target states sovereign protests. It is commonly conceived that international interventions have been motivated and supported because individual politicians, governments, and the international community all identify human rights abusers as threats to international peace and security.¹⁷³ Weiss and Collins propose that a new normative standard of human rights has become rooted in ‘...the psyche of international society,’ and that this new universalized normative standard has guided states in their contemporary state-to-state and state to society relations.¹⁷⁴

In comparison Wheeler, although agreeing that a normative shift has occurred, is more cautious about the extensity and intensity of such a shift in the normative structure of international society. Wheeler proposes that the prevailing international normative context is dependent upon the distribution of power in the international arena. In tune

¹⁷¹ Finnemore, 2003c, p. 56.

¹⁷² Finnemore, 2003, p. 79.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁷⁴ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 7.

with realist doctrine he argues that a change in the balance of international power will lead to a normative shift, as long as it reflects the norms and values of the dominant players. His hypothesis is that the most prominent international actor(s) will most successfully promote their ideology in the international community. Wheeler cites the evidence of the Security Council's greater willingness to apply Chapter VII resolutions to intervene to protect humanitarian rights in the 1990s, as an example of this new normative context.¹⁷⁵ Certainly it is apparent that with the demise of the Soviet Union the balance of power and ideological outlook in the Security Council swung towards the Western members of the Council, predominately the US, Britain and France. These states have similarly view internal state conflicts and human rights abuses as threats to wider international stability and therefore have cooperated multilaterally to address such issues.

In one instance Krasner acknowledges the argument that sovereignty is being eroded by globalization and evolving human rights. However he still suggests that the traditional Westphalian system persists today. Krasner reconciles this perspective by suggesting that sovereignty is actually a form of 'organized hypocrisy' whereby state leaders only abide by sovereignty's normative rule when it is in their interests to do so.¹⁷⁶ The argument is that leaders should and do (at times) abide by Westphalian sovereignty norms such as recognizing the autonomy of other states and not intervening because it is logically 'appropriate' to do so. However Krasner adds that this logic has to be balanced against the potential 'consequences' in a particular situation.¹⁷⁷ For example if a ruler wants to choose a course of action that does not abide by traditional sovereignty norms,

¹⁷⁵ Wheeler, 2004, p. 31; Wolfrum, 2002, p. 98.

¹⁷⁶ Opposed to the contemporary realist perspective Krasner suggests that it is rulers not states that are the primary actors in the international system. Krasner, 1999, p. 5.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1999, p. 5.

but produces other dividends that he finds more important, then the ruler may by Krasner logic of consequences disregard the appropriate act of abiding by an agreed international convention and instead maximise his interests by intervening. This rationality is based on the realist perspective that a ruler makes decisions in line with his own self interest. Furthermore that the ruler's desire to stay in power means that he will also make decisions that reflect the values of the citizens, such as human rights, thereby maintaining popular domestic political support for his regime.¹⁷⁸

To summarize, throughout the literature on humanitarian intervention advocates and critics both agree that interventionism violates the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. Hence, the debate is mostly centred on the deliberation over which norm has greater prominence in the policy response by the international community, i.e. which is valued more, upholding sovereignty norms or human rights standards. Nadler frames this conundrum between defending human rights and respecting sovereign rights quite succinctly by stating that '... metaphorically, these two values represent the compass that guides social action, and when they are in conflict, the social compass points at two opposite directions simultaneously.'¹⁷⁹ The author notes that in instances of humanitarian disaster where human rights and sovereign norms come into conflict, there are only two possible outcomes. First that intervention occurs at the cost of violating state sovereignty. Second, that the normative rule of sovereignty is respected at the cost of violating the norm of social responsibility to other human beings or lastly that the target state is

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 1999, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹ Nadler acknowledges the political reality that to ignore the importance of sovereignty in individual state governance and the international community is to '... invite frequent meddling in the other's affairs and constant strife and conflict are likely to follow.' However, the author mitigates this assertion with a more moralistic tone by proposing that '... sensitivity to the fate of those in need wherever they are is a foundation of human morality.' Nadler, 2002, p. 39.

induced to alter its behaviour without the need for intervention.¹⁸⁰ Overall, on first investigation it appears that human rights norms have evolved in importance in the international political arena, however it is also evident that sovereignty has retained its traditional dominance even in the face of this development.

In summary it is apparent that the Security Council's increased willingness to apply Chapter VII resolutions, has led to an increase in humanitarian interventions. These interventions are contravening traditional sovereign rights of the targeted states to non-autonomy and interference. Even though the nine UN resolutions of the 1990s would indicate that there is currently a greater propensity for international humanitarian will to override individual state sovereignty, it remains a conspicuously contentious debate. Many states remain suspicious of Western motives for intervention and adamantly oppose the Security Council's interpretation of the UN Charter and its application of Chapter VII resolutions in support of interventionist policies. For some countries humanitarian intervention policies, even for protection of human rights, are viewed as aggressive acts against individual state autonomy.¹⁸¹ Consequently although there is greater acceptance of human rights ideals, the principle of sovereignty remains a critical component of the international debate over whether or not to intervene in a state for humanitarian reasons.

4.3 International Institutional Change: the United Nations

Two prominent changes occurred after 1989 in the international community. The first was a revitalization of the UN, and the second was a greater willingness on the part of the

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁸¹ Weiss and Chopra, 1995, p. 88.

Security Council to legitimize humanitarian interventions. This renewal of the UN capacities was motivated by the wishes of its member states to channel their foreign policy efforts to resolve humanitarian crises at the international level. This section on international institutional change will be addressed in three stages. The first stage will outline a brief history of the UN. The second stage will look at the UN Charter and how its Articles are interpreted to substantiate humanitarian interventions. Finally, the last stage will look at the Security Council as the decision making forum within which states have demonstrated a greater willingness to vote on humanitarian intervention resolutions.

The United Nations

It is generally considered that the end of World War II was the catalyst which advanced of global humanitarian ideals, including the codification of humanitarian international law with the creation of the UN.¹⁸² In the 1990s the majority of international interventions were organized around the institution of the UN, and legitimized by the normative framework provided by its Charter.¹⁸³ Sir Roberts proposes that the responsibility to address humanitarian disasters and formulate subsequent responses is unavoidable for the UN. He argues that the UN has charged, by virtue of its Charter, to having a greater responsibility to uphold human rights and regulating the use of force in the international community.¹⁸⁴ In tune with this responsibility Adelman suggests that many actors both inside and outside the UN have envisaged the institution's role as going beyond creating a legal global authority in the international system. These actors see the UN's international role as being one of a moral leader, with the responsibility to impart

¹⁸² Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 21.

¹⁸³ Finnemore, 2003, p. 78.

¹⁸⁴ Roberts, 2004, p. 96.

and uphold universalized moral values.¹⁸⁵ This notion is reflected by the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he proposed that ‘... it is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world’s nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing to the work of this [UN] organization.’¹⁸⁶

With the end of the Cold War and the superpower stalemate, the UN is generally considered to have undergone resurgence in its role in the international community. In particular, two notable decisions were taken by the UN that illustrated its renewed position in international relations. The first was its move in 1991 to legitimate the use of force against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The second was its resolutions on Bosnia and Somalia, in response to the first complex humanitarian emergencies of the early 1990s.¹⁸⁷ The role that the UN played in sanctioning the war in Iraq in 1991 and responding to these early cases of humanitarian disaster are held to have marked a watershed in the forty-five year existence of the UN and the interpretation of its Charter.¹⁸⁸

The creation of the UN and its Charter in 1945 was seen to reflect the international community’s will to create and stabilise the peaceful interaction between states, a political will that Jackson suggests represents ‘... the classical Westphalian

¹⁸⁵ Nadelmann also talks about transnational moral entrepreneurs; although he defined them as transnational NGOs who sought to generate political and public support for morally related issues. Nadelmann, 1990, p. 482.

¹⁸⁶ Adelman, 2002, p. 10. Wolfrum suggests that it is understood internationally that a component function of the UN is to preserve international peace by upholding these standards. Specifically Article 39 of the Charter speaks to cases where there is a threat to peace, a breach of peace or act of aggression. Wolfrum, 2002, p. 98

¹⁸⁷ Onuf, 1995, p. 53. In both cases the UN eventually authorized an armed interventionist policy on humanitarian grounds activating UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II in Bosnia and Somalia respectively. ICISS, 2001, p. 48.

¹⁸⁸ Roberts, 2004, p. 81.

morality of international relations.¹⁸⁹ However, one of the criticisms of the UN's Charter is that its lack of specificity has and continues to lead to widely different interpretations of the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.

The UN Charter

When the UN Security Council passes resolutions it cites the UN Charter to justify its decision, however these resolutions necessitate member states participation and political will to execute the resolution. Therefore the initiative remains with the member states of the UN. In the realist perspective a state like the US decides on its course of action and then refers to the UN Charter in order to legitimize its decision to the international community. In the constructivist perspective the UN Charter provides the normative foundation for a state to interpret its interests and justify its decision, yet the decision still occurs at the national level. In both cases a state makes its policy decision first and then cites the UN Charter to justify its decision. The same is true for those states that do not support interventionist policies, they only appeal to the UN Charter after they decide what their interests are in the international interventionist debate. Nevertheless the UN Charter is a key document which establishes a normative reference point for international behaviour and additionally sanctions international action against a state which abuses the human rights of its citizens.

Sir Roberts suggests that the UN Charter is essentially a non-interventionist document. He notes with Jackson, that the Charter was created to limit the rights of states to use force internationally, with exceptions occurring only in cases of self-defence, collective defence, or to assist UN authorized operations. However although the UN Charter does not deal with humanitarian intervention, Sir Roberts contends that it does

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 62.

contain a number of components ‘... which are germane to humanitarian intervention.’¹⁹⁰ In particularly the justification for humanitarian intervention can be found in two parts of the Charter. The first is based on the reference to the sanctity of fundamental human rights as laid out in the Preamble to the Charter. The second is in article 39 which empowers the Security Council to authorize military action against states that it deems as a ‘...threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’¹⁹¹

The most often cited source in support of non-interventionism is the Charter’s article 2 (4). It was formulated to prevent states from using force against the territorial integrity or autonomy of another state. Reinforcing article 2 (4), article 2 (7) prevents the UN and other states from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of another state.¹⁹² However Sir Roberts points out that within article 2 (7) there is a caveat, that any interpretation of article 2 (7) shall not prejudice or limit the application of enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII by the Security Council.¹⁹³ Thus in essence any rights embodied in Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) are susceptible to being legitimately overruled by Chapter VII decisions. Given the overriding authority of Chapter VII decisions and the varying interpretations of the Charters articles, Sir Roberts suggests that the Charter is ambiguous enough to leave scope for justifying humanitarian intervention as a threat to international peace and security.

This conflict in interpretation between articles in the UN Charter is complicated further as the UN Charter tries to simultaneously uphold human rights and protect

¹⁹⁰ Roberts, 2004, p. 72.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁹² Article 2 (7) provides that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” ICISS, 2001, p. 7.

¹⁹³ Roberts, 2004, p. 73.

sovereign rights at the same time. In the UN the reality is that different states appeal to different interpretations of the UN Charter in order to support their particular interests in any given case and their policy course of action. Subsequently whichever perspective triumphs in the Security Council, will directly influence the nature of the UN resolution i.e. intervention to protect human rights or non-intervention in respect the targeted states sovereign rights.¹⁹⁴ The contention is that different interpretations of the same Charter can support dissimilar policy responses with regard to the same case. However as past humanitarian intervention have shown where there has been a clash between human rights and sovereignty, frequently the Security Council has chosen to intervene to protection of human rights than to respect a targeted state's sovereignty. Furthermore once a national government decides on an intervention policy action they use the UN Charter to legitimize their decision.¹⁹⁵ The evidence of humanitarian interventions throughout the 1990s suggests that UN Security Council resolutions have predominantly authorized armed intervention based on the justification that humanitarian abuses/crises are a threat to international peace and security.¹⁹⁶

The Security Council

Two dominant political trends were apparent in the UN's Security Council in the immediate post-Cold War period. First there was a greater willingness on the part of the Security Council's five permanent members [US, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia] to view internal state conflicts as potential threats to wider international stability. Second an increase in political cooperation at the UN, generated by the demise of the Soviet Union led to a greater inclination by Western members of the Security Council

¹⁹⁴ Finnemore, 2003, p. 79.

¹⁹⁵ Wheeler, 2004, p. 49.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 22.

(Russia included) to cooperate to advance multilaterally foreign policies. However, in the short term this cooperation did not endure, as previous Cold War tensions resurfaced leading to a subsequent reversal in the level of political cooperation over the long run. The resulting divisiveness hampered, but did not forestall completely the generation of common agreements on military action in support of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s.¹⁹⁷

It is commonly believed that since the Cold War the Security Council has become more assertive, and that major powers have begun to rely more on the Council to initiate, legitimize and in some cases carry out humanitarian intervention.¹⁹⁸ This critical change is believed to have occurred when the Security Council showed greater willingness to classify humanitarian emergencies which occur within the sovereign borders of a state, as a threat to international peace and security.¹⁹⁹ In particular Wheeler notes that this reorientation of the UN remit occurred as Western powers sought to secure UN legitimacy for interventions to protect civilians in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans.²⁰⁰ These UN resolutions on military interventions in the 1990s were a significant departure from the UN's previous decisions during the Cold War.²⁰¹

By reinterpreting humanitarian disasters as threats to international peace and security the Security Council members tabled UN Chapter VII resolution in order to legitimize the use of force against states. In essence the Security Council used the Charter as a means of applying a broader interpretation of what was and was not a threat to

¹⁹⁷ Roberts, 2004, p. 81; Wolfrum, 2002, p. 98.

¹⁹⁸ Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995, p. 13. UN authorized Chapter VII missions in the early 1990s included UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, UNOSOM II in Somalia, and UNAMIR II in Rwanda. See Appendix 2: Authorisations for Military Interventions in the 1990s.

¹⁹⁹ Wheeler, 2004, p. 33.

²⁰⁰ Wheeler, 2004, p. 29; Donnelly, 1995, p. 118.

²⁰¹ Roberts, 2004, p. 85; Onuf, 1995, p. 53.

international peace and security.²⁰² This reinterpretation identified systematic human rights violations including genocide as threats to international peace and security and therefore justified a response by the international community.²⁰³ Wolfrum points out that although the Security Council has intervened in states with the aim of stopping human rights violations, it still remains problematic to predict under what circumstances the Council will consider human rights violations as a threat to international peace.²⁰⁴

From a less optimistic perspective Wolfrum argues that regardless of how the Security Council started the decade as early as 1993 the willingness of Security Council members to intervene in humanitarian disasters was visible mitigated by their early experiences in Northern Iraq and Somalia.²⁰⁵ He suggests that there are several clear reasons for this; the first is the unwillingness of countries to incur the political costs of placing their soldiers at risk. The second reason is due to Western political leaders' failure to justify humanitarian interventions, especially where costs in lives might be expected. Finally, Wolfrum suggests that the financial burden of undertaking and maintaining a humanitarian intervention also deterred most states from supporting or participating in the process.²⁰⁶ The supposition is that the experience in past humanitarian interventions has made the international community more cautious to engage in future humanitarian interventions.²⁰⁷

²⁰² ICISS, 2001, p. 9.

²⁰³ Wolfrum, 2002, p. 99. As an example with regard to the humanitarian intervention in Somalia the Security Council's resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 established a direct linkage between violation of human rights and the threat to peace. Again in 1994 the same justification was made with regard to the Rwanda in resolution 925, which stated that '... the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.' Wolfrum, 2002, p. 102-103.

²⁰⁴ Wolfrum, 2002, p. 105.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁰⁷ Exacerbating this situation the authors contend that when humanitarian interventions were undertaken in the 1990s, they were implemented without any clear 'conceptual mooring', were devoid of clear mandates,

In conclusion the UN did go through a renewal of institutional importance in the 1990s, as its member states and in particular the Security Council's permanent five members reinvested the institution with the support and resolve to act on humanitarian issues. Abiding by the liberal institutional theory, the motivation behind this renewed interest in the UN after 1989 was due to a greater domestic political will to proactively protect universal human rights norms. Thus in order for states to achieve these domestic policy aims the UN was revitalized as a forum within which to forward humanitarian policies. Additionally domestic political decisions were legitimized by specific interpretations of the UN Charter which sought to justify domestic policy decisions based on national interests. Although many observers believe that not all humanitarian interventions in the 1990s were a success. What is clear in the post-Cold War period is that the Security Council played an unprecedented role in calling for more resolutions that necessitated military humanitarian interventions to protect human rights.²⁰⁸

Conclusion

The aim of this third and final part of the literature review is to establish the political environment and normative context within which humanitarian interventions occurred in the 1990s. Reviewing the role of humanitarian ideals and political conditions in generating support for humanitarian intervention is important to this thesis as these factors are the basis of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM. Therefore in order to identify the conditions and understand the US's decision making process in the Somalia humanitarian

and needlessly risked the lives of troops on the ground because of poor and unclear rules of engagement. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 170.

²⁰⁸ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 182; Keren and Sylvan, 2002, p. 14.

intervention one needs to first establish the political environment and normative context in which the case study occurred.

Within the humanitarian intervention literature it is evident that there has been progress in the evolution of humanitarian ideals since the end of the Cold War. The debate over humanitarian intervention remains a contentious issue in the international system, primarily because of the tension it generates between the principle of state sovereignty and the evolving application of international norms of human rights.²⁰⁹ The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflects this normative debate when he supports sovereignty as a key normative standard in the international system while also asserting states responsibility (by virtue of their sovereignty), to safe guard the human rights of their citizens. The rationale is that if a state cannot fulfil its sovereign mandate to protect its own citizens, then and only then is it the legitimate responsibility of the international community to intervene to secure those basic human rights. In such instances as demonstrated by the interventions of the 1990s, the norms, values, and interests espoused by the Security Council's have consistently guided UN responses to humanitarian disasters.

It is also evident from the renewed capacity of the UN and the Security Council's application of its Chapter VII mandate, that political leaders both domestically and internationally have been more willing to forward humanitarian resolutions at the UN. This political willingness is based on greater domestic support for human rights and a

²⁰⁹ Welsh, 2004, p. 1.

strategic recognition of the links between humanitarian assistance, human rights and international peace.²¹⁰

Overall the tone of the humanitarian intervention debate has become more urgent as exemplified by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 when he said ‘... States bent on criminal behaviour [should] know that frontiers are not the absolute defence, that massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to stand.’²¹¹ While acknowledging the egalitarian intent and genuine motivation of the Secretary-General’s statement, it is evident from the literature that the international community has been very slow to respond to international humanitarian disasters, and in the ultimate deployment of troops as part of an armed humanitarian policy response. Specifically critics cite the Rwandan case in 1994 as an example of this lag time, where even though the Security Council decided to send peacekeepers, the second phase of garnering material support for the political process stalled as member states procrastinated for six months before the first troops were sent to Kigali.²¹²

This literature review of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s has highlighted several dominant themes. First there is a considerable deficit in both political will and capacity to act when it comes to voting on and applying resolutions involving humanitarian interventions. Second, observers like Welsh challenge the ability of international organizations like the UN to undertake humanitarian interventions. For example two prominent authors, Finnemore and Welsh argue that in reality the UN is

²¹⁰ Throughout the 1990s it became more commonly accepted that human rights could and would motivate international action in the form of humanitarian intervention. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 38.

²¹¹ Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 181.

²¹² This delay is even more apparent when it is considered that 19 governments at the time had pledged to keep some 30,000 troops on a stand by, for such UN Peacekeeping. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 160.

quite limited because of its political and resource dependence on its dominant member states.²¹³ Third there has been a compelling inconsistency both during and after the Cold War in the international community's response to humanitarian disasters that resonates throughout the literature. Krasner highlights this when he critically cites the killing fields of Cambodia as an example where gross human rights violations were routinely ignored by the international community. More recently he highlights the political disorder in Africa during the 1990s that produced mass starvation, as a clear example of where human suffering did not precipitate any intervention by the international community. This criticism raises a final controversial theme which is whether in fact shared normative values, such as human rights, have really been universally adopted. Krasner proposes that even if it were agreed that new normative standards existed, empirical evidence suggests that it has not in practice motivated or guided the international community to undertake humanitarian intervention.²¹⁴ In the sixth chapter the US Somalia case study will address these four themes by first looking at the role of political will as a variable in the US domestic political process to generate humanitarian intervention policies. Secondly the case study narrative will highlight the capability and credibility of the UN in Somalia and what affect this had on the operation. Finally the role of human rights norms in influencing President Bush, President Clinton and the American public will be addressed. Lastly the apparent inconsistency in policy response to international humanitarian disasters will be assessed in the case study by looking at the differences in the US's policy response between Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994.

²¹³ Finnemore, 2003, p. 59; Welsh, 2004, p. 2.

²¹⁴ Krasner, 1995, p. 248.

Chapter 5

RESEARCH DESIGN

The following research design will outline why the US Somalia case study was chosen, how the model variables were identified and how they are going to be measured. It will also delineate what the research has to find for the model to be applicable to the case study, why the measurements are valid and reliable, and what the limits of the study are. This research design will establish the indicators that will facilitate an investigation into how and why President Bush and President Clinton responded to the humanitarian crises in Somalia in the manner that they did. This chapter will first deal with the selection of the case study. Second it will determine whether the findings will be generalizable to other cases. Third, it will outline how the case study will be operationalised. The last part of the chapter will incorporate a summary of the sources used to facilitate this study.

5.1 Case Selection

The US humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 was the second time (Northern Iraq was the first) in the post-Cold World period where the US deployed ground troops to assist in providing a safe and secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies. The Somalia case is suitable for this thesis question for several reasons. The first reason is because the scope and severity of the famine and civil war created an indisputable complex humanitarian emergency. Second with the end of the Cold War Somalia, located on the Horn of Africa, no longer represented a geopolitical or strategic interest for the US.²¹⁵ Therefore no overt national interest was at stake when the US decided to send

²¹⁵ See Appendix 1: Map of Somalia.

troops to Somalia. This notion suggests that the administration's decision had good potential to be seen as a moral action instead of a self-interested one. This feature of the case study indicated that there are good grounds to consider that the US's Somalia intervention is a CIMA. Third, by choosing the US Somalia intervention there are two instances when the SLM can be applied. The first application of the SLM will be to the US decision making process in December 1992. It will seek to explain the conditions and ideals that motivated President Bush to decide to engage in Somalia and determine whether or not his decision represented a CIMA. The second application of the SLM seeks to extend the model beyond its initial design in order to see if it can explain why a state would abandon its CIMA. This is a worthwhile extension of the model as it seeks to will identify those variables integral to the SLM, and therefore sustaining the CIMA over time. The extended SLM will be applied to President Clinton's decision making process in October 1993, and will endeavor to identify and explain the condition variables that changed and thus motivated President Clinton to decide to withdraw from Somalia. The premise is that by keeping the same model variables in both applications, the research should be able to identify the variables which are integral to the SLM and the successful generation of a CIMA. By identifying the variables that are integral to the maintenance of the SLM, one can identify the domestic level political conditions that are central to the creation of a SLM. Fourth, because the model is first applied to Bush's decision in December 1992 and then subsequently to Clinton's decision in October 1993 we can control for time within ten months. Finally the value of the dependent variable in both instances in the case study was different i.e. Bush's policy of humanitarian intervention and Clinton's policy of disengagement from Somalia.

5.2 Generalizability

The thesis findings are generalizable for several reasons. First of all Kaufmann and Pape conclude that any unilateral humanitarian military intervention, where the intervening state has no strategic or economic interest at stake, qualifies as a CIMA.²¹⁶ Therefore a humanitarian intervention that exhibits these criteria can be considered a CIMA. Second because the research looks at two time periods of domestic political conditions under two separate Presidents, one should be able to apply the deductions to other time periods and other Presidents within the US domestic political context. Third given that the SLM was generated to explain the British anti-slavery policy in the nineteenth century, if the model is successfully applied to the US decision making process in 1992 then one can infer that the SLM should be applicable to other countries at other times. If the SLM can effectively explain the decision making process that led to the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, then this finding would suggest the model is generalizable to other case studies. However, given that the investigation is only based on one case study further research would be needed to increase confidence in the results.

5.3 Operationalization

The hypothesis of this research question is whether or not Kaufmann and Pape's SLM can explain the decision making process that led to the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The predictive value of this analysis lies in successfully applying the model to a contemporary case of humanitarian intervention. A positive result would suggest that one can, with greater probability, use the SLM to predict when the US will deploy troops in a humanitarian intervention in the future. Secondly if the model explains the US case study

²¹⁶Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 633.

there are further grounds to believe that it will explain other humanitarian intervention that meet Kaufmann and Pape's criteria.

Theoretical framework

Chapter 1 reviews the alternative theoretical explanations provided by realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism for explaining humanitarian intervention. In Chapter 2 Kaufmann and Pape's SLM is outlined and presented as their theoretical alternative to the standard international relations theories. The premise of the model is that a combination of ideals and domestic political conditions interacted to generate CIMA.²¹⁷ Chapter 3 concludes the literature review by establishing the political and normative state of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. The aim of the complete theoretical literature review is to highlight both the theory and practice in the field of humanitarian intervention policy and provide an accurate context in which to undertake the empirical research into the US Somalia case study.

Hypothesis Specification

When Kaufmann and Pape conclude that none of the traditional international relations theories could explain Britain's CIMA, i.e. its anti-slavery policy, the authors posited that a combination of domestic political conditions and ideals were the true explanation of the British policy.²¹⁸ In order to illustrate this research conclusion they constructed the SLM to explain instances of CIMA as outlined in Chapter 3. The purpose of the research question is to conclude whether or not Kaufmann and Pape's SLM is an appropriate model for explaining and predicting US humanitarian intervention policies.

²¹⁷ Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, p. 664.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 662.

In so doing the examination will conclude whether US policy towards Somalia can be considered a CIMA, and secondly whether the model can be used to predict future US policies. The variables of the model and their relationship to each other are illustrated in Diagram 1: SAINTLY LOGROLL MODEL ARROW DIAGRAM. For the purposes of this thesis the complete model is constructed using three assigned and three implied variables. In their model Kaufmann and Pape identified three explicit antecedent conditions (Shaded spheres in Diagram 1). However in order for their model to be logically complete three more implied conditions have been added (White spheres in Diagram 1).

Observable implications

In order to test the applicability of Kaufmann and Pape's model the research has to determine three things. First the six antecedent conditions as laid out in the Arrow Diagram of the SLM did exist. Second the antecedent conditions did influence the value of the independent variable i.e. Saintly Logroll. Finally, that there is a causal relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable i.e. Saintly Logroll and the US's humanitarian intervention policy.

For the SLM to be applicable one or more of the antecedent conditions has to be missing or other variables not identified in the model had greater influence on the independent variable. The premise is that the magnitude of the antecedent conditions influences the value of the independent variable. The value of the independent variable in turn is linked directly to the value of the dependent variable in a causal relationship. If this pattern is not apparent then the Kaufmann and Pape's SLM can not be applied successfully as an explanatory tool.

Measurement

The three assigned and three implied antecedent conditions of the SLM will be measured as following. The first assigned antecedent condition (condition 4) reflects elite need for political legitimacy. Legitimacy will be measured by the Presidents popular support as reflected in public opinion polls. The US President will represent the single elite in this condition as the US Congress shall be incorporated into condition 5. The variable will be measured by assessing Presidential job approval poll data from sources such as the *Washington Post-ABC News* polls and the *New York Times News* polls. The supposition is that public opinion polls measure the President's job approval rating and that the higher this rating the higher the Presidents legitimacy/popular support and vice versa.

Evidence suggests that Bush was motivated primarily by an altruistic humanitarianism and also a personal interest in the dividends he could gain by appealing to the countries humanitarianism. Additionally it is thought that Bush was motivated by a concern for his political legacy. It is realistic to speculate that this appeal to humanitarianism was driven not only by Bush's personal conscience, but also by the linkage that the US public supported humanitarian intervention and for that reason he could gain political dividends by following such a policy. President Bush's motivation will be measure by looking at primary source material and statements by the President (that will be cited later). Bush's concern for his legacy is more difficult to measure as Bush made no direct statements to this affect. Instead the supposition comes from primary source material from members of his administration.

The second assigned antecedent condition (condition 5) refers to the domestic balance of power. The variable is measured by assessing the balance of power as determined by political support held by President and Congress. This political support is measured for the President by polling performance during the election. For Congress the measurement is gained by observing the number of seats in the House of Representatives (i.e. majority party in the House) and whether or not there is political support for an interventionist policy. The precariousness of the Presidents political standing is reflected by his polling in the 1992 Presidential race measured from data collected by the *Gallup* Presidential campaign poll results.²¹⁹ For Congress it is measured by in the degree to which Congressional members are willing to cooperate across party lines (across the balance of power i.e. Republican/Democrat) to forward policy and by individual Senators statements supporting a humanitarian intervention policy. Polling evidence confirms the contemporary notion that the US public supports humanitarian policy responses, as demonstrated by the post Somalia opinion polls were it was indicated that the public thought that the US humanitarian intervention was the right thing to do.²²⁰ The premise is that elected representatives will react to popular support for humanitarian intervention when the US public supports the policy. The realist perspective is that those with power seek to retain it by satisfying the public wishes and those that wish power hope to gain political dividends by advancing popular policies. Therefore the value of this variable will measured first by the presidents need for political support reflected by the Presidents subsequent election defeat, and second by members of Congress forwarding the pro-intervention policy individually and in cross party cooperation.

²¹⁹ See Appendix 4: GALLUP – Presidential Approval Rating Poll.

²²⁰ See Appendix 6: Somalia Intervention and Public Reaction to Fatalities in Somalia.

Condition 4 and 5 may appear similar, but the first looks at Presidential legitimacy as measured by popular support gained through public opinion polls and job approval ratings. The second condition is measure in terms of the US domestic balance of power, gauged by political support in terms of who gets elected to office and who (which party) holds the majority of seats in Congress. This difference allows for the occurrence whereby President Bush after the Presidential election had high popular support for his humanitarian decision to intervene in Somalia, yet low political support as he lost the election. Similarly, President Clinton popularity in the summer 1993 was low, yet his political support was high as the public and Congress supported his policy to withdraw troops from Somalia.²²¹

The third assigned antecedent condition (condition 3) represents the ability of a saintly faction to form a coalition. The viability of this coalition formation is dependent on the extent to which saints can ally with other political actors from across the political spectrum, in order to gain the critical mass needed to bring about their desired end state. This variable is measured by determining the degree of political liability or legitimacy (popular support) that other political actors can engender by associating with the Saintly Faction. Two things influence the likelihood of garnering this political cooperation. First the nature of the issue that is advocated i.e. humanitarian relief, and second where the Saintly Faction lies on the political spectrum. In this case study one can say that the issue is a humanitarian relief is morally acceptable and that the Saintly Faction occupies the middle of the political spectrum. By identifying these two factors one can measure the value of the antecedent condition by how much actors are willing to cooperate with humanitarian advocates.

²²¹ See Appendix 6: Somalia Intervention and Public Reaction to Fatalities in Somalia.

As stated in order for the model to be logically complete it necessitates three implied antecedent conditions. The first of these implied antecedent conditions (condition 1) is that a moral issue has to exist in order to motivate agents to act i.e. slavery for the Dissenters or humanitarian disasters for humanitarian advocates. The value of this variable will be measured by looking at what is known about the Somalia disaster, and who transmitted the information that informed the US public and government of the unfolding disaster. The quality of information coming out of Somalia needs to be accurate and objective, in order to concisely judge the value the condition. Therefore the sources of information will be recognized NGOs, government departments and known US media sources. This variable will be measured by the corroborated information provided to the administration by these organizations.

The second implied antecedent condition (condition 2) requires that there be a Sainly Faction in existence in order to adopt the moral humanitarian campaign in the first place. The value of this variable will be measured by the existence and influence of actors involved in promoting US engagement in the Somalia humanitarian disaster. In the British anti-slavery case the Sainly Faction was represented by the Dissenters, in Somalia case study this' faction is represented by humanitarian advocates made up of the US relief NGO community and select US Senators.

The final implied antecedent condition is (condition 6) which is the political willingness on the part of elites to cooperate in a political coalition. The value of this variable will be measured by showing the degree of willingness on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Pentagon, to cooperate over the Somalia affair. These

measurements will be made by looking at primary and secondary sources that reflect to the willingness of elites to logroll.

The completed arrow diagram incorporates these six variables which generate the Independent Variable, which is the degree of political coalition in the form of a saintly logroll. The value of the independent variable will be measured by the size of the political coalition that is generated. The supposition in the Somalia case study is that in December 1992 the President, the US Congress, the Pentagon, the public and the combined US relief NGO community all supported the policy of humanitarian intervention. Comparatively the claim is that after the deaths of US servicemen in Mogadishu in October 1993 most of these entities withdrew their support and only the combined US relief NGO community continued to support US engagement.

The dependent variable represents the US government's policy. The value of this variable will be measured by looking at the mandate of the US policy towards the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. For example a weak political coalition might only generate a government policy that mandates financial support to a humanitarian crisis, whereas a strong political coalition might authorize financial and material resources as well as a troop deployment in support of the government policy. The supposition is that the higher the value of the independent variable the greater the policy commitment and magnitude of the dependent variable.

Validity

The first assigned antecedent condition (condition 4) reflects elite need for political legitimacy. Legitimacy being measured by the Presidents popular support as reflected in public opinion polls. These measurement vehicles are valid because they ask

direct questions i.e. do you think the President is doing a good job, therefore minimizing ambiguity. In the case study the Presidents method of gaining legitimacy appears to be by his expressed appeal to humanitarianism. Measuring this humanitarian impulse is valid as Bush made statements to that effect which can be corroborated by primary and secondary sources. Bush's apparent second rationale, concern for his political legacy, is harder to measure as he did not actually say anything to that effect. Therefore his measurement is less valid as it is only mentioned in secondary source material.

The second assigned antecedent condition (condition 5) refers to the domestic balance of power. This variable is measure by assessing the balance of power as determined by political support held by President and Congress. Presidential political support will be measure by Presidential campaign poll results. This method is valid as an estimate of how many people are going to vote and given the polling predications throughout 1992 were substantiated by the election results this add to the potential accuracy of the measurement. Measuring the balance of power in the US Congress by observing seat distribution is valid. What is less valid is utilising Congressional statements by individual representatives and observing cross party support for intervention as a measure. This is because these Congressional indicators are susceptible to misrepresentation and strategic voting.

The third assigned antecedent condition (condition 3) is the ability of a Sainly Faction to form a coalition. This variable is measured by determining the degree of political liability or legitimacy (popular support) that political actors can engender by associating with the Sainly Faction. The likelihood of this association is influenced by two measurements, first is the nature of the issue being advocated i.e. humanitarian relief.

This measure is valid because the more extreme the suffering the greater the humanitarian impulse to react. Second the measurement is based on the potential political liability or popular legitimacy to be gained based on the Saintly factions position on the political spectrum. This measurement is valid in as much as the more moderate the Saintly Factions position the more likely it is for mainstream political parties to associate with them.

The first implied antecedent condition (condition 1) is that a moral issue has to exist in order to motivate agents to act. The variable is measured by looking at what is known about the Somalia disaster, and who was transmitting the information that informed the US public and government of the unfolding disaster. This measurement is a valid measurement because the sources of this information were recognized NGOs, a government departments and known US Media sources. The validity increase as the information is corroborated by different sources.

The second implied antecedent condition (condition 2) requires that there be a Saintly Faction in existence, in order to adopt the moral campaign in the first place. The validity of this measurement is confirmed by the presence of NGOs conducting humanitarian work in Somalia and by the public statements of advocates such as NGOs and select US Senators supporting US engagement in Somalia.

The final implied antecedent condition is (condition 6) is the political willingness of elites to cooperate in a political coalition. This variable measurement is valid as it is sourced from public statements, primary and secondary source materials that confirm that the President, the Congress, and the Pentagon were willing to cooperate over Somalia.

However it is acknowledged that these actors could misrepresent themselves or vote strategically and therefore the measurement may be susceptible to validity questions.

The value of the independent variable will be measured by the size of the political coalition that is generated. This measurement is valid as all members of the logroll; the President, the US Congress, the Pentagon, and the combined US relief NGO community all publicly supported the policy of humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

The dependent variable represented by the US government's policy is a valid measurement as it is observable and reflects the mandate of the US policy towards the humanitarian disaster in Somalia.

Reliability

The indicators that are going to measure the six antecedent conditions will be drawn from primary and secondary source books, journal articles, biographies, newspaper articles, and public opinion polls. The two newspapers used in this study, are the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. They are both considered to be reliable because their articles undergo editorial scrutiny and fact checking.

The opinion polls data drawn from GALLUP, the Program of International Policy and Attitudes (PIPA), *New York Times/CBS* and the *Washington Post/ABC* news are also considered to be more reliable. This is because polls are based on a random sample number and the results are considered to be accurate within the certain stated percentage point. Furthermore in terms of opinion poll data one can say that because they ask direct questions i.e. Do you think the President is doing a good job, Do you support a US humanitarian intervention in Somalia, that the answers should be unambiguous. In

terms of reliability it is recognized that the wording of opinion poll questions and sample selections can be conducted in a manner that skews or alters poll results.

Due to the reality that primary and secondary source books, journal articles, and biographies, are susceptible to personal perspective and bias they are considered to be less reliable sources. However one can speculate that as the number of corroborating sources increases, so too the reliability. While acknowledging the susceptible of these measurement methods to claims of unreliability, if a third person was to use the same variables and the same measurements then they should deduce the same findings

Limitations of the research design

The limitations of this research paper are that it will only test for the applicability of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM to the US's Somalia policy. The research remit is to identify the models antecedent conditions and evaluate them in relation to each other. By investigating the Somalia case study the antecedent conditions should be identifiable and if they are not, then alternative conditions should be recognizable.

The relevance of Kaufmann and Pape's Model to the generation of humanitarian interventionist policies will be relatively weak. This is because the predictive formula of the model is neither unique to nor certain to guarantee a US national policy of humanitarian intervention. One could argue that there are multiple theories, models and prescriptive formulas that have informed the policy decisions of different US administrations. This diversity in policy responses is epitomized by the different US policies towards humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s. The scope of this research paper is to prove or disprove the utility of the SLM in explaining the US's adoption of its

humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992. How certain a finding shall be reached is dependent on whether the SLM can be successfully and clearly applied to the case study.

5.4 Sources

The data and evidence for this research paper will be gleaned from primary and secondary source books, journal articles, archival government records, newspaper articles, public opinion polls and biographies. Primary source material will be used where possible. Where there are no primary sources, evidence will be gathered from sources close to the Presidents and their administrations, such as from Colin Powell's autobiography. President Clinton's autobiography will be referenced along with first hand accounts from members of his administration. These sources are considered to be reliable and complete.

The two US daily news papers that will be referenced will be the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Both papers are considered to be the most nonpartisan and reliable papers in American print media. The public opinion polls used to substantiate claims in the thesis and measure values of some variables will be drawn from three sources. The first is GALLUP, the second is PIPA and the third source will be public opinion polls conducted by the two aforementioned newspapers in conjunction with polling agencies such as the *New York Times/CBS* Poll and the *Washington Post/ABC* news poll. Although poll deductions are only an extrapolation based on a small sample; those poll sources are considered to be representative of all the polling conducted with regard to issues within this case study.

Chapter 6

US HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

“US intervention in Somalia in December 1992 suggested that humanitarian intervention was securing a new legitimacy in the post-Cold War international society. It seemed that an era might be dawning in which Western Governments, freed from the constraints of the Cold War, and would use their armies to save strangers in places far away from home.”²²²

As noted by Welsh the US deployment of ground troops to create a safe and secure environment in Somalia for the distribution of humanitarian relief, set a new US foreign policy precedent in the post-Cold War period. The aim of this chapter is to first apply the SLM to the US domestic political situation in December 1992 in order to discover the context and motivation behind President Bush’s decision to deploy ‘Operation Restore Hope.’ By applying the SLM the goal is to discover if the President’s decision was a CIMA. Additionally, the SLM will then be extended beyond the author’s original design in order to look at when a CIMA is abandoned. This will be attempted by applying the SLM to President Clinton’s decision to withdraw troops and disengage from Somalia in October 1993. The intent is to identify the conditions that were most influential in reversing the CIMA. By investigating the ideals and domestic political conditions in the US Somalia case study, the aim is to see if the SLM can explain the US’s decision making processes.

The study will be conducted in three main parts. The first part will examine the domestic political conditions that led President Bush to choose to deploy troops to Somalia. The second part will examine the apparent reversal in the value of the condition

²²² Welsh, 2000, p. 173.

variables after the deaths of US Army Rangers in October 1993. The final part of the chapter will assess the fallout from the US's Somalia intervention policy, and how the US experience influenced its future responses to humanitarian crisis.

The first part of this examination will look at the process that led to the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia and will be broken down into four sections. The first section will outline a brief history of Somalia in order to set a context for the humanitarian disaster. The second section will chronologically present the sequence of events that led to the international intervention in Somalia. The third section will apply the conditions of the SLM to the US domestic political conditions in December 1993, which produced the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia. This examination will consist of an arrow diagram of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM with the US condition variables illustrated. The subsequent investigation of the model's variables will seek to describe their formation and assign a value to each condition in order to show the degree to which it influenced the generation of the independent variable. The final section will seek to explain what motivated President Bush to undertake a policy U-turn and risk the costs of undertaking an armed intervention in Somalia. The section will end by reviewing why President Bush was willing to incur the risks and costs of a humanitarian intervention and whether or not his decision was a CIMA.

6.1 History of the Humanitarian Disaster in Somalia

Since its independence from Italy in 1960, Somalia has been in a consistent state of internal conflict in the form of a civil war. The humanitarian disaster which occurred in

the early 1990s is believed to have been caused by a combination of historically rooted factors. The first contributing factor was the ongoing conflict between the various socio-political identities within Somalia. The source of the socio-political conflict which plagued Somalia lay in the family, sub-clan and clan system.²²³ Within this clan system political and military alliances were made and broken as interests and opportunities changed, which led to a very unstable domestic political environment. Secondly the geopolitical boundaries established during Somalia's colonial past did not reflect the traditional tribal boundaries and therefore exacerbated the inter clan fighting. Thirdly since the time of its independence from Italy, Somalia has suffered from a weak governmental system, and this situation was further exacerbated by the violent nature of Somali clan politics. Fourthly, the country had long been subject to chronic economic underdevelopment. The collapse of the official economy in 1990 is believed to have precipitated the final collapse of the state.²²⁴ Ramsbothum and Woodhouse argue that these systemic conditions, along with the occurrence of a prolonged drought which led to a famine, all establish the context for the humanitarian disaster that occurred in Somalia in 1991.²²⁵ When in January of 1991 the internationally recognized President of Somalia, Siad Barre was overthrown, the country disintegrated into 'an orgy of inter clan fighting,' to the extent that no one single clan faction was able to consolidate power.²²⁶ The two main protagonists in the subsequent civil war were Mohammad Aideed and Ali Mahdi, whose militia occupied the capital Mogadishu and the vast majority of the countryside. The intense combination of Somalia's historical problems, the prolonged drought and the

²²³ Somalia itself is quite socially homogenized as ethnically, linguistically, and religiously most Somali are same. Ramsbothum and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 193.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 198.

²²⁶ Parsons, 1995, p. 198.

renewed civil war all contributed to create the massive humanitarian crisis that faced both the UN and President Bush in 1992. A *New York Times* editorial in February 1991 noted the extent of the Somalia complex emergency when it reported that Somalia was ‘a disaster almost beyond imagining.’²²⁷

6.2 Sequence of Events Leading to the Decision to Deploy Troops

In March of 1991 the US State Department formally declared the situation in Somalia a ‘state of disaster.’²²⁸ In the following months the US government initiated a concerted humanitarian relief response through the US State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as numerous national and transnational humanitarian relief agencies.²²⁹ The US was to become the largest relief donor throughout the duration of the Somalia relief effort.²³⁰ Despite a focused response by the combined relief NGO community, the situation in Somalia deteriorated further during 1991 and into 1992.²³¹ In retrospect the international humanitarian community did not fully appreciate the scope of the disaster and therefore their response did not match the scale or pace of the humanitarian disaster. Throughout its precipitous decline in 1991 and 1992, Somalia was to remain a low priority policy issue for the Bush administration.²³² Although the UN did push for a more comprehensive policy response and greater international commitment to Somalia in the Security Council, the US and Russia resisted greater pressure to get further involved. The justification for this lack of engagement was

²²⁷ Editorial Desk, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 9 Feb, 1992, p. 16.

²²⁸ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 49.

²²⁹ Agencies such as Save the Children’s Fund, Medicines Sans Frontieres, CARE, UNICEF, The World Food Program, World Concern, International Medical Corps, UNHCR, UNCF, ICRC, and Catholic Relief Services were involved. Woods, 1997, p. 152.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²³¹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 45; Haass, 1999, p. 43.

²³² DiPrizio, 2002, p. 44.

that they wished to avoid greater costs and potential entanglement in what was recognized early on as complex emergency. The US's non-interventionist policy stance towards Somalia in 1992 was not contested domestically as there was no widespread media attention, public interest or Congressional scrutiny.²³³ In spite of the lack of international and US interest, the UN managed to push through a UN Security Council Resolution 751 in April 1992, which initiated the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I).²³⁴ UNOSOM I was a non-military humanitarian intervention, aimed at monitoring the factional ceasefire and to provide security for relief supplies. The resolution sought to achieve these aims with the deployment of 500 unarmed military observers. UNOSOM I operation turned out to be undermanned and ill-equipped for the demands of the mission. The operation was not successful in providing the security and stability needed by the humanitarian relief agencies in order to effectively and safely work in Somalia.

By July of 1992 US Congressional interest in the US's role in Somalia grew to a new level. The first reason for this was that representatives of US humanitarian agencies, like CARE and Save the Children began meeting regularly with State Department and Congressional representatives in Washington to lobby for greater US involvement. The second reason was due to the proactive involvement of select Congressional Senators Paul Simon (D – IL) and Nancy Kassebaum (R - Kansas) who advocated immediate government action and a greater commitment by the US to resolving the crisis.²³⁵ Specifically Senator Kassebaum forwarded a Senate resolution calling for the President

²³³ Woods, 1997, p. 153.

²³⁴ See Appendix 3: UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia.

²³⁵ Both Senators were members of the Senate Africa Subcommittee and therefore were well placed to receive information on the nature of the Somalia crisis. Woods, 1997, p. 153.

to 'lead a world wide humanitarian effort in Somalia to relieve the suffering and for the UN to make the humanitarian crisis a priority.'²³⁶ As early as August 1992 the idea of deploying US troops started to get airtime in both television and print media in the US. For example *The New York Times* cited Senator Kassebaum as supporting a policy of US troop deployment to Somalia in order to ensure that food shipments could get through to the people.²³⁷ At the time these calls for intervention by both Senators Simon and Kassebaum did not meet with widespread public or Congressional support.²³⁸

Mid-way through his election campaign and well after the humanitarian disaster in Somalia started observers noted that President Bush appeared to take a personal interest in events in Somalia. DiPrizio suggests that this change occurred after the President read a cable from the US ambassador to Kenya, titled 'A Day in Hell,' in which the ambassador described his firsthand experience of the dire humanitarian situation in Somalia.²³⁹ By August 1992 the President announced several policy decisions that would mean greater involvement for the US.²⁴⁰ In order to meet the Presidents new policy directive towards Somalia, the Pentagon initiated 'Operation Provide Relief,' which increased food aid and provided airlift capabilities to support UNOSOM I. The US's role however was limited to one of support and no US troops entered Somalia itself as Operation Provide Relief was staged out of Mombassa in neighbouring Kenya.²⁴¹ A *PIPA* poll suggested that 82% of the US public supported US delivery of humanitarian relief to

²³⁶ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 192; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 213.

²³⁷ Anna Quindlen, "Public and Private: Somalia's Plagues," *The New York Times*, 12 August, 1992, p. 19.

²³⁸ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 195.

²³⁹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 50.

²⁴⁰ There was an increase in the number of emergency airlifts, donors were lobbied even harder to make commitments to the UN and additional quantities of relief supplies were allocated. Woods, 1997, p. 155.

²⁴¹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 46.

Somalia.²⁴² In the meantime the Bush administration continued to abide by its non-intervention policy towards Somalia and continued to block UN plans for a more ambitious force deployment. Throughout this time UN and the US were criticized strongly by observers for failing to address the crisis in Somalia during 1992.²⁴³ The UN emergency intervention UNOSOM I ultimately failed to mitigate the causes of the crisis on the ground and thus the overall expanded humanitarian effort was stalled. For all the information flowing out of the country during 1991-1992 on the extent of the humanitarian disaster in Somalia the UN humanitarian response remained one of extreme hesitation and inactivity.²⁴⁴

In the second half of 1992 the potential of a US led military intervention was beginning to be discussed at the US interagency policy meeting on Somalia. However the administration, the Pentagon, and the US Congress were uncomfortable with the idea of greater military involvement on the ground.²⁴⁵ The Pentagon estimated that given the circumstances on the ground the US military could not successfully accomplish a military intervention to address the humanitarian crisis.²⁴⁶ Nevertheless by August of 1992 there was significant pressure from Congress and the US public for the administration to do something urgently to relieve the suffering which the US public was now witnessing on a regular basis on nightly news broadcasts in the US.²⁴⁷ As Colin Powell noted in his autobiography 'The world had a dozen other running sores that fall, but the television hovered over Somalia and wrenched our hearts, night after night, with images of people

²⁴² See PIPA Poll 2004, Public Opinion on Africa.

²⁴³ Slim and Visman strongly contend that UN inactivity during 1991-2 bordered on negligence. Slim and Visman, 1995, p. 146.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 146.

²⁴⁵ Woods, 1997, p. 157.

²⁴⁶ Western, 2002, p. 110.

²⁴⁷ Clarke, 1997, p. 8.

starving to death before our eyes.’²⁴⁸ In part due to heightened public awareness and increased domestic political pressure, Bush directed the interagency committee on Somalia to formulate new policy options.

On November 4th Bush officially lost the election to Clinton; until the official handover of authority Bush became a lame duck President. On November 21st the principal members of the National Security Council Committee met and considered three policy options with regard to Somalia. The first involved financial and material support to the UN effort. The second called for logistical support for the UN. The third option called for a US-led multinational military intervention. The fourth policy option was to maintain the status quo of non-intervention. By the end of the meeting on the 21st no policy was decided upon, and therefore the non-intervention status quo policy remained.²⁴⁹ However, just three days later on the 24th the Pentagon changed its previous estimation on the potential success of a US led military intervention in Somalia, when Admiral David Jeremiah at the regular interagency committee on Somalia said ‘If you think [committee] US forces are needed, we can do the job.’²⁵⁰ Once the US indicated that it was willing to commit troops the UN Security Council voted unanimously in support of sending a military force to Somalia with a mandate to stop warring factions from blocking relief operations. This decision was vital as the *Washington Post* reported ‘The decision constitutes the first United Nations intervention in a country's internal affairs with a mandate to use offensive force.’²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Powell, 1995, p. 550.

²⁴⁹ Woods, 1997, p. 158; Western, 2002, p. 113.

²⁵⁰ Woods, 1997, p. 158; Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention,” *The Washington Post*, 6 Dec, 1992, p. A1.

²⁵¹ John Goshko, “U.N. Orders U.S.-Led Force into Somalia,” *The Washington Post*, 4 Dec, 1992, p. A1.

Subsequently on December 4th, one month after his defeat in the Presidential election, Bush announced publicly his decision to send US military forces to Somalia in order to create a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief. Bush categorically expressed that his decision was not based on strategic national interest, but instead on humanitarian need.²⁵² The decision to use US troops to intervene in Somalia was perceived as generally popular with the US public and the majority in Congress.²⁵³ Both the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* printed the President elect's explicit support for Bush's decision to stand-up 'Operation Restore Hope' quoting Clinton as saying, '... I commend President Bush for his leadership on this important humanitarian effort.'²⁵⁴ Durch notes that for both the outgoing and incoming Presidents the signals were good that the country would support an interventionist policy in Somalia. A *New York Times/CBS* poll taken a few days after President Bush's televised address announcing the operation suggests that 81% of those interviewed agreed that 'the US is doing the right thing in sending troops to Somalia to make sure food gets to the people, while 70% agreed 'that the task was even worth possible loss of American lives.'²⁵⁵ The US led United Task Force (UNITAF) actualised the US's policy commitment to undertake a humanitarian intervention. UNITAF had the mandate under UN Security Council Chapter VII Resolution 792 to use any means necessary to create a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies in Somalia.

²⁵² Haass, 1999, p. 44.

²⁵³ Clinton, 2004, p. 550; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 195; Woods, 1997, p. 158; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 51.


²⁵⁴ Michael Wines, "Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save Thousands,'" *The New York Times*, 5 Dec, 1992, p. 1; Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Praises Bush 'Leadership' in Crisis," *The Washington Post*, 5 Dec, 1992, p. A16.

²⁵⁵ Durch, 1996, p. 321.

6.3 The Saintly Logroll Model Part 1.

What follows is an arrow diagram of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM as applied to the US domestic political conditions that led to the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The premise is that the six domestic political condition variables (CV) outlined in the model influenced the generation of political cooperation (IV) on the Somalia issue, which in turn caused the Bush administration to initiate the UNITAF deployment (DV). The examination seeks to investigate the value of the condition variables, in order to understand their casual relationship to the value of the IV and thus the generation of the DV. In order to take a consistent sample across the six condition variables and appreciate to what degree their values influenced the President's policy decision, the variables values in the model will be assessed as of December 4th 1992.

DIAGRAM 2: SLM SOMALIA - UNITAF DEPLOYMENT (DEC 4th 1992)



Antecedent Condition 1: Existence of a moral issue.

The first of Kaufmann and Pape's conditions is the existence of a moral issue that generates an ethical response from actors. During the nineteenth century in Britain, it was existence of slavery. In this case study it is the existence of the complex humanitarian emergency in Somalia, brought on by the famine and civil war. The value of this condition will be measured by looking at what was known about the Somalia disaster, and who was transmitting the information to inform the US public and government. The quality of information coming out of Somalia needs to be accurate and objective, so in order to value this condition the sources of information will be recognized NGOs, government departments and known US media sources. These are appropriate sources because they first mediate bias because they are combination of both government and non-government sources. Secondly by choosing three sources one can better evaluate and corroborate reports on similar subjects.

Throughout 1990 to 1994 and beyond international relief agencies continually reported on the state of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The frequency of this reporting both by NGO's and UN increased as the disaster intensified in late 1992. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for example reported that an estimated 4.5 million Somalis were suffering from severe malnutrition and disease. The ICRC estimated that the civil war had created 1 million refugees and that an estimated 500,000 had already died due the ongoing combination of the famine and war.²⁵⁶ In the same month *The New York Times* quoted a US official as admitting that Somalia, was '...an African country living through -- and dying of -- a lethal combination of clan warfare, drought and famine that has wrought... the worst humanitarian crisis in the world right

²⁵⁶ Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 199.

now.²⁵⁷ Several weeks later the same newspaper published an estimate that more than 1,000 people a day were dying in Somalia from hunger or disease.²⁵⁸ An article in the *Washington Post* in December 1992 made the emotive plea for public and government action when it reported ‘The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act.’²⁵⁹ Even Andrew Natsios, the chief representative of the government department US AID, was quoted as saying that the Somali famine was ‘... the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world.’²⁶⁰

It is clear that by the end 1992 that international relief agencies, US media and the US State Department were all aware of the scope of the disaster, and were transmitting this information as best as they could to the government and public. However both the UN and the US government remained slow to respond throughout 1991. By 1992 the value of this condition had increased substantially as greater public and governmental attention was being focused on Somalia. This was primarily because of greater media reporting of Clinton’s heavy criticism of Bush for his inaction in Somalia and Bosnia during the presidential campaign.

Antecedent Condition 2: Existence of a Saintly faction.

The value of the Saintly Faction condition is represented by the existence and influence of actors involved in promoting US engagement in the Somalia humanitarian

²⁵⁷ Anna Quindles, “Public and Private: Somalia’s Plagues,” *The New York Times*, 12 August, 1992, p. 19.

²⁵⁸ Jane Perlez, “Armed U.N. Troops arrive in Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 15 September, 1992, p. 10.

²⁵⁹ Final Editorial, President Bush statement from Oval Office, “The People of Somalia . . . the Children . . . Need Our Help,” *The Washington Post*, 5 Dec, 1992, p. A16.

²⁶⁰ Comment made by Andre Natsio during his testimony on 30 January 1992 before the US House Select Committee on Hunger, in Ramsbothum and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 206; Slim and Visman, 1995, p. 146.

disaster. The humanitarian advocates were made up of two groups. The first group combined the US relief NGO community and the second group was made up of select US Senators.

The extent of the lobbying power of the US relief NGOs is reflected by the ability of CARE and Save the Children representatives to get regular meetings with both the State Department and Congressional members on the issue of US engagement in Somalia. Furthermore, Slim and Visman note that the combined influence of US aid agencies such as InterAction was very successful in mobilizing public support through the media. They suggest that these NGO's successfully generated significant public interest in the US's foreign policy in Somalia.²⁶¹ These US relief NGOs worked domestically with the State Department and USAID in order to present a coordinated effort to address the problems. Furthermore, international aid agencies such as Medicines Sans Frontieres, UNICEF, the World Food Program, World Concern, International Medical Corps, UNHCR, UNCF, ICRC, and Catholic Relief Services also worked in Somalia and lobbied both the US administration and the UN for greater international commitment.²⁶²

The second group in the Sainly Faction was made up of humanitarian advocates in particular Senator Paul Simon and Senator Nancy Kassebaum. Early on in 1992 both Senators called for immediate action and greater US commitment to resolving the crisis.²⁶³ Specifically Senator Kassebaum forwarded a Senate Resolution calling for the

²⁶¹ InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S. based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Interaction has more than 160 members operating in multiple developing countries. InterAction is considered to be a force multiplier that gives members the collective power of all members to speak and act on issues of common concern. Slim and Visman, 1995, p. 157.

²⁶² Woods, 1997, p. 152.

²⁶³ Woods, 1997, p. 153.

President to make Somalia a greater policy priority for the US administration and calling for the government to dispatch a special envoy to the region immediately.²⁶⁴ By January of 1992 Senator Nancy Kassebaum visited Somalia herself and returned to Congress with first hand information of the deteriorating security situation and the rising death toll.²⁶⁵ On the Senator's return she increased her lobby for the deployment of US forces to Somalia in order to ensure that food shipments could get through to the people.²⁶⁶

It was evident that by December 1992 with the combined lobbying of the relief agency community and select Senators, the prominence of the Somalia issue and US engagement had grown extensively, both in the media and Congress (by December 1992 Congress had held seven hearings on the subject).²⁶⁷ Given the significant influence which the Sainly faction was having on US government and public opinion, one can conclude that by December 1992 the value of this variable was extremely high.

Antecedent Condition 3: Ability of Sainly Faction to Form a Coalition.

The ability of the Sainly Faction to form a coalition is based on its capacity to garner political support from across the political spectrum. This capability is based on two components; the first is the nature of the issue that they are advocating (i.e. humanitarian relief) and the second is the saintly faction's position on the political spectrum (i.e. the degree of political liability and/or legitimacy that other political actors will engender by associating with the Sainly Faction).

²⁶⁴ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 192; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 213.

²⁶⁵ Natsios, 1997, p. 82.

²⁶⁶ Robin Toner, "Public and Private: Somalia's Plagues," *The New York Times*, 12 August, 1992, p. 19.

²⁶⁷ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 193.

In the first instance the nature and extent of the human suffering in Somalia as reported by the UN, the US State Department, US relief NGO community, and various US media outlets provided a compelling argument for the ethical necessity of acting to solve the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. In the second instance all the humanitarian advocates in the Sainly Faction were either apolitical, in the case of the international relief NGOs, or bipartisan as represented by Democratic Senator Paul Simon and the Republican Senator Kassebaum cross party cooperation. Johnston and Dagne make the point that by December unified congressional pressure on the Somalia issue was extremely influential in publicizing the crisis and pressuring the administration to act.²⁶⁸ By November 1992 it was apparent that there was a significant political coalition seeking an active US solution to the crisis, not to mention that a proactive humanitarian policy had been a presidential campaign promise of Clinton's. This policy momentum however continued to be stifled by the Pentagon as it stuck to its recommendation that the military could not successfully and safely intervene in Somalia. Nevertheless by December 1992 the political coalition motioning towards intervention was larger than it had previously been, as there were no political or ideological constraints preventing humanitarian advocates and mainstream political actors from participating in the coalition which advocated a humanitarian intervention.

Antecedent Condition 4: Elite need for political legitimacy.

The value of this condition is reflected by the degree of political legitimacy sought by Bush. Political legitimacy in this condition is interpreted to reflect popular support for the President as reflected in public opinion polls. The value of this variable

²⁶⁸ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 193.

will be measured by identifying the prime reasons that motivated President Bush to intervene in Somalia.

First it is important to justify why President Bush sought political legitimacy by the end of 1992. By mid 1992 an *ABC News-Washington Post* Presidential campaign poll showed Clinton with 54%, and Bush with 38%.²⁶⁹ A *New York Times* article commented on the scale of President Bush's demise in the opinion polls during the election when it reported that it was 'especial noteworthy as just eighteen months before the President had managed unassailable approval rating after the Gulf War.'²⁷⁰ Detrimentially for Bush the Clinton camp consistently attacked the administration on its lack of policy action on Somalia.²⁷¹ By the time Bush officially lost the Presidential election the polls indicated that his political support in the US was extremely low hence the rationale as to why he wanted to redeem some political legitimacy before he left office.

In light of this poor political showing, it is notable that Bush's decision to initiate 'Operation Provide Relief' (US contributed airlift capabilities and increased its relief contribution to the UN mission in Somalia), came on the eve of the National Republican Convention, and at a time when he was behind in the election polls.²⁷² Most observers cite two predominant reasons why Bush made this decision. The primary explanation forwarded by Bush himself was that he was unequivocally moved by his personal feelings on the human suffering unfolding in Somalia. Secondary sources support this explanation that the President's humanitarian impulse was the primary reason for deciding

²⁶⁹ Jane Perlez, "Clinton Retains a Wide Lead in Latest Survey," *The New York Times*, 16 Sept, 1992, p. 1.

²⁷⁰ Robin Toner, "Critical Moments; How Bush Lost Five Chances to Seize the Day," *The New York Times*, 11 Oct, 1993, p. 1.

²⁷¹ Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 72.

²⁷² DiPrizio, 2002, p. 51.

to send troops.²⁷³ This humanitarian rationale was reflected throughout the press in the days following Bush's decision to initiate a humanitarian intervention. For example *The New York Times* quoted Bush as saying '...our human interest superseded our national interest,' in the case of Somalia.²⁷⁴ The White House and the State Departments further reinforced this singular humanitarian motivation by stating in the *Washington Post* that the 'aim of the force [UNITAF], would be only humanitarian.'²⁷⁵

The second explanation offered for why Bush made the decision to intervene, was because of concern for his historical legacy. After losing the election it was evident that Bush was motivated to some degree by a humanitarian ethic, however many observers argue that a concern for his political legacy was also apparent in his decision making process.²⁷⁶ This factor was noted by *The New York Times* on December 6th when it quoted 'Friends and advisers to President Bush say that mounting concern about the fate of more than one million starving people was the major goad to his decision, 11 days ago, to offer troops for use in Somalia. But it is no coincidence, that Mr. Bush is leaving office with a show of American might in a noble cause.'²⁷⁷ Even a Bush administration insider Brent Scowcroft (Bush National Security Advisor) was quoted by Western as suggesting that 'Bush had become more sensitive to his Presidential legacy, which appeared jeopardized by the exhaustive liberal criticisms of the administration's apparent callousness to humanitarian crises.'²⁷⁸ One could reasonably suggest that once Bush lost the election he was no longer concerned or constrained by his electoral standing, and

²⁷³ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 53; Woods, 1997, p. 155.

²⁷⁴ Robin Toner, "Right to Intervene," *The New York Times*, 30 Nov, 1992, p. 15.

²⁷⁵ Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Plans Short Stay For Forces in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 1 Dec, 1992, p. A29.

²⁷⁶ Woods, 1997, p. 158; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 51.

²⁷⁷ Michael Wines, "Mission to Somalia," *The New York Times*, 6 December 1992, p. 14.

²⁷⁸ Western, 2002, p. 137.

furthermore he was no longer directly accountable for the Somalia policy and/or any future foreign policy. Therefore one could postulate that the political costs of intervention were no longer applicable to him. Instead, by virtue of the timing of his decision, Bush transferred all potential political costs to the new administration. *The New York Times* reported the following insight into the rationality behind the timing and reason for President Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia, which many observers would agree with '...for President Bush, Somalia is a win-win situation. If he wraps it up in his remaining lame duck administration, he has another Desert Storm illusionary victory for the history books. If the incursion fails, Mr. Bush will have left Bill Clinton in a quagmire that will stymie his domestic efforts.'²⁷⁹

Bush could have reasonably calculated that his political popularity would rebound with the announcement of his decision to intervene in Somalia based on his normative belief that the public would support a humanitarian intervention. The immediate response to Bush's decision was widely seen as extremely popular with both the public and the majority in Congress.²⁸⁰ A *Washington Post* survey reported that the majority of Americans supported Bush's policy, when 76% of those questioned approved of Bush's decision to send troops to Somalia.²⁸¹ It appears that Bush made the correct estimate that the public would respond favourably to his policy decision to launch a humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

²⁷⁹ Thomas Friedman, "Give Diplomacy a Chance to Revamp Somalia; Clinton's Quagmire?" *The New York Times*, 9 December, 1992, p. 11.

²⁸⁰ This policy decision was also supported at the time by Clinton. Clinton, 2004, p. 550. Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 195; Woods, 1997, p. 158; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 51.

²⁸¹ Richard Morin, "Poll Finds Public Is Optimistic About the Economy and Clinton," *The Washington Post*, 16 Dec, 1992, p. A16.

Irrespective of which reason motivated his decision, Bush's poor showing in the poll numbers throughout 1992 and his subsequent loss in the Presidential election, present plausible grounds on which to suggest that by December President Bush felt he was in need of political legitimacy. Therefore one can extrapolate that no matter what motivated Bush in his decision making process, in the end he still gained a great deal of popular legitimacy by his decision to initiate 'Operation Restore Hope.' Consequently the value of this condition was very high after Bush announced his decision on December 4th.

Antecedent Condition 5: Domestic Balance of Power.

This condition reflects the political needs of the ruling elite. In this case the political elites are represented by the President and the US Congress. This variable is made up of two premises; the first is that the more precarious the President's standing the greater his incentive to cooperate with the Saintly Faction will be. The second premise is based on the realist perspective that the majority party in the Congress will seek to retain power in part, by advancing popular policies and the minority party will seek to acquire power by also doing the same thing. Based on opinion poll data one can conclude that humanitarian intervention in Somalia was popularly supported policy at the time.²⁸² The value of the condition is established by looking first at Bush's political standing in the fallout of the 1992 Presidential election, and secondly by identifying how well supported a policy of intervention in Somalia was in the US Congress from 1991 to 1994. The value of the condition will therefore reflect the overall balance in political power in the US political system.

²⁸² See Appendix 7: PIPA Poll – Humanitarian Intervention in Africa.

To start it is necessary to note that throughout 1992 the Bush administration held to its non-intervention policy stance towards the Somalia crisis.²⁸³ In early 1992 *The New York Times* highlighted this policy stance when it remarked that ‘...Washington is reluctant in an election year to become embroiled in what could be a costly quagmire.’²⁸⁴ One significant reason for the administration’s non-intervention policy was based on the understanding that the use of force would create a huge domestic political gamble for the administration in an election year. As Haass highlights, there is no other public policy issue in the US that is as controversial as the use of American military force.²⁸⁵ Similarly Durch noted that US Presidents have always been wary of committing US forces in election years, as he suggests that ‘... if things turn out well you are a hero; if not, you will likely be accused of risking, and wasting, young American lives to further your own political career.’²⁸⁶ Therefore for most of 1992, the Bush administration was not motivated by the potential political legitimacy to be gained by further involvement in Somalia. Comparatively the administration felt that the Somalia crisis was a policy liability. However as the Presidential campaign continued through 1992 the more precarious the President’s political standing became. The *New York Times* noted in October of the Presidential election year that Bush was struggling for legitimacy with an approval rating marginally above 40%.

The systematic decrease in Bush’s political standing resulted in his losing the Presidential election.²⁸⁷ This demise was tracked by Gallup, in a trend line for the Presidential campaign which indicated that from July 1992 onwards Clinton consistently

²⁸³ Western, 2003, p. 113.

²⁸⁴ Editorial Desk, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 9 Feb, 1992, p. 16.

²⁸⁵ Haass, 1999, p. 2.

²⁸⁶ Durch, 1996, p. 319.

²⁸⁷ See Appendix 4: GALLUP - Presidential Campaign Approval Rating.

led Bush in all the election polls. In fact the *Gallup* trend line suggests that Bush's poll rating actually started to diminish in comparison to his opponent as early as April 1992. In the final month of the election campaign a *New York Times/CBS News* Poll proposed that Clinton held a significant percentage lead over President Bush as the campaign entered the final month of 1992.²⁸⁸ From these poll results one can extrapolate that by December 1992 Bush was very much in need of a boost to his political standing. The proposition is that President Bush's loss in the election was the incentive that prompted him to cooperate with the Sainly Faction to form a broad coalition in support an intervention in Somalia for the reason a gaining political dividends and abiding by his sense of humanitarianism. Subsequently on December 4th 1992 the Bush administrations policy of non-intervention towards Somalia was reversed, from a policy of non-intervention which Bush had dogmatically held for nearly a year, to a policy of greater cooperation with humanitarian advocates and a new policy of humanitarian intervention.

In terms of the second premise of this variable one can say that Congress did play an important role in the administration's policy response to Somalia. Specifically, Johnston and Dagne propose that the 102nd Congress (1991-1992) played a critical role in legitimating and supporting the Bush administrations ultimate decision to intervene.²⁸⁹ It is notable that although the Democrats controlled the majority in the 102nd Congress there was widespread cross party support for greater US engagement in Somalia both by Democrats and Republicans.²⁹⁰ Hence the overall focus of political power within the US Congress in 1992 was aimed at pressuring the administration to further engage in

²⁸⁸ Robert Toner, "Poll Finds Hostility to Perot and No Basic Shift in Race," *The New York Times*, 6 Oct, 1992, p. 1.

²⁸⁹ The authors suggest that this change in Congressional support for the intervention in Somalia significantly influenced the UN's decision to withdraw UNOSOM II. Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 191.

²⁹⁰ See Appendix 5: Distribution of Seats in the House of Representatives 1989-1997.

Somalia. The US 102nd Congress played a proactive role in getting the US administration to engage in three specific ways. The first was in the role played by select Senators such as Nancy Kassebaum and Senators Paul Simon who visited Somalia and provided information to Congress and lobbied the administrations to take a stronger policy stance.

The second way, in which the 102nd Congress supported a greater US engagement in Somalia, was by publicizing the extent of the disaster and focusing public attention on the issue. Johnston and Dagne argue that Congressional activities were very successful in indirectly pressuring the administration by publicizing the Somalia crisis in the media. It is notable that by the end of the second congressional session in December 1992 Congress had held seven hearings on the subject, at one of which the US AID chief representative Andrew Natsio testified that Somalia was ‘the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world.’²⁹¹ In retrospect the influence of this bipartisan Congressional pressure on the administration was verified by President Bush when he stated that he had strongly taken into account Congressional views on the urgent need of action in Somalia, when he made his decision to deploy UNITAF.²⁹²

The third way Congress played a role in influencing the balance of power was in the lobbying of the Congressional Black Caucus for greater engagement by the administration in Somalia.²⁹³ Johnston and Dagne point out that the African American Congressional members were extremely active as the crisis in Somalia worsened. Specifically in April 1992, the Black Caucus sent a letter to secretary of State James

²⁹¹ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 193.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 193.

²⁹³ The Congressional Black Caucus is an organization of African-American members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Founded in 1970, it addresses legislative concerns of African Americans and other minority citizens, such as employment, welfare reform, minority business development, and expanded educational opportunities.

Baker asking the US to take 'the initiative in the UN in forcefully advocating a high-level UN presence in Somalia.' Furthermore in October 1992 a member of the Caucus, Representative Lewis, introduced a Resolution that demanded the US government be more actively involved in Somalia through the UN, in order to protect relief operations.²⁹⁴ Throughout 1992 and 1993 the Congressional Black Caucus was especially proactive in securing extra monies for foreign aid to Somalia.²⁹⁵

One can infer that the value of this condition in December 1992 was quite high for two reasons. The first was because Bush sought to renew his waning political legitimacy by exercising his authority in one last foreign policy decision, before the President-elect's inauguration. Secondly, a combination of a bipartisan congressional lobbying, the actions of select Senators, and the activity of the Black Congressional Caucus all focused political attention on the Somalia issue in order to bring about a change in the administration's policy of non-intervention.

Antecedent Condition 6: Willingness of elites to logroll.

The final inferred condition outlined in Kaufmann and Pape's SLM involves the political willingness on the part of elites to cooperate in a political coalition. In this case study the elites are represented by the President, the US Congress, and the Pentagon. The value of this condition will be measured by showing the degree of willingness these actors had to cooperate over the Somalia affair.

Although Bush stuck to a policy strategy of non-intervention towards Somalia throughout the Presidential election year, only one month after his defeat on the 4th of

²⁹⁴ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 195.

²⁹⁵ Adam Clymer, "House Democrats united to approve Clinton's budget," *The New York Times*, 19 Mar, 1993, p. 1.

December 4th, he undertook a policy reversal and announced his decision to send US military forces to Somalia.²⁹⁶ Bush's willingness to get further involved in the Somalia crisis was because of his expressed humanitarian impulse to do something more about the human suffering in Somalia. The expressed aim of this deployment was to create a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief. Reflecting Bush's apparent humanitarian motivation at the time the *Washington Post* quoted Bush as saying that morally '... a failure to respond to massive human catastrophes like Somalia would scar the soul of our nation.'²⁹⁷

By the end of 1992 the US Congress also showed a greater willingness to support US military action in Somalia. Specifically the 102nd Congress played a critical role in the deployment of US troops to Somalia, first by pressuring the Bush administration to intervene, and then secondly by legitimating and financing the policy decision after it was taken.²⁹⁸ Specifically in terms of budgeting after the fact, the *New York Times* noted how the Senate proactively supported the administration's policy by approving \$1.2 billion in military spending that the Pentagon had not even asked for.²⁹⁹ Furthermore in the 102nd Congress there was bipartisan support for greater US engagement in Somalia, led by Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, who as early as the middle of 1992, first championed the policy idea of deploying US troops to stabilize the country so that international relief agencies could safely distribute aid. Inside Congress the Congressional Black Caucus showed the greatest collective willingness to lobby for

²⁹⁶ Mayall, 2004, p. 133.

²⁹⁷ John Goshko, "Bush Warns Against 'Retreat' to Isolationism," *The Washington Post*, 16 Dec, 1992, p. A22.

²⁹⁸ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 191; Adam Clymer, "House Democrats united to approve Clinton's budget," *The New York Times*, 19 Mar, 1993, p. 1.

²⁹⁹ Adam Clymer, "Senate Panel Backs Military Spending the Pentagon Never Sought," *The New York Times*, 8 June, 1993, p. 16.

greater engagement by the US in Somalia. Specifically the Congressional Black Caucus introduced resolutions that called for greater US cooperation in the international response towards Somalia.³⁰⁰ In terms of defining the tone of Congressional support for intervention, a *New York Times* article two days after the President's decision highlighted how there was a 'chorus of Congressional support for military intervention in Somalia.'³⁰¹

The third actor whose attitude towards Somalia was very important was the Pentagon. The Pentagon's unwillingness to commit to greater engagement in Somalia was one of the dominating rationales expressed by the administration for why intervention should not be undertaken as a policy solution prior to December 4th. Specifically the Bush administration's policy strategy of non-intervention was backed by a military estimation that given the circumstances the US military could not successfully accomplish a military intervention in Somalia to address the humanitarian crisis. For example General Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was steadfastly opposed to calls for a US humanitarian military intervention.³⁰² The *Washington Post* suggested that the military's reluctance to get involved was because '... for the Pentagon, the similarities between Vietnam and Somalia were initially sufficient to make everyone cautious.'³⁰³ Throughout 1991 and 1992 the Pentagon openly resisted any direct American military involvement in Somalia. However on November 24th the Pentagon reversed its assessment on the 'do-ability' of an armed intervention in Somalia. Contrary to his earlier statements General Powell said that the military could now successfully

³⁰⁰ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 195.

³⁰¹ Clifford Krauss, "A Few in Congress advising Caution, or Vote, on Somalia," *The New York Times*, 7 Dec, 1993, p. 14.

³⁰² Western, 2002, p. 110.

³⁰³ Richard Cohen, "It's Not another Vietnam," *The Washington Post*, 1 Dec, 1992, p. A19.

launch a mission.³⁰⁴ Admiral David Jeremiah subsequently told the National Security Council Committee on Somalia 'If you [committee] think US forces are needed, we can do the job.'³⁰⁵ A cursory analysis of the context of the policy reversal is thick with contradiction as highlighted by Western when he questioned, 'Why did the Joint Chiefs reverse their estimation from July 1992 that Somalia was a 'bottomless pit', to their November proclamation that 'we can do the job!'³⁰⁶ One month before Bush made his decision to intervene the *Washington Post* noted how both members of the administrations, and the Pentagon were still 'not eager to embrace military action in Somalia.'³⁰⁷ Specifically *The New York Times* highlighted how most observers were caught off guard by the President's decision to send troops suggesting that it even '...surprised many in the administrations, including top State Department officials, who had thought the President was not prepared to send in American ground forces.'³⁰⁸ Although the military did not recommend an intervention in Somalia initially, with their subsequent change in estimation of the 'do-ability' of the mission on November 24th the Pentagon showed greater public willingness to undertake the operation.³⁰⁹

With the explicit willingness of the US executive, legislator, and military to support and undertake a humanitarian intervention in Somalia the value of this condition was extremely high by December 1992.

³⁰⁴ Western, 2002, p. 131.

³⁰⁵ Woods, 1997, p. 158.

³⁰⁶ Western, 2002, p. 113.

³⁰⁷ Barton Gellman, "Pentagon Sees Likely Success; Somalia Anarchy Forces Policy Shift," *The Washington Post*, 28 Nov, 1991, p. A1.

³⁰⁸ "Somali Aid Plan Is Called Most Ambitious Option," *The New York Times*, 28 Nov 1992, p. 2.

³⁰⁹ Blumenthal, 2003, p. 640.

IV: Saintly Logroll

Although all six antecedent conditions varied at the rate in which they appreciated in value, by December 4th, one month after Bush's defeat in the Presidential election, he announced his decision to abide by the wishes of the Saintly Faction and the US Congress, by sending US military forces to Somalia in order to create a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief. One can say that at this point the Saintly Logroll was solidified and untied for the first time.

DV: Costly Moral Action/Operation Restore Hope

The subsequent policy decision by President Bush resulted in 'Operation Restore Hope' being initiated by the Pentagon. The humanitarian intervention was led by the US and involved 28,000 US troops along with 10,000 troops from over twenty other nations. The international coalition was formally authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 794 and called UNITAF. UNITAF was mandated by the UN Security Council to employ 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.'³¹⁰

Conclusion

So why did President Bush incur the risks and costs of a humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December 1992? Bush appears to have been motivated by two primary reasons in his decision making process. The first and more popular explanation is that Bush was motivated by a personal humanitarian impulse to do something in response to the immense human suffering in Somalia. This second most cited explanation was

³¹⁰ DiPrizio, 2003, p. 47; ICCIS, 2001, p. 96.

because he was concerned about his political legacy. This concern presumably developed after his official defeat in the Presidential election campaign on the 4th of November. There are other factors that have been identified to have played a role in the President's decision making process. They range from pressure from mass media, reaction to public opinion, lobbying from humanitarian aid agencies, exogenous pressure from the UN, and finally endogenous pressure from the US State Department and the US Congress.³¹¹ There is also the political account that suggests that Bush wished to politically preempt Clinton, in order to prevent Clinton from deciding to intervene in Bosnia (a policy which Clinton expressed on the campaign trail and one that Bush did not support) and therefore burden Clinton with a foreign policy strategy concentrating on Somalia.³¹² The empirical evidence suggests that all these factors played a role in setting up the domestic political conditions that framed Bush's decision making process. However, probably the most important enabling factor for President Bush's decision making process was that the US public and the Congress both actively supported intervention by December 1992.

Even though antecedent condition 4 (Elite need for political legitimacy) provided compelling evidence with which to understand Bush's motivation, a clearer idea of his rationale is still necessary. In Krasner's logic of 'consequences' he adopts the realist perspective that a ruler can make decisions in line with his own self interest to stay in power. In order to stay in power it is rational for a ruler to make decisions that will promote the values of their citizens so that they can continue to gain popular and political

³¹¹ The ICISS report proposed that television coverage of Somalia had significant role in increasing public pressure to induce governments to undertake interventions. However, the existence of the CNN effect is refuted by Piers Robinson (2002) *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, Foreign policy and Intervention*. Today the 'CNN effect,' remains contested extensively within humanitarian literature. Weiss and Collins, 2000, p. 203; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 47 & 158; Western, 2002, p. 112; ICISS, 2001, p. 351.

³¹² Western, 2002, p. 121.

support.³¹³ Based on this perspective Bush's belief that human rights were an important normative standard in the US, then this deduction is in part proof that human rights have evolved to political importance in the US. This acknowledgement reinforces the theoretical discussion on the evolution of human rights in Chapter 4. The concept that human rights norms can constitute a real national interest lends credibility to the constructivist perspective, which suggests that public interests can be redefined overtime to generate new national interests and influence government decisions. The compelling evidence of the role of humanitarian ideals in the US Somalia case study abides by one of Kaufmann and Pape's important theoretical claims that ideals play a key role in generating a CIMA. The combination of Bush's humanitarian impulse and concern for his political legacy provide a convincing explanation to why President Bush decided to engage the US in Somalia.

Furthermore Kaufmann and Pape's SLM successfully identified the necessary conditions that would when individually strong enough and taken in unison in the model trigger the formation of a political coalition with the single aim of forwarding a CIMA. This Sainly Logroll in turn created the positive political conditions which allowed the President to choose the policy option of deploying troops. Although each value of the six antecedent conditions appreciated at different rates over the year, by the 4th of December all the antecedent conditions had reached their highest level. Specifically one can say from the evidence that condition 1 (Existence of a moral issue) and condition 2 (Existence of a Sainly Faction) were consistently of a high value throughout 1992. In terms of condition 1 it is apparent that multiple governmental, non governmental and media sources consistently reported the extent of the disaster in Somalia and therefore the

³¹³ Krasner, 1999, p. 7.

extent of the crisis was well known. Similarly for condition 2 the combined US relief NGO community and select Senators lobbied together for greater US engagement in Somalia throughout 1992. Comparatively the value of condition 4, (the Presidents need for legitimacy) as reflected by popular support, remained low as President Bush's job approval ratings matched his poor polling in the Presidential election campaign.³¹⁴ However, after the election his popularity increased as his decision to intervene was met with a positive and popular response from the public and Congress. In terms of condition 5 (Domestic balance of power) one can say that the value in this condition increased slowly as it took time to build up a critical mass of cross party Congressional support for engagement in Somalia. In terms of the Presidents political support, the evidence suggests that when he lost the election on the 4th of November Bush's lack of political power actually helped him decide on his policy strategy, as he was no longer constrained by the political necessities of his office.

Kaufmann and Pape's SLM indicated that condition 6 (Willingness of elites to logroll) played the decisive role in completing the variable chain of influence that generated the Sainly Logroll in late November/early December 1992. What led to the last minute appreciation was a combination of the Pentagon decision that a military mission was possible, President Bush's wish to move towards a policy of humanitarian intervention in Somalia and the Congresses willingness to allocate the funds for the intervention. One explanation for why the Pentagon changed its estimation of the mission after the 24th of November was because the President either ordered them to. A second explanation offered by the *New York Times* is that the President 'persuaded' the Pentagon when it reported '... the President persuaded the Joint Chiefs to go along with the

³¹⁴ See Appendix 4: GALLUP – Presidential Approval Rating Poll.

political judgment of the Commander in Chief that the moment had come for a genuine - police action.’³¹⁵ Regardless of the nature of the discussion held between the administration and the Pentagon it was the President who dictated the Pentagon’s eventual course of action.

Once condition 6 had hit a critical mass, this indicated that there was now a willingness on the part of the President and Congress to form a coalition with the Sainly Faction to forward a CIMA policy response. The value in condition 3 (Ability of Sainly Faction to form coalition) tracked the increase in interest from the President, the public and Congress for greater engagement by the US in Somalia. By late November/early December 1992 all six of the antecedent conditions hit their highest value hitting the threshold which precipitated the Sainly Logroll. These domestic political conditions allowed Bush to choose an armed humanitarian intervention with the knowledge that he had the broad and popular support of Congress and public opinion.

Was the US’s policy a CIMA? Kaufmann and Pape defined CIMA as one that advances a moral principle rather than a selfish interest. Bush’s humanitarian impulse to relieve suffering in Somalia indicates that the policy was motivated by moral principles and humanitarian normative principles rather than national interests. In addition the US had no apparent political, economic or security interest in Somalia after the Cold War. By this rationale ‘Operation Restore Hope’ was a CIMA. Kaufmann and Pape also propose that a CIMA need not only be substantiated on moral grounds, but also that the policy needs to have incurred real costs in terms of material interests such as wealth, loss of life, or national security. The evidence from the Somalia case shows that the US was the single largest donor of financial aid and relief aid through its engagement in Somalia.

³¹⁵ William Safire, “Right to Intervene,” *The New York Times*, 30 Nov, 1992, p. 15.

This fact alone proves that the US was willing to incur material costs to advance his policy. In the US Somalia case study the SLM successfully identified how a combination of a normative humanitarian ideals and domestic political conditions interacted to generate a national political will to support Bush's decision to undertake 'Operation Restore Hope.'

To conclude one of the most contested issues in the US Somalia case study is the timing of President Bush's decision. As the *Washington Post* reported the President's 'sudden offer to send a division of American soldiers to face down Somalia's warlords is mysterious in its timing and logic.'³¹⁶ Throughout 1992 Bush managed to resist pressure from the media, the public, the US Congress, the Clinton Presidential campaign, and the UN to further engage in Somalia.³¹⁷ Therefore Bush's subsequent policy reversal caught his opponents, the Pentagon, the US media and even some in his administration off-guard.³¹⁸ Although the 'A Day in Hell,' cable appears to have prompted the President's interest in Somalia in July, the administration still stuck to its non-interventionist policy for a further six months. It is also true that neither the political, military or logistical situation on the ground had changed in the period prior to Bush's decision. The crisis had long since reached a critical humanitarian mass with the deaths of over 300,000 Somalis by the end of the summer, and yet the Bush administration policy remained non-interventionist until December 4th. The discrepancy between Bush's rhetoric on human rights during 1992 and his policy action of non-intervention, leads one to be naturally skeptical about Bush's true 'humanitarian impulse.' Even using Kransers logic it is unclear why Bush did not institute 'Operation Restore Hope' long before December 4th.

³¹⁶ Jim Hoagland, "On Somalia, a Mysterious Decision," *The Washington Post*, 3 Dec, 1992, p. A21.

³¹⁷ DiPrizio, 2003, p. 60.

³¹⁸ Western, 2002, p. 113.

One explanation for Bush's non-engagement is that for Bush as for all US Presidents, committing troops overseas during an election year is a significant political gamble. In short after November 4th, the political costs of an interventionist policy were no longer constraining Bush's decision making ability. Therefore having instituted the US's Somalia policy Bush was no longer directly accountable for any failure of the policy after January 1993, yet he would gain political dividends from its potential success. By virtue of the timing of his decision Bush transferred the potential political costs associated with Somalia to the Clinton administration. Most observers believe that President Bush's loss in the Presidential election was therefore the key factor in the decision making process to intervene in Somalia, as it allowed the outgoing President the political latitude to act on his personal humanitarian motive and also take the credit for initiating the US's humanitarian response.

6.4 Clinton Takes Office as UNITAF Deploys to Somalia

The second part of this chapter will examine if the SLM can be successfully extended to explain the US's subsequent abandonment of its CIMA policy. The hypothesis is that the apparent reversal in value of the condition variables in the SLM was precipitated by the deaths of US Army Rangers on October 3rd, which then led to President Clinton's decision to withdraw US personnel from Somalia. This examination will be broken down into three sections. The first section will outline the sequence of events that occurred from the time the US led UNITAF mission got on the ground, up until Clinton decided to withdraw all US personnel. The second section will contain a second arrow diagram of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM, but this time it will delineate which of the six condition

variable changed. The subsequent analysis of the antecedent conditions values will seek to explain why these values changed and what this meant to the integrity of the SLM. The final section will seek to explain why Clinton responded in the way that he did and what implication his decision had on future foreign policy.

6.5 Sequence of Events after December 1992

The *Washington Post* reflected public opinion and commended Bush for his decision to intervene when it reported that to ‘... mount an ambitious and risky humanitarian intervention... Operation Restore Hope is the right thing to do.’³¹⁹ However the main political implication of Bush’s decision to conduct a humanitarian intervention in Somalia was that he left his Democratic successor with a difficult foreign policy inheritance.³²⁰ By pre-empting Clinton’s ability to make his own foreign policy decision Bush committed Clinton to a difficult and consuming foreign policy responsibility in Somalia. *The New York Times* highlighted the political ramifications for the Clinton administration by noting that ‘Bush's willingness to intervene in force set a tone for policy that President-elect Bill Clinton will find hard to change after Jan. 20.’³²¹ Nevertheless early in his Presidency, Clinton set about trying to fulfill his 1992 campaign promises, to promote human rights while simultaneously advancing US security and economic interests, and also reducing US military commitments after the end of the Cold War.³²² However as the administration’s Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck noted after the fact, both the economy and US

³¹⁹ Jim Hoagland, “Operation Restore Hope,” *The Washington Post*, 5 Dec, 1992, p. C6.

³²⁰ Slim and Visman, 1995, p. 157.

³²¹ Michael Gordon, “Somali Aid Plan Is Called Most Ambitious Option,” *The New York Times*, 28 November, 1992, p. 3.

³²² Shattuck, 2003, p. 14.

military engagement in Somalia were to become the most problematic policy areas for Clinton in his first year in office.³²³

The US led coalition UNITAF 'Operation Restore Hope' was very successful and highly focused on accomplishing its humanitarian mission to secure transport routes, logistical centers, and provide security for the humanitarian effort.³²⁴ The operation was so successful in achieving its mission aims that a force reduction took place within several months. Most observers skeptically suggest that the move was merely a symbolic act taken on President Clinton's inauguration day in order to gain political credibility.³²⁵ The *Washington Post* reflected the immediate early success of the UNITAF mission on the ground by quoting Andrew Natsios, optimistically suggested that 'The operation is much further along than I expected.'³²⁶ The *Washington Post* even reported that Somalia was proving to be the case '... that gave military intervention a good name.'³²⁷

Even with the success of the UNITAF mission, the contemporary belief amongst observers was that the working relationship between the UN and the US worsened for two reasons. The first was that the UN wanted to extend the UNITAF mandate to incorporate more nation building roles. As early as December 16th 1992 *The New York Times* highlighted the difference in opinion between the US and the UN over the US's role in Somalia when it noted that 'Officials in Washington seem to envision a short-lived operation primarily aimed at getting food to the starving,' whereas the UN wanted '... the American-led force to undertake the more difficult and dangerous task of systematically

³²³ Ibid., p. 15.

³²⁴ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 44; Woods, 1997, p. 159; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996, p. 208.

³²⁵ Woods, 1997, p. 159.

³²⁶ Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Ahead of Schedule, In Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 30 Dec, 1992, p. A6.

³²⁷ Mary McGory, "Looking Beyond Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 24 Dec, 1992, p. A2.

disarming Somali irregular troops.’³²⁸ Similarly the *Washington Post* reported the White House press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater as emphasizing that any U.S. role would be limited to the immediate problem of safeguarding food and medicine distribution and would not include any effort to establish a government.³²⁹ The second apparent reason for the uneasy relationship between the UN and US over Somalia was that it was generally felt by observers that the UN took too long to bring its political and humanitarian resources to bear in the Somalia crisis and that when it did respond with UNOSOM I the effort was insufficient. As time passed there was increased US criticism both on the ground and in Washington that the UN was ‘foot-dragging’ with regard to its operational responsibility.³³⁰

Contemporary thought suggests that the UN wanted the US to engage in nation building as well as security tasks, and that this desire was blocked by the US administration and the Pentagon, because they wanted to avoid mission creep beyond their clear military mandate to provide security. However this point is disputed by Clarke and Herbst when they suggest that it was untrue that the UN tried to broaden the US mission in Somalia. Instead the authors suggest that ‘in fact, all of the major Security Council resolutions on Somalia, including Resolution 814, the “nation-building” resolution were written by the United States [by the Clinton administration], mainly in the Pentagon and handed to the UN as a fait accompli.’³³¹ What is clear in hindsight from the humanitarian interventions in the 1990s is that humanitarian intervention is itself a political act and in most cases necessitates some kind of nation building component. The

³²⁸ Paul Lewis, “U.N. Chief Says Letter to Bush Outlines U.S. Commitment to Disarm Somali Gangs, *The New York Times*, 13 December, 1992, p. 3.

³²⁹ Jim Goshko, “U.N. Chief Favours Use of Force in Somalia,” *The Washington Post*, 1 Dec, 1992, p. A1.

³³⁰ Clarke, 1997, p. 7; Woods, 1997, p. 16; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 47.

³³¹ Clarke and Herbst, 1997, p. 241.

Bush administration either did not understand this or ignored the fact knowing that the Clinton administration would have to deal with any future problems.

As per the agreed intervention plan by the winter of 1992 the US UNITAF mission stood down to be replaced by the UNOSOM II mission. The UNOSOM II deployment was made up of a UN force of 28,000, and had a more robust Chapter VII mandate to enforce a ceasefire and support UN reconstruction efforts. Unfortunately as time went by, this more robust mandate antagonized Aideed. The subsequent escalation in clashes between Aideed's militia and the UN resulted in casualties on both sides. In particular on June 5th 1993, twenty four Pakistani UN soldiers were killed in an operation against Aideed. In reaction to the escalation in conflict and as a response to the deaths of the twenty four peacekeepers, the UN Security Council, primarily motivated by the US sought a new mandate under Chapter VII that authorized all necessary measures to be taken to arrest, detain, and punish those responsible.³³² For all intense purposes UNOSOM II and Aideed were now at war.³³³ In light of UNOSOM II's lack of success in finding Aideed, and in reaction to Aideed's very public defiance of the UN directive for his arrest, the US administrations in August 1993 made the decision to deploy a Ranger task force to kill or capture Aideed.³³⁴

Subsequently on October 3rd 1993 the more aggressive military pursuit of Aideed led to the now renowned deaths of eighteen US Army Rangers during a clash with Aideed's militia in downtown Mogadishu. The clash ended with the now infamous television pictures of a body of an American pilot being dragged through the streets of

³³² DiPrizio, 2002, p. 49.

³³³ Woods, 1997, p. 163; DiPrizio, 2002, p. 50.

³³⁴ Woods, 1997, p. 163.

Mogadishu.³³⁵ Swamped with unfettered criticism from the public, the US media and Congress, Clinton immediately halted the policy of trying to kill or capture Aideed and adopted a defense military posture that was aimed at avoiding further US casualties.³³⁶ As an immediate response to public and political pressure Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. Army Rangers from Somalia.³³⁷ In the short term the administrations proceeded to reassure the public, media and Congress that hunting down Aideed was no longer their intent, and instead Clinton declared his plan to withdraw all American forces from Somalia within six months.³³⁸ In the meantime Clinton bolstered the US contingent in Somalia with reinforcements at the same time limiting their activities with the aim of preventing further casualties. Clinton's declared longer term plan was to hand over all responsibilities to UNOSOM II, under what the *Washington Post* called a 'Controlled Exit.'³³⁹ The death of the US Army Rangers had an immense impact on the US public as reflected by the *Washington Post* when it noted 'Just how wrong Somalia went has come into painful, sharp focus in the White House, in Congress and across the country since the Oct. 3 Mogadishu disaster that took eighteen American lives.'³⁴⁰ By August of 1994 the US finally closed its liaison office marking the end of all US government presence on the ground in Somalia.³⁴¹ In part because of the complete disengagement of the US and the

³³⁵ The operation also resulted in massive numbers of deaths and casualties amongst the civilian population. Woods, 1997, p. 163; Clinton, 2004, p. 551.

³³⁶ Clinton, 2004, p. 552; Woods, 1997, p. 165.

³³⁷ Ruth Marcus, "U.S. Pulls Rangers Out of Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 20 Oct, 1993, p. A1.

³³⁸ Douglas Jehl, "Overview; US mixes signals to Somali General on its next steps," *The New York Times*, 8 Oct, 1993, p. 1.

³³⁹ Woods, 1997, p. 165; Haass, 1999, p. 46; Jim Hoagland, "Controlled Exit," *The Washington Post*, 10 Oct, 1992, p. C6.

³⁴⁰ Ann Devroy, "Clinton Re examines a Foreign Policy under Siege," *The Washington Post*, 17 Oct, 1993, p. A1.


³⁴¹ Woods, 1997, p. 166.

further deterioration of the security situation the UN announced the phased reduction of UNOSOM II in July 1994.

6.6 The Saintly Logroll Model Part 2.

What follows is an arrow diagram of Kaufmann and Pape's SLM as applied to the specific domestic political conditions which occurred after October 3rd when the US Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu. The premise is that in reaction to the deaths of the US Army Rangers the values of several of the domestic political condition variables changed negatively. This change then dissolved the once inclusive political cooperation which once supported the Sanity Logroll. Thus the integrity of the IV disintegrated. Against this backdrop the President chose to withdraw US personnel and thereby ending the US's CIMA. Having constructed and analyzed the antecedent conditions in the first part of the chapter, this second part of the examination will seek to explain why the antecedent conditions changed and what this meant to the veracity of the SLM.

DIAGRAM 3: SLM SOMALIA – POST DEATHS OF RANGERS (OCT 3rd 1993)



Antecedent Condition 1: The Existence of a Moral issue.

The value of this condition stayed constant throughout 1992 and 1993 as the famine and civil war continued. The ICISS report of 2001 estimated that in the two years preceding the US intervention 400,000 to 500,000 Somali's died. During and after the UNITAF deployment the commissions conservative estimate was that 10,000 Somali's died due to the famine. It is suggested that the civil war only abated as the Somali militias spent more time fighting the UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions than each other.³⁴²

Antecedent Condition 2: Existence of a Sainly faction.

Similarly the value of this condition held relatively constant as the US relief NGO community continued to engage physically on the ground in Somalia and lobby in Washington. However the assistance of select Senators Paul Simon and Nancy Kassebaum appears to have dissipated after October 3rd in the face of Congressional criticisms of the administration's foreign policy strategy in Somalia, and questions from individual representatives like Senator Robert Byrd (D – W.V.) who questioned the costs of the US's role.³⁴³

Antecedent Condition 3: Ability of Sainly Faction to form a coalition.

The value of this condition fell abruptly after the October 3rd as the Sainly Faction could no longer garner political support for continued engagement in Somalia. Even though the humanitarian necessity remained, the political will to engage in a coalition with the Sainly Faction did not. The Sainly Factions ability to sustain its

³⁴² ICISS, 2001, p. 97.

³⁴³ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 197.

coalition after October 1993 proved impossible, although though they continued to lobby government both the President and Congress no longer wished to cooperate,

Antecedent Condition 4: Elite need for political legitimacy.

Having won the 1992 Presidential election, Clinton continued to maintain popular public support as indicated by opinion polls. In December 1993 as the UNITAF deployment got underway a *Washington Post-ABC News Poll* showed that 58% of those surveyed said that they approved of the job Clinton was doing as President.³⁴⁴ Similarly in February 1993 *The New York Times* reported that 64% of Americans said they approved of the way President Clinton was doing his job.³⁴⁵ It is fair to suggest that Clinton popular support in part was because of the successful UNITAF operation, which was popularly supported in the US.

However, the emotive public response to the television pictures of a US pilot being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, led to an immediate backlash against the administration. Clinton was inundated with criticism from the public and Congress about the role and mandate of US forces in Somalia.³⁴⁶ The events of October 3rd impacted immediately on Clinton's approval ratings as the *Washington Post* noted that Clinton's foreign policy ratings tumbled as events in Somalia became known.³⁴⁷ The public quickly made their feelings known when an *ABC* poll conducted on the 5th of October indicated that 58% of Americans thought that US troops should be removed from Somalia

³⁴⁴ Dan Balz, "Clinton Approval Rating Climbs to 58% in Poll," *The Washington Post*, 21 Dec, 1993, p. A10.

³⁴⁵ Gwen Ifill, "Clinton to fight foreign subsidies," *The New York Times*, 22 Feb, 1993, p. 1.

³⁴⁶ Clinton, 2004, p. 552; Woods, 1997, p. 165.

³⁴⁷ Dan Balz, "Clinton Approval Rating Climbs to 58% in Poll," *The Washington Post*, 21 Dec, 1993, p. A10.

immediately. Similarly a *CNN-USA Today* poll indicated that 43% of Americans polled thought the troops should be withdraw.³⁴⁸ Given this popular demand for troop withdrawals, one can speculate that Clinton incentive to continue forward a costly foreign policy dissolved. The administration immediately began conducting a form of damage limitation by abandoning the US's policy in Somalia in order to avoid further criticism.³⁴⁹

Antecedent Condition 5: Domestic balance of power.

This condition reflects the political support held by President Clinton and political support for the intervention in the US Congress. The value of the condition will be established by looking first at Clinton's political standing after the 3rd of October and secondly by identifying the dominant policy preference of the US Congress in reaction to the events in Somalia.

Having won the Presidential election Clinton's domestic political standing was good at the start 1993. However this political support decreased as the year went on. The *Washington Post* noted the general change in mood of the nation when it reported on the first hundred days of Clinton's presidency, the paper suggest that '...diminished public expectations that he [Clinton] -- or anyone else in Washington -- can do much to turn around a country that seven out of ten voters think is going in the wrong direction. Whatever the voters may have believed last winter about what Clinton and the new Congress would do to fix the economy, reduce the federal deficit and put the country on a different path, they are noticeably more doubtful today.'³⁵⁰ The same paper one month

³⁴⁸ See Appendix 5: Public Reaction to Fatalities in Somalia.

³⁴⁹ Clifford Krauss, "Backing Clinton," *The New York Times*, 16 Oct, 1993, p. 12.

³⁵⁰ Dan Balz, "President Clinton's First 100 Days," *The Washington Post*, 29 April, 1993, p. A1.

later reported that ‘...just five months past the glow of Clinton's election victory, the President once again was feeling the undertow of declining faith in the nation's future.’³⁵¹ Shattuck noted that the Somalia incident marked the lowest point in Clintons first year in office and effectively froze his foreign policy over the next year.³⁵² Significantly for the domestic balance of power the *Washington Post* noted that Clinton’s low poll standing meant ‘there is no "fear factor" to inhibit members [Congressional members] from crossing him [the President],’and the paper even suggests that the Presidents precarious political standing meant that there was some incentive even for Democrats to distance themselves.³⁵³ Overall after October 3rd Clinton political position was very precarious as both his domestic and foreign policies were under pressure.

Given the weakness of his political standing Clinton had no incentive to risk further political damage by maintaining the CIMA in Somalia. Even Clinton’s policy decision to reinforce the US deployment for force protection reasons in the short term, while formulating his ‘controlled exit’ plan, drew considerable bipartisan congressional criticism as both ‘Republicans and Democrat’s questioned what appeared to be an open-ended American military presence there.’³⁵⁴ Even one month after the Ranger incident the *Washington Post* reported that Clinton’s approval rating was not rebounding and in fact was hovering at just 43%. Therefore one can reasonably conclude that Clinton did not have the popular or political support justify going against public opinion and not withdraw troops from Somalia.

³⁵¹ David Border, “Approval Ratings,” *The Washington Post*, 2 May, 1993, p. C7.

³⁵² Shattuck, 2003, p. 23.

³⁵³ David Border, “Trouble for Clinton,” *The Washington Post*, 4 Nov, 1993, p. A22.

³⁵⁴ Eric Schmitt, “Defining Goals in Somalia; Washington Sends Soldiers, Sets Terms for Withdrawal,” *The New York Times*, 29 August, 1993. p. 2.

In terms of Congressional political support for the intervention in Somalia the behaviour of the 102nd and 103rd Congresses were very different. The 102nd Congress (1991-1992) played a critical role in supporting the Bush administration's decision to undertake a humanitarian intervention in Somalia. However the deaths of US Army Rangers in October caused the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) to reverse its bipartisan support for the Somalia operation.³⁵⁵ When Congress did turn on the administration in light of deteriorating conditions on the ground, it was led by members of the Republican Party.³⁵⁶ Even when Clinton publicly stated that all US troops would be withdrawn by March 31st 1994, the Democrats in Congress continued to favor a more immediate withdrawal date.³⁵⁷ One of the most outspoken politicians was Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd who threatened to table a vote in the Senate removing financial support for the mission. The *Washington Post* noted the significance of such threat, reporting that 'such a cut off of funds for combat activities since Vietnam.' Continual Congressional demands for the immediate withdrawal from Somalia were only tempered after a US Senate voted 76 to 23, on a resolution to endorse the President's 'controlled exit' policy which set a March 31st withdrawal deadline.³⁵⁸

In short, Clinton's political support after the Mogadishu incident was not at a level that would have suggested that he could have done anything else other than abide by the public's wish for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Somalia. An *ABC* poll on October 7th supports these conclusions when it indicated that of those polled 50%

³⁵⁵ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 191.

³⁵⁶ Other factors such as rising costs of the military operation and the blurring lines of responsibility between the US and the UN in Somalia were also prime concerns of both Republican and Democratic members of Congress. Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 191 & 197.

³⁵⁷ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 200; Clinton, 2004, p. 555.

³⁵⁸ Clifford Krauss, "Senate Rejects Bid to Speed Somalia Pullout," *The New York Times*, 16 Oct, 1993, p. 12.

wanted an immediate withdraw and 33% a withdrawal by the 31st of March 1994.³⁵⁹ Also because of Clinton's political vulnerability the Congress effectively used its political leverage to force the administration to commitment to a specific date for disengagement. Overall one can infer that the value of this condition dropped instantly in the aftermath US casualties, as the President tried to regain political support for his policies by abandoning the US's CIMA in Somalia. An interesting component of this case study which remains inconclusive is why President Clinton did not try to persuade the US public that the Somalia policy was a righteous foreign policy and that the humanitarian situation in Somalia still necessitated military intervention in order to save untold numbers of lives. Instead it appears that he conceded to the Congress's and US public's wish to withdraw US troops from the country.

Antecedent Condition 6: Willingness of elites to logroll.

Until the Ranger incident in October, Clinton, the US Congress and the Pentagon continued to show their willingness to support the Somalia intervention. However as the events of October 3rd unfolded on the evening news this willingness faded.

It is argued that the Ranger task force deployment in August 1993 further expanded the mandate of the US role in Somalia and committed the US to a more proactive use of force policy. This transition was reported by *The New York Times* when it suggests that '... the administrations decision to send the Rangers underscores how the mission has evolved from providing relief to aggressive enforcement.'³⁶⁰ Even though Clinton inherited the Somalia foreign policy from Bush, his administration wilfully

³⁵⁹ See Appendix 6: Public Reaction to Fatalities in Somalia.

³⁶⁰ Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Troops raise stakes in Somalia," *The New York Times*, 22 August, 1993, p. 5.

supported further US engagement in Somalia.³⁶¹ However in response to the public shock at the deaths of the US Army Rangers and in reply to the political pressure from Congress, Clinton initiated a policy reversal and withdrew all US personnel from Somalia. Within days of the October 3rd Clinton was evidently no longer willing to maintain the US presence in Somalia and he publicly declared his policy to withdraw all troops within six months.

The 103rd Congress had continued to support the UNITAF deployment and even the subsequent deployment of the Ranger task force in August with the mandate to arrest or kill Aideed. However, within 48 hours of the reported deaths of the eighteen US Army Rangers Congressional support for the Clinton policy in Somalia evaporated. Very quickly Congress was no longer willing to politically support or finance the further deployment of US troops in Somalia. The *New York Times* noted on October 5th that ‘A wave of hostility toward the military operation in Somalia swept Congress today... precious few Congressional voices expressed support today for the Somalia mission,’³⁶²

As for the Pentagon, early on in the UNITAF deployment it did raise its concern that ‘mission creep’ was starting to set in, as its initial mandate to provide a safe and secure environment for relief agencies to work slowly morphed into a state building exercise.³⁶³ After the fact US General Shalikashvili (Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1994) noted that after the Somalia incident ‘Congress was all over us [US military] for allowing mission creep,’ the Congressional charge was how did a

³⁶¹ Clarke and Herbst, 1997, p. 241.

³⁶² Clifford Krauss, “White House Tries to calm Congress,” *The New York Times*, 6 Oct, 1993, p. 16.

³⁶³ Woods, 1997, p. 161; As noted earlier Clarke and Herbst contested that the US administration and Pentagon unknowingly forwarded Resolution 184 at the UN Security Council that explicitly involved nation-building.

peacekeeping mission turn into a manhunt with fatal consequences for US soldiers.³⁶⁴ It was clear from the beginning that the Pentagon was not supportive of an intervention by virtue of its assessment that the intervention could not be achieved successfully. The evidence shows that the circumstance that had made the Somalia intervention militarily impossible throughout 1992 had not changed up to November 24th. Therefore it is curious why the Pentagon reversed its assessment on the 'do-ability' of an armed intervention in Somalia. One can speculate that President Bush as Commander and Chief of the US military simply told the Pentagon that the mission was necessary. Ultimately the value of this condition dropped abruptly in October 1993, as Clinton was evidently not prepared to argue for the righteousness of the mission, the US Congress was unwilling to continue financing the intervention, the Pentagon's long standing aversion to the mission, and public criticism of the administration's handling of the policy

IV: Sainly Logroll.

Prior to October all six antecedent conditions held a constant value. However within days after the images of a US military pilots body being desecrated the value of antecedent conditions 3, 4, 5 and 6 collapsed. The executive and legislative political establishments were no longer willing to invest the political capital to support an increasing costly intervention in Somalia. Subsequently with the devaluation of four of the six antecedent conditions, the political cooperation and the political will that sustained the Sainly Logroll dissolved. As a result ten months after Bush decided to embark on a humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and two months after Clinton's

³⁶⁴ Shattuck, 2003, p. 64.

administration had decided to deploy the Ranger task force, the administration under immense pressure from both the public and Congress reversed its CIMA.

DV: US Policy of Disengagement from Somalia.

Even though Clinton inherited the Somalia operation from Bush, he willfully supported UNITAF and the expanded UNOSOM II mission. Nevertheless after the deaths of the US Army Rangers, Clinton, motivated by the domestic backlash against US policy in Somalia and aware of his precarious standing in the polls, called off the manhunt for Aideed and announced the immediate reinforcement of US troops, with the intent to withdraw all US personnel.³⁶⁵ This decision effectively reversed the US CIMA in Somalia. Clinton's expressed reason for increasing the numbers of troops in Somalia was to stabilize the situation and avoid any indication of a US policy climb down after the loss of US personnel.³⁶⁶ Nevertheless by August 1994 the US had handed over all operations to UNOSOM II and closed its liaison office, marking the end of all US government presence on the ground in Somalia.

Conclusion

So why did Clinton authorize the deployment of the Ranger task force as part of the US intervention in Somalia? After the deaths of the twenty four Pakistani peacekeepers the UNOSOM II mission had no success in finding Aideed. Subsequently in reaction to Aideed's very public defiance of the UN directive for his arrest, the US insisted that

³⁶⁵ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 49.

³⁶⁶ Clinton's stated reasons for increasing troops strength was to protect bases, keep key routes open, and keep pressure on those who would attack the US presence and in order to help provide a context for the Somali political process. Haass, 1999, p. 46.

something had to be done and thus the Ranger Task Force was sent.³⁶⁷ Very early on in 1993 Woods notes that the Clinton administration felt that the hunt for Aideed had gotten its 'policy train off track' and that the Somalia situation was threatening to increase US military engagement in the civil war.³⁶⁸ However nothing was done to alter the administrations policy direction and one month into the US's policy of a more aggressive military pursuit of Aideed, the eighteen US Army Rangers died.

There are two predominant conclusions that can be drawn from applying the SML to the US domestic political context in October, that indicate how the model was reversed and the CIMA abandoned by the US. First the model showed that a change in the value of the antecedent conditions could negatively influence the integrity of the SLM. Specifically the model showed that condition 4 (the Presidents need for political legitimacy) and condition 5 (the domestic balance of power) decisively influenced condition 6 (willingness of elites to logroll). Second, the model highlighted that although condition 2 (existence of a Sainly Faction) appeared to be integral to the causal chain that generated the Bush administrations CIMA policy, however the condition did not prevent the Clinton administration from deciding to withdraw from Somalia. Certainly the existence of condition 2 is important to the model as it acted as the vehicle for the passage of information to the government. However the second application of the SLM suggests that this variable cannot sustain a political coalition by itself. The evidence from both the first and second application of the SLM suggests that condition 6 (willingness of elites to logroll) is the key variable that supports the Sainly Logroll and maintains the CIMA.

³⁶⁷ Woods, 1997, p. 163.

³⁶⁸ The operation also resulted it massive numbers of deaths and causalities amongst the civilian population. Woods, 1997, p. 163.

Finally, the contemporary interpretation of the events surrounding Somalia are that President Bush initially sent US forces on an armed humanitarian mission to feed starving Somalis then as Clinton himself noted 'somewhere in between the humanitarian mission had turned into a nation building exercise in a country where there was no state and into a hunt for Aideed.'³⁶⁹ This interpretation of events however is problematic. Perhaps the Bush administration did believe that the intervention would be short and fast as indicated by the Bush White House press spokesman when he emphasised that the U.S. role would be limited to the problem of safeguarding food and medicine distribution and would not include any effort to establish a government.³⁷⁰ However as the intervention continued the Clinton administration directly participated in passing UN Security Council resolution which contained nation-building components.³⁷¹ It is inconclusive how or why the Clinton administration would have rationalised otherwise. The idea that President Bush could send a division worth of US soldiers into a failed state such as Somalia to create a safe and secure environment for the delivery of relief aid and not get involved in nation-building, is either disingenuous or an indication that the administration really did not understand what it was getting into.

After the deaths of US Army Rangers President Clinton was referenced in the *New York Times* as suggesting that the Bush administration had naively advised the American people that US troops could be withdrawn from Somalia once the starvation was ended.³⁷² Similarly Woods argues that the extent of the situation in Somalia and the risks involved were never communicated clearly to the US public and Congress by either

³⁶⁹ Clinton, 2004, p. 447.

³⁷⁰ Jim Goshko, "U.N. Chief Favours Use of Force in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 1 Dec, 1992, p. A1.

³⁷¹ Clarke and Herbst, 1997, p. 241.

³⁷² AP Foreign Desk, "Clinton Implies Bush Was Naïve," *The New York Times*, 16 Oct 1993, p. 6.

the Bush or Clinton administration.³⁷³ Specifically he suggests that the public and Congress had never adequately understood the significant risks involved in both the UNITAF and Ranger task force missions, including the potential loss of lives.³⁷⁴

Consequently, when the US incurred casualties from the concerted effort to arrest Aideed there was strong public outrage. A primary reason for the public anger was that they believed US intervention in Somalia to be a peacekeeping mission, not a war. *The New York Times* reflected the public confusion when it reported ‘...Americans have not just a right but an obligation to demand that the Clinton administration explain what compelling national purpose justifies such risk to the lives of U.S. soldiers and Somali civilians caught in the crossfire.’³⁷⁵

Historically Haass cites the example of where the Reagan administration in 1982 made the estimation that the American public was not prepared to pay relatively high costs for uncertain interests and outcomes, and thus this deduction motivated Reagan to withdraw US troops from the Lebanon.³⁷⁶ No such calculation appears to have been made by the Bush or the subsequent Clinton administration, and no record exists to suggest that the subject of the potential loss of US lives by undertaking a humanitarian intervention was considered. On the contrary, in making the argument for his decision to intervene in Somalia *The New York Times* suggests that President Bush ‘sought to convince Congressional leaders and the public that the American role in the Somali relief effort was both morally necessary and reasonably painless.’³⁷⁷ In comparison, public and Congressional anger over the casualties incurred in Somalia is the primary explanation

³⁷³ Woods, 1997, p. 165.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 171.

³⁷⁵ Editorial Desk, “Somalia: Time to Leave?” *The New York Times*, 30 August, 1993, p. 16.

³⁷⁶ Haass, 1999, p. 71.

³⁷⁷ Michael Wines, “Mission to Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 5 Dec, 1992, p. 1.

for what caused the antecedent conditions to drop in value, and ultimately caused the dissolution of the Sainly Logroll and reversal of the US's CIMA.

6.7 The Policy Fallout from Somalia

The final part of the chapter will assess the fallout from the US's Somalia intervention, and how it influenced the subsequent US policy response towards Rwanda in 1994. In the short term after Somalia Henriksen postulates that the White House moved overcautiously in its foreign policy and because of this apprehension can be accused of abdicating leadership in both the Bosnian and Rwandan crises.³⁷⁸ Although the US had the capabilities and resources to respond to these global humanitarian disasters, Woods suggests that the domestic political fallout of the Somalia affair resulted in the decline of political will to undertake or lead international responses to such complex emergencies.³⁷⁹ It is generally considered that the US's experience marked a beginning in a shift toward greater isolationism in the US Congress.³⁸⁰ This was evidenced as the executive responded by limiting its willingness to deploy troops as part of its foreign policy response in both Haiti and Rwanda. In a 1993 address to the UN General Assembly Clinton made it clear that his purpose was to make it harder for the UN to launch military interventions, when he said 'The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.'³⁸¹ As a result of this policy shift the Clinton administration issued a policy statement on multilateral peace

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

³⁷⁹ Woods, 1997, p. 167.

³⁸⁰ Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 203.

³⁸¹ Haass, 1999, p. 17.

operations in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) in May 1994. PDD 25 outlined a more detailed list of criteria that would have to be satisfied before the US would fund or participate in international operations. The tragic irony of the timing of the issuance of PDD 25 was that it was released in May 1994, approximately one month into the ongoing genocide in Rwanda. The adoption of PDD 25 would suggest that the Clinton administration was seeking a way to constrain its future adoption of armed humanitarian policies. It would appear that in drafting PDD 25 the administration preferred to adopt a criteria that would place the nations self interest over that of any potential moral responsibility in its decision making process. However one could counter that similar to the interpretation of the UN Charter as discussed in Section 4.3, the US administration only refers to the PDD 25 after is has decided its course of action. Thus PDD 25 is used purely as a means to justify decisions already made by the administration. Another result of the UN and US's experience in Somalia was the birth of the term "Somalia Syndrome," which was became shorthand for the growing reluctance of Western countries to sustain military casualties in distant lands in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives.³⁸² The US's non-engagement policy towards Rwanda in 1994 can be said to have been one of the most striking fallouts of the US experience in Somalia.

6.8 Rwanda 1994

In August 1993 the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed the Arusha Peace Accord, ending the long running Rwandan civil war. However a large proportion of the Hutu resistance opposed all power sharing and therefore did not stand down as per the Arusha Accord. Internationally it was believed that the Rwandan solution

³⁸² ICISS, 2001, p. 97.

called for peace making with a military force capable of defeating the Hutu resistance. However in the aftermath of Somalia both the Clinton administration and the UN were reluctant to undertake an imposed armed intervention. Furthermore because of the pace at which the genocide was occurring and the limited confirmed intelligence and media reporting coming out of the region, both the US administration and public considered the violence to be part of a civil war, and thus believed that a UN peacekeeping solution was required.³⁸³ Eventually UN Security Council Resolution 872 was passed calling for a small lightly armed peacekeeping contingent called the 'UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda' (UNAMIR I) to deploy. After a short period in Rwanda the UNAMIR I field Commander General Romeo Dallaire estimated that he could not achieve his mandate without extra human and material resources.³⁸⁴

On April 6th 1994 the Rwandan President was assassinated. After the fact it was apparent that his assassination was the trigger that set in motion the coordinated premeditated mass extermination of the Tutsi minority, by the Hutu majority.³⁸⁵ Although the Rwandan government forces did participate in the killing of Tutsis, what Dallaire called 'Third Force' the Hutu 'interahamwe' and 'impuzamugambi' militias carried out most of the killings.³⁸⁶ Confronted with evidence and information about the true nature of the crisis the UN Security Council authorized a follow on force called UNAMIR II. This was a more robust armed peacekeeping force which had a mandate to use force, disarm factions, arrest leaders, and include nation-building tasks.³⁸⁷ However the UN peacekeeping mission was powerless to stop the killings as government radios broadcasts

³⁸³ Power, 2003, p. 373.

³⁸⁴ Dallaire, 2004, p. 84; ICCIS, 2001, p. 100.

³⁸⁵ Haass, 1999, p. 173.

³⁸⁶ Dallaire, 2004, p. 122; DiPrizio, 2001, p. 64.

³⁸⁷ ICISS, 2001, p. 98.

aired anti Tutsi rhetoric and incited Hutus to violence.³⁸⁸ In the process of the killings the Hutu leadership instructed its militia to kill the President of Rwanda and the ten Belgian peacekeepers that were tasked to protect her. Samantha Power explains that the killing of the Belgian peacekeepers was a deliberate move on the part of the Hutu leadership. She notes that it was a strategic decision by the Hutu leadership to massacre the Belgian soldiers in order to prompt their government to withdraw from Somalia. Their rationale for doing this was based on their estimation that the US retreated from Somalia because of the deaths of the Rangers, and so the estimation was that the Belgian government would react the same. True to the Hutu leadership's prediction Belgium withdrew its troops. Power notes that the deaths of the Belgians marked the point at which Rwanda had gone from a 'Somalia waiting to happen' to a Somalia that was happening.³⁸⁹ The subsequent UN response continued to be insufficient as Shattuck estimated that by May the genocide was proceeding at 'roughly a rate of five killings a minute, three hundred an hour, and 7,200 a day.'³⁹⁰ Eventually in June the French government on its own initiative and authorized by the UN under Chapter VII, led an armed intervention called 'Operation Turquoise' into Rwanda. The intervention was aimed at being a short term stopgap measure while UNAMIR II was being reinforced. By mid July 1994 the RPF had taken most of Rwanda and on the July 18th the RPF called a unilateral ceasefire ending the civil war and genocide. The genocide in Rwanda lasted three months and resulted in the killing of over one million people.

³⁸⁸ DiPrizio, 2001, p. 65.

³⁸⁹ Power, 2002, p. 332.

³⁹⁰ Shattuck was the Clinton Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Shattuck, 2003, p. 49.

Conclusion

So why did the Clinton administration not undertake a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in 1994? From August 1993 to July 1994 the US stuck to its non-intervention policy towards Rwanda and made it clear to the UN Security Council that it was not prepared to use forceful action to stop the violence.³⁹¹ Harriss contends that because of US's reluctance to get involved in Rwanda, the UN subsequently remained largely inactive as well. The operations which the US did subsequently undertake after July 1994 such as 'Operation Restore Hope' were confined to limited humanitarian actions of providing relief supplies to Rwanda.³⁹² DiPrizio charges that even this response by the US was 'lackluster at best.'³⁹³

The lack of response to the genocide in Rwanda is primarily believed to have been a byproduct of the administration's experience in Somalia. In particular there are two arguments why the administration adhered to a non-interventionist policy. The first is that the administration was still mindful of the public outrage and Congressional opposition that arose because of the Somalia incident. Second, it is because there was insufficient national interest at stake to justify the risks and costs that would go along with an intervention.³⁹⁴ Thus it appears that a combination of the fallout from the Somalia experience and a traditional realpolitik explanation determined Clinton's policy response towards Rwanda. This conclusion is even supported by Clinton himself when in his autobiography he proposes that 'We [the administration] were so preoccupied with

³⁹¹ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 71.

³⁹² On the 23rd of July Clinton authorized 'Operation Support Hope' which was directed to provide support to aid givers in the region as well as direct relief to refugees. The operation had no security component. DiPrizio, 2002, p. 69; Haass, 1999, p. 174.

³⁹³ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 61.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.³⁹⁵ However against this contemporary belief by Clinton and the political elites that the US public would not risk US soldiers' lives overseas *PIPA* polls at the time indicated that 61% of the US public wanted the US to contribute troops to a large UN peacekeeping operation to forcibly stop the killing in Rwanda. The poll further indicated that a significant 80% thought that the UN and the US should intervene to stop the killing.³⁹⁶ This discrepancy between elite's perception and actual public desires was highlighted by Ramsey and Kull when they suggested that US elites wrongly believed that the public was not willing to tolerate losses of American soldiers in overseas military operations.³⁹⁷

DiPrizio argues that the killing of the eighteen US soldiers in Mogadishu galvanized US policymakers against intervention 'thus sealing Rwanda's fate.'³⁹⁸ It is indisputable that the US experience in Somalia did have a detrimental influence on the attitude of the administration, Congress, the Pentagon and public opinion towards Somalia and humanitarian intervention generally. The direction to develop PDD 25 was itself a result of the administration's experience. Although it is acknowledged that US Presidents have the ultimate discretion when it comes to applying foreign policy doctrines such as PDD 25, the directives development still symbolizes a theme of US disengagement or conditional engagement after its Somalia experience.

³⁹⁵ Clinton, 2004, p. 593.

³⁹⁶ See Appendix 7: PIPA Poll - Humanitarian Intervention in Africa.

³⁹⁷ Further reading see Ramsey and Kull 'The Myth of the Reactive Public.' source at <http://www.pipa.org/index.html>

³⁹⁸ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 71.

Shattuck a member of the administration at the time suggests that the directive in reality acted as a 'peacekeeping straitjacket,' and noted how the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department were all paralyzed by this post Somalia policy on Peacekeeping.³⁹⁹ Most observers argue that intentionally or unintentionally PDD 25 effectively blocked any possibility that the US would support an armed intervention in Rwanda in 1994.⁴⁰⁰ Senator David Obey contended that in fact PDD 25 reflected the administration's desire for 'zero degree of involvement, and zero degree of risk, and zero degree of pain and confusion.'⁴⁰¹ It is important to consider that even though PDD 25 prevented US engagement in peacekeeping activities in Rwanda, it was not published until one month into the genocide. The reality was that prior to the release of PDD 25 on multilateral peacekeeping operations, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine had already supported the administration's decision not to intervene in Rwanda. In short the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine espoused that the use of US military force should only be used when vital national interests are at stake, and secondly when there is a clear political and military objective.⁴⁰² Since the Cold War many political actors have published criteria to guide US policy formulation with regard to military intervention.⁴⁰³ The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine itself was drafted by Casper Weinberger (Reagan era Secretary of Defense) in 1984, but was then further added to by General Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff during Bush's presidency) in the early 1990s to

³⁹⁹ Shattuck, 2003, p. 41.

⁴⁰⁰ Harriss, 1995, p. 12; Shattuck, 2003, p. 41.

⁴⁰¹ Power, 2002, p. 343.

⁴⁰² Casper Weinberger (Reagan era Secretary of Defense), Gary Hart (US Senator), George Shultz (Reagan Secretary of State), Les Aspin (Clinton Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services), Colin Powell Former Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff), George Bush (US President), Bill Clinton (US President), Madeleine Albright (US permanent representative to the UN and Secretary of State during Clinton's second term), Warren Christopher (Secretary of State under Clinton) and William Perry (Secretary of Defense in Clinton administration after Aspin). Haass, 1999, p. 14.

serve as a set of foreign policy criteria that would guide US military interventions. In its final form PDD 25 was remarkably similar to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. However, again it appears that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, like PDD 25 was only used to reinforce the decisions already made by the administration, as it is evident that President Bush was not hampered by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine criteria when it decided to conduct a humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

Although the US faced numerous humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s where no vital interests were at stake and where the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine did not support intervention, it still decided to undertake some armed interventionist policies. Such notable examples under the Bush administration were the armed intervention in Iraq in 1991 and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992. Comparatively the Bush administration in 1992 refused to undertake a humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, apparently because of a lack of national interest in the conflict and because the Weinberger-Powell criteria would not support intervention. Similarly the Clinton administration decided in 1994 that there were no US national interests at stake in Rwanda and that the PDD 25 criteria did not justify an interventionist policy.⁴⁰⁴ These cases would suggest that there are situations in which at the discretion of the President, policy directives such as PDD 25 and the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine are applied differently. In early December 1992 after Bush's decision to send troops *The Washington Post* picked up on this hypocrisy in the application of policy guidelines when it questioned 'How does the proposed Somali operation fit into America's global responsibilities in the post-Cold War era? Bush and Powell need to lay the foundation

⁴⁰⁴ DiPrizio, 2002, p. 3.

for an American deployment in Somalia by explaining more clearly why they seem to be using different criteria for their non-intervention in Bosnia.⁴⁰⁵

In the final analysis Clinton's policy response towards Rwanda was taken in the context of continued public, congressional and military aversion to humanitarian interventions. Furthermore due to the political, financial and human cost of the Somalia intervention, it was apparent that Clinton was not prepared to risk an intervention in Rwanda where there was no apparent US interest at stake.⁴⁰⁶ As Weiss points out, there are 'fewer risks for politicians from humanitarian assistance... than from early preventative action by military forces with possible casualties or the potential for protracted involvement in a civil war.'⁴⁰⁷ Therefore it appears that Rwanda was not of sufficient national interest to risk political, economic, and military capital, especially in light of widespread domestic criticism which the administration felt it endured over the Somalia intervention.

⁴⁰⁵ Jim Hoagland, "On Somalia, a Mysterious Decision," *The Washington Post*, 3 Dec, 1992, p. A21.

⁴⁰⁶ Mayall points out that in the aftermath of Somalia the Americas had no stomach for another open-ended African Adventure. Mayall, 2004, p. 136.

⁴⁰⁷ Weiss, 1999, p. 116.

CONCLUSION

Successfully applying Kaufmann and Pape's SLM to the US Somalia case is significant because contemporary thought suggests that states almost never pursue expensive international moral policies. By effectively applying their model to the US's policy in Somalia shows that the SLM can be applied to modern day humanitarian issues. The SLM sufficiently explained President Bush's decision making process in the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia by identifying the role played by normative humanitarian ideals and the six domestic political conditions which generated the political coalition that supported the policy. An examination of the empirical evidence demonstrated that the US policy is a CIMA. The key to obtaining a CIMA necessitated solving two problems. Primarily the case study showed that the adoption of human rights norms in US society was the bases for the US's willingness to pay the costs of undertaking altruistic foreign policy. Additionally the evidence shows how circumstances led to the generation of a political coalition around a moral cause. The case study demonstrated that there were five entities involved in the Sainly Logroll; the first was the US and International relief NGOs, the second was the US public motivated by a humanitarian ethic, third was President Bush motivated by his personal humanitarian impulse and cognisant of his political legacy, fourth by a bipartisan Congress willing to allocate the funds for an intervention, fifthly the Pentagon altering its assessment of the feasibility of the mission and finally the moderate political position of the Sainly Faction itself produced sufficient political willingness to form a Sainly Logroll. Thus as per Kaufman and Pape's requirements the Somalia case study shows how the US's

humanitarian intervention policy was motivated on moral grounds and that the public was willing to incur the material costs of launching the 'Operation Restore Hope.'

The second application of the SLM showed that the model could be successfully extended to explain the US's subsequent abandonment of its CIMA policy. By identifying the changes in values of the original antecedent conditions after the October 3rd. The extension of the model helped to identify those variables which subsequently undermined the integrity of the SLM. In the first application of the SLM condition 6 (Willingness of Elites to Logroll) was found to have played the central role in creating the Sainly Logroll, similarly in the second SLM condition 6 proved to be the key variable that also maintained the Sainly Logroll. Once the value of condition 6 dropped the integrity of the SLM was undermined and this resulted in the US abandoning is CIMA. Therefore the application of the SLM also explained the factors that led the US to reverse its humanitarian intervention policy.

The investigation also concludes that the 'domestic moral reform' component of the SLM needs to be modified in order to successfully apply the model to modern day cases of humanitarian intervention. The author's premise that individuals are only motivated to support a costly foreign policy because of their belief that their society is morally corrupt and in need of reform is not substantiated by the case study. Instead the US Somalia case study showed that US society was motivated by humanitarian ideals and was willing to pay the costs of their government's foreign policy because of that humanitarian ethic.

The implications of this analysis are twofold. First by identifying and understanding which contributing conditions and ideals are necessary to generate a

Saintly Logroll, one can with greater probability predict when the US might engage in future humanitarian intervention policies. At a domestic US level the immediate policy repercussions of the US's experience in Somalia were that President Clinton did not undertake humanitarian intervention in the Rwanda humanitarian disaster in 1994. The findings of this thesis are only generalizable to other cases for the following reasons. Firstly based on Kaufmann and Pape's proposition that any unilateral humanitarian military intervention where the intervening state has no strategic or economic interest qualifies as a CIMA, one can say that a humanitarian intervention that exhibits these criteria can be a CIMA.⁴⁰⁸ Secondly the US case study applied the SLM under two different time periods, and two separate Presidents, therefore one can conclude that the model should be applicable to other times and other Presidencies in the domestic US political context. Thirdly at an international level, the SLM was generated to explain the British anti-slavery policy in the nineteenth century, and subsequently this thesis found that it was applicable to the US's humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the twentieth century, this would suggest that the model is generalizable to other countries at other time periods. However, given that this investigation is only based on one case study further research would be needed to increase confidence in the broader applicability of the results.

As with the anti-slavery case, both the realist and liberal institutionalist perspective have difficulty explaining why the US led a humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Realism does not provide a satisfactory answer for two reasons. First the US had no evident political or strategic interest to be gained by intervening in Somalia. Woods even suggests that the US's post-Cold War attitude towards Somalia was

⁴⁰⁸Kaufman and Pape, 1999, p. 633.

'approaching indifference.'⁴⁰⁹ Second from the outset there were financial and material costs associated with President Bush's decision and after the incident on October 3rd there were costs in terms of lives of US servicemen. Realism cannot explain why the US incurred costs of intervening in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, unless the policy was really a guise for another more self-interested motive.

From a liberal institutionalist perspective the US administration certainly used the UN as a conduit to advance its foreign policy aims and promote international cooperation on Somalia. Although the US appeared to have considerable influence on the UN the same was not evident for the UN as it did not demonstrate any influence on the US's policy strategy towards Somalia. In this case liberal institutionalism did contribute by legitimating and facilitating cooperation between states to undertake UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. However given the lack of success of both these missions the case study shows that the UN's authority lay more in its role of legitimating the use of force in the international community. The practical reality remained that the UN was dependent on their member states resources and political backing in order to actualize its humanitarian interventions.

Similar to Kaufmann and Pape's anti-slavery case study, this case suggested that constructivism held the greatest explanatory power because it presents interests as variable. This perspective provides reasonable grounds on which to support the finding that the internalization of human rights norms in the US did generate a national interest in itself. This finding reinforces President Bush's declared 'humanitarian impulse' motivation for deciding to intervene in Somalia. It also serves to explain why the US public supported intervention even in the face of considerable costs. In their analysis

⁴⁰⁹ Woods, 1997, p. 151; Mayall, 2004, p. 133.

Kaufmann and Pape discounted cosmopolitanism and transnationalism influence on the British anti-slavery policy, however the evidence from the US Somalia case study suggests that they do play a role. First the role of cosmopolitan humanitarian values is very apparent in Bush's decision making process, and in the general public sense of moral obligation to help those suffering in Somalia by supporting a humanitarian intervention. Second in terms of transnationalism one can argue that the US relief NGO community played a pivotal role as transnational moral entrepreneurs by mobilizing public and political support for engagement in Somalia in the first instance. As opposed to the anti-slavery case, the Somalia case did suggest that a cosmopolitan human rights ethic were at work in the US. Furthermore although the political momentum for generating the Sainly Logroll predominately came from within the US executive and legislative bodies, lobbying by US relief NGOs was very effective in informing and generating public and political support for engagement in Somalia.

In order to confirm the findings of this thesis more investigation should be conducted primarily on President Bush's personal motivation. Greater insight into what influenced his personal decision making would help reinforce or correct notions that he was prompted by humanitarian ideals and or a concern for his political legacy. To prove false either of these notions is significant because one of the two key explanations which substantiate the occurrence of a CIMA is that the policy is based on an altruistic ethical motivation. Additionally if further research was to find that the US actually had some form of geostrategic and economic interests in Somalia, then one would have to reassess the role of realpolitik notions in the administrations decision making process.⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰ David Gibbs proposed that Somalia was a long known potential source of oil and that Said Barre had actually signed exploratory agreements with four American oil companies, the largest of which was a

A potential avenue of further research that is identified by this investigation lies in the apparent disconnect between US public opinion and the US administration's perception of that opinion. In particular President Clinton's belief in 1993 that the US public was unwilling to accept further casualties in Somalia does not match the opinion poll data collected by organizations such as PIPA that suggests that the public is willing to incur casualties as part of overseas military missions. Nevertheless the case study finds that President Clinton did not try to persuade the US public that the Somalia intervention was either a necessary and righteous policy. Instead he opted for a strategy of damage limitation by withdrawing the troops in order to avoid further casualties and negative political repercussions.

company called 'Conoco.' Gibbs argues that the claim that the US had no strategic or economic interest in Somalia is inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. David Gibbs (2000) Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia, in *International Politics*.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Map of Somalia



Source: http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-62202-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html

Appendix 2: Authorization for Military Interventions in the 1990s

Country	Chapter VII & authorization UN Mission	Chapter VII authorization delegated	No initial Security Council authorization
Northern Iraq 1991 -		Coalition	Coalition
Former Yugoslavia 1992 -	UNPROFOR	IFOR & SFOR	
Somalia 1992 – 1993	UNOSOM II	UNITAF	
Rwanda 1994 – 1996	UNAMIR II	Operation Turquoise	
Haiti 1994 – 1997	UNMH	MNF	
Sierra Leone 1997 -	UNAMSIL		ECOMOG
Kosovo 1999 -		KFOR	NATO
East Timor 1999 -	UNAMET	INTERFET	

Source: The international Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) *The Responsibility to Protect: Research Bibliography, and Background*, Supplementary Volume to the Report of The international Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p. 80.



Appendix 3: UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia.

Date	Resolution	Resolution intent	US role	Result on the ground
Jan. 1992	733	Imposition of arms embargo, UN observes deployed and increase in relief assistance.	Starting in March US was largest relief donor.	90 day Plan of Action for Emergency Assistance was enacted. It was considered to be too late and overall a failure.
April. 1992	751	UNOSOM I, non-military humanitarian intervention	US 'Operation Provide Relief' US participation was limited transporting UN personal and relief resources into Somalia.	The UN mission was not very successful as it was limited in manpower and resources.
Dec. 1992	794	UNITAF, create secure environment for distribution of relief.	US 'Operation Restore Hope,'	By January 25,000 US troops on the ground. The mission was very successful over the short term.
Mar. 1993	814	UNOSOM II, UN, forcible military humanitarian intervention.	US lead UNITAF was to transition with UNOSOM II force.	UNITAF successful at enforcing cease fire and securing relief distribution.

Sourced : *Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, by Haas, 1999, and *Humanitarian intervention in Contemporary Conflict*, by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996.

Appendix 4: GALLUP – Presidential Approval Rating Poll.

Trend Lines through 1992 Presidential Election Campaign.



Source: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/?ci=1258>

Appendix 5: Distribution of Seats in House of Representatives 1989-1997

101st Congress (1989-1991)

Total Membership: 435 Representatives, 4 Delegates, 1 Resident Commissioner
Party Divisions: 260 Democrats, 175 Republicans

102nd Congress (1991-1993)

Total Membership: 435 Representatives, 4 Delegates, 1 Resident Commissioner
Party Divisions: 267 Democrats, 167 Republicans, 1 Independent

103rd Congress (1993-1995)

Total Membership: 435 Representatives, 4 Delegates, 1 Resident Commissioner
Party Divisions: 258 Democrats, 176 Republicans, 1 Independent

104th Congress (1995-1997)

Total Membership: 435 Representatives, 4 Delegates, 1 Resident Commissioner
Party Divisions: 230 Republicans, 204 Democrats, 1 Independent

Source: Office of the Clerk US House of Representatives,
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/index.html

Appendix 6: Somalia Intervention and Public Reaction to Fatalities in Somalia

(1) PIPA Opinion Poll

As you may recall, the U.N. (United Nations) carried out a two-part operation in Somalia in which it delivered humanitarian relief to the hungry people and also tried to end the civil war. How do you feel about the part of the operation that delivered humanitarian relief? Do you think this was the right thing to do or do you think it was a mistake?

Responses:

It was the right thing to do	82%
It was a mistake	14
Don't know/Refused	4

Organization: PIPA
Sample Size: 600
Date: APR 19-23, 1995

(2) PIPA Opinion Poll

(As you may recall, the U.N. (United Nations) carried out a two-part operation in Somalia in which it delivered humanitarian relief to the hungry people and also tried to end the civil war.) How do you feel about the operation that tried to end the civil war? Do you think it was the right thing to do or do you think it was a mistake?

Responses:

It was the right thing to do	43%
It was a mistake	46
Don't know/Refused	11

Organization: PIPA
Sample Size: 600
Date: APR 19-23, 1995

(3) ABC Poll, 5 Oct. 1993

The ABC 37 per cent for immediate withdrawal is based on two questions: 64 per cent who said in the first question that the US should pull out its troops 'very soon' were then asked, 'Immediately, before the end of the year, or what?' Only 58 per cent of the subgroup said they wanted this to happen immediately.

3a. Question: Do you think the United States should keep troops in Somalia until there's a functioning civil government there that can run things, or do you think the US should pull its troops out of Somalia very soon, even if there is no functioning civil government in place there?

Responses:

Keep troops in Somalia	28 per cent
Pull troops out of Somalia	64
No opinion	8

3b. Question: How soon do you think US (United States) troops should be removed from Somalia – immediately, before the end of the year, or what?

Responses:

Immediately	58 per cent
Before the end of the year	38
Longer than year's end (into 1994)	2
No opinion	2

(Asked of those who said US troops should be removed very soon even if there is no functioning civil government (64 per cent))

Source: ABC News. National adult sample, N = 509. Telephone survey, 5 October 1993.

(4) CNN – USA Today, 5 Oct. 1993

Question: In your view, what should the United States do now in Somalia?:

One: Withdraw US troops right away. Two: Gradually withdraw US troops.

Three: Keep US involvement the same. Four: Increase US military commitment.

Responses:

Withdraw troops right away	43 per cent
Gradually withdraw troops	26
Keep involvement same	7
Increase military commitment	18
Don't know/Refused	5

Source: Gallup Organisation for Cable News Network, *USA Today*. National adult sample, N = 525. Telephone survey, 5 October 1993

(5) Time – CNN, 7 Oct. 1993

Question: Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which US (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by Forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) . . . How should the United States respond to the fighting that has broken out in Somalia? Should the US send more troops to Somalia, keep the same number of troops, remove all its troops from Somalia within the next six months, or remove all its troops immediately?

Responses:

Send more troops	25 per cent
Keep current number of troops	6
Remove all troops in next six months	28
Remove all troops immediately	37
Not sure	4

Source: Yankelovich Partners Inc. for *Time*/Cable News Network. National adult sample, N = 500. Telephone survey, 7 October 1993

(6) ABC, 7 Oct. 1993

Question: What would be your preference – to have all US (United States) troops withdrawn from Somalia immediately, by 31 March (1994), or sometime after 31 March?

Responses:

Immediately	50 per cent
31 March	33
Some time after	31 March 9
Not at all (vol.)	3
No opinion	5

Source: ABC News. National adult sample, N = 506. Telephone survey, 7 October 1993.

(7) CNN – USA Today, 8 Oct. 1993

Question: In your view, what should the United States do now in Somalia – One: Withdraw all US troops now, Two: Withdraw US troops over the next six months, or Three: Keep troops in Somalia until our humanitarian mission has been accomplished.

Responses:

Withdraw now	37 per cent
Withdraw in six months	27
Keep troops in Somalia	31
No opinion	5

Source: Gallup for CNN/USA Today. National adult sample, N = 1019 Telephone survey, 8 October 1993.

Appendix 7: PIPA Poll - Humanitarian Intervention in Africa.

1. Do you favour or oppose the use of U.S. (United States) armed forces as part of a United Nations mission to try to stop the violence in Rwanda (Africa)?

Favour	45%
Oppose	41
Not sure	14

Organization: Yankelovich Partners / Time, Cable News Network
Sample Size: 800
Date: MAY 4-5, 1994

2. When you think about what's (in the interest of the United States/good for the world as a whole), do you think it's best for the US to support such an operation, including contributing US troops, or not? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat? [responses to different versions combined]

Contribute strongly	29%
Contribute somewhat	32
Not contribute somewhat	22
Not contribute strongly	4
Don't know/Refused	

Organization: PIPA
Sample Size: approx. 600
Date: June 23-28 and July 7-13, 1994

3. Imagine that a UN commission studied the situation in Rwanda and concludes that genocide is in fact occurring there. Imagine that the US accepted this conclusion. Do you think that the UN, including the US, should then intervene to try to stop the genocide?

Yes	80%
No	13
Don't Know	7

Organization: PIPA
Sample Size: approx. 600
Date: June 23-28 and July 7-13, 1994

4. (Now for each country would you please tell me whether or not you think America's vital interests are at stake in the situation involving that country.) Do you think America's vital interests are at stake in... Rwanda, or not?

Yes	18%
No	63
No opinion	19

Organization:	ABC	News/Washington	Post
Sample		Size:	1531
Date:	JUN 23-26, 1994		

5. Rwanda is far from the US and we have no real interests there. Therefore, it would be wrong to risk the lives of American troops in a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Do you find this argument convincing or unconvincing? Would that be somewhat or very?

Very convincing	20%
Somewhat convincing	16
Somewhat unconvincing	26
Very unconvincing	36
Don't Know	1

Organization:			PIPA
Sample	Size:	approx.	600
Date:	June 23-28 and July 7-13, 1994		

6. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States sending troops and humanitarian assistance to the Rwandan refugees?

Approve	63%
Disapprove	28
Don't know/No answer	9

Organization:	CBS	News
Sample Size:	541	

Source: http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/africa/africa4.cfm