Emotional Formation

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Abstract

Emotional experience has long been ignored or marginalized by the philosophical tradition because of its irrational or unrationalizable character. Ethical formation, a developmental approach to moral philosophy developed by virtue theorist Sabina Lovibond and others, is a rationalizing approach to character formation which does not ignore or marginalize the affective area of human experience. But neither does it develop in significant detail a method to include emotional experience within its main aims.

This thesis intends to eliminate this problem by showing how we can sensibly 'rationalize' our emotional experience without, as some more recent approaches have tended to do, *over*-rationalizing them. In order to do so, I will focus on Ronald de Sousa's account of emotional rationality and illustrate how his notion of 'paradigm scenarios' can help us to include the emotions within ethical formation. Paradigm scenarios enable us to develop emotional intentionality and, thereby, enable us to give our emotional experiences teleology—the minimal elements necessary for any rationality. In order to best illustrate that emotional experience can helpfully be included within the rational project of ethical formation I go on (in chapters two and three) to show how these paradigm scenarios are acquired and applied.

In the end, the thesis stresses that neither project (de Sousa's emotional rationality or Lovibond's ethical formation) is complete without supplementation from the other. My specific focus on the emotions requires situation within a wider perspective just as Lovibond's broad perspective requires a finer-grained focus in order to appropriately value emotional experience.

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Dedication

To my parents, whose love and support have always been inseparable from my achievements academic and otherwise.

Introduction

The intention of this thesis is to show both that in order to fully engage in the rational project of ethical formation we must necessarily grasp the importance and rationalizability of emotional experience and that such rationalization is, in turn, only made possible within the broader rational program of ethical formation itself. In order to show this, I will highlight the similarities and differences between a powerful account of ethical formation (that of Sabina Lovibond) with a particular vision of emotional rationality (that of Ronald de Sousa). In showing how we can situate the specific aim of rationalizing the emotions within the much broader project of ethical formation, I will show that we cannot fully understand *either* project without the supplementations of the other. In other words, I will argue that de Sousa's account supplements an important lack in Lovibond's work and that his emotional focus in turn requires situation within the broader theses of ethical formation.

Sabina Lovibond, in a book appropriately entitled *Ethical Formation*, outlines a developmental approach to moral philosophy; she, like Aristotle and many contemporary virtue theorists, envisions "moral virtue [as] the outcome of a successful process of *formation*"[1] rather than as the result of the successful application of predetermined principles (as many other trends in moral philosophy seem to indicate). Lovibond gives us a philosophical account of the processes through which we become ethical actors: people capable of taking responsibility for our actions and words. She argues that by becoming capable of authoring[2] our words and deeds we become better capable of giving

[1] Lovibond, 9.

[2] The notion of authorship is a key one for Lovibond. She suggests that full mastery over ourselves requires the ability to 'own' or 'author' our actions and words. She argues that it is through a more complete ability

our life a form in rational accordance with a virtuous character ideal.[3]

Lovibond, like her teacher McDowell, is clearly an ethical realist: she argues that reasons for acting appropriately exist in our world and are not merely parasitic upon or reducible to more traditionally 'material' properties (those of biology, physics, or even neuroscience). For her, as for McDowell, the commonplace treatment of value as epiphenomenal and reducible to 'natural' (read: mechanistic) properties is wrongheaded and philosophically disastrous. She argues that reasons are 'in the world' and that ethical formation should be envisioned as a project aimed at increasing our ability to perceive these reasons and, thereby, to act in accordance with them.[4] Lovibond also describes ethical formation in relation to *consistency*. She writes that it

> ...is the idea of upbringing as a process that creates a unitary character out of the various motivational "fragments" present in us from day one in the form of transient impulses, and so gradually enables us, as this character gains definition, to *speak as one person*, self-consistent over time (or sufficiently so, by human standards) in our desires, beliefs, and habits of judgement.[5]

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to commit ourselves to the meaning, implications, and effects of our actions that we become capable of responsible, ethical action. The processes of ethical formation attempt to make us more completely the authors of our lives. (While the notion of authorship is discussed through *Ethical Formation*, the fifth chapter ("On Being the Author of a Moral Judgement") is particularly helpful.

[3] Though the virtuous character ideal is central to Lovibond's work, its specificities are largely tangential to the concerns of this thesis and it will not receive any detailed treatment here. The gyst of this ideal is that it is an unattainable goal which all our actions should strive to more fully enact. More and more accurate approximations of this ideal imply a deeper understanding and clearer perception of reality (and the reasons found therein). Despite my glossing over of the details of the virtuous character ideal, I will be interested in the notion of a clearer perception of reality/value in the later portions of the thesis.

[4] Ethical realism is a contentious and complex stance, and one whose subtleties cannot be satisfactorily summarized in this introduction. After having outlined my approach to emotional rationality in the main body of the thesis, I will be better situated to show how Lovibond and McDowell's ethical realism is necessary if we are to make emotional rationality something other than mere cultural relativism. This will, I trust, become clearer and clearer in the latter half of the thesis.

[5] Lovibond, 71.

So, ethical formation is the development of a subject capable of reliable and responsible behaviour. This formation gives us the "psychological consistency"[6] necessary for our words to be given weight (by ourselves and by others). In order to achieve such formation we must become capable of clearly and accurately perceiving[7] the value in pursuing ethically and socially responsible goals. Thus, our right to make statements of intention is proportional to our related capacities for psychologically consistent, appropriately perceived and valued courses of action. We possess this 'right' only insofar as we are capable of *knowing* why a course of action is good or bad, why we should act this way and not that way. Our authority (our capacity for authorship) rests precisely on this ability to truthfully characterize the reasons for our words, thoughts, and deeds.[8]

But nowhere in Lovibond's fascinating work is there a detailed or specific focus on the emotions—an area of human experience which has all too often been excised from rational projects like ethical formation due to its 'disruptive' or uncontrollable aspects. Because emotional experience is so dramatically important for a complete understanding

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[6] Ibid, 71.

[7] On the notion of perceiving value, see, for instance, John McDowell's collection of essays *Mind, Value, and Reality* (in particular the group of essays collected in the second section of that work entitled 'Reason, Value, and Reality' as well as the remarkable essay "Virtue and Reason"). There McDowell writes that when a person is truly kind, she will recognize cases of kindness *perceptually*:

> A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behaviour. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity [McDowell, "Virtue and Reason" in *Mind, Value, and Reality*, 51].

In broader terms, someone who is sufficiently oriented within the space of reasons will *perceive* certain avenues of conduct as rational or valuable. The goal of ethical formation is to encourage a clearer vision of the values and reasons which are there in the world for us to perceive.

[8] And, again, this capacity to know or truthfully characterize our words, thoughts, and deeds is founded, for Lovibond upon an ability to orient ourselves to the space of reasons. This type of 'knowledge' is not merely

of human experience—a point which I assume but attempt to provide some support for in the thesis—it would seem that ignoring it would create a considerable lacuna in the project of ethical formation. Lovibond is patently *not* dismissive of the potential import of the emotions, she even discusses them tangentially (indeed, she agrees with other contemporary theorists like John McDowell and Martha Nussbaum that "moral rationality [is] a process with both an *affective* and a cognitive aspect".[9] Nevertheless, because her focus is necessarily broader, she does not provide sufficient detail in *Ethical Formation* for us to understand the full complexity of interaction between our emotional lives and the rational processes of ethical development. In this thesis I wish to provide the philosophical groundwork required to make such an understanding possible.

In order to do so I will have to evade a number of deeply entrenched conceptual roadblocks resulting from historical trends in philosophy which make it difficult to appropriately understand the important role emotional experience plays in human life. I will argue that certain philosophical worldviews—which are far from 'false'—have been ingrained and internalized to such an extent that particular avenues of inquiry have been entirely foreclosed from Western thinking *without having been sufficiently investigated.* More specifically, I will suggest that the 'common sense' application of a Cartesian worldview (one which marks a radical distinction between the human mind and the world) leads us to misunderstand (and therefore discount the possibility of) emotional rationality.

In Chapter One ('Rationality') I will argue that we can understand emotional experience through the lens of a 'relational' or 'worldly' vision of human existence

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'subjective' for Lovibond, but based in an objective awareness of the layout of the space of reasons which initiation into a culture should encourage. These claims will become clearer at the close of the thesis.

without the detrimental, obfuscating effects required by a dualistic Cartesian approach. I will suggest that such a view allows us to understand that emotional experience and 'higher' cognitive experiences are related areas inextricably bound together insofar as they are the experiences *of* a human being in the world. Rather than a 'subject' or a 'thinking thing', this Heideggerian view allows for a vision of human beings in innumerable (cognitive *and* non-cognitive) relations to the world and themselves. This relational view does not (through implication or decree) require us to measure all human activity against the standards of cognition. It thus leaves room for complex relations between thinking and emoting, between nature and intentionality, and between reason and emotion. It is the possibility of *emotional rationality* which I will develop in the remainder of the thesis. I do so by attempting to clarify aspects of Ronald de Sousa's account of emotional rationality. His project, modest in scope, is to show that emotions are *minimally rational*, i.e., that they are capable of supporting the most basic elements of rationality.

In the second chapter (entitled 'Acquisition') I further pursue this initial development of de Sousa's project by showing how our 'common sense' picture of language and emotion acquisition lead us to an inaccurate picture of emotional rationality. I then proceed to offer an account of human development—indebted to psychologist Lev Vygotsky—which envisions biology and 'culture' as inseparable aspects of the same process.

The third chapter ('Application') takes the theoretical picture developed in the first two chapters and attempts to show how it can be used to our benefit in concrete cases. By showing how de Sousa's broad vision of emotional rationality can be applied to

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[9] Lovibond, 9-10. My emphasis.

the specificity and idiosyncrasy of real human interactions I hope, finally, to illustrate that not only is emotional rationality a viable notion, it is also—especially when situated within the broader project of ethical formation—a useful and beneficial one.

Chapter One: Rationality

"A mood makes manifest how one is, and how one is faring"[10]

The modern commonsense view of the human subject is of an autonomous, embodied being navigating within a world upon which it acts and about which it thinks. This view of the subject, which I shall call the traditional view, tends to emphasize certain aspects of the above definition at the expense of others. The notion of autonomy and the activity of thinking have, in particular, been used by the traditional view to define what is distinctively 'human' about human beings. As a result, the embodied and worldly character of human experience has been generally glossed over and misunderstood. In this chapter I wish to show that this traditional view (related here to the impact of Descartes' account of subjectivity)[11] has lead to certain misunderstandings about the nature and importance of emotional experience, particularly insofar as that experience relates to rationality. By outlining a rival view of human subjectivity (that of Martin Heidegger) I will show that we can understand the non-rational character of emotional experience without unnecessarily foreclosing the possibility of emotional rationality. Aside from Heidegger's broad remarks on human being-in-the-world, I will also discuss his more specific theory of moods which will aid in illustrating the importantly non-rational character of emotional experience. After developing this alternative view, I will offer a more specific account of emotional rationality indebted to Ronald de Sousa. De

[10] Heidegger, H134 (173).

[11] Here I utilize Descartes work as a particularly successful example which can be/has been used to support the 'traditional view'. We can, of course, find this trend in other thinkers, both later and earlier. There are also moments in Descartes' thinking which buck this trend. It should be noted that I do not straightforwardly associate Descartes' entire body of work with the view I am interested in here. His *Meditations on First Philosophy* is simply a readily accessible, commonly read work which strongly exhibits many of the defining characteristics of the traditional view.

Sousa's view will prove helpful precisely because it does not require (as other contemporary theories of emotional rationality might) the denial of the non-rational character of the emotions. Through this combination of Heidegger's account of human being-in-the-world and de Sousa's conception of emotional rationality, I hope to show that emotional experience is an important and necessary aspect of human experience generally and that we must understand the emotions' subtle relation(s) to rationality if we are to adequately engage in the project of ethical formation.

§1.1: Cartesian Subjectivity, Relational *Dasein*

Descartes utilizes the thinking subject—the *ego cogito*—as the starting point from which he proceeds to 'prove' the existence of the world.[12] Descartes radical and global skepticism leads him to strip away everything until he ends up at the irreducible kernel of human existence: the 'I' which is logically prior to the world. This 'I' serves as the *subjectum* which undergirds his proof of the existence of the world. This key element of Descartes' view—the subject that thinks—has provided us with an extremely fruitful vision of human experience. It has, for example, enabled the development of a scientific method which encourages detachment and objectivity in the search for truth. That such a picture has advanced the sciences (and human knowledge more generally) is indisputable. But, precisely because of its wild and obvious successes, this view has led to

[12] In his third meditation Descartes writes,

> For since I know now that even bodies are not, properly speaking, perceived by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that they are not perceived only through their being touched or seen, but only through their being understood, I manifestly know that nothing can be perceived more easily and more evidently than my own mind [Descartes, 23].

Descartes' emphasis upon the autonomous mind over the accoutrements of an embodied subject (e.g., the senses, the imagination, the emotions) is clear here. In the fourth meditation Descartes moves from this starting point (i.e., the manifest experience of his own mind) to the world: "...I understand what a thing is,

misconceptions regarding forms of human experience which are not profitably understood in relation to radically autonomous, thinking subjects who are prior to the world. More specifically, Cartesian subjectivity (insofar as it is an example of the traditional view) has led us to emphasize certain aspects of *emotional* experience (i.e., their 'disruptive' side) over others.

In most modern philosophy after Descartes (and in much philosophy before him as well)[13] the emotions have been denigrated as disruptors of more highly-valued rational processes. Even objectors to this denigration, like Hume and Nietzsche[14], tend to value emotions precisely *because* of their non-rational or irrational character. Over the last thirty years, however, a new trend in analytic philosophy has arisen in direct opposition to the characterization of emotions as non-rational or irrational phenomenon.[15] This recent trend attempts to defend the rationality of emotion; it also condemns much of the

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what truth is, what thought is, and I appear to have derived this exclusively from my very own nature" [Ibid, 26].

[13] Here I trace, in broad strokes, the lack of philosophical interest in the emotions to the influence of Descartes' account of subjectivity. This may seem to suggest that *before* Descartes' influence was pervasive, the emotions were not maligned and marginalized. This is, however, generally not the case. There are deeper historical roots which ground the radical separation of reason and the emotions (the unearthing of which would take us too far afield). What I wish to suggest here is merely that the continuation of this de-emphasis and marginalization of the emotions can be linked—in the modern period—to the wider popularity of the Cartesian view of subjectivity. (More detailed work in the history of philosophy focusing on the exclusion of emotional investigations might even illustrate that Descartes' account of subjectivity is *itself* indebted, at least in part, to the traditional historical trend of de-legitimating emotional experience, though on this I can only speculate here).

[14] Hume is a clear exemplar of this tradition with his famous suggestion, in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, that 'reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions'; Nietzsche is perhaps a more troubling case as his early emphasis (in, e.g., *The Birth of Tragedy*) on the passionate Dionysian aspect of human experience later becomes possible only through interaction with the cooler, more 'reasonable' Apollonian aspect (and vice versa). Nevertheless, Nietzsche's insistence on the importance of emotional experience is often (if not always) based upon a stark contrast between emotional experience and 'detached' rationality. Indeed, his appreciation of emotional or passionate experience often takes the form of an *attack* on rationality (see, for instance *On the Genealogy of Morals*, essays II and III where Nietzsche's historicizes aspects of 'reason' by showing their roots in emotion/passion/instinct. He thereby attempts to 'oppose' reason to itself.)

[15] See, for example, Patricia Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification*; Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion*; as well as two excellent anthologies: *Philosophy and Emotion* (edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis) and *Explaining Emotions* (edited by Amelie Rorty). These works represent a number of different trends in recent analytic theorizing about the emotions, and not exclusively those which I believe to be guilty of 'over-rationalization'.

philosophical tradition for misunderstanding both the emotions and sometimes rationality itself. Supporters of this trend attempt to show that our emotional experience can be as reasonable as the cool objectivity we so admire in scientific thinking and which is much prized by the traditional view. However, in recent years, I believe that this admirable trend towards 'rationalizing' the emotions has itself swung too far in the opposite direction by emphasizing the rational character of the emotions *at the expense of* the non-rational and irrational characteristics of emotion.[16] I believe that these two tendencies—to exclude the emotions because of their non-rationality and to over-emphasize the rationality of the emotions in order to legitimate them—are both rooted in a view of the subject which emphasizes autonomy and the cognitive activity of thinking above all else.

As my aim is to include a proper understanding of emotional experience with the rational project of ethical formation, it is clear that I must resist the traditional characterization of emotional experience as exclusively 'disruptive' of rational phenomena. But, as I am also concerned with the more recent tendency to over-rationalize emotional experience, any view I offer must allow for emotional rationality without thereby glossing over the importantly non-rational or irrational aspects of the emotions. I believe that Martin Heidegger's relational account of human experience offers us an excellent starting point from which to develop such a hybrid view.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time* and elsewhere, gives us an account of human existence that is considerably different in emphasis than Descartes' account of

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[16] A common way of 'over-rationalizing' the emotions stems from 'judgmentalist' positions regarding emotions. Such positions (which have been defended—at least at some point—by Patricia Greenspan and Robert Solomon, for example) render the affective quality of emotions unimportant by emphasizing emotions-as-judgments or the propositional character of emotional experience. See Greenspan's *Emotions and Reasons* and Solomon's article, "Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a 'Cognitive Theory' of the Emotions and Does it Neglect Affectivity?" in *Philosophy and the Emotions* (here Solomon evaluates previous attempts—his included—to arrive at a strictly cognitive/judgmentalist theory of the emotions).

subjectivity.[17] While Descartes highlights thinking and autonomy as the essential, indeed fundamental, characteristics of human subjectivity, Heidegger suggests that the relational, 'worldly' character of human existence is more fundamental.[18] While Descartes' positive view begins with the thinking thing and only then proceeds to a proof of the existence of the world, Heidegger *begins* with the world and our relations with and within it. Heidegger argues powerfully that this Cartesian picture unnecessarily misconstrues the actual character of human experience in the world[19]; I believe this more general misunderstanding leads to the specific mischaracterization of emotional experience.

Abraham Mansbach accurately characterizes Heidegger's difference from the Cartesian tradition when he writes that

> For Heidegger, disregarding the fact that the human being does not exist independently of its surroundings has led traditional ontology astray. If, in the ontology of Dasein, we take the worldless 'I' as a starting point in order to provide this 'I' with an object, then we have not presupposed too much but too little. The human being is always in the world; it is always involved in worldly, factual affairs. The *ego cogito* must think something; something must be present for thinking to take place. Thus, the 'I' is not an isolated subject. By positing an independent 'I,' the world is forfeited.[20]

This seemingly simple 'reversal' (from 'I-to-world' to 'World-to-I') has radical implications both for our understanding of the kind of beings we are and for our relative characterization of the various activities in which we engage. Heidegger's view suggests

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[17] Throughout this chapter I will refer to Descartes' account of 'subjectivity' and Heidegger's account of human 'existence' or 'being-in-the-world' rather than Heideggerian 'subjectivity'. Heidegger himself largely eschews the term 'subjectivity' as he finds the notion of the *subjectum* (that which underlies what is 'thrown' or that which underlies the world into which it is thrown) misleading. The reasons for this terminological distinction should become clearer in what follows.

[18] On this see Heidegger, H46 (72) and, later, H114 (150) where he gives the term '*subjectum*' a quite different, worldly sense in relation to the 'Who' of *Dasein* (i.e., the individual self in its relation to Being).

[19] See ibid, H89 (122) and following for Heidegger's opposition to Descartes: particularly section 21where he diagnoses "Descartes' conception of the world [as] ontologically defective" [Ibid, H95 (128)].

[20] Mansbach, 43.

that we are human beings only insofar as we find ourselves in relation to the world.[21] Mansbach again helpfully describes the crucial difference here: "The essential state of Dasein is that of being constantly involved with things and other beings in a web of relationships".[22] That we are thinking things is, on this view, only a corollary of the deeper insight that our thinking is a specific (albeit fascinatingly complex) mode of our *relating* to the world. Heidegger's view, in contrast to that of Descartes, situates the cognitive capabilities of human beings within the larger understanding of human beings as 'worldly' in character. We are not *primarily* thinking subjects but beings in the world who are capable of thought precisely because we are in relations with the world—beings whose relational quality makes it possible to think in the first place.[23]

Heidegger's refusal to *begin* with the activity of thinking is, I think, an excellent place for us to start if we are interested in correctly characterizing the non-rational aspect of emotional experience without thereby denying the possibility of emotional rationality.

§1.2: Non-Rationality and Emotion; Moods

The traditional view of the emotions is that they are adequately described as disruptors of rational processes. I have suggested that this specific view is derived from a more general tradition exemplified by Cartesian subjectivity. The connection between

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[21] In §4 of *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that "Dasein, in its Being [i.e., ontologically] has a relationship towards Being" [Ibid, H12 (32)] and, later, that "Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 'world,' and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world" [Ibid, H13 (33)]. Thus, for Heidegger, Dasein's own essence is inextricably bound together with the world and the beings to be found within the world.

[22] Mansbach, 43.

[23] Of course Heidegger does not dismiss or ignore the importance of thinking—it is, in fact, one of the most persistent themes in his work—rather, he wishes to find the *proper* place for thinking in human experience. One of the most radical differences between Heidegger and Descartes is that the *status* of thinking (i.e., situating its importance properly) is itself a complex and exceedingly difficult problem rather than a starting point. (For Heidegger's complex and changing views on the status of thinking see, for example, (much of) *Being and Time*, his *Discourse on Thinking* and the essays collected in *Poetry, Language, Thought*).

these two views is not necessarily a logical one: one does not imply or entail the other. Rather, their connection lies in direction of emphasis. If we view human subjectivity as fundamentally cognitive in nature, we will logically investigate and emphasize processes which are seemingly non-cognitive or cognitive in ways radically different from rational thought only through their relation to traditional cognition. If we maintain a view of human beings as radically autonomous thinking subjects, we are likely to deemphasize and devalue processes which limit the autonomy (construed, by this traditional view, as the ability to act and think without worldly constraints) of human experience. I believe that this is precisely the situation that the almost unparalleled success of a Cartesian view of human subjectivity has led to. We now understand emotions as rationally disruptive, peripheral mental phenomena.

However, we need not maintain this understanding. Alongside his general (relational) approach to human being-in-the-world, Heidegger makes some very specific remarks about the role of moods which, I believe, can show us how to more properly situate the emotions within human experience. Quentin Smith describes Heidegger's theory of moods as

> ...a radical innovation in the conception and classification of moods. He departs from the traditional conception of feelings as sensuous states that "merely accompany" the so-called "higher faculties" of will and reason, and from the usual practice of classifying moods according to their qualities of pleasure, pain, and desire. Heidegger's basic idea is that moods are a *unique and primary way of disclosing Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and disclosure that is prior to the 'cognitive' disclosure of the so-called 'faculty of reason'*.[24]

The traditional view of emotions (and of moods) suggests that they are disruptive phenomenon which cloud or distort our reasoning and perception. On this view,

[24] Smith, (online). My emphasis.

reasoning is entirely distinct from emotional experience and related it to it only through this unfortunate distortion. Heidegger's view allows us a different, I think subtler, way of thinking about the relations between thought and mood. As Smith rightly points out, Heidegger holds that moods show us something which is importantly *prior* to reasoning and thinking—prior to any cognition whatsoever. Indeed, Heidegger's fundamental rejection of the isolated Cartesian subject leads him to reject the priority of reasoning over mood-laden (i.e., affective) experience and replace it with the view that moods *make reasoning possible*. This shift in emphasis, from autonomy to 'relationality', comes with an associated shift in attitude regarding emotional experience. The emotions have been moved from the margins to the origins of rationality; they are no longer unimportant but *central* to a fuller understanding of human experience.

Ontologically prior to conceptual thought, moods 'disclose'[25] to us the relational character of Dasein. If we properly understand this pre-rational disclosure we are less likely to misunderstand the relations between rationality and emotional experience. How,

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[25] Many are likely to assume that this deep, primordial ontological disclosure which is prior to all thought necessarily entails some sort of non-conceptual *content*. The issue of non-conceptual content has been and remains a highly contentious one, and one which, of necessity, will not be dealt with at any great length in this thesis. I believe an appropriate reading of Heidegger (like that of Charles Taylor) will show us that this 'disclosure' is not necessarily non-conceptual *content* but that it is nevertheless importantly non-conceptual. Taylor, in an illuminating essay on John McDowell, helpfully characterizes this disclosure:

> Heidegger, [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty, and (I think) [Gareth] Evans portray human conceptual thinking as embedded in an ordinary way of living and moving around in the world, and dealing with things, which is in an important sense pre-conceptual; what Dreyfus calls "everyday coping" [Taylor, 111].

Taylor's position takes Heidegger's deep ontological point and brings it nearer. Rather than metaphysically contentious non-conceptual content, Taylor brings this primordial disclosure much closer to us by suggesting what comes to seem obvious: our 'concepts' and thinking themselves take place in a world which is, in an important sense, already there before them. (Of course to adequately defend this point would require considerably more explanation and elucidation, but with this preliminary description I hope the charitable reader will ignore the potential complications involved in 'non-conceptual content' (though even *that* notion may prove to be a useful and well-formed one)). My suggestion, and Heidegger's, is that moods are the modes through which this non-conceptual disclosure takes place for us (on both the ontic and the more philosophically troubling ontological levels).

then, does this disclosure occur? Close attention to Heidegger's direct remarks on moods will help answer this question. In §29 of *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that "Dasein always has some mood"[26] and that,

> In a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. ... The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away.[27]

Here we see Heidegger's insistence that human experience (which is always experience in the world) is always laden with some mood. Humans always find themselves in some mood (anger, elation, boredom, anxiety, tranquility, etc.), but 'finding one's self in a mood' is not like happening upon an event or a quality in the world and noticing it.[28] Rather, finding that I am in some mood requires that even my 'finding' is disclosed to me by and through that mood. So, if we note that we are enraged, our noting of this rage does not signify a detachment or extrication from that rage. Even when (or if) we are able to change or improve our mood (as we commonly are) we only do so by entering a different mood. Thus, if by 'coldly analyzing' the source and nature of my anger that anger begins to subside, the shift out of anger is fluidly accompanied by a shift into tranquility, sober reflectivity, or "the undisturbed equanimity... of our everyday concern".[29] Heidegger writes that "when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods".[30]

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[26] Heidegger, H134 (173).
[27] Ibid, H135 (174).
[28] This in contrast to the pure, removed, autonomous subject who can note its bodily or affective condition without thereby being 'tainted' by that condition.
[29] Ibid, H134 (173). That such *undisturbed* equanimity is itself a 'mood' marks the key difference between Heidegger's view and the purely negative view of moods/emotions as disruptive.
[30] Ibid, H136 (175). The *rational* mastery of our emotional experience will be discussed in significant detail in the following section (and at many points in the remainder of the thesis).

For humans (seen, most fundamentally, as beings-in-the-world) moods are ontologically prior to rational cognition insofar as they disclose to us that we are in some relation to the world. This disclosure 'places' our activities *in* the world and thus allows us to encounter (and conceptualize) entities in the world. So, moods allow our thinking to connect to the world. But these moods also have what Heidegger would call 'ontic'[31] effects; effects which occur after the primordial, ontological disclosure of our being-in-the-world. These effects are seen, by the traditional view, as the disruptive essence of moods and emotional experience generally. The traditional view, then, is interested only in 'mastering' moods by removing all moodiness from thought to arrive at purely rational thinking (i.e., thinking removed from the vicissitudes of the world and our place within it). But, importantly, such a negative take on emotional mastery ignores the positive pre-rational disclosure of moods and focuses only on the ontic or post-rational capacity of moods. And, because the traditional view is committed to a Cartesian view of subjectivity it characterizes these ontic effects solely in disruptive terms without investigating the more fundamental relationship between thinking and mood described by Heidegger. In other words, because it has ignored the 'primordial disclosure' of moods, the traditional view misunderstands and mischaracterizes *both* rationality and the emotions.

Heidegger insists upon the replacement of this negative view with a positive one when he writes that

> Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may

[31] Heidegger distinguishes between the 'ontologico-existential' level (which is, I take it, the level upon which the analysis of Dasein's relation to Being occurs) and the 'ontical-existentiell' level (which is concerned, primarily, with the phenomenological analysis of beings). Of course, there are numerous and important relations between the two levels. My use of the term 'ontic' here should be taken to suggest that the disruptive effects are not central or essential to the ('ontological') character of human experience in the world. One might profitably think of the distinction as one between beings and the logic-and-structure-of-Being.

> signify a priority of volition and cognition [i.e., we can view the demand for mastery in the merely negative sense outlined above]. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure.[32]

This is, obviously, quite different from the view of moods solely as disruptors of rationality. Heidegger's view suggests that rational thinking itself requires a mood (or, perhaps, a variety of moods). We can define these negatively (as the traditional view seems to demand) by suggesting that rational thinking only requires the *absence* of, e.g., anger, lust, elation, anxiety, pride, envy, or fear. Such a negative definition can lead us to view rational thinking as a potential escape from the mood-laden character of Dasein. But only misleadingly so, as this negative definition only furthers the mischaracterization of affective experience as disruptive. Heidegger's view, if we properly understand the relations between the ontic and the ontological, allows for a *positive* understanding of the mood-laden character of rational thought, thought which has, in a sense, mastered its mood, or become appropriately attuned to itself and its mood.

Before I move on to provide more details regarding a positive view of emotional mastery, I would like to retrace my argument up until this point in order to further clarify how Heidegger's opposition to the traditional view allows him (and those, like me, who find his view attractive) to see emotional rationality as a live option without thereby discrediting the obvious insight that emotions are not rational in the same way that cognitive processes are.

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[32] Ibid, H136 (175). This may seem to foreclose the possibility of rationalizing emotional experience. On my view it need not. It merely limits the *range* of such rationalization by making any full rationalization impossible—a point which Lovibond, without the specific focus on emotions, exploits to provide us with a goad to criticism. (On this see, e.g., chapter 7 of *Ethical Formation*, entitled "The Determinate Critique of Ethical Formation").

I have suggested that there is a traditional, commonsense view of the emotions which envisions them solely as disruptive of rational thinking. The reason this view finds little of interest in emotional experience is that it is derived from a view of human subjectivity which prizes autonomy and the activity of thinking above all else. This Cartesian view of subjectivity holds that autonomy and the capacity to think are the very things which define human experience as such. This emphasis on the cognitive autonomy of human beings leads to a related de-emphasis on non-cognitive or less 'autonomous' modes of human experience like emotion. It is this de-emphasis which leads to the dismissal or devaluation of the possibility of emotional rationality.

As one of the central aims of this thesis is to show that emotional experiences are a necessary and important part of ethical formation, which is itself a thoroughly rational project, I have offered an opposing view. Heidegger's view offers us the possibility of emotional rationality without thereby denying the valuable insight—central to the traditional view—that the emotions are not (at least solely) cognitive or rational phenomenon. For Heidegger, humans are most fundamentally beings who find themselves in relations with the world. On this view, autonomy and the capacity for thought are important characteristics of human being that are situated within a larger, more inclusive relational framework. Cognition is not emphasized at the expense of non-cognitive processes, but, instead, the cognitive and the non-cognitive alike are investigated insofar as an understanding of both allows a better appreciation of how human beings relate to the world in which they find themselves. This view does not force us to marginalize emotional experience; rather it suggests that emotional experience discloses our being-in-the-world (our 'relational' character) before cognition can occur.

This disclosure *allows* us to think, as it shows us that we are in a world which is capable of being thought. Heidegger's view, then, shows us the importance of emotional experience by showing us its primordiality. It is because of the primordial disclosure of emotional experience that emotional rationality remains a viable option: if moods are prior to rationality, then rationality *itself* is mood-laden in some way. In order to understand rationality we must therefore understand its relation(s) to moods.

But this says nothing, at least directly, to the traditional view's characterization of the emotions as irrational, disruptive phenomenon. Even if we show, as I have attempted, that the traditional, negative view is based upon an inadequate account of subjectivity, we have not spoken directly to the commonsense belief that emotions are related to rationality only as disruptors. What I *have* shown is that the radical opposition between emotional experience and rational thought can be avoided and that the concept of 'emotional rationality' is not, at least prima facie, an incoherent one. So, at this point in the chapter I hope to have undermined, at least in part, the hold that the traditional view has on our understanding of the emotions by showing that its fundamental insight (i.e., the 'disruptive' character of emotional experience) can *potentially* be understood in a markedly different theoretical framework. In the following section I will attempt to illustrate how we might actually do so; how we might come to a clearer understanding of emotional rationality.

§1.3: Emotions, Minimal Rationality and Paradigm Scenarios

In the above sections, I utilized Heidegger's position to illustrate *that* emotional rationality is a live option. In this section I would like to utilize Ronald de Sousa's work to show with more precision *how* emotional experience might be rationalized.

Rather than supporting the traditional view that the emotions are merely anti-rational disruptions, de Sousa suggests that the level of emotional rationality may be "the deepest and most inclusive".[33] If we take Heidegger's account of the pre-rational disclosure of moods seriously, we are better equipped to understand this seemingly radical claim. The level of emotional rationality is 'deep' in the sense that it is the least-specialized, barest sort of rationality available to us. In its earliest stages it is the first step towards the more robust and intricate forms of rationality we utilize in our higher cognitive processes. De Sousa, who approaches the 'depth' of emotional rationality from quite a different point of view (i.e., that of analytic philosophy as opposed to the metaphysical/phenomenological approach of Heidegger), attempts to show what the bare conditions for "minimal rationality" are, and how we can think of emotional experience as fulfilling these conditions.

The definition of rationality has been and continues to be one of the central concerns of Western philosophy. Notoriously resistant to exhaustive definition, rationality nevertheless remains one of our most important concepts, both inside and outside of academia. Here I want to show how de Sousa establishes some very general (and, I think, very *reasonable*) constraints on the notion of rationality by providing a framework for 'minimal rationality'. These constraints point us toward a conception of *emotional* rationality which yet allows for the non-rational or arational aspect of the emotions. Rather than defining rationality exhaustively he attempts to show what minimal conditions must be established before we can deem a class of experiences, behaviours, actions, or mental states *assessable* for rationality. He argues that despite

[33] De Sousa 1987, 187.

rationality's recalcitrant vagueness, we do know some things about it (and that we know is exhibited in our practical uses of the concept).

De Sousa's development of minimal rationality begins in his 1979 paper, "The Rationality of Emotions" and is more fully treated in his 1987 book *The Rationality of Emotion*. In the earlier paper de Sousa outlines two particularly important qualities that any rationally assessable phenomena must possess: teleology and intentionality. He writes there that

> Rationality is always a teleological concept. Anything that we speak of as rational or irrational, we so designate in the light of some function or end. An act is irrational if it tends to frustrate its ostensible or ultimate goal, or the agent's. A want can be said to be irrational in the light of other wants claiming precedence in a hierarchy of wants and ends.[34]

Thus, we judge states (or acts, beliefs, etc.) as rational only insofar as they achieve some prior goal. They are irrational if they become obstacles to such goals.[35] For example, the 'goal' of belief is commonly held to be truth (or 'justified true belief'). Holding a particular belief can thus be deemed rational (at a particular time) if that belief is true or if it is likely to be true given all currently available information.[36]

But teleology is not enough. There are plenty of activities which are teleological but not rational (or, for that matter, irrational). The photosynthetic processes of oak trees may be teleologically sound, they may appropriately fulfill the goal of sustaining the life

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[34] De Sousa 1979, 128-129.

[35] Such a definition obviously withholds judgment upon the rationality or irrationality of these goals themselves. De Sousa's account of the 'rationality of emotional rationality' (to use an awkward turn of phrase) relies, as I suggested very briefly above, in large part on the notion of normality. By supplementing his specific and focused account of emotional rationality with the broader realism of Lovibond's ethical formation we will be better able to avoid the subjectivist complications of such reliance upon (potentially irrational) cultural norms as signposts for emotional rationality. This will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion of the thesis.

[36] Obviously the complications and subtleties of epistemology are being sacrificed for the sake of exemplification here.

of trees (and perhaps the lives of other related organisms), but we wouldn't say of a particular tree, or of any organism, that it is rational of that organism to have organs or parts that function teleologically. Intuitively, rationality is beside the point here. De Sousa suggests, then, that teleology is a necessary but insufficient condition of rationality. He writes that, "It is primarily individuals who are assessed for rationality, and it is in respect of their *intentional states* that they are so assessed".[37] What is missing from mere teleology is the notion of intentionality. We might, in fact, say that the photosynthetic capabilities of an oak tree are rational, but *only* by assuming some intentional agency (some god or god-like entity) that intended the tree to function as it does. Similarly, we don't think of our creations (computers, machines, systems, etc.) as rational unless we endow them, through personification, with powers of intentionality.

But again, intentionality alone is not a sufficient condition for rationality. De Sousa writes, "Any intentional state amenable to criticism in terms of canons of rationality must be described by some true description that represents the state as rational".[38] The simple fact of some action being intended does not, as may seem obvious, confer rationality on that action. Rather, it is the combination of intention and appropriateness to a specifiable goal (i.e., teleology) that defines minimal rationality.

So, if we are to analyse our emotions and emotional responses for rationality, we must show that (and, to convince, how) they are teleological and intentional. In other words, we have to say something about what emotions 'aim' at and how we measure their success in achieving their aims (teleology). We must also show that/how emotions are

[37] Ibid, 129. My emphasis.
[38] Ibid, 129-130.

(at least partially) under our control and are not, as has often been suggested, automatic and exclusively biological or deterministic functions of the body (intentionality).[39]

In *The Rationality of Emotion* de Sousa develops the idea of minimal rationality (with its concomitant notions of intentionality and teleology) in significantly more detail. In a chapter of that work (entitled "Evolution and Teleology: From Instinct to Intentionality") de Sousa endeavors to isolate a further distinction between adaptive (i.e., purely biological) teleology and, what is more interesting for my purposes here, intentional teleology (e.g., the teleology of 'mental' phenomena like emotions). He writes that

> Corresponding to the proximate and the remote levels of [evolutionary biological] explanation, there are two sorts of prima facie teleology: the adaptive and the intentional. The first is exemplified by the fact that organs and behavioural mechanisms fit the environment. The prototype of the other is deliberate action. But the capacity for motivation, which is presupposed by intentional action, is itself presumably a product of evolution.[40]

De Sousa will draw from this distinction the deeper insight that our emotions (like many other mental phenomena) are intimately related to our evolutionary past even though not reducible to that past. What de Sousa attempts to show here is how "the apparent teleology of adaptation relates to the individual teleology of motivation and action, in such a way as to make possible the full-fledged intentionality of human emotion".[41] So, instead of two distinct but related notions (i.e., teleology and intentionality) what de Sousa suggests here is a single concept (intentional teleology) which encompasses

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[39] It may seem as if I suggest that intentionality can be reduced to control (over our body, e.g.). Here I imply this oversimplification with the express promise of complicating this tentative definition significantly in the following chapter. Below, it should become somewhat obvious that I find any simple opposition between instinct (biology) and intention (culture) to be entirely untenable. Such an opposition misses the subtlety of de Sousa's brand of 'naturalism'.

general biological and historical facts about how human beings have become what they are: i.e., animals capable of intending, desiring, reasoning, emoting, etc. The minimal conditions for rationality are thus intimately linked with the biological, species-specific conditions which have allowed intentional teleology (typified by "the capacity for motivation"[42]) to arise.

What is interesting about de Sousa's account is that even while paying due respect, along with theorists of the emotions like William James, to the biological origins of our emotions he is wary of reducing their historical/social aspects exclusively to their evolutionary origins in biology. His is a naturalist account, but one that allows—like Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and, in quite a different way, Nietzsche and Michel Foucault's 'genealogical' histories—an escape from the dangers of a strict, *reductive* naturalism without ignoring the 'situational' benefits of naturalism.

De Sousa argues that there is an important and inalienably biological component in the 'rationality' of our emotions but that this component does not make irrelevant (or fully explain) the social and historical aspects of this rationality. He holds that there are certain conditions of possibility—e.g. the ability to intend—whose origins can (and must) be explained biologically. But he does not make the further step of suggesting that the biological origins of intention can completely explain the complex functions that intention fulfills in fully developed human beings. Rather, he believes that the historical and social component of the emotions is an important, indeed a crucial, requirement if we are to understand the subtlety of emotional rationality. By understanding how we actually learn and acquire emotions through historical and social processes (how our emotional

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[40] De Sousa 1987, 77.
[41] Ibid, 76.

lives are 'formed'), we will be able to better understand the limited and limiting role that biology plays here. To this end, de Sousa develops an account of emotional assessability that is centered upon the learning, acquisition, and development of 'paradigm scenarios'. I will now turn to a description of this account.

That emotions can be evaluated for appropriateness is not terribly controversial[43]: we commonly feel that a particular emotion in a particular situation is warranted or even necessary (grief at a loss[44], surprise and happiness over an unexpected windfall, etc.). Indeed, we often discriminate between degrees of appropriateness: it may be mildly inappropriate to be angry at a child for spilling milk, but grossly inappropriate to be angry at a child for forgetting lines in a school play. Despite the fact that emotional 'measurability' is not a foreign concept, understanding how such measurements can be made rationally is quite difficult.

De Sousa, noting this difficulty, proposes that we start at the beginning: where do our emotions and our emotional vocabulary come from? How are they acquired? His answer is that our emotional repertoire—the set of emotions that we can identify, experience, and judge—is learned through the acquisition of increasingly refined and broadened paradigm scenarios. These paradigm scenarios are like emotional set pieces that provide us with (varyingly approximate) yardsticks for measuring our emotional behaviour and that of others. Once we have learned one of these set pieces and understood, by ostensive definition, what a given emotion 'means' we can judge the

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[42] Ibid, 77.

[43] Though, strangely, this characteristic is quite often ignored by proponents of the traditional, 'disruptive' view of the emotions.

[44] An obvious example: that the protagonist of Albert Camus' *L'Etranger* makes us uncomfortable because of his lack of emotion regarding his mother's death stems directly from our implicit belief that emotions can be *required* in certain situations. A similar strangeness or unpleasantness is created by the absence of appropriate emotional interactions throughout much of Franz Kafka's work, most obviously in *The Castle.*

appropriateness of emotional experience in any relevantly similar situation. Thus, the *telos* of any given emotion is determined by the paradigm scenarios which apply to it: happiness, for instance, by real instances of reward and satisfied expectations.

These paradigm scenarios require, like the rest of de Sousa's account, a combination of biology and culture: the preconditions for their acquisition are largely biological, genetic, and physiognomic. A child must possess appropriate sensory organs, the capacity for certain facial contortions, an aversion to pain, an appreciation of pleasure, etc, to be capable of emotional learning. But, beyond biology as a precondition, de Sousa also seems to be indebted—though precisely how far is not clear—to a vaguely Piagetian account of developmental stages. He writes that "A child is genetically programmed [preconditioned] to respond in specific ways to the situational components of some paradigm scenarios. But what situational components can be identified depends on the child's stage of development".[45] In other words, the biological maturation of an infant toward adulthood limits what sorts of things in the world can become salient at any given 'stage' of that development. For example, if, at a particular developmental stage, a child has yet to acquire the ability to discern that more coins does not translate directly into more money ("I'll trade you 5 nickels for your dollar"), then certain potentially salient components (emotional and otherwise) involved with the concepts of theft, borrowing, owing, purchasing, etc. will be entirely unavailable to them. As I mentioned above, how far (and in precisely what terms) de Sousa wishes to adopt the notion of 'developmental stages' is not entirely clear. What I extract from his limited discussion of the topic is the belief that there are certain stages of development, perhaps of varying rigidity, which limit (though precisely how is left unsaid) which paradigm scenarios

(perhaps even concepts more generally) are available to a child. This, obviously, has important consequences for the acquisition of paradigm scenarios. De Sousa continues the passage cited above as follows:

> An essential part of education consists in identifying these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the scenario, and thus teaching it [sic] that it is experiencing a particular emotion. That is, in part, what is involved in learning to feel the right emotions...[46]

In other words, we acquire paradigm scenarios by initially responding 'naturally' (from our as yet unintentional preconditioning); these primitive responses are then situated or contextualized with the help of our caregivers. This help consists, in part, in linguistic 'pointing', in naming the emotion, the response, the scenario, the context, and so on.[47]

As far as the teleological aspect of the intentional teleology required for emotional rationality, the notion of paradigm scenarios is quite helpful. Our emotions can be deemed teleologically appropriate (and, thus, quasi-rational) insofar as they 'fit' or 'match' an appropriate paradigm scenario. Our emotional experiences can be seen, in de Sousa's terminology, as minimally rational if they adequately fulfill the demands of

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[45] De Sousa 1987, 183.
[46] Ibid, 183.
[47] The view that emotional acquisition is intimately bound up with language lines up nicely with Lovibond's vision of ethical formation as a process aiming at a more complete *authorial* mastery of our words and deeds. It also, perhaps unsurprisingly, meshes well with John McDowell's vision of maturation. In *Mind and World*, McDowell gestures toward much the same point when he writes that

> Human beings mature into being at home in the space of reasons or, what comes to the same thing, living their lives in the world; we can make sense of that by noting that the language into which a human being is first initiated stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world [McDowell, *Mind and World*, 124].

For de Sousa, Lovibond, and McDowell, the capacity for rationality and the development of rationality (in the broad understanding of ethical formation and de Sousa's more specifically emotional view) is directly related to linguistic acquisition and mastery, i.e., to our capacity for making ourselves at home in language. I will exploit this connection further in Chapter 2.

appropriate paradigm scenarios. We gauge this appropriateness through something like the following process: First, we determine which scenario (out of the many scenarios we've acquired) is appropriate; second, we determine how close the current instance 'matches' or 'fits' the scenario we've deemed appropriate; third, we determine, based on the closeness of this match whether the current instance is rational or irrational, we may also determine how rational or irrational it is. All of this requires as a precondition that we have acquired or learned the appropriate paradigm scenario and are intimately familiar with it. We acquire these scenarios though the interactive shaping and naming of our earliest (biological) responses to phenomena in the world. On this view, the rationality of emotion is dependent upon paradigm scenarios which are acquired in the move from species-specific behaviours (pure biology) to intentional behaviours (biology and culture both).

Clearly the above discussion of the teleological appropriateness of particular emotional experiences requires an account of intentionality and its development. As I noted above, teleology alone is not enough for rationality; emotions must possess intentionality as well. In order to understand how emotions can be intentional, we have to understand more clearly how the transition from a purely biological nature to a 'second' nature (combining biology with culture and intention) occurs.[48] De Sousa suggests that through enculturation and language learning we also learn how to intend (or, in Lovibond's terms, how to become the 'authors' of our utterances and behaviours). But, as we often treat intentionality and our primitive, natural responses to the world as radically separate things (perhaps even inhabiting different ontological spheres) we must delve

deeper into this transition. How do we make this leap? Is the process itself purely biological? If so, does intentionality remain biological and subject to a kind of naturalist reduction?

In the next chapter I will attempt to deal with these questions at some length in order to show that emotional intentionality is not simply reducible to a purely biological picture of the world. As emotional acquisition and the transition from mere biology to something 'different' is of central importance to de Sousa's account, I believe it is necessary to clarify what seems, at this point, to be a rather general and unspecified picture of childhood development. I will, accordingly, interrogate de Sousa's account of emotional acquisition with the hope of making that account more robust and responsive to what it is we actually do when we acquire a paradigm scenario.

[48] The notion of 'second nature' will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion to this thesis. At present, it is perhaps most helpful to think of second nature simply as the aspect of our nature which we commonly think of as largely separate from our 'animality'.

Chapter Two: Acquisition

The preceding chapter ended with a promise to investigate how full-blown emotional intentionality develops out of biological nature; or, in Lovibond's words, how we "[construct] a "second" nature on the basis of the first".[49] I suggested there that de Sousa's account of this transition, if it is to be satisfactorily complete, requires a more detailed explanation of what it is that goes on when we acquire a paradigm scenario. Though de Sousa provides us with a broad theoretical framework in which to work, he treats certain questions of specificity too briefly to be helpful. My aim here is to supplement his broader framework (which I find useful though limited) with a more specific understanding of the processes of emotional acquisition and childhood development.

This chapter, like the first, will be separated into three sections. The first will be largely exegetical: I will reiterate (in greater detail) what de Sousa has to say about the acquisition of paradigm scenarios. I will then show that his limited remarks on the subject are closely analogous to the 'Augustinian' picture of language learning that Wittgenstein attempts to problematize in the earlier sections of the *Investigations*. By drawing this analogy (which de Sousa himself hints at) I will pave the way for the second, more critical section. Just as Wittgenstein is skeptical of the bare-bones picture of language acquisition which Augustine relates to us, so shall I remain skeptical of de Sousa's largely ostensive account of the acquisition of paradigm scenarios. In this second section I will show that the ostensive account gives us a misleading, unhelpful picture of emotional development which, in turn, leads to problems understanding emotional

[49] Lovibond, 30.

intentionality. In the third section I hope to bypass these problems by offering a considerably different account of emotion/language acquisition (largely indebted to Stanley Cavell and Lev Vygotsky). Here I will show that an appropriate understanding of the relationship between biology and culture helps us to avoid the problems of the ostensive picture, and, in so doing, allows a clearer understanding of the development of emotional intentionality from our pre-emotional 'first nature'.

§2.1: The Ostensive Picture

For de Sousa, the possibility of emotional rationality hinges upon the acquisition of paradigm scenarios. These paradigm scenarios, in turn, must be acquired in infancy or early childhood and developed throughout adolescence and (hopefully) into adulthood. In the previous chapter I briefly presented de Sousa's thoughts on paradigm scenario acquisition. This brief characterization requires further details regarding how, precisely, we acquire or learn paradigm scenarios. De Sousa's view of this acquisition can be separated into two parts. The first relies on the notion of developmental stages. Here de Sousa suggests that at certain stages in a child's development some features of a situation are understandable or graspable while others are not. Thus, more complex emotional paradigms like hope, indignation, and bitterness will only become available after a given developmental stage has been reached (and cannot be 'taught' before this stage). This is a negative qualification: we can only learn or acquire those paradigm scenarios which are available at our current developmental stage. This of course does not answer how this acquisition occurs; it merely sets a condition of possibility for such acquisition.

The second aspect of de Sousa's view is more positive and also differs considerably from many more traditional accounts of emotional development. These

traditional accounts suggest that our complex emotional lives are built out of 'emotional primitives', simplistic building blocks that, when combined, somehow give rise to the startling complexity of human emotion. De Sousa remarks that the sheer variety of lists of such emotional primitives should serve as evidence that this theoretical strategy is unlikely to prove successful.[50] While he does not reject this tradition entirely, he nevertheless wishes to go beyond it.

> I think we can understand, in principle, how our repertoire of emotions gets built up, without positing a set of 'primary emotions' that get combined like basic blocks or even mixed like primary colours. We do need a repertoire of primitive instinctual responses, but emotions are not mere responses.[51]

He suggests here that while there are some basic conditions that must be in place for the possibility of emotion (e.g., instinctual responses to certain stimuli), these necessary conditions are not themselves emotions, even of the most primitive kind. Our emotional lives may grow out of such responses but, once developed, they are not reducible to those responses. Just as a pile of bricks is not a home, so pre-intentional biological reactions are not emotions.

He nevertheless argues that the first inklings of emotion are to be found in such genetically- and physiognomically-determined responses:

> A child is genetically programmed to respond in specific ways to the situational components of some paradigm scenarios [e.g., to pain by crying]. But what situational components [i.e., which sorts of 'pain'] can be identified depends on the child's stage of development. *An essential part of education consists in identifying these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the scenario, and thus teaching it* [sic] *that it is experiencing a particular emotion. That is, in part, what is involved in learning to feel the right emotions...*[52]

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[50] De Sousa 1979, 54.
[51] De Sousa 1987, 181-182
[52] Ibid, 182. My emphasis.

So, while we may have a natural ability to respond to pain by crying out, or to pleasure by smiling, the type of pleasure or pain (or grief, happiness, pride, love, hatred, envy, hope, surprise, etc.) we are capable of experiencing is limited by our development. If we cannot grasp the logic of temporal sequence because of a developmental inability then the anticipatory nature of hope will entirely elude us and efforts to educate us about hope (without first overcoming this developmental block) will of necessity fail. So, while we may be able to move, by way of specific and context-dependent reinforcement, to 'simpler' emotions (or simpler instances of potentially complex emotions) like happiness or sadness, we cannot move from pleasure to hope simply on the basis of these responses.[53]

But of course most of us *do* acquire the ability to feel hopeful, or envious, proud or elated, anxious, homesick or dejected. Even further, we become capable of feeling specific emotions when it is appropriate (to the appropriate degree) and also capable of gauging when it is appropriate for *others* to feel them. De Sousa is rightly worried about connecting these complex, culturally sophisticated emotions directly to their origins in biology. But he is equally wary of any radical divide between biological reaction and cultured intention.[54] How then *do* we learn emotions and acquire paradigm scenarios?

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[53] Similarly Wittgenstein writes: "We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him to-morrow. Why not?" [Wittgenstein, §650, see also pp. 174 and 229 for similar examples]. A dog cannot fear what may come tomorrow nor can a 'merely instinctual' infant hope precisely because fearing-what-may-come-tomorrow and hoping both require cultural stage-setting which is impossible for a dog to obtain, and which developing children at certain stages have yet to obtain. (Wittgenstein's remark that "...the word "hope" refers to a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face)" [Ibid, §583] helps illustrate even further that enculturation into human forms of life is required for any 'intending' or 'meaning' to get off the ground).

[54] See chapter two of *The Rationality of Emotion*, entitled "Emotion and Biology: Physiology and Function", where de Sousa interrogates William James' view that emotional experience is explainable simply in terms of physiological change. There he begins the construction of a mitigated view of emotional

De Sousa's suggestion is broad and, in a sense, broadly correct: he argues that by learning how to name, individuate, identify and contextualize the predecessors to emotion, we become capable of truly feeling and intending them. By learning, imitating, and vocalizing about our pre-intentional, natural reactions we become capable of transforming them into hybridized biological/cultural emotions of the sort that "an animal *with the right to make promises*"[55] might possess. In Lovibond's terms, we become the authors of our emotions by learning the *language* of emotions (which will no doubt include the subtle contextual language of emphasis, tone, and gesture). This seems, at least *prima facie*, a reasonably accurate portrait of emotional acquisition.

And so far as it goes it *is* an accurate portrait. However, it is only accurate if it is supported by an appropriate understanding of the processes involved here: of naming, identifying, contextualizing, learning, teaching, et cetera. If we improperly construe these constituent processes then we are likely to be led astray by de Sousa's broad picture of emotion acquisition. Which is to say, if we move the investigation one level closer and ask *how* children come to identify and name a particular emotion (or an associated paradigm scenario) or how children learn what counts as a relevantly similar instantiation of a particular situation, then de Sousa's broad view seems to require significantly more detail. 'Learning' and 'naming' are themselves conceptual boxes (like 'emotion acquisition' and 'paradigm scenario') which need to be further unpacked if we are to understand how we become capable of intending our emotions.

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biology which salvages much of James' view while admitting that we must move beyond *pure* physiology in order to fully understand the complexity of (many) emotions. The questions raised in this chapter are dealt with continually throughout the work; of particular importance is chapter seven where de Sousa discusses the relationship between biology and rationality.

[55] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 57. Cited by Lovibond in *Ethical Formation* (p. 72 and elsewhere) as a helpful way of characterizing the peculiarly human combination of biology/determinism and culture/freedom.

In order to make the potentially misleading self-sufficiency of this broad view of emotion acquisition more apparent I will offer an analogy. The analogy is between the acquisition of emotions (which is dependent upon emotional language) and the acquisition of language more generally. Augustine, as is well known, suggests something similar to de Sousa's broad view in a passage cited by Wittgenstein at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Augustine recollects that:

> When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was [shown] by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.[56]

This is a common, even common sense, picture of language learning; one that gives great weight to the process of ostensive definition and the function of words as names of things. We can draw a close analogy between this Augustinian account of language acquisition and de Sousa's account of emotion acquisition. De Sousa, like Augustine, emphasizes the identification (by ostention)[57] and naming of emotions in particular situations; these names are then (somehow) generalized in scope beyond the current situation. It is this ostensive definition of terms (emotional or linguistic) that provides us

[56] Augustine, cited in Wittgenstein, §1

[57] Recall de Sousa's remark that "An essential part of education consists in identifying these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the scenario..." [De Sousa 1987, 183]. Neither de Sousa nor Augustine make the claim that 'giving names' by pointing to something is *all* that learning requires. Rather, both offer pictures of language acquisition which emphasize this aspect to the detriment of others (or so I will argue). These pictures are not wrong—just as the Cartesian view of subjectivity is not 'wrong'—rather, I believe that their respective emphases lead us toward misunderstandings which might

with the basis for sense-making. Ostending is, in other words, the method by which we move—and are moved—from primitive responses (like wordless crying) to subtler expressions of what goes on 'inside' us.

§2.2: Problems with this picture

Let us now interrogate this picture a little more closely. We can state the view roughly as follows. A child is shown a thing (an object, a situation, a behaviour, etc.). The person who shows the child the thing then utters a noise. This noise is the name of the thing. The child internalizes this noise-thing connection and comes to understand it as the name of the thing. When the name has been internalized, the child becomes able (if she has learned correctly) to deploy and project the name on her own. Now, stated bluntly, the broad, common view of language learning begs a few questions. First, how can we 'show' a child a thing—let's say a shoe—without that child already having that concept somehow? Second, how does the child come to understand the utterance of a noise ("Shoe!") *as a name* without already understanding *what a name is*? Third, how do we become certain that the child has learned a name and is not merely uttering a meaningless—meaningless for the child—noise?

(All these questions apply equally well to the acquisition of paradigm scenarios: how do we show a child what it means to 'love' without the child already possessing some concept or experience of love? How does the child connect our utterances ("I love you", "This (the way I feel about you) is what we mean by love") without already understanding what 'feeling' is being indicated, or—even further—without the understanding that what 'goes on inside herself' might also go on inside others? Finally,

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helpfully be avoided if we envision language learning differently (as Wittgenstein and Cavell help us to do).

how is it that we 'outsiders' (parents, teachers, friends) come to know or agree that the child has in fact learned to love in the way we understand love?)

Stanley Cavell, in a remarkable essay on Wittgenstein, provides an example which illustrates perfectly the complexity involved in answering (both sets of) these questions. He discusses his puzzlement about what went on when his daughter first learned the word 'kitty'. It is worth quoting at some length:

> What does it mean to say she 'knows the word'? What does it mean to say she 'learned it'? Take the day on which, after I said 'Kitty' and pointed to a kitty, she repeated the word and pointed to the kitty. What does 'repeating the word' mean here? and what did she point to? All I know is (and does she know more?) that she made the sound I made and pointed to what I pointed at. Or rather, I know less (or more) than that. For what is 'her making the sound I made'? She produced a sound (imitated me?) which *I accepted, responded to* (with smiles, hugs, words of encouragement, etc.) as *what I had said.* The next time a cat came by, on the prowl or in a picture book, she did it again...Now take the day, some weeks later, when she smiled at a fur piece, stroked it, and said 'kitty'. My first reaction was surprise, and, I suppose, disappointment: she doesn't really know what 'kitty' means. But my second reaction was happier: she means by 'kitty' what I mean by 'fur'. Or was it what I mean by 'soft', or perhaps 'nice to stroke'? Or perhaps she didn't mean at all what in my syntax would be recorded as 'That is an X'. After all, when she sees real kittens she not only utters her allophonic version of 'kitty', she usually squeals the word over and over, squats down near it, stretches out her arm towards it and opens and closes her fingers (an allomorphic version of 'petting the kitten'?), purses her lip, and squints with pleasure. All she did with the fur piece was, smiling, to say 'kitty' once and stroke it. Perhaps the syntax of that performance should be transcribed as 'This is like a kitty', or 'Look at the funny kitty', or 'Aren't soft things nice?', or 'See, I remember how pleased you are when I say kitty', or 'I like to be petted'. Can we decide this? Is it a *choice* between these definite alternatives? In each case her word was produced about a soft, warm, furry object of a certain size, shape, and weight. What did she learn in order to do that? *What did she learn from having done it?*[58]

Cavell's questions here lead us to notice the misleading simplicity of the Augustinian picture of language learning (and, by analogy, that of de Sousa's broad view of paradigm

scenario acquisition). This view relies upon a number of assumptions which seem to treat primary language acquisition more like the learning of a second language than the markedly different process of first becoming at home in language. The child gradually becomes able to reproduce phonemes similar enough to our word "kitty" that we accept her utterance as a meaningful one: "Kitty!" We say that for her "Kitty!" *means* the same as it does for us. But without a further understanding of how the ability *to mean* comes about, this picture remains rather like an adult English speaker learning that the word for "kitty" in French is "*chaton*" and proceeding to excitedly utter "*C'est un chaton*!" upon viewing instances already known as 'kittens'. But this view, again, misses the point: it views learning as a kind of filling in of pre-established slots—what Paolo Freire, in a different context, has called the "'banking' concept of education".[59]

Again, Cavell is helpful:

> What we want to say is that the child learns that a sound that is (counts as) this word names objects which are cats. But isn't that just what we thought we needed, and were trying to give, an explanation for?[60]

This is precisely the problem: the common view of language learning seems to assume that everything is already in place for a child to learn a name; the child already requires a grasp of syntax, individuation, pointing, and naming in order for this picture to get off the ground. But aren't we interested precisely in *how the child becomes capable of understanding and engaging in these processes*? We want to know how our natural inclinations (like crying out in pain) are transformed by education and enculturation into

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[58] Cavell, 24.

[59] Freire in more detail: "Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the "banking" concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing deposits" [Freire, 58].

full-blown acts of intentionality. This Augustinian picture of language learning (as well as de Sousa's directly analogous account of paradigm scenario acquisition) is misleading. The developing child is viewed as a passive subject[61] imbibing sensory information (e.g., watching others point, hearing their words, etc.) which is then 'filed' into pre-established slots: thing one=name one, thing two=name two, etc. But this passive view of the subject tends to obscure the dynamic processes required to establish the conditions which make such 'filing' or 'banking' possible in the first place. The Augustinian picture tells us that children are 'shown' names by being shown the connection between a thing and its name; they are 'shown' intentions through gesture and tone. But this says nothing about how they are shown: it merely reiterates *that* they are shown. This picture thus refuses to engage the question we wish to have answered: how do children learn a name, how do they connect a certain gesture with a certain intention? What is needed, if we are to understand how intentionality develops, is a theory which is more attentive to these concerns. In the following section I will outline what such a theory might look like.

§2.3: Potential Solutions

There are at least two potential solutions to this problem. The first involves directly positing some innate capacity of the human mind for naming. This would allow us to maintain the Augustinian picture's latent vision of children as passive subjects

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[60] Cavell, 22.

[61] As I have connected de Sousa's unspecified account of paradigm scenario acquisition to the Augustinian view of language acquisition, I may seem to be suggesting that de Sousa consciously holds such a 'passive' view of developing children. This is patently not the case, as he states that "...we should not assume, as both psychoanalysis and behaviourist psychology might incline us to do, that the child is merely a passive recipient of shaping by parental and other external influences" [De Sousa 1987, 182], and, further, that "How an infant is treated determines the paradigm scenarios that define its emotional repertoire; but its treatment, in turn, partly depends on its [sic] own innate facial characteristics and behaviors" [Ibid, 192]. Rather, what I suggest is that without further specification and clarification about developmental processes, it is likely to *appear* that de Sousa's view unwittingly assumes such a passive subject. My aim is to show

merely awaiting appropriate stimuli to fill in mental pigeonholes. But I believe this tentative suggestion, like the Augustinian picture itself, stops short of full engagement with the problem. If we hold that we have an innate capacity to name things, we still have to learn which things are called by which names. But, the innate theorist might suggest that, in addition to our innate capacity for naming, we are also innately equipped with a store of concepts. But this won't suffice either. Cavell's 'kitty' example is useful in showing why. In each case the child's utterance of 'kitty' is interpretable through what we, as more competent speakers of the language, would deem conceptually distinguishable aspects of the world: furry, pleasantness, cat, softness, etc. Taking the hard-line stance on innateness here would require not only a vast stock of innate concepts (from kitty and fur to carburetor and golden mountain) but also the ability—remarkable and perhaps inexplicable—to pluck the correct concept (our 'kitty') from our gesturing toward (and emitting an accompanying noise) some 'thing' which, as we have seen, may support a host of possible appellations. This not only requires the innate ability to name and an innate stockpile of concepts, but also an almost telepathic ability to understand what it is adults are pointing to when we could very well be pointing to two, five, or a hundred different aspects of the visible world. There may very well be an innate linguistic aspect of the human mind which deals with naming, but if this is the case it must be importantly supplemented by enculturation. Innateness is, at best, a partial solution to our problem.

So we still require a richer story detailing the transition from first to second nature—from mechanism to mastery. The second option, insofar as it shies away from

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precisely that we can 'rescue' de Sousa's account from a latent commitment to this kind of Augustinian view by providing a more specific vision of the relevant processes.

the passive model of the subject latent in the Augustinian picture, seems more plausible. This option (which I will presently extract from the work of Lev Vygotsky) approaches the question differently: rather than a transition from brute biology to sophisticated, cultured intentions, this second option takes a larger view of the process of development itself. It offers us a picture in which no firm distinction is erected between instinct and intention: both are always situated within the greater context of the development and maturation of a human being. Biology is not equated here with an alien animality that must be overcome and supplanted by culture in order for any development to occur. Rather, biology itself is seen as a developmental phenomenon, its relations with more obviously 'cultural' development becoming subtler and more complex as children mature into adults endowed with a certain degree of linguistic and emotional mastery.

Lev Vygotsky, throughout his work, points out that such questions as "How does pure biology lead to cultured intention?" tend to misconstrue how human beings actually develop. The reason we are likely find—as the Augustinian picture does—the move from reaction to intention mysterious or troubling, strange, or even magical is that we think of (biological) reaction and intention as radically different (even opposed) phenomena. Dorothy Robbins argues that Vygotsky gives us an entirely different picture, one which suggests that the lower (i.e., biological) and higher (i.e., intentional) mental processes are part of a single developmental continuum.[62] What is interesting about Vygotsky's work (and what is also an admirable quality of de Sousa's work)[63] is that biology and culture

[62] She suggests throughout her book, *Vygotsky's psychology-philosophy*, that this 'continuum' stems from Vygotsky's interest in a sort of Spinozaistic monism, combined with an interest in the synthesizing aspects of a dialectical method. I am unsure how far the connection to Spinoza can be taken; its historical characteristics are, I think, beyond the scope of my argument here.

[63] See, for instance, chapter four of *The Rationality of Emotion*, entitled "Evolution and Teleology: From Instinct to Biology" where de Sousa outlines in broad strokes the necessary connection between culture and biology without reducing one to the other.

are woven together in a more complete picture of the developing human being than either the Augustinian picture or even de Sousa's own unspecified view of paradigm scenario acquisition seem to allow.

It is important to emphasize that this hybrid account of human development, which intimately combines biology and culture, skirts the dividing line between two equally unsatisfying positions. On the one hand, we have rigid reductionisms which see all human behaviour as determined by our physiology, biology, etc. Such views are monistic: cultural development does not represent a distinct kind but is in all instances reducible to biological development. These sorts of views (which, with the continued success of cognitive science, remain popular) tend to obscure the developmental process by mischaracterizing human beings as passive recipients of stimuli, and understanding human intentionality as thoroughly deterministic. On such views, emotional rationality is reduced to a kind of teleological appropriateness not greatly different than the teleological appropriateness photosynthesis can be said to possess in plants. Such views gloss over the important conjunction of intentionality and teleology necessary to understand how emotional rationality is possible; they require no reference to the intentionality we exhibit or the meaningfulness we find in the world (by way of paradigm scenarios, for instance) which make human being-in-the-world importantly different than the existence of plants and (most) animals. If we simply reduce intentionality to biology, then we flatten emotional experience by equating it with other unintentional and meaningless—though nevertheless teleologically appropriate—sensations like hunger or physical fatigue. On the other hand we have dualistic views of biology and culture as radically separate concerns: cultural development is not only irreducible to biological

development on such views but it is, in fact, entirely and radically separate from biology. The problem with this sort of view—which is, when less blatantly stated, often assumed to be common sense—is, as we have seen, that it makes the transition from biology to culture seem magical. If the two realms are radically distinct, then we must either posit some bridge between the two or reduce the process of development to one side of the divide. Vygotsky's account (and, when sufficiently supplemented, de Sousa's) refuses both of these options. Levy Rahmani, in noting Vygotsky's rejection of pure behaviourism, shows us the defining insight of this alternate, hybrid view:

> Vygotsky...objected to the [behaviourist] contention that human behavior is simply a sum of reflexes. "It is true," he wrote, "that the reflex is the foundation, but from it you can learn nothing about the building which will be constructed".[64]

Here we see the central difference between Vygotsky's view and monistic behaviourism on the one hand and dualistic 'culturalism' on the other: we have to pay attention not only to the biological constraints on development (which are obviously quite important) but also to the specific cultural and historical conditions which facilitate the shift from the exclusively biological to the hybridized intentional/biological. This view accepts the fact that as limited, animal beings we are incapable of escaping certain biological and physiognomic limitations while it nevertheless encourages us to see the developmental force of culture and history as importantly—though not *entirely*—separable from biology.[65]

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[64] Rahmani, cited in Robbins, 6.

[65] This may seem to reiterate the unhelpfully rigid distinction between biology and culture but, as Robbins argues, to think as much is to misunderstand Vygotsky. More specifically, she suggests that it is to misunderstand that Vygotsky's cultural heritage is different from a traditional Western 'Cartesianism' (i.e., a commitment to various brands of dualism) which never had much currency within Soviet academia. On this see the first chapter of Robbins' *Vygotsky's Psychology-Philosophy: A Metaphor for Language Theory and Learning*, particularly pp. 1-14. (Here, as mentioned above, Robbins connects Vygotsky's non-

Vygotsky's view gets around the avowed monism of reductionists as well as the latent (and potentially misleading) dualism of the 'common sense' view by suggesting that the notion of "one continuum of lower and higher mental processes does not exclude varying *attributes* with distinct lines of origin and different trajectories of development".[66] Which is to say, culture and its artifacts (e.g., higher mental processes) are importantly continuous with biological and bodily instincts but this continuum does not limit the later development of significantly non-biological, specifically 'cultural' attributes (e.g., a sophisticated emotional repertoire, linguistic mastery, etc.).

A further corollary of this idea is the notion—which will become more and more important as we go on—that we can never achieve the purely biological or the purely cultural: though the two ends of the spectrum are certainly vastly different, there is always some remainder of one within the other. This insistence on what a dualist might call 'impurity' has the helpful implication that we must *always* understand ourselves and others as animal beings in possession of a culture which is *not* separate from our 'animality' but which is an interesting—and in some ways unique—outgrowth of that animality.[67]

To phrase it in terms which may be more familiar after the first chapter, the intertwined development of biology and culture is a central element of human being-in-the-world. We are thrown into a world which is, in many important ways, beyond our

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Cartesian monism to Spinoza, this time by way of a slew of German and Russian philosophers. While I am incapable of dealing with the complexities of the Russian cultural milieu of the 1920s and 1930s, I believe it is clear that Vygotsky's work is likely to be—but need not be—misunderstood by those of us committed (consciously or otherwise) to a dualistic, Cartesian view of subjectivity).

[66] Robbins, 7.

[67] The idea that our animal and cultural 'natures' are intimately related is also captured, as I have suggested above, in McDowell's Aristotelian account of 'second nature' (a notion which Lovibond utilizes in *Ethical Formation* to explore the development of seriousness and the possibility of 'authorship') On this see, e.g.,

control. This lack of control over the world takes many forms, one of which is our inability to completely determine how our bodies (and here I include our brains) react to the world. But, this 'thrownness' (our finding ourselves in a world not of our making and not completely under our control) is not the final word on our being-in-the-world. Human beings, as such, also react and relate to their thrownness and become capable of *taking responsibility* for it. It is precisely this capacity to take responsibility for (or 'become the authors of') our place in the world which reductionist views gloss over and dualistic views make magical or puzzling. But, with Vygotsky's alternative view, there is no suggestion that the uncontrollable (instinctual, biological) aspects of our thrownness make the controllable (intentional, cultural) aspects incoherent or impossible: both are unique elements of a single process. That process is our coming to accept our place in the world as the sort of beings we are (i.e., as human beings thrown into the world). Or, in non-Heideggerian terms: the process of becoming mature adults capable of intending our actions and also capable of taking responsibility for those actions *even when they were not what we intended.* Though the terminology and aims of the two thinkers are distinct, I believe the Vygotskian point about the continuous nature of instinct and intention and the Heideggerian analysis of thrownness are in many ways complementary.

But how does all this relate to the acquisition of emotions and of language? The point I've been trying to make is that the ostensive picture leads us astray by reducing language learning to a sort of stimulus-response exercise. We are shown an object and 'told' its name (stimulus) and are led, by various techniques of positive and negative

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John McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 124 and following; as well as Lovibond, *Ethical Formation*, chapter four, "Why Be 'Serious'? The Natural Basis of Our Interest in a 'Rational Self' pp. 67-85.

reinforcement, to respond appropriately. On this view, the move from mimicry to mastery remains mysterious.

In contrast, the view I propose (which follows Vygotsky and Cavell) holds that when infants learn a name they are not simply fitting a new block into an already prepared slot or responding in an exclusively pre-determined way to given stimuli. Rather, learning a name (before naming itself is properly understood) is precisely learning what *naming* is.[68] We begin to learn names by learning *how to name*; the status a name has for an infant yet uninitiated in naming (or linguistic meaning) is not that of a name nor simply that of an accidental noise (though in earlier stages this connection might be closer to what we would call 'accidental' than anything else). Through the reinforcement of (hopefully) concerned caregivers, and through the infant's own active interrogation of the possibilities of the situation, certain natural responses are encouraged and others discouraged; by showing pleasure[69] at a given response (as Cavell did when

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[68] Though it might not be the case for naming (at least in an obvious sense), many developmental processes continue in this way throughout life. By learning new things about love (e.g., about the 'name' love) we better learn how to love; we understand loving by understanding 'love'. But we also learn about what love *is* by becoming better capable of loving. And, if we are attentive to the world around us, we are likely to continue learning about 'love' (and death, happiness, responsibility, vulnerability, strength, etc.) and loving for the rest of our lives.

[69] Here I may seem to be replacing one kind of troublesome 'showing' (i.e., ostensive definition) with another (showing pleasure as a way to encourage certain behaviour). However, such an objection fails to note the biological/physiognomic preconditions which make 'showing' possible. If we are to accept such preconditions—as it seems necessary to do—then surely the recognition of pleasure and pain (and basic human expressions like crying out or smiling which accompany pain and pleasure) must be on the list. Cavell, Vygotsky, and de Sousa all accept this point. Cavell states this acceptance quite clearly when he writes that

> the initiate must be able to follow us, in however rudimentary a way, *naturally* (look where our finger points, laugh at what we laugh at, comfort what we comfort, notice what we notice, find alike or remarkable or ordinary what we find alike or remarkable or ordinary, feel pain at what we feel pain at, enjoy the weather or the notion we enjoy, make the sounds we make); and he must *want* to follow us (care about our approval, like a smile better than a frown, a croon better than a croak, a pat better than a slap) [Cavell, 28].

his daughter responded in a way he perceived to be 'correct') children are drawn into our world, into the offshoot of the developmental continuum we tend to think of as 'cultural'. But none of this is guaranteed, as we might be led to think by a reductionist behaviourism. This process is slow, unsure, tenuous—at every stage risky.[70] Steps taken forward into culture are often accompanied by steps back into unthinking, unfeeling response; a new, appropriate understanding of 'kitty' might be dashed by a slight hint of hesitance or displeasure from a caregiver or a child may come to perceive its prior ('correct') understanding as insufficient given factors which we might discount as irrelevant. The point is that development is not entirely a fluid process: seeing the relevancy that we see, understanding things as we come to understand them hinges on the careful and patient guidance of a child as well as upon that child's active interpretation and re-interpretation of what we (both knowingly and unknowingly[71]) present them. Despite these considerable 'obstacles' (if we choose to think of them that way) most of us

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If a child does not instinctually prefer pleasure to pain, or a smile to a frown then it is hard to see how either learning or teaching can get off the ground at all. (De Sousa, as we've seen, makes the parallel point with more explicit reference to biology and facial musculature [at, e.g., de Sousa 1987, 182]).

[70] Michel Serres, in his beautiful and novel work *The Troubadour of Knowledge*, captures this risky and uncertain nature of education: "Before the frontier, less at home already than usual, the novice swims or is displaced toward the strange once past it, having almost arrived elsewhere, he is always coming from home: half nervous, at first, and filled with hope; already nostalgic, after, and soon half-regretful" [Serres, 162]. Serres eloquently shows us the transition from the uncertain nervousness of the novice to the sure-footed agility of the full-blooded adept. Elsewhere in this work, Serres emphasizes that *without* this element of riskiness and novelty, philosophy (specifically) and education (more generally) become less human and less sensitive to the particular predicaments of humanity. For Serres, education without risk becomes merely preparation for bureaucracy.

[71] It is important to note that this process does not occur exclusively when parents or other caregivers feel as though they are 'teaching'. An infant has yet to be enculturated sufficiently to differentiate (as we often, and perhaps unfortunately, do) between situations that can be 'learned from' and those that cannot or should not. Thus, the infant takes in and interprets a myriad of factors which we have, perhaps wrongly, grown accustomed to placing little educational value upon: tone of voice, bodily posture, facial expression, the 'unrelated' conjunction of a bad mood with our teaching of the words 'love' and 'hate'. In the early and highly formative stages of development, the 'accidental' association of a parent's carriage with their 'lessons' may prove unfortunately long-lasting for an infant. The association of love with violence or dishonesty, of power with abuse, of action with carelessness might prove disastrously formative. (But, the equally accidental conjunction of love with gentleness or of punishment with forgiveness may prove correspondingly beneficial). Of course, which associations stick and which practices remain relies upon

do come to appreciate the world in ways recognizable to the rest of us: we become capable of speaking about the world, about ourselves, and about our place in the world in ways which are, by and large, intelligible to our fellows. None of this is guaranteed, and it can end up leading us in completely unexpected directions: there is no guarantee that children will come to understand 'kitty' as we understand it, and even less of a guarantee that they will experience love or revulsion in precisely the same ways we experience them. But, with persistence and time, children learn more and more about what *we* think of and understand by our words and practices; by building upon this understanding it becomes more likely (but not certain) that our visions of the world will mesh in many respects.[72]

Let's now return to our central concern: the development of emotional intentionality. As we saw in the previous chapter, emotional rationality hinges upon emotional experience's ability to support teleology and intentionality. De Sousa's paradigm scenarios seemed to be an excellent way of supplying emotions with *teloi*: an emotion is 'teleological' insofar as it aims at appropriately fulfilling the requirements of a specific paradigm scenario. So, if we experience happiness, it is appropriate or rational only if it can be connected with a previously established paradigm scenario governing

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the individual temperament of the child (on which see, e.g., de Sousa 1987, 252) and the child's own experiential history.

[72] Cavell describes the process of combining world-views with his daughter eloquently when he writes

> If she had never made such leaps she would never have walked into speech. Having made it, meadows of communication can grow for us. Where you can leap to depends on where you stand. When, later, she picks up a gas bill and says "Here's a letter," or when, hearing a piece of music we've listened to together many times, she asks "Who's Beethoven?", or when she points to the television of the Democratic National Convention and asks "What are you watching?", I may realize we are not ready to walk certain places together [Cavell, 24].

These kinds of gaps in the mesh of understandings continue throughout life and may never be fully

happiness.[73] These paradigm scenarios also offered us a way into emotional intentionality: as we become acquainted with these scenarios, we become able to shape our emotions according to their constraints. We become able, that is, to feel this way rather than that, to intend this emotion and not that one. The abiding concern of this chapter has been to show precisely how we acquire paradigm scenarios. I've suggested, by analogy, that a proper understanding of such acquisition requires an understanding of human development which understands 'cultural' phenomena and biological phenomena as aspects of a single developmental process. Such an understanding allows us to see that 'intentionality'—that seemingly occult force—is not alien to the embodied, lived world but an outgrowth from it. We learn how to feel emotions at the right time and in the right proportion by having our natural responses (e.g., flight from pain, desire for pleasure) contextualized—by adults and, importantly, ourselves—in ways far subtler than simple ostention can explain. A key aspect of this process is its uncertainty and riskiness: there is no guarantee (biological, metaphysical, or otherwise) that development will result in an understanding of the world which will mesh sufficiently with the already-going concerns of society and culture at large. Facing this lack of certainty, and envisioning development only with it in mind, we are less likely to misconstrue intentionality as an occult or mysterious process and more likely to see it as a remarkable but nonetheless worldly achievement made possible by the patient and persistent contextualization of pre-linguistic and pre-emotional inclinations.

So, we are now in a position to show precisely how emotional rationality is possible. We are able to deem individual instances of emotional experiences (ours and

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resolved; discovering and overcoming them comprises much of the 'work' of human interaction.

those of others) rational insofar as they are intended responses to relevantly similar instantiations of paradigm scenarios. The better we understand the scenarios which give meaning to our emotions (by individuating and defining their characteristics for us) the more capable we become of appropriately and intentionally expressing our emotional experiences. If the transition from pre-intentional biology to intentionality is continuous, as I have suggested, then the ability to become more fully the masters of our emotional experience (i.e., the ability to more fully author or intend that experience) should not remain static after the end of childhood or even adolescence. Rather, by increasingly refining our understanding of emotional vocabulary and paradigm scenarios, the degree of intentionality we experience in relation to our emotions should also increase—and there is no reason to think that our navigation of the complexities of human emotions ends at adolescence...quite the contrary!

In the next chapter I will discuss how we might deepen our understanding of the emotions by attention to the subtle negotiations between our general views and our idiosyncratic experiences. I will again interrogate de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenarios, this time with the hope of understanding how we can apply them in concrete cases which do not simplify or over-generalize the complexity of human experience and interaction. Following de Sousa's suggestion that in the later stages, the acquisition of paradigm scenarios is "reinforced by the stories and fairy tales to which we are exposed, and, later still, supplemented and refined by literature and art"[74] I will utilize detailed literary examples in order to better illustrate my point.

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[73] This is obviously a simplification. The bulk of the next chapter will consist of an elaboration and sophistication of the use of paradigm scenarios in our actual lives.
[74] De Sousa 1979, 55.

Chapter Three: Application

In the preceding two chapters I was concerned with establishing the plausibility of Ronald de Sousa's account of emotional rationality. In chapter two I investigated the acquisition of emotions to fill in some missing details regarding the development of emotional intentionality—a necessary element of de Sousa's emotional rationality. In this third chapter I would like to show how we can actually apply de Sousa's paradigm scenarios to help us increase the rationality of our emotions and our emotional responses (and thus to increase the compatibility of ethical formation with emotional experience). The central question of this chapter, then, will be: how can we apply paradigm scenarios in order to improve our emotional rationality?

In order to do so I will show how de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenarios can be better understood (and better applied) through the adoption of a relational, dynamic view of adult emotional development. More specifically, I will argue that three elements—self-analysis, the analysis of others and our relations with them, and the deployment of generally available, socially pervasive paradigm scenarios—combine to inform our judgments of emotional rationality. 'Fitting' a paradigm scenario to a particular situation (or vice versa) requires the subtle ability—of which we are all, in varying degrees, capable—to navigate between and appropriately weight these three areas of analysis. In order to illustrate these points I will rely on lengthy and detailed examples, without which the force of my view will be less obvious. While it will not be the main thrust of my argument, I hope that my work will exhibit due respect for the necessity, for philosophy

and theorization in general, to supply concrete and varied examples.[75] It is only with an appropriate combination of philosophical inquiry and literary attentiveness that we can think rigorously and abstractly without (necessarily) falling into the decontextualized ideality which is the constant danger of 'pure' theory. Literature (and narrative more generally) can provide us with the specificity required to connect our abstractions to the world so that they are not merely cogs in an ideal machine.[76] Philosophy, in turn, can provide the broader perspectives and concepts required to recontextualize the idiosyncrasies of literature and narrative experience in order that they may prove useful in the shaping and reshaping of our character.

The chapter will be separated into five sections. The first section will outline my broad approach to emotional development after infancy and childhood—an approach which I, again, contrast with a fill-in-the-blanks or 'banking' view of education. This first section will provide a general framework for the next three sections which will deal, respectively, with self-analysis, the analysis of others, and the application of paradigm scenarios. In each section I will weave my general theoretical claims together with specific examples drawn mainly from two sources: Philip Roth's novel *Patrimony* and the abundant correspondence surrounding the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche and

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[75] My aim here is to avoid unconvincing, flat examples, and to avoid stressing one type of example at the expense of others. I aim, that is, to take Wittgenstein's diagnosis of philosophy ("A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example" [Wittgenstein, §593]) seriously.

[76] I do not wish to construct an unfounded dichotomy between theory/the ideal and literature/the concrete. Of course theory is capable of concrete assertions and, likewise, literature is capable of detached ideality. What I wish to suggest, here as below, is that the tendency of theorization is (or at least has been) towards ever more general principles. By contrast, narrative experience—and novels are particularly good expressions of such experience—tends to elaborate upon concrete situational details. Certain theorists and certain novelists provide interesting and valuable exceptions to this rule (Wittgenstein and Woolf are two good examples); nevertheless this difference between theory and narrative can be helpfully exploited. To use Martha Nussbaum's turn of phrase, literature (unlike most theory) allows a sensitivity to the "the unfolding continuities and structures of the work" [Nussbaum, 155], whether this work is a novel or one's own life.

Richard Wagner. In the final section I will draw together these three elements of emotional rationality and argue more forcefully that *without* the simultaneous deployment of all three, any useful application of paradigm scenarios is impossible.

§3.1: Emotional Development after Childhood

In chapter two I suggested that the process of development (understood, in Vygotsky's sense, as a single process combining culture and biology) does not end when we reach adulthood. Of course we tend to hold that education continues throughout one's life (or at least that it should), but we do not generally think of this adult education as a continuation of our 'development'. A common view of adult education runs something like this: we develop our capacities to a certain point, and after this foundational point[77] is reached, our education is different in kind; it becomes more like the 'banking' or fill-in-the-blanks sort of education whose application to children I objected to in the previous chapter.[78] Such views suggest that we modify the superstructure of our knowledge by acquiring modules of information or specific areas of expertise while our original developmental ground remains untouched.

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[77] The inability to conclusively establish this foundational point—of adulthood—is itself good evidence that 'development' is not merely a biological matter. Cultural shifts in Western society (not to mention intercultural differences) have variously placed 'adulthood' in the early teens, the late teens, or the early twenties.

[78] In the realm of adult education theory there are a large number of emerging approaches which attempt to dispose of this simplistic vision in favour of developmental, personal, or holistic approaches. The very fact that such approaches are novel and numerous is evidence—albeit negative evidence—of the widespread acceptance of a "banking" view which is to be opposed. For a collection of interesting theoretical and practical approaches to adult education see *Making Space: Merging Theory and Practice in Adult Education* edited by Vanessa Sheared and Peggy A. Sissel. Though many of the papers in this collection are geared toward a political critique of existing social institutions, the new solutions they offer often have much in common with the developmental approach I suggest here. For instance, Donna Amstutz writes, in the context of a critique of "adult basic education programming in the United States" [Amstutz, 182] that we should "utilize the context of learners' lives as a focus of learning activity" [Amstutz, 183]; she recommends that we move from procedure- or institution-centered practices to practices that emphasize an appreciation for the complex relationships that arise between teachers and students (especially focusing on cultural differences which other approaches gloss over or ignore entirely). Such context-based approaches are, I think, much more open to (and could potentially benefit from) the relational, developmental view I suggest than the banking method.

This type of view, like others entertained in previous chapters, has both helpful and detrimental aspects. It is helpful insofar as it highlights a key difference between childhood and adult learning: adults tend to be more certain of their established categories precisely because long years of experience have shown (or seem to have shown) them what works and what doesn't work. Filling in the blanks is, in many instances a broadly accurate view of how adult learning proceeds. But, in another way, this picture is misleading, particularly so in the (related)[79] cases of emotional and moral development. As we grow older, we accrue relationships with other people, some closer than others. These relationships vary in solidity: some may slowly evolve without any considerable or radical shifts in meaning; others may proceed similarly but with occasional interruptions which radically shift the previously established, generally stable meaning of the relationship (either for one or both of the parties concerned); still others may be wrought with conflict and change from start to finish. Now, if we simply 'fill in the blanks' regarding our adulthood by attempting to fit newly received information into pre-established slots, we are likely to misconstrue the ongoing development of our relationships, which may be fluid or discontinuous, slow or rapid. Relations between parent and child, for instance, rarely maintain a fixed meaning or even fixed *categories* of meaning throughout their duration. They are complex, evolving relationships which require a view of development that shies away from 'banking' toward an active, multi-

[79] Though I will not develop this connection in great detail in this thesis, I believe it is crucially important for any understanding of moral action and decision-making. As I've suggested, emotions provide us with the primordial ability to relate to ourselves, others, and the world. But, beyond this primordial aspect, they also provide very real, meaningful connections between human beings, connections which make possible the complex relationships of everyday life. It is generally within such relationships that our moral decision-making takes place. Thus, in order to accurately map the realm of ethics, we must also map our emotional attachments to others and ourselves. This idea can be found in much more detail in Alisdair MacIntyre's work, *Dependant Rational Animals*. Though in quite different terms, MacIntyre outlines there an ethical theory which stresses the importance of human interdependencies.

variable account that emphasizes the evolution of existing categories as well as the development of entirely new categories.[80]

The longer and more intimately we have known someone, the more factors we are capable of weighing (and, indeed, required to weigh) in our estimation of their actions and our interactions with them.[81] Lifelong friendships and child-parent relationships are perfect examples of this. Such relationships develop slowly and, occasionally, in fits and starts: there are times where no event jars us out of the comfortable boundaries we have erected around our interactions, and also times when events (dramatic, mundane, subtle, over-the-top) require us to reconfigure our understanding of the relationship, the other person and (if the relationship is intimate and important enough) ourselves as well. As we have seen, establishing the emotional rationality of a particular act, experience, or response requires measuring it against an already-acquired paradigm scenario. When we first acquire paradigm scenarios they are broad, and insensitive to many of the contextual features of specific relationships we may partake in. But can we capture the complexity of interpersonal dynamics—their evolution in meaning and limitation—with de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenario?

I believe that we do in fact utilize something quite like paradigm scenarios when we attempt to weigh the meaning and rationality a particular act or motion holds for us. But paradigm scenarios are not simply isolated, coldly objective measuring devices

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[80] Of course I do not deny the importance of qualities which are 'stable' in relationships (e.g., the consistent presence of trust or love, doubt or hatred). Rather, I suggest that we would be better served if we understand even these static qualities only in relation to the whole development of the relationship itself (which involves, of course, the development of the individuals involved).

[81] But our personal histories needn't act as albatrosses around our necks—quite the opposite. As we will see below in more detail, paradigm scenarios are a way of making the weight of history 'lighter' and the knotty tangle of variables clearer. They provide us a way to appreciate complexity without being overwhelmed or weighed down by it. The more comfortable we are within a friendship or any sort of relationship, the more

which avoid the fray and complexity of our lives. They require constant and attentive supplementation drawn from our analyses of our specific experiences. We tend to hold ourselves to a (varyingly accurate, varyingly realistic) self-portrait somewhere between the person we are seen as and the person we see ourselves as (by taking into account our temperament, relationships, past history, etc.) When an emotional response or experience involves someone else (as it almost invariably does) we combine this self portrait with our understanding of the other person, the specific dynamics of the situation, and an appropriately specific (or, if need be, helpfully general) paradigm scenario in order to arrive at a judgment of the appropriateness of a course of action, an emotional reaction, etc. Though, of course, we rarely perform this combination consciously; it is often the background of assumptions which limits the realm of possible responses. Generally speaking, we simply weight the variables appropriately (in most cases) without a second thought—which isn't to say that this apparent ease is not supported by a whole history of difficult thinking and decision-making. In order to fully appreciate the role paradigm scenarios play I will first examine the importance of self-analysis and the analysis of others. By doing so, we can, when we finally arrive at a direct discussion of paradigm scenarios, better understand the roles they play in determining emotional appropriateness in our actual lives.

§3.2: Self-Portraiture

Providing an accurate self-portrait is, perhaps, one of the more difficult introspective feats human beings are capable of performing. It requires not only an intimate and honest knowledge of your past and capacities but also the remarkable ability

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paradigm scenarios we have agreed (tacitly or otherwise) to introduce as measures of our conduct. Of course these can be expanded, tested, exchanged, or even rejected at any time.

to understand how others see you. Of course if we maintain, as does the traditional view stemming from Descartes[82], that we know our own minds better than anything else and also that the defining characteristic of the human being is the ability to think autonomously, then it might not strike us as a particularly noteworthy capability. If, on the other hand, we subscribe to a relational view of human being-in-the-world then we are more apt to praise those capable of accurate self-analysis. Accurate knowledge of how things are with ourselves, and how we appear to others, requires an understanding of an exceedingly complex web of dynamic, intertwined (internal and external) relationships. First, we must understand how we relate to ourselves: how we describe ourselves, how we remember (what we remember of) ourselves, our habits and the capacities we feel we have that others remain blind to, etc.[83] If the situation we face is far-reaching and important enough we feel called upon to include an estimation of what we might become in the future: who we are likely to be ten years from now, say. Second, and more complicated, we must understand how other human beings relate to us—and not simply to the portrait we have painted of ourselves (however accurate it may be). We must be able to gauge how our previous dealings with particular individuals are likely to have coloured their pictures of us—an obvious corollary of this is the ability to exploit others' misconceptions about us (this is the genius of our great traitors, our clever

[82] Recall Descartes' statement that he "manifestly [knows] that nothing can be perceived more easily and more evidently than [his] own mind" [Descartes, 23].

[83] Michel Foucault's work (particularly *Discipline and Punish* and the last two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*) attempts to show how complex the relationships between 'the self and the self' actually are by illustrating their historical contingency and the dramatic differences that have arisen since the time of the Greeks or the early Christians (for example). As this is not my focus here, I will have to ignore the fascinating possibilities offered by a comparative history of self-to-self relations and their resulting effects on emotional expression and experience. Though, clearly, work of this sort could only broaden our understanding of the justifiability, origins, and trajectory of currently pervasive paradigm scenarios.

villains, our astute detectives).[84] A more concrete example is helpful in illustrating the subtlety and necessity of accurate self-analysis.

In *Patrimony*, Philip Roth presents us with a particularly striking example of the effects of inaccurate (or insufficiently prescient) self-portraiture. After having convinced his father to remove him from his will (from any financial inheritance more particularly) Roth is shocked and hurt when his father reveals to him that he has done precisely that:

> To my great dismay, standing with him over his last will and testament, I discovered that I wanted my share of the financial surplus that, against all odds, had been accumulated over a lifetime by this obdurate, resolute father of mine. I wanted the money because it was his money and I was his son and I had a right to my share, and I wanted it because it was his, if not an authentic chunk of his hard-working hide, something like the embodiment of all that he had overcome or outlasted It was what he had to give me, it was what he had wanted to give me, it was due to me by custom and tradition, and why couldn't I have kept my mouth shut and allowed what was only natural to prevail?[85]

Just below Roth reveals his disdain for the, perhaps arrogant, reasoning of his prior-self: "...this had happened to me more than once in my life: I had refused to allow convention

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[84] A comical, though nonetheless tragic, instance of the villainous *failure* of self-analysis (among many other failures) can be found in Vladimir Nabokov's novel *Pale Fire*. The main character, Charles Kinbote, is so enamored of his constructed-self (and an equally constructed 'friendship') that the very structure of the book becomes misleading, evasive, and delusional. The book, written as a series of Kinbote's notes to a 999-line poem provides an interesting reversal. Kinbote radically and violently reconfigures John Shade's poem in order to provide hard evidence—for himself and, presumably, his readers—to support the 'reality' of his delusions. He writes, for instance,

> that without my notes Shade's text [i.e., the poem 'Pale Fire'] simply has no human reality at all since the human reality of such a poem as his (being too skittish and reticent for an autobiographical work), with the omission of many pithy lines carelessly rejected by him, has to depend entirely on the reality of its author and his surroundings, attachments and so forth, a reality that only my notes can provide. To this statement, my dear poet would probably not have subscribed, but, for better or worse, it is the commentator who has the last word [Nabokov, 28-29].

Of course Nabokov's character is pathologically delusive and an extreme case. Nevertheless, his pathos grandly illustrates the potential for our own (more minor) mischaracterizations to pull us further and further from reality.

to determine my conduct, only to learn, after I'd gone my own way, that my bedrock feelings were sometimes more conventional than my sense of unswerving moral imperative".[86] Here we see two instances of self-portraiture: the first is a failure; Roth wrongly, and brashly, estimated his own feelings about and relations to tradition, with the result that he was left out in the cold and too embarrassed to retract his earlier demands. The second is as successful as the first is disastrous: when Roth realizes he has wrongly interpreted his future-self (who has now become his current-self), he just as correctly analyses the fault which caused this mis-estimation. He isolates a tendency in his personality to reject traditional values which he may nevertheless (perhaps covertly) agree with; he characterizes his iconoclasm as an outgrowth of his unwillingness to own up to his 'bedrock' traditionalism. Elsewhere in the book—and elsewhere in Roth's fiction more generally—this tendency is linked in detail to his attempted rejection of what the younger Roth perceived to be an overbearing, overly traditional, social environment which was better overcome or refuted than embraced.[87]

There are a large number of variables in play any time we are called upon to provide ourselves with a self-portrait (and as many ways for this portrait to go wrong), but they can—at least for our purposes—be broadly categorized temporally: past-self, present-self, future-self. Our ability to accurately characterize our past-self requires a patient rethinking and recontextualisation of our prior experiences (as well as decisions regarding which experiences are relevant and for what reasons); if we wish for higher

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[85] Roth, *Patrimony*, 104-105.
[86] Ibid, 105.
[87] One could read much of Roth's most popular novel, *Portnoy's Complaint*, in this light; the status of tradition (Jewish tradition in New Jersey more specifically) is one of the most persistent and complex themes in Roth's work as a whole. Novels like *The Counterlife* and *Operation Shylock* attempt to show precisely how complex it is to come to terms with one's cultural and familial inheritances.

accuracy we have to weigh more aspects of our past, and do so more carefully. We will have to admit when we were wrong, understand that when we were right we may have been wrong (or, worse, right for the wrong reasons), face the fact that much of what we did was—perhaps remains—opaque to ourselves; in short we must be capable of facing ourselves nakedly, as the mistaken, arrogant, unfoundedly optimistic, misguidedly pessimistic individuals we have all, at times, been (or if we feel more positive: we have to be honest about the times when our harsh assessments of our motives, feelings, and reasons have proven mistaken). Knowing when and to what degree we have been wrong (or right) about ourselves requires a considerable amount of patience and willingness. A secondary ability, which many of us have intuitively developed, is the 'meta-ability' to take into account our habitual mischaracterizations of ourselves. If we tend to be overly severe, or overly optimistic about ourselves, we will come, as we grow older and if we are critical enough, to factor in such 'slippage'. (In cases where we come to know people well enough, we come to factor in *their* particular idiosyncratic methods of self-portraiture ("She thinks she's a big shot", "He's too hard on himself", etc.)).

Obviously the accuracy with which we represent our current-selves to ourselves is directly related to the accuracy with which we represent our past-selves. But the portraiture of the present also poses specific problems of its own. In order to fully understand 'how we are' currently, we have to see ourselves *in relation* to both our past and our future. We must be able to isolate what is of relevance for our present concerns and what can be helpfully ignored. But, even before the potential relevance of aspects of the past and the future can be determined, we must (at least partially) grasp our present context. This, as we will see in more detail in the following sections, requires a keen

appreciation for the effects (upon us, others, and the world around us) of the various relationships which make our lives meaningful. We must be able to judge how the history of a particular relationship translates into a specific kind of momentum; we must be capable of plotting the course of a relationship and understanding its shape and meaning. Doing so in turn requires a clear appreciation of the forces which impact (or will impact) that relationship: past and future, private and public, formal and personal. Because an appropriate understanding of the present situation or context is intimately connected at every level with all the elements of human relationships which I wish to isolate in this chapter (i.e., past/present/future self portraiture, modeling others, and understanding the broader social context provided by paradigm scenarios) I will attempt to provide a clearer picture of it in the final section of this chapter, after I have discussed these essential components in more detail.[88]

Accurately modeling our future-selves is dependent, in large part, upon our ability to maintain, in some way, a generally homogeneous character or temperament. This, of course, needn't mean that we must remain utterly consistent or that we have to maintain a static personality (though certainly consistency and stasis would make such predictions *easier*). It means, simply, that a certain degree of predictability—and we may even be predictably *unpredictable*—is required for our projections to hold any weight. For instance, if I know and accept that I am the sort of person who follows passing whims or who changes his mind constantly, my vision of my projected-self will be vaguer, but

[88]A preliminary, helpful image, which I take, in part, from the work of Michel Serres, is of the present as a mobile cutting edge between the past and the future. On both sides this blade encounters resistances which must be navigated carefully to maintain a steady and clean cut (i.e., to map out a trajectory neither dragged to one side by the complications of the past nor too mired with calculations of a possible future. The best 'cut' of time is that which weights the blade with due attention to the inertia of the past and the pull of the future.

nevertheless capable of its own sort of accuracy. I will be more likely to exclude the possibility of a particular relationship or situation developing with great stability or plodding progress. I am more likely to factor in the possibility for radically different scenarios in which my current interests or personality traits are over-shadowed by novel acquisitions not found within my current horizons. Each person will, of necessity, become capable of eliminating certain possible selves from their projections based on the inertia they have gathered through their temperament, past experiences, habits, etc. Of course, at any point we may realize that our prior elimination of a possibility was hasty or unfounded: we may discover something about ourselves which escaped conscious awareness but which, nevertheless, has pervasive effects on our actions. (If we are interested in rationalizing our emotional experience and combining it with our ethical development, this ever-present possibility to go wrong in unforeseen ways can provide us with an excellent goad to constantly and critically re-evaluate ourselves. By appreciating the incompleteness of our self-portrait, we will better appreciate the need for such criticism).[89]

By accurately representing ourselves to ourselves, we become better capable of rationalizing our emotional experiences. With the combined knowledge of what we have done, what we are doing, and what we are likely to do, we can better contextualize and judge the appropriateness of our emotional experiences. Without accurately representing ourselves to ourselves, we are unable to judge the appropriateness of our emotional interactions. Self-analysis is the primary grist for the mill of emotional judgment; without

[89] Lovibond spends considerable effort showing that our utter inability to perfectly enact the fully rational character of the virtuous person is not a detrimental but a beneficial aspect of her account of ethical formation. She does so throughout *Ethical Formation*, but chapter 5, "On Being the Author of a Moral Judgement" (pages 86-110), is particularly helpful.

it we have nothing to work upon, nothing to measure. With the combined knowledge of what we have done, what we are doing, and what we are likely to do, we can better contextualize and judge the appropriateness of our emotional experiences.

§3.3: Modeling Others

Of course, we are not beings in isolation from the world or from the people around us: I have insisted throughout this thesis that a consistently *relational* understanding of human being-in-the-world is required to more fully appreciate the character of our experience.[90] Far from simply analyzing ourselves, most situations in which we must judge the appropriateness or rationality of an emotional experience or response require an understanding of other people: our friends, spouses, children, acquaintances, co-workers, mentors, fellow citizens, parents, peers, even complete strangers. Because our emotional experiences are invariably tied to the people with whom we live our lives, we must understand how we relate to these people (and how they relate to us as well) in order to fully appreciate the context of our experiences and actions among them. But, given that self-analysis alone requires painstakingly specific inquiry about the person we are, have been, and will become, we might reasonably ask what role the far broader analyses provided by paradigm scenarios can play when the complexity of interpersonal relationships is added. How can these general scenarios help us to rationalize our emotional experiences if those experiences become (in adulthood) so bound up with our idiosyncratic personal history (and those of others) as to seem largely un-generalizable? Aren't they even less applicable when we add relationships into the

[90] Even without taking into account interpersonal relationships, we are still 'relational' beings insofar as our selves are not monadic entities but a (largely cohesive) collection of relations between drives, memories, experiences, thoughts, our body, things, the world, etc, etc. In this sense, the 'isolated' subject seems impossible and meaningless.

mix? My contention is that paradigm scenarios are not only applicable to emotional experiences between people, but necessary elements of our assessment and analysis of other people.

As nearly all of our emotional experiences involve other people, to whom we are related in specific, often 'institutionalized' or canonical ways (e.g., as parent to child, husband to wife, friend to friend, employee to employer, etc.), if paradigm scenarios are inapplicable here they are of practically no use to us. Now, while such relationships are by no means uniformly experienced throughout a particular society[91], they often[92] contain recognizable, typical characteristics which enable us (and others around us) to count them as instantiations of friendship, marriage, etc. The common elements of friendship, for example, will include (in most cases) an abiding sense of trust, an appreciation for each others' company, the willingness to aid each other insofar as this is possible, etc.[93] Of

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[91] I would argue that these relationships themselves take on different meanings in different times and places. Works like Michel Foucault's three-volume *History of Sexuality* and Paul Veyne's brilliant *History of Private Life* attempt to illustrate how other societies and epochs experienced these relationships and how the contingent historical development has led to the cultural forms we modern Western society are familiar witirh. The contingency and variability of these institutional relationships is all the more reason that we should *critically* and actively interpret the forms which they take in our lives and the lives of others. De Sousa makes a similar remark about paradigm scenarios:

> ... a scenario can become completely inert, obsolete: this will take place if every situation that fitted the original scenario comes to be seen, from a more comprehensive perspective, as fitting another (set of) scenario(s). In some North American subcultures, for example, the sentiments and scenarios once associated with such notions as "chastity" or "satisfaction in affairs of honor" have lost their power to move either to feeling or to action. Situations that would once have evoked those sentiments are now simply felt in terms of quite different scenarios [De Sousa 1987, 187].

When focusing on longer views, as Veyne and Foucault do, this point becomes all the clearer. As I will discuss in the conclusion to this thesis, Lovibond's attempt (and that of theorists like McDowell and Wiggins) to provide a more critical account of rationality, less based in cultural norms, allows us to accept such norms only when they are appropriately situated within the total space of reasons.

[92] In fact, I would suggest that all but the most remarkable (i.e., radically novel, epoch-introducing) relationships are heavily institutionalized, at least in their structure.

[93] This is obviously a very loose definition of friendship. I take it that these things will, in large part, be accepted by many in modern Western society as key elements of friendship; I do not mean to suggest that other aspects of friendship are less important, or that other types of friendship are not possible. Aristotle's

course, how trust is experienced, how appreciation is shown, and what shape aid takes within an individual friendship are largely idiosyncratic affairs only partially determined by our typologies and broad social conventions. Nevertheless, this partial determination still plays an important role. How we understand friendship (and not simply our individual friendships) depends in large part upon which actions, responses, experiences, and relations we deem appropriate between friends; our understanding depends, that is, on a partially idealized or generalized notion of friendship. The same goes for relations between parents and children, spouses, coworkers, etc. Our understanding of these institutional relations is determined by our understanding of the boundaries of appropriateness within them. Which is to say: when we define friendship we define it in terms of which actions befit friends and which don't, which feelings are 'friendly' and which aren't. And, as I have suggested throughout this thesis, the boundaries of emotional appropriateness are largely determined by paradigm scenarios, acquired set pieces which provide rough guidelines for emotional rationality.

We can see just how important paradigm scenarios are for understanding and evaluating interpersonal relations more clearly when they go *wrong* or are insufficient. When something forces us to rethink a particular friendship we don't do so in isolation from our general understanding of friendship; we rethink both the general and the specific. It is precisely because we do in fact utilize paradigm scenarios (i.e., broad assumptions about emotional appropriateness) that experiences which challenge our understanding of this appropriateness require conceptual re-mapping. In other words, it is

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notion of friendship, for instance, contains certain aristocratic assumptions which may be unappealing to liberal democratic societies. As will become clearer below, I find Nietzsche's demand in *The Gay Science*, for *new* forms of friendship, freed from certain disagreeable constraints associated with the momentum of Western culture and Christianized thinking, to be quite interesting and powerful.

because paradigm scenarios are central to our analyses of others (and, as we'll see, to social interactions more generally) that experiences which challenge our accepted analysis or understanding of a person will often require re-working or re-evaluating our extant paradigm scenarios (e.g., those relating to friendship, parenthood, etc.). By returning to Roth's *Patrimony* we can see how thwarted (or seemingly thwarted) expectations can lead us to re-evaluate our specific analyses of others and also our paradigm scenarios themselves; Roth helpfully illustrates the tension between our habitual expectations of emotional appropriateness and the weight of novel experiences which demand the expansion of our habits and expectations, and our understanding of others.

Philip Roth's father worked as an insurance salesman and, later, as a branch manager for Metropolitan Life throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Roth, having recollected that company's discrimination against Jews during this period in an autobiographical essay for the *New York Times Book Review*, received a letter of complaint from its current president, John Creedon. Included in Creedon's letter was related correspondence between himself and a "retired M.D. who had been an officer of the company in the 1940s".[94] The letters suggested that Roth was mistaken about the historical facts. Both Creedon and the doctor aimed to "correct [Roth's] impressions".[95] Roth was put off by what he understood as an unwillingness to face "simple historical fact"[96] and as an attack on his father's experiences and memories from that time:

> What rankled me and goaded me on was that they [the doctor and Creedon] were determined to blame an unflattering perception of their company on my father, on unsubstantiated "attitudes" and "views" of his

[94] Roth, *Patrimony*, 182.
[95] Ibid, 183.
[96] Ibid, 183.

rather than on the company's prior practices.[97]

Roth's response, after calling his father to confirm what he knew about the Metropolitan in those days ("...for a Jew to advance in that company like a Christian? In those days? Come on. You could count the Jews in the home office and you wouldn't need your whole hand"[98]) was to research and substantiate his—and his father's—'views' and 'attitudes'. He then submitted a well-documented, well-researched rebuttal of Creedon's and the doctor's complaints. When he next saw his father, he presented him with a copy of this rebuttal. The exchange which followed is illustrative of the role paradigm scenarios play in the analysis of others.

> After he read it, he didn't seem to know what to make of what I had done.
>
> "How do you find all this stuff?" he asked me.
>
> "The archives at the American Jewish Committee. I spent a couple of afternoons there."
>
> "He's an awfully nice fellow, Mr. Creedon. He had me to the home office for lunch, you know."
>
> "I know."
>
> "He sent a limousine over here to take me to the home office that day."
>
> "Look, I'm sure he's a nice fellow. There are just a couple of little holes in his sense of history."
>
> "Well, you laid it out for him, all right."
>
> "Well, I didn't like what he wrote about you—that he hoped *you'd* changed *your* mind. Screw that."
>
> "They've been awfully good to me, the Metropolitan. You know how much pension I've received since I retired? I figured it out here just last week. Well over a quarter of a million dollars."
>
> "That's peanuts. You're worth twice that."
>
> "With an eighth-grade education? Am I?" He laughed. "I had nothing, absolutely nothing. Mother and I were flat broke and they hired me. It's a wonder what happened to a man like me."
>
> "The hell it is. You worked. You sweated blood for them. You have a history and so do they. The difference is that you own up to yours, you say you were 'nothing' but they don't admit to theirs, if those letters

[97] Ibid, 184.
[98] Ibid, 184.

are any indication."

"They don't like the truth. What's so unusual about that? Do me a favor, will you? After this," he said, holding up my letter, "that's enough."

Well, *this* was new—my father expressing chagrin over something I had written. In my Zuckerman novels, I had given Nathan Zuckerman a father who could not stand his writer son's depiction of Jewish characters, whereas fate had given me a fiercely loyal and devoted father who had never found a thing in my books to criticize—what enraged *him* were the Jews who attacked my books as anti-Semitic and self-hating. No, what made my father nervous wasn't what I wrote about Jews but, as it turned out, what I had now written about Gentiles—about Gentiles to Gentiles, and to Gentiles who had been his bosses.

"I don't think they're going to tamper with your pension because of my letter—if that's what's worrying you."

"Nothing's worrying me," he said.

"I certainly didn't mean to upset you. Quite the contrary."

"I'm not upset. But just don't send 'em another one."

And yet, at my father's funeral, my cousin Ann told me that when she and her husband, Peter, had been visiting one evening, he had gone to his files and taken out the letter to show it proudly to Peter, who was his lawyer. To me he never mentioned it again, nor did I receive a reply from anyone at the Metropolitan".[99]

Roth originally assumes that his father will be proud of what he has written, ostensibly in his defense. He assumes this because his understanding of fatherhood and the triangular relationship between himself, his writing, and his father has always been defined (for him) by 'fierce loyalty' and 'devotion'. These characteristics have, until this point, defined the limits of appropriateness in this specific relationship (or, more correctly, this *aspect* of this relationship) and have informed his understanding of 'fatherhood' more generally. What is interesting here is that Roth's sense of the tension between the inappropriateness (derived from an accepted paradigm scenario)[100] of his father's words

[99] Ibid, 187-188.

[100] Here, though perhaps not everywhere, we can think of the applicable paradigm scenario as having the form of a maxim: "My father ought to react with loyalty and devotion when I present him with one of my new works." Of course Roth mightn't have had precisely this maxim in mind when his expectations were thwarted: a paradigm scenario remains in the background as a sort of tacit assumption unless it is 'challenged' by an appropriately novel experience, or a bout of intense self-reflection.

and his belief in his father's fierce loyalty forces him to "emotional[ly] regestalt"[101] this aspect of his relationship with his father, to make it *subtler*. Before this particular run-in, Roth's running assumption (based on tacitly accepted paradigm scenarios) that his father would unquestioningly support his writing without a second thought had been borne out by the facts. But after this exchange, it appears to Roth that his original understanding of their relationship was mistaken: his father is supportive of his writing, but nevertheless *nervous* about his mucking about with the people who had been 'awfully good' to him (and, by extension, to Roth himself) over the years. Roth's first impulse (guided by his sense of the boundaries of appropriateness for this relationship) is to see a conflict between his father's unwavering support and this nervousness. But, he is forced, yet again, to 'regestalt' his understanding of his father after he learns that, despite this nervousness, his father had been *proud* of his letter to Creedon.

Roth originally enters into this conversation with an established understanding of the relationship between himself, his father, and his writing. This understanding is hedged around and supplemented by various paradigm scenarios: the most important of which is an expectation (from Roth) for his father to support his writing in a very specific way (e.g., without hesitation or nervousness). This paradigm scenario is preliminarily thwarted when Roth's father becomes—as Roth sees it—nervous or upset or uncomfortable with his rebuttal of Creedon's claims. At this point Roth supplements his previous understanding of this triangular relationship with a qualification: his father supports his writing about Jews but becomes unsupportive, worried, and nervous when Roth writes about Gentiles, especially when he writes "about Gentiles to Gentiles, and to

[101] De Sousa 1987, 188.

Gentiles who had been his bosses".[102] He has thus made his broad paradigm scenario ('My father supports my writing proudly') more specific: 'my father supports my writing proudly insofar as it does not offend the honor he pays to the people who were so good to him over the years (e.g., upper management at Met Life)'.[103] And this new scenario worked for the remainder of his father's life—most likely because the topic never arose again. But, after his father's death Roth is forced to see that his father's worrying or nervousness about his writing to his old bosses was not incompatible with his pride. He is forced, that is, to see that his father's insistence that Roth end his correspondence with Creedon has very little to do with his pride about Roth's writing. It is more about maintaining the tenor that his father has established in his relationship with his former bosses, with the Gentiles at Met Life.

In this brief excerpt from Roth's relationship with his father, we can clearly see how our analyses of others combine with paradigm scenarios to limit a particular relationship's range of appropriateness. Roth combines his understanding of his father (as a fiercely loyal, devoted man) with a paradigm scenario (the "My father supports my writing" paradigm) in order to evaluate the appropriateness of his father's reaction to his letters. Roth's estimation goes wrong in two respects, which he discovers separately. First, he assumes that his initial characterization of his father as 'fiercely loyal' to his writing really only extends to his writing insofar as it avoids tension with upper management at Metropolitan Life. Here Roth adapts his initial paradigm scenario as a

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[102] Roth, *Patrimony*, 188.

[103] Again, stating the expectations involved in a paradigm scenario so bluntly misses the subtle negotiation required to fit the scenario to a very particular event or experience. This glib way of putting should be taken as shorthand for a more complicated grouping of expectations which are likely to remain, for the most part, in the background of Roth's actions. (This difficulty with unearthing tacit assumptions in order to state them clearly and propositionally illustrates the larger set of difficulties involved with 'rationalizing' or 'authoring' our emotional lives).

result of his inability to combine his father's apparent 'nervousness' with his accepted understanding of 'fierce loyalty'. This inability goads him to make his paradigm scenario more subtle ("My father is loyal to my writing, but with exceptions..."). This is an excellent example of inaccurate analysis of others' emotional reactions leading to an equally (possibly *more*) inaccurate reconfiguration of a pre-existing paradigm scenario. Roth wrongly interprets his father's response as 'nervousness' which throws his assembled array of father-writing paradigm scenarios into revision. After his father's death he discovers his second error: he was wrong in the assumption (guided by his initially general paradigm scenario) that his father's 'nervousness' and his 'fierce loyalty' were incompatible. When he discovers that his father proudly exhibited his letters, he realizes that the behaviour he evaluated utilizing paradigm scenarios appropriate to the triangular relationship between himself, his father, and his writing would have more appropriately been evaluated with paradigm scenarios appropriate to the relationship between Herman Roth and Metropolitan Life (or, perhaps, his father's relationship to himself and his past). The complexity involved with rationalizing our emotional interactions with others should be evident here: not only do we have to accurately understand *what they mean* by their actions, we must have to understand in *which context* their meaning is being communicated and both of these are mediated by our ongoing utilization of paradigm scenarios. Roth shows us here how dangerous it is to uncritically maintain our assumptions about others, even if those assumptions have been confirmed by decades of familiarity.

§3.4: Ourselves, Others, and Paradigm Scenarios

Up to this point in the chapter, I have highlighted two activities which are

important for the application of any paradigm scenario: self-analysis, and the analysis of others. While the above two sections have extracted important aspects of this process, the actual evaluation of emotional interactions requires the *simultaneous combination* of self-analysis and the analysis of others, alongside the deployment of paradigm scenarios. This combination itself presents difficulties which are glossed over if we merely treat aspects of the process in isolation. In this section I will present an example designed to show the dynamic complexity involved in understanding and situating emotional experiences involving others. For this purpose, let's return to friendship, one of the most complex and varied forms of relationship humans engage in.

Over the years a lasting friendship acquires certain characteristic deviations from our idealized notion(s) of friendship: with certain friends we may allow belligerence, endearing excesses, or liberties that, when considered outside this particular context, we by no means feel are characteristic of friendship as such. In such cases, it may seem that the broad paradigm scenarios we associate with friendship will be of no help whatsoever: they simply cannot capture the nuances of this particular relationship. If this is the case, then our measurement of the appropriateness of emotional experiences stemming from interactions with our belligerent or excessive friend will be an improvisational or entirely habitual affair: their brusque mannerisms and our acceptance of them will be deemed 'appropriate' because customary, but we will still think of them as contrary to the spirit of friendship (rather than as part of the friendship itself). This seems too rigid, too insensitive to the complex negotiations that the meshing of our general typologies with concrete experience requires. But, paradigm scenarios, even with their generality, can—and do—help us better evaluate even our most idiosyncratic experiences and

relationships.

Our understanding of friendship-in-general shapes *and is shaped by* the specific friendships which our (limited) experience brings us into contact with—through literature, personal experiences, communication with others, etc. Our paradigm scenarios first show us which modes of behaviour and interaction constitute friendship (and, by doing so, allow us to forge friendships to begin with). But, once we come to see the possibilities opened by particular friendships, we begin to further broaden our general, idealized notion of friendship. If we maintain our friendship with our belligerent friend, we may come to see our acceptance of their belligerence not as a concession, *exterior* to the friendship, but as an internal necessity which helps define this friendship in its particularity. If so, we will combine our general understanding of friendship (which may not have included belligerence, or even tolerance of belligerence) with our experience of a particular friendship in order to achieve a broader (and at the same time finer-grained) appreciation of appropriate emotional interactions between friends. In this way, our early understanding of friendship (as, e.g., a domain of calm politeness) will have been broadened to include certain forms of antagonism, sarcasm, or the intimate analysis of personal flaws: all things which come to be situated *within* friendship rather than outside it.

Accurately mapping a friendship and the limits of its appropriateness (and thus better understanding friendship-in-general) often requires a keen awareness of one's self and the friend in question, as well as the 'external' (paradigmatic) expectations which serve to rein in our actions in ways that specific, isolated person-to-person relations cannot. In any reasonably well-developed friendship there will, then, be a complex and

constant negotiation between the general and the specific, between external and internal considerations, between one's self and the other, between habit and novelty. The development and eventual decline of Friedrich Nietzsche's friendship with Richard Wagner provides us with a particularly striking example of these complexities. There are two reasons why this relationship is such a good example: first, there is a wealth of material available (from both sides) to provide us with a reasonably accurate picture of its development. Second, and more importantly for my purposes, Nietzsche, as a philosopher, provides us with innumerable cutting self-analyses which bear—in more general, 'impersonal'[104] terms—on exactly the questions we are interested in here: appropriateness, the effect of novel experience on accepted habit, the negotiations between the specific and the general, the relationship between our picture of ourselves and who we 'really are', etc, etc. Nietzsche, who Freud once described—perhaps justifiably—as one who "had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live"[105] is also someone who, helpfully, left traces of this self-analysis (in letters, in his autobiography, *Ecce Homo*, and in the more personal sections of *The Gay Science* particularly). All of these factors combine to make this friendship an auspicious, though nonetheless tragic, example of the complexity involved in rationalizing human emotional interactions.

As is well known (from Nietzsche's extant correspondence,[106] from his published

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[104] Or *seemingly* impersonal terms; Nietzsche's writing, even at its most distant, austere point, always emanates from a deeply personal source. There is little Kantian detachment to be found in his work.
[105] Freud, cited on p. 203 of Walter Kaufmann's introduction to *Ecce Homo*.
[106] Examples are numerous; "May you [i.e., Wagner] remain what you have been to me during the past year [1870], my mystagogue in the esoteric doctrines of life and art;" [N-W Correspondence, 49], "All I ask of the coming year is that I may not prove unworthy of your priceless sympathy and your unfailing encouragement;" [N-W Correspondence, 49-50], "My life has been infinitely enriched by my intimate intercourse with such a genius [as Wagner]. All the highest and most beautiful experiences of my life are associated with the names of Schopenhauer and Wagner..." [N-W Correspondence, 54], etc.

works[107] and from numerous biographical sources) the young professor Nietzsche was an ardent admirer and, eventually, a close confidant of Richard Wagner. Wagner, always in the market for disciples and proselytizers of his work,[108] very much appreciated Nietzsche's early works—he praised the heavily Wagnerian *The Birth of Tragedy from out of the Spirit of Music* as "a work which is unequalled," a work "characterized by an assurance so consummate, as to betoken the most profound originality. In what other way could my wife and I have realized the most ardent wish of our lives, which was that some day something might come to us from without and take full possession of our hearts and souls!"[109] Their burgeoning friendship was characterized by Nietzsche's intense admiration (even veneration) of Wagner and his work and by Wagner's equally intense devotion to those whom he saw as devoted, utterly loyal disciples.

But, slowly, the very qualities which characterized the friendship (the intensity of both parties, Wagner's genius and desire for esteemed disciples, Nietzsche's originality and admiration, etc.) began to make its maintenance impossible. One of the first instances of 'the master's' displeasure with Nietzsche is instructive. Nietzsche, bound with illness, philology, and familial concerns, declined one of Wagner's many summonses to Bayreuth. Wagner's ideal of friendship seems, like his vision of art, to have included only totality: he took Nietzsche's refusal (on this and other occasions) as an offense and a sign of waning devotion and loyalty.[110] Nietzsche, who had not yet fully appreciated Wagner's

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[107] Particularly his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, which is, by and large, a paean to Greek cheerfulness and the new spirit of art and life brought out in Wagner's music-dramas and conception of the total work of art.

[108] Early in their friendship Wagner wrote to Nietzsche, "Division of labor is a good thing. You, for example, could assume a large part, in fact the half of my objectives, and (perhaps!) thereby be fulfilling your *own* destiny!" [Ibid, 39].

[109] Ibid, 99.

[110] Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche (Nietzsche's sister), with uncharacteristic insight into Wagner's character, writes that "Wagner had not the faintest conception of the extent to which his faithful admirers were

conception of and demand for such total friendship, failed to notice the offense until, after a lengthy silence between the two friends, he was informed (by a mutual friend, Erwin Rohde) of Wagner's displeasure. After establishing the source of the offense, Nietzsche attempted to endear himself to Wagner yet again by immediately suggesting a visit to Bayreuth. (Wagner's response, typically self-assured: "Always overjoyed by sensible suggestions, especially when they take the form of announcing a visit herewith heartily welcomed"[111]).

Now, what is interesting for our purposes here—quite aside from the voyeuristic glance into the lives of these 'historical personages'—is Nietzsche's evolving analysis of the continual ups and downs of this friendship. These show us how Nietzsche navigated his dealings with Wagner by way of an increasingly accurate and honest understanding of Wagner's conception of friendship as an all or nothing affair and of his own (Nietzsche's) experience of 'loyalty'. During this particular upheaval, Nietzsche wrote about his concerns to another mutual friend, Carl von Gersdorff:

> Do tell me what you think of this repeated giving of offense. I cannot imagine how anyone could be more loyal to Wagner in all fundamental matters than I am; if I were able to think of any way of showing this loyalty more plainly, I should certainly do so. But it is absolutely imperative for me to preserve my personal freedom in unimportant secondary matters, and a certain avoidance of a too frequent personal intercourse is for me almost a 'sanitary' matter. I only do this, however, in order to be better able to preserve my loyalty in the truest and highest sense.[112]

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influenced by proximity to him, and thereby impeded in their own productive work" [Ibid, 153]. She relates an anecdote: "It seems that [Peter] Cornelius had been peremptorily summoned to Munich and had excused himself on the plea that he was obliged to work on his "*Cid*." "...Just as if he couldn't have worked on it quite as well here in Munich!" grumbled Wagner upon receiving this answer" [Ibid, 153]. Here we see not only Wagner's blindness and brusqueness but the demand for absolute and unwavering loyalty which characterized much of his early friendship with Nietzsche.

[111] Ibid, 165.

[112] Ibid, 163.

At this point Nietzsche is unable to reconcile his conception of friendship with Wagner's offense; he also implies that the offense is given because Wagner has not correctly understood him. Has he not been *loyal*, even to the point of reworking his first book to suit Wagner's tastes? Has he not remained devoted, to the point of endangering his own career to further certain Wagnerian interests in that same work? The paradigm scenarios Nietzsche associates with loyalty and devotion clearly do not mesh with those of Wagner, but Nietzsche, desirous to maintain this friendship (and to re-experience the idyllic cheerfulness of its earliest days) attempts to resituate his understanding of the friendship to include Wagner's peculiar—and unreasonable—demands as much as is possible. Here we can see the beginnings of the coming break: Nietzsche worries that his unavoidable concerns[113] with personal freedom and 'sanitation' will exclude him from Wagner's company even though they are necessary conditions for the maintenance of any relationship with the master. Nietzsche's concerns hint that, for Wagner, friendship may ultimately be reducible to a kind of sycophancy.

To trace the entire history of this complex relationship would be a task more suited to a biography than this thesis. But, even from my necessarily limited discussion, we can garner an understanding of the friendship's trajectory and the reasons for its ultimate decline. It began with mutual (though, perhaps, unequal) admiration: Nietzsche for Wagner's genius, Wagner for Nietzsche's youthful prestige. But this promising beginning obscured certain expectations (which we might think of as the result of tacitly accepted paradigm scenarios) on both sides. Nietzsche initially understood their relationship as one between master and disciple; he believed his role to be the furtherance

[113] That Nietzsche diagnoses these concerns precisely *as unavoidable* is further testament to the importance of honest self-analysis in appropriately navigating any relationship.

of Wagner's agenda. To this he was clearly and absolutely committed. But, for Wagner, whose expectations similarly included actions befitting a master/disciple relationship, the ways in which Nietzsche fulfilled his duties seemed a bit too wayward, even a bit irrelevant to the Wagnerian agenda. But, Wagner's suspicions stemmed from an incomplete understanding of Nietzsche (i.e., from his assumption that Nietzsche was primarily a Wagnerian rather than an individual human being, radically original in his own right). This we can clearly see from the letter to Gersdorff where Nietzsche insists that *in order to* remain the devoted and absolutely loyal disciple Wagner requires he must do precisely those things which (unbeknownst to him) Wagner, given his all-or-nothing understanding of loyalty and devotion, sees as evidence of a waning and insufficient friendship. This pattern—of Wagner's offense and Nietzsche's subsequently broadened understanding of their friendship—continued until Nietzsche's understanding (even *his overcoming*) of Wagner's sometimes petty misunderstandings of other people's aims led him to reject his role as a Wagnerian apostle.

In terms more friendly to my argument we can rephrase this development as follows. The friendship was initially based upon a meeting of broad and accepted expectations of loyalty and devotion. These broad expectations (or paradigm scenarios) had continually to be refined in the face of misunderstandings on either side. Wagner often misunderstood Nietzsche's intentions in pursuing his own work rather than purely or obviously Wagnerian goals as well as his own effect on the people around him. Wagner's inability to see Nietzsche clearly can, in some ways, be connected to a combination of self-delusion (though 'delusion' might be somewhat misleading) and the rigid maintenance of an ideal of friendship insensitive to the peculiarities one is bound to

encounter in other individuals—especially *great* individuals. On the other hand, Nietzsche assumed that 'loyalty' and 'devotion' did not include complete submission. Nietzsche, unlike Wagner, took these continual and painful misunderstandings as opportunities to refine his understanding of Wagner and, in so doing, refine his ability to remain 'loyal' to him as far as possible. But, at a certain point, Nietzsche's movement toward a perfect enactment of Wagner's paradigm of friend/disciple became impossible. Nietzsche's increasingly honest analyses of himself, of Wagner, and of their relationship ultimately forced him to realize the impossibility of maintaining contact. (Wagner, obviously, came to a similar realization though this was based less upon a newly arrived at understanding than upon his habitual insistence that Nietzsche's intentions were not befitting a truly loyal friend). So, interestingly, the break in the friendship can be attributed to clarity and obfuscation both: increasing clarity on Nietzsche's part led him to see the impossibility of himself as Wagner's friend, i.e., as a Wagnerian. Increasing reliance upon contextually irrelevant paradigms of loyalty and devotion on Wagner's part led him to a cloudy picture of Nietzsche as a friend; Nietzsche's rapid philosophical (and personal) estrangement from the fundamentally Schopenhaurian, pessimistic spirit of Wagner's art and thought meant that on the academic front (always a crucial component of the friendship) their relationship was on a disastrous course. So, Wagner's unwillingness (or inability) to mitigate either his general understanding of friendship or the paradigm scenarios it was based upon, his inaccurate picture of Nietzsche's devotion (based in large part upon his misunderstanding of Nietzsche's 'sensitive' constitution), Nietzsche's improved understanding of Wagnerian 'friendship', and the rapidly widening philosophical gap between the two friends *all* led to the decline of the friendship.[114]

[114] Even this already complex account of the break glosses over several key concerns: e.g., Wagner's

The point I have been trying to make is that even for simpler relationships, not so bound up with the development of Western philosophy and music as the Nietzsche-Wagner friendship, we must constantly evaluate ourselves, others, and the paradigm scenarios we have (either tacitly or consciously) agreed upon. Doing so is not only a matter for cold reflection but must be done 'on the fly', every day of our lives; the interactions which comprise our relationships do not simply happen but are formed (largely through our navigation of these three areas). We can improve these interactions in hopes of better understanding and enriching our friends, parents, etc., by becoming better informed about their constituent parts.

Nietzsche, in what I think is one of his most beautiful and remarkable aphorisms, attempts to go beyond the accidents of a friendship (those things which enable it, enrich it, and even, as in the case of Wagner, destroy it) in order to see even its destruction and dissolution as a part of that friendship itself. His attempt to understand his life as a creation in which all things are not only intended but desired and cherished—his longing for perfect *amor fati*—leads Nietzsche to consider even his devastating break with Wagner as something to be loved.

> *Star Friendship.*—We were friends and have become estranged. But that was right, and we do not want to hide and obscure it from ourselves as if we had to be ashamed of it. We are two ships, each of which has its own goal and course; we may cross and have a feast together, as we did—and then the good ships lay so quietly in one harbour and in one sun that it may have seemed as if they had already completed their course and had the same goal. But then the almighty force of our projects drove us apart once again, into different seas and sunny zones, and maybe we will never meet again—or maybe we will, but will not recognize each other: the different seas and suns have changed us! That we had to become estranged is the law *above* us; through it we should come to have more respect for each other—and the thought of our former friendship should become more

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continual financial concerns for Bayreuth, the triangular relationship between Nietzsche, Wagner, and Wagner's wife, Cosima, Nietzsche's omnipresent health concerns, Wagner's age, etc., etc.

> sacred! There is probably a tremendous invisible curve and stellar orbit in which our different ways and goals may be *included* as small stretches— let us rise to this thought! But our life is too short and our vision too meager for us to be more than friends in the sense of that sublime possibility— Let us then *believe* in our star friendship even if we must be earth enemies.[115]

Nietzsche's analysis of and deep appreciation for his friendship with Wagner—combined with his equally deep appreciation of accepted Western expectations of friendship—forced him to forge a completely new conception of friendship, with completely new paradigm scenarios.

The Nietzsche-Wagner example is quite helpful in illustrating the role paradigm scenarios play in evaluating emotional interactions within canonical relationships. The role they can play in adulthood is a dual one. Because paradigm scenarios are bound up with ongoing cultural and historical concerns, they provide the original social foundations which first allow us to enter and understand institutionalized, customary relationships (like friendship, marriage, employee/employer, etc.). Though this function is also definitive of the role paradigm scenarios play in childhood, it nevertheless continues well into adulthood: our broadest understanding of these canonical relationships generally changes only slowly.

Their second function is perhaps more complicated. *After* we have entered into and maintained friendships, we integrate and combine our notion of friendship (which, for our purposes, can be thought of as a cluster of associated socially prevalent paradigm scenarios, of which we have a semi-individualized understanding) with detailed analyses of ourselves and our friends. Here our paradigm scenarios allow us some way to measure

[115] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §270.

appropriateness that is, in a sense, outside the singularity of a particular relationship[116]; we have a general—though still contextually sensitive—framework with which to supplement our evaluations of the appropriateness of emotional experiences related to our complex, idiosyncratic friendships. Here there will be an elastic push-and-pull relationship between our already-accepted understanding of friendship (our 'personal tradition')[117] and the novelties that particular situations and relationships present us with. The result of this antagonism can be the rigorous maintenance of tradition, and an associated decision to excise a particular action from the realm of appropriate friend-friend interactions. This is a common enough occurrence: we deem an action inappropriate and are hurt, annoyed, or insulted by our erstwhile 'friend'. Here paradigm scenarios play a limiting role: they provide us boundaries for emotional appropriateness which greatly increase our ability to act within and evaluate emotional situations quickly and readily. Though rarely 'conscious' in precisely these terms, these quick evaluations provide us with obvious social boundaries which help us to easily map out the contours of a particular relationship. It is precisely because paradigm scenarios are tacitly agreed upon (and rarely verbalized) that they perform this function so well. If every emotional judgment was wrenched out of us through torturous analysis of all possibly relevant minutiae, then we would be much less capable of meaningful relationships. It is because we tacitly agree, in various ways, upon the meaning and appropriateness of certain interactions that we are able to make progress in our relationships and in coming to know

[116] Though not, as yet, outside the norms of the culture in which our paradigm scenarios have meaning. For the extension of emotional rationality beyond such cultural subjectivism, see my comments in the conclusion regarding Lovibond's ethical realism.

[117] I use the term 'personal tradition' to indicate that even when we are conforming to extant social norms we do so only personally; we internalize customary understandings and there will always be some amount of slippage between individuals. (This amount of slippage is one of the reasons why even the most oppressive and violently purgative regimes have never become fully 'purified').

others at all.

But—and here is where Nietzsche's example is most helpful—the antagonism between the general and the specific (i.e., between a paradigm scenario and a particular situation) can also result in a new understanding of friendship, a broader understanding, which will allow us to see an act or experience, which we may previously have condemned, in a new light. Here the pressure of the specific (of the vicissitudes of a particular relationship) comes to outweigh the demands of the general in such a way that our old, 'traditional' understanding of friendship (as a cluster of related paradigm scenarios) becomes broadened or even, as in Nietzsche's case, overturned and *replaced.*[118] In such cases the ability of our paradigm scenarios to limit socially appropriate contact is tested, expanded, and even shattered in order to forge entirely new paradigm scenarios which may allow a broader view of friendship than previously available to us. Of course such shattering moments are rare—and such madly novel moments as Nietzsche's creation of star friendship, or (in a similar way) Brutus' slaying of Caesar are almost impossibly rare. But, throughout our lifetime, we will undoubtedly experience dozens of mild tremors which shake up our paradigm scenarios and expand them, little by little, so that eventually a much wider understanding of emotional appropriateness and rationality might prevail.[119]

§3.5: Application and Negotiation

Let us now return directly to the driving question of this chapter: how can we

[118] Nietzsche's insistence that 'star friendship' can be seen from the perspective of a law 'above' can be seen read as an insistence that the cultural norms which often guide our conduct must themselves be criticized and, potentially, overturned. Nietzsche, at least in this sense, can be viewed as rationalizing his emotions in the deeper, less 'subjective'/norm-bound sense that Lovibond's ethical realism (to be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis) suggests.

apply paradigm scenarios in order to improve upon our emotional rationality? I have argued that we can only ever apply paradigm scenarios with any degree of accuracy if we combine them with detailed analysis of ourselves and, when applicable, an analysis of others. But, importantly, neither of these components can—in practice—be isolated from any of the others. In order to understand ourselves we must understand how we stand in relation to other people, particularly those with whom we have ongoing and intimate relationships. The analysis of others, too, almost always takes place with due respect to our relations to that person. This is so even if our relationship is distant (as in the case of strangers, employers, etc.): we will often analyse the actions of a person unconnected to us in quite a different light than we would those of our friends. And, further, *both* these types of analysis take place with due regard for tacit norms or expectations, what I've been calling paradigm scenarios. When coming to a judgment about the appropriateness of a particular emotional experience we combine the contextualization provided by self-analysis and the analysis of others with a broader, general understanding of what is appropriate in this *type* of scenario. We can state this more clearly. Analysis provides us with the information required to determine which general scenarios (those pertaining to guilt, joy, indignity, grief, surprise, etc.) are appropriate in a *particular* situation. Thus, when Nietzsche attempts to assess the appropriateness of Wagner's reactions (Wagner's 'offense'), he must first establish the context: who is Wagner, who am I, what is our relationship, etc. This is done instinctively in many cases (though, later in the friendship, Nietzsche's analyses of who *Wagner* is will become increasingly more complex and central to his understanding of *himself*). After this, Nietzsche must understand which

[119] Of course the *narrowing* of our experience is also possible—and, unfortunately, far more common. By cutting off certain avenues of appropriateness (because of unresolved bitterness, chance mishaps, grief,

paradigm scenarios Wagner has deployed in order to 'condemn' him. He believes, as we can see in the letter to Gersdorff, that the primary lenses through which Wagner has analyzed his actions are those of loyalty and devotion. The next move is to understand how *Wagner* understands those notions: what do these paradigm scenarios include for Wagner? His analysis (again in the letter to Gersdorff) shows that there is great slippage between his and Wagner's use of these paradigm scenarios; they mean something quite different by them. When he later comes to appreciate what friendship means for Wagner, and as a corollary what loyalty and devotion mean, he begins to see the boundaries of appropriateness for the friendship: only with this information can he judge whether Wagner's offense is well-founded or not. Of course he can also attempt to negotiate a new understanding with Wagner and, thereby, expand the boundaries of appropriateness of their relationship and forge entirely new paradigm scenarios. This is a common enough practice, though the amount of slippage in our less intense friendships or relationships will often be smaller than in the Nietzsche-Wagner case. Because of this slippage, between the limits we see in a relationship and those seen by others, the application of paradigm scenarios requires a constant negotiation (and, if we want to be perfectly accurate, even when we are dealing solely with a case of self-analysis this 'slippage' exists insofar as our minds are never perfectly open to ourselves, despite Descartes). This constant negotiation means, in turn, that we can only ever have a degree of certainty when deeming a particular response or experience 'rational': the slippage inherent in all relationships means that assignations of emotional rationality are, in every case, uncertain and risky. But this risk is not necessarily a negative thing. It is because we must perform these feats of self- and other-analysis in order to understand what is emotionally

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etc.) we are entirely capable of devolving emotionally.

appropriate that we become more self-aware and more comprehending of those around us.

So, we apply paradigm scenarios through a complex negotiation which requires self-awareness, an appreciation for those around us, and an understanding of the tacit agreements which support our interactions with ourselves and others. Remove any element of this process (e.g., rely solely upon accepted paradigm scenarios) and this already uncertain process of assigning emotional rationality becomes impossible or stilted. What I hope to have shown in this chapter, then, is that making such judgments is a difficult task which can only be understood—and even then only partially—by introducing the subtly negotiated application of paradigm scenarios.

Conclusion

In this thesis my main aim has been to show that we can and should include emotional experience within the broader project of ethical formation. As ethical formation is a thoroughly *rational* project, I have tried to show that (and *how*) emotional experience can be rationalized; in order to do so I have outlined a particular account of emotional rationality. In this I have relied, in large part, on Ronald de Sousa's work, particularly on his notion of paradigm scenarios.

In the first chapter I outlined a relational picture of human being-in-the-world which emphasized human situatedness within a world not of our making—what Heidegger calls 'thrownness'—first and foremost. This view, unlike a more commonsense view which I termed the 'traditional view', does not de-emphasize emotional experience in order to privilege cognition and thought. Rather, these aspects of human experience are seen as particular ways of relating to the world, to ourselves, and to others. I then combined this relational picture of being-in-the-world with de Sousa's claim that emotions are capable of supporting a kind of rationality which he calls *minimal rationality*. He defines something as capable of assessment for minimal rationality if it is capable of exhibiting teleology (i.e., appropriateness to a pre-determined goal) *and* intentionality. He then offers the notion of paradigm scenarios to show how we can think of emotional experience, particularly, as assessable for minimal rationality. He suggests that paradigm scenarios (which we can think of as mini-dramas which show us the situational characteristics belonging to particular emotions or sets of emotions) not only show us the *teloi* of emotions but also allow us to develop emotional intentionality in the first place. De Sousa suggests that if we look closely at emotional development and

acquisition we can see more clearly how they possess *intentional teleology*. They allow us to acquire emotions (by drawing us out of biologically determined response into the world of intentions, from 'first' to 'second' nature) and they also provide us with a way to *measure* particular emotional experiences: he suggests that the two concepts are inseparably linked.

In the second chapter I investigated in some detail the developmental process which gives rise to intentional teleology. There I suggested that if we view intentionality as something radically separate from *or* simply coterminous with the biological world of instinct then we are incapable of understanding its development as anything but mysterious. Instead, I suggested a view of development which sees culture and intention not as opposed to biology and 'nature', but as an outgrowth of them. Thus, the developmental process is a continuous one: biology and intentionality are at different ends of a *continuum* instead of occupying different ontological levels. By seeing emotional acquisition in light of this view, we can understand more readily how emotional intentionality develops. By long and uncertain methods of reinforcement (which may fail or be wrongly interpreted at any time) a child is slowly drawn from the world of mute animality into our world, a world filled with concepts, meaning, values, words, and emotions. The conditions for the possibility of emotional experience are to be found in primitive stimulus-response scenarios. A child's caregivers (and those around her more generally) enable her intentionality by continually contextualizing her responses as well as their own. So, when a child utters (or feels) what we would deem an appropriate response to a situation, we encourage them with gestures, smiles, words, etc. It is by encouraging appropriate responses and discouraging inappropriate ones that a

child first becomes capable of intentional teleology.[120] Thus, we become capable of intending our emotions by learning in which contexts (or with regard to which *teloi*) they are appropriate. At the same time, we are encouraged to match our natural responses (which are not yet emotions) with certain scenarios: to feel displeasure (and eventually 'sadness') when a loved one is injured or dejected, to feel pleasure (and eventually 'happiness') when we are petting a kitten, etc. We advance toward intentionality (or retreat into animal nature) only by degrees: a radical break between the two is made impossible by the Vygotskian view I suggest, in which biology and culture are part of a single continuous process (i.e., the development of a human being in constant relation to the world).[121] It is also because of the developmental *continuum* that we can never 'fully' intend our emotions; we can only ever asymptotically approach a *perfect* realization of intentionality which would be 'purified' of all unintentional response. So at the end of chapter two I hope to have shown that our emotional experiences are minimally rational (and thus potentially capable of combination with ethical formation) insofar as we intend them to mesh with appropriate paradigm scenarios.

After having shown *that* emotional rationality is a plausible concept in the first two chapters, I moved on to discuss precisely *how* it is possible in the third. I illustrated how we might apply de Sousa's paradigm scenarios to the actual complexity of human experience in order thereby to increase our emotional rationality and allow a more

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[120] As I stressed in the second chapter, what counts as encouragement and discouragement will depend upon biological characteristics like facial musculature, a preference for pleasure over pain, etc. But which aspects of the world are experienced by a child as 'encouragement' or 'discouragement' will not be limited to cases in which parents or caregivers believe themselves to be 'teaching'. Incidents which appear innocuous may be interpreted by an infant as of great importance. Thus, certain coincidental associations (of happiness with suffering, say) may 'encourage' a child in ways which were never intended by caregivers.

[121] As I'll make clear below, we can also trace this continuous view of biology and culture to McDowell (and thence to Hegel and Aristotle).

thorough insinuation of emotional experience within ethical formation. I argued there that in real cases understanding *which* paradigm scenarios may apply to a given situation and *how* to apply them requires a constant negotiation between self-understanding, the understanding of others, and the paradigm scenarios themselves. Because I have stressed a relational view of human experience I emphasize here the relational character of paradigm scenario application. None of these areas (self-analysis, other-analysis, paradigm scenarios) can be isolated or deployed without reference to and reliance upon the other two. Our analyses of ourselves must (and, in fact do) take into account our meaningful relationships with other people as well as certain on-going societal expectations (which will include various clusters of paradigm scenarios). Similarly, we cannot understand others except insofar as they stand in a particular relation to us (as friends, co-workers, strangers, etc.); and, as most of our relations are 'institutional' (i.e., instantiations of common social forms of relation) many analyses of others in relation to ourselves will require an understanding of the paradigm scenarios which are bound up with those institutions. Finally, and importantly, paradigm scenarios *themselves* require the contextualization provided by self-analysis and the analysis of others. Without an at least nominally clear understanding of the particular situation to be judged for appropriateness, we are incapable of determining which of the multitude of paradigm scenarios are applicable and which options for appropriate experience and response are available to us. By emphasizing the relations between these three components of the process of assigning emotional rationality I have attempted to show that analyzing emotional experience requires a constant movement between the general (i.e. paradigm scenarios) and the specific (i.e., our specific understanding of the situation at hand). If we

stray too far into one or the other, we will likely stumble and misjudge the scenario (as we saw in the Roth examples). But, interestingly, there are cases when our inability to understand how to navigate between our generalized expectations (based upon accepted paradigm scenarios) and specific experiences will force us to re-assess either a particular relation or our broad understanding of such a relation with the result that we end up with new paradigm scenarios or a completely new relation (to ourselves, or the others concerned). This is what we saw in the Nietzsche-Wagner case: both parties entered into the friendship with certain expectations regarding the nature of friendship and regarding the character of the other. But, as time wore on the slippage between Nietzsche's understanding of friendship and Wagner's became greater and greater until it was clear that in order to maintain the relationship Nietzsche would have to forfeit certain qualities of his which he believed inseparable from a good and loyal friendship. This clash of paradigm scenarios forced a break in relations which was only 'healed' (at least conceptually) when Nietzsche produced an entirely new conception of friendship (i.e., star friendship) which supplanted the conflicting paradigm scenarios with much broader ones (albeit only *after* Wagner's death).

In short, the thesis has argued that emotional rationality is possible insofar as emotions are capable of supporting both intention and teleology through the deployment of paradigm scenarios. We can apply general paradigm scenarios in real cases by contextualizing them with the aid of suitably fine-grained self-analysis and, when applicable, analyses of other people.

Now, after having shown that (and how) emotional experience may be rationalized, I would like to make some more specific remarks regarding a particular

deficiency in this (necessarily) limited approach to rationality. As I have suggested, largely through footnotes, de Sousa's notion of rationality as I have outlined it can be reduced to conformity with extant cultural norms. If we simply leave emotional rationality within the scope of paradigm scenarios without questioning and rationalizing them as well, we are left with a potentially dangerous cultural relativism in which any pervasive cultural practice is deemed 'rational'. While I have attempted, throughout this thesis, to defend de Sousa's conception of emotional rationality I've also suggested that it must be situated within the larger project of ethical formation to avoid precisely this problem. But, as my focus was specifically on the emotions, I've dealt with ethical formation only comparatively briefly. But *how* can ethical formation provide us with a firmer foundation for the 'meta' rationality required to situate our culturally idiosyncratic paradigm scenarios in something firmer? In order to answer this let's describe ethical formation in greater detail.

We can think of ethical formation as a process geared towards increasing our ability to rationally author our actions. We may then ask what rationally authoring an action (or an utterance, an experience, etc.) means precisely. For Lovibond rationally authoring our actions means becoming increasingly sensitive to or perceptive of the layout of the "total 'space' of ethical reasons"[122] or becoming better able to orient ourselves and our actions within that space. The notion of a total space of reasons is a philosophically complex one, and one that is intimately connected with Lovibond's adoption of the McDowellian/Aristotelian appreciation for our first and second natures.

Throughout *Mind and World* McDowell diagnoses a dangerous and seemingly

[122] Lovibond, 32.

inevitable "tendency to oscillate between a pair of unsatisfying positions"[123] (one which allows human freedom without connecting it to the world, and another which reduces human freedom to the mere mechanism of the natural sciences). McDowell, hoping to salvage the key insights of both sides of this oscillation, attempts to illustrate that freedom and animality are not mutually exclusive attributes of human beings but that they are, in fact, intimately related. McDowell, like Vygotsky,[124] suggests that both are elements of the maturation of human beings. McDowell, following Aristotle, suggests that we 're-enchant'[125] nature in such a way that the coldly deterministic, value-neutral picture of the world given to us over the last four centuries by Western science is no longer taken as our *total* picture of the world but only a part thereof. His suggestion is that we take the notion of a second nature (which he also calls "*Bildung*"[126]) seriously: that we see, as Aristotle does, that humans are *naturally* perceptive of value in the world and that there is nothing strange or otherworldly about this capacity.[127] McDowell, like Lovibond (and, in different terms, Vygotsky), argues that through enculturation we come into the possession of such a 'second nature' and, thus, we also become aware of the existence of the reasons that there are for acting appropriately or rationally. He writes that

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[123] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 24.

[124] And certainly Hegel as well. Indeed McDowell writes in the preface to *Mind and World* that he "would like to conceive this work as a prolegomenon to a reading of the *Phenomenology* [*of Spirit*]" [Ibid, ix]. And, despite Dorothy Robbins' insistence that Vygotsky's philosophical inheritance is largely Spinozaistic I find it hard to resist the characterization of him in Hegelian lights as well.

[125] McDowell takes his notion of re-enchantment from the inversion of Max Weber's classic image of modern society's disenchantment [at ibid, 70].

[126] Ibid, 84 (and elsewhere). His use of the notion of *Bildung* is also further evidence of McDowell's deep respect for Hegel.

[127] Here we can see the similarities between Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world and McDowell's attempt to re-enchant nature through *Bildung*. For Heidegger, resolutely facing our thrownness in a world not of our making requires an understanding both of the animal beings we are and of the cultural meanings which shape our thoughts and actions. For him there is no radical separation between the two but a detailed and intricate overlap and confusion. Similarly for McDowell, becoming a virtuous person by properly situating ourselves within the space of reasons (perhaps his rough equivalent for resolutely facing

> In being initiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something that already embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively constitutive of the layout of the space of reasons, before she comes on the scene. This is a picture of initiation into the space of reasons as an already going concern; there is no problem about how something describable in those terms could emancipate a human individual from a merely animal mode of living into being a full-fledged subject, open to the world. A mere animal, moved only by the sorts of things that move mere animals and exploiting only the sorts of contrivances that are open to mere animals, could not single-handedly emancipate itself into possession of understanding. Human beings mature into being at home in the space of reasons or, what comes to the same thing, living their lives in the world; we can make sense of that by noting that the language into which a human being is first initiated stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world.[128]

At this point, this picture does not yet escape the problem of cultural relativism inherent in the paradigm scenario account of emotional rationality. It merely states that acquiring a second nature is like finding one's self on a boat already at sea: the culture into which you are born has a course and a construction not of your manufacture and though you may affect both, they must, inevitably, also affect you. But, McDowell goes further than this by suggesting that precisely by understanding nature in this sense—by understanding enculturation as an initiation into our second nature—we will no longer find the notion of *ethical realism* (a problematic position in much philosophy at least since Hume) problematic. We will see that our 'second nature', insofar as we are capable of developing it, requires a situation within the *space of reasons*. Because 'second nature' is *precisely a part of nature*, the values which it allows us to espy in the world are also natural and not, as Mackie famously treated them, ontologically 'queer'. Of course, we may see things wrongly (we do, in fact, see things wrongly...and quite often!). But *that*

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thrownness) requires understanding the totality of nature properly, in both its cultural and 'biological' incarnations.

we may see things wrongly does not mean that there is nothing to be seen, or that the very notion of ethical *truth* in the most robust sense is impossible or philosophically intolerable. McDowell's insight (which is also powerfully, though differently, formulated by David Wiggins) is that the re-enchantment and de-scientization of nature allows us to see the values which are there before us in the world; it allows us to connect the human freedom which arises out of our second nature with our (equally human) animal nature without any of the extensive and unconvincing ontological epicycles required by the positions at either end of the dangerous oscillation McDowell treats in *Mind and World.*

So we are now, finally, prepared to understand how emotional rationality can be situated within the project of ethical formation without any commitment to cultural relativism (even though, sociologically, such relativism may be largely unavoidable). Because we envision culture (which is nothing if not an ongoing system of valuation) as a *natural* part of human existence, we can see its artifacts (e.g., virtues, rationality, what McDowell calls 'reliable sensitivities'[129] to the evaluative features of the world, etc.) as no more ontologically queer than our animal ability to distinguish a pleasant aroma from a foul one, though perhaps more complex. What is difficult to understand (and this because we have, as McDowell rightly laments, so disenchanted and de-humanized nature as to make ourselves strangers in our own world) is that simply by situating culture properly within nature we can avoid those ever-persistent debates between radical Platonistic objectivists and equally radical cultural relativists. But it is precisely the *replacement* of one conception of nature with another that allows McDowell and others like him to avoid these polarized positions. Without this deeper understanding of the

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[128] Ibid, 124.
[129] McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality*, 51

'naturalness' of culture, we are unable to understand how de Sousa's emotional rationality can be anything other than radically relative. But, now that we are equipped with a re-enchanted nature, we can see that any particular cultural practice or any paradigm scenario can and should be evaluated for rationality itself. In other words, when we deem a particular emotional experience rational by measuring it against a pervasive, socially accepted paradigm scenario we should (if we are to *really* engage in the project of ethical formation) attempt to see how it fits into the space of reasons, if its value is 'real' or if it is merely an illusory or ideological after-effect. Lovibond, even more than McDowell, continually stresses that ethical formation requires a determinate critique of itself: this determinate critique is *implicit* in the very notion of initiation and openness to the space of reasons.

Emotional rationality, as I have outlined it, is only possible if its 'minimal rationality' is situated within the broader ethical realism which is (both implicitly and explicitly) demanded by an appropriate understanding of the notion of culture, or *Bildung*, or 'second nature'. Correspondingly, ethical formation, as a project which aims at full openness to the reasons that there are, requires that we rationalize as far as possible our emotional experience and, indeed, all other areas of human experience.

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