On Hollow Terms: A Genealogy of Integration and its use in Quebec’s Immigration Discourses

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Abstract

*On Hollow Terms: A Genealogy of Integration and its use in Quebec’s Immigration Discourses*

Christian Allan Bertelsen

This research offers a genealogical analysis of the concept of *integration* as it exists—and has existed over the last 36 years—within the Quebec government’s immigration discourse. Methodologically, this analysis generally restricts itself to exacting a conceptual critique of *integration* and identifying the problems surrounding and embedded within the term at that level. This investigation adopts a two-pronged approach, it first outlines the nuances and complexities that constitute *l’identitaire québécois*’ state of play and the relationship it shares with the concept, ethic and goal of *integration*. Second, this genealogy assesses the discursive body of *integration* as it has emerged, mutated and persisted in Quebec’s immigration discourse. Of particular interest is locating how and where *integration* fits into Quebec’s salient antinomy with respect to its cultural identity: namely the negotiation between a *preservation* of identity(s) and an *openness* to difference. By dint of a thorough Foucauldian genealogy of *integration*’s emergence (*Entstehung*) along with its *descent* (*Herkunft*) within the Annual Reports issued (by various immigration ministries) between 1968-2004, this work deconstructs and problematizes *integration* as both an ethical and formative approach to immigration practice. After having thoroughly curated the concept of *integration* via its limitations and complications, this research posits that *integration* is not the most apposite of concepts. In fact, I argue that Quebec’s immigration practice and services might be better served by working under an ethic of *coordination*. 
Acknowledgements

Walter Benjamin has said how “thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well” (222)—and throughout this writing experience the pauses have been aplenty; through a one year-long employment contract at le Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’immigration, a provincial and national election, four logic board failures, one marriage, a complimentary honeymoon, and a host of other day-to-day occurrences it is remarkable this project came to fruition. And, of course, there is a host of people to thank for this.

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# Table of Contents

List of Illustrations vii

Introduction 1

Chapter One  
*The Epistemology of My Genealogy* 15

Chapter Two  
*Je me souviens et on s'Imagine: Articulations and Divergences of l'identitaire québécois in Quebec's immigration discourses* 42

Chapter Three  
*Post-Mortem: A Genealogy of Integration throughout Quebec Immigration Discourse* 106

Conclusion(s)  
*Coordinated Becomings: A Future Beyond Integration* 149

Works Cited 179
List of Illustrations


Introduction

For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.
Walter Benjamin. "Theses on the Philosophy of History."

How does one integrate the ‘Other’ into ‘l’identitaire québécois’? L’identitaire québécootherois? No, that doesn’t work. It comes off as awkward and, additionally, the ‘Other’ is forced to shed the capital ‘O’ that distinguishes it and that cues us into significance of the term itself. L’identitaire québotherécois. Again this is awkward as well. And worse still, the word bother somehow manifests itself within the term—as if to suggest that this endeavor is itself taxing and therefore bothersome as a result. L’identitaire québécoisother—no, how about l’identitaire otherquébécois? No, neither of these would work. Both are more of a coupling, than an integration proper. Moreover, they run the risk of being semantically misleading. Hyphens are of little use to us. With examples like québécois-other or other-québécois, the hyphen merely ends up serving as an alibi for the failure of not being able to integrate one into the other. Well, as you can see the task of seamlessly integrating the ‘Other’ into ‘l’identitaire québécois’ is a difficult one to say the least. And yet this question of integration is a pivotal one, in that it concomitantly concerns the questions surrounding Quebec’s future as well (Gagnon and Iacovino 374).

Perhaps one of the best ways of understanding Quebec is through the words of Michelle Gagnon when she defines it as being “a place of commitment” (Gagnon 4). And this commitment is always put to the test. This becomes apparent in the day-to-day experiences of living here, and it is perhaps most evident with regards to identity politics.
In this province the construction of this identity has largely been preoccupied with substantiating a shift from *les canadien-français* to the affirmative and oppositional *le peuple québécois* (Allor and Gagnon 36). The primary fulcrum in effecting this shift has been the French language; it is the official language of public life and economic affairs and it serves as a cornerstone of *l'identitaire québécois*. In Quebec, just as in many other cultures, language is viewed as that which supports "the weight of a civilization" (Fanon 18). It follows from this that if one is able to develop a decent command of the language, then they should be able to fully participate in, and consider themselves part of, *l'identitaire québécois*. If only things were that simple. As explained above, identity, and identification thereof, is part of the commitment that one encounters when living in Quebec. So powerful is this commitment that when identifying someone's identity, many are moved to get the very essence.

"*Je suis québécois.*" I am a Quebecker.
Without contestation, nor confirmation:
"*Mais vous avez un accent.*
*Vous êtes né où—c’est quoi votre pays d’origine?*"
But you have an accent. Where were you born—what country are you originally from?

As Frantz Fanon had written, having to undergo a linguistic interrogation upon every utterance is exasperating (35). And that which is even more interesting is the immediate assumption of your foreignness. I have been subjected—a number of times—to the question of where either I, or my parents, were born. The consistency with which this occurs is rather amusing; yet it is also profoundly disheartening... For many of the individuals who ask me this question seem to wholeheartedly—or even innocently—believe that because my first language is not French, then I must necessarily be from
elsewhere. The resonance of this sorrowful circumstance is amplified by the fact that I am white male. Can you imagine how well-inkulcated this rigid notion of _l'identitaire québécois_ must be for any individual to make that kind of intuitive leap? And one mustn’t forget that Othering is hierarchical and interlocking (Jiwani; Razack). Which is to say that Othering operates hierarchically and interlocks with other forms of oppression that weigh upon its victim. Admittedly, one must acknowledge that the Othering that I have experienced has itself stemmed from the years of Othering and oppression that _le peuple québécois_ have suffered throughout their particular history(s). Be it their mother country’s (France) abandonment of them or the myriad attempts by the English to assimilate them, _le peuple québécois’_ history(s) is one replete with struggle.¹ What does that say for _l'identitaire québécois_? It says that no matter how well one masters the French language that alone won’t make you _québécois_. You can rest assured that either your queer accent or your visual difference will betray you. You will be investigated. You will be queried because there is a prominent chasm between being fluent in French and being _québécois_; the two are not the same.

In many ways it is difficult for one to speak of an _identitaire québécois_. It is the name of an identity that encompasses many. Across its breadth, _l'identitaire québécois_ includes varying patois, numerous histories, and different terrains and soils from which many communities have grown and continue to flourish till today. Nevertheless, however manifold it might seem, there have been great efforts made in defining, (imag)ining, and writing into law a conception of _l'identitaire québécois_ that could be understood as being the identity of a distinct people. And this conception has been—and continues to be—

¹ For comprehensive articulations of issues such as these see Bouchard, _Nation Québécoise_ and _Genèse_; Bouthilette; Dumont, _Genèse_ and _Raisons Communes_; Handler and Moreau and Poulin.
fought for, contested and vigorously maintained. From the purview of immigration, it is at the heart of this continuous dynamic that one finds a troubling antinomy. How does a society, so bent on the preservation of sameness, concomitantly remain open to difference? Let us return to this later.

Living in Quebec is in many ways a schizophrenic experience. On some levels I am proud of the prescient openness that has writ itself into the annals of this society. As well, I have a profound respect and fondness for the passion and intensity that many people who live here exemplify vis-à-vis their identity and lives. However, I also find myself deeply dismayed by these same passions and intensities as they can often be seen dividing, excluding and stagnating rather than multiplying, including and growing. I know from experience. For again, I am a person of privilege, a cultural chameleon of sorts. Being a white male, I have often reaped some of the advantages and received some of the scorn that circulates in this province. Now it is fairly important to underscore that this is not just a problem because it has affected me in some way. No, this is and has been a problem for many, affecting those concerned to different degrees and intensities; in fact, I am lucky enough to be counted among those who are more mildly affected. Nevertheless, I do not presume to speak on the part of an(Other),\textsuperscript{2} instead I wish to articulate a conceptual problem that I have observed in this province’s ethic towards immigration, and that I can be sure, prima facie, affects and has affected Others. With that said, however, it is important for me to be forthright about my own identity. I am a young male (born in Quebec), interested in identity politics, hospitality, affect, feminism and political philosophy. I speak English, French, and—to a far lesser extent—German and Spanish—but I am by no means an Anglophone. The term Anglophone is a freighted

\textsuperscript{2} For to do so is problematic see Bannerji 144.
one (Straw), and I simply do not want its charge on my back. Moreover in Montreal, the term Anglphone is also often used as the name of an identity that gathers itself negatively (Saussure) against the predominant identitaire québécois. Negative constitution can, in many ways, be no constitution at all. For it is always reliant upon something or someone else to stand upright. And, it is precisely squabbles of sibling rivalry such as these that one hopes to move past.

Nevertheless, it is not just a simple matter of ‘moving past it,’ so to speak, because to live in a city like Montreal is to be very much in the middle of it. In fact I should recount how it is that I came to work for le Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration (MRCI) and carry out this analysis. It all came about because of a fateful summer in 1999. Just as it is for many students, summer employment had always presented itself as a means by which to finance my university studies. As I hadn’t already made any arrangements for an employment that summer I registered with Placement Étudiants Québec online. By the end of March, I began receiving offers for different summer positions across the city. One of the first of these was a position with the transport ministry, where I might work as a dispatcher. I showed up for my interview\(^3\) on-time, positive and brimming with confidence, however, my hopes were soon to be dashed. A few minutes into the interview it became clear that something was askew. Throughout the customary question period, my interviewer, a Caucasian woman who certainly identified herself as québécoise (and who would most probably be identified as such), repeatedly asked whether or not I had any difficulty expressing myself in French. Knowing that I didn’t, I would confidently allay any such worries by citing the vast

\(^3\) It was only later on that I found out that a Placement Étudiant Québec interview is not an interview so much as it is an initial meeting whereby your job responsibilities are explained to you.
experience that I had already acquired working in various francophone milieus. Nevertheless, each time I would make some headway in the questioning, she would stubbornly return to this topic, even though she didn’t seem to have any problems understanding my ripostes. She said that she was concerned, and took me to a room where she submitted me to a battery of ridiculous tests—one of which consisted in reading a paragraph to her out loud. At the end of this ordeal, she said that she regretfully (though it didn’t seem to be the case) could not give me the position. Livid, I contacted Placement Étudiants Québec to tell them of the outcome. The individual with whom I spoke was taken aback. For Placement Étudiants Québec was not really in the practice of scheduling ‘interviews,’ as much as it was simply dispatching capable students to different government offices in need of staff. Funny enough, the next ‘interview’ I received from them was for the position of immigration agent at the MRCI, where I would be called upon to counsel arrivées⁴—in French—on how best to find lodging,

⁴ In a bid to remain analytically accurate about the terms I invoke, it is important to stress that arrivée(s) should be understood as those who are immigrants—regardless of gender, race or sexual preference. Even though there are a number of identities who are considered minorities in Quebec (such as the Aboriginal communities and Anglophone communities for example), this analysis will primarily focus on those who are coming from another country and settling in Quebec for the first time. This is important because the integrative difficulties of those who already have some kind social, economic and political anchoring is different, in many respects, than those who are coming here for the first time. And, of course, it is analytically irresponsible to assume that multiple ethnicities and individuals can simply be lumped together when considering issues of discrimination, because there are different tiers of discrimination (Fanon 103) and their dynamics are experienced by each ethnicity and individual in very particular manners. And in using this term I am completely aware that those to whom the term refers “are people with histories, with social relations and ideologies of power among themselves. Class, gender, caste, “race” and religion make them far from homogeneous, and similar to those among whom they find themselves” (Bannerji 148). These considerations aside, my providing you with further substantiation as to why I invoke arrivée rather than the terms new arrival, immigrant, etc. is nevertheless important. Terms the likes of new arrival, immigrant, etc. have certain histories, they are freighted if you will. Moreover, the use of these terms by governments and other institutions are oftentimes erratic. Such inconsistency indicates an epistemological uncertainty towards naming the other. That which is not in doubt, however, is who has the power to name. From another perspective, these same terms, along with their diverse uses, have certain corollaries—and identifying just to what extent they do is a question best left to local and thorough analyses (by conclusion’s end, though, this contention might be somewhat clearer). Suffice it to say, at least for the moment, that terminologies often have a way of being determinative. What then of arrivée as my chosen term? Well, I mean it to be construed as an organic skin of sorts. For the word arrivée is an irrefutably
apply for important pieces of identification, gain an equivalence for their schooling, find work, etc. and, as irony would have it, determine their proficiency in French and suggest courses where necessary. Irony, it would seem, is not without a sense of humor.

Dynamics of exclusion, in whatever social fabric they may have been sown, are always troubling; however, their effects are far less critical when one already has a well-established home from which to venture. For an arrivée, on the other hand, to have these dynamics compounded with the worries of not having a proper abode or social safety net to rely on, the task of becoming part of a new society can be a stifling one indeed. And rest assured, a task such as this demands an infinite amount of work. As such, it is commonly agreed upon that, for arrivées, the task of acculturation is always a difficult one. It is for this reason that most welcoming governments have in place certain provisions that aim to frame and facilitate an arrivée’s nascent participation in their society. In Quebec, ever since November 5, 1968 when it acquired a decisive role with respect to its immigration practices, this provision has been predicated upon a concept and goal of integration or some semblance of it. From the perspective of academic

temporal one. It can be used to describe (for a time, but not forever) someone who has completed the act of coming from without. Or, it can also be used quite simply to refer to the act thereof; alternatively, it can be used to indicate the space where that occurs. The term can also be used to mark the beginning of a season or period: l’arrivée des premiers froids (the arrival of the first chill). My use of the term will most likely touch upon all of these meanings at different points in this analysis. Generally speaking, however, it should be understood as a temporary term used to name s/he who has arrived from without. It is useful to conceive of this term as an organic skin because the hope is that it will be shed and be left behind to dissolve as organic things do. It is a self-effacing word. From another perspective, it is a question of respect. As a name, it makes no assumptions, it strictly states a fact: arrivée you are, for you now stand before me; as Ludwig Wittgenstein has suggested “the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer” (Philosophical Investigations 21). Arrivée has the semantic flexibility to both confirm someone’s arrival as well as mark the beginning of a process or period that such a fact brings about. There is, however, another meaning that I have until now neglected to mention. The term arrivée can also be used as an adjective that qualifies a person as being someone who has made it either socially, professionally, financially—or all of the above. In this way it can be a potentially regenerative skin. It might, from time to time, return to name s/he who has, in some form or another, garnered some success. Therefore, I make great efforts to use the term, and use it consistently, for I appreciate the organic qualities and potential for growth that inhere within it.
research, very little attention has been paid to the concept of integration proper (outside a bastion of predominantly québécois scholars who rarely take it up directly)—as it pertains to Quebec immigration; thus, while this lacuna has rendered the task of critically analyzing it more difficult, it has concomitantly proven the need for such an articulation. The concept of integration would appear to be a rather intractable beast. It is rarely taken up as a primary object of inquiry, nor is it ever sufficiently questioned. Instead integration generally tends to be overlooked, taken for granted or consigned to the periphery in analyses that have education (Mc Andrew); sociology (Bouchard, Nation Québécoise; Pagé); immigration and governance;\(^5\) language, culture, memory, identity and governance;\(^6\) how the dissolution of the political subject has rendered nationalism(s) archaic and intractable (Beauchemin, “What Does” and “Le sujet”; Bellerose and Beauchemin); nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship;\(^7\) Quebec history and oppression;\(^8\) and Quebec’s standing on the global stage (Turgeon), as their main foci. Here lies the problem. Part of what this research seeks to demonstrate, is that the question of integration, as both a concept and ethical approach, is crucial in that it is a formative one. This thesis argues that the neglect/unquestioned acceptance of integration has had serious repercussions on its overall feasibility and effectiveness within Quebec’s immigration practice. To conceptually bring this to light, my thesis takes the form of a Foucauldian genealogy that employs a two-pronged qualitative approach canvassing and considering

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\(^5\) For further examples see Fontaine; Gagnon and Iacovino; Juteau et al.; Labelle et al. and Piché.

\(^6\) For works addressing issues such as these see Allor; Allor and Gagnon; Beauchemin, “What does” and “Le sujet”; Bellerose and Beauchemin; Cantin, “Quel avenir” and “J’impense”; Cardinal; Carens, Culture; Castles; Grenier; Karmis; Létourneau; Maclure, “Narratives” and Quebec Identity; Probyn; Salée, “De l’avenir” and “Espace Publique”; Simon, Hybridité and “Notes” and Straw.

\(^7\) For further reference see Carens, “Immigration”; Clift; Gagnon and Iacovino; Handler; Karmis; Maclure, “Narratives” and Quebec Identity; Piché; Salée, “De l’avenir” and “Espace Publique”; Simon, Hybridité and “Notes” and Vacher.

\(^8\) For instance consider the following Dumont, Genèse and Raisons; Bouthillette; Moreau and Poulin.
both the relevant scholarship and government texts that deal primarily and secondarily with the concept of integration as it relates to immigration affairs in this province. More specifically, this analysis focuses on all the annual reports that were issued between the period of 1968-2004 by the various branches of government charged with immigration services, any and all documents that directly define the term and concept of integration, and a selection of other contiguously related government texts. This assembly of documents serves as the corpus—and as my objects of inquiry, and it is through them that I retrace and problematize the history of integration in Quebec’s immigration affairs.

Integration has thus always remained a conceptual thorn in my side, for in this term lies a number of a priori fallacies that problematize the government’s goals—and more importantly, the arrivée’s experience of joining Quebec society. On its own, the concept of integration is fairly ambiguous, and it broaches a number of questions: Why must the arrivée be forced to integrate? What are they integrating into? What does this process of integration entail? Does it require any particular sacrifice? If so, then on the part of whom? Will they ever truly be able to consider themselves québécois—that is, will they ever be able to accomplish the tall task of integration?

Consequently, the proposed research locates, describes and problematizes integration (as it is, and has been, deployed in the Quebec government’s immigration discourse) so as to reveal that it cannot withstand close scrutiny. Preliminary research indicates that the concept suffers from a number of ambiguities, inconsistencies and implicit assumptions. Thus in order to bring these weaknesses to light this research primarily asks: What is integration? How might we understand it vis-à-vis Quebec

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9 Richard Handler underscores how, with respect to the Quebec government’s discourse on its immigration goals, the notion of “assimilation is rejected outright, yet the concept of integration is ambiguous” (177). My emphasis.
immigration discourses? And what function does it serve in Quebec’s immigration/political discourses? These questions inevitably give rise to many others, for instance:

- Is integration teleological? Is it linear and accomplishable?
- Or, is it instead to be understood as a manner of being—a roving desire (Probyn)—a perpetual process without finality?
- The determination of the first two questions is imperative to understanding whether or not there is any possibility of measuring the success—or degrees thereof—of one’s integrative efforts. In short, is integration quantifiable?
- Does there exist a chasm between the government’s theoretical conception of integration and its real and lived practice? If so, it must be articulated.
- How polysemic is integration? Does it get taken up differently by the various government institutions that make use of the term?

There is, as well, a plethora of scholarship that, while not addressing Quebec proper, nevertheless considers issues and concepts that are very pertinent to our examination of integration. Works such as these centre on issues of: identity politics, multiculturalism and belonging;\(^\text{10}\) identity, community, nationalism, racism and culture;\(^\text{11}\) discourse analysis;\(^\text{12}\) ethics of communication tout court (Peters); globalization (Appadurai; Bauman) and immigration (Folson).

**Chapter Breakdown**

*Chapter One*: This chapter defines the epistemology of my genealogy. To this end, it thoroughly curates Foucault’s concept of genealogy by laying bare its stance, objectives, presuppositions, corollaries and potential effectivity. To truly flesh out the breadth of a genealogical approach, this portion of the analysis seeks recourse to the various readers

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\(^\text{10}\) For instance see Bannerji; Mirchandani and Tastsoglou; Probyn; Razack; Taylor and Williamson.

\(^\text{11}\) Consider Anderson; Balibar and Wallerstein; Bhabha, Dewey; Fanon; Hall, “Culture” and “Notes”; Karim and Williams.

\(^\text{12}\) Consult Foucault, *Nietzsche* and *History* and Faubion.
who have taken up the concept and who have made the attempt of expanding and developing it further. A particular focus is in providing my reader with a map of the methodology that I use when conducting my examination. One of the components that is certainly a requisite to any genealogy is that of discourse analysis. With respect to my corpus of research, this form of analysis is crucial in that discourses serve to organize, inscribe and regulate relations of power—thereby constituting regimes of truth (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 131). This is fitting because the goal of this research is, of course, to articulate the regime of truth that shoulders, legitimates and renders intelligible the concept of integration as it exists in Quebec’s immigration discourse.

Chapter Two: This chapter considers how (imag)inings are instantiations of the nation. And with its national aspirations, Quebec, of course, invests heavily in disseminating articulations of l’identitaire québécois—which is a fluxional aggregation of competing discourses, collective memories, social practices and traditions, etc. Knowing that immigration is a realm pregnant with (imag)inings of national identity, a number of questions arise. How is l’identitaire québécois (imag)ined as a political community, what are the theoretics behind this process? How is l’identitaire québécois framed for the immigrants? How are they interpellated to recognize l’identitaire québécois and to recognize themselves therewith? To address these queries, this analysis critically examines Le cœur québécois immigration campaign and considers some of the theoretical work carried out by Jacques Beauchemin, Charles Bellerose, Serge Cantin and Daniel Salée on l’identitaire québécois and its relationship to the (imag)ining of self vis-à-vis immigration.
Chapter Three: Here we find ourselves at the very heart of this thesis. This analysis focuses primarily on all the annual reports that were issued between 1968-2004, along with a selection of complimentary government texts. This bulk of documentation serves as my principal object of inquiry, and through them I effect a close examination of the history of integration. In particular, this line of inquiry zeros in on the concept’s emergence (Entstehung), descent (Herkunft), development, mutation and effectivity, and works towards deconstructing and problematizing integration as both an admirable ethic and a priori (and hence formative) approach to immigration practice. As this chapter carries out a Foucauldian genealogy of the ethic and goal of integration from both theoretical and experiential perspectives (i.e.: my years of employment with the MRCI), this approach is best characterized as a “method of immanent social criticism” (Hoy 13).

Conclusion(s): After having thoroughly curated the concept of integration via its limitations and complications, its actual implication in government policy—and the and implications thereof, along with Quebec’s tension between preservation and openness, this research will posit that integration is not the most apposite of concepts. In fact, from the current state of affairs, what appears to be afoot is more a nascent state of coordination rather than one of ‘successful integration.’ Moreover, what this research will argue, is that once this dynamic of coordination is acknowledged, only then can the conceptual reframing that this recognition entails be fully appreciated and only then can we begin to work (hopefully more effectively) within its bounds. Naturally, this section will offer an explication of the dynamics and merits of an ethic of coordination. And lastly, it will be argued that issues such as the difficulties inherent to a project of integration and the political turmoil that le Parti Québécois is currently experiencing
(The Gazette; Ha; Séguin “Landry”), raise important questions with regards to l’identitaire québécois, and identity politics more broadly, in the province of Quebec.

**Genealogical Critique**

Of course, by pursuing a genealogical analysis, this project avows from the onset, that its intention is not to produce an eschatological assessment of integration and immigration in Quebec; it could not, because “genealogy cannot cease to be marginal and oppositional and still be genealogy” (Prado 151). Thus, genealogy is very measured in its deployment. And as much as it is concerned with the demystification of times past, it must also be aware of the timeliness of its own introduction. With the next provincial election potentially being decisive vis-à-vis where the lines of one’s identity get drawn (The Gazette; Descôteaux; Ha; Séguin “Landry” and “Youth-Wing”), this genealogy seeks to precipitate and problematize these delineations. It is a question of strategy, really. As Brian Massumi has argued, the ‘critical’ aspect of critical thinking does, of course, need to be pragmatic about when and where it brings itself to bear (Parables 13). Critical thought made pragmatic. And this is something that I am very conscious of vis-à-vis this undertaking. Nevertheless, I should warn that I am not making this point out of guilt. I make it out of an ethical imperative. An ethical imperative that is beholden to both the persons to whom my object of inquiry corresponds with, and—importantly, to my self. For it is true that there is this need, as Massumi says, to lean towards more affirmative methods of thought (Parables 13). Otherwise what would be the point of raising a problem, if one wasn’t prepared to offer their thoughts—however preliminary they might be—towards augmenting that field of discussion? Experimentation and thought are joined
at the hip. Thus, this strategic act of critical thinking is twofold. It is at once a critical insight into what I see as a persistently pressing antinomy and it is also a creative act that hopes to offer a new pathway of thought with respect to harnessing the potential inherent to our increasingly diverse publics. At its most humble it is an offering, at its most hubristic it is a cartographic palimpsest.
Chapter One

The Epistemology of My Genealogy

The task of genealogy is not to recount history in its purity, but to give another perspective of history, one whose purpose is to rid history of its illusions of progress and reconciliation.

Todd May. Between Genealogy and Epistemology.

Facts are lonely things.
Don DeLillo. Libra.

When one writes about a past, one is necessarily writing for the future. It is not a rendering of a past for past’s sake, but rather for future’s sake.\(^{13}\) It is history for the future. Future history. And it is in this way that a past is allowed to cast its light upon the future. However, that light is, of course, permitted… Recollected, written and issued by a particular authority, history is anything but objective in the strictest sense. It is for this reason that it gets fragmented and we thus speak of histories in the plural. For behind every story lies a claim(s) to ownership, a set of interests which guides its recounting. Thus we come to recognize that history is itself a site of epistemological struggle. It is the tumultuous intersection where myriad forces clash and vie for dominance. And the reason why the contest is so fierce is because this intersection opens onto the winds of futurity. Those gales have a tendency to polarize: because the future, of course, has its friends and enemies. There are those who tremble before such wind because they are anathema to the

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\(^{13}\) This not to say to that contestations of past histories do not occur. The Armenian struggle to have the genocide committed against its people recognized and properly recorded as such is but one (albeit an extremely serious one) of many possible examples. Nevertheless, any rewriting of such a history will, in the end, be for the future—sure it will have been made to rectify the past, but this rectification will only have its desired effect upon the future readers and listeners who will initially learn it as fact.
contingency that gusts along with it. For them, the future is no friend, all it does is wreak
havoc with the stability of their history. Cleaving into the present, the future potentially
disrupts the planned continuities, strategic essentialisms and well-permeated narratives
that they hold so dearly. For others though, the future is more a friend than a foe. It brings
with it the possibility of change. And, in this way, hope is mortgaged to the potentiality of
its forces. For them, the violence of its arrival is inventive. Creative cleaving.

And it is somewhere at the fringe of this clamorous intersection of historical
conflict that genealogy finds itself. With regards to its positioning, genealogy sides with
those discourses and practices which are themselves oppressed or repressed (May 82); it
aligns itself with those who see hope in the future. Genealogy is simultaneously located
within, critical of and irreverent towards history by decree. Its goal, of course, is not to
eliminate history or supplant it. No, that would be impossible. Instead, it is to place a
strategic critique against it—to engender, if only for a moment and for only a few, the
possibility of an alternative means of thinking the same thing through. For Gilles
Deleuze, experiment is beyond history’s scope. History is “just the set of more or less
negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond
history. Without history the experiment would remain indeterminate, [and] lacking any
initial conditions […]” (Deleuze, Negotiations 170). Genealogy is experimental, but it
isn’t foolish. It has no interest in displacing history, only to have the guilt of its
epistemological pogroms to shoulder.

In what follows, I outline the epistemological frames that guide and inform my
project of disinterring the problems associated with the ethic, concept and goal of
integration as it exists in Quebec’s immigration practice and services. To accomplish
this, I invoke Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy and curate it thoroughly so as to lay bare its stance, objectives, presuppositions, corollaries and potential effectivity. To truly flesh out the breadth and implications of a genealogical approach, I also seek recourse to Foucault’s various readers and consider their multiple views and criticisms.

As well, in the space of this chapter I sketch out a methodological map of sorts. And upon this cartography, I trace the connections that I see existing between discursive (largely Foucauldian) and deconstructive (part Deleuzean and part Derridean) approaches to textual interpretation. Discursive analysis is, of course, an essential part of any genealogy. With regards to its objects of inquiry, Foucault has written that genealogy “operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times” (“Nietzsche” 139). It is in this way that the palimpsest becomes, for Foucault, the conceptual metaphor par excellence for understanding history. With respect to my corpus of research, discursive analysis is crucial in that discourses serve to organize, inscribe and regulate relations of power—thereby constituting regimes of truth (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 131). This is fitting because the goal of this research is, of course, to articulate the regime of truth\textsuperscript{14} that shoulders, legitimates and renders intelligible the concept of integration as it exists in Quebec’s immigration practice and services.

\textsuperscript{14} As Foucault elaborates: “Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (Power/Knowledge 131).
Locations, Positions & Potential

It is of course important for me to be forthright about the fact that I cannot and will not be speaking from an objective position, for it is simply not possible. To effectively canvass the concept of integration, I am forced to both straddle and illuminate the divide that exists between ostensibly clean and altruistic government policies and the messy and problematic nature of their lived realities. As such, my personal experiences seem to expand within and throughout both of these poles. For instance, even though I have lived here for all my life, I often find myself in a perpetual process of integration. There are a number of reasons for this. One of them is the fact that I am sometimes told that I speak French with a peculiar accent. In fact one day, my superior at le Carrefour d’Intégration du Nord inquired as to whether or not I was a naturalized citizen. Though I found this rather amusing for a number of reasons, it serves as a stark reminder of how identity, and identification thereof, is part and parcel of what it means to live in Quebec.

I say Quebec, but, to be more accurate, I ought to say this analysis stems from the city of Montreal. Indeed, I insist that the genealogy of the ethic, concept and goal of integration that I am undertaking here be recognized as emerging from—and focusing upon—the province of Quebec and the city of Montreal in particular. Thus, it is not my intention to make any broader claims outside my area of inquiry.15 Besides, as Todd May underscores, “genealogy’s political import lies in its very specificity” (82). And even though I unthread the ethic, concept and goal of integration from a particular location, my hope is that this unraveling might also lend itself to those, perhaps from elsewhere,

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15 I certainly wouldn’t preclude the possibility entirely, however, within the breadth of my examination I can only take responsibility for that which I have said, seen and studied. Ultimately my hope is that this offering helps undo some sutures and spurs on creative thought. Genealogies aren’t meant to answer, but to question—and provoke further questioning thereafter.
who ask themselves whether or not it is possible to imagine other ways of becoming, beyond those already shackled to integration.

**Framing Foucault**

This examination deals with a great many things. Generally speaking, it addresses issues of identity politics, (govern)mentality, globalization, ethics, etc. In short, it touches upon issues that have *material* effects\(^\text{16}\) on people’s lives. Nevertheless, the focus of this analysis lies not in ethnographic research on particular subjectivities, but rather, in disinterring the many anomalies and contradictions that surround, and exist within, the notion of *integration*. That is to say that the problem with *integration* can be originally retraced to a conceptual level. In order to carry out this act of retracing, I adopt Foucault’s genealogy as my principle methodological strategy. In choosing Foucault—and, more specifically, by adopting genealogy as one’s formal method of examination—one is likely to ruffle some feathers. This is because Foucault has a number of friends and enemies who come from myriad places and positions. As Mitchell Dean points out, when one chooses a Foucauldian approach to (what he terms) *historical sociology*, this consequently involves meddling in the variegated terrains of social philosophy, political thought, cultural and intellectual history along with those of “economies, societies and civilisations” (1)—hence the many feathers that one might ruffle.

It is difficult to speak of ‘Foucault’s methods’ as though they were conceptually definite and temporally tractable. Foucault did, for sure, delineate conceptual mappings that could help one visualize how knowledge and truth were reticulated. And, most

\(^{16}\) By this I mean the lived-realities and experiences of being othered that result in not getting the job, being left-out socially—all of which have certain affects on one’s psychological well-being.
importantly, he stressed how these reticulations were themselves the product of struggle and, as a result, quite fluid. However beyond these visual ruminations, it is nevertheless possible for one to encounter certain gaps and fissures between his avowed methodologies and the products thereof. And this is because Foucault was primarily concerned with exploring "how it is possible to think in a certain way and how far a specific language can be used" (Dean 2). Indeed, as Dean argues, it is for this reason that:

so little of what Foucault was to write could be described as an application of concepts or methodological principles and why, having offered accounts of method at certain points, he appears to jettison them or take them up in an entirely different fashion. (Dean 2)

Part of that which created unease amongst so many was Foucault's irreverence for thought—or, more precisely, normative theoretical thought. Foucault was steadfastly defiant against such strains of thought. Evidence of this can be found in his post methodological musings. Foucault's trademark elusiveness is best observed in the instances when he would address issues of methodology; for as Dean has indicated such commentary is often "a summary that revisits and clarifies analysis after the event rather than a rationalistic plan put into practice by analysis" (2). Though troubling to philosophers, this unruliness, this refusal to be pinned down is largely what defined Foucault as a thinker. As Dean points out, "Foucault never sought to apply a particular system or to allow his own heuristics to congeal into a fixed, formal method" (14). Of course, this is not to say that his work was without rigor. Foucault's historical works certainly bespeak a heightened degree of diligence. However, what this does indicate is that part of what made his work so engaging was the pithy insights that he offered in the interstices of his scholarly arguments. That is to say few people can do Foucault. For the essence of his thought lies in the singularity of its expression. Nevertheless, this does not
preclude us from taking up his theoretical tools and applying them ever so carefully; rather, this simply means that any work we end up fashioning will, in the end, be an expression of our own voice.

**Genealogy, The Foreigner & Precarious Positions**

The concept of genealogy can be approached in a number of ways. However, it might be understood through the conceptual persona (Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*) of the foreigner. Here, then, is a pedagogical parable. Genealogy is the individual who comes from without and who is quickly made to realize that, in the eyes of those from within, her/his being is not ‘of here’ and thus not recognized. Looked upon askance, the foreigner is, more often than not, beset with others’ distrust. Thus the foreigner is someone who occupies dangerous ground. S/he is someone who, as a result of others’ distrust, is refused the recognition of being but who stubbornly struggles to be nevertheless; it is surreptitious being, but being all the same. And worse is in store for s/he who utters an opinion. For to speak is draw attention to one’s being—and to do so in opposition to the *logon* of the society which disallows it. Thus, for a foreigner, to voice one’s opinion is to speak out of turn. *How dare you speak up... with what authority do you speak?* As nobody likes to have her/his authority questioned, the foreigner’s decision to speak is a significant one. The foreigner chooses to express her/himself because they believe that what they speak of is just. In speaking her/his mind, in contradicting, the foreigner knows very well that her/his actions won’t entirely reverse the society’s *logon*, however, that isn’t the point. Much like a rhetorical objection in a courtroom, the goal of the foreigner’s utterance is to register it among listeners; the objective is to plant a seed which might then, or perhaps sometime thereafter, cast doubt upon an interpretation made
in the name of that society’s logon. However, there remains a snag. In having affirmed her/his being in blatant opposition to the logon of that society—and having done so without occupying any legitimate grounds from which to speak—the foreigner has made an enormous sacrifice. For s/he have concomitantly drawn attention to her/his intractable being, issued a challenge to the authority of that society and, as a result, ultimately jeopardized any possibility of her/his gaining any legitimacy within it. It is important to underscore that legitimacy here should be construed as recognition—by the logon of that society—of one’s lawful being, that is, of one’s right to exist and speak among them. To return to the parable, the foreigner’s right to legitimately speak has not been—and in all likelihood will probably never be—accorded to her/him. So how, then, does the foreigner register her/his spoken words? It is by dint of the justification that lies behind her/his statement (May 72). The words of which s/he speaks must carry a certain force that might give the listener(s) “reason to take them as true pending further inquiry” (May 72). As such, the foreigner’s words speak to an active listener, one who would ruminate upon her/his words long after they were spoken. This parable, I believe, provides us with a means of understanding Foucault’s genealogy. The figure of the foreigner stands in for the concept of genealogy and allows us to animate it. However, far be it from me to make that figure work solely in the service of my exegesis. I refer to that figure—and will do so again—because it stands for (even though it has been made to undergo some significant foreshortening i.e.: the multiplicity of singular subjectivities) the many individuals who have come from without and seek to be within.
If genealogy could be characterized by one word, it would have to be ethical. For genealogy, as a form of critical and effective history,\(^{17}\) is compelled by a sense of ethical responsibility to the future (Dean 29). It issues its warning, all the while knowing, that few will hear its creed. In many ways, a genealogy is about a feeling. It follows from a feeling of skepticism towards that which parades itself under the guise of legitimacy. It feels for those who find themselves oppressed or repressed as a result of particular *regimes of truth*. And it is via a feeling of injustice which impinges upon us, that one takes up genealogy and uses it as the irreverent form of critique that it aspires to be. In fact, one could say that genealogy is driven by a certain *intensity of feeling*. Indeed, this is where Friedrich Nietzsche fits into the picture. Foucault’s recourse to Nietzsche, though part conceptual, is highly intensive. As Dean notes:

Foucault’s turn to Nietzsche is not for a model of a methodology to follow but for *a kind of incitement* that would force the conceptualisation of the relation of historiography to its present outside the rarefied positivism of archaeology. Nietzsche represents a pole that is capable of wresting historical thought from its complacency and from its typical moves, of inducing the effects necessary to examine our own purposes in historical study. (20)\(^{18}\)

There is something very practical about genealogy. It is practical in the sense that, as a concept, it is very mindful of the bounds of its potential. And this awareness can be discerned from its insistence upon locality, its concern with the “present configuration[s] and organisation[s] of knowledge” of a given place at a given time (Dean 23). Genealogy is cognizant about the locality and temporality of fields of knowledge in general, it recognizes the fluid and particular nature of these fields. Thus, genealogy’s awareness

\(^{17}\) "Let us call history ‘effective’ to the extent that it upsets the colonisation of historical knowledge by the schemas of a transcendental and synthetic philosophy of history, and ‘critical’ in proposition to its capacity to engage in the tireless interrogation of what is held to given, necessary, natural, or neutral" (Dean 20).

\(^{18}\) The emphasis here is my own.
stems from its consistent musing upon its own capacity. Practical capacity. This is what makes genealogy so very ethical. As Deleuze underscored in one of his lectures on Spinoza, "ethics is a problem of power" ("Spinoza" 11). It asks us what we are capable of in a given situation. From my end, I can be fairly certain that this genealogical analysis of integration alone will not result in the abandonment of the concept. That simply isn't within this project's capacity. Micro-forms of resistance are, of course, meant to aggregate. That which is within this examination's capacity—and that which I hope to accomplish, is crafting a persuasive argument concerning the reevaluation of integration and its centrality in structuring immigration practice and services. The practical goal, here, is to incite a general rethinking of the concept, to get the ball rolling so to speak.

The genealogist, by accepting such a role, admits that s/he is absolutely imbricated in her/his research project, and as a result, s/he is to some extents partial to it (Hoy 7). That is the nature of genealogy. It is necessarily steeped within the history and multiple discourses that it addresses (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 148). It does not make the foolish claim that it speaks from a detached and objective position. Genealogy knows better. Genealogy recognizes its own complicity. And so do I. I am keenly aware that I am inextricably associated with that which I seek to examine. I am, of course, critiquing from within (Hutcheon 4).

Genealogy, then, presupposes a particular a priori view of knowledge. And it is important to shed some light on this because the literal meaning of the word genealogy is itself misleading in this regard. The concept does not view knowledge as stemming—by way of lineage—from essentialist roots, nor does genealogy assume it to necessarily be
oriented towards progress. Genealogy understands knowledge as being contingent, contested, and controlled. As such, genealogy:

traces the play of dispersed forces as they form shifting and dissolving unities which have no purpose or intention informing them. And knowledge, too, rather than lying behind this movement, is part of it. In the course of his account of genealogy, Foucault twice accuses knowledge as being a sort of error: it is the error of the origin which comes to be accepted as true, and it is the false interpretation of progress which the play of dominations gives itself in its meaningless march through time. (May 75)

Thus, what we call knowledge is all those discourses which, in a particular context, have been conferred legitimacy by the powers that be. It is in this way that one can say that communities are distinguished by their proper forms of knowledge and epistemologies (Fish; Lingis, Community). The contextual realms that house the different forms of knowledge are, of course, not in themselves static. They are the fluid cultural contexts within which communities share certain assumptions, understandings, practices, patois, etc. and that however much these contexts are bound to change there are nevertheless significant efforts made by the dominant powers (governments, institutions, communities, etc.) of that society to hold onto—and incite the public to hold onto—particular understandings, views, forms of identity, traditions, etc. Thus amid society’s natural flux, there remain pronounced, and even surreptitious,¹⁹ efforts towards maintaining a particular consistency or selective order of things. These enduring—but not perdurable—things constitute the epistemological traits that, in many ways, serve to define different societies. Disinterring these and challenging that which is problematic about them, is genealogy’s raison d’être.

¹⁹ As Foucault has warned us, history is sometimes best understood by the masked continuities that underlie the officially articulated vicissitudes (Foucault, “On the Ways” 283).
Conceptions of knowledge such as these have a way of provoking a cacophony of critique among normative theorists. They charge that when knowledge is conceived of in that way, one no longer has a legitimate position from which to speak (Habermas; May; Dean; Prado). In fact when viewed from their perspective, genealogy is seen as an epistemological failure (May 77). This certainly isn’t the case for Foucault though. For he recognizes that knowledge is itself inextricably bound up within processes of emergence (Entstehung) and descent (Herkunft). And it has always been subject to the various dispersed forces which have played their part in enacting “new appropriation[s] of knowledge and, thus, a new set of interpretations” which come to be referred to as truth (May 76); Foucault calls this perpetual struggle the will to knowledge. Thus, the very grounds upon which knowledge is constituted are themselves rather unstable. It is in this light, then, that Foucault believes he can viably offer genealogy as a form of immanent historical criticism and refrain from providing any epistemological bastion from which it could ‘legitimately’ speak. Suffice it to say that genealogy’s epistemological existence is such that, no one will ever be able to find a resolution to its paradoxical nature and thus be able to persuade a hardened normative theorist. The ostensibly insurmountable topic is often seen with trepidation from those who approach it. In fact, many try to sidestep it by way of theoretical legerdemain. For example James Faubion states, albeit contentedly remaining at a logical remove, that genealogy “belongs apparently to another rationalism, another will. [...] Its constant point of departure and return is power-knowledge. Its critique has the will to know as its constant object” (xxxvi). Elusive. This does not mean, however, that attempts haven’t been made to reconcile the apparent contradiction. For instance, there is one concept that might allow us to understand—though not entirely
resolve—genealogy’s epistemological positioning. Dean implies it, when he explicates how genealogy is “a form of analysis which suspends contemporary norms of validity and meaning at the same time as it reveals their multiple conditions of formation” (33). Delay. It is a momentary pause that cries: ‘just hear me out! Allow me to explain.’ It is an offering that, if deemed apposite, can gain a certain currency. It is thought’s great revenge. As one might guess, in an argument such as this, thought becomes the bastion of legitimacy. However, for us to make sense of this we must first unthread the knot of the holy trinity: thought, power & knowledge. We start with power and knowledge and seek to understand why it is that these separate elements always seem to be joined at the hip. Explaining Deleuze’s assessment, May writes that:

the relationship between power and knowledge is one of foundedness: knowledge, though irreducible to power, is still founded on force relations. In this sense, it is possible to say that knowledge is founded upon power. What relations of power create are not specific truths (or, better, specific claims or theories that pass for truth in a given historical epoch), but instead “problematizations,” spaces of knowledge within which certain questions arise, certain procedures for attaining truth are established, and certain visibilities [(non discursive)] and articulations [(discursive)] are formed. (87)

Even though that might have settled the ambiguity behind power and knowledge, how are we to construe the first element of this triumvirate? Here, we can look to Deleuze, who introduces the concept of thought (or reminds us rather) as the back door out of genealogy’s epistemological impasse. Thought is that which allows one to see the diagrammatic relationship between the articulable (discursive) and the visual (non discursive) (May 88). Thought can construe power “because it is not merely its expression” (May 88). Now the distinction that Deleuze is making here is between knowledge, as an intersection of interpretations that have been conferred legitimacy by
the powers that be, and thought, as an element separate from knowledge (though not entirely unaffected by it) which allows one to understand the power that determines it (May 89).

The reason why both Deleuze and Foucault can eschew the epistemological impasse that some might characterize of thought and genealogy, is because they are both, at heart, antifoundationalist thinkers. Their commitment to thinking was such that it sought to reject labels and foundations outright. Thus, the normative or foundationalist’s critique of genealogy does not obstruct them from carrying out that which they surely saw as justified and critical analyses. And, it is useful to remind ourselves that what genealogy chiefly interrogates “is not the epistemic standing of knowledge but its emergence and its links with various practices;” in short, it is not a question of justification, but rather one of justice (May 94). For we mustn’t forget that genealogy is a historiographical endeavor. Which is to say that it is a critique lodged against an unjust articulation of history. And when we speak of history, we speak of it “as a practice, as a particular set of actions brought to bear on a particular material. This material is not ‘raw’ but already the result of other practices of conservation and organisation” (Dean 15). Thus genealogy is necessarily “gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 139) because it seeks to expose the oppressive corollaries of particular articulations of the past. It won’t simply take history at its word—no, genealogy delves deeper to reveal the “apparently simple as actually complex” (Faubion xxxiv). And when carrying out a genealogy, we mustn’t conceive of the process as being a “writing of the past in terms of the present” (Foucault, Discipline 31), because that would only taint, in a
Heisenbergian\(^{20}\) manner, the discursive past that we wish to understand; instead we wish to reveal how the past may not have been as uncomplicated as we were led to believe. A discursive past is not one of an essentialist unfolding from a particular origin, but one of contingent, contested, and controlled forms of knowledge. Of course, as Foucault had specified "the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation" ("Nietzsche" 162). Genealogy’s part in contributing to these timely dissipations is by offering local, critical and effective histories that persuade by dint of their justification. Therefore, instead of allowing myself to be mired in an argument regarding genealogy’s epistemic grounding—which for all intensive purposes is rather irrelevant, I simply ask: does it work? That is, does this methodology allow me to sufficiently interrogate the questions that I have posed? Does it allow me to make a justified critique? And in the end, by eschewing foundations outright, all that genealogy has to rely on is the strength of its own justification... and luckily that is all that is required of it (May 70).

**Foucault, Criticisms & Implications**

By having chosen to pursue a genealogical analysis I am beholden, from the very start, to anticipate and address some of the critiques that have been made of Foucault and his work. And there have been many. However with that said, it must be acknowledged that the task of outlining either Foucault’s supporters or opponents turns out to be a veritable minefield, in that addressing an author from one camp often triggers a concatenation of explosions throughout both.

\(^{20}\) This should be understood in the sense that a subject under investigation is itself compromised by the very act of investigating.
One of Foucault’s most vociferous detractors is Jürgen Habermas. He chides Foucault by questioning his call for us to struggle against domination (Hoy 8). By posing such a query, Habermas seeks to expose the fallacy inherent to Foucault’s intellectual project, that being: by recuperating Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the will-to-knowledge, Foucault puts himself in the paradoxical position of offering epistemological frameworks that hope to subvert dominant ones, yet run the risk of merely usurping them (3). In addition to Foucault, a number of other French postmodernists/poststructuralists (Bataille, Derrida, etc.) have also found themselves at the centre of Habermas’ ire, because he considers them to be guilty of conducting an erroneous attack on his beloved modernity. Habermas is unsatisfied with their positions and approaches because they generally tend to give short shrift to all the progress that the project of modern enlightenment and rationality has accomplished. Many scholars, such as Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, are troubled by Habermas’ argument, because they do not feel as though he provides a fair account of Foucault and his work. Others, such as Richard Rorty, who—while having serious concerns about what epistemology his (Foucault) work espouses—have come to Foucault’s defense by arguing that his project of subverting critical histories is a valid one, and that some of Habermas’ arguments—such as that of an ‘ideal speech community’—are quixotic to begin with (Hoy 9).

There are those like Michael Walzer who take issue with the discrepancies he finds in Foucault’s political epistemology. For instance, while Foucault is adamant about resisting dominant structures, he fails to offer a sufficient reason why we should resist them, nor a viable way in which to do so; as Walzer says, “Foucault believes that truth is relative to its sanctions and knowledge to the constraints that produce it. There would
appear to be no independent standpoint, no possibility for the development of critical principles” (Walzer 64).

Some of Foucault’s critics find his conceptualization of power to be problematic. Steve Lukes, being one of those proponents, argues that Foucault’s notion of power is overly deterministic because it fails to recognize that power is carried out by individuals towards whom a certain measure of responsibility may be attributed. From a slightly different perspective, Charles Taylor, realizes that the effects of power cannot always be easily attributed to particular individuals, nevertheless, he argues that it is possible to discern patterns—however directly or obliquely—that may be smartly linked to conscious action; Taylor believes that considerations such as these reveal some of the lacunae inherent to Foucault’s work.

Theorists like Clifford Geertz and Frederic Jameson find Foucault’s dystopian and nihilistic rhetorical approach to be self-negating, in that it allows him to paint such a dire picture of society that the futility imparted throughout his assessment leaves the reader questioning the worth of actually responding to his calls to resist (Hoy 11).

I read Foucault differently. I find his dystopian approach to be purposefully elicitory. By adopting such a modus operandi, I believe that Foucault seeks to acknowledge the complexity and perniciousness of power, while at once illustrating the urgency of intervention. To fault him on not providing specific means by which to effectively resist, is unfair to say the least. As he has argued throughout most of his work, the fields of combat are local ones (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 83). Each and every site will have manifold particularities that need to be carefully disentangled before they may
be understood and critiqued; such is our task. And meeting this task requires us to be patient, persistent and creative in our approaches.

With regards to the arguments of someone like Walzer, part of what is troubling about his critiques, is that they tacitly presuppose an unwavering faith in the value of liberalist thinking. And yet, as it has been trenchantly pointed out, the conceptual liberal soul upon which this thinking has been predicated is far too often thought of separately from its actual grounding—that is to say, that it is not properly understood or effectively theorized because it is never conceived of as it exists, deeply imbricated in particular contexts (Razack 24). To reflect upon the liberal soul at greater length, would be to immediately realize that such a subject doesn’t exist, not even at a particular level of abstraction. It is completely quixotic to think of a detached, translucent, neutral and unproblematized subject. To do so would be to dismiss any and all considerations of individuals’ subjectivities. If we content ourselves to ruminate upon mythical subjects, “equality then becomes a creed of mechanical identity which is false to facts and impossible of realization” (Dewey 27). It is my belief, that Foucault’s conception of power is one that recognizes the complex and variegated nature of its circulation and effects. For power is murky. It is a dense web composed of filament layered upon filament; it constantly reticulates—so much so, that making out just a single thread’s trajectory is indeed difficult. It is a challenge because power is quite often promiscuous. It circulates through not just one—but a number of threads; it is for reasons such as these, that construing power involves understanding one’s complicity in its diffusion. As Foucault has explained:

[...] individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They
are not only its inert or consent ing target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. (Power/Knowledge 98)

It is for reasons such as these that when we apply Razack’s work in tandem with Foucault’s we can begin to truly flesh out that which his opponents feel he has left out. Thus, part of what I seek to accomplish with these writings, is to flesh out that which seems most tenuous about integration. Therefore this will be a gathering of microhistories, one that seeks to underscore the salient discontinuities that reveal the contextual nature of identity and integration in the province of Quebec. And it is precisely a task such as this that highlights both how useful and radical Foucault’s genealogy is, because it ruptures the essentialist conception of history and underscores how moments in history are just that, moments. It is in this way that Foucault challenges one to question her/his belief in essential origins—especially vis-à-vis identity (“Nietzsche” 142). History, though, is nevertheless important. For “the genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin,” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 144) and must accomplish this by detecting and disrobing salient discontinuities and emergences and trenchantly identifying how these are decisive events in history (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 152).

Of course, by pursuing a genealogical analysis, this project avows from the onset, that its intention is not to produce an eschatological assessment of integration and immigration in Quebec; it could not, because “genealogy cannot cease to be marginal and oppositional and still be genealogy” (Prado 151). However, this is not to say that it is a methodology which is completely uninterested in gaining a return on its investment. No, genealogy carries out its task in the hopes of contributing (but not necessarily creating) to those “short-circuits where[by] the future breaks through into the present, modifying institutions in its wake” (Deleuze, Negotiations 170). And this view of genealogy is
buttressed by Foucault when he says that one adopts it because it offers “the possibility of a discourse which would be both true and strategically effective, the possibility of a historical truth which would have a political effect” (Power/Knowledge 64). Thus, my work here seeks to politicize integration anew. In fact, this project aims to transfuse such interest elsewhere and incite further discussion on a subject that has had a very insular history of scholarship in this province. This kind of analysis is particularly important because it can generally be said that scant attention has been paid to the broad field of government intervention within the different cultural realms such as that of “immigration and the ‘cultural’ communities” (Allor and Gagnon 25) for instance.

**Discourse, Deconstruction & Ethics**

Implicit within the term of integration are issues of power. Integration, insofar as it is articulated in government discourse, suggests that the arrivée stands outside of a distinct identity, culture and history, and is consequently subject to it. By participating within the integration process, the arrivée is thereby constituted by, and within, a set of power relations (Razack 34). Such are the terms of power. Foucault’s genealogical approach is germane to fleshing out particular terms of power (namely those between arrivées and the Quebec government) because it “not only links systems of truth and modalities of power, but also shows how to conceptualize the very notion of a modality of power in a way that adds a new dimension to the investigation of social relations” (Davidson 226). Thus, genealogy is invaluable to charting, and critically engaging with, the diachronic development of integration as it has existed in both theory and praxis. This critical engagement involves carrying out a “history of the present,” (Hoy 6) which is to say that I am undertaking a historiographical analysis that will produce a critical history of the
term integration—with all its contiguously related and synonymic forms—as it has existed in the province of Quebec (especially vis-à-vis issues of immigration).

Naturally, to conduct this inquiry I have gathered a plethora of historical and historiographical materials; as such, my corpus consists of all the government annual reports issued between 1968-2004, a selection of policy statements on integration proper, settlement documentation targeting arrivées, appropriate scholarship, news articles, etc. My primary focus is on texts that address the following topics: prerequisites to integration, methodologies to accomplishing integration, impediments to integration, definitions of integration, definitions of interculturalism, the dynamics of interculturalism and the characterizations of l'identitaire québécois and its cultural development.21 With respect to my epistemological framework, this genealogy can be construed as a critically-minded archival approach that allows me to assemble all the pertinent documents and vestiges, so that I may then, by dint of discourse analysis along with a deconstructive sensibility (Deleuze, Negotiations; Derrida and Caputo, Critchley), detect whatever ambiguities, inconsistencies and implicit assumptions that lie within, or underlie, these objects of inquiry. I have invoked the methodologies of discourse analysis and deconstruction more for their attitudinal inspiration and less their definite conceptual frameworks. For however much one may seek recourse to supplementary concepts and models, the project of genealogy is such that its intensity is derived from the discontinuities, facts and fictions that it examines (Prado 152)22 rather than the “sterile

21 Thus, I am deeply interested in delineating the dynamics of cultural development as they have existed throughout different periods in Quebec’s history. From this perspective, it will be particularly important to decipher whether or not the government’s current integration services and practices can be said to unfold from French colonialist traditions.21 Sunera Thobani has demonstrated how interventions (on the part of government, media, etc.) that seek to mitigate difference are often retraceable to older colonial tropes (409). 22 It is for this reason that it becomes difficult to speak of methodology at any greater length or specificity. For when one carries out a genealogy, one is carrying out a violent act of interpretation (May) and it could
theoretical schemas” (Dean 13) that one might try to apply in its name. It is an endeavor in which the salient vestiges that spur on one’s thought, and the analytical gaze that recognizes them, serve as decisive components of the researcher’s project.

There is good reason why I am inclined to mending together different methodological concepts under an overarching genealogical project. One of the justifications that immediately comes to mind is that despite his various discussions of genealogy, Foucault never truly offers a “fixed language and style of presentation” (Dean 14). Thus conceptual ambiguity is a characteristic intrinsic to genealogy. And it is one that permits a certain degree of sifting on our part. So then, what I have in mind to do here is consider Deleuzean (re)reading, Derridean deconstructing and Foucauldian discourse analysis alongside one another—not argue that these three strategies are the same, nor that they are entirely complimentary. For it would be foolish to do so; one must, of course, proceed with the understanding that these concepts and strategies are nevertheless distinct.\(^\text{23}\) My consideration of these three along with my poaching from them, then, attempts to draw out the moments where threads can be linked between them and where this can be useful to articulating the problems that surround the ethic, concept and goal of integration.

Let me qualify what is meant by a deconstructive sensibility. By deconstructive I do not mean to rend asunder the very foundation that gives rise to Quebec’s immigration and integration services. No, instead my goal is to inhabit the aforementioned

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\(^\text{23}\) As my project is concerned with conducting a genealogical analysis of integration as it exists in Quebec immigration practice and services and not with arguing about the homology and divergences that exist between the works of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, I believe I am justified in not tarrying on this any longer.
government texts with a view to exacting a close reading of them—and through them: to delve deeper into that which is written, uttered and disseminated, so as to reveal the assumptions, presuppositions and understandings implicit within these texts. As Jacques Derrida and John Caputo have underscored, deconstruction is not "a destruction or demolition, but a way of releasing and responding, of listening and opening up" (57). Drawing my inspiration from Gilles Deleuze and in part from Derrida, what I hope to accomplish is to inhabit these texts, work within their proper structure and allow them to reveal their own weaknesses and limitations. In effect, I seek to take these authors from behind and help them beget an unruly child that is their own, however, one that is not so reserved about its shortcomings—in short, a child that is more frank about itself (Deleuze, Negotiations 6). This metaphor illustrates, quite vividly in fact, the complicity of my act of critique; because, of course, this genealogy is just that: critique from within (Foucault "Nietzsche"; Hoy; Hutcheon). The rigor of such a project lies in staying within the bounds of both the plausible and the government texts themselves, and of being fair to them and their authors (Critchley 25-6). Thus, there is certainly an ethical imperative that guides any well-executed genealogy. And this is important. As Derrida and Caputo succinctly put it: "deconstruction is the preparation for the incoming of the other" (108). This is to say, that deconstruction is, from the onset, an endeavor carried out in the name of the other. Thus, it is our sense of responsibility that—when provoked and overwhelmed by an angular problem—initially sets in motion any deconstructive practice (Derrida and Caputo 51). It is more nuanced than this in fact. For our sense of responsibility is better understood as a resolute stand to affirm, in a Levinasian manner, the tout autre (wholly other) regardless.

24 Also see Critchley 21.
As such, the central ethical imperative behind deconstruction is not about committing violence, but rather, of protecting one from it (Derrida and Caputo 128). Consequently, deconstruction has as its focus all that which is “un-deconstructible” such as “justice, the gift, hospitality, the tout autre, l’àvenir,” etc., all that which it cannot allow to come to harm (Derrida and Caputo 128). That is why the un-deconstructible cannot be made any more specific. Thus, the ambiguity regarding the figure of the foreigner is necessary. For the specific articulation of the bearer behind that name can only be determined in the singular moment of her/his Othering.

Additionally, as this analysis is committed to deconstructing the ethic, concept and goal of integration at a conceptual remove, it avowedly eschews the ethnographic realm outright. Thus, the figure of the foreigner, that individual who is Other, will remain unnamed. Moreover, implicit within many of Derrida’s concepts is a binary tension that binds. In deconstruction, for example, its bounded Other and raison d’être is the un-deconstructible. Without the un-deconstructible, deconstruction would lose all impetus along with its reason for being a substantive (Derrida and Caputo 128).

Lastly, it is important to situate where justice fits into the fold. Derrida and Caputo claim that justice, if there is such a thing, is first and foremost not a thing (131). Remember, justice, is an un-deconstructible. As Derrida and Caputo explain, “the only thing that can be called “just” is a singular action in a singular situation, and this only for the while that it lasts, in the instant of decision” (138). Ephemeral. In fact, Derrida and Caputo advance that deconstruction is justice’s closest articulation, it “makes justice possible” (133). Integration’s deconstruction, then, offers us a means to lodge our critique and give, if only for a moment, a voice to justice.
One might be inclined to ask: what is the benefit of doing a genealogy? And this is a valid question, for genealogy is an expressly ethical endeavor. Genealogy sides with the oppressed because it believes that “exploration of the ‘other’, of that which is marginalized, can bring into focus the limits of a culture and social organisation” (Dean 41). Thus my goal is not to issue a diatribe against the Quebec government or Quebec society more broadly. No, I recognize that all of Quebec’s governments have honestly grappled with these issues from different positions and perspectives. Nevertheless, what I am striving to accomplish here is to begin, however adumbratively, to shed some light on where those limits lie. Moreover, this is a genealogy that seeks to both take stock of what has been said and thought, and offer, thereafter, another form of self-reflexivity that permits us to recast certain problems and allow for new encounters with them (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?; Eagleton). Part of what this project hopes to accomplish is to make suspicious the sanguine view that many some have of integration. Overall, then, I have chosen to adopt genealogy as my methodological and analytic approach because it seeks “to give another perspective of history, one whose purpose is to rid history of its illusions of progress and reconciliation” (May 76).

No matter how well intentioned genealogy might be, we mustn’t let that put us off from raising questions about the concept itself. And when do, we immediately come to realize that genealogy precludes itself from any considerations of sustainability whatsoever insofar as its local and temporal rigidity curtails its potential from the onset. From another perspective, genealogy’s cutting nature is such that it doesn’t lend itself well to reconciliation. For genealogy only comes to be in the face of injustice. As such, it is manifestly antagonistic. Its first words are accusatory. It begins from the premise that
the specific rendering of history that it confronts is oppressive. This is certainly not the best way to make friends. Additionally, genealogy’s indicting nature does, as Faubion underscores, “tend to leave its objects under a persistent aura of suspicion” (xxxvi). Considered in this light, serious questions emerge with regards to the possibility of change (from—or within a—dominant power itself), as well, as what role genealogy might play to this end. Therefore genealogy is a fairly shifty thing in and of itself. It casts a shadow, if you will, upon the object of study, the analysis itself and, importantly, s/he who yields the concept. These are indeed weighty ramifications and one would do well to consider them thoroughly before wielding such a weapon.

Conclusion(s): Countering Concinnity

Indeed, historical thought can be responsible to the future by issuing warnings concerning the dangers inherent within certain modes of thought and institutional practices, including ones which present themselves as progressive, utopian, or even, simply, modern.

Mitchell Dean. Critical and Effective Histories.

When one begins to think about integrity, the word itself has already—semantically—urged us down the wrong path. And this is significant, for it is indicative of an encouraged misconception that has sullied our history of thought. Integrity is meant to present itself as a concinnity of sorts, always glabrous, even and immaculate. However, this will to harmony and the inclination to represent everything in that light, is simply inaccurate. If fidelity is of any import to us, we must realize, as Foucault did long ago, that human thought and its history is more accurate and productively marked by error than it is by perfection. As Faubion quips “Foucault is not a pragmatist but a fallibilist, or
better, a philosopher of fallibility” (xxxii). This realization, especially vis-à-vis integration, must be hastened and accordingly justified. For if we content ourselves to believe in the concinnity of fantastic projects like that of integration, then we close our eyes to the muted failures that pervade them. And by so doing, we overlook those interstices where real lives run aground. And there is complicity in that, whether we acknowledge it or not.

And so, when one writes about a past, s/he is indeed writing for the future. Yet those who write about the past seem curiously anxious about distancing themselves from the history they’ve penned. They would rather we see history as an objective record. Indeed, just like the moments immediately following a street crime, they scurry off—splintering in different directions with a particular nervousness about them. As if the more distance they cover the more natural their articulations will be made to appear. And in some respects their worried run seems justified, because the farther we move away from the past, the more difficult it becomes to accurately recollect it. History’s past. Therefore, if we are to take history seriously, then we must see it for what it is, a site of epistemic struggle. We need to be careful about not taking the dismissive cliché “it’s all in the past” as a conclusion, but instead, as a provocative beginning—to which we commit ourselves—and quip: “Exactly. And I intend to find out why.”
Chapter Two

"Je me souviens et on s’imagine":

*Articulations and Divergences of l’identitaire québécois in Quebec’s Immigration Discourses*

While origins or beginnings are critical for myths of the nation, it seems just as critical to understand how the nation ideologically plots for the far, far future.

Julia Bryan-Wilson, *Monuments and Memory, Made and Unmade*.

Nation-state. In French they call it: *l’écart*, the gap. Don’t let that hyphen fool you though, it’s there: the space in-between. It’s that which stands between an empirical collectivity(s) and the image(s) they have of themselves. You can surely relate, because everyone has one. There is always a slight difference between who we are and how we see ourselves. As apparent as it is to others, the self always seems to gloss over it somehow. In many ways we have Benedict Anderson to thank for this insight. His deceptively simple and seemingly obvious argument that the nation is “an imagined political community” (6) is undoubtedly a sound and important contribution to the study of nationalism(s). And, of course, it is an insight that has brought with it significant ramifications upon how we construe identity within the oftentimes miasmatic parameters of the nation. However, that which perhaps still deserves further reflection is the very process of (imag)ining. It strikes me as though the intrinsically subjective component of this (imag)ining—along with its particular renderings—remains a fruitful realm of inquiry; with the increasingly plural nature of contemporary societies, it is an area that
begs both our consideration and critique. This is especially so with respect to Quebec and its various domains of culture, for as Martin Allor and Michelle Gagnon have underscored, it is among these insufficiently investigated terrains that decisive articulations of l’identitaire québécois—and hence of social difference—are made (25-26). Though far from providing an exhaustive taxonomy of such articulations, this analysis will instead concern itself with l’identitaire québécois’ state of play along with a selection of objects of inquiry and it will attempt to answer, however adumbratively, the following questions: How are some ways in which l’identitaire québécois is (imag)ined? And, what are some of the difficulties that emerge when arrivées encounter these (imag)ings or vice versa? How is difference incorporated into collective (imag)ings? How does Quebec’s immigration services attempt to define l’identitaire québécois for, and elicit an identification from, arrivées?

It is plainly obvious that questions such as these constitute a critical element of research within any serious study of integration. For in Quebec, integration is of course that which is mobilized as the engine charged with fostering arrivées’ belonging with respect to their nascent citizenship; it is the concept that superintends their becoming. Accordingly, an interrogation of how l’identitaire québécois is (imag)ined can then provide us with a better understanding of what arrivées are expected to integrate into. Predicating this examination on three fields of study, I first devise how the process of (imag)ining might be said to operate, then I assess a selection of the scholarship that has been effected upon l’identitaire québécois, and lastly, I revisit the relics of the le Ministère des Affaires internationales, de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles’
(MAIICC) *Le cœur québécois* campaign and consider what significance it has held—and still holds.

**The (Imag)ining of the Self**

The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*

I imagine myself as such and such, and therefore that I am—this is of course a problematic line of thought. Things are never so simple. For the self is *read* by others. And this is to say nothing of the fact that the articulation of the self is often made by multiple actors. So already one can see that the (imag)ining of the self is a fairly complicated and continual process. In many ways it is a dyadic process in which privileged actors within society imagine a self—infused with particular realities and holding certain aspirations—while at the same time they outline certain images (both visual and discursive) thereof. (Imag)ining is of course a continual process of construction and renewal.

Quebec’s process of (imag)ining has largely been preoccupied with substantiating a shift from *les canadien-français* to the affirmative and oppositional *le peuple québécois* (Allor and Gagnon 36). A primary fulcrum in effecting this shift has been the French language and it is touted as being Quebec’s official form of communication and the very cornerstone of *l’identitaire québécois*. The Quebec government believes in earnest, just as Frantz Fanon did, that language is a pillar that supports “the weight of a civilization” (18). It follows from this that if one is able to develop a decent command of the language,
then they should be able to fully participate in, and consider themselves part of, 
l’identitaire québécois. If only things were that simple. As Allor and Gagnon explicate:

for *le fait français* to be rendered the essence of québécois culture, the
linguistic divide has to be maintained—but now by the Québécois—and
the fluency of other languages *obviated, assimilated* or *exoticised* as the
practices proper to Quebec’s “cultural communities”. (40)²⁵

Thus, this (imag)ining is carried out through a *dispositif* (Allor and Gagnon 28) which is
itself constituted through discursive practices and a complex web of laws, regulations,
government offices (especially so *vis-à-vis* immigration services), programs, images,
services, benefits and campaigns which aim, through the breadth of their diffusion, to
convey a certain ubiquity of the French language and of *Frenchness* in general. Thus the
*dispositif*, from which l’identitaire québécois emerges, is charged with elaborating “new
forms of knowledge about *le peuple québécois* and hence new articulations of social
difference within the population” (Allor and Gagnon 26). Of course part of what drives
the continued elaboration of this identity (and thus in someway the substantiation thereof)
are Quebec’s more general claims towards sovereignty (—thus nationhood) and its status
as being a *distinct society*.

One of the things that Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein’s work reveals
is that *forceful affirmation of one’s identity, leads to pernicious dynamics of exclusion
(whether intentional or not) for many of those who are not, or can never be, a part of it.*
Now before treading any further it is very important to acknowledge that “we all live in
‘racist societies’” (Balibar and Wallerstein 40). Thus, one should not suspect that this
analysis is unfairly singling out Quebec. For in fact, the goal of this analysis is to find
evidence of articulations of l’identitaire québécois, to flesh out *how* these articulations

²⁵ The emphasis is my own.
are made, to consider what this says about _l’identitaire québécois_ and also to draw attention to various problems that ride the coattails of these processes. Of course, any form of (imag)inings will inevitably raise issues of inclusion as well as those of exclusion—a concept like that of integration certainly implies as much. Corollaries such as these are of course particular. Thus I focus on Quebec because the dynamics of its self (imag)ining and integration policy and services operate in a singularly synchronic (which is itself diachronically imbued as well) and localized manner; and the processes of exclusion that might ensue therefrom are of course not universal, but contextual (Hall, “Race” 337).

(Imag)inings are instantiations of the nation. Instantiating Quebec as a nation, is always a primary concern of any of its ruling parties. The reason being is that Quebec, in accordance with its claims to nationhood, is primarily concerned with distinguishing, and thus affirming, its cultural identity apart from the rest of Canada.\(^{26}\) Therefore, as opposed to many past forms of nationalism, Quebec’s chief opposition towards Canada makes it such that its fundamental contradistinctive impulse is primarily directed towards the exterior, that is, to Canada and Canadian federalism; not surprisingly this creates certain tensions (Fontaine) and it makes for a rather awkward set of circumstance as we shall see later on. Quebec’s particular form of self-affirmation derives from “the heritage of colonialism [which] is, in reality, a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and ‘internal exclusion’” (Balibar and Wallerstein 43). Affirmation of the self is carried out in contrast to others. And, as Stuart Hall has warned, we mustn’t forget that one of the greatest dangers that stands before us are those inceptive, or recrudescent, claims to a

\(^{26}\) Quebec’s (imag)inings of itself have been fairly successful in creating a distinct and recognizable sense of self, for as William Straw reveals “it is a commonplace to note that Québécois cinema and television evoke a more coherently imagined national community than those of English Canada.”
definite national or cultural identity ("Community" 361). As such we are beholden to heed the copular relationship that has existed between nationalism and racism; as Balibar and Wallerstein suggest:

racism is not an ‘expression’ of nationalism, but a supplement of nationalism or more precisely a supplement internal to nationalism, always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always still insufficient to achieve its project, just as nationalism is both indispensable and always insufficient to achieve the formation of the nation or the project of a ‘nationalization’ of society. (54)\textsuperscript{27}

The line between nationalism and racism is dangerously thin. And it is in this way that ethnic nationalism or identity-based citizenship, in contrast to other forms of modi vivendi, is increasingly a problematizing reality rather than a comforting one. The disjunctures and difference of current transnational flows have leavened from the depths of our conscious (at least in North America) the realization that for all intents and purposes we have but an inchoate understanding of citizenship vis-à-vis these realities. The predicates of ethnic traits, collective memories or experiences and cultural traditions are not, and have never truly been,\textsuperscript{28} neat and uniform concepts that can represent and satisfy the myriad identities that dot the lands in which we dwell. It is for this reason that the construction of the nation is a process that, first and foremost, is the result of an act of power (Salée, "De l’avenir" 144; Beauchemin, "What Does" 20). The process carries itself via reticulated pathways of discourse and power. And it is important to point out that amid these structures there are actors who, by virtue of the particular privilege they might hold within the overall hierarchy, exercise significant influence in both the orientation and conditions of life for that society as a whole (Salée, "De l’avenir" 145).

\textsuperscript{27} Original Emphasis.

\textsuperscript{28} Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919 does a wonderful job at revealing the complicated inter-minglings of—and thus problematizations of—such concepts of identity.
Of course within such a dynamic it is inevitable that these actors’ desires and articulations of the self will hold sway over the other members of society who, in their own right, might recognize or resist such formulations (Salée, “De l’avenir” 145).

It must be acknowledged, however, that such formulations are not necessarily stable, as there are constantly subject to tension, challenge and resistance (Salée, “De l’avenir” 145). Thus, it would be manifestly quixotic to envision a nation or a common public culture as a fixed or invariable social formation, for nations constantly (imagine) themselves as consistently as they are read. And with regards to such ‘reading,’ Daniel Salée importantly reminds us that to merely (imagine) one’s political community is but an act in and of itself (“De l’avenir” 143) and not one that guarantees that others will necessarily recognize or identify with it.

Considered alongside Anderson’s central argument, this warning carries the dialogue regarding the nation down other avenues. And of course with an admonition such as this, the faint echoes of Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition can be heard in the distance. 29 Moreover, it cues our awareness into the fact that such (imagine)ings are far from being clearly singular and uniform. It fact, it is more accurate to speak of an aggregate of (imagine)ings that, while subscribing to a certain degree of consistency, are more precisely informed by a variable interplay between collective themes/memories and subjective/localized experiences that frequently affirm one another, thereby truly making experience a public matter (Dewey). 30 What makes this aggregate of (imagine)ings significant is that a majority of them do, in some measure, agree upon certain norms and

29 Taylor makes the argument that some forms of political liberalism endanger the recognition of plurality. And he asserts that an individual’s community absolutely needs to be recognized, both politically and socially, for a liberal democracy to work.
30 For an articulation of how individual memory links with collective memory see Grenier.
that these fairly concordant (imag)inings serve as integral elements vis-à-vis tradition, the
play of identity and the dynamics of belonging (Salée, "De l’avenir" 142-143). But then
again, we are already aware of this. A revisiting of Raymond Williams’ Marxism and
Literature would certainly be of service in explaining why; of tradition he writes:

It is a very powerful process, since it is tied to many practical
continuities—families, places, institutions, a language—which are indeed
directly experienced. It is also, at any time, a vulnerable process, since it
has in practice to discard whole areas of significance, or reinterpret or
dilute them, or convert them into forms which support or at least do not
contradict the really important elements of the current hegemony. (116)

Tradition is always that which has past. Which is to say that if you weren’t apart of it in
some way (experience, the transmission of narrative, etc.), then you’ve missed out. There
is an additional nuance however, for in actual fact tradition is the past that is consciously
retained in the present. It is not a simple accumulation of the past, rather, it is “an
intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then
powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification”
(Williams 113). Along these lines we come to realize that tradition (and with this, read:
collective memories) and (imag)inings form a sprawling network that has a rather
decisive impact on one’s understanding of the self. And of course these (imag)inings,
traditions and narratives of the self are consistently challenged by counter-(imag)inings
and counter-narratives. Oftentimes, it is upon the grounds of popular culture where these
forces affront one another (Hall, “Notes” 228); and there is little peace on those grounds.
In keeping with militaristic metaphors, those grounds are more precisely a field of
struggle where different forces vie with one another, some seeking to retain dominance
and others wishing to challenge it. And it is upon this field that the different elements
which constitute *l'identitaire québécois* circulate. It is not a question of whether or not *l'identitaire québécois* exists, not in Quebec at least, it is more a question of what that existence is said to mean and how it ought to develop. And of course there is no easy answer to this as *l'identitaire québécois* is a complex and variegated center of Quebec’s cultural field; it is a name that numerous actors lay claim to. Indeed, from an analytical perspective there is little use in investigating *l'identitaire québécois*’ ‘falsity or genuineness’ (Anderson 15), this would only lead us to impasses; instead that which is fruitful, is examining how (imag)inings of *l'identitaire québécois* are made in the cultural field and then considering these alongside the arrivée’s position so as to outline some of the complexity behind its state of play.

In her discursive reading *la Musée de la civilisation’s* music history exposition entitled *Je vous entends chanter*, Line Grenier incisively reveals how the consistent back and forth between both the individual (read here: subjective) and the collective events, experiences, memories, anecdotes, emotions, etc. along with the regular mention of Quebec and Quebecers throughout, constituted discursive articulations of *l'identitaire québécois* (36). That oscillating back and forth served to concomitantly categorize and affirm elements of *l'identitaire québécois*. However there is an important nuance to underscore here, for as this exposition’s dynamic was expressly predicated upon actualizing Quebecers’ ‘present’ pasts (Grenier 36)\(^31\)—and thus the entire set of memories, experiences and social relations aggregated therewith, it triggered a mirroring process whereby remembering Quebec’s popular music was simultaneously a means in which individuals could recognize themselves as *québécois*. Concatenation. This social-

\(^{31}\) Also see Allor.
historical process was undoubtedly a complicated one. The full complexity of this process could only be experienced by those who had traveled certain routes and had thus nurtured the particular roots that could consequently give rise to feelings of belonging with *l'identitaire québécois.* For someone who was ultimately devoid of these social links, the relationship they would have had with that exposition would have been more of an educational experience and less a triggering of both affective memories and feelings of patriotism. And when considered from the arrivée’s vantage point, we come to recognize that certain aspects of the dispositif which deploys *l'identitaire québécois* are oftentimes culturally-rooted, past-oriented and as such sometimes ill-disposed to the Other and a shared future with them. Thus products of cultural tradition such as these are remarkable in that they sometimes broach problematic intersections when linked to difference and futurity—and these problematizations, in fact, point to the very heart of the challenges faced by *l'identitaire québécois* and its negotiation of difference.

All challenges aside, the Quebec government nevertheless asserts that immigration is in fact an indispensable component to its (imag)ining of *l'identitaire québécois.* As Joseph H. Carens (one of the few academics in western Canada to take any interest in Quebec’s issues of social cohesion) indicates:

According to the government, the way to cope with any potential tension between immigration and the building of the distinct society is through better selection and integration of immigrants. Quebec should increase the proportion of French speakers among the immigrants, should improve French-language training for others, should strengthen the position of French as a common language and the language of public life, and should

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32 Williams’ conception of ‘tradition’ is clearly at work in Grenier’s assessment of *Je vous entends chanter.* Marvelously timed so as to precede the referendum, the exposition worked to simultaneously legitimate, defend and elicit feelings towards *l'identitaire québécois* and its artistic history, so as to do its part in laying the necessary ground work for the referendum on sovereignty.
ensure that the francophone community is open to "the full participation of people of different origins." ("Immigration" 24)

It is fairly interesting that, along these lines, betterment is always future-oriented, which is to say, that whatever problems might be encountered within its immigration practice and services, the solution always lies ahead; it is as if Quebec's immigration practice and services is an unstoppable process that, by virtue of having been set in motion, can only be dealt with in the future, never in the present, for the present's already past. From another perspective, it seems to me that an enormous burden is attached to nascent citizenship in Quebec. For if an arrivée is to play a such pivotal role in the populational constitution (Carens, "Immigration" 23) and self-(imag)ining of tomorrow's Quebec society, then any failure or unforeseen deviation might elicit serious resentment. It is in this way, then, that pressures and expectations get placed squarely on the shoulders of arrivées. Failure, of course, assumes a normative basis from which judgment can be made; the concept of integration confirms as much. However much the government professes that l'identitaire québécois' future is equally open to, and at the whim of, all those who participate within it, the stark reality is that there are very real and perdurable forces that struggle to hold sway over its becoming. And we ought not to forget Hall's particularly wise warning that a "danger arises [...] [when] we tend to think of cultural forms as whole and coherent" ("Notes" 233), because as the complexity of l'identitaire québécois' (imag)inings will indicate, porousness and contradiction are no strangers to it.

**Genealogically Conceptualizing l'Écart**

So far we have moved hermeneutically through the concept of (imag)ining and with it we have demonstrated that l'identitaire québécois should not be mistakenly construed as an
inert form of identity that simply is; for in fact it is an ongoing process that has been consciously writ and wrought throughout history by myriad actors (by government especially) and forces. The manifold nature of these influences make it such that l’identitaire québécois is a rather complicated play of identity to represent, at least not without betraying the significant and problematizing nuances that inhere within it. Any discussion of it elicits numerous valid and contradictory questions, for example: does l’identitaire québécois recognize and celebrate the plural character of its society? Yes. Does l’identitaire québécois marginalize and exclude it ethnic minorities—and hence difference? Yes. In order to make sense of how such contradictions surrounding l’identitaire québécois can coexist, we will seek recourse to Karim H. Karim so as to build a conceptual cartography of how l’identitaire québécois’ state of play functions.

In his article entitled “Constructions, Deconstructions, and Reconstructions: Competing Canadian Discourses on Ethnocultural Terminology,” Karim offers us four concepts that provide us with an initial means of charting l’identitaire québécois’ state of play, they consist of the: dominant, alternative, oppositional and populist discourses. Dominant discourses need to be construed as inherently plural. There is never just one. Far from homogenous, dominant discourses are those which “reflect the ever-changing structures of power, [and] are shaped by a continually evolving and potentially contradictory combination of assumptions, hypotheses, and world views of socio-economic and cultural elites” (Karim 200). Stuart Hall says it best when he surmises that dominant discourses constitute a “field of meanings” (“Notes” 223). It is for reasons such as these that l’identitaire québécois, as a dominant discourse, can house the contradictory discourses of an openness to the Other and an ardent preservation of the
Self alongside one another. A fairly important attribute of dominant discourses is how they enact the semantic and discursive boundaries of public discussion (Karim 201); understandably these discourses are so named because by having the capacity to establish the bounds of discussion, they concomitantly have the agency to co-opt/reconstruct competing discourses within their own parameters (Karim 201).

As such dominant discourses are often deceptive. They appear as though they were simply natural (Hall, “Notes” 223) when in fact this naturalness is but a cloak that obfuscates the unequal power relations that work in the favor of dominant groups (Karim 206). Dominant discourses are often linked, in very particular ways, to populist discourses. These kinds of discourses are conservative in character—“retaining political and social characterizations considered outmoded in dominant discourses,” function at the level of everyday conversation and, most importantly, have a significant capacity to influence dominant discourses (Karim 201). And so we now find ourselves face to face with it again, l’écart: that which can be characterized as the split between dominant and populist discourses. Dominant discourses regularly bespeak ‘politically correct’/idealized discourses, which often stem from alternative discourses that have been incorporated into the parameters of the dominant. Populist discourses, however, are those blunt grumblings, those “outspoken manners [...] [that] voice extreme viewpoints” (Karim 199) and that, more often than not, steer clear of the dominant realm. Every now and then though, they manage to slip into the dominant realm. For instance one need only recall that in 1995, when the quondam Premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, infamously stated that the bid for sovereignty was lost partly because of the ethnic vote. Surely we would like to believe that the xenophobic remark was an offhand, insincere comment—mustered
only by emotions or adrenaline, but it would be naïve to think so. It was a terse comment, the face of an ostensibly innocuous crevice that masks the deeper and particularly wide disjuncture that exists between ‘tolerance’\(^{33}\) and acceptance. It was a Freudian slip if you will. One that is indicative of a muted populist discourse (Karim 199) that, during calmer times of course, is normally patinated by a ‘tolerant’ smirk. Populist sentiment of this kind exists among certain “members of society, who remain unsocialized into dominant discourses but share their conservative ideology, [and who] continue to use the older discursive structures which unapologetically discriminated against certain types of people” (Karim 211). This isn’t the only way in which populist discourses sidle into the dominant realm. For as Karim emphasizes, there exists “an interactive discursive relationship between populist and dominant discourses, with the former expressing the sentiments unacceptable to “civilized society”” (211); of course there is more to the relationship that these two discourses share and it is with further investigation that this will become manifest. Oppositional discourses are those that politically disagree with dominant discourses, but nevertheless “generally subscribe to the same sets of fundamental myths and premises” (Karim 201). Whereas alternative discourses are those that completely refute the myths and premises of the dominant and, in so doing, offer alternative conceptions that pose “more serious challenges to the hegemonic order” (Karim 201).

Having now mapped out the conceptual terrain, I will explicate how these terms might fit with, and help us understand, some of the preliminary nuances of l’identitaire québécois. L’identitaire québécois, Quebec identity... there is of course something

\(^{33}\) I put tolerance in quotations to indicate that both the term and concept are problematic see Mirchandani and Tatsogliou and especially Hage.
misleading about the term *prima facie*. Its singular and monolithic appearance belies the
multiple folds that actually constitute it. Politically speaking, *québécois* is an appellation
that encompasses a great many actors: *des Gaspésiennes, Montréalais*, sovereignists,
*Liberaux, Pégists, Action Democratistes, francophones*, Anglophones, *allophones*,
nouveaux arrivants—or arrivées, franco-québécois, canadiens français, québécois de
veille souche, pur laine, communautés culturelles*, Aboriginal communities, Inuit, etc. As
you can see, it can get rather complicated. An important reminder is that these terms are
not always mutually exclusive, nor are they forever stable. And though *l'identitaire
québécois* certainly constitutes a complex and fluid play of identities (with some more
prominent than others), we shall, by remaining at a certain analytical remove, content
ourselves with simply outlining the general discursive processes that are carried out
within it.

**Dialogues On the Self**

The theoretical strategy guiding the following component of this analysis is predicated
upon assessing the academic contributions of a selection of *québécois* scholars such as
Jacques Beauchemin, Charles Bellerose, Jocelyn Maclure, Serge Cantin along with
Daniel Salée and gauging how they might be categorized within the bounds of: *dominant, oppositional, populist and alternative discourses*. The theorists included in this selection
were chosen for two reasons. First each of them, in their own right, serves to exemplify
one or more of the discursive categories that we have enacted (and reveals the movement
that occurs between them). And second, I invoked these academics and only these ones

56
for the sake of their contemporaneity and because I had to be pragmatic about what an assessment such as this could accomplish within the limits of a chapter.  

Seeking recourse to these four concepts will allow us to articulate some of the complexity behind l'identitaire québécois' state of play. And this is important because as Dimitri Karmis has pointed out, the fruitfulness of Quebec's reflections upon issues of identity and citizenship is often bedimmed by "the omnipresence of the civic nationalism/ethnic nationalism dichotomy" (81). In fact, Karmis argues that Quebec is marked by a perpetual three-way conflict between the following conceptions of national identity: "(a) Trudeauism, which is a mix of civic nationalism and Canadian multiculturalism opposed to the redefinition of Québec as a nation; (b) Québec nationalism of the Jacobin styles; [an assimilatory approach] (c) Québec nationalism of the integrationist type" (81). While these categories are fairly accurate in reflecting the different strains of how pluralism is received in Quebec, they do so at a level of analytic remove that does very little in the way of representing the nuances, complexity and movement of l'identitaire québécois' state of play; and, of course, to neglect grasping its movement is to concomitantly foreclose ever considering its future. Therefore, undertaking an assessment such as this is useful because it will reveal how these different forces consistently act upon l'identitaire québécois and, moreover, how these categories—when applied to Quebec—blur significantly into one another.

Jacques Beauchemin makes it explicit, from the title of his article "What Does It Mean to be a Quebecker? Between Self-Preservation and Openness to the Other," that the

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34 It should be noted that even though this selection of theorists consists solely of males this should not lead one to believe that there aren't significant or numerous québécoise feminist contributions to such issues. I have merely restricted myself to these selections because of the way they play off—and dialogue with—one another.
prepolitical Quebec is—from the very onset—faced with what appears to be two antithetical concerns: preservation and openness. Indeed, this is an important and in many ways pressing question because as Beauchemin recognizes:

On a more directly political level, this sometimes explicit, but most often implicit, desire to promote what Dumont calls the “French Nation” simultaneously with a nation whose “political community” has been reconstituted and whose plural character is immediately recognizable, leads to an ungrounded affirmation of francophone nationalism, one that does not tend to include other identities. ("What Does" 19)  

Beauchemin poses this question because it decisively impacts his broader interests regarding liberal governance and the redefinition of citizenship in a pluralist society bereft of a clearly defined political subject ("What Does" 20). Indeed, after reviewing reflections presented before the Commissions sur l’avenir du Québec, Bellerose and Beauchemin make the argument that recurrent themes suggest that the québécois political subject can no longer solely be conceived of as being predicated upon the constitutive intersection of memory and the past. No, instead they contend that what currently preoccupies the conception of the québécois political subject is rather an identity crisis—not a crisis concerned with the loss of self, but instead with how the self will be reinvented ("What Does" 31). Bellerose and Beauchemin offer this argument as though a clear line could simply be drawn between the two. But doesn’t one imply the other? Which is to say that doesn’t an identity crisis of this kind always involve anxiety regarding loss and a reticence towards change? The fact that this gets framed as a crisis is revealing in and of itself; it intimates that the government strategy of rhetorically promoting pluralistically inclined conceptions of l’identitaire québécois while banking on civic nationalism to materialize this sensibility in praxis hasn’t been entirely successful.

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35 The emphasis is my own.
For it is a transformation that asks the prepolitical majority of Quebecers to open themselves to new forms of tradition, ones that might necessarily entail mollifying so much of the history that has composed their sense of self. It does so by asking, these Quebecers to place the self at the whim of an uncertain and shared future with the Other. And it is indeed important to note that the disconcertment surrounding the québécois political subject, is frequently framed in a negative slant; Beauchemin makes one such characterization when he asserts that pluralism has shaken liberal democracy to its very core by fragmenting and thus etiolating it political subject (“Le sujet” 208). As such, one talks of the québécois political subject’s deviation, deconstruction or unmooring and never of its syncretic becoming, or its becoming syncretic. Bellerose and Beauchemin are, I believe, a little too optimistic in their assessment that the disconcertment shadowing the québécois political subject is more one of becoming (hence with futurity) and less one of loss (hence of the past). We mustn’t forget that the québécois political subject is one that has a particular history of victimization and a perpetually uneasy relationship with its place in Canada. In fact Dominique Clift states that “the whole period extending from the onset of the Quiet Revolution to the referendum on sovereignty-association in May 1980 […] [was] presented as a long attempt to formulate a national purpose and identity” (88) that could properly articulate Quebec’s distinction from the rest of Canada. This effort was carried out on the battlegrounds of Quebec’s cultural field which itself constituted both a “central legitimating agency of government and […] an emergent regime of social power” (Allor and Gagnon 26). This cultural field is the space where l’identitaire québécois is at once articulated and legitimated. As Allor and Gagnon explicate:

This production of the ‘Cultural’ involves the elaboration of new forms of knowledge about le peuple québécois and hence new articulations of
social difference within the population. *L'identitaire québécois* is thus articulated across a dispositif which links temporal (language and ethnicity as the historical grounds of *le peuple*), spatial (the regions as the figuration of cultural difference within *l'identitaire*) and administrative (the structuring perspective of cultural develop) logics in the formation of emergent state practices. (26)

As such Quebec has in many ways successfully become master of its own domain (Salée, "De l'avenir" 140). There is an important nuance that underpins this transformation. While Quebec has achieved a fair degree of cultural dominance within its borders, it has yet to receive either the distinct status or the political independence that it has persistently sought after. Thus it finds itself in the awkward situation of simultaneously occupying the positions of the colonized and the colonizer. Admittedly, these are tremendously difficult roles to negotiate or reconcile with one another; hence, the stitched contradiction between self-preservation and openness to the Other. In fact this stain of victimization has sullied Quebec's political fabric for some time now. For as the continuing support for sovereignty confirms, there are indeed some wrongs that have never been sufficiently rectified so as to bring about reconciliation; this vestige of victimization even subsists in many popular conceptions of *l'identitaire québécois* as we shall see further on. And echoes of it can be heard in Jean-Marc Léger's assessment, when he suggests that "the urgent problem in Québec is the cultural survival of the French-speaking majority rather than the respect for minority rights" (Karmis 86). Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine that Quebeccers are not at all perturbed by the transformative potential that the future brings with it.

In many ways, what we know of the *québécois* political subject is what has been defined for us by the dispositif that structures *l'identitaire québécois*. As Allor and Gagnon importantly remind us "governmental discursive formations are particularly
characterized by their tendency to articulate emergent questions, objects, and projects to
the lines of forces contained in existing formations and institutions” (37). Thus according
to Quebec’s immigration services (a facet of this dispositif) the québécois political
subject is a faceless, translucent individual who (a) speaks French in public life (b)
respects the Quebec Charter of Rights, and (c) willingly contributes to Quebec’s
economic prosperity. But of course such an individual does not exist. As Sherene Razack
has cogently pointed out, such mythic and abstracted liberal subjects rarely enjoy such an
uncomplicated footing in praxis (24). In fact, Beauchemin is quite right to point out that
Quebec is a society of identities (and much like a fine wine, this insight will only become
truer as time goes by) (“Le sujet” 208); and these identities, different from one another in
many respects, all find themselves particularly situated within the power relations that
constitute this society (Bannerji 141). Beauchemin begins to reveal these power relations
when he describes how some of the prepolitical segments of Quebec society—those
reflecting a strongly populist sentiment—enjoy a complicated relationship with
immigration. Summarizing, he writes:

We expect these minority communities to assimilate into the majority or,
at the very least, that they will not impede the majority’s broader project.
It follows naturally from this position that the French-Canadian majority
community should uphold the idea of its political independence to the
extent that this project constitutes the means for decolonization.
(Beauchemin, “What Does” 24)

The power relations that begin to emerge here are not that dissimilar from the ones that
haunt a concept, goal and ethic the likes of integration. At the centre of both there is a
dominant group, from outside which Others are expected to work to fit in. And it is
plainly obvious that the power dynamics are, a priori, horribly skewed in favor of the
majority. Along lines such as these, Others are permitted to exist, but only to certain
extent, for their becoming québécois has already been narrowly girded and their political leanings have been determined for them in advance.

In contrast to such preservative forces, the dominant realm has also been a discursive space in which many strides have been made towards rendering l'identitaire québécois more open to the realities of pluralism. For instance the Quebec government has made a strong effort to move away from the modality of ethnic nationalism as it is entirely incommensurable with, and anathema to, a pluralist society. As Beauchemin and Bellerose confirm, this general inability to ground Quebec's political project on a definite political subject results in the evanescence of political and ethical constructions of the whole of society (45). Citizenship must instead ground itself upon a foundation of political values that, irrespective of its plural citizenry, can be shared by all (45). Though progressive, this shift is also concomitantly stifled by a certain vacuousness. For the disheartening lag between theory and praxis is such that sometimes kind words don't necessarily change unjust realities. For instance, Beauchemin, as with many of Quebec's intelligentsia, is keen on offering such platitudes as:

*La seule façon d'assumer politiquement ce pluralisme réside dans une défense des droits particularistes et, sur le plan éthique, dans la promotion des valeurs de tolérance et de respect.* ("Le sujet" 212)

The only means in which to politically affirm this pluralism is through the defense of personal rights and, with regards to the ethical plan, the promotion of the values of tolerance and respect.

However, as the work of Ghassan Hage has trenchantly brought to light, clichés such as these do little in the way of readjusting the power relations in which dominant identities—read here l'identitaire québécois—find themselves favorably ensconced. In
fact, Hage’s work has shown that concepts like that of tolerance actually work towards maintaining the systemic inequalities that serve the interests of the dominant identity (33). Thus part of Quebec’s social cohesion troubles can be found in the fold that lies between a charter of rights that affords equality to all—irrespective of difference—on the one hand, and a prepolitical québécois majority that, however manifold, nevertheless occupies a position of dominance and, is held together by shared histories, culture and language, on the other (Quebec, Quebec Charter). Though the charter guarantees individual freedom to all, it prescriptively serves the interest of the latter. Moreover, a charter is a rational set of laws, drafted to shelter a society. However, this society only becomes by dint of the social actors that inhere within it. These actors coexist with one another and operate within society from different positions of dominance and are guided by particular rationales and desires—hence the opportunity for divergence. Thus the contention that the charter of rights is a panacea that somehow remedies all inequities is fraught, for it disavows the empirical existence of a francophone majority who have particular pasts and who tend towards differently desired futures. Thus, a problem emerges; as Beauchemin poses with concision: how does one develop and nurture a communitarian (with Quebec’s political project) will amongst those who do not feel they belong to the francophone québécois majority? (“Le sujet” 215).

Beauchemin and Bellerose are scholars whose rhetoric exemplifies that which would be found in dominant discourses on l’identitaire québécois. Their theoretical concerns hover around the challenges and complexity that stand before l’identitaire québécois. Generally noncommittal, theirs is a propensity that leads them to take a decidedly descriptive rather than a conceptually innovative approach to the objects of

63
inquiry that they examine. Consequently, however useful their contributions may prove
to be in an analytically descriptive sense, they offer little in the way of alternative
(imag)inings of l'identitaire québécois. In fact, so evasive is Beauchemin in this respect,
that he has concluded some of his articles with speculations regarding how Quebec
society might look a hundred years from now ("Le sujet" 220; "What Does" 30); of
course by doing this he effectively manages to extricate himself from making any
suggestions towards, or commitments on, extremely contentious issues.

The narration of historical experience, the perpetual telling and retelling of those
stories is, as Jocelyn Maclure admits, an indispensable component of national identity
("Narratives" 33); our consideration of (imag)ining, narrative, tradition, collective
memories and experience certainly confirms this. And Maclure warns that if any
understanding of a national identities is to be gained, then we must realize that it will
emerge from the planes of the imaginary and of the praxis ("Narratives" 33). Stories are
lived, told and lived again. Telling stories is a way of keeping elements of the past alive.
And of course with its particularly effervescent history, Quebec’s stories are aplenty.

Throughout all these narratives, the theme of victimization is one that circulates
widely. It still does. Even contemporary expressions of nationalism towards l'identitaire
québécois bespeak some kind of lineage with what Maclure describes as melancholic
nationalism ("Narratives" 36). This form of nationalism is rooted in a “‘tragic’ relation
to the past” (Maclure, "Narratives" 34) that sees Quebec, and prepolitical Quebecers in
particular, as always having been oppressed—but never completely subjugated—by

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36 This notion of achieving an emancipatory moment that frees the self from tragic victimization, is well
exemplified by La Presse’s coverage of Karl Tremblay’s (a member of Les Cowboys fringants, an
extremely popular Quebec rock band) address to the crowd:

Karl Tremblay a assuré que << ce n’est qu’une question de temps avant que la Saint-Jean dure une semaine, 24 heures sur 24, pour fêter notre pays >> (Vigneault A3)
colonial rule. The oppressors take the form of the English along with several federal governments. What is most remarkable about this conception of nationalism is that however dejectedly tinged it might be, it has nevertheless brought about significant "activism and political voluntarism" (Maclure, "Narratives" 34). Thus, what we have here is a rather decisive view of personal history and identity. A view that brings with it rather meaningful social corollaries. It is important to underscore that this historical view of the self has imbued many Quebecers' understanding of their own identity—especially those in the populist realm—and even among those who do not necessarily see sovereignty as the only means to right this wrong. This victimized sensibility has understandably had a particular effect upon Quebecers' interactions with difference. Writes Maclure:

According to [Fernand] Dumont, even despite knowledge of the quasi-hegemonic and regulative character of self-contempt in the social imaginary of the francophone Quebecers, it is not at all obvious that this sentiment of chronic inferiority really ever left the ethos of the francophone Quebecers—that we are cured of this historic ailment. Indeed, since an open and trusting relationship with difference requires a healthy self-esteem, "the difficulty to deal with other cultures" arises out of this negative self-awareness. ("Narratives" 38)

A troubling moment emerges in Maclure's article "Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Identity in Québec" when he asserts, parenthetically, that melancholic nationalism now plays a less predominant role in the matrices of literary and scientific production. It follows, then, that melancholic nationalism has been somewhat on the wane and is perhaps giving way to a new form of nationalism. However, the continuing fallout of the
sponsorship scandal\textsuperscript{37} has conversely indicated that this assessment might not be the case. In a recent Léger Marketing poll that was charged with gauging reactions to this scandal, it was found that within the current climate, 54\% of Quebecers now supported Quebec sovereignty and the concomitant separation from Canada that it entails (Séguin 2005, A1). Of course it is not difficult to see how sovereignists might frame the sponsorship scandal as yet another manifestation of an oppressive federal government’s continued attempts to subjugate Quebec and circumscribe its destiny. However, that which is most significant here is the fact that a little more than half of Quebecers would opt for sovereignty rather than another political avenue. This penchant does not convincingly support the contention that melancholic nationalism (nor the side-effects it has on Quebec identity) is on the decline, nor that it shall remain as ostensibly attenuated as it has been in recent times. It is far more likely, pace Maclure’s suggestion, that melancholic nationalism’s existence within the matrices of literary and scientific production shall increase with the coming months. This is because contemporary sovereignist leanings are emerging at the cusp of Liberal failures on both the provincial and federal levels. Hence, all signs are now pointing to another moment of intensity. In fact the tone of the 2005 Saint-Jean\textsuperscript{38} celebrations, which were held at Jean-Drapeau park, confirmed that there is certainly an affective and political resurgence towards the sovereignty issue (Elkouri; Touzin; Vigneault); and as the tone of this resurgence was generally marked by themes of

\textsuperscript{37} The sponsorship scandal, also known as “AdScam,” refers to the Liberal Party of Canada’s gross misuse and misdirection of funds vis-à-vis federal government advertising in Quebec in the years immediately following the 1995 referendum.

\textsuperscript{38} Collective memory(ies) is an important consideration with respect to understanding and relating to l’identitaire québécois. Take la fête de Saint-Jean for example, this holiday has been constructed as a day in which Quebecers can celebrate their distinct identity and culture. On such a day collective memory plays an integral part. As Benjamin has said “[…] calendars do not measure time as clocks do; they are monuments of a historical consciousness […]” (221). Bereft of such memory how are arrivées expected to associate with this fête?
a disenchanted with the present and of sovereignty as being the means to right persisting wrongs, it would appear that melancholic nationalism is still a very strong current in *l'identitaire québécois*.39

Moreover Quebec, as both a province and an assembly of myriads communities, has been diachronically punctuated by an oscillation between various periods of anomie and particular spells of intensity with regards to (imag)inings, articulations of identity and corresponding political actions. The consistent back and forth between these poles bespeaks that *l'identitaire québécois* and the forms of nationalism that it might imply remain heavily imbued by feelings of victimization and, in some cases, by a continued longing for political emancipation. And though Maclure earnestly reveals how both narratives and counter-narratives make Quebec a "plurivocal and dissensual" community ("Narratives" 47; *Quebec Identity* 140-141), he nevertheless fails to adequately consider the particular power relations that subtend those narratives. That is to say, that a different weight is given to various interlocutors who make (imag)inings and articulations of, or raise questions about, identity. Those who offer counter-narratives from the margins, do so clearly from that position (what some of those challenges are however is not something that Maclure devotes any attention to). The question of what impact those articulations have upon *l'identitaire québécois* is still worth asking. Maclure’s faith in

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39 Lysiane Gagnon, in an attempt to refute Rhéal Séguin’s article regarding the spike in the desire for sovereignty, claimed that, even though the *le Parti Québécois* had certainly gained from the sponsorship scandal, the bid for sovereignty, on the other hand, did not. Her justification for this argument lies in the fact that the *PQ’s* commitment to sovereignty in the next election is predicated on gaining a total break with Canada (and thus not retaining an “economic and political partnership with Canada” (A13)), however—as she admits within the same article herself—it is highly unlikely that the *PQ*, once in office, will follow that strategy, for it would significantly curtail their chances of success—in her words “as soon as the PQ is returned to power and a referendum is looming, the party will change its program and resort to a soft, ambiguous and reassuring question” (Gagnon A13). So it really depends on what kind of sovereignty one is talking about. For if we take sovereignty to mean the same thing that it did in the 1995 referendum, it does look as though there is support (perhaps increasingly so) for the sovereignty movement (stemming from multiple influences)
Quebec’s perpetual, plurivocal and dissensual dialogues is one that I’d like to share, however, with the skewed power relations that currently exist, it is hard to imagine a becoming-syncretic of l’identitaire québécois that is not circumscribed from the onset. Maclure’s work, like that of Beauchemin and Bellerose, reflects the view of dominant discourses. Which is to say that it serves analytically descriptive ends, without challenging the dominant (imag)inings of l’identitaire québécois. It could certainly be argued that implicit in Maclure’s work is a mild form of alternative discourse in that the ongoing process of plurivocal and dissensual discussion naturally brings with it change and transformation. However, Maclure is quite careful about not speculating too far ahead and in this way he avoids ‘going against the grain.’

In a rather impassioned response to Jocelyn Létourneau’s article entitled “Pour une révolution de la mémoire collective. Histoire et conscience historique chez les Québécois francophones” [For a revolution of collective memory. History and historical conscience among francophone Quebecers], Serge Cantin lays out some of his conservative cards and explains his leanings. Létourneau, another québécois theorist, has made the argument that instead of remaining fixated on the past, Quebecers need remember from where they’re going (i.e. to not allow l’identitaire québécois to remain anchored to a past that is continually disappearing) (123). And from the polemical nature of Cantin’s response, one gets that impression that he is thoroughly disgusted with Létourneau and his theoretical beliefs. He chastises Létourneau for his future-oriented inclinations and argues that they are in fact atavisms that reach so far into the past that their archaic nature is utterly beyond Létourneau’s awareness. To wit Cantin, with the most sardonic of tones, contends that the work of this professor of history runs counter to
Quebec's plight of "survivance" in that it regresses to an archaic doxa that sees Québécois' founding and constitutive ambivalence as both a point of origin and a locus of their liberation ("J'impense" 140). Such a return, Cantin argues, stems from Létourneau's desire to abandon the melancholic strains of Quebec nationalism. Yet Cantin charges that this very "ressentiment" has been the quintessentially persisting element of Québécois' existence throughout the tests of time ("J'impense" 141), to abandon it, is to abandon oneself completely. As such, Létourneau's insistence upon treading down such a path is something that leaves Cantin nonplussed.

In fact, in stark contrast to the work of Létourneau, Cantin contends that Québécois couldn't possibly remember where they've left from as they march into the future because they have not yet properly digested, internalized and recreated their heritage and in that way they remain ill-disposed at plotting a future for their collective memory ("Quel avenir" 41). Moreover, he underscores how the questions surrounding l'identitaire québécois always ask how it should be and never what it in fact is (Cantin, "Quel avenir" 43); this temporal orientation, he argues, addles the coherency of sovereigntist discourses (Cantin, "Quel avenir" 43). This implicit amnesia results in a paradox that Laurent-Michel Vacher describes as a sovereignty without nationalism (Vacher). Cantin suggests that the work of the eminent theorist Fernand Dumont—specifically his book entitled Genèse de la société québécoise—is an oeuvre that seeks to psychoanalytically restore Québécois' lost collective memory ("Quel avenir" 46). To be sure, Cantin claims that, if psychoanalysis does indeed present itself an apposite methodology by which to study Quebec society, then, it follows, that this community must in someway be ill; for Cantin, the malady is none other than a traumatism which has
damaged their collective memory. Seeking recourse, again, to the Dumont’s work, Cantin advances that Quebec society needs to undergo a reciprocally dyadic process of mourning and remembrance à la Paul Ricœur, in which its melancholic bent ought to be transformed into an active mourning that will consequently lead to a remembrance of the original source of its sadness—l’identité canadienne-française—which it must repudiate thereafter ("Quel avenir" 48-50). It is only by dint of this reciprocally dyadic process that the québécois self, will ever reconcile itself with its forgotten object of woe.

In many ways, Cantin’s compulsion with a never sufficiently remembered or activated past, is indicative of his own temporal positioning; which is to say that he of course comes from a generation that is far different than the one that unfurls before us today. Alternatively, one could say that Cantin can be categorized as speaking on behalf of populist discourses in that his particular perspectives and concerns along with the memories that incite them, derive from a different sociological period, one that afforded a different understanding of oneself, a different form of self (imag)ining; an understanding of the self that despite obviously sharing certain leitmotifs with those of today, nevertheless emerged from an empirically different sociological base. It is in this way that Cantin can be said to advocate populist discourses, because clearly, for whatever reason(s) (an increasingly pluralist society obviously being one of them), the contemporary dominant discourses regarding l’identitaire québécois have moved in such a direction that some of Cantin’s discursive elements are considered to be outmoded within its realm. It is equally important to draw attention to the fact that many of his articles discussed here have emerged from non-refereed journals and there is a reason for this. For populist discourses are of course those forms of talk and opinion that do not
necessarily subscribe to the forms of propriety that are generally observed within dominant discourses. And concerning the aforementioned “interactive discursive relationship” (Karim 211) that dominant and populist discourses are said to enjoy, it seems equally important to draw attention to the fact that just as populist discourses have a certain influence upon, and ability to penetrate within, dominant ones, it must also be recognized that mutations in the forms of propriety particular to dominant discourses have the effect of applying pressure, through their very contradistinction, upon that which can spoken, without rebuke, in populist discourses; I qualify this influence as pressure for this is really no guaranteed way of closing down their potentially contentious expressions.

If one has for so long now taken great pains in preserving their identity against circumambient threats, how does one admit difference into their identity without sacrificing all that which s/he has so ardently fought for? This is undoubtedly a difficult question. But here’s another: what if one realizes that the identity that s/he has defended for so long had somehow changed from underneath them and had done so in such a way that to continue understanding her/himself as s/he once did would be unsustainable and could potentially lead to social demise, how then does one articulate this realization and reevaluate her/himself without becoming a pariah within her/his own community? In some ways this seems to be an even more difficult question. One to which there is no easy answer. However, both Salée and his work provides us with a good place to start.

Perhaps one of the best ways of understanding Quebec is through the words of Michelle Gagnon when she defined it as being “a place of commitment” (2). For Quebec is a locus of protracted political struggles. To be on this side or that side of an issue is to
simultaneously be at odds with a number of other parties, sometimes even your own. Among Quebec’s intellectual community, Salée stands out as a fairly courageous or contentious figure. For he is a theorist that identifies as a québécois, however, he is one that will never shy away considering l’identitaire québécois through a critical lens. In fact, one of the things that makes Salée’s work so stimulating is not his ability to level caustic judgments against l’identitaire québécois, rather it is his altruistic willingness, as a Quebecker, to be critical of those elements of Quebec society that impede or vitiate its contemporary and future social cohesion. So brazen is he that he entitles one of his analyses *De L’avenir de L’identité Nationale Québécoise* (Regarding the future of Quebec’s national identity), thereby making those difficult questions that others have chosen to eschew his primary ones. In this article, Salée argues that a fundamental question confronting both nationalists and sovereigntists alike is:

*Comment reconcevoir la communauté politique québécoise de façon à ce que, tout en ne pervertissant pas le substrat ethnoculturel sur lequel elle s’est constituée originellement, elle intègre dans le respect des règles de la démocratie libérale et de la citoyenneté moderne les influences et apports nouveaux qui émanent d’un tissu social en mutation, de plus en plus complexe et diversifié?* (“De l’avenir” 136)

How to conceive of Quebec’s political community anew in such a way that, without perverting the ethnocultural foundation upon which it was originally constituted, it integrates—in accordance with the rules of liberal democracy and modern citizenship—the new influences and benefits that emerge from a changing social fabric that is more and more complex and diverse.

At once a concept, reality, and productive force, pluralism is a great many things. Faced with the increasing reality thereof, Quebec nationalists and sovereigntists have been forced to reconceptualize and (reimag)ine the idea of the nation (Salée, “De l’avenir” 139). First and foremost, this reconsideration involved muting—at least within dominant
discourses—the ethnocultural bases and shared sociocultural history(s) and experiences, that originally founded l'identitaire québécois (Salée, “De l'avenir” 137). The changing face of Quebec’s population, and hence of its voters, created an atmosphere whereby such exclusivistic conceptions of Quebec identity were no longer deemed as being politically correct. However, the political correctness of a particular matter and the continued reality of that same matter are never guaranteed to accord with one another. Such is the space of l'écart. Knowing that pluralism writhe identities as it is wrought, what then does the nationalists and sovereignists’ reformulation of the Quebec nation entail? Well, it is one that is beholden to eschew specificity in favor of an abstractness that can afford all (Beauchemin and Bellerose 45). Thus Quebec citizenship, as framed by the dominant discourses, is that which can be claimed by all those—irrespective of their ethnicity or divergent interests—residing within the geographic bounds of the land so named (Salée, “De l’avenir” 137). No matter what their ethnolinguistic or cultural origins might have been, regardless of their shared history vis-à-vis this land, Quebec citizenship is open to them and it ought not to be seen as that which is solely reserved for francophones (Salée, “De l’avenir” 137-138). So long as each individual consents to rally around the institutions of democracy and accepts the outcomes that emerge therewith; so long as each member— aspiring the ideals of a cohesive citizenry—is willing to participate in a Quebec state, in a public realm whereby French is both the common language to all and the communicative means of ensuring its own survival, then québécois is a name to which they can lay claim (Salée, “De l’avenir” 137-138). There is, however, one last proviso to this reformulation, and it states that:

_Tôt ou tard, il sera nécessaire de libérer l’État québécois du carcan juridico-administratif qui lui impose l’État canadien de manière_
précisément à assurer le plein développement de la culture publique commune québécoise. (Salée, “De l’avenir” 138)

Sooner or later, it will be necessary to decisively free the Quebec state from the juridico-administrative noose placed upon it by the Canadian state so as to ensure the full development of Quebec’s common public culture.

As Salée is quick to point out, this last segment results in an articulation of sovereignist desire that now becomes written into the very conception of Quebec citizenship. It is in this way that, throughout Quebec’s political realm—and especially within the purview of immigration practice and services, there seems to be a tendency to conflate Quebec’s political project(s) with its reality (Salée, “Espace Publique” 133). In other words, under this frame of thought, the desire for sovereignty is no longer an inclination reserved for francophones or other actors of those political stripes, but now it becomes a desire proper to any and all Quebecers (Salée, “De l’avenir” 138). Thus to be seen, in their eyes, as a legitimate Quebecer one must desire independence. Eclipse. Really, there is no other way. And to subscribe to a nationalist or sovereignist conception of Quebec citizenship such as this, is to concomitantly sacrifice one’s political allegiance to Canada. As one can imagine, this could be a rather weighty and admittedly bizarre decision to have to confront as an arrivée. Welcome to Quebec—now choose! Add to this fray the fact that all immigration processes to this province pass through Canada’s federal immigration apparatus and then you can begin to see how problems emerge.  

What occurs is that government authority is bifurcated from the onset, as such the arrivée is confronted with a seemingly schizophrenic authority: on the one hand, there is

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40 Though Quebec’s immigration services constitute the first line of the selection process, Canada’s immigration services reserves the right to veto any applicant who they consider to be a danger to national security.
Canada’s immigration services and on the other there is Quebec’s—and of course both end up playing a decisive role in the determination of her/his future. And from another perspective, both of these states make their respective attempts towards conveying an image of themselves as being the political entity best capable of representing arrivées and their interests. For reasons such as these it is plainly obvious that domains, such as that of immigration, are contested sites and fertile spaces whereby important articulations of identity (read here l’identitaire québécois) are made (Allor and Gagnon 25; Salée, “Espace publique” 142). Additionally there is a peculiar temporal play that occurs in most sovereignist discourses whereby the logic of the argument is: Quebec’s current subjugation and the problems arising thereof shall all be possible to resolve once the Quebec nation succeeds in liberating itself from the rest of Canada. This logic is curious insofar as it mortgages a number of things to the future and hence to the unknown. For instance, it presupposes that little can be done for Quebec now, at least so long as it remains a part of Canada. Thus, responsibility towards the continual bettering of Quebec society seems, to some extents, conveniently placed, in bond, in a warehouse of the future. Moreover, all questions pertaining to whether or not Quebec can succeed as a sovereign nation are left there as well.

Quebec’s propensity to subsume difference is of course nothing new. Indeed as Salée reveals, Quebec nationalism has, for so long now, needed to evacuate difference from its articulation so as to make it palatable to contemporary political discourse (“Espace publique” 127/133). As such, conjuring a sense of belonging to Quebec amongst arrivées, is admittedly an awesome challenge. For l’identitaire québécois is

41 Even beyond the federal/provincial dichotomy there exists another level of political splintering composed of different parties—each of them advocating particular interests and aspirations.
itself manifold, and in some measure composed by very particular subjectivities, collective memories, beliefs, discourses, social practices, etc. For instance, of certain sovereignist leanings and aspirations, Salée writes:

_Simplement, la rationalité qui les guide est celle de leurs intérêts spécifiques, souvent étroits: celle d’un vécu immédiat, subjectif, irrémédiablement marqué au fer rouge d’une identité historiquement chargée dont ils n’accepteraient pas de se départir._ (“Espace Publique” 135)

In the simplest terms, the guiding rationality is one that serves their [(sovereignist’s)] often narrow and specific interests: these stem from an immediate, subjective and lived experience that from the very beginning is irremediably marked by a historically charged identity that they refuse to move away from.

Sovereignists, frequently the mouthpiece of _populist discourses_, constitute strong and rather fiery forces within _l’identitaire québécois_’ state of play. With an overriding goal of sovereignty, these forces share along with melancholic nationalists the understanding that Quebecers are an oppressed people who must throw off the shackles of Canadian federalism so as to finally gain the autonomy that is rightfully theirs. Sovereignist forces of this kind are marked by their refusal to give up their ethnic foundations and particular pasts. However based on Quebec’s contemporary and empirical reality, Salée is absolutely correct in his contention that if _l’identitaire québécois_ is going to effectively become pluralist, it must move away from its ethnic foundations and consequently adopt an institutional identity, in which a full allegiance is pledged to common interests irrespective of the different ethnicities that constitute society (“Espace Publique” 137). A form of citizenship expressly predicated on collective participation as opposed to an ethnic view of _the nation_, has profound ramifications that some Quebecers are not willing to accept.
As difficult as it may be to accept, Salée raises an apposite insight. One that indicates how Quebec’s immigration practice and services need, then, to be reconceptualized with this understanding in mind (see Conclusion(s) for further development of this). This redefinition of the nation does not necessarily imply the outright dissolution of the past memories and experiences that are held dear by Quebecers (Salée, “Espace Publique” 139). However, it does mean that the future might hold an accrual of positive and potentially transformative difference—hence the snag. Difference is manifestly perceived as transformative and this causes anxiety. It is for this reason that the encouragement of difference is always imparted from a position of dominance, one that is bent on retaining its place. Consequently, change is a slow, extended and intensely resisted process (Salée, “Espace Publique” 133). But then again liberalism’s relationship with difference has always been this way. As explicated by Salée:

les sociétés liberals—et le Québec n’y échappe pas—l’encouragement et la célébration de la diversité culturelles s’estompent derrière les tentatives beaucoup plus robustes d’en contenir et d’en limiter les manifestations. La société hôte ou la culture dominante accepte l’altérité à la condition seulement qu’elle s’intègre, s’adapte ou puisse être facilement localisée à l’intérieur de la matrice normative en vigueur. (“De l’avenir” 146)⁴²

Liberal societies—and Quebec is no exception—encouragement and celebration of cultural diversity is blurred by strong inclinations towards limiting and containing protest. The host society or dominant culture accepts alterity only under the condition that it is integrated, adapted or is easily placed within the current normative matrix.

Thus Salée is quite right when he argues that a harmonious civic nation is but a chimera that is all too clearly a product of philosophy and, especially when considered from Quebec’s vantage point, it is an idea that results in Quebec nationalist discourses presupposing a far greater political engagement than is the case (“De l’avenir” 146).

⁴² The emphasis is my own.
Additionally, this is also problematic in that the state’s recognition of diversity naturally creates expectations on the part of arrivées with regards to the raising and redressal of their living standards (Salée, “De l’avenir” 147-149), yet these hopes turn out to be fairly Panglossian insofar as such results can only be achieved by dint of concrete government and societal actions—and it is precisely endeavors such as these that western societies are weakest at. It is of course altogether insufficient for the government to celebrate pluralism and diversity in rhetoric alone. In fact, to do so can be quite damaging. For it creates gaps, it opens up l’écart. The Quebec government, and its immigration practice and services in particular, have a pronounced inclination towards speaking in ideals. For instance, when articulations of l’identitaire québécois are made within the confines of this institution, there are almost certainly positively oriented and bespeak a laudable celebration of alterity and tolerance to the extent that one might never think that anything otherwise was possible. However, Salée underscores how a fissure nevertheless exists between this ideal image of l’identitaire québécois and the one held to heart by some segments of Quebec society (“Espace Publique” 141). Moreover, in his discursive analysis of Quebec government’s documentation on immigration Carens professes that “there is some gap[s] between the principles that it professes and the social and political realities of immigration in Quebec” (“Immigration” 68). The danger of privileging the positive within the realm of immigration is that arrivées are exposed to a cushioned and fantastic discursive space which frequently fails to correspond, as admirably, to the realities they will encounter outside that institutional space. Resentment. It is almost as though the arrivée, after leaving the immigration office, is sent through a field in the dark and left to discover the chasm on her/his own.
The most trenchant point that Salée advances, and one that he makes with concision, is that civic nationalism is predicated upon a conceptual foundation that is nearly devoid of any understanding of alterity and the social dynamics that ensue therewith. In fact, he contends that civic nationalism gives rise to a reification of alterity (Salée, “De l’avenir” 150) which in turn leads to a condescending view of difference as being that which “enriches” society. Discourses of enrichment always serve to reinforce the position of the dominant culture at the ganglion of society (Hage 31). As Ghassan Hage surmises, it is a case of concretizing “the opposition between the enriched and the [Other] enriching cultures” (31), whereby Others are given another ontological reality: they exist for the Self’s benefit. Of course, difference must be framed. It absolutely has to be framed as productive or as being of some benefit to the host society, for if it is simply left on its own, difference comes to be seen as that which is unfamiliar; hence we come to realize that we in fact do not understand it and are thus required to actively work towards developing such an understanding so as to begin being able to live respectfully with one another. Seen in this light, difference is taxing for it demands an effort on our part and this is a call that many would rather ignore. But ignorance isn’t bliss, ignorance causes strife.

Here is a story, a difficult one. The transport company where I have worked as a security guard for the better part of seven years, has revealed itself to be a site of: cultural articulation, heterogeneity and conflict, ‘naturalized’ racism, worker exploitation, heightened capitalism and its corollaries, stagnant becomings, beginnings and endings, beautiful connections and glimpses of other possibilities. It was 2005, a day or so after Yasser Arafat had died. I was picking up an extra shift; I normally worked on the
weekends. During the week, this company was a whirlwind of activity. People, trucks, cars and cargo were always coming and going. This locus was punctuated more by different degrees of intensity than by moments of calm. To wit, my job consisted in simultaneously overseeing myriad tasks—some of which were: data entry of in-going and out-going vehicles and loads, supervising and controlling a centralized alarm system that included over twenty buildings in different locations across Quebec and Ontario, addressing and orienting different clientele, weighing trucks and trailers, and various other responsibilities. In the midst of all this, a truck driver entered our fifteen by eight foot guardhouse. As we work in teams of two during the week, my colleague was there and he and the driver began conversing. It was a few minutes past six o’clock, and my colleague had been distractedly watching the news on television. They suddenly went silent when images of Arafat’s funeral in Ramallah appeared on screen. Admittedly, it was an awesome event. Before our eyes stood an impressive number of people all crammed in a space that was made to look much smaller than it probably was. This particular clip captured and framed how many people jostled with one another to touch Arafat as he floated by and how soldiers let off warning rounds into the air—presumably to maintain order. Now here is where context is absolutely crucial (Fish). Here is where the media owes it to the public’s understanding to frame culturally-specific events with a better cross-cultural sensitivity. In this instance, of course, the heightened acuity required was lacking. Without taking his eyes off the screen, my 65-year-old colleague muttered in disgust:

"Regardez-les—commes des chiens?!?" Look at them—(they’re) like dogs?!?
Then there was moment of contemplative silence. There is so much possibility in a moment that you wonder how it is that your hopes could so quickly be dashed. The driver, in his late thirties, after truly taking that moment to reflect, responded *sotto voce*—with a sincerity so sharp that I have not since recovered from the gash:

"Je les hais eux autres." I abhor them.

Stunned and deeply hurt, I found myself utterly speechless at that which was easily the most racist and scathing comment I had ever heard. Turning away as he had dropped that frightening admission, he was out the door before a riposte could be made. Unmoved, perhaps in agreement with him, my colleague tended to his trucks and I, still completely shocked, had to do the same. I wanted—with every fiber of my being—to right this injustice. I wanted to make them see the violence in those words. But honestly, how do you—in the span of a moment—offer an expression that could possibly counter that which was certainly the result of years and years of nurtured hate. I failed. There’s no doubt. Though I have to admit, to this day, having seen the very face of evil, I am still not quite sure how destroy it.

What role does this anecdote serve? First, it represents how cultural and racial hierarchies are enacted by individual actors at the level of everyday life. Moreover, it reveals the media’s complicity in these constructions. For without providing sufficient background on the plight of the Palestinian people(s), these images are left to signify in a North American context, a context where passionate swarms such as these aren’t *normal*, *that is not how we do things here*, a context where boisterous and unsettled throngs such as these are synonymous with threat and danger. The problem with difference is that it is always figured as hopelessly different such that “every Other is every bit Other.” That
which might appear as foreign, is almost always left to signify as such; when presented with no background or explanation given, avatars of Otherness come off as different and esoteric—which makes for a rather volatile medley.

Of course, this last account is not a case of Quebec nationalism, it is obviously a case of outright racism. Naming it is only the first step though. Next, one needs to identify the surrounding discourses and influential forces that allow racism to take the shape of an action or utterance. In fact, along these lines of thought, it becomes particularly interesting to think of what a concept of integration affords or obliquely gives rise to. It of course implies that there exists a society replete with its own languages, cultures, forms of knowledge, social practices, etc. and that all these particular, and at times corresponding, histories reach deep into the past. Of course for those coming from without, these ‘common’ understandings won’t be so obviously common. For those from within however, these ways of living are entirely natural, they’re just the way things are done, how else would one go about it. You see where this is going. Understood in this light, integration becomes a standard of judgment; one which allows us to ascertain just to what extent they’re different, to assess how far they are from properly integrating into our society. Integration is a bar to which they can be held, it is also a bar against which they can be reproached.

With regards to integration, Salée and Micheline Labelle’s research into minority representation of citizenship in Quebec has indicated that though arrivées indeed desire belonging to Quebec society, they nevertheless find themselves losing that drive after repeatedly experiencing situations where they have failed to adequately integrate within those social and economic relations (Salée, “De l’aventir” 154). In fact, with each failure
comes less and less of a response to interpellations regarding social cohesion and united
citizenship (Salée, “De l’avenir” 154). Salée additionally reminds us that though socio-
economic marginalization might be the result of systemic effects, it is nevertheless a
phenomenon that has an impact upon the lived reality of many an individual (“De
l’avenir” 154-155). The phenomenon of oblique corollaries stemming from particular
systems warrants our questioning integration in the same regard. What indirect
consequences does integration contribute to? To be sure, one of them is psychological;
for a concept such as that of integration attests to a fairly significant ethical
presupposition on the part of both government and society: the immigration process
involves a lot of work, and between you and I, you are going to have to shoulder that
burden because you the are one coming from without. Seen in this light, integration
offers itself as the most (ostensibly) convenient solution for welcoming societies. For it is
predicated upon an anlage whereby the host society, composed as it is of particular
histories, memories, cultural products and practices, etc., is held aloft as the immutable
essence of all that is within its parameters. This favoring makes it such that any
difference which might serve to dilute this pristine foundation is of course in and of itself
expressly unfavorable.

Even though this analysis has concerned itself with a conceptual interrogation of
the concept, ethic and goal of integration, the problems associated with it are not
restricted solely to that realm. In fact, there are significant problems that have become
manifest in praxis and which serve to reveal how our beleaguered project of integration
has not been entirely successful. Salée has demonstrated that an uncomfortable socio-
economic chasm exists between arrivées and the prepolitical majority (“De l’avenir” 156-
It has been increasingly difficult for arrivées to pierce into the midrange and higher-end management positions (Salée, “De l’avenir” 157). And we refer to this as a chasm because recent history has shown that this separation has only tended to widen. Salée has underscored how this is a common trend across many occidental societies (“De l’avenir” 159) and thus he argues that it would be unjust to expect that the Quebec state’s civic nationalism be somehow more adept at integrating its arrivées than other similarly-minded societies (“De l’avenir” 160). Nevertheless, the impact upon arrivées cannot be discounted nor ignored. As Salée has explicated, the process of economic exclusion results in a secondary form of Othering whereby arrivées obviously recognize that they are being Othered and marginalized for their difference and yet have no recourse but to shoulder this violence (“De l’avenir” 161). And we mustn’t forget that arrivées, more often than not, find themselves getting far lower equivalencies (now referred to as comparative evaluations) than they might have anticipated; and this all too frequently results in their working in hierarchically lower positions.\(^4\) And unfortunately, it is often at levels such as those where racism is its strongest. Of course, under such conditions it is rather unlikely any government will successfully convince those subjects that they are full members of the political community (Salée, “De l’avenir” 161). It is for this reason that we are beholden to resist the temptation of allowing integration to remain the apogee of critical reflection upon issues of social cohesion. Instead, we must interrogate the ethic, concept and goal thereof so as to ascertain its merits and its particular deficiencies. For like all government interventions, integration is of course an act of power.

\(^4\) It is also crucial to draw attention to the fact that forms of economic exclusion such as these sometimes lead to emasculative corollaries which can then give rise to different kinds of spousal abuse that place arrivée women in positions of danger (for an excellent articulation of the threats faced by arrivées or women of color see Jiwani Forthcoming).
In sum, despite the significant strides that Quebec nationalism has made over the last twenty years towards being inclusive of Others, Salée argues that there is nevertheless much work to be done. Of the lacunae that exist, he cites the persisting tension between the preservative forces of the inveterate prepolitical nation and the willingness to include plural identities under the general framework of what it means to be a Quebecker as a particularly pressing one. Additionally, Salée argues that even with this willingness aside, there nevertheless remains a remarkable incapacity on the part of both theorists and politicians alike to fully understand the complexity of the nation and how to actualize the inclusive and plural national political community that is referred to in rhetoric and abstraction ("De l’avenir" 141-142).

Salée’s theoretical contributions on l’identitaire québécois straddle both oppositional and alternative discourses. Oppositional, because on one level he is choosing at different instances to adhere “to the same sets of fundamental myths and premises” that constitute dominant discourses. His work also reflects an alternative discursive bent in that, he advocates a serious need for l’identitaire québécois to temper its ethnic foundations and open itself to transformative difference that both pluralism and the future tout court will bring with it (Salée, “Espace publique” 136-137). It is this prescient understanding of the general development of cultures along with his openness to alternative outlooks that truly sets Salée apart from the other theorists that we have appraised.

Subtending Foucault’s conceptualization of his genealogy, is an understanding of knowledge as that which, in a particular context, is fluxionally constituted by all those discourses that have been conferred legitimacy by the powers that be (May 75). As such,
it is fairly important to consider the breadth of québécois research on identity, nationalism, immigration, integration and citizenship from the purview of the discursive regularity that it bespeaks. In so doing, we can begin disinterring the bounds of that which is seen as ‘legitimate knowledge’ and, we can then adumbratively flesh out that which can be said in Quebec’s intellectual circles. My selective analysis of Quebec scholarship on the aforementioned themes is meant to be a first step in this regard. Obviously an assessment of four theorists will not at all be sufficient in thoroughly delimiting the bounds of the possible. Nevertheless, the inchoate findings suggest that beyond the descriptive work of, and rhetorical nods and strategies made towards, pluralism, most québécois theorists have made little in the way of advancing pragmatic concepts that avail the Quebec state in successfully mobilizing and facilitating (i.e.: avowedly taking action and responsibility towards integration) Others’ belonging to l’identitaire québécois. Condemnatory as it may be to point out, the theorists guilty of such lacunae are of course speaking from privileged positions amid social power relations, so the risks to them are minimal. And though there is an abundance of Quebec scholarship on issues of identity and citizenship (which is of course a positive reality that we should recognize and celebrate), a genealogical consideration of such scholarship nascently indicates that the forms of knowledge produced by this research are ones which are analogously beset by forces, tensions and boundaries similar to those that structure and chaperon l’identitaire québécois’ becoming in other realms.

*Le cœur québécois* and Other Theoretical By-passes

Nothing *is* for free. Capitalism has already taught us that much. But this is also to say that a correspondent image of thought seems to be at work within liberal societies’
relationship with difference. There is never free admission for difference, it must always pay a toll. This consistent and ubiquitous requisite has become a feature of our society—and this is especially so within the sphere of immigration practice and services. We must of course remember that, as Salée points out, whether sovereignist or not, the Quebec state remains predominantly linked towards francophone Quebeckers ("Espace publique" 142). This fact unfolds in a particular fashion upon immigration practice and services for within those institutional bounds, there is a dual need of instruction and interpellation. The arrivée needs to be taught who they are expected to become, and, thereafter, they must only be summoned as such. Hence why a project of integration is adopted; it serves as an economy of the toll. And hence why the consideration of how nations (imagine) themselves is so very important. For in those limned (imagine)nings, one can find visually concretized evidence of a nation’s exercise of power carried out in the name of its economy of otherness (Hage 33).

Conceptually, Hage’s economy of otherness is extremely useful in that it names that which is inherently difficult to name, much less articulate. In fact, every society has an economy of otherness, the operation of which is geared towards its particular power dynamics and prejudices. It is for this reason that the advocacy of civic nationalism as panacea is always fraught. As such, an important critique of civic nationalism that is rarely addressed by its proponents is how, in abstraction, the political system it represents is always imagined as being predicated upon egalitarian grounds, whereas in reality that is never the case (Salée, "De l’avenir" 150; Hage 21). In fact, to conceive of civic nationalism in such a manner is to concomitantly deny both the rootedness of culture and history along with the myriad power relations that are imbricated in all societies (Salée,
"De l’avenir" 150; Hage 21). Somehow these considerations always seem to remain silent. Whether or not this lacuna is a strategic abjuration or merely a case of negligence is undeterminable, however, on the other hand, the lack of reflection upon such issues has guaranteed that the societies in question largely remain unchanged (Salée, "De l’avenir" 151).

Civic nationalism, conceived of in a realm of abstraction as it is, allows for other fantastic conceptions. For instance, it has been argued that part of the reason why it is so very difficult to instill notions of Quebec citizenship among arrivées is because they are perpetually confronted with two conflicting tensions of allegiance: the federal and provincial. Thus, as one such argument goes, if the Quebec state were to become a sovereign nation, then adherence to Quebec national identity would no longer be encumbered, it would simply happen on its own (Salée, "De l’avenir" 153). Of course, in order to see things this simplistically one must do a great deal of overlooking. Accordingly, one must see the source of the problem as singular and coming from without to such a degree that those from within share no responsibility for it. Naturally this is a rather fallacious line of reasoning, for Quebec has had an equally difficult time at developing a sense of belonging amongst its ‘cultural communities’. And of course one needs to conceptualize belonging as different from citizenship for they are simply not the same. Citizenship, as a concept, is far more predicated on a nation’s juridico-political apparatus, whereas belonging, as a component of citizenship, is a concept that gives a more precise name to a set of affects which are subjectively felt or sensed from within and from without and that are identified with on both public and private levels. And though discourses hold significant sway over these senses of belonging, their influences
are not at all uniform. With dominant, oppositional, populist and alternative discourses constantly vying with one another and each impacting these senses of belonging in their own ways, it is easy to see how this is complex and variegated concept poses a fair bit of analytic ambiguity. Consequently, much of the research undertaken on the intersection of (govern)mentality and immigration has often tended to overlook this affective dimension (Vukov 338). This has been to the detriment of the process of (imag)ining in general, for as Tamara Vukov contends “immigration evokes strong political affect around commonsense imaginings of national belonging, of who should be included and excluded in the national community (340). And of course the Quebec government does in fact see itself charged with the responsibility of defining l’identitaire québécois (its dispositif confirms as much) and the society it so names, for as they explain:

[une] société qui accepte l’immigration et recrute des immigrants se crée à elle-même l’obligation de rendre explicite le cadre d’accueil dans lequel elle convie le nouvel arrivant à inscrire ses projets. (qtd. in Salée, “De l’avenir” 153)

a society that accepts immigration and recruits immigrants is also obliged to define the welcoming society, into which the new arrival is expected to carry out his/her life projects.

However, by enacting dichotomies such as these from the onset (hence us/them), the government only serves to reethnicize the question regarding the québécois political subject despite its intentions to the contrary (Salée, “De l’avenir” 153). And drawing upon this perceived methodology of articulation, one could have found similar dynamics at work in the Le cœur québécois campaign (Fig. 1). The campaign consisted of featuring visibly ethnic and different individuals under a slogan that at once highlighted and celebrated her/his difference, all the while contending that s/he had the heart of a Quebecker. To be sure, from the onset we are faced with the realization that arrivées, by
virtue of their having come from without, of course find themselves at loss with respect to the well of collective memories, experiences and affects that inevitably color *l'identitaire québécois*. And the institutional realm of Quebec’s immigration services constitute fertile grounds for articulations of identity, only these enunciations get imparted in differently nuanced ways. Thus defining the fashion in which these articulations are actually made is central to any analysis seeking to understand the process of (imag)ining.
Bereft of common (to all) memories, the government is compelled to forge alternative links with the arrivées whom they seek to address. And it is imperative not to forget that *Le cœur québécois* campaign had a very particular goal behind its communicative act: it sought to publicly introduce difference into the common conceptions of *l'identitaire québécois*; it is of course an instance of transformation in which (imag)inings, conceptions, traditions and activities are re-worked—despite the great pains taken to make them appear as though they simply persist (Hall, "Notes" 228).

At this point, it is useful to remind ourselves of the chronological value that the predicates within these advertisements hold. *Québécois*, an appellation that refers to a community—multiple communities in fact, and one that names a complex set of social and economic configurations and relations—all of which constitute the society we see today and stand before the subject who comes into it thereafter. Then, in a secondary position by dint of their otherness, there is the variable ethnic individual, the token of difference, the subject who aspires to be *québécois*. Being both an individual and patent minority, the government must conceive of a means to transcend her/his marginal status, or, instead it must find a manner in which to make that immutable difference work in her/his favor. In *Les yeux en amande, le cœur québécois* (Fig. 1) a discursive bridge is enacted whereby the different individual—who is celebrated as such—is discursively accepted into, anointed by, and made subject of *l'identitaire québécois* in one fell swoop. The crux of this dynamic lies in the vehicle that affords this vaulting, the heart. Aside from being a critical organ within the human body, the heart has, over time, also accrued a fair amount of metaphoric currency. It has been intensely linked with such things as: spirit, courage, determination, emotions, love, devotion, intellect, essences, and the soul.
So then, knowing that this metaphor can come to stand for a great many things, how are we to understand it here? Is it that despite not having undergone the same history or collective experiences these individuals nevertheless share, with gusto, Quebecers' particular spirit, courage or determination? One would hope not. How presumptuous—or condescending rather—is it to foist one's own cultural background upon an(Other)—and in so doing—completely overlook their history and their background? In short, how ethical is it to entirely set aside the trials and tribulations that have, in some part, served to make these individuals who they are? Or is it possible that this reference to the heart predicates itself upon the assumption that the arrivée, simply by virtue of having immigrated to Quebec as opposed to somewhere else, has already found, and will certainly continue to nurture, the same love and emotions that Quebecers hold towards this land and the culture within it? Again it strikes me as though important questions of ethics seem to hover around these calls: how ethical is it to expect an arrivée to eclipse her/his own being? Or lastly, is it instead that despite these individual’s indelible difference, they somehow nevertheless have, deep within themselves, the same heart, essence or soul of a Quebecker? Such an interpretation is unlikely, for it opens onto an irresolvable aporia: if the arrivée comes from without and thus has no shared history, memory or affects, no prior vested interest, nor any familial lineage, how feasible is it then, that this individual be said to have the same heart, essence or soul? It’s just not possible. In Line Grenier's analysis of the musical exposition Je vous entends chanter, she explains how the museum had framed Quebecers’ country songs as being pieces that "viennent du cœur et s’adressent au cœur" [came from the heart and spoke to the heart] (qtd. in Grenier 39). So the metaphoric conundrum of the Quebecker heart emerges once
again. It seems only reasonable that the heart metaphor refer to those who have individual and collective memories and (socio-economic) experiences that have been discernibly colored by the French language, and who hold a vested interest in Quebec as a political community. Nevertheless, this suggests that however rosy and deceptively alluring the metaphor of the heart might be, it is ultimately a fraught ploy that can never lead us out of this problematic.

Without recourse to shared culture and collective memories, the articulation of l'identitaire québécois within the scope of Quebec’s immigration practice and services takes on a prescriptive bent. Thus, the articulation of l'identitaire québécois is about teaching Others about the self, and it is about giving the Other an image of the self that they are encouraged to live-up to. And, of course Vukov is certainly correct when she argues how “immigration is a central site through which national communities are institutionally imagined and materially constructed” (335). With this in mind, it is possible to (re)read the Les yeux en amande, le cœur québécois (Fig. 1) poster with a greater breadth of interpretation. It is of course no coincidence that the subject of this photo is a young Asian girl. Her obvious role as the signifier of youth is not a haphazard inclusion by any means. This is a prescient choice for, as we all know, there is so much innocence in youth. Young, labile and a token of futurity, this girl constitutes an ‘ideal’ immigrant. Unfettered by different and rigid cultural convention, this girl still has—at least at this early juncture—the capacity to make the strides necessary to become a Quebecker. For the purposes of contradistinction, it is perhaps useful for us to try and (reimag)ine this poster with an elderly Asian woman as its subject. Everything changes. In fact a telling inversion occurs. Old, less mobile and culturally set in her ways, an
elderly woman would constitute an intensified and immutable avatar of difference. This (imag)ined subject would be a marginal figure and so it is at the margins she must remain. For a figure such as this can do no more than make itself a disruptive element within the Quebec government’s carefully constructed discursive space of pluralism. We come to realize quite clearly that within the (govern)mental realm of immigration the free play of difference is but a mirage, for difference always presents itself as that which needs to be tamed or mitigated in some fashion. This is entirely in keeping with how the nation-state ‘accepts’ difference, as Beauchemin explains, the:

state rhetoric revolving around the revitalization of citizenship urges the expression of pluralism and simultaneously, attempts to limit the corrosive effects of these demands for recognition on the integrity of the social connection by invoking a necessary convergence around a Québec political subject that sovereignty would sanction. (“What Does” 23)

Accordingly, Salée’s reading of Le cœur québécois campaign as being a governmental warning is quite apposite. For Salée, citing the Le cœur québécois campaign, argues that there is a heightened ambiguity surrounding the Quebec government’s discourses on alterity (“Espace Publique” 143). He provides us with a useful semiotic analysis of Le cœur québécois campaign ad as he zeros in on two potential interpretations to make his critique. The first is a reading that recognizes the government’s well-intentioned steps towards warmly welcoming arrivées, regardless of their ethnicity, as though they were already family (“Espace Publique” 143). It concomitantly targets indigenous Quebecers and seeks to clearly communicate to them that difference is to be celebrated and that the Other is a Quebecker too. The second reading he offers, however, is that these ads are more of an initial warning to arrivées. The message being that as result of their difference, arrivées will find themselves in the position of being the minority. As such,
they are encouraged to blend—as quickly as possible—into Quebec, a preestablished society whereby they can expect to have little influence upon (Salée, “Espace Publique” 144). Above all, within the scope of this interpretation, however much alterity is commixed with l’identitaire québécois it shall not be allowed, in any way, to impact upon or obviate its essence (Salée, “Espace Publique” 144). Salée concludes by pointing out that under a paradigm such this, the transition towards a collective-nation is untenable because instead of evacuating the ethno-cultural predicates, this kind of articulation is still very much founded upon them (“Espace Publique” 145). In trying to move past exclusion, tolerance and other trifles, the government completes a full circle and arrives back at its initial problematic. As Hage has well articulated “the very act of acceptance operates as an exclusionary force on the accepted” (29). Which is to say that an arrivée’s first encounter with these posters might be an awkward one, for s/he might be led to ask her/himself: what’s the reason for this government’s bizarre compulsion to convince me that I have a Quebecker’s heart? Is it a welcome or a warning? It must be a warning, for if I was truly welcome then there would be no need to transform my very being from the onset… Indeed, “acceptance translate[s] into doubt” (Hage 29). For as the Quebec government is well aware, there are certain segments of the population who won’t necessarily be so forthcoming in their acceptance of these Others. Accordingly, the government’s over zealous acceptance is further complicated by the fact that it has now, to some extent, created false expectations on the arrivée’s part, but has done little to anticipate the effects of their possible deception. Overall, the Le cœur québécois campaign was a rather gauche articulation because it constituted a poor attempt, on the government’s part, to redefine the semantic breath of l’identitaire québécois to Quebecers
themselves. And as Sherry Simon has pointed out, identity by fiat is rarely a popular gamble (*Hybridité* 55).

Even though *Le cœur québécois* campaign emerged circa 1995 (tellingly timed for the referendum), some of its remnants continue to persist. Of course you won’t find any of these posters emblazoned upon city billboards, nor would you come across them in government pamphlets on immigration services. You might, however, find them in the office space of an immigration centre such as that of *le Carrefour d’Intégration du Nord* for instance. Curiously, these posters, despite all the controversy they had stirred up, still enjoyed some post-campaign circulation within the walls of those centers. The cool reception of these posters in the Quebec public sphere and their consequent relegation to its immigration centers is, all contingency aside, revealing. It is a testament to the difficulty surrounding the immersion of difference within traditionally ethnic conceptions of *l’identitaire québécois*, as much as it is a confirmation that there are still certain segments of the population who do not recognize Quebec citizenship in the same manner that their government rhetorically does. Moreover, this also speaks to the different discursive codes and structures that exist, and that are allowed to exist, within the space of those immigration bureaus. The target audience is, of course, altogether different. Of most public spaces, this is a fairly sheltered one. For it is rare that any indigenous Quebecers (employees aside) will ever set foot in those offices. Therefore we can safely assume that the primary target audience is arrivées. Clearly, then, the continued use of these posters in this space operates on two levels: the prescriptive and the interpellative. On the first, the arrivée is being instructed. They are being taught about those elements, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that constitute a Quebecker and give meaning to *l’identitaire*
québécois in contrast to other identities. On the second, the government is making the attempt to interpellate the arrivée in such a manner s/he recognizes her/himself in the government’s call. Obviously, the latter part of these communication goals is the most difficult to accomplish.

Fig. 2. Immigration poster. Fiers de Contribuer. Le Carrefour d’Intégration du Nord, Montreal. (Personal photograph by author, 18 Mar, 2004).
There does seem to be some hope with the Quebec government’s (imag)ining of its future and differently composed self. In a contemporary campaign entitled *Fiers de contribuer au développement du Québec*, the government invokes a less awkward approach to *integrating* difference into *l’identitaire québécois* (Fig. 2). This poster features four individuals: a black woman, an Asian woman, an ambiguously blond man and another Caucasian male with black hair. Yet in images such as these, what is most salient is not so much what is included, but that which is left out. As Judith Williamson cogently indicates “our culture, deeply rooted in imperialism, needs to destroy genuine difference, to capture what is beyond its reach; at the same time, it needs *constructs* of difference in order to signify itself at all” (101); our colonial history confirms that this has always been the case. Thus, though this poster might at first glance seem fairly intercultural in that it brings together a number of visually different races/ethnicities, the fact still remains that in Quebec society difference must be tempered. Consequently the individuals in the poster continue to function as tokens of difference; each individual is only as useful as their visual characteristics are contradistinctive to one another. Which is to say that this poster operates at a bare minimum of difference. With their fairly similar style of dress, each individual can be perceived as not being that different from you or I. In a poster such as this, we will of course never see a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, nor will we ever see an South Asian woman clothed in a sari, because these avatars of otherness are simply *too different* to pass under the rubric of *l’identitaire québécois*. And yet this articulation bespeaks a positive development since the *Le cœur québécois* campaign in that the cautionary expectation no longer consists of a flagrantly unfeasible demand that the arrivée have the heart of a Quebecker. No, instead the cautionary
expectation here is one that awaits a useful contribution from the arrivée towards Quebec's social and economic development. To be sure, one could certainly argue that there is something unsettling ab ovo with this indurate need to articulate expectations. However, we need to accept that, amid Quebec's inured relations of power—like that of most liberal societies, change comes in increments.

Conclusion(s)

Of nationalism, Clift has said that it "is in fact a cluster of ideas and feelings in constant flux" (viii); that was a fairly wise assessment. However having written his words in 1982, he made the mistake of being too generous in his speculation that nationalism in Quebec "is destined to decline as a political movement. It can no longer be expected to dominate public debates as it has now done for more than twenty years" (Clift 126)—then came the referendum of 1995. History has shown us that we cannot allow ourselves to make that mistake. There is no guarantee that Quebec, under the aegis of self-determination, will ever become its own nation, nor is there any certainty that traditionally ethnic conceptions of l'identitaire québécois will somehow become slaked and thereafter give themselves to a becoming syncretic of l'identitaire québécois. Neither outcome is clear. Quebec society, it would appear, is caught between the Scylla of a prepolitically predicated nationalism and the Charybdis of ethnic alienation insofar as those who identify with l'identitaire québécois—and who are recognized as such—have full right to do so in order to preserve that which they consider a definitive aspect of their cultural identity, however, this sometimes runs the risk of creating an inhospitable environment for arrivées. Of course, it is not a question of: to be or not to be? Instead, it should be a
consideration of how to be and how not to be. The discrepancy within Quebec’s immigration discourse cannot be overlooked: the government welcomes immigrants who will help fulfill population quotas, and solicits their avail in achieving economic prosperity, however, this same government has not made sufficient nor effective efforts in conceptualizing l’identitaire québécois in such a way that it can accept, and respectfully coexist with, difference. One must hope that this isn’t an indication that the Quebec government is, as with most governments, far more concerned with economic interests than with those of morality and justice (Folson 26). To put it plainly, Quebec’s fixation upon the self complicates their welcoming of the Other. Quebec society in general must reconcile itself with difference... because haven’t arrivées already accepted to work with difference by working with us?

Frankly, Quebec is in a tough position. For whatever one settles upon, there is no discounting that l’identitaire québécois is an ebullient and persevering identity. And for that very reason it has become the object of significant scorn. But concomitantly this criticism has also challenged and rallied Quebecers to the task of working out the problems that have been recognized—in many ways to a greater extent than other nations. Thus it becomes important to recognize that Quebec is an incredibly progressive nation in regards to issues of social justice and equity, among other things. And far too often this fact gets relegated to margins in favor of advancing facile criticisms that already enjoy a wide audience. In fact within the space of immigration practice, the

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44 As Quebec immigration explains on its website:

"The Government of Quebec relies on immigration to help meet some of the challenges faced by Quebecers today, such as offsetting the decline in the birth rate, achieving economic prosperity [...]." (Original emphasis.)

Quebec government has made fairly progressive efforts towards making ethnic difference an inherent part of its institutional fabric (Labelle et al. 232). For instance, the government shares the pedagogical responsibility of its language services with a coalition of ethnic community groups and academic institutions that work in tandem with one another to make French public life a possibility. Nevertheless, we mustn’t forget that at the endpoint of these interactions, the Quebec government and the prepitical majority remain in a definitive position of power, they remain firmly in control, a position in which very little is left to chance; *Le cœur québécois* campaign faithfully confirms this. And this propensity is of course evident in *l'identitaire québécois*’ state of play. *Dominant discourses* ensure that they retain that position. In fact, the *dominant discourse* on *l'identitaire québécois* (this is especially discernible in the works of Beauchemin, Bellerose, Cantin & Maclure) reveal a tendency to commingle its political project(s) with its reality (Salée, “*Espace Publique*” 133). Which is to say that one can certainly detect a significant amount of slippage with regards to *populist discourses* sidling into *dominant* ones. In Quebec, because of its particular history, one might almost say that the influence which *populist discourses* enjoy over *dominant* ones is a *sui generis* phenomenon. Another phenomenon that remains in someways particular to Quebec, is its unequal sociological development *vis-à-vis* pluralism. Indeed just as one could say that amid *dominant*, *oppositional*, *populist* and *alternative discourses* there are far more folds and layers of complexity than could have been addressed here, one must also draw attention to fact that Quebec’s human geography is both awkwardly and troublingly skewed. Which is to say that, the statement: Quebec is becoming increasingly plural, can only be made at a certain level of generalization. For in fact it would be more accurate to say that,
by and large, Montreal and to lesser extent Quebec City are becoming more empirically plural. Encouraging arrivées to settle outside the urban ganglions of Montreal and Quebec City has been a perennial quandary for Quebec’s immigration apparatus. And indeed the experiential lack of pluralism in certain cities and towns brings with it of course particular corollaries for peoples’ understanding of l’identitaire québécois. As such one can imagine that the individual weight of influence that dominant, oppositional, populist and alternative discourses will have upon individuals/communities will vary from place to place; in loci where there is a scant presence of difference, it is possible that the more pluralistically inclined dominant discourses might find themselves in far greater competition with populist ones that both speak of, and speak to, a more ethnically homogenous public. It is in this way, that considerations of human geography offer us other important lenses through which to understand the complexity behind l’identitaire québécois’ state of play.

The question of l’identitaire québécois is not so much one of what it is, as much as it is a query regarding what being québécois will mean in the future. Protracted. Of all the theorists who recognize that ethnic or past predicated conceptions of l’identitaire québécois are ultimately unsustainable, it would appear as though Salée and Jocelyn Létourneau are the most willing in sincerely rethinking these conundrums. In fact with regards to the narration of collective memory, Létourneau contends that he can only accept this practice as the intellectual’s responsibility if the goal of such narrativizing “is of “remembering (from) where we’re going”” (123). Even though its gracefulness is somewhat lost in translation, Létourneau’s provision is importantly positioned towards the future as opposed to remaining mired in trite rehashings of the past. Moreover, his
stipulation also confirms the problematic surrounding Quebec's prepolitical collective memory when considered alongside both contemporary pluralist realities as well as future conceptions of citizenship (Carens, "Immigration" 32). And though Létourneau's offering might, at first, seem nearly insignificant, the thought that subtends it is actually quite progressive, ethical and pragmatic in character. In fact, it is quite commensurate with the line of argument that I will propose and articulate in the concluding chapter.

In her broaching of the term integration, Simon reveals that she is cognizant that the concept is mired in a number of problems because in conclusion she asks:

How are we going to find an adequate symbolic language to account for the fractured and plural identities of those (more and more numerous) who are committed to Quebec and yet participate in several cultures? Or, rather, how are we going to re-imagine the very concept of culture in a way which does not assume specificity and exclusivity? (“Notes” 23)

We must be particularly careful about not allowing the concept, goal and ethic of integration in immigration to be the "sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 144). For it has not shown itself to be a particularly effective concept at resolving Quebec's social cohesion challenges; in fact, from what we have seen thus far, one would be more inclined to say that it shares a measure complicity in those processes. In fact, it is absolutely crucial that we bring our critical thought to bear on integration anew so as to allow for a recrudescence in contemporary thought on social cohesion in globalized contexts. For as Stephen Castles and Salée have both warned, it is clear that the nation-state has not fully understood, nor adequately conceived of how to respond to diversity (Castles 223; Salée, "De l'avenir" 163); and this fact is likely to reveal itself over time. Presently, we have the privilege of standing before a juncture that could open
differently unto the future. For Quebec has a fairly well-developed immigration apparatus and the state should not resign itself to poor statistics, it ought to preoccupy itself with further reconceptualizing and aggrandizing its services so as to maintain the particular dominance it holds in this field. Of course any move towards etiolating these corollaries of exclusion—especially if it is to be a sustainable one—will necessarily involve a significant rethinking, on the part government and society alike, about our approach to both the sense and composition of our political community (Salée, "De l'avenir" 163); to be sure, it is highly unlikely that conditions will improve if left to the winds of chance.
Chapter Three

Post-Mortem: A Genealogy of Integration throughout Quebec Immigration Discourse

There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.
Walter Benjamin. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”

No document is ever lost, the Court never forgets anything.
Franz Kafka. The Trial.

AUTOPSY No. A95-2004

Clinical Summary

The patient, a thirty-six year old concept of integration, had an extensive history with Quebec’s immigration practice and services. This history began on February 10, 1965 with the creation of le Service de l’immigration which operated as a subdivision of le ministère des Affaires culturelles. This carried on until November 27, 1968 when these services finally became their own ministry and were given the title of le ministère de l’immigration du Québec (MI).45 From these modest origins, integration gradually began taking on more of a presence and depth in Quebec immigration discourses. Remarkably though, this patient managed to avoid critical examination for the better part of its life. As

45 1968 had been a decisive year insofar as Quebec had just emerged from collectively pondering (in the form of Action Nationale’s release of États généraux du Canada français) its constitutional future the year before (Bellerose and Beauchemin 35).
such, this lynchpin of social cohesion could have been ill for quite some time and yet still have been none the wiser to its potential failings. You might be asking yourself what I am doing here. Well, I am carrying out an autopsy upon the body of integration... only this body is still very much alive. With an analytic scalpel in hand, I seek to cut into this body—into this corpus, so as to make those incisions that are absolutely necessary to understanding the subcutaneous elements that make integration what it is. For so long now, all we've had was the skin. But as Don DeLillo has so beautifully put it, "a surface separates inside from out and belongs no less to one than the other" (9). Therefore with this autopsy—this genealogical autopsy to be more precise, I seek to get at that which lies beyond the boundary of the skin, to get at the haggard viscera writ by history. This autopsic "genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 148). By making ever so careful lances I will get beyond the skin and, with its innards laid bare, interpret the signification of its organs and consider the very quiddity of the concept.

**Pertinent Gross & Microscopic Findings**

With regards to the state's use of integration, the breadth inherent to a genealogical perspective allows us to immediately realize that it is a freighted term that has undergone ostensibly slight but nevertheless telling vicissitudes. With that in mind, this research consists of examining all the annual reports issued between 1968 and 2004 along with some complimentary documentation that takes the concept of integration as its main focus. The rationale behind canvassing the annual reports as opposed to other documents lies in the fact that it wasn't until the 1990 communiqué entitled *Au Québec pour Bâtir*
even had a basic definition. Prior to that there had been a discernible emergence (Entstehung) (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 148) of the term in Quebec’s immigration discourses, however, in the descent (Herkunft) (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 145) that followed integration was set adrift in a sea of semantic ambiguity and it was left to mean whatever conventional definition that it held for a reader at that time. Indeed the inattentive use of so significant a term reveals that the Quebec government has, in some respects, allowed integration to exist without adequate reflection or problematization (or worse, it has abetted the concept in this regard). Consequently, this research seeks to both flesh out those aspects of integration that remain insufficiently considered and to reveal that these lacunae are grounds for a serious reassessment of the term vis-à-vis today’s sociological realities.

Methodologically speaking, this research has taken Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy as its chief inspiration. A discursive past is not one of an essentialist unfolding from a particular origin, but one of contingent, contested, and controlled forms of knowledge. Of course, as Foucault had specified “the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to it dissipation” (“Nietzsche” 162). In very much the same manner, my goal here isn’t to simply provide a diachronic cartography of the ethic, concept and goal of integration as it has existed in Quebec’s immigration discourse, instead my objective is to ‘commit to its dissipation’ from the inside out. For so long now, we’ve only had its skin. Which is to say that, for quite some time now, the only access that we’ve had to integration has been through the government’s discursive representations of it. And with integration
consistently being framed as carrying itself out in a harmonious fashion (Salée, “De l’avenir” 155; MCCI – MICC), these representations are of little avail with regards to understanding either the concept itself or the lived-reality of those undergoing its process. As such, Joseph H. Carens is absolutely correct when he concludes how “formal policy pronouncements are notoriously unreliable as a guide to actual practice” (“Immigration” 41).

And yet integration has been gravely ill for quite some time now. Much like the autopsic pathologist, the genealogist “must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 145). The body is a register; its organs, bones, ligaments and blood all bear history’s inscription. That is why Foucault finds Herkunfi to be such an apposite a tool for the genealogist. It offers her/him a means of construing descent. And a post-mortem examination, in a similar fashion, makes it possible to discern how “descent attaches itself to the body. [How] it inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; [how] it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diet, in the debilitated and prostrate body of those whose ancestors committed errors” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 147). Thus I am engaging in the unthinkable, I am cutting into the living body of integration. I believe that this analysis will, on one level, reveal how this body has been brain dead for some time, and on another, it will expose how government and scholarly discourses share a certain complicity in promulgating the semblance of integration’s healthy and flourishing life.

An overall review of the annual reports indicates that even though there is significant continuity to the use of integration in government texts, there are nevertheless important variations. For instance, when the Quebec government released the Rapport De
La Direction Générale Et Du Ministère De l'Immigration Pour l'Exercice Financier 1968-1969, which had been prepared by a branch of government that was then called the Ministère de l'Immigration [Ministry of Immigration] (MI), integration was often accompanied by the appendage ‘et l’adaptation’: “toujours en vue de faciliter l’intégration et l’adaptation des nouveaux venus dans la société québécoise [...]” (2). (Quantitatively, integration appears in this publication a total of 3 times and adaptation twice). The implication was that there was a necessary distinction between the two, and that both terms were indeed required. But were they? On one level, the arrivée, having only just completed their voyage here, was expected to begin an entirely new journey (albeit, one of unknown duration) of integrating into this society—to do that which was necessary to fit in if you will, and secondly, there was the additional—and in many ways tautological—proviso that this travel would demand some form of change on the part of the arrivée. Herein lies one of the problems with integration: its inhospitality. It is the welcome that isn’t... doubly so in fact. Additionally, there is a certain temporal irrationality here. One cannot hope to integrate, if one does not first adapt to the contingent surroundings that prevail. Integration demands change. As such, we bear witness here to a case of Entstehung. Entstehung or “emergence, is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of the Entstehung must delineate this interaction, the struggle these forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances [...]” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 149). The emergence here lay in the struggle between assimilation and integration, with the former reluctantly giving way to the latter. Indeed, the 1960s were marked by a besiegement of assimilation on multiple fronts (Juteau et al. 97). Thus like competing brothers, assimilation and integration find
themselves uncomfortably related to one another; and adaptation, in this regard, serves a vestige of that sibling rivalry.

Moreover in this publication, arrivées were referred to as immigrants, ‘des Néo-Québécois’ (new Quebecers), or, more rarely, ‘des nouveaux venus” (new comers). These terms are remarkable insofar as only some of them continue to exist in contemporary immigration discourse. The general eschewal of the term Néo-Québécois, is particularly unfortunate because its past use seemed to bespeak a heightened degree of prescience and hospitality (Derrida). Lastly in 1970, the MI began so decisively favoring the term ‘adaptation’ over that of ‘integration,’ that one of its three major sub-branches was actually entitled the ‘Direction Générale de l’Adaptation’ (Rapport de la direction 2). (Quantitatively, integration appears in this publication a total of 7 times and adaptation 10 times).

The MI was renamed le Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l’Immigration (MCCI) on April 30, 1981 (Rapport annuel 1981/1982 1). And almost immediately, this designation was criticized as enacting a dichotomy whereby Quebec’s ethnic citizens were separated from the prepolitical majority (Labelle et al. 228). It is important to remember that, as Zygmunt Bauman has said of the label of “ethnic minority,” these terms constitute an exercise of power from above (89-90). More often than not, these titles are imposed without the consent of the subject so named (Bauman 89-90). Moreover, as Louise Fontaine has pointed out, there is a fair bit of ambiguity as to what the appellation les communautés culturelles refers to (1045). Danielle Juteau et al. contend that:

the use of ‘communautés culturelles’ is presented in a very critical light, as a necessary evil acknowledging two sociological facts: the persistence of
an attachment to one's ethnic group by some Quebecers of non French-
Canadian background and the persistence of obstacles to full participation
linked to ethnic 'origin'. The statement is also very clear on the rejection
of any perspective that would postulate a necessary and automatic link
between ethnic origin and ethnic identity. (100)

So then, this name is to some extent a mark of failure. And, along these lines, we come to
realize that it doesn't refer solely to a past failure. No, in fact, it both refers to and
perpetuates that failure. For the title 'des Communautés Culturelles' identifies,
distinguishes (by drawing attention to difference) and distances (in the act of naming)
those, who have, at some point of another, arrived from elsewhere. Now with all title
quandaries aside, in the MCCI's first annual report it would seem that they had been
made aware of, and had corrected for, the intégration/adaptation temporal antinomy, for
they state:

L'accueil, l'adaptation et l'intégration des immigrants ont toujours été
considérés par le Ministère comme un ensemble d'opérations qu'il ne
pouvait assumer de façon exclusive. Le M.C.C.I. reconnaît la société
québécoise dans son ensemble comme la première responsable de
l'adaptation harmonieuse et de l'intégration des nouveaux venus dans le
milieu. (MI, Rapport annuel 1980/81 29)

The welcoming, adjustment and integration of immigrants has always
been considered by the ministry to be a set of operations that the ministry
itself could not be solely responsible for. The M.C.C.I. recognizes Quebec
society in its entirety as being those who are first responsible for the
harmonious adjustment and integration of new comers in this
environment.

Nevertheless, there are a number of other intriguing characteristics that emerge from this
publication. First, one can almost detect a caesura vis-à-vis the application of integration
in that it is more sparsely used in this text (the terms l'adaptation/établissement being
privileged instead) as compared to previous annual reports. Second, there is a particular
adjective that now begins to be coupled with integration, and it is: harmonious. This is

112
important to highlight because this nascent theme of concinnity still pervades contemporary immigration discourses on integration. Moreover, this theme of concinnity is also troubling insofar as it sets fairly lofty goals for Quebec immigration; is it realistic—or even ethical for that matter—to expect the ‘harmonious adjustment or integration’ of an arrivée into society? Or, is it realistic—or even ethical for that matter—to expect a government to orchestrate or compel such integrative harmony—in short, for them to be responsible for a goal such as that of societal concinnity? Invoking themes of concinnity in government immigration discourse is problematic insofar as leitmotifs such as these tend to set up goals that are unattainable from the very onset (and ones that are ethically questionable as well). Additionally, themes of concinnity such as these naturally create expectations on the part of arrivées with regards to the raising and redressal of their living standards (Salée, “De l’avenir” 147-149), yet it seems absolutely fair to question whether or not these idealized metaphors in fact do a disservice to the arrivée by giving them a rosier picture than is the case. Testing of the brain indicated that there was little mental activity. Instead, immigration goals need to be pragmatically conceived of via considerations of hospitality and feasibility. Third, when examining how integration was used by the MCCI during this era, it becomes immediately clear that the term itself has evolved and been significantly developed over the years. At this particular point in its history, integration comes off as a fairly underdeveloped term—so much so, that it is often used interchangeably with adaptation. (Quantitatively, integration appears in this publication a total of 15 times and adaptation 21 times).

In 1990, however, Robert Bourassa’s Liberal party made the first significant attempt to articulate the concept and ethic of integration (Karmis 87) and this came in the
form of the publication *Au Québec pour Bâtir Ensemble: Enoncé de Politique en Matière d'immigration et d'intégration* which inchoately outlined a ‘moral contract’ (*Un contrat moral garant d’une intégration réussie*) (MCCI, *Au Québec* 15) and a definition of integration ("L’intégration: un processus complexe et dynamique qui interpelle la société d’accueil dans son ensemble") (MCCI, *Au Québec* 44). (Quantitative considerations reveal that in this publication *integration* appears a total of 147 times and *adaptation* 44 times. With the shape that *integration* takes in this communiqué, we immediately realize that it is, beyond all contestations, the primary term, concept, ethic and goal in Quebec project of social cohesion. The use of *adaptation* is limited to references regarding the government’s disposition of its institutions. There is no longer any significant substitution between the two). Quebec’s moral contract, is predicated upon the three following tenets:

- *une société dont le français est la langue commune de la vie publique;*  
  a society whereby French is the common language of public life;

- *une société démocratique où la participation et la contribution de tous sont attendues et favorisées;*  
  a democratic society where the participation and contribution of all is expected and encouraged;

- *une société pluraliste ouverte aux multiple apports dans les limites qu'imposent le respect des valeurs démocratiques fondamentales et la nécessité de l'échange intercommunautaire. (MCCI, Au Québec 15)*  
  a pluralist society open to the multiple benefits that emerge within the limits set by an overriding respect of fundamental democratic values and the necessity of intercommunity exchange.

For the Quebec government, this ‘moral contract’ identifies the three critical points of agreement that an arrivée must be in accord with if they wish to join Quebec society.
Moreover, agreement on these tenets is also essential because it creates the stable ground upon which successful *integration* may be achieved.

Surprising as it may seem, the ‘moral contract’ poses some rather unsettling ethical questions. To wit, I offer the following parable. In the very first year of my employment with *le Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration*, I was faced with a rather disquieting training situation. One of the various women who was overseeing the training of myself and a colleague of mine, told us about the ‘moral contract.’ Believing it to merely be one of those forms of ‘government’ discourse best left to pamphlet consultation (by an individual at a time of her/his choosing), I asked a question that would carry our training along another path. Yet fearing that we had not taken it seriously enough, the lady returned to ‘moral contract’ and unflaggingly explained how very important it was. As she was explaining, I began to wonder how awkward the very creation of a ‘moral contract’ seemed to be. I was suddenly roused out of my pondering when she concluded that, at some point in our 45 minute information session (which explained to an arrivée how to find lodging, employment, or how to register for French courses, etc.), we had to explicate the particulars of the ‘moral contract’ and confirm that the arrivée understood that s/he would be held to it. I was nonplussed. Not only was the very idea of a ‘moral contract’ absolutely gauche to me—but beyond that, the requirement that I outline a *contract of being* with arrivées seemed so ethically fraught that I could not participate in such a process without serious compunction. After providing her explanation of the ‘moral contract,’ she drew to a close with the extremely discomforting: “*il faut leur expliquer comment ça marche ici*” (you have explain to them how it works here). Constituting both an insult to, and infringement
upon, an Other’s being, I could not get past the problematic nature of it all. I couldn’t get past how (a) the ‘moral contract’ gets perniciously invoked as a cleansing or purifying (of difference) tool, (b) how it unfolds from colonialist traditions insofar as it outlines a set of rules that an arrivée must learn and follow if s/he is to join this ‘civilized society,’ and (c) how it inscribes and enacts a negative anlage which an arrivée will be subjected and held to. *Examination of the liver revealed it to be acutely worn from overuse.*

Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, in their article "Interculturalism: Expanding the Boundaries of Citizenship," frame the ‘moral contract’ as being “a reciprocal endeavour [...] between the host society and the particular cultural group, with the aim of establishing a forum for the empowerment of all citizens—"a common public’” (375). Presented in a ‘reciprocal’ light, the contract seems to be a benevolent device. However, let us not forget that this ‘contract’ is, above all, a provision imposed upon the arrivée by a prepolitical majority; its ‘reciprocality’ is second to an initial act of power, one that is far from neutral. The ‘moral contract’ is less of a reciprocal device and more precisely a *ritual of empowerment* (Hage 29). Ghassan Hage describes *rituals of empowerment* as consisting of those acts that, however benevolently framed they may be, nevertheless constitute an imposition whereby the government along with the prepolitical majority maintain the “*power to talk and make decisions about*” (Hage 29) the becoming of Others. Quebec’s immigration practice and services are of course replete with such *rituals of empowerment* (Hage 29) i.e.: *le contrat moral, le fait français*, the process of *integration* itself, etc.—obviously with some being less problematic than others. All of these elements serve to concomitantly reinforce the Self (often at the Others’ expense) and warn the Other. *The initial visual inspection of the inner cavity of the chest revealed*
the heart to be ill-positioned. Moreover, they constitute a form of compulsion in immigration discourses that I find extremely troubling. It for this reason that one must certainly take issue with naïve comments regarding the compulsive nature of immigration discourses. For instance, Carens (who is one of the few Canadian scholars, outside of Quebec, to actually address and support its immigration practices) remarks that: “what is surprising from this perspective is how little adaptation Quebec expects of immigrants and how little of that seems “distinct”” (Carens, “Immigration” 43). A comment such as this, I would argue, could only come from someone who has not adequately surveyed the sizable amount of government documentation on arrivée integration. For if one were to do so, they would quickly realize that integration is in fact quite demanding and it often finds itself locking horns, so to speak, with issues of democracy and of ethics more broadly. Moreover, a comment such as this could only ever ostensibly be true in theory and not in praxis.

To integrate oneself, as far the MCCI is concerned, is to become an integral part of a collectivity that is itself emerging from a particular model of social relations (Au Québec 44). Thus from this, it is clear that integration is fluxional, synchronic and something that is to be carried out individually at varying rhythms (MCCI, Au Québec 46). In fact, the MCCI states that the process of integration can, in many cases, take a number of generations before being fully achieved (Au Québec 47). Furthermore, because of integration’s indeterminable temporality and inherent synchronicity, the MCCI admits that integration-related policy must itself be flexible and dynamic. As well, the MCCI identifies Quebeckers as being just as crucial to accomplishing the project of integration as the arrivées themselves, because as hosts they are called upon to welcome, and be open
to, the arrivée’s full participation in Quebec society (Au Québec 45). Nevertheless, included with this bifurcation of responsibility is the caveat that the contemporary character of the francophone majority (charged with a particular history) has the effect of complicating the problematic of integration further still (Au Québec 48). The question of how integration is complicated by that character, is one that gets left to the reader to answer for her/himself. And yet, if the whole of Quebec society is summoned by the project of integration, then it strikes me as though the understanding and posing of such a question becomes absolutely imperative. Because frankly, how does one negotiate the contradictory inclinations of a preservation of sameness and an openness to difference simultaneously?

After the release of Au Québec pour Bâtir Ensemble: Enoncé de Politique en Matière d’immigration et d’intégration, however, three things became clear. First, the concept and ethic of integration, really started to take on a particular shape and resonance in immigration discourse. Second, when the government spoke of integration, they were necessarily speaking of a threefold process that was composed of linguistic, social and economic fields (Mc Andrew; MRCI 1997-2004; MCCI 1990-1996). And third, that integration was so central to immigration practice and services that it was to be considered as indissociable from it (MCCI, Au Québec 15).

Now even though the MCCI had, in its publication of Au Québec pour Bâtir Ensemble: Enoncé de Politique en Matière d’immigration et d’intégration, devoted six full-length pages to articulating the concept and ethic of integration as it should pertain to Quebec immigration practice, it had nevertheless remained decidedly vague/general on some fundamental issues (as is common with most government publications). It is quite
possible that the sparing attention that has been given to integration—on the part of successive governments—has had something to do with the general reticence they have shown towards confronting the issue of civic relations and drafting clear policy on it (Mc Andrew 311). Indeed many of the questions that existed prior to this publication, still remain. For instance, questions surrounding the ethicality, feasibility, clarity and the lived-reality of integration still abound. Moreover, a close examination of the usage of integration in government texts reveals that serious stumbling blocks still remain, such as: the generous use of the troubling theme of concinnity; redefinitions of l'identitaire québécois that seem, in many instances, to go no further than the texts themselves; a general articulation of what a successful integration consists of; whether or not integration is realistic; its future-oriented and goal-focused discursive bent (as opposed to one that would take the problems of the present as its premise), etc.

The MCCI was subsumed into le Ministère des Affaires internationales, de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (MAIICC) on June 17, 1994 (MAIICC, Rapport annuel 1994/1995 17), and was created to shoulder international affairs, the cultural communities and immigration services. In 1994, under the leadership of Daniel Johnson's Liberal party, the MAIICC was initially created with the objective of merging the ministries of International Affairs and the Cultural Communities and Immigration into a single branch of government. However, when the Parti Québécois, led by Jacques Parizeau, won a majority government in that same year, they effectively quashed the proposed merger and kept the ministry in a hybridized state pending the outcome of the 1995 referendum. Therefore, even though integration (was deployed in a very similar fashion as it was under the MCCI) was certainly present in this publication, it was
nevertheless forced to take a backseat to all the transitional concerns and issues that the ministries’ proposed merger had leavened. However, it should be noted that one of the themes that emerges most forcefully is a *compulsion*—and expectation—from the government, that an arrivée *do the work necessary* to become a *full citizen* (*MAIICC, Rapport annuel 1994/1995* 17). In fact, the government states that it will support *integration*-related initiatives that are brought forward by arrivées and the cultural communities themselves (*MAIICC, Rapport annuel 1994/1995* 17). And this is troubling in some respects, because it implies that there is, embedded within *integration*, this obstinate expectation—on the part of Quebec government—that the arrivée *carry out the work that is owed to them*, that—upon arrival—they be prepared to *do more work*, that they *render the services required of them, so as to show thanks*. In short, that which is most troubling about this *compulsion to integrate* is how it all too easily folds back into a ‘western society as savior’ narrative (Razack 89), whereby a discernible relationship of power is created and the arrivée’s new life abroad is thrust further into deficit as a result.

Stark power imbalances such as these, however, find themselves etched into Quebec’s project of *interculturalism*. *Interculturalism* is that which outlines the relationship that Quebec’s prepolitical community is to share with the various ethnic groups that make up its sociological landscape. And, of course, questions regarding Quebec’s policies of *interculturalism or integration* are critical in that they are ultimately indissociable from the questions regarding its future (Gagnon and Iacovino 374). Gagnon and Iacovino indicate that as it rests on a normative framework, *interculturalism* solicits two primary considerations (372-373). The first being a recognition of citizenship that affords an acknowledgment of cultural identity along with the concomitant understanding
that full and equal participation means that such members be allowed “to maintain their cultural differences when affecting the affairs of the polity through democratic participation” (Gagnon and Iacovino 373); beyond that, there must be a realization and acceptance that this kind of participation will naturally result in cultural identities making their mark on government affairs and policy. With regards to this first point, everything seems to be fair and ethically sound. The second, however, is where the trouble lies. The second consideration, they argue, states that for the first to be feasible, a “common ground for dialogue”—that is, a “centre that also serves as a marker of identity in the larger society and denotes a pole of allegiance for all citizens” (Gagnon and Iacovino 373) is also required. The problem with the centre, innocently conceived as it is, is that access to it is far more complicated than Gagnon and Iacovino are willing to acknowledge. However much Gagnon and Iacovino waltz with interculturalism in a realm of abstraction, l’identitaire québécois’ practical realities are such that it is naïve to claim that one only needs a proficiency in French to be recognized as québécois. As chapter 2 has demonstrated, l’identitaire québécois is far more complex than that; it concerns not only a certain linguistic commitment, but also an intricate set of political, cultural and economic ones, ones that are fairly nuanced and oftentimes inaccessible, prima facie, to the arrivée as a result. Moreover and in addition to that, their discussion of interculturalism startlingly overlooks the power relations held by the prepolitical majority. Theirs’ is an assessment that nearly paints such relations of power as equal. Or, it limns those relations of power as being a simple centripetal wheel in which the centre merely consists of a shared-commitment to Quebec’s political, cultural and economic affairs in French. However, a view of social cohesion such as this pays scant attention to
the impediments broached by the traditions, social practices, collective memories, collective experiences (of oppression), etc. that are particular to various segments to Quebec's prepolitical majority. An interpretation such as this eschews the significant complications that arise, as Micheline Labelle et al. remark:

À la juxtaposition égalitaire des groupes qui a inspiré la politique sur le multiculturalisme le gouvernement du Québec a plutôt préféré une structure hiérarchique mettant côté à côté deux catégories d'individus, d'une part, la <<nation québécoise>> et, d'autre part, les <<communautés culturelles>>. Les rapports qui lient ces deux éléments sont à la fois exclusifs et partiellement inclusifs: exclusifs dans la mesure où la nation québécoise ne fait référence qu'aux francophones québécois, inclusifs puisque les membres des groupes ethnoculturels sont appelés à s'intégrer au premier groupe. L'ambiguïté demeure tout de même, en dépit d'une acculturation réussie puisque la <<nation québécoise>> est d'abord celle des francophones québécois. Les membres des minorités visibles, ceux qui sont nés à l'extérieur du Canada ou dont la langue maternelle n'est pas le français, ne participent pas à cette définition de la <<nation québécoise>>. (221)

With regard to the equal juxtaposition of groups which inspired the policy of multiculturalism, the Quebec government instead preferred a hierarchical structure that placed two categories of individuals side by side, on the one hand, the "Quebec nation" and, on the other, the "cultural communities." The relationship that links these two elements is concomitantly exclusive and partially inclusive: exclusive in that the Quebec nation refers only to francophone Quebeckers, inclusive because the members of ethnocultural groups are called upon to integrate themselves into the former group. An ambiguity nevertheless exists, even with a successful acculturation aside, because the Quebec nation is that of francophone Quebeckers to begin with. Members of a visible minority, those born outside of Canada or those whose mother tongue is not French, do not participate in this definition of the Quebec nation.

Emerging in the same year as Quebec's referendum on sovereignty-association, this quote provides an uncharacteristically frank—even if somewhat confused—assessment of its approach to immigration. Labelle et al., in their articulation of interculturalism entitled "Pluriethnicité, citoyenneté, et intégration: de la souveraineté, pour lever les obstacles et les ambiguïtés," [Pluriethnicity, citizenship, and integration: sovereignty, to lift away
obstacles and ambiguities] reveal both the dynamics behind the concept along with the
central quandary that impedes its overall success. First off, it is worth noting that
interculturalism is as much a means of social cohesion as it is a highly political riposte to
Canadian multiculturalism (Gagnon and Iacovino 373). Thus when interculturalism does
get mentioned, it is often in contradistinction to Canada’s multiculturalism (another
fraught concept, see Bannerji along with Bissoondath) for the two have been set against
one another in many a debate (Juteau et al. 95). However, multiculturalism found itself at
the centre of Quebec’s ire because its conceptual structuring has had the effect of
obviating Quebec’s position of being an instrumental partner in the foundation of
Canada; for, as they argue, it places Quebec on equal positioning with any other cultural
group living within the bounds of the nation (Juteau et al. 98; Labelle et al. 243). In many
ways, federal policies such as these have been catalysts in the development of Quebec’s
nationalist discourses and policies. That which is also important about interculturalism as
opposed to multiculturalism, is where the latter juxtaposes all cultural groups on equal
footing, the former explicitly subordinates all such groups to a common public that is the
‘Quebec nation.’ And as Labelle et al. remark, this structural difference has the potential
for being either inclusive or exclusive in that it places the prepolitical majority and the
cultural communities alongside one another with the understanding that the latter
integrate into the former group (221). Nevertheless, it is rather important to point out that
however much effort is made in representing these two groups as being on a equal
playing field, it would be manifestly quixotic to believe this to be true. For the
prepolitical majority obviously holds a position of dominance over any and all members
of the cultural communities and will likely continue to hold sway over them in that the
Quebec state remains predominantly inclined towards francophone Quebecers (Salée, "Espace publique" 142). As such, it is less accurate to speak of an invitation to integrate than it is an imperative to integrate; for failure to do so is to consign oneself to a perpetual state of non-being. In fact, it is even valid to question whether or not the arrivée actually exists when setting foot on this land because of course they have yet to begin, much less accomplish, this process of integration; accordingly, the term ‘arrivée’ itself seems to be a most apposite designation in that it presumes nothing more than is the case. It is in this way that we come to realize what a weighty demand integration is. Labelle et al. only serve to confirm this, when they explain that:

Le processus d'intégration se situe explicitement dans le cadre d'un certain projet de la société québécoise et doit participer, de ce fait, à la consolidation du projet national des francophones québécois. [...] Le niveau des attentes est fort élevé. L'effort exigé va au-delà de la simple acquisition de l'habileté linguistique, mais inclut un engagement quant à son développement. Cette volonté est explicitement exprimée à travers les trois composantes qui constituent le 'contrat moral' [...]. (224)

The process of integration is explicitly situated within the cadre of one of Quebec society’s particular projects and it must participate, from this fact, towards the consolidation of francophone Quebecers’ national project. The level of expectations is quite high. The effort required must go beyond the simple acquisition of linguistic ability, it includes an engagement towards its development. This will is explicitly expressed across the three elements that constitute the ‘moral contract.’

First, it is interesting to note that, during particular moments of intensity—such the months surrounding a referendum for instance, the discursive tone regarding l'identitaire québécois, arrivées and citizenship swings noticeably in the direction of self-preservation rather than that of openness (this is especially the case with Labelle et al.'s article). And second, along with some of Quebec’s nationalist discourses, integration too is a demand that might very well be guilty of presupposing a far greater political

124
engagement from its arrivées than is reasonable (Salée, “De l’avenir” 146). Nevertheless Labelle et al. argue that interculturalism is inclusive in that it affords arrivées’ integration into the Quebec nation.

However, inclusivity can be a rather subjective thing. For if we remind ourselves of chapter two’s analysis of the complexity behind l’identitaire québécois’ state of play, we remember that there is a troubling tendency within dominant conceptions of l’identitaire québécois to conflate Quebec’s political project(s) with its reality (Salée, “Espace publique” 133). It follows, then, that there is a very undemocratic potential associated with integration when conceived of in this way. Along such lines one can remark how desires for sovereignty can get confusingly commingled with questions of full integration into l’identitaire québécois and the Quebec nation. This obviously problematic potential reflects the uneasy relationship that some segments of l’identitaire québécois share with democracy.\(^{46}\) For as Labelle et al. importantly underscore an ambiguity nevertheless persists in that, all successful acculturations aside, the ‘Quebec nation’ is still that of the prepolitical majority to begin with’ (221).

Hage’s reflections upon the complexity of tolerance are very apposite to our considerations of integration’s functioning in Quebec immigration apparatus, for they cue us into the nuanced dynamics of power that operate in this province. For instance, just as tolerance in a multiculturalist dispositif serves to perpetuate particular power relations and inequalities (Hage 24), integration in an interculturalist dispositif affords Quebec’s prepolitical majority a continued grasp of the current power relations, which, as a result and however inadvertently, furthers the inequalities encountered by those

\(^{46}\) Of course, it is important to underscore that not all members of Quebec’s prepolitical majority see sovereignty as a necessary step in Quebec’s political development.
inevitably marked by difference. In this way, concepts such as these only serve to reproduce unjust power dynamics (Hage 25) that inevitably influence social cohesion and societal relations. And again implicit within this conundrum of being is a kind of girded existence that gets meted out to the arrivée: you can exist but only insofar as you do not disturb our reality(s) or derail our political project(s). This tension permeates throughout the tenets of interculturalism and the ‘moral contract’ that grounds it. For Quebec’s common public culture is conceptualized as a convergent social space in which “the established “modes of being” in economic, political, and socio-cultural realms are to be respected as markers of identification and citizenship status” (Gagnon and Iacovino 376).

It is curious how things sound in abstraction. It seems to me that a ‘mode of being’ is itself always in flux. And that such a state is a fortiori fluxional when one introduces difference into it. Nevertheless, a command is placed upon this ‘mode of being,’ the behest that these established modes of being be respected as markers of identification and citizenship. So on the one level, the arrivée’s alterity is simultaneously underscored and reinscribed by the forewarning that established modes of being need to be heeded. And on the other, the arrivée is informed that these modes of being are to be construed as markers of identity and citizenship. So then it is to these abstracted and nebulous modes of being that the arrivée’s convergence with l’identitaire québécois is left. Yet it is seems to me that many other questions are left there as well. For instance, what are the bounds of the arrivée’s being? What limits are there to the influence that s/he might have upon those modes and within those realms? Because these modes are already ‘established,’ right? With Daniel Salée’s insight regarding how arrivées have encountered great difficulty in moving into the midrange and higher-end management positions (“De
l’aventir” 157), what should we be led to believe? Is it that these arrivées have not properly respected those modes of being? Or is it that they have allowed themselves to be perhaps too generous in the amount of creativity that they bring to these ‘established modes of being’?

In Juteau et al.’s comparative assessment between Canadian multiculturalsim and Québécois interculturalism some particular inconsistencies emerge. Drawing out the commonalities between the two, they suggest that both concepts constitute a response to older assimilationist models in which pluralism was discouraged rather than celebrated (Juteau et al. 101). Juteau et al. mention that during the 1900s “Quebec and Canada as a whole seemed to be articulating a civic type of nationalism, transcending both the ethnic and jacobinist-assimilationist models” (100); remarkably though, they say this as though Quebec had by now surely moved beyond jacobinist-assimilationist discourses, yet the work of Dimitrios Karmis reveals how these discourses remain a central part of the competing discourses narrating Quebec’s relationship with pluralism (81). Continuing on in their comparison of the two concepts, Juteau et al. explain how the government is expected to allotted a portion of their budget towards language and cultural programs that avail the arrivée’s participation in society (101). Then Juteau et al. go on to explain how both concepts demonstrate an understanding that “the actualization of equality requires more than formal equality” (101). Yet a moment later, they reveal how Quebec’s policy statement on interculturalism “pays less attention to anti-racism” (Juteau et al. 101) than Canada’s policy of multiculturalsim officially does. Though multiculturalsim is manifoldly problematic in its own right (see Bannerji along with Bissoondath), with our focus on interculturalism and integration it seems to me that a policy that does not place
a marked emphasize upon anti-racism is somehow not fully cognizant that equality needs actualization. Moreover, a little further on, Juteau et al. conversely intimate that they are those in Quebec who aren’t entirely interested in going too far beyond a formal equality in that the appeal interculturalism that holds for them is its refusal to equalize all identities (all identities are attached to the epicenter of la culture québécoise); such proponents of the concept argue that interculturalism allows them to avoid “potential confinement within the boundaries of a community that multiculturalism, so they argue, imposes on them” (101).

Methodologically, Gagnon and Iacovino’s article approaches interculturalism in a similar fashion. Here again they invoke multiculturalism as a foil for interculturalism. In a rather odd stroke, they contend that, implied within multiculturalism’s zero-sum juxtaposition of identities, is a lack of public culture such that no minority can truly “make their mark” (Gagnon and Iacovino 383). Conversely, they posit that interculturalism offers such a possibility in that it is through one’s participation in Quebec’s common public culture that an arrivée can effectively make her/his mark; that mark of course takes the shape of recognition, and as they argue “recognition is an outcome of participation” (Gagnon and Iacovino 383).

47 This is not to say that Quebec is oblivious to the consideration of anti-racism, for as its Charter of Rights indicates:

“RÉPARATION DE PRÉJUDICE: 49. Une atteinte illicite à une liberté reconnu par la présente Charte confère à la victime le droit d’obtenir la cessation de cette atteinte et la réparation du préjudice moral ou matériel qui en résulte. En cas d’atteinte illicite et intentionnelle, le tribunal peut en outre condamner son auteur à des dommages-intérêts punitifs.”

Moreover, it has instituted la Semaine d’actions contre le racisme (Action against Racism Week) along with le Mois de l’histoire des Noirs (Black History Month) so as to sensitize its citizens to issues of anti-racism and diversity (MRCI Des valeurs 93).
Nothing is for free. As such we mustn’t forget that participation is prescriptive, there are always rules to follow. In fact, even prior to that point you must of course be deemed fit to participate before taking to the field. And, of course, there are a number of potential impediments to participation. However, Gagnon and Iacovino pretty much gloss over these—at least with respect to interculturalism. The only obstacle that they cite in their analysis is that there remains a “continuing ambivalence with regard to the legitimacy of the Québec model in the eyes of ethnocultural groups” (Gagnon and Iacovino 385). Though of course this is a ‘minor’ thing, one that they treat as a ‘meaningless and rather inconsequential’ insight. However, this perception—held by those who actually undergo the experience of this concept—stands in direct contrast to the laudatory view both Gagnon and Iacovino have of interculturalism. Flagrant abjurations such as these indeed confirm Salée’s contention that there remains a frightening inability, on the part of theorists, to fully grasp the complexity of the nation (“De l’avenir” 141-142).

The MAIICC had a rather short spell as a ministry. It was replaced by the far more apposite le Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration (MRCI) in September 1996 and this marked an important turning point in immigration practice insofar as many of the government offices which were closely-related to such affairs had now fallen under its responsibility (MRCI, Rapport annuel 1996/1997 9). And, moreover, as can be deduced from the name, the creation of this ministry brought with it a greater sensitivity (in general) to the othering that could result from appellations that identified arrivées and ethnic groups as distinct and separate from the rest of Quebec society (MRCI, Rapport annuel 1996/1997 9); thus, a title such as that of the Ministry of Citizen Relations and of Immigration attempts to bridge the gap and reveal, quite rightly, that in
the end, we are all in the same boat so to speak. Though the documentation issued by the MRCI bespeaks a marked improvement from those of previous years, there nevertheless remains a tacit confirmation that some of the problematic integration-related themes of the past continue to tarry. A number of these concern a failure, on the part of arrivées, to accomplish the integration goals set for them by the government. Of course, these failures take many forms. For instance, within some of the MRCI’s responsibilities vis-à-vis immigration practice and services, one can still detect the faint echoes of these continued failings:

*Offre des services d’intégration et de francisation qui permettent à la personne immigrante de trouver sa place, notamment dans les réseaux francophones de la société québécoise, de remplir ses obligations civiques et de contribuer au développement de son milieu. (MRCI, *Rapport annuel de gestion 2003/2004 2)*

Offers integration and French language services that allow immigrants to find their place, notably in the Francophone networks of Quebec society, to fulfill their civic obligations and to contribute to the development of their environment.


Encourages the attraction and lasting settlement of immigrants in the regions outside of greater Montreal, notably within the nation’s capital, in such a way that all of Quebec can profit from the advantages of immigration.

In the former, the implicit suggestion is that arrivées are lost and not properly *fitting in*. Or, alternatively, they are trying to fit into the wrong linguistic communities. This is problematic in that there is a particular place that they are meant to find—one and only one. For in that place they are expected to fulfill their civic obligations and contribute to the betterment of their environment; because, of course, nobody wants efforts such as
these to be wasted on some other community. Behind every policy lies an inveterate expectation. In the latter, these arrivées have once again somehow lost their way—they just don’t get it. Or, they have gone to the desired places but have not remained. What occurs here is a construction of the arrivée as an intractable and insecure individual always lazily resorting to the comfort and safety of a shared community, rather than populating Quebec’s vast expanse of land. What’s more, is that by remaining in Montreal they aren’t fulfilling their civic obligations elsewhere, and of course there is much work to be done. These forms of discourse troublingly construct arrivées in other ways as well, for example:

Le Québec est une société démocratique où l’expression des rivalités ethniques, politiques et religieuses n’est pas tolérée […]. (MRCI, Des valeurs 80)

Quebec is a democratic society where the expression of ethnic, political or religious rivalry is not tolerated.

Figured in this way, the arrivée is, from the very onset, constructed as cantankerous, politically underdeveloped and likely to be an administrative burden. The moralistic nature of these collected declarations adumbrate the bounds of being that an arrivée is expected to fit into. By the circumspective bent of these statements—which are themselves very much reflective of the ethical problems rooted in the term—it becomes clear that there is very little leeway within integration, an arrivée’s potential being is proleptically girded because, as you know, you’ve got to watch out for those immigrants and what they bring with them from their lands.

One mutation that is particularly worthy of note is that of the annual report’s change in name. For the 2001/2002 annual report, the MRCI changed their title from Rapport Annuel (and the appropriate two years) to Rapport Annuel de gestion 2002/2003
(Annual Management Report 2002/2003) and one wonders whether or not this change in name, brings with it a change in mentality towards immigration services. For it would appear that now the ministry perceives itself as being one of many conglomerates all working together under the umbrella of a money-managing state. Of course, refractions such as these often bring particular consequences with them.

In a disheartening denouement vis-à-vis integration’s development in Quebec’s immigration practice and services, there was an unexpected change in the ministry’s name (circa 2005): le Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (MICC). Lingering upon the new name, we of course return to a bothersome conclusion. The cultural communities… this title is of course a naming of difference. However, it also strikes me as being a securing of that difference (especially as compared to the ministry’s former name). Forever the cultural communities they shall remain. Though apart of, they are forever apart from. This fixing bent is akin to racializing, a tendency whereby individuals become tokens of a particular race. Thus, unique individuals become seen not as the singular individuals that they are, but instead as a token of race, as manifestations of a different and homogenous race. Positioning, in this regard, can be a fruitful line of thought with which to consider the conceptual problems that striate integration. In regards to tolerance, Hage makes the very trenchant insight that tolerance is an active practice and one that leads to a particular positioning of the Other (28). Thus, Others by dint of their difference find themselves at the margins; to be tolerant of them, then, is to simultaneously recognize and reaffirm that very fact, to acknowledge that position and maintain it. Integration is not that dissimilar. A concept of integration recognizes and highlights Others’ outsider positioning and reminds them of it all.
throughout their efforts; the MICC’s recent change in name attests to this fact. *Attempts to disgorge liquids from the aorta revealed there to be longstanding blockages in many of its arterial branches.*

Lastly, it is important for us to recognize that there is a very important distinction to be made between official government discourse, and how govern(mental) notions (and goals) are taken up (or *received*) by society. In the opening paragraph of her article “Immigration, Pluralism, and Education,” Marie Mc Andrew carefully asserts that one of the major societal changes that Quebec has encountered in the last 30 years has been “the opening of institutions and civil society to pluralism, reflected in the evolution of discourses, policies, and programs in this regard” (307). The ‘opening’ that Mc Andrews speaks of, is substantiated only by “discourses, policies, and programs” (307). However, altruistic government goals do not always translate faithfully when conveyed to the public. In fact, it is not uncommon for disjunctures to develop. As such, it is important for us to consider how *integration*—as it is supposed to invoke the participation of the prepolitical majority (*MCCI, Au Québec* 45)—is received by indigenous Quebeckers. To be sure, few of those who are ‘also targeted’ will ever read these governmental communiqués regarding the ethic, concept and goal of *integration*. Consequently, it becomes extremely valid to question these persons’ understanding of the term. One can—and I would argue must—ask how it is conceived of by those in the public realm who have little or no access to the institutional/government-based discourses devised upon the subject. A study of Quebeckers’ conceptions of *integration* might very well yield startling results.
Using the various mutations of Quebec’s ministries of immigration as signposts, we have retraced the evolution of the concept, ethic and goal of integration up until the very present. This kind of approach has allowed us to observe how the ushering in of new ministries has brought with them particular variations to the conception and usage of integration. And, empowered with a genealogical gaze, we have been able to discern how integration, like most forms of knowledge, is both fluxionally and particularly constituted by a number of discourses that have been self-interestedly conferred legitimacy by the powers that be; in this way, our approach to assessing integration is one in which:


to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is [one in which] to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us […] (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 146)

Moreover judging from the discursive regularity that this analysis has fleshed out, we realize that, with regards to integration’s Herkunft, it is an underdeveloped accident that has been made to persist over a such significant span of time that it has become “the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 144).

Clinical Correlation

Why must we consider integration? What makes it so very important? Well, with it being the citizenship project that primes the being of approximately 30,000 arrivées every year, it certainly warrants consideration. Moreover the ethic, concept and goal of integration finds itself deeply imbricated within many facets of Quebec; indeed as Victor Piché
argues, it is inextricably linked to the triumvirate of: nationalism, integration and demography (142). Demographically speaking, the concept of integration is only a matter of interest when a society’s majority recognizes that their fecundity is in jeopardy (Piché 144). As such integration, insofar as it exists in Quebec, is intimately tied to issues of risk management vis-à-vis l’identitaire québécois. Demographic research has in the past tended to support this claim in that much of the research was concerned with answering the following question: with which linguistic groups do arrivées gravitate towards when integrating into Quebec society (Piché 145; Gagnon and Iacovino 374)? It follows, contends Piché, that such research attempts to ascertain the degree of risk posed to the prepolitical majority by arrivées. Viewed in this light, we can see the compulsive bent towards social management that subtends the concept, ethic and goal of integration. And additionally, one must also remark that if integration operates in Quebec as a technology of risk management, as a tool used to ensure the safety of the self, then, it is highly unlikely that it will ever be subjected to a critical lens. To be sure, our autopsy of its use in government discourse certainly confirms this abjuration to be the case. However, part of what also motivates this research is the fact that many of the elements that are so problematic about integration have managed to slip underneath the radar of Quebec’s scholarly realm as well. Which is to say that the critical lens that one would normally expect Quebec’s academic community to bring to bear upon the concept has generally remained tucked away in a dusty drawer. It is in this way that this somewhat contingently constituted term has been allowed to comfortably gain a foothold in Quebec’s discourses of social cohesion, even though it is many ways one of the impediments of such a project.
One of the only theorists to really face the concept of integration head-on, so to speak, is Michel Pagé. In his article “Intégration, identité ethnique et cohésion sociale,” Pagé ambitiously tackles the triad of integration, ethnic identity and social cohesion. Unfortunately though, his primary goal lies in providing a conceptual clarification of these concepts rather than giving his reader any thorough or critical assessment of how these notions play themselves out in Quebec society. His work confirms how the choice of integration, as a means of achieving social cohesion, is always a prescient one; for integration is of course a fairly laden concept. To be sure, integration is one form of interaction that a society can take vis-à-vis difference, one that seeks to strike a balance between conserving a majority’s cultural identity and characteristics and developing positive relations with myriad ethnic groups (Pagé 119); it is in this way that integration is, ab ovo, marked by a tension of some sort. But then again it is not as simple as that, for there are many faces to integration. Which is to say that there is more than one way to conceive of the term.

Pagé’s analysis is useful in this regard as he offers three different conceptions of the term, and they are as follows: multiple cultural spaces, common cultural spaces and common civic spaces (120). The multiple cultural spaces kind of integration is one whereby ethnic communities, having predominantly occupied a single space within the majority’s territory, are given full right to establish their own, exclusive norms that are derived from the particularities of their cultural identity (Pagé 123). Within this notion ethnic communities, being so concerned with preserving the integrity of their own cultural identity, have a pronounced tendency of remaining detached from other ethnic communities or the majority (Pagé 122). Amid this dynamic, the contact occurring
between such an ethnic community with others or the majority is often the result of a shared-interest regarding a particular issue (Pagé 141). When this is not the case, ethnic communities such as these enter into public discussions as fairly uniform pressure groups whose political involvement stems from very specific community-centered interests (Pagé 145). Considered within the full spectrum of social cohesion, it is clear that the *multiple cultural spaces* kind of *integration* is not the most desirable insofar as it is predicated upon an anlage that explicitly favors cultural exclusivity and that augurs a political future that will always be subject to intense debate among different community interests.

*Common cultural space* is an understanding of *integration*, in which myriad cultural communities constantly associate with one another, however all of them refrain from rigidly carving out their own community spaces. In contrast to the *multiple cultural spaces* kind of *integration*, their means of identity constitution is intrinsically polycultural.\(^{48}\) Thus *common cultural spaces* afford a play of identity in which members of ethnic communities frequently appropriate the norms and cultural traits of the other various ethnic identities or the majority in their midst, yet they do so all the while maintaining their own distinct and proper cultural identities (Pagé 126). Within a social formation such as this, the majority find themselves on equal footing with all the other ethnic communities and are prepared to give them whatever space is necessary for their cultural affirmation (Pagé 134). Within this conception, difference is not perceived as menacing, but instead as naturally enriching (Pagé 126). Within this kind of *integration*, though shared-interests often constitute a bridge between various ethnic communities and

\(^{48}\) Pagé defines polyculturalism as a form of culture that fully reflects all the forms of diversity that inhere within it and that expressly encourages a profusion of exchange amongst its different constituents (126).
the majority, it is more importantly the explicit valorization of difference that superintends their political involvement with one another (Pagé 142).

With regards to the political consequences of this kind of integration, it is very revealing to note how most theorists often conclude that this free play of difference naturally portends a disaster of some sort. Which is to say that there is something suspect about how difference is often metaphorically represented as destructive. In chapter two, we saw how Jacques Beauchemin has argued that Quebec’s political subject has been severely etiolated by the increasingly plural nature of its sociological composition ("Le sujet" 208). And when speaking of the common civic space kind of integration versus that of the common cultural spaces, Pagé warns that:

*Ce principe ne consiste pas à accepter que les forces de cohésion sociale qui permettent l’exercice de la démocratie soient diminuées de telle façon que les institutions éclatent dans toutes les directions par la multiplication des situations d’exception. C’est ce qui risque de se produire dans la perspective de la deuxième conception [common social space]. (147)*

This principal does not consist of accepting that the forces of social cohesion which afford the exercise of democracy be diminished in such a way that the institutions explode in all directions because of the multiplicity of exceptional situations. This is what risks occurring in the second conception.

As one can see, the odds are always stacked against difference. To say that there is a certain reticence towards difference is to be euphemistic about the situation entirely, for in actual fact there exists hardened resistance to it—hence the tension founding integration. It is, of course, a concept that attempts to manage and mitigate difference. Contrary to these avowedly pessimistic assessments of the common cultural space’s political potential, one could argue that, within a normative framework of democracy, this fundamentally dialogic kind of integration offers, via crucial debate and concession,
a means by which the majority, along with the myriad ethnic communities standing beside it, can truly work towards a common project.

The last kind of integration that Pagé offers is that of the common civic space and he contends that it is the one operant in Quebec society today. In a common civic space, Pagé claims that though there is a set of public norms established by the government, there nevertheless remains a significant margin for personal freedom (121). Along these lines the state understands how important it is for the individual to recognize her/himself in the norms of life that s/he has chosen to adopt (Pagé 128). With that said, however, there is also the suggestion that distancing oneself from her/his ethnic group allows for a greater identification with the civic society that rallies all of these ethnic communities together (Pagé 128). As such, it could be said that a tension confronts the arrivée insofar as s/he is faced with the warning that too great a commitment to one’s ethnic group can have negative consequences upon her/his integration into the common civic space. With regards to the political potential of this kind of integration, Pagé contends that while affiliation or interest-based associations are certainly possible, the common civic space obliges arrivées to contribute to civic norms and constantly work towards the betterment of society in general (142).

There are a number of problems that emerge from the conceptual cartography that Pagé provides. First off, Pagé’s methodological approach of offering a conceptual cartography is troublingly inconsistent. For even though he generally tends to avoid making references to Quebec’s particular realities, in the few instances where he does draw parallels it is only to illustrate how Quebec fits the sumnum bonum of this model and never to offer any critical insights (e.g.: the ethical predisposition of this model, the
prevalence of *l'identitaire québécois* in Quebec’s democratic discourses, the moral contract, etc.). As such his article is problematic in that it conveys a highly skewed impression (hence an unproblematized one) of the *common civic space* kind of integration. Moreover, the conceptual terrain that he maps out is absolutely devoid of any serious consideration of the very real and significant power relations that constitute Quebec society. As such, the *common civic space* comes off as fairly untroublesome concept because it, along with the other conceptual distinctions that Pagé enacts, caters to a realm of abstraction. However, many of integration’s problems are found in praxis—that is, in the lived-reality of those actors who expect it and those actors who must accomplish it. As Ghassan Hage has trenchantly underscored, it is often only once these conceptions are grounded in the “existing social relations of power” (21) that we begin to recognize the pernicious corollaries that they might entail. For instance, as the notion of a *common civic space* is tied into that of civic nationalism, it too suffers from being a chimeric product of philosophy (Salée “De l’avenir” 16).

One of the reasons why these concepts are so fraught in practice is because they neglect the influence and perdurability that societal power relations hold vis-à-vis social cohesion. Which is to say that by glossing over a society’s rooted relations of power and by neglecting the favorable position held by a majority, notions such as these are blind to the marginal positions that ethnic communities are often forced to occupy and they consequently misperceive the amount of appeal that civic participation might hold for an arrivée. As well, the rigidity of Pagé’s conceptual distinctions is also troubling. For while Quebec is guided by the integrative notion of a *common civic space*, this does not mean that elements of the other kinds of integration are not manifest in its social space. For
instance, Mile-end’s Hassidic community is an ethnic group that, while adhering to the laws set by the Quebec government, nevertheless follows a very autonomous and insular mode of existence. Naturally, their detachment stems from a deep desire to preserve the integrity of their culture and its traditions. So while this case could certainly be said to fall under the category of a *common civic space*, it nevertheless shares some likeness with the characteristics that define the *multiple cultural spaces* model. Mile-end is again a useful site of inquiry because it is a borough that is home to a striking mix of different ethnicities. Amid this sociological composite, polycultural tendencies undoubtedly take shape. Potentially, sociological proclivities such as these might bring with them a heightened form of cross-cultural understanding that could lend itself well to the political development of that district.

Much of the scholarship carried out upon *integration* in this province is fairly poor. For instance, Labelle et al.’s article “*Pluriethnicité, citoyenneté et integration: de la souveraineté pour lever les obstacles et les ambiguïtés*” bespeaks a rather disheartening lack of creativity with regards to issues of social cohesion. The concern here is with their adamant insistence that *integration* is the only suitable concept for Quebec’s immigration practice. According to them *integration* is the only way, for without it ghettoization and other social problems will inevitably occur (Labelle et al. 234). *Integration* has become inveterate. Which is to say that there are rather obstinate forces that surround the term and seem bent on defending it as an impenetrable bastion within the process of social cohesion. This perception of *integration* has existed for so long now that it has become naturalized to the extent that it is almost impossible to think of social cohesion in any other manner. Cites Labelle et al.:
La nation se constitue par un processus d'intégration continue. La politique dite d'intégration [...] n'est pas un choix parmi d'autres possibles, mais elle est un fait et une nécessité. L'intégration comme processus est et a toujours été génératif de la nation, quelles que soient les justifications idéologiques. Parce que la nation ne peut manquer d'allier à son action intégratrice une idéologie (239).

The nation constitutes itself through a continual process of integration. The policy named as integration is not a choice among other possibilities, but it is a fact and a necessity. Integration as process is and has always been generative of the nation, regardless its ideological justifications. Because the nation cannot avoid coupling an ideology to its integrative actions.

When one asks why integration? One is either likely to get tautological responses such as these or naturalized justifications that are almost always devoid of ethical reflection. Integration is, of course, often held as the apogee of social cohesion because it serves to benefit the integrator. To ask critical questions of it is, in many respects, to ask such questions of ourselves. Throughout most of the scholarly forays into the body of integration, one can realize that questions of this sort are never posed. Take Dimitrios Karmis' synopsis of integration nationalism for example:

[it] establishes a clear distinction between nations and ethnocultural communities. Integration nationalism is a form of normative pluralism that emphasizes the integrative role of a common civic culture, but also the integrative role of the culture and language of the majority nation itself. The culture and language of the majority nation are conceived as the rallying point for the various communities established on a territory. This form of nationalism easily meets the first criterion of pluralism [hence possible inclusion]. The culture and language of the majority are not used as markers of exclusion but as instruments of inclusion that must be easily accessible to everyone through the public system of education. This is a question of justice. The integrationist model is also pluralist because it does not support assimilation; it proposes integration to the majority nation. Finally, it is pluralist in the sense that the allegiance to the integrative nation does not have to be exclusive. (79)
In it, there isn’t even the slightest consideration of how an ethic, concept and goal of integration might very well ride roughshod over an arrivée’s being and how it might fundamentally raise certain ethical issues. It seems to me that if Karmis is concerned with issues of justice, then he might do well to consider these ethical questions first.

Then there is the work of Gérard Bouchard. In his article "Nation et co-intégration: contre la pensée dichotomique," Bouchard contends that the nation-state can no longer be conceived as stably as it once was. Accordingly, he argues that in the simplest terms, there are two forces that have contributed to this excitement: one the hand, there are the numerous forces of globalization (see Appadurai); and on the other, there is the inner forces of fragmentation that constantly bring about a mutation of society as a whole (Bouchard, “Nation et” 21). Yet even at this nascent point, it is worthwhile noticing how the inner mutation is naturally framed as a fragmenting of a past unity, rather than the syncretic expansion of that society.

There rarely seems to be anything positive about contemporary global flows. As any general survey of Quebec scholarship on citizenship, immigration and pluralism will confirm, there is a fairly common propensity, by most theorists, to approach these issues with some antagonism. And this is telling. Nevertheless, Bouchard effectively points out how the nation has always been marked by its capacity for adaptation and development—this is what has, in many ways, ensured its longevity (Bouchard, “Nation et” 28). Moreover along these lines, identity has also in some respect always been marked by this same capacity. Which is to say that hybridity has always existed in some form or another. These tendencies of course take myriad paths. It is a consequence that, whether willing or not, confronts any being in her/his march through time. As such, Bouchard eagerly
underscores that identity possesses, and has always possessed, the possibility of emerging differently; his particular interests concern identity’s ability to emerge from a heterogeneous or plural society, like that of Quebec. Therefore he is quite right to point out that the problem that we confront today is not that dissimilar from those of days gone past. As such, Bouchard contends that the primary question regarding contemporary society’s encounter with difference is:

[...] comment repenser, sinon refonder le mode d’intégration culturelle des sociétés contemporaines dans un contexte de pluralisme ethnique qui n’entend plus se sacrifier sous l’action d’un autoritarisme quelconque? (Bouchard, “Nation et” 22)

how to rethink, if not refound the mode of cultural integration of contemporary societies in an ethic of pluralism that no longer has to sacrifice itself to whatever authority?

Or, alternatively, Bouchard asks how it is possible for a nation to legitimately stand and speak for a pluralist civic culture (“Nation et” 25)? The question he poses, is, in fact, the same query that any nation, having consciously experienced increasing flows of pluralism and having ethically reflected upon this reality thereafter, is asking at present. It seems to me that that which remains important to consider, is how each nation actively responds to these problematizations; for their reaction evinces their sense of justice.

Overall, Bouchard craftily attempts to point that the different forces observably at play in today’s nation-states are not too terribly different from those that have shaped our world in the past. As such, Bouchard’s disservice to integration consists in his naturalization of the concept as that ‘which simply happens in a world like ours.’ However, this is precisely one of the problems with integration, by figuring in this ‘natural’ way one ends up concomitantly obfuscating the very real fact that behind the
concept stands an *integrator* who occupies a position of privilege rather than one of participation. And even though it is replete with pithy insights, Bouchard’s analysis carefully omits all the perdurable forces of preservation that are imbricated in each and every society; those dynamics that explicitly aim at preserving the particular majorities, inequities, political aspirations, policies, modes of being, beliefs, social practices, etc. already in place. And what a glaring excision it is. For as chapter 2 has demonstrated, these powerful discourses are also themselves marked by their adaptation, development and longevity. Bouchard’s casual neglect of these fairly significant phenomena leaves fairly telling fissures in his analysis.

**Conclusion(s)**

After having exacted a number of slits, after having delicately peeled back its skin and studied its organs, we begin to see, I believe, that—despite all its development—*integration*, at its worst, offers us an airy and ethically fraught concept, and at its best, a fairly banal and not entirely effective goal with regards to social cohesion. The autopsy has revealed that far from being in fine fettle, the grey, gaunt and prostrate body of *integration* shows signs of prolonged illness. But then again it never seemed all that healthy anyhow. Indeed as Labelle et al. remark, for some time now, Quebec’s approach to immigration has been negatively perceived, viewed with suspicion or simply disregarded altogether (213). Thus, we haven’t adopted a genealogical approach to this interrogation of *integration* haphazardly. For genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 147); as such, our goal here has been revealing the fallaciousness in conceiving of
integration as an unproblematic and benevolent device of social cohesion. In fact, when reflecting upon integration's place in Quebec, we come to realize that, tragically, it is always bound to this expectation that the Other will wholeheartedly—and with gusto—take up the fight regarding the preservation and continued blossoming of the French fact and l'identitaire québécois. However, this is an expectation that, in many ways, primes resentment. For if the Other fails the self... Feelings of ill will such as these ought to cue us into taking up ethical reflections and reformulations of immigration practice; this potential resentment needs to be acknowledged and perhaps interpreted as a sign of the potential levels of political participation that arrivées are willing to make in this society. Take Labelle et al.'s discussion of why many of Quebec's ethnic communities reject its project for independence, for instance. They cite a number of potential reasons, such as: preserving particular economic interests, having witnessed excess nationalism in their countries of birth, worry regarding socioeconomic repercussions, fear of a sharp increase in discrimination, advantages vis-à-vis Canadian nationalism, a fearful perception of the Quebec state as being intrusive, lack of openness on the part of the Parti québécois, the ambiguities and contradictions surrounding the project of independence, etc (Labelle et al. 230). Interestingly though, a simple lack of identification with the project of independence (on the part of an arrivée) is not among the potential substantiations. It is rather bizarre when you think about it. It really shouldn't be all that inconceivable that arrivées, who by virtue of their having come from without, might not share any investment in such a project. The fact that this line of consideration is apparently beyond these theorists is fairly telling. It reveals that there something that is so natural about integration and the multiple set of expectations that it brings with it, something so
naturally reflexive that it must derive from a fairly well-rooted structure of domination. That structure is, of course, colonialism. Integration bespeaks a colonial lineage in that it constitutes a complicated knot of transformation and acceptance such that the Other is made to undergo a process that doesn’t stand so very far from older forms of colonialism (Hage 29). Of course, now it becomes a question of finding less coercive means of maintaining control over post-colonized subjects. The concept of integration offers just such a means, for it is of course Quebec’s way of managing what Hage calls its economy of otherness (33). Our genealogical autopsy has revealed that in both government and scholarly discourses, there has been a suspicious lack of criticism directed towards a concept that is so central to Quebec’s project of social cohesion; for this very reason, one could certainly be forgiven for never having known how blighted by illness this concept has been.

Lastly I will address how I situate myself vis-à-vis the ethicality of invoking an autopsic metaphor as a structuring device for my analysis of a persisting government concept. I have committed this ostensible transgression out of necessity. For in someways (assuming the political circumstances generally remain what they are) we may be in the midst of integration’s extremely slow and protracted death, because difference will continue to permeate.49 That is not to say, though, that this analysis has been vain, for integration’s extended demise changes nothing of the fact that it has existed—and continues to exist—in an ethically suspect manner. Perhaps I have cut into a live body—but then again this statement largely depends upon your definitions of life and death. For

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49 I say this because history has shown that assimilationist and integrationist policies end up gradually ceding to states of normative pluralism—just as Canada has despite its originally assimilationist approach (Juteau et al. 97). Nevertheless, I use the cautionary ‘might’ for history has also shown that it is never teleologically guided. Moreover, Juteau et al. define normative pluralism as; “the acceptance of [an empirical] pluralism as a desirable state” (107).
my part, it seems to me that the body of integration has been brain dead for quite some
time; all I have done here, is shown this to be true. What would be worse? To allow the
semblance of its living to persist, or to collect its healthy organs and transplant them into
an alternative and clinically living body/concept? I believe it would be a social injustice
to opt for the former. Integration is dead. It has been for quite some time now. Let us pull
the plug. Let us place the necessary sutures and then give it a just burial. But let us not
weep, for better friends have past.
Conclusion(s)

Coordinated Becomings: A Future Beyond Integration

Any politics which fails to sustain some relation to the principle of unconditional hospitality has completely lost its relation to justice.

The theme of solitude and the breakdown of human communication are viewed by modern literature and thought as the fundamental obstacle to human brotherhood. The pathos of socialism breaks against the eternal Bastille in which each person remains, his own prisoner, locked up with himself when the party is over, the crowd gone, and the torches extinguished. The despair felt at the impossibility of communication... marks the limit of all pity, generosity, and love... But if communication bears the mark of failure or inauthenticity in this way, it is because it is sought as a fusion.
Emmanuel Levinas, "The Other in Proust."

The hope of doubling the self always misses the autonomy of the other. Authenticity can be a profoundly selfish ideal.
John Durham Peters. Speaking into the Air.

'Healthy'... Besides it being an entirely inappropriate qualification with regards to integration, it is also a popular word bandied about to such an extent that there are many people who desire 'being healthy.' And admittedly, for certain people, there are times when alarming inversions occur such that the latter takes primacy over the former—i.e. where 'healthy' overrides 'being' itself. Nevertheless, at the corner of avenue du Parc and la rue Saint-Viateur—at the YMCA du Parc in fact, we can, from day to day, observe a variegated group of people all aspiring to 'be healthy.' It occurred to me one day, while gliding to nowhere in particular on the treadmill and sweating profusely
throughout, that that which was offering itself before me was truly a beautiful sight. There were a number of people on the treadmills beside me, some were brazenly running, some trotting and others lumbering along. On the stationary bikes, there were those who were content to read while pedaling along and others who insisted on fiercely speeding through their exercise. Similarly, on the elliptical trainers some were awkwardly figuring out how to use the machine (even with the help of a staff member), and there were others who were thrusting their legs, pumping their arms and coruscating all over from their myriad beads of sweat. All of these individuals were working towards becoming healthier, they were coordinating with the goal of being-healthy (and of sharing the facilities to accomplish this). Of course, some individuals had greater ability and understanding towards training than others; and, of course, some individuals needed more help from the staff than others, but then again that is essentially what coordination is about, it necessarily involves variegated individuals—each of them with different capacities, levels of desire, needs, etc., coming together and co-ordinating their respective efforts to tackle a particular problem.

In what follows, I attempt to tie up the loose ends of the analysis presented in the previous chapters. First, I deliver the deathblow that will allow us to move past integration. Second, I demonstrate how there are certain semantic inconsistencies surrounding the term and how coordination offers us a way out of these impasses. Third, I consider some of coordination’s merits along with how its adoption might fit with the imperatives that structure Quebec society. And forth, I contemplate what this genealogy has allowed us to ascertain about the ethic, concept and goal of integration overall.
Peters, Ethics & Integration

The question of what approach to immigration a government should adopt vis-à-vis today’s sociological realities constitutes one of the very real ethical conundrums of our times. Indeed it is the very presence of the foreigner that broaches this question; placing her/his being squarely before us, s/he is tacitly asking how will we respond—what responsibility we will have towards her/him (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 131)? Yet it should also be noted that, in the same fell swoop, this concomitantly places the self in question (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 3): how will you be in the face of my difference that is? You see the foreigner’s presence constitutes a challenge to the logon of a host society. For in a host society only the native habitant is and only an indigene can be; all that which comes from without is not—thus non-being. Therefore, the challenge to the logon takes the form of an assertion of non-being that in fact is (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 7). Of course, the means in which a society responds to this challenge serves as a mark of their ethicality towards difference, themselves and their shared future together. In Quebec, where immigration is in many ways seen as a remedy to its weak fecundity, this question has a particular resonance; in many ways, the very face of the self is necessarily changing and these arrivées—or these Other-selves often “reject the symbolic and political hegemony of the totalizing political subject of the nation” (Beauchemin, “What does” 18). Tied into a relationship with these arrivées, the prepolitical majority is confronted with the realization that they have an obligation to make place for, or give place to, the arrivée (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 25). Yet this obligation is troubled by Quebec’s perennial antinomy between self-preservation and openness to the Other; indeed, it is difficult to give place to the Other, when the self is
fighting so very hard for it as well. As such, the paralysis that emerges from this contradiction has served to blight most of Quebec’s attempts to give place to the arrivée.

Government discourses on citizenship provide us with fruitful realms of inquiry in this regard. As can be deduced from its title “La citoyenneté québécoise: Document de consultation pour le forum national sur la citoyenneté et l’intégration” (Quebec Citizenship: Consultation Document for the National Forum on Citizenship and Integration) is a document that was issued by the MRCI for consultation purposes with respects to Quebec’s ‘National Forum on Citizenship and Integration.’ The overriding goal of this forum was to take stock of the conditions and means of citizenship that pervade in Quebec and to vigilantly assure that a fissure between its ideals and reality not develop (MRCI, La citoyenneté 6); interestingly though, one could argue that that which the forum seeks to prevent, has already occurred. Nevertheless, the MRCI cites the forum as having three objectives:

• présenter et faire connaître les orientations en matière de citoyenneté québécoise et d’intégration;

present and make clear the orientations of Quebec citizenship and integration;

• définir les moyens d’action les plus susceptibles de faire comprendre et apprécier la citoyenneté québécoise ainsi qu’accroître la participation civique;

define the means of action that are most likely to lead to an understanding and appreciation of Quebec citizenship as well as an increase civic participation;

• associer les partenaires gouvernementaux, socio-économique, culturels et régionaux, ainsi que les milieux communautaire et les nations autochtones à la définition de ces moyens d’action. (MRCI, La citoyenneté 6)

associate the governmental, socio-economic, cultural and regional partners, as well the community environments and first nations with the definition of these means of action.
Notice the fairly prescriptive nature of these goals. One can see that however participative and dialogic the word ‘forum’ might seem, the regulative character of these objectives nevertheless restricts this appraisal of citizenship. In fact, all throughout this document one can observe how the compulsive bent that hinders integration also works to defeat the well-intentioned nature of this project. For of course there is an express need to make them understand, and, moreover, to make them appreciate. This forcefulness, that seems to sully everything integration touches, is an indication of its lack of awareness regarding the nature of social formations and participation in contemporary pluralist societies. Sadly, this seemingly insurmountable tension imbues Quebec’s discourses on social cohesion. Take the following exemplar for instance:

Minoritaire sur le continent et dans le Canada, le peuple québécois doit vivre avec l’éternel défi de configurer ses institutions de manière à concilier les contraintes de son poids démographiques avec la nécessité de se donner des conditions qui permettront au seul État français d’Amérique du Nord de continuer de servir l’expression d’un projet de civilization original. Les tensions inhérentes à sa condition peuvent aussi bien servir à stimuler son développement qu’à miner ses acquis. Les exigences de cohésion sociale et de cohérence institutionnelle sont, en raison de sa taille et de ses ressources, sinon plus dures pour lui que pour les grandes nations, du moins plus sévères. Les petits peuples ont d’étroites marges d’erreur. (MRCI, La citoyenneté 9)

Minorities on the continent and in Canada, the people of Quebec have to live with the eternal challenge of configuring their institutions in a manner that conciliates the constraints of its demography with the necessity of giving itself the conditions that will allow the only French state in North America to continue to serve as the expression of a civilization’s original project. The tensions inherent to its condition can work towards stimulating its development as much as it can rob it of its accruals. The exigencies of social cohesion and of institutional coherence are, by virtue of its breadth and resources, if not more difficult for them than for bigger nations, at least more severe. Smaller peoples have a lesser margin of error.

Embedded within this quote are a number of Quebec’s quintessential tensions. First, it is thoroughly stained with integration. Which is to say that it reveals a natural inclination
towards privileging the self before the Other (even when such a propensity guarantees
that neglect of the Other will return full-circle to haunt the self). Moreover, one can
remark a strategic use of ‘minority’ that proleptically seeks to justify this privileging; to
be sure, this invocation works on multiple levels. On one level, it works to obfuscate the
fact that the prepolitical majority have become a majority and are now effectively des
maîtres chez eux; on a second level, it suspiciously glosses over what the ‘civilization’s
original project’ entails and whether or not it might impinge upon the Other (for instance,
does it refer to an imperative of sovereignty, and as a result, serve to problematize—by
dint of a unique conflation between political aspirations and reality (Salée, “Espace
publique” 33)—the set of citizenship expectations that arrivées are likely to confront?);
on a third level, it forecloses all ethical questions of the Other by overdetermining le
peuple québécois (hence the self) with the concomitant plight of ‘being a minority,’
‘facing an eternal challenge,’ ‘having weak fecundity,’ ‘being the only French state on
the continent’ and having a rather ambiguous ‘obligation to serve as the expression of a
civilization’s original project.’ And with all this situated at the beginning of the
document, it is not difficult to see how a quote such as this preemptively enacts the limits
inherent to Quebec’s project of social cohesion—as least insofar as integration
superintends it.

Throughout this interrogation of integration, I have contended that the ethic,
concept and goal thereof raises serious ethical questions in regards to contemporary
projects of social cohesion. And John Durham Peters’ work on the history of
communications is one of the few erudite oeuvres that has the gravitas needed to help us
articulate the ethical quandaries surrounding integration. In his book entitled Speaking
into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication, Peters provides us with an ethical reframing of communication that most certainly has some implications for contemporary immigration practice. Peters cogently retraces how communication has, for so long now, been mistakenly understood as a process whereby one communicates with the goal of fusing with an interlocutor so as to effectively achieve a reduplication of the message or—more figuratively—of the self (8). And Peters argues that this general misunderstanding of communication constitutes an ethical violation unto the Other; for as he explains with concision: “the hope of doubling the self always misses the autonomy of the other” (Peters 6). Peters’ argument is that this hope has always been a quixotic one in that the enterprise of communication is naturally marked by failure. Which is to say that to communicate, is to exchange with varying degrees of failure. So like a pebble thrown into a pond, the conceptual and ethical reformulation of communication posited by Peters, sends shock waves throughout the realm of immigration.

If considered as a means of ontological communication for a moment, then integration can certainly be seen as a way of expressing the self. When someone calls on an Other to integrate, s/he is simultaneously and unavoidably imparting a message about her/himself. Especially when it becomes quite clear that the arduous labor of integration is to be primarily carried out by the arrivée. For such an anlage constitutes an incredibly non-dialectical relationship where “instead of seeing [...] [the arrivée] as a bridge toward a syncretic possibility, [...] [the Quebec government] uses [her/him] as a mirror that reflects the colonialist’s self-image” (JanMohamed 19). When viewed, scrutinized and judged solely from a Quebec cultural perspective, the arrivée’s self becomes eclipsed. What’s more, integration arrogantly places the expectation that the arrivée model
her/himself—in some measure—upon a québécois self. Herein lies integration’s ethical transgression, it fails to adequately recognize that the Other’s autonomy must be taken as a sine qua non for social cohesion to be a possibility. And this stems from the fact that integration is an approach to social cohesion that is to some extent modeled upon a misunderstanding of communication, one that inexorably seeks to reduplicate the self. But if this re-engendering of the self is ultimately impossible, where does that leave the arrivée? Well, it leaves her/him on the outside. As Elspeth Probyn argues “outside belonging operates now not as a substantive claim but as a manner of being” (8).

Continuing on, she explains that:

[…] the desire that individuals have to belong, a tenacious and fragile desire that is, I think, increasingly performed in the knowledge of the impossibility of ever really and truly belonging, along with the fear that the stability of belonging and the sanctity of belongings are forever past. (Probyn 8)

Probyn importantly cites the fragility of desire in this regard. When thought of in alignment with integration, it becomes rather crucial that we understand how this ethic, concept and goal might impact an arrivée’s desire, how it might work towards stifling it, or, alternatively, not work hard enough at eliciting it. The ethical predisposition of integration along with so much of the government and academic discourses that represent it, all miss one fundamental point: “the other, not the self, should be the center of whatever “communication” might mean” (Peters 265), which is to say that integration has, for some time now, only been articulated by québécois academics or bureaucrats—in other words, by the self.
Indeed, what this thesis has attempted to reveal on some level is the extent to which the discourses surrounding *integration*—like most forms of knowledge in general—have been regulated *via* representations from privileged interlocutors (i.e.: selves) that consistently describe it in the most generous and auspicious of tones. These skewed articulations have been conveyed at the expense of the Other—that is, the actors who undergo the experience thereof and deal with its different degrees of failure. Of course, an obvious starting point towards remedying this fault consists of asking the arrivées who have undergone this process about their experience and making sincere attempts at understanding their positions in this regard.

Part of the difficulty behind critiquing *integration* lies in the fact that the plight associated with it, is only really experienced by Others; oftentimes a subjectivity such as this remains utterly beyond the self's horizon of consciousness. Of course, this is because Others are different, they constitute "the "difference" of cultural knowledge that "adds to" but does not "add up" [and that] is the enemy of the *implicit* generalization of knowledge or the implicit homogenization of experience …" (Bhabha 163). With it being impossible to occupy those myriad and subjective positions of Othering, and with it being difficult to convey that subjectivity even if it was somehow feasible, I have had to find different means (e.g.: discourse, etymology, geography, etc.) of representing and articulating the ethical quandary that is burnt into *integration*. Which is to say that, above and beyond its predicament of naturalization, *integration* also suffers from a problem of representation. The two are not the same. The predicament of naturalization has occurred as a result of the regularity of utterances and abjurations surrounding *integration*. Whereas, the problem of its representation—though certainly linked to that of
naturalization—stems from the difficulty inherent to speaking of ethics and subjectivity in general.

Part of what this research has sought to accomplish, in a most diligent manner, is to show that part of Quebec's contemporary problems surrounding social cohesion stem from the ethic, concept and goal of integration itself. For just as the economic marginalization currently being experienced by arrivées confirms (MRCI, "Des valeurs" 1979; Salée, "De l'avenir" 156-159), the project of integration, and the work effected in its name, has not remedied these enduring problems. One potential explanation for this ongoing reality is that there is a fundamental ethical problem that lies at the heart of the ethic, concept and goal of integration. To wit, integration being as self-concerned as it is, places most of the burden upon the shoulders of the Other. And this plays itself out very clearly in the perpetual problems surrounding arrivée employment and economic marginalization.

Integration is expressly focused on getting the arrivée into Quebec society, it is above all concerned with giving her/him the tools and advice required to accomplish this lofty project, however, the flip side to this is that it is not as intensely concentrated upon rousing employers to participate in an equal fashion. In fact the title of a 2004 communiqué implicitly confirms this disparity; with its prompting tone, the MRCI's "Des valeurs partagées, des intérêts communs" underscores that:

l'accroissement de la diversité requiert une adaptation de la part des employeurs et des diverses composantes de la société québécoise. La sensibilisation à l'apport des immigrants et des communautés culturelles ainsi que la mise sur pied de services d'expertise et de soutien-conseil pourront apporter des correctifs et faciliteront la réalisation d'objectifs en matière de représentation de la diversité au sein des différents sphères d'activité de la société québécoise. (80)
the increase of diversity requires an adaptation on the part of employers as well as with the diverse constituents of Quebec society. The sensitization regarding the contribution brought by immigrants and the cultural communities along with the institution of expertise services and a support counsel can bring about corrective measures and help achieve the objectives of representing diversity at the heart of the different spheres of in activity in Quebec society.

As it stands, *integration* lends itself far too easily to a noncommittal (in action at least) and complacent self. As such, it doesn’t really recognize the Other. For as Himani Bannerji underscores, “recognition needs respect and dignity, its basic principle is accepting the autonomy of the other, and being honest about power relations which hinder this autonomy” (149). *Integration*, along with all of its glowing representations, fails to do this. And it should be noted that recognition does not entail *knowing* the Other; for this is just as impossible as reduplicating the self. Of Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of communication, Peters writes:

The failure of communication, he argues, allows precisely for the bursting open of pity, generosity, and love. Such failure invites us to find ways to discover others besides knowing. Communication breakdown is thus a salutary check on the hubris of the ego. Communication, if taken as the reduplication of the self (or its thoughts) in the other, deserves to crash, for such an understanding is in essence a pogrom against the distinctness of human beings. (21)

*Integration* has a tremendous ego. For it reveals itself to be incapable of seeing past the edge of its own nose. Which is to say that it is an approach to immigration that fails to realize how “the challenge of communication is not to be true to our own interiority but to have mercy on others for never seeing ourselves as we do” (Peters 266-267). And, as any diachronic consideration will reveal, integration’s lack of understanding is the result of its having been lineally fettered to colonialist traditions. Moreover, one could make the argument that integration—by virtue of its constrained
orientation to the self—inadvertently gives rise to racism, prejudice and other exclusionary practices. For it creates a fairly lofty goal of integrating the Other into the Self, however, the Other is fated to never accomplish this goal to the Self’s satisfaction; thus, this often has the result of irritating the Self, who consequently reproaches the Other for their inability to accomplish a goal that was set *ab ovo*, not by the Other, but by the Self. Thus *integration’s* colonial lineage lies in its presciently structured transformation and acceptance of the Other (Hage 29). As Ghassan Hage importantly brings to light, concepts like *tolerance* and *integration* do in fact unfold from colonial mentalities and practices (34) in that they serve to reproduce similarly unjust relations of power (33). In a world marked by pluralism, it becomes a question of finding the less coercive means of maintaining governance over post-colonized subjects.

**Etymologies, Images & Transitions**

Come as you are, as you were, as I want you to be, as a friend, as an old enemy.

Nirvana, *Come as you are*.

We have already shed light upon how *integration* derives from the Latin word: *integrare*—which itself is filially bonded with *integrity*. Additionally, we have also underscored how it should be understood as “the making up or composition of a whole by adding together or combining the separate parts or elements; combination into an integral whole” (Oxford 367). The goal of composing an *integral* whole or of begetting some form of *integrity* is of course one that unmistakably brims with concinnity. And for that reason it is immensely troubling. For on one level concinnity, integrity and harmony are simply not realistic goals with respect to matters of social cohesion. Moreover, the
assumption that undergirds any such goal is equally troubling. For let us not forget that to 
*integrate* also means “to complete or perfect (what is imperfect) by the addition of the 
necessary parts” (Oxford 367); one mustn’t assume that this *perfecting* refers to Quebec 
society or its prepolitical majority, for of course they aren’t the ones really expected to 
undergo the process (assisting is not commensurate with undergoing). Thus it must 
necessarily refer to the arrivée, s/he who is incomplete and lacking things in some 
respect.

And yet on another level, there is an additional bother—perhaps one that is even 
more serious, one that actually divulges the main problematization behind *integration*. 
For throughout the definition of *integration* provided above, nary is there any mention of 
a preexisting composition. So in some respects, one is confronted with the realization that 
*integration* is perhaps not the right word at all... For *integration*, in the proper sense, 
hasn’t really occurred for quite some time. It would not be entirely accurate to say that 
social cohesion in Quebec has simply been involved in composing an *integral* whole of 
manifestly separate parts or elements, for in fact *les québécois*—as it manifoldly refers to 
the prepolitical majority—constitute a majority community that: (a) stands in a clear 
position of dominance with respects to all others; (b) share particular affinities amongst 
themselves; and (c) expect arrivées to combine with, and contribute to, *their* society.

Thus there is much more going on here than a simple composition of separate 
parts or elements into an *integral* whole—it’s more complex than that; one of these parts 
is far more predominant than any of the others. So to some extent it would appear as 
though *integration* is certainly not the best word to describe the dynamics of the social 
formation at play here. Moreover, to insist on the continued use of the term is also to be
complicit with the promulgation of its semantic inaccuracy; a form of inaccuracy that completely glosses over the skewed relations of power imbricated in this society. And, moreover, it is an inaccuracy that engenders ill-informed conceptions of integration and its means of completion.

If integration has been thoroughly perforated, if we have shown it to be inapposite ab ovo, than what might be a more suitable term? The answer may lie in a semantic retracing of coordination. Etymological retracings are useful insofar as they afford us the possibility of excavating “the deposits of [former] truth[s] [that] mankind has let slip into its language as it evolves” (Barrett 214). And with our engaging in nothing less than a clash of concepts, an etymological approach seems rather befitting in that, as Deleuze has remarked, it constitutes “a properly philosophical athleticism” (“What is Philosophy?” 407). Coordination, in its Latin origins, reveals itself to be formed by a conjunction between the words co- (together) and ordinarne (order) (Oxford 964-965; Stockwell and Minkova 195). Co- is of the same family as cum meaning ‘with’ (Funk 370). Ordinare or ordinatio correspond to ‘order’ and ‘arrangement’ respectively. Though it shares some similarities with integration, coordination is differently nuanced from it in significant ways.

Where integration pays no attention to the particularities of the different elements used in its engendering of an integral whole, coordination on the other hand, expressly takes these differences into account and recognizes how doing so is an imperative step in the act of assembling. Thus, coordination is defined as a process that seeks “to place or arrange (things) in proper position relatively to each other and to the system of which
they form parts; to bring into proper combined order as parts of a whole” (Oxford 965). The adverb ‘relatively’ importantly underscores an awareness that within each relationship—both between the two actors from one perspective and between the actor and her/his environment from another—needs to be considered in its own right. Moreover, where we have shown how integration delegates the better part of its responsibilities to arrivées, coordination operates differently in that calls upon both the self and Other “to act in combined order for the production of a particular result” (Oxford 965).

Keeping this last solicitation in mind, we should now address the relationship that coordination shares with concinnity. Where integration strives to enkindle a harmonious composition, coordination instead aims at achieving “a harmonious combination of agents or functions towards the production of a result” (Oxford 965); as such, coordination’s greatest concern is with harmoniously coordinated action as it relates to a particular result and not with the composition of an integral whole for its own sake. In many ways, the project(s) of coordination seems to be far more provisional (and, as I am arguing, more realistic as a result) than that of integration.

Lastly, where we have shown how integration creates—whether inadvertently or not—a negative anlage vis-à-vis the social relations of power, coordination, on the other hand, works towards balancing those inequities by arranging them in positions relative to each other as well as to each other’s positioning in the system of which s/he is apart’; because coordination is of course concerned with making elements coordinate—that is, of placing them “in the same order, rank or division” (Oxford 965). It is in this way that one begins to see how coordination, in stark contrast to integration, seems to truly

50 The emphasis here is my own.
recognize the autonomy of the Other. Though \textit{coordination} will not miraculously change the relations of power, it might serve to attenuate the assuredness of the self.

The conceptual image that arises with \textit{integration} is one that is ultimately constrained and constraining. For integration assumes an antecedent. It is always anchored to a society of the past and never to one of the future. The \textit{arrivée} is always integrating her/himself into a preexisting society. Whether or not s/he succeeds on levels other than linguistic or economic ones is of little interest, because interest itself is not future-oriented, it is oriented to a past-self—thus it is self-oriented. \textit{Coordination}, on the other hand is expressly future-oriented—actually it would be more correct to say that \textit{coordination} is future-oriented insofar as it concerns the now. Which is to say that, it constitutes itself at the threshold of a foreseeable risk, perceived threat or a common problem/goal and asks: how are \textit{we} going to work together to deal with this \textit{now} and in the \textit{future}. Present-future. It is in this way that \textit{coordination} lends itself generously to the coming community rather than the already established one. The conceptual image that \textit{coordination} broaches, is one that is far more pragmatic to becoming.

Moreover, there is an important distinction to be made between the concepts of \textit{integration} and that of \textit{coordination}. \textit{Integration} privileges sameness and works towards upholding it as both an original and indelible fact. To wit, as \textit{integration} is oriented to a past-self, it privileges maintaining the sameness of that past-self and it works towards \textit{managing} the development of pluralism \textit{vis-à-vis} that self. Thus, it can be said that the concept of \textit{integration} abets the perpetuation of archaic senses of the self that are adverse to pluralism. Whereas \textit{coordination} instead privileges synchronicity and development, thus it is a concept that always lends itself to the future. Therefore \textit{coordination}, as a
potential engine of social cohesion, places enormous importance and possibility upon becoming-québécois (now and towards the future) as opposed to being québécois (as an identity predicated upon an accumulation of experiences). And as coordination occurs synchronically, it is always housed within a context of particular language laws and social conventions.

The transition from integration to that of coordination ought not to be seen as insurmountable. For as Jocelyn Maclure has indicated it is “only out of pre-existing narratives [that] it is possible to imagine new figures, to become other, or, to use Michel Foucault’s apposite expression, to “free ourselves from ourselves”” (“Narratives” 34). From another perspective though, it should be noted that there are already some elements of coordination at play in Quebec’s immigration practice. For instance, the very fact that the government shares its pedagogical (French language) responsibilities with various ethnic community groups and academic institutions is a sign of coordination and its potential. Coordination is also manifest in those instances where capable immigration agents address arrivées in their native language so as to ensure comprehension.\footnote{However, logical that effort may seem, it is one that is often made with great reticence. In fact, towards to the end of my employment with le Carrefour d’intégration du Nord, we were told that if an arrivée spoke no French at all and didn’t have a translator present then we would have to encourage them to come back when they could have one present (even though, at the time, many of our office staff were polylingual).} However, emergences of coordination such as these are more so irregularities than they are the norm. It is for this reason that Quebec’s immigration practices need to be completely reconceived of under an ethic of coordination. In fact, as this analysis has labored to reveal, it won’t be until Quebec’s immigration ministry reconceptualizes its practice and services along an ethic, concept and goal of coordination that its full merits can be actualized.
Coordination, Concept & Ontogenetic Indeterminacy

For power to inscribe itself effectively within subjectivity there must be something in it for the individual themselves.

Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory.

Playing the part of a bureaucrat can be painful. Participating in that web of power, allowing it to run through you, and articulating it from your own mouth... it can really take its toll on you. One day I was serving a woman who had come to have her diplomas evaluated at the comparative evaluations department where I worked. This was an encounter that would stick with me. One of the reasons why she was memorable was because she had a unique dossier vis-à-vis the usual clientele. She had a Bachelor, specializing in Arabic languages, from a Beijing university. Next, she had gained a MBA at a French institution in Lyon. First it would be useful for me to explain how the comparative evaluation branch operates. The source to which a client’s documents are held is the standard set by UNESCO. Second, Quebec’s comparative evaluations branch will only emit an equivalence certificate for a degree that can be matched in its own education system; hers was a particular case, as such, it needed to be researched. After nearly twenty minutes of hunting, I had found a most unfortunate answer; her MBA would not be recognized. This was the worst part of the job. Having to take part in the epistemological decimation of an arrivée and being powerless to help is something that you cannot walk away from unaffected. Sure there were often clients who would knowingly bring internationally unrecognizable documents and give it a go, but, from time to time, there would be that unwitting individual who had clearly pinned all of
her/his hope to a single piece of paper. This woman was just such an individual. I called her into an office—disappointment, according to the government, is a decidedly private matter. I had to be the bearer of bad news. I informed her that an equivalence could be made for the Bachelor, but that the MBA, however, had been issued by an institution that wasn’t recognized by Quebec. We could not consider it. An epistemological dispute between two institutions had left her crestfallen. Incredulous, she just stared at me in silence. It wasn’t the aggressive look that usually precedes an argument. It was instead the blank expression that signified a total loss for words. She began to cry. She asked why? how?—but at this point her questions were mostly rhetorical. I saw the face of the Other and could not help but be moved. I wanted to put my hand on her shoulder, but instead I had to remain the steadfast bureaucrat. There was nothing that I could do for her. A moment later, she gathered herself together, along with what was now a useless document and left in haste. I never knew what happened to her.

I use this story not to depict the Quebec government as sinister because they apply international guidelines, but rather to highlight how an ethic, concept and goal of coordination might work towards preventing unfortunate happenings such as these. For instance, couldn’t a comparative evaluations service be prescient enough to make this kind of information available (via the internet or their embassies) to aspiring new arrivals before they make the sacrifice of immigrating? It might save arrivées from a significant amount of sorrow. This is where the distinction between an ethic of coordination and integration is most pronounced. With an ethic of integration: she is the one coming from without, she is the one seeking a comparative evaluation; in the end, it’s her problem. Whereas with an ethic of coordination, it’s a problem for the arrivée as much as it is for
the host; as such, if can be addressed prior to the arrivée’s departure then both parties will be better off as a result.

It is important to underscore that coordination concomitantly involves trusting. And of course vulnerability and risk are part and parcel of such endeavors (Lingis, Trust 195-94). Quebec has had some understandable concerns vis-à-vis the survival and vulnerability of the French language that lies at the heart of their identity and culture. Consequently, the government has developed risk-oriented institutions like that of Le Bureau de la langue française. Institutions such as these anticipate the threats that might befall the French language and devise preventative strategies to counter them. And these are legitimate concerns, because Quebec abuts upon English-speaking territories to the east, west and south and Inuit cultures to the north. The proximity of these disparate cultural influences, has always led Quebec to be rather circumspect. But as Linda Cardinal confirms in her article entitled “Droits, langue et identité. La politique de la reconnaissance à l’épreuve de la judiciarisation,” with Quebec’s adoption of la Charte de la langue française (Bill 101), the prepolitical francophone segment of society went from being a minority to a majority (277). And, moreover, this government intervention has proven to secure that majority status and linguistic right. As such, this raises important questions surrounding the notion of capacity. As Gilles Deleuze underscored in one of his lectures on Spinoza, “ethics is a problem of power” (11). It asks us what we are capable of in a given situation. Quebecers are, by now, quite capable of coordinating. Which is to say that when considering the contemporary structures that exist, it does not appear as though an ethic, concept or goal of coordination would necessarily disturb their functioning or aspirations. In fact, coordination might even make them more palatable to
arrivées, because by adopting an ethic, concept and goal of *coordination* in Quebec immigration practice, the pernicious power dynamic created by the concept of *integration* is loosened and made less stark. For now, both the arrivée and the indigene are placed in a position of vulnerability *vis-à-vis* their identity and, along these lines, the French language would offer them a common ground of safety.

Yet we mustn’t forget that language stands aloft. It is that which we come to borrow, but never truly own. And, ironically, it is in many ways the only thing that we have—or just about the only thing that we can come close to possessing—for we carry it on our person. Thus language is both the foreign and familiar home that we inhabit (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 89-91). It is both prison and palace, the paradoxical site of constraint and possibility (or freedom). In Quebec, language—and more particularly the French language—is perceived as being a vector of participation. The French language is invoked as panacea, as a common home to all. Thus it is a home away from home, an abode into which an arrivée is invited. However, it is also the home that binds and the home to which we are ultimately bound, for if one wants recognition, one has to speak the language of the indigene. One has to *speak*, for only in uttering does one truly reveal her/his being, because of course “to speak is to exist absolutely for the other” (Fanon 17). And embedded within *coordination* is the understanding that an allophone make the efforts necessary to adopt French as one of her/his primary languages. As Joseph K. Carens has quite fairly concluded, “learning French is, among other things, a necessary means to participation in society so that if one can defend the duty to participate, and I think one can, one can defend the duty to learn French” (*Community* 128). *Coordination*, as a concept, recognizes that some arrivées will have an easier time than others (this
should be assessed on an individual basis—and not an ethnic one\(^52\) and that the
government needs to stand ready to assist on a case-by-case basis.

*Coordination*, as a method of being, of course presupposes an important
ontological reframing. It is a reconceptualization in which one is not solely the sum
her/his past, yet is it not a form of being that is tantamount to a hysteric’s fugue either.
Nevertheless, there is an important lesson to be drawn from this figure in that *l’identitaire québécois* is tremendously marked by a need to make connections—both now and in the
future. In fact, if arrivées have not sufficiently taken up the project of a Quebec nation, it
is perhaps because the prepolitical majority have not, for whatever reasons, given them
enough of an incentive to.

The benefit of adopting an ethic of *coordination* (it is hoped) is that *l’identitaire québécois* might transmute itself into a more labile and welcoming identity—however,
one that does not loose the distinctiveness of its character. We need to realize that
arrivées, having sometimes just left a life of marginalization in their former countries,
have no desire to settle in a similar environment elsewhere. Most arrivées, it can be
assumed, have a sincere desire to embrace a new life and way of living in their nascent homes—but not if this is dependent upon an ontological hollowing of themselves. This is
where *integration*, as concept of social cohesion fails. *Integration* is self-interested.

\(^{52}\) Awkward as it is, I feel it necessary to specify as I have already encountered instances, in Quebec
immigration practice and services, in which there is a tendency to totalize ethnicities. In a particularly
discomforting situation I found myself in a monthly meeting, where one of my colleagues, who was
married to a gentlemen originally from China, was being posed multiple questions regarding *how the Chinese are; how do the Chinese react in this situation? What does it mean if they do this or that? My problem isn’t with their desire to gain some cross-cultural understanding. No, my discomfort lies in the conversation’s potential to leave these people with the impression that (a) *ab ovo* a total understanding of any ethnicity is possible; and (b) after having posed a few questions these public servants could simply jot down the answers in their notebooks and apply the answers indiscriminately to all people of Chinese origin; that kind of totalizing thought is most certainly, and unfortunately, influenced by the way in which knowledge is disseminated in these institutions.
Which is to say that it has no interest in the Other, its only concern is an integrated-Other, one that is adequately transformed. Coordination, on the other hand, creates the potential of having a (more) level playing field. The anlage that coordination affords is one whereby there is an understanding that arrivées are unique, that their needs, desires and aptitudes vary and that these considerations must assessed on an individual basis. Where integration has, at different times and in different ways, functioned without assistance from the indigenous population, coordination cannot. If one of the two parties is doing all the work, then it is no longer a case of coordination. The concept of coordination variably divvies up the responsibility of social cohesion between the arrivée and the state such that the sustenance of a healthy society is in both of their hands.

Some might argue that coordination is a term far too freighted by its associations with corporations and capitalism—in fact, our genealogical review of the annual reports revealed that the term only figured in those documents when the subject concerned intergovernmental dealings. However, we must never surrender a concept to such tenuous forces, for to do so would be to let capitalism make a mockery of philosophy (Deleuze, “What is Philosophy?” 409). If coordination can allow for a respectful cooperation between governments divisions, then why can’t it allow for an analogously just relationship between the state and arrivée? I believe it can.

Of course there are still a number of questions that one could ask with regards to coordination vis-à-vis Quebec immigration practice and services, however we will leave those questions unanswered. I have been decidedly frugal in my positing of coordination—perhaps even a little vague, but that is okay. As Brian Massumi has warned:
the logical resources equal to emergence must be limber enough to juggle the ontogenetic indeterminacy that precedes and accompanies a thing’s coming to be what it doesn’t. Vague concepts, and concepts of vagueness, have a crucial, and often enjoyable, role to play. (Parables 13)

Vagueness is part of theory and thought, a beautiful part of it. For the goal of discussion and thought is, of course, not to impose but to elicit. This conceptual reframing that I suggest seeks to open up avenues of thought, not close them down. I certainly did not wish to foreclose any of coordination’s ontogenetic potential; as such, I did the unthinkable… I have pretty much eschewed applying this concept (Massumi, Parables 17). Following Massumi, I have chosen to adopt an exemplary approach that, instead of laying it all out, works towards cuing us into—as opposed to constraining—the concept’s potential.

Genealogical Harvests

This survey of a particular corpus of government documentation (the annual reports issued between 1968-2004) along with a consideration of the québécois scholarship effected upon integration-related issues—though admittedly limited in scope—tends to indicate that there are certainly bounds which limit integration discourses in Quebec. Which is to say that there are some things surrounding integration that one cannot say. For instance, the discursive structures surrounding the ethic, concept and goal of integration are such that criticism towards of concept itself is simply not acceptable. For all intents and purposes, integration has now become the “sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 144).
From both governmental and academic interlocutors it is clear that integration is naturally something to be lauded, so much so that any critical considerations, no matter how sound, are simply beyond the realm of the possible. I have sought to disrupt this pattern. A genealogical approach has made it possible to both detect and articulate the bounds that exist around integration. Of course, the guardedness that surrounds integration also serves to protect l'identitaire québécois in some measure as well. As we have seen in chapter 2, nascent genealogical results would tend to suggest that there is a discursive regularity with regards to the forms of knowledge that articulate l'identitaire québécois. Which is to say that amid l'identitaire québécois' discursive existence, one can most certainly detect bounds of legitimacy and articulation. To be sure, its perpetually contested nature implies that any utterance will of course be subject to scrutiny and judgment. Thus it can be said that the discursive regularity in fact serves a regulatory function. Or, alternatively, one could say that out of the chaos of competing discourses there is nevertheless a discernible structure that remains; this structure, in many ways, reflects the relations of power that are imbricated in Quebec society. And it is in this way that we can clearly confirm integration’s intrinsically self-interested origin. For by adopting integration as the concept of social cohesion, one burns an ethically problematic arrogance (one in keeping with the vestiges of colonialism) into the very anlage of social relations such that it becomes naturalized and unquestionable. Integration is given short shrift critically because it is seen as naturally benefiting the prepolitical majority. Moreover, it is often proleptically argued that integration is in fact chosen so as to help the arrivée (Juteau et al. 100), for it is a concept that acknowledges
that there are skewed power relations and it both alerts the arrivée to this fact as much as it warns them that a particular effort will be required on their part to ‘fit in.’

So what we have here is an interesting rhetorical strategy that seeks to obfuscate integration’s self-interestedness by framing it as a kind and generous enterprise undertaken with the arrivée’s best interests in mind: we fully empathize with your predicament and are merely trying to be realistic with you. With all this rhetorical befogging aside, the fact remains that integration constitutes an ethically suspect and fairly onerous demand to ask of anyone. From our cartography of l’identitaire québécois and the difficulties posed by its past-predicated and preservative inclinations, we come to realize that the arrivée, who by coming from without and thus having no access to such present ‘pasts,’ is asked to undertake a process that promises great difficulty—but that also cannot, in anyway, guarantee the possibility of its success or completion. Why bother then? It’s as if to say: I don’t know if this will work, but give it a try... in any case, it is not I who will suffer the consequences of its failure. However, this line of thinking is absolutely wrong, for in a shared society such as ours every participant has something to lose. The arrivée occupies the same social space and, willingly or not, s/he will find her/himself sharing the same political project and realities; to close one’s eyes to her/his plight, is also to remain blind to one’s future (with them).

**Conclusion(s)**

Keeping silent is already a modality of possible speaking.

Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*.

And so it has hopefully become clear that integration poses a problem. For in the end, the
concept, ethic and goal of *introduction* amounts to a fairly unreasonable demand, and it is
one that has very little understanding of the dynamics of culture, identity and alterity.
And Daniel Salée is absolutely correct in contending that if *l'identitaire québécois* is
going to effectively become pluralist, it must adopt an institutional identity that evacuates
the priority of ethnicity ("De l'avenir" 137). Moreover, a true becoming-syncretic of
*l'identitaire québécois* will require that significant efforts be made in the spheres of
philosophy (producing concepts worthy of the name), art and literature, such that the
actors within those spheres earnestly take up the challenge of thinking about old
questions of identity, citizenship, and memory anew. For the task of academic research in
the field of contemporary citizenship is one that ought to be focused upon increasing and
nurturing societies’ valence towards difference. Adopting an ethic of *coordination* in the
place of *integration* would certainly constitute a step in the right direction. As Bertrand
Marotte has recently espoused, arrivées are increasingly becoming an integral part of our
society, economically, culturally and politically (B7), that is why questions of social
cohesion press upon us in the way that they do; and it is also the reason why our *modus
vivendi* needs to be reconceived of in turn.

And of course as our genealogy of *integration*’s history has revealed, there is no
guarantee, nor any indication that this ship will right itself on its own. For instance, the
Quebec government recently changed its immigration ministry’s name from that of *le
Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration* to *le Ministère de
l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles*—once again highlighting the cultural
community and arrivées’ difference and simultaneously distancing them from the rest of
the population. This volte-face actually serves to justify our genealogical analysis of
integration in that, with respect to Quebec's project of social cohesion, there still remains a need "to rid history of its illusions of progress and reconciliation" (May 76). And we mustn't forget that as Quebec's experiences with pluralism have been significantly tempered by geography, questions of inclusivity could potentially remain a thorn in its side for years to come.

This examination does not presume to offer a conclusive concept of coordination because as Deleuze has beautifully surmised, a concept is a meteorite ("What is Philosophy?" 409). And with all the benefits that coordination brings to the table, we must nevertheless be mindful of the need—on the part of government—to supplant an ethic of coordination with the necessary social programs (which ought to be construed as context-specific governmental interventions) that work towards preventing and eliminating systemic forms of discrimination that are particular to different localities. Coordination, on its own, will not alleviate those impediments, for "the actualization of equality requires more than formal equality" (Juteau et al. 81). Coordination is not a panacea. Instead we must understand it for what it is, a respectful concept that is broader than integration in ethical scope. And if ethics is about questions of power and capacity, then it also, in some measure, about being pragmatic. It is in this way that both Peters and Probyn's work demonstrates an acute understanding that becoming the self and belonging are illusory goals; both their works recognize that we shall never truly belong and that if we are to be pragmatic about our contemporary predicament together, we must aim for a "successful coordination of behaviors" (Peters 268). And the situation is not so dour as it may appear at first glance, for as Deleuze would surely remark: a problem is but a way of creating a future.
Amid the incipience of a moment there is an aperture of possibility that, from time to time, opens onto what we might call: beauty. And to this end, let us now move through three fragments that I consider to be so very whole. One day, again at the transport company where I had worked as a security guard, a South Asian gentleman was weighing his truck. As sure as rain, his trailer was too heavy. The gentleman’s company habitually dispatched loads that were filled to the brim with cargo, often illegally so. Left with the headache of trying to move his axels so as to balance this malapportioned freight, this gentleman was having a terrible time; for the trailers that one has to deal with are often old, rusty and seized nightmares. Sliding one’s axel (quite the euphemism) alone, is a bothersome process whereby you must lock the trailer’s rear wheels and rock back and forth ever so gently until they are first freed (if that is possible) and then slid precisely to an appropriate position. Sometimes, the cargo is so poorly loaded that it is impossible to adjust within the legal margins. In this instance, the gentleman’s trailer was seized. Many other drivers passed, but none offered him assistance. Looking up from my reading I recognized his silent distress. I put on my coat and began to assist him. We fiddled with it for ten minutes and finally managed to slide his wheels to an appropriate position. He thanked me as I gave him back his gloves.

Several months later, I found myself in a conversation with a québécois gentleman with whom I would always have the same discussion, a rather awkward one in fact. It was an informal discussion of integration that he would always frame around me in a lauding manner. He would pose questions regarding failed integrations of Others and then be quick to offer me (apparently a successful case) as a counterpoint. In the midst of just such an exchange, the South Asian fellow came to weigh his load. Having caught the
tail end of the gentleman’s praise, he immediately joined in. He recounted how, when others had simply gone by, I had helped him balance his trailer some months earlier. Then, the two began exchanging, rather comically, their respective appreciation for either me or my actions. Despite the South Asian fellow’s limited French, he nevertheless managed to offer:

_Bon gars!_ He’s a good guy—_Bon gars._

To this the _québécois_ gentleman heartily responded:

Yeah, he’s a good guy—_un bon gars!_

This statement was something they both agreed upon. Some months later, on a particularly quiet night, my South Asian friend stopped by to use the scale. After having taken his weight receipt, he turned to head out the door but then suddenly paused to address me. With a smile, he simply said: “I am always happy to see you.” I blurted back: “Me too.” And then he was on his way. Rapt by his comment, or his gift rather—a beautiful and rare gift, I stood there for a while. And standing there with a silly smirk, I recognized, in a seemingly trite moment of _coordination_, how possibility might unfurl otherwise.
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