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Appropriation Art: Moving Images and Presenting Difference

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A Thesis

In

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Program

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ABSTRACT

Appropriation Art: Moving Images and Presenting Difference

Marie B. Shurkus, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2005

The dual nature of artworks has had a wrenching impact on art-historical scholarship. At one extreme, historians interpret visual artworks in terms of their historical eras, cultural conditions, and artists' biographies. At the other, historians receive artworks as aesthetic objects and interpret their formal structures. In the former construct artworks are understood as semiotic systems that operate like text. The latter focuses on the perceptual experience of viewing. This thesis addresses how postmodern appropriation art engages the dual nature of artworks to redefine visual representation as a translational and transformative event.

Postmodern appropriation art takes two different forms: art after media and art after art. Although this thesis focuses on the latter, the introduction reviews the development of both and establishes how material expression functions differently in each. Chapter one considers the emergence of rephotography in 1979 to demonstrate how even this—the most exact version of art after art—embodies difference at the material level. Applying Gilles Deleuze's insight that repetition expresses difference, this thesis then redefines appropriation art as the movement of images into new contextual and material expressions. The body of the thesis takes up each of these
elements—context, image, and material—and specifically explores how they produce creative outcomes.

Throughout, this thesis examines how the practice of postmodern art after art demonstrates that visual artworks provide territories in which performative events occur. However, unlike what was suggested during Abstract Expressionism, this is not a performance between an authorial artist and the artwork; it is a performance between the artwork's material condition, which generates affective qualities, and its contextual frame, which sets up referential relationships that are tied to social and cultural forces. Through an analysis of individual artworks, this thesis demonstrates that these outcomes—the qualitative changes and new referential relationships—are neither predictable nor obvious in the source artworks; they must be actualized to become apparent. Thus, authorship is realigned with the art object, the artist is redefined as a viewer, and visual representation becomes a material event.
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All measurements are given in inches unless otherwise indicated.


89. Jeannette Christensen, *Ostentatio Vulnerum*, 1995. Laser copy and wooden frame filled with JELL-O, approx. 37.5 x 30 x .9. Source: Mieke Bal. *Quoting*


Introduction

The use of the term appropriation in art discourse is relatively recent and in decline. The heyday of its usage is located in the late 1970s through the mid-eighties, when it seemed to become synonymous with another term, postmodern. Taken together, these two terms—Postmodern Appropriation—invariably generate artists’ names: Sherrie Levine and Richard Prince figure prominently on this list. As models, these artists’ works define the two primary approaches that shaped appropriation art in the late twentieth-century, namely “art after art” and “art after media”. Specifically, Prince pirated imagery from popular culture to analyze how advertising constructs viewers’ identities and desires, while Levine exacted thefts from art history to drive a wedge between the terms “original” and “author”. As a result of these and other artists’ works of postmodern appropriation, critics of the eighties questioned the fundamentals of representation, asking what and how artworks articulate expressions. Embedded within this initial inquiry was a plethora of other questions, not the least of which was: Who or what constitutes the author?

Despite the profound contributions that postmodern appropriation made to art history’s understanding of both representation and authorship, these artists and their critics were not trail blazing. Quite the opposite. Postmodern appropriation represents the culmination of several concerns that shaped the overall development of art throughout the second-half of the twentieth century.
Following in the footsteps of many Pop and Photo-realist artists, postmodern appropriation artists embraced a return to figurative representation in order to continue their predecessors' investigation of the referential operations of visual imagery and its condition as a sign. Profiting from the lessons of conceptualism, postmodern appropriationists also recognized that the meaning generated by imagery is largely determined by its context or frame. And finally, appropriation art recalled the concerns of Minimalism by underscoring the temporal effects of material expression and investing in serial multiplicity. Beyond the insights of this art historical legacy, postmodern appropriation art also drew upon a number of contributions made in other fields of study, including semiotics, Lacanian psychology, contemporary philosophy, and Marxism.

As noted, Levine's and Prince's oeuvres identify two distinct approaches to appropriation—art after art and art after media—that define the practice of most late twentieth-century appropriationists. The past image and the arena that frames it regulate these categories. Thus, where Levine garnered her imagery from the annals of art history to produce art after art, Prince borrowed his from media sources such as advertising. For example, in Prince's 1980 untitled picture viewers see three images lifted from magazine advertisements that, as the subtitle describes, depict Three Women Looking in the Same Direction (figure 1). To create this work Prince carefully selected and rephotographed these images, removing any references to the commodities being promoted by the source advertisements. Through this process, he also cropped the images to
enhance the apparent sameness of the depicted women’s gestures and expressions. As a result, the women appear to be the same model, performing different personalities. The power of this work is located in its simplicity and the presumed absence of Prince’s intervention, for while the images have clearly been removed from commercial advertisements, they appear otherwise unaltered. By isolating these images and ganging them together, Prince effectively underscored how they manipulate our desires and disarm them through this process. Likewise, by generating photographs of other artists’ photographs, Levine’s art after art pictures directed viewers to the source imagery and asked them to consider the cultural significance of the appropriated images and the artists who had created them. Thus, for example, critic Craig Owens told us that Levine’s rephotographs of Walker Evans’s iconic FSA photographs revealed (figure 2) that even abject poverty, if fashionably photographed, could become entertainment.¹ Together, these two appropriationists explored some of the many ways in which imagery communicates information; moreover, Levine’s work—being copies of other artworks—specifically expanded this exploration by problematizing the issue of authorship.

However shocking Prince’s and Levine’s work seemed in the late seventies, neither approach was unique. Levine’s heritage reaches all the way back to the Renaissance, where viewers find, for example, Raphael paying tribute to his teacher Perugino in the Marriage of the Virgin (figure 3) by recycling the
composition of Perugino's *Christ Delivering the Keys to St Peter* (figure 4). In addition, some of Levine's more renowned early twentieth-century predecessors include Francis Bacon, Joseph Cornell, Rene Magritte, and Pablo Picasso. Historically closer to Levine, there is a seemingly endless list of artists creating art after art in the 1960s and 1970s; although incomplete, this list includes John Baldesarri, John Clem Clarke, Richard Estes, Audrey Flack, Red Grooms, Ray Johnson, Josef Levi, Roy Lichtenstein, Marisol, Malcolm Morley, Richard Pettibone, Mel Ramos, Martha Rosler, Larry Rivers, George Segal, Sylvia Sleigh, Elaine Sturtevant, Masami Teraoka, and Tom Wesselmann. Prince's immediate lineage, on the other hand, leads to Andy Warhol's factory, where almost perfect, albeit empty, replicas of red-and-white Brillo boxes were created as well as precise copies of Campbell soup-can labels, silk-screened images of a gun-slinging Elvis Presley, and the ever-popular film stills of Marilyn Monroe reappeared, repeated over and over in the frame of fine art. Looking past Warhol, there are also several other pop artists who practiced art after media, including Peter Blake, Jasper Johns, Robert Indiana, Roy Lichtenstein, James Rosenquist, Tom Wesselmann, and others. Art after media finds older ancestors in the era of Dada photomontage (Raoul Hausmann, John Heartfield, and Hannah Höch) and before that the Duchampian readymade provides at least a step-grandfatherly role.

The term "step" offers an important distinction here, for where Duchamp's readymades engaged actual commodities—bottle racks, urinals, etc.—art after
media deals in copies; even Warhol’s Brillo boxes were fabricated packages and not the real commodities purchased at a grocery store and then displayed in an art gallery. In other words, appropriated images—be they two-dimensional patterns of lights and darks or composed three-dimensional constructions—are copies. In this regard appropriation art comes dangerously close to the more criminal practice of forgery. This sinister allegiance seems particularly evident in postmodern appropriation, for what distinguished late twentieth-century appropriation art from its various predecessors was the seemingly exact nature of its appropriated imagery. Despite this exactness, appropriation art—postmodern or otherwise—is not forgery, for where forgers traffic in disguise, presenting their work as being the actual and original object, appropriationists make no effort to hide the fact that their works are copies. In the past, artists achieved this by significantly altering their appropriated imagery so that viewers readily recognized them as copies. For example, the addition of a moustache clearly distinguishes Duchamp’s *L.H.O.O.Q.* (figure 5) from Leonardo’s masterpiece. Postmodern appropriationists, on the other hand, identified their works as copies primarily through the use of titles and other framing devices. Thus, Levine persistently labeled her rephotographs “untitled” and parenthetically cited the source artist’s name.

Situated between Levine’s and Prince’s works are the untitled film stills of Cindy Sherman. As the name implies, Sherman’s series recalls Hollywood cinema. In fact, many of Sherman’s photographs appear to be actual shots borrowed from
specific Hollywood B-movies. As Sherman has pointed out, the pictures "trigger your memory so that you feel you have seen it before." Thus, Untitled #20 (figure 6), for example, suggests a scene from Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window. However, if a viewer were to examine Hitchcock's film frame-by-frame, s/he would discover that no such scene actually exists. Effectively, Sherman fabricated the imitation of an appropriation, opening a vein of investigation that a number of artists would expand upon in the mid-eighties under the guise of Simulation art.

A Picture's Worth a Thousand Authors

As noted, unlike earlier practitioners, these three artists' works were distinguished by the seemingly exact nature of their appropriated imagery. In part, this aspect of postmodern appropriation was a presumed function of photography, which postmodern appropriation was specifically associated with more than any other medium. Ironically, exactness is an illusionary quality of this medium that all of these artists capitalized upon. In fact, Sherman's and Prince's photographs specifically relied upon this illusion appearing and then unraveling, for they both laid out little clues designed to question the veracity of their images. Nevertheless, several critics theoretically defined appropriation in terms of the documentary function of photography. In fact, the significance of photography became doubly important for Levine's and Prince's practice, for
where Sherman’s images were pictures of *faux* movie stills, Prince’s and Levine’s were pictures of other actual pictures and thus dubbed rephotography.

The critical significance of rephotography was two-fold. Defined as mechanical reproduction, photography seemed to eliminate the artist’s hand and by extension, his/her personal expression from the artistic production. The absence of the artist’s personal touch was further underscored by the fact that most postmodern appropriationists abandoned the darkroom and had their work developed commercially. The cultural significance of rejecting personal artistic expression was critically interpreted as a political stance against late-modernism in general and specifically against the critical assessments of Abstract Expressionism, which had linked personal intention to artistic expression. Accordingly, some postmodern critics embraced rephotography as a strategic refusal of painting and the codes that surrounded it. The significance of photography for postmodern appropriation was also located in the inherent multiplicity of the medium, which essentially defined these artworks as copies and decidedly *not* originals. Thus, this overt celebration of copying flew in the face of modern aesthetics, which had always insisted upon the presence of an original vision in artworks.

Beyond the particulars of art history, the significance of rejecting modern aesthetics was also fueled by the tenets of post structuralism, particularly those advanced by Roland Barthes. In his 1968 seminal essay “Death of the Author”
Barthes explained that the act of writing was not an original expression but simply a process of redeploying material borrowed from other texts. Since postmodern appropriation art demonstrated this tenet visually, it was described as a conscious refusal of authorial intention and original expression. Barthes’ eulogy for the author also had another relevance here. Dismissing conventional approaches to literary scholarship, which had sought the meaning of a text in the biographic details of the author, Barthes maintained that the meaning of a text was to be located in its destination, namely the reader. In the visual arts the Barthian reader became aligned with and defined as the viewer. Accordingly, postmodern appropriationists were described as readers of imagery who created metatexts rather than authorial subjects who produced original works of art.

Although critics discussed and analyzed the different effects and implications of these artists’ individual works, the overall significance of their different approaches—art after art versus art after media—went largely unaddressed in the scholarship. Instead, appropriation art in the early eighties was generally understood as a critical act of reproduction that shifted or highlighted the references associated with the source image. In other words, postmodern appropriation was defined as recoding. Nevertheless, it is clear that the redundant nature of rephotography served different ends for Prince and Levine.

Where Prince regularly altered the advertising imagery that he reproduced, Levine’s appropriated images were received as exact copies. Traditionally, the
photographic copy presumes sameness and an accuracy that goes beyond human perception. As art after art, the implications of this exactness raised both eyebrows and questions regarding authorship, originality, and finally ownership. In fact, in 1980, when Levine exhibited several rephotographs of Edward Weston’s pictures, the Weston estate threatened to sue her on the grounds of copyright infringement. Similarly, but with total support for her endeavor, art historians Douglas Crimp and Rosalind Krauss mused: if Levine’s images were exactly the same as Weston’s earlier images, could they really be called originals? In fact, were Weston’s even original?¹⁰

Taking up these questions from a more Marxist perspective, critics such as Benjamin Buchloh wondered what the implications were of identifying a body of work with an artist’s proper name, such as “Levine’s” or “Weston’s”?¹¹ Was this not a way of staking out territory and claiming it in the name of a personal vision, which then defined it as the property of an individual subject? Moreover, was not the presumed singularity of an artwork simply a means of imposing rarity and thereby enhancing the work’s value in a commercially competitive economic market? To answer these questions, another philosopher’s discussion of authorship was pressed into action. Shortly after Barthes’ essay was published, Michel Foucault rhetorically asked, “What is an Author?” Foucault found his answer in the proper name; he argued that the proper name sets up schools of thought, such as Marxism, which then no longer refer to the individual person once identified with that name.¹² In the visual arts this practice of establishing
authorship through the proper name mirrors the tradition of connoisseurship, where the evidence of a signature style is plied to establish originality. Originality, in turn, certifies the artwork’s value, both aesthetically and economically.

Related to these post-Marxist discourses is the work of another postmodern appropriationist, Louise Lawler. Like Cindy Sherman’s photographs, Lawler crosses Prince’s and Levine’s practices of art after media and art after art. Since 1982, almost all of Lawler’s photographs have featured images of two or more past artworks (figure 7). However, unlike Levine and Prince, Lawler locates the cultural significance of her imagery within the picture plane, for Lawler’s work is never about the appropriated imagery she depicts or even the source artists; rather her camera focuses on the spaces surrounding the artworks she photographs, namely the institutional rhetoric of museums or galleries and the practice of collecting and exhibiting artworks. Through this use of appropriated imagery in situ, Lawler alludes to the artwork’s status as an economic sign. However, beyond this apparently simple observation, Lawler’s work also has a performative effect. By self-consciously isolating many of the elements that structure an art-viewing experience, she makes viewers aware of their status as viewers, a fact that not only implicates viewers in the commercial process but that also refocuses the camera on the viewer as s/he is suddenly aware of being caught looking.
Curiously enough, it is Lawler’s picture—the inanimate object—that catches viewers in this dynamic. In one way or another all postmodern appropriation art strives for this performative effect; in fact, the postmodern practice of appropriation art always actualizes transformations and in this regard it becomes an event. Early on critics focused on the transformative effects of reframing, which recoded the appropriated imagery. Beyond the early eighties, however, appropriationists actualized these transformations by engaging the affective qualities of the materials that were used to express the appropriated images. Accordingly, images, such as the “bachelors”—which appear in Duchamp’s The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors (The Large Glass) even—were copied exactly but nonetheless drastically transformed by virtue of their expression in glass (see figures 78 & 79). This increased focus on the transformative effects of material expression helps to articulate an important difference between postmodern appropriation art after media and art after art. However, before exploring that difference, it is important to note that the affective qualities of a material expression are not dependent upon a viewer’s perception; they are inherent to the actual material expression of the artwork. Moreover, these affective qualities are not generic; all glass objects do not generate the same affective qualities; for example, consider a light bulb and a glass brick. Affective qualities are specific to an object’s actual and therefore individual material expression.

*The Media is the Message*
Art after media sidestepped many of the issues surrounding authorship and originality by appropriating imagery already located within the public purview. For Prince and the postmodern appropriationists who followed in his footsteps, appropriation became less concerned with the presentation of exact renditions of imagery and focused more upon the significant relationship between an image and its frame or context. In this regard Barbara Kruger’s work is exemplary. As an artist, Kruger progressed from painting, to writing, to *Picture Readings*: a book that juxtaposed photographs of California homes with brief fictional accounts that alluded to the potential events occurring within these silent suburban residences. Thus, *Picture Readings* established the formal structure that would define Kruger’s later artworks: photographs of collages that juxtaposed accusatory text against appropriated black-and-white imagery taken from advertisements dating from as far back as the 1920s and up through the sixties. Engaging both the style and voice of advertising, Kruger’s texts are printed in white on red bands of color that suggest the bold headlines of posters. In one example from 1982 viewers encounter the seemingly benign image of a knife being rinsed under a stream of water (figure 8). The blade, sharp side up, splits the flow of water and the staggered text reads: “You rule by pathetic display”. Using a similar approach, in another untitled work Kruger conveys a feminist perspective. This photograph depicts a wedding band being placed upon a woman’s hand. Printed atop the image are the words: “You are a captive audience”. In all of Kruger’s works the text functions like a photographic caption.
that refrares the imagery and tells the viewer how to interpret it. Invariably, Kruger's text is a surprise, as it always offers an alternative to the cultural messages already coded into the visual imagery.

Laurie Simmons's photographs employ a similar juxtaposition of disparate representations; however, rather than using text, Simmons plies three-dimensional objects. For example, in her 1984 photograph *Tourism: Pyramids 2nd View*, viewers see three yellow-plastic toy-figures moving across the foreground of an image that depicts traditionally dressed Arabs traveling on camels in front of the Egyptian pyramids. The gesture of the central toy figure appears to be clapping, while the other two lean forward, on the move and oblivious to their surroundings. Here, Simmons' title "Tourism" identifies her theme, while her imagery offers a somewhat parodist critique of Westerners in Asia. Like Kruger's work, Simmons appropriates imagery from popular media and reads it through the effects of another added element.

Following Walter Benjamin, critics Benjamin Buchloh and Craig Owens identified this treatment of appropriated imagery as allegory. In an allegorical structure the appropriated image is read or deconstructed through the frame or context of another.15 When the allegorist appropriates an image, Owens explains, "he does not restore an original meaning, rather he adds another meaning. He adds to replace, the allegorical meaning supplants an antecedent one, it is a supplement."16 Both Buchloh and Owens concur that allegorical postmodern
appropriation is designed to reveal the ideological content inscribed in a visual image through the creation of a myth. Once again, Barthes’ theoretical influence is operating here, for as Buchloh explains:

Barthes’ strategy of secondary mythification repeats the semiotic and linguistic devaluation of primary language by myth and structurally follows Benjamin’s ideas on the allegorical procedure that reiterates the devaluation of the object by commodification.17

Barthes sketched out these ideas on “secondary mythification” in his 1957 text *Mythologies*. Using his now-famous example of a picture of a Black African soldier saluting the French flag, Barthes explored how mythology is created by appropriating images or signifiers out of one context and then redeploying them in another context that is motivated in another direction. According to Barthes, the act of appropriation displaces the source image; relocated in another context, the image then acquires additional meanings. Thus, the African soldier is lifted from a historical context of harsh French colonial rule and relocated within another context that communicates happy allegiance. Here, the history of the French soldier is not erased; it is simply redirected so that it begins to resonate with other meanings. Effectively, the image is primarily altered at the connotative level. Barthes concluded this essay by recommending that the best weapon against a myth was to remythify it. Thus, critics suggested that postmodern appropriatists were redefining the meaning of their appropriated imagery by relocating the imagery in the context of another frame.
Crucially, Barthes maintained that in order for this representational system to do its ideological work the appropriated image needed to appear natural in its new surroundings. Thus, the seamlessness of photography lends credence and authority to Kruger’s and Simmons’ imagery. However, both artists also undermine this credibility; Kruger’s surprising statements and collage format and the surreal quality of Simmons’ imagery intentionally work against the otherwise naturalness of the imagery. This duplicity is evident in most postmodern appropriation artworks after media, and it was specifically designed to encourage viewers to question the entire enterprise of representation.

As Barthes’ essay suggested, images are representational systems that operate like text. In other words they carry coded messages. Barthes’ analysis demonstrated how these messages could be manipulated through appropriation. Throughout the eighties and nineties, appropriation’s strategic ability to recode imagery thus provided artists with a powerful reclamation tool. Robert Colescott’s work is a forerunner in this regard, for as early as 1975, he was engaging text and appropriated imagery to “correct” the oversights of history. For example, in Colescott’s hands, Emanuel Leutze’s 1851 history painting *Washington Crossing the Delaware* becomes *George Washington Carver Crossing the Delaware* (figure 9). Insisting upon a voice, Colescott appropriated history and literally rewrote it, and to ensure viewers’ recognition of the revised scene, Colescott stenciled his title along the top of the painting’s picture plane. Beyond the title, viewers also note that all of the characters in “George
Washington Carver's boat are not only Black, but they are all depicted according to racist stereotypes: they all embody white bug eyes, big flabby lips, and painted watermelon smiles. Thus, while Colescott has usurped the official white version of history and inserted the presence of Carver, he has also juxtaposed the respected name of Carver against an ironic visual portrayal of the typical visual forms used to represent Black Americans during Carver's era.

Like Colescott's painting, most examples of appropriation art in the 1960s and 1970s engaged some form of parody. During the early eighties, artists and critics alike began to recognize the fragility of this form of critique, for in order to produce an ironic commentary the parodist image must repeat the problematic stereotype. Therefore, the parody runs the risk of actually reinforcing the stereotype rather than effecting difference. Thus, while some postmodern appropriationists continued to create parodies, others, such as Lorraine O'Grady, followed Barthes' recommendation of naturalizing their presentations of appropriated imagery. Accordingly, in O'Grady's "Miscegenated Family Album" (figure 10) series the viewers sees a number of diptychs that juxtapose portraits of young Black women with appropriated images of beautiful, culturally respected Black women from antiquity, such as the ancient Egyptian Queen Nefertiti. Through this juxtaposition, O'Grady creates a new context that invites the viewer to see these young Black women in terms of a legacy of empowerment rather than one of unemployment and welfare.
Somewhat similar to O’Grady’s family album, David Wojnarowicz appropriated an image of himself as a boy (figure 11). The fact that this image is a self-portrait is largely irrelevant, for as viewers look at the boy, he appears to be the all-American young white child who embodies the ideals of the late 1950s. This boy’s image looms large against a background text that reads in part:

One day this kid will do something that causes men who wear the uniforms of priests and rabbis, men who inhabit certain stone buildings, to call for his death. One day politicians will enact legislation against this kid. One day families...All this will begin to happen in one or two years when he discovers he desires to place his naked body on the naked body of another boy.

Thus reframed, the picture of this all-American boy encourages viewers to question the presumed abnormality that society imposes on gay identities.

The use of appropriation to reclaim imagery is also evident in works such as Cathy Grove’s “The Other Series”. Inspired by Lacan’s infamous remark that “The Woman” does not exist in language, Grove set about appropriating images of the nude female figure from past artworks. For example, in her 1990 photograph The Other Series: After Man Ray (figure 12) viewers see the shadow of a woman that recalls a Turkish bather excised from an Ingres painting. In fact, this is an appropriation of Man Ray’s 1924 photograph Le violin d’Ingres, which depicts the back of a nude female figure posing as a figure from an Ingres painting. Man Ray altered Ingres’ image, however, by inscribing the woman’s back with the sound holes of a violin. In what amounts to a reversal of appropriation, Grove has blacked out the image of the female body, leaving
visible only her turban and the violin holes. Thus, Grove has literally removed
this female figure from representation and presumably from the grips of the male
gaze.

With the pictorial image defined by its semiotic coding, the entire enterprise of
appropriation began to shift. Now, rather than necessarily copying imagery from
popular media or art history, artists began to copy the styles and compositions of
images, co-opting meaning through frames of reference rather than actual
figurations. The activist group Gran Fury's infamous 1989 billboard *Kissing
 Doesn't Kill* (figure 13) offers viewers a powerful example of this approach. In the
space of a glance most viewers will misrecognize Gran Fury's billboard as a
1980s' Benetton sweater advertisement. The artists achieve this by aping the
font and overall graphic design of the then well-known Benetton ads. Effectively,
they appropriated a frame of reference and inserted an entirely different image:
the picture of three attractive couples kissing: one heterosexual, one lesbian, and
one gay. As a result, viewers are led to read these images in terms of the codes
already established around Benetton sweaters, namely as beautiful, culturally
sophisticated, and desirable. The Gran Fury artists recognized that if meaning is
relative to the frame of an image, then the codes surrounding one image could
be extended to another image by appropriating the frame rather than the exact
figuration of a past image. Thus, appropriation artworks such as this began to
raise more questions about imagery: Is an image something separate from its
frame of reference? How does an actual image differ from its referential
function? Is there a difference between an image and its composition? These questions will play a fundamental role in shaping postmodern appropriation art as it moves through the eighties and into the nineties. This “new” approach to appropriation, however, was also evident in the late seventies, but in order to discuss these earlier efforts this thesis will have to move beyond photographic mediums and now consider painting.

Despite the important theoretical role that photography played, postmodern appropriation was not an activity exclusive to photography, and to suggest otherwise would be a grave oversight. The importance of photography and other mechanically reproduced mediums to postmodern appropriation was an opinion fostered by a select group of critics, most of whom were associated with the journal *October*, which was founded in 1976 by Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe and former *Artforum* editors Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson. Most of the discussions of postmodern appropriation that were published in *October* took aim at modern aesthetics and specifically critiqued expressionism. For many of them, Barthes’ pronounced death of the author also came to mean the death of painting. *October’s* first editor Douglas Crimp explains:

> If modernist aesthetic theory and practice commence with the creation, during the early 19th century, of the museum as we know it, they also coincide with the invention of photography, whose mechanically determined images would haunt them. Painting, the principal museum art, developed throughout the modern period in antagonism to photography’s descriptive powers, its wide dissemination, and its mass appeal. Isolated in the museum, painting increasingly shunned objective depiction, asserted its material uniqueness, became hermetic and difficult...But behind painting’s self-referentiality, guaranteeing its particular meanings,
stood the artist’s subjectivity, for ultimately painting had to transcend its materiality and become human. The autonomy of art always defers, if only implicitly, to a prior autonomy, that of the sovereign human subject. 21

As Crimp’s comments conclude, the problem was not with painting per se; rather the problem lay in the references surrounding painting, namely the “sovereign subject”. Through this semiotic reference, painting seemed to lose its condition as a material object and, at least for the October writers, it became a cultural practice invested with a particular ideological stance associated with modernism. The terrific irony here is that by suggesting that appropriation was proper to the mechanical and inherently multiple medium of photography, the October writers were reinvesting in the Greenbergian notion that each medium had to define itself according to its limiting conditions. 22 As early as 1982, Hal Foster recognized this problem; noting that postmodernism had defined itself in terms of the legacy of modernism, he wrote: “the fallacy here is to derive a logic of a medium from historical examples and then to see it (the logic) apart from the examples as somehow essential to the medium.” 23 Furthermore, Foster argued that appropriation and textuality should be acknowledged as tactics independent of specific mediums. 24 The ongoing presence of appropriated imagery in painting would eventually make this clear.

Despite the October group’s vehement opposition, painting returned to prominence in 1978 when the Whitney Museum of American Art mounted the exhibition “New Image Painting”. 25 Within many of these paintings another
approach, related to rephotography, was evident, for here are the seeds of the
citational approach that would later serve Gran Fury so effectively. Unlike the
photographers, these so-called “new image” paintings reflected a much broader
interpretation of appropriation: theirs was neither image-based nor was it
concerned with presenting exact renditions. Instead, they borrowed the “look” of
past artworks and popular imagery by engaging recognizable styles and
presentational formats. For example, Jennifer Bartlett’s paintings, steel-plates
coated with a layer of baked-on white enamel, literally adopted the form of New
York’s subway signs to depict painted images and abstract shapes. Closer to the
practice of art after art, Robert Moskowitz’s painting Skyscraper 2 (figure 14)
offered a minimal interpretation of its title: two almost identical rectangles reach
vertically up the ten-foot canvas against an empty, evenly measured color-field
background. This depiction of “minimalesque” imagery, however, belied
Moskowitz’s simultaneous conceptual interpretation of the subject matter his title
alluded to, namely New York’s World Trade Towers. Indeed, on one side of each
rectangle viewers see a dark strip that creates the illusion of depth and ever so
slightly suggests three-dimensional forms. As a result, the image shuttles
between a purely geometric configuration and a representation of a particular
scene. As curator Richard Marshall suggested, this shuttling neutralizes and
frees the image from its typical function:

   The artist is free to manipulate the image on canvas so that it can
be experienced as a physical object, an abstract configuration, a
psychological associative, a receptacle for applied paint, an
analytically systematized exercise, a vehicle for formalist
explorations, or combinations of any.26
In other words Moskowitz's image simultaneously asserts the image's condition as an abstract configuration while acknowledging its referential role. This concern is also evident in Nicholas Africano's paintings. These works feature tiny, isolated figures expressively rendered and set against large color-fields that seem to wink back at the last breath of modernist purity, namely color-field painting. Meanwhile, Africano's titles, such as *The Argument* (figure 15), clearly identify his visual images as lexical signs that might easily function as dictionary illustrations.

Of all the paintings in the "New Image" exhibition this exploration of the textual condition of imagery was perhaps most prominent in Neil Jenney's work, which not only consciously aped recognizable presentational formats but also engaged the metonymic play of language. All of Jenney's paintings were encased in distinctive black frames on which the titles were printed, a format that recalled the gold title-plates that museums once affixed to the frames of masterworks. Looking at one, viewers find that Jenney's title *Saw and Sawed* (figure 16) suggests an illogical association of the acts of seeing and cutting. This play is elaborated in the imagery which depicts a landscape in which a saw has been placed atop a severed tree trunk; beside this conjunction is a refined piece of lumber that sits atop a cut log. The simple, almost mathematical, grammar of this picture is enhanced by the style of Jenney's illustrations, which suggests a coloring book. Overall, his images operate like text. Again, Marshall's comments are insightful:
In some ways, imagistic painting confounds the viewer because expectations and associations with the suggested illusion are not readily discernible or explicable. A viewer's response is not made directly to an image but is based on the meanings that he attaches to such images. A viewer responds to meanings of objects that are defined within a cultural system and social organization and which are mediated by the use of symbols.27

Thus, when Jenney's imagery combines with the historical references evoked by his treatment of the frame, associations between the process of refining lumber and the scenic landscape become manifest. Significantly, none of these associations appear through narrative depictions, rather they are produced semiotically, through references to images that exist outside the picture plane.

Africano's, Jenney's and Moskowitz's paintings are all exploring the territory that text and visual imagery share, namely referentiality. Although this concern also dominated early postmodern appropriation art, these artists' works are significantly different. In fact, these works help to demonstrate what appropriation art is not. Appropriation art traffics in imagery, the abstract configurations that make references but that nonetheless exist separately from these references. All three of these works reference past art historical styles through imitation, but they do not feature past imagery. Likewise, both Bartlett's painted signs and Gran Fury's billboard ape presentational formats not imagery. These artworks do not appropriate images; they construct images according to a selected and predetermined stylistic formula. A style is a reference but it is not a pictorial image, and appropriation art always deals in imagery. In fact, to be
precise, appropriation art moves specific images into new frames of reference and new material expressions.

*Figuring it Out*

In 1982 Crimp noted the difference between appropriation and these stylistic imitations in his catalogue essay “Appropriating Appropriation”. Here, Crimp defined works that imitated stylistic approaches—naming Michael Graves’ architecture, Hans Jurgen Syberberg’s films, Robert Mapplethorpe’s photographs, and David Salle’s painting—as regressive, while works that imitated material—Frank Gehry’s architecture, Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet’s cinema, Sherrie Levine’s photography, and Roland Barthes’ texts—as progressive.\(^28\) It should be noted that Crimp is using the term “material” not to refer to the physical matter that composes an artwork but to the semiotic matter. In other words, the latter group appropriates imagery from specific works, while the former apes styles. Thus, where Crimp celebrated Levine’s photographs, which re-presented the imagery of others, he rejected Mapplethorpe’s, which imitated the stylistics of prewar studio photography.\(^29\) As noted above, this difference is key to identifying and separating appropriation art from other citational approaches; however, as Gran Fury’s later works would demonstrate, it is hardly a gauge by which to determine a regressive or progressive political stance.
Crimp's polemical statement reflects the critical rift between painting and photography that had been growing since the late seventies. Although many of the “New Image” painters shared common ground with the rephotographers in terms of their investigation of referentiality, any possibility of camaraderie evaporated a few months after the “New Image” exhibition, when the Whitney presented another painting exhibition that featured the work of Julian Schnabel, David Salle, and Eric Fischel. Of these three only Salle and Schnabel engaged appropriation strategies. Like many of the “New Image” painters Schnabel tended to imitate stylistic looks. His paintings contained inexact renditions of recognizable art historical imagery, such as Byzantine crucifixes, as well as more specific but not exact appropriations, such as Caravaggesque youths in togas. Meanwhile, his all-over use of broken crockery metaphorically referenced the expressionistic brushstroke. Salle, on the other hand, appropriated exact images, including Donald Duck, soft-core pornographic female nudes, the occasional fragment taken from an art historical masterpiece, among others. Invariably, Salle’s appropriations appeared randomly strewn in picture planes rife with other imagery, all of which refused any form of narrative interpretation or critical commentary.

Unlike the deconstructive model supported by the October writers, the appropriated imagery that Salle and Schnabel employed functioned as empty signs, seemingly deployed for purely decorative purposes and designed to strangle definitive meaning. Accordingly, this work was derogatively labeled
pastiche, which Fredric Jameson had defined as a form of blank parody motivated by a nostalgic desire to return to an earlier period that had never really existed:

pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that these exists something normal compared with which what is being imitated is rather comic.\textsuperscript{30}

For the October writers the critical blindness of pastiche would have been enough to earn their disdain, but Schnabel seemed particularly determined to resurrect the guise of the heroic, misunderstood genius painter. As a matter of fact, in 1979 Schnabel adopted a martyr’s identity for his self-portrait, titled St. Sebastian-Born in 1951. In 1981 he followed this up with a portrait of God and told an interviewer that he strove for the feeling of God as he painted.\textsuperscript{31} As Crimp had pointed out, the problem was not the paint but the sovereign subject, and in Schnabel’s case subjecthood appeared to be working overtime.

In contrast to Schnabel’s work, critic and painter Thomas Lawson tried to defend Salle’s work, arguing that Salle was subverting the formalism practiced by Schnabel and others:

The images are laid next to one another, or placed on top of one another. These juxtapositions prime us to understand the work metaphorically, as does the diptych format Salle favors, but in the end the metaphors refuse to gel. Meaning is intimated but tantalizingly withheld. It appears to be on the surface, but as soon as it is approached it disappears, provoking the viewer into a deeper examination of prejudices bound inextricably with the conventional representation that express them. Salle’s work is
seductive and obscure, and this obscurity is its source of strength, for when we attempt to bring light to the darkness, we illuminate much else as well. Salle follows a strategy of infiltration and sabotage, using established conventions against themselves in the hope of exposing cultural repression.\(^{32}\)

Lawson was not alone in defending Salle; Peter Schjeldahl championed his work as well.\(^{33}\) Nevertheless, the presumed meaningless of Salle’s work was harder to swallow when it came to his treatment of the female figure. For example, his 1985 painting *Géricault’s Arm* (figure 17) depicts two almost identical female figures that suggest modern, slightly pornographic caryatids rendered in a grayish monochrome. Both are partially nude: a cut-off shirt drapes and just covers their breasts, while their stockings have been pulled down to reveal their pubic areas and upper thighs. The difference between them is basically a function of perspective; viewers are meant to read them as being in line, the smaller one behind the other. Moreover, the rear figure’s head and shoulders have been supplanted by a toga-clad arm, which was lifted from a painting by Jean Louis Géricault.

This incongruent layering of imagery is typical of Salle’s work. In fact, the two figures are further separated by a rectangular inset that depicts a colorful object shaped like an hourglass, which might be a child’s toy or perhaps an elaborate candy dish with a cover; it is impossible to tell. Despite Salle’s insistence to the contrary, when the various references that these images invoke are associated with the headless female figure, somewhat derogatory implications emerge, as the female body becomes associated with a child’s play thing and/or a dish of
candy. Yet, when Salle’s work was charged with misogyny, Salle tried to justify his sexualized objectification of the female body by arguing that his imagery represented a social critique of currents in representation, and at least one feminist, Barbara Kruger, supported him in this regard. Still, like other somewhat concurrent attempts at parodist commentary, this one was charged with reinforcing what it presumed to critique.

As the eighties progressed, the popularity of painting continued to grow under the rubric of “Neo Expressionism”. In 1982 Salle and Schnabel were invited to exhibit in the Zeitgeist exhibition in Berlin, joining a group of expressionistic painters that had been garnering international attention for several years. These painters included Georg Baselitz, Sandro Chia, Francesco Clemente, Enzo Cucchi, Jörg Immendorf, Anselm Kiefer, Markus Lüpertz, Sigmar Polke, Gerhard Richter, and others. As the name “Neo-Expressionists” implied, many of these artists borrowed the styles and subjects of twentieth-century Expressionism. Baselitz’s work recalled Emile Nolde’s harsh palette and primitive figures outlined with thick black brushstrokes, while A.R. Penck’s neo-primitive technique suggested the primitive symbolism of Abstract Expressionist Adolph Gottlieb. Kiefer returned to the earlier tradition of German Romantic landscapes. However, rather than representing the sublime beauty of nature that compelled the Romantics, Kiefer incorporated the non-traditional materials of straw, lead, and tar to depict the scorched fields of war that seemed to continue to haunt Germany. Meanwhile, Chia drew on classic mythological characters such as
Sisyphus and redressed them in modern attire. This apparent fascination with the look of past art only seemed to reinforce Jameson's charge of nostalgia. Similarly, Owens argued that these artists were investing in a bankrupt tradition, creating "artificial masterpieces", in what amounted to an authoritarian rejection of the real radicalism of postmodernism. Crimp summed it up as reactionary, and Buchloh suggested that the Neo Expressionists' use of appropriated imagery demonstrated a "phallocratic tendency".

Like the "New Image" painters, these artists seldom appropriated imagery and instead borrowed stylistic approaches. Gerhard Richter and Carlo Maria Mariani, however, are notable exceptions. Although these artists' works imitated specific styles, they also quoted specific imagery from either art history or popular media. Looking first to Mariani, viewers find a return to the format of grand history painting and the neo-classical style popular in the eighteenth century. Beyond these stylistic references, many of Mariani's works contained fragments borrowed from particular past paintings as well as borrowed compositions. For example, his 1981 La Costellazione del Leone (La Scuola di Roma) (figure 18) echoes Anton Raphael Mengs' 1761 painting Parnassus, which reworked Raphael's earlier version. Described as an "iconic hybrid" by Art in America reviewer Lisa Liebmann, Mariani's painting has updated the cast of characters such that the viewer can recognize Mariani seated in the center and Cy Twombly arriving on horseback. Also present are Chia holding a canvas and Clemente beside him. Janis Kounellis has been cast as a putto, and Mario
Merz stands in a bathtub playing the role of Hercules. In this work Mariani's approach recalls the Renaissance practice of *imitato*, in which artists imitated a past composition in order to claim an artistic lineage and simultaneously declare their innovative contribution to the field.\(^{41}\) Thus, Mariani engages the meaning associated with Mengs' and Raphael's *Parnassus* to establish himself and his contemporaries within a legacy of greatness. Significantly, Mariani is engaging the narrative device that Buchloh and Owens defined as postmodern allegory, that is, reading one image in the terms of another. However, unlike Kruger's and Simmons' work, this use of allegory is hardly critical of its imagery; instead it is intended to narrate artistic virtuosity.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Richter's work imitates a range of specific art historical painting-styles. Within his *oeuvre* viewers find a series of paintings that ape the drama of Abstract Expressionism but do not actually reference any particular painting or individual artist's work. Thus, Richter reiterated Expressionism as a textual vocabulary rather than a personal expression. Moving backward in time, Richter also produced another series of paintings that took up the vocabulary of the Baroque. In addition to these stylistic citations, Richter painted copies of photographs appropriated from the media. In this series Richter always reproduced the imagery exactly, even imitating the blurry material quality common among old black-and-white photographs and newspaper images. Finally, within Richter's *oeuvre* there are five renditions of Titian's *Annunciation*; the first, *Annunciation After Titian*, 1973, presents an
exactly rendered version of Titian's imagery and the remaining four become increasingly abstract. In addition to these art after art appropriations, Richter's 1966 *Ema (Nude on a Staircase)* (figure 19) offers an updated version of Duchamp's *Nude Descending the Stairs*. In these and other examples of appropriation in Richter's *oeuvre*, the appropriated image provides the artist with a point of departure, a quality that distinguishes it from the metatextual approach that defined postmodern appropriation as a form of commentary. In fact, as this thesis will demonstrate, this treatment of the source as a point of departure distinguishes art after art from art after media.

Although Richter's appropriation work maintains a relationship with its source imagery, these works make no effort to comment on the past work. Instead their relationship is purely serial, a repetitive movement that opens and allows differences to appear. By the mid-eighties this approach will become more and more common. For example, in Peter Schuyff's 1983 abstract painting his title *The Bathers* (figure 20) directs viewers to Cezanne, the source of his imagery. Or is it Matisse? Maybe it is Picasso? For these artists also created works dealing with this subject matter. Unlike the rephotographers' work, Schuyff's imagery does not help viewers to identify the source of his appropriation, for the image in no way presents an exact rendition of any past artwork. Instead, he offers viewers very strange, black-and-grey striped shapes that undulate with a snake-like sense of movement. These figural elements appear grouped together on a yellow ground and against a blue sky. Strangely and despite their
fantastically odd shapes, when viewers read Schuyff’s title, they immediately recognize these shapes as bathers and identify their possible ancestry.

As happens with Sherman’s simulated film-stills, these works prompt viewers to question their ability to recognize the imagery and show viewers how they tend to codify imagery without really looking at it. Schuyff makes the viewer look and look again, as he seems to separate figuration from its referential function just long enough to call the viewer’s attention to the important and profound differences between these elements. In short, he reminds the viewer that an image is not the same as what it represents. When this insight is applied to appropriation art, it demonstrates that an appropriation also is not what it represents; in other words, an appropriation is not the same as its source. In fact, Schuyff’s work was part of a growing shift in appropriation art that became prominent in the mid-eighties under the guise of Simulation art. Like Schuyff, the Simulation artists presented appropriated images that did not resemble the figurations of their sources. Thus, they insisted upon difference conveyed through a redundant practice.

Effectively, the Simulations of the mid-eighties confronted viewers with the following questions: what is it that actually comes forward from the source and what is left behind? The answer here is almost obvious: the image comes forward and the material body of the cited work is left behind. Inevitably, an appropriated image carries with it coded or semiotic information, which enters the
new context of the appropriation and like a translation it communicates differently in this new locale. Moreover, the image reappears through a different material expression, which alters the affective qualities of the image. Ultimately, the Simulation artists’ works force viewers to recognize that unlike what critics suggested about rephotography, appropriation art is a creative practice that produces new works of art. Furthermore, viewers’ recognition of the differences that appear through appropriation art, particularly material difference, helps to draw a subtle but important distinction between art after art and art after media.

The media image is fundamentally a projection that actively denies its material composition in an effort to expand its mimetic effects and connotative powers. For example, when an individual encounters an advertising image, such as a billboard, s/he actively ignores the cheap paper and wooden support and instead focuses on the image that these materials present. Moreover, when a consumer invests in an advertising image, such as a Mazda Miata, s/he purchases the codes that surround the image, namely youthfulness and sex appeal. Although the consumer knows that the Miata is merely a car and not a fountain of youth, s/he also recognizes the power of the Miata image to communicate on a connotative level. In purchasing and driving this vehicle the consumer also acquires the connotative signs that travel with the image. The connotative effect of the Miata image is real; the consumer actually acquires the social codes of youthfulness and may even feel younger by virtue of the responses that these codes generate. Nevertheless, the consumers actual physical age remains
unchanged by the car. Recognizing this, postmodern art after media primarily invested in an exploration of the semiotic functions of visual imagery; whereas, art after art focused its exploration on the affective qualities of material expression.

To understand the process of art after media better, it may be useful to consider Hans Haacke’s 1990 installation, titled *Helmsboro Country* (figure 21). This work features an enlarged replica of a pack of Marlborough cigarettes on which the surgeon general’s warning has been replaced with quotes from the former U.S. Senator Jessie Helms and executives from the Phillip Morris company. The Phillip Morris logo has also been revised so that it now bears a portrait of Helms, and on each cigarette Haacke has silk-screened a copy of the bill of rights, destined at least metaphorically, to go up in smoke. In this work the tobacco industry appears in the gallery space as a reference carried by the appropriated image of a box of Marlborough cigarettes. This conjunction is not a creation of Haacke’s, rather it is more of a translation, for it brings out references that are already in place but not necessarily obvious. Indeed, any perusal of major American museum funders will reveal that the Phillip Morris Corporation is often prominently listed. This translation then expands, for when Phillip Morris cigarettes join hands with the visual arts another common denominator emerges, namely Senator Helms, who represented North Carolina—where Phillip Morris is headquartered—and who spear-headed the 1989 campaign to dismantle the National Endowment for the Arts on the grounds that it was supporting “obscene”
imagery. Effectively, Haacke’s work demonstrates that the American museum
gallery and Marlborough cigarettes share certain references. By making these
shared references visible, Haacke’s installation translates the connotative into
the denotative, and the implicit becomes explicit.

While this work is invested in a deconstruction of the references that surround its
imagery, it achieves this by engaging the mimetic condition of visual imagery and
the illusionary presence that it creates. For, in order for this piece to accomplish
its goal, the viewer must see a pack of Marlborough cigarettes. However, unlike
the traditional effect of mimesis, Haacke is not asking the viewer to suspend
reality and actually believe that the object before him/her is a real pack of
cigarettes. In fact, the exaggerated size is meant to discourage any such
mimetic tricks. Viewers are expected to see this sculpture as a representation or
image because this work is not about the materiality of cigarettes or the effects of
cardboard on the imagery, rather it is about the media representation of
cigarettes and all that it implies.

Media representations are specifically engaged in manipulating the referential
codes attached to images, and they are generally unconcerned with the real
material objects that present these images. Art after art appropriations are very
different in this regard, for the sources of their appropriated imagery, namely
other artworks, are deeply invested in the effects and affects of their material
expressions. Artworks that appropriate imagery from other artworks force
viewers to consider the impact of the appropriated images’ expression in a new material, while art after media generally asks viewers to ignore the material expression of both the source and the appropriated image. In this regard, art after media expands upon Conceptual Art’s goal to dematerialize the art object. In doing so it locates the image and focus primarily on the effects of context. Not so for art after art. These works expand the range of appropriation art by extending its investigation of how visual representations operate to include the affects of materiality.

*Material Evidence*

To date the scholarship around appropriation art has produced a comprehensive analysis of art after media. Yet, for the most part, this scholarship has treated art after art as if its formal concerns were the same as those of art after media. As a result, the affects of material expression on appropriated imagery have been largely ignored in the art historical scholarship surrounding appropriation art. Accordingly, this thesis will re-explore the impact of appropriation art on representation and authorship by looking at the profound effects and affects of material expression on the image. In an effort to limit the scope and hone the focus of this investigation, this thesis will examine postmodern appropriation exclusively through the practice of postmodern art after art. Accordingly, this thesis begins with the developments of postmodern art after art as it first appears in Levine’s rephotography, produced in the late 1970s. This thesis will trace the
development of postmodern appropriation art after art from Levine's practice through the development of various movements and individual artworks, created as late as 2003. Although the primary focus of this thesis remains on the development of appropriation art after art in the United States, this thesis will also consider works by many individual Young British Artists and other non-American artists.

Essentially appropriation artworks—both art after media and art after art—are composed of three elements: image, context and material expression. Throughout this thesis appropriation art will be defined as the movement of imagery into new material and contextual expressions. Inherent to this perspective is an understanding of movement that has been defined by Brian Massumi. According to Massumi, when an image is in movement it does not coincide with its own identity, rather it coincides with its own transition.\textsuperscript{44} Through Massumi's understanding of movement, this thesis locates the appropriated image in transition. Specifically, this thesis will look at how the movement of an appropriated image into a new context orchestrates translational effects on the references that the appropriated image brings with it. In addition, this thesis will explore how the new material expression of the appropriated image qualitatively transforms its sensual affects.

This thesis's definition of art after art as movement demands that much of the critical interpretations that surrounded appropriation art in the eighties be set
aside, for these critics focused almost exclusively on the effects of context and largely ignored the fact that appropriation artworks were discrete material expressions, separate and different from their sources. The goal here is not to suggest that these initial interpretations were entirely wrong; in fact, in many instances these critics made profound observations about the ways in which appropriation translated imagery at a contextual level. Moreover, these observations provided tremendous insights into the ways in which the referential function of an image operates. Nevertheless, these critical assessments did not go far enough, for they remained stuck at the level of the frame, reluctant to move into the material terrain of the artwork where some of the most profound transformations of images are actualized.

As demonstrated in the works of Colescott, Kruger, and Simmons, many of the appropriation artworks produced during the late seventies and early eighties give voice to political issues left out of modernism. Although these issues will continue to be addressed by appropriation artists, as the practice of art after art develops beyond the early 1980s, material expression and its qualitative impact becomes increasingly conspicuous and harder to ignore. Therefore, while this thesis will address these political issues as they appear in individual artworks targeted for discussion, the focus of this thesis will be on the impact of material expression on visual imagery. Here, it should be noted that the conspicuous focus on material expression, which develops in late twentieth-century and early twenty-first century appropriation art, makes it increasingly difficult to understand
how the early postmodern critics missed this vital component. This difficulty, however, is an illusion of time and a product of “twenty-twenty hindsight”. When situated historically, that is within the fading but still present shadows of modernism and its credos of self-expression, the critics of postmodern appropriation art clearly reflect their age. Indeed, the very term "postmodern" embodies the traces of the polemical arguments that later developed around appropriation art. First applied to visual artworks by Leo Steinberg in 1968, the term “postmodern” was cited to describe as “the most radical shift in the subject matter of art, the shift from nature to culture.” Steinberg’s comments were made in relationship to Robert Rauschenberg’s “flat bed” paintings, and he hailed the power of context to construct meaning between imagery and separate from artistic intention, indirectly and retrospectively applauding the semiotic investigations of Pop Art that had followed Rauschenberg’s own break with Abstract Expressionism. Thus, wittingly or not, Steinberg’s term suggested a radical break with mimetic representation and the Aristotelian edict that art follow nature, while also marking Abstract Expression as the end of modernism. The echoes of this division are heard throughout the early discussions of rephotography; in fact many of the writers for October magazine will cite Steinberg’s essay and define themselves according to his polemically defined term, postmodernism. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that many of their early discussions of appropriations are decidedly aimed at a critique of modernist aesthetics, particularly Greenbergian formalism. Hopefully, at this point in history the exaggerated weight and perhaps even looming threat of modernism’s
exclusionary tenets, which so privileged the straight white first-world male, seem to have lessened, affording viewers the opportunity to return to postmodern appropriation art after art and recognize its productive and creative material affects without signaling the advance of yet another avant-garde.

Hopefully, by redefining appropriation as a transformative and creative process, art historians will also reconsider the term "copy" and the tradition of sameness that it has imposed on the appropriated image. For ultimately, appropriation broaches the question: how can an appropriation be both a copy and yet remain materially different? Gilles Deleuze's seminal philosophical study *Difference and Repetition* offers insight into this quandary. In this text, Deleuze's point of departure is Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of the "eternal return". Abandoning any presumptions of origins, Deleuze engages Nietzsche's concept to define repetition as an on-going serial condition that allows difference to enter the world. To clarify this definition Deleuze first distinguishes repetition from generality, which he says imposes sameness.46 This distinction is key to the study that follows, for this thesis will demonstrate that generality is a product of abstraction, and however much a visual artwork might present abstract affects, visual artworks are never abstract generalities; no matter what they represent, visual artworks always remain concrete material objects.47

Art after art re-presents figurations that are materially transformed; at the referential level, however, these figurations may be generalized and thereby
presumed to be the same as their sources. Yet, at the actual level, which is the material level, this generalization is not possible because in the end there will always be two different material objects: the source artwork and the appropriation. Therefore, following Deleuze, this thesis maintains that there are only first times, unique appropriations that exist as part of an endless series. As Deleuze explains:

Each term of a series, being already a difference, must be put into a variable relation with other terms, thereby constituting other series devoid of centre and convergence. Divergence and decentring must be affirmed in the series itself. Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown differing. We know that modern art tends to realize these conditions: in this sense it becomes a veritable theatre of metamorphoses and permutations...The work of art leaves the domain of representation in order to become ‘experience’, transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible.48

For Deleuze, a repetition is movement motivated by difference.49 However, it is not movement defined in terms of space-covered or distance, which would suggest a linear progression forward, rather it is an in-depth movement that emerges from a ground of multiplicities that paradoxically implies a groundlessness. From this “groundless ground” difference appears folded in a repetitive expression that is always new. By denying the primacy of the original over the copy and by redefining the copy or repetition as the affirmation of difference, Deleuze offers a theoretical stance from which to understand the powerful reconfiguration of representation that postmodern appropriation art after art engages. Indeed, this thesis will demonstrate how the fact of appropriation
links at least two artworks together in a significant manner, which establishes a serial relationship. In the past this link has provided artists with a pulpit from which to articulate commentary on the past work and/or its historical context; this gaze was a retrospective one. This thesis will look at how late twentieth-century appropriationists refined the creative potential of the link that appropriation establishes in two different ways. First, these artists recognized that the referential function of imagery could be re-aligned and reconfigured in the pictorial terrain, such that it produced new and unexpected narratives. In these works the appropriated image spoke about subject matter that often had little to do with the concerns of the source artwork. Accordingly, through the postmodern appropriation process, representation became less of a tool for communicating information and more of a tool for creating translations. In this regard the source artwork began to function as a point of departure.

In the process of reiterating imagery, postmodern appropriation artists also located the affective qualities of material difference, which was the second way that they redefined the creative potential of their source artworks. Here postmodern appropriation artists engaged what Deleuze has described as a "science of the sensible". Indeed, at the material level the redundant image appears transformed by the physical affects of its expression. These affects produce sensual changes that viewers experience in a manner that goes beyond what most semiotic systems can explain. As a result, postmodern appropriation art after art demonstrated that visual artworks are much more than textual signs.
Finally, this thesis hopes to demonstrate that late twentieth-century appropriation art after art proposes an answer to a question that Clement Greenberg’s modern project of limiting conditions posed more than half a century earlier. Although a critical analysis of Greenberg’s project lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is pertinent to note that the appropriationists provide a viable answer to the seminal question upon which Greenberg built his project of limiting conditions, namely: What is it that defines the visual arts as separate from literature and the other arts? Postmodern appropriation art after art demonstrates that the material expression of visual artworks moves imagery in a manner that is decidedly different from text and that is regulated by the material that expresses the image. For, in much the same way that music infuses lyrics with the qualitative power of sound, so too do visual artworks infuse images with the qualitative powers of the materials that express them. Ultimately, by moving redundant imagery into new material expressions, which by definition occupy new locales or contexts, the appropriation artists of the late twentieth-century demonstrated that visual artworks are more than semiotic tools of communication; they are material objects that qualitatively affect both the imagery that they present as well as the viewers who encounter them. As a result, postmodern appropriation art after art offers a critical reinterpretation of how visual representation operates.

Chapter Descriptions
This thesis begins by returning to the late seventies, when postmodern art after art emerged and its critics defined the two fundamental concerns of appropriation art as authorship and representation. Chapter one primarily addresses the latter and alludes to the former through its discussion of the impact of Sherrie Levine's rephotography on ideas of originality. The purpose of chapter one is to review the critical interpretations of postmodern appropriation art after art that emerged in the early eighties and to demonstrate how their arguments ignore the role of material expression in rephotography. By considering the affects of material expression on the imagery that Levine re-photographs, viewers discover copies that are imbued with difference and that do not actually resemble their sources. Thus, these works redefine copying as a vehicle for carrying difference, and this fact helps to redefine appropriation art and visual representation in general as a form of movement.

As noted, appropriation art involves a dynamic interaction of three elements: image, context, and material. Each of the next three chapters will analyze specific appropriations with an eye toward exploring the function of one of these three elements in-depth. Thus, chapter two takes up the effects of context to consider how the context in appropriation art after art revised our notions of authorship. Specifically, chapter two demonstrates how the postmodern appropriationists redefined authorship by situating it within the art object. Accordingly, chapter two reviews the brilliant analysis of context that many postmodern critics of appropriation provided. Chapter two expands on their
insights to demonstrate how appropriationists exploited the referential potential of past images to produce new narratives. In doing so chapter two demonstrates how appropriations operate like translations.

As noted, in the mid-eighties, under the guise of Simulation art, appropriations emerged that presented appropriated images that no longer resembled their sources. Chapter three explores the image by looking at how Simulation art reinforces the fact that an image is composed of a figuration that exists separately from its referential function. By separating these aspects, the Simulationists help to establish the presence of a virtual image, which this thesis defines as the moving force driving appropriation art.
One of the insightful discoveries of postmodernism was the common terrain that textual signs share with visual images. Exaggerated, this insight led to the belief that all images function exactly like text. At the material level, viewers realize that this presumption of sameness is profoundly mistaken. This becomes eminently clear in chapter four through an exploration of material expression. Specifically, chapter four looks at appropriation artworks that, like the rephotographers, engage somewhat exact versions of their source imagery but then redeploy these images in dramatically different material expressions. Chapter four examines how artists in the early nineties use this approach to explore how the inherent qualities of material expressions transform appropriated images in ways that go beyond our traditional understanding of semiotics.

Finally, the focus of the last chapter is the viewer. Chapter five explores how the three elements of appropriation art—image, context, and material expression—interact together to create a duration that the viewer experiences. Accordingly, chapter five establishes that the appropriation artist is first and foremost a viewer. In addition, chapter five explains how the appropriation process develops a depth of field that releases unexpressed potentials lodged in the source image. Thus, the final chapter distinguishes the difference between appropriation art and other artworks.
Chapter One
Representation: Movement, Levine & Other Copy Cats

In the nineteen-eighties, the phenomenon of producing images from other images swamped the art world. After rephotographing works from the modern masters of photography Sherrie Levine moved on to watercolor and began reproducing Egon Schiele self-portraits, Henri Matisse paintings, and others. Meanwhile, Mike Bidlo was reproducing Jackson Pollock’s painting Blue Poles stroke for stroke. Under Mark Tansey’s guidance, cows were evaluating the accuracy of Courbet’s depiction of their ancestors. And George Deems’s painting School of Caravaggio had collapsed most of this Baroque master’s oeuvre into the surface of one canvas. Despite this prevalence, most critics considered eighties’ appropriation art a trend with a predictably short lifespan.\textsuperscript{51} As it turned out, quite the opposite occurred. In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, appropriation art had become increasingly sophisticated with artists deploying multiple citations in a single work, altering composed narratives by importing textual and pictorial elements, and expanding fragmented details into entirely new works. Moreover, even now, into the first decade of the twenty-first century, the practice of appropriation art persists.

All of this seems to beg the question: Why has there been such a sustained interest in appropriation? One easy but nonetheless important answer is: it has
simply never been any other way. In fact, the practice of borrowing and adapting visual imagery and motifs from the past permeates art history: near the center of the Sistine ceiling, Michelangelo's *The Expulsion from the Garden of Eden* pays tribute to Masaccio's 1427 version; the angel in Rembrandt's 1637 painting *The Angel Leaving Tobias* has flown in from Mearten van Heemskerck's 1563 woodcut of the same name; the general's dramatic death swoon in Benjamin West's 1770 *The Death of General Wolfe* intentionally recalls the posture of Christ depicted in Van Dyck's *Lamentation*; and in the early twentieth-century Picasso produced countless copies, including over 150 versions of Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*, a work which had in turn borrowed its composition from Marcantonio Raimondi's engraving *Judgment of Paris*, itself a copy after Raphael. Much more than a postmodern practice, art after art is deeply rooted in the Western tradition of art making. Just listen to the nineteenth-century painter Jean-August-Dominique Ingres' response to critics' complaints over his repeated renditions of Raphael's paintings: "You don't make something from nothing, and it is only the rendering familiar to oneself of the inventions of others that enables one to make good things."\(^{52}\) Certainly, this recognition and an acknowledgement of these and many other historical precedents lay at the heart of the postmodern crisis of authorship and the rejection of originality that it produced.

Antithetical to the *avant-garde*’s march through the first half of the twentieth century, the postmodern project redefined the creative process in terms of
recycling: ideas, images, and phrases became mere quotations traveling through time, both in and out of artistic works. Accordingly, the artist's role was revised; rather than the heroism of a director or even the melancholy of a poet, the artist was aligned with the agency of a "medium". Originality was declared a mythological construct and thus dismissed from the pantheon of valid aesthetic criteria. In the aftermath of these seismic upheavals, the absence of originality has left behind a huge and gaping space that remains largely unexplored by critics. Within this open terrain lies the rest of the answer to our question, for it is here that appropriation continues to roam and reproduce, redefining representation in the process.

Without originality, what is left? Copies. More of the same? Quotations. Paraphrases. Imitations. Translations. Pastiche. Parodies. These are only some of the terms art historians have plied to describe the phenomena of "art after art". In part, this plethora of terminology bespeaks the multiple motivations that have directed "inter-art traffic," art historian Leo Steinberg's addition to the list of terms. Steinberg's contribution came in 1978, when he wrote the introductory essay for the Whitney Museum of American Art's exhibition catalogue "Art About Art". This exhibition chronicled the development of inter-art traffic from 1953 through the early part of 1978. In his brief catalogue essay, Steinberg noted the preponderance of terminology surrounding this practice and interpreted it as evidence of a more profound oversight in the critical literature:

The varieties of artistic trespass or repercussion (or whatever you call it) are inexhaustible because there is as much unpredictable
originality in quoting, imitating, transposing, and echoing, as there is in inventing. In hindsight Steinberg’s comments resound like a challenge. How far could this practice go and remain “unpredictably original”? And just where was the dividing line separating the terms of “inter-art traffic” from that other, more sinister, tradition of forgery?

The significance of the Whitney exhibition—its timing, the works it presented, and Steinberg’s comments—is hard to ignore, for it opened almost simultaneously with the appearance of rephotography, the term initially employed to describe the method of exact appropriation that would dominate art practices in the late seventies and early eighties. As the name suggests, these citations were photographs of other photographs. What distinguished them from earlier examples of inter-art traffic was their shockingly overt and exact nature, and in this regard, Levine’s work has become emblematic.

*Picture Perfect*

In 1976, shortly after moving to New York, Levine organized a shoe sale at Stephen Eins’ Soho storefront: *Two shoes for Two dollars on Two Saturdays.* The reference to Claes Oldenburg’s store was obvious, but it was Oldenburg run through Duchamp; for unlike the merchandise in Oldenburg’s store, these shoes were already made and more importantly made by someone other than Levine; moreover, they were all exactly the same. With these references in tow some
relatively basic, even redundant, ideas came forward: anything could be art, and art was a commodity. This last concern introduced the notion of desire, which in turn propelled Levine’s *Sons and Lovers*, a series of images that were included in the now famous 1977 “Pictures” exhibition that Douglas Crimp curated at the alternative gallery Artists Space. Levine’s series featured pictures of women appropriated from magazine advertisements and collaged into hand-drawn silhouettes of the presidential heads that appear on U.S. coins (figure 22). In his curatorial essay Crimp pointed out that Levine’s compositions forced the viewer to read the two images—fashion photography and currency—through each other. In many ways this compositional structure of reading one image through the frame of another would define the critical analysis of almost all appropriation artworks that emerged in the early eighties. But that was yet to come. For, while the shoe sale was clearly citational in its references and the *Sons and Lovers* series entailed various levels of appropriation, these works were merely sketches for the rephotography that would become Levine’s signature postmodern work.

*In 1978 Sherrie Levine met Richard Prince...*

For over a year Richard Prince had been rephotographing images he had scavenged from magazine advertisements. Intrigued and inspired by the efficiency of Prince’s methods, Levine followed suit but raised the stakes: rather than advertising imagery, Levine aimed her camera at fine art photography. Boldly, she snapped her shutter close and grabbed pictures from the *oeuvres of*
Walker Evans, Andreas Feininger, Eliot Porter, Edward Weston, and others. Even in retrospect, the outlandishness of Levine's actions still strikes a very humorous chord. As the hanging committee must have wondered when they uncrated R. Mutt's *Fountain*: Was this a joke or a test? In both cases critics decidedly settled on the latter. Thus, critics wrote in *October* magazine and *Art in America* that Levine's work and appropriation in general was testing the limits of artistic authorship and specifically interrogating the modern value of original artistic vision.

Although Levine's rephotographs are not readymades, the Duchampian *Fountain* holds a significant place in the lineage that shaped the critical interpretation of appropriation in the eighties. Situated in the context of the gallery, this piece of hardware was to be certifiably transformed into an artwork by the terms of a 1917 exhibition. But everyone knows what happened, or more precisely, what did not happen. Despite the Society of Independent Artists' best intentions, R. Mutt's *Fountain* was omitted and art history forever changed. By reneging on its promise to exhibit all submissions, the Society unwittingly set up a conceptual framework that fundamentally redefined the way in which artworks operated. For, without the power of the contextual frame that the Society's exhibition would have provided, the *Fountain* remained an upside down urinal. Effectively, the reality of defining this object as an artwork was reduced to a conceptual condition, and Duchamp's plan to exhibit a urinal as art literally became equivalent to its actuality. In fact, art history has inherited Alfred Stieglitz's image
of this "idea" as if it actually occurred. But, of course, it did not. Thus, a conception not only eclipsed the physical art object, but it also virtually became the image, thereby setting the stage for the "dematerialization of art" that would flower approximately half a century later in the Conceptual Art movement.

Emerging from this influential heritage, appropriation art reinvested in figurative representation, but it now seemed to be representation turned against itself. For, while depiction had returned, the actual pictures and physical art objects seemed irrelevant; the pertinent element was the frame. Unlike the artists of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries who copied in order to learn specific techniques or to establish their individual style against the backdrop of a master,63 appropriation artists of the late twentieth-century seemed to copy in order to critique. Thus, critic Craig Owens described Levine as "the dealer, the curator, the critic—everything but the creative artist".64 Simply put, these new copyists were described as masters of the metatext, and appropriation art was understood as a form of interpretation that was defined according to Crimp's initial insight: a compositional design that read one artwork through another conceptual framework.

Quite perceptively, in 1980 Owens associated this critical idea of "reading images" with allegory: "Allegorical imagery is appropriated imagery; the allegorist does not invent images but confiscates them. He lays claim to the culturally significant, poses as its interpreter."65 Throughout his discussion of allegory,
Owens cites Walter Benjamin's definition of allegory. Yet, for Benjamin, allegorical "reading" entails neither interpretation nor critique; it simply produces change without imposing judgments or evaluations. Benjamin associated allegory with reading because reading is a process infused with time; it unfolds through time and space and thus involves a form of movement that Benjamin associated with decay. Accordingly, Benjamin defined the ruin as the penultimate allegorical image, for its decayed condition embodies the passage of time. In this regard Owens was right to associate postmodern appropriation art with Benjamin's discussion of allegory, yet a ruin does not interpret the past; it simply embodies elements of the past that have been transformed by the movement of time, which also relocates these past elements in the present. Seen from this perspective, appropriation cannot be defined as interpretation, rather it becomes a strategy that initiates movement; it becomes a process, even an event, that creates transformative variations by moving images into new contexts.

Unlike what critics suggested in the early eighties, appropriation is not fundamentally about a crisis of authorship or a dismantling of modernism. Although these were important and meaningful outcomes that resulted from the critical analyses that appropriation art prompted, they remain byproducts of a transformative process that in and of itself does not present meaning. In fact, the seeds of this recognition were evident as early as 1982, when Crimp wrote:

Over the past few years it has become increasingly clear that the strategy of appropriation no longer attests to a particular stance
toward the conditions of contemporary culture. To say this is both to suggest that appropriation did at first seem to entail a critical position and to admit that such a reading was altogether too simple. For appropriation, pastiche, quotation—these methods can now be seen to extend to virtually every aspect of our culture, from the most cynically calculated products of the fashion and entertainment industries to the most committed critical activities of artists.⁶⁹

Crimp's observations subtly allude to an anti-theoretical stance that had been brewing in the art world since the late seventies and that would loom ever larger on the horizon as the twentieth century came to a close. Throughout the early eighties, the polemics of this conflict grew and defined themselves around appropriation art. On one side critics—Benjamin Buchloh, Crimp, Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Owens and Abigail Solomon-Godeau—promoted appropriation as a progressive strategy that critiqued cultural institutions and heightened the public's awareness of how images constructed their lives and opinions. Meanwhile, these critics dismissed pastiche, particularly painters' use of pastiche, which they deemed a retrograde form of nostalgia that employed citation as a decorative device aimed at market concerns. In contrast, Gerald Marzorati articulated the other side of this conflict in 1986:

Increasingly, these theoretical critics were writing less about new art (which of it was important and why) and more about the art world—about art's role in a late capitalist, consumer society. Their critiques were drawing now on Marx or, more accurately, on contemporary Marxist writing, as much as on Barthes and Derrida. And this showed in their readings of Levine's work. What mattered most it seemed was how her appropriations commented on the gallery system; that she was an artist making decisions about making pictures seemed to matter hardly at all.⁷⁰

However reactionary, Marzorati's comments hint at a critical oversight in the initial reception of appropriation art; namely that in addition to generating
meaningful cultural and philosophical insights, appropriation artworks were also material objects that presented imagery. As Richard Prince had suggested about his own work, appropriation is simply a mode of production, and "it shouldn't be mistaken for something exclusively theoretical or for that matter programmatic."\(^71\) In the wake of all the profound and important theoretical work that emerged with eighties' appropriation and the subsequent critical disinterest in appropriation that came in the nineties, it may be time to return to this practice and consider how this mode of visual re-presentation operates.

Go Figure

At its most basic level, appropriation art involves a dynamic interaction between three elements: image, context, and material. More specifically, when an artist appropriates, s/he moves an image—a specific figuration—into another material context. In the process of this movement difference enters the picture, for as Brian Massumi has pointed out, "when a body is in motion, it does not coincide with itself. It coincides with its own transition: its own variation."\(^72\) Appropriation art puts images in motion and through this movement variations emerge. In and of themselves these variations are not meaningful; meaning is a coda that is attached as an after effect and that arrives after movement has come to an end. As Massumi has pointed out, meaning is established by retracing the path that movement took, but this can only happen once movement has dissipated because when bodies are moving, potential remains open and unpredictable.
Until an event comes to a close and movement halts, it is impossible to know what will happen; therefore, there is no path to retrace and interpret. As movement, appropriation does not interpret the past artwork that it cites, critics do. The critical interpretation of the effects of appropriation art is a separate event—an equally important one—but one that happens outside the artwork, in the pages of text, and that attaches meaning as an after-effect. In contrast, postmodern appropriation art after art moves past images and re-presents them in new expressive forms.

*It Takes One to Know One*

Arguably, appropriation art requires an expert viewer, someone who can recognize the source and identify the imposed changes. Although this argument is not entirely without merit, it is primarily a product of the theoretical assessment of appropriation art that defined it exclusively as interpretation or metatext. From this perspective it is quite true that appropriation cannot perform its labor of commentary if the viewer does not recognize that a citation is being activated. However, as actual material objects, appropriation artworks barely glance back at their sources because their concern is with the “presentness” of the image, which has been moved into a new material expression located in a new context. Therefore, when a viewer recognizes the source of an appropriation, their experience of the appropriation no doubt expands, but being able to identify the source of an appropriation is by no means a prerequisite. In short, the source does not define the appropriation.
The relocation of a somewhat exact figuration in a new material context underscores the inevitable differences that repetition always brings.\textsuperscript{74} By maintaining a level of "sameness" in the figuration of the image, rephotography makes the contextual effects and material affects of movement visibly apparent. Thus, perhaps more than any other form of appropriation art,\textsuperscript{75} rephotography set up a discourse with the source image that relied upon a recognition of the redundancy at work in the appropriation. Nevertheless, this recognition does not define the entire experience of the work. Moreover, as appropriation art develops beyond the early eighties, artists engage this recognition less and less and instead produce new works that operate almost entirely through the affective qualities of their new material expressions. Ultimately, appropriation art demonstrated that the imagery presented by an artwork invariably inherits the affective qualities of its material expression and this expression alters the way in which the imagery appears. As a result, appropriation art asked viewers to reconsider the entire enterprise of visual representation for appropriation art engaged the tools of visual representation as a transformative process rather than a form of communication.

\textit{Without originality we are left with movement.}

In Levine's rephotography movement occurred at two different levels. Levine relocated appropriated images in other material expressions that were then
framed in new contexts. As noted earlier, appropriation art asks viewers to consider what comes forward from the source artwork and what remains behind. The exactness of Levine's appropriations and the documentary aura surrounding photography made it difficult to see the answer to this question; however, one of the more renowned precedents for eighties' appropriation—Duchamp's 1919 *L.H.O.O.Q.*—offers insight (figure 5). To create this work, Duchamp, of course, did not receive permission from the Louvre Museum to graffiti a goatee and moustache atop the actual pigment and canvas of Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*. Instead, Duchamp altered a reproduction that had been printed on a postcard, a decidedly different and separate object from Leonardo's masterpiece.

Duchamp gained access to *Mona Lisa*'s "image" because it had already been moved into another material composition, the postcard. Thus, Duchamp's work demonstrates an important but nonetheless simple condition of representation: image is an incorporeal form that may move from one material object and be relocated in another, and the movement will always produce change. Although *Mona Lisa*'s image continues to appear clean-shaven in the Renaissance painting, she now also exists with the possibility of facial hair. The image has remained consistent, but its references have multiplied and it has therefore acquired differences. Moreover, the smaller size and postcard's material presentation of the image generates qualities that are entirely different from Leonardo's canvas and oil paint version. Significantly, these qualitative material differences are evident even when these two works of art are viewed in
reproduction; in other words if a reproduction of Leonardo's painting is placed beside a reproduction of Duchamp's *L.H.O.O.Q.*, material differences are discernable. This occurs despite the fact that the reproductions are composed of different materials. Effectively, some aspect of the material expression is abstracted but not generalized, and this aspect actually travels with the appropriated image becoming a visual presence that nonetheless remains non-visible. This contradictory condition of a "non-visible, visible presence" suggests a "haptic vision," a visual sensation that is not specifically illustrated. Another way to describe this is the visually discernable presence of a material quality or sensibility that is not really actualized since the physical matter that conveyed it (the paint of Leonardo's masterpiece, for example) is not actually present. Still, some residue or trace of the physical matter is retained as an abstract qualitative presence. As appropriation art moves into the late eighties and early nineties, artists will create works that increasingly explore abstract condition of material qualities.

Like the *L.H.O.O.Q.* and Levine's rephotography, all appropriation artworks purloin imagery from previous artworks, but they always leave the material matter or body of the source works behind. In this regard, appropriation art underscores a wrenching dualism that most artworks embody: on the one hand, artworks present coded or symbolic images, and on the other hand, they exist in the world as real objects composed of materials that emanate affective qualities. Thus, appropriation art redefines representation as the movement of imagery through
these elements; that is, through the referential effects of context and the affective qualities of material expression.

To fully understand the ramifications of this movement, it may be useful to pause here and draw out a few rudimentary examples. For instance, consider the image of two circles, one depicted on top of the other; most viewers will identify this configuration as a coded representation that refers to the quantity of eight. Viewers recognize this not because there is anything "eightish" about this image; unlike Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*, mimetic illusion is not operating here, rather viewers have learned to read this image as code. Image, however, never functions in isolation. In order for the number eight or any other image to appear, it must enter into a material construct. Here, on this page, for example, ink and paper support the image "8" so efficiently and discreetly that viewers tend to forget about their active presence, and yet without them no image could appear. Additionally, the codes attached to images are invariably influenced by the affective qualities of material. After all, how different would the image "8" become if instead of paper and ink, it were presented by red lipstick and drafted on a mirror, or by fat on steel, or gasoline on...? In all of these examples the material asserts an active presence that qualifies the image in a manner that can be neither denied nor ignored. When the image "8" materializes in the fat, quantity takes on quality; in fact, a quality that generates sensibilities that are quite distinct from the ones generated by the lipstick or the gasoline. Moreover, these sensibilities are not a function of the signification attached to the image;
they exist outside of the linguistic models that have been used to define postmodern representation.

The appearance of an image in material is an embodiment; image and material literally construct each other within the specific confines of the artwork that the material support provides. Thus, the inked “8” appears within the picture plane that the paper provides, and the fat “8” is contained by the steel, etc. The material support allows the artwork to become a discreet entity that is composed by a dynamic interaction between image and material. Significantly, both image and material are porous. Therefore, when they come together, a transformation takes place such that each becomes something more than it was without the other, and a newness opens that nonetheless retains traces of its history. Simply put, the “8” inscribed in gasoline cannot be traded in for the lipstick “8” without generating a loss that is also a gain. But what are these losses and gains? What would happen if this trade was actually negotiated? These are the questions that appropriation art asks viewers to consider, for if the lipstick “8” were traded in for the gasoline version, then the image “8” is effectively moved into a new material terrain, which is an appropriation.

Appropriation art operates according to one of the most fundamental properties of visual representation; that is, the visual imagery that an artwork presents can only appear by passing through the material that composes that artwork, and material changes everything. Regardless of whether the object under
discussion is a "lipstick eight" or Levine's rephotography, appropriation demonstrates that when an image moves into a material construct, it does not coincide with itself—its identity or its references—it coincides with the transitions that are orchestrated by its movement into a new material expression.

The significance of material expression is evident in another important precedent for eighties' appropriation. In 1953 Robert Rauschenberg asked his friend and mentor Willem de Kooning for a drawing that "was good enough to be missed and difficult to erase." De Kooning complied and Rauschenberg spent the next two months erasing what de Kooning had figured. But what exactly did Rauschenberg erase to create his work: Erased de Kooning Drawing? (figure 23). Here, it may be worth recalling the example of the image "8" presented in ink on paper. Quite the opposite of what the title of this work implies, Rauschenberg erased the material and not the image; he removed the pencil marks and without this material the image, de Kooning's drawing, could no longer appear. What Rauschenberg left is the terrain of the paper that had been literally "dematerialized" of graphite. Consequently, the image was relegated to a virtual existence, which was unavailable to anyone who had not seen the drawing prior to its erasure. The virtual existence of an image is imagined, which is not to say that it does not exist, but simply that it does not have a material expression. This more ethereal condition of the image is often mistakenly understood as the ideas or concepts associated with an image, which is the realm of meaning. This was
certainly what happened with the Duchampian *Fountain*, but as chapter three will demonstrate, this is hardly the whole story.

Some critics have astutely pointed out that a material presence remains in the residual marks left by Rauschenberg’s eraser. This argument goes on to suggest that this material presence embodies de Kooning’s drawing as an absence.\(^{77}\) According to this interpretation, de Kooning’s drawing lingers like a ghost haunting its old stomping grounds or, more precisely, like a shadow left behind with the figure removed. In fact, the figural elements of this drawing disappeared when Rauschenberg removed the graphite, but “de Kooning” remains. However, de Kooning’s presence is evident *not* because an ethereal quality or a trace of his gestures entered the material artwork. The physical or ethereal presence of “the man” de Kooning never resided in this drawing. There was only ever the figuration that disappeared when Rauschenberg erased the pencil marks. The residue of Rauschenberg’s eraser is just that, a new figuration created by the addition of another material, namely the eraser; it is a material presence and not an absence.

Rauschenberg’s erasure came with yet another addition: the name “de Kooning”. The title of this work, *Erased de Kooning Drawing*, is engraved on a brass nameplate now affixed to the frame.\(^{78}\) Thus, some of the representational codes that surrounded the no longer visible image continue to echo through the physical presence of the name “de Kooning” but not the man. The words
"erased" and "drawing" alert viewers to the possibility that another image once appeared, but these words are not the same as de Kooning's materialized image, which no longer appears.

As the lessons of post structuralism have demonstrated, the codes of representation extend well beyond the pictorial elements that are commonly thought of as imagery. Therefore, while the material support provides a terrain or picture plane in which the materialized image appears, the image also enters a context, which produces a set of relationships that create possible references. This is immediately evident through the use of titles, which inevitably frame artworks in certain perspectives. However, the context of an image can also be more oblique. Images reference broader cultural and ideological concerns that are not readily apparent in the figural construct that the materialized image presents. This terrain is not only composed of specific cultural experiences that viewers bring to a work, but it also concerns the poetic and historical echoes that Jacques Derrida has described as the supplement of the word. What Rauschenberg's artwork presents is context—not only the mostly dematerialized context of the paper, but also the context of de Kooning's defigured image—its frame. By isolating the picture plane and the contextual frame of an image, Rauschenberg's work helps to refine the intricacies of movement that appropriation art engages. For an appropriation not only relocates an image in another material expression, but it also moves that image into other conceptual frameworks or contexts. This is the inheritance that appropriation art received.
from the Duchampian readymade: by relocating the image, appropriation art establishes new relationships that create referential possibilities not expressed in the source artwork.

Despite the insights that Rauschenberg’s *Erased de Kooning Drawing* offers, this work cannot be considered an appropriation. Rauschenberg did not move an image; he replaced it. Rauschenberg swapped the figuration of de Kooning’s drawing for the contextual frame that the name “de Kooning” supplied. By contrast, appropriation enacts movement without actually prying the image out of the body of the cited work and thereby physically destroying it. Appropriation always and only creates new works; it does not substitute one work for another. Nevertheless, while Rauschenberg’s piece cannot be considered an appropriation, it does provide important insight on how the context of imagery functions literally as a framing device that marks out a territory in which the meanings of an image expands through the relationships it finds there.

In recent history artists created works that rigorously interrogated the narrative meanings that framing imposes on imagery. In fact, the dematerialization of the artwork that defined Conceptualism led many artists to examine how exhibition sites function as contextual frames that generate meaning. A case in point is Daniel Buren’s work. Buren used the redundant image of green-and-white vertical stripes and moved the image into various sites: gallery walls, billboards, street banners, etc. This never-changing striped imagery was intentionally left
devoid of narrative subject matter to direct viewers’ attention to the frames that the installation sites provided. While there are numerous examples of artworks that expand upon this investigation of contextual framing, one particular strategy for recontextualizing imagery would become key in the appropriation wave of the 1980s: retitling. Once again, Duchamp’s work has special relevance here. In part, Duchamp created a new context for his revised image of Mona Lisa by giving it a new name: *L.H.O.O.Q.* As a result, the title became the frame, and like one-point perspective, it positioned the work according to a specific point of view.

By retitling his appropriation of Mona Lisa’s image, Duchamp established a formal structure that many citational artists would duplicate. In fact, this structure was prominent in many of the works featured in the Whitney’s “Art About Art” exhibition. One especially relevant example is John Baldessari’s *A 1968 Painting* (figure 24). To create this work Baldessari photographically printed a black-and-white picture of Frank Stella’s painting *Takht-I-Sulay-Man 1* onto a canvas support. The Stella image is surrounded by a wide border, and printed in block letters below is the title: “A 1968 Painting”. Thus, Baldessari reduced Stella’s painting to a textual illustration, a condition emphasized by its reproduction in black-and-white. Moreover, as Rauschenberg’s work demonstrated, Baldessari’s title serves a dual function. It not only occupies a space outside the body of the artwork, but it has also entered the picture plane, becoming a visibly prominent element of the figuration. Thus, it simultaneously serves as both image and
contextual frame, and it even suggests that these elements are the same, that
the image in Stella's painting is only a conceptual category, literally "A 1968
Painting".

As precedents, Duchamp's, Baldessari's, and many other citational artists' works
demonstrate the powerful role that titles can play in creating new contexts.
Therefore, it is perhaps not at all surprising that eighties' appropriation artists
continued this trend. Significantly, however, most of these younger artists
returned the title to its place outside the material body of the artwork, an act that
reasserted the distinction between image and context. This was clearly evident
in Levine's rephotography.

By definition, reframing requires movement; however, rather than focus on the
movement operating in Levine's work, critics exclusively attended to the meaning
that her new frames generated. As a result, the images and the material was
ignored, and Levine's rephotography and appropriation in general was
interpreted as a strategy for revealing the ideological content of images by
drawing attention to the frame. According to this argument, the frame for
Weston, Evans, and all of the photographers whose images Levine appropriated,
was modernism—an aesthetic project invested in originality that privileged
authorial intention. Thus, the photographers' names cited in Levine's titles were
read as indexes of modernism. Meanwhile, Levine's use of the "non-name",
which the term "untitled" implies, coupled with her parenthetical "after" phrases,
which cited the source authors' names and thus recalled the tradition of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century copyists, set up a contextual relationship
between copying and these modern artists. Accordingly, Levine reframed the
modern masters of photography in terms of copying, displacing originality in the
process.

Although this analysis seems to recognize that reframing entails relocation, which
by definition requires movement, it nonetheless fails to acknowledge that
movement occurs between locations, for movement occurs between departure
and arrival. Therefore, to paraphrase Massumi, it was as if the artwork had
simply leaped from one context to the next, that is from modern original to
postmodern copy, without any movement or transformation in between. In
short, the image was perceived to be the same, which it was not.

Without movement, the image simply could not go anywhere. Therefore, the
image actually remained stuck in the source artist's photograph and a critical
blindness developed around Levine's work. Consequently, when image was
addressed, it was always the source image that was discussed. Listen to art
historian Rosalind Krauss:

As has been pointed out about Weston's 'originals,' these are
already taken from models provided by others; they are given in
that long series of Greek kouroi by which the nude male torso has
long ago been processed and multiplied within our culture.
Levine's act of theft, which takes place, so to speak, in front of the
surface of Weston's print opens the print from behind to the series
of models from which it, in turn has stolen, of which it is itself the
reproduction.
Krauss's intention here is to reveal a sequence of copies that exist without an origin. She is elaborating on Crimp's observation that Weston's images imitated the style of classical Greek sculpture typified in the works attributed to Praxiteles.83 Problematically, both of these analyses focused on Weston's image and failed to acknowledge that the photograph under scrutiny had been shot by Levine and not Weston (figure 25). In part, this oversight was informed by a conceptual or linguistic interpretation of the copy.

Krauss introduced her discussion of Levine's picture with the rhetorical question: "what would it look like not to repress the copy, rather than its concept of the copy?" By way of an answer, she offered readers Levine's picture. Krauss's question, it should be noted, concerned "the concept of the copy" rather than the copy itself. Conceptually, copying has always meant the preservation of sameness.84 Thus, Krauss quite accurately points out that it would be difficult if not impossible to depict a male nude torso that did not fall in line with "that long series of Greek kouroi by which the nude male torso has long ago been processed and multiplied within our culture".

The phrase "processed and multiplied" creates a wide embrace that is difficult to escape, which, of course, is Krauss's point—they are all copies, copies without an origin. This wide embrace, however, also seems to be a narrowing vice that reduces everything within its grasp to being the same; it is a vice that actually processes all the multiple examples of young nude male torsos into one and the
same “context” and, as both Baldessari’s and Rauschenberg’s works demonstrated, it presumes that context and image are identical. This line of thought requires a logical reversal in which origin is established post-facto—copies first, followed by a conceptual classification that then becomes a categorical imperative.

In his text *Difference and Repetition* the philosopher Gilles Deleuze explains how this perception of representational sameness is constructed through reason and does not actually exist in the material world. Deleuze maintains that reason privileges the perceptual recognition of similarities and inscribes a resemblance by locating a generalized concept. This concept not only gives the resemblance an identity, but it also generalizes any differences that appear among the actual objects. For example, a hammer may be deemed similar to a pencil through the recognition that both objects function as tools. Therefore, under the rubric of tools, a hammer may be exchanged for a pencil because they share an essential identity. Deleuze defines this operation as “infinite comprehension”, which accommodates individual differences by moving on to ever larger and less determinate concepts. Nevertheless, even reason recognizes that while in extreme conditions a hammer might be employed to imprint the shape of letters on a surface, it remains distinctly different from a pencil. As objects, they may share the general identity of tools, but their specific differences cannot be completely denied. Thus, reason provides for a conception of difference through opposition, which establishes a relation between the determinate objects and the
generalized concept. As Deleuze explains, the object remains fixed in the concept while it becomes something other in the determination.\textsuperscript{86} For example, the pencil must remain a tool while becoming a pencil. Therefore, while opposition allows for difference, it is a difference that remains both regulated and dominated by the general concept—in this case the general concept of tools. In other words, individual difference is subordinated to an identity of sameness, and real difference is effectively reduced to conceptual difference. Thus, Deleuze concludes:

The principle of difference understood as difference in the concept does not oppose but, on the contrary, allows the greatest space possible for the apprehension of resemblances.\textsuperscript{87}

As a result, conceptual difference seals any apparent gaps between perception and the generalized concept. Through this process actual difference becomes subordinated to a conceptual identity and repetition becomes generalized sameness. Thus, in much the same way that reason subordinates difference to conceptual sameness, it also constructs repetition as general resemblance.\textsuperscript{88} Unlike general resemblance, Deleuze finds true repetition in the evidence of identical twins.\textsuperscript{89} Although identical twins maintain an external condition of resemblance, they are internally different; in fact, one twin cannot be exchanged for the other. As Deleuze points out:

Difference is represented in the identical concept, and thereby reduced to a merely conceptual difference. Repetition, by contrast, is represented outside the concept, as though it were a difference without concept, but always with the presupposition of an identical concept. Thus repetition occurs when things are distinguished in numero, in space and time, while their concept remains the same.
In the same movement, therefore, the identity of the concept in representation includes difference and is extended to repetition. By establishing repetition as a general condition of external resemblance defined by a concept, reason defines repetition as equivalence and effectively denies the most fundamental aspect of repetition, namely the veritable expression of difference. In a departure from these “rationalized” conceptions of difference and repetition, which are based on negation and identity, Deleuzian difference and repetition is an affirmative expression of the transformation of qualities. Rather than confirming a perceived identity, Deleuze maintains that difference and repetition literally moves, destabilizes, and continually transforms qualities, a process that prevents any fixed identity from gathering. Seen from this perspective, repetition becomes a series of events that never occur in exactly the same way. Likewise, art after art becomes a transformative serial event, namely a repetition that expresses difference. With each materialization the redundant image inherits qualities from the physical conditions of its expression and is transformed accordingly. This transformation, however, is not a singular or isolated event. Rather, the serial nature of repetition locates appropriation within a broad spectrum in which the expression of difference becomes a virtual but nonetheless real force that the image carries.

Turning back to Levine’s work with Deleuzian repetition in mind, it is possible to rephrase Krauss’s question and instead ask: What would it look like not to repress the copy, rather than the concept of the copy? Placing Weston’s
photograph beside Praxiteles' sculpture of Hermes, incredible differences immediately appear. In fact, just about the only element that that these objects share is a code: classically styled male nude torso. It should be pointed out that Krauss and Crimp were absolutely correct when they said that Weston's image shares a code with Praxiteles' sculpture, the same code that Levine's photograph embodies, but that is only part of the story. Each of these artworks expresses that code differently by virtue of their materiality. When the concept of a classically styled male nude torso becomes an image that enters these different material expressions something akin to a molecular change takes place each time. Herein lies the fundamental lesson of postmodern appropriation art after art; that is, artworks are not simply codes, they are also materialized images that emanate affective qualities. In other words, appropriation art after art is not conceptualism; unlike the Duchampian readymade, appropriation art insists upon the artwork's condition as a material object that generates sense both referentially and qualitatively.

Invasion of the Body Snatchers

Almost without exception the critical discourse surrounding Levine's rephotography ignored the material object.91 Howard Singerman, remarking on the fact that Levine's work was seldom reviewed, suggested that the problem was that Levine's work seems to have "no body". Singerman wrote, "she provides no material impregnated by intention or by its own self-consciousness
materiality; there is no image that is Levine's for the critic to decipher. To
Singerman's credit, he points out, "Levine does offer an object and it is greater
than the idea it has been reduced to," but as his comments continue, the focus
becomes Walker Evans's pictures and what Levine reveals about these
photographs. In short, the body of Levine's work was lost to the new contextual
meanings she established for the source image, and her work was reduced to
interpretation, a metatext. Singerman is not alone here; in almost every critical
analysis of Levine's rephotography the material object is usurped by the meaning
conveyed by the frame.

The critical oversight here was to interpret Levine's work as being all frame, a
presumption that assumed that Levine's picture was the same as Weston's
picture, for example. Levine's image was the same as Weston's; the
photographic prints, however, were quite different, which ultimately changed the
expression of the images. Invariably, Levine's rephotographs presented slightly
blurred and washed-out images. As such, these photographs would never be
mistaken for the pristine prints that Weston produced. Moreover, a simple
comparison of the photographic objects would reveal that the dimensions of
Levine's pictures never matched the dimensions of their presumed sources.
Levine intentionally set up these inconsistencies to underscore the fact that the
models for her photographs were never the "original" Westons or Evans or
whomevers; Levine always worked from reproductions, producing pictures of
pictures that were often three and four times removed from their sources. How
was this missed? Simply stated, it wasn't. The "poor" quality of Levine's pictures was either deemed irrelevant and ignored or interpreted as yet another strategy for drawing the viewer's attention away from the image and to the frame. Therefore, the fact that Levine's pictures were photographs of reproductions and thus generally smaller than the artworks they referenced was interpreted as yet another way of articulating the idea that all photographs are reproductions. In the end material expression—be it the expression of a pristine print processed in the darkroom through the efforts of Weston, a dulled print processed commercially, or even marble processed by a classical Greek sculptor—in the end material expression was deemed insignificant, for Levine's work was viewed entirely in terms of its referential codes, exclusively as the context of a dematerialized form, which it was not.

The problems of a purely contextual analysis of Levine's rephotography further played themselves out in the critical assessment of the work's medium, photography. Without exception critics evaluated Levine's medium as if it was another image, an identity, that generated references. Thus, rather than consider the material quality of Levine's individual photographs, critics focused on the semiology surrounding photography, namely, its condition as a form of mechanical reproduction that destroys the "aura of the original" and rejects uniqueness by investing in the copy. The fallacy here was to confuse the theoretical implications of photography—what might be called the material identity of photography—with the actual material object, the photographic print.
Although image appears as a transitory illusion in a material, the material itself exists as a concrete reality. Appropriation works against these illusionary perceptions by moving the image out of its shell, the material body of the artwork, and recomposing it in a new material expression that is neither disguised nor disregarded but in fact a pronounced presence.

In 1992 curator Erich Franz finally looked at Levine’s pictures and recognized that the presumed “sameness” of Levine’s appropriations was “a sensory quality in its own right”. Astutely, Franz noted that the blurred condition of Levine’s photographs, which produced a sensory experience that was completely different from their sources:

> On ceasing to penetrate into the objective content of the photograph, we start to perceive it as a taut, gray, tonal veil, across which the eye glides without resistance. The museum-like framing and serial arrangement of these works still further emphasizes the homogeneity of the gray surface inside each wide, white mat.

The blurred condition of Levine’s works invites the cited photographs to appear as virtual images. Here, it is useful to recall the virtual condition of the image that Rauschenberg’s *Erased de Kooning Drawing* evoked. A virtual image presents the affect of an image and not its meaning. Levine’s work presents the virtual existence of these past images; they become images that are not quite there, and viewers encounter a sensory experience of the materialized image.

*Another Treason of Images*
It is not that there are no meanings to be had from appropriation artworks; the critical theory of the early 1980s certainly attests to this. However, what appropriation art is fundamentally about is activating movement, which in turn creates materialized transformations. When seen from this perspective, imagery proceeds as a transformative force rather than a communication device, and appropriation art becomes an investment in representation as a transitional experience. This is evident in what is perhaps the most important precedent for Levine’s practice, namely Elaine Sturtevant’s work.

Surprisingly ignored by most critics in the early eighties and somehow left out of the Whitney “Art About Art” exhibition, Sturtevant had been painting exact replicas of many prominent Pop Art works since the 1960s. Sturtevant distinguished herself from her contemporary citational artists, such as Roy Lichtenstein, by virtue of the exact nature of her reproductions (figure 26). In fact, even more accurate than Levine’s later rephotographs, Sturtevant was careful to retain the precise dimensions of her source artworks.

Sturtevant’s significance was popularized in 1986, when White Columns presented a solo exhibition of her work. This exhibition prompted many appropriationists and theorists to embrace Sturtevant’s work as an important precedent, a position that Sturtevant rejected, insisting that, unlike Levine and the other appropriationists, she was not producing copies. Rather than producing copies, Sturtevant said, “I am talking about the power and the
autonomy of the original and the force and pervasiveness of art."\textsuperscript{101} For Sturtevant the visual image functions as container that holds potential. Appropriation art develops this potential by moving the images into new material contexts. In this regard the appropriated image operates like a virtual force and its expression becomes performative, an event that is different every time.

Amazingly enough, in 1977 Crimp seemed to recognize this performative force operating in appropriation art. Thus, in his “Pictures” essay he described certain appropriative artworks as “staging representation” and associated this drama with the “presentness” that many Minimalist artists strove to create. Appropriation does not re-present something prior; rather, as Crimp suggested, it presents “that which is present”.\textsuperscript{102}

\textit{Ghostly Matters}

On more than one occasion Crimp associated the theater of this presentation with a ghostly presence.\textsuperscript{103} Setting spooky stories aside, a ghost can be defined as a disembodied presence or simply an incorporeal force, what will be called the virtual image in this thesis. Appropriation confronts the viewer with this ghostly force by asking viewers to consider what is present. This, of course, was the lesson of Rene Magritte’s infamous painting \textit{Treason of Images}, which articulated this conundrum much more directly: \textit{Ceci n’est pas une pipe}. With this simple statement, Magritte directed viewers to look beyond the frame of his
picture for the pipe. Still, the question that this work posed bears repeating: if the pipe is absent, what is present?

Understanding representation as the presence of absence is the legacy of mimesis, and while art history no longer invests in a definition of art as the representation of an outside reality, the residues of this understanding persist. In this regard, it may be useful to return to the lessons of mimesis briefly. As noted earlier, without a material expression imagery cannot appear. Despite this fact, mimetic representation actively works to disguise the presence of material, for illusion breaks down when the material of an artwork—Monet’s thick impasto, for example—asserts its presence. Simply stated, when viewers see the paint, the represented picture begins to recede; it actually loses definition and becomes vague. Quite the opposite of what conservation-sensitive museums have led viewers to expect, image is the more fragile and dependent component of an artwork. It is forever threatening to disappear or become something else. When mimesis is left behind, visual images become more than mere depiction, for artworks present a reality that eludes linear depiction. Moreover, this reality is not about absence, although it is invisible.

As noted, artworks present images that inherit the affective qualities of material expression. Accordingly, viewers perceive the image along side of what might be called a material sensibility, which is a presence that nonetheless registers as an absence because it exists without a nameable identity or a definable body. This
is the incorporeal ghostly force that appropriation presents and asks viewers to consider. It is presence that registers as absence because it requires absence in order to become apparent as a quality that is not essentially tied to the body of the individual object being depicted. When visual representations are acknowledged as material objects that no longer depict but nonetheless present imagery in a qualitative manner, there can be no absence only the presence of material objects that generate sensibilities, the presence of presences.

To speak about presence, the unmediated experience of an artwork, is a highly dubious enterprise. Presence is an abstract term that refers to an illiterate condition, in this case the phenomenological aspect of artworks. In general, phenomenology has a history that traffics in essentialism, treacherous territory at best. In the past the phenomenological condition of the artwork has been convected with transcendental ideals of beauty and God. More recently, it has been linked to the body of the author, where it has been discussed in terms of other abstract notions, such as artistic genius and original self-expression. However, in the wake of the profound insights of post structuralism, it not only seems possible but also pertinent to reconsider the phenomenological condition of the artwork and examine how this aspect operates not through the artist or the referential relationships of context, but through the material body of the artwork. In fact, this recognition has been the fundamental concern of appropriation art and in the next four chapters this thesis will look at how this recognition develops and redefines representation.
As the 1980s progressed, the practice of appropriation art dramatically changed. Like Levine's rephotography, some of these later appropriations presented exact renderings of past art works. However, where Levine appropriated a single image in its entirety, these artists only quoted sections from past artworks and redeployed these fragments in pictorial terrains preoccupied with other imagery. Fractured and relocated, the appropriated images became part of new pictures that generated unexpected and multiple narratives by virtue of a play enacted by these images and their contextual references. Chapter two will explore how appropriation provided contemporary artists with a tool for constructing narrative discourses, which embodied a new form of authorship that Roland Barthes had described as "reading". Additionally, the next chapter will revisit the crisis of authorship that ensued around appropriation art and consider the historical precedents that informed this crisis.
Chapter Two
Authorship: Contextual Translations

Appropriation art caused two of the most fundamental concerns of art history—representation and authorship—to collide and subsequently implode. In part, eighties appropriationists orchestrated this drastic move through an ironic and yet absolute reification of authorship. More importantly, however, appropriation art recreated representation as a materialized presence that transformed imagery through movement. This underscored the fact that material, context and imagery construct expression and meanings, not the intention of the authorial figure who fashions the artwork. Thus, while eighties' appropriation art was not fundamentally about authorship, it still raised profound questions related to this issue.

The crisis of authorship that erupted around eighties appropriation art can be divided into two distinct phases. The first, discussed in chapter one, was primarily concerned with originality. Drawing on the theoretical contributions of Roland Barthes, critics, such as Rosalind Krauss, celebrated Sherrie Levine's investment in copying as an attack on the authentic status of the modern author. By the end of the decade, however, the crisis of authorship had expanded exponentially and was nearing epidemic proportions. Critics, turning then to the scholarship of Michel Foucault, found in appropriation art a form of authorship that seemed to throw the entire enterprise of representation into question. Thus, in 1989 the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art put
this larger problem under spotlights in an important exhibition titled “A Forest of Signs: Art in the Crisis of Representation”.

The Los Angeles exhibition was specifically promoted as an update on the ideas explored in Douglas Crimp’s now famous “Pictures” exhibition. Not surprisingly, many of the same artists were included, and all of the artworks exhibited entailed some form of appropriation. As the show’s title suggested, the issue at stake was no longer articulated in terms of authorship, rather all of representation was under scrutiny. Despite this broader focus, the fundamental problem of authorship remained in place; for like everything else, authorship had been redefined as yet another form of representation.

*What’s in a Name?*

If Crimp’s exhibition had been inspired by a new approach to picture making that drew the viewer’s attention to the frame, then the Los Angeles exhibition was largely fueled by the perception that appropriation art had defined reality as representation. In her catalogue essay, Anne Rorimer connected this perception to authorship. Thus, Rorimer argued that Levine’s practice of claiming and recycling images as her own removed personal style and self-expression from the discourse by establishing that an artwork was first and foremost an authorial sign. The theory underpinning Rorimer’s proclamation was Foucault’s notion of the “Author Function”, which had redefined authorship as a proper name
attached to an ideological position rather than an individual person. According to this argument, authorship performs a disciplinary function; it establishes discourse as an object with codified boundaries that may be regulated. Here, authorship operates categorically, as a contextual frame that is assigned and maintained by scholars after the fact of production. Thus, as Foucault points out, Freud is not simply the author of certain texts; he is the "founder of a discourse." As a discourse, Freud loses the fluidity of a living being; thus, Foucault explains:

The author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real position. When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inverts it, one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.

Embracing Foucault's perception of authorship, Rorimer insisted that Levine's work, above all else, was "a Levine"; that is, a picture that did not represent the expression of the individual person called "Sherrie Levine" but rather represented the critically determined effects of Levine's authorship. In fact, in much the same way that the proper name "Leonardo" has come to signify the Renaissance and all its significant baggage, the name "Sherrie Levine" had become a code for
postmodern appropriation and its inherent rejection of original expression and authenticity.

As a summation of the "appropriation decade", the Los Angeles exhibition concluded that artistic authorship was yet another framing device, which prescriptively located images in critically assigned places within an archeology of knowledge. Earlier in the decade, however, a group of relatively unknown artists in Belgrade had pushed this notion of authorship toward a different logical outcome: beyond the sign of authorship, they located the physical art object. The implications of the Belgrade Fiction Reconstructed project (figure 27) open up another possible interpretation of authorship; namely, as a discursive process that is generated by the art object.

The Belgrade artists initiated their project by painting copies of several of Kazimir Malevich's Suprematist paintings and then remounting "The Last Futurist Exhibition 0.10" at Ljubljana's Skuc Gallery. Unlike Levine and Mike Bidlo, who also strove to produce "exact" copies, these artists remained anonymous. By not registering themselves as authors, they inherited the contextual frame that the authorial name "Malevich" provided. More importantly, as a result of their anonymity, they were able to isolate and illustrate the Author Function in operation, for the images that they had produced actually remained attached to the name "Malevich" and all of the meanings that that name regulates. Indeed, as Foucault has suggested, here authorship does not reflect an individual's act of
production, for clearly Malevich had not painted these images; rather it reflected an ideological position designed to stabilize meaning. Thus, the Belgrade artists underscored a significant point in Foucault’s essay: the Author Function arrives after the fact and therefore exists as something separate from fabrication.

By divorcing the regulatory function of authorship from the process of fashioning an artwork, the Belgrade artists derailed any possibility of assigning a definitive Author Function to the actual works that they produced. Instead, the Belgrade “Maleviches” force viewers to think about the fabrication of an artwork as being something more than a process that leads to the production of an authorial name that can then be mapped on a grid of period styles and regulated accordingly. Stubborn and full of contradiction, these late twentieth-century “Malevich” paintings remain present, reminding viewers that these objects exist as something more than an image regulated by an authorial discourse and the meanings contained therein. By separating the fabrication of these objects from their authorship, the Belgrade artists demonstrated that although Malevich’s Author Function no doubt shapes a viewer’s understanding of these images, it does not override the impact of the material expression of these images, where another kind of transformation takes place.

As this thesis will demonstrate, this transformation is not only an affect of material expression; the picture plane also orchestrates what might be called “translational effects”. Appropriated images encounter other images in the
picture plane and through a dynamic interaction with these images, other referential relationships are set up and a translation occurs that produces new and unexpected discourses. This performative translation recalls Barthes' essay on authorship, for it recasts the art object in the authorial role that Barthes once described as "reading".\textsuperscript{112}

In the eighties several appropriationists connect the question of authorship with the problems surrounding representation and referentiality to create a form of visual representation that mirrors musical sampling. Accordingly, the narratives that visual artworks—such as Dotty Attie's and Yasumasa Morimura's—articulate are fragmentary in nature and employ a collage-like approach to composition. Engaging appropriated images as discursive fragments, these works ask viewers to reconsider authorship in terms of the Barthian reader; that is, as layers of unoriginal quotations that blend and clash.\textsuperscript{113} This chapter will explore how this narrative use of appropriation develops historically. Through a careful analysis of this development and some of the individual art works that compose it, this chapter will begin to identify how the Barthian reader operates at the level of the physical art object. Since this history is fundamentally related to the concerns of authorship, this chapter initiates its exploration of the narrative use of appropriated imagery by returning to the authorial signature.

\textit{Naming Names}
The crisis of authorship that appropriation art flaunted reaches deep into history. Almost since its inception, art history has labored to establish the identities of individual authors lost behind anonymous works or in the collaborative nature of workshop productions. These investigations have even led art historians to fragment individual artworks, parceling out areas such as the background or the torso of a figure to the hand of a workshop assistant, while determining that the face was a product of the master’s brush.\textsuperscript{114} Through this practice of attribution, the art historian emerged from the Enlightenment as a connoisseur, quite literally an expert witness capable of testifying to the individual marks of a master as if they were actual fingerprints. These so-called fingerprints, in turn, are used to construct a personal style that creates a unified look and produces an \textit{oeuvre} that might then be interpreted and assigned an Author Function.\textsuperscript{115} Unique but always consistent, a signature style then becomes a necessary sign of artistic maturity. Oddly enough, at the end of the nineteenth century, copying will be instrumentalized to guarantee the presence of a unique signature style and thus help to set up the problems of authorship that will come to define the end of the next century.\textsuperscript{116} In contrast, the more blatant nature of postmodern copying recalls the ancient rhetorical practice of engaging past works as creative tools.

\textit{Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Better}

The problems of authorship that postmodern appropriation art confronts may be traced back at least as far as the Italian Renaissance. In fact, Foucault’s definition of the Author Function perfectly describes the idealized role ascribed to
Cicero in the literary debates that emerged in fifteenth-century Italy around the educational pedagogy known as Ciceronianism.\textsuperscript{117} Revising the rhetorical tradition of basing literary imitation on multiple sources, the Ciceronians advocated a form of imitation derived exclusively from the work of one author, the celebrated Roman rhetorician Cicero. As such, Cicero's work achieved what Foucault calls a "transdiscursive position," that is the sacred status of an original text against which all other writing was measured.\textsuperscript{118} Opposing this revision, the Anti-Ciceronians recalled Ancient Rome's concern for anachronism by stressing the ineradicable difference of Cicero's texts, which, they argued, was a consequence of the passage of time and cultural change. Thus, they maintained that even if they quoted Cicero's words exactly, his words could not produce the same effect they had produced years earlier.

A defining issue in the Ciceronian debates, this concern over anachronism took shape in Ancient Rome, as scholars wrangled with questions over the proper way to translate ancient texts. At the heart of these earlier debates is the Hellenistic scholar Aristarchus, who is credited with establishing the fallacy of anachronism as it related to translation.\textsuperscript{119} An editor and commentator on Homer, Aristarchus refused to modernize Homer's vocabulary and grammatical constructions simply because they were outdated. Thus, literary scholar Thomas Greene writes, "Aristarchus defended Homer as the representative of his own mundus significans."\textsuperscript{120} Inherent to Aristarchus's position is the belief that a modernization of Homer's work would produce a dehistoricizing effect, allowing the
modern reader an illusionary access to an oversimplified text. Aristarchus’s recognition of the insurmountable gap between past authors and the present becomes a central problem for literary imitation. Greene explains:

As the cultural center of gravity shifts to Rome, the crucial problems surround the translation of a tradition. Is it possible? demeaning? appropriate? anachronistic? Are etiologies extensible across a sea and a linguistic frontier? And can one, in an era of decline, hope to reactivate momentum lost? The continuing dialogue over imitation is conducted against a background of these uncertainties.\textsuperscript{121}

As Greene’s comments suggest, Ancient Roman rhetoricians’ efforts to deal with the problem of anachronism while maintaining a diachronic translation of a tradition no longer based on human contact formed the foundation upon which the later Ciceronian debates were built. The polemics of these debates are rooted in the different attitudes toward the past articulated by the Senecas. Although both father and son deal with the problem of anachronism by recommending the same solution—the use of multiple sources for literary imitation—their rationales reveal diametrically opposed positions regarding the preservation of past traditions. (Ironically, both positions will lead to a rejection of Aristarchus’s effort to retain the alien nature of the past.)

For Seneca, the elder, Roman rhetorical practice had reached its pinnacle with Cicero and was thereafter in decline. Thus, writing a generation after Cicero, he advised:

You should not imitate one man, however distinguished, for an imitator never comes up to the level of his model. This is the way things are; the copy always falls short of the original...Imitation will teach the pupil, if only by his own mediocrity, how great men once
were. The choice of many models is justified by the inevitable failure of the copy to equal any single original; multiple imitation, if it does not repair, diffuses the humiliation.\textsuperscript{122}

Clearly, the elder Seneca's rationale for the use of multiple models is based on a tragic sensibility toward the past, which he aligned with originality and elevated to a divine status. However unintentionally, Seneca the elder set the stage for the later Ciceronians to establish Cicero as an ideal, which effectively dehistorized him and set up his Author Function. The result was a redefinition of anachronism, which would no longer bespeak a failure to grasp a lost past but would be reconfigured to refer to the inability to achieve an enduring standard.\textsuperscript{123}

Seneca's son, author of the highly influential \textit{84th Epistle}, offered quite a different perspective toward the past that stressed metamorphosis of various texts gathered from reading. Thus, the younger Seneca recommended:

\begin{quote}
This is what our mind should do, it should hide away all the materials by which it has been aided and bring to light only what it has made of them. Even if there shall appear in you a likeness to him who, by reason of your admiration, has left a deep impress upon you, I would have you resemble him as a child resembles his father, and not as a picture resembles its original; for a picture is a lifeless thing.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

Here, the younger Seneca is clearly distinguishing mimetic representation from literary imitation, which he associates with inspiration and influence but not slavish copying; this perspective would inform the later anti-Ciceronian position. In addition, by describing the activity of imitation in terms of a parental lineage, this Seneca suggests a serial activity that produces difference even as it copies. In fact, after posing the rhetorical question: "won't the model be obvious?", the
younger Seneca's innovative answer actually suggests that every copy is a new expression:

I think that sometimes it is impossible for it to be seen who is being imitated, if the copy is a true one; for a true copy stamps its own form upon all the features which it has drawn from what we may call the original, in such a way that they are combined into a unity. Do you not see how many voices there are in a chorus? Yet out of the many only one voice results.¹²⁵

Although here the younger Seneca appears to be setting the stage for what will eventually become an understanding of authorship defined in terms of the "sovereign self", the younger Seneca's approach also reflects a Deleuzian sense of the serial nature of difference and repetition, where repetition provides a qualitative expression of difference.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, the echoes of a Deleuzian perspective that are evident in the younger Seneca's philosophy will be drowned out by the later influence of Erasmus on the Ciceronian debates.

Quintilian, one of the last of Ancient Rome's rhetoricians to discuss literary imitation, occupies a middle ground between the Senecas. His recommended use of multiple literary sources employed a rationale that was vaguely reminiscent of the elder Seneca's tragic sensibility: "there is nothing harder than to produce an exact likeness, and nature herself has so far failed in this endeavor that there is always some difference." Thus, Quintilian concluded, "whatever is like another object, must necessarily be inferior to the object of imitation."¹²⁷ Although Quintilian clearly seems to invest in an origin that privileges the source over the copy, he rejects the possibility of sameness. Moreover, he resolved the problem of an alienated past by prescribing paraphrase, a process of
internalization that was quite similar to the younger Seneca's recommendation.

Thus, Quintilian's Book X defined paraphrase as follows:

We must return to \textit{(repetamus)} what we have read and reconsider it with care, while, just as we do not swallow our food till we have chewed it and reduced it almost to a state of liquefaction to assist the process of digestion, so what we read must not be committed to the memory for subsequent imitation while it is still in a crude state, but must be softened and, if I may use the phrase, reduced to a pulp by frequent re-reading.\textsuperscript{128}

According to Quintilian, paraphrase should not be restricted to "the bare transposition of the model: its function is rather to rival and vie with the original in the expression of the same meaning."\textsuperscript{129} Here, Quintilian introduces the notion of emulation, which will define the practice of imitation that develops in the visual arts of the Italian Renaissance.

Essentially a conflict between heuristic and reproductive imitation, in the sixteenth century the Ciceronian literary debates shifted from a concern over the problem of anachronism to a discourse focused on whether or not self-expression was possible. Thus, the Ciceronians not only rejected the problems associated with anachronism, but also insisted that exact imitation precluded self-expression. For these rhetoricians then, Cicero's work represented an ideal standard, what Foucault would later call an Author Function, and not a unique individual style. In contrast, the major proponent of the anti-Ciceronian position in the sixteenth century, Erasmus positioned self-expression as the central concern of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{130} Indeed, literary scholar Terrance Cave has argued that primarily because of Erasmus's influence on literary theories of imitation,
Renaissance humanism is charged with inventing the modern author, defined by his uniquely individual style.131 The historical figure around whom this epitaph circulates is the early Renaissance poet Francis Petrarch, who has also been identified as the father of humanism.132 Significantly, Petrarch was an author who predated the Erasmian influence and who viewed his work as a product of past works; thus he wrote:

I have read Virgil, Horace, Livy, Cicero, not once but a thousand times, not hastily but in repose, and I have pondered them with all the powers of my mind. I ate in the morning what I would digest in the evening; I swallowed as a boy what I would ruminate upon as a man. These writings I have so thoroughly absorbed and fixed, not only in my memory but in my very marrow, these have become so much a part of myself, that even though I should never read them again they would cling in my spirit deep-rooted in its inmost recesses.133

Here, Petrarch is describing literary imitation as it existed prior to the development of Ciceronianism, and as it was set forth in Ancient Rome by Seneca the younger and the later Quintilian. It is a process of writing that is based on assimilation, rather than self-expression. In fact, as literary scholar Ulrich Langer has suggested, early Renaissance authors did not perceive their work as unique creations, rather their work overtly relied on the disposition of preexistent material. Langer explains:

Constraint by prior material was in many cases perceived as enabling, rather than disabling, for the fictional world was thought of as a celebration of the survival of culture, not its reinvention by the individual.134

Langer's above description of past artworks as "enabling" also clearly articulates the approach to imitation that developed in Renaissance visual arts. Visual art
imitation is advocated in the sixteenth-century by Lodovica Dolce, who recommended copying the ancients because they had already perfected nature. While Dolce did not counsel exact copying of antique statuary, he nonetheless described these earlier artworks as ideals worthy of imitation. In Renaissance painting imitation was designed to announce the innovative contribution of the later artist, while simultaneously claiming an artistic lineage. Thus, somewhat like what the postmodern critics suggested about appropriation art, it functioned as a metatext.

A case in point is Raphael's 1504 painting *Marriage of the Virgin* (figure 3). In this work two distinct narratives operate: one overtly conveys the plot of a commissioned narrative, while the other inadvertently establishes a specific artistic lineage. Here, context plays an important role by simultaneously referencing several different temporal moments, including the time frame of the depicted narrative as well as the artistic lineage or what Foucault has called the Author Function of the past artist, whom the more contemporary Renaissance artist engages by articulating a formal relationship that demonstrates a connection predicated on innovation. A close analysis of Raphael's work will help to reveal how this approach operates.

Raphael's picture depicts a high priest in the center of a group of figures who are spread across the foreground of the painting like actors arcing across a stage. Flanking the priest on either side are two figures who represent Joseph and
Mary. The priest is lightly grasping Joseph’s hand, which is about to place a ring on the Virgin’s hand. The priest’s gesture seems odd, for while it is clear that the priest is not trying to halt Joseph’s progress, it is equally clear that Joseph, standing only inches away from Mary, requires no assistance from the priest. Raphael is using the priest’s interrupting gesture to point back to a specific narrative from the *Golden Legend*, a thirteenth-century collection of stories about the saints’ lives. According to this narrative, several suitors were invited to compete for Mary’s hand, and success was awarded to the suitor who presented the priest with a miraculously blooming rod, which Raphael has depicted in Joseph’s other hand. Raphael’s reference to the *Golden Legend* story is further enhanced by the figure on Joseph’s left. A magnificent demonstration of pictorial foreshortening, this figure is seen snapping his unblooming rod over his knee, apparently disappointed at not being the chosen groom.

As noted, this scene arcs across the foreground of the painting and suggests actors on a stage, standing in front of a painted backdrop. While the backdrop makes no reference to the *Golden Legend* narrative, it demonstrates Raphael’s mastery of the one-point perspective system of representation, which had been explained the century before in Alberti’s 1435 text *Della Pittura*. Beyond the figures in the foreground, a piazza gridded with perspectival lines draws the viewer back to a centrally planned temple, which Raphael’s contemporaries would undoubtedly have recognized as derived from Donato d’Angelo Bramante’s *Tempietto*. Nevertheless, Raphael has not painted an exact replica
of this celebrated Roman building; he has replaced the post-and-lintel
construction of Bramante's colonnade with ornate arcades, crowned by curling
spandrels that add a celebratory zeal to Bramante's otherwise formal design.

In addition to Bramante's temple, Raphael is renovating yet another temple that
bears a strong connection to the narrative operating in the foreground, namely
the basilica built by the Emperor Constantine, who first legalized Christianity in
Rome. Although Constantine's basilica was no longer standing when Raphael
painted this picture, viewers would have known this building from the background
of another painting: *Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to Saint Peter*
(figure 4), painted in 1481-83 by Raphael's teacher Perugino. In fact, Raphael's
painting is a virtual copy of Perugino's composition.

In Perugino's picture Christ appears in the central foreground, handing a set of
keys to the kneeling St. Peter. Much like Raphael's image, these two characters
are the central figures in a group that is spread across the foreground of the
picture. However, rather than an arc, this group forms the base of a
compositional triangle that the gridded perspectival lines of the piazza trace back
to the doorway of Constantine's basilica, where the pinnacle of the triangle is
located. By compositionally connecting the drama in the foreground to
Constantine's basilica, which was originally constructed on the site of St. Peter's
tomb, Perugino produces a marvelous visual echo of the biblical story depicted in
the foreground; that is, Christ informing Peter that he is the rock upon which
Christianity will be built. Thus, the temporal movement of the narrative from Christ and Peter to the establishment of the Christian church is conveyed through the linear movement of the orthogonal lines through the mid-ground of the painting to the vanishing point in the doorway of the basilica. The result is a brilliant geometrical interpretation of time conveyed through distance or space covered.

Raphael's quotation of Perugino's picture initiates a temporal movement that is less visibly confined to such spatial constraints. In Raphael's painting the past enters the present in a temporal discourse that occurs between the narratives of the two pictures. Thus, Raphael sets up a second narrative that mirrors the plot line that develops between the two paintings; Raphael's other story seems to suggest that in much the same way that Christ, the central figure depicted in Perugino's picture, will be the miraculous outcome of Mary's and Joseph's marriage so too, Raphael's mirror image seems to say, "I am the product of Perugino". Historically framed by Perugino's work, Raphael's mastery of Renaissance one-point perspective and his superior understanding of foreshortening thus appears against the backdrop of Perugino's Author Function, that is his brilliant understanding of geometric compositional devices and narrative depiction. Thus, in this homage to Perugino, Raphael defines his artistic singularity while declaring Perugino as both his teacher and progenitor. This example of Renaissance visual art imitation demonstrates how the source image may supply a narrative point of departure from which to tell another story.
Postmodern appropriation artists will capitalize on this approach and in the process locate authorship within the art object. This, however, is yet to come, for the immediate legacy of Renaissance visual art imitation is located in the practice of copyists and the development of copying as an educational tool promoted in art academies.

*Creating Copies*

Following the opening of Paris’s Louvre Museum in 1793 and the subsequent opening of several other major European museums in the early part of the next century, we see the practice of copyists increase dramatically. These new public museums gave artists access and the opportunity to study masterpieces that had previously been largely unavailable in private collections. In fact, during half of every week, the Louvre was closed to the general viewing public and reserved exclusively for the use of copyists.

Situated before easels in the gallery, these artists strove to produce exact replicas of the displayed paintings. For some, the goal was purely educational: copying provided a vehicle for discovering the secrets of a master’s technique. Others were driven by more commercial pursuits, for established artists were regularly commissioned to produce copies that were destined to adorn civic buildings, churches, arts academies, or private collections. Regardless of their motivation, all of these early nineteenth-century copyists shared one criterion:
exactitude. In fact, the degree to which they were successful in producing an accurate rendition would be a testament to their skill as an artist.\textsuperscript{139}

In part, the flourishing nineteenth-century practice of copyists is rooted in an educational pedagogy that had defined art academies for centuries. As noted earlier, the sixteenth-century theorist Lodovica Dolce advocated copying the ancients because he maintained that they had already perfected nature.\textsuperscript{140} This tenet quickly found its way into art curricula, such as that of the French Académie de Rome, established in 1666. Residents here were required to spend at least half of their time replicating the masterworks available to them in the surrounding environs.\textsuperscript{141} Later, in the eighteenth century, Sir Joshua Reynolds advocated copying to students at the British Royal Academy of Art.\textsuperscript{142} And even in the early twentieth-century this practice remained a fundamental component of the curricula at many art schools.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, copying remained largely an academic practice that occasionally offered established artists a commercial income. Moreover, while museum retrospective exhibitions often included painted copies, commercial galleries typically held copies in the back room—always for sale but not for exhibition.\textsuperscript{143} By the end of the century, however, this would change. In 1873 Charles Blanc founded the Musée des copies, and in the spring of 1910 Paris witnessed D’après des maîtres, the first commercial exhibition of painted copies.\textsuperscript{144} This move from the backroom to the
front salon was indicative of a growing shift in taste. For, while the skill required
to produce an exact rendition had always been highly celebrated, at the close of
the century the interpretive copy, or what came to be called an "imitation", held
sway in both academic and commercial circles.\textsuperscript{145}

In contemporary parlance "imitation" and "copy" have become somewhat
interchangeable terms, yet in the nineteenth century they described two very
distinct activities. Where the copy referred to a painstaking reproduction that was
fundamentally concerned with executing the source artwork as accurately as
possible, the imitation demanded a creative interpretation that transformed the
source such that the copyist's signature style appeared against the backdrop of
the source image.\textsuperscript{146} No longer a testament to an artist's skill, interpretive
copying thus became a vehicle for revealing an artist's inventive abilities and
expressive style. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, copying begins to
resemble the practice of Renaissance visual art imitation.

Vincent van Gogh's painted copies played a pivotal role in legitimizing this shift
away from the academic copying exercise toward the interpretive expression of
the imitation.\textsuperscript{147} Typically, van Gogh accurately reproduced the compositions
and color schemes of the works he cited, but details were often lost in his
agitated and relentless brushstrokes, which created a stylistic departure that
could not be ignored. For van Gogh, copying was a decidedly performative
activity, and he defended his stylized interpretations by comparing his practice to
that of a musician playing a composition that was written by another. This informative comparison aligns authorship with a performative activity.

The nineteenth-century critic Octave Mirbeau also defended interpretive copying in his review of van Gogh's 1891 exhibition "Echo de Paris". Arguing that van Gogh's "copies" should not be called copies but rather "recreations", Mirbeau insisted that the interpretive departures of these works simply affirmed the creative force of van Gogh's personality. Thus, a practice, which was once designed to garner the skills and sensibilities of the old masters and effectively preserve the past, became a method for asserting difference and expressing one's unique style. Nevertheless, as Mirbeau's term "recreations" suggests, interpretive copying was always characterized by an active decision to articulate difference, and the notion of individual style that takes shape beyond the tradition of imitation would reposition signature style as an involuntary expression of an authentic self, thereby constructing the author that many postmodern critics would take aim against.

This history comes full circle in the 1960s, when copying once again emerges as a significant, albeit ironic, practice. Here, the works of John Clem Clarke, Roy Lichtenstein, and Malcolm Morley are significant. Like the nineteenth-century copyists before them, these artists generally retained the titles of the works they cited and left the images and compositions of their sources intact. For example, Clarke's 1968 *Trumbull—Battle of Bunker's Hill* rearticulates the composed
images of John Trumbull’s 1786 *Battle of Bunker’s Hill, Charlestown, Mass.*, 17 June 1775 almost exactly. Nevertheless, Clarke’s working process creates a dramatic visual departure from Trumbull’s painting. Using a slide projector, Clarke produced a stencil of Trumbull’s image and then with an airbrush and paint roller, he repainted the stenciled areas in a simplified palette that drastically reduced tonal variation. The result is an overall flattening of the image that suggests wallpaper designs. Applying this same process to other masterworks (figures 28 & 29), Clarke thus imparts sameness: incredibly, in Clarke’s hands Rene Delacroix’s *Liberty Leading the People*, for example, begins to look like Trumbull’s “Battle”. Not unlike van Gogh’s copies, these likenesses are a direct result of the stylized effect that Clarke’s process imposes. However, the mechanized look of Clarke’s “recreations” makes no allusions to the “creative force” of Clarke’s personality, rather this “signature style” is clearly constructed through a systematized working process that literally enacts appropriation by moving images from their sources and relocating them in new pictorial terrains where variations occur. Thus, Clarke’s work demonstrates how the so-called signature style of the imitative copyists was in fact a translational effect of appropriation.

A similar observation can be made about many of Malcolm Morley’s paintings of paintings, such as his 1968 *Vermeer—Portrait of the Artist in His Studio* (figure 30). To create this work Morley scored a color reproduction with a grid, and using acrylic paint, he copied the image square-by-square, including the white
border that had framed the reproduction. Unlike Clarke's process, at first glance Morley's seems to recreate Vermeer's original exactly. This illusion, however, unravels quickly. Morley's painting is almost twice the size of Vermeer's, and as often happens when working from a reproduction, the picture plane has been slightly cropped and the tonal register has been altered; Morley's version is somewhat darker than Vermeer's. Moreover, the painted white border has a flattening effect, drastically diminishing the illusionary depth that is so central to Vermeer's painting. Subtler than Clarke's process, Morley's nonetheless reveals how the terrain of the new work affects the borrowed image.

Quite close to both Morley's and Clarke's work are the appropriations of Lichtenstein. In 1962 Lichtenstein painted *Portrait of Madame Cezanne* (figure 31), a black-and-white copy of a diagram that had appeared in Erle Loran's book *Cezanne's Compositions*. Loran's diagram translated the image of Madame Cezanne into an outline that was printed with letters and arrows added to the design. Intended as an illustration of Loran's analysis of Cezanne's composition, this depiction represented a potent revision of the image depicted in Cezanne's painting. In fact, quite unwittingly, Loran had produced an entirely different image that bore almost no resemblance to its source. Recognizing this, Lichtenstein appropriated Loran's diagram and presented it with paint on canvas. Materially contradicting its textual source in Loran's book, the transformed image pronounces the tremendous distance that it has traveled from Cezanne's painting. In fact, without Lichtenstein's title, it would be very difficult to place the
image’s source in Cezanne’s work. The title performs this task for us by creating a contextual frame that points, past Loran, to Cezanne. Thus, the image, incomprehensible without Loran’s analytical text, materializes as a painted figuration that casts doubt on its entire ancestry, effectively declaring itself as something different.

Expanding on the insight that drove this work, several years later Lichtenstein took up a toothbrush and, applying paint through a perforated screen, he recreated monochrome versions of Monet’s Rouen Cathedrals (figures 32 & 33). Through this painstaking process, Lichtenstein dramatically altered the appearance of the images that he borrowed, turning these icons of Impressionism into something that looked like manufactured products of the local print shop. The images were primarily transformed by their new expression as drawings that suggested the presence of Ben Day dots, the language of commercial printing. Yet, these marks were not Ben Day dots. For, not only were they hand-painted, but they also created the opposite effect of Ben Day dots. Rather than making it possible to see a printed image, Lichtenstein’s faux Ben Day dots dominated the images and made it difficult to see the cathedral shape without stepping several feet away from the work. While it is true that Lichtenstein intended this effect as an ironic reference to the myopia of Impressionism, this effect nonetheless emphasizes the fact that these dots are another image. They are pictures of Ben Day dots that the cathedral image encounters when it enters the pictorial terrain of Lichtenstein’s work. Thus,
Lichtenstein’s *Rouen Cathedral Set* engages another image that appears in the picture plane to translate the image appropriated from Monet. Effectively, within the context of Lichtenstein’s work, the image of the Rouen Cathedral—which references Impressionism, Monet’s painting, and especially the marvelously thick facture of layers upon layers of paint—is translated by the referential effects of another image, the Ben Day dots—which access the contemporary era, generic cheap printing, and the flattening effects of commercial reproduction. As a result of this interaction, the cathedral’s image is rearticulated and it moves toward the condition of an advertising logo. A similar process is actually at work in Clarke’s and Morley’s paintings, for Clarke has developed an elaborate process that self-consciously depicts the look of wallpaper designs, and Morley has produced illustrations of poster reproduction.

Unlike Levine’s later rephotography, which will produce actual pictures of pictures, these artists are painting images of reproductive processes. Whereas Levine actually employs the reproductive process to present an appropriated image, these artists are using appropriated images in order to depict and even exaggerate the formal effects that reproductive processes impose on the images that they effectively appropriate. The result is a narrative discourse that unfolds like an event because it actualizes an encounter between images in the picture plane of the artwork. In this regard, these artists are actually following the formula of the imitative copyists, for the appropriated image functions as a backdrop against which another image is layered. In Lichtenstein’s work the
second layer presents an image of Ben Day dots; in Morley's viewers find an image of poster reproduction, and in Clarke's, wallpaper design is depicted. Like the image of a signature style, these added images recreate the appropriated image in a new way. Moreover, by transforming these mechanical reproductive processes into images, these artists reveal how the structure of the imitative copy can function as a narrative tool. They reveal how the picture plane presents an arena in which images can "blend and clash" to create new images that in turn make different references appear. Over the course of the next few decades appropriationists will dramatically expand upon this structure to create elaborate discourses that take their appropriated images in entirely new directions. In order to fully understand the impact that this structure will have on authorship, it may be useful to pause here and carefully examine how the primary elements of this structure—image and context—operate.

Moving Pictures Into New Terrains

As noted earlier, the postmodern analysis of representation demonstrated how visual images, essentially abstract figural forms, function like signs by pointing to objects, eras, ideologies, etc. In the case of appropriation art the pirated image designates its source and all of the various meanings that surround that source: the Author's Function, the subject matter, the genre, etc. This history of the appropriated image gives it a context that travels with it to its new locale. Thus, Monet and Impressionism travel with the Rouen Cathedral image to
Lichtenstein’s work. Here, it should be noted that context always operates in at least two different registers: there is the context or, for the sake of clarity, the terrain of the picture plane into which the appropriated image enters as well as the context that exists outside but nonetheless surrounds the physical art object, what might be called the frame. This distinction is key, for the terrain of the picture plane and the external context of the art object play very different roles in shaping the translational effects of appropriation.

For example, in Lichtenstein’s *Rouen Cathedral Set* the appropriated cathedral image encounters the image of Ben Day dots in the terrain of the picture plane, while the references to Monet and Impression become part of the external context or frame. Thus, the history of the appropriated image (the source and the meanings associated with it) does not enter the picture plane; it stops at the door, if you will, forming part but not all of the new artwork’s context. The figuration of the image, however, proceeds right through the door and enters the pictorial terrain, where it undergoes a mortal embodiment, or to use Walter Benjamin’s term, it is “ruined” by its new locale. Not destroyed, but ruined, which means that the appropriated image has been transformed through its movement, and it is no longer the same. Therefore, while the past references remain available, new ones appear. In part, this translational effect of the pictorial terrain becomes possible because the appropriated image has left its history at the door. Again, this history does not disappear, but the image has been somewhat unhinged from it, which gives it the opportunity to interact with the other images,
set up relationships, and accumulate other references. Therefore, in its new locale, the appropriated image acquires a strangely contradictory condition, for it has become a fundamentally different image even though its context holds a certain amount of redundancy. Translators regularly struggle with this contradictory condition, and Phillip Lewis' comments offer insight on how this process works:

When English rearticulates a French utterance, it puts an interpretation on that utterance that is built into English; it simply cannot let the original say what it says in French, since it can neither allow the translated utterance to relate to previous utterances in the same chunk of discourse in the way the French statement does nor allow the English substitute to relate to the world it positions or describes in the way the French original does. What comes into English from French will therefore be something different.153

Similarly, when an appropriated image comes into a new pictorial terrain, it cannot designate what it did before because it forms new relationships that generate different expressions in its new location. Alfred Leslie's 1975 painting *The Killing of Frank O'Hara* [*The Killing Cycle (#5): The Loading Pier*] (figures 34 & 35) is relevant here. Leslie has repainted Caravaggio's *Entombment*, but the image appears entirely different. Viewers recognize the composition, but replacing the figures lowering Christ's body are casually clad beachcombers, and the dead Christ is now portrayed as the late poet and curator Frank O'Hara. The image of Caravaggio's *Entombment* entered the new terrain of Leslie's painting, where it was confronted and interpreted by the other images it found there. Thus, Caravaggio's subject matter, the meaning of Christ's death, is translated in its new terrain by the details of O'Hara's death on Fire Island.154 As a result of
this translational effect, the death of O'Hara is expressed as being somewhat equivalent to Christ's.

To accept this view of representation is to define the work of representation as a creative process that produces change in the place of meaning. Significantly, to paraphrase Deleuze here, this does not imply that there is no meaning to be had from representation but simply that meaning is a relative construct that is always conditioned by its locale.\textsuperscript{155} According to Deleuze, language translates rather than discusses; when a representation enters an assemblage with other representations, it undergoes a translational transformation and becomes something new.\textsuperscript{156} Appropriation art powerfully demonstrated how the meaning of images is contingent upon their location or context. Moreover, in the process of this demonstration appropriation art also revealed that the author, even when defined as an Author Function, is not entirely responsible for or even aware of the meanings that an artwork generates. Paraphrasing Barthes now, the only unified place where this comes together is the reader.\textsuperscript{157}

\textit{The Slow and Painful Death of the Author}

The development of narrative appropriation in the eighties brought with it an acute awareness of how appropriated images appeared differently in their new homes. In fact, once materially embodied in the new location of an appropriation, images have a life of their own, creating and gathering references that can
neither be predicted nor controlled. This development of narrative appropriation demanded that artists relinquish their control over meaning, a concession that did not come easily. Mary Beth Edelson’s 1972 lithograph Some Living American Artists (figure 36) is relevant here.

Most viewers will recognize the composition of this work, Leonardo’s The Last Supper, a tour-de-force of geometric perspective in which the background symbolically echoes the narrative unfolding in the foreground. Doubling this effect, Edelson appropriates this history by moving Leonardo’s image into the background of her picture, where it enhances the story of a new cast of characters. Depicted in the foreground of Edelson’s picture are photographic portraits of contemporary female American artists that have been collaged atop the figures in Leonardo’s image. Strategically, the contextual terrain that Leonardo’s Last Supper provides to Edelson’s image also uses Leonardo’s Author Function—an undisputed artistic genius—to cast light on these under-recognized artists. Therefore, as a result of the translational effects of Leonardo’s image of the “Last Supper” and his Author Function, a new story emerges that becomes a celebratory accounting of American female artists. Edelson’s title, Some Living American Artists, confirms this interpretation.

As happened in Baldesari’s A 1968 Painting, Edelson’s title appears in the picture plane as a caption that collapses image and context. Thus, the work’s title dominates the picture plane and tells the viewer exactly how to interpret the
image, effectively discouraging any other narratives from developing. This is not
to suggest that other narratives cannot develop, but simply that Edelson has
powerfully directed the imagery and context toward a specified outcome.

Edelson is not alone here. Authorial control is also evident in Leslie’s work,
where the context and imagery are singularly directed toward constructing a very
specific narrative interpretation. As noted in the previous chapter, in the eighties
most appropriationists will return the title to its place outside the picture plane,
where it provides a contextual frame. As context, the title’s authority is
somewhat diminished, and the image is allowed to operate more like a
performative enunciation that proceeds without blinders toward a confined
narrative.

Chapter one demonstrated how the critical assessment of appropriation art in the
early eighties brought much attention to the powerful role that context plays in
shaping the imagery that artworks present. Insightfully, these critics identified
appropriation art as an aesthetic strategy that reframed images in other contexts.
Yet, this critical assessment of context failed to recognize the impact of material
expression. This oversight not only caused critics to assume that appropriated
images were exact copies, but that visual images operated like text. Accordingly,
their analyses focused almost exclusively on the past and absent image. This
had profound implications for authorship; for rather than defeating the authority
associated with the intention of a unified and authentic subject, it actually
reinforced it by casting the appropriationist in the role of an interpreter or critic. Thus, Levine, for example, was said to be critically unveiling the modern myth of originality that images such as Edward Weston’s or Walker Evans’s presumably carried. Yet, as Barthes so clearly stated: “once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile.”158 In other words, the death of the author also provided for the death of the critic.

Barthes’ argument relies upon his belief that a text is not a reflection of the individual who produced it as much as it is a product of a cultural system. This perspective defines text as a sign, which seems to align it with visual imagery; however, as chapter one demonstrated the material expression of images distinguishes visual artworks from text.159 Since many postmodern critics did not acknowledge the role of material expression, they freely applied Barthes’ analysis of text in their assessment of appropriation art as a process of reframing imagery in new contexts.160

*Look Homeward Angel*

In part, this persistent critical focus on the source image and the effects of context may be attributed to the influence of the previous generation’s use of appropriation to create visual parodies. Most of this lineage was well documented in the Whitney’s “Art about Art” exhibition catalogue in which numerous masterpieces appeared humorously renovated. Prominent in this
crowd of superstars was Ingres' 1814 Grande Odalisque, which Mel Ramos had thoroughly modernized by replacing Ingres' female model with a "Playboy" version (figure 37). Richard Pettibone's painting—elaborately titled Ingres' Grande Odalisque, 1814; and Clay Regazzoni's Ferrari After Winning the U.S. Grand Prix at Long Beach, Cal., 1976—articulates ironic commentary by juxtaposing an exact but miniaturized rendition of the Odalisque with a similarly painted reproduction of a racing car (figure 38). Moving onto another source artwork, Robert Colescott's 1975 painting Natural Rhythm: Thank You Jan van Eyck (figure 39) rearticulates Van Eyck's 1434 painting Giovanni Arnolfini and His Wife as a biting commentary on American slavery by reproducing the young bride in "black-face". Thus, Colescott reminds viewers of the common and so-called "natural" practice of keeping a Black slave as a mistress. Peter Saul contributed cartoon-styled caricature's of Rembrant's 1642 The Night Watch and Picasso's 1937 Guernica. Another example of caricature can be found in Scott Grieger's 1970s photographs titled Impersonations, which document light-hearted interpretations of past art works (figure 40). For example, one image depicts Grieger on all fours with a car's tire fitted around his waist; below the image the source is identified with text reading: Robert Rauschenberg. In another image viewers see Grieger pinned to the wall, suspended a few feet off the ground, and with a perfect stripe going down the middle of his T-shirt; almost redundant, the text below this image says: Barnett Newman.
As these examples demonstrate, visual art parodies generally follow one of two formats: collage or caricature. The former approach adds figurative element(s) to an otherwise exact rendition, while the latter approach retains the overall composition of the source image but revises its content through exaggeration. John Currin's 2001 painting *Nude on a Table* (figure 41) continues the collage approach to visual parodies. Thus, viewers see a somewhat exact rendition of Mantegna's well-known depiction of a foreshortened *Dead Christ* (figure 42); however, in Currin's picture plane the body of the dead Christ has been replaced by a nude, somewhat eroticized, female figure. This replacement effectively aligns pornographic references with the death of this Christian figure. Where Currin's work continues to explore parodies using the collage approach to parody, many of the Young British Artists who emerge at the end of the twentieth century will take the caricature approach to parody in a new direction by revising the content of the source imagery through a shift in medium and material. (Since this development is so pertinent to this thesis's discussion of the material affects on appropriated imagery, the YBAs' work will not be discussed here and instead will be explored in more depth in chapter four.)

In both formats the revisions orchestrated in the picture plane situate the appropriated image in a new context that carries out a referential shift. The parodist structure focuses viewers' attention on the source artwork, which is set up in the picture plane as either a target or a tool for generating some form of ironic commentary. In either case the past image primarily functions as a vehicle
for carrying references, that is, as a textual construct designed to express a narrative specified by the artist.

While Edelson’s and Leslie’s works continue to invest in the authorial stance that is evident in these earlier parodies, their works nevertheless make a departure from their source imagery. They appropriate the fully composed image in order to borrow the narrative attached to it, and then they apply this narrative to a new figuration. Thus, rather than looking backwards, as Grieger’s, Pettibone’s and Ramos’s works do, these artists actually use the appropriated image as a point of departure. This characteristic of leaving the source artwork behind becomes somewhat consistent in narrative postmodern appropriation artworks. There is also evidence of this approach in Colescott’s work as well as in Joseph Cornell’s much earlier work *Mica Magritte* (figure 43) from 1965.

In this work Cornell has collaged a reproduction of Magritte’s painting *Time Transfixed* onto a pencil drawing, which extends the architecture of the room depicted in Magritte’s picture. This illusionary extension expands the surreal effect of Magritte’s train, which is chugging along in thin air, and it opens the imaginative possibilities for another world beyond the picture plane. Indeed, as Cornell’s composition implies, this work was meant to suggest a life beyond the concrete realities of the everyday, for it was produced as a memorial for Cornell’s late brother Robert, an avid train enthusiast who had passed away earlier. Many postmodern appropriation artists will continue to explore the narrative
potential of this approach to art after art. Through a careful analysis of their explorations, this thesis demonstrates how narrative plotlines open even further as authorial control diminishes.

You Can't Go Home Again

Up until now, this thesis has looked at works that for the most part demand that the appropriated image remain a displaced immigrant that continues to refer to its homeland and is never fully assimilated by its new location. Eighties' narrative appropriationists will release their pirated images from this constraint and create narrative works that demonstrate how the meanings that appropriated images bring to the page of the canvas are dependent upon their destination, that someone who Barthes dubbed the reader. For example, Peter Blake's 1981-83 painting The Meeting or Have a Nice Day Mr. Hockney (figure 44) moves the image of a past work into a new terrain that also paraphrases the pictorial style of another artist. Thus, in the foreground of Blake's image, viewers encounter a meeting between three men that is staged against the backdrop of a southern California shopping-center parking lot, populated with casually but nonetheless fashionably dressed roller-bladers. Among the three men, many viewers will recognize a portrait of the popular British painter David Hockney. In fact, Hockney's presence beats like a pulse throughout this picture, for he is not only identified in the title, but his work also reverberates in the setting of this meeting. For more than ten years, Hockney's work was dedicated to portraying the social
arena of southern California, which appears like Hockney’s “signature” in the background of Blake’s painting. None of Blake’s images calls a specific Hockney painting forward; they simply set up a context that helps to take the other images present in new directions.

Hockney is depicted leaning on an over-sized paintbrush. He is greeting the other two men, whose portraits also make them identifiable. They are Peter Blake, the artist of this picture, and his contemporary, the British abstract painter Howard Hodgkin. Although not depicted, there is a fourth man whose presence is contextually implied and actually haunts this scene. The nineteenth-century realist painter Gustave Courbet lurks within the presence of Hockney as well as Blake, for Blake’s image and title are translating Courbet’s 1854 painting The Meeting, or Bonjour Monsieur Courbet (Figure 45). With reference to Courbet’s 1854 painting, viewers see that the figure of Courbet, leaning on a walking stick, has shape-shifted into Hockney, holding his huge paintbrush, which appears like a winking reference at Pop Art. Cast in the role of Courbet, Hockney is also contextually aligned with the traditions of Realist painting. However, instead of Courbet’s more illusionistic depiction of a pastoral landscape, references to Hockney’s realism in the background celebrate the flatness of the canvas. The rolling, wooded hills of Courbet’s painting have been reiterated as the landscape of Santa Monica; this contemporary urban landscape is somewhat abstractly depicted through the use of wide bands of color. Against these broad strokes, the roller-bladers, the three painters, and the over-sized paintbrush look like
cutouts that continually announce their condition as images and icily delineate
the difference between the referent and the sign. Appropriated, Courbet's image
has become a pastiche of figural shapes that now reference the historical
condition of realism, namely illusionism in crisis.

Other revisions of Courbet's image expand this discourse on painting in another
direction. Where Courbet depicted his self-portrait on the face of the central
figure who was meeting his collectors, the artist of this later picture has cast
himself in the less important role of one of the collectors. Joining him as the
other collector is Hodgkin, whose non-narrative work is nonetheless rife with
general references to past artworks.

In an appropriated image that depicts two painters in roles contextually
associated with collecting, Blake's image now suggests that painting is an act of
collecting pictures that are received by other artists. Is this Blake's intended
message? Perhaps. But what's significant is how the picture articulates this
discourse through a network of exchanges that occur among the images and the
references that they activate. Significantly, Blake is not concerned with
expressing a commentary on the meaning of Courbet's painting. In fact, Blake's
work does not glance backwards at Courbet's anymore than it looks sideways at
Hockney's; instead, it moves in its own terrain, using these past references as
elements that Blake's other images engage in a discourse grounded in the
present condition of representation, which seems to be a postmodern "pastiche"
of quotations that has restructured narrative composition along the lines of 
collage.

If Blake's use of appropriated imagery moves in the direction of a disjointed 
narrative space that asks the viewer to authorize meaning by linking context with 
images, Dotty Attie's work attains this destination. Since the early 1970s, Attie 
has been extracting details—a dramatic facial expression, a pointing figure, folds 
in fabric—from masterworks by Caravaggio, Copley, Eakins, Ingres, Vermeer, 
Velázquez, and others. Focusing on the possibilities of the picture plane, she 
redeployed these fractured images on small discrete canvases—usually six inches 
square—that are laid out with a half-inch of space between each canvas. 
Although Attie's works are often installed using a grid format, Attie prefers to 
see them exhibited as a line of canvasses moving along the length of a wall.163

Attie's installation of her work accentuates the fragmentary or collage like nature 
of her narratives. The space creates openings or gaps that tend to prevent a 
singular narrative from gathering and dominating the work. Attie's process of 
fragmenting these narrative details out of larger works and carefully repainting 
them on discrete canvasses effectively reproduces the pieces as whole images 
that have a life of their own, largely separate from their sources. She then 
redeployed these new images in a pictorial linear narrative that is rife with other 
fragments. Thus, the appropriated images resonate with references that the 
other images activate and elaborate. Removed from their sources, these new
images become fodder for other narrative episodes that Attie alludes to in textual panels that join the pictorial quotes as images painted on small canvasses, which are hung, interspersed among the other figurative pictures. For example, in Attie’s 1988 painting _A Violent Child_ (figure 46), thirty canvasses depict images that have been pried out of many different paintings by Caravaggio.

Taking a closer look at this work, in the first canvas viewers find a close-up of a baby’s face. Removed from Caravaggio’s relatively unknown _Madonna-Pellegrina_, this infant can no longer be read as the Christ child. Moving ahead, viewers then encounter an image of a man, bent over and struggling to haul something that is apparently quite heavy, but not revealed. Next comes a close-up of a boy’s contorted face, lifted from Caravaggio’s _Boy Bitten by a Lizard_. It is difficult to make sense out of these images until viewers get to the next panel, where it reads: _Born in the small town of Caravaggio, Michelangelo Merisi, after a placid and contended infancy, became a violent child_. The image of the struggling man still remains something of an enigma, but Attie gives viewers enough to keep them moving through her story.

Skipping ahead four canvasses, the narrative takes a dramatic turn. Here, viewers see the headless torso of Holophernes, straining to get up from his bed. Isolated in the terrain of Attie’s work, however, this torso no longer belongs to Holophernes, even though violence remains evident in the bands of spurting blood left visible. The next canvas gives viewers the tightly framed face of
Caravaggio’s *Medusa* (figure 47). However, where Caravaggio depicted Medusa’s face upright, Attie shows viewers this face howling from a reclining position. Thus, it seems to become the head of the torso depicted in the previous canvass. From here, viewers move on to the torso of Caravaggio’s *St. John*, who appears to be drawing away from something outside of the picture frame. The text explains: *A more likely source of his uncertain temper was his experience when apprenticed, while still a boy, to a Milanese painter who liked to call himself a pupil of Titian.*

As viewers move on from this point, the details of the narrative become less clear, and the images begin to stutter, as disturbing references appear that are difficult, if not impossible, to decipher. Viewers learn from the text that there is “a special room” and something, perhaps inappropriate but related to anatomical study, occurs there. Beyond this, the text only whispers gossipy tidbits and the images stare back at viewers, unwilling or unable to spell out exactly what happened.

Significantly, as viewers look back over the images, trying to find the “whole story”, they encounter Attie’s painting, which is magnificent. Like broken shards, the images suddenly announce their materialized condition and the entire work begins to feel more like a sculpture, crawling across the wall for more than sixteen feet. Increasingly, the gaping spaces between the canvasses become louder, as the images become a materialized presence that refuses to fulfill a
complete narrative. With their narrative possibilities diminished, they emphasize their condition as real materialized figural forms.

In the end, when viewers walk away from Attie’s artworks, they are left to contemplate the luscious painting, the story’s failure, their unfilled desire to know. Moreover, viewers’ imaginations might wander down a road, where the story is completed and/or another one emerges. Thus, viewers begin to write new stories in their heads that are inspired by and indirectly quoting Attie’s work. Effectively, Attie’s work illustrates how narratives are visually constructed by placing images in particular contexts. Simultaneously, Attie presents imagery that refuses to be contained in a singular narrative and remains open to other possibilities. Finally, through Attie’s disjointed narrative, which is actually a non-narrative, viewers discover Barthes’ seminal reader.

What Kind of Reader is this?

Unlike what some critics suggested early on, Barthes’ eulogy for the author did not call for a moratorium on writing; it did, however, ask that the operations of writing and by extension, representation be reconsidered. Thus, where Foucault focused on the effects of authorship, Barthes attended to the very act of composing. For Barthes writing is not a form of recording, depicting or even
representing events and information; rather it is a performative enunciation in which content arrives through the act of composing. Accordingly, Barthes explained: "A text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash." At the heart of Barthes’ essay is the belief that meaning is a fluid and relative construct and that definition is perpetually deferred. Nevertheless, while Barthes described writing as a process that continually posits meaning only to evaporate it, he still maintained that texts were accessible, for "there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader." Thus, Barthes concluded that the death of the author occurs with the birth of the reader.

As some critics have pointed out, Barthes’ conclusion seems to replace one authority, the author, with another, the reader. At first, this criticism seems particularly pertinent since Barthes has said that the reader is a unity in which none of the quotations is lost. Thus, quite surprisingly, Barthes’ conclusion seems to reassert the authoritative subject that he dismissed at the onset. In fact, this reader approaches the status of an expert who is incredibly well read, for as Barthes has suggested, s/he is capable of recognizing all of the quotations inscribed in a text.
However convincing, this criticism represents a misunderstanding of Barthes’ essay. Yet, it proposes another possible way of thinking about Barthes’ reader. For Barthes is careful to note that “the reader is without history, biography, psychology.”\(^{173}\) What kind of reader is this? Well, Barthes says, “he is simply that *someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted.”\(^{174}\) The problem here is the term “*someone*”, but it has been italicized for a reason, namely to indicate its foreignness. Without history, biography, or psychology, this so-called *someone* is not a person at all; rather, as Barthes has said, s/he is a field of inscription. In much the same way that Barthes has said that it is language which speaks and not the author, this reader becomes a field of inscription, not a subject or person but a receptacle for language, namely a book, or for the purposes of this thesis, a picture plane. In fact, the book is the only possible field of inscription where none of the quotations can be lost, and the only destination where the unity of a text can be located.\(^{175}\) Likewise, the reader that appropriation art circumscribes is the picture plane, the only destination where none of the visual quotations can be lost and the place where representation becomes a performative translational effect of quotation. This process certainly engages an exchange with the viewer, but the picture plane and its surrounding context will always contain more narratives than even that expert viewer, the art historian, can detect.

This is manifestly demonstrated in Yasumasa Morimura’s photograph, titled *Doublonnage (Marcel)* (figure 48). This work is a doubled double, for it replays
Man Ray’s 1921 photographic depiction of Marcel Duchamp performing his feminine alter ego “Rrose Selavy” (figure 49). Functioning as a translation, the photograph brings the appropriated image into a new terrain, where Ray’s photograph becomes a self-portrait that speaks in another language, the language of Yasumasa Morimura’s image. Therefore, instead of the features of Duchamp disguised as Rrose Selavy, viewers encounter the facial features of Morimura posed as “Rrose Selavy (Marcel)”. Still, viewers would never mistake Morimura for Rrose or even Duchamp. These figures stop at the frame of Morimura’s photograph, where they deposit contextual references: Rrose signals the themes of identity construction and gender, while Duchamp brings with him the power of the pun. Accordingly, the context of Morimura’s work plays these references like musical refrains. Thus, viewers enter Ray’s appropriated image through “Rrose”, that showy flower that doubles as a secret bodily passion, and Morimura’s title, Doublonnage, parenthetically sounds the alarm, showing viewers the secret below Ray’s photograph, namely Marcel, and setting viewers up for the possibility of many more secrets stowed in the image inside this frame up.

Indeed, doubling echoes throughout Morimura’s picture, which features not only two hats but also two sets of hands. One set of hands, clearly Caucasian and adorned with a French manicure, seems to tuck the face more protectively in the fur collar. The other set of hands, brown in color, lightly grasp the wrists of the first figure, as if to stop this gesture of covering up. Both left hands are adorned
with a ring; opposing the topaz gem on the Caucasian hand is a jade stone worn on the colored hand. In the tradition of self-portraiture, the jade stone functions as a clear reference to Morimura’s Japanese heritage, for jade is primarily harvested in Japan and China. However, like the name of Rose Selavy, there is another pun at work here; jade is also a term used to refer to a worthless or disreputable woman, which in the context of cross-dressing suggests a drag queen.

Cross-dressing also follows another line of flight moving through Morimura’s image. Specifically, the history of post-colonialism that shaped post-W.W.II Japan collides with Morimura’s enunciation of cross-dressing, for in addition to the lipstick and eye make-up that Duchamp wears, Morimura’s face is painted with stark white theatrical make-up. This references the larger theme of the Western invasion of Japan that not only defined Morimura’s upbringing in Osaka but also permeates Morimura’s entire oeuvre. Moreover, in the context of drag this theatrical make-up doubles back on itself, bringing forward the legacy of Kabuki Theater.

Developed in seventeen-century Japan, Kabuki Theater consisted of burlesque skits in which many of the female performers cross-dressed. Rivalries over the affections of these actresses, most of whom were prostitutes, led the government to ban women from the Kabuki stage in 1629. Nevertheless, Kabuki Theater continued with young male actors performing cross-dressed, and the prostitution
associated with Kabuki Theater took on a distinctly homosexual identity. When
the government’s efforts to censor the content of Kabuki performances failed,
homosexual prostitution was outlawed in 1648, and the Kabuki Theaters closed
in 1652. Eventually, the theaters reopened, but now with only adult men
performing the female roles. And out of this contorted legacy the highly
respected art of the on’iagata or female impersonator (Morimura Marcel)
emerged.

Through Morimura’s translation, the object of cross-dressing, which in
Duchamp’s performance expresses identity-construction, is relocated in another
terrain where it collides with Morimura’s images, which express Kabuki Theater,
homosexual prostitution, and post-colonial Japan. Significantly, none of these
topics are conveyed by Man Ray’s photograph of Duchamp’s performative work,
and yet together these works provide the context from which to consider them.
Morimura’s picture plane sets up a contextual relationship that draws out various
references from the images presented there. Nevertheless, while viewers might
find many more references and narratives operating in Morimura’s photograph,
viewers will never find them all; for with the passage of time they will continue to
multiply, as they gather new references and shift with our ever-expanding
understanding of history. Still, this photograph holds all of these traces together
in a single field, none of them are lost, even if they might not all be readily
apparent to every viewer at all times.
Significantly, Morimura is not the author of these stories, though he certainly has played a role. As was established at the start of this chapter with the Belgrade artists, Morimura is the fabricator who acts like an agent, arranging this pictorial event. Each image in the terrain of this artwork resonates with references that interact with and produce possible narratives that expand beyond Morimura's control and any single viewer's comprehension. The result is a picture plane that assumes the authorial role of reading and creating new narrative images. In short, every picture plane becomes a translation, and the reader becomes the dynamic that occurs among the images that appear within that picture plane. The viewer, as the next three chapters will demonstrate, plays an entirely different role.

Chapter one demonstrated that appropriation is the movement of images into new material expressions and pictorial terrains that are located in different contexts. This chapter has focused on the translational effects that occur within the pictorial terrain of an appropriation. The next chapter will attend to the image itself, for the appropriation process revealed something quite profound about visual imagery that distinguishes it from most textual representations. Chapter three will explore how artists in the mid-eighties capitalized on the translational effects of appropriation to create images that wildly depart from their sources. This era marks an important development in the history of appropriation art since a number of these appropriationists actively distanced themselves from the "Pictures generation" and the critical interpretations that had defined
appropriation art up to that point. Moving forward, sometimes blindly, they
pushed the appropriated image to an extreme that is very insightful and that
located the driving force behind appropriation art, namely the virtual image.
Chapter Three
Simulationism: Figures, Referential Functions & Virtual Imagery

In the correspondence section of the September 1986 issue of Art in America there appeared a curious letter, which read in part:

While I was hanging my small Suprematist paintings here and there, it did not occur to me that the photo of this installation would become so famous and be published in hundreds of books, reviews…I have an impression that this photo is becoming even more important than my Suprematist paintings!177

Below, the letter was signed: “Kazimir Malevich; Belgrade, Yugoslavia”.

Apparently back from the dead, Malevich seemed to be warning us against the encroaching power of the photograph and its diabolical ability to preserve and even elevate a representation over the real object. Yet, Malevich’s residence in Belgrade suggested another source for this message; in fact, Fiction Reconstructed had expanded beyond the confines of Ljubljana’s Skuk gallery into the pages of this art journal to lay the referential function of representation in the grave beside the author’s.

With the privileged twenty-twenty hindsight of the dead, Malevich suggests that the bodies of his artworks—his paintings—were being left behind by this less weighty documentary snapshot (figure 52). Indeed, in many art historical tomes Malevich’s paintings are represented, arguably replaced, by this photograph. Of course, the actual paintings continue to hang in collections across the globe. The real issue lies in the fact that Malevich’s paintings appear in this photograph
as merely images. Materiality has been replaced by imagery, and this is always a poor trade; just try eating a picture of a steak for dinner tonight. Yet, this does not mean that representations are false or somehow not real. A picture of a steak is a very real material object, but it is not a steak. While everyone knows that a representation is never the same as what it depicts, viewers regularly ignore this fact for the sake of communication. Craftily, Allan McCollum's *Plaster Surrogates* plumbed this insight (figure 50).

Represented in books, McCollum's "Surrogates" appear to be exactly what their title implies: framed rectangular canvasses of various sizes that have appropriated Malevich's *Black Square on White Ground* (figure 51); summarily, a painting that depicts a painting of painting. Yet, what viewers see represented is not what they encounter in the gallery; there, McCollum's pieces reveal themselves to be cast plaster objects hanging on the wall. In reality, they barely resemble Malevich's painting. Accordingly, we might again conclude that the pictures of McCollum's work fail as representations because these pictures actually misrepresent McCollum's work. This conclusion, however, presumes that images are constituted by the references they make, that a picture is what it represents, and this leaves us once again at the dinner table confronting an image rather than a juicy porterhouse. In actuality, visual images are materialized figurations, and referentiality is only a function that images perform. The pictures of McCollum's "Surrogates" are very successful representations that clearly reference McCollum's work, but like all photographs, they achieve this by
presenting an image of McCollum's works in another material expression, and material changes everything.

*Ain't Nothin Like the Real Thing*

Appropriation art is the movement of visual images into new material and contextual expressions. Thus, in many ways the image is the defining component of appropriation art, for it is the element that travels from one location to another and is thereby transformed. In fact, through the transformative effects of movement, appropriation art revealed something quite profound about the visual image, namely that images are figural articulations expressed in material matter, and through these two qualities—figuration and materialization—images acquire a singular density that interferes with and even works against the image's referential function. For, as noted above, McCollum's cast-plaster "Surrogates" are singularly different from both Malevich's painted *Black Square on White Ground* and both of these artworks are also different from any photographic depictions of them.

Chapter one demonstrated how the initial assessment of appropriation art focused almost exclusively on the frame and a critical blindness developed around the material object and the image that it expressed. This interpretation defined appropriated imagery conceptually. Poignantly, this perspective forced the transformative effects of movement out of the picture, and the actual image
was misconstrued as a redundant image defined by its historical context. Perceived as such, the image was reduced to its referential function and it became a mere sign or code. Thus, the actual image, the materialized figuration, remained invisible and was lost inside its frame.

The previous chapter revealed how artists capitalized on the referential functions of imagery to explore the narrative potential of appropriation. These artists recognized that the referential nature of visual images can operate in an interconnected manner that differs dramatically from coded references. Thus, the referential connections that appropriated images make in new pictorial terrains expand unpredictably beyond the images’ historical context. This unpredictable expansion occurs because of the translational force that characterizes the referential nature of visual images and signs in general. The close of the last chapter demonstrated how some artists orchestrated a movement between the coded references that contextualized their appropriated images historically and the translational references that their pictorial terrains activated. The controlled relay between these two referential operations of imagery produced narratives. Thus, Yasumasa Morimura’s picture *Doublonnage (Marcel)*, for example, drew upon the references surrounding Duchamp’s “Rose Selavy” to activate a historical discourse about gender in Japan’s history. In this and other works, codification keeps translational movement in check, a condition that allows non-linear stories to emerge. This chapter will look at artists who engaged appropriation to move in the opposite direction. Rather than enhance
the referential operations of their appropriated imagery, these artists severely disable referentiality. As a result, these works present appropriated images that communicate incoherently, a condition that inevitably brings attention to the fundamental fact that visual images are figural articulations that operate separately from any referential functions that they might perform.

_Ambiguity: The Real Deal_

The expanding crisis that moved from authorship to encompass all of representation grew out of the development of Simulationism and its East Village stepsisters Neo-Geo and Commodity art. Since the early eighties, these expressions of appropriation art had been roaming New York's alternative galleries, but they remained virtually unnoticed by critics. That is, until the autumn of 1986, when the art world witnessed the fruition of an entirely different tack in appropriation art. This new direction became apparent and impossible for critics to ignore primarily because of two prominent exhibitions. IIlanna Sonnabend's prestigious Soho gallery presented a sold-out group exhibition that featured works by four, then relatively unknown, artists: Ashley Bickerton, Peter Halley, Jeff Koons, and Meyer Vaisman. Meanwhile, Boston's Institute of Contemporary Art organized a much larger investigation of this new trend in appropriation, titled "Endgame: Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting and Sculpture".
All of the artworks in both of these exhibitions entailed some form of appropriation, yet without exception the artists refused the label "appropriationists". Their resistance was part of a larger effort aimed at distancing themselves from the more righteous stance that had been associated with earlier appropriationists, whom they dubbed the "Pictures generation"—a term that simultaneously referred to the title of Douglas Crimp’s 1977 exhibition at Artists Space and to Metro Pictures, the gallery that went on to represent many of the artists featured in Crimp’s show.\(^2\)

The Simulationists believed that critique—be it a critique of the market or the institution of art history—had produced its own failure: it had left the body of the artwork dangling in a noose of rhetoric that had banished poetic discourse in favor of a *task-oriented spectacular didacticism*.\(^3\) In the wake of these utopian pursuits the Simulationists embraced the economic relations of the art world—both the economy of the sign and the economy of capital—and produced works that seemed to celebrate that once repugnant wasteland of commercialism. Not surprisingly, many of the critics who had promoted and perhaps even defined the Pictures generation were outraged. Crimp and Hal Foster implied that this work had turned appropriation into a fashionable style rather than a critical strategy.\(^4\) Moreover, Foster argued that this work was defined by its ambiguity, a quality that not only precluded a critical stance but that facilitated the exchange value of the artwork and thereby enhanced its commodified condition.\(^5\) Interestingly enough, the artists readily acknowledged
the ambiguous nature of their work; in fact, ambiguity seemed to be a vital component of their project. Listen to Bickerton’s somewhat poetic description:

After years of pulling the object off the wall, smearing it across the fields of the Utah desert, and playing it out with our bodily secretions, the artwork has not awkwardly but aggressively asserted itself back into the gallery context: the space of art—but this with an aggressive discomfort and a complicit defiance. 186

There was the ambiguity: discomfort and complicity. In other words, Foster argued, these artists wanted it both ways. Yet, Foster maintained, they could not both critique the artwork’s status as a commodified sign, while also participating in and even propagating the economy that relied upon and guaranteed this condition. 187

By definition, ambiguity avoids definitive articulation and produces the general appearance of smoothness. As a result, it allows somewhat contradictory terms to appear equivalent, or at least equivalent enough to function as stand-ins for each other. Indeed, it was the ambiguous referential nature of Koons’ 1981 sculpture New Shelton Wet/Dry Double Decker (figure 53) that allowed it to function as both fine art and vacuum cleaners encased in vitrines: from either perspective, these objects were seen as items for sale and on display in the windows of the New Museum of Contemporary Art. Ambiguity permitted viewers to identify these vacuum cleaners as both a Koons work and a Shelton product, with the value of each fashioned by the authorial name. And finally, ambiguity let this commodity/artwork echo the Duchampian readymade. With this reference in tow it offered a mild critique, but this disturbance was actually more nostalgic
than critical. It produced no more than a slight ringing in the ears, just enough discomfort to make the work critically interesting, which was a necessary ingredient in order to be commercially viable in the market of the early eighties.

Despite this reference to Duchamp’s ready-mades, Koons’ work cannot be considered an appropriation since it has not moved an image. None of the images from Duchamp’s ready-mades—the urinal, the shovel, the bicycle wheel, etc.—have entered Koons’ piece. Instead, Koons has rearticulated many of the ideas informing the ready-mades. An idea, however, is not a visual image. Visual images activate references that produce content or subject matter. This process, what this thesis is calling the referential function of an image, does not constitute the physical reality of an image. Visual images are materialized figurations, and while it is clear that a visual image cannot be entirely dislocated from its referential function, neither can the material reality of a visual image be reduced to this function. That is, viewers cannot erase the memory of Duchamp’s readymade that Koons’ work stirs, but neither can they fail to notice that these sculptures are material objects. With this in mind it should be noted that the ambiguity, which Koons’ work conveys, relies upon its frame: the context of the museum windows and the lit-up vitrines. Invariably, framing devices facilitate the referential functions of visual imagery. Beyond referentiality, Koons’ work stubbornly insists upon its material reality as an object, constructed out of mostly plastic and metallic parts, that functions as a domestic tool. As Koons’ work develops and he produces the highly crafted cast stainless-steel sculptures
Bob Hope and Italian Woman (which were featured in the Sonnabend exhibition), this insistence upon materiality will become paramount. Indeed, the references that these later works make are inane, but the materialization is stunning, a quality that will only continue to grow in Koons' work and that is key to the Simulationists' project.

1986 and Baudrillard's simulacrum was floating in the airwaves

Whether in the name of Pictures or Simulation, appropriation art entails a profound skepticism over the realism of representation that illusionistic sculptural and painting techniques produce and that the documentary tradition of photography presumes. In other words, appropriation art fundamentally insists that all images are derived from other images and that they do not represent the world per se. Embedded within this perception, however, is the somewhat problematic assumption that representations are not real, an idea advanced by Jean Baudrillard's discussion of the simulacrum, which lent its name to much of this work.

According to Baudrillard, a hyperreality results when the difference between a representation and its referent is no longer recognized. Relieved of their referential function, simulacral images create their own reality, producing a hyperreality. This understanding of representation suffers from the same problems that were located in the critical commentary surrounding Levine's
rephotography: it continues to invest in a definition of representation based almost entirely upon its referential function. Moreover, it ignores the material body that expresses the image and thereby transforms it. Problematically, this perception of representation reduces the important relationship between difference and repetition that defines visual imagery as a serial event. The picture is never an isolated or contained event; it is a materialization of an ongoing serial expression of the image. Fundamentally, the inherently serial nature of appropriation art demonstrated how imagery functions as an event; for the image is always in transition and translation in both its material and incorporeal expressions.

Despite its name, much of the artwork produced under the guise of Simulation actually underscored the real material body of representation. A case in point is Bickerton’s 1987 piece Tormented Self-Portrait (SUSIE at Arles) (figure 54). Oblique but nonetheless clear, Bickerton’s title references van Gogh’s work, but this reference occurs in name only. Bickerton has orchestrated the referential power of this framing device to make irrational conjunctions in the picture plane. Thus, reference to van Gogh’s self-portrait, which the title provokes, evaporates when viewers consider the image that it frames: a picture plane composed entirely of corporate logos and commercial decals, advertising Bayer, Citibank, Marlboro, Fruit of the Loom and others. In fact, Bickerton sold the compositional surface of Tormented Self-Portrait as ad space, actualizing this so-called portrait as a billboard. Thus, following Baudrillard, Bickerton’s title appears to function as
a free-floating signifier. Disengaged from its referent—van Gogh's actual self-portraits—it produces its own reality: a billboard, displaying corporate crests. Pursuing these free-floating signifiers, viewers see that the references to the emotionally tormented van Gogh has been renamed “SUSIE”, capital letters that also appear as a logo in the picture plane. In the larger body of Bickerton's work, viewers discover that SUSIE is an acronym that stands for no words, suggesting “Susie”, a generic female name imitating an acronym. It is possible to continue chasing these references, for the connections go on and on, but they never lead the viewer toward a definitive conclusion or explanation of this work.

In this work the translational force operating in the pictorial terrain overpowers the referential code articulated in Bickerton's title, which is van Gogh's Author Function as the very definition of the tormented self-portrait. This coded title frames a stream of references that keep moving and appear to have gone haywire, as a kind of nonsense takes over. Significantly, Bickerton in no way interferes with the referential function of his images; he only disables it by throwing it into overdrive and thus producing incoherency. With the possibility of meaning frustrated, viewers are left to confront the material reality of the work.

Squarely situated in the viewer's space, Bickerton's "tormented" construction towers more than six-feet high and protrudes from the wall by another one-and-a-half feet. In the well-lit gallery space, viewers cannot ignore the brightly colored, enameled metal plates, which are riveted above this huge and imposing
rectangular structure that has been assembled out of slick and harsh industrial materials. Unlike what Baudrillard has suggested, this so-called simulation has a real material body that demands the viewer's attention. In fact, the material reality of this work cannot be denied unless it is dealt with purely as an image, as a photographic reproduction that like Malevich's paintings appears in a text.

Nevertheless, once again, this piece cannot be considered an appropriation. As with Koons' work, instead of moving an image, this work simply borrows the referential function of an image and leaves the figuration behind; in this case van Gogh's Author Function comes forward but there is no actual image being appropriated. Yet, Bickerton will skillfully employ this framing technique in other works that successfully function as art appropriations. For now, this piece helps to demonstrate how the Simulationists inhibited the referential function of their imagery in order to draw attention to the material reality of their work.

Material presence is fundamental to the Simulationists' work, for this material focus helps to separate the referential function of an image from its figural expression.

In reality, the material figuration of a visual image often stands in direct opposition to its referential codes. Where figurations always articulate singular expressions, codes tend to generalize masses of expressions into broad identities that gloss over difference and thus consume countless and widely divergent singularities under the rubric of what is ultimately an artificial identity.
Cleverly, many conceptual artworks, such as John Baldessari's *Pure Beauty* (figure 55), illustrated this fact by depicting words against a flat color-field. Although the letters in Baldessari’s artwork, P-U- R-E B-E-A-U-T-Y, in fact compose a materialized image, the figural quality of the image is completely dominated by its referential function as code. As a result, referentiality seems to become the image’s actuality, producing a general idea of beauty that details nothing. Referentiality, however, is a process not a constitutive part of representation. Simply put, Baldessari’s painting is not composed of pure beauty, this is only an idea that his painting conveys. His image, on the other hand, is a figuration actualized in material. Intentionally, it is not a very interesting image—only the marks of letters—and this keeps viewers focused on the referential function of this representation. In contrast to this approach, the appropriationists, particularly the Simulationists, are ultimately concerned with the figures that appear through the material body of the artwork.

The fundamental difference between a coded reference and a visual figuration becomes evident if one tries to articulate Baldessari’s work without using text. Setting off down this path, one soon discovers that it is not possible to draw a figure that will accommodate all of the various expressions of beauty that the code covers. Unlike the code, the visual figuration will always bring forward singularities that become excessive limitations. That is, the figuration of a visual image will express details that go beyond pure beauty and thus become exclusionary in their singularity. To cite a trite example, if a picture of a sunset
were to function as a visual code for pure beauty, it would appear to exclude the beautiful storm. Despite one’s best intentions, the details that figural depictions require will always end up adding specifics to the coded reference, impeding its essential generality.

Although the singularity of a visual figuration works against referential codes, it nonetheless enhances translational references. Thus far, this thesis has established how the referential function of visual imagery operates in two different manners: as a code that refers to the source artwork and its historical references, and as translation that moves the past image to engage new and unexpected references. Where the former extracts general definition, the latter avoids generality and pluralizes meaning; in fact, it bespeaks the countless and widely divergent expressions that codes tend to consume. Drawing on this pool of translational references, the image can set a chain of signifiers into motion; each stumbles into the next, recreating itself without regard for definition or a logical progression. Here, it is worth recalling that ambiguity produces the general appearance of smoothness. If, as noted, ambiguity avoids definitive articulation, then there is nothing ambiguous about the imagery that appears in Bickerton’s "Tormented Self Portrait" or in any of the Simulationists’ actual images. Admittedly, Bickerton’s "Tormented Self Portrait" fails to produce definitive meaning, but it achieves this failure through the articulation of very specific images. As was seen in Koons’ work, any ambiguity that the Simulationists’ works convey occurs at the level of meaning. Meanwhile, their
figural expressions engage translational movement because they are highly specific articulations.

The movement that translational references create relies upon the specificity of the image, for it is the particularity of an expression that leads to another specific reference and thus creates more links. Indeed, as was seen at the close of chapter two, Morimura's work engaged this process such that cross-dressing led to make-up, which introduced white-face; this in turn brought references to theater and the Kabuki tradition into the picture plane. Translational references move in an expansive manner; they push at the boundaries that coded identities create, and if left unchecked, they can erode meaning entirely. Thus, where Morimura and other narrative appropriationists contained the translational movement of their imagery within the coded references of their contextual frames, the Simulationists unleashed the translational references of their imagery and produced works in which meaning dissipated like spent energy. The result was the exact opposite effect of Baldessari's *Pure Beauty*; instead of referentiality, either materiality dominated the Simulationists' imagery as was seen in Bickerton's work, or figuration dominated, as happens in Halley's 1986 painting *Blue Cell with Triple Conduit* (figure 56).

Curator Elizabeth Sussman described Halley's work in the 1986 "Endgame" exhibition as having borrowed from Frank Stella's *oeuvre*. Once noted, the reference to Stella (figure 57) becomes apparent in Halley's use of geometric
shapes and day-glo paint, but this reference only appears generally, operating more like an influence than an actual appropriation. For, as Sussman pointed out, Halley's work does not appropriate a specific Stella image. The generality of this reference allows us to move beyond Stella's work, where Halley's imagery begins to articulate other references. The central figure of a blue square appears to float above the red color-field that frames it. Contemplating the image, viewers momentarily perceive a picture of a blue painting situated inside of a red frame. The intense blue of this floating square recalls Yves Klein's work, while the colored squares within squares bring Josef Albers to mind. These perceptions, however, are destroyed by the rigid black lines or "triple conduit" which violate the red frame, entering the blue painting from below and exiting it from above. Now, the square begins to make more mimetic references: architectural structures into which conduits enter appear...but then again, perhaps this is a road map...or a depiction of wired communication systems: Stella, Klein's Blue painting, Albers' squares, urban architecture, maps, communication systems. What viewers encounter here in this stream of references is the translational force of representation.

Without a coded reference to direct this translational power toward the development of a narrative, definitive meaning never arrives, ambiguity reigns, and as was seen in Bickerton's piece, the material fact of the work hanging in front of the viewer asserts its presence. This time, however, instead of an overwhelming sense of the materiality, viewers are confronted by the simple
geometric figurations, which are only that, materialized figurations that exist separately from any referent. These squares and lines conveyed in paint are in fact their own referent, and while they may be mute, they are not without expressions. In other words, by frustrating meaning, the Simulationists gave viewers the opportunity to recognize once again that figural forms, such as a square, convey distinct sensibilities that exist outside of language.

In a very fundamental way, most of the Simulationists used appropriation to focus viewers' attention on the figural and material aspects of their imagery. By focusing on the figural expressions rather than the referential meaning of their appropriated imagery, the Simulationists began to investigate how representation operates beyond narrative. In this regard they seemed to be reinvesting in an art for art's sake and specifically in Clement Greenberg's project of "limiting conditions", which in the 1940s had directed visual artists to reject "literature's corrupting influence", to rid their work of realistic imitation techniques, and to produce abstract art, an art of pure form that communicated only sensation and not stories. In fact, the Simulationists shared Greenberg's concern with sensation and abstraction; yet, unlike Greenberg, they recognized that all images, abstract figurations or otherwise, function as signs. In this regard appropriation provided the Simulationists with the perfect vehicle to explore figuration, for appropriated imagery seems to be doubly referential, since it simultaneously points to its source while also functioning as a figuration that carries meaning. Thus, with an eye toward enhancing the sensual and singular
experience of the figural image the Simulationists exaggerated the referential load of their appropriated images, strategically disabling it in order to draw the viewer’s attention to the figural articulation of the image.

*Now You See It, Now You Don’t*

By isolating the figural and material expressions of their imagery from its referential function, the Simulationists revealed that when a figuration enters a material expression it acquires a unique singularity that remains part of a serial expression. Philip Taaffe’s work offers an insightful effort in this direction. Following the critical assessment that had defined the Pictures generation and particularly Levine’s rephotography, Taaffe produced his 1985 painting *Homo Fortissimus Exelsus* (figure 58) such that it appears initially as an exact, albeit significantly smaller, rendition of Barnett Newman’s *Vir Heroicus Sublimis* (figure 59). However, a second, closer look, reveals that Taaffe has replaced Newman’s zips with collaged images depicting braided ropes. Overall, Taaffe’s painting retains the color scheme that Newman employed, and the distances between the rope images proportionally match the compositional space between Newman’s zips. Significantly, Taaffe’s rope images appear isolated from any functional use or situation, a condition that causes them to serve a decorative purpose rather than a mimetic one. This ornamental quality underscores the figural condition of these images and it actually aligns them more closely with the Newman zips. Yet, as often happens, these similarities ultimately make the differences between
these images more apparent. By recreating Newman’s abstract figurations as mimetic images that, even as decorative motifs, still reference specific objects, Taaffe has disrupted the transcendental associations that have characterized the Newman zip. By using Newman’s image as a point of departure, Taaffe multiplies the associations that surround this new and yet redundant image. For, looking at Taaffe’s canvas, many viewers will recognize Newman’s picture and then find the differences that the ropes provide. Many viewers will recall the transcendental affect of Newman’s zips and see that here in Newman’s picture plane that affect no longer operates. Thus, in altering the figuration of Newman’s picture Taaffe has recreated its visual affect, which is not to say that Newman’s transcendental affect has disappeared, rather it has become a reference that directs the viewer to recall the sensual affect of the Newman zip. Moreover, by substituting the zip with a depiction of decorative ropes, Taaffe demonstrates that figurations exist separately from the references that they articulate. Taaffe achieves this not by commenting on the validity of Newman’s transcendental references; rather Taaffe’s painting simply extends Newman’s image in a new direction, recreating it as a new figurative expression. As a result, Taaffe’s work actually underscores the singularity of both Newman’s and his own figurations. Paradoxically, the singularity of Taaffe’s image can only appear in relationship to Newman’s painting. Thus, Taaffe’s painting has the additional effect of placing Newman’s picture into a series, albeit a series which seems to be composed of only two elements.
As Taaffe’s work develops, his references to past artworks will become more and more oblique. Like most of the Simulationists, he will transform the images he appropriates so completely that his sources will often become incoherent or at the very least appear to be multiple. These two effects—incoherence and multiplicity—produce important outcomes. For example, the transcendental references that the Newman zip makes is a code, one that is legible through Taaffe’s painting because viewers can easily identify Taaffe’s source. However, when the figural transformations are so dramatic that the source of an appropriated image becomes unclear or incoherent, the coded references that an historical context would normally provide are impeded. This in turn thwarts the referential function, and it is possible, as happened in Halley’s painting, to create an image that insists upon its material condition as a singular figuration. Multiplicity then sets this singularity up as part of a serial expression that is not defined by an authorial oeuvre or any other referent; rather the serial expression appears entirely in terms of the figuration.

By creating appropriated images that appear to have several sources, the Simulationists demonstrated how seriality is composed of singular expressions. Seen from this perspective the appropriated image operates like a topological figure, which Brian Massumi has described as: “the continuous transformation of one geometrical figure into another.”¹⁹⁴ This type of figuration requires a continuity of movement and transformation, making it inherently serial yet singular in each of its expressions. In this regard Walter Robinson’s 1986
painting *Green Velvet* (figure 60) is exemplary. When viewers encounter this work, it is impossible to name a single source for the depicted image but several come to mind. The colorful concentric circles make Jasper Johns’ target paintings (figure 62) immediately evident, and the wavy edges of the circles allow Kenneth Noland’s “bulls-eyes” (figure 61) to tag along as well. Arguably, Adolph Gottlieb’s “sunbursts” can also hitch a ride here. Robinson’s painting resonates with all of these possible sources entirely at a figural level; for the figure that appears in Robinson’s painting is a version of the same figure that appears in all of these works, but each time it appears differently. Paradoxically, at the figural level Robinson’s image exists within Johns’, Noland’s, and even Gottlieb’s works, but at the material level each of these works express this figure in a singular manner. As a result, all of these paintings enter into a serial relationship through Robinson’s image, but each material expression causes the figure to appear distinctly different.

When viewers confront the material expression of Robinson’s painting, they encounter his working process: spin art. This fact can open a referential door, which simultaneously points to both the master of drip art—Jackson Pollock—as well as to kitsch and commercialism in general. Despite these references, Robinson’s work should not be summed up as an ironic commentary on the New York school of painting, which some critics have argued. In fact, Robinson seriously studied and mastered spin art so that he could control and manipulate the imagery that he produced. Instead of critique, Robinson’s work creates
figural transformations that simultaneously restate and expand the figurations expressed in the sources he recalls.

_Invisible Pictures_

The distinction between a visual figuration and its referential function is important for two reasons. First, it focuses viewers’ attention on the singular experience of the image. Second, the singularity becomes the expression of a serial movement. Together these conditions help to refine this thesis’s definition of appropriation: appropriated images are singular material expressions that nonetheless exist as part of a series; the serial quality is created through topological figures that move through material expressions and are transformed each time. This leads to what is perhaps a third important reason to distinguish an image from its referential functions: the experiential.

Traditionally, visual referentiality is achieved mimetically and/or semiotically. Both ways, the figural expression is perceived in terms of another object. In other words, one sees a steak instead of a picture of a steak, a Suprematist painting instead of a picture of a Suprematist painting, a modern ideology instead of a photograph. While no one would actually serve pictures for dinner, the question remains: How does a picture of a steak perceptually become the equivalent of a steak? Immanuel Kant, of course, has tackled this question and provided an elaborate and impressive answer.¹⁹⁶ And Paul de Man has argued
quite convincingly that Kant’s project actually describes a semiotic system that is
equivalent to language. Since the concern here is with the material object
through which an image appears, these arguments, which deal with the
referentiality of imagery, need to be set aside. When one does this, it becomes
reasonable to conclude that perceptually representation occurs through the
figuration. In effect, one’s imagination receives the visual information and
extrapolates the impression of the object being depicted. Simple enough. Yet,
this does not explain an encounter with a mouthwatering picture. How does this
level of physical sensibility get triggered? And why does one picture produce this
mouthwatering effect and another does not? Once again the answer seems
obvious: the illusionary devices of one image are more believable than the
other’s. One more question: What makes it more believable? By dramatically
altering the images that they appropriated, the Simulationists revealed that it was
not simply a matter of looking more like a steak or a Barnet Newman, rather it
was necessary to access the figural image at a virtual level and bring forward its
affective qualities.

Images create sensual movements that are experienced physically. These
sensual movements resist semiotic interpretations. They are caused by both the
material and the figural expressions of the image. It is not possible to separate
these two expressions because a figuration cannot appear without material to
express it. Quite literally, when images materialize they become visible.

Therefore, if a figural expression is moved out of its material, it will either become
invisible or appear differently in another material. Thus, the singularity of a visual image is a function of its actualization in a material expression. Yet, if the proposed definition of appropriation art—the movement of images, of topological figures, through material expressions—is to hold up, then it forces the somewhat ridiculous sounding question: Is there such a thing as invisible pictures?

Yves Klein thought so, and he proved the existence of his invisible paintings by working backward from a referential function. That is, through an economic transaction documented by a bill of sale and a certificate of ownership, Klein established the existence of an invisible work of art, not an invisible painting, but a non-material conceptual artwork. Still, this is not an invisible image. Klein simply isolated the referential function from the materialized mage. Moving in the opposite direction, the Simulationists took on the question of the invisible image at the figural level.

The figural component of an image provides the serial condition that defines appropriation art and it carries the relational quality between images into a material and thus viable existence. A relational quality, by definition, needs at least two points of reference. The first is the appropriation artwork; most critical assessments of appropriation art located the second in the source artwork. However, since the Simulationists drastically altered the images that they appropriated, this point of reference became vague or at least multiple. Moreover, by re-imaging a past picture without regard for exactness, the
Simulationists asked viewers to imagine the past image without its material support, and this is a virtual image. Significantly, the Simulationists did not ask the viewer to recall what the image meant but to re-experience an impression of a figuration.

It's only a figment of your imagination

Thus far, this thesis's discussion of appropriation art has made almost no reference to the viewer; even the role of the Barthian reader, which in the visual arts has been interpreted in terms of the viewer, has been reassigned to the art object. In chapter one, however, the viewer was addressed in terms of Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning Drawing. When Rauschenberg erased the material that expressed de Kooning's image, the image was relegated to a virtual existence, unavailable to anyone who had not experienced the drawing prior to its erasure. Although the erased image no longer has a material expression, it continues in a virtual existence.

When a viewer sees a materialized figuration, the image virtually enters his/her body and creates an impression. Settling, this "afterimage" remains in the viewer's body somewhat like a repeated activity—say a basketball lay-up or a gymnastic flip or even running—as a physical knowing, a pattern, that can be called upon without thinking it through. It is important to note that what a viewer receives from the artwork is decidedly different from the actual artwork because
the figuration must leave its material expression behind in order to enter a
viewer’s body. Therefore, what enters a viewer’s body is not the materialized
figuration (the actual image) or the referential function of the image (its meaning);
rather what a viewer receives is a sense of the image in its virtual, non-material,
purely figural condition. Moreover, when the image enters a viewer’s body, even
as a sensual impression, it is altered by what it encounters there in the viewer’s
body, for the viewer’s body becomes another embodied repetition.

To better understand how the virtual component of an image operates, this thesis
will consider Bickerton’s 1988 *Formalist Painting in Red Yellow and Blue* (figure
63). As in Bickerton’s “Tormented Self-Portrait”, this work also protrudes from
the wall by three feet and is almost six-feet wide. Once again, this massive size
is coupled with enamel-painted surfaces and other sleek industrial materials.
Figured in these materials are rectangular shapes. As found in most of
Mondrian’s paintings, all of these rectangles are painted in primary colors and
framed with black borders. At the top, one of the red enameled squares bears
text describing important installation instructions, while another warns viewers to
keep their hands off the material and to wear gloves. This time, instead of logos
and decals, viewers encounter mailing labels with text written in the language of
the country represented by a flag depicted in the corner of each label. Below, a
rolled-up, bright yellow tarp is held in place by black bands. Typically, this work
and others like it have been interpreted as an ironic commentary on the
packaging of artworks, packaging as a form of presentation both literally in terms
of the material and figuratively in terms of public relations. Accordingly, Bickerton's title packages Mondrian as "Formalist Painting", while his instructions bespeak packing the material artwork.

However, unlike Bickerton's earlier work, where the references to van Gogh occur in name only, a Mondrian image is actually embodied in this work. If viewers squint, the work flattens, the details of mailing labels and text blur, and the primary-colored rectangular shapes bounded by thick black lines come forward, and an actual Mondrian image begins to appear. Which one in particular? It is impossible to tell since the image appears drastically transformed. Nevertheless, while there is no specific Mondrian work that can be identified as Bickerton's source, the image before the viewer is certainly not the concept of a Mondrian; Bickerton's title illustrates the difference nicely by providing viewers with the concept of a Mondrian: a formalist painting in primary colors. Unlike this concept, the image in Bickerton's work moves into the viewer and accesses the physical tracks or movement of a Mondrian's work (provided of course that the viewer has experienced Mondrian's works). Bickerton's work seduces the viewer into re-imagining a Mondrian image. Nevertheless, Mondrian's imagery remains a vague presence in Bickerton's work. Bickerton's use of text, the massive three-dimensional quality of his piece, and the cold industrial materials all keep Mondrian's image at bay: on the edge of appearing, but never actually arriving, except in the viewer's imagination, where it makes a
virtual appearance. What is this image that seems to have no material form, and that actually exists elsewhere and differently from what the viewer imagines?

In actuality, if a Mondrian painting is set beside Bickerton’s work, the sculptural materiality and size of Bickerton’s piece would immediately scream out its difference. Effectively, Bickerton’s vagueness and overwhelming material expression strategically combine to remind viewers that the image before them is not a Mondrian image but something entirely different. Nevertheless, Bickerton’s work shares something with Mondrian’s and it is clear that this something is related to the visually figurative elements even though these elements are not identical to Mondrian’s. In fact, Bickerton’s image resonates with Mondrian’s at a virtual level.

*Ride Like the Wind*

In order to speak about the virtual image an invisible component of the image must first be acknowledged. As strange as the notion of invisible pictures might seem, viewers are more familiar with this than they might realize. Consider the wind as it appears in a tree. Everyone knows that the wind exists, and yet no one knows what it looks like. Most people do, however, know what its effects look like. People see its expression through other material objects; in and of itself the wind does not appear to have a material expression; in fact, it does not have its own material body but its force is its expression. The virtual component
of the image operates in a similar manner, never appearing fully and always appearing through other material objects. In this regard the virtual image operates more like a force than an object. Its appearance is the expression of this force through another figure, which it transforms just as the wind transforms the look of a tree or a hairdo. Forces produce sensations, not meanings, and people experience and store these sensations but in a different manner from the way in which they lodge meaning.

From the invisible this thesis now moves on to the hard part—the ghostly. Again, everyone is more familiar with this than they realize. Most people have received telephone calls from machines conveying pre-recorded messages. Usually, one recognizes the absence of a live being on the other end long before the voice fails to respond to a comment appropriately. On some level one senses the absence of a presence. Now what happens if this example is extended in the other direction, toward the presence of an absence or more accurately stated the presence of presence, an immaterial presence, in short, a ghost. Have you ever awoken sensing that you are in a particular room, perhaps your childhood bedroom, only to realize that you are someplace else entirely? This experience is highly disorienting because you are not consciously trying to remember your past bedroom or even dreaming about it. The room appears to be present because you actually feel its presence; you experience it spatially and haptically, and you are so convinced by this experience that you don’t even question it until something causes you to realize that this physical experience cannot be accurate. What happens in this experience? What is it that you actually
experience as being present? Clearly your childhood room never actually appears, nor do you time travel back to your childhood, yet an incorporeal sense of your past room does become apparent. You re-encounter this room in an imaginary way, yet this encounter produces real sensations. Your past room returns as an embodied event, and it becomes present virtually, that is as an image that exists without a material body, an expression that you experience sensually as a duration and not as a consciously recalled experience.

The virtual image is literally becomes a presence in the viewer’s body, which is not to say that it does not exist but simply that it does not have a material body; like the wind, it is an expression that appears through another material body. By refiguring Mondrian’s picture in a vague manner, Bickerton calls the virtual image forward and it becomes present without actually appearing. As noted earlier, figurations move through material expressions like forces, and they never fully appear. This comes dangerously close to suggesting that Bickerton’s and Mondrian’s actual images participate in some kind of transcendental ideal. Transcendentalism needs to be taken off the table, for it invests in the eternal and removes time from the picture, thereby setting up a static condition where change cannot occur. This completely misses the point of appropriation art. Unlike transcendental ideals, the virtual image is an unfolding expression that expands through time and thus changes every time it materializes as a figuration. The appropriated figure that appears in another material expression actually expands the virtual image, literally extending it and transforming it into something
more than it was. Since the virtual image is in a state of constant becoming, it cannot fully appear because it is never complete; therefore, it is the very definition of seriality. Thus, the redundancy that is inherent to appropriation art provided the perfect platform through which to explore the virtual condition of imagery. For, appropriation art is a redundant expression, which is more than a repetition because it performs its repetition in a manner that is designed to actualize difference, the difference of a new contextual and material expression.

This chapter now turns to consider Ross Bleckner’s 1981 painting *The Forest* (figure 64), where all of the Simulationists’ techniques can be seen operating. Beginning with the referential function of his appropriated imagery Bleckner disables this operation by setting coded references against each other and creating an illegibility. Specifically, the greenish stripes of Bleckner’s painting recall the Op Art movement. Although Bleckner’s imagery is not an exact copy that can be identified, the vertical stripes point to Bridget Riley’s *oeuvre* (figure 65) in a definitive manner; and as happened with Bickerton’s appropriation of Mondrian, viewers recognize the presence of a Riley image, albeit dramatically transformed. Beyond Riley’s work, Bleckner’s image also captures “Op Art” as a code, and the meaning that comes forward is Op’s reputation as failed imagery, abstraction reduced to ornamentation, which was quickly commercialized in product designs that in turn went on to reference psychedelics, drug use, and the 1960s in general. Meanwhile, Bleckner’s title, takes these greenish stripes in another very literal direction that suggests an abstract interpretation of a forest,
that is, a minimal visual conception of a forest. Still, this reference makes no sense with the line of thought emanating from the Op Art reference. Moreover, the definitive article “The” in Bleckner’s title implies a specific forest that makes even less sense with the abstract imagery depicted. It suggests an essence, the abstract generality that codes or pictorial symbols convey. Are viewers expected to interpret this picture as an icon that represents the concept of “forest”, the absolute representation of “the forest”, which all forests participate in? If so, how should viewers accommodate the Op Art references. Or, is this simply a mixed metaphor? A bit of botched referential work? In part, the answer is “yes”. Together, Bleckner’s coded references to Op Art and “The Forest” inhibit each other, and semiotically the image becomes somewhat dysfunctional, leaving viewers with the materialized figuration.

Unlike Op Art's crisp-edged stripes, Bleckner’s are fuzzy. Appearing like an image out of focus, they produce a subtle sense of movement, a swaying that at times, if viewers stay with the painting long enough, even seems to suggest breathing. Rather than the disorienting dizziness that the optical illusions of Riley’s paintings generated, in Bleckner’s “forest” the movement is slow and sensual. Through these sensations, another kind of reference to the forest becomes discernable.

The stripes sit on the surface of Bleckner’s painting and protect viewers from the blinding, yet enticing light emanating from below. Thus, Bleckner has captured a
sensibility that retains a quality of intense light diffused by thick foliage. This diffused light is made present qualitatively through an affect that appears detached from the forest. Bleckner has not painted light; he has recreated some of its affects in the forest, and in much the same way that a tree makes the wind visible these affective qualities appear through Bleckner's materialized imagery. In this regard, the figurations—the appropriated stripes—become an armature through which a qualitative aspect of light can appear.

An important distinction needs to be made: light itself is not actually present in Bleckner's painting, nor is there an idea of light; instead what viewers encounter is an affect of light. This is where the virtual image comes into play. When viewers see Bleckner's work, they immediately recognize that it resonates with Riley's work at a figural level. This recognition occurs even though Bleckner's image does not actually resemble Riley's. Thus, Riley's work becomes present only as a recollection that is enfolded in the flesh, that is, as a virtual image. Just as the wind transforms the appearance of a tree, the affective qualities of light transform Bleckner's appropriated image. Riley's hard-edged stripes acquire a sensuality that under the spell of the title resonates with thick foliage, and once again, this occurs even though the transformed appropriated image does not look anything like thick foliage. Moved into Bleckner's painting, Riley's image now appears completely transformed because a qualitative expression is moving through it like the wind. Viewers can recognize these transformations as the affects of light only because of the presence of the virtual image and the failure of
the referential function of his title “The Forest”. Unlike Magritte’s *Treason of Images*, which told viewers to look elsewhere for the pipe, Bleckner’s title directs viewers toward the forest, which is present qualitatively, even though it is not actually or even figuratively present.

Bleckner’s work is visually expressing the sensation of a force, but this sensation cannot appear without a materialized figure to express it. Bleckner has probably experienced this sensation in an actual forest, and he has attempted to represent it through another materialized figuration, an image appropriated from Riley. Thus, viewers experience a new figural expression that is nonetheless derivative. It is important to point out that the sensation that Bleckner is making present through Riley’s image is not the same as the sensation of defused light that he experienced in the forest. He has not only transformed Riley’s image, but he has also transformed the qualitative appearance of light in a forest. The latter transformation occurs because of his material, paint. Instead of light, Bleckner is using paint to produce this qualitative affect that we associate with light, and once again, material changes everything.

Here, one of the questions posed earlier might be recalled: Are viewers meant to interpret this picture as an icon that represents the concept of a forest, the absolute representation of “the forest”, that all forests participate in? The grammar here suggests an equivalence between these phrases, that the concept of something is the same as the absolute representation. In part, Bleckner’s work and appropriation at large is an exploration of the differences between
these perceptual modes. The concept of a forest is established through a linguistic system that is regulated culturally. This system categorically organizes the world. Thus, within this system the forest is defined in a general enough manner to accommodate all forests. The representation of the forest steps away from definitions and appeals to viewers at a sensual level. On this level viewers receive the world in a qualitative manner. While qualities convey specific sensibilities, they are not tied to specific identities; instead they move through objects like forces. Chapter four will examine how artists used appropriated imagery to pursue qualitative expressions.

The development of appropriation art ultimately generated an incisive and long overdue investigation of the representational process itself. Thus far, this thesis has shown how artists engaged appropriated imagery to explore how the referential functions of imagery operate. Beyond referentiality, the Simulationists attended to the figural component of imagery. Invariably, this brought questions regarding the effects of material, which some of the Simulationists, such as Bleckner, began to tackle. The next chapter will examine how other appropriationists dealt with these questions by moving appropriated images into entirely different material presentations.
Chapter Four

YBAs: Material Expressions & Potential Difference

If as was suggested at the outset of the previous chapter, image is the defining element of the appropriation process, it is an entirely dependent traveler for without a material expression its transformation remains an unexpressed potential. Perhaps more than anything else, appropriation art has offered art history a profound investigation of the powerful effects of material expression. This becomes particularly evident when one considers appropriations that have moved images into dramatically different material presentations.

Fundamentally, the appropriation process opens an image up to the qualitative influences of another material presentation, which ultimately changes how the image is conveyed. The new material presentation activates unexpressed potentials lodged in the source imagery. In this regard appropriation functions as a catalyst, bringing forward elements that were stowed in the source image but not articulated. Thus, chapter two demonstrated how appropriations activated the referential potential reserved in an image to produce new and unexpected narratives. Chapter three explored appropriations that mined the potential of figurations. This chapter will examine how the inherent qualities of material expressions and the conditions that they create transform appropriated images so completely that their links to the past nearly disappear and often become incidental. Through this exploration of material expressions, appropriation art
mirrors the creative process and thus offered artists an avenue to pursue in the wake of the author’s passage and the death of originality.

Forging Ahead

The last chapter showed how the Simulationists in the mid-eighties turned their backs on the theoretical rhetoric that had surrounded the Pictures Generation’s work and that had confined the effects of appropriation to the frame. Beyond framing devices, the Simulationists explored the transformative effects of appropriation at the figural level, ultimately defining appropriated imagery as singular figurations manifested through material expressions. The consequences of this shift in appropriation art moves right into the nineties, when the Young British Artists (YBAs) stormed the art world.

In the shadow of the 1989 recession and an economic art-boom gone bust, this group of recent art-school graduates seemed to have nothing to lose but the burdensome weight of art history, which they attacked, wielding appropriation like a weapon. Thus, Angela Bullock became a Mud Slinger (figure 66). Tracking after Richard Long, who had used mud to hand-paint huge abstract images on gallery walls, Bullock simply sprayed gallery walls with mud designs, numbered and all titled Mud Slinger. Likewise, Glenn Brown reproduced Frank Auerbach’s paintings, transforming his expressionistic brush strokes into precise line drawing devoid of depth. Sam Taylor-Wood, wittily or not, imitated Mary Beth Edelson
and produced a photographic version of Leonardo's *Last Supper*, however, where Edelson revised the apostles' identities in order to make a social statement, Taylor-Wood simply installed her friends and recreated the image as a sensationalized stage-set. As these examples demonstrate, it is not surprising that under the guise of the YBAs, appropriation became a largely puerile but still somewhat insightful strategy for negating the expressive power of past images. Accordingly, where the Simulationists were charged with ambiguity, the mantel of the YBAs became nihilism.\(^{202}\)

Perhaps the best known of the YBAs, Damien Hirst rarely trafficked in art after art. Preferring to move objects, such as animal corpses, out of the realm of popular culture and into the gallery context, most of Hirst's work follows in the well-worn footsteps of the Duchampian readymade. Arguably, there are a few wonderful exceptions. For example, approaching his 2002 painting *Armageddon* (figure 67) from a distance, viewers recognize its almost hackneyed picture plane: a solid color-field, rectangular in shape. These elements, together with its black hue, call forward several ancestors, Ad Reinhardt (figure 68) and Kazimir Malevich (figure 51) prominent among them. Despite these references, significant departures are apparent: Reinhardt's subtle color variations are absent and Malevich's wide white border has receded to become simply the surrounding white gallery wall. These differences pale, however, as viewers move closer to Hirst's work and encounter a vague but putrefying odor that suggests vinegar mixed with far too much spray glue. Even closer inspection
reveals the source of this odor: dead houseflies, thousands and thousands of them affixed to the surface of his canvas.

The sensational grossness of this piece is overwhelming. As happens in most of Hirst’s works, this effect is caused by his materials. Significantly, viewers’ disgust actually heightens their awareness of their physical presence in the gallery, where their awareness seems suddenly peaked and on edge. This temporal transformation of the viewer’s awareness is a common effect of Hirst’s work, and it is directly tied to the shock-value of his unsavory materials: sharks floating in formaldehyde, flayed cows, and in this case a mass of dead houseflies. In terms of appropriation this material effect offers insight, for it moves Armageddon so completely away from its source that viewers are unlikely to recognize it as an appropriation. In fact, the appropriation only becomes apparent when viewers step away from the putrid canvas and view it from across the room or, better yet, reproduced in a text; from either of these perspectives most viewers cannot help but recognize Malevich’s image lurking within the frame. In this regard Hirst’s Armageddon operates almost exactly like Alan McCollum’s Plaster Surrogates (figure 50), albeit much more offensively.

Throughout this text, appropriation has been discussed in terms of its components: context, image, and now material expression. These divisions, however, are entirely artificial, for it is actually impossible to isolate and separate the individualized effects of these elements without destroying the dynamism that
composes an actual artwork. In other words, these components operate through each other, and the newness that appears in an appropriation is located in the expression of the relationships that these elements set up with each other. Although Hirst's sensational materials dramatize the dynamism of these relationships, these relationships have always been evident in appropriation art, even in eighties' rephotography. For, as noted near the close of chapter one, if Levine's picture of Edward Weston's nude son Neil is set next to the Weston "original" and in a room with a kouros sculpted by Praxiteles, difference will predominate, particularly material difference. This becomes all the more evident in a room displaying Armageddon, a McCollum Surrogate, and Malevich's Black Square on White Ground. Obviously, in the first example it is the Greek kouros that really makes differences appear in the room; indeed, without the kouros the material expression is somewhat leveled and thus less apparent. However, no such diminishing effect is possible in the second example; remove any of the three works and the other two will still hold their own as distinctly different objects. Amazingly enough, this occurs despite the fact that like rephotography, all three of these works present the same figuration.

Saying Goodbye Is Never Easy

Precedents for the approach taken by Hirst and McCollum may be found in George Segal's work, specifically in his 1971-73 plaster and wood sculpture The Dancers (figure 69). This work reproduces Henri Matisse's renowned 1909
painting *Dance* (figure 70). In this example the image moves from Matisse's flat and simplified picture plane to Segal's life-size three-dimensional composition, and the effects of this movement are profound. First off, Segal's sculptural format required figural adjustments; otherwise, the dancers would not stand up, and they would appear as they do in Matisse's work: lying facedown on the floor or leaning against the rear wall. In order to present Matisse's group of dancers as upright figures, Segal had to infuse Matisse's image with real volume and anatomically correct Matisse's disproportionate figures. The price of these changes is a more staid composition that actually focuses the viewer's attention on the individual dancers rather than the movement passing joyfully through them. Moreover, because Segal cast his figures from live models, his dancers display individualized facial features. Accordingly, where Matisse's unrealistic space and generalized figures become an armature that allows the energy of the dance to appear, Segal's figures seem to be concentrating and engaged in a slow and deliberate process of learning steps. Both works are marvelously articulated, but they generate entirely different affects that have little to do with each other, except for a redundant image.

Segal's work begins in a past artwork, Matisse's painting, but its expression is vastly different, and thus, like Hirst's absolute transformation of Malevich's work, Segal's creates an entirely new work. Effectively, Segal's and Hirst's works become discoveries generated through an appropriated image that follows the influences of its new material presentations. Similarly, several other artists
working in the 1990s use exact figuration as a springboard to create new works of art. Rummaging in that gaping space that the critical dismissal of originality left behind, these artists actively engage appropriation as a tool that produces creative results. As noted, these creative results are a function of the affective qualities of the material expression on the image.

*Material Matters*

In the YBAs' work there is a return to the Pictures Generation's use of figurally exact appropriated imagery. This return to exact figural reproduction resulted in two outcomes: it identified a singular artwork as the source of the appropriation, while underscoring the effects of material expression. Yet, unlike the subtle material changes evident in the Pictures Generation's work, the YBAs' appropriations were cast in material expressions often designed to affront the viewer. A case in point is Jake and Dinos Chapman's 1994 sculpture, *Great Deeds Against the Dead* (figures 71 & 72), which takes aim at the Romantic expressionism of Goya's prints. This life-size sculpture grew out of *Disasters of War*, a series of eighty-three miniature dioramas, composed of plastic toy soldiers, that ape Goya's nineteenth-century print series of the same name. In Goya's work the ironic title combines with his expressive drawing to create a biting depiction of the inhumanity of war. In the Chapmans' hands, however, Goya's ghastly image becomes a cheesy Hollywood set, composed with life-size fiberglass mannequins that have been propped on an equally artificial tree.
Carefully, the Chapmans have extracted an image from one material presentation and redeployed it in another, where a profound transformation occurs such that the image seems to tell an entirely different story. Even though the depicted events remain the same, the Chapmans’ materials re-express Goya’s image such that it reappears not only completely drained of pathos and bereft of any social commentary, but now something almost comic prevails.

This dramatic transformation of Goya’s image occurs despite the fact that the image itself, the actual figurative details, appear largely unaltered. In fact, both pieces depict three, nude, male corpses that have been brutally mutilated and are seen hanging from an isolated dead tree. In Goya’s picture two figures wear a moustache, while the third appears clean-shaven; the Chapmans’ image is the same. In both works one of the corpses has been decapitated and its severed arms are seen strung up with rope, hanging just below the detached head. Even the gesture of these hands, presumably frozen with *rigor mortis*, is the same: both works show one hand bent at the wrist and drooping, while the other reaches upward as if grasping for its head. In Goya’s etching this gesture is a heartbreaking sign of life’s last breath, but in the Chapmans’ piece it becomes ridiculous, bordering on the hysterical. As a result, in one work the image stimulates a horrific response and in the other it appears somewhat silly. What accounts for these disparate affects?
At first, the answer to this question seems obvious: Goya's image appears as a smaller two-dimensional print, whereas the Chapmans' is presented as a life-size sculpture. Together, the expressive qualities of both the materials and the genres of these works (sculpture versus print) transform the affective outcome of the imagery. The simplicity of this answer, however, is deceptive.

Taking a closer look, the viewer finds that in Goya's print the image appears inscribed in a paper ground, which creates an intimate and somber world for the image and its narrative to unfold in. Goya's paper ground has actually absorbed the ink into its fibers, making it impossible to separate the ground from the figuration and thus creating a powerfully atmospheric world. This atmospheric quality is extended by the print's small size, which produces the illusion of a world that exists separately from the viewer's. Accordingly, viewing this dramatically reduced world becomes a somewhat private experience. Goya enhances this effect by roughly scratching out a background that suggests a landscape and by positing cast shadows that situate this scene within a timeframe determined by a light source beyond the viewer's range of vision and participation. Positioned on the outside and looking in, viewers can only enter this world through their imaginations, which is where the virtual holds rein. Viewers are invited to imagine a narrative for the scene and perhaps even to wonder how they might feel if one of the victims was their brother, husband, or partner... Within this imaginative realm viewers also experience the force of Goya's drawing: his quick sharp strokes and over-determined contours
emphasize the brutality of the scene before them and enlarge the horrific affect moving through their imaginations.

When the Chapmans transform this image by recreating it as a life-size sculpture, the elements of imaginative immersion diminishes, and is replaced by a more physical immersion in the viewer's actual space. As a result, the intimate seduction orchestrated by the print's smaller size no longer operates. Instead, the three-dimensional life-size format causes viewers to become acutely aware of the figures' presence in the room with them. Viewers actually encounter the figures as real physical objects rather than imagined representations. Instead of invigorating this scene with a life-like quality, this dose of realism destroys the illusionary power of Goya's image. The hard and rigid surface of the Chapmans' new materials—fiberglass, resin and paint—discourage any flights of fancy; for these mannequins not only exist in viewers' world and timeframe, but viewers also recognize them for what they are: cast dummies whose seams are showing. This fact is enhanced by the overall presentation of the Chapmans' sculpture. Instead of the atmospheric quality of Goya's paper ground, viewers now encounter these slain figures situated atop a low, white platform. Like the paper, this stage provides a world for the scene to appear in, but this stage is raw and stripped bare of all illusionary devices. If in Goya's background the tree branches alive with leaves contrast and underscore the gruesome deaths in the foreground; then in the Chapmans' background the intense gallery lights and the
harsh realism of white walls contrast and underscore the falseness of the
figuration atop the platform.

Accordingly, the Chapmans' material presentation moves the narrative being
carried by the imagery in another direction. In Goya's print the ropes tied
around various body parts can be seen pinching into the supple flesh; for even in
death Goya's figures appear musclessly defined and struggling. However, in the
Chapmans' sculpture the ropes cannot penetrate the hard surfaces of these
hollow figures, where shadows only vaguely indicate a relaxed musculature
below. Indeed, in places the ropes only drape across the mannequins, becoming
purely ornamental details. Rather than a struggle, the Chapmans' material
presentation articulates this scene as being a weightless fabrication. Instead of
expanding the realism of the image, the Chapmans' material presentation
generalizes the figures, and with the loss of their potential identities as individuals
the viewer's compassion is extinguished. The figures literally become stiffs: not
even representations of imagined individuals but dead mannequins who were
never-alive anyway. This is kitsch at its very best. Completely denatured, the
image relinquishes its power to move the viewer to tears and now leaves the
viewer either howling with laughter or generally offended.

Brilliantly, the Chapmans show how a dramatic shift in material presentation
results in an equally dramatic shift in narrative tone. Initially, when viewers
encounter Goya's etching, its grave and disturbing tone seems to be a function of
the image and the ghastly events it documents. Yet, the Chapmans’ sculpture demonstrates that neither an image’s figural expression nor its references are entirely responsible for the tonal affect of the image. Rather, the qualitative tones that have gathered around Goya’s image are primarily a function of their material presentation. The figuration carries mimetic information, while the presentation of that figuration shapes the qualitative expression of this information. Strikingly, the Chapmans’ sculpture suggests that the expressive power of Goya’s print seems to be largely a result of its specific material presentation, rather than the signification of the image.

A key component of the Chapmans’ sculpture is its presentation of a figurally exact appropriated image. For, when an appropriated image is re-presented with an eye toward exactitude, it tends to lose some of its expressive power. This is not simply a case of an unknown image being more intriguing or shocking than the known entity. As was seen in the critical reaction to Levine’s rephotography, figural exactness has a generalizing effect and this tends to move the visual image toward the condition of a code by focusing viewers’ attention on the source image’s referential function. Thus, rather than experiencing the actual figuration embodied in the material object before them, viewers immediately recognize the appropriated image as a reference to the source artwork and mentally impose sameness, ignoring any material differences that inevitably appear. The result is an image that operates like a prefabricated form, that is like a form of text, rather than a singular figuration embodied in a sensual material
expression. The strength of the Chapmans' sculpture is located in its ability to undo the generalizing effect of figural exactness.

Accordingly, Goya's etching and Romantic expressionism in general become displaced codes or counter-points, against which the Chapmans set up their material presentation. Effectively, the Chapmans' material presentation separates the figuration from these past references. Significantly, the material expression does not sever the image's attachment to these references; it simply creates a gap where other references can enter. As a result, the mimetic information that the figuration conveys remains essentially intact, but the material presentation shifts the overall tone of the narrative, moving it away from being an impassioned outcry against the horrors of war to a silly adolescent form of entertainment. Significantly, the Chapmans do not destroy the expressiveness of Goya's image, they only revise it. As a matter of fact, their work is just as expressive as Goya's; it simply expresses something vastly different.

Like many of the YBAs' works, the Chapmans' sculpture offers an extreme example of the qualitative changes that different material presentations orchestrate. However, by laboring to maintain an exact figuration, the Chapmans actually interfere with and even undermine the appropriation process, which will always transform the image. In actuality, figural exactness is a limitation that must be painstakingly imposed, for the figuration of an image is always a function of the material that composes an artwork. Therefore, when an appropriated
image enters a different material expression, it automatically mutates, both qualitatively and figuratively. This is true even when the medium remains consistent; as was demonstrated in chapter one, Levine’s rephotographs appeared differently even though both the source and the appropriated images were expressed photographically. Despite the complex revisions that the Chapmans’ presentation has produced, their unwavering focus on Goya’s print actually holds the sculpture hostage and inhibits it from moving past Goya’s work to become something completely new. In contrast Hirst’s work *Armageddon* does not suffer from this problem. The qualitative effects of Hirst’s material are so overpowering that Malevich’s work becomes somewhat irrelevant and almost invisible, for the image no longer belongs to Malevich or, perhaps more accurately stated, the image no longer speaks Malevich’s name. The formidable power of Hirst’s material expression nearly severs the image’s ties with Malevich. As a result, Hirst’s work extends the black square beyond the limits of Malevich’s work.

At some level all appropriations are extensions. In the case of the Chapmans’ sculpture, however, extension has become a lifeline, for without Goya’s print as a point of reference it is difficult to imagine how this “Great Deed Against the Dead” would sustain interest. As an appropriation, it compels the viewer’s attention through Goya’s print, which permeates every aspect of the Chapmans’ sculpture as a significant counterpoint. Hirst’s work on the other hand uses the source of his appropriation as a point of departure and never looks back.
Moving beyond the substantial referential link that appropriations have with their sources is always easier when the appropriated image is an abstraction that has already been reduced to a geometric composition somewhat devoid of narrative. In this regard, Hirst's work seems to have a huge advantage over the Chapmans', for separating a mimetic image that also carries a narrative is doubly challenging. Which is not to suggest that abstract geometric images, such as Malevich's, exist without references; rather, the point here is that the figuration of such an abstract image already exists clearly separated from narrative subject matter. Any references that minimal images make—the artist’s name, his/her historical context, etc.—are already situated at the level of the frame and outside of the actual picture plane of the canvas that contains the figuration. However, in narrative images, such as Goya’s, references are not only a function of what surrounds the work, but they are also produced by the mimetic information that the figuration conveys in the picture plane. Nevertheless, appropriating abstract geometric figurations is no panacea against the gripping power of the past artwork. To explore this problem more fully, this thesis now leaves the YBAs behind and looks at other artists whose work also engages figurally exact appropriated imagery in dramatically different material expressions.
Blinded by the Past

Like Hirst, Rachel Lachowicz has appropriated an abstract image (figure 73). Hers comes from Richard Serra’s 1989 *One Ton Prop (House of Cards)* (figure 74), a geometric composition that is largely devoid of narrative content. Serra’s subtitle—*House of Cards*—makes a metaphoric reference, but this allusion does not construct a narrative figure as much as it doubles the sculpture’s precarious composition: presumably, one false move and a ton of lead will hit the floor. In actuality, the extreme weight of Serra’s panels—500 pounds each—makes them much more stable than flimsy cards, which will shift in response to even the tiniest change in their environment.

Despite this stability, Serra’s “Prop” is not immovable, and its potential collapse testifies to the extreme danger it embodies. Herein lies the power of Serra’s work, for the danger of collapse exists only as a threat. Moreover, this danger is lodged in the dynamic created by the material expression of the image. Thus, much more than an object, this artwork is inertia materialized. The inherent heaviness of its material—lead—is set up as a contained force that is literally hanging in the balance of the sculpture’s composition. Lachowicz completely disarms this threat by moving Serra’s image into the less-weighty materials of lipstick mixed with wax.
Taking a far less radical approach than what was seen in the Chapman Brothers' sculpture or even Hirst's canvas, Lachowicz's appropriation preserves both the size and sculptural format of her source image. Therefore, like Serra's, hers is composed of four, forty-eight-inch, square panels that are propped upright and balanced against each other. Despite this exacting accuracy, the reddish color of the lipstick immediately alerts viewers to her material intervention. And, without the threatening weight of lead, Lachowicz's sculpture gives viewers an experience of balance unhinged from danger. The materials not only help Lachowicz's panels to adhere to each other, but their light weight makes a possible collapse much less terrifying and almost irrelevant. Materially transformed, the force of Serra's *House of Cards* has thus been tamed. This occurs because when an image moves into a material, it is shaped by the inherent qualities of the material that express it. Accordingly, without the alarming danger inherent to Serra's composed material Lachowicz's new expression allows viewers to experience the balance of this configuration as a calm and restful pause.

*A Frame Up Materializes*

As noted, the minimal structure of Serra's piece actively works against narrative and thus draws viewers' attention to the basic formal concerns of composition and materiality to create a physical experience of the work. Lachowicz duplicates this composition in another material, giving viewers a very different
physical experience. In Lachowicz’s piece viewers immediately recognize
Serra’s well-known figuration, but the material has moved this image away from
Serra’s House of Cards and recreated it in a new piece that generates different
sensibilities. Still, the distance that Lachowicz’s work has traveled from Serra’s is
thin, when compared with Hirst’s departure from Malevich. In fact, looking closer
at Lachowicz’s sculpture, viewers realize that where the reference to Malevich
becomes almost irrelevant in Hirst’s work, the reference to Serra in Lachowicz’s
is central. This fact is echoed in Lachowicz’s title Sarah, which actually reworks
the qualitative changes that her materials have extended to the image, taking
them in yet another direction.

The title of Lachowicz’s sculpture, clearly a pun on Richard Serra’s name,
reconfigures her material—lipstick—into a metaphorical code for femininity. This
in turn sets up a polemic: lead and lipstick become polarized as cultural
signifiers denoting gender roles. Thus, this title specifically directs us to consider
Lachowicz’s sculpture in terms of the codes of femininity, while Serra’s is
positioned in terms of masculinity. This references images such as Gianfranco
Corgoni’s famous 1969 photograph, depicting Serra wearing a gas mask and
throwing lead in Leo Castelli’s New York warehouse. Backlit and shot from
below, Serra looks monstrously powerful and even a bit monumental. Working
together, Lachowicz’s title and coded material literally redress such macho
references in drag, rearticulating “Serra” as “Sarah”. In the end viewers are
invited to explain Lachowicz’s sculpture as a feminist commentary on the heroic
gestures of Modern male artists. Meanwhile, the more subtle material qualities that transform the appropriated figuration are somewhat lost beneath the weight of this commentary. In this regard Lachowicz’s sculpture intersects with a much earlier approach to appropriation, namely parody.

As chapter two demonstrated, parody is a literary form of imitation that is designed to produce an ironic commentary on its source. In the visual arts, parodies generally follow one of two formats: collage or caricature. The former approach adds figurative element(s) to an otherwise exact rendition, while the latter approach retains the overall composition of the source image but revises its content through exaggeration. In both formats the revisions orchestrated in the picture plane situate the appropriated image in a new context that carries out a referential shift. Typically, parodies signal this new context by reframing their appropriated images with a title that underscores and solidifies this referential shift. Thus, for example, Duchamp’s title L.H.O.O.Q. simultaneously makes an ironic commentary while confirming his revision of Leonardo’s masterpiece.

In many ways Lachowicz’s appropriation follows this traditional approach to visual parody but with one significant difference. Lachowicz’s title, Sarah, is intended to ridicule Serra’s work through a feminizing gesture. In a conventional parody, this title would reinforce a figural revision already actualized in the picture plane. Lachowicz’s sculpture, however, presents an unaltered version of Serra’s image. Instead, the shift that she has orchestrated occurs at the material level:
she has replaced steel with lipstick. Effectively, Lachowicz is asking her material—lipstick—to perform the same function as Duchamp's moustache and goatee on the *Mona Lisa*. In short, Lachowicz's material is being asked to function as an image of an identity that stirs certain references.

Everyone knows that culturally certain materials tend to construct identities. In fact, many viewers saw how the popular film *The Graduate* turned "plastics" into a code for an era beset by a profound generation gap. Similarly, Lachowicz is drawing on the gender codes that Western culture has constructed around lipstick and steel. Nevertheless, while the identity of a particular material may carry coded information into the picture plane, the primary function of material is to express the image. In fact, if material does not carry out this primary function, then no image or references can appear. Fundamentally, material expresses qualities that condition the figuration. In this regard the material—lipstick—operates very differently from the word "lipstick", which only carries cultural codes. Words are used to represent materials, and through these words materials gather identities. Nevertheless, materials are not words.

By drawing on the identity of her material and the references that it generates, Lachowicz has thus created a new approach to parody. However, like all parodies, this approach demands that the source artwork remain the focus of the appropriation. Thus, while Lachowicz's sculpture expands the referential range
of Serra’s image through her new material expression, she also undermines the qualitative transformation of the image that her material actualizes.

One of the most significant discoveries of postmodern appropriation artists was the realization that invoking a material identity could work against a material’s power to transform an image qualitatively. In fact, this realization became the driving force behind Vik Muniz’s series of photographs titled *Equivalents*. In these works, Muniz specifically engages appropriation to carefully separate material identity from its qualitative expression. Through this separation, he demonstrates how the qualitative and transformative power of material expressions generates virtual affects.

For Muniz, appropriation is part of his studio process, as he appropriates imagery from his own artworks, which often enough also refer to other artists’ works. Thus, using a host of non-traditional materials—sand, chocolate, thread, cotton, dust, food, and others—Muniz creates paintings, drawings and sculptures that invariably arrive in the gallery in the form of photographs. For example, *Kitty Cloud* (figure 75) is a picture of a sculpture that Muniz constructed and then destroyed after taking a picture of it.

*Kitty Cloud* is part of the series that Muniz called “Equivalents”; through this title, Muniz points back to the great modern photographer Alfred Stieglitz, who also produced a series of cloud images titled “Equivalents”. In addition to the frame of
reference that this title supplies, Muniz describes the look of Stieglitz's work materially, for all of the images figured in this series appear drifting in sepia-colored backgrounds that physically imitate the look of the albumen-coated paper used during the early days of photography. Effectively, through this illustration of a material quality, Muniz enhances and underscores the reference that his series' title specifies as Stieglitz. Thus, this reference to Stieglitz is composed by a contextual frame and a figural illusion disguised as a material affect. With Stieglitz's identity come other references to modernism and expressionism. The individual photographs or actual material objects that comprise Muniz's series then take this identity in an entirely different direction, one that directs the viewer to experience the material or qualitative condition of the artwork, which exists separately from these referential identities.

As the Kitty Cloud title suggests, this photograph depicts a cloud formation in which the image of a cat is gathering. However, as viewers contemplate Kitty Cloud longer, the materiality of the cloud begins to assert itself and viewers recognize that what they thought was a cloud depicting a cat is in fact a sculpture constructed out of cotton. This realization happens slowly and it opens the door for a more fundamental one: the picture is not actually a cloud or cotton; it is a photograph. Although viewers are never deceived into believing that the work before them is anything else but a photograph, this reminder is nonetheless central to Muniz's piece. For, as so often happens with visual representations and particularly with photographs, while viewers concentrate on trying to figure
out what they are seeing in the picture, they tend to forget about the underlying fact that they are actually looking at a photograph, a material object. As a result, viewers identify the image without really taking into account the rest of the artwork, namely the image’s material presentation. In fact, most people entirely forget about the fact that a photograph is just as much a material object as a painting or a sculpture. Muniz takes advantage of this illusionary quality of photography to bring forward the virtual condition of material affects.

Through the photograph, the materiality of the cotton sculpture slips away, leaving the image, “the cat”, which becomes a mimetic representation conveyed and enhanced by the expression of the photograph. As a photographic illusion, the image acquires a furry cloud-like quality that causes the viewer to experience a sensation that shifts easily among references to a cat, a cloud and cotton. Despite these multiple associations, the sensation viewers experience remains relatively consistent. Eventually, most viewers realize that this sensation has not been caused by any of these references because none of those actual objects or materials is present. All that is in front of the viewer is a photograph. Through this realization, the viewer suddenly recognizes that the sensation, which has appeared, is something of a completely different order that resists naming. It is not a cat or a cloud, nor is it cotton; yet it is a quality that these objects seem to share. Indeed, this sensation is difficult to name because it is not an identity as much as it is a qualitative condition. Viewers become aware of this qualitative affect by insisting upon the existence of the photograph. Identifying the presence
of the material photograph, viewers recognize that the illusionary image has momentarily tricked them, giving them a physical experience of a quality that they thought was inherent to cat fur and perhaps related to clouds and cotton. Yet, once they are made acutely aware of the photograph, they realized that this sensation is the experience of a qualitative condition that exists separately from the furriness of cats or the fluffiness of clouds and cotton. Significantly, if the viewer had simply encountered the cloud sculpture, this “other” sensation would not register, for the material would definitively assert its identity as cotton, overriding the qualitative condition. The viewer would identify the cotton and this recognition would close down this other physical sensation, which cotton, cloud, and cat all share.

It is the terrain of the photograph and its distance from the real object that allows the transit from material identity to qualitative condition to occur. In fact, once the “trick” of the photograph is recognized, the illusion does not disappear; the photograph continues to engage the viewer’s sense of an almost weightless cumulus gathering a mass of “cottony” fur. Because viewers recognize that neither is present, they can recognize the presence of a qualitative condition that is not materially generated but that is nonetheless dependent upon the material and its image for its expression. In this regard, Muniz’s work operates like an optical illusion, allowing viewers to experience vision as a muscular activity. Viewers become distinctly aware of their perception as a physical act that moves them both sensually and intellectually. Their body is every bit another physical
site into which the virtual image and virtual qualities of material expressions enter, and viewers process these impressions along side of the other information that they receive from the image and its contextual references. Thus, where Lachowicz used the identity of her material to make a commentary on her source artwork, Muniz uses the identity (or in this case, identities) of his material to access a qualitative affect.

*Lightening the Load*

Unlike the Chapmans' work, neither Lachowicz's nor Muniz's engages a source image that carries a narrative plotline. Instead the narrative references that Lachowicz's appropriated image carries are produced primarily through the context that her source image provides. Muniz also sets up similar references through the context that his title establishes with Stieglitz's work and through the optical illusions that his imagery sets up. Nevertheless, neither of these works draws on source images that, like the Chapmans', carry a specific narrative plotline in the grand tradition of history painting. As noted earlier, narrative images cling tightly to their sources, and once appropriated, they are generally more reluctant to relinquish their connections to the source artwork. One reason this occurs is because narrative imagery carries mimetic information through the actual figuration, which brings the subject matter of the past artwork into the picture plane of the appropriation. Therefore, figurally exact appropriated imagery will always travel with elements of the narratives they expressed in the
source artworks. This fact makes it all the more difficult for an appropriation that engages a narrative image to emerge as a work that is complete unto itself. Eileen Cowin, however, has found an ingenious solution to this problem. In her 1997 Untitled cibachrome print (figure 76) she turns the formula of a visual narrative against itself by transforming a history painting into a still life that presents a figurally exact but fragmented appropriated image. This shift opens the imagery to the influence of its material expression, which transforms its affects. However, in order to really appreciate Cowin’s work fully it is necessary to trace its unfoldings, for it operates like a performance.

Anyone familiar with art history will immediately recognize the bathtub depicted in Cowin’s image as the one belonging to Jacques Louis David’s eighteenth-century oil painting titled Death of Marat (figure 77). Once again, it is the exactness of the figural representation that allows for this ready recognition, for although bathtubs appear in countless images throughout art history, only David portrays Marat’s tub draped with a white cloth and partially covered with another cloth, this one green. Only David’s version features an upturned wooden crate, two quill pens and a knife recklessly tossed on the floor. Precisely because Cowin’s image preserves these and other details, it points to David’s painting as its one and only source. Accordingly, viewers’ first reaction is this identification. Then, Cowin’s photograph asserts its difference through pertinent departures from this well-known source. Most significant is the missing corpse; in fact, Marat’s presence has been entirely erased, even the crate no longer bears his inscribed
name. Moreover, the entire orientation of the tub has been reversed and its position in the picture plane has shifted. Instead of filling the entire foreground like a horizontal band, the tub now appears in the middle of Cowin’s picture and it only fills the left half of this mid section.

Regardless of these critical revisions, most viewers still have no doubt that Cowin’s picture has been appropriated from one and only one source: David’s *Death of Marat*. This confidence persists despite the fact that the more viewers compare Cowin’s image to David’s, the more different the images become: Cowin’s tub has been drained of water, a contemporary bottle of India ink replaces Marat’s antique inkwell, the woolen green cloth has shape shifted into a satiny fabric and lost its fringe. Ultimately, all of these changes lead viewers to ask: How did they instantly recognize this image even with these enormous differences? The answer to this question lies in the fact that they have identified Cowin’s image in terms of a narrative that is essentially missing.

David’s work is a history painting, which therefore conveys a specific narrative. In the tradition of narrative painting, David’s image portrays the most significant event in the story, namely Marat’s death. Moreover, David has added props to allude to the other events that lead up to this climax. Thus, through the knife, viewers can deduce that the cause of Marat’s death was stabbing. The abandoned quills and paper suggest that he was caught unawares and in the midst of writing something. Turning back to Cowin’s picture, viewers see that
many of these specific props have been retained, and even if the contemporary bottle of India ink does not actually resemble the inkwell in David’s picture, it is of no matter because the reference is clear... and there it is: *the reference is clear.* In other words, viewers have generalized the elements in David’s painting enough so that they can read Cowin’s picture as if it were a piece of text. In doing this, viewers actually discount differences as if they were not really there. In fact, learning to read has trained most people to ignore many figural deviations because reading requires that one look past the individual letters that compose words as well as the idiosyncrasies of different fonts or handwriting in order to recognize each word as a meaningful gestalt. Applying this tenet to the visual arts means that viewers tend to focus on the references that an image makes and ignore the uniqueness of both its figuration and material expression. In an appropriation that engages figurally exact imagery the most powerful reference will always be the source artwork. Thus, Cowin only needed to isolate David’s tub to produce most viewers’ recognition of her source.

Returning to Cowin’s photograph now, viewers discover that Cowin has actually led them down this path toward reading, for her work moves in two different directions at once: it sets up an intense dichotomy between the referential function of the image and its singular figuration in a material expression. Thus, capitalizing on the material invisibility that tends to surround photography, Cowin first gives her viewers just enough details to produce an instant recognition: this is Marat’s and only Marat’s tub as portrayed by David. She creates this
recognition by reproducing the image as a code that operates in a very limited manner: the image can no longer tell a story, it can only point to David's painting. Thus, its potential references are severely compressed and the image becomes indexical, pronouncing the proper name “David's Death of Marat” and no other. Although viewers clearly identify David's painting as the frame surrounding Cowin's picture, they are simultaneously aware of differences that do not quite add up to David's painting. Paradoxically, the indexical condition of Cowin's image also unhinges the image from its source, for viewers' instant recognition of the picture is immediately followed by their realization that this is not David's painting. Therefore, in the space of a glance viewers both name David's painting and let it go. The first recognition is a function of the image's referentiality; the second is a product of the figuration, which focuses viewers' attention on the actual material object in front of them.

It should be noted that Cowin's work reveals itself to the viewer in a manner that is reminiscent of the Simulationists; however, where the Simulationists disabled the referential function of their imagery, Cowin merely tames and collars it on a short leash. Thus, where the Chapmans' and Lachowicz's sculptures both maintain a narrative discourse with their sources, Cowin's sets up this narrative discourse with the source image as a means of departure. If viewers focus on David's work, they experience its loss and the referential function of the image, but if viewers stay with Cowin's work long enough, loss disappears and they
encounter the material object in front of them that then, like Muniz's photograph, makes another kind of sense.

Right off, viewers see that Cowin's image is not a photograph of David's painting but rather a photograph of a still life that she composed. Cowin has fractured David's painting, pulling the tub and its accoutrements out and leaving Marat's corpse behind and with it the central event of the narrative. As a result, viewers encounter this image on its way to becoming something else. One or two more steps and any reference to Marat and David will also disappear. Cowin even emphasizes this through her title or her lack thereof, established by the ubiquitous term Untitled. Teetering on the edge of a complete departure from David's painting, the figural elements are held, theatrically paused on a dramatically lit stage, waiting for actors and another narrative that never arrives. This stillness, rife with anticipation, rips away the narrative of David's painting and viewers are left to confront these visual props in all their dumbness.

Fundamentally, the only link that Cowin's picture maintains with David's picture is through this specific set of props. If viewers let go of the architectural support of Marat's narrative, these props appear as mute figural elements. Viewers can name them but beyond that meaning is thwarted. Thus, Cowin has led her appropriated image away from the referential burden of carrying a past narrative, and she emphasizes this moving departure by balancing the mimetic information that her figurations convey against the qualities of their material expression.
Reduced to this obtuse condition, viewers become more attuned to their presence as materially embodied figurations. In fact, her glossy flat surface never lets viewers forget that they are experiencing a photograph and not a painting.

The keyed up intensity of the colors pop against the flat black background. Taken out of the context of David's narrative, the reddish drip on the white sheet no longer bespeaks blood, which its orangey tint never actually reflected. The reference to blood came through the link to David's painting and if viewers let that link go, any horror that this stain on the sheet might have conveyed dissolves. Indeed, viewers who do not know David's painting and therefore do not recognize this link, are free to enjoy the brightness of its hue, which begins to crack open the picture plane, taking the imagery in a very abstract direction that is reminiscent of Clyfford Still's paintings. Abstraction, however, is only a tease, for this image steadfastly insists upon the entirety of its picture plane, which depicts a vacated scene comprised of shapes that we recognize.

Effectively, Cowin has charged this scene with a rhythmic force, one that first moves the viewer back and forth between her image and David's narrative. Moving past David's painting, the force persists, carrying the viewer into the compelling material power of this orange-red shape and then bouncing the viewer out of that visual revelry so that s/he can get lost in another. Now, the satin finish of the green cloth transforms the bright lights into a yellowish-white
flow across mysteriously dark folds. Transfixed by this new affect, the cloth appears windswept and wildly alive, ready to take off. But once again the rest of the picture calls the viewer back; the wooden crate, strategically placed in front of the tub, holds these figurations down and keeps them from materially shape shifting into pure abstractions. Still, if viewers try to hang on to the crate, the movement starts again as the crate’s solid form collapses before their very eyes. Its top edge becomes a mere yellow swatch and down the front of its longer side the pattern and colors of the wood’s grain threaten to erase the rectangular form entirely. Despite all these perceptual affects, viewers can still pull their vision back and make the magic recede and the figurations slip back into recognizable objects held in place by the surrounding blackness. Thus, Cowin’s picture powerfully engages vision as a perceptual process that generates both physical sensations as well as impulses that are interpreted semiotically. She has created a living material phenomena in the form of a photograph, a material rarely associated with such affective qualities. In the process of experiencing this work meaning moves from the front seat to the back; for it belongs to the past with David’s painting, and it is eminently clear that Cowin’s picture is an artwork with absolutely different concerns.

Let’s Get Physical

As happened in all of the works discussed in this chapter, figural exactitude sets up the source image as a point of departure. In part, the breadth of this
departure is determined by the relationship that the other elements that compose
the work establish with the source work. If the source becomes a target for
commentary, the departure becomes abstract and the movement of the image is
retarded, if not entirely dismissed by a new contextual frame. However, when
the artist increasingly relinquishes the source artwork and allows the image to
move into a new material expression less restrained by its past, the
transformation of the imagery becomes an extension that actualizes previously
unrealized potentials lodged in the past imagery.

In the works discussed in this chapter the material qualitatively alters how the
appropriated image is conveyed and that in turn effects the meaning that the
artwork generates. As was seen in Cowin’s work, at its most basic level a new
material expression lends an appropriated image its inherent qualities, and these
invariably open aspects of the image that have not been seen before. In part this
transformation occurs because the material expression gives the image
something that it did not have before, namely its inherent qualities, which in turn
bring out something not previously expressed in the image. The outcomes of
these shifts cannot be imagined or predicted; they can only be actualized.  

The potential that an appropriation expresses is always recognizable after the
fact but oddly not predictable. After having seen Cowin’s photograph or the
Chapmans’ sculpture viewers can identify where these works came from,
analyze how they operate and even locate their potential inspiration. Yet,
viewers can only do this after the appropriations have become concrete realities. Prior to actualization, the transformation of the image that appropriation activates remains an unexpressed potential. Yet, this potential exists in the source image like stowed energy, available but not actualized as an expression. Sherrie Levine's 1989 series *The Bachelors* (figure 78) offers insight here.

Although both Levine's images and the title that identifies them are fragments extracted from Duchamp's *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors (The Large Glass)* even (figure 79), the inspiration for Levine's *Bachelors* originates in another work by Duchamp. In *The Green Box* Duchamp's notes indicate that the leaded bachelors of the "Large Glass" were molds meant for casting but delayed.¹⁰⁵ Duchamp not only imagined these "malic forms", as he dubbed his imagined bachelors, but he even described them as "a thousand spangles of frosted glass".¹⁰⁶ Attempting to bring Duchamp's vision to fruition, Levine cast six of the nine bachelors in glass, which she then frosted. Although Levine carefully respected the deliberate and idiosyncratic shapes of Duchamp's bachelors, hers barely resemble their ancestors, neither the actual ones in the "Large Glass" nor the imagined ones Duchamp described. In fact, without Levine's title the traces of this lineage might disappear entirely.

In Duchamp's enigmatic work the bachelors appear in the lower half as oddly shaped forms hanging on a mechanical apparatus. Depicted as such, these figurations become bachelors in name only, for without the research and
guidance of scholars most viewers would be unlikely to identify these images as male figures much less desiring bachelors. Nevertheless, once named, Duchamp's images appear somewhat animated and life-like. They are all symmetrical forms that stand vertically upright, most feature an indentation to suggest a neckline and a head above, and one even seems to be wearing pants. Duchamp has also engaged several basic illusionary devices, such as overlapping and stacking, to suggest depth and enhance the bachelors' three-dimensional appearance. The dark outlines of the wire that encases their lead-foil bodies individualizes them, creating solid and distinct entities that appear suspended under a clear-glass ground. Levine's Bachelors, on the other hand, no longer float somewhere between two dimensions and three. Rather, her frosted bachelors embody an interior depth that now requires not one but four panes of glass to encase them. Accordingly, Levine exhibits each of her Bachelors in its own glass case.

Isolated in their respective vitrines, Duchamp's drab machinic figurations have now become fragile and delicate. In fact, the frosted glass suggests a softness. Instead of the dark rigid outlines of lead, viewers encounter smooth, rotund objects without seams or figurative details. Lying on their sides with no frontal orientation, they can no longer even allude to an erect figure, much less presume to desire a bride. On the contrary Levine's individuated semi-translucent objects rest silently, seemingly content. Self-contained and protected in their vitrines,
these figurations assert and even appear to celebrate the sensual qualities generated by their new material embodiment.

If Duchamp’s figures exist as bachelors through a complex formula based on puns and diagrams, Levine’s have traded in this kind of abstraction to become simply abstract figurations singularly expressed in frosted glass. Hermetic and self-contained, these sculptures have relinquished Duchamp’s animated formula, preferring, it seems, their lifeless but elegant condition as material objects. Without the illusion of narrative or mimetic effects, their identity becomes a qualitative expression of their materiality. Thus, Levine’s *Bachelors* are almost entirely defined by the qualities of their material presentation: they are fragile, delicate, semi-transparent, enclosed glass forms isolated in vitrines. Viewers cannot imagine the expressive qualities emanating from these figurations; they can only experience their force and recall its affect.

Moreover, unlike what happens with Lachowicz’s piece, even Levine’s title cannot overpower the transformative effects of her materials. Although the title confirms Levine’s source, like her appropriated imagery, it is only a fragment, which partially disables its ability to reference Duchamp’s work. Meanwhile the figurally exact imagery, which should make the link to Duchamp obvious, is so completely transformed by its material presentation that the title merely hints at a point of departure. Thus, Levine’s appropriation activates a serial movement that
renews the image rather than revising it. This distinction is seminal and it bears review.

Both renewal and revision are forms of repetition used by appropriationists to extend images, but revision strives to replace whereas renewal expands the appropriated image in new directions. As a result, revision insists that the source artwork remain in play. At its most extreme—Robert Rauschenberg’s *Erased de Kooning*, for example—revision imparts difference through destruction and physically replaces the source artwork. Appropriationists, however, use a less extreme version of revision. Nevertheless, in much the same way that Rauschenberg permanently altered de Kooning’s drawing these less extreme forms of revision strive to install a similar permanence at the level of signification.

As post structuralism has shown, installing any kind of permanence at the referential level is a pipe dream of Magritte-like proportions, for references are always circumstantially derived through relationships that exist in a particular context. In this regard revisions are always doomed enterprises. Nevertheless, revisions work toward overpowering and dislodging the contextual references of the source artwork and replacing them with references generated by the appropriation. In short, most revisions strive to recreate the source image so that it can no longer exist except in the terms of the revision. Thus, revisions focus on the past and strive to change viewers’ understanding of the past.
Not surprisingly, most parodies are engaged in revision. For example, John Baldessari’s 1984 photograph, titled *White Shape* (figure 80), depicts an image appropriated from one of Hans Namuth’s photographs documenting Jackson Pollock working. Baldessari’s highly pixelated version has been cropped to narrow the focus on Pollock’s body, which is missing. Baldessari has replaced Pollock’s image with a white cutout silhouette. Despite this change, most viewers still know exactly who has been cut from the scene. For even if viewers do not recognize Namuth’s picture, the paintings that sandwich the white silhouette are unmistakably Pollock’s. In fact, because viewers recognize the figure their first reaction is laughter; they are more than willing to forget Namuth’s picture in order to enjoy Baldessari’s joke. Indeed, Baldessari’s intervention is a hilariously simple gesture, akin to defacing an image with a moustache and goatee. And like its famous precedent, Baldessari’s revision disempowers the source image, such that an homage to an artist and his working process is ridiculed.

The power of Baldessari’s work is revealed when viewers return to Namuth’s picture. Having witnessed Baldessari’s photograph, most viewers have difficulty shaking this reference loose and seeing Namuth’s image without Baldessari’s ghost lurking in the frame of the experience. In other words Baldessari’s *White Shape* takes Namuth’s picture through a door from which there is no return; it alters the source image so that it is difficult if not impossible for viewers to see it outside of the terms of this revision. Significantly for our discussion, revisions
must always maintain the identity of the source, for without the source the revision cannot operate.

Renewals, on the other hand, extend the past images with little respect for the boundaries of the source artwork and almost no regard for careful preservation of the past work. Here, it is worth recalling an example discussed in chapter two, Yasumasa Morimura's *Doublonnage (Marcel)* (figures 48 & 49). Like a revision, this work enters the appropriated image at the referential level. Nevertheless, viewers will never look at the source, Man Ray's picture of Rrose Selavy, and see Morimura's face and his whiteface references to Kabuki theater because, unlike the shape of Pollock's body, the figural elements in Ray's picture cannot make these references. The references that Morimura's image activates are not actually present in Ray's image; they only exist as potentials. Morimura adds visual elements to expand upon the potential of Ray's reference to cross-dressing. Expressing this potential takes the image in such an entirely different direction that Morimura's photograph becomes a new work that can neither replace nor even interfere with Ray's picture.

Renewal capitalizes on the creativity of the appropriation process, which as a form of actualized repetition will always generate change by virtue of the fact that it allows the effects of movement to materialize. Invariably movement releases potentials housed but unexpressed in the item being transported. As noted earlier, the effects of movement cannot be predicted; they can only be realized.
In the visual arts, realization comes down to material expression. When an image enters a material, the material lends the image qualities that another material could not. These qualities bring out aspects of the image not present in other expressions.

Abstract Realities

As artists continue to pursue the potential of material transformations, they produce works that capitalize upon another level of material expression, namely qualitative transformations that occur through the material expression but not because of it. Accordingly, these are not material qualities as much as they are qualitative conditions that the materials in conjunction with the imagery create. In other words a qualitative condition is not a product of a characteristic that is inherent to a particular material. Yet, these conditions can only appear through material expressions of images, a process that can be found in Richard Misrach’s series of photographs, titled “Pictures of Paintings”.

Like Cowin’s work, Misrach’s photographs offer viewers another powerful example of imagery appropriated from narrative paintings. Still, unlike Cowin, Misrach appropriates his images directly from the paintings as they hang in museums. Using a large-format camera and whatever lighting happens to be available in the gallery, he exposes eight-by-ten inch sheets of film to capture figurally exact images. Despite this accuracy, Misrach’s film only records
sections of the paintings. For example, in his photograph *San Francisco, California, 1991* (figure 81) viewers see only the lower right corner of the image that appears in Baron Fançois-Pascal-Simon Gerard’s painting, titled *Comtesse de Morel-Vinde and her Daughter (The Music Lesson)* (figure 82). Fragmented out of the overall narrative of Gerard’s painting, Misrach’s photograph no longer depicts a music lesson. Nor does it represent any specific individuals, for the faces and upper torsos of Gerard’s figures are entirely missing. Instead, viewers have a close-up view of the seemingly insignificant space that appears below the piano in Gerard’s painting and the lower part of the chair against which the daughter’s white dress drapes.

The relative obscurity of Misrach’s source painting is important, for in part the effect this image creates relies upon the fact that viewers are not likely to recognize the fragment and thus imagine the source image. This prevents the appropriated image from carrying little if any contextual meaning to the frame, and it keeps the virtual image and any sensations it might recall from appearing. Thus, divorced from its lineage, Misrach’s image matter of factly appears on its own terms, which are decidedly non-narrative.

Without a pictorial narrative or the commanding focus of portraiture to direct them most viewers’ attention is immediately drawn to the incongruity of a strip of gold-gilded framing that appears only along the right side of Misrach’s image. This strange pictorial element alerts viewers to the fact that this image is a fragment,
probably appropriated from a master painting. It also affirms the power of photography to reframe and excise images from their context. Thus, if viewers were ever uncertain about Misrach’s medium, the broken frame makes it clear that they are witnessing a photograph and not a painting. The fact of Misrach’s medium is further emphasized by the black border of unexposed film that Misrach has included in the printed image. This border contrasts dramatically with the gold-gilded frame. Together, the gold frame and the black border announce the surface of the print, keeping viewers ever aware that the object before them is a photograph.

In this work the transformative effects of photography are profound. Not only does the photographic surface spread an evenness across the image, that reduces the depth of field, but the close-up view, devoid of the dominant narrative, also allows otherwise insignificant details—such as the cracks in the surface of the paint—to come forward and insist upon the material component of both figurations, however different. Likewise, the under-painting of the Countess’s daughter’s dress becomes more apparent, enhancing the overall glowing warmth and mystery of this corner. Finally, this glow feeds the most remarkable transformation: the appearance of a qualitative condition that is not actually present in Gerard’s painting.

Having figured out the problem of the gold frame, the next element that commands viewers’ attention is the sweeping gesture of the daughter’s pose.
However, in Misrach’s picture this depicted gesture no longer belongs to the daughter; indeed only the red slipper indicates the presence of a body below the fabric folds. Isolated as the focus of Misrach’s camera, this arcing gestural fabric becomes a sensual movement. Traveling through the glowing white cloth, the movement conveys a sense of longing or desire. Indeed, as viewers contemplate Misrach’s picture and consume this affect, some might even experience a sense of the erotic. The effect of this sensibility overpowers any compulsion to account for the missing narrative, and quite unexpectedly, this sensibility completes the picture. As a result, Misrach’s photograph becomes a wholly new work that exists entirely separate from Gerard’s painting. Significantly, unlike the images that have been considered thus far, the erotic sensibility that Misrach’s picture seems to generate is not an inherent function of his material, for clearly photographs are not necessarily erotic in the way that lead, for example, is always heavy.

Returning now to the source for Misrach’s picture, Gerard’s “Music Lesson”, viewers are instantly drawn to the lower right corner of the painting, where they readily locate the fragment, which was the source of Misrach’s photograph. Under the spell of Misrach’s work, viewers contemplate this corner of Gerard’s painting, waiting for the sensual force of the image to emerge. It never does. The figuration is identical, but something vital is missing. Yet, how can this be? How can a straightforward photographic record produce an entirely different sensation?
To answer this question, it is necessary to begin like Misrach in Gerard's painting, where the overall narrative compels a tone that is designed to ward off any sense of the erotic. This is largely conveyed through the mother's massive hand, which is seen covering and protecting her daughter's hand. Situated at the exact center of Gerard's image, this powerful gesture keeps the mysterious and threatening dark curtains, which frame the daughter's face, in their place in the background. Additionally, Gerard's composition works in conjunction with the power of this hand, for if viewers try to focus on the sweeping gesture of the daughter's dress, they find it leads up the daughter's torso and, twisting toward the mother, it delivers them once again to that hand. Even if viewers persist and turn back to the daughter, the compositional lines of the piano direct them back to the center, until finally the daughter's gaze takes them up to the mother's face, whose stare confronts viewers directly, preventing the erotic experience of Misrach's picture from ever taking shape. As a result, the erotic remains an unexpressed potential that viewers would never know about had Misrach's photograph not extracted and released this otherwise constrained corner. Freed from Gerard's picture plane, the imagery in Misrach's picture opens up to another qualitative condition that in turn creates an entirely different affect for the viewer.

In the Chapmans' sculpture difference was conveyed through a shift in material and genre. In Levine's Bachelors the appropriated imagery is primarily transformed by the qualities it acquires from its new material expression in glass.
In Misrach's work the image is also qualitatively transformed, but here the material expression is not entirely responsible for the qualitative shift. The technical effects of the photograph—cropping, an infusion of new lighting effects, a flattened surface and close up view—all come together with the figuration to call this qualitative condition forward. However, unlike Levine's frosted-glass or Serra's lead, the erotic sensation that appears through this image is not a quality inherent to the material; yet without the effects of this material presentation, it would not appear.

Returning to Misrach's picture, it is now necessary to deal with the fact that it does not actually express eroticism; it produces a pattern of relations that viewers experience as a sensation that they then identify. As happens with the affective power of the virtual image, what viewers experience is not the same as what is being generated by the material object. The forces passing through the artwork enter the viewer's body where they are transformed and cognitively identified. Yet, viewers' experience of these sensations is quite different from word-recognition or image-identification. The term erotic, which identifies the sensations, arrives later. It is, nevertheless, important to point out that both activities—naming and sensing—are embodied. Although these perceptual modes allow viewers to participate in the world in different ways, they both operate through and in viewers' bodies. Thus, before viewers name the sensation or energy moving through Misrach's work, they must encounter it physically; it must occupy their bodies.
In actuality the fragmentary nature of Misrach’s image engages the perceptual mode that governs image-identification only to suspend it. In the image viewers easily recognize most of the depicted elements: a chair, a pillow, a slipper on a foot, and finally the wooden floor, which creates a sensible place for these elements to appear in. Indeed, the broken gold-gilded frame is the only curious element and its inexplicability commands viewers’ attention. Once identified as a frame, it insists upon the surface of the print and reminds viewers that the image beside it is an illusion. From the frame viewers move farther out to the edge of the picture, where they locate the black photographic border; this in turn relegates the gold frame to an illusionary status as well. Passing easily through these playful layers of reality that keep unveiling themselves, viewers become entertained more than confused by Misrach’s picture. This playfulness invariably calls viewers back into the image, inviting them to play the game over again. This time, however, viewers arrive perceptually wide open: no longer concerned about finding a sensible narrative or explanation for the picture, they are prepared for a physical encounter. Thus, viewers allow the picture to wash over them, and this is when the energy of the image enters their bodies. As a matter of fact, if viewers do not give the picture this second chance, they are likely to miss out on its vitality, which plays the body like a musical instrument, creating actual physical sensations or vibrations. These sensations occur in a suspended moment beyond image-recognition; they occupy the space of being in movement. Through viewers’ experience of these sensations, they develop an
impression of the artwork, but this impression is not the expression of the artwork. This is confusing because on one level viewers seem to be actually participating in the artwork, but what viewers are experiencing is a qualitative condition that is a force passing through the artwork. This experience becomes viewers' impression of the artwork, which they will later identify as a sensation that might be called eroticism. The qualitative condition that appears in the materialized image becomes an expression of energy that rematerializes in viewers' bodies, where other potentials are expressed because viewers' material bodies contain a new field of relations.

As Misrach's picture so clearly demonstrates, there is always much more contained in images than what viewers immediately recognize and experience. Appropriation art is a process of drawing this more or this potential out. At the material level potential is a qualitative expression that operates in two different ways: directly through the material's inherent qualities and indirectly through a relationship that occurs between the material and the imagery and that creates a qualitative condition, which becomes available to the viewer as sensations.

Throughout this text, appropriation has been presented as a creative process that expresses itself through the transformation of imagery. In doing so, appropriation art demonstrated that the production of visual imagery operates in a material manner that is almost antithetical to the textual process. This chapter demonstrated how appropriationists moved well past the conventional
understanding of appropriation as an exact copy. In fact, this chapter showed how these artists engaged exactness as tool or armature upon which to express material difference. In all of the works discussed in this chapter the material expression accessed the viewer in a sensual manner that goes beyond semiotics. The next chapter will look more closely at the role of the viewer and how the appropriation process constructs a virtual depth of field that re-defines viewing as the experience of a duration.
Chapter Five
*The Image Endures*

“You know the great Cimabue Crucifixion? I always think of that as an image—as a worm crawling down the cross. I did try to make something of the feeling, which I’ve sometimes had from that picture of this image just moving, undulating down the cross.”

In 1962 Francis Bacon appropriated Cimabue’s thirteenth-century *Crucifixion* and redeployed the image in the third panel of his triptych *Three Studies for a Crucifixion* (figures 83, 84 & 85). Viewers recognize this image as an appropriation primarily because of Bacon’s admission, for Bacon’s picture depicts an abstract bulbous shape in which a monstrous human/animal hybrid appears to be forming, an image that hardly conjures up references to a crucifixion and that would never be misconstrued as Cimabue’s painting. Explaining, Bacon has said that the images, which he has appropriated, “breed other images for me. And of course one’s always hoping to renew them.” Accordingly, Bacon described his encounter with Cimabue’s depiction of Christ’s body as a worm “undulating down the cross.” Drawing upon this “bred” image, Bacon then renewed Cimabue’s *Crucifixion*. Indeed, with Bacon’s comments in mind, it is now possible to locate certain resonances between these otherwise disparate works. For example, in Bacon’s picture the figuration of Cimabue’s cross remains present, albeit inverted and with its arms mutating. Reaching behind, these arms are becoming a white circular ring that appears to be composed of finger-bones. Turning to consider Cimabue’s *Crucifixion*, viewers may also sense an undulating
rhythm in the gesture of Christ's body and now understand how Bacon has activated this rhythm in order to remove his slithering creature from the inverted cross. In other words, Bacon's image, while decidedly bizarre, seems to contain at least the residues of an interaction with Cimabue's Crucifixion.

Chapter three demonstrated how the Simulationists, like Bacon, produced appropriations that barely resembled their source imagery. The transformative effects of these appropriations and the figural dissonances that they produce raise an important and perhaps over-due question: Does appropriation art really exist? Or, more precisely stated, what is the difference between an appropriation and any other artwork? The answer to this question becomes exceedingly complicated when Roland Barthes' insight that all representations are derived from other representations is considered. In fact, with Barthes' observation in mind, all visual artworks suddenly seem to qualify as examples of appropriation art; that is, redundant images expressed through new material contexts. Thus, rather ironically, this thesis seems to have arrived at an understanding of appropriation art that is all-inclusive, a conclusion that makes the category of appropriation art somewhat irrelevant, if not entirely unnecessary and certainly redundant.

As it turns out, all visual artworks do operate like appropriations, for all images are derived from other past works and then transformed by their new expressions. Indeed, herein lay one of the primary contributions of postmodern
appropriation art; namely, its insistence upon the expressive singularity of the materialized image. As the last three chapters have demonstrated, the specifics of any image's appearance—its material and contextual expressions—recreate the image in a singular manner. Thus, through the materialization of an image, appropriated or otherwise, difference always appears.\textsuperscript{212} By using conspicuously redundant images, postmodern appropriation art underscored this fact and further demonstrated that visual representation is expression and not simply depiction.

Despite this shared fundamental principle, appropriation art distinguishes itself from other visual artworks by virtue of the serial relationship it maintains with its source artworks. Unlike other visual imagery, an appropriated image draws upon specific and identifiable sources to expand the expression of the virtual image that it finds there.\textsuperscript{213} The difference between a source artwork and an influential artwork will help to further clarify this relationship.

Barthes' observation that all representations are composed of quotations is based on his recognition of the vast network of influences that shape one's perceptions and subsequently construct all representations. In short, everything that a person imagines, thinks, writes, or depicts is a product of influence. Appropriated images, being forms of representation, are also generated through this vast influential network. Accordingly, most of this thesis's definition of appropriation art—a movement into new material and contextual
expressions—applies to all visual art works. In fact, appropriation artworks strive to harness and actually engage the moving forces of influence that characterize representation. However, in order to achieve this, the appropriation must circumscribe a particular field of interaction, which identifies a specific source artwork(s) as a point of departure. Therefore, as Barthes has suggested, all representations are copies, but appropriations are specific copies. Specific, however, does not necessarily mean figurally exact.

Appropriation artworks establish a relationship with their sources through their expression of a virtual image. As discussed in chapter three, the virtual image refers to a figuration that no longer has a concrete material expression. The appropriated image always leaves the source artwork behind but physically intact; therefore when an image is appropriated, it is the virtual image and not the actual image that moves. Accordingly, the transient force that makes appropriation art possible is situated within the virtual realm. Significantly, the force of virtual imagery also operates in visual influences; in fact, it is the expressive force of the virtual image that appropriation art harnesses. However, where other visual artworks involve a myriad of influences that are not entirely traceable or knowable, appropriation artworks are derived from specific sources that are identifiable.214

*What Goes Around Comes Around*
Appropriation art's effort to harness the moving force of influences leads directly to the viewer. An appropriation occurs when a virtual image moves from a specific source and enters a new material expression. This passage, however, cannot occur unless the artist facilitates it by functioning as the intermediary or conduit. Thus, first and foremost the appropriation artist is always a viewer.

Virtual imagery lodges in a viewer like a ghost, a palpable presence that exists without a material body. Somewhat like the appropriation artwork, the viewer then provides this virtual image with a body and thereby the image produces a viewing experience, what Bacon described as breeding and what this thesis will call a duration. An example might be helpful here; to clarify how a duration occurs, consider a weekly commute from New York City to New Haven, CT. Every week, Larry takes the 7:20 train from Grand Central station and arrives in New Haven at 8:05. Following the exact same route, the train usually requires the same amount of time to travel this distance. Despite this consistency, sometimes Larry’s trip flies by while other trips move with the weight of a wounded animal. The distance and time on the clock for these trips are always just about the same, but Larry’s actual experience of the trips is entirely different. Accordingly, the trips have different durations. The duration of an experience is its qualitative expression of movement. Appropriation artworks express the virtual image’s duration in a new material body. This final chapter will focus on how duration operates, for it is primarily through the duration of their artworks that appropriation artists revealed the performative nature of representation.
Viewing an artwork always entails an exchange; the artwork inspires certain associations while also generating affective qualities—all of which enter the viewer and expand. Significantly, viewers never receive the virtual image in isolation; their bodies and their previous experiences mingle with the impressions and associations that the appropriated image generates. Thus, a resonating presence might then connect with a recognized association (or vice versa) and produce a movement that might connect a crucifix, for example, with an undulating worm. This qualitative breeding of imagery within the viewer is an experience of the image’s duration. Moreover, because virtual images breed, the expression of the virtual image that a viewer recieves can never be the same as the one that the artwork’s material expresses.

Therefore, a general map of the appropriation process begins with the artist’s encounter with the source artwork, which is a viewing experience, a duration. As a viewer, the artist receives sensibilities and associations inspired by the virtual image. Then, when the artists re-expresses the image, it mutates yet again, for it acquires another material body and contextual frame, which sets up new references and different affective qualities. Therefore, the duration that the virtual image expresses in the appropriation is never the same as the one that it expresses in the source artwork. Accordingly, appropriation art is an expression of the movement of a virtual image, but whatever emerges physically expressed in the new object can never be the same as what entered the artist’s perceiving
body or what then took shape therein. When an image enters a material expression, it expands its virtual existence as it becomes something different in its new flesh. Therefore, during the appropriation process, the virtual image moves through several different bodies—the source artwork, the artist, and the appropriation; through this movement, the duration of the virtual image continually changes. Moreover, through this movement, appropriation artworks become defined as serial expressions. Nevertheless, the specifics of an appropriated image's appearance—its figuration in a particular material context—recreate the image as a singularity. Thus, through appropriation a singular variation appears as part of an unfolding expression composed of durations.

*Going Nowhere*

As suggested throughout this text, appropriation is a serial expression of a moving but virtual image that is materialized. In this regard, the source artwork provides a point of departure, which in actuality is a point of expression, a duration. An appropriation expands the duration of this expression by renewing it in another material expression. This renewal process establishes a depth of field, which links the appropriation to the source artwork. However, since the movement of appropriation occurs through a virtual image, the depth of field established between the two works of art must also be virtual. In other words, the actual source image goes nowhere, for as demonstrated earlier,
appropriation always leaves the source artwork intact; the appropriated image continues to appear in the source artwork even as it appears transformed in the appropriation. Therefore, even though the movement of the virtual image entails a trip from the source artwork to the new material terrain of the appropriation, no actual distance is traversed because the movement occurs through a virtual image. As a result, the figuration remains simultaneously present in the source image, even as it appears moved into the appropriation artwork. Instead of covering distance or progressing forward, the movement of the appropriated image occurs in depth and concerns the experience of the virtual image, which is to say its duration in a new material expression.

This is movement separated from distance traveled, and it creates a depth of field that is virtual, which does not mean that it is not real. It is a very real but qualitative condition of an image in movement that has not yet materialized. When it becomes materialized, when the virtual image enters a material expression, it appears and viewers encounter it as a duration. Thus, the viewing appropriation-artist experiences a duration of the virtual image that the source artwork expresses, and through the appropriation process, the virtual image moves, creating what this thesis will call a depth of field, as it simultaneously appears in a new material expression that generates a new duration.

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Finally, through the recognition of the virtual depth of field that appropriation artworks produce, it is possible to return to a question raised earlier: if all artworks present somewhat redundant images, then what distinguishes appropriation art from other artworks. By definition, the appropriation process engages specific points of departure; thus, appropriated images explore the potential of specific, albeit virtual, imagery. The act of appropriation sends a particular image on an excursion that occurs without traveling through actual distance; this establishes a virtual depth of field between the source and the appropriation artwork, a relationship that occurs through the artist’s participation.

Significantly, this depth of field is just that—a thick passage. The source artwork is not a flat background against which the appropriated image appears. By embodying the appropriated image, the material expression prohibits it from having a simple figure-ground relationship with its sources. In fact, the only way for an appropriated image to have a figure-ground relationship with its source image is to ignore the material expression and to treat the appropriation as a mere shift in context, which is an incomplete picture, or a translation without a material body. Moreover, the depth of field that develops through the movement that defines the appropriation process is a qualitative relationship that develops between an appropriation and a source artwork but that is not materialized. The depth of field is where the virtual image accesses its full potential, which is all of its past, condensed, including its most recent past, that is its passage through the viewing appropriation artist.
This perception of the virtual depth of field mirrors Henri Bergson's description of the present, that is the past in its most contracted state.²¹⁶ For Bergson sensation is "the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface."²¹⁷ The point of contact, the living present, becomes a charged event that simultaneously condenses all of the former living presents as it adds yet another living present, which ultimately transforms all of the past. This conception of time helps to illuminate the serial nature of the appropriation process. In much the same way that the relationship between the condensed form of the previously living presents or the past is altered by its movement into a new living present, so too is the virtual image changed by its movement into another expression. This movement occurs through a depth of field that develops between the appropriation and its sources. As noted earlier, this movement is then expressed through qualitative changes actualized by the image and its expansion in a new material expression.

Appropriation art allows a virtual image to expand its expression through a serial extension that is materialized. Thus, appropriation art visually expresses a duration that is composed through the passage of the virtual image through a depth of field and into a material terrain where unexpected contextual conjunctions create translations, qualitative presences materialize the transformations of movement, allowing untold potentials appear. This concluding chapter will look more closely at the virtual depth of field and the serial duration
that the appropriation process engages. Up until now, each chapter has taken up one aspect of the appropriation process—context, image, and material expression—and specifically explored how it operates. As noted in the last chapter, this separation has been entirely artificial, as none of these elements actually operates in isolation of the other components. Every appropriation artwork actualizes difference through a dynamic interaction of all three elements. The exploration of depth of field and seriality that follows will focus on how these components actually work together to express a duration of the virtual image’s movement through a depth of field.

*Same As It Never Was*

As the previous chapters have taken pains to demonstrate, exact copies do not exist. Material expression precludes the possibility of exact copies because the concrete material expression of an image not only transforms the image, but it recreates it as part of a singular object located in a new context. Interestingly enough, forgeries are no exception here, for the conditions of the physical world do not allow for the production of absolute sameness. In reality, sameness is a term used to describe a relative condition that is quantifiable, not an absolute state of being or quality. To cite a common example, fingerprints are identified by matching points of commonality; a fingerprint is identified not by being a mirror image of a previously recorded sample or figuration but by demonstrating a certain number of points of commonality. In actuality sameness describes a
range of resemblance and exactness limits the breadth of this range, but neither creates mirror images. In the visual arts, absolute sameness only exists as the disguise of forgery or as an abstract notion used to quantify an image in terms of a particular past referent.

Appropriation artworks have a specific generative relationship with their sources that enhances the serial nature of imagery and expression. Without a relationship with a specific source the artwork cannot be considered an appropriation; instead, the source simply functions as one of many influences. Although appropriation artworks are not the same as their sources, they are linked to their sources through the image. In appropriation art the quantity that "sameness" conveys visually establishes the source artwork as a referent. When the appropriated image "looks like" the source image, it expresses a significant amount of sameness and the source plays a strong referential role. In other words, its framing effects will be loud and even potentially limiting, as happened with Sherrie Levine’s rephotography. This effect is largely composed through an exchange between the image and its new context. However, if the appearance of the source image is hardly discernable in the figuration of the appropriation, then the appropriation’s relationship with the source image becomes more qualitatively apparent, which means that the presence of the source appears primarily through the material’s expression of the virtual image. It should be noted that the virtual image does not look like the source image; in fact, without a
material expression it cannot look like anything, it can only convey sensibilities that, as Bacon suggested, then breed other figurations.

In general the illusion of figural sameness allows the appropriated image to cling more powerfully to the source artwork; whereas, the virtual presence of the source artwork allows the material expression of the appropriation artwork to assert its transformative affects more directly. In other words, sameness causes viewers to recognize the source image almost instantly, which tends to flatten the artwork’s depth of field into a figure-ground relationship and overpower the duration of the virtual image that is extended through the material expression. Still, it should be noted that regardless of whether the appropriation figurally resembles the source, the virtual image of the source always passes into every appropriation; sameness, however, often overshadows the affects of its presence by collapsing the depth of field. Ian Hamilton Finlay’s work offers us an excellent example of how this collapse occurs.

Since the late 1960s, Finlay and his wife Sue have been transforming Stonypath, approximately four acres of moorland, into an elaborate garden that contains several unusual examples of art after art. One such work is the Finlays’ The Great Piece of Turf (figure 86), which actualizes an expression of an image appropriated from Albrecht Dürer’s watercolor of the same name, Das Grosse Rasenstuck (figure 87). Viewers recognize the past image not only through the title, but through the overall composition, which apes the figuration that appears
in Dürrer's watercolor. Still, this appropriated image is expressed through highly unusual art materials: marsh grasses and flowers planted near the edge of a pond. The Finlays further articulate their reference to Dürrer by marking this patch of flora with a small stone engraved with Dürrer's unmistakable monogram. Although the Finlays' constructed garden image does not offer an exact rendition of Dürrer's image, it mimics the composition of Dürrer's watercolor enough and the marker confirms the viewer's initial recognition of this figural resemblance. In short, the monogram confirms a number of points of commonality that exist between the watercolor image and the Finlays' planted patch.

This resemblance to Dürrer's work, however, is transient; for the Finlays' material—living plants—will, if left to grow or die, eventually transform the image beyond any possible recognition. Thus, this work embodies the transformative power of material expression that fuels the appropriation process. Once overgrown, Dürrer's image will be transformed beyond recognition and thus become something more and less than it was. Yet, even in this dramatically transformed state, the engraved marker will maintain a significant and identifiable relationship with its source.

There is a wonderful irony in the Finlays' piece, for it suggests a reversal of mimesis: nature created after art. Of course, there is a long tradition of topiary in gardening, but few artists have attempted to produce art after art using the volatile material of plants. Thus, the Finlays' work underscores a poignant insight
about two- and three-dimensional representation, namely its tendency to suggest an unchanging state, which exists outside of time. For example, in a photograph a flower seems to bloom eternally because the image appears to be transported out of time. In fact, this is an effect of mimetic representation, for the flower has not entered the photograph, only its image, which is being expressed by an entirely different material, namely chemically treated photographic paper. The use of living materials and the overall effect of material expression on an appropriated image demonstrate that the transcendental impression which mimetic representation produces is artificial and illusionary. In fact, this timeless impression relies upon a denial of the artwork’s material condition, for over time the material composition of any artwork will change as it decays and in the process the expressed image will be transformed. Thus, one of the fundamental insights of appropriation art is its recognition that visual representations are not transcendental composites of stilled time but rather living, on-going, serial expressions. Moreover, through this insight, postmodern appropriation artists located a creative praxis within the effects and affects of material expression on visual imagery in new contexts.

Postmodern appropriation artists were hardly the first to stumble upon the power of material transformation. Yet, where past artists—notably Robert Smithson—recognized the transformative power of decay, postmodern appropriation artists recognized that the fundamental principle of material expression was located in the fact that decay is an ever-present and on-going
effect of material expression on imagery. Ultimately, postmodern artists realized that material is in a constant state of change, which is to say that material matter operates as a moving force and in this force postmodern appropriation artists located the power of material expression to move imagery qualitatively.\textsuperscript{218} Therefore, unlike what colloquial definitions of the term decay might imply, material expression does not cause the figural image to disintegrate and disappear, rather it moves the image, which is to say it qualitatively transforms its expression by investing it with the force of time. In other words material expressions give imagery a duration.

Here it might be worth pausing to recall from chapter one Walter Benjamin's assertion that the ruin was the ultimate image of allegory because it was an image invested with time. For Benjamin, allegory stood in direct opposition to symbolism, which he associated with the transcendental because like mimetic representation symbolism isolates an image from the effects of time and lends it an eternal quality. As noted, Craig Owens brilliantly applied Benjamin's perception of allegory to appropriation art, for Owens recognized the translational force at work in appropriation art. Owens, however, attributed this effect entirely to the contextual shift that appropriation art exerts, and he ignored the more profound transformative effects of material expression. Yet, in a general reversal of the eternal effects of mimesis, postmodern appropriationists directed the living power of material expression at the image and thereby actualized imagery not as
a representation of something else but as an extended transformation of it, which is to say representation became an event, a duration.

Although the transformative power of material expression is evident as the promise of the Finlays' material, it is not actualized in *The Great Piece of Turf*, for the Finlays continually trim back the material expression of the appropriated image and thereby keep the reference to Dürer's image figurally in place. Ironically, this trimming effectively undermines the transformative power that is so fundamental to the appropriation process, and it curtails the potential of the virtual image by collapsing the potential of the depth of field.

When the image is protected from the affective qualities of its material expression, the performative nature of appropriation is not only restrained, but it is also reduced to a somewhat static condition that remains defined and regulated by the source artwork. In the end sameness contains this work in terms of Dürer's watercolor and an artificial transcendental effect is imposed. As in the initial interpretations of Levine's rephotography demonstrated, this is due to a denial of the movement inherent to the new material expression. While a contextual shift has occurred that creates translational associations, the denial of the material expression has a flattening effect on the depth of field. As a result, a simple figure-ground relationship appears to develop instead. Effectively, this constrains the duration of the virtual image in its new material expression. Thus, viewers experience this work almost exclusively in terms of Dürer's oeuvre, with
its echoes of the Renaissance, contemplation, the calm beauty of nature, etc. These echoes are the translational effects orchestrated by the appropriated image’s interaction with their new contextual elements. In this limited expression, the material takes on a symbolic or semiotic role, which further diminishes its affective qualities. As happens in mimetic representation, its qualitative presence is suspended. Thus, this piece becomes a beautiful embodiment of many of the problems surrounding mimetic representation discussed in earlier chapters.

More than any other element, material expression defines appropriation as a transformative process because it is through material expression that virtual imagery actually comes into being. In other words, without a material expression an image cannot appear and it remains virtual. Moreover, when the appropriated image actually enters a material expression, it not only acquires the tangible affects of the physical matter that re-expresses it, but it also gains a context that opens the referential potential of the source image to new associations, producing translations that enhance the discursive range of the image’s references. Another work from Stonypath powerfully demonstrates how these elements might work together in order to engage the viewer in an experience of the artwork’s duration.

In See Poussin/Hear Lorraine (figure 88) the reference to the source artworks is clearly articulated through the context of the title. Engraved on a stone marker and situated at the edge of a pond that overlooks the rolling hills beyond, this title
actually composes the figuration of the work by framing the scene with a directive that tells viewers to contextualize the landscape before them in terms of the *œuvres* of the two painters cited, namely Nicholas Poussin and Claude Lorrain. Essentially, the title offers viewers historical frames of reference through which to perceive the actual landscape before them. Moreover, the sensual shifts, directed by the respective commands "see" and "hear", tell viewers to consider the landscape using different modes of experience. In combination with the painters’ names these modes of experience then become aligned with different historical eras. Therefore, seeing becomes associated with identifying the signature style of Poussin’s neo-classical compositions, and viewers are told to interpret the scene accordingly. An art historical style is an artificial referential function that is imposed on a group of images from a retrospective stance; that is, it always arrives after the fact of materialized figuration. Thus, the Finlays engage an Aristotelian maneuver here that categorically reduces the particular scene in front of the viewer to a general rule or code, which is articulated by the engraved marker and dependent upon the viewer’s past knowledge. Meanwhile, the second-half of the title seems to move the viewer in the opposite direction.

As if in a nod to Wassily Kandinsky, the Finlays then ask the viewer to consider how visual matter can produce the affect of sound. The viewer is told to hear Lorrain’s painting, which historically can be associated with the sublime passion of the Romantics and their treatment of the landscape. But what does it mean to “Hear Lorrain”? In appropriation, this request for a perceptual shift would open
the potential of the source painting and call forward the viewer’s impressions of the virtual image, separated from any focus on the sameness of the image. Therefore, the potential for a duration is opened, but then it suddenly crashes because there are no source artworks. A duration does not exist in abstraction; it appears through a material expression of a virtual image. As the Simulationists demonstrated, an appropriation can lead the viewer to re-imagine the experience or the duration of a virtual image that s/he has experienced before. However, this requires accessing a specific work. In fact, the Finlays’ piece is not an appropriation; even though the sensual shift directed by the title wonderfully engages the concerns of appropriation, a specific source image has not been moved. In lieu of a specific image the title generally references Lorrain’s and Poussin’s past artworks: specific oeuvres are cited but not specific artworks. This generalization of individual artworks only brings forward the references that surround the two painters, and the individual artworks become generalized abstractions, not virtual images put into motion.

But, how do you really feel?

Despite their limitations, the Finlays’ pieces help to demonstrate how the material expression of appropriated imagery might engage the viewer in an experience of its duration. Jeannette Christensen’s 1995 piece Ostentatio Vulnerum (figure 89) effects this engagement as it expands a depth of field. A diptych, this work is composed of two separate picture-planes that are encased in simple blond-wood
frames, stacked one atop the other. In the upper frame, viewers find an image that has been appropriated from Caravaggio's painting *The Incredulity of Saint Thomas (Doubting Thomas)* (figure 90). The image has been cropped around Thomas's finger, probing the wound in Christ's side.

Christensen confiscated Caravaggio's image from a coffee-table book reproduction, where it was photographically reproduced at a significantly reduced size. Having left Caravaggio's painted canvas far behind, this appropriated image now appears in Christensen's work, more than twice removed and visibly pixelated as a laser print. As a result, the pixelation interacts powerfully with the subject matter, for the circular pixels echo the hole in Christ's flesh while also threatening the overall clarity of the figuration. This material dilution of Caravaggio's figural image further diminishes the narrative, which the cropping has already somewhat disabled. By slightly fracturing the image's relationship with the biblical narrative, Christensen has opened the referential potential of Caravaggio's image, and the material in the lower frame then expands it qualitatively.

Framed behind glass, this laser image appears directly above and attached to an identical blond-wood frame that has been filled with the gelatin dessert known as "JELL-O". This juxtaposition creates a strange confluence of material and image. Through this lower picture plane, the wound depicted in Christ's flesh and the pixelated holes imposed on the figuration resonate with the pockets of air
captured in the semi-transparent flesh of this strawberry-flavored gelatin.

Somewhat severed from the supporting biblical narrative, the image readily inherits the abject qualities generated by the JELL-O below. As a result, the visceral event of probing a wound, described in Caravaggio's image, acquires a living presence. The vulnerability of Christensen's unstable material enhances this effect. Under the heat of the gallery lights, the JELL-O emits a sickeningly sweet smell as it dries, breeds mold, and eventually dissolves, leaving behind reddish stains that retain the marks of the circular air pockets. In short, the physical material disappears, but the effects of its presence remain. This outcome restates the biblical narrative through a physical performance that offers a different kind of interpretation. Rather than plying the descriptive tools of visual narratives, this artwork plays the viewer's body, where a different kind of making sense occurs. Thus, Christensen's work demonstrates how the affects of materiality and the effects of referentiality operate differently, but continually invade each other. Moreover, the sense of movement that appears between the two framed picture planes begins to illustrate how the depth of field between a source and appropriation artwork operates.

Almost matter of factly, Christensen's work actualizes the formula of reading one image through another, but here the viewer actually experiences one image through the affect of the other. Through the sensual imagination that the physical material stirs, the image loses its informational power as it becomes more physically expressive. Thus, the visceral affects of the JELL-O beckon the image
above to descend and enter its sugary flesh. Nevertheless, the frame and glass-sealed boundaries prevent this serial development of the image from continuing, and somewhat like the Finlays' *The Great Piece of Turf*, the viewer is left to imagine the demise of Caravaggio's image in the sweet mold. However, unlike the Finlays' piece, Christensen's laser print has already disabled the power of sameness through the transformative effects of cropping and pixelating the figural image. Moreover, by triggering the viewer's imagination in this visceral manner, Christensen's work empowers the virtual image. Unlike the actual pixelated laser image, the virtual one can move easily past the glass framing. As a result, the virtual image enters the viewer's sensibilities along side of the affective qualities of the decaying JELL-O, and together, as Bacon has suggested, the appropriated image breeds other images in the viewer.

Curiously enough, the power of Christensen's work relies upon the fact that it never fully actualizes the serial development that she has set up. She holds Caravaggio's figuration, suspended on a precipice and restrained from an actual movement into the JELL-O below, which would invariably consume it, rendering it beyond recognition. In this regard, Christensen's work positions the viewer as part of the virtual depth of field that the appropriated image endures. For, instead of flattening the depth of field as happens in the Finlays' piece, this restraint cracks open the depth of field and allows the virtual image to slip into the viewer's imagination, where a duration develops. This duration cannot come to fruition because the viewer is not a form of physical matter that can visually
express this transformed image. Thus, Christensen allows the viewer to assume the role of the appropriation artist, a viewer inhabited by a breeding virtual image.

*Let Them Eat Cake*

In contrast to this suspended approach Sharon Core pushes her appropriated imagery through several serial developments that powerfully express the material affects of their mediums. Her point of departure is Wayne Thiebaud’s food paintings from the early 1960s. Thiebaud’s food paintings walk a tightrope between abstraction and realism that is reminiscent of Edward Hopper’s work. Like Hopper, Thiebaud’s figuration is spare, and it seems almost secondary to his use of color, which produces sculptural effects. For example, in Thiebaud’s 1962 painting *Salads, Sandwiches and Desserts* (figure 91) viewers find that the cerulean blue shadows are almost more compelling than the rows of club sandwiches and pie slices that presumably cast them. Likewise, the slash of green, which defines the edge of a plate against its thick surface of white paint, is far more alluring than the depicted avocado-half it presents. Meanwhile, the heavy colorful outlines that geometrically define the otherwise yellowish slices of honeydew melon are delightfully animated. In short, while Thiebaud never lets his figural representations lose touch with their referential identities, he pushes them right to the edge of dissolving into their material expression of paint and color. Still, Thiebaud’s painterly approach is often overlooked. The flat, sign-like quality of his repetitive imagery overpowers the expressive quality of his material.
As a result, he creates a colorful feast for the eyes that becomes somewhat reminiscent of advertising.

Core's serial approach to appropriation intervenes with Thiebaud's works precisely at this point of their material expression. Trained as a master chef, she begins by literally remaking the actual cakes, pies, and other foodstuffs that compose Thiebaud's still lifes. Thus, with careful attention to scale and detail, Core puts the fact of painting on the shelf and sends this imagery into a new medium, reproducing Thiebaud's compositions as installations composed of actual food and dinnerware. This reversal of mimesis seems to destroy the imagery's condition as a sign; nevertheless, the imagery continues to reference Thiebaud's paintings, and in part this confusion tends to highlight the material condition of Thiebaud's work.

When Core is reproducing Thiebaud's subject matter, she is coaxing Thiebaud's imagery forward. She asks it to relinquish its material expression and to enter her installations, not as exact renditions but as recognizable presences that have left their coats of paint behind and yet retained their passage through Thiebaud's work. In other words, it is important that Core's installations not only resemble Thiebaud's painted imagery but also remain fully open to the effects of their new material expression. In this regard, Core is retracing the tightrope act present in Thiebaud's work, and in the process she undoes the flattening effects of the image.
Continuing her serial movement of these appropriated images, Core then returns them to a two-dimensional format by photographing her installations. As viewers might expect, this return to a two-dimensional expression seems to suppress difference and align the imagery more closely with their sources in Thiebaud’s oeuvre. For example, at first glance the figural differences between Thiebaud’s painting *Salads, Sandwiches and Desserts* and Core’s photographic one (figure 92) are negligible, as the points of commonality far exceed the points of departure. Yet, when Core’s photograph is placed next to Thiebaud’s painting, the qualitative conditions of the two different mediums pronounce themselves loudly. Through Core’s photograph, viewers recognize the expressive plasticity of Thiebaud’s paint. For example, the glass bases of his parfait cups unveil themselves: they are each composed of a fanned out array of brush strokes in blue, brown, and red hues of paint, and none of them look anything like glass. In fact, “the realism” of Core’s photograph makes the painterly affects of Thiebaud’s work so obvious that Thiebaud’s painting edges toward abstraction. Even more amazing, however, is the fact that removing Core’s photograph causes the painterly effects of Thiebaud’s work to disappear and once again his imagery resumes its status as “photo-realism”. Of course, these painterly effects never actually disappear; if they did, they would take the image with them. Their presence only appears to become virtual in the shadow of the dominant figuration.
The seemingly magic power of Core's photograph to undo this effect underscores a well-known but nonetheless important fact of representation: figural illusions rely upon absence to operate. In other words, mimetic representation only works in lieu of its referent. As chapter three demonstrated, appropriation art not only underscores this tenet through its use of redundant images, it also begs another question: if representation does not actually present its referents, what does it present? Even without the presence of Thiebaud's work, Core's process forces viewers to consider the material reality of its redundancy, for if nothing else viewers recognize that her photographs are neither Thiebaud's paintings nor are they the material installations that they represent.

Neither Thiebaud nor Core's work is driven by a desire to replicate the world exactly; rather both are exploring the potential of their material expressions. Yet, where Thiebaud's material expression remains in service to his imagery, Core reverses this formula; her imagery attends to its material expression, moving through installations and photographs and changing all the time. Thus, the redundancy of her figural image becomes a structural armature through which she can explore the qualitative differences that material expressions produce.

Effectively, a serial passage takes place through Core's process, which allows imagery to move through paint, food, and photography and become more and less each time. Through this serial process, Core reveals the affective qualities
of material expression. The impact of this serial movement is perhaps best exemplified in her photograph *Five Hot Dogs* (figure 93). Once again, Core identifies her photograph with the title of her source, Thiebaud's 1961 painting of the same name (figure 94). As the descriptive title indicates, both works depict five bright-red hot dogs sitting in buns against a white background. Compositionally, Core has again taken pains to mimic Thiebaud's imagery accurately: the physical dimensions of her C-print are identical to the dimensions of Thiebaud's painting, and the position of the five hotdogs within the two picture planes is also identical as is the space between them. In short, the two works are the same size and they offer identical compositions of the same subject matter, but that is precisely where the similarities end.

In Core's photograph viewers can sense the flat hard and smooth texture of the paper and tabletop on which the hot dogs sit, but in Thiebaud's painting this surface is only suggested, quickly sketched out with broad strokes of thick paint. This difference is a direct result of Core's serial process. Thiebaud's material allowed him to create an abstract background for the hotdog images; whereas Core's hot dogs were composed of food and therefore had a mass and weight that required a horizontal surface capable of holding them in place. By installing the hot dogs on an actual material background, Core added a new qualitative texture not present in Thiebaud's color-field; likewise, the hotdog imagery acquired the qualities of both mass and weight missing in Thiebaud's painting. When Core then photographed her installation, the immaterial aspects of these
new qualities traveled from her installation into her photograph. Although the hot
dogs in both Core’s photograph and Thiebaud’s painting are only images, in the
photograph they exhibit qualities that bespeak the mass and weight that they do
not exhibit in Thiebaud’s painting. As a result, the hot dogs in Core’s photograph
sit down instead of floating vertically on the brink of animation, and the affect is
entirely different.

Throughout her process, Core is tracking material expression not figural
accuracy. As she recreates Thiebaud’s still lifes, she composes them like crime
scenes out of actual objects and reveals that Thiebaud’s paintings fail as a
precise record of their referents. In many ways Core’s process underscores the
depth of field that appropriation art creates, for in her process, viewers may see
how the virtual image moves through material expressions, gathering affective
qualities along the way. Thus, through the depth of field that Core’s work
creates, Thiebaud’s images reveal themselves to be strokes of brushes loaded
with paint, impossible to eat or smell. Meanwhile, Core’s photographs
demonstrate that visual representation captures virtual immaterial presences that
viewers perceive even if these qualities remain outside of the terms of semiotics.
In short, these are images composed through movement that become apparent
via the serial relationships expressed in a virtual depth of field.

In exploring material expressions through the extended serial development that
defines her process, Core locates the viewer’s interaction with the affective
qualities of material, which transforms the virtual image. Fundamentally, the serial power of appropriation art relies on two factors—the movement of the image orchestrated at a virtual level and its conduit. Moreover, in the appropriation process there are always at least two conduits: the material artwork that receives the virtual image and the viewer. Therefore, every time a viewer encounters an image the potential for an appropriation is opened; however, it does not become actual unless this potential is specifically materialized—that is moved into another material terrain that contains it and thereby allows a depth of field to expand and create the potential for a new duration. In short, the object is an appropriation that expresses a duration, which then enters the world full of potential, awaiting another field of expression to open. The process is a movement that creates a depth of field where the virtual image accesses its potential and begins to transform. This transformation continues to expand when the virtual image enters a new material expression and becomes visible.

You Had To Be There

The appropriation process circumscribes a field of interaction, and the image is invariably transformed by its passage through this field. However, when distance is applied to this field, differences seem to become less distinct and sameness appears to reign. The appropriation process revealed that this apparent sameness is actually the effect of abstract generalization. Chapter four
demonstrated how Vik Muniz’s photograph *Kitty Cloud* strategically engaged an optical illusion to thwart the effects of generalization and thereby extend the duration of his work through an expanded depth of field that like Core’s work moves the virtual image through several different material expressions.

Generalization can only occur in an abstract system, for at a material level differences always persist. As demonstrated at the outset of this chapter, sameness is established when a certain number of points of commonality are abstracted and then generalized. However, an experience of abstraction does not necessarily lead to sameness nor even produce generalities. In actuality abstraction produces change by allowing the referential possibilities of an image to expand. Another photograph by Muniz, his 1999 *Wanderer Above the Sea of Ashes* (figure 95), demonstrates how image, context and material expression operate together to orchestrate these possibilities and produce translations.

In part, Muniz achieves this through a complex switching station that he establishes in the serial development of his depth of field. Like *Kitty Cloud*, Muniz’s “Wanderer” starts out as a composition, which is then photographed. In the movement from the composition to the photograph Muniz plays with the function of his materials, which as his title suggests, start out as ash—cigarette ashes to be exact—but end up becoming an image in a photograph; that is a figuration that presents an identity defined by references generated by the interaction of his source image with this image of cigarette ash.
Strategically, Muniz once again sets up a shift from material expression to material identity so that it unfolds slowly for the viewer, through time, a condition that enhances the viewer's awareness of the work's duration. Thus, in the foreground of Muniz's picture the viewer is immediately struck by the mound of cigarette butts and spent matches that appear in sharp focus there. Eventually, the bright white speckles of cigarette ash, which sit on the surface of this print, will draw the viewer's gaze upward, where the viewer is likely to find the figure alluded to in Muniz's title, namely Caspar David Friedrich's 1818 image of the Wanderer over the Sea of Mist (figure 96). Once identified, Friedrich's work provides a contextual frame, which sets up a number of associations.

Renowned for its visual depiction of man's alienation from nature, Friedrich's painting uses the darkness of the Wanderer's silhouette and the mound he stands upon to prevent the viewer's easy access to the romantic landscape beyond. Compositionally, the darkness of Friedrich's Wanderer and his craggy mound dominate the picture like a High Renaissance triangle. Moreover, this triangular mass of darkness covers the vanishing point in the background, which not only reinforces the inaccessibility of the landscape, but also demands that the viewer's attention return to the foreground, where the Wanderer steadfastly remains transfixed, becoming a symbolic representation of man's divided position between raw nature and civilization. Meanwhile, the far-off landscape is infused with light and appears figured in much more detail, a visual effect that contrasts
the presumption of distance that the foreground suggests. Therefore, using compositional and figurative devices, Friedrich delivers a narrative that implies that civilization has alienated man from nature, from the light, and presumably from God. Effectively, Friedrich has engaged the viewer's perception of distance and linked this to abstract metaphorical references that produce the general narrative message described above.

The components of an appropriation never operate in isolation; accordingly, Friederich's painting deposits these references at the frame of Muniz's picture plane, where they are available and may generate other referential connections with the imagery that appears in Muniz's picture plane. Unlike Friederich's picture, which focuses the viewer's attention on the landscape beyond, Muniz focuses the viewer's attention on the foreground. Thus, the foreground of Muniz's picture arrests this German Romantic painter's fascination with man's alienation from the sublime rawness of nature by introducing it to a very different craggy mound, one composed of cigarette butts, ash, and spent matches. In fact, the high realism of the cigarette butts command the viewer's attention and the viewer returns to them again and again, even after having found Friederich's Wanderer above. Ironically, where Friedrich's Wanderer appears fixed on his perch, unable to travel farther into the wilds beyond, Muniz's looks like he is actually descending into the valley and on his way to the hills beyond. This impression occurs even though Muniz's Wanderer is positioned on the mound in exactly the same way as Friedrich's. Muniz creates the optical impression that
his *Wanderer* is entering the valley through his material, for his figure appears to be dissolving into the landscape. His hair, blowing in the wind, has actually become part of a distant mountain. Likewise, his left shoulder is disintegrating and drifting into the background. This effect is especially pronounced on the entire left side of the image, where any figuration has disappeared completely, and the image has become a non-descript strip of black and white speckles that emphasizes the surface of the print. In other words, unlike Friedrich’s *Wanderer*, Muniz’s image is barely articulated and is on its way to returning to its raw materials.

This effect produces a very humorous translation, for Muniz’s mound of cigarette butts end up sharing the same symbolic position as Friedrich’s *Wanderer*, that is, they are alienated from the landscape with which they share their true material nature. Thus, the viewer is left to wonder: is Muniz’s picture meant to convey a commentary on the fate of smokers, banished to the outdoors to pursue their addictions and thereby alienated from the rest of civilization? Perhaps. This inane narrative connection is the result of the associations that the new context of Muniz’s appropriation opens, but on a material level these humorous references move in another direction.

As this work so clearly illustrates, the act of illusionary representation engages material in a transformative process. Like Friedrich’s *Wanderer*, Muniz’s material—the cigarette ash—has been alienated from its true nature; that is, in
order for Muniz’s appropriated image of the Wanderer to appear its material identity as cigarette ashes must recede. Like underscoring, Muniz’s photograph actually doubles this fact; for, in actuality neither the cigarette ash nor the Wanderer is present in Muniz’s work. In fact, the cigarette butts that visually insist upon their sculptural presence are no more real than the Wanderer above. Thus, Muniz’s photograph appears to function like two photographs in one. In actuality it is a picture of two different kinds of representation: the first—the cigarettes—is a mimetic picture of objects that effectively generates a narrative about those objects; the second is a picture of a picture, that is, an appropriation that engages a specific source image and transforms it both referentially and affectively such that it becomes different but retains the residues of its passage through a particular depth of field.

The veracity of Muniz’s ash drawing of the Wanderer fades in the shadow of the real cigarettes, yet in the plane of the photograph Muniz reverses this effect. The focus and lighting of Muniz’s photograph lends the cigarette butts a hyper-real quality. As a result, they cast dramatic shadows and seem larger than life. This fantastic condition is also enhanced by the fact that the photograph removes the nauseating smell of the real cigarette butts, which would otherwise dominate the viewing experience and overpower any other impressions. Similarly, the ash drawing inherits a hyper-real quality from its photographic reproduction, but here this affect enhances the reality of the illustration rather than diminishing it through exaggeration.
Muniz's figuration of the actual drawing is fragile and entirely vulnerable to the slightest breath; it is only the material effects of the photograph that give it solidity and prevent it from disintegrating. For, not only is the drawing extremely fragile, but its actual articulation is also somewhat vague, making it difficult to discern the imagery; the photographic expression, however, changes both of these qualities. Through the materialized photograph, the intense lighting is transformed such that the electric lighting actually becomes part of the two-dimensional figuration captured in the print. This lighting is presented as part of the drawing, a material effect that enhances the three-dimensional illusion of the figuration as well as the reflective power of the whites. As a result, the entire picture holds together better both materially and figurally. This transformation might suggest a transcendence, a step outside of time, and a permanent fixing of the image in which material decay has been arrested. In fact no such thing is possible, rather the image has simply left the material expression of cigarette ash behind and entered a new material expression, namely photography, where it will also decay but differently. Ultimately, Muniz's photograph depicts the delicate balance that exists between a figuration and its material expression—the figuration is simultaneously dependent upon the material expression, even as it is threatened by its material affects. Thus, Muniz underscores the fact that material changes everything.
Just my imagination runnin away with me...

For Muniz, Friedrich’s image provides a point of departure that is clearly articulated through the figural image. In all of the works that have been considered in this chapter, save Bacon’s, the point of departure or source image has been made evident through the figuration. In David Hilliard’s photograph *The Swimmers* (figure 97) the appropriated image is not figurally obvious. As a result, this work pushes at the limits that define appropriation art, and in doing so it completes the direction set out by the Simulationists of the mid-eighties and by Cindy Sherman before that.

Although the source for Hilliard’s photograph is not readily apparent in the image, the title—*The Swimmers*—provides a clue. Still, in and of itself, this title is too generic to point to Hilliard’s specific source, Thomas Eakins’ 1885 painting *The Swimming Hole* (figure 98). Most viewers will only learn about Hilliard’s source because, like Bacon, Hilliard has informed his viewers of his appropriation.219 Once identified, Eakins’ picture begins to resonate with the figuration in the dark background of the left panel of Hilliard’s triptych. Here, viewers see an array of boys swimming in a river that recalls Eakins’ composition somewhat. As in Eakins’ painting, all of Hilliard’s swimmers are male and depicted both in and out of the water. Despite these similarities, figural differences prevail. Where Eakins’ painting shows young nude men in classical poses; Hilliard’s picture features boys, all clad in swimming trunks and casually posed. Their youthful
age is further emphasized by their mode of transportation—bikes, which appear
discarded on the grass depicted in the third panel. Still, the major difference
between Hilliard's image and Eakins' is found in the central panel, where a single
boy appears, isolated on the river bank, and apparently left out of the others'
reveries in the water downstream.

As noted at the outset of this chapter, if an appropriation does not establish a
relationship with its source figurally, it must do so virtually. Hilliard achieves this
primarily through the lone figure in his central panel. Situated in the foreground
of the central panel, this isolated boy appears with his back to the viewer, sitting
on the riverbank and dangling his legs in the water below. The sunlight washes
his bare back, illuminating his undeveloped musculature and his winter-white
skin. His posture reveals that he is staring out across the river, at the trees
beyond, but the camera angle skews this reality, creating the impression that his
head has been turned slightly, as if to gaze, perhaps longingly, at the boys
playing in the water downriver. This lone boy is situated between the bikes and
the other boys, which compositionally implies that he was once apart of the group
that traveled together on their bikes to play in the river. Why this awkward
isolation? Something has clearly isolated this boy, but Hilliard offers viewers no
other definitive narrative clues to help solve this apparent mystery.

As several art historians have pointed out, a subtext of homosexuality runs
throughout Eakins' work, particularly his painting The Swimming Hole.\textsuperscript{220}
Moreover, this contextual reference, which the appropriated image supplies, is in
keeping with the subject matter of Hilliard's larger oeuvre, which has dealt with
the intimacy of gay relationships and desire. Thus, a possible explanation for the
boy's isolation might be located. Yet, and somewhat significantly, this isolated
boy does not appear in Eakins' picture. Hilliard has fabricated him and
positioned him as if he has literally emerged from the group in the background,
both the young trunk-clad boys and the nude men in Eakins' picture.
Nevertheless, it is through this isolated figure that Hilliard most powerfully
connects with Eakins' image, for within this boy viewers may locate the emotional
isolation that a repressive society, intolerant of homosexual behavior, might
create.

Here, it might be worth recalling Bacon's interpretive sensation, for this boy
brings forward an expression that is not readily available in Eakins' work but that
is recognizable after the fact of Hilliard's picture, that is a potential brought to
fruition through the viewer named Hilliard. Indeed, through the wake of Hilliard's
picture, viewers may now identify a lone figure, who is separated from the nude
men depicted in Eakins' Swimming Hole. In the bottom right corner, almost
hidden in Eakins' panting, viewers see a bearded man swimming in the water,
gazing at the others and decidedly separate from the rest of the group. Art
historians have identified this figure as a self-portrait and further noted how his
position in the painting mirrors Eakins' distant relationship, perhaps even denial
of his homosexual desires. Thus, in this frame Hilliard's picture both depicts
and imagines the reality of a young boy isolated by his similarly confusing desire. Through Hilliard's picture, viewers might also imagine that the young boy is looking out on a future beset by a conflicted distance among men; perhaps he is realizing, even at this young age, the threat that his very presence will embody if he openly acknowledges his desire...

Powerfully, Hilliard has engaged Eakins' picture and much that it references as a point of departure. Within this frame, Hilliard's image resonates with a strong sense of feeling isolated in a somewhat public setting. The depth of this experience goes beyond simple alienation, for it is sexualized and mixed with a subtle sense of fear, despair and even humiliation. In the light of these affects the beautiful rural setting of the river becomes horrifically uncomfortable and cruel. Ironically, by conveying these intense affects, Hilliard takes a tremendous step away from Eakins' picture, which is more classical in its calm demeanor and non-emotional rigor. Moreover, through this departure, Hilliard opens another figural presence.

As the viewer concentrates on this boy and imagine with Hilliard his story beyond the depicted scene, the details of the landscape fade away. Instead, the viewer focuses primarily on this boy's half-naked torso depicted in his red swimming trunks. Looking intently, the viewer may sense his white unexposed skin that has become ghostly in the intense sunlight. The viewer might notice his cropped reddish-brown hair and something familiar about his shoulders slumping slightly
forward, his knees bent, feet dangling in the river beyond...and then suddenly the image might open. Or perhaps more accurately stated, another presence might begin to haunt Hilliard’s figuration.

Out of his riverbank, which is situated like Eakins’ in the late nineteenth-century, comes another boy who, like Hilliard’s, is also painfully aware of being both isolated and alienated. Suddenly and fleetingly, Georges Seurat’s redhead bather becomes present in Hilliard’s picture. Significantly, the image of this boy depicted in Seurat’s *Bathers at Asnières* (figure 99), never actually appears; it cannot, as Seurat’s painting is not being appropriated, nor is it even being generally referenced, as we saw in the Finlays’ *See Poussin/Hear Lorrian*. Instead, a topological shape shifting is threatening but not actualizing.

As discussed in chapter three, the serial condition of appropriation art is created by topological figures. Thus, where chapter three showed how Walter Robinson’s work accessed several other works through his figuration, here, Hilliard accesses Seurat’s work qualitatively, an exchange that allows the figural expression of his image to interpolate Seurat’s image as part of its serial expression. Significantly, like Robinson’s work, this topological connection does not exist prior to Hilliard’s work; it is not a connection waiting to be found, it is a potential that only comes into being through Hilliard’s work. Moreover, it is a potential that exists as part of Hilliard’s work’s duration, for it appears through the viewer and not through the material object.
Like Christensen’s appropriation of Caravaggio, this presence appears only as a potential of the duration that is actualized through the viewer; in fact, it is entirely dependent upon the viewer to find Seurat’s *Bather* and to experience its presence. Thus, Hilliard opens a potential in Seurat’s image at the virtual level and thereby releases a thematic, homosexual desire that does not actually exist in Seurat’s picture. Nevertheless, the potential of this translation may be found after the fact of Hilliard’s picture and in the particulars of Seurat’s image: a group of men on the edge of a river, isolated from each other and the society depicted in the background, and finally the central boy in the red trunks whose posture and affect closely echo Hilliard’s boy.

The background of Hilliard’s left panel makes visibly clear his point of departure, but its diminished role allows the image to open an unexpected topological connection to Seurat’s *Bathers at Asnières*. Thus, Hilliard’s picture demonstrates how a virtual image interacting with the referential possibilities and affective qualities of an appropriation can create an unexpected alliance that produces a topological relationship between Seurat’s and Eakins’ images. What’s important to recognize here is that this relationship is not inherent to Seurat’s and Eakins’ images. Potential does not exist until it is created; Hilliard creates the potential but the viewer must realize it. Thus, these two source images only participate in each other through the viewer’s interaction with Hilliard picture. In fact, here Hilliard’s picture becomes a Barthian reader, a unity in which none of the
quotations is lost. In this way, a new serial development is initiated, another line of flight opens potential, and a different duration expands, waiting for a depth of field to actualize its expression and recreate the image once again, over and over again.
Conclusion

In the late 1970s and early eighties appropriation art swamped the postmodern art world. It appeared in two distinct forms: appropriation after art and appropriation after media; the former version was almost as old as art itself, while evidence of the latter practice can be traced back at least to Cubist collages. Postmodern appropriation art after media was largely an investigation of the semiotic operations of the visual image; postmodern appropriation art after art took this investigation of visual imagery to the material level, and this has been the primary focus of this thesis.

Throughout this thesis, appropriation art has been defined as the movement of imagery into new material expressions and contextual terrains. The effects of movement revealed that the appropriated image was something separate and different from what appears in the source artwork. This difference was established through the recognition that an image cannot appear without material to express it and materials ultimately reshape the expressive qualities of an image. In addition, the actual materialization of an appropriated image occurs within a specific context that expands the referential potential of the image beyond its sources. Thus, this thesis explored how appropriation artworks present redundant images that are nonetheless new, and how, through this process, artists redefined authorship and visual representation in general.
Ultimately, the past image that is engaged in the appropriation process never remains the same, and in this regard the physical art object becomes its own author, fashioning both meaning and expression through an interactive performance of its component parts: context, material expression, and the image. This perception of appropriation art leads to the conclusion that all appropriations, no matter how carefully they ape their sources, become singularly different works of art. Accordingly, appropriations embody a fundamental contradiction: they are unique copies. Which is to say that appropriation art demonstrates the Deleuzian notion that repetition is the vehicle through which difference enters the world. The late nineteenth-century copyists reached a similar conclusion, but then difference was wed to human expression, or to use Douglas Crimp’s terminology, to the sovereign self. In the late twentieth-century appropriation artists rescued expression from this unfortunate marriage. By realigning expression with the materiality and context of an artwork, appropriation artists thus refined their role. Rather than creator, the appropriation artist became a conduit or a plane of passage. Meanwhile, the art object became the source of expression and meaning, in a word, the author.

The ramifications of defining appropriation art as movement underscored an important oversight in the critical interpretations of rephotography that emerged in the early eighties. As noted in chapter one, these critics focused almost exclusively on the effects of context and turned a blind eye to the qualitative contributions of material expression. Craig Owens, for example, described
appropriation art as reading one image through the frame of another.\textsuperscript{223}
Accordingly, appropriation art was defined as a meta-textual practice, contextually designed to generate commentary on the source image. Although these early interpretations of appropriation art recognized the presence of a new context, which implied some form of movement, the construct of reframing for the sake of commentary required sameness at the level of the image. Therefore, the appropriated image was perceived to be the same as the source image. In contrast to this perception, this thesis has argued that movement transforms the image and thereby extends it, producing artworks that are simultaneously derivative and singular. In this regard, appropriation art resolved an important issue that had haunted twentieth-century visual art.

As the critics of the early eighties recognized, the context of an appropriation artwork shapes the meaning that an image conveys. By exploring the effects of different contexts, appropriation artists were expanding upon the work of several conceptual artists, such as Joseph Kosuth, Daniel Buren and others. However, unlike most conceptual artists—who either did away with the material object entirely or simply used it as an artifact designed to carry meaning—appropriation artists focused on the affective qualities of material expression. This interest in the virtual affects of materiality intersected with Minimalism’s efforts to activate the physical presence of the art object. Surprisingly enough, by bringing these two concerns together—the translational effects of context and the virtual affects of material expression—the appropriationists answered a question that Clement
Greenberg had raised several decades earlier: What is it that distinguishes the visual arts from all other arts? How are paintings and sculptures different from literature, theater, and music? Where Greenberg located difference in the medium of an artwork, appropriation artists located it in the material expression of the actual art object. Thus, where Greenberg defined material quantitatively and in terms of the formal structures of each medium—such as the flatness of painting—appropriation artists demonstrated that material expression is a qualitative affect that expresses every image in a singular manner. Therefore, unlike text, which operates more like mimetic representation in that it actively ignores its material expression, the visual art object engages the affective qualities of its material expression. In this regard, the visual arts more closely resemble music, poetry and theater. However, each of these arts becomes somewhat uniquely defined by the affective qualities of the materials that they employ; in fact, at the material level all artworks become singularly expressive, a condition that makes the categorical definitions of mediums somewhat moot.

Ultimately, postmodern appropriation artists demonstrated that every material creates a unique affect that is particular to its expression; in other words, even two photographs do not have the same material expression. Effectively, appropriation artists demonstrated the profound and dynamic exchange that occurs when an image enters a new material and contextual expression, which together qualitatively transforms and effectively translates the image. As a result, they redefined representation as a performative event. To explore this precept in
more detail this thesis looked at how the three components of appropriation art—context, image and material expression—operate specifically, and chapters two through four each offered an in-depth investigation of one of these three elements.

Accordingly, chapter two took up context and demonstrated how acknowledging the movement inherent to appropriation art situates authorship within the actual art objects, for the passage of a redundant image into a new location or context sets up a new field of referential relationships and figural interactions. Like text, the referential operations of visual images are complex systems that change with time and location. Thus, appropriated images not only point to their source artworks as referents, they also engage these referents with a myriad of other associations that are determined in the new context of the appropriation. Through this new context, the referential potential of the source image expands exponentially, which allows the appropriated image to speak in a manner that the source image could not. This is not commentary as much as a serial extension of the referential possibilities locked in the source image. With authorship situated in the art object chapters three and four, respectively, considered how the figuration and the material shaped the expression of an appropriation.

Throughout the late twentieth-century, appropriation artists explored the potential of movement that appropriation art releases in two specific ways: first figurally and then materially. Thus, in the mid-eighties appropriation art re-emerged
under the name of Simulationism; these appropriations no longer aped the figuration of their source artworks. Without a figural resemblance the power of the referential relationship between the source work and the appropriation was greatly diminished. This underscored the fact that a visual image is composed of a figuration that performs references. Through an analysis of specific works, chapter three demonstrated that the figuration of an image is not the same as its referential function and that figurally each visual image exists as a unique material expression. In addition, chapter three showed how the Simulationists overloaded and thus disabled the referential function of their appropriated images, thereby setting up a stronger relationship with their sources through the virtual image. By activating the virtual image, the Simulationists' works encouraged the viewer to imagine a sensual presence of the source artwork. Thus, through a further analysis of specific works, chapter three established that the appropriated image moves as a virtual presence and that this presence, the virtual image, is the driving force behind the appropriation process.

While the Simulationists did away with figural resemblance, other appropriationists—particularly the Young British Artists—moved in the opposite direction. Recalling the efforts of rephotography, these artists created artworks that reproduced the imagery of their sources almost exactly but then deployed these appropriated images in drastically different material expressions. Thus, almost scientifically, they underscored the affective qualities of material
expression on imagery. Accordingly, chapter four looked at works by the YBAs to consider how material expression impacts the appropriated image.

Throughout, this thesis has maintained that postmodern appropriation art after art has always been concerned with the power of material expression to transform imagery. Thus, where chapter one found evidence of this in its most exact forms—Levine’s rephotographs, which captured the material graininess and slight blurring inherent to reproductions but not present in her sources—chapter four explored how Levine’s interest in the affective qualities of material expression dramatically developed in 1989, when she transformed Marcel Duchamp’s “Bachelors” by re-expressing these figurations as three-dimensional glass forms. Here, the transformation of the appropriated imagery was so complete that without the help of Levine’s title most viewers would not recognize the source nor even necessarily identify these works as appropriations. Through this insistence upon the material fact of appropriation art, works such as Levine’s Bachelors not only underscored the creativity of this redundant practice, but they also revealed that the initial interpretations, which had characterized appropriation art and particularly rephotography as exact copies, were no longer relevant, if they were ever really accurate.

Finally, the last chapter explored how the three components of appropriation art—image, context, and material expression—work together to access the viewer. This exploration established that the appropriation artist always begins
as a viewer who experiences the source artwork as a duration, which is the qualitative experience of a virtual image in movement. In this regard, the source artwork provides a point of departure. When the virtual image departs from a source, its full potential opens in a depth of field, which transforms it. This transformation continues as the virtual image enters its new material and contextual expressions. Actualized, the appropriated image reappears differently but it retains residues of its passage from the source image; thus it not only becomes a new redundancy, but it also defines appropriation art as a serial expression that occurs through time. Chapter five also looked at how the redundancy inherent to appropriation art maintains a specific relationship with the source image through a depth of field and how this relationship with a specific source artwork distinguishes appropriation artworks from other forms of representation.

To sum this up, this thesis now concludes by taking up one final example of appropriation art that functions as both art after art and art after media, namely, Christian Marclay’s 2003 installation, *The Bell and The Glass*. Like so many appropriation artworks, this one names its sources through the title: they are the Liberty Bell and Duchamp’s *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors (The Large Glass)* even. Situated between this dual lineage, Marclay’s appropriation *The Bell and The Glass* makes it somewhat easier for viewers to see how the depth of field develops, for Marclay specifically builds this depth of field by establishing a constellation of correspondences through a dramatic composition
of highly disparate elements. Accordingly, viewers find a close-up view of Duchamp's "Bachelors", depicted behind the lines of their cracked glass, juxtaposed with an image of the liberty bell surrounded by navy men dressed in their formal whites (figure 100). This juxtaposition resonates like a plucked violin string, full of potential and held but without any specific definitions being narrated. As a result, viewers might analyze the depth of connections that this juxtaposition creates—bachelors and sailors...one group under cracked glass and situated below their bride, while the other surrounds the bulbous bell and her prominent crack...—and viewers might also savor the experience of the virtual space that opens between these references and the other possible connections that continue to multiply there. In Marclay's installation there are countless juxtapositions such as this one, and all of them vibrate with potential. Thus, Marclay's piece unleashes the intertextual power of referentiality, which creates irrational connections that appear in the depth of field that this piece produces. As Ingrid Schaffner has observed:

The pressure Marclay produces by connecting two things that ultimately have nothing to do with one another, is enough to create exactly that thing which has been seen to unite them. The more the Liberty Bell and THE LARGE GLASS come together, the closer one's capacity to keep them either together or apart comes to cracking.224

Ultimately, Marclay's work demonstrates both figuratively and actually that the depth of field, which develops through an appropriation, is an opening that releases the potential lodged but not expressed in the source image.
If it is easier to see the depth of field of this work, the same cannot be said for the material expression. For, the actual artwork is a temporary installation that features a dual screen projection, a musical score, an artist book, and several display cases filled with souvenir glass Liberty Bells and artifacts referencing Duchamp that were borrowed from the Philadelphia Museum of Art. Each of these different material expressions lends its inherent qualities to the presentation and thereby further opens the source imagery, giving the illogical coincidences that appear between them a material presence. This is particularly evident in the musical score, which was made by transcribing the pitch of Duchamp’s voice into musical notes. Incidentally, the recording of Duchamp’s voice comes from an interview in which he is recounting the story of how the glass cracked. This recording passes through the depth of field, where it becomes musical notes that materialize during the actual presentation of Marclay’s installation, when the score was played live by Rêlache, an instrumental ensemble of musicians who were free to improvise with the sound track of the video and other ambient sounds in the gallery. Thus, in this component alone viewers might recognize how a referent of “The Large Glass”—Duchamp’s interview—entered Marclay’s piece and was materially transformed, becoming something other that expressed a different duration. Likewise, the inherent qualities of the video projection are engaged to superimpose imagery and create a rapid-fire sense of movement, all of which further enhances the expression or duration of this piece.
Similar developments are evident in the artist book, which also functions as a catalogue for the installation project. In lieu of a curatorial essay, the book features a transcription of a conversation about the piece between Marclay; Thomas Levin, chairman of the Department of Germanic Languages and Literature at Princeton University; Thaddeus Squire, artistic and executive director of Rêlache; and Ann Tempkin, curator of Modern and Contemporary Art at the Philadelphia Museum of Art. The text of this transcription includes 96 informational footnotes, which become lines of flight that create cracks in the conversation. Thus, we learn about a vandal’s attack on the Liberty Bell; we find a biblical excerpt from Leviticus that cites liberty; we discover that Lore’s Chocolates makes candy Liberty Bells and that bars of chocolate were always sitting on the window sill of Duchamp’s studio, which has been described as “a typical bachelor’s niche”; we read Ocavio Paz’s definition of the pun; and we find a number of other odd tidbits that become strangely related. Effectively, even as the notes “crack” open the conversation, they connect it to the other elements in the installation and take the conversation in other multiple directions. Ultimately, the qualitative condition of a crack becomes present. Significantly, this artist book becomes the conceptual artifact that viewers take away from this installation, for the actual piece disappears when it is not on display and materially present, a condition that further underscores the singularity of visual artworks that appropriation art invests in.
Despite the importance of the material elements, fundamentally, this work is held together by its actual context. In fact, composed of multiple references, the frame of this piece becomes the actual installation that presents it. At first, this critical emphasis on context might seem like a return to the analyses that initially shaped the understanding of appropriation art in the early eighties. Yet, closer investigation of the context reveals otherwise. For rather than comment on either source, the context of Marclay’s appropriation brings the various elements of this piece together in a manner that works toward creating interruptions, openings and space for other correspondences. Indeed, this context becomes the expression that allows the duration of this new work to emerge.

As Marclay’s piece and hopefully this thesis demonstrate, appropriation art offers one of the most profound and in-depth investigations of the visual representation process. Appropriation art reveals that visual images are always composed with redundant images that become new through a dynamic interaction with their contextual and material expressions. Appropriation art demonstrates that artists are viewers that collaborate with these expressive elements. And finally, appropriation art demonstrates that viewing entails the experience of a duration, a qualitative movement that always produces change by accessing the potential of an image through a virtual depth of field. In the end appropriation art made it clear that visual artworks do much more than communicate, they express durations.
Endnotes

1 Craig Owens, “Sherrie Levine at A&M Artworks,” *Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power, and Culture* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992) 114. I have avoided a more in-depth analysis of Levine’s work here because her work will be the focus of chapter one.

2 In the mid-eighties Jeff Koons will expand the range of Warhol’s Brillo boxes by hiring skilled craftsmen to create exact replicas of high-end commodity packages. To distinguish these from Readymades, critics will coin the term “remade”.


4 In part Sherman achieved this by exhibiting the “film stills” in clusters so that her own presence as the consistent actress would become apparent; additional devices included the presence of anachronistic objects such as a 1970 Manhattan phone book in the background of Untitled number 4 as well as shutter cords left visible in numbers 6, 10, 11, 34 and 35. Prince, on the other hand, questioned the veracity of the source image as discussed earlier.

5 The quality of mechanical reproduction extended postmodern appropriation to other related mediums such as film and video.


13 Michael Asher’s work operates in a similar manner; however, rather than appropriating imagery he enters the museum and uses actual artworks. Fred Wilson’s *Mining the Museum* project follows a similar path by using actual artifacts to interrogate the somewhat invisible legacy of racism in most history museums. Similarly, the collective Group Material appropriated imagery and objects from popular culture to create and critique museum exhibitions. Finally, Thomas Struth’s work must also be mentioned here. Like Lawler, Struth photographs other artworks on display; however, his primary focus is on the viewers, as he literally depicts the act of looking. Significantly, both Lawler’s and Struth’s work treat the past artwork as a prop, a quality that tends to preserve the integrity of the original artwork as a discrete material object. In this regard these artists continue a well-established tradition of depicting past artworks hanging on the walls in the background of an interior scene.


15 Buchloh 43-56.


17 Buchloh 49.
20 Significant discussions of appropriation came from Douglas Crimp, Rosalind Krauss, Craig Owens, Benjamin Buchloh, and later Hal Foster.
24 Foster 197.
25 To credit the “New Image” exhibition with orchestrating this shift entirely would be an exaggeration, for several other exhibitions devoted exclusively to painting were mounted around the same time. Still, the “New Image” exhibition received the most critical attention and it specifically aligned certain painters with the semiotic investigation of representation that was so pertinent to the discussions surrounding rephotography. Other painting exhibitions included “A Painting Show” presented at P.S. 1 in 1977 and featuring 41 artists, in 1978 the Albright-Knox Art Gallery in Buffalo, NY, presented “American Painting of the 1970’s” and in 1979 Barbara Rose curated “American Painting: The Eighties” at the Grey Art Gallery and the New Museum of Contemporary Art presented “Bad Painting”. In April, 1980, Mary Boone’s gallery presented a group show featuring Ross Bleckner, David Salle, and Julian Schnabel and later that year, in September, Sporone Westwater Fischer hosted an exhibition of Francisco Clemente’s, Sandro Chia’s and Enzo Cucchi’s work.
27 Marshall 80.
29 Crimp 30.
36 Sandler 281.
37 Owens 135-139.
38 Buchloh 52.
39 It should be noted that Sigmar Polke’s work from the sixties and seventies also includes numerous examples of appropriated imagery. However, by the eighties he had abandoned these interests and was more engaged in a purely abstract exploration of painterly materials. There were also many other painters like Mariani who were reinvesting in a neo-classical style and occasionally citing specific past artworks. See Charles Jencks, *Post-Modernism: The New Classicism in Art and Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, Inc. 1987). Finally, the lesser-known German painter Rainer Fetting should be mentioned here. He was also engaged in a Neo-Expressionistic approach and sometimes produced paintings that included fragments appropriated from past artworks. Like Salle’s use of appropriated imagery, these fragments generally appeared to be arbitrary ornamental elements.
Lisa Liebmann, “Carlo Maria Mariani at Sperone Westwater Fischer,” *Art in America* 70 (February 1982) 143.


Conceptual artworks present a possible exception here, for although most of them engage a physical object, the object primarily functions as a placeholder, effectively a sign for the embodied concept.

Deleuze 56.

Deleuze 10.

Deleuze 56.


As noted in the introduction, Craig Owens and Benjamin Buchloh associated this idea of reading with Walter Benjamin’s definition of allegory and firmly established appropriation art as a form of deconstruction, both the American version of deconstruction based on Roland Barthes’ essay “Mythologies”, which is the version Buchloh applied, and the continental version based on Jacques Derrida’s work, which is the version that Owens applied.

Phillips 23.

Although Levine’s rephotography dates back to 1979, she did not exhibit her rephotographs until 1982, when they debuted at Metro Pictures, New York.


Chapter two will deal with this history in more depth. See Roger Benjamin, “Recovering Authors: The Modern Copy, Copy Exhibitions and Matisse,” *Art History* 12 (June 1989) 176-205; also see Richard Shiff,
64 Owens 115.
65 Owens 54.
67 Walter Benjamin 164-179.
68 Roger Benjamin 177-178.
69 Crimp, “Appropriating Appropriation” 27.
71 Phillips 33.
72 Massumi 4.
73 Massumi 1-21. I am deeply indebted to Brian Massumi for these insights on the relationship between movement and meaning.
74 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, chapter 1-3.
75 Chapter four explores how appropriations created by many of the Young British Artists also maintain sameness at the image level, but in these works the transformative affects of their material expressions are impossible to ignore.
76 Fineberg 184.
77 Fineberg 184.
78 Originally this title appeared simply as part of the wall label identifying the work. However, the work has since been framed and the title now appears on the frame thereby becoming a part of the actual work.
79 For more on the supplement, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Also chapter two of this thesis, which focuses on the effects of context, will discuss these concerns in more depth.
80 Buchloh 43-56.
81 Massumi 3.
82 Krauss 27.
84 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, chapters 1-3.
85 Deleuze 11.
86 Deleuze 11-50.
87 Deleuze 11-50.
88 Deleuze 270.
89 Deleuze 13.
90 Deleuze 13.
91 Carter Ratcliff notes the “washed out” quality of Levine’s photographs in a brief discussion directed toward dismissing their importance. See Carter Ratcliff, “Issues & Commentary: Art & Resentment,” Art in America 70 (Summer 1982) 11.
93 Singerman 80.
94 Singerman 80.
96 Franz 98.
97 See Crow 70-74.
98 In fact, her Flowers (after Warhol) series was created using the same silkscreen that Warhol used; Warhol lent the screen to Sturtevant, fully aware of her intentions. See Bruce Hainley, “Erase and Rewind,” Sturtevant: Shifting Mental Structures (Ostfildern-Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2002).
99 In 1985 Sturtevant’s work was featured in the group show, titled “Production Re: Production” and curated by Bob Nickas at Gallery 354/Art for Social Change. However, from 1974 until 1985, Sturtevant neither exhibited nor produced work. Some critics saw this as yet another artistic imitation, namely an imitation of Duchamp’s retreat from art making. See Bruce Hainley, “Sturtevant talks to Bruce Hainley” ArtForum XLI (March 2003) 246-247.

More recently, Sturtevant has conceded that everything is a copy, including her work. See Tolnay.

Crimp, “Pictures” 177.


Krauss 27.

This latter crisis of representation was also informed by the theoretical work of Jean Baudrillard, which will be addressed in chapter three.


See Foucault, 205-222.

Foucault 217.

Foucault 221-222.

Like the original 1916 St. Petersburg exhibition, the Belgrade version was initially presented in an apartment before moving to the Skuc Gallery. The Fiction Reconstructed project also included a remake of the 1913 Armory show and a lecture titled “Walter Benjamin: Mondrian 1963-1996”. In 1992 the project came to Manhattan, where it manifested Salon de Fluerus, a detailed recreation of Gertrude and Leo Stein’s apartment that included reproductions of their art collection. This particular manifestation of Fiction Reconstructed was also featured in the 2002 Whitney and Sydney Biennials.

This remains true even though it has now been established that one of the major figures behind this and other similar projects was Goran Djordjevic, who actually served as the doorman and guide for the Salon de Fleurs. This, of course, may change depending upon how history treats Djordjevic.

See Barthes, 142-148.

Barthes 146.


Roger Benjamin actually uses Foucault’s term Author Function to refer to signature style. See Roger Benjamin, 176-205.

Oddly, few postmodern critics cite the history of copyists in their discussions of appropriation art. A rare but insightful exception occurred at the 1988 College Art Association conference, where art historian Roger Benjamin suggested that a precedent for eighties’ appropriation could be located in the previous century’s practice of copyists. Benjamin’s observation drew an immediate response from Rosalind Krauss who asserted that unlike the rejection of originality that characterized the twentieth-century practice, nineteenth-century copying was seen “as a vehicle for making the individuality of the artist in question reveal itself against the backdrop of the pirated image.” Both perceptions are somewhat accurate. See Krauss, “Retaining the Original? The State of the Question,” Retaining the Original: Multiple Originals, Copies, and Reproductions (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1989) 7; and Roger Benjamin, 176-205.


Foucault 211.

Greene 56.

Greene 56.

Greene 57.

Greene 72-73.

Greene 154.

Greene 74-75.

Greene 75.

Deleuze 76.

Greene 77.


Cave 36.
130 Cave 43.
131 Cave 43.
133 Greene 99.
138 Rosenblum 8.
139 See Roger Benjamin, 177-180.
140 See Ackerman, 125-141.
142 Reynolds actually advocated Renaissance imitation, a less exact form of copying that paid tribute to a past master while simultaneously establishing the younger artist's contribution to a particular lineage. See Ackerman.
143 See Roger Benjamin, 184.
144 Presented at Chez MM. Bernheim Jeune & Cie., the exhibition featured 116 works, including both copies and imitations that came from a wide range of both living and dead artists. The Frick Art Reference Library, New York, holds an exhibition pamphlet listing all of the works included in this exhibition.
145 See Boime as well as Roger Benjamin.
149 Homburg 105-107.
150 There are examples of artworks that explicitly cite past images throughout the twentieth century. This practice begins to return to prominence in the 1950s and becomes something of an all out trend in the Pop Art movement. See Lipman and Marshall.
151 Lipman and Marshall 92.
152 Lipman and Marshall 92.
154 As Robert Rosenblum pointed out, the precedent for this approach is Benjamin West's The Death of General Wolfe, which compares Wolfe's death to Christ's by quoting Van Dyck's Lamentation. See Rosenblum, 20.
157 Barthes 147-148.
158 Barthes 147.
159 Technically speaking, written text also has a material expression—ink on paper for example—however the role of material expression in a textual artwork is entirely subservient to the referential function of these signs; this is hardly the case with imagery in visual artworks.
160 As noted in the introduction and chapter one, Benjamin Buchloh and Rosalind Krauss specifically cite Barthes' work in their discussion of appropriation art.
See Lipman and Marshall.

Barthes 147.

Photos Giovanis, director P.P.O.W. Gallery (e-mail communication, May 7, 2004, 12:25:27).


Barthes 145-146.

Barthes 146.

Barthes 147.

Barthes 147-148.

Barthes 147-148.


Barthes 148.

Barthes 148.

Barthes 148.

Barthes 148.

Barthes 148.


The interconnected referential nature of signs is often described as the "poetics of language". See Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) 159-209.

By 1986, these terms had become interchangeable. Initially, Neo-Geo was established to distinguish these artists from the Neo-Expressionists—Julian Schnabel, David Salle, Francesco Clemente, Sandro Chia, and others—discussed in the introduction. Where the Neo-Expressionists seemed to be "appropriating" the gestural style of the action painters, the style of the Neo-Geo artists was more in tune with Minimalism. The term Commodity Art grew up around works that aped the look of commercial products. (Jeff Koons’ and Haim Steinbach’s works are exemplary here.) Simulation Art embodies a reference to Jean Baudrillard’s discussion of the simulacrum, which Peter Halley regularly cited in interviews as well as in his critical essay about this work. See Peter Schjeldahl, "A Visit to the Salon of Autumn 1986," *Art in America* 74 (December 1986) 15-21; Peter Halley, *Collected Essays 1981-1987* (Zurich: Galerie Bischofberger, 1988).


This exhibition featured work by Richard Baim, Gretchen Bender, Ross Bleckner, Peter Halley, Perry Hoberman, General Idea, Jon Kessler, Jeff Koons, Sherrie Levine, Joel Otterson, Haim Steinbach, and Philip Taaffe.

See David Robbins, ed., "From Criticism to Complicity," *Flash Art* 129 (Summer 1986) 46-49. This article offers an edited transcript of the panel discussion, which was originally held at the Pat Hearn Gallery in New York on May 2, 1986; the panel discussion participants included Ashley Bickerton, Peter Halley, Jeff Koons, Sherrie Levine, Haim Steinbach, and Philip Taaffe; Peter Nagy was the moderator.

The phrasing here is an abbreviated version of Ashley Bickerton’s comments made during the aforementioned panel discussion. See Robbins.

Crimp, "Appropriating Appropriation" 27-34.


Robbins 47.

Foster 104-105.

Koons’ work has definitely appropriated imagery (the vacuum cleaners) from popular culture and it therefore qualifies as appropriation art after media. However, since this text is limited to an investigation of appropriation as art after art, Koons’ work will not be considered an appropriation here.


Again, like Koons’ piece mentioned earlier, this fails as an example of art after art, but by moving logos it does qualify as appropriation art after media.
This approach—borrowing a referential function separated from an actual image—is actually quite similar to Gran Fury’s strategy of borrowing a stylistic look or composition that was discussed in the introduction.


Greenberg 23-38.

Massumi 134.


The discussion of the virtual image that follows is greatly indebted to Brian Massumi. See Massumi.

As noted in chapter one, Douglas Crimp alluded to the ghostly in his 1979 version of his “Pictures” essay. He associates the ghostly with the presence of the artwork and even describes Jack Goldstein’s performance of _Two Fencers_ as looking “virtual, dematerialized”. Crimp goes on to note “After one fencer had appeared to defeat the other, the spotlight went down, but the performance continued; left in the darkness to listen to a replay of the background music, the audience would attempt to remember that image of fencing that had already appeared in memory. In this doubling by means of the mnemonic experience, the paradoxical mechanism by which memory functions is made apparent: the image is forgotten, replaced.” See Crimp, “Pictures” *October* 8 (Spring 1979) 78. One year later Crimp returned to this reference and redefined this effect of the image as a referential function. See “The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism” *October* 15 (Winter 1980) 92.

Massumi 134.

Thomas Crow disputes this description of Op Art in an insightful essay about Bleckner’s work. See Crow, “Ross Bleckner, or the Conditions of Painting’s Reincarnation,” *Modern Art in the Common Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) 111-127. In particular, see n. 11, a reference to part of the text that apparently was edited out while the note remains.


This work is sometimes exhibited with actual Goya prints that the Chapmans purchased and then altered by drawing on them, adding new marks to Goya’s originals.

If this seems to contradict what was stated in the last chapter about the virtual image, the contradiction is only superficial. When a person imagines that s/he has awoken in her/his childhood bedroom, the person is physically recalling what it felt like in that room, but there are two important differences here. First, the viewer has never seen the appropriated image; therefore, the viewer cannot recall what it felt like. Secondly, what a person might have felt in her/his room is not the same as what was actually qualitatively expressed in the room because human bodies are another material expression that transforms what they receive.


Krauss, *Bachelors* 182.

In many of the other images from this series the brand name “Kodak” can be seen outlined in this black border.


In Bacon’s work from the 1940s through the 1960s there are many examples of appropriated images that were taken from a number of sources, including works by Eadweard Muybridge, Vincent van Gogh, Diego Velázquez, and others. However, in the 1970s Bacon’s use of appropriated imagery diminishes, and in later interviews he expressed regret over these appropriations. See Sylvester.

Sylvester 14.

It is important to point out that difference does not mean originality; it simply means change: new associations and potential transformations.
Generally, appropriation art identifies a singular source; however, as seen in Dotty Attie’s work, for example, sometimes more than one source is engaged. Nevertheless, the sources remain clearly distinct. The use of multiple sources is also possible through works that establish topological relationships, as discussed in chapter three and at the conclusion of this chapter.

Here, it should be noted that appropriation artworks are also visual artworks, which means they too are the product of a myriad of influences, but these influences operate at a different level and in a less direct manner than the specific sources that appropriation artworks replay.


Deleuze, *Bergsonism* 74.

Deleuze, *Bergsonism* 74.


Saslow 196-198.

Barthes 148.

Owens 54.

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Appendix


4. Perugino, *Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to Saint Peter*, 1481-1483.
One day this kid will wake up and realize something that causes a sensation is a product of the separation of the earth from the sky. One day the kid will reach a point where he actively imagines that its true mathematical. One day the kid will feel something stir in his heart, and through his mouth. One day the kid will feel something in his mind and body that make him hungry. One day the kid will do something that he swears he never did. The uniform of Joe's clothing, the man who inherited these shoes, these jeans, the baby's Celtic cross that hangs for his neck. One day the kid will reject legislation against the law. One day the family will get false information to their children and teach them to hate. One day the family will get false information to the entire nation. One day the family will begin to experience all that activity. The activity in the family.


42. Andrea Mantegna, *Dead Christ*, 1501.
44. Peter Blake, *The Meeting or Have a Nice Day Mr. Hockey*, 1981-83.


52. Kasimir Malevich, 0.10 Exhibition Photograph, Petrograd, 1915.


79. Marcel Duchamp, *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (Large Glass)*
1915-23.
82. Baron Francois-Pascal-Simon Gerard, *Comtesse de Morel-Vinde and her Daughter (The Music Lesson)*, 1799.
84. Francis Bacon, *Three Studies for a Crucifixion*, 1962. (detail of right-hand panel)


