A Critical Analysis of World Bank Gender Mainstreaming in El Salvador

Aida Geraldina Polanco Sorto

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Sociology) at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada

June 2006

© Aida Geraldina Polanco Sorto, 2006
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:
L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l’Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n’y aura aucun contenu manquant.
Abstract

A Critical Analysis of World Bank Gender Mainstreaming in El Salvador

Aida Geraldina Polanco Sorto

Since the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the World Bank has launched a series of initiatives that it claims demonstrates its commitment to gender equality through ‘gender mainstreaming’. Gender mainstreaming is part of the ‘human development’ framework, and is supposed to be undertaken for the purpose of promoting greater poverty reduction and gender equality. There are, however, often discrepancies between stated objectives and concrete policy prescriptions.

As pertaining to the tension between stated objectives and realities, in this thesis I investigate the friction between, on the one hand, the World Bank’s commitment to poverty reduction and gender equality through mainstreaming and, on the other, its’ overarching neoliberal framework for development initiatives. I trace the colonization process and draw parallels from this historical advancement and the current ‘development framework’ in the form of neoliberalism. The main goal is to facilitate an understanding to the extent to which gender mainstreaming within the workings of the Bank is capable of making improvements to the lives of girls and women in El Salvador, and in what shape and form these advancements are made. I employ the use of a feminist-Gramscian framework to analytically deconstruct the World Bank’s proposals, its policy prescriptions and the theory of neoclassical economic theory that informs neoliberalism. I supplement these deconstructions with observations drawn from field research on mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador. I conclude that gender mainstreaming is being embraced so as to silence opposition to the neoliberal model of development.
Acknowledgements

There are many people who have supported me and inspired me during these past two years of graduate studies. I would first like to thank my friends who were there for me, notably on several different capacities. Their presence and support (even if in many cases ‘long distance’) always filled me with a sense of security.

I would also like to thank my family. To my mother I would like to thank her for her unwavering support and words of wisdom throughout these past two years. I am particularly grateful for her phone calls and updates regarding my babies - my cats - Michy and Coco. I particularly liked it when she would put them ‘on the phone’ to ‘talk to me’. I would also like to thank my father for his ‘life discussions’ and frequent lunch dates, which always seemed to come exactly when I needed them. I would specially like to thank my best friend Gabriela (who also happens to be my sister). Although it is true that she distracted me too often on MSN, she has nonetheless always been a huge fountain of strength and support for me, as has my other best friend, Maria Panis.

In addition I would like to thank the sociology department at Concordia University for inspiring me and guiding me during my graduate studies. I was especially moved by Fran Shaver and Bill Reimer, whose academic drive and personal qualities have inspired me to continue forward in my own studies. I am also very grateful to Bill Reimer and Sally Cole for being on my graduate defense committee.

I would in particular like to thank my advisor Dr. Marcus Taylor. Marcus was the best supervisor that anyone could ever hope for. He was always extremely generous of his time and his knowledge, and was incredibly supportive throughout this process. I
learnt so much from Marcus and have grown to admire him both as an academic but also as a friend. Thank you, Marcus, for sharing your wisdom and inspiring me.

Last but not least I would like to thank and dedicate this thesis to the country and people of El Salvador. Even in the face of repeated economic, social and political hardships, Salvadorans have struggled and continue to struggle with a sense of resilience, strength and optimism that bares witness to the power of the human spirit. My thesis is a very modest contribution to the literature on El Salvador, and this contribution is tiny in comparison to the warm country and culture that has given so much to me. Nonetheless, I would like to dedicate this thesis to those Salvadorans that I interviewed during my fieldwork experience and to the country and people - my country and people - of El Salvador more generally.
Table of Contents:

Thesis Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1

Chapter One: Global Development from a Historical and Feminist Perspective............. 9
  Colonialism explained through Dependency Theory ............................................. 11
  Primitive Accumulation and Colonial Primitive Accumulation ......................... 15
  Bretton Woods and the Birth of the World Bank ....................................................... 17
  The World Bank has not delivered what it was supposed to .................................. 20
  Biases that have and continue to permeate the Bank ............................................ 20
  Role of foreign aid as ‘development’ ................................................................. 21
  1970s ‘golden age’ of development ..................................................................... 22
  From Keynesianism towards neoliberalism ...................................................... 23
  Structural Adjustment Programs ....................................................................... 25
  World Bank promotes ‘neo-imperialism’ ............................................................ 26
  Development, Neoliberalism and Gender Oppression .......................................... 28
  Maria Mies’ understanding of women under capital accumulation ..................... 29
    ‘Additive approach’ towards women and development .................................... 31
    ‘Superexploitation’ ............................................................................................ 32
  Diane Elson’s theorizing on gender and development ......................................... 34
    ‘Male bias’ .......................................................................................................... 35
    ‘Women’s work’ ................................................................................................. 36
    Male bias in neoclassical economic theories .................................................... 37
    Male bias underlying SAPs .............................................................................. 37
    Households a site of conflict premised on gender lines .................................... 39
  Suzanne Bergeron’s theorizing on gender and development ................................. 40
    Production of ‘knowledge’ marginalizing women ............................................ 41
    Production of knowledge in neoclassical economic theory ............................. 42
    ‘Expert knowledge’ and the Bank ................................................................... 43
    Limitations in feminist critiques of macro economics ...................................... 45
    Women as ‘carers’ ............................................................................................... 46

Chapter Two: Theoretical framework for interrogating the Bank ................................. 50
  Antonio Gramsci and other neo-Gramscians ...................................................... 50
    Hegemony ........................................................................................................ 52
    Common sense ................................................................................................. 54
    Crisis of authority ............................................................................................ 55
    Passive revolution ............................................................................................ 57
  Shifts in economic and development theories .................................................... 58
  From Keynesianism to the ‘Washington consensus’ .......................................... 60
  Neoclassical economic theory .......................................................................... 61
    ‘Homo Economicus’ ....................................................................................... 62
    ‘Say’s Law’ / Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ ................................................... 63
Gendered indicators of inequality...........................................124
Gendered consequences of SAPs...........................................125
Gender mainstreaming within neoliberalism..........................130

Chapter Five: Gender mainstreaming in El Salvador...................132
  Women’s and feminist movement in El Salvador.....................133
    Ties between revolutionary and feminist movement..............135
  Contemporary mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador..........138
    Definitions of gender mainstreaming...............................138
    Different strategies for promoting gender equality..............138
    Gender mainstreaming as rhetoric................................140
    Gender mainstreaming a top-down approach.......................141
    Gender mainstreaming fragmented................................142
    UNDP’s gender mainstreaming.......................................142
    Human development versus economic development................143
    Gender roundtable..................................................145
    ISDEMU.............................................................145
      Limitations of ISDEMU............................................149
      Promoting gender mainstreaming of the ministries.............149
  Central contradictions of gender mainstreaming..................150
    ‘Red Solidaria’.....................................................161
  Mainstreaming disarticulates opposition against neoliberalism...167

Thesis conclusion..................................................................171

Bibliography.........................................................................175

Appendices...........................................................................182
  Fieldwork methodology....................................................182
  List of interviews conducted............................................186
  Consent form (English).....................................................188
  Consent form (Spanish).....................................................190
Thesis Introduction:

Since the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the World Bank has launched a series of initiatives that it claims demonstrates its commitment to gender equality through mainstreaming. According to their definition, "mainstreaming gender into development means understanding the differing needs and constraints faced by women and men that affect productivity and poverty, and then designing actions so that gender-related barriers to economic growth and poverty alleviation are reduced and the material well-being of men, women, and children is enhanced" (World Bank, 2002: 42). There are, however, often discrepancies between stated objectives and concrete policy prescriptions.

As pertaining to the tension between stated objectives and realities, for the purpose of this thesis I investigate the friction between, on the one hand, the World Bank’s commitment to poverty reduction and gender equality through mainstreaming and, on the other, its’ overarching neoliberal framework for development initiatives. The main goal is to facilitate an understanding to the extent to which gender mainstreaming within the workings of the Bank is capable of making improvements to the lives of poor and working class girls and women¹ in El Salvador, and in what shape and form these advancements are made. This is accomplished by undertaking analytical deconstructions of the World Bank’s proposals, its policy prescriptions and supplementing this with observations drawn from field research on mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador.

Through this work I am contributing to critical literature on gender and development. This is an important contribution because, since the birth of the

¹ Whenever I make reference to ‘poor’, ‘working class’, ‘marginalized’, and / or ‘Southern’ girls and women I do not intend for this to imply or mean a homogenous category. Girls and women experience multiple and interacting systems of oppression and indeed some women are privileged at the expense of others. Like the designation ‘racialized women’ this is not intended as a homogenous category.
development project in the 1940s and prior to this development project in the form of colonization, girls and women have largely been absent from discussions on development. Although there have been debates regarding economics, work, workers, markets, the welfare state and the like, disproportionately and undeservedly the underlying assumption has been that the above are gender neutral terms and processes. The recognition that gender ‘matters’ within studies on development has been (for the most part) a recent acknowledgment by the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank. This belatedness has posed significant hardships on girls and women globally, particularly on poor and working class girls and women in Southern countries. It has only been in recent decades that policy prescriptions have begun to take note of the distinct ways that the genders have experienced (and continue to experience) development.

I chose to use El Salvador as my case analysis because of the key role that the World Bank has played in this country since the end of the civil war, totaling loans and credits of US $989 million since its first loan in 1947. It is significant that the World Bank has forwarded a neoliberal development strategy for this country. This is particularly so when noting its most recent country assistance strategy (CAS) for El Salvador of which the Bank, on 22 February 2005, agreed to provide more financial assistance for projects, totaling US $485 million from 2005 to 2008. The level and extent

---

2 According to Philip McMichael, the ‘development project’ was born in the 1940s and witnessed its ‘golden age’ up to the 1970s. During this era there were country-specific pursuits towards economic growth within national boundaries as opposed to producing monoculture goods for exportation on global markets. He posits that this has changed since the late 1970s and early 1980s with the advance of neoliberalism, retreating back to a previous mode of ‘development’ premised on production for global markets through re-establishing and accentuating international divisions of labour (McMichael, 2004).

to which the Bank is involved in El Salvador provides a rich opportunity to test the extent
to which their mainstreaming policies are both prioritized and executed using a
theoretical and discursive analysis, bolstering this with a discussion regarding what the
results of World Bank gender mainstreaming have been on the ground.

I also chose to develop El Salvador as my case analysis because, as Aldo Lauria-
Santiago and Leigh Binford note (2004), “El Salvador is Latin America’s least researched
nation-state, perhaps because of the perceived absence of a large, visible, and “exotic”
indigenous population” (2). With some notable exceptions, when El Salvador has been
researched, this research has disproportionately explored the conditions upon which the
civil war broke out, the armed conflict itself and the period shortly following it. It has not
focused sufficiently on the contemporary situation of El Salvador, particularly as it
relates to more localized understandings of the country. In Laura-Santiago and Binford’s
words (2004), “we not only lack insight into “local” Salvadoran places, institutions, and
experiences….we [have] also missed opportunities to reposit and reframe the larger,
national perspectives” (8). In exploring mainstreaming within the context of
contemporary El Salvador through the use of field interviews, I seek to add to this
negated space by contributing to literature that explores Salvadoran institutions and
experiences within a national framework. This thesis is also an original contribution to
literature on gender and development in that although some others have forwarded
similar arguments as my own as it relates to the character and nature of mainstreaming in
Southern countries (as is later outlined in the following chapters), employing a case
analysis of El Salvador’s practice of gender mainstreaming from a feminist, Gramscian
lens has – as far as I am aware – not been undertaken elsewhere.
The central objective of this thesis is to understand the tensions between the human-centred development rhetoric that gender mainstreaming forwards and the goals and logic of the neoliberal project. I begin in chapter one by examining the relationship between development and gender inequalities in both an analytical and historical perspective. I therefore loosely trace the lineage of 'colonization' and the ways in which this process instigated the formation of an international and gendered division of labour on a global scale. I also explore the manner in which colonization has informed the 'development project', and then continue by providing specific understandings of the dynamics of women's oppression within capitalist development. Through undertaking this I begin to foster a general conceptual framework that helps elaborate aspects of feminism, gender and gender and development, setting the stage for a more in-depth and analytical interrogation.

In the second chapter I introduce the complement to the feminist analysis of my thesis by engaging with Gramscian and neo-Gramscian theorists. I do this so as to create an analytical framework by which to engage with the question of the World Bank, neoliberalism, the issue of gender mainstreaming, the shift from the 'Keynesian', to a 'Washington' and now to a 'post-Washington' consensus and Philip McMichael's argument that the World Bank acts as part of the hegemonic debt regime. Specifically, I employ Gramsci's concepts of 'hegemony', 'ideology', 'crisis of authority' and 'passive revolution' in order to create a theoretical framework for interrogating the implicit assumptions, theories and repercussions permeating the Bank's neoliberal policies. Through an engagement with Gramsci's work, a space is opened for making theoretical sense of the power relations within the Bank, the Bank's ideology and the purpose of this
ideology, and the manner in which this ideology is maintained and reproduced through its discourses (specifically as pertaining to mainstreaming).

In the third chapter I critically analyze the World Bank’s discourses on gender mainstreaming through employing the use of a feminist-Gramscian framework. I discursively analyze two major World Bank publications as pertaining to gender and development more generally and gender mainstreaming more specifically, that of *Engendering Development* (2001) and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work: A Strategy for Action* (2002). I engage with these two documents because they shed light as to the Bank’s theorizing on gender and development and the manner in which this theorizing gets applied into concrete policy prescriptions in the form of gender mainstreaming.

In the fourth chapter I provide a political-economic account of contemporary El Salvador, demonstrating the extent to which neoliberalism has perpetuated and accentuated structural oppression through recent socioeconomic transformations. I do this so as to provide a backdrop for contextualizing the socioeconomic space in which mainstreaming initiatives have been undertaken. This sets the stage for chapter five in which I relay the findings of my fieldwork on gender mainstreaming initiatives in contemporary El Salvador. I make use of the preceding chapter’s historical and theoretical analysis and tools in order to make sense of gender mainstreaming initiatives on the ground in El Salvador.

Prior to continuing further it is important to identify and explain a few limitations that are maintained within this thesis. The first shortcoming is a perfect parallel with what
Joan Acker notes when she states that:

[Although gender includes female and male, masculine and feminine, women and men, in scholarly and everyday practice, including discussions of globalization, gender often means women. Much of the work on gender and globalization is actually research on women, work, and family under contemporary conditions of economic transformations (Acker, 2004: 20).

To a significant extent I was also constrained by this tendency within my research. The reasoning for this is two-fold. Partly this is due to the normative manner in which gender is dealt with in feminist discussions surrounding development. Also I was constrained into maintaining this limitation because this practice is forwarded in most of the Bank’s work and is also typical of the manner in which mainstreaming is applied within contemporary El Salvador.

Certainly there is a need to critically engage with masculinity and its practices within studies on gender relations. There is also a need to acknowledge that ‘marginalized women’ experience multiple and interacting systems of oppression, and that referring to ‘girls and women’, even ‘poor and working class girls and women in Southern countries’ is limited in many regards. I do not employ the use of these terms as though to suggest that this is a homogenous category. Rather, regardless of the constraints in employing this form of language partly due to the limits of this language itself, what I am trying to explicate are the similarities that marginalized Southern girls and women face as a result of current development initiatives. Consequently, I focus on the similarities of experiences faced by girls and women globally so as to explicate and contribute to critical literature on gender and development. This is not because ‘girls and women’ are a homogenous category, but rather because there are gender-specific
hardships that are being perpetuated globally as a result of the current neoliberal model of development that need to be explored.

The second limitation of my research is the potential for perceiving my analysis as disregarding agency of vulnerable persons. It would also be understandable that some might interpret my analysis as suggesting that women are similarly situated, implying that ‘women’ are a homogenous category experiencing neoliberal development uniformly. Both of these potential critiques are rendered possible due to the fact that various research problematics were, for the time being, beyond the scope of my analysis.

This thesis is focused on exploring the tensions underlying the practice of gender mainstreaming and neoliberalism. It is about understanding the reasoning for the embracement of gender mainstreaming, and the manner in which mainstreaming is being applied by institutions such as the World Bank in contexts such as contemporary El Salvador. The struggles faced by Salvadoran women within the context of maquiladora industries are wholly related to processes of capitalist patriarchy, currently in the form of neoliberalism. As are the increasing levels of violence, poverty and precarious work options available to many girls and women. However, the scope of my analysis does not render possible an analysis of women’s experiences within maquiladoras. Nor does it make available the deliberate interviewing of union leaders, maquiladora employers or labourers within other precarious labour industries. This thesis is centrally about the policy practice of gender mainstreaming, the reasoning for its practice, the tensions, challenges and contradictions of its practice and the role of different stakeholders within mainstreaming initiatives specifically, and gender and development issues more generally. Clearly at the heart of these issues are the poor, working class and
marginalized girls and women who are being affected by these practices and policies. However, extensive fieldwork on these issues was (for the time being) beyond the material and temporal capacity of this research. It is, however, an important problematic that others might chose to embark upon. It would, indeed, provide invaluable contributions to critical research on gender and development in El Salvador.

Now that I have recognized a few of the limitations that I have been constrained into partly maintaining due to the character of my research and the scope of its analysis, it is now possible that we redirect our attention to exploring the tensions underlying the neoliberal model of development and gender mainstreaming.
Chapter One:

The goal of the first chapter of this thesis is to facilitate an understanding of the relationship between development and gender inequalities in a manner that is both analytical and historical in perspective. In order to do this, I will first begin by introducing a theoretical framework that makes possible an understanding of the dynamics of global development from a historical perspective as a prelude to appreciating how the gender relations fit into this. To this end, I will be employing the use of dependency theory because of its focus on surplus extraction from periphery countries to the core, and its emphasis on the continuities of north-south relations and the international division of labour from colonialism up to the present. I will then follow by providing an account of how the development project was born, and the distinct forms in which this project has taken. I will as such be providing an account of how the World Bank and the IMF came into existence in 1944 as a result of the conference at Bretton Woods, outlining some of the biases and hierarchal relations that permeated and continue to permeate the World Bank. Through this I demonstrate how neoliberalism has become the contemporary expression of these north-south relations and how the World Bank has become central to the operation of global neoliberalism. I undertake this so as to create a theoretical and historical understanding of the emergence of neoliberalism and the World Bank prior to understanding the role of gender oppression. It is with these theoretical and historical underpinnings that the ability to interrogate the possibilities and limits of gender mainstreaming is facilitated.

Following the discussion of global development and neoliberalism, I continue with a specific gendered analysis of the dynamics of women’s oppression within
capitalist development. Consequently, the concept of ‘male bias’ and the gendered
division of labour are explored as it pertains to the ‘development process’. This is done so
that in the following chapters it is possible to explore the legitimacy of the Bank’s claim
that gender inequality and ‘women’s issues’ are now being properly addressed (and
perhaps even ‘fixed’) within the development project through gender mainstreaming, and
to what extent and form this ‘solution’ is taking place.

Global Development and the Rise of Neoliberalism:

Within the confines of this thesis it is essential to undergo a critical engagement
with what is meant by ‘development’ and the discourses that have informed these
development initiatives. This is because policy prescriptions and gendered discourses are
inserted within the larger traditions of development. Some have argued that the Bank
incorporates discourses diverging from their own (current) neoliberal framework in a
manner that upholds their own ideologies and hegemony (Bergeron, 2003; Molyneux,
2002).⁵ Arturo Escobar also alludes to this when noting that “although the discourse [of
development] has gone through a series of structural changes, the architecture has
remained unchanged…The result has been the succession of development strategies and
substrategies up to the present, always within the confines of the same discursive space”
(Escobar, 1995: 89).

---
⁵ The Gramscian concepts of hegemony and ideology are explored in greater detail in chapter two. But very
briefly, “[h]egemony refers to a dominant group’s ability to make others want the same thing as it wants for
itself” (Wade, 2002: 215). In other words, hegemony is the ability to rule through consent and to make
particular class relations appear legitimate. This is fostered through discourses which construct notions of
‘common sense’, making certain ideological philosophies appear legitimate and fair, aiding in the ability of
the elite to rule through consent. In other words, ideologies disguise the power relations and class
inequalities and attempt to make them appear ‘common sensical’ and legitimate. This in turn helps to
maintain the hegemony.
Some have accused the Bank of merely paying lip service to the need to engage with the issue of gender and development though conversely doing little to make the necessary policy changes which would concretely benefit poor and working class girls and women in the Global South. On the other hand, some have hailed the efforts of the Bank for improving the situation of girls and women within the development process. In order to interrogate the Bank and reach a well-informed conclusion regarding its gender mainstreaming policies, an account of the rise of development and its beneficiaries is necessary.

Development differs from the colonial era that preceded it, though the lineages of the latter still permeate the former. While recent development discourses appear less blatantly racist, classist, sexist, ethnocentric and predatory, there are still clear similarities which resonate amongst the ideological and discursive frameworks of both; these continuities are also present within the workings of the Bank (Bergeron, 2003b: 414-415). The objective of the following section is to make sense of the World Bank and gender mainstreaming as a moment within the ‘development project’ through comprehending it by what preceded it. The following therefore explores how and in what form neoliberalism has been informed by the ideological and discursive framework of colonialism.

In order to demonstrate how neoliberalism has been informed by the logic of colonization, I will be employing the use of dependency theory. Dependency theory is the most appropriate approach to draw upon for this purpose, as it provides the tools for making sense of the overall dynamics of global capitalism and how it has been informed
by what preceded it. As such, dependency theory provides the best analytical tools for understanding the oppression of women as one part of the development process.

According to one of the founders of development theory, Andre Gunder Frank, "contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries" (Frank, 1969: 4). By satellite countries dependency school refers to the economically peripheral countries within the global economic system, while the metropolitan countries constitute the core, wealthy countries. Frank argues that within the global capitalist system, the wealthier countries enriched themselves and continue to enrich themselves as a result of the symbiotic relations that core countries have with peripheral countries. This was accomplished at the expense of peripheral countries, for in his words, "[t]hese regions [of the Global South] did not have a chance against the forces of expanding and developing capitalism, and their own development had to be sacrificed to that of others" (Frank, 1972: 13). In other words, according to the dependency school, core countries enriched themselves because they were able to develop at the expense of the peripheral countries. Beginning in the colonial period, core countries were able to extract raw resources and industrialize while bringing the peripheral countries into a dependent relationship in which their role was to provide raw resources cheaply through their adherence to a monoculture cropping system. This instigated a formation of an international division of labour. It also resulted in the enrichment of core countries through processes of colonization, which could not have been accomplished without the exploitation of peripheral countries: "[t]he successful industrialization of Western Europe was evidently dependent on...the colonization of the
now underdeveloped continents of the world” (Frank, 1969: 176). This is the case because Europe no longer had to focus on its own agriculture development and instead could direct its efforts towards industrialization.

There is an emphasis within the dependency school that is bestowed on the symbiotic exploitative relationship which constitutes the relations between core countries and peripheral countries, to the point that Frank suggests that “the regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past” (Frank, 1969: 13). The dependency school and the national liberation movements which these frameworks informed suggest that what needs to be carried out to improve the economic situation of peripheral countries is that satellite countries need to break their relations with core countries, freeing themselves of this symbiotic, exploitative capitalist relationship (Frank, 1969: 178). Although this proposition is unlikely to materialize, dependency theory aids in the ability to understand the process of colonization and the current underdevelopment and overdevelopment that characterizes the present global economic order, partly explicating the reasoning behind the international division of labour.

Though colonization has many similarities with the ‘development projects’ that followed, there are nonetheless some clear distinctions that should be made. For instance, from the 1870s to the 1940s, colonization was premised mostly on European countries controlling the resources and commercial interests of the colonial states to which they claimed rights through direct political tutelage (Rist, 2002: 49). This is distinct from that which currently occurs under the neoliberal guise in which, as a result of the previous advocating by certain individuals such as Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say (along with
large transnational companies, powerful nations and the debt regime), the current order is
to open up free markets so as to facilitate the development of both the metropole and
satellite countries (Rist, 2002: 49).

Accompanying the colonization of satellite countries by core countries was a
discourse that aimed at disguising the power relations characterizing colonization. This
discourse attempted to legitimize colonization by European power holders, and was
presented as though, through colonization, 'God's Will' was being pursued for the purpose
of promoting philanthropic objectives. In Victor Hugo's words (as quoted in Rist):

Men's destiny lies in the South...the Moment has come to make Europe
realize that it has Africa alongside it...In the nineteenth century, the White
man made a man of the Black; in the twentieth century, Europe will make
a world of Africa. To fashion a new Africa, to make the old Africa
amenable to civilization - that is the problem. And Europe will solve
it....Go forward, the nations! Grasp this land! Take it! From whom? From
no one. Take this land from God....Not for conquest but for fraternity
(Rist, 2002: 51).

As Rist notes, “[b]y making colonization out to be natural, it was possible to disguise the
political decisions and economic interests lying behind it, and thus render any debate
about its wisdom superfluous” (Rist, 2002: 54). And these are the attitudes and practices,
broadly speaking, that ideologically justified the practices and processes of colonization
and its resultant economic capitalist order. It likewise set the foundation for creating the
economic and social relations between the core and peripheral countries; relations that
continue to be promoted up to the present.

It is noteworthy that the process of colonization began much earlier in the area
considered to be El Salvador, as 1524 marked the year that Pedro de Alvarado, the
Spanish adventurer, conquered the region in the name of Spain. Nonetheless, from a
global perspective, the 1870s through to the 1940s marks the era of global colonial expansion and the creation of relations that resulted in the overdevelopment and underdevelopment of the colonizing and colonized countries; the countries which today constitute the Global North and Global South. Dependency theory therefore highlights processes of surplus extraction from periphery countries to the core, resulting in the continuities of north-south relations from colonialism to the present. This framework therefore facilitates the ability to understand the history of why El Salvador is a ‘Southern country’ within the global political economy.

Processes of colonization had evident effects on the economic role of colonizing and colonized regions. Most notable was the creation of a colonial division of labour, in which the satellite countries were directed into primary commodity production, often specializing in export monoculture cropping, with all the inherent dangers and limitations that investing in one crop on the world market gives rise to (McMichael, 2004: 9). This process of monoculture cropping devastated colonized countries, and it was through what Karl Marx termed ‘primitive accumulation’ that cash cropping became established.

According to Marx, primitive accumulation is “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding to it” (Marx, 1954: 668). In other words, primitive accumulation is “[t]he brutal process of separating people from their means of providing for themselves” (Perelman, 2000: 7). For Marx, this process is significant for two reasons. It established the economic framework whereby individuals ceased to have land from which to subsist. This therefore facilitated the rise of capitalism, as it made proletarians of the masses who no longer had an alternative to
selling their labour. This is vital because according to Marx, capitalism cannot become the dominant economic and political order if individuals have access to land, which is equitable with additional options for subsisting. Marx also notes that, ironically, primitive accumulation is often presented as though it ‘benefits’ those in question through their ‘emancipation’. This discourse attempts to hide, as Marx notes, that:

> these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (Marx, 1954: 669).

The process of primitive accumulation took a slightly different form in peripheral countries, depicted through the term ‘colonial primitive accumulation’. In terms of colonial primitive accumulation, “those, who stripped of land and the means of production, became a proletariat, could find little employment in either agriculture or industry. They would, for the most part, remain trapped as surplus labor in the countryside” (Byres, 2005: 84). Consequently, not only were these new proletarians unable to subsist through the use of land that was once available to them, but in many cases employment options were minimal. They would therefore remain as ‘surplus labour’ in the countryside.

Within the case of El Salvador, this process was instigated by the decree abolishing Comunidades (peasant villages with communal lands) dated February 26, 1881. In Liisa North’s words (1981), “those lands [in El Salvador] were taken over by the land-hungry large-estate owners and wealthy urban commercial groups anxious to expand production and increase their incomes from sales on booming international markets” (19). This process of colonial primitive accumulation was so successful in El Salvador that by
1971 the country had the most disproportionate land ownership concentration in all of Central America. In fact, according to James Boyce, in 1971, 1.5 percent of farms operated just under half (49 percent) of all agricultural lands in the country, whilst 87 percent of all farms in the country farmed less than 20 percent of all arable land in the country (Boyce, 1996: 21-23).

These processes of colonization, primitive accumulation and colonial primitive accumulation aid in the ability to make sense of the colonization process and the symbiotic relationship that these processes produced by over-developing some regions through under-developing others. It also assists in the ability to understand the distinct differences in the social and economic realities between core and peripheral countries.

In the following I provide an account of how neoliberalism has become the contemporary expression of these north-south relations and how the World Bank has become central to the operation of global neoliberalism. I will as such be providing an account of how the World Bank and the IMF came into existence in 1944 as a result of the conference at Bretton Woods, outlining what forms of biases and hierarchal relations permeated its formation. The objective of the following is to make sense of the role of the Bank and the nature of development initiatives more currently. This is because gender mainstreaming is being inserted into broader development initiatives. This will then set the stage for exploring the gendered nature of past and current development initiatives.

**The Birth and Rationale behind the Governing Function of the Bank:**

The July 1944 conference at Bretton Woods was globally significant for a plethora of reasons. Most significantly, it resulted in the birth of ‘development’ as a ‘project’.
Similarly, it brought to life various institutions that have played and continue to play an imperative role within the development process. In the following I explore the idealistic reasoning behind the Conference at Bretton Woods and its ensuing institutions, juxtaposing these ideals with a political-economy analysis of the role of these institutions in the post-war period. Similarly, I briefly explore the historical shifts that have occurred, and how this has affected the different frameworks for development. This will then facilitate an entry for understanding how the gender relations fit into this.

According to Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras (2005), foreign aid has played a significant role within the development project. Engaging with the role of foreign aid is therefore imperative for understanding the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of development as a ‘project’. It is similarly imperative for understanding the role of the World Bank, for the Bank has been amongst the greatest ‘leaders’ in the creation and existence of foreign ‘aid’ as ‘development’. According to Veltmeyer and Petras, the role that foreign aid has taken within the development project can be periodicized into five eras. These eras represent the different roles that aid has taken since the onset of ‘development’ following the Second World War. Certainly it is the case that these models have been informed by the political economic situation of the distinct epochs. Nonetheless, they are dissimilar enough to warrant a more detailed engagement. Also, as the World Bank has been a leader in respect to offering ‘Overseas Development Assistance’ (ODA) to developing countries, periodicizing the role of the World Bank from the perspective of foreign aid is beneficial, particularly when considering the causes and purposes of structural adjustment programs. As such, understanding the role of the World Bank from the perspective of foreign aid is ideal for making sense of neoliberalism and the hierarchical relations and
biases that exist within the functioning of the Bank. Similarly, it will later be useful for contextualizing the Bank in respect to its relations with its ‘client countries’ and the practice of gender mainstreaming.

Borrowing from the work of Veltmeyer and Petras (2005), I periodicize the role of foreign aid and development in the same five epochs in which they do. The first of these eras is the 1940s to the 1950s, which was also the temporal period in which the ‘development project’ was born. This era was marked by the conference at Bretton Woods and the task of the newly established international financial institutions at “combating the lure of communism” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 120). The following further explores this era, and the biases that permeated the Bank since its onset.

The ‘ideal’ motivation for the conference at Bretton Woods was to look “beyond the end of the war with hopes for a world united in peace through prosperity. Their specific goal was to create institutions that would promote this vision” (Korten, 1996: 20). Amongst these economic institutions were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (what would later be termed the World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In respect to the specific role of the Bank, it:

was given the task of making post-war development loans for infrastructure projects (roads, utilities), which, because they were unprofitable, were not likely to be initiated by private capital. The Bank was also mandated to promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participation in loans and other investments made by private investors (Danaher, 1994: 1).

These loans were supposed to assist ‘developing’ countries to ‘catch-up’ within the development process. This was going to be rendered possible by these new institutions through the medium of these loans.
The post-war ideals, however, have far from materialized. According to Korten, "[w]hether intended or not, the policies so successfully advanced by the Bretton Woods institutions have inexorably empowered the super rich to lay claim to the world’s wealth at the expense of other people, other species, and the viability of the planet’s ecosystem" (Korten, 1996: 25). Some even purport that the ‘ideals’ of the Bretton Woods Conference were never genuine, but rather a front for a class-based offensive:

[d]espite all the rhetoric about development and the alleviation of poverty, the central function of these multilateral lending institutions [such as the World Bank] has been to draw the rulers and governments of weaker states more tightly into a world economy dominated by large, transnational corporations (Danaher, 1994: 2).

Instead of engaging in an either-or debate regarding the role of the Bank and its relations with Southern countries, I consider it more fruitful to explore the biased nature of the Bank. This will be dealt with in terms of its creation and the historical actions and policies of this particular institution. This will facilitate the ability to discern the power relations that have and currently permeate the Bank as pertaining to its relation with its ‘client countries’. I now turn towards an exploration of the biases that have and continue to permeate the Bank.

Power discrepancies and ideological biases permeated the Bank since its very onset. This is partly the result of the undemocratic manner in which the conference at Bretton Woods was undertaken. For instance, in terms of the logistics of the conference, only the Allied nations were permitted to send delegates (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 121). Nonetheless, these delegates created the rules and institutions that would later posses the power to control the international political economy. According to Bruce Rich:

the United States and other leading industrialized countries gave World
Bank management a relatively free hand. They were not overly concerned whether the Bank was propping up particularly nasty regimes or traducing its purported poverty and environmental goals, since it was above all an invaluable institution for helping to win the Cold War (Rich, 1994: 13).

In other words, the epoch was marked by the beginning of the Cold War; a struggle between ‘communism’ and capitalism: “[t]o a large extent, the decision to lend to these countries [Southern countries]... was in response to a major political goal: the fight against communism” (Dumenil and Levy, 2005: 17). As such, the purpose and role of the Bank was to forward the interests of the global elite in the name of capitalism. Development was therefore fashioned in a capitalist manner. The ‘winning’ nations created the Bank and used it for the purpose of controlling the international political economy; the Bank was in existence to serve the interests of the United States (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 121), along with the interests of other global elite. The United States therefore took / were bestowed the privilege of acting as the world leaders; they accomplished this through the creation and use of the World Bank. The United States and other capitalist elite were going to halt the ‘spread of communism’ through the medium of loans. Concisely, “development was ‘invented’ in the late 1940s as a form of imperialism – to impose new relations of domination on peoples in diverse countries struggling to liberate themselves from the yoke of colonialism” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 120).

Immediately following the Second World War, an enormous number of banks along with the newly established international financial institutions granted a considerable number of loans to the various ‘developing’ countries (Rich, 1994: 7). Loans which were granted in the following era of the 1960s to the 1970s were similar in
motivation as their 1940s to 1950s mission of ‘combating communism’. According to Veltmeyer and Petras, this era sealed the shift from revolution to reformism in respect to the economic models. In other words, ‘communism’ or ‘socialism’ was going to lose out in favour of capitalism. This was largely accomplished through the medium of foreign aid (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 121). According to them, aid during the 1960s and 1970s was being partly redirected to NGOs instead of governments. As such “these NGOs served as executive agents of US imperialism, promoting values and behaviour functioning in the economic and political interests of the growing US empire” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 121). As such, perhaps unintentionally, the international financial institutions (IFIs) were able to partly elicit various NGOs into helping fulfill their goal of crushing out communism in favour of capitalism (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 121). This contributed to setting the stage for expanded, capitalist economic development. This similarly marked the shift from Keynesianism towards neoliberalism (a significant point explored in the following chapter when examining the shift from the ‘Keynesian’, to the ‘Washington’ and currently to the ‘post-Washington’ consensus). The World Bank was by this time a leader in promoting capitalist, economic development through the medium of loans.

The post-war period up to the early 1970s has often been regarded as the ‘golden age’ of development. The role that foreign aid had assumed prior to the 1970s was one in which resources were utilized for the purpose of building infrastructures, projects and, for the most part, a focus on national development. Noteworthy is the fact that “[f]or the 25 years after the Second World War (1945-70), Keynesianism constituted the dominant paradigm for understanding the determination of economic activity” (Palley, 2005: 21).
Keynesianism was marked by state-intervention in both market relations and welfare interests, which drastically differs from the logic of neoliberalism. As a result of Keynesianism, “extensive systems of welfare provision were constructed, dealing with health, unemployment benefits, education and housing....Keynesianism became an ideological term that captured the self-satisfied outlook of the ‘mixed economy’ of the immediate postwar decades” (Lapavitsas, 2005: 33). However, in the 1970s there witnessed an era of repeated economic crises, which acted as a catalyst for the change in the meaning of ‘development’. This also changed the role of the Bank within development. In Thomas Palley’s words, “[i]n the mid 1970s the Keynesian impulse went into reverse, to be replaced by a revived neoliberalism. This revival piggybacked on the social and economic dislocations associated with the Vietnam War era and the OPEC oil price shocks that marked the 1970s” (Palley, 2005: 21).

The shift in the meaning of development from national development to insertion within the global economy occurred following the 1970s inflation crisis, and to a greater extent following the 1980s debt crisis. In relation to ODA and the World Bank, “[u]ntil 1983, such official transfers of financial resources’ were channelled into projects designed to establish the infrastructure for economic activity. However, after the onset of a region-wide debt crisis, ‘official’ transfers took on a different form – loans premised on policy reforms oriented towards the free market” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 122), otherwise known as structural adjustment. The debt crisis resulted in a recalling of loans which were loans that Southern countries could not repay. As a result, the World Bank and IMF are now intimately involved in the process of ‘helping’ Southern countries repay their loans. In Hugo Radice’s words, “the common interests of the Northern great powers
were increasingly maintained through the reconstitution of the IMF and the World Bank as debt collectors for the North” (Radice, 2005: 95).

In respect to the change in the meaning bestowed on ‘development’, by the 1970s development was premised on maintaining (and even exacerbating) the role of exporting primary goods or non-finished industrialized goods by the Global South in a similar vein to the colonial era. The international financial institutions were intimately involved in re-establishing relations of domination and subordination (through maintaining and exacerbating the international division of labour), this time through the medium of loans (McMichael, 2004: 43). In a nutshell:

[by 1980, the World Bank had redefined development as “successful participation in the world market.” The prescription for Third World countries was to adopt the NICs’ [new industrialized countries’] strategy of export-oriented industrialization. Specialization in the world economy, rather than replication of economic activities within a national framework, emerged as the criterion of “development” (McMichael, 2004: 115).

The global elite in conjunction with the IFIs (such as the World Bank) have managed to dictate the manner in which development now occurs because of the immense levels of debt. This is because debt restrains peripheral countries, and in some cases “countries were devoting new loans entirely to servicing previous loans... Third World countries were suddenly mired in a debt trap. Debt was choking their economies” (McMichael, 2004: 131).

The World Bank and the IMF have been intimately involved in the process of restructuring development so as to enlist peripheral countries to pay back their debt. They have also encouraged the opening of ‘free markets’ (as related to the institutions that
interfere with market relations), resulting in the inflow of financial direct investment. This is what characterized the 1980s and 1990s.

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a period of regression in overseas development loans, being replaced by structural adjustment loans and foreign direct investment (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 123). Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are one of the principle means through which the World Bank facilitates the repayment of debt, hence maintaining a privileged position for dictating the form through which development now occurs (George, 1992). SAPs are also one of the central means through which the current marginalization of women (particularly poor and working class women in Southern countries) ensues and through which economic elites maintain their hegemony. This is to a significant extent accomplished through the workings of the Bank. For instance, as a result of foreign debt, the World Bank used and continues to use SAPs to dictate the conditions upon which development ensues. This is because structural adjustment loans are only granted to those governments that adhere to the 'conditionalities' forwarded by the World Bank. These 'conditionalities' result in the creation of 'free-er markets', as such forwarding the ability of powerful countries, elites and transnational capital to more easily and successfully exploit Southern peoples and countries.

It is important to understand the basic processes and implications of structural adjustment programs and especially how these programs are ideologically maintained through the 'intellectual framework' of neoclassical economic theory. The latter is further explored in the following chapter. It is also essential to understand how neoliberalism has grown into the contemporary expression of North-South relations and how the World
Bank has become central to the operation of global neoliberalism. This is similarly investigated in the following chapter. Nonetheless, according to McMichael:

Structural adjustment measures followed: a comprehensive restructuring of production priorities and government programs in a debtor country – basically reorganizing the economy. Along with the World Bank and its structural adjustment loan (SAL), the IMF levied restructuring conditions on borrowers in return for loan rescheduling. By the mid 1980s, loan conditions demanded policy restructuring, whereby debtor states received prescriptions for political-economic reforms, including austerity measures, to stimulate economic growth and regular debt service (McMichael, 2004: 132).

In other words, the World Bank and the IMF have been employed for the purpose of dictating the manner through which development now occurs. They accomplish this through the restructuring that they have implemented, along with accompanying loan conditions. This was made possible by the high levels of debt that peripheral countries owed (and continue to owe) following the debt crisis. In this respect, El Salvador is no exception. Along with the Bank’s ability to dictate the manner through which development occurs, this development is now equal to inclusion within the global market; the result has been the ushering in of the neoliberal era. The World Bank has played an integral role in this process.

From approximately the 1980s up to the present, the role of the World Bank has largely been one of promoting neo-imperialism (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 124). In terms of the World Bank, this imperial project has taken on various forms, characterized by what is termed the ‘Washington’ consensus (typified by neoliberal prescriptions) and more currently the ‘post-Washington’ consensus (typically regarded as ‘development with a human face’). Chapter two explores the Washington and the post-Washington consensus in more detail, particularly as gender mainstreaming is an example of the
‘post-Washington’ consensus. Nonetheless, regardless of the reformist changes which were enacted at the Bank when transitioning from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus, these reforms have translated in little to no significant changes. In Veltmeyer and Petras words, “[t]he problem is that economic development and the whole ODA enterprise – is predicated on the adoption of reforms designed to serve the interests of the donors rather than the recipients” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2005: 126). As such, ODA has accomplished little to alter the exploitative and colonial core and periphery relations that characterized the pre-1940s era; if anything, acting to exacerbate these tendencies.

To summarize, the Bretton Woods conference ultimately resulted in the creation of institutions such as the Bank. These institutions have served the interests of the Global elite in their aim of exploiting the Global South due to the its peripheral, dependent position (Korten, 1996: 25). At present this is the case since most peripheral countries are in extreme levels of debt owing to the loans lent to them during and following the era of national liberation movements. This debt has similarly sanctioned the ability of the IFIs (such as the World Bank) and the Global elite to dictate the manner through which global development now occurs. Following the Second World War, “[t]he postwar order entailed major political concession by capitalists: to restore the world economy while keeping communism at bay, they gave us the Keynesian welfare state in the North, and the developmental state in the South” (Radice, 2005: 98). But this is no longer the case, as the Keynesian welfare state has largely been replaced by the project of neoliberalism that drastically retracts from providing social services and eradicating other institutional ‘barriers’ that interfere with market relations. The birth of the ‘development project’ and
its accompanying levels of debt and structural adjustment programs have merely altered the colonizing and predatory nature of global economic relations. But they have not destroyed them.

Now that a basic understanding has been established regarding the undemocratic manner through which the World Bank was created and what this has meant for the expansion of the ‘development project’, we now turn towards an exploration of current feminist understandings of the nature of gender and development.

**Development, Neoliberalism and Gender Oppression:**

Following an explication of past North-South interactions and a description of how current enactments of global neoliberalism came to the fore, it is now possible to move forward towards an appreciation of how the gender relations fit into this. To facilitate this, I now focus my efforts towards feminist understandings of past colonization processes and current critical feminist understandings of neoliberal development projects. To facilitate the space for a discussion regarding the relations between gendered marginalization and development, the major theorists who will be introduced and engaged with are Maria Mies, Diane Elson and Suzanne Bergeron, while supplementing their arguments with the work of others. I have chosen to borrow from these three theorists because they each offer a feminist perspective which analytically supports each other regarding the gendered nature (in both its creation and perpetuation) of women’s exploitation and subordination as a result of past colonization processes and recent development initiatives. These feminist theorists are particularly important within the context of my thesis because they highlight the gendered nature of past and present
development processes. As such, these theorists facilitate a theoretical framework through which to interrogate the concept and practice of ‘development’ more generally and the workings of the Bank more specifically. They also represent different historical approaches towards the understanding and challenging of gender discrimination within the development process, as Mies’ work represents the conceptual trend of the 1970s, and Elson and Bergeron’s later historical trend that typically focuses on the macro-economy: “[m]ost feminist research in the 1970s and 1980s focused on microeconomic questions of gender inequality in the labor market…and analyses of power, conflict and distribution in the household….Since the late 1980s, however, feminists have begun to pay more attention to macroeconomic issues such as structural adjustment” (Bergeron, 2004: 130).

More importantly, through their discussions of male bias and the gendered and international division of labour, they facilitate the tools by which to examine gender mainstreaming within the workings of the Bank at a deeper analytical level. They are wary of the development process (both as it has been forwarded and as it continues to be perpetuated), and as such their work fosters the analytical tools to cautiously interrogate World Bank gender mainstreaming. As such, they permit me to explore whether the claim that gender mainstreaming, which has been undertaken by many development organizations, is making (and to what extent, shape and form it is making) the promised improvements in the lives of economically, politically and socially marginalized girls and women in the Global South.

I begin with Mies because she offers a broader macro, historical and gendered analysis of development, differing from Elson and Bergeron’s more detailed critiques of current development processes and policies (such as the issue of structural adjustment).
In so doing, she offers some compelling insights regarding the international and gendered (what she terms ‘sexual’) division of labour and its effects on women. This is the optimal manner by which to introduce the discussion on the gendered nature of women’s marginalization, male bias and potential oppression within development initiatives.

To commence I use Mies to provide a broad historical, ideological and discursive outline regarding the progression of both colonization and development initiatives which resulted in the current situation of women and the Global South. I address how this process is related to the current international and gendered division of labour. Also, I explore some of the ways in which the ‘capitalist project’ and more currently the neoliberal project has become premised on and dependent on patriarchal values with the ensuing subordination of women; a system that Mies terms ‘capitalist patriarchy’.

Likewise, I address how patriarchy and capitalism are symbiotically related, and what the implications of this intimate relationship are. To engage with these issues I provide a short overview of her book *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale* as it pertains to the creation and perpetuation of the international and gendered division of labour. This book is also a compilation of much of her pervious work, and as such it is a good source from which to commence this discussion.

Within *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale*, Mies’ explicit agenda is to “understand the ‘women question’ in the context of all social relations that constitute our reality today, that means in the context of the global division of labour under the dictates of capital accumulation” (Mies, 1998: 2). Her methodological approach for accomplishing this is to explore the connections between the 'sexual' and international division of labour (Mies, 1998: 2), paying particular heed to the processes of colonization
and development which created it. This facilitates the ability to engage with the need to comprehend the historical, ideological and discursive development that resulted in the international and gendered division of labour. These are all important themes as they relate to gender mainstreaming and the World Bank. The ability to understand at least briefly the historical formation of the international division of labour and its current manifestations through the work of Mies permits the ability to later make sense of global economic power discrepancies and how this is continually played out within more current neoliberal development projects such as the ones that the World Bank forwards (though Mies herself does not specifically engage with the issue of structural adjustment).

In terms of the ideological formations which were employed in the past so as to justify exploitative global economic processes, these are still permeating current neoliberal development projects (such as those upheld by the World Bank). I therefore need to highlight them so as to create an appreciation of the ideological rationales forwarded by the World Bank. Likewise, the discourses used to legitimize the current neoliberal project and how these discourses were informed by others (such as colonization and modernization) will also need to be interrogated so as to comprehend how gender mainstreaming fits into these discourses, ideologies and interests of the World Bank and those that benefit from the workings of the Bank. Her book therefore assists in creating a general though solid framework for engaging with these issues.

Mies engages with the limitations of simply adding the category of women to pre-existing theories and discourses of development. Mies strongly rejects this practice of simply adding the ‘women question’ to already existing theories regarding development. She feels that this approach is highly problematic as it reifies the belief that capitalism
and patriarchy are two different systems which at times happen to cross paths. Mies is not alone in rejecting an additive approach towards critical engagements of women within the development process. Elson likewise notes the limitations inherent in this form of approach when she states that “women in development [approach]...has several limitations. It facilitates the view that ‘women’, as a general category, can be added to an existing approach to analysis and policy, and that this will be sufficient to change development outcomes so as to improve women’s position” (Elson, 1995: 1). Mies’ central argument and conclusion, therefore, is that although patriarchal oppression existed before capitalist exploitation, the form that patriarchy takes within capitalist-patriarchal relations is distinct, what she terms ‘capitalist patriarchy’ (Mies, 1998: xi). This is an extremely important point. Women are not a ‘special interest group’ within the development process. Their subordination is absolutely crucial for the maintenance and perpetuation of the capitalist system as it has existed in the past and as it continues to exist today. They also constitute a large proportion (presumably half) of those affected by development initiatives. They experience development differently than do men, and simply wanting to add them to the development project or assuming that ‘development’ is a gender-neutral process will not suffice in improving their situation. Rather, this approach is only beneficial for the expansion and legitimating of capitalist-patriarchy and neoliberalism, as is more integrally demonstrated in further chapters. Nonetheless, an explication of Mies’ discussion of capitalist patriarchy will assist in the elaboration of this point.

As pertaining to the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy (or rather capitalist patriarchy), Mies introduces the concept of superexploitation. This concept is of
pivotal importance for understanding Mies’ central premise regarding the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, and as such I quote her in length to explicate what she means by this term and how it assists in the ability to understand the relationship between gender and development:

the superexploitation of non-wage labourers (women, colonies, peasants) [is the foundation] upon which wage labour exploitation [or rather capitalism] then is possible. I define their exploitation as superexploitation because it is not based on the appropriation (by the capitalist) of the time and labour over and above the ‘necessary’ labour time, the surplus labour, but of the time and labour necessary for people’s own survival or subsistence production. It is not compensated for by a wage, the size of which is calculated on the ‘necessary’ reproduction costs of the labourer, but is mainly determined by force or coercive institutions. This is the main reason for the growing poverty and starvation of Third World producers [most notably women] (Mies, 1998: 48). 

What Mies is therefore suggesting is that through the superexploitation of women in the form of not paying them or through exploiting them by means of underpaying them, they (along with other colonized peoples and lands) have created the ‘iceberg’ upon which capitalism is upheld. But superexploitation is beyond not paying women or underpaying them, precisely because under capitalist-patriarchy ‘women’s’ labour is not considered to be work. Moreover, this is not merely a question of attitudes but of real material processes because the kind of work assigned to women within the gendered division of labour is structurally excluded from the realm of paid labour. Women have, therefore, produced a trickling-up effect as a result of their ‘free, dutiful’ activities. Women’s role in fueling capitalist-patriarchal development through their ‘pass-time activities’ (such as through housework and the bearing of children) and also their role in subsistence agriculture and informal economic activities has been absolutely crucial for the creation and maintenance of the capitalist-patriarchal system. That women are superexploited and
that their labour is seen as being always available in ever greater quantities (for it is not recognized as 'labour' or 'work') is extraordinarily problematic as it fuels major assumptions implicit within current development policies (particularly as relating to structural adjustment). This is an argument likewise put forth by Elson. Mies is therefore highlighting how the gendered division of labour (along with the international division of labour) have come into existence and how they function to exploit women while concurrently and symbiotically fuelling the capitalist-patriarchal system; in other words, at highlighting the historically gendered character of development processes and its effects on women.

The work of Diane Elson provides a complementary perspective for undertaking a critical analysis of current gender asymmetries within the development process. Through the work of Elson, it is possible to discern how development initiatives have been particularly detrimental to women notably with the onset of structural adjustment, and how this has been either ignored or justified within neoliberal development initiatives and its accompanying discourses. To demonstrate this I offer an account of what she means by 'male bias', why it is analytically useful for examining current development initiatives, and how this bias is maintained and perpetuated within contemporary development projects, notably through the practice of structural adjustment.

In Male Bias in the Development Process, Elson pays particular heed to the category of 'women' as pertaining to the gendered nature of the development process. She, like Mies, rejects the practice of simply adding the category of 'women' to previous theories or practices of development (such as is routinely exercised within 'Women in Development' approaches), as she considers this additive model flawed for it overlooks
the critical gender-relations that ensue between the genders (Elson, 1995: 1). As Beneria and Roldan likewise note:

in the latter case [of applying a Marxist tradition to the subordination of women], the main emphasis is on understanding the material basis of women’s oppression – as understood within the Marxist tradition – often disregarding ideological aspects of the social construction of gender. Consequently, a straightforward use of Marxist concepts tends towards economic reductionism, resulting in the subsumption of gender hierarchies under class inequalities (Beneria and Roldan, 1987: 8-9).

As such, Elson prefers to work with the concept of ‘male bias’ which she posits is useful for grasping the gender relations which are causing gender-specific hardships for women. It is this concept of ‘male bias’ which is most analytically useful for engaging with the queries regarding how development initiatives have been particularly detrimental to girls and women notably with the onset of structural adjustment, and how this has been either ignored or justified within development initiatives.

‘Male bias’ is “a bias that operates in favour of men as a gender, and against women as a gender, not that all men are biased against women” (Elson, 1995: 3). To elaborate, Elson introduces the limitation of employing gender-neutral words in public policy initiatives such as ‘work’, ‘development’ and ‘worker’. The limitation in practices such as these is that by ignoring the gendered nature of terms which are considered gender-neutral, one is in actuality perpetuating the hardships of many women the world over within the development process. For instance, “[w]hen there is an implicit assumption that farmers are men, it is not surprising that new agricultural technology and inputs flow mainly to men” (Elson, 1995: 9), and therefore not to women. This form of male bias can often cause women to remain dependent upon men; a specific form of gender-relations which is detrimental to women and not to men.
Elson's concept of male bias and different examples of it are extremely useful within the confines of this thesis, particularly in the latter chapters in which a discourse analysis of World Bank documents and gender mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador are investigated. This concept facilitates my ability to interrogate whether gender mainstreaming is moving away from the limitations of previous development initiatives in which gender biases represented the norm.

Elson also calls attention beyond macro economic process taking place and interrogates the "everyday attitudes and practices" (Elson, 1995: 11) which function to maintain and support male bias on a more micro level. This is of central importance within this thesis, as structural adjustment programs which are male biased have significant implications for women within their daily, domestic lives. To illustrate, one need only consider that 'women's work' in the form of domestic work is seen as the 'logical' place for them owing to the gendered division of labour and the perception of particular familial responsibilities as the 'natural' place for women. Many women are responsible for maintaining their homes, children, spouses and sometimes other relatives, not permitting them to go out and take 'advantage' of new jobs being created through development. Or if their economic needs are taxing enough, they may have to seek (if they have not already) employment in either the formal or informal sectors. This is problematic in that women are still disproportionately responsible for the reproductive work, or pass it down to other women, as such only causing double burdens to their workdays and/or that of other women. Beneria and Roldan also address this issue, when noting that "women... [have to decide]... whether to concentrate on paid or unpaid work...or to diminish their own share of housework by having elder daughters or other
female relatives substitute for them” (Beneria and Roldan, 1987: 135). These patterns, according to Elson, are characteristic of what occurs within structural adjustment. Her central argument is that although structural adjustment programmes tend to focus on the macro economic level and maintain a belief that these policies are gender-neutral, there clearly exist diversities in the ways in which the genders experience structural adjustment on both a micro and macro level, being much more violently and adversely felt by women (Elson, 1995: 165).

Elson likewise notes that macro-economic processes and discussions (being informed by neoclassical economic theory) overlook reproductive labour, and therefore the policies that arise tend to assume that there is an infinite amount of human resources. This is because within neoclassical theories it is assumed that workers arrive in the labour market fully formed, therefore failing to see the reproduction of labour-power which occurs largely within the home through work undertaken primarily by women. This work is therefore naturalized, made invisible and not taken into account when formulating policies. Consequently the policies that are created overlook the fact that there is a point at which individuals (in this case women) cannot take any more of the burdens and responsibilities which ensue as a result of structural adjustment, as their labour is largely unacknowledged. For instance, structural adjustment creates policies such as “devaluation...withdrawal of food subsidies, and cut-backs in public expenditure” which increases the burden of social reproduction on the household (Elson, 1995: 167). In Isabella Bakker’s words (2003), “[t]he displacement of public sector functions either to the market or the home as the unpaid caring work of women is a process of “reprivatization”.... Reprivatizing the costs of social reproduction is intensifying
women’s labor in the provision of needs” (79). According to Elson, therefore, what is problematic within the case of households is that these policies most negatively affect women. To elaborate, if there are cutbacks to public services such as healthcare and if somebody in the household gets sick it then becomes the responsibility of a girl or woman to take care of those that have become ill. This is owing to the gendered division of labour which presumes that the female gender should be responsible for reproductive work. This tendency is exacerbated when noting that, particularly within the export-orientated labour intensive industries promoted by structural adjustment programmes, “employers have a preference for employing women” (Elson, 1995: 169). As such, women become double burdened because there is a cut-back on services to help them and their households, though they must now enter exploitative, precarious labour industries (and other formal and informal labour niches) in greater numbers with little or no changes to the household gendered division of labour. This form of male bias is often forwarded within World Bank development initiatives through its policies of structural adjustment that assume that men and women are in an equivalent position to enter paid labour. Elson’s concept of male bias is therefore useful for depicting the gender-specific hardships faced by women and the misguided World Bank policies of structural adjustment programs that perpetuate their subordination as a result of these initiatives.

Another factor that Elson describes is the deterioration of living standards that accompany structural adjustment and the male-biased nature of these initiatives. I find this particularly relevant because I wish to ascertain whether the process of gender mainstreaming has actually improved the socioeconomic situation of women in El Salvador. Within Elson’s discussion, in male-headed households men generally continue
to give the same amount of money to women in order to maintain the household in the area of feeding its inhabitants, clothing them, and sending the children to school. However, these costs have become inflated, and women must find ways to make their finances stretch much further than was required in preceding decades. Often when women ask for more money to maintain the household and its inhabitants, arguments result which sometimes lead to domestic violence. Simply put, “[i]ignoring the implications of macro-economic changes for unpaid domestic labour inputs is tantamount to assuming that women’s capacity to undertake extra work is infinitely elastic” (Elson, 1995: 179). In this case gender mainstreaming is entirely antithetical to improving the well-being of women in the Global South who have to deal with social-spending cutbacks being made as a result of the prescriptions of neoclassical economic theory being performed under the guise of structural adjustment. This is the case unless the World Bank addresses with the gender-specific ways in which structural adjustment are felt by women.

Elson likewise questions the male-biased assumption in macro-economic models of development which assume that “the household [is] an institution which maximizes the welfare of all of its members” (Elson, 1995: 181), rather than considering the household a site of conflict premised on gender lines. According to Elson, men, unlike women, tend to keep a portion of their earnings for their own recreational use (Elson, 1995: 183). This means that although there may be more money which could be used towards the family unit (which policy analysts likely assume), not all of this money is actually going towards the household and the wellbeing of everyone in that household. Women are often obliged to maintain a family unit with fewer resources than policy analysts assume they have,
overestimating these individual’s standard of living. A potential solution would be to
direct resources directly to women as opposed to men, for it has been proven that in many
instances, resources do not trickle down to women and children. This will be one
criterion by which to judge mainstreaming initiatives. It is also interesting to note how
this re-directing of resources occurs, such as through aid for public services or in the form
of micro-credit or other means of insertion into the market. Recognizing this limitation,
later on I explore to what extent Salvadoran women have direct access to money within
World Bank initiatives, and in what form this access to money takes place. Borrowing
from Elson’s above stipulated examples of male bias, these patterns provide measures for
interrogating the legitimacy and benefits that gender mainstreaming have had in acting as
a solution to the issue of gender inequality within the development process.

The last theorist employed for the purpose of engaging with the issues of gender
and development is Suzanne Bergeron. I employ the use of her latest book *Fragments of
Development: Nation, Gender, and the Space of Modernity* (2004) to further foster a
general conceptual framework that helps elaborate general aspects of feminism, gender
and gender and development. Further on in chapter three I employ some of her other
work (notably “Challenging the World Bank’s Narrative on Inclusion” (2003a) and “The
Post-Washington Consensus and Economic Representations of Women in Development
and the World Bank” (2003b)) in order to undertake a discourse analysis of two World
Bank documents related to gender and development and gender mainstreaming. Her
critique of current feminist approaches towards understanding the global economy and
structural adjustment are also analytically useful for this latter endeavour.

is Bergeron’s most recent book. In it she begins by outlining the role of the nation and the process of modernization within the ‘space’ of development. She maps the role of modernization as a discourse and its creation of current North-South relations, and engages with the role of colonialism, modernity and the nation-state within dependency theory. Although these discussions are extremely fruitful for constructing an analysis of gender within the development process, it is her last two chapters which are the most useful for the purpose of my analysis. These sections engage with the limitations of structural adjustment programs within the development process (with considerable focus on the World Bank), and offer some suggestions on how to revision development from a feminist perspective. She similarly highlights some of the limitations in preceding and current feminist challenges towards the development process, of which Elson is specifically mentioned. These are all similarly fruitful discussions. I now turn towards an overview of her analysis and how I benefit from her theorizing.

Although Bergeron raises some important issues regarding the process of colonization and the role of the nation-state as pertaining to the resultant development initiatives, it is her engagement with the role of ‘knowledge of expertise’ (as related to neoliberalism and the practice of structural adjustment) that is of most concern for my purposes. Bergeron does not conceive of structural adjustment programs as merely the manner in which colonialism and racism are being currently enacted (although she considers this to be partly the case). Rather, for Bergeron “[t]he concern here is not whether structural adjustment is a benevolent force that can be reformed or a source of exploitation to be denounced. It is not only the representation of certain directed interests but rather a more complex and contradictory structure of knowledge and practice”
(Bergeron, 2004: 96). An elaboration of this practice and structure of knowledge from Bergeron’s perspective will assist in elaborating.

According to Bergeron, it is essential to interrogate “how the presentation of economic knowledge in development macroeconomic models contributes to a particular way of seeing the developing economy” (Bergeron, 2004: 97). This is the case both in terms of the knowledge that is created by the IFIs such as the World Bank along with those that resist this kind of knowledge and practice. This is because the way that one conceptualizes ‘the problem’ has implications for the extent and form that resisting the macro economic development model can take. I therefore begin with her analysis on how knowledge and practice are created and perpetuated through neoliberal economic thought and those that forward it, namely for my purposes the World Bank. I then turn towards an analysis of Bergeron’s critique of feminist takes on structural adjustment.

Bergeron asserts that it is imperative to analyze the economic models that guide policies such as structural adjustment programs and the way that this knowledge is created and practiced. For Bergeron, one of the important characteristics of the neoclassical model of development (which is explored in greater detail in the following chapter) is that it is presented as a mathematical model. This is significant because “mathematical models by economists suggests a level of technical confidence. Mathematical models portray the certainty of knowledge (i.e., that the essential principles of the economy are well understood)...[this] makes developing economies and the adjustment process into something that is legible and thus manageable” (Bergeron, 2004: 100). This results in the creation of what appears to be expert, mathematical and ‘true’ knowledge, resulting in the exclusion of other perspectives and voices. Namely it
excludes knowledge that does not forward nor employs correctly this ‘expert’ knowledge; women’s groups and other grass roots organizations would be included within this category of groups producing ‘unscientific’ knowledge. Another limitation in the presentation of macro economic development models as ‘mathematical’ and ‘scientific’ is that these models then end up encompassing this level of apolitical neutrality that is not warranted. This is because “far from being value-free inquiry, modern economics is based on a particular set of values that view the abstract, general, detached, dispassionate, and masculinist approach to inquiry as superior to the particular, concrete, and connected feminist approach” (Bergeron, 2004: 101). In a nutshell:

Economic knowledge is presented as a universal rationality that stands above the fray. Against model knowledge and its aura of objectivity, other knowledges and other perspectives are judged (and even come to judge themselves) and are found wanting. It is in part through this set of knowledge practices that other representations and perspectives (and their nondetached social and moral concerns) are often discounted and marginalized in discussions about structural adjustment (Bergeron, 2004: 102).

Similarly, the policy aims and discussions that ensue all focus on maintaining this particular form of economic model (that which uphold the logic of neoclassical economic theory). It is with this in mind that we turn towards an analysis of the knowledge and models that are forwarded by the World Bank as pertaining to structural adjustment programs.

The World Bank’s approach towards development places much of its emphasis on “the structural and institutional constraints that interfere with market outcomes that must be eliminated before any real growth can happen” (Bergeron, 2004: 111). In other words, the prescription put forth by the World Bank as a result of the ‘expert’ knowledge that
they both create and perpetuate is premised on the notion that the solution to ‘underdevelopment’ is greater inclusion within the global market through minimalist state intervention in respect to institutions that interfere with market relations. The World Bank therefore ‘encourages’ governments to undertake actions that facilitate greater inclusion within the market. Amongst these include processes of flexibilization, privatization, liberalization and deregulation, processes which are particularly detrimental to women. What results is that this presentation of expert knowledge creates the “illusion of expertise...[that the] economy [is]...a predictable and manageable site” (Bergeron, 2004: 115).

Another limitation that Bergeron notes as pertaining to the logic and policies of the Bank is the questionable reliability of the statistical information upon which the Bank creates its policies (Bergeron, 2004: 114). For instance, the Bank often gathers information regarding the effects of adjustment on worker’s ‘real wages’. The problem is that in most cases ‘real wages’ are equated with public sector wages. This is highly problematic if only because many people make their livelihoods through labouring in the informal economy. This limitation is even noted by the World Bank (Bergeron, 2004: 114). Nonetheless, most of their policy ‘recommendations’ are forwarded through this particular approach of considering changes to ‘real wages’. Bergeron suggests that much of the Bank’s other statistics from which they create their policies are premised on shaky and questionable figures. Yet this is the kind of questionable statistics that inform their structural adjustment programs. This will become of greater importance when further exploring mainstreaming within the confines of El Salvador.

Besides questioning the knowledge and discourses that guide the models and
policies of the World Bank, Bergeron likewise highlights some of the limitations that permeate feminist critiques of macro economic models of development and their ensuing practices such as structural adjustment. She considers this extremely important because according to her, the way that feminists are critiquing the macroeconomy has implications for the manner in which solutions and resistance are enacted and framed. Also important is that within her critique one of the recurring theorists that she continually references is Diane Elson. As such, I offer an account of what she considers to be some of the limitations within current feminist theorizing as pertaining to global development.

Since the late 1980s and into the present era, Bergeron highlights two distinct feminist projects that challenge policies on gender and development. The first project is the "disaggregating [of] the macroeconomy to take gender difference into account" (Bergeron, 204: 131). Here she quotes Elson's challenge that gender-neutral discourses and knowledge excludes women through language such as 'workers' 'farmers' and 'entrepreneurs' because implicit within this language is that these people are men. The second project is that of making visible reproductive work that women engage in which is overlooked within macro economic development models. Within this project Mies would be included, although Bergeron holds that Elson is 'at the forefront' of this project (Bergeron, 2004: 131). According to Bergeron, the major shortcoming in this approach towards challenging macro economic development is that:

[w]hile contributing important new insights to macroeconomic theory, the project of engendering macroeconomics remains inscribed within the disciplinary boundaries of macroeconomic discourse. The task of engendering macroeconomics has been to add women's previously
invisible behaviour and production to already existing macroeconomic frameworks. This move allows economists to look at a different set of constraints and/or interactions than those recognized within traditional macroeconomic models. But it does not fundamentally challenge the basic core of preexisting models (Bergeron, 2004: 132).

Although this is her major critique (of which she offers suggestions of how to remedy them, which shortly follows) she also has more specific critiques of the limitations within much current feminist theorizing. I offer a few of her more specific critiques, particularly because they relate to the theorizing of Mies and Elson.

One of the central critiques Bergeron forwards as pertaining to current feminist theorizing on development is that “feminist writing about structural adjustment implicitly assume that all women are carers. Given the problems associated with essentializing women’s behavior in masculinist discourses, feminist might want to avoid the assumption that women’s position is largely defined with regard to nurturing” (Bergeron, 2004: 133). Bergeron’s critique that women are portrayed in an essentialist manner is warranted. Both Mies and Elson overwhelmingly focus on ‘women’s work’ and Mies goes so far as to highlight the ‘nature’ of women, particularly in relation to women and child bearing.

Although it is indisputable that women perform the majority of the reproductive labour and that there is likely something unique in the process of child-bearing, there are inherent dangers in presenting the marginalization and experiences of women in an essentialist manner. According to Bergeron (who borrows from Mohanty), “the development industry’s representations of women in the global South as inherently oppressed implicitly assume the modern liberated Western women as the standard against which the Third World women is measured. It also contributes to the idea that Third World women are in need of Western expert knowledge” (Bergeron, 2004: 134). In short,
what Bergeron is suggesting is that certain feminist critiques are ethnocentric and racist. She does not posit that these theorists are knowingly racist, but rather that the effects of theorizing in a certain manner have clear repercussion both to the kinds of knowledge that is created and the policies that result from this knowledge. It similarly sets limits to the alternatives that can be conceived of for women within the development process. This is what Chandra Talpade Mohanty is alluding to when she states that:

Western feminist writing on women in the third world must be considered in the context of the global hegemony of Western scholarship – i.e., the production, publication, distribution and consumption of information and ideas. Marginal or not, this writing has political effects and implications beyond the immediate feminist or disciplinary audience” (Mohanty, 1984: 334).

This contention is telling when we consider the option of “[c]ontrast[ing] the portrayal of women as a vulnerable group with an alternative story that stresses women’s willingness to fight social service cuts through community organizing and political action, and you can see that the latter story does not take on as big a role for the economist or policy maker” (Bergeron, 2004: 135). It paints a different picture as to the solutions and potential avenues for countering the male bias within the development process.

Bergeron does not suggest that the work of certain feminist should be disregarded (such as the work of Mies and Elson). Rather Bergeron suggests that “feminist economists’ critique of structural adjustment...can be developed further by being attentive to how its interpretations of women’s lives replicate certain assumptions about gender and the economic found in non-feminist economics accounts” (Bergeron, 2004: 136). What I borrow from Bergeron’s analysis is the need to consider the kinds of portrayals that I make of Southern women and their development struggles. Nonetheless, I appreciate the work of Mies and Elson because it is true that most women are
disproportionately responsible for the reproductive work and that on many levels they experience development differently than do men. Bergeron’s critiques are important because they bear light to the importance of appreciating the logic that guides the creation of certain knowledge and practices. This is something that needs to be considered both in relation to the knowledge and practices of the World Bank and those that resist practices informed by neoclassical economic theory, such as grassroots feminist organizations. As such, through engaging with the works of Mies, Elson and Bergeron, I am well equipped to both interrogate the creation of capitalist patriarch relations, specific occurrences of male bias within the development process, and the ‘expert’ knowledge and knowledge of resistance that is created. The latter facilitates the ability to consider the effects of global economic relations and the local experiences of capitalism from a neoclassical perspective, and the effects that critiquing neoclassical economic theory from a feminist perspective results in, especially if these critiques are in any way classist or racist. As such, through the theorizing of Mies, Elson and Bergeron, I am now well equipped with the analytical tools to cautiously interrogate gender mainstreaming through a discursive and case-study analysis.

Before proceeding through to my discourse analysis of two World Bank documents as related to gender and development (*Engendering Development*) and gender mainstreaming (*Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work*), I first explore the discursive intellectual framework that guides the Bank’s overarching neoliberal prescriptions. I also explore why the Bank embraces this view of development policy. This constitutes the goal of the following chapter. In chapter two I seek to further understand the theoretical rationale for supporting neoliberalism and for perpetuating it
from the perspective of the Bank. This discussion will facilitate my ability to interrogate, within the third chapter, the Bank’s discourses of gender and development as well as gender mainstreaming. Bergeron’s work will prove particularly useful in this endeavour, as will other feminist theorists that I have not yet introduced.
Chapter Two:

In this chapter I explore the role of neoliberalism and the World Bank in respect to McMichael's accusation that the World Bank acts as part of the hegemonic debt regime (McMichael, 2004: 129). I do this so as to be able to in the following chapters engage with the issue of gender mainstreaming. For these purposes, I begin this chapter by employing the work of Antonio Gramsci. Through an engagement with Gramsci's conceptual apparatus, a space is facilitated for making theoretical sense of the power relations within the Bank, the Bank’s ideology and purpose of this ideology (under the guise of neoliberalism) and the manner in which this ideology is maintained and reproduced through its discourses (specifically as pertaining to gender mainstreaming). More explicitly, I employ Gramsci's concepts of 'hegemony', 'ideology', 'crisis of authority' and 'passive revolution' so as to create a theoretical framework for interrogating the implicit assumptions and repercussions permeating the Bank’s neoliberal policies. This also allows the exploration of different perspectives as pertaining to who and what benefits from the current workings of the Bank. Others who similarly borrow from Gramsci’s work (such as Martin Carnoy, Susanne Soederberg, Robert Hunter Wade, William Roseberry and Einar Braathen) are likewise employed for making sense of the Bank’s discourses and / or their Gramscian understanding of the above concepts. All the theorists and conjectures in this chapter are ultimately engaged with so as to discern (from a Gramscian framework) how the Bank maintains a hegemony and what this means theoretically and on the ground for mainstreaming initiatives.

Neoliberalism is the 'intellectual' framework of the Bank. Consequently in this chapter I also focus my efforts towards building a framework for understanding what is
specifically entailed and implied by 'neoliberalism', as it is the intellectual framework that guides the workings of the Bank. Intellectually, it stems from neoclassical economic theory (Robinson, 2003: 50). The problem, however, is that according to Henry Veltmeyer:

[the north-south development gap has grown over the years [since the onset of the neoliberal model of development]... The social inequalities and inequities of market-led growth and social development has grown...[and the] progress promised in terms such as justice and equity, growth and development, modernization and advances in human development has not materialized (Veltmeyer, 2001: 3-4).

I avoid providing a full account of the rise and logic of neoliberalism as this is beyond the scope of my analysis. However, it is likewise necessary to grasp the logic and workings of the Bank through fostering an understanding of what the rationale and interests of neoliberalism are, as the World Bank employs the prescriptions underlying neoliberalism. As such, an account of the logic of neoliberalism is undertaken so as to capitalize on this interrogation when making sense of the biases and the nature of the Bank as related specifically to gender mainstreaming. To accomplish this I draw upon the works of Marcus Taylor and William Robinson. Taylor is engaged with because of his account of the reasoning guiding processes of liberalization, deregulation and privatization, paying particular heed to how these practices stem from the logic of neoclassical economic theory (Taylor, 2002). Robinson (2003, 2004) likewise clearly engages with these issues, though situating them specifically in reference to Central America. As such, both Taylor and Robinson complement each other for the purpose of discerning neoliberal policies, how they stem from the logic of neoclassical economic theory, and what the effects of these processes have been in El Salvador.
The goal of this chapter is to attain an appreciation of the discourses and ideologies propagated by the World Bank and the ways in which these discourses maintain hierarchal relations and biases. This is undertaken so as to be able to in the latter chapters to contextualize the accomplishments and limitations of gender mainstreaming.

Hegemony, Ideology, Crisis of Authority and Passive Revolution:

According to Gramsci, hegemony is "the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes" (Carnoy, 1984: 66). Unlike Marx who places more emphasis on the economic (infrastructure) of society, Gramsci does not forward what he terms 'economism' or 'vulgar materialism' (Bennet et al., 1987: 192), and rather prefers to privilege the superstructure. In other words, he focuses more on the role of discourses and ideologies as opposed to perpetuating an overly materialist focus on the means of production.

In order to elaborate on the concept of hegemony, Robert Hunter Wade states that, "[h]egemony refers to a dominant group’s ability to make others want the same thing as it wants for itself" (Wade, 2002: 215). This is not a one-time, simplistic procedure, but rather is a constant, dynamic and contested process. The concept of hegemony is imperative for the purpose of analyzing gender mainstreaming. Similarly, so are Gramsci’s concepts of ideology, crisis of authority and passive revolution. Nonetheless, it is the concept of hegemony that is the most important, because in the end, ideology, crisis of authority and passive revolution act to explicate or perpetuate the presence (or the lack thereof) of a particular hegemony. Hegemony therefore permits the analysis of power and class relations. In order to be able to accrue the greatest purchase
for this concept, I quote in length a clarification of hegemony:

Hegemony, Gramsci said, is the additional power, beyond domination, that accrues to a dominant group by convincing subordinate groups that its rule serves not only its own interests but also those of the subordinate groups. In other words, hegemony is soft power, the ability to make others want the same thing as yourself, as distinct from hard power, the ability to force others to give you what you want. The convincing takes place through some combination of (1) belief that the system of rule created by the dominant group brings material and other benefits to all or most participants and that the feasible alternatives are worse, and (2) belief that the processes and procedures of the dominant system of rule are fair and appropriate and will be enforced on the dominant group as well as on the subordinate group. Hegemony, in other words, has two pillars, one substantive, and the other procedural (Wade, 2002: 217).

In respect to the ‘two pillars’ of hegemony that Wade notes, Carnoy goes on to suggest that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be grasped through two central discernments. The first is that “a fraction of the dominant class exercises control through its moral and intellectual leadership over other allied fractions of the dominant class” (Carnoy, 1984: 70). Secondly, “[h]egemony involves the successful attempts of the dominant class to use its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all-inclusive, and to shape the interests and needs of subordinate groups” (Carnoy, 1984: 70). The pursuit of a hegemonic project is therefore premised on two goals:

[the first] is to build a hegemonic discourse. That is made by involving representatives of all those groups that one pretends to build consensus on in discussions, that is, to set an agenda….The second aim of a hegemonic project is, as a result of the discursive process, to produce legitimacy (Braathen, 2001: 32).

This, Gramsci posits, is accomplished through the ideologies and moral leadership of those with power whom are working (albeit consciously or not) to maintain the hegemony. The purpose of creating and maintaining hegemony is to legitimate and
maintain particular class relations. The moral leadership helps to extend and legitimate certain philosophies such as, for instance, neoliberalism and transform it into ‘common sense’ in an apparently legitimate manner. Common sense is therefore the ability to make certain philosophies appear ‘legitimate’ and ‘fair’, aiding in the ability to rule through consent. Nonetheless, as with hegemony, this process is constant, dynamic and contested. Gramsci was very aware of this, as he noted that: “[e]very philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of “common sense”: this is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life” (Gramsci, 1971: 326). As such, what results is that violence that is perpetrated by the ruling classes is done so in a manner that is accomplished through consent; a consent that is legitimated through “the acceptance by the ruled of a “conception of the world” which belongs to the rulers” (Carnoy, 1984: 68).

In the present era, it is the ‘science and economics of the specialists’ in the shape of neoclassical economic theory which inform and justify the neoliberal prescriptions upon which the World Bank forwards their development initiatives. As such, neoliberalism and its accompanying discourse have come to take the form of ‘common sense’ (Munck, 2005a: 65). Similarly, this consent is accompanied by a discursive framework that helps to legitimate the common sense and hegemony. In William Roseberry’s words, “[t]o the extent that a dominant order establishes such legitimate forms of procedure, to the extent that it establishes not consent but prescribed forms of expressing both acceptance and discontent, it has established a common discursive framework” (Roseberry, 1994: 364). This common discursive framework is imperative in
the functioning of hegemony. Nonetheless, the legitimating of the hegemony is the case even if the Bank appears to be seeking the opinions and considerations of those that may forward a distinct perspective from theirs, such as feminist economists, academics, policy analysts and those within civil society. This is demonstrated when Braathen notes that the Bank "[a]pparently...is embracing as many discourses or schools of thought as possible" (Braathen, 2001: 35). Nonetheless, these opinions and/or prescriptions are being synthesized within the workings of the Bank in a manner which legitimizes and strengthens their hegemonic control, constantly attempting to make capitalism, neoliberalism and structural adjustment 'common sense'. These discourses are similarly incorporated in a manner that supports and adds to the 'common discursive framework', common sense and hegemony.

It should be duly noted, however, that common sense is both historically and environmentally contingent and consequently it possesses a dynamic nature. Changes are rarely accomplished effortlessly, as transformations in common sense may be indicative and result in challenges being posed towards the hegemony and its hegemonic order. In other words, it represents a challenge towards the present class relations. This can result in what Gramsci termed a 'crisis of authority'. It is therefore towards a 'crisis of authority' and what this crisis potentially entails that we now redirect our attention.

In terms of a definition for 'crisis of authority', Carnoy (who quotes Gramsci), explains that a 'crisis of authority' means that "the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant,'...this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously" (Carnoy, 1984: 78). In terms of Latin America, Susanne
Soederberg argues that the region is currently experiencing a crisis of authority as it relates to the legitimacy of neoliberal policies; in other words, neoliberalism has lost its status as ‘common sense’. This is the result of the chronic economic crises that the neoliberal agenda has spawned for many within the subordinate classes (Soederberg, 2004: 18). This includes economic deterioration for the Global South and a continued polarization between the North and the South (10), repeated economic crises and increases (instead of decreases) in poverty levels. In her words:

[a]s this crisis erodes the legitimacy of the ruling classes among the subordinate classes, and therefore the former are no longer considered as ‘leading’ through consensus, they are forced to rely increasingly on coercion and reinvention of political domination in the form of neoliberalism (Soederberg, 2004: 18-19).

Soederberg is not alone in noting this crisis, as Braathen likewise observes that in the World Development Report (WDR) publication (a World Bank publication) “the main business of the WDR is not to create an intellectual consensus, but to legitimize future use of force, e.g. in imposing new conditionalities in its lending activities [such as the new conditionalities being imposed through structural adjustment programs]” (Braathen, 2001: 42). To elaborate:

[t]he ensuing struggles and policies aimed at dealing with the ‘crisis of authority’ involve a constant reorganization of state power and its relationship to the subordinated classes and groups to defend and maintain dominant-class hegemony whilst excluding the masses from exerting influences over political and economic institutions. Gramsci termed this class-based strategy a passive revolution. The latter entails the attempt to freeze the contradictions that arise from the crisis of authority (Soederberg, 2004: 19).

Although the World Bank claims that gender mainstreaming is their response for dealing with the wellbeing of women within the development process, it is also possible that gender mainstreaming is one of the Bank’s responses in trying to remedy a crisis in
its authority. From a Gramscian perspective, this would mean that mainstreaming is acting as part of a passive revolution. By passive revolution what is entailed is “the constant reorganization of State power and its relationship to the dominated classes to preserve dominant-class hegemony and to exclude the masses from exerting influence over political and economic institutions” (Carnoy, 1984: 76). Gramsci coined the term ‘passive revolution’ to explicate how the elite and dominant classes manage to maintain their hegemony even in the face of political and economic crises. ‘Passive revolution’ is an incredibly informative term, for it demonstrates “the difference between reformist and revolutionary politics, where reformism is a version of the passive revolution” (Carnoy, 1984: 77). The World Bank’s commitment to gender mainstreaming can possibly be regarded as a reformist policy, and as such it could be understood to be acting as a ‘version of the passive revolution’. This potential ‘revolution’ became institutionalized on 13 April 2001 when the senior management approved the strategy of gender mainstreaming, becoming endorsed by the full Board of Executive Directors on 18 September 2001 (World Bank, 2002: ix).

The World Bank states that their reasoning for engaging with the issue of gender and development is because “the gender-based division of labor and the inequalities to which it gives rise tends to slow development, economic growth and poverty reduction” (World Bank, 2002: xi). In other words, the Bank is stating that their motivation for dealing with the issue of gender and development is so as to increase efficiency. This resides well with the neoclassical economic theory which guides their policy agendas, indicating that the Bank may merely be trying to maintain and perpetuate their neoliberal framework and hegemony. In order to explore the possibility that mainstreaming is acting
as a passive revolution, it is important to understand the 'common sense' and discourses that are upholding this neoliberal hegemony, as mainstreaming is being inserted into the larger neoliberal development project. It is also important to understand the shifts in economic and development theory that have made possible the mainstreaming initiative, as well as comprehending the theoretical underpinnings in which mainstreaming is enacted. As such, in the following I deconstruct the 'common sense' and 'scientific knowledge' that currently informs the practices of the Bank in its current enactment of neoliberalism. I undertake this theoretical analysis because gender mainstreaming is representative of and a result of some of the 'shifts' that have occurred within the theorizing of economics. This will then set the stage for undertaking the discourse analysis of *Engendering Development* (2001) and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work* (2002).

**Shifts in Economic and Development Theories:**

Before proceeding forward with an analysis of neoliberalism and the neoclassical economic theory which has informed it, it is imperative to briefly outline some of the theoretical shifts which have been made within the field of economic theory. This is particularly relevant for discerning the logic which has informed the Bank and which the Bank is also forwarding. I undertake this theoretical analysis because gender mainstreaming is representative of and a result of some of the 'shifts' that have occurred within the theorizing of economics. It is therefore imperative to situate gender mainstreaming within the context of the theoretical rationales of various economic theories. It is similarly crucial to discuss these shifts because the logic of neoclassical
economic theory and its informing of neoliberalism are more fully understood from the standpoint of these alterations. More precisely, in order to appreciate the 'common sense' and 'scientific knowledge' that currently informs the practices of the Bank in its current enactment of neoliberalism, it is necessary to engage with the prior common senses and 'scientific knowledge' which have previously informed the Bank. These shifts have occurred from Keynesianism, to the Washington consensus and more currently to the Post-Washington consensus. The following briefly engages with these theoretical shifts so as to make sense of gender mainstreaming and the theoretical rationale informing the practice of mainstreaming.

The Washington consensus "emerged in the 1980s after the end of the Golden Age decades of post-war capitalism" (Jomo, 2005: 11). The term was originally coined in 1990 by John Williamson in "What Washington Means by Policy Reform". In it he addresses the reforms that were being imposed on Latin America so that (in theory) the region could escape the debt crisis (Williamson, 2003: 10). Originally Williamson had only intended for the 'Washington consensus' to signify ten reforms that were being imposed on the region. These include: fiscal discipline; reordering public expenditure priorities; tax reform; liberalization of interest rates; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization; deregulation; and secure property rights (Williamson, 2003: 10). Nonetheless, this term has now been employed more generally to represent the transition away from a Keynesian-informed model of national development towards development premised on insertion within the global economy. The Washington consensus is therefore now the term that denotes the adherence to the neoliberal model of development, with the ensuing
prescriptions and solutions that it ‘offers’. This is predominantly the case within the
Global South: “[t]he ‘Washington consensus’ codified the actual implementation of
neoliberalism across the South” (Munck, 2005a: 65). In a nutshell:

the Washington consensus...emerged in the early 1980s as the neo-liberal
counterpart for developing economies...an ideology of reliance upon
market forces and the reduction of state intervention and expenditure to a
minimum...posing economic issues in terms of the state versus the
market, leaning heavily, or falling over, in favour of the market (Fine,
2001: 2).

In other words, the shift towards the Washington consensus was significant and marked
the ushering in of the neoliberal era (Palley, 2005: 21). Although John Williamson had
never intended for the term ‘Washington consensus’ to signify the prominence of the
neoliberal era, this is nonetheless how the concept is now employed.

The Washington consensus marked the end in the reign of Keynesianism:

“[c]lassical and radical development theory alike was cast aside and replaced by a ‘one
size fits all’ neoliberal set of remedies” (Munck, 2005a: 64-65). This neoliberal set of
remedies has been informed by the logic of neoclassical economic theory (Robinson,
2003: 50). Although gender mainstreaming is characteristic of what has come to be
referred to as the ‘post-Washington consensus’, I will first engage with neoliberalism and
how it has been informed by neoclassical economic theory. Following, I proceed with an
examination of the post-Washington consensus. This will facilitate the ability to
understand and interrogate the shift from the Washington to post-Washington consensus.
It will also assist in examining whether this shift is actually making the ‘progressive’ and
‘humanistic’ break away from the limitations of the original Washington consensus.
Neoclassical Economic Theory (The Mother of Neoliberalism):

Neoclassical economic theory was born in the 1870s, and is largely attributed to the work of Adam Smith. Neoliberalism is a political project to reform societies based on the theoretical underpinnings of neoclassical economics. The following describes some of the major theoretical presumptions informing the logic of neoclassical economic theory. This engagement will lay the foundation for proceeding with the discernment of neoliberalism.

Neoclassical economic theory forwards assumptions that have implications in the prescriptions that it offers. This theory is driven by the various suppositions regarding the market and what is ‘best’ and will ‘most effectively’ stimulate development. One of the major themes of neoclassical theory is the emphasis that is placed on free markets, what Adam Smith referred to as the ‘Invisible Hand’. The logic behind the ‘invisible hand’ is that markets will always tend to self-regulate if left free to do so. As such, “neoclassical economists conclude that free-market economies enable individuals to pursue their self-interest to the benefit of society...[in other words]...the less state, the better” (Rapley, 2002: 52). This focus on market relations and the privileging of free markets is at the heart of neoclassical economic theory. However, the privileging of the free-market is tied up to the ‘nature’ and role that is attributed to individuals and their role within market systems. It is also informed by the logic of the comparative advantage of areas through their role in specialization, as by the logic of the role of transparency and full information. In order to understand the logic of neoclassical theory that prescribes the favouring of free markets over social relations, it is imperative to explore the assumptions that underlie neoclassical economic theory.
The manner in which neoclassical economics theorizes the role and nature of people is imperative and consequential to the logic and prescriptions that it offers. A significant assumption permeating neoclassical theory is that “people [are]...atomistic individuals who are bound together only through market forces. People are reduced to isolated creatures of the marketplace, devoid of...social relationships beyond simple market exchanges” (Brohman, 1995: 297). The functioning of economies from this perspective is that they act as a technical device for the allocation of scarce resources (Brohman, 1995: 298). Central to this logic and conception of individuals is the concept of ‘homo economicus’. Since human behaviour within neoclassical theory is understood through the concept of ‘homo economicus’; it has significant implications to the logic that it ends up forwarding. As such, I quote in length an explication of what is meant by ‘homo economicus’:

From its origins, neoclassical theory has basically conceived of a world composed of scarce means of unlimited desires, within which individuals must make choices. The role of 

\textit{homo economicus} within this world becomes one of defining the ‘best’ choices, ie those that maximize an individual’s ends given the limited means available. \textit{Homo economicus} performs this function as a ‘rational, self-interested, instrumental maximizer with fixed preferences’. Social processes are reduced to a universal psychological end – utility – which supposedly motivates all economically rational behaviour (Brohman, 1995: 298).

The argument forwarded by the logic of homo economicus is that all people are rational and purely economically-motivated. As such, the world is made up of autonomous individuals: “individuals [are]...the building blocks of society” (Rapley, 1995: 54). Nothing else (such as history, culture, gendered socialization, or values) matter within this framework. Consequently, whether intentionally or not, through the concept of homo economicus power discrepancies and ‘isms’ become completely irrelevant. People are
regarded as rational beings who always seek to maximize their own utility. As a result it is assumed that people will always make decisions based on what is rational and what will maximize their own gains. This is the only motivator of individual actions.

Another assumption underlying neoclassical economics is that the market always manages to equilibrate itself. This assumption has been given the theoretical name of ‘Say’s Law’, which is a central component of economic orthodoxy (Lapavitsas, 2005: 31). Say’s Law also helps to explicate Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’. By ‘Say’s Law’ what is argued is that “effective demand and supply in a capitalist economy tend to be equal” (Lapavitsas, 2005: 31). As such, individuals will always be paid what their labour and commodities are worth, at least in the long run. This is premised on the logic of supply and demand, and the belief that if there is an overflow of commodities on the market or if a particular form of labour is no longer in demand (as labour is nothing more then a commodity), individuals / goods will redirect their efforts towards doing a different kind of labour or producing a different type of commodity. The central limitation in this argument, however, is that:

[Labour is not automatically paid what it is worth by an anonymous neutral market process [neither are other kinds of commodities]. Rather, the pattern of income distribution is impacted by labour-market institutions, and institutional interventions are needed because markets have a tendency to favour capital over labour” (Palley, 2005: 28).

The argument of ‘Say’s Law’ is also closely related to the concept of homo economicus and comparative advantage. Individuals will always do what is rational and maximizing, and if their efforts seize to be maximized, they will change and do something that will be more rewarding to their efforts. This is a prime example of the faith placed on rationalism that permeates neoclassical economic theory.
Another central tenet of neoclassical theory is the advocacy of specialization, premised on the argument of comparative advantage. According to the logic of comparative advantage, every region has a lead on what it should be producing. This "advantage" is based on the specific human and natural environment of the area in question, and the belief that all areas should specialize at what they are "best" at producing. As such, if Central America has a comparative advantage at producing commodities such as textiles through the promotion of its cheap and under-employed labour force, then this is the commodity that they should specialize at producing. What a region is best at producing are "those industries whose production benefits the most from the cheap local input" (Shaikh, 2005: 45). Regions should not be diverted at attempts towards diversification, but rather produce commodities for exportation on global markets. Consequently, this theorizing justifies free-er markets (as related to institutions that interfere with market relations), insertion within global market systems as well as mono-culture cropping. It similarly acts to depoliticize global trade. The fact that some regions produce high income-generating commodities such as TVs and cars whilst other countries produce low-cost agriculture products or textiles through maquiladora industries remains unquestioned. Rather, this becomes justified through the argument of comparative advantage, "Say's Law" as well as the role of homo economicus. Countries should keep producing the commodities that they are "best" at producing, and somehow (in theory) every region will develop.

Neoclassical economic theory also assumes that participants possess (or at least should possess) full information regarding the market. It is assumed that individuals will always engage in exchanges which are mutually beneficial, yet in order for this to occur,
participants must be fully informed. More specifically, they should be informed regarding aspects such as "uses of commodities, the productivity of labour, the quality of investment plans, and so on" (Lapavitsas, 2005: 36). In order for this to occur, however, neoclassical economic theory presumes that there is a perfect level of transparency (or at least that there should be) and that the homo economicus individual will always engage in exchanges that are beneficial and personally maximizing. This is what keeps the markets at equilibrium. Consequently, nothing should stand in the way to impede this. As such, this is the rationale as to why markets should remain 'open', especially 'liberated' from state intervention that interferes with market relations. State intervention (as related in market relations) is often regarded as corrupt and inefficient; Southern governments are particularly prone to being regarded in this manner. As long as there is a full disclosure of information, individuals (who are characterized as homo economicus) will always benefit from their involvement with the market. There are no internal conflicts within the market, only harmony and equilibriums.

Neoliberalism as an economic theory has been informed by the arguments of neoclassical economics. Consequently, most of the central tenets of neoclassical theory have permeated, informed and continue to inform neoliberalism. The shift from Keynesianism towards neoliberalism has meant that the prescriptions offered by this theory resulted in a drastic break from the practice of state-intervention. In the following I briefly outline the similarities permeating neoclassical theory and neoliberalism. This is carried out so as to appreciate what this has meant for global economic processes. This will also aid in the ability to understand the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus.
Neoliberalism became the leading global economic project during the 1970s and 1980s. Neoliberalism is rooted in the logic of neoclassical economic theory. Amongst this logic is the privileging of 'free markets', comparative advantage, specialization, homo economicus and full information. What is ironic about the discourse of creating free markets, however, is that in order to create the 'right structures' to facilitate the functioning of neoliberalism, states and various other institutions (like the World Bank) have been very involved. Neoliberalism is also not necessarily about 'less state' intervention. This is because some state institutions are strengthened, notably those that reinforce the power of money and property (such as the Central Bank and the judiciary), both of which are essential for upholding marketized social relations. Therefore in practice it is only those state institutions that are seen to interfere with market relations (such as labour institutions, welfare institutions, and protectionist trade institutions) that are retrenched (Bakker, 2003: 70). Nonetheless, according to this logic, all will prosper and mutually benefit from the market when the policy prescriptions informing neoliberalism are enacted.

In the following I employ the work of Taylor and Robinson to explicate the processes undertaken to attain these goals. Namely I engage with the practice of deregulation, liberalization, flexibilization, and privatization and how they are motivated by the aspirations of attaining 'free markets'. This will facilitate the ability to appreciate the shift from the Washington to the Post-Washington consensus, especially since the World Bank has been intimately involved in leading this process. This will similarly facilitate the ability to explore whether this change should be regarded as an example of what Gramsci termed a passive revolution.
Deregulation, Liberalization, Flexibilization and Privatization:

According to William Robinson, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization are characteristic of neoliberal models of development. According to him, liberalization is of utmost importance within the Washington consensus, particularly for realizing the doctrine of ‘free trade’ as related to trade and finances. What is implied by this term is the process in which “liberalization of trade and finances [is undertaken], which opens the economy to the world market (Robinson, 2003: 51). Liberalization is ultimately accomplished through the reduction of trade barriers. Hence, this fits well with the noted shift towards the Washington consensus, in which state intervention becomes regarded as being destructive particularly if it is interfering with market relations. In Andrew Gamble’s words, “[t]he presumption is always in favour of recreating the widest possible conditions for markets to flourish, which means removing as many restrictions on competition as possible…and empowering market agents by reducing the burdens of taxation” (Gamble, 2001: 132). More explicitly, “the restructuring process rapidly tore down the politically imposed barriers to the global movement of commodities...structural change involved an intensive liberalisation of trade, the opening of capital accounts and the entrenchment of fiscal discipline” (Taylor, 2004: 12). The World Bank has been intimately involved in ‘promoting’ this in the South through their structural adjustment packages. The process of liberalization is supposed to benefit everybody because in theory it permits the market to facilitate the development of all countries. The markets will dictate through the logic of comparative advantage which commodities countries should ideally be producing. This has the result of pulling more countries into the global economy, as exportation of goods is regarded as being the path towards development. As
such, according to the logic of neoliberalism, liberalization will assist all countries to develop. This will only, however, be accomplished if countries remain free from costly and supposedly damaging trade barriers upheld through state intervention.

Deregulation is another central component that represents and is attributed to the Washington consensus. By deregulation what is implied within neoliberalism is that states should be removed from economic decision-making (Robinson, 2003: 51). Hence states should not be regulating or interfering with international or national market relations. Rather, through the process of liberalization and the deregulation of market activities, the market will solve and equilibrate itself, especially since individuals are rational, maximizing beings. This is equivalent to what Adam Smith regarded as the ‘invisible hand’. Concisely, through the process of deregulation, the state becomes removed from economic decision making, permitting the markets to ‘flourish’ and ‘develop’, with the supposed result that everybody will benefit from the market.

Privatization is another central component espoused by neoliberal development theory. Privatization (of public sectors and spheres) is supposed to aid in the development process because if privatization is not undertaken, then public sectors “could hamper capital accumulation if public interest over private profit were left operative” (Robinson, 2003: 51). Similarly, this is supposed to be good because “privatization of “inefficient” public sectors...[will help to]...attract investment and allocate resources “efficiently”” (Robinson, 2003: 52). Hence privatization is undertaken under similar logic as that of deregulation, and will supposedly aid in the development process.

Flexibilization is the last central prescription forwarded by neoliberalism. Flexibilization is solely related to labour, and hence is better understood as labour
flexibilization. The rationale of flexibilization is that labour is a commodity, like any other. There should be no state intervention in the wages that labourers are paid, as the market will supposedly assure that workers get paid what their labour is worth. If there are changes in the demands on the market as pertaining to labour, then workers will have to enter other sectors because their previous labour is no longer in demand; this remains entirely unchallenged within this framework. Instead, since individuals ( premised on the argument of homo economicus) will always seek to maximize their utility and economic earnings, then they will willingly enter the job sectors where their labour commodity is most rewarded and required. In a nutshell: "non-market factors that interrupt or distort the market-driven dynamic of the labour market toward equilibrium are understood to be rigidities that prohibit the optimal distribution of labour with negative consequences for overall economic efficiency and welfare outcomes" (Taylor, 2002: 225). According to Taylor (2002), amongst the three central interruptions within this framework are regulations on wages, hiring and firing practices, and ‘supra-wage benefits’ (225). In other words, there should be no state or other forms of intervention as related to labour (such as unions), as this can have the effect of disadvantaging those who work in other sectors, resulting in a supposed price-distortion of labour. Rather, according to the logic of neoclassical theory, "liberalization of trade added to labour market flexibility should increase employment, in which general deregulation should foster growth, and in which faster growth should lead to higher wages" (Taylor, 2002: 225). Once again, as long as markets are left to self-regulate in certain institutions such as labour and welfare institutions, everyone who participates in the market will benefit, since individuals are rational, maximizing beings. The road to development is therefore characterized by a
minimalist state in respect to institutions that interfere with market relations while privileging market relations through empowering capital over social relations.

The World Bank has been intimately involved in promoting this logic through concrete development policies embodied in their shock-therapy prescriptions. For example, the Salvadoran government has aggressively pursued SAPs since the early 1990s. Nonetheless – or potentially because of this – many of their indicators for social wellbeing have worsened, irrespective of the country’s levels of ‘economic growth’. For example, in 1980, 68% of the population in El Salvador lived in poverty. In 1990 this had grown to account for 71% of the population, and by 1999, 80% of the population in El Salvador lived in either extreme or relative poverty (Robinson, 2003: 309). Also according to the Human Development Index, in 1990 El Salvador was 72nd in the world. By 1997 they had dropped 50 places, becoming 112th on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1999). These data are indicative of the fact that the World Bank and neoliberalism have largely failed within the development process within the context of El Salvador. This is also the case on a more global scale. According to Veltmeyer (2001), since the onset of the Washington consensus and more currently the Post-Washington consensus, the gap between the rich and poor has continued to grow, regardless of the increase in ‘economic growth’ (3). Some regions of the world have not only stagnated, but have even retreated in their levels of human development whilst other regions and peoples have benefited; Africa is a prime example, though Latin America is not far behind (Munck, 2005b: 32).

The prescriptions offered through neoliberalism in the form of liberalization, deregulation, privatization and flexibilization have caused havoc on many countries, most
severely in the Global South. These trends have stirred up a crisis in authority for both the World Bank and the ‘common sense’ logic of neoliberalism. It is precisely this which has resulted in the shift from the Washington to the Post-Washington consensus. The following outlines what is meant by the Post-Washington consensus, and how the Bank has been embracing and employing this ‘new’ development framework.

**The Post-Washington Consensus:**

The post-Washington consensus and its ideological and discursive arrangements became the prominent development framework during the mid 1990s (Bergeron, 2003b: 399). This post-Washington consensus is sometimes referred to as a ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ (CDF), which is a:

broaden[ing of]...the scope of economics to include explanations of the economic rationality behind the existence of precisely the kind of ‘non-economic’ factors – institutions, social structures and customs – that are playing an increasingly important role in the Bank’s explanations and resolutions of poverty and underdevelopment (Bergeron, 2003b: 400).

According to Taylor, the embrace of the CDF was “driven by a combination of lost legitimacy [of neoliberalism] and the tangible need to address the failure of development programmes in the South” (Taylor, 2004: 14). The major premise and goal of the CDF is to bring the social ‘back in’ to the development process. This is supposed to be accomplished through an acknowledgment of factors such as gender (in the form of gender mainstreaming), indigenous peoples’ unique needs and concerns, the condition of the environment as well as health and education, among other factors. Problematically, however, is that the social is ‘brought back in’ “as a way of understanding and potentially resolving market imperfections” (Bergeron, 2003b: 398). As such, this addressing of the
social is operationalized through an array of reformist policies; policies that reaffirm the major theoretical and prescriptive underpinnings of neoliberalism, leaving little opportunity for any substantial changes. David Moore also observes this, when noting that the World Bank does “not move far from the oxymoron of spontaneous neoliberalism...the efforts of the reformers simply look more like meek justifications for World Bank intervention at any cost...rather than coherent alternatives to neoliberalism” (Moore, 2006: 15). From a Gramscian perspective, then, the shift in the consensuses is in fact only acting as a passive revolution, ‘giving in’ to some of the smaller and more reformist demands, whilst attempting to keep intact the neoliberal hegemony. Gender mainstreaming is an example of a ‘giving in’ to the reformist demand of considering gendered specific realities within the development process as well as the gendered nature of poverty and poverty reduction programs.

In what follows, I elaborate more clearly as to what the post-Washington consensus (in the form of the CDF) entails. I engage with some of the specific policy prescriptions, and briefly consider its discursive composition. I do this in order to demonstrate why the World Bank has embraced these particular policies. This will serve as a useful backdrop for undertaking the discourse analysis of Engendering Development and Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work as it will facilitate making sense of gender mainstreaming in relation to the post-Washington consensus. I argue that the World Bank is implementing the CDF to act as its passive revolution. This is because within this specific framework, ‘capitalist social relations’ and the ‘scientific knowledge’ informing neoliberalism remain for the most part unchallenged. Consequently, the prescriptions offered through the post-Washington consensus will (at best) have minimal
gains in the ‘fight against poverty’. Similarly, gender mainstreaming will also have minimal gains in the struggle towards more gender equality within the development process. This adds support to the claim that the post-Washington consensus (and hence gender mainstreaming) is being embraced due to the crisis in neoliberalism. The implicit goal is not to eradicate poverty, but rather to embrace the CDF to act as a passive revolution.

According to the World Bank, the CDF is a process (rather than a ‘blueprint’) through which low to middle-income countries can reduce poverty. In terms of its motivation for embracing the CDF, the Bank states that:

[1]he old model of a technocratic government supported by donors is seen as incomplete. Most development practitioners now believe that aid and policy effectiveness depend on the input of a whole range of agents—including the private sector and civil society—as well as on the healthy functioning of societal and institutional structures within which they operate”.

In other words, the CDF arose out of the recognized failures and limitations characterizing the Washington consensus, mainly in respect to the complete faith bestowed on the ability of ‘free markets’ to regulate itself. This shift is presented as a ‘new’, cross-cutting approach towards international development that remedies the limitations of neoliberalism. It is premised on the principles of a “[I]ong term, holistic vision, country ownership, country-led partnership [and] results focus[ed]”. According to the actual programs that the CDF principles inform, these doctrines “have been

---


underpinning the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process since its inception, and were formally endorsed as the basis for all of the Bank's work, starting in January 2001".9

PRSs are supposed be strategies that countries can embrace for the purpose of reducing poverty. They differ nationally, because of the apparent recognition that the mediums for stimulating ‘development’ through ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ are nationally specific. PRSs are outlined in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). These PRSPs outline “a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs”.10 Guiding the focus for a ‘long term, holistic vision’, the World Bank engages in “research and policy initiatives that are concerned with such issues as marginalized groups, displaced peoples, social conflict, inequality, the environment and social factors of development such as health and education” (Bergeron, 2003b: 399). Amongst specific interests and programs that have resulted from the CDF are a focus on agriculture and the rural poor, a recognition of the importance of gender through gender mainstreaming, the improvement in the life of the urban poor in places like Bahia, a focus on indigenous peoples and their diverse and unique concerns, a concentration on education, and the like. The CDF is more of a process than an actual blueprint for development, and therefore it would be inaccurate to claim that the CDF entails the execution of specific actions. Nonetheless, there are some chronic tendencies and characteristics which are consistent. The following briefly engages with some of these dispositions.


The CDF “incorporates a high degree of populist rhetoric, including catchwords such as “empowerment”, “partnership” and “ownership”” (Taylor, 2004: 15). Joseph Stiglitz (the ex-chief economist of the World Bank) characterizes this tendency, when suggesting that the “key ingredients in a successful development strategy are ownership and participation” (Stiglitz, 1998: 88). The problem, however, is that ‘empowerment’ through ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ is sought through the improvement of individual human capital: “[d]evelopment entails the empowerment of individuals, so that they have more control over the forces that affect their lives, so that they can have a richer, healthier life. Education and health – including moral health – are at the centre of efforts at individual development” (Stiglitz, 1998: 92). When the focus is shifted beyond the individual and is framed in terms of improving the national base for development, “the substantive emphasis of comprehensive development is the refashioning of national and sub-national institutional forms in order to compliment and optimize the basic fundamentals of market relations” (Taylor, 2004: 23). This limitation is significant, because at no point in time are ‘capitalist social relations’ or the ‘scientific knowledge’ of capitalism or neoliberalism challenged within this framework. Instead, as Ben Fine rightly notes:

the new consensus deploys more variables on a wider scope and less dogmatically than the old. But its intellectual narrowness and reductionism remain striking for it replaces an understanding of the economy as relying harmoniously on the market by an understanding of society as a whole based on (informational) market imperfections (Fine, 2001: 3).

In other words, the crisis in the practice of neoliberalism and its emphasis on the market is being remedied through the CDF.

In Bergeron’s words, “[a]dding culture, social factors and institutions to the
equation is within the bounds of acceptable practice if it is framed in terms of preserving core ideas of neoclassical economics such as methodological individuals and a focus on market efficiency” (Bergeron, 2003b: 402). Consequently, the prescriptions offered through the post-Washington consensus will always have minimal results as pertaining to the ‘fight against poverty’, and instead is acting as a passive revolution. The fact that the World Bank has embraced a ‘new’ model of development that maintains intact and justifies the practice of neoliberalism whilst permitting it to appear to be embracing a more ‘socially’ responsible model of development is the perfect façade and response to the crisis in neoliberalism. In Moore’s (2006) words:

> [a]s if taking the Gramscian injunction to heart, the Bank is preparing its own long term war of position...just about any question leads to the confirmation of ‘market’ over ‘state’ and all the permutations of that belief...no matter where...[one] starts, the endpoint is pro-market economics (19).

Gendering mainstreaming embodies this tendency, as the discourse analysis of *Engendering Development* and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work* later denote.

The prescriptions that are offered through the CDF demonstrate the Bank’s attempt to enact a passive revolution. This is due to the crisis in authority of neoliberalism. The major limitation is that at no point in time are ‘capitalist social relations’ or the ‘scientific knowledge’ of capitalism in the form neoliberalism actually challenged. When the limitations of neoliberal prescriptions are actually addressed, they are done so in a manner that upholds the major tenets and theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism. The above discussion has repeatedly demonstrated this tendency. Consequently, the prescriptions offered through the post-Washington consensus will never enjoy significant advances in the ‘fight against poverty’. Instead, it is acting as a
passive revolution, in order to maintain intact the neoliberal hegemony. As the following
demonstrates, this is also true of gender mainstreaming and the policy publications of

*Engendering Development* (2001) and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work: A
Chapter 3:

Discursive Analyses of World Bank Texts from a Feminist Perspective:

In this chapter I undertake a discourse analysis of two World Bank publications, that of Engendering Development (2001) and Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work: A Strategy for Action (2002). I have chosen these two publications because the former heavily informs the policy prescriptions of the latter. Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work is the Bank’s ‘official’ document which clearly stipulates their reasoning and policy prescriptions for and how to mainstream gender into development. Nonetheless, Engendering Development is also the document that broaches theoretically the Bank’s concept of gender and development; its policy oriented rhetoric and prescriptions underlying the practice and benefits of mainstreaming are built upon this reasoning. It is also telling that in Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work, Engendering Development is often referenced. As such, I begin the first part of this chapter by discursively analyzing Engendering Development and then demonstrate in the latter section how the assumptions permeating Engendering Development are built into the Bank’s policy prescriptions for mainstreaming gender; I demonstrate this through the discursive analyzes of Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work. I undertake these discourse analyzes from a critical feminist perspective. I employ mostly from the works of Maria Mies, Diane Elson and Suzanne Bergeron to analyze the discourses, policy recommendations and ideological nature informing mainstreaming. Through this analysis I will be showing that gender mainstreaming is acting as a passive revolution. The manner in which gender inequality and poverty are framed is accomplished in an approach which finds ‘solutions’ through pro-market prescriptions. This is irrespective of
the fact that gender inequalities result from the international and gendered division of labour within global capitalism, and that these inequalities are often heightened under neoliberal restructuring. Consequently the recommendations put forth in the name of mainstreaming function to maintain the gender-oppressive neoliberal hegemony whilst attempting to legitimize neoliberalism in the name of ‘progress’ and ‘gender equality’.

In *Engendering Development* various factors that are related to the theme of gender and development are outlined. Amongst these are: gender equality and inequality; what gender inequality looks like at the global level; how gender inequality hinders development; why economic development is ‘good’ for promoting gender equality; and the means by which to promote gender equality through neoliberal development. As the discursive analysis of this text will denote, there are many limitations permeating this document. This is the result of the premises and ideological nature saturating both the issues and the recommendations put forth in this text. The three major premises that will be interrogated are as follows. First, I will be uncovering why the Bank suggests that they engage with the issue of gender and development so as to improve and facilitate the development process. Second, I will be problematizing the World Bank’s definition of gender equality and why the Bank explicitly argues that Southern poverty and gender inequality are the result of the ‘gender disparities’ permeating Southern institutions, households and the economy. Third (and perhaps most importantly) I will be exploring the way in which the Bank maintains a teleological understanding of ‘development’ in which neoliberal prescriptions cannot be challenged. I conclude that the theoretical underpinnings espoused within *Engendering Development* are reformist. They portray the ‘problem’ in a particular fashion; in a manner that frames the remedies through pro-
market solutions. The fact that gender inequalities are perpetuated through the international and gendered division of labour and that this has been exacerbated through neoliberal restructuring is completely ignored. As the latter section will denote, this has limitations both in terms of the policies that become enacted while simultaneously hindering the possibility of struggling towards poverty reduction and gender equality. Consequently the neoliberal hegemony is left intact while the Bank becomes portrayed as practicing 'development with a human face'. This has aided in pacifying the crisis in authority of neoliberalism, facilitating the transition from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus.

*Engendering Development* is a publication that is both contradictory and fragmented. This is because at first glance it potentially appears as a 'progressive' piece of text. Within it the Bank engages with various issues that have been interrogated by the likes of feminist academics, activist and policy analysts. For instance, they dedicate an entire section of this publication to outlining what is implied by the household gendered division of labour and how it functions to marginalize women. The limitation is not so much that the World Bank ignores the problems as put forth by feminist academics, activists and policy analysts. In Einar Braathen’s words (when referring to another World Bank publication) “the report is embracing as many discourses or schools of thought as possible” (Braathen, 2001: 35). The problem is that these discourses are synthesized into the workings of the Bank in a manner that maintains the discourses of the neoliberal hegemony. In other words, although some of the subaltern standpoint and discourses are employed in the Bank’s discussions, these discourses have little effect on the policy recommendations that are actually put forth by the Bank.
Gender is 'Important' if it Facilitates the Development Process:

*Engendering Development* is a policy report that engages with the concept of gender and development. According to the Bank, engaging with the issue of gender and development (or the persistence of gender inequalities) is related to their 'commitment to a world free from poverty' (xi). They claim that "[t]hese disparities disadvantage women and girls and limit their capacity to participate in and benefit from development ... [Consequently]...gender inequalities hinder development" (xi). In this publication the Bank often makes reference to their 'commitment to a world free from poverty'. In the last paragraph of the foreword the ex-president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn states, "[t]he wealth of evidence and analysis presented in the report can inform the design of effective strategies to promote equality between women and men in development. In doing so, it helps us – as policymakers and as members of the development community – to realize our commitment to a world without poverty" (xii).

According to the World Bank, gender inequality hinders economic development (73). In their words, "it impose[s] an indirect cost by hindering productivity, efficiency, and economic progress...[therefore]...diminishing an economy’s capacity to prosper and provide for its people" (74). Therefore, gender inequality is maintaining and perpetuating poverty: "societies that discriminate on the basis of gender pay a significant price in the well-being of their people, in their economic growth, in their governance, and in their ability to reduce poverty" (97-98). The World Bank states that "gender equality is a core development issue...It strengthens countries’ abilities to grow, to reduce poverty, and to govern effectively...Economic development opens many avenues for increasing gender equality in the long run" (1). What is telling about these statements is that gender equality
is understood to result from economic development. It is also understood that greater
gender equality will also result in economic development. Sometimes this argument is
made in reverse; that gender inequality is the result of women ‘not participating’ in
economic development, and that this gender inequality acts as a detriment to
development. For example: “[gender] disparities, whether in education or other
productive resources, hurt women’s ability to participate in development and to
contribute to higher living standards for their families” (5). It is assumed that if they
could ‘participate in development’ that this would contribute to higher living standards
for their families. This argument is tautological because it assumes that gender inequality
is what is maintaining and perpetuating poverty, and that through eradicating gender
inequality simultaneously poverty will also be eradicated. If there is little to no poverty it
is because there is also little to no gender inequality. The problem with this logic is that
there is no way to prove or refute this theory as its verification relies completely on the
existence of the other; in other words, there is never a dependent variable within this
equation. Yet these tautological arguments are present throughout this entire document.

What is significant about the Bank’s discussion on gender inequality and
economic development is that it is representative of why they engage with the issue of
gender and development; they do so in order to ‘improve’ and ‘facilitate’ the
development process which will supposedly result in poverty reduction. As will be later
demonstrated, the manner in which they operationalized the causes for ‘gender
inequality’ act to reify their dream of ‘open markets’. Nonetheless, their arguments are
tautological and it becomes almost impossible within this framework to question the
prevalence of gender inequality and the causes of this inequality outside of this
constructed framework. Arturo Escobar elaborates on this process when he states that “the system of relations establishes a discursive practice that sets the rules of the game...it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory or object to emerge and be named, analysed and eventually transformed into a policy or plan” (Escobar, 1995: 87). Under these ‘rules of the game’ gender inequality cannot be attributed to the international and gendered division of labour within global capitalism which is heightened under neoliberal restructuring. Instead according to the Bank, “rigid gender roles and associated gender disparities are often inefficient, imposing significant costs on societies and on development” (World Bank, 2001: 35).

This portrayal of the limitations of gender inequality also demonstrates the Bank’s privileging of economic development above all else; an economic development that takes the form of neoliberalism irrespective of the disproportionate harm that neoliberalism causes for working class girls and women globally but in particular in Southern countries. This quote demonstrates that it is not so much that gender inequality is inhumane and morally enraging (though from time to time they make gestures in that direction), but rather that it acts as a hindrance towards development which will supposedly only then result in poverty reduction – a poverty reduction that is framed through ‘open markets’ and neoliberal development. These premises are significant because they set limits upon which discussions regarding gender equality and inequality can be had. Their privileging and understandings of gender equality and inequality also taint the policy solutions which ensue from these understandings.

This publication also upholds some of the underlying characteristics of the comprehensive development framework (CDF). The Bank claims that it is important that
"policymakers take account of local realities when designing and implementing policies and programs. There can be no one-size-fits-all formula for promoting gender equality" (xii). This is characteristic of the CDF in which development prescriptions should supposedly differ from country to country due to the ‘unique’ realities of each country under question. In their words, “[s]ince the nature and extent of gender inequality differ considerably across countries, the interventions that will be most relevant will also differ across contexts” (22). However this claim is not in fact a call for diversity within the development process because this ‘diversity’ can only occur within the confines of already prescribed development practices. Consider that in another passage they make a contradictory claim when they state that “there are many lessons to be learned and shared across countries that take different approaches and are at different stages of development” (xiii; emphasis my own). Although countries may be ‘unique’ in the different approaches that they take towards development (which is in respect to the Bank’s past performance a questionable claim) ultimately the development process is understood as being teleological. ‘Different stages of development’ implies that there is a procession by which countries must follow in order to ‘catch-up’ and ‘prosper’ within the development process. The comprehensive development framework may emphasize the ‘uniqueness’ of countries, which implies that different approaches towards development should ensue. Nonetheless, the notion of ‘different stages of development’ is modernist and contradicts this claim since stages implies a pre-determined teleological framework. Instead ‘differences’ are really only related to the ‘marginal’ issues within the development process (such as education and pensions). Diversity can occur within these areas, but not at the level of macroeconomics or other key policy realms.
‘Gender Equality’ and the Underlying ‘Causes’ for its Non-existence:

The Bank defines and operationalizes gender equality in respect to “equality under the law, equality of opportunity – including equality in access to human capital and other productive resources and equality of rewards for work – and equality of voice” (35). They refer to this within the text as equality of ‘rights’, ‘resources’ and ‘voice’. They do not, however, define gender equality in respect to equality of outcomes. They argue that each country is distinct and that individuals may chose to take on different roles and different goals (35). This reasoning is highly problematic when referring back to their definition of gender equality. It is not a radical notion that the genders should have equality under the law, equality of opportunity and equality of voice, and to test this ‘equality’ through the equality of outcomes. This is particularly so in respect to equality of law and equality of voice. Perhaps it would be harder to test the outcome in ‘equality of opportunity’ because of the gendered division of labour and women’s disproportionate role in maintaining their households and the choice of having and caring for children (notably a ‘choice’ that occurs within normative patriarchal discourses and structures); a choice that undermines economically women’s wellbeing. Nonetheless, outcomes need to be tested to see if any progress is actually being made. Through their definition, however, the Bank avoids putting themselves in a position which might ultimately result in criticisms regarding their policy prescriptions. This is because the definition that the Bank puts forward is so vague that this facilitates the ability to avoid any substantive implications. Their definition rests at the level of rhetoric made possible through emphasizing equality of opportunity rather than outcome. The Bank over-emphasizes words and processes as opposed to outcomes. This has permitted their ability to make
what may appear as a turn towards a ‘progressive’ and ‘humanistic’ direction without the risk of later being criticized for the failures of their development and policy prescriptions since neoliberal restructuring has in many cases been equated with maintaining and exacerbating gender inequality and poverty globally.

The three factors that they operationalize gender equality with are equality of ‘rights’, ‘resources’ and ‘voice’. In respect to the equality of rights they are largely referring to equality “in legal statutes, in customary laws, and in practices in communities, families, and households” (36). They measure equality of rights in respect to political and legal equality, social and economic equality, and the equality of the sexes in things like marriage and divorce (38). In respect to equality of ‘resources’ they measure aspects such as the equality (or inequality) of things such as access to education and land. In equality of ‘voice’ they are largely referring to women’s political participation. The following deconstructs these ‘equalities’ in further detail.

**Equality of ‘Rights’:**

In respect to the Bank’s definition of equality of rights they are basically referring to legal statutes, customary laws and norms underlying communities, families and households. According to the Bank:

*Social norms and customs* go a long way toward explaining…gender disparities…They determine the roles that women and men have in the family and the community. They shape individual preferences and power relations between the sexes…Social norms thus create powerful incentives that guide people’s behavior…and behavior outside the accepted boundaries can unleash formal and informal systems of social sanction (109; emphasis my own).

Following this brief discussion on social norms and customs as underlying causes of
gender inequality, the Bank then goes on to talk about the northern part of South Asia as an example of a kinship system, ‘tradition’ and ‘customs’ that are characterized by high levels of gender stratification. They state:

[The tradition of female seclusion, or purdah, is prevalent, significantly limiting women’s freedom of movement and autonomy...And following the tradition of exogamous marriage, brides move to their husband’s (often distant) village upon marriage, leaving behind their natal kin...[In respect to education]...schooling itself may be considered a threat if contact with boys cannot be avoided, if schooling is perceived to be teaching girls aspirations contrary to custom, or even if it simply takes girls away from work and care activities at home (111; emphasis my own).

This depiction of ‘tradition’, ‘social norms’ and ‘customs’ as causing and maintaining gender inequality is pervasive throughout this text. For example:

social norms and customs embody gender structures that result in occupational segregation, high rates of gender-related violence, and persistent gender gaps in earnings not attributable to worker characteristics. The culture of machismo [original emphasis] in Latin America and elsewhere...exalts masculine virility and physical strength and aggression as a means of resolving disagreements – including the use of force with women (111-112; emphasis my own).

Their ‘analysis’ does not end at ‘tradition’, ‘social norms’ and ‘customs’, for they then redirect their attention to ethnicity and religion: “[I]ke ethnicity, religion influences gender relations and outcomes...[though]...other factors besides religious affiliation are producing differences in women’s autonomy. Embedded in entrenched kinship and religious systems, social norms and customs related to gender are difficult and slow to change” (112; emphasis my own). This text suggests that gender inequality persists within the realms of ‘backward’ Southern countries because most of the discussion surrounding ‘tradition’, ‘social customs’ ‘norms’ and ‘religion’ and how they are contributing to gender inequality are premised on employing the use of Southern
countries as examples. This point is significant. Gender inequalities exist in Canada and in fact in some cases have been exacerbated since the mid 1990s: "[t]he wage gap, which measures the difference in earnings between women and men, has increased for the first time in 30 years" (Grant-Cummings and Sharma, 1997: x). However, this fact cannot and is not elaborated on in this text because the underlying implicit argument being forwarded by the World Bank is that gender inequalities are largely the result of "social and cultural norms that shape the roles of and relationships between men and women" (98); but Northern countries and practices are rarely mentioned.

This emphasis on social norms, customs, ethnicity and religion are highly problematic; most problematic is their emphasis on 'tradition'. The Bank frames gender inequality as though it were due to the 'backwardness' of Southern peoples and countries and uses (amongst other terms) the concept of 'tradition' to forward this argument. Bergeron also notes this World Bank tendency of employing this form of racist logic to explain poverty and gender inequality to the 'backward, traditional cultures' of Southern peoples and countries (Bergeron, 2003b: 410). What ensues is that, whether explicitly or not, Western women are unquestionably heralded as the standard upon which the 'progress' of development and 'Third-World' women are measured against, especially since 'traditional' culture is seen to be the cause of Southern women's peripheral economic and social conditions. As demonstrated above the World Bank implicitly and at times explicitly makes this argument. This is a blatant form of racism, embedded within the logic and ideologies of colonialism and development. Bergeron (2003a) also notes this tendency when she states that:

tradition is often seen as the wellspring of women's oppression, preventing them from having access to resources. Given the
Bank's tendency to envision women's subordination as the result of their lack of sufficient contact with modern ideas and markets, it is not surprising that the blame is often placed on tradition. Thus, the way that the Bank imagines the process of integrating women into development relies... on an old trope of white (wo)men rescuing brown women from brown men (162).

This functions not only to legitimize the workings of the Bank but almost makes it appear as some form of philanthropic favour that the World Bank is bestowing on Southern countries; an attempt to end these causes of gender inequality that are supposedly the key underlying contributors to poverty. This tendency acts to disguise the violence that neoliberal World Bank initiatives cause on Southern countries and peoples and, in particular, women.

**Equality of Resources:**

In respect to equality of resources, the Bank outlines equality in education, health, productive assets (such as land, information, technology and financial resources), and employment and earnings. In their words:

*women and girls tend to have systematically poorer access than men and boys to a range of resources. This limits their opportunities and – as with rights – circumscribes their ability to participate in and enjoy the fruits of development. The story of unequal access to resources has many dimensions, involving access to human resources, social capital, physical and financial capital, employment, and earnings. Such disparities limit women's ability to participate in development and to contribute to higher living standards for their families (41).*

In other words, what the Bank is suggesting is that in many cases girls and women face structural barriers towards accessing resources such as education, health, productive assets and employment and earnings. They argue that this is also creating obstacles for
girls and women to enjoy higher living standards. Certainly this is indisputable and the
obstacles blocking the attainment of these resources are struggles worth pursuing. Girls
and women should be able to attend and benefit from formal education, as well as being
able to access financial capital, employment options and higher earnings. The problem,
however, is that through the manner in which the Bank frames these limitations gendered
tropes are perpetuated whilst the workings at the macroeconomic level are completely
overlooked. The following explicates this in further detail.

The most obvious limitation in the Bank’s definition of resources is that women
are regarded to ‘not be participating in development’ if they have not been brought into
the market system. This analysis ignores Mies’ notion of superexploitation and the
gendered household division of labour, a topic that Elson also engages with. Women’s
work in performing reproductive labour is read as women ‘not participating’ in the
development process. The fact that women (along with other people performing within
marginalized social categories) have created the ‘iceberg’ upon which development is
upheld through their unrecognized, unpaid and underpaid labour is completely
overlooked through this analysis. Women are participating in the development process
both when they are performing solely reproductive labour and also when they are
engaging in the formal and / or informal economy. The Bank’s emphasis on women’s
inability to ‘participate in and enjoy the fruits of development’ is also extremely
misguided when noting that “[i]t is not that “women” as a development category have
been excluded from experiencing the effect of the market...[Rather] Third World
women...[have] experienced an erosion in their economic well-being in the 1980s and
1990s precisely because of their increased contact with the market” (Bergeron, 2003a:
Therefore although "[s]everal countries have revised their labor codes to establish equal treatment of—and equal opportunities for—men and women in work and employment" (World Bank, 2001: 41), the manner in which the Bank envisions 'work' and 'workplace' is also attributing to the marginalization of many women.

The Bank considers disparities in resources as largely contributing to gender inequality. As mentioned previously in respect to resources they focus mostly on education, health, 'productive assets' and employment and earnings. What is problematic about their focus on these particular resources is not that they center on these specific resources but the solutions and reasoning for this particular focus. To elaborate, when referring to education the Bank states "[e]ducation is central to one's ability to respond to the opportunities that development presents, but significant disparities remain in several regions" (41). Therefore men and women must be given equal opportunity for education so that they can 'benefit' from the 'opportunities' that ensue through the opening of markets through neoliberalism. This is demonstrated perfectly when they state that "[t]hose who lack access to basic education are likely to be excluded from the new opportunities, and where long-standing gender gaps in education persist, women will be at increasing risk of falling behind men in their ability to participate in development" (44). Discursively the expansion of open markets and foreign direct investment is seen as an opening that will permit individuals to take advantage of 'new opportunities'. It attempts to disguise the nature of the system that coerces individuals into exploitative market relations out of sheer necessity, adding to the levels of exploitation of peoples within almost all of their social relations, most notably women. This is because the language employed by the Bank is gender-neutral, particularly when referring to
Southern people’s need to take advantage of ‘new opportunities’ in their role as workers, even if (especially in El Salvador) the ‘new opportunities’ being created for working class girls and women tend to be maquiladora jobs in the textile industry. Elson referred to ‘male bias’ as “a bias that operates in favour of men as a gender, and against women as a gender, not that all men are biased against women” (Elson, 1995: 3). She particularly framed this in reference to the limitation of using gender-neutral words in public policy initiatives such as ‘work’, ‘development’ and ‘worker’. This claim about individual’s taking ‘advantage’ of ‘new opportunities’ resulting from ‘development’ is male biased. It overlooks the gender-specific ways in which women experience the market and the double burdening that has and continues to result from their insertion into the formal (as well as informal) economy as ‘workers’, even if they experience processes of empowerment through this insertion. It also depoliticizes and leaves unquestioned the type of ‘new opportunities’ being created and the sort of ‘workers’ that this investment is creating.

It is also an individualistic stance, focusing on individual’s level of human capital as opposed to the structures that result in some people easily accessing formal education whilst others are impoverished and denied this basic human right. Their discussion surrounding health also has similar underpinnings as their discussion on education:

“[g]ood health is critical for well-being and, like education, an important resource that enables people to take part in and enjoy the fruits of development” (45). It is characteristic of the Bank’s agenda in which “[a] major part of this effort includes identifying women who have been excluded and then designing strategies of inclusion” (Bergeron, 2003a: 161). The problem is that “[t]he removal of constraints (including
social constraints) to restore the supposed underlying order of the market is a key trope of development discourse” (Bergeron, 2003a: 163). It is not so much that women are excluded from the market but rather that in some cases it is as a result of their insertion and inclusion within the market (if one is even willing to ignore the male bias in this definition of ‘inclusion’ and speak in these terms) that their levels of poverty have been exacerbated: “there is a documented global trend towards the “feminization of poverty.” They [the Coalition of ‘Women’s eyes on the World Bank’] suggest that this trend has been aggravated by policies of the World Bank…that at best sustained the status quo of unequal gender relations, and at worse have, in many cases, deepened gender disparities” (Thomas-Slayter, 2003: 298). This is a significant limitation; a limitation that will be returned to shortly.

**Equality of Voice:**

In respect to equality of ‘voice’ the Bank is mostly referring to women’s levels of access to political participation. They argue that although in most countries women gained the right to vote in the 20th century, “there still are large gender disparities in political participation and representation at all levels of government – from local councils to national assemblies and cabinets. Women continue to be vastly underrepresented in elected office” (57). They also note that women tend to be underrepresented in the more powerful executive branches of the government and that “[w]omen who do hold cabinet appointments are more likely to be in ministries of women’s or social affairs than ministries of finance, economics, or planning, which make mainstream policy and budgetary” (58).
The Bank’s emphasis on ‘voice’ is part and parcel of what Taylor regards as the blaming of poor people for their inability to ‘participate’ in markets, due to institutional and social impediments:

It is not...the substantive irrationalities of marketised social relations that are causatively related to the creation and reproduction of poverty, but rather the failure of poor people to adequately access and participate in markets owing to institutional and social impediments – such as lack of information, corruption, discrimination, and political voice (Taylor, 2004: 23).

Under this framework the emphasis on ‘voice’ is supposed to facilitate the ability of women to ‘participate in markets’ and in politics more generally. This increased participation of women in politics is supposed to contribute to countering the ‘institutional and social impediments’ of corruption that Taylor makes reference to. This is because according to the Bank “[s]tudies in behavioral and social sciences suggest that men and women differ in behaviors that have to do with corruption, the general conclusion being the women are more community-oriented and selfless than men” (93). The Bank claims that “[t]o the extent that lower corruption results in higher investment and thus growth, gender equality indirectly affects growth through that channel” (94-95).

As such, a focus on ‘voice’ is ultimately ‘good for development’ because “[g]overnments are less corrupt when women are more active in politics or the labor force...corruption falls as the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women rises” (95). The emphasis on equality of voice therefore has little to do with promoting gender equality and political participation in order to give women more power and increased political voice. Instead in the words of the Bank, “having more women in politics and in the labor force...could be an effective force for good government and business trust” (96). This in turn is supposed
to facilitate ‘development’; ‘development’ from a neoliberal framework.

**Neoliberal Prescriptions are Never Challenged:**

As repeatedly alluded to throughout this chapter, ‘development’ and neoliberal prescriptions are never actually challenged in *Engendering Development*. This is not an accidental tendency, but rather is built into the neoliberal hegemonic project that the Bank is forwarding. The Bank does not discursively ignore the suggestions put forth by others. As I have demonstrated in the preceding, the Bank does indeed incorporate subaltern perspectives such as those put forth by feminist academics, activists and policy analysts; they do this due to the crisis in authority of neoliberalism. The limitation however is that the ways in which these subaltern discourses and suggestions are incorporated are done so in a manner that is largely tokenistic. These subaltern discourses and suggestions have little relevance or effects on the policy prescriptions that the Bank ultimately ends up forwarding, since pro-market solutions is always regarded as the ‘answer’. Others have also noted this tendency when stating that some are “skeptical of such dialogues with the Bank. She [Suzanne Bergeron] argues that the ‘new paradigm’ of development embodied in the Bank’s ‘Challenge of Inclusion’ initiative can only frame women’s needs and goals within the context of inclusion into the global cash nexus” (True, 2003: 379). It is not that ‘women’ as a social category are now invisible or that those who are struggling for women’s equality are entirely ignored. Indeed the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus has changed this. Yet the focus on girls and women and their unique development issues are incorporated in a tokenistic manner; they have little effect on the policy prescriptions that are ultimately put forth.
The rationale for poverty and gender inequality is understood to be due to social relations at the local and national level and institutional impediments, not the result of neoliberalism or the macroeconomy. Pro-market solutions are regarded as the ultimate ‘answer’, and almost every question in relation to women’s subordination and poverty reduction are understood through this framework. This logic adds ‘legitimacy’ to World Bank policy prescriptions whilst simultaneously adding ‘legitimacy’ to neoliberalism.

In the following section I demonstrate how the assumptions permeating *Engendering Development* are built into the Bank’s policy prescriptions for mainstreaming gender. I accomplish this through a discourse analysis of *Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work*. As in *Engendering Development*, I undertake this analysis from a critical feminist perspective. I demonstrate that the same limitations that permeate *Engendering Development* are built into the Bank’s policy prescriptions for mainstreaming. Through this analysis I further demonstrate that gender mainstreaming is acting as a passive revolution. The manner in which gender inequality and poverty are framed in this text is also accomplished in an approach which finds ‘solutions’ through pro-market prescriptions while ignoring the international and gendered division of labour that promote female adversity. Therefore the policy prescriptions put forth for mainstreaming by the Bank function to maintain the gender-oppressive neoliberal hegemony.

**Gender Mainstreaming:**

According to Jacqui True, gender mainstreaming is supposed to describe the “efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation
across all issue areas and at all levels from a gender-differentiated perspective, to address
and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women" (True, 2003: 369). It is supposed to "balance the goal of gender equality with the need to recognize
gender difference to bring about a transformation of masculine-as-norm institutional
practices in state and global governance" (True, 2003: 369). There is little doubt that the
World Bank indeed ‘undertakes’ this in *Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work.*
Yet the limitations that permeate the process and emphasis of Bank mainstreaming lies in
how they frame the ‘problems’ of gender inequality as well as the policy
recommendations that ensue from these understandings.

In this document the Bank engages with issues related to gender and development
more generally and gender mainstreaming more specifically. The first section is entitled
“The Business Case for Mainstreaming Gender” and addresses the ‘empirical links’
(from their perspective) between gender, poverty and growth. They then outline a 20
page strategy that specifies ‘how’ to mainstream gender into the development process,
although it is more of a ‘template’ since from according to the CDF perspective, room
has to be left for the distinct needs and priorities of the different member-countries under
question. Following, they offer a framework by which to prioritize gender issues through
mainstreaming and the challenges of gender mainstreaming within the development
process. The last section is entitled “The Bank’s Comparative Advantage in Gender and
Development”, which is indicative of their reliance on neoclassical economic theory in
respect to the terminology of ‘comparative advantage’. This last section is characterized
as self-praising for the work that they do in the area of gender and development. The
following deconstructs this text in further detail.
In the executive summary it is evident that the Bank's engagement with gender mainstreaming is representative of the comprehensive development framework. For instance:

the gender-based division of labor and the inequalities to which it gives rise tend to slow development, economic growth and poverty reduction…These findings make clear that gender issues are an important dimension of the fight against poverty…the incorporation of gender issues into development actions needs to be sensitive to the specific conditions in each country (xi; emphasis my own).

The first part on the 'gender based division of labor and inequalities to which it gives rise' denotes the Bank's inclusion of subaltern feminist standpoints; standpoints that are included although they have little effect on the resultant policy prescriptions since neoliberalism is never questioned. Nonetheless the inclusion of 'more voices' is representative of the comprehensive development framework. The focus on the 'fight against poverty' and the 'sensitivity to the specific conditions in each country' is also representative of the comprehensive development framework (Taylor, 2004: 23). The most telling passage in which the Bank is espousing the logic and arguments underlying the CDF is when they state:

[i]n the strategy described in this paper, the World Bank will work with governments and civil society in client countries and with other donors, to diagnose the gender-related barriers to and opportunities for poverty reduction and sustainable development; and will then identify and support appropriate actions to reduce these barriers and capitalize on the opportunities (xii; emphasis my own).

Also “education is a critical condition for empowering women” (5; emphasis my own).

As elaborated on in the previous chapter, these terms and logic are all characteristic of the
emphasis and discourses underlying the CDF, regardless that this logic does not actually materialize in their mainstreaming policies.

On the section that explores the links between ‘gender to poverty to growth’, the Bank states that “[g]ender inequality retards economic growth and poverty reduction” (4), referencing Engendering Development as the source of this claim. They employ almost all of the logic forwarded in Engendering Development to outline the link (from their perspective) between gender, poverty and growth. They see pathways for promoting economic growth and poverty reduction through taking steps that will result in gender equality. This is representative of the tendency that I argued informs Engendering Development in which the issue of gender inequality is engaged with because of its relevance to economic growth. In the Bank’s words, “gender is an issue of development effectiveness. Low and middle-income countries can achieve faster, more inclusive growth if they identify gender-related barriers to growth and poverty reduction and act to reduce these barriers” (11). As demonstrated through this passage, aspiring towards gender equality is not undertaken for humanistic reasons but rather because through more gender equality this will supposedly result in economic growth which will apparently result in poverty reduction.

The Bank outlines specific means by which gender equality can be attained by following particular pathways in respect to investment and development. For instance, they focus on investing in human capital for women, in women’s access to physical capital and on improving the ‘functioning of markets and institutions’. They footnote this last point and claim that “[g]reater gender equality and a less rigid or extreme gender-based division of labor promote growth in two ways; by raising the total level of
productive capital in the society, and by specifically increasing female productive capital, which has important pro-growth effects” (5). This ‘greater gender equality’ through ‘a less rigid or extreme gender-based division of labor’ will occur through changing ‘tradition’, ‘social customs’ and ‘culture’, since these inequalities are what is causing ‘greater gender inequality’. Refer back to my depiction of this in my discourse analysis on ‘rights’ within Engendering Development. According to the Bank’s implicit and explicit arguments, getting ‘rid’ of tradition and other such ‘social burdens’ will result in ‘pro-growth effects’ and consequently supposedly result in poverty reduction. This is regarded to be the case since ‘social customs’, ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ act as a ‘hindrance’ towards open markets; this is what is meant by the ‘rigid or extreme gender-based division of labor’.

The process of lip-servicing the need to consider the gendered-based division of labour and women’s disproportionate role in performing reproductive labour is also evident within this text. For example, when the Bank refers to improving employment opportunities and higher incomes for women and their families they state “[e]ducated, healthy women are more able to engage in productive activities [through] find[ing] formal sector employment…Investments in female education and health therefore tend to increase the incomes of families, with benefits for men, women, and children” (5; emphasis my own). This passage is entirely indicative of the dominant discourses regarding reproductive labour and the fact that women are considered to be ‘non-productive’ within the ‘private’ sphere and not actually participating in development. This misguided logic is also present when the Bank states “[t]he Bank aims to reduce gender disparities and enhance women’s participation in the economic development of
their countries” (14; emphasis my own). They are not considered to be ‘participating in their country’s economic development’ if they are doing reproductive labour in the ‘private’ sphere. In Joan Acker’s words:

gender is intrinsic to globalizing capitalist processes and relations... The division between commodity production in the capitalist economy and reproduction of human beings and their ability to labor has long been identified by feminists as a fundamental process in women’s subordination in capitalist societies. This organization of social life carries contradictory potentials: production is organized around goals of capital accumulation, not around meeting the reproductive and survival needs of people... Thus the structural and ideological division between production and reproduction was shaped along lines of gender and contributed to continuing gender inequalities (Acker, 2004: 23).

Although the Bank may pay a great deal of lip service to the need to consider the gendered division of labour, it nonetheless reproduces the logic and discourses that women’s reproductive labour does not constitute work at all and hence does not warrant the term of ‘productive activity’. As Acker notes, this logic acts to seriously subordinate women, which is particularly ironic considering the Bank’s claim that this text is dedicated to reducing gender inequality and poverty. The Bank also does not question the causes of the international and gendered division of labour, and how neoliberal restructuring and their own institutional mechanisms perpetuate and exacerbate this tendency.

According to this text there are three main opportunities by which the Bank can enhance their development ‘effectiveness’ through mainstreaming (13). The first is by “[m]aking Bank interventions responsive to country conditions and commitments” (14). This responsiveness to country conditions and commitments is supposed to be
accomplished through the ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs). These papers are ‘owned’ by each country and are therefore country-specific since PRSPs are country-produced. The second is by “[m]aking Bank interventions more strategic” (16). These Bank interventions, however, are supposed to “enhance effectiveness without escalating the costs of doing business” (16). This is indicative of their ‘commitment’ to gender equality and poverty reduction as long as it does not ‘escalate the costs of doing business’. The third means by which to make development more effective through mainstreaming is by “[i]mproving the alignment of Bank policies, processes, and resources to support strategic gender mainstreaming” (16). The opportunities for mainstreaming gender are ‘operationalized’ in the section entitled “the strategy”.

In the section entitled ‘the strategy’ the Bank stipulates that there are three basic steps by which to mainstream gender into development. These ‘steps’ are not specific but rather more of an outline since according to the CDF each country is distinct and will therefore have different needs and priorities. These steps therefore constitute more of a loose framework on how to facilitate an environment for mainstreaming gender. In the Bank’s words:

[t]he goal of the strategy is...to create a methodology and enabling environment for the Bank to play a supportive but proactive role vis-à-vis member countries, helping to make clear the linkages among gender, growth, and poverty reduction that apply in each country, and supporting

---

11 “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) describe a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory process involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)”. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:384207~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384201,00.html>
the actions that each governments considers beneficial. Precisely how this is done will depend on the country (17).

The first step in the strategy towards mainstreaming gender is to prepare for each country in which the Bank has an active lending program, a periodic, Country Gender Assessment analyzing the gender dimensions of development across sectors” (18). The second is to “develop and implement, as part of the country assistance program, priority policy and operational interventions (if any) that respond to the CGA (18).

The third is to “monitor the implementation and results of these policy and operational interventions” (18). Through undertaking these cost-effective strategies, gender can supposedly be mainstreamed into development and apparently result in ‘economic growth’ and ‘poverty reduction’. The limitations of this ‘strategy’ are significant. The most considerable is the fact that gender inequality is largely regarded as being due to ‘social customs’, ‘tradition’ and women’s ‘not participating’ in the development process. I have demonstrated this repeatedly in both Engendering Development and Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work. The fact that the Bank gets to dictate the linkages between gender, growth and poverty is overlooked in this picture of ‘collaboration’ that the Bank is painting. As I have demonstrated these linkages between gender, growth, and poverty are male biased and racist among other factors. This greatly limits the extent to which mainstreaming will actually result in any benefits, since mainstreaming gender will only be accepted if it is undertaken with pro-market solutions in mind.

As in Engendering Development, the Bank never questions the neoliberal development model or the presumption that ‘economic growth’ results in ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘gender equality’. This limitation permeates and is the foundation of both
mainstreaming and this entire document. The conflation of ‘economic growth’ and ‘poverty reduction’ is discursively created on numerous occasions throughout this text: “the gender based division of labor and the inequalities to which it gives rise tend to slow development, economic growth, and poverty reduction” (xi); “a country-level gender analysis that identifies critical areas in which gender-responsive actions are likely to enhance growth, poverty reduction, and well-being” (xiii); “[there is] evidence linking gender to poverty reduction and economic growth” (2); “[g]ender inequality retards economic growth and poverty reduction”(4); “measures of gender equality have significant, positive effects on growth and thus on poverty reduction” (9); “[the Bank attempts to] make clear the linkages among gender, growth, and poverty reduction” (17); “gender conditions…inhibit growth, poverty reduction, and well-being” (18). This tendency permeates the entire document. This conflation between gender inequality, economic growth and poverty reduction is extremely ideological because it attempts to hide the fact that in many cases, ‘economic growth’ and ‘poverty reduction’ are not one and the same thing. As I demonstrated in the textual analysis of Engendering Development, indeed for many women this has not been the case. Some women have experienced processes of impoverishment because of their country’s greater insertion into the market system regardless of the ‘economic growth’ that has ensued (Bergeron, 2003a: 164).

Maxine Molyneux notes that the World Bank engages with the issue of gender and development in order to maintain their neoliberal agenda and hegemony (Molyneux, 2003). Gender is not mainstreamed into development because of the Bank’s actual commitment to eradicating gender inequality and poverty. In contrast, gender
mainstreaming embodies and is an example of the post-Washington consensus, functioning to act as a passive revolution. This consensus is characterized by the apparent goal of bringing the social ‘back into’ the development process. Gender is one of the social factors that has been brought ‘back into’ the development process. But as I have been arguing and denoted throughout this chapter, the social is ‘brought back in’ “as a way of understanding and potentially resolving market imperfections” (Bergeron, 2003b: 398). The ‘social’ is constructed in a manner that leaves unchallenged the logic and prescriptions underlying neoliberalism. Therefore it is not surprising that the mainstreaming initiative is characterized by policy papers and process of ‘collaboration’ that leave unchallenged the power relations permeating these supposed relations of ‘collaboration’. In other words gender mainstreaming acts as the perfect passive revolution because it appears as though the Bank were practicing ‘development with a human face’ instead of simply relying on economic equations. Yet in the end the Bank only incorporates subaltern standpoints in a tokenistic manner. The Bank now employs some feminist subaltern discourses. Nonetheless besides an acknowledgment at the level of rhetoric nothing has substantially changed in the Bank’s policy prescriptions or development initiatives.

In the following chapter I will be offering a brief account of the current political economy in El Salvador. I will be demonstrating that since the signing of the peace accords, El Salvador has consistently pursued a neoliberal model of development. I will demonstrate that the ultra-Right government in El Salvador have taken the World Bank’s neoliberal prescriptions to heart and are pursuing a neoliberal path towards development. This contextual template will set the foundation for relaying my fieldwork experiences in
El Salvador. I will be demonstrating how the Bank's theoretical contradictions (as demonstrated in the discourse analyses of *Engendering Development* and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work*) are manifested within the context of El Salvador. It is towards the brief account of the current political economy of El Salvador that we now redirect our attention.
Chapter 4:

In this chapter I undertake an exploration of the social, political and economic factors that affect the nature of, possibilities for and limits to gender mainstreaming in contemporary El Salvador. I undertake this in order to contextualize for the following chapter my fieldwork findings on mainstreaming in the country. The central problematic of this chapter is that the World Bank makes pro-market assumptions regarding gender equality and gender mainstreaming. The limitation is that these assumptions – when translated into policy – generally have negative effects on women, most notably women who are already socially and economically impoverished. The World Bank forwards gender mainstreaming as though it were a neutral tool to be employed in any particular social setting, which will have ensuing positive effects towards gender ‘equality’. This is supposedly accomplished by ‘helping’ women to overcome a variant of factors, namely social factors such as ‘tradition’. This is supposed to be ‘overcome’ through women’s ‘empowerment’, which is supposedly accomplished through their insertion into the ‘market’. Power inequality and structural issues are never addressed in this ‘solution’. Instead equality is framed in terms of access to formal market engagements as both a good in and of itself, as well as having important efficiency effects which (in theory) will improve the development process.

In the following I provide a specific outline of the social, economic and political conditions that affect women’s lives in contemporary El Salvador. This in turn affects gender relations and the possibilities for positive change through mainstreaming initiatives. More specifically I demonstrate that although the Salvadoran government (under the leadership of ARENA) has aggressively pursued processes that will further
integrate the country into the global economy, these processes (namely through SAPs and free trade agreements) have had few virtuous effects in the arena of expanding freedom and equality; in fact according to many social indicators, the social and economic situation of ‘average’ Salvadorans (and in particular women) is daily becoming more adverse. This contradiction raises reservations regarding the promises that the World Bank forwards in respect to their development prescriptions. It also creates obstacles for the possibility that gender mainstreaming will have the positive effects that in theory it is supposed to.

I begin this chapter by demonstrating that throughout the past 15 years El Salvador has become the epitome of the neoliberal state. Beginning in the early 1990s the Salvadoran government has aggressively employed neoliberal prescriptions as their central medium for economic and social ‘development’. I trace the specifics behind the institutionalization of SAPs in El Salvador, namely through processes of deregulization, privatization, liberalization and flexibilization.

Following my outline of the specific SAPs that the government has implemented I demonstrate that contrary to the theory, these policies have not had positive effects on most Salvadoran’s social and economic circumstances, focusing particularly on the detrimental effects that it has had on women. I demonstrate this through employing the use of quantitative data, depicting the extreme levels of wealth and gender inequality that currently characterizes the country.

I conclude this chapter with a brief engagement of the recent free trade agreements that El Salvador has signed. These agreements signal the country’s continued
reliance and commitment to neoliberalism that the government is pursuing for El Salvador in the name of ‘development’.

**El Salvador’s Structural Adjustment Programs:**

The civil war in El Salvador “was a key catalyst of…[the institutionalization] in favour of finance capital, commerce and export processing” (Robinson, 2003: 93). During this era a ‘new’ model of development was being formed in Central America. It “entailed essentially the package of neo-liberal structural adjustment measures, among them trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, privatization, and labor market deregulation and flexibility, as the mechanism for a shift from “inward-looking development” to “export led growth”” (Robinson, 2003: 157). Even before the signing of the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords which marked the end of the 12 year long civil war, the Salvadoran government began to aggressively implement SAPs. According to the World Bank, there are two goals to adjustment which facilitate the development process. In their words, this includes “reducing the demand for imports and domestic goods to stabilize economic conditions and restructuring the economy to reach a higher growth path” (World Bank, 1990: 103). However, according to Ronaldo Munck:

What the stabilization and structural programs aimed for was the neoclassical economic objective of “getting prices right.” The optimum equilibrium rate would be achieved basically through liberalizing markets and eliminating any state interference in the setting or regulating of prices for products or services. The state was seen as too heavy-handed to get prices right, so it must withdraw from the economy so far as possible, for example, through the privatization of state firms. Another goal of the structural adjustment loans…was “to create a more ‘open economy’…This entailed not only removing all tariff barriers and other impediment, legal or otherwise, to the free movement of goods and services, but also, usually, export-oriented growth” (Munck, 2005: 47-48).
SAPs first became implemented in El Salvador in June 1989 under the leadership of President Alfredo Cristiani. Nonetheless, it was the Chapultepec peace accords that:

accelerated the integration of El Salvador into global capitalism. The National Reconstruction Plan became an instrument for consolidating the neo-liberal project... The program emphasized the reconstruction of infrastructure and relief programs that could facilitate private-sector activity, foreign investment, and a speedy rearticulation of the country to world markets (Robinson, 2003: 101).

In the following I outline the specifics underlying the SAPs that were implemented through the leadership of the ARENA presidents. In particular, I focus on processes of deregulation, privatization, liberalization and deregulation pursued by the Right-wing ARENA government whom continue to ‘lead’ the country today.

According to the discourses surrounding development in El Salvador, the poverty and economic regression of the country during the 1980s was not the cause of the falling coffee and cotton prices globally or a result of the civil war. Instead, according to neoliberal discourse it was the government’s fault since it was ‘too involved’ in the economic spheres of the country, a neoliberal script of the government acting as a severe obstacle against the logic and superiority of the ‘efficiency’ of ‘free markets’ (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 15). I will first begin by outlining El Salvador’s process of privatization and liberalization, which continues being pursued up to the present. In William Robinson’s words, 1989 marked in El Salvador a trend of “sweeping neo-liberal reform, including trade liberalization, devaluation of the currency, privatizations, the lifting of subsidies, the promotion of non-traditional exports, and the expansion of free trade zones in maquiladora activities” (Robinson, 2003: 96). The sheer number of state-led industries
which have now been privatized is a clear indicator of the government’s embrace of neoliberalism.

**Privatization in El Salvador:**

El Salvador began privatizing its industries and services in 1989. In that year they privatized the industries of INCAFE (coffee), INAZUCAR (sugar) and COPAL (the cotton industry). In 1991 the country privatized the importation of petroleum, and the once state-owned PETROCEL was bought by the private company monopoly of RASA - which is owned by the transnational companies of EXXON and SHELL (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 18). Most recently, TEXACO and Puma also import petroleum into the country (Equipo Maiz, 2005a: 15). In 1991 they also privatized the medical consultation of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute, which are now medical services provided by private clinics and companies. From 1989 to 1994 they privatized the Presidential hotel, which is now owned by the Safie family. They privatized the financial system of the country and the Banks that had been nationalized during the 1980s were once again private industries. The institute that did research on coffee production (Instituto Salvadoreño de Investigaciones del Café) was closed down in 1991. In 1994 they privatized the administration of the University of the Instituto Tecnológico Centroamericano. In that same year they also liquidated the Instituto de Vivienda Urbana which once used to make affordable urban houses for poorer families to purchase and now provides loans so that these same people can buy privately constructed homes at greater prices (Equipo Maiz, 2005a: 50). In 1998 the government privatized pensions, electrical energy, telecommunications as well as ANDA – which was the industry that controlled water
consumption and the construction of infrastructure for the services of water (SAPRIN, 2002: 4). They have privatized most of the airport and two coffee production plants (which are now the property of Nestle). The currency in El Salvador was privatized throughout the 1990s, and in 2000 they approved the dollarization of the country. In the upcoming years under the current president Antonio Saca, the ARENA government has plans to privatize the Acajutla fishing port, as well as many of the sectors of health and education, along with the complete privatization of water (Equipo Maiz, 2005a: 52).

**Liberalization in El Salvador:**

Besides an aggressive process of privatization, the Salvadoran government has also forcefully liberalized many sectors of the economy. Under President Cristiani, 230 products which make up the food and medicine basket in El Salvador were liberalized (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 23). In 1989 the government liberalized and eliminated protectionist policies (both internally and externally) in respect to coffee, sugar and cotton production (Equipo Maiz, 2005a: 48). In 1991 they liberalized the commerce of basic grains, notably the key staple grains of beans and rice. The government also liberalized its enforcement of interest rates in the Banks, which are now up to the ‘discretion’ of the privatized banks. They also liberalized the market on lands, as well as liberalized the maximum duties from 230% to a maximum of 20%. Under the leadership of President Armando Calderón Sol, this was minimized even further to 15% (except on a select number of products). Cristiani eliminated the taxes paid by coffee and sugar exporters, he eliminated the taxes paid on ‘patrimonio’ (which was a tax paid by people who had properties valued over 500, 000 colones), he reduced the taxes paid by
businesses on net earnings and renting of factories, as well as reducing duties exponentially (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 24). In 1995 President Calderón Sol:

relaxed regulations imposed earlier stipulating that maquilas had to be located in one of the free trade zones in order to receive tax benefits irrespective of where they were located. The goal in Calderon Sol’s words, was to “incorporate ourselves into the world production chain...to turn all of El Salvador into one big free trade zone...and to convert the country into the...Hong Kong of Central America” (Robinson, 2003: 97).

To counter all the tax and duty cuts being made for big national businesses, transnational corporations and other economic elite, the government implemented in 1992 a goods and services tax to be paid by all. These goods and service taxes apply to everything from clothes to basic grains, fruits, vegetables, milk and medicine. It began at 10% in 1992, and in 1995 it was increased to 13% under the leadership of President Calderón Sol (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 25), making living a normal life increasingly expensive for Salvadorans, in particular burdening the women who have to make household money stretch further than in preceding decades. Through these processes of liberalization, the insertion into the global economy (either through exports, foreign direct investment and / or importation) has been facilitated.

**Flexibilization in El Salvador:**

In El Salvador the processes of flexibilizing labour through SAPs does not take the form of specific programs. Consequently an elaboration of flexibilization in El Salvador necessitates a less-direct manner of approaching this problematic. Within the context of the country the government has a policy of trying to attract as much foreign direct investment as possible. This prioritizing of development through foreign direct
investment means that lowering the cost of labour (through flexibilizing labour) within the confines of the country is central to the process of economic development, because El Salvador’s comparative advantage is considered to be its cheap labour force (Montecinos, 2000: 201). According to the logic of the World Bank, flexibilizing labour is ‘good’ for the development process because “greater disparity of wages, income, and wealth is – up to a point – a necessary part of transition, because allowing wages to be determined by the market creates incentives for efficiency that are essential for successful reform” (World Bank, 1995: 66).

El Salvador does not have an explicit flexibilization program, yet the government accomplishes flexibilization through changes made to the labour codes. These changes render possible and facilitate the flexibilization of the Salvadoran labour force, which are particularly detrimental to economically and socially impoverished female labourers (Montecinos, 2000: 178). This is because, as Robinson notes:

[a]chieving a “competitive” reinsertion into the world market through a new set of exports is predicated on the regions “comparative advantage” in cheap labor. The new transnational economic activities that form the basis for a reorganization of the region’s productive structures are components of globalized production chains that draw from the local economy population pools as cheap labor but do not generate the conditions for the social reproduction of these populations (Robinson, 2003: 306).

In other words, “labour flexibility under the neo-liberal governments...[are]...designed to better secure capital’s control over its work force” (Munck, 2005: 33), irrespective of the effects on reproduction. The fact that women are disproportionately responsible for social reproduction is a further indicator that flexibilization has particularly violent and detrimental effects on women.
One of the central mediums through which the flexibilization of labour is accomplished within the context of El Salvador is through the vagueness and ambiguity that characterize the labour codes. This vagueness is largely the result of the labour codes that were altered and implemented through the SAPs during or shortly after the signing of the peace accords (Montecinos, 2000: 161). For instance, according to Article 38 of the labour code in El Salvador, workers should be paid enough to cover their subsistence needs and to live in conditions of dignity. The framing of the minimum wage in this manner poses significant obstacles for workers. For one, through this code it makes it possible to uphold the logic that different places have different subsistence needs and therefore (for instance) that rural workers should be paid less than urban workers. Furthermore what also occurs is that different industries (namely commercial, industrial, maquila and agricultural sectors) get paid different wages (see, for instance UNDP, 2004: 72), and these wages become framed as ‘minimum wages’ for those sectors. This facilitates the ability of employers to pay employees premised on a (largely gendered) script of what is productive and important labour, with a complete disregard for ensuring that workers get paid enough to fulfill their basic needs to live in conditions of dignity, since legally this minimum wage is largely unspecified.

There are more limitations permeating the labour legislation as related to minimum wage levels in El Salvador. For instance, according to Articles 38 and 144 of the labour code, workers have a right to a ‘minimum’ wage that guarantees their basic needs. However the government does not specify how much labour one has to perform in order to accomplish this ‘minimum wage’ that is supposed to result in decent standards of living, regardless of the fact that the maximum workday is supposed to be eight hours
(which is often case not upheld). The ambiguity permeating this legislation is significant, particularly from a gendered perspective. For instance, women who perform homework are often paid exploitative wages for completing a certain amount of piecework. This is also a normative practice within the context of maquiladoras. In Robinson’s words, “[t]he piece rate system in place in most maquilas assured breakneck work for minimum and sub-minimum wages” (Robinson, 2003: 171). This is because it is assumed that a worker should be able to complete certain tasks in a time frame that is too short for the tasks under question. Therefore although the labour legislation does not specify that employers can exploit their workers in this manner, the ambiguity that permeates labour legislation facilitates the flexibilization of labourers in this manner (Montecino, 2000: 188).

Another limitation permeating this ‘minimum wage’ legislation is that the wages necessary to cover basic survival needs changes due to levels of inflation. Nonetheless according to Article 159 of the labour code, minimum wages should be checked every three years or so. The key limitation of this article lies in the terminology of ‘should’ be checked. This ambiguity in terminology favors employers, since legally they are not required to check minimum wage rates as they relate to inflation every three years (Montecino, 2000: 187). Indeed when one considers that real minimum wages have dropped consistently in all sectors of the economy from 1979 to 1998, this is significant. For instance, in 1993 minimum wages could cover 78.89% of what was needed for basic foods and nourishments. By 1998 the minimum wage could only cover 58.13% of basic necessities (Montecino, 2000: 194). Clearly this ambiguity in the labour code facilitates flexibilizing labour and maintaining the primacy of capital over labour.
The influx of temporary work and contract labour is an example of the flexibilization of labour. Yet even within temporary contracts the primacy of employer’s needs takes precedence over that of workers. According to Article 23 number 4 of the labour code, workers should be granted the right to completing the duration of their contract. Nonetheless under this same code it specifies that if the employer has reasons for ending the contract (like lack of work) than the employer can terminate the short-term contract. This is another example of the ways in which the labour legislation facilitates the process of flexibilization within the context of El Salvador (Montecino, 2000: 198).

El Salvador has also implemented and is continuing to implement processes of flexibilization. They have and are doing so in order to attract foreign direct investment, which is considered to result in development. This is particularly the case since El Salvador’s comparative advantage is considered to be its large, cheap and under-employed labour force. The problem, however, is that El Salvador’s labour force is not as cheap as it is in other countries (such as in China), and the government and big businesses in the country are aware of this. They are therefore flexibilizing the labour force to compete with these other countries, undergoing a race to the bottom. And many of these changes in the labour codes are most detrimental to women. For example, in El Salvador throughout the years in which structural adjustment programs were implemented many of the codes which were in place to protect women (particularly pregnant women) have been retracted. In maquiladoras many women have to take pregnancy tests to prove they are not pregnant and sign a contract stating that they understand that they will be fired if they do indeed become pregnant (SAPRIN, 2002: 14). The large private-sector industries in El Salvador are also presenting a program
entitled ‘Anteproyecto de Ley para la Reactivación del Empleo’ (Preceding-project of Special Law for the Reactivation of Employment) to the government in the hopes of passing new labour legislation. Under it they ask the government to consider extending the working day beyond eight hours, they aim at extending a worker’s trial periods up to six months (in order to facilitate the firing process) and they seek to legally facilitate the ability to fire female employees who become pregnant (Equipo Maíz, 2003b: 32). The private industries are putting pressure on the government to follow through with this legislation, and the most intense pressure is coming from the large transnational corporations with industries in the country. Their reasoning for these changes is that it will help to attract foreign direct investment, which in turn will ‘benefit’ the country.

**Continued Expansion of Neoliberalism through Free Trade Agreements:**

The prevalence and expansion of free trade agreements in Central America is indicative of the continued prevalence and strength of neoliberalism in the region. The negotiations for the US-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) began back in January 27, 2003 (Hornbeck, 2003: 1). The US congress approved CAFTA in July 2005, and the President of the United States signed it into law on August 2, 2005 (Iritani, 2004). This free trade agreement will eventually encompass the five Central American countries along with the Dominican Republic. The first country in which this agreement came into force in was El Salvador, on March 1, 2006. CAFTA is similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that covers the United States, Canada and Mexico. It is meant to eliminate tariffs and any remaining protectionist trade policies between the United States and the Central American countries.
The specific provisions underlying CAFTA function to facilitate open-market relations and the prominence of neoliberalism. Amongst some of the specifics underlying CAFTA are that: all public services are to be open to private investment; governments agree to reduce tariffs and any other nationalist protectionist policies; governments assure to grant inflexible guarantees in relation to foreign direct investment; governments must consider transnational companies and bids when purchasing something; governments promise duty-free imports and elimination of subsidies on agricultural products; and they also permit the privatization of and monopolization of technological knowledge in respect to intellectual property rights.

CAFTA is the complete institutionalization of the prominence of open markets underlying neoliberalism. This is alarming from a class and gendered perspective. As I will be demonstrating with the use of quantitative data, the expansion of neoliberalism in El Salvador has functioned to greatly enrich a small percentage of the population whilst concurrently impoverishing the majority of the people. The expansion of neoliberalism in the form of SAPs has also had gendered effects, with particularly detrimental ones experienced by women. Salvadoran women (in particular the poor and working class) have disproportionately born the impact of the SAPs characterizing the expansion of neoliberalism. This is so in respect to their insertion into the formal market system, the increased need for their unvalued labour in the reproductive fields and the prominence of precarious, feminized and unstable work that is flourishing through the expansion of free trade zones. What is telling about the direction of the political-economy in which El Salvador is heading raises obstacles for the mainstreaming initiative. CAFTA upholds and even further exacerbates the neoliberal tenets that have characterized the past 15
years in El Salvador. As the following denotes, these characteristics have functioned to impoverish the majority of the population, with particularly detrimental effects on women.

Away from the Nation and Into the Global Economy:

Since the early 1990s, El Salvador made an evident shift towards production for exportation as opposed to production for internal markets. From 1991 to 1995 the sectors of the economy that grew the fastest were the financial sector (by 12%), the commercial sector (by 8%), the industrial sector (by 7%) and the construction sector (by 6%) (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 32). According to the United Nations, from 1990 to 2004 the percentage breakdown of the sectors contributing to El Salvador’s growth were the service sector at 60.3%, the manufacturing sector at 31.1%, the construction sector at 4.5% and the agricultural sector at 4.1% (UNDP, 2005a: 117). One of the biggest expansions in industries in recent years has been that of the maquiladoras. In 1992 maquila production only constituted 2.8% of all industrial production in the country. By 2004 maquila production accounted for 13.2% of national production in El Salvador and an astounding 53% of all exports for that year (Equipo Maiz, 2005b: 15). In other words more than half of all exports are maquila exports, primarily in the textile industry. To elaborate “El Salvador…experienced an amazing growth in the [maquila] industry. Maquila exports to the United States increased by 3,800 percent between 1985 and 1994, from $10 million to $398 million, while the number of workers shot up from 3,500 to 5,000 (Robinson, 2003: 170). It is significant that maquila work is dangerous and precarious, that it is a feminized job and that this is the type of work that is expanding and proliferating in the country. In
1990 there totaled 17,000 (mostly women) labourers in maquilas. By 2002 this number had grown exponentially to account for 87,500 employees (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 33). The minimum wage of $154 per month (which is what is paid in maquilas if one is ‘lucky’) cannot even cover the minimum cost of survival for a family of three. This is indicative of the levels of poverty in the country. It is evident that this is even worse for women, in particular for female-headed households. This is because according to the UNDP, female-headed households in urban areas are significantly more impoverished than male-headed households, which is problematic when noting that female-headed households are extremely prevalent in El Salvador (UNDP, 2004: 52). And in fact, the number of female-headed households is growing. In 1992, 26.38% of all households were headed by women. In 2004 this number had grown to account for 32.19% of all households (UNDP, 2005a: 293). Maquila work is hard and physically damaging, and women are often fired if they become pregnant. Such factors give an indication of the levels of exploitation faced by female workers, which has been facilitated through structural adjustment programs.

In El Salvador the unemployment rate for women has been decreasing since 1990 up to the present. This is in contrast to the male unemployment rate in the country which has in recent years been increasing. In fact, regardless of the household gendered division of labour and the double-burdening of women that their formal introduction into market relations results in, the unemployment rate between women and men in El Salvador is highly gendered. According to the International Labor Organization, in 1999 women’s unemployment in El Salvador constituted 5.8%, while male unemployment was almost
double that, at 9.9%.\textsuperscript{12} This demonstrates that the fastest growing jobs in the country are those that are feminized, precarious and low-paid. In other words the sectors of the economy that are expanding the fastest are those in which women disproportionately toil. That women are more systematically exploited and that the labour that they engage in is paid less than that of men is indicative of the government’s commitment of attracting foreign direct investment through their comparative advantage of El Salvador’s cheap (and largely female) workforce.

\textbf{Wealth Inequality:}

The levels of wealth inequality that typify the country are pronounced. This polarization between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ has been accentuated since the advance of neoliberalism and in particular through the implementation of SAPs. In the following I offer a quantitative account of the breakdown of wealth in the country beginning with those who are extremely affluent. I juxtapose this with those who are at the other extreme end of material deprivation, depicting how this has been exacerbated since the advance of neoliberalism. Following, I provide a gendered account of wealth inequality as well as other indicators of gender inequality in El Salvador. This will help to demonstrate in concrete conditions the detriment that SAPs and neoliberal development have ensued on the majority of people in the country.

According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report, in 1998 the poorest 20% of the population in El Salvador shared 3.3% of the country’s national income, while the richest 20% shared 56.4% of it (Robinson, 2003: 311). A brief elaboration of this wealth

\textsuperscript{12} \url{http://www.oir.org.pe/spanish/260ameri/publ/panorama/1999/graficos/anexest/cdro2a.html}
inequality is telling. There are eight large commercial groups in El Salvador that have the greatest economic power in the country. Most of these group’s major businesses are those of the Banks. The greatest and most powerful one of these groups is the Grupo Cuscatlán. One of the senior and wealthiest owners of the Banco Cuscatlán is Alfredo Cristiani, who was the Salvadoran president from 1989 to 1994 (Equipo Maiz, 2005b: 20). The Grupo Cuscatlán has 44 large businesses directly under their control. In 2003, the Grupo Cuscatlán had 6722 million in active dollars in the country, which totaled 45% of all national production for that year (Equipo Maiz, 2005b: 25). In fact, only six of the largest and wealthiest business of the Grupo Cuscatlán had twice the amount of money than the entire budget for the government in 2005 (Equipo Maiz, 2005b: 26). When we juxtapose this with the fact that 1195 million people in the country live on less than one dollar a day (the mark for extreme poverty in the country) this inequality is astounding (Equipo Maiz, 2005b: 54). And levels of wealth are daily becoming increasingly polarized. In 1984, 50% of the national income created during that year went as net earnings to businesses, 42% of it went to workers as wages and 8% were government funds. In 1995 shortly following structural adjustment programs, 62% of the national income went to big businesses, 32% went to workers as wages and 6% were government funds (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 39). This indicates that increasingly more and more money is going to big businesses as opposed to workers as wages or to the government to provide services. It is also telling that since the advance of neoliberalism the percentage of the population living in poverty has also expanded. In 1980, 68% of the population lived in poverty. In 1990 this had grown to account for 71% of the population, and by 1999, 80% of the population in El Salvador lived in either extreme or relative poverty (Robinson, 2003: 309). In other
words, structural adjustment programs have not delivered the promises they forward in respect to creating jobs and economic improvements for those who participate in the market.

Wealth inequality is not the only stunning marker of inequality in the country. Other national indicators for wellbeing are also becoming worse. In respect to the Human Development Index, in 1990 El Salvador was 72nd in the world. By 1997 they had dropped 50 places, becoming 112th on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1999). El Salvador is (besides Haiti) the most deforested country in all of the Americas (Equipo Maiz, 2003a: 42). In fact, the leading cause of death in El Salvador for children 14 years and younger is due to respiratory problems caused by the polluted air in the environment (UNDP, 2004: 60). In 2003, 1 million seven-hundred and seventeen million dollars were the monetary costs of violence in El Salvador (UNDP, 2005b: 5). The UNDP holds that part of the cause of this violence is due to the economic disparities and the lack of rewarding employment options facing many young people in the country (UNDP, 2005b).

Gendered indicators of inequality are also troubling. In 2002, 81% of all women in El Salvador had no form of health insurance (UNDP, 2004: 63), in large part due to the privatization of health services undertaken by the ARENA government. According to the Gender Development Index (GDI), men (per capita) had more than double the wealth than that held by women in 2003 (UNDP, 2004: 45). Discrepancy in salary rates between women and men that favour men did not decrease from 1999 to 2002, but in fact increased during that time era (UNDP, 2004: 46). For example, in 2002 women only earned 76% of the amount earned by men for doing the same jobs as their male
counterparts (UNDP, 2005b: 33). And it is telling that women are entering the labour force in increasing numbers. In 1980, 25% of women were in the labour force. By 1995 this had grown to 34%, and by 2000, 46% of women were active participants in the formal labour force (Robinson, 2003: 290). This is in spite of the fact that women in El Salvador dedicate much more time than men do to performing reproductive labour (UNDP, 2004: 76). Salvadoran women in rural areas are also burdened with the reproductive tasks of collecting wood for cooking food with and water for drinking. Yet due to the deforestation that the country has witnessed in the past few years (partly the result of the country’s attempt to ‘develop’ economically), these tasks have become increasingly more difficult and time-consuming. For example, at least 17% of all women and girls in 18 municipalities of El Salvador spend at least half of their day trying to collect water to drink and fuel to cook with (UNDP, 2004: 97). Also, 98.8% of all rural households that live in extreme poverty have no garbage collection services. Consequently, 40.2% of this population burns their garbage, 16.7% throw their garbage anywhere, and 4.5% bury their garbage (UNDP, 2004: 95). This results in a (largely gendered burden) of what to do with one’s waste, not to mention the continued contamination of the environment because of the lack of feasible alternatives enjoyed by this population.

**Gendered Consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs:**

As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, women experience the development process differently than do men. This is particularly true within the case of structural adjustment programs under neoliberalism. If we recall back to chapter one’s discussion
on women and structural adjustment programs, Diane Elson argued that one of the fundamental limitations of SAPs is that underlying their prescriptions is the assumption that women’s labour is always available in ever greater quantities. This is because women are expected to continue performing the ‘invisible’ and undervalued reproductive labour such as stretching household funds, along with being increasingly inserted into the formal market system. This is in despite of the fact that under SAPs, governments undergo cutbacks in services that support social reproduction. There is also a feminization and flexibilization of labour which is most detrimental to women as well as increased levels of gendered inequality. In the following I briefly summarize some of these points as they were outlined above. I undertake this in order to explicate further how SAPs have been most detrimental to women within the context of El Salvador.

Elson argued that structural adjustment programs include policies such as “cutbacks in public expenditure” (Elson, 1995: 167). According to Elson, these policies are most detrimental to women because of the gendered and household division of labour. For instance, if there are cutbacks to public services such as healthcare and if somebody in the household becomes sick the responsibility is transferred onto the woman to take care of those that have become ill.

In El Salvador it is evident that the government has cutback on services that once supported social reproduction through processes of privatization. For instance, in 1991 the Salvadoran government privatized the medical consultation of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute. Consequently, now when individuals get sick and can no longer receive some of these healthcare services, it becomes ‘the women’s’ (or girls’) responsibility to care for those that have become ill. The Salvadoran government has also
privatized electrical energy and telecommunications. This means that money must now stretch much further than it used to in preceding eras, particularly since under the current labour legislation, wages have not increased with levels of inflation. The dollarization in the country has also exacerbated this burden. Under processes of liberalization, the government implemented in 1992 a goods and services tax that applies to everything from basic grains, fruits, vegetables, milk, medicine and clothes. This tax now stands at 13%, making the task of stretching household funds more difficult. And in the years to come the ARENA party under President Antonio Saca have plans to privatize more of the health and education sectors. This therefore means that these tendencies will only be intensified in the years to come.

Services that supported reproductive labour have never been widespread within the context of El Salvador. Yet although the welfare state in El Salvador was not as large or as strong as that which normatively existed in Northern countries, the services that were in place to support social reproduction did nonetheless make a difference, most notably to poor and working class women. Consequently, as Munck’s notes:

> The crisis of the welfare state created by neo-liberalism’s privatization drive...has...affected women more severely. The care of young children, the elderly, and the sick is privatized (made profitable), and when families cannot access these services, it is women who resume their traditional caring roles...[therefore] reinforc[ing] the traditional gendered division of labor and disempower[ing]...women (Munck, 2005: 83).

Another harmful result of SAPs on women is the accompanying feminization and flexibilization of labour. One of the oppressive tendencies of neoliberalism is that countries must try to attract foreign direct investment through lowering the labour costs in their countries through process of flexibilization. This is the case – particularly within
the context of El Salvador – where the country’s comparative advantage is deemed to be its cheap, under-employed and (for many industries) largely female labour force. And under these processes of flexibilization, women are most negatively affected. For example, under the countries flexibilization process, there are levels of ambiguity in respect to the minimum wage, and the notion that different sectors and different areas can and should be paid different ‘minimum’ wages. The different sectors that are paid less are normatively those in which women toil. Similarly, through processes of flexibilization, under the labour laws there is no specificity as to how much labour needs to be done in order to attain this minimum wage, regardless of the supposed eight-hour workday. Consequently, many of the sectors in which women work (such as women who perform homework and the piece-work system that is typical in maquiladoras) result in women having to perform too much work as compared to the hours that they actually get paid for. And in more blatant cases, laws that were once in place to protect pregnant women have under processes of flexibilization – as a result of SAPs – been retracted. In maquiladoras, many women have to take pregnancy tests to prove that they are not pregnant or sign contracts stating that they agree to be ‘let go’ (i.e. fired) if they become pregnant. These are additional examples of how SAPs have furthermore and directly undermined the wellbeing of women in El Salvador.

SAPs have also increased levels of inequality while concurrently exacerbating levels of gendered inequality. For instance, in respect to levels of gendered inequality, the fastest growing industry in El Salvador is the textile maquila industry. Yet maquila work is feminized, exploitative, dangerous and precarious, and women are increasingly entering this labour niche out of sheer economic necessity. This is because the cost of
living in El Salvador is growing, and minimum wages are not growing with levels of inflation. Similarly, urban female-headed households are significantly more impoverished than male-headed households, and female-headed households are proliferating (UNDP, 2005a: 293). This also comes at a time when the male unemployment rate is almost double that of women, as I denoted above. Accordingly, poor and working class women are entering the jobs that are available to them, although under SAPs these employment options are dangerous, exploitative and poorly rewarded. In 2002 within El Salvador, women only earned 76% of the amount earned by men for doing the same jobs as their male counterparts (UNDP, 2005b: 33), irrespective of the fact that women and men are usually segregated in gender-specific job niches in which feminized jobs are paid less than ‘masculine’ ones. And in 2003 within El Salvador, men held more than double the wealth than that held by women (UNDP, 2004: 45).

William Robinson sums these entire processes up concisely, particularly as related to the specifics characterizing SAPs. His summary is entirely relevant to the process of SAPs which I have demonstrated El Salvador has been undertaking since the early 1990s. In his words:

[Neo-liberalism and structural adjustment programs have a particularly adverse effect on women, especially poor and working-class women. Women are generally responsible for household budgeting and maintenance. Adjustment leaves them to cope with increased prices, shrinking incomes, and dwindling social services. The decline in wages and work conditions associated with the new capital-labor relation at the site of production thus takes place at a time when women increasingly make up the ranks of the work force. At the same time, the costs of reproduction of the labor force are assumed by women without compensation, and these costs rise dramatically to the extent that neo-liberal adjustment removes state and public support for that reproduction, which becomes “privatized” and reverts more exclusively to the household. The state’s withdrawal from providing basic services linked to social reproduction takes place at a time when the need for these services

]
has grown with the rapid increase in urbanization and commodification (Robinson, 2003: 288).

The Salvadoran government has heeded the 'advice' of the Bank in the form of neoliberalism. They have aggressively implemented SAPs and opened up their markets with the goal of pursuing export-oriented growth. Nonetheless, the situation of the majority of the people in the country has in the past 15 years become considerably more adverse. These difficulties are particularly detrimental to women, as I have repeatedly demonstrated in this chapter.

Gender mainstreaming is supposed to be implemented into the project of neoliberalism. However, contrary to being a neutral tool to be employed for the purpose of pursuing gender equality, the neoliberal project has clear winners and losers, with women as a social category being at the losing end. Neither is neoliberalism (as a contemporary movement within global capitalism) a gender-neutral process. There is a clear international division of labour along with a gendered division of labour that characterizes the neoliberal project. El Salvador is also at the losing end of this divide, partly because El Salvador's comparative advantage is deemed to be its cheap, under-employed and abundant labour force. This labour force is also largely female. Women are supposed to be 'empowered' through their insertion into formal market systems, irrespective of the fact that the employment options available for (in particular poor and working class) women are feminized, precarious, unstable and highly exploitative. They are also non-rewarding in that regardless of the reality that women labour in both this formal and informal market system and increasingly so in the reproductive spheres as a result of processes of privatization, the majority of peoples (and in particular women) still
continue to and in fact increasingly live in both extreme and relative poverty. The processes taken towards economic development have had few virtuous effects in the arena of promoting poverty reduction and greater gender equality, and this will only be further accentuated through the operation of CAFTA in the region. This contradiction raises questions regarding the promises that the World Bank forwards in respect to their development prescriptions.

As the above has denoted, the social terrain in El Salvador is one in which wealth is being polarized, inequality is being exacerbated, and consequently women as a social category are being met with increased hardships. This is the social terrain in which mainstreaming programmes are operating in El Salvador. It is one that is typified by increased inequality, the feminization and flexibilization of labour as well as cut-backs in some basic services that supported social reproduction. This social terrain is at odds with the Bank’s apparent commitment of promoting poverty reduction and greater gender equality. This raises the question as to whether mainstreaming is indeed a vehicle for ending these inequalities or whether it is actually being embraced to disarticulate opposition to them. In the following I answer this query through undertaking an analysis of mainstreaming initiatives in contemporary El Salvador.
Chapter Five:

In this chapter I will be demonstrating how the Bank’s theoretical contradictions (as demonstrated in the discourse analyses of *Engendering Development* and *Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work*) are manifested within the context of El Salvador. I analyze El Salvador’s mainstreaming initiatives as an example of the manifestation of these contradictions. I accomplish this by relaying the findings of the fieldwork I undertook in El Salvador from January to March of 2006. I begin by providing a brief historical depiction of the rise of feminism and feminist organizations in the country, as this contextual history has had notable affects on the manner in which gender equality is conceptualized nationally and regionally by some of the more marginal stakeholders involved in mainstreaming. This has consequently affected the means by which the different stakeholders are involved in and are capable of influencing the manner in which mainstreaming has been and is currently applied at the policy level. I proceed by providing a general section introducing the nature of mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador. Through this general introduction I am then able to demonstrate how the central contradictions that were present in the World Bank documents and its policy prescriptions are manifested in gender mainstreaming initiatives in contemporary El Salvador. By doing this I attempt to shed light on some of the central problematics that underscore gender and development under neoliberalism. I proceed by employing the use of a joint World Bank, Salvadoran government and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) initiative entitled *Red Solidaria* as a case analysis for concretely exploring the practice of gender mainstreaming. I conclude with an examination of the major tensions
in mainstreaming initiatives and where the mainstreaming project appears to be heading.\(^{13}\)

It should be made known that, although I undertook a considerable number of interviews during my fieldwork, I do not present an exhaustive account of gender mainstreaming in El Salvador. As mentioned previously, gender mainstreaming is supposed to underlie all of the development work that takes place within a country that has made a commitment to promote gender equality through mainstreaming. Attaining a complete picture of this was beyond the scope of my fieldwork at this stage. Similarly, some organizations were not willing to be interviewed, and other major players in the country (like the World Bank) do not have a regional office in the country and consequently do not have any local, full-time staff to be interviewed. Rather my intention is to present my fieldwork findings as a brief national example of gender mainstreaming. Where possible I try to privilege the voices of those that I interviewed in order to keep biases at a minimum.

**Rise of Women’s Groups and NGOs in El Salvador:**

In Cinzia Mirella Innocenti’s (1997) thesis “Evolucion Hitorica Del Movimiento De Mujeres y Del Movimiento Feminista en El Salvador Desde 1900 Hasta 1995” (Historical Evolution of the Women’s Movement and the Feminist Movement in El Salvador from 1900 until 1995), Innocenti argues that there is a clear distinction to be made between what she terms the ‘women’s movement’ in El Salvador as opposed to the

\(^{13}\) For an overview of the methodology that I employed during my fieldwork, the kinds of information that I had sought to acquire as well as a copy of the consent forms in both Spanish and English, please refer to the appendices.
more current Salvadoran ‘feminist movement’. For her, a women’s movement “looks to satisfy specific demands for certain basic goods and rights that result in the marginalization of a certain group of women” (1997: 12). She juxtaposes the women’s movement with the ‘feminist movement’ which she regards as “looking to re-vindicate women as a gender, in the different sectors of society and at different levels within this movement in which these changes can be enacted” (1997: 12). Maxine Molyneux also makes a similar distinction in what she argues is the difference between ‘practical’ and ‘strategic’ interests. To elaborate, “Molyneux argues that a distinction exists between women organizing to meet basic needs that are the result of a gendered division of labour (i.e., childcare) or what she calls practical interests, and those explicitly organizing to counter systems of patriarchy (i.e., safe and legal access to abortion), or strategic interests” (Shayne, 2004: 3). This is not to suggest that these categories are mutually exclusive, or that ‘practical interests’ (what Innocenti characterizes as normative in a ‘women’s movement’) do not challenge the patriarchal system, for indeed in many ways they do and are also political. Nonetheless, there is an analytical distinction to be made between struggling for basic rights as opposed to seeking to reform the patriarchal system altogether. To elaborate, the:

women’s movements does not question the gendered division of labour, the differences in educational opportunities…or the different roles that women are ‘supposed’ to occupy under patriarchal systems….This is different from the feminist movement which is conscious of the subordination and marginalization that women face, and look to organize and struggle against this (Innocenti, 1997: 23).

According to Innocenti, the women’s movement preceded and was absolutely essential for paving the way for the feminist movement in El Salvador.
In light of Innocenti’s account, the women’s movement in El Salvador began in the 1900s, altering and beginning to take the form of a feminist movement in 1946 (Innocenti, 1997: 65). A central thesis of Innocenti’s argument is that women have long been present in the social (and particularly class) struggles which have characterized the country’s history since its ‘official’ formation. Although the feminist movement was just starting to take hold in El Salvador during the mid 1940s, it was actually during the Salvadoran civil war and following its cease-fire that the feminist movement gathered considerable strength. In Julie Shayne’s words, in El Salvador “the revolutionary movements provided the political, ideological, and logistical foundations for their feminisms” (2004: 10). In other words, “[t]he sexism that leftist women experienced, combined with the organizational training they received, in part led many women ex-guerrillas to join and even lead feminist movements” (Shayne, 2004: 9). As such, even though it was the particular conditions both during and following the war that acted as a catalyst for the feminist movement to institutionally form and gather strength, it is important to remember that contrary to the male-biased manner in which history is both created and presented, Salvadoran women have long been involved as active participants within social movements in the country as well as having led women’s and feminist movements. It is not that Salvadoran women became ‘political’ during and following the civil war, but rather that the war both accentuated and accelerated this process.

According to Shayne, “the most explicit example of the connections between revolution and feminism in El Salvador are the women’s organizations that started during the war” (2004: 47). In Karen Kampwirth’s words, “the vast majority of the groups that made up the women’s movement, had been created by one of the guerrilla groups that
made up the FMLN in the eighties” (Kamwirth, 2004: 75). According to Kamwirth the reason for this is because:

Once the war ended in a negotiated settlement in 1992, the contradiction between those goals [as outlined by the Left] and the reality of continued gender inequality even within the guerrilla organizations, led some to believe that being true to the martyrs required, ironically enough, seeking autonomy from the guerrilla groups and the political parties they became. To be revolutionary meant breaking with the revolutionary leaders (Kamwirth, 2004: 76).

Similarly, according to Shayne, the FMLN used the proliferation of women’s groups to expand the revolutionary movement, but the women involved in these groups felt constrained both by the hierarchal nature of the FMLN as well as by the back-seat that women’s issues were taking within this arrangement (2004: 48). Consequently, in the late 1980s and early 1990s women’s organizations began to proliferate in the country, and on a national scale these groups normatively broke away from the FMLN to form autonomous institutions. This is not because these feminist organizations no longer had connections with the FMLN or that they no longer had faith in them as a political party. Indeed based on my discussions with various feminist organizations during my fieldwork, many of the members still place their faith on the FMLN as a political party. Instead what it does mean is that to function as a feminist organization in which gender issues were at the heart of the organizing and efforts, many of these newly-founded feminist organizations needed to break away from and function as autonomous institutions.

The specifics regarding which guerrilla organizations were directly linked to the different women’s organizations is not entirely important for the purpose of my analysis (see Innocenti 1997; Kampwirth 2004; Shayne 2004). What are important are the ensuing
effects that this revolutionary origin has meant in practice for the work that the feminist organizations have done and are continuing to forward. In Shayne's words:

> Because the majority of the leadership of the revolutionary feminist movement in El Salvador comes from the Left, which is heavily rooted in Marxism, many of the issues upon which feminists focus their energies are directly connected to women's economic exploitation and disenfranchisement... In other words, the revolutionary feminist movement in El Salvador is one that continues the Marxist struggle for equality among the social classes from a feminist perspective (Shayne, 2004: 60).

And this tradition has meant that many of the women's organizations are wary of gender mainstreaming, because gender mainstreaming is being incorporated within an already-existing neoliberal macroeconomic development framework; a framework that has been documented as heightening inequality between the genders.

In the following I provide a general section introducing the nature of mainstreaming initiatives in El Salvador, outlining the concrete manner in which gender mainstreaming is being pursued in the country. I discuss the role that the multilaterals and bilateral organizations have had in shaping the manner in which mainstreaming transpires, along with the functions of some of the other key players. Through this general introduction I will then be able to follow through and demonstrate how the central contradictions that were present in the World Bank documents and policy prescriptions are manifested in gender mainstreaming initiatives in contemporary El Salvador. This framework will set the stage for then relaying and analyzing the opinions, consensus, and tensions that underlie the practice of gender mainstreaming in contemporary El Salvador.
Nature of Contemporary Mainstreaming Initiatives in El Salvador:

According to the World Bank, "mainstreaming gender into development means understanding the differing needs and constraints faced by women and men that affect productivity and poverty; and then designing actions so that gender-related barriers to economic growth and poverty alleviation are reduced and the material well-being of men, women, and children is enhanced" (World Bank, 2002: 41). To elaborate in further detail, according to Shirin Rai, gender mainstreaming can be defined as:

The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy of making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality’ with the aim of transforming structures of inequality (Rai, 2003: 16).

In practical terms, gender is supposed to be ‘mainstreamed’ into everything that an institution plans and undertakes in every sphere and at all levels. The different institutions and organizations have somewhat different definitions for gender mainstreaming, but for the most part from a theoretical and conceptual perspective this is what mainstreaming is supposed to entail. The most difficult challenge of gender mainstreaming (which was repeatedly mentioned by almost every person interviewed) is how to shift from the theoretical level to the policy level in the application of mainstreaming.

According to a private gender consultant that I interviewed in El Salvador, there are three different strategies for promoting gender equality. First, there are actions that are ‘focused on women, by women and for women’, which is most normatively the
practice engaged in by many women’s and feminist organizations. In other words, women focus on the needs of themselves and other women and struggle to provide these goods and services for themselves and other women. Secondly, there is the strategy of ‘gender mainstreaming oriented towards women’, in which a focus on women has been institutionalized. According to this strategy, men and women at the institutional level provide services for women for their advancement relative to men. The third strategy for promoting gender equality is ‘gender inclusive gender mainstreaming’. This is the favoured approach of this gender consultant, and is also the approach that was employed in the case of San Salvador’s City Hall. It is also the method that is envisioned by most of the multilaterals and bilaterals, although they rarely apply it in their own work. In it, women and men at the institutional level work to promote gender equality for girls, women, boys and men. It is regarded as being ‘gender inclusive’ because both of the genders are welcome and considered indispensable in the struggle towards eradicating gender inequality (Fundacion Heinrich Boll, 2006: 13).

According to the report ‘Resultados de Aplicacion del Plan de Accion 2003 – 2006 para la Equidad de Genero de la Alcaldia Municipal de San Salvador’, strategy number one (‘actions focused on women, by women and for women’) is the most common approach towards dealing with gender inequality in El Salvador, although number two (‘gender mainstreaming oriented towards women’) is also sometimes applied. The report states that although strategy three (‘gender inclusive gender mainstreaming’) is the one that will reap the most benefits, it is not the normative approach towards dealing with gender inequality. Partly this is because it is a more difficult process, as well as the fact that it requires a shift in thinking; gender inequality
must be understood as having to do with both of the genders. There needs to be a focus on the way that men practice and perpetuate their masculinity, and not only on the ways in which women are marginalized. Men and boys need to be involved as well as actively deconstruct their gender scripts along with girls and women. However the focus in El Salvador is normatively on the ways in which girls and women are marginalized, and how to promote their advancement relative to boys and men.

Gender mainstreaming within the context of El Salvador rarely moves beyond the level of rhetoric. According to one of the gender specialists at the UNDP, one of the problems is that “gender is not an issue that interests everybody. It is a theme that has been imposed from above” (interview UNDP, February 14, 2006). When gender is concretely addressed within various institutions, it only occurs within human development projects as opposed to other projects such as infrastructural projects or economic development projects. And although in some cases they rightly claimed that – for example - water projects benefit women more than men in light of the gendered division of labour (interview with CIDA, February 6, 2006), within most infrastructural projects or projects focused at the macro-economic level, gender mainstreaming does not occur. In the words of the gender specialist at USAID, “it is difficult to incorporate gender into every project. Indeed, in some projects a gender analysis is impossible or not entirely relevant” (interview with USAID, February 14, 2006). Therefore, although gender mainstreaming is supposed to occur in every single dimension of an institution and its working, in practice it only occurs within projects that can be defined as ‘human development projects’.
Gender mainstreaming is a top-down approach towards development within the context of El Salvador, and it tends to be the multilaterals, bilaterals and governmental institutions that have the greatest influence over the form that mainstreaming takes. In the case of the multilateral organizations, they lend the money to the Salvadoran government who already has a pre-determined plan in respect to what the money is going to be used for. This plan is largely constructed at the governmental level by government officials, regardless of their claims that this is a collaborative process. The government then distributes the money (often to the different ministries), who then proceed to execute the projects. In the case of the bilateral organizations, they also design most of the projects and determine how they are going to gender mainstream. When they contract some of the work out to the various NGOs and women’s groups, the NGOs and women’s groups do not have any say in what a project will look like because the project has already been calculated. Rather, they are simply being hired to perform certain services. In the words of the project coordinator at CARE International, “they treat us as though we were nothing but a subcontract as opposed to working in collaboration” (interview, January 31, 2006). In some cases some of the bilaterals collaborate with municipal governments or others at the more local level, but this collaboration rarely (if ever) takes the form of collaboration during the project design process. The bilaterals and multilaterals also accept project proposals from NGOs and women’s / feminist groups in order to undertake certain programs. Nonetheless, it is still up to the bilaterals and multilaterals to decide who is going to receive the funding and for which projects under question. Consequently, it cannot be argued that mainstreaming is a bottom-up approach towards development even if at times some of those that are affected are consulted.
The manner in which gender mainstreaming gets incorporated within organizations and projects is fragmented within the context of El Salvador. This is because although the funding organizations necessitate that in order to receive a grant each project must promote gender equality, there are clear levels of inconsistency amongst the organizations in respect to this promotion. Some organizations appear to be more consistent in this process (such as the German Cooperation (GTZ) and the European Union), having institutionalized mechanisms to promote this process. On the other hand, other organizations (at least from their interviews) seem to think it is not their problem, most notably like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). According to the gender specialist that I interviewed at the IDB:

If the government, ministries or NGOs don’t mainstream or focus on gender in their projects then there is nothing that we can do. And quite frankly, the Salvadoran government (particularly at the higher levels) is not really concerned in supporting or promoting mainstreaming. Sometimes it takes years for them to give us their project reports, and there really is nothing that we can do about it. The problem with mainstreaming is that there are too many problems in the country, and gender and gender mainstreaming just don’t appear to be pressing issues (interview IDB, February 14, 2006).

There are some instances in which gender mainstreaming moves beyond the level of rhetoric. During my interviews in El Salvador, the UNDP was attributed as being the institution that has made the most progress in the area of gender and development more generally and gender mainstreaming more specifically. The UNDP is the one organization that has undoubtedly moved beyond mainstreaming at the ideological level. In fact, the UNDP has created and implemented specific tools on how to gender mainstream. The UNDP is the only institution that gender mainstreams at the institutional level. They insure that every person that works at the UNDP El Salvador receives gender
training, including the program officials, security guards, gardeners through to the office support staff. For many of their recent hires they have also practiced affirmative-action appointing. They are the only institution that claimed to and provided me with an institutional diagnostic of their gender mainstreaming practices. They also appear to work most closely with the NGOs and feminist organizations than any of the other organizations that I interviewed.

I do not engage in detailed specifics of what their tools for gender mainstreaming actually consist of (see How to Prepare a Gender Strategy for a Country Office, UNDP El Salvador: 2004). What is significant, however, is that they have comprised specific tools on a national level of how to gender mainstream, which greatly exceeds the actions of any other institution that was interviewed. This demonstrates that if an organization is committed, it is possible to move beyond gender mainstreaming at the level of rhetoric through implementing techniques for accomplishing mainstreaming concretely. In fact, in How to Prepare a Gender Strategy for a Country Office, UNDP El Salvador, the UNDP offers a step-by-step instructions manual on how to mainstream gender into UNDP country offices. What is telling from this recounting is that the success of this organization appears to be premised on the fact that they are committed to promoting gender equality.

According to one of the gender specialists at the UNDP, one of the foremost explanations for why they have accomplished so much in their own institution is because their goals are guided by a vision of human development, as opposed to the goals underlying many of the other institutions. She stated that in her own personal opinion:

the government of El Salvador and the multilaterals are discursively very well versed in the issues of human development and gender
mainstreaming. But the problem is that their visions and goals are very
economistic...their practices benefit only a minute group of people and the
larger corporations. The problem - and this is a very personal opinion - is
that the goals of human development and economic development are
(under neoliberalism) contradictory. This is why although the government
has mastered the discourses surrounding human development like gender
mainstreaming, we rarely see this commitment in their concrete agendas
(interview UNDP, February 14, 2006).

The sociologist that I interviewed as well as the economics professor sited the
contradicting aspirations underlying human development and economic development as
significant reasons for which gender mainstreaming has not materialized beyond
discourse. They both stated that the government of El Salvador has become very well
versed in the discourses surrounding human development. In fact, the motto of the
ARENA government is "a government with a sense of humanity". The problem,
however, is that in privileging economic development, human development (through
methods such as gender mainstreaming) is never actually materialized. This is
irrespective of the fact that so much effort is exerted in pretending as though this were not
the case.

The UNDP El Salvador has been a leader in the area of gender mainstreaming.
According to the interviewee, the UNDP is committed to mainstreaming. Institutionally
they believe it is a vision worth pursuing. She did state, however, that it is a vision that is
sometimes at odds with many of the feminist organizations. This is partly because of the
emphasis bestowed on gender relations, taking the focus away from girls and women.
She explained that for many of the feminist organizations this comes out of concerns over
funding. They worry that if the focus shifts from girls and women in favour of 'the
genders', they might lose already minimal amounts of grants for their programs. She
stated that although she comprehends this practical fear, the feminist organizations that are in opposition to working with men are unknowingly working against the mainstreaming initiative. Both of the academics that I interviewed were in accord with this account, although they were empathetic as to why many of the feminist organizations might feel this way. According to the economist, all one needs to do in project proposals is to “use the magic word ‘gender’ and you’re guaranteed to get money” (interview UCA, January 27, 2006). For her it is not surprising that the feminist organizations are wary of mainstreaming because now money is going for projects that in reality have no gender component and certainly do not promote gender equality. The sociologist that I interviewed was also in accord with this account and was very sympathetic to the feminist organizations. According to her, at least under girl and women-centred projects, these programs were directly aimed at girls and women. In her words, “Now almost everyone says that they gender mainstream, but just the fact that they can’t tell you in concrete terms how they do it is indicative of the fact that gender is largely absent from most of their programs. In a lot of ways we haven’t only failed to improve the situation, but indeed through ‘mainstreaming’ we’ve made it much worse” (interview UCA, January 26, 2006).

One of the most significant contributions that the UNDP has made in El Salvador in relation to mainstreaming has been the creation of the gender roundtable. The purpose of the roundtable is to share information, support each other and discuss issues of gender and development such as gender mainstreaming. This roundtable used to include only some of the multilaterals and bilaterals. The membership of this roundtable has changed over the years, and some that once participated – such as the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) – no longer partake. Of the most consistent participants have been UNICEF, the UNDP, the European Union, GTZ, the Japanese Cooperation (JAICO), the Spanish Cooperation, CARE International, and a few others. In the past few years the Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ISDEMU) has taken over the facilitation of this roundtable, which now includes various government workers, NGOs and the ministries. Of the ministries present are the ministries of Health, Education and the Family. Notably absent are the ministries of Finance and Labour.

According to the gender specialist, the most striking limitation of the UNDP is that their mandate only extends to providing assistance. The UNDP can never push for or enforce a policy onto a country, but rather can only assist them if they wish or agree to be assisted. She seriously questions the motivation of the Salvadoran government when they approach the UNDP for support in respect to gender mainstreaming, beyond the reality that this rarely actually occurs. She also claimed that although UNDP El Salvador has made significant progress (particularly as related to other UNDP regional offices) their ability to enact concrete gender transformations within the context of El Salvador is minimal. The differences in power held by the stakeholders act as an obstacle, as does the role that the UNDP is constrained into taking. The UDNP can enact changes in their own institution, but their power does not extend further than that. These limitations seriously restrict the UNDP’s capability of forwarding pro-gender equality measures outside of their own UN institutions or regional country offices.

ISDEMU, on the other hand is – at least theoretically speaking – capable of promoting pro-gender equality measures. In practical terms ISDEMU operates as the Ministry of Women. It was formed subsequent to Beijing and the government’s
commitment to promote gender equality. It became a functioning ministry in 1996 (UNDP, 2004: 28). According to the legislature, the president’s wife is to act as the chair of ISDEMU as well as to take the role as the National Secretary of the family. If the first lady is incapable of taking on this role, then it is up to the president to appoint somebody to the position (UNDP, 2004: 29). Beyond the obvious conflict of interest within this arrangement, ISDEMU is limited in trying to advance the ruling-government’s Plan for the country (currently Plan 2021). In other words, ISDEMU cannot attempt to change the workings at the macroeconomic level since this is not in the government’s plan and hence not part of ISDEMU’s mandate.

In practical terms, one of the major roles of ISDEMU is to assure that the ministries are gender mainstreaming (UNDP, 2004: 29). In the past they have also done a lot of work on social problems such as intra-family violence. Similarly, they have made tremendous improvements in advancing changes to the legislature as related to promoting paternal responsibility; an advance of particular importance in El Salvador where paternal irresponsibility is widespread (UNDP, 2004: 31). And in recent years they have begun working in programs to promote productivity, most notably in the area of female-run micro industries. The limitation of ISDEMU as an institution (particularly from the standpoint of the feminist organizations) is that regardless of the advances that ISDEMU has accomplished ISDEMU tends to focus on ‘traditional’ women-centred problems. According to a professor of Economics that I interviewed at the University of Central America (UCA), this is partly because ISDEMU was formed as the ministry of women, not as the ministry of the genders (interview UCA, January 27, 2006). In my interview with the feminist organization the DIGNAS, one of the members stated that although
physical violence against women in the home needs to be eradicated, economic violence is also violence, and that ISDEMU is overly-narrow in their analysis and application (interview with DIGNAS, January 18, 2006). According to CEMUJER (another feminist organization), ISDEMU is too focused on women and on stereotypical ‘women problems’. They feel that ISDEMU would make further advances if they focused on gender relations and moved beyond ‘traditional women problems’, such as the dangers that many girls and women face due to working in maquiladoras (interview with CEMUJER, January 31, 2006). The UNDP’s representative also felt that ISDEMU exerts too much energy on ‘women-centred’ problems (interview with UNDP, February 14, 2006), and the gender specialist at the European Union similarly argued that ISDEMU overlooks gender relations because they overly-focus on girls and women (interview with European Union, February 7, 2006). Nonetheless, much of this is due to the fact that ISDEMU’s president is the first lady as well as that ISDEMU was implemented to forward the plan of the government.

As mentioned previously, one of the central mandates of ISDEMU is to assure and promote gender mainstreaming of the ministries. In practical terms, they monitor and undertake analysis of the ministries in respect to their gender mainstreaming initiatives. They evaluate the ministries mainstreaming practices, and offer specific suggestions on how to improve gender mainstreaming. Similarly, they attempt to carry out yearly gender workshops for those ministries that wish to participate.

The ISDEMU project coordinator suggested that the greatest current challenge in respect to mainstreaming is how to put the ideological and discursive mainstreaming commitment into practice. He feels that although it is an advance that the ministries are
"mainstream audited", ISDEMU relies on good faith that the ministries will implement their suggestions. In fact, there is nothing that ISDEMU can do if the ministries chose not to follow through with ISDEMU's recommendations. This project coordinator stated that the challenge is to see "mainstreaming move beyond sensibility raising and workshop training towards seeing it actually being implemented" (interview with ISDEMU, February 10, 2006). He also claimed that there are certain ministries that fair much better in the mainstreaming process. According to him, it is the ministries of education, the ministry of health and the ministry of the family that tend to be the most committed to gender mainstreaming. He compared them with the ministries that are most closely related to economic practices (such as the ministry of finance and the ministry of labour) that appear to be the least committed to gender mainstreaming. In fact, in my interview with the Director of International Cooperations for the ministry of finance, she was the only person in all of my interviews who did not know what gender mainstreaming is. Speaking from an institutional perspective they were the only ministry to admit that they do not gender mainstream and that they consider irrelevant gender relations or women within the development process. In her words, "The fact that most of the jobs that are being created through the medium of maquilas are 'women jobs' is irrelevant. Jobs are jobs and any job that can be created in the country is good for the country as a whole” (interview with ministry of finance, January 25, 2006).

According to the project coordinator of ISDEMU, the levels of commitment to gender mainstreaming in the higher government positions occurs largely at the ideological and discursive level. He argued that beyond occasional workshops and claims of commitment to gender equality, government officials at the higher ends are not
entirely interested or prioritize mainstreaming. And ISDEMU to a large extent has their hands tied, as they are institutionally in place to forward the Plan of the government.

**Gender Mainstreaming and the Central Contradictions:**

Many of the central contradictions that were present in the World Bank documents and policy prescriptions are manifested in gender mainstreaming initiatives in contemporary El Salvador. In the following, I outline some of these limitations and how they seriously undermine the mainstreaming process in El Salvador. This engagement also sheds light on some of the central problematics that underscore gender and development under neoliberalism more generally.

One of the central problematics in the application of mainstreaming in El Salvador is the manner in which gender inequality is ideologically constructed. The stakeholders with the greatest power for dictating how mainstreaming occurs in El Salvador frame gender inequality as being the result of women having been ‘unable’ to ‘take advantage’ of the ‘opportunities’ being created through neoliberal development. For example, according to the economist that I interviewed at the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency, foreign direct investment generates employment, and this is the optimal manner for promoting poverty reduction. He shared with me that this is the logic that is employed by the Salvadoran government, and that this is why they have chosen to focus on certain factors in their governmental Plan 2021. He said that by focusing on aspects such as education, health, and better highways, would-be investors will be more inclined to invest in the country since the country’s workforce is educated, healthy and easily accessible. He argued that export processing zones and free trade agreements like
CAFTA are a ‘win-win’ situation that benefits the entire country. They create income-generating opportunities, which in-turn apparently results in poverty reduction. The fact that many of the jobs being created are ‘women jobs’ in the form of maquilas were for him an advance for women, because it gives them the ‘opportunity to work’ and ‘make money’. This echoes very closely with the argument promoted by the Director of International Cooperations for the ministry of finance in respect to the creation of jobs and women. According to her, any job that a woman can acquire (even if it is maquila work) is empowering for a woman, and this is why focusing on girls’ and boys’ education is important so that they can have better opportunities as workers. She agreed that wages in maquiladoras are too low. Nonetheless, she argued that from an institutional perspective, creating jobs for women was empowering for them and beneficial to the country.

This conflation of ‘economic growth’, ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘gender equality’ that is being forwarded by most of the multilaterals, the ministry of finance and the Technical Secretariat of the presidency was also evident in the World Bank’s *Engendering Development* (2001) and *Integrating Mainstreaming into the World Bank’s Work* (2002). Yet this conflation is extremely ideological because it attempts to hide the fact that in many cases, ‘economic growth’, ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘gender equality’ are not one and the same thing. As I have noted repeatedly in the other chapters, some women (as in the case of El Salvador) have in fact experienced processes of impoverishment because of their ‘access’ and insertion within the ‘market system’, even within cases in which ‘economic growth’ has occurred (Bergeron, 2003a: 164).
This framing of gender inequality as the result of women’s inability to have ‘benefited’ from development due to their lack of ‘access’ to the market sets limits as to the ‘solutions’ that are envisioned in relation to gender equality. It also sets limits as to the discussions that can be had surrounding mainstreaming. Through this framework, the multilaterals, bilaterals and government can focus on individualistic factors such as ‘education’ and claim that they are promoting gender equality. The problem is that it is assumed that just by building upon marginalized people’s levels of human capital through focusing on formal education, the well-being of these peoples will be facilitated. In Isabella Bakker’s words, “rather than [focusing] on civil, political, and social rights, the neo-liberal consensus emphasizes individual solutions to what are seen as individually determined problems, not social, common ones” (Bakker, 2003: 70). But this overlooks, as the economist that I interviewed at the UCA noted, that most of the jobs that are being created in El Salvador are exploitative, low-paying jobs in the maquila industry that cause physical damage to girl’s and women’s health through these precarious employment options, even if persons are experiencing processes of empowerment through these industries. This is because the development route that El Salvador is taking is one of attracting foreign direct investment by using El Salvador’s comparative advantage; its comparative advantage is its large, semi-educated, cheap and (for many industries) largely female labour force. According to this economist:

What is the point of increasing the levels of human capital if the jobs that are being created in the country are low-skilled, highly exploitative, unstable and poorly paid? The government is promoting cheap labour as the country’s comparative advantage, and educating poor people does nothing because in the end they will just be taking on the only available jobs in the maquilas anyways (interview UCA, January 27, 2006).
The framing of gender inequality as the result of women’s inability to have ‘benefited’ from development silences other voices (namely those of feminist and NGOs) and debates such as the nature of the jobs that are being created. This is because according to this framework, the workings at the macroeconomic level are entirely irrelevant in respect to the promotion of gender equality.

Within the context of El Salvador gender inequality is also blamed on the culture of ‘machismo’ that is pervasive in the country. According to many of the multilaterals and government officials, gender inequality is the result of the practice of masculinity in the form of ‘machismo’ that seriously undermines women’s wellbeing on all levels. Consequently, this blaming on ‘machismo’ (or rather on culture and / or tradition) also helps to uphold the logic of neoliberal development. Through this framing of tradition as being the cause of gender inequality, the solution becomes envisioned as one in which women’s ‘empowerment’ will be facilitated through ‘modern’ ideas and the ‘benefits’ of the market. Consequently, if women are seen to be marginalized because of a ‘backwards’ culture and their lack of ‘contact’ with ‘modern ideas’ and ‘the market’, then the solution that becomes envisioned is one in which pro-market solutions become the ultimate answer. This is constructed through blaming poor people for their poverty while inventing the ‘saviors’ as being the market and the neoliberal economic system. If ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ is understood as being due to the ‘backwardness’ of Southern countries, then through embracing the market there will apparently be a process of liberation that will be accompanied by gender equality. The solution and the way forward is understood as being through embracing neoliberalism, as it is the ‘backwardness’ of ‘tradition’, ‘culture of machismo’ and lack of contact with the market that is the cause
and perpetuation of gender inequality. This framing hides the imposition of violent market relations in the form of neoliberal prescriptions that have often been shown to severely undermine girls and women, most notably poor and working class women in Southern countries.

In El Salvador another central contradiction in the application of mainstreaming is the notion that those that are exclusively performing reproductive labour are not actually participating in development at all. This is also present and perpetuated in the literature and policy prescriptions that were and are forwarded by the Bank. A lot of the discourses regarding the need to mainstream are justified in El Salvador by asserting that women need to be ‘saved’ from an oppressive ‘culture of machismo’; a culture that relegates them to their homes to raise children, cook and clean. Consequently, the discourse that is constructed is one in which women will be ‘liberated’ and ‘empowered’ once they are able to ‘participate’ and join the market system, overlooking even the fact that many women have for years partaken in the market system.

There are many limitations permeating the discourses surrounding reproductive labour. Most significant is that the household gendered division of labour is only being addressed superficially in the policy prescriptions being forwarded through mainstreaming. This is because all of the ‘solutions’ being put forth function to incorporate women at ever greater degrees into the market system while doing little or nothing to change the household and / or gendered division of labour. These policy prescriptions also uphold the notion that women are ‘not participating’ in development when they are performing reproductive labour, although I have demonstrated repeatedly that this is certainly not the case.
Women who perform reproductive labour are upholding and recreating the present and the future labour force. Labour is one of the most important components of the capitalist economic system, as is the existence of current and future consumers. However, as Acker (2004) notes, "[c]aring and nurturing, unless a source of profit, are not important, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary... As caring work is devalued, so are those who primarily do that work. Claims to non-responsibility reinforce the underlying gender divisions between production and reproduction and the gendered understructure of capitalist production" (27).

It is not that women are not working when they are performing reproductive labour, but rather that this labour is not acknowledged as being labour. Consequently, it is at best under-valued or at worse not valued at all. Consequently, women have and continue to produce what Mies terms a 'trickling-up effect' due in part to the discourses that undervalue their labour. Women's role in fuelling capitalist-patriarchal development through their unrecognized as well as undervalued labour has been absolutely crucial for the creation and maintenance of the capitalist-patriarchal system, which has been exacerbated since the 1970s with the advance of the neoliberal era. Accordingly the notion that women who perform reproductive labour are 'not participating' in development produce harmful policy prescriptions. Through attempting to incorporate more and more women into the market system in order to 'liberate' and 'empower' them, women become double burdened; not only do they have to work for exploitative wages 'within' the market, but they are still also responsible for performing the reproductive labour in the households. If they are incapable of performing the reproductive labour, these tasks are passed down to other women in the household, often to young girls. This
trend has also been exacerbated by the cuts to services that supported social reproduction in El Salvador through SAPs as the previous chapter denoted. In Bakker’s (2003) words:

[w]omen spend more time on unpaid labor at virtually all stages of the lifecycle than men… Yet at the same time as the material conditions of the traditional family are being eroded [through cuts to services that supported social reproduction], more and more women are providing a vital contribution to the living standard of their family through waged income. In this double movement, reprivatization is intensifying the material and discursive claims made on the family while undermining the very material and discursive conditions that could support these claims – greater responsibility for care-giving and women’s financial contribution through labor-force activity is assumed and encouraged, yet dependency, particularly dependency on the family...is pathologized” (79-80).

Consequently, although in rhetoric there is an acknowledgement of the gendered division of labour, this acknowledgement does not actually result in policy prescriptions that improve most women’s lives.

Another serious limitation in development (and hence ‘mainstreaming’) prescriptions is that for the most part they tend to be male biased. As discussed in chapter one, Elson argues that male bias “is a bias that operates in favour of men as a gender, and against women as a gender, not that all men are biased against women” (Elson, 1995: 3). In particular she focuses on the limitation of employing the use of gender-neutral words in public policy initiatives such as ‘work’, ‘development’ and ‘worker’. According to her, the problem with practices such as these is that by ignoring the gendered nature of terms which are considered to be gender-neutral, one is in actuality perpetuating the hardships of many women the world over within the development process. This form of male bias is certainly perpetuated by the major stakeholders in El Salvador that are involved in development and hence the mainstreaming process. The economist at the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency as well as the Director of International Cooperations for the
ministry of finance were both convinced from an institutional perspective that the best approach towards promoting poverty reduction and gender equality is through the promotion of ‘more investment’ and ‘jobs’. Neither of these organizations problematize the gendered nature of these jobs, focusing instead on the fact that ‘workers’ need employment. Most of those interviewed within the multilaterals and bilaterals also spoke in male-biased language. Consequently their solutions are also male biased because they are not considering the different ways in which women and men experience ‘work’, ‘development’ or the act of being ‘workers’. Women and men experience the market differently. They experience development differently and there is usually a gendered segregation in respect to the kinds of jobs that women and men labour in; women also tend to earn less than men. Women are normatively double burdened when they enter the formal or informal labour market, an experience that is not often felt by men. The fact that all of this is overlooked by the major stakeholders or is mentioned in a tokenistic manner is significant. In concrete terms it means that the policies that are envisioned and promoted are often detrimental to women, regardless of claims to the contrary.

Gender mainstreaming is part of the ‘comprehensive development framework’ that characterizes the post-Washington consensus. A central tenet of this framework is that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for promoting poverty reduction or gender equality. The problem with this framework as it relates to gender mainstreaming is that in concrete terms gender mainstreaming is never undertaken in any systematic approach. Yet according to the gender specialist at the UNDP and the private gender consultant that I interviewed, mainstreaming needs to be undertaken in a very concrete and systematic manner. This limitation facilitates as well as partly explicates why the practice of
mainstreaming is so fragmented in El Salvador. The lack of systematization also explains why mainstreaming rarely moves beyond the level of rhetoric. In the words of a member of Las DIGNAS, “mainstreaming is attractive to a lot of the organizations, but we are highly critical of it. In theory everything has to have a focus on gender. The problem is that in practice this focus is actually nowhere. And then, even worse this takes away from the specific spaces in which women-focused problems and solutions can arise from” (interview, January 18, 2006). What is ironic about all of this is that although each country is supposed to be ‘unique’ in the steps that they take towards promoting poverty reduction and gender equality, there are indeed a set of prescribed ‘one-size-fits-all’ remedies underlying the practice and prescriptions of neoliberalism. As such, each country can be ‘unique’ in the ‘marginal’ issues surrounding development (such as education, health, girls / women and pensions), as long as governments promote and embrace neoliberalism and the prescriptions underlying neoliberal development.

The comprehensive development framework is also supposed entail working in ‘collaboration’ with ‘civil society’. Yet in my interviews with the various NGOs and feminist organizations, they did not feel that they actually had any significant influence on development more generally or mainstreaming initiatives within development initiatives more specifically. They claimed that since gender mainstreaming is an approach that is ‘imposed from above’ their role is limited to contracting out their services for the ‘gendered’ dimensions of a program. Most of these organizations also apply to the multilaterals and bilaterals for funding to carry out projects, or they are hired by some of the ministries to provide specific services. Not one of these organizations felt they had any say in the manner in which gender mainstreaming is either envisioned or
applied in the country. And in fact they felt that through pretending to be working ‘in collaboration’, gender issues become depoliticized. Las DIGNAS were the most animate on this claim, although CEMUJER, CARE International and GMIES were not far behind. In the words of a member of Las DIGNAS:

Mainstreaming takes away from the specific focus on women, and then you have almost no critical gender analysis left. The power analysis gets completely lost, and then what do you have left? Mainstreaming does not deal with the power relations at all, at least not in any critical manner. They talk about everybody ‘working together’, but the power dimensions are completely lost or silenced in this ‘solution’ (interview, January 18, 2006).

As mentioned previously, many of the feminist organizations in El Salvador have their roots in the Leftist movement of the Salvadoran civil war. This has meant that, as Shayne (2004) notes, many of these organizations continue to focus heavily on the class-natured origins of women’s marginalization (60). Consequently, much of the work that they do focuses on the exploitation faced by women, such as in labour abuses that occur within maquiladoras. Most of the feminist organizations did not appear to be interested in discussing the mainstreaming initiative in any great detail, and they have been largely absent from the mainstreaming debates in the country altogether. In the words of a member of Las DIGNAS, “mainstreaming has been imposed from above. It is an institutional politics to deal with the international requirements of dealing with gender. That is why there is a lack of commitment on all levels to actually commit and make changes to promote gender equality. Because of this gender mainstreaming is never going to be ‘the answer’” (interview, January 18, 2006). They are notably wary of mainstreaming as a policy solution, and prefer to work in other arenas for the promotion of gender equality. None of the feminist organizations or NGOs that I spoke with claimed
that they are taking any significant measures to promote the improvement of gender mainstreaming as a policy solution. Most of these organizations prefer to provide services to women or lobby the government on specific gender issues. This is as opposed to concentrating their efforts on improving the practice of mainstreaming more specifically.

The most informative insight that I gained during my interviews with these civil society organizations are the groups of people that are marginalized and made invisible within development more generally and mainstreaming initiatives more specifically. According to these organizations, those that live in extreme levels of poverty (on $1 - $2 per day) are made invisible within most development initiatives altogether. Consequently, gender mainstreaming also does not reach them. This point was often brought up during discussions that were surrounding the difficulties faced by maquiladora workers. In the words of the interviewee from GMIES:

Neoliberalism and its accompanying gender mainstreaming is a system that exploits a lot of people. But we must remember that just the fact that some women are being exploited in maquilas puts them in a privileged position relative to some others. There are a lot of people that are even more marginalized. I mean, a lot of people in El Salvador live on less than 1 to 2 dollars a day! Maquila workers are not the most exploited, and we can’t forget this (interview, January 24, 2006).

According to the interviewee at CARE International, most of the projects or work that is done by the multilaterals, bilaterals government ministries and even themselves does not reach the most impoverished communities. Consequently, gender mainstreaming makes invisible the most vulnerable peoples and communities because most of the work that is being done does not even reach them. And none of the other ‘types’ of organizations made reference to this reality.
There is, however, one specific program that deals exclusively with the poorest and most vulnerable Salvadorans in the country. This is the joint World Bank, Salvadoran government and IDB project entitled Red Solidaria. Consequently, the following serves as a case analysis of Red Solidaria as an example of a ‘human development’ initiative in the country that claims to gender mainstream. I have chosen this specific project because it is the principal ‘anti-poverty’ project in the country, and was also the most often referenced by all of the stakeholders that I interviewed. Similarly, it is a ‘human’ development project, so the chances that gender is mainstreamed in this project are much higher than in projects focused on the workings at the macroeconomic level or infrastructural projects.

‘Red Solidaria’:

According to the World Bank they are concerned with:

the increase in inequality in recent years [in El Salvador] and [have] urged the authorities to strengthen their efforts to increase social spending, and in particular to improve access to education and healthcare. They recognized progress has been made, and welcomed the Government’s intentions to continue with its successful efforts to improve the quality and coverage of education, as well as the creation of a social safety net for the most vulnerable.\(^\text{14}\)

Red Solidaria is the social safety net that is being referred to. It is a joint World Bank, Salvadoran government and IDB program to deal with extreme levels of poverty in the country. According to the Bank it is “an integrated program of targeted investments

aimed at strengthening the provision and quality of basic social services, improving basic infrastructure, and enhancing the poorest households’ capacity to invest in their children’s education, health and nutrition". 15 In practical terms it is “a conditional cash transfer program to encourage extremely poor families to send their 5-15 year old children to pre-school and primary school, fully immunize children younger than 5, and regularly monitor the health and nutrition status of pregnant mothers and infants”. 16

Of the US$485 million that the Bank is lending to El Salvador from 2005 to 2008, US$21 million is going towards the Social Protection Loan over a five-year period. This Social Protection Loan is the Bank’s financial support for Red Solidaria. BID is also supporting Red Solidaria with US$57 million. 17 According to BID:

the promotion of growth with inclusion requires action in two areas: improving the productive capacity of the poor and promoting their access to job markets with greater opportunities for employment and wealth creation...Since labor is the main factor of production of the poor, a critical element in the fight against poverty and inequality is strengthening investment in human capital beginning at the earliest stages of infancy. 18

Red Solidaria makes use of the national poverty map that the Salvadoran government recently prepared. In it the 100 poorest municipalities of El Salvador are traced, disproportionately communities in rural areas. In practical terms, Red Solidaria “gives indigent families subsidies in exchange for keeping their children in school and

17 http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?language=En&arType=PR&parid=2&artid=2974
18 http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?language=En&arType=PR&parid=2&artid=2974
taking them to periodic medical checkups. It also aims to sign people up onto the national registry system who have not been able to do so due to practical reasons such as distance.

In my interview with the gender specialist working on Red Solidaria, what they do in terms of education is subsidize families the costs of their children’s going to school. So in other words, they are trying to ensure that children go to school as opposed to taking on jobs due to financial necessity. According to this specialist they give the cash transference to ‘the women of the family’ whenever possible because by doing this the family is most likely to benefit. They also try to insure that children receive medical services, along with expectant mothers and infants (interview, Red Solidaria, February 8, 2006).

Many people during my fieldwork criticized Red Solidaria because of the way it is presented by the government. They were not critical of the particulars of this program, but rather because it is not actually a ‘development program’. In fact, Red Solidaria is a more of a social assistance program that provides a few dollars every two months to families in severe need. Nonetheless, after this program ends in 2011, many claimed that nothing will have really changed.

According to the economist at the UCA, Red Solidaria is an extremely misguided program. It is supposed to build on the levels of human capital of the poorest communities so that these people can ‘take advantage’ of ‘opportunities’ created by ‘development’. But according to her the problem with the government’s current macroeconomic development program is that all that is created are every increasingly
exploitative job 'opportunities'. And for her, the fact that the poorest communities in El Salvador are so impoverished because of the workings at the macroeconomic level is completely distorted in the way that the government presents Red Solidaria.

The gender specialist at the UNDP was also critical of Red Solidaria. She also posited that unlike the workings at the macroeconomic level, Red Solidaria is more of a social assistance program. She thinks it is important to acknowledge that at least the government is noting that there are extreme levels of poverty in the country. According to her this is a huge step in El Salvador, where for years the government has been ignoring and denying that there is poverty in the country. Nonetheless in her opinion once this program is over, nothing will have really changed for these communities in the way of 'opportunities' or alternatives.

Those that were the most critical of Red Solidaria were the NGOs and feminist organizations. According to most of them the problem with Red Solidaria is that it ignores what is occurring at the level of the macroeconomy. They also noted – as did the economist – that much of the reasoning for such extreme levels of poverty is because of the steps that the government has taken in its embrace of neoliberalism. In the words of a member of the YWCA:

First they make all these cuts to services in health and education because of the prescriptions of neoliberalism, and then they focus on creating export processing zones. They have in recent years consistently ignored rural areas and the growing number of poor people. And now they think that all it's going to take is to give women a few dollars for the next five years and the problems will be solved? Or that now all of a sudden they are going to be empowered? And the biggest problem with Red Solidaria is that there is no space within this program to raise questions of what the government is doing in the way of economic policy (interview, January 27, 2006).
They were also wary of the fact that this program does not actually create ‘new opportunities’ for people, but rather encourages them to participate in employment at exploitative wages.

There is little doubt that Red Solidaria is a social assistance program as opposed to a development program. It is also fairly evident that even within this social assistance program the manner in which gender is mainstreamed is minimal and superficial. If we recall back to the BID’s reasoning for promoting Red Solidaria:

The promotion of growth with inclusion requires action in two areas: improving the productive capacity of the poor and promoting their access to job markets with greater opportunities for employment and wealth creation…Since labor is the main factor of production of the poor, a critical element in the fight against poverty and inequality is strengthening investment in human capital beginning at the earliest stages of infancy.20

This logic still upholds the notion that poor people are poor because of their inability to have ‘participated’ and ‘benefited’ by the ‘opportunities’ being created by the market. The discourse being promoted is one in which poor people are poor because they have not ‘participated’, and not because the workings at the macroeconomic level have contributed to their extreme levels of poverty. Most of the people living in extreme poverty in El Salvador are rural peoples. Yet most of the ‘new opportunities’ being created are in the cities through export processing zones or in San Salvador in low-paying formal or informal job sectors. This ‘promotion of growth with inclusion’ does nothing to change the manner in which rural areas are systematically excluded. Consequently, the plan is to ‘invest in education’ so that rural children can migrate to the cities in search of

20 http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?language=En&arType=PR&parid=2&artid=2974
exploitative, low-paying, unstable work either in the maquila sectors or in other precarious labour niches.

The extent to which they mainstream within this project is by giving the subsidized school money to the ‘women’. That is all. They do not question the nature of the education that the children will be receiving. They also do not question the fact that most of the jobs that are being created are exploitative as well as female-dominated because women are cheaper to employ than men. They do not challenge the capitalist-patriarchal system that upholds neoliberalism. They uphold the male-bias being perpetuated when talking about promoting ‘employment’ and they encourage double-burdening women by promoting them to ‘participate’ in the ‘market’ and ‘development’ through making a rural to urban migration.

What is most alarming about Red Solidaria is that within the media it presented as the government’s ‘social program’; as though it ‘proves’ the government’s ‘commitment’ towards poverty reduction and gender equality. The recurring commercials aired on Sundays in El Salvador regarding Red Solidaria reveal this. The fact that this is the best way that a World Bank program is mainstreamed is also alarming considering just how much money gets loaned to El Salvador from the Bank. It is even more alarming that Red Solidaria is an example of their human development program as opposed to an economic development program such as their ‘Broad-based Economic Growth Program’. This is because, consistent throughout my fieldwork, gender is mainstreamed into ‘human development’ programs and not into ‘economic’ development programs and minimally into infrastructural programs. Based on the weak manner in which they mainstreamed gender into Red Solidaria (by giving the few dollars a month to the women and not the
men), this creates a lot of doubt that gender is mainstreamed any better in other Bank programs or Salvadoran development initiatives. It also bears the question of whether the most powerful stakeholders are really as committed to promoting poverty reduction and gender equality as they claim to be.

**Mainstreaming as a Mechanism for Disarticulating Opposition:**

Gender mainstreaming at the policy level has many obstacles to overcome if it is to act as a vehicle for eradicating gender inequalities. Noteworthy of these obstacles is that the already modest social services that once supported social reproduction in El Salvador has been cut due to the prescriptions underlying structural adjustment programs. In other words, a major impediment to gender mainstreaming in the context of El Salvador is that the neoliberal model of development is privileged over the services that support social reproduction, further burdening girls and women as a result of the gendered division of labour.

Mainstreaming rarely moves beyond the conceptual and discursive level, and at the policy level it is normatively inconsistent and unsystematic. Gender mainstreaming only occurs in ‘human development’ programs, and it never extends towards economic development programs. The fact that the ministry of the family and the ministry of education sometimes mainstream gender whilst the Director of International Cooperations for the ministry of finance had never even heard of it is telling. It is also significant that every NGO and feminist organization that I interviewed is critical of gender mainstreaming. In fact many of them are so convinced that gender mainstreaming
is acting as a facade that they prefer to be absent from these debates altogether, considering other struggles to be more concrete and useful.

At the discursive level there appears to be a firm commitment towards gender mainstreaming and the eradication of gender inequalities. However the major constraint is that the neoliberal model of development is at odds with this goal. The needs of girls and women – particularly girls and women from marginalized and working class socioeconomic backgrounds – are ignored in favour of pursuing neoliberal development. This raises some serious contradictions and even more pressing obstacles to the gender mainstreaming initiative at the policy level.

Gender mainstreaming in El Salvador faces other significant obstacles. As this chapter denotes, most institutional practices of gender mainstreaming rarely move beyond gender mainstreaming at the conceptual and discursive level. When concrete steps are taken beyond the discursive terrain, these changes that are implemented are very minimal. In the words of most of the feminist organizations that I interviewed, “in gender mainstreaming’s attempt to be everywhere, what happens is that it is actually nowhere”. And in some cases in which they do move beyond the discourse (such as in Red Solidaria) mainstreaming comes second and is guided by the goals underlying neoliberalism. Also, the focus is on particular aspects of women as opposed to attempting to eradicate gender inequality at its structural roots.

Another obstacle faced by gender mainstreaming is that human development is framed as being the ultimate objective. The problem, however, is that for the most powerful stakeholders in the mainstreaming initiative – most notably the Salvadoran government, the multilaterals and the bilaterals – economic development under
neoliberalism is considered to be the solution for promoting poverty reduction and greater gender equality. Consequently, gender mainstreaming is inserted into the larger initiative of neoliberal development. This is irrespective of the fact – or rather because of the fact – that neoliberalism is never questioned within this human development initiative. Gender mainstreaming within this context is a prime example of the post-Washington consensus. Mainstreaming occurs at the level of rhetoric or in the area of human development projects. It never moves in the direction of focusing on the economic level, although neoliberal restructuring has often been seen to cause violence on women. There is an incorporation of subaltern discourses. However this incorporation is largely tokenistic and is incorporated in an attempt to maintain the neoliberal hegemony. Therefore it is the perfect passive revolution, because it is feigned that lots of efforts are being made to embrace ‘development with a human face’ with little to no threat that major changes will actually occur.

Gender mainstreaming has and continues to be imposed from above, and so there is a clear hierarchy of power between the major stakeholders in this process, although it is presented as though it were ‘community-driven’. The multilaterals, bilaterals and the government retain most of the power, whilst the majority of other stakeholders are marginalized within this arrangement. What ensues is that, regardless of the tremendous efforts that are being exerted by an array of actors, the advancements that have been made are minimal at best. When taking into account that in the years to come the Salvadoran government has signed free trade agreements such as CAFTA denoting their commitment to pursuing a neoliberal model of development, it is clear that
mainstreaming will never be the solution towards greater gender equality within the context of El Salvador.
Conclusion:

I began this thesis by arguing that neoliberalism as a development model has been informed by the economic expansionist projects that preceded it. In other words, neoliberalism as the current predominant ‘development model’ has been informed and continues to be informed to a great extent by the rationale and tendencies underlying colonization. The process of colonization instigated and perpetuated an international and gendered division of labour on a global scale. As Maria Mies argues, this was accomplished through the superexploitation of others, namely colonized lands, peoples, and women. Currently, this division causes significant hardships on Southern countries, most notably on the poor and working class girls and women who are marginalized within these nations.

The World Bank was formed by the Allied nations following the end of the Second World War. However, contrary to delivering the promises that Southern countries would ‘develop’ and ‘catch up’ within the development process, many of these nations have actually witnessed deteriorations in their social indicators of well being, irrespective of levels of ‘economic growth’. El Salvador is an example of a country that exemplifies this trend. Consequently, this supports McMichael’s position that the World Bank functions as part of the hegemonic debt regime, chronically imposing ‘conditionalities’ and other development prescriptions that benefit a variant of capitalist elite both in the global North and South while impoverishing those whom in theory are supposed to be benefiting.

As within the colonization process, neoliberalism is also accompanied by a variant of discourses that attempt to render ideological the nature of its classed-based
offensive. Currently, neoliberalism as an economic model of development is upheld by the theoretical logic of neoclassical economic theory. Through the rendering of these discourses as a ‘knowledge of expertise’ yet common-sensical, the elite (including the World Bank) manage to maintain their hegemony, characterized by the ability of the elite to rule through consent. Nonetheless, as Gramsci noted this consent is not static but rather a dynamic process of attempting to legitimate particular class relations. When marginalized classes no longer believe what they used to believe previously, this causes a crisis in authority of the hegemonic project in question; neoliberalism and the World Bank have witnessed crises in authority during the late 1990s and into the 20th century. This partly explicates why they have embraced ‘development with a human face’, denoting the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus.

Gender mainstreaming is an embodiment of the shift in consensuses and is an example of the CDF’s promises to promote ‘poverty reduction’, ‘inclusive development’ and more generally ‘development with a human face’. However, as I have denoted through undertaking the discourse analyses, an examination of the political economic situation of El Salvador and through the examination of mainstreaming initiatives on the ground in El Salvador, this shift is largely tokenistic. This is because although many of the subaltern standpoints are ‘incorporated’ into the workings of the Bank along with the supposed inclusion of a variant of other social factors, the underlying macroeconomic tenets that inform neoliberalism remain entirely intact. This is irrespective of the fact that a great deal of the hardships faced by Southern countries and Southern person (most notably poor and working class Southern girls and women) are due to the workings at the macro-economic level, seriously undermining the promises of promoting poverty
reduction and greater gender equality through gender mainstreaming. Consequently, the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus is largely acting as a passive revolution, incorporating some marginal subaltern discourses and concerns, whilst for the most part maintaining the neoliberal hegemony.

Within dominant discourses “gender and often race are invisible...Globalization is presented as gender neutral [therefore overlooking] unpaid caring, household, and agricultural labour, along with much informal economic activity that maintains human life” (Acker, 2004: 20). What is rendered ‘work’ as well as ‘important work’, and what in fact is not considered one or the other, is also dictated. Through the re/construction of these various discourses, the neoliberal hegemony is maintained and perpetuated, with clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Women as a social category (and in particular poor and working class girls and women in Southern countries) are at the losing end of this divide. These processes have entrenched international, gendered, and racialized divisions of labour, being informed, maintained and perpetuated through neoliberal prescriptions.

Gender mainstreaming is being inserted into the larger project of neoliberalism. Consequently, regardless of all of the promises being promoted under gender mainstreaming, they come second to the goals underlying neoliberalism. Consequently (as the case study of El Salvador denotes), regardless of the tremendous efforts being exerted by many of the gender consultants, NGOs, feminist organizations and many others, the indicators of gender inequality are yearly demonstrating increasing disparities, irrespective of international commitments to fighting class and gender inequality.

Gender mainstreaming is not a vehicle for ending gender inequalities but rather is being embraced to disarticulate opposition to them. Nonetheless, although the Bank is
attempting to disarticulate opposition to neoliberalism, there are always those that keep envisioning and struggling towards greater equality. In the words of Gloria Anzaldúa:

It is not enough to stand on the opposite river bank shouting questions, challenging patriarchal, white conventions. A counterstance locks one into a duel of oppressor and oppressed... both are reduced to a common denominator of violence... the counterstance [is] a step towards liberation from cultural domination. But it is not a way of life (Anzaldúa, 1987:100).

Within El Salvador NGOs and feminist organizations continually struggle towards promoting greater gender equality and poverty reduction for poor and working class girls and women. They are articulating and fighting for class and gender equality, and their voices will not be silenced. There is little doubt that the neoliberal model of development is disarticulating these voices and attempting to silence them through the embrace of the CDF. Yet all one needs to do is listen attentively to see that women globally will not be silenced. Perhaps their struggles within the context of El Salvador are not significantly focused on the practice of gender mainstreaming, but certainly these efforts are being exerted in other domains. Their struggles are an uphill battle, but the dream of class and gender equality keeps the global feminist struggle alive. Neoliberalism has retained its hegemony up to the present but let us not disregard feminist counter-hegemonic discourses globally. The struggle has indeed become more difficult, but let it be clear that the struggle has not come to an end.
Bibliography


Taylor, Marcus (2004). “Responding to Neoliberalism in Crisis: Discipline and
Empowerment in the World Bank’s New Development Agenda” in Research in
Political Economy. vol. 21: 3-30.

Thomas-Slayter, Barbara (2003). Southern Exposure: International Development and the
Global South in the Twenty-First Century. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Inc.

True, Jacqui (November 2003). “Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy” in


UNDP (1999). Estado de la Region en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible. Costa Rica:
UNDP.


Humano, Genero. San Salvador: UNDP.

Nuevo Nosotros: El Impacto de las Migraciones. San Salvador: UNDP.

Neoliberalism: Community-Based Development in Latin America. Veltmeyer, Henry

Imperialism” in Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. Alfredo Saad-Filho and

Wade, Robert (Summer 2002). “US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over the

Williamson, John (September 2003). “From Reform Agenda: A short history of the
Washington Consensus and suggestions for what to do next” in Finance &
Development: 10-13.

DOREXTN/0.menuPK:295253--pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:29
5244,00.html

Bank and Oxford University Press.


Appendices

Methodology:

To examine contemporary gender mainstreaming initiatives I interviewed a range of stakeholders involved in gender and development in El Salvador. To this end I made use of an exploratory depth interviewing style and a snowball sampling technique. For strategic reasons I employed a depth interviewing style, which involves "asking open-ended questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then following up with additional relevant questions" (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002: 331). For one I chose to employ a non-structured interviewing style and to make use of open-ended questions because my research was largely exploratory. This approach therefore facilitated the ability of the interviewee to communicate the specifics underlying gender, development and gender mainstreaming in the country. Secondly it was an appropriate method to exploit because I was carrying out interviews with different groups of people and organizations, and as such the interviews needed to be less structured in character. In an attempt to create enough space for the diversity of opinions of the different stakeholders, I chose to allow the interviewees to lead the course of the discussion. Similarly, employing the use of a snowball approach was also ideal because I was unclear as to who the major players in gender, development and gender mainstreaming were. Concisely put in other words, due to the exploratory character of my fieldwork, using a depth interviewing style and a snowball sampling technique was ideal in view of the goals under question.

During my months in El Salvador I undertook a total of 24 interviews. I interviewed different stakeholders involved in gender mainstreaming specifically and gender and
development more generally. To this end, I consulted individuals working in multilateral organizations, bilateral organizations, government organizations, NGOs, feminist organizations, a private gender consultant, academics and two United Nation organizations. The subjects were asked to sign a consent form\textsuperscript{21} and were made aware that although their specific identification would remain anonymous, their institutional affiliation would be made known within this thesis. They were also made aware that their participation was entirely voluntary and that they were free to refrain from answering any questions they chose not to. It was also noted to them that they were free to withdraw their participation at any time, although nobody withdrew their participation during this process. The majority of these interviews lasted an hour in their entirety, though they ranged from half an hour to two hours in duration. All of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.

Prior to commencing the interviewing process, I had anticipated gaining specific information through these interviews. The kind of information that I sought was:

- the number of gender mainstreaming programmes in El Salvador
- the financial and infrastructural resources behind them
- how they are integrated into other development programmes / projects
- what gender mainstreaming means for these programmes in practice
- which stakeholders have influence over the form that mainstreaming takes
- which groups of people are marginalized and / or made invisible within these initiatives

\textsuperscript{21} Consent forms (in both English and Spanish) are also included in the appendices
• whether it is a top-down or bottom-up approach towards mainstreaming and/or development

• whether the macro-economic level is prioritized over the micro

• what criteria the multilateral organizations, bilateral organizations, the Salvadoran government and other stakeholders use to judge whether these programs are successful

• what the (initial) successes and failings of existing programmes have been

• what influence/role NGOs and women’s groups have both in the country more generally and in relation to mainstreaming more specifically

• whether NGOs and women’s groups have been able to shape the form of gender mainstreaming initiatives

• to what extent gender mainstreaming may serve to assist or marginalize other strategies for women’s empowerment

The findings from the interviews were less direct than the anticipated information outlined above would suggest. This is because the process of applying gender mainstreaming as a medium towards gender equality is considerably fragmented. The different organizations have diverse levels of financial and infrastructural resources. Many privilege a variant of goals within their development initiatives. There are visibly dissimilar levels of commitment towards gender equality between and amongst the different kinds of organizations. As gender mainstreaming is supposed to underlie ‘all’ development initiatives, this also poses difficulties because it is impossible to get a clear picture of all the ‘development work’ that occurs in the country. And of course there are a
plethora of opinions regarding what will most effectively stimulate gender
'empowerment', equality and development. Nonetheless, these were the major themes
that I was attempting to address through the interviewing process. The following page
provides a list of all of the interviews that I conducted.
Interviews and Meetings

(All interviews conducted by the author)

(18 January 2006). Member of the feminist organization ‘Mujeres por la Vida y la Dignidad – Las Dignas’. San Salvador, El Salvador.


____ (08 February 2006). Coordinator for the Local Initiatives and Technological Transfer Funds for the Canadian International Development Agency - CIDA. San Salvador, El Salvador.


Consent form to Participate in ‘An Analysis of Gender Mainstreaming in El Salvador’
(English Copy. Spanish copy follows)

This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Aida Geraldina Polanco Sorto of The Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Concordia University (phone number in San Salvador; geraldinapolanco@yahoo.com).

A. Purpose: I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to undertake a brief examination of gender mainstreaming projects within contemporary El Salvador by interviewing different people who are either directly or loosely connected to the process of mainstreaming or economic development in El Salvador. Whether these are government officials, NGO workers, women group workers, or academics, the purpose is to understand the different perspectives and roles that varying organizations and people play within the mainstreaming, development or gender and development arena.

B. Procedures: The research will be conducted at a location that is the most convenient for the participant. This may include either a coffee shop, their office, at their school or their respective organizations. The interviews will take anywhere from half and hour to an hour and a half (unless the participant chooses to withdraw their participation before the actual termination of the interview, in which case the interview will end when they decide it is over). The participants will be asked a few questions and they will be asked to answer them. The interviews will be more open-ended in nature, and so it is unlikely that they will be uncomfortable with the nature of the interviews. The data will be used for the purpose of completing my M.A. thesis and likely be published in a refereed journal; the identities of the interviewees will remain anonymous.

C. Risks and Benefits: There are very few risks that will ensue as a result of participation in this research. The participants will remain anonymous, and the interviews are open-ended, which helps to ensure the continued comfort of the interviewee. Although there are no direct benefits to the participants, their involvement will help contribute to the knowledge and information that academics and hopefully policy-makers will have as pertaining to development more generally and gender and development more specifically within the confines of San Salvador.

D. Conditions of Participation:

- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without negative consequence.
- I understand that my participation in this study is confidential.
- I understand that the data from this study may be published.
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

NAME: _________________________________

SIGNATURE: _________________________________

If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 x7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca.
Autorización para participar en un “Análisis de la Transversalidad de Género (“Gender Mainstreaming”) en El Salvador”

Por la presente acepto participar en un programa de investigación conducido por Aida Geraldina Polanco Sorto del Departamento de Sociología y Antropología de la Universidad de Concordia (Numero de teléfono: 7204-8267; geraldinapolanco@yahoo.com)

A. Propósito: He sido informado/a que el propósito de la investigación es realizar un breve examen de los proyectos de la transversalidad de género (“gender mainstreaming”) en de El Salvador actual entrevistando a diferentes personas que están conectadas directamente o de alguna forma al proceso de transversalidad o al desarrollo económico en El Salvador. Ya sean funcionarios del gobierno, trabajadores de OGN, mujeres que trabajan en grupos o profesores universitarios, el propósito es comprender las diferentes perspectivas y roles que juegan las diversas organizaciones y personas dentro de la transversalidad, el desarrollo o el género y el campo de desarrollo.

B. Procedimientos: La investigación tendrá lugar en el lugar que más le convenga al/la participante, tal como una cafetería, en su oficina, su escuela o en sus organizaciones respectivas. Las entrevistas durarán entre media hora y una hora y media (a menos que el/la participante opte por retirarse antes del final de la misma, en cuyo caso la entrevista terminará cuando ellos/as así lo decidan). Se les pedirá a los/las participantes que respondan a unas pocas preguntas. Las entrevistas serán abiertas, por lo que es poco probable que la persona entrevistada se incomode por el tipo de entrevista. Los datos obtenidos serán usados para completar la tesis de mi maestría y posiblemente aparecerán en una publicación arbitrada; la identidad de los/las participantes quedará en el anonimato.

C. Riesgos y Beneficios: Son muy pocos los riesgos que se corren por participar en la investigación. Los/las participantes serán anónimos/as, y las entrevistas son abiertas, lo que garantiza la comodidad de la persona entrevistada en todo momento. Aún cuando los/las participantes no se beneficiarán directamente, su participación contribuirá al conocimiento e información que los profesores y es de esperar las autoridades responsables, tengan con respecto al desarrollo en general y al género y desarrollo en particular dentro de los confines de El Salvador.
D. Condiciones para participar:

- Entiendo que tengo la libertad de retirar mi participación en cualquier momento sin que haya consecuencias negativas.
- Entiendo que mi participación en este estudio es confidencial.
- Entiendo que los datos de este estudio podrán ser publicados.

HE LEIDO CUIDADOSAMENTE LO QUE ANTECEDE Y COMPRENDO ESTE ACUERDO. DOY MI CONSENTIMIENTO LIBRE Y VOLUNTARIAMENTE Y ACEPTO PARTICIPAR EN ESTE ESTUDIO.

NOMBRE: ____________________________________________

FIRMA: ______________________________________________

Si tiene alguna duda sobre sus derechos como participante en la investigación, por favor contacte a Adela Reid, Oficial a cargo de la Ética en la Investigación y su Cumplimiento, Universidad de Concordia al (514) 848-2424x7481 o por correo electrónico a areid@alcor.concordia.ca