(Re)framing Mass Media Values: The Prospects and Challenges of Peace Media in Uganda

William Tayeebwa

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ABSTRACT

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William Tayeebwa, Ph.D.

Concordia University, 2012

For two decades from 1987 to 2006, the three million inhabitants of Northern Uganda lived under a civil war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). Several initiatives were undertaken to end the insurgency ranging from cultural, to national, to international. This dissertation is an analysis of the efforts undertaken through three ‘peace radio’ broadcasts on two radio stations in Northern Uganda to end the LRA rebellion. *Dwog Cen Paco* (Luo language for ‘come back home’) as well as *Ter Yat* (Luo language for ‘conversation under a tree’) broadcast weekly on 102 Mega FM in Gulu, while the third program ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcasts on *Radio Wa 89.8 FM* in Lira. I use framing theory to analyse how journalists and some media actors on the broadcasts constructed the concept of ‘peace’ and relayed it as mass media discourse. The analysis of the radio broadcasts reveals the broad discussion of the drivers of conflict and/or violence in the country. Further, several actors of peace as well as of conflict and/or violence were identified in the radio broadcasts.

From a broader perspective, I use the Peace Journalism theoretical framework to assess from Ugandan journalists the functionality of conventional journalism norms and practices that often valorize conflict and/or violence. The data shows that while appreciative of the values of peace, Ugandan journalists still apprize the conventional media frames that promote violence such as ‘drama’; ‘crisis’; ‘extremism’; ‘threats’; and
‘destruction’ among others. This, therefore, points to a need for a pedagogical and praxis-oriented engagement with journalists to enhance skills in Conflict Sensitive Reporting, which includes proficiency in conflict mapping and analysis. As a solution, I make an original contribution in this dissertation by proposing media frames of peace as an alternative to the entrenched frames of conflict and/or violence. Such frames of peace include ‘cooperation and consensus’; ‘reconciliation and forgiveness’; ‘patience and moderation’; ‘peacemakers and peace processes’; ‘humanness’; ‘truth and justice’ as well as ‘order and harmony’. I argue that these frames ought to constitute a monitoring and evaluation structure for Peace Journalism practices and products.

**Key words:** peace journalism; peace radio; Northern Uganda; media framing
Acknowledgements and Dedication

On her return from Europe in Fall 2011, Professor Lorna Roth, my thesis advisor, brought for me an eyeglass lens-cleaner on which were written Latin words “Labore et Constantia”, literally meaning ‘work and constancy’, but more correctly: ‘by exertion and resolution’. This got me traction, and it echoed my High School motto at St. Joseph’s Vocational in Mbarara, Uganda: “ora et labora”, meaning ‘pray and work’. I thank you Professor Roth for your sturdy guidance in humility, academic rigour in modesty, and friendship in professionalism. Thank you for encouraging me to ‘open-up’ by writing the prologue, my biographical note, which weaves my personal story into this dissertation. I am grateful to you for putting together a tremendous examining committee comprised of astute academics that I look forward to working with on joint projects in the near future. I hope that in the many pages ahead, I was able to ‘bring in my own thinking’ and to have ‘taught people something new’.

The thesis writing was arduous and protracted, but the fieldwork in Uganda was blissful because of the amazing help I received from all my interviewees herein as Appendix 09, Focus Group Discussion participants herein as Appendix 10, questionnaire respondents herein as Appendix 12. I applaud the assistance provided by: Audrey Depault for SPSS data entry and the harvesting of survey questionnaires; Harriet Anena and Jonan Luwum for Acholi translations and transcriptions; Eve Akello and Agatha Angwech for Langi translations and transcriptions; Thadius Mujuni and Salmah Tusimampora for dozens of English interview transcriptions (Appendix 09). Thank you friends Chris Lortie and Nick Bleser for your research assistance on three related studies conducted in Uganda that laid the ground for this dissertation. I am eternally grateful to you all for making my research a very successful and enjoyable undertaking.
Yet, the research activities would not have been possible without the financial assistance of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation of Canada as well as Makerere University’s School of Graduate Studies in conjunction with the Department of Training and Staff Development. I am also grateful to the following persons and institutions that provided support over the years: Professors Rae Staseson, Yasmin Jiwani and Maurice Charland for research assistantships in Communication Studies; Professor Steve High for a research assistantship on the ‘Montreal Life Stories’ project; Professor Frank Chalk for a research assistantship in the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS); and the Carnegie Corporation of New York under the small grants programme at Makerere University for the Next Generation of African Academics (NGAA). I am grateful for the teaching assistantships from: Professors Lorna Roth and Bill Buxton in Communication Studies as well as Professor Thomas Waugh in the interdisciplinary HIV/AIDS course series.

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The journey this far has been long and many have paid quite a price. My dear mother Margaret Nyakahangare did everything to ensure I got a great foundational education through the help of the Missionaries of Africa (RIP Rev. Fathers: Alexandre You, Georg Vollinger, and George Eeckhout). My wife Consolata Kyomugisha and our children: Doreen Natukunda (DOB 1990, RIP 2010); Alex Ahumuza (DOB 2000); Donnah Ninsiima (DOB 2003) and Arnold Aheebwa (DOB 2007) endured many months of my absence. Before ovarian cancer claimed her in October 2010 at the height of my thesis writing, Doreen used to jokingly call me ‘Absentee Dr. Dad’; and the ever present question from the younger ones each time I called home was: “Dadi noija ryaari”, meaning ‘Dad when are you coming back?’ To you my mother, my wife, my children; and all the peace-builders as well as the generous peoples of Northern Uganda who suffered the wrath of the LRA-UPDF confrontations for over two decades: I dedicate this dissertation.
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<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Commission on Human and People’s Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACODE</td>
<td>Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Amplitude Modulation is one of the radio broadcasting signal technologies that was among the first developed early in the 20th century. It is less used today.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Broadcasting Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Commission of the European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAR</td>
<td>Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Conflict Sensitive Reporting (at times referred to as Peace Journalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>[United Kingdom’s] Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party [is reportedly the oldest political party and is now led by Norbert Mao, former Chairman of Gulu District in Northern Uganda]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EED</td>
<td>Church Development Service [Germany]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPAD</td>
<td>Facilitation for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Forum for Democratic Change [is the leading opposition political party led in 2012 by Dr. Kiiza Besigye]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Frequency Modulation is the most commonly used radio broadcasting signal technology used in Africa. The FM stations in Uganda fall within the radio spectrum ranging between 87.5 and 108.0 MHz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUSCO</td>
<td>Gulu Support the Children Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSM</td>
<td>Holy Spirit Movement (mystic rebel movement started by Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’ in 1986 to fight the NRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Latin term <em>Ibidem</em> used in citations meaning ‘in the same place’. It is used to refer to a re-citation of work by the same author and from the same page.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Peoples Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMCU</td>
<td>Independent Media Council of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army (Ugandan rebel force led by Joseph Kony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGS</td>
<td>Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAADS</td>
<td>National Agricultural Advisory Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army (Ugandan rebel force led by Yoweri Museveni that captured power in January 1986 and became the national army). It was renamed the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) following the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTV</td>
<td>Nation Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUSUF</td>
<td>Northern Uganda Social Action Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op.cit.</td>
<td>Latin term <em>opere citato</em> used in citations meaning ‘as cited above’. Though not as commonly used, it is handy in re-citations of an author’s work without repeating year of publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORINFOR</td>
<td>The Rwanda Bureau of Information and Broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>PRDP</td>
<td>Peace Recovery and Development Plan</td>
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<td>Research Question Two: What are the factors that would hamper or propel the development of a Peace Journalism model in Uganda?</td>
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<td>RQ3</td>
<td>Research Question Three: What values and norms of peace can be developed into mass media frames to transform the entrenched conventional media frames of conflict and violence; and which of these norms are discernibly Ugandan [sub-Saharan Africa]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td>SCIAF</td>
<td>Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDD</td>
<td>Social Development Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC(s)</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBC</td>
<td>Uganda Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
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<td>UCC</td>
<td>Uganda Communications Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMDF</td>
<td>Uganda Media Development Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCST</td>
<td>Uganda National Council of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>The United Nations Development Fund for Women (merged in January 2011 into UN Women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Congress [is the political party founded by Milton Obote, twice president of Uganda in 1966-1971 and then 1980-1985]. The party is now led by Olara Otunnu, a former UN diplomat and former minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim government that was overthrown by Yoweri Museveni in January 1986.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDA</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Democratic Army (Ugandan army defeated in January 1986)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Forces – the current army of Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>Attacks in the USA by aeroplane hijackers on 11 September 2001 that led to the destruction of the World Trade Center twin-towers in New York as well as damage to the Pentagon in Washington.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prologue: A Biographical Note

This dissertation is a product of my personal lived experiences in the civil wars in Uganda, but also represents my enduring quest for strategies of peace. As I stepped into fieldwork in Northern Uganda, particularly the interaction with the former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commanders for a focus group discussion (Appendix 11), I was sensitive to how they perceived me; a Munyankore from Western Uganda where their “former” archrivals President Yoweri Museveni and most of his top military commanders come from. To break the ice, I greeted them in Acholi and they laughed. I asked why they laughed and teased them to guess from my accent and physical features where I come from. They all, without mincing words, said I was a Nyankore. While true, I felt cold sweat because it is such physical identifiers that fuelled the Rwandan massacres in 1994. As we discussed peace and the drivers of violence in Uganda, their answers were clearly guarded and hardly critical of the Museveni army and government, their adversaries for two decades. I wondered whether they would have been more candid if they had not identified me as overtly a Munyankore. The same socio-cultural dynamics were at play in all the eight focus groups I conducted (Appendix 10).

Yet, each time I left for Northern Uganda, I recall reminders from some members of my family: “mwana oyerinde Kone” (please be mindful of [Joseph] Kony). I would then remind them that the LRA left Northern Uganda in 2005 and besides, those being brutalized were Ugandans like us in the West. Therefore, going back to Northern Uganda between 2009 and 2011 as a researcher on media and peace-building was an amazing experience that took me back in time to 1986 when I went to Northern Uganda following my young brother Jackson Taremwa who was then a fully-fledged combat child soldier.
Taremwa and most of us young boys had joined in mid-1985 the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni, the current president of Uganda. We were impressed by the army fatigues the young NRA boys adorned. To us, the boys were also apparently living a great life of feasting on roast beef as “we” lay siege to Mbarara (Makenke) barracks for months where the “enemy” forces of Milton Obote were holed-up and unwilling to surrender. While my mother managed to end my child soldier dream early, she did not succeed with Jackson, who pursued soldiering until his death in March 2007 in uniform. He must have been very happy to receive a full military burial with the blasting of guns. He loved the army and as Kampala fell in January 1986, our childhood friend Francis Mulindwa, who like my young brother had continued on the march to Kampala, was killed by the deposed and fleeing Uganda army forces. As the NRA pursued them North, I escaped from my mother and went to check on my brother and found them camped at Minakulu in current Apac district. The boys were buoyed by the successes and recounted their exploits. The hatred for the peoples of Northern Uganda was real. For two decades, we in the West and South had been brutalized by Northerners: first by Idi Amin’s forces and later by the army dominated by the Acholi-Langi during Milton Obote’s second regime (1980-1985). The talk from my brother and his colleagues, even for what I knew as a much-disciplined NRA, was revenge, which seemed to be their implied concept of justice.

When I completed High School in 1990, I joined Roman Catholic Major Seminary in Tanzania. As I worked on my French in preparation for further studies in Switzerland and France, my High School head-teacher and benefactor, Fr. Alexandre You, a French man, gave to me a small 1986 book published by NOVALIS in Ottawa entitled “Artisans de
Paix” (peace-makers), in which several Quebec pioneers of the modern concept of peace-building had discussed issues such as nuclear disarmament, but also gender parity and how to address poverty in the global South. I still keep the book and had it with me in then Zaire (now DR Congo) when the 1994 Rwandan genocide took place. My offer to volunteer as a missionary student in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma was judged unwelcome, as I was manifestly a “Ugandan Tutsi”, the same people who had allegedly ignited the genocide. In my later life as a journalist for The Monitor newspaper, I reported on the LRA civil war, went to Rwanda and DR Congo. Conflict and violence seemed so rooted in the region and I started to ponder on how that state could change. While at University of Oslo in 2003, two visiting British professors, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, came to offer a novel course known as Peace Journalism. For the first time, I was introduced to a model challenging the entrenched conventional journalism norms that I was familiar with. The two professors later published a seminal book titled Peace Journalism (2005). When I returned to The Monitor newspaper later in 2003, I was in search of a journalism paradigm shift. It became clear though that institutions, particularly conglomerates like Nation Media to which The Monitor belongs; do not embrace change easily, except if it brings in big profits. I, therefore, decided to concentrate at Makerere University as well as at the National University of Rwanda to contribute towards the formation of a new generation of journalists who will, hopefully, uphold the values of peace in their practise.

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Montreal, Canada, June 2012
PART 1: OVERVIEW

Chapter 1: Background and Context

1.0 Introduction

This dissertation is situated at the intersection of journalism and peace studies in the emerging field of Peace Journalism inquiry and practice. The proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm propose a reframing of conventional journalism norms that until now favour conflict and/or violence; and to develop new frames that promote common ground and communal harmony (Galtung, 1998, 2000, 2010; Lynch, 1998, 2010; Tehranian, 2002; Howard, 2003, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Shinar, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, 2010; Lugalambi, 2006; Kempf, 2007; Nassanga, 2007, 2008; Lee, 2008; Birungi, 2009). The advocates of Peace Journalism base their claims on historical facts as well as research highlighting the destructive capacity, but also the peace-building potential, of human beings in which the mass media as social institutions have played a role (Chalk, 1999, 2007; Dallaire 1997, 2003, 2007; OECD 2001; 2007; Thompson, 2007; UNDESA, 2005).

As the literature I review in this dissertation shows, the Peace Journalism model has become an international focus of inquiry. This dissertation is, therefore, conceived as a contribution in that quest, particularly as an assessment of the paradigm’s feasibility in global south contexts. The original contribution of the dissertation, however, is the delimitation and proposition of mass media frames of peace that could be used to progressively replace the conventional journalism norms that favour conflict and/or violence. From the interrogations of Ugandan journalists, journalism students and mass
media actors, I propose some norms of peace that could be reframed into mass media values useful for adoption in countries experiencing protracted conflicts.

In the proceeding sections of this chapter, I justify the study based on the history of conflict and/or violence in Uganda, but also the commendable role the mass media has been playing in Northern Uganda towards the end of two decades of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency. Cognizant of how the mass media has been used in the past to propagate hate speech in Nazi Germany, Rwanda and in Kenya, I draw insight from the recent 2009 events in Uganda where several media houses were closed by Government for allegedly propagating inflammatory rhetoric. While noting some exemplary cases of Peace Journalism practice such as the work of Search for Common Ground and Fondation Hirondelle across Africa, as well as the Conflict Sensitive Journalism project implemented by the Uganda Media Development Foundation (UMDF), this inquiry is limited to interrogating Ugandan journalists and media actors as well as analysing the ‘peace radio’ broadcasts that aired in October and November 2009 on two Northern Uganda radio stations: 102 Mega FM in Gulu and Radio Wa 89.9FM in Lira.

The extensive literature review of mass communication theory as well as peace and conflict theory provides grounds on which to corroborate the findings and claims made by the subjects of my fieldwork. Whereas personal hunches and years of journalism practice played a role in the conceptualization of the study, it is the literature review that ultimately informed the framing of most research questions.
1.1 Mass Media in Propagating Hate Rhetoric

While this is a study about the role the mass media, particularly radio, is playing in Uganda’s peace-building efforts, it is useful to commence with a chilling reminder of the counter role the medium has historically played as a tool to propagate and amplify messages of hate (Chalk, 1999; Thompson, 2007; Straus, 2007). During the November 1945 trials at the Nuremberg-based International Military Tribunal, Hans Georg Fritzsche, a radio broadcaster who had disseminated incendiary rhetoric against Jews under Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda was among the accused for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Neave, 1989, p.67).1 In his radio broadcasts, Fritzsche used “provocative libels against Jews, the result of which was to inflame Germans to further atrocities…” 2 But as the Tribunal read out its verdict on 1st October 1946, Fritzsche was acquitted partly because he had been tried in place of Joseph Goebbels who had committed suicide. In acquiting him, the Tribunal made the following observation:

“The Prosecution has asserted that Fritzsche incited and encouraged the commission of war crimes, by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German people those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities under Counts Three [War crimes] and Four [Crimes against humanity]. His position and official duties were not sufficiently important, however, to infer that he took part in originating or formulating propaganda campaigns... In these

broadcasts Fritzsche sometimes spread false news, but it was not proved he knew
it to be false.”

The decision for his acquittal, however, was not unanimous. Two Soviet Union judges on
the panel agreed with their Soviet prosecutor General R.A. Rudenko, who argued that the
defendant was guilty of propagating lies to influence public opinion for war and therefore
the issue of mitigating factors ought not to apply. Rudenko argued that:

“For the correct definition of the role of Defendant Hans Fritzsche, it is necessary,
firstly, to keep clearly in mind the importance attached by Hitler and his closest
associates (as Goering, for example) to propaganda in general and to radio
propaganda in particular. This was considered one of the most important and
essential factors in the success of conducting an aggressive war. In the Germany
of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor in preparing and conducting acts of
aggression and in training the German populace to accept obediently the criminal
terprises of German fascism. The aims of these enterprises were served by a
huge and well-centralized propaganda machinery. With the help of the police
controls and of a system of censorship, it was possible to do away altogether with
the freedom of press and of speech. The basic method of the Nazi propagandistic
activity lay in the false presentation of facts.”

Although Fritzsche was acquitted, his mass media counterpart, Julius Streicher, the editor
of Der Stuermer, a vitriolic anti-Semitism publication did not survive as he was
sentenced by the Tribunal to hang for committing crimes against humanity for his role of
propagating hate and racist rhetoric against Jews (Hamelink, 2008. p.80). His conviction
led to Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1948), which provides that all persons who conduct public incitement shall

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4 Ibid.
be punished (Ibid.). From both positions, the first international criminal trial by interdicting a broadcaster for committing “crimes against peace” as well as sending a publisher to the gallows for propagating hate rhetoric was able to create a precedent that the mass media had the potential to influence the public to commit grave crimes. The precedent set by the first international media trial in 1946 would set the stage for another international media trial for Rwanda more than 50 years later (Biju-Duval, 2007; Kagwi-Ndungu, 2007; Monasebian, 2007; Straus, 2007).

On 19th August 2003, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) sitting in Arusha, Tanzania requested life sentences on charges of genocide, incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity for Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and Ferdinand Nahimana who worked for Radio-Television Libres des Mille Collines (RTLM) as well as for Hassan Ngeze who was the director and editor of Kangura newspaper (Thompson, 2007, pp. 277-307). The ICTR on 03rd December 2003 found all the three media personalities guilty of the crimes and sentenced Ngeze and Nahimana to life imprisonment while Barayagwiza got 35 years for their roles in the genocide (ICTR, 03 December 2003). Following an appeal by the defence, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR gave a judgment on 28th November 2007 upholding the convictions of all the accused on charges of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, though with reduced prison terms for all the three (ICTR, 28 November 2007).

With respect to roles each played, prosecution noted that Barayagwiza was an influential political personality in Rwanda having been a founding member of the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR) party and a diplomat who was once a director of Political
Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵ Notable for the media trial was the fact that Barayagwiza was not only a member of the ‘Comité d'initiative’ that organized the founding of the company *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), but was the chairperson of the executive committee for RTLM during the genocide.⁶ Ferdinand Nahimana, like Barayagwiza was also an influential personality and a highly regarded academic as a professor of history at the National University of Rwanda. Following the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash near Kigali airport on 06⁰ April 1994 that ignited the mass killings, an interim government led by Théodore Sindikubwabo was put in place and Nahimana served as a political advisor to the government under which the genocide took place. For the media trial, it was noted that he served as the director of the Rwanda Bureau of Information and Broadcasting (ORINFOR) and was founder of *Radio-Television Libres des Mille Collines (RTLM)*. In considering his sentence, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR had observed that:

“He [Nahimana] was fully aware of the power of words, and he used the radio – the medium of communication with the widest public reach – to disseminate hatred and violence. He was motivated by his sense of patriotism and the need he perceived for equity for the Hutu population. Instead of following legitimate avenues of recourse, he chose a path of genocide. In doing so, he betrayed the trust placed in him as an intellectual and as a leader. Without a firearm, machete or any physical weapon, he caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians” (ICTR-99-52-T, pp. 358-359).

⁵ The CDR was a known Rwandan political party with extreme views against the Tutsi. Its leadership and members are acknowledged to have played a direct role in the incitement and execution of the genocide.

The third convict in the media trial, Hassan Ngeze, was the owner and editor of Kangura, a Rwandan news magazine. He was also a shareholder in RTLM and at one point worked as its correspondent. Four years before the genocide, Ngeze published in Kangura (Issue No.6, December 1990) the “Hutu Ten Commandments”, one of the most demeaning texts about Rwandan Tutsi women that is believed to have fomented anti-Tutsi sentiments prior to the genocide and influenced the widespread, systematic rape of and sexual violence against Tutsi women (Nowrojee, 2007). ⁷ Even as a journalist, Ngeze was also known to be a leading personality within the CDR party. While sentencing him, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR observed thus:

“Hassan Ngeze, as owner and editor of a well-known newspaper in Rwanda, was in a position to inform the public and shape public opinion towards achieving democracy and peace for all Rwandans. Instead of using the media to promote human rights, he used it to attack and destroy human rights... However, Ngeze did not respect the responsibility that comes with that freedom. He abused the trust of the public by using his newspaper to instigate genocide... He poisoned the minds of his readers, and by words and deeds caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians” (ICTR-99-52-T, pp.359).

In a more recent (2012) case, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 23rd January 2012 committed a Kenyan radio broadcaster, Joshua Arap Sang, to trial for “crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts and persecution” that were committed during the Kenya electoral violence of December 2007.

and January 2008. Court heard that during the 2007/2008 mayhem, Sang hosted morning shows on Kass FM, a Kalenjin-language radio station in which he allegedly broadcast incendiary ethnic hatred against ethnic Kikuyus. In one incident, hundreds of Kikuyu sheltering in a Church near the Eastern town of Eldoret were torched by people that were following leads provided by Arap Sang on Kass FM. Like in the case of Rwandan and the Nuremburg Tribunals before, the ICC by committing a journalist to trial for crimes against humanity is sending a clear message that the international human community will not allow the mass media to set an agenda for the destruction of human life.

1.1.1 The Scare of Inflammatory Media in Uganda

In the specific case of Uganda, violent protests involving youth and law-enforcement personnel broke out in September 2009 within the central Ugandan region of Buganda leading to a heavy GoU clampdown on the broadcast mass media, particularly radio stations. The riots were triggered by GoU’s blockage of Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda Kingdom, from conducting a familiarization tour as well as attending a youth celebration in Bugeere County of Kayunga district; which is one of his disputed fiefdoms. By the end of the three-day riots, twenty-one people were reported dead and hundreds wounded. During the riots, some buses plying routes to western

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10 While Article 78 of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution provides for representation by youth, the concept of “youth” is not defined. In most government policies, however, youth conform to the conceptualization I adopt from Annan et al. (2006, p.iv) as including persons aged 14 to 30 years.
Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni and most of his political allies comes from, were stopped by angry youth and burnt. People, particularly women who perceptively looked like Bahima, with body features similar to the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi — such as long necks, pointed noses, wider hips — were reportedly stopped and made to forcefully sing the cultural anthem of Buganda kingdom; and those who failed were in some cases undressed and humiliated.

Prior to and during the riots, GoU accused several broadcast journalists of inciting tribal hatred and proceeded to close down five radio stations, one television talk-show, and banned the popular interactive open-air-talk-shows (ebimeeza) that often aired on several radio stations across the country (IRIN, 2009; Bareebe, 2009; Wandera, 2009; Ntale, 2009; HRW, 2010). While three of the five closed stations, namely Radio Sapientia 94.4FM, Suubi 104.9 FM and Radio Two Akaboozi Kubiri 87.9FM, were allowed to operate within less than a week of closure, two Central Broadcasting Services (CBS) stations on frequencies 88.8FM and 89.2FM owned by Buganda kingdom remained closed for more than a year (Rhodes, 2010; HRW, 2010). A television and radio talk-show host, Robert Kalundi Serumaga was arrested and later reportedly tortured by secret service operatives after appearing on the Kibazo Live discussion program on Wavvah Broadcasting Service (WBS) Television on which he said some of the problems Uganda

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14 Interview with Mr. Godfrey Male, Chief News Editor, Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) 88.8FM and 89.2FM, Kampala, 02 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Damascus Ssali, Deputy Programmes Manager and Host of several cultural programs on CBS, Kampala, 03 December 2010
was facing was because her leaders, particularly President Museveni had “very poor quality upbringing” (HRW, 2010, p.27). Other journalists suspended during the crisis for allegedly violating sections of the Electronic Media Act 1996 (Chapter 104) on inflammatory broadcast rhetoric included Aloysius Matovu, Irene Kisekka, and Ben Mutebi all of *Radio Sapientia*. They reportedly pressured by their stations on government orders to resign included Kazibwe Bashir Mbazira, Eddie Katende and Deogratias Walusimbi of *Suubi FM*. Other journalists affected by the clampdown were Peter Kibazo of WBS Television; Charles Ssenkubuge of *Radio Simba 97.3 FM* as well as Mark Walungama of *Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) Television* (Bogere, 2009). A common feature between the affected journalists and their programs is that they broadcast in Luganda, the language of the Baganda of central Uganda who are Kabaka Mutebi’s subjects; and some of them during the riots kept playing songs exalting the Kabaka with some denigrating non-Baganda or the GoU leadership.

The chairperson of the Uganda Broadcasting Council, mandated with monitoring electronic media, said all the radio stations that were closed had been consistently monitored and their journalists were using sectarian and inflammatory rhetoric against sections of the Ugandan population. He said that CBS radio had for five consecutive years been broadcasting sectarian content in disregard of the laws contained in the

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15 Interview with Mr. Francis Jjuunju, Programs Director, Radio Sapientia 94.4FM, Kampala, 30 December 2010
16 Interview with Mr. Robert Sempala, Political Editor and talk-show host on Suubi 104.9 FM, Kampala, 30 November 2010
17 Interview with Mr. Aloysius Matovu, Suspended Journalist of *Radio Sapientia*, Kampala, Uganda, 02 December 2010
18 Interview with Engineer Godfrey Mutabazi, Chairman of the Uganda Broadcasting Council, Kampala, 07 January 2011
Electronic Media Act. On the closure of the popular open-air-talk-shows (ebimeeza), the then Minister of Information and National Guidance said they were actually illegal platforms since none of the radio stations conducting them had an outside operating license. She said that whereas the shows were initially seen as an excellent platform for the civilian population to interact with government, a couple of them were hosted in bars where the discourse often degenerated into shouting matches and abusive diatribe. As a final verdict to the crackdown, President Yoweri Museveni stated as much at a press briefing following the riots:

> What you say on those radios is recorded. We have got a section of the intelligence service which records all those things you say. If you get a journalist or a broadcaster promoting sectarianism in Uganda, you think that should be accepted? That is not part of media freedom. Some of these radios, I don’t know what they thought. Just promoting almost genocide like the other radio of Rwanda [Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines]? If you do that, I don’t know what the Media Council does, but I think you should even be charged with criminal offences of sectarianism.  

To most media observers in the region, the events of September 2009 in an otherwise peaceful southern part of the country brought to mind the reported role that hate media, particularly RTLM, played in the 1994 Rwandan killings. To other observers, however,

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19 Interview with Hon. Kabakumba Labwoni Masiko, then Minister of Information and National Guidance, Kampala, 17 December 2010. Minister Kabakumba was forced to resign from cabinet in December 2011 following allegations that as the line Minister of Information, she influenced the using of Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) equipment, notably a transmitter and a mast, for her private King's Broadcasting radio station in Masindi (see Vision Reporters, 19 December 2011, “Kabakumba Masiko resigns.” URL in May 2012 at http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/314859-Kabakumba-Masiko-resigns.html)

20 Text from a radio transcript of President Museveni at a press conference in September 2009 obtained from the Uganda Media Centre in Kampala. To date, promoting sectarianism is a capital offence under the anti-sectarian clause in section 42A of the Penal Code Act (1950). (See also Wandera, A. N., 14 October 2009, “Museveni warns on tribal politics.” URL in February 2012 at http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Museveni_warns_on_tribal_politics_89634.shtml)
the events were only a manifestation of entrenched grievances of a structural nature, which if not handled will only aggravate the situation into future spirals of violence as already manifest in March 2010 and also April 2011. During fieldwork, I interrogated some of the journalists implicated in the closures on what they perceived as their role and that of the mass media in national peace-building efforts.

The cases in Section 1.1 above amply demonstrate that the mass media, if used wrongly, have incredible power to establish the agency of journalists in fuelling violence and instigating human destruction. Since this has happened in the past, there is always potential it can happen again. In fact, subsequent to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Des Forges (2007) points out that *Radio Rutomorangingo* started in mid-1995 broadcasting anti-Tutsi diatribes in Burundi using the same format as Rwanda’s genocidal RTLM (p.53). He notes that while requests to the USA by the Burundian government to jam it were not readily implemented, the Israeli government helped to successfully jam the radio in 1996 (Ibid.). From that point on, efforts to monitor hate media have gained traction. Chalk (2007) for instance calls for the development of domestic and foreign media monitoring programs to make sure that hate rhetoric is tracked and stopped before violence breaks out. He also advocates for an “international code of conduct that recognizes the dual-use possibilities of television and AM, FM, and satellite radio transmitters” and wants the export prohibitions of this equipment to rogue elements.

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21 In March 2010, Buganda kingdom’s cultural Kasubi tombs where kings are buried and also a UNESCO world heritage site was gutted by fire; sending a section of the Buganda population onto the streets [see BBC News, 17 March 2010, “Protesters killed at Uganda’s Kasubi tombs”]. Further, in April 2011, a consortium of the political opposition started the ‘walk-to-work’ demonstrations over rising costs of living in the country, thereby paralysing business in Kampala, the capital city, as well as a few other towns countrywide [see Namiti, M., 28 April 2011, “Uganda walk-to-work protests kick up dust”. *Al Jazeera online*. URL in February 2012 at [http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114283130647345.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114283130647345.html).]
enforceable under the already existent law on international arms embargoes (p.379). Likewise, Hamelink (2008) calls for the establishment of an “International Media Alert System (IMAS)” that would be necessary to monitor mass media content in areas of conflict (p.82). He argues that such a system would provide an ‘early warning’ where and when media set the climate for crimes against humanity (Ibid.). In fact, such media monitoring efforts as proposed by Chalk (2007) and Hamelink (2008) are already being undertaken by institutions such as the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS). It is projects like this that are laying the ground for a sustainable regime of radio for peace-building in Africa and across the globe, which forms the body of this study.

1.2 The Corpus: Mass Media for Peace-building

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in a 2001 report argues that media and information providers have “a unique capacity to reach and influence populations in conflict-prone conditions and a crucial role to play in the promotion of dialogue in divided societies” (p.123). The OECD (2001) notes that “local tensions and communal violence are often as much the result of misinformation and misunderstanding as of real conflicting interests” (Ibid.). In order to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence, the OECD proposes that media and communication channels ought to ensure that the wider society gets access to information that explains the situation in its broadest context (Ibid.). The OECD proposes a wide range of activities geared towards enhancing the various roles of the media in conflict management:

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22 As of February 2012, the MIGS was conducting media monitoring in sixteen countries in Africa and the Middle East [See “The Early Warning Media Monitoring Project.” URL in February 2012 at http://migs.concordia.ca/Media_Monitoring/Media_Monitoring_Reports.html]
“Media reporting which is fair (including all views), accurate (reporting context, not just events) and complete (reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions), can be crucial to defuse conflict potentials” (pp.123-124).

As radio stations such as Rutomorangingo were trying to propagate inflammatory rhetoric in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, organizations such as the Suisse-founded Fondation Hirondelle was busy laying a foundation for a flourishing network of radio-for-peace-building in Africa.23 Taking cue from what Fondation Hirondelle was doing in Zaire and the region, an American non-governmental organization, Search for Common Ground (SCG), with funding from USAID set up in August 1995 “Studio Ijambo” (Kirundi language for “wise words”), as an independent radio production studio to produce programs promoting dialogue, peace, and reconciliation in Burundi and amongst her refugees in neighbouring countries (Hagos, 2001; Burton, 2006).24 In 2003, SCG launched a new program known as “Radio for Peace-building Africa”, whose activities in twenty African countries are in part funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland; and involve more than fifty participating radio stations across the continent.25 The program produces guidebooks for radio journalists and producers, hosts an online library with audio resources as well as an inventory of radio trainers across the globe (Ibid.). In addition to the above initiatives, the number of

23 “Since its founding in 1995, Hirondelle has established and managed Radio Agatashya in the Great Lakes Region of Africa; Star Radio in Liberia; the Hirondelle News Agency at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania; Radio Blue Sky in Kosovo; Radio Ndeke Luka in Bangui in Central African Republic; Moris Hamutuk, a radio program for refugees in Timor; Radio Okapi, a national network in the DRC; Radio Miraya, a national network in Sudan; as well as a support project with the Radio-Television of Timor-Leste (RTTL)” (Dahinden, 2007, p.382).


radio stations on the African continent dedicated to the promotion of the peaceful resolution of conflicts keeps growing. Notable examples include Radio Okapi in the DRC, Radio Ndeke Luka in CAR, ONUCI FM in Cote d'Ivoire, Radio UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethiopia, Star Radio in Liberia, Radio UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, Voice of Peace in Somalia, and Voice of Hope in Sudan; to mention a few that are broadcasting across the African continent.\(^{26}\)

Elsewhere in the world, Maltby (2010) cites cases of Radio Oksigen in the Balkans and Rana FM in Afghanistan used by NATO and the Canadian military respectively to promote particular themes and messages that seek to “persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce audiences to take a particular course of action, or to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a particular course of action” towards peace (p.225). Radio Oksigen was set up by NATO in 1999 in post-conflict Bosnia Herzegovina to unite audiences towards a peaceful, multicultural state (p.228). On the other hand, Rana FM was launched in 2007 by the Canadian military in Afghanistan to support NATO peace-building and counter-insurgence operations (p.226).

In the context of the Northern Uganda insurgency, the two radio stations that I study in this dissertation have directly been involved in the country’s peace-building efforts since 2001. Radio Wa 89.8 FM, meaning “Our Radio” in the local Luo language, is based in the conflict-prone Lira District and its motto flashing on the station’s website in English and Langi reads: “Blessed are the Peacemakers” (Matthew 5:9). The station logo is the

color of the rainbow, which the station website states is the “sign for peace and harmony.” In early 2002, the station started a weekly talk-show program known as *Karibu*, a Swahili word meaning “welcome”, as an open invitation to LRA combatants and abductees to disarm and return home under the framework of the Uganda Amnesty Act 2000. Under the Station’s website ‘history’ rubric, the rationale and success of the *Karibu* program is explained:

“Being very well aware of the critical circumstances the abducted children were living in and also knowing that many of them were eventually able to get hold of small radio receivers and used to clandestinely listen to radios in the region, the team of *Radio Wa* decided to launch specially for them a radio program that was called “Karibu” (Welcome, in swahili language). This program, most of the times presented by the late J.J. Kakaba one of the most popular radio presenters in the region, was mainly thought to be a way to re-establishing in the heart of the abducted children the emotional links that had been so seriously severed by the brutal techniques employed by the rebels on them (such techniques included abducted children killing their own companions or neighbors and many others).”

When dozens of LRA combatants started to isolate themselves from the main fighting parties and escaping, the LRA leadership were enraged and the station was attacked and burnt down on 27th September 2002. By the time the radio station re-opened in March 2003, it had been joined on the regional airwaves in October 2002 by 102.1 Mega FM (meaning in the Luo language ‘Mine’ or ‘My FM’) based in neighbouring Gulu District. In December 2003, the station started airing a talk show thrice a week known as *Dwog*.

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Cen Paco, meaning in the Luo language ‘Come Back Home’, an open invitation to the LRA combatants and abductees to lay down their arms and rejoin their communities. A September 2004 report by the Christian Science Monitor captures the views held by several civil society groups that many former LRA combatants and abductees who laid down their arms attributed their change of heart to the reassuring radio messages heard from their former colleagues who had returned and were living a normal life (Palmer, 2004).

Following the ebbing of the LRA insurgency in 2006, both radio stations started new programs focusing on the broader issues of peace-building and the reconstruction of Northern Uganda. One of the programs that Mega FM started is Ter Yat (Luo language for ‘discussion under a tree’) which is a panel discussion program held every Saturday from 10 a.m. to 12 noon. On their part, Radio Wa phased out the pioneer Karibu program and renamed it ‘The Peace Maker’ in 2006 following a demand by the LRA as a precondition for negotiations during the Juba peace talks. Like its predecessor, ‘Peace Maker’ initially broadcast for one hour three times a week on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 11 a.m to 12 noon. When the station launched its website in May 2012, the program lineup revealed that ‘Peace Maker’ was broadcasting twice a week on Mondays and Fridays, keeping the slot of 11 a.m. to 12 noon. In December 2008, Radio Wa launched another discursive program known as ‘Vision for peace’ to focus on peace-

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30 Dwog Cen Paco is still running on Mega FM, but has reduced the number of shows from three to one running every Thursday from 10 p.m. to 11 p.m. It instead introduced a sister show known as Ter Yat, which broadcasts every Saturday from 10 a.m. to Midday.

31 Interview with Mr. Pelegrine Otonga, News Editor, Radio Wa 89.9FM, Lira, 28 December 2010

building issues.\textsuperscript{33} It airs every Thursday for one hour from 8.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. It is this latter program that is the subject for analysis in this dissertation. The Radio Wa program lineup, however, reveals other peace-building programs such as “community concern”, “business panorama”, “children’s program”, “women’s hour”, “healing our wounds”, “speak out”, “you and the law”, “moment of truth”, “straight from the heart” and other ad hoc topics under the rubric of “talk show” (Ibid.).

In addition to the peace radio programmes on Mega FM and Radio Wa, some media organizations have already embarked on training projects to equip Ugandan journalists with skills in Peace Journalism. A leading example is the Uganda Media Development Foundation (UMDF), which is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) whose stated agenda is to “enhance the capacity of media practitioners to play an active and meaningful role in the realization of democracy, human rights observance, and development in general.”\textsuperscript{34} Since its inception, the UMDF has been central in the mid-career training of journalists across the country in various genres including investigative, environment, health, human rights, democracy, and most recently in Conflict Sensitive Journalism. From January 2009 to December 2010, the UMDF with funding from the Church Development Service (EED) of Germany held journalism-training workshops to promote peace and communal harmony across the country through radio programming.\textsuperscript{35}

The project’s focus was on four regions of the country that have been over the years affected by armed insurgency. During the two years of project implementation, the

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\textsuperscript{32} Interview with Mr. John Ocen, Programs Manager and Host of ‘Vision for Peace’, Radio Wa 89.9FM, Lira, 28 December 2010


\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Mr. Mathias Mulumba, National Coordinator of the Uganda Media Development Foundation (UMDF), Kampala, 06 January 2011
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UMDF targeted one hundred media practitioners working in radio stations such as journalists, talk-show presenters as well as programmers in the four conflict-prone regions of the country namely Rwenzori (in Western Uganda), West Nile (in North Western), as well as LRA-affected Northern and North Eastern. In addition to journalism training, the organisation also trained ten Church media personnel who already work in the justice and peace sector of their religious denominations. The church-based media trainees play a monitoring role to ensure that any media houses that broadcast incendiary talk are brought to the attention of the Peace Journalism network for concerted action. The project also runs two Google Group platforms under the rubrics of Peace Journalism and ‘Conflict Sensitive Reporting’ where the trainee peace journalists share their experiences and post news stories for peer reviewing.36

In addition to the work of the UMDF, other actors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored another project from July 2010 to April 2011 entitled “The Peace, Development, and Electoral Journalism Project”. The USAID project was coordinated by Steven Youngblood, a journalism instructor at Park University in Parkville, Missouri who conducted countrywide activities including “25 workshops for radio journalists, five workshops for radio managers, as well as a public service announcement campaign and a citizen mobilization/peace club formation” (Youngblood, 2011).37 The primary goal of the project was “to prevent media-induced or exacerbated election related violence” during the February 2011 parliamentary and

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presidential elections (Ibid.). According to an assessment report of the project, Youngblood states that anecdotal evidence as well as a survey of trainees showed that the Peace Journalism project was effective in preventing media-induced election violence (Ibid.). During field research, I interrogated the UMDF and USAID Peace Journalism trainees and some trainers about the feasibility of such a model in the Ugandan context.

1.3 Research Assumptions and Attendant Questions

Reinard (2008) points out that in research “one of the hardest parts is finding the right question to ask and the right hypothesis to advance” (p.46). He observes that problem-statements set limits on relevant information and they allow researchers to know what information to examine in addition to delimiting which methods and techniques to use (Ibid.). He enumerates the characteristics of good research questions in the Social Sciences and Humanities, noting the importance of choosing problem statements that are do-able given one’s resources and abilities, and to ensure that the problem is a communication-related one (p.47). With that hindsight, this dissertation is structured to answer three central research questions, which also have several sub-questions. The research questions are based on insights drawn from journalism and communication scholarship, peace and conflict literature as well as my personal experiences as a journalist and journalism trainer.

1.3.1 Research Question One (RQ1): What are, according to Ugandan journalists and media actors, the drivers of peace, conflict and/or violence in the country; and how are they framed in media discourse?

Proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm acknowledge that human conflicts usually turn into violent confrontations in circumstances where structural issues are ignored; and
that the mass media, therefore, ought to play a central role in deciphering those issues and bringing them to the fore in public discourse (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Lee, 2008). Structural violence, according to Galtung & Jacobsen (2000), shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances owing to the skewed distribution of resources such as education, health, and income. With regard to African journalism practice, Mutere & Ugangu (2004) argue that in situations of conflict, it is the ideological constraints that often prevent journalists from providing accurate, enlightened and fair accounts of events. They challenge journalists to appreciate the historical origins of conflicts, the structural root causes of violence, the exacerbating factors as well as the triggering factors (p.3-5). In their seminal work titled Peace Journalism, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005), also note that violence usually occurs in societies where “resources are scarce (employment, income, housing, water); power is unevenly distributed; and unresolved grievances exist from the past” (p.1).

In light of the foregoing, and from a wide reading of scholarship in peace and conflict, I hypothesize that Ugandan journalists and media actors do not recognize the complex web of conflict formation and progression as well as the wider array of the drivers of conflict and/or violence; thus the reason why their reporting privileges simplistic immediate events to the detriment of causative factors. By examining the peace radio programming on Mega FM and Radio Wa, I sought to establish how journalists and media actors in Northern Uganda framed issues; and I discerned the ideologies some of them attempted to advance and promote. Whom did Ugandan journalists and mass media actors identify as the key actors of peace, conflict and/or violence? With regard to language, what are the keywords used to frame peace, conflict and/or violence particularly on the radio
broadcasts? What proposals for peace are discernible in the broadcasts, the interviews
and the FGDs? How participatory are the broadcasts and how are they used as sites for
jostling authority and influence? These are the questions that I answer in Chapter 7.

1.3.2 Research Question Two (RQ2): What are the factors that would
hamper or propel the development of a Peace Journalism model in Uganda?

According to Shinar (2007a), the major challenges in the development of a Peace
Journalism model are the “day-to-day problems and dilemmas in the activities of media
organizations and professionals” (p.55). Compressing the views of several authors, he
outlines such operational problems and dilemmas as including “control, freedom of
expression, responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, the public interest, personal ethics,
constraints affecting journalistic coverage, development of skills such as form, technique
judgment and critical thinking, depth and content, and built-in contradictions between
media structures and peace-oriented/development-oriented communication” (Ibid.). In a
specific study of the media coverage of the peace process in Northern Uganda, Birungi
(2009) noted the “significant media control and interference coordinated by the
government-controlled [Uganda] Media Centre” (p.103). She further points out that “80%
of reporters depended for their reports on official news sources, particularly the military”,
which factors hampered the journalists’ independence in covering the peace process
(Ibid.). Lugalambi (2006) also writes about Ugandan media practices and notes that
“matters of peace are barely covered in the media” owing to the “very organisation and
structure of the media system and its influence on the production of media content”
(p.112). He points out the personal pitfalls individual journalists willing to challenge the
conventions of the trade have to face, notably the entrenched corporate culture in which they work (Ibid.).

In this dissertation, I interrogate journalists on what factors significantly hamper their practice; notably their aptitudes as individual journalists, the limitations ensuing from institutional imperatives as well as the extra-media factors such as the social-cultural and political environment in which they function. How do individual factors such as social-cultural influences (ethnicity and tribalism), insufficient professional training and the various ideologies such as religious and political party affiliation impinge on the development of a peace journalism model? How do institutional factors such as media ownership and control as well as daily newsroom routines impact of journalism practice? What should be done to media institutions and journalists who engage in spreading ethnic or tribal hatred? On the issue of extra-media factors, how do influences by sources, advertisers, government, technology as well as ideologies such as religious impact on the Peace Journalism model? How does the poor attention to issues of gender and minorities impact on Peace Journalism practice? Answers to such questions are the subject of Chapter 8.

1.3.3 Research Question Three (RQ3): What values and norms of peace can be developed into mass media frames to transform the entrenched conventional media frames of conflict and violence; and which of these norms are discernibly Ugandan [sub-Saharan Africa]?

Shinar (2007b) observes that while a lot of work has been done on the “deconstruction of war discourse”, there is hardly any work being done in the “invention, development and marketing” of a media peace discourse (p.7). He for instance observes that while reporting peace such as in peace processes, journalists were still using war jargon and
frames (p.6). He, therefore, challenges journalism scholars to work towards the “development of a media peace discourse”; which is a departure from conventional western-centric media values and frames that favour war or violence. At the epistemological level, he calls for the development of clearer philosophical and conceptual norms that would encompass “a deconstruction of journalism principles such as truth, objectivity, accuracy, responsibility …” (p.5). However, Wolfsfeld (2004) in what he calls a “static model” belabours the point that conventional news values are so grounded in conflict to the extent that “when peace appears to be taking hold in a particular area, it is time for journalists to leave” (p.15). In an enumeration of the conventional news values, he observes that journalists and their editors select what is newsworthy based on a sacrosanct set of values such as “immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism” (Ibid.). He argues that these news values are so well established to the extent that even competing political actors use these frames to position their messages and actions for the effective attention of the mass media. With specific reference to Ugandan media practice, Birungi (2009) scrutinized the challenges of integrating Peace Journalism into conventional journalism practice with focus on the coverage of the LRA peace process. After examining coverage of the peace process in five newspaper articles as well as interviewing six journalists who covered the LRA peace process on site in Juba, Southern Sudan, she noted that the journalists covering the peace process exhibited a strong tendency to look for drama and immediacy: “most journalists covering the LRA peace process looked for the here and now stories - the drama, disagreements, clashes and irreconcilable positions. The sense of immediacy was high and few journalists expressed efforts at follow-ups” (p.102). While she established that journalists in the conflict zone of Northern Uganda, “understand that Peace Journalism is a new kind of journalism with a new unique tone, bent at promoting harmony and not stirring antagonisms”, the overall
view was that “journalists in Uganda consider Peace Journalism a noble beat, but one that is not yet ripe for their kind and nature of reporting orientation” (p.86).

In yet another newspaper content study of media coverage of the Northern Uganda civil war, Nassanga (2007) noted that the UPDF and government officials predominated as news sources (p.5). She also observed that “confrontational articles took the stance that there was a ‘zero-sum’ conflict going on and used negative, emotionally charged words to characterize one of the sides, such as ‘rebels’, ‘terrorists’ etc, which tends to aggravate rather than reduce mistrust and fighting” (p.6). She observed that the high level of confrontational reportage in the *New Vision* newspaper could be attributed to the high use of army and government sources as opposed to the *Daily Monitor* newspaper that used more local sources (p.6). Like Shinar (2004), she also calls for increased training of journalists in peace reporting in addition to other issues such as attention to media ethics, increased networking amongst journalists as well as the development of Public Relations skills amongst journalists (pp.8-9).

In this dissertation, I took the above challenges seriously; and from the perspective of a wider pool of journalists, editors, journalism students and key media players across the country, I probed how the various components of the concept of ‘peace’ could be constituted into news/media values. Specifically, I interrogated Ugandan journalists on whether norms of peace, proposed by peace journalism scholars, such as patience and moderation, cooperation and consensus, forgiveness and reconciliation, justice and truth, harmony and order, mediation and arbitration, peace processes and peace actors, as well as humanisation of enemies could constitute sustainable media news values that journalists can routinely deploy to inform and direct public discourse. I also probed whether Ugandan journalists still considered values of conflict and/or violence – such as
drama, crisis and internal discord, extremism, immediacy, threats, destruction, ethnocentrism, hostility, major personalities - as satisfactory news values.

Additionally, I noted that Uganda had two line ministries charged with the development and promotion of national values and norms, namely; the ministry of “information and national guidance” as well as the ministry of “ethics and integrity”. The mandate of both ministries revolves on institutionalizing Ugandan values that would contribute towards good governance and national harmony. During research, I interrogated the two line ministers and conducted an institutional review to establish which values and norms the GoU has in place and whether they could be reconstituted as mass media values. Further, I probed Ugandan journalists and media actors on whether there are discernible Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) socio-cultural values that could be embedded and reconstructed into media frames distinct from the conventional Western ones. In Chapter 9, I discuss these issues and provide answers to these questions.

1.4 Context of the Study: LRA-Affected Northern Uganda

Whereas I conducted the Peace Journalism assessment survey with practitioners in the five traditional regions of the country, the discourse analysis of the ‘peace radio’ broadcasts, as well as all focus groups and interviews were conducted in LRA-affected Northern Uganda. By the end of 2011, what had started in 1987 as a localized Northern Uganda armed insurgence led by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) had evolved into an international conflict spanning four African countries (Uganda, Sudan, DR Congo and Central African Republic). The conflict had also drawn in international intervention from

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38 For more than two decades, the LRA insurgence directly affected nine districts with an estimated population of two and a half million people. The districts and their estimated population include Amolatar (96,189), Amuru (176,733), Apac (415,578), Dokolo (129,385), Gulu (298,527), Kitgum (282,375), Lira (515,666), Oyam (268,415) and Pader (326,338) (Gwillim Law, 12 November 2011).
organisations such as the African Union, the United Nations as well as some Western governments notably the United States of America (USA). For instance Arieff and Ploch (2011) point out that on 14 October 2011, President Barack Obama reported to the USA Congress that he had authorized the deployment of approximately one hundred USA armed forces to serve as advisors to the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the “regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield” (p.8). Following the USA’s engagement, the African Union in November 2011, through its Peace and Security Council, formally declared the LRA a terrorist group and authorized the regional force formed by several African government armies to eliminate it (Heinle, 2011). While the LRA had been since 2001 on the US State Department’s “ Terrorist Exclusion List”, its leader Joseph Kony was officially named by the U.S. government as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” only in 2008. Two years later in May 2010, USA President Barack Obama signed into law the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act (P.L. 111-172), a piece of legislation that had received unanimous support in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; thus enabling the Obama administration to officially support direct action against the LRA (Arieff & Ploch, op.cit.).

In late 2005, the LRA fled from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan into Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). They were in late 2008 reported to have gone as far as Central African Republic where they are in May 2012 still reportedly active (Macdonald, 2012; UN News Centre, 09 January 2012; Nyakairu, F., 13 February 2008; UNHCR, 03 May 2012).

Joseph Kony has since 1987 been the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group fighting to overthrow the government of President Yoweri Museveni. Alongside four of his top commanders, Kony was in 2005 interdicted by The Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) and is currently an international fugitive operating in the corridor along the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2004; UNHCR, 03 May 2012). The LRA is discussed further below in the section.

According to a May 2012 Enough Project field report, the “LRA continues to extend its area of operation” and “recent attacks and abductions show that the LRA remains a highly capable rebel force” (Agger, 2012, p.1). The author proposes revamped deployment of American Special Forces and logistical support to
The 2011 USA military engagement against the LRA, and additional support announced in April 2012, however, tardily followed earlier national and international efforts to stop the widespread human suffering due to the insurgency. For instance between 1993 and 1994, the GoU initiated systematic peace talks with the LRA led by Betty Oyella Bigombe, a then Minister of State for the Pacification of Northern Uganda. Subsequently, several peace initiatives were fronted by the GoU spanning many years and without success; the last one being the July 2006 to April 2008 peace negotiations in Juba, South Sudan led by Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, then Uganda’s Minister of Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{42} However, with an unsupportive new government in Southern Sudan, the LRA faced increased pressure and lost their bases thus forcing them to cross in September 2005 into Garamba National Park in the DRC. Further, the GoU had in January 2004 referred the LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague; and the ICC prosecutor had in July 2004 opened investigations into the crimes committed by the LRA. On 13 October 2005, the ICC issued an indictment for Joseph Kony and four of his commanders on various crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{43} Due to increased regional and international pressure, the LRA accepted to negotiate with the GoU to end the hostilities. In July 2006, the LRA and GoU resumed negotiations under the mediation of Riek Machar, Vice President of the then Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the Community of Sant’ Egidio. The negotiations climaxed with the signing of a formal agreement for cessation of hostilities on 26 August 2006, pending the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement to prevent the LRA from regrouping and re-arming in Darfur where they were reportedly headed in mid-2012 (Op.cit.).

\textsuperscript{42} The intensive negotiations collapsed in April 2008 when the LRA leadership declined to sign the final peace treaty. The LRA resumed fighting while being pursued by a combined army of Uganda, South Sudan, DR Congo and CAR with the help of American technical forces (UN News Centre, 09 January 2012).

\textsuperscript{43} The ICC accuses the five indicted LRA leaders of crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross human rights abuses. As of 2012, three of them remain on the run while Raska Lukwiya was reportedly killed on the battlefield in 2006 and Vincent Otti was executed by the LRA leadership in 2008 (See ICC, 13 October 2005; BBC News, 21 December 2007).
peace agreement (ICG, 2007). The agreement was premised on a temporary cease-fire upon the movement of the LRA forces into two assembly zones in Southern Sudan: one in Owiny Kibul and the other in Ri-Kwangba, which conditions the LRA failed to observe (Senyonjo, 2007).

Encouraged by the initiatives of the ICC and the GoSS to end the LRA insurgence, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had during 2006 increased its discussions on the LRA, noting what a regional security threat it had become. The UN interest led to the appointment in December 2006 of Joachim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to become a UN Special Envoy to LRA affected areas; charged with helping in the peace negotiations. Subsequent to that, several negotiations were undertaken throughout 2007 and early 2008 without success. In June 2008, media reports emerged that the LRA was forcibly recruiting fighters, digging up their cache of arms as well as acquiring new weaponry in preparation for war (BBC, 6 June 2008). This resumption of hostilities by the LRA led to an initiative by the armies of Uganda, South Sudan and DR Congo to launch a joint military operation to crush the LRA (Ibid.). Given the current international action, it is unlikely that the LRA will thrive as an organized fighting force in the region. What is sure though is its capacity to continue as a criminal group launching sporadic attacks on civilian populations in Central Africa (UNHCR, 03 May 2012). Vinci (2007) makes a valid argument that while the LRA could have started the rebellion in 1987 with instrumental goals such as the creation of political change, these goals have largely over the years been replaced by existential motivations whereby the LRA organization fights in order to continue providing security and a vocation to its members (p.337).

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44 UNSC Website, (2012), “Publications on LRA/Northern Uganda and other affected areas,” URL in January 2012 at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.g1kKWLeMTIsG/b.2400719/
However, as the insurgency ebbs, the effects remain profound and widespread. For instance at the height of the insurgency in 2004, humanitarian organisations such as World Vision in conjunction with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) had noted that the protracted nature of the LRA conflict had created a humanitarian crisis in Northern Uganda judged among the world’s worst, with 1.6 million people living in displacement camps that were squalid and cramped (Muhumuza & Toysen, 2004; UNOCHA, 2005; Natukunda-Togboa, 2008). They further noted that over 20,000 children had been abducted since 1987, constituting 80% of the LRA’s pool of armed combatants and sex slaves (Ibid.). One of the most dramatic incidents that put the LRA on the global radar was the 10 October 1996 attack on St. Mary’s College Boarding Girls’ High School in Aboke, Apac District where 139 female students were abducted. As the school administration negotiated the release of the girls, the LRA fighters chose 30 ‘most beautiful’ whom they carried away to become sex slaves. Over the years, five of the 30 girls died in captivity, while all of them were by 2006 reported to have escaped back to their communities, most of them carrying children fathered out of brutal rape (De Temmerman, 2008). In 2003 alone, the LRA combatants abducted an estimated 8,500 children instilling widespread fear among parents in the greater region of Northern Uganda leading to an internationally known phenomenon that was dubbed “night commuters” (Erin, 2005).45

45 The phenomenon of “night commuters” received global attention when two Canadians, Adrian Bradbury and Kieran Hayward launched a global movement called “Gulu Walk” to raise awareness about the plight of Ugandan children who walked several miles each night to flee abduction by the LRA combatants. The movement later attracted international attention and led to others such as the “Global Night Commute” (GNC) as well as film dramatizations in e.g. “Invisible Children” [See Gulu Walk at http://www.guluwalk.com/ and “Global Night Commute.” See also Human Rights Watch, (2003), “Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda” and Amnesty International, “Uganda: Child Night Commuters.”]
As the LRA continues its activities across the jungles of Central Africa; and as the peoples of the region return from the Internally Displacement People’s camps (IDPs), the reality of the human development cost is unfathomable (MoFPED, 2003). For instance, the 2007 Uganda National Human Development Report (NHDR) pointed out that the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures achievement in human development for Northern Uganda at 0.499 was the lowest in the country. The report noted that the “low performance is attributed to the insurgency which forced people to relocate to safe areas which have fewer opportunities to participate in economically productive activities” (Ibid.). The report pointed out that districts in Northern Uganda had the lowest school enrolment ratios as well as the highest infant mortality rates (Ibid.). Further, Northern Uganda had the lowest Human Poverty Index (HPI) of 30.54%, meaning that people in the region suffer more deprivations in human development such as a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (Ibid. and UNDP, 21 October 2008).

Other studies have also established glaring disparities between Northern Uganda and other regions of the country. For instance, the African Economic Research Consortium conducted a study in 2002 on “determinants of regional poverty in Uganda” and concluded that:

“Northern Uganda was found to be the poorest region; it has the largest depth of poverty and worst inequality. It is characterized by the poor having large mean household sizes, least education, least mean household income, least expenditure on health, lowest chance of child survival and highest concentration in the rural areas” (Okurut et al., 2002, p.vi).

Taking the case of HIV/AIDS, a Ugandan Ministry of Health Sero-Behavioral Survey (UHSBS 2004/05) pointed out that the North Central region, comprising the most LRA
affected districts of Apac, Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, and Pader had an HIV sero-prevalence rate among adults of 8.2%, which was higher than the national average of 6.4%. Other studies have pointed out that the highest incidence was in the crowded IDPs (Internally Displaced Peoples’ camps) where poverty was the key driver to transmission due to the high incidence of commercial, transactional and inter-generational sex (Erin, 2005; MOH, 2006; PlusNews, 21 November 2006).

Considering the level of human misery the LRA has visited on the peoples of Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, North Eastern DR Congo and now Central African Republic; one cannot but wonder who was behind such a misguided organisation that progressively turned to criminality. The LRA emerged in Northern Uganda at the start of 1987 as an offshoot of the now defunct Holy Spirit Movement (HSM); which was a coalition of several dissident groups formed in early 1986 comprising mainly remnants of the defeated Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). The UPDA government, led by General Tito Okello Lutwa had been overthrown in January 1986 by the National Resistance Army (NRA), which was then a rebel force led by Yoweri Museveni, who in 2012 is still President of Uganda. The HSM was defeated by the NRA in November 1987 and Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’, its prophetess leader, fled to exile in Kenya where she died in January 2007 (Murithi, 2002; Refugee Law Project, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2004). However, the HSM was revived and re-baptized the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership of Joseph Kony, a cousin of Alice Lakwena, who pitched the group to the restoration of the Biblical Ten Commandments and to the return of Uganda to northern political leadership. With its chances of gaining political power fading, the LRA progressively turned into a criminal force responsible for despicable human rights
abuses; including the death of an estimated half a million people and the displacement of thousands (Ibid.; Vinci, 2007).

1.5 Conclusion and outline of the dissertation

In the foregoing chapter, I have examined the background to and context of the systematic violence visited upon the peoples of Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, DR Congo and Central African Republic by the LRA. I have also presented the historical reminders of how radio has been used to propagate inflammatory rhetoric. As all the cases demonstrate, radio personalities have abused their broadcasting power in the past and they have the potential to do it in the future; such as was implied by the closure of several Ugandan broadcast media in September 2009 and the ICC referral for the trial of Kenyan journalist Arap Sang in January 2012. In order to stem the tide of incendiary radio, I have highlighted initiatives such as those by Fondation Hirondelle, Search for Common Ground (SCG) and the Uganda Media Development Foundation (UMDF) where radio is used to promote communal harmony, common ground and non-violent outcomes to conflict situations. It is in this corpus of radio-for-peace-building that I situate the two radio stations, Mega FM and Radio Wa that were the subject of investigation.

In Chapter 2, I continue to lay out the overview of the dissertation by discussing Uganda’s ubiquitous broadcast media industry with particular reference to emerging trends in the sector as well as the implications for peace radio that current policies and regulations bring to bear.

Chapter 3 starts the section of theoretical and conceptual frameworks with a discussion of the four journalism and communication theories that act as an anchor for the arguments I
advance in the dissertation. Each theory is discussed within a framework of its key proponents and critics. Each of the chosen bodies of theory helps in elucidating specific aspects of the data I assembled and discuss in the dissertation.

In Chapter 4, I continue the discussion started in Chapter three on journalism and communication theory, focusing on the specific genre of Peace Journalism; which is being proposed as an alternative model to the conventional genre that favours conflict, violence and war frames. Proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm are unyielding in proposing epistemologies and norms to put the model into praxis (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000; Shinar, 2004, 2007a & 2007b; Tehranian, 2002; Howard 2002, 2003, 2009; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). It is these norms presented in Appendices 13-20 that I used to formulate the questions that I put to Ugandan journalists in view of assessing the applicability of the model in developing nation settings such as Uganda.

In Chapter 5, I examine the peace and conflict scholarship with the view of making a wider interpretation of what the major causes of systemic violence are and what proposals are on offer to stem them. The assumption is that if journalists get conversant with techniques of ‘conflict mapping’ and ‘conflict analysis’, they would transcend the conventional simplistic framing of complex structural issues, which puts an undue premium on conflict and violence reporting (Galtung, 2000; Howard, 2002, 2003, 2009; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Porto, 2008).

In Chapter 6, I present and discuss the research techniques I deployed to assemble fieldwork evidence and those used to analyze the data.

Chapter 7 is the first of the three presenting and discussing the findings. In this chapter, I present data generated from the analysis of “Dwog Cen Paco” and “Ter Yat” radio
broadcasts on *Mega FM* as well as from “*Vision for Peace*” on *Radio Wa*. In the chapter, I examine how actors of peace and violence are framed in the broadcasts and what ideologies dominate the discourse. I also mine the broadcasts to bring out the dominant issues (macrostructure) as well as the nuances presented in the way language is used (microstructure). The views captured from interviews and FGDs enrich the discussion.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the feasibility of the Peace Journalism model, from the perspective of Ugandan journalists and journalism students. In three sub-sections, I bring the quantitative survey data to life by analysing what Ugandan journalists and journalism students consider to be the propelling factors as well as the hindering ones for a functional Peace Journalism model. To enable an easier reading of the quantitative data, I make generous use of tables and Figures.

Chapter 9 presents data, mainly qualitative, on whether the normative values of peace such as patience and moderation, cooperation and consensus, mercy and forgiveness among others can indeed constitute a media-for-peace-discourse that Shinar (2007b) strongly advocates for. What are the views of Ugandan journalists and media actors on the proposition to constitute such norms into journalism values? Which, among these values, are discernibly Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) that can be reconstituted into media values?

In Chapter 10, I bring the entire dissertation together and discuss the field results in light of the research questions and hypotheses as well as the theories. Which of the assumptions were confirmed by the fieldwork data and which ones were rejected? What are the outlier findings, those not envisaged in framing the research questions, but stand out for reflection? What does the data offer for further exploration?
Chapter Two: Uganda’s Broadcast Media and Implications for Peace

2.0 Introduction

This dissertation is largely a study of radio practice in Uganda in general, and peace radio programming in Northern Uganda in particular. From its nascent days as a British colonial government project in the 1950s, radio has become the most prolific mass medium in the country (Mwesige, 2004; Chibita, 2006; Lugalambi et al, 2010). Prior to 1992 when the broadcast sector was liberalised, Radio Uganda was the sole national broadcaster alongside Uganda Television (UTV). Licensing data by the Uganda Media Council indicates that as of July 2010, there were 244 radio stations licensed and 41 television stations (Media Council, 2010; Lugalambi et al., 2010, p18). The 2010 data show a sharp jump from that of April 2007 when the number of privately-owned radio stations was 145 and 12 TV stations (Sewanyana et al., 2007, p.14). While about 90% of all licensed stations are operational at any one given time, the sector is extremely vibrant across the country, making radio the most ubiquitous means of public communication.

In this chapter, I trace the development of radio in Uganda from its colonial past to the present; highlighting the unique features of the sector across the country, with emphasis on the particular case of Mega FM in Gulu and Radio Wa in Lira. Since operations of the mass media in Uganda are influenced by the regulatory regimes, I examine the laws that affect the sector with a focus on clauses and articles in the law books that impinge on freedoms of expression and of the media.
2.1 **Genesis and Growth of Radio in Uganda**

Scholars of Uganda’s broadcast media point out that radio was established in 1953 as a project of the British colonial establishment to counter the emergent anti-colonial nationalism; and as a service for European colonial administrators to supply news from home (Armour, 1984; Gariyo, 1992, 1993; Mwesige, 2004; Chibita, 2006). During the post Second World War years, there emerged in Uganda a series of workers’ strikes that led to the emergency of several national political parties demanding independence from Britain. These conditions led the colonial government to seek means of national communication to counter the rising tide of pro-independence political rhetoric by projecting a favourable image of the British Protectorate government (Armour, 1984; Chibita, 2006).

However, to understand the historical dynamics of the broadcast media, Chibita (2006) points out the need to first appreciate the conditions under which the written press was established half-a-century earlier (p.104). Whereas the first printed media was established at the end of the 19th Century by Christian missionaries for evangelization purposes, the British colonial administration realized the potential of encouraging the development of the indigenous press, particularly in the dominant Luganda language (Gariyo, 1992, 1993; Chibita, 2006). The local press thrived and by the end of the Second World War, it had grown into a significant national mobilization force that warranted being countered by the colonial government (Chibita, 2006, p.105). Thus, following a series of recommendations starting with the Lord Plymouth report in 1937 as well as subsequent ones by the “Committee on Broadcasting Services in the Colonies”, a broadcasting survey of East Africa was finally completed by BBC engineers in early 1946; who then
proposed a broadcasting model akin to the one of the BBC, but favouring local language programming (Armour 1984, pp.359-365). After successful equipment tests in 1953, Uganda Broadcasting Service (UBS) radio went on air on 01 March 1954 (Armour, 1984, p.387; Chibita, 2006, p.108). During the launching, Governor Andrew Cohen outlined the objectives of the radio medium as including linking up the people of Uganda more closely with the colonial administration by informing them of what the government was doing for them; engendering confidence and securing cooperation in the measures necessary for the protectorate’s economic and social advancement; publicizing Uganda abroad and counteracting rumours and subversive propaganda (Armour, 1984, p.387).

While UBS initially broadcast in Luganda and English, Governor Cohen is reported to have told the Uganda Legislative Council on 18 December 1956 that the station was by then broadcasting also in Lunyoro, Luo and Ateso; and that 16,000 wireless radio sets had been imported into the country in the previous two years (Ibid.). The UBS operated under the Colonial Ordinance Act, which significantly curtailed media freedoms. Upon Uganda’s independence from Britain on 09 October 1962, UBS was renamed Radio Uganda and became the mouthpiece of the post-independence government broadcasting in more than 20 local languages (Chibita, 2006, p.117). At the eve of the country’s first independence anniversary on 08 October 1963, Uganda Television joined Radio Uganda on the country’s airwaves (Ibid.).

2.1.1 Liberalization of the broadcast sector

The liberalization and privatization of the media sector in Uganda ought to be situated in the wider context of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund that started in 1987 (Chibita, 2006, p.116; Banda, 2010, p.132). With the liberalization of the economies of Africa also came the push to open up the hitherto monopolized mass media sector. In the case of Uganda, the media market had since the 1950s been monopolized by the Government of Uganda (GoU), which controlled both the national radio and television. Banda (2010) points out that during the 1990s, the economic policies of deregulation, privatization and commercialization reconfigured the media landscape in most of sub-Saharan Africa (p.132). In Uganda, Chibita (2006) points out that the privatization of the broadcast sector was due to a combination of ‘private demand’ and ‘patrimonous connections’ (p.116). As was the case in other sub-Saharan Africa countries, private media soon started to compete for audiences and the broadcast revolution on the continent was born. The first private radio station in Uganda was Radio Sanyu 88.2FM, which went on air in August 1993. Two months later in October 1993, another private radio station, Capital Radio 91.3 FM was testing its equipment on air (Kemigisha, 1998). A breakdown of the radio stations by the Uganda Media Council shows that the spread of private radio stations now covers every region of the country (Media Council, 2010). While the private radio sector continues to grow, Chibita (2006) analyses the ownership dynamics concluding that the “State controls most frequencies” and that even the so-called community stations are in reality owned by powerful sponsors notably European multilateral agencies (p.127). She further notes how the ownership regime of Uganda’s private media is extremely narrow since “the largest number of private stations in Uganda are owned by active politicians mostly from the ruling NRM and by churches or religious organizations” (Ibid.). In a related study, Lugalambi et al. (2010) concur that while initially FM stations were predominantly
owned by private business people who appeared to be primarily motivated by profit, a new trend has emerged of politicians setting up FM radio stations targeting their constituents (p.18). The trend in ownership of private radio is skewed towards the ruling government to such a degree that “several powerful politicians connected to the ruling NRM were able to obtain licences even during a period of an official ban on the issuance of licences” (Chibita, 2006, p.129). Further, all the powerful cultural institutions in the country such as the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Tooro and Busoga each own a radio station (Ibid.). With regard to geographical distribution, the study by Chibita (2006) established that most commercial stations are concentrated in urban centers, the vast majority in Kampala the capital city, leaving a few community stations to cater for rural dwellers that constitute 80% of the Ugandan population (p.128). A worrying trend for media freedoms in Uganda is the fact that opposition politicians are often barred from owning radio stations (Chibita, p.129; Lugalambi et al., 2011, pp.6-7; HRW, 2010, p.6). And worse, the opposition is increasingly being denied a platform on radio stations across the country as was the case during the national campaigns leading to the February 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections where paid announcements by opposition presidential candidates were declined by several stations and in a number of cases scheduled broadcasts of opposition politicians cancelled (Habati & Masinde, 2010; HRW, 2010, pp.42-44; HURINET, 2010; Lugalambi et al., 2011, p.3-6; EU, 2011, p.26).

With respect to access, radio is acknowledged as the medium that reaches the majority of Ugandans, particularly those who cannot read or are not schooled in English, which is the dominant language of most print media and television outlets. Quoting data from the Uganda National Household Survey 2006, Lugalambi et al. (2010) state that 60.8%
Ugandans owned a radio set with 74.8% in urban centres and 58.2% in rural areas (p.18). In a 2009 private study conducted by the Steadman Group (now Synovate), however, “89 per cent of Ugandans said radio was their main source of news and 97 per cent of households owned a radio set” (Ibid.). As internet penetration increases, more and more radio and television stations are becoming accessible online, thus opening up the discussion of contentious national issues beyond the control of government (Uwe, 2012; Jumptv.com, 2012). With respect to demographic media, 101.7 Mama FM was established in 1993 by the Uganda Media Women’s Association (UMWA) “to provide development information to women and other marginalized groups…” (UMWA, 2010). The program line-up of the station covers a wide range of development issues (Ibid.).

From the perspective of the political economy of the radio sector, Mutere & Ugangu (2004) note that while the liberalization of airwaves has brought dramatic changes in East Africa’s media landscape, a key problem remains the hyper-commercialized media regimes whereby radio stations “find it more cost effective to recycle Western music…than to invest in generating quality local productions for their outlets” (p.73). They also observe that most of the broadcast outlets are urban based, with the effect that “voices and perceptions of rural people are given minimal attention” (Ibid.). In a study of Uganda’s political talk-radio, Mwesige (2004) noted that while the broadcasts provided a valuable opportunity to citizens as well as political groups to debate issues, the discourses were often “adulterated” and degenerated into “uninformed opinion, bias, gossip, and kicks” (p.192). Despite such a negative indictment on the performance of political talk-radio, Mwesige (op.cit.) concludes that “however imperfect the discourse facilitated by
talk radio, it still appears to be better for the democratic process than having no public debate at all” (pp. 200-201).

2.1.2 The Case of Mega FM and Radio Wa

Northern Uganda, which is the geographical focus of this study, has for a long time been underserved by the mass media. While private radio stations were established in the South/Central region as early as 1992, the first private radio stations in the north went on air a decade after. The first station in Gulu, Radio Four was launched in January 2001 as a partnership with Radio Eden, a British Evangelical radio, which provided the hardware (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p.211). Prior to that, Radio Freedom, an affiliate of the state-run Radio Uganda, was broadcasting from Gulu since 1989 but under the control of the Uganda army (Op.cit. p.210). In August 2002, Mega FM went on air fully funded by the British Department for International Development (DFID) with the specific task of promoting the peace process between the LRA and GoU. The name of the station, “Mega”, was chosen to highlight the idea that it belonged to the community since it means “mine” in the local Luo language (Ibid.).

In the central-northern town of Lira, Radio Wa FM 89.8 went on air earlier than Mega FM on 01 January 2001 to service the Lango region, also affected by the LRA insurgency. Like its counterpart Radio Four that started in Gulu with funding from a British evangelical group, Radio Wa was established by the Roman Catholic diocese of Lira with funding from the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF). The SCIAF website states that the station was launched to “encourage child soldiers who had
been abducted and recruited by the Lord’s Resistance Army to return home to their villages free from fear of reprisal” (SCIAF, 2012).

In addition to Mega FM and Radio Wa, the northern region is now serviced by more than a dozen private radio stations functioning pretty much under the same operational imperatives like their counterparts across the country. As of 10 June 2010 when there was still a government freeze on licensing new broadcasters, there were sixteen documented radio stations operating in the LRA affected northern region (GuluOgle, 2010). Given the specific circumstances of the region, however, it is observed that unlike most of their counterparts in other parts of the country that depend on commercial advertising, stations in Northern Uganda are mainly dependent on funding from Western non-governmental organisations such as Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR), Norwegian Refugee Council, World Vision, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF) and several others (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). In the case of Mega FM, Brisset-Foucault (2011) discusses how its affiliation to the GoU gives it undue advantage over other stations in the region as it is often the only station that gets advertisements from government agencies. She also argues that the peace programming on Mega FM sets an agenda for favourable funding from the NGOs working in the region; thus permitting the station to have the best equipment and pool of journalists (Op.cit, p.211, 213-214).

The foregoing sub-section shows that the radio sector in Uganda is vibrant and has been expanding to cover previously underserved regions across the country. But as radio stations increase, so does the need by government to regulate the sector. While the broadcast regulatory regime was slow in developing, Ugandan law books have over the years become replete with regulations that seek to purportedly streamline the sector.
Whereas some of these laws are a legacy of the British colonial government, most have been instituted by the NRM government and they remain a challenge to the sector.

### 2.2 Uganda’s media regulatory framework and implications for peace media

Proponents of the Peace Journalism model, the conceptual focus of this dissertation, highlight the professional imperative of committing to justice, balance, and fairness in the coverage of issues (Messman, 2001; Lee, 2008). Yet, a dedication to the imperatives of journalism in emerging democracies almost inevitably puts journalists and political leaders at loggerheads. In the case of Uganda, the site of confrontation is laid out in the country’s plethora of media laws and regulations. A historical analysis of Uganda’s media regulatory frameworks shows that current media laws are a legacy of previous regimes, sometimes going back as far as the colonial British administration. Press historians on Uganda agree that since colonial days, no single government has ever unconditionally recognised the necessity of a free press (Gariyo, 1992, 1993; Mwesige, 2004; Chibita, 2006; Sewanyana et al., 2007; Lugalambi, et al., 2010 & 2011). According to Gariyo (1993), “the relationship between the press and the State has always been one of struggle and, more specifically, the struggle by the former to exist” (p.1).

Observers of media freedom in Uganda argue that the country is actually slipping into repression through enacting more restrictive laws as well as deployment of State agents against journalists (Sewanyana et al., 2007; Nalugo & Kusasira, 2008; Lugalambi &Tabaire, 2010; Lugalambi et al., 2011; HRW, 2010; HURINET, 2010; Amnesty International, 2011). According to the press freedom rankings released by Reporters
without Borders in January 2012, Uganda had slipped 43 places to the 139th position out of 179 countries surveyed. The report states that: “Led by President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda … launched an unprecedented crackdown on opposition movements and independent media after the elections in February [2011]” and that journalists “were the targets of violence and surveillance during the presidential election in February and were targeted again during the brutal crackdown on the ‘Walk to Work’ protests later in the year, when dozens of journalists were arrested” (Natabaalo, 2012).46 In eight subsections below, I discuss the regulatory frameworks that impinge on freedoms of the media in Uganda; while paying attention to those clauses that GoU insists work against public order, safety and therefore promote violent outcomes.

2.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 47

The 1995 Constitution is the supreme law of Uganda, and was produced following a highly participatory and consultative national exercise under the 1994 Consultative Assembly. To date, the Ugandan Constitution is hailed as one of the most progressive pieces of legislation on the African continent (ACHPR Report, 2009, p.68). With regard to the mass media, Article 29 (1) (a) guarantees media freedoms:

“Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media” (Uganda, 1995a).


In Article 41(1), those freedoms are enhanced by the guarantee of access to information, albeit with important qualifications:

“Every citizen has a right of access to information in the possession of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the privacy of any other person” (Ibid.).

In addition to the fact that it is only “citizens” who are guaranteed access to information in possession of the State and its agencies, the other qualifications relating to the security and sovereignty of the State as well as those related to the privacy of individuals have over the years been deployed by government functionaries to deny journalists crucial public-interest information under the cloak of "classified information". Actually, Article 41(2) added a qualification that was to become an issue of contention for years:

"Parliament shall make laws prescribing the classes of information referred to in clause (1) of this article and the procedure for obtaining access to that information" (Ibid.)

While the Access to Information Act was enacted in 2005 and finally made Article 41(2) operational, Sewanyana et al. (2007) observe that most government functionaries still ignore the new law as is discussed in sub-section 2.2.3 below. In addition to Article 41(1) above, however, Article 43 (1) stipulates further qualifications that:

“In the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in this Chapter, no person shall prejudice the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others or the public interest” (Uganda, 1995a).
Whereas the Constitution does not define what public interest is, it gives what it is not. Article 43(2) (a) (b) and (c) read:

"2) Public interest under this article shall not permit – a) political persecution; b) detention without trial; c) any limitation of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by this Chapter beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society, or what is provided in this Constitution" (Ibid.).

While Article 43 is a fair reminder that enjoyment of rights goes with an obligation to respect the rights of others, government functionaries often cite Article 43 to deny journalists information on government operations.

From the above articles, it is clear that the Constitutional guarantees to media freedoms are limited and as the sections below show, what it gives with one hand, other laws take away with another; causing significant frustration to journalists as they are often charged under various laws (FES, 2010, p.12). Although government has lost most cases brought against journalists on appeal, court appearances are costly and emotionally draining to journalists. Further, the numerous charges brought against journalists over time engender a culture of self-censorship and often lead to journalists abandoning the profession altogether (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.7, 19; HRW, 2010, p.3). More so, the enduring debates in Parliament on various Bills relating to the mass media create an atmosphere of journalism under siege and over time wears down journalistic morale and industry. In seven subsections below, I present and discuss the most salient of these media laws that present a huge challenge to journalism practice in the country, paying attention to how each of them has kept evolving.
While this is a study of the broadcast media, most print media houses in Uganda also own radio stations and the journalists often file for all outlets. When they are not charged in courts, they are summoned before the Media Council, which is a statutory body established under the Press and Journalist Act of 1995, amended in 2000 but without significant changes to the mother version. In all its versions, the main objective of the Law has remained the professionalising of journalism practice in Uganda by instituting minimum standards for editors and journalists as well as empowering the GoU to oversee the licensing and certification of journalists – print and broadcast (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.20). Its most recent form is the Press and Journalist (Amendment) Bill 2010, which in the preamble captures its spirit:

“That an Act to amend the Press and Journalist Act in order to provide for registration of newspapers; to require that the editor of a newspaper shall ensure that what is published is not prejudicial to national security; to rationalize the composition of the media council; to provide for licensing of newspapers; to increase the membership of the disciplinary committee; to provide for expeditious disposal of complaints before the disciplinary committee; to provide for offences and penalties and to provide for other related matters” (Uganda, 2010).

A significant addition to the previous Act is the amount of powers to the Media Council to determine, for example, what amounts to “material that is prejudicial to national security, stability and unity” (FES 2010, p.12). A closer look at the 2010 Bill clearly

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shows that the spirit is to make operational the previous versions of the Press and Journalist Act without making any effort to address the concerns raised over the years. In this regard, the contentious sections of the previous Acts ought to be analysed from the mother laws. What has remained a point of contention for years with the national and international journalism fraternity is Part IV, Sections 13-20 which established the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda (NIJU) designed “to establish and maintain professional standards for Journalists”, which standards include being a holder of a university degree in journalism or equivalent qualifications. As Sewanyana et al. (2007) point out, several media houses in Uganda employ people without the minimum requirements in the law and many of these people have done tremendous work in the media industry and have received international awards for their work (p.21). For instance, a survey conducted by the Human Rights Network of Journalists (HRNJ) in late 2005 established that 65% of practicing journalists had a diploma or certificate and only 15% had a degree (Ibid.). The study further established that “as many as 20% have no formal training at all but have gained on the job experience” (Ibid.).

The other issue of contention has remained Sections 26-29 under Part IV of the Act on “regulation of public practice” in which anyone who wishes to practice journalism in Uganda must obtain a practicing certificate that carries a fee and is renewable each year (Ibid.). According to Sewanyana et al. (2007), a survey of journalists in 2007 revealed that out of the hundreds of practicing journalists, there were only forty-six on the register, all of whom from the electronic media (p.22). He observes that human rights bodies are opposed to this practice because the requirements for registration and certification of media practice were not only unrealistic, but would curtail the ability of the mass media
as a free ground for exchange of opinions even among non-journalists (Ibid.). In Sections 8-12 of Part III, the Act established the Media Council as the primary regulatory body, whose many functions include exercising “disciplinary control over journalists, editors and publishers” as well as “censor films, videotapes, plays and other related apparatuses for public consumption” (Uganda, 1995b).

In Part VII of the Act, a disciplinary committee is set up to handle complaints that arise between journalists and their various publics (Ibid.). While the Council had since its establishment been inactive, Lugalambi et al (2010) observe that from 2008 to 2009 the State had referred to the council 53 cases that were filed by the police (p.32). He further points out that the Council had actually dismissed all the cases referred to them “on technical grounds” (Ibid.). Sewanyana et al. (2007) argue that the Media Council has no justifiable function except to suppress the media since it has never stepped in to influence the government not to prosecute a journalist (p.23). He, as well as Lugalambi et al. (2010) concur that government, which typically has the most grievances against the mass media, still prefers prosecuting journalists to taking its cases for hearing by the Media Council. Since the Media Council is a government-controlled body whose role is to suppress critical media voices, Sewanyana et al. (2007) argue that it cannot play the role of an effective media regulator (Ibid.). Lugalambi et al (2010) argue for a non-statutory media regulator and hail the establishment of the Independent Media Council of Uganda (IMCU) (p.134).

However, in an opinion article, Mary Karooro Okurut, the Minister of Information and National Guidance faulted the quality of Ugandan journalism and defended the mandate of the various statutory media regulators as well as the obtaining laws:
“There are too many embarrassing errors of fact - erroneously referred to by the same media as ‘factual errors’- some of them on the front pages of otherwise reputable newspapers. These are usually caused by poor news gathering techniques, lack of tradition of rigorous cross-checking of facts and downright poor editing. It is interesting that in many news outlets, the editors, who ought to be the gatekeepers, ensuring quality control, are themselves either untrained in journalism or are novices in the profession so that they have no idea which street they are on” (Karooro, 2012).

She further faults the content in Ugandan media:

“Even the news itself has, in many instances, tended to be of low quality. There is often a huge disconnect between the content of press conferences and the coverage offered in the news bulletins thereafter. Journalists often choose the sensational rather than the important, showing a rather skewed and narrow appreciation of news value” (Ibid.).

With this kind of thinking from high government functionaries, it is no surprise that more regulatory arms of government keep cropping up. For instance in 2005, the NRM government established a Media Centre which seems to be in competition with the Media Council, particularly in the accreditation of foreign journalists (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.14). The website of the Media Centre explains the background to its establishment thus:

“H.E. [His Excellency] the President decided to establish the Uganda Media Centre in September 2005. The main idea was to introduce professional management of government media relations. In order to achieve this, it was understood that this institution would exist and operate outside ordinary public service structures”.

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The twelve aims and objectives of the Centre are outlined and include to “provide professional media and communication services to government departments; standardize government communication; ensure that the government’s voice is given a fair hearing” among others (Ibid.). The role of the Centre and its conflicting mandate with the statutory Media Council emerged in 2006 with the expulsion of Blake Lambert, a Canadian journalist corresponding for *The Economist* and *The Christian Science Monitor.* The BBC quoted Robert Kabushenga, then director of the Media Centre as having told Reuters News Agency that: "Lambert is generally an unwanted person here. He consistently misrepresented and misreported the [Ugandan] situation" (Ibid.). In this particular case, Sewanyana et al. (2007) argue that the Media Centre usurped the powers of the statutory Media Council by refusing to renew the accreditation of Lambert (p.28). In another move, the accreditation of BBC correspondent Will Ross was shortened from one year to four months (Ibid.).

In the newly enacted Press and Journalist (Amendment) Bill 2010, however, the role of the Media Council is re-asserted and revamped. The website of the Media Centre no longer flags its earlier role of assisting the Council in the accreditation of journalists. Overall, however, the journalism fraternity remains resolute in promoting the voluntary Independent Media Council of Uganda (IMCU); even when GoU is not heeding calls to allow this self-regulation mechanism to override the statutory regulation mechanism led by bodies such as the Media Council and Broadcasting Council (Lugalambi et al. 2010, p.134).

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2.2.3 The Access to Information Act of 2005 (No.6) [and Access to Information Regulations of 2007] 53

The Access to Information Act 2005 was enacted mainly to make operational Article 41(2) of the Constitution on the right of access to information in possession of the State or her agencies. Sewanyana et al. (2007) state that the Act is “premised on the principle that public bodies hold information not for themselves, but as custodians of the public good, and everyone has a right to access this information, subject to clearly defined rules established by law” (p.54). He adds that the enactment of this law is “central to the development of participatory democracy, ensuring governmental accountability and strengthening the fight against corruption” (Ibid.).

Sewanyana et al. (2007) argue that the Act has significant limitations, particularly the definition of a “public body” in Section 2, which he insists should have been more expansive to include, “any authority or body established under the Constitution or by government law…” (p.55). He further faults the Act for not being applicable to certain information such as “cabinet records and the records of court proceedings among others” (Ibid.). One of the other points of contention with journalists is Section 10 of the Act that institutes the position of an Information Officer in every public body to whom a formal application for access to information would be made. Further in the Act, Section 34 gives the Information Officer powers to disclose information if the public’s interest in the disclosure outweighs the danger of withholding information. According to Sewanyana et

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al. (2007), the twenty-one days in which an Information Officer can make the decision is counter to the time-bound professional imperatives in which journalists work (p.55).

In Sections 37 and 38, the complaints procedure in case the application to access some records has been denied is laid out. The procedure includes filing a case before a magistrate’s court and if the applicant is not satisfied with the magistrate’s ruling, there is the possibility for appeal in the High Court. Sewanyana et al. (2007) provide some of the cases in which journalists have invoked the Act to access information from State agencies and were denied (p.58). He concludes that “in practice the coming into force of the Act has not changed the attitude of public officials who cannot provide information without the consent of superior authority” (p.58).

In order to revamp Part II on “Access to Records” of the Access to Information Act 2005, a few changes were introduced to the Act as the Access to Information Regulations 2007. To the disappointment of journalists and human rights bodies, none of the amendments changed the spirit of the original Act. The regulations seem clearly intended to protect the powers of the Information Officer and also streamline the modes of paying for the information provided.

2.2.4 Official Secrets Act, 1964 (Cap 302)\textsuperscript{54}; The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002\textsuperscript{55} [and the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010]

As a requirement for appointment in the civil service, candidates must swear an oath of secrecy as stipulated in the Official Secrets Act 1964. This law, in effect, empowers


public officials to not release information to the public which they consider might be prejudicial to the State contrary to Section 2 of the Act (Uganda 1964). Section 4 on wrongful communication of information also carries provisions that public officials can use to defend their refusal to release information to journalists or the public contrary to the spirit of The Access to Information Act 2005 (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.57). Further, Section 6 on “interfering with officers of the police or members of the armed forces” can also be invoked to prevent journalists from accessing certain venues that would be classified as prohibited from access, such as the LRA war zone of Northern Uganda.

In the same spirit of the Official Secrets Act 1964, the Parliament of Uganda in July 2010 passed the Interception of Communication Bill, referred to by Ugandans as the “Phone tapping Bill”. This law authorizes government security agencies to tap private conversations as part of wider efforts to combat terrorism-related offences in the country. Amnesty International argues that this Act “gives the government far-reaching discretion in surveillance and interception of all forms of communication and that it lacks adequate safeguards and threatens freedom of expression” (Amnesty International, 2011). One of the amendments that caused significant debate in the country relates to the fact that all mobile phone subscribers in the country are obligated to register their SIM cards for security purposes (Mulondo, 2010).

In Section 8 of the Interceptions Act, all communication service providers have an obligation to enable interception of communication. Section 8(1) (f) states that service providers have a duty to ensure that “intercepted communications are transmitted to the monitoring centre via fixed or switched connection as may be specified by the Minister” (Ibid.). In this respect, Amnesty International argues that “the broad and undefined basis
for interception of communication also allows for possible intrusion into communications of individuals and professionals – such as journalists, human rights defenders and political dissidents engaged in legitimate activities and exercising their human rights, including freedom of expression and association” (Ibid.).

One of the main reasons the Interceptions Act was introduced was to reinforce the provisions of Part VII (Interception of Communications and Surveillance) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 (FES 2010, p.14). In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA, countries allied to the USA moved to outlaw organizations they considered terrorist. In the case of Uganda, the Anti-Terrorism Act was enacted in 2002 and in addition to identifying some terrorist organizations notably the LRA in the Second Schedule; the Act also imposed a significant burden on the mass media with regard to coverage of any terrorist organization or its activities in Section 11. Under Section 9(1), the Act makes it a criminal offence, among others, to publish and disseminate news or materials “that promote terrorism” without precisely defining what is implied by the term “terrorism”. Section 24 further stipulates a possible death sentence or a long prison sentence on those who would violate the law (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.32). Further, Section 3 (1) (c) of the Third Schedule of the Act violates journalistic ethics by clearly excluding “journalistic material which a person holds in confidence and which consists of documents or of records other than documents” from the list of items that are subject to legal privilege during terrorist investigations (FES 2010,p.13). In Section 11, the Act makes it criminal for journalists to meet or speak with people or groups considered being terrorists. But probably the point of most contention is Sections 11 and 15 in which the Act seeks to compel journalists to disclose sources of information, which contravenes
journalistic norms on protection of information sources. Sewanyana et al. (2007) rightly point out that the Act makes reporting in conflict areas particularly difficult, adding that the law impacts directly on the mass media’s ability to cover the conflict in Northern Uganda and to make possible the cover up of abuses committed by security personnel (p.32). It ought to be recalled that in closing The Monitor newspaper in 2002 over a story implicating the army, security agencies were quick to invoke the Anti-Terrorism Act (Balikowa, 2006). 56

2.2.5 The Electronic Media Act, 1996 (Cap 104) Amendment 2000 57

While the Press and Journalist Act 1995 as discussed in Section 2.2.2 above is concerned with regulating the practice of print journalists and of the print mass media, the Electronic Media Act was enacted to regulate the broadcast media and broadcast journalists (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.23). The preamble defines it as:

“An Act to provide for the setting up of a broadcasting council to license and regulate radio and television stations, to provide for the licensing of television sets, to amend and consolidate the law relating to electronic media and to provide for other related matters” (Uganda 1996, p.3).

In Part II of the Act, the conditions for the installation of television and radio stations are laid out, specifying in Section 2 the issuing of broadcast licenses for TV and Radio stations as well as licenses for the operation of a cinematic theatre or video library by the

56In October 2002, The Monitor newspaper journalist Frank Nyakairu reported that a UPDF helicopter had been shot down in Northern Uganda by the LRA. The NRM regime was so enraged by the report and sent up to 50 security personnel to confiscate computers, documents and mobile phones of journalists and editors. Journalist Nyakairu and three Monitor editors were charged for publishing “a false report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace” (Amnesty International, 2002; Ojwee & Moro, 11 October 2002; Balikowa, 2006).

Broadcasting Council (Ibid.). Section 3 stipulates the registration of the broadcast media by the Media Council; while Section 4(b) requires that proprietors or producers of broadcasting stations retain a record of all that is broadcast for a period of not less than 30 days (Ibid.). Part III of the Act establishes the Broadcasting Council whose roles include coordinating, exercising control over and supervising broadcasting activities. In Section 10(b), some of the functions of the Broadcasting Council including “standardizing, planning, managing, and allocating the frequency spectrum dedicated to broadcasting and to allocate those spectrum resources in such a manner as to ensure the widest possible variety of programming and optimal utilisation of those spectrum resources” (Uganda 1996, p.7). The minimum broadcasting standards are outlined in the First Schedule; while Section 10(1) (f) states that in conjunction with the Media Council, the Broadcasting Council arbitrates disputes between the public and the broadcast media and between operators of broadcast stations (Uganda 1996, p.8). Sewanyana et al. (2007) cite some of the cases in which the Broadcasting Council has been implicated directly in the affairs of the media:

- “On 11th August 2005, the BC [Broadcasting Council] took Kfm off air after the broadcast of a program on 10th August in which one of the Kfm journalists Andrew Mwenda, accused the government of transporting Sudanese Vice-President John Garang in a poor-quality helicopter [that killed him] and described the President as a “coward” and a “failure”. According to the BC, the program had failed to meet the standards set out in the first schedule. The station was allowed back on air on 18th August 2005” (Sewanyana et al., 2007, p.24)

- “On 26th August 2004, Radio Simba featured a discussion on discrimination against homosexual individuals in Uganda. The BC imposed a fine of $1000 on
the station and ordered it to apologise for having offended a wide section of the Public. According to the BC, the program offended public morality” (p.25).

- “The Broadcasting Council was also implicated in the raid and closure of Choice FM in Gulu in February 2006. Police arrested Program Manager Martin Ojara Mapenduzi and accused the station of being a security threat. The accusation stemmed from a talk show featuring the opposition candidate for the District Chairman seat Norbert Mao and the incumbent, NRM candidate Colonel Walter Ochora. Mao had apparently harshly criticized the local and military authorities and accused them of corruption and mistreatment of local citizens” (Ibid.)

- “In February 2006, the UPDF raided Unity FM in Lira and arrested the station manager Jimmy Onapa, journalist Paul Odongo and two others. The arrests were the result of their reports of a meningitis outbreak in Moroto region and their remarks that additional NRM supporters were being moved into the region to increase attendance at an upcoming NRM presidential campaign rally. The BC explained that they had temporarily closed the station because of the reckless remarks made regarding the meningitis outbreak” (p.25).

- As discussed in Section 1.1 of this dissertation, following the September 2009 riots in Central Uganda, the Broadcasting Council invoked the Electronic Media Act 1996 to close five radio stations, one television talk-show and the banning of the popular interactive open-air-talk-shows (ebimeeza) that often aired on several radio stations across the country (HRW, 2010, p.34; IRIN, 2009; Bareebe, 2009; Wandera, 2009; Ntale, 2009). Several journalists including Aloysius Matovu, Irene Kisekka, and Ben Mutebi all of Radio Sapientia were suspended by the Council.58

In the final analysis, Sewanyana et al. (2007) argue that the provisions in the Electronic Media Act and the manner in which the Broadcasting Council is exercising the wide

58 Interview with Engineer Godfrey Mutabazi, Chairman of the Uganda Broadcasting Council, Kampala, 07 January 2010
powers granted to it open the door to censorship and stand as a threat to freedom of expression (p.26). They further point out that the mere existence of these provisions in the legislation as well as their ambiguity raises the potential for self-censorship among the media as they attempt to comply (Ibid.). In a 2010 report, Human Rights Watch further catalogues the shortcomings of a restrictive media regime.  

2.2.6 The Uganda Communications Act No.8, 1997 [and The Uganda Communications (Amendment) Bill No.27, 1997] as well as The Uganda Communications Act 2000 (Cap 106)

With the rapidly expanding communications sector, GoU deemed it necessary to develop a regulatory framework to manage it. In 1997, the Uganda Communications Act No.8 came into force; with minor amendments in Bill No.27 of 1997. The UCC 1997 Act was further amended in 2000, but hardly changing the gist of the mother law. In Sections 4-13 of Part II, the procedure for the establishment of the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), its functions, powers and mandate are laid out. In what appears to be a duplication of roles with the Broadcasting Council, the UCC Act in Part V Sections 24-28 outlines the roles of the UCC as including the licensing of radio and telecommunications as well as allocating radio frequency spectrum (Uganda, 1997a). In Section 27 (1), the “Commission shall be the exclusive authority to issue (a) licenses for radio communications apparatus and spectrum use…” Section 28 states that

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59 The report discusses the criminal charges against journalists (pp.14-22), the physical assault of journalists by security forces (pp.25-26) as well as a catalogue of journalists that have been summoned and/or charged (p.59). See A Media Minefield: Increased Threats to Freedoms of Expression in Uganda. URL in August 2012 at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda0510webwcover.pdf


“Notwithstanding any other law, the Commission shall have the exclusive duty to (a) plan, monitor, manage and allocate the use of radio frequency spectrum.” Part IX of the Act gives the UCC enforcement powers including investigating complaints, instituting enquiries and appointing inspectors (Ibid.).

In his analysis of the roles of the UCC, Sewanyana et al. (2007) note that “the powers granted to the UCC duplicate the powers bestowed on the Broadcasting Council as it relates to licensure of radio stations and allocation of frequency” and that “any difference is a matter of rhetoric and much confusion remains regarding the specific powers of the two bodies” (p.26). They argue that “such overlap creates duplication of government effort, misallocation of resources, and undue burden on media operators to comply with duplicate procedures” (Ibid.). Further, such duplication “creates confusion regarding responsibility and accountability of Government as it relates to regulation of the media in as far as the UCC is responsible for advising the Government on communication policies and legislative measures in respect of the provision and operation of communication services, much like the Broadcasting Council advises Government on all matters relating to broadcast policy” (p.26).

2.2.7 The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) Act 2005

The UBC Act is the law that not only set the ground for the merger of the two public broadcasters, Radio Uganda and Uganda Television into the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC); but also provides a legal framework for affiliated public broadcasters such as Mega FM in Gulu. Lugalambi et al (2010) point out that the spirit in the UBC Act
2005 was shaped by the Uganda Broadcasting Policy 2004. In view of streamlining the mandate of the UBC, the Policy defined public broadcasting thus:

“A system of broadcasting that is accountable to the public, and operated on a non-profit basis in order to meet the full range of public information needs in the overall public interest. It may be funded by government grants, licence fees on receivers, loans from government, organizations or persons, donations, proceeds from any of its functions and activities, advertising revenue or a combination of these” (Lugalambi et al., 2010, p.79).

One of the strategies set out in the Policy was to “provide an enabling legislation for the establishment of a public broadcaster”, which was the UBC Act 2005. The Act, therefore, established the UBC as the public broadcaster with objectives including to:

“Develop the broadcasting bodies into a public national broadcasting centre of excellence, for the purpose of providing electronic media and consultancy services that educate and guide the public; achieve and sustain comprehensive national radio and television coverage; and achieve and sustain a common carrier status” (Ibid.).

One of the contentious issues that Chibita (2006, p.142) and Lugalambi et al (2010, p.81) point out is that while the Act claims to establish a national broadcaster, it also states that the Corporation will be “wholly owned” by the government. Actually among the functions of the UBC is to “reflect the government vision regarding the objective, composition and overall management of broadcasting services” (Lugalambi et al, p.81). Further, Chibita (2006, p.142) and Lugalambi et al. (2010, p.83) point out the contradictory mandate of the UBC as stipulated in Section 13 which on the one hand calls for ‘enhancing profitability’ of the Corporation, while on the other calling for an efficient
public broadcaster. They argue that the imperative of making profits and being a public broadcaster are at cross-purposes.

What remains a point of frustration with public broadcasting in Uganda is the fact that it remains largely a mouthpiece of the ruling NRM. For instance, Sewanyana et al. (2007) provide an analysis of the imbalanced coverage of the 2006 presidential elections, showing that the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni of the NRM got 88.5% coverage on UBC TV prime news compared to 11.5% coverage for Dr. Kiiza Besigye his main challenger (p.33). On UBC radio, Museveni enjoyed 61% coverage while Besigye had 9.7% (Ibid.). In the elections of February 2011, the European Union Monitoring Group in a report noted that while the UBC was the broadcaster with the widest national reach owing to its repeater and sister stations, it had during the election campaigns “remained subservient to the interests of the government and the ruling party” (EU, 2011, p.26). The EU states:

“UBC Radio also used an increasingly negative tone towards the opposition parties as election day approached. UBC Television followed a similar pattern. Coverage of President Museveni and the NRM amounted to nearly fourteen hours, compared with just 56 minutes devoted to the President’s main challenger, Dr. Besigye, and the IPC. UBC Television was also embroiled in a row with the IPC for failing to air Dr. Besigye’s paid advertisements. Costing 19.8 million Uganda shillings, these advertisements were scheduled to run for one month from 4 December 2010 to 4 January 2011 but only a small fraction of them was aired” (p.28-29).
2.2.8 The Penal Code Act 1950 (Cap 120) Amendment 1998

One of the ways the NRM government has over the years enforced her version of responsible journalism was to invoke the Penal Code Act, which is to date the oldest and most repressive law in Uganda. The Penal Code is a colonial relic that contains a range of offenses that tend to render press practice in Uganda a hazardous undertaking. While two court rulings in 2004 and 2010 have seen some of the penal laws annulled, most provisions still remain in force and the chilling effect the numerous arrests and charges have created on journalists cannot be under-estimated. The provisions that have impacted on journalism practice in Uganda the most relate to sedition in Sections 41 and 42 of the Penal Code Act; while Sections 36 to 39 on importation of seditious publications have hardly been invoked.

Sedition can be committed in a number of ways that include doing acts or uttering words with a seditious intention; dealing in seditious publications that includes printing, publishing, selling, offering for sale, distribution, reproduction or importing. In Section 41(1), a seditious publication is one that has a seditious intention, which includes: (a) “to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person of the President, the Government as by law established or the Constitution; (b) to excite any person to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any matter of state as by law established; (c) to bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection against the administration of justice; and (h) to subvert or to promote the subversion of the

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63 Uganda. (1998). “The Penal Code Act 1950 (Cap 120).” URL in February 2012 at http://www.ulii.org/ug/legis/consol_act/pca195012096/. Note that the 1998 amendment (Cap 120) has several of the Sections re-arranged e.g. Section 51 in the 1950 law (Cap 106) is Section 50A and so on.
Government or the Administration of a District” (Uganda, 1998). Clause (2) stipulates those instances when an act, speech or publication shall not be deemed to be seditious. A reading of this Section shows the wide latitude the law provided to government to charge journalists on seditious charges. The law of sedition has for years formed the major basis upon which arrests of journalists were made and prosecutions carried out. Sewanyana et al. (2007) for instance provide some cases when the law has been invoked:

- “In August 2005, journalist Andrew Mwenda was arrested for making seditious statements against President Museveni and his government relating to the government’s alleged role in the death of Sudanese First Vice President John Garang. He was charged with sedition and promoting sectarianism under the Penal Code. He later filed a petition in the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the law against sedition as well as the law against promoting sectarianism. The petition was merged with a similar petition from the East Africa Media Institute Limited (EAMIL) in October 2006” (p.31).

- “The Editor in Chief of The Red Pepper, Richard Tumusiime was charged with sedition on February 16, 2007, after the publication the previous day of a story alleging that the State House had paid the Kabaka of Buganda $1 million to fire the Katikiro Dan Muliika. Mr. Tumusiime was released on bond” (Ibid.).

- In August 2010, journalist Timothy Kalyegira, the editor of the online news site Uganda Record, was charged with sedition for articles he published that questioned possible Ugandan government involvement in the 11 July 2010 bombings in Kampala, the Ugandan capital (CPJ, 04 August 2010).

In what was held as one of the most significant victories for the media in Uganda, the Constitutional Court on 25 August 2010 declared as unconstitutional the offense of criminal sedition that has been used over the years to prosecute journalists (Clottey, 25 August 2010). The ruling was based on a 2005 constitutional review petition filed jointly
by the East African Media Institute (represented by Haruna Kanaabi) and journalist Andrew Mwenda. The latter is the journalist who has been in Ugandan courts the most and by the time of the ruling he was facing up to 17 charges of sedition over his political radio and newspaper commentaries that are critical of the NRM government (CPJ, 26 August 2010). In the ruling, the panel of five judges, led by Deputy Chief Justice Leticia Mukasa Kikonyogo, unanimously held that sedition was in contravention of Article 29 of the Ugandan Constitution that guarantees the right to free speech. The judges also based their judgement on a precedent of the February 2004 ruling that annulled Section 50 of the Penal Code on "publishing false news". If the petition by the State attorney is unsuccessful and the ruling is upheld, more than a dozen journalists who have been charged with sedition in recent years would stand to benefit.

What was not annulled during the August 2010 ruling, however, was Section 42A (Statute 9 of 1988) of the Penal Code, otherwise known as the “anti-sectarian law”. This law was enacted by the NRM government purportedly to guard against rising discontent and disaffection among a group or body of persons on account of religion, tribe and ethnic origin. One of the first journalists charged under this law was George William Lugalambi, then editor of The Crusader newspaper, who was arrested in December 1998 for publishing an opinion article that questioned government's arming of the Bahima, an ethnic group to which President Museveni belongs (IFEX, 18 December 1998). Lugalambi was charged before Presiding Magistrate Jane Alividza in the Kampala Magistrate Court with "promoting sectarianism contrary to section 42A (i) (d) of the Penal Code Act as amended by Statute 9 of 1988" (Ibid.). The charges were in connection with an article The Crusader newspaper published on 19 November 1998.
titled “Karuhanga’s Excuse for Arming Bahima is Nonsense” (Ibid.). Prosecution held that Lugalambi published the article with the intent of promoting ill-will and hostility among the people of Nyabushozi in Mbarara district on the basis of their ethnicity (Ibid.). Related to the same story, journalist James Mujuni of The New Vision newspaper based in Mbarara was also arrested the same week for a follow up story on the same issue of guns in Bahima hands in Nyabushozi, the home place of President Museveni (Ibid.). Sewanyana et al. (2007) also recount that in June 2006, two journalists of The Weekly Observer, James Tumusiime and Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda were charged with promoting sectarianism for having reported in December 2005 on FDC accusations that the President and high ranking military officials were targeting Kizza Besigye for ethnic reasons and the journalists had to report to court on a monthly basis (p.31). During the 25 August 2010 Constitutional Court ruling that declared as unconstitutional criminal sedition, the panel of five judges did not concur with petitioner Andrew Mwenda to annul Section 42A on Sectarianism. In addition to the above journalists charged under this section, Mwenda also faces eight counts of "promoting sectarianism" (CPJ, 2010). Immediately after the ruling, he filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Despite the setback of the ruling on Section 42A, the Supreme Court had also on 11 February 2004 annulled Section 50 on “publication of false news”. The seven justices of the court unanimously agreed that Section 50 was inconsistent with article 29(1) (a) of the 1995 Uganda constitution that guarantees freedoms of expression and of the press. The Section stipulated that “any person who publishes a false statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public is guilty of a criminal offense” (Uganda, 1998). The ruling followed a successful appeal by journalists Charles
Onyango-Obbo and Andrew Mwenda. Lugalambi et al. (2010) quote Justice Joseph Mulenga, who gave the lead judgment as having observed that:

“… it is evident that the right to freedom of expression extends to holding, receiving and imparting all forms of opinions, ideas and information. It is not confined to categories, such as correct opinions, sound ideas or truthful information. Subject to the limitation under Article 43, a person’s expression or statement is not precluded from the constitutional protection simply because it is thought by another or others to be false, erroneous, controversial or unpleasant. Everyone is free to express his or her views. Indeed, the protection is most relevant and required where a person’s views are opposed or objected to by society or any part thereof, as ‘false’ or ‘wrong’” (p.36).

The above successes notwithstanding, the Penal Code is still replete with sections that criminalize journalism practice. For instance, Section 50A on “incitement to violence” can be invoked against journalists covering riots. Section 51 on “defamation of foreign princes” has been invoked in the past to convict journalists notably in February 1990 when journalists Festo Ebongu, Alfred Okware and Hussein Abdi were charged for “defaming” then visiting Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda by asking him “embarrassing” questions regarding his son accused of murder, his overstaying in power and business dealings with the South African racist regime (Mbaine, 2003, p.45-48). Many other journalists such as Haruna Kanaabi of the Shariat newspaper and Hussein Musa Njuki of Assalum were also charged in 1995 under the same law; and it remains on the law books to be used anytime the government deems appropriate (Ojambo, 2008, p.13; Mbaine, 2003, p.49-50).

Section 101 on contempt of court holds a potential danger to journalists and limits their freedoms to cover court proceedings; while sections 174 to 181 relating to defamation
and criminal libel have not been often invoked. Section 161 on “trafficking in obscene publications” has been invoked on a few cases against *The Red Pepper* tabloid newspaper. A newer Section 39A on publication of information prejudicial to security has gained importance given the rampant insecurity in the country and it is now supplemented by the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002.

While the Penal Code Act has recently suffered some setbacks, the GoU has resisted calls to repeal it completely like what Britain and most of her former colonies have done. By keeping most of the media sections in the law books, government is nurturing an environment that promotes censorship and self-censorship.

### 2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the history of the broadcast mass media in Uganda, with specific focus on radio. From its early years as a colonial project, radio has grown tremendously and now forms a core commercial entity for the country’s economy. As the mass media expanded, however, so did the need by government to control it through a stringent media regulatory regime. Whereas the 1995 Uganda Constitution clearly enshrines media freedoms, the plethora of laws and regulations place undue restrictions on the media’s ability to freely operate; as well as engendering self-censorship among the media (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.19). In addition to the crowded media law books, the multiplicity of bodies governing media operations with often duplicated roles such as the UCC, Media Council and Broadcasting Council fuel confusion and create a situation where the suppression and manipulation of media has been made easy (Sewanyana et al. 2007, p.27). Media law scholars in Uganda argue for a consolidated law on the media as well as bringing together all media bodies (Ibid.). There is also a growing momentum to
work towards a non-statutory regulatory regime in the form of the Independent Media Council of Uganda (IMCU) to promote professional self-regulation.\textsuperscript{64}

While the picture painted by the multiplicity of media laws and regulatory bodies casts a shadow on freedoms of expression and of the media, the 2004 and 2010 precedents of successful litigation to annul sections of the Penal Code Act are a welcome prospect. For journalists covering conflicts and violence in the country, the laws at the disposal of government remain a challenge.

With that in mind, this chapter ends the overview section of the dissertation; whose focus has been provision of background information on the research problem (violence in Uganda and the role radio plays) as well as on the radio broadcast landscape within its regulatory environment. Chapter Three below is the first of three chapters in which I present the key theories and concepts that inform the dissertation; starting with a discussion of journalism and communication theory.

PART TWO: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

Chapter 3: Anchorage in Mass Communication Theory

3.0 Introduction

While journalism and communication theory has grown into a vast field of inquiry, I have in this chapter drawn insight from four theories; each providing anchorage to the various strands of argument I advance in the dissertation. Those arguments are constructed as a contribution towards the applications of journalism and communication theory into the praxis of a world in quest of sustainable peace.

3.1 Framing theory

The theory of frame analysis, according to Baran & Davis (2006), is grounded on the notion that “people use expectations to make sense of everyday life” (p.281). Resse (2010) defines frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p.17). As a mass media theory, Entman (1993) conceptualizes framing as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p.52). The enterprise of journalism, points out Van Gorp (2010), entails a dynamic process of meaning construction and a constant process of creating social reality in which the role of the journalist is to “present additional layers of interpretation of issues and events in the form of a news story” (p.84). Resse (2010) also highlights the role journalists play in frame construction and calls for a good
understanding of journalism routines and values, which would inevitably help elucidate how and why certain frames are favoured over others (p.18). In its framing role, the media play a key function of assisting citizens to determine what is common sense or socially normal through both regular repetition and a preference for particular framings of events (Scott, 2001, p.137). D’Angelo & Kuypers (2010) take it further and point out the important dialectical relationship that exists between news sources who frame topics to make information interesting and pleasant to journalists, and the journalists who adopt such frames or often overlay their own set of frames to come up with the final hybrid framing of the events (p.1).

In the specific situation of news making, Perry (2002) cites extensively the frames developed by Galtung and Ruge (1965) that continue to guide reporters and editors in their news selection decisions. He enumerates twelve factors, eight of which are assumed to work in all cultures, while four factors presumably apply primarily within Western cultures. These frames, as outlined in Appendix 19, continue to feature as the conventional news values in journalism training literature (Mencher, 2006; Itule and Anderson, 1994). They include the frequency at which events occur, the cultural proximity or relevance of the event or issue, the unexpectedness of an event as well as whether a particular event concerns elite nations and elite people. The other key news value is whether the event has negative consequences (in Perry, 2002, p.107). It is observed that “the more of these factors an event embodies, the more likely that it will become news” and that “if an event is low on one factor, it will have to be high on another to become newsworthy” (Ibid.). In his study of news framing, Lugalambi (2006) argues that by selectively determining what to include and exclude, journalists allow
some frames to emerge at the expense of others, thus allowing the dominance of frames that support the status quo (p.134). On the part of the media consumers, he points out that while they are not necessarily beholden to the frames they happen upon, they cannot easily escape the undercurrent of issue framing that pervades public political discourse (p.140).

In frame analysis, Baran & Davis (2006) argue that it is crucial to understand the social-cultural as well as political context in which any particular framing takes place in view of establishing the consequences of those frames on a given society (p.285). Resse (2010) also argues that “frames don’t just arise as free-standing entities”, but are a product of “a web of culture” (p.18). He accordingly urges framing scholars to pay attention to how the frames emerge in their cultural contexts (p.18). Van Gorp (2010) also notes that culturally embedded frames are often the most appealing for journalists and media audiences since they tap into the already familiar ideas and social reality, thus making interpretation and internalization of messages easier (p.87). He points out that “each culture or subculture has a limited set of commonly used frames that are institutionalized in various ways and prized and protected for their ability to explain important issues” (p.88). Given the importance of culture in sponsoring frames, Van Gorp (2010) makes a case for what he calls “cultural competence”, which is a requirement for journalists to become conversant with the cultural contexts in which they are working or set to work in (p.142).

On their part, Brewer and Kimberly (2010) embark on the task of classifying media frames noting that “partisan frames”, for instance, are usually constructed and sponsored by actors in a given situation with the intent of moving public opinion in a manner
consonant with held positions or preferred policy outcomes (p.159). Other frames used by the mass media include “episodic (or anecdotal)”, “thematic (or abstract) frames”, “strategy or game frames” deployed mainly in political manoeuvring, as well as “the substance or issue frame” that is usually presented in the form of policy proposals (p.160). In an earlier classification of news framing, Iyengar (1991) explains that “to frame news episodically is to concentrate on isolated events or cases, whereas to frame news thematically is to present issues and events within their broader context” (p.2). On their part, Nelson & Willey (2001) distinguish between “issue frames, collective action frames, decision frames, news frames, and audience frames” (p. 246). They point out that “issue frames” are discourse-specific usually concerned with political discourse, while “collective action frames” are often deployed in the study of social movements, social protest, and collective action in general (Ibid.). While “decision frames” apply to interpretations made of particular facts, they point out that “news frames” can be classified as exogenous or endogenous. The former are often an outcome of the way the media industry functions at institutional and procedural levels, while the latter are mostly imposed internally on the news and are connected with the structural and production elements of news content (Ibid.). Finally, “audience frames” are the “observable outcomes of framing processes as measured by individual perceptions” (Ibid.).

In their study to investigate the impact of news frames on readers’ thoughts and on their ability to recall the information presented to them in a story, Valkenburg et al. (1999) observed that “the news media can have the capacity not only to tell the public what issues to think about but also how to think about them” (p. 567). Thus, argues Lugalambi (2006), “a frame is important insofar as it can determine whether people notice,
understand, and remember an issue [as well as] how people assess and decide to act upon an issue” (p.131). Likewise, Brewer and Kimberley (2010) also argue that frames keep interacting with each other and exposure to a rival frame can sometimes moderate or even neutralize the impact of a given frame; and that frames produce different effects depending on the credibility or lack thereof of the source (p.165). They point out other factors that impact on frames such as as repeated exposure to a message, the passage of time as well as interpersonal discourse (p.166).

As a method of inquiry, Van Gorp (2010) points out that framing is conceived as a deductive strategy whereby “a predefined and limited set of frames is invoked and where the empirical aim of the study is to decide to what extent these frames are applied…and which effects they produce” (p.91). The various framing devices that can be taken into account include “themes and subthemes, types of actors, actions and settings, lines of reasoning and causal connections…all of which contribute to the narrative and rhetorical structure of a text” (Ibid.). Other framing devices, according to Resse (2010), include specific linguistic structures such as metaphors, visual icons, and catchphrases that communicate frames” (p.19). In his study of framing, Lugalambi (2006) points out that “the units of observation or analysis commonly used are the message (news, campaign rhetoric, and arguments); textual components (words, sentences, and paragraphs); the individual (recall of information and opinion about an issue); and the social system (behaviour and attitudes of institutions and audiences)” (p.127). He concludes that “framing is largely operationalized by measuring the effects, occurrence, location, nature, structure, usage, and interpretation of frames in various forms of media and public discourses” (Ibid.). On his part, Resse (2010) draws attention to the significance of “the
‘what’ is being framed (frame-building) and the “how” the framing is taking place” (p.19). He argues that the “What” of framing analysis leads the researcher to examine latent aspects of the text, notably the reasoning devices as well as specific keywords that constitute the underlying frames (p.19). Van Gorp (2010) concludes that in most studies of news framing, the conflict frame is often omnipresent (p.87).

Bringing the conceptualization about framing to bear on the discussions about Peace Journalism, Rukhsana (2010) puts it succinctly: “Thus it follows that if the agenda of the media is for peace and the framing is done in a manner that aims to promote rapprochement, then it can influence public opinion towards the resolution of conflict” (p.336). For instance in the specific case of the LRA insurgency, Muto-Ono p’Lajur (2006) points out how the framing of the war by journalists was skewed in favour of the GoU side. He points out that the mass media often blamed only the LRA combatants for all the atrocities, even in cases when it was clear that some of the carnage had been inflicted by the GoU forces (p.82). He points out how the situation was further complicated by the fact that the LRA did not give any prominence to media propaganda as the government army did (Ibid.). He further notes how statistics were misused by the government to misrepresent the casualty figures: “Journalists quote official sources that often exaggerate figures of the enemy in their favour” (p.82). In her analysis of media coverage of the LRA-GoU peace talks in 2008, Birungi (2009) highlights the problematic framing of the peace process whereby “the journalists found themselves looking for news values of prominence, conflict, drama, novel and trivial” (p.112). She notes that the framing was influenced by several factors including the journalists’ lack of confidence in
the peace process, the unpredictable actions of the actors on the negotiating table as well as editorial policies and journalistic routines (p.112).

One major critique of news framing that informs this dissertation is the fact that deconstructions of conventional news frames are often rare in the mainstream media. For instance, Resse (2010) points out how frame contestation is often slow amongst journalists due to the “professional constraints” such as objectivity, which makes it harder for journalists to mount their own frames of issues for fear of being accused of subjectivity (p.37). In other cases, however, there is simply no time or cultural competence to engage in useful reframing of issues. For instance in the coverage of African conflicts such as the LRA insurgency, local media houses depend to a large extent on news feeds from international agencies such as Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP) and others. This is due to the insufficient facilitation of local journalists by their local media houses. Under such circumstances, the problematic question of how international foreign correspondents frame issues comes into play. Progressively, owing to commercial considerations, Western-based international news agencies have significantly reduced foreign bureaux so much so that the few international correspondents left behind have the task of covering wide geo-political regions making it impossible for them to conduct thorough newsgathering that would improve the framing of a given conflict (Carruthers, 2000; Seib, 2004).

In this dissertation, I evaluate the applicability of the conventional news frames in light of newer ones as proposed by proponents of the Peace Journalism model (Lynch 1998; Galtung 2000; Tehranian 2002; Wolfsfeld 2004; Shinar 2004, 2007a-b; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Lee 2008). In the analysis of the peace radio broadcasts on Mega FM
and _Radio Wa_, I deploy some of the frames as conceptualized and explicated above by Brewer and Kimberly (2010, pp.159-160), Nelson & Willey (2001, p.246) as well as Van Gorp (2010, p.91). The broader scope of the dissertation, however, is a proposition that media values based on conflict and violence be reframed and replaced with media values of peace. For this task, I draw instructive insights from the conceptualization of “reframing” by Watzlawick et.al (1974) who perceive it as a way of redefining reality by putting something in a new light (p.95). They note that: “To reframe, then, means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally well or even better, and thereby changes its entire meaning” (Ibid.).

While the material facts about Uganda such as the different ethnicities, political and religious affiliations, skewed resource distribution, and other structural factors that often trigger violence will not change, reframing them calls for an adjustment in the meaning attributed to those situations and their consequences to society. In their explication of what “reality” entails, Watzlawick et.al (1974) argue that what in essence matters is our beliefs and perceptions about any given situation: “Reality is often the ‘opinions’ or the meaning and value attributed to the phenomenon in question….real is what a sufficiently large number of people have agreed to call real” (p.96). From this line of argument, the mass media can be used to influence the beliefs and perceptions of Ugandans about the drivers of violence in the country. As per the research questions outlined in Section 1.3, one of the key tasks in this dissertation is to establish from the journalists how conflict, violence and peace in Uganda are conceived and what they consider their roles to be in
abetting violence. I hypothesize that a good understanding by journalists of the structural drivers of violence will lead to a reframing of issues in the mass media in a manner favourable to sustainable communal harmony.

In order to be effective in the reframing process, journalists are further invited to engage in a new game plan. As Watzlawick et.al (1974) succinctly put it, “reframing …teaches a different game, thereby making the old one obsolete…” (p.104). They also point out that “reframing means changing the emphasis from one class membership” by “introducing such a new class membership into the conceptualization” (p.98). In this thesis, I discuss the Peace Journalism model as the new game that offers a new class membership in form of media values of peace. The model is opposed to the conventional media values which are the old game with old class memberships that favour conflict and violence frames. I present media values of peace as alternative frames that can progressively define media practice to mitigate conflict situations. I argue that the mass media can play a major role in effecting this reframing process. Importantly, Watzlawick et.al (1974) further point out that “successful reframing needs to take into account the views, expectations, reasons, premises - in short, the conceptual framework - of those whose problems are to be changed” (p.104). In this dissertation, I probe the realities of individual journalists using a survey questionnaire, the operational imperatives from the perspective of media managers through interviews as well as the realities of media consumers through focus group discussions.
3.2 Agenda-setting

This dissertation is grounded on the principle that the mass media have the capacity to either positively or negatively influence public perceptions on any given issue; which is what proponents of the agenda-setting theory illustrate. The media scholar credited for refining the agenda-setting theory is Bernard Cohen (1963). He coined a widely cited foundational statement worth citing in detail:

“The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read” (Cohen, 1963, p.13).

Other scholars such as McCombs & Shaw (1972), after conducting widespread studies on the effect of media campaigns on USA political voting decisions, expounded on the theory observing that by choosing and displaying news, media gatekeepers play a key role in influencing political reality: “Readers learn not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position….” (p.176 as cited in Baran & Davis, 2006, p.316).

Writing about Ugandan mass media, Nkurunziza (2006) extols the agenda-setting capacity of the mass media in determining “what is important and what is not; what is normal and what is deviant; what is consensus and what is deissent; what is significant or newsworthy and what is marginal” and concludes that “the media has the capacity to form or manipulate the public conscience” (p.145). Proponents of the theory argue that the issues the mass media decide to emphasize inevitably take a central place on the
public agenda. In so doing though, Berger (1995) points out that those issues not emphasized are consigned “secondary status or, in some cases, relative obscurity” (p.63).

At the macro level of agenda-setting lies what Baran & Davis (2006) refer to as agenda-building; described as “a collective process in which media, government, and the citizenry reciprocally influence one another in areas of public policy” (p.319). The unique feature of this perspective is that it adds an element of circularity to the theory since the role of extra-media sectors such as the citizenry and government in influencing the media’s agenda is acknowledged. This line of argument is also advanced by Perry (2002) who observes that the mass media, as part of society, often conforms to the issues that society has chosen to emphasize, which would have in effect emerged as the social agenda (p.209).

At the micro level, an acknowledged level of agenda-setting is the role played by individual journalists who by way of their biases and prejudices interpret events and relay their subjective perceptions to the public. Rukhsana (2010) points out that at the time of reporting, it is “journalist-the-individual whose words are being read or heard, whose images are being seen and whose interpretation of the events forms the ‘first draft of history’” (p.339). This process, according to some scholars, is linked to what is referred to as the gate-keeping role of the media; the view that individuals in media organizations (reporters and editors) determine what issues or personalities would make news and the importance to accord to each (Berger, 1995, p.64; Scheufele, 2000).

The arguments by agenda-setting proponents notwithstanding, the emergence of social media is bringing into scrutiny the assumptions embedded in the theory. In their
examination of media coverage of violence, notably the November 26th 2008 Mumbai bombings, Matheson & Stuart (2010) point out how mainstream media such as BBC Online depended on citizen tweets; and the kinds of ethical questions that emerged since some of the re-tweets were later established to have been falsehoods (p.180). In reference to the ubiquity of the social networking platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and blogs, the scholars argue that “in journalistic terms, the [Mumbai] crisis provided evidence that every citizen could be a front-line correspondent, a prospect which called into question the viability of the mainstream news media - not least their capacity to set the news agenda” (Ibid.)

Bringing the theory to bear on the specific practice of Peace Journalism, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) define the model in agenda-setting terms as “when editors and reporters make choices - about what to report, and how to report it - that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict” (p.5). In this definition, the agenda of society is dependent upon the choices made by the journalists reporting on conflicts and the editors who decide on what to include in the reports. Writing about his relationship with the mass media during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Romeo Dallaire (2007), a Canadian General and former commander of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), notes that while the media can play a negative role, they can also be used in equal, if not better measure to promote peace: “I felt that one good journalist on the ground was worth a battalion of troops, because I realized they could bring pressure to bear” (p.16). On his part, Shinar (2007a) argues that while the mass media “can contribute to war, genocide, terrorism, oppression, and repression”, they also have the potential to contribute to “security, dignity, growth,
and decision-making by citizens on the basis of accurate, credible, and manageable information” (p.56). But in her study to assess the application of the Peace Journalism model to the peace process in Northern Uganda, Birungi (2009) established that the potential of the mass media to impact on the agenda-setting process had been overstated; noting how the conflicting parties actually set the agenda by fine-tuning their messages to attract the attention of the media since they knew what stories the journalists wanted (p.114). Her work highlights the influence news sources have on the process of determining which issues are to be fronted to journalists for eventual dissemination.

Whatever the scope of argumentation on how media agendas are set, the overarching realization is that the mass media and its actors have incredible capacity to not only highlight the issues that society ought to think about, but also the presumed importance of those issues as determined by placement on front pages or prime time as well as the frequency of coverage. In Section 1.1, I have highlighted cases where the mass media has been used to propagate hate rhetoric. I also cited in Section 1.2 the increasing number of media houses and organisations particularly in the global south that are setting an agenda for non-violence and harmonious human existence. With that hindsight, I argue in this dissertation that journalists can use their power to set an agenda for human development and prosperity (OECD, 2001; UNDESA 2005; Shinar, 2007a). The peace radio programs in Northern Uganda that I examine in this dissertation provide the grounds and evidence for such an argument.
3.3 Normative theory

Normative media theory, according to Baran & Davis (2006), “explains how a media system should operate in order to conform to or realize a set of ideal social values” (p.33). It is “concerned with examining or prescribing how media ought to operate if certain social values are to be observed or attained” (McQuail, 2000, p.8). Christians et al. (2009) argue that “normative theory attempts to link our everyday communication activities in the public sphere to a broader system of values that will help eliminate some of the contradictions in our actions” (p.76). They further point out that normative theory is a continuous conversation among major social actors: “We define normative theory of public communication as the reasoned explanation of how public discourse should be carried on in order for a community or nation to work out solutions to its problems” (p.65).

In formulating normative theory, Christians et al. (2009) point out the need to engage in a “legitimating process” where the moral claims of all major actors in a particular public communication context are taken into account (p.74). While it is not easy to find “an acceptable formula to respect the moral claims of all major actors”, it is key to engage in that process by making recourse to values and norms that have societal appeal. They point out for instance that “all of the major values associated with good media – truthfulness, freedom, objectivity, diversity, and contributing to social solidarity – are infused with a moral sense” (p.83). In circumstances where moral values conflict, the idea is to engage a host of actors to determine which social norms would be acceptable in view of coming up with a formula that harmonizes the various conflicting moral claims (Ibid.). When such a rigorous process has been followed, the emergent set of norms will
be an acceptable “set of ideals for individual media professionals and a basis for socializing media personnel into these values” (Ibid.). Such norms would also act as acceptable “guidelines for media policy and media legislation” (Ibid.).

Citing the specific case of media ethics development in Africa, Christians et al. (2009) note the numerous attempts to legislate on journalism norms warning that such an action moves “communication ethics across the boundary of voluntary action into the area of state action and the state’s monopoly on coercive measures” (p.69). At a macro level, Christians et al (2009) point out how normative theory has evolved into a global dialogue; whereby the normative theories of the West are in conversation with theories from other parts of the world (p.67). In this regard, Shakuntala (2010) calls upon media scholars to abandon “the supremacy of one theoretical skeleton” and instead formulate “ethical theories that can help explain various ethical practices around the world” (p.100). Since media practices around the world and the norms that give birth to them differ significantly, she calls for “decolonizing universality”, which entails: “to recognize - academically and institutionally - non Western, indigenous theories, as being equally exhaustive and profound in their implications to understand global media ethics…” (p.102). She argues that in order to have a global media ethics regime, there is need to resurrect the “often non-institutionalized knowledge” that is not yet included in the inventory of scholars (p.102).

Discussing the challenges of developing African normative theories, Fourie (2010) points out that African scholars are in the first instance expected like everyone else to contribute towards the advancement of “(post)modern trends and producing (post)modern media” (p.106). In addition to this task, however, they are also “expected to honor African
traditions, to serve and not only represent their communities, to represent and reflect reality from an African perspective, and to reinterpret freedom of expression and concepts such as public interest in an indigenous way” (Ibid.). Highlighting a specific case of African normative theory that is often cited in global ethics scholarship, Fourie (2010) states that the discourse about Ubuntu as an ethical framework is part of a wider global expectation to “rediscover and honor the traditional and the indigenous while at the same time pursuing modern trends” (p.107). He cites several authors who have looked at Ubuntuism and its emphasis on community and collectivism as a proposed African normative media theory. He argues that in the Ubuntu worldview, “the overall purpose of the media would be to play a developmental role in the sense of stimulating citizen participation, community participation, and consensus based on widespread consultation with the community” (p.110). In the same line of argument, Christians (2004) also argues that the “Ubuntu morality does not construct an apparatus of professional ethics”, but rather works and provides “an ethic of general morality” (p.250). The key consideration in an Ubuntu morality is that “the moral domain is understood to be intrinsic to human beings, not as a system of rules, norms and ideals external to society and culture….“(Ibid.). From this conceptualization, therefore, Fourie (2010) examines Western norms such as “freedom of expression”, “public interest”, “factuality” and points out how they conflict with the Ubuntu values that are often grounded in the community as the nucleus of action and decision making (p.110). He points out that in Ubuntuism, it is believed that values such as truth, freedom and justice are to be constructed interdependently by and within the community (Ibid.). Media and news reports, therefore, ought to be interpreted against the background of the “community’s
contexts, beliefs, values and needs” (p.111). In the Ubuntu worldview, the role of the media is towards promoting bonding and dialogue to build consensus: “The emphasis thus moves from the media as informant, gatekeeper, entertainer and educator to the media as mediator; from the media as observer, to the media as participant and negotiator” (p.111). From the above emerges a journalism paradigm that does not place a high premium on Western journalism norms of objectivity, neutrality, truth, and detachment. It is a model in which a journalist is an involved member of the community and not a spectator of events to report on (p.110).

While the Ubuntu worldview presents some distinctive features, Fourie (2010) cites Christians (2004) as having drawn up significant similarities between Ubuntuism and Western strands of Communitarian ethics. He points out that like in Feminist Communitarianism which valorizes “ethics of care, affection, intimacy, empathy and collaboration”, the moral rules of Ubuntuism are also grounded in “community care, group understanding and group experience” (p.112). He further points out that Ubuntuism bears strong similarities with Western Communitarian ethics since both emphasize that “only through dialogue about what constitutes the common good we become fully human; that restoring dialogue should be the primary aim of humanity; that interaction between the self and the other should be the guiding principle in public life and of social ethics” (p.112). In yet another comparison, Fourie (2010) notes that Ubuntuism resembles North American civic journalism since both emphasize “a close relationship between the media and the community on issues such as strengthening civic culture, rejuvenating public life, to reach consensus rather than conflict...” (p.112).
From the above arguments, Fourie concludes that in the scheme of a global media ethics, the *Ubuntu* moral philosophy cannot be advanced as being exclusively African (p.112). An added complication to advance *Ubuntuism* as an African normative media theory is the fact that “in contemporary African life, neither the traditional values nor the traditional cultures associated with the idea of *Ubuntuism*, or with *Ubuntuism* as an attitude, may still exist in their pure form” given the fact that over the year, traditional African cultures have interacted with other ideologies such as Christianity and Islam (Ibid.). Further, colonialism also brought Africa into contact with new moral and cultural values as well as news modes of production that have all compounded the erosion of African traditional culture (p.113). However, Banda (2010) presents a different view arguing that in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-racial society, the ideal would be to negotiate a conceptual middle ground between the universalizing tendencies of libertarian utilitarianism and the particularistic traits of Afrocentric communitarianism (p.138)

Bringing normative media theory to bear on the specific genre of Peace Journalism, Shinar (2007b) defines the model as “a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals and audiences towards war and peace” (p. 2). Likewise, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) point out that “Peace Journalism can be seen as a set of tools, both conceptual and practical, intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service” (p. 5). In an elaboration of a “media peace discourse”, Shinar (2004) argues that normatively, “the code-of-conduct that calls for media responsiveness to social change also calls on the media to join in peacemaking
efforts” (p.2). Therefore, in the “mechanics of peacemaking or peacekeeping”, the roles of the mass media, given their positions as “catalysts, mediators and messengers”, have to be rethought constantly (Shinar, 2007b, p. 6). In a re-examination of what he calls “the message of criticism”, Shinar (2007b) challenges scholars who argue that journalism practice should be limited to only norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ and proposes that Peace Journalism ought to be considered as an independent normative framework with “legitimate alternative frames of reference for journalistic coverage” (p.4).

In a discussion about normative theory practice in Uganda, Lugalambi (2001 & 2006) proposes five normative frames that he calls “generic roles for the media in peace-building.” In its role of "nurturing the public interest”, the mass media are bound to “champion a common vision based on those core principles and values around which citizens ought to be encouraged to unite” (Lugalambi, 2006, p.115). In its second generic role, the mass media are challenged to “cultivate public consensus” by focusing citizens’ attention on “issues of collective concern, to generate agreement, and to persuade people to voice their opinion”, particularly on issues that have potential to cause conflict (Ibid.). Lugalambi advocates for a “pro-social journalism”, which “does not shy away from directing its audiences on an issue” (p.100). He argues that the chances of preventing conflict are higher when the public pronounces its position clearly on an issue of collective concern (op.cit, 2001, p.101). In its third role of “feeling the pulse of public opinion”, the media constantly provides “social intelligence that captures the essence of citizens’ perceptions of issues at stake, thus identifying points of tension before they crack” (op.cit, 2006, p.115). The fourth role of the mass media ought to be “directing the current of public opinion” by articulating the concerns of the few who may hold
legitimate but contrary views from the dominant thinking held by the majority (Ibid.). The fifth role of the mass media in conflict situations, according to Lugalambi (2001) is to “critically engage with issues” by rigorously inquiring into the motives of all the parties: “prevention of conflict calls for full and meaningful disclosure of all the issues – the sticky points, the prejudices, the biases, and the fears that constitute the entire mosaic of a given conflict” (p.102). He argues that the mass media ought to “support peace-building by proactively working against those elements of the political culture that enable the institutionalisation of violence (op.cit, 2006, p.115).

The above arguments find resonance in the long list of Peace Journalism norms and frameworks as outlined in Appendices 13-20. The Peace Journalism model, as proposed, is a set of normative frameworks in which proponents spell out what they consider ideal professional values that would promote a media for peace discourse in view of engendering a human community living in cooperation, harmony and non-violence (Christians, 2010b). In this dissertation, the specific propositions by proponents of the normative Peace Journalism model are discussed in Chapter Four below. In Chapter Eight, the same normative values are evaluated by Ugandan journalists. In Chapter Nine, I probe the feasibility of operationalizing normative media values of peace such as patience and moderation, cooperation and communal solidarity, forgiveness and reconciliation, justice and truth, harmony and order, mediation and negotiation, as well as human dignity. In the chapter, I pay particular attention to the discernible Ugandan [sub-Saharan Africa] normative values of peace that can be reconstituted into media values.
3.4 Development Journalism and Communication Theory

The concept of development journalism, according to Christians et al. (2009), originated in the 1960s as a form of “independent journalism that provided constructive criticism of government and its agencies, informed readers how the development process was affecting them, and highlighted local self-help projects” (p.201). In its conventional conceptualization, however, development journalism has come to denote “certain media practices and arrangements presumably appropriate for ‘transitional’ nations whose political, economic, and cultural institutions lack the maturity that a truly free press arguably requires” (p.200). Whereas Christians et.al. (2009) situate the paradigm within developing nation settings in the global South, Roth (1994&2005) examines it in the context of the First Peoples mediascape of Canada.

One of the peculiar features of “development journalism” is the fact that it calls for the mass media to “stand alongside, rather than apart from other institutions in society including those of the State so that together, all societal institutions including the mass media pursue the benefits of modernization for themselves and for the nation as a whole” (Christians et.al., 2009, p.200). From such a standpoint, Christians et al. (2009) point out that “responsibility tempers press freedom; journalists can question, even challenge the state, but not to the point where they undermine government’s basic plans for progress and prosperity” (p.201). This thin line between State and media inevitably leads to scenarios where the State justifies control of mass media to promote state policies, which control progressively turns into State repression (Ibid.). For instance in their work on Southeast Asia, Ward (2010) criticizes the ‘development journalism’ model promoted in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore whereby participation in the
development agenda of the nation often calls for a non-critical look at abuses by government functionaries (p.51). He further points out that the journalists who criticize government on issues such as corruption are often labeled non-patriotic and enemies of development (Ibid.).

On the other end of the spectrum, however, Romano & Cratis (2001) draw parallels between contemporary “development journalism” practice and “public journalism”; noting that both genres aim at giving voice to ordinary citizens at the community level who often don’t have the platform that is usually dominated by elite actors in business and politics (p.170). They point out that development journalism draws extensively from liberation theorists such as Paolo Freire who conceived it as “an interactive, advocative, educational, and often ethnographic medium aimed to build self-reliance and participant democracy in the community” (in Romano & Cratis, 2001, p.170). A key feature of such public journalism is the recognition of the expertise of ordinary people as not only news sources but also originators of media content (p.173). An important component is that “by bringing the stories, opinions, and experiences of ordinary people into the limelight”, public journalism also “prompts politicians, bureaucrats, and business people to react to their concerns” (Ibid.).

Such a conceptualization of development journalism and communication calls to mind what several scholars refer to as “participatory communication” (Servaes, 1999; Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Jacobson & Kolluri, 1999; Dervin & Frenette, 2001). For instance, Servaes (1999) argues that the participatory communication approach necessitates audiences to play an active role in deciding what information is functional in their context (p.60). He posits that in such an approach, communication facilitates development, rather
than enforcing it (Ibid.). According to Lent (1987), the idea of participatory communication was integral to development communication discourse from early on. He quotes Everett M. Rogers (1978), one of the early proponents of the linear communication models (diffusion of innovations), as having suggested in his 1978 publication entitled *Communication Research* that approaches to development ought to be participatory, stating that communication ought to be “a widely participatory process of social change in a society intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including social equality, freedom and other valued qualities) for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment” (in Lent, p.29). Lent further quotes Wilbur Schramm, a contemporary of Rogers, from a 1979 Monograph of the MacBride Commission in which he also suggested that “the centre of development strategy, as far as feasible, will be the local area, local activity; and as far as possible, local decision making will become central in development planning; two-way, not one-way communication will be emphasized, and horizontal communication will be emphasized at the expense of vertical communication” (in Lent, Ibid.).

Applying the concept directly to mainstream mass media, Servaes (1999) states that participatory communication is a push away from “uniform, centralized, expensive, professional and institutionalized media” to more of “multidimensionality, horizontality, deprofessionalization, and diachronic communication exchange” whereby the senders and receivers interchange roles (p.84). Jacobson & Kolluri (1999) add that in terms of communication, the participatory approach has tended to highlight “small rather than large media, horizontal rather than vertical communication, collective self-reliance rather
than dependence on outside experts, and action rather than theory-oriented inquiry” (p.268).

At a practical level, Dervin & Huesca (1999) state that in participatory communication practice: “The bulk of recommendations for communication applications take the form of rather modest, specific actions such as linking up with popular organizations, unions, and civic groups; scheduling a high percentage of programming in indigenous languages; recruiting practitioners from surrounding communities; visiting popular gathering spots when constructing socio-dramas and news; incorporating a variety of formats – humour, debate, games, and so on – into programming” (p.178).

In order to achieve true participation as explicated above, one issue that ought to be valorized is dialogue geared towards promotion of mutual understanding. Nair & White (1993) define participatory communication as: “The opening of dialogue; source and receiver interacting continuously, thinking constructively about their situation, identifying development needs and problems, deciding what is needed to improve the situation, and acting upon it” (p.51). On her part, Lana (1989) in her ‘New Communication Model to Recover Public Participation’ states that: “Active participatory citizenship is a process through which individuals create themselves with others through the shared processes of speaking, deliberating, and judging, ordering their collective lives through institutions they have designed and in a language they have made their own” (pp.179-180).

Making a case for traditional media forms in development communication, Mushengyezi (2003) challenges communication planners not to overlook the “significant role
indigenous forms such as popular theatre, drumming, village criers, storytellers, orators, etc., have played - and continue to play - in communication among rural, poor communities” (p.107). He argues that media forms and specific performances such as “dance, music, drama, drums and horns, village criers, orators and storytellers” remain effective channels for disseminating human development messages in predominantly rural and semi-literate societies (p.108). And on the extreme spectrum, Matheson & Stuart (2010) make a case that digital technologies as presented by social networking media are re-distributing communicative power and broadening the global public spheres making wider participation a reality (p.188).

Bringing the conceptualization of Peace Journalism to bear on development communication and journalism theory, Lee (2008) defines the model as “an effort to transcend the bounds of established practice to open up public mediated discourse to a more inclusive range of people, ideas, and visions that includes space for voices of peace” (p.1). He adds that “it [peace journalism] encourages journalists and media institutions to review themselves and their practices to produce information that addresses the full array of political, ethnic, social, and cultural injustices” (p.1). On his part, Shinar (2007a) in what he refers to as a “golden triangle”, calls upon proponents of the Peace Journalism model to pay attention to the inseparable linkage between peace with democracy and development. He argues that none would take root without the other. He supports his argument by citing several policy programs by the USA, Canada as well as other Western donor governments and the United Nations agencies who have all realised the need to link post-conflict peace-building efforts to democracy and the
economic development of nations. Journalism, he argues, ought to valorize this “golden triangle” (p.54).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the programming models I explore on both Mega FM’s “Dwog Cen Paco” and “Ter Yat”, as well as on Radio Wa’s “Vision for Peace” are highly participatory following the principles as explicated in the scholarship cited above. For instance on Dwog Cen Paco, former LRA combatants, most of them youth who had been abducted years earlier and forced to kill people including their relatives, engage in dialogue with their former victims. During the length of the talk-show, listeners call-in to express views about the topic of the day. Typically during the Dwog Cen Paco program, the former LRA combatants, re-integrated in the communities, are given a couple of minutes to call upon some of their colleagues still fighting to abandon rebellion and “come back home” (Dwog Cen Paco). On the shows, they dispel myth and propaganda spread by the rebel commanders that all surrendering LRA combatants would be executed by the GoU. Likewise, “Ter Yat” program on Mega FM and “Vision for Peace” on Radio Wa often bring together aggrieved members of the community who suffered from the LRA insurgency to dialogue with GoU officials and development partners to explain why some situations are the way they are.

However, the programming model of both Mega FM and Radio Wa ought to be examined in the broader critiques of development communication and journalism theory. Both stations could be described in the words of Shakuntala (2010) as still being in the “tenacious hold of the colonial past and its continuing effects in the present” (p.95). For instance, Mega FM was launched in August 2002 with 100% funding as part of the British Department for International Development’s (DFID) conflict reduction and peace
building program in Northern Uganda (Ginifer, 2006, p.9). Undoubtedly, funding from DFID was decisive in Mega FM’s early years as it permitted the station to acquire modern broadcasting equipment and to hire the best media professionals in the region (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). In subsequent years, the station became independent of the DFID, but remains to date dependent on advertising revenue from a host of mainly Western NGOs such as Norwegian Refugee Council, Action against Hunger, Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR), UNHCR as well as some big GoU agencies such as the Joint Clinical Research Centre (JCRC) who are themselves funded by agencies such as USAID and the Bill-Merinda Gates Foundation (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). In the case of Radio Wa, one of the major and consistent funding agencies since its inception in 2001 has been the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF). In fact Radio Wa’s founder and manager, Fr. John Fraser is a Scottish missionary who has seen the station expand from the initial estimated radius coverage of 100 square miles to the current 400 square miles.\(^6\) In a study of Mega FM, Brisset-Foucault (2011) provides an analysis of how the dependency on NGOs conflates the roles of journalists since they have to adhere to the agenda as set by the organisations that sponsor the programs. Likewise, Banda (2010) discusses how the libertarian agenda of Western agencies had been infused into the nationalist media culture in Zambia and observes that: “Given the multiple donor agendas involved, it was going to prove impossible for the country to carry on the meta-discourse of national unity and development” (p.133).

By virtue of their dependency on foreign funding, the peace radio programs that I analyze in this dissertation cannot escape the scrutiny that neo-colonial theory brings to

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\(^6\) Radio Wa, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund. URL in January 2012 at [http://www.sciaf.org.uk/where_we_work/africa/uganda/projects_in_uganda/radio_wa](http://www.sciaf.org.uk/where_we_work/africa/uganda/projects_in_uganda/radio_wa)
bear. That said though, this dissertation is not conceived as an evaluation of those programs based on stated neo-colonial development agendas (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). It is rather an analysis of the kinds of ideologies that emerge in the broadcasts and which authority figures advance them. What kind of development discourse emerges and how is it framed; and who is being targeted by the development messages?

3.5 Conclusion

I have in this chapter presented four journalism and communication theories that I consider as solid anchors to the arguments I advance in this dissertation. Framing theory provides a conceptual structure in which to examine conventional media values grounded on conflict and violence in light of newer media frames of peace. If journalists get to perceive issues and situations such as the structural causes of violence from a different perspective, then the way they present those realities will be different and hopefully lead to non-systematic violence.

From agenda-setting theory, it is evident that journalists, editors and their media institutions wield incredible power to influence the way many in society think about certain issues. While sources of media content as well as the public can effectively influence how some issues are presented by the mass media, the onus is on the media to present those particular issues as a positive and progressive public record. Normative Peace Journalism theory calls for setting social values and norms that promote none-violence. Such a theory draws from a wide pool of already existing social and professional codes and guidelines (Appendices 13-20).
On their part, proponents of development and journalism theory draw attention to the significance of involving marginalized and underprivileged members of society to share their stories and experiences in an inclusive and participatory manner. It is a departure from the state-controlled and elite-dominated mass media. In the context of the global south, the theory is also a call to pay attention to the ever-present dominant ideologies of the global north. In this dissertation, these theories interact and are in constant conversation.

In Chapter Four below, I continue the discussion on journalism and communication theory, but focusing on the specific genre of Peace Journalism; which is being proposed as an alternative model to the conventional Western-centric genre that favours conflict, violence and war frames (Galtung, 1998, 2000; Lynch, 1998, 2010; Tehranian, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Shinar, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Kempf, 2007; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, 2010; Lee, 2008).
Chapter 4: The Peace Journalism Paradigm

4.0 Introduction

The debate in the journalism scholarly community on how to shape and influence mass media practice under circumstances of systematic violence and war keeps flourishing not only in geographical scope, but also on the epistemological and praxis fronts. Lee (2008) notes that the first to justify a positioned role of the mass media in the coverage of war and violence was BBC correspondent Martin Bell (1995) who “highlighted the impossibility [in journalism] of standing neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, victim and oppressor” and thus proposed a “journalism of attachment” (p. 5). Subsequently, other scholars have proposed related qualifications captured in such concepts as “victim journalism” (Hume, 1997); “justice journalism” (Messman, 2001); “engaged journalism” (Lynch, 2003) and “pro-active journalism” (Galtung, 2000; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004 and 2006). However, Shinar (2007b) observes that due to conventional journalism’s entrenched views about objectivity and neutrality, such brands of positioned journalism “enjoy low degrees of popularity among professionals and audiences” (p. 4). Within the league of positioned journalism genres, the Peace Journalism model is one of the most prolific; generating significant debate and an ever increasing pool of scholarship (Galtung, 1998, 2000; Lynch, 1998, 2010; Tehranian, 2002; Howard, 2002, 2003, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Shinar, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Kempf, 2007; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, 2010; Lee, 2008).66

66 The journal, Conflict & Communication Online, is dedicated to the scholarly debates of the Peace Journalism paradigm. URL at http://www.cco.regener-online.de/
In this chapter, I examine the various conceptualizations of the Peace Journalism model by some of its most prolific advocates and critics. I review the growing literature to highlight the key debates on the model’s strengths and shortcomings. How do its propositions bear on individual journalistic practices as well as against the entrenched structural and institutional mechanisms? What other extra-media factors would impinge on the implementation of such a model? Throughout the chapter, I pay specific attention to how the paradigm bears on African journalism practice since the analysis of the peace radio broadcasts on Mega FM and Radio Wa is informed by propositions from the model. Some of the seminal Peace Journalism normative frameworks are highlighted in Appendices 13-20.

4.1 Conceptualising Peace Journalism as a departure from conventional practice

Johan Galtung is credited as the first scholar to coin the phrase “Peace Journalism” and for having conceptualized how “peace/conflict-oriented” reporting differed from the “war/violence-oriented” strand (Lynch, 1998; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 6; Shinar, 2004, p. 3, 7). In his initial argument, Galtung (1998) noted that in conventional journalism, nobody referred to journalists covering health issues as ‘disease journalists’ and wondered why it seemed ordinary for journalists covering conflicts and wars to be called ‘war correspondents’ and not ‘peace journalists’ (p.9). But as the model gained more adherents, its unique character as a direct call to journalists covering war and violence to promote voices and outcomes geared towards consensus and common-ground became more pronounced. For instance, Tehranian (2002) defined the genre as “a kind of

67 The main elements of this model as reproduced and reformulated by several scholars are presented in Appendix 16.
journalism and media ethics that attempts, as well as possible, to transform conflicts from their violent channels into constructive forms by conceptualizing news, empowering the voiceless, and seeking common grounds that unify rather than divide human societies” (pp. 79-80). On their part, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005), who were among the first adherents of the model and its most prolific proponents, point out that it is about “identifying and predicting patterns of omission and distortion in conflict coverage” in as much as it “offers a basis for identifying and rethinking [journalistic] concepts, values and practices alike” (p.1 and p.5). Shinar (2007a) argues that peace-oriented strategies in media “provide space for alternative voices and encourage an interest in learning the views of all involved parties while ensuring that conflict - rather than involved parties - is seen as the problem” (p.57). The Peace Journalism model, according to Shinar, is the only one that allows for a strategy focusing on the “connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover, and the consequences of their reporting, including the common interests of media owners and power structures” (Ibid.). Bringing the conceptualization to bear on war coverage, Hanitzsch (2004) credits the model for enabling journalists to be on the side of the “victims of war” (p.484). He thus defines Peace Journalism as “a program or frame of journalistic news coverage which contributes to the process of making and keeping peace respectively, to the peaceful settlement of conflicts” (p.484).

Writing about African journalism practice, Mutere & Ugangu (2004), without using the term Peace Journalism, explain instead that “pro-active journalism” is “a method of covering conflict-related issues in a manner that gets beyond the limitations of inverted pyramid formats to capture historical context, exacerbating factors and the significance of
events” (p. 18). They also note that pro-active journalism is a move from “events-oriented to process-oriented journalism” (p.20).

On his part, Hackett (2007) conceptualizes Peace Journalism as a “reform movement” that is a rallying point for a challenge to the increasingly homogenized global news discourse, and a campaign for change by journalists and activists (p.49). Likewise, Keeble (2010) calls it a “form of revolutionary alternative media”; akin to that deployed in some parts of the world to highlight the woes of the oppressed majority in countries such as apartheid South Africa, Vietnam, Colombia, Afghanistan or Iran (p.55). He argues that the Peace Journalism mantra fits the bill for radical alternative journalists and publications in which presenting views that are counter to the status quo are possible (p.57). The objective of such alternative media outlets, he argues, would be to “seek to invert the hierarchy of access to the news by explicitly foregrounding the viewpoints of ‘ordinary’ people (activists, protestors, local residents), citizens whose visibility in the mainstream media tends to be obscured by the presence of elite groups and individuals” (p.58). Further, Peace Journalism is the kind that should showcase the works of radical peace movements and groups such as IndyMedia, UK Peace News and International Peace Bureau whose work rarely makes it into mainstream corporate media (p.59).

Sounding a warning, Patindol (2010) makes a case against those who present the genre as “peace propaganda”, which concentrates on covering only ‘positive’ news by avoiding ‘bad’ stories such as those of violence (p.199). More so, the genre should also not be limited to “only reporting about peace, peace movements and peace initiatives - with no critical reporting on peace efforts” (Ibid.). She, like Howard (2003, 2009), proposes that Peace Journalism should instead be known as “conflict sensitive reporting”, which is a
concept that “applies to the reporting of conflict, not to avoiding it” with the emphasis being on encouraging journalists to pro-actively report on conflict potentials so they don’t escalate into violence (p.200).

On the other hand, the Peace Journalism model has not been without critics. Lee (2008) summarizes the views of several scholars who have argued that such conceptualizations of journalism practice are an “unwelcome departure from objectivity” and could compromise the integrity of journalists by upsetting their role as “neutral disseminators” of media content (p. 4). He surmises from the scholarship that proponents of Peace Journalism are in conflict with “traditional journalistic values of objectivity, neutrality, and detachment” (Ibid.). Further, he highlights another criticism of Peace Journalism based on the charge that “it gives too much credence to powerful and direct media effects, ignoring the fact that journalists can rarely stand outside the cultural consensus of the societies in which they live and work” (p.5).

From the operational perspective, and taking the example of television, Hackett (2007) captures the view of war correspondents who argue that warfare makes better television than reporting on peace because “it is filled with highlighted moments, contains action and resolution, and delivers a powerful emotion: fear”; while “peace is amorphous and broad” and “the emotions connected with it are subtle, personal and internal ...far more difficult to televise” (p.48). The other argument advanced by war correspondents is that covering peace is hard because “war satisfies all the news value demands of the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization and results” (Shinar, 2007b, p.5).
As the debate persists on what constitutes Peace Journalism, some scholars conceptualize it also as a call to re-focus on the conventional norms and values of journalism that have fallen along the way at the behest of market-oriented journalism (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004, p.71; Tehranian, 2002, p.81). For instance, Galtung (2000), the first proponent of the model, noted the failure of journalists to stick to the trade’s basic conventional principles and stated that “objective journalists are those who are able to cover all sides of the conflict” and who “make an effort to tell it in their (protagonists) own words”; which features are recognized as conventional journalistic norms of ‘balance’ and ‘neutrality’ (p. 163). In the same line of argument, Howard (2003) perceives Peace Journalism as a more “reliable journalism” that connotes “practices which meet the international standards of accuracy, impartiality and social responsibility” (in Rukhsana, 2010, p.338). These arguments are representative of those in the Peace Journalism community who are not positioning it as a new genre, but rather as a call to re-tool and re-focus on the conventional journalism norms of balance, truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, objectivity, neutrality/impartiality, detachment and social responsibility (Howard, 2003, 2009; Hackett, 2006; Kempt, 2007, p.2; Rukhsana, 2010, p.338). Overall, however, the dominant thrust is towards the development of Peace Journalism as a positioned genre that focuses on covering conflict potentials with a view to ensuring they do not escalate into violence.

The proponents of the Peace Journalism model insist that the genre’s uniqueness is to for instance focus on highlighting the work of peace actors as well as peace processes and initiatives wherever they happen; while diminishing the voice of promoters of war and violence. As Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) point out, the genre also calls for humanisation
of ‘enemies’ and seeking the ‘other’ in the ‘self’ as well as to focus on the “the suffering, fears and grievances of all parties” in a conflict (p.28). In this genre, journalists find ways of reporting on the invisible effects of violence or war such as the “long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma” since it is such effects that increase the likelihood for future spirals of violence (Ibid.). It is the Peace Journalism genre that allows for a pointed focus on issues, needs and interests of those affected by violence and war with the view of addressing human development challenges to create a culture of peace (op.cit, p.31). It is the Peace Journalism genre that valorizes ‘pro-activity’ focusing on “prevention before any violence or war occurs” as opposed to war journalism which is often “reactive, waiting for violence before reporting” (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.6; Shinar, 2004, p.3). But as Patindol (2010) points out, the Peace Journalism model is bound to meet significant opposition across the spectrum of the media system since it is an intrinsic challenge to “the main assumptions, paradigms and practices of traditional journalism” (p.193). In the three subsections below, I examine the factors that influence Peace Journalism practice at the micro-level of individual journalists, at the meso-level of media institutions and structures, as well as at the macro-level of extra-media factors (Hanitzsch, 2004, p.492; Shinar, 2007b, p.6).

4.1.1 The aptitudes of individual journalists

As discussed in Section 1.1 with respect to the Nuremburg, Rwandan and Kenyan media cases, individual journalists are increasingly being held responsible by international criminal justice regimes for the roles they play in instigating their audiences to commit hateful crimes. Reflecting on how journalists become complicit to crimes against humanity, Thomas Kamilindi, a former Rwandan journalist who survived the 1994
genocide and years later still can’t make sense of how some of his colleagues became implicated in committing genocide observed thus:

“But there are still many troubling questions. How does a journalist become a criminal? It’s extremely difficult to answer that question because journalists are human like everyone else. We can be caught up in the circle of violence like anyone else” (Kamilindi, 2007, p.141).

Reflecting further, and while admitting the insurmountable professional pitfalls, he reminds journalists that theirs is a higher calling and urges them to: “Look at what you write. Listen to what you say, and analyze yourself. If you are demonizing people, if you are stigmatizing other tribes, other clans, you are involved in violence” (Ibid.). In the same vein, Rukhsana (2010) cites other scholars to remind journalists covering violence and war to be aware of their own weaknesses and biases since they would not be free from the misconceptions about the ‘other’ that constitute a repertoire of their given society (p.344). She argues that while such biases might not be prominent in conflicts where the journalists are acting as ‘outside observers’, the prejudices and intolerance would come to the fore in circumstances where their personal beliefs and ideologies are challenged (Ibid.). Hanitzsch (2004) calls for an engagement with journalists themselves to gain an understanding of the impact of “individual characteristics such as gender, age, education, class, ethnic and religious affiliation” on their practice (p.492). Likewise, Hackett (2007) notes that the socio-demographic backgrounds as well as political beliefs of individual journalists shape news indirectly since “individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organizational routines” (p.50). Bringing her argument to bear directly on the genre of Peace Journalism, Ross (2006) argues that effective Peace
Journalism must be one of “symbolic rapprochement”; the type that “must recognize journalists are human beings subject to the same social, political, religious and nationalistic pressures as all people” (p.1).

With respect to African journalism practice, Hagos (2001) cites the case of working with journalists in Burundi and states that key journalistic values and principles such as “openness and objectivity” appeared at counter purposes in a society that seems to “value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else” (p.vi). He further observes that it was very challenging for Studio Ijambo, a peace media production unit, to train journalists to “reconcile conflicting values, some rooted in the old culture, and others in the new evolving newsroom culture” (p.7). He observes that “of the culturally based challenges a journalist faces in Burundi, ethnic loyalty is probably the most important because it negates the fundamental principles of journalism, especially independence and objectivity” (Ibid.). To stem these challenges, Hagos (2001) explains how Studio Ijambo sends ethnically-mixed teams to cover any given event (p. 9). For instance in the coverage of the conflict between the Tutsi-dominated government army and the ethnically Hutu-dominated rebel forces, ethnic Tutsi journalists would find it hard to report on the activities of the army, while Hutu journalists would find it hard to report on the attacks by the rebels. The solution was ethnically-mixed teams to cover such issues and the outcome has been that Studio Ijambo news reports gained more “credibility and authenticity since people knew the journalists by their voices” (Ibid.). Shinar (2007a) also makes a case for such an approach in culturally or ethnically diverse settings to increase the potential of presenting a more balanced view of issues and reducing partisan reporting (p.60). He further proposes other techniques such as “engaging journalists in
scriptwriting and interviewing exercises focused on avoiding stereotypes and bias in covering ‘the other’; developing seminars on covering ‘the other’ in which journalists and editors can discuss problems and solutions in covering sensitive topics and in serving their diverse audience” (Ibid.).

In order to help journalists surmount some of the above challenges, several scholars make a case for a robust training regime in view of re-orienting journalists from the conventional norms that favour war/violence frames to the Peace Journalism genre that favours conciliatory frames. To stem inflammatory media rhetoric in violence-prone countries, Chalk (2007) for instance advocates for “training programs and codes of conduct to raise the skills and standards of local editors and journalists and strengthening of the local independent media” (p.378). Howard (2003) also makes a case for journalism training that foremost provides “the contextual and conceptual understanding of what constitutes conflict, peace and violence”, while at another level providing the “skills and tools required to report on conflict situations” (in Rukhsana, 2010, p.340). In Peace Journalism training, however, there are several challenges to be faced including the “digital revolution” that has altered newsroom behaviour and journalism norms; the peculiar roles journalists ought to play in peace-making; as well as lack of resources that often conflates foreign news coverage out of its cultural context (Rukhsana, pp.346-7). In the specific case of Uganda, Birungi (2009) established that “journalism training offered by the major media training institutions does not focus on Peace Journalism as a key beat and area of specialization” (p.83). And yet, Patindol (2010) in her reflection on Peace Journalism training in the Phillipines notes the challenges as being “institutional and ideological constraints (such as time pressures, editorial guidelines on what is
newsworthy, and market pressure)” (p.201). Alongside the training of individual journalists to improve their professional aptitudes and competences, she calls for “top-level discussions on conflict-sensitive journalism with editors, publishers and even advertisers” (p.201). In the next sub-section, I examine the institutional and structural factors that are identified as important considerations in the development of a Peace Journalism model.

4.1.2 The Impact of institutional and structural issues on Peace Journalism practice

In considering factors that affect Peace Journalism practice, Hackett (2007) and Shinar (2007a) emphasise the need to examine the daily newsroom routines journalists follow as well as the ownership and control regimes of the media institutions. Both Hanitzsch (2004) and Hackett (2007) note that the daily work routines in which journalists function produce standardized and recurring patterns of generating media content; so much so that, according to Hanitzsch, “claims for a change of war reporting must address the structures of journalism e.g. the criteria of news selection, formats and techniques of story-telling” (p.486). But one of the most detailed analyses of how structures of journalism practice impact on peace reporting is provided by Wolfsfeld (2004) who states that “peace and news make for awkward bedfellows” (p.2). He captures the operational impediments that proponents of a Peace Journalism model face in breaking up the entrenched conventional norms of journalism thus:

“A successful peace process requires patience, and the news media demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm environment and the media have the obsessive interest in threats and violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events. Progress towards
peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs of the other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards adversaries” (Ibid.).

Under what he calls a “static model”, Wolfsfeld (2004) belabors the point that conventional news values are so grounded in conflict to the extent that “when peace appears to be taking hold in a particular area, it is time for journalists to leave” (p. 15). In an enumeration of the conventional news values, he observes that journalists and their editors select what is newsworthy based on a sacrosanct set of values such as “immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism” (Ibid.). He argues that these news values are so well established that even competing political actors use these frames to position their messages and actions for the effective attention of the mass media. As a conventional news value, the “immediacy” frame captures events and specific actions while “processes and long-term policies” do not qualify as news values since journalists are not known to be in the “business of waiting” (p.16). What makes news under the “drama” frame is “violence, crisis, conflict, extremism, dangers, internal discord, major breakthroughs”; whereas “calm, lack of crisis, cooperation, moderation, opportunities, internal consensus, incremental progress” do not constitute news values (Ibid.). The “simplicity” frame favours “opinions, images, major personalities, two-sided conflicts”; while “ideology, texts, institutions, multi-sided conflicts” do not qualify as news worthy (Ibid.). Under “ethnocentrism”, news is “our beliefs, our suffering, their brutality, our myths/symbols”; whereas what is not news is “their beliefs, their suffering, our brutality, their myths/symbols” (Ibid.). On his part, Lynch (2010) also notes the problematic nature of a conventional media concept such as ‘balance’ since “it encourages dyadic i.e. on the

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68 The conventional news frames were expounded by Galtung and Ruge (1965) as in Appendix 19
one hand, on the other hand; which provide equal voice to warmongers as to peacemakers” (p.73). In the same vein, Hanitzsch (2004) cites other authors to make a case that conventional news values such as "establishment, controversy, surprise, influence/prominence, personalization and damage…represent important criteria of news processing for the audience as well” (p.490). He points out that since news values are negotiated between journalism and its audiences, media institutions that compromise that state of affairs would suffer with “a loss of readers, listeners, viewers or users” (Ibid.).

With regard to African journalism practice, Mutere (2006) argues that reporters ought to have more opportunities to dialogue with their editors on the issues in their reports, but notes that unfortunately, “the parochial structure of newsrooms does not lend itself well to such dialogue” (p.9). In his research capturing the views of East African journalists, he states that for most, the conventional routines of “reporting events is easier than addressing issues” (p.8). In another research, Mutere & Ugangu (2004) established that most East African journalists were “unable to capture issues or processes” and depended on “single sourcing” for their reports (p. 16). They also noted that journalists were “vulnerable to manipulation by sources” and the stories were often “incomplete” (p.17). Referring to the conventional principles of journalism, Mutere (2006) argues that “with events, as long as you accurately represent what happened and who said what, why, when, where and how (5Ws and an H), you are just about there in journalism” (p.8). This style of news framing is called the inverted pyramid, which Mutere & Ugangu (2004) label “out of date” and “weak [at] addressing issues” (p. 36). They propose the “suspended-interest news story” as an alternative model. Whereas in the inverted pyramid model the most important elements are packed in the lead, the suspended-interest one
“captures audience interest and holds (suspends) it; then releases it later in the story, [and] sometimes the interest is held to the very end of the story” (pp. 36-37).

Mwesige (2004) also established in his study of political talk radio in Uganda that the mass media agenda was often “event driven” and those issues that “generated controversy and drama” were more likely to make it to the media agenda (pp.114-115). Reflecting on news values in his “four promises” of Peace Journalism, Shinar (2007b) observes that there is a tendency in conventional journalism to “overplay the place of national, political and religious leaders” by always giving them centre-stage. In a framework that for instance examines “the leader [as] the message”, he proposes a widening of the news coverage horizon from a personalities’ perspective (p. 4)

On the other spectrum of the debate, however, some scholars are making a case that however difficult it may appear, frames of peace can progressively constitute news values. Galtung (2000), for instance, defends peace as a news value and charges that for anyone “to argue that violence is the only thing that sells is to insult humanity” (p. 162). Citing some of his research, he argues that other than a small section of males aged 18 to 55, the vast majority of the population comprising women, the youth and the elderly prefer news that is less adversarial (p. 163). He states that for the majority of the human family, peace and not conflict, remains an important news value. The work of Wolfsfeld (2004), though seemingly justifying news frames of war/violence, in effect supports the view that journalists have an obligation, in situations of violence, to “emphasize the benefits that peace can bring”, to “raise the legitimacy of groups or leaders working for peace”, and that “they can help transform images of the enemy” (p. 1). The push for the development of media values of peace notwithstanding, Shinar (2004) deplores the fact
that owing to the current media institutional practices based on “competition, high news-value and ratings, the current economic structures of the media entail a preference for war” (p.2). For such an agenda to be successful there is need to rethink and reposition the ownership and control dynamics of media institutions.

In a discussion of the structural issues that affect peace-oriented media, Shinar (2007a) reviews literature by political-economy media scholars and observes that “a few transnational media corporations in the more developed countries dominate the commercial media system” across the globe (p.55). Likewise, Bell (2008) notes how “most media outlets, in television and print, are owned by mega-corporations who see them as profit centers rather than public services” (p.228). He points out that such ownership affects the very definition of news whereby “if it sells, it leads” (Ibid.). Citing examples from several countries, Shinar (2007a) proposes the introduction and use of new peace-oriented media structures that have turned out to be effective in countries such as Burundi in transforming conflict potentials (p.57). He also cites changes in media policies such as in Bosnia and Kosovo where independent media commissions were established to prevent the propagation of hate messages (p.58). In addition to media structures, Shinar (2007a) also cites successful examples in countries such as Burundi, Colombia, Israeli-Palestine and the Balkans where peace-oriented radio stations have been set up; and production of peace-oriented programs such as “news, soap operas, programs for women and children, and musical shows featuring peace songs” have been accomplished (p.58). Shinar concludes that “pluralism of media ownership and control is an indispensable condition for media checks and balances as well as for the production and dissemination of peace-oriented contents and forms during and after conflicts”
In agreement, Lynch & McGoldrick (2010) observe that for the Peace Journalism model to be successfully adopted by media institutions, its promotion and adoption must “emanate from the level of management” (p.97). As Patindol (2010) noted from the implementation of the Peace Journalism model in the Philippines, “no matter how conflict-sensitively an article is written, if an editor does not like it, it is cut or worse rejected” usually based on “pressing publisher demands and advertiser constraints” (p.201). It is such pressing extra-media factors that I discuss in the subsection below.

4.1.3 The Impact of Extra-media factors on Peace Journalism practice

Hackett (2007) delineates extra-media influences as including “sources, advertisers, the political power of governments, market structures, and technology” (p.51). Patindol (2010) in her reflection on ‘conflict sensitive reporting’ observes that the Peace Journalism model “contradicts the requirements of the market” in the sense that in conventional journalism practice, “readers are perceived to require nothing but simple, attention-grabbing and entertaining news and the entire media production system is designed to cater to this perceived type of readership” (p.201). Yet, the Peace Journalism model requires a much more rigorous engagement with sources and contents; which requires time, resources and a much longer attention span from audiences and an acute engagement level.

In addition to considerations of the market, one other key extra-media factor that Hackett (2007) underscores is what he calls “ideology and cultural narratives”; described as a “system of values and beliefs that governs what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as 'natural' or 'obvious' and that furthermore serves in part to
maintain prevailing relations of power” (p.51). He points out that “ideology not only shapes news, it is extended, renewed and reproduced through media texts” (Ibid.). Related to the concept of ‘ideology’, Lynch (2010) discusses how governments and other interest groups are increasingly using the mass media for war propaganda ends. He defines propaganda as “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p.72). He points out that for communication to be considered propaganda, it must be “willful, intentional and premeditated” (Ibid.). In his extensive writings about the Western media coverage of the wars and violence in the Gulf, he concludes that “we are immersed in war propaganda; our media relations, our very mediatised existence perhaps, are saturated in it, its subjectivity de-centered and dispersed. It is always already there” (p.81). In order to curtail such a situation, he proposes that it is key to work with power relations in the media domain by for example having “a strategy covering both structure and agency to increase the plenitude of cues and clues for readers and audiences to form their own negotiated or oppositional readings of appeals to support collective violence of one kind or another” (Ibid.).

However, as Maltby (2010) argues, propaganda does not necessarily serve negative ends. Citing the cases of NATO radio in the Balkans as well as Canadian military radio in Afghanistan, she points out how the military manages impressions effectively by constructing audience-specific messages towards peacekeeping. She observes that “those whose responses have a significant impact on tactical activities in the region are thereby identified as the audience for whom definitions are constructed” (p.227). In the case of Afghanistan, the objective of the Canadian military was to target civilians, particularly
youth and women that were still ‘uncommitted’ or not yet aligned to a particular fighting force or ideology (Ibid). In her analysis of Rana FM, however, she concludes that the radio does not adhere to all journalism principles; particularly the one of ‘balance’ since it often denied voice to the other party, in this case the Taliban (Ibid.).

The issue of propaganda aside, another important extra-media factor to consider in Peace Journalism practice, according to Kempt (2002) and Hanitzsch (2004), is culture since journalists are often an integral part of the given society on which they report; and therefore do face the same constraints and temptations as other individuals in that society. Kempt (2002) argues that there is nothing exceptional about journalists as members of a given society, and that Peace Journalism can only evolve within a "culture of peace" (p.60). Making the same argument, Hanitzsch calls upon journalism to reflect and ask the question: “what kind of society is it that creates the sort of journalism that has no sense of peace?” (p.491). If one reflects on that question, then it becomes clear that it is not journalism or the journalist that is the problem, but rather their society and culture (Ibid.). He argues that if journalists are perceived and viewed as ‘off-springs’ of their societies and their cultures, then there is no reason they should be expected to “be better humans than their readers, viewers and listeners” (Ibid.). He concludes by posing the question: “Isn’t it more likely that in a culture which does not regard the peaceful settlement of conflicts to be an essential value, Peace Journalism will be meaningless and mostly ineffective?” (p.491). Attempting an answer to his own question, he proposes that instead of “imposing normative values of journalism” such as Peace Journalism, scholars should instead concentrate their efforts on developing “peace public relations”; which he argues
is a sector of public communication that by nature deals with specific and pointed purposes such as supporting peaceful conflict resolution (Ibid.).

Alongside ideas such as the development of ‘peace public relations’, a growing body of research is acknowledging the ubiquitous role of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as major players in peace building efforts (Stauffacher et al., 2005; Matheson & Stuart, 2010). A 2005 United Nations ICT Task Force study highlights several projects across the globe where various ICT tools are already deployed for peace building; ranging from cell phones, to the internet, to streaming radio and recently to real-time tracking tools such as the “LRA Crisis Tracker” (Stauffacher et al., 2005). Matheson & Stuart (2010) also provide an analysis of the “range of ways in which war journalism is being rearticulated by social networks, including content-sharing websites such as YouTube and Flickr, personal media such as blogs and the micro-blogging platform Twitter, social sites such as Facebook and virtual worlds such as Second Life, as well as networks enabled over cell phones” (p.174). Following an examination of several cases in places such as India, Greece, Sri Lanka and the Middle East where new media technologies have been effectively deployed in violence scenarios, they conclude that “social networks are rapidly rewriting the principles and protocols of war and conflict reporting” (p.187).

Given the challenges presented by some of the extra-media factors cited above, Patindol (2010) argues that for an effective implementation of Peace Journalism practice, there

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See also “UN Streaming Radio” at http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/regions/AF.html
was need to train and re-orient not only the journalists in the field, but also the other actors in the media system such as the “journalism and communication educators, editors, publishers, advertisers and especially the media consumers” (p.201). Likewise, Shinar, (2007a) calls for the conducting of “peace-oriented media-literacy projects for audiences, including those in educational system settings and community frameworks of different ethnic, religious, regional, and other backgrounds” (p.60). Elsewhere, Shinar (2004) in his conceptualization of a “media peace discourse” argues that journalism needs pro-peace attitudes and proper tools that can only be harnessed through “the invention, development and marketing of a media peace discourse” to be “included in the current research agenda” (p.2). The main objective of such an agenda would be geared towards increasing the “news-value of peace coverage” (p.2). On his part, Hackett (2007) makes a case for a rigorous research agenda involving the monitoring and evaluation of the performance of news media in conflict situations using content analysis and other forms of textual analysis (p.50).

Stretching farther the purview and scrutiny, Lynch & McGoldrick (2010) envision Peace Journalism as setting the stage for a “global standard”, whereby journalists become allies for media reform across the globe and develop connections to social movements as well as to private and civil society groups that work in the advancement of global peace (p.94). They also envisage a scenario where such a “global standard” would boost the work of ‘agencies committed to properly informed consumer choice and protection, including statutory agencies that often operate at arm’s length from government’ (Ibid.). With such calls, however, Hanitzsch (2004) warns that Peace Journalism might suffer the fate of development journalism; which was originally intended to contribute to the
process of national development in less-developed countries but was instead ‘hi-jacked’ by authoritarian rulers in order to legitimize further restrictions on press freedom (p.490).

### 4.2 Conclusion

From the above conceptualizations of Peace Journalism and peace communication, an emergent common denominator is that the means and institutions of mass communication ought to be used in a deliberate manner to promote an agenda of non-violence and common ground. From the above conceptualizations, I position this study as an evaluation of the feasibility of the Peace Journalism model in developing countries such as Uganda; bearing in mind the individual, institutional and extra-media factors as hypothesized in Research Question Two (RQ2). Cognizant of what Keeble et al. (2010) call the “opposing forces in journalism, such as enterprise”, I agree with their proposition that to surmount such challenges, the Peace Journalism “movement must be intellectually rigorous, courageous, imaginative, life-affirmative - and open to diversity” (p.11). I also concur with Patindol (2010) who wonders how Peace Journalism would become the mainstream practised in a global society that has become increasingly complex and violent; and recommends that “those who have been trained in the field need to band together and engage in mutually helpful exchanges, building solidarity as they jointly work towards implementing Peace Journalism in the mainstream” (p.193).

The other objective of this study drawn from the above conceptualizations as set out in Research Question Three (RQ3) is to interrogate the practices of journalists and media actors in Uganda in view of contributing to the framing of peace as a mass media value. As the discussions above have demonstrated, the mass media frames of war and violence
are well developed so much so that journalists, their sources and audiences deploy them easily in their daily news routines (Howard, 2003, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Shinar, 2004; Keeble, 2010; Rukhsana, 2010). But as several scholars belabor the point, journalism frames of peace are hardly developed and journalists are rarely equipped with skills of conflict analysis and conflict mapping (Shinar, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Howard, 2003, 2009; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Porto, 2008; Rukhsana, 2010).

In the next chapter, I provide the groundwork for a robust ‘conflict analysis’ and ‘conflict mapping’ strategy. The chapter is also a rigorous conceptual and theoretical response, as hypothesized in Research Question One (RQ1), to proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm who claim that human conflicts usually turn into violent confrontations in circumstances where structural issues are ignored; and that the mass media have an obligation to decipher those issues and to highlight them in public discourse (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Lee, 2008).
Chapter 5: Conceptualizing Peace, Conflict and Violence

5.0 Introduction

Proponents of the Peace Journalism model, the focus of this dissertation, argue that journalists covering conflicts ought to take time to ask questions about the root causes and the motivations of the protagonists (Galtung, 2000; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). For instance, Howard (2003) in an explication of the “Conflict Sensitive Reporting” model argues that “having the skills to analyze conflict will enable a reporter to be a more effective professional journalist” (p.6). Drawing parallels with Medicine, he observes that medical reporters do not just report on a person’s illness, but also on what caused the illness and what may cure it (Ibid.). Likewise, Porto (2008) notes the significance of conducting “conflict mapping at different levels such as local, national, regional and international” so as to “identify the key actors and stakeholders in the conflict situation” (p.56). He also proposes systematic “conflict dynamics analysis where patterns and trends are identified and possible accelerators and triggers for violence explored” (Ibid.). The postulates of these scholars form the grounds for Research Question One that seeks to establish from Ugandan journalists and mass media actors what the drivers of peace, conflict and/or violence in the country are and how they are framed in media discourse.

In this chapter, I explore the various forms of violence and underscore ‘structural violence’ as the most insidious, malignant and persistent in Uganda. Without drowning the discussion into the numerous micro conceptualizations of ‘peace’, I also delineate the concept of ‘peace-building’ and delimit from scholarship some ‘values of peace’ that could constitute a ‘media for peace’ agenda that Shinar (2007b) advances.
5.1 Conceptualizing Conflict and Violence

Several scholars argue that conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of human interaction that plays a positive role in spurring social change such as promoting justice, peace, sustainable development and human rights (Fombad, 2002; Kasaija, 2002; Howard, 2003; Lugalambi, 2006; Hamelink, 2008). In their study, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) highlight the various conflicts and their sources; such as ‘identity conflicts’, ‘resources-based conflicts’, ‘conflicts over governance and authority’ and ‘ideological conflicts’ (pp. 33-45). The scholars agree that whereas it is fruitless to talk about conflict prevention, it is worthwhile to intervene in conflicts to ensure they don’t erupt into violence (Howard, 2003; Lugalambi, 2006).

Discussing the various conceptualizations of ‘violence’, scholars delineate three forms; namely ‘direct or physical violence’, ‘cultural violence’ and ‘structural violence’. From a review of literature, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) as well as Lugalambi (2006) concur that in ‘direct or physical violence’, there is often a victim who can confront, name or at least point to an aggressor and it appears in the form of physical acts such as assault, torture, executions, massacres, ethnic cleansing and sexual abuse. Macnair (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the causes of violence ranging from structural-social factors such as the passion for war by political actors as well as the “destructive obedience to authority”, to the psycho-social factors such as machismo whereby the mental predispositions of some is towards a culture of war (pp.11-28). Macnair (2003) argues that violence is also often based on a set of beliefs: “When there is an ideology, a coherent belief system, which has reasoned violence as necessary to attain important goals, then people who hold that ideology are more likely to commit violence or support
others in doing so” (p.6). She further links violence to the personality traits of some people such as the “narcissistic or antisocial personality” who exhibits an “associated lack of empathy and compassion; a belief that acts of violence will have much grander consequences than is realistic” (p.18). In that category are “psychopath” and “sociopath”, who she describes as the “kinds of people who don’t have normal stress hormones and where emotional numbing is extreme” (p.19). Macnair (2003) points out that those who perpetuate direct violence may choose to do so alone or may be acting under someone else’s authority; and in other cases they may be the authority commanding that the actions be taken (p.80). She also highlights psychological violence as being “behavior or threat of behavior intended to humiliate, degrade, intimidate, or otherwise demean the dignity of others” (p.81). Lugalambi (2006) proposes that as a response to direct violence, the mass media ought to “help society to identify and promote direct acts aimed at propping up peace and transforming conflicts [which] includes dialogue and conscientious pursuit of non-violence by exposing and opposing injustices, oppression, violent behaviour, and aggression at all levels of society and in all social domains” (p.107).

The second form of violence that scholars delimit is ‘cultural’, which Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) argue is identified in terms of the religious, ideological or linguistic symbols that legitimize direct or structural violence (p.29). They argue that any aspect or particular elements of a culture that encourage, provoke or justify violence such as flags and anthems, to inflammatory speech and mythical stories, can be defined in terms of cultural violence (Ibid.). Howard (2003) notes that cultural violence can be the way a group has been thinking about another group for many years, which may include “talk,
images or beliefs which glorify physical violence” (p.7). He points out examples of cultural violence to include “hate speech, xenophobia, myths and legends of war heroes, religious justifications for war, and gender discrimination” (Ibid.). Lugalambi (2006) argues that the mass media can help society to identify cultures where peace is cherished that include “honouring and celebrating differences” (p.107).

With regard to ‘structural violence’, Lugalambi (2006) reviews literature and notes that it manifests as “unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances owing to the skewed distribution of resources like education, health, and income” (p.105). Howard (2003) points out that structural violence is “harm which is built into the laws and traditional behavior of a group or society” and it includes “institutional racism or sexism, colonialism, extreme exploitation such as slavery, poverty, corruption and nepotism, and structural segregation” (p.7). Macnair (2003) agrees that ‘structural violence’ manifests as “poverty, racism, misallocated resources, and workers who labor under exploitative or dangerous conditions” (p.39). On their part, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) cite examples of structural violence to include “the inefficient or unfair administration of justice; sexual, religious, racial, linguistic, economic or age-based discrimination such as Apartheid in South Africa; repression of free speech and thought e.g. in Burma; institutional violence by social institutions such as the police or military forces” (p.28). In the same vein, Tony Karbo (2008) argues that “structural dimensions of conflict are generally characterised by weak political and administrative institutions, a repressive political system that does not allow for a diversity of voices, lack of legitimacy of political leaders and more importantly in Africa, the idea of ‘stayism’; the situation where leaders seek to perpetuate their irresponsible leadership” (p.117). He identifies other
factors that engender structural violence as including “decaying economic infrastructures, high levels of international debt, poor and weak legal frameworks for taxation and its collection mechanisms, relatively high unsustainable military expenditures and high levels of human and capital flight” (p.121). Lugalambi (2006) argues that considering the lives lost, the human suffering and the investment in the tools of oppression, structural violence comes out as the worst form (p.105). He further points out that unlike direct violence, “structural violence is latent in that it is embedded within the social, political, and economic systems of a society, community, country, and the world” and that “the obscure nature of structural violence makes it difficult to decipher and to link to its direct manifestations, yet it contributes substantially to the intractability of conflicts” (Ibid.). Likewise, Macnair (2003) observes that one of the main effects of structural violence is “psychosocial trauma” which affects the victims as it does to the perpetrators (p.40). She points out that structural violence “kills people indirectly, kills slowly, commonplace” and that it is “impersonal [and a] chronic insult to well-being” (p.80).

Karbo (2008) argues that to deal with structural violence, the “focus should be on the systemic and structural conditions that foster violent conflict” such as “the root causes of poverty, corruption, discrimination, lack of political representation, environmental degradation and unfair distribution of resources such as land” (p.122). Lugalambi (2006) argues that the mass media ought to respond to structural violence by helping society to “identify the structures of peace necessary to cater for the people’s needs and opportunities for them to individually and collectively realise their full potential” (p.107). While noting the role of the mass media in highlighting “structural violence”, Hamelink (2008) warns that unless competing claims to scarce resources are addressed, information
and communication campaigns might not be the solution. He points out for instance that while the “most lethal conflict in the 21st century is likely to be about access to drinking water”, any “information campaigns directed at people’s hearts and minds will do little to make this conflict less dangerous” (p.79). However, he notes that the worst cases are when “media workers become agents for the dissemination of the ‘elimination belief’ and when media are intentionally used as weapons to incite people to commit crimes against humanity” (p.80). He points out that the proponents of ‘elimination beliefs’ are very successful in justifying action by dehumanizing the ‘other’ and how the ‘other’ poses a fundamental threat to the security and the well-being of society (Ibid.). Hamelink argues that such ‘elimination beliefs’ that push groups to kill are not part of the human genetic constitution: “They are social constructs, which need social institutions for their dissemination. Such institutions include religious communities, schools, families and the mass media” (p.81). Likewise, Macnair (2003) highlights what she calls “semantic dehumanisation”, which is a form of linguistic warfare where the “viciousness of the words serves as support for acts of violence against defenseless groups” (p.2). She notes that dehumanizing often involves the demonizing of others who are then “seen as worthy of attach, monsters, demons, simply evil” (p.2).

5.1.1 The Dynamics of the Conflict and Violence Affecting Uganda

A key hypothesis of this dissertation is that Ugandan journalists and media actors do not recognize the complex web of conflict formation and progression as well as the wider array of the drivers of conflict and/or violence; thus the reason why their reporting privileges simplistic immediate events to the detriment of causative factors. This section, therefore, examines the scholarship on the dynamics of conflict and violence in Uganda
with the view of laying out a solid conflict mapping strategy. In a discussion about the persistent state of strife in Uganda, Lugalambi (2006) argues that violence and coercion have been institutionalised as mechanisms to deal with conflict from as far back as the colonial through to the post-colonial era: “violence, and political violence in particular, has persisted in Uganda precisely because there is a culture that endorses or tolerates the use of violence to settle political questions and other differences” (p.108). On her part, Tripp (2010) argues that President Yoweri Museveni’s government that started in 1986 on a broad base, incorporating an array of political interests at the time, has increasingly become autocratic, sectarian and governed on patronage and militarism.

5.1.1.1 The Ethno-Political Conundrum and the Burden of History

Alfred Nhema (2002) points out that between the 1960s and the 1990s; approximately 80 violent changes in government took place in the 48 sub-Saharan Africa countries (p.11). He argues that “although historical legacies can be traced in some of the African conflicts, the bottom line is that the root causes of these conflicts are found in the socio-economic and exclusionary political configurations” (p.12). Tripp (2010) as well as Lugalambi (2001 & 2006) argue that the struggle for political power grounded on patronage has been and remains the strongest driving force towards ethno-political violence in the country. Since her independence in 1962, flagrant undemocratic practices have bedeviled the country (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Lugalambi 2001 & 2006; Tripp, 2010). For most of her independent years, Uganda has been governed under what Bratton & van de Walle (1997) call a “military oligarchy” whereby national politics are very much controlled by army generals, thus encouraging armed political resistance in the form of rebellions (p.80). Museveni’s current style of leadership has been referred to
by Barkan (2011) as “big-man-rule” and by Tripp (2010) as “semi-authoritarian.” Even after opening up political space for competition during the first presidential elections under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in 1996, Ugandan politics remained what Bratton & van de Walle (1997) call “neopatrimonial rule” and Tripp (2010) calls “patronage”; whereby state control of power and resources is limited to a few hand-picked political actors who are often chosen from the same ethnic group. When the country re-opened for multi-party political competition during the 2006 presidential elections, the polls were characterised by state-orchestrated violence whereby supporters of Dr. Kizza Besigye, the main challenger to President Yoweri Museveni, were openly harassed including several being prevented from casting their votes on polling day. Like in the previous 2001 polls, the malpractices in 2006 were noted by international observers; and Dr. Besigye rejected the results (HRW, 2006 and 2010). 70 Owing to the numerous limitations on political expressions and organisation, Uganda’s version of democracy is clearly at odds with the internationally acceptable one. Bratton & van de Walle (1997) make a remark that remains relevant to the Ugandan situation:

“Whereas neo-patrimonial regimes sometimes encourage mass rituals of political participation, they have rarely permitted competition, not least in civil society but especially between political systems...We regard intolerance of political competition as the fatal flaw of neo-patrimonial regimes and a major reason why democratic transitions from such regimes are low-probability events” (p.273).

70 Dr. Besigye filed an election petition in the Supreme Court on 23 March 2001 seeking to annul the 12 March 2001 elections. The five judges on the panel made their ruling on 21 April and decided with a close three-two decision in favour of Museveni. They noted, however, that the polls were characterized by malpractices including rigging in some regions, but the reported malpractices could not change the results substantially.
While there have been over the years positive signs in Uganda towards stability, the political problems remain insurmountable. For instance, President Museveni who took power in January 1986 is not showing any willingness to allow credible competition, which is creating significant political stress within the country’s opposition that is degenerating into violence (Barkan, 2011; Tripp, 2010; Mattes et al., 2010). In a discussion about multi-party politics in Uganda, Lugalambi (2006) points out that “the problem with political parties is symptomatic of a deeper failure of governance reflected in systemically dysfunctional approaches to conflict management”, adding that the failure of governance “typifies a political culture in which violence and coercion have emerged as the norm” (p.106). He notes that “political violence grows out of the failure to accommodate and resolve differences using institutional arrangements and procedures that could eradicate or mitigate the negative consequences of these contradictions while making the most of their positive corollaries” (Ibid.). He argues that “it is the culture of violence that creates the conditions for the undemocratic and violently authoritarian responses to political conflict both by those in power and those opposed to them” (p.115). He observes that “meaningful democracy presupposes the existence of a political culture in which peace-building is a central feature of the process of democratisation” (p.115). He points out that peace is “a way of life and a social attitude that affects collective democratic behaviour [and that] Uganda as a society must find ways of nurturing a culture of peace by creating democratic institutions and systems of governance for

71 In April 2011, a consortium of the political opposition known as “Activists for Change (A4C)” launched a campaign of walking from their homes to their workplaces (walk-to-work) to shine a spotlight on poor governance as manifest in the rising cost of consumer goods in the country. As the campaign progressed, armed forces were deployed to stop the exercise thus leading to violent confrontations with the protesters. [See BBC News, 12 April 2011, “Kizza Besigye held over Uganda ‘walk to work’ protest.” URL in March 2012 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13033279]
arbitrating conflicts” (p.116). He is convinced that with such structures and their accompanying norms in place, people will have less reason to resort to violence when dealing with political conflicts (Ibid.).

With the specific case of the conflict in Northern Uganda, Lugalambi (2006) argues that the two-decades confrontation had everything to do with the political economy of the region and that the GoU’s “early insistence on a military rather than a political solution seems to have been misguided as it poisoned the atmosphere for the subsequent attempts at a peaceful settlement” (p.103). On his part, Muto-Ono p’Lajur (2006) notes that the causes of the northern civil war were varied ranging from social-cultural issues such as ethnicity and mutual mistrust between the North and South/West; to political issues such as the breakdown of peace negotiations and the eventual overthrown by Yoweri Museveni in 1986 of the Northern government led by General Tito Okello Lutwa (pp.68-72). With regard to the Acholi sub-region, several former Uganda army forces kept their guns for illegal activities such as poaching, while others joined the LRA hoping to recapture lost power, which has for the last two decades caused significant violence in Northern Uganda (Ibid.).

Linked to the violent struggle for political power in Uganda is the issue of ethnicity; which concept Oberschall (2007), citing other sources, describes as denoting “a large aggregate of people who have a self-defined name, believe they share a common descent, have common historical memories and elements of shared culture (such as religion and language), and have an attachment (even if only historical and sentimental) to a specific territory” (p.3). Discussing causes of ethnic violence, he advances what he calls the “ordinary man’s thesis”, which holds that “given the right circumstances, most people
have the capacity for extreme violence and the destruction of human life” (p.18). He points out the catalyzing factors as being the “obedience to authority, peer pressure, a perception of threat to one’s group survival (real or amplified by the regime), ethnic loyalty, public justification for violence against adversaries, lack of accountability supplemented for some by opportunities for enrichment through crime” (Ibid.). He adds that “collective myths legitimize our ideals, values, and moral codes, and make them compelling for us” (p.22).

In the case of Africa, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) as well as Lugalambi (2001) observe that the ebbing of colonial power intensified the competition for central state power amongst rival ethnic groups. Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) point out that strong patron-client relations akin to traditional power structures developed at the national level leading to a phenomenon that persists to date where “in many countries, the ethnicity of the president is indicative of the ethnic allegiances of the entire government” (p.9). Gebrewold (2008) agrees that the wave of African democratization since the 1990s has actually seen an increase rather than a decrease in the visibility of ethnic politics and conflict (p.159). In the specific case of Uganda, Lugalambi (2001), as well as Tripp (2010), point out that even after independence from Britain in 1962, the subsequent regimes always pitied one ethnic group against each other. In particular, the militarized Nilotic groups of Northern Uganda, under Milton Obote and later Idi Amin, maintained a brutal repression against the Southern Bantu groups for two decades (1962-1986); thus creating ethno-political tensions between northerners and south-westerners that linger on to this day. While President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government banned multi-party politics upon taking over power in 1986, ostensibly to
impede the politics that was always based on religion and tribalism, his record of leaving the army firmly in the hands of Westerners where he comes from as well as dominating political appointments have led to accusations that his NRM government has not rid Uganda of ethno-politics as claimed (Barkan, 2011, p.9-10; Tripp, 2010, pp.127-148).  

On his part, Malan (1997) highlights the issue of colonialism, often a hyped causative factor of ethno-political strife in Africa:

“And in their pursuit of these tempting goals they made themselves guilty of fighting, of establishing arbitrary boundaries (either splitting nations and/or lumping together hostile groups), and of enforcing structural violence. By the beginning of the 20th century, almost the entire Africa was partitioned into colonies or protectorates under European rule or supervision” (p.15).

Poku (2008) also notes how the arbitrary nature of the demarcation of the state boundaries at the 1884 Berlin conference resulted in a large number of diverse identities, ethnicities and cultures being grouped into new states; while at the same time separating nations with rich and unified histories into separate states (p.99). Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) agree that in many African countries, “the difficulties faced today are rooted in the power structures devised by former colonial rulers” (p.9). They point out that the arbitrary boundaries drawn on maps in Europe divided territories and grouped long-feuding tribes under the same national identities (Ibid.). Both Southall (1976) and Buckley-Zistel (2008) highlight the lingering effects of the colonial legacy on Uganda’s politics with some regions having benefited much more than others and thus entrenching the current ethno-regional imbalances. Whatever the nature of the argument, what is sure

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72 The LRA armed rebellion led by ethnic Acholi was widely seen as an effort by Luo Northerners to recapture political power from Bantu Southerners.
is that most colonial policies were geared towards dividing and ruling better rather than uniting Africans to live in harmony. What is also true is that the political creations of colonialism are almost impossible to undo without causing more conflict and violence. When Uganda’s Idi Amin tried in 1978 to annex part of Northern Tanzania that belonged to pre-colonial Uganda, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere declared war and with the help of Ugandan dissidents ousted the Ugandan leader in less than four months sending him into exile in Saudi Arabia where he died in 2003. More recently in 2008, Uganda and Kenya were on the verge of deploying troops over a border dispute involving a piece of rocky outcrop in the shared Lake Victoria waters known as Milingo, which was disputed by fishing communities of both countries (BBC News, 13 May 2009; Olita & Odyek, 2009). At the height of the dispute, some Kenyan MPs called for war while rowdy Kenyan youth in the Kiberu slum in Nairobi uprooted a chunk of the railway line connecting landlocked Uganda to the Kenyan seaport of Mombasa (Ibid.). During the disruptions, goods from Mombasa could not be transported to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern DRC.

Therefore, the ethno-political conundrum remains real and needs to be squarely addressed (Tripp, 2010). Lugalambi (2006) acknowledges the problem and argues that mass communications “can contribute to the development of norms of peace within Uganda’s political culture” by for instance focusing on those aspects of the political culture that create the environment for violence in the first place (p.116). This process also includes a re-examination of the "Western" model of democracy which Malan (1997) describes as “decidedly too individualistic and legalistic for Africa” to discern a version that “will do justice, and give full scope to the community and its traditions” (p.37).
5.1.1.2 Social Disenfranchisement

In this study, I take social disenfranchisement to include religious bigotry, male chauvinism and forced human displacement. Gerald Powers (2010) defines religion as “the human response to a reality perceived as sacred” (p.322). He cites a 2008 study by Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research on incidences of conflicts in the world and notes that “22% of conflicts involved religious claims” (p.319). Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) note the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in several parts of the world as well as a rise in other manifestations of religious extremism such as Orthodox Judaism in the political arena in Israel and right-wing Christian movements in the USA (p.11). They note that “at a time when old political ideologies and utopias are being swept away, religion is muscling its way back on to centre stage and, in doing so, has emerged as a potent source not only of spirituality, but also of identity” (Ibid.). On their part, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) noted in a 2006 study that religious fundamentalism is becoming an increasingly important regional issue in the Greater Horn of Africa due to weak state institutions (p.7). While Uganda is largely a Christian country that is not necessarily part of the Muslim extremism the CEC (2006) discusses, there is increasing intolerance perpetuated by Christian fundamentalist groups, particularly against gay people.73

In addition to religious bigotry, the issue of male chauvinism and the perpetuation of violence against women in conflict situations was amply acknowledged by the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on ‘Women, Peace and Security’. While

entities such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) were established as early as 1976, participants at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) noted there were still major hindrances towards gender equality. Subsequent to such efforts, Karbo (2008) observes that “a considerable number of African countries have made significant strides in mainstreaming gender into their peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction” (p.129). He provides examples of grassroots efforts such as the Liberian Women Mass Action for Peace (WMAP) as well as institutional efforts in countries such as Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa and Uganda where representative quotas for female leadership have been set (p.130). In keeping with Resolution 1325, UNIFEM commissioned in 2002 the report “Women, War and Peace” that handled a wide range of issues ranging from profiling the continuum of violence against women such as trafficking, sexual slavery and exploitation of women as well as domestic violence (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002). The authors also highlight specific ways women can use the mass media as a tool for peace. They propose that “hate media, under any circumstances and particularly when used for direct and public incitement to commit crimes against women, be prosecuted by national and international courts” (p.110). They further propose empowering of women in media through increased funding towards the “training of editors and journalists to eliminate gender bias in reporting” (Ibid.). Notwithstanding the efforts towards addressing women issues in Resolution 1325, Vayrynen (2010) notes that while it seeks to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, the Resolution assigns to women “a particular type of agency and identity” (p.147). She observes that in the Resolution, “the dominant

74 UNIFEM was in January 2011 merged with several other UN women’s efforts to form UN Women. URL in March 2012 at http://www.unwomen.org/
form of femininity is that of civilian, protected, and passive, whereas the hegemonic masculinity reconfirms the roles of combatant, protector and active actor” (p.147).

While gender and religious bigotry are serious issues that lead to ‘cultural’ and ‘structural’ violence, almost all countries that have experienced civil war have also been leading producers of refugees both internally and externally. The Commission of the European Communities (CEC 2006) observes that the Greater Horn of Africa including Uganda is one of the regions with the highest number of migrants and refugees in the world with the attendant problem of vulnerability to exploitation by traffickers and criminal/terrorist networks (p.7). In several cases, refugees such as the case of the Sudanese in Northern Uganda as well as Congolese and Rwandans in Western Uganda, compete for and eventually deplete local natural resources such as fuel wood thus becoming a further destabilising force within receiving communities. For instance, one of the acknowledged exarcebating factors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide was the invasion in October 1990 of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a coalition of returning Rwandan refugees from mainly Uganda.

5.1.1.3 Poverty and Lack of Opportunity

Salih (2008) discusses the poverty-human-insecurity nexus noting that while income poverty has fallen in all regions of the world since 1990, it was sub-Saharan Africa that had witnessed an increase both in the incidence of poverty and in the absolute number of poor (p.173; IMF, 2005). Linking poverty to conflict, Shaw (2003) exemplifies many other authors noting that several “resilient wars are more about economic resources/survival than, say, ethnicity, ideology, region, religion etc.” (p.3). Citing many
countries around the globe, most of them in Africa, Shaw notes that “economic shocks play an even more exacerbating role” in violent conflicts (p.10). In agreement, Smith (2010) points out that “employment disruptions caused by market liberalization may in themselves help prolong, rather than curtail, civil wars” (p.255). On their part, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) also point out that while poverty alone does not lead to communal violence, the awareness of relative poverty and expectations of a better life have always been potent ingredients in the world’s richest and poorest nations (p.12). Authors of a 2005 United Nations Committee for Development Policy report noted that “poverty creates an environment in which violence and conflict can thrive [and that] indeed conflicts can and do arise not only over a sudden loss in income, but also over the inequitable distribution of windfall gains” (UNDESA, 2005, p.11). On their part, the World Bank in a 2006 report noted that “many of the world’s poorest countries are locked in a vicious circle in which the competition over limited resources leads to conflict, and conflict in turn increases poverty” (SDD, 2006, p.5). The Bank reported that in 2006, “80 percent of the world’s 20 poorest countries have suffered a major war in the past 15 years” (Ibid.). Kanbur (2007) argues that in situations of conflict, measures of poverty and inequality ought to be assessed from the perspective of “between-group” and “within-group” dynamics, each calling for a different approach (p.2). While there are often “within-group” inequalities, it is the “between-group” dimension of inequality that is crucial since it is often accentuated by structural cleavages and polarizations of society based on factors such as caste, religion, ethnicity, race and region (p.3). Kanbur proposes a host of solutions including a need on the part of national and international actors to
“carefully design economic policy packages that do not sharply increase inequality across salient groups” (p.5).

While Uganda’s economy has had a positive macroeconomic outlook since the NRM took over power in 1986, an enduring debate is whether such figures translate into better living conditions for Ugandans. In a 2008 debate in the Ugandan Parliament, the NRM government was tasked to explain why despite impressive Gross National Product (GNP) statistics the number of Ugandans “who cannot afford basic needs in life such as food, clothing, water, education and shelter has risen from eight to nine million to date” (Mugerwa, 30 April 2008). The then Finance Minister, Dr. Ezra Suruma attributed the increasing poverty to mainly the exploding population growth (Ibid.).

Like in many countries, the group that is most affected by poverty are the youth. The unemployed youth are often incited by political demagogues to wreak havoc during political turmoil. During the September 2009 riots in central Uganda, for example, the participation of unemployed youth was widely acknowledged (Maina, 2009). Infact following the riots, President Museveni addressed a special session of Parliament during which he announced wide-ranging projects to boost youth employment (Muyama, 2009; Mugisa, 2009).

Given the link between poverty and conflict, several scholars suggest a wide range of economic activities that ought to be undertaken in conflict situations. Brown & Kanagaretnam (2005) make a case that multinational corporations (MNCs) working in conflict-prone regions of the world would stand to benefit by investing in peace: “Decades of investment in the business, substantial infrastructure and potential future
profits can be lost in one civil war, which should make the promotion of peace, security and stability a significant feature of business planning and corporate social responsibility” (p.11). They further argue that companies could contribute to communal and social harmony by employing people of different ethnic and religious groups and providing a neutral workplace for interaction (p.6). However, companies also need to ascertain the possible negative impacts their investments could have on the community: “For example, collaboration with a repressive or autocratic regime has the potential to exacerbate community tensions. Introduction of new technologies could adversely affect the traditional livelihood of the community as well as the collective resources and healthy environment commonly held by the people. Income disparity resulting from investment could also lead to domestic inequities leading to social unrest” (p.6).

5.1.1.4 Globalization Processes

Whitman (2008) provides a broad description of globalization as: “the shrinkage of time and space; movement of peoples and ideas across or through borders and boundaries, both psychical and cultural; an increase in the span of access to common goods and services; knowledge supplanting production as the basis for economic prosperity; a blurring of the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics; the emergence of new centres of allegiance, competence and authority; and new forms of complex interdependence - political, economic, sociological” (p.187). While Whitman’s conceptualization of globalization is quite encompassing, I take globalization processes in this study to include unfair exploitation of natural resources such as minerals, land and water; the proliferation of global trade in small arms and light weapons; foreign aid and poor terms of trade as well as the ‘NGOization’ and commercialization of peace-building.
Smith (2010) rightly notes that “contemporary violent conflicts are not purely localized phenomena but are deeply embedded within a global context of complex political and economic relationships” (p.247). For instance, a 2006 strategy for Africa report about the intractable conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) notes that “competition for access to natural resources such as water, timber and non-timber forest products, fish and fertile land, further negatively impacts on human security in the region” (p.7). The report further points out that in addition to human-induced extractive factors, natural disasters such as the “impact of desertification and climate change will further exacerbate the pressure on natural resources” and cause more conflicts such as is already happening in Chad and the Darfur region of the Sudan (Ibid.). The report, as well as authors such as Roche (2003) and Francis (2008a-b), paints a bleak picture whereby a constant struggle for natural resources, notably the River Nile waters, is becoming increasingly acute with Egypt threatening war on Ethiopia and other up-river riparian states including Uganda (Yacob, 2004; Tenywa, 2009). For instance, Francis (2008a) cites a 2007 African Development Bank Report noting that by 2025, almost 50% of Africans will be living in areas of water scarcity or water stress because of increasing depletion and scarcity of water resources, which will increase the threshold for conflict (p.7). On their part, Brown & Kanagaretnam (2005) argue that “resource wars” in most of Africa, notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which borders several countries in Central and Eastern Africa including Uganda will continue to draw drones of rebel groups that thrive on the illegal extraction of a wide range of minerals such as Diamonds, Gold and Coltan as well as timber and exotic animal species. In agreement, Smith (2010) points out that
localized conflicts depend on resource flows that extend well beyond national borders (p.249). She argues that since various webs of interdependence shape conflicts within as well as between states, effective interventions to end them should take into account the relationships between the local and global contexts (Ibid.).

Other than the destabilizing regional influence of extractive activities within the DRC, Uganda in 2006 discovered oil in the Lake Albertine Graben region shared with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The oil is being extracted by Tullow Oil, an Anglo-Irish firm that in 2011 sold a third each of her shares to Total of France and the Chinese state oil company CNOOC in a deal worth £2.9 billion (Klein, 2012). In a study on the Ugandan oil sector, Jacob Kathman & Megan Shannon (2011) point out that the oil has been discovered in “a politically sensitive area that lies between two countries [Uganda and DRC] with a history of violent conflict and border disputes” (p.24). In their work that describes how Uganda can avoid the phenomenon known as the “resource curse”, they point to studies indicating that “sizeable petroleum reserves in less developed countries have not improved overall national economic performance” and that in fact for many petroleum-rich, underdeveloped states, the exploitation of oil “has reduced the competitiveness of previously productive economic sectors, leading to declining wealth, social and political unrest, increasingly disaffected populations, emergence of rebel organizations, government corruption, and destabilized domestic security” (Ibid.). The study further highlights the increasing incidence of conflicts involving the indigenous Banyoro with immigrant groups locally known as “Bafuruki” (p.30-31). While the authors propose “government transparency” as one of the best options to avoid instability, controversy is rife between the NRM government leadership
with the opposition members of Parliament over the secrecy that surrounds the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) (Mukarazi, 2012). The secrecy was also highlighted by a coalition of civil society groups in a February 2010 report (Lay & Minio-Paluello, 2010). At a broader level, Whitman (2008) observes that one of the biggest problems will be China’s increasing interest in African natural resources; noting for instance the importation of Sudanese oil in exchange for weapons as troubling (p.193). He concludes that “the importance of oil and other commodities for the world political economy will almost certainly continue to bring unwelcome attention and pressures as well as opportunities to many African states” (p.193).

The problem of oil notwithstanding, the bigger natural resource problem facing Uganda is the ever-diminishing land amid a growing population. A policy report in 2009 by Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) noted that “land conflicts will escalate in at least 30 districts in Uganda unless urgent measures are taken to resolve them” (Rugadya, 2009, p.1). The Report states that the conflicts include “border disputes with neighboring countries, inter-district border disputes, wrangles between landlords and tenants, and tenants resisting acquisition of land by investors” (Ibid.). In addition to the national land disputes, the phenomenon of international multinational corporations buying and/or leasing of huge chunks of African land to grow crops for biofuels or for international food exports is causing significant concern to Afro-human rights groups (Cotula et al., 2009; Laishley, 2009). A 2009 report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) details trends, drivers, features and impacts relating to international
land deals in Africa noting that “while a failed attempt to lease 1.3 million ha in Madagascar has attracted much media attention, deals reported in the international press constitute the tip of the iceberg” (p.4). They argue that the issue of land-grabs in Africa is “rightly a hot issue because land is so central to identity, livelihoods and food security” (Ibid.).

Related to the issue of natural resources, however, is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) notes in their 2006 report that owing to past and present wars in the Greater Horn of Africa and beyond, there is a huge cache of arms exchanging hands across borders (p.7). They note that “large-scale trafficking of arms thrives between the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region, Central Africa, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula” owing mainly to permeable borders often inhabited by populations from the same ethno-cultural groups thus making cross-border enforcement difficult (Ibid.). To make the situation worse, there are several third party states providing arms to rebel groups such as the LRA, which is a major contributing factor to the presence of warlords, militias, criminal networks, armed crime and violence in the region (Ibid.). On his part, Wairagu (2002) traces the existence of small arms from the African decolonization and liberation wars to the political machinations during the Cold War (p.109). He points out that the fall of governments in Uganda (1979 and 1986), Ethiopia (1991) and Somalia (1992) as well as the enduring conflicts in Southern Sudan and DRC are contributing to the availability of small arms and illegal weapons in the region (Ibid.).

On their part, Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) note the privatisation of security in the global south, noting that “in a number of cities in Africa and Asia, automatic weapons
can even be hired on an hourly basis” (p.14). They state that the privatization of security has become a growing industry where “large multinational companies, mining operators and oil conglomerates have opted to hire professional military units to protect their installations from local guerrilla attacks” (p.14). However, the control of arms flows and the change of government policies regarding the manufacturing and sale of arms remains a contentious issue since defense is a lucrative business for the world’s super powers notably America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia and China, who also happen to be the world’s top arms-producing nations (Ibid.). Roche (2003) also notes that it is the illegal trade in arms that effectively fuels the illegal trade in all other products and resources (p.23). Yet, another complex situation that Shaw (2003) highlights is the fact that “a post-bipolar era” has challenged the sustainability of conventional armies with the effect that as “military budgets decline, so statutory forces have had to begin to learn to fend for themselves” (p.5). He notes that demobilized soldiers, and sometimes those still in service, often take off their uniforms only to use their guns in banditry activities (Ibid.). For instance, Uganda has been destabilized for years by marauding armed groups often based and supplied through third party countries such as the Sudan in the case of the LRA.

Taken together with the problems posed by the unfair exploitation of natural resources as well as the global trade in arms, the issue of foreign aid and poor terms of trade alongside corruption and the “NGOization” or commercialization of peace-building remain some of the other globalization issues of concern. Esman (1997) as well as Miller (1992) observe that development assistance often introduces fresh resources into a local economy and sometimes allocates existing resources in new patterns, which presents a potential for
ethnic conflict. Esman observes that in several African countries, aid has propped up rogue regimes leading warring groups to perceive rivals as benefiting at their expense thus exacerbating conflict (p.5). Related to the issue of foreign aid is what Karbo (2008) refers to as “NGOization” whereby the proliferation of non-governmental organizations leads to significant duplication of tasks reducing efficacy and to the commercialization of peace-building (p.123). On his part, Carey (2010) also notes the significance of NGOs as not only watchdogs in conflict situations but also as major providers of humanitarian assistance (p.237). However, some NGOs are manipulated and used by governments, national and international; including some of them emerging as fronts for insurgent groups (pp.241-2). In the specific case of Northern Uganda, Brisset-Foucault (2011) provides an analysis of how the dependency on NGOs by peace radio journalists of Mega FM conflates their roles since they have to adhere to the agenda set by the organisations sponsoring their radio programs.

While a lot of money flows into African governments and local organizations through foreign aid and from the western non-profit sector, most of it does not reach intended recipients as it ends up misappropriated. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Uganda ranked 127th out of 178 countries surveyed with a score of 2.5 out of 10; which was one place worse than in the 2008 survey. The best-ranked country, Denmark scored 9.3 out of 10 while Canada was ranked 6th best in the world with a score of 8.9. The worst ranked country has consistently been lawless Somalia with a score of 1.0 in 2008 and 1.1 in the 2010 survey (TI, 2010). For years, corruption in Uganda has been noted as one of the major causes of structural stress since it takes away from deserving millions what is due to them in basic services and skews the
distribution of national wealth thus providing ground for social unrest. While several agencies, governmental and non-governmental, have been instituted to monitor the misuse of resources, Tangri & Mwenda (2006) argue that the problem persists due to lack of political will, an entrenched culture of impunity and failure by the donor community to hold the GoU to account (p.101).

Without a doubt, the picture painted above on the various globalization processes is quite gloomy. However, the positive aspect is that there are regional and international efforts towards resolving such conflicts before they develop into full-scale war. For example, the Kimberly Process against “blood diamonds” resulted in the industry’s adoption of a nine-point plan that also made available diamond fingerprinting technology (Shaw 2003; Brown & Kanagaretnam 2005). Further, there are several regional African initiatives such as the Congo Basin Initiative and the Trans-border River Basin Commissions among others that have been established to promote dialogue over disputed resources before conflict escalates to violence (Holt, 2004, p.3; OECD, 2005, p.2). For instance, Holt (2004) also points out that a positive development came out of the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada in June 2002 where participating nations turned their sights toward a better regulation of arms brokers and traffickers with the help of the United Nations to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa (p.3).

The task of Conflict Sensitive Journalism, therefore, is to valorize ‘conflict mapping’ by raising the threshold of such drivers of conflict and violence discussed above as mass media discourse in view of coming up with informed de-escalation outcomes (Galtung, 2000; Howard, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Porto, 2008).
5.2 The Concept and Theory of Peace

Isaac Albert (2008) traces the entomology of ‘peace’ and notes that in all the major Western religious traditions notably Judaism and Christianity, the concept of *Shalom* (peace be unto you) is as central as *salam aleikum* amongst Muslims (p.33). He is quick to point out, however, that the problem remains the lack of agreement on what constitutes peace; and even “more contentious is the debate on how peace can be attained” (Ibid.). In an extensive literature review, he points out that the first conceptualization of ‘peace’ is ‘the absence of violence’ or ‘absence of war’, which Johan Galtung, one of the first proponents of Peace Studies referred to as ‘negative peace’ (p.34). From the various conceptualizations, Albert surmises three meanings: “peace as a world without war, peace as world justice, and peace as world order” (p.35). Among the several characteristics of peace, Albert points out that the definition goes beyond the conception of peace as merely the absence of war and captures a broad spectrum of what is needed for maintaining decent human living such as the absence of human suffering in its physical, psychological and structural/cultural dimensions (Ibid.). He notes from studies of prayers from various parts of Africa that “peace was not only a matter of human interaction but also included issues like food security, health, a state of harmony between man and his environment and elders’ readiness to speak with one voice” (p.38). Citing other sources, he argues that peace ought to be pursued based on ‘respect for life and human dignity; universal responsibility; and global cooperation’ (p.35).

On her part, Toft (2010) defines peace as “a cessation of violence”, but also as “a general lack of willingness to pursue economic, political, or social objectives by means of violence” (p.11). In agreement, Lederach & Appleby (2010) also conceptualize peace as being linked to “the conditions for the elimination of deadly violence and the
development of local and national communities that respect the dignity of each individual and promote authentic human flourishing” (p.41). They also agree that conditions for peace include “the absence of war and other forms of deadly violence, such as violations of human dignity by state or non-state actors (negative peace)”, but also “extends to basic human security, access to food and clean drinking water, housing, justly compensated employment, education and other expressions of positive peace” (p.41-2).

In a nuanced explication of the concept of ‘peace’, Galtung (2011) differentiates between what he calls ‘positive’ and ‘negative nonviolence’. He points out that while negative nonviolence includes all forms of action against physical violence such as “non-cooperation, civil obedience, breaking laws, declaring and practicing autonomy”; positive nonviolence instead includes “clearing the past through conciliation, the present through mediation of dangerous conflicts, and building a future through equitable participation in positive projects” (Ibid.). He argues that the two forms of nonviolence are “not exclusive [since] a Gandhi, a Martin Luther King did both” (ibid.).

On the other hand, Macnair (2003) argues that while ‘nonviolence’ denotes the absence of physical harm to an individual or a group of people, it does not necessarily denote a peaceful approach to issues since actions such as hunger-strikes, demonstrations, blockades represent unmet needs and grievances of a structural nature (p.58). In an analysis of regime changes across the globe, Keeble (2010) notes that several have been overthrown not through violent confrontations, but peaceful means (p.61). Citing several sources, he points out that “major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success in 53 per cent of cases compared to 26% for violent resistance campaigns” (p.63). In agreement,

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Roche (2003) outlines in relative detail the effects of wars and proposes an end to the “culture of war” to the “culture of peace”. He argues that contrary to popular opinion, humans are not hard-wired to engage in violence; but that instead war is out of a process of “socialization” (p.11). He discusses the philosophy and work of pacifists and civil rights activists such as Mohanda Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela who show that non-violence through negotiations and conciliation are viable options to alter and overcome systemic violence (pp.100-105).

5.2.1 An explication of ‘Peace-building’

Lederach & Appleby (2010) define ‘peace-building’ as “a set of complementary practices aimed at transforming society riddled by violent conflict, inequality, and other systemic forms of injustice into a society oriented toward forging a just peace” (p.35). Abu-Nimer (2003) sees the concept as “an umbrella term that includes the full spectrum of conflict resolution and transformation frameworks and approaches including negotiation, conciliation, mediation, facilitation, alternative dispute resolution, problem-solving workshops, education and training, advocacy, and nonviolent resistance, among others” (p.22). On their part, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) describe ‘peace-building’ as a “complex and extensive process of helping a society recover from collective violence” and is often seen as having four pillars: “physical security, socio-economic development, building political institutions, and reconciliation to build relationships and psychological security” (p.37). Writing about the work of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Cilliers et al. (2003) see ‘peace-building’ as a process of changing unjust structures through right relationships and it “transforms the way people, communities, and societies live, heal, and structure their relationships to promote justice and peace” in addition to creating a space in which “mutual trust, respect, and interdependence is fostered” (p.377).
Karbo (2008), like Kasaija (2002), points out that the term ‘peace-building’ got into wide use following the 1992 report by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali entitled “An Agenda for Peace” (Ghali, 1992). The report links the concept of ‘peace-building’ to three approaches namely “preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peace keeping” (Ghali, 1992). In 1994, another report entitled an “Agenda for Development” was produced by the Secretary General in which peace was identified as the foundation for development (Ghali, 1994). Both Kasaija (2002) and Karbo (2008) note that in 2004 the United Nations, under Secretary General Kofi Annan expounded the concept of “Agenda for Development” in which ‘peace-building’ encompassed a wider range of issues such as economic development, social development, empowerment of women, rights of the child, international migration, environment among others (Annan, 2004).

Karbo (2008) critiques what he calls the “short-sighted approaches to peace-building” as proposed by the UN arguing that in the context of Africa, peace-building should be geared towards “rebuilding of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity” (p.115). In the specific case of African ‘peace-building’ initiatives, Karbo (2008) as well as Francis (2008a-b) and Taylor (2010) note the imposition and wide adoption of the Western liberal peace agenda, which has led to the neglect of indigenous resources and institutions. Taylor (2010) notes how the liberal peace agenda greatly

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76 “Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html).


influences the work of the UN bodies, of intergovernmental organizations, the OECD states and donor agencies, as well as the international financial institutions (p.157). However, Albert (2008) notes that the heavy implantation of conflict resolution approaches that follow a liberal peace agenda are less popular in Africa since traditional mechanisms seem to offer better options towards conflict management and peace building (p.32). Taking the case of the African Ubuntu worldview, for instance, Murithi (2009) notes the differences in approach whereby the liberal philosophy separates aggressor from the victims; while in the African one a dispute between members of a society is perceived as one involving the whole community (p.151). In that logic, an individual who has been wronged depends on the group to remedy the wrong since in a way the group has also been wronged (Ibid.). He notes that the key feature of African indigenous approaches is the insistence on “forgiveness, healing, reconciliation and restorative justice” (p.16). He provides several examples where African peacemaking approaches have been adopted with success such as the jir mediation in Nigeria; the Xeer, shir and guurti in Somaliland that have been used with success.

In the case of Northern Uganda, Murithi (2008) as well as Albert (2008) and Karbo (2008) review literature to explain that the Acholi community traditionally practiced mato oput as a reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanism; which has been identified as an appropriate mediation approach to end the conflict between the LRA and GoU as well as reconcile communities affected by the insurgency. In Acholi culture, the entire community feels a sense of responsibility for the wrongs done by warring parties since a law-breaking individual transforms his or her group into a law-breaking group. Murithi (2008) notes that a key feature of the Mato Oput process is the public participation through a public assembly known as Kacoke Madit that constitutes a council

5.2.2 The values of peace

One of the objectives of this dissertation was to assemble views of Ugandan journalists and media actors on what social attributes and practices of peace that could be reframed to constitute media values. Yet, from the conceptualization of ‘peace’ and ‘peace-building’, one notes that the description is limited to macro-level processes geared to the promotion of non-violence and the meeting of basic human needs. As Albert (2008) notes, even the adherents of leading religious traditions and philosophers seem not to reach consensus on what constitutes peace and on how peace can be attained. However, there are discernibly certain components of peace that cut across most human traditions. It is such norms that I delineate from the literature and frame as constituents of peace that could be reframed into journalism values.

For instance Galtung (2000) as well as Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) identify journalistic ‘truth’, which for them implies not focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses and wrongdoings of one side, but rather naming all wrongdoers and treating all allegations

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Note: The *mato oput* process typically follows five stages, namely: perpetrators acknowledging responsibility or guilt after hearing of evidence by witnesses, the public and investigation by the Council of Elders; then perpetrators are encouraged to report and demonstrate genuine remorse; perpetrators are encouraged to ask for forgiveness from the victims and victims are encouraged to show mercy and grant forgiveness to the perpetrators; then follows payment of compensation to the victims often a symbolic gesture to reinforce remorse of the perpetrator; finally an act of reconciliation between the representatives of the victims and of the perpetrators follows through the ceremony of *Mato Oput*, which is the drinking of a bitter-tasting herb derived from the Oput tree to symbolize the psychological bitterness that prevailed in the minds of the parties during the conflict situation (Murithi, 2008, pp.23-24).
made by all parties in a conflict as equally serious. Truth also encompasses other journalistic values such as fairness and balance; which are not only a call to include all views on a given issue, but also to pay particular attention to minority ones, especially on mainstream issues (Romano & Cratis, 2001, p.183). Truthfulness also embraces conventional journalism values such as objectivity and neutrality, which are a call to stand outside one’s social-cultural arena, and allowing the protagonists “to tell it in their own words” (Galtung, 2000, p.163). Truth draws attention to accuracy, which is not just reporting the hard numerical facts but also the context (OECD, 2001, p.123). As Tehranian (2002) argues, truth in journalism is an ideal that calls for the identification of the views and interests of all parties since there is often “no single truth” (p.80). Truth is an appeal for completeness, which is about reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions (OECD, 2001, p.124).

In working towards serving the truth, journalists do respond to ‘justice’, another normative value, which Lederach & Appleby (2010) argue entails exploring the links between systemic inequalities and intractable conflict and/or violence. Noting how peace can hardly be achieved without justice, Murithi (2009) differentiates between various forms of justice observing that ‘retributive or punitive justice’ works on the principle of controlling or shaping anti-social behavior through punishment to the offender; while “restorative justice works on the principle of trying to, wherever possible, restore a relationship between the victim and the perpetrator so that they can continue to coexist in the same community” (p.143).

In his review of literature, Karbo (2008) notes that ‘reconciliation’ is a site where justice, peace, truth and mercy interact (p.119). He argues that those engaged in reconciliation should be “proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their
relationship and share their perceptions, feelings and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience” (Ibid.). Several scholars examine the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as well as other international justice systems where the values of reconciliation, forgiveness and healing are encouraged (Fombad, 2002; Campbell & Furey, 2006; Johansen, 2010; Philpott, 2010). On his part, Abu-Nimer (2003) examines conflict situations and argues for avenues that promote effective ‘cooperation’, ‘consensus’ and ‘common ground’ by capitalizing on commonalities and a celebration of any “moments of connectedness, even though these may be few in number and small in scale” since they can “nevertheless be highly effective in generating positive energy among the parties and empowering the peace-building process” (p.19).

In a detailed discussion of the African approach to peace-building, Murithi (2008 & 2009) as well as Omeje (2008) and Karbo (2008) note that most communities across southern, central and east Africa use the *Ubuntu* (humanness) worldview that acknowledges the interconnectedness of humanity across time and space. Tracing its etymology from the Xhosa and Zulu of Southern Africa, Murithi explains that the concept connotes the view that “a person is a person through other people” or that “I am human because I belong, I participate, I share” (Ibid.). Omeje (2008) agrees that the term connotes “a humanistic philosophy” of “collective personhood” and is best comprehended in maxims such as “my humanity is inextricably tied to your humanity” (p.89). He, as well as Murithi (2009), points out that the *Ubuntu* concept represents virtues such as group cooperation, generosity, hospitable, caring, compassionate, tolerance, respect, sharing, solidarity, forgiveness and conciliation.
However, Wolfsfeld (2004) in his explication of media coverage of peace processes laments how the virtues of ‘patience’ and ‘moderation’ are not favoured in conventional journalism. He notes that “a successful peace process requires patience, and the news media demand immediacy” (p.2). He further notes conventional journalism’s obsessive interest in covering events and not processes, thus making it harder for those working on long-term policies since “journalists are not in the business of waiting” (p.17). Further, in responding to the exigencies of the ‘drama’ frame, what is “calm, lack of crisis, cooperation, moderation, opportunities, internal consensus, incremental progress” are not considered news worthy (p.16). He notes that while extremism is exciting, moderation is considered “dull” (Ibid.). Yet, Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) argue that Peace Journalism brings to bear the norms of patience and moderation, which encompass going beyond assessing visible effects of violence and examining the invisible ones such as the long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, which might increase the likelihood that those affected will be violent in future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries (p.29).

Based on an extensive review of literature, Albert (2008) contrasts the Western conception of peace from other traditions. He notes that while in Western societies the cross-cutting issues in the understanding of ‘peace’ are the maintenance of law and order, the pursuit of stability, and a relatively safe social and political order; the African conceptualizations put emphasis on morality, which is manifest in “traditional etiquettes and observance of essential taboos needed for maintaining a state of tranquility in society” (p.37).

From the foregoing, it is evident that aspects of peace have nuanced understandings and applications in different cultures. However, it is also true that the human community for
survival depends on norms and values that promote respect and preservation of life, which constitute a universal ethic (Christians, 2010a). This dissertation is conceived as a contribution towards the conceptualization of that universal ethic of peace.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explicated the concepts of ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ by discussing the various corollaries of each. I have pointed out that conflict is usually a product of human competition for limited resources and is generally positive for human creativity and advancement. Conflict, however, becomes destructive when it degenerates into violence. I delineated the various forms of violence namely direct, cultural and structural. In the context of Uganda, I pointed out the dynamics that give rise to intractable conflict and violence. In the explication of ‘peace’, I identified some values that I believe can be constituted into mass media frames to contribute towards the advancement of a media-for-peace discourse (Shinar, 2007b).

This chapter concludes my literature review in which I have discussed in three chapters the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that inform this dissertation. In the next chapter, I explain the techniques deployed to gather and assemble data, while highlighting how each is the best to help me answer the research questions outlined in Section 1.3.
PART 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Chapter 6: Research Methodology

6.0 Introduction

In order to answer the research questions outlined in Section 1.3, I considered several mass communication research methods and techniques and chose those that optimally helped me assemble the most pertinent data. As Hansen et al (1998) suggest, “researchers should not only consider which is the most appropriate method for the study of their chosen topic or problem, but also what combinations of research methods will produce a better and deeper understanding of it…” (p. 1).

In this chapter, I present and discuss the research design and justify the choice of the techniques that I employed namely; content/discourse analysis, survey research, indepth interviewing, as well as focus group discussions or interviewing. In keeping with requirements for the study of human subjects, I also explain the ethical considerations I undertook. The research instruments are located in Appendices 1-8.

6.1 Research Design and Techniques

The approach of employing a variety of techniques in research is called “triangulation” and is a key organizing principle that I employ in this dissertation (Jensen & Jankowski, 1991; Hansen et al., 1998; Patton, 2002; Fortner & Christians, 2003). Citing other authors, Patton (2002) identifies four basic types of triangulation, namely: data triangulation (the use of a variety of data sources in a study); investigator triangulation (the use of several researchers or evaluators); theory triangulation (the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data); and methodological triangulation (the use of
multiple methods to study a single problem or program) (p.247). Hansen et al (1998) also suggest that “triangulation can be carried out in a variety of ways - across time, space, personnel, settings, organizations, methods, and researchers” (p.45). Whereas the other aspects of triangulation as outlined above were used in one or another way during fieldwork, the most explicit type I used in this study was ‘methodological triangulation’ through the use of both qualitative and quantitative techniques (Lindlof & Taylor 2002; Cookman, 2003; Mike et.al., 2009). Patton describes quantitative methods as those requiring the use of standardized measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can be fit into a limited number of predetermined response categories to which numbers are assigned (p.14). He states that the major advantage of quantitative research methods is that they can be used to measure the reactions of many people to a limited set of questions thereby “facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation of the data” (p.14.). Wimmer & Dominick (2006) state that one of the major advantages of quantitative research is that the use of numbers allows greater precision in reporting results (p.50). Likewise, Mike et al. (2009) point out that the primary objective of quantitative research is to “create, expand, and refine theory through systematic observation of hypothesized connections among variables” and one of the key roles of the researcher is “to be a precise analyst of data” (p.4).

On the other hand, Patton (2002) describes qualitative research methods as those that permit the researcher to study selected issues in depth and detail (p.14). Wimmer & Dominick (2006) state that the key advantage of qualitative research is that apart from being more flexible than quantitative research, it allows a researcher to “view behaviour in a natural setting” thereby increasing a researcher’s depth of understanding of the
phenomenon being investigated (p.49). Mike et al. (2009) agree that qualitative researchers seek to “create, expand, and refine theory by observing and interacting with people in their natural environment to discover rich explanations and unique instances” (p.4). In this approach, they argue that the role of the researcher is “to be a careful and reflective observer” (p.4). According to Wimmer & Dominick (2006), the major disadvantages with qualitative research methods arise because often sample sizes are generally too small to allow the researcher to generalize the data; while reliability of the data can also pose a problem since one relies on “single observers describing unique events” (p.49).

Within both qualitative and quantitative approaches, Kumar (1999) highlights the centrality of sampling, which is another aspect of research design that I employed in this study. He describes sampling as a “process of selecting a few (a sample) from a bigger group (the sampling population) to become the basis for estimating or predicting a fact, situation or outcome regarding the bigger group” (p. 148). Several scholars state that samples can be chosen either on a probability or non-probability basis (Gunter, 1991, p.215; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006, p. 92; Hansen et al., 1998, p.240-241). Gunter states that a probability sample is selected according to mathematical guidelines whereby the chance for the selection of each unit is known (p.215). He states that a non-probability sample often relies on the fact that respondents are available, convenient to access and prepared to participate (Ibid.). He identifies two main systematic forms of non-probability sampling as “purposive and quota” (Ibid; Wimmer & Dominick 2006, p. 92). Gunter (1991) defines a “purposive sample” as the one when “respondents are selected according to a specific criterion”, while a “quota sample” is a “selection procedure
whereby participants are chosen to match a pre-determined percentage distribution for the general population” (p.216). While acknowledging the significance of “quota sampling”, this study relies exclusively on “purposive sampling”. Patton (2002) states that the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study: “Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry” (p. 230).

From the fifteen techniques of “purposeful sampling” that he suggests, I used two in this study, namely: “snowball or chain sampling” and “criterion sampling” (pp.237-238).

Both Patton (2002) and Jensen (2002) describe “snowball sampling” as an approach in which initial contact with an informant generates further contacts. Patton states that the ‘snowball’ gets bigger and bigger as one accumulates new information-rich cases: “In most programs or systems, a few key names or incidents are mentioned repeatedly. Those people or events recommended as valuable by a number of different informants take on special importance” (p.237). In this study, I deployed this technique to generate knowledgeable contacts for in-depth interviews amongst media professionals as well as peace and conflict workers.

The logic of “criterion sampling”, on the other hand, is to review and study all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of importance (Ibid.). While most quantitative scholars agree that determining an adequate sample size remains one of the most controversial aspects of sampling, Wimmer & Dominick (2006) suggest several criteria to use, concluding that given resources, the larger the representative sample used, the better (pp.125). With regard to the survey questionnaire with journalists and journalism students, I typically first had a conversation with the editors to determine the number of
journalists that would be available to fill out a relatively long and reflexive questionnaire. Other than the journalism schools where all willing final year students were free to fill out the questionnaire, the ‘purposive criterion’ sampling within media houses across the country was done based on the advice of editors or senior journalists working in those particular media houses on how many would realistically respond to the questionnaire. Further, Patton states that when it comes to qualitative research, there are no specific rules to determine sample size: “Sample size depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources” (p.244).

In addition to the technique of sampling, Reinard (2009) as well as Wimmer & Dominick (2006), point out that researchers ought to ensure that their data is obtained in reliable and dependable ways to enhance validity. Reinard states that in quantitative research, validity is the “degree to which a measure actually measures what is claimed” (p.127). On the other hand, Wimmer & Dominick refer to another form that they call “external validity” which is a measure of “how well the results of a study can be generalized across populations, settings, and time” (p.32). While there are several ways to determine the validity of the research process, I relied in this study on what Reinard (2008) refers to as “expert jury validity” whereby a group of experts in the subject matter examine the measurement devices and judge their merit (p.127). A related concept he proposes is to use “dependability audits”, which is having experts evaluate procedures and interpretations of the research instruments (p.130). In addition to a dissertation proposal panel comprising three professors in communication that examined the research instruments, the Concordia University Research Ethics Committee further scrutinized all the material to ensure that they adhered to the acceptable criteria for the study of human
subjects. On ground in Uganda, I further subjected the instruments to the scrutiny of two senior colleagues in the Department of Journalism and Communication at Makerere University whose expertise on researching Ugandan mass media was brought to bear on the final post-testing revisions of the instruments. According to Hansen et al (1998) as well as Wimmer & Dominick (2006), pre-testing research instruments before administering them is a crucial procedure to iron out potential unanticipated difficulties during the research process. Given its relative professional framing, the survey questionnaire for journalists and journalism students was pre-tested amongst second year undergraduate journalism students at Makerere University to make sure that their seniors in the final year would be conversant with all the concepts used. With regard to the in-depth and focus group interview questions, I pre-tested the instruments amongst community members and social workers in Gulu who were of similar characteristics as the target groups (Berger, 2011, p.234-5).

To enhance dependability of qualitative fieldwork data, I had a full-time local research liaison as well as a Canadian participant observer. Each one of us came from a different social-cultural background, which was an asset on how to approach local situations. The Canadian observer questioned some of the issues that we Ugandans took for granted such as the importance of professional psychologists to help in the integration process; while my research liaison in Northern Uganda helped me determine how best to approach their communities that belong to a different social-cultural background than mine. In the social-cultural and political history of Uganda, the ethnic group to which I belong (Banyankore) is the same as that of the current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and most generals in the Ugandan army that has since 1987 been fighting armed groups in Northern Uganda such as the LRA. For almost anyone in Northern Uganda where I
conducted fieldwork, it was evident that I was from Western Uganda; a fact that bore the potential of changing the dynamics of the group discussions or interviews. Except for interviews with government or civil society leaders, I always went with local research liaisons as well as the Canadian Caucasian companion to raise the bar of neutrality in the process and allay some fears or suspicions that the information I was gathering could be used against them by the NRM government to which I am associated by default.

I conducted the above checks to minimize bias bearing in mind the argument by Renard (2008) that in qualitative research, the major consideration is not necessarily validity but dependability of the researcher and the measures used (p.130). I believe that the socio-cultural sensibilities I brought to bear in the field ensured a more dependable set of data.

In the sub-sections below, I discuss the four data gathering techniques that I used to solicit answers to the research questions. As alluded to above, triangulation helps in ensuring that the right sets of interpretations are applied to the varied communication phenomena (Jensen & Jankowski, 1991; Hansen et al., 1998; Patton, 2002; Reinard, 2008).

### 6.1.1 Content or Discourse Analysis

As a research technique, Berger (2011) describes content analysis as “the systematic classification and description of communication content according to certain usually predetermined categories” (p.205). He points out that the technique may be used in the study of quantitative or qualitative data (Ibid.). Like Wimmer & Dominick (2006, p.154), he highlights the steps that a researcher ought to follow such as ensuring measurable scoring units and having a systematic coding system (p.209-211). In their discussion of
discourse analysis, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) point out that the corpus of materials should be varied and could include advertisements, transcripts or interviews (p.78).

In this study, the corpus for analysis comprised of radio transcripts from Mega FM and Radio Wa. The starting point was the acquisition of the raw recordings of the two ‘peace radio’ programs from Mega FM (‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Ter Yat’) as well as ‘Vision for Peace’ from Radio Wa. I chose the first two because they are the pioneer ‘peace radio’ programmes in the country. Since their inception in 2001, the focus of those programmes was calling upon LRA combatants to renounce rebellion and escape from captivity as well as hosting the returnees to call upon their colleagues still in captivity to also return home. As pointed out in Section 1.2, both Mega FM and Radio Wa later introduced programmes that discussed issues of peace and conflict from a broader perspective. One of such programmes is ‘Ter Yat’, which I chose to analyze because of its unique feature of having a big panel composed of at least six members from various sectors of Ugandan society.

The material obtained from the stations covered the three months I undertook fieldwork from October through December 2009. Having obtained the broadcasts in Acholi and Langi, I hired two sets of translators who did a preliminary examination of the broadcasts and helped me determine the volume and nature of the content. In addition to its vastness, we noted that the broadcasts in the month of December were biased towards the discussion of the Christmas festive season. In order to obtain a broader scope of issues, I considered broadcasts from October and November. While both ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcast every Thursday, Ter Yat airs every Saturday. Therefore, for October 2009 there were four ‘Ter Yat’ broadcasts, five ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcasts, and five ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcasts. For November, there were four ‘Ter Yat’
broadcasts, four ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcasts, and four ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcasts. While ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcasts are typically an hour in length, ‘Ter Yat’ is two hours, but with multiple commercial breaks and jingles.

In conducting content analysis, Reinard (2008) and Berger (2011) propose that the designed coding sheet ought to cover all the categories within the corpus of analysis ensuring that they are mutually exclusive. In designing the discourse-coding sheet, I incorporated the category of issues as set out in the research questions. To enhance consistency and reliability of the data, the same coding sheet was used to record all the broadcasts (Appendix 02). One of the biggest challenges dealing with the broadcasts, however, was what Johnstone (2002) notes as the disconnectedness of the transcribers. He notes that transcripts are “by necessity a partial representation of talk” since in the process of transcribing the “most literal way to represent a speaker’s speech may not be the most desirable way to represent the speaker” (p.21). In other words, the meaning we derive from a speaker in a transcript is sometimes not what he/she intended. Bearing this in mind, I increased the level of reliability and dependability on the data by employing two research assistants who independently transcribed the texts while translating them from Acholi and Langi into English. As Reinard (2008) and Berger (2011) observe, proper training of coders increases the level of reliability and having more coders increases inter-coder reliability whereby the point is to measure the consistency by which each of the coders captures the same issues (p.123). Further, using independent translators increases the level of intertextual competence since the reading of texts can be nuanced depending on who is reading (Fairclough, 1992, 1995). While the coders followed a pre-determined set of variables in Appendix 02, they were also encouraged under “other observations” to note emerging issues such as the tone of the callers to the
radio shows, the attitude of the host and invited studio guests towards each other as well as towards callers. As the instrument in Appendix 02 shows, I was interested in each broadcast to establish who are identified as the key actors of development, peace-building, conflict and/or violence. With regard to the “macrostructure” analysis of the broadcasts, I used a grid of variables drawn from a literature review on the causative factors of conflict and violence as discussed in Chapter Five. The coding sheet was used to capture the issues raised in the broadcasts by the program hosts, the invited guests and audience members; as well as to note the keywords used during the discussions. At a “microstructure” level analysis, I used the coding sheet to record the keywords that are used in the broadcasts to describe peace or conflict. Since it is not easy to record intertextuality on the coding sheets, I discussed with the translators the nuances that they were not able to write in the transcripts and made additional side notes. In the case of Ter Yat as well as Vision for Peace, I was also able to interview the producers and hosts of the programs using the transcripts as the guidelines. The producer and host of Dwog Cen Paco was unavailable for the interview, but the station manager and news editor were able to provide useful commentary on the program. The outcomes of the discourse analysis of the broadcasts is presented and discussed in Chapter 7.

6.1.2 Interviewing

Interviewing, according to Weinberg (2001) as well as Patton (2002) and Silverman (2004), is one of the most widely used research data collection method because it is the best way to find out from people what cannot be directly observed. Patton states that “interviews yield direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge” (p.4). To capture views from a variety of information-rich actors, I used a technique several scholars call in-depth interviewing (Patton, 2002;
Silverman, 2004; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). For Wimmer & Dominick (2006), in-depth interviews are commended because they are usually longer, more detailed, customized to individual respondents and can easily be influenced by the interview climate (p.135). In this study, the choice of whom to interview was determined through an initial “purposive sampling” of information-rich respondents and I subsequently used the “snowball” approach to reach more respondents. To formulate the questions, I adopted what Patton (2002) calls a “standardized open-ended interview guide” whereby all interviewees in the same category are asked the same basic questions in the same order to facilitate the comparability of responses while organizing and analysing the data (pp.342-346) (Appendix 03). To enhance preparedness of the interviewees, I typically sent out the interview guide in advance along the letters seeking the interview (Appendix 05). Concerning the interview venues and time, respondents had the liberty to choose where and when, bearing in mind factors such as noise and other interference during the interview. All interviews were electronically recorded following a procedure where the interviewee signed a consent form (Appendix 08). In some cases, I made a follow-up of the interviews with email exchanges to get clarification on emerging issues post the interview. The responses from the interviews are presented in Chapters 7 and 9.

6.1.3 Survey Research

Hansen et al (1998) observe that survey research “seeks to provide empirical data collected from a population of respondents on a whole number of topics or issues” (p.225). They point out that surveys are not limited to collecting data about things but can also be used to obtain data about “individual opinions, attitudes, behaviour and so on” (Ibid.). They, as well as Wimmer & Dominick (2006) suggest that the key research instrument in survey research is a survey questionnaire (Appendix 01). Likewise, Berger
(2011) points out that questionnaires are the best tools “to obtain information from large numbers of respondents presumed to be representative of a special population” (p.222). Wimmer & Dominick discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various types namely: “Mail Surveys, Telephone Surveys, Personal Interviews, Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI), Mall Interviews, Disk-By-Mail Surveys (DBM), Internet Surveys, Group Administration” (pp. 195-205). With respect to the research instrument, they state that the standard questionnaire comprises of “closed-ended questions” whereby several answer choices are suggested to the respondent, albeit with some “open-ended” options for respondents to present independent responses (pp.181-182). In the design of the questionnaire, I used the Likert scale that Reinard (2008) describes as comprising of “statements that reflect clear positions on an issue, for which subjects indicate their agreement on typically five-point scales from 1-5 i.e. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree” (p.139). He notes that the scale is popular because it is easy to develop and use. Its major shortcoming, however, is that “a total score sometimes hides specific details of the response from a person” (Ibid.). He further points out that the scales can be adjusted (Ibid.). In my case, I opted to use three scales of Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree and Strongly Disagree to have a more robust aggregation of respondents’ views (Appendix 01). The choice of having more closed-ended questions was borne from my personal understanding of newsroom dynamics whereby journalists do not have much time to work on a long questionnaire that demands open-ended responses.\footnote{80 Out of the 250 questionnaires distributed in media houses and four media schools across the country, 195 were returned (78%), with 183 (73.2%) providing the requisite information for analysis (Appendix 12).} In order to capture views of those who wanted to provide detailed responses, I provided the option for a follow-up telephone interview (Question 037) and/or they could provide additional comments at the end of the questionnaire.
During the pre-testing phase, we noted that the questionnaire required reflexivity; and thus the need to give respondents the opportunity to take as much time of up to two weeks to fill it out.

Capturing the views of other scholars, Berger (2011) notes that survey research has several advantages, including that: “surveys are inexpensive; surveys can obtain current information; surveys enable you to obtain a great deal of information at one time; surveys provide quantitative or numeric data; surveys are very common, and some of the information you seek may have already been discovered in a survey” (p.227). However, he also notes the disadvantages: “people often don’t tell the truth, especially about personal matters; people make mistakes about what they’ve done even if they are trying to tell the truth; obtaining representative samples is frequently quite difficult; people often refuse to participate in surveys; relatively small percentages of people answer and return questionnaires; writing good survey questions is difficult to do” (p.229). Aware of the pros and cons of using survey research, I used my personal experience as a journalist and journalism lecturer to obtain the highest pool of respondents. For university students, I sought the help of communication research methods lecturers to distribute the questionnaire to willing journalism students. For the journalists, however, I left the questionnaires at the editorial desk where the editor typically sent out an email informing staff about the questionnaire and helped me work with one journalist or staff member to coordinate the distribution and harvesting. My research assistants would then make

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81 Due to time constraints, I did not followup on the 81 telephone contacts I received in the questionnaires. It is also likely that the length and professional intensity of the questionnaire made question 038 on additional comments redundant as hardly anyone responded.

82 In addition to a deficient question 033 on media house where I did not provide for students, the cumulative response rate from journalism students was very poor; thus making the assessment of students’ views in this study untenable. As a compromise, I instead aggregated in the data analysis ‘journalism experience’ of below 5 years where I believe most students fall.
follow up visits to the newsrooms to bring the filled questionnaires as they exerted minimal pressure on the coordinators to collect more from the journalists. In general, all questionnaires were ready in two weeks and the completion rate was 78% (n=195/250). As Appendix 01 shows, the questionnaire covered a wider range of issues raised by Peace Journalism scholars as discussed in Chapter Four. The results from the survey research are presented mainly in Chapter 8, but some of the responses feed into Chapters 7 and 9.

6.1.4 Focus Group Discussions and/or Interviewing

The Focus Group Discussion (FGD) technique is also referred to by Wimmer & Dominick (2006) as “group interviewing” and is identified as a key technique for understanding audience attitudes and behaviour (p.128). Wilkinson (2004) highlights the importance of ensuring that the discussion hinges around a particular topic or set of issues (p.177). He notes that one of the key features of FGDs is that they are more ‘naturalistic’ than say in-depth interviews since they include a range of communicative processes such as “storytelling, joking, arguing, boasting, teasing, persuasion, challenge, and disagreement” (p.180). Due to such dynamics, the role of the moderator to keep the discussion in focus is central. During the process of conducting the FGDs, Wimmer & Dominick (2006) as well as Hansen et al (1998) note the importance of paying attention to “self-appointed group leaders” who should be checked by the researcher so that they do not monopolize the discussion or impose their views on other members of the group.

Based on the guidelines of “purposeful criterion” sampling, I chose civil society groups working in the sector of peace-building, particularly those helping with the re-integration and rehabilitation of former LRA abductees and combatants in Northern Uganda. A typical FGD encounter started with a letter addressed to the group leader requesting for
his/her help to organize group members for a discussion of at least one hour to be arranged within at most 20 days after receipt of the letter (Appendix 06). Accompanying the letter was a set of guiding questions (Appendix 04) as well as a copy of the FGD verbal consent form that would be read out to the group before the exercise and then signed by the leader on behalf of the group (Appendix 07). Cognizant of social-cultural factors, I held the FGDs within distinct demographics such as youth, women, and men. In almost all Ugandan cultures particularly in rural settings, the right to talk in groups is still biased by gender and age, with men and elders often dominating the discussion. The views from the FGDs are used in Chapters 7 and 9. Since no participant objected, the participating groups are herewith shown in Appendix 10.

### 6.2 Data Analysis Procedures

In qualitative research, Patton (2002) argues there are mainly two strategies to assemble fieldwork data. In the ‘case analysis’ procedure, the researcher writes a case study for each person interviewed or each unit studied (p. 57). The ‘cross-case analysis’ procedure, however, allows the researcher to put together answers from different people to common questions or to analyze different perspectives on central issues (Ibid.). Patton adds that although these strategies could be used separately, they are in most cases supplementary (p. 492). While conducting the focus group and in-depth discussions, the interview guides were used to aggregate respondent views on given issues/variables on a case-by-case basis (Appendices 3&4). At the point of analysis, however, I have adopted the ‘cross-case analysis’ technique whereby I developed central themes in which views of interviewees have been placed. The themes were drawn from the literature review and informed by the research questions.
With regard to survey research, the main data analysis tool was the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) computer software (Sweet & Karen, 2003; Riffe, 2003, p.182-208; Mike, et al. 2009, pp.18-25; Berger, 2011, pp.259-301). In addition to generating descriptive statistics in frequency tables and cross-tabulations, SPSS also helps aggregate research data for more analysis to probe correlations between variables, thus helping the researcher to tell a more compelling story using what the data presents (Ibid.). In the determination of relationships between variables, I used the Pearson’s Chi-square correlation coefficient (r) whereby the closer the values are to zero, the more statistically significant the relationship between the variables is. Mike et al (2009) note that in the Social Sciences, any probability point less than or equal to p<.05 is considered significant since the relationship is 5% less likely and 95% most likely; meaning that random chance was unlikely to have resulted in the observed test statistic (p.25). For instance in measuring whether the experience of journalists impacts on given variables such as the appreciation of news values of violence, a Chi-square test score of 0.056 is an alert that the measured correlation is statistically significant; and therefore there may be an association between experience and appreciation of violence as a news value. However, if the Chi-square test score is above 0.10 such as 0.568, this confirms that the observed differences (or association) could be by chance and might as well be ignored (Mike et al, p.25; Wimmer & Dominick, pp.306-314). In the presentation and discussion of the survey data in Chapter 8, I use Chi-square correlation tests to help me assess some of the responses in relation to the hypotheses and research questions set out in this study.

### 6.3 Research Ethics

Greenberg (2003) highlights the significance of ethical considerations prior to and during research. In keeping with the Concordia University “Policy for the Ethical Review of
Research Involving Humans”, I ensured that fieldwork was conducted in a manner that respected “human dignity, privacy and confidentiality” as well as the “free and informed consent of subjects” (p.1). I also endeavored to “minimize harm and maximize benefits” as well respecting “the position of vulnerable persons” (Ibid.). During fieldwork, I at every step sought written and verbal consent from the participants using the forms in Appendices 7 & 8. In the case of the survey questionnaire, I included a detailed introductory statement outlining ethical considerations (Appendix 01). Towards the end of fieldwork, I became aware of the “Research Registration and Clearance Policy Guidelines” by the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST, 2007), which calls for prosecution if a researcher does not register any research being conducted in the country. Owing to time constraints as well as the fact that the Concordia clearance addressed all the ethical concerns, the Uganda clearance of the research project was addressed retrogressively with the UNCST.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented and justified the choice of triangulated research methods namely; discourse/content analysis, in-depth and group interviewing as well as survey research in the assembling of fieldwork data. I have laid out the research design explaining the value of purposive and criterion sampling. In the data analysis procedures, I have justified the use of a ‘cross-case analysis’ to treat qualitative data as well as SPSS in dealing with quantitative data. To ensure that the research process met the criteria of academic inquiry and that the data met validity and dependability claims, I adhered to guidelines set out in the Concordia University “Policy for the Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans”, which do not contravene nor contradict the Ugandan national research guidelines set by the UNCST.
The next chapter, the first in three presenting and discussing the findings, deals with the data mined from the ‘peace radio’ broadcasts from Mega FM and Radio Wa as well as some discussion about the broadcasts by some community members during FGDs, and individual respondents on the issues through in-depth interviews.
Chapter 7: Framing the Drivers of Peace, Conflict and/or violence

7.0 Introduction

The main organizing principle of this chapter is framing theory as expounded in Section 3.1 above. Van Gorp (2010) points out that framing is conceived as a deductive strategy whereby “a predefined and limited set of frames is invoked and where the empirical aim of the study is to decide to what extent these frames are applied…and which effects they produce” (p.91). Both Lugalambi (2006) and Reese (2010) agree that effective framing analysis benefits from several devices of language usage. The chapter responds to Research Question One; a probe of what Ugandan journalists and media actors conceive to be the drivers of peace, conflict and/or violence in the country and how they frame those drivers in media discourse.

To ensure that all the attendant sub-sets of Research Question One are answered, Section 7.1 for instance provides an answer as to whom Ugandan journalists and media actors identify as the frame sponsors of peace and which frames emerge. In Section 7.2, I present the frame sponsors of conflict and/or violence and which frames are used to describe them. In Section 7.3, I explore the issues that Ugandan journalists and media actors identify as the drivers of conflict and/or violence; in keeping with the scholarship that urges journalists to be conversant with ‘conflict mapping’ and ‘conflict analysis’ techniques (Galtung, 2000; Howard, 2003, 2009; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Porto, 2008). The section draws largely from the conceptualizations in Section 5.1.1 on the dynamics of conflict and violence in Uganda. Finally, Section 7.4 discusses the other emergent frames from the data, particularly drawing from theoretical frameworks such as
development journalism and communication, to discern which ideologies the actors of peace, conflict and/or violence promote. While the chapter draws mainly from the corpus of transcripts from ‘Dwog Cen Paco’, ‘Ter Yat’ and ‘Vision for Peace’, the discussion is also enriched by commentary drawn from in-depth interviews and some Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

7.1 Framing the actors of peace

By default, the hosts of the three ‘peace’ programs are framed as pacifists, conciliators and counselors. Mega FM’s ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ (come back home) is a clear frame of reconciliation, forgiveness and communal harmony. The host, Lacambel Wod’Ogena introduces every show with statements that are geared towards the promotion of a harmonious society and is therefore, for Mega FM, a quintessential pacifist and conciliator. For instance during the 01st October 2009 program, he introduced the program thus: “Today I have three of our children who have come back from the bush. They will tell us how their life was while in the bush and send a message to their colleagues who are still in captivity. We shall also give time to listeners to call in and contribute to the show, which is aimed at bringing peace to our community. Peace is sweet to all of us, so what we say should support peace...” During the FDG with former LRA commanders in Gulu Senior Quarters, as well as an interview with Brigadier Kenneth Banya, a former LRA ideologue, the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program was highly credited for having debunked myths about the GoU amnesty to LRA combatants.83 The FGD participants confirmed that program host Lacambel Wod’Ogena has incredible

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83 Focus Group Discussion with eight former members of the LRA leadership, Gulu Senior Quarters, 02 March 2010 (Appendix 11); and Interview with Brigadier Kenneth Banya, the former LRA political advisor, Gulu, 03 March 2010.
appeal to the LRA abductees. Further, Lacambel’s commitment to peace is discernible on the 29th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program: “On Sunday, I will be with them [LRA returnees] on Radio Uganda which is heard from Central Africa [Republic]. Our children who have listened to their colleagues speak on UBC are all anxious about coming back home. They have realised that they were being deceived.” On the sister Mega FM ‘Ter Yat’ program, the host and producer Steven Balmoi and the program panelists, notably the six regular ones during October and November 2009, do not always agree on some issues, giving the program a conflict framing allure. This is because the program is comprised of a broad panel of members from opposing political parties as well as civil society groups that often present counter-positions to those advanced by government panelists. Nonetheless, the ‘Ter Yat’ program falls within the peace-building framing since its mission is to address the structural causes of conflict and violence in Uganda by using radio as an effective public sphere. On Radio Wa, the tag of the program I analysed, ‘Vision for Peace’ spells out its mission by default and host James Jacob Kakaba as well as his regular panelists Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling deployed conciliatory rhetoric throughout the programs. In framing theory, the program hosts clearly deployed what Brewer and Kimberly (2010) call ‘strategy framing’; and what Nelson & Willey (2001) refer to as ‘collective action framing’. The hosts use their radio programs to lay a ‘strategy’ for the peaceful end to the LRA insurgency and they call upon the ‘collective’ will of LRA combatants to renounce rebellion and come back home. The hosts also rely on the ‘collective actions’ of the LRA returnees and their community to coexist in forgiveness and harmony.
In addition to the ‘peace radio’ program hosts, all the regular panelists and the guests on the broadcasts are framed as pacifists, promoters of reconciliation, of consensus, of common ground and communal harmony. For instance during the 08th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, former LRA peace negotiator Silver Achama had this message: “For those who are still in the bush, if you are listening to me now, just come back home tomorrow. Those who have returned home are living in peace; they are not being disturbed by anybody. Come home and don’t allow the law to catch up with you.”

In the subsequent ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program on 15th October 2009, Mary Okee from the Uganda Amnesty Commission said: “To our children who are with us in the studio today, I would like to on behalf of Amnesty [Commission Gulu] and the parents of Gulu District welcome you home. I am grateful to God for protecting you and for bringing you safely home. I continue praying to God to help all our children who are still in the bush to return home…” On the ‘Ter Yat’ program, the messages of each panelist were often contested, but overall none of the panelists used inflammatory language. The regular panelists on ‘Vision for Peace’, Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling often use a moralist tone with their arguments couched in Roman Catholic religious dogma. For instance during the 29th October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program discussing the ideals of the Humanist Movement, panelist Vincent Oling said: “Listeners, what we discuss here is serious. We want to have results and I want to encourage everyone to listen to Radio Wa’s programs so that we can have peace for our development in terms of wealth and welfare. I thank all of you who have been listening. I would like to tell you to stop excessive drinking. I know it is important to take leisure or rest, but you should do so after work.” Like their hosts, the program panelists and guests deployed mainly ‘strategy’
and ‘collective action’ framing. The panelists and guests on ‘Ter Yat’, however, deployed mainly what Brewer and Kimberly (2010) refer to as ‘substance framing’ and what Nelson & Willey (2001) refer to as ‘issue framing’. In both cases, several policy issues were contested and specific proposals were made by the discourse parties.

In addition to the panelists, several individuals are singled-out on the broadcasts for their role in the peace-building efforts of Northern Uganda. During the 08 October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, former LRA peace negotiator Silver Ray Ochora recounted his efforts for years to get the LRA onto the negotiating table through clandestine missions to Nairobi, Kenya in order to meet with LRA sympathizers and prospective funders of the peace process. In the program, he seemed to be deliberately naming people central to the peace negotiations as a way of building institutional memory. On the LRA side, he credited Brigadiers Sam Kolo and Vincent Otti for being at the centre of peace negotiations over the years. 84 He also singled-out several civilian players both in Uganda and in the Acholi diaspora community in Kenya. Also prominent in the process was the Acholi paramount chief Rwot David Onen Achana. He also identified the early financiers of the peace talks as including the UN as well as the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands who financed chartered flights for early negotiators from Nairobi to Southern Sudan to meet GoSS leaders Dr. Riek Machar and Salva Kiir. On the GoU side, he hailed Betty Oyella Bigombe, then Minister for the Pacification of Northern Uganda

84 Brigadier Sam Kolo was once the LRA’s spokesperson who was active in all LRA peace negotiations with the GoU over the years. He renounced rebellion in February 2005 and went to Gulu University where he graduated in January 2012 with a degree in Business Administration. His counterpart Brig. Vincent Otti was the LRA’s second in command who was also central in all LRA negotiations with the GoU. Unfortunately, Joseph Kony ordered Otti’s execution in October 2007 accusing him of treason over his role to push for the end of the insurgence during the 2006-2007 Juba peace talks (BBC News, 21 December 2007; Kasper, A., 25 January 2012)
for having been supportive of efforts to contact the LRA. Callers into the programs also referred to Betty Bigombe several times and credited her for the central role she played in the peace negotiations with the LRA. For instance during the 17th October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program, panelist Samuel Oduny identified Betty Bigombe as being one of the first government officials to bring the plight of the Acholi children to the attention of President Yoweri Museveni. The pre- eminent framing that emerges is of ‘collective action’ (Nelson & Willey, 2001) where all the efforts of the individuals identified were geared towards a negotiated, peaceful end to the LRA insurgency.

On the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, the returning former LRA combatants are frame sponsors of peace because of their exemplary courage to renounce rebellion and for the calls they made on radio to their colleagues to end the fighting. They also come out as courageous and resilient individuals who trekked hundreds of miles through difficult terrain. All the twenty-five returnees who came to the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs that I analysed during October and November 2009 sent out messages imploring their counterparts still fighting to renounce rebellion and ‘come back home’. For instance during the 29th October 2009 program, former LRA combatant Patrick Otika sent out a reassuring message thus: “I send my greetings to Nyeko, I know we used to stay together. I have already returned home. It is my voice you are listening to. So come back home. I also send my greetings to all the commanders in the bush. Use that courage which has made you to live in the bush up to today to come back home my brother. Take courage and come back home.” The 16-year old Samuel Ojara sent out an emotional message to his colleagues during the 29th October 2009 program: “Come back home, so that when you die, at least you will be given a decent burial. Don’t die like a dog. You are not the
one who started that war. You were abducted. You are supposed to be at school. So why
don’t you come home? There is no crime you have committed. One local musician called
Guti Kwaro sang thus, ‘you should bring the bones back home’. Commander Ocen
Lukung, you are the one in charge of the children in the bush, send them home.” During
the 05 November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, returnee Michael Ojok also said his
homecoming was determined by the dignity he wants in death: “I said, if I am meant to
die, then let it happen while am home; because here, no one will even bury me. I will just
be eaten by wild animals or rot in the bush or under a tree.” On the 01 October 2009
‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, returnee Quinto Onen declines to name anyone saying all
abducted LRA fighters were his friends, but his colleagues Christopher Ochora and
Charles Okeny made their calls personal by addressing their friends still in captivity by
name: “Okot, Okole, Agole, Lutolo, Nyam, Job, Ladwar, Ochoii, John Ogenga.” For
those LRA returnees who reintegrate properly, the rewards are many such as those that
accrue to Ray Apire, a former LRA commander who is a regular ‘Dwog Cen Paco’
panelist and adviser. His enhanced status as community adviser is discernible during the
29th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program: “These children were not lazy and yet I
have noticed that there is a lot of laziness in homes. To men, do not leave all domestic
chores to women. If it was not for hard work, these children would not have come back
home. They put their all in the idea of coming back home and indeed it happened. They
used to go without food. So let us stop taking alcohol without control. Alcohol disrupts
peace in the home,” he counseled. As is evident, the former LRA combatants are
employing a ‘collective action’ framing to send out their appeals to their colleagues, but
also use what Brewer and Kimberly (2010) refer to as ‘episodic or anecdotal frames’
where they use particular cases such as names of their colleagues and commanders to strengthen their appeals. Their accounts are also ‘anecdotal’ through repetition of the escape narrative and their reintegration in Acholi society.

The Acholi community is also framed as a key sponsor of peace as the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program depicts it as forgiving and supportive to the former LRA combatants; irrespective of the crimes some of them might have committed. For instance during the 01st October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, host Lacambel urges the community to “join hands” so that “the heavy load of hardships becomes light”. In all the programs of October and November 2009 that I analysed, a total number of 37 encouragement calls were made on ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ from across the sub-region. For instance during the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program of 01st October 2009, five people called into the program from across the region welcoming the three returnees in studio and giving them messages of encouragement and counsel on how to succeed in their new life. Lapwony Oryem called from Pabbo to reassure and counsel the returnees: “I want to welcome my children from the bush. I want to encourage them to go back to school even though some of them feel that they have wasted time in the war. The world is changing and very soon, they will start asking for O-level [Ordinary level or Junior High] or even A-level [Advanced level or Grade 12 or CEGEP in Quebec] certificates before one can join the army. So even when some of you say you want to join the army, you have to get time and study.” During the 12th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, a one Ochama called from Guru-Guru and said: “They should not fear. Kibwota Walter [in studio] is my brother. I appreciate him for coming home. The voices of these children should be relayed to various radios so that their colleagues can listen to their appeals and come back home.”
On the 25th November 2009 program, Okwonga Denis called to provide testimony: “I also returned from captivity and now six years at home. I went back to school and am now living comfortably at home. They should not have any fear.” In these few examples, the community are sponsors of ‘collective action’ frames of forgiveness, understanding, empathy and willing to help the returnees reintegrate.

Related to the community is the frame sponsorship by Mega FM of the former LRA combatants as “our children”, thus appealing to the family frame. In 18 of the 37 welcoming calls from listeners during the shows I analysed in October and November 2009, the LRA former combatants were specifically referred to as “our children”; while in 8 calls they were referred to as “my brothers”. At the start and during the entire ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs, host Lacambel Wod’Ogena repeatedly refers to the former LRA combatants in the studio as “our children”. He also makes detailed introductions of his guests by mentioning the names of their parents, their original villages, the dates when and places from where they were abducted. Yet, of all the 37 former LRA combatants that Mega FM reported to have returned in October and November 2009, and the twenty whose age was mentioned during the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcasts that I analysed, only two were below 18 years and thus legally qualify to be referred to as children as per Ugandan law - Osilo Simon, 14 and Ojara Samuel, 16. The average age of the remaining 18 returnees was 23; with the oldest being Ochola Richard at 32 who was abducted in 1991 when he was 14 years old. However, notwithstanding the African cliché that every child belongs to the community, the framing of LRA returnees by Mega FM and her listeners as “children” becomes more apparent when one looks at the dates each of these individuals said they were abducted to realize that all of them were below 18 years,
averaging 12 years. Unless Charles Okeny did not know his real age, he said on the 01st October 2009 program that he was 19 years and was abducted in 1994 when he must have been just 4 years! In this framing of the returnees as “our children”, time for the Acholi families seems to have stood still from when their children, now adults, were abducted by the LRA. This framing is; however, even more significant in the sense that it exonerates the LRA former combatants of any wrongdoing since they were children when abducted; innocent, lacking in agency and victims of the war. In fact, none of the returnees in all the nine ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs I analysed says they joined the LRA willingly. Even during a focus group discussion with eight former LRA commanders in Gulu Senior Quarters, all said they had been abducted; including 60-year old Brigadier Kenneth Banya, a former member of the LRA High Command and military advisor to LRA’s chief Joseph Kony. Banya was reportedly captured by the UPDF in combat in July 2004 at the frontline in Northern Uganda. The frame sponsorship of former LRA combatants as “our children” responds to the ‘collective action’ framing criteria, but also as ‘strategy’ framing by Mega FM to facilitate the implementation of the GoU Amnesty law.

The Acholi elders and cultural leaders are also frame sponsors of peace as the unifiers of the Acholi people, priests who purify and offer blessings as well as psychotherapists to the returning LRA combatants. In this framing, the LRA returnees come back from captivity as culturally contaminated individuals who have to, in most cases, undergo Acholi traditional cleansing rituals. For instance during the 15th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen

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85 In an interview with Brigadier Banya in Gulu on 03 March 2010, he denied the charge that he was captured by the UPDF and said he willingly surrendered having been sent by LRA leader Joseph Kony to accompany back home women and children in preparation for the Juba peace talks.
Paco’ program, staff from the Uganda Amnesty Commission explained to the returnees in the studio, and those listening, how the reintegration process functions. Mary Okee highlighted the Acholi traditional cleansing rituals: “We do a little celebration to welcome you and where necessary, we take you to Ker Kwaro Acholi (cultural home in Gulu) where you are cleansed. In Acholi when someone stays away from home for a long time, elders carryout cleansing.” 86 The remarks by Okee, who identified herself as a Roman Catholic nun, and whose institution is traditionally opposed to cultural practices shows how the LRA conflict had conflated some institutional practices in Northern Uganda. For instance, prior to conducting three FGDs with members of the Okweyo Psychosocial Support Project of the Diocese of Northern Uganda, the members underwent a Christian ceremony of forgiveness and healing at the Church headquarters. A striking feature of the ceremony was the generous use of Acholi traditional cultural symbols in an otherwise Christian ceremony. In an interview, Pamella Lukwiya, the project manager explained that the Okweyo plant used in the ritual is planted at entrances of Acholi homesteads for its powers to guard against evil spirits. It is also a plant used in conflict resolution rituals: “We have adopted the Okweyo practice to promote healing and reconciliation in the community and to end the vicious cycle of hatred and revenge. Our target group are the wounded LRA survivors; those who were directly hurt physically, psychologically and economically by the war.” 87 The significance of elders and cultural leaders in conflict resolution was also emphaized by Dominic Dipio who explained the

86 In a FGD with eight former LRA commanders in Gulu Senior Quarters on 02 March 2010, participants corroborated the cleansing rituals where they were made to step on and break an egg to signify breakage of their past and a new life that comes from an egg (Appendix 11).
87 Interview with Pamella Lukwiya the manager of the Okweyo Psychosocial Support Project, Gulu, 03 March 2010
use of the Tumi tree planted at entrances of Madi homesteads for its believed cosmic powers to cleanse people of their evil deeds before they enter a homestead. From the above, the cultural leaders and elders are sponsors of ‘collective action’ frames of healing, protection, unification and purification.

Civil society groups in Northern Uganda are sponsors of ‘collective action’ frames as providers, integrators, counsellors and psychotherapists. During most ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ shows, host Lacambel and some of the former LRA combatants speak highly of the rehabilitation and reintegration work done by the World Vision’s Children of War Rehabilitation Center in Gulu as well as the Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO). During the 12th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, host Lacambel explains the work of the above centres in tracing the relatives of the returning children, in addition to providing for their day-to-day material and psychosocial needs. On the 17th October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program discussing the rebuilding of Northern Uganda, the panelists hailed the work done by a Canadian civil society movement, Gulu Walk, whose mission was initially to raise awareness about the plight of Acholi children dubbed ‘night commuters’, but had evolved into ‘UPLIFT for Africa’, a Northern Uganda rebuilding agency that funds projects in the education and health sectors. Other groups mentioned on Mega FM included the Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR), Norwegian Refugee Council, War Child Canada and War Child Holland. On Radio Wa, host Kakaba and his regular panelists Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling repeatedly hailed the contribution by the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF) as well as the

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88 Interview with Rev. Sr. Dr. Dominic Dipio, Associate Professor of Literature and Alternative Media, Makerere University-Kampala, 15 December 2010
FAPAD (Facilitation for Peace and Development). During the 29th October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program, the work and ideals of the Humanist Movement were presented by four guests; Sylvia and Thomaso from the chapter in Italy as well as Owayn Caesar Okello and Sam Opio from the Ugandan chapter. Within the framework of the work by these civil society groups, one could also add the framing by the LRA returnees of the religious institutions as benevolent and trusted protectors. For instance during the 29th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, LRA returnee Patrick Otika testifies to this trust: “I moved away from the center and later met a man who, after I introduced myself, told me he has a home at the Congo-Uganda border and offered to take me to the UPDF. But I told him to take me to a Church and not to the police or to the army. Better still, I asked him to take me to Arua Church Mission. He agreed and we started walking to Arua from 8pm.” Among the civil society groups, one can also add some musicians who play peace songs, such as Baby Dalvin whose music inviting the warring parties to continue the dialogue is sometimes played during breaks on the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program.

On several ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs, the panelists and callers in general frame the GoU as worthy of trust and a provider to the LRA former combatants. During the 15th October 2009 program, the Uganda Amnesty Commission is framed as a key player in the resettlement and reintegration of former LRA combatants. On the show, Mary Okee

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89 In every ‘Vision for Peace’ program that I analysed in October and November 2009, at least one FAPAD official, often more than two, was in studio as a panelist [See FAPAD website. URL in April 2012 at http://www.fapaduganda.org/about_us.html]

90 The four discussed the then forthcoming “World March for Peace and Nonviolence”, a 90-day event that started in New Zealand on 02 October 2009, a date that is Gandhi’s birthday that was declared “International Day of Non-Violence” by the United Nations. The event ended on 02 January 2010 in the Andes Mountains (Punta de Vacas, Aconcagua, Argentina). See “World March for Peace and Nonviolence”. URL in April 2012 at http://www.theworldmarch.org/index.php?secc=info
highlighted the institutional and material help the returnees would get from GoU: “After that [completion of rehabilitation] ceremony, we give you a package from the government which includes a blanket, mattress, sauce pans, seeds, hoe and Shs263, 000 [US$120]. This package is not to thank you for fighting but to welcome you and resettle you and help you start a new life.” The Amnesty Commission publicist, Moses Draku pointed out the benefits of the government amnesty to the LRA returnees and the abductees still in captivity: “You will be resettled and given reintegration support, medical care, continuation and enrollment in education. You will be united with your parents and enroll voluntarily in the UPDF. All these you will not get unless you come out of the bush and ask for amnesty.” The GoU interventions clearly appeal to ‘strategy’ framing whereby the objective is winning the hearts of LRA combatants and reassuring the returnees.

In the same vein, the Ugandan and Congolese forces are framed in ‘strategy’ terms by many LRA returnees on the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program as disciplined, saviours, defenders, brave and victorious, and sometimes pacifist forces. On most ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs I analysed, the UPDF are framed as benevolent combatants who pursue the LRA fighters with the aim of rescuing and not killing them. For instance on the 25th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, LRA returnee James Oloya confirmed that the UPDF in pursuit of the LRA use non-violent means such as throwing pamphlets from helicopters offering amnesty to those who surrender. He said: “There are some people who have no plans of returning home. Letters that are being dropped in the bush by the UPDF with offers of amnesty are being torn by some rebels.” On the 12th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcast, returnee Walter Kibwota recounted how he was
captured after a shootout with the UPDF and how well he was treated upon capture:  
“When the UPDF shot me, I threw away my gun and ran for about three kilometers. I was bleeding profusely and got tired and lay down since I was losing a lot of blood. The UPDF followed me...The soldiers picked me up and brought me to Uganda.” During the 29th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, both returnees Ojara Samuel and Patrick Otika recounted how their first step to freedom was the surrender to the Congolese army. Ojara said: “They told us to hand over our guns, which we did. They put down our names and took us to the barracks and welcomed us. They gave us food and took us to the army headquarters where we stayed for about a week.” Apparently due to this positive framing of the UPDF, several returnees said on radio that they wanted to join the Uganda army. The interest for reintegration into the Uganda army was also evident during the FGDs with the former LRA commanders at Gulu Senior Quarters. One major hindrance the former LRA commanders cited was the unwillingness of the UPDF to uphold their LRA ranks.\(^ {91}\) In an interview, Captain Ronald Kakurungu the UPDF 4th Division spokesperson in Gulu played down the concern saying that in the UPDF, any rank has to be commissioned by the commander in chief after thorough training. He said the LRA had their own system of awarding ranks that has to be streamlined based on the promotion criteria of the national army. He said most LRA had passed tests and formed the bulk of the 105 battalion that used to track down LRA rebels during Operation Iron Fist (2004-2005). Since then, several former LRA had taken command courses and became

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\(^ {91}\) In an interview (01 March 2010), Col. (Rtd.) Walter Ochola Odoch, a former rebel leader and then the Gulu District Resident Commissioner (RDC), confirmed the historical primacy of military service for the Acholi and said it was important for the UPDF to reintegrate as many former LRA combatants as possible. Col. Ochola passed away on 03 March 2011.
commissioned officers of the UPDF; and that the 105 battalion was disbanded with its officers distributed across other units for cohesion of the army.\textsuperscript{92}

As a summary to the discussion in Section 7.1 above, Table 2 below aggregates who were identified as the frame sponsors of peace in the \textit{Mega FM} and \textit{Radio Wa} broadcasts that I analysed, as well as in some FGDs and interviews. The table also shows the dominant discernible frames deployed to portray the actors of peace in Northern Uganda.

\textit{Table 2: Summary of the sponsors of peace and the discernible frames}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsors of peace</th>
<th>Emergent frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Hosts on \textit{Mega FM} and \textit{Radio Wa}</td>
<td>pacifists, conciliators, counselors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Panelists and Guests</td>
<td>pacifists, promoters of reconciliation, of consensus, of common ground and communal harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former LRA combatants</td>
<td>children/innocent, abductees/conscripts/victims, resilient/courageous, contaminated/cleansed, hopeful/fearful, pacifists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society groups [World Vision, Gusco, SCIAF, FAPAD, Gulu Walk and others]</td>
<td>providers, integrators, counselors, psychotherapists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Acholi community (callers)</td>
<td>pacifists, forgiving, benevolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi cultural leaders</td>
<td>psychotherapists/healers/purifiers, protectors, unifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>trustees, benevolent, compassionate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoU and the UPDF</td>
<td>pacifists, saviours, disciplined, defenders, brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese army</td>
<td>sympathetic, disciplined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\subsection*{7.2 Framing the Actors of Conflict and/or Violence}

While the LRA fighters are rather back-grounded and omitted from the discussions on both ‘\textit{Ter Yat}’ and ‘Vision for Peace’, the group forms the focus of discussion on all ‘\textit{Dwog Cen Paco}’ broadcasts that I analysed in October and November 2009. Contrary to the global framing of the LRA as mass killers, it is in only one ‘\textit{Dwog Cen Paco}’

\textsuperscript{92} Interview with Captain Ronald Kakurungu, Public Relations Officer of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) 4\textsuperscript{th} Division; and Coordinator of the Demobilized Former LRA Commanders, Gulu, 05 March 2010.
broadcast that the issue of killing comes up. During the 01st October 2009 program, returnee Chistopher Ochora refers to an order from LRA leader Joseph Kony: “People who are in the bush think a lot about home, but one day there was an operation against us in Congo and Kony gave an order that people [abductees] who escape should be killed.” The dominant framing of the LRA leaders on the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs is a ‘strategy’ one of them as propagandists and liars. When host Lacambel asks his guests during the October 1st program to cite the grievances they had against GoU before the LRA abducted them, all said that in the bush the LRA commanders told them that whoever returned would be lynched by civilians or killed by UPDF and its coalition armies. Michael Ojok for instance said during the November 5th ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program that LRA commanders told them those who surrendered were injected with slow-acting poison by government operatives. Further, Richard Opio said during the 12th November 2009 show that LRA commanders recounted how all returnees were miserable slaves in Uganda prison farms. His colleague Michael Ojok concluded: “So when you see people taking long in the bush, you realize that it is because of those stories. Those rumors make someone to think a lot and wonder whether to come back home or not. The decision to come home is not made in a day or two, it’s made after a year or even more, because of the fear instilled in us.” During each ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, host Lacambel and his guests counter LRA leadership lies and propaganda. For instance during the 15th October 2009 program, Mary Okee from the Uganda Amnesty Commission reassures the former combatants in the studio, and those listening, that the Amnesty for LRA who renounce rebellion was still in place. She said: “Don’t be deceived that Amnesty is no longer being granted to returnees. Amnesty still exists and
we shall continue granting it because we want this war to end so that all of you can come back home.” In an interview, Julius Muhairwe, the Gulu District Intelligence Officer (DISO) and Coordinator of the Child Protection Unit (CPU), said one of the biggest challenges for GoU for years had been to counter LRA leadership lies and propaganda: “The mass media helped us to win the war since it was above all based on propaganda of the LRA. When the abducted children reached the LRA, they were told that the UPDF was anti-Acholi and that it would kill them upon return. Through the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, we used the returning children to demystify the lies and slowly Kony’s propaganda was exposed as bankrupt.”

In addition to being framed as liars and propagandists, the LRA fighters are also framed by the returnees as plunderers who go around villages pillaging for food and looting other basic necessities. During the 05th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, both returnees Francis Opira and Denis Okwera confirmed how a section of LRA fighters are always dedicated to the task of raiding villages: “Hunger due to lack of food is a common hurdle we face. If you are in a group of 50 people, 10 people will be sent to raid food from civilians...Life was hard.” Further, even when hungry and on the run, the LRA remain framed as child abductors across Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, DR Congo and CAR. During the 29th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, LRA returnee Patrick Otika corroborates this framing: “I decided to continue my journey alone. I reached Awar [in Congo] and when school children saw me, they ran away.” The extent of the abductions across Northern Uganda was most poignant on the 05 November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcast on which each of the five abductees in the studio came

93 Interview with Mr. Julius Muhairwe, the Gulu District Intelligence Officer (DISO) and Coordinator of the Child Protection Unit (CPU), Gulu, 05 March 2010.
from a different district across the vast greater Northern Uganda region. Further, ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ host Lacambel during the 15th October 2009 program commented about LRA returnee Osilo Simon who was abducted by the LRA fighters in 2003 from Amuria District in Eastern Uganda and noted the devastating impact of the LRA abductions on culture: “As you were listening to Osilo, you might have noticed that he no longer speaks Iteso fluently. He speaks a mix of Acholi and Iteso. This shows the negative effects of war on our children. War erodes culture, especially from those who were abducted when they were still very young.”

The UPDF and GoU are also framed by the LRA leadership as well as several people of Northern Uganda as robbers who looted the Acholi people of their wealth during the two decades’ war. For instance on the 01st October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcast, returnee Christopher Ochora said that he was made to believe that the government through the army were responsible for the poverty among the Acholi: “I was made to understand that in the past, the Acholi used to have so many cattle, but the government raided all our cattle. I imagined that our people’s lives were difficult because the cattle used to help them in farming. I realized that since we no longer have the cattle, we needed to fight and regain our cattle.” In addition, several returnees said the UPDF remains a mistrusted force by most LRA abductees and it is framed as an alien army that does not have the interests of the Acholi people at heart. Returnee Robert Opio during the 26th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program confirms this alien framing: “There should be more Acholi-speaking soldiers among the UPDF that go for operations in Congo so that they understand the rebels more. There are some non-Acholi speaking soldiers who are not merciful at all.”
Relatedly, the coalition army composed of armies of Uganda, DR Congo, South Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR) are by default sponsors of conflict and violence. The returnees recounted on ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ how while in Garamba National Park they were under relentless attack by the UPDF and the Congolese army. For instance during the 29th October 2009 program, LRA returnee Patrick Otika said during that month of October when he escaped, the LRA had been pushed out of the DR Congo and were on the run towards Central African Republic (CAR): “We started trekking to CAR but we were attacked by the UPDF and decided to come back to Congo. We tried going to CAR for a second time but the army again foiled our journey. We then stayed in Garamba [National] Park under the command of Lt. Col. Okot Odet. We were about 40 people. Then we divided ourselves into three groups. We were 13 in our group. When we were attacked, we again divided ourselves and I was now in a group of only four people staying in Teto.” Further, the frame of the LRA fighters, particularly the commanders, as fugitives from the International Criminal Court (ICC) was confirmed by returnee James Oloya during the 25th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program: “I also found one of the [UPDF] letters, and when I read it, I realized that if I surrender and denounce rebellion, I will not be taken to the ICC for war crimes. I decided that I had to take courage and come home and see my people: the Acholi.”

Notwithstanding the generally positive framing of the LRA returnees, former LRA peace negotiator Ray Ochora Silver during the 08th October 2009 program frames them as trouble-makers who find reintegration and re-entry to Ugandan society challenging: “Some brothers and sisters of ours who have returned from the bush are living in pain because of breaking the law.” In this program, there is an underlying framing of former
LRA combatants as disconnected and disoriented individuals who had lost touch with Ugandan reality. Moreover, the LRA returnees are also framed as collaborators and instruments of the UPDF in the pursuit of the LRA fighters. For instance on the 05th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcast, returnee Denis Okwera recounted how, upon surrender to the Congolese army and later to the UPDF, he was tasked to aid the armies locate where members of his LRA group were camped: “The next day, the UPDF again told me to lead them to the place where we met Arop. I did. I stayed doing operation for one week. They again asked me to go for another operation but one commander said I should be brought to Uganda and rest.” While the collaborator framing is not as evident in the radio broadcasts, participants in the FGDs in Pabbo internally displaced people’s camp recounted how the UPDF and the intelligence agencies use these LRA returnees to spy on their communities in view of sniffing out suspected LRA collaborators.\(^\text{94}\) While denying he was having any problems with the community, Brig. Kenneth Banya said in an interview that most people are not happy with the continued links the returnees have with the army and government security agencies (op.cit).

In the context of the many failed peace negotiations, the GoU and Ugandan Acholi in the diaspora are framed as the twin hindrances to ending the insurgency. On the 08th October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ broadcast, former LRA peace negotiator Ray Silver Ochama said the NRM leadership led by Yoweri Museveni had always been a difficult and unwilling peace negotiator. In reference to the failed peace negotiations coordinated by Betty Oyella Bigombe in 1994, Ochama said: “Since I was operating between Nairobi and

\(^{94}\) Focus Group Discussion with 19 men in Pabbo IDP on 03 March 2010 (Appendix 10)
Kampala, I was sometimes gripped by fear that the government would discover my actions. I decided to talk to the minister for security [Muruli Mukasa] but he did not pay much attention to what I told him.” During the same program, Achama also frames Ugandans in the diaspora as self-seekers who failed the Juba peace process: “Those who came as a delegation from the diaspora are the ones who said the peace agreement should not be signed.” He singles out David Nyekorach-Matsanga for failing the peace process because of his egoism and hunger for power.\(^5\)

During both ‘Ter Yat’ on Mega FM and ‘Vision for Peace’ on Radio Wa, Northern Uganda leaders are often framed as being at the root of most communal conflicts because they are divided, corrupt, greedy and self-seekers. For instance during the 28th November 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program discussing the rehabilitation program of Northern Uganda, Alfred Oluba from the office of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) disagreed with MP Betty Aol Ochan on the issue of hiring tractors from Kampala to help farmers in Northern Uganda and accused the Acholi leaders of being self-seeking, which hurts the development of the region. On the same program, another ‘Ter Yat’ panelist Rosalba Oywa agreed: “What saddens me is the way the Acholi have embraced politics in a manner that I still cannot properly comprehend. Every small program that is meant to help the people is politicized…. The aim of politicians is to bring each other down. They want to involve the people in their fights but we are tired of the fighting. Let every

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\(^5\) David Nyekorach-Matsanga, a non-Acholi exiled in London since the mid-1980s, is cited in the mass media as having emerged in 1998 as the official spokesperson of the LRA before denouncing them at a press conference in February 2000 citing the crimes against humanity the rebels had committed. In what surprised many, he was again named the LRA chief mediator by Joseph Kony for the Juba peace talks in early 2008, which collapsed when the LRA refused to sign the peace accords at Ri-Kwangba, South Sudan on 10 April 2008. The insurgence resumed from then on and as of May 2012, an international hunt for the LRA leadership is ongoing, while Nyekorach-Matsanga was in June 2010 offered amnesty by the GoU and is free to return to Uganda (Olita, R. et al., 04 June 2010).
politician come up with development ideas for the people but not on the basis of how many opponents he has brought down.” Occasional panelist Akera Jamisco, a district councillor and opposition politician added that government funds from NUSUF (Northern Uganda Social Action Fund), NAADS (National Agricultural Advisory Services) and the PRDP (Peace Recovery and Development Plan) were at the source of many communal conflicts. 96

As a summary to the discussion in Section 7.2 above, Table 3 below aggregates who were identified as the frame sponsors of conflict and/or violence in the Mega FM and Radio Wa broadcasts that I analysed, as well as in some FGDs and interviews. The table also shows the dominant discernible frames deployed to describe the actors of conflict and/or violence in Northern Uganda.

Table 3: Summary of the sponsors of conflict and/or violence and the attendant frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsors of Conflict and/or Violence</th>
<th>Emergent frames of conflict and/or violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LRA fighters</td>
<td>Killers, abductors, enemies, propagandists, liars, dictators, evil, contaminated, cowards, fugitives, plunderers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda army (UPDF) and Government of Uganda (GoU)</td>
<td>Land grabbers, cattle rustlers, robbers, killers, mistrusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi and Langi politicians</td>
<td>Greedy, divided, self-seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese civilians</td>
<td>Untrustworthy, uncooperative, fearful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan diaspora</td>
<td>Selfish, self-seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA escapees</td>
<td>Spies, lawless, disconnected, disoriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition army (Uganda, DR Congo, South Sudan and CAR)</td>
<td>Killers, pursuers, uncooperative, alien</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 Framing Northern Uganda and the Issues

In the conceptual explication of the dynamics of the conflict and violence affecting Uganda in Chapter 5, I discussed scholarship pointing to the issue of natural resources, particularly land, as being a key driver of conflict and violence in Africa (Rugadya, 2009; Cotula et al., 2009; Laishley, 2009). During field research, the issue of land emerged in the broadcasts as well as the FGDs and interviews as being at the center of most communal conflicts and a major trigger of violence when it is not properly addressed. Given the prominence of the issue, I in Table 4 below present all the callers that raised the issue of land during the Mega FM and Radio Wa programs that I analysed during the months of October and November 2009.

Table 4: Callers into ‘Dwog Cen Paco’, Vision for Peace’ and ‘Ter Yat’ programs citing a land conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision for Peace’ on Radio Wa 89.9FM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>01st October 2009</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[In studio: Host JJ Kakaba with Peter Adar and Emmanuel Eryem from FAPAD discussing the “Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “I am Beatrice from Amolatar. I want to know whether FAPAD also resolves the issue of land disputes.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “I am Okwir James from Amolatar. How can those people [FAPAD] help me if a rich man is grabbing my land? I am a poor man.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Hello! My name is Okullu James. How can they [FAPAD] help if I am an orphan and they [someone] want[s] to chase me away from home?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22nd October 2009</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[In studio: Host JJ Kakaba with Joy Oyada and Grace Akot discussing “the peace-building programs implemented by FAPAD”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Hullo! This is Robert Ochan of Agulurude. This is what I have. There was a piece of land sold from home here but without the signature of any child of this home. How can FAPAD help us?” [This listener called again during the November 12th program on the same issue]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Hello Kakaba. I am calling from Okwanga. My brother went and built at the land boundary of our grandfather. He then passed away but the issue was in court but it came to a standstill when the insurgency broke out. There was a conflict between our clan and another clan but now the other clan is so hard on the issue. I would like FAPAD to assist me.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 05th November 2009 | [In studio: Host JJ Kakaba with Joy Oyada and Brian Ayo from FAPAD discussing “Children’s Welfare in the Family and in the Community”] | “I am an orphan but a certain man came and started digging my father’s land and it is our uncle who gave it to him. What should I do?”  
“I am called Moses Okello from Apac. I am an orphan and our grandfather had a large piece of land which was divided among us by our uncle. But now some people are encroaching into mine….So, what advice can you give me?” |
| 12th November 2009 | [In Studio: Host JJ Kakaba with Bosco Ogwal and Emmanuel Oryem from FAPAD Discussing “the causes and manifestations of domestic violence”] | Here Ogwang Adyeny from Adwari. I have a problem with my land. There is a rich man who is a Permanent Secretary who wants to use his position to grab our land. We tried to settle it culturally but the clan leaders also feared. Even the LC2 and LC3 were afraid so I don’t know what advice you can give us”  
“Hello Kakaba! I am calling from Loro. There is also somebody here disturbing us from our land. He is a policeman. This case is already before the LC3 but he is forcefully grabbing the land.”  
“This is Robert Ochan of Agulurude. This is what I have. There was a piece of land sold from home here but without the signature of any child of this home. How can FAPAD help us?” |
| 22nd October 2009 | [In Studio: Host Steven Balmoi with MP Reagan Okumu and NFA publicist Antonius discussing “Afforestation and Encroachments on Protected Forests in Northern Uganda”] | “I am Opee calling from Amuru. We have been living on our grandparents’ land but now the National Forestry Authority is claiming that the land belongs to them and that we should leave. How does this come about?”  
“I am Okello Denis from Minakulu. I have been living in my grandfather’s land for over 20 years but NFA is now telling me to leave. What does the PRO got to say?”  
“This is Otwo from Anaka. I am staying in my ancestral land. I have some brothers who do not want trees planted on the land. What advice can you give?” |
| 24th October 2009 | [In studio: Host Steven Balmoi with seven panelists discussing the work of Gulu Walk in the rebuilding of Northern Uganda] | Pa’ Layeng from Ker Kal Kwaro: “There is a lot of land wrangles today and children who have been left orphans as a result of the war have no shelter over their heads because of land disputes with relatives. Some parents bought land when their children were young but when they were killed in the war, the children have no clue about their father’s land. Relatives are taking advantage of that ignorance to evict children from their parent’s land.” |
### Table 4: Callers on land continued....../3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>21st November 2009</th>
<th>‘Ter Yat’ on Mega FM .....contd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| [In studio: Host Steven Balmoi with nine panelists discussing the Land (Amendments) Bill 2007 and Act 2010] | • Samuel Oduny (Member of the ruling NRM party): “If you go to Anaka, Amuru and Purongo, will you find any respect for customary land? If you go there you will find some people claiming 10 square miles of land, how did that come about? Did we talk about this problem, which has taken place for only two years? We are now claiming that the government wants to grab our land and yet we are grabbing our own land.”  
• Jamisco Akella (Opposition politician and Councillor of Awach): “We have heard Mr. Oduny saying some people have taken thousands of square kilometers of land in Amuru. If the Bill is passed and that case ends up in court, those individuals will be compensated if they lose the case. This means the government is just strengthening and backing those land grabbers.”  
• “I am calling from Bobi. When I listen to the debate about this Bill, I just realize that it is meant to give support to the affluent to oppress the poor. For instance in Bobi, some UPDF soldier wants to grab land where 40 families are residing. He is using his position to evict all those people and I feel the authorities should intervene in the issue.” |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28th November 2009</th>
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| [In studio: Host Steven Balmoi with Betty Aol Ochan the Woman MP Gulu, and six other panelists to discuss her objection of Government’s hiring of tractors from Kampala to help farmers in Northern Uganda] | • The entire program was about effective re-development of land in Northern Uganda.  
• Panelists were divided between those who supported the proposal by the Office of the Prime Minister to hire tractors from Kampala to help farmers in Northern Uganda; and those, like MP Betty Aol Ochan, who opposed the proposal in favour of more sustainable solutions such as buying ox-ploughs for farmers. |

While Table 4 above captures the views of callers on all three programs, the land question was comprehensively discussed on the November 21st ‘Ter Yat’ program during which nine panelists debated for two hours the prospects and challenges of the Land (Amendment) Bill 2007 that was due to become the Land (Amendment) Act 2010. During the program, Henry Kilama Komakech, the Mega FM lawyer, explained the key provisions of the Bill noting that eviction of land occupants is a case for the courts, but
that the law also recognizes the customary system such as the role of the Acholi Ker Kal Kwaro (the Acholi cultural institution) in handling land disputes. He clarified that the new law was good since it protected the interests of the marginalized from those intent on grabbing their land. However, some panelists such as Ojara Martin Mapenduzi, the Gulu District speaker wondered whether the new land law was not a sinister move by the NRM government to protect nomads who have been moving into certain regions of the country, including northern Uganda. Gilbert Olanya, a councillor from Amuru district, said a lot of community land in Bweyale (Kiryandongo district) and Amuru district had been occupied by the nomads (Balaalo) noting how the new law would make evicting them problematic since the law provides that they be compensated.  

During interviews and FGDs, the issue of land was repeatedly cited as a powder cage in the region. In an interview, Willy Akena, the Information Officer of the Anglican Diocese of Northern Uganda and member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), explained the issue: “Because people have lived away from their homes for more than 20 years, on return they fail to identify boundaries, which causes conflicts with neighbors. Worse, most elders who knew the boundaries are dead.” The issue of land wrangles is being addressed by almost all cultural and religious institutions, but there also exist several mediation projects conducted by institutions such as the Gulu

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97 President Yoweri Museveni and most of his generals in the army are from the Bahima ethnic group whose traditional mode of existence, like the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, is cattle-keeping where some still practice nomadism. Occasionally, there are media reports about the nomads (balaalo) occupying communal lands and causing conflict in Northern and Eastern Uganda. When people in Uganda talk about balaalo, the backgrounded inference points to the Bahima and the Tutsi, the powerful ethnicity of President Museveni [See Muramira, G., 17 February 2011, “Balaalo evictions extend to Northern Uganda.” The New Times, Rwanda. URL in April 2012 at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=14498&a=37223#]

98 Interview with Rev. Willy Akena, the Information Officer of Anglican Diocese of Northern Uganda and member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Gulu, 25 February 2010.
University Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies under the Community Outreach Peace Project (COPP), the Center for Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR), and the Great Lakes Centre for Conflict Resolution (GLACCR).99

Other than land, Northern Uganda is also framed as being plagued by social ills such as domestic violence, child labour, family breakups, alcoholism, drug abuse and HIV/Aids. For instance during the November 12th ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcast, Bosco Ogwal and Emmanuel Oryem working as paralegal officers with FAPAD told listeners that domestic violence eroded the peace within families and the communities. Emmanuel Oryem said that the Langi traditional culture, which did not cater for women to own property notably land was in conflict with national laws and needed to be reviewed. During the 05th November 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program, two guests Joy Oyada and Brian Ayo from FAPAD discussed children’s welfare in the family and within the communities and noted the rampant child labour that causes school dropouts as well as the growing problem of street children. Brian Ayo, a social worker with FAPAD singled out alcoholism and the cultural male chauvinism as major contributing factors to the rampant abuse of women and children. During the 17th October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program held in Pader district, Lilly Apio Odongkara, the district deputy speaker, said the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) did not address women’s issues.100 On the same

99 Interview with Esther Acio, the Project Manager of the Community Outreach Peace Project (COPP), Gulu University, 25 February 2010.
- Interview with Gloria Nimungu Ociba the Senior Legal Officer of the Center for Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR), Gulu, 01 March 2010.
- Interview with Robert Opira the Executive Director of the Great Lakes Centre for Conflict Resolution (GLACCR), Gulu, 06 March 2010.

100 In an interview (Gulu, 04 March 2010), Mr. Adolf Gerstl, the regional coordinator of the European Union-funded Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Program (NUREP), said that community development was best implemented by civil society organizations.
program, audience members raised a wide range of issues including the insufficient health units and lack of medical personnel as well as lack of assistance for persons with disabilities. The scourge of HIV/AIDS that is ravaging Northern Uganda was discussed on the 14th November 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program that was dedicated to the discussion of the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill 2009. Panelist Ojara Mapenduzi, the Gulu district speaker, reminded listeners that Gulu district and northern Uganda had the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the country. Panelists, notably Jimmy Oloya, the coordinator of people living with HIV/AIDS in Amuru district discussed the pros and cons of the proposed Bill, while Gilbert Olanya, a regular panelist, said the main problem was the social-cultural stigma still associated with the disease.

Related to the social problems discussed above, the issue of poverty stemming from unemployment and nepotism is also invoked on the programs as a driver of conflict in Northern Uganda. For instance during the 03rd October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program discussing Uganda’s 47th independence anniversary, regular panelist Rosalba Oywa, a social worker, noted that although other regions of the country had seen poverty levels reduce to 32%, those for Northern Uganda stood at 67%. She explained the main faces of poverty, noting that: “Women are still dying during child birth; children below five years are also dying of malaria and other preventable diseases...Leaders should think of how to take their people away from poverty, ignorance and disease. This is what we should meditate upon as we celebrate independence.” One of the major causes of poverty that she identified was unemployment, noting that during the insurgency most youth in Northern Uganda were employed by the dozens of NGOs that would close shop in 2012 when most reconstruction programs would end. On the 17th October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’
program held in Pajule town board in Pader district, panelist Opoka Robert said he represented the youth who are affected most by unemployment and wanted the district leaders to explain the plans they had for youth “because programs for the youth are not mentioned under the PRDP.” On his part, Martin Ojara Mapenduzi, the Gulu District Speaker, identified the issue of nepotism on the 03rd October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program as adversely hurting people: “In northern Uganda, several Acholi children were permanent secretaries and also held several big positions. But today, favouritism has taken over job recruitments with some tribes dominating the job sector. Merits and qualifications are no longer considered. If we want to develop Uganda, we should correct such problems.”

Overall, most advice to the youth on the issue of unemployment is provided on the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs where host Lacambel as well as his panelists and callers advise the LRA returnees to go back to school as the best means of empowerment.

Northern Uganda is also framed as being wrecked by the ethno-political problems that have defined Ugandan society for decades. During the 08th October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program discussing Uganda’s 47th independence anniversary, panelist Hellen Rose Oling noted that Northern Uganda had lost 20 years of the 47 due to a destructive war; while Vincent Oling presented a nuanced framing of several pertinent issues in Uganda’s post-independence period that would be surprising to citizens in the country’s South and West. During the show, sound-clips of former president Milton Obote were played from a BBC interview about his return to Uganda; with Vincent Oling noting how Uganda’s independence leader, then exiled in Zambia, talked with bitterness yet he was a very happy man the day he received the independence flag from the British in October
Oling also explained the background to the current ethno-political problems the country faces such as the role played by Buganda chiefs in annexing Northern Uganda; the thorny issue of the 1966 Buganda crisis in which he exonerated Milton Obote, blaming the predicament on the intransigency of Buganda’s King (Kabaka) Fredrick Mutesa and the decision by his parliament (Buganda Lukiiko) to oust the government of Prime Minister Apollo Milton Obote from Buganda land. In his framing of Uganda’s post-independence problems that persist to date, Oling sounded cautious while discussing the circumstances surrounding the December 1980 elections that current President Yoweri Museveni alleged were rigged by Milton Obote leading to a five-year rebellion that led to the ouster of Milton Obote in July 1985: “I want to tell you what the European Union which was the international organisation that monitored the elections reported. They said it was not free and fair.” Separately on the ‘Ter Yat’ program of October 3rd where panelists also discussed the 47th independence anniversary, Martin Ojara Mapenduzi, the Gulu District Speaker directly blamed the British for the policy of divide and rule that had left many problems for Uganda. He also raised the thorny issue of reparations by the British: “Some of the problems in Uganda should be jointly solved by the British because they also contributed towards it. For example those who participated in the Lamogi rebellion in northern Uganda should be compensated by the British, including those who fought for the British during the Second World War.” On his part, Samuel Oduny called for nationalism by highlighting some independence heroes from

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Northern Uganda, notably Milton Obote. Fellow panelist Rosalba Oywa called for a re-writing of history since it was distorted by the colonialists: “Our history has tended to portray Uganda in bad light which tallies with how the Western world perceives us; that Africa is a continent of poverty, ignorance and disease.”

The problems related to neo-colonialism were debated in detail during the 03rd October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program on Uganda’s 47th independence anniversary. For instance Margaret called from O lilim and pointed out the dependency on foreign aid and wondered whether Uganda would not have been better if it had remained under British rule than the current corrupt and insensitive government. While Martin Ojara Mapenduzi decried the lack of patriotism from national leaders who were selling off the country to foreign investors, Robert Mugabe, a member of the opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP), said Uganda was still a neo-colonial state dependent on foreign funding and expertise: “Although we attained independence, the Europeans have not left us. They are still neo-colonizing us as Kwame Nkrumah said. They still work here as expatriates and are paid [more] highly than Ugandans.” The neo-colonial frame was even most evident during the 25th October 2009 ‘Ter Yat’ program during which panelists debated the work of the Canadian-founded Gulu Walk, with some local leaders citing the lack of transparency on how funds are sourced from abroad and spent locally. Studio guest Odong Erick, a program officer for the NGO Forum, explained the activities undertaken using Gulu Walk funding that included immunization, building a children’s ward at Gulu Hospital, support to orphanages and scholarships for hundreds of children. He further explained that through Gulu Walk, other Canadian institutions such as the Liu Institute had come in to support the NGO Forum’s justice and reconciliation program, while War
Child Canada supported LRA former child mothers and girls who are family heads. During the debate, however, Ojara Mapenduzi, the Gulu District speaker questioned the structure of Gulu Walk calling for transparency since it is the people of Gulu who are being fronted for fundraising abroad. On his part, Gilbert Olanya, the secretary for health and education of Amuru district and regular panelist flagged the work of a local NGO, Acholi Education Initiative, as the alternative since it sourced financial and scholastic materials to students in secondary schools in northern Uganda through local fundraising drives instead of begging from Western donors.

From the foregoing, there are a host of framing devices that were deployed in the discussion of the drivers of conflict and/or violence in Northern Uganda. One can discern ‘partisan frames’ whereby panelists, guests and listeners who made calls tried to move public opinion in a manner consonant with their positions and their preferred policy proposals (Brewer and Kimberly, 2010, p.159). There are also several ‘thematic’ and ‘substance or issue frames’ that were deployed in debating topics such as independence, HIV/AIDS, poverty, domestic violence, neo-colonialism and others (ibid.). To get a supplementary and broader national framing of the drivers of conflict and/or violence, I probed Ugandan journalists on which issues they considered the major causes of violence in Uganda/Africa. Table 5 below shows the results.
Table 5: The issues that Ugandan journalists consider being the major causes of violence in Uganda/Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural cause of violent conflicts</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Struggle for political power</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or tribal cleavages</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over natural resources</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and lack of opportunity e.g.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious bigotry or fundamentalism</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms and light</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration, refugees and internally</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption, nepotism and greed</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor international terms of trade</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, what is evident is that Ugandan journalists and journalism students ‘strongly agree’ by a high percentage of 95.1% (n=174/183) that the ‘struggle for political power’ is the major cause of violence in Uganda. There is also ‘strong agreement’ that other endogenous issues such as ‘ethnic or tribal cleavages’ (66.7%, n=122/183); ‘corruption, nepotism and greed’ (63.9%, n=117/183); and ‘competition over natural resources’ (57.4%, n=105/183) are at the root of the violence in Africa. However, opinion was divided as “somewhat agree” when it came to factors that have not been at the centre of public discourse as causes of violence in the country. Such factors where the number of those who ‘somewhat agreed’ pre-dominated included ‘religious
bigotry or fundamentalism’ (61.2%, n=112/183); ‘migrations, refugees and internally
displaced persons’ (50.3%, n=92/183); ‘poverty and lack of opportunity’ (49.2%,
n=90/183); ‘proliferation of small arms and light weapons’ (37.2%, n=68/183); and
‘colonialism’ (33.3%, n=61/183). The issues of ‘colonialism’ and ‘weapons trade’ were
the ones that attracted the most divided opinion with the level of those who ‘strongly
agreed’ and those who ‘strongly disagreed’ equally significant. When it came to purely
exogenous factors, however, Ugandan journalists and journalism students were
unanimous in their ‘strong disagreement’ that Uganda’s violence was caused by ‘foreign
aid’ (45.4%, n=83/183) and ‘poor international terms of trade’ (48.1%, n=88/183). In fact
‘foreign aid’ and ‘poor terms of trade’ attracted the lowest percentage of those who
‘strongly agreed’ that they were major causes of violent conflicts in Africa. Based on the
scholarship on structural causes of violence discussed in Chapter 5, the survey data
showed that Ugandan journalists and journalism students have a good grasp of the causes
of ‘direct or physical violence’, but don’t seem to appreciate the equal significance of the
causes of ‘cultural’ and ‘structural violence’ (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000; Mutere &
Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Lee, 2008). This, though, confirms the
research hypothesis under Research Question One that Ugandan journalists do not
recognize the complex web of conflict formation and progression as well as the wider
array of the drivers of conflict and/or violence; thus the reason why their reporting
privileges simplistic immediate events to the detriment of causative factors.

In two related questions in the survey, I also asked respondents to assess whether
journalists covering conflicts explain to the public the root causes and the motivations of
the protagonists; and in another question, I hypothesized that African media practitioners
do not know that any given violent conflict has links to a host of local, regional and international actors. The two combined SPSS generated frequency tables below capture their views.

Table 6: Combined assessment of whether journalists in Uganda explain root causes of conflict and whether they know the links to various actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>005-Journalists covering conflicts never explain to the public the root causes and the motivations of the protagonists.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>006-African mass media practitioners (journalists and editors) do not know that any given violent conflict has links to a host of local, regional and international actors.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first question, the proportion of those who ‘strongly disagreed’ (32.8%, n=60/183) is higher than those who ‘strongly agreed’ (23%, n=42/183), but the majority were divided (44.3%, n=81/183); which is indicative of the problematic of journalists’ failure to provide sufficient information about conflict formation and conflict development. In the second question, the majority of respondents ‘strongly disagreed’ (44.1%, n=79/179) with the proposition, an indication that Ugandan journalists believe the agenda-setters are conversant with the complexities of conflict formation. Nonetheless, the cumulative level
of agreement with the proposition at 55.9% is equally revealing of the deficiency amongst media practitioners on issues of conflict formation.

### 7.4 Other Emergent Frames from the Broadcasts

One of the significant ‘substance or issue framing’ factors that comes out in the analysis of the LRA returnees is the gender imbalance. During all the nine ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs that I analysed, none of the 29 returnees who came to the Mega FM studio was female. On the 15th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, however, host Lacambel read out names of nine individuals who had returned that week and three of them were girls: Pauline Adoch, 19; Stella Acan Tabu, 18; and Alice Amony, 18. While it is evident that more boys were abducted by the LRA, the return of only 3 girls out of 37 returnees during October and November is actually indicative of the gendered roles during captivity where boys are free to roam far from camps allowing them to escape while girls keep within camps making it harder for them to escape. It is also true that most girls are married off to LRA commanders and assume family roles with the attachment that goes with it; again making it harder for females to escape. For instance during the 05th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, Alice Amony who was abducted in 2001 when she was 10 years was reported to have returned with a son, Quinto Okot, nine months, born in captivity.

Further, a look at the format of the three programs I analysed reveals that while all of them fulfill the criteria of participatory media, there were more callers into ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ than into ‘Ter Yat’; even when the first two are an hour shorter than ‘Ter Yat’. The nature of discourse was also more personalized on ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ where the LRA returnees used solemn and emotional narratives to recount their
escape. Unlike on ‘Vision for Peace’ and ‘Ter Yat’, there are hardly any jokes or laughs on ‘Dwog Cen Paco’. A total of 48 listeners from across the Northern Uganda region called into ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ in the nine programs of October and November 2009 that I analysed. Most of these calls, 37 of the 48 (77%) were congratulatory and encouragement to the LRA returnees. On ‘Vision for Peace’, the discussion is often led by experts from FAPAD (Facilitation for Peace and Development) discussing the various peace-building issues in the region. FAPAD officers, usually from different departments, appeared on every one of the nine programs during October and November 2009. I also observed that the ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcasts are prescriptive in nature with FAPAD officials sounding the experts on the issues under discussion and listeners calling to solicit solutions. In the two months of October and November 2009, a total of 63 listeners called into the ‘Vision for Peace’ programs, including a caller from the DR Congo during the 29th October 2009 program. On the other hand, the ‘Ter Yat’ program is highly political and the discourse is often confrontational with members of different political parties advancing opposing views. The number of panelists is also usually not less than six members, which allows less time to take calls from listeners. However, a total of 46 calls were received during the eight shows I analysed in October and November 2009. Further, an examination of the ‘Ter Yat’ panelists reveals a deliberate effort by Mega FM to provide a platform to varied views ranging from panelist Samuel Oduny of the ruling NRM party, to Martin Ojara Mapenduzi of the FDC opposition party, to Okello Pa’ Layeng a representative of the Ker Kal Kwaro Acholi (Cultural Council of Chiefs). Depending on the topic under discussion, the ‘Ter Yat’ panel is often comprised of experts on the issue. For instance on the November 14th program discussing the HIV/AIDS

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Prevention and Control Bill, three experts on HIV/AIDS were on the panel. Further, on 17th October 2009, the program moved from Gulu district and was hosted in Pajule town board of Pader District. Of the nine panelists, five were regular ‘Ter Yat’ members while four were members of the Pader District leadership. The format for non-panel contributions also changed with five participants in the town hall fielding questions. Also to note is that across all the 26 broadcasts I analysed, the most combined number of callers were made during the ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcast of November 12th discussing the causes and manifestations of domestic violence which attracted 15 calls; and the ‘Ter Yat’ program of 21st November 2009 with ten calls when the topic for discussion was on the Land Amendment Bill 2007. In both these broadcasts, most callers raised the issue of land. From the above, all the three programs clearly adhered to the principles of participatory communication (Servaes, 1999; Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Jacobson & Kolluri, 1999; Dervin & Frenette, 2001).

Also to note is how the journalism role of the ‘peace radio’ hosts is conflated with them assuming direct roles of pacifists, conciliators and counsellors. As pointed out earlier, ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ host Lacambel Wod’Ogena positions himself directly in the journey of the LRA returnees. On a few occasions, he comes out as protector of his studio guests, particularly when callers want to know specifics about the LRA operations. For instance during the 05th November 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, Mark called from Acet asking the LRA returnees in the studio where the LRA got their guns. Despite Lacambel’s intervention that these were children who did not know the origin of the guns, returnee Francis Opira provided a revealing response: “We were using the guns that have Arabic inscriptions from Sudan but when we reached Congo, there were no more new guns. We acquired some from the UPDF and also used the old ones.” This response
points to a long accusation by the GoU that the LRA were receiving ammunitions from the Khartoum government; but also that the UPDF, contrary to denials, was losing some munitions to the LRA combatants.\textsuperscript{103} An examination of the ‘Ter Yat’ program, however, reveals that while host Steven Balmoi often hosted a big panel, he plays the role of moderator satisfactorily, often interjecting to ask his verbose speakers to clarify a point, and also to take calls and direct their questions to the relevant members of the panel. On the other hand, ‘Vision for Peace’ host Kakaba is often in the studio with a regular panel comprising Hellen Rose Oling and Vincent Oling, who are so verbose and clearly dominate the discourse each time they are in the studio dispensing advice and richly paraphrasing Biblical texts. From the way Kakaba addresses them, it is clear their status as elders in the community affects how he appropriates his hosting authority from them. A unique feature with ‘Vision for Peace’, however, is that host Kakaba seemed to enjoy a special connection with listeners as most of the 63 callers addressed him directly. For instance during the November 5\textsuperscript{th} broadcast: “Hello Kakaba. I am Odongo Basil of Apac. I really like your program and it makes me so happy. I am asking God to bless you and place his right arm on you. Kakaba, I listen to only Radio Wa. God should bless you.” There are several such personal messages addressed to Kakaba in person, even when he often had the two regular panelists Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling in the studio.\textsuperscript{104}

One can also discern that both ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ are framed as sites of moral and religious expression where hosts, panelists and callers make statements

\textsuperscript{103} In October 2002, \textit{The Monitor} newspaper journalist Frank Nyakairu reported that a UPDF helicopter had been shot down in Northern Uganda by the LRA. The NRM regime was so enraged by the report and sent up to 50 security personnel to confiscate computers, documents and mobile phones of journalists and editors. Journalist Nyakairu and three \textit{Monitor} editors were charged for publishing “a false report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace” (Amnesty International, 2002).

\textsuperscript{104} Mr. James Jacob Kakaba, who had hosted several peace programs on \textit{Radio Wa} passed away on October 1\textsuperscript{st} 2010 at the age of 38 years. May his soul rest in the eternal peace he so cherished.
couched in religious dogma. For instance, ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ host Lacambel ended the 01st October 2009 show thus: “May all of us meditate upon bringing laughter to the lives of these children. May your doors be open to them and may you give them all the support you can afford.” During the October 29th ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, Captain Ray Apire, a former LRA commander and a regular panelist said that children are able to escape under lots of hardships because there is a god that supports the Acholi: “The god of our forefathers is alive; that is why he brought these children back home.” In reference to the LRA abductees, he paraphrased scripture on the 08th October 2009 program saying: “The Prophet Isaiah said those who have been crying wipe away your tears because time has come for you to be set free.” Taking the issue of prayer further, ‘Vision for Peace’ is a program running on a Roman Catholic founded radio station and every program begins with a prayer; usually the Lord’s Prayer. When present, James Obot leads the opening prayer, but Vincent Oling or Hellen Rose Oling often did so when Obot was absent. This framing of peace radio as a site of religious expression matches the national framing of the peace negotiations where religious leaders always play a central role. During interviews, leaders of different religious persuasions recounted to me the active role played by religion in ending the LRA insurgency. 105

7.5 Conclusion

The foregoing chapter has provided answers to Research Question One and its attendant sub-questions. In Section 7.1, I have provided answers summarized in Table 2 as to

105 Interview with Rev. Fr. Cyprian Ocen the Chair of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Archdiocese of Gulu, 28 February 2010.
- Interview with Rev. Fr. Julius Orach a leader of the Orthodox Church in Northern Uganda and member of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPi), Gulu, 01 March 2010.
- Interview with Sheik Al Hajji Musa Khalil the Gulu District Khadi and Member of the ARLPI, Gulu, 01 March 2010.
whom Ugandan journalists and media actors identified as the frame sponsors of peace and which frame devices are used. In Section 7.2, I have presented the frame sponsors of conflict and/or violence and the frame devices that were used to describe them. The actors of conflict and/or violence identified in the research data as well as the numerous framing devices or keywords used to describe the actors are presented in Table 3. In Section 7.3, I use the conceptual framework on the dynamics of conflict and violence in Uganda presented in Section 5.1.1 to establish that the main issues are: land wrangles; social ills such as domestic violence, child labour and family breakups; poverty, unemployment and nepotism; ethno-politics; and neo-colonialism. In Section 7.4, I have discussed the other emergent frames from the data such as the gender imbalance; the radio programs as effective participatory media; the conflation of journalism roles with conciliation and pacifism; as well as the programs as sites of moral and religious expression.

In the proceeding chapter, I present findings from a survey with Ugandan journalists and journalism students on the feasibility of adopting the Peace Journalism model in Uganda.
Chapter 8: Feasibility of the Peace Journalism Model

8.0 Introduction

This chapter responds to Research Question Two and presents the perspectives of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on what they consider the propelling factors as well as the hindering ones for a functional Peace Journalism model. In Section 8.1, I discuss the micro-level factors such as the aptitudes of individual journalists as well as the professional predisposing factors that could impinge on their acceptance of peace journalism practice. Section 8.2 is a presentation of the meso-level institutional factors such as media ownership and control as well as newsroom routines that could facilitate or hamper the development of the Peace Journalism model. In Section 8.3, I analyze the extra-media factors such as the influences of sources, markets and ideologies in the implementation of the Peace Journalism model (Hanitzsch, 2004; Shinar, 2007b).

The theoretical basis of the chapter is agenda-setting; the view that journalists as individuals or as constituents of the media institutions have the capacity to influence what their audiences or readers think about (Scheufele, 2000; Baran & Davis, 2006; Rukhsana, 2010). As demonstrated in Section 1.1 on hate media, but also in Section 1.2 on conciliatory media, journalists retain the potential to guide society for worse or for good. The data I present in this chapter provides an assessment of how journalists perceive their agenda-setting roles. I also make recourse to normative media theory by probing Ugandan journalists and journalism students to evaluate some professional norms and values such as objectivity, neutrality, detachment, fairness, accuracy and completeness.
8.1 The aptitudes of individual journalists

As discussed in Chapter 4, implementation of the Peace Journalism model could be propelled or hindered by a host of individual factors such as social-cultural influences (ethnicity and tribalism), insufficient professional training and the various ideologies such as religious and political party affiliation (Hagos, 2001; Howard, 2003, 2009; Shinar, 2004; Kamilindi, 2007; Hacket, 2007; Shinar, 2007a & 2007b; Chalk, 2007; Nassanga, 2007; Birungi, 2009; Patindol, 2010; Rukhsana, 2010). At micro-level, I sought to establish in a general question which factors significantly hamper journalism practice (007). The bar chart below summarizes the responses.

*Figure 1: Assessment of which factors hamper journalism practice in Uganda*
In the bar chart above, the verdict by Ugandan journalists and journalism students is that professional training and technology are major hindering factors. The clear majority (60.5%, n=104/172) ‘strongly agreed’ with the proposition, with an equally high percentage of 37.8% (n=65/172) ‘somewhat agreeing’, while a very low percentage of 1.7% (n=3) ‘strongly disagreed’. This statistic confirms the calls by scholars of media-for-peace who have proposed the training of journalists as one of the key issues to address (Howard, 2003, 2009; Chalk, 2007, p.378; Nassanga, 2007, p.8-9; Birungi, 2009, p.83; Patindol, 2010, p.201; Rukhsana, 2010, p.340).106

At the level of professional practice, I sought to establish from Ugandan journalists and journalism students how they evaluated conventional norms of journalism such as fairness, accuracy and completeness (014-016). In the framing of the questions in the survey as repeated in Table 7 below, I highlighted the views expressed by proponents of the Peace Journalism model when they interrogate conventional journalism norms (Galtung, 2000; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). In the first question on ‘fairness’, the majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students ‘strongly disagree’ (55.3%, n=100/181) with the proposition, meaning that they support the view that it is possible to apply fairness and to include views of protagonists in their reports; which is the position supported by Peace Journalism proponents (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch &McGoldrick, 2005). While a high percentage had divided opinion (34.8%, n=63/181), a much smaller

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106 Peace Journalism training was highly appraised in the interviews I conducted during fieldwork:

- Interview with Dr. Goretti Linda Nassanga, Associate Professor of Journalism and Communication, Makerere University, Kampala, 15 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Charles Ogwel, Director and Lecturer, United Media Consultants and Trainers (UMCAT), Kampala, 03 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Daniel Komakech, Acting Director of the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University, Gulu, 04 March 2010
percentage (9.9%, \(n=18\)) ‘strongly agreed’ that it is impossible to include views of the protagonists. On the second issue of reporting on context and background as opposed to events, again the majority of respondents (48.3%, \(n=88/182\)) rejected the proposition by ‘strongly disagreeing’, implying that it was possible to apply ‘accuracy’ in reporting on conflict. Compared to the previous question on fairness, the number of those who ‘strongly agree’ doubled at 18.7% \((n=34/182)\), with an equally high percentage of 33\% \((n=60/182)\) who ‘somewhat agreed’.

Table 7: Combined SPSS generated frequency tables assessing conventional journalism media values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>014-In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply fairness by including views of the protagonists.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>015-In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply accuracy by reporting on context and background and not just the event.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>016-In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply completeness by reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions of the protagonists.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The relatively high support for the proposition on ‘accuracy’ is indicative of the classic case of journalists’ failure to report context and the background of issues in favour of events (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Mwesige, 2004). The final question on ‘completeness’ had the majority not committing themselves with 48.3% (n=86/178) ‘somewhat’ supporting the proposition. But again, an equally high number (32.6%, n=58/178) ‘strongly disagree’, meaning that they support the view that it is possible for a journalist to apply ‘completeness’ by reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions of the protagonists, which is the view supported by Peace Journalism proponents. The percentage who ‘strongly agree’ with the proposition on completeness at 19.1% (n=34/178) is not negligible, an indication of how hard it often is for journalists to report on processes; a charge confirmed by Peace Journalism scholars (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Howard, 2003; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Birungi, 2009).

In a reflection on the personal aptitudes of journalists in covering victims of conflict (017), an SPSS generated frequency table shows that by far the majority of journalists and journalism students (84%, n=152/181) ‘strongly agreed’ that journalists covering conflicts should dedicate time to reflect and report on the invisible yet long-term effects of the conflict such as psychological damage and trauma to the people (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.29). The other 14.4% (n=26/181) ‘somewhat agreed’ while only 1.6% (n=3/181) ‘strongly disagreed’. In a validity check question elsewhere in the questionnaire, but with a nuanced emphasis on ‘enemies’, the majority of respondents (44.9%, n=75/167) ‘strongly agreed’ that ‘humanisation of enemies makes a good news value’, while an equally high percentage of respondents (40.7%, n=68/167) ‘somewhat agreed’, with 14.4% (n=24/167) ‘strongly disagreeing’.
In an evaluation of commendable Peace Journalism practices, I used the assertion by Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) that since all protagonists in a conflict claim to have legitimate goals, journalists ought to ensure that all sides get a platform to state their motivations (011). An SPSS generated frequency table shows that the majority of respondents (74.4%, n=131/176) ‘strongly agreed’ and 21.6% (n=38/176) ‘somewhat agreed’, with a meagre 4% (n=7) ‘strongly disagreeing’. The high agreement on ensuring freedom of expression to all parties has far-reaching implications for Ugandan journalists who are always dealing with the issue of opposition politicians that are routinely denied mass media platform by high-handed government operatives (Habati & Masinde, 2010; HURINET, 2010; Lugalambi et al., 2011, p.3-6; EU, 2011, p.26). 107

To get a general idea about the problems Ugandans face, I sought to know in an open-ended question the issues or fears with regard to ‘peace’ or ‘violence’ that respondents were not comfortable saying in public (028). Whereas half of the respondents answered (n=92/183 valid cases), the ten most cited issues are quite revealing: criticism of government (n=12); domestic violence (n=10); rape (n=9); tribalism (n=6); freedom of speech (n=5); atrocities by the Ugandan army (n=4); torture (n=4); political violence (n=4); wars (n=4); and ethics (n=4). The implications of these responses are far-reaching because these are issues that Ugandan journalists, who are supposed to be the ‘voice of the voiceless’, are supposed to put on the public agenda, but they are themselves not comfortable to raise in public. The reasons range from government laws and interference that has created an environment of self-censorship, to Ugandan culture where some issues

107 See the discussion in Section 2.1 on operations of the broadcast sector
such as rape and domestic violence are considered family matters. Further discussion on these issues is presented in Chapter 9 on mass media values.

8.2 The institutional imperatives

Proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm argue that some of the most hindering factors to the implementation of the model are meso-factors at institutional level such as media ownership and control as well as the sacrosanct daily newsroom routines (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2004; Lugalambi, 2006; Hackett, 2007; Shinar, 2007a). Several of such scholars have proposed a re-shaping of conventional newsroom functions and the structure of media operations to allow for creativity in news selection and techniques of storytelling in view of ending the entrenched conventional practices (Galtung, 2000; Hagos, 2001; Howard, 2003, 2009; Hanitzsch, 2004; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Patindol, 2010).

In the survey questionnaire with Ugandan journalists and journalism students, I used several propositions by Peace Journalism scholars explicated in Section 4.1.2 to assess their level of agreement or disagreement. In the first instance, I sought to evaluate the institutional factors that Ugandan journalists and journalism students thought significantly hampered journalism practice (007). In the combined SPSS generated frequency tables below, by far the majority of respondents (88.4%, n=153/173) ‘strongly agreed’ that media ownership and control was a major hindering factor, which is the view expressed by several Peace Journalism scholars (Tehranian, 2002; Hackett, 2007; Shinar
An equally high cumulative percentage of 68.5 (n=105/168) agreed that ‘daily newsroom routines and tight deadlines’ are hampering factors.  

Table 8: Assessment of the institutional factors that significantly hamper journalism practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the two direct questions evaluating the institutional hampering factors, I sought to evaluate the argument by Johan Galtung that since the vast majority comprising women, youth and the elderly prefer less adversarial mass media content, the media institutional claim that conflict sells news is an insult to humanity (2000, p.163). Results from an SPSS analysis show that opinion was spread. Looking at those with strong views, however, the majority (31.2%, n=57/183) ‘strongly disagree’ with Galtung’s claim compared to the 28.4% (n=52/183) who ‘strongly agree’. This ambivalence on whether

108 The editors that I interviewed confirmed the views on hampering factors:

- Interview with Mr. David Opio, Station Manager, Kioga Veritas Radio (KVR), Soroti, 11 January 2011
- Interview with Ms. Evelyn Abbo, Station Manager and Host Peace Radio programs on 92.4 Luo FM, Pader, 12 January 2011
- Interview with Mr. Daniel Etyang, Manager, Radio Rock Mambo, Gulu, 10 January 2011
the vast majority of humanity prefers less adversarial mass media content is possibly borne from conventional journalism realism where conflict still sells news. The other reality, however, is that the majority of respondents were males in the age group that Galtung claims prefers adversarial news content! In general, however, there is strong cumulative support (68.9%) for the claim; meaning that Ugandan journalists agree that for the vast majority of humanity, it is better to have less adversarial news content.

With regard to the cultural violence that is perpetuated by the mass media, I sought views from Ugandan journalists and journalism students on whether they thought radio provided to women and youth a genuine platform for the discussion and advancement of issues specific to them (024). A cross-tabulated analysis with gender shows that overall, the level of agreement with the proposition was high with a cumulative majority of respondents ‘somewhat agreeing’ (47.3%, n=86/182) and 36.8% (n=67/182) ‘strongly agreeing’. An examination of the gender-specific responses, however, is quite revealing showing that of the 41 females, the majority 43.9% (n=18/41) ‘strongly agreed’, with an equally high 41.5% (n=17/41) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and only 14.6% (n=6/41) ‘strongly disagreeing’. This could be an indication that Ugandan female journalists, probably based on their personal status, find that radio indeed provides them a genuine platform for the discussion and advancement of issues specific to women. Whereas there are noted differences in levels of gender agreement with the majority of males ‘somewhat agreeing’ (48.9%, n=69/141), a high Pearson Chi-square test value of 0.567 confirms that the difference between the gender disparities is insignificant and chance could be responsible. In an interview, Ms. Rebecca Kaikara as well as Ms Evelyn Abbo noted that while Ugandan media have made commendable strides in addressing gender issues, the
industry was still male-dominated, particularly on political beats where issues of peace and conflict are pre-eminent. 109

In a related question, I asked respondents to assess whether Uganda and Africa as a whole needed women-only and youth-only media outlets (027). A cross-tabulated frequency table by gender showed that overall, the majority across gender ‘strongly disagreed’ with the proposition (69.3%, n=124/179), while again across gender the next choice was ‘somewhat agree’ at 17.3% (n=31/179), while across gender less respondents representing 13.4% (n=24/179) vouched for women-only and youth-only media outlets. A low Pearson Chi-square test score of 0.029 shows that the relationship is statistically significant; meaning that the equally high number of females and males disagreeing on having demographic-specific media outlets is not by chance. While the non-endorsement of demographic media in a country like Uganda, which has Mama FM, a female media outlet, is surprising, it is nonetheless consistent with the earlier view that the current mass media outlets already satisfactorily cater for these demographics.

As a validation check on the issues of minority and demographic coverage, I further probed journalists with a proposition that the mass media in Uganda was still insensitive to specific demographics (026). In an SPSS generated cross-tabulated table by gender, again the level of agreement on the issue of insensitivity to women’s coverage is highest across gender for ‘somewhat agree’ with 57% (n=102/179); while an examination of within group views shows that the females who ‘strongly agree’ (24.4%, n=10/41) are


Interview with Ms. Evelyn Abbo, Station Manager and Host Peace Radio programs on 92.4 Luo FM, Pader, 12 January 2011
more than their male counterparts (20.3%, n=28/138). The total cumulative number of those who ‘strongly agreed’ (21.2%, n=38/179) is almost equal to those who ‘strongly disagreed’ at 21.8% (n=39/179). A high Pearson chi-square value of 0.838 again shows the differences in opinion per gender are insignificant and could have been by chance.

With regard to media insensitivity to coverage of youth, again the number of respondents who ‘somewhat agreed’ is highest at 54.2% (n=97/179), with those who ‘strongly agreed’ at 29.1% (n=52) and those who ‘strongly disagreed’ at 16.8% (n=30). Like in the case of women and youth, opinion was also divided on media insensitivity to ‘rural dwellers’ with 44.1% (n=78/177) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and 43.5% (n=77/177) ‘strongly agreeing’. However, the highest percentage of ‘strong agreement’ with the proposition is coverage of issues concerning the elderly at 55.9% (n=100/179), and an equally high number 34.1% (n=61/179) who ‘somewhat agreed’ and only 10.1% (n=18) who ‘strongly disagreed’. In an African country like Uganda where the elderly are considered prominent members of society, the findings here indicating that Ugandan media are insensitive to them could be out of cultural sensitivity to the issue or could actually be a reflection of modernity trends where the elderly are progressively pushed aside in society, even in mass media coverage. The same situation pertains to coverage of minorities where the majority of respondents (46.1%, n=83/179) ‘strongly agreed’ and an equally high number (39.9%, n=71) ‘somewhat agreed’.

Looking at all responses, the overall picture that emerges is that Ugandan mass media are still insensitive to issues concerning all traditionally underserved demographics (Rehn &
While issues on women and youth are better covered, those concerning the elderly and minorities seem to receive the least coverage. In all the validated questions concerning gender and youth, the responses were consistent, proving that Ugandan journalists and journalism students are conversant with the significance of keeping these issues on the mass media agenda, as proponents of the Peace Journalism model propose (Galtung, 2000). Nonetheless, respondents provided a wide range of answers in an open-ended question on the challenges women and youth face in Uganda that radio (mass media) ought to address (025). The ten most cited responses from the 160 respondents (87.4%) were as follows: domestic violence (n=35); unemployment (n=16); illiteracy/limited education (n=15); poverty (n=14); sexual abuse/neglect (n=7); corruption (n=4); stereotypes (n=3); under-representation (n=3); discrimination by employers (n=3); lack of freedom of speech/expression (n=3).

In addition to assessing the insensitive media coverage of specific demographics, I was also mindful of the discussion in Section 1.1 where I noted that the mass media as social institutions have in the past been used, and continue to be used, in the promotion of ideologies of hate. I, therefore, sought views of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on a host of questions related to hate media. The first question I put to journalists and journalism students on the questionnaire (001) was actually to assess the charge that the mass media can play a major role in triggering conflicts through spreading misinformation and ethnic hatred (UNDESA, 2005, p.15). An SPSS generated frequency table shows that the majority of respondents (43.7%, n=80/183) ‘strongly agreed’ with the proposition, meaning the charge that mass media trigger conflicts was an

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110 Interview with Dr. Goretti Linda Nassanga, Associate Professor of Journalism and Communication, Makerere University, Kampala, 15 December 2010
exaggeration. An equally high number (37.7%, n=69/183) ‘somewhat agreed’ with the proposition, while only 18.6% (n=34/183) ‘strongly disagreed’. The implication of the high level of agreement with the proposition is that Ugandan journalists and journalism students could be in denial by judging that the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), which made the charge in a 2005 report, exaggerated the role of hate media. In putting the question on hate media to Ugandan journalists in 2010, however, I had in mind the September 2009 events in central Uganda that led to the closure of several media houses and the arrest of some journalists accused of inflammatory rhetoric. The responses denying media play a major role in fanning ethnic hatred could, therefore, be a statement by Ugandan journalists to deflect government blame concerning the events of September 2009.111

Still on the issue of mass media and ethnic bias, I asked Ugandan journalists and journalism students whether adopting the Burundian ‘Studio Ijambo’ model of having ethnically-mixed groups covering conflict situations is a feasible one (Hagos, 2001:9; Shinar, 2007a, pp.57-58). In a related question, I also probed them on a claim that since the mass media has an important role in modifying images of the ‘enemy’, it was a good idea to assign reporters to spend time living on the ‘other’ side to get a balanced perspective of the conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.2). As the responses in an SPSS generated combined frequencies table below show, the majority of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ (37.2%, n=67/180) that deploying ethnically-mixed teams is a good idea. An equally high number ‘somewhat agreed’ (36.7%, n=66/180). Whereas the 26.1% (n=47/180) who

111 As explained in sub-Section 1.1.1, Government in closing the radio stations blamed the mass media of triggering the riots by spreading misinformation and ethnic hatred, particularly targeting natives of Western Uganda where President Yoweri Museveni and most of his political allies come from.
‘strongly disagree’ is significant, the Burundi model received high endorsement from Ugandan journalists. With regard to reporters spending time on the ‘other’ side to get a balanced view of the conflict, an even higher number ‘strongly agreed’ (57%, n=102/179), with another 30.2% (n=54/179) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and only 12.8% (n=23/179) ‘strongly disagreeing’. While Ugandan journalists strongly endorsed the view of rapprochement with the ‘other’ side in the conflict, I discussed in Chapter 2 that Uganda has developed a plethora of laws, notably the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 which makes it a criminal offence for a journalist to for instance spend time in LRA camps and coming back to report about the experience.

Table 9: Assessment of ethnically sensitive coverage of conflict situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>010-To stem ethnic/tribal biases in media reports, some countries (e.g. Burundi) deploy ethnically-mixed teams to cover major conflict issues. This is a good model that should be adopted by all media houses in African countries undergoing ethno political strife.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>012-The mass media have an important role to play in modifying the images of the 'enemy' by for instance assigning reporters to spend time living on the ‘other' side to get both sides of the conflict.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a final question on the ethnic issue, and in light of the radio closures following the September 2009 riots as presented in sub-Section 1.1.1, I sought views of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on what action should be taken to mass media institutions that engage in spreading ethnic or tribal hatred. On whether the particular broadcast frequency should be jammed by government, the majority of respondents (40.8%, n=71/174) ‘strongly agreed’, but with an equally high number of 33.9% (n=59/174) ‘strongly disagreeing’ and 25.3% (n=44) ‘somewhat agreeing’. However, opinion understandably changed on the proposition that the concerned media house be closed, with 45.7% (n=80/175) ‘strongly disagreeing’, 38.3% (n=67/175) ‘strongly agreeing’ and 16% (n=28) ‘somewhat agreeing’. Considering only those expressing ‘strong’ opinions on government action in the above two questions, the majority favours jamming, but is strongly opposed to closing media houses. Regarding whether a persistently inflammatory journalist be banned from practicing, the views are spread out with 37.2% (n=64/172) ‘strongly agreeing’, 32% (n=55) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and 30.8% (n=53) ‘strongly disagreeing’.

When asked whether the media house and the journalist be sued in civil court, the majority ‘strongly agree’ (59.4%, n=104/175), with another high number of 26.3% (n=46) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and 14.3% (n=25) ‘strongly disagreeing’. Opinion was also very favourable to questions that proposed self-regulation. For instance when asked whether inflammatory media houses and journalists be summoned for disciplinary action by the ombudsperson for arbitration or warning or fining, the majority ‘strongly agreed’ (59.7%, n=105/176), with 30.7% (n=54) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and only 9.7% (n=17) ‘strongly disagreeing’. The same high level of ‘strong agreement’ (58.9%, n=96/163)
was remarked in a question probing journalists whether the media house and the journalists be summoned by a committee of peers for advice. An equally high number ‘somewhat agreed’ (25.2%, n=41/163) with 16% (n=26) ‘strongly disagreeing’.

When I conducted a cross-tabulation of journalism genre (print versus broadcast) against the actions to be taken, a nuanced view about jamming frequency emerged.

An examination of within group results in the figure above shows that a higher percentage of broadcast journalists (50.7%, n=33/65) ‘strongly agreed’ with jamming of frequency compared to 24.6% (n=16/65) who ‘strongly disagreed’. Yet for their print counterparts, a higher within group percentage of 38.6% (n=39/101) ‘strongly disagreed’
compared to 35.6% (n=36/101) who ‘strongly agreed’. It is revealing to note that broadcast journalists were supportive of jamming than their print counterparts.

On the issue of closing the media house as well as banning inflammatory journalists from practice, the same opinions of ‘strong agreement’ from broadcast than print journalists were observed. Instead of being defiant to government action in their opinions in the survey, these findings seem to point to a ‘tamed’ broadcast fraternity following the closures of September 2009. It is instead the print journalists, not affected by the closures, who seem to strongly oppose any government action. A cross-tabulation on all the other issues of professional self-regulation produces the same high number of ‘strong agreement’ amongst print and broadcast journalists.

Whereas all the Pearson Chi-square tests show relatively high values above 0.10 indicating the observed relationships between journalism genre and actions to be taken are statistically insignificant, it is a possibility that the September 2009 closures of radio stations created a chilling effect among broadcast journalists and most, for self-preservation, would rather follow the government line of closures of errant media houses and banning of errant journalists. However, another possible explanation is that most broadcast respondents were from Northern Uganda where I run the survey questionnaire with journalists attending workshops. The impression from discussions with journalists outside central Uganda, the site of the September 2009 riots, was that the Baganda radio stations deserved the closures because they were indeed flaming ethnic hatred. The survey findings, from the perspective of the broadcast journalists, seem to confirm those views.
Taken together by looking at the overall levels of cumulative agreement, the verdict is clear that Ugandan journalists and journalism students do not support media institutions that engage in spreading ethnic or tribal hatred. They are least supportive of media closures as happened post the September 2009 riots and would have preferred jamming the broadcasts. Better still, Ugandan journalists and journalism students prefer disciplinary action by an ombudsperson and/or summoning by a committee of peers for advice. If none of these self-regulation mechanisms works, the respondents supported litigation in civil courts.

8.3 Extra-media factors

In Section 4.1.3, I reviewed literature in which scholars delimited some extra-media factors that would impinge on the successful adoption of the Peace Journalism model. Those factors include sources, markets or advertisers, government interference, advances in technology as well as ideologies such as religious and cultural influences (Hagos, 2001; Kempt, 2002; Hanitzsch, 2004; Hackett, 2007; Shinar, 2007a & 2007b; Nassanga, 2007; Birungi, 2009; Matheson & Stuart, 2010). To deal with such extra-media factors, some proponents of the Peace Journalism model have made several proposals ranging from media literacy programs (Shinar 2007a; Chalk, 2007; Nassanga, 2007; Patindol, 2010) to formation of a global coalition of peace journalists (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2010; Keeble, 2010; Patindol, 2010). Using the propositions from this rich body of scholarship, I sought views of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on how the identified extra-media factors play out.
In the first instance, I sought to evaluate views on the claim that extra-media influences such as sources and advertisers significantly hamper journalism practice (007). In the figure below, the statistics clearly show that the majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students ‘strongly agree’ (50.6%, n=84/166), with an equally high number of 42.8% (n=71) ‘somewhat agreeing’ that sources and advertisers hamper journalism practice. These findings are consistent with what Birungi (2009) and Nassanga (2007) observed in their studies of print media coverage of the LRA conflict where news sources, particularly government and army ones, considerably stood in the way of balanced reporting.

*Figure 3: Assessment of whether sources and advertisers hamper journalism practice*
In a related question, I probed respondents on whether various ideologies such as religious and political hampered journalism practice (007F). Responses from an SPSS frequency table show high agreement with 50.9% (n=89/175) ‘somewhat agreed’ and 37.7% (n=66/175) ‘strongly agreed’, while 11.4% (n=20) ‘strongly disagreed’. The overall view reflected in the high agreement level with both propositions is that extra-media factors significantly impinge on the way journalists conduct their work.\footnote{During interviews with editors in Northern Uganda, the interference by government officials, particularly Resident District Commissioners (RDC) and the army was confirmed:  
- Interview with Mr. David Opio, Station Manager, Kioga Veritas Radio (KVR), Soroti, 11 January 2011  
- Interview with Ms. Evelyn Abbo, Station Manager and Host Peace Radio programs on 92.4 Luo FM, Pader, 12 January 2011  
- Interview with Mr. Daniel Etyang, Manager, Radio Rock Mambo, Gulu, 10 January 2011}

On the extra-media factor of culture, I asked respondents to assess how their socio-cultural situatedness affected the applicability of journalism norms such as objectivity, neutrality and detachment. An analysis of an SPSS frequency table shows that the majority of respondents (45.4%, n=83/183) had a divided opinion (somewhat agreed) on the possibility of achieving journalism norms of objectivity, neutrality and detachment owing to socio-cultural influences. Yet, an equally high percentage (31.7%, n=58/183) ‘strongly disagreed’ with the proposition; making the case that despite the socio-cultural consensus of the society in which one lives, it was possible to achieve objectivity, neutrality and detachment in journalism. A lower, but not insignificant, number of respondents (23%, n=42) ‘strongly agreed’, thus supporting the proposition that socio-cultural situatedness came in the way of journalism practice.
As a validity measure, I asked respondents in a separate question to assess whether their personal socio-cultural influences such as tribalism and ethnicity were hampering factors to their practice (007C). Consistent with the responses above, 48.9% (n=85/174) of respondents ‘somewhat agreed’, with an equally high number (36.8%, n=64) ‘strongly agreeing’ and only 14.4% (n=25) ‘strongly disagreeing’. From these high levels of agreement, it becomes evident that Ugandan journalists appreciate the reality of rootedness in one’s socio-cultural context and that it has an effect on journalism practice (Hagos, 2001; Ross, 2006; Kamilindi, 2007; Hackett, 2007; Lee, 2008; Rukhsana, 2010).

In an interview, Damascus Ssali as well as Godfrey Male of Buganda Kingdom’s Central Broadcasting Services (CBS) while denouncing tribalism highlighted the primacy of the mass media in nurturing culture. They argued that in modern republics such as Uganda where political discourse is often conflictual, the best unifying factor for the diverse communities was to uphold cross-cutting cultural artifacts notably songs and dance, legends and personalities such as cultural leaders.

On the issue of ideology, the majority of journalists ‘strongly agreed’ (41.7%, n=73/175) that in their role of holding politicians accountable, they should not belong to partisan politics and should even abstain from voting (020). However, an equally high percentage (34.9%, n=61/175) ‘strongly disagreed’, while 23.4% (n=41) ‘somewhat agreed’. In

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113 Interview with Mr. Godfrey Male, Chief News Editor, Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) 88.8FM and 89.2FM, Kampala, 02 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Damascus Ssali, Deputy Programmes Manager and Host of several cultural programs on CBS, Kampala, 03 December 2010
114 As discussed in sub-Section 1.1.1, Buganda’s CBS radios 88.9 FM and 89.2 FM were the site of confrontation with GoU during the September 2009 riots leading to their closure for a year. The programs hosted by Mr. Ssali are often couched in fables of cultural heroism and have been interpreted by GoU operatives as promoting sectarianism (Interview with Engineer Godfrey Mutabazi, Chairman of the Uganda Broadcasting Council, Kampala, 07 January 2011)
follow-up interviews with some editors, it became clear that the point of contention was the second part of the question on abstaining from voting; which on hindsight should never have been included since journalists are citizens who should exercise their voting responsibilities. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the highest cumulative percentage was those who ‘strongly’ supported the view that journalists should have nothing to do with partisan politics.

Reflecting on the charge that African issues usually receive either negative or minimal coverage by the international press, I sought views from respondents on a proposition by Mutere & Ugangu (2004) that African media ought to nurture a sense of ‘Afrocentricism’ by weighing the rest of the world in terms that are relative to African interests (008). From the bar chart below, one observes that the younger generation of journalists, ‘less than five years’ as well as the group of ‘five years to ten’, exhibited the highest level of ‘strong agreement’ for Afrocentric media, while the more experienced were less enthusiastic. Overall, however, all categories showed a high level of agreement with the proposition. Across the three groups, those who ‘strongly disagreed’ were the minority. From this response, it is evident that Ugandan journalists and journalism students are cognizant of the negative coverage the African continent and her peoples receives from the Western press and want to remedy the situation by nurturing Afrocentric coverage.

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115 Interview with Mr. John Kakande, Editor, New Vision Group, Kampala, 10 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Geoffrey Kulubya, Editor, Bukedde Newspaper, Kampala, 16 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Michael Kisenyi, Programs Manager, Radio Two Akaboozi Kubiri 89.7 FM, Kampala, 01 December 2010
The cumulative strong support for Afrocentric media matched the ambivalence towards international peacekeeping on the African continent. When asked to evaluate the work of peacekeeping agencies in Africa, notably the United Nations, the majority of respondents at 46% (n=82/177) said they were not satisfied with the peacekeeping work of the United Nations. Yet in a related follow-up question on whether it would be better to have only African organizations to keep peace and promote reconciliation, the majority of respondents at 71% (n=129/182) disapproved, while only 14.8% (n=27) ‘strongly’ approved and 14.2% (n=26) were divided (somewhat). Given the amount of UN peacekeeping operations on the African continent, coupled with the number of media institutions that the UN supports such as Radio Okapi in the DR Congo, the low support amongst Ugandan journalists was not clear.
However, Steven Balmoi as well as Julius Muhairwe had noted in an interview that most wars on the African continent were resource wars sponsored by external actors; which only the United Nations had the capacity to stop. Taking the case of the Congo, for instance, they noted that the United Nations did not have sufficient mandate to engage the warring parties. The UN and the African Union forces were also too few on ground to stop the external flow of arms.

To evaluate the views of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on the issue of training, I probed respondents using yet another proposition by Mutere & Ugangu (2004)

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116 Interview with Mr. Steven Balmoi, Host of ‘Ter Yat’ programme on Mega FM, Gulu, 03 March 2010

* Interview with Mr. Julius Muhairwe, the Gulu District Intelligence Officer (DISO) and Coordinator of the Child Protection Unit (CPU), Gulu, 05 March 2010.
that due to technological changes in news production and distribution, the inverted-pyramid model of writing news whereby the most newsworthy elements (the 5Ws and H) are packed in the first paragraph is outdated and should be changed in journalism training (018). The responses in the table below are quite telling because the most experienced journalists of ‘more than ten years’ had the highest level of ‘strong agreement’ at 50% (n=11/22) and the least number of ‘strong disagreements’ (18.2%, n=4/22).

On the contrary, the highest number of those who ‘strongly disagreed’ was among the least experienced journalists of ‘less than five years’ at 44.1% (n=45/102). A look at the middle-range journalists of five to ten years shows that their opinion was divided (45.6%, n=26/57). Overall, it is evident that the younger generation of journalists exhibited less ‘strong agreement’ with the need to change the training model.

*Table 10: Assessment of whether to change inverted pyramid journalism model in training*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience in Journalism</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five years to Ten</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of the relatively low Pearson Chi-square test score of 0.10 alerts one to the fact that the observed differences are worth examining; that there may be an
association between experience and appreciation of the inverted pyramid journalism model. It could be that the younger generation has not appreciated the limitations of the model, and the ‘strong agreement’ from the seniors to overhaul the inverted-pyramid model might be a good point to note.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented quantitative fieldwork data showing that Ugandan journalists in general confirm propositions by proponents of the Peace Journalism paradigm that micro-level factors such as the aptitudes of individual journalists impinge on the adoption of the model. The findings also show that overall, Ugandan journalists and journalism students appreciate most of the meso-level institutional factors that Peace Journalism proponents argue hamper the development of the model. Further, I have analysed and presented views of respondents on how some extra-media factors ranging from social-cultural influences, to sources and advertisers, as well as political ideology are at play in embracing Peace Journalism practice.

In the next chapter, I present a combination of quantitative and qualitative data from the survey with journalists and journalism students, interviews, focus groups and radio broadcasts. In the chapter, I present and discuss the values of peace that could be reframed into news or mass media values. It is also in the next chapter that I present the Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) social-cultural values or norms that could constitute news or mass media values.
Chapter 9: Re(framing) Mass Media Values

9.0 Introduction

The main organizing principle of this chapter is normative theory as discussed in Section 3.3. The chapter supports the argument by Shinar (2007b), who in a re-examination of what he calls “the message of criticism” argues that Peace Journalism ought to be considered an independent normative framework with “legitimate alternative frames of reference for journalistic coverage” (p.4). It is these “alternative frames” that I propose and discuss in this chapter.

The chapter directly responds to Research Question Three in which I presented the call by Shinar (2007b) towards the “development of a media peace discourse” as well as the development of clearer philosophical and conceptual norms that would encompass “a deconstruction of journalism principles such as truth, objectivity, accuracy, responsibility …” (p.5). In this respect, I draw insight from the conceptualization of “reframing” by Watzlawick et al. (1974) who perceive it as a way of redefining reality by putting something in a new light: “To reframe, then, means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally well or even better, and thereby changes its entire meaning” (p.95). They add that “reframing …teaches a different game, thereby making the old one obsolete…” (p.104). Further, “reframing means changing the emphasis from one class membership [by] introducing such a new class membership into the conceptualization” (p.98).
In this dissertation, I present the Peace Journalism model as the ‘new game’ and I offer in the sections below values of peace as the ‘new class membership’ as opposed to the conventional media values that are the old class membership. I also delimit some ‘Ugandan’ socio-cultural norms that could constitute mass media values as the alternative frames to progressively define media practice in conflict situations. In keeping with framing theory as well as agenda-setting theory discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I argue that the mass media can play a major role in effecting this reframing process.

9.1 Evaluating Media Frames of Conflict and/or violence versus Frames of Peace

One major critique of news framing that informs this dissertation is the fact that deconstructions of conventional news frames are often rare in the mainstream media. For instance, Resse (2010) points out how frame contestation is often slow amongst journalists due to the ‘professional constraints’ such as objectivity which makes it harder for journalists to mount their own frames of issues for fear of being accused of subjectivity (p.37).

During fieldwork, I sought views from Ugandan journalists and journalism students on the applicability of the conventional news frames that favour conflict contrasted with newer ones that favour common ground and consensus (Lynch, 1998; Galtung, 2000; Tehranian, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Shinar, 2004, 2007a-b; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Lee, 2008). In the first instance, I sought to assess the perspective of some Peace Journalism critics who for instance claim that war or violence will always make better news than ‘peace’ because it delivers powerful emotions while the latter is amorphous with subtle emotions (Hackett, 2007, p.48).
The verdict as shown in the pie chart is that the majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students ‘strongly agree’ (62%, n=113/183) with the claim by Peace Journalism critics such as Hackett (2007) that war/violence makes better news. An equally high number (21%, n=39/183) ‘somewhat agree’, leaving a smaller number of 17% (n=31) to ‘strongly disagree’. The implication of this high cumulative level of agreement (83%) is that war/violence news framing has been normalized by journalism institutions and individual journalists; which is a major challenge to proponents of the Peace Journalism model. In an interview, Paul Mukasa of the Uganda Media Council as well as several editors reasoned that violence and sensational events were attractive news values because they affect human existence and people want to know whether their lives
and property are secure.\textsuperscript{117} In a related question, I probed respondents to a survey questionnaire by asserting that African journalists lacked well formulated media frames of what constitutes ‘peace’ and therefore continue to frame media content using frames of conflict.

\textit{Figure 7: Assessment by Ugandan journalists of the media frames of peace}

Whereas the opinion of the majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students was divided with 61.2\% (n=112/183) ‘somewhat agreeing’ with the proposition, the percentage of those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the proposition at 20.8\% (n=38/183) was higher than those who ‘strongly disagreed’ at 18\% (n=33/183). The high level of

\textsuperscript{117}Interview with Mr. Paul Mukasa, Secretary of the Uganda Media Council, Kampala, 13 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. John Kakande, Editor of The New Vision Group, Kampala, 10 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Michael Kisenyi, Programs Manager, Radio Two Akaboozi Kubiri 89.7FM, Kampala, 01 December 2010
- Interview with Mr. Geoffrey Kulubya, Editor of Bucedde Newspaper, Kampala, 10 December 2010
cumulative agreement at 82% confirms the view that African journalists lack well formulated media frames of peace. That position is, therefore, a strong endorsement to develop them so that they could progressively replace the entrenched and well-developed media frames of conflict (Shinar, 2007b; Resse, 2010).

Further, a detailed evaluation of the media frames of conflict versus the frames of peace reveals how strongly conventional journalism practice remains entrenched. For instance, an examination of the cumulative percentages in the combined SPSS cross-tabulated tables below shows that in all the cases, the level of agreement that frames of conflict and/or violence constitute ‘good news values’ is on average above 75%. In the case of frames such as ‘crisis or internal discord’, ‘threats’ as well as ‘violence or destruction’, the majority of respondents ‘strongly agreed’; while for ‘drama’ and ‘extremism’ the majority of respondents ‘somewhat agreed’. The other news values of conflict that received ‘strong agreement’ included ‘events such as signing of peace accords and shaking hands by belligerents’ with 63.2% (n=108/171) and ‘coverage of major personalities’ with 64.1% (n=107/167) ‘strongly agreeing.’ For Ugandan journalists, ‘hostility towards enemies’ is the least appreciated as a news value with 40.1% (n=67/167) ‘strongly disagreeing’; though 31.1% (n=52/167) ‘somewhat agreed’ and 28.7% (n=48/167) ‘strongly agreed’. These survey findings confirm the claim by scholars who have observed that conventional journalism frames that favour conflict and/or violence are well entrenched and routinely influence media content (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.15-16; Hanitzsch, 2004, p.490; Hackett, 2007, p.48; Shinar, 2007b, p.5; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004, p.16). The cross-tabulated results with the experience of journalists did not reveal any major differences in levels of agreement.
Table 11: Assessment by Ugandan journalists of the frames of conflict and/or violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>019#2 – Drama is a good news value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019#4 - Crisis/internal discord is a good news value</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019#6 - Extremism is a good news value</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019#9 – Threats are a good news value</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019#10 - Violence/destruction is a good news value</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the same evaluation question in the survey, however, I included frames of peace as proposed by proponents of the Peace Journalism model. For a nuanced analysis, I cross-tabulated some of those values with the number of years of journalism experience. The cross-tabulated values of peace included ‘patience and moderation’; cooperation and consensus; ‘calm belligerents’; ‘processes e.g. peace negotiations’; ‘humanization of enemies’; ‘civil society and community players’; as well as ‘institutions involved in peace processes’ (Galtung, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Looking at the cumulative percentages of agreement in Table 12 below, more than 80% of respondents consider the frames of peace to constitute good news values. The frames that received the highest cumulative majority of respondents ‘strongly agreeing’, some of them not captured in the table below, included; ‘peace processes such as peace negotiations’ with 56.1% (n=92/164), ‘civil society and community players’ with 51.4% (n=89/173), ‘institutions involved in peace processes’ with 47.3% (n=79/167), and ‘humanization of enemies’ with 44.9% (n=75/167).

An analysis of within-group comparisons shows that six of the seven frames of peace evaluated received ‘strong agreement’ across the cohort of journalism experience. From readings of the cross-tabulated Table 12 below, as well as three other frames of peace not included in the table, it is evident that the younger generation of journalists tended to have the same views on the frames (strongly agreeing), differing from the more experienced journalists of more than ten years whose views were overall divided (somewhat agreeing). For instance in five of the seven frames of peace evaluated (71%); journalists of ‘less than five years’ shared their ‘strong agreement’ with those of ‘five to ten years’ experience.
Table 12: Evaluation of *frames of peace* by the* experience of journalists*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience in Journalism</th>
<th>Cooperate/consensus is a good news value</th>
<th>Calmness is a good news value</th>
<th>Humanization of enemies is a good news value</th>
<th>Patience/moderation is a good news value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>019*3 – Cooperation/consensus</td>
<td>019*8 – Calm belligerents</td>
<td>019*13 – Humanisation of enemies</td>
<td>019*1 – Patience/Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
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From the examination of the Pearson chi-square readings, differences in views within five of the seven frames were very high (above 0.30) meaning that there were no associations that could be made between the experience of journalists and their level of agreement/disagreement with the frames of peace as news values. However, the framing of ‘calm belligerents’ as a good news value drew the highest level of ‘strong disagreement’, at 50% from the most experienced journalists. A chi-square value of 0.011 draws one’s attention to the fact that within-group views were extreme, an indication that the framing of ‘calm belligerents’ was the most controversial across groups. The other peace value that had a low chi-square score of 0.057 was ‘cooperation/consensus’. A closer look at the cross-tabulations shows high percentage gaps observed within the three levels of assessment; whereby the most experienced journalists ‘somewhat agreed’ at 62.5% (versus 16.7% ‘somewhat’ and 20.8% ‘disagreement’), as well as the journalists of ‘less than five years’ who ‘strongly agreed’ at 50.5% (versus 38.1% for ‘somewhat’ and 11.3% ‘disagreement’); which explains the low chi-square reading.

The implications of the above findings are that while the conventional media values have been normalized in journalism practice and receive acceptance by default as shown in Table 11 above, the media values of peace have also high potential for successful implantation as shown by the high cumulative percentages of agreement in Table 12. What is even more significant is the fact that whereas the older generation of journalists (more than ten years) expressed a higher level of scepticism (somewhat agree), the younger generation of less than ten years’ experience ‘strongly agreed’ in five of the seven frames of peace. This means that with the progressive insertion and popularization of the frames of peace as media values, the reframing of mass media discourse to favour
common ground and consensus will also most likely be normalized. The figure below summarises the proposed reframing and deconstruction process.

*Figure 8: Deconstructing and (Re)framing the values of peace, conflict and/or violence*

In a follow-up general open-ended question, I sought suggestions on how the mass media could improve coverage of peace. A good number of respondents (n=135/183 representing 74%) provided answers that I aggregated and from which I took the ten most frequent (029): ‘improve training in peace journalism’ (n=25); ‘enforce journalism ethics such as objectivity, professionalism, and balance’ (n=24); ‘increase reporting, broadcasting and talk shows on positive news’ (n=21); ‘increase wide coverage of peace events’ (n=20); ‘improve media freedom and accessibility’ (n=8); ‘open platforms to all’
(n=4); ‘provide security to journalists in conflict areas’ (n=2); ‘encourage formation of media associations’ (n=2); ‘sensitization of populations on peace’ (n=2); ‘provide better pay to journalists in conflict areas’ (n=2). From these responses, it is obvious that Ugandan journalists and journalism students are conversant with the issues that would constitute a media-for-peace agenda (Shinar 2007b).

9.2 Towards Media Values of Peace

Christians (2010a) argues that: “Without a commitment to norms that are beyond one’s own self-interest, moral claims are merely emotional preferences. Without a protonorm on behalf of human solidarity, history is but a contest of arbitrary power” (p.19). Elsewhere, Christians & Traber (1997) propose what they call metanorms, values that cut across all human cultures such as ‘truth-telling, human dignity and nonviolence’ among others. In seven sub-sections below, I aggregate - from the survey, the radio broadcasts, the interviews, and the focus group discussions - what Ugandan journalists as well as various media actors said were values of peace that could be reconstructed to constitute mass media frames.

9.2.1 Truth and Justice

Every journalist and media house covering conflict issues with a potential for violence ought to uphold the values of truth and justice. In an interview, Philip Odii explained that while the concept of truth has formed a subject for philosophical debate over centuries, its basic tenets remain what are physically visible and discernible by the human senses,
but also what one deeply believes as guided by faith.\textsuperscript{118} Whereas there can be various ‘truths’ about an issue depending on cultures and traditions, the ultimate truth according to Christianity and most religious traditions is God (Ibid.). Noting that Uganda is largely a Christian country, Odii argued that the way to the truth is through following the teachings and way of life proposed by Jesus Christ who said in John 14:6 that "I am the way, the truth, and the life..." Citing scripture further, he added that the Christian concept of truth is intrinsically linked to the respect and love of humanity: "When we love others, we know that we belong to the truth, and we feel at ease in the presence of God" (1 John 3:19). In agreement, Cyprian Ocen agreed that linked to the concept of the truth in Christian tradition is the concept of ‘justice’ since distortion of the truth and failure to acknowledge the absolute truth through revelation and faith breeds injustice to humanity.\textsuperscript{119} He argued that for Christians, it is the concept of ‘social justice’ that is central whereby every human being should have the stage to flourish. Problems such as poverty, corruption and nepotism undermine the concept of ‘social justice’ because they deny some human beings their due share of happiness and flourishing. The mass media, therefore, has an obligation to stand for ‘social justice’ by exposing individuals and institutions that undermine other’s ability to flourish (Ibid.).

During the 08 October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcast on Radio Wa discussing the independence anniversary of Uganda, panelist Vincent Oling told listeners that the Langi have always been truthful and trustworthy people. When they believed in a cause as

\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Rev. Fr. Philip Odii, Executive Secretary for Social Communications, Uganda Episcopal Conference, Kampala, 18 December 2010

\textsuperscript{119} Interview with Rev. Fr. Cyprian Ocen, Chairperson of the Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Archdiocese of Gulu, 28 February 2010
truthful and just, they never hesitated to defend it: “I remember the Langi helped Bunyoro in the fight for their land against the colonialists and their collaborators. Our people also fought in World War I to show their courage.” On Mega FM, the publicist of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, Moses Draku, discussed during the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program of 15 October 2009 the issue of justice in various contexts; notably the retributive justice system favoured by the Western-dominated international justice system of the ICC. He explained that while Uganda acknowledged the ICC philosophy of not condoning impunity, it was also open to the traditional as well as the hybrid concepts that are currently discussed within Northern Uganda as alternative justice systems that would promote reconciliation and communal harmony. In an interview, Julius Orach of the Orthodox Church in Uganda commented about the Acholi traditional justice system and said some aspects can be found in the Christian faith such as the interest in upholding truth and justice as manifest in the promotion of communal dialogue and consensus building. He argued that truth and justice could only be cemented through a rigorous process of community participation and sharing on issues that affect everyone.\(^{120}\)

9.2.2 Reconciliation and Forgiveness

In a survey questionnaire, I sought views from Ugandan journalists and journalism students on whether the mass media in Uganda addressed issues of peace and reconciliation in a satisfactory manner (Qn. 021). An SPSS generated frequency table shows that the majority of respondents (60.5%, n=107/177) ‘somewhat agreed’, while 15.3% (n=27/177) answered in the affirmative, with 24.3% (n=43/177) responding in the

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\(^{120}\) Interview with Rev. Fr. Julius Orach, leader of the Orthodox Church in Northern Uganda and Member of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Gulu, 01 March 2010
negative. From the high level of uncertainty, combined with a low level of agreement with the proposition, one can infer that Ugandan journalists are not satisfied with their current coverage of peace and reconciliation issues.

In the *Mega FM* and *Radio Wa* broadcasts that I analyzed, the ‘reconciliation and forgiveness’ frame was pre-eminent. For instance during the 15 October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, Mary Okee from the Uganda Amnesty Commission called upon the community to be merciful and forgiving to the returning former LRA combatants: “*Let’s show love to these children so that they do not live in fear. Welcome them with forgiving hearts. We are the ones who should stop this 23-year-old war by being forgiving and living together with these children in school, at work and at home.*” The Amnesty Commission publicist, Moses Draku also said during the same program that the amnesty concept was arrived at after an extensive community consultation which favoured forgiveness: “*The community acknowledged that these people committed atrocities against us but said they need to be forgiven because if you don’t forgive them, the little you could have accumulated over the years could be taken away from you because of violence.*”

During the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program of 26 November 2009, Peter Otto called from Cereleno and said: “*Everybody errs but forgiveness should be key. If it comes to reconciliation, let us do it with our whole heart.*” During the 22 October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program, Grace Acot from FAPAD (Facilitation for Peace and Development) explained that under the peace-building programme, the FAPAD objective is conflict resolution through mediation and negotiation to promote reconciliation. She explained that unless an issue was of a criminal nature, it was preferable for people to avoid
litigation through courts since they are costly and always favouring a zero-sum approach whereby someone wins and the other loses. She said the FAPAD approach is to promote win-win scenarios that favour common ground and reconciliation. Musa Khalil, the Muslim head of Gulu district said that everlasting communal healing could not take place without communities reconciling.\textsuperscript{121} He said that Uganda had undergone many phases of violence that created national pain and generalized anger, adding that since every ethnic group of the country has grievances against others, the solution was national reconciliation to achieve national forgiveness. Whereas Northern Uganda was on the reconciliation and forgiveness path with the help of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), he called for a national platform such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to promote national healing. He said all journalists covering the conflict in Northern Uganda should be helping people to appreciate the values of forgiveness and reconciliation. During the focus group discussion with former LRA commanders, forgiveness was highlighted as an important aspect for sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{122} On his part, Brigadier Kenneth Banya hailed efforts by the LRA leadership for sending a delegation in November 2007 at the height of the Juba peace talks led by Martin Ojul to meet victims of the insurgency and to ask for forgiveness.\textsuperscript{123} He blamed the mass media for not having given that event the utmost coverage.

\textsuperscript{121} Interview with Sheik Al Hajji Musa Khalil, Gulu District Khadi and Member of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Gulu, 01 March 2010.

\textsuperscript{122} Focus Group Discussion with eight former LRA commanders, Gulu Senior Quarters (CPU), 02 March 2010

\textsuperscript{123} Interview with Brigadier Kenneth Banya, a former LRA commander and Joseph Kony’s political advisor, Gulu, 03 March 2010
9.2.3 Order and Harmony

One cannot talk about peace in a community or nation when there is generalized insecurity for persons and property. The enforcement of order through observance of national laws is geared towards promoting order and harmony, key components of peace. During the Ter Yat program of 03 October 2009, Samuel Oduny who identified himself as an NRM party member explained the concept of independence saying it means security of persons and property as well as a state of order and calm across the nation. During the 08 October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ broadcast on Radio Wa also discussing Uganda’s independence anniversary, James Obot called for unity in the communities, which would translate into unity for the nation: “I advise that instead of engaging in fights, quarrels and abuses, we need to unite our efforts to develop our country.” Another panelist Vincent Oling said that independence meant observance of human rights, good governance devoid of corruption, and upholding freedoms of expression. In an interview, Gloria Nimungu Ociba said the generalized insecurity in Northern Uganda had created a situation where nobody could enjoy peace.124 George Ocaka said that in the context of Northern Uganda, the majority of people had been dehumanized by conditions in the displacement camps whereby elders and family heads lost their cultural status, thus creating a breakdown in order and harmony within communities.125 From the focus group discussion with men of Pabbo Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) Camp, a proposal was that journalists ought to pay attention to whether institutions and persons in charge of law

124 Interview with Ms. Gloria Nimungu Ociba, Senior Legal Officer, Center for Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR), Gulu, 01 March 2010.
125 Interview with Mr. George Ocaka, Project Coordinator, Kica Ber Support War Victims, Gulu, 02 March 2010
and order are doing their job. They further proposed that every member of the community should appreciate through education and the mass media the communal norms that ought to be observed so that peace is ensured and sustained.

9.2.4 Cooperation, Collaboration and Consensus

Some of the most treasured values by proponents of the Peace Journalism model are cooperation, consensus and common ground (Galtung, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). For the scholars who have studied the African philosophy of *Ubuntu*, the values of collective responsibility, communal solidarity, inclusivity and collaboration are central tenets of a peaceful society (Albert, 2008; Murithi, 2008 & 2009; Omeje, 2008; Karbo, 2008). In the survey with journalists, I probed whether such values as ‘cooperation and consensus’ could constitute news media values. The results in Table 13 below show a cumulative percentage level of agreement with the proposition at 87% (n=147/169); indicating that Ugandan journalists support the proposal by proponents of the Peace Journalism model that the mass media ought to valorize processes that promote cooperation between belligerents and outcomes that favour common ground.

*Table 13: Assessment of the peace frame of cooperation and consensus as news value*

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126 Focus Group Discussion with men of Pabbo Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camp, Gulu, 03 March 2010
Yet, while discussion and dialogue was the linchpin of common ground, the insurgence in Northern Uganda had weakened mechanisms and avenues for members to express their concerns and perspectives in view of reaching consensus.\textsuperscript{127} With the quasi-breakdown of the traditional mechanisms of consensus building, the mass media provided a wonderful platform where contentious issues could be debated to gauge the public’s position before decisions are taken (Ibid.). In a focus group discussion, the women of the HIV Positive Club of Family Strengthening Programme highly appraised the virtues of cooperation and communal solidarity.\textsuperscript{128} They noted that it is their solidarity and teamwork that is responsible for the survival of each member since social stigma against people living with the disease was still widespread. From the individual and group interviews, as well as the survey with journalists, the peace frames encompassing cooperation and collaboration were highly upheld as important norms, a good pointer towards the development of a media peace discourse (Shinar, 2007b).

\textbf{9.2.5 Peacemakers and Peace Processes}

During several radio programs on \textit{Mega FM} and \textit{Radio Wa}, the merits and demerits of the various peace negotiations between the GoU and the LRA over the years were discussed. Interlocutors noted that peace processes were long, tedious and demanded patience and persistence. For instance, the publicist of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, Moses Draku, during the 15 October 2009 ‘\textit{Dwog Cen Paco}’ program extolled the importance of the then stalled LRA-GoU peace negotiations in Juba: “\textit{Let us realize that}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{127} Interview with Mr. Denis Martin Okwir, coordinator of Empowering Hands Uganda, Gulu, 26 February 2010

\textsuperscript{128} Focus Group Discussion with members of the HIV Positive Club of Family Strengthening Programme, SOS Children’s Village, Gulu, 19 February 2010
\end{flushleft}
conflict resolution is not an easy matter. But one thing is certain, and it is known all over the world, that people now want to solve conflicts through peaceful means. A peaceful settlement brings reconciliation and reconciliation brings lasting peace.” On the 08 October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, former LRA peace negotiator Silver Ochama also highlighted the fact that peace negotiations can be tedious, particularly the process of confidence building since much mutual mistrust exists. On the 15 October 2009 program, Moses Draku pointed out that the Juba peace process was on the verge of collapsing because there was a lot of mistrust on both sides: “The Amnesty Commission is continuing to urge the Government not to close the door for signing the peace agreement. At the same time, Amnesty Commission is urging the LRA to reconsider their stand and sign the peace deal.”

Whereas proponents of the Peace Journalism model note that conventional journalism abhors processes and favours events (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Birungi, 2009; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004), the majority of Ugandan journalists at 92.1% (n=151/164) agreed in a survey that ‘processes such as peace negotiations’ make good news. In fact, 56% (n=92/164) ‘strongly agreed’, with 36% (n=59) ‘somewhat agreeing’ and only 8% (n=13) ‘strongly disagreeing’ with the proposition. In a related question, I probed journalists on whether ‘civil society groups and community players’ constituted a good news value. A cumulative percentage of 92.2% (n=156/173) agreed with the proposition; with 51.4% (n=89/173) ‘strongly agreeing’, and only 10% (n=17/173) ‘strongly disagreeing’. This is again, in conformity with what proponents of the Peace Journalism model propose (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). On whether ‘institutions involved in peace processes’ constituted a good news value, 88% (n=147/167) agreed with the proposition; another
confirmation that Peacemakers and peace processes are good news values. In an interview, Robert Opira urged the mass media to not always focus on only the major personalities and the major breakthroughs but also the small incremental steps towards agreement such as the belligerent teams playing games or even sitting together during breaks. He said that such coverage ought to be sensitive to the broader sensibilities so as not to portray such actions of common ground as weakness but the steps in the right direction. A key aspect of peace processes that ought to be valorized is mediation and arbitration, particularly in instances where there is generalized mistrust between the belligerents. In addition to negotiations, mass media ought to highlight avenues for mediation and arbitration whereby neutral parties are invited to help in resolving the sticking issues.

9.2.6 Patience and Moderation

During the 01 October 2009 ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program, host Lacambel Wod’Ogena said peace negotiations require a lot of patience and compared them to gardening: “When you start gardening, you don’t stop on the way. You have to go through all the processes until the crop is ready for harvesting. You have to weed and tend to the crops so that you get a bumper harvest.” As pointed out in Section 9.1 above, the majority of Ugandan journalists (82%, n=138/168) agreed with the proposition that ‘patience and moderation’ were a good news value. In a related question on ‘calm belligerents’, an equally high cumulative percentage of 78% (n=121/155) agreed. While supportive of the Peace

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129 Interview with Mr. Robert Opira, Executive Director, The Great Lakes Centre for Conflict Resolution (GLACCR), Gulu, 06 March 2010

130 Interview with Rev. Willy Akena, Information Officer of the Anglican Diocese of Northern Uganda and Member of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Gulu, 25 February 2010
Journalism paradigm, these views are counter to the conventional journalism norms whereby it is immediacy and drama that makes news (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Birungi, 2009).

In an interview, Robert Opira noted that during the Juba peace negotiations, Government leaders seemed to be in a big rush and yet peace negotiations demand a lot of patience and restraint.\(^\text{131}\) He observed for instance that the process was marked by Government ultimatums to the LRA such as the places where to assemble and stringent deadlines. He noted press reports indicating that when President Museveni went to Juba during the peace negotiations, he reportedly derided the LRA leadership and the negotiating team as ‘unserious’, which clearly undermined the spirit of the process.\(^\text{132}\) The mass media ought to encourage restraint and not push for short-term solutions.

### 9.2.7 Humanness

For proponents of the Peace Journalism model, humanisation includes aspects such as journalists paying attention to long-term effects of conflict and violence such as psychological damage and trauma (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.29). It also includes paying attention to generalized suffering across the spectrum of protagonists, particularly the suffering of the “Other”, which is often ignored or denied (Lynch & Goldrick, 2005, p.6; Shinar, 2004, p.3; Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.14). From the perspective of the Ubuntu philosophy, it is collective personhood and the primacy of the individual in communion with others that is the essence of existence (Albert, 2008; Murithi, 2008 & 2009; Omeje, 2008; Karbo, 2008). During the 29 October 2009 ‘Vision for Peace’ program on Radio

\(^{131}\) Interview with Mr. Robert Opira, op.cit.

Wa, host James Jakob Kakaba, with regular panelists Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling, had in studio members of the Humanist Movement to discuss the activities of the World Match for Peace and Nonviolence. 133 An Italian guest, Sylvia Thomaso, said the objective of the Humanist Movement was to affirm the equality of all human beings, to denounce armaments and to expose all the variants of violence such as economic, racial, sexual and religious that are often the most dehumanizing and yet the most disguised. Daniel Komakech observed in an interview that all international human rights declarations acknowledge the dignity and the inalienable rights of all members of the human family. 134 Referring to sensational reporting, he invited journalists to be more empathetic; and that objectivity was not tantamount to blatant dehumanisation. Pamella Lukwiya said humanisation is grounded on the Christian concept of the Golden Rule, which holds that “do to others as you would like them to do to you” (Luke 6:31). 135

In a survey with journalists, I sought to assess the appreciation of ‘humanness’ as a news value and used ‘humanisation of enemies’ as a measure. As already alluded to in Section 9.1 above, the cumulative majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students (85.6%, n=143/167) supported the proposition. In fact the majority of respondents (45%, n=75/167) ‘strongly agreed’ that journalists ought to pay more attention to human sensibilities, particularly by ‘humanizing enemies’; which is what proponents of the Peace Journalism model propose (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Wolfsfeld, 2004).

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134 Interview with Mr. Daniel Komakech, Acting Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University, 04 March 2010
135 Interview with Ms. Pamella Lukwiya, Project Manager, Okweyo Project [Psychosocial Support], Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu, 03 March 2010
As a summary of the findings and the discussion in Section 9.2 above, I propose in the table below that journalists covering situations with potential for violence, as well as their editors, use the frames and/or values of peace as monitoring and evaluation parameters to ascertain that a particular story advances a media-for-peace discourse (Shinar, 2007b).

Table 14: The Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks for Peace Journalism Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames and/or values of Peace</th>
<th>M &amp; E Coverage and Editing Parameters</th>
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| **Truth and Justice**         | • Spotlight what is witnessed in person and corroborated by various sources, particularly the community players as opposed to only official ones.  
• Focus on ‘social justice’ by exposing individuals and institutions that undermine other’s ability to flourish because of corruption, nepotism, discrimination and favouritism. |
| **Reconciliation and Forgiveness** | • Highlight individual and community efforts towards the resolution of outstanding grievances.  
• Accentuate communal events as well as stories of mercy and clemency; and how they can serve as a lesson for others in similar circumstances. |
| **Order and Harmony**         | • Expose all those who by commission and omission promote lawlessness and chaos.  
• Examine and spotlight the institutional and legal mechanisms to correct wrongs and reward good conduct. |
| **Cooperation, Collaboration and Consensus** | • Emphasize all individual and communal initiatives that promote mutual aid, teamwork and communal wellbeing.  
• Underscore all individual and institutional efforts that stimulate compromise and common ground |
| **Peacemakers and Peace processes’** | • Scrutinize horizontal levels of peacemaking from community to international  
• Valorize in coverage all peacemakers and minimize voices of the harbingers of hate and violence  
• Amplify the voices of those with alternative conflict resolution options |
| **Patience and Moderation**   | • Pay attention to issues that are process-based and those that are of a procedural nature. Have mechanisms for follow-ups on such issues.  
• Examine with caution major breakthroughs and dramatic events |
| **Humanness**                 | • Uphold the Golden rule of empathy: “do to others as you would like them to do to you.”  
• Espouse the Ubuntu philosophy of collective personhood where “my humanity is inextricably tied to your humanity”  
• Focus on the human suffering across the board, particularly the humanization of the “Other” considered the “enemy” |
9.3 Discernible Ugandan Socio-cultural Norms to Constitute Mass Media Values

A component of Research Question Three was to establish, from Ugandan journalists and media actors, whether there are some discernibly Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) socio-cultural values that could be embedded and reconstructed into media frames distinct from the conventional Western ones. The question was borne from claims that Western journalists and their institutions consistently portray Africa and issues about the continent in sensational and negative light; thus the need to develop Afrocentric media coverage to redress the deficiency (Carruthers, 2000; Seib, 2004; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004). The problem, however, remains that African journalism training institutions still follow Western models due to the absence of alternatives. To seek a solution, I asked Ugandan journalists and journalism students in an open-ended question to state the African socio-cultural values or norms they thought could be reconstituted into mass media and/or news values (Qn. 030). An analysis of the SPSS generated frequency table shows that this question received one of the lowest response rate of 42.6% (n=78/183). A look at the responses is even more discouraging, showing that either the question was too vague or respondents could hardly think of any such Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) socio-cultural values. The aggregated most cited responses included ‘respect for elders’ (n=39/79, 50%); ‘time management’ (n=7); ‘truthfulness’ (n=6); ‘cultural practices’ (n=6); ‘honesty’ (n=5); ‘obedience’ (n=2); ‘peace’ (n=2); ‘integrity’ (n=2); ‘accuracy’ (n=2).

In addition to the survey, I put the same question to several media actors, including two government ministers, who at the time held the portfolios of ‘Information and National Guidance’ as well as ‘Ethics and Integrity’. The questions revolved on what the GoU
envisaged as norms for ‘national guidance’ and what the GoU considered to be values of ‘ethics and integrity’. Could those values and norms be reconstituted as mass media values? Ethics Minister James Nsaba Buturo referred to the national strategy for maintaining ethics and integrity, which was conceived in 2003 with the view of improving governance in all sectors of government.\footnote{136 Interview with Dr. James Nsaba Buturo, Minister for Ethics and Integrity, Office of the President [and Former Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting], Kampala, 17 December 2010.} Within the strategy, there is embedded a ‘National Integrity Values and Ethics System (NIVES)’ whose objective is to uphold the core values based on ‘Integrity, Transparency, Honesty and Accountability (ITHA)’. According to the Directorate’s website, ‘integrity’ encompasses ‘consistency and uprightness in one’s character’. It calls for ‘open mindedness and being straightforward, being reliable and consistent in actions and decisions, as well as being free from conflict of interest’ \cite{136}. The other national value to promote is ‘honesty’, which is a ‘quality of truthfulness and trustworthiness to oneself, to one another and to stakeholders’ \cite{137}. The value of ‘accountability’ calls for ‘promoting the duty and obligation or willingness to accept responsibility for one’s actions’ \cite{137}. Minister Buturo held that Uganda was a nation with a moral crisis where honesty, care, patriotism and morality had been eroded over the years. He agreed that there was a deep-rooted socio-cultural attitude among Ugandans fuelling corruption and impunity among political leaders depicted in such phrases such as “\textit{twariire}” (our turn to eat). Further, the nation was experiencing a huge corruption of values due to globalization. He held that since values are like cement to hold together various peoples with different aspirations, Ugandans must defend their

\footnote{137 Directorate for Ethics and Integrity, Office of the President. URL in May 2012 at \url{http://www.dei.go.ug/background.html}}
right to decide the values they cherish. He denounced social ills such as corruption, homosexuality, pornography and witchcraft.\footnote{In March 2011, Minister Buturo resigned from cabinet following a Supreme Court ruling that MPs who lost in the party primaries could not run in the parliamentary elections as independents. In his resignation speech, he reiterated the issues we had discussed in the interview. Throughout his service, he was one of the most vocal top government officials to promote stringent legislation against LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) practices [see Vision Reporter, 15 March 2011, “Buturo quits cabinet.” URL in May 2012 at \url{http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/749139}.]}

On the issue of national guidance, Minister Kabakumba Masiko said GoU had put in place a patriotism programme for national civic education to re-align the aspirations, expectations, duties and responsibilities of Ugandans.\footnote{Interview with Hon. Princess Kabakumba Labwoni Masiko, Minister of Information and National Guidance, Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala, 13 December 2010. Minister Kabakumba was also forced to resign from cabinet in December 2011 (See Footnote 19).} The programme also aimed at mobilising Ugandans to embrace national values such as family, human dignity and social inclusion. On his part, Paul Mukasa of the Uganda Media Council said the problem is that values cannot be imposed by government, but have to be developed and nurtured through consensus by the entire community.\footnote{Interview with Mr. Paul Mukasa, Secretary of the Uganda Media Council, Kampala, 13 December 2010.} He said there was need for a wide national approach to make values such as respect for humanity, authority of elders and courteousness to be appreciated through popular culture such as music, dance and literature. However, John Kakande noted that due to years of misrule, many in Ugandan society had gotten so morally bankrupt that they see success in terms of physical wealth and not civic service.\footnote{Interview with Mr. John Kakande, Editor, New Vision Group, Kampala, 10 December 2010.} He observed that the yardstick for success in society had changed over the years from honesty and diligence in service to flashiness and material wealth as the quintessential status symbols. Geoffrey Kulubya added that generalized poverty had worsened the problem of moral decadence and accelerated the breakdown of
social integrity. He noted that despite the plethora of anti-graft institutions, there seemed to be no will by the ruling NRM government to stem the ill that had become institutionalized. There was also discernible impunity whereby public officials found guilty by commissions of inquiry were reinstated in government service. In such a society with a morally bankrupt political system, it was a challenge to expect an integral and accountable citizenry (Ibid.).

9.4 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter have demonstrated that the frames of conflict and violence have been normalized as shown by the high percentage of respondents who upheld them as legitimate media/news values. However, the findings have also shown that the frames of peace are equally highly apprized to be reconstituted into media/news values. In the chapter, all frames of peace as conceptualized by proponents of the Peace Journalism model such as patience and moderation, cooperation and consensus, forgiveness and reconciliation, justice and truth, harmony and order, peace processes and peace actors, as well as humanisation of ‘enemies’ have been confirmed by the majority of respondents as sustainable media news values that journalists can routinely deploy to inform and direct public discourse.

142 Interview with Mr. Geoffrey Kulubya, Editor, Bukedde Newspaper, Kampala, 16 December 2010
143 In 1999, parliament censured three ministers Jim Muhwezi, Sam Kutesa and Kirunda Kivejinja for corruption and forced them to resign. However, all the three ministers were subsequently reappointed to government amidst an outcry from anti-corruption bodies [See Uganda Democratic Federation, 29 June 2011, “Corruption is Essence of the National Resistance Government in Uganda”. URL in May 2012 at http://www.udfed.com/corruption_is_essence_of_NRM_government.html]
In the survey, as well as the discussion with media actors and editors, it was apparent that Ugandan (sub-Saharan Africa) socio-cultural values were not properly conceptualized; not even within the line ministries established to provide leadership to the nation on those notions. What emerged from the interviews and the survey questionnaire was that values such as ‘respect for elders’, ‘courteousness’, ‘truthfulness and trustworthiness’, ‘uprightness of character’, and ‘human dignity’ are cherished across the board. However, critics also noted that the endogenous factors such as the decay of institutional governance over years of misrule as well as exogenous factors such as globalization were facilitating the fast erosion of Ugandan values. Whereas institutional mechanisms such as the patriotism programme as well as civic education might help in the end, it was also imperative for the nation’s leadership to lead by example and not perpetuate the prevalent culture of impunity in the abuse of public office whereby the NRM appears to abet the erosion of integrity and social values. On their part, mass media institutions, as part of the social fabric, ought to play their role of holding anyone abusing the public good to account, but most especially by identifying and highlighting role models in the community, those who have served diligently and upheld societal values.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{144} Op.cit., John Kakande
Chapter 10: Concluding Reflections

10.0 Introduction

This chapter is an evaluation of the assumptions as laid out in chapter one against the empirical evidence presented in the dissertation. I also re-examine the theoretical assumptions in light of the findings. I assess emerging issues from the findings that invite pondering and further exploration.

10.1 Reflections on the Research Assumptions and Questions

In Section 1.3, I outlined three research questions to which I sought responses during fieldwork. In the three findings chapters, I presented the varied answers to those questions and discussed some of the implications. In three subsections below, I assess each of the research questions, noting which of the assumptions were confirmed and which ones were rejected.

10.1.1 Research Question One (RQ1): What are, according to Ugandan journalists and media actors, the drivers of peace, conflict and/or violence in the country; and how are they framed in media discourse?

The first hypothesis embedded in this research question was that Ugandan journalists and media actors do not comprehend the wide array of issues that constitute the dynamics of conflict and/or violence in the country; which deflects the focus of the media discourse from the real actors of violence. The data presented in Table 5 shows that from the perspective of the survey with journalists and journalism students, the hypothesis was partly confirmed. Based on the scholarship on structural causes of violence discussed in Chapter 5, the survey data in Table 5 shows that respondents had a good grasp of the causes of ‘direct or physical violence’ that are often of an endogenous nature such as the
‘struggle for political power’; ‘ethnic or tribal cleavages’; ‘corruption, nepotism and greed’; as well as ‘competition over natural resources’. In these factors, the level of ‘strong agreement’ that they cause violence was much higher than that of ‘strong disagreement’.

However, Ugandan journalists and journalism students did not seem to appreciate and comprehend the equal significance of the causes of ‘cultural’ and ‘structural violence’ that are often of an exogenous nature such as ‘proliferation of small arms and light weapons’; ‘poor international terms of trade’; ‘foreign aid’; ‘the legacy of colonialism’; as well as ‘migration, refugees and internally displaced persons’. For these factors, the level of ‘strong agreement’ that they cause violence was lower than that of ‘strong disagreement’ which calls for a need to raise the level of awareness amongst journalists about the wider array of conflict formation that often goes beyond national borders (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

With regard to the three radio broadcasts, however, the hypothesis that media practitioners do not understand the dynamics of conflict formation was rejected. The discussion in Chapter 7 shows that the program hosts, their panelists, guests as well as people who called into the broadcasts presented a wide array of issues and often linked the violence in Uganda to national, regional and international actors. For instance, the LRA returnees who appeared on ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ routinely identified as a structural cause of violence in Northern Uganda the armaments supply by the Sudanese government led by Omar al-Bashir. The security personnel I interviewed identified the international supply chain from Somalia through inhabited terrain in Southern Ethiopia, Northern Kenya and Southern Sudan to the LRA bases across the vast region.
Moreover, radio broadcast interlocutors also exhibited an advanced appreciation of even exogenous causes of conflict and violence in Africa such as the artificial borders created during colonialism as well as the dependency by people in Northern Uganda on Western non-governmental organisations. Whereas the issue of land wrangles predominated, many other issues ranging from social ills such as domestic violence and child labour, to HIV/AIDS, to corruption and nepotism, were identified as causes of communal strife. In keeping with peace and conflict theory, the journalists and media actors on Mega FM and Radio Wa exhibited advanced skills of conflict analysis and conflict mapping (Galtung, 2000; Howard, 2002, 2003, 2009; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Porto, 2008).

The second assumption implied in RQ1 was that the three peace radio programs, given their default framing of peace, would have a hard time identifying and discussing the actors of conflict and/or violence. The discussion in Section 7.1 as summarised in Table 2 shows that the first assumption on the predominance of peace framing was confirmed. Several actors ranging from the LRA returnees, to journalists, to community actors, to government players were identified on the broadcasts as sponsors of peace. However, the hypothesis was also confirmed with regard to the identification of sponsors of conflict and/or violence. As the discussion in Section 7.2 as summarised in Table 3 shows, the actors of conflict and/or violence ranging from the LRA, to local politicians, to the government armies were identified; and the keywords used to describe their actions articulated. Of note too is the fact that in all the 26 direct broadcasts that I analysed for October and November 2009, nobody used inflammatory rhetoric to name the sponsors of conflict and/or violence. The discourse, while candid with callers and studio guests referring to government officials as land-grabbers and cattle-rustlers, was nonetheless respectful. In that regard, the peace radio broadcasts on Mega FM and Radio Wa clearly
adhered to the principles of Peace Journalism as presented in Appendices 13-20. Since the studio receives direct calls from the listeners, it is probable that interlocutors are acculturated to frame their interventions in a conciliatory and pacifist framing. It is also likely that the audience expectations helped in the framing of the peace radio discourse to remain conciliatory.

However, an examination of the peace radio broadcasts, particularly the direct engagement of the program hosts, reveals how peace media conflates the roles of conventional journalism. In the peace broadcasts, the journalists were not mere conveyors of the messages or moderators of the discourse, but were rather engaged peace actors who came out as pacifists, conciliators and sometimes as counsellors. The conflation of the journalism roles was facilitated by the fact that the three programmes I analysed were actually talk shows, which afforded the hosting journalists more latitude to take positions. It is likely that an analysis of hard news would produce a less engaged role by the journalists. Nonetheless, the analysis of the three peace radio programs confirms the arguments by Lee (2008) that in the coverage of war and violence, journalists tend to take strong positions, which has led to the emergence of labels such as “the journalism of attachment” (Bell, 1995); “victim journalism” (Hume, 1997); “justice journalism” (Messman, 2001); “engaged journalism” (Lynch, 2003) and “pro-active journalism” (Galtung, 2000; Mutere & Ugangu, 2004 and 2006).

10.1.2 Research Question Two (RQ2): What are the factors that would hamper or propel the development of a Peace Journalism model in Uganda?

From the review of the Peace Journalism literature in Chapter 4, the first hypothesis associated with RQ2 was that aptitudes of individual journalists such as their personal social-cultural influences, insufficient professional training and the various ideologies to
which they are exposed hampered their appreciation of peace journalism practice. The findings and discussion in Section 8.1 show that from the perspective of Ugandan journalists and journalism students, the hypothesis was confirmed. For instance results in Figure 1 demonstrate that the majority of respondents agreed that insufficient professional training and advances in technology were hampering factors (98%, n=169/172).

In an evaluation of journalists on individual professional aptitudes, Table 7 shows a high level of support for ‘fairness’ (including views of the protagonists) and ‘accuracy’ (reporting on context and background), but a lower level of support for ‘completeness’ (reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions of the protagonists). The results validate the findings by scholars such as Wolfsfeld (2004) as well as Mutere & Ugangu (2004) among others, who call for more attention to be accorded to coverage of processes in which the underlying causes of conflict would be explained and long-term solutions sought.

The findings also show that the majority of journalists support proposals by Peace Journalism scholars who argue that journalists covering conflicts should dedicate time to reflect and report on the invisible yet long-term effects of conflict such as psychological damage and trauma to people (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.29). An equally high cumulative number of respondents were supportive of ‘humanizing enemies’ at 85.6% (n=143/167). As discussed in Section 1.1 on hate media, dehumanization was a notable tool for the perpetrators of genocide in Nazi Germany as well as during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It is thus significant that Ugandan journalists and journalism students
supported the view that focusing on the humanity of the “Other” – in this case ethnically defined - was important.

The second hypothesis linked to RQ2 was that the institutional factors such as media ownership and control as well as daily newsroom routines significantly hamper Peace Journalism practice. The findings in Section 8.2 as summarised in Table 8 show that the majority of respondents (98.3%, n=170/173) supported the hypothesis that ‘media ownership and control’ was a major hampering factor; while an equally high cumulative number (68.5%, n=115/168) said ‘daily newsroom routines and tight deadlines’ were hampering factors.

As a solution to the institutional impediments associated with media ownership and control, I proposed that demographic media, such as women-only and youth-only, would be a good solution. However, the majority of respondents across gender ‘strongly disagreed’ with the proposition (69.3%, n=124/179). In fact, a high cumulative percentage of female respondents (82.9%, n=34/41) held that radio in Uganda provided to women a genuine platform for the discussion and advancement of issues specific to them. This result, coming from female journalists, possibly speaks to the privileged platform that they occupy as mass media agenda-setters.

Yet, in an assessment of whether Ugandan mass media, particularly radio, were still insensitive to demographic issues, the cumulative majority of respondents confirmed the hypothesis. In all categories assessed, the lowest cumulative agreement was 78.9% (n=140/179) for ‘women’ and the highest was for the ‘elderly’ at 90% (n=161/179). The other categories included ‘youth’ (83.3%, n=149/179), ‘rural dwellers’ (87.6%,
Taking the cumulative responses together, the overall picture that emerges is that Ugandan mass media are still insensitive to issues concerning all traditionally underserved demographics. Whereas the assessment of women’s coverage is consistent with previous questions that showed a positive gender-coverage outlook, the high percentages about insensitivity towards the ‘elderly’, followed by ‘rural dwellers’, invite pondering. In the first instance, most sub-Saharan Africa cultures are stereotypically-framed as holding the ‘elderly’ in high regard. The fact that Ugandan journalists think elders do not get good press could be indicative of the culture shock due to globalization that the continent is experiencing leading to the erosion of cultural values such as care for the elderly. The same level of sensitivity could be implied in the assessment about the coverage of ‘rural dwellers’, particularly in a country where 80% of the population is still considered rural, yet becoming increasingly urban (UBOS, 2006). Overall, however, the findings that the Ugandan mass media are still insensitive to demographic coverage shows the need to address the problem as proponents of the Peace Journalism model propose (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

Further, respondents in an open-ended question provided a wide range of answers on the challenges women and youth face in Uganda that radio (mass media) ought to address; including ‘domestic violence’, ‘unemployment’, ‘illiteracy/limited education’, ‘poverty’, ‘sexual abuse/neglect’ among others.

In addition to assessing the insensitive media coverage of specific demographics, I also sought views of Ugandan journalists and journalism students on a host of questions related to inflammatory media, particularly in light of the radio closures following the September 2009 riots as presented in sub-Section 1.1.1. Among the six options provided,
respondents supported the most ‘disciplinary action such as warning or fining by an ombudsperson’ as well as ‘summoning by a committee of peers for advice’. If the self-regulation did not work, the next preferred action was ‘litigation in civil courts’. The least preferred course of action according to respondents was ‘closure of the inflammatory media house’ as happened to five stations after the September 2009 riots. Instead of closures, the majority of journalists as Figure 2 shows, suggested ‘jamming the broadcast frequency’ (66.1%, n=115/174). The high support for self-regulation is consistent with efforts such as the establishment of the non-statutory Independent Media Council of Uganda (Lugalambi et al, 2010, p.134).

With regard to exemplary Peace Journalism practice, the cumulative majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students (73.9%, n=133/180) approved adopting the Burundian ‘Studio Ijambo’ model of deploying ethnically-mixed teams to cover conflictual ethno-political issues. Taking the case of the September 2009 riots for instance, all the five media houses that were closed would be obliged to deploy Baganda and non-Baganda journalists to cover the events surrounding the Kabaka (king of Buganda). Before the joint ethnically-mixed team files a report, they would agree on the issues, the personalities to interview and the framing to adopt. In the studio, the editorial team would also be inter-ethnic to avoid stories that denigrate other groups as Buganda media outlets allegedly did during the riots (Mutabazi, op.cit.).

The third and final assumption linked to RQ2 was that extra-media factors such as technology, sources, advertisers, and government interference hamper the development of a Peace Journalism model. In the first instance, Figure 3 summarizes views of respondents showing that the cumulative majority (93.4%, n=155/166) supported the
claim that ‘sources and advertisers’ hamper Peace Journalism practice. In a related measure, an equally high cumulative number of respondents (88.6%, n=155/175) agreed that various ideologies such as religious and political beliefs hampered Peace Journalism practice. In both these direct measures of extra-media factors, the hypothesis was confirmed.

The findings also confirmed the claim that extra-media factors such as socio-cultural situatedness affected the applicability of journalism norms. For instance a cumulative majority of respondents (85.7%, n=149/174) confirmed that their personal socio-cultural influences such as tribalism and ethnicity were hampering factors to their practice. Taken together, the responses in support of ethnically-mixed media such as in Burundi, with the number admitting the impact of rootedness in one’s socio-cultural context, confirm the Peace Journalism scholarship that calls for sensitivity to cultural situatedness in journalism practice (Hagos, 2001; Ross, 2006; Kamilindi, 2007; Shinar, 2007a; Rukhsana, 2010).

To continue the thinking about journalism and cultural context, the cumulative majority of Ugandan journalists and journalism students (89.2%, n=158/177) supported the view by Mutere & Ugangu (2004) that since the international media often misrepresent African issues, media on the continent ought to nurture a sense of ‘Afrocentricism’ by weighing the rest of the world in terms that are relative to African interests. Since Peace Journalism abhors ethnocentric coverage, the emergent issue is whether Afrocentric coverage constitutes ethnocentricism. What is sure though, as Kamilindi (2007) pointed out, is that if African journalists engage in demonizing and denigrating others in the name of Afrocentricism, then they would be engaging in ‘cultural violence’.
10.1.3 Research Question Three (RQ3): What values and norms of peace can be developed into mass media frames to transform the entrenched conventional media frames of conflict and violence; and which of these norms are discernibly Ugandan [sub-Saharan Africa]?

The first underlying hypothesis behind RQ3 was that Ugandan journalists lack well formulated media frames of what constitutes peace, thus the reason they continue to structure media content using frames of conflict and violence. The results in Figure 7 show that the cumulative majority of respondents (82%, n=150/183) supported the hypothesis confirming the lack of well-formulated media frames of peace. This position implies strong approval to efforts towards the development of media frames of peace (Shinar, 2007b). The support for the development of media values of peace was further confirmed in an evaluation question of some specific frames that I delimited from the Peace Journalism literature (Appendices 13-20). As the results in Table 12, as well as the subsequent discussions show, all the selected frames of peace were supported as follows: ‘cooperation and consensus’ (87%, n=145/169); ‘calm belligerents’ (78%, n=121/155); ‘humanization of enemies’ (85.6%, n=143/167); ‘patience and moderation’ (82.2%, n=138/168); ‘peace processes such as peace negotiations’ (92.1%, n=151/164); ‘civil society and community players’ (90.2%, n=156/173); as well as ‘institutions involved in peace processes’ (88%, n=147/167). From the perspective of the Peace Journalism paradigm, these results show a robust endorsement for the frames of peace and therefore the leeway to develop them into media values of peace (Shinar 2007b).

As shown in Table 12, what is even more revealing is that a cross-tabulation with experience in journalism demonstrates that the younger generation of journalists were more enthusiastic about the frames of peace as news values. These findings have epistemological implications for the streamlining of Peace Journalism in training.
institutions as several proponents of peace media propose (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004; Chalk, 2007; Howard, 2003, 2009; Nassanga, 2008; Birungi, 2009; Patindol, 2010; Rukhsana, 2010). Based on the high appraisal of the media frames of peace, I have thus proposed as summarised in Table 14 a reframing mechanism whereby those frames and/or values of peace would constitute monitoring and evaluation (M&E) parameters for all journalists covering conflict issues and situations with potential for violence.

The second hypothesis linked to RQ3 was that Ugandan journalism still appreciated the conventional frames that favour conflict and violence. In a direct question to assess this hypothesis, a cumulative majority of respondents (82%, n=152/183) as shown in Figure 6 confirmed the claim made by Hackett (2007, p.48) that war/violence will always make better news than peace because of the powerful emotions it delivers. From the perspective of Peace Journalism theory and practice, this result calls for reflection on how frames of peace can also deliver powerful emotions. For instance, journalists could focus on emotionally powerful moments of conflicting parties shaking hands and hugging each other. Journalists could focus on those crying tears of joy after successful reconciliation and forgiveness. Journalists could focus on emotionally charged communal celebrations of birth, initiation and harvest where harmony is often the norm.

Yet, in a longer question to evaluate frames of conflict and/or violence, the results as summarized in Table 11 and the subsequent discussion show that the cumulative majority of respondents supported the hypothesis that frames such as ‘drama’ (84.8%, n=144/172) as well as ‘crisis or internal discord’ (85.3%, n=145/170) were good news values. Other frames supported were ‘extremism’ (69.2%, n=117/169); ‘threats’ (70%, n=119/170); and ‘violence or destruction’ (82.4%, n=140/170). Considering that journalism training is
still based on conventional norms that favour conflict and violence, the high level of support for the hypothesis should not be surprising. The results though call for a robust reframing and deconstruction of journalism norms where frames of peace would be popularized and progressively normalized to replace the entrenched frames of violence; which is what I propose as summarised in Figure 8. Based on the cross-tabulations in Table 12 exploring the experience of journalists, one can infer that the younger generation were more supportive of frames of peace, which can be the driving force in the deconstruction drive of the frames of conflict and/or violence. As in the case of frames of peace, training institutions ought to progressively deconstruct and de-popularize the conventional journalism frames that favour conflict and/or violence.

The third hypothesis associated with RQ3 was that Ugandan journalists had an appreciation of some socio-cultural values that could be isolated for a reframing into mass media values of peace. From the findings as discussed in Section 9.3, the hypothesis was not confirmed since most responses could not be considered to fall in what I conceptualized as socio-cultural values. However, a few values cited deserve scrutiny. For instance, the majority of respondents cited the ‘respect for elders’ (n=39/79, 50%), which in retrospect speaks to the prevalent practice where African journalists tend to accord importance to authority figures to the disadvantage of community actors (Mutere, 2006; Nassanga, 2007; Birungi, 2009). The same scrutiny could apply to the concept of ‘obedience’ (n=2), where again African journalism tends to accord prominent coverage to institutions and personalities that command reverence such as the presidency, ministers and other leaders. On the issue of ‘time management’ (n=7), it can be noted that for 80% of Uganda’s population living in rural areas, the concept of timeliness, by virtue of the
work dynamics, differs from that of their urban colleagues (UBOS, 2006). Yet, this reality is fluid and is changing with the advent of new media technologies such as the cellphone, radios, the Internet and even satellite television that are progressively becoming ubiquitous across the country making the concept of news to adhere to the conventional principle of immediacy (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

### 10.2 Reflections on communication theory

From the perspective of framing theory, the analysis of peace radio broadcasts in Chapter 7 has shown that a host of framing devices were deployed in the discussion of the drivers of peace, conflict and/or violence in Northern Uganda. For instance, ‘partisan frames’ are discernible in cases where panelists and studio guests as well as callers made statements to move public opinion in a manner consonant with their positions and their preferred policy choices (Brewer and Kimberly, 2010). On several occasions, panelists from different political parties on Mega FM’s ‘Ter Yat’ took ‘partisan’ positions, but never used rhetoric considered incendiary. I also discerned ‘thematic’ and ‘substance or issue’ framing of topics such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, domestic violence, neo-colonialism, independence, and others (ibid.). Other framing devices such as ‘episodic or anecdotal’ were discernible from the tales of escape by the former LRA combatants who appeared on the ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ program in which a pattern of heroism and resilience emerged and dominated the discourse. As Table 2 on frame sponsors of peace and Table 3 on frame sponsors of conflict and/or violence show, framing theory was an effective structure in the analysis of the peace radio broadcasts as it helped isolate elements of the micro and macro usage of language that would have otherwise been lost.
With regard to development journalism and communication theory, the point of interest was to assess whether there were any so called ‘neo-colonial’ ideologies that were discernibly promoted. Given that the radio stations on which the peace programs run are donor founded and/or funded, I hypothesized that the discourse could be censored to follow guidelines provided by the funders. From the field research, this hypothesis was not supported because callers into the programs did so directly and the relay was instantaneous with hardly any opportunity for censorship. While hosts tried on a few occasions to redirect callers, it was usually on matters of focus but not incendiary speech. Whereas Mega FM went on air in August 2002 fully funded by the British Department for International Development (DFID), I could not discern any direct influence from any sponsors in the two peace radio programs I analysed.

On Radio Wa, however, ‘Vision for Peace’ was clearly a platform in October and November 2009 where FAPAD (Facilitation for Peace and Development), a local non-governmental organization active in the sector of peace-building, promoted their work and programs. While FAPAD funding was not discussed on any of the programs I analysed, their website lists several partners that include the Open Society Initiative, the European Union as well as some national and international partners. 145 Further, ‘Vision for Peace’ host James Jacob Kakaba on several occasions hailed the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF), the official sponsors of Radio Wa. The rhetoric on Radio Wa was discernibly measured and in keeping with Roman Catholic values that are featured prominently on the station’s website. 146 Therefore, while one can discern on the

145 FAPAD website. URL in May 2012 at http://www.fapaduganda.org/index.html
146 “Radio Wa 89.9 FM”. URL in May 2012 at http://www.radiowa.org/
peace radio programs some efforts towards moderating speech based on known principles, I was unable to discern any external influences, particularly those of the so called ‘neo-colonial’ nature.

Further, proponents of development and journalism theory draw attention to the significance of involving marginalized and underprivileged members of society to share their stories and experiences in an inclusive and participatory manner (Servaes, 1999; Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Jacobson & Kolluri, 1999; Dervin & Frenette, 2001). It is a departure from the state-controlled and elite-dominated mass media. The discourse on all the three peace radio programs shows that they adhered to the principles of participatory communication such as focusing on local issues and being two-way horizontal communication where the interactive talk-show format was favoured. For both ‘Ter Yat’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ where more panelists participated, there was discernible diachronic communication exchange with the hosts and studio guests interchanging roles. In fact, the verbose panelists on Radio Wa, Vincent Oling and Hellen Rose Oling, often hijacked the roles of host James Jacob Kakaba. Given the number of callers amounting to 63 into ‘Vision for Peace’, 46 into ‘Ter Yat’ and 48 into ‘Dwog Cen Paco’, one can conclude that the peace radio programs on Mega FM and Radio Wa indeed adhered to the principles of participatory communication as explicated in Section 3.4.

Normative theory, as the analysis and discussion in Chapter 9 has demonstrated, provided the best framework to propose the media values of peace as presented in Section 9.2 and summarised in Table 14. Using normative theory, I also interrogated the postulates by the two line ministries of ‘Information and National Guidance’ as well as of ‘Ethics and Integrity’ to show that the conceptualization of national values and norms is deficient.
Within the postulates of normative theory, I have proposed, as summarised in Figure 8 and Table 14, a reframing and deconstruction of frames of conflict and/or violence to favour the frames of peace in mass media discourse.

However, the reframing and deconstruction process can only be possible if the agenda-setters, particularly editors but also the individual journalists, can appreciate the frames of peace and progressively normalize them as they have for years done with the conventional frames of conflict and/or violence. From the field research, there is evidence that Ugandan journalists and journalism students, particularly the younger generation of less than ten years’ experience, appreciated the values of peace; and given the right institutional and extra-media circumstances, the “invention, development and marketing” of a media peace discourse will become reality (Shinar, 2007b, p.7). From the praxis perspective, the starting point would, therefore, be an invitation to radio stations and other media houses to consider adoption of the Peace Journalism monitoring and evaluation parameters that I propose in figure 14. It is envisaged that with time, these parameters would be internalized by journalists and progressively contribute to the deconstruction of the conflict and/or violence media framing of issues.

10.3 Issues for further exploration

During the discussions on the nine ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ programs that I analysed for October and November 2009, I noted that only three females out of 37 individuals had returned from captivity. What was even more noteworthy was that none of the female returnees was hosted on the nine programs that I analyzed. From the perspective of gender studies, the stories of escape by the females are of interest. Owing to time
constraints, and the inability to note early the gender omission from the transcriptions, I was unable to seek out the female returnees for interviews or focus group discussions. This was a significant oversight since as proposed in sub-Section 5.1.1.2 on social disenfranchisement; a key component of peace-building is to address gender disparities, particularly in media coverage (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002). The findings from the analysis of the broadcasts confirm the critique by women’s studies scholars where the agency and identity of female participants in combat operations is diminished to that of the “civilian, protected, and passive” whereas that of their male counterparts is reconfirmed as ‘combatants, protectors and active actors’ (Vayrynen, 2010, p.147). The gendered-roles of the LRA combatants are certainly an aspect for further exploration.

During the focus groups, the discussants were amazingly candid. The participants accused journalists of concentrating on diversionary and divisive politics, while neglecting issues that communities consider important. While the peace efforts by ‘Dwog Cen Paco’ and ‘Vision for Peace’ were appraised, the ‘Ter Yat’ model of occasionally taking the studio to the people was highly applauded. While the community was framed on the peace radio programs as forgiving and conciliatory, the views expressed during focus groups were quite varied and often not as tactful. For instance, the government programmes under the Amnesty Act to help former LRA combatants resettle, while their victims were still wallowing in poverty inflicted by the LRA, was described as unfair and unjust. The former LRA commanders in a focus group discussion, while clearly guarded in the conversation, also revealed some of the sticky issues with the communities; saying most returnees preferred the streets of major cities to their former communities for fear of reprisals due to their suspected past atrocities. Given that the conversation with the
community in focus groups was more blunt and nuanced than the discourse on peace radio, it is worthwhile to consider for exploration the widespread audience perceptions using tools such as an audience survey or better still an ethnographic study with a researcher living amongst the community to follow closely how former LRA combatants perform in their communities.

Looking to the future, I discussed in Chapter 2 the worrying trend with regard to the plethora of media laws and regulations that promote many forms of censorship. The discussion in Section 8.2 shows that journalists are less supportive of government actions against media practitioners and institutions. These findings have implications for policy-makers to stop the multiplication of media laws and regulations, and instead work towards de-regulation, and especially the de-criminalization of journalism practice by repealing the moribund Penal Code Act, a relic of colonial Britain where it is no longer applied. The findings in Chapter 8 further call for government policy that recognizes and encourages self-regulation mechanisms as well as the revamping of the institution of the ombudsperson.

On the pedagogical front, it is noteworthy that Uganda is already benefiting from several initiatives promoting Peace Journalism practice such as the 2009-2013 UMDF-EED training workshops in four conflict-prone regions of the country. Other players such as the USAID have also stepped in to sponsor Peace Journalism projects in the country. During fieldwork, trainees on both the UMDF-EED as well as the USAID project participated in evaluating postulates of the Peace Journalism model. In a country where the majority of practising journalists lack formal training, such initiatives are going a long way in providing the requisite skills. In addition to the training projects, curricula in
formal journalism institutions are changing to reflect the realities of conflict and/or violence. At Makerere University, for example, curricula have been reviewed to include courses on Peace Journalism. As the findings in Chapter 8 have shown, Ugandan journalists in several media houses across the country as well as journalism students in four training institutions highly appraised the Peace Journalism model, which is a good indicator for its implantation in training and practice.

On the national institutional front, the analysis in Section 9.3 has shown a deficient conceptualization of national values and norms by the line ministries. In interviews with the two line ministers, it was evident that despite the rhetoric, government did not yet have frameworks in place for ‘national guidance’ as well as for ‘ethics and integrity’. An analysis of the documentation revealed that the emphasis was on good governance, particularly the curbing of corruption. While the institutional mechanisms are in place, there is still need to work on the conceptualization and delimitation of the values and norms that the Ugandan government wants to nurture and promote. From the interview with Minister Nsaba Buturo, it was evident that the Christian norms he cherished and advanced such as curbing homosexuality (LGBT) are counter to universal human values and will be untenable in the end. Such norms will most likely face national and international resistance and would not constitute media values of peace. Besides, as discussed in sub-Section 5.1.1.2 on social disenfranchisement, the persecution of minorities such as homosexuals goes counter to the values of peace-building. For instance in the survey with journalists and journalism students, I probed whether Ugandan media were still insensitive to ‘minorities’. A cumulative majority of respondents (86%, n=154/179) agreed with the proposition. While framing the question, I
had in mind homosexuals, but was unfortunately not specific to solicit LGBT-specific responses. Given the lack of a clear conceptualization of national values, I, therefore, call for the development of the kind of values that I propose as summarized in table 14 to constitute a framework of the government’s ‘national guidance’ as well as ‘ethics and integrity’ strategy. In addition to journalism institutions, such values would become a reference point for a national media literacy campaign targeting schools, local leaders as well as social-cultural institutions. Such a national strategy could easily be replicated regionally and would go a long way in contributing towards the “invention, development and marketing” of a media peace discourse (Shinar, 2007b, p.7).
References


Appendix 01: Survey Questionnaire for Journalists

Dear Respondent,

This is to kindly request your attention for about 15 minutes to fill out this semi-structured questionnaire. The survey is being conducted as part of a doctoral research thesis on the prospects and challenges of the mass media for peace-building in Uganda.

The findings will be used by the researcher for only academic purposes towards the award of a PhD in Communication of Concordia University, Canada. The findings from the study will also be presented in public forums e.g. conferences and will likely be published. Unless you advise otherwise, your views will remain confidential. Please also note that you are free to discontinue the exercise at any time. Your acceptance to proceed to answer this questionnaire constitutes your free and informed consent. Your contribution is precious. Thank you very much.

William Tayeebwa 147

001: The charge that the mass media can play a major role in triggering conflicts through spreading misinformation and ethnic hatred is overstated/exaggerated (UNDESA 2005, p.15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree:</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%):</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
</tr>
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</table>

002: African journalists lack well formulated media frames of what constitutes “peace” and therefore continue to frame media content using frames of conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree:</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%):</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
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</table>

003: It is impossible to achieve objectivity, neutrality and detachment in journalism simply because journalists cannot stand outside the socio-cultural consensus of the society in which they live (Lee, 2008; Hagos, 2001; Kamilindi, 2007; Rukhsana, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree:</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%):</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
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</table>

004: To claim that conflict sells news is to insult humanity since the vast majority (comprising women, youth and the elderly) prefer less adversarial mass media content (Galtung, 2000:163).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree:</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%):</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
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147 The researcher is currently a PhD candidate at Concordia University in Canada. He has been a Journalism Lecturer at Makerere University since 2000. Prior to starting doctoral studies in 2006, he also worked as a visiting lecturer at Islamic University in Uganda (UIU) as well as the School of Journalism, National University of Rwanda, Butare. He has practiced journalism at The New Vision (1999) and The Monitor (2000-2004) Newspapers. He can be contacted on +256 (776 or 752) - 482892 and wtayebwa@yahoo.com
005: Journalists covering conflicts never explain to the public the root causes and the motivations of the protagonists (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____

006: African mass media practitioners (journalists and editors) do not know that any given violent conflict has links to a host of local, regional and international actors.

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____

007: The following factors significantly hamper journalism practice:

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<tr>
<th>The Hampering Factor</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media ownership and control [e.g. government etc…] (Hackett, 2007; Shinar, 2007a)</td>
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<td>Insufficient professional training and advances in technology (Chalk, 2007; Howard, 2003, 2009).</td>
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<td>Journalists’ personal social-cultural influences [e.g. tribalism/ethnicity etc…] (Shinar, 2007b).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daily newsroom routines/tight deadlines (Hanitzsch, 2004; Hackett, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extra-media influences such as sources, advertisers (Hackett, 2007)</td>
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<td>Various ideologies [e.g. religious, political etc…] (Hackett, 2007; Mutere &amp; Ugangu, 2004)</td>
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008: Due to the poor coverage of African issues by the international press, African media ought to nurture a sense of “Afrocentricism” in their coverage by weighing the rest of the world in terms that are relative to African interests (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004).

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____

009: War/violence will always make better news than “peace” because the former delivers powerful emotions while the latter is amorphous with subtle emotions (Hackett, 2007:48).

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____

010: To stem ethnic/tribal biases in media reports, some countries [e.g. Burundi] deploy ethnically-mixed teams to cover major conflict issues. This is a good model that should be adopted by all media houses in African countries undergoing ethno-political strife (Hagos, 2001:9; Shinar, 2007a, pp. 57-58).

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____

011: Since all protagonists in a conflict claim to have legitimate goals, the mass media ought to ensure that all sides get a platform to state their motivations (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

Strongly Agree: _____ Somewhat Agree (50%): _____ Strongly Disagree: _____
The mass media have an important role to play in modifying images of the ‘enemy’ by for instance assigning reporters to spend time living on the ‘other’ side to get both sides of the conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004:2).

012:          Strongly Agree: □ □ □ □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ □ □ □ Strongly Disagree: □ □ □ □

Several authors identify the following factors as the major causes of violent conflicts in Uganda/Africa (Esman, 1997; Rupesinghe & Anderlini, 1998; Nhema, 2002; Shaw, 2003; Lugalambi, 2001 & 2006; Oberschall, 2007; Kanbur, 2007; Whitman, 2008). Assess:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural cause of violent conflicts</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<tr>
<td>Struggle for political power</td>
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<td>Ethnic or tribal cleavages</td>
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<td>Competition over natural resources</td>
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<td>Poverty and lack of opportunity e.g. unemployment</td>
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<td>Religious bigotry or fundamentalism</td>
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<td>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>Migration, refugees and internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>Corruption, nepotism and greed</td>
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<td>Foreign aid</td>
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<td>Poor international terms of trade</td>
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<td>Colonialism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Others:</strong></td>
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In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply fairness by including views of the protagonists (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

014:          Strongly Agree: □ □ □ □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ □ □ □ Strongly Disagree: □ □ □ □

In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply accuracy by reporting on context and background and not just the event (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

015:          Strongly Agree: □ □ □ □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ □ □ □ Strongly Disagree: □ □ □ □

In reporting a conflict, it is not possible for a journalist to apply completeness by reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions of the protagonists (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

016:          Strongly Agree: □ □ □ □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ □ □ □ Strongly Disagree: □ □ □ □

Journalists covering conflicts should dedicate time to reflect and report on the invisible yet long-term effects of the conflict such as psychological damage and trauma to the people (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.29).

017:          Strongly Agree: □ □ □ □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ □ □ □ Strongly Disagree: □ □ □ □
018: Due to technological changes in news production and distribution, the inverted-pyramid model of writing news whereby the most newsworthy elements (5Ws and H) are packed in the first paragraph is outdated and should be changed in journalism training (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004: 36).

Strongly Agree: □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ Strongly Disagree: □

019: The following is a mix of Peace Journalism and War Journalism frames according to some authors (Galtung, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Assess their significance:

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<th>Makes news</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
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<td>Patience/Moderation</td>
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<td>Extremism</td>
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<td>Immediacy</td>
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<td>Calm belligerents</td>
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<td>Threats</td>
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<td>Violence/destruction</td>
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<td>Processes [e.g. peace negotiations…]</td>
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<td>Events [e.g. signing of peace accords, shaking hands by belligerents…]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanisation of enemies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnocentricism (focusing on “our” issues and not “theirs”)</td>
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<td>Hostility towards “enemies”</td>
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<td>Major personalities</td>
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<td>Civil society and community players</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutions in the peace process</td>
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</table>

020: Journalists, in their role of holding politicians accountable, should not belong to partisan politics and should even abstain from voting.

Strongly Agree: □ Somewhat Agree (50%): □ Strongly Disagree: □

021: In your view, do you think the mass media in your country addresses issues of peace and reconciliation in a satisfactory manner?

Yes: □ Somewhat (50%): □ No: □
022: Are you satisfied with the work international organizations such as the United Nations is playing in keeping peace in Africa?
Yes:  □  Somewhat (50%):  □  No:  □

023: Would you approve that African organizations such as the African Union and/or East African Community be the **ONLY** peacekeepers in your country?
Yes:  □  Somewhat (50%):  □  No:  □

024: Do you agree that radio provides to women and youth in your country a genuine platform for the discussion and advancement of issues specific to them?
Yes, I agree:  □  Somewhat (50%):  □  No, I disagree:  □

025: What challenges do women and youth in your country face that radio (mass media) must address?


026: The mass media in this country are still insensitive to issues concerning (Mutere & Ugangu, 2004):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under-covered Issues</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural dwellers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

027: Would you agree that your country and Africa as a whole needs women-only and youth-only media outlets?
Yes, I agree:  □  No, I disagree:  □  Somewhat (50%):  □

028: Are there issues with regard to “peace” OR “violence” that occupy your mind (your fears) that you are not comfortable saying in public? If YES, which ones?


029: What do you suggest the mass media can do to improve the coverage of “peace”?


030: What African socio-cultural values or norms do you suggest could constitute mass media [and/or news] values? [E.g. respect for authority, lack of punctuality etc…]


031: In order of importance, which of these actors do you consider key in promoting peace and communal harmony in your country? [Rank with 1=Most important, 8=Least Important. PLEASE USE EACH NUMBER ONLY ONCE.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious leaders:</th>
<th>NGOs/CBOs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Traditional leaders:</td>
<td>Business Community:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders:</td>
<td>International/regional actors e.g. UN, AU, EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists:</td>
<td>Others:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

032: Any mass media institution that engages in spreading ethnic/tribal hatred should face the following actions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action to be taken</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree (50%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The particular broadcast frequency be jammed by government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The particular/concerned media house be closed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If persistent (more than two times), the journalist be banned from practicing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media house and journalist be sued in civil court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media house and journalist be summoned for disciplinary action by the ombudsperson for arbitration, warning or fining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media house and journalist be summoned by a committee of peers for advice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

033: Media House:............................................................................................

034: Title:...........................................................................................................

035: Gender: Male: ☐ Female: ☐

036: Years worked in Journalism:........................................................................

037: Telephone [Optional, only if you allow the researcher to contact you for an in-depth interview]:............................................................................

038: Any additional Comments:................................................................................

THANK YOU VERY MUCH
Appendix 02: Discourse Analysis Coding Sheet

Introduction: This study explores the role peace radio is playing in the peace-building processes in Uganda. The coding in this sheet covers one broadcast of a particular themed day during the three months (October and November 2009).

Approach: The radio transcript is read carefully while scanning the text based on a set of variables as outlined in the subsections below. The appropriate variables identified are entered in the sheet for later analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) computer software.

1. Details of the radio program/show:
   - Name: .................................................................
   - Length: ............................................................
   - Date of broadcast: .............................................
   - Time of broadcast: ............................................
   - Format: ............................................................
   - Name of Host: ...................................................

2. Demographics of Radio Guests:
   - Names and Sex (Mr., Ms): ....................................
   - Profession/Position: ...........................................
   - Special Characteristics [e.g. Foreigner, Youth etc...]:
     ...........................................................................
     ...........................................................................

3. Key actors of development/peace-building mentioned in the radio program: .................................................................
   ............................................................................

4. Key actors of conflict/violence mentioned in the radio program: .................................................................
   ............................................................................
5. Issues of discussion on the program (Macrostructure of the broadcasts):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural causes of conflict</th>
<th>Times Mentioned [use straight bars]</th>
<th>Keyword used in the broadcast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Struggle for political power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or tribal cleavages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over natural resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and lack of opportunity e.g. unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious bigotry or fundamentalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration, refugees and internally displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption, nepotism and greed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor international terms of trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Language usage (Microstructure of the broadcasts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords on Peace or Conflict</th>
<th>Number of Times Used</th>
<th>Used by whom [e.g. Host, Particular Guest…?]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Proposals for peace-building discernible in the program:

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

8. Other observations:

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Appendix 03: In-depth Interview Guide with Media and Peace Professionals as well as Government Officials

A) General Issues

1. In your opinion, which issues are key drivers of conflict in this Country that if not solved could lead to future violence? (Probe: ethnicity, poverty, party-politics, corruption, resources etc…). [Everyone]

2. What practical steps (or actions) are being taken in this country to break the cycle of violence and heal wounds of hatred? (Probe: peace processes/negotiations initiated/implemented by whom?). [Everyone]

3. Corruption (and/or nepotism) is often a key driver of civil strife in many countries, and Uganda has consistently ranked high on the corruption index by organizations such as Transparency International. Why, in your opinion, is there a reported (alleged) lack of political will to combat corruption? [Everyone, especially Government Officials]

4. Probe: Why does Uganda still experience rampant corruption in the presence of several organs and mechanisms e.g. Inspectorate of Government, Leadership code, The Public Accounts Committee, the Inspector General’s Office as well as the Parliamentary Local Governments Public Accounts Committee? [Mainly Government Officials]

5. Probe: What explicit actions have been taken to bring to justice those implicated in the various Commissions of Inquiry on corruption and abuse of office e.g. Sebutinde Commissions etc…? [All Ministers]

6. One of the objectives of the draft National Strategy on Ethics and Integrity (March 2003) was “to mobilize and build national consensus on the ethics and integrity values that should guide all Ugandans in improving governance in the country…” What progress has been made? [Minister of Ethics and Integrity]

7. Which African traditional values of conflict resolution are you aware of that could be revitalized/strengthened/rejuvenated? [Everyone]

8. What challenges do women and youth in this country face that radio (mass media) must address? [Everyone]

9. What should be the role of international and multilateral agencies such as the UN, AU, EAC in peace-building? [Everyone]

148 These questions were customized to respective interviewees in a guide accompanying a letter requesting for an interview. Aware of time constraints faced by most interviewees in newsrooms, I typically did not exceed ten questions in the guide sent out.
B) On the Mass Media:

10. What can the mass media do to break the cycle of violent conflict and heal wounds of hatred in this country? (Probe: Ethnicity, Political, Religious…)
   [Everyone]

11. What is your take on how the mass media addresses issues of peace, dialogue and reconciliation in this country? (Probe: Specific Cases of Peace Media)
   [Everyone]

12. What can be done (is being done) by the mass media to change the seemingly deep-rooted socio-cultural attitude fuelling corruption and impunity among sections of Ugandans depicted in phrases such as: “twariire” (fallen into things), “mafuta mingi” (eaten big), “twateera embundu twafuna obwogerero” (the gun gave us unlimited freedom/power) etc …? [Everyone]

13. What is your opinion on having journalists engaged in the politics of their communities (Probe: elective positions or belong to political parties)? [Everyone]

14. What should be done to mass media institutions that engage in spreading ethnic/tribal hatred? [Probe: be jammed by government?; be closed?; journalist be banned?; media house and journalist be sued in civil court?; disciplinary action by ombudsperson?) [Everyone]

C) Media Professionals:

15. What factors influence what is included in media reports (e.g.: ownership, government control, sponsors, self-censorship…)? How do you curtail them? [Reporters and Editors]

16. Can you think of any Uganda (or East-African) socio-cultural values that can be embedded and reconstructed into media frames distinct from the conventional Western news/media ones? [Reporters and Editors]

17. PRODUCERS: What are the criteria used to choose the guests on the radio programs?

18. FINALLY: Any other issues that you consider important on this topic that I have not raised? [Everyone]
Appendix 04: Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide

1. Which issues are causing (ethno-political) conflict in your community (Probe: this region) that you think if not solved could lead to violence? (Probe: ethnicity, poverty, politics, religion, natural resources etc…).

2. What practical steps (or actions) are being taken to break the cycle of violence in this country and heal wounds of hatred? (Probe: peace processes/negotiations initiated/implemented by whom?).

3. What does the concept of “peace” mean to you? (Probe: What constitutes “peace” in this community/region?)

4. Which African traditional values of conflict resolution are you aware of that could be revitalized/strengthened/rejuvenated? [Probe: Mato oput…]

5. What challenges do women and youth in your community (country) face that radio (mass media) must address? [Probe: Programs on media they are aware of]

6. What role are international and multilateral agencies such as the UN, AU, EAC playing in peace-building processes of this community/region?

B) On the Mass Media:

7. Do the mass media relay in their discourses a sufficient conceptualization of what constitutes “peace”?

8. In what specific ways are journalists (mass media) addressing issues of peace and reconciliation in this community (region)? (Probe: Specific radio programs)

9. What should be done to mass media institutions that engage in spreading ethnic/tribal hatred? [Probe: be jammed by government?; be closed?; journalist be banned?; media house and journalist be sued in civil court?; disciplinary action by ombudsperson?)

10. What is your opinion on having journalists engaged in the politics of their communities (Probe: elective positions or belong to political parties?)

C) On the Radio Programs on Mega FM and Radio Wa

11. What issues does the radio program raise that are of concern (of importance) to this community/region?

12. What questions or issues does the radio program not address that you consider important for this community/region?

13. What is your advice to the journalists/mass media of this country?

14. Any other issues that you consider important on this topic that I have not raised?
Appendix 05:  Draft Letter for In-depth Interview Requests

Dear Madam/Sir:

Re: In-depth Interview with you on Peace Radio in Uganda

Greetings and I trust you are well. I am an Assistant Lecturer in Journalism and Communication at Makerere University, Uganda and currently a doctoral candidate in Communication Studies at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. I am in the country to conduct research for my doctoral thesis on the prospects and challenges of peace radio in the peace-building processes in this country. The actual title of the thesis is: “Airwaves for Peace-building in Uganda.” The findings from this research will be used for academic purposes towards the award of a PhD in Communication of Concordia University.

This is, therefore, to seek a meeting with you for an in-depth interview based on the guiding questions herewith attached. Kindly set for me an appointment time at your convenience, but preferably within a few days of receiving this letter given the limited time I have for the exercise.

You are free to choose the venue of the interview, bearing in mind the need for a quiet place since I will seek your permission to electronically record the interview for better accuracy. You will also be asked to consent to the interview as per the form attached.

Please, feel free to let me know in advance if you have any questions via my cell-phone and email provided. I highly appreciate and value your help. Yours sincerely,

William TAYEEBWA

- Ph.D. Candidate, Concordia University, Canada
- Assistant Lecturer, Makerere University, Uganda
- Visiting Lecturer, School of Journalism, Butare University, Rwanda

Cell-phones: +256-776-48 28 92 and +256-752-48 28 92
Email: wtayebwa@yahoo.com
Appendix 06: Draft Letter for Group Discussion Requests

Date:…………………………………………………..

Dear Madam/Sir:

Re: In-depth Interview and Group Discussion on Peace Radio in Uganda

Greetings and I trust you are well. I am an Assistant Lecturer in Journalism and Communication at Makerere University, Uganda and currently a doctoral candidate in Communication Studies at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. I am in the country to conduct research for my doctoral thesis on the prospects and challenges of peace radio in the peace-building processes in this country. The actual title of the thesis is: “Airwaves for Peace-building in Uganda.” The findings from this research will be used for academic purposes towards the award of a PhD in Communication of Concordia University.

This is, therefore, to seek a meeting with you for a discussion on the work your Organization/Institution is engaged in as well as to request you to mobilize your members (if applicable) to participate in a Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Kindly set for me an appointment time at your convenience, but preferably within 20 days of receiving this letter given the limited time I have for the exercise.

IF APPLICABLE: Prior to the FGD, I will seek to administer a survey questionnaire with consenting members of your group. I will first read to them the consent form herewith attached and those who accept will proceed to answer the questionnaire, a copy of which is also herewith attached. The entire exercise will take approximately two hours, and I will be grateful to you for advice on how to best proceed. In all these exercises, I will appreciate a less noisy place since I will be electronically recording the responses. Please, feel free to let me know in advance if you have any questions via my cell-phone and emails provided. I highly appreciate and value your help.

Yours sincerely,

William TAYEEBWA [Ph.D. Candidate, Concordia University, Canada]
- Assistant Lecturer, Makerere University, Uganda
- Visiting Lecturer, School of Journalism, Butare University, Rwanda
Appendix 07: Copy of the Verbal Consent for Group Discussions

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Greetings! I am a PhD candidate from Concordia University in Canada.

After completing my studies in Canada, I will return to my teaching job at Makerere, Uganda’s national university and Butare, Rwanda’s national university; where I have taught journalism since 2000. I also have practiced journalism with several newspapers in Uganda and have been a commentator on several national, regional and international radio stations.

The research I am doing is geared towards helping journalists choose their words carefully so that they don’t propagate incendiary and hateful speech. I am here today so that you can help me with your views on how the mass media, particularly radio, can be used to promote peace and reconciliation in your communities and country.

My University in Canada requires that I not only request your verbal consent to conduct this exercise, but also inform you that you have a right not to participate if you consider the research or some of the questions I will be asking too sensitive.

If you consent to participate in this exercise, you do so with the knowledge that the entire discussion will be electronically recorded.

I also want to let you know that as a journalist myself, and a journalism lecturer, the views I gather from you will be disseminated in public forums such as academic and press conferences in a general way to safeguard your individual and/or group confidentiality.

The same confidentiality criteria will apply when I publish the findings in academic journals or books.

If for whichever reason (e.g. personal safety) you feel uncomfortable participating in this research exercise, please discontinue at any moment.

Otherwise, I am very thankful to you for coming to help me establish the best ways we can help train our journalists for peace.

Before we start the exercise, I will ask your group leader to sign this verbal consent form on your behalf; one copy for me and one for your records. Thank you very much.
ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP, WE FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

NAME AND TITLE (please print) __________________________________________

SIGNATURE __________________________

If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal Investigator (Supervisor):

Dr. Lorna Roth, Professor
Department of Communication Studies,
Concordia University, 7141 Sherbrooke Str.West,
Montreal, Quebec Canada H4B 1R6
Office: CJ 4.325, 4th Floor
Phone: +1(514) 848-2424 ext. 2545/+1514-983-8369
Fax: +1(514) 848-4257
Email: lorna.roth@gmail.com and l.roth@sympatico.ca

If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor, Concordia University, Dr. Brigitte Des Rosiers, at +1(514) 848-2424 x 7481 or by email at bdesrosi@alcor.concordia.ca
Appendix 08:  Copy of the written Consent Form for Public Figures/Leaders

This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by William Tayeebwa under the supervision of Professor Lorna Roth of Communication Studies of Concordia University at:

7141 Sherbrooke Str.West, Montreal, Quebec Canada H4B 1R6
Phone: + (514) 848-2424 ext. 2545/ +1514-983-8369
Fax: +1(514) 848-4257
Emails: wtayebwa@yahoo.com and lorna.roth@gmail.com

A. PURPOSE
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to gather information on the role of the mass media (radio) in the peace-building processes of this country.

B. PROCEDURES
The research is being conducted amongst several journalists around the country as well as civil society groups engaged in peace-building processes.
I will answer the questions posed by the researcher to the best of my knowledge and ability.

C. RISKS AND BENEFITS

- While this research focuses on how the mass media is currently being used for peace-building, I understand that answering some questions on peace necessarily means reflecting on how the mass media has been used in the past (or even presently) to inflame conflict and hatred in my community/country.
- I acknowledge that I or some people I know could have been victims of hate speech and I might therefore feel uncomfortable answering some questions in this interview/questionnaire. If this be the case, I know that I have the right not to participate in the exercise or to not answer any question I feel uncomfortable about.
- I understand that the importance of my participation is to suggest ways the mass media (radio) can be used as an instrument of peace and not violent conflict. By so doing, I am participating in an important aspect of building a nation based on a culture of peace.
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION [Please tick in the box provided]

a) I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time without negative consequences:  

b) I understand that the discussion will be electronically recorded:  

c) I understand that my participation in this study is (Please tick appropriate word):
   - CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the researcher will know, but will not disclose my identity): 
   OR:
   - NON-CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., I will explicitly ask the researcher to reveal my identity in the study results): 

d) I understand that the data from this study may be published in various formats [e.g. journals, conferences, books]:  

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

NAME (please print): ____________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ___________________________________________________

If at any time you have a major query about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal Investigator (Supervisor):
Dr. Lorna Roth, Professor
Department of Communication Studies,
Concordia University, 7141 Sherbrooke Str.West,
Montreal, Quebec Canada H4B 1R6
Office: CJ 4.325, 4th Floor
Phone: +1(514) 848-2424 ext. 2545
Cell: +1514-983-8369
Fax: +1(514) 848-4257
Email: lorna.roth@gmail.com and l.roth@sympatico.ca

If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor, Concordia University, Dr. Brigitte Des Rosiers, at +1(514) 848-2424 x 7481 or by email at bdesrosi@alcor.concordia.ca
## Appendix 09: List of In-depth Interview Respondents ………1/3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Officials</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Kabakumba Labwoni Masiko</td>
<td>Minister of Information and National Guidance</td>
<td>13/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Dr. James Nsaba Buturo</td>
<td>Minister of Ethics and Integrity, Office of the President [and Former Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting]</td>
<td>17/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Godfrey Mutabazi</td>
<td>Executive Director, Uganda Communications Commission/Broadcasting Council Merger</td>
<td>07/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Paul Mukasa</td>
<td>Secretary, Uganda Media Council</td>
<td>13/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Obed Katureebe</td>
<td>Editorial Director and Political Research, Uganda Media Centre</td>
<td>14/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. (Rtd) Walter Ochola Odoch</td>
<td>Resident District Commissioner, Gulu and Member of the Government Negotiation Team with the LRA</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Adolf Gerstl</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator, Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Program (NUREP), Office of the Prime Minister</td>
<td>04/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Ronald Kakurungu</td>
<td>Public Relations Officer, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) 4th Division in Gulu and Coordinator of the Demobilized Former LRA Commanders</td>
<td>05/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Julius Muhairwe</td>
<td>Gulu District Intelligence Officer (DISO) and Coordinator of the Child Protection Unit (CPU)</td>
<td>05/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier Kenneth Banya</td>
<td>Former LRA Commander [Under Government Amnesty Commission]</td>
<td>03/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media and Communication Scholars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Charles Ogwel</td>
<td>Director and Lecturer, United Media Consultants and Trainers (UMCAT)</td>
<td>03/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Daniel Komakech</td>
<td>Acting Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University</td>
<td>04/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Goretti Linda Nassanga</td>
<td>Associate Professor of Communication and Peace Media scholar, Makerere University</td>
<td>15/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Rev. Sr. Dominic Dipio</td>
<td>Associate Professor of Literature and Alternative Media Scholar, Makerere University</td>
<td>15/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace and Conflict Specialists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev.Fr. Philip Odii</td>
<td>Executive Secretary for Social Communications, Uganda Episcopal Conference</td>
<td>18/12/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix 09: List of In-depth Interview Respondents......continued.... 2/3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Willy Akena</td>
<td>Information Officer, Anglican Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu</td>
<td>25/02/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Esther Acio</td>
<td>Project Manager, Community Outreach Peace Project (COPP), Gulu University</td>
<td>25/02/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev.Fr. Cyprian Ocen</td>
<td>Chair, Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Archdiocese of Gulu</td>
<td>28/02/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Fr. Julius Orach</td>
<td>Member, Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLP)</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheik Al Hajji Musa Khalil</td>
<td>Gulu District Khadi and Member of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLP)</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. George Ocaka</td>
<td>Project Coordinator, Kica Ber Support War Victims</td>
<td>02/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Gloria Nimungu Ociba</td>
<td>Senior Legal Officer, Center for Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR), Gulu</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Denis Martin Okwir</td>
<td>Coordinator, Empowering Hands Uganda</td>
<td>26/02/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Pamella Lukwiya</td>
<td>Project Manager, Okweyo Project [Psychosocial Support], Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu</td>
<td>03/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Opira</td>
<td>Executive Director, The Great Lakes Centre for Conflict Resolution (GLACCR)</td>
<td>06/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mathias Mulumba Mayombwe</td>
<td>National Coordinator, Uganda Media Development Foundation (UMDF)</td>
<td>06/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Journalists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Sempala</td>
<td>Political Editor and Talk show host on Suubi 104.9 FM</td>
<td>30/11/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Sr. Denis Samanya</td>
<td>Managing Director, Radio Sapientia 94.4 FM</td>
<td>30/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Francis Jjuunju</td>
<td>Programs Director, Radio Sapientia 94.4 FM</td>
<td>30/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Aloysius Matovu</td>
<td>Journalist and Talk show Host of Okyogerako Kyi [What is your say?] Radio Sapientia 94.4 FM</td>
<td>02/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Steven Balmoi</td>
<td>Producer and Presenter, ‘Ter Yat’ Program, Mega FM</td>
<td>03/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Kakande</td>
<td>The Editor, The New Vision Group</td>
<td>10/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael Kisenyi</td>
<td>Programs Manager, Radio Two Akaboozi Kubiri 87.9 FM</td>
<td>01/12/2010</td>
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</table>
### Appendix 09: Interview respondents…....continued 3/3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Geoffrey Kulubya</td>
<td>Editor, <em>Bukedde</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>16/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Godfrey Male</td>
<td>Chief News Editor, Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) 88.8 FM and 89.2 FM</td>
<td>02/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Opio</td>
<td>Station Manager, Kioga Veritas Radio (KVR), Soroti</td>
<td>11/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Rebecca Kaikara</td>
<td>Journalist and Host of UMDF-EED Peace Radio Model Program, Kioga Veritas Radio (KVR), Soroti</td>
<td>11/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Evelyn Abbo</td>
<td>Station Manager and Host of PEM [UMDF-EED Peace Radio Model Program], 92.4 Luo FM, Pader</td>
<td>12/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Daniel Etyang</td>
<td>Radio Manager, Rock Mambo</td>
<td>10/01/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Ocen</td>
<td>Programs Manager and Host, Vision for Peace, Radio Wa 89.9 FM</td>
<td>28/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Pelegrine Otonga</td>
<td>News Editor, Radio Wa 89.9 FM</td>
<td>28/12/2010</td>
</tr>
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</table>
# Appendix 10: List of Focus Group Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Groups</th>
<th>Members in Attendance</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Former LRA Commanders, Gulu Senior Quarters (CPU)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>02 March 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gulu Disabled Persons Union</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HIV Positive Club of Family Strengthening Program, SOS Children’s Village, Gulu</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Men of Okweyo Project [Psychosocial Support], Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Women of Okweyo Project [Psychosocial Support], Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Youth of Okweyo Project [Psychosocial Support], Diocese of Northern Uganda, Gulu</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27 February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Men of Pabbo Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) Camp</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>03 March 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Women of Pabbo Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) Camp</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>03 March 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11: Former LRA commanders who participated in a Focus Group Discussion

### DEPARTMENT OF MASS COMMUNICATION

#### FOCUS GROUP ATTENDANCE LIST

**Location:** SENIOR QUARTERS (CPU) LARO

**Date:** 2nd March 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<th>Signature</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Achamna Ray</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Arop Charles</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Mr. Ongoro Tana</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Abas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPL. Apare Ray</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. OkwangoAkie</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilizers:**

1. EL KOMIRECH

   - 40,000 =

2. [Signature]

   - WTayebwa

   - 03/03

   - 2010
### Appendix 12: The mass media institutions that participated in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qtn 033 – Your Media House</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journalism, Makerere University</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>The East African</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Media Group</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monitor Publication</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Broadcasting Services (CBS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Sapientia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Vision Group</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Choice, Gulu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mega F.M., Gulu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio King F.M., Gulu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Rupiny</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Redpepper</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent Magazine</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>83.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bukedde Radio</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>84.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFM Radio</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>86.3</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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<td>Radio Pacis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Rukungiri</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>89.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>91.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunters Radio</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater African Radio</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>94.5</td>
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<td>Vision Radio</td>
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<td>.5</td>
<td>95.1</td>
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<td>Kabale F.M.</td>
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<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>95.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voice of Life F.M.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilal F.M.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic University in Uganda, Kampala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Plus</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some journalism schools such as Mukono and UMCAT who participated don’t figure in the SPSS frequency table above because most students identified with the major print media houses such as New Vision Group, Nation Media Group and Daily Monitor as well as The Red Pepper.
Appendix 13: The Dos and Don’ts of Peace Journalism

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 28-31) provide the following 17 points as practical suggestions for devising and applying a strategy to re-balance the reporting of conflicts, countering the distorting influence of unexamined War Journalism.

1. “AVOID portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting the same goal(s). The logical outcome is for one to win, and the other to lose. INSTEAD try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into many smaller groups, with many needs and interests, pursuing many goals, opening up more creative potential for a range of outcomes. And ask yourself - who else is involved, and how? (p.28)

2. AVOID accepting stark distinctions between 'self' and 'other'. These can be used to build the sense that another party is a threat, or 'beyond the pale', of civilised behaviour. Both are key justifications for violence. INSTEAD seek the ‘other’ in the ‘self’ and vice versa. If a party is presenting itself as 'the goodies', ask questions about how different its behaviour really is to that it ascribes to the other – isn’t it ashamed of itself? (Ibid.)

3. AVOID treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring. INSTEAD try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future. Ask:
   - Who are all the people with a stake in the outcome?
   - How do these stakeholders relate to each other?
   - Who gains from the conflict?
   - What are they doing to influence the conflict?
   - What will happen if...?
   - What lessons will people draw from watching these events unfold as part of a global audience? How will they enter the calculations of parties to future conflicts near and far? (Ibid.)

4. AVOID assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only. INSTEAD try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects, e.g. the long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries (p.29).

5. AVOID letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders' restatements of familiar demands or positions. INSTEAD enquire for yourself into goals, needs and interests:
   - How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life?
- What do they want changed? Who else is speaking up for them besides their political leaders? Answers to this are often surprisingly accessible, as even many small grassroots organizations now have websites.
- Is the position stated by their leaders the only way or the best way to achieve the changes they want?
- This may help to empower parties to clarify their needs and interests and articulate their goals, making creative outcomes more likely.

6. AVOID concentrating always on what divides the parties, on the differences between what each say they want. INSTEAD try asking questions which may reveal areas of common ground, and leading your report with answers which suggest that at least some goals, needs and interests may be compatible, or shared (Ibid.).

7. AVOID only reporting the violent acts and describing 'the horror'. If you exclude everything else, you suggest that the only explanation for violence is previous violence (revenge); the only remedy, more violence (coercion/ punishment). INSTEAD show how people have been blocked and frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the conditions for violence are being produced (Ibid.).

8. AVOID blaming someone for starting 'it'. INSTEAD try looking at how shared problems and issues are leading to consequences which all the parties say they never intended (Ibid.).

9. AVOID focusing exclusively on the suffering, fears and grievances of only one party. This divides the parties into 'villains' and 'victims' and suggests that coercing or punishing the villains represents a solution. INSTEAD treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, fears and grievances of all parties (Ibid.).

10. AVOID 'victimising' language like 'devastated', 'defenceless', 'pathetic', 'tragedy' which only tells us what has been done to and could be done for a group of people by others. This is disempowering and limits the options for change. INSTEAD report on what has been done and could be done by the people. Don't just ask them how they feel; also ask them how they are coping and what they think. Can they suggest any solutions? (Ibid.)

11. AVOID the imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people, such as the following:
- ‘Tragedy' is a form of drama, originally Greek, in which someone's fault or weakness ultimately proves his or her undoing.
- 'Assassination' is the murder of a head of state (p.29).
- 'Massacre' is the deliberate killing of people known to be unarmed and defenceless. Are we sure? Or do we not know? Might these people have died in battle? (p.30)
• 'Systematic' – e.g. raping or forcing people from their homes. Has it really been organised in a deliberate pattern or have there been a number of unrelated, albeit extremely nasty, incidents?

INSTEAD always be precise about what we know. Do not minimize suffering but reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses which escalate the violence (Ibid.).

12. AVOID demonising adjectives like 'vicious', 'cruel', 'brutal', 'barbaric' These always describe one party's view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalist on that side and helps to justify an escalation of violence. INSTEAD report what you know about the wrongdoing and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people's reports or descriptions of it. If it is still being investigated, say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet be known (p.30).

13. AVOID demonising labels like 'terrorist', 'extremist', 'fanatic', 'fundamentalist'. These are always given by 'us' to 'them'. No one ever uses them to describe himself or herself. And they are difficult, if not impossible, to apply impartially in every instance where they would be warranted. (What, for instance, is a 'fundamentalist regime'? A working definition might be - an unelected government with leaders avowedly guided by religious belief. But many journalists would have found it very difficult, in practice, so to describe the first George W. Bush administration, appointed to power by the US Supreme Court, in 2000, despite garnering half a million fewer votes than the Democrat, Al Gore.) In practice, therefore, to use such labels is always to take sides. They also generally mean the people labeled are unreasonable, which weakens the case for reasoning (negotiating) with them. INSTEAD try calling people by the names they give themselves. Or be more precise in your descriptions – e.g. 'bombers' and, for the attacks of September 11th, 'suicide hijackers' are both less partisan and give more information than 'terrorists' (Ibid.).

14. AVOID focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanors and wrongdoings of only one side. INSTEAD try to name ALL wrongdoers, and treat allegations made by all parties in a conflict equally seriously. This means' not taking at face value, but instead making equal efforts to establish whether any evidence exists to back them up, treating the victims with equal respect and the finding and punishing of all wrongdoers as being of equal importance (Ibid.).

15. AVOID making an opinion or claim seem like an established fact. This is how propaganda works – e.g. the campaign, primarily aimed at US and UK media, to link Saddam Hussein to 'international terrorism' in early 2002. Under a headline linking Iraq to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, came the claim that 'Iraqi military intelligence officers are said to be assisting extreme Palestinian groups in attacks on Israel...' 'Said to be' obscures the question of who is doing the saying. See also 'thought to be', 'it's being seen as', etc. INSTEAD tell your readers or your audience who said what. That way you avoid
implicitly signing up yourself and your news service to the allegations made by one party in the conflict against another (p.30).

16. AVOID greeting the signing of documents by leaders which bring about military victory or a ceasefire as necessarily creating peace. INSTEAD try to report on the issues which remain, and on the needs and interests of those affected (what has to happen in order to remove incentives for further acts of violence?). Ask what is being done to strengthen the means on the ground to handle and resolve conflict non-violently, to address development or structural needs in the society and to create a culture of peace? (p.31)

17. AVOID waiting for leaders on 'our' side to suggest or offer solutions. INSTEAD pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from. Ask questions of politicians – e.g. about ideas put forward by grassroots organizations. Assess peace perspectives against what you know about the issues the parties are really trying to address; do not simply ignore them because they don't coincide with established positions. Include images of a solution, however partial or fragmentary - they may help to stimulate dialogue (Ibid.).”
Appendix 14: The Ten Commandments for Peace Journalism

Tehranian (2002) proposes Ten Commandments for Peace Journalism that are negotiable and suggestive rather than exhaustive (pp.80-81).

1. “Never reduce the parties in human conflicts to two. Remember that when two elephants fight, the grass gets hurt. Pay attention to the poor grass.

2. Identify the views and interests of all parties to human conflicts. There is no single Truth; there are many truths.

3. Do not be hostage to one source, particularly those of governments that control sources of information.

4. Develop a good sense of scepticism. Remember that reporting is representation. Bias is endemic to human conditions. You, your media organization, and your sources are not exceptions.

5. Give voice to the oppressed and peacemakers to represent and empower them.

6. Seek peaceful solutions to conflict problems, but never fall prey to panaceas.

7. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the problem if it exacerbates dualisms and hatreds.

8. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the solution if it employs the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions.

9. Always exercise the professional media ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights and dignity.

10. Transcend your own ethnic, national, or ideological biases to see and represent the parties to human conflicts fairly and accurately.”
Appendix 15: A diversity checklist for Conflict Sensitive Journalism according to Mutere & Ugangu (2004, pp. 71-72)

- “Have I covered the story with sensitivity, accuracy, fairness and balance to all of the people involved?
- What are the likely consequences of publishing or broadcasting this story? Who will be hurt and who will be helped?
- Have I sought diversity of sources for this story?
- Am I seeking true diversity or using “tokenism” by allowing one minority person to represent a community or a point of view?
- Have I allowed preconceived ideas to limit my efforts to include diversity?
- Am I flexible about the possibility that the focus of the story may change when different sources are included?
- Am I being realistic? Are there some stories that can’t be diversified? Is there a reasonable effort being made to balance the story and avoid exclusion?
- Have I developed a meaningful list of minority sources who can bring perspective and expertise into the mainstream of daily news coverage?
- Have I spent time in minority communities and with residents to find out what people are thinking and to learn more about lifestyles, perspectives, customs etc.?
- If I am writing about achievements, am I writing about them on their own merits rather than as stereotype breakers?
- Am I letting place names (Eastlands, Soweto, Kibera etc) become code words for crime and other negative news?
- As I seek diversity, am I being true to my other goals as a journalist?
- Will I be able to clearly and honestly explain, not rationalize, my decision to anyone who challenges it?”
Appendix 16: Differentiation of peace/conflict and war/violence journalism as adopted from the table by Lynch & Goldrick (2005, p.6) and Shinar (2004, p.3,7).

From the point of view of praxis:

- Peace Journalism “explores conflict formation X parties, Y goals, Z issues general, win-win situation; while War Journalism “focuses on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, general zero-sum orientation.

- Peace Journalism is about “open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.” While War Journalism is about “closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.

- Peace Journalism is about “making conflicts transparent”. War Journalism is about “making wars mysterious/secret.”

- Peace Journalism aims at “giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding.” While War Journalism is about “us-them, propaganda, voice, for ‘us’.

- Peace Journalism “seeing conflict/war as a problem, focus on conflict creativity”.

- Peace Journalism is about “humanisation of all sides; more so the more devastating the weapons.” War Journalism about “dehumanisation of ‘them’; more so the more frightening the weapon.”

- Peace Journalism is “proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs.” While War Journalism is “reactive: waiting for violence before reporting.”

- Peace Journalism is about “focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture).” In War Journalism “focus only on visible effects of violence (killed, wounded and material damage).”

At ideological level:

- Peace Journalism is fact-oriented by exposing “untruths on all sides/uncover all cover-ups. While War Journalism is “propaganda-oriented (to) expose ‘their’ untruths/help ‘our’ cover-ups/lie”.

- Peace Journalism is “people-oriented” in the sense that it’s “focus [is] on suffering all over; on women, the aged, children, giving voice to voiceless. It is also about to “give name to all evil-doers; and “focus on people Peacemakers.” While War Journalism is “elite-oriented” whereby the “focus [is] on ‘our’ suffering, on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece. It also “gives name of their evil-doers” and “focus on elite Peacemakers”.”
Peace Journalism is “solution-oriented” in the sense that “peace = non-violence + creativity”. It is a “highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war”. The “focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society.” On the “aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation.” War Journalism is “victory-oriented” whereby “peace = victory + ceasefire.” It “conceals peace initiatives, before victory is at hand.” Its “focus [is] on treaty, institution, the controlled society.” “Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again.” (p.6).

Shinar (2004:7) adds a media dimension to Galtung’s characterization of war and peace journalism.

According to Shinar, “peace-oriented media framing” is “embryonic, sporadic peace discourse; experimental demonstrations of peace discourse” and ought to pay special attention to issues of “style or media event techniques”, to the “content or textual analysis genres” and to “constitutive rhetoric” which is the “assignment of meaning to new symbolic entities/processes (i.e. peace), through reality construction and combination of social and historical narratives with ideological objectives” (p.7)
Appendix 17: Elements of Conflict Resolution Journalism (Howard, 2003, pp.8-9)

1. **“Channeling communication:** The news media is often the most important channel of communication that exists between sides in a conflict. Sometimes the media is used by one side to broadcast intimidating messages. But other times, the parties speak to each other through the media or through specific journalists.

2. **Educating:** Each side needs to know about the other side’s difficulty in moving towards reconciliation. Journalism which explores each side’s particular difficulties, such as its politics or powerful interests can help educate the other side to avoid demands for simplistic and immediate solutions.

3. **Confidence-building:** Lack of trust is a major factor contributing to conflict. The media can reduce suspicion by digging into hot issues and revealing them so there are no secrets to fear. Good journalism can also present news that shows resolution is possible by giving examples from other places and by explaining local efforts at reconciliation.

4. **Correcting misperceptions:** By examining and reporting on the two sides’ misperceptions of each other, the media encourages disputing sides to revise their views and move closer to reducing conflict (p.8).

5. **Making them human:** Getting to know the other side, giving them names and faces, is an essential step. This is why negotiators put the two sides in the same room. Good journalism also does this by putting real people in the story and describing how the issue affects them (p.9).

6. **Identifying underlying interests:** In a conflict, both sides need to understand the bottom-line interests of the other. Good reporting does this by asking tough questions and seeking out the real meaning of what leaders say. Good reporting also looks beyond the leaders’ interests and seeks the larger groups’ interest.

7. **Emotional outlet:** In conflict resolution, there must be outlets for each side to express their grievances or anger or they will explode in frustration and make things worse. The media can provide important outlets by allowing both sides to speak. Many disputes can be fought out in the media, instead of in the streets, and the conflict can be addressed before it turns violent.

8. **Framing the conflict:** In a conflict, describing the problem in a different way can reduce tension and launch negotiations. In good journalism, editors and reporters are always looking for a different angle, an alternative view, a new insight which will still attract an audience to the same story. Good journalism can help reframe conflicts for the two sides.
9. **Face-saving, consensus-building:** When two parties try to resolve a conflict they must calm the fears of their supporters. By reporting what they say, the media allows leaders in a conflict to conduct face-saving and consensus-building, even reaching to refugees and exiles in far-away places.

10. **Solution-building:** In a conflict, both sides must eventually present specific proposals to respond to grievances. On a daily basis, good reporting does this by asking the disputing parties for their solutions instead of just repeating their rhetoric of grievances. Good journalism is a constant process of seeking solutions.

11. **Encouraging a balance of power:** Conflicting groups, regardless of inequalities, have to believe they will be given attention if they meet the other side in negotiations. Good journalism encourages negotiation because the reporting is impartial and balanced. It gives attention to all sides. It encourages a balance of power for the purpose of hearing grievances and seeking solutions.”
Appendix 18: The Network of Conflict Resolution in Canada (www.nicr.ca) offers 5 Alternative Ws, an H and O for Conflict Reporting:

- **WHO**: Who is affected by this conflict; who has a distinct stake in its outcome? What is their relationship to one another, including relative power, influence and affluence?

- **WHAT**: What triggered the dispute; what drew it to your attention at this time? What issues do the parties need to resolve?

- **WHEN**: When did this conflict begin; how often have the circumstances existed that gave rise to this dispute?

- **WHERE**: What geographical or political jurisdictions are affected by the dispute? How has this issue been handled in other places?

- **WHY**: Why do the involved parties hold the positions they do; what needs, interests, fears and concerns need to be addressed?

- **HOW**: How are they going to resolve this e.g. negotiation, mediation, arbitration, administrative hearing, court, armed warfare; what are the costs/benefits of the chosen method?

- **OPTIONS**: What options have the parties explored, how do the various options relate to the interests identified?” (p.341)
Appendix 19: Conventional News Frames as Per Galtung and Ruge (1965) 
[Adopted from Perry, 2002, p.107]

i. "Frequency means that the event occurs within an appropriate time period. Generally speaking, very slowly occurring events tend to be ignored; the media tend to favour the quick and dramatic.

ii. Threshold means either that the event is large enough in magnitude to receive attention or that its size increases sufficiently to call attention to it.

iii. Unambiguity refers to events that are clearly meaningful or interpretable.

iv. Cultural proximity or relevance concerns events that occur in a similar culture to that of an audience or that are otherwise relevant to it.

v. Consonance means that the event was expected or desired. (Perry K. David. 2002 p.106)

vi. Unexpectedness means that the event was unexpected or scarce.

vii. Continuity occurs to the extent that the event has been defined previously as news.

viii. Composition refers to whether the overall news environment is favourable for an event (e.g. whether other competing news can crowd it out).

ix. To the extent that an event concerns elite nations, it tends to be selected as news [Western frame].

x. To the extent that an event concerns elite people, it tends to become news [Western frame].

xi. If the event can be personified (i.e. linked to actions of specific people), it tends to become news [Western frame].

xii. Events with negative consequences tend to be selected as news" [Western frame]
Appendix 20: Tenets of Community Service Reporting

Eric Loo (1994, 1995) has developed a genre known as *community-service reporting* based on the following principles:

- “Don’t just look on an event from afar. Be a participant observer of events and issues.
- Critically assess the needs and interests of the audience and the wider community.
- Develop your cognitive and experiential knowledge and the wider community.
- Be aware of the way the story can affect the development of community resources.
- Shift news emphasis from policymakers to those affected by the policies (that is, the community).
- Shift news focus from economic figures and other facts and statistics to look at concrete personal life experiences of community members.
- Personally connect with a wide cross-section of the community.
- Treat audiences as communities with needs and concerns rather than as information markets.
- Provide the community with open access to the media.
- Pay fair attention to mainstream and minority views, including minority views on mainstream issues” (cited in Romano and Cratis, 2001, p.183).