The Development of Dominant Parties and Party Systems
– Taiwan as a Case Study

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A Thesis
In
The Department
Of
Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts (Political Science) at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

September 2012

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ABSTRACT

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Of the emerging democracies in the 20th century, Taiwan demonstrates itself as a distinguished case as its pre-authoritarian party, the Kuomintang (KMT), was able to prolong its rule in the government after regime transition from authoritarian regime to democracy. According to scholars of dominant parties and party systems, Taiwan's dominant party, the KMT, existed in a dominant party system because it was able to defeat the opposition party, the DPP, until 2000 even after martial law was lifted in 1987. The existing literature investigates the factors of the development of political parties and how it links to the literature which discusses the development of dominant parties and party systems. From the discussion, I argue five factors are the cause of the development of the KMT one-party dominance including 1) social influence from the U.S., 2) the KMT’s ability of crisis management in 1971 event, 3) the development of voting behaviors affected by generational social experiences, 4) the effect of SNTV system on the development of political parties, 5) the effect of the leadership, Lee Teng-Hui, on the KMT’s party internal structure. We found that these five factors confirm our suggesting theories.
Acknowledgement:

This thesis is impossible without Dr. Nikolenyi, for your consistent academic support and advice and encouragement. Because of you, writing thesis becomes an enjoyable process which cultivates my interest in academic research. I also would like to thank Dr. Lachapelle, who encouraged me to study in Montreal, Dr. Price, who gave me the strength to continue the program while I was frustrated because of language deficiency I suffered at the beginning of my graduate studies, and my most loving and caring friends, Andrea, Katy, and Dennis, who helped me to get through the toughest times during my studies. I would like to thank Greg, for your love that enables me to finish my master degree. Lastly, I would like to thank my family, for your financial support and prayers throughout my studies. Without you guys, I would not be able to finish a master degree in a foreign country.

本論文獻給所有教導過我的老師及母校，以及那些在我研究所的路途中，支持我的親朋好友：台北大學所有教導過我的教授們，那些還沒或快畢業的博士班學長姐們（小拉、立煒、天申等）、婉青、507 寢室親友團、芝櫻、琼琳等。唯有妳們的支持，讓我堅持下去順利的完成了不可能的任務！最後，感謝我的家人一路上養育我到終於把碩士給念完！
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. A Puzzling Emerging Democracy

The 20th century marks a political breakthrough as democratization began to proceed in seven Asia countries: Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Mongolia, Cambodia, and Indonesia (Huntington 1991). Among the emerging democracies, Taiwan is of our research interest because, first of all, not all the countries mentioned above have become mature democracies (i.e. Thailand, the Philippines, Mongolia, Cambodia, and Indonesia) and because of the perplexing political development in Taiwan, according to which the post-authoritarian party, the Kuomintang, managed to sustain one-party dominance after democratization, unlike what happened in other Asian countries (e.g. South Korea). Thus, Taiwan’s case is puzzling because the post-authoritarian party retains a prominent role in government after democratization, the cause of which is not fully explained by any single existing theory of party and party systems. In order to fill in the gaps, the solution to this puzzle is to evaluate the theories and formulate hypotheses so as to discover what explanatory factor is missing.

1Recently, Taiwan held a new round of presidential and legislative elections and the KMT in 2012 seems to be regaining its electoral support after its one-party dominance ended in 2000.
1.2. Hypotheses

Conventional wisdom on Taiwan’s case of one-party dominance has stressed external factors such as electoral systems (which affects how politicians form strategies) and environmental shock (which comes from a significant event that "can change the operational environment of an organization" as well as internal factor such as organizational structure (which is influenced by factionalism or leadership changes) (Tan 2002; Cheng 2006; Wong 2008). In addition, we contend that it is necessary to discuss the influence of generation replacement on the development of the political party. According to Franklin (2004: 13), voting cohorts with different ages, social features, and education backgrounds will reflect on the whole electorate gradually. This theory is important to our study because it implies that certain cohorts of the electorate will vote differently from the previous ones if society is undergoing transition (Franklin 2004: 17). Certain social changes (i.e. the age structure of the population) will have more immediate effects on the whole electorate turnout while other social changes (i.e. education) will have a slower visible effect (Franklin 2004: 18).

In summary, in this study we will include both external and internal factors that affect party changes and add generation replacement theory in our hypotheses in order
to have a better understanding of the development of the KMT. The factors we will test in our thesis include: 1) organizational structure (Tan 2002; Wong 2008), 2) electoral system (Cheng 2006), 3) social issues (Tan 2002; Cheng 2006; Copper 2009), 4) crises (Tan 2002; Greene 2010), and 5) generational replacement (Franklin 2004). This thesis will hypothesize that the KMT succeeded in becoming a dominant party in Taiwan because: 1) the KMT had more unified organizational structure than the other parties, 2) the electoral system provided incentives for politicians of the KMT to stay unified, 3) the KMT was able to market and identify itself as the representative of the Taiwanese people and the protector of national identity, 4) the KMT was able to sustain its legitimacy by solving diplomatic isolation, at the political juncture in Taiwan’s political history, in 1971, and 5) the emerging cohorts of electorates had not yet carried a substantial cumulative effect on the older cohorts of electorates, which preferred the KMT more than the new emerging opposition parties.

At the same time, this thesis also posits that the failure of the KMT in the electoral competition of 2000 was the result of the following conditions: 1) the factions of the KMT were no longer unified; 2) the electoral strength of the KMT was weakened when the electoral system provided incentives for politicians to split; 3) the DPP was able to capture more votes of Taiwanese because of the democratic values from the U.S., which tarnished the KMT’s image as it used violent measures to suppress the
opposition during the *Kaoshiung incident* in 1979; 4) the emergence of the DPP (the Democratic Progressive Party), which has stronger national identity than the KMT, weakened the supporters of the KMT because it can no longer claim itself as the only protector of Taiwanese national identity; and 5) the emerging electorate began to be replaced by the new emerging cohorts, which do not share the same preferences as the older electorate cohorts, and gives the opposition party a chance to realign the voters.

### 1.3. The Taiwanese Case: History and Background

1987 marked a political breakthrough in Taiwan’s history when the KMT (breaking from its authoritarian past) lifted martial law, which had put restrictions on the freedom of speech, public gathering, and publishing (Wong 2008). After 1987, Taiwan’s party politics became the contest between the KMT and the DPP, with the latter successfully gaining the support of Taiwanese, workers, the poor, and citizens who suffered under the KMT rulers (Copper 2009: 134). The electoral results of national legislative elections in 1992 (53.02 % of the KMT versus 31.03 % of the DPP in terms of seats) and the local government elections in 1997 (8 out of 23 counties of the KMT versus 12 out of 23 counties of the DPP) showed the rapidly growing support behind the DPP (Copper 2009: 135). In 2000, the DPP won presidential elections and the following year it won the majority of seats in the
legislative Yuan, which put an end to the KMT’s 51 years one-party dominance (Copper 2009: 135). Taiwan’s case thus seems puzzling because one would expect that the emergence of the DPP, established in 1986, marks the beginning of a competitive party system, in which the KMT is more likely to lose its dominance. In 2000, the KMT lost its one-party dominance for the first time. However, the electoral defeats in the 2000 presidential and legislative elections seem a temporary aberration as the KMT regained its power since 2008 presidential and legislative elections up until now. Greene’s (2010: 222) resource theory suggests that the dominant parties have better access to the resources in government. By transferring the resources onto patronage use, the dominant parties can maintain one-party dominance successfully (Greene 2010: 222). However, we find this argument incomplete when we apply it to Taiwan. Firstly, the KMT’s one-party dominance began to weaken even though no economic crisis arose to challenge the ability of the KMT to distribute patronage. According to Greene (2010: 222), as economic crisis emerges, the dominant party will have less resource to distribute to the patronage programs that serve as links between the dominant party and its supporters. As such, the Taiwan case challenges Greene’s resource theory that links the decline of dominant party and party system to the
shrinking resources. Secondly and interestingly, as the economic development in Taiwan continues to grow so too does the democratic stability even after the decline of the KMT. If Greene's resource theory applies to all dominant party systems, we would expect that Taiwan experienced economic downturn during the period of KMT’s decline. However, it is not the case in Taiwan. With no less resource at hand, the KMT should be capable of distributing them into the on-going patronage programs and the DPP would not be able to defeat them.

Taiwan, as a successful Third-Wave democracy, fulfills our purpose of studying a dominant party that transformed from an authoritarian party into a competitive party in a democracy without losing a single election once, and the relationship between the decline of dominant party and economic development. Taiwan experienced regime transformation in 1987, in which the dominant party, the KMT, successfully maintained one-party dominance from DPAR (dominant party authoritarian regime) to DPDR (dominant party democratic regime) (Huntington 1991; Wong 2008). In order to examine Greene's resource theory, we need to look at economic development in Taiwan first. We find that Taiwan was one of the Asian Tigers which experienced significant progress measured in terms of GDP since 1900 and continued the growth in 2000 (Copper 2009: 160). If one follows the recipe provided by Greene, we would
witness the defeat of the KMT by the biggest opposition party at the time - the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). However, it was not the case in Taiwan's scenario. It therefore suggests that economic crisis can be a common but not always sufficient condition in catalyzing the decline of dominant party.

We argue that to understand how a dominant party begins to lose power calls for questions of where its power resource lays and how it develops. Evidently, the KMT was able to regenerate its image to attract more votes than the opposition party as they were given equal rights and freedom to compete in elections. We thus argue that democratization does not impact and weaken the KMT's dominance right away and this requires us to search for the factors that consolidate its supporters during two different regimes. Before 1987, Taiwan should be considered a competitive authoritarian regime with the existence of local elections. The local elections can be traced back to 1950 while national elections were held only since 1980 (Copper 2009: 138). Copper (2009: 138) contends that the development of local elections in Taiwan, which essentially displayed Taiwan as a competitive authoritarian regime, was crucial in introducing democratization and bringing about the eventual emergence of the DPP in the 1970s (Copper 2009: 138). The increasing support of the DPP over time resulted in a higher degree of tension between the government, the KMT, and the
citizens (Copper 2009: 52). Moreover, the political crisis in 1979 catalyzed the process of democratization in Taiwan. Specifically, the termination of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States in 1979 presented the DPP an opportunity to attract more support and protests from citizens who deemed democratization as the only way to solve the country’s diplomatic isolation (Copper 2009: 52). The reaction from the KMT, initially, was to suppress them by violent measures but Chiang Ching-Kuo, the leader of the KMT at the time, realized that his political regime, a competitive authoritarian regime at the time in Taiwan, could not be sustained through government repression anymore and he held meetings with leaders of the DPP in the 1980s to discuss the details of political reform to begin democratization (Copper 2009: 52).

1.4. Methodology

This thesis adopts “process tracing” in the historical occurrences of Taiwan to examine the causality of each hypothesis and compare the proposed hypotheses to enhance its validity (King et al. 1994: 85-87). Specifically, process tracing involves the development of a series of coherent causalities which we test against our ‘intuitive sense’ to confirm the causal link of incidents (King et al. 1994: 86). This also allows us to use the method of difference; which “consists of ‘comparing instances, in which [a] phenomenon does occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does
not”; to validate my proposed hypotheses (Lijphart 1971: 687). The thesis seeks to understand why the KMT in Taiwan sustained its electoral strength between the transitions from DPARs to DPDRs without losing dominance and what factors came to play to weaken the dominance of the KMT in the end. We will use organizational structure, electoral system, social influence from the West, generational replacement influence, and crises management as four key factors to analyze the rise and the collapse of the KMT.

Lijphart (1971: 691) proposed six types of case studies with different purposes: 1) atheoretical case studies, 2) interpretative case studies, 3) hypothesis-generating case studies, 4) theory-confirming case studies, 5) theory-infirming case studies, and 6) deviant case studies. Atheoretical case studies focus on describing case studies as they are, and are not based on established hypotheses, and are thus not aimed at forming a general hypothesis (Lijphart 1971: 691). Interpretative case studies focus on the case being applied to existing theories and are not concerned with the formulation of general hypotheses (Lijphart 1971: 692). Hypothesis-generating case studies are a method that seeks to formulate a general hypothesis for which no theories yet exist (Lijphart 1971: 692). Theory-confirming/ infirming case studies focus on applying established theories or frameworks in a case and examining the utility of existing
theories and frameworks (Lijphart 1971: 692). Lastly, deviant case studies are used to
demonstrate why certain cases do not fit into existing theories and frameworks and
propose possible factors that existing theories and frameworks did not explain
(Lijphart 1971: 692).

This thesis is a theory-confirming case study using process-tracing as the
methodology, in which it seeks to develop hypotheses based on previous studies on
the development of dominant parties and party systems in order to explain Taiwan’s
scenario. We therefore seek to investigate what factors are missing in explaining the
development of the KMT and provide some fresh insights in the theories of the
development of dominant parties and party systems. We believe that by
process-tracing the thesis can compare the theories that have been used separately to
analyze the rise and the decline of dominant parties and party systems. Taiwan will be
an interesting and useful case to apply the existing theories about dominant parties
and party systems because it experienced the transition from the DPARs to DPDRs,
which is rare in case comparisons or studies in the existing literature. Process-tracing,

hence, can be a useful methodology because we can see how variables under different
theories of dominant parties and party systems vary under the conditions when a case
stays consistent.
1.5. Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is organized in five main chapters: Introduction, Literature Review and the Analytical Framework, Case background, Analysis, and Conclusion. The Introduction presents the topic of one-party dominance as a puzzling scenario given that it can exist in both established democracies as well as competitive authoritarian regimes. In the rest of the sections, we will begin the discussion with the relationship between political parties and democracies and non-democracies and explain why dominant parties traveling from competitive authoritarian regimes to democracies is phenomenal. In order to investigate the cause of this type of parties, we will discuss, in the Literature Review, the origin and the factors that impact the development of political parties, by which different classes of party systems form. From this Literature Review, we will derive our analytical frameworks and hypotheses and present the key factors that affect the development of the KMT and the party systems. The factors are 1) social influences from the West, 2) crises management, 3) generational replacement, 4) electoral system, 5) and the development of internal party structure. After structuring our analytical framework, we will provide the data and information of Taiwan that are relevant to the above-mentioned factors in our case background chapter for use in later analysis. In the Analysis, we will evaluate our hypotheses based on the information provided in the case background section and investigate whether our hypotheses reflect Taiwan’s scenario. Lastly, we
summarize our finding in the Conclusion and discuss the value of this study if applied to other case studies.

1.6. Data Collection

This study will include a wide range of data and sources. We will gather secondary data and sources that are pertinent to the critical events of political or historical development in Taiwan. Also, in order to observe the KMT’s dominance, data and sources gathered from the central election bureau as official documents is necessary. We aim to gather these sources in the English version first yet Chinese data and sources will be included to supplement the analysis if necessary.

1.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, we briefly reviewed Taiwan’s political history background, in which we discovered that the KMT’s one-party dominance seems to re-emerge after it was defeated by the DPP in the 2000 and 2004 presidential and legislative elections. Before the martial law was lifted, the party system in Taiwan was restricted to one single party and uncompetitive. Yet, the KMT’s one-party dominance was not ended as the martial law was lifted in 1987. We thus wonder what factors can explain the prolonging of the KMT’s party dominance and the electoral defeat in 2000.
We look at Green’s resource theory to seek possible explanation but it does not fit easily unto Taiwan’s case since the KMT’s electoral defeat in 2000 was not due to resource shrinkage. In the wake of Green’s resource theory, we found that Taiwan’s case is puzzling. In order to investigate the factors that can explain the KMT’s dominance in a democracy and authoritarian regime, we examine what elements in respective regimes shape the party structure and development. We found that the institutional strength of political parties, determined by their adaptability, is crucial to build a stable and long-lasting party system. Based on the previous review of the KMT’s one-party dominance, we summarize five factors as our hypothesis. The methodology and organization of the thesis were also discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

2.1. Introduction: Dominant Parties of "What" Party System

This chapter will survey the literature regarding how political parties function in democracies and non-democracies, in which different political environments (e.g. the degree of electoral competition, the presence of sanction mechanisms, vertical and horizontal accountability, and transparency) will determine the regime stability. In terms of the regime in transition, we found that it is possible for the post-authoritarian party to be competitive and become a dominant party in democracy, if the party is willing to regenerate its image into a positive one by abiding by the democratic values. According to Greene (2010: 12), such party can exist in both democracy and non-democracy, on the ground that meaningful elections are present. In terms of party system, Greene (2010: 157) posits that dominant party systems arise when a dominant party emerges.

In order to understand how political parties evolve, we will provide the origin of political parties so as to discover the explanatory factors for the development of political parties. In terms of the types of party system a dominant party corresponds to, we will discuss the framework of party systems derived from Sartori, which is widely used by the scholars of party politics, to see whether the existence of a dominant party
suggests a dominant party system. Based on the literature review, the following sections of analytical framework and hypotheses are framed in five below factors: 1) external social impact: social influences from the west, 2) external social impact: crises management, 3) internal social impact: generational replacement theory, 4) the effect of institutional setting: electoral system, and 5) the development of internal party structure: the effect of party recruitment process. We will elaborate further how we derivethese variables as the following sections begin.

2.2. The Role of Political Parties in Democracy vs Non-Democracy

Political parties play a central role in building modern democratic governance. Powell (1982: 12) states that the central element of democracy is the act of participating in a competitive election, as the lever of public contestation, and cannot be undertaken without political parties and choosing which party to vote for. Dahl (1971: 1) points out that the existence of political competition, in the form of legitimate elections between governing party and the opposition parties, encourages a higher degree of responsiveness of the government (Downs 1957: 24; Huntington 1991: 15). Competitive elections thus can be seen as an important interplay between government and citizens in democracies. One may wonder if a high degree of competitiveness among different political actors may affect the stability of democracy,
since more opinions during negotiation require more time and resources to solve the
disagreement on one issue (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 86). On that note, Schmitter and
Karl (1991: 85) argue that democracy itself does not translate the political system into
an “orderly, stable, or governable” government. Thus, one wonders under what
conditions an enduring and stable democracy can be facilitated.

We can understand an enduring and stable democracy from an equilibrium
perspective. Przeworski (1991: 20) provides three conditions in democracy that will
smooth out potential power struggle and foster an enduring democracy. The three
conditions include 1) spontaneous self-enforcing outcomes, in which actors will make
decisions according to the given circumstances. He argues that all political actors will
act passively and conservatively if no independent and spontaneous incident occurs to
disturb current political dynamics (Przeworski 1991: 22). 2) A process of bargain, or
contracts: Przeworski (1991: 23) argues that the existence of a sanction mechanism
will foster an enduring democracy because it will punish the democracy destructors.
One should note that the sanction mechanism can be effective as society promotes a
higher degree of political participation, by which it indicates that the sanction
mechanism can also come from citizen levels (Przeworki 1991: 23). Without the
existence of a sanction mechanism, a Leviathan will emerge (Przeworki 1991: 23). 3)
Norms: Przeworski (1991: 25) suggests that the above two features can coexist mutually and the interaction of these two factors also determines the degree of durability of democracy.

An enduring democracy hence, according to Przeworski (1991: 24), involves not just the pursuit of self-interested behavior of politicians but also depends on non-compliant political actors. By his definition of democracy, we would expect a strong sanction mechanism to impose costs on the non-compliant actors to an extent which prevent them from breaking the existing rules. If the sanction mechanism is weak, we would witness a faltering democracy that may break down and turn into an authoritarian regime. Yet, it is not clear to what degree the strength of the sanction mechanism can be used to distinguish the threshold between democracies and non-democracy, which calls for more elaboration on the definition of democracy and non-democracy.

Democracy consists of two aspects of accountability, that is, vertical and horizontal accountability, which involve the interplay between three actors: government, political parties, and citizens (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 77-78; O’Donnell 1998: 112). Vertical accountability refers to the existence of free and fair
elections and no restriction on speech, press, and groups convening (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 78; Powell 1982: 175; O’Donnell 1998: 112). Dahl (1971: 3) points out that, in order to foster a responsive government according to citizens’ preferences, each citizen should be given the same opportunities to access alternative sources of information, which influences heavily on their voting behavior. Moreover, the opposition parties should be able to express their opinions on disputable public affairs without fearing punishment from the governing party (Dahl 1971: 20). By practicing this right, the opposition parties may win political office as they have more favorable policies to the majority of citizens than the governing party (Dahl 1971: 20). This chance of turnover in the government signifies the importance of citizens’ participation (Dahl 1971: 21).

Dahl (1971) uses the degree of public contestation\(^2\) and participation\(^3\) as indicators of civil rights to distinguish between closed hegemonies and democracies. In order to become a modern democracy, a regime needs to have higher levels of both


\(^3\) In addition to universal suffrage, Dahl (1971: 5) suggests an examination of whether a repressive government restricts the formation of the opposition as one dimension of participation.
public contestation and participation (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 83; Dahl 1971: 6). Higher levels of public contestation and participation at citizen levels can absorb a better degree of societal diversity to improve the representation of government (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 80; Dahl 1971: 4). A transition from a closed hegemony to democracy, in this sense, is a process involving gradual changes in the degree of public participation and contestation (Dahl 1971: 6). He also points out that historical background, socioeconomic order, and subcultural influences will vary the degree of public participation and contestation. Yet one should keep in mind that a broadening suffrage among citizens does not ensure a full representation of social-economic composition of a society. Instead, the goal of modern democracy is to promote a better degree of representation in political leadership and parliamentary members (Dahl 1971: 21-22). Based on this fact, Dahl (1971) contends that polyarchy will be a more suitable term for democracy.

On the other hand, horizontal accountability exists when no one can be above the rule of law (O’Donnell 1998: 113). O’Donnell understands democracy from the opposite ideologies regarding how society should be governed: liberalism⁴ and

⁴It promotes the ideas of importance of private life where government should protect the civil rights and freedom in this arena so that citizens can pursue their own personal development at its best.
republicanism. No matter how their opinions differ in terms of the boundary between private and public sphere, these two ideologies both agree that government should obey the rule of law under any circumstance in order to foster a responsive government (O’Donnell 1998: 113). The effectiveness of the rule of law determines different degrees of political stability in polyarchies (O’Donnell 1998: 114).

Moreover, he argues that the emerging democracies in Latin America offer good examples of how a low degree of horizontal accountability affects the consolidation of democracy (O’Donnell 1998: 113). If horizontal accountability is absent, two consequences might occur: 1) law encroachment by a state agency and 2) corruption (O’Donnell 1998: 120).

The first consequence occurs when the political system lacks other state agencies that oversee unlawful actions so as to inhibit the executive from infringing upon the freedom of citizens (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 84; O’Donnell 1998: 12). In emerging democracies, especially the ones with presidential systems, some of them face a major difficulty in sustaining a stable democracy because the president is given strong power without strong and independent legislative and judicial branches to act as the check-and-balance mechanism (Diamond, et al. 1995: 40). Moreover, these two sanctions agencies cannot function to protect the rule of law when one of them is

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5 It contends that public duties are to fulfill the public interest utmost.
the protector of the ruled from an arbitrary ruler and it should serve as the pillar of
democracy. He reasons that the inactive and weak judiciaries exist in emerging
democracies due to prevalent corruption, politicization, or lacking training and
resource (Diamond et al. 1995: 41).

On the other hand, the legislature should be capable of monitoring the executive
autonomously as well as scrutinizing those questionable political behaviors in a
professional manner (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 83; Diamond et al. 1995: 41). It is
important to note that only if the scrutinizing mechanism, the legislature and the
judiciary, are also held accountable by other state agencies, they cannot serve as the
check-and-balance mechanism and discern unlawful and corrupting behaviors
(Diamond et al. 1995: 41). Thus checks-and-balance mechanisms not only can come
from the governing apparatus, but also from outside government. Without any
checks-and-balance mechanism in democracy, delegative democracy emerges
(O’Donnell 1994). To be sure, the difference between delegative democracy and
representative democracy is whether other opposition forces, such as from congress,
political parties, interest groups, or street protest, exist (O’Donnell 1994: 61). What is
more, the former ignores the opinion from any other opposition forces while the latter
promulgates the ideas of integrating public interests into policies, which essentially is to promote a stronger civil society (O’Donnell 1994: 61). In terms of vertical accountability, delegative and representative democracies are identical in that they both require the rulers answer to the voters through the act of elections (O’Donnell 1994: 61). Yet, only representative democracies contain horizontal accountability which allows other state agencies to scrutinize the executive (O’Donnell 1994: 61). By this measure, it will encourage a higher degree of competitiveness in elections between different opinions and the governing party. In delegative democracies, horizontal accountability does not exist or is very weak because the executive and the governing party impede any potential opposition opinion or groups, without which civil society cannot grow (O’Donnell 1994: 61).

Civil society, according to Diamond (1994: 5), is “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” In contrast to political parties, civil society “seeks from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability” instead of aiming at winning public office (Diamond 1994: 6). Civil society can come in different forms. Aside from the well-organized groups, social movements that are concerned with public interests are the other forms of civil
society that consolidate democracy (Diamond 1994: 6). In terms of its functions in
democracy, Diamond (1994: 7) points out that civil society serves as the
checks-and-balance mechanism outside government in which it monitors any
potential threat to democracy and the rule of law and exposes them to the public
(Diamond 1994: 7). One of the important factors that can affect the development of
civil society is the degree of freedom of information (Diamond 1994: 10). Freedom of
information plays an important role in providing the citizens with different
perspectives from that of government and it will limit the chances that government
hides the repression or violation of law from the citizens (Diamond 1994: 10). In
terms of relationship between political parties and civil society, political parties serve
as the role of forming government and influencing key policy changes (Diamond et al.
1995: 55). Specifically, civil society organization allows more marginalized minority
groups to voice their needs and promote a higher degree of accountability of elected
officials in the process of decision-making (Diamond et al. 1995: 55). On the other
hand, civil society organization is also a key external force to educating and
mobilizing the public in order to urge government reform (Diamond et al. 1995: 55).

With regard to the second consequence derived from a low degree of horizontal
accountability, corruption, it is relevant to the degree of transparency in the process of
political decision making. The occurrence of corruption is due to the lack of a high degree of transparency in the process of political decision making, by which unethical politicians can conduct embezzlement or bribery to make personal material gain without worrying about being discovered (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 76; Diamond et al. 1995: 41; O’Donnell 1998: 120). A weak and less independent judiciary is also a feature in these types of political system (Schmitter and Karl 1949: 76; Diamond et al. 1995: 41; O’Donnell 1998: 120). Transparency, in a broad definition, is to make government information available to citizens, through which they are capable of evaluating government performance from a fairer perspective (Florini 2007: 9). To call for transparency of government is to seek to solve the problem of asymmetric information between principals (i.e. citizens) and the agency (i.e. government or corporate board) (Florini 2007: 6). The agents can make decisions which benefit themselves, if they are allowed to withhold any information that is based on self-interest decision-making (Florini 2007: 6).

Moreover, without transparency in the process of decision-making, the distant principles cannot monitor potential publicly undesired decision-making made by the agents (Florini 2007: 6). This norm of secrecy in decision-making will prevent the unjustified behavior from being uncovered and turn government into a market place
where insiders exchange favorable policies for personal gain to the outsiders (Florini 2007: 7). Only if the transparent process of financial transaction and decision-making are promoted, the norm of secrecy will be discouraged and the chances of unlawful politicians to conduct corruption can therefore decrease (Florini 2007: 7). However, if every internal governing apparatus is rooted with corruption, external forces will be crucial in urging government to conduct reform. Diamond et al. (1995: 42) point out that a strong and active civil society is a crucial external impetus to reform the political system and foster a cleaner political culture, especially in a consolidating democracy.

Following the line of thinking above, democracy itself does not guarantee the emergence of a well-performing political system. According to Diamond et al. (1995: 35), a stable democracy requires at least one political party equipped with the ability to develop a program or policy, the stability of internal organization, and adaptability to the changing environments; and the degree of party institutional strength determines the party’s capacity to carry out these functions. Democratization is a different concept than democracy. According to Teorell (2010: 31), democracy is a regime in which citizens have “channels of access to principal governmental position” and any democratic countries can compare more or less well with another at any given
time. To him, the concept of democratization refers to regime change. Specifically, the process of democratization does not foster an emergence of a stable and consolidated democracy immediately. Instead, democratization is a process that involves three stages of a sequence (Carothers 2010: 79). The first stage of the sequence is the occurring of political liberalization in the dictatorial regime, in which democratic values are fermented; the second stage will involve the collapse of the dictatorial government and facilitate governing institutions based on a new and democratic constitution (Carothers 2010: 79). The first two stages of the sequence are considered regime transition and the third stage is the consolidation of democracy; where the new governing institutions promulgate democratic values by “the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic rules of the game” (Carothers 2010: 79).

One should keep in mind that the first stage, the occurrence of political liberalization, does not necessarily lead to democratization (Mainwaring 1992: 298). In order to understand the development, we will first provide the concepts of these two terms and explain what the crucial factor is for an authoritarian regime to democratize. Mainwaring (1992: 298-302) distinguished the differences between
political liberalization and democratization. Political liberalization refers to the reduction of repressive measures towards the opposition groups, from which the level of civil liberties increases. On the other hand, democratization describes regime transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, in which the level of political contestation increases due to the rise of political participation. In contrast to democratization, political liberalization is due to the split of elites that reduces the degree of cohesion within an authoritarian coalition under an authoritarian regime. At this point, if external groups that promulgate democratic values have consistent interaction with the authoritarian coalition, it is more likely that such a split can lead to a mobilization against the regime. The crucial factor for political liberalization to trigger democratization is the division within the authoritarian coalition and the opposition groups. Specifically, the political liberalization opens the possibility of regime transition, which lies heavily on the negotiation between the authoritarian coalition and the opposition groups. For example, if the opposition groups refuse to negotiate with the authoritarian groups, it is less likely for democratization to proceed and the regime will remain as an authoritarian one.

In terms of the effect of the number of political groups on a democracy, Diamond et al. (1995: 35) find that two or a few parties that encompass broad social
and ideological bases may lead to a stable democracy. On the contrary, a system consisting of a large number of political parties may increase the degree of fragmentation of political systems and it is highly likely to destabilize democracy and lead to a systematic breakdown (Diamond et al. 1995: 35). It is also important to note that the institutional strength of political parties affects the regime stability (Diamond et al. 1995: 36). According to Diamond et al. (1995: 36), a stable regime will have at least one political party with strong institutional strength. In order to have strong institutional strength, political parties are required to have a high degree of adaptability, by which the political parties can sustain electoral support by recognizing social changes and incorporating new groups (Diamond et al. 1995: 36). However, to have such levels of adaptability and incorporation, the internal party organization may encounter party incoherence and become a weak party, if party discipline is absent (Diamond et al. 1995: 36).

Moreover, Grzymala-Busse (2002: 2) also pinpoints the importance of internal party structure in determining the development of authoritarian parties during regime transition. One would not expect the successors of the authoritarian parties to survive and even prosper since they could no longer "organize in the workplace, their assets were expropriated, and they were forced to relinquish their auxiliary organization"
while opposition parties were granted more freedom to mobilize citizens and compete for votes (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 2). Eventually, the authoritarian parties would wither with the passage of time (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 2). Yet, Grzymala-Busse(2002) proposes the elite-driven theory to argue how authoritarian parties thrive even after the countries are democratized. If the elite of authoritarian parties can reform party organization and rebuild a positive image for the voters, it is highly likely for the authoritarian parties to maintain the support of voters in the course of democratization (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 9). Moreover, if the elites are skillful in parliamentary cooperation to enact a program that concerns the majority of the voters and caters to changing social issues, authoritarian parties can regenerate into a party that can compete with the opposition parties in democracy (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 9). This theory emphasizes the importance of party organization for the possibilities of party regeneration to sustain or attract its supporters and determine whether an authoritarian party can prolong its rule after regime transformation. The possibilities of party regeneration is crucial in understanding the development of dominant parties, derived from an authoritarian regime, and it implies the possibilities of an authoritarian party to prolong its rule in democracy as it is capable of fulfilling the needs of citizens.
2.3. The Dominant Parties in Democracy and non-Democracy

In non-democracies (i.e. authoritarian or totalitarian regimes), where a single party uses repressive and violent measures to repress the emergence of other opposition parties, it is not surprising to find that the same party, or the same small set of parties would control government most of the time (Pempel 1990: 5). In a democracy, on the other hand, where political rights and liberties and competition are relatively open and fair, one may expect a government led by different political parties since democratized societies display a higher degree of political inclusion based on social diversity (Pempel 1990: 5). Yet, in some industrialized countries, a single party managed to stay in government and win elections consecutively. Though democracy implies possible and periodical changes of government through elections, in cases of one-party dominance democracy is not necessarily undermined as long as public contestation and participation take place (Powell 1982: 178).

That is to say, a dominant party system can be found in a party system where one single party wins elections consecutively, as long as public contestation and participation are ensured. According to Greene (2010: 12), the dominant party systems can be found in both democracies and non-democracies and it does not necessarily conflict with the definition of different regime types. Specifically, Greene (2010: 157)
distinguishes between the two types of dominant parties where the challengers are determined by the presence or absence of repressive measures or the restrictions of political activity: 1) DPARs\(^6\) (dominant party authoritarian regimes in which the government will restrict political activities at the local levels and repressive measures will be used to suppress the dissidents) and 2) DPDRs\(^7\) (dominant party democratic regimes in which elections are fair and open and no political restrictions are imposed on the dissidents). One should keep in mind that DPARs differ from authoritarian regimes. Specifically, in DPARs, there exist meaningful elections while authoritarian regime citizens do not have meaningful elections (Greene 2007: 12; 14). What Greene (2007: 12) defines as meaningful election is based on whether the political system is able to attract more opposition parties to compete for votes. On the other hand, in authoritarian regimes, the incumbent limits political competition by forbidding the opposition to form parties and the numbers of challengers decrease accordingly (Greene 2007: 12). Recently scholars have already begun to consider this sub-type of


regimes "competitive authoritarian", "electoral authoritarian", or "hybrid regime" in
order to distinguish it from a fully closed authoritarian regime (Greene 2007: 12).

This subtype of democratic and non-democratic regime leads us to wonder about
the factors that facilitate its emergence and decline. Boucek and Bogaards (2010)
investigated the factors that advance dominant parties and party systems in both
DPARs and DPDRs. They found that party organization and electoral systems affect
the degree of party unity, which fosters different degrees of intra-party competition
and determines the rise and the decline of dominant parties and party systems
(Boucek and Bogaards 2010: 226). Moreover, Greene (2010: 222) argues that in both
DPARs and DPDRs the transformation of public goods into patronage tools by the
dominant party is also the crucial factor in determining the odds that the opposition
parties will defeat the dominant party. This perspective emphasizes the importance of
resources on hand to determine whether dominant party collapses. As economic
resources shrink, economic crises cancel out the resources that a dominant party uses
for patronage programs to maintain its supporters, and can lead to the termination of
one-party dominance in both DPARs and DPDRs as the dominant party would no
longer have the same access to distribute the same amount of patronage resource
(Greene 2010: 166).
Yet, Lindberg and Jones (2010) argue that the countries without dominant parties, in fact, score higher in terms of level of corruption than the countries with dominant parties. This seems to contradict the resource theory provided by Greene and suggests that dominant parties in turn can provide economic growth over a long period of time without necessarily becoming corrupted as they maintain their hold on the levers of economic power (Lindberg and Jones 2010: 213). Government effectiveness; a concept developed by the World Bank, including indicators like government stability and administration, bureaucratic quality, policy consistency and a scale to evaluate public spending composition; shows another interesting aspect of dominant parties and party systems. Lindberg and Jones (2010) found that the countries with dominant parties in Africa had higher rankings than the ones without dominant parties.

According to Greene’s logic, we would expect a higher degree of corruption and a lower degree of government effectiveness in countries with dominant parties and party system, as the dominant parties grab resources for their own gain. Based on the above discussion, we found that it is necessary to investigate other possible factors that can account for the development of parties and party systems (as a single theory does not apply to all cases) by which we can explain better the development of dominant parties and party systems.
2.4. The Origin of Political Parties

Duverger’s (1954) distinction of party formation is one of the most well-known models. He distinguishes two types of party formation: 1) internally generated parties: emerging after the creation of parliamentary groups and electoral committee and 2) externally generated parties: emerging from external organizations without the presence of parliamentary groups (Duverger 1954: xxiv). Parliamentary groups originally were the grouping of people who shared the same professions or lived closely for the defence of their interests at the local levels (Duverger 1954: xxiv). Throughout the regular meetings, they expanded their concerns onto national policy and invited deputies of other regions with the same views to join them, leading the groups to transform from profession or region-driven into ideology-driven (Duverger 1954: xxv).

The extension of universal suffrage is linked to the creation of the electoral committee (Duverger 1954: xxvii). Moreover, the desire to oust traditional social elites was also an important factor in the birth of electoral committees (Duverger 1954: xxvii). However, without political parties organizing and presenting new candidates, newly eligible electorates tended to vote for those old social elites with whom they were familiar (Duverger 1954: xxvii). Internally generated parties, therefore, are to
foster the creation of electoral committees in the constituencies with none (Duverger 1954: xxix). In contrast to the parties with parliamentary or electoral origins, externally generated parties are established by the “pre-existing institutions of which true activities lie outside elections and parliament” (Duverger 1954: xxx). Such institutions derived from the development of social (e.g. trade unions, workers’ parties, and philosophical society), religious (e.g. church), and economic development (e.g. banks, employers’ federations) (Duverger 1954: xxx).

Von Beyme (1985) explains the emergence of political parties in Western countries with three theories which expand Duverger’s model. These include institutional theories, historical crisis situation theories, and modernization theories (Von Beyme 1985: 14). In institutional theories, parties emerge at the behest of the parliamentary system which acts as the representative institution that requires a government supported by the parliament (Von Beyme 1985: 12). In crisis theories, the emergence of political parties is caused by the ideological drive within a society fueled by historical incident(s) (Von Beyme 1985: 18). Such incidents can come from the “emergence of a new state, breaks in legitimacy, and the collapse of parliamentary democracy” (Von Beyme 1985: 19). Last but not least, in modernization theories, new political parties emerge to represent the new interests of society derived from the
development of education system, city urbanization, or industrialization. Based on the 
theories, one may expect a great number of parties to enter politics (Von Beyme 1985: 19). Yet, due to the high threshold of the early electoral system (i.e. to have an 
absolute majority to win), the chances of party survival was reduced because of 
limited representation in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 30). Thus in order to 
broaden its support base, the rising parties sought alliances or coalitions with the 
bigger parties so as to enhance their political influence (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 30).

On the same note, one may wonder what defines a strong social influence that 
affects the party’s electoral bases. One has to keep in mind that, in a given society, 
some political influences will weigh heavier than others. For instance, in Western 
established democracies, social cleavages that are based on ethnicity, culture, religion, 
or linguistics are more likely to foster "divided communities" (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967: 32). The deeper these cleavages shape society, the more likely the emergence of 
the parties will reflect those cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 32). Different from 
Western established democracies, the rising parties in Eastern emerging democracies 
displayed different party functions. They play an important role in introducing and 
consolidating democracy (Huang 1997: 137). Huang (1997: 144) uses Taiwan's case 
to demonstrate that the opposition party, the DPP, was the one that led Taiwan
intoregime transformation. In contrast to the Eastern emerging democracies, the emergence of political parties in the Western established democracies was to carry out government functions instead of regime transformation (Von Beyme 1985: 12).

Notwithstanding varying party functions in established and emerging democracies, the parties serve one and the same purpose, that is, forming a bridge between the citizens and the government (Von Beyme 1985: 11). Specifically, they both act as the mediating institutions: 1) within which a group of citizens exercise their power for the common interests, 2) which adopt legitimate rules to fulfill the common goals, 3) which engage in elections, and 4) which represent a fraction of the interests of society (Ware 1996: 2-5). Based on these four definitions, we see how social composition and electoral setting set by the government impact the formation of political parties. In addition to these two external forces, we will also explore how different social composition and institutional settings affect the internal structure of parties and lead to the different degree of party cohesion.

2.4.1. How Parties develop: External Social Impacts

A political party is a means of representation, through which people express social preferences and opinions so as to make a government responsive (Sartori 1976: 27; Blondel 1978: 13). Yet, not every society has the same social composition. A
society with a higher degree of social fragmentation (i.e. cultural cleavages or economic cleavages), will foster high numbers of political parties that align with these political cleavages (Blondel1978: 13; Powell 1982: 34). These cleavages are the strong sets of attitudes in society, which are the responses from citizens towards how policies should be developed, and they can be mobilized easily into great political influences (Powell 1982: 42). In order to gain electoral support, the rising small parties tend to align with these cleavages (Powell 1982: 42). According to Powell (1982: 42), "it is easier to build organization and campaign for support along the lines of social division than across them". On the other hand, it implies that a homogenous society will have fewer parties than that of a heterogeneous society because it has a lower degree of social fragmentation (Powell 1982).

However, one should keep in mind that the composition of society is not consistent and stagnant. The fact that social composition evolves as economy, modernization, and urbanization develop adds more potential factors that impact the development of party structure (Blondel 1972: 86; Zariski 1978: 30; Powell 1982: 34). Before moving onto the discussion of the relationship between social development and parties, we need to understand the components of a party, which, essentially, is the key to understanding how a party develops in accordance with social changes. A party
consists of three sub-groups: factions, tendencies, and non-aligned partisans (Macridis 1967: 106). Factions are groups of politicians united by party discipline and are able to follow party decisions consistently and unanimously, which lead to a strong and cohesive party structure (Macridis 1967: 107). Tendencies are a set of political attitudes that are subject to marginal ideologies and cannot combine as a strong group to influence policy-making (Macridis 1967: 107). Lastly, non-aligned partisans are the fluid group within parties, who change their loyalty swiftly to different parties according to their political calculations (Macridis 1967: 108). Among these three subgroups of parties, factions make up the most influential part that can affect the degree of party cohesion and determine the party’s development (Macridis 1967: 108). Parties are therefore organic institutions rather than constant or fixed bodies (Macridis 1967: 106).

Scholars used to link a society with a low degree of economic development to a clientele system, in which the patron-client relationship relies on "unusual" distribution from the government to its supporters (Zariski 1978: 30). If the parties do not have enough resources to support their clients, the clients will move their allegiance to other resourceful parties, which may lead to the collapse of the original parties (Zariski 1978: 30). However, Zariski (1978) argues that socio-economic
development is only sufficient to explain limited faction system development. Two
other factors are crucial in determining the emergence of faction systems. Zariski
(1978: 30-31) argues that past political history and the social class affect the
development of faction systems. He uses Colombia and Uruguay as examples to show
that the continued and stable existence of the clientele system is because their "stable
two-party system[s] were imposed on a preexisting clientele structure, discouraging
the formation of third parties and interest groups" (Zariski 1978: 30). In terms of social
classes, for example, the supporters of the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano—the Italian
Socialist Party) factions of the Italian Socialists tend to come from the educated and
middle class who live in urban area (Zariski 1978: 31).

2.4.2. How Parties Develop: Internal Social Changes

One has to keep in mind that as society evolves voting behaviors of citizens
change as well. Franklin (2004: 210) contends that generational replacement is an
important internal social change that will lead to a drastic change of voting behaviors
of the whole electorate over the long term, which will also involve the changes
in party identification, given that the emergence of the new
generation experiences different socialization from the previous generation (Franklin
2004; Lyons and Alexander 2000). That being said, the emerging generation may
change the electoral dynamics by voting differently and this may lead parties to
different developments (parties can be stronger or weaker). Thus, we will take

generational replacement as one factor that impacts party development. To be sure,
generational replacement theory suggests that the new cohorts, having different life
experiences from the previous one, will have a different degree of political
participation (Lyons and Alexander 2000). Moreover, the first few elections will have
strong and decisive influences on the long-term voting behavior of the new cohorts
(Franklin 2004:60). For example, the decreasing voter turnout of American's politics
in the past 30 years is due to the emerging cohorts featuring "persistent nonvoters of
the post-New Deal cohort" (Lyons and Alexander 2000: 1017). Lyons and Alexander
(2000) conclude that generational replacement of the new cohorts has a direct impact
on the decline of voter turnout in the United States; while other social changes, such
as socio-economic and media-related variables, have indirect effects. This finding
directs us to investigate the socialization experience of the cohorts so as to have a
better understanding of how party identification develops.

2.4.3. How Parties Develop: The Effect of Institutional Settings

Constitutional settings and electoral systems are two key institutions that shape
the party unity and lead to different party developments (Carey 2007). According to
Carey (2007: 93), "[party] unity affects the ability of parties to win votes and shape
policy". Memberships in the legislature under different constitutional settings have
different influences on shaping party unity (Carey 2007). Specifically, under different constitutional settings, the effect of shaping party unity is based on how much resource (i.e. financial and electoral base) the leadership controls (Carey 2007: 95). In a parliamentary system, "where legislative and executive leadership is fused, the parties in government have more resources to impose discipline…” (Carey 2007: 95).

Moreover, "generic incentives" and "procedure devices" in a parliamentary system, which cannot be found in presidential-related systems, are two forces that promote a higher degree of party unity (Bowler et al. 1999: 10). By generic incentives, patronage and committee appointment can encourage their supporters to be more cohesive; moreover, the existence of the whip is a useful tool for the leader to identify and punish any (potential or real) dissidents, which is beneficial to party similarity (Bowler et al. 1999: 10). In terms of procedure devices, the mechanism of open roll call votes will help the leader monitor the disloyalty in a parliamentary system (Bowler et al. 1999: 11). On the other hand, under the constitutional setting with an elected executive, party unity is more difficult to sustain (Carey 2007: 95). The legislators have to subordinate to both legislative party leaders as well as the president, who has an "independent electoral base and is endowed with often considerable arrays of constitutional authorities - budgetary, regulatory, and often the ability to influence the legislative agenda directly" (Carey 2007: 95). Therefore, in a parliamentary
system, gaining membership in the legislature means the additional resource for the party leadership to influence the legislative action, but it is not the case in a presidential system (Carey 2007: 106). Party unity is at risk when the president and legislative party leadership do not agree with each other (Carey 2007: 95). It therefore suggests that leadership under a presidential system will have a greater impact on shaping party unity, which leads to different party development, given that the constitutional settings give politicians less incentives than in parliamentary systems to be disciplined.

However, a parliamentary system does not guarantee a strong party. Instead, we also need to look at the electoral systems, which can also affect the party unity (Bouceck 2010). Electoral systems provide incentives and/or disincentives for politicians to behave during elections (Bouceck 2010: 118). For instance, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV)\(^8\) and list-preference vote tend to shape sub-party groups into institutionalized factions of parties (Bouceck 2010: 136). In open list systems and SNTV in multi-member districts, candidates of the same party will have to compete for the same pool of voters, whereas under single-member plurality systems, the nominees need not compete with other nominees of the same party,

\(^8\)In Taiwan’s case, the adoption of SNTV system began during Japanese colonization and lasted until 2005 before its electoral system reform.
hence the degree of intra-party struggle is reduced (Boucek 2010: 118). Furthermore, according to Carey and Shugart (1995: 429), SNTV will encourage more personal reputation than party-reputation voting-behaviors. If voters have personal-voting behaviors, the dilemma arises when more than one candidate runs in the same election pool because the candidates from the same party compete with their own party members for the same pool of voters (Carey and Shugart 1995: 429).

2.4.4. How Parties Develop: Party Structure

One has to keep in mind that the existence of factions within parties does not necessarily lead to a lower degree of party unity (Key 1949). Instead, the loose factionalism, derived from the lack of continuity in the recruitment of the crucial party members, will decrease the degree of party unity because of the weak self-identification of new-comers (Key 1949: 303-304). Key (1949: 304) points out that this type of factionalism is due to the lack of a well-designed process to recruit members who share the same goal and ideas, thus it is more difficult to promote a promising leadership from these discordant members. An effective party requires a well-designed process to recruit members with a high degree of similarity in order to avoid "…rough edges and angular qualities out of preference for more conformist personalities" (Key 1949: 304). Only when the party consists of members with a high
degree of similarity, the party will have strong party cohesion and thus be more likely to win elections (Key 1949: 304).

The process of candidate selection for legislative elections influences the behaviors of party members which may induce different degrees of party unity (Key 1949). The argument is that the legislators respond to the demands from their selectorates in order to be reselected as legislators again (Hazan and Rahat 2010:149). Selectorates can come from: 1) party elites, 2) party delegates, 3) party members, and 4) voters. The selectorates in the latter of our ranking order will be composed of a higher degree of inclusion of demands (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 150). A higher degree of inclusiveness of selectorates will force the legislators to choose demands from limited selectorates that are easiest to solve and respond to (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 149). In order to choose which demands to respond to, legislators will calculate their given resources and potential vote gain to decide the targeted group (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 150: 149). This calculating process might lead the legislators to "deviate from party program or act in a way that reduces part cohesion" (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 150;149).
2.5. Political Party and Party system

According to Ware (1996:7) and Sartori (1976:4), party systems are the dynamics of interaction among political parties competing for public office, which could be formal, informal, or implicit. Therefore, we can understand the interplay of parties as occurring at the micro-level of politics whereas party systems occur at the macro-level of politics. To summarize and illustrate the relationships between parties and party systems, we designed Table 1 below.

Table 1: The Relationship of Political Parties and Party System.

In this section, we will use Sartori's framework of parties and party systems for introducing different party systems because his framework has been widely used by the scholars of party politics for case studies. Essentially, he distinguishes different classes of competitive party systems by two indicators, the degree of fragmentation and ideological distances (Sartori 1976: 126). In terms of the degrees of fragmentation, a low degree of fragmentation of party systems will have at most 5 parties in the system competing for power; whereas a high degree of fragmentation of party systems will have more than 5 parties to compete in elections (Sartori 1976: 127). In terms of
ideological distances, it is based on the “spread of the ideological spectrum of any
given polity” to define whether the party system is a polarized one (Sartori 1976: 126).

Combining two indicators above, we will have moderate pluralism and polarized
pluralism. If party systems are fragmented but not polarized, they are moderate
pluralism; if party systems are fragmented and polarized, they are polarized pluralism
(Sartori 1976: 126-127).

To differentiate competitive and non-competitive party systems, ideological
distances only exist in more-than-one party systems (Sartori 1976: 126). On the other
hand, one-party systems feature different degrees of ideological intensity derived
from "the temperature or the effect of a given ideological setting" (Sartori 1976: 126).

One may wonder if non-competitive party systems imply non-existence of the
opposition parties and question how the governing party interacts with them.

According to Sartori (1976: 127), if there are other parties allowed to exist in a
non-competitive party system, it does not promote itself to become a competitive
party system (Sartori 1976: 127). Instead, the governing party controls political power
by forbidding other parties from contesting power and thus political competition
cannot grow (Sartori 1976: 127; 215). To Sartori (1976: 221), a competitive system
requires a structure which allows people to voice themselves and choose whichever
parties to join. A non-competitive party system, on the contrary, could only allow people either to voice their concerns or join a party without criticizing the current government (Sartori 1976: 221). In competitive party systems, Sartori (1976) classifies polarized pluralism, moderate pluralism and segmented societies, two party systems, and predominant party systems as competitive. Among these party systems, Sartori (1976) considers predominant party systems as subtypes of other competitive party systems. We argue that it is necessary to understand predominant party systems as one type of competitive party system that can also exist in a not fully competitive party system. In this section, we will first distinguish different types of competitive party systems and justify our position on why we have to reclassify predominant party systems.

Polarized pluralism arises when an anti-system party emerges (i.e. the Christian Democrats (Italy), the Weimar Republic, the French Fourth Republic, etc) (Sartori 1976: 134). Alternatively, in moderate pluralism and segmented societies, parties will have smaller ideological distances than the ones in polarized pluralism and they do not have anti-system parties (i.e. the German Federal Republic, Belgium, etc.) (Sartori 1976: 179). The presence of anti-system parties poses a great challenge for existing parties to build coalitions in polarized pluralism. The opposition groups in polarized
pluralism are "bilateral", in which the opposition groups cannot build coalitions because they are "incompatible" (Sartori 1976: 134). Yet, in moderate pluralism, the opposition groups are "unilateral", in which the oppositions from both the left and the right can build coalitions due to the absence of anti-system parties (Sartori 1976: 179). Despite the differences above, both polarized and moderate pluralism are often dominated by a centrist party that can soften the ideological tension in society (Sartori 1976: 179). According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), ideological tension defines how the party systems in Western societies are built. They point out four types of social cleavages that dominate and define political histories in the Western European societies: 1) the “center-periphery” ideological stance, 2) the state-church, 3) the land-industry cleavages, and 4) the owner-worker cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 35). On the other hand, the emerging democracies of the East exhibit relatively homogenous social features, thus the development of parties is associated with certain economic or status interests of the generation, which explains why polarized and moderate pluralism are more visible in the Western European societies (Watanuki 1967: 457).

In two-party systems, governance will be expected to involve possible alternation between two major political parties (Sartori 1976: 186). Sartori (1976: 188)
defines the possible alternation as a situation where the supports of the two major parties are close enough that the opposition party has a great chance to win the next election (Sartori 1976: 186). In a two-party system, the governing party does not need to build coalitions in order to win majority supports; instead, they govern alone (Sartori 1976: 188). Two-party systems can often be found in the more homogenous societies where citizens have similar preferences and values (Sartori 1976: 188). In Anglo-America, for instance, the voting behaviors are associated with their class positions (Alford 1967: 68). There are also other social issues, such as education background, income, occupation, religion, etc., that will influence voting behaviors (Alford 1967: 69). One should note that these social factors do not divide citizens into the privileged and the oppressed, as social issues in Western Europe, thus it is harder to mobilize citizens with these social characteristics into political groups (Alford 1967: 69).

Last but not least, the one "type" of party system, pre-dominant party system, emerges when one single party, the dominant party, captures an absolute majority of seats in parliament for a minimum of three consecutive elections (Sartori 1976: 196, 199). Sartori (1976: 199) argues that winning three consecutive elections constitutes an appropriate criterion to define a pre-dominant party system because it allows us to
identify the stability of the party’s support base. In terms of the relationship between the dominant party and the pre-dominant party systems, Sartori (1976) contends that the existence of a dominant party does not transform the party system into a dominant party system directly. His argument above is based on research on 21 countries with dominant parties and finds that they do not share an electoral cutting-point, which, to him, is the essential component of building a new class of party system (Sartori 1976: 193-4). Moreover, due to his indicators of using numbers of parties and ideological distances for classifying party systems, predominant party systems are not qualified to build a new class of party system because their features overlap with other classes of competitive party systems (Sartori 1976: 199). However, we argue that the existence of dominant parties does create a new class, instead of a type, of party system because this party system has a distinguished interplay among the existing parties from other classes of party systems. After all, different party systems emerge as dynamics among existing parties vary (Ware 1996: 7; Sartori 1976: 4). Based on the discussion above, the detailed definitions of dominant parties and dominant party systems, to strengthen, our argument are necessary.

2.6. Dominant Parties and Party Systems
Conceptually, scholars held the same view on the definition of dominant party: a dominant party has a visibly stronger influence than the rest of existing political groups in determining governmental projects and policies and cannot be easily defeated by the opposition parties (Duverger 1954; Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Bogaards 2004; Greene 2007). Operationally, however, scholars measured the dominant party with different thresholds. Duverger (1954: 308) understood dominant party as the "epoch" of a country, which defines the political and policy development in a country, but he did not provide a time threshold to measure the dominance. Sartori (1976: 193), nevertheless, began to use the threshold of a 10 percent difference of electoral results, between the dominant party and the strongest opposition party, to define and observe dominance across countries.

Pempel's definitions on party dominance provide us a more rounded understanding to observe one-party dominance. He provided four dimensions in an attempt to identify one-party dominance better: 1) it [dominant party] must enjoy bigger shares of seats than its oppositions, 2) it will maintain a greater degree of bargaining capacity in government, 3) it will exert its power over a long period and chronologically, and 4) it can be recognized through some historical projects or public policies that conditioned the nation’s political agenda (Pempel 1990: 3-4). This definition reminds us of the "epoch" defined by Duverger (1954) but we also can see
that to examine the seats in the government became an important indicator to observe one-party dominance. Bogaards (2004) defines one-party dominance further by providing specific thresholds in presidential systems. He contends that a dominant party is required to seize the executive position as well as an absolute majority in parliamentary seats, for at least three consecutive elections (Bogaards 2004: 175).

Lastly, Greene (2007) provides us with different thresholds according to different constitutional configuration. In presidential systems, a dominant party should be able to win the executive power and an absolute majority of legislative seats; in parliamentary systems and mixed systems, a dominant party should be capable of winning premiership with the plurality of parliamentary seats and be valued as an indispensable part of forming government (Greene 2007: 15).

Dominant party systems had not been understood as a product of the dominant party until later scholars’ works. Duverger (1954: 308) did not apply dominant party to any kind of party system and he contends that dominant parties can coexist with two-party systems or multi-party systems so long as they have the stronger influence over policy-making in the government. Sartori (1976) agrees with this view as well. He argues that the concept of dominant party systems should not be misused as a new class of party system (Sartori 1976). To Sartori (1976: 323), the dominant party is
when a party possesses the electoral majority in parliament whereas a (pre)dominant party system is “a power configuration in which one party governs alone, without being subjected to alternation”. When a winning majority is no longer able to maintain absolute seats in parliament, pre-dominant party systems disappear (Sartori 1976: 196).

What Sartori (1976) did not consider, however, is the hybrid authoritarian regime, in which opposition parties are given rights to compete for office (Levitsky and Way 2002). Specifically, in the hybrid authoritarian regime, the government is built on democratic institutions in order to gain political authority (Levitsky and Way 2000: 52). The elections are free but the governing party may use state resources in favor of their electoral campaigns or “deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53). One can distinguish the hybrid regime from a fully closed authoritarian regime by examining whether a check-and-balance mechanism is present (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53). In the hybrid authoritarian regime, the governing party cannot use repressive measures to ban oppositions and to eliminate political competition (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54). Instead, the governing party can only use legal institutions to tilt the playing field to gain electoral
advantages, which is essentially different from a fully closed authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54). That being said, predominant party systems may emerge in this hybrid authoritarian regime, as long as the governing party gains its majority supports through a legitimate process. Bogaards and Boucek (2010:7) also point out that "[predominant party system] fits rather uneasily into Sartori’s framework, since it is defined by wholly different, ad hoc criteria, such that a predominant party system can by definition coexist with every possible category of numbers (that is, it can develop within a context of two-part system, a system of limited pluralism, and a system of extreme pluralism), and […] with every possible spread of the ideological distance" (Mair 1997: 203). That is to say, given that predominant party system has the distinguished feature defined by the electoral seats of a party in the parliament and the duration in power among other types of party systems, one should use such features as a way to identify a new class of party system.

Pempel (1990: 3) also points out that Sartori’s definitions of dominant parties and party systems lack operational values. Specifically, he argues that to observe one-party dominance requires one to use the operational measures that define the dominance overtime, instead of using one or two elections to observe dominance.
(Pempel 1990: 3). In terms of party systems, he does not apply one-party dominance to any type of party system because the current studies of party systems, he argues, ignore and exclude the discussion of “internal dynamics of party organization, candidate selection, party popularity, program generation, and the like” (Pempel 1990: 8). Instead, he interprets the existence of dominant parties as the special phenomenon of how state power is sustained across time in democracies (Pempel 1990: 15). At the same time, he is not surprised by the fact that some non-democracies with a single mobilizational party underwent regime transformation but the party did not lose majority support from the citizens (Pempel 199):359). Yet, the problem arises when we include the definition of hybrid authoritarian regime into consideration, which involve oppositional party participation more actively than in the fully closed authoritarian regime. If the opposition parties are given the same right to compete for votes, it implies that they have the capacity to mobilize their supporters to a certain extent.

Therefore, we argue that it is necessary to define two types of systems where dominant parties emerge. Greene (2007: 12) argues that elections in dominant party systems are meaningful but do not have to be fair. This definition will therefore include democracies as well as the hybrid authoritarian regimes, which both display
the feature of fair elections. According to this standard, we exclude a fully closed authoritarian regime from our definition of dominant party systems. Essentially, in fully closed authoritarian regimes, no opposition party is allowed to form or to challenge the governing party (Greene 2007: 12). To further distinguish the difference of dominant parties and party systems in democracies and the hybrid authoritarian regimes, Greene (2007: 12-13) suggests that elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are not fair whereas elections in fully competitive democracies are fair.

Unfair elections, according to Greene’s (2007: 12) definition, are those where the governing party uses partisan resources (i.e. electoral fraud) to protect its electoral strength so much that the opposition parties cannot possibly win. By this definition, we have DPARs (dominant party authoritarian regimes) and DPDRs (dominant party democratic regimes) (Greene 2007: 14-15). In terms of the dominance threshold, Greene (2007: 12) sets it at existence of meaningful elections and the governing party seizing both the executive and a majority of legislative positions for 20 consecutive years or 4 consecutive elections. This thesis will use Greene’s dominance threshold as our definition since recent scholars’ definitions in defining dominant party systems are not much different. We summarize the definitions of dominant parties and party systems according to various scholars in the past (see Appendix 1), by which readers can see how the definitions evolve.
2.7. Analytical Framework for the Development of Dominant Parties and Party Systems

According to the discussion above, we find that a dominant party system emerges when a dominant party exists. Therefore, in order to explain the development of dominant party and the party system, we should look into the factors that explain the development of political parties. The discussion above posits that four variables will affect the development of political parties: 1) external social impact, 2) internal social impact, 3) the effect of institutional settings, and 4) the development of party internal structure. In the following section, we will discuss the literature of dominant party and the party system related to these four variables. By doing so, we will have hypotheses that can explain the development of dominant party and the party system.

2.7.1. External Social Impact: Social Influences from the West

Levitsky and Way (2002: 59) argued that the influence from the West, and specifically the United States, will foster the emergence of groups and parties, which may lead to an alternation of power. Specifically, they use the degree of linkage to the West via cultural and media influence, elite network, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western government to predict whether competitive authoritarianism will collapse (Levitsky and Way 2002: 60). Moreover, the degree of Western influence in competitive authoritarian regimes may be enhanced if the country is
subject to the following conditions: 1) the smaller the size of a country and its strength in terms of military power and economic strength the stronger the influence of the West, 2) if Western foreign policies are significant in economic or security developments, the countries will have higher Western influence, and 3) if the degree of regional influences are higher, Western influence will be lower (Levitsky and Way 2005: 21-22).

In the case of Taiwan, public opinion favors the relationship with the United States because it provided Taiwan with financial and military aid (Copper 2006: 194). Since the Chinese Civil War, the United States supported the KMT with money and weapons to aid and develop Taiwan’s society, estimated at the value of US $1.5 billion (Copper 2006: 202; Dumbaugh 2006: 2). It was the aid from the United States government that consolidated and built the dominance of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule in Taiwan (Dumbaugh 2006: 2). Also, the United States was Taiwan’s main trading partner and provided the country with investment and capital resources during the period of Taiwan’s economic development (Copper 2006: 202). Combining Levitsky and Way’s theory above, we present our hypothesis one as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** The level of American influence on Taiwan had two impacts on the fortunes of the dominant party. Specifically, America provided resources to the KMT and strengthened the KMT’s position yet it also
fostered the emergence of the opposition and precipitated the decline of the KMT after Taiwan is fully democratized.

2.7.2. External Social Impact: Crises Management

Political or economic crises may challenge both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the dominant party in government. Levite and Tarrow (1983) suggest that such crises may lead to a process of de-legitimating of the governing party. The process of legitimation and de-legitimation is a construction triggered by a political or economic crisis derived from domestic or international events (Levite and Tarrow 1983: 297). National events and crisis provide the opposition parties with opportunities to legitimize themselves by solving the pressing social issues that the current government cannot solve (Levite and Tarrow 1983:296). For example, in the cases of Italy and Israel, political crises delegitimated the one-party dominance of the Italian Communist Party (Italy) and Herut (Israel) (Levite and Tarrow 1983). It thus implies that a dominant party needs to adapt itself to exogenous social factors otherwise one-party dominance can no longer be sustained.

According to the Nixon doctrine, the United States’ government changed its attitudes towards China from adversary to friend in order to restrict Soviet Communism (Dumbaugh 2006:2). Due to the changing relationship between the United States and China, Taiwan renounced its position in the United Nations in 1971,
which caused a setback in Taiwan’s foreign policy (Copper 2009: 191). The United States’ government subsequently allied with China against the Soviet Union and began to recognize China as single legal Chinese government in 1980 (Dumbaugh 2006: 2). The consequence was that Taiwan suffered diplomatic isolation and the whole nation feared that Beijing would claim Taiwan as part of China (Copper 2009: 191). National identity at that moment became a pressing issue that the whole nation was concerned about (Copper 2009: 191). Lee Teng-hui, as the president in 1988, and the entire leadership of the KMT, sought to solve this dilemma through “pragmatic diplomacy” in which Lee Teng-hui aimed at establishing diplomatic ties with as many nations as possible, even with those nations which had diplomatic relations with China (Copper 2009: 192). Moreover, he promoted the idea of “flexible diplomacy”, in which Taiwan sought to build trade relationships with former or existing communist countries and promoted the ideas of the New World Order (that no country should be restricted from joining any global community) (Copper 2009: 192). Through this measure, Taiwan was able to remain active on the global stage and retain its distinguished national identity (Copper 2009: 192).

The biggest opposition, the DPP, in the same period was not able to challenge the KMT’s electoral base because of its strong ideology that demanded for absolute
national independence (Wang 2000: 164). The example can be seen from the “417 Resolution” and “1007 Resolution”, in which the DPP strongly claimed its political stance that Taiwan is an independent sovereignty and not a part of China (Wang 2000: 164). With this ideology, Taiwanese were afraid that China would attack Taiwan if the DPP won office and this gave the KMT more advantage to attract Taiwanese voters (Wang 2000: 164). However, the DPP decided to adjust its stance on the issue of national independence after the departure of the DPP conservative members in 1999. Since then, the DPP was able to show itself as a Taiwanese protector and weakened the KMT’s electoral bases. The discussion above leads us to Hypothesis 2.

**Hypothesis 2:** The ability of the KMT to manage the critical event of 1971 provided a strong case of legitimating its position as the protector of Taiwanese national identity, which in turn allowed the KMT to prolong its dominant position. At the same time, the emergence of an opposition which could claim a similar political stance challenged the KMT’s role as the only protector of Taiwanese identity. Eventually, it led to the weakening of the KMT’s electoral base.

2.7.3. Internal Social Impact: Generational Replacement Theory:

Enduring social characteristics shape the political orientation and behaviors of their citizens (Inglehart 1990: 333). Yet social characteristics may change as socialization experiences vary across generations. For instance, postwar generations were on the cutting-edge of voter turnout change in the United States as the postwar generations acted on different socialization experiences from the previous generations.
As the old generations faded out, the cumulative effect of the emerging postwar generations began to manifest on the whole electorates’ voting behaviors as well as party identification after 1980 (Inglehart 1990: 331). As the number of young voters increases, the new generation will revamp the social value structures in accordance with their socialization experiences and party alignment will be subject to these changes (Inglehart 1971: 1009). Inglehart (1971) compels us to examine whether the new generations in Taiwan revamped the social cleavages and led to the changes of voter turnout. According to Yiu and Shiao (2007: 115), voters after 1992 displayed different voting behaviors and party identification from the previous generations (Yiu and Shiao 2007: 115). Specifically, the generations since 1992 have a stronger degree of party identification towards the DPP and have a neutral stance towards the issue of China-Taiwan unification (Yiu and Shiao 2007: 115).

According to this argument, we have our hypothesis 3.

**Hypothesis 3:** The older cohort of voters provides the KMT with a strong electoral base to sustain its dominance, by which the KMT can still sustain and prolong its dominance after democratization. Yet, as the older cohorts of voters began to fade away, the cumulative effect of the younger cohorts of voters, who have a weaker party identification towards the KMT, led to the decline of the KMT in 2000.

### 2.7.4. The Effect of Institutional Setting: Electoral System

Domestic political institutions may facilitate the emergence of a dominant party and party system. For example, electoral systems and processes that impose more
costs on the opposition parties, such as SNTV, are responsible for the rise and continuing dominance of the governing party. Cox (1997) argues that the SNTV tends to lead to strategic failures of many opposition parties. The features of the SNTV highlight the significant role of resources at hand for a political party to translate votes into seats (Cox 1997: 242). Due to the fact that governing parties have better access than the opposition to controlling and distributing pork-barrel projects and money, the coordination problems derived from the SNTV can be solved easily by the governing party (Cox 1997: 242). Bogaards and Boucek (2010: 121) argue that the emergence of the dominant parties and party systems can be explained by the country’s electoral system, which requires the existing parties to have the better strategic coordination within and outside parties. In order to sustain one-party dominance, the dominant parties have to be able to attract or sustain the support from the existing sub-political groups (Bogaards and Boucek 2010: 121).

In Taiwan’s case, the design of the electoral system before 2000\(^9\) allowed the KMT to sustain its dominance (Cheng 2006: 372). Taiwan’s legislative election is based on a proportional system, which would typically encourage the emergence of smaller parties (Cheng 2006: 372). Yet the electoral system in Taiwan benefited the

\(^9\) Even though the electoral system was changed in 2008, the KMT was defeated in the 2000 presidential and legislative elections.
KMT in prolonging its dominance in government (Cheng 2006: 372). The country uses the SNTV electoral system, holding multi-members constituency elections, which advantages political parties that can distribute even votes among candidates (Cheng 2006: 372). That being said, the KMT, advantaged by the access to pork-barrel projects and money, could distribute seats among its nominees more effectively (Cheng 2006: 372). It is worth noting that the electoral system in Taiwan underwent reform in 2005, as SNTV system was replaced by the mixed-member majoritarian system (single-memberdistrict (SMD)) plurality rule and list proportion representation (PR) (Hsieh 2009: 2). Under the new electoral system, the larger parties tend to win the most shares of the seats (the winner-takes-all) and it will encourage the merging of small parties (Hsieh 2009: 3-4). Larger parties, such as the KMT, are more likely to win since only one strong candidate needs to be nominated in a district (Hsieh 2009: 5). Based on the electoral system before 2000, we have our hypothesis 4.

**Hypothesis 4:** Before 2000, the SNTV electoral system provided political advantage to the KMT as the governing party and helped it sustain its dominant elected position. In 2000, when the DPP had finally adapted to the SNTV electoral system, the KMT was not able to gain electoral advantages from such an institutional design and lose its dominance.
2.7.5. The Development of Internal Party Structure: The Effect of Party Leadership on Party Development

One-party dominance requires a party to be able to unite multiple interests of subgroups and factions within. The better internal organization of the political party fulfills the brokerage function, the greater the likelihood that such a party can become dominant, holding everything else equal. On the other hand, losing the organizational ability to unite factions is likely to result in the organizational decay of the party and the beginning of a loss of dominance. Panebianco (1988: 42) argues that the party leadership is crucial in ensuring the organizational stability over time. For instance, sporadic environmental changes will challenge the party structure (Panebianco 1988: 42). If the party leadership does not possess enough controllable power resource to ensure the stability of the party, the party may collapse due to the weak party structure (Panebianco 1988: 43). According to organizational theory, party leaders can gain and extend their controllable power resource by expanding party organization (Panebianco 1988: 43). However, as the organization expands, party cohesion may be at risk because of the diverging collective identity, derived from the design of the recruitment process, among the old and new members (Panebianco 1988: 43). It therefore suggests that the role of party leadership is crucial in sustaining the strength of party organization.
In Taiwan’s case, the factions of the KMT were divided between mainlanders (people who retreated from China to Taiwan after 1949) and islanders (people who lived in Taiwan already before 1949) (Tan 2002: 156). The key decision-making positions of the KMT were filled by mainlanders before the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, who began to introduce islanders into key decision-making positions (Tan 2002: 156). His successor, Lee Teng-hui, assigned islanders to the positions of party secretary-general, the chairman of the party business committee, the party’s central committee, and central standing committee. These key placements transformed the KMT’s image from a party single-mindedly aimed at the reunification with China to one that was inclusive of Taiwanese interests (Tan 2002: 157-158). The new leader of the KMT, who had a Taiwanese background, successfully attracted Taiwanese voters by implementing Taiwanese-friendly policies. Lee’s policies led to the exodus of young mainland politician in 1993 and 1994 from the KMT, who formed the New Chinese Party (NCP) (Tan 2002: 158). However, it was not until the departure of James Soong from the KMT that resulted in great electoral loss in the 2000 presidential election (Zhuan2010: 157). The departure of James Soong was due to the restriction of the KMT’s candidate selection process that prevented him, as the most popular candidate among voters, to participate in the 2000 presidential election (Zhuan2010: 157). Lee could not resolve the dilemma between his promise to another
Hypothesis 5: The emergence of Lee Teng-hui as a new party leader of the KMT helped the KMT to attract a wider electoral base and maintain party internal cohesion, by which the KMT was able to prolong and sustain its dominance after democratization. However, as Lee Teng-hui was not able to dissolve internal party conflicts, the factions began to split the KMT and weaken its electoral dominance.

2.8. Conclusion:

This chapter has discussed the origin of political parties from four perspectives: 1) external social impacts, 2) internal social changes, 3) the effect of institutional settings, and 4) party structure. We discovered that the emergence of political parties is not a result of one factor. Instead, it is the reaction to social and institutional changes. Based on the literature review, we explore what specific social and institutional settings will lead to the development of political parties.

In terms of external social impacts, we found that political parties tend to align with social cleavages based on culture and economy and social development can impose influences on the faction systems of the parties. In terms of internal social changes, we found that voting behavior, as the variable to reveal social dynamics, can
change across generations because of a different cohort of social experiences. In terms of institutional settings, we found that political parties will show different degrees of party unity under parliamentary and presidential systems because of its systematic designs. In the presidential system, the president has a separate electoral base from the legislature’s members which suggests a potential split of the party if the president and the legislature disagree with each other. On the other hand, in the parliamentary system, the electoral bases of the legislature and the executive are infused and the generic incentives (party whip) and the procedure devices (open roll calls) can also prevent the party from splitting. Aside from the constitutional settings, we also found that electoral systems will affect the party development. For instance, in open list systems and SNTV in multi-member districts, it will provide more political advantage to the bigger parties because they are able to invest resources to ensure the vote distribution evenly to their candidates of the same district. In terms of party structure, we found that the membership recruitment and the process of candidate selection are crucial to sustain a strong party unity. The former emphasizes the degree of similarity of newly recruited membership while the latter is focused on the legislators in the face of the demands of potential selectorates.
In order to investigate the relationship between dominant political parties and party systems, we use Sartori’s framework of party systems as a starting point. In his framework, we found that his classification of dominant party system needs to be modified. We argue that a new party system will arise when a new dynamic between political parties emerges. Based on this conclusion, we reviewed the existing literature of the dominant parties and party systems to see the development of its definitions. We found that the definition has developed from a concept of “epoch” to a quantitative measurement (i.e. 20 consecutive years or 4 consecutive elections). Moreover, the dominant parties and party systems can exist in both democracies and non-democracies and the subtypes of the dominant party system include dominant party authoritarian regimes (DPARs) and dominant party democratic regimes (DPDRs). Based on the above literature review of the origin of political parties and the definition of the dominant party and party systems, we developed our five hypotheses.
CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL HISTORY ON TAIWAN’S POLITICS

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide relevant historical background and data that can explain the development of the KMT’s one-party dominance. Before we begin our review of Taiwan’s political history, we will provide a glimpse into Taiwan’s political and economic development. The relocation of the KMT in 1949 from China to Taiwan ended 38 year Japanese colonization and Taiwan entered an authoritarian regime governed by the KMT. As KMT was in power, Taiwan’s political development began to take off and in 1987, as the martial law was lifted, Taiwan became a democracy. In terms of economic development, Taiwan transformed from an agriculture driven industry into a service and technology driven industry during 1960-1970s. As a result, Taiwan was one of the Asian Tigres by which it became a developed country. The following discussion is all framed during the period between 1949 and 2000.

3.2. Western Influence

Levitsky and Way (2002: 21-22) propose three factors that weighon the relationship between Western influences and the political development of a country: 1) country size and its military and economic power, 2) foreign policy development, 3) and the degree of potential regional influence, if any. Moreover, they also argue that 1)
cultural and media influence, 2) elite network, 3) demonstration effects, and 4) pressure from Western governments will catalyze the emergence of opposition voices to challenge the authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2002: 60). In this section, we will provide historical information and data relevant to the above factors in order to support later analysis of the relationship between the United States and Taiwan.

3.2.1. Taiwan’s Physical Setting and Foreign Policy of Taiwan and the U.S.

In terms of Taiwan’s physical setting and population density, it “would rank above average in population (number 49 of 221 countries) and just below average in land area (number 136 out of 232)” (Copper 2009: 2). As a result, we can see Taiwan as a small-size country but with high population density. Notwithstanding the size of the country, Taiwan ranks as a strong economic entity and has above world-average GDP (CIA World Factbook 2012). Taiwan experienced several periods of economic modernization during colonization by different countries (i.e. the Dutch, the Chinese rule between 1660s and 1885, and the Japanese occupation between 1885 and 1945) and a great economic boom occurred during 1950 and 2000 under the Kuomintang (KMT) government (Copper 2009: 155). During this period, the U.S. government’s generous financial assistance was one of the factors that resulted in this economic development (Copper 2009: 155).
The financial and military assistance from the U.S. government was prompted in part by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, taking the bilateral relationship to new heights (Hickey 2007: 9). As Chiang Kai-shek relocated the government from China to Taiwan, he viewed Taiwan as a military base to prepare for the future war against China and had no intention to reform the government into a democracy (Roy 2003: 55; 60). The outbreak of the Korean War changed U.S. foreign policy towards Taiwan and vice versa. The U.S. government began to change its dismissive political attitude towards Taiwan, rallying instead against Communist invasion and providing financial and military aid to support Taiwan’s economic development (Tucker 1994: 52; Hickey 2007: 9). The changing attitude of the U.S. government was informed by the beliefs of both the U.S. President Truman and policy makers that “the contest with the Sino-Soviet bloc had entered a new, more intense phase” (Roy 2003: 112). With this belief in mind, the U.S. government sent the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan for protection (Roy 2003: 112). Furthermore, the U.S. and Taiwanese government co-signed a mutual defence treaty in 1954, at the time of a military operation conducted by Communist China with the intention to attack Taiwan (Hickey 2007: 9). The following year, the U.S. Congress passed “the passage of Formosa Resolution” which rendered greater power to the U.S. government to defend Taiwan.
By then, the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. was strong and significant, as they were allied against Communism (Hickey 2007: 9).

The development of the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan was significant in facilitating the latter’s development. Specifically, the U.S. government had offered the Taiwanese government a total amount of $100 million to develop its economy between 1951 and 1965 (Tucker 1994: 54). In addition, the U.S. government paid an estimated 40% of import goods and services for the Taiwanese government (or the KMT government) (Tucker 1994: 54). In terms of military aid, according to the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, passed in 1951, the U.S. government had provided the KMT government with $2.5 billion to strengthen Taiwanese military bases and equipment (Tucker 1994: 69). Given the generous assistance from the U.S. government, Taiwan’s military budget between 1951 and 1965 was 85% of government expenditure in total and the country had the highest degree of military intensity of any country in the world (Tucker 1994: 69). The aid from the U.S. government became a great help to the KMT government to develop programs and policies that boosted the economy and infrastructure building, with which Taiwan was ready to move from traditional industry to a more modernized industry (Copper 2009: 155). Yet, the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan did not stay harmonious for
good. As the supporters of the Chinese Communist government began to lobby for its representation as a Chinese government in the United Nations (UN), the U.S. government sought to solve this dilemma by proposing the placement of two representatives, from China and Taiwan, respectively, in the U.N. (Hickey 2007: 10).

However, Chiang Kai-shek refused this dual recognition of Taiwan and the Communist China government and argued that no patriots [the KMT] and traitors [the CCP] can live together (Hickey 2007: 11). Before U.N. members voted for the issue of dual representatives from China and Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his representative in the U.N. to resign in 1971 (Hickey 2007: 11). The aftermath of this political decision was harmful to Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships with other nations (Hickey 2007: 11). Additionally, the U.S. president Nixon visited China in the following year, putting Taiwan in a more difficult position as the KMT government decided to distance itself from both the U.S. and China (Hickey 2007: 11).

### 3.2.2. The Development of Elite Education and Networks

One should note that the U.S. influence not only impacted Taiwan’s economic development, but also on the development of the opposition network in Taiwan (Chao 2001: 96). Except for the aid to Taiwan’s economic and military development, the U.S. also provided Taiwanese elites the opportunity to receive Western education. For instance, the U.S. government funded 2,988 people to study or train in the...
U.S. education system between 1950 and 1970 (Chao 2001: 96). After these Taiwanese finished their training and education, they returned to Taiwan to hold important positions in the Taiwanese government (Chao 2001: 96). At least 6,000 soldiers also went to the U.S. for military training purposes (Chao 2001: 96). In addition, the Smith-Mundt Act\textsuperscript{10} and Fulbright Act\textsuperscript{11} bridged the networks for elites in Taiwan and the U.S. (Chao 2001: 84). According to the Smith-Mundt Act, the U.S. government set up a professional exchange program for different education levels between Taiwan and the U.S. (Chao 2001: 97). The exchange included students, teachers, research scholars, lecturers, specialists, and leaders (Chao 2001: 97). In 1958, the U.S. Congress instituted the practice of the Fulbright program in Taiwan to replace part of the functions of the Smith-Mundt Act (Chao 2001: 97). Specifically, the Fulbright program applied to educational and academic exchanges while Smith-Mundt applied to exchange of specialists and leaders (Chao 2001: 97).

Statistically speaking, there were 92 elites including professors and research scholars and 168 students funded by the Fulbright program and who studied in the U.S. (Chao 2001: 100). On the other hand, in terms of the Smith-Mundt program, 198 Taiwanese...

\textsuperscript{10}It was proposed by Congressman Karl Mundt and Senator H. Alexander Smith to promote the U.S. image in the world (Chao 2001: 89).

\textsuperscript{11}Also known as Fulbright-hay Act. Essentially, Congressman William Fulbright proposed to redirect the surplus from selling U.S. government war property to facilitate international education and knowledge exchange (Chao 2001: 87).
scholars and specialists went to the U.S. to conduct research (Chao 2001: 97). To this
day the Fulbright program in Taiwan still includes a wider range of research
purposes and generously funds students who are interested in advanced education in
the U.S. According to Taiwan’s Fulbright Commission in 2012, around 1400
researchers (including students) received funding to study in the U.S. between 1958
and 2008 (Foundation for Scholarly Exchange 2012).

3.2.3. The Emergence of Taiwanese Opposition in Taiwan and the U.S.

In terms of the emergence of opposition groups in Taiwan, the United States
was an important location for the opposition of the KMT to develop (Tucker 1994: 182).
For instance, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs was established in the
U.S. in order to lobby for a greater Taiwanese interest among the congressmen in the
U.S. (Tucker 1994: 182). Moreover, the large Taiwanese communities published
newspapers to promulgate the idea of national independence and democracy – the
Taiwan Tribune (Long Island City, N. Y.) and the Los Angeles-based Formosa
Weekly (Tucker 1994: 182). In terms of the opposition in Taiwan, they took further
measures to advance their protest against the KMT. They went to the United States to

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12 It includes 1) Senior Fulbright Research Grants, 2) Experience America Fulbright Research Grants,
lobby the congressmen, present themselves on media channels, and engage in church communities in order to expand their supporters (Tuckey 1994: 182). This resulted in a higher degree of participation of the U.S. senators in Taiwan’s democratization and led to the passing of a resolution in 1987, which called for a higher representative government, parties, and the freedom of speech; and Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT’s leader, lifted martial law to begin Taiwan’s democratization (Tuckey 1994: 182). One should note that the influence of the U.S. did not fade away as Taiwan is democratized. After democratization in Taiwan, other cultural influences still manifested in Taiwanese daily life. For instance, the International Community Radio of Taipei, the radio station that was for the U.S. armed forces in the 1950s, ranked as the most popular radio station in 1992 (Tuckey 1994: 194). In addition, with the help of U.S. congressmen, Taiwan made the first art loan to the U.S. in 1992 as part of an exhibition in the National Gallery of Art of “Circa 1492: Art in the age of Exploration” (Tuckey 1994: 194). From this perspective, Taiwan not only had material influences from the U.S., but also cultural and educational influences impacting Taiwanese society.

3.3. Political Crisis

According to Levite and Tarrow (1983), political and economic crises, derived from international and national events, may weaken the governing party’s electoral
strength if the opposition party is more capable of solving the crises than the

governing party. On the other hand, if the governing party can solve the crises, it can

sustain its electoral support, or even increase it. In this section we will provide an

historical account relevant to the crises that may jeopardize the legitimacy of the

KMT so that we can see how it affects the relationship between the KMT and the

opposition party.

3.3.1. China’s Diplomatic Resurgence as a Threat to Taiwan’s Sovereignty

After Chiang Kai-shek demanded his representative to resign from the U.N.,

Taiwan suffered a great diplomatic setback (Hickey 2007: 11). Moreover, the

resurgence of China onto the international stage posed a greater risk on Taiwan’s

sovereignty (Roy 2003: 13). Since 1970, many nations felt sympathy towards China’s

long-term diplomatic isolation and began to “soften” their diplomatic stance towards

China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized the chance to build

relationships with nations which they did not consider before (Roy 2003: 130). In

terms of the issue regarding the relationship between China and Taiwan, the CCP had

more flexibility (Roy 2003: 13). Three key factors catalyzed the resurgence of

China’s diplomatic position on the global stage. For one, the CCP deemed the

rebuilding of diplomatic relations with other countries, at the time, more important

than sticking to a “one-China” policy (Roy 2003: 130). For instance, as China
established a relationship with Canada, Canada only agreed to “take note” of its stance towards Taiwan and the CCP accepted this suggestion and still proceeded with its official diplomatic relationship with Canada (Roy 2003: 13). On the other hand, the KMT government had very strict rules on diplomatic conditions. For instance, the KMT government severed the diplomatic relationship with France when the KMT noticed that France sought to build a diplomatic relationship with China (Roy 2003: 13). Secondly, as the CCP began to lower its diplomatic standards with other nations, the relationship between China and the U.S. began to improve (Roy 2003: 130). As the relationship between the U.S. and China began to grow, the U.S. government recalled the Seventh Fleet which guarded Taiwan during the Korean War and agreed to accept China as a member of United Nations, as long as it would not challenge the seat of the Taiwanese government in the United Nations (Roy 2003: 130). As much as the U.S. government tried to provide solutions that both the CCP and the KMT governments would be satisfied with regarding the seats in the United Nation, the KMT government insisted that only either the CCP or the KMT could represent the Chinese government in the United Nations (Roy 2003: 135). In order to settle this issue, the members in the United Nations were forced to vote and choose between China and Taiwan (Roy 2003: 135). Before the votes were cast, Chiang Kai-shek
demanded his representative to resign from the seat in the United Nation in 1971, knowing that no nation would vote against China (Roy 2003: 135).

3.3.2. The Aftermath of Exiting from the United Nation and the KMT’s Solutions

The move of withdrawing from the United Nations had a great price. Upon withdrawal many countries began to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China (Mosher 1992: 34). To compare the diplomatic developments between Taiwan and China in 1969, Taiwan had 64 diplomatic country ties while Communist China had only 45 county ties (Mosher 1992: 34). The number of diplomatic ties with Taiwan dropped to 23 by 1977 (Mosher 1992: 34). In addition, the U.S. government claimed that its diplomatic relation with Taiwan was suspended (Mosher 1992: 35). The aggravated diplomatic situation concerned a great number of Taiwanese, who began to protest and rally on the street in hope to call for changes from the KMT government (Mosher 1992: 35). During this period, Taiwan’s society was experiencing a social uprising and the KMT government realized that it was necessary to take some actions to avoid a greater degree of political instability (Mosher 1992: 35).

The realization of the need for political reform coincided with a leadership change within the KMT. During his leadership, Chiang Kai-shek imposed the ideology
of “Han-tsebuliang-li”, which literally means “no coexistence between Han [the KMT] orthodoxy and the apocryphal [the CCP]” (Hsiung 2000: 119). Chiang Ching-kuo, the successor of Chiang Kai-shek, realized that this ideology would impede Taiwan’s diplomatic development and lead to diplomatic isolation (Hsiung 2000: 119). Therefore, in order to solve this crisis, he used pragmatic diplomacy as a way to mediate the tension between Taiwan and China and the U.S. (Hsiung 2000: 119). The pragmatic diplomacy included two principles: 1) the one China principle and 2) democratic values (Hsiung 2000: 119). The first principle eased the tension between China and Taiwan because it gave China a hope that Taiwan eventually would return as a province of China (Hsiung 2000: 120). On the other hand, he endorsed the values of democracy in the hope to win back U.S. support resulting from the suspended diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Hsiung 2000: 120). These two principles made Chiang an important figure who was able to ease the tensions from the political crisis exacerbated by his father’s actions (Hsiung 2000: 121).

The successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, was alsoable to develop Taiwan’s diplomatic relationship to a greater extent (Copper 2009: 192). The end of the Cold War, during 1989 and 1990, presented the opportunities for Lee Teng-hui to gain more diplomatic relationships from the new emerging democracies (Copper 2009:
In terms of the relationship between Taiwan and China, Lee’s strategy was to sustain a good relationship with China because China began to weigh heavier in the same economic region as Taiwan (the Pacific Basin bloc) (Copper 2009: 192). Lee Teng-hui also adopted “pragmatic diplomacy” to develop more potential diplomatic ties (Copper 2009: 192). More importantly, he did not exclude those countries which had formal relationships with China and it helped Taiwan expand its diplomatic possibilities further (Copper 2009: 192). In addition to “pragmatic diplomacy”, Lee also adopted “flexible diplomacy”, which aimed at building relationships with nations beyond formal diplomatic status (i.e. trade relations) (Copper 2000: 192). Last but not least, instead of focusing on the issue of national independence, Lee promoted the principles of the New World Order in which no nation should be banned from joining the international community (Copper 2000: 192). Lee’s leadership made Taiwan’s foreign policy become more flexible and adaptable and won many Taiwanese supports (Copper 2009: 192).

3.3.3. The DPP’s Stance on the Independence Issue vs Taiwanese Perspectives

It is equally important to see what the stances of the opposition parties were on the relationship with China and its role during Taiwan’s political crisis. The biggest opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), was founded in
In terms of the issue of national independence, the platform of the DPP did not specify a stance initially because of unsettled negotiations among its members (Wang 2000: 163). In 1988, the DPP chose a stronger stance as it claimed that in the “417 Resolution” “Taiwan was an independent and sovereign state which was separate from China”, and, moreover, in the “1007 Resolution” it stated that “Taiwan’s sovereignty did not include the Chinese mainland and outer Mongolia” (Wang 2000: 164). Yet, not every member in the DPP supported this strong expression, considering that China might use military measures if Taiwan declared its independence (Wang 2000: 165). The issue of national independence within the DPP thus remained an unsettled issue until the exodus of DPP members in 1999 to form the Taiwanese Independence Party (Wang 2000: 164).

In terms of Taiwanese attitude towards national independence, we can see that Taiwanese tended to have a higher degree of support for the status quo (as the Figure 1 below). According to Wang (2000: 165), the reason that Taiwanese preferred the status quo was to avoid any undesired political consequences and potential military attack from China. Thus, it may explain the results of legislative elections in 1995 and 1998, respectively (Wang 2000: 166). Interestingly enough, if we look at the elections at the county and magistrate levels, Taiwanese did not necessarily favor the KMT
more than the DPP (i.e. in 1997 election, the DPP won 43.32% of total votes as the KMT won 42.12% of total votes) (Wang 2000: 166). This result made it clear to the DPP that they needed to modify their platform in order to win the elections at the national levels (i.e. legislative and presidential elections) (Wang 2000: 166).

Eventually, the DPP passed a resolution in 1999 which endorsed a preference for the status quo and softened its stance on “de jure” independence (Wang 2000: 165).

The presidential and legislative elections in 2000 and 2001, respectively, showed that they were able to cater to the majority of Taiwanese.

Figure 1: The Trend of Taiwanese Support on the Issue of National Independence (%).

(Source: Yiu and Shao 2007:121)

In 2000 presidential election, the DPP won 39.9% of total votes while the KMT won 23.1% of total votes; in 2001 legislative election, the DPP won 36.6% of total votes while the KMT won 31.1% of total votes.
3.4. The Changes of Taiwanese Social Issues as an Impact on Generational Voting Behaviors

Voter behavior in a country will not remain consistent and may have generational changes over time (Inglehart 1990). It therefore implies that party supports are dynamic and it calls for a party to adapt to the new emerging voters, who may have different voting behaviors from the previous ones because of changing socialization experiences (Inglehart 1971). In this section, we will provide information and data relevant to the changes of social issues in Taiwan in order to understand how voters over time react to these issues. The changing social issues can be divided into two phases: 1) before 1987, Taiwanese sought a higher degree of representation in government and democratization and 2) after 1993, Taiwanese were more concerned about the issue of national identity. The following sections are chronological.

3.4.1. The Emerging Local Politics during Japanese Colonization

Local politics in Taiwan was the force that led to the reform of the political regime (Holly et al. 2006). During Japanese colonization in Taiwan, the government used assimilation and discrimination to govern the Taiwanese (Rigger 1999: 34). In terms of the discrimination policy, for example, Taiwanese students were only allowed to study fields irrelevant to “potentially subversive disciplines” like social sciences, to prevent potential critical thinking from the Taiwanese against the Japanese
government (Rigger 1999: 35). However, Taiwanese hoped to have local governments that were more oriented towards Taiwanese interests (Rigger 1999: 35). In order to attract the Japanese government’s attention, Taiwanese students conducted a protest in 1918 in Tokyo (Rigger 1999: 35). In response to the protest, the Japanese government sent a Japanese civilian to serve as Taiwanese governor in 1919 and began to institute assemblies in each of Taiwan’s “prefectures” in 1920, which allowed a limited number of Taiwanese elected representatives, even though the majority of the representatives were still Japanese appointed (Rigger 1999: 36). As the Second World War required the Japanese government to provide more resources to support the front line, it increased half of the members of local assemblies to be Taiwanese elected, in 1935, so as to attract more local Taiwanese support during the war (Rigger 1999: 36). Moreover, by allowing more elected positions in Taiwan, Taiwanese were less likely to join the opposition groups to challenge Japanese government and conduct the protest movement (Rigger 1999: 37). Statistically speaking, of 192 assembly members, 60 appointed and 49 elected (in total 109) were Japanese and 26 appointed and 37 elected (in total 63) were Taiwanese (Rigger 1999: 36). In 1937, the Japanese opened up more elected positions in the governor-general’s advisory council (Rigger 1999: 36). In addition to the increased quota of Taiwanese elected members, the Japanese
government also issued a mandate in order to institute local elections and it marked a beginning of Taiwan’s political history (Rigger 1999:36).

3.4.2. Democratization

Japan was defeated in the Second World War, ceasing its colonization of Taiwan in 1945 and the KMT relocated the government to Taiwan in 1949 upon defeat by the CCP during the China Civil War (Holly 2006: 37). The KMT’s rule in Taiwan was authoritarian, in which the KMT had veto power on key political decisions (Holly 2006: 37). Yet local elections in Taiwan were not cancelled upon the arrival of the KMT but the candidates had to comply with the KMT’s rules in order to have chances to be elected (Holly 2006: 39). In order to suppress those dissidents who challenged the KMT’s rule, they were either “brutally repressed or often imprisoned” (Holly 2006: 40). One has to keep in mind that the KMT also sought to promote its image as it improved the economic situation, performed agriculture reforms, and criticized communism; these measures reduced certain levels of opposition forces against the KMT’s rule (Holly 2006: 39).

The strict control over social opinions began to change when many KMT appointed members from the National Assembly began to retire or pass away (Holly 2006: 40). It forced the KMT to open up more elected positions so as to recruit talent.
in 1969 (Holly 2006: 40). Huang Hsin-Chieh, after being elected as the new member of National Assembly, left the KMT and became the opposition force against the KMT in the National Assembly (Holly 2006: 40). This move encouraged another member from Taipei city council, Kang Ning-hsiang, to join him and they began to use “Tangwai” (‘outside of the party’) as a symbol to challenge KMT authoritarian rule (Holly 2006: 40). Their criticism included a request for the KMT to lift martial law, the temporary provisions that froze the full implementation of the Taiwanese constitution (Holly 2006: 40). They can be seen as the first important opposition voice, against the KMT, that emerged at the national levels (Holly 2006: 40).

As they published articles and conducted democratic movements to raise public attention, the Tangwais successfully gained support from intellectuals and activists (Holly 2006: 40). Interestingly, local election results also began to reflect the success of the Tangwai (Holly 2006: 41). The aftermath of the Kaoshiung Incident\(^{14}\) even showed the KMT government that Taiwanese did not appreciate repressive measures because the legislative election the following year showed an unusual high Taiwanese support for the Tangwai (Holly 2006: 41). However, the Tangwai could not

\(^{14}\)The Kaohsiung Incident was derived from a gathering in 1979 in support of International Human Rights Day, which led to a conflict between police and demonstrators, and, consequently, numerous Tangwai members were arrested and faced charges (Holly 2006: 41).
develop strong institutional strength because of the disagreement on the political strategies, policy positions, and the candidate selection process (Holly 2006: 42). The failing legislative elections in 1983 prompted them to develop election strategies that could increase cohesion within the group (Holly 2006: 42). In the 1985 legislative election, they had a great victory\(^\text{15}\) in the elections (Holly 2006: 42). With this victory, *Tangwai* members decided to build a political party and declared it the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986 (Holly 2006: 42).

### 3.4.3. National Identity as an Effect on the Emerging Parties

After Taiwan was democratized, Taiwanese social issues were changed. According to Zhuan (2010: 105-106), national identity became the key social issue that divided the electorates between the KMT and the DPP. For instance, the electorates of the KMT tended to view Taiwan in the context of China; while the electorates of the DPP tended to view Taiwan as a distinguished national entity and promote the value of democracy (Zhuan 2010: 106). In order to promote Taiwan as sovereign, the DPP in 1991 passed a resolution, which sought to promote a higher degree of national independence and self-determination on this issue (Zhuan 2010: 111). Figure 4 displays the differences between the KMT and DPP on the issue of

\(^{15}\)The results were “all 11 of their candidates for Taipei City Council, half of their candidates for Kaohsiung City Council, 11 of its Provincial Assembly candidates, and one municipal executive were elected” (Holly 2006: 40).
national independence. According to Zhuan (2010: 106), the pressing issue in society that distinguished parties in 1986 was democratization yet it developed into the issue of national independence after 1993 and became the key issue that split the KMT (i.e. the New Party (NP)) in 1993 from the KMT, the People First Party (PFP) in 2000 from the KMT, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union in 2001 (Zhuan 2010: 112-116).

Figure 2: The Trend of Supporters of the KMT and DPP towards the Issue of National Independence (%).

(Source: Zhuan 2010: 112)

The KMT and the DPP hold different views towards national identity, which can be attributed to the distinct waves of Chinese immigrants from China to Taiwan (Liu 2005: 11). Taiwanese used the term “wai-shen-ren” (literally, outsider 外省人) to distinguish those people who followed the KMT party to Taiwan between 1947 and 1949 from Taiwanese, who immigrated to Taiwan generations ago (Liu 2005: 11). It
was originally not a negative term (Liu2005: 11). However, the KMT government only allowed those “wai-shen-ren” to hold important government positions, excluded Taiwanese, and used repressive measures to control the society, which eventually led to the conflicts that created a negative impression of “wai-shen-ren” (Liu 2005: 11). Moreover, the language barrier\textsuperscript{16} between the “wai-shen-ren” and Taiwanese worsened the relationship (Liu 2005: 12). However, the relationship between these two groups began to change as the next generation emerged (Liu 2005: 12). For one, the second generation did not have the same negative social experience from “wai-shen-ren” as their parents since the generations who were suppressed by “wai-shen-ren” began to fade out (Liu 2005: 12). Secondly, the KMT government promoted Mandarin to reduce the tension between these two groups (Liu 2005: 12). Thirdly, the new generations of Taiwanese and “wai-shen-ren” grew up in social backgrounds of increasing similarity (Liu 2005: 12).

According to Table 2, the self-identification of “wai-shen-ren” began to shift from mostly Chinese to both Chinese and Taiwanese as the younger generation emerged. The first generation of “wai-shen-ren” had 52.7% population self-identifying as Chinese while 9.2% population self-identifying as Taiwanese. In terms of the

\textsuperscript{16} “wai-shen-ren” spoke Mandarin while Taiwanese spoke “Hoklo” or “Hakka” (Liu 2005: 12).
population who viewed themselves with both identities, it consisted of 38.2% for the first generation. However, the self-identification of “wai-shen-ren” displayed a historic change since the second generation emerged. 34.8% of the second generation viewed themselves as Chinese while 51.8% of them considered themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese. Among the third and the fourth generations, self-identification as both Chinese and Taiwanese continued to increase (from 63.5% to 66.5%) while self-identification as only Chinese continued to drop (from 23.8% to 18.9%).

In terms of Taiwanese, the first generation displayed a stronger self-identification towards Taiwanese (54.4%) than Chinese (13.5%) and both identities (32.1%). The second generation showed a historic change when the population self-identified as both Chinese and Taiwanese increased (from 32.1% to 41.9%) while the population self-identified as Taiwanese decreased (from 54.4% to 43.3%). The third and fourth generations confirmed such a transition as 17.5% more (third generation) and 19.2% more (fourth generation) of the population considered themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese than only Taiwanese.
In short, Table 2 displays a transition of self-identification among generations of “wai-shen-ren” and Taiwanese in which younger generations in both of the groups shifted their self-identification from one exclusive identity to a sharing identity. In terms of the percentage of populations who identified themselves as either Chinese or Taiwanese in both groups of “wai-shen-ren” and Taiwanese, the populations who considered themselves Taiwanese are bigger than the ones who considered themselves Chinese only.

Table 2: The Development of Self-Identification between “Wai-Shen-Ren” and Taiwanese.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation Identification</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wai-Shen-Ren (外省人)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation (Before 1931)</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation (1932-1953)</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Generation (1954-1968)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Generation (After 1968)</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>2,647</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 In the fourth generation of both “wai-shen-ren” and Taiwanese, 27.1% (18.9% of “wai-shen-ren” plus 8.2% Taiwanese) self-identified as Chinese while 50.9% (14.6% of “wai-shen-ren” plus 36.3% of Taiwanese) self-identified as Taiwanese.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Before 1931)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation (1932-1953)</td>
<td>14.8 41.9 43.3 17,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Generation (1954-1968)</td>
<td>11.3 53.1 35.6 35,830</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Generation (After 1968)</td>
<td>8.2 55.5 36.3 20,385</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Liu 2005: 63)

3.5. Electoral System

According to Cox (1997), the single-non transferable vote (SNTV) may benefit the parties with greater resources at hand because SNTV requires a party to develop a better strategy in order to distribute votes more evenly among its candidates. In this section, we will provide historical background and data on Taiwan’s electoral system and discuss how the competing parties, at the different stages in history, were influenced under this type of electoral system.

3.5.1. The Origin of Electoral System in Taiwan

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government was the one that instituted assemblies and began to allow local elections (Wu 2003: 105). The elections were based on SNTV system, which remained the electoral system even after Taiwan democratized (Wu 2003: 105). The KMT also used SNTV in the areas where Taiwanese candidates were allowed to compete (Wu 2003: 118). The legislative
elections in 1948, for example, adopted SNTV system, according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and Legislative Election law (立法委員選舉罷免法), to elect eight members in Taiwan (Wu 2003: 117). On top of it, the localelections since 1950, and supplementary elections for legislative Yuan in 1969 and between 1972 and 1989 also adopted SNTV systems (Wu 2003: 117). After Taiwan was democratized, the electoral system remained the same until it was reformed in 2008; instead, they only restructured the ridings of each county and adjusted the number of representatives in each riding in legislative Yuan (Hsieh 2009: 2; Wu 2003: 117).

Based on the time of electoral reform in Taiwan, we argue that the SNTV system has an important bearing on the development of the KMT. In the next section, we will look at how the SNTV system impacted the dynamics of party politics in Taiwan.

3.5.2. The Impact of the SNTV System on Taiwan’s Parties

At the first glance, one may expect that SNTV may benefit a bigger party because of the greater resources at hand to solve the strategic problem, but it did not mean that SNTV was created so as to benefit the bigger party (Cox 1996: 754). One should keep in mind that “SNTV can both disadvantage large parties (by presenting them with tougher problems to solve) and advantage large governing parties (by giving them good resources to solve the problem)” (Cox 1996: 754). The tougher problem here refers to the party skills in nominating the number of candidates in order
to optimize the vote division among each candidate (Cox 1996:74). However, a small party will be less likely to suffer from this problem because they would not have more than one candidate running in the same district (Cox 1996: 741-742). In Taiwan’s scenario, SNTV with multiple members resulted in a high degree of factionalism at the local levels because a large party tends to nominate two party members to compete in the same district (Sheng 2006: 71). Without a good strategy to nominate candidates, it resulted in the drive to achieve personal-reputation rather than policy-reputation by politicians; candidates of the same party may turn against each other in public in order to gain votes, instead of focusing on how policies will be improved (Sheng 2006: 71).

The coordination strategy within a party therefore is important to prevent its candidates from competing with each other. The following Table 3 showed that the KMT was more capable of solving the coordination problems than that of the DPP under SNTV with multiple members system (Cox 1996: 753). For instance, if the contestable seat number is one, the gap of average seats won between the KMT and the DPP is .22 percentages different. However, as the number of contestable seats increases (meaning more than two candidates competing for votes), the odds of the DPP average seats won decreases\textsuperscript{18}. In short, with more contestable seats in a district,

\textsuperscript{18}It is interesting to point out that the DPP had more average seats won than the KMT (1.83 (DPP) v.s. 1.5 (KMT)) when there were two contestable seats. However, Table 3 shows that the average seats won by the DPP decreases as the contestable seats increase. For instance, when the contestable seats were three, the average seats won by the DPP was 2 while the KMT was 2.4; when the contestable seats
we can see that SNTV will have subproportional effects on winning seat distributions.

That is, the bigger party will have a lower rate of seat-loss as the number of contestable seats increase.

Table 3: Maximum Number of Seats Winnable in Taiwan’s 1992 Legislative Yuan Elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Av. Seats Won

<table>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

# of Seat Loss

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<th>42.9</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>28.6</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>14.3</th>
<th>16</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of Seat Loss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>28</th>
<th>42.9</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>28.6</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>14.3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Cox 1996: 753)

were four, the average seats won by the DPP was 3 while the KMT was 3.5. The gap became even wider as the contestable seats were five. The average seats won by the DPP was 3 while the KMT was 4.5.
The above observation showed that the DPP could not solve the coordination problem as efficiently as the KMT when the contestable seats demanded more than two candidates of the same party competing for the same pool of votes. In the 1996 legislative assembly election, the DPP nominated three candidates to compete for a five-seat district, Hsin-chu County (Moon 1997: 661). The DPP received 52,971 votes yet none of the candidates were elected because of over-nomination (Moon 1997: 661). Three candidates received 16,871, 18,708, and 17,392 votes respectively and the lowest winning vote getter was the NP which got 23,793 votes (Moon 1997: 661). If the DPP only nominated two candidates and distributed equally among them, 52,971 votes would have been enough for both candidates to win elections (Moon 1997: 661). On the other hand, the NP only nominated one candidate and it received 23,793 votes and seized one seat in the district (Moon 1997: 661). To a smaller party, like the NP, it is easier to solve the nomination problem because it only has to choose the most popular candidate (Moon 1997: 662). During elections in 1995 and 1996, for instance, the NP nominated candidates based on birth dates or family-level instruction, by which 10 candidates of the NP won elections with 39% of votes in three districts of Taipei City (Moon 1997: 662). According to Moon (1997: 662), the misdistribution of votes of the DPP was due to the size of party, which was neither a big and resourceful party nor a small party that had to nominate one candidate (Moon 1997: 662).
Instead, with its scale, the DPP would seek to nominate more than one candidate in a district but was more likely to lose due to the lack of resources to solve the coordination problem in nominating candidates (Moon 1997: 662). On top of that, the KMT had a lot more resources (i.e. experience, organizational strength, and money), which further increased the chance of the DPP losing elections (Moon 1997: 662).

Table 4 below demonstrates the trends of successful rate of the KMT, the DPP, and NP in nominating candidates under the SNTV system. In terms of the KMT, except for the 26% drop in 1992, the ratio of winning to all candidates running was climbing up between 1992 and 1996 legislative elections. It is important to consider the impact of the NP leaving the KMT, which reduced the rate of candidates winning elections of the KMT in 1992 (Moon 1997: 662). After that event, the KMT modified its nomination strategy into an approach which reduced its candidate numbers in one district and the legislative elections in 1995 and 1996 reflected the improving results of the rate of winning candidates (Moon 1997: 664).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Year</th>
<th>Winning to Candidate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Year</td>
<td>Winning to Candidate Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Moon 1997: 663)

3.6. The Development of KMT's Organizational Structure

According to Panebianco (1988: 42; 50), leadership of a party is crucial in the development of organizational stability and impacts the party’s “genetic model”, which determines how the party develops. More specifically, if a party has a stronger leadership, the party will develop into a stronger structure that has a higher degree of party cohesion; on the other hand, if a party has a weaker leadership, party structure will become weaker, which may lead to weaker party cohesion and factionalism (Panebianco 1988: 42). Moreover, Key (1949) and Hazan and Rahat (2010) direct us to examine the candidate selection process in order to examine the development of party cohesion. In this section, we will not only detail the leadership that had influenced the KMT’s party structure but also the candidate selection process to see the development of the KMT’s party structure.
3.6.1. The Relocation of the KMT and the Leadership of Chiang Kai-shek

When Chiang Kai-shek relocated the KMT from China to Taiwan, the party structure of the KMT was based on the Marxist-Leninist model, which was restrictive in terms of member recruitment and ideology, to govern Taiwan (Tan 2002: 153).

Under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, between 1949 and 1975, the KMT was described as an “authoritarian, hierarchical and restrictive party controlled mainly by Chiang Kai-shek” (Wu 2001: 105; Tan 2002: 153). There was no intra-party democracy and the top party leadership made all important decisions (Tan 2002: 153).

In terms of member recruitment process of the KMT, the central committee and central standing committee, of which the members were appointed by the KMT’s leadership, selected the new incoming members (Tan 2002: 153). Through these two committees, the party leadership could control the qualities of incoming members indirectly. In terms of legislative candidate selections, the central committee selected the candidates and they had to be approved by the party leader (Tan 2002: 154). The most important position of the party, the party chairman, would be selected by the previous party chairman then the National Congress members would support his decision by applause (Tan 2002: 154). The process of selecting party leaders did not involve secret ballots and the previous party leader was the only veto player in the process (Tan 2002: 154). These processes allowed the party leader to monitor
disloyalty and potential betrayers, and thus during Chiang Kai-shek’s rule the KMT’s party structure was highly centralized (Wu 2001: 105).

However, the KMT was forced to reform its party structure as society began to evolve (Wu 2001: 105). One should keep in mind that this type of party organization will be sustainable as no other opposition are allowed in the society to challenge the party (Wu 2001: 105). For example, in a traditional and homogenous society where less social issues can polarize society, the party members will have a lower degree of pluralism (Wu 2001: 105). In the 1980s, Taiwan began to develop a polarized political environment as the society experienced economic developments and modernization that bought about new social issues, making it more difficult to sustain party cohesion (Wu 2001: 105). Among many social issues that concerned Taiwanese the greatest was an increased degree of political participation in the KMT so as to serve them better in the local government (Wu 2001: 108). In order to respond to this demand, the KMT reformed the candidate selection process (Wu 2001: 108). For example, the candidate selection process in Taipei Municipality was reformed into a three-phase process which included party member opinion response, cadre evaluation, and approval by the central agency (Wu 2001: 105). The phases of cadre evaluation and the final approval still meant that the KMT had greater power over the final
decision of the nominee (Wu 2001: 105). Yet, the first phase of the process displayed a meaningful step towards party decentralization, which gave the local elites and grassroots the opportunities to select their ideal nominees (Wu 2001: 108). The Appendix2 presents the development of elections in Taiwan and the KMT candidate Selection System between 1950 and 2000.

3.6.2. Changes in KMT’s Party Structure

Chiang Ching-kuo, the successor of Chiang Kai-shek, was the key actor who began liberating Taiwan’s political system (Wu 2001: 110). Before the 1970s, Chiang Kai-shek adopted repressive measures to hinder potential opposition voices to ensure the KMT’s dominance in an authoritarian regime (Wu 2001: 110). Yet, because of the increasing quest for political participation and representation, Chiang Ching-kuo, as the KMT’s chairman between 1976 and 1988, had more tolerance towards the opposition groups and allowed a limited amount of anti-KMT opponents, which foreshadowed the emergence of the DPP in 1986 (Wu 2001: 110). In response to the changing society, the KMT reformed the candidate selection process into “party member opinion inquiry” in 1994 for the gubernatorial, municipal mayoral and presidential elections, which consisted of party member opinion responses, evaluation of cadres, and polls (Wu 2001: 109). In this new candidate selection process, the local organizations could select their nominee based on their preference (Wu 2001: 110).
The first two processes consisted of the involvement from the local organization. This process did not fully decentralize the party’s influence because the central agency still held the final decision on these nominees (Wu 2001: 109). However, this process began to reduce party cohesion because the locally-nominated candidates would seek to cater their preferences to the non-elected delegates from the central agency (Wu 2001: 109).

3.6.3. Factionalism within the KMT

The factions within the KMT were based on identity - mainlanders or Taiwanese (Hood 1996: 471). Technically speaking, mainlanders and Taiwanese shared the same cultural background and it was the early immigration from China to Taiwan that fostered a new socialization experience and led to new identity recognition (Hood 1996: 471). Mainlanders are people who immigrated to Taiwan during the years of China’s civil war (between 1947 and 1949) (Hood 1996: 471). What is more, because language use between Taiwanese and Mainlanders was different19, the KMT government forbade Taiwanese to speak their dialect and restricted participation in the political positions of importance (Hood 1995: 470). However, the KMT began to value the local factions because they had close contacts with local businessmen and other influential interest groups, and to stay close with the

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19 Taiwanese spoke Hakka or Taiwanese while Manlanders spoke only mandarin (Hood 1995: 470).
local factions would help the KMT to legitimate its rule in Taiwan (Hood 1995: 470). As KMT’s candidate selection systems began to decentralize, the local factions were able to exert a greater influence on the KMT’s party structure to fulfill their demands (Hood 1995: 472). With the increasing pressures from local factions, the KMT elites realized that it was necessary to share power with local factions to gain party strength (Hood 1995: 472). It was under this circumstance that Lee Teng-hui emerged as a potent leader of the KMT by the support of local factions (Hood 1995: 472-473). On the other hand, he knew how to manoeuvre the relationship between himself and mainlanders to strengthen his support. The relationship between Lee Teng-hui and the mainlanders was mutually beneficial. As the power-holder members of the KMT supported his leadership, he showed his support for the KMT’s mainlander candidates in the 1993 city and county chief election and the 1994 mayoral and provincial elections (Hood 1995: 473). Because of his popularity among Taiwanese, the election results were positive and the KMT mainstream members believed that it “could be attributed to their willingness to give the people what they want – a Taiwanese representative in elected bodies and chief executive” (Hood 1995: 473). Lee Teng-Hui, therefore, can be viewed as a leader who linked mainstream factions successfully within the KMT to win the elections in the early days of Taiwan’s democratization.
3.6.4. The Split in the KMT

A group of non-mainstream KMT members formed the New KMT Alliance (NKMTA) within the KMT and became the main faction in 1990 because of their disagreement over the issues of party corruption, Taiwan independence, and party recruitment with the mainstream KMT (Fell 2006: 49). After its emergence, it became the main source of intra-party competition and led to the split of the KMT in 1993. The intra-party competition of the KMT can be seen in the 1992 legislative election when the NKMTA already functioned as a de facto party as it tried to nominate their own candidates (Fell 2006: 49). Even though Lee Teng-Hui sought to block their nominees, the NKMTA succeeded in not only nominating their candidates but also winning 11 seats out of 12 candidates winning elections (Fell 2006: 49). After the elections, Premier Hau Pei-tsung, who was close to the NKMTA, was forced to resign from his position in 1993 (Fell 2006: 49). It was at this critical event that the NKMTA decided to leave the KMT and form the New Party (NP), which became the third political party in Taiwan (Fell 2006: 49). The NP, initially, had a certain level of support from Taiwanese, yet it became weak in the late 1990s presidential and legislative elections. According to Table 5 below, the NP was only able to maintain electoral support in the 1995 and 1996 national parliamentary elections and began to lose its electoral support drastically in 1998 (7.1%) and 2001 (2.9%) national
parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the electoral support of the KMT dropped in the 1995 national parliamentary election after the defection of the NP but remained stable in 1996 and 1998 elections. However, the electoral support of the KMT dropped in the 2001 national parliamentary election. Table 6 shows a picture of electoral support for political parties in Taiwan between 1996 and 2000. We can see that the KMT experienced a sharp decline in electoral support (from 54% to 23.1%). One may suspect the impact of the NP leaving as the cause of such electoral results, but Table 6 shows that the NP had no significant impact on the decline of the KMT given that the vote share was only 0.1% in the 2000 presidential election.

Table 5: Main Parties in National Parliamentary Elections’ Vote Shares (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Fell 2006: 50)

Table 6: Presidential Vote Share (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Fell 2006: 51)
James Soong’s departure was the second split of the KMT. We argue that the leaving of James Soong was the key to the KMT’s reduced vote share in 2000 presidential and 2001 legislative elections. James Soong, the previous KMT member and national governor, announced himself an independent candidate for the 2000 presidential election in 1999 (Hsieh 2001: 930). The key reason for James Soong’s defection was that he felt disadvantaged by the process of candidate selection of the KMT, in which the chairman of the KMT appointed the nominee for the 2000 presidential election (Zhuan 2010: 157). Based on this candidate selection process, Lee Teng-Hui, the party chairman, already planned to nominate Lien Chan as the candidate for the 2000 president election (Zhuan 2010: 159). At most, James Soong would run as the candidate for vice-president to pair with Lien Chan (Zhuan 2010: 159). However, James Soong was confident that he had a better chance to win the presidential election based on a poll conducted in 1999 (Zhuan 2010: 159). Table 7 below shows that James Soong was the most popular candidate, with around 40% of support, among Taiwanese voters, compared to Lien Chan (KMT candidate who had around 13-14% of support) and Chen Shui-Bian (DPP candidate who had around 20% of support). The result of 2000 presidential election also reflected the same outcome as the poll suggested\(^{20}\).

\(^{20}\)In the 2000 presidential election, James Soong had 36.8% of votes, Lien Chan had 23.1% of votes, and Chen Shui-Bian had 39.3% of votes, respectively.
Table 7: Polls\textsuperscript{21} of Supports for Potential Presidential Candidacy (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Lien Chan (KMT)</th>
<th>Chen Shui-Bian (DPP)</th>
<th>James Soong</th>
<th>Others Candidates or not decided yet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999.03.13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999.04.17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999.05.08</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>1999.05.22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999.06.28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Zhuan 2010: 159)

3.7. Conclusion:

This chapter has provided literature and data related to our five hypotheses: 1) social influences from the West, 2) crises management, 3) generational replacement, 4) electoral system, and 5) the effect of party leadership on party development. In terms of social influences from the West, we discussed Taiwan’s physical setting in relation to the degree of Western influence and provided the development of foreign policy between Taiwan and the U.S. to examine this relationship. We found that the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 strengthened the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S., by which the KMT government at the time received funding and resources from the

\textsuperscript{21}According to Zhuan (2010: 159), this Table was based on the poll by Lien Ho Newspaper (聯合報). However, he also argued that other polls from Shan ShuiPoll (山水民調), ChuanGuoPoll (全國民調), TVBS Poll, Tong Sheng Poll (東森), and Public Survey Opinion Foundation (民意調查基金會) had the same trends.
U.S. to boost economic and military development. We found that increasing numbers of Taiwanese elites (scholars, politicians, and students) went to the U.S. under exchange programs, which fomented the opposition of the KMT and led to the passing of a resolution in 1987 urging the Taiwanese government to democratize.

In terms of crises management, we discussed how the resurgence of China onto the international stage as a flexible diplomatic country threatened Taiwanese identity. We found that the strict rule, based on the ideology of “Han-tsebuliang-li”, which Chiang Kai-shek imposed on its diplomatic policy towards other countries was the main cause of the political crisis. However, the successors, such as Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, practiced a more flexible diplomatic policy, by which the Taiwanese government could build as many diplomatic ties with other countries as possible, hoping to solve this political crisis and win Taiwanese support. On the other hand, the DPP, the biggest opposition, was struggling to smooth the conflicts within the party with regards to the issue of national identity, which provided the KMT with more electoral support as it sought to avoid potential attacks from China.

In terms of generational changes of voting behaviors, we found that social issues that mobilized Taiwanese had changed from democratization to national identity. The
seed of democratization can be traced back to Japanese colonization, during which Taiwanese sought for a higher degree of responsible governments at the local levels. Through protests, electoral systems were introduced by the Japanese government at the local levels and Taiwanese began to be involved in local elections. After the KMT took over Taiwan’s government from Japan, local elections became the key sources for Taiwanese to gather the strength of opposition which led to the emergence of the DPP. The DPP had a strong sense of Taiwan being sovereign while the KMT had a strong stance of Taiwan being unified with China. In relation to voting behaviors, we found that self-identification as either Taiwanese or Chinese began to drop as the first generation that was suppressed by the KMT government faded out and the Mandarin policy promoted a higher degree of similarity between “wai-shen-ren” and the earlier habitants.

In terms of electoral system, we have discussed how the SNTV system impacted the capacity of political parties to nominate successful candidates. According to Cox, the SNTV system tends to promote a higher degree of party internal conflicts, if a party does not have strategies or resources to coordinate the candidates in the same district. In Taiwan’s case, we found that the KMT was more capable of coordinating
candidates than other parties, especially in a district involved with more than two contestable seats.

In terms of the development of KMT’s organizational structure, we found that the candidate selection process encouraged the development of factionalism within the KMT. When the KMT relocated from China to Taiwan, the party was strictly controlled by the party leader and the leadership appointed all the important party and government positions. Such measures allowed the KMT leader to monitor any potential dissidents. However, we found that the KMT began to change its candidate selection process as the leadership of the KMT changed. The successor of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, adopted “party member opinion inquiry” in the candidate selection process, which involved the participation of non-elected delegates and decreased party cohesion. After Taiwan was democratized, factions of the KMT centered the issue of identity as the members of the KMT mixed with local Taiwanese. The emergence of Lee Teng-hui as a KMT leader was beneficial to party cohesion before 1990 because of his background and skills in manoeuvring his relationship with the mainlander faction. However, the NKMTA split the KMT in 1993 because of the disagreement over the issues of corruption and national identity. Moreover, the second split of the KMT, led by James Soong, was the result of disagreement over
candidate selection process and caused the defeat of the KMT in the 2000 presidential election.
CHAPTER 4: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KUOMINTANG

4.1. Introduction: Redefine KMT’s One-Party Dominance

Before evaluating our hypotheses, it is necessary to define KMT’s one-party dominance. As mentioned in the second chapter, we applied Greene’s (2007) definitions to Taiwan’s scenario. In order to qualify as the dominant party and party systems, the governing party has to seize the executive position and win the majority of parliamentary seats for 20 consecutive years or 4 consecutive elections (Greene 2007: 12). In terms of regime types, he argues that the dominant party and party systems can be found in both non-democracies (DPARs) and democracies (DPDRs). In non-democracies, the elections are meaningful but not fair and the dominant party can use partisan resources (i.e. electoral fraud) and repressive measures to increase or sustain its electoral strength (Greene 2007: 12).

In terms of the power thresholds, Greene (2007: 16) defines Taiwan as a DPAR between 1987 and 2000, within which the KMT may use authoritarian controls to help it sustain one-party dominance. However, if we look at Table 8 published by Freedom House, we soon notice that it is necessary to reconsider the position of the KMT in a dominant party system. We will set 1987 as the beginning of DPAR in Taiwan because of the lifting of martial law the same year.
Table 8: Taiwan’s Political Status between 1986 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>86-87</th>
<th>87-88</th>
<th>88-89</th>
<th>89-90</th>
<th>90-91</th>
<th>91-92</th>
<th>92-93</th>
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<th>94-95</th>
<th>95-96</th>
<th>96-97</th>
<th>97-98</th>
<th>98-99</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Partially free (period A)</td>
<td>Free (period B)</td>
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</table>

(Source: Freedom House 2012)

Freedom House (2012) defined political status by the scales of civil and political rights of a country. According to Freedom House (2012), it was only up until 1995-1996 that Taiwan was qualified as a democracy. Strictly speaking, during period A, Taiwan was partially free politically so that it can be viewed as a DPAR; during period B, Taiwan became politically free thus it can no longer be viewed as a DPAR. Yet, it did not suggest that during period B Taiwan became a DPDR, because we do not contend that the period B was long enough to become a DPDR. Instead, we argue that it will be less problematic to label subtypes of dominant party systems in Taiwan’s case and frame the period between 1987 and 2000 in Taiwan as a dominant party system. In terms of elections held during this period, there were legislative elections in 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998, respectively, and presidential elections in 1996 and 2000. Taiwan passed Greene’s time thresholds for being a dominant party system given that the KMT won all four legislative elections and the presidential election in 1996 (Table 5 and 10).
Based on Table 5 and 6, we can see that in and before 1998 the KMT enjoyed legislative electoral support close to fifty five percent. On the other hand, the DPP had consistent legislative electoral supports during 1995 and 2001, which counted around 32 percent. Interestingly, the DPP presidential vote had increased from 21.13 % to 39.3 % in the 2000 presidential election while the KMT dropped from 54 % to 23.1 % in the 2000 presidential election. Chronologically speaking, the KMT reached its peak electoral support in the 1996 presidential election then began to drop afterwards; the DPP’s electoral supports dropped around 10 percent in the 1996 presidential election but began to climb up in the 1998 legislative and reached its peak in the 2000 presidential election. We therefore argue that the KMT began to lose its one-party dominance after the 1996 presidential election. Based on the above discussion on KMT’s one-party dominance, we will begin to evaluate our hypotheses and to investigate the factors that impacted the development and decline of KMT’s one-party dominance.

4.2. The United States’ Impact on the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

Our first hypothesis suggests:

The level of American influence on Taiwan had two impacts on the fortunes of the KMT. Specifically, America provided resources to the KMT and strengthened the KMT’s position yet it also fostered the emergence of the opposition and precipitated the decline of the KMT after Taiwan is fully democratized.
As discussed in our second chapter, the level of American influences (i.e. material aid and foreign policy) will affect the development of an authoritarian regime. In theory, the stronger the American influence is in a non-democratic country, the more democratic movements or groups will be catalyzed to promulgate democratic values. On the other hand, the resources provided by the U.S. to the country during its development could strengthen its one-party dominance.

4.2.1. The Prolongation of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

As discussed in our third chapter, the U.S. influence began at the Korean War breakout in 1951. The generous financial and military aid Taiwan received from the U.S. during the period of 1951 and 1965 propelled Taiwan’s foreign policy (i.e. mutual defence treaty in 1954) to align with the U.S. against the CCP. In terms of the U.S. aid, it was estimated at $2 billion aid plus the U.S. paid down parts of Taiwan’s exports. With this aid, we argue that the KMT was able to consolidate its one-party dominance and survive after its authoritarian rule ended. To be sure, one has to keep in mind that there was no horizontal accountability that served as a check-and-balance mechanism to monitor policy-making and decisions from the KMT government before 1987. As a result, the total amount of the U.S. aid was at the KMT’s disposal. We argue that with more manageable resources the KMT was able to expandand
consolidate its rule by politicizing government and public service. Over the timespan of 40 years, it is possible to say that the KMT had strong support inside and outside government because of its patronage connections. As a result, it will be more difficult for the emergence of an opposition party in the 1980s to challenge the strong patronage ties and defeat the KMT in an election. With the U.S. aid, the KMT also developed Taiwan’s economy and increased the GDP from average $12,648K ($433,848K in Canadian dollars) in 1951 to 840,846K ($28,842.45K in Canadian dollars) in 1965 (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics 2012).

The following Table 9 further shows that ongoing economic development was evidence that the U.S. investment in Taiwan was a great help in promoting its economy in the long-term and Taiwan favored the support of the U.S. With successful economic development, it is not a surprise that the KMT was able to attract Taiwanese support and build itself a positive image that essentially prolonged one-party dominance after the authoritarian rule ended.

Table 9: The Development of Taiwan’s GDP between 1951 and 1978 (in Taiwanese $K$)

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<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>103.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>147.5</td>
<td>171.8</td>
<td>199.1</td>
<td>229.4</td>
<td>266.6</td>
<td>319.6</td>
<td>415.1</td>
<td>556.3</td>
<td>597.7</td>
<td>717</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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dollars).
(Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics 2012)

4.2.2. The Decline of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

In terms of the decline of one-party dominance, the *Kaoshiung incident* in 1979 was an instance in which Taiwanese protested and called for the KMT government to lift martial law and proceed with democratization in Taiwan. In addition, as discussed in our third chapter, Taiwanese abroad used democratic movements and journals in the U.S. to demand the KMT government lift martial law. We argue that it was the result of the increasing contact between Taiwan and the U.S. because of the program of Fulbright and the Smith-Mundt program which made democratic values more popular among Taiwanese. As more educated Taiwanese were influenced by the U.S., it was not a surprise that more opposition groups began to question the legitimacy of the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Chiang Ching-kuo, the successor of Chiang Kai-shek, lifted martial law and Taiwan began to democratize.

However, the KMT’s rule did not end immediately after democratization and it continued to win a majority of Taiwanese electoral support until 2000. Following our hypothesis, we suspect that it was due to the limited resources of the opposition party and the politicizing relationship that the KMT had built during the past decades.

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22These members were key members forming the DPP later on.
to sustain its dominance, holding everything else equal. In order to evaluate our argument, we look at Taiwan’s political status evaluated by Freedom House, in which the civil rights and political rights (as Table 10) began to function as a modern democracy 9 years after the lifting of martial law. If our hypothesis follows what theory suggests, we would expect the KMT’s defeat years after the opposition party gathered enough resources to compete with the KMT. According to Tables 5 and 8, a trend emerged when the DPP’s supporters dropped in the year of 1996 from 32.9% votes to 21.13% votes. However, after the 1996 presidential election, the DPP was able to attract votes consistently and won the 2000 presidential election. On the other hand, the KMT still maintained a similar degree of support as the vote share increased from 54% votes to 54.7% since the 1996 election but began to drop in the 2000 presidential election to 23.1%. Based on the election results, we can say that even with the U.S. financial aid and the use of patronage, the KMT was not able to resist the democratic influence from the U.S. that catalyzed the emergence of the opposition.

Table 10: The Development of Civil Right and Political Right in Taiwan.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Source: Freedom House 2012)

Note: The lower the score the more democratic.

4.2.3. Conclusion on the U.S. influence to the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

In summary, the information we discussed in the third chapter led to confirm the first hypothesis that the U.S. influence benefited the KMT’s one-party dominance yet also catalyzed the emergence of the opposition groups to challenge the dominance. The rise of the KMT’s one-party dominance was due to the extra financial aid and the KMT was able to use it to strengthen its dominance as the government was not scrutinized by check-and-balance mechanisms and opposition parties were absent. On the other hand, the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan catalyzed the emergence of the opposition party and democratization, which challenged the legitimacy of the KMT and resulted in the decline of its one-party dominance. Eventually, with a fairer playing field between the governing and the opposition party, the DPP was able to defeat the KMT in the 2000 election.

4.3. Crises Management of the KMT

Our second hypothesis suggests:

The ability of the KMT to manage the critical event of 1971 provided a strong case of legitimating its position as the protector of Taiwanese national identity, which in turn allowed the KMT to prolong its dominant position. At the same time, the emergence of an opposition which could claim a similar political stance challenged the KMT’s role as the only
protector of Taiwanese identity. Eventually, it led to the weakening of the KMT electoral bases.

Levite and Tarrow’s theory suggests that political or economic crises may challenge both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the dominant party in government. Based on this theory, the opposition party will have the chance to de-legalize the dominant party, if a political or economic crisis emerges and the governing party could not solve it. The 1971 United Nations event, when Taiwan’s relationship with China and the U.S. was worsened as China replaced Taiwan as the only Chinese government in the United Nations Security Council, was a political crisis that mobilized a great number of Taiwanese on the street to demand the KMT government to reform in order to solve political isolation. One has to keep in mind that the KMT government at the time was based on authoritarian rule and opposition groups were not allowed to express their concerns as freely as in democracies. In this case, the issue of political crisis can be viewed as an important issue to Taiwanese, because it successfully mobilized a majority of Taiwanese to challenge the KMT’s rule, even at great risk. If the KMT could not provide a good solution to political isolation, it would give a chance to opposition groups to compete for the legitimacy in government if they could provide better solutions that are in favor of the Taiwanese people.
4.3.1. The Prolongation of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

If the KMT successors, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, followed Chiang Kai-shek’s ideology that “Han-tsebuliang-li” and allowed no other nation to build relationships with China and Taiwan at the same time, the opposition forces may have become greater in Taiwan’s society. However, Chiang Ching-kuo began a new diplomatic strategy which differed from Chiang Kai-shek’s in order to ease the tension between China and the U.S. and Taiwan and assure Taiwanese a higher degree of national security. To do so, Chiang Ching-kuo focused on two strategies. One was to promulgate democratic values in order to gain back U.S. support; the other one was to mediate the tension between China and Taiwan by proposing a one-China principle. The following successor, Lee Teng-hui, developed diplomatic strategies to a greater extent by using pragmatic and flexible diplomacy, in which Taiwan could build relationships with all nations, regardless of whether they have diplomatic ties with China. In addition, in terms of national identity, Lee stayed neutral on this topic and did not choose an extreme political stance to avoid any controversy. In this case, we can confirm that Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui resolved the 1971 political crisis by providing a softer ideology and more practical strategies than that of Chiang Kai-shek to avoid political isolation. Because the KMT can resolve the issue of political isolation, it took away the opportunities for the opposition groups to challenge their governing capacity. In addition, the political
stance of the DPP was crucial in determining the KMT’s one-party dominance.

According to our third chapter, the biggest opposition party against the KMT, the DPP, emerged with a strong political stance. With the “417 resolution” and “1007 resolution”, the DPP evidently pointed out that China and Taiwan should not be discussed in the context of one country in the early 1990s. However, not every Taiwanese was willing to support this proposal regarding national identity, knowing that it might upset China and lead to a military operation towards Taiwan. With these Taiwanese feelings in mind, it gave a greater chance for the KMT to prolong its dominance since the DPP’s political stance might jeopardize national security.

4.3.2. The Decline of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

In order to support the above hypothesis, we will use the survey conducted by Liou (2004) about Taiwanese stances toward reforming social issues that might jeopardize national security. Liou (2004: 67) found that Taiwanese tended to support a party that upheld the importance of national security when it conducts policy reforms (as Table 11 below). Moreover, he found that the KMT gave a higher sense of national security to Taiwanese than the DPP did (as Table 11 below).
Table 11: Taiwanese Views on National Security and how Parties reflect this Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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</table>

(Source: Liou 2004: 68)

Note: it is based on the question with scale 1 to 10 that asked interviewers “how do you value national security when it comes to a reform?”. 0 means that only reform matters; 10 means that national security should outweigh the reform.

We can see that the DPP did not maintain the same political stance across the years and began to move closer to the KMT’s stance. Between 1994 and 2000, KMT had given Taiwanese an image of protecting national security; while the DPP had changed its image from a relatively extreme reformer to a moderate reformer. We contend that the DPP changed its political stance toward a more moderate reformer role because of the loss in the early 1990s of presidential and legislative elections, to become more likely to attract more Taiwanese votes, especially among those who value national security more than reforms. Even though the KMT can prolong the one-party dominance in the early 1990s, the voting began to shift as the DPP was modifying its political stance.

In the 1990s the DPP experienced a split from the faction that upheld the ideology of pro-independence in Taiwan. It was derived from the great loss in the
1996 presidential election that prompted the DPP to choose a political stance away from being the extreme national independence party and this changed platform of the DPP upset and led to the exodus of the conservative faction within the DPP. If we examine Tables 5 and 6, we can see that the party support for the DPP had climbed up 18% of votes since the 1996 presidential election and resulted in the DPP’s victory in the 2000 presidential election. With a party platform that provided Taiwanese more national security, the KMT no longer had advantage over this issue and the DPP was more likely to win.

4.3.3. Conclusion on Crisis Management

Based on the information and data we collected in the third chapter, we can confirm that the KMT was able to prolong its one-party dominance after the end of its authoritarian rule because it assured Taiwanese a higher degree of national security through measures it used during the 1971 event. At the same time, the DPP’s ideology with regards to the issue of national identity was deemed by the Taiwanese people as a potential threat to national security, which eventually resulted in the loss of electoral support. On the other hand, the great loss in the 1996 presidential election made the DPP realize the necessityof modifying its stance if it hoped to compete with the KMT in future elections. According to the election results in the 2000 presidential and 2001
legislative elections, it showed that the DPP gained electoral support consistently after the exodus of the pro-independence faction.

4.4. Generational Support for the KMT

Our third hypothesis suggests:

The older cohort of voters provided the KMT a strong electoral base to sustain its dominance, by which the KMT could still sustain and prolong its dominance after democratization. Yet, as the older cohorts of voters began to fade away, the cumulative effect of the younger cohorts of voters, who have a weaker party identification towards the KMT, led to the decline of the KMT in 2000.

As we discussed in our second chapter, party electoral bases vary across time because younger generations may change their voting behaviors as their socialization experience differs from the older cohorts of voters. Based on the generation theory, the dominant party has to adapt itself to the society with changing social issues in order to prolong its dominance. If the dominant party could not evolve its platform to cater to the younger generation, the one-party dominance will be likely to collapse in the long-run and be replaced by the opposition party that caters to more Taiwanese interest. In Taiwan’s case, 1987 was the important watershed between the old and new social issue. As detailed in the third chapter, Taiwanese had been struggling for a greater degree of representation in the government before 1987 because the central government had been based on authoritarian rule (i.e. Japanese colonization and the
KMT government). The governing party could easily control and monitor government in a way that no other opposition could question its authority.

4.4.1. The Prolongation of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

The KMT’s authoritarian rule was not a fully closed political system. Even though the central elections (i.e. legislative and national assembly elections) were mostly appointed by the KMT, local elections (i.e. magistrates and country elections) were allowed to a wider degree, with non-KMT candidates competing, thus it was possible for the opposition groups to emerge. For example, previous members of Taipei city council (i.e. Huang Hsin-Chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang) emerged as the first opposition groups in the national institutions as the KMT began to release a limited quota of the national elections to be contested.

It is necessary to point out that the KMT’s rule was not only based on authoritarian control and monitoring, otherwise it would be defeated as soon as political competition increased. Yet, the KMT was only defeated the first time in the 2000 national election. That is to say, there were enough electoral bases for the KMT to maintain its one-party dominance and to compete with the opposition party after the end of authoritarian rule. Our third chapter suggests that the later Chinese immigrants to Taiwan may have a stronger degree of party recognition toward the
KMT because of the favoritism by the KMT toward “Wai-shen-ren” only. As mentioned above, national identity was enlarged as an important issue since Taiwan was democratized and it therefore highlights the importance of party recognition to voting behaviors after 1987. According to Figure 4 as below, we can see that a majority of generations have shifted their national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese since the early 1990s.

Figure 3: The Self-Identification of Taiwanese between 1992 and 2000 (%).

(Source: Zhuan 2010: 84)

According to this figure, self-identification of Taiwanese as Chinese dropped across years while self-identification as Taiwanese increased so significantly that it overpassed the number of self-identification of Taiwanese as Chinese in 1996. This evidence supports our hypothesis that the KMT can prolong one-party dominance because of a higher degree of self-identification as Chinese in the early 1990s than
self-identification as Taiwanese. In addition, to have a higher degree of support of Chinese does not mean that no Taiwanese would support the KMT. The following Table 12 presents the trend of self-identification as Taiwanese among KMT’s supporters. It shows that the KMT began to attract a higher number of supporters who self-identified as Taiwanese, which demonstrated that the KMT began to cater not only the needs of Chinese but also the needs of Taiwanese. With such adaptability, the KMT was able to prolong its dominance throughout generational changes during the 1990s.

Table 12: The Development of Self-Identification as Taiwanese among KMT’s supporters (%).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporters (%)</td>
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(Source: Zhuan 2010: 85)

4.4.2. The Decline of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

As the older cohorts of a generation that viewed itself as Chinese began to fade out it weakened the KMT’s support base. Specifically, the KMT government promoted assimilation policy (i.e. Mandarin education) in Taiwan, by which the younger generation born and raised in Taiwan would have a lower degree of party identification towards the KMT than the older generation. Figure 4 has shown us that
young generations in Taiwan tend to view themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese, which supports our hypothesis.

It is important for us to look at the party supporters in the DPP. If the DPP has a stronger degree of self-identification as Taiwanese than the KMT does, we would confirm that it is more likely for the DPP to win elections as the older generations began to disappear. The following Table 13 presents the trend of party supporters of the DPP that identify themselves as Taiwanese. According to the Table, we can see that the supporters of the DPP have a higher degree of self-identification as Taiwanese than that of the KMT. In terms of party supports, the self-identification of Taiwanese and of KMT and DPP has shown us that the DPP has the greater advantage to use the issue of self-identification in order to attract more votes. The 2000 presidential election confirmed our hypothesis.

Table 13: The Party Supporters of the DPP with Self-Identification as Taiwanese (%).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPP Supporters</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Zhuan 2010: 86)
4.4.3. Conclusion on Generational Changes on the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

In summary, our third hypothesis was confirmed by the information and historic background provided in our third chapter. In terms of the KMT’s one-party dominance, the older cohorts of voters who identify themselves as Chinese prolonged the dominance, based on our provided graph above. However, we can see that the cohorts began to disappear in the younger generations who identify themselves more as Taiwanese. This development of self-identification among emerging generations led to the decline of the KMT’s one-party dominance. We support our hypothesis by identifying the DPP’s supporters who identify themselves as Taiwanese. The gap between the KMT and DPP’s supporters who identify themselves as Taiwanese was greater across time. In 1992, it was 11.8% (KMT) versus 38.1% (DPP) and became 30.4% (KMT) versus 56.9% (DPP). With the decrease of self-identification as Chinese, it was more likely that the KMT’s one-party dominance will decline.

4.5. Electoral System

Our fourth hypothesis suggests:

*The SNTV electoral system provided political advantage to the KMT as the governing party and helped it sustain its dominant elected position.*

According to the theory discussed in our second chapter, the SNTV electoral system may benefit the bigger party more because it has more resources to calculate and divide votes more evenly to the more-than-one candidate ridings. In terms of
one-party dominance, the theory suggests that with SNTV electoral system the

governing party will have a greater chance to sustain its dominance because it has

better access to pork and barrel projects in the government that can strengthen their

link with many stakeholders of the government.

4.5.1. The Prolongation of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

In Taiwan’s case, the KMT’s authoritarian rule had been 33 years hence it is

more likely that the KMT has more resources and connections with stakeholders

inside and outside government than the opposition groups to sustain its

dominance. Moreover, given the design of the electoral system (i.e. SNTV with

multi-member districts), the DPP’s position as a medium-size party may suffer greater

loss than the smaller parties and it may in turn prolong the KMT’s one-party

dominance. As we can see in the 1992 legislative election, the DPP did not necessarily

have weaker electoral bases than the KMT did (Table 3 in the third chapter), if the

winnable seats of a district were 1 or 2. However, as the district magnitude increased,

the gap of average winning seats between the KMT and DPP became wider. The

result confirmed what our theory has suggested that the parties with greater resources

can develop strategies and calculations to divide votes more evenly across nominated

candidates which led to a higher chance of winning elections. With resources that the

KMT received from the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s and the 38 year authoritarian rule,
the KMT was more likely to know how to access resources in the government and use it to strengthen its dominance than the DPP. Our evidence of the 1992 legislative election reflected our hypothesis.

It is also important to note the impact of electoral reform in 2008 on the development of Taiwan’s party system. The current electoral system is based on the SMD and PR system, which, according to Hsieh (2009: 2), is more likely to result in a two-party competition, if the society has a high degree of similarity across all districts. In Taiwan’s case, the key social issue that determines party affiliation of the Taiwanese people is self-identification as Chinese or Taiwanese and is not limited to certain counties. Under such an electoral system, the small parties which were not able to attract enough electoral support tend to merge with the bigger parties seeking greater chances to win (Hsieh 2009: 4). The PR system, on the other hand, will foster a higher number of parties if the social cleavages were based on class, religion, and/or rural/urban bases. Given that social issues in Taiwan were not based on above factors, it is less likely that Taiwan’s party system would involve competition with more than two parties (Hsieh 2009:4). In terms of the emergence of dominant parties and party systems, it is more likely to see a dominant party and party system in the SNTV system than in the SMD system because the latter system does not involve two same
candidates competing for the same pool of votes which could result in party split, if
the party cannot distribute votes among their candidates evenly.

4.5.2. Conclusion on Electoral System to the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

Our third chapter discusses the potential effect of SNTV on one-party dominance. Based on our third chapter, the evidence confirmed that with SNTV the dominant party will have greater chances to win elections in a riding with more-than-one nominated candidates. Even though the DPP did not have weaker support bases than the KMT, SNTV will have a super-proportional effect on the party based on the amount of resources a party has. If Taiwan’s electoral system had not been based on SNTV with multi-member district, the KMT would be less likely to maintain its one-party dominance as long as it did.

4.6. The Candidate Selection Process and the KMT’s leadership

Our fifth hypothesis suggests:

*The emergence of Lee Teng-hui as a new party leader of the KMT helped the KMT to attract a wider electoral base and maintain party internal cohesion, by which the KMT was able to prolong and sustain its dominance after democratization. However, as Lee Teng-hui was not able to dissolve internal party conflicts, the factions began to split the KMT and weaken its electoral dominance.*

As discussed in the second chapter, party leadership has a direct impact on whether a party can maintain party cohesion and thus determine the development of one-party dominance. In theory, if a party has strong leadership that can reduce the
conflicts of the groups within the party, the party will have a stronger degree of party cohesion. In terms of one-party dominance, the dominant party has to be highly cohesive so that the party can garner stronger electoral support bases. If the degree of factionalism in a dominant party began to rise, the party may lose party supports as factions leaving the party.

On the other hand, candidate selection process within a party is crucial in determining the degree of party cohesion. Specifically, if the candidate selection process involves more selectorates, the party may have a lower degree of cohesion as the candidates have to respond to demands from more than its party leader (Hazan and Rahat 2010:149). In Taiwan’s case, the KMT used the closed party recruitment process before 1993 and the selectorates only involved party leader and members. Since 1993, the candidate selection process began to decentralize and led to a new development of the KMT’s organizational structure.

4.6.1. The Prolongation of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

The change on the KMT’s leadership has an important effect on prolonging of the KMT’s one-party dominance. As the local organization and elites began to have a greater influence over the KMT, the KMT had to cater to these local needs in order to maintain its supporters. Considering that it was important to sustain local factions’
supports, Chiang Ching-kuo decided to promote Lee Teng-hui, who was Taiwanese, in order to strengthen its party dominance in the local area. His emergence as KMT’s new leadership was crucial in prolonging the KMT’s one-party dominance because he expanded KMT’s electoral supports to more Taiwanese. Moreover, Lee Teng-hui’s moderate stance on the issue of national independence and practical diplomatic measures attracted more supporters based on his own reputation in the KMT. During Lee’s leadership, he focused on policies in favor of Taiwanese and released political criminals arrested during the KMT’s authoritarian rule.

In terms of candidate selection process, Lee maintained the same process in selecting candidates, even though some KMT conservative members demanded a greater degree of decentralization so that they can have a higher chance to be selected as candidates. With Lee’s strong control over the KMT’s party organization and Taiwanese-friendly policy, the KMT was able to prolong one-party dominance after the end of authoritarian rule. To support our hypothesis, if we examine the 1996 presidential election, the KMT still enjoyed an absolute majority of Taiwanese support (54% votes). As discussed in our second chapter, the leader in the presidential system tends to garner electoral support because of his/her reputation. We believe that
the 1996 presidential election confirms the theory that Lee successfully attracted Taiwanese supporters and maintain the KMT’s party organization.

**4.6.2. The Decline of the KMT’s One-Party Dominance**

The KMT’s party organization became weaker in the late 1990s. In terms of the development of factionalism within the KMT, Lee’s leadership upset conservative members of the KMT who disagreed with his policies in favor of Taiwanese and his close relationship with the DPP. It was during these circumstances that the NKMTA emerged as the opposition force against Lee. Essentially, the rift between Lee and the NKMTA was irresolvable since Lee intended to make the KMT into a more Taiwanese friendly party. The NKMTA left the KMT in 1993 as Lee began a new party reshuffle on certain political positions and removed one member of the NKMTA.

On the other hand, candidate selection process was one important factor that catalyzed factionalism of the KMT to a greater extent. We can see that candidate selection process was unsatisfactory to the conservative members of the KMT because during the 1992 legislative election the NKMTA sought to nominate their own candidates and did not follow the plan of a party leader. Essentially, the following year the NKMTA left the party given that they won some seats. Yet, the
greater setback of this closed candidate selection process occurred as the 2000 presidential election approached. James Soong, who was the previous popular Taiwanese governor, hoped to be nominated as the 2000 president candidate but was rejected by Lee, given that Lee already promised Lien a candidacy earlier. According to the poll conducted prior to the presidential election, James Soong was upset that Lee ignored the fact that he was ahead of Lien and did not nominate him as president candidate. This resulted in James Soong leaving the KMT to run for president independently in 2000. The 2000 presidential election confirmed our hypothesis that the incapability of Lee’s leadership in the late 1990s facilitated a higher degree of factionalism in the KMT and put an end to the KMT’s one-party dominance.

4.6.3. Conclusion on Candidate Selection Process and Leadership on the KMT’s One-Party Dominance

Our third chapter emphasizes the importance of party leadership and candidate selection process on the development of party cohesion. Based on our evidence and information, we confirmed that these two factors were crucial in the development of the KMT’s one-party dominance. For one, Lee’s Taiwanese friendly policies attracted a high degree of supporters from other political groups and a closed candidate selection process ensured a degree of KMT members’ loyalty. By doing so, the KMT prolonged its one-party dominance after the end of the KMT’s authoritarian rule.
successfully. On the other hand, Lee’s strong and authoritative leadership increased factionalism because of disagreement over candidate selection process and led to the great loss of KMT’s supporters in the 2000 presidential election as James Soong left the KMT.

4.7. Conclusion:

In this chapter, we discuss the period of dominant party system in Taiwan by revisiting Greene’s definition. We found that the dominant party system in Taiwan during 1987 and 2000 should not be defined as DPAR because Freedom House suggested that Taiwan became a democracy during 1996 and 1997. To qualify Taiwan’s dominant party system, we mark the year 1987 when martial law was lifted as the beginning because the Taiwanese people were granted a greater degree of civil rights and political rights. Therefore, we defined the period between 1987 (the lifting of the martial law) and 2000 (the defeat of the KMT) as a dominant party system.

Under the first hypothesis, we discussed what and how U.S. influences impacted the development of the KMT. In terms of the emergence of the KMT as a dominant party, we found that the financial and military aid, due to the change of the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. during the Korean War, promoted the
Taiwanese economic development, which helped the KMT attract electoral support, and provided the KMT with extra resources for patronage. In terms of the decline of the KMT, we found that the strengthening relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan was also a double-edged sword, by which the opposition party emerged in the pursuit of democratic values. As Taiwan was democratized, it would be less likely for the KMT to sustain its one-party dominance through patronage relationships given that the check-and-balance institutions were in place.

According to the second hypothesis, we discussed how the KMT managed the crisis in 1971 that impacted the development of the KMT as a dominant party. In terms of the prolongation of the KMT’s one-party dominance, we found that the changing strategies in the face of diplomatic dilemmas were crucial for the KMT to sustain its dominance. The KMT was inflexible on the issue of recognizing China as a country. However, as China’s diplomatic relationships began to gain influence, the KMT had to soften its stance on the issue to avoid diplomatic isolation. The later leadership of the KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, used more flexible strategies and gained the support from the Taiwanese people. In terms of the decline of the KMT, as the DPP softened its stance on the issue of national independence, the
voters began to shift party affiliation to them and the KMT could no longer present itself as the only Taiwanese interest protector.

According to the third hypothesis, we discussed how the shifting generations affected the development of the KMT as a dominant party. We found that the Taiwanese residents between 1992 and 1995 identified themselves as Chinese more than as Taiwanese. However, the emerging generations began to demonstrate a higher degree of identification as Taiwanese instead of Chinese since 1996 and this trend never reversed again. In terms of the link between self-identification and party affiliation, we found that the KMT’s supporters shifted from consisting of a lower degree (11.8%) of Taiwanese to a moderate degree (30.4%) of Taiwanese. In terms of the prolongation of the KMT, we argue that the older cohorts of voters who recognized themselves as Chinese in the early 1990s were the key for the KMT to maintain its dominance. On the other hand, in terms of the decline of the KMT, we argue that the decreasing influence of the older cohorts in the voter turnout weakened the KMT’s electoral support. As the majority of the Taiwanese residents began to shift self-identification from Chinese to Taiwanese, it was more likely to benefit the party which had a stronger image of Taiwanese interests.
Under the fourth hypothesis, we discussed how the SNTV system impacted the development of the KMT as a dominant party. We found that under the SNTV system the bigger parties with more resources were more likely to win elections because it involved strategies in nominating candidates in a two-seat district. According to the statistics, we found that the DPP was more likely to suffer from nomination problems than the KMT as the district magnitude increased. In the same chapter, we also discussed how the lately reformed electoral system affected the development of dominant party systems, in which we found that the SNTV was more likely to benefit the resourceful party to become a dominant party and have a dominant party system.

In the fifth hypothesis, we discussed how leadership change of the KMT affected its development as a dominant party. We found that the emergence of Lee Teng-hui was beneficial to the KMT’s one-party dominance because of his social background as a Taiwanese, by which he was able to attract a wider degree of electoral support, and the process of candidate selections that he continued from the previous KMT’s leadership. In terms of increasing electoral support, in contrast to the KMT’s conservative stance, Lee choose to stay neutral on the issue of national independence and pursue the expansion of diplomatic relationships which made him win more electoral support for the KMT. In terms of the process of candidate selection, Lee had
strong control over candidacy selection which reduced the degree of factionalism of the KMT. We argue that Lee’s leadership of the KMT was important to the KMT’s one-party dominance. On the other hand, in the late 1990s, as James Soong became a popular candidate for the presidential election, Lee faced the dilemma of nominating presidential candidates because he already promised Lien to be the presidential candidate. The failure of solving the dilemma led the KMT to split votes between James Soong and Lien and end the KMT’s 51 year one-party dominance.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In this thesis we have discussed the potential factors that may facilitate the emergence and the decline of the dominant parties and party systems in Taiwan. In Taiwan, the historical American influence weighed heavily on Taiwan, leading to economic development and making Taiwan a special case among the countries with dominant parties and party systems. We found that 1) American aid during the second World War, 2) the ability of the KMT to solve diplomatic isolation, 3) the stronger identification with the KMT among senior voters, 4) the SNTV electoral system, 5) and the strong leadership and closed candidate selection system within KMT were crucial to the prolongation of the KMT’s one-party dominance. On the other hand, 1) American influences that facilitated the emergence of opposition groups in Taiwan, 2) opposition parties that demonstrated a similar platform as that of the KMT regarding national independence, 3) the younger generation that replaced the elder voter cohorts identified less with the KMT, 4) and a faltering leadership and unreformed candidate selection process in the KMT weakened the KMT’s one-party dominance.

To assess the theories that are pertinent to our puzzle, we have looked through theories that explain party development in search of the factors relating to the changes
of electoral bases. This concluding chapter will summarize the previous chapters of this thesis and provide an update on Taiwan’s party system development.

Chapter One provided an overview of the puzzle of dominant parties and party systems that, based on Greene’s resource theory, a dominant party would expect a higher likelihood of ending its dominance if the available resources to build patronage ties declined. Taiwan is a good case study in this respect due to the fact that its economic development was ongoing as the KMT’s one-party dominance only ended in the 2000 presidential election. In addition, the collapse of the Communist successor parties in democracy is often more expected because we would assume that their dominance in authoritarian regimes is based on factors besides real electoral bases. Yet, based on Grzymala-Busse’s theory, the fortune of the Communist successor party has more to do with its adaptability and it therefore suggests that it is of more use to examine the party adaptability to see party development. In order to support this argument, we provided an overview to examine the key components that constitute democracy and showed that dominant parties can exist in both democracy and non-democracy as long as elections in the party systems are contestable despite the degree of fairness. If the communist successor party can survive through regime transformation from a closed authoritarian to a hybrid regime and to democracy at the
end, the fate of the dominant party does not necessarily have anything to do with democratization. The development of the KMT in Taiwan’s politics had followed this pattern, therefore the thesis sought explanations from the perspective of party development instead of regime development. In addition, Greene’s resource theory added an interesting spin to Taiwan’s case. He suggests that the richer parties would have a greater chance to win elections by tilting the playing field unfairly through the use of patronage ties. Yet, Taiwan’s background seemed to contradict this argument because the KMT ended its one-party dominance with no lessening resources at hand and we therefore wonder what other factors may better explain the KMT’s development.

In order to develop an analytical framework, Chapter Two departed in search of the factors that could facilitate the development of political parties, of which we found factors that strengthened electoral bases of a party while others weakened electoral strength. Through an extensive literature review, we found four factors that facilitated party development: external social impact, internal social change, the effect of institutional settings, and party organization. In Chapter Two we also dealt with the issue of redefining the party system that arises as a dominant party emerges. Earlier literature understood the existence of a dominant party as a party that won elections over a long period of time but did not consider it the emergence of dominant party
systems. Yet, later scholars modified the definition by proposing dominant party systems where a dominant party is present. This redefinition of party system allowed them to better evaluate the true nature of party systems. In this chapter we defined the use of dominant parties and party systems based on current scholars’ work on party systems. To build our analytical framework and hypotheses, we looked through the literature, based on the four factors that could facilitate the development of parties, to structure into five specific hypotheses.

In Chapter Three, we categorized the historical background and information relevant to our five hypotheses as follow: 1) external social impact: international influence, 2) external social impact: crisis management, 3) internal social impact: generational replacement theory, 4) the effect of institutional setting: electoral system, and 5) the development of internal party structure: party recruitment process and party leadership. Our analysis relied on these hypotheses in the subsequent chapter. In terms of international influence, we found that the U.S. government provided the KMT government with generous financial and military aid during 1951 and 1965 because of the outbreak of the Korean War, which essentially strengthened the KMT’s resource-base. With this aid, Taiwan’s foreign policy began to connect with the U.S. intensively, and Taiwan and the U.S. cosigned a defense treaty against the expansion
of communism. On the other hand, the strengthened ties between the U.S. and Taiwan impacted the awareness of Taiwanese on the issue of democratization. The evidence was that the Taiwanese publishers and associations in the U.S. promoting democratization increased and they demanded the KMT government to liberalize politics to a greater degree, to allow political competition and participation at both the national and local levels. By doing so, opposition groups began to emerge as the forces to question the KMT’s authoritarian rule.

In terms of crisis management, we found that the 1971 event in the United Nations was a political crisis challenge to the KMT’s rule. However, the KMT’s leaders, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, at the time were able to promote the strategies that expanded Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships with as many nations in the world. At the same time, the DPP, which had a stronger stance on the issue of national independence, could not attract sufficient supporters to challenge the KMT’s rule because their extreme ideology on the issue of national independence led Taiwanese to shy away from supporting them. Regarding generational changes on the development of the KMT’s one-party dominance, there is a discrepancy between the older and younger voters on the party identification towards the KMT. The data in Chapter Three has shown that the earlier generations had a stronger
party-identification towards the KMT while the younger ones do not show the same pattern. This is the result of the change of socialization experiences between the earlier generations and the younger ones. Specifically, the elder generations would have a stronger degree of self-identification as Chinese, tying their party identification towards the KMT, and the degree dropped as the younger generations emerge. As time passed younger voter turnout showed a greater degree of influence than the elder voters.

In terms of the electoral system, we gathered historical evidence and electoral results that showed the opposition groups would have less capacity to defeat the KMT because of a lack of resources. Interestingly, we also found that if a riding allowed only one or two candidates to compete, the opposition groups would not necessarily have lost the elections. As the contestable seats grow, the gap of seat distribution between the KMT and the opposition groups became greater, which demonstrates the effect of the electoral system. In terms of party leadership and candidate selection process, we provided a historical account of the development of the KMT’s leadership and candidate selection process, in which we can see that the KMT began to reshuffle and evolve after Lee became the KMT’s leader. Lee’s leadership was beneficial in prolonging the KMT’s one-party dominance because he attracted Taiwanese voters.
that the KMT was not able to. Yet, the conservatives within the KMT were not satisfied with Lee’s policies that kept close ties with the DPP and showed a more moderate stance on the issue of national independence, so they formed the NKMTA and left the KMT in 1993. The greatest of the KMT’s electoral loss was when former Taiwan governor, James Soong, left the KMT and nominated himself as an independent presidential candidate, which took away 36.8% Taiwanese vote from the KMT and ended the KMT’s 38 year one-party dominance. This result was because the KMT’s leader was not able to smooth out the factionalism within the KMT, which led to splits of the NP and PFP in the end.

In Chapter Four, we used the analytical framework developed in our second chapter in order to analyze our puzzle: what factors prolonged and facilitated the decline the KMT’s one-party dominance. We evaluated five hypotheses by using the information provided in Chapter Three. We found that the U.S. influences gave the KMT extra resources than the opposition groups were able to acquire and it directly provided greater chances for the KMT to prolong its dominance after the country was democratized. The U.S. influences also catalyzed the emergence of opposition groups in Taiwan, which eventually defeated the KMT after it agglomerated enough resources to compete. In the second hypothesis, we found that the KMT was capable of dealing with the political crisis derived from the 1971 event and, therefore, it
provided a stronger incentive for the electorate to support the party. In addition, the opposition groups at the time had a more extreme ideology on the issue of national independence, which led to a higher degree of difficulty in attracting votes in the national elections, and the KMT one-party dominance could therefore be prolonged.

In terms of the decline of the KMT’s one-party dominance, we found that the readjusting stance of the opposition group on the issue of national independence made it capable of competing for votes with the KMT and weakened the KMT’s one-party dominance.

In our third hypothesis, we found that the emerging generations had an accumulated effect on the development of the whole electorate and led to the decline of the KMT’s one-party dominance. We identified that the senior voters had a stronger degree of party identification towards the KMT as they had a stronger degree of self-identification as Chinese instead of Taiwanese. Yet, the emerging generations, with different socialization experiences, began to develop a greater degree of self-identification as Taiwanese and the KMT was no longer able to sustain the same sources of electoral support as in the past. In our fourth hypothesis, the evidence suggested that SNTV system gave a greater degree of benefit to the more resourceful parties and the medium-size party, which was more likely to compete with the bigger
party, had the greater odds of losing more seats than that of smaller parties. Finally, in
the last hypothesis, the historical record suggests that the development of the KMT’s
leadership and candidate selection process impacted the degree of the KMT’s party
cohesion. We found that, during Lee’s tenure, he first was able to receive greater
Taiwanese support for the KMT because his background and all factions seemed to be
united initially. Yet, the increasing degree of factionalism within the KMT caused the
split of the NKMTA and James Soong’s independent president candidacy in 2000,
which weakened the electoral bases of the KMT in the end. In short, Taiwan’s case
confirmed our five hypotheses.

Interestingly, Taiwan held a presidential election in 2012 and it seemed that the
KMT was likely to become a dominant party and form a DPDR if it wins the next
presidential election with the majority in the legislative Yuan in 2016. The first defeat
of the KMT in the 2000 presidential election was disastrous (39.3 % (DPP) versus
23.1 % (KMT) of all votes). Yet, the KMT’s electoral base regained strength as the
presidential result in 2004 was marginal (50.11 % (DPP) versus 49.89 % (KMT) of all
votes). In 2008, the KMT took back office from the DPP and it once again maintained
a higher degree of Taiwanese support in the 2012 presidential election (45.63% (DPP)
versus 51.60 % (KMT) of all votes). At this point, we argue that the adaptability of a
party to the changing society was crucial in regaining and sustaining its dominance, given that the emerging parties become more capable to compete with the more resourceful parties, if they successfully mobilize Taiwanese, and the institutional settings stay consistent.
# APPENDIX:

## Appendix 1. Comparison of Concepts of Dominant Parties and Party Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Threshold of dominance</th>
<th>Relationship with the Oppositions</th>
<th>Party Systems</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duverger (1954) “Political Parties”</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Visibly stronger and difficult to be challenged</td>
<td>Two-Party Systems or Multi-Party System</td>
<td>Observe whether the doctrines and ideologies were widely accepted by the public</td>
<td>France-the Radical Parties under the Third Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1: Comparison of Concepts of Dominant Parties and Party Systems

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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Boucek & Bogaards (2010)  
“Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons” | positions or four consecutive winning elections | Repressive Measures in authoritarian regimes | Democratic Regimes | Structural Factors (electoral and Strategic Factors (electoral, executive, and coalition dimensions)) could matter in one-party dominance | (1936-1976).etc  
DPARs:  
Malaysia: UMNO/BN (1974-)  
Taiwan: The KMT (1987-2000)  
Singapore: The PAP (1981-)  
Mexico: The PRI (1929-1997)…etc |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Nomination system and methods for party member participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1</td>
<td>County magistrates and city mayors</td>
<td>Selective support for qualified candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2nd session provisional provincial assemblymen; county magistrates and city mayors</td>
<td>Quasi-closed primary system, electoral outcomes not made public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Provincial assemblymen; county magistrates and city mayors</td>
<td>Quasi-primary system for provincial assemblymen; party member opinion response system for magistrates and mayors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>Party member opinion response; with inquiries via party bulletins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Party member opinion response during party cell meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-9</td>
<td>Provincial assemblymen; county magistrates and city mayors; supplementary members of the representative bodies; Taipei municipal councillors</td>
<td>Party cell opinion response; registration for nomination taking place after cell inquiries were held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>Supplementary members of the representative bodies; provincial assemblymen; county magistrates and city mayors; Taipei municipal councillors</td>
<td>Party member opinion response, with aspirant evaluation by party members during party cell meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Supplementary representatives of the Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Provincial assemblymen; Taipei municipal councillors; county magistrates and city mayors; supplementary members of the</td>
<td>Party member opinion response, with aspirant evaluation by party members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type of election</td>
<td>Nomination system and methods for party member participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Supplementary members of the representative bodies</td>
<td>Party member opinion response and cadres’ evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Provincial assemblymen; Taipei and Kaohsiung municipal councillors; county magistrates and city mayors</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Supplementary representatives of the Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>Same as above; a revised party member opinion response system used in Taipei municipality, with straw voting during aspirant get-acquainted meetings but results not made public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-7</td>
<td>Provincial assemblymen; Taipei and Kaohsiung municipal councillors; county magistrates and city mayors; supplementary members of the representative bodies</td>
<td>Revised party member opinion response system, with evaluation by party, political and social cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Supplementary representative of the Legislative Yuan; provincial assemblymen; Taipei and Kaohsiung municipal councillors; county magistrates and city mayors</td>
<td>Closed party primary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; session representative of the National Assembly</td>
<td>Revised closed party primary, 60% by primary, 40% by cadres’ evaluation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Type of election</td>
<td>Nomination system and methods for party member participation</td>
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<td>Primary system of party delegates for presidential election; party member opinion inquiry for the rest</td>
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<td>Primary system of party delegates for municipal mayoral elections; party member opinion inquiry for the rest</td>
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<td>President</td>
<td>Primary system of party delegates</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY:


