Seeking Authentic Educational Development Practice: A Spiritual and Philosophical Journey

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A Thesis in the Special Individualized Programme

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ABSTRACT

Seeking Authentic Educational Development Practice: A Spiritual and Philosophical Journey

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This thesis is a spiritual and philosophical journey whose purpose is to explore the question: How can I realize my authenticity more fully in my practice as educational developer? The investigation is situated autobiographically in various dilemmas of educational development practice that I experienced. These experiences are consequences of tensions between the performative demands of the culture of western universities and the more ontological demands of authenticity. Authenticity calls us to a moral, "higher" educational purpose to become persons in a more developed sense. I propose that performative acts and utterances designed to create an impression of excellence and efficiency, and to improve competitiveness and wealth of universities, can obscure this higher educational purpose, denigrating authenticity of individual educators and of the institutions within which we work. I also propose that the Social Sciences research paradigms underpinning academic development as an emerging field of study and practice have methodological limitations for educational research. This lack of an authentically educational methodological paradigm, focused on the development of persons and rooted in educational practice, is at the heart of the stated problems of lack of legitimacy in the field of academic development. In this thesis I both employ and propose philosophical fieldwork as a new, inclusive paradigm for higher education research and practice that is concerned with the "higher" development of persons. This paradigm does not necessarily exclude or delegitimize performative criteria or traditional or postmodern methodological approaches. It acknowledges and critiques them in the context of what it is to be educational. At the same time this paradigm includes and legitimates a moral horizon (and language) of education that facilitates individual and institutional authenticity. I identify moral and spiritual dispositions and qualities of listening, thinking, and being underpinning this educational methodology – a pathway for realizing my authenticity more fully in my practice.
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INTRODUCTION

The ultimate educational force is who I am, and who we are, and what if that cannot be faced? (Wilshire, 1990, p. 203)

In this thesis I aim to more fully realize my authenticity in my practice as educational developer through an exploration of the tension between the demands of performative criteria in higher education and the demands of the individual seeking authenticity in the university. Originally, my investigation within the Special Individualized Programme (SIP) was to focus on the qualities and competencies of faculty related to effective teaching and learning. I had intended to interview professors with the objective of enriching and deepening understanding of qualities and competencies that support effective teaching and learning in higher education. While I remain committed to supporting teaching and learning, my original focus on qualities and competencies of professors shifted. This occurred as the result of an experience of “loss” of what I saw as my professional identity as educational developer. Through my ensuing reflections and research, I came to see that the qualities and competencies required of educators (beginning with myself) must flow from an authenticity that is, by definition, connected to a higher purpose (Taylor, 1991). Authenticity has become, for me, the source, the organizing principle, and guide for my identity as educator. Authenticity, as individuals and as individuals in community is, in my view, the hope for the great evolving project of higher education and its institutions.

I have also come to view performativity (Lyotard, 1984), an ideology of which I was unaware at the initial conceptualization of my thesis, as an element in the
academy that can be pernicious to the extent that it overshadows personal, community, and, inevitably, institutional authenticity. Left unacknowledged and unarticulated, the demands of performative criteria in and on higher education institutions can unnecessarily contribute to, or perhaps exacerbate, conflict and suffering both personally and professionally. More profoundly, I became aware that, given my vision of practice, the source of my identity and contribution as educator must be shifted more consciously from the performative to the authentic. Thus, although the end remains the same, in terms of ultimately supporting the teaching and learning project of higher education, my research perspective, and its underlying philosophy, has been both illuminated and transformed, moving from learning about others (Todd, 2003) through a focus on their narratives to learning from others and from myself and my experience. In my view this perspective is aligned more surely with my desire to more fully realize my authenticity in my practice.

In order to accommodate the evolution of this thesis, its structure was shifted from traditional to manuscript based. This shift occurred after struggling with persistent methodological barriers that worsened as the writing progressed. What I was doing became increasingly difficult to fit into traditional methodological frameworks of social science research. Before beginning the writing, I conducted an extensive review and critique of quantitative and qualitative research paradigms in the Social Sciences. It became clear to me that these paradigms and related methodological approaches were inadequate to the kind of educational research I wished to engage in. Through this process, I came upon the work of Jack Whitehead (1989, 1999) an educational action researcher who proposed creating a living
educational theory based in the question: “How can I improve my practice?” Whitehead also questioned the adequacy of Social Sciences paradigms for educational research. He believed that academics who write about educational theory should claim to know their development and subject it to public criticism, toward creating what he called a “living educational theory” (1989, p. 41). This more philosophical and practitioner-oriented approach to educational research appealed to me because it was based explicitly in what one knows and how one has come to know it. While I did not adopt Whitehead’s action research model because it was more focused on classroom research, I retained his notion that the heart of educational inquiry, perhaps unlike inquiry in other Social Sciences disciplines, is the individual “living I” of the researcher. Choosing the manuscript-based option freed me to bring the “I” more fully into my inquiry and to adopt a more philosophical approach. The required feature of linking text inserted between chapters in the manuscript-based option made it possible for me to more coherently capture and link the various elements of my experience and research. Not long after, and I believe because of the freedom this new format afforded, I was able to identify and define my methodology as doing philosophical fieldwork (Minnich, 2005).

The shift from traditional to manuscript as well as the “personal” nature of some of the text has implications for reading the thesis. Thus some advance preparation and framing may be helpful to the reader. My thesis is both part of, and an account of, a personal and professional transformative journey. How can a methodological approach for a doctoral thesis capture and honour such a journey and, at the same time, meet scholarly expectations and standards of rigor and originality?
There is indeed a growing concern amongst feminist educators that the rich legacy of feminist pedagogy and scholarship could be yet again erased from history to be replaced by more “shallow” (Clegg & David, 2006, p. 149) pedagogies emerging from a growing tradition of personal discourses and more personalized education. This concern is very relevant to this thesis for I see it as feminist scholarship. It is based in my feminism, synonymous with my humanity. My feminism embodies the value I place on the personal and on always remembering and articulating through scholarship that humanity is shaped by the primal performative demand, namely gender. My feminism provides needed courage to try to insert the personal, inspired by the knowledge that how I perceive and experience the world, and how I am perceived and experienced by others, is gendered. In my view, perceived difference, particularly gender difference, matters in all human endeavours, including educational research. A central concern for me throughout the writing was to insert the personal in a scholarly fashion worthy of feminist scholarship and true to my journey toward authenticity.

My committee, colleagues, friends, and, I struggled with the personal nature of the text. It is: “unusual”, “dangerous”, “heretical”, “never done before”, “will make the reader too uncomfortable”, “makes me too uncomfortable”. I edited, deleted, and rearranged. I understood the validity of these sentiments. Above all, I wanted my individual and unique journey to make a contribution to educational research and not detract from my message or unnecessarily distract the reader. I hope that I have accomplished this balance. Clearly however, there is a need to prepare the reader - to
describe at the outset the methodological process of (educational) philosophical fieldwork (Minnich, 2005) that underlies my thesis journey.

I remind the reader that this philosophical fieldwork is carried out within the context of the Special Individualized Programme (SIP), a programme that I chose because it is designed to support innovative research. It is also carried out within the emerging field of higher education studies – a field with tentative philosophical grounding. As of this writing, no recognized Canadian doctoral programmes are offered in the field of academic development. In my view, philosophical fieldwork, which emerged authentically during this investigation, is an ideal and appropriate methodological approach given the newness of the field and the problems with basing educational research solely in traditional Social Sciences (particularly sociology) paradigms.

Philosophical fieldwork was a challenging methodological path, taken within a challenging and demanding individualized doctoral programme. My methodology, in particular the philosophical assumptions underlying my inquiry, was not established at the outset, but rather emerged naturally through the reading, writing, and reflection process.

Before beginning to write this thesis, my methodological dilemma had already been established. I had found existing methodologies in the Social Sciences inadequate and, as mentioned above, had some idea of the personal, living “I” that I wanted to place at the heart of my educational inquiry, but did not know how I would accomplish this. Nowhere had academic development scholarship truly broken the
“silence”, not to mention explicitly used the self or perceptions of a professional crisis and transformation, to connect to and inform professional and institutional learning and development. Educational action research had some credibility but was limited in scope. Autoethnography offered a partial solution and I drew from this genre, as you will see. However, autoethnography is not a familiar, or perhaps even credible, methodological approach in academic development scholarship. Barnett (2004a, 2004b) offered a more philosophical methodological approach but focused almost exclusively on institutional leadership as key to institutional transformation and did not include the individual educator in any substantive way.

I believe firmly in the preciousness and centrality of individual human beings. The authenticity of the individual holds the initiating potential for creating authentic communities and institutions. Authenticity thus comes first. I had to find a way to locate the individual in my thesis to reflect this centrality. The individual I could locate in this manner was myself. I could access my own journey; my conscious seeking of authenticity in the context of serving higher education. Thus, where needed, I locate myself both as researcher and as subject, or, more accurately, object of study. This arrangement also solved another issue of concern related to my choice of methodology, namely my ethical conflict over making others the object of my study in any subtle or overt manner. I have no conflict ethically with using myself. I believe this approach makes possible a greater potential for accuracy of “interpretation” given that I can check with myself to verify, refine, and deepen the “data”.

1 Personal communication, Arshad Ahmad, November 2006. In reference to STLHE discussions on deconstructing silence in higher education.
Paradoxically I am not the “person” you will read “about” in this thesis, for Life moves, and I and all beings move with it, changing, learning, and developing. Through the experience of attempting to insert the living I, I have come to understand Foucault’s (2003) concept of the author-function. The author is not an individual or a person and the discourse of the author has no relation to the real person outside the discourse. It is the author-function that operates in my thesis. The author function then is a certain notion of the author held in societal (higher education and academic development in this case) discourse that changes with the times and context. It exerts different forces on the same text at different moments in history. The impact and meaning of this text remain to be determined by you, readers within individual contexts, disciplinary societies, and the context of this time.

Thus, I encourage you to read the text as an experiment in philosophical fieldwork that explores issues (namely performativity and authenticity) relevant to academic development as a field of study and practice and to the project of higher education. Philosophical fieldwork is “thinking with others out and about in the agore and then reflecting in solitude with them in mind” (Minnich, 2005, p. 4). It is not an application of existing philosophical systems nor does it try to derive a theory from experience. It is “listening and hearing, looking and seeing, taking in and trying to comprehend without rushing to interpret, to translate into familiar terms, to explain” (p. 5). It is about being deeply attentive to self and others and learning from this attentiveness.

Philosophical fieldwork as a methodological approach requires deep awareness of, and explicitly incorporates, our prejudices and complexes and how they
determine our perceptions and ensuing thinking and action. Doing philosophical fieldwork is, at its core, a commitment to thinking that honours the unique capacities of comprehension and understanding we possess beyond the methods that characterize and delimit all professions and established practices (Minnich, 2005). It encourages us not to renounce, disable, or scorn the arts we possess, but to bring them firmly to our research. It encourages scholarly fearlessness along with a respect for the formalized methods necessary to prevent us from imposing what we already think we know on what we are seeking to understand. While philosophical fieldwork acknowledges a plethora of helpful methods for investigation, it is not yet another method to be learned and applied, for it acknowledges how methods legitimized by dominant meaning systems can overshadow other ways of knowing. It calls us into fresh thinking.

Fresh thinking can begin with an overview, chapter by chapter of my spiritual and philosophical journey. Linking text for Chapter One introduces the autobiographical approach I employ to launch my fieldwork. In Chapter One, I set the contextual impetus for my thesis, introducing the tension between performativity and authenticity with a personal tale of a crisis and turning point viewed through three different perceptual lenses at three different points in time. This crisis in my work and in my identity as educator is explored first from the perspective of the felt experience, then from the perspective of the demands of performative fabrication in higher education, and, finally from the perspective of the demands of individual development toward authenticity. In order to illustrate the universal dimension of my experience, I use the methodological licence afforded me in my fieldwork and draw
from literature and history. Each perspective was transformational, helping me to make meaning personally, professionally, and universally.

Chapter Two is a foundational chapter, in part, a depersonalized version of Chapter One and a more traditional literature review of the relevant literature on performativity and authenticity along with an analysis of their intersection with higher education. It traces the historical and philosophical development of authenticity and performativity and explores their relevance to individuals working in the academy and to the project of higher education. It is also intended to establish the meaning I ascribe to these two major concepts of the thesis. To keep the integrity of each manuscript and to enable them to stand alone, I have repeated some text from Chapter One and from the linking text to this chapter. I have attempted to keep repetition to a minimum so as not to distract the reader.

Chapter Three asks: What is higher education inquiry and practice? I provide autobiographical contexts in the linking text, as well as at the beginning of the chapter. These are two very different, yet relevant, contexts at two different levels of experience, the spiritual or mystical and the everyday experience of a faculty developer. The first experience is described in the linking text because this descriptive format is, as I see it, more conducive to the less traditional (in educational research) nature of the text. Linking texts are not intended for submission for publication. Both contexts, however, are directly relevant to how we come to know and to the construction of knowledge in educational research. I draw from these experiences and from an analysis of research paradigms in the Social Sciences to create a model for higher education inquiry and practice that is more resonant with
my experience as educator and with my view of authentic higher education inquiry and practice.

Chapter Four is entitled *Challenging Performative Fabrication: Claiming Authenticity in Academic Development Practice*. This manuscript is in press for a Special Issue of *International Journal for Academic Development*, (IJAD 12(1)), *Thinking otherwise in academic development: Critical reflections on identity and practice*. The linking text to this chapter provides an autobiographical context of the evolution of this co-authored article. This manuscript reflects, in published and more concrete form, the discussions, reflections, writing, transdisciplinary scope, and deep self - reflexivity of philosophical fieldwork. It introduces into the thesis the experiences and perspectives of others through autoethnographical case study of three educational developers’ experiences (myself included) explored from the perspectives of performativity and authenticity. Including others in my study as full participant/subjects enabled an ethically acceptable educational approach that unites inquiry and practice.

Chapter Five is a concluding chapter, returning to the question: How can I realize my authenticity in my educational development practice? Here I reflect on the tools and dispositions I have developed and identified through the thesis process. I conclude that philosophical fieldwork is a viable methodological approach for academic development as an emerging field of study and practice and identify three tasks of my philosophical fieldwork, namely, listening, thinking, and being.

With the exception of the concluding chapter, each chapter is preceded by a connecting text that explains how it fits with the theme of the thesis and the
progression of the manuscripts. The linking text allowed me to respect the
requirement of the manuscript option and to move outside convention to more deeply
and freely insert my self into the thesis as I wrote about the background context to the
chapters.

This thesis is an articulation of my experiences and values and a
foregrounding of the implications of these experiences and values beyond the
personal. This articulation is in service to the project of higher education and the
emerging field of academic development. Through my experience I have changed;
there has been a transformation in how I see myself, and my role, as faculty developer
and educator. I have come to know with certainty that who I am must be faced, for I
am indeed the ultimate educational force.
ROLE OF CO AUTHORS

Kim McShane, of the University of Sydney, Australia, and Susan Wilcox, of Queen’s University, Canada, collaborated with me as second and third authors on Chapter Four, a manuscript currently in press for the *International Journal of Academic Development*, IJAD 12(1). This article was based on my thesis inquiry into the tensions between performativity and authenticity that was in progress throughout our collaboration. It is also based in Kim’s Ph.D. thesis, completed during our collaboration, and in Susan’s ongoing research into transformative models of education and development. Preparing this manuscript was very much a collaborative process as we communicated electronically throughout, employing autobiographical analysis of our shared professional experiences. In addition to ongoing related discussion on the CAD listserv, there were three levels of peer review: an internal process where other authors of the Special Issue were assigned papers, external blind review by experts in the field, and review by the IJAD editorial committee. The issue also includes an opening overview of the papers and how they are linked, as well as a final critique paper by two experts in the field.
CHAPTER ONE: Contextual Tale from Three Perspectives

LINKING TEXT

Research always carries within itself an epistemology a theory about knowledge and truth and their relationship to the world or ‘reality’. (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.149)

Chapter One is an autoethnographic account of the professional crisis that was the catalyst for this thesis. At best it may illustrate how perceptions define our reality and illuminate the suffering that is often the catalyst to transformative learning and development. At worst it can be seen as an exercise in narcissism. As you will see in this thesis, I am committed to the inclusion of context in the construction of knowledge that expands always toward inclusion of ever widening possible ways of knowing. Thus, I include this account because it is an important contextual background for my inquiry. It is in the spirit of the thesis.

Autoethnographer Andrew Sparks (2002) describes his visceral reaction to a colleague’s stinging claim that Sparks’ PhD student’s autoethnographic dissertation seemed “a bit self indulgent” (p. 210). He acknowledges that autoethnographic writing can become self-indulgent confessionalism and makes a case instead for artful writing that is self-knowing, self-respectful, self-sacrificing, and self-luminous. Sparks sees the hostile criticisms of autobiographical writing in the Social Sciences as grounded in a deep mistrust of the self. The self, for example, contaminates and must be eliminated in the interest of “legitimacy”. The self does not have any generalizable relevance to the field. True scholars are to be seen only in the credits and not heard in the text (Sparks, 2002). These assumptions are, in my view, rooted in falsely dualistic
thinking that can be, at least partially, dissolved through autobiographical writing. The autobiographical project disputes false dualisms of self/other, inner/outer, and public/private. It offers to educational research an experimental method, a way to break out of methods adopted from the dominant traditions. Though decidedly risky, autoethnography offers a way to try to ground research and scholarship in the ordinary human experiences of everyday life. In particular, with regard to academic development, it offers a reflexive portal into the experiences and realities of everyday practice. It legitimates the struggles of practice as the needed material for articulating a philosophy of academic development that will shape our field and, to the extent that it has an impact, the critical teaching and learning project of higher education.

Indeed, there is little basis for the assumptions that would eliminate autobiographical writing as a legitimate form of scholarship. As Sparks asserts, autobiographical writing cannot only be about the self. It is relational by the very fact that someone is being addressed. Indeed, autoethnographic writing “works toward a communitas, where we might speak together of our experiences, find commonality of spirit, companionship in our sorrow, balm for our wounds, and solace in reaching out to those in need” (Ellis, 2002, p. 401). Thus, reflexivity is not merely a matter of being up front about one’s personal values and standpoint for it involves finding out about (or researching) the self and foregrounding: “the implication of the personal within what is beyond the personal” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 149). This is what I hope to accomplish in this first chapter.

This first chapter provides a contextual background to my thesis, describing the professional conflict that catalyzed my personal and professional transformation
toward a new way of seeing and being, an educator. I revisit that conflict here to provide the contextual basis for my inquiry.
CHAPTER ONE
Contextual Tale from Three Perspectives

When those who have the power to name and to socially construct reality choose not to see you or hear you, whether you are dark skinned, old, disabled, female, or speak with a different accent or dialect than theirs, when someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing. (Adrienne Rich, quoted in Maher & Tetreault, 1994, p. 1)

Adrienne Rich’s words capture what I, at first, experienced as the dehumanization and suffering that ended not only my job as faculty developer but also what I saw as my identity as a professional. Slowly and surely, through a series of events and decisions, I faded from view in the university where I had studied and worked for most of my adult life. Having had the opportunity to reflect, I now see this experience in a positive, transformative light. Rich’s words describe the impermanent and arbitrary nature of socially constructed realities and the socially-constructed identities which are the products of such realities. I have come to see this moment of “psychic disequilibrium” as Divine providence, an opening to a new way of seeing my self, my educational relationships, and the world. It is, in my view, rich with lessons about the ideological currents in higher education, their deep relevance to our ontological nature, and what tensions between ideology and ontology can mean for the future direction of higher education. This crisis of identity signified the beginning of a conscious awareness of the tensions between my desires to practice in ways that
foster my authenticity and the demands of performativity in higher education. I present this crisis from three perspectives: the catalytic, personal experience of suffering; the more generalized ideology of performativity; and the ontological seeking of authenticity. I begin with suffering.

Suffering and Change are Nigh

I started my career in academic development in 1993. I loved my job. Working with professors and their students to help improve the quality of teaching and learning was my passion. I designed and conducted consultations, workshops, programmes, and conference sessions with enthusiasm and purpose. I felt part of a great vision for higher education, feeling lucky and grateful to be able to work in a culture that embodied my love of learning and allowed me to practice in a way that resonated with my values. Ten years later, I no longer recognized myself. After a series of events and administrative decisions that reduced the autonomy of my role and narrowed my responsibilities, I was angry, overwhelmed, and disillusioned. Finally, I had to take a medical leave for depression.

The depression lifted quickly and I was medically ready to go back to work within three months. I could not, however, bring myself to return, for I knew I could not bring the same motivation and optimism to what I experienced as a very different academic culture from the one I had thrived in. I knew it was time to step back and reflect. I decided to take the time and make space in my life to do this.

There are many perspectives to any story. From my perspective, the ending began when I signalled to the administration what I saw as problems that threatened the health of all staff in the unit and which interfered with the unit’s functioning. I
believed at the time that this was my duty and that I was acting in the best interests of
the university and everyone in the unit. I would report my perceptions, what I saw
then as the truth.

Once aware of the distress in the unit, the university administration instituted
a management intervention. For me, however, things ultimately worsened, for an
outcome of this intervention was a reduction in the scope of my role and
responsibilities and finally, a change in job description that reflected this
diminishment.

I had started my career with a measure of professional autonomy and had
always been included in decisions related to faculty development programmes. With
the changes to my role, I struggled to find meaning in what I saw as trivial and
arbitrarily - assigned tasks that I had had no say in creating. I no longer had the
requisite input into decisions that affected what I saw as my professional practice, and
for which I felt ethically responsible. My identity and sense of self as a professional
eroded. Most intolerable for me, I saw myself becoming bitter and cynical, something
I had always considered poisonous and counterproductive in the academy. I could no
longer bring cheer or optimism to my work, for it had lost much of its meaning and
purpose. I felt battered and confused by an increasingly impersonal and elusive
institutional system.

While these factors were extremely difficult in themselves, the primary source
of my intense distress throughout this debacle was the fear that I would be seen
somehow as insincere or dishonest with regard to what I saw then as my good
intentions in trying to improve the working conditions of my unit. I experienced the
psychic disequilibrium that Adrienne Rich described. Indeed, although the problems were acknowledged and addressed, a polarization occurred. I began to doubt myself. I worried about what others may think of me and of my intentions. I was caught in a tangle of uncertainty. Unsure of my own perceptions, I was tormented: What is true/false; who is right/wrong, good/bad?

I had always taken great pride in being a professional. Having trained and practiced as a counsellor before coming to my faculty development position, I saw myself as committed to ethical practice. Being seen by others as honest and trustworthy was, at the time, intrinsic to my identity. I believed then that I was on the side of truth and had acted in the best interests of all. I had a foggy hope that, once I was truly heard and understood, I would somehow be redeemed. Indeed, this is exactly what happened, but not in the way I envisioned. My redemption was through a deep transformation in my perceptions and ensuing thinking about self and the academy. Most importantly, it was in my new, or perhaps reclaimed, awareness of responsibility to authenticity.

*Dawning of Awareness*

Given the opportunity of time and space to process this experience, I began to see fundamental errors in my thinking that had contributed to my intense distress. These errors were rooted in perceived opposites of right/wrong, true/false, and good/bad. I began to realize that the uncertainty I suffered was founded upon a dualistic thought paradigm that permeates society, including the university. With the help of ideology critique and a growing psychological awareness, I began to understand that there is something beyond what I now see as ego driven dualistic
thinking that fosters such painful contradiction, confusion, and uncertainty. I have come to an acceptance of a level of being (Barnett, 2004b) that is not of the ego. It is a spiritual consciousness or awareness wherein lies my true identity, my authenticity, and “the ultimate educational force” (Wilshire, 1990, p. 203) that is my responsibility to bring to the world.

My conflicted inner world was reflected in the outer world, specifically, the university culture of which I was a part. These worlds were “symbiotically linked” (Davis 1999, p. 184). As a system, the university’s “thinking” is also rooted in positivism’s dualisms (Wilshire, 1990) reflecting and reinforcing the suffering of many who, like myself, view the world from a positivist perspective. To the degree that individuals within the university are conflicted, the university itself is conflicted, denying spiritual consciousness and thwarting full individual and institutional authenticity. Charles Taylor (1991) called the broader phenomenon of spiritual ignorance in western society the “malaise of modernity”, a pervasive and dehumanizing suppression of an ethic of authenticity. This malaise can be seen to play itself out in western universities in what Jean François Lyotard (1984) identified as performativity.

With a developing understanding of the symbiotic link between personal and institutional malaise, my perspective evolved into two new and interrelated perspectives on this experience, namely, striving toward authenticity and meeting the demands of performativity. Striving toward authenticity is an inner focused perspective that includes suffering and leads to intellectual, emotional, and spiritual growth and transformation – ultimately, a dissolution of the egoic self toward a higher
non egoic Self (Taylor, 1991; Trilling, 1972). Identification of performativity focuses outward, naming an institutional malaise that fosters inauthenticity and suffering. It is my contention that individual authenticity is the starting point for healing and transformation of the self and for fostering authenticity of, and well-being within, the university. I introduce authenticity and performativity here, expanding on my personal experience of suffering in the university and drawing from literature and history to illustrate, and to learn from, the universal aspect of my human experience.

Seeking Authenticity: Spirit Arising from Suffering

Time and reflection have allowed a new perspective on the story of the end of my old identity as an honest faculty developer working for the good of all in the university. This perspective is one of striving toward authenticity. In the course of researching authenticity, I read the eighteenth century novel *Rameau’s Nephew* (Diderot, 1966). Lionel Trilling (1972) used the story in his history of sincerity and authenticity to illustrate both the alienation of the social being from the self and the liberty inherent in the human spirit. This novel captured the dysfunction in my thinking in a way that allowed me to laugh (gently) at myself and to place my experience into a wider, and healing, perspective. It dramatically illustrates the split nature of the socially constructed self, which I will refer to as ego. More importantly, Trilling’s analysis offered a hopeful, universal dimension that illuminated and expanded my understanding of my suffering and inner conflict as a conscious experience of the contradictory quality of the ego. It signified something very positive, a movement toward authenticity.
Rameau's Nephew: A Teaching on the Split Nature of Ego

Jean-François Rameau was the nephew of the great composer Jean-Phillippe Rameau. He hated his successful and selfish uncle, claiming he had never done anything for him. The nephew Rameau made a precarious living teaching singing and entertaining the wealthy, somewhat like a court jester. In the novel, the nephew meets Diderot, who he refers to as Mr. Philosopher, by chance one evening in a Paris Café. Diderot recounts the famous dialogue² between two very different characters, the philosopher (Diderot himself) and the buffoon (the nephew). Assuming himself to be the morally superior of the two, Diderot the narrator describes the nephew as one of the weirdest characters in the land. "His notions of good and evil must be strangely muddled in his head, for the good qualities nature has given him he displays without ostentation, and the bad ones without shame" (Diderot, 1966, p. 33). Toward the end of the encounter the nephew uses his substantial mimetic skills to demonstrate to Diderot how he performs the dance upon which his survival depends. Diderot describes the Nephew's pantomime:

Then, smiling as he did so, he began impersonating the admiring man, the supplicating man, the complaisant man, right foot forward, left foot behind, back bent, head up, looking fidiy into somebody's eyes, lips parted, arms held out towards something, waiting for a command, receiving it, off like an arrow, back again with it done, reporting it. He is attentive to everything, picks up what has been dropped, adjusts a pillow or puts a stool under someone's feet, holds a saucer, pushes forward a chair, opens a door, shuts a

² Famous because Hegel, Marx, and Freud used this story as a universal, applying it to explicate their theories.
window, pulls curtains, keeps his eye on the master and mistress, stands
motionless, arms at his sides and legs straight, listening, trying to read
people’s expressions. (Diderot, 1966, pp. 120-121)

This description provides a powerful mirror of myself attempting, with
increasing distress, to perform what I believed was my duty to the university. My
duty was to be competent, virtuous, and loyal, to dedicate my professionalism to
service to the university. I believed that my “success” and the university’s best
interests were one and the same. Given the fact I was a paid employee, it would be
hypocritical of me as I saw it to be anything but completely loyal in word and deed. I
was sincere and honest. Trilling explains the curiously compromised part sincerity
plays as we present ourselves on the social stage:

Society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most
efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see that we really are sincere,
that we actually are what we want our community to know we are. In short,
we act the part of a sincere person, with the result that a judgment may be
placed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic. (1972, p. 11)

Trilling’s analysis helped me to understand the bind that contributed to my
distress. Behind what I saw as my duty was fear of being judged as less than an honest
professional. As I worried about external judgments being placed on my motives, my
focus was indeed on what I wanted my community to believe about me, namely, that
I was an “honest soul” (Trilling, 1972, p. 35). It is the honest soul however who
engages in what Hegel called “the heroism of dumb service” (Trilling, 1972, p. 35).
Unbeknownst to me, my sincerity would not bring the truth and goodness to my
practice that I sought. My sincerity was ultimately inauthentic, based in an egoic
desire to be seen by my peers and superiors as honest and trustworthy.

As he performed his pantomime, Rameau’s nephew however was well aware
of the inauthenticity of his sincerity. At the end of his performance the nephew
proclaims: “There you have my pantomime; it’s about the same as the flatterer’s, the
courtier’s, the footman’s, and the beggar’s” (Diderot, 1966, p. 31). The nephew’s
unflinching pantomime is a shameless exhibition of his own shame. He is not a dumb
server. He is bitterly aware of himself as flatterer and of the social pressure to remain
so. He realizes that he must not articulate his knowledge of the unspoken contract,
which is to play the role expected of him. The nephew is aware of his degraded
relation to the external powers of society. “I do know what self-contempt is, or the
torment of the soul that comes from neglect of the talents heaven has vouchsafed us,
which is the cruellest of all. It were almost better that a man had never been born” (p.
51).

The nephew expresses my torment of the soul as I struggled and failed to
serve in ways that upheld my image of myself (and, by extension, the university) as
virtuous. A psychic split opened up. Truth and falsity, good and evil were indeed
muddled in my mind. As the cynical flatterer began to replace the dumb server, I no
longer knew myself. The, ultimately false, certainty of my professional identity
disintegrated and I became painfully aware that I could no longer continue in my
work in good conscience. This was the dawning of awareness of the inauthenticity of
my professional identity, of a deep need to know what heaven had vouchsafed me. It
was this need to know directing me to an inner path toward authenticity.
Dawning of Authenticity: Mind Becoming Aware of Itself

Man’s nature and destiny are not wholly comprehended within the narrow space between virtue and vice. (Trilling, 1972, p. 320)

The situational depression that I experienced and much more serious workplace burn out that afflicts many are, unfortunately, increasingly common today in many sectors, including universities. Such events can have severe health and economic consequences for individuals, their families, and institutions. On one level, my particular experience could be, and was, interpreted from this familiar perspective. On a deeper level however, it can be seen as the opportunity of a disintegrating and transforming way of seeing self and the world, signifying what Hegel saw as “a positive attribute and of the highest significance, nothing less than a necessary condition of the development of Spirit, of Geist, that is to say of mind in its defining act, which is to be aware of itself” (Trilling, 1972, p. 34). In moving from loyal and obedient servant there is a point of losing wholeness, of becoming a disintegrated consciousness, detached from a familiar perception of self as integrated and being aware of this. I could no longer hold onto my familiar perception of myself as honest professional and I was painfully aware of this.

The nephew’s pantomime exhibits his stark awareness of the inauthenticity of the obedience, attentiveness, and devotion he performs. It exhibits what Hegel called the “heroism of flattery” (Trilling, 1972, p. 34) which translates into a conscious choice to maintain relations with the external powers by remaining a flatterer. It is a practical commitment to, rather than identification with, the external power of society. Many take this path. Paradoxically, it represents a movement toward Spirit,
away from the esteemed good of the noble, to the baseness of the disintegrated,
alienated, and distraught consciousness. "It is Rameau, the buffoon, the flattering
parasite, the compulsive mimic, without a self to be true to: it is he who represents
Spirit moving to its next stage of development" (Trilling, 1972, p. 44).

The university was the educational society with which I had been identified. I
had placed it above regular society as a virtuous beacon for knowledge, truth, and
justice. As my identification with and by the university disintegrated, my sense of self
as professional disintegrated with it. Unlike Rameau's nephew, however, I could not
consciously choose a role of cynical flatterer. I did not become condemned to a
professional life as cynical flatterer. I had always known that cynicism was part of a
morale (and moral) problem in the university. Indeed I consciously held on to my
naïveté as a form of resistance to the cynics. To practice consciously and deliberately
as flatterer and cynic would have constituted, for me, a decision to participate
knowingly in the degradation of the university. I could not assume the mantle of
cynical flatterer and I could not return to my former role of naïve server. Both roles
were unacceptable. I was, caught between worlds.

Some feel that they inhabit a no-man's land between two worlds. They are no
longer run by the ego, yet their arising awareness has not yet become fully
integrated into their lives. Inner and outer purpose have not yet merged.

(Tolle, 2005, p. 262)

I know now that these roles were rooted in the ego and that my suffering
signified a movement toward spiritual consciousness and an opportunity to begin to
consciously merge inner and outer purpose. My thesis is part of this transformative
process. Linked to my outer purpose was naming performativity, the institutional malaise of which I was a part. This came with the help of a community of friends in the practice.

Performativie Fabrication: Naming Institutional Suffering

If universities cannot confront questions of meaning and of goodness, vitality, purpose, beauty, reality, the universe directly lived – they suffer moral collapse. This has happened. (Wilshire, 1990, p. 203)

One of my major projects as faculty developer was the evaluation of a funded teaching and technology project. This included interviewing 21 project participants. There were many encouraging findings, which reflected the dedication of these hard working academics. Throughout the interview process however, I heard a pervasive message of exhaustion, of being fragmented, overwhelmed, and scattered, and of people making exceptional demands on themselves (MacKenzie, 2002). Producing was the name of the game. Technology was moving too fast; there was no time to develop good ideas or for reflection and integration. Interviewees’ comments consistently reflected a tyranny of time and energy. Participants exclaimed:

- It’s all in bits and pieces everywhere;
- I had 57 emails in one day and I’ll go home and have 30-40 more;
- The technology itself moves faster than the content;
- I have all sorts of ideas, but my energy and my time [are] limited.

This pervasive malaise, captured in the language of busyness, fragmentation, fatigue, and resignation seemed to be accepted. It was the price to pay for keeping up with the
calls for excellence, adopting new technology, teaching more students, achieving tenure and promotion, and doing more with less.

I was part of this malaise in two ways. I contributed to it. It was, increasingly, my job to support professors in meeting all of these criteria for success. As professor’s time became increasingly scarce, programmes were condensed, more tip sheets produced, workshops shortened, and time-intensive individual teaching consultations, once the core of the unit’s services, virtually phased out. I also shared it. My reality was very similar to theirs. There was indeed little time for, or value placed upon, reflection and integration – to connect the daily faculty development programming to a purpose beyond delivering content, pleasing the powers that be, and staying ahead of the game. Like many of the professors I interviewed, I too worried about promoting the adoption of new technologies with too little time or opportunity for reflection and integration. Was there an institutional malaise? It seemed that I was not the only person working in academic development who was asking these questions.

_Illumination From Friends in the Practice: The CAD Collective_

In the fall of 2004, I joined a listserv called the ITL-CAD Collective (Challenging Academic Development). The opening topic was performativity and its impact on academic developers roles and the quality of academic life. Discussion was informed by the work of Stephen Ball, Erica McWilliam, and Stephen Rowland (Ball, 2000, 2003; McWilliam, Hatcher, & Meadmore, 1999; Rowland, 2002). The following description of performativity is the first CAD posting, adapted from Ball (2003), described a modern day pantomine reinforcing the teaching value,
universality, and timelessness of Diderot’s vision. It resonated with my experience of self and others in the academy:

The new performative worker is a promiscuous self, an enterprising self, with a passion for excellence. [..] It is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as a means of incentive, control, attrition and change - based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances (of individual subjects or organizations) serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of 'quality', or 'moments' of promotion or inspection. As such they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organization within a field of judgement. The issue of who controls the field of judgment is crucial. (Peseta, 2004)

This posting described the new higher education culture of accountability and competition and the new academic identities that are being formed to meet new output requirements and quality indicators. It echoed my own experience, and my troubling observations of the experiences of the many professors with whom I had worked over the years describing the continuous “spectacular” (Ball, 2000, p. 2) flow of performativities. Ball described the familiar “uncertainty and instability of being judged in different ways, by different means, through different agents; the ‘bringing-off’ of performances – the flow of changing demands, expectations and indicators that make us continually accountable and constantly recorded” (2000, p. 2).

Ball described the uncertainty and insecurity of teachers he had interviewed as they asked, “Are we doing enough? Are we doing the right thing? How will we
measure up?” (2000, p. 3). As new academic identities are fabricated, commitment, judgment, and authenticity within practice are sacrificed for impression and performance. Professional judgment can be subordinated to the requirements of performativity and marketing. Ball framed these struggles in a way I deeply related to as a colonization of lives, a deprofessionalisation of roles, and an ethical retooling. “The spaces for the operation of autonomous ethical codes based in a shared moral language is colonized or closed down” (Ball, 2000, p. 17). These struggles, however, are not articulated in higher education discourse for there is no language or culture to support it. Instead, such struggles are often highly personal and internalized, “setting the care of the self against duty to others” (Ball, 2003, p. 216).

On line discussion with the CAD Collective over the past two years has introduced me to an emerging literature on performativity and managerialism in higher education and to the identity crisis of academic developers who describe themselves as immigrants from other fields, hybrids, and on the borderland of academia (Manathunga, in press). Disciplinary variety is one of the strengths of the collective. Here, within an articulated framework of trust, respect, and love there is open experimentation with ideas, discussion of conflicts and dilemmas, and a searching for new languages and paradigms to open up the discourse and transform academic development practice (Peseta, 2005b).

Institutional and Professional Malaise: An Example

In a recent CAD posting, an academic developer was asked by a Theological College to come and help them to “speak the language of ‘quality’ since they too, were being visited by our national quality agency”. She describes the consultation:
We did the usual: student learning research paradigm, learning outcomes/SOLO, constructive alignment, assessment etc... and all the signs showed that they really valued the scholarship of the student-focused perspective. In preparing and looking over their graduate attributes, there were a lot of references to words like love, charity, temperance in the way they described the sorts of dispositions they wanted to develop in their students. In their course evaluations for instance, they have questions like: This unit of study helped me in my relationship with God.”

Reflecting on her reactions to this consultation she asked:

What do we learn as a field/discipline in our interactions with other disciplines that fundamentally changes our canon? How can I bring back the notion of something like ‘love’ (and its related concepts) and talk seriously about it amongst those in my academic development unit? Sometimes I get the feeling that our work is about ‘dropping things off’ in other places but very rarely ‘picking anything up’. (Peseta, 2005a)

This, like many other posts from academics throughout the year, conveys the symbiotic link between individual and institutional malaise.

The birth of CAD is, in my view, an important indication that the time has come to engage in moral and philosophical discussion, to challenge academic development at its core. “We want to investigate alternative paradigms and experiment with new ideas about the constitution of research and evidence within the scholarship of academic development” (Peseta, 2005b, p. 60). I am not alone. CAD conversants wish to engage philosophically in important questions about things that
matter about their work as educators and about the university as part of the whole (MacKenzie, McShane, & Wilcox, 2005).

My association with academics over the years, some who are dear friends, and the many face to face and on line conversations with colleagues who have gathered to discuss their ideals and their work in the university have assured me that there is, as Betty Freidan (1963) famously stated a “problem that has no name” (p. 11). Jean François Lyotard (1984) in his report on knowledge in higher education has named it performativity and I have adopted his usage for my thesis purpose.

More critically, there is an authenticity that flows from the human spirit that is moving more to the foreground of our educational discourse and practice, providing a moral and unifying language for the busy, conflicted, and fragmented performative academic. Authenticity is not to be found in the paradoxes and contradictions of the egoic self that can be created and destroyed by society. Authenticity is an expression of our spiritual consciousness. While spirit was not created, and cannot ultimately be destroyed, by institutions or society, it can be nurtured and fostered or starved and broken.³ To the extent that the university and individuals within it, beginning with myself, are responsible for teaching and learning, we play a part in fostering or starving spirit: “I am the agent and the subject within the regime of the academy” (Ball, 2000, p. 5).

By attempting to face my egoic self and to speak from my spirit, I hope to make the force of an ideal that many educators are seeking, or already living by, more palpable and real. Through exploration of my development toward authenticity,

³ I thank my friend Kathleen Arbor for helping me to clarify this.
I will bring a discourse of authenticity to the foreground of my educational philosophy and practice, exercising the freedoms and fulfilling the responsibilities that are at the core of my vision for educational practice and of my hope for strengthening an ethic of authenticity - a moral language and context of and for higher education.
CHAPTER TWO: Authenticity and Performativity: Historical Context

LINKING TEXT

Chapter Two explores the history and meaning of the concepts of authenticity and performativity and how they intersect with individuals, institutions, and with the project of higher education. Two different academic groups introduced these concepts to me at a time when I was struggling to make meaning of my experience of professional loss. These were the CAD Collective introduced in Chapter One and the Kali Collective. The CAD Collective, as I have outlined, introduced me to the concept of performativity. The Kali Collective helped me to identify the issue of seeking authenticity as in tension with the demands of performativity. Throughout my thesis process they nurtured and encouraged me intellectually, spiritually, emotionally, and (with delicious, lovingly prepared lunches) physically.

The Kali Collective consists of four women academics, including myself. Our purpose is to explore and question our work and to support and advise each other. We are particularly concerned with the intersection of work dilemmas with our ethicality and authenticity. It was within this context that my colleagues pointed out the contradiction between my vision for higher education and how I describe my work. On one occasion of our meeting, they identified a chasm between my stated philosophy of educational development as an integrated spiritual, emotional, and intellectual process that is ultimately humanizing and my “soulless”, technically correct, account of designing faculty development workshops. It was clear to them that I could not bring my authentic self into my work and that this was painful for me. This moving experience helped to illuminate my experience and impressed upon me
my real need to articulate and more fully realize my authenticity in my practice. Thus, I was encouraged to explore authenticity as a thesis focus.

At about the same time the Kali Collective was forming, I joined the CAD (Challenging Academic Development) Collective (Peseta, 2005b) as mentioned in Chapter One. CAD is an international listserv of academic developers that formed after the June 2004 annual meeting of ICAD (International Consortium of Academic Developers) in Ottawa. The collective formed following a symposium looking at new conceptual frameworks for theorizing academic development (Peseta, 2005b). The symposium: Liminality, identity, and hybridity: On the promise of new conceptual frameworks for theorizing academic/faculty development was a refreshing readers' theatre that acted out the often conflicting and confusing identities, roles, and responsibilities of academic developers in the changing higher education landscape. Seeing many parallels with my experience, I signed up with other symposium participants to continue the conversations online.4 The opening topic was performativity and its impact on academic developers’ roles and the quality of academic life (Peseta, 2004). The following description of performativity, adapted from Ball (2003), resonated with my experience of self and others in the academy.

The new performative worker is a promiscuous self, an enterprising self, with a passion for excellence. [performativity] is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as a means of incentive, control, attrition and change - based on rewards and

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4 Since its inception the membership has grown from approximately 20 to over 100 and, at this writing, has invited the Canadian Society for Teaching and Learning in Higher Education (STLHE) and American Professional and Organizational Development (POD) higher education networks to join the conversation.
sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances (of individual subjects or organizations) serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of ‘quality’, or ‘moments’ of promotion or inspection. As such they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organization within a field of judgment. The issue of who controls the field of judgment is crucial. (Peseta, 2004)

Ball framed performativity as an ethical retooling in higher education and a struggle for the soul of professionalism. This concept offered further illumination of my experience as linked to an ideology of performativity. Thus, along with authenticity, performativity became the second site of investigation. I formed the conceptual foundation for my thesis around the tension between these two demands. Chapter Two elaborates on these concepts and their meaning in this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO

Authenticity and Performativity: Conceptual Development and Relevance to Higher Education

This chapter outlines the development of the concepts of authenticity and performativity and their intersection with, and relevance to, higher education. It is, in part, inspired by a personal quest to more fully realize my authenticity in my practice as educator. My aim is to deepen my understanding of the inner demands of authenticity and the external demands of performativity in the higher education context. I aim further to challenge the core of academic development, contributing new initiatives based on discussions with colleagues. "We want to investigate alternative paradigms and experiment with new ideas about the constitution of research and evidence within scholarship of academic development" (Peseta, 2005b, p. 60). By exploring the tensions between demands of authenticity and performativity I do not aim to set up a (falsely) oppositional dynamic. I hope, however, to make more explicit a source of malaise that I have witnessed and experienced in the academy as a necessary part of a process of envisioning a way forward for the university and for myself as educator.

Part I: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Authenticity

Just because we no longer believe in the doctrines of the Great Chain of Being, we don't need to see ourselves as set in a universe that we can consider simply as a source of raw materials for our projects. We may still need to see ourselves as part of a larger order that can make claims on us. (Taylor, 1991, p. 89)
Two modern scholars of authenticity, Lionel Trilling (1972) and Charles Taylor (1991), explore authenticity from helpful historical and philosophical perspectives. Trilling’s historical overview traces the evolution of conceptions of sincerity and authenticity. Before authenticity was introduced into our language, sincerity was held to be an ideal of how we ought be. Trilling traces the devaluation of sincerity as it has increasingly become associated with an extinction of the true self, signifying instead a sincere social persona: “‘I sincerely believe’ has less weight than ‘I believe’; in the subscription of a letter” (1972, p. 6). In this diminished view, being true to one’s self is proposed not as an end but only as a means of fulfilling a public role. Indeed, as we play the role of being ourselves, sincerely acting the part: “A judgement may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic” (1972, p. 11).

Authenticity entered the English language in the first third of the sixteenth century. It is, as Trilling (1972) states, “a word of ominous import” (p. 93), capturing “the peculiar nature of our fallen condition, our anxiety over the credibility of existence and of individual existences” (p. 93). It is to the artists and aesthetes that Trilling turns to capture a universal language and meaning of authenticity. Authenticity is described by Trilling as a sentiment of being, devoid of socially defined roles and independent of the opinion of other people. Because it entails something that is beyond the self, it cannot be relegated to mere subjectivism. “His reference is to himself only, or to some transcendent power which - or who - has decreed his enterprise and alone is worthy to judge it” (p. 97). This sentiment of being is the sentiment of being strong and integrous as a human being, of escaping “the Hell
of dehumanization that inauthenticity is" (p. 102). The strength of authenticity is to be found in an "unassailable intuition" (p. 92) of the certitude of our selfhood. It is only through such conscious certitude that we can reach our knowledge of others. Our authenticity is the "the hardest basic fact and the only entrance to all facts" (Trilling, 1972, p. 92).

Charles Taylor (1991) in his critique of modernity, referred to the suppression of our unassailable intuition and the ensuing dehumanization of inauthenticity as the malaise of modernity. Also drawing from the language of poets, Taylor points to authenticity as a sentiment of being that is of the self and, at the same time, part of a wider whole.

Authenticity is "a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in an imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to oneself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me. (1991, p. 29)

This ideal of authenticity supposes both self awareness and demands that emanate from what Taylor calls a "horizon of significance" (1991, p. 38); things that matter beyond the self.

Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands. (1991, p. 41)
Thus, authenticity assumes an awareness of self that is part of a deep, universal moral force or calling. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss fully within a purely conceptual frame and draws directly from experience using poetic languages of personal resonance to express its intuitive essence. Fundamentally concerned with the nature and purpose of the self, authenticity is grounded in the spiritual and psychological aspects of what it is to be human, to be part of humanity, and to be true to ourselves. In different ways, Trilling and Taylor capture these spiritual and psychological aspects in their discussion of development toward authenticity and the ensuing tensions between the contradictions of ego and the unity of Spirit.

*Spirit, Ego, and Authenticity*

Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a soul ... destined to possess a sense of identity.

(Keats quoted in Trilling 1972, p. 166)

While the poets discovered the unconscious well before Freud, it was Freud and his predecessors who identified and developed the notion of the ego as the source of inauthenticity. The “normal” ego is the false self, “completely adjusted to our alienated social reality” (R.D. Laing quoted in Trilling, p. 170). It is through dissolution of the normal ego that we can become conscious both of our alienation and of the authenticity of our personal being. It is here that we can experience the strength and power of authenticity. This process of development is partially illustrated by Trilling through the narrative power of the novel. Using a character from a seventeenth century novel, *Rameau’s Nephew* (Diderot, 1966), Trilling illustrates the
split nature of ego and the qualities of conscious awareness that signify development toward authenticity.

*Rameau's Nephew: A Story of Development Toward Authenticity*

Jean-François Rameau was the nephew of the great composer Jean-Phillippe Rameau. He hated his successful and selfish uncle claiming he had never done anything for him. The Nephew Rameau made a precarious living teaching singing and entertaining the wealthy, somewhat like a court jester. Diderot recounts the famous dialogue\(^5\) between two seemingly different characters, the philosopher (Diderot) and the buffoon (the nephew). In the novel the Nephew meets Diderot, who he refers to as Mr. Philosopher, by chance one evening in a Paris Café. Assuming himself to be the morally superior of the two, Diderot, the narrator, describes the Nephew as one of the weirdest characters in the land. “His notions of good and evil must be strangely muddled in his head, for the good qualities nature has given him he displays without ostentation, and the bad ones without shame” (Diderot 1966, p. 33). Toward the end of the encounter the nephew uses his substantial mimetic skills to demonstrate to Diderot how he performs the dance upon which his survival depends.

Diderot recounts:

Then, smiling as he did so, he began impersonating the admiring man, the supplicating man, the complaisant man, right foot forward, left foot behind, back bent, head up, looking fixidly into somebody’s eyes, lips parted, arms held out towards something, waiting for a command, receiving it, off like an arrow, back again with it done, reporting it. He is attentive to everything,

\(^5\) Famous because Hegel, Marx, and Freud among many others used this story as a universal, applying it to explicate their theories of humankind.
picks up what has been dropped, adjusts a pillow or puts a stool under someone’s feet, holds a saucer, pushed forward a chair, opens a door, shuts a window, pulls curtains, keeps his eye on the master and mistress, stands motionless, arms at his sides and legs straight, listening, trying to read people’s expressions. (1966, pp. 120-121)

On the surface, this description provides a powerful account of the loyal servant engaged in what Hegel called “the heroism of dumb service” (Trilling, 1972, p. 35). But this appearance was not what it seemed. At the end of his performance the Nephew proclaims: “That is my act, about the same as that of flatterers, courtiers, flunkeys and beggars” (Diderot, 1966, p. 121).

The nephew’s unflinching pantomime is a shameless exhibition of his own shame. He is not a dumb server. He is bitterly aware of himself as flatterer and of the social pressure to remain so. Yet he knows that he must not directly articulate his knowledge of the unspoken contract, which is to be the buffoon he is expected to be. Acting the fool, he ensures for the nobles he serves their perceived pure identities as persons of taste, intelligence, and reason. It is all a game devised by a false self. Conscious of his degraded relation to the external powers of society, the Nephew is full of self-contempt, proclaiming: “I do know what self-contempt is, or the torment of the soul that comes from neglect of the talents heaven has vouchsafed us, which is the cruelest of all. It were almost better that a man had never been born” (Diderot, 1966, p. 51).

The Nephew articulates the painful split between his inauthentic and contradictory relations to society and his awareness of a calling to honor the talents
heaven had vouchsafed him. He sees himself as a walking contradiction, "a mere histrionic representation" (Trilling, 1972, p. 31). This awareness signifies what Hegel saw as "a positive attribute and of the highest significance, nothing less than a necessary condition of the development of Spirit, of Geist, that is to say of mind in its defining act, which is to be aware of itself" (Trilling, 1972, p. 34). In moving from loyal and obedient service to society⁶ there is a point of losing wholeness, of becoming what Hegel called a disintegrated consciousness, detached from a familiar perception of self as integrated and being aware of this. This was the painful experience of the Nephew.

The Nephew’s pantomime exhibits his stark awareness of the inauthenticity of the noble sentiments that he performs for a living. It articulates what Hegel called a perverse "heroism of flattery" (Trilling, 1972, p. 34) which translates into a conscious choice to maintain relations with the external powers by remaining a flatterer. It is a practical commitment to, rather than identification with, the external power of society. Paradoxically, it represents a movement toward Spirit, away from the esteemed good of the noble, to the baseness of the disintegrated, alienated, and distraught consciousness. "Rather it is Rameau, the buffoon, the flattering parasite, the compulsive mimic, without a self to be true to: it is he who represents Spirit moving to its next stage of development" (Trilling 1972, p. 44).

Unfortunately, the Nephew remained stuck in this distressing and depressing condition, condemned and committed to a life as cynical flatterer, suffering with the experience of his inauthenticity, yet seemingly without the power to move beyond it.

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⁶ Exemplified by Diderot, who appears in the novel as unaware of his inauthenticity.
At the conclusion of the dialogue, Diderot offers his theory of society. The beggars’ pantomime, Diderot confidently asserts, "is what makes the whole world go round" (Diderot, 1966, p. 122). Then, perhaps suspecting that the beggar and the noble cannot be so neatly separated, he attempts to separate himself from both. With one exception he says: "There is one person free to do without pantomime, and that is the philosopher who has nothing and asks for nothing" (p. 122). Diderot’s comment triggers the Nephew’s grief for his dead wife:

But from what you say I can see that my poor little wife was a philosopher of sorts. She had the courage of a lion. At times we had no bread and were penniless. We had sold almost all our clothes. I would throw myself down across the bed racking my brains to think of someone who would lend us a crown that I wouldn’t have to pay back. But she, gay as a lark, would sit down at the keyboard and sing to her own accompaniment. (p. 124)

The Nephew saw his wife, who had nothing and who asked for nothing, as philosopher, with the strength and power of authenticity. She was free from the material grasping and striving of the noble self and the base self both rooted in the ego.

Perhaps his dead wife symbolized the Nephew’s lost hope that he might realize his authenticity, his Spirit, free from the conflicting and contradictory demands of the ego. Indeed Rameau’s Nephew is a story of the contradictions, confusions, and deceptions of the ego’s mechanisms of preservation and defense. These mechanisms maintain the false separation of the noble self from the base self. In doing so they block development toward authenticity, our human relation to the
world, and the realization of Spirit, of *Geist*. Trilling used *Rameau’s Nephew* to capture a turning point in modernity, and the history of authenticity, which was to give rise to what Charles Taylor (1991) later wrote about as the *Malaise of Modernity*.

*Authenticity Meets Modernity*

In his exploration of authenticity throughout modernity, Trilling (1972) traces the rise of the idea of culture and, with it, the growing anxiety of poets and philosophers that man was losing his sentiment of being and his human relation to the world. Essentially, culture arose out of man’s changing relationship with money and machines. As Rameau’s nephew illustrated, money was beginning to be seen as a threat to moral values, as the “principle of the inauthentic in human existence” (Trilling, 1972, p. 124). Quoting Shakespeare, Marx cited: “Money makes black, white; foul, fair; wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant” (in Trilling, 1972, p. 124).

Along with money, the idea of the machine was seen to be a threat to the very minds of men and women. The idea of the machine was of anything that did not permit the maker to infuse his quality of being into what was made. “A terrible machine has possessed itself of the ground, the air, the men, and the women, and hardly even thought is free” (R. W. Emerson, quoted in Trilling, p. 126). The machine could only make inauthentic things. These dead and inorganic things communicated their deadness to those who used them. Yet, as Trilling points out, things are not that

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7 The idea of culture that rapidly became available was of: “a unitary complex of interacting assumptions, modes of thought, habits, and styles, which are connected in secret as well as overt ways with the practical arrangements of a society and which, because they are not brought to consciousness, are unopposed in their influence over men’s minds” (Trilling, 1972, p. 123). The idea of culture, which we nowadays take for granted, was considered by some to be the discovery of the 19th century.
simple. Money and machines/technology were not relegated simply to the inauthentic, an evil threat to the good, the organic, and the natural. As modernity progressed a reversal occurred. Money and machines began to represent the good, the organic, and the natural. The acquisitive principle of wealth and profit, driven by the mechanical principle of technology became the authenticating principles of modern life.

There was a moment in the history of the machine when it became the divider, separating the "men from the boys" (Trilling, 1972 p. 128). *The Futurist Manifesto*, written by F.T. Marinetti in 1908, extolled the beauty and vitality of the machine, in particular the automobile. His manifesto ridiculed those whose "lymphatic ideology" opposed the machine with a "dream of a primitive pastoral life" that resembled "a man who in full maturity wants to sleep in his cot again and drink at the breasts of a nurse who has now grown old" (Trilling, 1972, p. 129). The mechanical principle offered an alternative to this lymphatic ideology equated with the organic. As Trilling points out, inorganic machines, in particular the accelerating racing car, had the power to startle this dull pain of the social world and make it move and live, "retrieving the human spirit from its acquiescence in non-being" (p. 132). Spirit was seen to need the perpetration of acts of unprecedented power and mastery.

In this way, the mechanical and the acquisitive brought new energy, immediate and swift. The gradual, organic, process of development toward authenticity is, on one level, increasingly irrelevant to modern society and its institutions. But the ideal of authenticity cannot be eliminated from the human psyche as easily because it is fundamental to the nature and purpose of humans and humanity. If it cannot be sought and expressed directly it will be sought and
expressed indirectly through what Taylor (1991) has identified as malaise. Building on Trilling’s (1972) historical overview, Taylor provides his perspective on authenticity in late modernity.

Retrieving an Ethic of Authenticity

Charles Taylor (1991) addresses the split perspectives of current “boosters” and “knockers” of the contemporary culture of authenticity characterized by an ethic of self-fulfillment. The argument as it stands is between either blanket condemnation or global endorsement. Taylor argues for retrieving the subtler element that is lost in this debate, namely, the ethic of authenticity.

What we ought to be doing is fighting over the meaning of authenticity, and from the standpoint developed here, we ought to be trying to persuade people that self-fulfillment, so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self, actually requires these in some form. The struggle ought not to be over authenticity, for or against, but about it, defining its proper meaning. We ought to be trying to lift the culture back up, closer to its motivating ideal. (Taylor, 1991, p. 73)

Taylor does not launch a condemnation of today’s western culture caught in the grips of a malaise characterized by individualism, instrumental reason, and political apathy. His message is that what gets lost in the critique of authenticity is a rich understanding of the ideal of authenticity. More importantly, Taylor claims that this malaise indicates an underlying striving for development toward authenticity, which remains unarticulated. Taylor’s work is a work of retrieval of the meaning of the ideal

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8 The Malaise of Modernity also published as The Ethics of Authenticity is an overview of Taylor’s major work Sources of the Self.
of authenticity, "through which this ideal can help us restore our practice" (1991, p. 23).

Boosters and Knockers: Sustaining the Culture of Narcissistic Authenticity

The present critique of the culture of authenticity is devoid of a discussion of the meaning of authenticity. Referring to the polarized debate of the boosters and knockers, Taylor asserts: "Both in a sense conspire to the lowest, most self-centered expressions" (1991, p. 80). In this debate authenticity no longer supposes demands that emanate from beyond the self. "Modern freedom and autonomy centers us on ourselves, and the ideal of authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our own identity" (Taylor, 1991, p. 81). This self-centered expression is rooted in the modern malaise of individualism, creating a culture of narcissism where people have lost sight of concerns that transcend them. This individualism of self-fulfillment shuts out, or is unaware of, the greater issues and concerns that transcend the self whether religious, political, or historical.

The knockers claim that we are a debased society, the "culture of narcissism" (Taylor, 1991, p. 11) deserving only of contempt. Boosters, who are deeply into this culture, accuse the knockers of hankering for an earlier age and wanting to deny the world the benefits of science. What is missed in this debate, according to Taylor, is that there is a powerful moral ideal at work here, "however debased and travestied its expression might be" (p. 15). The moral ideal is that of being true to oneself. Taylor works to retrieve this ideal through what he calls the "subtler languages" (p. 81).

Retrieving Authenticity Through the Subtler Languages
The subtler languages have shifted in our modern discourse from the very publicly universal to the private, yet still universal. Taylor associates the rise of individualism with the end of primacy of a major western metanarrative, namely, the Great Chain of Being\(^9\). This metanarrative provided a shared moral horizon, a unifying force and order that gave purpose and meaning to the world and to human activities. Taylor points to a watershed in the history of literature where poetic language shifts from references to restricting hierarchical orders that were part of the shared public domain, to languages of personal resonance. These languages were rooted in personal sensibility. Yet this does not mean that the poet no longer explores an order beyond the self. The difference is that the self is not separated hierarchically from, but is (part of), this order:

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. (Wordsworth, quoted in Taylor, 1991, p. 88)

Here Wordsworth articulates more than his individual feelings. He articulates something about human experience of existence that resonates with those who

\(^9\) God, man, woman, and nature.
recognize their own experience or hear their silent longings expressed in the resonant language of the poet.

This qualitative change in artistic language means that the artist must articulate her own world of reference and make it believable through her own creativity. She must make us aware of something in nature for which there are, as yet, no adequate words. Borrowing from Shelly, Taylor calls these “subtler languages” (1991, p. 85). There is something universal and yet very personal implied. It conjures ideas of languages of the soul and the heart. Unlike earlier public languages, this subtler language does not represent a preordained meaning separate from the reader. It is also not a question of mere subjectivism and fragmentation, for it cannot be simply said that formerly poets had a common language and now everyone has his or her own.

Thus, the intentions of those who speak in the subtle languages are not only of and for the self, but something beyond (Taylor, 1991). This entails a different quality of subjectivism and requires careful distinction from the self-centered subjectivism that slides to narcissistic authenticity. Through the subtler languages writers are trying to tell us something “about our predicament, about the relation of the living to the dead, about human frailty, and the power of transfiguration present in language” (Taylor, 1991, p. 89). Such explorations offer an alternative to the flattened and trivialized culture of narcissism described by boosters and knockers alike. What has been lost is the ideal of authenticity beneath our strivings. Indeed Taylor sees an exploration of the claims that nature and our world make on us as key to retrieving authenticity. “If authenticity is being true to ourselves, is recovering our own
“sentiment de l’ existence”, then perhaps we can only achieve it integrally if we recognize that this sentiment connects us to a wider whole” (p. 91). Indeed there are possibilities for this work of retrieval in higher education practice that I believe a more subtle and critical reading through the lens of seeking authenticity may uncover. The next three sections view higher education and academic development through this lens.

*Higher Education Perspectives on Authenticity: Scholarship Missed*

In my view, there was a missed turning point in higher education discourse that illustrates the ideal of authenticity as it can be overshadowed by a discourse of performativity. Ernest Boyer (1990), in his widely recognized *Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate*, laid the ground for a more holistic, integrated conception of the university that contained within it the ideal of authenticity. Boyer’s report was framed within the 350- year historical context of the evolution of higher education in America that parallels the evolution of the modern age (Trilling, 1972). During this time the meaning and focus of scholarly activity evolved with the rise of culture and in order to meet the needs of a rapidly developing new society. Scholarly activity evolved and changed as it moved through three distinct and overlapping phases from a religious commitment to educating and morally uplifting the coming generation, to a service orientation dedicated to shaping a democratic society, and finally to the post Second World War emphasis on scientific progress and the advancement of knowledge through basic research and graduate education. During this historical period, higher education has also evolved from a once elite system to a mass system available to every citizen.
Boyer's case for a reconsidered scholarship is based upon problems that he linked to the impact of the present day basic research oriented conceptualization of scholarship on higher education in general. While research per se was not the problem, the problem was that the research mission, appropriate for some institutions, created a shadow over the entire higher education enterprise. As America's higher education institutions were becoming more open and inclusive, the culture of the professoriate, focused on publishing or perishing, had become less student-focused and more narrow, specialized, hierarchical, and restrictive.

Boyer states: "If the nation's higher learning institutions are to meet today's urgent academic and social mandates, their missions must be carefully redefined and the meaning of scholarship creatively reconstructed" (1990, p.13). This call to the duties of citizenship is the context within which Boyer offered a vision for creative reconstruction and widening of the meaning of scholarship. Importantly for the ideal of authenticity, the "scholarship of teaching" offered a new, broader, and more inclusive conceptualization of higher education teaching practice carried out within urgent social mandates. Scholarship was tied to directly meeting these social mandates through teaching (transmitting, transforming, and extending knowledge), discovery (investigation), integration (synthesis), and application (practice). Teaching was envisioned as one of four equally valued scholarships that dynamically interact to form an interdependent whole. Focus on the scholarship of teaching would not necessarily be continuous throughout a career but part of a varying pattern of outstanding contributions over a lifetime, allowing for shifting foci on discovery, integration, and application and for renewal, and change. The scholarship of teaching
would also contribute to a shared vision of intellectual and social possibilities within the academy, helping to build and sustain a community of scholars.

Boyer reached back in time to reclaim the centrality of teaching and students and asserted the responsibility of the academy to address the pressing issues of our time through the practice of a reconsidered, consciously socially-responsible scholarship. The practice of these interrelated scholarships was to be dedicated to the renewal of the academy and the renewal of society through meeting the wider moral horizon explicitly stated as the duties of citizenship. It remained for others to extend, adapt, and apply Boyer’s framework.

In the years that followed faculty developers responded to Boyer’s work in a flurry of investigations into the scholarship of teaching (Andresen, 1996, 2000; Kreber, 2001a; Kreber & Cranton, 2000; Richlin, 2001; Trigwell, Martin, Benjamin, & Prosser, 2000; Weston & McAlpine, 2001). All of these works, except that of Trigwell et al, (2000) who studied regular faculty’s conceptions of scholarship of teaching, offered empirical or conceptual models of the scholarship of teaching held by faculty developers. All conceptual models excepting Andresen (2000) separated teaching from Boyer’s integrated vision and made no mention of the wider social horizon underpinning Boyer’s original purpose and vision.

Andresen (2000) addressed a primary issue raised by Boyer, namely the need for the university system to re-invent itself and for a renewal of a professoriate in danger of burnout and demoralization. He saw the transformative potential of the idea of scholarship of teaching as key to faculty renewal. He defined scholarship as a moral as opposed to a technical term. Following from this moral stance, he offers a
view of scholarly teaching that would contribute to the growth of a public knowledge base for teaching in the university. Of Boyer and his successors he says:

To confront the meaning of scholarship in not simply to be called to task for how and when we use it, nor is it merely the challenge to talk and write with semantic integrity. *It is to experience a fundamental challenge to the way one operates in academic work* [italics added], hence practicing our teaching in ways that embody and convey intellectual and educational integrity. (p. 139)

With the exception of Andresen (2000), Boyer’s broad view of scholarship, based upon the moral responsibility of higher education to society, does not appear in the faculty development literature that followed *Scholarship Reconsidered*. Pervasive in the literature is a decontextualized, technical focus on defining scholarship and related terms (Richlin, 2001), on facilitating transformative process and on the development of faculty toward the scholarship of teaching (Kreber & Cranton, 2000; Kreber, 2001; Weston & McAlpine, 2001). Many of these works were concerned with scholarly performance in terms of finding ways to assess the scholarship of teaching, whether or not scholarship should be linked to publication, and challenging the teaching and research dichotomy in terms of making teaching count. These studies isolated teaching both from Boyer’s original integrated and historically rooted vision of scholarship and from a broader moral horizon of duty to citizenship. Retaining the original vision may have helped to retrieve and restore an essence of authenticity (in terms of our connection to a moral horizon of significance) to academic development and higher education discourse.
However, as Taylor has stated, there is an ideal of authenticity beneath our strivings that seeks expression. There is perhaps evidence of this in recent studies by Cranton and Carusetta (2004a, 2004b), in the writings of the newly formed CAD Collective, and in a developing literature explicitly addressing spirituality in higher education. The following section will explore these areas.

_Academic Developers: Bringing Authenticity into the Teaching Discourse_

Authenticity is an uncommon topic in academic development literature\textsuperscript{10}. Notable exceptions are the work of Cranton and Carusetta (2004a, 2004b) and Cranton (2006). These researchers recently explored the meaning of authenticity in the context of how educators bring their sense of self into their teaching. Their research was sparked by an interest in transformative adult learning theory (Mezirow, 2000) and what they see as a discrepancy between research-based principles and practices of effective teaching and the ways in which individual teachers are authentic, meaning “bring[ing] themselves into their teaching” (Cranton & Carusetta, 2004a, p. 276). It is, in their estimation, “more common for people to look for standardized principles of effective practice than it is for them to turn inward and examine how it is that they as social human beings and individuals can develop their own way in the world of teaching” (2004b, p. 21).

Using data collected from university professors and applying it to Mezirow’s (2000) transformative learning theory, these researchers developed a model of authenticity as a transformative process (Cranton & Carusetta, 2004a). Authenticity in teaching is seen as an ongoing developmental process moving from inauthentic

\textsuperscript{10} ERIC searches using descriptors authenticity, higher education, universities, teaching turned up almost no references.
beginnings to mature authenticity. It is, according to these authors, transformative in nature, moving from wearing a mask or teaching persona through individuation and finally integration (2004a). The authentic teacher brings a “cluster of values” (2004a, p. 285) related to self-awareness, into her teaching; understands the learners and her relationships with them; and takes stances on issues and norms in the workplace and the social world; and, finally, engages in critical reflection on each of these components.

Critical reflection on self, others, relationships, and context played a primary role in the way participants in Cranton & Carusetta’s (2004b) study talked about developing authenticity. The authors reported that interviewee reflections beyond the self were mostly confined to their perceptions of students in the classroom. Few referred to the broader social and cultural expectations of university faculty and references to the community were inferred.

The qualities Cranton and Carusetta assign to authenticity are primarily psychological and intellectual, focused on developing one’s own way of teaching. While qualities such as self awareness and interest in others are present in their findings, there are no references to authenticity as an experience of existence apart from socially defined roles and connected to a wider whole, which are fundamental to Taylor’s (1991) conception. This could be because Cranton and Carusetta explored authenticity within the context of a socially defined (teaching) role. Framing the exploration this way overrides meanings of authenticity as an experience of existence distinct from socially constructed roles.
It is not possible to know whether it was the role-based conception of authenticity inherent in the particular research focus, a malaise of individualism endemic to the particular interviewees, or both, that gave rise to perspectives on authenticity by faculty that exclude articulation of awareness of the universal claims that nature and our world make on us. It is also possible that the dominant research traditions, which exclude subtler languages in general, limits possibilities for knowledge production that includes expression of Spirit (Self) intrinsic to authenticity.

Challenging the dominant positivist research paradigms that dictate how knowledge is produced and legitimated (Minnich, 1990), as well as addressing the need for methodological tools that acknowledge spiritual ways of knowing (Shahjahan, 2005), has important implications for retrieving authenticity in higher education. If the ominous import of the meaning of authenticity is to be retrieved and nurtured in higher education practice, in my view, a widening of the epistemological framework within which research is conducted is necessary.

Legitimizing Spiritual Ways of Knowing in Higher Education

A spiritual way of knowing would transform the way we view the process of learning that takes place in that it also makes sure that we take responsibility for our future generations and the world beyond us. (Shahjahan, 2005, p. 702)

Part of the import of authenticity with regard to both teaching and research is articulated in the literature addressing spirituality in higher education. Evidence of spiritual perspectives on authenticity in teaching as developed and defined by Trilling (1972) and Taylor (1991) are perhaps best captured in the work of educators bell
hooks and Parker Palmer (hooks, 1994, 2000, 2003; Palmer, 1998, 2000). Indeed, when referring to identity and vocation in the context of teaching, western academic developers often refer to these writers. Drawing from Buddhist and Quaker traditions, hooks and Palmer use personal narrative to explore their spirituality and its connection to education. These writers maintain that education is first about healing and wholeness.

In his exploration of why spirituality is marginalized in the academy Shahjahan (2005) asks a question intrinsic to identity and authenticity: “Why do I feel dissociated from the knowledge I am gaining in the Western academy?” (p. 686). There is scant literature on spirituality in higher education that discusses integrating spirituality into knowledge production. Shahjahan provides a personal narrative of his social location and spiritual mission in the context of knowledge production. He describes his search for his “center” as a constant throughout his life: “Sometimes I believe I have it, but forget it. That center for me has been Allah – my divine source” (p. 689). Echoing Trilling (1972), Taylor (1991), and Diderot’s (1966) story of Rameau’s nephew, Shahjahan expresses, in his language of personal resonance, his experience of the tension between discourses of performativity and authenticity in the context of higher education:

This Divine fragrance calms my heart and my soul with peace that I cannot express and do justice to in words. The divine fragrance helps me heal and keeps me grounded. Hence all discourses in the academy that try to split me apart from other beings (animate or inanimate), such as the notion of subject
and object division, or that humans are purely material or social beings, rupture my relationship with the Divine. (p. 689)

Addressing the split nature of ego, Shahjahan's conception of authenticity in the context of higher education is not centered in a role per se, but rather what authenticity brings to higher education research. From this center Shahjahan articulates (somewhat like hooks and Palmer) his spiritual mission of healing in the area of higher education research inquiry: "My mission is to heal, to help people find their center, and to work towards equity and social justice for human beings and all creation" (Shahjahan, 2005, p. 690). Acknowledging different spiritual traditions and legitimizing spiritual ways of knowing the world is, for him, an important entry point for healing and for transforming ways of knowing. Transforming begins with a critique of the fragmentation posed by the academy. Shahjahan identifies the discourse of fragmentation in the academy as rooted in the idea of personal ego.

In the academy, number of publications, funding received, promotions and other accolades feed an ego that is trying to become better than others or to attain its own desires at the expense of others (Shahjahan, 2005). This high level of individualism and competition reinforces the subject-object disparity and sense of separateness from the rest of life. Recruiting the intellect to help defend this illusion, the ego fragments people's views of themselves by rupturing their interconnectedness with other beings and encouraging the development of separate rational entities. This dynamic was well illustrated in the story of Rameau's Nephew (Diderot, 1966). Yet, as Shahjahan asserts, according to many spiritual traditions, the primary site for spiritual development is through letting go of the ego. Indeed letting go of the ego is
the central aspect of Trilling’s (1972) conception of authenticity. Shahjahan advocates developing new methodological tools to allow spirituality into the academy in an explicit way.

These tools include, acknowledgement of the reality of non-Being; working with research communities that are aligned with, and affirm our spirituality; reciprocal relationships amongst all research participants; focus on inner agency; and use of language (of personal resonance) that helps us find and affirm our center. It is through our spirits that we can “penetrate, disrupt, and reformulate the academy” (Shahjahan, 2005, p. 703). What is at the root of a problem so pervasive? What feeds this ego driven culture, cutting us off from our spiritual nature, our authenticity? The following exploration of performativity provides a partial response to these questions.

Part II: Performativity and its Relevance to Higher Education

The true goal of the system, the reason it programs itself like a computer is the optimization of the global relationship between input and output – in other words Performativity. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 11)

In discussing barriers to spiritual ways of being in the university, Shahjahan (2005) captures a pervasive malaise of the university that parallels Taylor’s (1991) critique of modernity. This malaise was theorized as performativity by Jean François Lyotard (1984) in his prescient work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. While Lyotard is considered to have predicted the entrenchment of performativity in Western higher education, there was a long and slow evolution to capturing performativity as a phenomenon describing our present day condition of knowledge.
Performativity, as Trilling’s (1972) history of the rise of culture demonstrates, was seen to disrupt authenticity even before it was named as such. Modernity, characterized by the growing emphasis on the acquisitive and the mechanical, relocated and gradually redefined legitimate knowledge. Legitimate knowledge was no longer located in the self, infused with a quality of being. The conception of knowledge has evolved to this postmodern moment (Lytard, 1984), confined to what can be verified scientifically in terms of competetiveness and wealth. This shift can be traced to a deeper, more profound metaphysical shift in human consciousness, namely the death of the metanarrative.

*Death of the Metanarrative: Turning Point for Knowledge*

There was a time when we believed that we were part of a larger order, a cosmic order, a great Chain of Being. The hierarchical orders, most notably, of god, man, woman & nature while restricting, gave meaning to the world and to our activities. The natural order was beginning to decline at the outset of the modern era. In the time Denis Diderot wrote *Rameau’s Nephew*, it was becoming thinkable to discredit the order (Trilling, 1972). As the modern age progressed, humanity began to experience a decline, an accompanying malaise, in the midst of the development of civilization.

Charles Taylor (1991) expressed the worry that the individual lost something important along with the larger social and cosmic horizon. People lost the horizon of significance that offered a sense of higher purpose, of, as he put it, something worth dying for. “People are no longer sacrificed to the demands of supposedly sacred orders that transcend them” (p. 2). This dark side of individualism has made lives poorer in meaning and less concerned with others and society. There is a flattening
and narrowing of our lives as disenchanted people focus on their individual lives and lose the broader moral vision that accompanied belief in the Great Chain of Being.

This human quest for certainty, once satisfied by this hierarchical order, gives rise to performativity. The defining feature of postmodernism is incredulity or skepticism toward all metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984). Metanarratives (unlike stories, myths and other types of narratives) offer certainty by claiming a legitimating function in a shared, ideal “Idea” (p. 18) of a future that is yet to be. This Idea, of freedom, enlightenment, socialism, for example has a legitimating value because it is universal. It guides every human reality and gives modernity its characteristic mode. The grand Idea, however, has failed to deliver on its promise: the progressive emancipation of reason and freedom, the enrichment of all humanity through the progress of capitalism, and even the salvation of creatures through Christian conversion (Lyotard, 1992). According to Lyotard, humanity appears to be further away now than ever from realizing the project of modernity. The modern project, although certainly not over, has been delegitimized and is now subject to the characteristic skepticism and incredulity of postmodernity.

Lyotard rejects modernist claims that the failure to realize these universal ideas for humanity is because the emancipatory project is still incomplete and must be resumed and renewed (e.g. Jurgen Habermas). For Lyotard, the project of modernity has failed. A major reason for this failure is the very idea of a grand Idea. Metanarratives by their nature are totalizing. They lead to the tyranny of the majority, assuming consensus, preventing difference, and blocking analysis. Who can argue against the ‘goodness’, the ‘rightness’ of the grand Ideas? For Lyotard, one name that
is a symbol for the failure of the metanarrative is Auschwitz. Lyotard’s claims can perhaps be further supported with other familiar names that have since become additional tragic symbols in history: Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan.

Although still operating in society, the metanarrative is no longer a unifying and legitimating force providing universities and other knowledge - creating bodies unquestioned support for claims that some (meaning their) knowledge is intrinsically “good”, thus worthwhile, and some (meaning ‘others’) knowledge is “bad”, thus not worthwhile. The deligitimization of the metanarrative has not ended the positivist project of the search for verifiability and legitimacy, however. It has simply created the conditions for other positivist mechanisms for the legitimation of knowledge to take hold. Compensating for the deligitimization of metanarratives, positivism persists and entrenches itself by giving rise to Performativity, which is also concerned with the positivist project of verifiability. Performativity has replaced the metanarrative to become the new legitimacy criterion for knowledge. It is a response to postmodern incredulity, an attempt to reduce the undeniable complexity of our times (Dixon, 2000) and to claim legitimacy, truth and power by delivering authenticity in the form of scientific proofs.

*Performativity: Legitimating Useful Knowledge*

Performativity as a term has its historical origins in the concept of the performative utterance first articulated by linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin (Austin, 1962; Hall, 2000) in a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. In creating this category, Austin challenged the focus on the verifiability of statements that arose in logical positivism, a philosophical discourse that arose in the 1930’s
(Berlin, 1973) under the guise of being the most scientific and progressive philosophy. Austin asserted that, contrary to the positivist position that "a statement (of fact), ought to be verifiable" (1962, p. 2), statements were not verifiable in the sense of their truth or falsity. Instead, he claimed that all utterances were performative, including those that appear merely to describe a state of affairs.

The term performative is derived from the verb 'perform' and implies the performance of an action. According to Austin, the issuing of an utterance is the performing of an action. Performative utterances or acts do things with words, such as question, command, promise, inform, or express a wish. One does not ask whether an utterance is true or false, but rather what it did with the words. How did it perform? Did the utterance work or not in terms of fulfilling its intended use?

An Example: The Nephew's Language Game

The Nephew Rameau's pantomime, described in the first section, mimed how he performed devoted service conveying admiration, attentiveness, and obedience through his actions and utterances. These actions were all performed at appropriate points in his interactions with his employers. While we know the bitter sentiments behind these acts, we would not necessarily be able to discern these sentiments from the acts themselves. As statements in themselves they are neither true nor false but performative (i.e. they perform devoted service): "He began impersonating the admiring man, the supplicating man, the complaisant man" (Diderot, 1966, p. 120). The Nephew was well aware of the necessity of playing this language game if he wished to remain employed.
Austin cautions that it is a short step from utterances and acts to automatically assuming that they are accompanied by inward acts, such as good faith, making them true or, by the absence of good faith, making them false. This is the crux of Austin’s conception of performatives. He places no truth value on the acts or utterances in themselves. The utterance is a masquerade and disguise. If indeed there was bad faith, in no case can you say that the acts in themselves were false. “[T]he utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement” (1962, p. 11). Truth or false do not apply to the utterance itself. It is a performative utterance. The Nephew’s pantomime mimed devoted service that was indeed successfully\textsuperscript{11} performed. There was, however, a deep emotional and spiritual impact to the Nephew’s performative utterances and acts.

*Performativity Today*

Since performative was first introduced into the vocabularies and conceptions of linguists and philosophers, it has impacted many disciplines and undergone a great deal of refinement and change. In linguistic anthropology, the idea that all utterances are performative was revolutionary (Hall, 2000). Once critiqued by Jacques Derrida,\textsuperscript{12} it was established that more attention must be paid to the context-specific ideologies that govern language usage and the success of performative utterances in different cultures. Reinterpretation of Austin’s theory by Lyotard (1984) to capture new insights into the condition of knowledge in Western higher education gave rise to the ideologically based concept “performativity”. Later Judith Butler revolutionized gender studies with her theory of gender performativity (Butler, 1999). Butler and

\textsuperscript{11} Successfully for the most part that is. In the novel, the nephew, just prior to his encounter with Diderot, had just revealed his true feelings to an employer and been promptly dismissed.

\textsuperscript{12} Personal communication, Vivian Namaste, June 15, 2005.
Lyotard have reinterpreted the term performative from the original to capture particular meanings. Indeed, the term has captured the imaginations of many and, according to some who have tried to build upon Austin’s work, it has “broken down, under the strain of being given too many different jobs to do, and might usefully in future be relieved of some of its duties” (Warnock, 1973, p.89)

Performativity is richer and deeper in meaning than, for example, performance or productivity. Lyotard’s usage has, at its core, Austin’s original ideology critique. Performative utterances and acts are hegemonically designed to uphold and entrench the dominant positivist meaning system, to, in effect, reinforce the acquisitive principle and the mechanical principle. In Lyotard’s usage, performativity is a synonym for positivism (Wain, 2000).

The severe language of performativity excludes any adherence to metaphysical discourse. Focusing on efficiency and the production of proof, the system becomes a machine, dehumanizing humanity in order to rehumanize it at a new normative capacity (Lyotard, 1984). When an institution or society functions in this manner in order to preserve homeostasis, it is acting like a terrorist. Lyotard uses this term to mean eliminating or threatening to eliminate dissenting players by threatening one’s ability to participate: “Adapt your aspirations to our ends or else” (p. 64). With regard to access to rights within the framework of a performative system, a request of the system is not legitimate based on the hardship of an unmet need: “Rights do not flow from hardship, but from the fact that the alleviation of hardship improves the system’s performance” (p. 62). Performativity legitimates positivist epistemologies and ways of knowing in the academy while, at the same
time, deligitimating knowledge and ways of knowing that do not uphold the dominant "scientific" tradition.

Post Lyotardian discussion by higher education theorists (Ball, 2000, 2003; Barnett, 2003; Cowen, 1996; Readings, 1996; Wain, 2000) illustrates the continuing pertinence of Lyotard’s analysis of the condition of knowledge in Western higher education.

*Performativity and Knowledge in Higher Education*

In the university, performativity refers to the entrepreneurial use-value of academic work to the optimization, cost-effectiveness, and competitiveness of people and the institution (Lyotard, 1984). Knowledge is no longer its own end but acquires a performative character in that it has to have a pay-off (Barnett, 2003). What counts as knowledge is also affected, as truth criteria and the validity of concepts assume a "pragmatic tinge" (Barnett, 2003, p. 69). Inquiry is oriented toward client satisfaction and critique is necessarily played down in the interests of marketability.

Performativity is increased or decreased depending upon, for example, quantity of academic publications, marketability of the knowledge produced, and speed of flow of information. Individuals succeed when they contribute to the best performativity (i.e. competetiveness and wealth) of the institution.

Performative utterances or fabrications in the academy are declarations made by those who have the power and legitimacy to make such statements (Ball, 2000). They are also made, in my view, somewhat like Rameau’s nephew, to flatter those in power. While, as Austin has shown, such utterances can be misleading, deceitful or wrong, they are not subject to discussion or verification because truth or falsity is not
at issue. Typically, in universities, performative utterances are designed to accomplish with words an impression of excellence and efficiency that will improve competitiveness and create wealth and, most importantly, maintain the power structures. Thus, performativity has critical implications for the meaning of knowledge. This impacts fundamentally upon the role of the university and upon academic work and identity.

*Manufacturing Knowledge in the "Excellent", "World Class" University*

It is not hard to visualize learning circulating along the same lines as money, instead of for its "educational" value or political (administrative, diplomatic, military) importance; the pertinent distinction would no longer be between knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as is the case with money, between "payment knowledge" and "investment knowledge" — in other words, between units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (the reconstitution of the work force, "survival") versus funds of knowledge dedicated to optimizing the performance of a project. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 6)

To understand higher education's relation to the performativity criteria, Lyotard adopts the perspective of systems theory placing higher education as a subsystem of the larger social system within which it operates. Thus the same performativity criteria would apply to higher education as applies to society. The desired goal of higher education becomes the optimal contribution to the best performativity of the social system. It will have to create the skills that are indispensable to that system. These skills are designed to tackle world competition and to meet society's internal needs including maintaining internal cohesion.
In his analysis of the changing purpose and function of the university, Cowen (1996) looks at several Western countries (U.S., U.K., and Australia). He asserts that Lyotard may be more right in his analysis than we now know. He sees a major reorganization of the purpose of universities, illustrating a new decipherable pattern of gearing up for international competition. The reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s have respecified university roles in society to revolve around making university systems efficient and relevant. The test of relevance is whether what is researched and taught is useful to the national economy. Universities are forced to attend to the demands of external clients and to invest more and more techniques for the measurement of their efficiency. This changing purpose and function has a pervasive impact on the meaning of learning and knowledge.

True to Lyotard’s predictions, Government and industry critics of the university deligitimate the university’s claims to “excellence” and realign excellence with performativity criteria. The historic claim of universities to have special knowledge, to be creating special knowledge, and to be testing truth is undermined and virtually destroyed. Now, competition through knowledge as commodity rather than cooperation is the key motif. Performativity is stimulated by an external, global challenge and framed by the political discussions that universities are the current focus and arena for the interlinking of the business-industry-state concerns (Cowan, 1996).

Thus, the very existence and success of the university depends upon a performative relationship amongst the university administration, the governmental/multinational complex, and academics, the knowledge workers who
produce products for the market (the knowledge industry). As the meaning of
knowledge changes along with the core purpose and function of higher education,
internal personal and professional tensions are created. Tensions are also created
amongst the various cultures in the university about the purpose of higher education.
In a new context of global competition what the university is, what the academic does
and, indeed, who the academic is, are in flux.

This new performative university creates, and is, necessarily, created by, new
management and administrative approaches taken from business models. Conceptions
of learning and knowledge are changed differently and at varying rates according to
one’s location in the academic hierarchy and the degree of impact of new
technologies. This has created different cultures of the academy (Bergquist, 1992),
signified for example in the often divided and oppositional cultures of administration
and teaching. These divisions affect educational development scholarship and
practice because developers often must straddle the two cultures. The following
discussion suggests that these tensions might be rooted in the epistemological
assumptions underlying conceptions of learning held by these two cultures.

Knowledge Conceptions in the Culture of Teaching

While educational development scholarship has paid little direct attention to
epistemological foundations of the field, there has been a sustained research interest
in knowledge through research on conceptions of teaching and learning. This research
has focused primarily upon conceptions held by teachers and educational developers.
It was particularly active following Boyer’s (1990) Scholarship Reconsidered. There
has been no research on administrators’ conceptions beyond those of teaching and
learning center directors. It would appear that there are substantial differences in the meaning of knowledge held by teaching and administration cultures, reflecting different emphasis on performative criteria according to academic culture.

Phenomenographic\textsuperscript{13} studies of conceptions of teaching reveal a range from a practice-based conception held by professors whose primary responsibilities were teaching and research (Dall'Alba, 1993; Kember, 1997; Pratt, 1992; Prosser, Trigwell, & Taylor, 1994; Samuelowicz & Bain, 1992) to a scholarship of teaching conception held mostly by faculty developers who also taught and researched, primarily in the area of teaching and learning in higher education (Andresen, 2000; Kreber, 2000; Kreber & Cranton, 2000; Richlin, 2001; Weston & McAlpine, 2001).

Conceptions of practice-based teaching reflected two strongly contrasting subsets, namely teacher-focused and student-focused. These could be influenced by contextual factors such as departmental culture, class size and level, and discipline. Teacher-focused conceptions of teaching and learning appear to coincide with a performative conception of knowledge based upon delivery of knowledge, as a commodity, while student-focused conceptions appear more aligned with an educational conception of knowledge as intrinsic to the learner. Scholarship - based conceptions of teaching and learning held primarily by educational developers were more performative in nature, focusing primarily on defining related terms, facilitating the development of faculty toward a conception of scholarship of teaching, debating

\textsuperscript{13} There are various schools of phenomenological research: Husserlian transcendental, Merleau-Ponty's existential, and the Dutch school. My references here, and throughout the thesis, are, to the best of my knowledge, to the positivist/quantitative Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as it has affected educational research. They are not a sweeping indictment of phenomenology. I am grateful to Maureen Connolly (April 2, 2007) for this clarification.
the importance of publishing research on teaching, assessing the scholarship of
teaching, and making teaching count.

While the primary focus of educational development research and practice has
historically been on enhancing the quality of teaching and learning, the issue of
scholarship of educational development is becoming increasingly important.
Educational developers believe that they have helped to take teaching “out of the
closet” and to keep universities honest by “drawing attention to the educational
mission of universities at a time when our colleagues seem preoccupied with other
matters” (Knapper, 2003, p. 6). There is, however, a common theme on campuses and
at educational development conferences that teaching is undervalued and that this is
evidenced in the fact that the vast body of scientific knowledge about “best practices”
(e.g. Chickering & Gamson, 1987; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991) has not impacted
university teaching.

Developers often complain that: teaching, including teaching using
educational technology, remains overwhelmingly didactic; assessment methods are
often trivial and inauthentic; curriculum development a matter of faculty interest; and
teaching evaluation superficial (Knapper, 2003). The problem is seen to be lack of
legitimation of their field and research is seen to be the key to attaining it. Developers
see themselves as struggling for academic legitimation or “grudgingly accepted”
(Knapper, 2003, p.5) in an, as yet unbounded (Brew, 2002) and unrecognized
(Baume, 2002) field. Legitimate research must be carried out within a “rigorous
framework of evaluation and institutional research” (Brew, 2002, p.6) toward firming
up “evidence-based” (Knapper, 2003, p. 8) academic development practice. With
some important exceptions (Lee, 2005; Webb, 1997) to these performative remedies, there is little analysis of the positivist/performative epistemological paradigm underpinning phenomenography and how this has shaped knowledge, including the broadly - accepted conceptions of teaching and learning.

*Knowledge Conceptions in the Culture of Administration*

The educational development literature is silent on how university administrators conceptualize learning and knowledge. There are indications, however, of implicit conceptions of learning and knowledge held by administrators such as Tony Bates, John Daniel, and Paul Ramsden (Bates, 2000; Daniel, 1997; Ramsden, 1998). These well - known writers agree that embracing technology is the solution to meeting the increasing demands of governments, and of the competition for universities to change.

Ramsden draws on the “excellence literature” of effective management and leadership. He advocates a radical departure from the traditional university to a business model that will use management technologies to maximize the performance of universities and the individuals within. The goal of the new management technologies reflects the new meaning of excellence as optimization of client satisfaction. Academics are thus obliged to change practices that are deemed to be other than excellent in the perception of the client/customer (Ramsden, 1998).

Daniel (1997) appears to have fully adopted performativity criteria in his recommendations for creating the universities of the future. He offers technology strategies to address what he refers to as a crisis in higher education that is a threat to the “survival” of any institution that fails to renew itself within an environment that
calls for increased accessibility, improved quality, and reduced costs. Promoting the academic as opposed to what he calls the ideological ideal, Daniel predicts that in this "knowledge age" new university "brands" will emerge. These brands will answer the requirements of cost, access, and quality and, at the same time, be rooted in traditional academic values and, provide university graduates with understandings of the nature and dynamics of knowledge itself.

Daniel outlines how technology strategies designed to create "value for buyers" (1997, p. 85) will maintain or enhance "competitive advantage" which, according to him, is the central purpose of university renewal. Competitive advantage entails product leadership, operational excellence, and customer intimacy. Contrary to his brief reference to traditional academic values, it appears that Daniel's conceptualization of learning and knowledge confirms Lyotard's visualization of performative knowledge dedicated to optimizing performance and ensuring use value: "If students find technology useful in particular courses they will gradually acquire enthusiasm for the idea of technology-based learning. If this is done well the university will gain competitive advantage by being perceived [my emphasis] as a reliable first choice for such courses" (p.100). The university performs courses successfully and is perceived as reliable, enticing "buyers" and gaining competitive advantage in a global marketplace.

Daniel addresses faculty roles by counselling administrators on how to set the stage for change: "It is legitimate to create an aura of anxiety in order to generate discussion that increases understanding of the external forces for change" (1997, p. 138). Reminded of their stake in the future and that they need to remember that
technology changes rapidly, thus waiting to act until decisions are fully validated might mean missing "the boat", faculty must submit to mechanisms for course implementation that "emphasize cooperation, teamwork, and support" (p. 138). Technology-based teaching changes teaching to more closely resemble the organizational frameworks used for research.

Bates (2000) also calls for fundamental changes through technology adoption, encouraging universities to take this road in order to survive. He focuses much more on issues related to faculty adoption and adaptation such as encouraging buy-in, development and training, meeting fear and resistance, and addressing workload issues. Unlike Ramsden and Daniel, Bates asserts that he does not assume that universities should convert themselves into businesses. He warns of the dangers of a Faustian contract with the use of technology in higher education, asserting the importance of the social goals universities must continue to serve: "There is a heavy price to be paid to maximize the educational benefits of technology for teaching, a price some may feel strikes at the very soul of the academy" (p. 35).

Indeed, the heavy consequence to society, and, increasingly, to the university, is in what forms of knowledge are legitimized and delegitimized. As performative knowledge becomes increasingly legitimized, other forms of knowledge are delegitimized. This condition of knowledge is what strikes at the soul of the academy and of those who study and work within it.

*Legitimate and Illegitimate Conditions of Knowledge*

The technical criterion of performativity as articulated by Ramsden (1998) and Daniel (1997) drives the production, definition and dissemination of knowledge.
In order to be legitimated as usable, knowledge must fit into these new computing and communication channels (Lyotard, 1984). "It can fit into new channels, and become operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 4). This shapes the meaning of knowledge, including forms of knowledge that, for example, can be selected by virtue of speed of access, so as not to "miss the boat" (Daniel, 1997, p. 138) and excluding others that do not fit this criterion. Lyotard claims that the nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of general technological transformation. If this is true then the "traditional" academic values to which both Bates and Daniel refer, and which are often still the basis of the choice of an academic career, must also be changed.

Within this performative context, knowledge ceases to be an end in itself. It becomes a commodity, exteriorized from the knower and produced, often by teams, in order to be exchanged. Its value lies in its contribution to performativity. Higher education participates in the "act" performing efficiency and "world class" excellence on the competitive global stage where "proven" scientific knowledge is produced for consumption. At the same time, Lyotard observes, another form of knowledge, narrative knowledge, which does not fit the performativity criteria because it does not concern itself with verifiability or legitimacy, is excluded as not having a use value.

Narrative knowledge is knowledge related to our internal equilibrium and the creation of social bonds. This type of knowledge is concerned with a holistic view of human beings and with emotional, physical, intellectual, and spiritual well-being. Narrative knowledge builds and sustains communities and the community’s relation to itself and to the world. It is the story that embodies know how, knowing how to
speak, and, importantly, knowing how to hear (Lyotard, 1984). Narrative knowledge
does not adhere to procedures for legitimation and certainty. The narratives
themselves have authority by the very fact that they are recited and listened to.

In “highly developed societies” like ours, narrative and scientific knowledge
are different but not equal. Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women
and children (Lyotard, 1984). Because they are not subject to proof, narratives are
classified as belonging to a different mentality: savage, underdeveloped, composed of
opinions, customs, ignorance, and ideology. Knowledge, defined according to the
performativity criterion, and usable by virtue of its fit into new computer and
communication channels does not include narratives as legitimate. Scientific
knowledge that serves the best possible input-output equation is legitimate. Narrative
knowledge is not associated with input-output equations and is thus illegitimate.

The nature and course of knowledge is also shaped according to performative
funding criteria: “Research sectors that are unable to argue that they contribute even
indirectly to the optimization of the system’s performance are abandoned by the flow
of capital and doomed to senescence. The criterion of performance is explicitly
invoked by the authorities to justify their refusal to subsidize certain research centers”
(Lyotard, 1984, p. 47).

We have arrived at an historical juncture, at the postmodern moment (Usher &
Edwards, 1994). Alignment with use value, extent of buy in, and adherence to
performative criteria are part of the university culture and the consequences cannot be
ignored. The meaning and goals of the university and what it is to be an academic are
cast in the light of relevance for some and in the shadows of obscurity for others.
Managerial techniques and strategies focused on technological transformation of the academy are legitimated as the way forward. This new landscape has profound implications for the work and identity of the academic.

*The Performative Academic: A New Fabricated Identity?*

The performative criterion [sounds] the knell of the age of the professor.

(Lyotard, 1984, p. 53)

If, according to Lyotard’s performativity hypothesis, the desired goal of higher education becomes the optimal contribution to the best performativity of the social system, then being a successful academic would also entail contributing to the best performativity of the same system. Academics must perform within an evolving university that is undergoing a major shift in the nature of its mission and its place in society. It is no longer legitimate as a beacon, an ivory tower, producing pure knowledge and truth in service to the great ideal of human emancipation and ensuing freedom from ignorance. It is “under siege” and “in ruins” (Lewis, Massey, & Smith, 2001; Readings, 1996). A new performative academic must be fabricated to produce a new commodified version of knowledge that will “grow” the new knowledge corporation in an increasingly competitive global economy. Truthfulness and pursuit of knowledge for the sake of it are not the point. The point is usefulness and effectiveness.

This academic is no longer called to create ideas but will instead, have to create the skills that are indispensable to the functioning of the system. In the postmodern university “the transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding a nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the
system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 48).

These new pragmatic posts entail new teaching and research functions and new professional courses, programmes, and degrees. Importantly, they entail a new social identity for the academic or even, as Lyotard mused, no social identity: “To the extent that learning is translatable into computer language and the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics can be entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc.) and computer data banks to intelligent terminals placed at the students’ disposal” (1984, p. 50).

How do these performative demands manifest in the realities of the academic’s life on campus and in what it means to be an academic? New identities must be fabricated if one is to live according to the mechanics underlying performativity (i.e. the data base, the appraisal meeting, the annual review, report writing, the regular publication of results, promotion applications, inspections, and peer reviews). The new vocabulary of performance (e.g. Daniel, 1997) renders old ways of thinking and relating dated, redundant, and even obstructive (Ball, 2003). Responding to the mechanics of performativity, faculty must change how they think about themselves. In order to succeed academics must adopt a performative attitude and ethical framework within which to work, interact with each other, and think about what they do and who they are (Ball, 2000). “It is not that performativity gets in the way of real academic work, it is the vehicle for changing what academic work is” (Ball, 2000, p. 16).
Performative Fabrications

The new performative worker is a promiscuous self, an enterprising self, with a passion for excellence. For some, this is an opportunity to make a success of themselves, for others it portends inner conflicts, inauthenticity and resistance, (Ball, 2003, p. 215).

In the face of the onslaught of performance reviews, appraisals, reports, and evaluations, academics become calculating about themselves in terms of their added value, their productivity, and how they measure up to standards of excellence (Ball, 2003). Calculating about and valuing the self for productivity alone within the academy has a dehumanizing effect on social relations. The calculating self is not expected to care about people because people are valued for their productivity alone. Authentic social relations are also not valued, but replaced by judgemental relations. Under criteria of performativity academics live their lives as “enterprises of the self”, where social interaction, commitment, and service are of dubious value (Ball, 2003). Inherent in calculating the self is a conflict, what Lyotard (1984) called the “law of contradiction” where the time and effort spent fulfilling performative criteria prevent the very performance improvements the data are meant to prove.

There is only one acceptable outcome to calculations of the self and that is “excellence” or, more accurately, presenting the self as excellent. Within the culture of competition, academics must be “outstanding”, “successful”, “above the average” (Ball, 2003). Cooperation and older forms of collective relations are replaced by competition. Institutions and academics are encouraged to make themselves different from one another, to stand out, to improve themselves. They are encouraged to take
responsibility for transforming themselves. Like the calculating self, the excellent self does not care about people but about performances. The presentation is there simply to be seen and judged. Individual and organizational actors must carefully craft and manage presentations with an eye to the competition (Ball, 2003).

The manager has become central to the creation and presentation of the excellent academic. The manager is the new hero of quality and excellence drawing on the excellence literature to re-form academics as leaders and excellent teachers (McWilliam, et al, 1999). Creating the excellent academic is accomplished through governance at a distance, where individuals are made to feel personally responsible for the standard of their work. This standard requires careful and painstaking work on the self:

 Responsible academics are invited to see ‘leader/manager’ as a positive way of bringing oneself into being as a different sort of individual. The precise means of doing this is not an open question, but is framed within the dominant rationality for constituting best practice. (McWilliam et al, 1999, p. 61)

The cost here is a kind of “values schizophrenia [where] commitment, judgment, and authenticity within practice are sacrificed for impression and performance” (Ball, 2003, p. 221).

Another aspect of the fabricated academic is entrepreneurial. Increasingly, academics must prove their value by bringing in money for the university (McWilliam et al, 1999). Thinking as an end has “a single but irredeemable fault: it’s a waste of time” (Lytard, 1992, p. 47). As entrepreneurs, academics galvanize the economic potential of knowledge. With knowledge as a value-added commodity,
universities begin to resemble other business organizations. “In all of these changes towards corporatization and privatization, academics, of necessity, are required to reinvent their courses, their research interests, their publications and, indeed, themselves as marketable commodities” (McWilliam et al, 1999, p. 63). The excellent academic gives teaching a high priority when it is seen in terms of the value added - of attracting, keeping, and credentialing as many students as possible. There are, however some troubling paradoxes of performative fabrication.

Paradoxes of Fabrication

Fabrications require presenting oneself within particular boundaries of meaning where only certain possibilities of being have value. Judith Butler (1999) points out that fabrications are “paradoxical” (p. 136). Yet there is a paradox in this, for fabrications are both resistance and capitulation. Acts of fabrication and the fabrications themselves can be a form of resistance, evading surveillance by offering a façade of calculation designed to satisfy performativity criteria. At the same time, fabrications submit to the rigors of performativity and competition. In the end, fabrications “must render the organization into a recognizable rationality which is underpinned by ‘robust procedures’, punctuated by ‘best practices’ and always ‘improving’, always looking for ‘what works’” (Ball, 2003, p. 225). Ball uses the teaching portfolio as an example of such a fabrication. “The fabrication becomes embedded in, and is reproduced by, systems of recording and reporting on practice. It also excludes other things which do not ‘fit’ into what is intended to be represented or conveyed” (Ball, 2000, p. 9). Success depends on how well one grasps and uses the systems and procedures of fabrication.
A second paradox with regard to fabrications is the illusion of transparency. "Technologies and calculations which appear to make public sector organizations more transparent may actually result in making them more opaque, as representational artefacts are increasingly constructed with great deliberation and sophistication" (Ball, 2000, p. 225). This takes the form of, for example, "creative" accounting and grade inflation. When performance "improvement" becomes the only basis for decision-making, the heart of the educational project is destroyed. Ethical practices are a casualty; effectiveness rather than honesty is most valued in the performative regime. Ball sees an ethical retooling in education that is based upon commercial decision-making displacing student need and professional judgement. This process has potentially profound consequences for the nature of teaching and learning and for the inner life of the teacher.

Fabrications also entail deprofessionalization and fabrication of the "outer" self. Careers are reconstructed as seamless, developmental progressions to the present, with lines of further development, illustrating potential value-added, extending far into the future.

We rehearse our 'national' and international reputation', quote from reviews of our books, highlight the 'excellence' of our teaching and our contributions to administration and the institutional academic communities. We become rounded paragons with multiple strengths and infinite possibilities for further work, adept in the studied art of convincing exaggeration. (Ball, 2000, p. 16)
There are consequences to these performative fabrications, both to the academic as human being and to the university as institution. The malaise (Taylor, 1991) of inauthenticity, an unnamed shadow, hangs over the academy.

Symptoms of this malaise can be seen as spaces for the operation of autonomous ethical codes, based on a shared moral language, are closed down (Ball, 2000). Service commitments no longer have value or meaning, and professional judgement is subordinated to the requirements of performativity and marketing. Criteria for best practices are driven, not by the dictates of an intellectual field, but by degree of “client” satisfaction (McWilliam et al, 1999). There is a merging of selves into the WE (the academic community, the subject department, even the “collaborative we” of reports and publications). A certain form of life in which one could recognize oneself is threatened or lost. Anxiety and isolation can lurk beneath performative fabrication: “The contentments of stability are increasingly elusive, purposes are contradictory, motivations blurred and self worth slippery” (Ball, 2000, p. 3).

Care of self, set against duty to the best performativity of the system, in a culture of new forms of surveillance and self monitoring, can precipitate existential anxiety and dread (Ball, 2003). “We become ontologically insecure: unsure whether we are doing enough, doing the right thing, doing as much as others, or as well as others, constantly looking to improve, to be better, to be excellent. And yet, it is not always very clear what is expected” (p. 220). The sense of being constantly judged and continually accountable, in different ways, by different means, according to different criteria, through different agents and agencies, creates an overall climate of
uncertainty. It becomes difficult to determine what the priorities are, what is valued, and the reasons for our actions. Are we doing things to “look good”, to make our institution look good or because it is important and we believe in it because it is worthwhile in itself? Do we value who we are able to be in this maze of performativity?

Tension mounts with concerns that what is done will not be captured by, or valued within, the metrics of accountability. On the other hand, these metrics distort practice, cutting out the immeasurable and defining what is to be measured according to availability of measuring tools and ease of measurement. “In the hard logic of a performance culture, an organization will only spend money where measurable returns are likely to be achieved” (Ball, 2003, p. 223).

The degree of distress experienced in the performative university is influenced by an academic’s level in the hierarchy and by personal conceptions of knowledge. Those with more control over setting and influencing performative criteria, and those for whom knowledge is more aligned with performative criteria, would experience less anxiety and isolation in the “Excellent University” than those with less influence, and for whom performative criteria conflict with their personal values and epistemologies.

Responses to the Performative University

Lyotard: A Postmodern Science

Lyotard’s response to the performative condition of knowledge in higher education is based on his critique of the underlying epistemology of performativity. Legitimation by performativity is, according to Lyotard (1984), based upon the
hypothesis of determinism central to systems theory. According to the input/output ratio, it is possible to predict the behaviour of a system because it follows a regular path. This implies a highly stable system whose behaviour can be predicted if all the variables are known and managed. This “positivist philosophy of efficiency” (1984, p. 54) is the flaw in the legitimacy of performativity, for knowledge does not advance in a linear manner, but advances through paralogy, characterized by uncertainty, incomplete information, and paradoxes.

Postmodern science – by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, ‘fracta, catastrophes and pragmatic paradoxes – is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non rectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy. (Lyonard, 1984, p. 61)

Paralogy, meaning a flood of good ideas inspired by conversation, is science’s highest accomplishment. Paralogy’s “little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most particularly in science” (p. 60). It acknowledges that discoveries are unpredictable and defy the logic of positivist scientific methodologies. Paralogy is not based in the validity of a metanarrative of emancipation and does not follow the pragmatics of socioeconomics through improving the performance, power, and legitimacy of a system. Paralogy’s
pragmatics is based on the imaginative development of knowledge. It emphasizes
dissension rather than an unattained “consensual” horizon (Lyotard, 1984). Science
based on paralogy is an open system in which statements become relevant if they are
spontaneous and creative, generating other statements and other “game rules” (p. 64).
Generating ideas is the basis of legitimization of paralogy. It possesses no general
metalanguage for transcribing and evaluating all other languages. This is what
prevents paralogy’s “identification with the system and, all things considered, with
terror” (p. 64).

Paralogy subsumes consensus as an impermanent aspect of the quest for
paralogy: “Any consensus on the rules defining the game and the ‘moves’ playable
within it must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to
eventual cancellation” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 66). For example, if someone says, “What I
mean by ‘stuff’ is everything that I have that isn’t worth anything to anyone else,” that
definition stand as a local and provisional definition of “stuff”. Rather than challenge
the definition, we try to step inside the speaker’s vocabulary. This is generous
listening promoting reciprocal generosity (Shawver, 2006).

Readings: A Community of Dissensus in the Posthistorical University

claims, “We have to recognize that the University is a ruined institution” (p. 169).
The university’s role in (Canadian) culture has shifted in the face of globalization and
the end of the epoch of the nation state. Acknowledging the major changes in the role
of the intellectual, Readings calls for a response to performativity that acknowledges
the fact of performativity and, at the same time, preserves Thought. He addresses, in
particular, the performative university’s destiny as University of Excellence where “a general principle of administration replaces the dialectic of teaching and research, so that teaching and research, as aspects of professional life, are subsumed under administration” (p. 125). As transnational capitalism erodes the meaning of culture and national cultural missions (centered on the creation of liberal, reasoning citizens), the role of higher education can no longer be conceived in terms of cultural acquisition or cultural resistance. The university must give up the link between the University and national identity that has assured power, prestige, and research funds for some, while excluding others (Readings, 1990).

Asking what is the point of the university without a national cultural mission, Readings concurs with Taylor (1991), resisting both the calls to return to old nostalgic ideals of the knockers and the technocratic demands of the boosters (of performativity). He envisions teaching and learning as sites of obligation and loci of ethical practices, rather than as means of transmission of scientific knowledge. Teaching thus becomes answerable to the ethical question of justice, rather than to the performative criterion of use value. “We must seek to do justice to teaching rather than to know what it is or should be” (Readings, 1996, p. 154). Drawing from Lyotard’s analysis, he concludes that the university has to find a new language and a new pedagogy that refuses to justify itself in terms of a metanarrative of emancipation.

Readings envisions the posthistorical university that does not claim to know the true referent of the University but assumes a new, dynamic role, replacing the
advancement of excellence with preserving the horizon of Thought. Following Lyotard's claim that, in the performative university, thinking is a waste of time, Readings claims that, since thought is seen as non productive, it belongs to an economy of waste. Given this reality, how does one think in an institution whose development tends to make Thought more and more difficult, less and less necessary? How might one with a commitment to Thought dwell in the ruins of the University?

Drawing from Derrida and Lyotard's questioning of the transparency of communication, Readings proposes thinking about a community of dissensus as a response to this question. A community of dissensus is one in which communication is, as Austin (1962) also observed, not transparent, and the possibility of communication is not grounded upon and reinforced by a common cultural identity. It is a community without identity; singularities, "I's" rather than egos, occupy the positions of speaker and listener, and obligation and responsibility are to the condition of things.

Closely paralleling the work of Emmanuel Levinas in his vision, Readings claims Thought can only do justice to heterogeneity if it does not aim at consensus. No consensus can legitimate the University or the State as the authoritative reflection of the consensus it represents. The social bond is the fact of an obligation to others that we cannot fully understand for we are obligated to the other without being able to say exactly why. If we could say why in all certainty then we could be freed from them in

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14 Readingscapitalizes Thought, not to indicate a mystical transcendence, but to avoid reference with any one signification. I will capitalize certain words following a conventional custom among writers of metaphysical texts to signify aspects or attributes of God.
return for payment. Our (pedagogic) obligations have no origin except in the sheer fact of existence of [o]therness\textsuperscript{15}.

A community of dissensus presupposes nothing in common and does not seek communicational consensus. It seeks to make its differences more complex. It is understood on the model of dependency rather than emancipation. We cannot emancipate ourselves from our social bonds because “we can never totally know, finally and exhaustively judge, the others to which we are bound” (Readings, 1996, p. 190). But we can learn from the other in the posthistorical University, “where thought takes place beside thought, where thinking is a shared process without identity or unity” (p. 192). Readings sees this community of thinkers as a dissensus wherein the encroachment of the open market “is an opportunity for Thought rather than an occasion for denunciation or mourning” (p. 179).

In a community of dissensus the teacher/developer aims to evoke ethical obligations to justice, to respect for an absolute other that precedes any knowledge about the other. “There is some other in the classroom, and it has many names: culture, thought, desire, energy, tradition, the event, the immemorial, the sublime. The educational institution seeks to process it, to dampen the shock it gives the system” (Readings, 1996, p. 162). Dissensus welcomes the other and, unlike consensus, cannot be institutionalized.

\textit{Returning to Authenticity: A Personal Note}

Without philosophy as the study of reality itself, there can be no confrontation with our own reality as beings who as much need to find their lives

\textsuperscript{15}Through my collaboration with Kim McShane and Susan Wilcox we dropped the capital “O” to avoid an obvious othering of the other.
meaningful within the whole as they need to eat and sleep. If the need is not satisfied authentically it will be satisfied cheaply. (Wilshire 1990, p. 203)

Responses to performativity in higher education return this discussion to authenticity and to philosophy. Philosophy offers to educational development scholarship a way forward, toward an epistemological basis for practice. In my own strivings to more fully realize my authenticity as educator, I have been influenced by philosophy, including the works of Emmanuel Levinas through Sharon Todd (Todd 1996, 2003), a social justice professor at York University. Drawing from her experience with her students and from Levinas’ philosophical vision, Todd explores her responsibility as educator to the preservation of the “radical alterity” of the other. Radical alterity is an absolute and unknowable difference that is the Mystery of each human being. Sensitivity to, and preservation of, radical alterity of the other requires a letting go of the ego in order to learn from the other. This stance has transformative ethical possibilities for educational methodology, moving away from merely learning about the other (whether in the context of teaching, consultation, or more formal research and scholarship) to learning from the other. It constitutes a defining feature of the ethical pedagogical relationship (Todd, 2003). Such responsibility suggests a horizon of significance that is resonant with my journey toward authenticity.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter is a part of my quest to realize my authenticity in my practice as educator by tracing the historical and philosophical development of authenticity and performativity, and exploring their relevance to individuals working in the academy and to the project of higher education. Authenticity, as originally conceptualized
(Trilling, 1972; Taylor, 1991), was intended to capture a sentiment of being (Self) whose defining characteristic was of being both a part of, and responsible to, demands that emanate from a larger whole. Authenticity implies Spirit - a transcendence of a dualistic ego self and accompanying socially - constructed roles. In everyday life, the demands of authenticity are manifest in human strivings or longings for meaning and purpose in life. Strivings for authenticity can be satisfied in ways that connect individuals to concerns that both implicate and transcend them. It can also be satisfied cheaply through narcissistic cultural criteria of use value, defined in terms of excellence, competition, and wealth. These criteria are the criteria of performativity, (Lyotard, 1984) seen to be the defining condition of Western higher education.

The culture of performativity embodies the positivist epistemological foundations of the higher education project. Performative criteria shape and determine the very nature of knowledge in higher education. These criteria legitimate “scientific” knowledge, defined by its use value, to the best performativity of the system, and delegitimate narrative knowledge, which is not associated with use value. Ways of knowing, including spiritual, which are transcendent of the ego self, are marginalized or excluded as irrelevant to the system.

In order to shape knowledge to serve the best performativity of the system, academic actions and identity must also be shaped, with profound consequences to the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual well being of those who work in the academy. Varying degrees of anxiety, isolation, and disorientation are associated with
the fabrication of performative identities designed to present excellence in order to meet the entrepreneurial demands of the university.

Research on the scholarship of teaching and conceptions of teaching and learning have reinforced performative criteria. For example, Boyer's (1990) broad conception of scholarship as teaching, discovery, application, and integration aimed at responding to a moral vision of responsibility to society has been excluded from subsequent conceptions of scholarship in the educational development literature. Recent educational development scholarship has begun to address authenticity in practice but has not questioned the epistemological basis of the field's claims to knowledge. Conceptions of authenticity thus far developed also exclude the broader moral and ethical horizons of responsibility originally associated with authenticity. These exclusions and narrowing of knowledge are reinforced by the epistemological paradigm within which educational development scholarship and practice is conducted.

Responses to performativity in higher education accept the university's changed role in society and suggest an alternate role to do justice to heterogeneity. They point to alternative epistemologies to support heterogeneity, based in narrative ways of knowing (Lyotard, 1984) and dissensus (Readings, 1990). These responses, while retaining a certain dualistic and oppositional stance that I believe is ultimately unhelpful, nevertheless point toward an educational epistemology of authenticity, for there is an acknowledgment of, and respect for, the Mystery, the ultimate unknowability that is the essence of each individual human being.
CHAPTER THREE: What is Educational (Development) Inquiry and Practice?

LINKING TEXT

There is only one identical question underlying all human problems, conflicts, and anxiety, and that is the resolution of what truth is and by what means is it knowable. (Hawkins, 2005, p. 76)

As outlined in the Introduction, this thesis has shifted from traditional to a manuscript-based structure. This shift was related to problems defining a "methodological" approach isomorphic with my thesis focus on authenticity. Our philosophy of educational practice is articulated (consciously or unconsciously) through methodology, yet I was not clear, philosophically, where I stood or what message I would convey through a chosen methodology. Ultimately, as I explained in the introduction, I chose not to adopt a traditional methodology and to do philosophical fieldwork (Minnich, 2005). In this next manuscript, I turn to an exploration of philosophical paradigms in educational research in order to clarify where I stand regarding methodology with respect to educational (development) inquiry and practice.

There is a contextual background to this chapter that may help to further illuminate the nature and roots of my substantial methodological block and its connection to my thesis focus of authenticity. In the early stages of thesis conceptualization and writing, my thesis supervisor, Bluma Litner, asked: "What is driving you?" What came clearly and surely to mind was that my lifelong quest is "driving", perhaps leading, me. This quest can only be described as seeking truth and goodness. As my thesis developed, this quest became increasingly associated with an
experience that happened to me in 1991, the recollection of which kept pushing into
my thoughts. I knew intuitively that it was also related to educational methodology
but could not articulate the connection. The works of mystic, psychiatrist, and
"scientific" contextual frame for my experience and a bridge to clarification of what
is educational inquiry and practice. Here is a recounting of my experience:

In May of 1991, my husband and I were staying in Chamonix, a little village in the
French Alps. It was a beautiful, clear, and sunny day. We had taken a cable car with
a group of tourists to a high plateau overlooking Mont Blanc. Somehow I found
myself standing alone, looking out at the mountain rising before me against a
brilliant blue sky. I became exquisitely aware of the living earth, the beauty and
brilliance of the moment – the soft breeze, the quality of light. I experienced a
sensation of dissolving into these surroundings. I sensed what I could only describe
as Presence everywhere and flowing through me. This Presence was everything. It
was all-knowing and compassionate. I felt opened to a silent "message" in that
moment. The message was a sensation full of comfort and compassion and also a
gentle indifference to human suffering and joy, of which I felt intensely aware.

Somehow it did not matter. I felt as if I was being "told" that all was well. I wept with
humility and gratitude in a way that I had never wept before. There was so much love
and knowledge in this moment – love and knowledge that I knew I was part of and
that was part of me. I wanted to stay there forever.

I did not stay "there" forever, and my life went on as it was before. With time,
however, I came to realize that my life/I had been changed. What stayed with me in
the years after was a certainty that this experience was of pure goodness and truth, intrinsic to my authentic being. During the course of researching and writing this thesis, I returned to more fully explore this experience and to understand it more deeply through scientific and spiritual writings. I have come to understand this experience as an experience of Grace. It was a momentary and spontaneous shift of the mind from the dualistic, ego-bound state that characterizes the linear, cause and effect paradigm of every day reality and known as the Newtonian Paradigm to the Spiritual Paradigm - a non-dualistic, egoless state, characteristic of a non-linear level of consciousness that has been described many times by mystics and avatars and, more recently, scientifically "discovered" and identified through Quantum Physics.

One of the most important philosophical implications of quantum discovery is the breakdown of the deterministic principle of cause and effect. Newtonian causality is, in actuality, a mentation, or thought form. Quantum theory has revealed that causality is an invisible thought form, impugned by the mind. Causality is an operative theory and explanation (sometimes referred to as a paradigm), rather than a provable reality.

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle has pointed to the fact that further advances in science cannot occur without further understanding of the nature of consciousness itself. Scientific observation of subatomic phenomena has revealed that what we assume to be reality is profoundly affected by human consciousness. This has been observed in the behaviour of subatomic particles. Separated, sometimes by great distances in space, subatomic particles are affected simultaneously, and, at the same instant in time, as a human observation of these particles. This phenomenon
does not begin of its own but only as a consequence of human observation.

Perception makes reality. Human observation is part of, not separate from, the
phenomenal world. This implies a unifying presence of a common matrix or lattice
field underlying both the subjective consciousness of the human and the
phenomenographical world of matter. This invisible matrix is the underlying context
to the content of everyday reality. It is within this invisible, non-linear, synchronistic
matrix that Truth and Ultimate Reality abide. Indeed, great avatars such as Jesus and
the Buddha, who taught from this level of consciousness, have profoundly affected
the consciousness of humanity to this day.

It is, however, within the linear, cause and effect, matrix that the great
majority of humanity, who have not attained the consciousness levels of the
enlightened mystic, think and act. Although scientists were able to observe a property
of this matrix, namely, the effect of human observation on matter, this matrix is not
comprehensible through the intellect. It is a Radically Subjective experience of
Oneness with the Totality, which is Ultimate Truth. God, G-d, Allah, Krishna,
Buddha mind, Self, “I”, and Love are commonly employed as descriptors.
Importantly, Radical Subjectivity is free of ego and of the dualistic paradigm
characteristic of the human mind that gives rise to seeming opposites. It is the Eternal
Self, the Holy Self: Awareness, shared with all of life and characterized by peace, joy,
and unconditional love.

It has become clear to me that Truth cannot be discerned within a thought
paradigm based in the dualistic perceptions of ego that holds that human mentation,
based in a (false) theory of cause and effect, can give rise to provable reality – to
Truth. It is within this linear conception of reality that scientific research is carried out. Yet the pursuit of truth and meaning is central to human existence and also to the project of research in the physical and Social Sciences and humanities. Indeed, the search for truth in the service of humanity is at the core of the research process. This pursuit of truth -- this continuous striving, in my view, embodies the evolution of human consciousness from the Newtonian to the Spiritual Paradigm. It signifies the movement of consciousness from content and form, the “things” of the physical, mental, and emotional world, to underlying context, the matrix of Creation itself.

This evolutionary development of human consciousness is expressed, not only in religious and spiritual terminology, but also in the language of the artists, philosophers, mystics, and scientists. It is varyingly called a striving for beauty, truth, and goodness, for authenticity, to become more fully human, to know the self, to be true to oneself. These familiar phrases express the ultimate spiritual nature of our humanness and of our non-material strivings that seek Awareness or Spiritual Enlightenment.

Thus the background context of this next manuscript acknowledges that my exploration of philosophical paradigms in educational research is carried out within the limits of a Newtonian way of seeing. At the same, time my exploration honours Creation expressed through my human striving for Truth and Goodness. It is this Ultimate Reality, this horizon of significance that inspires my question, a question that precedes selection of methodology, namely: What is higher educational inquiry and practice?
CHAPTER THREE

What is Higher Educational Inquiry and Practice?

Universities are not, in the first place, sites of knowing but of being. The knowing comes, if at all, through the being. (Barnett, 2003, p. 178)

Educational researchers should assemble, within their research craft, an honesty and integrity of language with which to express the moral positions (as well as the methodological justifications) of their inquiry. This must inevitably call for new ways of seeing. (Clough, 2002, p.86)

This paper addresses the question: “What is higher educational inquiry and practice?” The response to this question, which I aim to both explore and embody in this paper, is that educational practice and educational inquiry are one and the same, namely fostering the learning and development of persons in the fullest sense. The context of educational practice addressed here is the field of academic development wherein educational developers work. My primary purpose is to discern what it is to be educational and what this means for inquiry and practice in the educational development field. I begin with a slightly fictionalized account (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Clough, 2002) of a dilemma of inquiry and practice, namely the familiar (to faculty/educational developers) problem of legitimacy of the field of educational development. This lack of, and struggle for, legitimacy continues to be (Bath & Smith, 2004; Eggins & Macdonald, 2003; Knapper, 2003; Baume, 2002; Andresen, 1996; Brew, 1995) a defining aspect of educational development discourse. Lack of legitimacy is associated with the low status of teaching in higher education. This, in
turn, is seen by many developers to be at the root of the pervasive ignorance (on the part of regular faculty and administrators) of the research on teaching and learning in higher education. Teaching (unlike research for example) is, according to the educational development discourse, not a priority in universities.

Through analysis of this particular dilemma of my practice, I will try to illustrate that dualisms of this sort are at the heart of problems of legitimacy. Striving to see educational inquiry as educational practice (i.e. non dualistically) can help to address the mismatch of traditional educational research to educational practice. While there is value in traditional educational research, legitimacy of the field of educational development cannot be attained solely through promotion and emulation of this research and its accompanying methodologies. In my view, educational research must, at the very least, be accompanied by an understanding of the limitations imposed by the dualistic paradigmatic underpinnings of traditional approaches. Ideally, educational research, grounded in what it is to be educational, strives to integrate inquiry and practice.

Academic development as a new field of study and practice (Wilcox, 1997b) has particular challenges and opportunities unique to its service orientation (Brew, 2003). There are particular occupational freedoms due to this orientation (Andresen, 1996) and, in my view, accompanying responsibilities and opportunities that place educational developers in a unique position to see a new way and to articulate a new educational discourse. Recent scholarship points to an emerging moral discourse for academic development (Eggins & Macdonald, 2003). Foregrounding of such a discourse would entail a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996) toward a new horizon, an
Educational Paradigm for Higher Education grounded in educational practice as a way of being. The following dilemma of practice is a natural starting point for my question: What is educational practice?

Dilemma of Practice: Through a Reflexive Lens

“If medical practitioners paid as much attention to the available medical research as faculty pay to the available research on teaching and learning in higher education, they would still be using leeches in their practice.” Thus came the scolding pronouncement from the closing plenary speaker at a teaching and technology conference that I, in my capacity as educational/faculty developer, had helped to bring to my university. Many in the audience cheered their approval of this clever juxtaposition. Others were silent. I blanched and gulped in discomfort. While this was a sentiment that I had shared with my educational development colleagues, I felt somehow complicit in a betrayal of the weary teaching colleagues that I worked with. Indeed, some of the “malpracticing” professors were in the audience. But, at the time, I could not discern the source of my discomfort. This pronouncement echoed the approved discourse of my educational development community, summed up in the familiar refrain: “Teaching doesn’t count!” This is evidenced in, for example, lack of reward and recognition for good teaching; pressures to place research ahead of teaching in the tenure and promotion race; increasing stresses and time demands on professors by societal and administrative pressures for accountability; and the changing demands of integrating new technologies in teaching, research, and administration. The historical marginalization and underfunding of teaching and learning centres in universities, along with the perceived indifference to educational
development on the part of the majority of professors and administrators, were evidence, the daily reminder of the second-class status of teaching in universities. Indeed I “agreed” with much of this. Why then did I feel so uncomfortable?

While it was true that there is a plethora of educational research that is, for the most part, ignored, and there exists a serious undervaluing of teaching, and, by association, educational development, I was not so sure that it was just because “teaching didn’t count” as much as research or other priorities. Schön (1983) had long ago pointed out, and my experience had verified, a serious mismatch between the complex realities of the professors I worked with and the capacity of educational research to address them. If this were true, could the research be part of the/our problem of legitimacy of educational development? Perhaps educational development as a field of study and practice is not so innocent and neutral. Could it be contributing to this problem? There was no time to think about these questions then. Yet they persisted.

Subsequent reflection and research has led me to see that my discomfort can be more honestly described as a sense of inauthenticity as educator that was part of an underlying moral conflict in my educational (development) practice. This inauthenticity was not, however caused by the commonly espoused and divisive “reasons” for lack of legitimacy that blamed others (administrators in particular) for the low status of teaching in higher education. It was linked to the problematic philosophical and paradigmatic underpinning of educational inquiry and practice based in what are ultimately false dualisms (Pring, 2000). Indeed, the defining methodological issue in the Social Sciences is the divisive qualitative/quantitative
debate (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). This debate reflects the underlying dualistic, Newtonian world-view, an intellectual paradigm that defines knowledge “objectively” in terms of opposites such as good/bad, right/wrong and excludes the “subjective” moral dimension.

Dualisms, in particular the qualitative/quantitative opposition, are seen by social scientists to be irreconcilable because, in the “postmodern moment”, there is no single “truth” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 212). All truths are but “partial”, making common understanding amongst scientists impossible. Claiming truth, according to these authors, implies coerciveness, seeing the world in one colour and preventing emancipation from the authoritative voices of Western Europe. While these sentiments are well understood in the context of the death of the Grand Narrative of emancipation and ensuing postmodern incredulity toward all claims to truth (Lyotard, 1984), they do not resonate with an educational way of seeing.

The central project of education is moral (Boyer, 1990; Pring, 2000; Readings, 1996; Wilshire, 1990) and truth matters very much, for education is fundamental to individual, societal, and human development. Education concerns teaching and learning toward development of persons in the fullest sense, of personal well being, and of worthwhile and fuller ways of life (Barnett, 2003; Pring, 2000). Through education, people become, “in an important sense, different persons” (Pring, 2000, p. 14). Universities are above all else forums for human beings with “the capacity to get under the skin, to have ontological effects” (Barnett, 2003, p. 174).

Education shapes one’s identity toward what Taylor (1991) calls a moral “horizon of significance”. “Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands
of nature, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order \textit{matters} crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial" (Taylor, 1991, p. 41). What it is to be educational embodies, at its most fundamental level, a common way of seeing teaching and learning as serving our humanness, human purpose, and human well being. It transcends a "malaise of modernity" (Taylor, 1991) characterized by the impossibility of shared meaning and mutual understanding. For higher education, what it is to be educational transcends the divisive ideologies that fuel individual and institutional pessimism and cynicism. It recovers and restores human qualities and dispositions, uniting "higher" educators in a shared human purpose (Barnett, 2003).

Educational inquiry and practice, if it is to be consciously educational, thus cannot be based solely in false dualisms and the (ensuing) dim hope of uncovering "partial" truths in what is described by Guba and Lincoln (2005) as a time in history of Social Sciences research "marked by multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new textual forms" (p. 212). These conflicts and controversies are symptomatic of a falsely dualistic worldview, giving rise to dissonance and a sense of illegitimacy in educational (development) inquiry and practice. Indeed, a defensive struggle for legitimacy, to a great degree, defines our discourse.

\textit{Academic Development and The Struggle for Legitimacy}

Historically, the primary focus of educational development practice has been to enhance the quality of teaching and learning. Indeed, developers believe that they have helped to take teaching "out of the closet" and to "keep universities honest by
drawing attention to the educational mission of universities at a time when our colleagues seem preoccupied with other matters” (Knapper, 2003, p. 6). Yet there remains a problem of legitimacy of the field that is seen to be at the root of its inability to significantly enhance the status and quality of university teaching and learning. Indeed the vast body of “scientific” knowledge about “best practices” has not significantly influenced university teaching. Developers maintain, among other things, that teaching, including teaching using educational technology, remains overwhelmingly didactic; assessment methods are often trivial and inauthentic; curriculum development a matter of faculty interest; and teaching evaluation superficial (Knapper, 2003).

The reason for the persistence of these problems is seen to be lack of academic legitimation of academic development as a field. Developers are grudgingly accepted in an as yet unbounded and unrecognized field (Baume, 2002; Brew, 2002; Knapper, 2003). Attaining legitimacy is a primary, insecure preoccupation. Some see research carried out within a “rigorous framework of evaluation and institutional research” (Brew, 2002, p. 6) as legitimizing, recognizing, and affirming “evidence-based” (Knapper, 2003, p. 8) academic development practice. Others see possible legitimacy as scholarship of teaching and learning (Hutchings & Shulman, 1999; Kreber, 2001b, 2001c; Trigwell et al., 2000; Weston & McAlpine, 2001) characterized by critical reflection on professional practice, exploration of theory, systematic investigation, and communication of the knowledge of practice to other practitioners.
To date, however, there has been little research interest in teaching and learning in the higher education community. Indeed, within the broad field of research and publication in the international field of Higher Education, questions of teaching and learning are often peripheral, marginalized by issues such as reward and recognition, governance structures, and student attrition (Lee, 2005). A “striking example” (Lee, 2005, p. 25) is the publication of the major *Handbook of Theory and Research in Higher Education*, where there were no direct explorations of the educative process and practices in the field.

Given the direct association of research with legitimacy, the issue of academic development research and scholarship is becoming increasingly important. Indeed, given the recent publication of *The Scholarship of Academic Development* (Eggbins & Macdonald, 2003), academic development has reached a turning point. It is faced with an opportunity and a challenge, for how it theorizes its quest for legitimacy will determine, to a great degree, how academic development research is conceptualized and how higher education discourse narrates and shapes educational practice. The philosophical and paradigmatic underpinnings of this research and scholarship, not its basis in evidence or scholarship of teaching and learning, will determine its legitimacy as educational.

It is true that, with the paradoxical exception of the field of higher education research, there is no paucity of scientific knowledge about best practices for teaching and learning (e.g. Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). It is also true that this knowledge has had little impact on teaching practice. The reasons for these phenomena, however, may be tied to an unawareness of the implications of the paradigmatic underpinnings
of this knowledge and its relevance to teaching and learning. The underlying paradigm determines the nature of research knowledge (Kuhn, 1996), how it will shape, and how it will legitimize, a field of study and practice. Thus awareness of the paradigm underpinning future higher education research and its power to shape and legitimize educational theory and practice is, in my view, critical for defining academic development scholarship. In the next section, I explore the paradigmatic context of the educational research to which our plenary speaker appears to (tacitly) subscribe and how this context both makes and reinforces problems of legitimacy for educational inquiry and practice.

Context of Educational (Development) Practice: Conflicting Paradigms and False Dualisms

Educational research is carried out within a paradigm or a group’s shared commitment to a way of seeing (Kuhn, 1996). Paradigms form within disciplines. They are part of what Kuhn describes as a disciplinary matrix. Other components of the matrix include unquestioned generalizations, shared beliefs in particular models, and shared values that provide a sense of community. (Values often come into conflict when a crisis is identified or members must choose between incompatible ways of practicing their discipline.)

Paradigms are learned ways of seeing situations as like each other. They are learned, often non-verbally, by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for doing it. What results from this process is tacit knowledge that produces a shared theory or worldview in a community and that holds the disciplinary matrix in place. Thus a paradigm is an invisible thought form, a constellation of internalized mental sets that underpins thinking. Its central purpose in the disciplines is to offer academic
legitimacy, in the form of a shared worldview, necessary in order for disciplinary sciences to develop and to support the truth-value of its claims (Kuhn, 1996).

Paradigms are upheld and reinforced by “normal science” (Kuhn, 1996), designed with the conceptual and instrumental tools of the disciplinary matrix to solve problems defined by the paradigm’s criteria for choosing them. Shared examples or exemplars are created through normal science and assimilated by members of the community, creating and reinforcing this “time - tested and group - licensed way of seeing” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 189). Normal science is cumulative, concerned with problems seen to be useful for defining, widening, and stabilizing a field. There is circularity to normal science in that problems that cannot be stated in terms of the paradigms’ conceptual and instrumental tools are rejected. Paradigms persist until a critical number of anomalies and unsolvable problems arise in a scientific community, and a new way of seeing is needed to explain them (Kuhn, 1996).

Paradigm shifts are at the heart of the revolutionary process in the arts and sciences (Kuhn, 1996). Historically, paradigm shifts are non-cumulative breaks in a traditionally - accepted worldview, brought about when a critical number of anomalies occur after a stable period of normal science. The mental set of the paradigm dissolves. If a paradigm shift occurs in a scientific community, those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach to another group. Intellectually, one can be fully persuaded of a new worldview because there are “natives already there” (p. 294) who can translate the new language of the paradigm. But to translate a theory is not to make it authentically one’s own.
Under such conditions, the mental set persists and one uses the new theories “as a foreigner in a foreign environment” (p. 204). True paradigm shifts occur, not through reason or translation, but with internalization of the mental sets of the paradigm - a change or transformation of minds - and of persons. The field of academic development is no stranger to mental sets.

A defining mental set for academic development practice is the deep/surface metaphor of learning (Webb, 1997). This pervasive metaphor, created through phenomenographic methodology, illustrates the operation of false dualism and the ensuing problems this makes for practice.

*A Mental Set in Academic Development: The Deep Surface Metaphor*

The deep and surface metaphor of learning is an example of a shared exemplar (Kuhn, 1996) created by normal (educational) science. It is a foundational metaphor upon which much of educational research, theory, and practice is based and has become “a canon for educational development” (Webb, 1997, p. 195). The deep/surface metaphor is created and reinforced by phenomenography, which is considered to be a qualitative methodology. Phenomenography, as a theory of knowledge and a methodology, developed at the same time as educational development centers (Webb, 1997) and this goes a long way toward explaining the field’s loyalty to this methodology. Educational development scholarship to a great degree adopted and reinforced this metaphor, conducting phenomenological studies into, for example, conceptions of teaching and learning (Dall'Alba, 1993; Kember & Gow, 1994; Prosser et al., 1994; Samuelowicz & Bain, 1992) and conceptions of scholarship of teaching (Trigwell et al., 2000). Through interview and analysis,
essential variations in a professor's understanding of teaching and learning were identified within their particular contexts. Conceptions were then decontextualized and mapped hierarchically into (usually five) categories illustrating the most distinctive characteristics (of teaching and learning) and the relationship between them. Higher order categories incorporate the lower order ones and are considered to be more complex.

The conceptions of teaching research, conducted primarily by educational developers, has defined five basic categories of teaching. These range from teaching-and instruction-centered, considered to be least complex and desirable, to student-and learning-centered, considered to be most complex and desirable. A similar range of categories was created in the scholarship of teaching research (Trigwell et al, 2000). Categories move from what were considered the lower order categories of, for example, gathering and reading information on teaching and learning, to the higher order categories of improving student learning by communicating one's own work on teaching and learning to a wider audience.

The normal science of phenomenography has fostered a shared understanding of models of teaching and of scholarship of teaching in the educational development community. The deep/surface metaphor had a simple and universal appeal, and we educational developers adopted it as a foundational theory for practice. Educational developers could develop and advise with certainty on practical ways to encourage movement, or conceptual change, along the continuum from teaching (surface) to learning (deep), (see Barr & Tagg, 1995), or from seeing teaching in a teacher-focused way (not scholarship based) to seeing teaching in a student-focused way
(scholarship based). According to these phenomenographic hierarchies, “Everyone could agree that a deep approach to learning or scholarship of teaching was desirable and good” (Webb, 1997, p. 199).

Indeed, because the theoretical desirability and goodness of this approach was so obvious, phenomenography was, with the exception of Webb (1997), and until recently (Eggins & Macdonald, 2003), adopted relatively uncritically. Given its academic respectability and practical applicability, phenomenography has served the purpose of legitimating teaching and learning research and entrenching the deep/surface metaphor amongst developers. The metaphor has not, to the bane of developers, been widely actualized in practice. Intuitively we know that teaching and learning are far more complex than can be captured through this simple metaphor.

Phenomenographic research, which has had a continuing and pervasive impact on academic development beliefs, research, and practice, illustrates the workings of normal science designed with the paradigm’s conceptual and instrumental tools. In this case the tools of phenomenography work to reinforce a “group-licensed” (i.e. deep/surface) theory of teaching and learning. Alternate ways of seeing teaching and learning are denied by the circular mechanism of the paradigm. Problems falling outside the power of the conceptual and instrumental tools of the paradigm cannot be addressed because they cannot be stated in terms of the paradigm’s conceptual and instrumental tools. It is, as Webb (1997) points out, “as though the higher education research and development community has found a theory to support its deepest ‘prejudices’ and common sense opinions” (p. 199).
Phenomenography has also served to confine higher education research to the classroom, focusing our attention on issues such as moving from teaching to learning (Barr & Tagg, 1995) and deflecting attention from radical critiques linking education and learning to the personal or to the world outside. Pointing out some of the qualitative/quantitative contradictions inherent in phenomenography, Webb (1997) assumes an anti positivist stance. Phenomenography “appears to have no particular view of humanity” (p. 198). While claiming qualitative status, in the end phenomenography has more to do with “ the quest for positivist generalization than the development of hermeneutical understanding” (pp. 197-198).

Here Webb implicitly supports a constructivist paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) where “reality” or multiple realities are constructed through hermeneutical dialectic processes. Yet there is as much danger of constructed realities reflecting the dominance of those in powerful negotiating positions as there are of researchers in the positivist paradigm serving the interests of, for example, powerful managers (Pring, 2000). There are strong and weak negotiators, those practiced in the art and skill, and those who are not and do not wish to be. In the end, however, phenomenological research, while claiming qualitative status, is rooted in an underlying positivist/quantitative epistemology. A linear, hierarchical view of knowledge is implicit in, and sustained by, phenomenological research.

Such studies reproduce (ultimately false) dualisms, invariably reducing findings to a linear (and divisive) hierarchy of desirable to undesirable approaches to teaching, learning, and the scholarship of teaching. Yet this epistemology represents the consensus of the educational development community, implicitly legitimizing its
theories and methodologies. In essence, a dualistic paradigm is subtly reinforced as suitable for understanding persons and for educational practice. Lacking an articulated educational philosophical and paradigmatic base, educational development inquiry and practice can thwart the humanizing element of what it is to be educational.

The dualistic and hierarchical conception of teaching and learning created by the phenomenographical tools of educational research has academic development research and practice in a circular bind. It is both well entrenched in the field of education and, in my view, at the root of much of the stated problems of legitimacy and striving to make teaching count. Pring (2000) observes: “In failing to do a proper philosophical job, educational researchers have drawn too sharp a contrast between qualitative and quantitative positions. The way in which we understand the social world, and thus educational practice, is much more complex and subtle than that” (p. 87). But academic development has few tools for understanding such subtleties for, as Barnett (2004b) points out, there is no philosophy of higher education.

Indeed, while there is at least one established doctoral programme in academic development16, there is no infrastructure (departments or research units) in the world with a primary interest in the philosophy of higher education (Barnett, 2004b). This is an area where academic developers, given their unique multidisciplinary context and proximity to a wide range of educational practices, could make substantial contributions to both understanding teaching and learning in higher education and to legitimacy (and I will add authenticity) of the field. Indeed, the problems arising in

16 University of Sydney in Australia has an established doctoral programme in higher education studies and academic development. Personal communication, Kim McShane, July, 2006.
educational development practice provide a multitude of opportunities for philosophic analysis toward educational ways of seeing. The current paradigms underpinning academic/educational development inquiry and practice, however, cannot fully enable an educational way of seeing. The following section takes a closer look at these paradigms.

Warring Paradigms in the Social Sciences: Splitting Teaching and Research

The paradigm(s) underpinning academic/educational development are influenced primarily by the disciplinary matrix of education, in particular the fields of cognitive and educational psychology (Brew, 2003; Lee, 2005). Adult education literature (Brookfield, 1990, 1995; Brookfield & Preskill, 1999) and literature on personal and organizational transformation (Cranton, 1996; Mezirow, 2000) are also important resources. Education, in turn, draws paradigmatically from the disciplinary matrices of the Social Sciences, in particular sociology and, to a lesser extent, anthropology (Pring, 2000). The Social Sciences, within which education is situated in most universities, operates ultimately out of the dualistic Newtonian Paradigm of the physical sciences, wherein all disciplinary matrices are currently situated. The defining feature of the Newtonian Paradigm is a dualistic worldview. Yet, as illustrated above, educational research, following the Social Sciences, does not explicitly position itself within this dualistic paradigm.

Pring (2000) provides a philosophical analysis of educational research, illustrating how unacknowledged dualistic mental sets and ensuing paradigmatic controversies in the Social Sciences create a “philosophical trap” (p. 33) for educational research. Research paradigms that embrace one side of a dichotomy to
the (perceived) exclusion of the other emulate the ancient (and ultimately false) dualisms between physical and mental, the public and private, the objective and subjective, and the personal and social.

Indeed, as is a consequence of unreflective human intellect and mentation, the Social Sciences are split into warring and irreconcilable world views, referred to for example as quantitative/qualitative, positivist/non positivist, or traditional and postmodern (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). According to the quantitative worldview, there is a world (reality), which consists of independently-made objects interacting causally with each other. Objects in science can be behaviors, physical objects, or even social events. These objects can be studied, their interrelations noted, regularities discovered, causal explanations given, and results quantified. Observers can check conclusions through replication of the experiments and a scientifically-based body of knowledge, reflecting the world as it is. Statements are true or false, depending on their correspondence to the paradigm - the world as it is (Pring, 2000).

The qualitative worldview abolishes the notion of truth (Pring, 2000). Truth is in consensus, which is negotiated. Indeed, truth of this very position is a matter of consensus. Each person lives in a world of ideas through which they socially construct the physical and social world. One cannot step outside this world. Communication is a negotiation of respective worlds of ideas. New consensuses have constantly to be reached. Notions of truth have to be eliminated or redefined in terms of consensus because, given the social construction of reality, there can be no correspondence between our conceptions of reality and reality itself. Objectivity is impossible because nothing exists independently of the constructed world of ideas,
and there are as many realities as there are constructions of reality (Pring, 2000). The language of higher education accompanying this view (chaos, unpredictability, uncertainty, contestability) projects a fragmentation (Rowland, 2002) and fragility (Ball, 2003) that can overshadow any larger purpose of the university and of the academics working within it (Barnett, 2000).

The qualitative/quantitative debate has become entrenched in the Social Sciences. It has evolved in part due to what Guba and Lincoln (2005) see as paradigm shifts in the Social Sciences. These researchers identify five major paradigms: positivist and post positivist, which are placed on the quantitative side of the split, and critical theory, constructivist, and participatory, which are seen to be in the qualitative camp. Major disagreements center on meaning and on interrelation of words such as objectivity, subjectivity, reality, truth, verification, knowledge, and meaning (Pring, 2000). Shifts from one paradigm to another reflect changing worldviews, from the disinterested scientist verifying hypotheses and establishing facts, to the passionate participant facilitating reconstruction and consensus. While there are areas of overlap and possibilities for borrowing within these two groups of conflicting paradigms, resolution of opposing claims to legitimacy and intellectual hegemony is, according to Guba and Lincoln (2005) highly unlikely.

The reason for this, according to Guba and Lincoln, is because, as mentioned above, in the postmodern moment all truths are but “partial”. Given this perception, Guba and Lincoln are “led inexorably toward the insight that there will be no single ‘conventional’ paradigm to which all social scientists might ascribe in some common terms and with mutual understanding” (2005, p. 212). Claiming truth in Social
Sciences research, according to these authors, implies coerciveness. It entails seeing
the world in one colour and prevents emancipation from the authoritative voices of
Western Europe. But, as Barnett (2004b) has pointed out, we should be cautious
about the postmodern story, especially in relation to education, for the postmodern
story undermines itself conceptually and practically. “On the surface, the postmodern
story projects a picture of village conversations; at a deep level, it shows that
universalism is still with us” (p. 68).

While the sentiments that deny universalism are well understood in the
context of the death of the Grand Narrative of emancipation and the ensuing
postmodern incredulity toward all claims to truth (Lyotard, 1984), they can also be
seen to contribute to a “malaise” characterized by this denial of universalism of the
human condition and loss of common meaning and mutual understanding about
things that matter (Taylor, 1991). “Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the
demands of nature, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else
of this order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial”
(p. 41).

I agree with Guba and Lincoln that there will be no resolution to these
paradigmatic controversies. This is not due, however, to the relativity, and potential
coerciveness, of truth but to the defining feature of the, very human, dualistic mental
set, namely investment, indeed identities, based in conflict between perceived
worldviews. Such conflict is, paradoxically, a consequence of an unacknowledged,
but nevertheless shared, narrative, namely the Newtonian Paradigm that views the
world in (false) dualistic terms. All paradigms that Guba and Lincoln identify lie
within this Paradigm (see Figure 1). It is the underlying paradigmatic and ultimately false belief in duality, exemplified in the quantitative/qualitative split for example, that upholds confusing controversies, contradictions, and fragmentations inherent in the age-old debates and insecurities related to legitimacy in educational (including academic development) research.

Figure 1: “Warring” Research Paradigms in the Social Sciences (Guba & Lincoln, 2005)
This worldview places educational research in a philosophical bind, for the normal science used to produce educational theory and inform educational practice, ultimately, contradicts what it is to be educational. Educational practice cannot be sought within a conflicting and contradictory paradigm. While methodological tools are needed, research tacitly upholding false dualisms and outside an explicit moral context is not, in my view, authentic educational research. Many educators have pointed to the moral and humanizing essence of what it is to be educational (e.g. Barnett, 2003, 2004a; Boyer, 1990; hooks, 2000, 2003; Noddings, 2003; Palmer, 1998, 2000). Explicit signs of this realization are beginning to appear as academic development discourse takes a critical and philosophic turn toward articulating a new paradigm of, and for, academic development (Ashworth, 2003; Gosling, 2003; Light, 2003; Mann, 2003; Peseta, 2005; Webb, 1997; Webber, Bourner, & O’Hara, 2003). This “reconciliation of research and teaching in learning challenges the pervasive and insidious ‘rivalry of learning’ at the heart of so many academic departments” (Light, 2003, p. 162). Indeed, it is central to the emergence of new paradigm of academic/faculty development.

Signs of a Changing Worldview in Academic Development

This emerging discourse problematizes the dichotomous teaching and research split in educational discourse in general (Brew, 2003), as well as the split within academic development itself. This split has been identified as between social (practice based) and psychological (research based) views of teaching and learning (Rowland, 2003), or, as Gosling (2003) asserts, scholarship of teaching and learning and evidence-based practice. Dissolving dualisms is proposed through various
methodological approaches, such as a more thorough and rigorous phenomenography (Ashworth, 2003), practitioner-centered research (Webber et al., 2003), action research (Brew, 2003; Light, 2003), and critical theory (Gosling, 2003).

Calling for a grounding of educational practice in a clear articulation of educational philosophy and values, academic development discourse is moving beyond simple deep surface metaphors to acknowledge the complexity of teaching and learning (Eggins & Macdonald, 2003). The importance of first understanding the underlying meaning and implications of an inquiry method is coming to the foreground as method of research is acknowledged as part of the thing being investigated (Ashworth, 2003). Different methods of inquiry are also recognized as yielding different forms of evidence and making different requirements on practitioners, depending upon the particular paradigmatic and ideological underpinning. The authority of traditional science and of the scientific method are challenged in this emerging discourse (Mann, 2003).

Yet, as we have seen, the authority of the new postmodern approaches and their ability to dissolve the problematic dualisms identified in academic development cannot be assumed, for these approaches are themselves embedded in a dualistic worldview. The authority of the practitioner and of subjective experience are also challenged, for the discovery of the unconscious would posit that we can never achieve full knowledge and mastery of ourselves (Mann, 2003). This view challenges the authority and innocence (Peseta, 2005) of, for example, reflective practice (Schön, 1983) and critical theory (Brookfield, 2005) favored by some in academic development (see Usher, Bryant, & Johnston, 1997 for an in-depth analysis of
reflective practice). Indeed, claiming to know oneself is a deception, for, given the discovery of the unconscious, there is always something that will be unconscious and unknowable to the human mind (Riker, 1997). Given the limits of our paradigms and our humanness, what is it to be educational? In my view, what it is to be educational can be articulated through our moral philosophies of higher education and of academic development.

*Toward a Philosophy of Higher Education Through Educational (Development) Practice*

The falsity of the dualistic split in the Social Sciences and Education (Pring, 2000) remains unacknowledged in academic development scholarship. But there is no need to struggle to dissolve the dualisms that plague higher education and its various paradigms, for they are false. It remains for us to accept these dualisms as inevitable consequences of the workings of the human mind and psyche. Within this misguided project to dissolve dualisms, Gosling (2003) rightly proposes a philosophical approach to academic development as a way forward. He asks fundamental educational questions: “What do we most value in our society?” “How do we prioritize our values?” and “What is better for people?” (pp. 71-72). As educators and educational developers we must ask explicitly: “What is better for our students’ development as persons in the fuller sense?” Addressing these questions sets key tasks for the academic development practitioner, namely, inquiry into how the mind should be cultivated, and to what end.

This turn to philosophy in academic development scholarship could contribute to a missing, much needed, philosophy of higher education for academic
development. Such a philosophy could begin to articulate an educational paradigm for academic development practice. It would acknowledge the inherent dualism of human intellect and the contradictions and conflicts that arise from this paradigm. It would articulate, through a moral language, an educational practice that transcended false dualisms of research and teaching. This new worldview entails a paradigm shift—a turn to epistemology and a moral philosophy, for this is the level of consciousness and action to which we must strive in order to do educational practice.

Arriving at this juncture returns me to my opening dilemma, for I can go no further with my inquiry without bringing it to my educational practice. Given the personal nature of consciousness and morals, I can only speak from my perspective. I see that my discomfort, my sense of inauthenticity in the face of the utterance of our plenary speaker, was a consequence, in part, of my lack of an articulated philosophy of higher education. I see that I was locked into a dualistic mind set, naturally confused and unable to discern truth from falsity. I had no conscious epistemological and moral base within which to contextualize these utterances. Through my subsequent explorations I have developed a new inclusive educational paradigm for my educational (development) practice (see Figure 2).

An Inclusive Educational Paradigm

In Figure 2, I place Social Sciences methodologies together at the center of my model, for these are familiar starting points for educational researchers. They are encircled by, and part of, a multiplicity of possible ways of knowing (Minnich, 1990, 2005). This expansion into a multiplicity of ways of knowing reminds us of the limits of our paradigms and of the uniqueness that is each individual human being. The
second circle dissolves into a moral educational context. This is the moral context of the individual educator (and can be of an educational research community) seeking authenticity. The horizon of significance, as I see it for educators, including educational developers, is always the learning and development of persons/students toward truth - toward a fuller sense of what it is to be a (good) person.

This educational paradigm provides an overarching moral context for my practice. It provides a horizon of significance (Taylor, 1991) that I can envision and a focus for realizing my authenticity through the cultivation of “qualities that make authentic being possible” (Barnett, 2004a, p. 259). This horizon focuses on the capacities and qualities that I see as distinctive of being a person in a more developed sense. Many university educators have articulated their moral horizon (e.g. hooks, 2000, 2003; Palmer 1998, 2000; Todd, 2003).

Different educators depending upon philosophical, religious, spiritual, and moral orientations will respond differently to the question of moral context. Barnett (2004a) for example outlines qualities of carefulness, thoughtfulness, humility, criticality, receptiveness, resilience, courage, and stillness as forms of higher order learning deeply connected to the purposes of higher education. These qualities describe aspects of his moral context. Pring (2000), outlining a philosophy of educational research, articulates his moral context, writing that person is a profoundly moral concept. To be fully a person is to be responsible for what one does, being treated and treating other, with dignity. To engage in moral deliberations essential for a developed sense of self requires uplifting and motivating ideals. These qualities
Figure 2: Inclusive Paradigm for Higher Education Inquiry/Practice.

HORIZON
TRUTH/GOODNESS

Moral Educational Context

Multiplicity of possible ways of knowing

Positivism
Post Positivism
Critical Theory
Constructivism
Participatory/
Cooperative
Etc.
offer a navigational beacon for educational practice in storms of paradigmatic uncertainty and conflict. Barriers to such a way of being are ignorance, lack of self respect, envy, and hatred of others. Without a horizon of significance, there is a danger of sinking into blame, cynicism, apathy, and boredom.

"What are the qualities and capacities that are distinctive of being a person in a more developed sense?" This question opens a personal horizon of significance both for me and for my educational practice, which is, ultimately, a reflection of self. We teach who we are. My moral context for educational practice integrates and provides meaning and purpose to my personal and professional experiences. It draws from personal, educational, philosophical, spiritual, and religious sources. It acknowledges the place of our dualistic research paradigms – the mental sets that provide content for educational research. It also acknowledges and includes the wider context within which educational practice occurs, namely of our strivings to be persons in a fuller sense. These strivings indicate a practice that acknowledges and embodies evolution of consciousness - my educational responsibility.
CHAPTER FOUR: Challenging Performative Fabrication: Seeking Authenticity in Academic Development Practice

LINKING TEXT

The following manuscript is currently in press to the International Journal for Academic Development (IJAD 12 (1)). The seeds for this manuscript were planted in the context of online discussions on the CAD listserv. My colleagues Kim McShane and Susan Wilcox, who shared common interests in addressing the tensions between performativity and authenticity, first joined with me to co-write a paper for presentation at the Higher Education Research and Development for South Asia (HERDSA) Conference, July 2005, in Sydney, Australia (MacKenzie, McShane, & Wilcox, 2005). This paper was presented by Kim along with four other papers which comprised the CAD Symposium: Conceptual transgressions: Furtive explorations in the scholarship of academic development. The symposium set the stage for the symposium with the following Heather’s Story adapted from one of my earlier thesis drafts.

Heather’s Story

I recall a process of disconnection from my practice that spanned a number of years. It involved an externally funded technology and pedagogy integration project, designed to create a cohort of university professors skilled and knowledgeable in the pedagogically-sound uses of new knowledge media. These professors would then become mentors to other professors. My role in this project was to provide university-wide coordination of the Faculties involved. Although there were many facets of this project, I want to focus on what captures, for me, the crux of my own conflict as a
faculty/academic developer with my particular vision of the mission of higher education.

Toward the end of the three-year project, I interviewed 21 project participants (12 professors, and nine administrators). There were many encouraging findings that I believe reflect the dedication of the project participants (MacKenzie, 2002). However, throughout the interview process there was a pervasive message of exhaustion, of being overwhelmed and scattered, and of people making exceptional demands on themselves. “Producing” was the name of the game, they reported. Technology was moving too fast. There was no time to develop good ideas or for reflection and integration:

- “It’s all in bits and pieces everywhere”;
- “I had 57 emails in one day and I’ll go home and have 30-40 more”;
- “The technology itself moves faster than the content”;
- “I have all sorts of ideas, but my energy and my time [are] limited”.

I flash back to an earlier, quite different, encounter with faculty. The New Faculty Orientation barbecue was winding down. I recall sitting around a table with about six newly-appointed academics, discussing the impending challenges of teaching. There was a quality of relaxation and openness in the conversation. Although they spoke of their lack of experience and fears, there was also an air of excitement. They reminisced about their experiences as students and talked about the kind of educators they wanted to be. They spoke of empathy and love for their students. They talked about their responsibility to society and the world, and how their teaching was linked to this greater purpose. Teaching and learning were
important – key to freedom and happiness. This was a memorable evening for me. It stands out as defining what my work in supporting teaching and learning was all about. I felt part of a greater vision for higher education that embodied my love of learning for the sheer sake of it and for creating a truly free society of equals. This vision resonated with my values and gave meaning and purpose to my practice.

The contrasting voices of the new faculty and of the project interviewees (many in their pre tenure years) capture what had become an ethical conflict for me. They reflected my own inner conflict. I started my career happy and hopeful, building trusting educational relationships and feeling part of the grand project of higher education.

Somewhere along the way I lost my bearings. I was now as tired, disillusioned and overwhelmed as my interviewees. Yet this pervasive malaise, the language of fatigue and resignation, seemed to be accepted. It was the price to pay for keeping up with technology, teaching more students, doing more with less. I worried about the disconnection I was experiencing between the encroaching performative conditions of my working environment and my ethics. I started my career with a measure of professional autonomy and felt ethically responsible as an individual for my practice. As bureaucratisation and management bore down, my sense of authenticity as a professional eroded. I no longer had the requisite control of decisions that affected my practice. I had no time to think, to step back and reflect, and there was little in the higher education literature that addressed my experience. I had what Betty Freidan once called “a problem without a name” and I blamed myself for it.
I realized, too, that I was beginning to sound cynical, something that I had always felt was poisonous and counterproductive in the academy, not to mention unprofessional. Unsure of the motivations behind administrative directives to my unit, I worried that my role and responsibilities were being increasingly and insidiously retooled to enforce a troubling agenda. Without the means for understanding my experience, I became increasingly anxious and alienated. I began to feel irrelevant and invisible in my role. Somewhere along the way I had lost the connection between my practice and my own sense of ethical authenticity.

At the end of this narrative, the following questions were designed to trigger discussion amongst conference participants:

- What is possible for ourselves as academics and developers, and for the idea(l) of the university, in current performative contexts?
- Can we (re)conceive the work of academic development and (re)organize our work accordingly?
- Is authenticity a useless/impossible ideal? What price do we pay for our efforts to maintain authenticity?
- Is there room for ethical decision-making in the performative university?

This session garnered a great deal of interest, given its personal tones and challenge to academic development scholarship. One attendee said:

There was a consistent and quite moving emphasis on authentic personal experience, the unhomely ambiguities and hybrid identities associated with academic development. Such topics as spirituality, authenticity, well-being,
personal experience, ethical stances, loss and mourning, [and] professional identities are not commonly discussed at conferences. (Donnan, 2005)

Many attendees asked if there could or would be an IJAD issue devoted to the topics introduced at the symposium. A report on this session was subsequently published in *HERDSA News* (McShane, Hicks, Manathunga, Kandlbinder, Peseta, & Grant, 2005) (see Appendix A). Given this interest and encouragement, a proposal, *Thinking otherwise in academic development: Critical reflections on identity and practice*, for five articles based on the HERDSA 2005 CAD symposium was submitted to IJAD and accepted for a Fall, 2006, special issue. Throughout the writing of my thesis, I collaborated with Kim McShane and Susan Wilcox on the following article that, with the change to manuscript-based structure, became Chapter Four of my thesis.
CHAPTER FOUR

Challenging Performative Fabrication: Seeking Authenticity in Academic Development Practice

Abstract

This paper explores tensions between individual desires to enact the work of academic development practice in ways that foster authenticity, and the pressure to fabricate proper identities in the service of the performative university. Through autoethnographic inquiry, three academic developers, two located in Canada and one in Australia, together ask: “How are we and our practices true to who we are, to our colleagues and university, and to the purposes of higher education”? Our writing aims to encourage reflection on the moral and ethical dimensions of the work of academic development. Our discussion identifies particular individual and collective strategies of healing and transformation that will lead academics, and academic developers, towards a more authentic practice.

Introduction

We have been collaborating across the globe since the Challenging Academic Development (CAD) Collective established its listserv in September of 2004. Our common interest in a list discussion about the effects of performativity on academic identities in universities has led us to this paper, to reflecting on, and theorizing, our troubling and painful experiences of fear, alienation, and crises of identity as developers. We aim to contribute to the literature on performativity in academic life, by focusing attention on what we experience as tensions between an inner, moral summons for authenticity in our work as developers and the external, institutional
demands for performativity. At the same time, in the context of this tension, we want to resist blaming and othering, and begin to articulate our responsibility to ourselves, to our colleagues and institutions, and to the multiple projects of higher education. Our inquiry is grounded auto-ethnographically (Sparks, 2002) in our dilemmas of practice, articulated through personal case studies that exemplify particular responses to the demands of performativity on our academic selves in our different university contexts on different continents.

Kim: Fear and Othering

As an academic developer I have heard lots of blaming, labelling and othering in the corridors of development units. I remember a colleague from the Humanities faculty in a different university joking with me several years ago, “So the academic development unit reckons they’re gonna come over and tell us how to teach online?” I also recognize the “us and them” line in my contact with developers and colleagues.

- “Kim, make sure they get the idea that what they need to do is…”
- “Don’t let them put ‘shovelware’ online; it encourages surface learning.”
- “Have you heard what they’re about to start doing with exams in Engineering (or: Arts, Health Sciences, Physics)?”
- “All those PowerPoint slides he’s putting up! No wonder they’re staying away in droves!”

I’ll admit that I have been party to jokes with my colleagues about sending out a teaching-learning Rapid Response Team to correct bad practice in the classroom! When I ponder such incidents I am aware of the psychological distance, the defensive
separation of “you and me”, “us and them”. Worse is the alienating undercurrent of fear about performance, about who we are, and what our role and value is within the university. As Parker Palmer (1998, p. 56) reminds us, fear “cuts us off from everything”.

*Performativity and Authenticity in Academic Work*

The drive on the part of universities to become increasingly self-funded, business-like organizations has created new tensions for the people who work and study within them. The fear and othering that Kim reports in her relations with her colleagues is one expression of tensions that can arise as academics find themselves having to respond to the challenges of performative management cultures in our universities. Here we use the term *performativity* to refer to the use-value of individual academic work for optimizing cost-effectiveness and increasing competitiveness of a person or institution. We derive our understanding from Ball (2000, 2003), who has adapted Lyotard’s (1984) notion of Performativity:

“Performativity is a technology, a culture and mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons, and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition, and change - based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)” (Ball, 2003, p. 216).

In a performative institutional (university) regime, “value replaces values” (Ball, 2003, p. 217). At the level of the individual, one must present oneself appropriately in myriad texts and contexts, including promotions applications, excellence awards, performance reviews, departmental websites, and seminar “bios”. Through such performative fabrications (Ball, 2000, p. 1), one’s academic work is
rendered more visible, and subject to unseen, panoptic judgement. These are the processes that produce the “enterprising academic” (McWilliam, Hatcher & Meadmore, 1999, p. 69).

Because impression management (Ball, 2003) and emotional management (Blackmore & Sachs, 1997) are critical to this self-work, sustaining this public fabrication has its costs. For many, it raises ethical issues (Knight & Wilcox, 1998), disrupting private intellectual, emotional, and spiritual well-being. The tension between fabrication and authenticity gives rise to feelings of inner conflict and alienation. It becomes difficult to determine our priorities, to know what is valued, and why we are acting. We become “ontologically insecure” (Ball, 2003, p. 220), experiencing a heavy sense of inauthenticity.

Reflecting on authenticity confronts us with fundamental questions of human identity and our purpose in life. Our unique human nature calls us to live authentically, not in imitation of anyone else. Authenticity summons an awareness of self, beyond the socially constructed ego. It calls up a sacred order, a deep universal moral force or calling - a “horizon of significance” (Taylor, 1991, p. 38). Only if we exist in a world in which a horizon of this order matters crucially can we define an identity that is not trivial. Seeking authenticity is a profoundly educational quest, going to the heart of the chief educational question, “What shall I be, what shall I make of myself?” (Wilshire, 1990, p. 57).

Performativity and authenticity signify different levels of identity in terms of conscious experience of self. The performative self is a fabricated, socially constructed self, created and confined by social and institutional laws and rules.
Authenticity refers to an inner self that can recognize performative demands and act knowingly and mindfully in response to them. We are concerned that a pervasive culture of performativity overshadows and silences discussion of authenticity and the associated moral, ethical, and educational purpose of the university. We believe that addressing these issues is profoundly important for shaping the future direction of academic development as an emerging field of study and practice. Thus we join the work of retrieval of the ideal of authenticity, an ideal that can help us restore our educational practice (Taylor, 1991).

As a field of study and practice, academic development is at a methodological turning point. Evidence of a critical, philosophical turn can be found in the problematization of binaries common to our discourse, such as those between teaching and research (Brew, 2003), social/practice based and the psychological/research-based paradigms (Rowland, 2003), and the “scholarship of teaching and learning” and “evidence-based” practice (Gossling, 2003). These splits are deeply rooted in and reinforced by the dichotomous paradigmatic framework of the Social Sciences within which educational research in general (Pring, 2000), and academic development research and practice in particular, are situated.

As educators and academic developers seeking authenticity in our practice, we wish to dissolve divisive, oppositional tendencies and to acknowledge the contradictions of our work. Tierney (2003, p. 315) writes that, “vulnerability is not a position of weakness, but one from which to attempt change and social fellowship”. While certainly rendering us vulnerable, making explicit how we see the world helps
us to uncover and address dualisms and contradictions in our thinking and practice. Auto-ethnography is particularly suited to identity work in academic development in this time of methodological experimentation - a turning point in educational research (Reed-Danahay, 2002; Tierney, 2002). It writes/rights a world in a state of flux, addressing the challenge of creating texts that convey movement between knowing and showing, writer and reader, crisis and dénouement (Holman Jones, 2005). It is, necessarily, a blurred genre, poised between different academic cultures (Delamont, Coffey, & Atkinson, 2000).

Under the methodological umbrella (Reed-Danahay, 2002) of auto-ethnography, we turn to case study, a method that entails both a search to identify social phenomena in the real (our) world, and our attempt to theorise them (Kemmis, 1982). We set out to describe particular contexts in the social world (i.e., how academic developers perceive their identities in a period of change), and we engage self-reflexively from the position of "native observer" of our own professional milieu. In these ways, we strive to transcend and move beyond simple dichotomies of objective versus subjective and self versus the other. We insert ourselves into the (con)text as learners and knowers of our experience, engaging in reflexive educational (development) practice as we explore tensions between the performative demands of the university and our strivings for authenticity.

Heather: Professional Crisis and Opportunity for Transformation

I began my work in faculty development as part of what I saw as my vocational calling. For many years it was a happy and fulfilling experience of building trusting educational relationships and feeling part of a grand project of
higher education. I felt ethically responsible as an individual for my practice and had the professional autonomy to practice accordingly. Slowly, I began to lose my way as my professional sense of self eroded. I no longer had the requisite control of decisions that affected my practice. There was no time to think, to step back and reflect. As bureaucratization and managerialism bore down, I sensed, with increasing distress, an unspoken contract to play a new, but elusive, role. Looking back I realize that I had a problem without a name.

There came a point where, struggling to find meaning and purpose in my work, I no longer recognized myself. Diderot (1966, p. 51) captured my suffering well, “I do know what self-contempt is, or the torment of the soul that comes from neglect of the talents heaven has vouchsafed us, which is the cruellest of all. It were almost better that a man had never been born”. My cheerful and optimistic self disintegrated. I became more like the increasingly tired and fragmented professors I worked with. I was becoming negative and cynical and knew that this was not how I wanted to be in my work or in my life. Caught between worlds and without a vision of another way to be, I grew anxious and alienated. Finally, losing all hope, I had to leave. I now see that this crisis was an opportunity for renewal and transformation of identity as educator. My current doctoral research is dedicated to this hopeful and healing process.

*Seeking Authenticity: Intellectual, Emotional, and Spiritual Transformation*

Here we draw on our experience and relevant scholarship to interpret Heather’s story from the perspective of seeking authenticity through a holistic transformative process of suffering and healing. We will explore three interrelated
elements of this process: the intellectual (through ideology critique), the emotional (through psychological awareness), and the spiritual (through moral practice). In the final section, we will explore the possible - how to bring these inner strengths and qualities to our practice. We will propose collective agency as a binding, reinforcing strategy to support the individual.

_Authenticity Through Ideology Critique_  

From an intellectual perspective, seeking authenticity entails striving for intellectual honesty through ideology critique. Performative, managerial, and instrumental ideologies have seeped into higher education, in large part, due to non-reflexivity of the university in an age of “supercomplexity” (Barnett, 2000). Individual reflexivity in the face of uncertainty is the first step towards creating and sustaining ideology critique within the university.

Engaging in ideology critique is healing. It places our particular experiences into the context of culture and society and questions previously unquestioned, and often painful, assumptions, beliefs, and values. Taylor (1991), Lyotard (1984), and Trilling (1975) provide philosophical and historical grounding for a broader and deeper understanding of the ideological underpinnings of performativity. Valuable insights are also found in higher education scholarship (Barnett, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Ball, 2000, 2003) and critical and feminist theory (Brookfield, 2005; Minnich, 2005).

Through the lens of ideology critique, performativity can be seen as a response to these uncertain times, characterized by delegitimization of grand narratives that, throughout modernity, have lost power to unite societies in shared and secure values and beliefs (Lyotard, 1984). The grand narrative, having failed to
deliver on its universal promises, no longer provides universities and other knowledge creating bodies with unquestioned support for hierarchical claims that some (meaning: the universities’) knowledge is intrinsically “good” and thus worthwhile, and some (meaning: others’) knowledge is “bad”, and thus unworthy. 

In universities, the decline of the grand narrative established the conditions for the entrenchment and exclusivity of positivist mechanisms for legitimizing knowledge, notably performativity. Stability as truth, power, and legitimacy takes the preferred form of scientific proofs, evidence-based practice, and a narrow conception of use-value. By recounting stories that reflect the tensions produced by performativity in our academic identities and in our souls, we seek to bring to light some of the judgemental, controlling practices of performativity, and to assist ourselves and others to make more informed decisions and choices as to how we will respond.

*Authenticity Through Psychological Awareness*

Regardless of the rigors of ideology critique, authenticity cannot be fully addressed by what we “know” intellectually. Indeed, “underestimation of the psychological factor is likely to take a bitter revenge” (Jung, 1959, p. 105). Seeking to live more authentically in life and work demands a deepening self-knowledge that can bring profound emotional and psychological transformation. Unrecognised projections and transferences can exert a pervasive and destructive influence on our lives and on the lives of our colleagues, friends, and families. These mechanisms prevent us from integrating our feelings of aggression, envy, and guilt into conscious awareness (Riker, 1997). Instead they are attributed to the other, leaving us feeling
fearful or embattled in a hostile world, “us versus them”. Unconscious processes are implicated in all human interactions, including those that create and maintain performative fabrications in the university. When acting from unconscious motivations, our response to performative demands can be damaging to ourselves and to our colleagues, limiting our ability to act ethically and authentically.

Yet, the unconscious does not leave us helplessly at the mercy of our past and our instincts, unable to realize our authenticity. Thanks to the possibility of increasing self-awareness through psychological insight, we can begin to understand, perhaps even appreciate, the workings of our personal unconscious world. There are many viable routes to psychological insight and we three developers have taken some of them, including: psychotherapy; spiritual practice; inviting our friends, family, and/or colleagues to serve as “critical friends”; joining trusted friends or colleagues in collectives devoted to personal/professional growth; informal reflective writing; academic and non-academic reading and research, particularly self-study (Wilcox, 1997a, 1998) or autoethnography. Brookfield’s (1995) autobiography analysis and Tennant’s (2005) guide to critical self-reflection are examples of the tools available to academic developers for fostering psychological insight in the context of practice.

**Authenticity Through Spiritual Practice**

The call to authenticity as a transformative process has a spiritual dimension. Spirituality is integral to authenticity and to the core educational question, “What shall I be, what shall I make of myself?” (Wilshire, 1990, p. 57). Unlike religion, spirituality is a private matter that cannot be captured in a neat definition (Shahjahan, 2005), but it goes to the heart of our identity as persons with a place and purpose in
the universe/university. As educators and students of higher education, we carry a highly significant and sacred life assignment (Rendón, 2000); we are charged with seeking truth. Yet, we are hobbled in our purpose, for spiritual voices are virtually silent in our scholarship (Shahjahahn, 2005). How do we bring our spiritual voices more fully into our practice? This is a highly personal question with profound implications for practice.

In addressing what it is to learn for an unknown future, Barnett (2004a) proposes eight dispositions of carefulness, thoughtfulness, humility, criticality, receptiveness, resilience, courage, and stillness that, “make authentic being possible and are also, in part, generated by a drive towards authenticity” (Barnett, 2004a, p. 259). Barnett’s dispositions coincide with many spiritual qualities of mindfulness experienced and taught by the Buddha (Hanh, 1978) over 2,500 years ago, and with the evolutionary levels of consciousness experienced, researched, and taught today (Hawkins, 1995, 2006). Embodying spiritual dispositions acknowledges the need for healing of the “rupture between faith and knowledge” (Jung, 1957, p. 86), between self and other, dissolving our fears as we experience the sacred unity of all beings. This sacred unity is at the core of our response to fear and othering, reflecting our hope and our vision as to what is possible for us, and for the university of which we are a part. How can we bring these possibilities and vision to our academic development practice?

Susan: What is Possible?
Possibility is everything in education. From the first year I entered academic development practice, I’ve had posted on my office wall excerpts from a poem by Adrienne Rich (1981):

If the mind were clear and if the mind were simple
you could take this mind and this particular state and say
This is how I would live if I could choose: this is what is possible...
But the mind of the woman imagining all this
the mind that allows all this to be possible...
does not so easily work free from remorse
does not so easily manage the miracle for which mind is famous ...
This woman’s mind does not even will that miracle,
having a different mission in the universe.

These words have always expressed for me something of the excitement and lure of reaching for all that is possible, while grounding my ambitions in a respect for the personal and the everyday. The poem reminds me, as an educator, to reconsider which gaps between the real and the ideal need be addressed, and which ones simply honoured.

I again find myself wondering what is actually possible, for me and for others like me, in the context within which we are working. Though I have always considered myself to be a pragmatic developer who puts my clients’ needs first, it is now more difficult to feel a real connection with others as we all spin our way towards achieving our performative goals. My current questions cut deep, challenging my previously unquestioned commitment to ethical authenticity in the academy: Is
authenticity a useless/impossible ideal? What price do we pay for our efforts to maintain authenticity? Is there room for ethical decision-making in the performative university? These questions guide my continuing explorations into the meaning of academic development work. I wish to examine whether and how it is possible to practice in a way that reflects my deepest beliefs and values, yet is also perceived by my colleagues to be relevant to their roles and responsibilities in the contemporary university.

*Authenticity Through Collective Agency*

While our individual strivings toward authenticity are important, we also need to connect into the shared strength and agency of the collective. The possibilities of insider agency are discussed in the literature on universities, academics, and change (Blackmore, 2001; Blackmore & Sachs, 1997; Gale & Kitto, 2003). Gale and Kitto conclude that it is unrealistic and inflexible for academics to adopt a position of pure critique, and they argue that academics need to “get into the prevailing game and transform it” (2003, p. 510).

Given our pan-university mandate, academic developers are (un)usually well positioned within the institution to create the conditions for ideology critique, and to foster individual psychological and spiritual awareness. In this field we sometimes find ourselves, like Sachs (2004, p. 111), “sitting uneasily at the table” with our colleagues from across the disciplines, centers, and key management hubs of the university. This liminal status locates us “betwixt and between” power structures, with access to many different networks and individuals. Others have commented on the intellectual possibilities of this location and status. Brew (2003, p. 168) describes
her developer self as a "practical epistemologist". Minnich (2005, p. 3) sees the potential for educators to become "fieldwork philosophers". For us, this positioning also provides the opportunity to enact what Sachs (2004, p. 114) terms "collegial, activist professionalism" – a professional disposition and commitment to working mindfully and strategically in ways that are negotiated, collaborative, socially critical, future oriented, and transparent.

We recognize collegial, activist professionalism as a strategy for ensuring that academics' experiences of performative fabrication and change are heard and acknowledged in university policy and planning. As active members of the CAD Collective we contribute to online discussions, conference papers, and collaborative journal articles. The CAD Collective engages with the scholarship of academic development via discussion and collaboration around counter-narratives, transgressive topics, and non-canonical perspectives on academic development. This group nurtures our thinking and establishes a model of collective reflection and dialogue that can be adapted to other collective agendas. Here we have in mind seminar programs, workshops, lunchtime gatherings, reading groups, and the many other collaborative activities that academics and developers lead or contribute to - all are potential circles of care and critique providing opportunities for paying attention to the values and issues that matter to academics in higher education teaching and learning.

Closing Reflections

Performativity poses particular challenges for academic developers, working with administrators and professors in "change management" (Cranton, 2006, p. 70).
Our development work can be seen as ideologically fraught, as a colonizing project destined to reinforce inequalities, insecurities, and unhappiness. As developers, we are all too aware of this perception and the associated ego-driven temptation to be experts charged with the responsibility to correct, develop, and instil proper knowledge, skills, and attitudes in our colleagues. In one ear we hear the demand of the performative university, to "develop" our colleagues into "excellent" teachers and enterprising, risk-conscious, self-auditing individuals (McWilliam et al., 1999; McWilliam, 2004). In the other ear we hear our inner voice reminding us of our values and our ethical and moral responsibility to be true to ourselves, to our colleagues, and to the broader higher education project as it evolves.

As we tune these voices in and out, we must recognise that each of us working within the academy is responsible, implicated in the regimes and discursive fabrications of performative management. The individual academic (and developer) must acknowledge this sobering fact: "I am the agent and subject within the regime of the academy" (Ball, 2000, p. 5). This responsibility calls us to foreground the demands of performativity and to address them in ways that resonate with our authenticity. We strive to do this firstly through self-work: through ideology critique, psychological awareness, and spiritual practice. In addition, the collegial activities of academic development also offer likely sites for engendering collective agency.

Our shared inquiry has allowed us to transcend and honour our personal struggles, to reach out to each other and others. Our stories and reflections suggest a way toward unity – contributing to grounding academic development practice in an inclusive, moral, higher education philosophy.
CHAPTER FIVE: Realizing my Authenticity: Concluding Reflections

I am neither spurred on by excessive optimism nor in love with high ideals, but am merely concerned with the fate of the individual human being - that infinitesimal unit on whom a world depends, and in whom, if we read the meaning of the Christian message aright, even God seeks his goal. (Jung, 1957, p. 125)

We are called by inspiring and by disturbing meanings of human beings to keep thinking, to hold horizons open. We, who are conscious creatures and creators of meaning, remain responsible. (Minnich, 2005, p. 1)

An individual human being has attempted to be present in this thesis. In stating this I do not mean that “I” have been its focus. It is true that an individual experience of suffering was its catalyst. It is true that an individual experience of transformation informed its writing. The “I”, who wrote this thesis, however, does not see herself as adrift in a meaningless universe of monads - relating her private story into a void. My life journey, as is true for all beings, matters greatly, for we are all responsible, all infinitesimal units on whom a world depends. Our suffering has meaning for all beings, and we are charged with seeking it - under pain of fragmentation, inauthenticity, dehumanization. We must find a way through our suffering toward integration and transformation – a conversion of self always toward a horizon of significance. This is an ontological task - the ultimate educational task (Barnett, 2004a).

Such striving does not emanate from a narcissistic self seeking. Nor is it an intellectual game of conceptual muscle building (Minnich, 2005). Through this thesis
I have tried to convey my striving in the context of a larger (educational) concern about living well in our contemporary, supercomplex (Barnett, 2000) world. I have tried to engage in a kind of deep reflection and theorizing\(^\text{17}\) that is both grounded and contextualized in individual experience and relevant to higher education practice. I have attempted to put a personal story (and stories of two of my colleagues) to work to illuminate broader patterns operating in the individual and in the university. These patterns, which I have tried to illuminate here through a discussion of performativity and authenticity, are deeply reflected in our educational practice, the project of higher education, and in the world we construct with our human minds.

What matters to us, what can appear on the surface as a personal dilemma of practice, is more than merely a “legitimate” focus of educational research, although it most surely is that. It is, in my view, central to educational inquiry as educational practice – a site for deep theorizing in the field\(^\text{18}\). In our strivings for self knowledge, to learn from our experience, we are asking what is true about ourselves and our place in the world – what shall we be what shall we make of ourselves? This is not a solitary task, for others are always implicated. Autobiographical writing cannot only be about the self. All writing is inhabited implicitly or explicitly not only by a history of relationships, but by the relationships into which it is directed (Sparks, 2002). In the case of my thesis, this includes committee members, critical friends and colleagues, family, prospective employers, and interested students and academics. It includes you, the reader. At its most profound level, it includes what I have found to

\(^{18}\) Personal communication, Susan Wilcox, June 23, 2006.
be the Source of my Identity - my Creator; God; my Self, beyond intellectual knowing.

Throughout my thesis I have attempted to illustrate why a discourse of authenticity is needed in educational (development) practice. I was concerned with the human reality of our shared need for truth, goodness, meaning, and purpose and its relevance to academic development. Expression of these human needs can be heard in the strivings of science, the demands of performativity. If we listen carefully, we hear the search for truth and goodness in our demands on, and critiques of, governments, the media, and public and private institutions; in our personal and professional relationships; and in our own inner tensions and conflicts. Indeed, truth is the very foundation of all trusting relationships. These fundamental individual and relational needs cannot be honored through meeting performative demands, for they are, in essence, ontological. I was concerned that these needs be articulated in academic development scholarship and viewed from the perspective of seeking authenticity.

While these explorations may seem abstract, they do point to educational tasks for academic development, beyond skills training and imparting knowledge - beyond dropping things off (Peseta, 2005) to our colleagues. These are philosophical and ontological tasks that have import for the emerging field of academic development and, at the same time, for answering the demands of authenticity more directly in our daily practice. Thus, given the pragmatic reality of our field (and some gentle prodding from my Ph.D. committee and critical friends and colleagues), I turn in this
final chapter to reflect on how the demands of authenticity can be answered in (my) educational (development) practice.

How Can I Realize my Authenticity More Fully in my Practice?

My current response to this question is to continue to do what I discovered I have been doing here, "philosophical fieldwork" (Minnich, 2005). Doing philosophical fieldwork is a working, scholarly, educational methodology. It captures how I see educational practice. It embodies a scholarly disposition, uniting inquiry and practice in service to an emerging philosophy of higher education and academic development. Importantly, it is rooted in and committed to a moral educational horizon - what it is to be a human being in the fullest sense. It is deeply concerned with the fate of the individual human being and all beings. It begins, necessarily, within the Self and emanates like ripples in a pond. It requires of the self a striving for authenticity. It is uniquely suited to academic development as a field of study and practice.

Academic development is an emerging discipline with a unique mandate to serve all university disciplines, to work with administrators, faculty, and staff in service to teaching and learning in higher education. This pan-university educational mandate provides the holistic perspective always essential for philosophical work. Indeed, given its perspective as part of the field of higher education studies, academic development has a unique potential and responsibility to contribute to a philosophy of academic development and higher education.

While the University of Sydney in Australia offers a Ph.D. in higher education and academic development, there are, to my knowledge, no Ph.D. Programmes in
Academic Development in North America. Indeed, there is, as yet, no comprehensive body of higher educational philosophy from which to draw (Lee, 2005). The 
*International Journal for Academic Development* (IJAD), the only journal in the field, has, since 1998, published only three articles that make any reference to philosophy, including philosophy of teaching.

As individuals and as a field, we need to ask deep philosophical questions as we choose the paradigms and methods that will shape this new field – a field that has deep import for higher education. Recent scholarship, as we have seen, calls for new paradigms for academic development that include a more explicit philosophical approach (Gosling, 2003; Mann, 2003). Some of the dominant postmodern and constructivist paradigms are seen as possible methods for accomplishing this. This is the time in the development of the field to be attentive to its philosophical underpinnings. It is the time to try to untangle the conceptual errors that block a fully educational practice and that are embedded in traditional methods drawn from the Social Sciences. Critical theory, cultural studies, psychoanalysis, history, philosophy, literature, and anthropology are emerging methods, some of which have been discussed within CAD. All, however, are subject to critique through higher educational practice based in learning from our fieldwork philosophy.

It is the time to be conscious of our thinking, of the ensuing mental sets defining the field, and of how teaching and learning are consequently shaped. Indeed whether explicit or tacit, intentional or non intentional, a philosophical (and ontological) basis is forming. To date, for the most part, this basis has not been teaching and learning in higher education. As I have shown in this thesis, old errors
uncritiqued will be, and are, repeated and exaggerated, contributing to persistent problems of legitimacy. Through practice and scholarship, we set the course. At this early stage of development, how the course is set will determine the future direction of academic development. In the next section I offer reflections on doing my philosophical fieldwork, not as a prescription or model but only as an example.

Doing (my) Philosophical Fieldwork: Listening, Thinking, Being

I have identified three overarching tasks that define my educational development practice as philosophical fieldwork and that resonate with my journey toward authenticity. These tasks are listening, thinking, and being. I have come to identify these simple, though not always easy, tasks through the experience of listening, thinking, and being at the heart of philosophical fieldwork. They are critical to the transformative learning process I have tried to articulate through this thesis. I have listened to my colleagues over the twelve years of my practice. In the past three years, partly through my doctoral writing and research, I have listened deeply to what my experience teaches me. I have attended to the transformational process arising from my dilemmas of practice and what they mean for educational research and practice. This listening was accompanied by more reflexive listening to colleagues, friends, and family; with thinking alone and together with critical friends; with writing alone and with friends in the practice; and, most importantly, with learning to be a person in a more developed sense. I will discuss each in turn.

Listening

Calling on every art of listening I have learned or found myself to possess, and trying always to practice it better, I do philosophical fieldwork to locate
where and how efforts to connect with others are distorted into prejudicial –
preformed, unreflective, and so potentially dangerous forms. (Minnich, 2005,
p. 5)

Philosophical fieldwork entails “listening and hearing, looking and seeing,
taking in and trying to comprehend without rushing to interpret, to translate into
familiar terms, to explain” (Minnich, 2005, p. 4). It is a philosophical attentiveness to
self and others that strives to avoid prejudgement, to connect at the level of human
being. Listening is the often forgotten component of dialogue. The kind of listening
we bring to conversation will determine to a great degree the way in which the
dialogue evolves. Through listening to our colleagues, to our friends in the practice,
both informally and as part of our more formal responsibilities (individual
consultations, workshops, seminars, and conferences), we begin to practice from a
new (higher) educational paradigm and to uncover a philosophy for academic
development.

There are risks involved in this kind of listening that can preclude it before it
can develop. Sharon Todd (2003) a Levinasian scholar and professor of social justice
education at York University has reflected deeply on the risks involved in such deep
listening. Indeed, Todd’s deep reflexivity on her role and responsibility as university
professor offers a powerful opportunity for educators and for the field of academic
development to learn from the philosophical fieldwork of the others we are mandated
to serve.

Listening demands a passivity, what Levinas has called a kind of openness
and willingness to “learn from the other”, that is necessary to counteract the potential
for violence. Listening in this way is a responsive listening. There is no inner
dialogue, no idea simmering for rebuttal, no urgency to interject. One listens not to
acquire knowledge about the other\textsuperscript{19} but to learn from the other. This stance embodies
awareness of the "radical alterity", the unassailable difference of the other from
which we can learn. Listening "refuses reducing the other to a common ground with
the self" (Todd, 2003, p. 51). This level of responsiveness is beyond one's own vested
interests and ability to reason. It is, according to Todd, grounded in one's capacity to
feel. Thought is suspended; self centeredness and self concern are absent. The risk we
take is the risk of vulnerability to be changed, somehow transformed and moved by
the other. This time of risk is the time of what Todd refers to as the birth of the ethical
subject.

Listening in this way does not conform to simplified forms of dialogue or
routine skills that we often encounter in our practices (e.g. creating a "safe space",
allowing equal participation, and bringing marginalized people "to voice"). Listening
as learning from the other means learning from difference. It is perhaps the learning
event par excellence. Such learning is not an act of interpretation or decoding but a
holding open of disruptive possibilities. Our listening says to the other "I can change"
(Todd, 2003, p. 137). We risk the discomfort, suffering, and self - transformation
implicitly at stake. Such listening is irreducible to rule - bound behaviour and ethical
codes. It assumes an ethic of the individual and a moral responsibility that supersedes
institutional laws. Indeed, institutional laws can depersonalize our moral
responsibility and deny our authenticity.

\textsuperscript{19} Except for quotations, lower case 'self' and 'other' will be used for simplicity and to avoid
setting up an obvious (masculinist) hierarchical dualism, a looking up into the face of the
Other/Man...so to speak. (Personal communication Kim McShane, July 20, 2006)
Our performative institutional roles cannot take in our full selves, yet, we are morally and ethically bound as educators to strive to bring our full selves to the project of higher education. Within institutional roles, particularly in times of fragmentation, ambiguity, and supercomplexity, we can be tempted to “console ourselves and not without reason when we find the task we have been asked to perform morally suspect or unpalatable” (Todd, 2003, p. 143). We must be aware, however, that sometimes violence can masquerade as the rule of law, and institutional roles and rules cannot substitute for moral and ethical responses. It is our capacity for individual acts of morality that holds in check the potential for institutions to erode individual responsibility (Minnich, 2005; Todd, 2003). Such acts spring from “a form of being that is authentic in character” (Barnett, 2004a, p. 259). Through such acts we also hold in check our own potential for violence and for unknowingly eroding the university’s authenticity along with its ability to act morally and responsibly.

**Thinking**

My personal history has rendered me very sensitive to the subtleties, pervasiveness, and dehumanization of violence in everyday life and in the world in general. I have come to see this as a blessing that shapes my responsibility and function in life as helping to bring peace and well being to myself; my family, friends, and colleagues; and to the world. This responsibility defines my educational practice as an expression of my human being, toward what Barnett has called “pedagogy for human being” (Barnett, 2004a, p. 247). In this view, each interaction is pedagogical, a teaching and learning moment charged with possibility for enhancing or, however subtly, doing harm to self and other, to my practice, and to the
educational project. How one thinks about the self/other relation sets the course for all pedagogical relationships. Discerning how I view the self/other relation is a central and ongoing task of philosophical fieldwork that recognizes thinking as an interrelationship between intellect and emotions. These intellectual/emotional tasks are not narcissistic self-seeking but rather in service to authenticity and to enhancement of well (i.e. human) being.

*Discerning my Self/Other Relationship*

Relinquishing the notion that we ‘cover’ the subject matter our fields name, remembering that we teach what has been agreed on by those who were enabled to define and legitimate them - assisted by the availability of money, prestige, and access to an intellectual community denied those excluded from the academy – we become able to teach our subjects as human constructions for which we and our students are also responsible. (Minnich, 2005, p. 268)

Doing philosophical fieldwork asks us to do the thinking needed to discern who and what we are and who and what the others are. Here I draw from philosophers Richard Pring (2000) and Elizabeth Minnich (1990, 2005) and from educator Sharon Todd (2003) who address the roles and responsibilities of educators from epistemological, moral, psychoanalytic, and ethical perspectives. I also draw from psychologists Carl Jung (1959) and James Riker (1997) and analyst Alice Miller (1983, 1984) who shed further light on the emotional underpinnings of our thinking. Applied to academic development practice, they help us to understand the social/human constructions and inner, psychic processes that influence our thinking about self and other in the academy. Thinking in this way can help me to more
actively strive for authenticity in determining the academic development
"curriculum".

Minnich (1990, 2005), in her critique of many of the dominant western
meaning systems that are the foundation of paradigms that shape university curricula
(including the curriculum of academic development) goes to a root problem deeply
embedded in these meaning systems namely, "dividing - not just distinguishing -
beings into ontologically, ethically, politically, epistemologically significant 'kinds'
and then taking one 'kind' to be the inclusive term, the norm, and the ideal for all"
(2005, p. 265). This division of beings into kinds leads directly to dominance-serving
intellectual errors, excluding other paradigms and possibilities of ways of knowing as
inferior to the dominant intellectual traditions. From this perspective Minnich
provides conceptual tools to cultivate intellectual honesty through an untangling of
the conceptual confusions that maintain an hierarchical idea of the other.

She identifies and describes four intellectual errors that both arise from, and
reinforce, this exclusivity: faulty generalization, circular reasoning, mystified
concepts, and partial knowledge. These intellectual errors generalize from the few,
who took themselves, and were taken to be, the norm and the ideal for the many.
They exclude information, make false claims to neutrality, and lock us into self-
justifying circles that uncritically perpetuate ideas from earlier and different times
(Minnich, 1990). Knowledge considered without analysis that would reveal its
qualifying contexts produces uncritical ways of thinking that both justify and
perpetuate these errors. Using the tools Minnich provides to identify these errors in
thinking and to understand how they operate in higher education and in my
educational (development) practice supports discernment of my self/other philosophy and my ability to practice a pedagogy for human being.

These tools of fieldwork philosophy are powerful analytic lenses for developers who often find themselves, as I have shown in this thesis, experiencing discomfort with the discourse, wishing to untangle and articulate the conceptual errors at the roots of such discomfort. Through this process we may help to resolve the struggle for legitimacy that overshadows the field. The self that we bring to this task of course will determine how willing and able we are to engage reflexively in the kind of listening that can disrupt our cherished beliefs and values and challenge our identity at its core. Striving to identify conceptual tangles and harmful intellectual errors through reasoning, I continue to discern my self/other philosophy at the level of how the other is made in society.

Indeed, making the other is a “natural” tendency of the human psyche. Categorizing humanity into kinds (Minnich, 2005) is a fundamental survival mechanism conducted by the unconscious to protect the conscious ego, the self, as we know it, from identity confusion, suffering, and possible disintegration. The ego’s mechanisms of defence separate humanity into kinds because it must be different from the other in order to exist; it must be superior to the other in order to be of value. But, as Jung has said, “The ego knows only its own contents, not the unconscious and its contents” (1959, p. 15). The extent and quality of our self-knowledge is determined by the extent and quality of our awareness of the psychic facts of who we are. These facts remain hidden from our awareness in our unconscious. We make the other in direct relation to our illusion of superiority, nurturing the prejudice that such
and such a thing does not happen with us, in our family, in our department, in our university, in our country. We ignore the unconscious at the cost of our authenticity.

*Becoming Conscious: Knowing What the Shadow Knows*

The discoverers of the unconscious recovered our lost worlds, restored possibilities for heroism and forays with the gods, and pointed toward a kind of human existence that was fuller and more complex than any hitherto imagined. (Riker, 1997, p. 229)

The existence of the personal unconscious is common knowledge. This is an assumption that I accept based upon my own experience and expressions of the artists and dreamers who revealed the existence of the unconscious long before Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, and Alice Miller, to name but a few. Thanks to Freud and those who came after him, psychoanalytic concepts have entered many disciplines and ordinary language has taken up psychoanalytic terms such as repression, defense, resistance, projection, neurosis, depression, and Freudian slips. Yet there is a paradox when it comes to the role of the unconscious in our ethicality: “Ethics is founded on a psychology which assumes that humans can come to know and master all their sources of motivation, while the psychology of the unconscious denies this fundamental assumption” (Riker, 1997, p. ix).

The complex and pervasive processes of the unconscious as described by Freud and Jung are virtually ignored in the study of ethics, the branch of philosophy that deals directly with questions of what constitutes human agency, intentionality, and responsibility (Riker, 1997). It is still widely assumed that humans can become fully aware of the forces motivating them, choose which of these forces is ethically
superior, and then act on the basis of this awareness. This rational psychology
underpinning ethics is exactly the psychology that the discovery of the unconscious
contradicts. The discovery of the unconscious maps out a complex psychic
underworld that tells us clearly that we are neither masters of our fate nor captains of
our souls (Riker, 1997). Yet the unconscious is implicated in all human interactions,
including those that create and maintain performative fabrications in the university

In my experience, striving for self awareness through understanding the
influences of the personal unconscious on my everyday thoughts and actions is a
pathway to authenticity, and, by extension, to creating and sustaining a humane and
caring university and world. Psychological insight helps to heal dividedness and
ensuing disruptions and fragmentations of the self. Such insight requires that we
enter, and bring to conscious awareness, our unconscious processes.

The unconscious is many things: "a realm of repressed wishes, the carrier of
infantile experiences, and the generator of fantasies, especially sexual fantasies\textsuperscript{20}; but,
first, and foremost, it is the cauldron of the instincts – the driving force of all human
activity" (Riker, 1997, p. 65). The contents of our individual unconscious worlds are
largely determined by experiences in infancy and childhood. In Western societies the
ideologies that underpin childrearing practices are firmly rooted in the problem that
Minnich (1990) has articulated, namely that "the few took themselves to be the
inclusive term, for the norm, the ideal" (p. 71). Children in the West are raised to
reach a concept of maturity that overemphasizes the values of the dominant
knowledge system: individuation, autonomy, and self sufficiency while de-

\textsuperscript{20} Influenced by social pressures arising from the ideologies of his time, Freud made a fundamental
error with regard to his sexual 'drive' theory. Please see Alice Miller \textit{Thou Shalt Not be Aware} (Miller,
1984).
emphasizing values of interdependency, socialness, and intimacy (Gilligan, 1982; Riker, 1997).

In order to reach/teach the social ideal of maturity, childrearing practices deny full expression of feeling and crush spontaneity through what Alice Miller calls “poisonous pedagogy” (Miller, 1983). In order to live according to established social ideals, unacceptable feelings must be denied and are “split off” from our conscious perceptions of our selves and repressed in the unconscious. To varying degrees, repression results in impairment of the ability to experience our true feelings in adulthood. Unacceptable feelings become our unconscious “shadow”, preventing full and coherent awareness of an integrated self and exerting a pervasive influence on our lives in the form of “overdetermined actions” (Riker, 1997).

Overdetermined actions such as transference and projection are manifested in our ‘everyday’ lives, including our lives in the academy. When we relate to people through transferences we are unable to see them in their own rights, separate from unconscious associations. Projections are aimed at maintaining a “good” social persona by preventing the “shadow’s” infiltration into consciousness (Riker, 1997). In suppressing our shadows we see ourselves as perfectly identified with our ego ideals. Unacceptable feelings about ourselves, such as guilt, aggression, greed, and envy, are projected onto others. Prevented from integrating these feelings into conscious awareness we attribute them to the other who is “different” from the social norm and ideal.

When, for example, our aggression is projected, we feel persecuted, fearful, or embattled in a hostile world of “us” and “them. Taken to the extreme there is a
feeling that “they” are out to get “us”. This fearful perception implies we must get “them” before they attack “us”; or “run and hide”. While there are complex social, historical, political, and cultural factors at work in the range of horrific scenarios of community and institutional violence and exclusion, war and genocide that we witness today, I agree with Riker that without the splitting off and projection of our aggressivity onto others, it is doubtful they could have occurred (Riker, 1997).

Philosophical fieldwork asks us to acknowledge and uncover unconscious processes that can distort our listening and thinking. It requires deep self awareness committed to discovering and working to resolve repressed feelings that entrap us in the misperceptions and overdetermined actions that, in these complex and challenging times, increasingly wreak havoc in our families, institutions, and nations. It is possible to take back the projections that contribute to the creation and maintenance of a hostile world, to discover the peace that lies beneath, and to bring it into the world. Riker’s ecological ideal of maturity describes a horizon for what kind of consciously aware persons can be possible.

Ecological maturity incorporates not only the intuitions of value that have been regnant in the Western tradition – autonomy, reason, knowledge, and ego development, but balances these with values that have been central in women’s experience and the experience of more traditional cultures. These values include the centrality of social life, intimate friendships, empathy, connectedness with others and with nature, the primacy of emotional response, and the recognition of the sacred. (Riker, 1997, p. 223)
Ecological maturity acknowledges that, while my unconscious motivations and narratives will not disappear, with increased understanding and integration their power can be lessened enough to be redirected into suitable outlets, or simply accepted without having to be acted out in overdetermined actions. This level of maturity is essential for doing philosophical fieldwork. It acknowledges that our thinking is influenced by powers of both inner ecologies of the personal unconscious and the outer ecology of ideologies embedded in the social unconscious. This brings me to the personal, unique, and, paradoxically, most universal - the essence of authenticity and what I see as the sacred, spiritual aspect of doing (my) philosophical fieldwork.

*Being*

I could be called a “lapsed Catholic”, but, even though I do not practice my birth religion through the church, I am not that. I have, for a long time received comfort from knowing that, despite their serious problems, organized religions were part of our society; institutions charged with care and nurturing of the spirit, holding (for me) faith in a power greater than myself, in the Creator, God, ultimate Buddha-nature. Nuns, rabbis, priests, ministers, and monks devote their lives to nurturing the sanctity of the inner life and to knowing God/Allah/G-d/the Creator. Knowing of these spiritual practitioners sustained me, though I did not consciously acknowledge my own spiritual nature. Finally, through striving to make sense of the suffering I have tried to articulate here, I have come to see that these strivings were, and are, my spiritual journey – an educational journey to realize my human being in the fullest sense. I now know that I share this journey in unity with all beings.
There are two other institutions of society with which I have been intimately engaged throughout my life and that have, more directly, sustained, me despite their imperfections and dysfunctions. These are the family and the university. Both, like the church, are charged with the development of persons. The family is a “crucible” (Napier, 1978) wherein our education as human beings begins, reaches back, and extends forward through the generations. The university is our “alma mater” our “giving mother” explicitly focused toward “higher” learning in service to the development of persons in the fullest sense (Barnet, 2004a; Pring, 2000).

Person is most profoundly a moral concept, implying a capacity to take responsibility for one’s own thoughts and actions and one’s own life. It indicates desirability for such responsibility, and to be treated respectfully and with dignity as one who is responsible. To be able to engage in philosophical fieldwork requires an engagement in the moral deliberations essential for nurturing a developed sense of being a person. It requires a horizon of significance and ensuing dispositions that uplift and inspire. Barriers to such an exercise are ignorance, false beliefs, lack of self respect, envy and hatred of others, absence of social skills, and lack of vision (Pring, 2000). There is a clear potential that the language and culture of performativity geared to the goals of competition and economic improvement could entrench these barriers, impoverishing our notion of higher learning, and thwarting the fullest development of persons.

If “higher” learning, in which the learner develops the capacities, skills, and modes of appreciation to see the world in a more valuable, respectful, and responsible

21 At Concordia University’s Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science Spring, 2005 Convocation, Dean Nabil Esmail reminded participants of the university’s identity, i.e. “giving mother”. 
way, is to be the main focus of higher educational practice, it must attend to a wider picture of development of persons that dissolves such barriers. If learning is the main focus of educational practice as inquiry, then such practice/inquiry must attend explicitly to this wider picture of development of person’s, characteristic of what it is to be educational. Such practice, characteristic of fieldwork philosophy, embodies a moral view and language. The language of education (how we talk about educational practice) then is not performative. This is not to deny a need for performative criteria in institutions of higher learning, but rather to refuse such language for educational discourse and to make space for educational discourse. The language of education is a moral language that seeks authenticity, embracing a broader moral purpose in which the development of persons is central. To engage in this search, as I have tried to convey, is transformative. It can be a daunting and painful task entailing breaking with traditions, loyalties, and cherished views - beginning, of necessity, with views of the self.

I have chosen to end this inquiry with three moral dispositions central to my development as a person who practices as an educator. I strive to practice these moral dispositions as part of what I see as spiritual practice, for I have found that thinking, regardless of level of intellectual insight and emotional awareness in which it is based, is, inevitably, subject to the mind’s dualistic reign. Thinking alone cannot sustain such dispositions. These dispositions in my experience, emanate from my being in a more developed sense and are nurtured and sustained through spiritual practice. While by no means prescriptive or exclusive, they have sustained me throughout this thesis journey. They are courage, love, and silence.
Courage

Without courage, suffering remains untransformed, acted out in negative and destructive ways in the academy. Courage brings inner confidence and a greater sense of empowerment because it is not dependent on external factors or results (Hawkins, 2005). With the strength of courage comes dignity and acceptance of my personal responsibility as educator. With courage I can discern and articulate my intellectual errors and those that persist in academic development practice. I can move my listening and thinking from established paradigms to the subtle individual reality of self and other/colleague. I can eschew the safety of certainty provided by performative criteria and trust myself to practice good judgment. I can acknowledge to myself and to others that performative criteria, wherein the individual can be erased, are inadequate in themselves as measures of “excellence”. Courage allows expression of the qualifying contexts of my strivings for authenticity. In my scholarship, courage helps me to begin to articulate my notion of equality that recognizes and respects a multiplicity of possible ways of knowing.

Courage helps me to drop pride and pretence. I can accept fallibility, for it is a normal human characteristic of self and others (Hawkins, 2005). With courage I no longer need to defend my ego and can view all relationships with others in the academy as cooperative. In academic contexts the courage I need might be fostered in relationship with trusted mentors and friends in the practice (e.g. Kali, CAD). Ultimately, courage is sustained by my personal spiritual practice, making it possible to listen with the openness and vulnerability of love. To listen is to love.
Love

There is a dire absence of love in performative academic discourse. Yet love is a central educational disposition, for it is love that makes us persons in the more developed sense. Love is the healing power (hooks, 2000, 2003) that “restores the oppressed subject to the world of subjectivity and humanity” (Todd, 2003, p. 77). Love connects us as human beings across our differences, transcending the othering that can feed and drive performativity. In love we feel understood, not alone, and connected to a loving presence. Love is responsibility to the other that is pure of motive, moving us beyond ourselves as we act, without self-interest, for the other. As a way of being, lovingness is free of fear, guilt, and blame; relating to the world in forgiving, nurturing, careful, compassionate, and thoughtful ways.

Love is the organizing principle for the scholarly, mindful inquiry of philosophical fieldwork. Within this stance, I watch my mind at work monitoring speech and actions, asking: Is harm likely to come of my intervention? How would I feel if this intervention were applied to me? How would I feel if this person were me?

Silence

Silence goes beyond what I can think or know intellectually. Silence pays homage to what lies beyond thought. It can be pointed to but never captured in words.

The waves of mind

demand so much of Silence.

But She does not talk back

does not give answers or arguments.

She is the hidden author of every thought
every feeling
every moment.
Silence
She speaks only one word.
And that word is this very existence.
No name you give Her
touches Her
captures Her.
No understanding
can embrace Her.
Mind throws itself at Silence
demanding to be let in.
But no mind can enter into
Her radiant darkness
Her pure and smiling
nothingness.
The mind hurls itself
into sacred questions.
But Silence remains
unmoved by the tantrums.
She asks only for nothing.
Nothing
But you won’t give in to Her
because it is the last coin
in your pocket.

And you would rather
give her your demands than
your sacred and empty hands. (Adyashanti, 2003, pp. 30-31)

Thus, my work here is done. Through listening, thinking, and being, I have
come to see performativity less in pernicious terms but more as an ideology that I
have a responsibility to contextualize and to temper through educational practice. I
suggest that a conscious discourse of authenticity, sought by and expressed through
individual educators and supported in communities of practice, has a place in
academic development practice/scholarship. I do not mean necessarily in opposition
to the dominant discourse of performativity, though oppositional critique cannot be
excluded, but rather along with other discourses, other possible ways of knowing. I
have come to see the discourse of authenticity as a legitimate discourse for
educational development practice and for theorizing our field. Through this process of
inquiry into how I can realize my authenticity more fully in my practice, I have
gained insight, acquired tools, and developed qualities that will sustain me and make
me a better educator. But there is something much more, for seeking authenticity has
been confirmed (indeed legitimated) as a transformative, educational way forward – a
horizon of significance for my educational development practice and my life.

For much of my professional life I have perceived the world through the lens
of my ego. The conflicts I have suffered, including the conflict that inspired this
thesis, occurred at the level of ego. I have come to know that no real and lasting
resolutions are possible within the ego's flimsy and contradictory realm. The truths and certainties, meaning and purpose that I have sought in a lifetime dedicated to knowledge and to the improvement of teaching and learning have, ultimately, eluded me. I have come to know they are to be sought, not through ego-driven strivings, but through seeking authenticity. Facing myself, aligning with the ultimate educational force, means aligning with, and speaking from, my authenticity.

Truth, goodness, and beauty have their claims. You may contest them, but in the end you will admire. Anything not bearing their stamp is admired for a time, but in the end you yawn. (Diderot, 1966, p. 101)
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1: The participant’s tale: On being at the CAD symposium
The Participants' Tales: On Being at the CAD Symposium

By the CAD Collective Symposium presenters (in order of their presentations): Kim McShane (with Heather MacKenzie and Susan Wilcox), Margaret Hicks, Catherine Manathunga, Peter Kandlbinder, Tai Peseta and Barbara Grant

The CAD Collective (Peseta et al., 2005) is a growing international scholarly community of people interested in critically engaging over theoretical and practical issues arising from the work of academic development/advising. If you would like to visit or join the CAD Collective, go to http://mailman.ucc.uct.ac.za/mailman/listinfo/cad

At the HERDSA Conference in July, the Challenging Academic Development (CAD) Collective presented a symposium of six papers. The umbrella title was Conceptual Transgressions: Explorations in the Scholarship of Academic Development. In order to set the tone for the account of the symposium that follows, we describe here its focus through the words of someone who attended: “There was a consistent and quite moving emphasis on authentic personal experience, the unhomely ambiguities and hybrid identities associated with academic development. Such topics as spirituality, authenticity, well-being, personal experience, ethical stances, loss and mourning, [and] professional identities are not commonly discussed at conferences…” (PD’s CAD posting, July 07).

Here we give a “report” of the symposium but an off-beat one. Out of reflections composed soon after the event, we have written a kind of dramatic script so as to give the reader a feeling for the diversity of responses of those who participated. In taking up this mode we wanted to capture our experience of performing the symposium and also some of our feelings and concerns afterwards, including our sense of connecting with some of those who came to hear us but not with others. This piece works like a chorus of singular voices, each expressing a distinctive experience of the event. Some of these voices reflect our thoughts and feelings, others reflect what we imagined of our participants. If the script was to be read aloud, the voices could sometimes be heard singly and at other times simultaneously to give a sense of a room crowded with thoughts and feelings.

Minutes before the symposium: a smallish, greyish university seminar room on the third floor, rather overcrowded with tables and chairs. Half a dozen restless, slightly nervous presenters are gathering at the front of the room, crowded by a teacher’s table and podium and the familiar clutter of technology.

The minutes tick by. The room begins to fill with conference attenders, some smiling and greeting the presenters, others solitary and quiet. There is an atmosphere of anticipation. Slowly the audience builds up, women and men, mostly middle-aged and white, becoming too many for the room. Black-garbed figures push through the doorway carrying extra chairs. The starting time has come and gone, there is a waiting feeling in the air.

The Developer:
Powell Room. Level 1? Level 2? I’ll just keep walking up these stairs and see what the signs at each level say. Right, level 2, more stairs, I have to keep climbing this stairway to ... I can hear a voice – heavens, there’s Ray Land, and isn’t that Sue Clegg? They’re all very quiet in here. A reverent silence. I’ll just stop over the legs of people sitting on the floor at the front, and navigate my way past more people and desks. Then I can prop myself against the high wall at the back of the room and drop my conference bag with its lead-weight Program and Abstracts to the floor. Phew.

The Inquisitor:
I have my coffee, my cake, my napkin. In the break I ventured outside to find some warmth, sun, not conversation. No one’s having the conversations I want to have at this conference. In the abstract booklet, a page catches my eye. Something to do with “conceptual trangressions”. I skim the names. Tai something, is that a man or a woman? I read on. Something about Foucault, a bit on Bourdieu, some sociology, ethics, performativity, ohhh ... something on mourning. Who are these people? What is the CAD Collective? Why haven’t I heard of this? Maybe I should go and check it out.

The Ironist:
This is a nice room. A bit squashed though. Waiting. Waiting. Oh, there’s Tai. “Hi Tai.” Ladies and Gentlemen, please take your partners for the CAD Symposium. One two three, one two three …

The Melodist:
We’d been in the room for a while before people began drifting in: some furtively, others striding in, sure of their place in academic development. People continued to flow in as Tai, our orchestra’s conductor, began in her gentle, thoughtful way to introduce our performance. CAD was about to sing its symphony to a new audience. We didn’t have a unified CAD anthem or a triumphant march. Instead we planned to perform a complex, moving piece full of quiet moments interrupted suddenly by startling floods of sound. There’s dissonance there as well as soothing harmonies.

The symposium begins: The lead presenter moves forward and
welcomes people before handing around a story of being an academic developer. People are asked to read the story and talk about it in groups. For a while the room is filled with the noise of bodies and furniture moving and many voices talking.

An Extract from Heather’s story:
“I started my career happy and hopeful, building trusting educational relationships, and feeling part of the grand project of higher education. Somewhere along the way I lost my bearings. I was now as tired, disillusioned and overwhelmed as my interviewees. Yet this pervasive malaise, the language of fatigue and resignation, seemed to be accepted. It was the price to pay for keeping up with technology, teaching more students, doing more with less. … I had started my career with a measure of professional autonomy and felt ethically responsible as an individual for my practice. As bureaucratisation and management bored down, my sense of authenticity as a professional eroded. I no longer had the requisite control of decisions that affected my practice. I had no time to think, to step back and reflect and there was little in the higher education literature that addressed my experience. I had what Betty Freidan once called a problem without a name and I blamed myself for it.”

The Reporter:
I … connected with [heather’s] descriptions of “a process of disconnection”, “producing being the name of the game”, “ethical and inner conflicts”, the “language of fatigue and resignation”, “the disconnection I was experiencing between the encroaching performative conditions of my working environment and my ethics” … and feelings of anxiousness, alienation, irrelevance and invisibility. After reading Heather’s story, other participants presented, picking up different threads of this story but telling their own stories – connections with each other and highlighting disconnections and troublesome moments with their roles.

The Ironist:
Me? No, no story to tell really. I’m just here to see if there’s anyone nice. Really? That’s nice of you to say so.

The symposium proceeds: One by one, the six presenters give their papers.

The Melodist:
Kim’s song, carrying Heather and Susan’s whispers from far away, is a contemplative, sweet tune about performativity, mindfulness, and ethical authenticity. It carries echoes of Buddhist chants that crescendo in Kim’s coming-out moment.

The Ironist:
So you’re a Buddhist? That must be nice. Does that mean you can’t kill a lecturer even if they are a mass murderer? Live in the now, baby.

The Melodist:
The symphony shifts to Margaret’s aria infused with Bourdieu and reminding us of Graham Webb’s challenging cry within/against academic “development” that had not been taken up. She plays with notions of silence asking us “what is unstated and where are the silences?” in academic development. Where are the dissonant tunes that were reduced to a whisper?

How does CAD amplify those songs and give them renewed voice? The CAD symphony rolls across the room. Participants are nodding, smiling, laughing aloud with the music. They are puzzled too and want to replay a few bars here and there to reflect or just to press pause so they can hum out their own tunes.

The Inquisitor:
Margaret someone, ah, this is the Bourdieu paper that the fella next to me has come to hear. Margaret says academic development is about power, unearthing power relationships, understanding how power gets circulated in the field. She tells us about the stakeholders in her study but she doesn’t present any data. This whole thing so far has been very thin on data and evidence, I must say. You can’t just present yourself as data. Can you imagine what sort of self-indulgent scholarship that would lead to? Academics are already indulgent enough!

The Melodist:
Catherine serenades the audience with her migration story with shanties about unhomeliness and hybridity as backing tracks. Her lyrics ask the audience to bring out the poetry and song in academic development.

The Inquisitor:
Catherine. She doesn’t look like a Manathunga. I wonder where she’s from. Her presentation is personal. I like this. She’s brave. She talks about “unhomeliness” and uses words like “migrant” and “refugee”. I’ve never heard academic developers talk like this before, or be that kind of political. I’m tantalised by this but I need more time. Then there’s the guy with the glasses, Peter from UTS. He comes out from behind the table. I feel in a conversation with him even though my neck is straining from being too close to the front. He talks about the public sphere. There’s a bit of a history lesson. A diagram. He asks us to think about whether this conference is an example of the public sphere. I want to ask a question, raise my hand, tell Peter my own learning outcomes for the conference but there’s no time. He seems like a decent chap, I’ll have to find him later for a coffee.

The Developer:
Tai Peseta has just brought up her slides and, hang on, what was that she just said? Why doesn’t higher education research read the way it feels? Hmm, I love my work as a developer, and I love seeing my colleagues get excited about teaching and student learning, you know, and Biggs is a real revelation for them. There’s a security in alignment, and it seems to help them understand what they are doing. But you know all that factor analysis and chi square and T-test, in those UK studies I was looking at the other day, doesn’t do much for me. Well it doesn’t match with my experience of teaching, she’s right. Hang on, there’s more. Tai is saying, “I want to? wonder about academic development that breaks your heart.”

The Ironist:
What’s a nice critical theorist like you doing in a place like this? That’s a firm
grip. Umm, it's cutting my circulation. Loosen, loosen!

The Developer:
Barbara Grant is in front of us, standing over the overhead projector. Oh, so that's what she looks like. Her voice is strong, her presence is energetic and serious at the same time. She talks of loss, grief and mourning and I start to feel a bit uneasy, and I wonder why I expect something more positive. Her words pull at me as I reflect on my own developer work back on the other side of the country. I seem to spend a lot of time these days running between consultancy meetings, and university committee work, and any time left after writing up all these events and their outcomes is spent on email. Barbara gets me in the heart: "When have I done enough?" she asks.

The symposium closes: The room empties, people hurrying because the presentations have gone over time and they are late for the next event. A few hang around to talk to the presenters, who dazedly gather their things. Someone (a stranger) silently hugs one of them.

The Inquisitor:
I look down at my notes. I’ve written a lot. References. Terms. Doodles in one corner, capital letters in another. Is this what it means to be transgressive? There’s a buzz in the room. Lots of people hang around the members of the CAD Collective and there are hugs and kisses. I hear the Sue woman say “well, actually”... to Tai, and together they laugh and embrace. There are questions about how to join this CAD Collective. There are questions about their papers, whether they’ll publish them, something for IJAD? I don’t know yet what to make of all this but I feel flooded with a peculiar kind of newness.

The Reporter:
The stories that I heard about academic development and the questions and dilemmas that were raised in this symposium resonate with my own experiences, some more strongly than others but never-the-less there is a connectedness. I am so grateful that finally there is an audience for these views and that people working in the role of academic development have the courage to speak these perspectives out aloud — some very personal and difficult, some with tentativeness and uncertainty, others confronting and uncomfortable. What is spoken are feelings of loss, confusion, uncertainty, being unsettled and troubled. It has provided a space to talk about what Heather’s story described as “a problem without a name”.

Over the next few days, the presenters meet and talk over the event and emails drift in from colleagues who attended.

One Colleague:
The experience of being a member of the audience ... was very different from most of the other conference sessions ... I would have liked a discussion period for at least half an hour so that is a thought for next time! (PD’s CAD posting, July 07)

And Another:
[I want to] congratulate you on bringing off such a rich and provocative event. I sat in the overcrowded room and relaxed into watching and listening to real thinking and dialogue and I have to say it was a great pleasure ... I felt that I was in the presence of a movement and a change in the field of academic development and that I and others would look back on the symposium as a significant staging as well as a marker of that change. I’d like to add, too, that I think there is a need to keep an eye on a moment for irony ... (AL’s CAD posting, July 09)

So, among the excitement (in many senses of the word) of raising the “problem without a name”, we also found reminders of the need to think about how we do what we do. We close this account with yet another singular voice, but one that speaks for all of us: “A lot of people thanked us for it, said they found it interesting and useful, that it was provocative, that perhaps we had gone too far, and felt a bit overwhelmed by the onslaught of so many new ideas. With hindsight, we recognised there were probably too many presentations, and we had no time for discussion ... which was not at all ideal and we have already made plans for a different kind of structure for future conferences. Thanks to all of you who came along, chatted with us over coffee, challenged us to be clearer, nodded, smiled at us, or just had simple words of encouragement for us”. (TP’s CAD posting, July 10)

References

Endnotes
1. All quoted material supplied by permission of the authors.

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