Ownmost Responsibility: Singularity, Relationality and Caregiving

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ABSTRACT

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Ami Harbin

This thesis centres on the following question: What are the necessary conditions of persons becoming able to act as responsible selves?

My attempt to answer this question proceeds by means of direct engagement with two schools of philosophical thought relevant to the issues at hand, Heideggerian and feminist theory, respectively. The thesis focuses in particular on Heidegger’s account of authenticity, singularization and responsibility, and relationality accounts’ emphases on both the importance of interdependent relationships of care and potential problems with overly individualistic accounts of the self. I argue that the Heideggerian notion of singularization should be seen as a necessary precondition of responsibility, while Heidegger’s account of care for others is ultimately an unsatisfying one, as it constitutes what I term a caretaking. I then argue that the relational accounts’ presentation of one’s need for care from others should be maintained in an adequate account of responsibility, while criticizing these views for what I call an over-problematization of the notion of the individual.

My own account of the responsible self maintains both singularization and relationality, in the manners I characterize them here, as necessary conditions of one’s ability to be responsible, and I argue that responsible caregiving for particular others should be seen as one way of enacting responsibility so conceived.
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BT – Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*
RL – Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*
IA – Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*
Introduction

My project in this thesis centres on the following question: What are the necessary conditions of persons becoming able to act as responsible selves? An adequate answer to this question should also provide insight into the specific ways in which one ought to act upon personal responsibilities to care for those others for whom he or she is responsible. What are the necessary conditions of one’s ability to act upon his or her responsibilities, and what can an analysis of these conditions tell us about the nature of caring responsibly for others?

My efforts to effectively answer these questions proceed by means of direct engagement with two schools of philosophical thought relevant to the issues at hand, Heideggerian and feminist theory, respectively. The thesis contains three chapters. In chapter one, I consider Martin Heidegger’s account of authenticity, insofar as it involves singularization and what he and other Heideggerians characterize as authentic care. In chapter two, I explore feminist articulations of the necessarily relational character of persons in terms of interdependent relationships of care. In the third, I draw my own conclusions regarding what I take to be useful connections between the two views, I articulate my own account of responsibility as it relates to those connections, and I flesh out a key normative implication of my view regarding care for individual others.

Before proceeding, it will be helpful to both clarify the scope of my project with respect to the responsibility at issue, and to present some of the motivating factors behind the considerations to be articulated here.
In this thesis, I am interested in presenting an account of the necessary conditions of responsible selfhood. I am primarily concerned with this level of questioning in my considerations of both the Heideggerian and feminist characterizations of responsibility. It is on this general level of analysis that I take the two approaches to be, in the senses I will articulate, capable of interaction. Beyond this, I am also interested in applying this account of responsible selves to scenarios involving our personal responsibilities to care for other persons. Though such relationships can take a number of forms, my particular focus here is on personal relationships between individual persons. I am focussed on establishing an account of our responsible selves which ultimately presents what I take to be two necessary preconditions of such responsibility, and one normative implication regarding individuals and care.

I understand responsible selves to be those persons who, broadly speaking, act upon the responsibilities they inevitably gain by means of involvement in the social milieu. That is, I take responsible selves to respond to the responsibilities which are, in some sense, required of them. This may involve such generally characterized responsibilities as those to oneself, to other persons, to other living things, to one’s environment, and so on. I take all persons to have certain responsibilities of these kinds and others, and I take responsible selves to be those persons who act upon their responsibilities. This understanding of responsible selves is my focus in this thesis, and my aim is to consider the necessary conditions of becoming responsible in this way. I will claim that both singularization and relationality, in the way I describe them here, are necessary conditions of such responsible selfhood.
While I would not claim that all responsibility involves a responsibility to care for
some other, I will focus upon these kinds of responsibilities in my final applications of
the view. I seek to limit the scope of applying my more general account of responsibility
in this thesis to one concerning one’s personal responsibilities to care for individual
others.

Beyond my interest in posing and seeking to answer the questions I have asked
here, this project is motivated also by some other specific concerns. My seeking to
consider the possible connections between a Heideggerian account of authenticity and a,
broadly speaking, feminist analysis of relationality stems from an ongoing interest in
building on the work of others who try to foster dialogue, rather than antagonism, across
these traditions. While much fruitful work has been done to this end, especially in the
last two decades, my work in this thesis is partially motivated by a sense of there being a
gap in the recent literature regarding the relation among Heidegger, authenticity, ethics
and care, in particular. Despite pertinent and persuasive criticisms of Heidegger’s
account of authenticity on the part of a number of theorists writing on these topics, I
would ultimately hold that certain aspects of such a Heideggerian account of authenticity
can be useful to maintain within discussions of one’s personal responsibility to care for
others. That is, while I think that Heidegger’s account of authenticity does mistakenly
omit and misrepresent some crucial components of what it means to care for others, I also
think that omitting some carefully characterized aspects of this account of authenticity
from contemporary understandings of personal responsibilities to others would be an
unfortunate (and, if I am right, avoidable) mistake. There seems to me to be room for an
exploration of these possibilities, and my conviction that such an exploration would
prove useful to both Heideggerian and feminist traditions has been a significant motivating factor in this project.
Chapter One:
Heidegger, Authenticity, and Authentic Care

Heidegger presents the authenticity of Dasein as a necessary precondition of its ability to act responsibly. In this chapter, I will consider this account of authentic Dasein in order to determine in what ways authenticity, as Heidegger understands it, might be a necessary component of the account of responsibility I seek to articulate here.

I will begin by outlining Heidegger’s account of care as basic to Dasein’s being in the world. I will connect this fundamental analysis of care to the question of responsibility in general terms, in order to provide a starting point for my discussion of a Heideggerian understanding of responsible selves. I will then proceed by briefly summarizing and clarifying Heidegger’s account of Dasein as potentially authentic. For Dasein to be authentic, it must act in terms of what Heidegger calls its ownmost possibilities. I will then provide Heidegger’s more detailed account of authentic Dasein in terms of the following three considerations, focussing most closely on the final one: authenticity in the face of death, the singularizing effect of authenticity, and authentic care. To be sure, these are closely related aspects of the authenticity movement in question, and my separate discussions of them should be understood as means to the analytical end of clarification rather than as signifying substantive distinctions between them. In my focus upon authentic care, I will clarify what I understand to be the correct interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis in light of discrepant contemporary literature on the subject. I will term what I understand to be Heidegger’s description of care for others a caretaking. I will continue by analyzing the feature of this view of authenticity which I will maintain as a necessary component of my own account of responsible selves. My
claim will be that the singularizing effect of this authenticity movement is necessary to one’s ability to be responsible. I will then provide a critique of what I take to be a problematic feature of Heidegger’s account, namely, care for others as caretaking. I will clarify the ways in which a conception of care for others as caretaking runs counter to my analysis of responsibility, thus explicating its exclusion from my account. I will conclude by summarizing the ways in which Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity can be taken to strengthen the account of responsibility I favour here.

I. Dasein, Care and Authenticity

Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein and care in *Being and Time* emphasizes Dasein’s way of being in the world as one involving care as a basic mode of experience. That is, care, in Heidegger’s terms, is itself a basic mode of being for Dasein. Simply put, Dasein’s care within the world signifies Dasein as the being which accesses its world by means of such care. Dasein’s care within the world signifies Dasein’s general involvement and interactive participation with it. That Dasein is involved in situations of interaction with the world itself is due to its basic mode of care. Dasein’s experience of the world in the mode of care allows it to access and relate to the world at all. It is care in this sense that allows Dasein’s dynamic accessing of the world, such that Dasein itself can develop within it. As such, Dasein’s care distinguishes Dasein from inanimate objects, such as stones, for example, which themselves do not participate in dynamic world interactions. All Daseins, as Daseins, exercise care on this ontological level. As
Heidegger says, “The Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care” (BT 57, original italics).¹

In keeping with its basic mode of care, Dasein develops its understanding of the world by means of a constant appropriation of it. In this sense, Dasein’s mode of care allows Dasein to take the world upon itself in such general terms, such that it can develop an understanding of it by means of interaction with and appropriation of it. The process generative of understanding, for Dasein, is one in which Dasein accesses an inherited world of which it first has no understanding, constructing for itself a framework based on worldly and social scaffolding. The way in which Dasein exists in the world is such that it actively accesses the world’s entities, by means of its appropriative way of being in the world. Such processes function within Dasein’s basic mode of care.

The way in which a basic sense of Dasein’s responsibility and its fundamental mode of care are connected soon becomes evident. Given care as a basic mode of accessing the world, Dasein is charged with the task of enacting such involvement and appropriation. Dasein has the task of taking the world upon itself in these terms, and each Dasein such a task to its individual self. Given both Dasein’s basic mode of existence, qua Dasein, as well as its need to develop understanding of its Being and its environment, Dasein has before it in each case the task of making the world its own. Dasein must appropriate its world by means of care. As such, this is Dasein’s responsibility. As François Raffoul states, “Being is given in such a way that I have to take it over and be responsible for it...What else can the expression of Care (Sorge) mean if not that primordial responsibility of oneself that Dasein, as Zu-sein, is?”² The issue of
responsibility thus emerges in Heidegger’s discussion at this fundamental a level and in this general a manner.

Dasein is, according to Heidegger, that being for which “Being is an issue” (BT 191-192). As Heidegger states in Being and Time, “The phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made plain in the state-of-Being of understanding – of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is” (BT 191). Simply put, Dasein is that being for which, among other things, authenticity is possible. Authenticity signifies a way in which Dasein responds to its potentiality for Being within the world. Heidegger cautions against any understanding of authenticity overly removed from this world. “Authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon” (BT 179, original italics). Broadly speaking, authentic Dasein responds to its potentiality for Being within the world by means of understanding its ownmost possibilities therein; Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s authenticity focuses significantly upon those possibilities it takes as its own. There is therefore a considerable focus on Dasein’s response to the possibilities it properly, appropriatively, and singularly has. As Heidegger describes it in his earlier text The Phenomenology of Religious Life, “The situation of enactment, authentic existence. – Appropriate the ‘having’ such that the having becomes a ‘being’” (RL 143, original italics). While maintaining the potential for this authenticity, Dasein is to be understood as predominantly inauthentic. Dasein is by default, or before fulfilling the conditions of authenticity to be outlined in this chapter, inauthentic, and Heidegger makes it clear that not all Daseins actively strive for authenticity (RL 145).
Dasein's predominantly inauthentic state is due to the dominance of what Heidegger deems Dasein's 'fallenness into the they (das Man)'. In short, Dasein's fallenness can be characterized as its unreflective participation within the world of other like beings, in such a way that both Dasein's actions and its character blend in rather than appearing, to either Dasein itself or to others, as uniquely those of an individual. Dasein's inauthentic worldly involvement can therefore be described as a dispersal into the world of 'the they' (BT 129)\(^4\) – inauthentic Dasein has not collected itself. As Heidegger says, "The authenticity of Being-one's-Self has of course been closed off and thrust aside in falling" (BT 184). This inauthenticity "has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part" (BT 176). Inauthenticity should therefore be understood neither as a fault of Dasein, nor as entirely avoidable.\(^5\) Rather, as will be discussed later, Dasein's inauthenticity remains a necessary part of its being in the world.

As inauthentic, Dasein engages with the world in a manner which prevents considered reflection upon itself as a unique self, apart from its absorption into 'the they'. Inauthentic Dasein is "hidden from itself" (BT 189)\(^6\) insofar as it remains "stuck in the worldly" (RL 74). Inauthentic inattentiveness to the self is easier for Dasein to enact than is authentic attentiveness to the self insofar as Dasein's careful consideration of itself inevitably leads to what Heidegger calls anxiety. Whereas inauthentic participation in 'the they' is soothing to Dasein, authentic self-consideration is jolting and anything but reassuring (IA 81). Heidegger describes Dasein's experience of inauthenticity as follows:

Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the "they", it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind
that goes with it. The supposition of the “they” that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a tranquillity, for which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open. Falling Being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquillizing.

(BT 177, original italics)

This point will be elaborated in the remainder of this chapter, but suffice it to say now that the movement towards authenticity requires that Dasein face its own anxiety, its own death, and its own ultimate singularity. Dasein becomes authentic by means of its coming to face and possess itself in the midst of the ongoing temptation towards falling. Authenticity involves, in this sense, bringing Dasein back from its fall (IA 62). In authenticity, Dasein gains an understanding of itself as singularized, and unlike the unconsidered and unquestioned acceptance of its position in fallenness, Dasein appears to itself as questionable. Authentic Dasein comes to understand itself and act in terms of what Heidegger calls its ownmost possibilities, which is to say, in terms of those possibilities for action which belong to Dasein alone in light of its unique situation in the world. Dasein can only understand its ownmost possibilities by means of coming to understand itself as distinct from, rather than dispersed into, ‘the they’ of the social world.

Dasein’s development of its own authenticity is understood to be a precondition of what Heidegger terms Being-with others (Mitsein). This form of Being-with signifies authentic Dasein’s way of engaging with the social world such that it remains a distinct and unique being within it. As Lawrence Hatab describes it, Dasein’s for-the-sake-of-itself, which is to say Dasein’s authenticity, is the condition for the possibility of Dasein’s
being-with others. Thus, “there remains a basic relationship between authenticity, resolution, and being-with-others”. Lawrence Vogel likewise notes that, “authenticity has a ‘moral’ dimension insofar as the mood which awakens me to the groundlessness and contingency of my own Being-in-the-world also opens me up to others in a new way”. As Hatab then concludes – and we will follow up on this: “Heidegger’s notion of authenticity – understood as the tension between socialization and individuation, animated by anxious disorientation and reorientation – has much to contribute to ethics”.

Heidegger’s notion of authenticity has thus been sketched as the movement from inauthentic Dasein’s fallenness into ‘the they’ and dispersal into worldly involvements to authentic Dasein’s facing of itself, its own death, and its singularity. This movement allows Dasein to act in terms of its ownmost possibilities. In the following three sections, I will consider in greater detail the ways in which authenticity is related to death, the singularization of Dasein, and to Dasein’s capacity for caring for others.

II. Authenticity and Death

For Dasein to come to face itself authentically, it must face its own death as something which indeed belongs to it alone; Dasein must come to face its death as one of its ownmost possibilities. Although in every case Dasein necessarily dies alone, the fallenness of inauthentic Dasein prevents it from recognizing its aloneness or singularity in the face of death. In the movement towards authenticity, Dasein responds to its inevitable death with anxiety. This anxiety allows for the individuation, or for what I
refer to as the singularization, which is a necessary component of the movement from inauthentic to authentic Dasein.

Heidegger’s treatment of Dasein’s death in Being and Time is extensive. As he states, “Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 250). “Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time” (BT 240). As Hatab also explains, “Authentic being-toward-death opens up Dasein’s authentic care and taking action”.\(^{11}\) In keeping with the way in which Dasein remains predominantly inauthentic, Dasein’s response to its own death is primarily also inauthentic, while maintaining the possibility of authentically facing it (BT 260). Facing its own death requires that Dasein understand its non-existence as one of its ownmost possibilities. Concretely, Dasein must itself respond to the possibility of a world which no longer contains itself – Dasein must respond to the eventual non-existence of itself in order to respond authentically to its current existence. “The state of mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face-to-face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence” (BT 265-266, original italics). The extent to which Dasein avoids facing the possibility of its own death is also the extent to which Dasein avoids facing its ownmost possibilities, insofar as its own death is indeed Dasein’s most crucial possibility, and therefore the extent to which Dasein remains inauthentic. In facing its own death, Dasein establishes itself as finite, and acknowledges finitude as one of its ownmost possibilities. As Michael Zimmerman explains it, “As authentic I disclose and accept my finitude and devote myself to my own possibilities. I
let myself be the finite openness which I already am”.12 As Hatab further clarifies, “Inauthenticity is simply a concealment of Dasein’s radical finitude by way of a fallen immersion in beings and a confinement to the common social patterns of das Man. Authenticity involves Dasein being called by and to its radical finitude”.13 The call to Dasein’s finitude is something to which it alone can respond, and thus something to which inauthentic Dasein, indistinguishable from ‘the they’, cannot respond. Insofar as its finitude affects each Dasein uniquely and at different times, Dasein must respond uniquely to its own death.

Dasein responds to the possibility of its own death with anxiety, and this anxiety singularizes Dasein as having to face its own death uniquely and alone. As Heidegger puts it, “Distress articulates the authentic situation” (RL 67). The anxiety Dasein experiences in response to its own death singularizes it all the more insofar as Dasein alone experiences its own anxiety. Anxiety in Heidegger’s terms is thus a non-relational response to one’s own circumstances.14 Vogel describes anxiety as a mood which “isolate[s] the individual and thrust[s] him into a ‘nonrelational’ encounter with his own possibilities”.15 In facing the possibility of its own death, Dasein experiences anxiety; in its experience of anxiety, Dasein is singularized; in having become singularized, Dasein comes to understand authenticity as one of its ownmost possibilities. Heidegger describes this process as follows:

In anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes [vereinzelt]. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in
each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings.

(BT 191)

Dasein’s anxiety in the face of encountering its own death is sufficiently disorienting as to allow for the laying bare of possibilities otherwise unable to appear within the everyday world. The singularized Dasein is enabled to understand itself as uniquely possessing the newly uncovered possibility of authenticity.

Dasein’s authenticity and inauthenticity importantly rely upon, rather than mutually exclude, each other. As stated in the passage from Heidegger above, the process of anxiety reveals to Dasein not only authenticity but also inauthenticity as possibilities of its Being. Dasein begins in a thrownness not of its own choosing, and is only there charged with the task of appropriation and singularization. The process of singularization only functions in response to that which is not yet appropriated by Dasein, which is to say, the world inherited in thrownness. Crucial to Heidegger’s description, however, is the essentially inappropiable nature of the world into which Dasein is thrown. In the process of Dasein’s development of authenticity, Dasein is charged with taking the inherited rather than chosen world upon itself uniquely. The authenticity movement functions by means of this process, and Dasein is thus charged with this task. The process of becoming authentic requires that Dasein make its own ground from that ground inherited by it, and, as such, the process contains a tension. Given that the inherited world is inevitably impossible to fully appropriate, inauthenticity remains a crucial component of the process, and thus, along with authenticity, one of the
possibilities of Dasein’s Being. Indeed, these possibilities are not merely non-exclusive, but rather both are necessary components, importantly interconnected. Raffoul’s treatment of this tension is a helpful one. As he states:

What Dasein has to be, and what it has to be responsible for, then, is precisely its very facticity, its being-thrown as such. What I have to make my own is thus what can never belong to me, what evades me, what will always have escaped me…I am responsible because I am thrown in an existence that I have to answer for…What I have to appropriate, ultimately, is the inappropriable itself.16

Dasein thus remains necessarily caught between authenticity and inauthenticity as revealed by anxiety to be possibilities of its Being. As Heidegger states,

Because Dasein is essentially an entity with Being-in, it can explicitly discover those entities which it encounters environmentally…it can have the ‘world’…The environment is a structure which [one]…can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ.

(BT 58, original italics)

Dasein’s encounter with its own death in anxiety, as one of its ownmost possibilities, and as a possibility necessarily faced alone, allows for the process of Dasein’s singularization, which is itself a necessary component of Dasein’s movement towards authenticity. As Heidegger says, “Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue” (BT 263, original italics). “Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual
Dasein” (BT 263, original italics). Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s ownmost possibility for death is as distinctly non-relational [unbezüglich]. As he states, “Death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]” (BT 251, original italics). Death as “this ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one” (BT 250). As Heidegger pointedly explains this non-relationality,

With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being...If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone.

(BT 250, original italics)

Given the extent of Heidegger’s emphasis upon the non-relational quality of Dasein’s ownmost possibilities, it is useful to turn now to a consideration of the connections between authenticity, singularity, and the emphatically non-relational.

III. Authenticity and Singularization

The singularization of Dasein is, as has been stated already, a necessary component of Dasein’s becoming authentic. Insofar as, for Heidegger, Dasein’s authenticity is a necessary condition of Dasein acting responsibly, the singularization of Dasein is thus also a necessary component of Dasein’s becoming responsible. As we have seen, “Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization”
(BT 188, original italics). Dasein’s singularization is the opposite of the dispersal already described as a problematic outcome of Dasein’s fallenness into ‘the they’. In being singularized, Dasein has effectively collected itself into a being capable of facing its anxiety in the face of its most important ownmost possibility – its death. As Heidegger explains, “The unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, discloses the anticipation of death as the possibility which is non-relational” (BT 307, original italics). For Heidegger, Dasein is singularized insofar as the requirement for it to face its own death is crucially non-transferable to any other Dasein, even though those Daseins each face the possibility of the same requirement. As Vogel claims, “Though I acknowledge that the abyss the others face is the same abyss I face, our situations are absolutely incommensurate inasmuch as the abyss ultimately throws each of us back on himself alone”.

Though Dasein faces anxiety in light of the same inevitability of death as all other Daseins, its own experience of anxiety is radically incommensurable with that of the other, and thus importantly singularizing. Jacques Taminiaux explains that “What constitutes Dasein in its ownmost [is] the care of Being specific to its finite temporality...[which is] what individualizes Dasein radically and without substitution”. Dasein’s response to its finitude allows for the process of singularization described here.

As will become relevant in the discussion which follows, Heidegger’s characterization of singularized Dasein draws significantly upon the language of taking, possessing and appropriating. Dasein as singularized gains the ability to possess, among other things, itself in a meaningful way. That is, in Dasein’s movement toward authenticity, it gains a form of what Heidegger refers to as ‘self-possession’
[Selbstbemächigung].19 “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being” (BT 188, original italics). As Heidegger describes it, “the authentic Self” is “the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way” (BT 129, original italics). The singularized Dasein is capable of the form of ‘taking’ relevant here; Dasein as singularized is capable of taking upon itself its ownmost possibilities, and thus of becoming authentic. Those who remain inauthentic “do not project this from out of themselves towards themselves as ‘possibility,’ in such a way that it would suffice to take possession of themselves in the first place” (RL 145, italics mine). As Raffoul states, “The being that I am is to be taken over. The determination of Dasein from the outset defines the self as a responsibility of itself”.20 Because the only one capable of authentically taking possession of Dasein in this way is in each case Dasein itself, those who do not take possession of their ownmost possibilities necessarily remain inauthentic. Heidegger’s extensive treatment of what he calls Dasein’s guilt, which some theorists have since explicitly called responsibility, is characterized by Heidegger also in terms of an act of taking. In becoming authentic, Dasein calls itself, as Heidegger says,
to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is…This calling-back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that Dasein itself…is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the ‘they’; and that means that it is guilty.

(BT 287, original italics)
Thus, as has already been mentioned, the singularity of Dasein, described by Heidegger in terms of a ‘taking’, is a necessary component of Dasein’s being responsible.

In the process of becoming authentic, singularized Dasein gains the possibility for being responsible as one of its ownmost possibilities. As I claimed above, insofar as, for Heidegger, Dasein’s authenticity is a necessary condition of Dasein acting responsibly, the singularization of Dasein is thus also a necessary component of Dasein’s becoming responsible. Heidegger’s claim, simply put, is that in order for Dasein to be responsible, Dasein must be authentic, and in order for Dasein to be authentic, Dasein must be singularized. That is, authenticity is taken to be a condition of responsibility, and likewise, singularization is taken to be a condition of authenticity. As we shall see, authentic Dasein is not only necessarily singularized (in the face of its own death) as it has been characterized thus far, but also necessarily capable of what Heidegger calls authentic care. This sense of authentic care will be considered in detail in the next section. By means of briefly charting the course of this chapter now, however, it should be noted that in my final analysis of Heidegger’s characterization of authenticity in light of my own account of responsible caregiving, I will argue that Heidegger’s singularizing component of authenticity should be retained in the desirable account of responsibility, while his account of caring relationships with others should not. The connection between Dasein’s singularity and its capacities for responsibility is thus very important for my purposes, and I will turn to that now.

As John Haugeland describes it, “An individual’s being-responsible is its taking over responsibility for its whole self”.

Dasein is responsible, in these terms, when it takes responsibility for itself. At this point, a qualification is in order: within Heidegger’s
general account of Dasein, every Dasein is inevitably responsible (guilty), just as we have seen that every Dasein is potentially authentic. In saying that only singularized and authentic Dasein is capable of responsibility, what is meant is the kind of responsibility taken over by Dasein and thus conceived of as Dasein’s ownmost responsibility. That is, Dasein is in every case guilty, but only singularized, authentic Dasein recognizes its guilt as its own and as something upon which it can choose to act. “As resolute, Dasein projects itself onto its ownmost being-responsible – that is, understands itself as responsible for its whole life by owning that responsibility and ‘taking it over’.” Dasein becomes authentically responsible for itself largely by means of the recognition of this responsibility as something necessarily and wholly its own, which is to say as something singularly relevant to Dasein itself. The responsibility Dasein authentically takes upon itself does, as will become clearer in the next section, extend to responsibility for and towards others, but, insofar as it affects each Dasein alone, it is always also a responsibility to Dasein itself. In these terms, Dasein is the only one ultimately responsible for the person it is. Its possibilities and responsibilities are truly its ownmost. As Haugeland explains, “The responsibility that existential conscience gives Dasein in each case to understand...is responsibility for its own self as a whole, for who it is”. Only by means of Dasein becoming responsible to and for its own self in this way can Dasein gain the possibility of being responsible to and for others.

The development of Dasein’s authentic responsibility to itself allows for the possibility of authentic ethical interaction with others. That is to say, Dasein’s authentic responsibility to and for itself can open up the possibility for ethical responsibility to others. As Hatab explains, “Experiences of guilt and conscience can be indicative of an
authentic ethical bearing, of an appropriated responsiveness to the claim of ethical responsibility”.

Whereas in inauthenticity, Dasein’s interaction with the social world involved only a fallenness into the dispersal indistinguishability of ‘the they’ where no individuals appear, in authentic ethical interaction, Dasein can be an individual providing meaningful responses to others. As Vogel puts it, “the affirmation of one’s anxiety in the face of one’s own finite freedom make[s] the individual available to others in a new way”.

Thus, in his terms, “‘existential solipsism’...does not detach one from, but places one in a new capacity for relation with others”.

“As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes – but only in such a manner that...it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others” (BT 264).

As will be more closely considered in the next section, authenticity not only allows for Dasein to be responsible to itself as singularized and for the possibility of ethical responsibility to others, but also importantly allows for what Heidegger calls ‘authentic care’ – for both self and others. It is thus useful to think about authenticity as importantly impacting not only Dasein’s self, but also the social world. As Hatab claims, “Authenticity is better rendered as the tension between individuation and socialization, rather than as a break with the social world on behalf of some radically unique existence”.

While Heidegger emphasizes the need for Dasein to establish a proper relation with itself, he also maintains that Dasein’s inevitable involvement in the social world must be accounted for. That is, though Heidegger clearly claims that the need for Dasein to establish an authentic relation to itself is fundamental (BT 124), he also holds that Dasein’s Being-with-others or socialization must not be overlooked (BT 123). As
we have seen, singularized Dasein’s development of its own authenticity is a condition of authentic responsibility both to and for itself and others.

In this chapter thus far, I have presented Heidegger’s account of authentic Dasein as that being which is singularized by means of its facing its ownmost possibilities for Being, its death chief among them. Dasein’s singularity has been established as a necessary condition of its authenticity, and its authenticity has been characterized as a necessary condition of the possibility of Dasein’s being responsible. In the next section, I turn to a consideration of Heidegger’s analysis of authentic care as something of which authentic Dasein is capable.

IV. Authentic Care

In becoming authentic, Dasein becomes capable of enacting authentic self-care, and care for others. Dasein’s authenticity, as Hatab says, “opens up possibilities of an individual Dasein’s own particular modes of care”.

In terms of Dasein’s project of authentic caring, just as in Dasein’s movement towards authenticity more broadly, Vogel claims that, “individuation is not the enemy, but the condition, of our being ‘authentically bound together’”.

Both Dasein’s self-care and its care for others are made possible by Dasein’s singularization and authenticity.

It is necessary to distinguish Heidegger’s ontological account of Dasein’s basic mode of care, as has been already discussed, from his account of Dasein’s care for other Daseins. All Daseins inevitably exercise the former, given their nature as Daseins. This basic mode of care is one which I will ultimately maintain in my affirmation of
Heidegger’s account of singularization, as it will impact my own account of responsibility and its applications within the realm of caregiving. However, Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s care for others itself constitutes a separate view of care which I will take to be insufficient.

Dasein’s authentic self-care is ultimately a care for the ongoing movement towards, and maintenance of, its own authenticity. As such, this self-care is to ensure that Dasein acts of its own accord in this crucial way: in order to remain authentic, Dasein must ensure that it faces its ownmost possibilities for Being. As the quote indicates, Dasein is the only one who can do the work of this ensuring, and thus Dasein’s authentic self-care is an important component of the maintenance of its authenticity. According to Heidegger, authentic self-care cannot take the form of drives such as willing, wishing, urge or addiction (BT 194), but is rather a fundamental striving to maintain authenticity, as described above.

Dasein’s care for others, as distinct from its authentic self-care, is itself made possible by Dasein’s own authenticity. As Joanna Hodge puts it, “Only through a relation to oneself is it possible to express genuine care for another, indeed to recognize the concerns of the other as their concerns”.30 Care for others is predominantly characterized by Heidegger as a “liberating solicitude”31 involving a “leaping ahead” of the other in order to provide him or her with authentic care (BT 122). Heidegger’s discussion of this solicitude, while relatively brief, provides a great deal of insight into Dasein’s care for others, and has accordingly received considerable attention in the recent Heideggerian scholarship. As Heidegger characterizes it, care for the other is to respond to the other “in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’;
but rather to give it back to him authentically” (BT 122). Heidegger contrasts liberating solicitude, as leaping ahead of the other “which leaps forth and liberates”, with a leaping in for the other, which neglects to care for the other by instead dominating the given situation (BT 122). In leaping ahead of the other, Dasein can care for him or her by opening up his or her ability to see the possibilities which lay ahead, and which can therefore be taken up as the other’s ownmost. In leaping in for the other, Dasein closes the situation by further preventing the other from seeing his or her own possibilities due to Dasein’s dominance of the circumstances. Dasein’s caring for the other is to be a leaping ahead of the other as a liberating move. This in turn “helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it” (BT 122, original italics). As Vogel claims, liberating solicitude “is made possible by an authentic self-relation” and is therefore “not available from within the posture of inauthenticity”.32 In leaping ahead of the other, Dasein cares for him or her in such a way as to emphasize again the importance of singularization. As Vogel explains, “Heidegger calls this ‘leaping ahead’: ‘letting the other be’ in his ultimately solitary responsibility for his own future”.33 Thus, as we have seen, care for self and others is both made possible by, and directed towards, authentic singularization.

The question of the relevant connection between self-care and care for others in Heidegger’s Being and Time is one taken up extensively in recent Heideggerian scholarship. In simplified terms, there are two chief approaches to articulating this relation. The first approach claims that Heidegger establishes an element of self-care as an ontological condition for the care of others. On this conception, Dasein’s ability to authentically care for others requires that Dasein first authentically care for itself. The
second approach argues that Heidegger claims not that care for others is based on a prior self-care, but that self-care and care for others are, in some sense, ontological conditions of each other.\textsuperscript{34} As Hatab, a proponent of the second approach, claims, "Phenomena such as care and responsibility are simultaneously an Other-relation and a self-relation".\textsuperscript{35} The majority of this literature regarding Heidegger's concept of authentic care focuses chiefly on the concepts articulated in \textit{Being and Time}, and on certain especially pertinent sections in particular.

My main exegetical point will be that, given the account of care articulated in the texts I draw upon here, it seems clear that Heidegger holds the first of the two positions broadly articulated above, namely, that authentic self-care is a condition of care for others, while claiming, contrary to the second approach, that the reverse does not hold. I base this reading on important discussions found in both \textit{Being and Time} and \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle} regarding care as a kind of taking care, or as I will call it here, as a caretaking.\textsuperscript{36} Caretaking involves Dasein's care for others, always with a primary concern for Dasein's own authenticity. These texts, I argue, confirm Lawrence Vogel's interpretation of care for others as based on authentic self-care, and provide further insight into care for others as what I term a caretaking.

In the midst of a lengthy discussion of care for others within the shared world, in \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle}, Heidegger characterizes humans beings as those "that can take in care, and have in care" (IA 72). He describes the experience of caring in the world as follows: "In one's own world, the 'myself' for which I care, is experienced in determinate kinds of meaningfulness, which emerge in the full life-world, where, along with one's own world, the shared world and surrounding world are always
present” (IA 71). Care as described here focuses predominantly on authentic self-care, while acknowledging the importance of a shared world to Dasein’s experience of meaningful care. Heidegger moves on in this text to characterize care for others in terms of the meaningfulness experienced by Dasein as a result (IA 66, 68). Care for others is described as involving not only care for the other involved, but also care “for the encounters themselves” (IA 70). As Heidegger says, “Caring is an experience of objects in their respective encounterability” (IA 68). It begins to become clear within these early articulations that, while care for others does involve and have an impact on these others, it also fundamentally relies upon Dasein’s self-care and includes a care for the authentic development of Dasein’s own self.37 “What caring aims at in its actualization…is it itself” (IA 101).

With Being and Time comes more discussion of Dasein’s authenticity and authentic care, as well as further clarification of the inauthenticity and inauthentic care common to Dasein’s experience. In the unquestioning mode of inauthenticity, care is both Dasein’s everyday mode of worldly experience and a distraction from a more authentic mode, while care in another mode – namely, in that of questionability – is basic to authenticity. Dasein’s caring with a directedness exclusively towards worldly contents, and an ignoring of the being of its own self in the process, is inauthentic. Indeed, inauthentic caring is marked by Dasein’s distinct lack of self-care.38 Authentic self-care and care for others, for Heidegger, are related insofar as Dasein’s caring for others requires Dasein’s self-care. As Vogel describes it, care for others “involves an attunement to the particularity of others as truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity of one’s own existence…It is on the basis of an authentic self-relation that
one is able to reach out to others as other”. 39 Although it is true for Heidegger that such care for others is made possible by Dasein’s self-care, Heidegger is careful to emphasize the way in which others do not play a role in the development of Dasein’s own authenticity. As he states, “Individuating is a way in which the ‘there’ is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the issue” (BT 263). Put differently, in those situations where Dasein’s authenticity and ownmost possibilities are at issue, which is to say in circumstances of self-care as conceived here, Being-with Others will not assist Dasein in its development of those possibilities. Rather, such self-care towards Dasein’s ownmost possibilities is to be developed despite the lack of assistance gained in Being-alongside and Being-with. These Being and Time passages, along with Vogel’s explication of them, establish the interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of authentic self-care as a condition for Dasein’s caring for others.

Having considered this conclusion in light of Heidegger’s account of authentic care in the pre-Being and Time texts as I established it above, I would claim that Vogel’s reading of care in Being and Time is confirmed and strengthened. Heidegger’s texts stress the notion of self-care as a crucial condition of care for others. Heidegger’s consistency on this point further validates the claims made by Vogel and other Heideggerians who take up this position. As Vogel says, “One’s own authenticity is the condition for the possibility of treating others as ends-in-themselves in the deepest sense”. 40 Beyond this, however, I would claim also that these texts shed light on a
specific aspect of the care for others based on self-care, namely, what I call care for others as caretaking.

Earlier in this section, I cited Heidegger as characterizing human beings as those who “can take in care, and have in care”. This is, I argue, a relevant insight into care for others in Being and Time. In a section on Dasein and care in Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein as being “ahead of itself…not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards…itself” (BT 192, original italics). There is a relevant parallel to be drawn between Dasein’s being ahead of itself, and Dasein’s leaping ahead of an other. I understand Heidegger to claim that both in cases where Dasein is caring for another and in cases where Dasein is authentically caring for itself, a fundamental concern remains always for the authenticity of Dasein. That is, in providing care for others, Dasein also implicitly takes care of, and takes care to remember its concern for, its own authenticity. As Heidegger states,

Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concerned Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord.

(BT 263-264, original italics)

As Heidegger crucially describes, even as the mode of caring for others, “Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein’s Being…bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with its authentic Being towards itself” (BT 122). This is to say
that, in keeping with my interpretation, Dasein’s care for others remains both based upon, and directed towards, a concern for its own authenticity. As Heidegger emphasizes in this passage, even as one who cares for others, Dasein is most importantly caring for its own authenticity.

This is to deny neither that care for others can take place in this framework, nor that Dasein’s care for another can be of genuine assistance to the other. Vogel gives examples of the “good teacher or therapist” who “cares for the other’s becoming”. 41 He goes on to state the following: “That care is inevitably self-related does not imply that it is selfish. That I can only be open to the other’s horizon from one’s own, that my understanding of others in necessarily colored by my own prejudices, does not mean that I cannot learn from another”. 42 I agree with Vogel that Heidegger’s account of care for others, when interpreted in this way, can provide the basis for genuinely helpful relations of the kind he describes. My claim is that the caretaking relation at work here implies both that Dasein’s care for others can be useful to others, and that its care for others is also concerned with a care for Dasein’s own authenticity. This does not imply a pure selfishness. Rather, it acknowledges that Dasein’s concern for its own authenticity may colour the quality or content of its care interactions. There is the potential for this to occur such that this concern will prevent Dasein from engaging in some care interactions which, while potentially of great benefit to the other, would put Dasein (and its authenticity) at risk. Indeed, Heidegger cautions against such types of interactions in stating that, “The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped…Free for its ownmost possibilities…Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite
understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others” (BT 264, original italics).

In caring for others, I take Heidegger (and Vogel’s interpretation of Heidegger which follows) to say that Dasein’s own authenticity is also consistently an underlying object of care and concern. I interpret the early quote regarding taking in care to shed light on this facet of Heidegger’s view. What I have called caretaking signifies, as stated by me above, “Dasein’s care for both self and other, always with a concern for Dasein’s own authenticity”. In caretaking, Dasein cannot be said to carry the concerns of others in the way it would its own. As Taminiaux explains, care for others “cannot possibly consist in sharing [their] preoccupations”.43 Likewise, according to Raffoul, “To transpose oneself in another cannot mean taking the other’s place, that is, for Dasein, taking his or her responsibility”.44 Rather, Dasein cares for others within the framework or the limits of its caring for itself. And, as Hatab describes it, the “structure of authentic care and being-in-the-world implies an ethical bearing of responsive appropriation”.45 Even in responding with care towards others, Dasein’s ultimate bearing remains appropriative. Dasein’s ultimate concern for its own authenticity within contexts of care for others is to be understood as Dasein’s caretaking.

In this section, I have presented Heidegger’s account of authentic self-care and care for others, and have argued that the former should be understood to be a condition of the latter. I have claimed that, on Heidegger’s view, even in caring for others, Dasein maintains a fundamental concern always for its own authenticity, and have suggested that this be understood as Dasein’s care for others as caretaking. In his analysis of Heidegger’s account of care for others, Vogel concludes that what I have now called
caretaking is a sufficient and useful characterization of personal responsibility for the
care of others. In my own critique of Heidegger, I will ultimately depart from this
estimation. In what remains of this chapter, I turn to articulating those aspects of
Heidegger's account which I seek to retain in my own analysis of responsible caregiving,
and those aspects which I instead critique and reject.

V. Singularization and Responsibility

Heidegger's account of responsible Dasein as necessarily singularized is one
which I find useful and seek to retain in my analysis of responsible selfhood. That is, my
characterization of responsible selves will maintain singularization as a necessary
condition of the development of such responsibility. This process of singularization
allows for persons to take on their responsibilities as their own in the relevant sense, and I
will argue that only in understanding one's responsibilities in this way can one become
capable of effectively acting upon them. That is, understanding my responsibilities as
uniquely my own is a necessary condition of my being able to act effectively upon them,
and my singularization is a necessary condition of my coming to understand my
responsibilities in this way. Furthermore, as I will claim in chapter three, the analysis of
responsible caregivers I seek to provide will account for them as necessarily singularized
in the sense provided by Heidegger here. As I will understand it, singularity is a
condition of becoming a responsible caregiver to other persons in the world. An
emphasis upon singularity within my account of responsible caregiving will serve to
ensure that the individual who enacts caregiving receives adequate attention.
An analysis of the importance of singularization should be taken, I would argue, to be a crucial element in satisfactory accounts of responsible selfhood. As I will claim further in chapter three, those persons capable of effectively acting upon their responsibilities are necessarily singularized. In order for my responsibilities to appear to me as indeed my own, and thus as those upon which I as an individual am uniquely required to act, I must approach my responsibilities as a singularized person. Put differently, in order to understand a given responsibility as picking me out as the one who must respond to it, I must be singularized and understand myself to be so. Without such an understanding, my abilities to act upon my responsibilities would be prevented by my inability to understand them as uniquely my own. As is evident in task delegation, if a task is assigned to a group but to no one in particular within the group, it is unlikely to be completed by anyone. If a task is pointedly assigned to one person, it is more likely to be completed, given that the person understands where the responsibility or ownership for the task falls. I have affirmed Heidegger’s emphasis upon the need for singularization in discussions of responsibility, and would argue that the lack of attention paid to the need for singularity within ethical accounts focussed primarily on rationality is a fault of such accounts.

Without this emphasis upon the individual, as I have said, responsibilities could not be effectively acted upon. And, as Hatab points out, “The individuating elements of authenticity are important not only to open up ethical appropriation, but to counterbalance certain forces in the ethical with-world that tend to consume or suppress individuality”. I understand Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s singularization as
necessary to its responsibility to be a fruitful one, and seek to maintain the singularization articulated here within my overall account of responsible selfhood.

VI. Caretaking and Responsibility

While seeking to maintain this form of singularization within my account of responsible selves, I would claim that Heidegger’s account of care for others is problematic and thus should not be maintained. My critical claim is as follows: given the above reading of Heidegger’s authentic self-care and care for others, firstly as the former being the condition of the latter, and secondly as the latter constituting a kind of caretaking, I find the Heideggerian account of care for others to be unsatisfactory. That is, I would argue that viewing care for others as caretaking remains an account too concerned with Dasein’s own authenticity to care adequately for others. My claim here is that Heidegger’s account of care for others, interpreted here as a caretaking, is unsatisfying insofar as it remains too concerned with Dasein’s own authenticity. As Taminiaux states:

Authentic solicitude for somebody else can only consist of helping him take upon himself his care in the ownmost. But if this care (which the other individual is for himself) also entails in the end his resolute confrontation of mortal selfhood, which, in his radical separation and finitude, is non-relational and without a dwelling, then authentic solicitude is a paradoxical relation in that, while seemingly uniting people, it refers them to their radical unrelatedness.47
Clearly, the sense of caretaking in question here is importantly distinct from a sense of Dasein taking responsibility for itself in general; while the latter, as a component of Heidegger's discussion of singularization, is a characterization I would affirm, the former is not.

As I will claim further in chapters two and three, an adequate account of responsible care for others cannot be construed as this kind of caretaking. There, I will argue that the positions on care for others articulated by those writing in the areas of ethics of care and relational autonomy need to be taken into account on the question of the relation between authentic self-care and care for others. I will connect the term caregiving to this ethics of care stance, in contrast to the caretaking I discuss within Heidegger's view. The account of responsible caregiving I aim to articulate in chapter three is not one within which care for others ultimately aims at a concern for oneself. As Frederick Olafson puts it, "What we are struggling with in all [this] is the contrast between a private economy of purposes within which other human beings figure only in terms of the ways in which they can affect our purposes and a genuinely public and mutual ordering of our common life". The account of responsible care I seek to articulate is one which aims at the latter.

I have thus far attributed to Hatab an account of responsible care which understands self-care and care for others to be conditions of each other. Hatab's interpretation of Heidegger's account runs contrary to that of Vogel, which, as I have claimed, I take to be the correct interpretation of Heidegger's texts. I take Hatab to be making two claims: a) Heidegger's texts should be interpreted to have self-care and care for others as conditions of each other, and b) such a view of care is a satisfactory one.
While I have argued that Hatab’s first claim regarding Heidegger is incorrect, insofar as I understand Heidegger to claim instead that self-care is a condition of care for others, I would agree with Hatab’s second claim that a view of care which had self-care and care for others as conditions of each other would be an adequate one. That is, I agree with Hatab’s own claims about an account of care, while disagreeing that Heidegger himself was a proponent of such a view.

Heidegger’s account and Vogel’s interpretation of it, including the characteristic of caretaking developed here in light of the early texts, involve a self-care as the condition for the possibility of caring for others. The caregiving I will suggest as a more useful alternative to Heidegger’s account will claim along with ethics of care theorists that the receiving of care given by others should also be seen as a condition for the possibility of self-care. Thus, only those persons who first receive care from others are capable of understanding and enacting self-care themselves. That is, on the account of care I will ultimately suggest, care from others is seen as a condition of self-care.49

VII. Conclusion

Heidegger’s account of authentic Dasein is partially useful to my overall project of understanding the conditions of responsible selfhood. As we have seen in this chapter, Heidegger claims that in Dasein’s authenticity is a condition of its ability to be responsible, and authentic Dasein is singularized and capable of care for others as what I have termed caretaking. I have claimed that the process of singularization is a component of the authenticity movement that should be maintained as a component of
my account of responsible selves, while rejecting what I understand to be the problematic notion of caretaking. Heidegger’s account has thus proved useful to my project insofar as it emphasizes the singularity of the responsible person. Vogel claims that Heidegger’s account usefully accentuates the personal, rather than the impersonal or strictly rational, components of decisions regarding one’s own responsibility.\textsuperscript{50} With this I agree. However, Vogel goes on to claim that, “Most of one’s responsibilities depend on one’s self-chosen ideals”.\textsuperscript{51} In keeping with my analysis of Heidegger’s account as articulated in this chapter, with this claim, I disagree. Rather, as I shall argue in chapter two, alongside ethics of care and relational autonomy accounts, one’s responsibilities originate more from one’s unchosen social situation than from one’s self-chosen ideals. The process of singularization accounted for by Heidegger becomes crucial insofar as one must enact these responsibilities as one’s own, if one is to effectively enact them at all.
Chapter Two:  
Ethics of Care and Relational Autonomy

Many feminist theorists claim that a person’s relationality is a necessary precondition of one’s ability to act responsibly. In this chapter, I will consider accounts of relationality as provided by ethics of care and relational autonomy theorists in order to determine what aspects of relationality might be necessary to my account of responsible selves.

I will begin by presenting the two feminist accounts of relationality I will investigate in this chapter. I understand both ethics of care accounts and relational autonomy accounts to articulate the crucially relational nature of personal responsibility, and, as such, to fall under the heading of ‘relationality accounts’. To clarify, my intention is to highlight the commonalities of ethics of care and relational autonomy accounts rather than to inconsiderately collapse either into the other, or both into an unfairly over-generalized third. I will summarize the claims of ethics of care and relational autonomy accounts, and will provide reasons for my considering both as relationality accounts in my consideration of responsibility. I will proceed to clarify the relational theorists’ claim that care from others is a necessary precondition of one’s own self-care, and will consider in detail the problematizing of the traditional concept of the individual as non-relational in these accounts. I will present what would constitute an adequate account of relational responsibility for these theorists. I will then provide my own analysis of these components of relationality accounts in light of my project. I will claim that the relationality account of care from others as a necessary precondition of self-care should be maintained in my own account of responsibility. I will claim that, on
my account, just as care from others is a necessary precondition of self-care, so too is relationality a necessary precondition of responsibility. I will also argue, however, by means of clarifying the form of relationality I wish to maintain, that the problematizing of the notion of the individual present in the relationality accounts I cite may itself be problematic. That is, I will argue that an over-problematizing of the autonomy of individuals is unhelpful to an adequate account of personal responsibility, and should be avoided. I will conclude this chapter by summarizing my claim that while acknowledging relational care is necessary to my account of one’s responsibilities to care for others, what I consider to be an over-problematizing of the individual is not. Given the analysis of singularization as a necessary precondition of responsibility provided in chapter one, I will then be prepared to argue in chapter three that a certain combination of both authentic singularization (chapter one) and relational care (chapter two) will constitute the account of responsibility I aim to articulate in this thesis.

I. Relationality Accounts

The relationality accounts I consider here hold that all persons importantly approach their lives from a necessarily relational perspective. That is, persons are necessarily social, and always begin their interaction with the world from their inevitable social involvements. As Marilyn Friedman claims, persons “begin in interrelationship with and dependence on other persons”. As Patricia Benner and Suzanne Gordon put it, “human connectedness...[is] the very essence of being human”. Relationality theorists share the assumption that persons begin and remain in a state of social involvement, and thus that interpersonal involvements are neither originally chosen nor ultimately
refusable, but rather inevitably negotiated. The “natural” state of humans is one of sociality. As Nel Noddings claims, “I am not naturally alone. I am naturally in a relation from which I derive nourishment and guidance...This is my basic reality”.\textsuperscript{4} The inevitability of interrelationship provides what becomes a useful focal point of these relationality accounts – namely, attention to the social situatedness of all persons, and thus the need for all moral discourse, if it is to be relevant, to remain accountable to such situatedness. As Margaret Urban Walker states, “I begin in the middle, as we all in fact do”.\textsuperscript{5} Alison Jaggar describes these relationality theorists as those who “try to be conscious of the assumptions and implications of our own ethical theorizing, including their practical consequences” and “seek to produce ethical theory that [they] acknowledge to be partial and provisional from [their] own explicitly situated perspectives”.\textsuperscript{6} Given the theoretical understanding of social embeddedness as basic to their descriptions of persons, both ethics of care and relational autonomy theorists make efforts to consistently acknowledge their work as that of socially embedded selves.\textsuperscript{7}

Ethics of care accounts move from the fundamental assumption of necessary social embeddedness to an understanding of the self as needing to respond to those around us. Persons engage with each other by means of a variety of concretely interdependent relationships, according to ethics of care accounts, and in order to participate in the process of their own developments, they necessarily respond to the likewise developing others around them. As Walker states, “We are obligated to respond to particular others when circumstances or ongoing relationships render them...dependent on us”.\textsuperscript{8} Throughout ethics of care accounts, interdependence rather than independence is emphasized. As Carol Gilligan explains, “Care is grounded in the
assumption that self and other are interdependent, an assumption reflected in a view of action as responsive and, therefore, as arising in relationship. When we understand interdependent relationships as given within the lives of all persons, we can more readily characterize the relationships of providing care to others to be a matter of responsiveness. As Noddings understands it, "Caring is largely reactive and responsive." Just as our relationships persist over time, so too should our responsibilities regarding care be understood as on-going. Certainly, our concrete responsibilities of care to and for specific individuals will change in the course of changing relationships. However, ethics of care accounts aim to accentuate the prevalence and necessary persistence of the moral obligation to care for specific others. Put differently, and as we shall see more clearly in what follows, ethics of care accounts make two primary claims: first, these accounts claim that the care received from others is a necessary precondition of one's ability to care for oneself and to develop as a person. Second, ethics of care accounts make the normative claim that persons ought to enact care for others within the social situation. That is, persons both require care from others, ontologically speaking, and are required to give care to others, normatively speaking. The normative requirement articulated within ethics of care accounts is not to be codified or accounted for similarly within all situations. Rather, given the nature of caring relationships, acknowledged above to be varied and changing, ethics of care theorists accentuate the flexibility inherent within the requirement. As Noddings explains, "To care is to act not by fixed rule but by affection and regard." Ethics of care accounts aim to chart the moral landscape of responsibility to others by drawing upon the widespread practices of care common to many everyday life situations.
In her article "The Problematic Normative Assumptions of Heidegger's Ontology," Tina Chanter characterizes what she takes to be "the most important achievement of care ethics" as:

its legitimization of...the idea that the values that have been enshrined in traditional moral theories, such as justice, rationality, and rule-governed behaviour, tend to privilege an approach to ethics that comes more readily to boys than to girls. Not only are the values celebrated by Enlightenment thinking (autonomy, individuality, and reason) typically assumed to constitute and shape the moral fabric of society, they are also assumed to be neutral, objective, and universal, when in fact, feminists suggest, they embody a view that is biased toward a masculine point of view.\(^\text{12}\)

Ethics of care theorists understand themselves to be working in a theoretical context wherein the need for care and the reality of mutual dependence is vastly underestimated, and largely ignored. "Reciprocity, mutuality, the impact and mutual influence of relationship between persons, and the larger context in which caring occurs is overlooked".\(^\text{13}\) Ethics of care theorists, working out of the feminist philosophical tradition, argue that predominantly non-care focussed moral discourse is problematically masculinist, and thus insufficiently attentive to what is often referred to by them as the "feminine" experience of morality and responsibility. Ethics of care accounts are thus commonly aligned with the feminine experience of morality, insofar as care is claimed to be for the most part enacted by women. Noddings claims that her ethics of care account is "feminine in the deep classical sense - rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness",\(^\text{14}\) claiming that women "remain in the situation as sensitive, receptive,
and responsible agents”\textsuperscript{15}. As Jaggar characterizes them, ethics of care accounts contend that “attention to women’s moral experience advances values that are ethically superior to those characteristic of modernity and [foster] more adequate conceptions of moral subjectivity and moral rationality”.\textsuperscript{16} Such values are taken to include those of care, empathy, and understanding. Though she clearly expresses ethics of care accounts as those which privilege traditionally conceived women’s roles over those of men, Noddings does provide the following disclaimer regarding her conception of them: “It should be clear that my description of an ethic of caring as a feminine ethic does not imply a claim to speak for all women nor to exclude men”.\textsuperscript{17} Rather, the effort is made within these accounts to bring to light activities of caring traditionally deemed feminine, to counter and potentially improve upon ethical accounts based solely on traditionally male experiences, and to attempt to provide an account of moral responsibility as care which would be effective for all persons. Noddings suggests that “a powerful and coherent ethic and, indeed, a different sort of world may be built on the natural caring so familiar to women”.\textsuperscript{18} Broadly speaking, as Jaggar describes it, “values hitherto associated with the private domain should become more prominent both in ethical theory and society at large”.\textsuperscript{19} Noddings claims that women “seem to approach moral problems by placing themselves as nearly as possible in concrete situations and assuming personal responsibility for the choices to be made”.\textsuperscript{20} As will become more evident in what remains of this chapter, I am particularly interested in the sense of responsibility at work in ethics of care accounts. These accounts argue for a more thorough recognition of the role care should play in moral discourse.
Just as ethics of care accounts call for a reconsideration of responsibility given relationships of care, relational autonomy accounts call for a reconceptualizing of responsibility given relationally developed capacities for autonomy. Accounts of relational autonomy challenge the traditional notions of autonomous agents by emphasizing the process of a person’s gaining autonomy as being fundamentally social. That is, contrary to traditional notions of the autonomous agent as self-determining, thoroughly self-governing, and independent, relational autonomy theorists claim that any relevant notion of autonomy will have to take seriously the social embeddedness of persons, and thus will have to account for the development of autonomy as a socially embedded project. As Friedman argues, “We need an account of autonomy that brings out its relational character”.21 What is needed is “a reconceptualization of autonomy that integrates it with...notions of interdependence and solidarity”.22 Much like the ethics of care critique of traditional conceptions of morality, relational autonomy accounts argue that mainstream autonomy theories insufficiently acknowledge social embeddedness. They argue that “those conceptions ignore the social nature of the self and the importance of social relationships to the projects and attributes of the self”,23 which leads to conceptions of autonomy which promote such troubling traits as “atomistic self-definition, denial of the self’s own development out of and ongoing dependence on intimate personal ties, [and] a disregard for nonvoluntaristic relational responsibilities”.24 Relational autonomy theorists hold the following: to the extent that persons have capacities for autonomy (as qualified relationally), they are not born with those capacities, but rather gain them by means of ongoing social interaction and interdependence.25 As Friedman states:
According to the relational approach, persons are fundamentally social beings who develop the competency for autonomy through social interaction with other persons. These developments take place in a context of values, meanings, and modes of self-reflection that cannot exist except as constituted by social practices.  

Relational autonomy theorists, as will be further clarified in what follows, vary with regard to the extent to which they problematize the notion of autonomy itself. All challenge the traditional notions of autonomy as something, as it were, self-induced. Traditional notions of autonomy which characterize the autonomous individual as static, unchanging and unaffected by temporality are also seriously challenged by these theorists.  

Some argue that personal or individual autonomy itself, even when understood to be relationally constituted, is a less useful conception than one of a more wholly embedded sociality. This will be taken up further in section three of this chapter.

Theorists from ethics of care and relational autonomy backgrounds commonly acknowledge the overlapping aspects of their views, and many have explicitly overlapping areas of research. As Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar put it, “The issues raised by care critiques are therefore to some extent continuous with the project of articulating a relational conception of autonomy as we understand it”.  

Just as ethics of care accounts find the traditional conceptions of autonomy to be problematic, so too do relational autonomy accounts argue for the need to recognize the place of care in morality. In Tronto’s terms, “Caring allows us to see autonomy as a problem that people must deal with all the time, in their relations with both equals and those who either help them or depend upon them”.  

Relationality accounts, as I have characterized them here,
emphasize the need to implement responsibility within concrete, local, socially embedded situations. As Noddings claims, to enact caring “is to act with special regard for the particular person in a concrete situation”. The attention paid within these accounts to relationship, interdependence and sociality within responsible action both connects the ethics of care and relational autonomy accounts to one another, and strengthens their joint initiatives in the realm of moral theorizing.

I have thus far presented the accounts of relationality I will consider. In the next two sections, I will describe in more detail the accounts’ characterizations of care from others as a necessary precondition of self-care, and of problematic notions of autonomy, respectively.

II. Care from Others and Self-Care

These relationality accounts claim that it is necessary to understand the care persons receive from others as a precondition for the possibility of those persons exercising self-care, care for others, and autonomy, more broadly speaking. In making this claim, these theorists draw upon considerations of personhood from a number of disciplines such as psychology and sociology, among others. The underlying assumptions of relationality present within these accounts have been briefly explained above. I am interested now in investigating the specific claim that care from others is a necessary precondition of self-care. This differs importantly from Heidegger’s claim, as presented in chapter one, that, if it is to exercise care for others, Dasein must first care for itself; for Heidegger, self-care is a necessary precondition of care for others, rather than care from others as a condition of self-care. As will become clearer in what follows, I
aim to consider the relationality accounts' claim of care from others as a necessary
precondition of self-care in order to facilitate investigating a way in which, in my own
account of responsible selfhood, both self-care and care involving others may be
necessarily involved.

As Benner and Gordon characterize it, the care received from others is required
for the creation of autonomous individuals. To elucidate this claim, some relationality
theorists have made efforts to distinguish the separate parties and activities involved in
caring relationships. Tronto draws a preliminary distinction between caring-about and
caring-for, with caring-about generally being a care directed at objects, and caring-for
being the interpersonal caring which concerns us here. Noddings further distinguishes
between parties of caring relationships as the one-caring and the cared-for, while
maintaining that “the one-caring and the cared-for are reciprocally dependent”. This is
to say that, according to these theorists, while the parties within relationships of caring
are, at least commonly or in analyses of specific caring actions, distinguishable from one
another, there nonetheless remains an important relationship of reciprocity. Thus, while I
(the one-caring) may be the one acting in a caring manner towards another person (the
cared-for), the movement of impact is not uni-directional. My giving of care to another
person, on these accounts, results not only in the other being impacted, but also in myself
experiencing impact. Participation in caring relationships importantly shapes all those
involved. As Benner and Gordon claim, “The skills and abilities of the person who is
cared for – their openness and capacity to respond to care – are as important an influence
on the success or failure of the caregiving relationship as the skills of the caregiver”.36
Although the conceptions of interdependence and mutual impact in relationships of care are useful to the ethics of care theorists’ project, I would claim that individual relationships of care would be better described as asymmetrical than, as Noddings claims, reciprocal. Though compatible with the interdependence described, there is a distinct asymmetry within individual situations of care in the following sense: although the one-caring does, in some sense, need or depend upon the cared-for in order that he or she be able to do the caring at all, the one-caring does not need the cared-for for his or her responsible selfhood itself; in the same way that the cared-for needs the one-caring for such selfhood. To be sure, the one-caring must have at some point depended upon others who have cared for him or her, in order to foster his or her responsible selfhood in the first place. This means that a person involved on either side of these caring relations is also, at different times, on the other side of the asymmetry. Therefore, while the system of caring relations may be considered symmetrical overall, the individual instances of care themselves are asymmetrical instead.

The claim of interdependence is crucial to the relationality accounts’ stronger one that persons are shaped into personhood by means of their involvements in relationships of care. It is through “being cared for by others that we are able to live, to know, and to allow things to show up, to matter in the world”.

According to relationality accounts, interdependent relationships of care provide the necessary conditions of the development of socially embedded persons within the world.

In making the development of persons possible, the care one receives from others allows for the possibility of self-care. As Noddings states, as I “am cared for by [others], I become able to care for myself”. Self-care is not taken to be something made possible
by our having been cared for first by others. It is worth emphasizing again that self-care is understood by these theorists to be significantly distinct from human instincts regarding basic needs. That is, concretely, an infant’s expression of his or her basic need for food or attention is not an expression of self-care. Thus, while simply construed basic physical needs of this kind can be expressed before an infant is impacted by relationships of care, the self-care at issue here, when taken to mean a basic concern for one’s own overall development of personhood, is made possible only after those relationships. One is not born with the possibility of self-care; that possibility emerges in situ. Once persons have become capable of both self-care and care for others, their exercising of those capacities leads them to a more thorough self-understanding. Noddings describes this as follows:

When I reflect on the way I am in genuine caring relationships and caring situations – the natural quality of my engrossment, the shift of my energies toward the other and his projects – I form a picture of myself. This picture is incomplete so long as I see myself only as the one-caring. But as I reflect also on the way I am as cared-for, I see clearly my own longing to be received, understood and accepted.39

As we have seen, then, by means of relationships of care, I not only gain my capacities for personhood, which includes my capability to care for others, and the possibility of self-care, but can also form a clearer sense of myself in the midst of these ongoing and dynamic involvements.40 Barbara Tarlow makes the claim alongside Noddings that, “To be caring of one another provides witness to the sense of community, and of one’s identity as a part of it”.41 Contrary to what may be sometimes assumed about enactments
of care, Benner and Gordon describe care as something less about freedom of choice than about what might be termed situated necessity. That is, given the frameworks of interdependence within which persons are embedded, the care they give to others is not something they are clearly free to withhold. For instance, Benner and Gordon claim that, given relationships between parents and their children, a father who responsibly loves his child cannot freely choose to no longer provide care to that child. Care, in that circumstance, becomes a situated necessity rather than a free choice. To connect this to earlier conclusions, then, by means of relationships of care, I gain my ability to be a socially embedded person, and by means of my social embeddedness, I enact care for some people around me as a situately normative necessity. The relationality theorists I present here thus take “the caring relation as ethically basic”. Given the basic nature of caring within discussions of normativity, “we must consider how the duties of caring for others are given moral significance in society”, and “Our efforts must, then, be directed to the maintenance of conditions that will permit caring to flourish”.

III. Individuals and Interdependence

In keeping with this account of care, the relationality theorists I cite here seek to problematize traditionally individualistic notions of the self as independent and self-sufficiently autonomous. These theorists understand autonomy to require significant revision, in keeping with underlying assumptions of relationality. As Chanter explains it, conceiving of persons “as highly individualized and unique ultimately prejudices...philosophy against a serious and sustained consideration of others”. The description of persons at which these theorists aim is one which highlights traditional
understandings of autonomous individuals as dangerous, and which seeks to replace them with understandings more attuned to the necessarily relational character of personhood. Just as some relationality accounts emphasize caring relationships as required for the realization of self-care, these accounts emphasize "the social context required for the realization of autonomy".48 Autonomy, conceived so relationally, is depicted by some theorists, most notably by Diana Tietjens Meyers, as taking place within the context of intersectional identities.49 Intersectionality involves, in part, the reciprocal interdependence described earlier. Such an intersectionality must be understood as compatible with, and partially constituted by, relations of dependence.50 Broadly speaking, according to these accounts, in order to characterize intersectional identities as potentially autonomous persons, a view of the person as a "self in community",51 or as possessing some form of "autonomy-within-culture" is needed.52 A discourse emphasizing social embeddedness is needed in order for identities to be understood as intersectional, and this useful reconceiving of identities as intersectional will, according to relationality theorists, problematize traditional conceptions of autonomy for the better. On these accounts, the focus upon individuals' autonomies is reoriented to a focus upon the impact of communities and social situations on decision-making processes. That is, the focus is shifted from the person acting responsibly or irresponsibly to the community and social framework which allows the person to act in the first place. According to Meyers, a failure to acknowledge and thoroughly consider the social framework of intersectional identities might undermine attempts to talk about autonomy at all.53 The discussion of intersectional identities is situated in opposition to what are deemed individualistic conceptions of persons. On the relationality accounts, to the extent that
persons can be described as responsible agents, they must first be understood as being intersectionally constituted. That is, insofar as one is capable of autonomous action, one’s autonomy is understood to be first constituted and made possible by one’s relationships of interdependence.

The problematization of the autonomous individual progresses all the more thoroughly within specific characterizations of caring practice. On these accounts, the emphasis upon care from and for others is primary, and traditional conceptions of autonomy or self-interest are criticized. As Benner and Gordon describe it, “Extreme individualism and a disillusioned utilitarian view of the insular autonomous self undermine a sense of connectedness, community, and caring practices in all spheres”.54 Caring practices, according to some of these accounts, require an emphasis upon relations between people, rather than upon the self. As Tronto says, “To think of the social world in terms of caring for others radically differs from our present way of conceiving of it in terms of pursuing our self-interest”.55 According to her, “At the moment when one wishes to care, it is impossible to be preoccupied with the self”.56

In discussing interviews conducted with women in the process of considering abortion, Carol Gilligan notes the repeated juxtapositioning of what the women took to be the responsible decision regarding care with what they took to be selfish.57 Such juxtapositioning cuts the dilemma both ways: in some cases, women felt that choosing to continue the pregnancy would be the most responsible or morally sound decision, while their self-termed selfish desire was to opt to abort. In others, women felt that continuing the pregnancy would fulfill their own selfish desires, while choosing to terminate it would be more responsible for other reasons. Most significant for our purposes,
however, is the frequent dichotomization of responsible care and selfishness itself. This is accounted for by some relationality theorists in the ways demonstrated by the above passages. The strong claim of some ethics of care theorists is that care for others requires a distinct move away from a focus upon the self.\textsuperscript{58} In Noddings' terms, "When I care, I realize that there is invariably [a] displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other".\textsuperscript{59} Such is the nature of the caring "engrossment" described in an earlier quote of hers.\textsuperscript{60} For Noddings, one's responsibility to care for another requires this displacement of interest and engrossment. As Friedman further characterizes it, a focus "on one's own needs and interests while ignoring our legitimate responsibilities to others...is to exhibit an excessive individualism that is morally culpable".\textsuperscript{61} Thus, as Noddings puts it, "Caring is always characterized by a move away from self".\textsuperscript{62}

The problematizing of notions of the individual self in what I have called relationality accounts thus occurs in two main senses. First, the conception of the individual as thoroughly independent and autonomous is understood to be a mischaracterization, insofar as persons develop the capacities for social interaction, care for others, and self-care only by means of receiving care from others in the first place (section two). Second, what is taken to be excessive focus upon the individual who cares for others is criticized, and an account of caregiving as enacted by intersectional identities, and as focussed on the other rather than the self is established as the more useful one (section three). In the final sections of the chapter, I will provide my analysis of the claims made by these accounts, in light of my own account of responsible selves.
IV. Relationality and Responsibility

The relationality accounts I consider here rightly emphasize the need to hold relationality as a necessary precondition of responsibility, and care from others as a necessary condition of self-care. In the account of responsibility I aim to articulate in this thesis, I wish to include the articulated relationality as a necessary precondition of responsible selfhood. The accounts of relationality presented in this chapter thus far are right to claim that traditional accounts of responsibility inadequately consider the role one’s social embeddedness plays in one’s ability to act responsibly, and they are right to present only views which actively account for this embeddedness as adequate ones. That is, I would claim that the efforts made by these theorists to involve in all their discussions of responsibility the presumption of relationality are useful ones. In this regard, these accounts, taken together, constitute what I take to be a crucial contribution to moral theorizing. The already characterized accounts of relationality as necessary to responsibility, and care from others as necessary to self-care, should both be maintained in my account of responsibility, insofar as I will argue that relationships of care from others are necessary to the development of my capacities for acting responsibly. I take the focus upon, and articulation of, relationality and care from others as necessary to one’s ability to be responsible to be positive features of these accounts, and the way in which I intend to integrate them into my own account will be further elucidated in chapter three.
V. Individuals and Responsibility

While I intend to maintain some features of the relationality accounts I have just articulated, I take what has been described as the problematizing of individualistic notions of the self to in fact be an over-problematizing, and, as such, to itself be problematic. I would argue that the extent to which the self-as-individual (with accompanying notions of autonomy and independence, to some degree) is problematized within these accounts actually causes these accounts to run the risk of being counter-productive to the ultimate goal of responsibility. That is, I would ultimately claim that overly criticizing individualism within accounts of persons is dangerous insofar as some degree of individualism should be maintained in an adequate account of responsibility. I will explain further my criticism of the relationality accounts now, before proceeding to articulate my own account in chapter three.

Though the relationality accounts sometimes claim that they recognize the need to present both the individual and the community of relationships as important components of responsibility, as I have tried to show in this chapter, it seems the accounts instead cause the former to be eclipsed by the latter. While Noddings claims that “Caring is...both self-serving and other-serving”,63 and is thus something which “preserves both the group and the individual”,64 as we have seen, the thrust of her descriptions of caring are overwhelmingly other- and group-focussed. Although Meyers claims also that “The care perspective in no way neutralizes concern with one’s self”,65 her analysis of identities as thoroughly intersectional and her strong claims about notions of individual autonomy as problematic, like those of Noddings, seem to overshadow concern with the individual. My claim, then, is that, even when select theorists within the relationality
accounts draw attention to the need to recognize the individual self, the framework of their theories precludes any kind of serious recognition or characterization. Recall the strength of emphasis upon notions of the individual as problematic as expounded in section three. Consider also the claims that “Caring involves stepping out of one’s own personal frame of reference into the other’s”; 66 and that “A caring relation requires the engrossment and motivational displacement of the one-caring”. 67 The kind of responsible caring put forth by these accounts is one which emphasizes the move away from the self at the expense of any sufficient recognition of the self doing the caring. These accounts problematize notions of the individual to such an extent that they ignore the following possibility: the very singularization of the individual self might itself be necessary to any self caring responsibly for another. I take the overriding of this potentially helpful characterization to be a fault of these accounts. To be sure, I would claim that it is necessary to closely investigate notions of the autonomous self as potentially involving unrecognized and harmful biases, or as insufficiently recognizing the social conditions required to the development of individuals. This is also to say that attention must be paid to the detrimental effects of oppressive circumstances of the development of individuals and their autonomies. I applaud the efforts made by these relationality accounts in these directions, especially as they are so often the first to chart this complicated territory. However, recognizing much of the traditional depictions of individuals and their autonomy as deeply problematic should not necessarily lead to what I take to be an over-problematizing in some of these accounts. 68 I would claim that too thorough an understanding of the self as intersectional might run the risk of overlooking the possibility of singularization, which would, as I will argue, work against rather than
towards what I take to be an adequate account of responsibility. Thus, I wish to criticize
the characterization of responsibility as necessarily requiring a thoroughly problematized
notion of the individual, and of care as involving one whose focus on the needs of the
other is incompatible with some focus upon him- or herself.\textsuperscript{59} As I will explain further in
chapter three, responsible care for others should not be taken to exclude the possibility of
recognizing a singularized, individual self. Indeed, on my account, the possibility of a
responsible self will actually depend on one.

VI. Conclusion

The relationality accounts I consider here are partially useful to my project of
depicting the conditions necessary to becoming responsible selves. As I have presented
them in this chapter, these accounts claim both that the social embeddedness of persons
allows for the possibility of their responsibility, and that the care received from others
makes possible one's own capacities to care for others and oneself. I have affirmed these
claims insofar as they will play crucial roles in my own conception of one's
responsibilities to care for others. In addition, these accounts criticize notions of the
individual to what I claim is a problematic extent, and, as I have argued here, to the
potential detriment of an adequate conception of responsibility. I agree with Sarah Lucia
Hoagland's claim that "If an ethics of caring is going to be morally successful... it must
acknowledge a self that is both related and separate."\textsuperscript{70} As I have argued in this chapter,
it seems that while the relationality accounts I have considered acknowledge the former
well, they insufficiently account for the latter. As I will claim in the final chapter, rather

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than viewing caring relationships and singularization as mutually exclusive, the
exercising of capacities for care should be understood as giving persons a more
immediate sense of their own singularization, and the care received from others as
making possible the process of singularization in the first place.
Chapter Three:
Singularity, Relationality, and Responsibility

The account of personal responsibility to others which I seek to present here combines the positive aspects of the singularization and relationality accounts presented thus far. In this chapter, I draw connections between these views, often held to be in opposition, and flesh out my own account of the conditions of responsible selfhood.

I will begin by outlining how aspects of singularization and relationality are connected in my account of responsibility. I will describe the ways in which the positive aspects of these accounts can be understood to supplement rather than oppose one another, the way in which they jointly contribute to my account of responsible selves, and the sense in which these accounts are beneficial to my project only when taken together. I will then present a normative implication of my account of responsibility, namely, what I have called responsible caregiving. I will establish what I mean by this term, what the process of such caregiving would entail, and what would constitute its ultimate object. That is, I will characterize what responsible caregiving would mean for those involved in its enactment, contrasting this form of care for others with a view of care described in chapter one as caretaking. I will proceed to a consideration of some possible practical implications of my account, using a concrete example of the process of responsible caregiving to clarify my view. I will conclude by reiterating what I understand to be the strength of this account of responsible selfhood. As I see it, the account of responsibility I provide here is one which more accurately reflects the way in which persons develop capacities for responsible action, and the ways in which healthy caring relationships take place in the world than either of the two views characterized here does in isolation.
I. Personal Responsibility

The account of personal responsibility I seek to articulate here is one which combines Heidegger's analysis of the process of authentic singularization with the relatedness accounts' analysis of the necessary interdependence of all persons in relationships of care. I aim to describe an account of responsibility as something which necessarily involves both of these aspects, which are, on my account, themselves necessarily intertwined. Heidegger's view of the process of becoming authentic and the relatedness view of intersectional identities, as each has been summarized in the previous two chapters, are mutually exclusive. That is to say, when the views are each taken in their entirety, including all the components of each as presented by their proponents, some of their premises oppose each other, and should therefore rightly be understood to be, at least to that extent, incompatible views. My analysis of each account in its respective chapter, however, has made efforts to show that useful claims can be extracted from each view while neither obliging the wholesale acceptance of all the view's claims, nor disrupting the efficacy of each desirable component. That is, I have thus far tried to show that certain aspects of each of the Heideggerian view of the authentic self and the relational view of the interdependent self can be accepted and endorsed while other aspects can be criticized and avoided. In particular, I have argued that while Heidegger's account of the process of singularization should be maintained as a fruitful component of an adequate analysis of responsibility, the Heideggerian depiction of care for others, itself ultimately what I have called a caretaking, is problematic and should therefore not be included in an adequate analysis. Likewise, while I have argued that the relatedness accounts rightly emphasize the need to recognize interdependency
and caring relationships as crucial to the development of responsibility, I have criticized what seems to be an over-problematizing of the notion of the individual in those accounts. I have claimed that the processes of both singularization and social involvement should be understood to be necessary preconditions of one's becoming responsible. It remains now to articulate in exactly what way these two components fruitfully complement each other, and, together, contribute to my view of responsibility.

I understand what I have heretofore characterized as singularity and relationality to be related in the following three ways within my account of responsible selfhood: a) singularity and relationality exist in a relationship of compatibility; b) singularity and relationality are co-implicating; and c) singularity and relationality are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for responsibility. That is, I understand the accounts of singularity and relationality to be compatible, implicated by each other, and necessary and sufficient conditions of responsible selfhood. In claiming that singularity and relationality are compatible, I am claiming that the two, as I have characterized them here, are neither exclusive, nor ones which stand in a dialectical relation to each other. While I have claimed that the views of each as presented in their entirety by Heidegger and relationality theorists respectively are not compatible, I claim that the views as considered and rearticulated by me are compatible ones. In claiming that singularity and relationality are co-implicating, I am claiming that each allows for the possibility of the other. The ways in which I take this to be the case will be explained further in the rest of this section. In claiming that singularity and relationality are severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of responsible selfhood, I am claiming that it is necessary that a person be both singularized and relational in these terms and in combination, as
characterized here, if one is to be a responsible self. The relationships between singularity, relationality and responsibility will be explained in greater detail in what follows.¹

On this view, the care one receives in relationships with others allows for the possibility of one’s singularization. That is, the relational account of persons as gaining the capacities for personhood only by means of interpersonal relationship and the care they receive from others applies similarly to the capacities of persons to become singularized. The process of singularization should be understood to necessarily take place within frameworks of social interaction; only by means of social interaction can one become comprehensibly differentiated from others, and only by having received care from others can one understand those others as having each enacted responsibilities as uniquely his or her own. The relational accounts provide a more adequate explanation of personal capacities for singularization than does Heidegger, while Heidegger’s depiction of the process of singularization itself is, as I have already claimed, a necessary but not sufficient one. Thus, drawing upon relationality accounts, I would argue, broadly speaking, that persons gain the capacities for singularization from involvement with other persons who, as a result of care received, are themselves singularized. This remains compatible with Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s singularity in the face of its own death, and, as will be explained later, in the face of responsibilities which are uniquely its own. To say that persons come to the capacity for singularization by means of social involvement and relationships of care is not to deny the possibility of their singularization. Rather, the process of singularization of persons existing within a framework of sociality should be seen to remain a process which leads persons to having
to face certain possibilities alone and as their ownmost ones. The relationality accounts can supplement Heidegger’s description of such singulization by clarifying the way in which persons come to view singularity itself as one of their most important possibilities; namely, by means of their involvements with other persons, and by the care received from them. Relationality is necessary for singularity. Likewise, by virtue of their coin-implicating relationship, the process of singulization allows for one’s ability to act within contexts of relationality. As we have seen, given the ways in which relational action requires the ability to respond to other persons as Others, and to respond to their needs as distinct from one’s own, a sense of differentiation is necessary for effective relational action. One’s own singulization allows for the possibility of such differentiation, and for the ability to act upon the needs of others as Others. Singularity is necessary for relationality.

Singularization and relationality combined allow for persons to enact responsibilities as their ownmost ones. On this view, singularization is a necessary component of responsibility insofar as one must act upon his or her own responsibilities, if one is to act responsibly at all. Put differently, I would claim that for persons to act responsibly, those persons must be acting on those responsibilities which they take to be uniquely their own. Only when I understand myself to have a responsibility which is importantly my own will I be able to act upon it, and, thus, to act responsibly. To clarify, this is not to claim that one’s responsibilities are always different in kind from those of others, nor is it to argue against commonsense notions of shared responsibilities. That is, in concrete terms, my claim that responsible acting is always my acting upon my own responsibilities is not to deny that I can describe myself as sharing a responsibility with
another person. For instance, if I had a daughter, and were raising her with her other parent, I could still be justified in saying that I shared responsibilities for her well-being with that other person. My claim is that in order for me to act upon my responsibilities to my child, I must understand those responsibilities to be uniquely my own. The process of singularization allows one to understand one’s responsibilities to other persons as uniquely one’s own, and such an understanding is necessary to acting responsibly towards those other persons. Thus, on my account, the process of singularization is a necessary precondition of responsible action. What can be further noted, and what becomes perhaps more evident in the above example, is that the process of singularization is not sufficient to require us to be responsible to others in the first place. As the relationality accounts hold, persons are necessarily involved in social relationships from birth, and one result of being in a framework of interdependent social relationships is that, just as I necessarily depend on others, so too do others necessarily depend on me. Persons are necessarily involved in relationships of responsibility to others. My claim is not that non-singularized persons remain without responsibilities to others. Rather, I would claim that only by means of one’s singularization is one able to understand his or her responsibilities as uniquely his or her own, or as his or her ownmost responsibilities, and that only by means of this kind of understanding can one enact one’s responsibilities by acting responsibly towards others. That is, only by means of my singularization am I able to respond to my responsibilities as my own, and only by means of this kind of response am I able to act responsibly. I gain the capacities for singularization, as well as the responsibilities themselves to which I respond, by means of my necessary involvement in interdependent relationships of care. As was claimed in chapter two,
responsible care for others should not be taken to exclude the possibility of recognizing a singularized, individual self – the possibility of responsible care for others will actually depend on such a self.

An emphasis upon relationality to such an extent that singularization is eclipsed runs the risk of threatening one’s ability to view responsibilities as one’s own, and thus also, as I have argued here, one’s ability to act on one’s responsibilities. An emphasis upon singularization to such an extent that relationality is eclipsed runs the risk of denying the necessarily relational process of gaining the capacities for personhood and singularization in the first place, and also of ignoring the need to act responsibly towards others at all. A balancing of both singularization and relationality is needed in an account of the conditions of responsible selfhood. On this account, the characterizations of singularization and relationality can be understood to fruitfully complement, and indeed, rely upon, each other in their relations to responsibility.

To summarize, the account of responsibility I seek to articulate here should take the following general form: singularity and relationality, interconnected in the ways explained here, are necessary conditions of responsible selfhood. One’s necessarily relational character, one’s embeddedness in relationships of interdependence, and the care one receives from others allow for the development of personhood, the necessary presence of responsibilities to others, and for the capacities for singularization. One’s singularization allows for the understanding of one’s responsibilities to care for others as uniquely one’s own, thus for the ability to respond to these responsibilities, and thus for one’s ability to be responsible. Further, I understand a crucial normative implication of this process to be what I have termed responsible caregiving. On this view of
responsibility, a normative requirement to act in terms of responsible caregiving follows from the necessary conditions of singularization and relationality. As will be discussed in detail in the next section, by responsible caregiving, I mean giving care to specific others in singularizing ways. In claiming that responsible caregiving is a normative requirement of having become responsible, I am taking it to be the case both a) that responsibility is something to be valued in individuals, both in oneself and in others; and b) that once one has become responsible by means of both singularity and relationality, one should also foster capacities for singularity and relationality in others. As we shall see, one should not only direct such fostering towards those who directly fostered such capacities in oneself (e.g. family members or members of one’s immediate community), but rather towards any specific others. I will explain in more detail what I mean by responsible caregiving in the next section. Suffice it to say for now that what I understand to be a normative call to responsible caregiving follows from my account of responsibility as involving both relationality and singularization in the ways specified above. If one is capable of responsible action in the sense of the combined account of relationality and singularization provided here, then one way in which such responsibility is to be enacted is by means of the provision of responsible caregiving to others.

II. Responsible Caregiving

Responsible caregiving should be understood to mean giving care to specific others in singularizing ways. As such, it will involve the providing of care to those to whom one is responsible, by means of one’s own development of responsibility as outlined above, with the ultimate end of caring for those specific others. On this view, I
enact responsible caregiving insofar as I understand my responsibilities to others to be my own, and enact those responsibilities in the giving of care to specific others. When I give care to others in the sense of responsible caregiving, I am ultimately concerned with enacting my responsibilities to them such that their capacities for personhood, for singularization, and for caregiving are fostered and allowed to flourish. In responsible caregiving, I can myself enact care for others, out of my own responsibilities to them and as a singularized person, without my own needs becoming the ultimate end. I emphasize the ultimate end of the responsible caregiving process for the following reason: I seek to contrast my account of responsible caregiving with an account of care presented in chapter one, namely, Heidegger’s account of authentic care for others as caretaking. In chapter one, I presented Heidegger’s view of Dasein’s capacity to care for others, and argued in light of discrepant interpretations of his view, that Heidegger characterized Dasein’s care for others, even when such care comes to fruitful ends for the others in question, as a care ultimately concerned with the development of Dasein’s own authenticity. I termed this account of care a caretaking, insofar as Dasein is ultimately understood to take care of itself rather than to give care to others, and argued then that such an account of care for others as caretaking was unsatisfying.\textsuperscript{5} Thus, the responsible caregiving I present as a normative implication of my view of responsibility should be understood to importantly differ from caretaking, especially insofar as its ultimate end is the fostering of the capacities of the other, rather than the strengthening of the authenticity of oneself.

I have characterized responsible caregiving as care for specific others in singularizing ways. As described above, I take responsible caregiving to be a normative
implication of singularization and relationality, as necessary conditions of responsibility. It is important to further qualify that by specific others, I do not mean to restrict this normative requirement to caregiving for those persons who first fostered one’s own capacities for responsibility. I emphasize this qualification for two main reasons: first, such a characterization of caregiving would, to some degree, remain a self-directed one, insofar as one might be seen to enact responsible caregiving only to the extent that one ‘owes’ it to those specific others who first gave care to oneself. This would be a mistaken characterization of the normative requirement. Second, and relatedly, the asymmetrical nature of relationships of care (as qualified in chapter two) makes clear that within individual relationships of care, an asymmetry necessarily and appropriately remains. Responsible caregiving within individual relationships will never completely facilitate symmetry within those cases. The only sense of symmetry at work in responsible caregiving is on a broader scale of one gaining capacities for responsibility by means of certain relationships of care, and enacting responsible caregiving for specific others in others. The normative requirement of responsible caregiving at issue involves, I would claim, care as something to be given to all specific others, but individually rather than universally given. Care for specific others in singularizing ways emphasizes the developing singularity of specific others as an important focal point of such care. This is in keeping with the intuition that the responsible caregiving in question is one to be given to individuals, be they strangers or intimates, while not one which can be given to collections of people at once. The singularization or developing singularity of both the one-caring and the cared-for, to use care theorists’ terminology, is a necessary component of this process.
By virtue of this account of responsible caregiving, though the ultimate end of one’s caregiving is the one to whom care is being given, rather than oneself (as was the case in the caretaking account), the importance of the caregiver is not overlooked. I would argue that because of this account’s analysis of the process by which we become responsible in the first place, and in particular because of the emphasis upon one’s singularization as a necessary precondition of one’s responsibility, the singularized self doing the caregiving is sufficiently acknowledged rather than problematically undervalued. Not only is one’s singularization necessary to one’s process of becoming able to act responsibly, then, but a clear emphasis upon the need for such singularization in an adequate account of responsibility is also a safeguard against the danger of insufficiently recognizing the personhood and needs of the caregiver in relationships of care. The caregiver necessarily remains within interdependent relationships of care throughout his or her life, continuing to receive care from others, and continuing to require other caregivers to care for his or her own flourishing. It is thus imperative that the caregiver him- or herself be continually understood as singularized, for without such acknowledgement, his or her own needs may go unnoticed. On this account, a caregiver’s act of giving care to others can allow for a clearer sense of his or her own singularization; when I enact caregiving as an enactment of those responsibilities which are uniquely my own, I can gain a more tangible sense of my ‘ownness’ or ‘ownmostness’, which is to say, of my singularity, in the process. Concretely, as a doctor, the enactment of my own responsibilities of care to my patient can give me a more tangible sense of myself as the one who uniquely has those responsibilities, of myself as my patient’s doctor. Thus, as was stated in chapter two, the exercising of
capacities for responsible caregiving should be understood as giving persons a more immediate sense of their own singularization.

As a clarificatory note, I have made efforts to specify responsible caregiving as one normative implication of certain relationships of responsibility in part because not all of one’s interactions with persons to whom one is responsible involve one having the responsibility to care for those persons. My claims about responsible caregiving as a normative requirement apply to those cases where one does have a responsibility to care for others. This account claims that in all cases where one has a responsibility to care for another, one is required to enact responsible caregiving. Not all cases where one has a responsibility to another involve one having a responsibility to care for that other. As I claimed in the introduction to this thesis, in applying the account of responsibility I seek to articulate here, I am interested in those cases where one’s responsibilities to another do include the responsibility to care for that other. My claim has been that one’s ability to responsibly care for another has both relationality and singularization as its necessary preconditions (in the ways expounded thus far), and that enacting responsible care for others requires that one exercise responsible caregiving.

Alongside ethics of care theorists, I want to clarify what I have termed caregiving as a much more broadly applicable notion than traditional conceptions of caregivers as only those in roles of mothering, nursing, and providing childcare, for example. As I hope to have made clear in my explication of this account of responsibility thus far, a wide variety of interactions wherein one has a responsibility to another can require responsible caregiving. Examples might range from situations of teaching, providing psychological therapy,6 and meeting the material needs of individuals in poverty, to
situations of parenting, providing medical attention, and assisting disabled adults.\textsuperscript{7} Though my focus in the next section will be on clarifying my account of responsible caregiving by means of exploring an example which does involve what is perhaps commonly considered to be a caregiving situation, namely, that of a parent-child relationship, I want to emphasize that this account of responsibility both allows for and requires an expanding of notions of caregiving, both in relatively traditional examples of such caregiving (as will be clarified in the next section), and in non-traditional ones.

\textbf{III. Practical Implications}

An example of the responsible caregiving I have in mind can be found in Amy Mullin’s paper “Parents and Children: An Alternative to Selfless and Unconditional Love,” as well as in her recently presented paper “Love Between Parents and Children: Melding Eros and Agape”. Mullin presents a series of cases of parents providing care to their children, thus taking up what is sometimes construed (potentially problematically) as a typical caregiving relationship. The specific cases she explores, however, are those of mothers with disabilities as the caregivers of their young children, with a focus on infants and toddlers. I will present Mullin’s account of these relationships of care, and will claim that the relationships she presents allow insight into one way in which my own account of responsible caregiving could be usefully understood and practically implemented. Though Mullin does not discuss responsible caregiving in these terms within these papers, whose ultimate foci are elsewhere, I seek to connect her examples of these parent-child relationships to the account of responsible caregiving I present here, in light of what seem to me to be similarly helpful understandings.
Mullin describes cases of mothers with physical disabilities who provide primary care to their children. The mothers characterized experience a wide variety of disabilities, including blindness, deafness, and those which limit one’s ability to walk or otherwise necessitate the use of a wheelchair, and to different degrees. In all the examples described, however, the mothers’ relationships with their infants or toddlers were affected by their disabilities in ways which became, to a greater or lesser extent, clear. The points made which will prove most relevant for my purposes here were those referring to the unique ways in which the children of these mothers responded to their mothers’ particular needs, and the way in which their reactions can be understood to be a reflection of what it means to enact responsible care.

The ways in which these mothers provide care to their children might differ appropriately given their specific needs. For instance, a blind mother might navigate giving her infant a bath differently from one who is not blind, a deaf mother might plan for the night time feedings of her newborn differently from one who is not deaf, and a mother in a wheelchair might pick up her toddler from a changing table differently from one who is not in a wheelchair. However, the (often unnoticed) ways in which the very young children of disabled mothers respond uniquely to their mothers’ disabilities are especially telling. Mullin describes, among others, studied cases of infants stiffening their bodies in ways which will allow for their mothers to lift them with one hand or from wheelchairs, young toddlers pointing to ringing telephones upon realizing that their mothers cannot hear them, and toddlers guiding their blind mothers’ hands to given objects. As Mullin explains the relevance of these sorts of cases:
Awareness of the other person’s particularity, responding to him or her as an end and not merely a means, recognizing that the other person has interests, giving those interests some weight, and valuing the relationship...[these qualities] could manifest in the emotional and physical responses of even a very young child.  

Mullin understands these and other cases to be examples of the ways in which those for whom one is caring can also contribute to the flourishing of the caregiving mother by acknowledging and responding to her particularity in tangible ways. She characterizes the parent-child relationship in this way:

Parents and children manifest their understanding of one another as unique, irreplaceable individuals, with identifiable needs and interests through their interactions with one another...It is not selfless love or self-sacrifice that we should want from parents. Considerable giving will be called for...but both parties in flourishing relationships will give and receive.  

Given the examples briefly provided here, I would claim that we can conclude that these mothers are enacting responsible caregiving towards their children by means of considering a number of factors. They are understanding their responsibilities to their children as their own and are acting upon them. As I have described it, both relationality and singularization are preconditions of their abilities to act responsibly, and they are enacting responsible caregiving as I have clarified it here. They are giving care to others both with a clear sense of their own singularity in so doing, and with the flourishing of their children as the ultimate end. Their character as distinctly singularized caregivers is especially clarified in these examples insofar as not only their responsibilities to care for
their children are uniquely their own, but even their concrete methods of caregiving uniquely distinguish them from others, insofar as their disabilities often require innovative methods of completing caregiving tasks. The ways in which the infants and toddlers respond to their mothers, often by uniquely shaping their physical movements to respond to the particular needs and disabilities of their mothers, highlight the way in which relationships of responsible caregiving involve a keenness to both of the singularized, particular individuals involved. This is by no means to claim that attention to the singularity of both caregiver and cared-for is only evident in these rarer situations of responsible caregiving, involving such circumstances of disability or difference. Rather, I understand these examples to be particularly helpful insofar as they allow for the emphasis upon singularity in responsible caregiving to show up more clearly. As I hope to have shown in this chapter, along with one’s necessarily social character, one’s singularity is of consistent importance, both in becoming capable of responsibility, and in responsible caregiving’s enactment.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that an adequate account of responsible selfhood must be understood to involve two necessary preconditions, namely, interdependent relationships wherein care is received from others, and a process of singularization whereby one comes to an understanding of one’s responsibilities as one’s own. I have claimed that these two conditions, interrelated in the ways specified in this chapter, are necessary both to responsible selfhood generally, as well as to its specific application in considerations of one’s ability to responsibly care for others. I have claimed further that
one implication of this account of responsibility is the call to what I have characterized as responsible caregiving, and I have provided a concrete consideration of what such caregiving might entail. In her consideration of embodied relationships of care, Barbara Tarlow claims that "Successful caring relationships...balance closeness and solitariness." I agree with this claim, and hope to have presented an account of responsible care for others which allows for just this kind of balance.
Concluding Remarks

The account of responsible selfhood presented here is one which takes into consideration claims of both Heideggerians and feminist relationality theorists. I have focussed in particular on Heidegger’s account of the relations between authenticity, singularization and authentic care, and the relationality accounts’ emphasis upon both the importance of interdependent relationships of care and the potential problems with notions of the individual. I have claimed that some aspects of both accounts are useful to my own account of responsibility, while some others are not. Specifically, in chapter one, I argued that the Heideggerian notion of singularization should be seen as a necessary precondition of responsibility, while Heidegger’s account of care for others was ultimately an unsatisfying one, insofar as it constituted what I termed a caretaking. In chapter two, I argued that the relational accounts’ presentation of one’s need for care from others should be maintained in my own account, which holds relationality as a necessary precondition of responsibility, while criticizing these accounts for what I called an over-problematization the notion of the individual. I hope to have shown that the positive aspects of each account which I have fleshed out here are stronger in combination than in isolation. In chapter three, I characterized my own account of the responsible self as having singularization and relationality as necessary preconditions, and as having what I termed responsible caregiving as a normative implication. In cases where one is able to responsibly care for others, given the conditions I have outlined here, one is required to enact responsible caregiving towards those others. Such a caregiving, unlike a caretaking, involves understanding the other person to be the ultimate end, while retaining a clear sense of the singularized caregiver in the process.
In the introduction to this thesis, I posed the following questions as focal points of my consideration: What are the necessary conditions of one's ability to act upon his or her responsibilities, and what can an analysis of these conditions tell us about the nature of caring responsibly for others? I have argued that both singularization and relationality, in the manners I have characterized them here, are necessary conditions of one's ability to act upon one's responsibilities, and that responsible caregiving should be one method of responsibility's enactment. I hope to have demonstrated the ways in which one's own enactment of responsible caregiving can directly impact the capacities for responsibility of others, thus further emphasizing the importance of authentically careful action.
Endnotes

Introduction
1 See in particular the especially useful Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger anthology, published in 2001.

Chapter One
4 See also RL 151-152.
5 Given that Dasein does not start as authentic, but rather only as inauthentic, the following quote from The Phenomenology of Religious Life further clarifies Heidegger’s account of falling: “Precisely in this ‘worldly’ positioning...the self is lost. – The meaning of the authentic fall from the self: this losing or never gaining” (RL 179).
7 The becoming-questionable of authentic Dasein can be compared to Heidegger's characterization of authentic philosophizing in the following quote: “To grasp philosophy authentically means to encounter absolute questionability and to possess this questionability in full awareness” (IA 29).
10 Hatab, Ethics, 77. This tension between socialization and individuation is further effectively articulated by Hatab in the following way: “What is ‘good’ for Dasein is something both inherited and chosen” (Hatab, Ethics, 78).
11 Ibid., 80. The way in which Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s authentic response to its own death here will prove useful to my later establishment and critique of Heidegger’s account of authentic care as caretaking. In particular, the verbs used by Heidegger to describe Dasein’s act of facing its own death here – ‘taking over death’, ‘taking death upon itself’, and ‘taking action’ – and elsewhere will factor significantly within my later argument.
13 Hatab, Ethics, 173.
15 Vogel, Fragile, 95.
16 Raffoul, Origins, 212.
17 Vogel, Fragile, 82.
19 See RL 143 and 145.
20 Raffoul, Origins, 207.
22 Ibid., 67-68.
23 Ibid., 64-65.
Chapter Two

Theorists writing within each of the two fields articulate a spectrum of stances within each area, and there exists fruitfully critical dialogue between the fields themselves. My focus is on the shared ground between the areas because, for my purposes in this thesis, both the aspects of the accounts which I seek to affirm (see section four) and those which I seek to criticize (see section five) are common to the area of agreement between the accounts. Where there are discrepancies relevant to my purposes, I try to acknowledge them.


7 As Frederick Olafor usefully claims alongside these views, “It follows that when in adulthood we pretend to wonder whether there are any minds other than our own, we are in effect trying to call into question something that has enabled us to reach the point at which we can pose this question” (Olafor, *Ground*, 25).

8 Walker, “Picking up Pieces,” 64.


13 Benner and Gordon, “Caring Practice,” 49.


15 Ibid., 42.


17 Noddings, *Caring*, 97.

18 Ibid., 46.

19 Jaggar, “Feminist Ethics,” 359. A number of theorists sympathetic to ethics of care accounts still question, with what seems to me to be good reason, a characterization of these accounts as unproblematically based in feminism. See also, for example, Marilyn Friedman, “Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender.” Though this is a problem worth considering, and, indeed, one which has been well-considered by these theorists among others, the aspects of ethics of care accounts which I wish to retain in my own account of responsibility do not rely upon a strictly feminine conception of morality, so this will be the extent of my considering it here.


23 Ibid., 41.

24 Ibid., 42.


26 Friedman, “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women,” 40.

27 The relational critique of traditional conceptions of autonomous individuals as non-temporal and unchanging is one to which I am especially sympathetic, given the extent to which Heidegger’s depiction of the singularization process depends on both temporality (Dasein in the face of its own death) and change (Dasein as capable of making the inherited world its own), and the extent to which my account of responsibility requires this singularization.


29 Tronto, Joan C. “Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from Caring?” *Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics.* Ed. Virginia Held. Boulder: Westview, 1995. 109. I specify this quote as being in Tronto’s own terms because I will ultimately take issue with seeing autonomy always as a “problem” to be “dealt with”. This quote is otherwise useful in its affirmation of the overlap between ethics of care and relational autonomy accounts, though I will argue against what I take to be an over-problematizing of personal autonomy in section five of this chapter.

31 Gilligan’s groundbreaking In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development serves as one example of this, insofar as it directly engages psychological theorist Lawrence Kohlberg’s work on the moral development of children.  
34 Noddings, Caring, 4.  
35 Ibid., 58.  
37 Ibid., 50.  
38 Noddings, Caring, 49.  
39 Ibid. I am uncomfortable with Noddings’ use of the term “engrossment” as employed both here and elsewhere, and will explain my reasons for finding these sorts of descriptions of care to be dangerous when I criticize aspects of the relationality accounts in section five of this chapter.  
40 Though a person’s uniqueness is not emphasized, and, indeed, is sometimes explicitly opposed, in the relationality accounts I use here, I will argue in section five of this chapter that the exercising of capacities for care should also be understood as giving persons a more immediate sense of their own singularization, and, in chapter three, as making possible the process of singularization in the first place.  
42 Benner and Gordon, “Caring Practice,” 50. Benner and Gordon also interestingly make the claim that, “societies that value individualism and individual freedom paradoxically require the most highly developed, interrelated caring practices” (Ibid., 47).  
43 Ibid., 50.  
44 Noddings, Caring, 3.  
46 Noddings, Caring, 5.  
47 Chanter, “Problematic Normative Assumptions,” 89.  
48 Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships,” 44.  
51 Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships,” 44.  
52 Meyers, Being Yourself, 205.  
53 Ibid., 23. A few relationality theorists discuss in some detail the relation of intersectional identity to authenticity (see Meyers, Being Yourself, 16, 42; Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 24; Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” 101-102), though their understandings of the term tend to differ so greatly from that of Heidegger as presented in chapter one, as to require a significantly different kind of discussion.  
54 Benner and Gordon, “Caring Practice,” 48-49.  
55 Tronto, “Women and Caring,” 113. It is worth noting, as one instance of discrepancy within the proponents of these accounts themselves, that Tronto does challenge Noddings’ view of caring insofar as it might insufficently account for the autonomy of the one-caring (Ibid., 109). To be sure, Tronto’s own account also problematizes autonomy to a great extent, as is evidenced by this quote. Another site of differing understandings centres upon the relational autonomy theorists claims that ethics of care accounts insufficiently account for the complex impact of oppression upon responsible persons (see Jaggar, “Feminist Ethics,” 363, and Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” 10).  
58 This strong claim is neither one which all ethics of care theorists make, nor one which I will affirm in my overall account of responsibility and its caregiving application. Dichotomizing a focus upon the self and a focus upon the other is clearly a problematic move within the context of this discussion.  
59 Noddings, Caring, 14.  
60 Ibid., 17, 49.
Chapter Three

1 It may be objected that my discussion of singularity and relationality, when the former is originally presented by Heidegger and the latter by feminist relationality theorists, is mistaken in considering both as equally important or likewise directed conditions. It may be claimed that these conditions differ significantly insofar as singularity is intended as an ontological condition of responsibility, while relationality is an empirical one, and, as such, the two might be taken to speak past each other to such an extent that my arguments for their co-implication may seem unconvincing. Given the original format and authors of these accounts, such an objection is understandable. However, on the general level at which I am speaking, I follow theorists such as Irigaray in understanding these conditions as the very conditions of the possibility of each other, and therefore not ones which inevitably speak past each other (see Irigaray, Luce. The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. Tr. Mary Beth Mader. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999. 5.). Given such an understanding, not only can these conditions be thought together, but it seems important that they are.

2 I would suggest also that too great an emphasis on relationality at singularity’s expense may lead to the over-dispersion of responsibility among groups of people, such that no individuals feel the need to take responsibility for what may be a dire situation, environmentally, socially, politically, or otherwise.

3 Given the space constraints, it is necessary for me to only acknowledge the impact of the Levinasian description of originary responsibility on my thinking, without summarizing that account here (see especially, Ethics and Infinity and Otherwise than being; or, beyond essence). My understanding of the need to respond to one’s originary responsibility (rather than any more Heideggerian sense of ‘making oneself responsible’; see BT 185, 282) to the other owes a great deal to Levinas, and I understand what I will later describe as responsible caregiving to bear resemblances in intention to his work. Responsible caregiving’s ultimate focus upon the other, rather than upon my own authenticity, is distinctly Levinasian in tone, and perhaps distinctly Derridian in its open-rather than closed-ended character (unlike caretaking, which, as I would understand it, is ultimately more closed than open, insofar as, unlike self-engagement, an engagement with an other who is truly other is always an openness to risk and to the unknown; see Derrida’s Aporias and The Gift of Death in particular). My aim in this thesis is restricted to connecting the Heideggerian discussion of authentic singularity to the feminist relationality accounts’ discussions of care for others. Connecting the latter in particular to the work of Levinas seems to me a potentially fruitful avenue for future work.

4 Hatab usefully characterizes a different but related movement as follows: “Dasein’s ethical authenticity, then, would involve (1) the responsibility of coming to one’s own decision in the midst of thrown involvements, and (2) the temporal openness of bringing to presence future possibilities” (Hatab, Ethics, 175). Given my claims, one of Dasein’s future possibilities could be seen as the possibility for responsible caregiving. As I have claimed, this should appropriately be thought of as one of Dasein’s ownmost.
I hope to have shown that the Heideggerian account of singularization does not necessitate only such a caretaking, but can rather be understood to partially account for what I am calling responsible caregiving. As I claimed in chapter one, however, much of the contemporary Heideggerian literature on the subject interprets the account of care which I have called caretaking to be sufficient. My disagreement with such an interpretation has served to partially motivate my project in this thesis.

Recall Vogel’s examples of the “good teacher or therapist” (Vogel, Fragile, 76), as described in chapter one.

Though my focus in this thesis is on situations of individual caregivers giving care to individual others, I would be interested to see how an account of an individual’s responsibility to give care to non-human others could consistently follow. For instance, it would be interesting to consider whether an individual’s responsibility to care for her natural environment could take the same form of this responsible caregiving; where the natural environment is seen as having provided the individual with her capacities for responsibility and singularization in the first place, and where the individual is called to exercise responsible caregiving for her natural environment, especially in the sense of having the flourishing of that environment, rather than her own development, as the ultimate end of her caring. Work would need to be done to clarify in particular the unique way in which one’s natural environment allows for the capacities of one’s singularization, as distinct from the account I have provided here regarding the social development of those capacities. My aim is not to defend such a view here, but rather to sketch what may be a fruitful possibility.

Mullin clarifies the term “disability” in the following way: “A person is disabled by her impairments when they, in interaction with a particular environment, make it more difficult for her to function in ways open to people without those differences” (Mullin, Amy. “Parents and Children: An Alternative to Selfless and Unconditional Love.” Hypatia vol. 21, Winter 2006 no. 1. 198).

Mullin, “Parents and Children,” 184.

Ibid., 183.

Ibid., 181, 193.

Bibliography


