Contestation vs. Cooperation: The impact of expertise in the policy influence of Social Movement Organizations

Kendra Thayer

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ABSTRACT

Contention vs. Cooperation: The impact of expertise in the policy influence of Social Movement Organizations

Kendra Thayer

This thesis seeks to understand the why some Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) gain greater influence over certain parts of the public policy cycle than other organizations. It asks the following question: Does a more contentious organization have more influence over specific parts of the policy process than more cooperative organizations? To answer this question, a comparative case study of two SMOs is presented, their different characteristics are explored and examples of their actions are analyzed using a framework based on social movement literature including the political process model, political opportunities, and epistemic communities. The various stages of the policy cycle are taken into account when analyzing the policy influence of each SMO. This thesis hypothesizes that a more contentious group will target the public masses and influence the agenda setting stage of the policy cycle, whereas the more cooperative organization will target the sub-government and influence the formulation stage of the policy cycle. It is the expertise and target audience together that determine the point in the policy cycle of policy influence. Through the use of the case study broader theoretical questions regarding social movement theory and SMOs are examined.
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Thank you all.
DEDICATION

To my mother, who has never faltered in saying that I can do anything.

To my father, who has never failed to encourage me to think about everything.
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Chapter 1. Contention vs. Cooperation: The impact of expertise in the policy influence of SMOs

Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) are the basic building block of social movements. To this end, SMOs have been studied and analyzed extensively in the analysis of the greater organisms that are social movements. This study is different from others in that it focuses on the SMOs involved in a larger movement exclusively and largely ignores the movement itself. This is in part to highlight how unique organizations differ from each other within the same movement. Being part of the same overarching movement does not make organizations the same, or even overly similar. While championing the same cause, such as homelessness, organizations may differ wildly from each other in terms of character, behavior, and achievements. These differences matter greatly in an organization’s ability to achieve influence over those political, social, and economic institutions that govern society. Whether an organization has a positive working relationships with state, the public, and other social organizations, or whether an organization considers the state to be its opponent, and displays disregard for pervasive public attitudes and those of other social organizations, the perspective and attitude that an SMO has about such relationships has a large impact of the ability of an organization to impact the political system. Ultimately, social movement organizations seek to impact
public policy, and while this is not necessary the only or main goal of the organization, it is certainly true that people join movements and organizations to change public policies.¹

Cooperative and contentious aspects of the relationships between SMOs and the state are well described in theories of contentious politics. Contentious politics is a concept in social movement literature that is used largely to describe the actions of social movements. Starting with the early studies of Sidney Tarrow on cycles of contention, and continuing with the works of Tilley and McAdam on the dynamics of contention, the body of work dealing with contentious politics has grown, and continues to develop. One area that has yet to be explored is the application and understanding of the concept of contention in respect to individual social movement organizations within the same movement. This paper shows that organizations can be more or less contentious than others, and it illustrates that this difference impacts the influence that individual SMOs have on public policy.

Contentious politics is often used to describe the behavior of social movements; however, it can also describe the relationship that a social movement or, in this case, a social movement organization has with the state. Tarrow defines contentious politics as “[E]pisodic, public collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and

(b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.\(^2\) In this study, the SMOs are the makers of the claims while the government is both a party to the claims and the object of the claim in that public policies are created and implemented by the government, which has its own position on the subject of the claims themselves. The claims advanced by the SMOs would affect the interests of both the SMOs and the government. In addition to the basic elements in Tarrow’s definition, the contentious nature of the interactions between SMOs and the state is defined by the very nature of the actions that comprise the interactions between the two parties. Contentious politics are often marked by contentious actions and behavior that can be described by observers as “unruly,”\(^3\) meaning disruptive. This behavior runs in sharp contrast from more cooperative actions that correspond to the more acceptable standard behavior of a given political environment. The nature of an organization’s relationship with the state, particularly when engaging in claims making and in taking actions for or against the state, affects the SMOs ability to influence public policy in a variety of ways to be further explored in this study.

This study is specifically interested in the public policies related to homelessness such as policies related to housing, health and welfare at all levels of government in Canada. No single governing entity has exclusive jurisdiction over these three policy domains, and as a consequence jurisdictional issues impact both policy and advocacy. To select the appropriate target for claims making means identifying which level of government has


the power to produce the change in policy that an organization seeks. Unfortunately for
SMOs, the level of government administering a policy or policy domain in Canada may
not do so exclusively. For example, housing programs are largely the domain of the
municipalities who are often governed by the rules and expectations of the provinces;
however, funding for housing can, and has, come from all three levels of government.

Government is only one participant in the policy community that develops around
specific policy fields. The policy community comprises of all potential actors and actors
with an interest in a policy area or function who share a common policy focus and with
varying degrees of impact shape policy outcomes over time.4 A policy community
consists, in turn, of the sub-government and the attentive public.5 The sub-government
represents the portion of the government that actively participates in the specific policy
field and as a consequence is relatively small compared to the attentive public that
includes all groups and individuals who are interested in and affected by the policies, but
do not necessarily participate in policy making on a regular basis.6 A SMO may target
both segments of the policy community or only one, but either target can result in policy
influence.

4 S. Wilks and M. Wright 1987b in William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Policy
Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Approach" in ed. William Coleman and
Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policies in Canada: A Structural
Approach (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 25.
5 Paul A. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1992) 120.
6 Ibid., 121.
To achieve policy influence an organization draws on its primary resources. In the case of SMOs with little funding, membership becomes an important resource. Leaders and members contribute their time, knowledge and expertise to the organization and its goals. If an organization has expertise in policy, then it will be better equipped to target the subgovernment. Moreover, a organization's knowledge of the various aspects of an issue, like homelessness, can make it part of the epistemic community surrounding the issue, which is the network of knowledge based experts\textsuperscript{7} that surrounding the issue. Epistemic communities are used by decision-makers to help formulate policies by providing information.\textsuperscript{8} The reliance on knowledge of experts is symptomatic of the professionalization of social movement organizations as described by McCarthy and Zald.\textsuperscript{9} Whereas external scientific expertise has been studied in a variety of public policy related literature,\textsuperscript{10} there has been less work done on the expertise that is housed within the membership of SMOs. This study focuses on the types of expertise found within organizations as represented by the members of the organizations themselves, such as subject matter experts (knowledge based) as well as other types of experts.

It is not only knowledge based subject matter expertise that SMOs have come to rely on, but also political expertise. Professional political organizers, such as leaders working full-

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{10} For example Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination,” \textit{International Organization} 46, No.1 (Winter 1992), 1-35
time for organizations, are another increasingly common phenomena in social movements. Organizers bring with them distinct skills regarding political action and advocacy, but not necessarily subject matter knowledge of the social issue being championed. The reverse is true for knowledge experts who may understand a great deal about social policy and alternatives, but not political actions. Political actions get the attention of the attentive public more than knowledge sharing, which gets the attention of the sub-government and in this way political organizational expertise can be a method to achieve policy influence.

This study profiles two social movement organizations based in the city of Toronto engaging in homeless advocacy. Both groups profiled, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) and the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC) can be placed in the Canadian anti-poverty movement, a social movement whose goal is to address poverty in Canada. While the two organizations work on the same issue within the same movement, they are dramatically different in many ways.

OCAP is a contentious organization, so defined by its clear opposition to the state. OCAP repeatedly positions itself against government policy, and takes actions that go beyond the norms of institutionalized politics. The organization engages regularly in protests, and has lead housing squats and even mock evictions of politician's offices. The members

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11 Institutionalized politics refers to the methods of engaging in political behavior that are deemed standard and legitimate by the dominant political system. This includes behavior such as voting, lobbying, electing members of parliament(s) and political leaders, certain types of protesting, etc. For further discussion see Jack A. Goldstone, “Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics,” in Jack A. Goldstone, ed., States, Parties and Social Movements, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-23.
of the group include students, activists, the working poor, immigrants, and the homeless. John Clarke, the leader of OCAP has been jailed, and other lead activists have faced criminal charges, and the group has even been banned from city hall. Clarke is one of two paid organizers that work for the group, and is inherently political in his expertise in that he has a background in trade unionism and general political activism without any formal knowledge, education or training in other social or political fields of study.

This contrasts sharply with TDRC that is a more cooperative group. TDRC engages in communication and participates in institutionalized politics. For example, TDRC members are part of the city of Toronto's Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated Persons. They have also worked with the city to re-house the residents of Toronto’s Tent City. TDRC members, many with business, social work, sociology and health science backgrounds, have created academic and media reports that include the analysis of housing policies and programs at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels. The organization's website hosts an educational plan for teachers to use to address homelessness and poverty in their classrooms. TDRC members, including those on the executive committee, are rarely paid. The organization's spokesperson, Cathy Crowe, is a street nurse who has sat on the city's Board of Health. They communicate regularly with bureaucrats at city hall. The fact that TDRC interacts with the government, and public, in all these forms speaks clearly to its more cooperative nature.

The Research Question
This paper draws on social movement literature to highlight how organizations differ in their ability to influence public policy. The goal of this paper is to show that different organizations have different influence on the policy process, in part because of their distinct relationships with the state. To do this, a case study of two different organizations within the same social movement is used. Studying groups within the same movement highlights the differences between organizations operating within the same political environment, as well as the impacts of those differences. This choice of comparative analysis highlights the fact that different relationships with the state can impact the influence that organizations have on public policy. The literature on social movement organizations suggests that groups that engage in cooperative institutional politics exert more influence on public policy than contentious groups. This study proposes to take this exploration further by proposing that the notion of 'policy influence' should be expanded to take into account the various stages of the policy cycle. This thesis asks the question: Does a more contentious organization have more influence over specific parts of the policy process than a more cooperative organization?

It is hypothesized that a more contentious group will target the public masses and influence the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, whereas the more cooperative organization will target the sub-government via policy networks and communities and influence the formulation stage of the policy process. It is the expertise and target audience of an organization that together determine the stage in the policy cycle that can be influenced. The distinct traits of an organization determine its ability to gain policy
influence over specific parts of the process; where one group can achieve success another may fail, and vice versa.

Theoretical Framework

This paper relies heavily on social movement theory particularly that associated with the political process model presented by Tarrow, Tilley and McAdam. This includes specific concepts such as contentious politics, and Political Opportunity Structure (POS), developed by Tarrow in the 1980s to refer to “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action.” POS defines the political environment that the organizations operate within. POS is used in this study to help explain how the contentious political relationship that the nature a SMO has with the state impacts its political opportunities and its ability to capitalize on opportunities. In other words, POS helps to explain why policy influence occurs when it does.

This study also uses policy networks and communities literature, such as that written by Coleman and Pross, to help conceptualize and describe the relationship between organizations in a movement, and between organizations and the state. Policy networks and policy communities are two concepts that allow scholars to elaborate on the how an organization influences policy at a particular stage of the process, be it agenda setting, formulation or implementation. By electing to look at what stage of the policy process an organization influences, this study circumvents the problems of measuring success or

failure\textsuperscript{13}, and seeks to place organizations along a spectrum of success by acknowledging that a group may achieve success in one area of the policy process and not in another.

**Methodology**

In this study comparative analysis is used to explore the case organizations. Though still rare in the late 1980s, the discipline has since amassed a greater body of literature employing the comparative analysis approach.\textsuperscript{14} There are multiple benefits to comparative analysis of social movement organizations. First, comparison with an organization that works in the same geographic area, with the same population, and within the same movement, allows for attention to be given primarily to factors such as organizational character (contentious or cooperative), political opportunity structures, policy networks and communities, and outcomes of action. Secondly, the research question itself is set up in a comparative structure making a comparative analysis an essential part of the research.

In terms of data methodology, this study relies on primary documents produced by the organizations, their members, and their leaders. This includes pamphlets, websites, media statements, etc. Secondary sources are also used, such as newspaper articles, online articles, web based information groups, independent institute reports, books, films, and second person accounts of working with either group (as a non-member/outsider).

\textsuperscript{13} As outlined by Charles Tilly in “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements” in ed. Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, *How Social Movements Matter*, (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 253-270.

Interviews were conducted with members of the policy domain (one representing each actor type: activist, politician, and bureaucrat) in order to obtain further insight into the policy networks and communities, and the organizations themselves. Interviews were based on a set list of questions regarding the structure, membership, and relationships with state and other policy community actors. To address privacy concerns no individuals will be identified by name in the body of this paper. Finally, a variety of academic sources were used, such as books, journal publications, etc., for the theoretical framework and analytical components.

**Paper Organization**

This paper is organized in the following manner. This introductory chapter lays out the basic elements and organization of the rest of the study. The next chapter provides an overview of homelessness in Toronto, and explores the issue at the greater provincial and federal levels. This second chapter outlines the evolution of policies related to homelessness, describes the political environment that the actors surrounding the issue of homelessness operate within, and introduces the reader to the two case study SMOs. The third chapter presents a summary of the literature related to social movements. It focuses on social movement organizations and the Political Process model. Key elements of the model are highlighted, including contentious politics. Policy networks and communities are also explored for use in the subsequent analytical chapter. Chapter four presents the case analysis in which the two SMOs are compared. This chapter highlights the dimensions of the organizations' contentious and cooperative characters, and seeks to answer the research questions while providing insight into public policy influence. The
final chapter concludes by highlighting the major findings, limits, problems and pitfalls of the study. This chapter concludes with comments on future possibilities in research on social problems such as homelessness, social movement organizations and public policy.
Chapter 2. Evolution of a Crisis

In 1996, a homeless person dying alone on a rich country's streets was big news. Today, it barely makes the paper. Our sense of outrage is dulled by repetition. The forgotten are common on urban streets.
- Jack Layton, NDP Leader, 2005

The quotation above references a particular period of time when homelessness became an important issue for the city of Toronto. In 1996, three homeless men froze to death on streets of Toronto mere months apart. The deaths galvanized the media and activists, and excited the public and politicians in turn. Over a decade has passed since that time and groups are still working on the issue of homeless in the city. This thesis compares two organizations working on this issue of homelessness in Toronto, and focuses primarily on the period of time from 1996 to 2006. This was an important period of time for policy changes and shifts in the public discourse surrounding the issue of homelessness in the city of Toronto. This second chapter provides a background on the issues of homelessness in Toronto, and the historical development of policy at all levels of the government that led to the homelessness crisis that persists to this day.

The background and history of homelessness presented in this chapter provides a basic understanding of the history of policies and attitudes that led to the emergence of the two

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To this end, it is important to understand basic elements of the policy environment, including the policy communities involved and the policy process at all levels of the government. This includes issues of policy jurisdiction related to homelessness. Housing policy is fundamental to the issue of homelessness, as are policies regarding welfare and health care. The policy areas of housing, health and welfare are governed by the three different tiers of government in Canada. The three tiered government structure in Canada has had impact on the development of social policy and resultant social programs related to housing and homelessness. This section is followed by an examination of the two social movement organizations that make up the case study component: OCAP and TDRC. The characteristics of each group are compared with each other to highlight the similarities and differences between them. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of facts and their importance in addressing the main research question of this thesis.

**Homelessness & Public Policy**

Scholars have written on the issue of homelessness for decades, if not over a century or more, and yet despite countless studies and theories - and public policies resulting for the two aforementioned items - homelessness persists. Despite the years of study, it also remains a problematic social issue to study, in the academic sense, for many reasons. First, homelessness is difficult to track. Issues with tracking numbers of the homeless in a given geographic area include the transient nature of homeless individuals, and hidden homelessness (couch surfing, etc.), which make exact measurements of the number of homeless individuals difficult to determine. A second reason is that homelessness as a
social issue is in reality a compilation of multiple issues. It is not simply poverty, or
homelessness, but also physical and mental health, and hunger, and a variety of different
social issues all of which may or may not be present in each individual case of
homelessness. One of the ways scholars and policy experts get around the complex
nature of homelessness is to simplify it down to a common denominator. In its simplest
definition being homeless means one does not have a house or home. Housing, and
housing policy, became the central focus for those studying homelessness and seeking to
end it. There is no doubt that housing is important, as are shelter systems, food banks,
soup kitchens, drop in clinics and street nurses, because they all represent the basic
elements missing from the lives of the homeless: that is housing, food, and health care.
This study includes references to all three elements; however, emphasis is placed on
housing due to its being the basis for measuring homelessness.

Homeless people are all without a home, or rather as Sabine Springer of the United
Nations Centre for Human Settlements has stated, they are houseless.\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Houselessness} is
a term that best captures the main crux of the homelessness issue, which is that “[w]hile
homelessness is not just a housing problem, it is always a housing problem.”\textsuperscript{18} To
understand houselessness, one must understand the housing system that the homeless are
interacting with. Housing in Canada can be categorized as one of two types: private and
public. Private housing is that found on the housing market, bought and sold as property

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
(Discussion paper, University of Toronto, Toronto, December 2000); available from
http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/researchassociates/Hulch_CountingHomelessPe-
ople.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007, 3.
\item[18] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
by those who can afford it. Public housing is more commonly referred to as social housing, in that it is housing assisted by the government in some way. Social housing, a term officially introduced by the CMHC in 1974, is used to describe forms of publicly assisted housing. There is no single form for social housing, in terms of development and management. For example public, non-profit, and co-op are all fall under the umbrella of social housing, and all have been supported by the CMHC at one point or another.

While social housing is designed to address those in housing need, there are different levels of need according to Canadian policy. The issue surrounding the use and need for social housing begins with the fact that Canada does not have a definition of poverty; instead it defines poverty according to the concept of “low income cut offs”, also known as poverty lines, which group those people that live under strained conditions. As a consequence, over the years housing policies have shifted to address not the poor, but rather those identified as in housing need. The difference between the poor and those in housing need is relative, in that while those in housing need are poor, not all poor would be considered in housing need; each category is calculated differently in that you can be part of the low income cut off group, but not necessarily be deemed part of the population in core housing need. Individuals and families in ‘core housing need’ are defined as “households unable to obtain acceptable housing with heat, running water, and customary

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20 Ibid., 123-124.
amenities at a price not more than 30% of gross household income."  Those in housing need are those who are supposed to benefit primarily from social housing programs in Canada. Social housing is brought about primarily through the direction and initiative of the government in housing policy and programs, and is aimed at providing renters and owners with low incomes aid in attaining and maintaining housing.

Housing policies are often slanted either towards or against ownership or rental of housing. As it has in the past, the current Canadian housing market clearly favors ownership over rental, in that more favorable conditions exist for owners in comparison to renters. Government programs often target owners over renters, in that programs are gears either towards encouraging ownership through purchases, such as allowing first time buyers to withdraw from their RRSP savings without penalties (i.e. Home Buyers’ Plan and the First-Time Home Buyers’ Tax Credit, or programs to assist in the maintenance of housing by owners (i.e. Home Renovation Tax Credit of 2009). It is important to keep this in mind when evaluating how Toronto came to find itself facing the homelessness crisis, and how the organizations profiled in the case study have chosen to respond to this crisis. John Sewell, scholar of housing, and ex-mayor of Toronto, has stated that: "Affordability and housing need are the two bases of almost all housing

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policy and decision-making in Canada.\textsuperscript{25} In general, housing policies in Canada are usually aimed at increasing the amount of housing on the market, or helping specific owners, and not at ensuring as affordable a market as may be desired given the housing need experienced in a given location. Undoubtedly, the lower level of affordability in housing in a city, and the greater the housing need, the more problems and strain a city will face regarding the use of social housing. As more and more citizens struggle to afford their housing, the more taxed a social housing system becomes. Toronto, as we shall see later on in this chapter, has definitely experienced this phenomenon. To understand the evolution of the crisis, it is important to understand the history that led to its creation.

The History of Housing Policy and Homelessness in Toronto, Ontario, Canada

The history of Toronto’s homelessness crisis and housing policy does not begin in the city hall of Toronto, but rather in the Canadian Parliament. While in contemporary times, housing policy has been largely governed by provincial and municipal governments, in the past the country’s housing policy was dominated by the federal government. During World War I until the mid 1930s, the federal government had not yet established a welfare system, and contributed little to the housing market. Housing funding, housing programs, and associated policies were haphazard. The only programs that existed were minimal and were created in response to crisis situations, such as the housing program in

the inter-war period that was aimed as much at addressing trade unemployment as the housing supply problems faced by the poor and demobilized service men.\textsuperscript{26}

The first major federal foray into housing policy was the Dominion Housing Act of 1935 created in response to those Canadians left poor and homeless by the depression. The Act allowed for $20 million in loans and helped to finance 4,900 housing units over three years. In 1946 the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was created as a mechanism to allow the federal government to help produce homes for purchase at reasonable rates. This early period of federal housing policy marked a period in which housing became an important federal policy area moving from a collection of random acts in times of crises to a more stable institution through which to deliver housing policy and programs.

In the 1950s the CMHC encouraged housing construction through different funding ventures,\textsuperscript{27} and as a result social housing improved in leaps and bounds. From the 1950s to the 1960s the CMHC created programs aimed at adjusting the housing market by increasing demand via mortgages, which resulted in 20% of new housing from 1957 to 1969 being financed through the CMHC.\textsuperscript{28} Up until the mid 1960s housing policy was firmly located in the federal sphere; however, this began to change in 1964 when the

\textsuperscript{27} According to some scholars social housing in Canada can be defined as housing that received government funding. See Jeanne Wolfe, “Canadian Housing Policies in the Nineties,” \textit{Housing Studies}, 13(1) (1998): 122.
\textsuperscript{28} Lawrence B. Smith, “Ontario Housing Policy: The Unlearned Lessons,” in George Fallis et al., eds., \textit{Home Remedies: Rethinking Canadian Housing Policy}, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995), 139.
CMHC became authorized to provide loans to municipal and private non-profit corporations for social housing development, which prompted the creation of Provincial Housing Corporations to capitalize on funding and revisions to the federal public housing program.

Beginning in 1971 the federal government began sharing costs directly with some provinces. A significant portion of federal housing policy during this decade remained focused on tax incentives for homeownership, and this trend continued into the 1980s.

The 1980s saw the decline in the number of social housing starts as the federal government turned its attention to intervention in and regulation of the housing market. A 1986 task force announced that the money allocated towards housing subsidies was not getting to those who needed it most. There was a clear need to change the system, and the attitude of the federal government was one in favor of change.

One of the reasons behind the shift in federal attitude towards housing can be attributed to the election of the Conservative party in 1984, which oversaw cuts to the national

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31 Rent Supplement programs provide provincial funding to assist rent for qualifying tenants in qualifying units based on tenant income. See John Sewell, *Houses and Homes: Housing for Canadians*, (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994), 127.
33 Ibid., 141.
34 Ibid.
housing programs of close to $2 billion.\textsuperscript{36} The culminating need for change resulted in a series of agreements in 1986 that formally transferred the responsibility of delivery and administration of new social housing to the provinces and territories, with the exception of PEI.\textsuperscript{37} The event heralded the end of a national housing program, and a clear shift of the housing policy domain from the federal to the provincial level of government. Under the 1986 Federal-Provincial agreements housing became the responsibility of the provinces. The agreements state that provincial governments are to work with both federal and municipal governments to ensure that housing is provided for communities. In addition, the non-profit housing program was to be provincially administered with the condition that they contribute enough funds to increase the total units by 33 percent.\textsuperscript{38} While funding was allocated to housing by the province from 1987 onward, the funding exceeded the number of units actually created.\textsuperscript{39} In other words, the shift from federal to


\textsuperscript{39} Ontario began to put funds forward for non-profit housing programs starting in the 1987/88 fiscal year, and between 1988 and 1992 it provided funding for a total of 66,600 units, though other sources indicate that from 1986 to 1992 only 30,998 units were actually created. See Lawrence B. Smith, “Ontario Housing Policy: The Unlearned Lessons,” in George Fallis et al., eds., \textit{Home Remedies: Rethinking Canadian Housing Policy}, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995), 158-159, and Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association, \textit{Timeline: History of Social Housing in Ontario}, Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association [website on-line]; available from: http://www.onpha.on.ca/AM/Template.cfm?Section=History_of_Non_Profit_Housing&
provincial responsibility did not produce the results it was supposed to, much to the disappointment of those in core housing need.

In 1990, the Liberal party critics for housing, Paul Martin and Joe Fontana, released a report titled *Finding Room: Housing Solution For the Future*, the work of the National Liberal Caucus Task Force on Housing, which spoke of the need for a national housing program and federal policy direction.\(^{40}\) Surprisingly, after the Conservatives lost control of the federal government to the Liberal in 1993,\(^{41}\) the national housing program fared no better; it was publically and officially abolished in 1996, when all social housing administration was transferred to the provinces.\(^{42}\) No other program has since supplanted it. In summary: housing policy shifted from federal to provincial responsibility over the course of five decades.

It is interesting to note that since the transfer to the provinces of responsibility for housing policy, the issue of homelessness became part of the public agenda. In Canada, the “rise of homelessness and the recognition of special housing needs emerged in the

\(\text{Template}=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1897; \text{Internet}; \text{accessed 14 March 2008.}\)


early 1980s . . . " and by the late 1980s the issue was on the public agenda. One of the reasons why the issue became salient is that there were many citizens without housing. To put it in numbers, by the end of the 1980s there were, nationally, somewhere between 130,000 to 250,000 people sleeping outside or in night shelters. In response to the rising political saliency of the issue of homelessness, and in the face of a lack of national housing strategy, the federal government introduced the National Homeless Initiative (NHI) in December 1999 to fund research and pilot programs regarding homelessness.

The NHI still exists as the main federal program relating to housing issues and homelessness. It provides funding for a variety of municipal programs related to shelters, community homelessness programs, and residential rehabilitation assistance. The most important NHI programs for funding for homelessness are the Supporting Community Partnerships Initiative (SCPI) created in 1999 and the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Plan (RRAP). SCPI has become a vital part of the social housing and shelter

landscape, and funding is directed towards “absolute homelessness” with the intention to
"strengthen and enhance existing services and the overall service system."\textsuperscript{48} Both plans
have been thrice renewed for a fixed period (2003, 2005,\textsuperscript{49} 2007).

Federal funding for housing and homelessness is the lifeblood of provincial and
municipal programs; however, simply setting aside money in the federal budget, such as
occurred in the 2006 Conservative budget, has not resulted in funding trickling down to
program administrators. Without adequate funding, provinces and municipalities struggle
to deal with the issues of social housing and homelessness.

Provinces and municipalities need cash to provide housing and homelessness related
services (such as welfare, health care, etc.), but they also need the volition to create
programs and allocate funding to these services. The attitude of the province of Ontario
has had great impact on the rise of homelessness in Toronto, particularly for the period of
1996 to 2006. Activists and scholars both point to the election of the Harris government
as a turning point in the provincial attitude and behavior towards homelessness and
housing. In the interim period between the province taking on the responsibility for
housing and the Harris government’s election there was still forward movement in the

\textsuperscript{48} Commissioner of Community and Neighborhood Services, \textit{Toronto Staff Report Re:
City of Toronto Homeless Initiatives Fund Allocations Report}, City of Toronto, 14
December 2000, 3.

\textsuperscript{49} Michael Shapcott, “Canada’s New Parliament: A Strategic Update on Housing and
Homelessness,” Families Matter Cooperative Inc., 31 January 2006 [website online];
available from: http://www.familiesmattercoop.ca/news.php; Internet; access 12 February
2007.
development of social housing in Ontario. From 1986 to 1992 the province took the lead role in developing 30,998 social housing units aided by the CMHC in offsetting a percentage of the cost under a Federal-Provincial social housing program, though by 1993 the federal government announced it would no longer fund any new social housing.\(^{50}\) Shortly after being elected in 1995 the Harris government abruptly announced the cancellation of the provincial housing program.\(^{51}\) In 1997, the Harris government went further and downloaded the responsibility for housing further by placing it completely onto the municipalities. The trend of changes to the detriment of those in housing need continued in 1998 when Harris introduced the Ontario Tenant Protection Act, under which the Landlord and Tenant Act, the Rent Control Act, and the Rental Housing Protection Act were all repealed, and an end put to the Residents Right's Act.\(^{52}\) These changes were aimed at de-regulating private housing in order to stimulate the private rental market.\(^{53}\) The impacts of the repeals were that evictions rose while vacancy


rates in the city dropped.\textsuperscript{54} After Harris, the province continued to struggle with addressing the needs for social housing and virtually no non-profit housing was developed in Ontario between 1996 and 2000.\textsuperscript{55} The share of rental units built in overall market share in Ontario decreased from 1989-93 to the 1994-98 of 66.7\%.\textsuperscript{56} Over the course of the past decade or so the housing market in Ontario has experienced issues with affordability and accessibility due to low numbers of units in the private market, ands low numbers in the social housing market.

In an effort to help the provinces with the burden of housing various funding agreements between the provinces and the federal government have been signed since 2001, most of which were arrangements were the provinces and federal government each contributed a certain amount of funding for new affordable housing.\textsuperscript{57} Though allocated by the federal

\textsuperscript{54} One of the unfortunate side effects of the repeals was the rise in evictions by 2000 – with more than 60,000 households evicted that year. The vacancy rates in Ontario dropped from 1996 to 2000, and Toronto saw a drop in vacancy rates from 1.2 \% to 0.6\% over 5 years, resulting in a 10 year low. See Michael Shapcott, \textit{The Made In Ontario Housing Crisis, Technical Paper #12}, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/Ontario, May 2001 [website on-line]; available from: http://www.policyalternatives.ca/news/2001/05/pressrelease301/?pa=281A8E32; Internet; accessed 15 June 2007; 2-6.


\textsuperscript{57} Examples are the Affordable Housing Framework Agreement (, and another agreement in 2002, for which the federal government announced an additional $115 million for Ontario in 2003. See Michael Shapcott, \textit{Profiting From A Manufacture Housing Crisis}, Canadian Centre For Policy Alternatives, 11 June 2002 [website on-line]; available from: http://www.policyalternatives.ca/reports/2002/06/reportsstudies284/?pa=B56F3A15; Internet; accessed 17 February 2007; 7, and Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association, \textit{Timeline: History of Social Housing in Ontario}, Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association
government, the funding set aside has never been used to create housing in Ontario. One of the reasons is that there is simply no mechanism in place with the agreements to ensure that the money is made available will actually be used to create housing units.

Housing availability pertains to both ownership and rental of units. While often discussions around housing and related policy programs or funding initiatives refer primarily to potential owners (or existing owners), renters are an important element of housing issues. Affordability and accessibility are key factors in the discussion of the rental housing market, and in Ontario renters have not been fairing well. Renters in Ontario have been facing affordability as well as accessibility issues, largely because of the changes made in tenants and rental rights. The changes that the Harris government brought in, those discussed earlier that favored landlords over tenants, contributed to other changes in the rental markets. From the mid 1990s into the mid 2000s, Ontario renters saw greater increases in rent, a loss of rental units on the market, and a drop in completion rates for social housing units. The problems that arose left those renters at risk of homelessness in a precarious position. In short, the changes resulted in a lack of affordable housing in the city of Toronto.

[website on-line]; available from:


59 Ibid.

Housing & Homelessness in Toronto

This chapter opened with a quotation regarding the shift in the attitudes of Torontonians regarding housing and homelessness over the span of a decade. The quotation references the time when homelessness became an important issue for the city of Toronto. In 1996 three homeless men froze to death on streets of Toronto mere months apart.61 Over a decade has passed since that time, and numerous organizations are still working with the homeless population on the streets of the city.

Toronto has one of the highest incidents of homelessness in Canada.62 From 1991 to 1999, the CMHC found that 16.7% of Toronto households demonstrated core housing need, exceeding the national average by 3.6%.63 In 2003, a City of Toronto Report Card indicated that the social housing waiting list stood at 71,000 households and that 31,985 people used the shelter system that year alone.64 Such a demand for shelters and housing is indicative of the issues surround housing in Toronto, and the following overview explores Toronto’s housing situation.

63 CHMC statistics indicated that 13.1% of households in Canada demonstrated core housing need, 11.7% in Ontario, and 16.7% in Toronto. See CMHC, Evaluation of the Urban Social Housing Program, Audit and Evaluation Services, CMHC, 1999: 9-10.
Like other municipalities in Ontario, Toronto has and continues to struggle with issues of housing affordability and housing need. The municipality has in place two major programs to deliver low income housing to those in need, both of which are managed by the same organization the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC). The TCHC was formed from the amalgamation in 2001 of two long standing Toronto housing programs the Toronto Metro Housing Authority (TMHA) and Toronto Housing Corporation (THC) both rental housing programs, which themselves had previous incarnations dating back to 1954.\(^{65}\) TMHA was the largest public housing project in Toronto, as well as Canada, and was responsible for 110 projects consisting of more than 29,000 units in Toronto.\(^{66}\) TCHC operates over 58,500 units in 350 different developments and houses nearly 6% the households in the city.\(^{67}\) Aside from social housing to help those at risk of being homeless and core-housing need, and address affordability issues, the city also runs programs for the homeless. The programs receive funding assistance for homeless community based programs through the City of Toronto Homelessness Initiative Fund (CT-HIF) and from the federal Supporting Community Partnerships Initiative (SCPI). Other programs include those aimed at helping the homeless get jobs and get into housing.\(^{68}\) The city continues to collaborate with NGOs,
and the two other levels of government to fund and deliver the various programs aimed at
the homeless.

Despite programs aimed at social housing and homelessness, the political saliency of the
issue within the city, which continued from 1996 onwards, resulted in an announcement
from then mayor Mel Lastman in January 1999 that Toronto had funded and completed
“the definitive Canadian report on the plight of the homeless.” The report was also
known as the Anne Golden Report on Homelessness, and of 105 recommendations one
was the continuation of the city’s Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially
Isolated Persons.

The Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated Persons is a monthly forum
to give a voice to all citizens and stakeholders concerned with homelessness. The
committee was founded in 1996, with the purpose of advising “senior staff in Community
and Neighborhood Services to identify issues facing homeless and social isolated persons
and to promote long-term solutions.” The committee is governed by two city
councillors who can report concerns and make motions in City Council, and receives

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69 Catherine Dunphy, “It’s ‘too little too late’ for homeless,” Toronto Star, 15 January
1999, 9(A).
70 Dr. Anne Golden, William H. Currie, Elizabeth Greaves, and John E. Latimer, Taking
Responsibility for Homelessness: An Action Plan for Toronto, City of Toronto, January
Internet; accessed 10 January 2006.
71 Toronto, Community Services Committee, Renewed Terms of Reference for the
Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated Persons in Consolidated Clause
assistance from the Shelter, Housing, and Support Division of Community and
Neighborhood Services Department. Unfortunately for its members, the power of the
committee within the political structure of city hall is limited, and while the committee
can pass motions it requires a councillor to bring its messages forward to city council or
other units in city hall.

Some members of the Advisory Committee are also city hall bureaucrats that work to
deliver programs that service the homeless population in Toronto, such as Phil Brown,
general manager of the city’s Shelter, Support and Housing Administration division.
Bureaucrats may use the forum to communicate with those using the services, advocates
and activists, and to gather information from these three other groups. Activists and
advocates and the homeless are also all welcome to participate in the committee
meetings. Some participants, such as Cathy Crowe, have dual roles. Ms. Crowe has been
on the committee as the City of Toronto’s Board of Health representative as well as a
member of TDRC, and as a committed street nurse. The committee serves as a link
between advocates and those they seek to influence within the government; however, not
all advocates use the forum to push their homelessness or housing agendas. OCAP, for
example, has refrained from actively attending the committee as a group, in addition to
having been banned from Toronto’s City Hall for some periods of time. The differences
between the two organizations of TDRC and OCAP extend beyond this one example of
participation, and the next section will introduce further the two case study organizations.

Understanding OCAP and TDRC
If 1996 marks a turning point for political attitudes and policies, as well as general public discussions about homelessness in Toronto, the two organizations profiled in the case study also reflect that this period was a turning point for advocates and advocacy organizations. While OCAP has existed since the 1980s, TDRC was only formed in 1998 in part do the apparent lack of wherewithal on the part of existing organizations to push for greater action in the wake of the homelessness crises that afflicted Toronto. The two organizations are different in more than the details surrounding their emergence, and have other similarities beyond that they both work on the issue of homelessness in Toronto. This section explores the similarities and differences between the organizations while also providing some general history and background on each one.

**OCAP: 1980s to present**

OCAP first took shape in the late 1980s as a revolutionary anti-poverty organization. It began as organized protests concerning the recommended improvements to the provincial welfare system under the government of David Peterson. Since its inception the organization has sought to empower the poor and the homeless. Empowerment is described in terms of “[r]esistance” against such actors as “[l]andlords, bosses, the police, government institutions” – all of which are portrayed as mounting attacks on the

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73 Slogan on the main page of the OCAP website: “We believe in the power of resistance.” *OCAP* [website on-line]; available from: http://www.ocap.ca; Internet; accessed 10 January 2009.
poor. One of the founders of the group, John Clarke, is also the defacto leader and spokesperson. He refers to himself as a free and proud “socialist”75 who believes in the collective ownership of wealth and is seeking a revolution. He believes that his organization is mounting resistance and “fighting to win”.76

As OCAP has persisted in mounting its resistance it has avoided becoming overly structured as far as organizations are concerned. While Clark is one of two professional organizers paid a salary of $20,000 per year, OCAP does not have a formal structure beyond its leadership strata. There are a handful of core activists (i.e. Gaétan Héraux, Stefan Pilipa) who have been involved in OCAP for a long period of time, and are often contact points for media and academics; however, the bulk of those participating in actions, such as demonstrations, etc., are outside of the organization’s core group. More importantly, OCAP has opted to have a loose networks approach in which many activists are contacted shortly before the action and told where to go.

Membership to OCAP is fairly loose in that some people participate in one action and others participate in many more over multiple years. There are a few regular, core members, often privileged with greater media attention, as they take the lead and help organizers on different actions. OCAP is an organization whose members include the

poor and underemployed, as well as a variety of different activists (i.e. students). There are no criteria for members. As a consequence of this open approach the organization’s membership is diverse. OCAP has reportedly close ties with the poor in the Toronto area and particularly the neighborhood around the organization’s office. OCAP is well known in activist circles because of its claim that it has had greater success than other organizations at mobilizing the poor and, in particular, the homeless.

OCAP has a long history of actions involving various types of mobilization. Its actions can be easily split into two different categories of those that are overtly political and those that are pragmatic. The overtly political category would include the numerous actions and tactics that seemed designed to create bold symbolic gestures, and used to gain public and media attention. These actions involve protesting, picketing, squatting, mock evictions of politicians from their own offices, street disturbances, and even engaging in theft, often with large amounts of participants, including the homeless. An example of this sort of action would be the mock eviction of Finance Minister Jim Flaherty from his Whitby office on June 12, 2001. The gesture was, according to organizers “an immediate act of symbolism in the context of mass evictions and consequent mass homelessness.”

The practical actions are what OCAP refers to as direct action casework in the form of advocacy work. The principals of direct action casework include “[t]o combine legal work with disruptive action” while avoiding duplication of the work of legal clinics or other agencies, and forward political goals without sacrificing the interests of those individuals for whom the work is being done.\textsuperscript{79} The casework seems to largely involve going through various processes like filing out the proper immigration forms, special diet forms, to ensure that people get their Personal Needs Allowances,\textsuperscript{80} etc., in addition to targeted protests with specific goals. For example, in December 2003 OCAP estimated that there were approximately 2000 evictions occurring in Toronto every month.\textsuperscript{81} On February 10\textsuperscript{th}, OCAP organized a protest, attended by approximately 50 people of northern Toronto’s Housing Tribunal. The group quickly brought the operation to a standstill and after a brief standoff, the office closed the tribunal for the day. The end result of this was that thirty tenants and their families had their eviction temporarily prevented.\textsuperscript{82} Any breakdown of the system resulting in any small amount of benefit to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Personal Needs Allowance (PNA) is a monthly stipend that the provincial government gives to individuals living in provincial psychiatric facilities, long-term care facilities, shelters, hostels, etc., so they can meet their incidental costs. The current PNA is $112.00 per month. See Psychiatric Patient Advocacy Office, “Personal Needs Allowance – Advocating For An Increase,” 14 June 2001 [website online]; available from http://www.ppaao.gov.on.ca/med-pre-per.html; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{81} John Clarke, “Is “Fighting To Win” A Criminal Act?,” \textit{The Dominion} 16, 16 March 2004 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.dominionpaper.ca/features/2004/03/16/is_fightin.html; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{82} OCAP, “OCAP Shuts Down McGuinty’s Eviction Factory,” \textit{OCAP}, 10 February 2006 [website on-line]; available from: http://ocap.ca/actions/47sheppardoccupied; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.
\end{itemize}
poor is considered a victory by OCAP, and it is this type of small success that is typical of the casework model, whether used for welfare or other social justice issues.83

In terms of participation in the policy community and networks, OCAP is greatly embedded in the activist networks compared to being embedded in political networks. OCAP is well known among activists internationally for its innovative repertoire, including the direct action casework mentioned above. In part because of ingenuity and notoriety, and popularity, and in part because of the numerous issues that OCAP works on, the organization is involved in activist networks at the local, provincial, national (i.e. CAW), and international levels. The website of OCAP provides a snapshot of some of the many other organizations they support, stand in solidarity with, and those organizations that support them. Though popular in the activist community the group has been banned from the Toronto City Hall, and can only have one member attending the Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated Persons at any time. There is little friendly collaboration between politicians at any level and the organization, which is a sharp contrast to TDRC.

**TDRC: 1998 to present**

TDRC was founded in 1998 by members of various other pre-existing poverty organizations in the Toronto area.84 The group has consistently focused their efforts to end homelessness by providing advocacy on housing and homelessness issues. TDRC

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84 Cathy Crowe, interview by author, tape recording, Toronto, ON, February 2006.
sees itself as having the responsibility of bearing witness to homeless and bringing their concerns to politicians and the public. TDRC believes that homelessness is “a human crisis” that requires government response and the attention of public officials. The moral and ethical tone to its statements should not be overlooked as the organization relates homelessness to a violation of human rights. To this end they have called upon the United Nations and argued that the right to housing is a basic human right. Under this framework homelessness and poor shelter conditions are akin to human rights violations. TDRC brings this message to all three levels of government through actions, publications, and media statements.

TDRC was founded by a collection of activists seeking an alternative forum for their fight against the growing problem of homelessness. Many are or have been social workers of various sorts, and activists with other organizations in the past. A few of the founding members even worked with OCAP for sometime before starting TDRC. Members also include business people, housing experts, academics, anti-poverty activists, AIDS activists, people experienced in being homeless, and members of the faith community, all of whom are concerned about homelessness.

Cathy Crowe is a co-founder and spokesperson for TDRC. She is well known as an avid social housing activist and as a street nurse. She continues to work in both capacities, and is not compensated monetarily for her work with TDRC. Crowe believes that Canada and

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
the Canadian government have the ability to address these issues, but that they lack the conviction and drive to do so. As a consequence Crowe is committed to fighting for housing and an end to homelessness. In recent years she won the Atkinson Award for Social Justice, which provided her with both funding and an office for a two-year period to help with her advocacy endeavors.

On its website TDRC appears to be non-hierarchical. The organization has a steering committee, rather than paid organizers, and has administrative staff members that oversee the offices at select times, etc., to monitor phone calls and perform basic administrative tasks. While the organization appears non-hierarchical on paper, one of the founding members stated in an interview that the group was more hierarchical than it appeared and that it had a centralized decision-making process, which was necessary for the organization to function well and respond to crises. While the members work together, some of the more senior members are free to vet and veto decisions they see as beneficial for the organization that they have helped build.

As an organization, TDRC is a non-militant, advocacy focused organization. The group engages in protests as well as more conventional political advocacy activities such as report writing, speaking to newspaper editorial boards, and meeting with government ministers. They provide coordination services for the National Housing and Homeless Network, track the number of homeless deaths through statistics, and create street death

88 Cathy Crowe, interview by author, tape recording, Toronto, ON, February 2006.
89 Ibid.
memorials. TDRC partners with academic institutions and scholars to produce reports on the problems affiliated with homelessness and social housing, as well as positing solutions. TDRC evaluates hostels, community outreach programs, and programs relating to housing and homelessness. The organization produces an annual report for shareholders for accountability purposes. It works with politicians at different time to push housing onto the election agenda, and have even created voting guides during federal elections to push votes into making housing an electoral issue. TDRC also engages in many standard actions, such as picnic protests, general rallies, fundraising events, etc. The organization denounces council members who advocate unfriendly policies regarding the homeless and housing publically through the media. TDRC has also used film and photography to make its issue(s) and organization more visible in the public eye. Overall, TDRC relies on the knowledge and expertise of their group to push information and their agenda into both public and political forums.

TDRC takes networking very seriously. The organization courts the media, as OCAP does, but in different ways. TDRC members are willing to be seen giving housing tours to politicians, not just berating them. They maintain a solid enough relationship with city hall bureaucrats that they do not hesitate to go to their office to beg for a shelter to be opened for one night if necessary. TDRC holds monthly homeless memorials and lunches for all those touched by the death of a homeless individual to attend, which allows them to expand and sustain a larger support base within the activist, homeless, and public segments of the community.

TDRC is connected with different activist organizations, and has collaborated with business, professional, religious, and academic groups at various points. Both TDRC and OCAP have had affiliations with the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) – OCAP has even received funding from the group in the past. Collaboration may involve collaboration on campaigns, or events, or simply form part of a contact network of groups known and acknowledge to do go work on the issue and be worthy of support. TDRC has offered OCAP events support and collaborated on some actions with the group. This is not surprising as despite the differences between the two organizations they are both part of the same social movement, known as the poor people’s movement in Canada, and they operate in the same geographic area.

To summarize the different characteristics of each group as laid out in this section the following table (Table 1) is provided.

Table 1. A Comparison of OCAP and TDRC Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TDRC</th>
<th>OCAP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Militancy</td>
<td>Non-militant</td>
<td>Militant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of Actions</td>
<td>Toronto and National</td>
<td>Toronto, Provincial, National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Homeless as national</td>
<td>Direct Action politics;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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91 Business and professional examples include the collaboration over the alternatives to Tent City as profiled in the video *Shelter From the Storm*, 2002. It is important to recall that social services professionals, academics, and business professionals are also all members of TDRC who are members of distinct communities as well.

92 Funding from groups such as CAW and CUPE have fluctuated over the years. For example, Buzz Hargrove pulled CAW funding after the “attack” on MPP Jim Flaherty’s office. See Tom Lyons, “Crown Attorney On Trial,” *NOW* 20:45, 12 July 2001 [magazine on-line]; available from: http://www.nowtoronto.com/print.cfm?content=128192; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.
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<th></th>
<th>disaster; human rights; moral obligation</th>
<th>Resistance, revolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (degree of)</td>
<td>Formal and informal</td>
<td>None/Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
<td>Two paid organizers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Spokesperson &amp; committee</td>
<td>Leader (one of the paid organizers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All funding</td>
<td>Private donations (i.e. individual donations)</td>
<td>Private donations (i.e. trade union funding and individual donations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Highly diverse</td>
<td>Highly diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backgrounds</td>
<td>All citizens including: activists, experts, the homeless</td>
<td>Professional organizers, the poor, the homeless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Networks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Networks – level</td>
<td>Municipal and Federal politicians</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist Networks</td>
<td>Municipal, provincial, national</td>
<td>Municipal, provincial, national, international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise of Members</td>
<td>Social experts (housing, social work, public policy, architects, health)</td>
<td>Political organizers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Characteristics are an important element of social movement organizations, and by their very nature they provide definition to the organization itself. As is shown in the next chapter, characteristics have various impacts in terms of how organizations behave and what successes they achieve. Just as importantly, characteristics are one way to separate social movement organizations from other types of groups. SMOs can be seen as the basic unit for social movements, and both these organizations are part of the poor people’s movement in Canada. When examined as SMOs these groups can be perceived as the complex organizations that they are. Each organization has a breadth of behavior beyond simple advocacy and engages in more functions than just political actions or membership drives. The portrayals of the organization in this final section are testaments
to the fact that these organizations may work on the same issue in the same area while being completely separate and unique – which makes them excellent candidates for this case study.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to lay out the background of homelessness and housing policy at all levels affecting the city of Toronto, as well as providing a deeper understanding of the two case study SMOs. As Table 1 indicates, while the case study organizations each work on the same issues of homelessness in the same geographic area during overlapping time periods, the character and composition of each organization is distinct. This distinction will be developed further in the next few chapters in order to show how different SMOs achieve different influence over the policy process because of their unique relationships with the state. Each case study organization has a unique view of the issue of homeless and the related state institutions. In the next couple chapters these views will be shown to influence how each organization attempts to impact policy related to homelessness and the relative notions of success that their attempts garner. The next chapter sets out the framework of this thesis, including the basic nature of social movement organizations, the policy process, and the interactions between the two.
Chapter 3: Social Movement Organization and Social Movement Theory

Understanding the interplay of social movement organizations and public policy requires a background in theory. Social movement theory and related public policy theory are vital to understanding how a contentious or cooperative organization impacts the policy process at different stages of the policy cycle. This chapter presents an overview of social movement theory, as well as key concepts and elements of social movement and public policy studies that are relevant to this thesis.

The chapter is organized in the following manner: First, a short summary of major theories of social movements is presented that highlights the Political Process model (PPM) and an important element of the model, political opportunity structures (POS). Then, key elements of the political process for this study are presented, including social movement organizations, policy networks and communities, and epistemic communities. This is followed by an exploration of framing and contentious politics, two concepts that explain critical features of the overall framework of this thesis. Finally, a concise statement of the working framework is presented.

A Brief History of Social Movement Literature

In the 1960s and 1970s a variety of social movements took shape in Western nations. To facilitate the study of these emerging movements, new theories regarding collective behavior were developed. One of the earliest theories to be explored in academic circles was Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). Resource Mobilization Theory has evolved
over time and took on various shapes and forms, while continuing to dominate the social movement field, particularly in North America, from its origins in the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s - and some argue that this domination continued until even more recently.  

The theory emerged as researchers began to look for alternatives to the conventional theories explaining collective political behavior such as collective behavior, mass society, relative deprivation, and political sociology. Leading theorists such as McCarthy and Zald helped popularize the theory, which is primarily concerned with the mobilization of resources, be they financial, social, institutional, etc., and how these aspect effect movement development.

RMT has distinct features that make it a good tool for social movement analysis. It focuses on tangible elements, such as funding and membership numbers, providing key elements in analysis. Within the theory, actors behave in a logical fashion when making decisions about organizational and political strategy. Social movements, according to RMT, are rational collective actors united by grievances and associated with shared interests that combine and secure resources for collective goods. In application, RMT examines a movement’s ability to capture and mobilize resources, which in turn

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determines the development of the movement. Resource Mobilization provides a good framework for understanding the complex ways in which movements are coordinated internally, and its basis in rational choice makes it an excellent tool to create a logical vision of movement actors and behavior. The goal of the theory is to create a cohesive picture of the dominating operational logic behind social movements, thus the focus on structure, logic, and linear development – all of which help to construct a logical picture to make sense of the complex dynamics of social movements. Clearly, RMT has some concrete benefits and advantages to bring to exploring social movements, but like all theories there are some inherent problems with it as well.

Critiques regarding RMT most frequently argue that it is too reductionist, and innately flawed because of its reliance on rational actors and logic. RMT minimizes the socio-political environment and its effect on movements. The theory does not pay much attention to the fact that movements operate within a larger environment that is not necessarily governed by strict logical operating rules. The social and political environment that movements are based in shift over time, and can both have impact on the movement and be impacted by a movement. Contemporary movements are more than political or economic based interests groups. They often have a large and vital social element that RMT does not address. In a similar vein, RMT also has trouble

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9 Susan Phillips, Projects, Pressure, and Perceptions of Effectiveness (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 144.
distinguishing between social movements and interest groups. This is in part because it assumes that the underlying reasons for actors to engage in collective action, such as grievances, are enough to unify the group; however, as has been found in numerous studies, common interest does not necessarily lead to cooperation. RMT cannot explain the emergence of movements particularly those that arise during times of economic hardship and crisis.

RMT was popular in North America at the same time that New Social Movement theory (NSM) was popular in Europe. NSM is based on the new social movements that developed in Europe and North America in the 1960s and 1970s. These movements presented distinct challenges to the academic theory of the day, and pushed theorists towards new ideas to explain movement development. NSM theory is about society more than politics, in that within it culture and identity matter greatly.

NSM theory attempts to make sense of social movements by focusing on identity. The creation and defense of collective identities and lifestyles against the intrusion of

1 Ibid, 45.
economic or state forces is a dominant theme. Scholars, such as Alaine Touraine, concern themselves with the structural transformation of Western industrial societies that they associate with the new types of social movements coming out of the 1960s and 1970s. Often referred to as the collective identity school, the theory argues that the purpose of social movements is to expand and defend social spaces in which collective identities are formed. Studies from this school dwell on the processes of identity formation, mobilization, and the impact that these processes have on the outcomes of social movements. NSM focuses on exactly what RMT does not: the social and cultural undercurrents of movements that drive movement emergence and collectivity. It allows for social movement analysis to “examine the plurality of diverse and frequently contradictory positions and discard the ideal of a perfectly unified and homogenous agent.” NSM allows scholars to balance collectivity of a movement with the individual identities of those that comprise it. Collective identity becomes a process, not merely a product of the social movement. By extension, conceiving collective identity as a variable in social movement construction allows researchers to evaluate whether or not

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identity formation contributes to the success of movements, either in emergence or in outcomes.

One criticism of NSM is that in focusing on the identity politics of everyday life, the greater political and social threads within the movements are lost. NSM theorists may underestimate the extent to which social movements may share a universal vision organized around modern themes of social justice. In other words, NSM overstates differences between both social movements, and even SMOs within a movement; and moreover, the theory does not pay enough attention to the fact that most contemporary movements with a goal of economic or political change use, in part, an injustice frame to create an shared understanding of their primary issue (ex. Homelessness). A second critique is that NSM has no ability to explain social movement’s effects on society. While it is generally accepted that the theory provides insight into why social movements affect society, it does not explain how they do so. A third common criticism of NSM theory is that it does not place enough importance on the role of the state as a target of collective political action, and as an institution that regulates social order. In other words, it negates the importance of the state within the political environment that movements operate in.

11 Susan Phillips, Projects, Pressure, and Perceptions of Effectiveness (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 22-23.
111 Ibid., 352.
While Resource Mobilization theory is satisfactory in explaining the 'how' of social movement mobilization, New Social Movement theory explains the 'why' of mobilization.\textsuperscript{112} In the 1980s, a new theory became popular and was thought to be able to bridge the two dominant schools: the Political Process model (PPM). It has since rivaled, if not supplanted, Resource Mobilization as the theory of choice by North American scholars.

The Political Process model is founded on the influential article published by Eisinger in 1973, which argued that “the incidence of protest...is related to the nature of the political opportunity structure.”\textsuperscript{113} The theory introduced the importance of the political system and environment to the study of social movements. Some of the most well know researchers working with political process models are Charles Tilly, Sydney Tarrow, and Douglas McAdam.

Social movements are defined by Sidney Tarrow as entities engaged in a struggle for or against a new social order, for which they use a broad network of groups and


organizations.\textsuperscript{114} In this definition, movements rely on organizations to perpetuate the struggle, and in this way the model recognizes the importance of SMOs. This makes PPM, and much of Tarrow’s work, an excellent choice for this thesis in which the SMOs are the main focus of the case study.

PPM describes social movements in reference to the political environment in which social movements exist. According to the theory, the political context of action\textsuperscript{115} is more important than the actors themselves. Social change is “the impetus to collective action”\textsuperscript{116} that drives individuals to join organizations and movements. In this way, movement development and success are mediated by the political environment.

According to PPM, the most important element of the political environment in which a movement works is political opportunity structures. Tarrow created and defined the concept of Political Opportunity Structures (POS) in the 1980s as “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action.”\textsuperscript{117} In 1996, McAdam established a general consensus on opportunity structures after surveying the literature. McAdam stated that POS is defined by: the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite

\textsuperscript{115} Byron A. Miller, \textit{Geography and Social Movements. Comparing Antinuclear Activism in the Boston Area} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 24.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and, the state's capacity and propensity for repression.\textsuperscript{118}

Both definitions suggest that opportunity structures vary greatly. POS are distributed unequally in different levels of government and with regards to different political issues. The challenger's main purpose is to take advantage of the opportunity structure.\textsuperscript{119} Movements can take advantage of structures because they are not static. Scholars believe "[o]ver time, any given challenging group can expect to confront a political system that varies a great deal in its vulnerability to organized protest."\textsuperscript{120} This is because political opportunity structures are both stable and transitory.\textsuperscript{121} Stable elements include electoral systems and political culture, while examples of more dynamic elements include public policy and political rhetoric. The more stable aspects of political opportunity restrict the possibilities for change and political action that activists define through cooperation and

\begin{thebibliography}{100}
\bibitem{11}Douglas McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., \textit{Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27.
\end{thebibliography}
competition with actors. Examinations of opportunity structures and their stability focus on two main components: the environment, and the impact of movement processes.

The environment of political opportunity structures is neither neutral nor passive. Instead, it is composed of a variety of social, economic political forces that are actively attempting to influence, control or destroy the social movement. There are multiple aspects that influence the structures of opportunities within the environment, but the two main aspects of POS are: the system of alliances and oppositions and the structure of the state. These two components are vital when examining the political environment that social movement organizations operate in, particularly in conjunction with movement processes.

Movement processes affect political opportunity structures in a variety of ways. First, movements can affect opportunity structures by influencing policy, political alignments, and raising the public profile and salience of issues. Secondly, movements create collective action frames, demonstrate political action efficacy, and draw media attention to an issue. This allows a movement to push an issue into political saliency. Thirdly,

125 Ibid.
movements can create or magnify events\textsuperscript{126}, and through this create and seize opportunities opened up by the political system.

At the same time that movements affect structures, structures affect movements. Mobilization and emergence are directly related to political opportunities. Movements arise when the political climate is receptive to them and their demands.\textsuperscript{127} Political opportunity structure may impact the cost of a particular action, and may also alter the benefits that result from collective action.\textsuperscript{128} Political opportunity structures suggest that constraints and opportunities influence social movements, not just resources.\textsuperscript{129}

Ultimately, in the political process model, success of a movement is in large part the result of organizational resources and a favorable political opportunity structure.\textsuperscript{130} Outcomes for organizations within a movement, as explained by POS, are driven by the organization’s capacity to create and capitalize on opportunities within the system.

The concept of political opportunity structures is a useful tool for analyzing the behavior and outcomes of a movement. The same can be said about state and government actors,

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{1} Byron A. Miller, Geography and Social Movements. Comparing Antinuclear Activism in the Boston Area (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 149.
as different sections and levels within the government send out different messages,\textsuperscript{131} and work with different mandates towards the same social problem. Policy jurisdiction is an issue when evaluating the effects that social movements have on public policy issues - particularly in Canada with its three tiered governance structure. The characteristics and resources of a movement may determine which aspects of opportunity structures most affect its development and, consequently, its success.\textsuperscript{132}

Some of the criticism of opportunity structures concerns the application of the concept in case studies, as well as theoretical oversights. Sawyers and Mayer pointed out that a truly robust version of POS would include an examination of missed opportunities, and the ramifications on the movement related to them.\textsuperscript{133} The problem with this criticism is pragmatic, in that the value to be ascribed to a missed opportunity would be difficult to determine, as the consequences of the seizure of that opportunity have no way of being verified. A second criticism of POS concerns the application and the term itself in that is its "relatively narrow focus upon political structures."\textsuperscript{134} There is a tendency when using POS of focusing primarily on political processes occurring within the political environment, though the processes themselves may be grounded in historical, social and cultural settings. In this thesis the analysis focuses on the political impact that a social movement organization has, which makes POS a good framework to use. POS is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Michael Orsini, \textit{Blood, Blame, and Belonging} (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2001), 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Nick Crossley, \textit{Making Sense of Social Movements} (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002), 123.
\end{itemize}
excellent at highlighting shifting opportunities and distinguishing different parts of the political process, which are key elements in this study. The central hypothesis being tested in this thesis concerns two unique SMOs that create and capitalize on different opportunities within the same political environment, the results of which translate into abilities to influence different stages of the policy process. The very nature of this study makes POS an excellent element of the theoretical framework to use in conjunction with other elements, such as SMOs.

Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)

The main unit of social movements is the social movement organization (SMO). These organizations are usually the basis for social movement analysis and study. An SMO can be defined as a “complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement... and attempts to implement these goals.” Organizations form the basic unit of social movements. As Orsini points out, organizations are ‘identifiable’, making them distinct from social movements themselves. This is due to the fact that people participate in movements largely through organizations, either by belonging to the organizations directly or by connecting to the associations forged through the organizations. Organizations are a structural element of collective action as well as actors within the political environment. Organizations act in a manner that adheres to the general beliefs of a specific movement, rather than the

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1 Michael Orsini, Blood, Blame, and Belonging (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2001), 12.
17 Susan Phillips, Projects, Pressure, and Perceptions of Effectiveness (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 139.
movement dictating how the organizations should act. It is only when an individual group shares the movement's beliefs and connects to the movement's networks that the organization can be considered part of the movement.\textsuperscript{138}

Phillips argues that SMOs distinguish themselves from other groups, such as public interest groups, because of their organizational embeddedness\textsuperscript{139} within the political environment. An SMO operates in an environment comprised of a variety of other organizations, including those of the larger social movement itself, the state and institutions. Organizations engage in other activities in addition to standard interest representation, such as identity creation and formulation, supporting members through certain problems, etc., whereas the main focus of interest groups is getting their interests represented in the system. The concept of SMOs within social movement theory presents a more inclusive view of group behavior and movement outcomes, far more than the narrower interest group studies\textsuperscript{140} or pluralist theories of the past. By conceiving of the organizations in this case study as SMOs, a more encompassing vision of the organizations develops, and with it, greater insights into their effect on public policy.

\textsuperscript{19} Susan Phillips, \textit{Projects, Pressure, and Perceptions of Effectiveness} (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 333.
\textsuperscript{140} In the Canadian context, well known authors such as Pross and Coleman focus on institutional interactions between interest groups and the state, the consequence of which is overstating the impact of political action structures at the expense of other equally important factors, such as participant’s perception of the political processes, the dynamics of political culture, and the import of identity formation in political action. See Michael Orsini, \textit{Blood, Blame, and Belonging} (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2001), 87-88.
Policy Networks and Policy Communities

Social movement organizations rarely work without some form of support from other groups. Support can be diverse: it may simply be public acknowledgement of the work done, or sharing organizational duties on actions or even funding an organization's efforts. Organizations that share a common interest are part of the same policy community.

The concepts of policy networks and communities, different aspects of the same approach, explain how organizations within the same policy domain interact. The distinction between networks and communities is best stated by Howlett and Ramesh (referencing Wilks and Wright) in that policy community refers to all potential actors involved in policy formulation, whereas policy networks refers to a subset of the policy community members that interact regularly.\(^1\) Policy networks and policy communities have different functions within the same policy domain. Networks help movements to recruit members, plan actions, and solidify their beliefs in relation to a given social issue. There are two specific types of networks that social movements rely upon: advocacy networks and social networks.

Social networks are fundamental to understanding the development and persistence of some social movements, and their organizations. Social networks direct the focus onto actual relations between actors within the movement and developing an understanding of

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social influence.\textsuperscript{142} The relationships of the actors are based on the belief that organizations and actors can generate social change. Activists in advocacy networks seek to make demands and claims for the less powerful in order to win over the purported interests of the more powerful.\textsuperscript{143} Activists have a variety of tactics that they can use within the political environment to achieve this goal. They can frame the issue, presenting it in a particular manner to move people around the issue; they can pay attention to opportunities and capitalize on them; they can confound expectations and generate disruptions; and they can attempt to broaden the network’s scope and density to maximize its access to pertinent information by mobilizing social networks.\textsuperscript{144} Obviously advocacy networks are not the same as social networks; they are more specific and have limited purposes and goals. Both types of networks have their roles to play in social movements and their outcomes. The case study organizations in this thesis are, by and large, advocacy networks.

Networks, alliance systems, etc., create political opportunities by linking organizations to the political system, connecting elites, political parties with the social movement actors.\textsuperscript{145} Networks can constrain or facilitate actions on the part of its members.\textsuperscript{146} Allies

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
can use networks to work with other organizations. Policy networks work well with
POS as they are a part of the structural environment of the policy process. Networks of
policy elites, distinct from the larger community can clearly influence the policy process
at different stages.

Policy communities are part of a given policy domain, and are larger than the networks
that exist within them. It is long held that policy communities are generally governed by a
commonly understood belief system, a code of conduct, and list of established
behavior. To this end, policy communities require certain norms to be adhered to by
their members. Organizations and their members who do not engage in expected
behavior, or whose beliefs do not mesh with those of the general community will find
themselves on the periphery of, if not excluded entirely from, a particular policy
community. Some recent studies suggest that communities may not be as much based on
these general beliefs as a combined sense of purpose or a common focus, such as a
particularly salient political issue or policy. This conceptualization leaves room for
conflict within the policy community over conceptualization of policy problems, or even

Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press/Polity Press, 1990), 126.

14 Susan D. Phillips, “Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the
Network of National Canadian Women’s Organizations,” Canadian Journal of Political
Science XXIV (December 1991): 759.

147 Lee Ann Banazak, Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the

148 Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1986), 98.

149 Maarten A. Hajer, “A frame in the fields: policymaking and the reinvention of
politics,” in ed. Maarten A. Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, Deliberative Policy Analysis:
Understanding Governance In A Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 89.
community membership. That said, the shared sense of interest in a policy by non-
institutional actors, or those outside the inner circle of the policy community, still appears
to require a certain amount of understanding in basic rules and conduct in order to have
concerns over policies heard by those members within the community that make policy
decisions. Policy communities always include those making policy decisions, and if a
group is excluded from the community it indicates that they are further removed from the
decision-makers governing a policy domain.

*Epistemic Communities*

Policy communities often have different groups within them that are often distinguished
from each other by virtue of their character. One type of group is defined as knowledge-
based,\textsuperscript{150} in that it holds scientific or technical knowledge associated with specific policy
domains. “Epistemic communities” is the term lent to these groups. This thesis uses Peter
Haas’ definition of epistemic communities as “a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge.”\textsuperscript{151} This definition incorporates three important elements of
epistemic communities. The first element is a network of professionals. This can include
any identifiable group from doctors to social workers. The second is that recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain. This can include political organizers,
who have expertise and competence in political organization. The third element is the
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge. This is perhaps the most difficult part of

\textsuperscript{150} Peter Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean, The Politics of International Environmental
\textsuperscript{151} Peter Haas, ed., *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*
the definition, for it assumes that scholars can easily recognize the authority of a claim to knowledge. In the policy process epistemic communities derive their authority from claims of knowledge.\textsuperscript{152} Through the recognition by others of a group's claim of knowledge within an information-driven policy process, both the knowledge and the group are conferred a degree of authority. Epistemic communities share a common body of facts as well as an interpretive framework, vocabulary, and a common network in which concerns are formulated and information shared,\textsuperscript{153} and within the community itself are these types of elements that act as parameters granting authority on claims of knowledge.

Epistemic communities communicate and interact amongst themselves as well as with other groups within the policy process and within the greater policy community. Similar to social movement organizations, epistemic communities exist at different levels such as local, national and international. The use of epistemic communities within the literature often involves communities acting at the international level in which communities and states as the main actors.\textsuperscript{154} This study applies the notion of epistemic communities to a meso-level of analysis, with actors being the state as well as social movement organizations. The professionalization of state bureaucracies and the increasingly technical nature of policy problems have resulted in the increasing use of technical

\textsuperscript{152} Peter Haas, ed., \textit{Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination} (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 3
experts in the policy process. A consequence of this is that groups and organizations that wish to have input into the policy process have begun to acquire and use their own experts in order to gain access to parts of the policy process.

**Framing**

Policy communities, activists and epistemic communities all engage in what social movement theorists refer to as framing. Framing is a collective act of signifying and generating meaning and interpretations surrounding an issue. Policy communities may frame a problem, by which they set up and identify a particular problem within a political or social issue. Movements and organizations engage in framing as a process of signifying, interpreting, and constructing meaning. A collective action frame can be defined more precisely as “emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns.”

Part of this process involves the construction of identities within the movement, the same identities that form the basis of collective action. As Miriam Smith has suggested movements engage in the production of identity that is linked to the frames of meaning movements create. Identities within movements structure discourses that stipulate

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156 Ibid.
possible causes and actions to be taken by the movement.\textsuperscript{159} Understanding the frame used by an organization (i.e. adversary, aggregate, or vilifying)\textsuperscript{160} in relation to identity and its construction allows us to better understand the movement discourse and actions projected into society. Individuals and institutional actors, each coming from different positions of power, engage in framing – representing – political processes in public discourse.\textsuperscript{161} These representations influence action and policy, and as such the impact of framing should not be overlooked.

Framing involves not only the act of creating a symbolic narrative surrounding a policy issue, and the various types of framing can be categorized as: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. These three components can be briefly described as: the identification of the problem or major elements of a situation; the articulation of a possible solution or method of resolution regarding the problem or situation; and the rationalization of action regarding the problem or situation.\textsuperscript{162} Within the same social movement, organizations often distinguish themselves by their prognostic and motivational frameworks. Motivational frameworks can reflect the militancy of a SMO in that those organizations with greater militancy will generally adhere more strictly to the framework of action that the SMO articulates to its members and the public. Articulation of motive can be seen in

\textsuperscript{1} Byron A. Miller, \textit{Geography and Social Movements. Comparing Antinuclear Activism in the Boston Area} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 124.
\textsuperscript{162} Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” \textit{Annual Review of Sociology} 26 (2000): 615-617.
the vocabulary that a group uses, and more militant organizations may use more severe and urgent descriptions of a given policy problem.

Movements and organizations are not alone in the act of framing. In fact, just as they engage in framing an issue, they themselves are being framed by other organizations, the state, and the media in order to affect the public discourse surrounding a given policy issue. By negatively framing a movement, the media engages in a form of taming or exclusion that helps to reinforce aspects of the political system. Positive framing has its problems as well. To achieve positive framing movement actors often engage in a closer relationship with the media. This can foster media dependency, in which a movement runs the risk of turning to revolutionary rhetoric in a non-revolutionary situation in order to fall into the media stereotypes that are linked to increased coverage and publicity, and it may highlight the political uncertainties that lie within a movement (such as the legitimacy of leaders, long term plans for change, etc.).

SMOs, the state, the media, and the public are all involved in framing in part because they all exist within the political environment that a movement is situated in. As discussed before, opportunity structures are elements of the political environment that impact the ability of an organization to influence policy. Many scholars believe that POS has the ability to impact framing, in that it can constrain or facilitate attempts at

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163 Ibid., 617.
15 Ibid., 285.
SMOs also engage in framing the POS within their discursive processes. For example, in this case study, one group clearly frames the existing political structure as rigid and flawed to the point of requiring a revolution in order to achieve its goal(s).

The goals of an SMO, or the desired outcome of a given tactic, are also subject to framing by the members of the SMO. This is what Verloo refers to as strategical framing by which organizations link one of their goals to the overall goal of a movement using a particular shared issue. The interpretation of success or failure by an SMO is often related to how the organization first diagnosed a particular situation, and how they explained the proposed solution and motivated its members toward a given action regarding the situation.

Ultimately, framing is important because a frame is the best statement regarding 'collective meaning' that can be deciphered from various portrayals of the movement, its actions, and its outcomes. In this case study, both organizations engage in different framing of the issue of homelessness and both groups are framed differently by the media and other actors in the policy domain in that one is perceived as more cooperative, and one is perceived as more contentious.

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167 Ibid., 631.
168 Ibid., 632.
Contentious Politics: Contention and Cooperation

This thesis examines two SMOs within the same social movement that differ from each other in their relationship with the state. The nature of their relationship with the state is defined as contentious and cooperative, concepts have been developed within the theories of the political process model. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly have all contributed to the understanding of contentious politics. Their definition of contentious politics is:

"Episodic, public collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants."¹⁷¹ In addition, many scholars identify contentious politics by the presence of some disruptive and unconventional actions.¹⁷² This type of contentious action has been observed by scholars in terms of poverty movements, in that often the actions that appear to achieve their goals are those that are more disruptive, and it is thought that poverty activists may demonstrate an inclination towards contentious actions in order to command attention in the political environment they operate within.¹⁷³ Contentious actions include such events as public demonstrations, protests, direct actions, acts of civil disobedience, or accountability sessions.¹⁷⁴ In contract, cooperative politics refers, generally, to a

¹⁷¹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5
¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 27.
relationship between parties that is based on agreement concerning the goal of an action
and includes collaboration for the purpose of reaching the given goal.\textsuperscript{175}

Contentious politics can be classified as either contained or transgressive contention.

Contained contention consists of institutional politics, in that it concerns cases of
contention “in which all parties are previously established actors employing well
established means of claims making.”\textsuperscript{176} Transgressive contention refers to the more
unconventional politics such as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of
claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of
claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interest of at
least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified
political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collection
action.”\textsuperscript{177}\textsuperscript{178} Claims making is the key action of, and a key element of the dynamic
relationship between, challengers and the powerholders.

\textsuperscript{175} Marco Giugni and Florence Passy, “Contentious Politics in Complex Societies: New
Social Movements Between Contention and Cooperation,” in ed. Marco Guigni, Doug
McAdam, and Charles Tilly, \textit{From Contention To Democracy} (Lanham: Rowan &
\textsuperscript{176} Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, \textit{Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings}. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7
\textsuperscript{177} Innovative action is defined as such when it includes claims, objects of claims,
collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are new or taboo to the regime.
See Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, \textit{Dynamics of Contention},
\textsuperscript{178} Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, \textit{Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
While initially contentious politics categorized groups into two distinct categories of either contentious or cooperative, more recent research by Giugni and Passy has explored the idea that some organizations may engage in "conflictual co-operation" with the state. In conflictual co-operation the traditional notions of institutionalization and co-operation are pushed aside to recognize that social movements may find ways in which to act with the state in a agreed upon manner within a given policy area. This does not mean that organizations agree completely with the state on a policy issue, but rather that they will work collaboratively with the state on certain actions to address an agreed upon policy problem. In other words, a group may not engage in contentious actions or behavior with the state, while at the same time they do not fully engage in complete cooperation with the state. This type of behavior is evident in the case study presented in Chapter 4, as one of the SMOs profiled has engaged in this contentious co-operation with the municipal government.

Conflict and cooperation are dichotomous concepts that clearly simplify the true nature of actors within the political environment, but they do so in a way that highlights crucial differences in the way that actors behave towards one another. Understanding the nature of these relationships is important to understanding how groups fit into the larger policy process, and why they achieve the influence on the process that they do. In using such oppositional concepts, it is important to keep in mind the possibility of oversimplification. The relationship that an SMO has with the state can fluctuate over

time, and with regards to specific issues and actions, and the limited ability of strict
categories such as conflict and co-operation can be overcome by the use of hybrid
concepts such as contentious co-operation.

The Policy Process

Understanding elements of the policy process, also described as the policy cycle, is key to
this case study. Howlett and Ramesh describe a policy cycle comprised of five stages:
agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy
evaluation. Each stage has its own sub-elements and purpose in the policy cycle. The
linear progress is not strictly abided by in every policy circumstance; rather, each stage
provides a basic schema by which to understand policy development, implementation and
feedback. The first stage of in the creation of any policy is agenda setting.

Under the model of Howlett and Ramesh, agenda setting it is defined as “the process by
which problems come to the attention of governments.” This stage explains how issues
become part of the government (also called institutional) or public (also called
systemic) agenda. The main distinction between the two is that when an issue is placed
on the institutional agenda it has become part of the policy process rather than simply an
issue for public discussion. Agenda setting can originate either from societal actors or
from the government. The goal of many social movement organizations is to get their

180 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, Policy Science and Political Science (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 11.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., 112.
issue on both the institutional and systemic agendas, and while this is not the only goal,\textsuperscript{183} it is vital for those organizations that seek to influence public policy. While agenda setting is a common and important goal for organizations, policy formulation is an important element of the policy process that also speaks to an organization's ability to influence policy. Policy formulation is defined as “the process by which policy options are formulated within government”.\textsuperscript{184} Policy formulation often involves multiple sets of actors, both within the government and the larger policy community. A policy community is the constellation of governmental and non-governmental actors that have a shared interest in a specific policy issue. This study focuses on the policy community concerned with the issues of poverty, and more specifically, homelessness.

According to the policy cycle model of Howlett and Ramesh a key component of policy formulation are policy subsystems. Policy subsystems are restricted to members who have some knowledge in the policy area, or related subjects that allow them to comment on the feasibility of options put forward to resolve policy problems.\textsuperscript{185} Subsystems vary greatly in their ability to influence policy formulation,\textsuperscript{186} as well as characteristics such as institutionalization. This thesis uses the concepts of policy communities and policy networks to refer to policy subsystems, and to discuss how an organization influences the


\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 125.

policy formulation stage. Agenda setting and policy formulation are points in the policy cycle that organizations can gain access or influence over. Decision making and implementation can be far more difficult to influence, as these stages often involve the government and bureaucracy as the main actors, if not the only actors. While decision-making is often what policy scholars focus on when evaluating the success of an organization at impacting government, it is certainly not the only area of the process in which groups can achieve influence or success.

Outcomes & Influence

Scholars have long been struggling to agree on a workable definition of social movement success – one that could be applied to various case studies and be methodically supported. They have failed to do so. Success, in terms of public policy in particular, has proven very difficult to measure. Previous attempts have focused on the media (i.e. Gitlin), relationships with the state (i.e. Phillips187), and self reflected measures by organizations themselves (i.e. Gamson). Inevitably, there are major “parameter control” problems188 that make empirical data weak and measuring success fundamentally problematic.

It is widely accepted in literature that contemporary social movements seek to change not just public policy, but also social values, and civil society.189 This provides for a large

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1 Susan Phillips, Projects, Pressure, and Perceptions of Effectiveness (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 285.
1 Ibid., 286.
number of aspects to include in analyzing the concepts of success in terms of social movements and organizations. Instead of focusing on success, this thesis focuses on the stage of the policy process that an organization achieves policy influence. This view of outcomes attempts to acknowledge that a group may achieve success in one area of the policy process and not in another. In other words, success may be achieved in one part of the policy process, and not only on a particular policy. As a consequence, this manner of examining influence and outcomes circumvents the problems of measuring policy results on a dichotomous classification of either success or failure.\textsuperscript{190} Alternatively, it seeks to place organizations along a spectrum of success.

**The Theoretical Framework**

The hypothesis of this thesis is that a more contentious group will target the public masses and influence the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, whereas the more cooperative organization will target the sub-government via policy networks and communities and influence the formulation stage of the policy process. It is a SMO's expertise and target audience that together determine the stage in the policy cycle that can be influenced. The distinct traits of an organization determine its ability to gain policy influence over specific parts of the process; where one group can achieve success another may fail, and vice versa.

\textsuperscript{190} As outlined by Charles Tilly in “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in ed. Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, \textit{How Social Movements Matter} (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 253-270.
Political opportunity structures explain how a contentious nature that characterizes the political relationship between an SMO and the state, at different levels, impacts its political opportunities and its ability to capitalize on opportunities. A more contentious group limits the opportunities that it will have, as well as that it can act on. In this way, POS helps to explain why policy influence occurs when it does.

Policy influence is also determined by the type of membership a group has. These days it is common for an SMO to have one or more experts as its core members; however, not all expertise is the same. If organizations rely on different epistemic communities to draw their expert members, they will end up with different knowledge guiding their SMOs and different networks supporting them. This in turn, impact policy influence, particularly in terms of the stages of the policy process.

The expertise of an organization determines, to some degree, the framing that it employs towards particular policy issues and social problems (such as homelessness). Experts from different backgrounds are likely to present different prognostic frames. In addition, the motivational frameworks used by SMOs can impact the POS that they operate within. An organization may find a POS more open or closed in response to the motivational framework espoused by its members.

To summarize, the expertise of a group impacts its framing of an issue, such as homelessness, particularly in terms of prognostic and motivational frameworks. Expertise in political organization (engaging in political actions, and framing issues as primarily
political) may result in framing an issue in a more contentious manner compared to
diverse expertise (from a variety of social, economic, and scientific backgrounds). The
framing of the issue impacts on the SMO’s ability to capitalize on political opportunities
via the political networks each group establishes. By its very nature, a more cooperative
group is more likely to have a great political network and use prognostic and motivational
frameworks that render it more likely to gain influence over the policy formulation stage
of the policy process.

Using the political process model, the opportunity structures surrounding the two case
study social movement organizations are explored in the next chapter. An understanding
of the contentious political nature of the SMOs is developed, as is the impact of that
nature on opportunities. In order to influence public policy organizations must have the
flexibility to act on opportunities, which means being able to maneuver within the policy
communities and networks in order to capitalize of opportunities within a policy domain.
In this way, political opportunity structure helps to explain why policy influence occurs
when it does. By electing to look at what stage of the policy process an organization
influences, this study circumvents the problems of measuring success or failure\textsuperscript{191}
categorically, and seeks to place organizations along a spectrum of success by
acknowledging that a group may achieve success in one area of the policy process and
not in another.

\textsuperscript{191} As outlined by Charles Tilly in “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social
Movements,” in ed. Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, \textit{How Social
Movements Matter} (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 253-270.
The purpose of this chapter was to lay the theoretical foundation for the analytical case study in Chapter 4. This thesis uses social movement theory to explore how SMOs differ in their ability to influence public policy. Various elements impact how an SMO behaves and what actions it selects from its repertoire in order to achieve specific goals of impact and influence on the policy process. The next chapter explains the differences between the two organizations in terms of their choices of action, tactics, and goals – as well as their own perception of their achievements. In doing so, certain elements of an SMO are shown to have an impact on what part of the policy process a group targets for influence and why they achieve the level of influence that they do using specific actions.
Chapter 4. Expertise & Influence

We put forward this basic theory of the defense: that we were a militant poor people's organization; that we were an anti-capitalist organization; that we were engaged in a struggle against an inhuman system and an inhuman government, and we were working for the defeat of that government.
– John Clarke (OCAP)\textsuperscript{192}

We declare homelessness as a national disaster, and demand that Canada end homelessness by implementing a fully-funded National Housing Program through the One Percent Solution.
– TDRC\textsuperscript{193}

The previous chapters illustrated that each social movement organization in this case study has distinct characteristics that make it unique within the poverty movement. This chapter attempts to address the main question: Does a more contentious organization have more influence over specific parts of the policy process than a more cooperative organization? The proposed hypothesis for this study, as stated in Chapter 1, is that the more contentious group target public masses and influence agenda setting stage of the policy process. By comparison the more cooperative organizations target the sub-government through policy networks and communities and consequently influence to formulation stage of the policy process. This chapter addresses the hypothesis in depth, using the two case study social movement organizations to as test cases.


This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, a major action from each group is examined in depth. The different elements of the action, such as the resources used, the expertise relied on, the target audiences for each organization, are explored as are the political environment involved in each action. This is followed by an analysis of the influence each action had on different parts of the policy process. The differences in influence between the two organizations are shown through the comparison in detail important actions for each organization. After this, a more in depth exploration of the hypothesis will be brought out to explain other smaller action by each group to support the argument that the expertise and target audience of an organization determines the stage of the policy cycle that is influenced successfully, and that the traits of each organization are related to its ability to succeed in different policy stages.

A Comparison of Major Actions: Queen’s Park vs. Tent City

**OCAP & Queen’s Park**

One of, if not the, most defining and memorable actions that OCAP has ever undertaken occurred early on June 15th, 2000. As Clarke summarized in an article: “The one action that seems to have offended the powers that be, perhaps more than any other, was the event on June 15th.”\(^{194}\) On this day and those that followed OCAP rose to notoriety in the public domain, thanks to the media coverage of a protest that became known as the

Queen’s Park Riot. OCAP describes the event as “a March of homeless people and supporters on the Legislature that demanded that the Government receive a delegation and deal with its grievances.” The leader of the group, Clarke, described the action as a “call to people in Ontario to ‘fight to win’” and “a challenge to the Government.” The focus of the event was to demand that the Provincial Conservative government take action on the issue on the growing crises of homelessness. Estimates for the number of those in attendance varies from over 1,000 to 1,500 people. OCAP had made even greater plans than simply showing up at Queen’s Park. They demanded that a delegation of those affected by homelessness, six members in total, be allowed to address a session of the Legislative Assembly. The organizers admit that they did not have much experience or knowledge of parliamentary procedure, and did not understand the extent of what they were asking. The police, including mounted police and riot squads, moved to clear the parliamentary grounds. What happened next was not pre-planned, or instructed, and came as much as a surprise to the organizers as to the police: The crowd did not disperse. The crowd stood their ground, and the conflict escalated. It was at this point that the infamous ‘riot’ is considered to have begun.

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The outcomes of the Queen’s Park Riot were plentiful. Numerous protestors were arrested from the clash with the police, including up to one half of whom were homeless, and consequently had difficulty getting out of jail (posting bail, etc.). The most well publicized arrests in July 2000 were those of the “three people viewed as ‘leaders’ of a social movement that Police Intelligence described in Court as a ‘criminal organization’.” The three leaders referred to were members of OCAP, and prominent activists within the organization: Stefan Pilipa, Gaetan Heroux, and John Clarke.

The gist of the charges was that the protest was actually a ‘planned riot’ which included a plan to storm the legislature, and that the three participated in, or in the case of Clarke counselled others to participate in, a riot and assault police. This was viewed in the activist community as a nuisance or an outlandish punishment by the Harris government on unruly protestors. In the end the jury became deadlocked, and the trial was ultimately declared a mistrial, but the trial was heavily discussed in the media, and in activist and political circles. OCAP gained support from numerous organizations in the community.

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198 Ibid.
200 It is important to note that Clarke, in his public statements regarding the trial, stated that his group intended to engage in a “militant demonstration”. It only became a riot because of “an arrogant Government”. John Clarke, “What’s At Stake In The ‘Queen’s Park Riot’ Jury Trial,” North Eastern Federation of Anarchist Communists [website on-line]; available from http://nefac.net/en/node/357; Internet; accessed 10 November 2007.
including CUPE Ontario, the political wing of the largest union in Canada. Other activists feared that this was a form of political intimidation on the part of the state that, if allowed, could then be used by the government to silence any activist or political organization that speaks at or participates in a political demonstration that turns violent. It was seen by many as an attempt to criminalize political activism, and articles written by OCAP and other activists encouraged this way of framing the state reaction to the event. The very fact that the state and media labeled the protest a riot helped gather support from the activist community of which OCAP was a member.

OCAP also saw a huge media backlash with the so-called riot and the trial that followed. This is not to say that OCAP had not received negative press before over issues such as the occupation of the Allen Gardens Park in 1999; however, the amount of media coverage alone on this action exceeded others. The bad press did not seem to bother organizers too much, as Clarke once told a reporter for Eye Weekly magazine “...bad media is an occupational hazard -- like getting arrested.” Clearly, bad media is an unintended, but not un-envisioned, consequence of action. Examples of bad media surrounding the organization abound. After the Allen Gardens episode, OCAP was referred to as “a tiny, motley collection of ultra-Marxist publicity hounds, who dribble

203 Ibid.
away as soon as the television cameras are switched off.”

Perhaps the worst of the bad press, has not been those articles that are character attacks on the organization, but rather those that suggest that OCAP is not really getting anything accomplished for the homeless. One Canadian Free Press article in June 2003 at the end of the mistrial question stated “[w]hat all this has done to improve the lot of the genuine homeless is unknown.” The last comments points to an important question, that is: What does media – good or bad- do for an issue such as homelessness?

First, it does not spare the homeless themselves from any bad press. The poor and the homeless have also been affected by bad media surrounding OCAP actions such as the Queen’s Park Riot. There is a belief that OCAP, with its confrontational manner, hardens the hearts of the public against the plight of the poor. As Rosie Dimmano wrote in the *The Sun* concerning one of the first major OCAP actions “.... If anything, the homeless have been rendered less sympathetic by the actions encouraged and stage-managed by Clarke, and his discredited Ontario Coalition Against Poverty.”

There have even been media reports that seek to remove the fallacy that all the homeless love OCAP. As a homeless man from Tent City was reported saying in *the National Post* that OCAP

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"...draws too much heat on homeless people."²⁰⁸ OCAP's actions have provided an opportunity for the media to launch a framing campaign of their own – sometimes negative for both OCAP and the homeless, and at other times clearly more positive.

Others in the media champion OCAP, and their contentious style, arguing that the organization pushes Canadians to recognize that they live in democratic nation where everyone has a voice. An action, like the Queen’s Park Riot, may not directly result in much more than beating, arrests, bad publicity, and trials; however, it may in the long run increase the overall media presence to a group and its issues, and force a debate concerning the political constituency of the homeless, and to prove, for a brief moment that the homeless can be political organized and can be heard.²⁰⁹ In this way, media attention is positive and beneficial to the organization and its issue.

The march on Queen’s Park is only one OCAP event that was aimed at bringing homelessness to the attention of the government. The march was a success in that it certainly brought attention to the issue of homelessness and poverty in Toronto, and helped place it on the public, if not the political agenda. It also helped increase the profile of OCAP within the policy community at large. There were also negative impacts associated with the event, such as the arrests, and the fact that the Ontario government did not change their policy. The risk that protests will result not in successful policy changes is acknowledge by OCAP, in such instances as the 1996 Days of Action rallies in

Toronto, which opposed the Harris government social cuts, that leader Clark described as a failure “because they didn't culminate in a decisive action.”

*TDRC & Tent City*

One of the earlier projects that TDRC became involved in was supporting those homeless living in Tent City in Toronto. Tent city was an autonomous creation by homeless individuals along a piece of land on the waterfront in downtown Toronto. A collection of tents, shacks, and lean-tos began appearing circa 1998. TDRC began working on the issue because they were asked for help in acquiring supplies for residents, and soon they found it to be a viable action for the organization to participate in. Despite public attention and political concerns, the makeshift city persisted until September 24, 2002, when the property's owners, Home Depot, decided to evict the residents using a private security force. One reason likely for the sudden decision to shut down the city was its population growth in 2002. Over the years the city did not have a stable population, and in the winter of 2002 the population went from seventeen to fifty. Suddenly what had been a small concern became a much bigger one.

While Tent City existed TDRC worked to support and politicize it. The organization sought to frame Tent City as a housing issue, and they did this by supporting the residents

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through aid in bettering their shelter conditions. The organization brought in heating for
the residents through wood stoves. They brought in prefabricated houses for the
residents, and they brought in portable toilets. Each of these acts helped to sustain those
in Tent City and improve their housing situation. It also helped to force politicians to look
at housing solutions, and public health officials to look at the consequences of inadequate
sanitation facilities for the homeless. In short, it showed the government and
bureaucracy of Toronto that homelessness was not without its own solutions, but that
there was a lack of will on the part of those who were to serve their citizens. TDRC did
not manage to politicize Tent City by itself, as the project has its support in Toronto City
Council. Members like Jack Layton helped to get the prefabricated housing units into
Tent City, and Olivia Chow worked on the pilot project that got residents housing after
Tent City was closed down.

Tent City was a success, in part, by being an ultimate failure. The activists working with
Tent City had tried to secure housing in various ways over the course of the City’s
existence. Some methods, such as getting the City of Toronto to purchase the land, and
plans to build more friendly and low cost permanent housing did not come to fruition. In
the end though, after the eviction and the political storm that TDRC activists and Tent
City citizens unleashed on City Hall both physically and in the media, the majority of

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215 Catherine Dunphy, “Tent City residents come in from the cold; Two more housing units delivered to shantytown,” *Toronto Star*, 21 December 2001, 03(B)
residents found housing. More optimistically, eighteen months later many of them still had it. TDRC worked with the city on the Emergency Homelessness Pilot Project that was created as a response for the need to house Tent City residents. TDRC representatives sat on a Steering Committee for the project, which was a form of rent supplement program combined with housing assistance, that started on September 26, 2002. The Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) delivered the pilot project. In 2004, a report was produced outlining the success of the program. Overall, out of 118 tenants that began the program in 2002, 112 were still in the program in 2004. This means that they were still in housing, being supported by the program. Of those that left the program: two were deceased, two were working and chose not to continue the program, and two were out of town. Overall, the costs associated with the program, per person, worked out to a savings of almost $5,000 annually compared with the cost of housing someone in the shelter system. The program was and continues to be a success for those lucky enough to be in it: the former residents of Tent City. It is a success that TDRC has framed as a policy victory of sorts, as Cathy Crowe states in the final scene from Shelter From The Storm, a documentary about TDRC and Tent City.

216 Gloria Gallant, Joyce Brown, and Jacques Tremblay, From Tent City To Housing. An Evaluation of the City of Toronto's Emergency Homelessness Pilot Project, City of Toronto, June 2004, 5.
217 Gloria Gallant, Joyce Brown, and Jacques Tremblay, From Tent City To Housing. An Evaluation of the City of Toronto's Emergency Homelessness Pilot Project, City of Toronto, June 2004, 23.
218 The costs for the EHPP were $11,631 per person per year while accommodation in the shelter system is estimated at $16,156 per year. See Gloria Gallant, Joyce Brown, and Jacques Tremblay, From Tent City To Housing. An Evaluation of the City of Toronto's Emergency Homelessness Pilot Project, City of Toronto, June 2004, 32.
It is important to conclude this section by stating what most activists and politicians in Toronto know: that neither TDRC nor OCAP operate their campaigns or actions exclusively on their own. They get support from other organizations and outside activists, including each other, on actions. While not all of the SMOs believe in the same tactics, they do have many in common and will extend various levels of support to one another. TDRC and OCAP have often worked together on protests, etc. For example, TDRC had a presence at the Queen Park Riot, and its spokesperson Cathy Crowe was working there as a health care worker treating those injured in the protest. TDRC often urges their supporters to attend OCAP events, and states in media communiqués that they support various OCAP actions (i.e. the occupation of an abandoned building, etc.). Table 2 below summarizes the key characteristics of the key example action by each SMO.

Table 2. A Comparison of Queen’s Part and Tent City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Queen’s Park (OCAP)</th>
<th>Tent City (TDRC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Action</td>
<td>Provincial &amp; Municipal</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>Municipal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks/Allies</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Activist, Community, Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Empowerment of homeless through voice and action; get representative to speak to Provincial politicians</td>
<td>Improve living conditions/ provide housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Protest; relatively uncontrolled</td>
<td>Varied: protests, discussions with city council members, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Empowerment, media</td>
<td>Housing, sanitary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing behavior</th>
<th>OCAP: “riot” label a threat to activists and an attempt to criminalize protest</th>
<th>TDRC: Tent City is a housing issue; successful placement of former Tent City residents in social housing is a victory for the SMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures of success</td>
<td>Media Attention; confirmation of the right to protest</td>
<td>Housing for Tent City residence (via pilot project); direct input into housing projects at municipal level; improvement of lifestyle and health-sanitation situation for homeless in Tent City; working relationship with municipal officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessing Influence: Testing the Hypothesis

The hypothesis explored in this chapter is that a more contentious group will target the public masses and influence the agenda setting stage of the policy process, whereas the more cooperative organization will target the sub-government via policy networks and communities and influence the formulation stage of the policy process. The two actions explored in the previous section will be examined vis-à-vis the various aspects of the framework, such as political opportunity structure, the influence of resources, including expertise, and policy networks and communities.

Political opportunity structures are one component of the political environment. Tarrow defines POS as “consistent --but not necessarily formal, permanent or national—dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from
using collective action. \(^{220}\) SMOs must capitalize on opportunity structures in order to ensure influence. In this case study, the POS relating to homelessness underwent a change as housing and social policy became the policy domain primarily administered and governed by local, municipal governments in conjunction with the overseeing of provincial governments. The national government was removed from the equation, and absolved of responsibility though it still allocates funding for various homeless and housing initiatives it does not run the programs (with the exception of the NHI). While housing activists do not think that a lack of Federal involvement is ideal, and have stated as much, the shift to the municipal and provincial levels have made policy networks and communities related to homelessness more accessible to activists. Currently, there are multiple governments that can be targeted for actions by SMOs working on homelessness with regards to funding amounts. Funding demands can sensibly be made to any government - municipal, provincial, and federal – as each allocates funds to relevant programs such as housing and health. Program specific actions must be focused on those organizations that administer them, which are usually found in one level of government, often municipal in today’s current policy environment. For example, TDRC’s action on Tent City was largely related to the municipal city council. They sought specific action about a specific problem. This was in contrast to OCAP’s Queens Park Action that was primarily aimed at the Ontario government. The policy arena for housing and homelessness has moved away from the federal sphere of politics, bring the possibility for access and influence closer to the public, and non-governmental organizations, such as those working on the issue of homelessness.

One of the consequences of this shift in the overall political structures is that organizations have more opportunities for actions to have impact, in that they can specifically target the municipal government funding and programs in order to create impact and change. Another consequence is that the municipal government has become familiar with the groups, and in the case of OCAP the municipal policy network and community has closed itself off from the group as a consequence of actions. Actions are comprised of two distinct elements. There are targets (i.e. the Ontario Government, the Safe Streets Act), tactics (i.e. erecting tents in a park for the homeless), and goals (i.e. temporary shelter for the homeless, raising public awareness, forcing politicians and bureaucrats to confront the issue, etc.). All are necessary for an action to be considered a planned, organized event with political intent. The target is defined as who and/or what claims are being made against, the tactics provide the methods and mechanisms for the expression of the challengers, and the goal is what the group is attempting to achieve by taking action.

Outcomes of actions vary greatly, even within the same policy domain and when dealing with the same political opportunity structure. The goal of any group is to promote political change, often in the form of changes in policy decisions. Positive influence on policy decisions is largely, as seen in Chapter 3, one measure of success held by any SMO. Influence is tied into the policy networks and communities that surround a policy issue. Influence at the sub-government stage requires that groups belong to both the appropriate policy community (the group of all potential actors involved in the policy
discourse) and the right networks (the subset of the policy community that interacts regularly on a given policy issue) in order to exact the effect. The distinction between community and network matters in this study as an SMO can be part of a policy community, while not necessarily being part of the policy network. Moreover, those organizations positioned differently in the policy community, or within the policy network, operating in a given POS are not going to be able to exact the same influence as others.

**Capitalizing on Political Opportunities: Using Policy Networks and Communities**

Political opportunity combines with actions to produce the results of said action. Elements of POS shape how an action is received in the political arena, and that is the ultimate result of the action. In Chapter 3 the criteria of POS were laid out as the openness of the political system, the stability of the elite alignments related to policy, the presence of elite allies, and the state’s ability and propensity for repression. The POS that the SMOs in this case study face are similar in terms of basic elements. In Canada, SMOs face an open media and public discussion forum, and a relatively low propensity to repress political groups. The stability of the elites, as far as policy creation has been fairly stable over the years that OCAP and TDRC have worked on the issue of homelessness, in that the democratic structures remain intact and the policy domain has been largely municipally based for program delivery, and stable in terms of the funding structures. What have changed are the political parties in power, and the overall composition of the elites and possible elite allies.

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Based on this preliminary analysis, it would seem that the groups would face an open and similar, perhaps even exactly the same, opportunity structure; however, this is not entirely accurate. It is important to remember that POS differ at different levels of government. Targeting one level may present different opportunities than another. In the case of TDRC and Tent City, they target the municipal government, and they had elite allies, such as Jack Layton on City Council, within the policy domain. TDRC used their networks within the municipal political structure and within their social activist community to get resources to share with the community (i.e. the woodstoves) and to ultimately access the policy formulation stage of the Emergency Homeless Pilot Project. TDRC has used the same methods, networking through the related policy community with elites such as politicians, the business community, and through activist networks.

In contrast, OCAP targeted the provincial level of government in the Queen’s Park Riot. They sought to access the political system in order to make claims against the state on behalf of homeless people. OCAP did not have any political elites championing their cause, and in the end the action ensured that they would have little support from provincial elites in the future. They did have support from the political activist community, which helped generate the large number of protestors in the action, as well as the support during the trial of the OCAP members. In the end, OCAP contributed to a discussion about homelessness, while also generating a great deal of public discussion around protesting rights, and militant activism.
These differences between the two organizations extend beyond the major actions used in the first section of this chapter. For example, while TDRC attends meetings such as the Advisory Council, and even City Council, and participates by and large in an accepted political manner according to those in the system, while OCAP does not. OCAP is known for "crashing" council meetings, disturbing the course of the agenda, and generally creating havoc, to the point where they were banned from city hall. In this case, previous OCAP actions have appeared to close a previously open process at least where they are concerned. In some part because they refused to participate in the manner deemed appropriate by the political community that they find themselves seeking to influence. Table 3, below, provides a comparative summary of the key elements of the POS that each SMO faced.

**Table 3. Political Opportunity Structures for OCAP and TDRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POS Element</th>
<th>OCAP</th>
<th>TDRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Political System</td>
<td>Fairly open</td>
<td>Fairly open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Elite Alignments</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Elite Allies</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present (few)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Repression (Capacity &amp; Propensity)</td>
<td>Propensity – yes</td>
<td>Propensity – None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity – somewhat</td>
<td>Capacity - Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(leaders, and vulnerable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>activists)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS shifts specific to organization</td>
<td>Moderate – Targeted by</td>
<td>Slight – provided room to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>municipal level political</td>
<td>participate in certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structures to limit and</td>
<td>municipal level political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restrict contact and</td>
<td>structures (positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation (negative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The POS for one group differs from the other, mainly because of the more transitory elements of the structures -in this case elites within municipal, provincial, and federal

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222 Councillor Jane Pitfield, interview by author, tape recording, Toronto-Ottawa, ON, 2006.
politics—have been altered by the groups’ behavior. OCAP has alienated itself from the political elites by placing itself in direct odds with them, by making them a target in its contentious actions. To illustrate, OCAP has managed to get itself banned from City Hall, apparently due to its antics of crashing meetings, and barging into the Mayor’s office, though individual activists affiliated with the group still manage to make it into some of the Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated persons. TDRC has chosen to work more cooperatively with the elites when it benefited their cause. Examples of working with the elites include meeting with municipal officials to attempt to force more shelter beds for emergency use, or sitting on the Advisory Committee at City Hall. This trend also speaks to the nature of the groups. OCAP, being much more contentious in terms of general behavior, framing, and its relationship with the state, is more likely to see the elites and state as their opponents, and seek to fight them on issues rather than work with them. TDRC, in contrast, displays more conflictual cooperation, meaning that while they do not agree with the politics or policies that the elites or state has promoted, the organization is willing to work with the elites and state to move towards better policies regarding homelessness.

In part, a SMO’s ability to take actions that capitalize on potential opportunities is related to its expertise, in that the knowledge base of experts can steer an organization towards certain types of action. Without expertise in a particular policy area, or without an understanding of the epistemic community that already exists in a policy network, organizations may simply not be able to select the proper tactics to reach their goals, or

223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
they may simply be unable to participate in the dominant policy discourse of a sub-
government on a given issue. It is the experts in an organization that impact the
prognostic and motivational frames that an organization uses, which in turn impact both
the organizations ability to use their networks and communities to their advantage and
gain access to specific parts of the policy process. OCAP’s political expertise steers it
towards symbolic actions, as well as more limited casework as this is where the
organizations expertise lies and where it can impact the policy process the most. To do
this, it must rely on the political prognosis provided by its experts that a revolution is
necessary as is militancy towards the state, which results in a politically contentious
relationship. In comparison, TDRC’s expertise provides the organization with a wealth of
knowledge on a variety of issues related to homelessness allowing them to speak to the
state with authority granted from the relevant epistemic communities, which in turn
provides them with the option of working cooperatively with the state on certain actions,
while still arguing for greater change (thus engaging in a contentious cooperative
relationship with the state). In this way, the role of experts within the membership of a
SMO impacts the organization’s relationship with the state as well as its ability to create
and capitalize on opportunities.

In response, perhaps, to the closing of political opportunities, OCAP has branched out
into other issues. It seems as though much of the campaigns, if they can be called that,
regarding homelessness, are now focused on those that infringe on the rights of those
struggling in the streets to get by. Recently, the attention that OCAP has given to events
like evictions (for example, the eviction of Chris Gardener who lived under a Gardener
expressway overpass for years in Toronto), or on panhandling bylaws, do not address causes of homelessness, but rather address the state’s desire to restrict the ability of those on the street to get by on their own.

SMOs decide on actions in part based on their identity. Another important factor is their resources. Funding is the resource that is most often examined, and not without reason as it clearly impacts an SMO’s ability to mount certain types of actions; however, the two organizations involved in this study do not differ greatly in the type of funding that they have (i.e. where it comes from), though they do differ in how it is spent. The executive committee of TDRC does not receive any salary or stipends for their work. OCAP pays one to two full time organizers (depending on its budget) to manage their affairs. OCAP clearly values the time and management work that its professional organizers provide the organization. The difference between the two organizations is that TDRC’s executive committee is composed of volunteer experts from different backgrounds. There are health workers, social workers, businessmen, and academics, and each contribute their knowledge to guide the organization in its actions. In contrast, OCAP’s actions are guided by professional political organizers. To this end, the two SMOs profiled are different not only in their type of actions (contentious vs. cooperatively-contentious), but also in the expertise guiding their actions.
Influence & The Policy Process

There was a certain irony in the fact that Shapcott was meeting with officials in the Prime Minister's office last fall when Clarke and 200 demonstrators were outside on Parliament Hill getting pepper-sprayed by the Mounties.  

225 - Linda Hurst

Influence on public policy is often difficult to determine. Many factors go into policy making, which is why it makes sense to break the policy process into stages and study the possibility of influence at each one separately. At the beginning of Chapter 2, the first couple stages of the policy process were explained: agenda setting and policy formulation. These are the areas examined in this case study, as they are often the areas associated with success for SMOs. OCAP and TDRC seek to raise awareness of the issue of homelessness, both in the eyes of the public and in the sub-government. They do so with the hope that this will contribute to reaching their ultimate goals, as well as specific goals associated with different actions.

Actions, as described in the previous section, are related to the expertise that exists as a resource within the SMO. It is commonplace for contemporary SMOs to rely on a set of experts in order to participate in policy formulation within a policy network and, more particularly, to persuade policy makers in the sub-government towards the organization's policy positions. This is due to the rise of need of the state for specialized knowledge, which is seen in the rise of the importance of epistemic communities (see Chapter 2).

Experts within the membership of an SMO straddle two distinct communities, that of the policy issue at hand (i.e. homelessness), and that of their epistemic knowledge. Members participate in the policy process through the SMOs by representing their epistemic community as experts. The SMOs in this case has different expertise, and as a consequence the expertise becomes relevant to the influence that an organization has on the policy process. Because of its professional organizers OCAP is creative and successful at engaging in disruptive public protests and similar actions. These actions garner a fair amount of media attention, particularly in Toronto where the majority of the actions take place. The actions goals are largely to disrupt the institutional political system and call attention to the act and the reasons behind it. Without professional organizers, it would be unlikely that OCAP could manage to mount these sorts of well planned out though loosely coordinated actions. Organizers are key to the success of these types of actions. The expertise of the organizers comes into play when creating, planning, and executing the actions. These types of actions are limited to influencing the public agenda, which in turn helps to influence the government agenda. This is done and can be seen in the amount of media coverage and discussion an SMO can generate over time about an issue. OCAP has done this; however, its tactics have been both applauded by the activist community (not all of it, but a large portion), and condemned by some media members. The group’s actions sometime over shadow the message, which some would argue is the case with the Queen’s Park Riot – the name alone illustrates this particular issue. The organizers in OCAP chose repeatedly to engage in these types of actions, and by consequence they are choosing to attempt to influence the agenda setting part of the policy process.
Compared to OCAP, TDRC capitalizes on its networks of different individuals with different backgrounds when conceiving of actions. The SMO chooses to engage with the state and elites in order to influence the policy process beyond agenda setting. Tent City illustrated that an SMO can gain access to the policy formulation part of the process by creating a relationship with the sub-government. This is in part due to the diverse background of TDRC and its ability to provide expertise beyond political agitation. The academics, health experts, and social workers that work for TDRC are able to contribute to the expert advise that the state and elites of today’s democratic nations require and include in policy discussions. Because of this, TDRC is able to participate in policy formulation, and not only agenda setting. Even so, TDRC does engage in agenda setting on the municipal level as well. Through its constant presence at city hall, the SMO never allows the city councillors to forget that homelessness is an important issue in the city.

The policy influence on housing and homelessness in Toronto is occurring in the municipal sphere. This is yet another reason why both groups have experienced a degree of success at the different policy stages. Housing and shelter actions face problems of having their objects (social housing, more shelter beds, etc.) being governed, essentially, by two different levels of government. This means that actions must be successful at convincing two levels of government to take (roughly) the same type of action. If they are not, then an action can fail. An example of this is TDRC’s attempt to get the old Princess Margaret Hospital in Toronto open for shelter. Initially, a TDRC rally in support of the shelter appeared to have induced the provincial government to act, as on November 2nd,
the Ontario Municipal Affairs Minister Tony Clement made a statement that the province would donate the building to the city on the condition that it be used for either 500 hostel beds or 200 affordable housing units. The problem that arose was that Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman would not accept the conditions as he wanted only 100 people housed there. The city's hostel services director agreed with Lastman's argument that the site was unsuitable for a 500-bed shelter. It seemed none of the organizations working on the issue could get a municipal politician or bureaucrat onside. Recently, OCAP paid attention to the possibility of using the old armories as temporary shelters, especially during the winter months when the homeless face the cold that claimed so many lives in the mid-1990s. OCAP announced on its website in 2006 that the armory battle had been won.

There are other ways in which the tiered levels of government work against activist on housing and homelessness in Toronto, and again, TDRC has experience dealing with them. While in the previous example the problem lay in the ability to convince all level of the state to work together and to get on the same page, there are also simple miscommunications, and improper targeting that result in loss of opportunities for action and success. An example of this is TDRC’s desire for local armories to be used for emergency shelters in the winter. In 2002, TDRC learned that the Federal Government had granted permission for the buildings to be used as shelters – if the city asked. The city did not, and TDRC found out about the federal grant too late to mount a campaign or

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action. Confusion within City Hall was given the blame, as according to City Councilor Jack Layton, there was funding available.²²⁸

An important element in examining social movements and their organizations is the ability to sustain collective actions. During the life-span of each SMO they have also launched ongoing campaigns, as well as short term projects. Some projects are completed with success or failure, and some are set aside to be worked on again later after some more immediate crisis is over. Social researchers should not ignore the frequencies of successful actions taken by a given SMO; however, looking at each and every action or demand of each group is well beyond the scope of this study. It would be remiss to fail to mention that success does not happen consistently for either group. Take, for example, the fallout of the Tent City episode for TDRC. While those in Tent City have appeared to be successful at getting into and keeping their social housing, other homeless since then have not been. Why? Because the City of Toronto has not responded to the needs of other homeless citizens in the same way. Activists attribute the success of the former Tent City residents in keeping their housing to the rent supplements that were provided to them. Rent supplements top up what individuals receive under social assistance in order to help pay rent. After Tent City more small groups of street people have been swept out of other areas around Toronto, but in many cases they were not offered rent supplements. When an enclave of homeless were removed by city workers from under Bathurst Bridge in 2004, they were offered social housing, however, without additional assistance like rent

supplements, many could not afford the housing they were 'offered'. Tent City’s success has not meant success for other homeless people in Toronto, though it did secure social housing for the vast majority of those who lived in Tent City at the time of eviction. Clearly, one action does not affect all policy. Policy actions and decisions can be as local and specific as the government wants. Table 4, below, summarizes the key analytical points regarding the influence each SMO exhibited on various actions.

Table 4. Analysis of Influence by OCAP & TDRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Target Level</th>
<th>Influence?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCAP</strong></td>
<td>Casework</td>
<td>Municipal, Provincial</td>
<td>Various – welfare program implementation reform, stopped evictions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TDRC</strong></td>
<td>Tent City</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Housing (pilot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 % Solution Campaign</td>
<td>Municipal, Provincial, National</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCAP</strong></td>
<td>Queen’s Park</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Media attention; attention of provincial politicians; restricted access to political powerholders; arrests; litigation; media/public opinion backlash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political office/meetings crashing</td>
<td>Provincial, Municipal</td>
<td>Success at disrupting operations; called attention to organizations and demands; arrests; charges; banning from premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TDRC</strong></td>
<td>SCPI</td>
<td>Municipal, Provincial, National</td>
<td>Notice of Motion for Funding Renewal request (J31) April 26, 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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| Heat Waves Campaigns | Municipal | More community awareness; better cooling center hours, etc. |

*Note:* Tent City existed for a four-year period, during which TDRC showed various support for it, consequently it has been framed as a sustained, long-term action.

**Conclusion**

The expertise guiding a group is a key element in selecting actions that influence certain parts of the policy process, as are the networks and political opportunity structures that an SMO can capitalize. Without the proper POS and networks in place, an SMO will not have the same ability to influence the policy process as one more properly positioned within its political environment and community. An SMO with a diverse expertise that is relevant to the cause being championed is more likely to gain influence over the policy formulation stage than those without a diverse expertise. An SMO with expertise in political organization is more likely to be successful at the agenda setting stage of the policy cycle, with the possibility of a greater success in setting the public agenda than that of the government. The impact of an SMO’s expertise is best perceived in the organization’s ability to engage in framing that will allow the organization to capitalize on POS using political networks.
Chapter 5. Conclusion: Cooperative vs. Contentious Expertise

The argument made in this thesis suggests that the type of expertise found within a Social Movement Organization (SMO) impacts the stage of the policy process that the organization targets and the level of influence that the organization achieves. The nature of the expertise is related to the characteristics of an SMO in that certain types of SMOs encourage certain types of membership basis that include specific types of epistemic knowledge. The knowledge of the expertise within the membership of an SMO impacts the organization’s relationship with the state – at various levels – and consequently impacts the ability of the organization to influence different parts of the policy process.

The expert knowledge within an organization, and its impact of the framing strategy of an organization, partly determines the political opportunity structures that a group will identify and choose to capitalize, and in turn, impacts the development of further opportunities.

This final chapter summarizes the findings of this study and indicates how the research questions were addressed. It also acknowledges the problems and weaknesses of the case study, and provides suggestions for further research in the study of social movements organizations. The final section of this chapter provides a summary on the issue of homelessness in Toronto.

Research Findings
This study sought to answer the question: Does a more contentious organization have more influence over specific parts of the policy process than a more cooperative organization? It was hypothesized that a more contentious group would target the public masses and influence the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, whereas the more cooperative organization would target the sub-government via policy networks and communities and influence the formulation stage of the policy process. The combination of expertise and target audience of an organization determines which stage in the policy cycle is influenced. The distinct traits of an organization determine its ability to gain policy influence over specific parts of the process; where a contentious group may achieve influence over agenda setting, the other may achieve influence over policy creation.

From the case study analysis in Chapter 4, it is clear that contentious actions can close off and restrict the opportunities that a political system presents to organizations so far as policy is concerned. The opposite is also true: more cooperative organizations may find an expanded amount of opportunities, through alliances with elites and access to decision-makers, which impacts the organization's ability to influence specific parts of the policy process. The question of a cooperative organization being able to open up political opportunity structures and capitalize on opportunities more effectively than a contentious group was addressed through the examination of networks and communities. A cooperative group is likely to have more positive relationships with other actors in a given community and more links in a policy networks than a contentious groups.
Networks, and a central position in the community, allow groups to capitalize on opportunities when they are identified.

The ability to capitalize on opportunities based on framing, expertise and policy networks, translated into more policy gains in specific parts of the policy process. More gains were achieved by the cooperative organization, TDRC, than the contentious organization within the same policy environment. Analysis revealed that policy gains can be achieved at various stages of the policy process – at formulation as well as implementation. The case study illustrated that TDRC affected policy at the formulation stage, as it did through its work on Tent City. OCAP affected policy at the implementation stage, which it did through its work on evictions.\(^{230}\) It is important for future research to keep all aspects of policy and programs in mind when looking at the question of “success”.

**Problems in Analysis**

A concern in this study was the incredibly low response rate in requests for interviews with different actors. In the end, because of a lack of participants, interview evidence became merely anecdotal, as only one person from the municipal bureaucracy, one municipal politician, and one organization’s representative were willing to sit and talk about this policy issue. The Ontario government completely refused to allow any interviews. Scholars, other activists, and professionals declined or did not respond to requests. While interviews are not always necessary, they are helpful when trying to

determine how public policy is affected, and how that affectation is perceived by
different actors involved in a given policy issue.

Had there been more time and resources for research, a more thorough examination of
related policy domains (like health, welfare, etc.) would have been included in analysis.
Particularly on social policy issues, it seems naïve to not examine related policy domains.
Particularly when looking at political opportunity structures where a development in a
related domain may well impact and shift the structure of another. This approach would
clearly take more effort, but the results would be both interesting and, perhaps, revealing.

The fact that both groups have failed to meet their larger goals, such as revolution and the
end of homelessness in Toronto, seemed to make an evaluation of success unfeasible. To
overcome the narrow definitions of success, the concept of policy outcomes and
achievements in specific parts of the policy process was used. Individual policy gains and
losses themselves could be used in the future to evaluate impact and overall success,
though that would require an additional step that was outside of the theoretical
framework created and used in the study.

**Future Research**

One of the goals of this paper was to expand on the use of policy networks and
communities in combination with social movement theories. Networks and communities
have consistently proven to be flexible conceptual tools to understand the political
process, and in this study they help to explain how organizations capitalize on
opportunities to exact policy gains. The concepts are good tools to enrich the political process model, and both should be used to evaluate how the same policy domain can appear to have two different political opportunity structures depending on the actors. The concept of different subsystems of opportunity is an area that would make for a fascinating study of the dynamics of the political system.

Another area of development for further study in political opportunity structures would be to examine the impact that changes in one policy domain would have on another. Homelessness in Toronto brought this to life, as actors such as Cathy Crowe, spokesperson for TDRC, is active in homelessness as well as health care. She is an active participant in both policy networks in the city of Toronto, and encourages other to straddle multiple areas. If a gain is made in one domain or on one issue, it may well be possible that effects are felt in another. More research on this issue would enrich the understanding of policy domains and political opportunity structures.

**Homelessness: Where Toronto Is Now**

On February 20, 2008 a homeless Aboriginal man froze to death in Toronto. OCAP stormed city hall, successfully, for the first time in years. As they stated from their website, the situation regarding homelessness and shelter use in Toronto is little better and fairing worse than in 1996: “Before this winter even began, five shelters in the downtown core were shut down. The total number of hostel beds lost was 312... Over the last decade the city has refused to address the serious over-crowding and lack of beds
that exist in the shelter system.\textsuperscript{231} The group is currently working on a campaign highlighting the failure and poor state of public housing in Toronto, as well as the problems with overcrowding and lack of access to safe shelters in the city.

Even more recently, on January 10, 2009 a homeless man trying to escape from the cold in an ATM lobby, accidently set himself on fire and was so badly burned he later died at hospital.\textsuperscript{232} He had been previously rejected from some of the Toronto shelters. Circumstances such as this ensure that organizations such as TDRC have much work to do. TDRC continues to move forward in the struggle to secure more housing. They are currently running a new declaration based campaign called Make Housing Not War.\textsuperscript{233} This campaign aims at pressuring the federal government to allocate money it is currently spending on military efforts towards housing program, what the organization calls a “make housing not war strategy”. In a release regarding this new strategy, the group points out that the recent United Nations Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate housing acknowledged the depth of the issue of homelessness in Canada. The Rapporteur issued a report urging the federal government to step up to solve this problem: “The Federal Government needs to commit stable and long-term funding and programmes to realize a

comprehensive national housing strategy, and to co-ordinate actions among the provinces and territories, to meet Canada's housing rights obligations.”

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