

Responding to Constraints:
Foreign Policy Behavior in the Authoritarian Regimes of the Middle East

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ABSTRACT

Responding to Constraints:

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Sandra Helayel

This thesis investigates the primary constraints on the conduct of foreign policy in the Middle East. The region has been of primary importance in the international system throughout history. However, contemporary international relations debates have been unable to explain adequately the causes of certain foreign policy behaviors in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East. By investigating an international systemic theory, the power-bargaining approach, against subaltern realism, a theory created specifically to explain the foreign policies of developing states by looking into their domestic environments, this study attempts to establish a link between different types of constraints and foreign policy behavior. By testing each respective theory against two relevant case-studies, Egypt and Jordan, the investigation concludes that the Middle East is a unique region within the international system; consequently, in order to understand the foreign policy behaviors of its states, one must create a regionally-specific approach which takes into account the distinct characteristics of the Middle East and of the regimes in power. Finally, in most circumstances, international systemic constraints will play a constant role in the decision-making process in these regimes, while the effects of domestic constraints may vary throughout different time periods.

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Introduction

Research Question and Importance:

Is structural realism's power-bargaining approach able to explain the foreign policy behaviors of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, or are theories created to explain the Third World exclusively more adequate in this respect? More specifically, when a ruling elite faces great domestic as well as international pressure, are they more inclined to make foreign policy decisions which quell the internal threats to their regime, or are they likely to ignore this environment and instead respond to the demands of their powerful international allies? As the conclusion of this study will show, elites in the Middle East must respond to the primary threat to the survival of their regime, a threat that will always emanate from the international environment, but one that could be exacerbated by domestic circumstances.

Understanding the foreign policy behaviors of the authoritarian regimes in this region is important due to the fact that the Middle East remains of vital importance to the major powers and economies of the world. Furthermore, it is assumed that the region was always, and continues to be, one which is distinct and unique from other regions in the international system. Due to the fact that authoritarian regimes are still predominant in the Middle East, and understanding that regional conflict remains a destabilizing factor in the states' relations with one another, it is important to analyze how ruling elites respond to different pressures, and what, ultimately, serves as the basis for their foreign policy behaviors.

Although the Middle East is not comprised solely of authoritarian regimes, this analysis will pertain to the behaviors of these types of states exclusively. The reason

behind this decision is that the internal composition of the non-authoritarian regimes in the region diverges greatly from that of the authoritarian regimes. In order to control as much as possible for external factors, including divergent regime structures, I have chosen to exclude the exceptional non-authoritarian regime, and focus instead solely on authoritarian regimes, or the ones which comprise the majority of the states in the region. The composition of these regimes, although not identical, remains similar across the states; therefore, identifying behavioral patterns in one such regime may give important insight as to the behavior of the rest. After understanding authoritarian state behavior, a new analysis attempting to understand alternative regime structures can be conducted.

The choice of the two theories

The two theories presented below, the power-bargaining approach and subaltern realism, explain differing perspectives on how states behave in the international arena. Given the nature of the research question, one of the theories presents a purely structural approach to foreign policymaking, while the other is a more domestic-oriented approach towards policymaking in the developing world. Each of these two theories will be analyzed in great detail and will be tested with the appropriate case-studies in an attempt to understand how ruling elites react to different constraints when responding to foreign policy problems in the Middle East.

The power-bargaining approach follows the conventional structural realist logic. Structural realism has been a dominant approach to explaining the majority of state interactions in the post-World War II era, especially those of the major powers. Examining the ability of this popular approach to explain the behavior of states in the

Middle East which, although have always been integral to world politics, have not experienced superpower status in the post-colonial era, would help determine the applicability of this theory to this unique region. If structural realism is able to explain adequately the foreign policy behaviors of Middle Eastern regimes, the newly created post-colonial approaches may be irrelevant; understanding the reasons for peace and conflict in the Middle East would be, consequently, linked to the respective states' position in the international system. Foreign policy behavior, in turn, would be explained by international structural circumstances, rather than domestic ones.

Subaltern realism, an approach developed specifically to explain the Third World, was chosen due to its stark differences, but also, due to its fundamental similarities with structural realism—mainly its emphasis of state centrality in world affairs. The approach's attempt to explain Middle East state behavior by combining the region with the rest of the developing world is interesting, given the unique nature of this region. Subaltern realism, in addition, distinguishes international security from domestic security, emphasizing the primacy of the latter when deciding on foreign policy. Therefore, in direct contrast to structural realism, but similarly to the majority of the other post-colonial theories of international relations, subaltern realists discuss the domestic environment and how it shapes the foreign policy behaviors of the developing world.

Both theories presented above adhere to the realist principles of power, security, anarchy and state survival. The reason these theories were chosen rather than ones focusing on alternate principles is that the history of the Middle East is one which portrays continuous cases of conflict, power struggles, and distrustful, unstable relations among states, all factors which seem to conform to these basic realist principles. Even

though the severity of the conflicts in this region may be lesser in degree than those of other regions, the fact that these states must continuously look to their personal security and power vis-à-vis their neighbors highlights the realist tendencies of the states in the region. Testing these theories, therefore, seems logical as they both seem to be the most applicable to the region, especially when looking at past foreign policy behavior. If one of these two approaches adequately captures the sources behind state behavior in the Middle East, that approach could be used to alter future relations amongst these regimes. If, however, neither of the approaches is able to explain sufficiently the foreign policy behaviors of the states in the region, a new and more regionally-oriented approach may be needed.

What makes the Middle East unique?

A number of factors distinguish the Middle East from other regions. Although one or more of these factors may be present in other regions, the combination of all of them in the Middle East makes this region distinct and unique from others around the world. The first and major factor which separates the Middle East from other regions is the presence of oil.¹ Oil has distinguished the region in that it has made the Middle East "...the only Third World system characterized by substantial intra-regional financial flows, which came to represent a very significant percentage of the total financial assistance received by system members."² Furthermore, the influence of oil, unlike other

¹R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider, *Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 35.

²Paul C. Noble, "The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities," in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: the challenge of change* Baghat Korany, and Ali E. Hillal Desouki, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 58.

resources, in maintaining international interest in the region cannot be ignored; this will be explained in greater detail shortly.

Secondly, the region is exceptional due to the presence of cultural, religious, and linguistic homogeneity amongst its members.³ Although regions such as South America and East Asia can be argued to experience high levels of homogeneity as well, homogeneity in the Middle East has increased the level of interaction amongst its states in a way that is not present elsewhere in the developing world.⁴ For example, homogeneity may have actually intensified the region's violence, playing a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict by unifying the Arab and Muslim world against a foreign state. This history of conflict serves as the third factor adding to the uniqueness of the Middle East.⁵ Continuous border conflicts, Arab-Israeli wars, and Iran-Iraq wars, among others, show just how much the region has been affected by conflict in its short past. Recognizing this fact is essential to understanding the sources behind state behavior in the region.

One more factor, when combined with the others, distinguishes the Middle East from other developing regions. This is the continued superpower interest present in the region. Although other regions have experienced significant superpower interest in the past, this growing and continuing interest in the Middle East has played a significant role in the development of its states. Interest in the Middle East has been evident throughout

³Bahgat Korany, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies: The Primacy of Constraints," In *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 32.

⁴Ibid, 33. Religious homogeneity here refers to the Islamic religion in general and does not discuss the Shi'ite/Sunni divide. Throughout the major conflicts in the region, Pan-Arabism and Islam have been tools which have been used to unite the populations against foreign aggression. Homogeneity here refers to this unifying force of the Islamic religion in the region in general.

⁵McLaurin, et. al, *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 13; Korany and Dessouki, "The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies," 32.

history. In the post-colonial era, this interest was the result of three main concerns. The first, which lasted up until 1990, was the constant battle between the United States and the Soviet Union over who would control the region's powers and its strategic resources. This battle led both states to take powerful stances on issues that mattered primarily to the states of the Middle East in order to decrease the influence the other state may have on its potential allies.⁶

As previously mentioned, interest in the region also stems from the fact that many of the Middle Eastern states have been endowed with vast amounts of oil resources. This is important to many states around the world. As an example, as of 2003, seventy-five percent of the oil supplies in Europe came from the Middle East.⁷ Furthermore, after the invasion of Iraq, one of the United States' main objectives was to lower the rising world oil prices, by using the country's vast amounts of oil resources to its benefit.⁸ These are just a couple of the many examples which distinguish oil from other resources available in developing states and show just how important this resource is to maintaining Western interest in the Middle East.

Finally, Islam also reinforces the interest of the international arena in the region and forces foreign states to pay close attention to the politics of the Middle East. In terms of the United States, this interest stems from the close relationship the country has had with Israel, and the threat Islam is believed to pose by some Westerners to the security of both Israel and its Western ally. However, other countries also are concerned with the

⁶ William B. Quandt, "America and the Middle East," in *Diplomacy in the Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd., 2003), 60.

⁷ Wm. Roger Louis, "Britain and the Middle East after 1945," in *Diplomacy in the Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd., 2003), 45.

⁸ Faraed Mohamedi, "Oil Prices and Regime Resilience in the Gulf," *Middle East Report*, No. 232 (Autumn 2004), 36.

religious aspect of the region as their respective populations contain significant numbers of Muslim constituents, as is the case in France, for example.⁹ The implication of the Islamic factor is that countries experiencing increasing Muslim influence domestically will always have an interest in how policies develop in the Middle East, and how these policies may affect their respective states.

Due to the unique nature of the Middle East, understanding whether the parsimony of structural realism is enough to explain the behaviors of its states or whether specifically defined theories of the Third World are more suitable is crucial if one hopes to alter the future behaviors of the states in the region.

Methodology:

I will test the two selected theories by using the case-study approach. Each theory will be tested exclusively using identical case studies; this will be done in order to discover which and whether either of the theories holds enough explanatory power when understanding state behavior in the region.

When testing each theory, I will first establish correlation; basically, do the international and/or domestic circumstances of the states in question conform to the predictions of the theory? Furthermore, if these circumstances are present, do they occur during the appropriate time period? By recognizing the existence of the appropriate circumstances and establishing a temporal link, correlation can be established.

⁹ Remy Leveau, "France's Arab Policy," in *Diplomacy in the Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd., 2003), 13-15.

Next, causation must be found. I will have to find evidence showing that the factors providing correlation were the actual *cause* of the foreign policy behavior in question. By using the appropriate primary and secondary sources, I will attempt to find enough evidence to substantiate the predictions of each respective theory and will then compare their respective explanatory powers with respect to foreign policy behavior in the Middle East. Alternative explanations also will be examined, and the analysis will conclude with a discussion on how one can best understand state behavior in this region.

Selection of cases:

The two case studies chosen for this analysis are Egypt in 1973 and 1979 and Jordan in 1990-1991 and 1994. The behavior of the two states will be investigated in two separate time periods due to the fact that, in both cases, there is a clear divergence in foreign policy behavior under the rule of the same leader. Under Sadat, Egypt went from waging war against a regional rival, Israel, in 1973 to signing a peace treaty with that same state in 1979. In the case of Jordan, King Hussein clearly changed his behavior from siding with Iraq and against Israel and the West in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, but then signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.¹⁰ This clear change of behavior under the rule of the same leader must be examined in order to understand what influenced his final decision in each time period.

¹⁰Although some sources reveal that Jordanians remained neutral during this war and did not side with either Iraq or the United States, evidence shows that actions taken and statements made by Jordanian officials during this time period demonstrate clear leanings towards Iraq rather than towards the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf.

In addition to the clearly divergent behavior, these two case studies are relevant due to the fact that both states, Egypt and Jordan, are reacting towards the same regional and international powers, in this case mainly the United States and Israel, with the Soviet Union playing a significant role in some instances as well. Not only does this simplify the analysis by controlling for external circumstances, but given the primacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict in world affairs, understanding the causes of the changing policy choices of these states would be central to understanding how to finally find a solution to this conflict.

Preliminary Conclusions:

After testing the power-bargaining and subaltern realist approaches, the findings show that neither of the two approaches can exclusively explain Jordanian and Egyptian foreign policy behavior in the relevant time periods. Although each approach offers crucial details regarding the sources of influence on King Hussein and President Sadat, international and domestic circumstances alone offer insufficient explanations regarding the overall factors affecting the states' foreign policy behavior. Furthermore, the two approaches are unable to account for the unique nature of the Middle East, and how this uniqueness contributes to the foreign policy process. A regionally-specific approach is necessary to understand these states' respective behaviors.

Outline of the upcoming chapters:

The next section briefly explains the literature review and what other authors have said regarding foreign policy behavior in the Middle East. The two approaches under

investigation will be introduced in greater detail and their main predictions will be discussed. Subsequently, the methodology will be presented, showing how the predictions of each approach will be tested. The following section presents the case-studies and tests how and whether each approach is able to explain foreign policy behavior in two states during two different time periods. The final section summarizes the main findings of the investigation and introduces a new approach which seeks to remedy the weaknesses of the tested approaches. Finally, the appendix presents tables and graphs which help in understanding the main predictions and assumptions of the theories under investigation.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Structural Realism and the Power-Bargaining Approach:

Power-Bargaining Approach:

The power-bargaining approach falls in line with structural realism and focuses on the structural constraints the international system poses on states and the power relationships which govern relationships between them. More specifically, it describes situations where developing states are inclined to pursue policies which satisfy the desires of their international power benefactors, with the expectation that the former may receive financial aid, economic cooperation, and/or security guarantees in return for their compliance.

Structural Realism:

In order to understand the main implications of the power-bargaining approach on state behavior, outlining the assumptions of neorealism is crucial. Structural realists believe that the international system is anarchic, or one in which no “central authority” exists to enforce international laws or to monitor the behavior of states.¹¹ States are the primary actors in the international arena, since they represent the interests of their respective populations and are the only actors able to protect those interests.¹² Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states rely on self-help, which is understood as “the ‘right’ of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened, or

¹¹Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Autumn, 1993), 59; Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 4-5.

¹²Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 5; Hans J. Morgenthau, “What is the National Interest?” in *Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations*, ed. Ivo D. Duchacek (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 250.

violated, and to employ such coercive measures as it may deem necessary to vindicate those interests."¹³

Therefore, ensuring survival and increasing security become the primary interests of the state,¹⁴ ones which are secured through increasing power vis-à-vis one another and competing for overall global dominance.¹⁵ The structure of the international system becomes one which reflects the distribution of power among states, allowing the powerful to pursue their interests more readily,¹⁶ while the less developed struggle for the economic aid and security guarantees granted to them by the powers in order to ensure their personal survival.¹⁷

In any distribution of power dynamic, consequently, conflict and war become "inevitable" as states find themselves compelled to protect their interests from threatening adversaries.¹⁸ Structural realists emphasize that, based on the changing balance of power in the international system, balancing and bandwagoning with other powers become crucial. Balancing, for example, is used when one power has gained too much strength and threatens the survival of the rest, forcing the latter to unite against it, while bandwagoning explains situations when weaker or isolated states join the more threatening adversary in an attempt to secure "concrete rewards" as a result of their

¹³Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (London: Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd., 1977), 4.

¹⁴Morgenthau, "What is the National Interest," 249; Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 21, no. 2 (June 1984), 112.

¹⁵Robert Gilpin, "The Nature of Political Economy," In *International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision Making* ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1985), 277; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), 38.

¹⁶Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Superpowers as Managers," In *International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision Making*, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1985), 130.

¹⁷Glenn H. Snyder, and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), 28.

¹⁸Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security," 113.

cooperation.¹⁹ All alliances, however, are temporary, as loyalty amongst states does not exist, especially when their security and survival may be at risk.

Finally, developing countries, when competing with more developed states, ultimately rely on relative gains in order to close the gap which exists between the more powerful and themselves over time.²⁰ However, the effect that these developing countries have on the international system and its structure as a whole is extremely limited, as they must act based on how the system was previously arranged, regardless of their personal preferences.²¹ Self-help here, consequently, refers to the *inability* of these states to pursue their interests in complete independence; ultimately, the “right of self-help is of necessity dependent upon the power at the disposal of those exercising this right.”²² This, again, highlights the need for states to increase the amount of power at their disposal, since gaining power will allow them the ability to guarantee their security more readily.

The Concept of power:

Central to both structural realism and the power-bargaining approach is the concept of power and its ability to influence interstate relations. Therefore, having a clearer understanding of what power signifies is crucial when attempting to explain how states behave and how they affect the actions of those around them. “National power,” according to realists, does not only refer to military capability, but combines this

¹⁹Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” 38.

²⁰Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” *World Politics* 40, no. 3 (April 1988), 335.

²¹Korany and Dessouki, “The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies,” 30.

²²Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations*, 4.

capability with economic power, “levels of technology, population, natural resources, geographical factors, form of government, political leadership, and ideology.”²³ The more of each of these characteristics a state possesses and the higher their quality, the more able it is to achieve its goals and secure its interests in the international arena. The ability of all states to maximize their power, however, is limited, and some will be able to achieve more than others.

Given this differentiation, a power *relationship* has traditionally been defined as *A* having the “power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do.”²⁴ However, Habeeb has taken this definition a step further and has amended it to correspond more precisely to those relationships where power inequality is extremely great.²⁵ He explains a power relationship as one which represents the *process* by which *A* achieves compliance from *B*; how does *A* use its resources and capabilities to persuade or coerce *B* to act in a certain manner? This definition is important because it highlights more clearly the *means* by which a state attempts to change the actions of another, rather than stating the *ability* of a state to do so. Such a distinction helps when attempting to explain *why* a weaker state necessarily complies with the demands of the great powers.

Consequently, a power relationship will exist between two states if three conditions are present. A conflict of interest between them must exist where one state is attempting to change the behavior of another; the latter state must actually respond to the

²³James E. Dougherty, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contenting Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1971), 65.

²⁴Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2, No. 3 (July 1957), 202.

²⁵William Mark Habeeb, *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 15.

demands imposed on it; and, finally, the more powerful state must have the ability to use its power resources as threats/“sanctions,” and/or promises against its weaker adversary.²⁶ Consequently, the use of these strategies to change the behavior of others could be seen as *the* process or the “means” by which *A* is able to affect the decisions taken by *B*.²⁷ Such a relationship is defined as a “compulsory” relationship, or as the type which “focuses on a range of relations between actors that allow one to shape directly the circumstances and actions of another.”²⁸ Central to this definition is the assumption that a particular state has the desire to change the policy choices of another.²⁹

To further understand the concept of power, it is important to distinguish between the terms power, influence, and force. Firstly, Morgenthau illustrates the difference between power and influence by using the relationship which exists between a president and his secretary of state as an example.³⁰ The secretary of state, according to him, influences the president by offering his/her advice and by having the ability to possibly alter the president’s final decision, *if* the president decides to take his advice into account; however, the president holds actual *power* over the secretary of state, for his position as leader allows him to “impose his will upon the latter by virtue of the authority of his office, the promise of benefits, and the threat of disadvantages.”³¹ Therefore, influence

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” 203.

²⁸Michael Barnett, and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 49.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), 29.

³¹Ibid.

relies more on an indirect attempt at changing behavior, while power represents a more overt effort at causing a weaker power to comply with one's demands.³²

Power and force should not be used interchangeably either. Power can be described as the *threat* of force, rather than the actual *use* of force. Therefore, power is the ability of a state to achieve its objectives with the use of threats and promises, while force is the actual exercise of violence *after* the weaker state refuses to comply with a powerful state's demands.³³

The Power-bargaining approach:

The power-bargaining approach helps highlight how developing states perform in an international system dominated by developed states which have already established their power and status in the existing structural environment. More specifically, this approach contends that developing states are compelled to pursue foreign policies which fall in line with the interests of their major power allies, due to the fact that the latter will then secure the economic, political, and security needs of the former. Before explaining the approach in detail, however, it is important to define bargaining theory in general and how it describes relations between states in the international system. Snyder and Diesing believe bargaining theory to be critical to the understanding of international relations, as its central components "correspond to what are widely regarded as the most important

³² Peter Bachrach, and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 3 (Sept. 1963), 639.

³³ *Ibid*, 636.

elements in international behavior—e.g., power, interests, conflict, and cooperation...³⁴

Furthermore, they contend that bargaining theory:

“being a theory about the interaction of entities in a condition of interdependence...is directly relevant to what we are presumably most interested in theorizing about, the interactions between sovereign states. The content of these interactions consists largely of the interplay of influence in the prosecution and resolution of conflicts...and the establishment of mutually beneficial collaborative arrangements...”³⁵

These authors continue to differentiate between two types of bargaining, accommodative bargaining, which takes place between more equally endowed parties, and coercive bargaining. This latter type of bargaining is the one which falls most in line with the power-bargaining approach. It entails bargaining with “intimidation, blackmail, [and] the use of power of some kind...”³⁶ The basic intention of states who engage in coercive—or power—bargaining, as will be explained in further detail in the next section, would be to either stop a party from or persuade a party to partake in a specified behavior.³⁷

As with neorealism, one of the main assumptions of the power-bargaining approach is that the structure of the international system is “the key element” in explaining how and why states choose to control the actions of others.³⁸ However, it can be argued that the international system is one representing “hierarchy” rather than anarchy; this stems from the proposition that Third World states have come to terms with the fact that they are weaker than the great powers and must sacrifice their personal

³⁴Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 22.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid, 22-23.

³⁷Richard Ned Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations* (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 225.

³⁸Singer, “Inter-Nation Influence,” 423.

international interests and follow those of the more powerful if they wish to develop economically or militarily.³⁹ This “hierarchical” definition should not be taken literally, as it is not meant to counter the structural realist view that the international system is anarchic. It is just meant to illustrate the view that the structure of the international system is such that the power of some states greatly exceeds the power of others, making the latter more insecure in their international environment.

From the time of their conception, developing states have had to deal with the fact that the only similarity they have had with their developed counterparts in the post-colonial era was that they were all considered sovereign;⁴⁰ sovereign, in this context, refers simply to the “supreme lawgiving and law-enforcing authority [these nations have] within their own territories.”⁴¹ However, this sovereignty does not necessarily mean freedom of action in the international arena. Instead, freedom of action depends largely on how much power and resources a state may have at its disposal.⁴² Therefore, due to its emphasis on international positioning and the need to accumulate power, the power-bargaining approach presents a structural explanation of interstate behavior. It shows how international negotiations and international bargaining scenarios depend largely on the availability of resources amongst the parties involved and their ability to use them.⁴³

During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the international system and the respective interactions which took place between the two major powers defined most of

³⁹Carlos Escude, “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and the Condor II Missile Project,” In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 55.

⁴⁰Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 14.

⁴¹Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 312.

⁴²Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations*, 4.

⁴³I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Explaining North-South Negotiations,” In *Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations*, ed. I. William Zartman (New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1987), 6.

the interstate relations in the Third World; the superpowers pursued alliances in the developing world, including in the Middle East, which best secured their respective interests in the different regions.⁴⁴ This led the more “subordinate” states to be forced to engage in actions regionally which represented the views of either of the two rival states, depending on which superpower guaranteed them the most economic and security benefits from their cooperation.⁴⁵ Therefore, in some cases, the developing states might have considered pursuing policies which would not have benefitted their specific regions as a whole as they, during the Cold War, “ha[d] become mere functions of the... world-wide balance.”⁴⁶ This was especially true in times when a regional conflict emerged and both superpowers entered on behalf of their respective allies; in such cases, the states in conflict must have taken into consideration the desires of their powers even more seriously, since their adversaries also were gaining external military aid and support.⁴⁷

In general, the world can be seen as one large system composed of many smaller subsystems; the dominant system—composed of a state or a group of states depending on the distribution of power—is usually more powerful than the rest.⁴⁸ The interest level the great power(s) of the dominant system may have in different regions will ultimately define how dependent the latter are on the former. Specifically, the more interest a great power may have in a subsystem, the more this subsystem is unable to act independently

⁴⁴ Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, “The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,” In *Regional Security in the Third World*, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 202.

⁴⁵ Leonard Binder, “The Middle East as a Subordinate International System,” *World Politics* 10, no. 3 (April 1958), 410-411.

⁴⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 201.

⁴⁷ Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 30.

⁴⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 198.

and the more it must take into account the interests and desires of the power.⁴⁹ Using the example of the Cold War once more, temporary alliances between the Great Powers and different states within these subsystems represented important “assets” to the powers when calculating their total capabilities and areas of control.⁵⁰ Therefore, if the region in question is of central importance to both the powers, they will each find ways to direct the policies of the respective states in order to gain the latter’s loyalty and to increase their personal power and influence in the region.

How would the international power benefactor achieve compliance by the developing state?

In order to fully understand the implications of the power-bargaining approach, it is important to discuss the different ways in which the great powers can achieve compliance from the more dependent states in the system. The main tools used by the powers include the promise of rewards, in terms of economic aid and security guarantees, and/or the threat of negative repercussions, such as the removal of aid or the imposition of sanctions, among others. By sending signals to the states regarding the consequences of their actions, a powerful state may achieve its desired objectives in different bargaining situations.⁵¹

There are different types of threats that a state may use to shape the behavior of another. A threat, in this context, is defined as a bargaining tool which “states a demand on another party, plus a sanction that will be inflicted if the demand is not met. The

⁴⁹ Ibid, 199.

⁵⁰ Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 30.

⁵¹ Ibid, 28.

purpose may be either compellent ('do that or else') or deterrent ('don't do that or else')."⁵² In order for a threat to be successful it needs to be clearly communicated to the weaker state, and the repercussions must be costly enough to guarantee compliance.⁵³ The credibility of the threat is also important, but will be discussed in further detail shortly.

Promises are also effective tools for guaranteeing compliance in bargaining situations between unequal powers. Escude, although arguing from a perspective which stresses the importance of domestic factors rather than international systemic ones, presents a useful representation of how powers may use their resources to influence states through the use of promises.⁵⁴ He stresses that the structure of the international world is one which includes three types of states, those who play a commanding role (i.e. the powers), those who "obey" the desires of the powers, and those who choose to rebel against the powers.⁵⁵ In terms of those who choose to comply, the major powers are able to engage in a method of bargaining which links economic development concerns (i.e. promises of aid and/or economic cooperation) to the preferred policy routes that they believe these more dependent states should pursue.⁵⁶ Therefore, in order to enjoy the promises of economic cooperation, these developing states would have to satisfy the desires of their international benefactors. With respect to the Middle East in specific, the region is one which is highly penetrated by the international environment due to the former states' continuous reliance on the powers for military as well as economic

⁵² Ibid, 213.

⁵³ James T. Tedeschi, Thomas V. Bonoma, and Robert C. Brown, "A Paradigm for the Study of Coercive Power," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15, no. 2 (June 1971), 197.

⁵⁴ Escude, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism," 55.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 64.

support.⁵⁷ When describing patron-client relationships in the region, Dawisha contends that, in some instances, the foreign policies of the states in the Middle East are based primarily on the interests of their patron; “[t]his is especially the case when a particular client state is inexorably linked through cultural, economic and/[or] military ties to the patron state.”⁵⁸

The main intention behind threatening sanctions or promising rewards to a less powerful state is to change the costs and benefits of this state when it decides whether or not to pursue a particular foreign policy. By attaching rewards or imposing repercussions which weaker states find crucial to their survival, a more powerful state is more likely to succeed in achieving a change in the behavior of the developing state.⁵⁹ For example, a country experiencing a significant economic downturn may pursue policies which would go against its previous ideological views, if its international power benefactor promises a large sum of financial aid in return for compliance. Although the weaker power’s sovereignty, in terms of territorial integrity, may not be compromised, its foreign policy behavior will be predicted by another state and by its position in the international system,⁶⁰ rather than by the demands of its domestic environment.

Finally, when deciding whether or not to comply with an international power’s demand, a developing state must find the threat or promise credible. In general, threats are seen as less preferable forms of coercive bargaining than promises, since they may invoke negative feelings towards the power by the weaker state; however, if the threat

⁵⁷ Abdel Aal, “The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,” 204.

⁵⁸ A.I. Dawisha, “The Middle East,” In *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* edited by C. Clapham (New York: Praeger, 1977), 47-48.

⁵⁹ Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 140.

⁶⁰ Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 15.

comes from a power that has an established and recognized status in the international system, it becomes far more powerful.⁶¹ Consequently, if the threat is believable, the likelihood that it shapes state behavior increases.⁶² Promises, in this case, are more likely to succeed, as they do not threaten harm, but guarantee benefits; therefore, countries are less likely to view them as negative acts affecting their security and/or survival.

Predictions of the power-bargaining approach on state behavior in the Middle East:

There are four possible predictions which must be tested when describing how the authoritarian states in the Middle East react to the demands of their main benefactors.

1. *The major power has to have an interest in the particular policy issue which is being decided upon by the respective states.* In order for an international power to want to change the behavior of another state, it must acknowledge the fact that it may have future interactions with the latter state, and/or the policy issue being decided upon is one which directly affects the interests and desires of the power.⁶³
2. *The ruling elites of these developing states recognize that, in order for their state to survive in the international system, they must neglect their domestic environment and act rationally to pursue the demands imposed on them by their international allies.*⁶⁴ Central to this prediction is the assumption that the domestic environment does *not* play a role in influencing the foreign policy behavior of states. The international environment is the one which presents the

⁶¹ Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict*, 126.

⁶² Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining," *The American Economic Review* 46, no. 3 (June 1956), 293.

⁶³ Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence," 423.

⁶⁴ Escude, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism," 55.

most imminent threat to the ruling elite, and, consequently, is the one which defines their future behavior.

3. *The foreign policy behavior taken by the Middle Eastern state should be one which reflects the interests and preferences of the international power.* In order to enjoy the rewards of cooperation, the regimes in the Middle East will pursue the policy which most completely falls in line with the demands of their benefactor. They will be inclined to avoid policy options which neglect the desires of those who are most likely to affect their interests internationally.
4. *Finally, if a state decides to neglect the demands of its international ally, it will suffer significant costs, whether in terms of economic cooperation, military or financial aid and/or security guarantees;⁶⁵ in contrast, acting in line with the international power's demands will result in a visibly positive change in the relationship between the two states, with the weaker state receiving greater aid and security than it had previously enjoyed.* This prediction will have to take into account the resulting benefits or losses felt by a state which ultimately complies with the preferences and constraints of the international environment. If economic and security gains were withheld and if these led to a serious loss on the part of the Middle Eastern regime's position regionally, then neglecting the demands of the international environment must have played a significant role in these resulting losses.

⁶⁵Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence," 426.

Possible criticisms that may be raised against the Power-Bargaining approach:

There are a few counterarguments which could be raised against the power-bargaining approach that must be mentioned before continuing. The first counterargument highlights the fact that the more powerful actor in the bargaining process does not necessarily always “win” or gain its desired demands. Military dominance might be counterbalanced by the “stakes” a weaker state might have in the contested issue. Therefore, military superiority might not always mean a definite gain for the more powerful state as the weaker power might have more interest in the specific issue at hand, and might, in consequence, have more resolve and commitment in the negotiations; this could lead to a more equally balanced bargaining process even with a militarily and economically superior counterpart.⁶⁶

Furthermore, there has been evidence of cases where a weaker state or coalition of states actually have been able to effectively and successfully bargain against the demands of their more powerful international allies. In terms of the Middle East, states in this region have been able to counterbalance the demands of the international system, as is evident with the oil embargo of the 1970s.⁶⁷ Therefore, although this region is seen as being “subordinate” to the rest of the world,⁶⁸ the states have been able to work together to balance against the power of their international benefactors. Power, in this case, was not the only determining factor of the foreign policy behavior of these states, but played a secondary role to the interests and resolve of the Middle Eastern states when it came to the issue at hand. Therefore, critics would argue that the power-bargaining approach is

⁶⁶ Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 189-190.

⁶⁷ Korany and Dessouki, “The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies,” 25.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

unable to explain situations where the weaker states in the system have overcome the constraints posed on them by the international system.

Finally, one of the main criticisms leveled against the power-bargaining approach is that it completely ignores the domestic politics of states and how these may affect foreign policy behavior. This approach assumes that a state's preferences are explained by its position in the international system.⁶⁹ However, critics would argue that such an assumption is dangerous, especially for Third World states, where international military threats are not the sole security concerns of the regimes, but are combined with domestic security concerns.⁷⁰

Newer post-colonial theories of state behavior:

In the post-Cold War era, the limitations of existing international relations theories were recognized when explaining conflict and cooperation in the developing world. The main problem with the conventional IR literature, according to one author, is that it did not take into account the increasing importance of the domestic environment when explaining international conflict; with respect to the developing world in specific, many of the states seem to be facing security threats from *within* their borders, rather than from their external environment.⁷¹

Including the domestic environment in the analysis of state behavior is important as it explains discrepancies in what otherwise should have been predictable foreign policy

⁶⁹ Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," 322.

⁷⁰ Bassel Fawzi Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World: State-society Relations and Foreign Policy Choices in Jordan and Syria* (Montreal: McGill University Department of Political Science, 2000), 29.

⁷¹ Mohammed Ayoub, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2002), 35.

behavior. Some authors have posited, for example, that foreign policy behavior may differ even when states face similar international circumstances.⁷² According to this assumption, the realist emphasis on rationality is inaccurate due to the fact that leaders need to respond to both internal domestic demands as well as to systemic constraints; responding primarily and with complete rationality to the international environment, consequently, may not be possible.⁷³ In addition, states which may face similar international circumstances may have completely different domestic regimes and government structures; therefore, assuming that these states will respond to international demands similarly might lead to inaccurate conclusions given the fact that their respective domestic environments pose conflicting pressures on their governing elites.⁷⁴ Even similar modes of governance, furthermore, could lead to contradictory behavior in different states due to the “structural autonomy” of the respective executives involved.⁷⁵ Valerie Hudson presses this argument further by stating that, although international politics may have an effect on shaping behavior, international or regional powers are unable to *force* a specific regime to act in a certain manner; in consequence, the “domestic game board [and] its effects on the regime’s moves on the foreign game board” are important to analyze.⁷⁶

⁷²Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective,” In *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, ed. Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002), 13.

⁷³*Ibid.*

⁷⁴Joel S. Migdal, “Internal Structure and External Behavior: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States,” *International Relations* 4, no. 5 (1972), 510.

⁷⁵Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

⁷⁶Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 128.

In terms of the Third World exclusively, it is argued that, until the dependency approach of the 1970s, none of the existing approaches were created in order to explain the behaviors of states in these regions specifically.⁷⁷ This is due to their primary focus on the relationships of the more powerful and influential states in the international system. Consequently, when the majority of Third World states gained independence, the developed world continued its preoccupation with power politics, focusing on the bipolarity of the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ What is interesting is that the neglect of the Third World in the post-World War II era came at a time when Third World states greatly outnumbered their more industrialized counterparts, and during a period when the majority of the conflicts took place within these developing regions.⁷⁹

Therefore, the post-colonial approaches of international relations have emphasized the need to bring in the domestic environment of states in order to explain their foreign policy behaviors, especially with respect to states in the developing world, including the Middle East. Most post-colonial approaches explaining foreign policy behavior in the Third World have a common starting point. They claim that the main dilemma confronting Third World states stems from their unique evolution into sovereign entities and the fact that all of them have been directly or indirectly affected by colonization; due to this common past, these states have had to adopt Western-style

⁷⁷K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance," In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 104.

⁷⁸Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing," 33.

⁷⁹Bahgat Korany, *Social Change, Charisma and International Behavior: Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy-making in the Third World* (Genève: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1976), 15; Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (March 1989), 69; Amitav Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies," In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 300.

political models, either to gain independence from colonization or to “escape colonization” for the few that had not been occupied.⁸⁰ Therefore, understanding the stability (or lack thereof) of the domestic political environment and the ruling elite’s ability to adapt to imported government structures is central to explaining their behavior and the increasing prevalence of intrastate conflicts in their territories.⁸¹

Therefore, as the power-bargaining approach would explain behavior in terms of compliance with the demands of international power benefactors, these new approaches focus on the internal environment of a state and allow the international system a secondary role when illustrating the sources of state behavior. With respect to the weaknesses of structural realism specifically, it is argued that the theory is applicable only when explaining situations which are not very representative of the Third World. Rather, it illustrates scenarios in which the international environment is anarchic and the domestic environment is assumed to be one of order and stability;⁸² however, the majority of states in the developing world face a situation where their domestic environments provide the overarching threat to their security, presenting them with an “insecurity dilemma,” or a situation of continuous struggle for power *internally* rather than externally.⁸³

⁸⁰Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing about the Third World” In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 217.

⁸¹Hagan, *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective*, 47; Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” In *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 37.

⁸²Mohammed Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 36-37.

⁸³Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World,” In *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian L. Job (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992), 17.

Subaltern Realism

Mohammed Ayoob's subaltern realist approach was created in an attempt to respond to the shortcomings of the conventional theories of international relations with respect to the developing world. In response to structural realism specifically, Ayoob believes that the approach's main weakness stems from the fact that it completely ignores the domestic security environments of Third World states; he believes that it is dangerous to trust, what seems to be, structural realism's great explanatory power in describing foreign policy behavior, especially since it fails to account for the unique environments predominant in the developing world.⁸⁴ Instead, Ayoob offers a new approach which seeks to describe the foreign policy behaviors of Third World states by explaining the process of state-making and state-building that these states have experienced in their recent past; the unique evolution of states in the Third World has led to a changing security environment which emanates primarily from within their borders rather than from their external environment.⁸⁵ Therefore, regional conflicts and interstate wars could be seen as the product of "weak state-structures and narrowly-based regimes lacking unconditional legitimacy" from *within* their own borders.⁸⁶

It is important to note that while Ayoob criticizes structural realism for its failures in describing Third World behavior, he does agree with some of the theory's main assumptions, primarily that the state is the central actor in international affairs, and that

⁸⁴Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 123.

⁸⁵Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States," 70.

⁸⁶*Ibid*, 71.

its main concerns always are linked to security and survival.⁸⁷ Third World analysts may criticize Ayoob for not creating a distinction between state security and regime security, arguing that regime security in these regions may be a higher priority to the ruling elite than the security of the state.⁸⁸ However, Ayoob emphasizes that, for these elites, the survival of the state usually signifies the survival of the regime as well.⁸⁹ The two are linked, and securing the state's future means securing the survival of the ruling elite.

Subaltern Realism's Definition of Security:

Given the centrality of security to the subaltern realist approach, it is important to understand the term completely within this context. According to Ayoob

“security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes. According to this definition, the more a state and/or regime...fall(s) toward the invulnerable end of the vulnerable-invulnerable continuum the more secure it/they will be.”⁹⁰

Although this definition acknowledges the importance of the international realm and its ability to threaten state or regime security, international concerns remain secondary to those of domestic security; consequently, a state's external activities usually are pursued in order to increase state legitimacy domestically in an attempt to insulate the regime from the dominant domestic threats.⁹¹ Therefore, structural realism's definition of

⁸⁷ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 8; Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 129.

⁸⁸ Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” *World Politics* 43, No. 2 (Jan. 1991), 233-256.

⁸⁹ Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking and State Failure,” 44.

⁹⁰ Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 130.

⁹¹ Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States,” 71.

security as being primarily an international structural phenomenon is altered within this approach to give the domestic realm priority over the international system.

As with structural realists, security here is defined in strictly political terms. Political security “concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.”⁹² Any further type of security, whether economic, environmental, or other is only important if it directly and significantly affects the political security of the state.⁹³ Therefore, as the state increases its stability within its own borders, it will be more secure both internally and externally.

Subaltern Realism Explained

Subaltern realism’s main purpose is to show how the unique state-making processes that states in the Third World have endured have ultimately led to their internal security dilemmas. State-making, according to Ayoob, requires three distinct processes.⁹⁴ A state must be able to ensure the “expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority...” In addition, it must be able to guarantee order and stability to its population while being able to obtain the necessary resources and revenue required to sustain the future survival of its territory.⁹⁵ Finally, for a state to complete successfully the state-making process, it must have the time and the “free-hand” to act as it may please within its own borders.⁹⁶ State-making, especially in its early stages, may justify the use of force as the government must have the ability to

⁹²Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (July 1991), 433.

⁹³Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 7-8.

⁹⁴Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 38; Ayoob, “Redefining Security,” 132-133.

⁹⁵Ayoob, “Redefining Security,” 132-133.

⁹⁶Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 40.

establish control over the rest of the population, including its dissident elements.⁹⁷ When looking at the history of Europe and the more industrialized West, it is not difficult to note the similar stages of state-making that these states have had with those of the Third World, as both types of states have had to experience these violent evolutionary processes.⁹⁸ However, the state-making processes of the two “worlds” have experienced fundamental differences which, for the Third World, are the root cause of their security predicament and their conflict-prone nature; ultimately, these differences and the effects they have had on developing states’ internal environments explain the latter’s respective foreign policy behaviors and the actions they pursue internationally.

One of the fundamental differences between the developed and the developing world’s evolution centers on the time required for the state-making process to be completed. Modern European states, for example, are the result of over three centuries of development.⁹⁹ The alternate stages of state-making took place sequentially and as one stage was completed, the other began. The Third World, however, has not had the same luxury. Not only are these states expected to develop at an extremely rapid pace, but the exclusive stages experienced by the developed world have all been compressed into one “simultaneous” process.¹⁰⁰

In addition, in the post-colonial era, developing states have had to endure continuous pressure from the outside world; unlike the previous state-making processes where all the states developed in tandem and, therefore, did not have to face pressure

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 38; Ayoob, “Redefining Security,” 121-122.

⁹⁹Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 40.

¹⁰⁰Korany, *Social Change, Charisma, and International Behavior*, 117-118.

from more industrialized foreign powers, the modern developing world has had to endure a process of development while competing with a world that has already established economic, societal, and governmental standards that far outweigh those of their own.¹⁰¹ This competition limits the ability of the latter states to take the time generally needed to experience a successful state-building process, as they feel the need to “catch up” with the rest of the industrialized world.

The time constraints these states face are exacerbated by their colonial past. As previously mentioned, most of the government structures in the Third World have been imposed on them by colonial powers.¹⁰² These political institutions, therefore, were not the product of a natural evolution in the state-making process, as was the case in Europe, but were, instead, implanted in the Third World in order to secure the interests of the international powers of the time. This leads to a situation where domestic populations are expecting their governments to perform in a manner far exceeding the latter’s ability at the particular level of state-making which it may find itself. The ruling elite will have to use unfamiliar government structures in an attempt to gain control over populations which have been forced to live within borders decided upon by foreign powers. The imposition of such borders and the inability of developing states to alter them furthers the regime’s insecurity, as the ruling elite has to gain control of populations who do not wish to be controlled by, what may be, domestic rivals.¹⁰³ The domestic instability caused by the combination of time constraints, weak government structures, and rigid territorial boundaries increases the internal security predicament of the developing world and

¹⁰¹ Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 40-41.

¹⁰² Buzan, “Conclusions,” 217; Korany, *Social Change, Charisma, and International Behavior*, 109.

¹⁰³ Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 42.

makes understanding the nature of their insecurity central to understanding their respective foreign policy behaviors.¹⁰⁴

Consequently, a central byproduct of the state-making process faced by the Third World becomes an inability to gain legitimacy from their domestic constituencies as well as from their regional and international allies.¹⁰⁵ In some cases, developing regimes attempt to democratize in order to satisfy growing threats to their security by including opposition groups in the decision-making process; however, democratization can only be successful if the state is able to acquire control over all aspects of its domestic environment, including the use of force as well as its divided population.¹⁰⁶ This, as is evident in many developing states, is not the case. Successful democracy is the result of “territorial satiation, societal cohesion, and political stability...As long as Third World states are not able to achieve these three goals, their formally established democratic institutions will continue to be vulnerable to internal challenges and the gains of democratization could be reversed.”¹⁰⁷

The combination of the aforementioned factors enhances the importance of the domestic environment when explaining a developing state’s foreign policy behavior. The ability of a leader or a ruling elite to ignore the domestic environment and act primarily in response to systemic constraints becomes almost impossible.¹⁰⁸ In order to secure their hold on power, government elites feel compelled to use foreign policy as a tool with which they may enhance their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population; with respect to

¹⁰⁴ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 5.

¹⁰⁵ Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 41.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 47.

¹⁰⁷ Ayoob, “Redefining Security,” 136.

¹⁰⁸ Hagan, *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective*, 47-48; Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 12.

the Middle East in specific, one must look at the domestic legitimacy problems faced by the regimes, and their continuous desire to further their control over their respective domestic populations.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, according to Ayoob, when looking at past international conflicts in developing regions, at least one of the root causes of the conflict will be linked to the internal environments of at least one of its participants.¹¹⁰ Therefore, foreign policy behavior and interstate relations, in general, reflect the unstable domestic environments of the developing states. Foreign policy, consequently, becomes a tool used by the ruling elite to subdue and overcome the dominant domestic threats to its power.

Although all regimes in the developing world are restrained by their domestic populations when responding to systemic constraints, the extent of these restraints depends on the degree of vulnerability the regime may have towards both domestic and international threats.¹¹¹ A regime's degree of vulnerability depends on its "security software," which includes coercive capacity as well as degree of legitimacy, degree of "integration or societal cohesion, and policy capacity..."¹¹² The more a regime lacks with respect to its "software," the more vulnerable it is to domestic threats, and the less able it will be to make foreign policy decisions which respond to international threats. For example, a state's inability to control the dissident portions of the population will

¹⁰⁹Hagan, *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective*, 47-49.

¹¹⁰ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 38.

¹¹¹ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 9.

¹¹² Ayoob, "Redefining Security," 130; Edward E. Azar, and Chung-in Moon, *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), 70-90.

lead to a situation of increased vulnerability, and the state will have to be increasingly aware of internal threats.¹¹³

Although subaltern realism emphasizes the primacy of the domestic arena when explaining the foreign policy behavior of states, it is evident that the international system does play an important role and cannot be ignored. This role is *indirect* and affects state behavior by increasing the domestic security predicament of the Third World state.

There are two main ways that the international system imposes constraints on a developing state: either by aiding domestic dissident groups, as previously mentioned, and/or by creating demands on the state due to the presence of international norms.¹¹⁴

Aiding domestic dissident groups was prevalent mainly during the bipolar era. The superpowers were able to export their conflicts to the developing regions on many occasions and did so by granting military aid and support to either the regime or the primary opposition groups within the state.¹¹⁵ This instability, however, did not end with the closing of the Cold War, but was worsened in some areas. This was due to the fact that some regimes counted on the support they received from either of the two superpowers in order to retain domestic control. The removal of superpower support as well as the presence of advanced weaponry—which had been transferred to different domestic rival groups in the earlier periods—made the ruling elite even more vulnerable to domestic opposition.¹¹⁶ Therefore, by stirring the nationalistic, cultural, or religious emotions of rival domestic groups, the international system was able to constrain the ability of leaders to respond primarily to their external environment by making them and

¹¹³ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 129; Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 4.

¹¹⁴ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 4-5.

¹¹⁵ Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," 42.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

their regimes more vulnerable to their domestic populations. The developing states' foreign policy behavior, in consequence, reflected this increasingly unstable domestic environment, either in the form of regional conflict and aggressive international behavior and/or in the form of cooperative behavior with beneficial international allies.

Finally, norms, according to Ayoob are also crucial, yet even more indirect, when explaining how the international system enhances the security predicament of the developing world.¹¹⁷ In the post-colonial period, many states in the system gained the right to "juridical sovereignty" along with their independence. Therefore, many of these states, which would have been unable to consolidate their authority over their respective populations otherwise, were allowed the right to statehood.¹¹⁸ The international norm of maintaining rigid borders, therefore, granted many otherwise unviable states independence and increased their domestic instabilities.¹¹⁹ In addition, colonially constructed borders have forced religiously, racially, ethnically, or culturally heterogeneous peoples to live under the rule of regimes whose beliefs run counter to their own, and the norm surrounding sovereignty has made this a permanent arrangement.

The issue of sovereignty, furthermore, when combined with other prevalent international norms such as human rights and liberal democracy, creates even greater dilemmas for the Third World regime. The need to use coercion, for example, falls outside the norms and behaviors of the more developed states in the international system.

"...these [developed] states have, by and large, successfully completed their state-building process... They can therefore afford to adopt liberal standards of state behavior in relation to their populations, because they are reasonably secure

¹¹⁷Ibid, 42-43.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

in the knowledge that societal demands will not run counter to state interests...What are currently considered in the West to be norms of civilized state behavior—including those pertaining to human rights of individuals and groups—are, in the Third World, often in contradiction with the imperatives of state making.”¹²⁰

Therefore, the high expectations placed on Third World states to evolve into stable polities within their unstable borders, while living up to international standards and regulations, again furthers their insecurities and their ability to cope with internal threats to their power. Consequently, states that have chosen to engage the international arena by including democratic and human rights norms into their domestic way of life, must respond to increasing internal threats with less coercion, since dominating the opposition groups by force in such an arena becomes increasingly difficult.

Ayoob’s subaltern realist approach, therefore, creates a new way of viewing Third World state behavior. Mainly, one must focus on the internal security predicament of these states, while exploring the international system’s influence in exacerbating these domestic insecurities. The more vulnerable the regime domestically, the less able it is to affect the foreign policy of its state, and the more its foreign policy behavior will reflect the dominant domestic sources of threat rather than portraying rational responses to external structural constraints.

Predictions of the Subaltern Realist Approach:

There are three predictions which must be tested when analyzing the explanatory power of the subaltern realist approach in describing state behavior in the Middle East.

¹²⁰Ibid, 43.

1. *When responding to foreign-policy problems, the ruling elites in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East will be compelled to take into account the constraints and demands presented by their domestic environment before responding to international structural demands.* Therefore, the states in the region will respond to a foreign policy problem in a way which most completely responds to the internal threats to their security, rather than to systemic constraints, since the former represent the most likely threats to their survival. The resulting state behavior will represent the most likely solution to the most imminent domestic threats the elite may be facing. When possible, foreign policy behavior may respond to international threats as well; however, the ruling elite in these regimes will never compromise the demands of their domestic environment as such compromises may risk the survival of the regime.
2. *Due to the problems of state-building in this region, these states will exhibit unstable domestic environments ripe with conflict between the ruling elite and the opposition groups, and division amongst the states' populations. Each of these factors will significantly affect the ruling elite's independent ability to respond rationally to an international policy problem and will affect the foreign policy behavior of the state.* In order to test this prediction, one must be able to test the level of state-making that a given state has experienced. This can be done by analyzing government structure, government legitimacy, population divisions, territorial disputes and other such factors which help measure levels of internal disunity and dissent.¹²¹ The less able the government is to control its domestic

¹²¹ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 45-46.

environment and the higher the levels of internal dissent and dissatisfaction, the more likely the state is to experience constant conflict, and the more likely that the ruling elite will be affected by the demands of their domestic environment when pursuing a given foreign policy initiative.

3. *Finally, the international environment will play an indirect role in influencing a state's behavior in that it may increase the demands of the domestic population.*

The existence of international human rights norms create demands for democratization and the equal treatment of dissident opposition groups, both of which the regime is unable to live up to at the early stage of state-making which it experiences. Therefore, the international environment serves as a compounding factor that intensifies an already unstable domestic environment.

Possible Criticisms of the Subaltern Realist Approach:

There are two main criticisms presented against the subaltern realist approach. These are that it combines the entire Third World into one group and that it overemphasizes the domestic arena and does not give the international system enough weight. For example, given the uniqueness of the Middle East as discussed above, inclusion of this region with others in the developing world could hinder an accurate analysis of state behavior from taking place. Furthermore, combining states of South America with ones in Africa and Asia can be dangerous as each of these regions could have experienced a unique type of historical development; as a result, each region's respective states may conduct foreign policy in a different manner.

Finally, by overemphasizing the power of the domestic arena in creating constraints on leadership, this approach neglects important international circumstances which also influence state behavior. Instead of allowing the international system to play an equal role in constraining state behavior, this approach makes international circumstances secondary to domestic ones. Rather than concentrating primarily on one of the two arenas, new approaches should combine both the international and domestic environments and should explain, to the best of their abilities, how these environments each affect state behavior, even if at the expense of parsimony.¹²² By focusing primarily on the domestic environment, Ayoob's approach suffers from the same weakness as structural realism, as it also excludes possible factors which may play a significant role in explaining foreign policy behavior.

¹²² Korany, *Social Change, Charisma and International Behavior*, 61.

Chapter Two: Methodology

In order to test the ability of the power-bargaining and subaltern realism approaches to explain foreign policy behavior in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, I will use the case-study approach. By testing the predictions of each theory and whether they are able to create a causal relationship between international and/or domestic politics and policy behavior, I will be able to determine which of—and whether either of—the two theories holds sufficient explanatory power when analyzing regional dynamics in the Middle East.

Testing the power-bargaining approach

Correlation:

When testing the power-bargaining approach, I will first have to establish correlation between system structure and foreign policy behavior. Bachrach and Baratz' three conditions for the existence of a power relationship will be helpful in this respect, as they highlight whether the international circumstances are of the type proposed by the theory.¹²³ The first condition attempts to establish a link between a powerful state and a less powerful counterpart. Is the structure of the international system one which contains a dominant power with significant interest in the regime in question? Initially, the distribution of power in the international system would have to be investigated. The number of dominant powers is important in that it highlights how many players in the international system may have enough authority to influence the policies of the developing regimes. After recognizing the number of great powers, it is important to

¹²³ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions," 633.

investigate whether a connection or a relationship exists between at least one of these powers and the Middle Eastern state, a condition which is essential if the former has the desire to affect the behavior of the latter.¹²⁴

A link between the two states can be established by examining the geopolitical background of the developing state. Is the state endowed with resources critical to the development of the power? Alternatively, is the state embroiled in conflict either with the power or with one of its main allies in the region? Establishing a connection between the international power and the regime in question, therefore, should be done by linking the two states either economically—through international interest in one or more of the regime's strategic resources—or politically—through the Middle Eastern regime's participation in a regional conflict and the international power's connection to this conflict. The preferences of the power will be highlighted here as well, as this power would prefer that the developing state behaves in a manner which best secures its economic or political interests in the region.

A political connection between the two regimes will be investigated by researching whether the power and the Middle Eastern state have participated in a series of bilateral or multilateral negotiations in the years directly preceding the foreign policy behavior in question. Negotiations can be conducted either directly or indirectly. If direct negotiations by high level officials are witnessed, one personal encounter between the two heads of state would be enough to provide evidence of the states' connection to one another, as meetings at such a high level do not occur frequently between unconnected states. Other types of indirect communication between the power and the

¹²⁴Dahl, "The Concept of Power," 204.

Middle Eastern state, including written communication between leaders, the sending of lower-level government officials and delegations, etc., would have to take place more frequently—with a minimum of three encounters—in order to show continued communication and a sustained relationship between the two states.

If there is more than one dominant power with interest in the region, it would be important to analyze which foreign state has the greatest influence on the regime under investigation. Looking at levels of aid and military support, economic relations in terms of bilateral trade, the number of bilateral treaties recently signed, and other such relations between the powers and the developing regime would be important to show which international benefactor has the most weight on the decision-making autonomy of the ruling elite in the developing state.

Once a connection has been established between one dominant power and the Middle Eastern state in question, Bacharach and Baratz' second condition would require a conflict of interest to exist between the two states over a specific policy issue. Is there a visible attempt by the power to impact the behavior of the Middle Eastern regime? Evidence of offers of rewards or threats of repercussions for a change in the behavior of the developing regime is necessary here. In their negotiations, discussions referring to the alteration of present economic relations and to changing levels of financial support and/or military aid from one state to the other would be helpful. In case no such discussion exists, the power must exhibit the use of alternate strategies in order to change the behavior of the Middle Eastern regime. Comparisons of levels of aid before and after the behavior are helpful in this regard, as they provide evidence of a change in the

behavior of the power towards the regime, even if not revealed through open promises and threats during direct negotiations.

The analysis presented here will focus mainly on levels of financial and military aid to the regime or the promise of economic development through international economic support. The promise of economic development, according to the power-bargaining approach, is central to sustaining a power relationship; furthermore, the removal of military aid, although not directly affecting the short-term economic development of the state, is important as it decreases the military standing of the developing state vis-à-vis its neighbors. In such unstable regions, military inferiority becomes a sign of weakness and vulnerability, making the state susceptible to losses in future conflicts.

The final condition needed to establish a power relationship regards the actual behavior of the developing state. Is the foreign policy behavior of the weaker state one which falls in line with the preferences of the foreign power? Evidence of this condition should be straight-forward. If the final policy choice portrays compliance with the preferences of the power, then a link could be established between foreign policy behavior and international systemic structure. However, if the foreign policy behavior of the weaker state goes against the desires of the international power, noncompliance with systemic demands is evident. In this latter case, evidence that the power followed through with its threats would be important to show that refusal to comply led the weaker power to incur serious negative repercussions.

The presence of these three conditions establishes the existence of a power relationship between an international power and a weaker developing state. Before

continuing, however, a temporal link must be established in order to verify correlation. The sequence and timing of events is important in order to portray whether the power's attempts at changing behavior preceded the state's actual behavior. Most importantly, the connection or relationship between the power and the state must have existed at least two to three years *prior* to the state foreign policy behavior. The relationship between the two states could have been initiated in earlier years; however, it must have been evident specifically in the years directly preceding the behavior under investigation in order to have had a direct affect on state behavior. In addition, the threats and promises invoked by the power must have been made at the same time as, or before, the changes in behavior had been made. If changes in the levels of aid were made indirectly without the use of threats and promises, these could have been witnessed before the behavior under investigation in order to prevent a state from continuing on a specific foreign policy course. If the timings did not fall into this pattern, it could be suggested that the strategies pursued by the power were meant to pressure the weaker state for reasons unconnected to the specific foreign policy behavior under investigation.

By establishing the presence of the three conditions along with the temporal link, correlation between the structure of the international system and the foreign policy behavior of the Middle Eastern regime would be established.

Causation:

Correlation is only enough to link state behavior with the existence of a power relationship; it is not, however, sufficient to show that systemic structure was the actual *cause* of the respective foreign policy behavior in question. Bachrach and Baratz as well

as Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Brown present four similar conditions which must be present in order for a threat to be successful in pressuring a state to behave in a certain manner.¹²⁵ These conditions will be used to show the success of a promise or a change in the economic relationship between states, since, as will be witnessed, they are relevant to these types of strategies as well.

The first of the four conditions pertains to the clarity of the international system. When establishing correlation, evidence regarding the overall preferences of the power were explored. For the purposes of causation, these preferences must have been clearly communicated to the weaker state. There must exist no ambiguity regarding what the international power desires in terms of the weaker state's behavior and what would occur in the case of compliance or noncompliance. Again, evidence of negotiations between the two states would be helpful here. How did the international power reveal its preferences and intentions? Under correlation, the number of meetings and encounters between the government officials of the two states was investigated. For this section, the *content* of the negotiations becomes important, as it may provide evidence of the power communicating its demands to the weaker state. In addition, content of the meetings conducted in international organizations, written letters by the head of state or other government officials, and recent intervention and/or diplomatic initiatives in the region could all serve as evidence outlining the particular preferences of the power. Furthermore, speeches given by high-level officials of the dominant state through the international media or other such forums would provide evidence that one state was advocating a certain preference as to appropriate state behavior, while the weaker state's

¹²⁵Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions," 634; Tedeschi, et. al., "A Paradigm for the Study of Coercive Power," 197.

public dialogue could highlight its acknowledgment of what the dominant power expects of it.

If the demand on behavior and the threats and/or promises connected to it were clearly communicated, the second condition requires that the repercussions of noncompliance be seen as costly. In terms of a threat, the withdrawal of aid or support must be significant enough that the developing state recognizes the importance of the demands imposed upon it. For a promise to be influential, it must grant enough support, either by military or economic aid, for the developing state to feel the need to alter its behavior or to continue on its present course of action, depending on the preferences of the power. Testing this condition requires a couple of important steps. Firstly, the contribution of foreign aid, both economic and military, to the total GDP must be considered. If the weaker state relies heavily on foreign financial support, the benefit of continued or increased support or the loss of external funding would be crucial to its future development. In addition, the level of financial support which would be granted or withdrawn by the international power must be identified as well. Recognizing how significant a change in the country's GDP would occur by compliance would show whether or not the developing state would take the dominant power's demands into consideration. Furthermore, if the loss of economic support is not significant, loss of military aid may be. Looking at possible regional aggression from long-time neighboring rivals due to military weakness in the developing regime if aid was suspended or withdrawn becomes essential. A regional rival's military superiority in this case may play a major role in the developing regime's acknowledgement of the power's threats and/or promises.

The third condition required for a power relationship to be successful is an extension of the second. Not only must the threats and promises be costly or valuable, respectively, in order to be acknowledged, but they must be great enough that the costs of noncompliance outweigh those of compliance, i.e. the loss or gain a state will experience by behaving counter to the preferences of the power must be greater, in terms of costs, or less, in terms of benefits, than those incurred by compliance. This requires a detailed cost/benefit analysis of the consequences of alternate state foreign policy behaviors. Circumstances such as loss of aid, not only from the international power but from other international donors as well, would have to be taken into account here, as they would provide insight as to *how much* the state would lose if it does not comply with systemic demands.

By not complying, furthermore, does the developing state gain alternative sources of aid? For example, if it loses military or economic aid from the international power and its allies, does the developing state make up for these losses by gaining aid from a new international source(s) or increased aid and economic support from already existing donors and allies other than the dominant power? This would be important as it shows the possible transfer in the power relationship from one international state to another or it can lead to the realization that the power relationship was not great enough to coerce the developing state to comply with the demands of its benefactor but, instead, was able to manipulate the international system to its own benefit. Comparing levels of aid granted by the international power and its allies in the years directly preceding as well as the years directly following the foreign policy behavior in question to alternate sources of aid and support that the developing state was receiving during these same years is vital here.

If the state loses significantly by noncompliance, the rational action would be to acquiesce to the demands of the international system; if, however, the losses incurred by noncompliance are replaced by alternate sources of support, the rational action could be to act against the demands of the great power. The costs of noncompliance, in this case, would not be great enough to persuade a state to behave in a certain manner.

One possible weakness in examining the level of aid given *after* state policy had been decided upon would be that a leader may not have known prior to his decision that this aid would have been made available to him, and therefore, would not have accounted for it when deciding which course of action to pursue. Recognizing these sources of aid is vital, however, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the developing state may have begun negotiations with these alternate states prior to the behavior in question, and, therefore, may have had some inclination that aid and economic support would follow. Second, even if it had no knowledge of the diverse sources of aid that it might receive, the fact that these sources did materialize shows that a developing state in the Middle East does have some independence when deciding on foreign policy, since noncompliance with its international power benefactor did not lead to a complete collapse of its economy and security vis-à-vis its neighbors, but, instead, led to a transfer in the relationships the state had with alternate international powers and/or regional allies.

The final condition needed to ensure compliance by a developing state requires that the threat or promise made by the power be seen as credible. The weaker power must believe that its international power benefactor would actually follow through with its threats and promises if it decided to act against and/or in accordance with the latter state's wishes. Credibility here can be tested by examining whether the power has

followed through with its threats and promises in previous negotiations in the region. In their past dealings with one another, has the power withdrawn or granted aid and support to the weaker state? Examining the entire past relationship would be impossible for the present study; therefore, analyzing the behavior of the international power in the last major encounter between the two states would be helpful here. If the two states have not had significant recent encounters, investigating the actions of the international power with respect to the issue under investigation could be helpful as well. The power reactions in preceding years in terms of levels of aid to regional allies and rivals, its military presence and support prior to and during relevant conflicts and its participation in diplomatic initiatives concerning the policy area all provide evidence as to the commitment of the power with regards to a specific issue. These past actions show the willingness of the power to pursue an initiative continuously, enhancing the credibility of its present threats and/or promises, and, consequently, allowing the weaker state to believe that noncompliance would result in the actual material losses predicted.

If these four conditions are present, the power-bargaining approach would assume that the weaker state would have no choice but to comply with the demands of its international power benefactor. If compliance is witnessed, then the structure of the international system would be central to explaining state foreign policy behavior in the Middle East. If, however, the state does not comply with the demands of the international power, analyzing the losses incurred by the weaker state in the period directly following its behavior is crucial. This is due to the fact that, if the threat of repercussions was actually pursued by the power, the losses incurred by the weaker state, if significant enough, might alter the future behavior of that state to one which complies

with the future demands of its international power benefactor. In this case, the international system would be seen to pose a significant constraint on state foreign-policy behavior, but not the *sole* constraint. Therefore, the reasons as to why the developing state did not comply in the first instance would have to be examined. Alternative explanations would have to be investigated such as unclear communication between the states, increasing domestic security threats, or other such unit-level variables. Due to the space constraints of this analysis, only the second of these unit-level variables (i.e. an increasingly unstable domestic environment) will be tested here.

Testing Subaltern Realism:

Correlation:

As with the power-bargaining approach, in order to test the predictions of subaltern realism, correlation must be established initially. Do the international and domestic circumstances at the time of the foreign policy behavior fall in line with the predictions proposed by the theory?

To reiterate, the “security software” discussed by the subaltern realist approach, includes regime legitimacy, policy capacity, and societal cohesion.¹²⁶ Blanchard and Ripsman present different questions, included in the appendix, which help assess the degree of “stateness” of a particular state.¹²⁷ Although not created as a response to subaltern realism specifically, these questions provide a method with which to operationalize regime vulnerability to the domestic environment and a means by which

¹²⁶ Azar and Moon, *National Security in the Third World*, 70-90.

¹²⁷ Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (2008), 394-395.

policy capacity, coercive capacity and regime legitimacy may be quantified. Societal cohesion, a factor exclusive to Azar and Moon's "security software," will be quantified in a similar manner but will be tested differently as it is not included in the stateness questions. After finding and analyzing the required information, policy capacity, regime legitimacy, and societal cohesion will be classified as falling into one of three levels of "stateness," high, moderate or low.¹²⁸ A high level of "stateness" will mean ultimately a low level of vulnerability to domestic constraints.

For the purposes of correlation, a lack of "societal cohesion" and regime legitimacy must be witnessed in the domestic environment of the state. The presence of these two factors provides "the contextual framework" which shows the type of composition of the domestic environment which is most conducive to domestic regime insecurity.¹²⁹ The degree to which policy capacity (defined as a combination of structural autonomy, economic capacity, and coercive capacity) exists and, consequently, its ability to constrain foreign policy behavior will be discussed in greater detail when establishing causation; policy capacity is crucial when analyzing *to what degree* a lack of legitimacy and societal cohesion would actually affect the leader's ability to respond to the demands of the international system and whether the level of constraints they present is as great as the subaltern realist approach would have predicted. However, societal cohesion and legitimacy must be witnessed in the domestic arena at the outset, as these highlight the type of context which is most conducive to domestic instability and an increased level of vulnerability, characteristics central to the subaltern realist approach. Low levels of legitimacy and societal cohesion portray a divided domestic environment which is

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Azar and Moon, *National Security in the Third World*, 79.

discontented with the behavior of the ruling elite. These domestic circumstances reflect those predicted by subaltern realists, and, therefore, are necessary in order for correlation to exist.

In testing whether societal cohesion exists it is useful to establish whether the developing state in question has experienced a history of colonialism, as this factor, according to subaltern realists, increases the likelihood that domestic population divisions are present. Secondary sources would be sufficient in confirming a colonial past, as they provide sufficient information regarding the history of the state in question and how and when it gained independence. The timing of independence is important as, if a developing state's experience with colonialism had ended relatively recently, the effects of the colonial era are expected to still be visible in the domestic environment of the regime and the process of state-making in the regime is likely to be in its earlier stages. Given that, according to subaltern realism, contemporary developing states have had to deal with foreign competition in addition to a colonial past, in order for their development to be complete *and* the effects of colonialism to no longer be visible, it would be logical to assume that they must have had longer than the four hundred years enjoyed by their more developed counterparts to develop, as developing states must also overcome these new obstacles. If these nation-states gained independence in a period sufficiently less than this four-hundred year benchmark, then the effects of colonialism on their domestic political environment must still be visible. This may seem like a tautological test since, for the state to have experienced a colonial history, it, consequently, would have had less than the given benchmark to develop in independence, as the colonial era experienced by today's Third World continued well into the first half

of twentieth century. However, showing exactly how *short* a time period the state actually has been a sovereign entity seems necessary to portraying how much its colonial past still dominates its domestic environment.

A history of colonialism, furthermore, is important as it shows whether the territorial boundaries of the state in question had been constructed artificially. By briefly examining the colonial relationships between the powers themselves and between them and the respective Middle Eastern regime, this connection can be made. Any documents relating a division of land between the powers, if they exist for this area, are central. As previously mentioned, this is crucial when providing evidence of societal cohesion, or a lack thereof. Looking at the composition of the domestic population as it existed in the period after the colonial experience is crucial. Is the population homogenous or are many different peoples, coming from culturally, religiously, racially, and/or ethnically diverse backgrounds forced to live within the same borders? For this condition to be applicable, many different sects or groups of people must be visible within one state. According to Azar and Moon, a study conducted in 1972 shows that in 53 of 132 states, the composition of the domestic population included more than five diverse societal groupings.¹³⁰ In others, more than a hundred different groups existed. Therefore, the countries under investigation must exhibit a domestic population where at least five diverse population groupings exist. If there are less than five groups residing within the state, a significant proportion of the population must represent at least two of the existing groupings. A significant proportion could be as little as fifteen percent, as this is a number great enough to create a clash between the two domestic groups, as the Tamil

¹³⁰Azar and Moon, *National Security in the Third World*, 86.

Tigers in Sri Lanka have shown clearly in the past.¹³¹ If a smaller proportion of the population represents one of the two groupings, however, and less than five such groups exist, the chances that the population composition would have been polarized enough to cause a significant level of violence domestically would be much smaller, *unless* this small proportion has a population with similar ideals and beliefs residing in a neighboring state.

Societal cohesion cannot exist if significant levels of violence between rival groups have existed in the domestic environment in the relevant time period. A high level of domestic violence can be tested by finding evidence of recent civil wars and/or continuous clashes between religious, racial, or ethnic groupings. Clashes between rival groups, if not occurring often, must have been significantly aggressive in nature, leading to the deployment of government forces to separate the opposing groups in at least one of the instances. Conflicts between opposition groups and the state, however, will not be included here, as these fall under the category testing regime legitimacy and will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

As with the example of the Kurds in the Middle East, nations representing similar beliefs and ideals but separated by state boundaries are likely to create conflict, increasing the likelihood that unstable borders exist between states. Such border tension, however, is not exclusive to population divisions within states, but diversity between

¹³¹Patrick Peebles, *The History of Sri Lanka* (California: Greenwood Press, 2006), 7.

states as well.¹³² Have there been recent border conflicts, even minor ones, between the state in question and its neighbors? Border conflicts are defined as any type of violence occurring on the border between two neighboring states, resulting in casualties from at least one of the two states. Clashes between civilians or between the military along the border of the developing state which led to casualties in one or both states can help portray instability. Civilian clashes would have had to occur more frequently than military ones, as one or two border clashes between civilians could be a coincidence rather than a justification of unstable territorial boundaries due to population diversity.

If evidence shows that the domestic population is greatly divided, has experienced a recent civil war or a major clash between opposing groups domestically, and has witnessed a series of conflicts along its border, societal cohesion would be classified as low. If, however, the domestic population was divided into two or more groupings, but none of the minorities had at least fifteen percent total representation, and if the border had been relatively peaceful, showing only one or two minor clashes in the years under investigation, societal cohesion would fall in the moderate level. Finally, if the majority of the population represents one homogenous group with similar ideals and beliefs and if the state has experienced a relatively peaceful recent past along with a quiet border with neighboring states, societal cohesion would be high.

Regime legitimacy must fall into the low category as well in order for correlation to exist, as Ayoob predicts a low overall acceptance of the leader in these states the majority of the time. Testing legitimacy will be conducted with the use of Blanchard and

¹³² Border tension has been included in the section regarding societal cohesion as it discusses how colonialism has affected and exacerbated population divisions in the developing world leading to increased levels of regional conflict.

Ripsman's questions as they provide an overall assessment of how accepted the regime is with respect to their domestic population. Domestic legitimacy would enhance the leader's ability to behave independently without being constrained by his domestic environment. How the opposition rallies support, whether diverse rival groups enhance domestic instability by participating in demonstrations, violent behavior, vocal disapproval of the regime, etc. would all increase the vulnerability of the regime to its population.

In addition, however, international legitimacy would have to be tested here.¹³³

The following question has been added to Blanchard and Ripsman's stateness questions to allow for the assessment of international legitimacy:

1. Is there evidence of continuous international pressure on the regime to liberalize its domestic government structure and its economy?

Evidence of such international circumstances would include the increasing presence of norms, such as human rights regulations and pressures for democratization. Pressure from the United Nations, international organizations and/or the Western industrialized allies of the regime is helpful here. Such pressure could be tested in terms of conditional aid agreements, UN resolutions, and Western governments linking financial aid agreements to demands of democratization, for example. The presence of powerful international NGOs promoting human rights norms in the states is also useful.

As with societal cohesion, after assessing the evidence provided in response to the questions regarding legitimacy, the regime's level of overall legitimacy will be evaluated.

¹³³ International legitimacy will be used more as an attempt to show the international arena's ability to impose itself on domestic government structures, as these help highlight how international norms can enhance the domestic insecurity concerns of leaders in these regimes.

If, for example, the regime relies on repression, while violent protests and demonstrations as well as public disapproval of the regime and its leader are evident, then, domestically, the regime would experience a low level of legitimacy. Positive overall support for the regime and the leader, with the exception of one or two opposition groups, however, along with only a few minor demonstrations where the majority of the population was not mobilized would show moderate domestic legitimacy. Finally, circumstances where the regime enjoys great legitimacy would be portrayed in states where demonstrations are the exception rather than the rule, and most articles, editorials, or other forms of media discuss the regime and the leader favorably, supporting his overall rule.

International pressure to democratize can be assessed similarly. The need for the regime to turn to international organizations in order to fund and stimulate its economy, and insistence of these organizations to provide aid conditional on political and economic liberalization signifies that the domestic mode of governance in the developing state is not greatly accepted by the industrialized powers of the world, consequently portraying a low or moderate level of international acceptance, which for simplicity will be referred to here as international legitimacy. Low levels would be portrayed by more open attempts by international governments and organizations at changing domestic behavior in the developing state, i.e. by more than one conditional agreement, by NGO's very frequently and actively pushing for reform, and so on. High levels of legitimacy would be portrayed when the international environment's dealings with the regime do not question domestic modes of governance and/or domestic repressive behavior.

Societal fragmentation, border tension, and international pressure to abide by international norms must be witnessed in the years directly preceding the foreign policy

behavior in order to establish a temporal link. Again, a maximum of three years was chosen as a benchmark as it allows sufficient time for the regime to feel the pressure of these constraints, but is not too long a time period that the conditions of the past are no longer powerful enough to affect the present behavior of the state. With the presence of these conditions and the establishment of a temporal link, correlation would link domestic factors and foreign policy behavior.

Causation:

After establishing correlation, enough evidence must be brought forth to show that domestic factors were the actual cause of the foreign policy behavior in question. One of the main assumptions of subaltern realism is that the high degree of vulnerability of a developing regime towards its domestic environment ultimately will increase its level of insecurity, and would, therefore, lead to foreign policy behavior which caters to the unstable domestic environment. Consequently, after predicting the level of societal cohesion and legitimacy present in these Middle Eastern regimes, providing evidence as to the amount of policy capacity enjoyed by the regime is central. Low or moderate levels of policy capacity, combined with low levels of either societal cohesion or legitimacy would mean that the ruling elite would be more susceptible to domestic pressures. A moderate level of capacity combined with moderate levels of both cohesion and legitimacy would allow the regime some maneuverability as to decisions regarding foreign policy, and, although domestic constraints may exist, they would not be as great as subaltern realists would expect. Finally, a high level of policy capacity would mean that the regime, regardless of what cohesion and legitimacy may portray, would be able

to manipulate the domestic environment in such a manner that the latter would not provide a significant constraint on foreign-policymaking.

Policy capacity “comprises the planning, formulation, and implementation of national security policies. Furthermore, threat assessment, decisions, articulation and enforcement of policies, and mobilization and allocation of resources all belong to the realm of policy capacity.”¹³⁴ Blanchard and Ripsman’s questions regarding autonomy test the “structural ability” of governments to pursue policy options independently of domestic constraints.¹³⁵ These questions analyze government structure, constitutional rights, norms and procedures on the conduct of foreign policy, and the distribution of power in different government institutions. Consequently, the questions highlight the *independent ability* of a leader, or lack thereof, to use the structural power at his disposal to insulate himself politically from the rest of the domestic environment. High levels of autonomy would allow the leader and his regime to behave in a manner which ignores the domestic environment and responds to the international system more completely by allowing them greater freedom to employ and test different strategies and policy options when deciding on future state action.

Autonomy alone, however, is not enough to decide on policy capacity. Economic and coercive capacities must be included as well. Economic capacity tests the amount of resources the government has at its disposal when attempting to control and/or satisfy the demands of its domestic constituents. This control would be established through guaranteeing cooperation by the promise or threat of economic benefit/reprisal for those unsatisfied with the conduct of the ruling elite. High economic capacity allows the

¹³⁴ Azar and Moon, *National Security in the Third World*, 91.

¹³⁵ Blanchard and Ripsman, “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft,” 378.

government to dominate the domestic public sector, seizing a vital source of influence which the opposition otherwise could use to gain the support of the domestic population. Finally, economic capacity ensures the ability of the ruling elite to mobilize domestic resources in order to pursue a specific policy freely, without the need to gain the compliance of much of the domestic opposition. As the questions presented by Blanchard and Ripsman indicate, evidence would have to be collected with respect to government-owned businesses, taxation measures, borrowing ability, and other such variables. Economic capacity, when combined with autonomy, helps increase the overall policy capacity of the regime, as the ruling elite has more resources at its disposal to rid of domestic opposition and to increase its overall support.

Finally, coercive capacity tests the ability of the ruling elite to subdue domestic threats with the use of force. Ayoub states that, at the level of state-making these regimes find themselves, coercive means used to ensure domestic stability are necessary. The inability of the regime to use force would signify the inability of the regime to control unruly domestic dissident groups, ultimately decreasing the regime's ability to pursue policy without being affected by local opposition. Security services, the domestic police force, military and intelligence units would have to be examined here. Finding such information, especially statistics, for the Middle East has been extremely difficult; therefore, to overcome this lack of information, analyzing cases where domestic security forces or military and police units have been deployed to quell domestic protests and conflicts in the years directly preceding the foreign policy behavior in question will be conducted as thoroughly as possible to allow for a more complete assessment of coercive capacity in these regimes.

By assessing the degree of autonomy, economic and coercive capacities enjoyed by the regime, I will be able to evaluate its overall policy capacity prior to the state behavior under investigation. The lower the level of policy capacity, the greater the degree of domestic vulnerability, and the more the leader would have been constrained by domestic politics, which would be reflected in the respective state's foreign policy behavior. This assessment, similarly to the tests conducted above, will rely on Blanchard and Ripsman's discussion regarding how to quantify the overall levels of the variables.

If autonomy, economic capacity, and/or coercive capacity fall into the high level, then overall policy capacity would be high, as the regime would be able to force the domestic environment to acquiesce to its rule by the use of either coercion, the promise of economic benefits, and/or overall executive autonomy. Consequently, the regime in question would have sufficient ability to conduct foreign policy independently of domestic opposition, regardless of societal cohesion and legitimacy, and foreign policy behavior would not be constrained by domestic politics. Alternatively, if the state experiences moderate levels with respect to all three variables, it would experience moderate policy capacity, which, if societal cohesion and legitimacy are moderate as well, would allow the regime the ability to behave independently of domestic constraints. This does not mean that the regime is not at all vulnerable to its internal environment, but that it is insulated from the domestic opposition enough that it can act on foreign policy without first responding to domestic threats to its survival. However, moderate policy capacity along with low societal cohesion and/or legitimacy would allow some regime maneuverability domestically, but domestic constraints would be more pronounced and foreign policy behavior would reflect domestic concerns to some extent, even if the

regime was not completely constrained. Subaltern realism, in this case, would hold some explanatory power with respect to foreign policy behavior in the Middle East, but, its assumption that domestic instability is severe in all developing regions may be ill-founded.

Finally, if the regime in question experiences low levels in any of the three variables, autonomy, economic or coercive capacities, the regime would have low overall policy capacity and will be greatly vulnerable to domestic circumstances. It, consequently, would have to respond primarily to domestic threats to its security. This would mean that foreign policy behavior would portray domestic politics, rather than respond to international systemic constraints. This would be greatest if the evidence provided portrays a lack of leadership autonomy in combination with low coercive and economic capacities. In this case the leader and his regime would feel the pressure to acquiesce to the demands of their domestic environment without taking into account the constraints posed by the international system. This final case would portray significant regime weakness, which according to Ayooob, would be the norm in most developing states.

In addition to predicting whether the regime is prone to domestic insecurity, the degree of "stateness" would help predict whether the regime is at the level of state-making that subaltern realism would assume to be the case in the developing world. If the regimes in question receive high levels of autonomy, economic and coercive capacity, as well as legitimacy and societal cohesion, Ayooob's inclusion of the Middle East as part of the developing world would be ill-founded. Receiving high levels in two or three of the four categories, or moderate scores in all four categories would counter Ayooob's

predictions as well. Although this would mean that the state-making process is not complete, it would offset the argument that the regimes are at a level of state-making similar to other states in the developing world which are expected to experience low scores in at least one, if not in all, four categories.

If the demands of the domestic environment required the regime to act in a certain manner and this behavior was witnessed through relations with neighboring states, the predictions of the subaltern realist approach could present a sufficient explanation of state behavior. If, however, the domestic arena required the regime to act in a certain manner, but the leader behaved in a contradictory fashion, alternative sources of influence must have played a role in his calculations. Finally, if the level of policy capacity in these regimes receives a high rating, subaltern realism's explanation of Middle East foreign policy behavior would not be accurate.

The tables included in the appendix help outline the predictions of the power-bargaining and subaltern realist approaches with respect to the case studies.

Chapter Three: Case-Studies

Case-Study 1: Egypt

Brief Summary of Egypt: 1973 and 1979

The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East has consumed the region, creating major wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1970 and 1973. As one of the main players in the 1967 war, Egypt was said to have lost 11,500 men, 286 warplanes and eighty percent of its armor with a further 5,500 men detained by its regional rival.¹³⁶ These losses had a serious effect on the country's standing as a leader of the pan-Arab movement which had grown greatly in the region during the preceding time period. Soon after Nasser's death and the consolidation of power by his successor Anwar Sadat, Egypt partook in the October War of 1973. Due to the element of surprise, the military was able to gain early advances in the war, and, although Israel regained control and recovered ground, the conflict was seen as a political victory for Sadat's regime.¹³⁷

Soon after, however, Egypt embarked on a foreign policy path which brought it much closer to the West and to Israel. The liberalization of the domestic economy through, what was called, *Infitah*, or opening, and the continued negotiations with Israel led to increasingly favorable dealings with the United States. The improving relations with Israel culminated with Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David

¹³⁶ Bahgat Korany, "The Glory That Was? The Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamic Alliance Decisions, October 1973," In *How Foreign Policy Decisions are made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. Bahgat Korany (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 90.

¹³⁷ Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 22; Marius Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," In *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark Gasiorowski, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 418; Joe Stork, "Sadat's Desperate Mission," *MERIP Reports*, No. 64 (Feb. 1978), 4.

Accords of 1978, and finally, the signing of the peace treaty between the two states in 1979.¹³⁸

The Power-Bargaining Approach and Egyptian Foreign Policy:

The 1973 October War-Correlation:

At the time of the 1973 war, the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for global dominance. Their interest in Egypt, specifically, was highlighted with the fact that both superpowers continuously struggled for control over this regional power throughout the Cold War.¹³⁹ Egypt's centrality stemmed from the critical role it had played during the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the years. Economically, furthermore, the Suez Canal had been a major factor behind foreign intervention in the state, one which did not change during this period.¹⁴⁰

Evidence establishing a direct connection between the superpowers and Egypt is found during this time period as the state was engaging in international negotiations with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, while high-level meetings between Sadat and Soviet leaders took place in the Kremlin in March of 1971,¹⁴¹ the Egyptian leader also held a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, while his national security adviser, Ismail, subsequently met with President Nixon, and held three private meetings with Henry Kissinger.¹⁴² Furthermore, while Egyptian delegations were sent to Moscow in 1972 and 1973, respectively, CIA representatives had come to Egypt in 1972,

¹³⁸ Yassin El-Ayouty, *Egypt, Peace and the Inter-Arab Crisis* (New York: State University of New York, 1979), 4.

¹³⁹ Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 423.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 406.

¹⁴¹ Anwar El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), 219.

¹⁴² Korany, "The Glory that Was?" 91-92.

and Ismail travelled to meet with Kissinger again in 1973 in France.¹⁴³ It was clear, therefore, that Egypt had a direct connection with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union prior to the 1973 war.

Despite continued negotiations with the United States, however, it was clear that the Soviet Union was the main power benefactor during this time period. After the 1967 war, U.S. support for Egypt dropped dramatically, awarding the Soviets greater influence on the state, at least until 1972.¹⁴⁴ In terms of loans, the Soviet Union supplied Egypt with thirty-seven percent of its total foreign loans between 1968 and 1972.¹⁴⁵ By 1973, the non-military debt to the Soviet Union and its allies had amounted to \$2 billion.¹⁴⁶ Even in terms of economic cooperation, the levels of bilateral trade between Egypt and the Soviets far outweighed that of Egypt and the United States during this period.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, military support was granted by the Soviet Union in substantial amounts, as the Soviets provided the arms with which Egypt fought the 1967, 1970 (War of Attrition), and 1973 wars.¹⁴⁸ In addition to weaponry, the Soviet Union had placed around 15,000 soldiers on Egyptian soil in the aftermath of the 1967 military defeat.¹⁴⁹ Finally, to further strengthen their relationship, the two states signed the Treaty of Friendship in May of 1971 which ensured continued Soviet aid to Sadat's regime in return for Soviet

¹⁴³Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 8-9.

¹⁴⁴ Joe Stork, "Egypt's Debt Problem," *MERIP Reports*, no. 107 (July-Aug. 1982), 12; W.B. Fisher, "Egypt," In *The Middle East and North Africa 1974-75*, 21st Ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1974), 282; Korany, "The Glory that Was?" 88; El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 207.

¹⁴⁵ Nazem Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Egypt's Economic Development: 1960-1972," *International Journal of Middle East Politics* 14, no. 1 (Feb. 1982), 87.

¹⁴⁶ Stork, "Egypt's Debt Problem," 12.

¹⁴⁷ Fisher, "Egypt," 298-299.

¹⁴⁸ Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 425.

¹⁴⁹ Michael Barnett, and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991), 385; Charles Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," In *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Louise Fawcett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 226.

participation in Egypt's domestic affairs.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, it was obvious that during this period, the Soviet Union's relationship with Egypt outweighed that of the United States.

Egyptian perceptions on Soviet preferences, however, on what would be acceptable behavior during this period were not as obvious. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union came to the military defense of Egypt during crucial times, especially to offset U.S. support for Israel,¹⁵¹ it seemed that the Soviets were interested in sustaining the stalemate which had developed between the regional rivals after 1970. As the two superpowers were coming closer to a policy of détente, a regional conflict may have greatly hindered their ongoing negotiations. Therefore, both Fahmy, eventually a minister in Sadat's cabinet, and Sadat himself revealed that continuing the deadlock between Egypt and Israel seemed beneficial to the Soviets at the time as it guaranteed continued cooperation between the two superpowers.¹⁵² In his autobiography, Sadat continued by saying that this Soviet preference could have been the reason behind the state's reluctance in providing the promised military aid to Egypt and disallowing India from doing so prior to 1973.¹⁵³

Due to the Soviet preference of maintaining regional stability, evidence of the Soviet Union promising military aid to Egypt was rare. A few incidences, however, are important to point out. During Sadat's visit to the Soviet Union in 1971, Brezhnev agreed to provide the Egyptian government with several types of weapons, some of

¹⁵⁰Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 109; El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 212; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 8.

¹⁵¹Alan R. Taylor, "The United States and the Middle East," In *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics*, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 149.

¹⁵²Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 6.

¹⁵³El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 212.

which were received during that year, while the rest were delivered in 1973.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Treaty of Friendship, as previously mentioned, was signed with the promise of continued Soviet assistance to Egypt during the period.¹⁵⁵ Finally, the delegation sent to Moscow in March of 1973 was able to secure the delivery of arms to Egypt in that year specifically; again, however, not all the arms were delivered on time.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, although evidence does exist supporting the premise that the Soviets continuously promised aid to the Egyptians, such promises were not extremely popular, and their actual delivery remained, more often than not, unfulfilled.

Did the Egyptian state's foreign policy behavior fall in line with the preferences of the Soviet Union, given that the latter state was supposedly its international benefactor? Assuming that Soviet preferences compelled Egypt to remain in a stalemate with Israel, the year 1971 would have portrayed compliance with Soviet preferences, as the year was dubbed one of "no peace, no war."¹⁵⁷ However, Egyptian actions after 1971 are more contradictory. Expelling Soviet military advisers in 1972 and conducting secret negotiations with the United States portray behavior which would not fall in line with the Soviet preference of remaining the dominant power in Egypt.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, by creating and openly advocating Sadat's Peace Initiative in 1971, Egypt clearly showed a

¹⁵⁴Ibid, 220-221.

¹⁵⁵Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 109.

¹⁵⁶Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 9.

¹⁵⁷Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 6.

¹⁵⁸For information on the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt, looking at the following sources is helpful: Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 8-9; *The Middle East*, 11th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 61-62; Joe Stork, "Bailing out Sadat," *MERIP Reports*, no. 56 (April 1977), 4; El-Ayouty, *Egypt, Peace and the Inter-Arab Crisis*, 2; Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 109. For information on the secret meetings taking place between the United States and Egypt: *The Middle East*, 61; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 8; Ali E. Hillal, Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," In *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 176.

desire for the development of a positive relationship with the United States; this Peace Initiative was initiated with the hopes of finally ending the state of war between Egypt and Israel, but did not lead to any positive developments due to the disinterest of the United States during this period.¹⁵⁹ Finally, Egypt's initiation and participation in the 1973 war against Israel would have gone against the Soviet preference of maintaining a stalemate between the two countries; furthermore, cooperation with the anti-communist Saudi Arabia during this war further validates the anti-Soviet behavior in Egyptian foreign policy.¹⁶⁰

In addition to the contradictory behavior portrayed by Egypt during and prior to the 1973 war, evidence found when attempting to establish a temporal link provided interesting results as well. Although the negotiations between the Soviets and the Egyptians and the promises provided by the former all took place prior to 1973, it is important to note that these Soviet promises of aid continued *after* the Egyptians partook in anti-Soviet behavior. The delivery of Soviet arms, furthermore, was the primary factor allowing the Egyptians to conduct a successful war against Israel;¹⁶¹ if the Soviets truly did not wish for Egypt to engage in war with Israel, the delivery of these arms warranted behavior contradictory to the international benefactor's goals in the region. Some may argue that the actions conducted by the Egyptian government during these years fell more in line with U.S. preferences, as acceptance of a regional peace and attempts at establishing communication with the U.S. make evident; however, again, the

¹⁵⁹ El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 219, 279.

¹⁶⁰ Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics," 156.

¹⁶¹ Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 9.

participation in the 1973 war and the resulting oil embargo of the 1970s, which will be discussed shortly, show that Egypt acted in defiance of U.S. interests as well.¹⁶²

Correlation, therefore, between Egyptian foreign policy behavior and systemic structure cannot be established in this case. Power relationships alone cannot provide evidence as to why the Egyptian government behaved as it did during the 1973 war and the years preceding it.

The 1973 October War-Causation:

Although establishing causation would be impossible without the existence of correlation, I will conduct the analysis regardless, as it might highlight important details regarding the reasons behind Egyptian foreign-policy behavior during the period.

Firstly, with regards to the clarity of the international system and the knowledge of Soviet demands, evidence shows that government officials in Egypt were convinced that the Soviet Union's preferences insisted on the continuation of the stalemate between Israel and Egypt.¹⁶³ However, Soviet military aid provided to Egypt during 1973, as well as the signing of the Treaty of Friendship granting continued aid, and other such behavior lead one to assume that Soviet interests in Egypt meant more than just forcing a neutral outcome in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as that would have been better maintained with the complete withholding of arms. Furthermore, continuing aid to Egypt after Sadat expelled Soviet advisors and rid himself of the pro-communist Sabri government in 1971 further

¹⁶²Some have said that Sadat's participation in the 1973 war was supported by the United States in an attempt for the Egyptian government to gain leverage against Israel so that the two states would be able to negotiate on more equal ground in the future; however, there was no concrete evidence supporting this view, and, therefore, this claim cannot be substantiated here.

¹⁶³El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 221; *The Middle East*, 61.

highlight an uncertain international environment. These actions show that the Soviet Union's interests were not entirely clear during this time period.

One possible reason behind Egypt's behavior could be the fact that it did not see the promise of aid from the Soviet Union as significant enough to merit compliance. Throughout its history, due to its endowment with an insufficient amount of natural resources to sustain its increasingly large population, Egypt has relied on foreign aid for its continued development.¹⁶⁴ After 1967, Egypt's dominant sources of aid became the Soviet Union and the Gulf oil-rich monarchies.¹⁶⁵ Aid from the latter states averaged up to \$280 million per year between 1968 and 1972,¹⁶⁶ while loans from the Soviet Union amounted to \$319 million during the same period.¹⁶⁷ Finally, aid from the Soviet Union and its allies reached a total of \$1.2 billion.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, in terms of reliance on foreign aid as a contribution to its GDP, Egypt was more than dependent on its international benefactors. However, the deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the years prior to 1973 and the Soviet Union's reluctance at providing the promised military support to Egypt could have been reasons behind the latter state's noncompliant behavior. The promise of continued aid and support may not have been significant enough to convince Sadat of the need to comply with Soviet demands.

¹⁶⁴Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," In *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 95.

¹⁶⁵Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital," 87, 90.

¹⁶⁶Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Egypt's Economy Under Sadat: Will the Peace Agreement be followed by Prosperity?" In *Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1978-79*, ed. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon, and Jacqueline Dyck, 3 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), 354; Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," 96 (although this source reveals that the Arab states provided Egypt with only \$250 million annually during this same period).

¹⁶⁷Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital," 87.

¹⁶⁸Stork, "Bailing Out Sadat," 8.

Furthermore, the benefits of noncompliance, according to evidence, seem to be greater than those of compliance. Arab aid, conditional on Egypt's participation in the 1973 war, was promised to increase to an amount which would replace much of the aid lost from the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁹ Alternatively, however, had Sadat remained consistent with his indecisive "no war, no peace" strategy, the Arab aid promised and received after the initiation of the war would have been unlikely.¹⁷⁰ In addition, due to the Soviet's contradictory behavior in previous years, Sadat may have assumed that noncompliance with Soviet demands would not lead to a complete stop in Soviet assistance for Egypt; specifically, the regional importance of Egypt for the Soviet Union's balance of power against the U.S. would make the loss of Egyptian support very costly for the international power.¹⁷¹ Indeed, although Soviet aid dropped after the conclusion of the war to \$76 million, it was still forthcoming.¹⁷² In addition, negotiations with the West, especially with the United States, accelerated in the post-war period, further increasing the benefits of noncompliance enjoyed by the Egyptian state.¹⁷³ Therefore, noncompliance with the international power benefactor's demands may have presented Sadat with more benefits than compliance, leading to his choice of behavior.

Finally, the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union had lost much of its credibility at this time. Especially given the Soviet Union's inexplicable increase of

¹⁶⁹ Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances," 390; Stork, "Bailing out Sadat," 10 (this article describes the increase in Arab aid after the conclusion of the war, an amount which reached up to \$2 billion); R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider, *Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 35 (These authors discuss how Arab aid in the years after the war were essential for Egypt to meet its debt payments).

¹⁷⁰ McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 35; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances," 392-393.

¹⁷¹ Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances," 390.

¹⁷² Stork, "Bailing out Sadat," 8.

¹⁷³ Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," 105-106; *The Middle East*, 223.

military aid after the expulsion of its advisors from Egypt,¹⁷⁴ this power's actions in the region were not consistent. Sadat's personal dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union, furthermore, decreased the essence of the relationship between the two states, as he viewed the Soviets with increasing distrust and suspicion.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, Sadat may not have believed that the promises of aid and cooperation from the Soviets actually would materialize, or, if they did, would be given at the promised amount.

The testing of causation, in conclusion, highlights a few important points. Although the Soviet Union may have been the primary international power benefactor during the period in question, the Egyptian state had alternative sources of aid, mainly those stemming from the Arab oil-wealthy regimes. These may have been supported, as well, with the possibility of future negotiations with the United States. Furthermore, although Soviet aid was forthcoming, Sadat's deteriorating relationship with the Soviets as well as the latter state's inconsistent behavior towards Egypt may have further influenced Sadat's decision to partake in a war which went against perceived Soviet preferences. Therefore, although Egypt may have lost Soviet support during this period, it gained benefits which were greater than the power-bargaining approach would have predicted from noncompliant behavior. This approach, therefore, is not able to explain sufficiently Egyptian behavior in the 1973 war.

The 1979 Peace Treaty-Correlation:

As with the distribution of power in 1973, Egypt in 1979 was still faced with the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. During this period, however,

¹⁷⁴ Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances," 390.

¹⁷⁵ Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 8.

Egyptian relations with the United States had improved dramatically, while the relationship with the Soviet Union had lost much of its substance.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, in the post-1973 period, U.S. interest in the region, in general, had increased greatly due to a few developments. Firstly, the powerful consequences of the oil embargo created by the oil-wealthy states on the United States and its Western allies during and after the 1973 war undoubtedly captured and maintained U.S. interest.¹⁷⁷ In addition, developments in Iran, mainly the fall of the pro-Western Shah and the rise of the anti-West Islamic revolution in 1978, led the United States to search for a new ally in the region.¹⁷⁸ Finally, the need to offset Soviet influence in the region remained persistent. Egypt, in this case, not only served as a replacement to Iran as a U.S. ally and a possible supporter of future peace with Israel, but also increased the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Middle East.¹⁷⁹

As a result of the developments in the region and the growing relationship with Egypt, the preferences of the United States in the Middle East during this time period were clear: it sought to remain the dominant force at the expense of the Soviets, while overpowering the anti-Western Islamic influence, finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and controlling the oil supplies which had led to the economic repercussions of the embargo of the mid-1970s.

Due to these factors, negotiations between the United States and Egypt increased greatly during this period. As discussed in the methodology, only one high-level meeting between the heads of state is enough to show a powerful connection between the two

¹⁷⁶Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 426.

¹⁷⁷Stork, "Sadat's Desperate Mission," 4.

¹⁷⁸William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 291; Joel Beinin, "The Cold Peace," *Merip Reports*, no. 129 (January 1985), 4.

¹⁷⁹Ashton Nigel, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 291.

regimes. Negotiations between Egypt and the U.S. far surpassed this one meeting benchmark. Sadat and Nixon met at least three times, in 1974, 1975, and 1977, respectively.¹⁸⁰ Sadat then engaged in talks with Carter, especially around the time of the Camp David Accords of 1978.¹⁸¹ Although these meetings by no means cover the extent of negotiations between the two states, they are enough to show a powerful relationship developing between Sadat and the U.S. prior to the signing of the peace treaty of 1979.

In terms of becoming Egypt's main power benefactor, the U.S. also achieved this status in the post-1973 period. In fact, Egyptian foreign policy in the late 1970s was accused as being one representing "overt American clientage."¹⁸² During these years, the United States began providing the Egyptian government with growing levels of aid, with amounts reaching up to \$1 billion and \$950 million in 1976 and 1978, respectively.¹⁸³ The Soviets, alternatively, now had become an increasing threat to the Egyptians, as they began increasing arms supplies to Egypt's neighbor and growing rival, Libya.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, in addition to the negotiations which took place between the two states, evidence shows that the United States had become the international power benefactor for Egypt in the post-1973 period, replacing the Soviet Union.

Although a direct connection between the U.S. and Egypt evidently exists during this period, for correlation to be present, there must be a clear indication of the U.S.

¹⁸⁰Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 425.

¹⁸¹ Quandt, *Camp David*, 301; Taylor, "The United States and the Middle East," 155; Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 297-298.

¹⁸²Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Egyptian politics under Sadat: The post-populist development of an authoritarian-modernizing state* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 65; Taylor, "The United States and the Middle East," 155.

¹⁸³Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 105-106; Israel Altman, "The Arab Republic of Egypt," Ed. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon, and Jacqueline Dyck, Vol. 3 of *Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1978-79* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), 411.

¹⁸⁴Raphael Israeli, *"I, Egypt": Aspects of President Anwar Al-Sadat's Political Thought* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981), 153.

providing promises of aid or threats of repercussions conditional on future Egyptian behavior. Evidence of such promises has been found. Firstly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during the mid-1970s, attempted to increase Egyptian support for peace by promising to try to allow Egypt to regain control of the Sinai Valley, a strategic piece of land crucial to the Egyptian economy, but one which was lost during the 1967 war.¹⁸⁵ The U.S., in addition, created a “‘food for peace’ credit agreement...entitling Cairo to purchase \$214 million worth of wheat in 1979;” these developments were combined with economic cooperation in the technological and rural development fields as well.¹⁸⁶ Economic support, however, was not the only type of foreign aid evident in this period. Military aid, granted in a February 1979 agreement, promised \$1.5 billion worth of arms supplies to Egypt between 1979 and 1981.¹⁸⁷

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 shows that the behavior of the Egyptian regime during this period falls in line with the preferences of the United States. In addition, however, the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1976, the suspension of debt repayment to the Soviets in 1977, the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, and the signing of the Sinai I, Sinai II, and Camp David Agreements, along with Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 are all behaviors which seemingly fall in line with U.S. preferences in the period as well.¹⁸⁸ The dates provided here, along with the fact that the majority of aid promises were made prior to the actual signing of the

¹⁸⁵*The Middle East*, 64.

¹⁸⁶Altman, “The Arab Republic of Egypt,” 411.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid*, 410.

¹⁸⁸Dessouki, “The Primacy of Economics,” 171; Kanovsky, “Egypt's Economy Under Sadat,” 366; El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 271; *The Middle East*, 64; Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 66, 74; The Sinai I, Sinai II, and Camp David agreements each advanced the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in their own respective ways, with the former two guaranteeing the eventual return of the Suez Canal to Egypt.

peace treaty, also establish a temporal link between state behavior and the promise of economic development and military security. With this temporal link, correlation between system structure and state behavior finally has been established.

The 1979 Peace Treaty-Causation:

After acknowledging the importance of the relationship existing between the United States and Egypt during this period, it is important to show that U.S. promises were the actual *cause* of Egyptian behavior. Firstly, U.S. preferences as to the acceptable foreign policy behavior for Egypt must have been made clear to the Egyptian leadership, leaving no room for uncertainty. Sadat's understanding of U.S. preferences, however, was evident as early as 1971 with his creation of the Peace Initiative discussed above and his attempt at reestablishing a relationship with the U.S. through the promotion of peace. Furthermore, as Sadat signed the disengagement agreements, Sinai I and II in 1974 and 1975, respectively, his understanding of U.S. interests were further highlighted.¹⁸⁹ Additionally, in his speech to the Egyptian National Assembly in 1977, Sadat openly proclaimed his willingness to visit Jerusalem, if invited by Israel,¹⁹⁰ this visit would have been the first of its kind in the Middle East and would have been a crucial step to furthering the peace process between the two states. Therefore, U.S. aid during this period was clearly "political" in nature, with its aims being "quite plain and explicit: to separate Egypt from the socialist bloc, to limit any radical influence Egypt might have in

¹⁸⁹Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 427; Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 228.

¹⁹⁰Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 230.

the Arab world, and to use Egypt to attain US regional policy goals, including an American solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict."¹⁹¹

Given the promise of aid, Egyptian behavior would portray compliance if the aid was large enough to contribute greatly to the state's economic development. This is undeniable here, since the increase in the contribution of aid to Egypt with the help of the United States, as of 1976, reached \$1 billion a year.¹⁹² Furthermore, overall military aid provided by the U.S. had reached \$28 billion in 2002 since its commencement in 1975.¹⁹³ Even though these are just a couple of examples, they show that the change in the Egyptian government's income levels due to the availability of U.S. aid was considerable, and, in consequence, could not be ignored.

In addition to gaining economic assistance from the U.S., Egyptian compliance with its benefactor's demands allowed for improved relationships with Britain, France, Germany and Japan beginning as early as 1974.¹⁹⁴ Alternatively, the main loss the Egyptians would face from signing the peace treaty with Israel would come from the Arab world, as they would, and eventually did, sever ties with Sadat's regime. Between 1973 and 1978 aid in the form of loans, credits, and "gifts" from these states reached \$17 billion. However, sources reveal that the loss of this aid may not have been large enough to attract Sadat's attention, as relations with the Arabs were already beginning to deteriorate, and the severed ties with Egypt would only last for a short period of time,

¹⁹¹Marie-Christine Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt: A Balance Sheet," *MERIP Reports*, no. 107 (July-Aug. 1982), 15.

¹⁹²Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 68-69.

¹⁹³Hillel Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army" In *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy* ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 97.

¹⁹⁴Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 116-119; Kanovsky, "Egypt's Economy Under Sadat," 364.

eventually regaining strength in the future.¹⁹⁵ In addition, Arab aid already had begun decreasing during this period, reaching only one-fifth of its expected amount.¹⁹⁶ After Camp David and the signing of the peace treaty, the economic sanctions imposed on Egypt by the Arab states suspended cooperation in all areas, except the two which were most important to Egypt, worker remittances and Gulf deposits in Egyptian banks.¹⁹⁷ Consequently, although the Arab sanctions against Egypt and their removal of aid were each said to have resulted in an increase in Egypt's overall deficit,¹⁹⁸ aid from the United States was to replace this loss, especially in the short run.¹⁹⁹

The credibility of U.S. promises, finally, was evident, as the past actions of this power in the region verified its commitment to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. To ensure Egyptian cooperation, U.S. aid began flowing, as previously mentioned, even before the signing of the peace treaty, ensuring the Egyptians that the material benefits from cooperation would be visible. Alternatively, after the 1967 war, the U.S. completely suspended aid to Egypt and continued increasing support for Israel, showing that noncompliance during this time period might lead to similar consequences. Even though this suspension of aid did not occur after the 1973 war, the war did gain U.S. attention and maintained it throughout the rest of the decade. The U.S.' actions in the Middle East, therefore, ensured Egypt that complying with the demands of its international power benefactor would secure its continued development. The power-

¹⁹⁵Israeli, *I, Egypt*, 154; El-Ayouty, *Egypt, Peace and the Inter-Arab Crisis*, 4.

¹⁹⁶Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 66.

¹⁹⁷Altman, "The Arab Republic of Egypt," 414.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 68.

bargaining approach, unlike in the previous analysis, holds more explanatory power with respect to Egyptian foreign-policy behavior in 1979.

Subaltern Realism and Egyptian Foreign Policy Behavior:

The 1973 October War-Correlation:

The history of colonialism in Egypt is quite interesting as it differs from the rest of the developing world, including the Middle East. Egypt gained “nominal independence” in 1922, but only became formally independent from Britain in 1936 with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.²⁰⁰ However, unlike many other developing states, the Egyptian state existed for over 5,000 years; therefore, it has had some form of governing apparatus for a period much longer than the usual colonial state would have been allowed.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, the Egyptian economy still experienced a significant level of foreign domination, coming under the direct control of many foreign powers. British influence, primarily, created a typical colonial economy out of Egypt, one which inhibited the independent growth and development of the state.²⁰²

Another fundamental difference between Egypt and the rest of the developing world stems from the fact that, due to its extremely long history, the state developed its borders through a natural sequence of events, rather than through foreign imposition.²⁰³ Due to this evolution, minority groups in Egypt are “the exception rather than the rule,”

²⁰⁰ Eugene L. Rogan, “The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System,” In *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Louise Fawcett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18, 30.

²⁰¹ Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 57; *The Middle East*, 21; Rogan, “The Emergence of the Middle East,” 24.

²⁰² Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 51; Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 182.

²⁰³ Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 58-59.

and have not posed a significant threat to the ruling elite throughout the history of the state; the majority of the population speaks Arabic and follows the Islamic faith, making the population quite homogenous.²⁰⁴ However, one minority group, the Egyptian Copts, is worth mentioning here, as this religious minority has clashed with opposing groups in the past. The Copts in Egypt constituted fifteen percent of the population at the time of the Egyptian revolution in 1952.²⁰⁵ Prior to the 1973 war, furthermore, clashes between Coptic groups and the Muslim majority were increasing in number and were a major factor leading to the 1972 law convicting someone with “life imprisonment...[if they were found] inciting violence between Muslims and the Coptic minority.”²⁰⁶

Given the unique history of Egypt and the fact that such clashes were not the norm, however, societal cohesion here will be rated as moderate. The Coptic minority passed the benchmark of fifteen percent only marginally, and the history of conflict between different groups was not greatly evident throughout the period. Furthermore, the manner in which the Egyptian state was formed allowed an Egyptian nationalist feeling to prevail over secessionist sentiments amongst minority groups within the state.²⁰⁷

In addition to the composition of the domestic population and to the history of colonialism, in order for correlation to exist, it is important to test Egyptian regime legitimacy, as subaltern realists would expect that Sadat and the ruling elite’s acceptance in the wider Egyptian populace would have been quite low. The main societal grouping dissatisfied with Sadat’s policies prior to the 1973 war was the Egyptian youth, which participated in various sit-ins, clashes with police, hunger strikes and other such

²⁰⁴Ibid; Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt,” 93.

²⁰⁵Deeb, “Arab Republic of Egypt,” 420.

²⁰⁶Fisher, “Egypt,” 282.

²⁰⁷Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 58-59.

demonstrative strategies in universities around Cairo.²⁰⁸ On one such occasion, around 20,000 students demonstrated against the arrest of two of their colleagues which had voiced discontent with the Sadat regime's economic policies.²⁰⁹ In addition to the students, however, other groups also were showing discontent with the Egyptian government. During 1972, evidence shows that workers and refugees living in the Suez Canal area demonstrated frustration at the poor standard of living they were enduring throughout the period;²¹⁰ workers in the Helwan district, furthermore, had taken to the streets to voice their displeasure with the economic situation in the country.²¹¹

Rioting related specifically to the Arab-Israeli conflict also took place during these years. For example, due to Sadat's 1971 "no peace, no war" stance against Israel, a group of military men entered a mosque in January 1972 and "publicly demanded immediate war with Israel;" demonstrations leading to the arrest of hundreds of students regarding the same subject were witnessed during the period as well. During these demonstrations, evidence shows that police forces were sent to quiet the opposition.²¹²

These demonstrations, in addition, were accompanied with increasing attempts by the regime to quiet down the domestic opposition through the use of coercion and repression. The student demonstrations of 1972-1973 described above resulted in Sadat's regime creating a law banning demonstrations in Egyptian society altogether; strikes, in

²⁰⁸ Ahmed Abdallah, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923-1973* (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985), 201-202.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 183.

²¹⁰ John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1983), 229.

²¹¹ Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 8.

²¹² Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances," 391-392; Fisher, "Egypt," 282; Bernard Reich, ed. *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

addition, were not allowed under Egyptian law during this period.²¹³ Repression also existed at levels higher up than the mass public. For example, Sadat's worry that the pro-Soviet Sabri cabinet, which was in power after Nasser's death, would threaten his hold on power led to the purge of Sabri and his allies.²¹⁴ Furthermore, Sadat discharged members of the military who were said to have opposing viewpoints on how relations with the Soviet Union should proceed.²¹⁵ To further rid the regime of opposition influence, Sadat created a law which prosecuted members of any political organization outside the Arab Socialist Union—the only legal political party at the time—with possible life imprisonment if discovered.²¹⁶ Therefore, vocal discontent against the regime and its leader as well as hopes for open political competition were withheld in this period.

The growing discontent in Egypt towards Sadat's economic policies and towards his regime's repressive nature was felt in other professional groups within Egypt as well, ones which included teachers, lawyers, journalists, and engineers.²¹⁷ Finally, Sadat himself was not seen in the same light as his predecessor. Especially after proclaiming 1971 as the "year of decision" and allowing the year to pass without any action being taken, Sadat was increasingly viewed as a weak leader who may not be able to resolve Egypt's economic and security problems effectively.²¹⁸

Overall, therefore, the Egyptian regime's legitimacy was not high. In fact, due to the growing number of demonstrations, accompanied with increasing repression, as well

²¹³ Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 184; Nadine Lachine, "Class Roots of the Sadat Regime: Reflections of an Egyptian Leftist," *MERIP Reports*, no. 56 (April 1977), 6.

²¹⁴ Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist State." *Social Problems* 28, no. 4 (April 1981), 445; Fisher, "Egypt," 281.

²¹⁵ Fisher, "Egypt," 282.

²¹⁶ Lachine, "Class Roots of the Sadat Regime," 6.

²¹⁷ Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 186.

²¹⁸ Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 418; Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 178; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 5; Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 105.

as the population's general discontent with the state of the economy and the conflict with Israel, domestic regime legitimacy will be given a low rating.

Evidence supporting levels of international legitimacy during the period was difficult to find. Since international pressure to liberalize the economy mainly came *after* the 1973 war, attention on the state of the domestic economy and government structure at this time by the international arena was not very great. However, it is important to mention that Sadat announced his policy of *infitah*, or the liberalization of his domestic economy in 1971 in an attempt to gain the economic assistance his economy needed from the Western capitalist states.²¹⁹ Nevertheless, the international world, mainly the United States, had focused its attention on the occurrences in Vietnam and had placed the events in the Middle East as a "secondary" priority.²²⁰ Therefore, international legitimacy did not play an important role for Egypt during this period, despite Sadat's best efforts at gaining Western acceptance.

For correlation to exist, a temporal link must be established here. However, due to the fact that most of the demonstrations mentioned above had taken place between 1971 and 1973, most, if not all, the events discussed took place within the two to three year benchmark required. Although societal cohesion was not low, the low level of legitimacy Egypt experienced during this time period may have created significant vulnerabilities for the Sadat regime. Therefore, testing the regime's overall policy capacity remains crucial.

²¹⁹*The Middle East*, 224.

²²⁰Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 5.

The 1973 October War-Causation:

This section will attempt to measure the levels of structural autonomy, economic capacity and coercive capacity enjoyed by Sadat's regime prior to the 1973 war in order to see whether, overall, Sadat was able to insulate himself from the low levels of legitimacy his regime experienced during this period.

In terms of autonomy, Egyptian leaders in general are allocated a vast amount of power. The political structure of the Egyptian government evidently was one which created institutional protection for the leader to act independently, at least in the realm of foreign policy. Constitutionally, the President of Egypt is allowed much decision-making autonomy. The constitution, approved by national referendum in 1971, consolidated this authority by granting the head of state—the president—increasing powers. According to this constitution, the President is nominated for a six year term and may run for reelection; however, as was the case with Sadat, reelection comes easy as the President usually runs without any political opposition.²²¹ The head of state may declare a state of emergency, appoint the prime minister, the cabinet, high court judges, as well as members of the National Assembly (the lower house remains elected by the population); he is the supreme commander of the armed forces and has the right to rule by decree in times of crisis; this latter condition is embedded in Article 74 of the constitution which allows the President to “take speedy measures to face that danger” that might be threatening state security.²²² Laws passed by parliament can be vetoed by the President, but this veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote from the entire assembly.²²³

²²¹McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 37.

²²²*Ibid.*; Deeb, “Arab Republic of Egypt,” 414.

²²³Deeb, “Arab Republic of Egypt,” 414.

In addition to the constitutional powers allocated to the President, the norms and procedures surrounding the foreign policymaking process allow the head of state even more independence. For example, although Sadat allowed members of the government increasing autonomy within their specific domains, the two areas which remained exclusively under his control were those of national defense and foreign policy.²²⁴ As an example, many of the foreign policy decisions taken by Sadat in the crucial years leading up to the 1973 war, including his decision to expel the Soviet advisers in 1972, were taken in complete secrecy.²²⁵

When he first came to power, Sadat was faced with a cabinet supporting Nasser's War of Attrition with Israel; proposing the Peace Initiative, therefore, was not necessarily supported by the majority of his cabinet. Regardless, Sadat's decision to openly discuss his Peace Initiative of 1971 was pursued, without the prior knowledge of the cabinet and without their consent.²²⁶ Furthermore, after the purge of the Old Officers, Sadat consolidated his power with the appointment of a new executive full of his supporters. These cabinet ministers had no intention of portraying disagreement with Sadat's policy choices and, in fact, showed support for decisions of which they did not have a complete understanding, including the decision to create the 1973 October conflict.²²⁷ Clearly, in terms of executive autonomy, the President usually is unaccountable to the ministers, and, instead considers them "as staff rather than as colleagues."²²⁸

²²⁴McLaurin et. al, *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 31; Hinnebusch, "Egypt Under Sadat," 446.

²²⁵McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 31-33; Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics," 169.

²²⁶Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 219.

²²⁷Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, 20.

²²⁸Hinnebusch, "Egypt Under Sadat," 445.

Control of the parliament also remains within the executive's hands as the only legal political party allowed to participate in political life until 1977 was the Arab Socialist Union (ASU); most of the top leaders of the ASU in fact also were members of Sadat's cabinet, and therefore, complied with the decisions taken by their leader.²²⁹ Consequently, whenever the party's members in parliament were vocal on issues of foreign policy, which was not very often, they directed their discontent towards the prime minister rather than towards the president. Autonomy in Egypt prior to the 1973 October War, therefore, was at a high level, with the President of the Republic facing minimal levels of opposition, especially after the purge of the main opposition in 1971.

The state's economic capacity prior to the 1973 war was not as beneficial to Sadat as the structural autonomy at his disposal. During these years, and especially after the 1967 loss in the war with Israel, the Egyptian economy faced great hardships, with foreign debt increasing at a rapid pace, government financial liquidity falling drastically, revenue from taxes remaining at below average, and spending on military as well as welfare programs remaining at unsustainably high levels.

The 1967 war had significant effects on the Egyptian economy, especially due to the loss of the Suez Canal, which had previously been a major source of revenue for the state. It is estimated that, overall, the military defeat cost Egypt around US\$350 million annually.²³⁰ To make up for this loss, Egypt looked outward, hoping that foreign aid would help fuel the worsening economy. Although aid was forthcoming during these years, it amounted to a foreign debt which Egypt could no longer ignore, especially in terms of its repayment schedules.

²²⁹McLaurin et., al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 41.

²³⁰Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," 96.

As previously mentioned, the primary donors of aid, loans and grants during these years were the Gulf States and the Soviet Union.²³¹ However, although these were the main foreign donors, the Egyptian government still managed to find alternate sources of aid, such as multilateral institutions, private banks, and other foreign governments, with the European Union alone granting over US\$100 million during the same period.²³² The high levels of foreign aid contributed greatly to the growth and maintenance of the Egyptian economy, allowing for a 4.4 percent growth rate, rather than, what otherwise would have been, 3.2 percent.²³³ Given the enormous military expenditure required to maintain Egyptian security vis-à-vis Israel,²³⁴ these international loans were necessary.

Nevertheless, the continuing reliance on foreign financing resulted in Egypt's creation of a foreign debt that it was incapable of managing. According to the United Nations, Egypt's foreign debt stood at greater than US\$2,000 million in both 1972 and 1973, and actually increased between the two years.²³⁵ Ignoring the debt would not have been possible as it would have led to, and actually did lead to, increasing rates of interest on the loans granted to the state. For example, by 1975, some loans had accumulated a rate of interest greater than 22 percent, placing the Egyptian government in an even more vulnerable position.²³⁶ Continuous borrowing, therefore, seemed to be an illogical option for Sadat, but one that was needed to finance the internal, domestic economy. Furthermore, during the same period, the Soviet Union, Egypt's main supplier of arms, decided that it would only continue financing the Egyptian military if the latter state paid

²³¹ *Ibid.*; Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Egypt's Economic Development," 87.

²³² Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital," 87, 90.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 94.

²³⁴ Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 112.

²³⁵ Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital," 87.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.

the Soviets “in full and in hard currency.”²³⁷ This was impossible given Egypt’s lack of financial liquidity.

The liquidity problem created major financial difficulties, leading the state to be less able to finance its external debt and leading to a situation where the domestic economy itself could face a complete collapse. Sadat, himself, recognized the problem stating that he

“...was very perturbed to learn that our liquidity problem was such that we might soon find it difficult to pay the salaries of our soldiers on the front and the salaries of civil servants. If it came to that, I thought, and they couldn’t be paid--if they came to know that their families back home had no food to eat--wouldn’t they desert the front? Wouldn’t Egypt collapse?...Only five days before the October War I asked the National Security Council to face the reality and learn that our economy had fallen below zero.”²³⁸

The liquidity problem in addition to foreign debt servicing, therefore, placed the Egyptian government in an extremely vulnerable position vis-à-vis its economy.

Sadat’s domestic policies further aggravated the state of the economy. The tax system serves as a perfect example here. Rather than creating more sources of liquidity and revenue by maintaining an effective and legitimate tax system, Sadat, instead, exempted a large portion of the population from taxes, while the rest of the population was accused of participating in mass tax evasion; it was estimated that by 1972, the Egyptian government was missing close to 170 million Egyptian pounds worth of taxes.²³⁹ Simultaneously, however, Sadat wished to increase his domestic base of support by maintaining the welfare system that had been created throughout the previous years;

²³⁷Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments,” 389.

²³⁸Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 214-215.

²³⁹Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 224-225.

the result was that the quality and effectiveness of the offered services worsened and the Egyptian economy fell deeper into crisis.²⁴⁰ The continuous spending occurring domestically on welfare services as well as on overall military expansion further placed Egypt in a situation where economic collapse seemed probable.

The overall state of the economy, therefore, placed Egypt in a vulnerable position, allowing the government a low economic capacity. Despite the continuing aid and loans flowing from different sources, the inability of the Egyptian government to benefit from domestic sources of revenue, including the lost Suez Canal and the Sinai oil fields—also lost to Israel in 1967—created a situation of inescapable crisis. Foreign policy behavior ignoring these economic developments surely would have been disastrous for Sadat.²⁴¹

Information regarding Egypt's coercive capacity during this time period has not been readily available. Therefore, further research on the state's overall control over the military, police, and intelligence services is necessary. Nevertheless, certain important details give light into the overall coercive capacity of the Sadat regime prior to the 1973 October War. As mentioned previously, the President of Egypt is the commander of the armed forces as well as the head of the national police force. Basically, "he controls the state's monopoly of coercive power."²⁴² Given that the Egyptian military during this period was growing at a rapid pace, reaching a level of 1.2 million in 1973,²⁴³ this control guarantees the leader a significant level of protection from domestic dissident groups. Indeed, throughout the history of Egypt, the president has never been denied the support

²⁴⁰Ibid., 112, 228.

²⁴¹Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," 96.

²⁴²McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 37.

²⁴³Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," 385.

of the military when responding to domestic sources of instability, “even when it meant quelling their own conscripts.”²⁴⁴

From the time of Nasser, furthermore, the Mukhabarat, or the domestic intelligence services, in addition to the military have played a central role in maintaining domestic stability within Egypt.²⁴⁵ Sadat himself was a military officer prior to taking power, and guaranteed the military a dominant role within Egyptian politics, allowing them to penetrate high-level positions within government. Even though the cabinet positions held by military officers were much lower in number than those enjoyed under Nasser’s rule, the military still was allocated around twenty percent of all cabinet seats during this time period.²⁴⁶ In terms of the paramilitary forces, different organizations, such as the Internal Security Force, the General Intelligence Service, and the Department for Combating Religious Activity, existed to combat the main domestic extremist groups, including mainly religious organizations, and reported directly to the President and his cabinet.²⁴⁷ Finally, in order to guarantee the loyalty of the military itself, a separate organization existed under the supervision of the military intelligence services.²⁴⁸ Therefore, overall control of the domestic military forces guaranteed Sadat at least a moderate level of coercive capacity. The likelihood is that coercive capacity was high; however, due to the lack of detailed information, a moderate level will be given here.

The results of Egyptian levels of autonomy, economic capacity and coercive capacity in 1973 provide for interesting conclusions. The high structural autonomy and

²⁴⁴Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 40.

²⁴⁵Deeb, “Arab Republic of Egypt,” 423.

²⁴⁶Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 39.

²⁴⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East* (Connecticut: Praeger, 2004), 186.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 185.

moderate coercive capacity guaranteed the leader a significant amount of freedom from domestic constraints when conducting foreign policy. However, the low economic capacity and the unstable future of the Egyptian economy remained a major factor in Sadat's foreign policy calculations. State foreign policy behavior, therefore, portrayed the need for Egypt to guarantee the future improvement of its domestic economy; however, how best to improve the economy remained the private decision of Sadat and his close allies as they were able to decide on foreign policy options without the interference of the majority of the population. Therefore, domestic constraints did play a role in constraining Sadat, but not to the degree that the subaltern realist approach would have predicted.

The 1979 Peace Treaty-Correlation:

In terms of societal cohesion and the history of colonialism, the information presented with respect to the 1973 war remains relevant here and, therefore, will not be repeated. However, it is important to note that, in addition to the Coptic-Muslim divide, border conflicts became more evident during this period. After the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, for example, there were two occasions where Israeli soldiers were found dead along the border.²⁴⁹ Although this shows an increasingly unstable border, these two incidents were the only evidence of tension and, therefore, do not justify a low level of societal cohesion due to a colonial past.²⁵⁰ As in 1973, therefore, societal cohesion prior

²⁴⁹El-Sadat, *In Search of an Identity*, 274.

²⁵⁰To reiterate, societal cohesion includes border conflicts between states, as these show how a history of colonialism has or has not contributed to the developing states' population divisions and, consequently, to domestic as well as to regional violence.

to 1979 was at a moderate level, showing some domestic and regional rivalry, but not enough to warrant great levels of domestic instability.

Legitimacy during this period, however, was just as low, if not lower than the levels experienced in 1973. Demonstrations during this period became more frequent and more severe, especially since the economic situation in the country had deteriorated even further. Between 1974 and 1976, there were yearly riots and demonstrations recorded against the government due to the worsening economy; these demonstrations included diverse population groupings, ranging from students to public sector workers, and were extreme enough to warrant the intervention of the police forces on at least one occasion.²⁵¹ The riots in 1975, wherein workers from the Helwan area were the main participants, received great coverage, as they led to the intervention of security forces and to the arrest of at least 150 people; these riots continued and increased in level of violence well into January 1976.²⁵² These riots, however, were less extreme in nature than the bread riots which took place in January 1977. Due to the IMF conditions placed on food subsidies, which will be discussed shortly, the population at large took to the streets to protest the state of the economy and the removal of subsidies essential to their survival; these riots led to the death of at least seventy people with many others injured and/or detained by police.²⁵³ Outside the masses, however, growing discontent was witnessed in parts of the military as well. Despite the fact that the majority of the military remained

²⁵¹ Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 8; "Egyptian Demonstrators hit Sadat's Political, Economic Policies," *MERIP Reports*, No. 34 (Jan. 1975), 28-29; Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 225.

²⁵² Lachine, "Class Roots of the Sadat Regime," 5; "Egyptian Demonstrations hit Sadat," 29; Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 229.

²⁵³ Stork, "Sadat's Desperate Mission," 6; Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 8; McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 36; *MERIP Special Correspondent*, "The Reaction of Bricks," *MERIP Reports*, No. 56 (April 1977), 6; Reich, *Political Leaders*, 457; Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics," 163.

loyal to Sadat, evidence shows that a new group under the name of "The New Free Officers," attempted, at some point, to organize a coup against Sadat's regime.²⁵⁴

In addition to the demonstrations, emigration out of Egypt became the norm, especially for the country's skilled labor.²⁵⁵ During 1976 alone, it was recorded that 1.5 million Egyptians lived overseas, with this number, according to the *Financial Times*, increasing at a rate of 150,000 per year.²⁵⁶

Furthermore, increasing repression by the Sadat regime was witnessed, again as a byproduct of the growing discontent in Egypt. As with 1973, Sadat emphasized the fact that public demonstration of dissatisfaction with the regime would not be tolerated.²⁵⁷ Additionally, Sadat's liberalization of the political system which had begun in 1977, which will be elaborated on when discussing structural autonomy, was slowly reversed, as the President wished to limit any growing opposition from gaining influence within the government.²⁵⁸ Specifically, the New Wafd Party experienced great repressive measures, with the arrest of many of its members and the creation of laws which, ultimately, undermined the party's ability to gain any type of control in government.²⁵⁹ Journalists, leftists, and political opposition either were jailed or relieved of their posts following the riots, again in an attempt of the President to ensure the survival of his regime.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁴ Altman, "The Arab Republic of Egypt," 395.

²⁵⁵ Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 9.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 9, 14.

²⁵⁷ Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 228.

²⁵⁸ McLaurin, et. al., *Midde East Foreign Policy*, 43; Altman, "The Arab Republic of Egypt," 390.

²⁵⁹ Deeb, 415; McLaurin, et. al., *Midde East Foreign Policy*, 44; Lachine, "Class Roots of the Sadat Regime," 5; Reich, *Political Leaders*, 457.

²⁶⁰ MERIP Special Correspondent, 6-7.

Consequently, although Sadat's personal legitimacy soared after the political victory in the 1973 war,²⁶¹ he lost much of this support with his economic policies in the following years. Mass chanting during the demonstrations emphasized this loss with the population yelling slogans such as "Where is our breakfast, hero of the crossing?"²⁶² His regime, furthermore, experienced similar public discontent, as the state and its policies were blamed for widening the gap between the rich and poor, allowing the former class to enjoy the benefits of the liberalized economy at the expense of the latter.²⁶³ Sadat's loss of support resulted in the Islamic groups gaining popularity during these years, especially in the universities and in the student movements.²⁶⁴

Interference from the international environment was more evident during the period than in the previous one as well. International institutions, supported by the U.S. and the oil-rich regimes of the Gulf, began in 1974 and 1975 to pressure the regime

"to make its economy more acceptable and accessible to the world capitalist market by curbing subsidies and devaluing the Egyptian pound...By the fall of 1976...[these international players continued] in pressing Egypt for additional fundamental changes. They refused to give Egypt more than a limited amount of money until the government agreed to the 'reforms' proposed by the IMF."²⁶⁵

Despite growing internal discontent within Egypt, the IMF and its supporters continued to pressure Sadat in the following years, highlighting the subaltern realist view that international players influence domestic policies and increase domestic instability; furthermore, the IMF's continuing pressure on Egypt during the period shows that the

²⁶¹*The Middle East*, 223.

²⁶²"Egyptian Demonstrators Hit Sadat," 29. "Hero of the Crossing" was a name given to Sadat in the aftermath of the 1973 War.

²⁶³Waterbury, 230; McLaurin, et. al., *Midde East Foreign Policy*, 54; MERIP Special Correspondent, 6.

²⁶⁴Abdallah, *The Student Movement*, 226; McLaurin, et. al., *Midde East Foreign Policy*, 47.

²⁶⁵Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics," 162.

international system was not very supportive of the internal politics of Egypt, placing international legitimacy at a moderate level. The reason legitimacy was not classified as low was because Sadat's regime actually continued attempting to follow through with IMF conditions, and aid continued to flow, showing some level of international acceptance. However, overall legitimacy during this period was low, mainly due to the increasingly unstable domestic environment. The number and degree of demonstrations and the restrictive nature of the regime, as well as the loss of support for the government outweigh the moderate legitimacy the Sadat regime received from the Western states.

Again, a temporal link is easily established here, as although many of the demonstrations took place in 1974 and 1975, four to five years prior to the signing of the peace treaty, these demonstrations continued well into the years directly preceding the foreign policy behavior in question. Furthermore, the years after 1977 experienced the most repressive government measures coming into existence, again as a response to domestic unrest. International interference, similarly, although beginning at least five years prior to the peace treaty, continued into the relevant time period. All these circumstances show that, in the period directly preceding the signing of the peace treaty, Sadat was experiencing domestic unrest and increasing legitimacy problems.

The 1979 Peace Treaty-Causation:

Constitutionally, the autonomy allocated to the President of Egypt in 1979 remained the same as that of 1973, since the regime still abided by the laws of the 1971 constitution. Similarly to 1973, furthermore, foreign policy decisions were the main

prerogative of the President. Therefore, opposition to foreign policy choices rarely led to a change in the leader's behavior.

Unlike the previous period, however, Sadat initiated a process of political liberalization in 1976 allowing three different "platforms" to be created within the ASU which represented the right, center (Sadat's group or the Arab Socialist Party of Egypt [ASPE]), and left of the political spectrum; these platforms became independent political parties in 1977.²⁶⁶ In an attempt to further liberalize the political system in 1978, Sadat allowed new political parties to join the political process and to participate in government;²⁶⁷ directly, the New Wafd Party, comprising of the majority of the political opposition, became the second largest party represented within parliament—second only to Sadat's ASPE.²⁶⁸ Although this party may have been able to restrict the political autonomy of the President eventually, this was not the case in Egypt. Soon after the New Wafd gained the support of the population, Sadat cracked down on members of the party and disallowed their participation in Egyptian politics; these actions, consequently, led to the party's dissolution.²⁶⁹ Therefore, the political liberalization which occurred after the 1973 October War was just a manipulation of the political system to give the image of increasing democratization, when, in truth, the President still retained the majority of the power in government. It is important to note, however, that minister influence on *domestic* policy did increase, although in a limited manner, during this period; nevertheless, foreign policy remained the specific domain of the President and his closest

²⁶⁶ Lachine, "Class Roots of the Sadat Regime," 7; McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 42; Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 414.

²⁶⁷ Hinnebusch, "Party Activists in Syria and Egypt," 88.

²⁶⁸ McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 43.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

advisors. His decision to consult his advisers, furthermore, was a matter of choice rather than a matter of obligation, as only those with a close relationship to the President were consulted.²⁷⁰ In an example similar to the expulsion of the Soviet advisors in 1972, Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem was taken in complete secrecy with the knowledge of his foreign minister, Fahmy, solely.²⁷¹

Again, as with 1973, political autonomy within Egypt during this period remained at a high level for the President. His ability to control the decision-making process without the inclusion of key cabinet members and without accountability to the parliament allowed him to act independently in key international events including the signing of the Sinai I and II agreements, the visit to Jerusalem, and, ultimately, his signing of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel.

Economically, the Egyptian system prior to the 1979 treaty was dominated by Sadat's "Open Door" policies, designed to liberalize the domestic arena and to increase foreign investment and aid in Egypt.²⁷² During these years, certain key factors allowed the Egyptian economy to experience significant levels of growth, with the GDP increasing between eight and nine percent per year.²⁷³ For example, either as a direct or indirect result of the policies, the Egyptian economy benefitted greatly from the reopening of the Suez Canal, the return of the Sinai oil fields from Israel, the surge of remittances from Egyptian expatriates, as well as increasing revenues flowing from

²⁷⁰Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," 98-99.

²⁷¹Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, 2.

²⁷²Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 418.

²⁷³Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 411-412; Denis J. Sullivan, "The Political Economy of Reform." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 3 (Aug. 1990), 317.

tourism.²⁷⁴ However, despite this economic growth, the majority of the Egyptian population was not benefitting greatly from the new policies. In fact, the population's standard of living remained low with the level of poverty and the standard of public services deteriorating throughout these years.²⁷⁵

Despite the attempts of the Open Door policies to liberalize the Egyptian economic system, government control over major economic industries remained great, as privatization attempts continuously were impeded by the state bureaucracy.²⁷⁶ The public sector, therefore, continued to grow throughout the 1970s, employing ten percent of the total labor force and entering the 1980s with a net worth of about 38 million Egyptian pounds.²⁷⁷ In addition, the "transfer of earnings to the state" in 1978 alone reached a level of over 700 million Egyptian pounds.²⁷⁸ This is not surprising as the income earned from the Suez Canal and the Sinai oil fields alone already guaranteed the state a sufficient amount of revenue. Furthermore, the textile industry, also under public control, employed more than half of the public sector employees and produced over twenty percent of all non-petroleum exports.²⁷⁹ It is clear, therefore, that the public sector was a main source of income for the regime, one that even Sadat was unwilling to relinquish control over despite his support for overall economic liberalization.

The tax system in Egypt during this period remained below average in terms of effectiveness, as tax evasion continued to be the norm and newly created laws exempted a growing number of the population from having to pay income taxes. In terms of

²⁷⁴Deeb, "Arab Republic of Egypt," 411. Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 7.

²⁷⁵Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 9.

²⁷⁶Ibid.; Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 108.

²⁷⁷Richards and Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 184.

²⁷⁸Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 108.

²⁷⁹Ibid., 104.

evasion, it is said that in 1975 alone only 243,000 of an eligible 790,000 people filed their income tax returns.²⁸⁰ Adding to this mass evasion, the government's exemption of agricultural workers, of married couples earning less than 660 Egyptian pounds a month, and of single men earning less than 600 Egyptian pounds a month from having to file income tax returns, further decreased the overall revenue earned by the Egyptian government during this period.²⁸¹ Additional exemptions, furthermore, were granted in Egypt's free zones as part of the state's new Open Door policies, highlighting the government's attempts at increasing overall investment in the domestic arena.²⁸² Despite the lack of revenue from income taxes, however, the government was still able to profit from indirect taxes as well as from business and profit taxes.²⁸³

The Open Door policies also had a significant negative effect on Egypt's balance of payments and domestic inflation levels. Even in the early 1970s, Egypt had always relied on imports to sustain domestic consumption. Attempts at constraining imports during these years failed miserably, and instead, led import levels of all types to rise.²⁸⁴ Eventually, Egypt began importing up to 60 percent of its food and had to turn to foreign aid in order to finance this high level of consumption.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, the remittances discussed above, despite increasing funding for the economy, further increased the level of imports by allowing the population to afford foreign products which they otherwise would have not been able to purchase.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁰Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 226.

²⁸¹*Ibid.*, 225-227.

²⁸²McLaurin, et. al., *Middle East Foreign Policy*, 53.

²⁸³Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 224, 227.

²⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 116.

²⁸⁵Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt," 10; Stork, "Bailing out Sadat," 8.

²⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 15.

The purchasing of imports, in addition, worsened the overall economic situation by increasing the level of inflation, which was the result of the government's continuous reliance on borrowing from the domestic banking system; the neglect of Egypt by its main foreign donors exacerbated the state's inflationary dilemma, as it was forced to print money in order to fund the domestic financial system.²⁸⁷ To add to this predicament, similarly to the years prior to 1973, the regime attempted to contain growing domestic opposition by maintaining a welfare system with a level of funding that reached unsustainable levels; however, the IMF program which Egypt turned to in the 1970s forced the regime to reverse its subsidization of the domestic economy.²⁸⁸

Despite the weaknesses of the domestic economy, however, state economic capacity on the whole is measured to be at a moderate level. The reason behind such a conclusion stems from the ability of the Sadat regime to use the primary productive sectors, the Suez Canal, Sinai oil fields, and tourism and textile industries, to its benefit and to continue its control over them. Although the inflationary pressures of the period did increase the government's overall domestic debt to close to 6 billion Egyptian pounds in 1979,²⁸⁹ the state remained able to sustain a relatively high level of economic growth. The bread riots and the deteriorating standard of living of the population guarantee that the economic capacity of the regime was not at a high level; however, the state's ability to use the land's most worthy resources to its advantage remained great. Moderate economic capacity, therefore, allowed the Sadat regime sufficient independence from domestic constraints, as the economy was not on the verge of collapse during these years,

²⁸⁷Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 114-115.

²⁸⁸Stork, "Bailing out Sadat," 8.

²⁸⁹Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 115.

as it had been prior to the October War. Obviously, complete neglect of the economy would have been a major mistake; however, its improving performance throughout these years allowed Sadat more freedom in the foreign policy realm.

Coercive capacity during this period was higher than in the previous analysis. In addition to the traditional paramilitary available to the President, Egypt during this period witnessed the creation of even more coercive forces used for control of the population. The main indication of this increase in coercive capacity stems from the government's creation of a paramilitary force under the name of the Central Security Forces, which included at least 10,000 men, in specific response to the bread riots of 1977; this force was created to respond to future sources of domestic instability, ensuring that such instances were not repeated.²⁹⁰ In addition to this specific organization, furthermore, Egypt's paramilitary groups during this period included the National Guard, Border Guard, Internal Security Force, General Intelligence Service, and the Department for Combating Religious activity,²⁹¹ organizing and strengthening the power of these forces was maintained with the US\$4,157 million that the Egyptian state spent on its overall defense expenditures in 1978.²⁹² By 1980, therefore, the number of the paramilitary within Egypt stood at 49,000 men.²⁹³ Consequently, as always, Sadat's ability to maintain domestic order and stability through the use of the military was evident. Coercive capacity, therefore, can be regarded to have been at a high level in the period

²⁹⁰Joe Stork, "Egypt's Military." *MERIP Reports*, no. 107 (July-Aug. 1982), 16; Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army," 104.

²⁹¹Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, 185.

²⁹²Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army," 95.

²⁹³Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, 174.

preceding the 1979 peace treaty, as the number and power of the forces was maintained, if not increased, from the level enjoyed in 1973.

Egypt, during this period, experienced a high level of structural autonomy and coercive capacity, and a moderate level of economic capacity. Subaltern realism's view that Sadat's foreign policy behavior would have been constrained, if not predicted, by domestic circumstances is ill-founded during this time period, as the information provided shows that Sadat's ability to shelter himself from domestic threats, including those presented by his low level of legitimacy, was great. Consequently, state foreign policy behavior would not have reflected an unstable domestic environment.

Case-Study 2: Jordan

Brief Summary of Jordan: 1990 and 1994

Similarly to Egypt, Jordanian foreign policy behavior has shown a clear divergent and contradictory pattern. Neighboring the Israeli state and containing a significant Palestinian population, Jordan has played a central role throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967, Jordan's role in the region became one which tried to bridge the Arab states and the West by continuously seeking a comprehensive peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁹⁴ Whatever progress had been made towards achieving such a peace, however, was halted once Jordan sided with Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait in 1990; King Hussein's relationship with many states in the West, specifically the United States, and the Gulf States in the Middle East deteriorated

²⁹⁴El-Ayouty, *Egypt, Peace and the Inter-Arab Crisis*, 4.

rapidly.²⁹⁵ Soon after the US-led invasion ended the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Jordan began renegotiating with its traditional Western ally and Israel. The result of these negotiations was the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty signed on October 17, 1994.²⁹⁶ The reasons behind Jordan's clear reversal in foreign policy strategy will be investigated here.

The Power-Bargaining Approach and Jordanian Foreign Policy:

The 1990-91 Gulf War-Correlation:

Unlike the case of Egypt, Jordan in 1990 did not have the choice between two superpowers as the international system was witnessing the culmination of the Cold War and the victory of the United States over the Soviet Union.²⁹⁷ This left the United States as the sole international power with control and interest in the politics of the Middle East.²⁹⁸ However, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, U.S. attention was diverted to the states acquiring independence and adopting democratic forms of governance in Eastern Europe.²⁹⁹ This did not mean that the U.S. completely neglected the region, since "U.S. interests had more historical continuity in the Middle East than anywhere else in the world."³⁰⁰ It did, nevertheless, mean that, along with the U.S.'

²⁹⁵ Mordechai Gazit, "The Middle East Peace Process," ed. Ami Ayalon, vol. 14 of *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 122; Miriam, Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan: The Career of King Hussein* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 146.

²⁹⁶ Asher Susser, "Jordan: Al-Mamlaka al-Urdunniyya al-Hashimiyya," Ed. Ami Ayalon and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Vol. 18 of *Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1994* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 412.

²⁹⁷ Ali, Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces on Jordan's Process of Democratization," in *Jordan in Transition*, ed. George Joffe (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), 61.

²⁹⁸ Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 233.

²⁹⁹ Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 61.

³⁰⁰ Barry Rubin, "The United States and the Middle East," In *Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1990*, ed. Ami Ayalon, Vol. 14 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 19.

“Israel first” strategy,³⁰¹ the Arab authoritarian regimes had to work harder to maintain continued U.S. support.

With respect to Jordan specifically, King Hussein’s regime had maintained close ties with the West ever since the end of World War II, as the state was seen as a “bulwark against communism” as well as a “moderating element in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”³⁰² It was clear, therefore, that in order to maintain U.S. interest in the regime, Jordan had to continue its peace initiatives and sustain good relations with Israel and other allies of the West in the region. Throughout the early 1980s, evidence shows that good relations prevailed between the United States and Jordan.³⁰³ Furthermore, it seemed apparent that President Bush and King Hussein had become close colleagues throughout the years.³⁰⁴ However, due to the former state’s continuing backing of Israel, and the latter state’s growing ties with Iraq, relations between the two began to deteriorate near the end of the decade. According to Joyce, one major factor contributing to the worsening relationship resulted from the refusal of the U.S. Congress to agree to grant Jordan military aid in 1986.³⁰⁵ In terms of negotiations, therefore, high-level meetings between old friends King Hussein and President Bush did not occur for three years prior to 1990, except for one meeting in 1989.³⁰⁶ Although lesser in number than usual, this meeting as well as a personal history between the two leaders shows that a direct and strong link between the United States and Jordan existed near the time of the Gulf War.

³⁰¹Marwan Muasher, *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 18.

³⁰²Curtis R. Ryan, “Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan,” In *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark Gasiorowski, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 310.

³⁰³Stanley Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5, (Winter 1990). 21, 23.

³⁰⁴Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 258.

³⁰⁵Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 139; Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 23.

³⁰⁶*Ibid*, 143.

Due to the hegemonic status of the United States and the fact that, throughout the post-World War II period, the U.S. and Jordan maintained close relations, it would be logical to assume that the United States was Jordan's main international power benefactor. In fact, from the beginning of their relationship, Jordan has relied on continued aid and support from the United States and its Western allies in order to ensure its survival.³⁰⁷ During the 1980s, US aid to Jordan was averaging at \$110 million per year, although this number began decreasing towards the end of the decade.³⁰⁸

However, another regional power, Iraq, was playing a major role in the development of Jordan as well. Although Iraq cannot be considered an international power benefactor, especially in comparison to the United States, this analysis would not be complete without a brief discussion of the influence Iraq has had on the Jordanian regime. Firstly, trade played a major role in the relationship between the two states, reaching \$1 billion worth of bilateral trade in 1988.³⁰⁹ This trade resulted mainly from the Iraqi need to finance its war effort with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Mainly, the port of Aqaba and its use for the transmission of equipment, labor, and cargo destined for Iraq increased overall trade for Jordan by great amounts.

“Between 1979 and 1988, imported cargo transiting Jordan through the port of Aqaba increased from 161,000 to 6,930,000 tons per annum, with almost all the increase destined for Iraq. Transit exports through Aqaba, almost entirely from Iraq, increased from 98,000 tons in 1981 to close to 3 million tons in 1988. Equally impressive was the increase in the movement of people through the port of Aqaba. While in 1979 the total number of arrivals to and departures from that

³⁰⁷ Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 310.

³⁰⁸ David Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), 13.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 30.

port was just over 7,000, by 1988 the number totaled more than 823,000, almost all of them Egyptian workers heading to or coming from Iraq.”³¹⁰

Furthermore, Iraq was providing Jordan close to 85 percent of the oil needed for its development at a price lower than any other regional ally was willing to offer; in actuality, Jordan did not have to pay for the oil it received in hard currency, as the cost was subtracted from the overall debt Iraq owed Jordan for the financing of its war effort.³¹¹ Indeed, Iraqi trade and oil to Jordan provided the latter state with years of economic growth that it may not have otherwise enjoyed.³¹² Finally, during this time period, Iraq was willing to supply Jordan with military support, compensating for the refusal of military aid to be granted by the United States in previous years. Iraqi military support was essential to offset the regional threats facing Jordan, specifically ones emanating from Syria and Israel.³¹³ Israel, however, proved to be a greater threat due to the increasing Soviet Jewish emigration into the country during this period; worried that this would lead to border instability with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and unable to receive military funding from the United States, Jordanians felt the need to acquire military support from elsewhere; Iraq was willing to provide such support.³¹⁴ The military aid, which included assistance in the intelligence and the air force, between the two states further strained the relationship between Jordan and the United States.³¹⁵

³¹⁰ Amatzia Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashimite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment,” *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991), 57.

³¹¹ Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashimite Jordan,” 68; Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*, 12.

³¹² Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*, 31.

³¹³ Markus Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope: Jordanian Foreign Policy from the Gulf Crisis to the Peace Process and Beyond,” In *Jordan in Transition*, ed. George Joffe (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 2002): 3; Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 23.

³¹⁴ Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 3; Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 31

³¹⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 262.

Therefore, although the United States was the dominant international power benefactor during this period, the role Iraq played as a regional ally cannot be ignored.

Did the U.S. make threats and/or promises to Jordan in order to pressure it to behave in a certain manner during this period? During their meeting in 1989, it was said that President Bush “assured the King that Washington would provide Jordan with economic and military assistance.”³¹⁶ Furthermore, other regional allies of the United States, mainly the Gulf States in the region, had promised to give Jordan enough aid to offset the loss it would incur if it broke ties with Iraq.³¹⁷ However, again, Iraqi promises of aid also seem important to Jordan. Iraq, during the Baghdad Summit in May 1990, was the sole regional power to make a “formal commitment” to grant economic aid to Jordan;³¹⁸ Iraq promised Jordan \$50 million in 1990 alone.³¹⁹ At this time, King Hussein appreciated Iraqi support, especially since the latter state had been experiencing economic hardship during the same period; furthermore, distrust towards the Arabs existed, since their granting of aid in previous years had not been up to what the King had thought was necessary or adequate given the revenue they had been receiving from their endowments of oil.³²⁰ Therefore, although evidence shows that the international power benefactor and its allies had made promises of aid to Jordan, Iraq had also guaranteed the Kingdom sufficient amounts of aid during the same period. Levels of aid, in this case, would be important to investigate, but will be looked into in the next section.

³¹⁶ Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 143.

³¹⁷ Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 5.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Asher Susser, “Jordan (Al-Mamlaka al-Urdunniyaa al-Hashimiyya),” Ed. Ami Ayalon. Vol. 14 of *Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 483.

³²⁰ Ibid.

Finally, before establishing a temporal link, it is important to establish whether or not Jordan's foreign policy fell in line with U.S. preferences. Jordan's support of Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War shows a clear divergence from its past pro-West foreign policy behavior.³²¹ Prior to the actual invasion, however, King Hussein already had begun showing signs of favoritism towards Iraq and against his traditional Western allies. For example, when a British journalist of Iranian origin, Farzad Bazoft, was executed in Iraq in 1990, King Hussein came to the defense of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime to the great discontent of Britain, especially since Margaret Thatcher had communicated her worries on the "Bazoft Affair" to the King prior to the execution.³²² Furthermore, after the actual Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein's regime had taken a clear anti-Western stance in more than one circumstance. The King himself began vocally expressing discontent with the West and its actions, even openly criticizing the Allied efforts in one such instance.³²³ Finally, even though the U.S. showed clear disapproval at Jordan's proposals on how to solve the crisis,³²⁴ and despite Iraq's clearly anti-Israeli actions during the same time period,³²⁵ Jordan continued in its defense of Iraq. To make their preferences clear, Jordanian officials linked the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; when Prime Minister Mudar Badran advocated "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force," he was implying that Iraq should leave Kuwait, but that, simultaneously, Israel should remove itself from the Occupied

³²¹Susser, *Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1990*, 490.

³²²Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 263-264.

³²³ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179; Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 146.

³²⁴Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 22.

³²⁵ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 177.

Territories as well.³²⁶ Given the United States' evidently pro-Israel preference, such comments show a clear break with U.S. interests in the region. Although King Hussein eventually supported the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq,³²⁷ his previous actions had portrayed a clear refusal to cooperate with allied efforts to stop the invasion.

To add to the discrepancy in behavior, the United States' promises of aid were made as early as 1989, prior to the initial invasion. In the late 1980s, furthermore, Kuwaiti and Saudi assurances of economic support were given to guarantee Jordanian compliance with the preferences of the United States, mainly the removal of the King's support for Saddam Hussein. Therefore, rather than portraying a case where Jordanian compliance came as a result of U.S. guarantees of aid, the temporal link in this scenario substantiates the contrary—Jordanian noncompliance came *after* the promise of aid. If the U.S. was truly the international power benefactor for Jordan at this stage, then the predictions of the power-bargaining approach are insufficient to provide correlation, as they would predict that Jordanian foreign policy behavior would have portrayed compliance with the United States. In this case, that would have meant siding with the anti-Iraq coalition and denouncing the Iraqi behavior towards Kuwait.

The 1990-91 Gulf War-Causation:

Similarly to the analysis of Egypt in 1973, although correlation cannot be established, I will proceed to investigate the conditions under which causality would have existed otherwise, as this may highlight some of the reasons as to why Jordan refused to comply with the demands of the United States.

³²⁶ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 270.

³²⁷ Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 145.

The first condition requires that the demands of the international power benefactor to have been made clearly, allowing for no ambiguity regarding the preferences of the power. If evidence shows that Jordan was unsure of what the United States expected of it in terms of behavior, then noncompliance with U.S. demands may not have been intentional. However, this was not the case. In terms of interests in general, Marwan Muasher, who has played an important role in the Jordanian government throughout the 1980s and 1990s, revealed that the foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. were meant to secure the safety of Israel.³²⁸ Another government official, Marwan Qasim, who was the foreign minister of Jordan at the time of the 1990 Gulf War, was “warned” by Secretary of State James Baker during a visit to the U.S. early that year that relations between Jordan and Iraq had increased greatly in recent years.³²⁹ These warnings must have been apparent to King Hussein and must have made clear U.S. interests, as he, in a private meeting with Saddam Hussein in July 1990, was pushing for a peaceful resolution of the emerging conflict, claiming that Western intervention would be inevitable if the Iraqi president did not alter his behavior.³³⁰ A month later, both British Prime Minister Thatcher and President Bush vocally revealed their discontent with Iraqi behavior towards Kuwait. Their statements were made prior to, or soon after, the Iraqi invasion which occurred on August 2, 1990.³³¹ Israel, furthermore, with reference to Jordan specifically, had made it clear that the presence of Iraqi soldiers in Jordan “would be viewed as a *casus belli*.”³³² Therefore, when King Hussein took an

³²⁸ Muasher, *The Arab Center*, 22.

³²⁹ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 265.

³³⁰ *Ibid*, 266.

³³¹ *Ibid*.

³³² Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 179.

anti-U.S. stance in numerous circumstances, including in the comments he made on August 4 defending Iraqi behavior,³³³ he and the rest of the ruling elite in Jordan must have known, quite clearly, the preferences of the U.S. and the resulting discontent that the regime's siding with Iraq would invoke.

If Jordanian government officials were clear on the demands of the United States, did they believe that compliance with U.S. demands would actually result in the favorable increase in economic and military aid that the regime required? As previously mentioned, although the United States and states in the Gulf promised Jordan aid, Iraq's formal declaration of financial assistance, in addition to trade relations between the two countries, the cheap supply of oil, and military support for the Jordanian army must have played a primary role in Jordanian foreign policy behavior at the time. According to King Hussein's calculations, in order for him to comply with the demands of the United States, the costs of compliance must have been lesser than the costs of noncompliance. If King Hussein decided to comply with the United States, especially with regards to the United Nations sanctions placed on Iraq after the invasion, he may have lost access to the entire Iraqi market on which his regime depended.³³⁴ Furthermore, compliance with the sanctions would have led to the halting of the oil supply flowing into the regime from Iraq.³³⁵ King Hussein may have also had to

“forget the \$310 million Baghdad... owes in import credits, and it will lose \$50 million a year in Iraqi aid. An additional \$2.6 billion that the Jordanians guaranteed in third-party loans to Iraq would also be at risk. If Amman were to stop purchasing Iraqi oil, it would face skyrocketing fuel costs estimated at an additional \$280 million annually, if oil prices average \$30 per barrel. Jordan has

³³³ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 270.

³³⁴ Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 24.

³³⁵ Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 5.

no significant oil output of its own and now obtains Iraqi oil at a fixed price of \$16.40 per barrel.”³³⁶

In consequence, complying with the demands of the United States and its allies would have resulted, and eventually *did* result, in the loss of financial and resource flows central to the regime’s continued development.³³⁷

However, had the Jordanian regime complied with U.S. demands from the outset, refusing to come to the defense of Iraq, would it still have suffered losses as severe as it had by prolonging its acceptance of the U.N. sanctions? It is important to remember that both the United States and the regional Gulf States had promised aid to Jordan if it agreed to comply with their demands. This aid would have possibly offset the losses incurred by Jordan if it had chosen to neglect its Iraqi ally. Although Iraq was Jordan’s primary trade partner, Kuwait, at this time, was the state’s “second-largest export market.”

Furthermore, the Gulf States, in general, were major contributors of aid to the regime.³³⁸

Refusing to comply with the U.S. and its regional allies, therefore, cost Jordan “much of the \$550 million in aid flows it [was] accustomed to receiving from Gulf States each year, as well as some \$600 million in remittances from the 315,000 Jordanians working in those countries.”³³⁹ To add to this loss, Jordan’s predictions that a U.S.-led intervention would occur in the case of an invasion, as highlighted above, would have also resulted in the disruption of economic relations with Iraq, as all economic support to Iraq at this time would have been halted by the Western coalition in an attempt to weaken Saddam Hussein’s war effort. Despite the interconnectedness of the two markets,

³³⁶ Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 24.

³³⁷ Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashimite Jordan,” 67.

³³⁸ Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 5.

³³⁹ Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 24.

therefore, neglecting the U.S. and its regional Gulf allies would have nevertheless upset the continued economic cooperation with Iraq. Therefore, losses incurred by the regime from noncompliance may well have been equal to or greater than losses from compliance.

One final possibility which would have allowed Jordan to support Iraq would have been its belief that the U.S. would not punish the regime for neglecting the U.S.-led coalition. Given Jordan's centrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, King Hussein must be included in any future peace initiatives. In consequence, the United States, even if temporarily disappointed with the regime's regional alignments, would not be able to ignore the Jordanian state for too long.³⁴⁰ Therefore, allowing the Jordanian state to collapse due to its alignment with Iraq, and further destabilizing the border with Israel as a result of the collapse, would not have been a logical maneuver for the United States and its peace efforts. However, the fact that relations with the U.S. as well as with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait indeed did deteriorate rapidly after the invasion, and the fact that Jordan still suffered grave economic losses from both the Iraqi and Western coalition fronts, show that neglect of the U.S. and of its demands was not a rational move for King Hussein and for the Jordanian state.

In conclusion, the fact that Jordan was losing an entire Iraqi market, the fact that it did not believe the U.S. would exclude it from future negotiations, as well as the discontent King Hussein had felt towards the Gulf regimes are all systemic factors which may have contributed to the regime's foreign policy behavior. However, the losses incurred by noncompliance, in this case, may have actually exceeded the losses from compliance, which, had the international system played the primary role in Jordan's

³⁴⁰ Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 3; Muasher, *The Arab Center*, 24.

decision-making, would have led to behavior in line with Western demands. Despite Jordan's ability to acquire aid from new international sources after the war, such as Japan, for example, and its ability to sustain its development by receiving new forms of external funding, loss of U.S., Saudi Arabian, and Kuwaiti support must have affected the Jordanian economy significantly. If this was the case, why did Jordan agree to defend Iraq, especially *after* the U.S.-led invasion took place? The power-bargaining approach, here, is unable to explain such a behavior.

The 1994 Peace Treaty-Correlation:

As with Jordan in 1990, the distribution of power in the international system in 1994 allowed for the United States to play a primary role in the political and economic developments of the Middle East.³⁴¹ Furthermore, similarly to 1990, the preferences of the United States in this period are clearly highlighted by its continued support for the economic development and regional security of the Israeli state. As evidence of the United States' role in Israeli politics, it is worth noting that the level of foreign aid provided to the latter country by the former is "unmatched in the history of foreign aid for any country," reaching, in the late 1980s to early 1990s, \$77 billion.³⁴² Furthermore, the United States' continuous seeking of a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, leading to the convening of the Madrid conference in 1991 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in

³⁴¹ Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 233.

³⁴² Abdul Salam Majali, Jawad A. Anani, and Munther J. Haddadin, *Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 13.

1993,³⁴³ must have highlighted U.S. preferences in the region prior to the signing of the peace treaty in 1994.

At this time, evidence shows that many international negotiations took place between the United States and Jordan. In the post-Gulf War period, these negotiations began when Secretary of State James Baker travelled throughout the region to resume prior peace initiatives.³⁴⁴ These travels led Baker to Jordan in April 1991 and resulted in the Madrid peace conference which convened in October of that year.³⁴⁵ The Madrid talks went on for a couple of years, providing evidence that communication between the United States and Jordan was sustained throughout the years prior to the signing of the peace treaty.³⁴⁶ Furthermore, Jordan was present for the conclusion of the Oslo Accords in 1993, where the Trilateral Economic Committee was created joining together the United States, Israel, and Jordan in an attempt to promote future economic relations between the latter two states.³⁴⁷ Additionally, in terms of high-level negotiations, during 1994 alone, King Hussein visited the United States three times in order to further talks on the Washington Declaration, the content of which will be discussed in greater detail shortly; meetings with Secretary of State Warren Christopher were conducted during the year as well.³⁴⁸ Although not a comprehensive account of the meetings taking place between the United States and Jordan, these negotiations show a clear connection between the two states, and further highlight the dominant role the United States had played in the region in this period. Finally, even though the United States had been

³⁴³ Majali et. al., *Peacemaking*, 199.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁴⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 285; Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 184; Majali et. al., *Peacemaking*, 13.

³⁴⁶ Smith, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 233.

³⁴⁷ Majali et. al., *Peacemaking*, 243-244.

³⁴⁸ Susser, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 1994, 431, 409.

greatly disappointed with the behavior of Jordan towards the West during the Gulf War, aid from the U.S. had not completely stopped, reaching a little over \$70 million in 1992, but falling to \$44.5 million and \$37.8 million in 1993 and 1994 respectively.³⁴⁹

Although the King and President Bush had begun to reconcile their differences in the post-Gulf War period, the rest of the U.S. government was still greatly disappointed and unwilling to forget Jordan's behavior.³⁵⁰ However, despite the two states' differences, there is evidence showing the presence of the promise of aid and cooperation in the future. To begin with, in a letter written to the King, President Bush assured him that he would be willing to push the U.S. government to supply Jordan with aid, if the King was willing to work in their interest.³⁵¹ Furthermore, in this period, negotiations began with respect to U.S. debt forgiveness to Jordan for an amount of up to \$950 million.³⁵² An agreement between the two states promised that this forgiveness would be given over three years starting in 1994; King Hussein's visits to the U.S. during that year also made apparent the promise of bilateral aid in the future.³⁵³ During this period, therefore, the promise of "a peace dividend" from the United States was made clear.³⁵⁴

As in the previous case studies, in order for correlation to exist, the actual behavior of Jordan during this time period must be one which corresponds to the interests of the United States. Unlike in 1990, the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994 shows a behavior which clearly falls in line with U.S. peace initiatives in the region.

³⁴⁹ Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*, 13.

³⁵⁰ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 294.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 286.

³⁵² Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 186.

³⁵³ Susser, *Middle East Survey, 1994*, 431.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 418.

Additionally, Jordan during this period undoubtedly was distancing itself from its prior regional ally, Iraq, an action which also shows correspondence with U.S. preferences.³⁵⁵

A temporal link is easily established in this case, as most of the negotiations between the two states took place between the years of 1991 and 1993, prior to the signing of the treaty. Even the letters exchanged between the heads of state began as early as 1991. Furthermore, the promise of aid given to King Hussein after he met with Congress in July 1994 also preceded the actual signing of the peace treaty, which took place in October of that year.³⁵⁶ In consequence, correlation between system structure and Jordanian foreign policy has been established here.

The 1994 Peace Treaty-Causation:

In order for Jordan's signing of the peace treaty to be the result of U.S. international pressure, Jordan must have known, without a doubt, what the U.S. expected of it in terms of its foreign policy behavior. Beginning with Baker's visit to Jordan in 1991, the U.S. Secretary of State made it clear to King Hussein that, after the Gulf War, the King would have to behave in a manner corresponding to U.S. interests if he wished to receive foreign funding. Baker's exact words after the meeting were that "It was clear to me the King understood the simple dynamic: for us to help him now, he needed to play on our terms."³⁵⁷ Soon after the meeting, President Bush wrote a letter to the King reiterating his desire for Jordan to participate in the peace process by joining the 1991 conference, stating that "the time has come for you and your country to seize the

³⁵⁵ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 430; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 295; Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 7.

³⁵⁶ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 411.

³⁵⁷ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 285.

opportunity at hand and shape events lest they shape us... You told me that you would be there. There will never be a better time. I am counting on you, your leadership, and your sense of history."³⁵⁸

Furthermore, government officials other than the King Hussein also clearly understood U.S. expectations. As Majali, who was soon to be Prime Minister, reasoned prior to the Madrid Conference, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was central to the future development and security of the region.³⁵⁹ Jordanian officials knew that opposing the United States again in a regional initiative would not be beneficial, especially as the latter state had placed a blockade on the port of Aqaba in Jordan after the Gulf War; removing the blockade, granting aid, and continuing political cooperation with Jordan was dependent on the regime's compliance with U.S. regional demands.³⁶⁰

King Hussein, therefore, was aware of the connection between aid and the participation of his regime in the peace talks with Israel. Was the granting of aid alone, however, large enough to convince him to pursue the treaty? Similarly to the rest of its history, Jordan relied on external aid to finance its domestic economy. The years between 1990 and 1994 were no exception as the country received aid up to a maximum of JD225.2 million per year, falling to a minimum of JD137.4 million.³⁶¹ Furthermore, due to its reliance on loans, Jordan's external debt to states in the Gulf, Europe, and to the U.S. in addition to international organizations reached levels of up to JD 4,720.5 million

³⁵⁸ Ibid, 286.

³⁵⁹ Majali et. al., *Peacemaking*, 15.

³⁶⁰ Susser, *Middle East Survey, 1994*, 409; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 285, 294; Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 8.

³⁶¹ Central Bank of Jordan, "Table No. (17): Summary of Central Bank Budget," <http://www.cbj.gov.jo/pages.php> (Accessed June 3, 2009).

in 1994.³⁶² Clearly, Jordan's reliance on external aid and loans remained important, if not increased in importance, in the post-Gulf War period. If it was to sign the peace treaty, furthermore, the United States would have guaranteed the state \$250million in cash per year, an amount surpassing the levels of aid it had been receiving prior to the peace treaty.³⁶³ This aid, along with the plans to grant debt relief to the regime, could hardly be ignored by Jordan.

Relations with the United States, however, were not the only ones which would improve by the signing of the peace treaty. As relations with the U.S. progressed, President Clinton pushed European countries to consider relieving Jordan of the debt it owed them.³⁶⁴ Britain, for example, agreed to write off all of Jordan's "aid-related debt."³⁶⁵ Furthermore, in 1997, Egypt and Israel, agreed to redirect \$50 million from each of their personal aid programs in order to increase the funding available to Jordan.³⁶⁶ Loans from Western States, including Japan, increased overall in the post-1994 period as well.³⁶⁷ Such debt forgiveness and increases in levels of aid would not have been possible otherwise, as most of the European states usually abide by the norms set out by the United States, granting aid only when the latter state approves.³⁶⁸

³⁶² Central Bank of Jordan, "Table No. (18): Outstanding Balance of External Public Debt (Continued)," <http://www.cbj.gov.jo/pages.php> (Accessed June 4, 2009).

³⁶³ Gad G. Gilbar, and Onn Winckler, "The Economic Factor of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Cases of Egypt, Jordan and Syria," In *Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution? Essays in Honour of Professor Moshe Ma'oz*, ed. Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 201.

³⁶⁴ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 431.

³⁶⁵ Gilbar and Winckler, "The Economic Factor of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," 201.

³⁶⁶ Lamees Al Hadidi, "Jordan," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/programmes/wtwt/taking_part/html/jordan.stm (Accessed April 5, 2009).

³⁶⁷ Central Bank of Jordan, "Table (18)."

³⁶⁸ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 417.

Relations with the Arab states at this time, furthermore, continued to be strained due to the behavior of Jordan in the Gulf War; therefore, not signing a peace treaty with Israel would not have guaranteed alternative sources of aid to flow into the kingdom from regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.³⁶⁹ The distancing of Jordan from Saddam Hussein, furthermore, would not allow for the compensation of noncompliance by economic cooperation with Iraq. Therefore, measurement of aid levels and support available to the kingdom show that King Hussein had no choice but to comply with the demands of the United States during this time period.

Finally, aid promised by the United States must have been viewed as credible, as the actions of the power in the region during preceding years show that it was willing to follow through with its threats of repercussions due to noncompliant behavior. For example, the blockade on the port of Aqaba and the lower level of aid granted to the regime after the Gulf War, as discussed above, show how U.S. disapproval and Jordanian noncompliance led to severe economic repercussions.³⁷⁰ King Hussein's compliance with U.S. demands, therefore, seemed crucial in 1994 in order to guarantee the sustainable development of his regime.

Subaltern Realism and Jordanian Foreign Policy Behavior:

The 1990-91 Gulf War-Correlation:

As with Egypt, Jordan's colonial history tied it to the British. The state, which was under the British mandate system until 1946, was admitted into the United Nations

³⁶⁹Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 11; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 293.

³⁷⁰Majali et. al., *Peacemaking*, 9; Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 11; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 294.

as a sovereign state in 1955.³⁷¹ Unlike Egypt, however, the borders which finally constituted the Jordanian state were influenced heavily by foreign powers. Most importantly, the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement signed between Britain and France clearly drew out the borders of the former Ottoman territories, and created, what would become, the lands of Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and parts of Turkey; these states were placed under the control of either the British or the French, depending on each imperial power's respective interests in the territories.³⁷²

The Sykes-Picot agreement, along with the Balfour Declaration discussed above, affected Jordan in an additional manner. The continuous conflict between Israel and the Palestinians led to the emigration of many Palestinians into Jordan. For example, after the 1948 war, it was estimated that 600,000 to 700,000 Palestinians came to Jordan.³⁷³ The ongoing influx of Palestinians into this neighboring state was assumed to have allowed, what was once, a minority group to become a majority, constituting approximately sixty percent of the total Jordanian population.³⁷⁴ In terms of how this affected the societal cohesion of Jordan, the Palestinians and their supporters within the Hashemite Kingdom reacted, in more than one instance, with anger towards events occurring in Israel. For example, the immigration of Soviet Jews into Israel along with the Intifada in the years prior to 1990 greatly destabilized the border between Israel and Jordan, *and* created conflict within the Jordanian population itself.³⁷⁵ For the King and the majority of East Bankers, Soviet emigration increased their fear that the Israeli

³⁷¹ Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 292; Rogan, "The Emergence of the Middle East," 17.

³⁷² Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 292-294; Rogan, "The Emergence of the Middle East," 23; Muasher, *The Arab Center*, 13.

³⁷³ Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 8.

³⁷⁴ Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*, 1.

³⁷⁵ Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashimite Jordan," 61; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 261.

government was pursuing the strategy of “Jordan is Palestine,” attempting to create a Palestinian state within Jordan.³⁷⁶ Jordanians of Palestinian origin and their supporters, furthermore, showed their discontent with the situation in the neighboring rival state when up to 20,000 people marched in the Jordan valley in May 1990; the demonstration was large enough that the Jordanian police and army personnel had to intervene to separate the masses.³⁷⁷ This protest was followed by many more, and created more instances where the domestic security forces were forced to intervene, especially within the Palestinian refugee camps in the country.³⁷⁸

The Soviet Jewish emigration into Israel, however, was not the only reason for increased tension within and along the border of Jordan. The Palestinian Intifada which erupted in the Occupied Territories in late 1987 also increased the violence. This violence, especially in the West Bank, was one of the major reasons for King Hussein’s decision to disengage from the area in 1988 and early 1989 due to his fear that instability in the West Bank would lead to violence within Jordan.³⁷⁹

Consequently, what had been a quiet border for almost twenty years witnessed increasing tension throughout this period;³⁸⁰ therefore, societal cohesion within the country prior to 1990 is measured to be at a low level. Unlike its Egyptian counterpart, population divisions within Jordan led to an increasingly unstable domestic environment which reacted with increasing discontent towards regional developments.

³⁷⁶Susser, *Middle East Survey, 1990*, 476-477.

³⁷⁷*Ibid*, 467.

³⁷⁸*Ibid*, 467-468.

³⁷⁹Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashimite Jordan,” 60; Muasher, *The Arab Center*, 23; Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 141.

³⁸⁰Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 262.

The legitimacy of the regime also was questionable during this time period. Due to the downturn of the Jordanian economy during the 1980s, the government felt it had no choice but to turn to the IMF and to implement the organization's proposed economic changes. One of these changes was the removal of government subsidies for population necessities, such as gas, diesel fuel, cigarettes, phone services, electricity and gasoline.³⁸¹ Almost directly after the announcement of the economic changes, riots erupted throughout Jordan in protest to the government's decision. Unlike the demonstrations discussed above, these demonstrations, surprisingly, were created primarily by East Bankers, the regime's main support group.³⁸² The riots, which initially continued for five days, left at least eight people dead and many others injured;³⁸³ a week later, violence continued in other predominantly East Bank areas, again as a direct response to the IMF subsidies. Surprisingly, Amman and other principally Palestinian areas did not react during this period, showing that even the Jordanians themselves had many grievances towards their regime.³⁸⁴ Due to these sources of instability, Jordan became the Arab state with the most recorded demonstrations in the two months after the 1990 invasion.³⁸⁵

In response to the 1989 riots, the regime attempted to increase its legitimacy through the liberalization of the government. The King allowed for elections to take place

³⁸¹Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 51; Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 28.

³⁸²Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 6; Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 169; Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 51.

³⁸³Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 28.

³⁸⁴Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 169.

³⁸⁵Shibley Telhamy, "Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War," *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), 449; Discussions of the Jordanian demonstrations in response to the Iraqi invasion specifically were not discussed here as they are case-specific and do not describe, a priori, the regime's legitimacy vis-à-vis its population.

later that year in order to regain the support he had lost from the East Bankers.³⁸⁶ What is interesting to note, however, is that the democratization which occurred was not typical, in that it was “defensive” in nature; in order to consolidate his support, the king forced the ruling cabinet to resign, as it was blamed for the internal economic and societal instability in the country. Furthermore, the electoral laws were altered in an attempt to undermine the power of the purely Palestinian areas while increasing the voting rights of the East Bank Jordanians.³⁸⁷ Therefore, although liberalization occurred, showing at the surface a less repressive and corrupt government, it was done so specifically as a strategy of King Hussein to regain the support of his traditional support groups.

However, as will be discussed in greater detail shortly, the elections which were meant to consolidate and increase the support of the King and his Transjordanian allies actually showed how little support the traditional ruling elite now held in Jordanian society. The elections granted the Jordanian opposition, comprising of Islamist and leftist groups, over thirty seats in the 80-seat Parliament, an amount they had not enjoyed previously in Jordan.³⁸⁸ In addition to their economic grievances and concerns for the Palestinians in the West Bank, the result of the elections showed that the population had grown tired of the increasing corruption and repressive nature of the Rifa’i government, leading to its forced resignation by the king.³⁸⁹

The king, however, did not experience the low level of support that his government did during this period. Most of the demonstrators, although openly

³⁸⁶ Scott Greenwood, “‘Jordan’s New Bargain:’ The Political Economy of Regime Security,” *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 249.

³⁸⁷ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 170-171; Kassay, “The Effects of External Forces,” 51; Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 6.

³⁸⁸ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 171.

³⁸⁹ Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” 27.

criticizing the government, did not include the king in their protests; furthermore, the king's response to the riots and the subsequent domestic liberalization, as well as his prior disengagement from the West Bank, increased his support by responding to East Bank demands and removing the primary sources of Palestinian opposition. Therefore, although the government in general was seen negatively, the king was not viewed in a similar light.

As with Egypt, Jordan's reliance on the IMF and the West in 1989 gives insight as to the level of international legitimacy during the period. Firstly, pursuing the required economic changes proposed by the IMF increased the government's vulnerability vis-à-vis its entire population. Furthermore, the Jordanian regime was aware that democratization would lead to increased levels of aid to flow into the regime from the Western world. Not only did the IMF make this clear, but the West's actions in the newly independent states in Eastern Europe further highlighted the link between democratizing, gaining international acceptance, and receiving foreign assistance.³⁹⁰ Therefore, King Hussein's attempts at liberalizing domestically conform to the subaltern realist view that international pressure to democratize and liberalize influenced domestic politics, consequently resulting in opposition groups penetrating government institutions.

The combination of the riots, IMF programs, low societal cohesion and its resulting border instabilities, and the victory of the Islamists in the 1989 elections show that regime legitimacy within Jordan during this period was at a low level, despite King Hussein's continuing popularity domestically. These events, furthermore, all occurred in

³⁹⁰Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 54.

the years directly preceding the 1990 invasion, confirming the temporal link between domestic instability and foreign policy behavior. Correlation here has been established.

The 1990-91 Gulf War-Causation:

Investigating government autonomy within Jordan prior to the 1990 Gulf War revealed interesting information regarding King Hussein's ability to act independently of domestic pressures. Although constitutionally the King was allocated massive amounts of power, his decision to allow parliamentary elections in 1989 greatly constrained the monarch's control over the lower house.

The Jordanian constitution guaranteed the King of Jordan significant decision-making autonomy. Firstly, although the 1952 constitution made the cabinet, which is usually composed of the King's closest allies, accountable to parliament—with the former needing a vote of confidence from the latter in order to remain in office—the parliament, in turn, was accountable to the king, who is able to dismiss and suspend its activities by royal decree.³⁹¹ Furthermore, the King has the power to appoint the prime minister and dismiss members of his cabinet; he enjoys “the right to sign and promulgate laws, veto legislation, issue royal decrees (with the consent of the prime minister and four cabinet members), approve amendments to the constitution, command the armed forces, and declare war. In addition, he appoints and dismisses judges.”³⁹² Moreover, the power to call elections after dismissing parliament remains under the monarch control.³⁹³

Finally, although the parliament has the ability to override a royal decree if a two-thirds

³⁹¹Ibid, 74, 79-80; Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 303-304.

³⁹²Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 304.

³⁹³Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 79.

vote is received by the upper and lower houses, such a vote is extremely difficult to come by, given that the upper house is directly appointed by the king; therefore, “the legislature is only as powerful as the monarch allows it to be,” and overall authority remains vested in the king.³⁹⁴

In terms of foreign policy, the monarch’s independence is further highlighted as the King and his closest allies are the central figures participating in the policy process. These allies do not include the entire cabinet, but are comprised mainly of the crown prince, the prime minister, and the “chief of the royal court.”³⁹⁵ As an example of the monarch’s ability to act independently, the King’s decision to suspend Jordan’s role in the West Bank in 1988 was conducted without consultation of the parliament at all, including the Upper House which comprises of members loyal to the monarchy.³⁹⁶

The King’s constitutional rights, however, seemed to have been undermined after the liberalization of the political system in the 1980s. Firstly, the change in the electoral law in 1986 created new clauses which allowed for the over-representation of the traditional East Bankers at the expense of the Palestinians in the refugee camps residing in these areas.³⁹⁷ One of these clauses increased the overall seats allocated to the East Bankers, while removing the representation of the West Bankers in the government; in 1988, furthermore, the East Bank seats increased to a total of eighty within the legislature.³⁹⁸ In general, these electoral changes, approved by the regime, were expected to create an atmosphere wherein regime loyalists would gain the majority of seats in any

³⁹⁴ Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 79; Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 307.

³⁹⁵ Laurie Brand, *Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 65; Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 74.

³⁹⁶ Joyce, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan*, 141.

³⁹⁷ Greenwood, “Jordan’s New Bargain,” 253.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 254; Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 305.

upcoming election. Usually, this would seem to be a positive step when speaking of regime autonomy; however, due to Jordan's economic circumstances, the 1989 elections led to the victory of the Islamic opposition in the lower house of parliament.

During the 1989 elections, only independents were allowed to run for office, ones that were not directly connected to any specific party; regardless, the independents usually were linked to one political group based on their platforms and their political goals.³⁹⁹ The results of the elections shocked the regime with at least thirty of the eighty seats being allocated to the Islamic opposition, and a further ten seats granted to leftist groups.⁴⁰⁰ Therefore, the opposition controlled 50 percent of the total seats.⁴⁰¹ The control of the parliament by the opposition posed a significant obstacle to the autonomy of the regime; for example, the King's appointment of Badran as prime minister narrowly managed to gain the vote of confidence required from parliament.⁴⁰²

The level of autonomy, therefore, is concluded to be at a moderate level. The reason that the level was not measured to be low was that, even though the opposition did hold a majority within the lower house of parliament, the King still had the power to dismiss parliament at will, and the upper house remained one that was appointed by the King. Furthermore, Badran and his cabinet, although having a hard time gaining a vote of confidence, still managed to remain in office. Therefore, the weaknesses the King faced with the election of an opposition parliament were offset with the constitutional powers appointed to him throughout the years.

³⁹⁹Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 305.

⁴⁰⁰Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan," 62; Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 305; Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 28; The exact number of seats differed according to different sources. Islamists did seem to hold over thirty seats, however, with leftist seats varying between ten and thirteen seats.

⁴⁰¹Greenwood, "Jordan's New Bargain," 254.

⁴⁰²Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 172.

Two factors stand clear as the sources behind Jordan's economic performance in the pre-Gulf War period. The first stemmed from the immense foreign debt the state owed to various international and regional benefactors, and the second was the growing interdependence between Jordan and Iraq.

Jordan's growing international debt was the result of a few important events occurring in its regional environment. To begin, the falling oil prices internationally led to a decrease in the Arab aid flowing into the regime during the period; when combined with decreasing aid from the West, this drop in external funding had a significant effect on the Jordanian economy.⁴⁰³ Worker remittances from the Gulf States also decreased substantially as many workers were laid off due to the drop in oil revenue; overall remittances, therefore, fell to a little over US\$600 million, a level significantly lower than the US\$1.2 billion the state had received in 1981.⁴⁰⁴

The declining economy led to a sequence of events which were disastrous for Jordan. The Jordanian dinar was devalued continuously during the period. In 1988 alone, the currency lost 23 percent of its overall value, with the exchange rate falling from US\$1=JD0.33 to US\$1=0.71.⁴⁰⁵ Due to Jordan's reliance on vast amounts of imports, the devaluation of the dinar had troubling consequences on its external trade balance. As imports in that same year amounted to nearly fifty percent of the state's GNP, the state was forced to borrow heavily from international benefactors, eventually leading foreign debt to reach a level twice that of the gross domestic product.⁴⁰⁶ The consequence of

⁴⁰³Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 4; Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 50; Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 301.

⁴⁰⁴Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 50; Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 26.

⁴⁰⁵Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 166; Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces," 50.

⁴⁰⁶Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 27; Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 302.

these events was the inability of the state to service its debt repayment, leading it to “default on its foreign debt, the first time in its existence that it had ever done so. Once the truth was finally out the enormity of the situation became clear: Jordan’s foreign debt was the largest in the world, measured on a per capita basis.”⁴⁰⁷

Simultaneously during this period, Jordanian ties with neighboring Iraq were growing significantly. Discussed with reference to the power-bargaining approach, ties between the two states grew mainly as a result of Iraq’s need to finance its war with Iran. Jordan’s dependence on Iraq stemmed mainly from the trade which grew between the two states and from Iraq’s willingness to supply Jordan with the majority of its oil requirements.⁴⁰⁸ The close ties between the two states created an economy within Jordan wherein the majority of the business sector worked towards exporting more goods and services to this regional ally; prior to the start of the Gulf War in 1990, for example, three-fourths of the business industry within Jordan was linked to the export business with Iraq, with one-quarter of all Jordanian exports sent to this latter state.⁴⁰⁹ Furthermore, Iraqi use of the port of Aqaba for the shipment of arms, goods and services, as well as labor created great avenues for growth for the Jordanian economy, as transit trade expanded exponentially.⁴¹⁰ Unfortunately for Jordan, however, the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 was due to lessen the positive effects of their relationship, while maintaining the dependence the state had developed towards this regional ally, especially

⁴⁰⁷Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 166.

⁴⁰⁸Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 5.

⁴⁰⁹Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan,” 58; Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*, 37.

⁴¹⁰*Ibid*, 57.

with respect to oil; as Iraq's economic capacity declined, Jordan's benefits from trade, aid, and support from the former state consequently were due to suffer as well.⁴¹¹

The economic decline experienced within Jordan during these years was to have a significant effect on the public sector, as the government's ability to maintain control over this sector was strained greatly. Due to the economic growth of the late 1970s and early 1980s, by 1986 the public sector employed close to fifty percent of the domestic labor force.⁴¹² For this reason, the eventual inability of the government to finance those working in the public sector was to have a drastic effect on the overall performance of the economy. In addition to the deteriorating standards of the public sector, revenue from taxes during this period also was not great, remaining at a level significantly lower than what it would soon be in the post-Gulf War period.⁴¹³ Without new sources of revenue, the government of Jordan would find it difficult to maintain the support of its public sector employees and its traditional support groups.

Economic capacity during this period, therefore, is at a low level. The government's inability to secure continued financing from the external world, and its inability to find avenues of sustainable growth make it vulnerable to external economic shocks, such as was experienced with the declining oil revenues in the 1980s.

Jordan has been cited as a state in which the military has played an important role throughout the state's history.⁴¹⁴ In the pre-1990 period, this remained the case as the government still was spending great amounts on its military. Although, in comparison to

⁴¹¹Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 5.

⁴¹²Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations*, 52.

⁴¹³Department of Statistics, "Gross Domestic Product and Expenditures at Current Market Prices for 1986-1995 (in million JDs)," Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb_ec/sdb_ec_e/index.htm (Accessed June 3, 2009).

⁴¹⁴Keith Krause, "Middle Eastern Arms Recipients in the Post-Cold War World," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 535 (Sept. 1994), 88.

Syria and Israel, military spending in Jordan was not very high, from 1985 to 1990 total expenditure in this sector amounted to US\$4,347 million.⁴¹⁵ The paramilitary forces during this period increased from a level of 11,000 in 1985 to 17,000 in 1990, showing an increase in the overall level of manpower allocated towards domestic security.⁴¹⁶ Falling into the category of the top ten states where the number of soldiers per 1000 people is highest, Jordan continuously spent over ten percent of its GNP on the military establishment; furthermore, according to 1989 data, Jordan's exact ratio of soldiers to the population was 60.5 soldiers per 1000 people, a number significantly higher than the 5.4 average for the world.⁴¹⁷ Even though these numbers are not specific to the domestic arena, the fact that the internal security environment within these states requires continuous military intervention, the figures on spending provided by Keith Krause are relevant for domestic population pacification as well.⁴¹⁸

Although not supported by concrete evidence, a source does reveal that the intelligence services in Jordan have been used against the regime as well. For example, the source reveals that the riots in Jordan due to the IMF subsidy program actually were instigated by the Jordanian intelligence with links to counterparts in Israel. The riots were started as a result of fears of a future Arab alliance formation which would serve as a threat to Israel in the long-run; since the main link between the two states throughout the years had been the Jordanian intelligence services, such a claim does not seem extremely farfetched.⁴¹⁹ However, no material evidence was provided in support of this incidence.

⁴¹⁵ Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, 143.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁴¹⁷ Krause, "Middle Eastern Arms Recipients," 89.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 260.

Coercive capacity during these years was moderate at the least. Due to the fact that the state continues to spend vast amounts on the military as a whole, and due to the growth of its paramilitary forces during the period, Jordanian reliance on the military for domestic pacification cannot be ignored.⁴²⁰

Despite the fact that autonomy and coercive capacities both fell at a moderate level in the pre-Gulf War period, economic capacity, falling at a low level, forces the ruling elite within Jordan to face significant domestic vulnerabilities. The King is unable to manipulate the domestic economy to his benefit, realizing instead that he is slowly losing control of his domestic arena. Turning to the IMF shows just how important the economy was to the Hashemite monarchy. Relations with Iraq seemed to be the only promising economic avenue, linking the majority of the population to external trade with the regime. Subaltern realism, therefore, offers insight into Jordanian foreign policy behavior during this period, as King Hussein's vulnerability to the domestic economy forced him to neglect the demands of the international system in order to retain domestic support. However, as subaltern realism would predict low levels of autonomy and coercive capacities to exist here as well, the approach still is unable to explain Middle Eastern regime behavior in a complete manner.

The 1994 Peace Treaty-Correlation:

The dynamics within Jordanian society after the 1990 Gulf War did not change much. The history of colonialism and the divisions within society, obviously, were the

⁴²⁰Due to the lack of space available in this analysis and the deficiency in information provided on the subject of coercion in Jordan, as was the case with Egypt, a more detailed investigation could not be conducted; future research on the subject in general would be helpful for the region as a whole.

same and will not be repeated; however, the violence created as a result of the domestic population divisions did differ during this time period. Firstly, it is important to note that after the Gulf War, the population in Jordan had united in support of the Iraqi invasion. Both East Bank Jordanians as well as those of Palestinian origin supported Iraq, whether it was due to their Baathist beliefs, or to their resentment of the West who fought in support of Kuwait, but had neglected, in their view, to support the Palestinian cause.⁴²¹ Overall, tension between Palestinians and Jordanians directly after the Gulf War, therefore, was not at a high level.

Domestic violence against the regime, however, did exist. To begin with, the Islamist groups within society were beginning to voice their dissent more openly. In 1993 and 1994, these groups were assumed to be connected to plots to assassinate the King and some government officials, including Majali.⁴²² The Islamic groups associated with the violence were not part of the Muslim Brotherhood, which at this time worked well with the government, but instead broke away from moderate Islamic groups in order to voice their criticism of Jordanian politics more openly.⁴²³ The influx of Afghans during the period also exacerbated the Islamic dissent as the groups united in their efforts to denounce the moderate nature of the Jordanian government.⁴²⁴

Repression during the period, similarly to 1990, continued to prevail alongside defensive liberalization. For example, although martial law was abolished in 1993, it was replaced by a new Defense Law, which allowed the cabinet to declare a state of

⁴²¹Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," 23.

⁴²²Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 436-437.

⁴²³Ibid.

⁴²⁴Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 187-188.

emergency in the event of great domestic instability.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, as many political parties were allowed the right to gain party status, many others were unable to gain formal recognition by the end of 1992, including those who held primarily leftist ideologies.⁴²⁶ In addition, although the Press and Publications law was meant to increase the rights of journalists, it forbade them from protecting their sources and of producing articles critical of the Hashemite monarchy.⁴²⁷

Other attempts at protecting the regime from domestic opposition were more transparent. Two examples of this open repression stem from the changing of the electoral laws in 1993 and openly arresting and trying members of the opposition in order to show the repercussions of dissent. The change in the electoral law was made to reverse the gains that the Islamist groups acquired in parliament after the 1989 elections. The law changed from one which allowed voters to cast ballots as many times as the number of seats allocated to their district allowed, into one which allowed every “one-person, one-vote;” this voting method ensured that traditional Jordanian tribal leaders, who supported the king, would prevail against the Islamic opposition.⁴²⁸ Furthermore, during this period the King allocated more power to the security forces allowing them to use unconditional means to suppress vocal opposition against the regime.⁴²⁹ Finally, the trial of one of the Islamic opposition’s main proponents, Laith Shubailat, was blown out

⁴²⁵Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 539.

⁴²⁶*Ibid*, 540-541.

⁴²⁷*Ibid*, 541-542; Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 459.

⁴²⁸Mutayyam Al-O’ran, “The First Decade of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace-Building Experience: A Story of Jordanian Challenges (1994-2003),” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 4 (Dec. 2006), 84; Paul L. Sham, and Russell E. Lucas, “‘Normalization’ and ‘Anti-Normalization’ in Jordan: The Public Debate,” *Israel Affairs* 9, no. 3 (January 2003), 145; Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 81; Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope,” 12; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 301.

⁴²⁹Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 76, 393;

of proportion by the regime, in an attempt at sending a warning to those who wished to criticize the government's activities, showing them the negative effects of their actions.⁴³⁰

The domestic violence and the ensuing regime repression, however, were not enough to cause a high level of emigration from Jordan to take place during this time period. Although there were many Jordanians living outside the country in 1994, with Amman alone recording an external population of over 14,000,⁴³¹ the post-1991 period actually saw an influx of people *into* Jordan. Both Palestinians and Iraqis moved into the country by the hundreds of thousands in order to find employment, as the former had been expelled from the Gulf States due to their support for Iraq, while the latter were unable to make a livelihood in their own state.⁴³²

Keeping these factors in mind, it is important to note that King Hussein still enjoyed a rather high level of domestic support, especially after the 1991 Gulf Crisis. Furthermore, the population's outpouring of support for the king after his battle with cancer in the early 1990s shows their appreciation and respect for their leader.⁴³³ This respect, nevertheless, did not extend to the rest of the government. During the period, open attempts to undermine the performance of the government were made by the primarily opposition groups, Islamists and leftists; the latter group were upset due to their continued persecution by the government, while the former mainly resented the growing talks occurring between the government and Israel.⁴³⁴ Other groups within the

⁴³⁰Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 187; Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 545.

⁴³¹Department of Statistics, "Distribution of Population by Living Inside-Outside Jordan, Nationality, Sex and Administrative Statistical Divisions (Kingdom)," The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb_pop/sdb_pop_e/inde_o.htm (Accessed Feb. 15, 2009).

⁴³²Robins, "A History of Jordan," 180; Joyce, *Anglo-American Support*, 146.

⁴³³Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 535;

⁴³⁴Ibid, 541; Majali, et. al., *Peacemaking*, 71-72.

population felt that the parliament itself was useless and did not have any control over the conduct of policy in the country.⁴³⁵

Overall, however, this period witnessed a level of domestic legitimacy higher than that of 1990-1991. The riots and demonstrations were less widespread and less popular, for a start; furthermore, emigration was not the norm during this period, with many people moving into the state rather than out of it. Finally, although the government did not experience a high level of support, the King still enjoyed a high level of popularity within the population and remained a central figure in Jordanian politics. Furthermore, although IMF programs continued during this period, they were not as pronounced as previously, as the regime was able to reverse its prior liberalization to its own benefit. Legitimacy overall during this period, therefore, will be placed at a moderate level.

The 1994 Peace Treaty-Causation:

As revealed above, the Jordanian political system allocates much authority to the King and his closest allies. The constitutional rights of the King during this period did not change significantly, and, if anything, were increased with the passing of the National Charter in 1991. Although the main opposition group, the Islamic IAF, held sufficient power in parliament up until the 1993 elections, their loss in this election consolidated the autonomy of the monarch, especially in issues of foreign policy. The National Charter was meant to continue the liberalization process which had begun in previous years, by legalizing political parties and allowing them to participate in the lower house of

⁴³⁵Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 456.

parliament;⁴³⁶ however, most importantly, the Charter consolidated the power of the King by reaffirming his role as the supreme ruler, granting him control over the different institutions in government.⁴³⁷ The elected lower house, furthermore, was constrained as it needed the approval of the upper house to pass laws, and the majority party within the lower house did not necessarily have to be included in the formation of the new executive, which was decided upon by the monarch.⁴³⁸

In addition to the rights of the monarch over parliament, the Jordanian government experienced one further significant change during this period. The electoral laws were altered to reverse the gains made by opposition groups and attempted to guarantee the victory of the King's Transjordanian allies; this electoral law came hand in hand with a reformation of the electoral districts to ones wherein the support of the East Bankers increased.⁴³⁹ Consequently, and similarly to the 1989 changes, the liberalization process in these years was unable to allow Jordan to reach a fully democratic system, as it was done at a minimal level, ensuring that the monarch remained the supreme head of state and government.⁴⁴⁰ The main difference between the two time periods, however, stemmed from the victory of the East Bankers and the traditional regime loyalists in the 1993 elections at the expense of the Islamic IAF, leading to a more "moderate" parliament to be formed.⁴⁴¹ This moderate parliament strengthened the support of the

⁴³⁶ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 175.

⁴³⁷ Laurie Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999), 54; Ryan, "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 306.

⁴³⁸ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 175.

⁴³⁹ Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 306; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 301.

⁴⁴⁰ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 451.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

monarch as it was joined with a pro-regime cabinet, headed by Majali, which had been formed in the preceding years.⁴⁴²

Further to the constitutional and structural limitations opposition groups faced within Jordan, they also faced a level of self-restraint and caution when voicing criticism against the regime. The Islamic groups knew that they were mistrusted by the monarch and the ruling elite;⁴⁴³ due to this, they feared that vocal opposition against the king could lead to the dissolution of parliament and the exclusion of the Islamists from the decision-making processes altogether.⁴⁴⁴ Therefore, although these groups may not have supported the cabinet chosen by the King, or may have had grievances against the King himself, they found themselves unable to openly voice their criticisms in fear of political reprisal.⁴⁴⁵ Such fear of open competition against the government further consolidated the authority of the monarch as he was able to ensure his personal protection from the domestic opposition groups and was able to suppress any growing influence they may have eventually enjoyed.

Although the opposition groups, however, could not act in defiance of the King, the King often found himself unable to act without the consent of the Palestinians, who comprised the majority of his population.⁴⁴⁶ These groups did not form a powerful opposition group within government; nevertheless, acting against the wishes of the Palestinians may have caused an uprising within the domestic arena. However, undermining their power within the government's institutions through prior electoral laws

⁴⁴² Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process," 58.

⁴⁴³ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 544.

⁴⁴⁴ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 458.

⁴⁴⁵ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 433.

⁴⁴⁶ Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 166.

allowed the King the ability to maneuver in secrecy and without the knowledge and direct intervention of the majority of the population.

It is clear, therefore, that the power and authority of the King is not to be contested, either by the main opposition groups or by the different branches in government. His rule is agreed upon by the people of Jordan, as the Hashemite kingdom is seen to have a direct link to the Prophet Mohammed, creating a powerful bond between the King and Islam, the state religion.⁴⁴⁷ This internal legitimacy enjoyed by the king along with the constitutional and structural authority allocated to him, when combined with the appointment of a cabinet loyal to the king and with the fear of the opposition from voicing their preferences, ensured the monarch a high level of autonomy.

Economically, worker remittances remained an important source of income for the Jordanian government amounting to \$3.92 billion between 1990 and 1994.⁴⁴⁸ Despite the losses said to have been experienced as a result of the Gulf War, Jordan still enjoyed growth rates prior to the signing of the peace treaty, reaching a level close to six percent in 1994.⁴⁴⁹ Some say that the growth was the result of the return of many expatriates after the Gulf War who invested their earnings in the Jordanian economy rather than in the Gulf States where they had worked previously,⁴⁵⁰ these earnings had the most impact on the construction industry which was a main force behind the growth in the economy in 1992 for Jordan.⁴⁵¹ In addition, the effects of the Gulf War did not have the projected

⁴⁴⁷ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 537.

⁴⁴⁸ World Bank, *MENA Development Report: The Road Not Travelled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2008), 263; World Bank, *Peace and the Jordanian Economy* (Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1994), 24.

⁴⁴⁹ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1994, 407.

⁴⁵⁰ Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope," 10.

⁴⁵¹ Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 548.

negative consequences on the economy due to the fact that the state was able to guarantee new sources of foreign aid, including Japan and countries in Western Europe.⁴⁵² States in Western Europe saved Jordan from massive debt repayment by rescheduling the debt due between 1991 and 1993 for repayment at a later date.⁴⁵³ Due to such changes in the domestic economy in 1992, the “reserves of gold and foreign exchange reached JD1,039m.—the highest they had been since 1981,” and for the first time in a long while, government revenue exceeded expenditure.⁴⁵⁴ The tourism industry also benefitted the economy as a whole. Despite an initial decrease in tourism in the period directly after the Gulf War, tourism began to increase again soon after, surpassing the 1989 level as early as 1992.⁴⁵⁵

The Jordanian government, furthermore, was able to control much of the domestic economy, owning many major public enterprises, including telecommunications and cement and phosphate industries; in addition, it was able to use its resources to employ up to fifty percent of the domestic labor force.⁴⁵⁶ Throughout its past, the Jordanian government was able to use its public enterprises and its control of major state sector resources as means of securing loyalty and support for the regime;⁴⁵⁷ this did not change during this period. Furthermore, the government’s overall tax capacity increased, with revenue from taxes averaging at over JD600 million between 1991 and 1994.⁴⁵⁸ This was

⁴⁵²Ibid.

⁴⁵³Susser, *Middle East Survey, 1992*, 549.

⁴⁵⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵World Bank, *Peace and the Jordanian Economy*, 32.

⁴⁵⁶Brand, *Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations*, 48, 63; Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 182; World Bank, *Peace and the Jordanian Economy*, 35.

⁴⁵⁷Brand, *Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations*, 48-49.

⁴⁵⁸Department of Statistics, “National Disposable Income and its Appropriations at Current Prices for 1986-1995 (in million JDs),” Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb_ec/sdb_ec_e/index.htm (Accessed June 3, 2009).

much greater than the income from taxes received in the period preceding the Gulf War, which could have contributed to the surplus revenue the government now enjoyed.

However, despite the gains enjoyed by the Jordanian economy during this period, the state still experienced major setbacks. Firstly, the government debt to the Western world and to other sources of financial assistance was growing, creating an extremely high level of overall debt. For example, in 1993 and 1994 alone, external debt exceeded GDP by over US\$2 billion and US\$1.5 billion in each of these years, respectively,⁴⁵⁹ overall debt had increased to 140 percent by 1993.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, despite its attempts to comply with the sanctions against Iraq, Jordan still relied on the former state for its oil supply and for a significant portion of its trade; in addition, the growth experienced in the post-Gulf War period had begun to slow down, showing the difficulty in maintaining such high levels of growth in the future.⁴⁶¹ To aggravate the situation, the sour relations which had developed with the Gulf States had not improved, and aid from these states remained at a low level throughout the period.⁴⁶² This latter situation fueled the unemployment problem experienced in Jordan, with the percentage of unemployed remaining at thirteen percent in 1993.⁴⁶³

Overall economic capacity, therefore, is harder to measure during this period. What seemed to be a promising post-Gulf War period remained ripe with setbacks which would, ultimately, prevent the domestic economy from reaching its full potential. The

⁴⁵⁹“Jordan,” In *The Middle East Military Balance, 1999-2000*, ed. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir (Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000), 235.

⁴⁶⁰Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 449.

⁴⁶¹Geoffrey Kemp, and Jeremy Pressman, *Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 97; Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 548.

⁴⁶²Ryan, “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 302.

⁴⁶³World Bank, *Peace and the Jordanian Economy*, 35.

gains made by economic growth and the return of migrants from the Gulf were somewhat offset by an extremely large level of foreign debt and unemployment. Consequently, government economic capacity was at a moderate level.

As with the previous cases, coercive capacity in Jordan during this time period was difficult to measure due to the lack of information provided on the subject. However, as with 1990, the security forces in the state were active in the domestic arena in several circumstances. Overall military spending in Jordan, in general, during the period was significantly less than the amount spent by other regional powers, including Egypt, Israel and Syria.⁴⁶⁴ However, the state still allocated enough spending to sustain a large paramilitary force, which during 1995 leveled at 10,000 personnel.⁴⁶⁵ Other sources reveal that security forces numbered much more, reaching up to 25,000 between 1994 and 1998.⁴⁶⁶

These coercive forces, prior to 1994, were allowed much more freedom to suppress regime opponents in the domestic arena, especially while the liberalization of the economy was underway.⁴⁶⁷ Islamists and leftist party members continuously raised complaints against the activities of the security services, claiming that the latter used “unjustifiable” means to suppress the former’s activities.⁴⁶⁸ In one specific incident, two members of the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) were arrested by the security services and tried for an alleged assassination attempt against King Hussein in 1993; although the ILP

⁴⁶⁴Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, 143.

⁴⁶⁵Ibid, 183.

⁴⁶⁶“Jordan,” *The Middle East Military Balance*, 238; Although this information is for the period directly after the signing of the peace treaty, it provides insight into the level of spending allocated to domestic security concerns in Jordan in general, as the levels do not vary greatly from the period prior to the Gulf War showing consistency in domestic military spending.

⁴⁶⁷Salloukh, *Organizing Politics in the Arab World*, 393.

⁴⁶⁸Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 539.

accused the government and the security services of creating false charges in order to delegitimize the party's activities, this incidence shows that the security services did play an active role in suppressing domestic dissent groups.⁴⁶⁹ Another case, again with members of Islamic groups, further highlights the activities of the security services during the period. In an attempt to silence vocal opposition to the regime, the government brought two deputies, Laith Shubaylat and Ya'qub Qirsh to trial before the State Security Court in 1992, charging them with belonging to a domestic political organization which hoped someday to overthrow the Hashemite regime; again, these defendants denied the allegations, but their arrest showed other potential dissident groups the regime's ability to quiet otherwise potentially powerful adversaries.⁴⁷⁰

Obviously, the security services did play an important role in Jordan during this time period. However, how much role they played is not easily determined with the provided information. In order to account for a lack of detail, coercive capacity will be placed at a moderate level, since evidence of regime funding towards domestic security concerns and the active use of the domestic paramilitary forces are witnessed, making a low coercive capacity unlikely. In future research, further incidences of security service intervention in the domestic economy may place coercive capacity at a high level; nevertheless, the present study and the evidence found confirm at least a moderate level.

Given the evidence provided for autonomy, economic capacity, and coercive capacity, the predictions of the subaltern realist approach alone are not sufficient in explaining Jordanian foreign policy behavior and the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. Overall stateness for Jordan during the period was significantly higher than subaltern

⁴⁶⁹Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1993, 458-459.

⁴⁷⁰Susser, *Middle East Survey*, 1992, 545.

realism would allow for a developing state; autonomy itself was at a high level, countering the idea that the domestic government structure is extremely vulnerable to domestic opposition. Moderate levels of economic and coercive capacities, in addition, allowed the regime enough power to control and manipulate the domestic arena to secure its preferences. King Hussein's decision to sign the peace treaty with Israel, therefore, cannot be explained solely by examining Jordan's domestic environment.

Chapter Four: Conclusion

Assessment of the Case-Studies:

This analysis concludes that neither the power-bargaining nor the subaltern realist approaches contain sufficient explanatory power when attempting to understand foreign policy behavior in the authoritarian states of the Middle East. Although the theories helped highlight important details regarding the sources behind Egyptian and Jordanian foreign policy behavior, neither was able exclusively to explain overall state behavior and the reasons behind the change in the attitudes of President Sadat or King Hussein.

Egypt-Conclusions:

Egypt's decision to participate in the October War of 1973, to begin with, was the result of both international and domestic forces. Internationally, despite Sadat's initial leanings towards the West, his support of and influence on the oil embargo of the 1970s could not have fallen in line with Western preferences on what would be acceptable foreign policy behavior. Furthermore, waging the surprise attack against Israel, the United States' long-time ally, also would have gone against Western demands. Alternatively, the Soviet Union, who financially remained Egypt's primary international benefactor during these years, also faced great difficulties when attempting to influence Egyptian behavior. Sadat's Peace Initiative of 1971, the purge of Ali Sabri and his pro-Soviet allies within the Egyptian government, his expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972 and other such actions fell in direct opposition with the Soviet desire to remain the dominant international power with influence in Egypt. Furthermore, the 1973 war, itself,

was against the perceived Soviet preferences of maintaining a stalemate between Israel and Egypt.

Egyptian behavior during this period can be explained with the uniqueness of the Middle East as a region. The Gulf States' promised aid to Egypt was meant to replace reliance on the Soviet Union, while the oil embargo actually increased the United States' interest in and cooperation with Egypt, rather than resulting in the former state's removal of support due to Egyptian noncompliance with Western demands. Similarly, Egyptian expulsion of Soviet advisors actually led to an *increase* in Soviet aid rather than a decrease, showing how control over the Middle East's strategic states is extremely important to foreign powers. Clearly, the international system did play a role in Egypt's decision to embark on the 1973 war; however, it did not play the role that the power-bargaining approach would have predicted.

The subaltern realist approach also offers important insight into Egyptian foreign policy behavior during this period, but is unable to predict behavior in its entirety for Sadat's regime. Domestically, Sadat's regime experienced a low level of legitimacy and economic capacity, both variables which fall in line with subaltern realism's predictions. However, societal cohesion, to begin with, fell at a moderate level due to Egypt's unique development throughout history. More importantly, autonomy and coercive capacity fell at high and moderate levels, respectively, showing a fundamental divergence from the predictions of the subaltern realist approach. Again, the uniqueness of the Middle East as a region creates a situation where the head of state is allocated more overall autonomy than other states in the developing world would have enjoyed. In addition, the coercive capacity allocated to the leader allowed him to remain protected from domestic dissident

groups despite the low level of legitimacy he may have experienced. Low legitimacy, therefore, did not necessarily lead to domestic vulnerability. This does not mean, however, that Sadat was not vulnerable at all to his domestic environment. Economic capacity remained a point of weakness in Egypt and played a major role in affecting the state's foreign policy behavior prior to the 1973 war.

Consequently, Egyptian foreign policy behavior during the October War was a combination of the state's need to guarantee continued sources of financial assistance as well as its need to regain its primary sources of revenue, the Suez Canal and Sinai oil fields, from Israel. The regime's ability to achieve both these objectives was strengthened due to Sadat's ability to use the international arena to his advantage by playing the superpowers against one another. His domestic autonomy, furthermore, allowed him to act internationally without significant threats from the dominant opposition groups.

With respect to the signing of the 1979 peace treaty, the power-bargaining approach offers significant insight regarding the sources of influence on President Sadat. Egypt's reliance on the United States during this period, and the latter state's continuing promises to aid in future Egyptian economic and military development must have played a primary role in Egypt's foreign policy calculations and its agreement to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Arab support promised to Sadat prior to 1973 had not materialized and the Soviet Union's aid had decreased significantly. The United States and its Western allies, therefore, became the main contributors of financial assistance to Sadat's regime. Furthermore, the United States played a key role in influencing the Israeli decision to return the Suez Canal and the Sinai oil fields to Egypt after they had been lost

in 1967. The positive economic benefits enjoyed by cooperating with U.S. demands, therefore, far surpassed the costs of compliance in this case. Consequently, the power-bargaining approach was able to explain state behavior in 1979 more accurately than in the previous time period.

It is important to note the weaknesses of subaltern realism in explaining Egyptian behavior here. Sadat's high structural autonomy and coercive capacity, as well as moderate economic capacity allowed him the ability to insulate himself from his domestic environment. Structural autonomy, as always, continued to shield Sadat from his political opposition, while any growing political threat, such as the New Wafd Party, was defeated readily. Regaining the Suez and Sinai oil fields as well as increasing revenues flowing from the tourism industry and the public sector guaranteed the government a higher level of control over its economy than it had enjoyed previously. Finally, the food riots showed Sadat that a more powerful paramilitary force was needed, which resulted in the creation of a new security force the following year. In combination with the already existing coercive apparatuses, direct threats to Sadat's security seemed unlikely. A low level of legitimacy did not result in increased regime vulnerability as Sadat's control over the government and over the paramilitary forces allowed him to overcome these domestic threats, at least in the short run. Domestic constraints, therefore, did not play a major role in Egyptian foreign policy behavior during this period, undermining subaltern realism's explanatory power in this region yet again.

It is important to note, however, that the common point between the two time periods, 1973 and 1979, remained the economy. Whether due to economic weakness or the promise of future economic development, Egyptian foreign policy was developed to

guarantee economic security domestically and internationally. Either through participation in the October War or through the signing of the peace treaty, it is apparent that hopes of regaining and maintaining economic growth were central factors in Sadat's decision-making process.

Jordan-Conclusions:

Jordanian foreign policy behavior in the 1990 Gulf War, as with the October War, could not be explained based on international circumstances alone. Jordan during this time period relied on the United States and on the Gulf States for its economic development; furthermore, King Hussein and President Bush had become close colleagues. King Hussein, in addition, was well aware of the consequences of noncompliance with U.S. interests, whether economic or political, as these were made clear by U.S. government officials and their allies in the Gulf States of the region. The power-bargaining approach would assume that these factors would have led to Jordanian cooperation with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as noncompliance would have led to severe losses for King Hussein's regime. However, this was not the case, as Jordan instead showed sympathy with Saddam Hussein's regime. Despite the fact that the Jordanian economy did suffer due to the removal of financial assistance by the United States and the Gulf States, the ability of the King to gain alternate sources of aid guaranteed that the economic loss the state experienced was not as great as was expected. The economy instead enjoyed high levels of growth in the post-Gulf War period. Again, the high level of international interest in the Middle East and this state's centrality in the region guaranteed continued international support despite noncompliance with U.S. demands.

Domestically, King Hussein had experienced an increasingly unstable environment. Unlike Egypt, both societal cohesion and overall regime legitimacy during this period were at a low level. Furthermore, the elections of 1989 decreased, what otherwise would have been, a high level of structural autonomy into one which was moderate at best. In combination with a low level of economic capacity and a moderate coercive capacity, the regime found itself facing more domestic threats to its security than ones emanating from the international arena. Given the regime's interdependence with Iraq during the same period and the population's support of Saddam Hussein, King Hussein was forced to abide by the demands of his domestic arena and to neglect the demands of the United States. Overlooking his internal environment would have severely threatened King Hussein's hold on power, as his domestic opposition was able to control one of the Jordanian government's main institutions. Subaltern realism, therefore, is better able to explain Jordanian behavior prior to the 1990 Gulf War than its power-bargaining counterpart.

Again, however, it is important to note the weaknesses of subaltern realism here. Although Jordan did experience a low level of economic capacity, societal cohesion, and regime legitimacy, the King still enjoyed a moderate level of autonomy, a factor which subaltern realists would not have predicted. In addition, his ability to create a coercive apparatus where the average number of soldiers in comparison to the population at large placed the Jordanian state among the top ten security states in the world showed King Hussein's coercive capacity to be higher than the subaltern realist approach would have allowed. Again, although less with this case than with the cases of Egypt in 1973 and

1979, the uniqueness of the Jordanian authoritarian regime must be acknowledged when analyzing foreign policy behavior.

Finally, Jordanian state behavior in 1994 again leads to interesting results. In contrast to the period prior to the Gulf War, legitimacy at this time was not low, allowing the King to enjoy a higher level of domestic support; this was due primarily to the support he received for choosing to support Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, leadership autonomy, due to changes in the electoral laws and to the subsequent results of the 1993 elections, increased during this period allowing King Hussein to insulate himself politically from the dominant opposition. Economic capacity, in addition, increased prior to the signing of the peace treaty, despite the losses Jordan had incurred after the Gulf War. This was due mainly to the return of workers from the Gulf States and to the ability of King Hussein to guarantee alternate sources of aid for his regime. In combination with a moderate, if not high, level of coercive capacity, King Hussein was able to act with more freedom in the foreign policy realm as opposition groups were weary of voicing criticism against the regime. This allowed King Hussein to respond primarily to the international constraints his regime was facing at the time. These factors serve to undermine the explanatory power of subaltern realism when explaining the signing of the 1994 peace treaty.

Internationally, Jordan during this period had experienced a deterioration in its relationship with the Gulf States, and Iraq, its previous regional ally, now was in a state of complete isolation due to the sanctions imposed upon it by the United Nations. Improving relations with the United States, therefore, as with the case of Egypt after the 1973 war, guaranteed Jordan the possibility of receiving and maintaining increasing

levels of financial assistance which, although not necessary in the short run, would be needed to sustain the state's future economic growth and development. Abiding by U.S. demands to participate in regional negotiations with Israel, therefore, seemed crucial to King Hussein, as he began enjoying the promise of economic rewards almost immediately after compliance. Allies of the United States, furthermore, influenced the king's behavior, as they promised debt relief to Jordan after it had agreed to comply with Western demands. Signing the peace treaty, therefore, not only satisfied U.S. regional interests, but also guaranteed Jordan necessary sources of financial assistance, while relieving it of the enormous debt burden it had accumulated. In this case, international circumstances played a crucial role in predicting Jordanian foreign policy behavior.

The behavior of Jordan in 1990 and 1994 is interesting as subaltern realism's explanatory power prevails in one case, while power-bargaining is more accurate in the other. However, what is needed is an approach which explains state foreign policy behavior in all circumstances. Both the tested approaches fail in this manner yet again. The cases above, however, highlight two important factors. Firstly, the economy always plays a central role in the decision-making process in these states. Whether through reliance on international support or through changes in their domestic economic policies, the Jordanian and Egyptian governments and their respective leaders were always concerned with ameliorating the overall state of their economy.

Secondly, when domestic threats were low and the leaders were able to consolidate their structural autonomy within their respective governments, they responded primarily to the dominant international threats confronting their regimes. It seems as though the international arena *always* placed a certain amount of pressure on

these leaders, one that did not fluctuate over time. Although the circumstances may have changed, international constraints remained great throughout both time periods for each respective state. This was due to the primacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict with respect to these states and to the persistence of international interest in the region throughout the years. When domestic threats increased, however, the leaders were forced to respond to their domestic environment primarily, a response which was reflected in their state's foreign policy behavior. This conclusion distinguishes the Middle East from other developing regions in that it acknowledges the fact that leaders in Jordan and Egypt have been able to act independently of domestic constraints, a conclusion which, according to subaltern realists, should not be witnessed in the developing world. In these circumstances, accurate and rational foreign policy responses to international circumstances were witnessed. Egypt during both time periods and Jordan in 1994 fell into this category.⁴⁷¹ However, once the leaders lost control of their domestic environments, especially in terms of economic development, a case witnessed mainly with Jordan prior to the 1990 Gulf War, the regime's international behavior became one which neglected international demands and responded to internal security threats instead.

Introduction of a new approach to understanding Middle East state behavior:

Due to the inability of both the power-bargaining and subaltern realist approaches to explain adequately the foreign policy behaviors of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, I will propose a new, regionally specific approach. This approach attempts

⁴⁷¹Although Egypt in 1973 faced a low economic capacity, Sadat's autonomy and insulation from his domestic environment allowed him to embark on a foreign policy path which most completely satisfied his state's economic needs. The October War was a necessary step to strengthen relations with the West in general and with the United States in specific.

to combine the strengths of both the above-mentioned theories while overcoming their fundamental weaknesses with respect to explaining behavior in the Middle East.

How it builds upon existing literature:

The main advantage of this approach is that it recognizes the uniqueness of the Middle East as a region. As a result, the approach will relax subaltern realism's assumption regarding the importance of domestic politics by recognizing the possibility that sufficient levels of leadership autonomy exist within these regimes. The approach, consequently, will be able to explain scenarios where domestic constraints are great **and** ones where they are minimal. Finally, this approach builds upon the existing literature by giving the international system the importance it deserves when considering constraints on decision-making in the Middle East and how these translate into state behavior. Given the high degree of interest in this region specifically, it is important to recognize the significant constraints/privileges the international system poses on the states in question.

Brief summary of the approach:

This approach combines two different models, each which plays a role in explaining how a leader in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East responds to international and domestic constraints. Inherent in both models is the assumption that a leader's main political objective always is linked to securing or increasing his hold on power and guaranteeing the survival of his regime.

In model A, I am attempting to explain how international and domestic constraints (the independent variables) affect a leader's degree of freedom (DV) to

respond to a specific foreign policy problem. Degree of freedom is defined as the leader's maneuverability and autonomy from constraints, international and domestic, to pursue the policies which he believes fall most in line with his preferences of securing power and ridding of the greatest threats to his regime.

I conclude that international constraints are constant and create continuous pressure on the leader. The leader, in turn, will be constrained in that he will have a clearly outlined international environment within which he must work. In terms of domestic constraints, the leader faces two different scenarios. In the first scenario, where domestic stability prevails, the leader will have a great degree of freedom to respond to a foreign policy problem at will, as he will only have to respond to international constraints. However, in the second scenario, the leader's degree of freedom is further constrained due to the fact that his domestic environment is unstable and threatening. The leader now faces a situation where both the international and domestic arenas pose significant constraints, minimizing his ability to act independently. By combining the domestic and international arenas and the constraints they pose on leadership, this approach is able to combine power-bargaining's focus on international security and subaltern realism's emphasis on its domestic counterpart into a scenario where both types of threats exist. The leader's degree of freedom, in consequence, fluctuates depending on the degree of constraints he faces from the domestic arena, allowing varying levels of overall constraints to exist.

Stopping the approach at model A was not desirable due to the fact that this model only explains the degree to which a leader is constrained by both environments. It does not explain how this degree of freedom, in turn, translates into the actual state's

foreign policy behavior and whether this behavior falls in line with the leader's desire to maintain regime and state security. Therefore, model B will make the degree of freedom tested in model A the new independent variable and will describe how this independent variable affects actual foreign policy behavior (dependent variable). Along with the assumption that preferences are always linked to retaining power, this model also assumes that leaders follow the foreign policy path which they *expect* to be the least threatening to their security. Therefore, expectation of threat is central to this model; degree of freedom will affect expectations which will in turn affect policy choice outcomes. Model B draws three possible conclusions. Firstly, given great degree of freedom, mainly constant international pressure coupled with domestic environment stability, the leader is able to choose the foreign policy path which he expects to be the least threatening to his regime. Given low domestic constraints, his expectations will lead to a state foreign policy behavior which is most likely to quell and respond to international threats, while neglecting the minimal or moderate domestic threats to regime security which may exist.

In times of constant international threat and domestic instability, the leader will, again, have to follow the course of action which he believes is least threatening to the regime's survival. When the leader is able to accurately assess which foreign policy option seems the least threatening, he will pursue that policy and will be able to retain power while responding to both domestic and international pressures (a result similar to that explained above). State foreign policy behavior will portray the most rational response at the time, one that is directed primarily either at the international or domestic arena. However, when the leader miscalculates which policy he believes to be the least

threatening, he will pursue that policy, but may stand the risk of losing his regime, or losing significant influence within his regime. In this latter case, state behavior portrayed a miscalculated perception of threat and resulted in an increasingly insecure overall environment for the leader. A loss in degree of freedom resulted in a suboptimal policy choice and a foreign policy behavior which failed to respond adequately to international and/or domestic constraints.

Final Thoughts:

The new approach presented above attempts to portray how leaders respond to constraints in the Middle East, and how these responses translate into state foreign policy behavior. Testing the case studies with this regionally-specific approach could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of Egyptian and Jordanian foreign policy behavior in the years under investigation. Future research on the Middle East, therefore, must take into account the uniqueness of the region as one which is not part of either the developing or the developed worlds; the region falls in between and should be considered based on this exclusive nature.

Theories which focus on the international system solely do offer important insight into the past behavior of states in the region as they highlight the centrality of foreign power influence and interest in the Middle East. However, the power-bargaining approach, in specific, suffers two main weaknesses when explaining events in the region. Firstly, its focus on the existence of a power relationship in the international system and its assumption that this relationship governs a developing state's foreign policy decisions leads to insufficient conclusions on what factors influence foreign policy to be drawn; the

approach's neglect of the domestic arena, in addition, further exacerbates this problem. For the Middle East, it is true that international donors are central to the regional state's development; however, the states in the region are able to use the resources at their disposal to either temporarily reverse or alter the existing power relationship, or to transfer the relationship to alternate international donors. These alternate donors will always, and have always, existed due to their interest in the Middle East, whether in terms of its oil resources, religious influence, or in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, an international power benefactor's demands have played a role in constraining state behavior in Jordan and Egypt and have led to situations where a leader acts based on the promise of future economic development.

Subaltern realism's focus on the unique development of the Third World in general also was beneficial to providing insight into a Middle Eastern state's foreign policy behavior. Recognizing these regimes' historical evolution was central to understanding their past behavior. However, as with the power-bargaining approach, this theory faced critical obstacles when attempting to understand all types of foreign policy behavior in the region. Firstly, assuming that autonomy and coercive capacity in these regimes would, most of the time, remain at a low level was not an accurate assumption. The case studies show that both leaders in Egypt and Jordan have been able to consolidate their authority throughout their rule and were able to use their coercive power to protect themselves from domestic dissident groups most of the time. The one factor which continuously seemed to play a role in the leaders' foreign policy calculations was their unstable economy. As soon as the economy began to improve its performance, the respective leader's insulation from domestic constraints would increase, and state foreign

policy behavior would portray compliance with systemic demands more completely. However, economic instability led to situations where domestic constraints indeed did increase regime vulnerability, a factor portrayed by Jordanian behavior in 1990.

Furthermore, Ayoob's discussion of societal cohesion and legitimacy were crucial as they portrayed the need for the leaders of these regimes to consolidate their rule over their domestic constituencies. The creation of these regimes and their interrupted evolution undoubtedly has allowed for many instances of societal clashes and discontent with the type of regime in power. These characteristics are ones that Middle Eastern regimes have in common with other developing states. However, again, both King Hussein and President Sadat were able to find ways to protect themselves from these societal divisions by maintaining firm control over the government and the military.⁴⁷²

In conclusion, future research on the Middle East is required if one wishes to fully comprehend foreign policy behavior in the region. The regionally-specific approach presented above recognizes this requirement and attempts to remedy the weaknesses of existing international relations theories which have attempted to explain behavior in this region in the past. Combining both international and domestic constraints on leadership and understanding how these translate into state foreign policy behavior, while remembering the uniqueness of the Middle East as a region, can highlight what factors ultimately govern state behavior. If one wishes to change the future of the Middle East and finally find an avenue for a lasting peace in the region, recognizing these sources of influence and understanding when and how they affect state behavior is crucial.

⁴⁷²Although Sadat was assassinated eventually by members of the domestic opposition, the events leading to this assassination must be investigated in further detail. The conclusions drawn here represent the periods under investigation exclusively, and, therefore, do not pertain to the period after the signing of the 1979 treaty.

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
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
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Theory Diagrams

• Power-Bargaining Approach



• Subaltern Realist Approach



Appendix 2: Blanchard and Ripsman's Questions for Evaluating Stateness⁴⁷³

Autonomy

1. Is there a separation or concentration of power? In short, does the executive/leader dominate or does the legislature, the military, or some other actor act as a veto player over foreign policy?
2. Is the executive a unitary actor or is it a coalition of parties or interest groups?
3. Do different parties/factions control different institutions of government?
4. Do existing political procedures facilitate autonomous action by the executive/leader (i.e., is there party discipline)? Do key actors routinely defer to the executive in foreign affairs?
5. What are the prevailing norms on the conduct of foreign policy? Do they encourage executive/leader independence in foreign affairs or executive/leader restraint?

Capacity-Economic

1. How big is the government budget relative to GDP?
2. What is the government's surplus tax capacity?
3. What other non tax resources can the government tap? Examples of non tax resources include borrowing ability, currency and gold reserves, resource sales, foreign aid, and so on.
4. What policy instruments and networks does the government have that it can use to coerce, co-opt, and take countermeasures? Examples include ownership of state-owned enterprises, R&D spending, licensing, business-government advisory councils, government controlled, dominated labor unions, and so on.

Capacity-Coercion

1. What is the size of the police relative to the target's population and territory?
2. Is there a utilizable military capacity (meaning military forces not devoted to other missions that can be used for domestic pacification)?
3. To what degree does the intelligence apparatus penetrate society?

Legitimacy

1. Is there much systematic violent dissent (violent protests or programmatic assassination attempts)?
2. Is there unusually large emigration from the target country?
3. Does the state rely on systematic repression?
4. Are there indicators of public support for the regime (public opinion polls, media-editorials, letters to the editor, items in news stories)?
5. Are there indicators of public support for the leader (public opinion polls, media-editorials, letters to the editor, items in news stories)?

⁴⁷³These questions were copied from Blanchard and Ripsman, "A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft," 394-395.

Appendix 3

Predictions of the Power-Bargaining Approach for the Case Studies:

Four Conditions for Compliance and Resulting State Behavior

<p>Clear international system, costs of noncompliance are significant and higher than costs of compliance, with a high credibility of the int'l power</p>	<p>Clear international system, high credibility of int'l power, but costs of noncompliance are <u>not</u> higher than costs of compliance</p>	<p><u>Unclear</u> international system, but high credibility of int'l power, costs of noncompliance are higher than costs of compliance</p>	<p>Clear international system, <u>low</u> credibility of int'l power, costs of noncompliance are not higher than costs of compliance</p>
<p>Developing state feels pressured to abide by the laws of the international system—compliance with power benefactor's demands</p>	<p>Possibility of gaining alternate sources of aid and financial assistance may be more beneficial than those promised by the power—results in developing state's noncompliance with power's demands</p>	<p>Possibility of misperception of costs and/or of power demands—possible noncompliance due to unclear transmission of information in the international system.</p>	<p>Costs of noncompliance are not higher than those of compliance, since the developing state does not believe the power will follow through with its threats and or promises—noncompliance with power's demands.</p>


Appendix 3 Continued

Predictions of the Subaltern Realist Methodology for the Case-Studies:


<u>Structural autonomy, economic capacity, and coercive capacity levels</u>	<u>Policy Capacity Levels</u>	<u>Domestic Security Levels</u>	<u>Foreign Policy Behavior</u>
High levels in one of the three variables	Overall policy capacity is <i>high</i>	Domestic threats to security are <i>low</i> , despite legitimacy and societal cohesion levels	Foreign policy behavior does not reflect domestic circumstances
Moderate levels in all three variables	Overall policy capacity is <i>moderate</i>	Domestic threats to security are <i>manageable</i> , but low societal cohesion and legitimacy levels may constrain the leader to some degree.	Foreign policy behavior does not respond primarily to the domestic environment but may reflect some domestic demands.
Low levels in either structural autonomy, economic and/or coercive capacities	Overall policy capacity is <i>low</i>	Domestic threats to security are <i>high</i> , despite legitimacy and societal cohesion levels	Foreign policy behavior responds primarily to domestic threats.
Low levels in one of the three variables in combination with a high level in one of the three variables	Overall policy capacity is <i>moderate</i>	Domestic threats to security are <i>high</i> due to the low capacity or structural autonomy.	Foreign policy responds to domestic demands, but allows some maneuverability due to high capacity or autonomy levels.

Appendix 4: Model of New Approach

Model A: Constraints on leader's degree of freedom to pursue policy preference



Domestic Constraints Explained



Appendix 4 Continued

Model B: Degree of freedom and foreign policy choice

