International Nongovernmental Organizations, Populations, and Structures: The Road to Collective Action on Emerging Issues?

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ABSTRACT

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Constraints and opportunities provided by social networks of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have recently become a focal point among international relations scholars under the heading *network governance*. This research adds to the understanding of how characteristics of NGO populations constrain and enable engagement on emerging issues by theorizing a connection between the dynamics of populations, hierarchical networks structures, issue emergence, and collective action. A mixed method approach combines statistical network analysis with process tracing case studies of networks within environmental and social advocacy fields at the international level in the European Union. Findings suggest that while characteristics of NGO populations do explain how networks become hierarchically structured, the structures themselves do not directly affect issue emergence. Further, the relationship between issue emergence and collective action is shown to not always be linear as academics have assumed, rather sometimes inverted or circular in nature, providing fertile ground for future research.

DEDICATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For my one and only love and wife, Melinda, who has stood by me and supported me through high and low, thick and thin, I dedicate this thesis to you. The fruits of this labour can only be attributed to your confidence and unflappable faith that this effort will lead to somewhere better for both of us, and it is for both of us that I have written it.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

CAN Europe - Climate Action Network Europe

CEJI - Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe

EAPN - European Anti-Poverty Network,

EC - European Commission

ECRE - European Council of Refugees

EDF - European Disability Forum

EEAP - European Energy Action Plan

EEB - European Environmental Bureau

ENAR - European Network Against Racism

ENGO - Environmental Nongovernmental Organization

EU - European Union

EWL - European Women's Lobby

EYF - European Youth Forum

FOE Europe - Friends of the Earth Europe

IFM - International Falcon Movement - Socialist Education International

IFOAM - International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements

ILGA-Europe - International Lesbian, Gay and Transender Alliance of Europe

ILUC - Indirect Land-use Changes

IRF - International Road Federation Europe

MIO-ECSDE - Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture & Sustainability

NGO - Nongovernmental organization

OLS - Ordinary Least Square

REACH - Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals

SNGO - Social Nongovernmental Organization

T&A - Transport & Environment

WECF - Women in Europe for a Common Future

WWF - World Wildlife Fund for Nature

INTRODUCTION

It was for a long time assumed that when organizations, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), work together in collective action that they do so based on principled objectives, i.e. moral understandings of what ought to be as opposed to what already is (*see* Thurner and Binder 2009; Chandhoke 2007; Florini and Simmons 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Others critiqued the naivety of 'principled' organizations arguing that when they work together it is more a result of complex internal and external factors which dictate when it is most opportune to cooperate or even pay attention to new issues (see Prakash and Gugerty 2010; Carpenter 2007b; Carpenter 2007a; Johnson and Prakash 2007). They argue that since NGOs are at the mercy of both their primary stakeholders as well as their boards of directors, they are often more calculative in dealing with others, even if their goals align. These perspectives tend to either look within the organization to find answers as to why or why not cooperation is suitable or they take collective action as a given (Carpenter 2007b). Yet, very few analyses have ventured to question the composition of actors and the role of the social arena itself upon the formation of collective action on new issues.

How actors relate to one another and how their combined composition serves to enable and constrain behavior is at the center of network analysis (Ward *et al*. 2011; Hafner-Burton *et al*. 2009). The constraints imposed by a collective of actors upon the collective itself, either intentionally or unintentionally, are what is known as network governance (Jones *et al*. 1997; Reinicke and Deng 2000); a set of explicit or implicit rules and norms that determine how the network behaves and what it is capable of. Despite the clear utility that analysis of network governance may provide to understanding complex

relationships among a large group of actors, network analysis in international relations is quite under-studied, and network analysis in international nongovernmental organizations is even less so (Hafner-Burton *et al*. 2009; Kahler 2009).

The purpose of my research is to address the dynamic world of international NGOs and how they work or do not work toward common goals. It is at once a study of individual relationships between organizations in a given population as well as a study of how the combination of these individuals into a complete population and social hierarchy has an effect upon the emergence of new issues and collective action.

The study of Networks, Issue Emergence, and Collective Action

How do characteristics of NGO populations affect the ability of NGOs to engage in collective action on a new issue? Populations are the aggregate of actors involved in a broad field of advocacy, such as environment, economic development, social or employment issues, or technological development, represented throughout by international nongovernmental organizations operating in the European Union. I argue that the characteristics of NGO populations have an effect on the type of network structure that emerges because individuals within the structure and the structure itself determine the extent to which new issues get noticed by more NGOs across the population and the extent to which collective action occurs in regard to the issue. Specifically, I maintain that different processes occurring at different levels (among individuals and across the total population) combine to represent a clear relationship between characteristics of NGO populations and hierarchical network structures, which determine the extent to which members of a population adopt new issues and subsequently engage in collective action. At the individual level, increases in the extent

to which individual NGOs make connections with other NGOs has a positive effect on the extent to which they will find themselves between more NGOs, thus occupying a more senior position in the social hierarchy that exists among the whole network. As actors become more central and more senior in the hierarchy they play an integral role in the reception and transmission of new issues throughout the network. At the same time, at the aggregate level, the extent to which the whole population is centralized has an effect on the extent to which the whole social structure is hierarchically structured because as NGOs tend more and more to cluster around a single NGO the entirety of the network will likewise become more dependent upon that NGO to gain access to any other NGO in the network thus rendering it more hierarchically structured. The more hierarchical the network is structured, the more effectively senior-level NGOs will be able to make use of the network to transmit new issues and engage in collective action because the top of the hierarchy will be less jumbled allowing lower-level NGOs to more easily identify shared turf with those above them rather than being concerned about competition with those at the similar levels. Issues having been more easily adopted in the more hierarchical network structure will then more easily allow NGOs to collaborate on projects regarding the new issue resulting in collective action because the structure again has facilitated the overlapping of shared goals and made incentives to collaborate more visible through the potential pooling of resources and the prospect of improving an organization's status.

Methodologically, I investigate two separate populations of NGOs operating at the international level in the European Union; environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) and social nongovernmental organizations (SNGOs). They are compared statistically from the start of the analysis as a source of variation in both the

extent to which characteristics of NGO populations are more or less centralized and the extent to which they are more or less hierarchically structured. Based on these variations, I then conduct a series of case studies to investigate differences in issue emergence and collective action between the two groups.

My research addresses some ambiguities that currently exist in regard to international NGOs and their networks. There is a considerable divide in methodological approaches to studying networks. On the one hand those that have studied them qualitatively have been criticized for failure to clearly identify all of the actors in the networks being studied (Ward *et al*. 2011) and basing their analyses on successful cases that make their theoretical arguments easily match hypotheses (Carpenter 2007b). On the other hand, quantitatively, they have been criticized for failure to address causal relationships (Kahler 2009), or mis-specifying hypotheses and causal mechanisms (Hafner-Burton *et al*. 2009). My research seeks to bridge this gap via a mixed method approach similar to Lieberman's (2005) *nested analysis*; employing statistical network analysis to test basic relationships and alternative hypotheses of the network actors and the collective as a whole, while conducting process tracing of six case studies of key NGOs from the ENGO and SNGO networks in order to more closely examine the intimate relationships shared among international NGOs and the causal mechanisms of issue emergence and collective action. The case studies follow emergence regarding *biofuels* in three networks in the ENGO population and *anti-discrimination* for three networks in the SNGO population, as well as collective action on these respective issues.

My research also addresses and tests propositions regarding the mechanisms of issue emergence, which to date have only been theorized, but have not yet been

empirically tested (*see* Carpenter 2007a, 2007b). Essentially, it has been argued that in order for emergence to occur, certain mechanisms must be triggered for each organization. Specifically, if an NGO does not share a similar turf as those other NGOs already advocating the issue, or if it conflicts with existing issues already being advocated or threatens resources that are meant for others, or if the issue frames do not define the problem and solutions to the problem the same, it will not emerge or will emerge differently (Carpenter 2007a). My research aims to test these mechanisms empirically in order to shed light on the process of how issues materialize and spread around the network.

Layout of the Thesis

The next chapter (Chapter 1) sets out my primary argument. It integrates a literature review within its broader goal of providing a causal explanation for how characteristics of NGO populations ultimately have an effect on issue emergence and collective action. Chapter 2 then outlines my hypotheses and methodological approaches to investigating the subject matter. What follows is a quantitative chapter (Chapter 3) which statistically analyzes the relationship between individual NGOs and their respective positions within the social hierarchies they are embedded in as well as tests the relationship between centralized populations and hierarchical network structures. A qualitative chapter (Chapter 4) then combines the results of process tracing for six case studies, taking three environmental networks and three social networks in comparison to test mechanisms of issue emergence and the relationship between hierarchical network structures and issue emergence and, consequently, issue emergence on collective action. Finally, Chapter 5 takes the results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis and discusses them in light of

the expectations gleaned from my hypotheses, and discusses the broader implications of the research as apply to future endeavors and academia more generally.

CHAPTER 1 – CAUSAL ARGUMENT

How do characteristics of NGO populations affect the ability of NGOs to initiate collective action on a new issue? My argument is rooted in a simple logic of network analysis; that characteristics of NGO populations based on centrality (mainly degree) share a direct and positive relationship with hierarchical network structures, based on betweeness. Degree is the central building block of power. An NGO with a high degree score has a greater potential of power among other NGOs in a population because it shares more connections with others (Lake and Wong 2009). Betweeness is the central building block of hierarchy. A higher betweeness score for an NGO relates to a higher place in the social hierarchy relative to other NGOs in the network structure (Murdie and Davis 2012). I therefore assert that a strong positive relationship exists between an NGO's number of connections to other NGOs and the tendency for other NGOs to then rely on that NGO to gain access to others in the population. Because centrality and betweeness are fundamentally related, I also argue that changes in characteristics of NGO populations, based on how *centralized* the population of NGOs is, lead to changes in how hierarchical the network structure is, because through increased centralization, the NGO at center is then more visible to a larger proportion of the population, thus creating a more vertical network structure. A visual representation of these relationships is demonstrated in **Figure 1.1**, where two levels of activity are occurring simultaneously, among individuals and between aggregate populations. At the individual level there is a relationship between degree centrality (i.e. the extent to which an individual NGO is more or less centralized than other NGOs) and betweeness (i.e. the extent to which an individual NGO is more or less senior in the social hierarchy), while at the aggregate

level there is a relationship between the centralization of a population as a whole and how hierarchically structured it is. The individual level allows understanding of variation within a population in terms of degree or betweeness, while the aggregate level allows understanding of variation between two populations or hierarchies. In combination degree centrality at the individual level and centralization at the aggregate level represent characteristics of NGO populations, while the combination of betweeness (position in the hierarchy) and hierarchical structure represents network structures.



Figure 1.1 - Characteristics of NGO Populations and Network Structure

Increases in hierarchical structure make emerging issues more visible because more NGOs have direct contact with the most senior NGO and therefore more NGOs will be less concerned about other NGOs occupying the same area of interest, because the relationship among NGOs is more vertical than horizontal, allowing for a greater amount of NGOs to adopt the issue. No single actor is influential enough to affect change in

targeted institutions on its own; therefore the prospect of joint pressure provides motivation for more senior NGOs to engage in collective action with other NGOs in the population. The logic of collective action expects that as the number of participants engaged in collective action increases there is greater need for a leader to provide some form of good (or incentive) for the others involved in order to avoid problems with freeriding and shirking (Willer 2009; Olson 1971). Here the collective good is the possibility of the desired outcome as relates to the issue at hand combined with the prospect of increased status and pooling of resources and capabilities, wherein less powerful actors participate in collective action in order to have access to the rewards of collective action. An increased number of NGOs already engaged in the issue simply enlarges the pool of potential participants, and as a result, allows for easier visibility of opportunities for collective action on the part of less powerful NGOs, which may increase their respective statuses and reduce overall costs through participation. Therefore, increases in issue emergence lead to more opportunities for collective action because there will more likely be more NGOs with shared goals, and because more NGOs will see incentives to pooling resources and capabilities, and incentives to increase their statuses. Therefore, as hierarchy is increased so too is the likelihood that NGOs will identify the issue and participate in collective action, the mechanisms of which I now turn to address.

Two sets of mechanisms link network structures to emergence and emergence to collective action respectively. In the first case, senior level NGOs in the social hierarchy will have an influence upon those lower down either by inspiring imitation or through direct negotiations, contingent upon other NGOs' areas of interest being similar (referred to as shared *turf*), on assuring the issue does not conflict with existing ones or allocation

of resources from the NGOs to them (referred to as *conflict* or *fit*), and to assure they are defined saliently with clear causal explanations as to the nature of a problem and proposed solutions for the problem (referred to as *salience*). More hierarchical network structures will more easily match turf, avoid conflict (or have a better fit), and increase salience, because as hierarchy is increased the flow of information in the network becomes less jumbled due to clarity of who the top NGOs are in the hierarchy, upon which they will base their evaluation of turf rather than relative to NGOs at similar levels in the hierarchy. Therefore, there is less confusion as to who the top NGOs are reducing the threat of turf wars. The other two mechanisms are dependent on activation of the turf mechanism. Less hierarchical network structures will encounter greater difficulty activating these mechanisms because there will be more turf wars, thus discouraging adoption.

Regardless of how powerful more senior NGOs are in a network, there are both institutional and practical barriers that require they seek others in order to lobby institutions or increase leverage through the weight of numbers (Zito and Jacobs 2009; Cullen 2005). For collective action it is necessary that *incentives* be provided to NGOs in order for them to cooperate. If these incentives demonstrate a greater cost then the perceived benefits to be gained through collective action, it will not occur. The incentives are shared common interests (i.e. goals), potential to pool resources and capabilities, and the potential to gain in status, both among network members and external to the network, as in the public eye or among policy makers. If the incentives are judged by NGOs to be deficient, collective action will be less likely, while if they are clear and demonstrate a greater benefit than cost it is more likely. Where issue emergence is increased, more

opportunities to participate in collective action will materialize because there will be more actors (NGOs) to which the issue will more clearly match organizational goals, and provide incentive in pooling resources and capabilities and improving status leading to a greater proportion of the population being engaged in collective action than if issue emergence is decreased.

In sum, I hold that changes in the extent to which NGOs are depended upon to gain access to other members of the population (i.e. betweeness) are directly associated with changes in the extent to which NGOs are more central than others in the network (i.e. degree centrality). Taken at the aggregate level, this means that increases in the centralization of NGO populations will lead to increases in hierarchical networks structures, resulting in a greater proportion of issue emergence among NGOs, and greater collective action. A schematic of this argument is provided in **Figure 1.2**, where variation in characteristics of NGO populations results in corresponding variation in network structures, and, as a result, a greater proportion of NGOs in a more hierarchical network structure is able to engage in the emerging issue via the emergence mechanisms, resulting in a larger pool of available NGOs subjected to mechanisms of collective action, and therefore greater collective action. NGOs that have failed in overcoming the mechanisms of issue emergence will not engage in collective action, while, likewise, NGOs that have failed in overcoming the mechanisms of collective action will not participate in collective action.

The remainder of this chapter deconstructs the argument to define concepts, explain the relationships between the variables, and elaborate on the causal mechanisms and their respective roles.



Figure 1.2 - Schematic of Causal Argument

1.1 Characteristics of NGO Populations and Network Structure

A complete body of individuals, whether people, organizations, or states, is a population. Populations, as such, are an aggregate form of representing and visualizing multiple individuals. In the context of this research, a population is characterized by the total number of registered organizations in the European Commission's Transparency Register (European Commission 2011), where any organization that engages or wishes to engage in lobbying EU institutions must be enlisted, and where these organizations are registered as *international* in jurisdiction and operation. Finally, a population is also defined by its fields of activity, where, in this research, these fields are in regard to, at a minimum, either environmental or social affairs, or both. NGOs can however be also registered as being active in additional fields, such as agricultural, economic, technology, or other

affairs. Therefore, a population is defined as a group of NGOs registered in a particular field of advocacy at the international level in the European Union.

The concept of characteristics of NGO populations is defined by the extent to which NGO populations exhibit the characteristics of centrality and centralization in two related ways; first, the extent to which individual NGOs are defined by their relationships to others NGOs explained by their centrality, and second, the extent to which a complete population is defined according to how centralized it is. Thus, a single NGO can be observed to see how central it is to the overall population, while two populations (or more) can be compared to see which one is more centralized, as is represented in **Figure 1.1**. As regards the individuals, I argue that increases in population centrality lead to increases in hierarchical betweeness. Actors are distinguishable at the individual level and their immediate relationships with others in the population are able to be measured based on *degree* and *eigenvector*[1] measures of centrality. While for the total population, a portrait of the aggregate is given, providing an explanation of how centralized the total is, and allowing for comparison across populations, rather than within them. Ideally, a more centralized population allows for a greater amount of control over the population by "[a] small number of nodes that are connected to a large number of other nodes that are not themselves highly connected" (Lake and Wong 2009, 129). Centrality and centralization therefore look at two levels – the individual and the aggregate – in order to describe characteristics of NGO populations. I now define and provide examples of these in turn.

[1] Degree and eigenvector are differentiated by the former representing the summed total of connections an NGO has to other NGOs in the population, and the latter representing the proximity of an NGO to well-connected NGOs. Degree centrality can also be regarded directionally, as in-degree and out-degree, defined below.

1.1.2 Population Centrality and Betweeness in Hierarchies

In attending to measurement of centrality among individual NGOs, two indicators are examined, *degree* and *eigenvector*. The *degree* through which a node is connected to others directly is measured as the sum of all ties a particular node has with other nodes (Jackson 2008; Knoke and Yang 2008; Murdie and Davis 2011). For example, in Hypothetical Network Population A of **Figure 1.3**, Node 5A has direct connections with twelve other nodes, while Node 2A has connections with only four. The former has a higher degree centrality (Degree = 12) than the latter (Degree = 4). One can actually count all the lines connecting node 5A to others, which is tedious, or one can refer to the assigned degree score in the corresponding table. Degree scores are calculated automatically by network software packages, such as Ucinet's NetDraw (Borgatti *et al*. 2002), expressed as whole numbers representing the number of ties a node has to other nodes. Taking the two hypothetical network populations together it is easy to see how two networks can differ among individual degree scores, even if they both have the same number of actors.

In addition to simple degree measurements, I consider a node's in-degree and out-degree score, which account for the number of directed ties made *to* a particular node from others (in-degree) and the number of ties made *from* a particular node to others (out-degree). Examples of these are also available in **Figure 1.3**, where node 5A has an in-degree score of 11 and an out-degree score of 3; meaning eleven nodes in the network have connected to 5A, while 5A has only connected to three other nodes. In-degree has been useful in political science network analysis to represent deference to knowledge or authority (Carpenter 2011), or the flow of resources, such as information, weapons, or

money (Hafner-Burton *et al*. 2009). Thus the prominence of a node may be measured by comparing in-degrees and out-degrees. It is not clear, in the literature at any rate, whether it is most advantageous to have a balanced number of in-degree and out-degree scores or high numbers of one or the other.

Eigenvector centrality is "[determined] by the organization's connection to other actors that are also central to the overall network" (Murdie and Davis 2011, 181). In this context, centrality is a product of how close an organization is to other well-connected organizations, represented mathematically in ratio form; thus any value is always between 0 and 1. Returning to **Figure 1.3**, Node 5A has an eigenvector score of .417, while node 2A has a score of .17; thus rendering the latter a lower score than the former. Borgatti *et al*. (1998) have determined that eigenvector is useful for studying interrelationships regarding increased social capital. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010) have noted its potential to assess state socialization through international organizations. Murdie and Davis, add that "[eigenvector] can be thought of as a measure of how important your 'friends' are in the network," thus explaining its utility. Therefore, a NGO with a high eigenvector score may be more likely to influence others through the ties it has to other well connected organizations allowing for the flow of information beyond the immediate reach of that individual organization.

The centrality of actors reflects their respective abilities to excerpt power and to influence over others (Johnson and Prakash 2007; Lake and Wong 2009). Carpenter (2011, 73) observes that relative power and influence are conferred upon some organizations to the detriment of some others. In essence, not every organization can be top dog. It is actors with higher degree centrality in a network that can be expected to

have greater power and influence over others. At the same time, some degree of deference is given to these more central actors by less central ones because at the end of the day organizations will jockey to be in good standing and closer than other organizations to a more central one. Thus, Carpenter (2011) and Lake and Wong (2009) note that organizations tend to follow a free-scale network pattern, where less powerful organizations will naturally try to connect with more powerful organizations rather than with other less powerful ones. Hypothetical Network Population B in **Figure 1.3** represents such a distribution, where the network more closely resembles the spokes and hub of a wheel. Of course social networks are rarely if ever so neatly arranged. However, the point is that as populations become more centralized they more and more begin to resemble this sort of pattern. It follows that an NGO that has high centrality will more likely influence others in the population than one that has low centrality because it is in a position of authority and because the constraints of the system cause those that are less central to try to align themselves with more central NGOs. Those that are less central (i.e. having low degree and eigenvector scores) tend to less and less be connected with others with similar degree scores, and more and more with those with higher scores. Lake and Wong (2009), Kahler (2009), and Carpenter (2011) rationalize this as a strategic decision by organizations based on attempts to maximize the potential benefits to be gained from being involved in a network. Here is where the logic of network structures begins to emerge in regard to hierarchy.

I argue that where NGOs increase the number of connections to others they also tend to be situated between more NGOs hierarchically. I define concept of hierarchy as the extent to which NGOs exhibit the characteristic of vertical stratification vis-à-vis each

other as measured by betweeness. As Hafner-Burton *et al.* (2009, 564) observe, betweeness "[corresponds] to the number of shortest paths in the network that pass through a particular node, [and] therefore it measures the dependence of a network on a particular node for maintaining connectedness." Thus, by studying the number of paths that pass through a particular node it is possible to gain an understanding of how crucially others will depend on it to gain access to other parts of the network. *Betweeness* scores are used to calculate where each organization is situated in the hierarchy. An organization that has a high betweeness score occupies a higher position in the hierarchy than one with a low betweeness score, and is therefore seen as more crucial to the flow of information or resources in the network (Murdie and Davis 2011, 192). As the total population is looked at, the various betweeness scores represent the respective position of each NGO within the hierarchy, or, in other words, the hierarchical distribution of NGOs in a single network.

Figure 1.3 also shows two hypothetical populations' betweeness scores. The first thing to note is that not all organizations are registered as being between any others, according to the definition given above, thus automatically have a score of zero. Moreover, it means they are at the bottom of the hierarchy. Recall the definition stipulates that the betweeness score is based on the number of *shortest* paths; thus, even though node 10B can be observed as being between nodes 13B and 6B, the shortest path from 13B to 6B is the direct tie the two nodes already share, thus ousting 10B from any betweeness standing. In Population B the top NGO is 14B with a betweeness score of 59, followed by 4B with a score of 21; ergo 14B is more senior than 4B.

I expect that when population centrality scores are increased, especially in regard to degree, betweeness will also be increased, because NGOs that are more central to the population will become more depended upon to gain access to other members in the network, thereby increasing their position in the hierarchy.



HYPOTHETICAL NETWORK POPULATION A

Node ID	Degree	In-degree	Out-Degree	Eigenvector	Betweenness
1A	4	0	4	0.2	0
2A	4	2	4	0.17	0.2
3A	8	1	7	0.327	2.117
4A	5	4	4	0.202	0.75
5A	12	11	3	0.417	14.067
6A	7	4	4	0.292	2.2
7A	12	10	6	0.417	14.067
8A	6	6	0	0.279	0.2
9A	7	4	4	0.292	1.25
10A	4	2	3	0.17	0.2
11A	4	1	3	0.2	0
12A	5	4	5	0.202	0.75
13A	6	3	5	0.279	0.2
Densities	5.46	3.00	3.00	2.15	1.77
Centralization	54.55%	27.08%	63.19%	32.73%	21.16%

HYPOTHETICAL NETWORK POPULATION B

Node ID	Degree	In-degree	Out-Degree	Eigenvector	Betweenness
1B	3	1	3	0.354	11
2B	1	1	0	0.212	0
3B	1	0	1	0.086	0
4B	3	1	2	0.267	21
5B	1	1	0	0.086	0
6B	1	1	1	0.114	0
7B	1	1	1	0.076	0
8B	1	1	1	0.212	0
9B	2	2	2	0.236	11
10B	2	2	1	0.326	0
11B	1	0	1	0.212	0
12B	1	1	1	0.212	0
13B	8	7	5	0.655	59
Densities	1.00	0.46	0.46	1.18	6.85
Centralization	59.09%	50.00%	31.95%	90.61%	36.81%

Figure 1.3 - Two Hypothetical Network Populations and their Respective Values. The networks on the left represent two distinct network populations with their respective centrality measures and centralization index scores in the tables to the right. Networks and values derived from UCInet NetDraw (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).

2.1.2 Centralization in Populations and Hierarchies

Degree, eigenvector, and betweeness scores are ideal for comparing individual actors within or between networks, but another way to look at the actors is to compare complete networks directly, which provides a generalized picture of each overall population.

Comfort and Haase (2006, 336) have observed that the less centralized the network is, the more loosely coupled it will be. For NGOs seeking to take control of the network or determine if an issue should be important to the others in the population, a more centralized population is therefore ideal because the actor or actors that occupy a more central position in the network will more easily be able to transmit a position or course of action, or at the very least will be more visible and likely to be imitated by others less central to the network. In looking at the aggregate of two populations, an instrument is necessary to establish to what extent either network is more centralized. A network centrality index does just this by assigning a value to the entire population of organizations based on the percentage of a network that is associated with the highest connected node. The higher the number of direct ties for the most central node, the higher the centralization index score will be for the whole population, indicating that it is more centralized. A perfectly free-scale network, where only one node is connected to all other nodes but no others are connected to each other, would have a centralization index score of 100%, while if all organizations only had one connection each, but no shared connections, there would be an index score of 0%, because no organization has more ties than any other. Networks of NGOs are not as crisply defined as these two extremes and it is therefore natural to find variation, as is the case for the hypothetical examples in **Figure 1.3.** Network analysis software is able to compute a network centralization index for all of the indicators listed above (degree, in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector), as well as for betweeness thereby providing an image of what is occurring at the network, or aggregate, level. This is the ideal measure to determine the extent of centralization and hierarchy for a whole network because its analysis is based on the degree or betweeness

score of the highest ranking actor. If *several* actors have high degree or betweeness scores, the index will indicate this by presenting a rather low score, signifying the possibility of discrepancies within the population or hierarchy. For political scientists, therefore, the possibility of conflict between high ranking NGOs represents a likelihood that there is confusion as to which NGO is more senior in the social hierarchy.

Figure 1.3 shows the centralization scores for degree, in-degree, out-degree, and betweeness. Taking betweeness as an example, the index scores are 21.16% for Population A and 36.81% for Population B; thus, Population A is less hierarchical than Population B because only 21.16 percent of Population A depends on the most central node to get to any other node in the network whereas in Population B 36.81 percent depends on the most central node to get to any other NGO in the population. I expect that when the degree centralization index is higher for an NGO population the betweeness centralization index will also be also be higher compared to an NGO population with a lower degree centralization index. Ergo, more centralized NGO populations are also more hierarchically structured, because centralization indexes for measures of centrality and for betweeness represent centralization of the population and hierarchical network structure, respectively.

2.2 Network Structures and Issue Emergence

There is a paradox that exists between network hierarchies and organizational hierarchies. Organizational theory expects that where an organization is more hierarchical, high ranking actors will be more able to excerpt control over others (Powell 2003). Thus, as actors higher up determine goals and address new issues, they are able to delegate to subordinates so that the organization moves in a particular direction. The

interconnections between actors within an organization (in terms of degree) can be controlled through adapting and regulating the organizational structure through its legitimate monopoly on power (Lake and Wong 2009; Powell 2003). For example, an organization may create divisions between departments and implement chain of command procedures, thus controlling the horizontal ties among actors which re-enforces the hierarchy. Networks between organizations behave differently because they are not contained within a single entity with a monopoly on power. All the organizations are autonomous and voluntarily connect with each other (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Lake and Wong 2009).

A less hierarchical network structure may be-riddled with conflict because the top of the hierarchy is more cluttered. There are a couple of explanations for why a cluttered hierarchy may be problematic. First, there is no legitimate source of control for a population of interconnected organizations; one organization cannot order another to do something. This is why Powell (2003) argues that network forms of organization are different than single hierarchical organizations as well as markets, which bind any two organizations through contracts. As Provan and Kenis (2008, 232) observe, "[Unlike] organizations, networks must be governed without benefit of [organizational] hierarchy or ownership." Organizations such as NGOs are not able to arbitrarily segment the population to limit the number of interconnections in the population. In less hierarchical network structures, there will likely be more organizations hanging around the top of the social hierarchy, but driving down the value of the hierarchy itself; all of which hold their own preferences as to what is important and what is less so. As such, those higher up have a tougher time controlling the interconnections between other organizations because

the hierarchy is flatter, and consequently other organizations gain in power and the overall efficiency of the network structure is compromised due to less clarity as to which organization ought to be followed over others. Therefore, decreased hierarchy may be problematic because it confuses the relative power of actors affecting the ability of the network itself to find consensus on any one issue.

A second, and more relevant, explanation is because the mechanisms of issue emergence become more difficult to trigger as more confusion exists over who is more senior to whom in the hierarchy. Following the work of Carpenter (2007a), a series of obstacles prevent organizations from automatically adopting new issues; namely, turf, conflict, and salience. I define *turf* as the operational scope within which an organization is active. For example, an NGO such as Greenpeace operates on a rather large turf because it is active in areas such as energy, biodiversity, agriculture, deforestation, and chemical control. An issue such as acid rain might easily fit its turf because of its concerns about chemical-particulate matter and dirty energy sources such as coal. Another organization concerned chiefly with deforestation in developing countries on the other hand may not hold acid rain to be something it needs to advocate about when its main concerns are things such as illegal logging, carbon fixing, and sustainable forestry practices. Its turf is therefore quite narrow compared to that of Greenpeace, and it may find difficulty seeing how acid rain is a relevant issue for it to engage in.

Turf wars are more likely to occur between organizations when a network is less hierarchical because of fears of redundancy and competition for donor funding (Carpenter 2007a, 658). Simply put, because a large amount of organizations share a large amount of ties, the odds are greater that NGOs will try to stake out a territory that is

very specific and reject new problems as not fitting within that territory. As Prakash and Gugerty (2010, 8) point out, "Advocacy organizations compete with actors that oppose their claims, with actors that advocate other claims, and with other organizations that stake out the same territory and compete directly for the attention of policymakers, publics, and donors." The territorial aspect here is significant. In a sense this is the same firm mentality that drives one hardware store to feel threatened by another one nearby. Thus, too many actors in the same area may constitute a threat rather than an advantage of being in a network. The result is that either the organizations specialize to be more identifiable to a particular niche of expertise, thereby narrowing their turf, or they avoid doing things in the network that would make them look redundant or that make a similar organization come across as better. In a more hierarchical network, there will be a greater tendency for NGOs to depend on only a few nodes or be contacted by only a few nodes higher up in the structure, signifying a more delineated flow of power. Consequently, it relieves some of the threat of turf wars because organizations are more vertically connected than they are horizontally. The mechanism of turf functions as a first step to dismiss or permit an issue from moving to the other mechanisms of issue emergence. If a problem does not fall on an organization's turf, it will not be considered and the issue will not move to the other two mechanisms, conflict and salience, and it will not be adopted.

Conflict relates specifically to how the new problem is seen as something that would cause conflict with existing issues because it does not fit with current stances or projects the NGO already holds or because it threatens to divert resources from existing ones (Carpenter 2007a, 659). For example, is acid rain something that would conflict or

compliment Greenpeace's current areas of advocacy? If the acid rain is seen as another potential tool in Greenpeace's arsenal for the regulation of chemical particulate matter coming from coal-fired plants, then Greenpeace will see a better 'fit' for adopting the issue. If the problem conflicts with existing issues or would divert funding in a way that is economically questionable, the problem will not be adopted as an issue.

Salience relates to the hard facts about the issue and the prospect of easily moving it around the network. Essentially, it is defined as how effectively the issue is conceptualized as a problem, wherein a causal link is clear and supported by expert or scientific opinion (Carpenter 2007a, 660). In the process of assessing the salience of an issue, organizations grapple with issue frames to look for clues that offer clarity of the extent, certainty, and tractability of the issue. Joachim (2007, 20) clarifies that there are three types of issue framing processes; diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. The first identifies the problem and the cause of the problem, such as realizing that sulphur dioxide is the primary contributing cause of acid rain. The second process identifies solutions to the stated problem, such as government bans or limits on sulphur dioxide emissions. The final process provides the reason why action ought to be taken toward fixing the problem, such as the threat acid rain itself poses to fish and wildlife or because it is something that resonates with an NGO's stakeholder group.

The three mechanisms – turf, conflict, and salience – act as hoop-tests along the way to issue emergence. All must be satisfied in sequence in order for an issue to emerge. It is expected that in more hierarchical network structures issue emergence will more easily occur because issues will less likely run into turf wars, conflicts with fit, and ambiguities in salience.

I define issue emergence as the extent to which NGOs have identified and accepted a problem at the international level as an issue within a network of organizations (Carpenter 2007b, 101). There are two dimensions to this definition therefore; how an NGO defines an issue, and whether or not it advocates it. The problem arises as the number of organizations with more connections to others closer to the top increases, rendering the structure less hierarchical and jumbled, which leaves greater room for turf wars and buck-passing, greater room for conflict over fit, and greater challenges in framing the issue saliently, thus inhibiting issue emergence. Encountering friction based on the mechanisms of issue emergence therefore makes the job of early proponents all the more challenging in less hierarchical network structures.

In sum, if a population is more centralized, there will be a more hierarchical network structure, which will facilitate issue emergence mechanisms being activated, allowing for greater issue emergence.

2.3 Issue Emergence to Collective Action

I believe that if issue emergence does not occur or is weak, collective action will not occur or will be weak because those NGOs that are not exposed to the issue will be less likely to participate in collective action due to ignorance. Warleigh (2000) and Zito and Jacobs (2009), writing on NGOs in the European Union, have both observed that collective action tends to occur on a more or less ad-hoc basis in response to a particular issue. For example, Zito and Jacobs (2009) explain how different groups converged and diverged in different combinations at multiple times over the development of European Union consolidated directives about chemicals, under the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) program. In addition, collective

action is a necessary part of the policy development process when lobbying many institutions around the world, such as the European Commission, which tends to recognize coalitions as opposed to singular NGOs that lobby institutions directly (Cullen 2005). What these and other authors hold in common is that issue emergence precedes collective action in the order of events. Collective action provides an opportunity to pool resources and capabilities in the pursuit of public goods (Willer 2009). Using Carlsson (2000, 509), I define collective action as the pursuit of "common interests" without a "formal organization." As opposed to a formal organization where hierarchy and rules are adaptable and the organization has a monopoly on power, collective action denotes something much less contained. According to Olson (1971), as group size grows, the ability to prevent shirking, defection, and freeriding decreases, requiring mandatory membership and the prescription of rules as incentive to remain in the group. Because of the voluntary nature of networks such measures are difficult to implement. At the same time organizations wishing to initiate collective action still want to mobilize enough actors to leverage targeted institutions because they want to throw weight behind the issue at hand. Participation in collective action is desirable for higher level NGOs simply because many institutions do not recognize singular NGOs, but rather grant audience to groups, as discussed above, and because a mobilized unit may send a stronger message and have a greater amount of leverage upon targets. Since NGOs operate on limited funding provided by grants and membership donations, there is incentive to pool resources and capabilities when goals converge in order to move toward a common objective. In short, NGOs need to cooperate if they expect to reduce expenditures and increase accessibility to institutions. In both more and less hierarchical networks,

collective action is a challenging endeavour but in more hierarchical networks the structure will be more directed (i.e. vertical) and collective action will be *less* challenging and elusive because more NGOs will have engaged with the issue itself allowing for a larger pool of NGOs that may be willing to engage in it.

Collective action does not arise willy-nilly but as a result of careful collaboration. NGOs look for signals as to if it is worth it or not to engage in it, which are common interests (e.g. goals and objectives), resources and capabilities (e.g. money, equipment, research etc.), and status (e.g. greater recognition among peers and publics) (Olson 1971, 60; Willer 2009, 24). As organizations engage in collective action, they therefore leave behind clues as to why they would do so in the first place based on these mechanisms. Common interests are easy enough to identify by noting organizational mission statements or areas of principle focus. For example, both AGE Platform Europe and Social Platform share common interests in anti-discrimination legislation, even though they represent different stakeholder groups; the former representing the elderly and the latter representing social advocacy organizations collectively. Sharing of resources and capabilities is most easily demonstrated in jointly published reports. For example, the European Environmental Bureau and Fondacion Biodiversidad jointly published the report *Building Green Infrastructure for Europe* (2008), in which they collaborated and pooled resources in order to come up with the report. On the other hand, some forms of collective action, such as joint letters or press releases, offer low cost solutions to increasing both exposure of the issue and the NGOs advocating it and therefore constitute a very low burden in terms of resources and capabilities. Finally, status is denoted through the deference one organization may give to another as a recognized expert,

trailblazer, or media-focal-point. Thus, in Green Eight's (2004, 32) report *Green Eight Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy*, it is reported, "[A Directive] for promotion of biofuels was adopted in 2003. However, the proposal was criticized by NGOs, including EEB and CAN Europe, as an agricultural subsidy that is likely to bring little or no environmental benefit since incentives are related to yields not quality." In this example, EEB (European Environmental Bureau) and CAN Europe (Climate Action Network Europe), are deferred to by Green Eight as being leading critics of this particular issue of biofuels. Yet, it is also possible to see the potential incentives for status based on the amount of exposure the form of collective action gains external to the group. For example, a joint publication may become a go-to source on a given issue on the World Wide Web, thereby increasing the status of the NGOs that wrote the report. Thus, the report Building Green Infrastructure in Europe, when dropped into a Google search engine in quotation marks, retrieves over 2,600 hits; something that may have been a worthwhile investment by the European Environmental Bureau and Fondacion Biodiversidad if it would raise their respective profiles.

In short, increases in issue emergence will lead to a greater proportion of NGOs participating in collective action on the issue because the issue itself is what draws NGOs together based on shared goals, incentive provided by the pooling resources and capabilities, and the prospect of gaining in status, both within and outside of the group. If there is less issue emergence, therefore, there will be fewer NGOs displaying the same shared goals, fewer NGOs to pool resources and capabilities with, and fewer opportunities for individual NGOs to improve their status within and outside the group, thus reducing the incentive to cooperate, ultimately resulting in less collective action.

Because degree and betweeness are connected, characteristics of NGO populations and network structure are inextricably tied. Organizations that have higher degree scores ultimately have higher betweeness scores while at the population level, more centralized NGO populations will also be more hierarchical network structured, because those NGOs that are most central to the population will also tend to be most senior in the hierarchy. As hierarchical network structure is increased so too is the proportion of NGOs demonstrating issue emergence with the same frames as the senior NGO because the structure allows for less turf wars, less conflict, and greater salience. As a result of increased issue emergence, there is greater incentive to act together in collective action because goals tend to overlap more on the issue, collaboration reduces production costs or lobbying expenses and allows for pooling capabilities such as different forms of expertise, and may improve or re-affirm the status of NGOs, thus providing incentive for collective action.

CHAPTER 2 – HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter has two main components, the first pertaining to hypotheses, and the second pertaining to the methodology designed to collect and assess the data used to test them.

2.1. Hypotheses

At the outset of the thesis I asked the question, *how do characteristics of NGO populations affect the ability of NGOs to engage in collective action on a new issue?* I then provided an argument that was devised to answer the research question, wherein it was explained that, first, the characteristics of NGO populations based on variation at the individual level within a population and between aggregate levels of two population would ultimately affect the extent to NGOs are situated between more NGOs in the social hierarchy at the individual level and are more hierarchically structured at the aggregate level. I then explained that as hierarchical structures are increased the number of organizations exposed to the more senior level NGOs in the hierarchy is also increased allowing for a greater number of NGOs to be subjected to the mechanisms of issue emergence and consequently a greater proportion of issue emergence. Finally, I explained that because the number of NGOs engaged in the issue is increased, there will be a greater potential for NGOs to identify more senior NGOs in the hierarchy with shared goals and identify opportunities to improve status and to pool resources and capabilities. Taken together, the argument represents a coherent chain of variables, which I now address in turn so that they may be tested empirically as a means of evaluating the overall argument.

The idea that characteristics of NGO populations can have an effect on issue emergence and collective action is contingent on two related notions. First, as an NGO makes more connections with other NGOs it is more likely to find itself between more NGOs as well, thereby establishing itself as more senior in the hierarchy. Second, NGO populations that are more centralized will result in more hierarchical network structures, thereby streamlining the network in a way that facilitates the flow of information. Thus, at the unitary level, NGOs that increase their connections will also increase their seniority, and at the aggregate level a group of NGOs that is overall more centralized will also be more hierarchically structured. The two notions are linked by different takes on the same measures; at the unitary level by degree and betweeness and at the aggregate level by degree and betweeness centralization indexes. Based on these two related propositions, I present the following two-part hypothesis:

> H1a – As an NGO makes more connections to other NGOs, measured in degree, it increases its chances of being between more NGOs, as measured in betweeness, and;
>
> H1b – Across NGO populations, increased centralization, as measured by a degree centralization index, is associated with increased hierarchy, as measured by a betweeness centralization index.

The hypothesis is falsifiable on two grounds. First, while controlling for other variables such as in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector, and others, *degree* must constitute a more significant and positive relationship with *betweeness* than any other variable; meaning as NGOs increase their individual degree centrality they also increase their position in the hierarchy. Second, it must be demonstrated that the NGO population which has a higher degree centralization index (i.e more centralized population) also has a higher betweeness

centralization index (i.e. more hierarchically structured). Failure to meet either or both of these criteria would result in rejection of the hypothesis.

Because I expect the extent to which a population is centralized is fundamentally associated with hierarchical network structures, I believe that they will have an impact on the extent to which issue emergence and collective action can occur. This is because both the characteristics of NGO populations and network structures themselves ultimately affect how easily senior network actors can be distinguished from ambiguous leadership and how easily a leader's message will be transmitted among the rest of the NGOs. I therefore expect that as the top NGO adopts a stance on an issue in a more hierarchical network, the issue will more easily fit within other NGOs' turfs, fit with other projects and campaigns, and hold the same diagnostic and prognostic frames which render the issue salient and allow it to emerge. Thus, I hypothesize that:

> H2 – Increased hierarchy is associated with decreased turf wars, conflict, and diagnostic and prognostic framing conflicts.

The hypothesis can be falsified in three ways; first, by indicating that the less hierarchical network allowed for a decrease in turf wars, conflict and framing conflicts; second, by observing that these mechanisms were not activated despite issue emergence occurring; or third, by observing all of the mechanisms activated but the issue not emerging.

I also expect that as hierarchy is increased, so too is the number of NGOs engaged in the issue. As such, I expect a direct relationship between increased hierarchy and increased proportions of issue emergence. Within the more hierarchical network stucture a greater proportion of NGOs will have adopted the issue than will be the case for a less hierarchical network. In less hierarchical structures the hierarchy is jumbled and there is

more ambiguity as to which NGOs are above which, which results in less issue emergence. I therefore hypothesize that:

> H3 – Increased hierarchy leads to an increased number of NGOs working on an issue as defined by the most senior NGO in the hierarchy.

Three kinds of outcome are possible for the hypothesis; either the issue emerges identically to the senior NGO, or it emerges with conflicting frames, or it does not emerge at all. Only the first instance will count as successful issue emergence. Two outcomes can lead to falsification of this hypothesis; if a greater proportion of NGOs in the less hierarchical network structure engage in the issue, or if the previous hypothesis has been falsified thereby demonstrating a break or discrepancy in the causal chain.

Next, I expect that issue emergence shares a direct relationship with mechanisms of collective action. As the sheer number of NGOs engaged in an issue increases, there will consequentially be more NGOs exposed to the mechanisms of collective action, which are common interests or shared goals and status and material incentives. I hypothesize:

> H4 – Increased issue emergence is associated with decreased conflicts in shared goals and incentives based on status and/or pooling of resources and capabilities.

This hypothesis can be falsified by demonstrating that collective action occurred in the absence of these mechanisms or by demonstrating that, in the population where there was less issue emergence, there were fewer problems with these mechanisms.

Finally, I expect that there is a positive relationship between increased issue emergence and increased collective action. Increased collective action is attained by virtue of the number of NGOs that have already engaged in the issue. If more NGOs have

engaged in the issue there will necessarily be more opportunities for NGOs to engage in collective action. Therefore, I hypothesize:

> H5 – Increased issue emergence leads to an increased number of NGOs engaged in collective action on the issue as defined by the most senior NGO in the hierarchy.

This hypothesis tests the proportional distribution of issue emergence and collective action. Any NGO (or group of NGOs) must have its/their name on any written content, be it a press-release, publication, letter, petition, or campaign alongside the most senior NGO in the network in regard to the issue at hand. The hypothesis can be falsified if there is a greater proportion of collective action among NGOs that had less issue emergence or if more collective action occurs in the absence of issue emergence.

Taking the three hypotheses together, the argument that characteristics of NGO populations ultimately effects issue emergence and collective action is tested both in terms of its causal chain as well as the mechanisms of issue emergence and collective action, which demonstrate where and how issue emergence and collective action have occurred or not.

2.2 Methodology for Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis

This research design is based on a nested analysis that on the one hand employs quantitative network analysis in statistically comparing centralized populations of NGOs and hierarchical networks structures in order to test several hypotheses, while on the other hand employing a qualitative process-tracing approach to investigating issue emergence and collective action among network actors, and the mechanisms that link them. I employ Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis framework which combines both methods to reinforce the strengths of each approach; namely, eliminating competing

hypotheses through the controlling of other variables through statistics, and allowing detailed qualitative assessment of causal mechanisms and instances of issue emergence and collective action through the process tracing of six NGO network case studies. There are two units of analysis: an individual NGO level, where each organization is looked at individually in relation to others, and the aggregate level, where centralization is compared across two populations in relation to network structure.

I choose social nongovernmental organizations (SNGOs) and environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) as the two populations compared statistically and in the case studies because they provide variation in my independent variable (IV) in the extent to which they are centralized. The former has a degree centralization index of 22.46 percent while the latter has a degree centralization index of 14.33 percent; thus the SNGO population is more centralized than the ENGO population. I base this approach of selecting cases based on variation in the IV on King *et al*.'s (1994, 137) notion that selection bias is reduced when cases are chosen for variation in the IV. Especially since the latter half of my research involves qualitative analysis, it is fundamentally important that there is variation between the two networks.

I confine my analysis strictly to organizations operating at the international level in the European Union (EU), with at least two member countries in the EU, and which have indicated they are active in the environmental or social arena, or both. These are the same criteria employed by the European Commission's Director General for the Environment in assessing applicability of EU funding (European Commission 2010). Both NGO populations are retrieved from the EU's Transparency Register[2], wherein all

[2] The European Commission's Transparency Register is a free online database where organizations, associations, unions, federations, registered networks, and other entities are registered and publicly listed as

organizations, think-tanks, associations, and federations are registered which have previously or in the future plan to lobby European Union institutions or apply for funding. The Register holds information about each organization including web-addresses, budgets, states that have members, organizational missions, areas of activity, and more (European Commission 2011).

The initial data set had all organizations dealing with an array of issues and thus had to be pared-down to the specifics of this research. After eliminating think-tanks, associations, and unions, from the ENGO and SNGO populations, the initial populations were 319 and 299 respectively. The web addresses of NGOs in each population were placed in Issue Crawler, an internet based algorithm that searches out links between any website. I used the *inter-actor* option which limits the analysis strictly to those organizations named in the list, and specified a crawl-depth of 3, which means the program searches up to and including linked pages in depth in within any website in the list (example: 'welcome' page to 'our contacts' page to 'our partners page.' On the one hand, this is helpful because many websites have different pages for different information, and often even more pages past the preliminary first page of any sub-section which means the model will go back and forth from the first page of the website to any other page within it that is no farther than two links away. On the other hand there is a risk that the crawl may not go deep enough and recover all the links. This technology is not readily available in other formats however[3]; therefore I simply acknowledge that

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being qualified to have lobbying capacity in European Union institutions (see European Commission 2011). It is also a repository of data about each entity, such as income, funding sources, contact information, location listings, and more. It can be accessed at the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do?stat=&categories=22&category_22_22=22&#searchResult%20

[3] The technology provided by Issue Crawler is unique. Some network analysis software allows for web-crawling (such as SocNetV), but the search parameters are even more limited than Issue Crawler.

there is a minimal chance that on a few websites the crawl will not retrieve all the web-links that are available. Issue Crawler provided me with a detailed list of NGOs that were connected, which is able to be looked at in network analysis software. I used Ucinet v6's Netdraw (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) to conduct the network analyses for both populations. In the end, 145 ENGOs and 119 SNGOs were shown to be connected within their respective networks.

2.2.1. Quantitative Statistical Analysis

I use ordinary least square (OLS) regression analyses for assessing the relationship between the number of connections each NGO has and how high each is be positioned in the hierarchy. I test the relationship between degree and betweeness, while controlling for in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector measures, as well as NGO Population type, number of different fields of advocacy, number of countries where people hold memberships, annual budget, and lobbying expenses. Each NGO has been coded with a dummy variable representing SNGOs (O) and ENGOs (1) in order to account for variation between the populations.

I run a series of OLS models to test different configurations of explanatory variables (i.e degree, in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector, and controls) and the dependent variable (betweeness). The first model is a regression based on raw data as derived from Ucinet v6. The second is a variation of the previous model where all data is converted to proportional values. The third and fourth models run the same data as the first and second models while treating degree centrality as the dependent variable instead of betweeness. Four more models run only the control variables against the DVs from the previous four models. Finally, a series of four models uses the same configurations as the first two

models however with two models dropping degree centrality and the other two dropping other measures of centrality but keeping degree.

At the population and network levels there is no statistical method for assessing direct relationships between population centralization and hierarchy, because these are only two populations whose values are derived from network analysis software. These values – or centralization indexes – explain the extent to which the totality of a network is dependent on the most connected NGO in the network for measures of degree, in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector, or betweeness, representing the aggregate total for each. To circumvent the fact that these indexes cannot be tested statistically, I have coded additional OLS regression models with weighted degree, in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector and betweeness scores according to their respective index scores as derived from Ucinet v6. In other words, by tying the centralization index scores directly to each individual NGO's measures of centrality (i.e. degree etc.) and betweeness, OLS regressions can then be run as a proxy for assessing whether or not the hypothesis regarding the more centralized population and hierarchical network structure can stand or is falsified. I can now run the same series of models as was performed for the previous series but with one important difference; all of the data are weighted according to centralization index scores. By observing the behaviour of the NGO Population dummy variable in response to the degree centralization and hierarchical betweeness, positive coefficients, respectively, would mean ENGOs are more centralized and more hierarchical while negative outcomes would mean SNGOs are more centralized and hierarchical. **Table 2.1** (***Centralization Index Scores for Weighting SNGO and ENGO Populations and Networks***) displays the centralization index scores for measures of

centrality and betweeness for both populations as retrieved from Ucinet v6's statistical output, which the weights will be based on.

Population	Degree	In-degree	Out-degree	Eigenvector	Betweeness
SNGO	22.46%	14.2%	22.03%	54.74%	22.54%
ENGO	14.33%	12.53%	9.75%	48.9%	4.17%

Table 2.1 Centralization Index Scores for Weighing SNGO and ENGO Populations and Networks

2.2.2. Qualitative Case-Studies and Process-Tracing

I perform a total of six comparative case studies via a method of process tracing in order to test the hypotheses regarding network structure, issue emergence, and collective action, as well as mechanisms of issue emergence. The sources of data are previously released publications, annual reports, press releases, blog entries, or website posts that NGOs themselves have made available on the World Wide Web. The case studies are designed to travel down the network by following the direct network of the most senior NGO in each network and two other NGOs directly connected to the senior NGO. I employ Mills method of difference to compare the more hierarchical network structure with the less, wherein I will process trace the evolution of issue emergence in each population for an issue that has already emerged. Essentially, what I do is follow an important issue from the top NGO in each population further down into each one's respective network for another two NGOs that are also rather high in the social hierarchy and are also enthusiastic about the issue (i.e. the issue is manifest multiple times on the NGO's website). The approach requires working backward from the top of the network downward in both populations, followed by further analysis of the next level down for two other organizations in the network of each top scoring NGO that also share the same issue. When three networks have been processed for each population, the results will be

pooled and analyzed in order to increase observations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Thus, three case studies per population and pooled data allow me to increase observations. Had I only investigated the top NGO in each population, I would not have had a very representative explanation of how others in the same population have also engaged in the issue however by increasing observations I see across a larger cross section of NGOs regarding issue emergence and collective action. Moreover, had I just looked at one additional NGO below the top NGO in the social hierarchy, there would have been an increased chance that some observations were more random than had I looked at two additional NGOs. Finally, by looking at two additional NGOs that are also highly interested in the issue at hand in both populations and also well connected, I am trying to hold constant as many factors as possible so that the pooling of data for each population will not give any advantage to either population other than those hypothesized earlier regarding network structure, issue emergence mechanisms, and issue emergence and collective action. In other words, it attempts to adhere as strongly as possible to Mills' method of difference by pooling the results from three case studies where all three top scoring NGOs have been treated the same. In order to compare case studies within populations and to also compare across populations (i.e pooled ENGO and SNGO case study results), I use proportional values[4] thereby controlling for population size variation.

Taking the top NGO in each hierarchy, based on its betweeness score, I will use all available resources on NGO websites to assess a) how each NGO in the top NGO's immediate network defines the issue b) whether the mechanisms of issue emergence have been triggered or not, and c) whether or not it has participated with the top NGO in

[4] Proportional values are derived by dividing the number of confirmed instances of issue emergence within a case-study or across the pooled population data by the total number NGOs in a case-study or pooled population, minus 1.

collective action, and if so when. Whenever website provide the date for which an NGO has first began advocating the issue along the same diagnostic and prognostic frames as the top NGO or when they have been mentioned as having been involved in collective action with the top NGO, the year and month will be recorded. The additional sets of case studies repeats the exact process for two NGOs below the senior, which are also senior in the hierarchy and are also strong advocates for the issue. Thus, in total there are two sets of three case studies, which will be pooled according to each population in order to increase observations.

In the ENGO population the top organization in terms of betweeness score was the European Environmental Bureau, with a score of 2513, while for the SNGO population, the highest betweeness score was 1819 for AGE Platform. The list of organizations directly affiliated with each top NGO is provided in **Table 2.2 (*Directed Networks of Most-senior NGOs, by Betweeness*)**, demonstrating their respective betweeness and degree scores. The lists are ranked from highest to lowest for each network.

Three important questions guided my search for matches in each issue area. First, I asked what the earliest reported date the top NGO was noted as taking a stance on the issue. Next, I asked what the earliest recorded date the NGO under observation was noted taking a stance on the issue. Finally, I asked where and when either of the two had participated together in collective action. I call this the *tic-tac-toe* method because it helps to establish the chronology of who got moving on the issue before whom. I also checked each NGO's website for cross referencing of each other's stances on the issue or involvement in collective action.

ENGOs			SNGOs		
Name	**Betweeness**	**Degreee**	**Name**	**Betweeness**	**Degreee**
eeb.org	2513	21	age-platform.eu	1941.896	30
greenpeace.org	1881.1	24	youthforum.org	1396.494	16
eufed.org	1223.8	2	edf-feph.org	1031.352	21
foeeurope.org	1199.3	19	enar-eu.org	918.742	18
seas-at-risk.org	1083.9	12	eapn.eu	738.869	16
anped.org	992	12	epha.org	728.787	18
usse-eu.org	880.8	3	coface-eu.org	517.419	8
wwf.eu	774.4	11	eucis-lll.eu	441.79	10
env-health.org	762.1	11	eurodiaconia.org	398.328	14
ifoam.org	735.2	6	womenlobby.org	231.527	9
anec.eu	596.3	4	eurochild.org	185.12	6
ecostandard.org	505.9	10	caritas-europa.org	160.482	7
natuurpunt.be	340.9	6	eu-patient.eu	152.883	8
pan-europe.info	306.1	7	eurohealthnet.eu	150.917	10
e3g.org	215.1	5	enna-europe.org	126.327	4
eaa-europe.eu	173.9	4	ilga-europe.org	90.362	7
arche-noah.at	144	3	euroblind.org	60.109	7
irfnet.ch	144	2	cev.be	57.554	6
green10.org	126	8	europeancancerleagues.org	44.146	5
mio-ecsde.org	126	8	hope.be	20.859	2
caneurope.org	16.95	17	cancernurse.eu	11.69	3
municipalwasteeurope.eu/	0	2	csreurope.org	11.327	2
			alzheimer-europe.org	8.619	4
			fundacionyuste.es	5.174	3
			efc.be	2.994	3
			autismeurope.org	2.333	3
			ecdl.org	0	1
			epda.eu.com	0	3
			esn-eu.org	0	2
			eufed.org	0	2
			fefaf.be	0	1

Table 2.2 - Directed Networks of Most-senior NGOs, by Betweeness. This table contains the organizations, by population, which have ties to the NGO in each population with the highest betweeness score, European Environmental Bureau and Age Platform.

The mechanisms of issue emergence are turf, conflict, and salience. For every match in discourse on the issue, which in the end is determined by diagnostic and prognostic issue frames, I take this as a sign that issue emergence has occurred. Proof of shared turf is acquired when it can be shown that at the time when the issue emerged the issue fit within the operational scope of the organization as demonstrated by comparison of mission statements, general principles, or areas of research and advocacy from NGO

websites. In addition, there must be proof that no conflict exists on the issue between the two organizations at the time the issue has emerged. This means the organization that is suspected of having adopted the issue must not have contradictory documents or be involved in campaigns that argue a contrary perspective to the top NGO in a given case study. If they do have conflicting documents and campaigns, they cannot have adopted the issue during the same time period. For example, an organization cannot take one stance on renewable energy that affirms the importance of using biofuels, while at the same time releasing a press-release that state that biofuels are harmful and should be avoided. Finally, issue salience will be evaluated to see if there are overlaps in shared language as regards issue framing. If organizations do not have similar frames, but indeed engage in the same issue, it may mean they have competing frames, and therefore the issue will not be seen as salient. Counterfactually, for organizations where issue emergence has not occurred, these mechanisms will nonetheless be assessed to locate the most likely stage at which the issue has faltered; if an issue has not been adopted, one of these mechanisms must be able to explain why it was most likely. NGOs that have do not demonstrate issue emergence, as per the criteria above, will be designated 'failed', indicating non-emergence. This does not mean they have failed in any normative sense, but rather the term is simply used to easily distinguish between those that have shown issue emergence and those that have not.

In all investigations any stated partnerships, collaborations, coalitions, moral support for campaigns, monetary contributions, shared resources, or shared research will be looked at to confirm the presence of collective action. Since the medium I am assessing is web-content, I can only realistically take public-statements from websites,

group press-releases, joint publications or research, or co-authored or co-signed letters of petition as observable forms of collective action. In addition, though collective action is subject to a law of diminishing returns as the number of participants increases, this deceleration in progress is likely to have an effect on the outcome of collective action and is therefore less of a concern for my investigation because I am focussing on what leads to collective action (as a dependent variable), as opposed to what collective action results in (as an independent variable). Consequently, I am only concerned with this law of diminishing returns in as much as it is avoided through the identification of incentives, as others have done when focusing on collective action as a dependent variable (see for example Siegel 2009, 124). These forms of collective action must explicitly relate to the issue at hand or involve the issue within a larger discourse, such as a section in a joint-report. Its mechanisms will also be tracked, which are incentives based on common interests (i.e. shared goals), pooled resources and capabilities, and status. Shared goals will be determined via the stated positions of NGOs about area in which the issue pertains. Thus, an NGO may have shared goals with a senior NGO in a network about improving biodiversity and reducing deforestation, while in another network an NGO may have shared goals with a senior NGO in a network about accessibility of a minority group to goods and services. For material incentives such as pooled resources and capabilities, NGOs must be shown to have being able to benefit from collaboration in a way which would lead to a reduction in cost. Here the emphasis is on burden sharing; if it can be shown that two or more NGOs pooled resources resulting in a reduced cost, or if it can be shown that participating in a low cost effort, such as a petition or group letter, then the mechanisms will have been satisfied. Finally, if it can be shown that the collaboration

resulted in greater visibility of the group or particular members or if members of the group signal deference toward others within the group, the criterion of status will have been met. A tally will be kept of where collective action has occurred and where it has not, while specifying the absence or presence of the mechanisms of collective action. Absence of collective action will be noted as *failed*, as was the case for issue emergence. The same counterfactual logic will also be used for mechanisms of collective action, wherein, in the absence of these mechanisms, there should not be collective action.

In the end I will have a list of all of the NGOs in each of the six case-studies that have signalled issue emergence and all the organizations that have engaged in collective action, from which to draw the proportions of each population that have done either or both of these things. Each list will also contain the organizations that did not have issue emergence or collective action. An aggregate is then made of all three case studies on both sides (i.e. all ENGOs and all SNGOs grouped) representing the total distribution of issue emergence and collective action in each combined population. These proportions will test the relationship between network structure and issue emergence and collective action.

2.3 Time is of the Essence

Indeed there are two dimensions to the time frame of this research that require address. First, there is likely a difference between network compositions that are derived from Issue Crawler, which only captures networks as they currently are, and network compositions at the time that issues have begun to surface within each network. This gap is openly acknowledged here as a potential problem in inferring relationships. However, the shortcoming is tempered to some extent by the time line provided by the qualitative

process tracing employed to scour each network. The process tracing will establish a timeline of issue emergence and collective action, thus providing a nuance to the initial network structures provided by Issue Crawler.

Second, how for back is far enough? Preliminary findings suggest that for both issues in the ENGO population, discourses on the Energy Efficiency Action Plan and on biofuel regulation only go back to the years 2004 and 2000, respectively, while for the SNGO population's work on discrimination and austerity date to about 2002 and 2009, respectively. In short, the time frame has been established. Moreover, since I am studying variation between two populations and not variation over time, timeframe is less significant to the causal story, as I am emphasizing cumulative proportions in each population.

CHAPTER 3 – STATISTICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS RESULTS

This chapter takes the two parts of my primary hypothesis in separate sub-sections followed by a brief review of the key findings. The ordinary least square (OLS) regressions used a total of 261 NGOs, with 143 ENGOs and 118 SNGOs.

3.1 NGO Connections and Hierarchical Position

The first part of my primary hypothesis expected that there would be a relationship between the number of connections NGOs had, based on degree, and the number of times other NGOs would need to pass through that NGO to access any others in the network, based on betweeness. Thus, the more central an NGO is to the population the more likely it will also occupy a higher position in the social hierarchy. Statistical findings are presented in **Table 3.1** (***Different Model Iterations of OLS Regressions***). I expected that degree would share the strongest positive relationship with betweeness, and as the results of Model's I and II demonstrate, this is certainly the case. Measures of significance indicate that the likelihood that Model I and Model II's findings for degree centrality would not reject the null hypothesis is less than 1 percent; meaning the relationship is significant. Moreover, the standardized coefficients indicate the relationship is positive; 1.463 (SE[5] 16.09) for Model I and 1.299 (SE .304) for Model II. Recall that Model II had based the values for each indicator in proportion to the sum total of the entire population, thereby reflecting the share each NGO had for a given indicator within its population. Proportionally speaking therefore, due to the low standard error of Model II, the positive relationship of degree is striking at 1.299; particularly since in-degree and out-degree do not register as statistically significant at all and eigenvector shares a negative

[5] SE stands for Standard Error.

relationship. Therefore, as NGOs increase the number of connections they have, they also increase the extent to which other NGOs will rely on them to gain access to any other NGO in the network; thus, increases in the number of connections lead to increases in the likelihood of holding a higher place in the social hierarchy. In-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector do not share such a relationship with betweeness because, in the first place, for Model I, out-degree shares a negative relationship with betweeness (-.252, SE 10.49) with a measure of significance of 90 percent, while at the same time in-degree does not even score register as significant. In addition, neither scores as significant in Model II. Eigenvector shares a negative relationship with betweeness in both models, with levels of significance of less than one percent probability that the null hypothesis stands regarding the relationship between eigenvector and betweeness. Thus, the only positive relationship that is statistically significant so as to reject the null with 99 percent confidence is degree. Secondly, when degree is switched with betweeness in the models, as in Models III and IV, in order to test for reverse causality, the remaining measures of centrality all have positive relationships with degree centrality. Further they are all statistically significant as to the probability with which the outcome is not the null hypothesis. In addition, though degree has a strong relationship with betweeness (Models I and II), betweeness does not have such a strong relationship with degree (Models III and IV), meaning the relationship is likely directional from degree to betweeness rather than inverted or reciprocal. Moreover, no other explanatory variable had any significant bearing on betweeness, but they did have very significant and rather uniform effects on degree, suggesting that degree is affected by in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector more than it is affected by betweeness.

		Betweeness DV		Degree DV		Betweeness DV		Degree DV	
	Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model V	Model VI	Model VII
Model I	Degree	1.463*** (16.087)							
	In-Degree	-.078 (12.087)							
	Out-Degree	-.252* (10.494)							
	Eigenvector	-.401*** (403.167)							
Model II	Degree II		1.199*** (.304)						
	In-Degree II		108. (.139)						
	Out-Degree II		.04 (.124)						
	Eigenvector II		-.513*** (.086)						
Model III	Betweeness			.115*** (0)					
	In-Degree			.413*** (.026)					
	Out-Degree			.376*** (.021)					
	Eigenvector			.225*** (.1.231)					
Model IV	Betweeness II				.126*** (.011)				
	In-Degree II				.413*** (.016)				
	Out-Degree II				.377*** (.014)				
	Eigenvector II				.214*** (.015)				
Controls	NGO Population	0.192*** (24.724)	.035 (0)	0.0 (.094)	-.011 (0.0)	0.145*** (4.346)	-0.020 (.0)	-.085 (.551)	-.059 (.001)
	Fields of Advocacy	-.08 (1.694)	-.001 (0)	-.007 (.006)	-.008 (0.0)	0.026 (2.968)	.043 (.0)	.007 (.038)	.005 (0.0)
	Member States	.053 (1.103)	.037 (0)	.002 (.004)	.005 (0.0)	0.206** (1.944)	0.198** (.0)	.173*** (.035)	.173*** (0.0)
	Annual Income	.051 (5.743)	-.051* (0)	-.001 (.021)	-.001 (0.0)	0.144* (10.139)	0.136** (.0)	.102* (.128)	.103* (.094)
	Lobby Expenses	-.06 (5.843)	-.059* (0)	.007 (.021)	.008 (0.0)	0.092 (10.247)	0.096 (0)	.183** (.130)	.094*** (0.0)
	R Square	.72	.80	.98	,98	.1	.09	.1	.1

Table 3.1 - Different Model Iterations of OLS Regressions

N=261, df = 9 for Models I through IV; df = 5 for models V through VIII. Values provided as standardized coefficients. *Levels of Significance: *p > 0.10; **p > 0.05; ***p > 0.01.*

Values in brackets represent Standard Errors. Models II, IV, and VIII use proportional data; Models I, II, V, and VI use betweeness as the DV; Models III, IV, VII, and VIII use degree as the DV.

Most control variables are inconsistent across the models in regard to the confidence with which the outcome does not uphold the null hypothesis except when all other variables are dropped from the analysis (Models V through VIII). Across all four models, there is a consistently positive relationship between the number of countries that have members in the NGO (i.e. 'Member States' in the table) and increased betweeness, with the confidence intervals ranging from 90 to 95 percent. Annual Income also shares a positive relationship with betweeness across Models V through VIII, but also with some variation in their confidence intervals. Thus, there is a connection between increased membership countries and betweeness as well as increased budget size and betweeness.

As NGOs have more membership countries and as they have larger budgets they tend to be higher in the social hierarchy.

3.2 Aggregate Analysis of Centralization and Hierarchical Network Structures

I had hypothesized that across NGO populations, increased centralization is associated with increased hierarchical network structures. In other words, the more centralized an NGO population is, the more hierarchically structured the network will be. **Table 3.2** (***Different Model Iterations for OLS Regressions with Weighted Scores***) displays the statistical output of the OLS regression models used to test this part of the first hypothesis (H1b).

There is much reason to confirm the hypothesis based on the direct relationship between degree centralization and hierarchical network structures and based on observation of the NGO population variable to determine that one population was in fact more centralized and more hierarchical than the other. In the first place, as Models I and II demonstrate, centralized degree shares a positive relationship with hierarchical network structure (as measured by the centralized betweeness variable), at 1.2 (SE 7.84) and 1.275 (SE .23), respectively. Both models have confidence intervals of greater than 99 percent, meaning that there is less than a 1 percent chance that the null hypothesis should have been rejected for either model in regard to centralized degree. The same models reflect a negative relationship for centralized eigenvector in (-.533 SE 73.52) and (-.582 SE .03), at 99 percent significance. Further, though a positive relationship exists between centralized out-degree and centralized betweeness in both models at .154 (SE 5.57) and .136 (SE .11), respectively, both are statistically less significant than centralized degree.

Therefore, there is a clear and positive relationship between the extent to which a population of NGOs is centralized and the extent to which the network is hierarchically structured.

In the second place, the NGO population variable is able to explain which population was more centralized and which population was more hierarchical. Recall that the NGO population dummy variable was coded as follows: SNGOs "0" and ENGOs "1". Across Models V and VI, there is a clear negative relationship between NGO population and centralized betweeness; -.216 (SE 603.69) and -.226 (SE .03), respectively. Both models indicate that there is less than a 1 percent probability that either null hypothesis should not have been rejected. Therefore, SNGOs share a stronger relationship with centralized betweeness than ENGOs, at a difference of at least .216 standard deviations from the mean centralized betweeness score. Further, inverting the models, as in Models VII and VIII, so that centralized degree becomes the dependent variable, demonstrates that the relationship between NGO population and degree centralization is also negative; -.254 (SE 10.8) -.235 (SE .02), respectively. These two models are also statistically significant in regards to the confidence placed in rejecting the null with a probability of less than 1 percent that it should not have been rejected. Thus, the SNGO population also is more strongly related to centralized degree than the ENGO population by at least .235 standard deviations from the mean centralized degree score. The SNGO population is both more centralized and more hierarchical than the ENGO population.

In sum, while Models I and II demonstrate that centralized populations share a significant and positive relationship with hierarchical network structures, Models V through VIII demonstrate that SNGOs are more centralized and more hierarchical.

Therefore, increases in population centrality lead to increases in hierarchical networks structures, and SNGOs are both more centralized and more hierarchical.

		Centralized Betweeness		Centralized Degree		Centralized Betweeness		Centralized Degree	
	Variable	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII	Model VIII
Model I	Centralized Degree	1.2*** (7.841)							
	Centralized In-Degree	.043 (8.64)							
	Centralized Out-Degree	.154** (5.567)							
	Centralized Eigenvector	-.533*** (73.52)							
Model II	Centralized Degree II		1.275*** (.231)						
	Centralized In-Degree II		-.039 (.151)						
	Centralized Out-Degree II		.136* (.107)						
	Centralized Eigenvector II		-.582*** (.026)						
Model III	Centralized Betweeness			.180*** (0.0)					
	Centralized In-Degree			.341*** (.043)					
	Centralized Out-Degree			.331*** (.028)					
	Centralized Eigenvector			.250*** (.479)					
Model IV	Centralized Betweeness II				.190*** (.013)				
	Centralized In-Degree II				.347*** (.024)				
	Centralized Out-Degree II				.349*** (.018)				
	Centralized Eigenvector II				.234*** (.006)				
Controls	NGO Population	.060** (273.224)	.019 (.016)	-.034*** (1.479)	-.042*** (.004)	-.216*** (603.688)	-.226*** (.033)	-.254*** (10.804)	-.235*** (.02)
	Fields of Advocacy	.007 (17.926)	.010 (.001)	-.004 (.127)	-.005 (0.0)	.058 (41.225)	.060 (.002)	.019 (.738)	.018 (.001)
	Member States	.014 (11.697)	.001 (.001)	.008 (.083)	.012 (0.0)	.158** (140.822)	.141* (.001)	.165 (.483)	.167*** (.001)
	Annual Income	.043 (60.877)	.039 (.003)	-.002 (.435)	-.001 (.001)	.103 (140.882)	.091 (.008)	.091 (2.52)	.093 (.005)
	Lobby Expenses	-.051* (61.883)	-.045* (.004)	.006 (.443)	.006 (.001)	.084 (142.316)	.091 (.008)	.171*** (.171)	.174*** (.005)
	R Square	.84	.83	.98	.98	.12	.13	.16	.15

Table 3.2 - Different Model Iterations of OLS REgressions with Weighted Scores
N=261, *Levels of Significance: *p > 0.10; **p > 0.05; ***p > 0.01*
Models are weighted for degree, in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector, and betweeness according to assigned centralization index scores. Models II, IV, and VIII use proportional data in combination with weighted scores. Models I, II, V, and VI use weighted-betweeness as DV; Models III, IV, VII and VIII use weighted-degree as the DV.

3.3 Summary of Findings

OLS regression models demonstrate that, as regards the first half of the hypothesis, indeed, as an NGO increases its connections to other NGOs, as measured in degrees, it does increase the chances being between more NGOs, as measured by betweeness. In all models where it appeared, degree shared the most robust positive relationship with betweeness compared to other explanatory variables. Further, when the models were inverted, to place degree as the dependent variable and betweeness as an explanatory

variable, results indicated that other measures of centrality had a closer and positive relationship with degree than they did when betweeness was the dependent variable. Thus, other explanatory variables do not have as strong a bearing on betweeness, if any at all. The extent to which an NGO is more or less central to a network, therefore, is the most significant determinant as to where it will end up in the social hierarchy.

Evidence from other OLS regressions also demonstrate that across NGO populations, increased centralization, as measured by a degree centralization index, is associated with increased hierarchy, as measured by a betweeness centralization index. It was shown that the SNGO population both has the strongest relationship with centralized populations as well as with hierarchical network structures compared to ENGOs. Thus, SNGO populations are more centralized and more hierarchical, and, in addition, increases in centralized populations lead to increases in hierarchical network structures.

Having located statistically the more hierarchical network structure as SNGOs and the less hierarchical structure as ENGOs, the next chapter takes these distinctions as the starting point for the qualitative case studies conducted on six NGOs.

CHAPTER 4 – QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENGO AND SNGO NETWORKS FOR ISSUE EMERGENCE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

This chapter unravels environmental nongovernmental organization (ENGO) and social nongovernmental organizations (SNGO) networks comparatively to analyze how the different network structures, as less hierarchical and more hierarchical, effect issue emergence and its mechanisms, and subsequently collective action. Three case studies have been performed for each population, beginning with the highest ranked NGO in each hierarchy, followed by two lower NGOs in each population that have been directly connected to the highest ranking one. In total, therefore, there are six case studies presented here – three for the ENGO population and three more for the SNGO population – which have been shown in the previous chapter to be less-hierarchical (ENGOs) and more-hierarchical (SNGOs). The NGOs observed were European Environmental Bureau (EEB), Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth Europe (FOE Europe) for the ENGO population, and AGE Platform, European Network Against Racism (ENAR), and European Youth Forum (EYF) for the SNGO population.

Two issues were assessed each for EEB and AGE Platform in order to determine which of the two was most prevalent in each of these NGO's direct networks. In the EEB's network seven NGOs engaged in the issue of dissent over the European Energy Action Plan (EEAP) while nine NGOs engaged in the issue of biofuels. I therefore conduct the case studies for the additional two ENGOs examined below based on the issue of biofuels. A clear overview of the issue is provided in the sections to follow. As for AGE Platform, the two issues initially examined were in regard to anti-austerity criticisms and anti-discrimination legislation, the latter of which had a far greater

resonance within AGE Platform's network than the former at a difference of seventeen to twelve. Case studies are therefore conducted for ENAR and Youth Forum in regard to the issue of anti-discrimination legislation, which is also outlined further below.

Specifically the case studies follow the issue as it has emerged within each NGO's direct network and though each case study is assessed in regard to issue emergence and collective action, I also pool the results for all three ENGOs and all three SNGOs in order to have a larger number from which to draw inferences. Thus, pooling the results allows for a larger abstraction of each network to be looked at on a larger scale. The directed networks of all six case-studies are summarized in **Table 4.1** (***Summary of ENGO and SNGO Directed Network Case Studies***).

In order to demonstrate how the mechanisms of issue emergence and collective action have been triggered or not and which ones, I have provided an example each of emergence and non-emergence for each of the six NGOs assessed in each population. These cases are examples drawn from the complete network of NGOs directly connected to each NGO being studied in a given case study. They demonstrate how mechanisms have been activated and are not to be looked at as examples of variation between ENGOs and SNGOs. The overall results of the case studies will be used to determine variation in the two combined sets of case studies.

Taking the two populations separately, I begin by outlining each issue as it has evolved, followed by the three examples of emergence and non-emergence and collective and non-collective action for the top ENGOs and SNGOs used in the case studies. Next, I pool the details from each case study into two sets of aggregate data on ENGOs and SNGOs, which I compare. Finally, I discuss the overall results in light of my

hypotheses[6].

ENGO Networks				SNGO Networks	
eeb.org	**greenpeace.org**	**foeeurope.org**	**age-platform.eu**	**enar-eu.org**	**youthforum.org**
anec.eu	anped.org	acleu.eu	alzheimer-europe.org	aedh.eu	age-platform.eu
anped.org	bankwatch.org	anped.org	autismeurope.org	age-platform.eu	ceji.org
arche-noah.at	caneurope.org	arche-noah.at	cancernurse.eu	caritas.de	cev.be
caneurope.org	chemtrust.org.uk	bankwatch.org	caritas-europa.org	ceji.org	crdm.cz
e3g.org	corporatejustice.org	caneurope.org	cev.be	eaea.org	ecas-citizens.eu
eaa-europe.eu	eaa-europe.eu	chemtrust.org.uk	coface-eu.org	eapn.eu	enar-eu.org
ecostandard.org	eeb.org	corporatejustice.org	csreurope.org	ecre.org	esn.org
env-health.org	europe.birdlife.org	ecostandard.org	eapn.eu	edf-feph.org	eucis-lll.eu
eufed.org	foeeurope.org	eeb.org	ecdl.org	epha.org	eufed.org
foeeurope.org	fsc.org	env-health.org	edf-feph.org	eurodiaconia.org	europe.wagggsworld.org
green10.org	green10.org	green10.org	efc.be	eurohealthnet.eu	federalists.eu
greenpeace.org/eu-unit	inforse.org	greenpeace.org	enar-eu.org	feantsa.org	flarenetwork.org
ifoam.org	mio-ecsde.org	ifoam.org	enna-europe.org	ilga-europe.org	ifm-sei.org
irfnet.ch	natuurpunt.be	mio-ecsde.org	epda.eu.com	irct.org	ilga-europe.org
mio-ecsde.org	oceana.org	natuurpunt.be	epha.org	picum.org	jef.eu
municipalwasteeurope.eu	rototomsunsplash.com	pan-europe.info	esn-eu.org	womenlobby.org	mijarc.info
natuurpunt.be	seas-at-risk.org	slowfood.com	eucis-lll.eu	youthforum.org	
pan-europe.info	shipbreakingplatform.org	transportenvironment.org	eufed.org		
seas-at-risk.org	theicct.org	wwf.eu	eu-patient.eu		
usse-eu.org	transportenvironment.org		euroblind.org		
wwf.eu	unpo.org		eurochild.org		
	wecf.eu		eurodiaconia.org		
	wwf.eu		eurohealthnet.eu		
			europeancancerleagues.org		
			fefaf.be		
			fundacionyuste.es		
			hope.be		
			ilga-europe.org		
			womenlobby.org		
			youthforum.org		

Table 4.1 - Summary of ENGO and SNGO Directed Network Case Studies
The table presents an overview of the various NGOs directly connected with each senior NGO located at the top of each column. The networks are as derived from Issue Crawler, hence the web addresses rather than proper names. There are three lead organizations for ENGOs and three more for SNGOs, indicated in bold.

4.1 The ENGO Networks and Biofuels

The idea that *biofuels* are wrought with conflict may appear, at first blush, counter intuitive. After all, biofuels were expected to be the great savior; offering a reasonable and cost effective alternative to fossil fuels and the benefit of fewer carbon emissions. In reality, ENGOs have been suspicious of the potential costs and benefits for some time.

[6] Complete lists for assessments of mechanisms of issue emergence for all NGOs are available in full detail in *Appendix B* (*ENGOs and Issue Emergence*) and *Appendix C* (*SNGOs and Issue Emergence*), respectively.

An evolving discourse has been in effect at least since 2001, wherein the problem of biofuels and proposed solutions can be seen as emerging over three distinct waves since then. In my analysis I focus on the third – and most significant – wave, but before doing so, I will provide a brief overview of the earlier evolutions.

In 2001, the European Commission announced plans to institute a biofuels directive on the transport sector in the EU (European Commission 2001). The first wave of issue emergence was in direct response to this move and subsequent directive-drafts by the EC. It begins with a letter addressed to all Commissioners by a triad of NGOs composed of Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe), Transport and Environment, and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature Europe (WWF) (see CAN Europe *et al*. 2001), and also a report by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) (see EEB 2002) and supplementary analysis commissioned by the EEB (see Jonk 2002). In all three documents biofuels are characterized along three problem dimensions; first, not all biofuels are created equal; second, the complete life-cycle of production is not taken into account when calculating emissions; and third, the pursuit of agricultural expansion on "set aside" land in addition to food-stuffs on existing land may counteract any positive effects of biofuels. The solutions proposed by these ENGOs, in the same documents, were to stop treating all biofuels as equal and account for differences of emission savings for different crops, to encourage calculations that include emissions from farming technology, fertilization, and pesticide use, and to discourage agricultural expansion. Concern was also raised over excised tax rates which would be viewed as a subsidy encouraging quantity of production over quality (Green Eight 2004, 32). There were very few ENGOs engaged in the issue during this phase, largely due to lack of issues fitting

into turf and ambiguities in problem definition and framing which encouraged other NGOs to leave the matter in the hands of those already involved. The turf issue would not begin to be resolved until the second wave, when the discourse expanded and the problem definition, reflecting the expanded discourse, was able to apply to more NGO's and therefore be more easily framed. The first wave lasted from 2001 to 2005, where the second wave began to build.

The second wave began in 2005 and is observable because it preserved the discourse of the first wave but added a geographic and social dimension; specifically, socio-economic impacts on developing countries that would export to the EU (*see for example* WECF 2005; EEB 2006; Spangenberg 2008). The expansion of the geographic context of the problem to countries outside of the EU and pointed criticism at the socio-economic impacts of biofuel production in those countries had the effect of expanding the problem definition sufficient enough to fit within more ENGOs' respective turfs. Moreover, critical reports released by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (see Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007) and World Bank (World Bank 2008), added salience to the issue, making it more easily adoptable. During the second wave 13 out of 37 ENGOs across all three networks looked at in this analysis had adopted the issue, compared to only 5 during the first wave. The second wave lasted from mid-2005 through 2008, with some overlap with the beginning of the third wave.

The third wave saw an overhaul of the problem definition by introduction of the concept of *indirect land-use changes* (ILUCs); a concept which sought to quantify the impact of biofuel production in a holistic manner with the combined consideration of complete life-cycle analysis from farm to vehicle, agro-fuel subsidy impacts, emissions

due to agricultural expansion, deforestation, or conversion of wetlands, and socio-economic impacts within and outside of the EU *(see for example* Natuurpunt 2007; Green 10 2009; EEB 2009; IFOAM-EU 2011). In other words, the third wave sought to combine all aspects of previous problem definitions under one coherent and quantifiable concept. A common conclusion therefore was that when all of these aspects are combined, biofuels overall present a rather detrimental effect to the environment and global society rather than a benefit.

Figure 4.1 (***Issue Emergence in ENGO Combined Case Study Networks***) displays all NGOs that shared the same issue as EEB, while **Figure 4.2** (***Collective action in ENGO Combined Case Study Networks)*** displays the distribution of collective action among NGOs. On the right of each network graph is a list with the NGO website names that corresponds to the node numbers in the graphs. In both network graphs the networks from all three ENGO case studies are combined. In subsequent discussions when I refer to different ENGOs I will do so by also indicating the node number in brackets, so that they can be easily located in the diagrams.



Figure 4.1 - Issue Emergence in ENGO Combined Case Study Networks.
Issue emergence is indicated by NGOs shaded in light green, while those in orange represent the three NGOs looked at in the case studies, European Environmental Bureau (eeb.org), Friends of the Earth (foeeurope.org), and Greenpeace (greenpeace.org/eu-unit). The largest orange square represents the most senior NGO in the hierarchy, EEB.



Figure 4.2 - Collective Action in ENGO Combined Case Study Networks.
Collective Action is indicated by nodes coloured light-green, while the orange nodes are European Environmental Bureau (eeb.org), Friends of the Earth (foeeurope.org), and Greenpeace (greenpeace.org/eu-unit). The larger orange square represents the most senior NGO in the hierarchy, EEB**.**

4.1.2 ENGO Network Case Studies

This section takes each top ENGO from the case studies (European Environmental Bureau, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth Europe) and provides an example of successful issue emergence and collective action and an example of failed issue emergence and collective action with other NGOs they are each directly connected to. These abstractions are representative of the analysis used to assess *all* NGOs across the three networks and their primary purpose is to assess mechanisms of issue emergence associated with turf, conflict, and salience, as well as mechanisms of collective action regarding common goals, and material and status incentives. A subsequent section takes the larger results from across all three combined networks to look at the proportion of issue emergence and collective action that the ENGO population has attained compared to the SNGO population.

The EEB Network

In EEB's (node 12) network Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe, node 6) is taken as an example of successful issue emergence and collective action, while the International Road Federation Europe (IRF, node 22) is taken as an example of failed emergence and non-collective action. CAN Europe has been engaged in the biofuels issue in previous waves of discourse, having been among the early pioneers that questioned EU biofuel policy (*see* CAN Europe *et al*. 2001), while IRF has not engaged in the biofuel issue at all, mentioning it only in passing and not taking a position on it or even acknowledging that there is a debate. I chose CAN Europe because it was involved in this discourse at the turn of the millennia but it has also largely been removed from the debate until recently where it collaborated on a joint publication in 2009 (*see* Green 10 2009)

and began issuing statements about biofuels on its website once again in September 2012 (*see* CAN Europe 2012). I chose IRF because it clearly demonstrates how each of the mechanisms of issue emergence was not activated and how collective action likely failed to materialize.

Evidence of issue emergence first materialized for the EEB on March 7th, 2008, where it had collaborated with Birdlife International on a briefing note regarding ILUCs and biofuels (Birdlife International and EEB 2008). Because the briefing was written by only two NGOs I have concluded that both of them take ownership of the issue and have based EEB's problem definition upon the briefing note; that ILUCs have not been given appropriate attention by the European Commission (EC), and that more stringent legislation needs to be developed to integrate ILUCs into evaluation programs for biofuels (*ibid*). CAN Europe engaged in collective action with the EEB on a joint report on the European Commission's track record on sustainable development for the term of 2004 through 2009 called *Off Target* under a collective of ENGOs called Green 10 (Green 10 2009). The publication presented a report card on the EC's areas of success and weakness regarding environmental policy and action, and had a section on energy savings which discussed the problem of biofuels. The report zeroed in on the EC's promotion of biofuels quantity over quality, and questioned whether biofuels even presented any net benefit, given the social and environmental spin-offs (Green 10 2009, 14). Yet CAN Europe's own discourse regarding indirect land use changes (ILUCs) does not materialize on its website until September 2012(CAN Europe 2012). Looking at the mechanisms of issue emergence, CAN Europe's turf is quite large. Its website notes: "The vision of CAN is a world striving actively towards and achieving the protection of

the global climate in a manner that promotes equity and social justice between peoples, sustainable development of all communities, and protection of the global environment. CAN unites to work towards this vision" (CAN Europe N/D). Bearing in mind that the third wave problem of biofuels is connected to ILUCs, which not only affect climate, but also people around the world, it is possible to see how CAN Europe shares the same turf that this issue fits within. The issue does not conflict with existing issues either because its ongoing policy work includes areas such as the EU's energy and emissions policies, with position papers and reports addressing issues such as CO2 reduction and global warming (CAN Europe 2013), alternative energy (CAN Europe 2011), and even deforestation(CAN Europe 2010), all of which lend well to the issue of biofuels. Therefore, addressing the biofuels issue represents a good fit to areas in which it is already engaged, and does not conflict with stances it already holds because many areas it is already engaged in have relationships with biofuels. Finally, the issue is salient as exemplified by a recent web-post that stated:

> Biofuels are wreaking havoc on tight food markets and our forests, increasing hunger and accelerating climate change just so Europe can fuel its cars […] The EU needs to comprehensively close the carbon accounting loophole (from ILUC), otherwise biofuels will continue to expand agriculture for fuel at the expense of forests and natural habitats, and increase carbon emissions.
>
> (CAN Europe 2012)

It is clear from the statement that there is shared understanding of the salience of the issue, with the noted connection to ILUCs. The issue is salient because it is clearly defined and the solution to the problem is also given, reflecting the same frame as EEB, who has argued for proper accounting of ILUCs and the adjusting of EC legislation to reflect the problem.

Collective action is also a match, as is demonstrated by the *Off Target* report mentioned above (*see* Green 10 2009). In the same way that inferences were drawn between mission goals and issue turf, it is possible to discern whether its goals match regarding collective action. The emphasis on affecting climate change with consideration of 'equality and social justice' in the above quotation demonstrates that these are broad goals of the organization which complement its stance on biofuels. In addition, the fact that the Green 10 (node 18) report is produced by a collective striving for democratic consensus among its 10 members (Green 10 2012), and that every report is released with each organization's name as a co-publisher, demonstrates that the NGOs have pooled resources and capabilities to publish the *Off Target* report. As the Green 10 site notes, "[The Green 10] tries to observe as democratic a process of decision-making as possible, taking into account the views of member organizations, their staff, boards, and members" (Green 10 2012); thus, when it publishes its reports, its intent is a collective voice of criticism (or potentially support) against those it is targeting. Finally, by dropping the complete report title in quotation marks into a Google search engine, 76 hits were returned, the majority of which were other websites than any of the Green 10 members. This demonstrates that the report garnered some attention from external sources demonstrating some benefit in regard or organizational status. Because so many people depend on the World Wide Web for up to date information, the prospect of a large number of hits materializing as a result of publishing a report online which is then picked up by other organizations or blogs may be a powerful incentive toward collective action. On the down side, closer scrutiny reveals that no major newspapers or media outlets have mentioned the report. Was the investment worth the return?

In short, the issue emerged because it was within CAN Europe's turf, did not conflict with existing issues, and was saliently defined. Moreover, it engaged in collective action because its broad organizational goals regarding equality and social justice dovetail with biofuel discourses, because it was able to reap the benefits of publishing a report collectively, which created added incentive, and because it was able to amplify its status, especially outside of the group. The same incentives would apply to why the EEB engaged in collective action as well. The EEB website notes:

> [The EEB] stands for sustainable development, environmental justice, global equity, transparency, participatory democracy and shared but differentiated responsibilities. It promotes the principles of prevention, precaution and the polluter pays […] It focusses on influencing EU policymaking and implementation and assessment of its agreed policies. It aims to be effective by combining knowledge with representativeness, active involvement of its members and coalition building.
>
> (EEB n/d).

It has goals that point to why the biofuels issue would resonate and merit caution. Its participation in the Green 10 report, which was the form of collective action in this instance, also functions on the logic of cost-sharing incentives. According to EEB's annual reports from 2010 and 2011, it allocated 15,546 Euros and 13,790 Euros respectively to agricultural affairs, not including salaries (EEB 2010, chap. 11; EEB 2011, 21). CAN Europe's website is less transparent making it more difficult to gauge its expenditures, but since EEB's 2011 report notes its total income as being 2,174,202.00 Euros (EEB 2011, 23) and CAN Europe's current income is 884,117.00 Euros (CAN Europe n/d), it is reasonable to infer that the share that CAN Europe is devoting toward agricultural affairs is proportionally less than the 13,790 Euros that EEB projected as 2011 costing it. At the end of the day, 13,790 is not a large amount and it would therefore

make economic sense to pool resources where applicable. Overall, there appears to be incentive to pooling resources toward the biofuel issue.

The International Road Federation Europe (IRF, node 22) did not show any signs of issue emergence, but why? IRF is a road federation, "established to encourage and promote development and maintenance of better and safer roads and road networks worldwide" (IRFNET n/d). When dealing with environmental issues, it generally restricts its activities to the procurement sector (i.e. building greener roads and highways etc.) (see IRFNET n/d). There is not much to allow for shared turf on the issue. Moreover, due to the fact that the federation retains members such as 3M (IRFNET n/d), a corporation that opened a new division focusing on alternative energy, including biofuels (Green Chip Stocks 2012), IRF may be subject to internal conflict based on corporations such as 3M's material interests. In this, therefore there are the seeds of conflict in addition to issues over turf. As a result, IRF has remained rather silent on biofuels, and when they are mentioned they are done so in passing and quite vaguely. For example, in 2011 IRF participated in the annual International Transport Forum in Leipzig, Germany, where one of its members was present at a discussion about biofuels, however there is no mention of what the representative discussed or what side of the debate, if any, IRF stood on (IRFNET 2011).The organization has not attempted to publicly define biofuels as an issue, let alone take a side in the debate, thus there is no evidence of salience. Issue emergence automatically fails on grounds of turf, though I have shown how the other mechanisms of issue emergence would have failed nonetheless.

Because IRF's goals pertaining to sustainability relate to the quality of road networks and procurement policy, it does not appear a good candidate for collective

action on the biofuel issue. Though it is in the EEB network, there are no documents on either of the organizations' websites demonstrating they have ever collaborated together or even referenced each other. Their relationship is likely nothing more than a web-link from IRF to EEB for those interested in learning more about environmental aspects of roads and highways. Because EEB's goals quite broad, it would possibly be more inclined to work with IRF on other matters where their goals overlap but since there are no shared goals as regards biofuels, there is not likely to be collective action any time soon.

The Greenpeace Network

Greenpeace shares the same issue definition as the EEB and argues for the same solutions, i.e. the adjustment of legislation to reflect the reality of indirect land use chances (ILUCs). In Greenpeace's network, I look at Birdlife International (hereafter, Birdlife, node 15) as a successful case of issue emergence and collective action, and the Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture & Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE, node 23) as a case of non-emergence and non-collective action. I choose Birdlife because it is an NGO that has collaborated with numerous NGOs or groups of NGOs throughout the development of the biofuels discourse, while MIO-ECSDE is surprisingly not involved in the biofuel debate, despite the implicit[7] turf suggested by its name, nor was it involved in collective action.

Birdlife collaborated with Greenpeace on four different publications or press-releases between April 2008 and September 2011 (see ActionAid International *et al*.

[7] Typically sustainable development pertains to a broad set of overarching principles that include ecological, social, and economic contingencies, thereby embodying a holistic approach to problem solving (De Vries and Petersen 2009, 1007). It would be expected that an NGO such as MIO-ECSDE, which has the phrase "sustainable development" in its name, would therefore have sufficient turf to accommodate a position on the biofuels debate, as it touches on both social and ecological issues.

2010; EEB et al. 2011; Green 10 2009; Greenpeace EU et al. 2008). Greenpeace's earliest mention of biofuels along the third-wave discourse was in November 2010 (see Greenpeace EU 2010), while Birdlife's was substantially earlier in March 2008 (see Birdlife International and EEB 2008). Indeed the joint briefing written between Birdlife and the EEB in March 2008 suggests they were very early advocates of ILUC reform. For Greenpeace and Birdlife, collective action appears to have occurred before Greenpeace posted a position of its own on its website (see Greenpeace EU et al. 2008). Since the briefing note written by EEB and Birdlife was a collaboration between only those two ENGOs I do not acknowledge it formally as an instance of collective action because Birdlife is officially in Greenpeace's direct network but is not directly tied to the EEB, according to the results from Issue Crawler, as demonstrated in **Table 4.1** (see above). At the same time I take note of the fact that already there is evidence that the picture provided by Issue Crawler is not as complete as it would appear.

Birdlife (node 15) has a shared issue turf to Greenpeace in that they both have concerns about the human impact on natural habitats such as wetlands, especially as regards agricultural expansion. For example, Greenpeace's website lists the following areas of active involvement: agriculture, climate & energy, oceans & fisheries, forests, and toxic pollution (Greenpeace EU n/d). Meanwhile, Birdlife's vision is "[By focusing] on birds, and the sites and habitats on which they depend, the BirdLife Partnership is working to improve the quality of life for birds, for other wildlife (biodiversity), and for people" (Birdlife International n/d). Taking the two NGOs in comparison, for Greenpeace, one observes that agriculture, climate & energy, and forests are all relatable to the biofuels issue, especially under the ILUC discourse, while for Birdlife it is also

clear that, though the species of interest are birds, their sites and habitats are equally important; therefore, the two turfs are complimentary but not so much that either NGO would be seen as invading the other's turf. Specifically, it is clear that Greenpeace has quite a wide and varied turf, while Birdlife's is narrower albeit flexible because the threat to birds and their habitat can be traced to a number of sources and the biofuels issue is just another reason to be concerned in addition to those other threats. For both organizations, the ILUC problem definition is applicable because of its connection to agricultural expansion and forest degradation; however each is concerned about these things from different, yet complimentary perspectives. The issue does not conflict with Birdlife's areas of operation or projects, because it already campaigns on the issue of agricultural expansion and deforestation, and therefore, taking a position on the biofuels debate adds more ammunition to its other endeavors. Birdlife's stated areas of concern are the following:

> [Prevent] the extinction of any bird species; maintain and where possible improve the conservation status of all bird species; conserve and where appropriate improve and enlarge sites and habitats important for birds; help, through birds, to conserve biodiversity and to improve the quality of people's lives; and, integrate bird conservation into sustaining peoples livelihoods
>
> (Birdlife International n/d)

If Birdlife is concerned about all of these things and is already waging campaigns, it can only stand to benefit by integrating the biofuels debate into its discourse because it is yet another causal factor in the realm of bird habitat loss and species endangerment. In other words, it compliments existing campaigns by providing yet another line of attack. Moreover, because the third-wave sees the expansion of the ILUCs in a more measurable way, Birdlife has no problem identifying how the issue is salient because the impacts are quantifiable. By tying together the environmental impact on natural ecosystems and the

human impact around the world (see Birdlife International 2010), Birdlife is at once framing the issue as something affecting wetlands and people, and expanding its criticism of agricultural policy. Birdlife's concerns and goals are easily summed in this extract from a press release (Birdlife International 2010):

> [W]hen these 'indirect land uses' are taken into account, biofuels will emit an extra 27 to 56 million tonns of greenhouse gas emissions per year […] BirdLife worked hard to try to ensure that biofuel production does not harm biodiversity or people's livelihoods […] Here we are pushing for solutions to mitigate and adapt to climate change which are environmentally and socially sound.

In other words, biofuels are problematic because they affect nature and people, and solutions to the problems of climate change need to be cognisant of ILUCs. Thus, a goal of Birdlife is to make sure the ends justify the means by accounting for ILUCs. Similarly, Greenpeace notes in a press release for the publication *Driving to Destruction* (ActionAid International *et al*. 2010), where it collaborated with Birdlife and other NGOs on: "The groups are calling on EU governments and the European Commission to review urgently the real impacts of biofuels on climate change and food security, and to prioritise energy efficiency in transport. New legislation must take account of the full carbon footprint of biofuels by introducing indirect land use change 'factors'" (Greenpeace EU 2010). Here Greenpeace and others are concerned about the impact of biofuels policy on climate change and the wellbeing of human beings in the global biofuel supply chain, as is the case Birdlife, where it referred to solutions to climate change needing to be sensitive to the environment and society. As a common goal, they would prefer to see the EU change its biofuel policies so that they do not adversely affect the climate and social wellbeing. The fact that they collaborated on no less than four publications *(see ActionAid International et al*. 2010; EEB *et al*. 2011; Green 10 2009; Greenpeace EU *et al*. 2008)

demonstrates that pooled resources and, possibly different kinds of expertise, were motivations to collective action. Of note is that none of these NGOs release reports on their own, but instead do so collectively. Finally, Birdlife and Greenpeace's statuses are given greater prominence through the work they do together. Both websites hold copies of the publications in question and, taking *Driving to Destruction: The impacts of Europes biofuel policies on climate and land* (ActionAid International *et al*. 2010) as an example, Google searches retrieved 1,330 hits on the publication name. It is clear that the collective endeavor reverberated outside of the network bubble.

Taking the case of MIO-ECSDE (node 23), there is evidence of some shared issue turf. MIO-ECSDE's website has much information on the impacts of agriculture, but it does not engage in the issue of biofuels at all, instead addressing issues such as agricultural run-off, rainwater storage, and biodiversity with a specific focus on capacity building in these areas (MIO-ECSDE 2012). Sustainable development as a concept implicitly relates to overarching principles regarding ecology, society, and economy in a holistic frame (De Vries and Petersen 2009, 1007), and would therefore mean that an NGO that uses the phrase in its own name would have a sufficiently broad turf so as to accommodate many different issues, biofuels being one of them. It addresses these things specifically, which centers the organization within a rather specific geographic and procedural niche; one focussed on areas surrounding the Mediterranean with a capacity building approach. Though there is room for the biofuel issue to fit within its turf, the NGO has not adopted it, nor has it even mentioned it. It's website notes the following:

> Currently, MIO-ECSDE capacity building workshops take place on an *ad hoc* basis, focussing progressively on more specific issues i.e. Cultural Diversity & Biodiversity (2004); the legal aspects & problems of the Barcelona Convention (2006); REACHing Sustainable Management of Chemicals in the Euro-

> Mediterranean Region (2006-08); Transboundary water resources Management in SEE (2008-2009), etc.
>
> (MIO-ECSDE n/d)

The common denominator in this quote is that all except for the first event (cultural diversity & biodiversity) relate to capacity and awareness building regarding existing EU legislation and treaties, most of which have a geographic relation to water, namely the Mediterranean Sea. As such, on the one hand, biofuels could fit within this turf, as it is through the 2001 Transport directive that the biofuels debate originated, though on the other hand, the geography of this area suggests that there is not likely much biofuel production; thus, rendering the issue more distant. Is there a geographic component to turf? There may also be part of the answer in the conflict mechanism. First off, the approach that MIO-ECSDE generally takes in regard to issues is one of capacity and awareness building, which means that even if biofuels were acknowledged as a problem, the NGO would more likely than not approach the issue from that perspective. Therefore, the argument that NGOs would be better to push for legislative solutions would not likely appeal to the NGO. Further, MIO-ECSDE's projects address very specific things, thus it may be possible that it simply does not have the resources to engage in the biofuel issue at the risk of losing resources for other projects. According to the European Commission's Transparency Register, in 2010 MIO-ECSDE only operated on a budget of 107,045 Euro, compared to Greenpeace, whose EU unit operated on a budget of 2,218,527 Euro or the 1,626,176 Euro and 2,085,625 Euro for EEB and FOE Europe, respectively, which are both also directly connected to MIO-ECSDE. Returning to the geographic context in regard to salience, another reason why the issue has not emerged may be because biofuels are not generally cultivated in the Mediterranean area, so the

issue's diagnostic and prognostic frames not easily apply to the area. This leads me to believe that the three mechanisms of issue emergence do act as hoop tests because a common thread of weakness, in this case mainly geographic, has materialized at several stages of this process. Because biofuels were rejected mainly at the turf stage, it is possible to see why the other two stages likely would not have borne anything more positive.

MIO-ECSDE has not engaged in collective action either. Though there are incentives to collaborating on projects, such as raising its own profile among other ENGOs or external parties, its goals do not reflect the need to address biofuels. Thus, it does not engage in collective action mainly because of differences in organizational and issue specific goals.

In sum, the biofuel issue emerged with Birdlife International mainly because it aligned with its turf, because it complimented projects and perspectives it already was engaged in, and because the definition fit clearly with the organization's primary objectives. At the same time, Greenpeace bought into the discourse after organizations such as Birdlife and the EEB had, suggesting that Birdlife is one of the early issue brokers. Birdlife and Greenpeace engaged in collective action four times, some of which occurred before Greenpeace had expressed a position on the issue on its own website. This may mean that the relationship between collective action and issue emergence is not as linear as expected, but instead possibly more circular; an iterative process of collaboration and learning and revision. The story is different for MIO-ECSDE because, although there is potential for the issue to fit its organizational turf, its projects appear more focussed on capacity building and less on advocacy. This may conflict with current

projects by taking away from resources already needed for projects it currently works on or by causing it to have to shift to an advocacy-oriented stance in general, which would also entail costs. Geography may play a deciding role in combination with or separate to costs. Because there are not many shared goals between Greenpeace and MIO-ECSDE, especially as regards biofuels, there is no incentive to even consider collective action.

The FOE Europe Network

I look at Transport & Environment (T&A, node 33) and Arch-Noah (node 4) as cases of successful and unsuccessful issue emergence and participation in collective action.

T&A's first acknowledgment of third-wave biofuels issues was in December 2008, where it noted "Numerous scientific studies in recent months have highlighted the importance of accounting for indirect land-use change if biofuels are to play a part in an EU climate strategy, but the Commission has played down these findings and has shown no wish to recognize the concept" (Transport & Environment 2008). As an early proponent of the third wave, as well as one of the only proponents of the first-wave on biofuel issues, T&A already shares a history with the issue. T&A is, above all other things, an *environmentally* oriented advocate of sustainable transport, rendering it is understandable that it would be at the forefront of the movement. Its turf is nearly a perfect match to the issue. FOE Europe, also has a similar turf, but only openly addressed biofuels on its own in November 2009. It may be possible that FOE has been affected more by T&A than the other way around. Both NGOs had already advocated biofuel issues in previous waves, and therefore, there was no conflict with the issue this time around. In the second wave however T&A had a divergent position on biofuel issue, choosing to emphasize the development of a certification scheme that would be able to

evaluate the quality of different biofuels (see Transport & Environment 2006). It therefore was more interested in accreditation and standardization than in the prevailing discourse of others such as the EEB and FOE which centred around EU targets themselves along the lines that took into consideration its global scope and the impact on societies (*see for example* EEB 2006; FOE Europe 2007), which demonstrates conflicting issue frames and proposed solutions during the period of the second wave. In the third wave however, as the discourse evolved to consider ILUCs, the measurability of biofuel impacts due to direct and indirect land use became more quantifiable and the issue was able to be adopted because it no longer conflicted with T&A's frame. Indeed, the shift from accreditation to a new method of carbon-accounting reflecting ILUCs may be attributed to the desire by NGOs such as T&A to bring ideas forward as more and more results pointed to the futility of promoting biofuels at all. In the end, both FOE Europe and T&A shared the same issue turf, issue fit, and diagnostic and prognostic frames associated with salience, which allowed them to recognize it as a problem and address solutions.

Collective action occurred between FOE Europe and T&A three times (see Green 10 2009; ActionAid International *et al*. 2010; EEB *et al*. 2011). In an open letter to EC President Barroso, ENGOs including FOE Europe, T&A, and others such as the EEB and Greenpeace observed:

> [T]he commission has sponsored a substantial research effort – no less than five world-class studies into the indirect impact of land-using biofuels. All those studies concur that the indirect impacts of these biofuels are significant, and could not only negate the expected carbon savings, but also lead to an increase in emissions and exacerbate environmental and social problems around the world […] As scientific consensus stands, specific ILUC factors for different types of biofuels are the only credible solution and we urge you to put this into the upcoming legislative proposal.

(EEB et al. 2011)

Thus, the issue is clearly highlighted, in that ILUCs are not given their due, and the proposed solution is to make sure they are entrenched in legislation so that proper measurement of the true impacts of biofuels can be observed. It is also clear that the goal is to make sure ILUCs are brought into legislation. The example, because it is from a letter composed by these various NGOs, demonstrates shared goals. The fact that it is co-signed by all the parties gives it some collective weight and also highlights the expected return each NGO would receive in regard to status. Though the pooling of resources and capabilities is probably minimal, the financial costs of writing a critical letter are not significant compared to the potential return. Therefore, all mechanisms of collective action appear to point toward the overall benefit of partaking in collective action compared to the cost. The other examples of collective action display the same tendencies, albeit with pooling of resources. Briefly, the Green 10 document *Off Target* (2009) has already been discussed, and the same pooling of resources and expertise apply to this situation as it did above because it is the same instance of collective action. As for the Action Aid *et al*. publication (2010), *Driving to Destruction*, the same motivations apply as was the case for the Green 10 publication albeit for a slightly different composition of NGOs. The *Driving to Destruction*: The impacts of Europe's biofuel plans on carbon emissions and land title was dropped into a Google search engine with quotation marks and returned over 2,400 hits, a host of which were other NGOs and blogs from around the world. If the intent was to expand public awareness and media attention, the investment appears to have paid-off in that regard. Such motivational factors, through shared resources and expertise and the potential increase in exposure of

the individuals and the group, are manifest these as organization's participation in collective action. Thus, the goals and various incentives demonstrate that all three instances of collective action were in the interest of FOE and T&A and appeared at the time to be worth the investment.

Turning to the NGO where issue emergence and collective action did not occur, I look at Arche-Noah (node 4); an NGO primarily interested in biodiversity in heritage food crops (Arche Noah 2012a). Though the biofuel issue would fit with its mandate in promoting genetic diversity of crops, it does not match the organization's primary goal of facilitating others' desires to grow heritage variety crops. Moreover, its main areas of advocacy are in the EU's seed-laws, where it encourages heritage varieties (Arche Noah 2012b). Given this perspective, it would be more reasonable to expect Arche Noah taking a stand on issues such as genetically modified organisms over biofuels. Indeed both of these ENGOs are active in condemning GMO based and corporate-controlled agriculture (see FOE Europe n/d; Arche Noah 2012a). Since biofuels are not even mentioned on Arche-Noah's website, it has to be concluded that the issue is not salient. Arche-Noah has no relationship with FOE Europe in collective action either. This is largely due to conflicting goals, with the latter interested in species diversity, while the other is more interested in broader impacts of biofuels regarding biodiversity and human security. As such, there is no collective action for Arche-Noah with FOE Europe.

To conclude, FOE Europe has engaged in collective action with T&A, and both share the same issue turf, fit, and salience. As the analysis demonstrates however this was not always the case. For T&A the third wave of the issue represented the coming together of two different worlds under a single concept, which allowed it to take an early stake in,

possibly even influencing other NGOs such as FOE Europe as a broker of some sort. The prognosis is not as positive for Arche-Noah because although there is potential for shared turf at first glance, in reality, this NGO is mainly interested in one thing, heritage variety produce. This very specific interest makes issue matching problematic and collective action undesirable in regard to biofuel.

4.2. The SNGO Networks and Anti-Discrimination

The issue of discrimination has its modern origins in the Treaty of the European Community, and subsequent EU Treaties which have expanded upon it. Building on Article 13, an anti-discrimination directive was developed in 2000 to combat discrimination in employment and occupational settings (Council of the European Union 2000). Early iterations of anti-discrimination discourse by NGOs were in response to the directive and its overall effectiveness and impact on the fight against discrimination. There was little engagement in the issue during this time, with organizations representing tangible forms of discrimination, such as race, gender, and, to some extent, sexual orientation being involved discussion of the topic (*see for example* European Youth Forum 2003; ENAR 2005; ILGA Europe 2005; Pillinger 2003). The era was quite ambiguous, with core issues remaining quite similar, addressing the strengths and weaknesses of the legislation and programs designed to expedite it, but at the same time issue-frames being quite specifically tailored to the perspective of each NGO. For example, writing on behalf of European Youth Forum, Pillinger (2003) characterises problems with existing legislation as regarding loop-holes, the need for greater cohesion and inclusion, and better promotion of the directive, just as the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) does (ENAR 2005); however they both specifically criticize the

legislation as it affects their respective constituents, i.e. youth and racial/ethnic minorities. Thus, although there are similarities in discourse there are also some differences. In addition, according to my results, no collective action is evident during this period until 2006 (*see* CEJI 2006, 13).

My own analysis of the evolution of the discourse highlights that during this early phase, 6 out of 45 SNGOs in the network were engaged in the issue of discrimination as pertains to weaknesses in the employment and occupation directive and possible promotion of mechanisms to help constituents access the full benefit of the legislation (*see* ENAR 2005; ILGA Europe 2005; European Youth Forum 2003; Pillinger 2003; EPHA 2003; Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2002). Only two NGOs, AGE Platform and the European Disability Forum (EDF), differentiated themselves from the prevailing discourse by suggesting that new horizontal legislation was needed extending to goods and services accessibility (see Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2002; EPHA 2003, respectively). Both organizations attempted to balance the need for new legislation with a push for socio-cultural changes but both also framed the issue discrimination outside of employment and occupational settings, specifically as it pertained to their own constituents; namely the elderly and disabled persons. The shift was from critiquing the existing legislation to asking why discrimination in other areas was not given equal attention as in the domain of employment. In short, it sought to tackle discrimination horizontally across multiple sectors.

The great push regarding discrimination issue emergence was likely the result of an exogenous shock. In 2004, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso pledged to

push forward an agenda that addressed horizontal discrimination and in 2008 a directive would be devised (EAPN 2008). The possibility of such a directive represented a window of opportunity, which, over time would result in a more and more SNGOs becoming involved in advocacy over the issue. The directive stalled several times as unanimity was needed to pass it in the Council, particularly by a defiant Germany (AGE Platform Europe 2009, 12). It was the constant up and down of this process which garnered attention from SNGOs as they sought to stake a claim in the debate and push for equal rights-based legislation that would go beyond employment and occupations. A core-cohort of SNGOs was at the leading edge of continued pressure on the EU, including AGE Platform, European Disability Forum (EDF), International Lesbian, Gay and Transgender Alliance (ILGA-Europe), European Network Against Racism (ENAR), European Youth Forum (EYF), and the European Women's Lobby (EWL); and it would be this cohort that would represent the multiple faces of discrimination. Symmetrical issue frames would materialize in press-releases, publications, and documents on a range of topics, from education (Solidar and EUCIS-LLL 2011) to active-aging and solidarity between generations (EY2012 2012) to accessibility of websites and e-technology (AGE Platform Europe *et al.* 2011). The issue would be framed in a way that balanced both broader public concerns over discrimination and specific impacts on key stakeholder groups that each NGO represented.

In sum, the early days of the anti-discrimination issue were quite ambiguous, largely as NGOs grappled with framing the issue differently according to their own concerns and focussing mainly on existing employment and occupation EU legislation. As the EC began to move on an agenda to promote new anti-discrimination legislation,

more SNGOs took notice. Discrimination began to be looked at as something applicable to different members of society in different ways. As the definition of discrimination shifted from employment to accessibility of goods and services, it fit within more NGOs' turfs than previously and more NGOs began to frame the issue similarly. Finally, AGE Platform and EDF were pioneers of this issue definition, and would commonly work with other NGOs representing the other faces of discrimination, making for a robust core group. There is no second wave in the discrimination discourse, but rather a new discourse altogether from the previous mode taking the issue away from a focus on the employment and occupation directive resulting in a different *horizontal* animal.

Figure 4.3 (***Issue Emergence in SNGO Combined Case Study Networks***) displays the distribution of issue emergence from all three SNGO case studies, while **Figure 4.4** (***Collective Action in SNGO Combined Case Study Networks***) displays the distribution of collective action. The same principles will be applied to SNGOs as were used in the above ENGO case studies.



Figure 4.3 - Issue Emergence in SNGO Combined Case Study Networks.
Issue emergence is indicated in the NGOs shaded in light green, while those in orange represent the three SNGOs looked at in the case studies, AGE Platform (age-platform.eu), European Network Against Racism (enar-eu.org), and European Youth Forum (youthforum.org). The largest orange square represents the most senior NGO in the hierarchy, AGE Platform.



Figure 4.4 - Collective Action in SNGO Combined Case Study Networks.
Collective action is indicated by nodes coloured light-green, while the orange nodes are AGE Platform (age-plaform.eu), European Network Against Racism (enar-eu.org), and European Youth Forum (youthforum.org) The larger orange square represents the most senior NGO in the hierarchy, AGE Platform.

4.2.2 SNGO Network Case Studies

As was the case for the three ENGOs discussed previously, I now turn to AGE Platform, European Network Against Racism (ENAR), and the European Youth Forum (EYF), to articulate examples of successful and unsuccessful issue emergence and collective action among these SNGOs and others within their direct networks. Also, as previously done, I draw from examples that illustrate how issues have failed to materialize at different stages of issue emergence. The choice of cases thus reflects this desire to illustrate different dysfunctions regarding mechanisms.

The AGE Platform Network

For AGE Platform (Node 2), I look at the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN, node 12) as a case of successful issue emergence and collective action and the EU Patient Forum (hereafter EU Patient, node 25) as a case of failed emergence and collective action.

As of November 2005, EAPN's (node 12) position on anti-discrimination was in favor of policies that balanced cohesion and anti-discrimination (EAPN 2005); however the focus shifted from encouragement of anti-discrimination *policies* toward anti-discrimination *legislation* by November 2007(EAPN 2007). Moreover, the issue was framed as a "fight" against discrimination, rather than mere "promotion" of policy. AGE Platform, began advocating a pairing of anti-discrimination and cohesion and inclusiveness policy as far back as 2002 (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2002). By 2007, its discourse remained intact maintaining an emphasis on legislation. For example, in a press-release from April 2008, AGE Platform wrote (AGE Platform Europe 2008a), "[AGE] calls on the Commission to propose to

Member States to make a strong political commitment to eradicate all forms of discrimination. With the ageing of our populations, AGE considers that a strong and coherent body of law - protecting all citizens from discrimination - should be the priority target."

EAPN shares the same turf as the issue because, as it noted in a declaration following its General Assembly in November 2007, "[Despite] the declared objective of making a decisive impact on eradicating poverty by 2010, the gap between rich and poor is widening, inequalities and discrimination persist, and poverty remains on an unacceptable high level" (EAPN 2007). The fact that EAPN ties discrimination and inequality into the same lament over the increased income gulf demonstrates it is concerned about the two; implying that income inequality and discrimination are related. Because AGE Platform represents the elderly and EAPN represents those in poverty, they find common ground on the discrimination issue because it is related to both sets of constituents allowing for some overlap in turf without the threat of either organization appearing redundant. The push for anti-discrimination legislation would not conflict with EAPN's other advocacy areas because of the way that it views discrimination being tied to poverty, or vice-versa. In regard to salience, EAPN's definition of the problem of anti-discrimination as affecting a variety of groups, including those in poverty, and the proposed solution along the lines of strong legislation, demonstrates that it both understands the issue and its solutions along the same lines as AGE Platform. Thus, the issue fits well in EAPN's turf because it views discrimination as something disproportionately affecting the poor, it does not conflict with other issues it is already concerned about because those issues are connected to the issue of discrimination, and it

is viewed as salient because it is able to be defined according to how it affects its primary stakeholders as well as other people, which allows EAPN to advocate the solution to the problem through legislation which would ease some of the burden that many in poverty carry.

Collective action occurred between AGE Platform and EAPN on two occasions between 2010 and 2012. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the EC fluctuated in its resolve to move forward anti-discrimination legislation. The first instance of collective action was in response to one of the high points, where it looked like the EC was finally moving forward on its commitment. In a joint statement co-written by AGE Platform, EAPN, ENAR, EYF, EDF, ILGA Europe and YWL, the organizations applauded recent advancements by the EC in putting together draft legislation (AGE Platform Europe 2010a). It may not appear that much collective action occurred in this instance, and in many ways it was minimal, but the fact is that these NGOs expressed support for their shared goal, collaborated on the letter, and acted in solidarity throwing weight behind their response. In other words, this represents the pursuit of a similar goal, material incentives by collaborating, and status incentives by re-affirming their respective authority on the issue of discrimination. When it looked like support for legislation was stalling two years later, another instance of collective action expressed concern and disappointment, and reiterated the need for proper legislation (EAPN, AGE Platform Europe, et al. 2012). EAPN and AGE Platform were also involved in this instance. Because a joint statement would likely create greater resonance regarding these SNGOs' frustrations, there is clear incentive to work together on a joint statement, which would

cost very little but potentially yield some positive feedback. The press statement writes (EAPN, AGE Platform Europe, et al. 2012):

> The EU has thrown in the towel about protecting discriminated groups, including lesbian, gay and bisexual people, persons with disabilities, religious minorities, youth and older people. A coalition of European equality and anti-discrimination NGOs now calls on the European Commission and the Danish Presidency of the EU to urgently take up this issue.

The statement is one of unison, and the fact that it directly refers to the collective as a 'coalition' means that they work together and assume the responsibility and costs of the statement collectively. Thus, it demonstrates shared goals, the pooling of resources and capabilities, and emphasizes the importance of the NGOs involved and their seniority as authorities on the subject of collective action.

Turning to the EU Patient Forum (EU Patient, Node 25), collective action did not occur, nor did the issue emerge. EU Patient's website explains: "Through our educational seminars, policy initiatives and projects, we help support their [organizations representing patients] work and mission through capacity building initiatives and exchange of best practices and information" (European Patients' Forum 2012). Its primary areas of focus are in improving patient care by facilitating practitioners in developing new skills to better take care of them. Consequently, policy areas include items such as pharmaceutical issues, cross-border health accessibility, medical devices, and such things. It would be expected that there is some wiggle-room on this organization's turf due to the fact that the aged are a key and growing demographic in the healthcare field (*ibid*). Perhaps further pressure in the future would expand its turf to include issues such as age and disability discrimination, but for the time being it is a non-issue for this organization. Moreover, even if it did share the same turf, since its focus is mainly in capacity building and best practices, this organization would likely approach

the problem in a way that reflects those aspects, such as through sensitivity training and proactive best-practices to help institutions and practitioners better address matters of discrimination. Thus, the solution to the problem would probably be different than that articulated by AGE Platform, whose interest is in improved legislation.

The different approaches of these two organizations confound the prospect of engaging in collective action on this particular issue. In this instance, the goals of EU Patient do not appear to extend to social problems such as discrimination. In addition, it has to be asked, what would EU Patient gain from being involved in collective action regarding an issue that is not even on its radar? There is no incentive to be involved mainly because the problem does not match its goals, let alone, present a benefit to be derived from pooling resources or capabilities. Status, on the other hand, is more difficult to understand in cases where collective action has not occurred. There are no means to find out from EU Patient how it regards the potential rewards to be gained through collective action in terms of status. This was a common problem in most failed instances of collective action in this analysis, and will be addressed below and in the concluding chapter.

In short, issue emergence mechanisms were triggered for EAPN while they were not for EU Patient. Collective action mechanisms are also apparent for EAPN, but harder to pin down for EU Patient regarding why they failed beyond lack of shared goals. It is clear however that EU Patient did not engage in collective action mainly because the issue is not something it typically engages in to begin with, eliminating the prospect for shared goals.

The ENAR Network

In this case study I look at mechanisms of issue emergence and collective action pertaining to the Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (CEJI, node 7) and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE, node 15), regarding their relationships with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR, node 18). I chose these two cases because CEJI is an early acknowledger, yet mainly a lone wolf, rarely participating in collective action. It is therefore important to look at its rare participation in collective action as to demonstrate the diversity of forms of collective action. On the other hand, ECRE appears at first blush to be an organization that ought to be concerned about discrimination, yet the issue has not emerged and it has not been involved in collective action. Why hasn't it engaged in anti-discrimination rhetoric?

It is clear from the *What We Do* page on CEJI's website that it is highly supportive of anti-discrimination legislation, which goes beyond religious discrimination (CEJI n/d); echoed as far back as 2006 in an annual report (CEJI 2006). It is an advocate of a stronger directive as well as a specialist in providing education materials through seminars and courses geared toward inclusiveness, diversity and combating discrimination (CEJI n/d). It has several publications relating to anti-discrimination including one that is a policy response to the proposed Equality directive from 2010 (CEJI 2010), and another that is a best-practices guide that also highlights the need for a directive from July 2007 (CEJI 2007). ENAR's earliest discussion on the discrimination issue dates to October 2008, where it specified the need for cross-cutting anti-discrimination legislation that would apply to all people in all walks of life (ENAR 2008). Despite ENAR's comparably late involvement on the need for anti-discrimination legislation, it was active prior to 2008 however its own website does not confirm this;

instead the evidence comes from CEJI. In its 2006 Annual report, CEJI mentions being involved in a consultation with the EC on the anti-discrimination directive in October 2006, where it accompanied and supported ENAR (CEJI 2006, 13). Not only does this show that both ENAR and CEJI were early proponents of a horizontal directive, but also that they worked together, noting (CEJI 2006, 13): "CEJI also participated in ENAR-administered sessions of the Parliamentary Inter-Group on Racism and Diversity, and in the seminar 'From racism to equality? Realising the potential of European anti-discrimination law', which took place in October 2006." The same passage also points out that CEJI is a member of ENAR, rendering the acknowledgement a form of deference to ENAR's higher social status. In addition, in March 2007, ENAR and CEJI worked together to release a Fact Sheet on the subject on the European Year for Inter-cultural Dialog, wherein it explains how NGOs and others can get involved in promoting anti-discrimination , tolerance, and diversity practices (CEJI and ENAR 2007).

But what does all this mean? Ambiguities made apparent between ENAR's own website and the records of other NGOs, such as CEJI, provide two different dates for when the earliest interest in an anti-discrimination directive materialized for ENAR. To be sure, ENAR had several policy responses between 2005 and 2007 that demonstrate its emphasis on anti-discrimination legislation with CEJI may have been tenuous (*see for example* ENAR 2005; ENAR 2007) . If that was the case, it may have been a result of shifting the issue frame in order to suit the context of what it was employed in. In other words, sometimes ENAR may have emphasized inclusion and cohesion through social engagement as a means to combating discrimination, while others it may have emphasized the legislative solution.

An NGO such as CEJI, with such a wide-reaching desire to bring about a more inclusive EU society, would easily find shared turf with an NGO such as ENAR because CEJI is interested in eliminating forms of discrimination within and among societies and views legislation as one out of several means of accomplishing that end. For example, on the one hand it has practical applications that reflect grass-roots oriented empowerment and awareness building, such as its brochure *A Classroom of Difference - School Community Approach* (CEJI n/d), while on the other, it has documents that more directly address the top-down legislative component, such as its formal response to the proposed equality directive (CEJI 2010); thus, allowing the organization to address two sides of the same coin. This is a rare outcome, as will be shown below, in that most other NGOs may be more likely to adopt one perspective or another rather than both. Therefore, it appears that CEJI has mastered the art of using multiple issue frames, a game reflected by ENAR, who also has tended to approach the issue of anti-discrimination from various perspectives. CEJI and ENAR have multiple issue frames but these frames are directed at different targets. For instance, CEJI's *A Classroom of Difference* is not designed to address EU institutions while its policy response to the proposed Equality directive clearly is. As a result the issue emerges for both because it is salient for a particular audience and it also pairs nicely with other tools an organization like CEJI already uses to address issues of discrimination, such as workshop facilitation and capacity building from a grass-roots perspective. Indeed, it is possible that because of these additional skills, CEJI had something to contribute when it came time to engage in collective action, such as it did with ENAR to create a fact sheet designed to address inter-cultural dialogue, with a primary emphasis on discrimination issues (CEJI and ENAR 2007).

Thus, the material incentives for the two to collaborate are increased because each organization has a different area of expertise that may help in developing such documents. Overall, these two instances of collective action were the only times my own research uncovered collective action between CEJI and ENAR, thus collective action was quite small. In the case of approaching the EC together, the incentive is clear; an opportunity to partake in a dialogue with the very institution that is often the primary target of collective action is a glaring window of opportunity. CEJI's membership in ENAR may have had something to do with this, and certainly it stood to gain in recognition for its participation. Overall, the issue emerged because both SNGOs had overlapping turfs which were flexible enough to integrate this issue discourse as it was required depending on the audience. There was no conflict because the issue itself was already being dealt with in other ways, such as through awareness building, which resulted in a good fit. Additionally, the flexibility with which both organizations were able to frame the issue, resulted in definitions and solutions which could be used in combination with other issue frames in a complimentary manner rather than in a conflicting manner. Finally, collective action occurred because both NGOs had shared goals regarding the need for legislation, in addition to other ways of dealing with discrimination, and were able to leverage each other's expertise in the consultation process with the EC, making for a greater material incentive to collaborate, and finally, the possibility of direct interaction with the EC would serve as a status incentive to cooperate in order to both work with the EC regarding the issue and also highlight each NGO's expertise. In short, collective action occurred because all the incentives made it a

safe bet, with low costs but much opportunity to both contribute to promoting the issue frame in the EC and gain in status.

I picked the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE, node 15) as an example of issue non-emergence because the issue seems to have failed on the level of salience, as opposed to many other examples which have failed on grounds of turf or because of the potential for conflict. The ECRE has had much to say about issues of discrimination, but because it defines the issue quite differently as a problem, it does not seek the same solutions. On its information webpage, it states that it "aims to promote the protection and integration of refugees in Europe based on the values of human dignity, human rights, and an ethic of solidarity" (ECRE 2012). ECRE therefore shares the same turf as would accommodate the issue of discrimination because discrimination would pose a problem regarding human rights and tension in the 'ethic of solidarity'. Indeed, ECRE has several press-releases explicitly dealing with discrimination issues. For example, one such release addresses problems of discrimination for refugees and asylum seekers as being rooted in the half-heartedness with which the EU tends to its "*Common Basic Principles (CBP) on Immigration Integration*" and its communication "*A Common Agenda for Integration*" (*emphasis* not added) (ECRE 2007). In a separate position paper, it outlines problems for refugees facing discrimination in employment opportunities, and points to the need to fix the employment and occupation directive (ECRE 2010). Bearing in mind the shift of criticisms as regards discrimination for the majority of SNGOs dealing with the discrimination issue to a position in favor of new horizontal legislation, it is evident that ECRE is advocating problems of discrimination as they only pertain to its own stakeholders, which are refugees, similar to what some other NGOs did in the

early 2000s (see ENAR 2005; ILGA Europe 2005; European Youth Forum 2003; Pillinger 2003). It therefore defines the problem strictly in terms that affect immigrants and refugees and not in regard to broader forms of discrimination. For this reason, even though there is potential for the issue to be adopted because of shared turf, and because it may in fact help some refugees to be protected by broader legislation advocated by other NGOs thus resolving issues of conflict, its stance on how the problem is defined reflects a conflicting issue frame that is not compatible with that advocated by other NGOs. Therefore, it cannot be said that ECRE shares salience in the issue of discrimination with ENAR and consequently. Though the issue has emerged in some form, it has not emerged the same. Because it does not concern itself with discrimination of stakeholders other than its own, there is no evidence of collective action on the issue on the part of ECRE. This may be because its organizational goals are to promote policies that benefit and facilitate the successful integration of refugees and exiles only, rather than a broader goal of a more inclusive and integrated European Union overall. An irony is that ENAR itself advocates most of its stances specifically are regards race and ethnicity, yet it has come to embrace the broader importance of addressing the issue, while ECRE has not. A confounding factor in this analysis is that it appears that there would be material and status incentives for adopting the issue and engaging in collective action upon it, yet this organization has not. According to the European Commission's Transparency Register, ECRE had an operating budget of 578,631 Euros in 2011(European Commission 2011), and its 2011 Annual Report notes that 84 percent of its income is from private and public grants (ECRE 2011, 21). In short, the organization does not have a large amount of money to work with, and pooling resources would likely help reduce overall costs. The

same annual report does not have any record of the organization collaborating with any other SNGOs other than those that are included in its own membership, none of which are listed in the SNGO network retrieved from Issue Crawler. The primary roadblock to collective action therefore is likely related to conflicting goals rooted in incompatible issue frames. Thus far, it appears that shared goals are sufficient as to allow material and status incentives to be evaluated. In other words, as a precondition to collective action, first there must be shared goals then there must be either material or status incentives or both.

In sum, CEJI and ENAR both share some overlapping turf which explains why they both adopted the issue because they already dealt with issues such as inclusiveness, which is the antonym of discrimination. Adopting a stance which called for legislative mechanisms to protect all people from forms of discrimination would fit their turf. For CEJI, adopting the issue would bring added value to things it already advocated which in many ways are related to the issue and therefore constitutes a good fit. Finally, both organizations share the same understanding of the problem of discrimination and the ways to combat it, demonstrating salience. Particularly, both organizations are able to shift issue frames to suit the occasion or target audience. Because both organizations shared the same goal of tackling discrimination through more robust legislation, and because there were perceived benefits in working together, especially in terms of status, collective action was a no-brainer when the opportunities arose to work together. The issue did not emerge in the same manner for ECRE which demonstrates conflicting definitions and frames. ECRE did not engage in collective action most likely because of

conflicting issue frames which led to different overall goals, with ECRE holding a strict interest in its stakeholders alone.

The European Youth Forum Network

For the European Youth Forum (node 45), I look at the International Lesbian, Gay and Transgender Alliance Europe (ILGA-Europe, node 39) and the International Falcon Movement - Socialist Educational International (hereafter IFM, node 38) for issue emergence and collective action, and failed emergence and collective action.

ILGA-Europe has had a long history of dealing with issues of discrimination, but like many other early advocacy groups, its focus was mainly on employment (*see for example* ILGA Europe 2005). The earliest date of ILGA's adoption of the problem definition of discrimination as something affecting a whole cross-section of society and the need for legislative redress is traceable to April 2006, where it urged:

> We strongly recommend the European Union to speed up the development of a horizontal anti-discrimination directive to protect against all forms of discrimination in the provision of and access to goods and services and to extent existing legislation beyond the employment directive, especially into the classroom protecting young people from discrimination.
>
> (ILGA Europe 2006, 93)

That same month Youth Forum released its own policy statement where it called on the EU:

> [To promote] the development of a horizontal anti-discrimination directive to protect against all forms of discrimination in goods and services, and also to extend the legislation beyond the employment directive, to ensure, for example, that the policy is also effective in protecting young people from discrimination in classrooms. Thus we want this directive to reach out all people potentially affected by discrimination.
>
> (European Youth Forum 2006)

The two statements are practically the same, right down to the emphasis on how youth are affected by discrimination in the classroom. It is not surprising that these two NGOs

share the same identical discourse, as many youth are grappling with issues of sexuality in addition to issues associated with their age. Moreover, Youth Forum even acknowledges that "disability, sexual orientation and religious belief (among other grounds) can intertwine with age, gender and '*race'* so as to render many young people victims to multiple discrimination" (European Youth Forum 2006, 4). Thus, Youth Form shows how this overlap can have an effect on its stakeholders. There is therefore substantial turf overlap between Youth Forum and ILGA Europe. Certainly the issue would not conflict with either of their respective policy stances either, as they are both already concerned about discrimination in general. It is also clear form the two above quotes that they both specify the problem and solutions, and even frame it as affecting young people; thus sharing issue salience.

Youth Forum and ILGA Europe participated in collective action on four occasions between 2007 and 2010 (see AGE Platform Europe 2007; AGE Platform Europe 2008b; Social Platform et al. 2008; EAPN 2010). Moreover, all of Youth Forum's instances of collective action involved work on projects or campaigns which involved ILGA Europe. It is clear from the issue definitions provided above and the two NGO's prescribed solutions that they share the same goals, which would address discrimination. It is also clear that by pooling resources and capabilities, Youth Forum and ILGA Europe, in addition to the other NGOs in the core-cohort (i.e. AGE Platform, EDF, EYL, and ENAR) that together they represent the multiple faces of discrimination under one solid banner. Finally, by working together on collective action, these NGOs are not only raising the profile of the issue but also re-enforcing their authority as experts on the issue, thus re-affirming and perhaps improving their status as leaders in the field. For example,

in 2007 Youth Forum and the five other core-SNGOs co-organized a conference on multiple-discrimination and in its collective press-release noted:

> By convening this seminar, the organisers wish to encourage closer ties and enhance networking between different civil society organisations involved in the work for equality and fight against discrimination, in order to promote effective responses at both the European and national levels.
>
> (AGE Platform Europe et al. 2007)

The press release itself demonstrates that there is incentive to participating in that it would increase the quality of the network they share and encourage closer ties. Thus, there is material incentive to collaborating. The passage also suggests that the need to collaborate on anti-discrimination solutions goes beyond the immediate six NGOs that wrote the letter, positioning them as leaders of the movement, thus demonstrating status incentives. Overall, collective action between these core-SNGOs appears to occur because the mechanisms of shared goals, and material and status incentives are provide a net benefit for the group as well as the individual organizations themselves.

For IFM (node 38), issue emergence has faltered because of differences over how it is best to be dealt with. As IFM's full name suggests (International Falcon Movement - Socialist Educational International), it has a focus on education. Though there is room in its turf to accommodate the issue as regards to problems of discrimination, particularly for youth, there is less incentive for this organization to go that extra mile because its understanding of the solution is rooted in educating society's youth. As its *Our values* page indicates "Through education we raise awareness on the mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination and empower children and young people to stand up against inequalities" (IFM-SEI 2012a). It follows that the organization provides awareness campaigns on bullying and discrimination (IFM-SEI 2012b) , capacity building exercises

on discrimination (IFM-SEI 2012c), and teacher resources such as activities geared toward sensitizing children to diversity and inclusion. Not only does the approach imply that the NGO sees a different means to addressing discrimination issues pro-actively which would render it problematic as regards salience, but the legislative push conflicts with its grass-roots approach which seeks to empower children and youth themselves. Moreover, to put resources into arguing a parallel discourse about the need for legislation may take away from resources IFM is already dependent on to run its own campaigns. Thus, IFM fails to hold the same understanding of the issue of discrimination on grounds of conflict as well as salience. There is no record of collective action on this issue between the two NGOs either suggesting, in this case, that there are conflicting goals; with IFM advocating youth empowerment and Youth Forum advocating legislative change.

In sum, while Youth Forum and ILGA-Europe had shared conceptions of the problem and prescribed identical solutions, allowing for numerous occasions of collective action. IFM did not share in these understandings. It instead viewed the problem from another perspective and clearly believes that youth engagement is the best way to tackle issues of discrimination.

4.3. ENGOs and SNGOs: Unpacking Some Key Differences

The six NGOs looked at in the previous two sub-sections (European Environmental Bureau, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Europe, AGE Platform, European Network Against Racism, and European Youth Forum) provide an illustration of how issues emerge or failed and an account of why collective action occurred, and to a slightly less extent, why it did not. The same type of analysis carried out for these 12 examples also

went into assessing all NGOs in all six sets of networks, totalling 83 different NGOs. The details pertaining to the 83 different NGOs are outlined in **Table 4.2** (***ENGO and SNGO Results for Issue Emergence and Collective Action***), which illustrates the distribution of issue emergence and collective action across the combined ENGO case studies and combined SNGO case studies. The table shows the NGOs that did or did not have issue emergence as well as those that did or did not engage in collective action. In addition, the table also shows how many times each NGO engaged in collective action (see "Freq." column).

An interesting finding is that the ENGOs tended to engage in collective action through the publication of joint reports such as *Biofuels: Handle with Care* (Birdlife Europe *et al*. 2009), or *Driving to Destruction* (ActionAid International *et al*. 2010), while SNGOs tended to rally the European Commission directly through letters or campaigns or engage in conferences and seminars about the issue. Barely any SNGOs collaborated on joint-reports, but many of them issued joint-press releases (*see for example* EAPN *et al*. 2012; ILGA Europe *et al*. 2008) or organized awareness events instead (*see for example* AGE Platform Europe *et al*. 2007; PPT2TXT 2007). Because most instances of collective action that occurred among ENGOs were in the form of joint publications, the relative resources and time commitment to such endeavors was likely larger than that required for activities carried out by SNGOs, which may to a certain extent explain why there was less collective action for ENGOs overall. The three largest examples of collective action in the ENGO population are all joint publications, *Off Target* (Green 10 2009), *Biofuels – Handle with Care* (Birdlife Europe et al. 2009), and *Driving to Destruction* (ActionAid International et al. 2010), compared to a letter

campaign (EAPN, Caritas Europa *et al*. 2012) or joint statements or press-releases (AGE Platform Europe *et al*. 2007; EAPN *et al*. 2012), which often brought in a mix of other network members other than the core (i.e. AGE Platform, ENAR, ILGA Europe, European Women's Lobby, European Youth Forum, and European Disability Forum). Those additional NGOs likely saw an advantage to participating because of the overall low cost of signing a name to a letter or campaign or participating in an awareness building seminar or conference. Therefore, the difference of cost in participating in collective action may have a powerful influence on how often NGOs engage in collective action. Since the standard approach to collective action among ENGOs was joint publications, the cost was larger than SNGOs, which meant ENGOs could only engage in collective action on the biofuels issue as determined by availability of funds.

One other factor that may explain why ENGOs work more collaboratively on publications while SNGOs do not may be because the nature of the information being dealt with is inherently different for each subject. This is also related to cost because the nature of the data is more time consuming and costly to present. In early waves of the biofuel debate there was less reliance on joint publications, but as more scientific information became available, ENGOs likely saw the utility of integrating such discourses into their criticisms. In order to afford to create such products, ENGOs would need to collaborate to reduce the overall costs. For SNGOs dealing with the anti-discrimination issue, the discourse is less reliant on hard-science and more on logic or reason, such as by referring to United Nations' conventions or EU treaty articles (*see for example* AGE Platform Europe 2010; AGE Platform Europe et al. 2010; AGE Platform Europe 2008a; European Womon's Lobby 2008; European Women's Lobby 2008).

Consequently, they can either work together or independently on conducting research with little consequence. To be clear, this is not to say that one method has succeeded where another has not, because this is not what I have been researching; instead, the focus is on the similarities and differences in how issue emergence and collective action occur, particularly in regard to their proposed mechanisms.

ENGO Networks	Issue Emergence	Collective Action	Freq.
NAME			
acleu.eu	0	0	0
anec.eu	0	0	0
anped.org	1	0	0
arche-noah.at	0	0	0
bankwatch.org	0	0	0
caneurope.org	1	1	1
chemtrust.org.uk	0	0	0
corporatejustice.org	0	0	0
e3g.org	0	0	0
eaa-europe.eu	0	0	0
ecostandard.org	0	0	0
eeb.org	1	1	6
env-health.org	1	1	1
eufed.org	0	0	0
europe.birdlife.org	1	1	5
foeeurope.org	1	1	4
fsc.org	0	0	0
green10.org/	1	1	1
Greenpeace.org/eu-unit	1	1	**4**
ifoam.org	1	0	0
inforse.org	1	0	0
irfnet.ch	0	0	0
mio-ecsde.org	0	0	0
municipalwasteeurope.eu/	0	0	0
natuurpunt.be	1	0	0
oceana.org	0	0	0
pan-europe.info	1	0	0
rototomsunsplash.com	0	0	0
seas-at-risk.org	0	0	0
shipbreakingplatform.org	0	0	0
slowfood.com	0	0	0
theicct.org	1	0	0
transportenvironment.org	1	1	3
unpo.org	0	0	0
usse-eu.org	0	0	0
wecf.eu	1	0	0
wwf.eu	1	1	1
TOTAL	**15**	**9**	
PROPORTION	**0.41**	**0.24**	
		Mean	**0.7**

SNGO Networks	Issue Emergence	Collective Action	Freq.
NAME			
aedh.eu	1	0	0
age-platform.eu	1	1	9
alzheimer-europe.org	0	0	0
autismeurope.org/	1	1	1
cancernurse.eu	0	0	0
caritas.de	1	1	1
ceji.org	1	1	2
cev.be	0	0	0
coface-eu.org	1	0	0
crdm.cz*	-	-	-
csreurope.org	0	0	0
eaea.org	1	0	0
eapn.eu	1	1	3
ecas-citizens.eu	1	0	0
ecdl.org	0	0	0
ecre.org	0	0	0
edf-feph.org/	1	1	6
efc.be	0	1	1
enar-eu.org/	1	1	8
enna-europe.org	0	0	0
epda.eu.com	1	1	0
epha.org	1	1	1
esn.org	1	0	0
eucis-lll.eu	1	0	0
eufed.org	0	0	0
eu-patient.eu	0	0	0
euroblind.org	1	1	1
eurochild.org/	1	1	2
eurodiaconia.org	1	1	1
eurohealthnet.eu	1	0	0
europe.wagggsworld.org	0	1	1
europeancancerleagues.org	0	0	0
feantsa.org	1	1	1
federalists.eu	0	0	0
fefaf.be	0	0	0
flarenetwork.org	0	0	0
fundacionyuste.es	0	0	0
hope.be	0	0	0
ifm-sei.org	0	0	0
ilga-europe.org/	1	1	5
irct.org	0	0	0
jef.eu	0	0	0
mijarc.info	0	0	0
picum.org	0	0	0
womenlobby.org	1	1	5
youthforum.org	1	1	3
TOTAL	**23**	**18**	
PROPORTION	**0.52**	**0.40**	
		Mean	**1.09**

Table 4.2 - ENGO and SNGO Network Results for Issue Emergence and Collective Action

On the other hand, smaller NGOs such as the Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE) may be unable to participate in larger projects such as joint reports. As noted in the examples above, MIO-

ECSDE operates on a substantially smaller budget than any of the three lead ENGOs it is directly connected to and would likely feel the cost and time commitment greater as a consequence of its limited budget. Collective research projects may also serve as a tool to limiting the number of actors involved in a given project, which allows for greater control of the output, and as a result, the network. Since the quality of voluntary collective action diminishes as population size increases (Olson 1971), there may be incentive for the top NGOs to monopolize published output; thus controlling both the issue frame and the scientific evidence used to back it up. In the SNGO population the mix of NGOs in addition to the standard core (AGE Platform, ENAR, EAPN, European Disability Forum, European Women's Lobby, ILGA-Europe, and European Youth Forum) is strikingly more diverse.

Another interesting finding from the case studies relates to two paradoxes that have been uncovered; first, some SNGOs that did not acknowledge the issue of anti-discrimination legislation on their own websites nonetheless participated in collective action, while, second, this phenomenon has not occurred in the ENGO population. To be clear, this does not mean that the issue was not mentioned on the websites at all, but instead means that it was not defined according to diagnostic and prognostic frames that would indicate issue salience, and consequently issue emergence.

Three different NGOs engaged in collective action despite not having issue salience; Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM, node 43), the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS, node 30), and the European Foundation Centre (EFC, node 17), but all three appear to have failed on grounds of salience, meaning their diagnostic and prognostic frames were not the

same as that of AGE Platform. In some ways their involvement in collective action may reflect almost a bandwagoning effect; as more NGOs get involved in an issue, others may see this as a sign to get involved as well and join because of the relatively low cost. For example, though EFC is active in anti-discrimination issues, its website does not explicitly take a stand on anti-discrimination in the same way as AGE Platform; instead posting updates about what the European Commission (EC) is doing, such as seminars on the EU anti-discrimination policy[8] (EFC 2005), surveys about discrimination (EFC 2007a), or updates on reports released by the EC (EFC 2007b). It is not clear from the picture presented by EFC what its own stance is on the issue, and therefore it was recorded as having not emerged on grounds of salience, but it nonetheless participated in collective action in April 2008 by actively supporting a campaign initiated by some members of parliament and several NGOs, including AGE Platform (EFC 2008). The low cost of simply 'passing along' the message to its constituents makes them participants in the collective campaign because they likely do not have much to lose by doing so.

The other two SNGOs that had engaged in collective action despite failed issue emergence on their websites also did not have issue salience. The root of the problem may be in the stringent requirements of the salience mechanism itself. Issue salience is dependent on diagnostic and prognostic issue frames being the same for any two or more NGOs. If they are different or there is no frame to compare, the issue cannot be said to have emerged the same as it has for others. But if that were the case the same phenomenon would likely also appear in the ENGO population, but it does not. Another explanation may be that these NGOs implicitly support such progress in equality rights

[8] Note that 'policy' in this context refers only to the EU position, and not to formal legislation.

but explicitly remain rather neutral or remain focussed primarily on their own stakeholders' concerns, thus restricting the issue frame to how it relates to their stakeholders. This again would explain why they would nonetheless participate in relatively low cost instances of collective action that are close enough to their own issue frames without violating them. By comparison, ENGOs engaged in collective action that was rather high cost compared to SNGOs, in the form of joint publications. It appears that relative cost therefore is the most likely explanation; after all, both ENGOs and SNGOs had some instances of collective action which preceded issue emergence. This possibility would most effectively be observed through interviews or surveys, which fall beyond the scope of the research at hand.

Turning to the other paradox, where the ENGO population does not have any instances where collective action occurred in the absence of issue emergence, it would appear that because most instances of collective action in this population relate to contributing to jointly-published reports, there is less room for NGOs to sit on the sidelines. A core-cohort of ENGOs often works together; the EEB, Birdlife International, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth. By April 21st, 2008, all four of these NGOs wrote a joint letter to the European Commission criticizing its failure to take into account indirect land-use changes in its evaluation criteria regarding biofuels (Greenpeace EU et al. 2008). When it came time to write the Green 10 report *Off Target* (Green 10 2009), therefore, there may have been enough ENGOs to serve as a tipping point for the issue. The involvement of these NGOs in a collective report may have brought others in on the issue that before had not registered it as salient. Thus, though there was a lag-time between when collective action occurred and when some NGOs adopted the issue, this

may have been the result in getting involved in a publication that was sufficiently broad in scope that those that were not fully aware of the issue were exposed to it during the process of collective action itself.

4.4 Tackling Issue Emergence and Collective Action

As mentioned in the methodology section of this research, I employed a tic-tac-toe method to ascertained who engaged with whom and when regarding issue emergence and collective action. Essentially, the lead NGO in each of the six cases (European Environmental Bureau, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, AGE Platform, European Network Against Racism, and European Youth Forum) is able to be compared with the dates with which other NGOs in their respective networks demonstrated issue emergence on their websites, or in records obtained from other websites, in order to determine when and for whom issue emergence occurred earliest. The same methodology also looks at earliest moments of collective action. While it cannot be proven simply by the paper-trail I followed in process tracing that one NGO did influence another, especially regarding issue emergence, there is nonetheless a time line of each issue's evolution in each network. **Table 4.3 (*Earliest Instance of Issue Emergence and Collective Action*)** demonstrates the results of the tic-tac-toe method for issue emergence and collective action, while **Table 4.4** (***Instances of Collective Action by Date***) demonstrates a more detailed breakdown of all instances where each NGO participated in collective action. Each date represents a time when the NGO in question engaged in collective action with the top NGO its respective case study, although many engaged with more than one top NGO. Thus, for example, in Table 8 ILGA-Europe (node 39) was involved in collective action on five separate occasions. The tables allow for a chronology of each issue's

evolution within its respective population and also for the evolution and instances of collective action.

ENGOs	Issue	CA	SNGOs	Issue	CA
europe.birdlife.org	Mar-08	Apr-08	age-platform.eu	Nov-02	Sep-07
eeb.org	Mar-08	Apr-08	edf-feph.org/	Jan-03	Sep-07
transportenvironment.org	Dec-08	Jun-09	feantsa.org	Feb-06	Jun-12
foeeurope.org	Nov-09	Apr-08	ilga-europe.org	Apr-06	Sep-07
green10.org/	Nov-09	Jun-09	youthforum.org	Apr-06	Sep-07
greenpeace.org/	Nov-09	Apr-08	ceji.org	Dec-06	Oct-06
pan-europe.info	Dec-09	-	caritas.org	Jan-07	Mar-07
anped.org	Dec-09	-	eapn.eu	Nov-07	Mar-07
wecf.eu	Dec-09	-	womenlobby.org	Jun-08	Mar-07
natuurpunt.be	Sep-10	-	eucis-lll.eu	Jul-08	-
inforse.org	Dec-10	-	enar-eu.org	Oct-08	Oct-06
wwf.eu	Sep-11	Jun-09	aedh.eu	Dec-08	-
theicct.org	Nov-11	-	ecas-citizens.eu	Jan-09	-
ifoam.org	Dec-11	-	epha.org	Nov-09	Nov-08
env-health.org	Mar-12	Jun-09	epda.eu.com	Dec-11	-
caneurope.org	Sep-12	Jun-09	eurohealthnet.eu	Dec-11	-
			eurochild.org/	Jun-12	Jun-12
			eurodiaconia.org	Jun-12	Jun-12
			autismeurope.org/	Jul-12	Jul-12
			euroblind.org	Nov-12*	Jun-11
			picum.org	-	Mar-07
			efc.be	-	Apr-08
			europe.wagggsworld.org	-	Jun-08

Table 4.3 - Earliest Instance of Issue Emergence and Collective Action (CA)
Note: for Euroblind.org* there was no date provided on its website as per when its position about the anti-discrimination directive was made publicly, thus the month and year for when it was observed in this research is provided.

For **Table 4.3** the results of these time-lines demonstrate for the ENGO network that European Environmental Bureau (node 12) and Birdlife (node 15) hold the earliest date of issue emergence under the discourse of indirect land use changes (ILUCs) and biofuels (March 2008), followed by Transport & Environment (node33) (December 2008). Collective action soon followed by April 2008, involving four EEB, Greenpeace, Birdlife, and Transport & Environment. EEB was not formally connected to either Birdlife or Transport and Environment (T&A) according to the network results returned by Issue Crawler, but Birdlife was in Greenpeace's directed network while T&A was in both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth's (node 16) networks. This suggests that to a certain extent the process tracing has uncovered a more intricate network than initially

provided by Issue Crawler. The height of issue emergence for ENGOs was June 2009, which coincides with the release of the Green 10 Report, *Off Target* (Green 10 2009). Moreover, as is indicated in **Table 4.4**, all ENGOs that engaged in collective action have evidently been involved in the *Off Target* report (in June 2009).

AGE Platform (node 2, in the SNGO network) holds the earliest date of issue emergence for the SNGO network regarding anti-discrimination from November 2002, followed closely by European Disability Forum (EDF, node 16) in January 2003. The lag between this early period of issue emergence and the first case of collective action is substantially longer than in the ENGO network, with ENAR (node 18) and CEJI (node 7) actually being the first to participate in collective action in October 2006. For SNGOs there is a space of more than three years between when AGE Platform and EDF adopted the issue compared to when others like FEANTSA (node 32), ILGA Europe (node 39) and European Youth Forum (Youth Forum, node 45) adopted it. This delay suggests that some other factor other than the emergence of the issue among AGE Platform and EDF catalyzed issue emergence for other core members. After the core NGOs adopted the issue, the remainder adopted it at a fairly consistent rate of between 2 and 4 NGOs a year. As mentioned above, in 2004 President Barroso of the European Commission pushed forward an agenda to bring forth an anti-discrimination directive (ENAR 2008), and it is likely that this event was a catalyst to other NGOs taking notice of the issue.

ENGO NETWORK	DATES of Collective Action
europe.birdlife.org	(Apr 2008) (Jun 2009) (Nov 2009) (Nov 2010) (Sep 2011)
eeb.org	(Apr 2008) (Jun 2009) (Nov 2009) (Nov 2010) (Sep 2011)
foeeurope.org	(Apr 2008) (Jun 2009) (Nov 2009) (Nov 2010)
Greenpeace.org/eu-unit	(Apr 2008) (Jun 2009) (Nov 2010) (Sep 2011)
caneurope.org	(Jun 2009)
env-health.org	(Jun 2009)
green10.org/	(Jun 2009)
transportenvironment.org	(Jun 2009) (Nov 2009) (Nov 2010) (Nov 2011)
wwf.eu	(Jun 2009)
SNGO NETWORK	**DATES of Collective Action**
enar-eu.org/	(Oct 2006) (Mar 2007a) (Sep 2007) (Jan 2008) (Jun 2008) (Dec 2008) (Jun 2012) (Jul 2012)
ceji.org	(Oct 2006) (Mar 2007a)
age-platform.eu	(Sep 2007) (Apr 2008) (Jun 2008) (Nov 2008) (Dec 2008) (Mar 2009) (Jun 2011) (Jan 2012) (Jun 2012) (Jul 2012)
caritas-europa.org	(Mar 2007b) (Jun 2012)
eapn.eu	(Mar 2007b) (Jun 2008)
picum.org	(Mar 2007b)
womenlobby.org	(Mar 2007b) (Sep 2007) (Jun 2008) (Jun 2012) (Jul 2012) (Sep 2007) (Mar 2009) (Jun 2011) (Jan 2012) (Jun 2012)
edf-feph.org/	(Jul 2012)
ilga-europe.org/	(Sep 2007) (Jun 2008) (Dec 2008) (Jan 2012) (Jul 2012)
youthforum.org	(Sep 2007) (Jun 2008) (Dec 2008)
efc.be	(Apr 2008)
europe.wagggsworld.org	(Jun 2008)
epha.org	(Nov 2008)
autismeurope.org/	(Jul 2012)
eurochild.org/	(Jun 2012)
feantsa.org	(Jun 2012)
euroblind.org	(Jun 2011) (Jul 2012)
eurodiaconia.org	(Jun 2012)

Table 4.4 - Instances of Collective Action Ranked by Date

For both groups (ENGOs and SNGOs) collective action began roughly around the same time (between 2006 and 2008) and early participants, for the most part, appear to have engaged in it more frequently than those that joined got engaged in the issue at later dates. Those NGOs that were most senior in their hierarchies, EEB and AGE Platform respectively, were among the earliest issue proponents of their respective issues. The reason that ENAR and CEJI are the earliest collaborators in 2006 is because they both participated in addressing the EC, as was shown in the earlier in this chapter. Overall, however, it is clear that the SNGOs engaged in collective action in more instances and with greater frequency than the ENGOs. The next section will address this directly.

4.5 Comparing ENGO and SNGO Networks in Issue Emergence and Collective Action

As was confirmed in the previous chapter, the ENGO population represent the less hierarchical network structure and SNGO population represent the more hierarchical one. This section compares the results of the six case studies regarding issue emergence and collective action for the two populations in their aggregate form.

A summary of the findings regarding issue emergence for each of the six networks, as well as combined totals for each population is displayed in **Table 4.5 (*Issue Emergence in ENGO and SNGO Networks*)**. In order to hold population size constant, I provide proportional values in percentages to represent the share of issue emergence that occurred in each NGO's network used in the case studies. In calculating the combined totals, or aggregates (i.e. "All ENGOs" or "All SNGOs), a significant danger exists in simply tallying the results of all three networks in each population in order to determine which population has a greater amount of issue emergence. The problem is that there is much overlap between some networks. Consequently, if I merely add them all up I will end up noting, for instance, that World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and ILGA-Europe had issue emergence three times each (because they each appear in all three respective networks). To account for this, where cases of issue emergence have been observed, other observations of the same NGO in other networks that were also positive have been dropped from the analysis, but *only* for the combined aggregate data. In short, issue emergence can only occur once, regardless of how many networks a particular NGO is connected to. The table also bears into consideration that, for both the case studies and aggregate, the issues have already emerged for the top NGO in their respective networks,

and have therefore not been included in the tallies for their direct networks. The same principle has been applied to the combined networks by removing EEB and AGE Platform from the total counts of issue emergence, because they are the NGOs from which I have compared all others to in regard to problem definitions and solutions.

	Number of NGOs	Unique Cases	Total Emergence	Proportion
EEB	21	2	10	48%
Greenpeace	23	5	12	52%
FOE Europe	20	0	12	60%
AGE Platform	30	6	18	60%
ENAR	17	3	14	82%
European Youth Forum	15	1	7	46%
ALL ENGOs	37	5	15	41.7%
ALL SNGOs	44	9	23	52.3%

Table 4.5 - Issue Emergence in ENGO and SNGO Networks

In **Table 4.5**, at the individual network level, EEB and AGE Platform have proportional shares of issue emergence at 48 percent and 60 percent, respectively, within their directed networks. In addition, European Youth Forum (EYF) had the lowest proportion (46 percent) out of all the networks, with Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth Europe (FOE Europe) having larger proportions than EYF, 52 percent and 60 percent, respectively. It was expected that all networks on the SNGO side would have greater proportions of issue emergence than the SNGOs because the SNGO population was found to be more centralized and more hierarchical in the previous chapter, but this is not the case for EYF.

In the column titled *unique cases,* which refers to the number of NGOs that adopted the issue that do not belong to any of the other networks, there is a notable difference between the ENGO and SNGO sets of networks. FOE Europe's network does not have any unique cases while the EEB only has two. In other words, all 20 NGOs that FOE Europe is connected to are either connected to the EEB or Greenpeaces' networks,

or both, while only 2 of the 21 NGOs that the EEB is directly connected to are not connected to either Greenpeace or FOE. Meanwhile, for the SNGO set of networks, all three networks have at least one case and they get proportionally smaller from AGE Platform downward. Overall, the ENGO population has substantially more overlap than the SNGO population, and, though EEB, Greenpeace, and FOE Europe have rather high numbers of connections, they are actually quite intertwined regarding which other NGOs they are connected to.

The FOE Europe network had 60 percent issue emergence, a value even higher than Greenpeace (52 percent) or the EEB (48 percent), which was the highest ranking ENGO in the hierarchy. Surprisingly, EYF has the opposite result of FOE Europe, where it is lowest among ENAR (82 percent) and AGE Platform (60 percent). Considering the fact that FOE Europe has no unique cases in combination with the fact it has the highest proportion of issue emergence may suggest that FOE Europe shares relationships with many NGOs that either of the other two on their own are not as well connected to. In other words, FOE Europe is in an ideal position to bring together a number of NGOs that would otherwise not be affiliated with one or the other top ENGOs. Then again, EYF's network only has one unique case and had the lowest proportion of issue emergence out of all the NGOs looked at in the case studies. The ambiguity of these results suggests that the fit between network structure and issue emergence may not be as snug as was expected, at least when the networks of each case study are looked at separately. Since the direct networks of the lead NGOs do not operate in isolation – meaning some of the NGOs that Greenpeace is directly connected to are, for example, also connected to EEB or FOE Europe – it is therefore a good policy to look at them collectively in their

aggregate form, as indicated in the bottom two rows of Table 4.5. Perhaps the source of the problem is the duplication of organizations from one network to another. As mentioned above, WWF exists in all three networks on the ENGO side, while ILGA-Europe exists in all three networks on the SNGO side. When the same NGO adopts or does not adopt the issue across multiple networks that it appears in, it is sufficient to use only one of the cases, to account for such inflations. Thus, the combined ENGO network yields a proportion of issue emergence of 41.7 percent compared to the SNGO network's 52.3 percent. To be clear, what these results mean is that at the aggregate level – where repeated instances of issue emergence are removed so that each NGO that has been shown to have adopted the issue in more than one network is only noted as having adopted it once – the data appears to indicate that there is a difference of about 10 percent between the less hierarchically structured and the more hierarchically structure networks, i.e. between ENGO and SNGO respectively. In other words, more than half of the SNGO population shared the same problem definition and solutions regarding anti-discrimination legislation as AGE Platform, while 10 percent less ENGOs shared the same problem definitions about biofuels as the EEB.

Finally, I compare the differences in failed issue emergence in the two combined populations to see which mechanisms were most often triggered across populations. **Table 4.6** (***ENGO and SNGO Failed Emergence***) provides a breakdown of where cases failed at each mechanism for the ENGOs and SNGOs. Overall, 58.3 percent of the ENGOs studied in the case studies did not adopt the biofuels discourse consistent with the EEB's interpretation of the problem and solution, while only 47.7 percent of SNGOs didn't adopt the anti-discrimination discourse as advocated by AGE Platform. Some

interesting differences are evident however when each mechanism is compared across populations. Specifically, no specific network population is uniformly higher or lower across all three mechanisms. Since ENGOs were the less hierarchical network structure, I expected that each mechanism would have proportionally more instances where issues failed compared to the SNGO network population. As the table demonstrates, this is clearly not the case. Four percent more SNGOs had problems with the turf mechanism than ENGOs, even though SNGOs were expected to have fewer problems across the board. ENGOs only had comparably less problems for conflict and salience (i.e. diagnostic and prognostic frames). The ambiguity of these results conflict with the expectations that network structures would have an effect on all three mechanisms in the same way.

	NGOs	Emergence	Non-Emergence	Turf	Conflict	Salience
ENGOs	36	15 (41.7%)	21 (58.3%)	10 (27.8%)	6 (16%)	5 (13.9%)
SNGOs	44	23 (52.3%)	21 (47.7%)	14 (31.8%)	2 (4.5%)	4 (9%)

Table 4.6 - ENGO and SNGO Failed Issue Emergence

In sum, on the one hand, comparing each of the network case-studies individually yields questionable results, especially considering the paradox demonstrated by FOE and EYF's similarly low unique case scores but strikingly different proportions of issue emergence. On the other hand, when the results of the case studies are pooled and repeated cases within ENGO and SNGO networks are eliminated, the less hierarchical ENGO network structure is 10 percent less effective than the more hierarchical SNGO network structure at allowing issue emergence to materialize. Yet, when the mechanisms themselves are each looked at in turn, there is much less uniformity, and one can see that the majority of the reason why ENGOs had less instances of issue emergence than

SNGOs is because of problems relating to conflict and salience. Turf, as the quintessential first step in the long road to issue emergence, was less problematic for SNGOs than for ENGOs. Overall, therefore, while it can be concluded that on the whole SNGOs had a greater proportion of issue emergence than ENGOs, the mechanisms provide greater clarity as to where and why this is the case. Moreover, they show that the most hierarchical network structure did not have fewer problems with turf wars, conflict, and conflicting frames across the board.

Moving on to address network structure and collective action, **Table 4.7** (***Collective Action in ENGO and SNGO Networks***) displays the results of the same six NGOs used in the case studies, plus aggregate totals. When NGOs have been shown to participate in *different* sets of collective action at different times, these were recorded as different instances of collective action, reflected in heading "Unique Instances". Collective action occurs if and only if there was confirmation (i.e. written proof obtained through process tracing of websites and databases) that an NGO within a case study was noted as having participated in collective action with the lead NGO in the case study in question. The final two columns refers to the total number of NGOs that participated in collective action from each case study (*Total Engaged*), and the Proportion of each case study that engaged in collective action with the top NGO in question. At the bottom of the table again, are the aggregate totals for ENGOs and SNGOs.

Taking each network individually, the SNGO with the largest share of collective action was ENAR who engaged in collective action with twice as many NGOs as FOE Europe, who was the ENGO that engaged in collective action with the most other NGOs. To put this into perspective, ENAR participated in collective action with 70 percent of

the NGOs it is directly connected to; while FOE Europe only participated in collective action with 35 percent of the NGOs it was directly connected to. The EEB had smallest proportion of collective action among ENGOs networks (29 percent) compared to Greenpeace (30 percent) and FOE Europe (35 percent). In the SNGO group, ENAR had the greatest proportion of collective action, with a staggering 70 percent, followed by AGE Platform (50 percent) and EYF (33 percent). Thus, neither the EEB nor AGE Platform were participated in collective action with the largest amount of NGOs. Overall, however, almost twice the amount of SNGOs engaged in collective action (41 percent) than ENGOs did (22 percent).

	Number of NGOs	Unique Instances	Total Engaged	Mean Freq.	Proportion
EEB	21	5	6	-	29%
Greenpeace	23	2	7	-	30%
FOE Europe	20	4	7	-	35%
AGE Platform	30	9	13	-	43%
ENAR	17	8	12	-	70%
European Youth Forum	15	4	5	-	33%
ALL ENGOs	38	6	10	0.7	22%
ALL SNGOs	45	12	22	1.09	41%

Table 4.7 - Collective Action in ENGO and SNGO Networks
Note: the heading Mean Freq. refers to the number of times each NGO participated in collective action when averaged across the entire population, including NGOs that did not participate at all.

Finally, the table also demonstrates that not only did the SNGO network have greater proportions of collective action, but those NGOs that *did* engage in collective action, on average, engaged in collective action more frequently than those in the ENGO network. This is evident in the *Mean Freq*[9] column, where ENGOs participated in collective action an average of .7 times each, while SNGOs an average of 1.09 times each.

[9] Mean Freq. stands for mean frequency; calculated as the *sum of all instances of collective action for each NGO divided by the number of actors in the population minus one*.

4.6 Issue Emergence and Collective Action: Evaluation of Hypotheses

Overall, Issue emergence and collective action were both less prevalent in the ENGO population than in the SNGO population. Moreover, when ENGOs did engage in collective action, they tended to do so less frequently than in the SNGO population.

Further investigation of the mechanisms of issue emergence themselves reveals that SNGOs, which were expected to encounter comparably less problems across all three of these mechanisms, actually had proportionally greater turf wars than the ENGO population. Thus, even though SNGOs did have more issue emergence and fewer problems with the mechanisms overall, at a finer resolution, SNGOs are not as uniformly successful as expected. Since turf is an important mechanism for issue emergence to occur, one cannot help but conclude that despite the greater extent of hierarchy among SNGOs, the structure itself has not aided to resolve issues of turf. Because my hypothesis (*H2*) expected that where there were increases in hierarchical network structures I would see decreases in turf wars, conflict, and diagnostic and prognostic frame conflicts (i.e. salience), the failure of SNGOs to better negotiate the turf mechanism than ENGOs compels me to reject the hypothesis. Increases in hierarchical network structures *do not* result in fewer turf wars, conflicts, and conflicting diagnostic and prognostic frames. The direct relationship between hierarchical network structures and the mechanisms of issue emergence therefore requires re-examination. This will be revisited in the conclusion.

In addition, I had hypothesized (*H3*) that increases in hierarchical network structure would result in increases in the number of NGOs engaged in the issue as defined by the most senior NGO in the hierarchy. Indeed, having learned in the quantitative analysis that ENGOs were both more centralized and more hierarchical than

SNGOs, the qualitative analysis has shown that SNGOs saw a 10 percent increase in NGOs engaged in the issue compared to ENGOs. Yet, as deeper consideration of the case studies suggests, this may not be alone due to network structure. For one thing, the top NGO in the ENGO social hierarchy (i.e. European Environmental Bureau) should have had a greater proportion of NGOs engaged in the issue than it subordinates (FOE Europe and Greenpeace) – as was the case for the SNGO population, where AGE Platform had more NGOs than European Network Against Racism (ENAR), which had more NGOs than European Youth Forum – but FOE Europe had the highest proportion of NGOs demonstrating issue emergence. The EEB should have had more issue emergence than Greenpeace, which should have had more than FOE Europe. Also, the fact that H2 was falsified on grounds of turf also draws into question the direct causal link which would connect network structure to issue emergence. Therefore, as per these analyses, I can only conclude the relationship may be spurious. I reject the hypothesis that increases the hierarchy leads to increases in the number of NGOs engaged in the issue as defined by the most hierarchical NGO.

Next, process tracing has not allowed for as thorough an investigation of the mechanisms of collective action as was originally envisioned. In particular, in failed instances of collective action, where it has not occurred, it has been difficult to determine why and which mechanisms where not activated. By being denied the possibility of testing against the counterfactual, therefore, H4 can only be regarded as inconclusive. Methodological limitations have therefore led to some inconclusive results and these mechanisms, though in some ways observable, were not uniform enough to truly confirm why or why not an NGO engaged in collective action.

Finally, it is evident that there is also a relationship between issue emergence and collective action, but it is not necessarily linear. In the context of this research, ENGOs have a smaller proportion collective action while SNGOs have a larger proportion of collective action, but the analyses have shown that issue emergence as an intervening variable does not fully explain this relationship. In particular, there are two results which support this conclusion. In the first place, the analysis has revealed that sometimes collective action precedes issue emergence. Though this reverse order materializes a number of times in both populations, the reversal appears to have happened more in the ENGO population than in the SNGO population. The reverse order of collective action preceding issue emergence therefore automatically draws the directionality of the relationship into question. Secondly, and most importantly, in some cases collective action occurred in the complete absence of issue emergence. For the SNGO population there were three cases where issue salience prevented the issue from emerging in the same way as was framed by AGE Platform, but nonetheless these NGOs participated in collective action. The evidence here seems to indicate that NGOs with similar but different issue frames may sometimes participate in collective action if the goal is close enough to compliment or represent their frame. Thus, these two observations taken together, it appears that rather than issue emergence necessarily preceding collective action, sometimes the opposite occurs. Moreover, this may point toward a feedback loop, wherein the increasing number of NGOs involved in the issue over time has an effect on collective action, which in turn indoctrinates other NGOs that were beforehand less cognisant of the issue through the process of collective action itself. This is especially applicable to NGOs such as Greenpeace and FOE Europe, who appear to have lagged

behind other high ranking actors in their network that adopted the issue, but were later shown to have adopted it after having participated in one or more instances of collective action. The act of collective action itself may therefore serve as a mechanism of *legitimization*, adding to issue salience and further encouraging others to adopt the issue. As it stands however, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis (*H4*) that increases in issue emergence see a greater involvement of actors in collective action, because, though this is true, the possibility of reverse causality or a feedback loop render the relationship non-linear. Issue emergence may have an effect on collective action, but it appears that collective action may also have an effect on issue emergence. More needs to be done to understand this relationship more clearly.

In sum, though it was expected that network structure would have an effect on issue emergence, and consequently an effect on collective action, there is evidence that this is not necessarily the case. The most hierarchical structure, being SNGOs, was only successful at surpassing the ENGO structure in two out of the three mechanisms, meaning that the direct relationship between increases in hierarchy and increases in issue emergence is not fully understood. In addition, the relationship between issue emergence and collective action does not appear to be as linear as expected. Sometimes collective action occurs prior to issue emergence or even when it has not occurred at all.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

Understanding the mechanics of the inter-organizational bonds that connect nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating at the international level, which both serve to constrict and enable their behaviour (Hafner-Burton *et al.* 2009), is an important and often overlooked aspect the study of international NGOs. How they interact amongst each other can be seen as a form of governance wherein the characteristics of NGO populations and their structures may play a role in determining the identification and transmission of new issues and subsequent collective action. This research has sought to shed light on the complexity of relationships shared among international level NGOs in order to understand how characteristics of their populations have an effect on collective action on a new issue. Because NGOs are subject to similar internal and external pressures that affect other forms of organizations, such as firms, they cannot be expected to align with others simply on a basis of principled beliefs or moral imperatives (Prakash and Gugerty 2010). It is therefore essential that they be studied in a way which is able to determine how new ideas and issues are understood and adopted by them and why they engage in collective action on a new issue. How do the characteristics of NGO populations affect the ability of NGOs to initiate collective action on a new issue?

A summary of the results of the hypotheses tested is provided in **Table 5.1**, where each hypothesis is stated, the variables or mechanisms listed, and the prognosis provided (i.e. confirmed, falsified, or inconclusive). Taken together, the table presents a linear explanation of the causal chain and its respective hypotheses, and, therefore, the overall evaluation of its contents reflects the answer to the research question. As a result of these tested arguments, I conclude that the relationship between characteristics of NGO

populations and collective action on a new issue is not fully explained by the analysis. The latter hypotheses regarding issue emergence and collective action (and their respective mechanisms) being contingent upon each preceding hypotheses, though methodologically rigorous, demonstrate that there are some as yet undiscovered explanations missing in the overall story. I address the conclusions of the causal chain in turn.

Hypothesis ID	Hypothesis Statement	Variables or Mechanisms	Prognosis / Outcome
H1a	As an NGO makes more connections to other NGOs, measured in degree, it increases its chances of being between more NGOs, as measured in betweeness	Degree / Betweeness	Confirmed
H1b	Across NGO populations, increased centralization, as measured by a degree centralization index, is associated with increased hierarchy, as measured by a betweeness centralization index	Centralization / Hierarchical network structure	Confirmed
H2	Increased hierarchy is associated with decreased turf wars, conflict, and diagnostic and prognostic framing conflicts	Hierarchical network structure / turf, conflict, salience mechanisms	Falsified
H3	Increased hierarchy leads to an increased number of NGOs working on an issue as defined by the most senior NGO in the hierarchy	Hierarchical network structure / Issue emergence	Falsified
H4	Increased issue emergence is associated with decreased conflicts in shared goals and incentives based on status and/or pooling of resources and capabilities	Issue emergence / shared goals, incentives (status and material) mechanisms	Inconclusive
H5	Increased issue emergence leads to an increased number of NGOs engaged in collective action on the issue as defined by the most senior NGO in the hierarchy	Issue emergence / collective action	Falsified

Table 5.1 - Summary of Hypotheses and Outcomes.

It has been argued that changes in characteristics of NGO populations, based primarily on the number of connections each NGO shares with others and the extent to which the whole population is centralized, lead to changes in how each NGO is seen as being between other NGOs in the social hierarchy and the extent to which the network structure is seen as more hierarchical. This is because, on the one hand, the more connections an NGO has the more likely it will be seen as being an integral linchpin in the flow of information and power. On the other hand, the extent to which populations are centralized impacts the extent to which the network structure is more streamlined and hierarchical. Specifically, I expected that the more centralized the population is the more hierarchical the network structure would be because the NGOs most central to the network would be clearly demarcated allowing for less confusion as to which NGO is situated above which. It was also argued that changes in hierarchical network structures would have an effect on issue emergence and collective action because increases in hierarchy make for a more streamlined structure with less ambiguity as to who was located above whom; permitting easier control and promotion of the issue from the top as well as making lower-level NGOs less concerned about shared turf with other similar organizations. Lower level NGOs would therefore hold more connections with organizations higher in the network rather than with NGOs located at similar social strata, allowing for them to feel less threats of redundancy when engaging with a new issue. Consequently, as new issues materialize in more hierarchical network structures, NGOs would be more willing to engage in collective action because they can find shared goals, see the incentives in pooling resources and capabilities, and improving their status. As a

result of increased issue emergence therefore there would be an increase in collective action across the network.

To understand how characteristics of NGO populations are related to network structures, I looked at two levels of analysis; one at the individual level among NGOs in two different populations (social and environmental), to assess the connection between degree and betweeness, and the other at the aggregate level by comparing the two populations, to assess the connection between how centralized a population is and its overall hierarchical network structure. Statistical models revealed that at both the individual level and aggregate level there was a clear connection between characteristics of NGO populations and hierarchical network structures. The models also determined that the environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) were less centralized and less hierarchical than the social nongovernmental organizations (SNGOs). In short, characteristics of NGO populations do appear to have an impact on the extent to which a network structure becomes more or less hierarchical; SNGOs are more hierarchical while ENGOs are less.

I had also expected to see a clear link between hierarchical network structures and issue emergence. As a result of Carpenter's previous work, three key mechanisms had been isolated pertaining to issue emergence (Carpenter 2007a). These included conflicts over turf, which stop NGOs from being willing to adopt the issue flat out because it is not seen as fitting within the organization's mandate; conflicts over issue 'fit' in relation to other issues being advocated or funding required to administer other projects, which would reject the issue based on conflict, and; conflicts over diagnostic and prognostic issue frames, which determine if any two NGOs share the same frame or divergent

frames. Since the topic of issue emergence has been highly understudied in general (Carpenter 2007b), one of my objectives was to scrutinize these mechanisms, which had not yet been tested empirically. In doing so, I hypothesized that issue emergence was dependent on network structure, and that those network structures that were more hierarchical would see more NGOs engaged in the issue as it was defined by the most senior NGO in the population. I conclude that the mechanisms do appear to work, confirming Carpenter's observations, but cannot conclude that issue emergence itself is dependent on network structure because of some rather puzzling results. While social NGOs overall encountered less problems in negotiating the 'fit' and 'salience' mechanisms compared to environmental NGOs (ENGOs), they also encountered more turf wars than the ENGOs. This was not expected at all, thus, throwing into question the causal relationship between hierarchy and issue emergence. Therefore, though there is evidence of some relationship between hierarchy and issue emergence, it is not fully explained by these mechanisms. There may be some other factor yet to be considered, such as characteristics of the issue itself, or some other measurement of network structure.

I had also expected to see a clear and linear relationship between issue emergence and collective action. Not only does this make intuitive sense, because people or organizations would be rather foolish to engage in collective action when they are not aware of the issue which collective action is addressing, but it is also an expectation presumed by academics. Empirical study after empirical study (*see for example* Joachim and Locher 2009; Zito and Jacobs 2009; Mahoney 2008; Joachim 2007; Warleigh 2000) continually establish a coherent chronology of organizations becoming cognisant of an

issue in particular and then, based on their interpretation of the issue and their own goals and incentives to collaborate, deciding to participate in collective action or not. In short, they take pre-existence of the issue as a given for all the NGOs involved. What my research has uncovered however is that not all issue emergence and collective action is linear but instead sometimes occurs the other way around for some organizations. Sometimes collective action, especially when it has a rather broad mandate such as the Green 10 report card on the European Commission's track record on sustainable development (*see* Green 10 2009), will start with a large core of NGOs of which not all have embraced a particular issue, yet through the process of collective action those that have not adopted the issue yet become indoctrinated and later adopt it having now been exposed to it. Moreover, the act of collective action itself may serve as a means of legitimization which adds to the salience of the issue itself, making it more easily adoptable. This reversed trend occurred in both populations studied in the qualitative analysis. Environmental organizations sometimes worked on joint letters or reports, which later saw an increase in issue emergence among the NGOs that had been involved in the collective action. Also, social organizations sometimes participated in joint-letter campaigns though not formally acknowledging the issue at hand, only doing so after participating in collective action.

Therefore, sometimes collective action itself may be part of the social learning process involved in issue emergence and there is a need to study this further. Academic work on norm diffusion such as that of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) may have some transferability to this new area of exploration. For example, is there a *tipping point* for NGOs engaged in collective action wherein they adopt an issue after being involved in

collective action because of some critical mass within the group which has already adopted it? Is issue emergence an iterative process where some NGOs learn more about the issue over time and diffuse new diagnostic and prognostic frames within the collective unit? Positive answers to these questions would imply two things in particular; first, that some NGOs engage in collective action for reasons not yet uncovered by my analysis, such as status incentives which were extremely difficult to confirm in the case studies under this method of process tracing, and second, that some kind of catalyst may act to trigger more NGOs adopting the issue, a threshold of sorts. Future studies drawing along the lines of interviews, focus groups, or questionnaires would be of benefit because process tracing does not shed enough light on the psychological motivations of actors, which would be an important insight.

There are a few short comings which may account for some of the more ambiguous results turned up in the analysis. The first has already been mentioned above in regard to process tracing. Since the majority of information acquired in the qualitative analysis was derived from online sources, such as NGO websites, it made intuitive sense to employ a process tracing framework to trace the instances of issue emergence and collective action across the six case studies conducted. Such a methodology however leaves the researcher at the mercy of what each NGO subjectively decides to provide in the form of online resources. There was considerable variation in the amount of publications different NGOs provided across both populations studied, causing a great deal of misery in searching for evidence for the existence or non-existence of issues and collective action, especially in regard to mechanisms of collective action. Though collective action could be confirmed easily enough through process tracing, much of the

evidence of the causal mechanisms cannot be seen as a smoking gun, but rather a straw in the wind, which at the end of the day is a rather weak causal link (Collier 2011; Bennet 2010). The work would have been supplemented if even a few NGOs were able to be questioned directly about motivations and relationships. Future research would therefore be greatly aided by employing some form of triangulation relative to the evidence being uncovered by process tracing itself, whether in the form of interviews, questionnaires, or focus groups.

A second short coming also relates to issue of triangulation. Much of the events of collective action, though apparently well represented among the sea of NGOs on the World Wide Web, have had very little resonance in media. No newspaper databases turned up results for any of the instances of collective action, even official publications or joint-press releases. Mahoney (2008) explains that this result is not surprising in the European Union where consumers, on the one hand, are more concerned with domestic politics than transnational politics, and, on the other, there are natural cleavages such as language and culture which fragment EU level politics. As a result, it was difficult to gauge how much or how little the issues being discussed actually resonated more broadly. For all the hoopla that NGOs invest into vocalizing their issues and collective action, at the end of the day, it is difficult to see whether or not their actions were reciprocated in any way which would have provided some evidence of status incentives.

Finally, and most significantly, process tracing has revealed that the interconnections shared among NGOs are actually significantly greater than those turned up by Issue Crawler. Because Issue Crawler relies strictly on existing web-links to determine who is connected to whom, only relationships which are acknowledged as such

materialize in the network. My research has learned time and time again that many NGOs in fact collaborate with many others that are not formally linked together on the web. For example, Birdlife International collaborated with the European Environmental Bureau on several publications and joint letters (*see for example* ActionAid International *et al*. 2010; Birdlife International and EEB 2008; EEB *et al*. 2006), but their relationship was not noted by Issue Crawler. As such Issue Crawler is likely better employed as a starting point, but additional relationships which are discovered as process tracing is conducted would have provided a more complete picture of the actual existing network. This is a shortcoming common to many network analyses, which often in the long run has a detrimental effect on the validity of causal inferences drawn from their results (Ward *et al*. 2011). Thus, there is need to augment results returned from Issue Crawler with additional observations. Yet, such adventures would likely require substantial time commitments, which are likely not practical. In sum, there is room for improvement in the gathering of network connections, but these improvements are contingent on time consuming work to verify to the fullest extent the interconnections of network members.

Overall, the research has been enlightening in several regards. In the first place, the quantitative analysis has shown that there is a clear relationship between characteristics of NGO populations and the hierarchical network structures that emerge. No political science research has until now sought to test the relationships between even these most basic building blocks of networks; the number of connections an actor shares with others and the number of actors that are then dependent on that actor to gain access to the rest of the network. Such insights however demonstrate that there is much to be investigated in regard to the basic architecture of relationships that constitute networks.

Second, qualitative case studies have shown that indeed mechanisms of issue emergence do function as Carpenter had expected (2007b; Carpenter 2007a), shedding light on what actually allows an issue to emerge. In particular, those NGOs that did adopt an issue were able to be shown specifically why they had matches in turf, why the issue fit with other issues already being advocated or did not conflict with resources already devoted those areas of interest, and why the issue's diagnostic and prognostic frames were indeed the same, demonstrating issue salience, but more importantly, the analyses also explained counterfactually how in the absence of these mechanisms an issue would not emerge. Moreover, the analyses have also uncovered some observations that suggest turf itself is both a concept applicable to areas of operation in which NGOs are mandated to act as well as a characteristic of the issue itself. In order for this mechanism to be activated therefore it is possible that both these criteria must line up positively. In addition, the analyses have shown that geography may also play a role along all three mechanisms. The more distant the issue is from the physical location in which the NGO is concerned about, the more likely it will have a negative bearing on considerations of whether the issue fits within an NGO's turf, whether it conflicts with other issues or the way it has decided to deal with issues, and whether or not it is regarded as salient. Though a question mark still remains as to the causal link between network structures and issue emergence, at the very least, it is clear that these mechanisms do explain why an NGO ultimately decides to adopt or not adopt a new issue.

Finally, the qualitative analysis has also uncovered this interesting paradox wherein sometimes NGOs engage in collective action before they have adopted the issue. This is very fertile ground for future research, which questions an assumption that

apparently many academics have taken for granted. Collective action may therefore be part of the learning or legitimization process by which other NGOs engaged in participation go on to adopt the issue after being exposed to it during the process of collective action.

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APPENDIX A – Glossary of Terms

Betweeness Centrality: The numerical value assigned to a node based on the number of other nodes which need to pass through it to access any other node in the network (Murdie and Davis 2012, 181).

Centrality: The extent to which a node is more or less central to a population (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011, 250).

Centralization Index: The proportion of a network that is dependent on the most central node in the network by degree, in-degree, out-degree, eigenvector, or betweeness.

Centralized Population: The extent to which an aggregate population is connected to the most central node in the network which is determined by a degree centralization index (see **Centralization Index**).

Collective Action: The pursuit of "common interests" without a "formal organization" (Carlsson 2000, 509).

Degree: The total number of undirected ties between one node and all other nodes it is directly tied to (Jackson 2008; Knoke and Yang 2008).

Eigenvector: The extent to which one node is proximate to other nodes in a network that are well connect to other well-connected nodes, expressed as a ratio (Knoke and Yang 2008).

Environmental Nongovernmental Organization: An organization that is registered in the European Commission's Transparency Register as being active in the field of environmental affairs.

Hierarchical network structure: The extent to which a social network is structured hierarchically determined by a betweeness centralization index provided for the aggregate population (see **Centralization Index**).

In-degree: The total number nodes that have directed ties toward a single node.

Issue Emergence: Extent to which organizations have identified and accepted a problem at the international level (Carpenter 2007b, 101).

Network: A group of two or more nodes characterized by semi-regular to continuous engagement in economic, political, or social relationships, or any combination of these factors (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011, 246).

Node: An actor, organization, or individual, such as a person that can be located in a network.

Out-degree: The total number nodes that have directed ties from a single node.

Population: The aggregate total of organizations registered in the European Union's Transparency Register in a given field of advocacy and operating at the international level in the European Union.

Social Nongovernmental Organization: An organization that is registered in the European Commission's Transparency Register as being active in the field of social affairs, including employment.

Tie: A link between any two nodes representing a pattern of semi-regular to continuous engagement; also referred to as a *link* or *edge*.

APPENDIX B – ENGOs and Issue Emergence

EEB NETWORK	1st Wave	Turf	Conflict	Salience	2nd Wave	Turf	Conflict	Salience	3rd Wave	Turf	Conflict	Salience
eeb.org	(Mar 2002)				(Feb 2006)				(May 2009)			
anec.eu	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	y	y
anped.org	x	y	y	n	(Jan 2008)	y	y	y	(Dec 2009)	y	y	y
arche-noah.at	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
caneurope.org	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	y	y	(Sep 2012)	y	y	y
e3g.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
eaa-europe.eu	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
ecostandard.org	x	y	n	n	(Dec 2008)	y	y	y	x	y	y	y
env-health.org	x	y	y	y	(Dec 2007)	y	y	y	(Mar 2012)	y	y	y
eufed.org	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
foeeurope.org	x	y	y	n	(Feb 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
green10.org/	x	y	y	y	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/	x	y	y	y	(Jul 2008)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
ifoam.org	x	y	n	n	(Nov 2007)	y	y	y	(Dec 2011)	y	y	y
irfnet.ch	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
mio-ecsde.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
municipalwasteeurope.eu/	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
natuurpunt.be	x	y	y	y	(Mar 2007)	y	y	y	(Sep 2010)	y	y	y
pan-europe.info	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n	(2009)	y	y	y
seas-at-risk.org	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
usse-eu.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
wwf.eu	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	n	n	(Sep 2011)	y	y	y
Greenpeace NETWORK	**1st Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**	**2nd Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**	**3rd Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**
Greenpeace.org/eu-unit	x	y	y	y	(Jul 2008)	y	y	y	(Nov 2010)	y	y	y
anped.org	x	y	y	n	(Jan 2008)	y	y	y	(Dec 2009)	y	y	y
bankwatch.org	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n	x	y	n	n
caneurope.org	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	y	y	(Sep 2012)	y	y	y
chemtrust.org.uk	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
corporatejustice.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n
eaa-europe.eu	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
eeb.org	(Mar 2002)	y	y	y	(Feb 2006)	y	y	y	(May 2009)	y	y	y

europe.birdlife.org	(Feb 2006)	y	y	y	(Feb 2008)	y	y	y	(mar 2008)	y	y	y
foeeurope.org	x	y	y	n	(Feb 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
fsc.org	x				x				x			
green10.org/	x	y	y	y	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
inforse.org	x	y	y	n	(Dec 2008)	y	y	y	(Dec 2010)	y	y	y
mio-ecsde.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
natuurpunt.be	x	y	y	y	(Mar 2007)	y	y	y	(Sep 2010)	y	y	y
oceana.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	n	n	n
rototomsunsplash.com	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
seas-at-risk.org	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
shipbreakingplatform.org	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
theicct.org	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Nov 2011)	y	y	y
transportenvironment.org	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	y	n	(Dec 2008)	y	y	y
unpo.org	x	na	na	na	(Oct 2008)	y	y	y	x	y	y	n
wecf.eu	x	na	na	na	(Oct 2005)	y	y	y	(Dec 2009)	y	y	y
wwf.eu	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	n	n	(Sep 2011)	y	y	y
FOE Europe NETWORK	**1st Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**	**2nd Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**	**3rd Wave**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**
foeeurope.org	x	y	y	n	(Feb 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
acleu.eu	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
anped.org	x	y	y	n	(Jan 2008)	y	y	y	(Dec 2009)	y	y	y
arche-noah.at	n	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
bankwatch.org	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n	x	y	n	n
caneurope.org	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	y	y	(Sep 2012)	y	y	y
chemtrust.org.uk	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n	x	n	n	n
corporatejustice.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n
ecostandard.org	x	y	n	n	(Dec 2008)	y	y	y	(Dec 2009)	y	y	y
eeb.org	(Mar 2002)	y	y	y	(Feb 2006)	y	y	y	(May 2009)	y	y	y
env-health.org	x	y	y	y	(Dec 2007)	y	y	y	(Mar 2012)	y	y	y
green10.org/	x	y	y	y	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/	x	y	y	y	(Jul 2008)	y	y	y	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
ifoam.org	x	y	n	n	(Nov 2007)	y	y	y	(Dec 2011)	y	y	y
mio-ecsde.org	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n	x	y	n	n
natuurpunt.be	x	y	y	y	(Mar 2007)	y	y	y	(Sep 2010)	y	y	y
pan-europe.info	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n	(2009)	y	y	y
slowfood.com	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n	x	y	y	n
transportenvironment.org	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	y	n	(Dec 2008)	y	y	y
wwf.eu	(Oct 2001)	y	y	y	x	y	n	n	(Sep 2011)	y	y	y

APPENDIX C – SNGOs and Issue Emergence

AGE Platform NETWORK	Date	Turf	Conflict	Salience
age-platform.eu	(Nov 2002)	y	y	y
alzheimer-europe.org	x	n	n	n
autismeurope.org/	(Jul2012)	y	y	y
cancernurse.eu	x	n	n	n
caritas-europa.org	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y
cev.be	x	y	y	n
coface-eu.org	(Feb 2008)	y	y	y
csreurope.org		y	y	n
eapn.eu	(Nov 2007)	y	y	y
ecdl.org	x	n	n	n
edf-feph.org/	(Jan 2003)	y	y	y
efc.be	x	y	y	n
enar-eu.org/	(Oct 2008)	y	y	y
enna-europe.org	x	n	n	n
epda.eu.com	(Dec 2011)	y	y	y
epha.org	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
esn-eu.org	(Nov 2012)	y	y	y
eucis-lll.eu	(Jul 2008)	y	y	y
eufed.org	x	n	n	n
eu-patient.eu	x	y	y	n
euroblind.org	(Nov 2012)	y	y	y
eurochild.org/	(Jun 2012)	y	y	y
eurodiaconia.org	(Jun 2012)	y	y	y
eurohealthnet.eu	(2011)	y	y	y
europeancancerleagues.org	x	n	n	n
fefaf.be	(N/D)	y	y	y
fundacionyuste.es	x	x	x	x
hope.be	x	n	n	n
ilga-europe.org/	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
womenlobby.org	(Jun 2008)	y	y	y
youthforum.org	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
ENAR NETWORK	**Date**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**
enar-eu.org/	(Oct 2008)	y	y	y
aedh.eu	(2008)	y	y	y
age-platform.eu	(May 2008)	y	y	y
caritas.de	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y
ceji.org	(Oct 2006)	y	y	y
eaea.org	(Jan 2007)	y	y	y
eapn.eu	(Nov 2007)	y	y	y
ecre.org	x	y	y	y
edf-feph.org/	(Sep 2008)	y	y	y
epha.org	(Nov 2009)	y	y	y
eurodiaconia.org	(Jun 2012)	y	y	y
eurohealthnet.eu	(2011)	y	y	y
feantsa.org	(Feb 2006)	y	y	y
ilga-europe.org	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
irct.org	x	n	n	n
picum.org	x	y	n	n
womenlobby.org	(Jun 2008)	y	y	y

youthforum.org	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
European Youth Forum NETWORK	**Date**	**Turf**	**Conflict**	**Salience**
youthforum.org	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
age-platform.eu	(May 2008)	y	y	y
ceji.org	(Oct 2006)	y	y	y
cev.be	x	y	y	n
*crdm.cz**	*x*	*x*	*x*	*x*
ecas-citizens.eu	(Jan 2009)	y	y	y
enar-eu.org	(Oct 2008)	y	y	y
esn.org	(Nov 2012)	y	y	y
eucis-lll.eu	(Jul 2008)	y	y	y
eufed.org	x	n	n	n
europe.wagggsworld.org	x	n	n	n
federalists.eu	x	n	n	n
flarenetwork.org	x	n	n	n
ifm-sei.org	x	y	y	n
ilga-europe.org	(Apr 2006)	y	y	y
jef.eu	x	n	n	n
mijarc.info	x	y	n	n

*Removed from analysis after finding it was not an International NGO