Benny Farm: The state, the community, and conflict

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Abstract

Benny Farm: The state, the community, and conflict
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The Benny Farm case study is an examination of the urban redevelopment process in a project

originally built for veterans of World War II. In 1991, the federal crown corporation, Canada

Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), that owned and managed the project proposed to

rehouse the aging tenants on a portion of the site and to demolish the existing buildings and sell

the land. These plans were vigorously opposed by local activists as well as heritage

preservationists and housing advocates. In 1998 these groups were consolidated into an

organization that eventually was incorporated as the Fonds Foncier Communautaire Benny Farm,

which sought to preserve the buildings and redevelop the project for social housing. During the

same period the property was transferred to another crown corporation, the Canada Lands

Company (CLC).

The evolution of the federal role as it moved from the welfare state to neoliberalism is examined.

The transition from CMHC to CLC exemplifies the roll-back and roll-out stages of

neoliberalism, as redevelopment of Benny Farm went from being primarily driven by the goal of

divestment and transferring the property to the private sector to active leadership in defining the

process and the outcome of the redevelopment. Through this evolution, changes in dealing with

community resistance and opposition are highlighted as are the constraints and ability of

community groups to sustain a lengthy process of contestation and opposition. Key to this

process has been the role of Canada Lands Company, as a quasi-governmental agency. In

possession of strategically located properties, the federal level is a major determinant in the

shape of urban areas.

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To my family, Akim and Lara, who have been terrific throughout, and to Colin, without whom I never could have done this.

Thank you all.

It's been a fabulous journey.

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List of acronyms

BCM   Bureau de Consultation de Montreal

BFCRT   Benny Farm Community Round Table

BFTA   Benny Farm Tenant's Association

BFVA   Benny Farm Veteran's Association

CDEC   Corporation de développement économique et communautaire

CLC   Canada Land Company

CLSC   Centre local de services communautaires

CLT   Community Land Trust (in French: Fonds foncier communautaire)

CMHC   Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

DAC   District Advisory Committee

DHA   Dominion Housing Act

FFCBF   Fonds foncier communautaire Benny Farm

MCM   Montreal Citizen's Movement

NDG   Notre-Dame-de-Grâce

NDGCC   NDG Community Council

NHA   National Housing Act

SHDM   Société d'habitation et de développement de Montréal

WHL   Wartime Housing Limited

CHAPTER 1   Introduction and Overview

Introduction

On April 29, 2003 the members of the Fonds foncier communautaire Benny Farm (FFCBF) got together for a penultimate meeting to discuss next steps. After working together for five years and after a battle of more than a decade to preserve Benny Farm, a 16-acre site of veterans' housing in Montreal, members of the FFCBF spoke of being "humiliated", of having done "what we could" and contemplated disbanding, even if it would mean that "those who opposed us" would now "gloat". I was at that meeting and agreed that it was time for the group to cease, to let go of the vision and our project, and let "another group carry on". Reading the minutes of this meeting years later, I still feel the sadness and the anger.

This dissertation grew out of the disappointment in the outcome of the FFCBF and perplexity about why the project had not been realized. The FFCBF had proposed to develop affordable housing on a site that had been owned by the federal government since the 1940s. Having served as family housing for veterans since 1946, after fifty years the remaining aging residents had been re-housed in new buildings on the site and some 300 apartments stood empty. Community activists, heritage groups, housing advocates had all denounced plans to raze the site and sell it, claiming that this was a public asset and should not be privatized and that in a context of growing needs for decent and affordable housing in the city, these units should be renovated and preserved for households who were increasingly being shut out of the market. The proposed

project included components of community economic development, social and innovative

housing forms, sustainable development, and a community land trust

The people who formed the board of the FFCBF were some of the most experienced community

activists in Montreal, who had worked on large-scale projects such as Milton Parc, where not

only had blocks of housing and commercial buildings been saved from demolition but had also

been renovated and transferred to cooperatives and non-profit groups. Other members of the

board were municipal politicians, representatives of community groups, and experienced

administrators. Those who worked on the FFCBF plans were architects, lawyers and people who

had worked for municipal and community sectors.

Since 1998 the group had been negotiating with the owner, a federal crown corporation, Canada

Lands Company (CLC), to redevelop the site. Having prepared plans, financial viability studies,

market studies, and identified potential partners and needs, the FFCBF finally signed an

agreement with CLC in 2001. Six months later, the agreement was ended and the FFCBF was

shut out as CLC undertook its own redevelopment process.

My decision to begin the PhD program stemmed out of a desire to understand this trajectory. I

had started to work on the Benny Farm project in 1998, when I was asked to prepare a proposal

for CLC with the group that would become the FFCBF. Since completing my Master's degree in

Urban Planning, I had worked with cooperative housing, including in Milton Parc, at the

municipal level, both in the housing department and with the city non-profit housing corporation.

As an independent consultant I had undertaken studies that examined the growing problem of

homelessness in Canada. In many ways the Benny Farm project was a culmination and application of the lessons learned in housing, planning, and community development that I had garnered over the years.

Historical and social context

Built in 1946 for returning World War II veterans, Benny Farm exemplifies the arc of Canadian housing and social policy. The initial development was in part a response to social unrest around housing issues after the war but also coincided with the formation of the Canadian welfare state and a period that many historians consider pivotal in terms of Canadian housing policy (Bacher, 1993; Rose, 1980). However, the historical roots of the project went further back: it exemplified the evolution of ideas about neighbourhood design and worker's housing that were rooted in the early 20th century. Furthermore, the impetus to build veterans' housing stemmed fear of repeating the social unrest that had occurred after World War I. Housing problems had been an important component of the turbulence that had culminated in the Winnipeg strike and the sympathy strikes across Canada in 1919 (Wade, 1993; Larson, 1976). The construction of Benny Farm and the continued support of residents was a concession by a state that held that housing belonged in private market.

The decision to redevelop Benny Farm, first announced in 1991, also reflected federal policy, in this case that of the turn toward neoliberal policies. David Harvey offers a definition of neoliberalism:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework for such practices (2005:2).

Brian Mulroney, part of a new generation of politicians along with Thatcher and Reagan, began to implement neoliberal reforms. Using public debt as a justification, state activities were redefined and public assets were returned to the private sector "where they belonged" (Brodie, 2002). Federal housing programs were slashed and responsibilities downloaded to provinces. The proposed redevelopment of Benny Farm was a small part of this vast shift.

In a context of reduced federal funding and industrial decline, cities became the vanguard of neoliberalization (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Leitner et al., 2007) as they turned to urban entrepreneurialism and as urban space was "reimagined" (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Zukin, 1995). One of the innovations in the transition from the "shallow neoliberalisms" (Peck & Tickell, 2002) of Thatcher, Reagan, and Mulroney to more interventionist practices has been the use of autonomous quasi-public organizations to lead urban redevelopment projects.

Deemed underutilized, situated in an attractive middle class neighbourhood and under new ownership as the property was transferred from CMHC to CLC, Benny Farm became an ideal terrain for a new kind of redevelopment process, undertaken by a new federal agency set up to optimize[1] the value of surplus federal properties. However this process also had to take into

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[1] "CLC optimizes the financial and community value of strategic government properties no longer needed for program purposes." (Corporate History, CLC Website) http://www.clc.ca/learn-more-about-clc/corporate-history

account community opposition that had grown out of a history of urban and community movements. Since the 1960s these movements had not only been instrumental in the realization of projects such as Milton Parc, but had also become an integral part of the "Quebec model" in the delivery of social services, in local economic development, and in the provision of social housing.

Objectives and method

Through a case study, this dissertation examines the way in which the shift to neoliberal governance in urban areas is expressed. More specifically two questions are addressed: In what ways has the role of the state changed, and in particular, in a context of the reconfiguration of interscalar arrangements, what have been the changes at the national scale? How have strategies and the politics of urban redevelopment adjusted and adapted to community opposition?

The approach that I have adopted draws on what Kincheloe (2005) terms "bricolage" in that it is multi-method and "highlights the relationship between a researcher's way of seeing and the social location of his or her personal history." It has components of case method (Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994) using document review (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993) and participant/observation (Cresswell, 2003), although in my case this occurs in two moments; as participant in the past and observer in the present.

The case study is the closest approximation of my approach as described by Stake (1978):

> … most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex, holistic and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case.

I have also drawn on social movement studies, both from historical and sociological perspectives (Klandermas & Staggenborg, 2002), especially those which share Green's (2000) goal to "reclaim history for the public" with the "obligation" to explain why movements fail. Oral historians such as Riordan (2004) James (2000), and Portelli (1991) have also sought to record the experiences of those "hidden from history" (Perks & Thomson, 1998) reflecting my own interest in balancing the official history of Benny Farm which is being written from the perspective of the "winners". My goal has been to look at what was done from the standpoint of the "loser", drawing on Piven and Cloward's observation that,

> Each generation of leaders and organizers acts as if there were no political moral to be derived from the history of failed organizing efforts ... Consequently … leaders and organizers attempt again to do what they cannot do, and forfeit the chance to do what they might do. (1979: xxiii)

However, at the core of the approach is "political activist ethnography" (Kinsman, 2006) and the "extended case method" (Burawoy, 2009). This reflects evolving approaches to social movement research (Frampton et al., 2006; Taylor, 1998; Church, 1995) that move away from claims to objectivity and value-neutrality since these "obscure forms of power and the different standpoints making up the social world" (Frampton et al., 2006) and instead look to make the connection between the local and broader social relations. Thus "by being located outside of and yet constantly in interaction and struggle with ruling regimes, activists can explore the social

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organization of power as it is revealed through moments of confrontation" (Frampton et al., 2006: 35).

Burawoy puts emphasis on theory and its central role in the extended case study approach,

> We don't start with data, we start with theory. Without theory we are blind - we cannot see the world. Theory is the necessary lens that we bring to our relationship to the world and thereby to make sense of its infinite manifold. (Burawoy, 2009: 13)

Understanding the connection between local and broader social relations, or what Burawoy calls microprocesses and macroforces, rests on theory, since "theory makes it possible for us to extend from the micro to the macro, to identify the forces at work in confining and reproducing micro social processes" (Burawoy, 2009:14). However, the analysis does not stop at the micro level, but instead the extended case method examines how the situation is shaped by external forces without the case study representing a potential example of a more generalized principle, as in grounded theory (Burawoy, 1991). The process is then to identify oneself in a particular theoretical tradition and participating and contributing to it (Burawoy, 1991).

While I focus on the microprocess of the FFCBF, I situate these in the larger context of changes to the role of municipalities and particularly, quasi-governmental agencies in leading urban redevelopment. This reflects a change in focus from my initial objective of studying internal debates, individual perspectives, and workings of the FFCBF, to a broader goal of understanding the role of key actors as state priorities shifted under neoliberalism. This dissertation is a case study of the microprocess that first resulted in the construction of Benny Farm and then its

demolition, set in the macroforces of the constitution of the Canadian welfare state, followed by the drive to privatization of the neoliberal state.

I draw from a range of primary sources and in particular the minutes of meetings of the FFCBF, e-mails, letters, organizational documents, and local and city newspapers. Some of these documents, primarily e-mails, reports, proposals and notes are from my personal archive. Other documents including letters and official documents, such as the protocol and incorporation documents and approved minutes of meetings, are from the FFCBF archive that will be deposited with the Canadian Centre for Architecture once this dissertation is completed.

To corroborate my analysis, I have relied on direct quotes from newspaper articles or from e-mails or letters that were sent. In some cases however, especially as CLC decided to terminate the protocol, reports of what was said over the phone (and included in e-mails) were different from the more formal official correspondence. I have noted these differences where pertinent.

The quality of the information, notably the minutes of meetings, changes over time. In 2001 for example, the minutes of the meetings of the FFCBF became more succinct upon the advice of our legal counsel, who reminded us that the minutes were quasi-public records and could be used by anyone. Individual positions and internal dissention were no longer recorded in great detail, nor were reports of conversations and particulars of the myriad of individual meetings being held with politicians, bureaucrats and community allies. This caution reflects both a move to a more formal structure as well as a growing sense of vulnerability as the period of the protocol began to run out and opposition to the FFCBF mounted. The other notable change to the record keeping is

in 2002; as the FFCBF came under greater pressure and as resources were diminished, the minutes began to reflect this with uncorrected spelling and grammatical mistakes. Because of these limitations in the recorded minutes, I have complemented this information with e-mails (received and sent), letters, my own notes, and newspaper clippings.

I also refer to a few studies that have been undertaken on Benny Farm, in particular two masters' theses that examine the planning processes used during the whole redevelopment process, and that included interviews with some of the key actors including CLC representatives, members of the FFCBF, the Task Force and community organizations.

Overview of the chapters

Chapter 2 begins by looking at the social, political and economic changes in the shift from a welfare model of the state and the forces that pushed it to neoliberalism. As the literature emphasizes, no single model of the welfare state nor of the neoliberal one is applicable everywhere and at all times, but key elements can be identified. I look at the impact of these changes on cities, in particular the increased dependence on redevelopment and re-appropriation of city land by municipalities. I end this chapter with an examination of the role of social movements but in particular their co-optation.

Chapter 3 examines forces that led to the construction of Benny Farm, in particular during the period leading up to World War II. I begin with a review of the evolution of approaches to urban problems and worker's housing at the beginning of the 20th century and some of the design

alternatives that continued to influence urban planning into the post-war period. I then discuss the social and political context of the federal government's intervention and resistance to intervention in housing, leading to the construction of Benny Farm.

In Chapter 4 I discuss the opposition to the redevelopment plans that were first presented by CMHC in 1991. In 1998 opposition coalesced into the Benny Farm Community Round Table (BFCRT), an event that coincided with the transfer of Benny Farm from CMHC to CLC. The BFCRT eventually formed the FFCBF and I examine the process it undertook in its negotiations with CLC, the community forces that surrounded its proposal, and the outcomes.

In Chapter 5 I return to the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 to analyze the redevelopment process and to draw the connection between the microprocesses of the Benny Farm redevelopment and the broader macroprocesses of neoliberal urban development. In particular I discuss the role of the federal level, through CLC, at a moment when the municipal level was being rescaled as Montreal was merged and demerged and power was redistributed. The chapter ends with a discussion of the losses and the gains of the process of redevelopment.

Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the dissertation and a return to my research question.

CHAPTER 2   From Welfare State to Neoliberalism

Introduction

The initial construction and the subsequent redevelopment of Benny Farm follow the arc of the establishment of the welfare state and the transition to neoliberalism in Canada. This chapter examines the character and practices of neoliberalism and in particular its expression in cities, the "key spaces" of neoliberal change (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002).

First, this chapter highlights the main features of the post-war welfare state which serves as both a backdrop to the building of Benny Farm, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, and to situate the transition to neoliberalism. Second, the chapter discusses the transition to neoliberal rule; the fate of Benny Farm is just one incident in a much larger process of vast and deep societal changes that began in the 1970s. These changes, especially those at the level of the nation-state, are essential to understanding the circumstances that led to the federal government decision to sell Benny Farm. Third, the chapter examines the changes taking place in cities as urban government is replaced by urban governance and as quasi-governmental agencies become key actors in urban redevelopment. I focus in particular on the process of gentrification and redevelopment of public housing as well as on the rights of residents. Finally, as the literature emphasizes, neoliberalism is above all a process; a process that is flexible and adaptable. I examine how institutions adjust to confrontation and dissension, in particular the process of institutionalization and cooptation.

In drawing on this literature, this chapter maintains that the key to understanding the dynamics that underpinned the Benny Farm redevelopment process is the role played by the state in a context of neoliberal restructuring.

The welfare state

The welfare state or "30 glorious years" and the "golden age" of capitalism were the result of a confluence of events; a world-wide economic depression, class mobilization, and the fear of the growing influence of communism. Belief in laissez-faire and a self-correcting market were refuted in the face of massive unemployment and market failure in the 1930s, leading to an acceptance that a "revolution" in demand and an expanded role of the state were imperative (Kelly & Caputo, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Jenson, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lipietz, 1989). The structure that emerged in the post-war period had three major elements; the decommodification of workers, full employment, and market regulation. The first component shifted responsibility for welfare to the state: the citizenship regime[2] or social citizenship[3] granted social rights to individuals primarily through their decommodification, freeing them from dependence on the market and lessening reliance on the family while full employment was essential to support the welfare model (White, 2003; Myles, 1998; Battle, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Banting, 1987). The third component, intervention in the market, ranged from stabilization of business cycles through monetary and fiscal policies to state ownership of key

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[2] A "stable set of civil, political and social rights, which together serve to constitute a society of equal citizens before the state" and in which social policy can play a central role, in terms of social cohesion and shared identity (White, 2003).

[3] Marshall defined social citizenship as the social responsibilities of the state to its citizens as "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall, T H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays. Cambridge [Eng.] University Press,)

sectors, while the creation of organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and UN, and agreements such as Bretton Woods, stabilized international relations (Harvey, 2005).

While the social policies that were introduced "smoothed out the jagged edges of oppression and inequality" these were not eliminated (Brodie, 2002[4]) but did represent a "larger share of the economic pie" for labour and some limitation to the economic power of elites (Harvey, 2005: 15). However the social policies that regulated the systemic inequalities varied in the level and extent of social citizenship, reflecting cultural and historical differences. Esping-Andersen (1990) categorized welfare regimes based on the relationship between the state, the family and the market, distinguishing for example, liberal regimes in which citizens primarily derive their welfare benefits through the market and market relations, and the social democratic model with widespread social rights emphasizing equality and redistribution (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Myles, 1998)[5].

Canada and Quebec

With modest universal transfers, a central role for the market, and low, targeted, and stigmatizing benefits, Canada, according to Esping-Andersen (1990) fell into the "liberal" welfare model. It never developed high levels of public enterprise[6] and while greater than those of the US, social

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[4]Quoting Donzelot, J (1988) The promotion of the social *Economy and Society* 17(3) p395-427

[5] The third model is the conservative or corporatist regime in which the focus is primarily maintenance of the traditional hierarchical social order rather than redistribution. Social insurance is directed at wage-earners rather than citizens and welfare is primarily derived from the family (Esping-Andersen 1990). Esping-Andersen later added a fourth regime, the Mediterranean, and others such as the Asian model have been added to the initial typologies by others.

[6] In 1981, assets of Canadian crown corporations represented 11 percent of total corporate assets. Public assets, (provincial and federal) have at times included electrical utilities, railways, airlines, telecommunications as well as oil (Petro-Canada), mining (Devco) and provincial auto insurance (Cameron, 1997).

rights remained residual (White, 2003; Cameron, 1997), built around male breadwinner for social security and less generous, means-tested social welfare for women and others on the margins (Brodie, 2002), and only "muted" the extremes of income inequality (Banting, 1987: 315). While the federal government seemed to acknowledge the need for intervention "in the face of an obviously failed capitalist system" during the Great Depression (Brodie 2002[7]) it did so reluctantly, propelled in part by the rise of alternative political parties such as the CCF and Communist Party, while simultaneously repressing social unrest with measures such as work camps for the unemployed (Brodie, 2002; Finkel, 2006)[8].

A weak working class resulted in a "diluted Keynesianism" (Suttor, 2011) and a welfare state built not on a compromise between labour and capital but focussed on US trade and federal-provincial relations (Jenson, 1989). A strong federal role and a national identity centred on social citizenship[9] emerged in the post-war period (White, 2003; Brodie, 2002; Jenson, 1989; Wolfe & Klausen, 1997) and by 1966 the "three central threads" of Canadian social citizenship ─ Medicare, the Canadian pension plan (CPP), and the Canadian Assistance Plan (CAP) ─ had been put into place (Brodie, 2002), propelled in part by "competitive welfare state building" in the face of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and increased debate about Quebec independence (White, 2003).

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[7] Quoting the 1935 Speech from the Throne.
[8] Federal intervention was also constrained when plans for unemployment and health insurance as well as a minimum wage and workman's compensation were struck down by the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1937 because these impinged on provincial jurisdiction (Brodie, 2002).
[9] Brodie (2002) notes that while the discourse was one that referred to all Canadians, marginalized Aboriginal populations and the growing nationalism in Quebec were barely acknowledged.

The Quiet Revolution in the 1960s redefined the role of the state as it took over what had been the traditional responsibility of the family and of the church.[10] In parallel, Quebec built a strong national identity, defined by a secular state and development of natural resources, in particular hydro power (Boudreau, 2003; Desbiens, 2001). However a distinctive feature was the "modernization" of the state in parallel to the upsurge in social movements and community action. Many of the state institutions that emerged were the result of pressure from community groups (e.g. Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement (BAPE) and the Ministry of the Environment), while innovative community practices, such as local delivery of health and social services, the basis of Centre local de services communautaires (CLSC), were incorporated by the state[11] (Ménard, 2003; White, 2003). Activists, notably those from ecologist and feminist groups also moved in and out of the state structures, influencing policy from the inside (Giraud, 2005:526; Maillé, 2003: 324; Lamoureux, 1992: 694; Vaillancourt, 1981). To a large extent this flow between community groups and the Quebec state continued and was the basis of the "Quebec model".[12]

Housing policy as social policy

While housing plays a key role in socialization, mutual support, social participation and integration, housing policy, especially social housing policy, was (and continues to be) disconnected from social policy. While health and social security were core components of the

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[10] According to Boychuk, the reliance on family and church and a limited state role was partially myth as Quebec quietly funnelled state financial assistance through private agencies rather than intervening directly (1998: 27).
[11] White (2001) points out that the CLSCs also illustrate "la tendance de l'État à s'approprier les actions de la base et à les transformer de manière à ce qu'elles répondent aux objectifs définis par le gouvernement".
[12] Ménard (2003) however proposes that much of the acquiescence by the state to demands was a way to keep issues at manageable levels without questioning the foundations of capitalism.

welfare state, housing continued to be supplied and distributed primarily by the market (Vaillancourt et al., 2001; Prince, 1998; Prince, 1995). Consistent with a liberal welfare regime priority was given to homeownership with housing production viewed primarily as a lever to stimulate the economy and generate employment (Suttor, 2011; Malpass, 2004; Denis & Fish, 1972). Except for the US, Canada has the smallest social housing sector of any major western country and was one of the last countries to institute a public housing program in 1949[13] and between 1949 and 1963, only 12,000 public housing units were built. It was only after 1964, when a cost-sharing program with the provinces was implemented, that 200,000 more units added to the stock (Hulchanski, 2002; Wolfe, 1998; Bacher, 1993). However, rather than a commitment to improved housing conditions, Bacher proposes that the modest incursion into affordable housing during this period was to reduce "the political vulnerabilities of the federal government" (1993:185); this to be accomplished while "disturbing the existing private market as little as possible" (ibid: 210). Between 1965 and 1981 public housing represented only five percent of all new units built in Canada, while several programs encouraged private rental housing (e.g. Limited Dividend Program and the Assisted Rental Program, the Multiple Unit Residential Building (MURB) tax shelter) from the late 1940s to 1985. Few of these units remained affordable for long, while many lower rent projects were often of bad quality and in poor locations (Hulchanski 2002).

Whether it was a compromise between labour and capital or the fear of political instability, by the end of the 1960s the welfare state was well-established with variation in the depth and extent of social support, even within Canada. At the federal level, the Canadian working class never

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[13] While legislation was adopted in 1938 it was never implemented.

developed a strong identity and was not a "social partner" (Jenson, 1989) in the building of the welfare state, while in Quebec a more open process, incorporating community groups occurred. While Canadian identity revolved around social citizenship, it was a modest version of social welfare that was applied in Canada, distinctive primarily for the difference to the American version. Housing is an area where the state barely intervened, reflecting the belief, as Blomley (2004) suggests that the "good" citizen is above all someone who is a property owner. Programs, notably those for social housing, continued to be developed throughout the 1970s, but a series of economic crises soon heralded the abandonment of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism.

The neoliberal state

Crisis of the welfare state and the advent of neoliberalism

While the pressures on the welfare state can be explained by endogenous causes that stem from the nature of capitalism, the compromises that led to the welfare state or the replacement of community by impersonal bureaucracies (Kelly & Caputo, 2011: 13) as well as by exogenous causes attributed to globalization, it was a series of crises that were seized as opportunities for market reforms (Leitner et al., 2007; Harvey, 2005). These included the global property market crash in 1973, followed by the Arab oil embargo, the New York City fiscal crisis in 1976, and increased unemployment and inflation (Harvey, 2010:8; Leitner et al., 2007; Harvey, 2005: 12). All led to the conclusion that Keynesian policies were longer working and were "exhausted" (Harvey, 2005: 13). The concessions granted in creating the welfare state had been done so reluctantly: the internal and external changes were opportunities to take back these concessions

(Lipietz, 1989; Genschel, 2004; Jaeger & Kvist, 2003) and, even more so, to have them accepted as "commonsense"[14] (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

What emerged from these crisis is characterized as neoliberalism, an open-ended process which, like the welfare state, is not monolithic but instead there are different "neo-liberalisms" based on history, culture and particular circumstances of nation-states (Kelly & Caputo, 2011; Peck, 2010; Hackworth, 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002). A central tenet, reverting back to the pre-welfare state period, is that well-being is best served by allowing individual freedom in an unrestricted economy. Unlike the expansive welfare state, the neoliberal state's role is limited to provision of a framework that protects individual and market freedom and defends private property rights, while individuals are held responsible and accountable for their own well-being. The social is "desocialized" as the idea of society is replaced by individuals and family[15] and "economic determinism" supplants systemic causes of inequality (Brodie, 2002).

The ideological roots preceded the opportunities offered by the crises in the 1970s and can be traced to the immediate post-war period. In England, the Mont Pelerin Society, created in 1947, promoted the ideals of personal freedom, the free market and opposition to state intervention. While it remained on the fringes of policy and academia until the 1970s, its ideas were espoused by think tanks like the Heritage Foundation in Washington and the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, as well as in academia (Harvey, 2005: 22). In Canada the terrain for acceptance of

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[14] Margaret Thatcher claimed that "there is no alternative" (Peck and Tickell, 2002).
[15] Margaret Thatcher is quoted as stating "And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families" in an interview with Women's Own magazine, October 31, 1987.

neoliberal ideology was prepared by organisations such as the C.D. Howe Institute[16], which by

the early 1980s had rejected Keynesian policies as "no longer feasible in the face of global

competition" and embraced free trade as the only "realistic" option and deficit reduction rather

than full employment as a core macroeconomic goal (Carroll & Shaw, 2001). The Business

Council on National Issues (BCNI)[17], described as a "shadow government", lobbied for a

reduced role for government in business, privatization, deregulation and free trade. When the

fiscal crisis eased in the 1990s, it shifted its focus to competitiveness in the global market and

reduction of government spending and corporate and individual tax rates (Carroll & Shaw, 2001;

Cameron, 1997). Along with the Fraser Institute, initially dismissed as "far right and extremist",

these organizations were successful in "creating more space and legitimacy for neoliberalism"

(Cameron, 1997).

Peck and Tickell distinguish between the *roll-back* and the *roll-out* phases of neoliberalism, the

first consisting of "active *destruction and discreditation* of Keynesian-welfarist and social-

collectivist institutions" (Peck & Tickell, 2002) and removal of "Keynesian artifacts" such as

public housing and public space (Hackworth, 2007: 11). The second phase, *roll-out*, is "the

purposeful *construction and consolidation* of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance,

and regulatory relations" thereby serving to deepen neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

The first experiments with neoliberalism in the 1970s were the American-backed Pinochet

regime in Chile and New York City in the wake of the fiscal crisis (Harvey, 2005). On the

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[16] Formed in 1973, when it merged with the Private Planning Association of Canada, which dates back to 1958.
[17] Formed in 1976, in part as a response to the poor public image of business and similar to the US Business Roundtable, the BCNI is composed of 150 CEOs of major Canadian companies who are invited to join the organization.

international level, IMF and World Bank "structural adjustments" forced neo-liberal institutional reforms in return for debt rescheduling as countries defaulted[18] (Harvey, 2005; Lietner et al., 2007). But it was the UK and the US that proved to be pivotal in enacting change. Thatcher, elected in 1979 and Reagan, elected in 1980, both were given mandates to deal with the stagflation that had characterised their economies throughout the 1970s (Harvey, 2005) heralding the shift of neoliberalism from a "philosophical project" to the roll-back phase of state-led restructuring (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The capitalist system itself[19] was never blamed for the crises, but rather it was attributed to government spending, Keynesian demand management policies, "an excess of democracy", and governments "bribing" voters (Cameron, 1997) as well as financial regulation, unions, state ownership and "overregulated" markets (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

The roll-back process included reducing if not silencing opposition, in particular workers. In the UK high interest rates had resulted in high unemployment[20] with a parallel reduction in union membership[21] and loss of bargaining power (Harvey 2005: 23). In focussing on the fight against inflation, Thatcher was able to "squeeze" the economy and public spending, which was a "cover to bash the workers". The union movement was broken in the year-long miners' strike provoked by Thatcher and its importance was further reduced by the opening up of the UK economy to foreign competition and investment. Resistance to her policies stemming from local levels of

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[18] Harvey quotes Joseph Stiglitz who calls the shift in policy at the IMF in 1982 a "'purge' of all Keynesian influences" (2005:29)

[19] Cameron (1997) also points out that as the 1980s advanced, "it became politically incorrect to speak of capitalism at all; the accepted formulation became market economy".

[20] More than 10 percent between 1979 and 1984 (Harvey, 2005: 23)

[21] The Trade Union Congress (TUC) lost 17 percent of its membership during this period (Harvey, 2005: 23).

government was also silenced as Thatcher cut back on central government funding to municipalities and sought to reform municipal finance and restrain spending (Harvey, 2005: 59).

In the US, a 1979 change in monetary policy increased interest rates and signalled a major policy shift as full employment was set aside to fight inflation. The "long deep recession" that followed resulted in the closure of factories and diminished power of unions. Like the miners' strike in the UK, Reagan's confrontation with the air traffic controllers in 1981 heralded an assault on organized labour, in this case middle class, not just working-class unions. Tax breaks on investment subsidized capital's move away from the unionized north-east to the non-union and weakly regulated south and west, as corporate and top personal tax rates were reduced (Harvey, 2005: 23-26).

Neoliberalism in Canada

In Canada, the 1980s were marked by globalization, deindustrialization, and restructuring of the labour market, resulting in the highest level of unemployment since 1930s: by 1993, 11 percent of the population (over three million persons) were on some form of social assistance. International lenders and the business sector urged cuts to expenditures to stimulate growth in the face of increased public debt (Brodie, 2002). Homelessness, lay-offs, and long-term unemployment were attributed to failing Keynesian policies as US and British neoliberal and conservative ideology framed the discourse; social programs were a drain on the economy and solutions were to cut government spending, eliminate deficits, deregulate business so it could compete on the global market, and return "public assets to the market where they 'naturally'

belonged" (Brodie, 2002). The idea of full employment "was redefined at higher and higher rates", underscoring the "inevitability" and the inability to prevent economic change (White, 2003).

Reflecting the central position of social citizenship in national identity, the dismantlement of the Canadian welfare state was first undertaken by "stealth" (Battle, 1998) and, because of popular resistance, cuts were "technical fiscal rather than policy issues", such as "claw backs" of old age security (White, 2003) or "slice by slice" cuts to Unemployment Insurance (Banting, 2006: 425). The process accelerated under the Mulroney government in the 1980s as the government insisted that the only way to maintain the social programs that "Canadians cherish" (Brodie, 2002[22]) was to take "painful action to modernize the social safety net" (Battle, 1998). By the early1990s the universality principle was gone in family allowances and old age supplements and federal funding for unemployment insurance was withdrawn, becoming a de facto payroll tax (Brodie, 2002; White, 2003). Michael Wilson, finance minister under Mulroney, expressed the attainment of the "creative destruction" (Harvey, 2005:3) of the roll-back phase when he noted that an accomplishment of the government's first mandate had been to "clear the ground" (Cameron, 1997).

By the mid-1990s, with NAFTA signed, the Canadian government abandoned the politics of stealth, and under the Liberal government transformation of the welfare state became a top priority (White, 2003). Canadian locations were now in competition with American investment sites which launched the push to harmonized Canadian and American standards and programs

[22]Citing a Speech from the Throne, April 3, 1989.

(Habibov & Fan 2008; Carroll & Shaw, 2001). The 1995 introduction of Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) to replace Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) and Established Program Financing (EPF) is seen as the defining moment that signaled neoliberal restructuring as federal expenditures for social programs fell to levels of the early 1950s (Brodie, 2002) and with this provinces lost their "countercyclical protection" making them more vulnerable during recessions (Battle, 1998). Childcare, for example was now forced to compete for funding with education and health, exposing it to eventual integration into workfare (Mahon, 2006). Other changes such as replacement of Unemployment Insurance by Employment Insurance, tightened eligibility rules[23] and distinguished "deserving" groups, such as unemployed workers[24] and "less deserving groups" such as welfare recipients who now became "eligible" to work and subject to employability programs (White, 2003). As the value of state retirement pensions was reduced and "personal pensions" encouraged, inequality was further exacerbated since lower-income groups were less able to save and needed the cultural capital to manage investments (Gough, Eisenschitz & McCulloch, 2006: 99-100)   This process was supported by provincial governments, no matter what their party allegiances: for example, in the mid-1990s, Ontario, under the Conservative Harris government cut welfare, reduced social services positions, under-funded schools, and redesigned local government, including amalgamating cities (Keil, 2002). Quebec was no different as the Bouchard Parti Québécois government cut government spending under the guise of zero deficit (Dufour, 2004; Noël, 2002).

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[23] Unemployed persons receiving benefits dropped from 87 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 1999 (White, 2003).
[24] Who nonetheless faced longer periods of work to become eligible for benefits and shorter periods when these were accorded.

Privatization

One of the major "logics" of neoliberalism has been privatization of publicly owned sectors of
the economy. It has been part of the "structural adjustment programs (SAP) of the World Bank
and the IMF[25]. The strategy has the advantage of responding to private sector claims of unfair
competition from public enterprises, offers money capital a safe investment when the private
market is in crisis and rates of profit are low, and boosts the public treasury while getting rid of
future responsibilities (Harvey, 2005; Cameron, 1997). Underlying this process is what Harvey
calls accumulation by dispossession: rather than generating wealth and income, neoliberalism
instead redistributes these. This process is heavily reliant on the state enforcement and definition
of legality and one of the main features is the privatization and commodification of what had
been public assets such as public utilities, social welfare provision such as social housing,
education, health care, pensions, and public institutions such as universities, and prisons.
(Harvey, 2005: 160-165)[26].

In Canada, the push to privatize was ideological and institutional, reinforced by the policy
directions such as those proposed by the 1985 Macdonald Royal Commission on Canada's
economic future[27] as well as political, with campaigns by business interests, such as the BCNI.

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[25] In 1992 the World Bank had estimated that since 1980 about 6800 state-owned enterprises had been privatized,
including about 2000 in developing countries (Cameron, 1997).

[26] Privatization and commodification also includes intellectual property rights, genetic materials and the global
environmental commons (land, water, air) and commodification, through tourism, of histories and cultural forms.
The three other features that Harvey defines are financialization through means such as speculation, asset
destruction through inflation, asset-striping; management and manipulation of crises through debt crises that are
orchestrated and managed to redistribute assets of countries such as Mexico; and state redistributions through
privatization and cutbacks as well as revisions to the tax codes, user fees, tax breaks and subsidies to corporations.

[27] The Macdonald Commission prepared the terrain for neoliberal reform when it concluded that economic growth
was being inhibited by diminished productivity and the solution was free trade and deregulation. The report
proposed that inflation should be fought by reducing wages and removing the structural obstacles to labour market
flexibility; obstacles such as minimum wages, unions, welfare and unemployment insurance. Its endorsement of free

However, "[a]t the end of the day, privatization reflects the most basic of business instincts, the drive to accumulate based on the expansion of private property" (Cameron, 1997). The first wave of privatization began in the 1980s during the Mulroney Conservative government, with the contracting out of internal government services to private firms justified by the need to save money and as part of a commitment to a smaller government. Crown corporations, such as Teleglobe, were sold and legislation was prepared to sell others such as Air Canada and Eldorado Nuclear, often at below book value[28] (Cameron 1997). Privatization was not exclusive to Canada; elsewhere the efficiency of public enterprises was increased, often by cutting the labour force and lowering prices, by measures such as excluding land prices from enterprises in high-value locations (Harvey 2005: 60). During the Conservative's second mandate, public sector think tanks such as the Economic Council of Canada were cut; the equivalent of "contracting out for thought", since "reliance on outside consultants for research allowed the government to set the questions, control publication of results, and restrict debate in the process", and with consultants who, unlike public sector employees, would be ideologically inclined towards privatization (Cameron, 1997). CMHC's decision to sell Benny Farm in 1991 can be situated in the current of the sale of public assets, a process that it had already begun with, for example, the sale of Strathcona Heights[29], a veterans project, in 1984 (Vakili-Zad, 1996).

Provincial governments also began privatization, for example liquor and spirits in Alberta and government employee pensions in Ontario that were freed to make stock market investments.

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trade was "crucial in giving political legitimacy to the option" and it "marks the turning away from the postwar "consensus" surrounding the economy and the welfare state" (Cameron, 1997).

[28] For example, De Havilland was sold for less than half of its book value (Cameron, 1997).

[29] The 404 units on 9.3 hectares in Strathcona Heights were sold to the City of Ottawa non-profit housing corporation and the units demolished and replaced by 659 co-operative and non-profit housing units (Vakili-Zad, 1996).

Business mounted another campaign in the 1990s to privatize, ostensibly to deal with the debt but driven by pension fund financial surpluses in search of new investments (Cameron, 1997). The signing of the NAFTA was pivotal; not only did it propel harmonization of Canadian standards and programs and shift policy as "rationalization" of programs and regulations gained credibility, but it also reaffirmed the central role of the private sector which would now be compensated for any loss of potential revenue if a new public service was instituted (Carroll & Shaw, 2001; Cameron, 1997).

The roll-out phase of neoliberalism

The "shallow neoliberalisms" of Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney in Canada were transformed into the roll-out phase under Clinton, Blair, and Chretien[30], as the state undertook reforms to deal with social issues such as crime, immigration and new policy objectives such as welfare dependency and community regeneration (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Economic policy was exposed to the market or transferred upward from nation states to structures such as the WTO and conventions such as NAFTA (Peck & Tickell, 2002) while the focus of neoliberal states became "support of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system" (Harvey, 2005:33).

A number of core state functions emerged in the roll-out phase. In a context of expanding commodification[31], the forced reliance on family, personal income and savings, as well as the

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[30] It should be noted that the roll-back and roll-out phases are not sequential. For example most radical budget cuts in Canada occurred in 1994 under the Liberal government with Paul Martin as finance minister (Boudreau et al., 2007) while the Cameron government in Britain has undertaken another round of deep cuts to social programs.
[31] "Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that any price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide – an ethic – for all human action." (Harvey, 2005: 165)

attribution of poverty to personal failing, social incoherence[32] increased, while the "chronic" instability of neoliberalism required order and coercion (Gough et al., 2006; Harvey, 2005). The increase in precarious wage earners and "contingent work" not only became normalized but was also enforced through welfare reform and workfare (Wacquant, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002). The latter pushed the unemployed into any job or program that offered training and backup such as child care or addiction treatment (Gough et al., 2006:102) with beneficiaries "treated not as citizens but as clients or subjects"[33] (Wacquant, 2010) These programs, along with repression and imprisonment, are all part of a "philosophy of moral behaviorism" (Wacquant, 2010) disciplining the non-compliant through policies dealing with crime, immigration and welfare reform (Picton, 2009: 49) and often targeting specific groups or areas (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

Thus, while small government is a tenet of neoliberalism, workfare and criminal justice have enlarged the size of the government[34] and is needed in cases of market failure (Peck, 2010; Harvey, 2005). However, while individual freedom is a core neoliberal value, collective institutions such as unions or social movements need to be supressed by propaganda (e.g. reference to international competition and globalization), force and police power (Harvey, 2005)

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[32] Harvey maintains that social incoherence is expressed through anti-social behaviours, such as criminality or through the reconstruction of social solidarity by revival of religion or "older" political forms such as fascism, as well as by a search for a sense of moral purpose and a "climate of consent" around shared values, as with the "Moral majority" in the US in the 1970s and 1980s or as in the nationalism that is expressed through sports competitions (2005: 80-85).

[33] Wacquant (2010) notes that the social profile of beneficiaries of workfare and jail inmates are "virtually identical".

[34] For example in the US public expenditures for police, courts and prisons increased by 364 percent between 1982 and 2001, while in England incarceration rates almost doubled between 1992 and 2008 (Wacquant, 2010).

as well as by control through the "theatricalization of penalty"[35](Wacquant, 2010). Displays of power and force have also included increased militarization and its normalization. In Canada the narrative of peacekeeping and humanitarianism shifted to a "hardened account" that emphasized the "business of war" and military sacrifice as the military tried to rebrand itself as an important national institution and to "make military symbols an endemic condition of the everyday life experience of Canadians" (Fremeth, 2010). Relief missions during the Red River flood in 1997 and the 1998 Eastern Canadian ice storm were opportunities for a military presence in urban areas and helped move public opinion in favour of the military and of increased spending on improved equipment (Fremeth, 2010). The War on Terror and rhetoric about security have also served to justify a military presence at events such as the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games, while the yellow ribbon has proliferated since Canada joined the war in Afghanistan, conflating support for individual soldiers with that for the mission, thereby curbing debate about Canada's participation (McCready, 2010).

Neoliberal cities and urban governance

The main elements of neoliberal economic policy (or New Economic Policy, NEP) according to Swyngedouw et al. (2002) is expressed at the urban level through New Urban Policy (NUP), and in particular through urban development projects that are heavily reliant on the state support and managed by quasi-public agencies. The shift to NUP occurred as the post-war "spatial fix" was depleted by the 1970s and problems of over-accumulation could no longer be addressed through

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[35] This includes commercial media (e.g. crime-and-punishment TV shows), police operations in poor neighbourhoods, and celebrity trials (Wacquant, 2010).

urbanization, domestic consumption and investment in housing and urban renewal (Harvey, 2001).

Cities had to deal with reduced federal funding, industrial decline, and the loss of the buffer from the global economy as the nation state was "hollowed out" and "rescaled" up to the supranational scale or down to cities (Hackworth, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Increasingly reliant on finance and real estate for tax revenue, cities turned to urban entrepreneurialism and "reimagining" urban space with the designation of enterprise zones, central-city makeovers and attracting the "culture industry" and the "creative class" (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Zukin, 1995) [36].

More and more cities were expected to be run like the private sector. For example, in Canada, since they lacked the constitutional authority to expand revenue sources, cities were prone to fiscal crisis as transfers from provinces were reduced (Young & McCarthy, 2009) and responsibilities, such as social housing and transportation infrastructure, were downloaded (Boudreau et al. 2007, Miller 2007).[37] Simultaneously upper levels of government concerned themselves with the ability of urban areas to compete in the global market (Boudreau et al., 2007), such as the 2002 Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues which concentrated on "the urgent need for urban centres to become economically competitive in the global economy"

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[36] The amalgamation of municipalities on Montreal island in 2001, as that of other Canadian cities, was justified on the basis of making the city more "competitive" in attracting international capital (Donald, 2005) fitting into the neoliberal "scalar narrative" as described by Peck (2001).

[37] Calgary is an example of a city that confronted a fiscal crisis and even when surpluses were generated in Alberta during the early 2000s due to rising oil prices, these were not used to reinstate social welfare spending on housing, health or education that had been cut the previous decade, but instead were targeted to electricity rebates, replacement of a progressive tax with a flat tax, and "prosperity bonuses" (Miller, 2007)

Wolfe (2003) . In Quebec, a series of commissions and reports under successive Liberal and PQ governments tried to find solutions to questions of financing, restructuring, and the means to cope in a "global urban world" which led to the imposition of municipal mergers in 2001 (Boudreau, 2003:206). As Hackworth notes, the "choice" of neoliberal governance was not as much an "organic shift to the right" but instead was "the result of an institutionally regulated (and policed) disciplining of localities" (2007:17-19). While Hackworth emphasizes the role of institutions such as the IMF and bond-rating agencies in imposing these changes, the Canadian examples underline the importance of the upper levels of government in this shift.

In spite of a discourse of reduced state intervention, the state is pivotal in creating the conditions for urban neoliberalism. Beyond implementing new forms of governance, the state plays a critical role in urban development projects. Museums, international events, redevelopment of areas such as Time Square in New York (Zukin, 1995) or the Quartier des Spectacles in Montreal[38] are primarily state-led and often state-financed[39] and the "catalyst of urban and political change" (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). "Geobribes" are given to keep key sectors in the city, such as with the NYSE threat to relocate to New Jersey (Smith, 2002), while direct state intervention is required in "soft-locations" such as abandoned or devalued areas as waterfronts, brownfields or obsolete central manufacturing districts (Picton, 2009). The risks and the deficits are assumed by the state while the benefits of revalued land, the result of state intervention

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[38] The Quartier des Spectacles is the location for major festivals, including the Jazz Festival and the Francofolies, that are important tourist attractions for the city. The area is being redeveloped, redesigned and renamed with new concert spaces, fountains, lighting and mist machines. It also includes the former red light district, of which a considerable portion is being demolished for a project that is being led by a non-profit redevelopment corporation, Société de Developpement Angus, that was invited to undertake the project without tender and to whom land was sold below market value. This redevelopment, according to the mayor, will stimulate revitalisation of the neighbourhood.

[39] Provincial governments play an important role in this. For example, a partner in the Quartier des Spectacles in Montreal is the provincial government. (http://www.quartierdesspectacles.com/a-propos/corporatif/)

through zoning changes and new infrastructure, go to the private sector (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Developing large-scale projects also often requires bypassing established planning processes and statutory norms under the guise of "exceptionality" as projects are promoted to revive the local economy and improve the tax base. They thus become symbols of the new metropolis, "cast with a powerful image of innovation, creativity, and success", but underpinned by the dependence on revaluing prime urban land (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). A "shock doctrine" reform and restructuring of urban space is also offered through the highly competitive pursuit of mega-events, such as the Olympics, which impose "accelerated development" as well as public investment in infrastructure and security (Gaffney, 2010).

The "deepening and intensification in the process of neoliberalization" in cities is the result of fast policy transfer with increasing use of "off-the-shelf" instead of more slowly developed "in situ" policies, as well as due to reliance on think-tanks, consultants, and policy networks (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This has made it "harder to find space for pursuing alternative imaginaries and practices" (Leitner et al., 2007) or to find "'realistic' local alternatives" (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The major urban forms that have emerged include gentrification in the inner core, inner suburb devalorization, with an accompanying change in the "contour to urban poverty", and the continued physical expansion of the city (Hackworth, 20076: 80), resulting in cities that are "a patchwork of socioeconomically highly diversified and more mutually exclusive areas" (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). This process has concealed "a harsher reality" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002) of deregulation and downloading, as well as an "underbelly" of social exclusion and marginalization (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) and uneven urban development (Picton, 2009). The new globalized city is claimed by different city users; the international business people view

"the city as a space consisting of airports, top-level business districts, luxury hotels and restaurants, as a sort of urban glamour zone", while at the other extreme are those who "lack the de facto legitimacy enjoyed by the new city users" and who "struggle for recognition, entitlement, and rights to the city" (Sassen, 1999).

A requirement of the more market-oriented and market-dependent NUP is greater flexibility in land ventures (Harvey, 2005: 69) something offered by quasi-governmental agencies such as urban development corporations.

> The newly emerging regimes of governing urban revitalization involve the subordination of formal government structures to new institutions and agencies, often paralleled by a significant redistribution of policymaking powers, competencies, and responsibilities. In the name of greater flexibility and efficiency, these quasi-private and highly autonomous organizations compete with and often supersede local and regional authorities as protagonists and managers of urban renewal. (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)

In Canada, major redevelopment projects in the late 1980s and early 1990s such as the Toronto and Vancouver waterfronts and Winnipeg's core were undertaken by third party multi-level government partnerships. These tripartite agreements were renewed under the Martin Liberal government and followed by agreements with other cities such as Regina, Saskatoon, and Victoria, representing "a remarkable incursion into the urban field" (Young & McCarthy, 2009). They also reflected the "managerial revolution" occurring at the federal level, where "the new public administration is supposedly more effective and open, horizontal structures abound, consultation and cooperation are the order of the day, and partnerships are the way to get things done" (Wolfe, 2003). The advantage of these new structures, particularly in complex and

difficult projects was that they "conveniently shifted accountability and responsibility away from formal government structures" (Picton, 2009: 68).

While the process of rescaling and implementation of new forms of governance has taken place it is also important to emphasize, as the tripartite agreements illustrate, that the national level still plays a critical role. Brenner argues,

> ...that national state institutions continue to play key roles in formulating, implementing, coordinating and supervising urban policy initiatives, even as the primacy of the national scale of political-economic life is decentred….We are witnessing…a wide-ranging recalibration of scalar hierarchies and interscalar relations throughout the state apparatus as a whole, at once on supranational, nations, regional and urban scales. (2004: 3)

In their examination of European urban development projects, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) found similar relegation of formal governmental structures to new agencies and institutions. Many of the features that were found in the European examples are echoed in the process that CLC undertook to redevelop Benny Farm. For example, they found that the primary form of democratic participation was structured around "stakeholders" and a significant role was given to experts; both trends resulting in unequal access to decision-making for the public and for traditional groups. Participation was found to operate "through cooptation and invitation" leading to the "imagination of the urban" that was exclusively that of those who were included. Because the ability to carry projects required sophisticated skills, financial resources, and access to "centers of power", weaker social groups and areas of the city fell behind and were "dependent on ad hoc measures imposed from above" (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

The projects that were developed reflected the interests of "key economic, political, social, or cultural elites", who decided on "fundamental rights to housing, access to services, access to land and the like", while the process lacked accountability and was shielded from public participation and community groups. Confronted by protest and critique, the institutions were found to "adjust or transform in order to maintain legitimacy, social cohesion, and sufficient political support", but a "veil of secrecy" was found to pre-empt criticism with structures that "circumvent, bypass, ignore, or marginalize certain social groups". However a prominent feature of the European projects studied was the "relatively low resistance and conflict they generate" with almost no major "grassroots" contestation (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

Gentrification and public housing

Two manifestations of the neoliberal city are particularly relevant as a backdrop to the Benny Farm project: gentrification, and related to it, the eradication of public housing, (including the push for a "social mix" or gentrification by stealth[40]) which requires more direct state intervention. Part of the neoliberal spatial fix, gentrification, by revaluing inner city areas, replaces the poor by the rich as the urban is "reimagined" not only through housing but also development of amenities and "lifestyle options" (Hackworth, 2007; Fraser, 2004). While initially welcomed after the destruction of urban renewal of the 1960s, gentrification is no longer an "idiosyncratic anomaly" (Hackworth, 2007) but part of neoliberal urban strategy, driven by corporate investors but dependent on state support (Arena, 2012; Krätke, 2012; Gaffney, 2010; Blomley, 2004; Smith, 2002).

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[40] See for example Bridge, Gary, Tim Butler and Loretta Lees (212) *Mixed communities: gentrification by stealth?* Bristol, UK; Chicago, IL: Policy Press

One of the few obstacles left to gentrification in some neighbourhoods is public housing; an obstacle that requires state intervention for its removal. Arena (2012) describes the destruction of St. Thomas, a 1,500 unit public housing project in the Lower Garden City of New Orleans that followed a broader process of gentrification begun in the 1970s. First led by "urban pioneers" and historic preservationists, the process of gentrification accelerated as real estate agents began to promote the area to young professionals who in turn fought to get neighbourhood nuisances, such as a machine shop, closed down. The next step was "spatial redefinition" as the neighbourhood and landmarks were rebranded and given new names[41], followed by open class warfare centred on the right to the area, including the right to public spaces by homeless persons and children from public housing, and the right of services such as soup kitchens to be located the area. These were all perceived by middle-class residents to have a negative impact on property values. Zoning changes, harassment of homeless persons, political pressure, and removal of playground equipment were used to drive out poor people from the neighbourhood, while the public housing project was increasingly targeted and identified as undeveloped potential. The rhetoric used by political leaders focussed on problems with the public housing; the "concentration of poverty" and the need to "dedensify, but clearer language was used by developers who spoke of the "undeveloped" potential and identified it as a major "physical and social" obstacle for continued transformation of the area.

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[41] For example, there was a push to rename the area the Lower Garden District rather than Irish Channel, the name given by Irish immigrants (Arena, 2012: 35).

Large public housing projects have been targeted for decades because of their "concentrated disadvantage" (Healey, 1998). In Europe the residualization of public housing was fuelled by the move of skilled working class and middle class households into homeownership (Murie, 2005; Vestergaard, 1998), a process that was especially radical in UK, where the right-to-buy council housing brought in by Thatcher "hollowed out" the estates leaving behind the poorest and most marginal population (Lupton & Power, 1998; Lee & Murie, 1999; Burrows, 1997). Social housing stock became perceived as the "tenure of the poor" (Lupton & Power, 1998) leading to an "increasing correspondence between economic vulnerability and place" (Cole & Goodchild, 2000). Thatcher's privatization of social housing at first appeared to be a gift for the residents who got access to a valuable asset and augmented their wealth. However, once the transfer was completed, speculation took over, especially in central locations, and low-income populations were bribed or forced out and working class housing estates became "centres of intense gentrification" (Harvey, 2005).

Because public housing in the US is a relatively minor portion of the housing stock and a minimal element of the social security system, there is not a broad constituency that supports it (Hackworth, 2007). However, Arena (2012) proposes that the existence of public housing, represents more than the physical buildings and unintentionally facilitated "rights talk"[42] that implied a right to decent housing. Although there had been challenges to American public housing as early as 1968 with a failed attempt to encourage purchase by tenants, its decline really began at the period of the ascendancy of neoliberalism, when in 1973 declaring that the program

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[42] Don Mitchell (*The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*, London: Guilford Press, 2003) cited in Arena (2012:xxxii).

was too expensive, a moratorium on new construction was imposed and the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) budget was cut, the largest cut of any domestic branch of government (Hackworth, 2007). Viewed as a "failed model", the program continued to be cut as existing housing was demolished and privatized and as the state transferred provision of new social housing to the private sector with programs such as the Low Income Tax Credit (LITC). Residents were targeted as well, with a discourse of "self-sufficiency", work ethic[43] and encouragement of homeownership (Hackworth, 2007).

In New Orleans, for example, public housing was criticised because it was "isolated from the mainstream of society" and as federal funding was cut back, local leaders insisted that "government cannot do it all; government cannot do it alone" thereby opening the door for corporate interests (Arena, 2012: 4). The 1990 HOPE IV[44] program has been the main tool to destroy public housing. At first it targeted "severely distressed" projects and required replacement of all housing, but by 1995 demolished housing did not need one-for-one replacement, with the result that by 2001 close to 150,000 public housing tenants were estimated to have been removed or would be removed. Simultaneously, tenants who remained in existing project were subjected to monitoring and control to retain their housing benefits with measures such as "one strike and you're out" whereby tenants could be evicted if any member of the family was convicted of criminal activity (Hackworth, 2007). By 2001, all the residents of the St. Thomas project in New Orleans had been evicted, through use of a HOPE IV grant and in

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[43] The link between public housing and work began with Reagan and Project Self-Sufficiency, continued with G.H. Bush and Operation Bootstrap, and was sanctioned by Clinton with the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (Hackworth, 2007: 49).
[44] Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere

spite of promises, there was no right of return for residents and all traces of the community were eradicated.

The American approach to redevelopment of public housing has served as a model and has influenced redevelopment in Europe, including the UK, France, Germany, Sweden as well as Australia (August, 2008). Canadian public housing has not been immune. Regent Park in Toronto, praised in 1949 as "an outstanding initiative" to respond to working class housing needs, twenty years later was characterised as a "colossal flop" and "hopeless slum" and by the 1990s was "synonymous with socio-economic marginalization and behavioural depravity" (Purdy, 2003). A process of redevelopment of public housing is underway in Toronto, including Regent Park, driven by a discourse of social mix[45], diversity, and "deconcentration", but this has been found to be primarily used for marketing purposes as an area is "reimaged" as a safe zone for commerce, entertainment and culture. August (2008) attributes part of the zeal for redevelopment to the neoliberalization of Ontario's housing sector as responsibility was downloaded and service providers driven to becoming more entrepreneurial. The Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), with over 58,000 units and sizeable downtown land holdings, has sold off part of its portfolio to fund new development and has transferred other units for homeownership. Nonetheless, redevelopment plans have mostly been well-received "perhaps due to the progressively-toned language of social mix" which for Regent Park includes references to solving problems of "social and economic isolation" and improved "behavioural patterns" with exposure to higher income residents. The result however is a loss of affordable

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[45] August (2008) points out that the merits of social mix date back to the works of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman who argued for diverse urban spaces, as well to programs such as the 1974 co-op and non-profit housing which promoted income mix, and more recently it has been part of conventional planning wisdom through principles found in New Urbanism, Transit-Oriented Development, and Smart Growth.

housing, with as little as 27 percent of the re-built housing in Regent Park to be subsidized, while the majority of the new 5,100 units will be primarily for sale. However, the redevelopment of Regent Park will serve a larger purpose, for as with the St. Thomas in New Orleans, the redevelopment "is poised to open up east downtown Toronto to gentrification, a process that has been held off in the area largely due to the presence of Regent Park"(August, 2008)[46].

The contours of the new city and the rights of residents

A consequence of the increased inequity in cities has been the valorization of some spaces and people and the devalorization of those deemed "marginal". Increased policing and repression of particular populations, such as panhandlers and homeless persons, and of areas such as parks used by those evicted from private spaces, has further polarized the city. Because neoliberalism is "a language of property", exercised through the free market access to land, it "is an important predictor of one's position within a social hierarchy" (Blomley, 2004: 38), determines access to decision-making and resources (Madanipour, 1998) and, because it is imbued with symbols and meanings, it has an impact on formation of identity (Blomley, 2004; Desbiens, 2001) and a sense of belonging or exclusion (Gard'ner, 2004). The increasing privatization of public places not only "inculcates 'acceptable' patterns of behaviour" but also "conceals a brutalizing demarcation of winners and losers, included and excluded" (MacLeod, 2002). This process strengthens "the boundaries between the consuming and nonconsuming public…. with nonconsumption being constructed as a form of deviance" (Gilroy & Speak, 1998). These spaces are the "geographical expression of the erosion of Keynesian ideals of full employment, integrated welfare entitlement

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[46] Public housing in Montreal seems to be immune from these trends. While there was discussion of a social mix and densification of the Jeanne Mance project in downtown Montreal, this was set aside and instead the project has undergone a process of renovation but keeping its initial vocation.

and 'social citizenship'" (MacLeod, 2002). Privatized malls or *urbanoid* spaces that blend

"consumption, entertainment and popular culture" promote "a privatised sense of city living"

(Atkinson, 2003). Non-consumption as deviance flows into concepts of citizenship as well: "The

rights conferred by citizenship are increasingly predicated on being a consumer - consumers of

private and government services" (Atkinson, 2003). Exclusion can also be manifested passively

with design such as "bum-proof" park benches, subtle codes that are woven into class and

cultural interpretations (Atkinson, 2003) as well as increased surveillance and discourses of

crime and insecurity, especially in terms of the impact on business, often around the presence of

homeless persons (MacLeod, 2002).

Blomley goes beyond economic and legal rights and explores the idea of the moral right of a

community to remain and continue as an entity in his analysis of the Downtown East Side of

Vancouver. The injustices, he proposes,

> …extend beyond the denial of the property rights of individual residents to the use
> of their hotel rooms [in reference to Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels].
> Development pressures challenge the collective entitlement of poorer community
> members to the use of and occupation of the neighborhood as a whole…For it is
> also argued that the neighborhood itself is imbued with local meanings that speak
> to a collective entitlement. (2004:52).

Collective entitlement is illustrated in the battle against condo conversion of the Woodward's

building in the Downtown Eastside. The "symbolic relationship" between the building and the

community was evoked by activists who maintained that the developer had to acknowledge the

community ownership through the "collective investment in the physical landscape", reflecting

the constitution of place through cultural struggle (Cresswell, 1996). Private property, Blomley

suggests, can be socialized by claims of "histories of the past", as is recognized in public access that is predicated on continued use. This was maintained by activists, who claimed that they had "given Woodward's its history" and that the private successes of the owners "were a reflection of local patronage". Blomley traces the community position to similar claims in the closure of a grocery store in Winnipeg and with the steel industry in Youngstown, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where relocation was challenged on the basis of community property rights because of the long-standing relationship between the community and the company.

The claims of community ownership also highlight the losses that occur as people are pushed out of the centre; beyond the physical loss is a symbolic one as the history and collective memories are destroyed, renamed, and "reimaged". The remembrance of a community's past is deemed essential to both the individual and to the collectivity (Tallentire, 2001; Cox, 1998; Massey, 1995), providing "the grid on which memories can be localized and mapped." (James, 2000:148). In the Downtown Eastside, part of the claim to place was achieved by naming places. For example, a co-op was named after a "martyr to displacement" and served as a reminder of unjust property relations and of community rights (Blomley, 2004). The evocation of memory through place is also described by Green (2000) in the attempts to reclaim Haymarket Square, site of a protest and killing of workers in 1886, as a "lieu de mémoire"[47] important to the labour movement, anarchists and immigrant workers. Physical acknowledgement, such as of monuments to violence against women in Vancouver (Burk, 2006) or to immigrants and women in Lowell, Massachusetts, (Norkunas, 2002) can serve to recognize people and events while by

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[47] Pierre Nora proposes that society creates "lieux de mémoire" sites at the intersection of history and a "dying tradition of memory" because there are "no longer 'milieux de mémoire', real environments for memory" (Green, 2000: 122).

their absence they are marginalized and excluded (Gard'ner, 2004; Massey, 1995; Blokland, 2001; Simon, 2005). Memory therefore is "like any other political domain" with competition over interpretation and ownership (Fremeth, 2010) and as Norkunas proposes,

> As a political tool, history can be used to marginalize class and ethnic groups in order to limit their access to power. Without an acknowledged physical trail to prove their historical presence – paper documents, monuments, and waysides – many groups in the society are left voiceless. (2002:46)

The loss of history and memory leads to a "culture of amnesia" (James, 2000: 156) or what Augé[48] calls *non-places*, "such as freeways or chain stores, [which] characterize the postmodern world with their lack of tradition and their absence of collective memory" (Norkunas, 2002:45). These are the opposite of *anthropological space* that "is full of personal relationships, of traditional activities based on content that is meaningful to local people, and has a long, collective memory that people refer to in guiding present activities and as a way of understanding their past" (ibid: 44). The temporal nature of place can thus be used to evoke action and finding the "threads of a tradition of resistance and struggle" that can assist in current struggles (Taska, 2003). For example, in Montreal a demonstration against the massive arrests at the Truxx discotheque in 1977, part of the process of expulsion of gays from the downtown core, evoked a previous battle, that of the Stonewall riots in 1969 (Guindon, 2002). At a later period, a drawn-out squat in Montreal began with a march that included Overdale street in its trajectory; an acknowledgement of the symbolic force of this location as a key moment in the battle for tenants' rights[49] (Lustiger-Thaler, 1993; Hamel, 1989-98; William, n.d.).

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[48] Augé, Marc (1995) *Non-places* London: Verso
[49] In 1987 the MCM administration gave developers permission to demolish a block of residential buildings in downtown Montreal and evict tenants in spite of strong community resistance. This decision led long-time sitting

The changes to urban areas, and in particular the process of gentrification and redevelopment as communities and their physical traces are removed and lost, therefore have deeper significance. I will return to this in Chapter 5 in the discussion of Benny Farm. However, the process of neoliberalization, especially as it is confronted by resistance, is an important component of the redevelopment of Benny Farm. As discussed earlier, neoliberalization, especially in the roll-out phase has proven to be adaptable and flexible. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) underline that,

> … as the process of planning and implementation is confronted with social protest or critique, institutional and organizational forms adjust or transform in order to maintain legitimacy, social cohesion, and sufficient political support.

The next section will review the process of institutionalization and co-optation of social movements and collective action.

Social movements: evolution and institutionalization

Social movements were instrumental in the compromise reached in creation of the welfare state and they shaped the state that emerged from the Quiet Revolution. The urban movements in Montreal during the 1960s occurred as the city, in particular the central core, was modernized, with roadwork and large real estate projects often built on sites in low-income neighbourhoods.

MCM councillors to quit the party. Overdale became a symbol of the abandonment of progressive principles by the MCM.

The Comités de citoyens, based initially in working class neighbourhoods, brought a new vision of the city, one that encompassed social justice, democracy and equality (Fournier et al., 1997; Bélanger & Lévesque, 1992; Hamel, 1983; Hamel, 1991) and were part of larger debates that touched on citizen participation, social inequality, heritage conservation, and gender roles (Hamel, 1991). This conflict over the definition of urban meaning is what Castells (1983) proposes forms cities, as alternative visions were articulated (Hamel, 1991:105) and a temporary public space created to express ideas and identities (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991).

However, the Comités de citoyens soon turned to formal politics with the creation of municipal parties, first the Front d'action politique (FRAP)[50], followed by the Montreal Citizens' Movement[51], while others continued in community groups that consolidated and specialized around issues such as unemployment, housing, and social rights (Hamel, 1991:110; Bélanger & Lévesque, 1992). With specialization, the broader societal analysis of the Comités de citoyens was dropped to be replaced by a narrower focus, which aligned groups more closely with state bureaucracies and funders (Hamel, 1991:111). This also made it easier for groups to be transformed from activism to service provision, especially as responsibilities were downloaded from the state to the community sector (Kelly & Caputo, 2011; Fontan et al., 2006; Guberman et al., 1997; Bélanger & Lévesque, 1992). For housing groups, the increased specialization also

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[50] The mayor, Jean Drapeau, used the October Crisis to associate the FRAP to the FLQ which led to its defeat. This crisis provoked some activists to drop out (e.g., to form communes or go back to the land), enter the system (e.g., public service or university teaching) or become even more radical (e.g., joining the Marxist-Leninist party). (Hamel et al., 1982: 260)

[51] In Castell's definition of urban social movement a *sine qua non* condition is that these be organizationally and ideologically autonomous of any political party (Castells, 1983:322).

meant that housing issues became isolated from broader urban (Hamel, 1991: 111)[52] and housing movements (Hanley, 2004: 283)[53].

The absorption of social movements, such as the environmental movement or community innovations, such as CLSCs, into the state, can be considered positive outcomes (Staggenborg, 1988; Coy & Hedeen, 2005), a sign of success (Hamel et al. 2000). Social movements can also have a voice in the definition of state policies (Hamel, 1986: 14), as with the goal of increased democracy that became integrated into the approach to public consultation developed by the MCM (Hamel, 2002: 240). Tovey (1999) found a similar process in the institutionalization of the organic farming movement in Ireland whereby state agents, exposed to new sources of opinion, introduced changes. Della Porta and Diani refer to this as the "sensitizing impact" of social movements, whereby goals may not be achieved, but the values of political elites are changed (2006: 232). Piven and Cloward on the other hand propose that the concessions granted to social movements by government and institutions are primarily attempts to conciliate or disarm; when political pressure wanes, the compromises will be withdrawn unless they are deemed useful (1979: 35).

As movements become institutionalized however, they also lose their identity and action repertoires are changed as disruption is replaced by conventional methods (Bacqué, 2005; Puijt 2003; Piven & Cloward, 1979). Community groups can also lose contacts with their base. Katznelson, in examining the evolution of community movements in New York between 1964

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[52] One of the exceptions to this, according to Hamel, is the FRAPRU that has maintained its critical analysis of urban issues and government policies.

[53] Hanley also attributes the isolation of housing groups in Côte-des-Neiges to their Anglophone and immigrant nature, while groups such as FRAPRU are "very Québécois", making communication a challenge.

and 1974, finds that the transformation and absorption of community groups into specialized and professionalized organisations led to local leaders becoming "frustrated" in attempting to bring about change, often losing internal battles, and when succeeding,

> …their successes were too limited to have much of an impact on the lives of their constituents. Enmeshed in the new institutions, and compromised by them, local activists were driven simultaneously away from a politics of protest and away from their followers. (1981:189).

Piven and Cloward (1979) explain this phenomenon by referring to Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy by which the original goals of an organization are displaced as it becomes bureaucratised and increasingly focused on survival (Piven & Cloward, 1979). Disorganized communities alternately are more difficult to co-opt since "individuals feel no social or moral obligation to consent to the wishes of any one group" whereas when conflict is institutionalized through formal structures one party holds more power, opposition is easily neutralized (Murphree, Wright, & Ebaugh., 1996) and more vulnerable to appropriation and control (Tovey, 1999). The American student movement of the 1960s, for example, resisted forming a centralised and formalised structure in the fear of losing the means and the goals of the movement (Breines, 1980). Furthermore, the "paradox of collaboration" can lead to ongoing access becoming a goal in itself once an organization becomes included in policy-making (Coy & Hedeen, 2005).

Co-optation

Confronted by resistance, an organization can revert to coercion. However, according to Selznick, while this can be used at strategic points, it is not as effective a long-term solution as

co-optation, which is "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence" (Selznick, 1980: 13). Based on his study of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1940s, Selzick proposes that co-optation serves two purposes, "the political function of defending legitimacy and the administrative function of establishing reliable channels for communication and direction." (Selznick 1980: 14) If legitimacy is called into question, an organization may publicly absorb challengers, thereby re-establishing stability and respectability, while with administrative participation, such as committees in housing projects, the objective is more to share responsibility and smooth communication.

While the lack of resistance to gentrification can be explained by the displacement of the working- class and repression, such as police action or restrictive laws [54](Hackworth, 2007; Sites, 2003) it has also been attributed to the co-optation of groups and organizations. Hackworth (2007) for example proposes that development corporations have absorbed challenger groups, and because they are dependent on state funding, they are vulnerable to "fiscal disciplining" and consequently less likely to take critical positions. Non-profits that have taken on delivery of state services in the context of downloading of state functions, offer what Arena (2012) calls a "protective layer of capitalism"[55] which can contain the emergence of challenges to the power of elites. Community leaders, recruited into non-profits, are encouraged to approach social problems from technical perspectives or identity politics (e.g. race, age, sexuality) rather than

[54] For example, laws in New York that limit protest around Tompkins Square in the Lower East Side (Hackworth, 2007:131)
[55] Joan Roelofs (*Foundations and Public Policy: The Masks of Pluralism*, Albany SUNY Press 2003) cited in Arena (2012: xxvii).

from a class perspective, creating an obstacle to the formation of a broad left movement (Arena, 2012).

The process of co-optation can result in some of the same outcomes as those described earlier with institutionalization and de-radicalization. For example, Murphree et al. (1996) describe how when "well-respected veterans of the environmental conflict" were brought into negotiations about a hazardous waste site outside of Houston, they brought "substantial legitimacy and credibility" to the process. However their participation also reassured local residents that there was a strong voice opposing the project, leading them to a de facto abdication of power as they suspended direct action and pressure tactics. In New Orleans, radical public housing leaders, once integrated into formal non-profit organizations[56] and "insider negotiations", also abandoned direct action and defense of public housing residents (Arena, 2012: xviii). Coy and Hedeen (2005) suggest that this process can be attributed to the "paradox of collaboration", by which entry into policy-making can also mean that continued participation and ongoing access to these groups becomes a goal in itself. This occurred in negotiations around the waste site in Houston, where the protracted negotiations led to opposition leaders believing "more strongly in the importance and justification of the process", reinforced by the formation of "inadvertent friendships" (Murphree et al. 1996).

Tovey (1999) examined the "discursive institutionalization" of the Irish organic farming movement, which, in the beginning, was tied to lifestyle and identity as well as concern for the

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[56] These were funded by private foundations and government and were also "predicated on being responsible – in other words, on maintaining support for privatization and elite-defined redevelopment" (Arena, 2012: 85).

environment. State interest in environmental issues (propelled in part by potential trade with the EU) led to the fragmentation of the movement. The umbrella organization that chose to work with the state benefited from recognition, funding, and "professional and technical upgrading", this however, at the cost of "organic farming practices… [that became]…detached from the organic movement and the values and goals". In parallel the state appropriated the discourse by reducing or denying differences between organic and conventional farming and relegated organic farming into a "niche" position so that it did not challenge the structure of food production and distribution. The movement was confronted with a "state development sector which simultaneously rationalises it and marginalises it. State agents promote organic farming as a set of production and marketing techniques, while simultaneously repressing it as a social movement." While Tovey proposes that there is a possibility that contact with the organic movement may have an impact on agricultural policy, this is deemed to be unlikely and the result is that the movement is "profoundly affected" while the state remains "relatively untouched – that the 'organobureaucrats' will become another species of state agents and those who want a 'real alternative' will have to withdraw, regroup and start all over again". (Tovey, 1999)

Co-optation, as well as institutionalization, raise questions about movement outcomes and how to assess these. They are hard to identify, especially when "movement" is broadly defined, (Giugni, 1998) and as goals shift over time (Meyer & Whittier, 1994). Gamson (1975) proposes two main dimensions of successful outcomes: the first deals with the challenging group, while the second with the benefits gained. In the first case, success would be gaining recognition as a valid representative for a legitimate set of interests, while the second revolves around new benefits gained. There are distinctions in terms of what combinations are achieved: full success

is the achievement of both dimensions (and failure is neither), while co-optation is recognition of a group but no benefits and pre-emption is benefits but the group is not recognised. These outcomes are "ultimate", capable of being assessed only when the "challenge" period ends, defined as when the challenging group ceases to exist or it stops mobilizing. Groups that become institutionalized, when the "conflict becomes regulated and waged under some standard operation procedures" are considered the end of the challenge as well (Gamson 1975).

Conclusion

As the literature demonstrates, the transition from welfare state to neoliberalism has been a variable process, adapting to times and situations. The state has been pivotal in this change, both in the redefinition of its own role and creating favourable conditions. This transition has been especially pronounced in urban areas, as redevelopment has been state supported and increasingly undertaken by quasi-governmental agencies that exemplify the transition from urban government to governance. However, it is in the eradication of public housing that the significance of the state in implementing neoliberal urban policy and in eliminating the vestiges of the welfare state is unmistakable. The process of gentrification, while dependent on the state for infrastructure and the regulatory framework, is primarily driven by the private sector. However the clearing out of public housing brings the state to another level of intervention and the active removal of poor residents out of areas of the city that have been revalued. What is surprising is the lack of mobilization against the dismantlement of housing projects. As with the projects led by quasi-governmental agencies described by Swyngedouw et al., the discourse

around the necessity to redevelop public housing to increase social mix and diversity has been persuasive

Before describing the process that was undertaken in the redevelopment of Benny Farm, the next chapter will examine the process that led to initial state intervention in housing and in particular the construction of Benny Farm in the post-war period.

CHAPTER 3   Benny Farm: The Context of Development

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the transition from the welfare state to neoliberalism and, in particular, the redefinition and reconfiguration of urban areas. Gentrification and privatization of public housing are two aspects of these changes that I focussed on since they form an important backdrop to the redevelopment process undertaken in Benny Farm that I discuss in Chapter 4.

This chapter will examine the background to the initial development of Benny Farm, in particular in the context of the emergence of Canadian housing policy. Specific attention is paid to the period leading up to the post-World War II period, including the early 20th century, as the role of the state and its response to social problems, especially urban and housing problems, is defined. This examination underlines that the state, especially in reaction to housing issues, is not monolithic but that the various levels of government, notably the municipal and the federal levels, defend different interests at different times. Striking as well is the discourse around support for working class and marginalized populations, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, in the parallels that can be drawn with the neoliberal discourse, which emphasizes the role of the private sector and individual rather than collective responsibility.

The period after World War II was especially significant as the welfare state in Canada began to take shape. However, intervention in housing, as discussed in Chapter 2, was a peripheral

concern. One exception was responding to veterans who confronted a severe housing shortage on their return; propelled by fears of social unrest, the federal government was forced to act. Benny Farm, discussed at the end of the chapter, was one of the projects built by the government.

I begin by discussing a distinctive feature of Benny Farm, its design, which embodied early 20th century ideals of workers' housing and urban design.

Benny Farm: design origins

In 1994, Michael Fish, Montreal advocate of heritage preservation, published an article about the potential loss of significant Montreal buildings, including the Benny Farm project[57] (Fish, 1994). Benny Farm, wrote Fish,

> …is a monument to the Second World War; to the respect the country holds for its warriors-defenders; to its prolific architect, Harold J. Doran; to avant-garde, high quality, low-income planning in this country; and to large-scale, serially-produced home construction. It is also the most important and best preserved example of Canada's "official" architectural style from 1930 to 1950 (Fish, 1994).

According to Fish, the design was by far the best example of a garden court planning, "rooted" in the Great Crescent in Bath, the Greenwich Hospital in London, and the Invalides, the Louvre and Versailles in Paris (Fish, 1994). Within a few days of the article's publication in Le Devoir, André Gohier, CMHC manager of the Benny Farm project, responded that while there was some merit in the coherence of the site, the work of "Harold James Doran n'a rien de particulièrement intéressant au plan patrimonial" (Gohier, 1993). Notwithstanding the CMHC reaction, the Fish

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[57] The other buildings were the Forum, the Emerson wing of Windsor station, and the 1950s extension to the Westmount library.

articles led to an analysis of the historic and architectural value by the Historic Sites and

Monuments Board of Canada (Fulton, 1993). The report traced the form and character of Benny

Farm to European social housing of the 1920s and in particular, courtyard housing of the

Amsterdam School and to Le Corbusier site planning (Fulton, 1993). Doran's work, it was

proposed, was "Proto-Modern Utilitarian" [58] with the use of materials that "recall early

European Modernist ideals of proletarian housing" which "lauds 'monotony and abstraction'"[59]

(Fulton, 1993).[60] Nonetheless, the Historic Sites and Monuments Board concluded that Benny

Farm was similar to other "superblock" public housing built in Canada (most of which no longer

existed) and while integrity of Benny Farm was well-maintained and interesting, it was not an

innovative example and there was little consensus about the social, historical or architectural

value of "modern public housing" (Fulton, 1993).

While there may be some debate about the heritage value of Benny Farm, its architect, Harold J.

Doran, incorporated contemporary ideas about architecture and planning in his work. He called

the project *Benny Farm Gardens: Montreal*[61] referencing the Garden City movement[62], as did

other contemporary projects (e.g. Colangelo, Montreal architect, named a 1941 project Garden

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[58] The description of the style and the design tradition are reaffirmed in a review of Canadian Architectural styles, which includes Benny Farm (Ricketts, Maitland & Tucker, 2004:199)

[59] Citing Adele Freedman(3 October 1987) Public Housing: Among exerts, Modern is a dirty word" *The Globe and Mail,* C17

[60] A more positive assessment was that the project represented the Modernist tradition in its "pre-war standards of human scale" through the architecture, site planning and "generous expanses of green space" (Phillips, 2001).

[61] However, a 1946 illustration in the Montreal Gazette calls it the more mundane *Benny Farm Project.*

[62] Wolfe (1981) notes that the original Garden City concept was "much deformed through the course of history" but also points out the "magic" of the word "garden" in a context of "airless terraced flats stacked three stories high and back lanes crammed with additional dwellings, sheds, and outdoor privies". Wolfe notes as well that "The idea of gardens for workingmen was also seen as providing an outlet for surplus energy, otherwise seen as being wasted in boozing, gambling or houses of ill repute."

City Park[63]). Before undertaking Benny Farm, Doran worked on another veteran's project, Les

Terrasses Villeray[64], for Housing Enterprises of Canada Ltd. (HECL). Doran had graduated

from the McGill School of Architecture in 1931, a period that coincided with teaching by Percy

Nobbs[65], a strong proponent of Garden Cities, who, when in London, had been influenced by

Ebenezer Howard and other urban reformers. Another architecture student at McGill during the

same period was Samuel Gitterman, who went on to work on the Cité Jardin du Tricentenaire

and Crawford Park in Verdun. Gitterman's familiarity with Garden Cities has been attributed to

both Nobbs and the Town Planning Institute of Canada (Choko, 1988).

Doran's work, while perhaps not innovative, as proposed by the Historic Sites and Monuments

Board, is a reflection of the preoccupations and concerns about urban living conditions during

the post-industrial period. Some of the earliest solutions revolved around planning and design,

notably Garden Cities.

The Garden City Movement

Problems of overcrowding and poverty in European cities in the mid-1800s resulted in two major

responses; urban reform, focused on improved housing and hygiene, and design, including the

founding of utopias away from urban problems. Ebenezer Howard's proposed Garden City

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[63] *The Gazette* (January 25, 1941) Garden City Park Development Progresses, p 20
[64] It was sold and formed into co-operative housing in 1982.
[65] In 1928, Nobbs became president of the Town Planning Institute of Canada, which advocated Garden Cities. The Town Planning Institute was also active in dealing with urban problems and in 1934 prepared plans for the Slum Clearance and Re-housing Committee set up by the Montreal Board of Trade and the City Improvement League (Wagg, 1982).

design was one of the most influential.[66] The Garden City was a self-reliant community away from large urban centres in which past mistakes would be corrected: industry would be separated from residential areas, land would be collectively owned to eliminate speculation, and profits would be used for the public good (Hall & Ward, 1998). While a few attempts were made in the early 20th century, such as the Garden City in Letchworth, it was the post-WWII period that saw the greatest diffusion of the Garden City through the New Towns movement. However, what remained were primarily the design features, such as street layout and generous gardens, while the social vision that Howard had proposed, such as collective land ownership, was abandoned.

Similarly in the US, reformers also struggled with concerns about the impact of industrialization on cities. One response was the City Beautiful Movement, which held that beauty could be a means to exercise social control; by creating a beautiful city, inhabitants would be inspired to moral and civic virtue.[67] The Garden City was also adopted but as in Britain, it was the design features that were incorporated in suburbs such as Forest Hills Gardens in Queens and Radburn in New Jersey (Stein, 1957). These design features became an integral part of suburban development, in particular curvilinear streets and the separation of residential areas from other uses.

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[66] Howard was not the only proponent of moving away from the existing problems of cities and founding new communities. Utopian Socialists such as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen were attempted in a number of countries, including Russia and the United States (Benevolo, 1980).
[67] Adherents to the City Beautiful Movement included Frederick Law Olmstead, designer of Central Park as well as Mount Royal Park in Montreal (Kostof, 1991).

The Garden City in Canada

Canada was not immune to the problems of industrialization. An economic boom in the 1880s fuelled a dual vision of cities: while these were acknowledged as the physical embodiment of progress and the arts, they also were seen as the locus of a concentration of modern evils. Works such as *The City Below the Hill* by Ames in 1897 illustrated the horrors of inner city neighbourhoods and housing was considered one of the most urgent questions in the urban reform movement. Private capitalists, hoping to safeguard their investments, also undertook housing projects (Wolfe, 1994). In Montreal, for example, organisations such as the Montreal Board of Trade and the City Improvement League, as well as individuals such as Nobbs, saw workers' housing in the centre city as a priority and advocated massive demolition of slums and government-funded rebuilding of affordable housing close to new industries (Choko, 1988). The ideas of the City Beautiful movement also found their way to Canada and led to the preparation of City Beautiful Plans by local associations of architects for a number of cities including Montreal and Toronto between 1906 and 1909. While they were not implemented, they were widely circulated in newspapers and provoked interest and influence among reform groups (Wolfe, 1994).

Interest in reform was shared by Mackenzie King, Prime Minister through the 1920s and from 1935 to 1948. He had been influenced by European and American progressive social thinkers such as Toynbee at Oxford, Jane Adams in Chicago and Sydney and Beatrice Webb in London and was a strong advocate of town planning as part of an overall program of social reform, singling out Garden Cities as an especially important component (Gordon, 2002). King's first mandate overlapped with the influence and activity of Thomas Adams, another advocate of the

Garden City movement and former secretary of the First Garden City Limited, which administered Letchworth in England. Adams became consultant to the federal Commission of Conservation in 1914[68], which was instrumental in advancing the idea of town planning in Canada and continued as advisor to the federal government until 1922 (Bacher, 1986). He played a significant role in the founding of the Town Planning Institute of Canada in 1919, and designed Lindenlea in Ottawa, which he hoped would become a national model of a garden city (Stein, 1994).

However, as elsewhere, the garden city was not fully applied as envisioned by Howard. For example, Lindenlea as designed by Adams, did not have communal land but instead incorporated individual homeownership, reaffirming the house as the "major economic and symbolic element in Canadian middle-class life" (Delaney, 1991). Adams' plans were never fully realised and Lindenlea became "just another real estate development" (Stein, 1994). The Town of Mount Royal (TMR), developed during the same period, also drew from the garden city movement as well as people such as Frederick Law Olmstead Jr.[69], advocate of the City Beautiful movement and Henry Vivian, British MP.[70] However, the element of social reform contained in Howard's vision was again missing, instead it was a real estate venture undertaken by the Canadian Northern Railway to defray the cost of building a three-mile railway tunnel to the downtown

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[68] He was persuaded to come to Canada by Clifford Sifton, head of the Commission of Conservation that was to deal with the impact of almost a million immigrants who had come to Canada between 1896 and 1914. Half of Canada's population was in urban areas and the problems that preoccupied the Commission revolved around a speculative housing market and unregulated land development; the Garden City and British approaches to local control were seen as a solution (Stein, 1994).
[69] Son of the designer of Mount Royal Park.
[70] Omstead had met Frederick Todd, who was in charge of planning TMR, during a visit to Montreal in 1910, the same year that Henry Vivian, MP and chairman of a British organisation dedicated to establishing Garden Suburbs, had visited. Vivian's visits had an "immediate impact on the discussion of housing and planning issues in Canada, and even in Montreal", inspiring the mayor, Joseph Guerin, to visit Hampstead Garden Suburb (McCann, 1996).

core of Montreal. The reference to garden cities[71] allowed the developers to distinguish Mount Royal from other housing projects and maintain its competitiveness (McCann, 1996).[72] As with Lindenlea, and in spite of Vivian's influence, Mount Royal was designed as middle class enclave with land as something to be "added to an individual's investment portfolio, rather than as a shared, community resource" (McCann, 1996).

Another attempt was the Société des Logements Ouvriers that focussed on working class housing. Formed in 1917 by an alderman and later mayor of Pointe-aux-Trembles, it was an effort to deal with the lack of workers housing in the context of rapid industrial development in the east end of the city. Rosaire Prieur had investigated European housing models and determined that Pointe-aux-Trembles would be an ideal location for a model garden city. A total of 103 units were built and while workers could acquire a unit through a rent-to-own scheme, the 15% down payment limited access to better paid workers (Choko, 1980: 82; Wolfe, 1981).

Another modest example developed during the same period was closer to the vision of a comprehensive garden city. Gardenvale, on the western tip of Montreal, was developed by James John Harpell who in 1918, seeking more space for his Montreal printing press, bought 10 acres of land in Ste. Anne-de-Bellevue. Through his travels in Europe, Harpell had become familiar with Garden Cities and adhered to the belief that the solution to urban problems was to build outside of large city centres (Girard, 1996). The Garden City Development Company Ltd,

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[71] Promotional literature presented it as a "Garden City in the very best sense of the word" (McCann, 1996).
[72] A population boom had resulted in a highly speculative and frenzied real estate market across Canada in the 1920s and Montreal builders, responding to the demand for owner-occupied, single family housing, were finding that competition was increasing.

established in 1919, built and managed 35 semi-detached workers' cottages (Girard, 1996).[73]

As well as the housing, the development included parks, playgrounds, tennis courts, skating

rinks, and a greenhouse as well as a water garden in an abandoned quarry. Harpell also set up an

Institute of Industrial Arts and a Study Club to encourage workers to continue their education, a

credit union, and a home-building society (Quarter, 2000).[74]

The depression and World War II slowed down housing production but elements of the garden

city resurfaced in the post-war period. Part of this came with the promotion of planning and

planning education by the Central Mortgage and Housing corporation (CMHC) created in 1946

(Wolfe, 1994) as well as by the revival of the Town Planning Institute in 1952[75] and the

establishment of the Community Planning Association of Canada (CPAC), which sought an

alliance of planners, citizens and political officials (Cross, 1997). A key proponent of community

planning, Humphrey Carver, compared the "scope and significance" of post-war housing

construction with the transcontinental railway (Cross, 1997). The "total community" according

to Carver, had to include not only good housing with an "abundance of sunlight, unsoiled air,

well-drained ground" but also schools, recreation, places of worship and retail: a good example

of such a "total neighbourhood" was the Cité Jardin du Tricentenaire (Cross, 1997).

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[73] Part of the construction was funded with $150,000 from the 1919 federal housing program (Wolfe, 1981), that is
discussed below.
The housing was turned over to a cooperative in the 1940s and the houses were sold to the workers according to
their capacity to pay, with financing from two local Caisse Populaires (Girard, 1996).
[74] The commitment to workers continued throughout the depression, during which no worker lost their employment,
and eventually the printing company was turned over to the workers in the form of a co-op during World War II
(Garden City Press), on condition that it remain a worker's co-op. However it was sold to private owners in 1996
(Young, 2011; http://coolopolis.blogspot.ca/2006/12/jj-harpell-local-legend.html).
[75] It has been suggested that town planning "came to an end" during the depression, epitomized by the Town
Planning Institute of Canada, which ceased to exist in 1932 (Wolfe, 1994).

The Cité Jardin du Tricentenaire had a very different set of origins from that of Mount Royal and Gardenvale. Developed in 1942, it was a response to both the conditions during the 1930s and to the promotion of social reform by the Catholic Church and the French-Canadian bourgeoisie. Private property was central to this reform as a means to make workers responsible and to support and strengthen the nuclear family. Decent workers' housing was not "part of the necessary equipment of industry" as had been advocated by local "big business", such as the Montreal Board of Trade. Instead, workers housing was required for human dignity, maintaining moral order and fighting subversive ideas that were easily propagated in slums (Choko, 1988). The promoter of the Cité Jardin du Tricentenaire, the Union Économique d'Habitation (UEH), was the inspiration of Joseph-Auguste Gosselin, a lawyer who had travelled through Europe in the 1930s and become familiar with initiatives for workers' housing and the co-operative movement, and Père Jean-d'Auteuil Richard, Jesuit priest, who also had travelled and studied social programs in Europe. Both were inspired by the garden city and shared a belief in co-operative ventures and collective social services. An initial proposal in Quebec City in 1939 proved too expensive for the targeted client group and failed to garner municipal support. Determined to implement their ideas, the two men organised an initial meeting in 1940 in Montreal, advertised as "an educative evening on housing", which drew 800 people and was followed by a subsequent meeting where 300 people attended to discuss the National Housing Act (NHA) and its application in Montreal (Choko, 1988). Part of this interest stemmed from Part II of the 1938 NHA which gave limited dividend companies and municipalities favourable terms [76] for low rent housing (Wolfe, 1981). A few months later, a study group was formed

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[76] Municipalities could borrow 90 percent at 2 percent interest, whereas limited dividend companies could borrow up to 80 percent at 1.75 percent interest (Wolfe, 1981).

which held a public meeting about the NHA and was attended by F.W. Nicolls, director of the National Housing Administration, responsible for the NHA (Choko, 1988). Part II of the NHA was withdrawn by the federal government in 1940 and with this the project became geared to middle-class housing with financing coming primarily from the Sun Life Insurance Company (Wolfe, 1981). This was the first time that the company had risked lending money in east-end Montreal, on "French-Canadian land", and in spite of the reluctance of the promoters and members of the UEH to collaborate with "big English capital" (Choko, et al., 1986).

A community comprising a school, church, pool, park, commercial uses, and 600 units was planned, and widely circulated in newspapers, with explicit references to the garden city of Radburn (Choko, 1988). One of the key actors responsible for the final design of the project was Samuel Gitterman, mandated to work on the UEH project by Nicolls, of the NHA.[77] The inauguration of the project in 1942 included fireworks, speeches, 10,000 visitors, and to commemorate the founding of Montreal in 1642, it was named Cité Jardin du Tricentenaire (Wolfe, 1981). Only 166 units were built but the project also included a grocery, a Caisse Populaire, and eventually a church and a school. Community activities and management of local space was done by residents' associations formed on each cul-de-sac and chaired by a "mayor" (Wolfe, 1981). However, in 1945 the project confronted a number of difficulties, including access to construction materials and competent workers as well as financial problems. While the federal government supported the project with an 80 percent loan guarantee, ongoing support of an approved lender proved to be challenging as was finding interim financing and potential

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[77] While with the National Housing Administration, Gitterman published a "Town Planning Manual" which advocated the use of cul-de-sacs and other elements associated with garden cities (Choko, 1988) and in the post-war period, worked on Crawford Park in Verdun, which had a "Radburn-like pattern" (Wolfe, 1994).

owners who could assume the remaining 20 percent down payment, especially as the costs began

to escalate (Choko, 1988). The initiative ended when scandal broke out in 1945, which resulted

in provincial trusteeship of the UEH and disposal of the remaining property (Wolfe, 1981).

An influential proponent of Garden Cities during this period was also Eugene Faludi, who taught

town planning at McGill and University of Toronto.[78] Planning, he maintained, was necessary

for Canada's economic welfare and urban sprawl should be controlled by using Garden Cities,

greenbelt communities and satellite towns (Cross, 1997). His ideas were incorporated in the

plans for Thorncrest Village, marketed as "Canada's first completely planned community"

(Cross, 1997:271). For Faludi the neighbourhood was the basic unit of design and interspersed

throughout were small green spaces that provided safe playing spaces for children and served as

points of contact between residents. While the clientele of Thorncrest was different from that of

Benny Farm, the description of these common spaces, designed so that the houses and front

yards opened on to them, are very similar to the spaces in Benny Farm.

> [A] ring of houses encircled the entire community as a kind of protective wall:
> perhaps a kind of 'wagon train" analogy can apply here, with the security of
> civilization inside the ring and the hostile world on the outside. Neighbourhood
> became a protected space, protected by the outer houses of the development….
> there seemed to be a conscious effort to get the "Thorncrester" to look inward to
> the neighbourhood. (Cross, 1997:276).

In Benny Farm, the buildings also formed a protective wall that turned inward from the

surrounding neighbourhood (Teasdale, 1998; Fulton, 1993) and instead of "Thorncrester"

residents identified themselves as Farmers and Farmerettes (Porter, 1952).

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[78] He produced a master plan for Toronto in 1943.

Benny Farm shared the vestiges of both garden cities and the modernist movement in the way that the project ignored the local grid street pattern and instead buildings were in a serpentine configuration around the interior courtyards that were connected with paths. For the most part however, comprehensive approaches to neighbourhoods were never fully implemented although some design elements of the Garden City, such as separation of residential areas and curvilinear streets, were adopted and continue to be used in planning and housing developments, in Canada as elsewhere. Above all the failure and the inconsistent use of the Garden City model reflects the larger issue of the lack of a coherent approach to urban and housing issues by the Canadian state and its abandonment to the private market.

Canadian housing policy

While there may have been willingness on the part of individuals, including Prime Minister King, to encourage town planning and to innovate in the design of urban areas and housing, the overwhelming philosophy in Canada has been that housing belongs in the private sector and that the government had no direct role to play. This was the core position in the early 20th Century as housing needs, especially urban housing needs, became more acute with industrialization and migration to cities. When concessions were made to respond to needs, these were often the result of collective action by workers, the fear of such collective action or because housing problems were disrupting the productivity of the workforce (Choko, 1980).[79]

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[79] For example, in the 1920s Gustave Tremblay an economist from the HEC wrote "L'économiste sait, en effet que le travail de l'Ouvrier bien logé, robuste en plein de santé est beaucoup plus productif…" (Choko, 1980:88). In 1935, the Montreal Board of Trade and the City Improvement League proposed, "Workers' dwellings are as much a part of the industrial plant of the country, the province, or the municipality, as are the mills they work in or the

Thomas Adams, for example, a key advisor to the federal government during the post-World War I period, promoted "scientific town planning" that included progressive measures such as restrictions on land speculation and more compact urban development. However his belief in the increased efficiency of planning was a means to "lessen class conflict" and he hoped not to "inaugurate socialistic extremes but to forestall them" (Bacher, 1986). According to Adams, rental housing subsidies, as those being implemented in Britain[80], were "economically unsound", instead homeownership, that had become "engrained in Canada", should be encouraged "in preference to renting" (Hulchanski, 1986). He was able to implement these beliefs in the federal 1919 housing program that focussed exclusively on homeownership (Wade, 1993).

Adams, identified "with the values and aspirations of the Canadian establishment" (Bacher, 1986), was but was only one of many urban and housing advisors to the federal government who either came from the real estate sector (e.g., Clark, deputy finance minister from 1932 to 1952, Lobley who developed the limited dividend program during World War II), insurance companies (e.g., Mansur, first president of CMHC) and banking (e.g., Spinney planned limited dividend units after World War II in Montreal). From the earliest period, the Canadian government's approach was based on "privatism" or reliance on the private sector to address housing issues

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machinery these mills contain….Assisted housing for wage earners may be viewed as part of the necessary equipment of industry" (Choko, 1980:123).

[80] The 1919 Addison Act enacted under the Lloyd George government recognized a role for the state in housing and social welfare measures that included the provision of working class housing. The Conservative Baldwin government, which came into power in 1923, reasserted the dominant role of private enterprise but also accorded a subsidy for rental housing (Macintyre, 1999).

and working with real estate and financial sectors to such an extent that their representatives "became barely distinguishable from the government itself" (Bacher, 1986).

While housing can be considered "integral to human and social well-being" (Prince, 1998) unlike education or health, it is the least decommodified component of the welfare state (Malpass, 2004). As in Britain, material well-being, including housing, is derived above all from employment income and a post-war commitment on the part of governments to the goal of full-employment (Malpass, 2004; Rose, 1980). While the post-World War II period is considered the pivotal moment in the shaping of Canadian housing policy, much of the response of the federal government was shaped by the previous 30 years, in particular the post-World War I period and the Great Depression. This was a period of increasing needs by the working class but also conflicting interests within the elite, in particular tension between the property-owning class, often closely allied to municipal governments, and financial and industrial capital more often represented at the federal level. This tension was especially marked in Quebec with the added dimension of political and cultural tension between the province and the federal government.

Pre-World War I

Rapid industrialization in Canada in the late 1800s was accompanied by equally rapid urbanization fuelled by migration from rural areas and immigration to Canada. In Montreal this was a period of land speculation, complicity between speculators and government and worsening

conditions for workers (Choko, 1980: 19).[81]. The migration to cities made workers more

dependent on labour and more vulnerable to business cycles, in particular economic depressions

such as those in 1893 and 1930 (Ruddick, 1979). It was also a period of increasing spatial

separation by class as new neighbourhoods for the rich and the poor were developed and as new

housing forms, such as the apartment block, were built (Choko, 1994; Lewis, 1991). The focus

on maximization of profit in a context of minimal municipal laws resulted in dense and poorly

constructed working class housing which "devient de plus en plus une merchandise qu'une partie

de la bourgeoisie va construire, acheter, louer, vendre" (Choko, 1980:19).

The dominant ideology held that solutions to housing problems would come from the private

sector or philanthropists, not the state. For example, Ames[82], who held that a scientific approach

was necessary to understand urban poverty also believed that the solution to housing problems

lay with "enlightened" philanthropists and not state intervention in the housing market (Purdy,

1997). While individuals such as Ames and Harpell and groups such as the UEH[83] planned and

undertook projects, these were driven not by government but were initiated by individuals. They

reflected a growing concern about the impact of poverty on social order and economic

productivity (Purdy, 1997). However, poverty was primarily seen as a moral issue, and the poor,

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[81] Major infrastructure was put into place in the mid-1800s that supported this expansion: the Lachine canal in 1846, the railway system in the 1850s and with it the establishment of large, capital-intensive industries such as the Grand Trunk shops, flour mills, sugar refinery, etc. At the same time a labour pool and market were created with the immigration that began in the 1840s (Lewis, 1991). Choko (1980) goes into detail about the alliance of industrial and land capital during the industrial expansion of Montreal, notably in areas such as Rosemount with the Angus Shops as well as the overlap of individuals involved in the development of neighbourhoods such as Outremont, Lachine, Verdun and Hochelaga and the upper management of companies such as the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company, Bank of Montreal, and Montreal Street Railway.
[82] Ames, author of "The City Below the Hill", built Diamond Court in 1897, which consisted of 39 units and a temperance grocery as an illustration of decent working class housing (Wolfe, 1981).
[83] Another project at the end of the 19th Century was the purchase of 20 lots near Mount Royal by a syndicate of longshoremen who wanted to build houses for members (Wolfe, 1981).

especially able-bodied poor, were blamed for their situation in spite of broader economic context and cyclical depressions that resulted in high levels of unemployment, (Finkel, 2006: 67-9). Living conditions were difficult; the rate of tuberculosis in Montreal was the highest in North America, infant mortality was higher than New York or Toronto (Choko, 1980: 66) and a third of Montreal children did not reach the age of one (Finkel, 2006: 72). Health divisions in Montreal followed the class structure, with modern sanitation in the upper city while poor areas were overcrowded and badly equipped. However, as germ theory began to be accepted, there was growing recognition that disease could spread from poor to rich areas and that improved sanitation was beneficial for all citizens (Finkel, 2006: 77; Purdy, 1997).

Nascent unions focussed not only on work but also on the cost of living and living conditions. The period is marked by a series of strikes[84] and a radicalization of workers (Choko, 1980). The Chevaliers du Travail, for example, founded in 1882 and drawing on ideas from the utopian socialists, promoted co-operatives (Choko, 1980:10) and improved housing as part of broader political objectives (Hamel, 1983: 20). The *Partie ouvrier*, formed in 1899, called for homeownership for workers, the right to vote in municipal and school elections, and the "municipalization" of public services such as snow removal and street paving (Choko, 1980: 33-39). In Canada, the Social Democrat Party, formed in 1911, had several branches in Quebec, including St Louis, where Joseph Schubert, in his 1916 electoral platform, denounced real estate companies and their control of the municipal government and called for universal suffrage,

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[84] Choko (1980: 13) cites various counts of work strikes including 40 between 1875 and 1894, 30 in the south west of Montreal between 1871 and 1903, "une grève importante et dure" at the Angus shops, and a six-week strike of 4 500 textile workers in 1913.

municipalization of utilities, including the tramway, taxation of property owned by religious orders, and the obligation of landlords to repair their units (Choko, 1980: 77).

Elites were also becoming afraid that unresolved housing issues could lead to instability. Rosaire Prieur, who had founded the *Société des Logements Ouvriers*, referred to the potential for revolutionary ideas if there were no improvements, while the mayor of Maisonneuve[85] blamed the lack of workers' housing on land speculation (Wolfe, 1981). Homeownership rather than rental housing was advocated by others since the "pride of ownership would improve the moral fibre of the working classes and quell revolutionary tendencies" (Bragg, 1912 cited in Wolfe, 1981). In parallel, principles about the nation, the role of women, and the family as the "foundation stone of the state" were being applied to the housing situation. The single family home was especially favoured since it "promised to uphold stable family life in a manner consistent with the market economy" (Purdy, 1997). Simultaneously, ideological positions of the elite were disseminated by media such as the Toronto Daily Globe which claimed that "the recipients of public bounty are notoriously dissipated" (Finkel, 2006:67).

By the end of the 19th Century sanitation was being improved as a result of the public health movement and municipalities expanded their intervention by setting up hospitals (Finkel, 2006:77). Lobbying by groups such as the City Improvement League as well as reports from Boards of Health and a 1909 Commission on Tuberculosis pushed the Quebec Assembly to adopt "An Act to assist in the construction of dwelling-houses in cities, towns and villages" in 1914 (Wolfe, 1981). Municipalities could guarantee loans of up to 85% to non-profit housing

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[85] Annexed to the city of Montreal in 1918

companies, but while the stated goal was construction of workers housing, the program was so difficult to apply that other than a project in Pointe-aux-Trembles, all other efforts to develop housing were abandoned (Choko, 1980: 81; Wolfe, 1981). Nonetheless, while unworkable, the program reflected a confrontation between opposing interests; industrial capital that needed affordable and suitable housing for workers, and property capital that wanted to protect their interests from government intervention (Choko, 1980: 81).

World War I and its aftermath

While there was a slight increase in the number of housing units in Montreal between 1914 and 1918 this was not sufficient and housing density increased (Choko, 1980: 70-71).[86] The war did not diminish collective action, and Prime Minister Borden's reliance on wealthy business owners to mobilize the economy for war, coupled with the ensuing inflation, reduction in real wages and profiteering, led to public outcries about the unequal sacrifice being required (Finkel, 2006: 97). May 1st demonstrations against capitalism as well as strikes and movements for peace and against conscription[87] continued throughout the period (Choko, 1980: 67). However, it was 1919 that saw the greatest mobilization in Montreal with a record number of strikes[88] and the formation of over a hundred unions (Choko, 1980: 67). Elsewhere in Canada this was also a period of increased unionization and defense of workers' rights; union membership passed from 166,000 members in 1914 to 378,000 in 1919 (Larson, 1976: 68).

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[86] The number of units increased from 117,210 to 120,000 but the average number of occupants increased from 4.6 to 5.5 (Choko, 1980: 70-71).

[87] This was not limited to Montreal, for example in 1917 in British Columbia 76 percent of unionized workers voted for a general strike against conscription (Isitt, 2007).

[88] "…soit 81, touchant 9153 employés pour 849,943 journées" (Choko, 1980 :67)

Part of the unrest was due to a badly planned and delayed post-war demobilization (Rivard, 1999).[89] More than 600,000 people, "eager to re-establish themselves and their families in civilian life", were demobilized (Wade, 1993) with little support from the government that held that the "returned men must face cold economic reality, not handouts" and like "good soldiers, veterans were expected to work hard and be grateful" (Morton, 1998). Lord Atholstan, owner of the Montreal Star stated, "The returned soldier…must not be allowed to consider himself an unlimited creditor of the State, to be supported in idleness" (cited in Morton, 1998). However, the veterans returned to an acute housing shortage caused by the cessation of building during the war ~~(Wade, 1993)~~ and not only was housing rare and expensive but the cost of living was increasing rapidly and there were no jobs (Wade, 1993; Doucet & Weaver, 1991:112). Many of the problems were not new; groups such as the Housewives' Leagues had pushed for price controls on necessities such as food (Finkel, 2006: 96). In Montreal rents in the latter part of the First World War had increased 50-75 percent (Wolfe, 1981) while in Vancouver, the increased cost of living, overcrowded housing, veteran's unemployment, a militant wartime workforce, and reaction to the killing of a labour leader by police[90] led to fears of a socialist revolution (Wade, 1993). These fears were further fuelled by a concern that soldiers had been exposed to "Bolshevism" while overseas (Rivard, 1999). Canadian veterans participated with and against labour, some resenting union members who had stayed and benefited from the war while others compared their own difficult situation to that of wartime profiteers (Morton, 1998).

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[89] The demobilization was deemed a complete failure in part because the war had been expected to end in 1919 or 1920 (Rivard, 1999).

[90] Ginger Goodwin, labour organizer and critic of Canadian participation in the war, was killed in 1918 by a police officer, who claimed self-defence, and was acquitted of manslaughter (Leier, 1997).

The Winnipeg strike in 1919 and sympathetic strikes that followed in other Canadian cities were especially pivotal but the unrest in Canada was not isolated; inflation, stagnating real wages, a decline in living standards, and war profiteering resulted in an increase of worker radicalization elsewhere (Peterson, 1981). In France veterans rioted because they were expected to pay back taxes while in Britain veterans demanded the "homes fit for heroes" promised by Prime Minister Lloyd George (Morton, 1998). While there may have been an array of causes for the unrest in Canada, both a federal business conference in 1918 and a subsequent 1919 Royal Commission on Industrial Relations focussed on housing and concluded that high rents, poor quality, as well as high building costs and land speculation were at the heart of the unrest (Wade, 1993; Larson, 1976: 68-69).

The federal government's response to the crisis was timid. Veterans demanded a $2,000 bonus to compensate for lost wages during the war, but the Borden government response was to portray this as a $2 billion "grab" (Morton, 1998). A Soldier Settlement scheme was introduced in 1917 that provided money to buy farming land, but to save money, the government provided funds only for poor land in remote areas and 80 percent failed within the first five years (Finkel, 2006: 98).[91] Provinces were under pressure to provide support, notably to widows and orphans, as well as continued advocacy for a mother's allowance. There were provincial differences in response, but at the heart was a moral stance in terms of "virtuous", that is married, women, and those who did not deserve such support (Finkel, 2006: 99).[92]

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[91] Ultimately the government and elites prevailed and the public began to see veterans as "loafers" as they "learned to remove their discharge pins and forget what they had been doing between 1914 and 1918 if they wanted a chance to work" (Morton, 1998).
[92] Finkel points out that on the other hand, workman's compensation, available only to men at that time, did not take moral worth of the recipient into account, thereby reinforcing rigid gender roles (2006:99).

In December 1918, in response to pressure from provincial governments, notably Ontario, the

federal government used the War Measures Act to distribute $25M to the provinces for housing.

A cabinet committee was also established to define a housing program.[93] The ensuing program

consisted of loans for mortgages for homeownership, minimum standards of services, space and

sanitation and encouragement in the use of large sites for "good planning and economy" (Wade,

1993). The stated goals were to "relieve shortages through construction, to give working people,

especially veterans the opportunity to own homes at a fair price and to promote community

health and well-being though housing and planning projects" (Wade, 1993). Rather than

encroaching onto property rights, as did measures such as rent controls introduced in France and

other European countries at this period (Willis, 1950-1), the program worked through

municipalities, the level of government that was the most influenced by property owners

(Larson, 1976: 69). At the heart of the program was expansion of ownership to more households,

thereby meeting the underlying goal of social stability; as expressed by the Vancouver Sun,

"there would be little, if any likelihood of serious social upheaval in a community where every

family owned the quarters in which they lived" (cited in Wade, 1993).

The program was applied differently across the country. For example, in Vancouver priority was

given to widows and disabled veterans, but eligibility required that veterans had lived in the city

before going overseas and had a maximum income of $3,000 a year (Wade, 1993). Quebec

integrated the program to its 1914 Act and together they were declared to be the "General

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[93] Thomas Adams was technical advisor to the Committee of Cabinet on Housing which administered the program and was primarily responsible for drafting the plan (Wade, 1993; Wolfe, 1981).

Housing Plan of the Province" (Wolfe, 1981). However, while 2,100 houses were built in Quebec, only 51 were for veterans. The "outstanding failure" in Quebec was Montreal where the program was not used: a provincial technical commission funded by participating municipalities was to prepare the plans and specifications for the new housing, but Montreal, which had set up its own Housing Commission to administer the program, felt that it could do the work more cheaply and did not want to "lose autonomy to Quebec" and refused to participate. The program was also ill-suited to the city; the maximum price of $4,500 for a house was too low, the reimbursement rate was more than what most workers could afford, and the prohibition on building multiple rental units was seen as "punitive" (Wade, 1993; Wolfe, 1981). In spite of modifications, including eligibility of multiple unit buildings, the program was ultimately deemed a failure (Wade, 1993; Wolfe, 1981).

A 1935 report of a parliamentary committee on housing "presented a grim picture of mismanagement, poor construction, and loss of owners' equity". Lindenlea, which Adams had hoped would be a model of good planning, was described as a "hopeless mess" and "gross failure" which had not demonstrated good planning (Wade, 1993). In Vancouver, owners who bought houses when prices peaked found themselves facing foreclosure and loss of equity when prices fell (Wade, 1993). The program was criticized for implementation, including not examining needs or consulting local groups, as well as with structure, such as low-down payment loans in a volatile market (Wade, 1993). In Vancouver, only one house was built in the city centre, where most low income households lived (Wade, 1993). In summary, the program was "short-term and market-oriented: its aim was to reduce social unrest and to stimulate the private

sector and generate employment without sounding too collectivistic. The housing never reached those of lowest income who most desperately needed it" (Wade, 1993).

The first federal incursion into housing had many of the characteristics of subsequent programs: a focus on homeownership and "a temporary solution to a monetary problem rather than a commitment to permanent involvement" (Wade, 1993). Interest in the program faded in 1923 as the economy improved and the "threat of social order declined" (Wade, 1993). In spite of pressure from veterans, boards of trade, unions, community groups and municipal and provincial governments, Mackenzie King, who had been lukewarm to the program, discontinued funding in 1923-4 (Wade, 1993). An acceleration of the economy helped ease the housing situation in Montreal as elsewhere (Choko, 1980:94) but the economic boom also intensified migration to the city with pressure exerted on municipal services (Ruddick, 1979). Builders responded to demand by expanding to the periphery of cities where land was cheaper for those who could afford homes and apartments for those who could not afford or desire homeownership (Doucet & Weaver, 1991:113). In Montreal the 1920s is the beginning of the "boom" in apartment building construction, especially in well-to-do neighbourhoods such as Outremont, Westmount, newly annexed NDG, and city neighbourhoods such as the Golden Square Mile, in spite of Catholic Church opposition to this type of housing (Choko, 1994).[94]

It has been proposed that the social policies, including the housing program, that were implemented in the post-World War I period served a larger purpose, that of "blunting the

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[94] The Church maintained that apartment buildings went against French Canadian values; each family needed its own door to the outside and private space inside and to avoid exchanges with neighbours since these could have an impact on good relations and morals (Choko, 1994).

bruising social conflicts of the war period" and developing a "ruling myth" of nationalism that would obscure the class divisions that had arisen while also defining what constituted a "proper citizen" (Purdy, 1997). From the response to veterans who demanded support from the federal government to support for widows and orphans, the intervention of the state rested on a definition of who was worthy and under what circumstances.

The 1930s

Housing issues again became a concern with the depression of the 1930s as housing construction dropped and property values fell (Larson, 1976: 71). In Montreal, in spite of a high unemployment rate, the population increased leading to co-habitation and overcrowding (Choko, 1988). City ownership rates, a relatively low 15 percent in 1931, dropped to 11.5 percent in 1941 as owners defaulted on mortgage and tax payments (Choko, 1988). Charitable institutions proved incapable of coping with the need and public assistance shifted to the public sector but unable to meet the need, provincial governments together with municipalities approached the federal government for help (Finkel, 2006: 109). There was little support: Prime Minister King stated that he refused to help Conservative governments (six of the nine provinces were governed by Conservatives) and maintained that above all families were responsible for welfare, although he allowed that municipalities and provinces, unlike the federal government, had some responsibility. His defeat in 1930 was in part attributed to this, and R. B. Bennett, who followed, granted over $200 million over the next five years to provinces; an unprecedented but inadequate amount (Finkel, 2006: 110). The program consisted of public-works with half the cost assumed by municipalities and provincial and federal governments equally sharing the other half.

Abandoned in 1932, it was replaced by direct assistance, primarily to families (Finkel, 2006: 111).

In Montreal throughout this period, organisations such as the Ligue d'unité ouvrière and the Ligue de Solidarité feminine raised issues related to housing, especially that of forced evictions (Choko, 1980: 116) but housing issues were part of broader issues that touched not only on living conditions such as the cost of electricity, gas and water but of worker's rights (Choko, 1980: 120). Collective action was met with repression, such as the use of the army to deal with rent strikes in 1934 (Larson, 1976). Fear of Communist-led social unrest led the prime minister to outlaw the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) in 1931 and the following year, set up remote work camps for single men (Finkel, 2006: 111). In Quebec 25,000 people were deported between 1930 and 1934 while the Loi du Cadenas in 1937, outlawed meetings of progressive groups (Choko, 1980: 105).

In parallel, Montreal property owners advocated more humanitarian approaches to housing and evictions, but they especially sought to relieve pressure on landlords (Choko, 1980: 120). Small property owners were especially affected by the unemployment of their tenants and found themselves unable to pay for upkeep (a need that was exacerbated by overcrowding), property taxes and mortgage payments (Ruddick, 1979:50). The city eventually acceded to the demands and in 1936-1937, 28.5 percent of the rents of the unemployed was paid by the city (Choko, 1979: 119). Simultaneously, financial interests, joining the property owners, began to advocate for the elimination of slums, primarily because this would invigorate the construction industry

and benefit city finances (Ruddick, 1979:55)[95]. Reformers such as Humphrey Carver also called for demolition and reconstruction to eliminate the deviance, crime, and immorality that were closely associated to slums (Purdy, 1997). Beyond revitalization of the construction industry and elimination of the evils of slums, many of the working class neighbourhoods were on central land, considered to be too valuable for low-income housing. This argument was put forth by the National Construction Council at the Ganong Committee and taken up by the Montreal Metropolitan Commission (Choko, 1980:130) and underlay a number of redevelopment schemes in Montreal during the 1930s.

The plan Doucet, in 1933, supported by Ligue des Propriétaires as well as municipal councillors and newspapers such as Le Devoir and La Patrie, proposed a subsidy and long-term loan to demolish and rebuild workers housing on the same location but at higher rents (Melamed, 1981; Ruddick, 1979). Arguments were made that this would not only relieve unemployment but it would save small landlords, "le rempart le plus efficace contre le communisme" (Choko, 1980: 123). Other interests, primarily those of large capital, and represented by individuals such as Nobbs and organizations such as the Montreal Board of Trade and the City Improvement League, argued for the need for a broader approach to slum housing since

> Workers' dwellings are as much a part of the industrial plant of this country…as are the mills they work in or the machinery these mills contain…Assisted housing for wage earners must be viewed as part of the necessary equipment of industry… (Montreal Board of Trade quoted in Choko, 1980: 124)

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[95] Both Ruddick and Choko devote some attention to the various plans that were put forward to deal with slums and the various factions that were represented in these debates, notably that of English large-scale capital represented by the Montreal Board of Trade and Percy Nobbs and smaller, francophone property owners, such as the Ligue des Propriétaires and the City.

In 1934, the Armstrong plan, endorsed by the Montreal Real Estate Board and a member of the

Executive Committee, proposed demolition of slums and redevelopment for commercial and

industrial purposes while replacement cottages would be built elsewhere for owners and tenants

(Ruddick 1979: 56). The Montreal Civic Improvement League and the Montreal Board of Trade

proposed another scheme in 1935 that would see the relocation of 18,000 people from slum

housing to "outer" lands since the cost of central city land precluded low income housing. Two

years later, a similar plan was put forth by the Montreal Metropolitan Commission which also

proposed that given that homeownership was not "appropriate" or "practical" for workers, 30,

000 new dwellings should be built in the east-end of the city (Ruddick, 1979: 58). None of these

plans were realized, attributed to the "deadlock" between two groups – the Montreal Board of

Trade and small landlords represented by the Ligue des Propriétaires (Ruddick, 1979: 62).

The period was also characterized by intervention by academics and elites. A more scientific

approach to urban issues had been emerging since World War I[96] exemplified by the Housing

Centre in Toronto, set up by Humphrey Carver, which undertook both research and lobbying.

The League for Social Reconstruction (LSR), associated with the Cooperative Commonwealth

Federation (CCF), drew in people such as Carver and Leonard Marsh (who would play a major

role in post-war reconstruction) and published a manifesto calling for a new social order that

included old age pensions, unemployment insurance, health care, town planning, and social

housing (Purdy, 1997; Wolfe, 1994). It saw a strong role for the state in housing including grants

for public housing, nationalization of the building industry if it proved unwilling to meet the

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[96] The Commission of Conservation, 1909-1921, had examined conditions resulting from industrialization and with the health branch had dealt with housing issues. In parallel the profession of town planning grew in Canada, with Adams as the first director of the Town Planning Institute of Canada (Purdy, 1997).

need, and expropriation of slums to build public housing (Purdy, 1997). Underlying this program was a concern that "the unchecked profit motive of monopoly capitalism rode roughshod over stable family life and overall social and economic progress" (Purdy, 1997).

The growth in a "scientific approach" to housing issues also resulted in a proliferation of housing surveys in major cities, including Halifax, Hamilton, Ottawa, and Winnipeg. The results, including those from Montreal (1934) and Toronto (1935), underlined that subsidized housing for low-income families should become government responsibility. The Montreal survey concluded that low-income rental housing would reduce "undernourishment, tuberculosis, hospitalization, destitution" while releasing the "working class purchasing power for other necessities, comforts and conveniences of life." The Bruce Report for Toronto came to similar conclusions and urged the development of social housing (Bacher, 1993). There was also strong pressure for government intervention from the construction industry, which had "almost ceased to exist" (Finkel, 1979). [97] The Canadian Construction Association, along with the Canadian Manufacturers Association and architects and engineers, formed the National Construction Council (NCC) which participated in housing surveys and lobbied the federal government for a comprehensive housing program since construction would be a better solution to unemployment than direct relief (Hulchanski, 1986). Groups representing bankers and mortgage lenders were also urging the prime minister to take national action to unfreeze the mortgages (Finkel, 1979).

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[97] About two-thirds of workers directly employed by the construction industry in 1929 were unemployed in 1933 (Finkel, 1979).

While the response to demands from the unemployed and working class was primarily repression, there was also evidence of a shift at the federal level as Prime Minister Bennett declared the end of the "uncontrolled marketplace" and that the role of government was to regulate and ensure a more equitable distribution under the capitalist system (Finkel, 2006:112); a position Bennett only took in the last ten months in office, just before McKenzie King won the election in 1935 (Hulchanski, 1986). Bennett's 1935 "New Deal", in spite of references to broad social welfare measures such as health and old-age insurance, ultimately consisted primarily of unemployment insurance (Finkel, 2006:112). In parallel[98], the government established a Committee on Housing (Ganong Committee), which, after hearing witnesses and examining data, concluded that "a National emergency will soon develop unless the building of dwellings be greatly increased" (Bacher, 1986). The report called for direct state intervention in housing, construction of at least 25,000 public housing units, subsidies to owners for home renovation, and the creation of a national housing organization that would initiate and manage housing projects and programs (Choko, 1980: 126). These conclusions for state intervention were unexpectedly strong and unanimous for a multiparty committee made up of nine Conservatives, seven Liberals and one Labour MP (Hulchanski, 1986).

Nonetheless, the recommendations of the Ganong Committee were mostly ignored by the government and instead the Dominion Housing Act (DHA) was drafted by W.C. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, in close collaboration with T. D'Arcy Leonard, representative of the Dominion Mortgage and Investment Association (DM&IA), which included almost all major

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[98] This was also four days after a bloody confrontation between the unemployed and police in Regina (Larson, 1976: 73).

loan, trust, and life insurance companies. The bill reflected Clark's presentation to the Ganong

Committee in which he acknowledged low-rent housing problems such as overcrowding and

insalubrity, but urged the need for more study and emphasized that the priority was the economy

and the role that housing construction could play as a stimulant (Hulchanski, 1986). Leonard,

representing the DM&IA had also appeared at the Ganong Committee and testified that an

increase in the housing stock would depress the real estate market (Hulchanski, 1986). Mortgage

money, according to Leonard, was available but the impasse was due to the 40 percent down

payment required of purchasers (Hulchanski, 1986). The availability of funds was confirmed by

further investigation of the Gagnon Committee that found that financial institutions had up to

$75M that could be invested, if guaranteed (Ruddick, 1976: 44).

The Dominion Housing Act (DHA), adopted in 1935, consisted of two main components:

continued study of the housing problem by the Economic Council of Canada and collaboration

with lenders to provide mortgage loans to buyers and builders of new homes (Belec, 1997).[99]

The federal government calculated that these measures would generate up to $50M in residential

construction (Hulchanski, 1986) and while slum clearance and adequate, affordable housing

were stated goals, these remained "more on the level of rhetoric than action" (Finkel, 1979). By

providing finance only to new construction, recipients of DHA loans were primarily

professionals or managers who bought homes in suburbs (Harris, 1999) and few units were built

(Hulchanski, 1986; Choko, 1980: 126).

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[99] Harris (1999) points out that few lending institutions were approved to lend under the federal program and until
well into the 1950s, half of all residential mortgages were given by individuals, not lending institutions.

It could be argued that the DHA represented a shift from the position held throughout the 1920s that either ignored housing problems or attributed slums and poor housing conditions to the poor (Bacher, 1993) and the name "Dominion Housing Act" suggested that the government was doing something about the housing problem, which along with unemployment, were deemed to be the major issues of the day (Hulchanski, 1986). Clark acknowledged that the DHA expanded the operation of existing financial institutions rather than "driving them out of business" but this was seen as a temporary response to the severity of the economic situation, not an indication that state intervention was "either normal or desirable" (Rose, 1980). Above all, according to Clark, the government should not "go into a general policy of socialism based on conditions today" (Ruddick, 1979: 44) but instead adhered to a belief in improved housing through government support of the marketplace (Bacher, 1986).

MPs reacted negatively to the bill when it was introduced in the House of Commons; they were disappointed that evidence to the Ganong Committee had been ignored, as were British and American initiatives (Hulchanski, 1986). They criticized the focus on homeowners instead of renters and the exclusion of municipal non-profit and limited dividend corporations from DHA loans (Hulchanski, 1986). The DHA was also criticized outside of the House of Commons by people such as Nobbs, who called the provision of subsidies to middle-income people instead of the need for low-cost rental housing a "comedy of errors" (Hulchanski, 1986). F.R. Scott, speaking more broadly about the Canadian response to the economic crisis, stated "Reform has been avoided to a degree remarkable in relation to the disclosed need, remarkable also in comparison with other democracies" (cited in Bradford, 1999/2000).

As criticism of the DHA illustrates, Canadians were well-aware of American housing initiatives that included programs such as the Homeowners Loan Corporation to help refinance home owners who were defaulting on their mortgages (Harris, 2000), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to offer mortgage insurance, and public and with the encouragement of the labour movement cooperative, housing (Harris, 1999). Explanations for the different approach taken by the Canadian state range from the dominance of Clark as Deputy Minister of Finance[100] (considered the "foremost shaper" of Canadian housing policy: Bacher, 1993) to less significant problems of mortgage defaults and a more stable centralized financial system (Harris, 2000) resulting in an economic crisis that was not as severe as that in the US (Hulchanski, 1986). The context for the initiatives in the US was also considered extraordinary; massive strikes and "conditions of severe electoral instability" which had weakened the alliance of political leaders and economic elites (Piven & Cloward, 1979:30). Canada, on the other hand, did not experience a "broader systemic political crisis" and opposition parties and organized groups were never strong enough to "cause concern" to ruling groups (Hulchanski, 1986) attributed to a lack of organization due to geography and the parliamentary system (Harris, 2000) while those who advocated state intervention were not "influential or significant actors, either in national politics or the economy" (Hulchanski, 1986).

In Quebec, both the conclusions of the Ganong Commission and the DHA were vehemently opposed. The provincial government established the *Organisme provincial sur la petite propriété* which denounced state intervention in housing but also advocated for measures such as tax abatements for small landlords and demolition of slums (Choko, 1980:128). These arguments

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[100] The federal housing program was administered under the Department of Finance until 1946 (Harris, 1999).

were appropriated by the *Ligue des propriétaires de Montréal* who also denounced DHA subsidies as unfair competition (Choko, 1980:129). Duplessis, elected in 1936, was slow in getting started on projects, and focused primarily on road construction (Melamed, 1981).

A few modifications were made to the DHA in 1936 with the addition of the Home Improvement Plan (HIP) guaranteeing loans for home rehabilitation. In 1938 the DHA was replaced by the NHA, which permitted households with lower incomes than those covered in the DHA to become homeowners (Wade, 1984). The NHA passed in circumstances similar to those of the DHA; persistent unemployment, a further economic recession in 1937/8, a drop in housing production, and a continued rate of unionization[101] (Larson, 1976: 80). While the NHA enlarged government activity to subsidies for rental housing, including municipalities, these provisions were never applied because of onerous conditions imposed on municipalities (Bacher, 1993; Wade, 1984; Larson, 1976: 81). Nonetheless the NHA made it clear that responsibility for housing belonged to municipalities and the provinces: the preamble stated,

> Whereas the task of providing adequate housing accommodation at rentals within the capacity of low income groups to pay is primarily a responsibility of the provinces and municipalities and whereas, nevertheless, it is in the national interest that a limited experiment in low rental housing should be undertaken now…. (Larson, 1976: 81)

While the number of mortgage loans increased following adoption of the NHA, it was the war preparations, beginning in 1939 that brought improvement to the economy (Larson, 1976: 83). Both the DHA and the NHA, from their inception were not likely to resolve low income housing

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[101] The rate increased by 30 percent between 1935 to 1938, going from 280,648 to 383,392 members (Larson, 1976: 80).

problems but rather, as much of subsequent housing policy, were used to stimulate the economy. The DHA made loans available for homeownership, but the 20 percent required for the down payment made this inaccessible to low income households, as illustrated by the difficulties experienced by the UEH. The "time-limited stipulations as to co-operation with municipalities and provinces" as well as an approach that "emphasized the purchase of new homes by the middle classes, thus releasing older housing for rental" were "completely ineffective in relieving the shortage of rental housing before the outbreak of war" (Evenden, 1997).

While the DHA achieved little in terms of alleviation of housing problems, its significance lay in the "long term precedent for defining an 'appropriate' role for the federal government in Canada's housing sector" (Hulchanski, 1986) and the process undertaken in its design. The work was led by government bureaucrats, and in spite of the more open and participatory process of the Ganong Commission, the conclusions were mostly ignored and instead the goals and means of the DHA were defined with financial capital and thus embodied "the major proposals of …organizations which included the largest loan, trust and life insurance companies in the country" (Finkel, 1979). While it is proposed that the DHA was "more a measure to stifle the protests of the unemployed than to alleviate housing" (Wolfe, 1994) what is remarkable is how little the context of working class hardship and housing problems was taken into account.

The DHA is just part of a weak response to the economic and social chaos of the 1930s and as with other initiatives (including the failed "New Deal" attempted by Bennett[102]) issues of

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[102] Bennett's attempt to institute changes to unemployment insurance, wages and health insurance had been blocked by the Privy Council in England that had ruled that the measures were provincial matters under the BNA.

federal-provincial relations came to the fore. In 1937 the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission) was created to examine public policy changes in Canada. Strongly pushed by senior civil servants, including W.C. Clark, it was reluctantly agreed to by Prime Minister King, who only released the report in 1940. By advocating a centralized approach to unemployment, stimulative spending, and centralized relief, it rested on a Keynesian approach and set the stage for the Canadian welfare state. The Commission was significant in that it relied on social scientists, notably economists, to develop social policy and shifted the issue of poverty from the municipal and provincial level, which had dealt with the impacts of poverty, to the national level where, while dependent on acknowledgement of responsibility by the federal government, the focus could shift to prevention through sustained high employment. The war economy proved to be the opening for a more interventionist state (Bradford, 1999/2000).

World War II

The arrival of workers to centres of wartime jobs intensified the housing scarcity resulting from the lack of investment during the depression (Rose, 1980). Housing was subdivided which led to overcrowding while tenants reacted to inflated rents with rent strikes (Larson, 1976: 84).[103] It became clear that there had been no planning for the shortages that would develop as result of war effort and no recognition that the private sector was unable to meet the need (Evenden, 1997). The war industries began to lobby the King government since housing shortages and high rents were keeping needed workers from cities (Evenden, 1997; Choko et al., 1986). One of the

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[103] Larson (1976) cites an internal CMHC document.

cities that was the most seriously affected was Montreal: the population had increased by 65,000 persons between 1940 and 1945 and in 1944, 40 percent of housing units were occupied by more than one family with up to 1,400 households living in garages, warehouses and other uninhabitable buildings (Choko, 1980).

Recognizing that housing demand would exceed supply during and probably after the war, and in spite of vigorous opposition from landlords, the federal government implemented a first measure in 1941; rent and eviction controls (Rose, 1980; Larson, 1976:84). This was part of a broader set of controls on prices and wages under the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) aimed at dealing with rapid increases in the cost of goods and services (Rose, 1980) but also stemming from a fear of repeating the cost-of-living issues that had radicalized workers during the previous war (Finkel, 2006:126). The King government was also facing growing public perception that management of the economy was benefiting company profits more than workers and an increasing proportion of Canadians had begun to believe that a socialist system might be better than capitalism. The recent use of polls informed the government of these shifts and in particular two polls suggested that Canadians were ready for change: the first found that two in five wanted public ownership of major industries and a second that 29 percent were ready to vote for the CCF (Finkel, 2006:126).[104]

However the reluctance to intervene in the housing market predominated: W.C. Clark was not convinced that the housing problems were serious and stated that "doubling up in wartime is one

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[104] In February 1942 the CCF candidate won a by-election in Toronto and the CCF came close to forming the Ontario provincial government in 1943 and won in Saskatchewan in 1944 (Finkel, 2006: 127).

method of making the necessary savings which the civilian must make if he is not to sabotage the war effort" (Bacher, 1993). An administrator in the Department of Finance stated that the housing shortage was merely the impact of higher incomes during the war, caused by low-income families who had been forced to double up during the Depression who now could afford their own unit. According to him, even if in Montreal, families were "a little crowded", they were still "much better off than in Singapore and Hong Kong" (Bacher, 1993). Clark also wished to disband all existing programs that had been instituted during the depression since he felt that their rationale, reducing unemployment, had been achieved with the advent of the war (Bacher, 1993). Pressure by the business community prevailed and programs continued to operate, although with reduced budgets (Wade, 1984). In Montreal, in spite of the dire situation and a population that was almost 90 percent tenants (according to the 1941 Census), the Chamber of Commerce, landlord groups, and the majority of city councillors were opposed to federal government rent controls (Choko et al., 1986). The Chairman of the Executive Committee justified the opposition to rent and eviction controls by referring to hardship that landlords had endured during the depression because of low rents and they "did not want anyone telling them they could not get any more now" (Lyons, 2002).

Wartime Housing Limited

Nonetheless, the war pushed federal government even further into direct intervention in a number of sectors including childcare for mothers working in critical war industries (Mahon, 2006) and in housing. Wartime Housing Limited (WHL), created under the War Measures Act and reporting to the Minister of Munitions and Supply (C.D. Howe), was given the mandate to

build, purchase, rent, and manage housing for war workers and their families where there were shortages (Wade, 1984). Although initially presented as intervening in only a city or two where needs were the greatest, WHL wound up building wherever wartime production was slowed because of housing problems, using "brutal" methods such as expropriation, including that of public parks, to achieve its goals in spite of obstacles from municipalities, landlords and the construction industry (Larson, 1976:86).

While WHL became a necessity for the war industries, its incursion into the market aroused a "very real fear of socialism" on the part of the Department of Finance and a belief that the direct provision of housing was "socialistic and dangerous" (Wade, 1984). W.C. Clark wanted to curtail WHL "to keep it out of competition with private enterprise" and distrusted architects who sought to "plan garden villages" (Bacher, 1993). To restrict it from competing with the private sector (Choko et al., 1986) and assuage the fear that permanent WHL housing would be the "socialization of all our housing" and lead to "disastrous results to our present economic policy of private homeownership" (Wade, 1984), the housing was to be temporary. However this also meant that it was resisted in municipalities because of the poor quality, often mere "barracks" built on wooden posts so that they could be disassembled and moved (Lyons, 2002). In Vancouver it was called an "eyesore" and "packing cases" (Wade, 1984) while in other cities, property owners felt that because it was rental housing, it "would have a depressing effect on the value of surrounding properties" and insisted that it be temporary and demolished as quickly as possible after the war (Evenden, 1997). With other municipalities Montreal was concerned that the temporary nature of WHL units would lead to slums (Choko et al., 1986). Instead of direct intervention by the federal government, the city called for support of private builders and

landlord through NHA loans and priority in access to building materials for construction

companies (Lyons, 2002).

Nevertheless WHL tried to respond to the need for permanent housing; but an initial attempt in

1942 in Hamilton was met with such great opposition from loan companies, builders, lumber

companies and others that the project was abandoned (Larson, 1976: 86). It then attempted a less

direct approach in Montreal in 1944. The federal government brokered a deal to build 900 units

in three storey brick apartment buildings throughout the city, using a limited dividend company,

led by the President of the Bank of Montreal, George W. Spinney. Lyons (2002) suggests that

the project was abandoned because the tax breaks and free land that the City had pledged were

never accorded, in spite of its expression of support for the project. However Bacher (1988) uses

the Spinney project to illustrate federal government inaction and reluctance to become directly

involved in housing. By 1943 Montreal had "endured" a "run around" from the federal

government in response to housing needs that were "indescribable" and that there was not only

"social dissatisfaction, the breaking up of families, absenteeism, crime, child delinquency" but

the level of health was dropping among the population with an accompanying increase in

tuberculosis (Bacher, 1993). The key problem with the Spinney project was its reliance on the

limited dividend model: the project was to meet two contradictory goals, that of low rents and

investor profits. The only way to achieve this was through low building standards but as the costs

escalated the directors were put in an "impossible situation… they would either build housing

below the standards that the city's business and professional communities accepted as minimal-

quality accommodation, or they would end up building for a restricted upper-income group"

(Bacher, 1988). Furthermore, according to Spinney, the federal government refused to commit scarce building resources to the project (Bacher, 1993) and the project was finally abandoned.

The Curtis Report and Social Reform

The federal government became preoccupied about the post-war period long before the war ended. Some of this reflected immediate needs: fearing that the perception that veterans of World War I had been treated poorly would harm recruitment and troop morale, the Liberal government set up a committee on demobilization and rehabilitation in 1940. A series of measures ensued the following year, including pensions and post-discharge payments, the right to return to former or equal jobs with pre-war employers, free university or vocational education, preference for civil service jobs, unemployment insurance for a year and interest-free loans to go into business. In 1942 the Veterans' Land Act provided loans for farming. These measures were all combined into the Veterans' Charter in 1944. (Finkel, 2006: 127)

On a broader level and in the context of the growing strength of the CCF, both the Liberal and Conservative parties had to accept the necessity of social reform. There was also concern about the post-war economy and fears of a return to the pre-war depression. Furthermore, workers' demands had not diminished; the number of strikes in 1944 and 1945 increased while the rate of unionization was twice as high in 1945 as in 1940 (Larson, 1976: 77). So in parallel to work on veterans' benefits, the King government established an Advisory Committee on Reconstruction in 1941 to make recommendations on social and economic policy, housing and the status of

women[105] (Finkel, 2006: 129). Housing issues had to be addressed, not only because of the difficulties that housing had caused in the post-World War I period but also an admission that a return to prewar conditions would not be acceptable (Larson, 1976: 88). [106] Leonard Marsh, Executive Secretary of the Committee of Reconstruction, emphasized that housing could not be seen in isolation but "as a basic part of the modern social environment, and also as a product of all the social forces at work" and that decent shelter, employment and income distribution were all connected (Purdy, 1997). A subcommittee focussing on housing and community planning was established, led by C.A. Curtis, who had headed an interdisciplinary social science research program at McGill University throughout the 1930s.

The Curtis report, published in 1943, called for a wide-sweeping national program for social improvement that would include housing and planning to deal with the problems of slums and of uncoordinated suburban development. Massive public intervention was urged to make up for the neglect of the Depression years and the shortages of the war period (Wolfe, 1994; Bacher, 1993) as well as a "nation-wide, comprehensive, and planned program emphasizing low-rental housing" (Wade, 1984). Households were put into three categories: those who could become homeowners without any help; those who could pay current rents; those who could not pay current rents and would need support (Larson, 1976: 89). The report recommended taking municipal powers and concentrating these with the federal government, that the construction industry, characterized as "our most backward industry" be modernized (Curtis Report cited in

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[105] The subcommittee on the status of women recommended state-funded half-day nurseries and the inclusion of domestic workers in social insurance programs such as unemployment, as well as the right of women to enter all occupations with equal pay (Finkel, 2006:129).
[106] The Curtis report noted that "The desire for better housing and better living standards generally is a post-war objective which is firmly rooted in the minds of people in all ranks of life" (Curtis Report p. 9 cited by Larson, 1976: 88).

Larson, 1976: 89), and that the state take responsibility for building 30 percent of new housing (Finkel, 2006: 129).

The King government was concerned that the cost of implementation of the recommendations for social reform from the Advisory Committee would be too high, while other members of government rejected the income redistribution that would follow if taxes were raised on the rich to pay for programs for the poor. However there was awareness that reform had to be demonstrated and the government chose to start with one: family allowances which had been recommended in a report on Social Security undertaken by Marsh. Family allowances had the advantage of being endorsed by the various subcommittees including the status of women but were also a means to reduce pressure for increased wages (Finkel, 2006: 131) and as Clark argued, would be a way to avoid low-rent public housing advocated in the Curtis Report (Bacher, 1986). While business elites did not support social programs, they realised that having the state provide funds for families with children would weaken union demands (Finkel, 2006: 131). Furthermore, family allowances had an added advantage of supporting the return of women to their homes and were endorsed by the Catholic Church in Quebec that viewed them as an incentive to larger families (Finkel, 2006: 132). While other reforms, such as a national health insurance, were proposed by the Liberal government, they were accompanied by a centralization of taxation at the federal level with 5 percent redistributed to the provinces on a per capita basis. Rejected by the provinces, the King government was then able to portray itself as an advocate of social reform, blocked by conservative provincial governments (Finkel, 2006: 135).

Nonetheless the strong role that the federal government had assumed during the war continued in the postwar period, and the emergency powers it had been granted during the war were extended as a means to deal with the shortage of consumer durable goods, building materials and other products necessary to the growth of the economy. It is suggested that the federal government was able to maintain its role in housing during this period in part because it had developed relationships with municipalities through WHL, and the provincial governments were not only "unprepared, in the political and administrative sense" to play role in housing policy but their financial resources were inadequate in immediate post war period (Rose, 1980). However, no level of government was especially interested in intervening in the housing market (Lyons, 2002; Bacher, 1993).

In Quebec opposition to intervention in housing was rooted in the perception that the role of the state was to manage political relations and not replace private economic and social actors in the production and redistribution of resources (Choko et al., 1986).[107] It's also suggested that to a large extent the federal government was also out of step with the aspirations of the leadership of French Canada (Choko et al., 1986). With the creation in 1942 of a department of urban planning in the National Housing Administration, the federal government assumed greater control over projects, developed norms, and implemented a rationalized approach to housing construction.

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[107] Boychuk (1998) in classifying the various provinces according to their assistance regimes, considers Quebec until the 1950s a "residual regime", which reinforces dependence on the "market and family simply by providing state assistance at such low levels that market or family participation is relatively attractive by comparison" (Boychuk, 1998: 14). Unlike Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island, also classified as residual because of state avoidance of responsibility, the Quebec regime was a partnership between the state and the Church. Responsibility was above all attributed to the family, and then to parish authorities. Between 1921 and 1960, the "myth" of limited state role was maintained by state financial assistance being funnelled through private agencies, "long after the state had come to play a leading financial role in providing assistance at home" (ibid: 27).

Two types of housing were promoted: detached single family units for homeownership and "walk-up" apartment building for tenants. However, the walk-up apartment building, with common stairs and corridors, was unknown in Quebec at the time and had negative connotations. While it was being heavily promoted and built by the federal government through limited dividend companies in Montreal and Quebec, large sectors of French Canadian society (e.g., the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada, chambers of commerce, university professors at Laval and HEC, editorialists at Le Devoir), were rallying around the slogan, "À Chaque Famille Sa Maison". The idealisation of single detached family houses was seen as supporting Christian morality that revolved around the nuclear family. The acquisition of a home was also central in the fight against subversion, especially communism and the abuses of capitalism epitomized by land speculation (Choko et al., 1987). Furthermore, the housing production process adopted by the federal government was alien to Quebec: developments of at least 100 units, using two or three housing models with standardised layouts and finishes were the federal norm, which was the antithesis of the type of project exemplified by the UEH, which had opted for small successive building sites (the first one was 16 units) with up to seven housing models, while the federal approach favoured larger construction companies (Choko et al., 1987).

In spite of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, the post-war housing program promoted private enterprise and homeownership (Wade, 1984). While a federal government role in housing was recognized, a more crucial objective was the sustained growth of employment and avoiding a post-war depression (Rose, 1980). The Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, with an explicit goal of promoting private enterprise and the responsibility

for low rental housing (Bacher, 1993), was created in 1945 and in 1946 all housing activity, including the NHA, were consolidated under CMHC. WHL, which been building more permanent housing since 1944, was incorporated with CMHC in 1949. It had built 45,930 units under the war workers' and veterans' rental housing programs (Wade, 1984). The strong bias towards homeownership led the selling off of WHL units: tenants received a first right of refusal to buy and "virtually the whole stock of wartime houses was sold into private hands" which had "profound" implications as a new class of homeowners emerged across the country (Evenden, 1997).

The focus of the newly created CMHC was detached owner-occupied housing for middle income households while low-income housing problems would be solved through the process of filtering down from the middle classes (Finkel, 2006:225; Carroll 1989). The 1944 NHA supported this direction by reducing interest rates and the down payment required for those who could afford to buy their homes. Subsidies and lower interest rates were available for rental housing for those who could not afford current rents (Larson, 1976: 93) but the provisions were restrictive and reflected the position of people such as Clark who had warned the Finance Minister that "if even a small program of rental housing were allowed, there would be 'irresistible' political pressures to expand it widely to 'cover more than the favoured few'" (Finkel, 2006: 224)[108].

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[108] The bias towards homeownership continued in the post-war period as David Mansur became the first president of CMHC, where according to Humphrey Carver (who also worked there), "The only interested party in the housing scene, which didn't seem to get much attention at the staff meetings of CMHC, was the Canadian family which couldn't afford homeownership" (quoted by Bacher, 1986).

Veterans' Housing Issues

By the second half of 1946 the housing industry had developed some momentum, but there was an intention to provide 10,000 per year of permanent veterans' housing (Rose, 1980), a priority because they were the most confrontational (Larson, 1976, 91). A survey undertaken across Canada revealed that over 100,000 veterans were registered for some form of housing support. The veterans began to voice their concerns about housing issues before the war had ended. In 1944 families began to receive notices of evictions and many were families of veterans or those still engaged in the war. There was concern that "soldiers who had volunteered for the continuing war against Japan had indicated they would not serve until they were 'assured their dependents are properly and permanently housed'" (Bacher, 1993). The federal government was forced to freeze evictions in 1945 when large protest meetings were being held in cities across the country, calculating that even if an "outcry from the landlord class" was not "politically desirable", this would be a "lesser problem" than a strike by tenants (Bacher, 1993). Provinces and municipalities refused to deal with the issues of the veterans' housing problems, insisting that the issue was one at the national level (Wade, 1984). In Montreal, a survey had revealed that 73 percent of veterans' families were living in overcrowded units, renters were forced to pay "key money" to gain access to units, and landlords refused to rent to families with children (Choko, 1980: 168). Yet when the federal Emergency Shelter Administrator (ESA) proposed ceding empty, surplus government and military buildings to municipal authorities for homeless civilians and veterans, the city administration responded that this was beyond the powers granted to them in their charter. When an appeal was made to the province Duplessis responded that "the housing crisis was a federal matter and a federal financial responsibility" (Lyons, 2002).

Veterans' demands that the government deal with the housing crisis were supported by calls for long-term, comprehensive solutions by the Labour Progressive Party (LPP), the CCF, communist-led unions, and community groups, as well as magazine and newspaper articles (Wade, 1984; Finkel, 1979). The situation of returning veterans led to action in a number of cities: the Association of Homeless Veterans in Ottawa undertook five different occupations of buildings in 1946, while in Vancouver, failure to convert the Hotel Vancouver into a hostel for veterans led to an occupation by the New Veterans Branch of the Canadian Legion, which had widespread community support (Wade, 1984).[109] In Montreal, the movement was the "plus important mouvement de revendications des travailleurs portant spécifiquement sur la question du logement dans toute l'histoire de Montréal", with 400-500 newspaper articles covering the situation (Choko, 1980: 166). Between 1946 and 1947 the *Ligue des vétérans sans logis* squatted in empty buildings; a strategy that was denounced as an "international communist plot" by Premier Duplessis (Choko, 1980: 175). The squats were undertaken in various buildings and neighbourhoods by small groups of families.[110] Other actions included demonstrations, such as that in front of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company against the use of materials for unessential construction instead of housing, obstruction of traffic by veterans' taxis and occupation of the military barracks on Île Ste-Hélène by 18 families (Choko, 1980: 170).

These actions were divisive among veterans. For example, the Snowdon Branch of the Canadian Legion was suspended after it pronounced itself in support of the squatters (Choko, 1980) and

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[109] The squatters' actions were news outside of Canada: the New York Times covered the arrest of two Ottawa squatters, who are quoted upon their release as stating that "no better method could have been found for presenting the plight of Ottawa's homeless veterans and housing conditions throughout the country" (New York Times, September 27, 1946). Similar problems were being experienced by American veterans as well.
[110] The numbers of families participating in the squats was relatively low, for example, five families on McGill College, three families on St. Denis and three others on Décarie (Choko, 1980: 170).

the Canadian Legion condemned the illegal occupation. The *Ligue des vétérans sans logis* had

strong ties to communist activists[111] and the backing of unions.[112] There was also wide-spread

support for low-cost housing and continued rent control on the part of working and middle class

organizations in Montreal, including the *Ligue ouvrière catholique* (LOC), the Canadian Legion

and the Montreal Labour Council as well as ethnic and religious groups such as the Montreal

Section of the National Council of Jewish Women. The demands were "framed … in the

language of democracy and family needs" and as a "basic right of citizenship; the state should do

everything in its power to see that decent housing was accessible to all" (Fahrni, 2005: 126).

However there was variation in terms of the level of government called upon to intervene;

organizations such as the LOC turned to the provincial government with a key demand of a

crédit ouvrier to help workers build their own single-family homes, whereas veterans,

"accustomed to receiving federal allowances and possessed of a sense of entitlement earned

through military service, were not afraid to ask for the government's help in housing their

families" (Fahrni, 2005: 132).

The situation next door to Montreal, in Verdun, was similar with refusal to rent to families,

evictions and demands of key money. For many veterans "who had sacrificed several years in the

service of the country", the "home front could prove a bitter pill". Public frustration with the

situation revealed "cracks in wartime Verdun's cohesive community consensus". The

responsibility was seen as that of the federal government, which was "letting down the very

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[111] Its president Ben Lubell was a member of the English Montreal section of the Parti ouvrier progressiste (POP), and Henri Gagnon, one of the main organisers and a squatter on McGill College, was an organiser with the POP, and eventual president of the Ligue.
[112] For example, the *Union des marins canadiens* and the *Fédéation provinciale du travail* which, while not supporting illegal actions, supported the demand for housing.

persons who had given so much to help win the war" (Durflinger 1997:330). The war, it is

proposed, was a "watershed" for Verdun's politics; the formerly Conservative city became a

Liberal stronghold. Subject to many of the same conditions as Montreal, Verdun also had an

Executive Committee that represented landlord interests. For example, the proposed measures of

the Emergency Shelter Administrator (ESA) lead to tension between property owners, who

refused the measures, and tenants. The Ligue des Propriétaires de Verdun protested the potential

loss of control of their properties and called it a "violation of democracy". This tension was

further fuelled by a linguistic divide, with English-speaking tenants and veterans, represented by

organizations such as the Verdun Legion, and Francophone landlords. By 1945, there was

concern that the city would "explode in anger "and while the Verdun Legion disavowed

violence, it did recommend that servicemen facing eviction should refuse to move and expressed

bemusement about the "apparent contradiction inherent in the government' ability to find money,

materials and labour to wage war and its subsequent inability to find the same resources to solve

the nation's housing dilemma" (Durflinger, 1997:337). Letters to the local papers reveal that by

1945 "a growing number of Verdunites, especially low-income, overburdened mothers, began to

view participation in the war more as a lengthy struggle against social marginalization and

dislocation and less as a duty automatically answered" (Durflinger, 1997:342).

Newspapers emphasized the illegality of the squatters' movement and the potential ties to

communists but simultaneously they were also "family men, responsible for wives and children

....'menacés d'être jetés dehors par la police'" and "[b]y taking the law into their own hands in

order to provide for their families, these fathers could be seen as doing the responsible – indeed,

the manly – thing" (Fahrni 2005: 131). While the actions involved a limited number of families,

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they resonated with the general public, many of whom were experiencing similar problems (Fahrni, 2005: 131; Choko, 1980: 179).[113] Politicians and the general public joined veterans in a moral position that the government had responsibility to veterans but also that "Canada's future stability and progress" depended on the removal of "causes of dissatisfaction and unrest" (Wade, 1984), that the government was creating "ammunition for Communist agitators" and that "serious trouble" could be expected (Bacher, 1993). The Department Veteran's affairs and demobilizing branches of armed services were concerned as well, since "Housing shortages were playing havoc with the government's efforts to rehabilitate returned servicemen" (Bacher, 1993).

The development of the Benny Farm project

It was against a backdrop of housing crisis and anger on the part of veterans that the Benny Farm was developed. The site, which had been farmed until the 1930s, was subdivided and sold to different buyers. In 1944, what became Benny Farm was sold to the Minister of Pensions and National Health, which initially planned to build a hospital complex for veterans. This plan was abandoned with the war's end and it was transferred to Housing Enterprises of Canada Ltd. (HECL). Another part of the site, which became a park[114], was sold to the Sun Life and London Life Assurance Companies in 1947, whereas the rest, between Sherbrooke Street and the escarpment, was sold to oil companies, industries and developers over the next few years.

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[113] "La ligue faisait ainsi la preuve qu'un petit noyau de militants, décidés et bien organisés, peut profiter d'une conjoncture favorable pour faire valoir avantageusement ses revendications et amener une prise de conscience des travailleurs à partir d'éléments très concrets, de leur vécu quotidien" (Choko, 1980: 179).
[114] Now the site of the recreation centre

The veterans housing program under WHL was to end and HECL, a holding company, had been set up in 1945 by the major insurance companies, upon the strong urging of the federal government which had threatened that "if 'private enterprise' declined to 'take the initiative', government would have to become 'involved very extensively in state housing, ownership and control for many years to come'" (Bacher, 1993). HECL was to build 20,000 rental units across Canada but by 1946 only 2,811 units were completed when the company, forced by financial difficulties, transferred the housing and management to CMHC (Wade, 1984), including Benny Farm, HECL's "showcase" project and "in its day the largest housing development in postwar Canada" (Lyons, 2002).

The plan for the project that was developed in early 1946 included 384 units of two, three, and four bedrooms, with buildings laid out in a serpentine fashion to maximize air, light and space for each building. Only 16.8 percent of the land was to be covered by buildings and a central heating plant would provide heat and hot water (Lyons, 2002). Interior features of the units included, "sanitary modesty" (i.e., bathroom doors hidden from dining, living and kitchen spaces), separate dining room spaces were combined with living rooms rather than kitchens, and there was no occupation of basements for living space, in spite of the rental loss that this represented (Fish, 1997). The project also included interior secondary stairs, unlike the predominant style in Montreal of exterior stairs and, "In this respect, the Benny Farm Project was and still is a real departure" (Fish, 1997).

The project was met with resistance, illustrating the dynamics of housing in Montreal at the time: "Here was yet another incursion into Montreal's rental housing market initiated by the federal

government and opposed by local landlords" (Lyons, 2002). Municipal zoning regulations had to be changed since only single-family or semi-detached houses or duplexes were permitted in NDG which local councillors accepted, but before the vote was taken at City Council, the Ligue des Propriétaires de Notre-Dame-de-Grâce circulated a petition against the change in bylaws. According to the president of the Ligue this was not because landlords' interests were threatened but more to "preserve the character of the area". People who signed the petition were told that the housing would be temporary one and two room houses and would "bring poor people into the area, deteriorate into a slum and lower surrounding property values" (Lyons, 2002). Newspaper accounts also reported that the project would bring "transients and low-income people" into the neighbourhood, that it would become a slum in five years. Neighbours feared that the "box-like structures" would "seriously deteriorate" local property values while opponents claimed that "apartments of one and two bedrooms would suit people who would not fit in with 'respectable' NDG residents" (Fish, 1997).

HECL, still owner of the project as it was being developed, threatened to move it to Toronto, although this does not appear to have swayed municipal representatives. However, within the community, a counter-movement, led by organisations such as the NDG Community Council and the Canadian Legion, emerged to support the project. According to Fish (1997) the NDG Community Council first sided with the Ligue des Propriétaires, favouring small homes for veterans "because these single family homes on their own lots more closely resembled their own homes". Nonetheless, by 1946, the NDG Community Council was involved in an information meeting and a petition in support of the project which was circulated to various branches of the Canadian Legion. The City Council passed the motion to change the zoning bylaw by the

minimum number of votes required (Lyons, 2002). However, an extension of the project and an

additional 438 units, were later defeated by the city council (Lyons, 2002).

Conclusion

The development of the Benny Farm project and the history of Canadian housing policy illustrate

the reluctance of all levels of government to intervene in housing, in spite of overwhelming and

persistent need. The war effort pushed the federal government to take action, but this only

because housing shortages were impeding wartime industries. The postwar period appears more

complex. The unwillingness of government to involve itself in housing persisted but there appear

to be two major elements that would explain the policies that were developed at the time; the

precedent that had been set during the war and the protest of veterans, who had strong popular

support for their position. Underneath this was the fear of communist agitation and further

disruption as had occurred after WWI. The decision to proceed with Benny Farm, in spite of

opposition of some local organizations and the general disinclination of the municipal

government for such projects, may be explained by these factors. In writing about the DHA and

the NHA, Rose (1980) concludes,

> No government is likely to take the requisite action to provide housing for those
> who require societal intervention unless there appears to be a political advantage
> or unless the pressure for action on the government in power is so strong that it
> can no longer be resisted.

This may well explain the decision to proceed with the Benny Farm project.

In many respects the Canadian approach to housing policy in the post-war period as the welfare state was being built was no different from other countries. While a large state housing sector was developed in Britain, for example, the replacement of older dwellings was justified "partly in terms of the role of the construction industry in mopping up post-war unemployment", but the long-term view was that public housing "would provide a residual service, underpinning the market rather than competing with it" (Malpass, 2004). Reform was not the focus in Britain, and while core industries such as transport, coal and steel production were nationalized, there was no attempt to "nationalize the failing private rented sector, nor the large house-building companies" (Malpass, 2004). The lack of fundamental reform shows that "housing policy was shaped by ideas different from those usually associated with the welfare state" (Malpass, 2004).

The Canadian approach to housing was similar: the CMHC had an explicit goal of promoting private enterprise (Bacher, 1993) and what reforms were introduced were remedial rather than fundamental (Wade, 1986). The direction taken also reflected the ambivalence of Canadians themselves towards home ownership and low-rental housing. While the majority favoured ownership, "fearful of post-war depression, many prospective owners believed that they could not afford to buy a house" (Wade, 1986).

Part of the post-war process of building the welfare state, in Britain as in Canada, first "required building a state" and the creation of a "national citizenship" (Wolfe & Klausen, 1997). In Canada social programs "could serve to draw the country together" and "recapture the level of social cohesion that the recent war had inspired" during the same period as the concept of Canadian citizenship was emerging (White, 2003). It has been suggested that housing built by WHL,

because it limited the number of designs available across the country to reduce cost, also had a

unifying impact: "the very townscapes that Wartime Housing created suggested to the citizen in

the street a shared identity from coast to coast; this was indeed a unifying cultural landscape and

to many a gratifying one" (Evenden, 1997). Another "powerful force for standardization" proved

to be the imposition of design guidelines on homes insured by the newly created CMHC in 1946

(Harris 2000). [115]

However, there was not a strong commitment to the Canadian welfare state in the post-war

period. It was not a "compromise" between labour and capital as in elsewhere (Lipietz, 1989)

since the working class "never occupied a privileged position in the policy bodies of the state"

and was never a "social partner" (Jenson, 1989). Instead the federalism forged was fragile, with

most of the areas of social spending that were central to the welfare state under provincial

jurisdiction (Jenson, 1989). The national social security strategy was based primarily on full

employment and family benefits, with social assistance as residual and because of this residual

role, "proponents of a national social security system did not challenge provincial responsibility

over social assistance" (Boychuk, 1998: 43). Added to this, in Montreal, in spite of an

overwhelming population of tenants, landlord interests dominated the City Council and the

Executive Committee[116] leading it to block "almost every attempt by the federal government to

regulate and improve the severe housing shortage which existed in the City" (Lyons, 2002).

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[115] Harris (2000) refers to a study in Newfoundland that found that the 1940s were the beginning of the decline of local architectural vernacular.

[116] The city council was composed of three classes of voters; property owners (Class A), property owners and lease-signing tenants (Class B) and councillors appointed by civic bodies (Class C). Since owners could vote in all districts where they owned property, they wielded considerable influence. Furthermore, along with the Class A councillors, most of the Class C councillors (except for a few workers' representatives) voted in a solid block to protect the interests of landlords.

In the next chapter I will briefly discuss the Benny Farm community that emerged in the post war period, and then focus on the battle to redevelop the site, led initially by the institution that had been created to coordinate Canadian housing activity in 1946, the CMHC.

CHAPTER 4   Benny Farm: Redevelopment and the Community

Introduction

The history of the redevelopment of Benny Farm is in two sections. The first section deals with

the period from 1991 to 1998 that began with the initial proposal by the Canada Mortgage and

Housing Corporation (CMHC) to redevelop the site. Over the next seven years CMHC undertook

consultation with residents and sought municipal approval of redevelopment plans while

opponents mobilized to save the buildings. The first period culminated in the construction of 91

housing units for residents and municipal approval of zoning changes allowing all the buildings

on the site to be razed to make way for the construction of 1200 new units.

The end of this period was also marked by two major changes that redefined the fight over

Benny Farm over the next five years. The site was transferred from CMHC to the Canada Lands

Company (CLC), a crown corporation with the primary mandate to take over properties no

longer needed by the federal government and maximize the financial benefits to the state.[117] At

the same time, opponents of the redevelopment formed a coalition, the Benny Farm Community

Round Table (BFCRT), that was incorporated in 2000 as a non-profit organization, the Fonds

foncier communautaire Benny Farm (FFCBF). In 2001 FFCBF signed a six-month protocol of

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[117] "Activated" in 1995, Canada Lands reports to the parliament of Canada and the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, is also mandated with optimizing community value and owns and manages some properties, such as the CN Tower in Toronto (Canada Lands Corporate History http://www.clc.ca/learn-more-about-clc/corporate-history). Canada Lands also owns and manages some properties, such as the CN Tower in Toronto.

agreement with CLC to purchase and redevelop the site. The second period ends with the dissolution of the FFCBF in 2003.

I began working with the BFCRT in 1998 as CLC offered to support a community consultation process and continued with the FFCBF as co-ordinator until 2003. I will focus on this period because as close as the FFCBF came to a community-led redevelopment project, this ultimately failed as CLC took back control of the redevelopment. My interest is in understanding how this process occurred. However, the first period is critical since many positions taken by the actors, both individual and institutional, were defined and, in some cases became entrenched, at this time.

A fundamental issue framed throughout the process was the ownership of the land: who owned Benny Farm and who had a right to speak to its future? Was it the veterans who lived on the site? Was it the local community, including N.D.G. Community Council (NDGCC) that in 1946 defended the construction of the project and now spoke to the need for affordable housing? Was it the larger Montreal community that claimed ownership as representative of the "public" and defended its architectural and heritage value? Was it local politicians who identified needs other than housing in the community or service providers who claimed part of the site to better meet the needs of their clients? Was it CMHC and CLC who had legal right to the land?

The issue of who had a right to speak to the future was also framed by insider/outsider distinctions, a framing process that allowed dismissal of concerns voiced by opponents of the redevelopment. The initial redevelopment process led by CMHC only included the residents in

the consultations while opponents were unwelcome outsiders. Later, as opposition to the FFCBF project intensified, members of the FFCBF were increasingly framed as "outsiders" imposing their agendas on the neighbourhood.

The distinction of insider/outsider can also be applied to the functioning within FFCBF, in particular for political strategy. Part of this can be explained by the backgrounds of members, some who had been on the "inside" of decision making and power, either as highly-ranked bureaucrats or because of their social networks[118], while others had a history of being on the outside of power, often by choice[119]. This framed the approach to negotiations and "partnership" with CLC and, especially towards the end, was the source of considerable friction within the group.

Overarching all of these issues is the larger goal to privatize Benny Farm and the shift to neoliberalism and the privatization of state assets. CLC demonstrated many of the characteristics of quasi-governmental agencies that have increasingly undertaken urban redevelopment projects while the city, in need of maximization of revenues, took a primarily passive role. The role of CLC and of the city, as well as the process of co-optation of the FFCBF will be the focus of the last part of this chapter.

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[118]In particular Miriam Green, who was president of the FFCBF, had worked as director of Montreal's largest social service agency until it was merged and social services reorganized by the provincial government. Robert Cohen, who became a consultant to the project, had been director of the Société de développement et d'habition de Montréal (SHDM). The NDG community also had a strong social network with ties to the Liberal party and found themselves on the board of directors of the NDGCC with connections to the provincial and federal Liberal parties.
[119] This included Lucia Kowaluk who had been co-ordinator of the NDGCC and a key activist involved in the Milton Parc project, Joe Baker, architect and Sam Boskey, municipal councillor from 1982 to1998, who was one of four sitting MCM members, but who left the party claiming that it had abandoned its progressive policies.

I will begin this chapter by situating the redevelopment of Benny Farm in its historical context and the post-war period.

Benny Farm Timeline

1946	Construction of Benny Farm
1991	CMHC proposes redevelopment of the site
1992	Benny Farm Veterans Association is formed First version of the redevelopment plans are brought to public consultation (District Advisory Committee) and to the Viger Commission Executive Committee refuses to authorize zoning changes
1993	CMHC presents a second redevelopment proposal to the city
1994	Redevelopment plans are brought to public consultation (Bureau de la consultation de Montréal) Executive Committee grants permission to demolish some buildings Municipal election: Pierre Bourque elected mayor
1997	First of the new veterans' housing completed
1998	Permission granted to demolish all the buildings but only with a construction permit Benny Farm transferred to CLC[120] Benny Farm Community Round Table (BFCRT) formed
2000	Fonds foncier communautaire Benny Farm (FFCBF) incorporated
2001	A six-month protocol of agreement is signed between CLC and the FFCBF Protocol ends: Injunction filed by the FFCBF and CLC states that it will undertake the redevelopment itself Municipal election: Gerald Tremblay elected
2002	FFCBF loses legal case CLC Task Force formed
2003	FFCBF Board votes to dissolve

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[120] I use 1998 as the year of the transfer of the site although the acquisition occurred in 1999. In 1998 CLC CEO, Erhard Buchholz, was responding to newspaper articles about Benny Farm and meeting with NDG community groups.

Benny Farm Redevelopment: the CMHC years

The Benny Farm Community

The Benny Farm project in the post-war period had all the hallmarks of a community: it was a source of "support and sociability" (Wellman & Leighton, 1979), social identity (Taska, 2000) and ties to place (Healy, 1998). Boundaries were set on the inside by the homogeneity of residents and the shared experience war service (Cohen, 1985), which was reinforced by the physical distinction of the buildings and their layout from the surrounding neighbourhood (Cohen, 1985).

If social memory is tied to place and community (Tallentire, 2001; James, 2000; Walsh & High, 1999; Massey 1995), why then fifty years later were the remaining residents of Benny Farm so happy to dismiss this history and agree with its destruction? While CMHC tied construction of veterans' housing to the sale of the rest of the site and demolition of the buildings, it is nonetheless surprising that when CLC took ownership and uncoupled veterans' housing from sale of the site, veterans continued to demand total demolition, this time justified by the desire to include the CLSC. A reason for this I propose is that, in spite of the strong community identity, there was shame and stigma about living in Benny Farm. This shame was evoked as arguments justifying demolition were debated.

A 1952 article in Maclean's Magazine[121] portrayed the residents as a "happy family" with "nearly four hundred veterans and their wives, fourteen hundred children…" who lived "felicitously at Benny Farm." The article described the playgrounds, ice rinks, team sports, a weekly newspaper, the Benny Farmer[122], and annual events such as carnivals, ski race around the buildings, and fireworks. At the heart of the community was the Benny Farm Tenants' Association (BFTA), representing all but sixteen out of three hundred and eighty-four families that "perpetually" engaged the women[123] with cooking contests, costume-making and car-pooling. The "close community of interests" was attributed to the common experience of armed forces service, children ("each couple has an average of three children"), narrow age ranges ("the great majority are between thirty and forty-five years old") and a strong identity tied to place; "The men call themselves Farmers and the women Farmerettes" (Porter, 1952).

More recent articles and websites also refer to the strong sense of community. For example Dillon (2009/10) wrote about neighbours who "chatted with each other across balconies" in the evenings and grown-ups who knew all the children "so someone always had an eye on us," while another ex-resident described how an " air of hopefulness pervaded the halls and courtyards" (Snelgrove, 2011). A Facebook page devoted to Benny Farm also portrays a happy, child-oriented community; "I grew up on Benny … through the 60s ...left that kids eutopia [sic] in '71 …. I pity the rest of the world that lived outside that realm!", "lots of kids and activities and our

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[121] This article as well as a copy of the 1954 Benny Farm Tenants Association Charter were annexes to the presentation of the BFTA before the OCPM in November 2003, with the explanation "Profile of Benny Farm in Maclean's magazine in 1952, and which continued over the many yeas is still in existence to-day."
[122] Dillon (2009/10) characterises the content in the newsletter as, "Happy Birthday to Barb Delisle who turned 29 again on January 8th. The O'Brien family cat, Scruffy has gone missing. She is a black-and-grey female with white feet. If you see her or have been feeding her, please let them know."
[123] One of the photographs in the Porter (1952) article is of a group of women at a "morning coffee party."

parents never had to worry about us playing in the yard" as well as "epic games of Hide and Seek" and services such as the 'library' set up by parents in the basement in the second doorway of B Block."[124]

Benny Farm was set apart from the rest of the neighbourhood. When first proposed in 1946, the project had been met with resistance and concern about the preservation of the "character" of the area, fear of bringing poor people who were different from NDG residents, creation of a slum, and reduced neighbouring property values (Lyons, 2002; Teasdale, 1998; Fish, 1997). The layout of the site, the physical design that included balconies in the back of buildings rather than on facades, the eventual addition of fences that impeded movement into the open spaces, turned Benny Farm inward, creating a defendable and controllable space. There was little contact between residents and the street, and a "fortress mentality" developed among residents (Teasdale, 1998), reinforced by a "class distinction" engendered by the lower incomes of the residents (Welsh, 2003:33). The Maclean's article in 1952 hints at the stigmatized portrayal of the project; the "happy" Benny Farm is presented in contrast to its characterisation as "just another tenement" and as "Bunny Farm" because of the "almost daily addition of new babies" (Porter 1952). The quality of the housing was also noted with stairs that were "scarred with the scribblings of many toddlers", small rooms, and thin walls which "stifled…domestic spats."

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[124] Comments from Benny Farm, Montreal Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/groups/42176732074/ retrieved April 24, 2013. A YouTube video captures the demolition of buildings by Barry Curtis, an ex-resident who writes "Found my old apt & the rest of Benny Farm, where I grew up, in the middle of it's make over during this visit," Benny Farm (the end as we knew it) - NDG ~ by Barry Curtis http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9MW3pBoKIw (More comments and photos of the demolition process are also posted on http://www.citynoise.org/article/4408)

According to Porter the turnover rate was over fifty percent; Benny Farm and was described by a resident as "a sort of holding unit, a rehabilitation centre, a place where the troops mark time before settling down to a routine march in homes of their own" (Porter, 1952). The post-war period was one of expansion of homeownership in Canada. Encouraged by development of suburbs and changes to mortgage financing (Rose, 1980), homeownership peaked in 1960 when 66 percent of Canadians were homeowners (Sewell, 1994:92) while three-fifths of Canadians lived in urban areas, the majority in suburbs (Harris, 2004). In spite of the strong community spirit and identity, for many households, Benny Farm was transitional housing.

By 1967, when the Dillon family moved to the project, it "had been neglected for many years and had fallen into a state of disrepair" with "stained porcelain sinks and a rusty gas heater" as well as "plump, brown cockroaches" (Dillon, 2009/10). The mission of the project had also shifted; while "originally built to house returning war vets and their families" instead the point system attributed only extra points to service during the war[125] and more low income residents moved into the project (Welsh, 2003: 34) attracted by the low rents (Dillon, 2009/10; Cosgrove, 1976; Porter, 1952). Changes to Benny Farm paralleled those found in housing estates that were "hollowed out" as those who could, moved away (Lupton &Power, 1998; Lee &Murie, 1999; Burrows, 1997).

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[125] Points were given for number of children, financial situation, "and whether or not a person was on welfare, which was seen as a mark against, rather than for, them" (Dillon 2009/10). The issue of non-veterans living in Benny Farm surfaced in 1976 when veterans demanded the eviction of "civilians" from the project. At that time only 255 of units were occupied by veterans. (Gillian Cosgrove, September 23, 1976, Benny Farm Civilians Stay, *Montreal Gazette* p. 3)

What then of the people who stayed behind and many years later were left to speak for the

community that had existed? Some may have been unable to move on. Porter (1952) refers to

difficulties of reintegration:

> They all knew what it was like to be fed, clad and billeted by the government.
> After the war they looked forward to an independent civilian life. But many were
> disillusioned by housing conditions…Others discovered that the transition from
> the collectivism of army life to the self-sufficiency of civilian life could be a little
> frightening... Benny humor, company and clan spirit, most of them decided,
> helped to smooth the changeover.

A similar portrait is evoked by Snelgrove (2011):

> The collective bond of the war experience was possibly one reason for the hilarity
> of the partying on weekends and the soundscape of tinkling glasses, heard from
> my bed at night. Men and women seemed, even to me, almost desperate to have a
> good time. In hindsight, the men also likely needed regular shots of male
> companionship after five years of steady male contact. In fact a reality emerged,
> that some ex-servicemen were not comfortable in family life. Their children didn't
> know them. A wife who had been a great buddy in 1939 had changed. Or the
> husband had changed. Insecurity abounded. But the urge was strong to put the war
> behind and create something new and good.

The veterans who remained on Benny Farm were those who had not moved on to

homeownership and I believe susceptible to arguments that referred to the undesirability of their

housing. For example, CMHC emphasized the inadequacy of the housing to justify the

redevelopment, provoking one resident to state, "If anyone not living on the project was reading

that and not knowing anything about it they would actually thing that we were living in slums.

The pictures are terrible….I was insulted when I read it and when I saw the pictures."[126]

Residents also insisted on a distinction between Benny Farm and social housing, especially as opposition to the FFCBF project, with its high proportion of social housing, grew and was fuelled by fears of an influx of low-income people. As the FFCBF project was discussed in the community, veterans underlined that their housing had been paid for through their rents and had never been subsidized[127] nor could it be considered social housing (SPR, 2012:33).

CMHC proposes redevelopment

In 1991 the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) proposed to study the redevelopment of Benny Farm[128] which it justified on the basis of two central arguments: "the unsuitability of the existing buildings for the aging residents" and the under-utilization of the site.[129]

At first the CMHC announcement appeared to include the possibility of renovation, a choice that would be determined by consultation with tenants.[130] The plans were not greeted enthusiastically; Helen Guy, president of the Benny Farm Tenants' Association (BFTA), stated that "most tenants would prefer to have their apartments renovated rather than demolished"

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[126]Bureau de consultation de Montréal, (1994) Projet de redéveloppement résidentiel de l'ensemble Benny Farm, Montréal: BCM: 37

[127] FFCBF Executive 2/08/01

[128] While the focus was on the Benny Farm site, CMHC plans also included 14 subsidized units in western NDG. A 50-year agreement with the City of Montreal had frozen rents and property taxes in 1948 and CMHC was not interested in extending it beyond 1948. Plans for these residents was to move them into the redeveloped Benny Farm project. (Derfel, Aaron (1991, November 21) Benny Farm project affects disabled *The Gazette* p. G1)

[129] BFCRT (2000, February) *The Project* (appendix to Minutes of BFCRT Feb 10, 2000)

[130] Heinrich, Jeff (1991, March 22) Veterans' housing in N.D.G. will be renovated by Ottawa *The Gazette* p A4 According to Teasdale (1998) the possibility of renovation was due to a mistake on the part of the office of the minister responsible for CMHC and was never intended to be a possibility.

while others were concerned about losing neighbours. "I don't want our building to be torn down and I want to keep my neighbours."[131] In spite of CMHC reassurances of consultation, many felt that "details of the project are being kept from them."[132] CMHC denied this, holding instead that the plans had not been released because "it is now gathering the input of tenants and the city of Montreal." [133] Guy Bossé, CMHC representative "predicted most tenants will start appreciating the merits of the redevelopment in the coming months"[134] that would include demolition of "some decrepit buildings" as well as renovation and new construction.[135]

Notwithstanding its assurances, within a few days CMHC announced that all the buildings would be demolished to be replaced by higher density housing and sale of vacant land "to developers or the city of Montreal" to fund the new veterans housing[136]. According to Anne Kettenbeil, CMHC tenant liaison, this was "prime land because of the location."[137] Tenants reacted negatively because "the sale of land would cut into Benny Farm's cherished green space and threaten its community spirit." [138] Most wanted units to be renovated [139] and many could not "understand why CMHC wants to push ahead with the redevelopment [since] Benny Farm's 64 buildings are structurally sound."[140]

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[131] Derfel, Aaron (1991, October 17) Benny residents worried by development plan *The Gazette* p G1
[132] Ibid.
[133]Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] This strategy had been used by CMHC with veterans housing in Kitsilano, BC where one quarter of the land was reserved for veterans housing and the rest, a park, sold to private developers. The process in BC had been very divisive as well (Beaudin, Monique (1994, April 2) A community torn apart; Benny Farm redevelopment pits veterans against neighbors and friends *The Gazette* pB2)
[137] Derfel, Aaron (1991, October 24) CMHC to sell chunk of Benny Farm; Existing buildings to face wrecker's ball *The Gazette* p. G1
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Derfel, Aaron (1991, November 14) 'We love our home'; Benny Farm tenants say no to CMHC development plan *The Gazette* p. H1

Residents were also sceptical of the consultation process, calling it "a public-relations stunt to keep war veterans and their families from complaining"[141] and that "CMHC is more interested in selling several prime hectares of Benny Farm real estate than in helping the veterans."[142] A CMHC survey of tenants was criticised since it "didn't give them a chance to say whether they wanted to be relocated at all."[143] Distrust of CMHC rose when the Montreal Gazette revealed that a bid document sent to architectural firms months before, described the site as "under used…" and called for plans for some new units for the residents while the "residual land will be divided into development parcels and made available for the construction of different types of housing (private, non-profit, social)."[144]

The on-going redefinition of roles and responsibilities for social housing explains some of the initial ambiguity on the part of CMHC about the future of the site. The CMHC plans coincided with one of the most active periods of state supported social housing activity in Montreal. In 1989 Montreal had released *Habiter Montréal*, its housing policy statement that identified individual and collective homeownership[145] as the priority for the city (Ville de Montreal, 1989). Measures to encourage collective homeownership included purchase and renovation of existing housing by the city non-profit housing corporation, the Société d'habitation et de dévéloppement

[141] Derfel, Aaron, (1991, October 31) Benny Farm tenant group rejects redevelopment *The Gazette* p.G7
[142] Derfel, Aaron (1991, December 5) Reject development plan, tenants urge city; Benny Farm veterans take fight to District Advisory Committee *The Gazette* p. G7
[143] Derfel (1991, October 31) op.cit.
[144] Derfel, Aaron (1991, November 14) Building plan was decided months ago tenants say *The Gazette* p. H11
[145] Collective homeownership includes co-operative and non-profit housing and is distinct from public or private housing and is also referred to as third sector housing.

de Montréal (SHDM)[146]. In parallel the federal government was withdrawing from social

housing support and would end new social housing funding in 1993. The provincial government

had signed an agreement with the federal government in 1986 to be the sole provider of social

housing[147] and continued to commit to its programs when the federal government withdrew

(Vaillancourt et al., 2001).

CMHC seemed to be open to the possibility of affordable housing on the site, but it also made it

clear that no support would be given to this by the federal government and that market value

would determine its use.[148] Furthermore, the spectre of low-income households was raised by

Kettenbeil who asserted that "some tenants have expressed fears Benny Farm might be turned

into a ghetto it the land that's sold is developed for low-income housing."[149]

Divided residents

However resident opposition to CMHC plans was splintered in early 1992 when a new group

supporting redevelopment was formed.[150] The Benny Farm Veterans Associates (BFVA) was

created because "a number of concerned war veterans living here wished to ensure that the

interests of veterans and their widow(er)s would be protected and that their voice would be heard

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[146] Between 1989 and 1992, through the Programme d'acquision de logements locatifs (PALL)., SHDM acquired 2645 housing units in targeted neighbourhoods (Bernèche & Serge, 1994). Once renovated, the units were handed over to community non-profit corporations or co-operatives. In NDG, almost directly across from Benny Farm, SHDM had purchased units 257 units, Les Habitations Sherbrooke Forest (http://www.atelierhabitationmontreal.org/realisations/les-habitations-sherbrooke-forest)
[147] Quebec had been funding social housing since 1977.
[148] Derfel, Aaron (1991, October 24) CMHC to sell chunk of Benny Farm; Existing buildings to face wrecker's ball *The Gazette* p G1
[149] Ibid.
[150] Richer, Roland (1992, January 23)Tenant welcomes Benny Farm plan; Notes building are in poor condition *The Gazette*, p G2

in decision-making and planning."[151] The BFVA felt that the tenants association should "stop creating fear and incertitude among the veterans by trying to stop or delay the project."[152]

The creation of the BFVA signalled not only a shift in support for CMHC plans but it also changed the way that Benny Farm residents would begin to identify themselves, less as "tenants" and increasingly as "veterans". This shift in identity would become more pronounced and used more frequently by CMHC and eventually CLC to defend redevelopment[153]. Residents on opposing sides referred to their war record: an opponent of redevelopment "clutching a box containing her husband's eight service medals" explained, "My husband was in the army for 27 years. He fought for Canada. Now the government's not showing him any respect."[154] The two sides of the debate were "soldiers who fought together in World War II now find themselves on opposite sides of a housing dispute"[155] and for Charlie Bradley, a supporter of the CMHC project, "When he goes out, Bradley never know if he'll encounter the enemy. At 68, this aging soldier should be done fighting. After all, Bradley hit the beaches of Normandy four days after D-Day and didn't get back home until V-J Day (Victory in Japan) – some four years later. You'd think that that kind of action would earn a man a little peace."[156]

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[151] Church, I.M. (1992, March 19) We're not competing with tenants' group: veterans *The Gazette* p G2
[152] Richer (1992, January 23) op.cit.
[153] While I have not undertaken an analysis of the newspaper coverage Benny Farm during this period, the English media, beginning with local papers and the west-end version of the Gazette, were more inclined to cover the issue. When the issue moved to city-wide coverage, the English papers followed developments more closely and referred more frequently to the role and societal responsibility to veterans.
[154] Riga, Andy (1992, August 13) Renovation plan draws battle lines between neighbors at Benny Farm *The Gazette* p. A5
[155] Arpin, Claude (1992, November 8) Old war buddies divided over new housing: some want convenience, other the memories *The Gazette* p. A4
[156] ibid.

The references to the status of veteran, at first used to divide the residents of the project also was used to limit and confuse the debate about the future of the site, especially when residents became united in support of CMHC. Between 1992 and 1994 CMHC submitted different versions of Benny Farm redevelopment plans to various planning reviews and consultations. While the plans changed in terms of the extent of demolition and the height of new buildings, one element remained constant, that of tying construction of the veterans' housing to the sale of part of the site. This framing of the project by CMHC inexorably tied the veterans, and the accompanying discourse around responsibility and sacrifice, to privatization of the major portion of the site. Throughout the debate about the future of the site, meeting the needs of the veterans was raised as a priority and used as a justification, if not obfuscation, of the proposed changes. Sam Boskey, member of the FFCBF, in his brief to the Office de la Consultation de Montreal (OCPM) in 2003 described CMHC's efforts as an attempt "to mobilize public opinion…by making the issue one of patriotism and veterans' rights" (Boskey, 2003) paralleling the process described by McCready (2010) in reference to the war in Afghanistan whereby "to disagree with the government is to disrespect soldiers."

The BFTA accused CMHC of being behind the "divide-and-conquer strategy to muffle opposition to the project" with threats that if residents did not "go along with the redevelopment they can dispose of the project as they see fit" and "if tenants don't agree to the redevelopment, CMHC would stop maintaining the buildings." [157] The CMHC tactic of threatening to withdraw, used repeatedly in dealing with the veterans, is similar to that described by Arena (2012) in the

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[157] Derfel, Aaron (1992, July 2) Tenants decry CMHC tactics; Opposition to Benny Farm being muffled, group says *The Gazette*, p. G3

privatization of New Orleans public housing and the increased coercive power of HUD and the

Housing Authority of New Orleans as they threatened to "get out of the housing business."

Burawoy's concept of "hegemonic despotism"[158] is used to explain how the state harnessed

tenant groups to accept privatization. In the same way, a threat by CMHC to withdraw would

lead to anxiety among residents, provoking them to lobby in favour of redevelopment.

Opposition and rejection

Opposition to redevelopment expanded beyond residents. Organized as the Neighbours of Benny

Farm[159], a group circulated a petition which gathered over 600 names[160] while representatives

met with CMHC to voice their concerns including that of selling of land, "The land was bought

with taxpayers' dollars, they say, and shouldn't be sold to the private sector."[161] Community

organizations became involved, especially "when a photograph of the model CMHC's proposed

redevelopment of Benny Farm was circulated widely in the community…which featured market-

value condominiums at high density, far above that of NDG."[162] While community groups did

not object to the goal of meeting the needs of aging veterans, "the means to achieving them were

considered questionable. It was the final objective, ensuring that the project was self-financing,

that provoked an increasingly hostile reaction from the public."[163] Lucia Kowaluk, co-ordinator

of the NDG Community Council (NDGCC) and later member of the FFCBF, argued that the

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[158] Burawoy used this concept to explain how capitalists gained concession in wages, benefits and labour control by replacing the fear of being fired by the fear of plant closure and disinvestment (Arena, 2012: 143).
[159] Also referred to as Association of Residents Bordering Benny Farm see Porter, Hazel (1993, April 22) Preservationists barred from Benny Farm meeting; MP Allmand called for get-together of tenants and neighbors to discuss redevelopment plans *The Gazette* p G7
[160] Derfel, Aaron (1992, July 16) Benny Farm neighbors continue fight; Still opposed as redevelopment proposal wins approve *The Gazette* p. G2
[161] Derfel, Aaron (1992, June 4) Revised proposal doesn't sway critics of Benny Farm plan *The Gazette* p. G1
[162] BFCRT (2000, February) The Project (appendix to Minutes of BFCRT Feb 10, 2000)
[163] Welsh (2003) p. 40

existing buildings could be used for social housing and that the land should not be privatized. "This land was originally paid for by tax dollars and it should be kept for the public."[164] Claudette Demers-Godley, a local municipal councillor, who also would become a member of the FFCBF, "objected to the project's high density and to the idea of squeezing tenants on one-third of the land space"[165] and the use of the site "I'm also worried about the vacant land they plan to sell and for what purpose. I wouldn't like expensive condos to be built on that land."[166]

The first version of the plans, in the spring of 1992, called for total demolition to make way for the construction of eight new buildings of up to eight stories and the sale of the remaining 4.2 hectares to finance the veterans' housing. [167] With the approval of the Housing and Urban Planning Department modified plans (reducing building heights[168]), the proposed redevelopment was submitted to the District Advisory Committee (DAC) for public consultation.

The redevelopment of the site coincided with changes to the planning process that had been promised by the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM), elected in 1986. For the first time in Montreal a master plan was elaborated and adopted in 1992 (Shaw, 2003; Pyun 2005).[169] However, while consultation on Benny Farm was still underway, municipal support of CMHC's

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[164] Derfel, Aaron (1992, April 16) Benny Farm project draws fire *The Gazette* p. G1
[165] Ibid.
[166] Derfel, Aaron (1992, April 2) Benny Farm Plan released; housing too dense, critics complain *The Gazette* p G1
[167] Ibid.
[168] Derfel, Aaron (1992, July 16) Benny Farm neighbors continue fight; Still opposed as redevelopment proposal wins approval *The Gazette* p. G2
[169] A public consultation process was implemented that was composed of three mechanisms: five standing committees[169] undertook consultations before forwarding major policy recommendations to the Executive Committee and City Council; District Advisory Committees (DAC) made up of municipal councillors led local debates on planning and service issues; and the Bureau de Consultation de Montreal (BCM) was mandated by the Executive Committee to conduct hearings on special projects (Shaw, 2003; Hamel, 2002). After its electoral defeat in 1994, many of these mechanisms such as the BCM and the DACs were abolished, the latter replaced by district councils (Conseils de quartiers), by the new mayor, Pierre Bourque (Hamel, 2002).

proposals, in particular building heights and reduction of green space, became evident when the master plan for NDG was revealed incorporating many of the changes proposed by CMHC. This too was to be submitted to a consultation process but already it was clear that CMHC's argument that the site was underutilized and in need of intensification had been accepted by the city. A municipal planner underlined this with a statement that there was "potential for greater use of the Benny Farm land."[170] To a large extent, this incident demonstrated the city's position that would be constant throughout the following decade: its willingness to follow rather than to lead in determining how the city would evolve.

After a "rowdy" first phase of the consultation held by the DAC with "jeering and cheering" as "300 people crammed into a stuffy community centre"[171], a majority vote[172] approved the CMHC plans to build the veterans' housing, but not the demolition of all 64 buildings. Instead it was proposed to "wait and see" if more demolition was needed.[173] "We're all against demolition for demolition's sake...We have to bite the bullet to meet the needs of the veterans." [174] Part of the ambiguity of the decision was due to the parallels that were being drawn with MCM debacles such as Overdale.[175] There was also recognition of the need for wider participation in the process

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[170] Derfel, Aaron (1992, June 18) Master plan draws fire in N.D.G.; Six-storey buildings would be permitted in Benny Farm *The Gazette* p. G1

[171] Riga, Andy (1992, August 27) Adversaries in Benny Farm disputes square off at meeting *The Gazette* p. G2

[172] The majority of the councillors were members of the ruling MCM. However in 1989 four sitting MCM members, including Sam Boskey of NDG, had left the party claiming that it had abandoned its progressive policies. They formed the Democratic Coalition in 1990 and ran in the election that year. Sam Boskey was re-elected and joined in NDG by Claudette Demers-Godley, who left the Democratic Coalition in 1992.

[173] Todd, Jack (1992, September 11) Confusion reigns; Row over Benny Farms gets even more muddled *The Gazette* p A3

[174] Riga, Andy (1992, September 3) Benny Farm battle lost, but not war; Opponents of plan to demolish veterans' homes say they'll continue fight campaign *The Gazette* p. G3

[175] Almost 100 tenants were displaced and their Victorian buildings situated in downtown Montreal were demolished to make way for construction of two towers that were to house 600 condominiums. In spite of protest the demolition was approved and the buildings demolished in 1989. This caused considerable rift within the MCM that had portrayed itself as a champion of tenants' rights and an alternative to the pro-demolition and development

with the suggestion by the DAC that CMHC, the city and community groups together examine

alternatives such as renovation and land trusts, and consider social mix and neighbourhood

impacts.[176]

The potential demolition of so much housing pushed the debate beyond the residents and local

community as architects,[177] students, Heritage Montreal[178] and other activists were drawn in.

Michael Fish[179] insisted that the buildings were in "excellent condition"[180]and that the

demolition was "pire que la vague de démolition des années 70."[181] His influence pushed

coverage from the local section of The Gazette to city-wide reports about "what the CMHC is

doing to veterans' housing projects across the country" as "nothing less than a national scandal."
[182]

The first round of consultation had also heightened the tension between the residents with reports

that "Friends and neighbors today do not even speak to each other…Animosity and hatred run

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approach of the previous Drapeau administration and was a factor in the departure of four MCM councillors. The project was never built and only recently was a project proposed for the site. (Pyun, 2005)

[176]Bureau de consultation de Montréal, (1994: 21) There was also controversy around the discovery of a prepared resolution to allow the demolition to begin before the public consultations took place. According to one of the MCM councillors, Saulie Zajdel, " the fact that the MCM had its resolution on Benny Farm all typed up and ready to go before the final public consultation where the resolution was approved has a perfectly innocent explanation: the MCM councillors did not anticipate further developments" (Todd, Jack, 1992, September 11, Confusion reigns; Row over Benny Farms gets even more muddled *The Gazette* p A3)

[177] E.g. Sijpkes, Pieter (1992, October 24) Benny Farm: to renovate or to demolish? *The Gazette* p. J6

[178] Derfel, Aaron (1992, October 15) Students petition against Benny Farm demolition; Concordia group asks CMHC to renovate apartments, add two buildings with elevators *The Gazette* p. G3

[179] Michael Fish, an architect, was a co-founder of Save Montreal in 1974 and played a major role in saving a number of buildings in the city.

[180] Riga, Andy (1992, August 13) Renovation plan draws battle lines between neighbors at Benny Farm *The Gazette* pl A5

[181] *La Presse* (1992, le 13 août) Démolitions dénoncées dans NDG p. B12

[182] Todd, Jack (1992 September 10) Housing fiasco; Plans for Benny Farm could result in disaster *The Gazette* p. A3

through the entire project." [183] Residents opposed to the project felt they were being "squeezed

like sardines on the least desirable portion of the land"[184] while supporters spoke of needing

physically accessible housing. The participation of the wider community in the debate led project

advocates to define outsiders and insiders and who had a right to speak: "We are getting a little

tired of younger, fitter people telling us what's good for us."[185]

After the DAC decision, the redevelopment plans were sent onto the next level of consultation,

the Viger Commission. John Gardiner, member of the Executive Committee in charge of housing

and urban planning, reflected the major preoccupation of the city administration, that of

economic benefits, "CMHC wants to pump more than $100 million into the local economy. The

redevelopment also means the city would collect about $1.5 million annually in property-tax

revenue."[186] In spite of these economic benefits, the Viger Commission gave only conditional

approval agreeing to increased density but "seriously" questioning the need to demolish all the

buildings[187] and in recognition of the value to the site, accepting redevelopment if it

"contribuerait au maintien en tout ou en partie des bâtiments existants ainsi qu'à leur mise en

valeur" so that the project "témoignerait de la mémoire des espaces et des lieux qui caractérisent

aujourd'hui cet ensemble."[188]

Based on the recommendations from the Viger Commission and the DAC, the Executive

Committee rejected CMHC's plans stating that it was not convinced that "demolishing the

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[183] Riga, Andy (1992, August 27) Adversaries in Benny Farm disputes square off at meeting *The Gazette* p. G2
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Derfel, Aaron (1992, November 5) City delays decision on Benny Farm *The Gazette* p. H1
[187] Bureau de consultation de Montréal, (1994:23)
[188] Ibid.

existing buildings was the best approach."[189] The immediate reaction from CMHC was to

threaten to pull out since they "were unsure whether their crown corporation still intends to build

new housing at Benny Farm ."[190] This possibility distressed tenants and was used by CMHC

heighten the tension about the future of the site; according to the local manager tenants had

"been phoning his office continuously to ask whether they'll get new housing." [191]

The mayor in response urged CMHC to not withdraw since "the veterans need new housing" [192]

and CMHC agreed to move forward but continued to refuse renovation since this was not

"economically viable" [193] and because "Personne n'a fait valoir que les bâtiments avaient une

quelcoque valeur patrimoniale."[194] More importantly keeping the buildings "abaissera la valeur

des terrains, parce qu'elle enlèvera beaucoup de flexibilité aux promoteurs éventuels." [195]

Echoing the economic advantages evoked by Gardiner, CMHC underlined that "redevelopment

would boost the local economy and create hundreds of jobs"[196] and that NDG "ne peut se payer

le luxe de perdre un tel projet…Depuis 20 ans, le quartier a perdu 15% de sa population."[197]

Throughout this period alternative plans were proposed by the community. Mark Poddubiuk and

Danny Pearl, architects who would eventually work on the FFCBF redevelopment[198], drew up a

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[189] Derfel, Aaron (1992, November 21) Benny Farm demolition rejected by city *The Gazette* p A1
[190] Derfel, Aaron (1992, November 26) CMHC ponders next move in Benny Farm development; Tenants worry new houing will be scrapped *The Gazette* p G3
[191] Ibid.
[192] *The Gazette* (1992, December 10) Doré urges new plan for Benny Farm p G9
[193] Ibid.
[194] Vailles, Francis (1993, 23 janvier) Montréal rejette un projet immobilier de 100M$ dans NDG *Les Affaires* p. 46
[195] Ibid.
[196] Derfel, Aaron (1992 December 23) CMHC to resurrect Benny Farm plan; Project still calls for the new highrises that the city rejected last month *The Gazette* p G1
[197] Vailles, Francis (1993, 23 janvier) op.cit.
[198] They formed the Office de l'éclectisme urbain et fonctionnel (l'OEUF).

plan that incorporated new veterans' housing and renovation of existing buildings for co-

operatives and non-profits while a coalition of 40 groups, led by Fish and Maria Peluso, from

Concordia University, formed the Société de Développement de Benny Farm [199] to buy the site

and build housing for the veterans, "turning Benny Farm into another Milton Park. Of the people,

by the people and for the people." [200] This group's announcement of their plans was disrupted

by "a handful of veterans" who "picketed outside and said they supported the redevelopment.

'It's exactly what we want,' said World War II veteran John Mackay, a regimental crest pinned

to his blue blazer."[201]

The city's decision brought national prominence as the Globe and Mail described the rejection of

the project, "shortly after Remembrance Day" as an affront to the veterans. According to the

article, the CMHC plan "had the support of three-quarters of the tenants" and while

> …politicians and paper-pushers dither and bicker, residents such as much-
> decorated John Mackay, who faced uncertainty and danger when Canadian forces
> stormed the beach at Dieppe – now face a daunting prospect each time they head
> out the door. For while there are no artillery shells and bullets at Benny Farm,
> many of the ageing men must trudge up and down three flights of stairs each time
> they leave home, a tall order for battle-weary septuagenarians. For the soldiers
> who fought for democracy, there is nothing more demeaning than being prisoners
> in their own homes while bureaucrats debate the most appropriate way to help
> them. The tenants have been fighting back for years, but in coming weeks they
> can expect reinforcements. Senators have begun turning their guns on Benny
> Farm and demanding action.[202]

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[199] Porter, Hazel 1993, April 22 Preservationists barred from Benny Farm meeting: MP Allmand called for get-together of tenants and neighbours to discuss redevelopment plans *The Gazette* G 7
[200] Todd, Jack (1992, Sept. 15) Who's on first? MCM's position murky in Benny Farm dispute *The Gazette* A3
[201] Derfel, Aaron (1992, November 6) Benny Farm complex should be named a national heritage site, architect says *The Gazette* p. A4
[202] Picard, Andre (1992, December 29) Time and red tape wear veterans down *The Globe and Mail* p A7

CMHC prepared new plans, meeting with representatives of the city, who continued to insist that while they agreed with increased density, some buildings should be preserved.[203] In the meantime, Fish, in a lengthy article, proposed that Benny Farm should be "declared a national heritage site" based on its "historical and architectural importance." [204] According to Fish, Benny Farm was the "plus grand complexe non industriel de la ville….Il est à la fois un monument: à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et au respect démontré par le pays pour ses guerriers défenseurs" as well as a monument to its architect, to quality affordable housing, and one of the most important and best preserved examples of the official Canadian architectural style of 1930 -1950. CMHC refuted the heritage value and stated that the new plans would include some renovation to preserve the "mémoire du site." [205]

A second redevelopment proposal

Acquiescing to the city, CMHC's second redevelopment proposal, in 1993, included preservation of some buildings. Frustrated by the delays, the BFVA staged a demonstration the day after Remembrance Day "as a reminder of the commitment made by the veterans….A year has passed and the city still hasn't made a decision…The situation is intolerable. It's tantamount to senior abuse."[206] CMHC undertook a new round of consultation workshops to discuss the revised plans [207] which Fish denounced as a sham but which unified the BFVA and BFTA in their opposition

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[203] Porter, Hazel (1993, March 11) New plan on way for Benny Farm; CMHC ready to renovate *The Gazette* p G1
[204] Derfel, Aaron (1992, November 6) op.cit.
[205] Gohier, André (1993, 12 juillet) Le ridicule ne tue pas *Le Devoir* p A13
[206] *The Gazette* (1993, November 11) Benny veterans to stage protest p. G5
[207] Porter, Hazel (1993 November 25) Benny workshops a sham: Fish; But some residents bristle at his 'interference' *The Gazette* p G1

to Fish's involvement, "His interference in our lives is far worse harassment and the stress cause by it is hazardous to our psychological well-being and our peace of mind."[208]

The revised project[209] supported by the Housing and Urban Development department, was sent to the Bureau de Consultation de Montreal (BCM) by the Executive Committee in early 1994.[210] The BFVA continued to emphasize responsibility to veterans[211] and "deplored" the involvement of outside groups, "It's very tiresome and discouraging that so many people are involved in telling me my point of view."[212]

The hearings that lasted five days[213], were characterized by La Presse as neighbour against neighbour but beyond the issue of immediate housing needs, it underlined that the issue was one of economic benefits for the city. "La Ville devra donc trancher entre quelques dizaines de propriétaires et 600 anciens combattants, entre le confort de quelques-uns et l'impact de 800 nouveaux condos sur l'économie de Montréal."[214] The buildings, according to La Presse had little value and instead the beauty of the site "est gâchée par la plate laideur des baraques de briques rouge" with units that were "décrépit, encombré et dangereux."[215]

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[208] Ibid.
[209] The project consisted of 1200 units in new and existing buildings of which 384 would be for veterans. The first phase was the construction of the veterans housing to be followed by subdivision and sale of the remaining site. (Ville de Montreal 20 juin, 1994).
[210] Beaudin, Monique (1994 February 3) Public hearings will be held on fate of Benny Farm *The Gazette* West End Edition p E1; Gauthier, Gilles (1994, février 2) Montréal octroie un contrat de 1 million sans appel d'offres *La Presse* p. A3
[211] Beaudin, Monique (1994, April 2) A community torn apart; Benny Farm redevelopment pits veterans against neigbors and friends *The Gazette* pB2
[212] Ibid.
[213] Block, Irwin (1994 April 4) Demolish all of Benny Farm: report; City committee goes against plan to save seven buildings in veterans' complex while putting up some new structures *The Gazette* p A3
[214] Pratte, André (1994, 4 mars) Pas dans ma rue (1) *La Presse* p A5
[215] Beaudin, Monique (1994, March 10) CMHC labelled tired bureaucracy at hearings *The Gazette* p E1

In its report, the BCM pronounced itself on the heritage value of the properties and on the responsibilities of CMHC to the wider community. While the recommendations of the BCM were eventually rejected by the administration and the BCM itself would be dissolved after Bourque became mayor, its report is significant in two areas of its ruling. The first is on that of the heritage value of the buildings, which continued to be a source of debate while the second, on CMHC's status and responsibility was the clearest indication that for the city, the federal government had no responsibility beyond that of any other developer and, as any other developer, the main objective was maximization of investment.

For the BCM preserving just a few buildings would be merely symbolic and the preserved buildings would be reduced to insignificant fragments. It recognized that while the site had heritage value as part of the history of Canadian housing policy, the buildings themselves had little value and to keep them would reduce the value of the land and the profits from its sale. The BCM recommended that the city's previous stipulation that some buildings be preserved be withdrawn.

The BCM accepted CMHC's definition of its role "comme un promoteur privé ayant des obligations de disposer de ses propriétés immobilières selon les options qu'elle privilège. Elle conserve toutefois ses obligations morales à l'égard des vétérans qui résident sur le site." [216] Given this circumscribed role, and in spite of previous recommendations by the DAC and the

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[216]Bureau de consultation de Montréal, (1994: 57)

Viger Commission, the CMHC, according to the BCM had no responsibility to the wider community, since it was no different than any other developer.

> Si, comme tout citoyen corporatif, la SCHL se devait d'informer la collectivité de ses projets, ce qu'elle a fait, elle n'avait aucune obligation d'élaborer son projet avec les différents intervenants du quartier Notre-Dame-de-Grâce ni de négocier avec eux.[217]

Furthermore, the city could not force a developer to undertake social development

> …ni à négocier avec le milieu des formules de rechange de développement résidentiel et de gestion du site si une telle approche ne reçoit pas l'approbation dudit promoteur, à moins que la Ville ne soit prête à les prendre à sa charge.[218]

Alternative proposals, such as land trusts, social housing or preservation could not be retained since "l'acceptation entraînerait de fait la fin du projet" and to integrate these elements "équivaudrait donc à recommander l'abandon du projet puisque l'équilibre financier serait rompu."[219] CMHC had shown that it was willing to receive proposals from the community, but only "si celle-ci s'intégrait dans ses objectifs et respectait ses contraintes de viabilité financière."[220]

The decision was received with dismay and surprise by local residents and community organizations and resulted in a "stormy, two-hour debate" in the municipal council[221]. Jeremy

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[217]Ibid. p. 40
[218]Ibid. p. 57
[219]Ibid. p. 140
[220]Ibid. p. 40
[221] Porter, Hazel (1994, April 14) City report raises uproar at Benny Farm; Recommendation to raze existing buildings irks development foes *The Gazette* F1

Searle, candidate for an opposition party (and who would eventually lead the call for a recreation centre on the site), stated that the hearings had been "a waste of time", that it was "nothing more than a seedy little developer's deal" and that the buildings could be renovated for the veterans.[222] Fish expressed disappointment with the consultation process that he maintained was a way for politicians to avoid decision-making, "I no longer believe in the consultation process... Consultation in Montreal hasn't saved a single building." [223] On the other hand, the CMHC and the BFVA were "delighted" with a spokesperson for the veterans group stating, "Finally, someone is listening to us and is responding to our needs" while for the CMHC, the social issues had been addressed "After all, what else can be put on the site?"[224]

Nonetheless the BCM[225] recommendations that all buildings be demolished[226] were rejected by the Executive Committee and city council that adopted a by-law allowing demolition of only 23 of the 64 buildings and the construction of 384 units for the veterans (Ville de Montréal, 1994). However soon after CMHC asked for a delay in the final approval so it could make what were characterised as minor modifications to the plan[227] but suspected to be an attempt to demolish all the buildings.[228] The timing of the request for a delay coincided with forthcoming municipal

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[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Under the new mayor, Pierre Bourque, elected in the fall of 1994, the BCM was eliminated and the DAC were revived. Marsolais, Claude-V (1994, le 9 décembre) Le BCM faisait le jeu de l'arbitraire politique : Goyer *La Presse* p A3; Beaudin, Monique (1995 January 26) Panel won't have much 'oomph': Boskey *The Gazette* p F1; Katz, Helena (1995 April 12) Local city councillors still split on best way to consult residents; Tomorrow marks last day of hearings by commission *The Gazette* p G2; Vermette, François (1994 le 23 décembre) La boîte aux lettres : Personne ne va pleurer! *La Presse* p B2
[226] Ville de Montréal, (1994) Rapport du Comité exécutif au Conseil suite au rapport du Bureau de Consultation de Montréal concernant le projet de redéveloppement résidentiel de l'ensemble Benny Farm, Montréal, le 20 juin
[227] Beaudin, Monique (1994 August 10) No vote on Benny Farm housing site; Project's developer asks to alter plans *The Gazette* p A3
[228] Lalonde, Michelle (1994, June 22) Benny Farm veterans' housing project gets first-reading OK from city council *The Gazette* p A3

elections and the suspicions of intense lobbying were confirmed by NDGCC contacts who

corroborated that pressure had been put on politicians to allow demolition or be faced by a total

withdrawal of the project by the CMHC.[229] The new mayor had also reportedly been approached

by CMHC "shortly after his election, hoping the new pro-development team would give them

more than had the previous administration."[230] The new Executive Committee in a "secret

decision" gave CMHC the "green-light" to revise the plans without the need to respect the bylaw

limiting demolition.[231] Parallels began to be drawn to Montreal under Drapeau when the federal

government undertook vast demolition for the CBC, Mirabel, and the Guy Favreau complex. [232]

While negotiations began with residents about relocation,[233] community organizations lobbied

for municipal intervention, proposing that either the SHDM[234] or the OMHM buy the portion of

the site not devoted to the veterans.[235] CMHC however, again delayed work on Benny Farm[236]

this time because "it won't start the project unless it can sell the land for what it calls a "fair

market price'" since without "enough money" there would not be subsidies for the veterans and

the project would be stopped.[237] Given the market conditions, CMHC seemed to raise doubts that

the land value could cover the costs[238] while the veterans suggested that they had been "been

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[229] Steering Committee on the preservation of the 1947 Benny Farm buildings, 02/03/98
230 e-mail Sam Boskey February 23 1998 Subject: Benny Farm demolition: Article submitted to *The Monitor* (NDG - Montreal).Benny Farm: The bulldozers arrived last week by Sam Boskey
[231] Ibid.
[232] Minutes Steering Committee 02/03/98
[233] Welsh 2003: 47
[234] Porter, Hazel (1994, June 16) N.D.G. group asks city to buy extra Benny Farm buildings *The Gazette* p G2
[235] Sub-committee of the Housing Committee of the NDGCC 23/06/94
[236] *The Gazette* (1996, January 11)Benny Farm seniors still waiting p G2 ; *The Gazette* (1996, March 14) Work stops at Benny Farm p E1
[237] *The Gazette* (1995 June 12) Housing project at Benny Farm could be stalled p. A4
[238] Beaudin, Monique (1995, July 20) Decision on Benny Farm project expected within a week *The Gazette* p E3

betrayed"[239] and that CMHC was "waiting for us to die off."[240] Pressure was put on CMHC with a letter-writing campaign by residents[241] , intervention by Allmand[242] and accusations by Michael Applebaum, a newly elected local councillor that CMHC was stalling to change the development plan.[243]

A third proposal

The first phase of the redevelopment ended with the completion of 91 units in 1997 and plans for an additional 100 units.[244] As many had predicted, CMHC requested that all the buildings be demolished. According to CMHC, the project was "untenable" unless all the buildings were razed and land sold to private developers. [245] This again led to accusations that CMHC was delaying so that tenants would "disappear"[246] while the NDGCC asserted that CMHC's goal was "to get out of the landlord business and maximize the potential for privatizing the site, like it has done with other veterans' projects elsewhere" and upheld the resident hypothesis of attrition "They're waiting on their actuarial tables…The longer they wait, the less people they have to subsidize."[247]

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[239] Porter, Hazel (1995 May 25) Will construction ever start, Benny residents wonder; Mood of despair spreads among veterans as housing project faces more delays *The Gazette* p H1
[240] Beaudin, Monique (1995 August 3) CMHC giving us the runaround: veterans; Benny Farm residents still waiting for word on future of project *The Gazette* p E3
[241] Porter, Hazel (1995 June 15) Benny blues; Housing-complex residents begin campaign of letters *The Gazette* p F1
[242] Beaudin, Monique (1995, July 20) op. cit
[243] Porter, Hazel (1995 August 17) CMHC stalling on Benny: councillor; Trying to change development plan, Applebaum says *The Gazette* p E1
[244] *The Gazette* (1997, January 30) Additional work on Benny Farm project set to begin in spring p.A4
[245] Gatehouse, Jonathon (1998, February 10) Two sides in Benny Farm dispute lock horns again *The Gazette* p A5
[246] Hiltz, Wayne (1997, October 23) Going, going, gone: Is the CMHC waiting for Benny Farm's aging veteran tenants to expire? *Montreal Mirror*
[247] Ibid.

The proposed changes were sent to the Urban Development Commission (Commission du développement urban, CDU). Two days before the request was to be heard, a day-long conference, *Benny Farm: Heritage Wasted or Heritage Regained?* was held. Open to "all interested citizens"[248] the event was sponsored by the NDCCC, Heritage Montreal[249], the Conseil des monuments et sites du Québec and the Canadian Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) The discussion on the demolition and privatization of the site also examined strategies "to make the city as a whole take notice" and to take the fight to Ottawa since, according to participants "the city of Montreal, famished for more tax revenues, will rubberstamp the zoning change."[250]

The CDU hearings were held at City Hall in spite of a request by local councillors that it be held in NDG.[251] The residents and community organizations confronted each other during the hearings[252], further emphasizing the division between veterans and community groups. The demolition of the site was also being played out in newspapers; in an article in The Gazette, Norbert Schoenauer, professor emeritus of architecture at McGill, acknowledged that while the existing housing was "less than ideal", the "clean-slate approach to design" was obsolete for

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[248]e-mail forwarded by Sam Boskey February 2, 1998, Subject: Benny Farm conference

[249] Save Montreal had earlier given a lemon prize for the decision to privatize Benny Farm land (Arcand, Denis (1997, le 20 décembre) Provio, Loblaw et Montréal arrosés de jus de…Citron! *La Presse* p A22)

[250] MacDonnell, Rod (1998, February 8) Activists, residents fight to save Benny Farm *The Gazette* p A4

[251]e-mail Sam Boskey February 23 1998 Subject: Benny Farm demolition: Article submitted to *The Monitor* (NDG - Montreal).Benny Farm: The bulldozers arrived last week by Sam Boskey
A few months before, hearings on demolition of the Angus Locoshop had been moved back to City Hall after negative reaction to the plans during a neighbourhood meeting. "What is left of public consultation is being strangled: for the first time since the election, a zoning change - the construction of a big-box superstore and partial demolition of the Angus Yards Locoshop in Rosemount - was discussed at a public meeting in the neighbourhood. But when the natives showed themselves to be unfriendly, the administration has decided to return all future consultations to the safety of Fort City Hall. (On a local note, when the proposal to demolish all of Benny Farm comes up this Fall, we'll have to fight to make sure that the hearings take place in NDG.)" e-mail Sam Boskey July 8, 1997 Subject: City Hall Column

[252] Gauthier, Gilles (1998, le 9 février) Le débat sur Benny Farm se transporte à l'hôtel de ville *La Presse* p A3

"social and economic costs of such insensitive interventions."[253] The CMHC decision-making

process was also the object of critique in a Gazette article by Jason Hughes, of the NDGCC.[254]

A CMHC official was quoted as saying "you don't understand how government works" in 1993

when discussing a participatory process and alternatives to demolition. This statement, it was

proposed, illustrated the approach of both Conservative and Liberal governments to privatize

government-owned land, including in the case of Benny Farm, to eventually convert veterans'

housing to market rents. CMHC was accused of cynicism in portraying

> …concerns from neighbours, community groups and a few elected officials about
> any aspect of the project as an insidious attempt to deprive the veterans of their
> 'new' housing…Even today, there is a strong feeling on the site that any
> discussion is tantamount to a frontal attack on the veterans. [255]

In spite of these interventions, the CMHC request was approved since "Mayor Bourque's

administration and many opposition councillors agree with the project"[256] although demolition

would not be permitted until a permit for new construction had been granted. The decision was

characterized by Boskey[257] and Searle[258] as a demolition rather than a construction project but

the themes of shame and right to speak to the future appeared to guide the decision-making. One

councillor voted for the project because "It degrades people to live in apartments that are so

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[253] Schoenaur, Norbert (1998, February 11) Worth preserving: Benny Farm should be upgraded and improved, not demolished *The Gazette* p B3
[254] Hughes, Jason (1998, February 12) Benny Farm and the CMHC *The Gazette* p G16
[255] Ibid.
[256] Derfel, Aaron (1998 February 14) Benny Farm demolition gets city committee's OK : CMHC wil be permitted to raze veterans' old walkups and sell off two-thirds of land to private condo developers *The Gazette* p A5
[257] Gauthier, Gilles (1998, le 13 février) 384 logements seront démolis dans le complexe Benny Farm dans NDG *La Presse* p A5
[258] Derfel, Aaron (1998 February 20) Council okays Benny Farm plan: Approval caps seven-year battle over future of war veterans' housing *The Gazette* p A5

dilapidated"[259] while another "said her vote was determined by the fact that some opponents came from outside the district."[260]

As the razing of the site was approved, CMHC announced that discussions were ongoing about transfer of the property to the Canada Lands Corporation (CLC).[261]

The end of the CMHC era

The first phase of redevelopment had resulted in the unification of the residents in support of demolition and reconstruction of their housing. The united position was the result of constant reference to the inadequacy and decrepit state of the housing and the threat that CMHC would abandon the project. Residents also defended their exclusive right to determine the future of the whole site, increasingly identifying and excluding "outsiders" such as Fish. CMHC's emphasis on responsibility to veterans allowed CMHC to obscure debate about the broader goal of privatization and the city, attracted by the promise of increased revenue, supported the redevelopment plans. While the recommendations of the BCM had not been accepted by the MCM administration, the report had delineated CMHC's limited responsibility to the community; beyond rehousing the veterans, the crown corporation had the same status and responsibility as any other developer in the city.

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[259] Ibid.
[260] e-mail Sam Boskey February 23 1998 Subject: Benny Farm demolition: Article submitted to *The Monitor* (NDG - Montreal).Benny Farm: The bulldozers arrived last week by Sam Boskey
[261] Shepherd, Harvey (1998, February 26) Benny Farm project : not if but when : With city's approval of plans, pressure grows to start building Phase 2 of development *The Gazette* – West End Edition p F7

Opposition to the demolition and privatization of Benny Farm was dispersed, carried by individuals such as Fish, opposition councillors as well as by neighbours and the NDGCC. The positions were similar in the rejection of CMHC's proposals but the emphasis varied from architectural preservation to immediate impact of redevelopment on neighbouring streets to the issue of privatization of public assets. The architectural value of the property had not been recognized. While the Viger Commission had acknowledged some heritage value to the buildings and the BCM mentioned historical importance, albeit minor, to the site, Benny Farm was not viewed as especially significant. On the contrary, CMHC, many of the residents, newspapers such as La Presse, and some politicians emphasized the inadequacy if not shabbiness of the housing: it was the land and its potential that was valuable. Organizations such as Heritage Montreal had supported preservation and the Conseil des monuments et sites du Québec criticized the city's decision to demolish, noting that "notre patrimoine du XXe siècle est malheureusement plus en danger que celui des siècles passées, justement parce que nos élites dirigeants ne le perçoivent pas comme patrimoine."[262] Benny Farm was "le dernier exemple d'habitations d'après-guerre construites par l'État fédéral."[263] While Shaw (2003) suggests that the earlier Milton Parc protest "gained credibility when renowned architects and preservationists joined local residents," this was clearly not sufficient for Benny Farm. This could be because it was not old enough to be recognized as "heritage" buildings but it is also a lack of acknowledgement of working class, marginalized and ethnic history and contribution in the physical expression of cities (Sandercock, 1998; Norkunas, 2002; James, 2000) whereas, Milton Parc, constituted primarily of bourgeois housing, was more easily recognized as valuable. Joe

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[262] Conseil des monuments et sites du Québec (1998) Avis et prises de position: Plaidoyer pour l'ensemble Benny Farm Numéro 77, Été p 56
[263] Ibid.

Baker, who became a FFCBF member, defended Benny Farm in an article in the Canadian Architect[264] and the social memory that it represented. "For better or worse, it is the expression and record of our identity as a society. Perhaps it would serve to remember, with more than poppies on our lapels each November, how we faced up to our responsibilities to those who served."[265]

The weakness of the city in leading redevelopment was also illustrated in this period. The fear of CMHC abandonment of the project and the potential loss of revenue drove much of its position. The MCM was no longer seen as a defender of tenants and its willingness to use force against them had been illustrated with the Overdale project. John Gardiner underlined the city's preoccupation with economic development and increased revenues: Benny Farm as "underutilized" land represented both. Local councillors vacillated in their position, especially hesitant to appear unsupportive of veterans and the election of Bourque in 1994 brought in an even more pro-development administration. To a large extent time was also on CMHC's side. On the most cynical level, with time the number of veterans needing subsidization would be reduced, but delays also brought more pressure to bear on the city administration, this carried by the veterans themselves, a group that was seen sympathetically, if not sentimentally, by the media.

The provincial government was particularly absent throughout this period. To a large extent its attitude was no different than in 1946 when it had dissociated itself from veterans' housing

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[264] Baker, Joseph (1998) Comment: Selling the Farm, *Canadian Architect*, 43 (9) p 28
[265] Ibid.

issues. It was only when the Bourque administration accepted total demolition that the most

direct provincial government intervention occurred. Rémy Trudel, minister responsible for

Municipal Affairs, held a press conference on the site where, acknowledging that the province

had no legal means to intervene, he accused the federal government of taking "l'approche

bulldozer" of the 1960s and 1970s when whole neighbourhoods were razed.[266] However, the

press conference was disrupted and the minister, "struggling to be heard over a jeering crowd of

veterans"[267] who had planted Canadian flags on the grass and responded with cries of "Chou

Trudel! Chou to PQ!" and "Parle anglais!"[268] John Mackay, president of the BFVA denounced

the minister's intervention stating "Les logements sont tous pourris…C'est effrayant. C'est pas

vendable." The Gazette concluded that the minister had "added his voice of support, but little

else."[269]

Benny Farm Redevelopment: the transfer to CLC

Signs of change

When Benny Farm was transferred to Canada Lands Company (CLC) its initial position on the

redevelopment was no different from that of CMHC. In reaction to the visit by Minister Trudel,

Ron Pachal[270] reiterated that renovation was too expensive, the housing was in poor condition[271]

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[266] Pelchat, Martin (samedi, mai 30, 1998)Le ministre Trudel appuie le projet de conserver Benny Farm à NDG. Des anciens combattants le chahutent et l'un le somme de s'expliquer en anglais *La Presse*, p. A7
[267] Lampert, Allison (1998, May 30) Trudel backs critics but offers no funding *The Gazette* p A4
While the minister deplored the demolition, the province's support was limited and he "n'entend pas…offrir des fonds québécois pour la rénovation des logements, comme lui demande le député libéral provincial de NDG, Russel Copeman. « Parce que nous n'avons pas la responsabilité », dit le ministre. " (Pelchat, Martin , Le minister Trudel appuie le projet de conserver Benny Farm à NDG. Des anciens combattants le chahutent et l'un le somme de s'expliquer en anglais *La Presse*, samedi, mai 30, 1998 p. A7)
[268] Pelchat, Martin (samedi, mai 30, 1998) op.cit.
[269] Lampert, Allison (1998, May 30) Trudel backs critics but offers no funding *The Gazette* p A4
[270] CLC Senior Director Real Estate (Québec)

and there was no need for more consultation, "Tout le monde a eu sa chance de présenter ses arguments. C'est approuvé."[272] Intervention by outsiders, including the province, was not welcome, "Le représentant de la SIC reproche au ministre d'avoir manqué de respect aux vétérans en convoquant sa conférence de presse sans les aviser."[273]

A major change in opposition to the redevelopment however occurred with the creation of a coalition to "try to reverse the federal decision to demolish 384 homes in NDG on the Benny Farm" and "have the social housing mission continue."[274] Representatives of community organizations, municipal and provincial politicians[275] identified two major goals: save the buildings and keep them in the public sector. Based on the experience of the battle with CMHC, the group determined that the issue of veterans housing would be separated from the question of the future of the site [276] since the blending of the two had been divisive and used by CMHC "to confuse the issue."[277]

Under the name Benny Farm Community Round Table (BFCRT) the group met in July 1998, formalizing its role as community representative[278] with participation of residents of Benny Farm (both the tenants and veterans groups), community organizations (NDGCC, YMCA, CLSC) and

[271] Lampert, Allison (1998, May 30) op.cit.
[272] Pelchat, Martin (samedi, mai 30, 1998) op.cit.
[273] Pelchat, Martin Le minister Trudel appuie le projet de conserver Benny Farm à NDG. Des anciens combattants le chahutent et l'un le somme de s'expliquer en anglais *La Presse*, samedi, mai 30, 1998 p. A7
[274] Progress on the Benny Farm minutes 19/02/98
[275] The minutes of meetings held throughout the early part of 1998 reflect the fluidity of the organization around redevelopment of Benny Farm. At times the group meeting is the Sub-committee of the Housing Committee, at others the Steering Committee on the preservation of the 1947 Benny Farm buildings or the Benny Farm Steering Committee, while others it is a strategy meeting for Benny Farm.
[276] Steering Committee on the preservation of the 1947 Benny Farm buildings, 02/03/98
[277] Benny Farm Steering Committee 09/03/98; BFCRT 28/09/98
[278] Lampert, Allison (1998, July 16) Group seeks Benny Farm consensus *The Gazette*: *West End Edition* p G11

local politicians from the three levels of government.[279] Miriam Green[280] was named president, a role she would also assume for the FFCBF. There was consensus about the social vision for the site but disagreement about the necessity to demolish more housing to complete the new units for residents,[281] in particular on the part of the BFVA that initially participated in the BFCRT.

Opponents of demolition also continued to exert pressure through newspaper articles[282] and letters[283]. It was in a response to an article by Fish[284] by Erhard Buchholz, president and CEO of CLC, that suggested a change from previously-held positions about the future of the site. In his letter, Buchholz stated that CLC did not have an "entrenched position on whether or not all of the old buildings need to be demolished"[285] and in a subsequent first meeting with the BFCRT, Bucholz, accompanied by Sylvie Archambault[286], and Pachal, reiterated that there was possibility

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[279] Persons and organizations they represented that were present were: Metu Belatchew (CLSC NDG-Montreal Ouest), Sam Boskey (Councillor – Décarie district), Bob Bracewell (Resident), Miriam Green (President NDG Community Council), Helen Guy (President, Benny Farm Tenants Association), Claudette Demers-Godley (Resident), Pierrette Dubuc (Resident), Debbie Harrison (YMCA NDG), Lucia Kowaluk (Resident, Kowaluk would also later identify herself as representative of the Urban Ecology Centre), Claude Lauzon (CDEC CDN/NDG), John B. W. Mackay (Benny Farm Veterans & Associates), Betty Shea (Resident). Those interested but unable to attend were: Marlene Jennings (MP NDG-Lachine), Phyllis Lambert, Russell Copeman (MNA NDG), François Saillant (FRAPRU), Pierre de Savoie (MP Bloc québécois, responsible for NDG). Furthermore Nancy Neamtam (RESO) would "not take part but would like to be kept informed". Minutes Benny Farm Community Round Table, July 13, 1998
Michael Fish was not invited and Joe Baker refused to attend in protest.
[280] Green had been director of Montreal's large English social services agency until it was restructured.
[281] BFCRT 13/07/98
[282] Baker, Joseph (1998, le 3 juin) Notre-Dame-de-Grâce : Alerte au terrain vague. La disparition de l'ensemble Benny Farm ajouterait une nouvelle plaie au tissue urbain montréalais *Le Devoir* p A9 ; Fish, Michael (1998, July 4) Demolishing Benny Farm will be expensive *The Gazette* p B4
[283] Kowaluk, Alex (1998, June 9) Money being wasted at Benny Farm could be used for retrofit *The Gazette* p B2
[284] Fish, Michael (1998, July 4) op.cit.
[285] Buchhholz, Erhard "Benny Farm: Letter didn't reflect reality" *The Gazette* July 17, 1998 B3
Buchholz was driven in part to respond to Fish's suggestion that residents did not want to move and that renovation was feasible, but especially to the accusation that "architects acting with questionable ethics on federal government orders" who had "deemed dangerous, dilapidated and uninhabitable" the Benny Farm buildings and blamed two individuals in particular: "Minister of Public Works Alfonso Gagliano and the local MP, Marlene Jennings" who "against all reason, and the wishes of many Liberal Party confreres, still refuse entreaties to save the homes" (Fish, July 4, 1998).
[286] General Manager Real Estate (Québec). In September 2000 she was named Vice President Eastern Region

of preserving the buildings. Furthermore, according to Buchholz, the CLC was open to discussion with the community and "what the community wanted was fundamental to what would happen with the site."[287] For the first time housing for the veterans was uncoupled from the sale of the land; while CLC "hoped to make money off the sale of the rest of the site", unlike the CMHC, it was "not necessary to look at the sale of the rest of the site paying for the construction of the new units."[288] The meeting ended with an offer to discuss how "the process of full consultation on the development of the land will occur" and financial help to support the Round Table in this work.[289]

To a large extent, CLC's position as expressed by Buchholz was in keeping with the values it promulgated in terms of dealings with local communities. In its 1998-1999 Annual Report for example, it stated that "Through community consultation and partnering with the private sector, Canada Lands applies its real estate expertise and creative property solutions to deliver lasting value for Canadians."[290] While CLC's intention was a circumscribed "consultative" role for the community and partnerships were reserved for the private sector, for the BFCRT the "dialogue" that had been opened up was "a vast improvement" from CMHC.[291] Seizing the opening that had been offered for financial support, BFCRT decided to present a proposal to develop "concrete ways to develop the site" and to consider "how public lands are used and developed", in the context of a "community vision."[292]

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[287] BFCRT 28/09/98
[288] Quote from E. Bucholz, Minutes BFCRT 28/09/98
[289] BFCRT 28/09/98
[290] Canada Lands Company, (1999) Enhancing Communities, Creating Value: Canada Lands Company Limited Annual Report 1998-1999, Ottawa
[291] Hiltz, Wayne (1998, December 3) Wrecking ball stops in mid-swing *Montreal Mirror*
[292] BFCRT 28/10/98

I became involved with the project at this point when I was asked to work on the proposal to CLC.[293] Rather than defining how to consult with the community, the proposal outlined a community-led redevelopment process with a goal of meeting the needs of the NDG population that had the greatest difficulty housing themselves.[294] While alternatives, such as that by Peluso and Fish had been proposed earlier, the BFCRT proposal shifted community reaction in a significant way. The organizations and individuals opposed to the redevelopment plans over the seven years since the CMHC had first revealed its intentions had developed elements of a community vision that drew personal experience (e.g., Kowaluk with Milton Parc), professional training (e.g., Poddubiuk and Pearl), and knowledge about mechanisms such as community land trusts (CLT).[295] Furthermore, not only had the BFCRT united opponents into a broad coalition, but for the first time the owners of the site had recognized their legitimacy and right to speak to the future of Benny Farm. Until this meeting, the owners, in particular CMHC but also CLC as

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[293] I had been involved in a project led by Concordia University and a GRT (ROMEL) to promote and evaluate the possibility of developing land trusts in two Montreal neighbourhoods, one of which was NDG. Because of that work and the contacts that I had made at that time, I was contacted about preparing a proposal that would incorporate the idea of a community land trust among other features.

[294] The project as defined in June 2000 would target housing for families with children (at least 35% of the units similar to the NDG proportion and with a target to approach the regional proportion of 44%) with housing forms to appeal to this group (access to the ground, play areas, two-storey units, and where applicable, support services). The plans also included innovative forms of housing such as co-housing and affordable homeownership, and sweat equity.

A second target group were seniors (at least 16% of the units reflecting the NDG proportion) and the development of a continuum of services to retain this population and permit aging in place (i.e., housing for independent persons to those who are less autonomous, adapted housing and links to community services for support). A maximum number of units would be wheelchair accessible. The project would also target households of "modest" income or below and the definition of modest, it was proposed, would be based on an objective statistic such as the median income for Montreal. Based on the tenure mix in NDG, a minimum of 30% of units would be destined to homeowners (with controls on resale prices) while the rest would be non-profit rental housing (including cooperatives). The project included 298 renovated units (some small units would be combined to make two-storey maisonettes) and the insertion of 122 new ones. (FFCBF June 2, 2000 *Benny Farm: Presentation to CLC*)

[295] The plans for Benny Farm that the BFCRT was developing was based on a community land trust (CLT) to own and manage the site, inspired to a large extent by the CLT movement in the United States, and in particular that developed by the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) in Vermont. I had first met a number of NDG community housing activists when I was involved in a project to try to apply the CLT model in two Montreal neighbourhoods, NDG and Park Extension.

represented by Pachal, only recognized a responsibility to residents while the future of the rest of the site belonged to market forces, constrained somewhat by the city and by peripheral input from residents.

Outline of the discussion

A number of elements will be examined about BFCRT and FFCBF fight to redevelop Benny Farm. I will first examine the issue of recognition and legitimacy that was opened up by the CLC invitation to the BFCRT to propose a consultation process. The issue of being recognized as the voice for the community and attempts to become a "partner" with CLC dominated the dealings with CLC throughout the five-year period. However, with the recognition of the BFCRT and its eventual constitution as a non-profit corporation, the FFCBF, the organization was confronted with the limits as a community organization to undertake a redevelopment process, in particular the need for state funding and political will to realise the project.

The second element I will examine are the divisions within NDG and the fight over how the land would be used and for whom. While the conflict with CMHC had been directed at preservation of the housing and resistance to privatization, during the FFCBF period ─ in particular after the agreement between the FFCBF and CLC was signed ─ other organizations, notably the CLSC, and a group demanding a recreation centre began to lay claims to the site. While these demands were specific in terms of uses other than housing, they also rallied opponents of social housing and the people it would serve.

Third, I will look at the evolution of the FFCBF as it confronted resistance and increasing difficulty in implementing its plans, especially after the protocol ended. The FFCBF began to look at alternative means and compromises to develop the project which led to considerable debate within the FFCBF as the goals and the vision which had driven the project began to weaken and dissolve.

This will be followed by the next section in which I will discuss the process by which CLC took back Benny Farm and in particular the co-optation of the FFCBF.

To a large extent these themes follow a chronological sequence as the FFCBF first tried to establish its legitimacy and credibility, and, once an agreement was signed, different views on the use of the land that had existed peripherally now began to target and challenge FFCBF plans. As the challenges mounted and as the period of the protocol of agreement with CLC advanced, there was also increasing pressure to compromise many of the initial positions, due in part to what were seen as insurmountable financial constraints and as a need to contain opposition. Finally, once the protocol was over, CLC needed to legitimize its own position and part of this was achieved through co-optation of individuals, both as members of the task force it set up and as consultants to its redevelopment plans as well as inclusion of some of the components of the FFCBF plan.

There are a number of issues that I do not deal with in any depth. One of these is the on-going contact and communication with community groups and organizations. Members of the FFCBF participated at community meetings such as the NDG 2020 and local and municipal summits

held in 2002. It also took actions such as press conferences and a demonstration on the site in

2002 with FRAPRU to denounce vacant units in the midst of a housing crisis. I do not dwell on

this part because while the FFCBF deemed outreach important, it was never the primary focus of

activity and priority instead was placed on implementation of the redevelopment project. More

interesting to me, however, are the decisions taken by the FFCBF to pull away from direct action

so that negotiations would not be jeopardized.

As well I do not follow the continuous letters, phone calls and meetings with bureaucrats,

administrators and politicians from the three levels of government. This too was an on-going task

as the FFCBF lobbied for support. People such as Marlene Jennings, local MP, and Russell

Copeman, local MNA, were apprised of the situation as it evolved and were at times pulled into

the debate; for example, Jennings as a conduit to Minister Gagliano or mediator with the CLSC

and Copeman with an op-ed article in support of the FFCBF in 2002. This activity was time-

consuming, often requiring preparation of documents and letters to explain the project, and often

with little concrete result. Instead I focus on a few moments when the position of the state

becomes clear and has a direct impact on the progress of the FFCBF, rather than the recurrent

expressions of interest or support that often stemmed from communication with those in power.

I also do not focus on the differences within the municipal bureaucracy, notably the two

departments most closely tied to Benny Farm; housing and urban planning. While the planning

department, responsible for zoning changes, agreed with razing the buildings and higher

densities, the housing department, with an expertise in renovation of existing housing, supported

preservation of the buildings.

Finally, I do not focus on the issue of financing of the FFCBF but this was an on-going concern. The FFCBF received funds from two major sources, the CDEC and CMHC, apart from the initial sum given by CLC to undertake a study in 1998. Two grants were given to the FFCBF by the CDEC ($20,000 in 2000, and another grant of $65,000 in 2001) and a project development grant of $150,000 from CMHC through its Public-Private Partnership Centre. These funds were not sufficient to carry the development work needed (e.g., legal representation, architecture, financial studies, coordination) and by early 2002 much of the work was done on a voluntary basis. The limits of community-based development were especially underlined by this reliance on grants and volunteers.

The BFCRT and the FFCBF: Recognition and distraction

The offer of support by Buchholz would allow the BFCRT to move forward with a number of key issues in the redevelopment of the site. The greatest priority for the BFCRT were feasibility studies that would determine the affordability of the housing and included identification of sources of funding and subsidies as well as an assessment of the extent and cost of renovations. A major constraint for the BFCRT was the lack of official status to approach public or private sector agencies about financing; a reason why the BFCRT continued to acquiesce to CLC in the hopes of a formal agreement. As a non-profit development project, subsidies were crucial and while city administered renovation and social housing budgets, the extent of the project, with 420 and renovated units would require political will.[296] Lobbying of municipal and provincial levels

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[296] Social housing budgets were allocated according to neighbourhood priority. NDG was not a high priority in the city because of its relatively high incomes and quality of housing.

was therefore a key activity. The purchase price was also critical in determining affordability but repeated requests for this information were refused because of CLC claims of commercial confidentiality until 2001 when the protocol was signed. Because the units were empty, identifying organizations or groups interested in developing housing was also an important task for the BFCRT; but there was hesitation and debate about broad calls for expressions of interest in part because the project was still years away from completion and because of a lack of capacity to organize and work with groups of individuals.

An initial difficulty that confronted the BFCRT was the difference in approach of the CLC head office, as expressed by Buchholz, from that of the local office [297] which had been charged with carrying out the offer that had been made to the BFCRT. The local office's disagreement was demonstrated by delays and stalling[298] and limited funding of for a study[299] which, while not what had been requested, was accepted to "show good will", "good faith" as well as "demonstrate our willingness to go forward."[300] However the process with CLC, in particular the local office, proved to be long and frustrating. Once the offer to work on the proposal was accepted, it was months before a contract was signed and once the report completed, there were again difficulties in setting up a meeting to discuss the next steps.[301] A joint press release to

[297] Working for the CLC office at this stage was Anne Kettenbeil, who was perceived by many in the community to have been instrumental in the creation of the Veterans Association and responsible for much of the ensuing divisiveness in the community. Her presence signalled that many of the positions carried by CMHC were being continued by CLC, at least at the local level.
[298] Minutes BFCRT 8/12/98
[299] It focussed on three issues: potential partners, sources of funding, and renovation costs.
[300] Minutes BFCRT 14/01/99
[301] Minutes BFCRT 15/04/99 and 18/05/99

announce that the BFCRT and CLC were working together was never completed, again because of difficulties in reaching the CLC office.[302]

This was the beginning of the distraction and the dispersion of BFCRT energies and focus. The BFCRT had been moving in the direction of a redevelopment project led by the community and the opening offered by Buchholz raised the possibility that this could be done in partnership. There was some debate about the nature of this relationship and as the delays with the local office continued, some members concluded that "they were not taking us seriously,"[303] but hope that the first report would lead to a "partnership between ourselves and Canada Lands Corporation" and that the BFCRT would be the "developers of the site or co-partners in its development."[304] However, when the BFCRT finally met CLC to discuss the report, its conclusions were questioned: renovation estimates were considered too low,[305] financial calculations were not viable, and the overall proposal not feasible[306]. More importantly, Pachal revealed that he preferred a "traditional approach" or a sale to a private developer with the possible imposition of a minimum proportion of social housing units.[307] The BFCRT had reached an impasse with CLC and Pachal's "attitude precluded any further negotiations."[308]

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[302] The decision to send a press communiqué to English and French papers was decided (Minutes BFCRT 15/04/99) but had not been sent a month later (Minutes BFCRT 18/05/99).
[303] BFCRT 15/04/99
[304] BFCRT 21/07/99
[305] The estimates had been prepared by an architectural firm that had considerable expertise in renovation and heritage preservation after bids had been received from a number of Montreal firms with similar experience. BFCRT 21/07/99
[306] BFCRT 30/09/99
[307] Ibid.
[308] BFCRT Steering Committee meeting 14/04/99

With the local CLC office seen as intransigent in its position, during a second meeting with
Buchholz, almost a year after the initial meeting, he reassured the BFCRT that CLC was not in
any discussions to sell the property, although there had been "unsolicited preliminary
expressions of interest from the private sector" and suggested a "more formalized commitment
by Canada Lands to the consultation process" in the form of a "mutually acceptable
memorandum or protocol agreement".[309] While the meeting was deemed positive "there was also
the sense that nothing substantive has been accomplished" and again the possibility that "this
was a stalling situation, like that experienced with the CMHC….that perhaps this was part of
their strategy."[310] However, Buchholz's reference to a contractual relationship was seized upon
because it would make CLC "responsible to the BFCRT."[311] Recognizing that the relationship
with Pachal was difficult, Buchholz had also promised to find a "qualified person" to represent
CLC but also urged the BFCRT to produce a document that would "quantify costs"[312] while
refusing to divulge the purchase price; "We do not want to appear secretive, but generally we
seek to treat such financial information as confidential. I think you can understand that this kind
of information in the hands of the private sector can affect our marketing competitiveness to the
detriment of the Canadian taxpayer." [313]

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[309] E. Bucholz to M.Green, October 22, 1999
[310] BFCRT 04/11/99
[311] BFCRT 04/11/99 (Benny Farm\1998-9\phase 2)
[312] Draft - ?_report_ - ?6-12-99 (Benny Farm\1998-9\phase 2)
[313] Benny Farm/1998-9/phase 2/budget dec 4
Buchholz did however state that the agreement between CLC and CMHC created "financial obligations for our
Company to compensate Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation for both the new Veteran units (Phase II/III)
currently being constructed, as well as for the balance of the property."

The BFCRT again acquiesced to CLC and prepared another proposal for a work plan that would

undertake feasibility studies, as well as consultations with the community and future residents.[314]

However the relationship with Bucholz came to an end when he announced that he was in

"retirement planning"[315] and by late December, Sylvie Archambault[316] who was now the main

spokesperson for CLC had hired Robert Chagnon as "community partner representative" to work

with the BFCRT.[317] However the process was no faster as the BFCRT found itself with

continuous requests for information and studies only to learn from Chagnon, months later that

CLC planned to apply for zoning changes once all the residents had been relocated[318] and then

invite proposals from the private sector for redevelopment of the site. The BFCRT would also be

invited to submit proposals [319] but according to Chagnon CLC plans included "nothing so drastic

as saving Benny Farm."[320]

The BFCRT, concluding that CLC had changed little in its approach, decided to mobilize with

press releases and a public assembly it also contacted local politicians to try to set up meetings

with Minister Gagliano and the mayor. All these plans were stopped after a meeting with

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[314] Benny Farm/1998-9/phase 2/budget dec 4

[315] Draft -_report -_6-12-99.doc (Benny Farm\1998-9\phase 2)
Two years later, when the sponsorship scandal began to gain momentum, Bucholz was interviewed about pressure put on CLC by minister Gagliano. Bucholz admitted that while he had been shielded from much political interference by Jon Grant, who had been chairman of CLC (and who made allegations against Gagliano's interference in CLC), "he still felt pressure on some Quebec files" without specifying which ones.[315] In 2003 Frank Magazine published an article however, that seemed to imply that Bucholz had been involved in transferring CLC legal business to a political organizer for Gagliano and that some work on Benny Farm had gone to people close to the minister as well.[315]

[316] General Manager of Real Estate for Quebec

[317] R Pachal to M.Green, March 15, 2000 In this letter Pachal also reiterates points made by Bucholz (letter of October 22, 1999) that no negotiations with the private sector had been undertaken and there were no commitments but that CLC still had concerns about the "future mix of property uses; heritage; financial viability and sustainability; timing".

[318] BFCRT 06/04/00

[319] BFCRT 27/04/00

[320] BFCRT 06/04/00

Archambault[321] where she claimed that there had been a misunderstanding and instead she wanted to present a joint vision for Benny Farm to the Minister in June.[322] Wary that this was more stalling, the BFCRT nonetheless agreed to forego the "political route" [323] due to concerns about the improvement in the real estate market[324] and increased private sector interest in the site. Already, Sonya Biddle, NDG councillor, had reported that Michael Applebaum, member of the BFCRT and city councillor, had said that "land in NDG is too expensive to be used as housing for poor people, or to be turned into another Walkley."[325] (Applebaum was asked to withdraw from the BFCRT on the basis of this statement.)[326] The BFCRT accepted to work on the presentation with CLC and in return Archambault promised support the BFCRT.[327]

CLC drove BFCRT's agenda throughout the spring as the BFCRT prepared plans and feasibility studies to respond to Archambault's needs.[328] Other than some funds for the architectural work, all of the costs were carried by the BFCRT[329] but it saw this collaboration as the best hope in realizing the project, convinced that Archambault's presentation to the ministers could result in a partnership based on the strength of the vision and the work that had been done to date. In a further effort "to give Sylvie Archambault support when she presented to the Minister"[330] a

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[321] Ibid.
[322] BFCRT Steering Committee 14/04/00
[323] Ibid.
[324] BFCRT 10/02/00
[325] Walkley street in NDG, situated close to Benny Farm, is primarily composed of post-war walk-up apartment buildings. Bad maintenance, low rents, and social problems linked to crime and drugs, had made Walkley a target of intervention by the SHDM and community resources. It was also code for a low-income and ethnic area for many NDG residents.
[326] BFCRT 11/04/00
[327] The CMHC under the Private-Public Partnership Centre offered up to $75,000 in development funds for projects. These funds would either be reimbursed when the project was fully funded or forgiven if it did not go ahead. The FFCBF, by dividing the project in two (East and West of Cavendish) managed to receive $150, 000.
[328] BFCRT Steering Committee 23/05/00
[329] Ibid.
[330] BFCRT 01/06/00

press release was prepared to announce the collaboration. However, instead of being pleased, Archambault expressed "a strong concern" that it not go out which was accepted by Green since "in her judgement this would have jeopardized our working relationship with CLC". [331] This was the second time, and not the last that publicity about any engagement on the part of CLC to a community process was withheld. The decision by Green caused friction within the BFCRT with members insisting that "this is still a political process and we are not going to take the bureaucratic route."[332]

Once the June meeting concluded, Archambault set a new deadline for the FFCBF to "develop something that is realistic, credible and doable" for an announcement about the future of the site that would coincide with Remembrance Day and the inauguration of the new veterans' housing. Archambault continued to put pressure on the FFCBF, underlining that CLC had to meet its "business mandate" and after two years of working with the community there had to be progress; she was willing "to be reasonable, but there is a limit", adding that the "private sector is easy to work with and they want the site." [333] The FFCBF again complied and agreed "to work hard to meet Sylvie's deadline" with Green stating that "we all want to move quickly, that we understand and respect Sylvie's situation and want to work with her to get the job done on time."[334]

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[331] Ibid.
[332] Ibid.
[333] BFCRT Steering Committee 12/07/00
[334] Ibid.

Yet progress with CLC was slow as the FFCBF tried to fulfil often contradictory requests,[335] while CLC continued to exert pressure with letters demanding information about financial capacity and its growing impatience with the FFCBF. [336] By the end of 2000, progress had again stalled in part due to an early federal election[337] but difficulties because the FFCBF had no official status without a formal agreement. In a letter to Archambault, Green wrote, "You have been more than clear that you need indications from us that we have firm commitments in terms of the financing of the Project…. However, all parties with whom we meet require an initial statement of intent from Canada Lands. We seem to be stuck in the middle and our Board is perplexed and distressed by the impasse in which we seem to find ourselves.[338] Archambault replied by complementing the FFCBF on the "travail formidable" that had been undertake as well as the "appuis importants" promising a meeting in the new year "afin de voir quelle serait la façon la plus appropriée de dénouer cette impasse." [339]

The relationship with CLC and the FFCBF had to a large extent revolved around the personal relationship that Archambault and Green had developed and in spite of growing impatience about the lack of progress. However at the end of January new rumours surfaced that finally pushed the FFCBF to act, "Rumours from a quality source suggest that CLC thinks the Fonds

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[335] For example, Archambault insisted that the FFCBF plans had to be supported by a market study (Prince, Jason January 2001 Montreal and NDG: Private and Rental Housing Market Overview). A focus group was to be part of the study and over 100 persons were recruited, only to be told by CLC that this part of the study was no longer necessary (Jason Hughes to Sylvie Archambault, January 30, 2001)
[336] Sylvie Archambault to Miriam Green, September 28, 2000
[337] Even though the Liberals were only 3 ½ years into their mandate, the fractured opposition, especially the right-wing parties (Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservatives) as well as strong polls and an internal challenge from Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, were reasons for the early election call (McCarthy, Shawn; Adams, Paul. The Globe and Mail [Toronto, Ont] 23 Oct 2000: A.1.)
[338] E-mail Luba Serge to Jason Prince December 14, 2000 3: 00 pm Fw: Miriam's letter to Sylvie
[339] Sylvie Archambault to Miriam Green, le 21 décembre 2000 archives: Protocol final

foncier has no credibility, no experience to manage this project, and is considered an "irritant."[340]

Based on this, the meeting in early February between Green and Archambault[341] was expanded

to other board members "in the interest of transparency."[342] During a meeting with all available

board members and Archambault and CLC representatives[343] the FFCBF referred to the rumours

and the perception that "deals behind the scenes" were being confirmed by the lack progress. The

FFCBF threatened to go public if there was no agreement with CLC.[344] This action and threat

seemed to be enough to stop the delays and the following day representatives of the FFCBF and

CLC began defining the content of a protocol of agreement.

Until the rumours of FFCBF lack of credibility surfaced, the FFCBF had continued to comply

with CLC in the hopes of an agreement. To a large extent, the group had believed that close

personal ties, in particular those between Green and Archambault, would establish trust and lead

to an agreement. The rumours ended confidence in the process, and after almost three years of

discussion, an agreement was signed in April 2001. While the signing of the agreement was a

victory, the terms would prove to be challenging, especially the requirement that zoning changes,

financing and subsidies[345] be achieved within a 180-day period.[346]

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[340] Board FFCBF 25/01/01
[341] The two had developed a close relationship and much of the communication between CLC and the FFCBF was channelled through the two, either by phone or in meetings.
[342] Jason Hughes to Sylvie Archambault January 30, 2001 archives: Protocol final
[343] Present were Chagnon, Pachal and Richard Clare, CLC lawyer from Fasken-Martineau.
[344] Hand written note Feb 13 2001 CLC Big Meeting archives: Protocol final
[345] Protocole d'Entente 2 avril 2001art. 6.5
[346] A purchase price had finally been set: $5.9M and a $200,000 "discount…in view of the special conditions that will be attached to the deed of sale to ensure that the destination of the property for low-cost housing will be maintained in perpetuity." (S Archambault to M Green March 15,2001 by fax)

Opposition

The energies of the FFCBF had been focused on an agreement with CLC while communication

with the NDG community, a preoccupation since the BFCRT had been formed, often was

relegated to a secondary position. Meeting the conditions set by the protocol as well as the search

for funds[347] put even more pressure on the FFCBF as it tried to plan and structure its work, [348]

including a day-long Think Tank to discuss on-going issues such as community outreach.[349]

There had been rumours in the community that the BFCRT's goal was to develop only low

income housing [350] while local papers had covered the "vision of a renewed Benny Farm"[351] and

board members participated in local meetings to explain the project. Community groups had also

sent letters of support as the FFCBF pushed CLC for an agreement[352] and a large community

meeting was planned for early September, just before the end of the protocol period, to present

the FFCBF plans for site.

The veterans, once their housing had been secured, continued to defend their interests, which

increasingly became opposition to the FFCBF. Already in reaction to positive news reports in

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[347] By the time the protocol was signed, a considerable portion of the CMHC project development funds had been
used in preparation of plans, legal studies, financial studies, and project management (FFCBF Board 24/05/01)
[348] Other issues included dealing with other organizations, notably the CLSC and managing mandates to groups such
as the CDH and l'OEUF. One of the challenges confronting the FFCBF was moving from a community group to a
development organization. In a desire to be transparent and ethical, given a redevelopment process that would last
years and cost millions, committees had been set up to develop policies, notably contract procedures and conflict of
interest policies. (FFCBF Minutes of the Think Tank 06/05/01)
[349] The day-long session was limited to board members. It had been determined that many of the issues were long-
standing but the six-month deadline imposed by the protocol made it more urgent to discuss and begin to resolve
these. No confidentiality agreement was signed with the facilitator of the meeting: there had been some hesitation
about hiring an outside person but the organization, CIRQ, had come highly recommended and it had worked on
various urban dossiers in the city. However, it is doubtful that he would have been hired had anyone realised that
Jacques Bénard, the facilitator, would eventually be hired to lead the CLC strategy for redevelopment, including
setting up the Task Force.
[350] BFCRT 18/05/99
[351] *The Monitor* (June 7, 2000) Benny Farm could get a $25 million facelift, *The Monitor* p 3
[352] Sylvie Archambault letters to community organizations le 30 novembre 2000 archives: Protocol final

2000, veterans had insisted that BFCRT plans were "not being welcomed by veterans…The current residents of Benny Farm are not opposed to the groups moving in, but they just don't see the use of renovating the dilapidated structures."[353] This cycle was repeated: positive coverage of the FFCBF would be quickly refuted by the veterans. This was not only done through the media, a positive front-page article in a local paper with an editorial praising the work of the FFCBF and in particular Kowaluk[354] resulted in letters from the BFVA to CLC and politicians expressing "overwhelming disgust" that CLC had "encouraged and financed" the project. Their status was evoked ("Just when we thought it was safe for the Benny Farm Veterans to settle into our new homes and start to enjoy what was left of our golden years ...") as was CLC's responsibility to them ("your legal obligation to keep the Benny Farm tenants informed of what you were doing.") Kowaluk was especially targeted, as was her involvement with Milton Parc, with the "prospect of giving these persons…any power over the destiny of Benny Farm, and thereby, over the lives of the elderly Veterans that live there, is more frightening than anything that has happened to us since the beginning of redevelopment."[355]

Opposition from neighbours also began to manifest itself. One of the first indications was the reaction of a neighbour to an attempt by the FFCBF to open an office on the site in an apartment offered by CLC. This was met with such hostility and threats that the FFCBF decided to abandon this idea.[356] Local residents had also contacted CLC and about twenty met with Pachal to voice

[353] Bucur, Diodora (2000, June 14) Bets sour on Benny renovations, *The Suburban* p A-22
[354] Goldberg, David (2000, October 25) Time for home sweet homes at Benny Farm *The Monitor* p 6 "It was only through the tremendous work done by the dedicated people like Kowlauk that there was any sanity restored to the project."
[355] Letter John Mackay to Sylvie Archambault, October 31, 2000
[356] Minutes FFCBF Board 12/07/01

"their frustration and concern" about the project.[357] The FFCBF attempted to reach residents through a letter explaining the project and inviting "children, grandchildren and relatives of the current residents of Benny Farm, as well as any veterans of Canadian wars, to submit letters of interest in forming a co-op or non-profit, to contact us to get on the waiting list for a homeownership apartment."[358] However, CLC refused that this be sent, concerned that the letter "could be perceived as circumventing the consultation" that had been promised to residents by CLC[359] and suggesting a later moment for a meeting. Other groups were formed, notably the NDG Community Coalition on Health Care concerned about "the lack of information regarding plans for the Benny Farm project," the constitution of the FFCBF,[360] and in particular the relocation of the CLSC. [361]

It was the issue of the CLSC that became the first major rallying point for opposition to the FFCBF plans. The CLSC had been a key organization when the BFCRT was formed in 1998 and its participation, while stemming from its knowledge of community, and particularly senior citizen needs, focused primarily on a new location for its offices; Benny Farm had been deemed ideal. As work with the CLC intensified throughout 2000, increased pressure was put on the FFCBF to integrate the CLSC in the plans[362] but, unable to come to an agreement, plans presented to CLC did not include the CLSC[363] leading to its withdrawal from the FFCBF:[364] a

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[357] Correspondence Ron Pachal to Miriam Green June 27, 2001
[358] Jason Prince to residents, July 26, 2001
[359] This was a CLC responsibility under the terms of the protocol, with support to be provided by the FFCBF.
[360] "The Fonds Foncier is perceived as operating in a closed fashion. Questions have been asked about who you are and how the corporation was constituted."
[361] Phil Nolan, chairman, NDG Community Coalition on Health Care to Miriam Green, July 26, 2001
[362] BFCRT 10/02/00
[363] For example, Metu Belatchew abstains from a vote on feasibility studies and "all votes including total units." FFCBF 12/10/00
[364] Letter Terry Kaufman to Miriam Green, November 7, 2000

decision that was widely circulated in the community, to local politicians, and CLC. While the

FFCBF and the CLSC continued to hold meetings[365] to try to reconcile the two positions, the

CLSC mounted a campaign of letters to community organizations to solicit support for its

position.[366] The BFTA, for example, sent a letter of support not only to the FFCBF but also to

the CLC, and federal politicians.[367] The FFCBF, in response, also sent letters to community

groups making a case for preservation of the housing and proposing alternatives to the CLSC

location.[368]

For the FFCBF, inclusion of the CLSC raised two fundamental issues, demolition and non-

residential uses on the site;[369] "Agreeing to demolish 24-36 units to accommodate the CLSC

would mean a major reversal of a position we have held for a decade." [370] Preserving the

buildings was at the core of the FFCBF mission and its credibility rested on this position.[371] The

FFCBF proposed alternative locations[372] and arbitration [373] but the CLSC maintained that the

FFCBF had to accept the possibility of demolition of buildings[374] and much of the battle

continued through letters to community organizations; the CLSC soliciting letters of support and

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[365] Letter Miriam Green to Terry Kaufman, November 29, 2000
[366] FFCBF 15/02/01 & 22/02/01
[367] BFTA to Miriam Green December 8, 2000
[368] Draft letter February 27,2001 Miriam Green to Terry Kaufman
[369] BFCRT 30/09/99
[370] Letter Miriam Green to Terry Kaufman, November 29, 2000
[371] E Vaudry comment: Benny Farm 2000: Key Planning Issues, December 1, 2000
[372] BFCRT 04/12/00 Note as well Extracts from Minutes around CLSC issues from 23/02/98 to 08/06/00
One of the alternative locations was on Sherbrooke street, adjacent to the project, which would be more accessible
by public transit and help revive the moribund commercial area. The CLSC reaction was to ask " if we should make
health service decisions based on economic impact." (BFCRT minutes 08/06/00) This idea was nonetheless upheld
by the Comité ad hoc d'architecture et d'urbanisme in August 2003 when it too referred to the potential impact of
the CLSC on the revitalization of Sherbrooke street if relocated there.
[373] Taylor, Zack & Jason Prince, 2000 July 7 Discussion paper A process for deliberation with respect to locating the
CLSC on the Benny Farm site,
[374] Letter Terry Kaufman to Miriam Green, February 3, 2001

a petition[375] while the FFCBF, defending its position and willingness to continue to negotiate.[376]

CLSC influence with CLC appeared to be strong when a draft protocol added clauses[377] that

included possible withdrawal of a parcel of land for the CLSC.[378] FFCBF arguments that this

would hamper its ability to get zoning changes and financing [379] were countered by CLC that

insisted that this was a reflection of "numerous letters and a petition requesting that a portion of

the Benny Farm project be sold for use as a 'CLSC'… it would appear that there is a strong

desire for a new CLSC facility in the sector." [380] Nonetheless the clause was withdrawn in

recognition that it would encumber the FFCBF.[381]

With the protocol signed, the CLSC needed to work directly with the FFCBF if it wanted to

relocate on the site. The veterans became a key ally in the CLSC fight. A front-page article with

a headline "Why not here?" and an editorial in a local paper boosted support for the CLSC.[382]

Residents stated that "Benny Farm 2000[383] has to show they care for the whole community." The

editorial echoed the earlier support of CMHC plans with references to veterans who had come

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[375] FFCBF Board 12/04/01 Copies of the petitions were given to the FFCBF after the protocol was signed and included most of the public housing projects in NDG, seniors' clubs and residences: HLM Terrebonne, HLM Claude de Maestral, HLM Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, HLM ST Raymond, HLM Monkland, residents of 6550 Sherbrooke West, members of Loyola Seniors St Ignatius Parish, Club de l'âge d'or Paroisse St-Catherine de Sienne, residents of 4400 Westhill & of 6955 Fielding. (Archambault to M. Green le 25 mai 2001)

[376] FFCBF Board 22/02/01; Miriam Green to groups March 16, 200 (as well Draft letter March 6, 2001 in minutes file)

[377] The second clause stated that the project should be "de première qualité s'intégrant harmonuesement dans l'environnement." The FFCBF considered this to be "somewhat insulting to the FFC" since it implied that the FFCBF would "not be able to deliver a quality project" and was thought to reflect "some concern that we are de facto creating a slum" (FFCBF Board minutes 28/03/01). This clause was retracted by CLC (letter S Archambault to M Green by Fax April 3,2001)

[378] "La SIC se réserve le droit de retenir ou de vendre toute partie des immeubles visés par le présent Protocole à des fins reliées à la qualité de vie des locataires de Benny Farm, y compris des cliniques médicales et des espaces publics." FFCBF Board 28/03/01 & Fax M-J Roux-Fauteux to E Vaudry 23/03/01

[379] FFCBF Board 28/03/01

[380] letter S Archambault to M Green by Fax April 3,2001

[381] Ibid.

[382] The Monitor (May 2, 2001) Why Not Here? Vol.77, No 17 p.1

[383] The organization was the FFCBF but the name of the project (and the letterhead) used Benny Farm 2000.

back from "battles to wrestle back land from the enemy. It was through their efforts and sacrifice that our country, along with the Allies, were able to beat back fascism and defend our way of life." The current situation was "another battle for land, although the stakes are not nearly as high as they were in France, and Italy, and Germany." While FFCBF members were praised as "hard-working social activists" with "earnest and deeply held motives" and "should be supported and congratulated for trying to improve the quality of life for many of our fellow residents" the editorial concluded that in spite of the loss of housing units, the relocation of the CLSC was "the greater common good…..This is about veterans and their families, but it isn't about war. It is about the same things that all soldiers understand - helping and protecting those who are in need." [384]

While the veterans lobbied on behalf of the CLSC, another strategy was used: waiting for the end of the protocol. The deadline for the zoning change was October and required resolution of the CLSC location, since moving to Benny Farm was a major change in land use, from residential to institutional, that had to be incorporated in the zoning. Yet attempts by the FFCBF to meet with the CLSC to resolve this issue were impeded. It was only in June, two months after the signing of the protocol, that an initial meeting was held where the FFCBF presented no-demolition options to the CLSC. [385] Agreeing to consider these[386], the CLSC director, Terry Kaufman proved difficult to reach over the next few months, not answering letters and postponing meetings.[387] The CLSC strategy worked: after the Conseil de Quartier meeting which had

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[384] Is it housing versus healthcare? Sides are divided over proposed CLSC move to Benny Farm property, *The Monitor*, May 2, 2001 Vol.77, No 17 p.3
[385] Baker, Joe e-mail CLSC MEETING June 15, 2001 4:30 pm
[386] FFCBF Board 21/06/01
[387] FFCBF Executive 16/08/01

weakened the FFCBF position, it decided to accept the CLSC on the site on "condition that the CLSC will full support the Benny Farm 2000 project, both publicly and to CLC, including the development and management of the project by the Fonds Foncier."[388]

A second group began to form around the idea of a recreation centre and became especially active the following spring, after the end of the protocol. It included many of the neighbours that had opposed the FFCBF, (including the person instrumental in the abandonment of the office plans). Organized as the Association des résidants et contribuables avertis de Notre-Dame- de-Grâce, the group was supported by Searle, who declared the FFCBF project "caduc… La population préfère une piscine et une bibliothèque à 2000 personnes supplémentaires dans le quartier".[389] During a meeting of about a hundred persons, led by the taxpayers' association, it outlined its platform:

> Le groupe veut faire la promotion d'un complexe comprenant des logements pour personnes retraitées, un centre de loisirs municipal avec une piscine et une bibliothèque ainsi qu'un CLSC, précise une porte-parole de l'association, Arlyle Waring….L'association prône donc la démolition complète des bâtiments construits après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale pour faire place à leur projet.[390]

Without explicitly campaigning against the FFCBF project, the push for the CLSC and for the recreation centre gathered opponents to the project; the veterans on behalf of the CLSC and neighbours on behalf of the recreation centre. The CLSC rarely stated its position publicly, except on one occasion, during a borough summit in April 2002 where Metu Belatchew, as

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[388] FFCBF Board 19/09/01 This was confirmed to CLC by Marlene Jennings in a letter she sent in support of the FFCBF (Marlene Jennings to S Archambault, October 24, 2001 cc M Green & Jean Caplan, Chair CLSC NDG-Montreal West Board of Directors)
[389] Rodrigue, Sébastien Désaccord sur l'avenir de Benny Farm *La Presse* le 8 avril 2002 p. E3
[390] Ibid.

representative of the CLSC "spoke against the project… and is against the intensification of social housing at Benny Farm."[391] For the most part, however, the most effective strategy was to wait and let the veterans carry the proxy battle.

Searle also remained relatively discreet until the protocol ended and he became outspoken in his opposition to the FFCBF project as he promoted the recreation centre. In an op-ed piece Searle invoked insider/outsider distinctions and fear of a low-income ghetto. He compared the recreation centre that was "being promoted from within the community" to that of the FFCBF, promoted by "an activist group".[392] The FFCBF, he stated were "intellos du Plateau" and "une fraude...Pour ces gens-là, il ne s'agit pas de bâtir un projet pour les gens de NDG, mais de créer un nouveau ghetto en faisant venir des personnes de l'extérieur."[393] Unlike the CLSC and the veterans, where the veterans made the public statements, it was Searle who could speak against social housing and the FFCBF, while his supporters, many who lived much closer to the site than Searle, could remain silent about the social housing, and instead focus on its alternative, a recreation centre.

The culmination of opposition: the Conseil de Quartier

Many of these opponents were present at the consultation on the FFCBF zoning changes that was held at the end of August.[394] The process as revised under the Bourque administration included a

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[391] FFCBF Board 17/04/02

[392] Searle, Jeremy Use Benny Farm to boost services *The Gazette* April 22 2002 p B3

[393] Benesaieh, Karim (12 novembre 2002) Jeremy Searle ne veut pas de logements sociaux sur les terrains de Benny Farm *La Presse* p E1

[394] The existing zoning, based on the 1994 CMHC project, allowed for demolition and reconstruction of the site. The change was primarily needed to integrate new construction on the site, but as suggested later, the FFCBF could have

neighbourhood council meeting (Conseil de Quartier) by the local councillors (Jeremy Searle, Sonya Biddle and Michael Applebaum). With a favourable outcome the FFCBF hoped that the city would approve the zoning changes during its council meeting in September, thereby respecting the October protocol deadline. In preparation the FFCBF contacted the three councillors,[395] and supporters were urged to come and speak on behalf of the project.[396] A document describing the project had also been distributed through various networks.[397]

The meeting attracted about 300 persons and chaired by Searle, quickly degenerated as neighbours and veterans repeatedly took the floor, necessitating three more days of meetings. Searle intervened, at times losing his composure, while hostile comments with no limits on length were permitted (Welsh, 2003:62). CLC representatives were in the audience and at one point, undoubtedly carried away by the emotion, applauded a call for the demolition of the project.[398] While some of this could be attributed to inexperience (Riel-Salvatore, 2006: 106), during a later interview Searle stated that the project "was not viable and, therefore, it was "very necessary" to reject it" and instead he had been lobbying "for the creation of new recreational facilities for NDG, which he perceived as the greatest social need in the area" (Welsh, 2003: 63).

Rather than choosing to recommend the project (or refuse it) the Conseil de Quartier voted to send it to public consultation[399] and the September municipal council meeting included

proceeded with the renovation of existing buildings and moved more slowly on the zoning change, thereby lessening the pressure on the FFCBF, especially given the municipal context of restructuring and an election.
[395] Minutes FFCBF Board 16/08/01
[396] e-mail L Serge to J Prince "august 30, round 1" August 23, 2001 2:37 pm
[397] "Basic information about Benny Farm" in e-mail "Re: August 30" L Serge to J Prince August 24, 2001
[398] Email September 14, 2001 4:10 pm L Serge to E Vaudry Re: sorta grim
[399] Email September 10, 2001 "Conseil de Quartier recommendation" L.Serge to FFCBF Board members

"passionate interventions during question period by those against the project" making it unlikely that the mayor would recommend that the project go forward.[400] A zoning change before the end of the protocol period was now unlikely.[401]

Internal divisions and core goals

Besides the zoning change, funding the project was the other critical task that had to be accomplished during the protocol period.[402] The federal government was approached for subsidies; Gagliano, Minister of Public Works and Government Services, as well as political minister for Quebec, was key in decision-making and oversaw a number of departments that potentially had funds. After numerous delays,[403] a meeting was held at the end of June but in a reversal from previous enthusiasm for the project,[404] Gagliano refused funds, stating that "the Federal government is already supporting housing in Quebec" through existing programs but also expressing "surprise, if not doubt, that the City would be positive about the zoning change."[405] In subsequent letters his office disengaged from any assistance[406] and the FFCBF

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[400] Email September 14, 2001 L Serge to E Vaudry op. cit.
[401] Ibid.
[402] The total cost of the project was estimated to be $39M ($5.4M for purchase and the rest for renovation, construction and development). Sources of funding identified included $10.8M from grants (social housing and renovation grants) and under a million dollars from the down payment (5%) from homeowners. The rest, about $28M would have to be carried as a mortgage, financed on the private market. However the monthly cost with such a large mortgage was too high for the target population and a grant, equivalent to the purchase price, was a major component of the viability of the project. (FFCBF, October 2000 Benny Farm 2000 Redevelopment Plan). It is important to note that the calculations were constantly being redone based on variations of total housing units, scheduling (and the impact on carrying costs), etc.
[403] FFCBF 17/05/01
[404] During a meeting in November 2000, Minister Gagliano had " responded with enthusiasm" to the project and was "very interested in the concept of a community land trust, even suggesting that he accompany us on a forthcoming visit to Burlington, Vermont, where such a land trust has flourished for many years" (Letter Miriam Green to Sylvie Archambault, Vice-Présidente, Immeubles, region de l'Est, SIC, December 14, 2000)
[405] FFCBF Board 21/06/01 There had been frustration about the delays – e-mails L Serge J Prince (w/ J Baker) re: Mr Gagliano May 28, 2001 5:57 am

was encouraged "to continue to seek support from other partners and organizations in the hope that you can proceed with this interesting and worthwhile project."[407] There were also indications that federal support from other departments not under Gagliano's ministry would not be available.[408] This news made it urgent to explore alternative financial scenarios and the FFCBF approached Robert Cohen, who had "a lot of experience running non-profits and has a good take on the big picture in housing and municipalities."[409] His analysis of the project and solution proved to be divisive and heralded the abandonment of core FFCBF goals.

Cohen examined the FFCBF financial plan that had been developed by the Groupe-CDH[410] and concluded that there was a "shortfall of about $5 million in the subsidies you are projecting" [411] and raised questions about components of the project, in particular the use of a land trust model.[412] In his memorandum he emphasized that if "nothing concrete is realized" by the time the protocol ended, "the momentum will shift to CLC." He suggested a "toolbox" of options, though "some of these solutions are less attractive, they must be considered because the objective is to prevent CLC from regaining the initiative and imposing its own development strategy." Among the solutions was a proposal call to developers which would "pre-empt CLC

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[406] Miriam Green to Alfonso Gagliano, July 11, 2001 His office promised to consider applying the Property Transfer fund (a fund tied to the homelessness initiative to subsidize surplus federal property) and Benny Farm as an "exceptional project" in the negotiations with provinces for an affordable housing program, but this was never followed up.
[407] Pierre Brodeur, Senior Special Assistant, Office of the Minister Responsible for Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, to Miriam Green, June 29, 2001 (stamped date – no date on the letter itself)
[408] FFCBF Board 27/06/01
[409] BFCRT 08/06/00 Cohen had been director of the Milton Parc project and then gone on to head the city non-profit organization, the SHDM.
[410] Cohen, Robert *Memorandum: Benny Farm Redevelopment Plan*, July 5th 2001, attached to e-mail to Board Memorandum from R. Cohen, July 10, 2001, 6:13 pm
[411] These were primarily for social housing and renovations.
[412] Cohen concluded that without subsidies or a discount on purchase price, potential homeowners would not be interested in the controls that a CLT would impose on their selling price.

which is preparing to do this once the October 2nd deadline passes." The proposal call would include three scenarios; the existing redevelopment plan, an "intensification of the properties" and "an open ended invitation to the developers to make suggestions." [413]

This analysis resulted in a heated debate. In an e-mail to Board members,[414] Baker wrote that "There is no doubt that turning a significant proportion of the site over to market driven development would resolve the financial shortfall of what has been until now, unequivocally, a socially oriented housing proposed.[415] The FFCBF meeting that followed the proposal exposed the divergent positions among the members. Some were appalled at the idea of working with profit-making developers, while Baker underlined that the vision of the FFCBF was shifting; already there were proposed changes to the legal structure to move away from a CLT model to a condominium structure.[416] One option proposed "implies demolition along Benny to allow "intensification," while the second was "an open invitation to abandon the field to developers."[417] Instead Baker suggested that CLC be advised "that we will not be able to complete the terms of the protocol by October 2nd and request a postponement until January 1st." [418] Green however, defended Cohen's proposal pointing out that he was "genuinely concerned that we might lose the project"[419] while Cohen reiterated that this would give the FFCBF

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[413] Cohen, Robert *Memorandum: Benny Farm Redevelopment Plan*, July 5th 2001
[414] This was based on a verbal report from Lucia Kowaluk to Joe Baker after she had spoken to Miriam Green who had met with Bob Cohen and me, see e-mail from L. Serge to E Vaudry July 13, 2001 4:46 pm Re: da loop
[415] Baker, Joe More thoughts on Benny Farm, e-mail to board members July 4, 2001
[416] Baker, Joe The Future of Benny Farm, (no date on document) July 6, 2001 & July 13, 2001, 4:46 pm Re: da loop – email from L. Serge to E Vaudry) The lawyer who had been working with the FFCBF to develop the CLT model, Ernest Vaudry, had moved to Italy, and Susan Altchul had taken on the legal work. She had proposed that the goals of the CLT model could be just as easily be met by using the condominium provisions in Quebec law. This was interpreted by some as a practical approach that would avoid too much controversy.
[417] Baker, Joe The Future of Benny Farm, (no date on document) July 6, 2001
[418] Ibid.
[419] FFCBF Board 6/07/01

"control of the process (rather than having the CLC take over in October)." This argument won over the board and the Cohen proposal was accepted. [420]

The decision created discord with a FFCBF ally, the Groupe-CDH[421], which had been working with the FFCBF on financial simulations and coop development. In a strong reaction they wrote "We do feel that a proposal call to the private sector is the wrong action at this time since you have not fully explored nor understood the options before you within the context of a Development Plan that you discussed and defended."[422] Instead, the CDH proposed that recruiting potential occupants was the most urgent task. "Politicians require real people, beneficiaries who are prepared to demonstrate their interest and need. You need a base and you need it in September."[423]

While the Cohen proposal went forward and Groupe-CDH held meetings with prospective tenants, neither was sufficient to extend the protocol. However, as it ended another solution emerged; a new source of support for the project identified at the end of 2002. The Chagnon Foundation[424] offered an interest-free loan of $5.7M to acquire the site and an operating budget

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[420] FFCBF Board 12/07/01
[421] The note was sent by J McGregor, who was interim director of the CDH at that point. Relationships were complicated by the fact that he and R Cohen had known and worked together for over 20 years, including the Milton Parc Project.
[422] L Serge to E Vaudry, Fw: Options and urgent action July 19, 2001 4:43 PM
[423] Ibid.
[424] The Lucie et André Chagnon Foundation is the largest private foundation in Quebec and was formed when Vidéotron, founded by Chagnon, was sold to Québecor. The federal government had modified its tax laws after lobbying efforts by Chagnon and $1.4B put into the foundation in 2002 (Froment, Dominque,le 23 février, 2002 La Loi de l'impôt change pour les Chagnons: Le fédéral facilite la creation d'une Fondation de 1, 38 milliard pour l'ex-proprio de Vidéotron, *l'Actualité,* p. 7)

of \$500,000 for five years for community development.[425] However, there were conditions tied to the funding. The focus of Benny Farm would have to shift from housing from a mix of low and moderate income households to the foundation's priority; family autonomy and breaking the cycle of poverty. [426] The foundation also insisted that while strategy could be contestation or "sensiblisation", it would only work if a more discrete and non-confrontational approach was taken.[427] The FFCBF strategy of filing an injunction[428] against CLC was questioned as well, since it was blocking communication.[429]

The FFCBF debated the two strategies and dropping the injunction.[430] It was in a vulnerable position: the agreement with CLC had ended, a number of board members had resigned or were not actively participating, and the FFCBF operating budget was almost inexistent making it difficult to continue the work it was doing. Green summarized the situation, "we need the support of the Foundation at this time (credibility and purchase price and development fees)."[431] The FFCBF agreed to try to take a middle ground in terms of contestation but decided to postpone a press conference that had been planned with community organizations in support of its project[432] in the hope that having the support of the Chagnon Foundation would reopen negotiations with CLC.

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[425] Louise A. Perras, Présidente-directrice générale, Fondation Lucie et André Chagnon to Miriam Green le 9 avril 2002
[426] FFCBF Board 14/01/02
[427] FFCBF Special Meeting 08/02/02
[428] Soon after confirmation that CLC would not extend the protocol, the FFCBF filed an injunction to prevent CLC from selling the site to anyone since it maintained that the protocol conditions had been met.
[429] Approche de sensibilisation le 8 février 2002 e-mailed document from Cohen-Altschul
[430] FFCBF Special Meeting 08/02/02; FFCBF Board 11/02/02
[431] ; FFCBF Board 11/02/02
[432] FFCBF Board 11/02/02

However, the foundation began to withdraw its support. Learning of a meeting between the city

and CLC to redevelop Benny Farm that had not included the FFCBF, it concluded that the

project was "malheureusement loin de pouvoir se réaliser tel que vous nous l'aviez proposé."[433]

Furthermore, the FFCBF had sent letters to politicians at the three levels of government that

mentioned the Chagnon foundation without first notifying them.[434] These two events, evidence

that CLC was undertaking the redevelopment of Benny Farm without the FFCBF and that the

FFCBF had communicated with politicians without the foundation's prior approval, led to the

Chagnon Foundation's withdrawal from the project. In a letter the foundation stated that while

they were still interested in the project, they preferred "un statut d'observateur bienveillant dans

ce dossier."[435]

In the hope of an agreement with CLC, the FFCBF had complied with many of its requests

between 1998 and 2001. Now that federal support for the FFCBF was not forthcoming

jeopardizing financial viability, lacking operating funds, without an agreement with CLC, and as

board members began to disengage, the FFCBF started to let go of some of its fundamental

principles. Already it had compromised in the decision to allow the CLSC on the site in

exchange for their support. Now keeping control of the process became more important than the

initial objectives of not privatizing the land or demolishing buildings. The potential agreement

with the Chagnon Foundation represented another shift, since the project would no longer serve

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[433] Louise A. Perras, Présidente-directrice générale, Fondation Lucie et André Chagnon to Miriam Green le 9 avril 2002 archives: folder Corr Mar/April 2002
[434] Ibid
[435] Ibid. By early 2003 the foundation had revised its mission and decided to focus on health, especially of young children.

the needs of the NDG population and would adopt the foundation's priorities of fighting the cycle of poverty and social exclusion.[436]

CLC takes back Benny Farm

In a letter dated October 5, 2001 from Clare to Susan Altschul,[437] the protocol was framed as a "leap of faith" that CLC had given the FFCBF after two years of working with it.[438] The agreement had allowed the "the Fonds foncier to tie up the property without any deposit" [439] for a period of time that the FFCBF had "considered to be more than adequate."[440] The CLC had "agreed to this additional delay on the basis that the Fonds foncier would either succeed or fail during such a period."[441] The end of the protocol had not been "resiliation or repudiation of a contractual relationship; the protocol simply expired pursuant to the provisions stipulated therein." [442]

This narrow time-frame was used by CLC and by opponents of the project, notably the CLCS, but also the city. While Archambault had stated that she was in agreement with the goals of FFCBF "in theory"[443] other CLC persons, notably Pachal, who dealt directly with the residents and community groups, had expressed his preference for a more "traditional" approach.[444]

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[436] E-mail Serge, L to M Green February 12, 2002 thoughts & concerns.doc
[437] The FFCBF lawyer.
[438] R Clare to S Altschul October 5 2001
[439] Ibid.
[440] Ibid.
[441] Ibid.
[442] Ibid.
[443] draft_report 6-12-99.doc
[444] BFCRT 30/09/99 Canada Lands representatives in the audience during the Conseil de Quartier meetings at one point applauded a call for the demolition of the project. (Email September 14, 2001 4:10 pm L Serge to E Vaudry Re: sorta grim)

I believe that there were two pivotal moments in the six-month period that signalled to CLC that

the FFCBF would not succeed in fulfilling the protocol conditions and that the FFCBF was

weakening in its political and community support. The first was the refusal on the part of

Gagliano to make any federal financial support available to the project[445] during a meeting held

after much delay in June, three months into the protocol period. There were hints that CLC was

pulling out of the agreement not long after: the scheduled joint meeting with the CLC a few

weeks later was "short" with "very little questioning or reaction from CLC." The members of the

board concluded that "CLC is bidding its time until October and just going through the motions

with the FFC."[446]

However, it was the Conseil de quartier meetings,[447] chaired by Searle, with his fellow

councillors, Applebaum and Biddle, that became the decisive event leading CLC to end the

protocol and not renew it. Right after one of the Conseil de Quartier meetings, Clare, who had

been present said that the FFCBF "had not delivered the community"[448] and in a subsequent

phone conversation with Altchul, he reported that Archambault did not see the point of a joint

meeting in September and that she was "ready to take over the project, demolish all the buildings

and provide new housing for the social housing clients"[449] although a letter, dated that same day,

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[445] FFCBF Board 21/06/01 (There had been frustration about the delays , e.g., e-mails L Serge J Prince (w/ J Baker) re: Mr Gagliano May 28, 2001 5:57 am)

[446] FFCBF Board 12/07/01
In parallel rumours were circulating that Chagnon was "preparing a plan B for CLC" (FFCBF Board minutes 06/07/01) and a year later the FFCBF learned that he had approached other architects to prepare a redevelopment plan (FFCBF Board minutes 08/04/02) although none of these rumours could be validated, nor was his mandate with CLC ever made clear.

[447] These were held on August 30, September 4, 5 and 10.

[448] Email September 14, 2001 L Serge to E Vaudry

[449] Email, "emergency meeting" September 20, 2001, 7:08 pm, L Serge to FFC Board

reassured the FFCBF that the scheduled joint committee meeting had been postponed "so that a

decision can be taken based on a more complete picture as to the status of the rezoning

application" and giving the FFCBF "the maximum period to realize the conditions set out in the

agreement as it relates to zoning."[450]

The following day, however, in a meeting with Green, Archambault said that "CLC was pulling

the plug on us" and the "decision not to honour the protocol was irrevocable."[451] In a letter sent

to Altschul a few days later, Clare explained why the protocol would not be extended,

> "there was very significant opposition expressed by those in attendance in respect
> of the Fonds foncier's project. As a result of this opposition, the Conseil de
> quartier recommended unanimously that the zoning amendment be submitted to
> public consultation. …..because the loose ends are very substantial, and Canada
> Lands considers that your client's renovation project lacks community support
> and may not be feasible." [452]

Nonetheless the CLC decision not to extend the protocol needed to be framed. While the Conseil

de Quartier had been a demonstration of opposition to the FFCBF project, media coverage of the

FFCBF project had been largely positive and as early as 2000 it had been called the resolution of

a "heated dispute,"[453] a return to "sanity"[454] and a "vision of a renewed Benny Farm."[455] The

protocol period coincided with the height of the housing crisis, the Overdale squat,[456] while

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[450] Letter Richard J Clare to Susan Altschul, September 20, 2001 & e-mail L Serge to Board members, September 21, 2001, 11:27 am "Board meeting Monday"
[451] Email L Serge to FFC Board, "Update", September 27, 2001, 5:20 pm
[452] R Clare to S Altschul October 5, 2001
[453] Lampert, Allison 2000 June 8, Group presents plan to develop Benny Farm *The Gazette* p A6
[454] Goldberg, David 2000, October 25 Time for home sweet homes at Benny Farm *The Monitor* p 6
[455] *The Monitor* , 2000, June 7 Benny Farm could get a $25 million facelift, *The Monitor* p 3
[456] In July, 2001 a group of about fifty anti-poverty and social housing activists, street youth and anarchists, supported by the Comité de sans-Emploi and the Convergence des Luttes anti-capitalistes (CLAC) took over an empty building on Overdale (where in 1987-1989, there had been a squat to protest the demolition of affordable housing to build condos), to denounce the lack of affordable housing and demand more social housing units. Mayor

Benny Farm units stood empty.[457] Newspaper coverage, including op-ed pieces by Boskey in Le Devoir[458] and the Gazette[459] as well as an article in *Les Affaires* ("Enfin des logements abordables!" [460]) linked the development of the FFCBF to solutions to the crisis and even CLC had suggested that it might extend the protocol given the extent of the problem.[461]

The injunction filed by the FFCBF to prevent the sale of Benny Farm to anyone other than the FFCBF and the press conference that followed generated more positive newspaper stories. A Gazette editorial called for Gagliano to "personally intervene to extend the deadline" especially since the federal government had promised $680 million for affordable housing during its election campaign and a cost-sharing agreement had just been reached with provincial housing ministers.[462] Headlines in Le Devoir, "La SIC laisse tomber le plus important projet communautaire de Montréal" (Boileau, 10 octobre 2001), and in a local paper, "Ne vendez pas la ferme à d'autres" (L'Interligne le 12 octobre 2001), gave prominence to CLC's action while another local editorial referred to the "noble vision" of the FFCBF and what "looks like a Canada Lands plot which may have been intended to thwart the Fonds foncier plan from the beginning."

Bourque invited them to move to another empty building in the east end of the city, the centre Préfontaine, which the group occupied until early October when the police evicted them (Parazelli, Mensah, & Colombo 2010).

[457] The following spring, François Saillant of the FRAPRU summarized the situation : "Il y a 319 ménages à Montréal qui sont présentement sans logis et il y a 312 logements vacants sur le site de Benny Farm depuis trois ans. Ça dit tout!" (Boileau, Josée (le 17 avril 2002) Plaidoyer pour le respect intégral du projet communautaire Benny Farm *Le Devoir* p A4)

[458] Boskey, Sam "À quelques pas d'une issue viable à la crise du logement qui sévit à Montréal", *Le Devoir*, Éditorial, lundi, août 27, 2001, p. A6 Le Devoir also published an article about the role of non-profit housing that was part of a series on the housing crisis that examined different forms of housing (including HLM). Boileau, Josée HLM et coops sont-ils passés de mode *Le Devoir* le 10 octobre 2001, p A1 ; as well, Boileau Dimanche au soir à Châteauguay p. A8, which looks at an OSBL

[459] Boskey, Sam (August 27, 2001) "A serious approach to the housing crisis" *The Gazette*, p. B3

[460] Dubuc, André (samedi, septembre 1, 2001) "Enfin des logements abordables! Déjà 200 personnes ont manifesté leur intérêt" *Les Affaires*, p. 29

[461] "Au besoin, la SIC étudiera la possibilité de prolonger le délai prévu au protocol d'entente, dit le vice-président de la SCI [sic], Gordon McIvor." (Dubuc, (septembre 1, 2001) op. cit.)

[462] Make it work, *The Gazette* October 10, 2001 p B2

While acknowledging that there had been opposition by veterans ("there is always a group of people against everything") the editorial concluded,

> It really boils down to this question: Who do you trust to develop the site in order to meet the needs of the some of the most vulnerable members of our community? Is it Canada Lands, or a group of local citizens, not out to make a quick buck, who have put years of hard work and energy into helping their fellow citizens. [463]

In response to the news stories CLC insisted that while there was "a great amount of respect" for the FFCBF it "had run its course after three years" [464] and that CLC did not believe that the FFCBF would get the necessary arrangements in place.[465]

Legitimation strategies

However, in a context of a serious and highly visible housing crisis and an emerging scandal that directly implicated Gagliano and touched CLC[466], CLC needed to establish its own legitimacy and that of its decision to end a project that was extensively supported and the outcome of a ten-year community battle. CLC did this through a four-part strategy. The first component was to propose a redevelopment plan that would be acceptable in the community and show responsiveness to the housing crisis, while privatizing the site. This was done by appropriating

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[463] *The Chronicle*, Editorial How you gonna keep them down on the Farm….October 28, 2001, p A6
[464] Patriquin, Martin Funding Benny Farm *Hour* October 25-31 p. 4
[465] Calabrese, Rina Benny Farm back up for grabs: Canada Land pulls plug on group, plans own development *The Gazette* November 3, 2001 p I5
[466] What became known as the Sponsorship Scandal and led to the Gomery Commission in 2004, was a program established by the federal Liberal government to raise awareness of the Canadian government in Quebec in the face of a Parti québécois government. The program ran from 1996 to 2004 when an auditor's report revealed widespread misuse of funds. Alfonso Gagliano, political minister for Quebec was at the centre of the scandal. Gagliano was alleged to have contolled property deals undertaken by Canada Lands by Jon Grant, Chairman of CLC. In 1998 CLC sold its 35 percent stake in Place Bonaventure in downtown Montreal for $4.7M below its assessed market value and also had to pay $475,000 to avoid a lawsuit from a potential buyer. (McIntosh, A. (2002, Feb 18). Canada lands landmark complex sold below market: $475,000 paid to avoid lawsuit by would-be buyer. *National Post*.)

elements of the FFCBF plan into that of CLC. The second element was to legitimize the CLC

plan by co-opting community leaders, including those of the FFCBF, to not only endorse the

CLC plan but to be implicated in establishing its framework, which CLC achieved through the

constitution of a Task Force. The third component of the strategy was to appease and get

community endorsement to avoid a resurgence of opposition that had managed to delay the

redevelopment of the site for over ten years, which was done through a CLC consultation process

on the site plan and community meetings after plan was adopted by the Task Force. To ensure

support for the CLC plan that resulted from the Task Force and community processes, and which

would be submitted to a municipal consultation process, CLC coopted people who had worked

for the FFCBF. Finally, beyond local legitimacy, the CLC plan needed recognition and validity

in the wider community and while some of this would be achieved through municipal permits

and approval, this was a slow process that would occur much later; CLC needed more immediate

affirmation of its plan, which was done through the participation of the director of the housing

and urban planning department in the Task Force[467] and municipal endorsement throughout the

CLC consultation process.

Appropriation of FFCBF plans

Initial statements by CLC focussed on the failure of the FFCBF to meet the terms of the

agreement but did not denounce the FFCBF plan itself. In her letter to Green following the

decision to end the protocol, Archambault acknowledged that the work of the FFCBF was "un

pas dans la bonne direction" and implied continuity through proposed consultations with "les

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[467] Cameron Charlebois, Executive Director, City of Montréal Housing Department, Economic and Urban Development, was not a member but an observer. In 2009 he was named CLC Vice President, Real Estate for Québec.

communautés locales, les groupes sociaux et les intervenants municipaux afin d'élaborer un plan directeur s'harmonisant avec les besoins de la communauté, ainsi qu'avec les réalités de la société."[468] Over the next few weeks CLC, primarily through its spokesperson Gordon McIvor[469] repeated[470] that the CLC redevelopment plans would incorporate affordable[471] and low-rent housing[472] as well as "other components of the project discussed with the coalition," [473] such as preservation of some existing buildings.[474] As the release of the redevelopment plan approached, CLC reassured "que ce plan "*va prendre en considération tout ce qui a été discuté*" lors d'audiences publiques tenues l'été dernier dans le quartier."[475]

Beyond appropriating parts of the FFCBF plan, the decision to end the agreement was cast by CLC as the best way safeguard at least part of the FFCBF vision, since CLC, unlike the FFCBF, had the resources to implement the plan.[476]

> The reason that we decided to take this on ourselves is to ensure that there is affordable housing built on this site…If they didn't have the financing, then the amount of units that would have been built by (the Fonds foncier) would have been zero.[477]

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[468] S Archambault to M Green le 26 septembre 2001 cc to Kathy Milsom, présidente SIC, Richard Clare, Fasken Martineau duMoulin, Susan Altschul, Gordon McIvor VP CLC
[469] CLC director of public relations
[470] Boileau, Josée (le 10 octobre 2001) La SIC laisse tomber le plus important projet communautaire de Montréal *Le Devoir* p A8; *L'Interligne Le journal en français* (le 12 octobre 2001) Ne vendez pas la ferme à d'autres p 1
[471] Galipeau, Silvia (18 octobre 2001) Benny Farm en Cour supérieure *La Presse* p A-11
[472] Block, Irwin (October 19, 2001) Fighting to redo Benny Farm: Coalition goes to court to stop sale *The Gazette* p A8
[473] Shepherd, Harvey (October 10, 2001)Benny farm deal ends in whimper, *The Gazette* p. A3
[474] Calabrese, Rina (November 3, 2001) Benny Farm back up for grabs: Canada Land pulls plug on group, plans own development *The Gazette* p i-5
[475] Boileau, Josée (le 17 avril 2002) Plaidoyer pour le respect intégral du projet communautaire Benny Farm *Le Devoir* p A4
[476] *L'Interligne Le journal en français* (le 12 octobre 2001) Ne vendez pas la ferme à d'autres p 1
[477] Calabrese (November 3, 2001) op.cit.

A few months later, while the injunction was still in place, Archambault reiterated these points in

a national building magazine, explaining that,

> We gave the Fonds group enough time to live up to the terms of the proposed sale, but they didn't, so there was no extension…..But that doesn't mean we don't share their objectives….We're not against the group and the project, but we can finance the project ourselves and do a master plan. We are in the best position to translate part of their dream into a real project win a realistic time frame…We want to work with their ideas, but we also want to maintain control as master developer of the project.[478]

By including affordable housing, CLC appeased some of the demands of organized groups[479]

who would gain the same benefits as those promised by the FFCBF, albeit without the CLT

structure, (which was still a theoretical and unknown component). However the promise of social

housing had not been sufficient for CMHC when it had first presented its plans in 1991. As well,

CLC was making it clear that it planned to raze most of the site, contrary to a major objective of

the FFCBF and that of a decade of community mobilization.

Before the injunction had ended, CLC had begun to define a community consultation process.[480]

There had been hints by municipal politicians, including Applebaum (who had proposed a

"public process to discuss the plans"), [481] Robert Libman[482] (quoted as saying *"on a mandaté*

Cameron Charlebois…. pour arbitrer toutes les différentes opinions et trouver un terrain

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[478] *Anonymous* (2002) "Standoff at Benny Farm" *Building* 52(1): 24
[479] Three groups that had defined projects with the FFCBF were Elizabeth House (young single mothers), Project Chance (single mothers who were back in school), and ZOO (young family coop). Two other community projects were in the development stage: Chez Soi for seniors (new construction) and an affordable homeownership project that was piloted by the SHDM.
[480] While CLC had been "theoretically free to sell the property" during the injunction, it had not done so "given the potential for political fallout"(*Building* February/March 2002:24).
[481] FFCB Board 02/05/02
[482] Mayor of a suburban town that had been merged in 2002, he became a member of the city Executive Committee and responsible for urban planning and development.

d'entente"),[483] the mayor who promised to name a conciliator[484] and rumours of a conciliation

process (which "could involve ALL parties: residents opposed, neighbours opposed, councillors,

Canada Lands, the City, bureaucrats, and the Fonds foncier, etc.").[485]

Co-optation of community leaders

In early July, Jacques Bénard of the Centre d'intervention pour la revitalisation des quartiers

(CIRQ),[486] hired by CLC to co-ordinate the consultation process, began to meet with community

leaders, including Green, [487] while in a simultaneous letter to the FFCBF, CLC announced that it

was undertaking a consultation process and that it "désire connaître votre opinion concernant ce

processus." The process would be "ouverte, inclusive et respectueuse des différents points de

vue", consisting of "la constitution d'un groupe de travail compose de représentants de la

communauté" which "s'efforcera d'établir un consensus autour des grandes lignes d'un plan de

réaménagement du site". The city, the letter underscored, "appuie cette initiative et y apportera

son concours." [488] Jim Lynes[489] in a subsequent meeting with the FFCBF identified veterans and

immediate neighbours as Task Force stakeholders "to ensure that it is the NDG community that

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[483] Boileau, Josée (le 22 juin 2002) Un médiateur tentera de dénouer l'impasse Pendant que les Montréalais vivent une crise du logement, les 312 logis vacants du site risquent de le demeurer encore longtemps en raison des tiraillements au sein du conseil d'arrondissement *Le Devoir* p A3
[484] Memo regarding meeting held June 10 2002
[485] FFCB Board 13/06/02
[486] The CIRQ (now Convercité) offers services such as consultation to the private and public sector in urban redevelopment projects.
[487] FFCBF Board 11/07/02 The FFCBF had passed a resolution earlier that it would participate in meetings with CLC and the City but no other parties present and " with the understanding that any proposals forthcoming must be forwarded to the entire Board for approval" (FFCBF Board 13/06/02).
[488] Basil Cavis, directeur general, immeubles, Québec to Miriam Green le 8 juillet 2002 Objet: Processus de concertation sur le réaménagement de Benny Farm
[489] Lynes, Vice President, Real Estate, Eastern Region, had replaced Archambault.

decides the future of the NDG site" [490] and defined consensus, as the moment when all concerns

had been heard and dealt with.[491]

CLC announced that the consultation process would be phased starting with a Task Force that

would "complete a set of common development objectives for the site" and that its work would

be "derived from preliminary consultations held in July and August."[492] The next stage in the

process would include having design firms present site plans that would be "presented to the

public and concerned groups, who will be invited to offer their input. According to the work and

the reactions to the various options, Canada Lands will prepare a development plan and will

present its plan to the City of Montréal in late fall."[493] Lynes promised that agreement on the part

of "groupes sociaux locaux," would lead to a "rapid" transformation "en un vaste chantier de

logements sociaux et d'habitations au prix du marché" tying the process to CLC's awareness of

"l'urgence de répondre aux besoins en logement, à Montréal,"[494] but also as McIvor

emphasized, the need for "Certains promoteurs devront cependant faire des sacrifices si nous

voulons un jour que le dossier Benny Farm aboutisse."[495]

[490] FFCBF Board 27/08/02
[491] FFCBF Board 27/08/02
[492] Canada NewsWire (September 9, 2002) Task Force Begins Work On the Benny Farm Redevelopment A2
[493] Ibid.
[494] Beauvais, André (10 juillet 20020 La formule des logements mixtes pourrait relancer Benny Farm *Journal de Montréal* p 28
[495] Péloquin, Tristan (le 9 juillet 2002) La SIC tiendra sa cinquième consultation en 10 ans sur l'avenir de Benny Farm *La Presse*

Beyond the immediate neighbours[496] and veterans[497] asked to participate on the Task Force, two members of the FFCBF, Green and Linda Schactler[498] were asked to join, as were Gail Tedstone, Board member of the NDGCC, as well as Ghislaine Prata, Executive Director, of the Constance-Lethbridge Rehabilitation Centre, who had been a member of the FFCBF. The choice of members of the Task Force confirmed its legitimacy and credibility.[499] CLC documents identified Task Force members in terms of their affiliations, such as the FFCBF[500] or the NDG Community Council and other local groups…"[501] and as "Un groupe de travail formé de 12 personnes, dont des représentants de groupes de citoyens, le vice-président de la Société immobilière du Canada et le Fonds foncier Benny Farm…".[502] Nonetheless, within the functioning of the Task Force, CLC insisted that the members, who reflected "the diverse views of the community" with "special consideration … to the participation of individuals directly concerned by the site's redevelopment," were "invited as individuals, not as representatives of organizations or interest groups" and could not ask "another person to represent them." [503] Furthermore, deliberations of the Task Force were not to be made public until after the process

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[496] Arlyle Waring, who lived on Walkley Street and Ken Briscoe who lived on Benny Street, represented the immediate neighbours and were members of the NDG Association of Concerned Residents & Taxpayers that had lobbied for a recreation centre and the demolition of all of the post-war buildings on the site.
[497] Rosemary Bradley was listed as a member of both the BFTA and the BFVA.
[498] Shactler, Executive Director, Elizabeth House, had been a member of the FFCBF since its founding and was developing a project on the Benny Farm site for its clients, young single-mothers.
[499] Other members included Metu Belatchew, CLSC NDG/Montréal-West, Necdet Kendir, President, Sherbrooke Street West Merchants' Association, Zane Korytko, Executive Director, YMCA-NDG as well as Jim Lynes, of CLC. Already four members of the Task Force were against the FFCBF project, representatives of the CLSC and the veterans, as well as the two neighbours, to which CLC could be added.
[500] A 2003 CLC document identifies Green as Past President of the Fonds Foncier Communautaire Benny Farm (CLC September 22, 2003).
[501] Barry, Martin C. (October 16, 2002) Consensus on Benny: Task force decides future of Benny Farm site *The Chronicle – West End Edition* p. 1
[502] Benessaieh, Karim (le 25 février, 2003) Plus de logements sociaux et un CLSC plus discret Les citoyens seront appelés à se prononcer sur ce plan «quasi final» *La Presse*
[503] CLC Participatory Process to Prepare a Development Plan for the Benny Farm Site September 17, 2002

had ended[504] and even after a consensus was reached there hesitation to discuss the process.[505]

Moreover, the work of the FFCBF was shut out of the process, since "No previous proposal may

be used as a basis for discussion."[506]

Community consultation

To a large extent the opacity of the CLC process and the control it maintained over decision-

making was displayed even more in the second phase of the consultation process. In early

October, CLC announced that the Task Force had reached a consensus[507] attributed to Task

Force members refraining from "extreme positions"[508] and accepting compromises, including

densification of the site[509] (some key issues, notably demolition, remained).[510] The inclusion of a

space for an eventual recreation centre was welcome by local politicians including Searle[511] and

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[504] FFCBF Board 30/09/02

[505] Arlyle Waring, a Task Force member and resident, was "circumspect" about the Task Force discussions after the consensus was announced, stating that everyone was sworn to secrecy, "All of us are supposed to be bound by an agreed upon commitment as a group not to respond to questions conceding what happened during the task force." (Barry, Martin C. (October 30, 2002) Benny not settled yet: No consensus on site's future says Fonds Foncier, T*he Chronicle – West End Edition,* p 1)

[506] CLC Participatory Process to Prepare a Development Plan for the Benny Farm Site September 17, 2002

[507] This included that 75 percent of the site was to go to housing with the remainder for services to residents; that the project should meet mixed needs, including single mothers, seniors, and persons with mobility problems; and that one third of the housing should be for "habitation privée" while two-thirds would be rental, of which 40 percent would be subsidized while 27 percent would be affordable for average incomes. (*Canada NewsWire* (le 8 octobre 2002) Consensus du groupe de travail sure le réaménagement de Benny Farm,)

[508] Boileau, Josée (le 9 octobre 2002) Benny Farm: fin d'une guerre de 12 ans *Le Devoir* p A1

[509] ""Il y aura une certaine densification, reconnaît Jacques Bénard. Mais les bâtiments existants n'occupent que 16 % de l'espace total du site: il y a encore de la place pour développer. Et avoir plus d'unités, c'était le compromis à faire pour pouvoir, accueillir tous les types de clientèles." " (Boileau, Josée (le 9 octobre 2002) Benny Farm: fin d'une guerre de 12 ans *Le Devoir* p A1)

[510] Bucur, Diodora (October 16, 2002) Benny Farm task force cuts deal *The Suburban* p A-4

[511] Searle stated, "We've got everything we want- it's a great victory for N.D.G….The 25 per cent is the key – we made it clear there would be no project without space for a recreation complex." (Carroll, Ann (October 10, 2002) Benny Farm plan finally gets OK: Local committee reaches compromise. Redeveloped veterans' project to include low-income housing, recreation and CLSC *The Gazette* p A 8).

Applebaum[512] while Prescott[513] expressed relief that a consensus had been reached, as did local newspapers, "The task force got it right."[514]

The second phase of the process consisted of a mandate to four architectural teams, including Poddubiuk, to design options that would be the object of a larger community process[515] and that would respect the criteria that had been established by the Task Force.[516] The four designs were presented at during an information session[517] at Concordia University in October, attended by three[518] to five hundred people.[519] Newspapers covered the process[520] and the designs were made available at four locations in NDG and on a website, with an invitation to the public to comment on the four options using forms provided by CLC.[521] Comments would then be reviewed by the Task Force and followed by recommendations to CLC.

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[512] Applebaum said, "My main concern was that there was a major need for recreational facilities in our community, and this basically brings it now to the forefront." (Barry, Martin C. (October 16, 2002) Consensus on Benny: Task force decides future of Benny Farm site *The Chronicle – West End Edition* p. 1)

[513] Prescott stated, "The Benny Farm project has been a saga for 12 years […] I'm very happy with the consensus….We can be optimistic not only for having a project, but having a project that is acceptable." (Bucur, Diodora (October 16, 2002) Benny Farm task force cuts deal *The Suburban* p A-4)

[514] *The Chronicle, West End Edition* (October 23, 20020 Editorial: After a decade, reason comes to Benny Farm p 4

[515] FFCBF Board 18/09/02

[516] "Les architectes invités devaient donc respecter des points précis: avoir 500 unités de logement; en réserver le tiers à des propriétaires, le reste au secteur locatif; prévoir 40% de logements sociaux et 30% de logements pouvant être accessibles aux personnes handicapées. Enfin, il fallait arriver à rénover une partie des 52 sixplex existants et inclure des bâtiments communautaires, dont un CLSC." (Boileau, Josée (le 31 octobre 2002) Benny Farm: les citoyens ont dix jours pour se faire entendre *Le Devoir*, p A8)

[517] *"Ce n'est pas un concours que l'on fait: nous ne sommes pas ici pour élire un vainqueur"*, insistait de son côté le représentant de la Société immobilière du Canada (SIC)…" (Boileau (le 31 octobre 2002) op. cit.)

[518] Benesaieh, Karim (le 31 octobre 20020 Benny Farm: un consensus, quatre projets *La Presse* p E 1

[519] FFCBF (n.d.) History of the project: draft

[520] Boileau, Josée (le 31 octobre 2002) Benny Farm: les citoyens ont dix jours pour se faire entendre *Le Devoir*, p A8; Benesaieh, Karim (le 31 octobre 2002) Benny Farm: un consensus, quatre projets *La Presse* p E 1; Carroll, Ann (October 30, 2002) Lifetime of memories inhabit Benny Farm: Most original war-veteran tenants have died or moved on, but developers are hoping some new proposals will breathe vitality into N.D.G. apartment complex *The Gazette* p A6

[521] *Canada NewsWire* (October 25, 2002) Public presentation of Benny Farm design alternatives
The 4 proposals are also described in Sidel, Noah Public presentation sheds some light on Benny Farm's future, *The Chronicle West End Edition* November 6, 2002 p 4 archives: folder press clippings 2002

The Task Force completed its review of the feedback at the end of November[522] and in early December CLC announced its choice of architectural firm, Saia Barbarese,[523] because, according to CLC, they had best integrated the two objectives for the site: preserve its distinctiveness and integrate it into the community.[524] However, the CLC decision-making criteria or process were never clarified and FFCBF members on the Task Force sensed that the decision had already been taken.[525] The process at the Task Force had consisted of members filling out a "decision matrix" based on the summary provided of the 287 responses from the community. Instructed by Lynes that "emotions must not get in the way of the discussions",[526] Lynes went "around the room and asked everyone to say which plan they preferred." Then CLC then took back control:

> Jim [Lynes] then stated that it was clear no one liked Plan A. He then said that there were positive elements in Plans B, C and D, but that Plan C [Saia Barbarese] is a compromise between Plan B and D and it meets the objectives. He also said that the Architectural firm is a full-service agency and had already worked on the first two buildings and so had a good sense of vision. He said that Plan D [Poddubiuk] has a lot of history (in the bad sense) but that some aspects, like the environmental design could be incorporated.[527]

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[522] Basil Cavis to Jeanne Mayo (no title) Subject: Benny Farm Redevelopment December 23, 2002
[523] This firm had prepared earlier redevelopment plans for CMHC (Teasdale 1998)
[524] In the press release Lynes stated, "The challenge for the design teams was to satisfy two very different objectives for the site: to integrate the Benny Farm site into the NDG community and at the same time to preserve its distinctiveness. Based on the preliminary design I submitted and the recommendations of the Task Force, we believe that Saia Barbarese will be best able to blend the two objectives into a workable plan." (*Canada NewsWire* December 5, 2002). In a later document prepared by the FFCBF, the links to Benny Farm were underlined, "Saia Barbarese is the architectural firm which designed the new apartment buildings currently housing the veterans. It is also the firm which proposed a very similar plan to CMHC 8 years ago." (FFCBF March 2003, draft Press Release "Sell-out at Benny Farm")
[525] FFCBF Board 18/11/02
[526] Ibid.
[527] FFCBF Board 10/12/02

Confirming their lead role in the decision, in a later conversation with Poddubiuk, Lynes had

explained that the Task Force had been divided and that CLC had determined that Saia Barbarese

was the best compromise.[528]

The process that CLC had established had been presented as a democratic exercise. It had many

elements of this, including widely disseminated information about design options which had

stemmed from a consensus of a Task Force composed of community leaders, and people had

been offered the means to give feedback and express their opinions. But once this phase was

completed, the analysis and the decision-making were no longer transparent – even to the Task

Force. CLC, as a semi-governmental organization had no accountability to the population, but

especially given the city's endorsement of the process and the observer status of a key

bureaucrat, there was a suggestion that this was an authentic public consultation process.[529]

However, there was little criticism of the decision-making process or of the lack of clear criteria

beyond the FFCBF,[530] the newly created Friends of Benny Farm[531] and the NDGCC.[532] Key

issues also remained undecided, notably the question of demolition. The Task Force continued to

meet and follow the evolution of the plans and the process being undertaken for municipal

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[528] J. Baker to M Poddubuik December 4 2002 9: 41 am

[529] It is important to note that this was process was also being undertaken by a new city administration and a new city as island municipalities were merged. Furthermore, under Mayor Bourque, the previous administration had abolished many of the procedures put into place by the MCM.

[530] Barry, Martin C. (December 11, 2002) An unfriendly response: Coalition unhappy with Benny Farm decision, *The Chronicle West End Edition*, p. 1 ; "«La plus grande frustration, c'est qu'il n'y a pas les données claires pour comprendre la décision de SIC», déplore Sharon Leslie, du Fonds foncier. " (Rodrigue, Sébastien (le 6 décembre 2002) Benny Farm: encore de la grogne *La Presse* p E 3);

[531] "Preliminary information does not provide a coherent rationale as to the criteria that served to select Plan C or the architectural firm that produced it" FBF said in a statement" (Barry, Martin C. (December 11, 2002) An unfriendly response : Coalition unhappy with Benny Farm decision, *The Chronicle West End Edition*, p. 1)

[532] FFCBF (n.d.) History of the project: draft

approval, including the forthcoming public consultation with the Office de la Consultation public de Montréal (OCPM) that had been formed the previous year. CLC also undertook community meetings to discuss its plans including one in conjunction with the NDGCC in March.[533]

However, perhaps in anticipation of the forthcoming public consultation process with the OCPM, CLC sought to strengthen its credibility and legitimacy again. This time CLC hired consultants to undertake studies on specific components of the CLC plan, which would then be presented to the city and for consultation. Two persons who had worked closely with the FFCBF were hired; Poddubiuk to assess the feasibility of renovation and me, to examine affordable homeownership.[534] We were listed as consultants in the plan and when the OCPM consultation took place in the spring of 2003.

Municipal endorsement

Much of what CLC had accomplished would not have been possible without the support of the city, the fourth component of the CLC strategy. Beyond the chaos that was reportedly occurring

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[533] The invitation from the NDGCC was widely circulated. "Bonjour, La lutte pour Benny Farm dure depuis 10 ans, mais depuis 2 ans le processus avance beaucoup. Enfin, il y a quelques semaines, la Société immobilière du Canada (SIC, gvt fédéral) annonçait le plan de développement sur le site de Benny Farm qui ira devant l'Office de consultation publique de la Ville de Montréal bientôt. Le plan prévoit 500 unités. Venez vous informer et faire valoir votre opinion sur les enjeux de l'abordabilité permanente. Cette soirée est organisée par le Conseil communautaire de NDG et Les Amis de Benny Farm regroupant 50 organismes. Soirée: Le plan sera présenté par le vice-président de la SIC, Jim Lynes, puis il y aura des ateliers animés par des militants sur la vie associative future et les projets sur le site: coops et OSBL d'habitation, logements et condos abordables. Cela se terminera par des débats en plénière, incluant M. Lynes, les personnes-ressources des ateliers et un représentant de la Ville. Des logements décents pour tous, ce n'est pas une demande, c'est un droit! " (E-mail S Boskey to recipients supressed Sunday evening Benny Board caucus March 19, 2003 8:09)
[534] A third person hired at that time was Avi Friedman from the McGill School of Architecture who undertook a study on building affordable homes.

at the municipal level[535] and noninterventionist stance that the city had taken, in spite of

promises to the FFCBF, once the CLC took back control of the site, the city endorsed and

supported the project.

Already, municipal officials in examining preliminary versions of the CLC plan assessed it to be

similar to that of the FFCBF; Jennings, reporting on a meeting with the mayor's chief of staff

had been told that the plan very similar.[536]. The letter sent to the FFCBF by CLC announcing the

consultation process had emphasized that the city sanctioned the process [537] which was later

repeated when the city publicly announced that "qu'elle allait être un collaborateur de premier

plan aux etudes de la SIC"[538] and supported the process "avec enthousiasme"[539] while Libman

spoke optimistically on behalf of the CLC project that, "si tout va très, très bien", could be

finalized for the end of the year.[540]

Community organizations that had sent letters to the city in support of the FFCBF also received

letters stating that the city had agreed to the CLC process[541] and while recognizing the

"outstanding efforts in recent months" of the FFCBF, the city had to "bear in mind that the

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[535] A municipal civil servant was reported to have said that the city was in "administrative chaos" with struggles between boroughs (some which had been independent municipalities) and the central city as well as a "potential for corruption". (FFCBF Board minutes 23/05/02)

[536] FFCBF Board 04/02/02

[537] Basil Cavis, directeur general, immeubles, Québec to Miriam Green le 8 juillet 2002 Objet: Processus de concertation sur le réaménagement de Benny Farm

[538] Beauvais, André (10 juillet 2002) La formule des logements mixtes pourrait relancer Benny *Farm Journal de Montréal* p28

[539] Boileau, Josée (le 21 juin 2002) À dix jours du 1er juillet des milliers de personnes ont fait appel aux centres d'urgence. La crise du logement est beaucoup plus grave cette année que celle de l'an dernier, estime le FRAPRU *Le Devoir* p A3

[540] Boileau, Josée (le 22 juin 2002) Un médiateur tentera de dénouer l'impasse. Pendant que les Montréalais vivent une crise du logement, les 312 logis vacants du site risquent de le demeurer encore longtemps en raison des tiraillements au sein du conseil d'arrondissement *Le Devoir* p A3

[541] FFCBF Board 18/09/02

Canada Lands Company (CLC) owns the site and has clearly indicated its desire to oversee the site's development" so the city was "working with the CLC to determine the design parameters of a development plan." [542] Further urging by the Friends of Benny Farm that the mayor meet with the FFCBF, was met with a response that he would do this only after the CLC process, "The task force has the responsibility to identify the principles on which the consultations will be based…All I'm asking is that people in good faith try to agree on general principles." [543] The spokesperson for the Friends of Benny Farm, Sharon Leslies, responded, "The mayor refuses to exercise leadership…He is the mayor of the entire City of Montreal, but he's got a bureaucrat from Canada Lands telling him what to do…"[544]

To a large extent the role of the city had not changed since Gardiner had underlined Benny Farm's potential for economic development and increased property taxes a decade before. In spite of expressions of interest by mayors and their advisors, the city administration never took a lead role in defending the FFCBF project, instead letting community groups lead the battle for social housing. Echoing the conclusions of the BCM, once CLC took back the project the mayor claimed powerlessness in the face of CLC's ownership of the site[545] relying on the "language of property" to exclude the FFCBF and the community. Nonetheless, the city played a key role in creating the conditions for privatization of the site by endorsing the CLC consultation process[546] and by remaining passive when confronted by community demands.

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[542] Richard Thériault, Director of Communications and Adminstration, Cabinet du maire et du comité executive to Mr. Pat Nolan, President Ressources Populaires, September 9, 2002 letter in response to August 23, 2002
[543] Bucur, Diodora (September 25, 2002) Benny Farm advocates seek city support *The Suburban* p A 5
[544] Ibid.
[545] Rapopport, Irwin , (March 6 2002) Benny rejig coming *The Suburban*
[546] The CLC consultation process also appears to have been viewed as legitimate and important by city bureaucrats. The Summary Decision prepared by the borough planning department in 2003 for the CLC zoning changes hints at

While the mayor refrained from strong pronouncements, the city administration allowed local

councillors to speak against the project, against social housing, and its advocates. Applebaum

had stated that he believed that the land was too valuable for poor people but Searle was even

more unequivocal; explaining the decision of the Conseil de Quartier, he stated "So Mickey

Applebaum and I ditched that. It doesn't make sense to use the most valuable piece of real estate

in Quebec for affordable housing." [547] Searle had been given the power to chair a chaotic Conseil

de Quartier meeting that allowed uncontrolled denunciation of the FFCBF, with little attempt by

fellow councillors to take back control, which became a major reason used by the CLC to end the

protocol.

The dissolution of the FFCBF

Throughout the work of the Task Force the FFCBF had continued to react and question decisions

dealing with affordability, demolition and community needs. It had participated in the creation of

the Friends of Benny Farm, formed by individuals and community groups to monitor the CLC

and the redevelopment of the site. However, as the project progressed, it became clear that no

resentment that the department was not asked to participate and of tension between the central city and the borough. "À l'automne 2002, la Société immobilière du Canada mandatait de nouveaux professionnels et a mis en place un important processus de consultation auprès de la population locale quant à l'avenir du site de Benny Farm. Les professionnels de la Ville qui avaient travaillé au dossier n'ont pas été invités à participer au processus et le Service de l'aménagement urbain et services aux entreprises de l'arrondissement de Côte-des-Neiges-Notre-Dame de-Grâce n'a pas été impliqué. En effet, le directeur associé développement économique et développement urbain, de la Ville de Montréal fut la personne invitée pour représenter la Ville dans ce processus de consultation, aucun représentant du Service de l'aménagement urbain et service aux entreprises de l'arrondissement ne fut invité. " (Arrondissement Côte-des-Neiges-Notre-Dame de-Grâce, 02/06/2003 Sommaire décisionnel, CA65.001)
[547] Segal, Craig (September 27 – October 4, 2001) Benny Farm boondoggle *The Mirror*

room would be made for the FFCBF in the CLC project and questions began to surface about its future. By early 2003 members began to talk about dissolution.[548]

I believe that it was primarily two events that propelled the decision to dissolve. The first was the announcement that Poddubiuk and I had been hired by CLC. Baker's reaction was, "FFCBF has been humiliated, CLC is picking off the pieces." [549] The second was the increasing community support of CLC. During a meeting with 150 participants, hosted by the Friends of Benny Farm, CLC had presented their redevelopment plan, which was eventually supported by the group.[550] The NDGCC had also discussed of "how to support the CLC project."[551]

Some members of the FFCBF had decided that they would resign if the FFCBF continued; they did not want to be implicated in an endorsement of the CLC project. The role of watchdog was also rejected, "FFCBF stood for a certain vision and we should not let another organization use our name."[552] A resolution was passed to cease operations with a final meeting on June 5, 2003 and Boskey prepared a press release

> Community activists spent 10 years developing a vision for this creative and
> necessary project. While there are various reasons why this venture was blocked,
> the most serious are the duplicity and repeated betrayal of the community
> demonstrated by Canada Lands Company (CLC), which treated its local
> associates in an inexcusable manner while deliberately keeping over 300 housing
> units empty for years during a serious housing crisis.

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[548] FFCBF Board 28/01/03
[549] FFCBF Board 29/04/03
[550] My e-mail to the Board in J Prince to L Serge Re: NDG housing Cttee & Friends of BF meeting, April 23, 2003 4:34 pm
[551] FFCBF Board 29/04/03
[552] Ibid.

Furthermore, the municipal administration demonstrated incalculable weakness and lack of principle in the face of a serious housing crisis, on the one hand promising to support the FFCBF's plan and on the other allowing a real estate corporation without any accountability to the city or the local community to plan the future structure of a neighbourhood. Local elected officials at the municipal level have demonstrated that there is no lack of opportunism in today's city.

As well, crassly displaying an absence of social solidarity, a community-based social agency lobbied against an affordable and non-profit housing project for its own corporate benefit.[553]

In keeping with past divisions within the FFCBF, there was strong reaction to the statement. Altschul wrote, "The FFCBF has never taken this strident tone in its communiqués, and I really hope it will not do so now. There are ways of making our point ─ and I endorse all the positive things in the text ─ without name-calling and accusations that could get us a libel charge. Please stick to the high road."[554]

The Boskey text was revised and more subdued final text produced that reviewed the history of the FFCBF and described the more recent process,

After a month of meetings to which the public was not invited, the Task Force arrived at a consensus on a certain number of social principles with which the FFCBF had no problem. However, the FFCBF was surprised when CLC decided to stop the Task Force deliberations at that point and start to "consult" the public. The FFCBF issued a press release to alert the public that many critical issues, fundamental to the debates over the past decade, were being ignored…

…..The FFCBF feels that CLC has once again betrayed the NDG community. It said that the Task Force would bring about a consensus amongst the participants as to a master plan for the Benny Farm site; however, the community remains as divided as ever. Some vocal critics are still only focused on the recreational centre and have not endorsed the objectives of social balance, inclusiveness, housing

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[553] E-mail S Boskey to Board FFCBF: text for Thursday's meeting June 3, 2003 11:27 pm
[554] S Altschul to Board (?) Re: FFCBF: text for Thursday's meeting June 4, 2003 1:08 pm

diversity and services that meet residents' needs. Others, while endorsing the principles adopted by the Task Force, are sceptical that CLC will ever respect these principles, especially as they relate to the principle of ensuring affordable housing. [555]

Conclusion

In this chapter I have traced the process and the controversy that surrounded the redevelopment of Benny Farm. As this chapter illustrates, CMHC, and later CLC, were determined in their pursuit of redevelopment, and the possibility of an ongoing responsibility to provide affordable housing, beyond that for the veterans, was never considered. Neither the municipal nor provincial levels displayed any interest in taking over this obligation, leaving it instead to community groups and residents to confront each other over the future of the site, often carrying the battle on their behalf. However, once it became clear that the FFCBF would not be able to meet the conditions of the six-month protocol, and that there was structured opposition to its plans, CLC took over the process, operating as other quasi-governmental agencies and in the consultation that it undertook, legitimizing its plans and curtailing opposition.

In the next chapter, I will analyse the redevelopment of Benny Farm, situating it in the context of the wider changes and the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the evolution of state intervention that was discussed in Chapter 3.

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[555] Press release: The FFCBF decides to disband The Fonds foncier communautaire Benny Farm June 2003

CHAPTER 5   Benny Farm: A Case Study of Neoliberal Redevelopment

Introduction

In the previous chapters I traced the evolution of the Benny Farm project. In Chapter 3 I situated the construction of Benny Farm in the context of 20th century Canadian housing policy and traced the modest and reluctant intervention of the federal government, even in periods of massive upheaval and need as in the post-WWI period and the Great Depression. Direct intervention during World War II, notably housing built by Wartime Housing Limited, was quickly sold or demolished after the war and it was only years later that the federal government introduced comprehensive affordable housing programs. However social housing was and continues to be, residual in Canada, based on an approach to housing characterized as "privatism" by Bacher (1986), with provision and distribution confined primarily to the private sector. Benny Farm built for veterans was an exception, as was its ongoing support.

In Chapter 4 I focussed on the redevelopment of the site between 1991 and 2002 and the role of CMHC and CLC as they sought to rehouse the residents and redevelop the rest of the site. Chapter 4 discussed the evolution of the opposition to these plans and the coalition of community groups that was formed, first as the BFCRT and later incorporated into the FFCBF. The redevelopment proposal put forward by the FFCBF was contested within the community and I discussed how this opposition became a factor in the termination of the agreement between the CLC and the FFCBF and described the subsequent community consultation process led by CLC.

In this chapter I will analyse the redevelopment process of Benny Farm in relation to the conceptual framework I outlined in Chapter 2. As I proposed in the introduction, Benny Farm is a case study of neoliberal urbanism and governance at a moment when municipal structures were being redefined. Benny Farm highlights the role that the state, and in particular the federal level, plays in urban redevelopment as well as its flexibility and adaptability in dealing with community resistance and conflict. I will first examine the shift in the approach to redevelopment as Benny Farm was transferred from CMHC to CLC, followed by a discussion of the role played by the municipal government. Second, building on the discussion in Chapter 2 about the flexibility of the neoliberal process, I will examine the reaction and adaptation of CMHC and CLC to opponents of redevelopment, tracing both the evolution of the FFCBF and its co-optation by CLC. I will end this chapter by discussing the implications of the redevelopment of the site. As Blomley has proposed, struggles over urban development "turn on contests over meaning, moralities, and politics of property" (2004: xvii); I will discuss some of these themes in terms of the process of redevelopment, touching briefly on outcomes as well.

Redevelopment and the state

In this section I will focus on the role of the national and local levels of the state. While housing and urban affairs are provincial jurisdictions, the provincial government played a minor role in Benny Farm. Other than the press conference by the Minister responsible for Municipal Affairs in 1998, provincial politicians, while willing to express support for the FFCBF project, did not intervene directly. In part this can be explained by the weak links of the FFCBF to the Parti Québécois that was in power from 1994 to 2003. Considered a safe Liberal seat, NDG did not

have an MNA from the party in power until 2003. (In the 1989 election that resulted in a second

term for the Liberal party, NDG elected one of four Equality Party members, asserting a strong

Anglophone identity.) The lack of access to those in power at the provincial level was of such

concern for members of the FFCBF, that in 2001 they took steps to hire a lobbying firm. This

was a highly controversial decision that was eventually abandoned but it illustrated the

inadequacy of the FFCBF links to the provincial level.

The federal government: two agencies and two approaches

While it is proposed that the process of neoliberalization and globalization has resulted in the

"hollowing out" of the nation-state as responsibilities are uploaded or downloaded (Hackworth,

2007; Swyngedouw, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999), the federal

government in Canada plays a significant direct and indirect role in urban affairs through the

properties it owns, control of policy areas, and employment (Wolfe, 2003). Picton (2009) in his

study of the redevelopment of Lebreton Flats in Ottawa notes the limited understanding of the

national scale in New Urban Policy (NUP).

> The relative absence of analysis of how Canadian federal institutions operate to
> enforce directly and regulate neoliberalism's NUP is an equally gaping omission
> in the understanding of the process of sub-national neoliberalization. Indeed in
> some instances, the Canadian federal government, through institutions such as the
> Canada Lands Company (CLC) and the National Capital Commission (NCC), has
> extended its reach beyond traditional subsidiary funding by directly aiding and
> abetting NUP and entrepreneurial behaviour – acting both in tandem and
> independently of cities.

Notwithstanding the changes to the state and to the reconfiguration of interscalar arrangements (Mahon 2006), over the last 50 years, the federal level, much as it did in 1946, played a substantial role in shaping the process and the outcome of Benny Farm; this in spite of Quebec's defence of its areas of jurisdiction and moreover, with full support and participation of the local level.

The two federal agencies, CMHC and CLC, that undertook redevelopment of Benny Farm illustrate the evolution of the federal role in neoliberal urban governance. In keeping with the roll-back phase of neoliberalism, CMHC sought above all to divest itself of Benny Farm and pursued this goal until 1998 when it transferred the property to CLC. The redevelopment of the site was initially proposed during the Mulroney government era and fit into that government's policy of privatization of public assets, as well as withdrawal from social housing. (New social housing funding would end two years later.) While CMHC continued to accept responsibility for housing the veterans, couched in its financing formula was the goal of selling most of the site. Beyond the unsuitability of the housing for the aging veterans, CMHC characterized the housing as decrepit, outdated, and not worth saving. When challenged by Michael Fish, who claimed that Benny Farm had architectural merit, the CMHC director of Benny Farm refuted any such value, calling it, "une oeuvre assez pauvre à bien des points de vue."[556]

Much of the battle for the project was fought by residents. The Benny Farm Tenants Association (BFTA) that represented most residents at first resisted CMHC plans, insisting on their attachment to the housing and the community. The BFTA was soon supplanted by a new

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[556] Gohier, André (1993, 12 juillet) Le ridicule ne tue pas *Le Devoir* p A13

organization in support of the project, the Benny Farm Veteran's Association (BFVA). The emergence of the BFVA reframed the debate as residents identified themselves primarily as veterans rather than tenants, and opposition to the CMHC project was recast as a disavowal of the sacrifices made by veterans, edging on disloyalty. This framing of the housing needs of the aging veterans echoed that of the immediate post-war period when veterans confronted severe housing shortages; the veterans had spent "years in the service of the country" and yet the government let down "the very persons who had given so much to help win the war" (Durflinger, 1997). This framing of the needs of Benny Farm veterans resonated even more in a context of increased militarization in Canada and the emphasis on military sacrifice (Fremeth, 2010), and was highlighted in newspaper articles, by the veterans, and by politicians

Tying the total demolition of the site to the veterans' housing was especially useful as a means to obscure the debate and CMHC's underlying goal of privatization. The issues became even more muddied as the public face of the redevelopment project increasingly became the veterans; they defended the project in meetings, letters, and newspaper articles. The residents, unified in their opposition to outsiders who weighed in on the debate, become more and more invested in the project. They became convinced that the state of the housing was beyond redemption, driven by the fear that CMHC would make good its threats to withdraw from the project if the city did not agree to the zoning changes.

CMHC was unrelenting in its pursuit of total demolition. Granted permission to only demolish enough to build the veterans housing in 1993, CMHC instead waited for the new developer-friendly city administration in 1994 to again lobby for total demolition. The zoning changes it

sought, razing the site and high densities, were propelled by the goal of maximization of the value of the land.

Beyond the insistence that the land be sold and that tenants be rehoused, CMHC was indifferent to the wider impact of its actions, expressing no strong position to the possibility of acquisition by the city or even community groups as long as the market-price was met. In keeping with its responsibility towards the residents, CMHC undertook a consultation process but residents were consulted on the narrowest of concerns: their own housing. The fate of the rest of the site would be left to the market. The attitude towards residents was paternalistic, underlined by statements from the local office that residents would eventually appreciate the plans even if they were initially unhappy. For CMHC, the larger community had no claims to the site although it would submit to consultation processes that were required for the zoning changes. The report of the Bureau de Consultation de Montréal in 1994 concurred with CMHC that it was like any other private developer; beyond its moral obligation to the veterans, it had no social responsibilities, refuting any relationship to the community of the state institution that had intervened in Canadian housing since 1946.

Almost immediately after CLC took over in 1998 there were signs that there was a new approach to redevelopment, especially from the higher echelons of CLC and in particular the CEO, who signalled a change when he stated that the larger community would be consulted. The debate about rehousing veterans was settled for the most part and the focus became the fate of the rest of the site, especially since CLC had uncoupled financing veterans' housing from the sale of the rest of the property. Demonstrating more flexibility and adaptability than CMHC, CLC,

especially in its relations with the FFCBF, presented a more open approach to the wider

community. This is consistent with the evolution of urban governance as,

> …these institutional and regulatory configurations are celebrated as a new form of
> governing, signalling a better and more transparent articulation between
> government (state) and civil society. (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)

The new approach was led by CLC's head office in Toronto; in Montreal the local representative

still spoke of his preference for a "traditional" approach with developers, while the Quebec-

based vice-president referred to the greater ease in working with private developers. It was only

after the agreement with the FFCBF had ended, the court challenge dismissed and when the

Quebec-based vice-president had left CLC[557], that the new approach was fully implemented. An

outside firm was hired to facilitate a community consultation process, while a Vice-President

from the CLC head office took the lead role in the redevelopment of the site. The disarray at the

municipal level, which I discuss below, was an opportunity that created the conditions to allow

CLC such control; as attempts by the mayor to arrive at a consensus in the community proved

unsuccessful, there was growing talk by the city administration of a CLC master plan[558] and of a

different kind of public process.

The process and the role of the city had the hallmarks of urban governance described by

Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

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[557] Archambault, who had directed the project, left CLC as soon as the injunction decision was handed down
[558] Applebaum had described proposed redevelopment of the site in meetings held with various community
representatives; many of the elements (e.g., location of the CLSC, extension of a street through the site) he described
were eventually incorporated into the CLC redevelopment plan (FFCBF minutes: Community meeting, January 30,
2002,Co-op Maison Verte*)*.

The newly emerging regimes of governing urban revitalization involve the subordination of formal government structures to new institutions and agencies, often paralleled by a significant redistribution of policymaking powers, competencies, and responsibilities. In the name of greater flexibility and efficiency, these quasi-private and highly autonomous organizations compete with and often supersede local and regional authorities as protagonists and managers of urban renewal.

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The emergence of a more fragmented and pluralistic mode of urban governance has also contributed to the redefinition of roles played by local authorities. In particular, it has served to reinforce the tendency towards a more proactive approach, letting local authorities act simultaneously as enablers, partners, and clients. At the same time, the new structures of governance also express the outcomes of an ongoing renegotiation between the different levels of government— local, regional, and national—regarding competencies and powers in the management of urban revitalization.

The city increasingly became an enabler as CLC defined its redevelopment process. CLC's power and authority were reinforced by statements by the mayor: in response to a question about Benny Farm during a council meeting, the mayor responded by referring to constrained municipal powers since CLC owned the site. This unassailability was further reinforced by the local MP: asked about CLC plans, Jennings replied that "Canada Lands is a federal crown corporation with a profit mandate…They have a legal mandate and can do what they want and the minister in charge cannot do anything about it."[559]

With the affirmation of CLC's legitimacy as owner of the site and with the unequivocal support of the city, CLC announced its own consultation process with "stakeholders" who would form a Task Force. As Swyngedouw et al. (2002) point out, this is a process with an exceptional level of

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[559] Eisner, Marlene (June 5, 2002) Benny Farm, health care top list of forum concerns, *The Chronicle- West End Edition* p 1

selectivity; the criteria or procedure for the selection of members of the Task Force were never explained. According to the CLC press release, members of the Task Force were "stakeholders from various community groups and local associations and institutions, notably the Fonds foncier Benny Farm 2000, as well as neighbourhood residents."[560] Task Force members' ties to various organizations, and in particular the FFCBF, were essential to legitimate the CLC process, but within the functioning of the Task Force, CLC emphasized that members were individual participants, not representatives of organizations. With no accountability to their organizations, members were also asked to not divulge Task Force discussions. As with other quasi-governmental agencies

> …the structures of representation of the participating partners are diffuse and unregulated. Here are rarely formalized mechanisms of representation, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify who represents what, who, and how. (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)

The Task Force decision-making process remained opaque. The choice of an architectural firm, for example, had the components of a consultative process, with a public meeting to present design alternatives, information widely available, and residents invited to submit comments and suggestions. However, with no accountability to the community, the next stage, the analysis of the feedback and the decision-making, remained obscure. This phase of the consultation process, with information sessions and feedback, was similar to that used by CLC in the Downsview project in Toronto, where a consultation comprising community meetings and workshops with over 3,500 citizens was criticized for being a "show and tell" exercise with an "air of a fait

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[560] *Canada NewsWire General News*, (September 9, 2002 - 11:02 EST) Task Force Begins Work On the Benny Farm Redevelopment

acccompli" and that instead of being an opportunity to influence the proposal, was "essentially a public information exercise" (Illsley, 2003). In Montreal, with a more modest process (and project) and the filtering back up to a Task Force that was perceived as legitimately representing the divergent positions, few in the community questioned the process undertaken.

The choice of architectural firm following the community process was, according to the press release, "based on the Task Force's final recommendations and public comments"[561] but the criteria were never made clear, even to the members of the Task Force. To a large extent the process undertaken by CLC reflects that described by Swyngedouw et al. (2002):

> …these forms of urban governance show a significant deficit with respect to accountability, representation, and the presence of formal rules of inclusion or participation. Indeed, accountability channels are often gray, nonformalized, and nontransparent, frequently circumventing traditional democratic channels of accountability (e.g., to representative elected body).

The CLC consultation process did not supplant that of the municipality but instead added a new component to the redevelopment process, especially in the face of potential contestation. CLC would have to submit the redevelopment plans to the newly created municipal consultation body to obtain zoning changes. However, the redevelopment project was defined during the Task Force phase and by the time that it reached municipal public consultation, there was little controversy on basic objectives; echoing the low resistance and conflict of development projects studied by Swyngedouw et al (2002).

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[561] *Canada NewsWire General News* (December 5, 2002 - 13:00 EST) Benny Farm Task Force Presents Final Recommendations

It is important to emphasize that Benny Farm was not an isolated project for CLC; it is actively involved in redevelopment projects across Canada, including almost 10 hectares in central Montreal where it foresees construction of 2000 housing units. This reinforces the importance of federal government intervention in urban areas as underlined by Wolfe (2003); with neither a national housing nor urban policy, through CLC the federal government is actively involved in both housing and urban redevelopment.

Much of what CLC was able to achieve would not have been possible without the complicity and support of the city. In the next section I will examine the municipal role.

The municipality

The redevelopment of the Benny Farm spanned three municipal administrations with varying levels of explicit support for private development. The municipal position in 1991, at the beginning of the redevelopment process, illustrated the tension within the ruling MCM party. Formed in 1974 and rooted in community groups and urban movements, the MCM by 1991 had won a second consecutive mandate, but decisions taken by the party had resulted in dissention[562] and formation of a new political party. NDG was particularly touched; Sam Boskey had resigned from the MCM to form the Democratic Coalition and was later joined by Claudette Godley-Demers, who won a by-election in NDG in 1991.

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[562] Divisions within the MCM stemmed from decisions that had placed the administration on the side of condo developers in the expulsion of tenants (Overdale), allowed demolition of a historic property (Queens Hotel), and environmental destruction for a company with ties to the American military (Matrox). Increased power of the executive committee along with imposed caucus confidentiality, were all seen as signs that municipal democratization, one of the key platforms of the MCM, had stalled (Thomas (1994).

As Boudreau (2003) points out however, the MCM, in spite of its progressive roots, came to power as neoliberalism was intensifying, making it more difficult for the radical wing of the party to push for fundamental MCM policies. Instead the party focussed on attracting investment as the mayor "spoke of Montreal as an enterprise, and of citizens as consumers" (Boudreau 2003:200) continuing the "pragmatic" approach with the business community that he favoured (Thomas 1995: 179-180) and reflecting the "commonsense" and necessity to accept a turn towards neoliberal reform (Peck and Tickell, 2002). John Gardiner[563], head of housing and urban development, had come from the community sector, but had moved to the political right in his handling of urban dossiers, including the redevelopment of Benny Farm which Gardiner applauded because of the economic benefits that it would generate.

In spite of the pro-development bias at the Executive Committee, local councillors were ambivalent about CMHC plans, expressing concern about "demolition for demolition's sake". The internal divisions, differing recommendations from commissions, and unpopular decisions on highly visible redevelopment projects all pushed the Executive Committee to refuse CMHC permission for total demolition. However the city's dependence on redevelopment was underscored when CMHC, angry with this outcome, threatened to withdraw from the project and the mayor intervened, asking them not to do so for the sake of the veterans. The city's position can be explained, as can that of the veterans, by the "despotic control" exercised by CMHC. Weakened by a fiscal crisis (Breux, Collin, & Négrier, 2007), internal dissention, and unpopular decisions, the city administration was vulnerable to CMHC threats of total withdrawal from the

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[563] John Gardiner was one of 18 MCM councillors elected in 1974 and then defeated in 1978. He then joined the Milton Parc resource group in the organizing work.

project. As in New Orleans' public housing described by Arena (2012) or by Burawoy in plant closures, hegemonic despotism results in concessions on the part of tenants or workers out of fear of the flight of housing authorities or capital. In the case of Benny Farm, CMHC was able to exercise this control over the veterans, who feared the loss of new housing, especially now that they were convinced of the dilapidation of their housing, and over the city, which feared the loss of potential investment in redevelopment.

The period that followed the MCM administration, voted out of office in 1994, was one of major rescaling of the local level as the city positioned itself internationally. This rescaling would continue for the next decade, creating a vacuum for CLC to take control. Bourque, elected mayor in 1994, lobbied the provincial government to merge island municipalities, arguing that as the economic driving force of Quebec, Montreal had to compete with other newly-merged cities such as Toronto (Boudreau, 2003: 211). He was successful in persuading the provincial government, but, defeated in the 2001 election, was no longer in power when the new city was formed in 2002. However, the structure of the city was unstable and was to undergo more changes. A new provincial Liberal government, elected in 2003 partially on the promise of permitting cities to demerge, resulted in the departure of 15 of the 27 suburban municipalities following a 2004 referendum, redefining once again the structure of the city and of the metropolitan region. Furthermore, to add to the complexity of the model of governance, a third scale was added: in an attempt to sway merged suburban municipalities to stay in the new Montreal, greater powers had been given to local boroughs in 2003 that included management of local services, some planning and public consultations. Boroughs now played a strategic role in urban governance and posed a challenge to the central city (Collin & Robertson, 2005).

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The instability at the municipal level was especially pronounced during the period that the

agreement between the FFCBF and CLC came to an end. This would explain both the lack of

success of attempts to mediate an agreement by municipal politicians and bureaucrats, as well as

the firm position taken by CLC representatives that they would not be dissuaded from their

decision to proceed with their own redevelopment plans.[564] The mayor increasingly ceded to

CLC and ultimately endorsed the Task Force, legitimizing it with the presence of the director of

urban planning; reinforcing the municipal role as "enablers, partners, and clients" (Swyngedouw

et al., 2002).

As boroughs were given powers that had never before been accorded to the neighbourhood level,

local councillors became more influential and were rumoured to claim that the fate of Benny

Farm would rest with them.[565] The lack of leadership and weakness of the central administration

was further demonstrated in the lack of control of a local councillor, Jeremy Searle, who became

increasingly virulent in his opposition to the FFCBF project while promoting a recreation centre

on the site. While it was known that Michael Applebaum, his fellow councillor, was favourable

to the redevelopment of the site (based on comments he had made as member of the BFCRT), in

his public statements, especially as he gained more power locally and at the central city,

Applebaum did not take a clear position. However, neither he nor any member of the city

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[564] The mayor, Executive Committee member responsible for housing and provincial housing minister had all expressed their support for the FFCBF project. In spite of this, the CLC representative stated "Nous avons pris une décision avant les élections municipales et nous ne reviendrons pas en arrière… Nous allons développer nous-mêmes un projet" (Boileau, Josée, Pénurie de logements sociaux: Le complexe Benny Farm est loin d'offrir la solution rêvée La Société immobilière du Canada s'oppose toujours à l'idée de consacrer tout le complexe au logement social, *Le Devoir* le 10 janvier 2002 p A3)

[565] L Serge to M Poddubiuk cc to board members Musings on our next steps…November 12 2002 16:39

administration denounced Searle's statements, suggesting a willingness to allow Searle to lead a proxy battle within the community, similar to that which had been fought by veterans on behalf of CMHC. Searle expressed what official representatives could not. He also became the rallying point of neighbours opposed to the FFCBF: rather than overtly expressing opposition to plans for affordable housing, neighbours instead supported a recreation centre, letting Searle denounce the FFCBF "outsiders" and plans for social housing. While Searle may have been portrayed as a renegade and out of control, nonetheless the recreation centre was adopted by the Task Force and eventually built by the city.

Redevelopment and opposition

Evolution of the FFCBF

The CLC invitation in 1998 to the newly-formed BFCRT to propose a consultation process was recognition of the group and of its legitimacy as the voice of the community. After years of dismissal of community concerns by CMHC, this was victory; the BFCRT was considered a valid representative of a legitimate set of interests (Gamson, 1975). The importance of recognition to the FFCBF was most clearly demonstrated when, based on the rumour that CLC did not respect or did not see the FFCBF as credible, the members of the FFCBF took over a meeting with CLC, demanding that an agreement be prepared. A few weeks later the protocol was signed. However, maintaining this legitimacy after being first recognized by CLC and attempting to become a partner with CLC dominated the FFCBF activities, and in this process, goals and means were transformed.

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The group that formed the BFCRT and subsequently the FFCBF was made up of activists who had been involved in urban social movements and community groups. Some, like Lucia Kowaluk, had successfully resisted redevelopment of a downtown neighbourhood and been pivotal in the creation of the Milton Parc community. Milton Parc was proof that not only could demolition of housing be stopped but that also, with state intervention and support, it could be preserved as affordable, resident-controlled housing. For housing and urban activists it was archetypal and became "a rallying point for many of the MCM's founding activists" (Thomas 1994: 191). Besides Kowaluk, others who worked on Benny Farm had also been involved in Milton Parc, while some members such as Sam Boskey and Claudette Demers-Godly had been municipal councillors and others had worked at the municipal level.

Furthermore, unlike most Canadian provinces, the provincial government had resisted the total elimination of social housing programs during the roll-back phase in federal social housing and instead had continued to developed and expand the programs it had begun in 1977, recognizing their importance politically and financially (Vaillaincourt et al., 2001). As in other social policy areas built on the "Quebec model", social housing was developed and delivered in close collaboration with community housing groups, the Groupe de Ressources Techniques (GRT). Many of the board members and people working with the FFCBF had experience with GRTs.

Thus, in many respects, the FFCBF represented the evolution of movements and activists in Montreal that moved from community mobilization into politics, state bureaucracies and community service groups (Giraud, 2005; Maille, 2003; Hamel et al., 2000; Lamoureux, 1992;

Vaillancourt, 1981). The background of members, the experience of successful projects like

Milton Parc, as well as the integration into state structures, explains the ease with which the

BFCRT moved from pressure group to defining its own redevelopment plans.

However, the literature would suggest that the evolution of the BFCRT from a coalition of

community groups and individuals to the FFCBF, a formal organization, signalled

institutionalization and increased reliance on conventional methods as well as concentration of

resources away from direct action (Puijt, 2003; Piven & Cloward, 1979). Adopting a more

formal structure allowed the FFCBF to negotiate an agreement with CLC to redevelop the site,

but this possibility often led to abandonment of direct action and disruption so that

communication channels could be maintained. For the FFCBF engaging in on-going discussions

with CLC and maintaining the contact became a goal in itself, what Coy and Hedeen (2005) refer

to the as the "paradox of collaboration" and it was reinforced by the "inadvertent friendships"

(Mruphree et al., 1996) that were formed, notably between Green, the President of the FFCBF,

and Archambault, the Vice-President of CLC. The FFCBF repeatedly pulled back from press

conferences, publicity or direct pressure in the hopes of an agreement; something CLC

recognized as an agreement was promised once certain requirements were met. However, these

requirements changed as new goals were set (e.g., a presentation for the minister in June 2000 or

to the CLC board in November 2000) or new information needed (e.g., market study,

confirmation of grants and financing, identification of partners).

In Chapter 4 I discuss the process of co-optation by CLC after the protocol ended and CLC took

over redevelopment in 2002. This I proposed was done to legitimize CLC's position and the

process that would lead to the adoption of its plans. Selznick identifies a second purpose other than legitimization for co-optation, that of "establishing reliable channels for communication and direction" (1980: 14). It could be argued that from 1998 when the BFCRT began its discussions with CLC and sought a partnership, it was co-opted. The benefit for CLC was that it was able to follow, and often control, the activities of the FFCBF. This was done through demands that consumed FFCBF resources, directing the FFCBF away from certain activities and by stalling (e.g., press releases, responses to reports, and meetings). The ongoing discussion with the FFCBF had a further advantage for CLC: in its origins as a coalition of opponents to the CMHC redevelopment, the BFCRT became the main voice of opposition. This allowed other challengers to abandon their actions, a situation similar to that described by Murphree et al. (1996) where the belief in a strong opposition led residents to abdicate their power and halt direct action. Opposition to redevelopment plans became channelled through the BFCRT and FFCBF; the control that CLC was able to exercise over its activities was thereby extended beyond the group itself.

While CLC may be responsible for the FFCBF digression from direct action, the FFCBF was complicit, reflecting in part some of the internal divisions. However it was the abandonment of the goals that had formed the basis and driven the FFCBF that is the most striking.

The first compromise of goals was the relocation of the CLSC onto the site. The discussions had dragged for years as the FFCBF, reluctant to demolish buildings, tried to suggest alternatives, demonstrate the drawbacks of CLSC's favoured location, and design options that would incorporate existing buildings. None were accepted by the CLSC and instead, determined to

relocate on the site, the CLSC mounted its own campaign, and eventually, adopting the strategy used by CMHC, led a proxy battle through veterans against the FFCBF. It was only in the waning days of the protocol that the FFCBF, concerned that it was losing the possibility of developing the site, accepted the CLSC.

However, at that point the FFCBF had already compromised another goal, ceding part of the project to a private developer because financial viability studies were pointing to a projected gap of five million dollars. In this decision the FFCBF became undistinguishable from CLC in its approach (one of the justifications for this was that it would pre-empt CLC, which would do this in any case). By turning over a part of the site, FFCBF was de facto agreeing to the privatization of part of the project, although it was proposed that the CLT structure would be maintained for the whole site.[566]

Financial viability was also the basis of the third compromise; relinquishing some of the social goals to accommodate the objectives of the Chagnon Foundation. While not incompatible with the FFCBF objectives, the Chagnon Foundation was primarily interested in breaking the cycle of poverty and saw Benny Farm as an ideal location for the groups that it prioritized. The FFCBF project on the other hand had targeted a social mix of low and moderate income households, serving the population in NDG that had the most difficulty housing itself. However, the FFCBF agreed to modify its goals in the hope of funding. But beyond the agreement to accept the

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[566] It is not clear whether this would have been followed through. At the same time as the viability study that had revealed a gap, an argument was also made that the CLT model for affordable homeownership, being based on below market prices (due to subsidies, grants, sweat equity, etc.), was not applicable in Benny Farm. There were no subsidies specifically for the affordable homeownership projects proposed, which I believe could have led to abandonment of the CLT model for the developer-led project.

Chagnon Foundation priority populations, the relationship was also subjected to fiscal disciplining (Hackworth, 2007). A condition imposed by the foundation was that the FFCBF abandon strategies of contestation in favour of the more discreet and non-confrontational approach of "sensibilisation" favoured by the foundation. Once again, this time in the hope of funding rather than an agreement with CLC, the FFCBF accepted to abandon direct action and in spite of proposing to find a middle ground between "sensibilisation" and contestation, one of its first decisions was to postpone a press conference.

While each one of these compromises was subject to heated debate within the FFCBF, leading to divisions that continued to the dissolution of the project, these decisions illustrate the difficulty for a community organization to undertake large-scale redevelopment projects. Without public support or funds it is difficult to sustain the long process of negotiations, planning and discussions with organizations such as the CLSC, which, while anchored in the community, was an integral part of provincial delivery of health and social services with resources that far surpassed those of community groups. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) in their observations of the tendering process for European projects conclude that it

> …favors projects that have a sound institutional and organizational basis capable of engaging in the complex tasks of project formulation, lobbying, negotiation, and implementation. This requires not only a set of sophisticated skills, but also significant financial resources, as well as easy access to the centers of power. All of this is usually not available to the weaker social groups and areas in the city, which are consequently falling behind and are dependent on ad hoc measures imposed from above.

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The lack of resources and the access to power made it difficult for the FFCBF to fully develop the project and can explain the concessions made. While it could be argued that the Task Force process allowed CLC to develop a project that reflected community preoccupations, the final decisions, including the critical one of an architectural firm, were taken by CLC. With its control of decisions, ownership of public lands, and access to resources, CLC reinforces the difficulty in developing local alternatives (Leitner et al., 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002).

Nonetheless the concessions made by the FFCBF are also in keeping with other observations of the impact of institutionalization on critical positions (Coy & Hedeen, 2005; DeFilippis, Fisher & Shragge, 2007) and confirms Michel's Iron Law of Oligarchy as the overriding concern for the FFCBF became survival. Control of redevelopment began to take precedence over long-standing objectives and with this, loss of its identity (Puijt, 2003) as key principles, such as opposition to privatization or demolition, were abandoned. Gaining control of the redevelopment of the site, even if it was not the integral project originally proposed by the FFCBF, became the main goal.

Questions can be raised about the lack of accountability within the FFCBF. The lack of resources, combined with the focus on meeting CLC demands, meant that mobilizing future residents was not undertaken. Attempts, such as a Father's Day picnic in 2000 or an invitation to the family of Benny Farm tenants to live on the site, were blocked by CLC, but the FFCBF did not fight hard against this in fear of breaking off discussions with CLC; thereby forgoing the opportunity to publicize and recruit for the project. Partner organizations that represented specific groups such as single mothers or senior citizens had become members of the FFCBF, but future residents, invested in living at Benny Farm, were not present.

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Furthermore, in spite of a serious housing crisis in Montreal, the FFCBF was not able to fully exploit the situation. The accelerating gentrification of inner neighbourhoods of Montreal and the conversion of large rental family housing into condos had resulted in a need for affordable housing that became exacerbated. The situation became highly visible when tenant leases ended on July 1st and families found themselves on the street. In June 2002, at the height of the crisis, the FFCBF held a demonstration in cooperation with the FRAPRU, denouncing the empty units on the site. However this action occurred after the protocol had ended and discussion with CLC had been severed, allowing the FFCBF to act more as a pressure group. This was an exception and for the most part the FFCBF was not closely aligned to housing advocacy groups such as the FRAPRU, due in part to its focus on the development of one project and consequently, as observed elsewhere (Hanley, 2004; Hamel, 1991; Katznelson, 1982), became isolated from broader movements.

Opponents and alternatives to the FFCBF plan

While the conflict with CMHC had been directed at preservation of the housing and resistance to privatization, during the FFCBF period, in particular after the agreement between the FFCBF and CLC was signed, other organizations, notably the CLSC and a group demanding a recreation centre, began to lay claim to the site. The debate about preservation of the buildings evolved from controversy about the architectural value of Benny Farm when CMHC first proposed redevelopment, to the quality of the buildings and the possibility of renovation. The veterans led the opponents who wanted the buildings demolished but belief in the unimportance of the site

and of the buildings was widely shared. City officials, CMHC, and local councillors had referred

to the site as underutilized, with potential for greater use, echoing language used in similar

situations to justify redevelopment (Arena, 2012). Just below the surface of the dispute about the

conservation of the buildings was who these buildings would house. Originally built as modest,

affordable housing, the project had been unwelcome in the neighbourhood. The possibility of

Benny Farm once again being home to modest and low income families was framed by one

CMHC official as creation of a possible ghetto, and by a local politician who spoke of avoiding

another Walkley street. Furthermore, the people who benefited from the original project, the

veterans, insisted that they had not been subsidized and as a subsequent study found, they "did

not see themselves as being in public housing and were not keen on having social housing in

their community" (SPR, 2012:33). Rallying around the CLSC and later the recreation centre, the

veterans, joined by neighbours, veiled their rejection of social housing, letting Searle instead, as

main proponent and spokesperson for the recreation centre, voice hostile comments about social

housing.

As I discussed in Chapter 4, some of the attitude of the veterans can be explained by the

stigmatization of Benny Farm. However their position and that of many opponents of the FFCBF

plans are also a reflection of an ideological bias. Housing policy in Canada favours

homeownership and is supported by governmental policies, rooted in a belief that ownership

"fosters valued behaviors, including responsible citizenship, political participation, and economic

entrepreneurship" (Blomley, 2004:4). The extension of neoliberal ideology reinforced this bias,

as poverty and need were attributed to personal failings, and in a context of "desocialization" of

the social, individuals and family, not the state, were expected to resolve problems. This

underpinned the insistence of veterans that they had not lived in social housing and, in a middle-

class neighbourhood with many homeowners, fueled the opposition to the continuation of the

previous vocation of Benny Farm. Housing needs were denied by statements such as those made

by Searle, that the goal of the FFCBF in providing social housing was to create a ghetto for

people from the outside. [567]

The inclusion of the CLSC and the recreation centre were framed as benefits for the existing

residents of the neighbourhood. The FFCBF had countered the CLSC insistence that the Benny

Farm site was the most convenient for its clients, by arguing that locations would be more

accessible and would not destroy the residential quality of the area, and that one location in

particular, south of Benny Farm, would have the added benefit of helping to revitalize a

commercial street. These arguments were later supported by city urban planners when the CLC

plans were submitted to the city.[568] However, statements such as those made by the CLSC

representative "against the intensification of social housing at Benny Farm"[569] or a representative

of a group in favour of the CLSC and a recreation centre that "L'association prône donc la

démolition complète des bâtiments … pour faire place à leur projet" [570] reveal that beyond

meeting service needs of the local population, there was an objective to demolish the buildings

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[567] Benesaieh, Karim (12 novembre 2002) Jeremy Searle ne veut pas de logements sociaux sur les terrains de Benny Farm *La Presse* p E1
[568] The opinion of the independent architecture and planning committee (Comité ad hoc d'architecture et d'urbanisme) was that a better location for the facilities was Sherbrooke street (Avis donné lors de la réunion du 15 août 2003) and the planning department found the decision to build large-scale facilities in a residential neighbourhood was "questionable" and would have a negative impact on the residents' quality of life (Arrondissement Côte-des-Neiges-Notre-Dame de-Grâce, 02/06/2003 Sommaire décisionnel, CA65.001).
[569] FFCBF Board 17/04/02
[570] Rodrigue, Sébastien Désaccord sur l'avenir de Benny Farm *La Presse* le 8 avril 2002 p. E3

and exclude social housing. Both of these representatives were given a voice as members of the Task Force, and the two projects were integrated into the final CLC plans.[571]

The outcome: what was gained and what was lost

The redevelopment of Benny Farm and the process undertaken by CLC can be viewed as one that allowed a consensus in the community and an end to more than a decade of controversy. The FFCBF, through the process of co-optation that I described in Chapter 4, had some of its goals integrated into the project; a success in that it gained the benefits that were sought (Gamson,1975), demonstrating its "sensitizing impact" (della Porta & Diani, 2006) as CLC included social housing.

However through this process the primacy of private ownership was asserted, and in spite of the quasi-governmental status of CLC, the public aspect of the site or even CLC were rarely acknowledged, denying any collective or public rights to the property.

The "Keynesian artifact" that was Benny Farm was also destroyed. While some buildings were preserved, the design of the site which reflected the ideals of the early 20th century social housing design was eradicated when a local street was extended through Benny Farm, imposing the NDG street grid to the project. Beyond the physical changes, however other vestiges of the post-war welfare state were lost. Benny Farm signified the acknowledgement of housing needs by

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[571] The recreation centre was eventually relocated from the proposed location on the site to a park across the street, but nonetheless the Benny Farm buildings on the original location of the centre were demolished. The decision to relocate the recreation centre was the object of controversy in the neighbourhood because of the loss of the park.

veterans and that the "business of war" had a flip side, that of veterans unable to fully reintegrate into society and in need of continued support. This acknowledgement contradicted a carefully managed image[572] and as with the "rights talk" (Arena, 2012) implicit in public housing, Benny Farm was a reminder that "worthy" people needed housing support. However, in the context of a neoliberal discourse of individual responsibility, this need was largely unrecognized if not refuted.

Thus the physical reminders of the welfare state and of the Benny Farm community's past have been filtered, and to a large extent eradicated, as the "markers of memory" Tallentire (2001) are removed. As with the "commodified public memory" that become the dominant representation of history (Tallentire, 2001), so too the history of Benny Farm has been encapsulated in a plaque commemorating the veterans that was placed on the site[573] and the landscaping, which uses an ornamental orchard as the unifying symbol of the site's agricultural past (CLC, 2003). More recently, reflecting the amenities and "lifestyle options" (Hackworth, 2007; Fraser, 2004) that the project now offers, Benny Farm has been rebranded and is now called "l'Aire Benny".

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[572] For example, this management was revealed in the controversy around the Ottawa's Military Museum exhibition that discussed Canada's participation in World War II bombing of German cities. Objections on the part of veterans to wording of a panel resulted in the museum revising the text, in spite of confirmation by historians that the original text was correct (Picton,, 2009:250)

[573] The plaque was placed by Kathy Milsom, President of CLC in a ceremony during which she explained that CLC "strives to create a lasting legacy in every community in which it does business…This monument is just a small token of our appreciation to the veterans of Benny Farm, for the sacrifices they and their families have made to ensure out freedom." One of the wives, now living in a new unit on the site, was quoted, ""This ceremony, it had to be done. It's the least they could do," she said, adding that moving the veterans had been a traumatic experience for many of them." (Eisner, Marlene (June 12, 2002) Canada Lands unveils monument to honour Benny Farm veterans *The Chronicle – West End Edition* p.3)

Conclusion

Benny Farm illustrates the evolution of the state, and in particular the federal level, in the redevelopment of urban areas. The transition from CMHC to CLC exemplifies the roll-back and roll-out stages of neoliberalism, as redevelopment of Benny Farm went from being primarily driven by the goal of divestment and transferring the property to the private sector to active leadership in defining the process and the outcome. Through this evolution, changes in dealing with community resistance and opposition are also highlighted, as the CMHC approach of ignoring community groups was replaced by discussion and engagement

The FFCBF also demonstrates the inherent difficulty for community organizations to plan and sustain a redevelopment project without funding and support. It also demonstrates how, in a context of insufficient resources, goals can be set aside as the overriding goal becomes survival.

CHAPTER 6   Conclusion

In this dissertation I set out to examine how the role of the state had been transformed in the shift to neoliberalism. In particular I was interested how the changes at the national level would be expressed in urban areas. As well, I was interested to understand how strategies to deal with community opposition had changed. By using the extended case study approach (Burawoy, 2009), I proposed to situate the microprocesses of the redevelopment of Benny Farm in the macroforces of the shift to neoliberalism.

The study of the Benny Farm redevelopment process permits to open a window on a multi-layered process, involving an array of agencies and actors that generally remains obscure. I believe there are two major observations that can be drawn from this study. The first is the role of the national scale. In possession of vast holdings, often consisting of land that is strategically located with functions that are no longer required, the federal level is determinant in the shape that many urban areas will be taking in the future. Through the Benny Farm case study, the evolution of the federal role as it moved from the roll-back to the roll-out phases of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) is revealed. The case study also gives insight into the relationship with the local and provincial levels. The second observation revolves around community groups and their ability to manoeuvre in the new context of the roll-out phase of neoliberalism as quasi-governmental agencies take the lead role in urban development. Beyond the constraints of community organizations such as lack of resources and sustaining mobilization and interest, the approach taken by quasi-governmental agencies when confronted with community resistance is

different from approaches used in the past and in the case of Benny Farm, the community was outmanoeuvered.

The federal level: From roll-back to roll-out

The redevelopment of Benny Farm occurred during the period when the federal government had moved into the roll-back phase of neoliberalism. As discussed in Chapter 2, neoliberalism, while representing changes that are portrayed as "commonsense" (Peck and Tickell, 2002), depends on the active involvement of the state: the roll-back phase has required that the state vigorously engage the destruction of vestiges of the welfare state. Already crown corporations and government activities had been privatized (Cameron, 1997) and selling Benny Farm was a small piece of a much larger progression. As with public housing elsewhere, including recently in Canada (August, 2008), the redevelopment of Benny Farm was part of the removal of "Keynesian artifacts" (Hackworth, 2007) and the "rights talk" that they embodied (Arena, 2012). CMHC's approach, I proposed, epitomized the roll-back phase of neoliberalism; the objective was divestment, and while responsibility to the tenants was acknowledged, this was the only concession made to the community in which Benny Farm was located. Community groups, heritage preservationists, and urban activists had no voice in the future of the site.

The city, a focal point in the process of neoliberalization (Leitner et al., 2007; Harvey, 2005; Swyngedouw, et al., 2002), was especially vulnerable to the promise of redevelopment of Benny Farm. An economic downturn made the potential of increased property tax revenue and employment highly desirable, but it also made the city vulnerable to despotic control (Arena,

2012) as CMHC threatened to withdraw if the zoning changes, allowing it to raze the site and increase heights and density, were denied. This also demonstrated the critical role that the local level plays in supporting redevelopment and maximization of profit: through zoning changes the value of the land would increase immediately.

The transfer of Benny Farm to CLC from CMHC heralded a shift in the state from roll-back to roll-out (Peck and Tickell, 2002) as the focus became not destruction but instead consolidation. Community groups were recognized, in particular the FFCBF, and in this recognition the FFCBF was drawn into a process that would take years, as the community sector was appropriated and CLC adjusted its approach. Initially, local CLC representatives viewed the process no differently from those at CMHC but by 2002, when the FFCBF had been dispensed with, the new approach was evident. Recuperating elements of the work undertaken by the FFCBF, CLC set up a process that was selective, exclusionary, and flexible (Harvey, 2005; Swyngedouw, et al., 2002). Community representatives, including those from the FFCBF, legitimized the process, but in accepting to participate they were expected to compromise their positions while the real power remained with CLC.

The lead role played by CLC in the community consultation process was also indicative of the shift from urban government to governance as the city became an enabler and partner (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002). Unlike the CMHC era, when the city administration was a separate entity, albeit susceptible to threats and to promises of revenue, with CLC the city participated in the process that CLC had defined. The city also spoke the spoke the "language of property"

(Blomley, 2004) as it pleaded limited ability to intervene on behalf of community groups, insisting that ownership overrode other interests.

The changes that accompanied CLC's redevelopment of Benny Farm represent a shift in the role of the federal level in urban development as well as a change in the role of the local level. Benny Farm, a relic of the Canadian welfare state past, had also been an unusual incursion in housing in Montreal. The veterans were a special group that, in their vocal condemnation of post-war conditions, had been relegated to the federal level as provinces and municipalities refused to deal with the aftermath of a war that had been fought by the nation state. Since that period however, provincial governments, especially that of Quebec, had defended their jurisdiction over housing and urban affairs. Furthermore, the restructuring of Quebec municipalities was to make them more capable of competing on the national and global scale. What Benny Farm demonstrates however is the almost nonexistent presence of the provincial government beyond the one attempt made to defend the housing that resulted in a dismissal and spurning of their interference. The municipal level, rather than strengthened by the mergers, was instead thrown into greater turmoil and proved itself incapable of leadership. The federal level was able to move into this vacuum and dominate the process.

In 2003 Wolfe proposed that the federal role played an "enormous" direct role in urban areas through its ownership of properties, noting along with CMHC and the National Capital Commission, CLC and the "key urban sites" it possessed. However, as Benny Farm demonstrates, CLC moved from passive ownership and disposal of properties to active engagement in redevelopment. Benny Farm reveals that as with other quasi-governmental

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agencies, CLC superseded the local level as a "protagonist and manager" of urban

redevelopment (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002), while demonstrating flexibility and adaptability in

its dealings with the local community.

Community groups and their ability to adapt

The second observation of the Benny Farm case revolves around the role of community

organizations and their ability to manoeuvre as the state is reconfigured and roles are redefined.

Some of the issues that were raised in Benny Farm are specific to the neighbourhood, in

particular the middle-class nature of the area and the intrusion of a project that distinguished

itself physically and socially. I proposed that the stigmatization of Benny Farm was a reason why

the tenants became such strong advocates of total demolition, this even after their own housing

had been assured and the debate had moved to the future of the rest of the site. The tenants

vigorously denounced any attempts to save the buildings or to use them for social housing,

denying any similarity between themselves and others who needed subsidized housing. Instead

they defended CMHC's plans to raze the site and later, the CLSC's insistence that it be relocated

on Benny Farm.

As other groups began to lay claim to the site, underlying motivation became obscured. This was

the case for the CLSC. While access to the services that the CLSC offered was important,

especially since it was in a location that was difficult to reach, the alternative site that was

proposed by the FFCBF, just south of the project, was equally as accessible as that on Benny

Farm; in many respects it was a much better planning decision in terms of revitalization of a

commercial area, maintaining the residential integrity of Benny Farm, and a better location for other users of its services who were dependent on public transportation. The insistence on a location on Benny Farm masked that the consequence would be demolition of buildings that could otherwise serve as social housing. Furthermore, the CLSC, while unmoving in its position, remained in the background and let the Benny Farm tenants lead the fight. A similar strategy of a proxy battle was used in the claim for space for a recreation centre. These facilities also represented more demolition and less social housing. However, because the fight was framed as a response to local needs, the underlying rejection of social housing again remained obscured. The exception was city councillor Jeremy Searle who, portrayed as a renegade, was able to voice the refusal of social housing.

The FFCBF proved to be unable to deal with all of these claims. The BFCRT had consolidated opposition to the redevelopment plan, which also allowed them to undertake negotiations with CLC for a community redevelopment process. However, this transition to a formal structure made the group increasingly focused on its own survival (Piven & Cloward, 1979), and isolated (Hanley, 2004; Hamel, 1991; Katznelson, 1982), as critical positions and direct action were abandoned (DeFilippis, Fisher & Shragge, 2007; Coy& Hedeen, 2005; Puijt, 2003). Opposition to the Benny Farm redevelopment became centralized within the FFCBF as other activists fell away, reflecting an abandonment of their power (Murphree et al., 1996). Negotiations and meeting CLC demands consumed the FFCBF resources and distracted them away from mobilization of future residents. This lack of accountability to the real beneficiaries, I propose, was one of the weakest elements of the FFCBF and allowed it to drift into a process of co-optation by CLC and to be unprepared for the virulence of opposition to its plans.

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However, the FFCBF was not alone in this drift as other local organizations, including the NDG Community Council, which participated on the Task Force, and the Friends of Benny Farm, formed in the waning days of the FFCBF, legitimized the CLC process and outcome. The CLC community consultation process was presented as an opportunity for community input, but control was not relinquished and decision-making rested with CLC. As a quasi-governmental agency, CLC had no accountability to the community, beyond what it defined for itself. Operating in the "twilight zone between the state and capital" (Swyngedouw, 2005), there was also little recourse for the community once it had engaged itself in the process: already the municipal administration had recognized the primacy of ownership and as evidenced in the previous decade, was unlikely to take a strong stand in favour of broader community interests.

This case study demonstrates the power of a quasi-governmental agency. With the property it owns and the resources it commands, as well as its ability to adapt to local circumstances, it is a formidable force in Canadian urban development. In many respects, in spite of the experience and expertise it was able to draw upon, the FFCBF was unprepared for the shift in the style of governance that CLC represented. CLC's ability to manoeuvre through the city administration and adapt and use community dissention and resistance underscores its flexibility and efficiency. This case study also highlights how "alternative imaginaries and practices" (Leitner et al., 2007), such as the community controlled process of Milton Parc, are likely to become much rarer and a vestige of another era.

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