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The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process, empirical results in SIC 7300 industry


The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process, empirical results in SIC 7300 industry

Zhang, Yushi (2015) The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process, empirical results in SIC 7300 industry. Masters thesis, Concordia University.

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Institutional investors exert an important influence in the takeover process. Several relationships are identified in this paper. Institutional ownership increases the probability of firms becoming takeover targets. The cross-holders’ (institutional investors owning shares in both acquirers and targets) shares before takeover bids are negatively related to the likelihood of takeover success, offer price and total acquirers’ premiums. Institutional investors and cross-holders achieve insignificant positive excess returns around the announcement period, compared to heavy loss of total acquirer stockholders. Higher excess returns during event window (-1, +1) will raise the possibility that acquiring firms becoming new targets in following three years. The empirical results are derived from 7300 industry (Business Service Industry) from 1985 to 2010.

Divisions:Concordia University > John Molson School of Business > Finance
Item Type:Thesis (Masters)
Authors:Zhang, Yushi
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:M. Sc.
Program:Administration (Finance option)
Date:12 February 2015
Thesis Supervisor(s):Betton, Sandra
Keywords:Key words: Institutional investors; Cross-ownership; Takeovers; Takeover gains
ID Code:979717
Deposited By: YUSHI ZHANG
Deposited On:13 Jul 2015 16:30
Last Modified:18 Jan 2018 17:49


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