*K*omrades to the Rescue: Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2014 through the Lens of *Izvestiia*

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines communist and post-communist press texts, as they are represented in the Russian newspaper *Izvestiia*. Taking a before-and-after approach, two case studies are performed, as well as compared and contrasted. The first examines articles documenting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Using the same newspaper title, the second investigates news coverage of the crisis over Ukraine in 2014. The study employs a Cold War framework to examine and correlate questions about the role and place of journalism *then* and *now*, by exploring both similarities and differences, from an explicitly linguistic angle. Applying a framing approach as a type of Critical Discourse Analysis, not only as a method of research, but also as a broader theoretical framework, the thesis aims to articulate a deeper understanding of the operational realities of Russian journalism and its troubled transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times, as well as to uncover its professional techniques in building imaginaries about Soviet and post-Soviet Russia and Russianness *then* and *now*.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the summer of 1989 Moscow State University hosted a very unusual conference for the times entitled: “Images of the USSR in the United States and the USA in the Soviet Union.” It brought together leading American and Russian journalists and journalism scholars to discuss the implications for the news media of the ending of the Cold War. The forum was seen as an “unparalleled opportunity for scholarly interchange and cooperation” (Dennis, Gerbner & Zassoursky, 1991, p. ix). Its stated goal was to foster mutual understanding and to overcome the bipolar East-West or communist-anti-communist portrayals of a world of enduring enmity.

Many scholars recognized then that, “What people in the USSR know about the United States and vice versa is largely a result of the media and other products of popular culture” (p. vii). As a consequence, all scholars who attended agreed that media images would represent the best barometer of success or failure in dismantling the Cold War legacy and in achieving new political thinking beyond the spirit of hostility. However, along with the optimistic view that a new way of communications was possible, there were some sceptics who doubted that the “war of words” was over (Dennis et al., p. 9).

Twenty-five years later, the sceptics appear to have been proven right. Although tremendous changes occurred in the West over the years, and the fall of Communism in Russia and former Soviet satellites brought a “wind of change” to the East as well, Cold War rhetoric has returned with a vengeance. By 2014, echoes of the old “dichotomized world of Communist and anti-Communist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides” increasingly

defined news practices when the West and Russia came face-to-face (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 30).

The most pressing example is, of course, the conflict in Ukraine where the news media in both camps have become the prime suppliers of persistent threat images about a second or a new Cold War in portraying the strained nature of Russia-US relations. The intensifying fighting in Ukraine, which claimed up to five thousand lives in its first year, has resonated with a growing news media battle of conflicting narratives. If seen as a test for reporting beyond the old Cold War constraints, the vast majority of both Western and Russian news media have failed. The news media not only brought back the Cold War reasoning in its simplest dichotomized understanding, but demonstrated that regardless of the global environment we live in, mastering conflict coverage in black and white strokes still constitutes a powerful news media technique in portraying other countries considered as enemies.

As Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs*, noted in a June 2014 roundtable in Moscow that brought together representatives of leading newspapers from 23 countries – including the *Washington Post*, *Le Figaro*, *China Business News*, and *La Nacion* – "we have come up against the problem of Russian and Western media giving a simplistic interpretation of the serious ethno-cultural and historical problems of Ukraine" (Litovkin, 2014).

The journalistic leaders who attended the roundtable warned that the events surrounding Ukraine have dragged the world into a new information war, even worse than the real Cold War in terms of its emotional and subjective rhetoric. Indeed, from a journalistic standpoint, the events in Ukraine have blurred the difference between facts and editorial opinions resulting in propaganda, distortion, and a great deal of confusion for the public. In this regard, the news

media coverage of Ukraine earns a distinctive place as a mockery of what, in academic terms, are perceived to be fundamental principles of journalism: practices which are informative, objective, critical, seeking of explanations and a challenge to the dominant narrative.

At a time when many of the most important scholarly questions about journalism revolve around issues of crisis or progress – a matter of opinion – due to the challenges brought by the new technological *milieu*, there would be much to be gained, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, from revisiting questions of what journalism *was* or *should be* in theory, and what *it is* in practice. A particular focus on the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian context provides a compelling opportunity to reveal just how far journalism has drifted from its theoretical ideals.

A number of reasons support the argument for a closer scholarly engagement with Russian journalism. As a point of departure, it is worth mentioning its timeliness. Russia and the crisis in Ukraine have dominated international news coverage, at this writing, for almost two years. Furthermore, the actions of Vladimir Putin at the head of the Russian State have revived the Cold War narrative *in* Russia and *about* Russia as never before. A detailed examination of the way the narrative has played out in the Russian context would produce a more fruitful understanding of what journalists in Russia are facing in their everyday work, why many of them prefer to leave the country and work from abroad, and finally what is going on in Putin's Russia as a whole.

More specifically, the study supporting this thesis uses the Cold War framework to examine, compare and contrast communist and post-communist press texts, as reflected in the Russian newspaper *Izvestiia*. It investigates questions about the role and place of journalism *then* and *now,* by exploring both similarities and differences, from an explicitly linguistic angle, applying Framing and Critical Discourse analysis (CDA) not only as a method of research, but

also as a broader theoretical framework. The basic premise is that language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of political and sociocultural changes. Therefore, the language deployed in press texts correlates with the progress or retrogression of Russian journalism since Communist times.

To draw both communist and post-communist journalism perspectives into a dialogue, the thesis contrasts and compares press texts from two case studies. First, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which took place in the midst of the *real* Cold War and second, the crisis over Ukraine in 2014 referred to as a *second* or a *new* Cold War.[1]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20-21, 1968, when the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact invaded the country in order to stop the liberalisation reforms, known as the Prague Spring. The reform movement began in January 1968, after the reformist Alexander Dubček was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring reforms were an attempt by Dubček to give his country what had become known as "socialism with a human face;" in other words, to grant his country civil rights such as the abolition of censorship and freedom of expression – that were unthinkable under the Soviet notion of socialism (Williams, 1997).

The invasion successfully stopped the reforms and strengthened the positions of the conservatives within the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, who strictly followed the line imposed by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and its doctrine. This Brezhnev Doctrine, also known as Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty, concerned the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It

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[1] See, for example Davidoff, V. (2014, July 20). Russians Will Suffer in Putin's New Cold War. *The Moscow Times*. Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russians-will-suffer-in-putins-new-cold-war/503782.html; Shuster, S. (2014, July 24). Cold War II. The West is losing Putin's dangerous game. *TIME magazine*. Front Page.

was announced in September 1968 and was published by the communist flagship newspaper *Pravda*.[2] In brief, it was designed to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as the right to intervene in other communist nations whose actions threatened the common values of the Soviet bloc. Designed as a doctrine of "political love," it demanded trust and sincerity (Williams, 1997, p. 36).

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine followed mass civil unrest in February 2014, which led to the ouster of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who had refused to sign an agreement of rapprochement with the European Union. In March, several regions in Eastern Ukraine were occupied by pro-Russian activists. While the protests in Ukraine escalated, on March 16, a questionable referendum on the status of Crimea took place. Following the referendum, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine and requested that it become part of Russia. Two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty in Moscow making Crimea part of the Russian Federation. In a televised address to the nation, Putin said he had corrected an "historical injustice" and had protected Russia's national interests.[3]

Putin's words provoked severe reactions among Western leaders who univocally condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea. As a result, NATO suspended its cooperation with Russia, and the G8 summit, scheduled to take place in June 2014 in Sochi, was canceled. In fact, the summit of the world's leading industrialized nations was held in G7 format, making it the first in decades to occur without Russian participation. In July, the tension over Ukraine escalated after the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 near the Ukrainian-Russian border.

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[2] Суверенитет и интернациональные обязанности социалистических стран [Sovereignty and International Responsibilities of Socialist Countries]. (1968, September 26). *Pravda*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.
[3] Ukraine Crisis: Putin Signs Russia-Crimea Treaty (2014, March 18). *BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062.

The United States, backed by several European countries, strengthened the economic sanctions it had imposed earlier on Russia. In retaliation, Moscow ordered a full embargo on food imports from the EU, US and a number of other Western countries. The conflict in Ukraine – and over Ukraine – is considered the most serious conflict between Russia and what the news media usually refer to as the West (the US and its NATO allies) since the end of the Cold War.

The analysis of the aforementioned case studies aims to articulate a deeper understanding of the operational realities of Russian journalism and its troubled transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times; to debate Russian journalistic values and professional techniques, similarities and differences *then* and *now;* to discuss the applicability of the Western liberal criteria of what journalism *should be* to that reality; and to draw specific attention to how the new Cold War narrative, as mobilized by pro-Kremlin journalists, draws on today's Russian culture – through specific rhetorical devices, metaphors and other techniques – to build contemporary nation-state narratives.

In addition, this thesis seeks to measure the degree to which post-Soviet Russian journalism has changed since Soviet times and, by doing so, to revisit some of the perpetual themes in journalism studies. Among them, the role of journalists in constructing images in the public's perception of other societies; the interplay between journalism and propaganda; and the connection between language, power, journalistic texts and the broader sociocultural context.

More precisely, the analysis explores the idiosyncrasies of Soviet Cold War and Russian post-Cold War discourses as reflected in *Izvestiia* in portraying two key events of the *old* and *new* Cold War. The basic premise is that language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of political and sociocultural change. Therefore, the analysis of pro-Kremlin press texts aids in a broader understanding of the way Russian journalism works, while providing evidence of its

day-to-day professional traits, values, and importance with regard to the broader political and sociocultural processes that take place in post-Soviet Russia.

In fact, this thesis makes the case that the pro-Kremlin press coverage of Ukraine, as reflected in *Izvestiia*, sets back Russian journalism to its Soviet roots wherein the purpose of journalism was the "transmission and periodical dissemination of information through mass communication channels aimed at propaganda and agitation" (Vartanova, 2012, p. 136). It argues that Cold War and post-Cold War discursive practices of the Soviet and post-Soviet pro-Kremlin news media provide empirical evidence – through language and journalistic texts – about the continuity of the old Soviet traditions as mobilized through discourses, rhetorical practices, and political agendas in Russia today. Thus, the Cold and post-Cold War news media discourses provide a related opportunity to uncover not only what the features of these discourses are, but also to shed some light on the role and place of journalists in Russia today, almost three decades after the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* or *openness*, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the ensuing collapse of the Communist regime.

The following four research questions are of particular interest in this line of inquiry:

- *What types of discursive frames can be identified in Izvestiia, past and present, by comparing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Russian intervention in Ukraine?*
- *Once identified, can discursive similarities be traced between 1968 and 2004?*
- *How do the past and the present discourses build, theoretically, nation-state narratives?*

- *Finally, what can these frames, similarities, and narratives tell us about the transformation of Russian journalism since 1989 – the year when the old Soviet regime, ostensibly, came to an end?*

Both case studies are used to substantiate the hypothesis that despite the collapse of the Soviet Communist regime in 1989 and the consequent political, social and economic changes that occurred in Russia and Soviet satellites in Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet past still guides the rhetorical and discursive intentions of the contemporary Russian regime. Of greater importance, the pro-Kremlin press today still serves as an important ideological and propaganda tool validating political decisions and feeding post-Cold War discourses in order to build contemporary Russian nation-state narratives and imaginaries. The rhetoric and discursive constructions have been aided and abetted by new technologies of dissemination. That is, the use of the Internet has made it easier for state-generated discursive constructions to circulate, and such circulation gives the state the appearance of being more "modern" than it really is. As this study aims to demonstrate, however, content remains patterned after the old Soviet communication strategies.

Indeed, the pro-Kremlin news media discourse provides a "regime of truth" – in the Foucauldian sense of the word – which, when disseminated repeatedly over time, becomes hegemonic in reinterpreting history, symbols, and even language to suit specific political interests and to justify political decisions. The Cold War framework, hence, is applied here as a useful tool to demonstrate the way in which this regime of truth operates in the Russian context, particularly when it comes to marshalling public opinion for or against a particular cause.

Izvestiia was selected as a primary source for analysis, first and foremost, because of its pro-Kremlin line and because of its existence during both Soviet and post-Soviet times. Because of this continuity, *Izvestiia* represents a useful means of contrasting and comparing the transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet way of doing journalism and framing the Kremlin's regime of truth. It also represents a unique "before-and-after" snapshot of discursive methods.

Usually translated as *News* or *Reports*, *Izvestiia* was established as the organ of the Supreme Soviet in 1917, and along with *Pravda* – the organ of the Central Party Committee – was regarded as the voice of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in the USSR. Over the years following the fall of the Communist regime, *Pravda* was relegated to a minor role. *Izvestiia,* however*,* which dropped its official function, is still regarded as a leading national broadsheet. It is considered a newspaper of repute, attracting a more educated readership (Voltmer, 2000, p. 474). Currently, the newspaper is owned by the *National Media Group* controlled by the St. Petersburg-based *Bank Rossiia*, whose co-owner, Yurii Kovalchuk, gained control in recent years over most big Russian media companies. Kovalchuk is considered to be a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin. In this regard, it is not too big a stretch to claim that – in a system where loyalty is rewarded and enmity crushed – *Izvestiia* packages the news in accordance with the Kremlin's political agenda. Therefore, by studying the newspaper's discursive practices, features of the Kremlin's dominating views in two historically different periods are also likely to be revealed.

With this in mind, a series of questions occur: Why is this important? Why should the Western world care about how the Kremlin manipulates language for political ends? What is journalistic about this kind of production? How does it differ from propaganda? These are all questions that this thesis will discuss and address.

It is worth mentioning again that Russia has been in the news literally every day over the last two years. Putin's Russia and the conflict over Ukraine have attracted international attention and brought back questions not only about the Soviet-*style* of Putin's autocratic ambitions, but also about the old propagandist ways of doing journalism and politics. To explain why we should care about Russia, Sun Tzu's (1910) famous quote from *The Art of War* offers insight:

> If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. (…) If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle (p. 45).

Drawing on Sun Tzu's strategy, if the war of words over Ukraine is seen metaphorically, as a battle between two narratives – Western and Russian – then it should be very useful, from the Western perspective, to know more about what's going on in the Russian camp, to be able to read or think about something that usually remains hidden from the Western eye.

Furthermore, to understand the internal Russian narrative is to gain a window onto a world that is normally superseded by Russian media designed for external consumption, that is to say produced in English for international audiences in publications such as *Russia Today*, *Sputnik*, and *Russia Beyond the Headlines*. The content of these publications differs significantly, in terms of discourse, from the content crafted for internal consumption – for Russian people, in Russian. If the former's primary goal is to present Russia in a positive light to the world, internally circulated media reports have different purposes. Namely, they are the real centerpiece of Russia's persuasive soft power in helping to justify particular political decisions.

Beyond that, they are the primary tool for Russian President Vladimir Putin to maintain hegemonic control over the Russian imagination and to keep his status as a strong leader and protector of what is considered to be the core of Russianness. Hence, the pro-Kremlin news media, produced in Russian for Russians, deserve serious attention.

In addition, news reports crafted for internal consumption are much more vibrant, in terms of discourse and rhetorical devices, than their external counterparts. As a matter of professional and academic journalistic curiosity, it is tempting to know more about the way they represent the events in Ukraine, and are likely to represent events in other contested areas of conflict. Besides that, the analysis of a newspaper like *Izvestiia,* which is one of the oldest Russian newspapers, can be seen as a way to understand at first hand the frames and discursive *aperçus* of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian journalism; to contrast and compare their similarities or differences.

Ultimately, an analysis of communist and post-communist Russian press texts furthers a critical perspective regarding journalism and its vocation as a central component of an effective public sphere and civil society in democratic states (Russia is considered a democratic state, according to its 1993 Constitution), by demonstrating the importance of social and historical contextualization.[4] By turning the focus on Russia, such an analysis aims to discuss not only the status of journalism in Russia today, as revealed throughout *Izvestiia*'s texts, but to reflect on the way that Western standards referred to as liberal approaches in the practice of contemporary journalism, contradict or overlap with certain Russian principles of what the profession stands for.

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[4] Конституция Российской Федерации [Constitution of the Russian Federation]. Retrieved from http://www.constitution.ru/.

In general, it can be argued that in writing about Russian journalism, the conventions of a Western understanding impose upon the subject an aspect that does not belong to it. In spite of the criticisms that have accrued to the seminal *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956) this classic of journalism studies remains the major point of reference for a significant number of authors trying to tackle post-Soviet Russian journalism. As a result, most attempts by Western critics to explain the Russian example, even with contemporary modifications, retain the old ideological dichotomy between East and West, creating further ideological conflicts and mutual misunderstanding.

As noted by Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White (2009) in their analysis of normative theories of the press and journalism in democratic societies, both journalism and democracy today are challenged. The old patterns of "the overarching framework of the Cold War" are confronted by the new challenges provided by the new reality: new technologies, the Internet, and the collapse of the Communist regime in Russia (p. 15).

Again, the enduring question occurs: Did the new reality tangibly change the way journalism is done, in terms of its rhetorical and discursive manifestation, when it comes to the *new* Cold War? As this thesis aims to demonstrate, the answer is no. But it also aims to demonstrate that different models of doing journalism are shaped by different political, economic and cultural factors. To make sense of what Russian journalism *is* requires critical scrutiny and contextualization. By offering an understanding of *Izvestiia*'s reporting in both Communist and post-Communist times, this thesis aims to instigate critical reasoning among readers. What are the implications of Soviet and post-Soviet journalistic practices for democratic communication? Are they applicable to the "professional" criteria as understood by Western practitioners and vice versa? By providing specific examples evaluated within their social and historical contexts, the

study intents to show how different modes of journalism, typically labelled as “Soviet” and “post-Soviet” are articulated, how they complement or contradict each other.

On a personal note, my own origins and experience have led me to this study. As an Eastern European born in Bratislava; raised in Bulgaria and Russia; as one who witnessed the fall of Communism in 1989 and the enthusiasm for democracy it brought; and as one who is currently completing a research-oriented master’s program in journalism studies in Montreal, this study carries particular meaning. My life experience, divided between East and West, combined with professional experience as a journalist, and the perspective of distance obtained in Canada, provoked a keen interest in seeking to understand what exactly has changed (or not) in the way the pro-Kremlin news media in Russia portrays the world, twenty-five years after the fall of Communism. In this sense, the conflict in Ukraine and the reminders of the old communist past it has rekindled, has provided both a framework and a starting point for this research. Moreover, the ability to speak and understand Russian affords an opportunity to not only read original journalistic texts, prescribed for internal Russian consumption, but to go beyond the texts to grasp the symbolic discursive meaning of the messages which usually remains hidden to the Western eye.

In practical terms, the goal of this analysis is to enrich the perceived de-Westernizing paradigm in journalistic and media research. As Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009) assert, by internationalizing the world of journalism studies, and by bringing different voices and new perspectives to the conversation, journalism studies could be expected to contribute to debates beyond the disciplines of journalism, media and communication studies.

For this reason, this thesis takes the position that Soviet and post-Soviet news media still remain a blind spot in comparative journalism studies. While the focus on Russia to illustrate

some of the key issues in de-Westernizing paradigm is primarily chosen for personal reasons – motivated by the author's personal background and research interests – such a focus can also be justified in terms of correcting its relative minor position within the broader debates on how journalism is defined beyond the dominant Anglo-American perceptions. A comparative study of communist and post-communist Russian journalism, as manifested in press texts, illustrates the contested nature of professional ideologies and values such as objectivity and truth-telling considered to be guiding lights for both Western and post-Soviet Russian journalism. In this regard, what Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009) call "the othering" of non-Western journalism, can rethink some of the established categories of the Western journalism itself.

Last but not least, this thesis comes exactly twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this symbolic light, it is worth to scrutinizing the changes – and lack therein – of Russia and other post-Soviet countries through the lens of language and journalistic texts, and to explore the viability of news media images, attitudes, and values associated with the old division of the world in contemporary reality. Drawing on the Russian context, can we talk about a successful transition of the news media from the communist model to what we see today? This is a valuable question that requires an answer because its amplifications go beyond journalism. It affects policies, perceptions, and ultimately people.

As Tatyana Lisova, editor-in-chief of the Russian newspaper *Vedomosti* commented in a recent television interview: "The most dangerous thing that has happened this year [2014] in the Russian media is not the neutralization of the independent media but these seeds of hostility that have been sown among our people. For political reasons, Russian state media has spent a whole

year appealing to people's emotions, spreading fear and anger, particularly in critical moments connected with Crimea and Ukraine."[5]

As Dennis et al. (1991) observed almost twenty-five years ago, in *Beyond the Cold War: Soviet and American Media Images*, media images would be – in the years to come – the best barometers of success or failure in dismantling the Cold War legacy and in achieving new political thinking beyond the spirit of hostility. Twenty-five years after the official dismantling of the ideologically bipolarized world, it is worth exploring what the news barometers indicate for past and present.

To do so, the discussion in the following chapters is organized as follows. Chapter Two introduces the literature surrounding the topics of the thesis. To explore the specifics of the Cold War reality, as created by *Izvestiia* in the Soviet context, and then to apply the findings to contemporary Russia, the study mobilizes a wide range of scholarship concerning two distinctive themes. The first focuses on Cold War discourse, the Soviet notion of journalism, and its propaganda techniques. It aims to trace the historical context and the background for further discussion. It also endeavours to expose communist values hidden in Cold War narratives. A second theme then looks at the scholarship surrounding post-Soviet news media discourses and the Soviet legacy as it pertains to and influences journalism in today's Russia.

The third chapter introduces and justifies the method of analysis – a framing approach as a type of Critical Discourse Analysis – applied here as a methodology, but also as a broader theoretical frame. It explains in detail the way the study is done level-by-level, by addressing and deploying theoretical frames. It answers both the *how* and the *why* of the study.

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[5] Media Trends to Watch in 2015, *Al Jazeera*, *Listening Post*. Broadcasted on January 3, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2015/01/media-trends-watch-2015-20151112114594498-201513102935996183.html.

Chapter Four is devoted to explanations and discussion of the study's findings, an expression of the compare-and-contrast approach that emerges from the before-and-after analysis of *Izvestiia*. By implicating direct quotations from the newspaper, translated from Russian, it provides *the evidence* in support of the thesis. It traces out the frames and broader discourses, as mobilized within the Cold War framework, from both 1968 and 2014, in order to build closing arguments in the concluding chapter.

The closing chapter draws final conclusions based on the research questions and the findings, to support the validity of the thesis and point the way to further exploration in the largely unmapped continent of contemporary Russian news media. It considers the applicability of the Western perspective in journalism studies to the Russian one, as evidenced by the findings, in order to produce stronger arguments and to place the findings within a broader sociocultural context. It incorporates the positive findings of the study, but also reveals potential shortcomings: areas where further study might be warranted.

Chapter 2

Doing Journalism *Then* and *Now*

Most scholarship about Cold War discourses explores the Western perspective toward Russia. Comparatively little scholarship has been done in English with regard to the idiosyncrasies of Russian discourse itself, especially after Stalin, i.e. the mid-1950s, and especially within the Cold War framework. Furthermore, from the Western perspective, original research in Russian is particularly scarce because of the language barrier. This thesis, therefore, intends to fill a particularly important gap in the scholarship by discussing discursive formations, from the Russian perspective, in order to understand how news media discourses are developed from within the Russian sphere of influence.

In addition, there have been a great number of works on Russian media-power dynamics and its effects on journalism and democratization processes. A limited number of studies, however, concentrate their efforts on the qualitative analysis of press texts, actual reporting, media discourse, and the language of Soviet and post-Soviet news media as signifiers for political and sociocultural change. As Svitlana Malykhina (2014), Professor in Russian at the University of Massachusetts observes:

> Until recently, most studies of post-socialist media have taken a non-comparative perspective to focus primarily on the media's ideological message and the freedom of the media from government control. Studies have also considered the impact of media ownership on media independence and pluralism, as well as the crucial role

of economic reforms and new legislation in media transformation. Few studies have examined the actual reporting carried out by the media (p. 13).

Similarly, in his analysis of the language of the press in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, Von Seth (2011) demonstrates that comparatively little research has been dedicated to textual analysis of the role of Russian and the Soviet newspapers in the democratization process. “While there have been numerous important works on the Russian media politics front and journalism,” writes Von Seth, “… and studies on broadcast media performance, especially during national elections … the qualitative focus on press texts exploring how democratic values can be linked to media discourse is virtually absent” (p. 55). A crucial aim of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to a deeper appreciation of the link between democratic values and circulated discourses in the Russian context.

To explore the specifics of the Cold War reality, as created by *Izvestiia* in the Soviet context, and then to apply the findings to contemporary Russia, this thesis mobilizes a wide-ranging discussion of scholarship concerning two distinctive themes.

The first theme contextualizes Cold War discourse: the Soviet notion of journalism and its propaganda techniques. It aims to trace the historical context and the background in order to lay the groundwork for a more contemporary exploration. It also endeavors to expose communist values hidden in Cold War narratives. The second theme looks at the post-Soviet news media discourse and the Soviet legacy as it pertains to and influences journalism in Russia today.

In his introduction to the book *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, Martin J. Medhurst (1990) defines the Cold War as “by definition, a rhetorical war, a war fought

with speeches, pamphlets, public information (or disinformation), campaigns, slogans, gestures, symbolic actions, and the like" (p. xiv). In other words, Medhurst addresses such rhetoric as "the issue" of the Cold War rather than a peripheral outcome of the underlying tension between East and West. In Medhurst's view, such rhetoricity constituted the central substance of the ideological conflict and for this reason was (and remains) in need of serious attention:

> Cold War, like its 'hot' counterpart, is a contest. It is a contest between competing systems as represented, for example, by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a contest involving such tangibles as geography, markets, spheres of influence, and military alliances, as well as such intangibles as public opinion, attitudes, images, expectations, and beliefs about whatever system is currently in ascendancy. The contest, in other words, is both material and psychological in nature (p. 19).

As Walter Lippmann observed as early as 1922 in *Public Opinion*, "public opinion" itself could be seen as a constructed, manufactured phenomenon, to be shaped and manipulated by those with an interest in doing so. Lippmann identified the rise of a new professional class of "press agents," functioning in the place of journalists, standing between political organisations and media institutions, manipulating public opinion, and creating what the author referred to as a "pseudo-environment" (p. xvii).

During the Cold War, these agents were assigned the task of navigating and manipulating, in Medhurst's (1990) words, "the tokens used in the contest" – namely, rhetorical discourse. Cold War discourse was "discourse intentionally designed to achieve a particular goal with one or more specific audience" (p. 19). Cold War discursive "weapons" were "words,

images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert means" (p. 19).

Dennis et al. (1991) agreed, writing that the Cold War was first and foremost a "war of words," where mostly negative images of the Other prevailed on both sides. As a consequence, both the US and the Soviet Union strictly controlled journalists and followed a policy that "did little to foster a free flow of information" (p. 5). The use of key, specific, and particular words mobilized against the idea of the Other was seen as the nucleus of Cold War mass communication techniques, along with visual and other ideological instruments (such as movies, posters, symbols) generated by both countries in the conflict for the purposes of propaganda.

Propaganda, as the prominent American political sociologist Harold Lasswell (1927) defines it with respect to techniques used by the Americans, British, French and Germans in World War I, and as it is understood for the purposes of this thesis, represents "the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, so to speak, more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures, and other forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned with the management of opinions and attitudes" (p. 9). Placed within the context of the Cold War, propaganda exerted its functions in correlation to a specific ideology serving Soviet purposes and opposing Communist (Marxist-Leninist) versus Western (liberal) ideals for world construction. Seen from a Marxist viewpoint, the term "ideology" can be understood as communication for the ruling ideas of the ruling class. Ideology, in this regard, encompasses partiality or particular interests embraced or concealed by a particular formulation (Medhurst, 1990, p. 131).

It is worth noting, however, that the Soviet notion of propaganda differs significantly from the Western perception of the term. Even today, more than twenty-five years after the end

of the ideological Cold War, propaganda, as defined by the *Oxford Dictionary*, represents "the information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view."[6] The *Dictionary of the Russian Language* defines it as "spreading in society an explanation of ideas, thoughts, knowledge or learnings."[7] The difference in the definitions is quite profound, as is the perception of different types of ideologically constructed worldviews and the role of journalists in them, as applied to Eastern and Western perspectives. If, in the former, journalists perceive their role as educators, the latter has the connotation of biased or misleading information.

To achieve its goals, ideology, understood as communication for the ruling ideas of the ruling class, also necessitates corresponding propaganda techniques. In the context of Soviet journalism, such rhetorical techniques included "empty signifiers," slogans, collectivisations, pejoratives, metaphors, and presuppositions in depicting the perceived – or manipulated – reality (Malykhina, 2014; Pasti, 2005; Voltmer, 2000). In terms of journalistic style, the language used was usually elevated and abstract; openly biased; empathetic and emotionally rich; and employed linguistic strategies such as irony or ambiguous formulations to produce arguments (Von Seth, 2011; Voltmer, 2000). Examining the interplay between rhetoric and ideology in his analysis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the American sociologist C. Wright Mills observes:

> Rhetoric and ideology limit choices and guide the decisions of men [and women]. For [they] are influenced in their use of the powers they possess, by the rhetoric they feel they must employ, and by the ideological coin in which they transact

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[6] Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/propaganda.
[7] Русский словарь Ожегова [Russian Dictionary of Ozhegov]. Retrieved from http://slovarozhegova.ru/word.php?wordid=24693.

> affairs with one another. The leaders as well as the led, even the hired mythmakers and hack apologists, are influenced by their own rhetoric of justification and the ideological consolidation that prevails (Mills, 1962, p. 27).

In *Newspeak: The Language of Soviet Communism*, the French historian Françoise Thom (1989), drawing on Orwell's idea of *newspeak* which represents a language created by a fictitious totalitarian state, refers to the language of the Soviet regime as newspeak or *langue de bois* (a wooden language). Thom stresses that the political language of the Soviet state performed as an antithesis to the "classical good style," as represented by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (p. 47). As Thom explains it, the expression *langue de bois* describes any politicized idiom or style obfuscated by jargon (p. 14). In itself, *newspeak* is wholly vague, full of abstractions and tautology, and avoids precision. It is wooden because it does not convey any real content, and it is identical in content no matter the author or the subject. Each proposition unfolds a bias, while notions of time and aggression pervade the language. As Thom also points out, "the structure of communist texts is in itself as much a cliché as the figures of speech it carries" (p. 54). Communist *langue de bois*, therefore, represents, "a unique and vivid example of a language which cut itself off from thought, but has not died of the split; it has not died because it is artificially kept alive by totalitarian political power or by the ideology that envelops it" (p. 57).

For decades the discursive weapons of the Cold War and Soviet newspeak were employed by appointed journalists-press agents, or so-called *publicists*, who in turn divided the world along the ideological lines of East versus West, in a reflection of the strained nature of United States-Soviet Union relations. This struggle was couched within corresponding yet ideologically charged communication as a way of achieving the aforementioned goals. Such communication was constructed through the creation of enemy images. It was partial, distorted,

and exaggerated, and "intended to influence the political environment and mobilise public opinion behind certain specific policies" (McNair, 2011, p. 180). Ultimately, it served the goals of propaganda.

In accordance with its propaganda functions, as De Smaele (2010) points out, "newspaper distribution was 'planned' from the top down: 'A Soviet citizen cannot simply buy or subscribe to the paper of his choice; he receives the paper that is specified for him according to plan'" (p. 48). There were obligatory subscriptions according to Party membership, or working position. Thus, "the 'most boring' newspapers (such as *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*) were distributed in high numbers while the more popular ones (such as *Vechernaya Moskva* or *Sovetskii Sport*) circulated in reduced numbers" (De Smaele, 2010, p. 48). Information, as De Smaele points out, "was one of the most sought after commodities and therefore in high demand" (p. 48).

According to the Soviet communist theory of the press, as discussed by Siebert et al. (1956), the role of journalists in Soviet Russia was to serve as collective agitators, propagandists, and organizers on behalf of the Communist Party. In this regard, the press was seen, along with other instruments of coercion, as an integral part of state power and party influence, as an instrument for unity, revelation and social control. The role of journalists as collective propagandists, agitators, and organizers was to follow the Party's ideological "Right Line" and to propagate its views of "socialist construction" (p. 144).

After the October revolution of 1917, the press in Soviet Russia became part of the state institutional apparatus, and the job of journalists was to convey, interpret and represent reality in accordance with the "Socialist perspective, with the result that 'truth' in reporting had nothing to do with objectiveness" (Von Seth, 2011, p. 54). The task of the press, as Von Seth notes, became

to legitimize the political system. In Foucauldian terms, the role of journalists in Soviet Russia was to propagate the socialist "regime of truth." As Foucault (1980) observes:

> Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (p. 131).

In the Soviet context, the regime of truth could be reinterpreted as the regime of the Kremlin's truth, since the newspeak of the state suggested neither deviation from, nor contradiction against the Kremlin's dominant views. Journalists in the pro-Kremlin news media, then, acted more as propagandists for the only possible truth, rather than as dispassionate observers and critics. Any criticism seemed impossible, any deviation from the "Right line" – punishable.

In order to survive, the regime of Soviet truth (which lasted more than 70 years) created its own methods of control. As Alexey Tikhomirov (2013) observes, one was through violence and terror, while another was based on the interplay between *trust* and *distrust* (p. 80). What Tikhomirov calls a regime of Soviet "forced trust" was based on simultaneously generating faith in the central power – by setting up channels for distributing it – and simultaneously maintaining a high level of generalized distrust (p. 80). This regime of forced trust "enabled emotional mobilization of the population and

establishment of discipline in order to create a multi-layered social differentiation of the population, dividing it into 'friends' and 'enemies'" (p. 80).

Conversely, the regime of forced trust "gave the individual a chance to escape from the oppressive feeling of distrust of the state and party, which offered a guarantee of protection and security, as well as access to material and symbolic resources for normalizing daily life" (Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 80). Thus, "forced trust was based on an "ethical-moral codex of honour that joined the state and the population together through bonds of mutual obligations, duty ay the rule of law, civil rights and well-functioning institutions" (p. 80).

Paraphrasing the general belief that "a society cannot exist without trust," Tikhomirov argues that the political order in Soviet Russia could not exist without distrust:

> Distrust formed a system of coordinates with its harsh rules of behaviour and rhetoric, cruel methods of control and oversight and its singular practices of inclusion and exclusion (…) In the formation of Soviet society's political and social order, distrust was a key factor in making and conserving the emotional bonds between people and state (…) stigmatizing the 'others' in order to maintain the emotional regime of forced trust. Societies of distrust have a much greater potential for mobilizing the population negatively – using images of 'enemies' – in the state's interests (p. 83).

The binary notions of *trust* and *distrust* were mobilized in perpetual motion by well-established networks for control where journalists played a crucial role. These networks "regulated everyday life and produced the feeling that the existing order was accountable and predictable and was working well" (p. 84). Ironically, distrust became the mobilizing frame for Soviet society and crucial tool for submission to its artificially constructed regime of truth.

Correspondingly, "the new regime demanded a renunciation of the rhetoric of the monarchy and a search for a new language for communication between society and the regime" (Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 89). As a result, the pre-Revolutionary concept of "the people" was transformed into "Soviet citizens" to semantically charge the individual with rights, obligations, and involvement into politics (p. 89). To further obtain the desired results, journalists resorted to what Tikhomirov refers to as a "dramaturgy of trust" or rhetorical practices such as publications of letters to the leaders, greetings such as "Dear," biographical sketches, and specific emotional connectors aiming to build emotional bridges between the public and their leaders (p. 93). The propagated idea of fraternity and common family was another powerful tool for meaning construction (p. 93).

As Becker (1999) also observes in his book on Soviet and Russian press coverage of the United States, the press in the Soviet Union was an instrument used to help the Communist Party to build Communism. It was a press "dominated by totalitarian discourse and committed to ideological struggle" (p. 2). It served as the prime instrument for the Party's "social engineering" aiming to build *Homo Sovieticus* (p. 19). During the years of the Cold War – in particular under Gorbachev's predecessors Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko – the ideological war with the West was seen as its dominant priority (p. 30).

The Cold War prescribed additional tasks to the propagandist function of Russian journalism – namely, the construction of the enemy image. It suggested an opposition between two identities – the Self (as the hero) and the Other (the enemy as the villain). However, it should be noted that such a construction was characteristic of the Western depictions of the Soviet Union as well.

The Us versus Them opposition could be pinpointed as a dominating feature of Cold War discourse, from both Eastern and Western perspectives. As Stein (1989) suggests in his study of enemy images in American-Soviet relations, the two ideologically constructed adversaries were locked in a permanent "dance" (p. 480). The same author refers to the enemy images as "a cultural pair" and notes that self-definition was impossible without reference to the other (p. 480). The image of the enemy, therefore, was a fundamental, "recurrent feature of a group's own internal self-regulation" (p. 480). It gave politicians the power to persuade and manipulate people, in both the Eastern and Western spheres of influence, "without resorting to physical force" (Hazan, 1982, p. 5).

The construction of the enemy image, from a Western point of view, is evident in Herman and Chomsky's (2002) propaganda model. This model argues that the US news media used the ideology of anti-Communism to filter information and to frame Communism as "the ultimate evil" (p. 29). The enemy image served as a political-control mechanism in order to mobilize the population against an imagined threat or to serve domestic power interests.

This is also illustrated in Entman's (1991) study on the narratives of the Korean Flight 007 (KAL) and Iran Air Incidents. It reveals the double standard in news reporting by showing that US news media portrayed the US downing of an Iranian plane in 1988 as a technical problem. In contrast, the 1983 Soviet downing of Korean Air Flight 007 was depicted as a

"brutal massacre" and the result of a "cold-blooded barbarous attack" (p. 22). Entman contends that such portrayals are illustrative of "the Cold War frames imposed on international affairs" (p. 7). McNair (2011) also observes that the Cold War furnished the US and other Western countries, for most of the twentieth century, with an enemy or a threat posed by this enemy. Expressed in military or moral terms, it was frequently invoked in the service of domestic politics (p. 175).

Representing the other side of the ideological struggle, the United States was constituted, as Becker (1999) contends, as the most important Other in the Soviet self-definition (p. 3). According to Becker, "the capitalist enemy played such a central role in Soviet thinking and discourse that changing images of the US reflect the process of breakdown of the officially imposed ideology and a re-evaluation of Soviet identity" (p. 4).

Soviet journalists-propagandists resorted to supplementary Cold War propaganda techniques as well. Four of the most prominent, as defined by Barukh Hazan (1982) in his book on the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, were *polarization*, *differentiation*, *flattery* and *sarcasm* (p. 161). The *polarization* technique involved describing an issue as black or white, identifying "the forces of evil" and "forces of good" pinpointing the enemies, and connecting the issue in question with much broader universal principles and ideas (Hazan, 1982, p. 161). The *differentiation* technique adapted the propaganda message to specific characteristics, customs, circumstances or traditions. For example, covering the US boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980, *Radio Moscow* referred to US domestic issues such as President Jimmy Carter's declining popularity as the real reasons behind the Olympic boycott (p. 161). In other words, the boycott was represented as an integral part of Carter's foreign policy aimed "against peace, détente, and cooperation" (p. 161)

Differentiation can be tied in with another tactic known as *whataboutism*. It suggests that any criticism of the Soviet Union during the Cold War needed to be put in an historical, political or other context with the reverse question "What about …," as invoked in relation to US actions in a given country. It was used as a self-protection tactic aiming not to justify Soviet actions but rather to criticize US ones. The *flattery* technique, as an exception, was rarely used by the Soviet Union. The irony and *sarcasm* technique, on the contrary was, according to Hazan, one of Moscow's favorite techniques to employ in its propaganda campaigns. To illustrate it, the author provides an example from 1980 when the information disseminated by the Soviet wire service *TASS* portrayed President Carter and his advisors "as a bunch of idiots" trying to present the boycott of the Olympics "as a huge success by fooling around with a computer" (p. 163).

Drawing on various examples of propaganda provided by Anur Shah (2005) in the study *War, Propaganda and the Media,* some common tactics of Cold War discourses could be summarized as follows: presenting the *self* as a hero and the *other* as a villain; demonizing the enemy; using selective stories; relying on partial facts or referring to historical context as justification; reinforcing reasons and motivations to act due to a pre-constructed threat; relying on "experts" to provide insights into the situation; resorting to a narrow range of discourse describing an issue within the framework of "our good" and "their bad" attitudes.

In sum, Cold War discourse refers to what many scholars define as *Manicheism*: a system based on dualism or the supposed primeval conflict between light and darkness.[8] In journalism studies, a Manichean paradigm suggests that one side is good and the other is evil. One very important characteristic of *Manicheism*, as discussed by Francoise Thom (1989) in her analysis

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[8] Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Manichaeism?q=Manicheism.

of the language of Soviet Communism, is that the basic dualism has another effect that is no less important: the idea that "no word is innocent" (p. 28). Rather, each concept is defined by its contrary, and lies between Communism and its enemy (p. 29).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regime in 1989, the Cold War was declared to be over. Since then, substantial scholarship has examined the dynamics of the news media-power relationship in Russia, with a focus on one or more of the following interconnected themes: democratization, citizen engagement, media and ownership (Voltmer, 2010; Zassoursky, 2004; Mickiewicz, 1997); the concept of *glasnost'* or *openness*, new and old journalistic practices, censorship and self-censorship (Goban-Klas, 1989; McNair, 1994; Pasti, 2005; Simons and Strovsky, 2006; Voltmer, 2000; Oates, 2007); and the applicability of Western models on the Russian media beyond Siebert et al.'s *Four Theories of the Press* (De Smaele, 1999; Becker, 2004; Christians et al., 2009; Roudakova, 2012; Voltmer, 2012; Vartanova, 2012).

This scholarship suggests that structural changes have occurred in the Russian media field since 1989. The communist media system – understood as the intentional interaction among politicians and journalists aiming to address purposefully specific politics to the public – was declared to be history (McNair, 2011). As McNair (1988) observes, "with the departure of the 'old guard' in the Soviet leadership – Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko – the USSR began to develop a new approach to propaganda and information policy, and to use the western media more effectively for the propagation of Soviet viewpoints" (p. 130). The press was reshaped according to the newly introduced policy of *glasnost'* which was set up in the early 1980s, but is mostly identified with Mikhail Gorbachev. The principles of *glasnost'* were formally introduced by the Communist Party at its Party Convention in February 1986 (Voltmer, 2000, p. 472).

The new policy was part of a much deeper process of change that took place within the Soviet Union – a process called *perestroika* (restructuring). The aim of *perestroika*, as McNair (1988) sees it, was "to equip and refit the Soviet economy, to make it competitive in the race with the west" (p. 131). As McNair suggests, "the ideological powerhouse of the drive for reform" was to make the press more open to the public, "peeling away the layers of bureaucracy and secrecy which have dogged it since Stalin's time" (p. 131). The policy of *glasnost'*, in this sense (usually translated as *openness*) was at the heart of the reforms. It aimed to provide not only meaningful information but to discuss publicly issues that were never before imagined as open for discussion. It was not only policy of *openness* to the public; rather it meant "*voiceness"* or *speaking out loud* to the public (p. 131).

As a result, the press during *glasnost'* became aware of people's needs, addressing the pressing issues of the day rather than legitimizing the regime of Kremlin-generated truth. The adoption of a new media law in 1990 inaugurated "revolutionary changes" for Russian journalism: official censorship was abolished, journalists became independent of the publishers and private ownership of media outlets was permitted (Von Seth, 2011, p. 55). However, as Voltmer (2000) argues, Gorbachev's notion of *glasnost'* was "radical, but not revolutionary" since he never granted the press a truly independent status (p. 472). Instead, "similar to his predecessors, he regarded the media as instruments for mobilizing mass support, though in this case for the goals of *perestroika*" (Voltmer, 2000, p. 472).

The post-Soviet Russian news media, however, were reorganized according to liberal principles, reshaped into pluralist and independent organs according to "the fourth estate model" (Christians et al., 2009, p. 12). Russia adopted the principles of a market economy, privatization of media, freedom of the press (including abolition of censorship), and shifted to what Vartanova

(2012) defines as “more objective reporting” (p. 121). Accordingly, the journalistic role switched from instrumental to autonomous, oriented with a dedication to a public service ideal whereby the role of the audience was redefined as active participant in public affairs rather than observer “in the theater state of politics” (Zassoursky, 2004, p. 20-23). As Christians et al. (2009) note, after 1989 Russia experienced its “golden age” of journalism (p. 12).

However, the golden age of Russian journalism did not last long. By the mid-1990s, as a consequence of privatization and economic pressures, big media groups took control over Russian media. As Voltmer (2000) observes, “the newly evolving oligarchs in Russia discovered the power of public opinion and started to supplement their financial empires with media empires” (p. 473). As a result, journalistic autonomy was curtailed and restricted, whereas objective reporting was replaced by biased editorials, pre-ordered copies or hidden advertising (Pasti, 2005). While the 1990s witnessed a plurality of voices, some even critical of the Kremlin, the reality was that the news media remained under state control or in the hands of regime-friendly corporations and oligarchs. Since then, as Christians et al. (2009) note, “no post-Communist theory of the press has emerged” (p. 12).

Thus, despite ongoing criticism of the *Four Theories of the Press* the work remains a major point of reference for a significant number of authors trying to tackle the post-Soviet Russian media system, or the relationship between politicians, journalists, and the public. As a result, most of the Western classifications in *Four Theories*, even modified, retain the old ideological dichotomy between East and West, creating further ideological conflicts and mutual misunderstanding. Drawn from the post-communist legacy, the old patterns of “the overarching framework of the Cold War,” however, are confronted by new challenges provided by the new reality – new digital technologies, the Internet and the collapse of the

Communist regime in Russia and Eastern Europe (Christians et al., 2009, p. 15). Moreover, as Voltmer (2010) demonstrates, "the experiences of the past decades have shown that democracy is not a one-way road" (p. 137). In practice, different democratic models are shaped by different political, economic and cultural factors; therefore, every case deserves critical scrutiny and contextualization.

With the arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency in 2000, the role of the media became extremely important in achieving a new form of officially imposed ideology, re-oriented to what Putin has referred to as the Russian Idea in his *Millennium Manifesto* "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium" (Putin, 1999).

Putin's Russian Idea rested on notions of patriotism, national pride, social solidarity, and a strong state. To achieve it, the Kremlin resumed control over a significant number of media outlets. Their task was to exercise a new form of soft power – or newspeak – throughout the news media in general. The aim of this newly evolved *newspeak* was to create an image of what Zassoursky (2004) describes as "Great Russia" (p. 33).

In *After Newspeak: Language Culture and Politics in Russia from Gorbachev to Putin,* Michael S. Gorham (2014) traces a history of the politics of official Russian language usage from Gorbachev to Putin. Gorham begins with the premise that periods of rapid and radical change both shape and are shaped by language. He demonstrates the linkage of language and politics in everything from everyday life to the speech patterns of the country's leaders, the blogs of its bureaucrats, and the official programs promoting the use of Russian in the so-called Near Abroad (the former Soviet republics). He also investigates whether Internet communication and new media technologies have helped to consolidate a more vibrant democracy and civil society or if they serve as an additional resource for the political

technologies manipulated by the Kremlin.

In his analysis of the 2007 episode of the "Direct Line," for instance, Gorham (2014) describes Putin's appeal as:

> [A] multimedia extravaganza usually staged in the final weeks of the year, the "Direct Line" attempted not only to install a "confidence of community", to use Anderson's term, but also to project, through language and images, a coherent and appealing collective identity, or "cognitive map" of the Russian nation as a whole (p. 140).[9]

The "Direct Line," thus, offers "some of the clearest and most coherent portraits of Putin's vision for a discursive construction of national identity" and a new Russia in "all its vastness, diversity, unity, and might" (Gorham, 2014, p. 140). As Gorham observes, it does so by employing multiple layers of framing – technological, geographic, historical, demographic, and linguistic – in order to transmit an imagined community which is: (1) historically rich, geographically expansive, and demographically diverse; (2) actively and demographically engaged in the political process; and (3) reverential towards its president looking to him as to a merciful tsar.

Another interesting observation Gorham points to is the Russian government's fear of new media resulting in legislative moves aimed to impose a "cyber curtain" (p. 189). As the author puts it, as a result of "the government's fear of the power of the new media," it is

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[9] "Direct Line" is Vladimir Putin's annual chat show, dating back to 2001, during which he takes questions from people all over the country.

taking measures to “isolate Russian cyberspace from the global network” by creating a “national cyberzone,” a “sovereign Internet” that not only makes the space “more Russian” but (more importantly) “more state-affiliated” (Gorham, 2014, p. 189).

All of these efforts, according to Gorham, demonstrate a concerted strategy on the part of the Russian President and the ruling United Russia Party to control the more liberal forms of *glasnost'* and free speech. Even if these efforts cannot mute the voice of the opposition on the Internet completely, through legal and economic measures they compromise it enough to make it a space more feared by the networked opposition. It is evident, therefore, as Gorham illustrates, that Putin's preference leans toward the old system of news media control as well as “in inoculating the virtual public space of all serious political debate” (p. 190). As a result, “the vast majority of Russian Internet users still spend most of their time online networking and entertaining themselves rather than fomenting revolution” (p. 190).

The nostalgic attitudes toward the Soviet past, with its practices of coercion and control, clearly demonstrate that “the pendulum of history was again gathering speed” with a vigorous reform of the ruling apparatus and free media, the aim of which was “perestroika of the media-political system” (Zassoursky, 2004, p. 33) and creation of a new form of *newspeak*. Referring to Foucault, the aim of the newly evolved newspeak is to create a regime of truth through specific discourses that are widely accepted and reproduced by the news media while remaining under the control of the ruling apparatus. Chapter Four of this thesis will demonstrate what the features of these discourses are.

What is evident here is that despite the changes following the fall of Communism in 1989, one particular feature of Putin's regime has been a resurgence in the old type of media instrumentalization, a preference of Soviet rather than post-Soviet techniques in building the

image of “Great Russia,” Russianness, or any kind of imagined Russian identity. This ties in with the argument that post-Soviet Russian journalism has occupied a role that has not been primarily one of neutrality, but above all designed for “upbringing” and “educative” intentions (Von Seth, 2011, p. 55). The former Kremlin PR agent Sergei Yastrzhembskii’s words clearly demonstrate this instrumentalization: “When the nation mobilises its forces to solve some task, [this] imposes obligations on everyone, including the media” (as cited in Simons and Strovsky, 2006, p. 202).

In a similar vein, journalists in Putin’s Russia perceive their role in a kind of alignment with Lipmann’s view of journalists as agents for the political elite, rather than as watchdogs of those in power (Voltmer, 2000; Pasti, 2005; Malykhina, 2014). As Malykhina (2014) argues, in contemporary Russian journalism, both the heritage of the Soviet journalistic tradition and the years with increasing freedom of the press are evident (p. 67). Scholars examining Russian journalistic practices refer to two generations of journalists in post-Soviet Russia – old and new – conducting journalism in a different way but unified by lack of objectivity, government interference and harassment of media outlets; lack of journalistic professionalism; and working in an atmosphere of violence against journalists (Malykhina, 2014; Oates, 2007; Pasti, 2005).

Pasti’s (2005) analysis of the two generations of contemporary Russian journalists, for instance, reveals continuing dominance of the “publicist” role of journalists inherited from the Soviet era, which represents highly subjective reporting in contrast with the Western ideals of objective news reporting and plurality of voices. Ironically, however, Simons and Strovsky (2006) argue that, since Putin came into power “political rhetoric has mostly framed the mass media as the protectors of democracy” (p. 201). In this regard, it should be noted that scholars examining post-Soviet media-power dynamics seem to lack coherence in their search for a label for the contemporary Russian media system and journalistic practices framed univocally as

captured between *new* and *old* Soviet and post-Soviet reality. Part of the objective of this thesis is to bring a measure of coherence to the contemporary Russian journalism-media matrix.

Iris Marion Young (2000), in her discussion on democracy and justice, defines two models of democracy in contemporary political theory – aggregative and deliberative. Both models require some basics of democratic governance such as the rule of law, voting, and freedom of speech, assembly, and association (p. 18). Drawing on this basic concept of democratic rule, in theory Russia possesses all the characteristics of being so. In practice, however, Russia represents a unique reality.

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation describes Russia as a democratic federal state with a republican form of government under the rule of law (Art. 1). Art. 29 (5) stipulates that the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship.[10] On one hand, the Russian specifics hinder the acceptance of the Western models; on the other, however, they encourage a specific Russian adaptation of the liberal-democratic ideals that shape an indigenous Russian system.

As noted by Roudakova (2012), several attempts to explain different democratic regimes, using liberal arguments, were proposed throughout the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most of them fell into the typologies of hybrid regimes defining the Russian reality as "illiberal democracy," "delegative democracy," "competitive authoritarianism," or "multi party authoritarianism" (Roudakova, 2012, p. 247). A common feature of these hybrid regimes is the existence of competitive and reasonably free elections, but a weak institutionalization of the rule of law and civil liberties (Voltmer, 2012, p. 241).

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[10] Конституция Российской Федерации [Constitution of the Russian Federation]. Retrieved from http://www.constitution.ru/.

One recurring element of what Zakaria terms "illiberal democracy", for instance, is the restriction of media independence and the resulting limitations of media pluralism (as cited in Voltmer, 2012, p. 241). However, it could be argued that the model of illiberal democracy partially reflects the Russian reality since there are restrictions on media independence even as it coexists with media pluralism. Therefore, the notion of "delegative democracy" seems more applicable to Russia. Behind this concept lies the assumption that democracy flourishes in countries with presidential systems of government. In delegative democracies presidents represent themselves as "the head" of the nation. As such, presidents use state-owned media as a tool for boosting their own vision of patriotism and agenda-setting.

Another outstanding feature of Putin's regime, along with his preference for the old type of media control, is the implementation of many former Soviet discursive practices in achieving the Russian Idea. In this light, Svitlana Malykhina compares Putin with Stalin, by pointing out that "the authoritarian tendencies in Russian society during Putin's presidency brought back (…) Stalin's rhetoric" (Malykhina, 2014, p. 75). Comparing expressions in some of the Russian mainstream newspapers such as *Izvestiia*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, and *Zavtra* from 2010 to 2012, for instance, Malykhina's analysis clearly demonstrates reproduction of Stalin's phrases in contemporary Russian news media discourse. As observed by Grenoble, cited in Malykhina's book:

> Soviet leaders knew that language counts, that it is a crucial part of both a nation's and individual's identity, and it could be manipulated to serve as a powerful tool for the State (…) If we look at the contemporary authoritarian discourse that is

> replicated on the deeper layers of the doxa's frame, it shows a high frequency of powerful Stalinist dicta, which acquired special status (p. 76)

The specifics of post-Soviet rhetoric, its propaganda techniques and the interaction between Soviet and post-Soviet media discourses, however, attracted comparatively little scholarly attention. In this regard, as the following chapters aim to demonstrate, Cold War discourses provide a useful framework to explore its features and continuity, with all of the attendant meanings as they pertain to contemporary Russian journalism, values, and Russian culture as a whole.

Chapter 3

Discourse and the Language of *Izvestiia*

This chapter outlines the methodology used to examine the language mobilized by *Izvestiia* in both Soviet and post-Soviet times as discourse – that is to say as a rhetorical tool conveying particular meanings in order to create particular perceptions and, finally, to convince readers of the rightness of particular political position. Taking a before-and-after comparative approach, the study employs a Cold War framework to examine and correlate discursive similarities and differences. In doing so, it contextualizes the role of journalism, *then* and *now*, from an explicitly linguistic angle applying the framing approach as a type of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This works not only as a method of research, but also as a broader theoretical framework. The importance of the linguistic aspect of the analysis originates in a non-judgmental stance that does not view journalists working for pro-Kremlin news media as merely ideological machines. Rather, the language employed in press texts is viewed semiotically as symbolic and interpretative of changes.

This form of discourse analysis is based on the social constructionist view that considers news media texts as tools for creating particular meanings and a particular kind of constructed reality that seeks to inform, form, and maintain social practices. As Malykhina (2014) puts it, one of the functions of media discourse is to understand communication, memory, and identity (p. 2). In this regard, the general contention here is that no word is innocent and journalistic language choices reflect particular identity choices at a particular time or historical moment.

Since the study is about using language to convince people, it is principally concerned with two related questions: first, what discursive patterns are revealed through an analysis of

Izvestiia's texts in Soviet times, particularly in covering the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and second, by comparing them with the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the study asks what kind of residual Soviet discourses can be identified in the more contemporary texts. The overarching objective lies in identifying the frames and techniques applied by *Izvestiia* in constructing news stories, *then* and *now*, in order to convey particular meanings to readers and influence public opinion in two historically different times.

As this thesis argues, a qualitative analysis of the rhetorical tools in press texts can reveal not only general social values, but also how they are reflected in journalistic practices. Following the basic premise that language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of political and sociocultural changes, the language deployed in *Izvestiia*'s texts, therefore, can be examined in correlation with the "progress" or "retrogression" of Russian journalism since Communist times.

To draw the comparative perspectives into a dialogue, the samples contrast and compare texts from two case studies, each situated within the context of Cold War rhetoric. First is the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which took place in the midst of the *real* Cold War and second, the crisis over Ukraine in 2014 referred to as a *new* Cold War. Respectively, the sample comprises two time-frames – 1968 and 2014 – between the months of January and August. In each case, conflict began approximately at the beginning of the year, gained momentum over the following six months, and reached a peak during the summer months. The invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20-21, 1968, whereas the tension between Russia and the West over Ukraine rose to a crescendo after the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 near the Ukrainian-Russian border on July 17, 2014.

Izvestiia was selected as the main source of analysis for several reasons. Because of its existence during both Soviet and post-Soviet times, it provides a good example of continuity or

transformation in terms of journalistic practices. Its pro-Kremlin line makes *Izvestiia* an important source of evidence for what the State perception of the world was like in Soviet and post-Soviet times. Finally, because of its consistent and stable position as a national broadsheet and opinion leader it has maintained a certain resonance with the Russian public (in contrast to *Pravda*, for example, which lost its influence over the years following the collapse of the Communist regime).

The selected items, 195 for Czechoslovakia and 240 for Ukraine, were broadly assigned to categories corresponding to different types of journalistic practice: factual news, opinion pieces (editorials), interviews or official statements, i.e. statements of official representatives – presidents, party leaders, politicians and so forth, in both 1968 and 2014. In the case of Czechoslovakia, factual news stories were chosen as such based on attribution to *TASS*, the Soviet wire service, or *Pravda*, the flagship newspaper of the Communist Party. Such attribution typically appeared in the headline or at the end of the text. In the example of Ukraine, a story was considered to be factual, if it reported something new without the inclusion of a journalist's personal opinion. In the case of *Izvestiia's* reportage on Ukraine, however, the identification of purely factual stories is complicated since all stories carry a by-line, none originate from a wire service, and virtually every contribution can be seen to reflect reporter bias or opinion. As an example, the breaking "news" about the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014, in the online edition of *Izvestiia*, appeared under the headline "The Crash of Malaysian Boeing Takes the Lives of 298 People" ("Крушение малайзийского Boeing унесло жизни 298 человек") followed by the subheading "The Leadership of New Russia Considers the

Destruction of the Liner as a Planned Provocation of Kyiv" ("Руководство Новороссии считает уничтожение лайнера спланированной провокацией Киева").[11]

In terms of editorial opinion, material from both 1968 and 2014 was selected based on the presence of authorship, or a by-line providing the name of the author and his or her profession or area of expertise. As the following chapter will reveal, opinion pieces were often communicated through "experts" identified as composers, journalists, writers, or professors. Generally, such items were spread across *Izvestiia*'s pages from 1968 but found mainly in an identified "Opinion" section in the online version of *Izvestiia* from 2014. Many of the selected items from 2014, however, were also spread across other sections, such as "First strip" ("Первая полоса"), "World," "Russia," "Russia-News" ("Россия-Новости"), "Russia-Ukraine," "Crimea," "Russia-World" depending on the newsworthiness of the story and its emotional appeal.

The examined items from 1968 were accessed at the microfilm archive at McGill Library in Montreal in the summer of 2014. All the scanned articles were gathered together in chronological order and transferred to a USB disk for convenience, then to my computer in two separate folders: one, from January to June 1968; second, from July to December 1968. While reading the items, the decision for their selection was based on the presence of key words, such as *Prague*, *Czechoslovakia*, *Czechoslovak Socialist Republic* (ЧССР, the official name of Czechoslovakia from 1960 until shortly after the Velvet Revolution in 1989), *Warsaw Pact*, *Alexander Dubček* (First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected in January 1968, who started the reforms known as the Prague Spring), and *Ludvík Svoboda* (who was elected President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in March 1968). After a second careful reading of the selected items, certain repetitiveness in terms of language, themes and frames was

[11] See Appendix 1.

identified, especially after the invasion in August 1968. Thus, and because of the large number of initially chosen texts, a decision was made to shorten the examined period from January to August 1968.

On a similar basis, the selection of data to be examined for 2014 was made based on presence of key words such as *Ukraine*, *Crimea*, *Kyiv*, *Donetsk*, *Maidan Nezalezhnosti* (the Independence Square in Kyiv where the protests against ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich first started), *Viktor Yanukovich*, and *Petro Poroshenko* (the current President of Ukraine). It is worth noting here that in terms of logistics, the data archiving of the items from 1968 was easier than the process of archiving from 2014. Surprisingly or not, it turned out that sampling online content for qualitative content analysis represents a huge challenge. First, *Izvestiia*'s website changes within days and sometimes hours. As a result, the online content increasingly expands the corpus for potential sampling. Due to this highly fluid state of data expansion, a decision was made to resort to more stable data available in the *Izvestiia* Digital Archive. The Archive was accessed free of charge through the *East View* database at McGill Library. Thus, additional articles were added to the initial sample downloaded from *Izvestiia*'s website (http://izvestia.ru/) based on further searches done using the assigned key words and identified thematic sections. Afterwards, all the articles – 342 items dated from January to August 2014 – were saved, in chronological order, along with the date of their publication. After a second reading in the early staged of the analysis, the sample was reduced to 240 articles.

In the process of reading some key words, linguistic features, phrases or references to particular socio-cultural phenomena were highlighted, mainly in the headlines and the leading paragraphs of the selected texts, and brief notes were taken. They were revisited at later stages of the analysis. Further, based on the collected material from both 1968 and 2014, a list of repetitive

themes was assembled categorising the stories. The *pathetic/emotional* category listed stories in line with the Kremlin's objectives with references to the historical past, great victories, anniversaries, geographical space, or common Soviet / post-Soviet values.[12] *Aggressive/martial* identified stories that intended to engender a sense of anxiety or fear, while attacking implicitly or explicitly the Other as a reason for action. *Abstract* stories were those that did not convey any particular meaning or new information; rather, they resembled a philosophical-sounding discussion. *Positive* stories generally focused on themes connected to public holidays, economic development, progress in a broad sense, while *negative* stories were based on themes such as social problems, conflicts, and war.[13] *Critical* and *Alarming* stories were added to the 2014 categories based on the repetitive appearance of criticism addressing the need to remember the Soviet past as a compelling symbol for Russian greatness.[14]

Of course, a number of themes were interrelated and mutually complementary. For instance, aggressive articles such as those mobilizing bellicose rhetoric against a particular threat could be categorized as both *aggressive, negative,* and *critical*. However, aspects of aggressive articles could also be categorized as *positive,* since the general theme of progress or economic/military development in 1968 is quite often represented by juxtaposing it with a particular threat. The initial classification, however, was made for the sake of methodological clarity, based on the dominant tone of the article, and as a starting point for further analysis.

In both its broad and specific analyses the thesis regards media texts as tools for creating particular meanings. For this reason it is useful to examine in detail theoretical ground that

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[12] Since "pathetic" has several meanings, it should be noted that here, as in the following chapters, I use the term in a specific, more archaic way, defined by the Oxford dictionary as "Relating to the emotions." See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pathetic. Such a usage-meaning has to do more with moving a reader to evoke pride, instead of arousing contemptuous pity.

[13] See Appendix 2.

[14] See Appendix 3.

justifies the application of the method to Russian news texts and the discourses they contain. Since the study is about using language to convince people in two different sociocultural contexts – Soviet and post-Soviet – the choice was made to mobilize key concepts from a variety of theorists seeking to draw a line between language, press texts, and the broader Russian context.

In *The Language of Newspapers*, Mark Conboy (2010) defines language as “a thoroughly social activity and newspapers extend that activity beyond the confines of face-to-face discourse to an extended, imagined community of kinship based on nation” (p. 3). Newspapers thus materialize that identity “quite literally onto the page” (p. 3). As for journalistic language, it denotes agency and power – it is partisan and never neutral. As Smith and Higgins (2013) suggest, “Journalism can only ever strive to be neutral or objective, and linguistic analysis can help to uncover the strategies and pitfalls of this endeavour” (p. 5). Furthermore, “language is an instrument that is shaped according to material circumstances and the purposes it needs to serve. Language is a medium of power and can be used to legitimize inequalities and unjust social relations for political ends. It can thus be used to empower as well as disempower” (p. 5). Conboy (2010) touches on this point:

> Journalism is defined in each era by its particular engagement with politics, technology, economics and culture. Dahlgren is one leading commentator who appreciates this diversity and stresses that the ‘cultural discourse’ (1988:51) of journalism is not simply informational but a part of a broader set of symbolic representation (p. 6).

Seeing *Izvestiia*'s language as a medium of power, an important question occurs: How does this medium succeed in its attempts to convince its readers of the rightness of a political position? As a starting theoretical argument, the answer could be found in the notion of the dialogical structure of communication, which is central to Mikhail Bakhtin's work (1986/2013); that is, *Izvestiia* builds a sense of dialogue with its readers by relying on particular culturally bound rhetorical clues to convey meaning. Drawing on Saussure's differentiation between *langue* and *parole*, or linguistic meaning as a relationship between "general system" and particular "performance," Bakhtin's concept of communication may be understood as an accumulation of senses through particular utterances or speech acts constructed of words and conveyed through specific speech genres. The Russian genre of *ocherk*, for instance, defined as a "kind of journalistic essay" by Voltmer (2000) represents a uniquely Russian journalistic genre characterized by "in-depth discussion of a particular problem in which the author expresses his or her own thoughts and emotions and aims to evoke the emotions of the reader" (p. 478). Such emotional appeals represent a central tool for building dialogue during Soviet and post-Soviet times.

According to Bakhtin (1986/2013), genres may be regarded as the central mechanisms of dialogue, "the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language" (p. 65). He argues that all utterances take place within unique historical situations, while at the same time contain memory traces or earlier usages. In this way, genres reflexively mediate between past and present. *Izvestiia*'s texts – in both 1968 and 2014 – for example, draw upon historical genres and techniques, such as philosophical reflections, when discussing political issues or references to historically and culturally embedded symbols that infer shared knowledge. The objective, clearly, is to establish a form of dialogue with readers through the use of common

understandings. Consequently, in order to be translated or decoded such texts require particular knowledge or context. They cannot be easily understood by a Western reader, for instance, in the same way as a Russian reader would be unlikely to understand the meaning of PBJ (Peanut Butter and Jelly) without referring to a dictionary of American slang.

The term *intertextuality*, therefore, is crucial in comprehending the dialogical or discursive character of the text. As posited by Julia Kristeva, such intertextuality suggests the need to examine media texts not only by drawing on their purely linguistic dimensions, but by identifying the diffused, figurative, and culturally bound sense-making power within them. Kristeva draws upon Bakhtin's conceptual ground in *Word, Dialogue and Novel*, where she defines intertextuality as "a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 85). As Bakhtin also observes, intertextuality is inherent in language as part of its comprehensibility:

> The speaker is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe. (…) He presupposes not only the existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – his own and others' – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation of another (builds on them, polemicizes with them, or simply presumes that they are already known to the listener) (p. 124).

Or, the transcription of a text suggests a transcription "of a special kind of dialogue: the complex interrelations between the *text* (…) and the created, framing *context*" (Bakhtin, p. 106). As such,

newspaper language seen as discourse could be understood as a particular expression of the semiotic nature of human communication.

The aforementioned quotations exemplify the Russian intellectual position toward the notion of discourse which is essential to understanding how Russian news "consumers" garner meaning from what they read by relying on an almost sub-conscious, autonomic understanding of the connection between language and culture. Respectively, both the Soviet and post-Soviet discursive regimes insert themselves into this cultural-linguistic matrix to exercise control over readers' consciousness. In both of the periods under discussion *Izvestiia* is full of emotionally rich outbursts that connect directly to notions of a common Russian history, or a sense of duty, gratitude, shared cultural values, or the "Unity of Hearts."

A resonance of the Bakhtinian argument for intertextual analysis as a necessary component of linguistic analysis can be found in Norman Fairclough's (1995) assertion that intertextuality is nothing less than the dependence of texts upon societal and historical discursive formations (p. 188). The term *discourse*, as introduced by Fairclough (1995) and with reference to Foucault regards discursive acts as "a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge" (p. 18). In this sense, discourse refers not only to language itself but also to sets of social and cultural practices. The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as employed here, is, therefore, to combine Bakhtinian ideas with Western views of text and context, to scrutinize the context of the way language is used by approaching it as a form of social practice and knowledge.

Proceeding from this line of thought, discourse, according to Foucault (1980) is not only the expression of social practice, it is also intrinsically correlated with the notion of power. Since discursive acts and practises are used by politically motivated institutions, it is inevitable that

discourse is used to regulate ways of thinking and acting. In doing so, language, through the operation of discourse, plays a central role in maintaining social control. Within such a discursive environment, the public can be seen as not only informed but also easily manipulated. In this regard, considering newspaper language as discourse – especially in the Russian institutional model – enables us "to view news production and dissemination as creating new forms of power as well as new forms of access to representation" (Conboy, 2010, p. 10).

In order to illustrate the different operational levels of discourse it is useful to examine, the use of word "comrade" (товарищ) as employed by *Izvestiia* in the Soviet context. This culturally invented term is charged with layers of meaning: first, it indicates a political position; second, it serves as a salutation; third, it conveys a sense of belonging with respect to a particular class. Discursively, therefore, the word "comrade" can only be understood in context and by the way it institutionalizes and regulates ways of thinking and acting. In a particular discursive context the salutation "Dear comrades" might suggest a positive intention such as greeting the Soviet working people on the occasion of May 1, International Workers' Day. In a different context, salutation "Dear comrades," addressed to the Czech representatives deviating from the Kremlin's line in their attempts for liberalization reforms in 1968, could be seen as a political warning. In an appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia published on July 18, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the friendly salutation "Dear comrades," for example, was followed by "deep anxiety" (глубокое беспокойство) regarding "the offensive of the reactions patronized by imperialism against your party and the foundations of the social order in Czechoslovakia" ("Поддерживаемое империализмом наступление реакции против вашей партии и основ общественного строя ЧССР," 18.07.1968). The different levels of meanings seem evident. In a post-Soviet context, the use of "comrades"

connotes a reference to the Soviet past, whereas Westerner unpacking this particular code would likely see it as a signifier of Communist ideology. The process of applying CDA, therefore, involves looking at choices of words in order to discover the underlying discourse(s) and ideologies within the context (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 20).

To do so, this thesis employs an articulated method involving Critical Discourse Analysis and Framing analysis in order to illustrate the discursive practices (and ideologies buried in texts) of Soviet and post-Soviet *Izvestiia*. In particular, it adopts and applies Norman Fairclough's (1995) three-dimensional analytical framework that integrates three levels: the textual, the interpersonal, and a wider societal context. In other words, Fairclough's analytical framework includes text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice. Indeed, this thesis applies what Malykhina (2014) refers to as a "framing approach as a type of CDA" (p. 16).

This theoretical framework, offers a rich method for revealing the specifics of Russian discursive practices and, for the purposes of this thesis, understanding the way *Izvestiia* constructs any kind of unified or shared meaning. The goal is to understand news media discourses as part of a set of broader social practices that involve not only production but also interpretation of media texts by situating them in a particular historical and sociocultural framework, thus revealing their part in the broader construction of the unified Soviet or post-Soviet Russian imaginaries.

Drawing on Fairclough's three-dimensional analytical framework, the first level of analysis – *linguistic analysis* – seeks to identify the explicit lexical and stylistic features of *Izvestiia*'s texts as "symbolic devices for meaning construction" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 58). The analysis is substantiated by the News Framing Theory whose key theoretical postulate stipulates that journalists frame their stories by selecting and making more salient "some aspects

of a perceived reality (…) in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

For example, in the way *Izvestiia* frames the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the word "invasion" (вторжение) is never mentioned. Rather, the Kremlin's intention to send tanks into Prague is portrayed as an act against "counter-revolutionary" (контрреволюционные) forces. This serves to build, metaphorically, the sense of increasing panic and anxiety. In the same vein, to legitimize the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, *Izvestiia* employes the same threatening factor of "counter-revolution" (контрреволюция) and "coup d'état" (госпереворот). In both cases, salience is given to the sense of a threat against "fraternal people" (братские народы) who need to be protected, in order to give legitimacy to the Kremlin's decision to enter foreign territory.

With regard to manipulative strategies journalists employ over people's consciousness, especially in times of conflict, analysis of frames is of particular importance since it "illuminates the precise way in which [such] influence over human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel-to that consciousness" (Entman, 1993, p. 51-52). Providing the Cold War as an example, the same author suggests that frames have at least four locations in the communication process: the *communicator*, the *text*, the *receiver*, and the *culture* (p. 52).

> Communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief systems. The text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence

> of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments. (…) The culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping (Entman, 1993, p. 52-53).

In the *Izvestiia* texts examined for this thesis, such cultural frames are widely used and reproduced. In 1968, for instance, they usually refer to the glorious victory of the Soviet army over Nazi German Fascism, or to the heroic fight of the Soviet army on Czech territory. The triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideology is another common and repetitive frame throughout the examined period. In the same vein, in 2014 the Russian Idea is built on a set of common frames, discursively expressed, through a stock of commonly shared keywords referring to Russian "greatness" ("величие"), "reasonableness" ("разумность") and "will for justice and peace" ("воля к справедливости и мира").

As employed here, framing analysis focuses on lexical and stylistic choices. Rhetorical strategies were identified including: metaphors, epithets, presuppositions (taken for granted assumptions based on shared culture and knowledge, common beliefs and values); catchphrases and pejoratives (derogatory or abusive words); the use of irony and sarcasm; and other representational devices typical not only for the Cold War discourse, but also for the communist propaganda techniques and *langue de bois* as a whole. For instance, the use of empty signifiers connotative of unity, solidarity and comradeship of the Socialist bloc in the Soviet context is consistently constructed in opposition to pejoratives such as "grotesque" (гротескный), "ill-

doomed" ("обреченный") or "imperialist" ("империалистический") mobilized in depicting the threatening Other. Or, in the post-Soviet context, *Izvestiia*'s coverage univocally frames the events in Ukraine as "our right" to protect Russians, "brothers" or "our people" threatened by "them" referring to the Ukrainian "extremists" ("экстремисты"), "nationalists" ("националисты), or "fascists" ("фашисты").

As Entman (1993) puts it, frames work by emphasizing or repeating particular information, or by associating it with signifying elements such as "culturally familiar symbols" (p. 53). With regard to political discourse:

> Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions. Framing in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power-it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text. Reflecting the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue, many news texts exhibit homogenous framing at one level of analysis, yet competing frames at another (p. 55).

As the findings of this thesis aim to demonstrate, the Cold War framework, as mobilized by *Izvestiia*, in both Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, operates discursively by the constant juxtaposition of the general mythologies of *our good things* and *their bad things* or *our rightness* against *their madness*. These repetitive themes exemplify not only the homogeneity of news discourse, but also the power of news framing by reinforcing some aspects of the constructed reality while suppressing others. One crucial goal of the first level of analysis, therefore, is to

extract the buried meanings from *Izvestiia*'s texts by examining the selection, exclusion, or salience of certain aspects of this reality in Soviet and post-Soviet times. To do so, the qualitative approach to frame analysis looks at specific words as "the building blocks of frames" (Entman, 1993). In the contemporary Russian context, one dominant building block is the tsarist concept of New Russia (Novorossiia), which is largely mobilized by *Izvestiia* as a reference to "the historical ruptures of Russian history."[15] Another example of frame construction in support of the pro-Russian narrative is the Russian Orthodox tradition, which is consistently mobilized as a bridge between Russia and Russian people in Ukraine. In addition, this level of analysis seeks to identify how often references to official sources are on display. This involves the use of "expert knowledge" to lend credibility to human-interest stories.

While the linguistic analysis refers to lexical and stylistic features of texts, the second part of Fairclough's framework corresponds to an *intertextual analysis* (Fairclough 1995, p. 61). Intertextual analysis occupies the middle position in Fairclough's analytical framework "as it mediates the connection between language and social context (…) bridging the gap between texts and contexts" and drawing attention "to the dependence of texts upon society and history" (p. 195). In the terminology of the three-dimensional framework, intertextual analysis refers to the dimension of "discourse practice" as it aims "to unravel various genres and discourses (…) which are articulated together in the text" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 61).

As it applies to *Izvestiia,* intertextuality draws upon "genres of discourses" or "diverse representations of social life" and the way they support or interfere with one another (Fairclough, 2001, p. 2). The different genres of discourse, as discussed by Van Dijk (2001) and Fairclough

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[15] See Mironov, S. (2014, July 31). Новороссия – Новая Россия [Novorossiia – New Russia]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/574606.

(1992; 1995) could be better understood as public or private, institutional, professional, medical, educational, corporate, or bureaucratic. What Bakhtin (1986/2013) refers to as "speech genres" or "relatively stable types of utterances" as in everyday narration, writing, social, political, military or scientific speech categories (p. 60).

For example, in the Soviet context, *Izvestiia* uses discursive genres that range from conversational – usually expressed as rhetorical questions or appeals "to a friend" – to militaristic, pathetic, highly opinionated, and speech that is subordinated to the bureaucratic, paternalistic and upbringing tone of the Party. *Izvestiia*'s post-Soviet texts reveal a plurality of discursive genres as well, varying from conversational, literary, publicist, ironic and sarcastic to experts' pieces usually written by journalists, philosophers or political scientists, but univocally framed in support of the Kremlin's view.

John Austin's classification of speech acts, as discussed by Von Seth (2011), also provides a useful theoretical tool to supplement the second level of analysis. According to Austin, different speech acts, depending on the illocutionary or semantic force of the verbs in the utterance, belong to five categories: "exercitives" which presuppose some unequal relationship between speaker and addressee resulting in commands, warnings or declarations; "verdictives" which are also seen as expression of power but in more interpretative sense, as analysis, diagnoses or judgments; and "commissives" such as promises, intentions and plans that presuppose a more equal relationship between speaker and reader. Austin's last two categories – "behabitives" and "expositives" – give the reader the right to comment or to judge (p. 59). For instance, in the Soviet context, the symbolic power of the texts is built through assertive and directive verbs such as "announce" ("объявляют"), "stress" (подчеркивают), or "require" (требуют), all of which frame the dominant view as the only unquestioned truth or possible

decision. In Von Seth's (2011) terms, *Izvestiia*'s texts regarding Czechoslovakia could be identified as "expositives" – commands, warnings and declarations – rather than as intentions for dialogue.

The second level of analysis, therefore, seeks to identify what kind of language is predominant in *Izvestiia*'s coverage. Austin's classification of speech acts is useful in bringing to light some rational conclusions about the self-representation of journalists in Soviet and post-Soviet times, as sympathetic to the audience or the authorities, as peers, educators or propagators. To this end, genres of discourse and speech acts reveal how a particular news media text is being addressed. Does it inform, entertain, give order or suggest dialogue? What is the semantic meaning of the text? Is it to command, assure, state, argue, or predict? Is the audience addressed as a collective or as individuals?

The third level of analysis corresponds to sociocultural practices, or the broader political and sociocultural context within which news media discourses operate. As Fairclough puts it, this level of analysis involves a "more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture" (p. 62). In relation to the notion of intertextuality, this level of analysis suggests that the meaning of a text does not reside in the text itself, "but is produced by the reader in relation not only to the text in question, but also to the complex network of texts invoked in the reading process" (Malykhina, 2014, p. 9). Applied to the case studies, this level of analysis aims to articulate the broad contours of the context – historical, geographical, and cultural – as mobilized by *Izvestiia* in the newspaper's references to a mythological past, cultural symbols, or an imagined future. The goal of this analytical level, therefore, is to locate *Izvestiia*'s agency and power in a more diffused sense, rather than one that is direct and causal. In particular, it aims to

identify how Czechoslovakia and Ukraine are represented in the Russian cultural imagination by revealing linguistic strategies in how the Soviet Union/Russia and the Western *other* are addressed, as well as the prevailing themes and the broader context within which the Soviet or Russian identity is constituted.

To this end, Benedict Anderson's (1983) theoretical notion of the "imagined communities" provides significant ground for discussion. According to Anderson's concept, the media play a crucial role as nation-builders by "imagining" some shared idea of common belonging through a variety of symbolic practices. This shared idea of common belonging might be imagined through the elaboration of shared national feelings based on glorifying the past, presenting unifying causes, or constructing a common threat or enemy. The notion of an imagined community is especially helpful in understanding what *Homo Sovieticus* represents in 1968 (as constructed by *Izvestiia*), and the implications for the meaning of the Russian Idea in 2014.

As illustrated in Oleksii Polegkyi's (2011) analysis of the concept of the "Russian world," the Russian identity is built on several main pillars. First, is that of difference from the West and similarity to the Near Abroad. According to this pillar, Russia aims to counter the Westernization ambitions in the Near Abroad by presenting itself as an attractive and preferable alternative for the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet republics. The West is often seen, as Polegkyi points out, as a mythical "Big Other" for a creation of the Russian identity (p. 16). Accordingly, news media play a crucial role in building a certain common sense of belonging by positioning the Self against the imagined Other.

The concept of any imagined "Russian world" or identity refers not only to the Russian diaspora itself, but also to the ideological concept of a shared Russian culture. The three

imagined cornerstones of this Russian culture are: common language, common history and the Russian Orthodox Church. The third level of analysis, therefore, seeks to identify the way in which the imagined *Homo Sovieticus* was re-constructed in post-Soviet times and applied to a new sense of imagined Russian greatness.

The overarching tenet of the theoretical framework is that the meaning of social phenomena is socially constructed through language. It follows then that *Izvestiia*, as a pro-Kremlin news outlet, is not therein a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently. Indeed, the method for analysis reveals *Izvestiia* to be a conduit for "an institutionalized structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions" (Polegkyi, 2011, p. 9). This explicitly illustrates what Foucault (1980) refers to as "techniques of power" which do not act directly and immediately (p. 125). To paraphrase Foucault, such forms of power act upon people's consciousness and beliefs instead upon their everyday actions. In the context of this thesis, *Izvestiia* is seen as a legitimator of the Kremlin's agenda through the dissemination of particular imagined shared meanings, which, over time and with varying degrees of intensity, act upon the larger cultural and political perceptions of the Russian public. The next chapter aims to reveal what exactly these meanings are.

Chapter 4

*K*omrades to the Rescue: The Cases of Czechoslovakia and Ukraine

This chapter outlines the main findings of the analysis of both communist and post-communist press texts, as they are represented in *Izvestiia*. Taking a before-and-after approach, the two case studies – the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the crisis over Ukraine in 2014 – are performed, as well as compared and contrasted. As expected, similarities but also variations emerge in the different patterns of Cold War discourse, mobilized by *Izvestiia,* in two historically different periods. The following pages reveal, in detail, what these patterns are and to what extent they support or contradict the claims of this thesis.[16]

Czechoslovakia

Not surprisingly, the way *Izvestiia* frames the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 mirrors the dominant Communist Party line – and its leader Leonid Brezhnev's views – of the Soviet commonwealth, comradeship and solidarity. However, some diversity in terms of journalistic style is on display. News announcements, official reports, foreign correspondences, interviews, official dispatches, appeals and more opinionated items such as experts' comments are all used to convey the Party line. A certain degree of story variety is also observed in terms of official party publications; statements by communist leaders; human stories such as letters "to a friend" or workers' reports; reports on holiday celebrations in the Soviet bloc; or encomiums of

[16] The examples are translated from Russian by the author of this thesis using the Library of Congress system of transliteration. The numbers in brackets following the quotations correspond to *Izvestiia* publication dates in a date, month, and year representation.

productivity achievements in selected factories. Some stories carry a by-line, others are reprinted from *TASS*, the Soviet wire service, or *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Communist Party.

Although it appears that there is a plurality of voices, every item of information is framed through repetitive terms and empty signifiers, usually delivered in headlines, in a manner that is an abstract connotative of unity, solidarity and comradeship: “Unity of People and Party” (“Единство народа и партии,” 31.03.1968), “Cohesion of the Forward Marching [countries]” (“Сплоченность идущих вперед,” 06.04.1968), “Strengthening of Socialism – Our Common Task” (“Укрепление социализма – наша общая задача,” 20.07.1968), “Our Brotherly Alliance is Unbreakable” (“Наш братский союз нерушим,” 22.07.1968), “Proletarian Solidarity in Action” (“Пролетарская солидарность в действий,” 23.08.1968), “Czechoslovakia – A Strong Unit of the Warsaw Pact” (“Чехословакия – прочное звено Варшавского договора,” 22.06.1968), “Unity – A Guarantee of Victories” (“Единство – гарантия побед,“ 08.08.1968), and “Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty” (“Защита социализма – высший интернациональный долг,” 23.08.1968). To further strengthen their emotional appeal, the headlines and subheadings are bold and much bigger in size than the underlying text.[17]

The linguistic symbolic devices for meaning construction regarding not only Czechoslovakia but every other socialist country are built through the use of epithets such as “mighty” (“могучий”), “progressive” (“прогрессивный”), “socialist” (“социалистический”) and “great” (“великий”) – each intended to underscore the superiority of the Socialist bloc. These terms work in opposition to pejoratives such as “ill-doomed” (“обреченный”) and “criminal” (“преступный”) each mobilized in depicting the United States, Bonn (the former capital of West Germany) and NATO. Metaphors such as “mighty guardian of the world”

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[17] See Appendix 4.

(“могучий страж мира”) referring to the fiftieth “glorious anniversary“ (“славный юбилей”) of the Soviet armed forces (25.02.1968), backed by rhetorical signifiers such as “friendship” (“дружба”), “solidarity” (“солидарность”), “brotherhood” (“братство”), “care” (“забота”), “unity” (“единство”), “hospitality” (“гостеприимство”), and “cordiality” (“радушие”) are used as another strategy in building the Soviet brotherhood’s mutuality and greatness.

Discursive genres vary from conversational – usually represented as rhetorical questions or appeals “to a friend” – to military, pathetic, highly opinionated and subordinated to the bureaucratic, paternalistic and upbringing tone of the Party. As a result, categorical assertions, and what Von Seth (2011) refers to as an “objective” or impersonal modality, prevail throughout *Izvestiia*’s texts. This includes the “*we*” form of expression as a unifying signifier for the collectivity of the Socialist bloc (p. 60). However, the use of pronouns like “we” or “us” in journalistic texts, in general, is “slippery.” It is often used by journalists or politicians to make vague statements, and to evoke their own ideas as our ideas, thus creating a sense of Other that is in opposition to these shared ideas (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 84). In the case of *Izvestiia*, the vagueness of the unquestioned “we” dressed up as “Soviet communists” (“советские коммунисты”), “the entire Soviet people” (“весь советский народ”) or the whole “socialist commonwealth” (“социалистическое содружие”) suggests one dominant view – that of the Kremlin – hidden under the veil of common values and beliefs. In this light, the readers are not addressed as individuals with different ideas or opinions. Rather, they represent workers, impersonalized friends or comrades, or a generalized projection of the Soviet or Czech people.

The symbolic power of the texts is built through nominalisations, such as “resistance to the intrigues,” “a threat to socialism,” “fighting against” that conceal the real actors – namely who is threatening whom exactly, or who is resisting or fighting against whom – and the real

goals of the actions. Thus, by removing people or the real agents of the story, the responsibility for a particular position is also removed. Applied in journalistic texts, as Machin and Mayr (2012) observe, the nominalisation technique represents a linguistic strategy of concealment and makes the position or action of the speaker/writer seem as it has just happen (p. 138). In the context of 1968, the real action – the invasion – is discursively built as necessary self-protection against an imaginary threat. Another important effect of such lack of specification, hidden under pompous, but empty slogans, is that it conceals not only questions of agency but promotes a very particular point of view: that of the Communist Party.

Another technique in support of the Party line is built through assertive and directive verbs such as "declare" ("заявляют"), "approve" ("одобряют"), "announce" ("объявляют"), "stress" ("подчеркивают"), "require" ("требуют"), "confirm" ("потверждают"), all used to frame the dominant view as the only unquestioned truth or possible decision. In Von Seth's (2011) terms, *Izvestiia*'s texts regarding Czechoslovakia could be identified as "expositives" – commands, warnings and declarations – rather than as intentions for dialogue, which might lead to differing opinions or possible unwanted interpretations. For example, on the day following the invasion, August 22, the headline "In the Name of Security of Fraternal People" ("Во имя безопасности братских народов") was followed by the categorical assertion expressed in the subheading "No One Will Ever Be Allowed to Wrest Even One Unit from the Commonwealth of the Socialist Countries" ("Никому и никогда не будет позволено вырвать ни одного звена из содружества социалистических государств"). This was published on *Izvestiia*'s front page, along with smaller headlines spread across the front page reading "Working Solidarity" (Рабочая солидарность), "A Necessary Step" ("Нужный шаг"), and "A Holy Duty" ("Святой долг"). Such texts suggest a much more commanding and propagative tone rather than an

invitation to discuss or interpret meanings. Journalists, following the Party line, clearly positioned themselves as propagators or educators on behalf of the communist leadership, rather than peers to the depersonalized readers addressed as “workers” or “people.”

However, to discursively construct an illusion of participatory inclusion with its readers, or in Bakhtinian terms, to accumulate senses through particular utterances or speech acts, *Izvestiia* relied not only on common values but on emotionally charged utterances, often expressed through concerns and appeals. Such utterances were constructed through what Machin and Mayr (2012) call “affection,” usually verbs that indicate liking, disliking, or fear that encourage readers to emote empathy, worry, or anxiety through the provided information. An example of perpetual fear-construction can be traced in “A Declaration About the Threat to the World Created as a Result of the Expansion of the American Aggression in Vietnam” (“Декларация об угрозе миру, создавшейся в результате расширения американской агрессии во Вьетнам”), published on March 10. The sense of anxiety was constructed through verbal expressions such as “expand the war” (“расширяют войны”), “threat to use nuclear weapons” (“угрожают применить ядерное оружие”), “bombard the capital” (“бомбардируют столицу”), and “break the resistance” (“сломить сопротивление”). In contrast, the sense of liking and empathy was conveyed through expressions such as “committed to our comradeship” (“посвещенные нашей дружбе”), “our bosom relations have strengthened and tempered” (“наши сердечные отношения окрепли и закалились”), and “no one will succeed in breaking the monolithic union between the Czech Socialist Republic, the USSR and the rest of the socialist countries” (“никому не удастся нарушить монолитный союз ЧССР с Советским Союзом и другими социалистическими странами”). It is evident that *Izvestiia*’s discourse constantly operates as a binary: demonizing on one hand; claiming moral superiority on the

other. These kinds of discursive strategies almost always work in tandem and are very effective because of it.

Often, the texts were also communicated through “experts” identified through particular specialties; for example, generals or professors. Such use of “functional honorifics” signifies the importance of the person, their seniority, and the ensuing degree of respect (Machin and Mayr 2012, p. 82). Throughout the experts’ texts the “I-form” or subjective modality is used to emphasize the importance and authority of the actor, and to support and assert the moral integrity of the dominant view. The presumption is that “specialists” have specialized knowledge, so they are expected to serve as role models and trustworthy instructors; i.e., they have credibility because of their expert status. In a statement entitled “A Feat” (“Подвиг”) for example, published on May 9, the author, Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, was enlisted to boost socialist pride, by providing specific numbers and statistics through an historical reference to the Great Patriotic War. His contribution compared Soviet glory to the “myth of the unconquerable Hitler army” (“миф о непобедимости гитлеровской армии“).[18] With regard to Czechoslovakia and the Socialist bloc, such an historical reference, provided by an “expert” can be regarded as a demonstration of the unquestioned superiority of the Soviet army over the imagined threatening factor.

This role-model semantic was reinforced by vague elevated-sounding presuppositions – or in Fairclough’s (1995) terms “pre-constructed elements” – such as “Socialist bloc,” “Marxism-Leninism,” “proletarian internationalism,” “imperialism” or “bourgeois ideology.” Such taken for granted monolithic concepts assume that every reader (presumably worker)

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[18] The term Great Patriotic War, as used in Russia, refers to the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which lasted from the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941 until Germany’s surrender on May 9, 1945.

should know what they indicate. The exact meaning of these pre-constructed elements is not articulated; however, repeated constantly, they serve to advance the dominant interests and ideologies. Moreover, such monolithic concepts tap into war- and post-war propaganda used to convince Russians of their superiority, and the superiority of their system, in defeating the Nazi invasion in the Second World War.

It is also worth noting that at the beginning of 1968 news about Czechoslovakia usually came along with dispatches from Sofia, Warsaw, and other socialist capitals, informing of "friendly and sincere" ("дружеские и искренние") visits, military partnership talks or "productive cooperation" ("плодотворное сотрудничество") built on "the great principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" ("на основе великих принципов марксизма-ленинизма," 26.06.1968). Most of the articles examined from January to June are highly empathetic and emotive. They are also strikingly forceful in their attempts to create a positive image of Soviet glory and greatness, both past and present. Holidays, such as the "Soviet Victory over Nazi-German Fascism" celebrated on May 9; the 98th anniversary of Lenin's birth celebrated on April 22; the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx's birth celebrated on May 5; the 50th anniversary of the Red Army; or May 1 —International Workers' Day – all served as a bolstering ideological tool. The objective was first, to bring to light the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and second, to create a sense of one family: that of "the little man" within the Socialist bloc, as opposed to the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" ("диктатура буржуазии"), "the enemy imperialist ideology" ("вражеской империалистической идеологии") or "the American aggression" ("американской агрессии").

However, as the tension in Prague rose throughout the year, the usual *TASS* "friendly" reports were replaced by a much more alarming tone. This was revealed in appeals to the Central

Committee of the Czech Communist Party or to "the Czech people," accompanied by short letters written by "Soviet people" or "workers." Usually, these letters sympathized with "the anxiety" (тревога) of the communist leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia "where a situation occurred when the interests of socialism are put in jeopardy" ("где возникла ситуация, когда подвергаются опасности интересы социализма," 20.07.1968). In these letters, the opening salutation "Dear comrades" differs significantly from its earlier discursive usages alluding to friendship and cordiality. As the following excerpt demonstrates they contain an implied threat:

> Dear comrades!
> On behalf of the Central Committees of the Communist and workers' parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union, we appeal to you with this letter, governed by sincere friendship, built on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, to express our concern about the state of our common affairs, about the strengthening of the positions of socialism and security, about the Socialist community of peoples (18.07.1968).[19]

The sense of anxiety and the need to resist it is also communicated as a collective "holy" or "common" duty, projected through rhetorical devices such as "we" ("мы") "our" ("наши"),

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[19] Дорогие товарищи! От имени Центральных Комитетов коммунистических и рабочих партий Болгарии, Венгрии, ГДР, Польши и Советского Союза обращаемся к вам с этим письмом, продиктованным искренней дружбой, основанной на принципах марксизма-ленинизма и пролетарского интернационализма, заботой о наших общих делах, об укреплении позиций социализма и безопасности, социалистического содружества народов; Центральному комитету комунистической партии Чехословакии [Appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. (1968, July 18). *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

“loyalty” (“верность”), “brotherhood” (“братство”), “high goal” (“высокая цель”), “unity – guarantee for victory” (“единство – гарантия побед,” 08.08.1968), and “solidarity, friendship” (“солидарность, дружба,” 09.08.1968). However, if the “Soviet people’s” appeals and approvals usually represented small pieces of texts, the official Kremlin’s positions communicated as the view of “our parties, our people” (“наши партии, наши народы”) were granted much wider editorial space. Such is the case in a two-page article in *Pravda* reprinted by *Izvestiia* under the headline “The Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty” (“Защита социализма – высший интернациональный долг”) published two days after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, on August 23.[20]

Throughout the months of July and August the tone would become both more alarming and instructive. However, the word “invasion” (“вторжение”) was never used. Rather, the Kremlin’s intentions were reported by *Izvestiia* as a “fight against bourgeois ideology, against all anti-socialist forces” (“борьба против буржуазной идеологии, против всех антисоциалистических сил”) as pointed out in a statement on behalf of the Communist and Working parties of the Socialist countries, published on August 4, after the Soviet-Czechoslovak Čierna nad Tisou and Bratislava talks in late July and August.[21]

Overall, the length of the stories increased significantly in August 1968 compared to the rest of the year, a fact that corresponds to the Kremlin’s eventual decision to move 165,000 soldiers and 4,600 tanks into Czechoslovakia under the code name *Operation Danube* during the night of August 20-21 (Williams, 1997, p. 112). Until that point there are no linguistic signifiers

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[20] See Appendix 5.
[21] Čierna nad Tisou is a Slovak village on the border with Ukraine. The Čierna and Bratislava meetings followed several other Soviet-Czechoslovak talks aimed to “to help break the impasse” with Czechoslovak liberal reformers. The meeting took place on July 29, the following in Bratislava – on August 3; see more in Williams (1997).

within *Izvestiia*'s texts indicating an erosion of Soviet trust. This could be viewed as part of the ideological work of the press to praise the imagined glorious Soviet brotherhood, in support of the imposed regime of truth, and to contrast it to "Washington," "Bonn's hypocrites" ("Боннские лицемеры") or "the aggressive NATO bloc" ("агрессивный блок НАТО") while concealing the real issues of the day (20.08.1968).

As the date of the invasion approached, *Izvestiia*'s articles suggested increasing panic and anxiety. Events in Prague were increasingly denounced as "counter-revolutionary" while the overall situation in Czechoslovakia was characterized as "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country" ("абсолютно неприемлива для социалистической страны," 20.07.1968), and even "insane" ("безумная," 31.07.1968). As for the Prague Spring's manifesto "2000 Words" (circulated by pro-reform adherents), it was condemned as a "political platform that contains an open appeal for strikes and riots" ("политическая платформа которая содержит открытый призыв к забастовкам и беспорядкам"), supporting the bourgeois ideologists who "attempt to export secretly anti-communism, nationalism and individualism into the world of socialism" ("идеологи буржуазии тайно стараются экспортировать в мир социализма антикоммунизм, национализм, индивидуализм," 20.07.1968)

On August 21, the Kremlin's decision to invade appeared in *Izvestiia* as a small *TASS* report.[22] It was portrayed as a common decision made by the Soviet Union and its allies to enter Czech territory in response to a "request" from Czech Party and Government officials for "urgent assistance" including the deployment of military forces, to protect the "Czech fraternal people" from "counter-revolutionary forces [that have] entered into [a] plot with hostile to socialism

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[22] See Appendix 6.

external forces."[23] After the invasion, the frame of "conspiracy," "plot" ("сговор"), and "counter-revolution" (контрреволюция) appeared throughout *Izvestiia*'s texts, as a counter-point to the positive descriptive language applied to "the healthy forces" (здоровых сил) of the socialist commonwealth.[24] Further justification for the invasion can be found on August 22, when the decision to invade was legitimized under the headline "In the Name of Security of Fraternal Peoples" ("Во имя безопасности братских народов").

Overall, the word "invasion" is absent from the way *Izvestiia* frames the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Rather, the Kremlin's decision to send tanks into Prague is portrayed as a protectionist act against "counter-revolutionary" forces. By not mentioning "invasion," the Kremlin's intentions, as reflected in *Izvestiia*, can be viewed as creating a space where the newspaper can insert language more in keeping with its own strategy. Doing so permits the Kremlin to allay panic by appealing to emotions that guide readers to support the invasion as a necessary act intended to protect a common good. This is based on well-tested Soviet propaganda devices, such as emotional outbursts ("Unity of hearts"), catchphrases and slogans ("Workers of the world, unite!"), and presuppositions ("progress of humanity").

As for the rhetorical strategies deployed, the analysis reveals an abundance of metaphors and epithets. In depicting the Socialist bloc, for example, salience was given to specific, in Entman's (1993) words, linguistic "building blocks," such as guardian, strength, glory, might, unity, brotherhood, fraternity, cordiality, and friendship, as well as epithets such as glorious,

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[23] ТАСС уполномочен заявить, что партийные и государственные деятели Чехословацкой Социалистической Республики обратились к Советскому Союзу и другим союзным государствам с просьбой об оказании братскому чехословацкому народу неотложной помощи, включая помощь вооруженными силами. Это обращение вызвано угрозы, которая возникла существующему в Чехословакии социалистическому строю (...) со стороны контрреволюционных сил, вступивших в сговор с враждебными социализму внешними силами; Заявление ТАСС [TASS Report]. (1968, August 21). *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

[24] See Appendix 7.

victorious, unbreakable, unconquerable, mutual, sincere, friendly, cordial, progressive, forward marching, immortal, memorable, defensive, protective, heroic, working, anti-fascist, rational and healthy. In contrast, the Other, in a broad sense, is addressed as an enemy: anti-socialist, imperialist, fascist, American, Nazi, crafty, capitalist, revenge-seeking, threatening, aggressive, bourgeois, provocative, diversionist, ill-doomed, hypocrite, insane.

In terms of sociocultural practice or the broader context within which the invasion of Czechoslovakia was framed, the intertextual analysis drawing attention, in Fairclough's (1995) terms, to the dependence of texts upon society and history, uncovers three important frames legitimating the Kremlin's position to invade and supporting the idea that Czechoslovakia and other Warsaw Pact countries shared an imagined common Soviet/Socialist identity.

Threat to the brotherhood and duty to the comrades. This frame is predominant in the news coverage, especially before and after the invasion. To legitimate the Kremlin's decision to invade and to build a shared sense of why it was necessary, *Izvestiia* relied on paternalistic and an emotionally rich tone connecting readers directly to notions of a common history, gratitude, and shared values. Priority was given to the socialist fraternal comradeship and the duty to guard it from threats posed by enemies of the Soviet Union.

In the appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from July 18, for example, the friendly salutation "Dear comrades" was followed by "deep anxiety" ("глубокое беспокойство") regarding "the offensive of the reactions patronized by imperialism against your party and the foundations of the social order in Czechoslovakia" ("Поддерживаемое империализмом наступление реакции против вашей партии и основ общественного строя ЧССР"). Further, on August 23, under the headline "The Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty" ("Защита социализма – высший

интернациональный долг”) the communist leadership expressed the alarm that the offensive “threatens the interests of the whole socialist system” (“подвергает угрозе интересы всей социалистической системы”). The symbolic power of the message was reinforced by accentuating not only the perception of a threat, but the threat to the sense of unity and common belonging supposedly embedded in the common history of Soviets and Czechs. By drawing on emotional appeals, the Soviets were often constructed as saviors of the Czechs from Hitler’s fascism, suggesting not only common belonging but also gratitude and fraternal duty:

> Our parties, our people, were fighting hand in hand (…) against Hitler’s invaders (…) And on the territory of Czechoslovakia, the graves of more than one hundred thousand Soviet fighters are scattered. Together with heroic Czechoslovak patriots, these people fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Hitler’s fascism. Exactly then, in these harsh years, were laid the solid foundations of unity and brotherhood between our peoples (23.08.1968).[25]

Furthermore, the same text expressed the idea that Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact were protectors of independence, peace and security in the whole of Europe, and that the alliance acted as a “barrier” against “the forces of imperialism, aggression and revenge.”

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[25] Наши партии, наши народы рука об руку боролись (...) против гитлеровских захватчиков (...) И на территории Чехословакии разбросаны могилы более ста тысяч советских воинов. Вместе с героическими чехословацкими патриотами (…) сражались эти люди за освобождение Чехословакии от гитлеровского фашизма. Именно тогда, в эти суровые годы, были заложены крепкие основы единства и братства наших народов; Защита социализма – высший интернациональный долг [The Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty]. (1968, August 23). *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

To strengthen the semantic force of the message, the Soviet idea was repeatedly connected to what Siebert et al. (1956) define as "Prometheanism." In this light, the whole idea of the socialist commonwealth reflected universal laws of self-sacrifice in the name of the common welfare, and "laws" that were incomprehensible to the "enemy." Under the headline "Will of the Time" ("Веление времени"), published on August 6, the socialist community was depicted by *Izvestiia* as not simply a temporary military and political bloc "like the bourgeois propagandists would like to represent it;" rather, the Soviet bloc was represented as "qualitatively new step in the gradual progress of humanity."[26]

Conspiracy and counterrevolution is another explicit frame in *Izvestiia*'s news coverage. This frame, in particular, was mobilized to trivialize the ideological drivers of reform that surfaced in the Prague Spring such as the "2000 Words" manifesto, "Club-231" and, generally, the uncensored free media. In this light, the conspiracy frame – notably reflected in the phrase "patronized by imperialism" ("поддерживаемые империализмом") – illustrates the fear of the Soviet leadership of exposing views and ideologies different from, in Siebert et al.'s (1956) words, the "Right Line" (p. 144). Hence, all the attempts for liberalization were depicted as counter-revolutionary instruments and platforms for "anti-socialist demagogy" ("антисоциалистическя демагогия"), which was meant to spread anarchy "under the slogan of democratization" ("злоупотребляя лозунгом демократизации, 18.07.1968). In order to illustrate to readers the implicit truth in such claims, "American imperialism" was placed in a

[26] Социалистическое содружество – это не временная групировка, не военно-политический блок, как хотели бы представить дело буржуазные пропагандисты. Это качественно новая ступень в поступательном развитии человечества; Веление времени [Will of the Time]. (1968, August 6]. *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

broader context of its “criminal war in Vietnam” and its “support of the Israeli aggressors in the Middle East” (18.07.1968).

After the invasion, a *normalization* frame became predominant. This directly followed the Czech-Soviet negotiations held on August 23-26 in Moscow, where a mutual agreement was reached “to take actions for urgent normalization of the situation in CSR“ (“была достигнута договоренность о мероприятиях, целью которых является скорейшая нормализация положения в ЧССР,” 28.08.1968). The normalization frame appeared in short but regular *TASS* dispatches entitled “Concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia” (“К положению в Чехословакии”). Each of these dispatches reported on the steps undertaken by the Czech government for “normalization of the political and economic life.”[27] In Russian, however, as Williams (1997) observes, the term normalization has dual meaning: “the process of ‘making normal’; and the adaptation of an object to conform to a norm” (p. 39).

Bearing this in mind, the process of normalization in its Soviet sense should be understood as “the re-establishment of rigid centralized control over Czechoslovak society by a disciplined, pro-Soviet party” (Williams, 1997, p. 40). Within the Czech communist context, the normalized life, as described by Czech President Ludvik Svoboda in his 1970 New Year’s address, meant three things: “a better tomorrow;” the confirmation of the leading role of the Party; and a “hermetic alliance with the Soviet Union” (p. 40). Thus, the much softer tone in *Izvestiia*’s coverage following the invasion used claims concerning the “healthy process” of normalization as a means to soften the Kremlin’s real objective: to reassert the dominant regime of truth. Moreover, even the normalization frame was placed in opposition to incendiary language that continued to demonize the enemy Other as “agents of imperialists” (“агенты

[27] See Appendix 8.

империалистов”) and “provocateurs” (“провокаторы”) disguised as “Western journalists” who were trying to impede the process of normalization by disseminating flyers, “fresh European information” (“свежая европейская информация”) or “intrigues and disinformation” (“интриги и дезинформация”).[28]

To further strengthen emotional appeal, the normalization processes led by the Soviet government “to protect socialism in Czechoslovakia” were characterized as having overwhelming support among both the Czech and Soviet peoples. This was contrasted with a supposed minority of “anti-people forces trying to tear Czechoslovakia away from the Socialist commonwealth … to cause nationalistic hysteria, anarchy and disorder” (“антинародные силы, которые делали ставку на отрыв Чехословакии от социалистического содружества (...) стремятся возбуждать настроения националистической истерии, насаждать анархию и беспорядок,” 29.08.1968). In an emotionally charged letter entitled “To My Friend in Czechoslovakia” (“Моему другу в Чехословакии“), published on August 29, the author Georgii Markov addresses his anonymous friend as “my dear friend” (мой дорогой друг) expressing the “Soviet people’s concerns” regarding the situation in Czechoslovakia:

> We want a better, worthwhile, more beautiful life. Do not you want the same? But why, suddenly, did our comradeship, bonded by the blood shed together in fighting against a common enemy, become an obstacle to this normal striving for a better life? (…) I write these lines and vividly imagine the strenuous life of our

[28] Провокаторы под маской западных журналистов [Provocateurs Disguised as Western Journalists]. (1968, August 30). *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

extraordinary soldiers who, today, are fulfilling in your country the international duty of the Soviet citizen (29.08.1968).[29]

Overall, the Cold War is not explicitly mentioned in the sample items about Czechoslovakia. However, it dictates and implicitly articulates the way the information is conveyed. In other words, the Cold War context constantly positions the on-going events between the binary opposition of Us versus Them. In order to strengthen the sense of Us and to justify the rightness of the Kremlin's regime of truth, *Izvestiia* relies on emotionally charged patterns, endlessly invoked, and grounded in easily understood commonalities that resonate across emotive categories such as common history, duty, gratitude and shared socialist values. Again and again these invocations are juxtaposed with the threat of the Other who aims to break the idyll of the Soviet bloc. In this respect, Moscow's decision to invade Czechoslovakia is portrayed as not only moral task to protect the Self and the imagined *Homo Sovieticus*, but also as the only rational response, one that aims to "put things right."

Ukraine

In the context of Ukraine, *Izvestiia*'s coverage contains predominantly (if not only) emotionally charged and highly empathetic items corresponding, in terms of journalistic practice, to opinion pieces – editorials or interviews – rather than to factual news. In this sense, a greater diversity of style genres was mobilized in the coverage of Czechoslovakia in the 1968 example.

[29] Мы хотим жить лучше, содержательнее, красивее. Разве вы сами не хотите этого? Ну почему этому нормальному стремлению вашего народа вдруг стала мешать наша дружба, скрепленная совместно пролитой кровью в боях с общим врагом? (...) Я пишу эти строки и живо представляю напряженную жизнь наших замечательных армейских парней, выполняющих сегодня в вашей стране интернациональный долг советского гражданина; Моему другу в Чехословакии [To My Friend in Czechoslovakia]. (1968, August 29). *Izvestiia*. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.

Considering that Ukraine is still regarded by most Russians as part of the Russian/post-Soviet sphere of influence, usually referred to as the Near Abroad, such an appeal to emotion should not be surprising. Russians overwhelmingly think of Crimea as their territory, inextricably connected historically, culturally and linguistically to them.[30] Russian-speaking Crimeans also tend to think of themselves as historically belonging to Russia. Such cross-associations are reified in expressions of Russian power: Russia's Black Sea Fleet, for example, is based on the Crimean peninsula. Russian ethnicity and language, and resonances with the perceived glories of the Soviet past are, therefore, deeply embedded.

Prior to the Sochi Olympics (February 7 to February 23, 2014), *Izvestiia*'s interest in Ukraine is quite intense, often with more than five opinion pieces per online issue dedicated, explicitly or implicitly, to praising, condemning, educating or propagating the need to remember or to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea, the Russian past, or Russian culture. The tone of these opinion pieces is highly emotional with an educational undertone. For example, the newspaper's overarching narrative choices constantly highlight the need to revitalize the Soviet Union's glorious past, which is seen as "doomed to oblivion" unless Russians stick together. By contrasting athletic achievements, "loud victories," "great champions and athletes," such as Lev Yashin (a football goalkeeper) depicted as "heroes" with today's "long-legged, busty" supermodel Irina Shayk, the newspaper repeatedly underscores a desire to keep memory alive and both preserve and promote an ideal of common legacy through the evocation of former Soviet sporting successes (09.01.2014).[31]

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[30] See, for example, the movie "Crimea: The Way Back Home" premiered on YouTube in March 2015.
[31] Shakhnazarov, M. (2014, January 9). Пусть помнят твердо героев спорта [Let's Firmly Remember Sports' Heroes]. *Izvestiia*, p.1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38241191.

Some of *Izvestiia*'s opinion pieces are reminiscent of a history lesson. Such is the case with "Common Duty," submitted by Maksim Kantor – a writer and painter – and published on January 9. Kantor begins his reflections with the bombing of Dresden in 1945, using the historical reference to build arguments in support of the Russian "national idea." He goes on to cite reminders of the "glorious Russian past" by invoking literary luminaries: the Apostle Paul, Dostoevsky, Fyodorov and Mayakovsky. Contemporary Russia is depicted as a "unique societal entity" threatened by "ideological crisis" whose "Christian duty" is to stay together in order to survive. The obvious message in Kantor's appeal is the need for self-protection from an impersonalised threat, a need that extends to protection of the neighbour.[32]

The escalation of territorial tensions in Ukraine throughout the following months is used as yet another reason for propagating Russianness in the pages of *Izvestiia*. In this regard, Vladimir Putin was able to play the Crimean card as kind of readymade "ace," for constructing the case that Crimea was, and remains, an integral part of Russia, a part that was relinquished as a result of an historical injustice. Starting with the protests on Kyiv's Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), the consequent annexation of Crimea in March, in spite of Western sanctions and outrage, *Izvestiia*'s coverage frames the events as "our right" to protect Russians, "brothers" or "our people" threatened by "them" referring to the Ukrainian "extremists,"

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[32] В России, которую жадность рвет в лоскуты, которую душат мелкие амбиции ничтожеств, которая судорожно ищет национальную идею, способную сплотить, данная идея существует давно. В разные времена эту идею выражали разными словами люди разных идеологических взглядов: и апостол Павел, и Достоевский, и Маяковский (...) долг христианина существует вопреки соревнованию, только солидарностью создается общество; Kantor, M. (2014, January 9). Общее дело [Common Duty]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38241259.

"nationalists" or "fascists" backed by "liberal gentlemen," "ultraliberal Western Europe" or "gloomy Washington."[33]

To foment a sense of panic and to legitimize the need to act, the events in Ukraine are depicted as "anarchy," "outrages," "radicalized," "bloody," and "aggressive." Europe is repeatedly portrayed in oppositional terms as "Western," "Russophobe," "supporting gay marriages," and "the Other Europe" (referring to Russia) – the defender of discredited conservative Christian values. In the same context, Putin is portrayed as "the most valued European in Europe" ("самый ценимый европеец в Европе").[34] Placed within a "civilizational framework" which reappears repeatedly, Ukraine is also characterized as "one country, two civilizations," an allusion to East Ukraine as pro-Russian; and "Kyiv-Westernish" seen as pro-Western, but invaded by "aliens," "provocateurs," "nationalists," and "neo-Nazis" (22.01.2014).[35]

Within the same civilizational framework, the depiction of the events in Ukraine escalates throughout the examined period to become a "civilizational skirmish" ("цивилизационная схватка") of the Third Rome (alluding to Moscow as the successor to the legacy of ancient Rome and Constantinople) versus "Hitler with a tail" or "Judas," a reference to Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist group, Right Sector (24.01.2014).[36]

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[33] As an example, see Benediktov, K. (2014, January 13). Россия и Германия - сотрудничество без дипломатических отговорок [Russia and Germany – Cooperation without Diplomatic Excuses]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38269335; and Kononenko, M. (2014, February 28). Валькирии и музы [Valkyries and Muses]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38974975.
[34] Mezhuev, B. (2014, January 16). На нас смотрит вся Европа [All of Europe is Watching Us]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38286896.
[35] Bondarenko, O. (2014, January 22). Виктор Федорович, раздавите гадину [Viktor Fedorovich, Crush the Reptile]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38324039.
[36] Karaulov, I. (2014, January 24). Гитлер с хвостом, Вий с усиками [Hitler with a tail. Vii with a small moustache]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38354354.

Within Ukraine, the same civilizational conflict is depicted as the "Slavonic anti-fascist front in Crimea" versus "Euromaidan" (Euro Square), referring to the Independence Square in Kyiv where the unrest in Ukraine began.

To further legitimize the Russian military intervention in Ukraine as protection not only of Russian "blood brothers," but also as a self-protection, a different rhetorical strategy was mobilized prior to the Crimean referendum held in March. In this case, *Izvestiia* represents events within the framework of panic and anxiety for "the Russian-speaking population" and "common national relics" (29.01.2014).[37] The threat of a referendum rejection of Russia is represented as "counterrevolution" and a "coup d'état." Anxiety was gradually stoked through the use of pejoratives and metaphors representing the authorities in Kyiv as an "Atlantic liberal-Nazi junta" or "useful idiots for liberal gentlemen," and part of "the global web of the American hegemony" (28.02.2014).[38]

In turn, Russia's legitimacy to act with regard to Crimea is presented as the only rational choice that Putin could make to protect the "pro-Russian citizens of Crimea." To strengthen the symbolic power of the message, *Izvestiia* contrasts Kyiv's foolishness to the hopelessness of the "worried citizens of Crimea" who "can only pray" for someone to come to their aid (21.01.2014).[39] Moreover, the power of the message continually relies on the presupposition of Crimean Russianness by articulating a statistical claim concerning the "millions of Crimean-Russians" who have a natural claim to protection from the Kremlin.

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[37] Levental', V. (2014, January 29). Сегодня мы все ленинградцы [Today We are All Leningraders]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38390542.
[38] Migranian, A. (2014, February 28). Украинская головоломка [Ukrainian Conundrum]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566745.
[39] Matsarskii, I. & Shakirov, D. (2014, January 21). Нам не нужна кровь, нам даже не нужна власть [We Don't Need Blood, We Don't Even Need Power]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38311175.

As Machin and Mayr (2012) observe, such statistics can be used to give the impression of credibility, when, in fact, readers are not given any specific information (p. 30). However in the case of Crimea, such "number games" could be seen as a strong tactic to gain public support. This is overtly expressed in an *Izvestiia* article from February 28, which explicitly stresses that "the biggest part of the [Crimean] peninsula's population traditionally gravitates to Russia which is not surprising considering its Russianness" (Основная масса населения полуострова традиционно тяготеет к России, что и неудивительно, учитывая ее русскость).[40] The sense of unity, entity and common belonging is also reasserted through emotional clues, usually conveyed in the headlines. These include the phrases: "Unity of hearts" ("Единение сердец," 16.03.2014), "We won't leave our people" ("Своих не бросим," 19.03.2014), and "Motherland, we are back" ("Родина, мы вернулись," 19.03.2014), all of which resonate with the old Soviet abstract way of constructing symbolic meaning.

The decision to send troops into Ukraine at the end of February is represented in elevated, paternalistic, and emotionally charged assertions. A Manichean "either …either" choice, or the use of an aggressive and dictatorial "must" form is used to make it clear to readers that the "wrong" choice will lead to an irreversible mistake. For example, in an article entitled "[Russia] Must Not Throw Russian People Away," *Izvestiia*'s special correspondent Elizaveta Maetnaia reports from Simferopol (the administrative centre of Crimea):

> I have a bunch of friends in Moscow, they are calling every day and I am asking – well, what have Yours [your government] decided – when are they going to help

[40] Khatuntsev, S. (2014, February 28). Незалежный Крым [Independent Crimea]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38974995.

> us? Yes, including with the army, you must not abandon Russian people here (…) Russia not only has to, Russia must help us; there are more than 70% of Russian-speakers here (…) Russia, we are with you! Putin is our President! (27.02.2014).[41]

Within the same issue from February 27, the head of the City Council in Simferopol depicts the Crimean people as scared, "beaten by radicals," mobilizing and arming themselves in order to say "no" to what is happening. In response to reports of "extreme danger" and "urgent requests for help," the Kremlin's decision to send troops is expressed through the categorical assertion: "We won't leave our brothers and more than one million compatriots" (27.02.2014). As with the Soviet-Czechoslovakian intervention (a half-century previously), the word "invasion" is never mentioned. Rather, the Kremlin's actions are represented as the only rational decision, even "against its will:"

> Russia does not need irredentism. Imperialistic seizures won't make it [Russia] stronger, richer, or more moral. We have enough land. There are uncultivated lands in the East, there are many desolated villages in the center of the country. As for the Russians abroad – the task and duty of Russia is to protect their rights worldwide. (…) Russia is not occupying and is not annexing (…) the course of the events has

[41] У меня куча друзей в Москве, звонят каждый день, а я у них спрашиваю - ну что там ваши решили, когда помогать будут? Да, в том числе и войсками, нельзя русских людей тут бросать (…) Россия должна, нет - обязана нам помочь, у нас тут больше 70% русскоязычных (…) Россия, мы с тобой! Путин наш президент; Maetnaia, E. (2014, February 27). Нельзя русских людей тут бросать [[Russia] Must Not Throw Russian People Away]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38971336.

> placed Russia, against its will, in a position of the only guarantor of the sovereignty of a neighbouring country (03.03.2014).[42]

Within the same issue, Russia's readiness to settle the conflict in Ukraine, including with military forces, is portrayed as "an invitation to dialogue" rather than as confrontation:

> What remains for Russia to do in this situation? Only to take a hard line, inviting partners to serious dialogue (…) Presumably, Russia's demonstrated readiness to regularize the Ukrainian crisis, including with military force, does not represent a step on the path towards confrontation, rather it is an invitation to a dialogue (03.03.2014).[43]

Surprisingly or not, as in Soviet times, the Kremlin's position is justified as not only the only rational choice to protect the Self but also as a needed step to protect "world history." This sentiment is summed up in the quotation: "In the face of Kyiv's junta, Putin decides not only the

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[42] Россия не нуждается в ирреденте. Империалистические захваты не сделают ее ни сильнее, ни богаче, ни нравственнее. У нас земли хватает. Есть неосвоенные просторы на востоке, есть множество пустующих деревень в центре страны. Что же до русских за рубежом, то задача и долг России - защищать их права во всех странах (…) Россия не оккупирует и не аннексирует (…) ход событий поставил Россию против ее воли в положение единственного гаранта суверенитета соседней страны; Karaulov, I. (2014, March 3). Когда срывают компромисс [When [They] Raze Compromise]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984485.

[43] Что остается делать России в этой ситуации? Только проводить жесткую линию, приглашая партнеров к серьезному диалогу (…) Можно предположить, что продемонстрированная Россией готовность урегулировать украинский кризис с привлечением военной силы является не шагом на пути к конфронтации, а приглашением к такому диалогу; Benediktov, K. (2014, March 3). Взвешенно и жестко [Nobly and Firmly]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984475.

fate of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, he [also] decides the fate of Russia, moreover – [the fate of] world history" (28.02.2014).[44]

In a further echo of the 1968 invasion, the Kremlin, through *Izvestiia*, mobilizes voices from its sphere of influence and control, in this case from another troubled vassal, Chechnya. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov is quoted as saying that "Russia should not leave in trouble those who need its help in Ukraine" ("Россия не должна бросать в беде тех, кто нуждается в помощи на Украине").[45] Other "expert" voices are also mobilized. In a commentary entitled "Ukrainian conundrum" ("Украинская головоломка") on "why Russia cannot stay indifferent to what is going on in the territory of its closest neighbour" ("о том, почему Россия не может остаться равнодушной к тому, что происходит на территории ее ближайшего соседа"), political scientist Andranik Migranian observes:

> (...) with all the respect due to the Ukrainian sovereignty and its territorial integrity, if armed clashes and bloodsheds happen in the East, the South [part of Ukraine] or in Crimea, it's hardly likely that the Black Sea Fleet and Russia itself would be able to stand on the sidelines of these events. Millions of Russians live in Ukraine and millions of people with relatives in Ukraine live in Russia. Russian authorities will

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[44] Перед лицом киевской хунты Путин решает не просто судьбу Крыма и Востока Украины, он решает судьбу России, более того - мировой истории; Dugin, A. (2014, February 28). Отказать новой Украине в признании [Refuse Recognition to New Ukraine]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38975003.

[45] Kashevarova, A. (2014, February 28). Кадыров оценил ситуацию на Украине как госпереворот [Kadyrov Evaluates Situation in Ukraine as Coup d'Etat]. *Izvestiia*, p. 3. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38974980.

be put under tremendous pressure in order to defend their own people (28.02.2014).[46]

To build his arguments, Migranian contrasts "the increasing chaos" in Ukraine, which takes place "right under Russia's nose," to American bombings and similar interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt and Syria – countries "that 99% of the Americans are not likely to indicate on a map" ("которые 99% американцев вряд ли покажут на карте"). In this regard, the Americans, the author insists, must understand that Russia cannot leave millions of Russians and their relatives. To make his arguments even stronger, Migranian refers to General Alexander Haig's words to American President Ronald Reagan, made in the midst of the Cold War, that in some cases a situation might occur when "there are more important things than peace" ("есть вещи поважнее мира").

In terms of journalistic style, *Izvestiia* relies on highly opinionated and emotionally rich items, the knowledge of "experts," official statements and crafted interviews to strengthen the Kremlin's position on Crimea. In contrast with the dominant commanding tone in the Soviet-era *Izvestiia*, however, the language here is much more vibrant. The post-Soviet texts reveal a plurality of discursive genres varying from conversational, literary, ironic and sarcastic to experts' pieces usually written by journalists, philosophers or political scientists, but always selected to support the Kremlin's position. The semantic force of the texts is conveyed through analyses, historical references, personal judgments, interpretations or observations connected to

[46] (…) при всем уважении к украинскому суверенитету и территориальной целостности, если будут массовые столкновения и кровопролитие на Востоке, Юге, в Крыму, то вряд ли Черноморский флот, да и сама Россия смогут остаться в стороне от этих событий. На Украине проживают миллионы русских, и в России миллионы людей, у которых есть родственники на Украине. На российские власти будет оказано мощнейшее давление, с тем чтобы защитить своих; Migranian, A. (2014, February 28). Украинская головоломка [Ukrainian Conundrum]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566745.

the dominant position. Nevertheless, they suggest “a much more nearly equal relation between speaker and reader” (Von Seth, 2011, p. 59). In other words, they are more conversational and less bureaucratic, but remain abstract and highly emotive.

In Bakhtinian terms, the semantic force of these messages is additionally reinforced by the constant reappearance of culturally shared symbols. As representatives of Russian cultural greatness, for instance, icons such as Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Rublev, Kandinsky, Tchaikovsky, and Stravinsky are repeatedly referenced to strengthen patriotic feelings. In an article published on February 12, for example, Russian culture is represented metaphorically as “a firebird” (“Жар-птица”) that needs to rise: a Russianized reference to the Phoenix myth. As the author Egor Kholmogorov (publicist) observes: “For the whole educated and civilized world, Russian culture is not a grinning bear with vodka (…) It is a wonderful unimaginable firebird. It is time for it to rise from the ashes for us too” (Русская культура для всего образованного и цивилизованного мира - это не оскалившийся медведь с водкой (…) Это чудесная невообразимая Жар-птица. Пора бы ей уже восстать из пепла и для нас).[47]

As for the rhetorical strategies deployed, the analysis reveals an abundance of metaphors and epithets. In depicting Russia, for example, predominance is given to “building block”-type language such as: great, unique, glorious, noble, spiritual, Orthodox, civilized, protective, moral, responsible, superpower, empire, reasonable, cultural, patient, determined, patriotic, peaceful. In contrast, the Other, in a broad sense, is addressed as: enemy, imperialist, fascist, American, Nazi, Westernish, liberal, radicalized, terrorist, extremist, hysterical, threatening, aggressive, marauding, foolish, irresponsible, provocative, hypocrite, insane, hostile. Journalistic voices are

[47] Kholmogorov, E. (2014, February 12). Возвращение Жар-птицы [Return of the Firebird]. *Izvestiia*, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38808410.

conveyed in the Soviet-inspired manner, through the objective modality and "*we*" form, connoting one collective view of unity, duty, and solidarity, with "our people," or "Russian-speakers" in Ukraine.

Drawing on such highly charged rhetoric, the predominant style is best described as *publicist*, defined by Pasti (2005) as "literature on public-political issues" (p. 111). The post-Soviet publicist, as Pasti points out, usually addresses a particular factual news story but in a literary format, using a much more "expressive, emotional, ironic and witty" style supported by personal judgments and comments in order to draw specific conclusions (p. 111). Referring to the genre of *ocherk*, a "kind of journalistic essay," such texts represent a unique journalistic genre characterized by "in-depth discussion of a particular problem in which the author expresses his or her own thoughts and emotions and aims to evoke the emotions of the reader" (Voltmer, 2000, p. 478).

The article "Valkyries and Muses," published on February 28, provides an explicit example of Russian publicist free-styling. The author identified in a by-line as "Maksim Kononenko, journalist," provides a discussion on revolutions as cultural symbols. To build his arguments, he contrasts the glory of the French and Russian revolutions to the contemporary "ersatz" revolutions in "mass consumption" such as "Made in the US, assembled in China" or "the latest Ukrainian" revolution. According to Kononenko, the cultural consequence of the "assembled in China"-type revolution is merely to go to war with monuments and cultural symbols, while the "latest Ukrainian revolution" is nothing more than the replacement of Mayakovsky and Rodchenko (here another reference to Soviet classics) with the Ukrainian singer Ruslana. Thus, Kononenko constructs a highly sophisticated narrative, underscored with sarcasm that trivializes the events in Ukraine by juxtaposing them with the Russian glorious past

and present while alluding to the spiritual emptiness of Western consumerism, the apparent and inevitable outcome of Ukrainian alignment with the West.[48] Throughout the period under examination, such opinionated items, contrasting Russia to some culturally inferior Other, written by journalists, publicists, politicians or "writers" are regularly cycled through *Izvestiia*'s coverage.

In terms of the sociocultural practices or the broader context within which the events in Ukraine are portrayed, the following interconnected frames are identified as building blocks of the Kremlin's concern for controlling the common post-Soviet identity.

Russia's greatness and duty to protect it frames Russia's historic greatness and the attendant responsibility of the Russian people and State to protect such a legacy. This is clearly evident in the sample texts. The "greatness frame" builds its arguments on a glorious past, common language, and Orthodox Christianity, values that are used to legitimize the Kremlin's decision to disregard its neighbour's sovereignty and to enter Ukrainian territory. Moreover, it confirms the argument that "Putin appears to believe that the revival of a strong state and the unification of society through a *pride of belonging* to it represent the only way" for Russia to move forward (Tolz, 2001, p. 279). In this regard, some rhetorical strategies deserve particular attention.

The notions of "empire," "superpower," and the "Third Rome" reappear repeatedly as fundamental characteristics of the Russian world. Following this line, *Izvestiia*'s coverage reasserts the rightness of the Kremlin's position as the only rational and natural decision in order

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[48] Kononenko, M. (2014, February 26). Валькирии и музы [Valkyries and Muses]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566608.

to establish the "empire of good" ("империя добра," 25.03.2014).[49] The independence of Ukraine is consistently portrayed as an "historical mistake" that should be fixed since "the preservation of Ukraine in its existing boundaries" is seen as "not historically neither ethnically nor legally grounded." Rather, it is portrayed as supported by an "anti-Russian vector" with the goal of Ukraine falling as soon as possible under "the guarantee umbrella of the EU and NATO" ("под зонтиком гарантий ЕС и НАТО," 11.03.2014).[50]

This position is strengthened by the recurring theme that most Russians believe Crimea is Russian territory, and the depiction of Russian soldiers in Ukraine as "patriots" ("патриоты") and "militias" ("ополченцы"). In this vein, Russian President Vladimir Putin is actually portrayed as a peaceable protector who "has never declared or will declare war on Ukraine and its people." Rather, "we are talking about the need to protect hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens" (03.03.2014).[51] It is worth noting here that the "millions" we have discussed above are now replaced by "hundreds of thousands." This may be closer to the truth, but according to *Izvestiia*'s coverage it is still impossible to say exactly how many Russians inhabit Crimea.

The notion of empire is recurrent. The events surrounding the Crimean referendum are addressed as not only an historical mistake, but as revenge for its "illegal" separation from the old Soviet Union. Once again, an implied threat is disguised as a reasonable argument to boost the case for Crimea's reunification with Russia, in order to gather together "the Russian lands." This "historical revenge" is seen as "a struggle with no rules" that Russia has been waiting to

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[49] Melent'ev, S. (2014, March 25). Становление империи добра [Establishing the Empire of Good]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/568110.

[50] Kholmogorov, E. (2014, March 11). Собирание земель русских [Gathering of the Lands of the Russians]. *Izvestiia*, p. 1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/39069713.

[51] Президент России Владимир Путин никогда не объявлял и не объявит войну Украине и ее народу. Речь идет о необходимости защиты сотен тысяч граждан России; Kadyrov, R. (2014, March 3). Ярошей скоро не станет, а нам жить в мире и согласии [It won't Become Iaroshei Soon, but We Have to Live in Peace and Understanding]. *Izvestiia*, p. 4. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984477.

enact for 23 years (since the dissolution of the USSR).[52] The following passage illustrates the emotive intent of the language around Russia's "awakening:"

> You too aggressively have buried the Soviet Union over the post-Soviet space, but now, exactly now, March 1-2, 2014, you finally, dazedly, begin to recognize that the rumors about the dead of a hateful superpower turned out to be premature. Too premature. [You finally begin to recognize] that our heads and hands – of our people, power, President of the RF, parliament, and government – they are all set in motion by these Soviet feelings, will and judgment (…) Finally, the USSR came out of a coma and shock, and began restoring order in its homeland Soviet space. (…) Yes, the events in the last few days – they reproduce statements and actions of the USSR, of its spirit, will and might (03.03.2014).[53]

In connection to the concepts of "empire" and "superpower," the awakening of Russia is constantly portrayed through "the firebird" metaphor, or "shaking off the dust." In turn, the need for a new ideology seems urgent. This is revealed in an article published on February 14 in which "historians, economists, journalists, and experts responsible for the ideology in Soviet times" have been invited to contribute to a new, Russia-centric way of thinking ("в ее

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[52] Kholmogorov, E. (2014, March 11). Собирание земель русских [Gathering of the Lands of the Russians]. *Izvestiia*, p.1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/39069713.

[53] Вы слишком настойчиво хоронили СССР на постсоветском пространстве, но теперь, именно теперь, 1-2 марта 2014 года, вы наконец-таки с изумлением начинаете сознавать, что слухи о смерти ненавистной сверхдержавы оказались преждевременными. Слишком преждевременными. Что нашими головами и руками - и народа, и власти, и президента РФ, и парламента, и правительства - движут именно эти - советские чувства, воля и разум (…) СССР наконец-таки (!!!) вышел из комы и шока и начал наводить порядок на своем родном советском пространстве (…) Да, события последних суток - это заявления и действия СССР, его духа, его воли, его мощи; Roganov, S. (2014, March 3). Детский лепет западной политики [Childish Prattle of Western Politics]. *Izvestiia*, p. 9. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984470.

разработке принимают участие историки, экономисты, журналисты, специалисты, отвечавшие за идеологию еще в советское время"). In addition, it is explicitly stated that "any concept of Russia's progress must contain the imperial idea" ("любая концепция развития России должна содержать в себе имперскую идею"). The three main postulates of the imperial idea are further developed as: first, Russian imperial history; second, Holy Russia (the Third Rome, namely Moscow as the capital of the Eastern Orthodox Christianity) as "the red avant-garde of the Earth" ("красный авангард Земли"); and third, a new elite, "fully committed to the development of the country."[54]

Another reconstruction of Russia's imperial greatness can be found in the repurposing of the old tsarist concept of *New Russia* (*Novorossiia*).[55] This is largely attributed to spokespeople representing the highly disputed, self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.[56] It is a controversial term, particularly in its deployment following the much-disputed annexation of Crimea, yet is frequently mobilized in *Izvestiia*'s texts as a booster for common patriotic feelings, and in support of the "people's guards" in Donetsk and Lugansk. For example, in an article published in July, Sergei Mironov, who is a famous Russian politician, explains that the ideas expressed during the Crimean referendum are shared not only by "millions of citizens of New Russia," but also by "millions in Russia," which is declared as a proof for the ambition to overcome "the historical ruptures of Russian history" ("преодолеть исторические разрывы

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[54] Podosenov, S. (2014, February 14). СПЧ и НАК разработают идеологию развития страны [SPCH and NAK Elaborate the Ideological Growth of the Country]. *Izvestiia*, p.1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38881191.
[55] The term dates to the late 18th century, when Catherine the Great won lands near the Black Sea after a series of wars with the Ottomans and created a governorate known as "New Russia."
[56] Following the referendum in Crimea in March, referendums on the status of Donetsk and Lugansk took place in May 2014. The results, however, were not recognised by any government, except the Russian. Moscow stated its "respect" for people's decision. See more in Tsoi, D. (2014, May 12). Донецк и Луганск объявили независимость [Donetsk and Lugansk Declare Independence]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/570657.

русской истории”). The same text by Mironov addresses two other prevailing ideas in building pro-Russian narratives – that of the Russian Orthodox tradition and of Vladimir Putin as the guardian of Russianness:

> (…) the people in New Russia and Russia identify themselves with the Russian Orthodox tradition – not in its purely ecclesiastical [form] but in a broader sense. This is revealed by sociological surveys for about 80% of the citizens of our country. (...) These 80% are the same people who today support Vladimir Putin and expect from him to strengthen the Russian state. Finally, these are the same people who are proud of our army – the army which crossed the Alps, stopped Napoleon, saved Russia during the years of the Great Patriotic [war] and very recently protected the population of Crimea from the fate that later overtook Donetsk and Lugansk (31.07.2014).[57]

Even prior to the referendums on the status of Donetsk and Lugansk, the term “New Russia” is discussed by Igor Karaulov – a poet and translator – as indicative of two interdependent concepts. Under the headline “Meet New Russia!” (“Встречайте Новороссию!”), the author explains that “New Russia” alludes to the notion of independence, but also to the notion of “the unbreakable connection” of these regions to Russia. Furthermore,

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[57] (…) в Новороссии и в России люди идентифицируют себя с русской православной традицией — не в сугубо церковном, но в более широком ее понимании. Таковых, как показывают социологические опросы, около 80% граждан нашей страны (…) это те самые 80%, которые сегодня поддерживают Владимира Путина и ожидают от него укрепления российского государства. Наконец, это те самые люди, которые гордятся нашей армией — переходившей Альпы, остановившей Наполеона, спасшей Россию в годы Великой Отечественной и совсем недавно защитившей население Крыма от той участи, которая позднее постигла жителей Донецка и Луганска; Mironov, S. (2014, July 31). Новороссия — Новая Россия [Novorossiia – New Russia]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/574606.

Karaulov asserts that an "Eastern Slavonic triad is rising, formed from the common cultural and territorial ground of "Russia, Belarussia, New Russia"" ("воссоздается восточнославянская триада, на этот раз в форме "Россия, Белоруссия, Новороссия," 06.05.2014).[58] It is noteworthy that Karaulov employs Belarussia (the older Soviet name of Belarus), not the name that independent Belarusians use for their country.

As late as June, "New Russia" is connected to the broader concept of the Russian world and culture by contrasting the concept with "the Ukrainian nationalists" and "Western Nazis," which are described as "criminal unities" ("криминальные объединения," 03.06.2014).[59] Even the breaking news about the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014 is appropriated for the cause. The headline "The crash of Malaysian Boeing takes the lives of 298 people," is followed by the subheading "The leadership of New Russia considers the destruction of the liner as a planned provocation of Kyiv" ("Руководство Новороссии считает уничтожение лайнера спланированной провокацией Киева").[60] Further, Western accusations regarding Russia's responsibility for the crash are completely disregarded. Rather, they are used as a counter-argument against "the Western propaganda" in order to justify "the battle for Ukraine as a stage in the struggle for a new world order" (29.07.2014).[61]

The Western insanity is another frame that reappears throughout *Izvestiia*'s coverage. It stands in contrast to the theme of Russian reasonableness and will for justice and peace. In this

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[58] Karaulov, I. (2014, May 6). Встречайте Новороссию! [Meet Novorossiia!]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/570410.

[59] Chalenko, A. (2014, June 3). Территория закона [Territory of Law]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/571890.

[60] Gridasov, A. & Petelin, G. (2014, July 17). Крушение малайзийского Boeing унесло жизни 298 человек [The Crash of Malaysian Boeing Takes the Lives of 298 People]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/574010.

[61] Migranian, A. (2014, July 29). Битва за Украину как этап в борьбе за новый миропорядок [The Battle for Ukraine as a Stage in the Struggle for a New World Order]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/574569.

frame, every Russian move towards Ukraine is justified as absolutely reasonable and rational as opposed to the West's "nonsense" or "madness" in Iraq and Libya. This can be seen as an obvious reminiscence of the differentiation technique, as discussed by Barukh Hazan (1982) or, in modern terms, as an example of *whataboutism* suggesting that any criticism should be put in a different context with the reverse question "What about…" In 1968, such a technique was largely deployed by *Izvestiia* with regards to the US actions in Vietnam and the Middle East; in 2014 it takes the form of "what about Iraq or Libya."

In this light, Western logic regarding Ukraine is ironically portrayed as "deadly" (убийственная) whereas Western readers, according to *Izvestiia*, "support Putin and laugh at Obama" (26.06.2014; 07.03.2014). Within the same anti-Western rhetoric, the US and its leaders are usually metonymically addressed as "America," "the Americans." Their "Ukrainian puppets" (марионетки) are regularly framed with epithets derivative of "insanity" because they are incapable of understanding Russian logic. Such a sarcastic tone, as the following extract illustrates, is mobilized even by Vladimir Putin in one of his early assessments of Western responses to the actions in Ukraine:

> Sometimes I get the impression that over there, beyond the big puddle, somewhere in America, are sitting in some kind of a laboratory, assistants doing some kind of experiments as if with lab rats, without even comprehending the consequences of what are they doing (…) Why was it necessary to do that? Who can explain it? There are no explanations at all (04.03.2014).[62]

[62] У меня иногда складывается впечатление, что там, за большой лужей, сидят где-то в Америке сотрудники какой-то лаборатории и, как над крысами, какие-то проводят эксперименты, не понимая последствий того,

The Other's mental inability to understand the real situation in Ukraine is developed from the very beginning of the protests in Kyiv, as reflected in the following excerpt:

> The events in Ukraine resemble a political thriller: spectacular, with special effects, with an unknown ending. Those coming to Maidan, immediately succumb to this romance and make reports with creepy and touching details, trying to convey the feeling, the atmosphere. Everyone wants drive-up. Everyone wants to feel Ukraine (…). Few want to understand it. Everyone wants to watch a movie. As if it is a movie about another planet, not about a neighboring country (04.02.2014).[63]

Faced by such a paradoxical indifference and lack of understanding of the real issues of the day, Russia's actions in Ukraine are over-and-over presented as the only rational and logical choice to be made.

The final dominant frame in *Izvestiia*'s coverage concerns *conspiracy, farce and the boomerang effect.* In portraying the "Western conspiracy" in Ukraine as a "farce" (06.03.2014), the newspaper illustrates "liberal attempts" to democratize countries such as Iraq as examples of Washington's ineptitude. Metaphorically, an article from July 1, compares American politics to a

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что они делают (…) Зачем надо было вот это сделать? Кто может объяснить? Объяснений нет вообще никаких; Sozaev-Gur'ev, E. (2014, March 4). Путин: «На Украине произошел вооруженный захват власти» [A military coup d'état took place in Ukraine]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566953.

[63] Украинские события похожи на политический боевик: захватывающий, со спецэффектами, с неизвестным финалом. Те, кто приезжает на майдан, тут же поддаются этой романтике и ведут репортажи с жуткими и трогательными деталями, стремясь передать ощущение, атмосферу. Всем хочется драйва. Все хотят чувствовать Украину (…) Мало кто хочет ее понимать. Все хотят смотреть кино. Как будто это кино про другую планету, а не про соседнюю страну; Fedorova, A. (2014, January 31). Романтика народного насилия [Romance of the People's Aggression]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/564775.

reverse Midas-touch where "… if Midas turned into gold everything he touched, everything that the US touches beyond its own territory – in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, Syria – turns into ashes, chaos" (01.07.2014).[64] Within the same article, the American politics of rapprochement of its "marionettes in Kyiv" with NATO and the EU is seen as the reason for "a civil war" in Ukraine.

In the same vein, the sanctions imposed by Washington on Russia are trivialized as nothing serious, with no effect on Russia's rightness and greatness. Rather, they are discussed within the "boomerang effect" suggesting that Washington and its allies will suffer more than Russia for the sake of their actions (17.07.2014).[65] The same "boomerang effect" appears in early *Izvestiia*'s articles, right after the Kremlin's decision to send troops into Ukraine "for normalization of the societal-political environment in the country" (03.03.2014). The author points out that "For now, Russia strikes back. In response to the offensive statements of Obama, [Russian] senators have proposed to recall the Russian ambassador in Washington." Discussing the sanctions that the US and the European Union might apply against Russia, the author admits that "such a 'punishment' on the part of Brussels and Washington would be painful for Moscow"; however, "… today, in practical terms, the US has no significant trade with Russia," and therefore, Washington's economic sanctions "won't lead to great harm for Moscow." Rather, the European Union is the one that will suffer more.[66]

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[64] Сравнивая американцев с фригийским царем Мидасом, можно сказать, что если всё, к чему прикасался Мидас, превращалось в золото, то всё, к чему прикасались США за пределами собственной территории: в Югославии, Ираке, Афганистане, Ливии, Египте, Сирии, а сегодня и на Украине — превращается в пепелище, хаос и неуправляемость; Migranian, A. (2014, July 1). От Клинтона до Обамы [From Clinton to Obama]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/573291.
[65] Sozaev-Gur'ev, E. (2014, July 17). Путин: 'Санкции имеют эффект бумеранга [Putin: 'Sanctions Have a Boomerang Effect]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/573960.
[66] Gor'kovskaia, M. (2014, March 3). Дипломатические демарши Москву не испугали [Diplomatic Demarches Did Not Frighten Moscow]. *Izvestiia*, p.1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984490.

In an article published on August 7, the headline ironically indicates that "Russia will survive without hamon [a type of Spanish ham], oysters and Roquefort," an allusion to bourgeois values. What is more important, the imposed sanctions are seen as yet another reason to protect Russia's national interests and to encourage its own potential in terms of domestic products, depicted as "irreplaceable," "with no chemistry," and "beneficial for people's health" (07.08.2014; 06.08.2014).[67]

The aforementioned findings provide compelling evidence for striking parallels and continuity of the old Soviet journalistic techniques and rhetorical strategies into post-Soviet times. However, they also reveal some important operational differences between the Kremlin's regime of truth, *then* and *now*. Overall, the post-Soviet *Izvestiia* relies significantly on anti-Western rhetoric in justifying the Kremlin's decisions regarding Ukraine. Such explicit Cold War strategies position Russia and its ruling elite not only as *the good* battling *the bad* guys but also serves as a dominant argument for constructing the concept of the post-Soviet Russian Idea. The following concluding chapter will consider the evidence presented here to flesh out the similarities and differences between *then* and *now*, and to discuss how the study of journalistic texts provides insight into the Kremlin's techniques for the application of power.

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[67] Lyalyakina, A. (2014, August 7). Россия обойдется без хамона, устриц и рокфора [Russia Will Survive Without Hamon, Oysters, and Roquefort]. *Izvestiia* online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/574967.

Chapter 5

East versus West Journalistic Practices: Concluding Remarks

To revisit a central concept within this thesis, according to Foucault (1980), each society has its "regime of truth" (p. 131). Such regimes are produced and transmitted through particular discourses, mechanisms and instances – army, education, media – controlled by those in power until official truth becomes received truth. The *Truth*, therefore becomes a system "of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" (p. 133). As Foucault suggests, language and, particularly language deployed by a regime within journalistic texts can be made to serve as tools to influence those whom the regime wishes to control.

In order to survive, the regime of Soviet truth created its own methods of control. What Tikhomirov (2013) terms a regime of Soviet "forced trust" was based on simultaneously generating faith in the central power – by setting up channels for distributing it – and maintaining a high level of generalized distrust at the same time (p. 80). The regime of Soviet forced trust "enabled emotional mobilization of the population and establishment of discipline in order to create a multi-layered social differentiation of the population, dividing it into 'friends' and 'enemies'" (Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 80).

Ironically, twenty-five years after the old Soviet regime, ostensibly, came to an end, the post-Soviet regime seems to operate within the same antagonistic boundaries of trust and distrust, mobilizing the same aggressive but emotive language as a crucial tool for submission to its artificially constructed regime of truth. In this light, if language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of political and sociocultural changes, which was the basic premise of this thesis, the

barometer of *Izvestiia* indicates a retrogression in Russian journalism and its practices to a communist model of control, rather than a model of *glasnost'* or *openness* that showed itself, briefly, following the fall of the Communist regime.

This is revealed by the discourse and framing analysis of both communist and post-communist journalism perspectives, as reflected in *Izvestiia* in portraying two key events of the *old* and *new* Cold War. Did the new realities, then, tangibly change the way journalism in post-Soviet Russia is done, at least in terms of its rhetorical and discursive manifestation? As the analysis demonstrates, the answer is no. Even though the old patterns of the Cold War are confronted by the new reality – new digital technologies, the Internet, and the collapse of the Communist regime – the rhetoric and discursive constructions of *Izvestiia*'s texts have been aided and abetted by new technologies of dissemination. In other words, the aims and objectives of message control, originating in the Kremlin, remain largely unchanged even as it has become easier for the regime to circulate its constructed reality. Such ease of circulation simply gives the state leadership the appearance of being more "modern" than it really is.

The findings, therefore, substantiate the hypothesis that despite the collapse of the Soviet Communist regime in 1989 and the consequent political, social and economic changes that occurred in Russia, the Soviet past still guides the rhetorical and discursive intentions of the contemporary Russian regime. Of greater importance, the pro-Kremlin press today still serves as an important ideological and propaganda tool, operating in a different sociocultural setting, but still maintaining those in power through the old techniques. First among these techniques is the re-purposing and adaptation of Cold War discourses in order to build contemporary Russian nation-state narratives and imaginaries. The ideological difference consists of the replacement of Marxism-Leninism with today's Russian Idea in order to fill the gap left by the collapse of

Communism. As the analysis aimed to demonstrate, *Izvestiia* has been appropriated to build the Russian Idea on the notions of a strong state, a shared Russian culture, patriotism, and a belief in Russian greatness. All is meant to serve Vladimir Putin's vision of the core values of Russianness, as expressed in his *Millennium Manifesto*, and has been used to reveal that *Izvestiia* strictly follows the Kremlin's line.

In an Orwellian sense, the contemporary newspeak of the Russian state, as reflected by *Izvestiia*, suggests neither deviation from, nor a contradiction to the Kremlin's regime of truth. Journalists in the pro-Kremlin news media, then, still act more as propagandists or "educators" disseminating, in Foucauldian terms, knowledge in support of the only possible official truth, rather than as dispassionate observers and critics. Of course, confronted by new social, cultural, economic and technological realities, fragments of the past are mobilized in a different context by the newly evolved Kremlin's newspeak, but new content is certainly crafted to fit previously used patterns. Both the Soviet and post-Soviet incarnations of *Izvestiia* circulated nation-state narratives of Soviet and Russian greatness in constant opposition to an imaginary Other, mobilizing the discourses of fear and protection. In both 1968 and 2014, there is no deviation from the dominant Kremlin line. This suggests that the highly instrumentalized role for *Izvestiia* has been maintained. Even if a certain strain of plurality is on display, it is more accurately a plurality of social actors (in the most literal sense) writing in accordance with the dominant view, rather than a plurality of different voices and opinions that circulate free of constraint.

It should be noted that the post-Soviet *Izvestiia* is much more vibrant and witty, when compared to its predecessor. However, this does not mean it is more "professional," at least in the Western sense of the word. Rather, the journalistic language deployed is less bureaucratic and more conversational even as it remains highly opinionated, partisan and one-sided. There is

no room for objectivity or criticism of the dominant view. The newspaper still retains many of the old rhetorical strategies that take the form of emotionally rich outbursts or vague headlines to produce arguments in support of those in power. Undoubtedly, this seems problematic since if *then*, in Soviet times, the techniques of master-minding the public's consciousness – through language – represented an integral, obligatory part of the *repertoire* of the Soviet regime, today the same techniques, built on a Manichean paradigm are vigorously employed by Russian journalists when it comes to marshalling public opinion. The recurring journalistic techniques can be summarized as follows:

Polarization technique – "forces of evil" versus "forces of good"

Manicheism – black or white, out of context

Pre-constructed threat as a reason to act against an enemy

Whataboutism

Partial facts or historical context as justification

Irony and sarcasm

Experts' knowledge

In addition, all arguments and counter-arguments are presented as if they represent the personal point of view of journalists, thus assuming legitimacy. But this is done at the expense of providing no new information or "news." To illustrate this, it is noteworthy that after reading hundreds of *Izvestiia*'s pages regarding Ukraine and Crimea, some basic "facts" remain unclear. The most obvious example is, and remains, a clear understanding of the exact number of

Russian-speaking people in Crimea. This is no small matter. The Kremlin's claim on Crimea is predicated on "saving" and "protecting" its cultural citizens on the peninsula.

In turn, the journalistic style, in both periods, is highly opinionated, "publicist," conversational, and subjective rather than objective. The paternalistic, educative and elevated tone is maintained, quite often suggesting and promoting a dominant position over the public. The tone of the texts positions journalists, writers or other "experts," vis-à-vis the *Izvestiia* readership, as propagators of specific and exclusive knowledge represented as the *Truth*, rather than as common knowledge shared among peers. As a result, instead of asserting critical thinking or igniting debate, as should be the role of the news media in a "fourth estate" journalistic model, the semantic force of the texts switches from commands and warnings to a more interpretative vein of analysis, judgements, and in-depth philosophical discussions simulating a dialogue but in practice representing a monologue.

In such a system of "top down" information flow it is useful to map out the types of discursive frames, past and present, that were identified in the analysis of *Izvestiia*:

Czechoslovakia	**Ukraine**
Pre-constructed threat	Anxiety
The self-definition is impossible without the enemy image	The self-definition is impossible without demonizing the enemy
Conspiracy and counterrevolution	Conspiracy and coup d'etat
Historical gratitude – Normalization	Historical injustice – Normalization
Need to protect the Socialist commonwealth	Need to protect Russianness

The Soviet Union as saviour	Russia as Motherland
Emotional clues	Emotional clues
Irony	Sarcasm
From *Homo Sovieticus*	To Great Russia

In both periods, the similarities in discourses, mobilized by the regime, can be readily traced. An opposition remains between a projection of the enemy as "Western," "fascist," "conspiratorial" and "insane," and self-legitimation as "protectionist," "rational," and "historically logical." Furthermore, in both periods, events on the ground are placed within the basic dichotomy of Us versus Them, in order to construct the overarching grand discourse of Soviet/Russian greatness. Ideologically, both Czechoslovakia and Ukraine are regarded as part of the Soviet or Russian sphere of influence. The audiences in each case are appealed to as reliable and predictable "comrades" or "brothers." In this regard, both the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Russian intervention in Ukraine are seen as protecting and legitimizing the Self, whether the Self is the Soviet bloc or the Russian Idea. The difference is that under Brezhnev, the news media propagated an "imagined community" of a happy and flourishing Soviet brotherhood with zero tolerance for the imperialist capitalist Other. Under Vladimir Putin, a different type of "imagined community" has been constructed, one in which the enemy image is portrayed as a threat against and a legitimation for the Russian national identity. The threatening factor, in the contemporary pro-Kremlin discourse, therefore, further builds on the classical dichotomy that conflates protection of Russianness and Russian culture with hatred toward an imagined enemy.

The discursive construction of the Russian Idea, however, mobilizes something that is missing in the Soviet-era *Izvestiia*. This missing part is the Russian Orthodox tradition.

Stigmatized by the old Communist regime, today's distinctly Russian Church is back as a compelling symbol, discursively constructed by *Izvestiia* as a unifying signifier for Russianness. The findings, therefore, support observations from a number of scholars, concerning Putin's apparent conservative Orthodox sympathies (Malykhina, 2014; Slade, 2005; Gorham, 2014). What is more important, the Orthodox values, as mobilized by the pro-Kremlin media, including *Izvestiia*, refer to another mythical construction – that of the Russian empire. As Malykhina (2014) observes:

> Over the course of Putin's rule, it has become increasingly clear that the Orthodox Church is playing a similar role to the one it played during the Imperial period. (…) Kremlin ideologists gloss over the role of the Orthodox Church "as the only major social institution to have survived their nation's turbulent history." Meanwhile Russian liberal leaders have less tolerance for overtly religious overtones in public discourse and expect a more nuances assessment of Russia's historical connections, particularly careful phrasing of the idea of Moscow being the Third Rome and its profoundly anti-Western orientation to avoid misunderstanding. Putin, who speaks this way, only confirms suspicions that such simplicities of faith, and a habit of seeing a hideously complicated Russian world in black and white fashion, may bring the survival of religious nationalism (p. 53).

It is also noteworthy that Vladimir Putin is the first Russian leader, after *perestroika* of a constitutionally guaranteed *secular* Russian state to openly exhibit "religious sentiments." Indeed, Malykhina records that Putin went so far as to talk about the relationship of church, state,

and nation at an Orthodox Christmas service in 2000, proclaiming "that [Orthodoxy is] an unbending spiritual core of the entire people and state" (p. 54). This stance is reflected in pro-Kremlin journalistic practices wherein the news media implicitly support the regime's pro-Church position and precisely adjust their tone to Kremlin initiatives.

Indeed, the newly evolved newspeak neither deviates from nor contradicts the ruling view where the Orthodox Church is concerned. The Orthodox tradition has been incorporated into the Russian Idea – along with other common cultural symbols – as a resurrection of Russian imperial glory. The essence of the "national question" for Russia, as Putin sees it, and as it is reflected in *Izvestiia*'s coverage, is a "civilizational identity that is based on the preservation of a Russian cultural dominance where differentiation between "us" and "them" is determined by a common culture and shared values" (Malykhina, 2014, p. 50).

In addition, the contrast-and-compare analysis of communist and post-communist Russian press texts, as reflected in the study of *Izvestiia,* poses some important questions regarding journalism as a central component of an effective public sphere and its role in civil society in democratic states. By turning the focus on Russia, the analysis in this thesis aimed to not only "open a window" onto the Russian world (as conveyed discursively by the media for internal Russian consumption), but also to provoke critical thinking on the way Western "liberal" journalistic standards contradict or overlap with certain Russian principles of what the profession stands for.

With respect to this line of thought, a question that might occur is: Isn't it obvious that the Western understanding of the role of the media in a democratic society has nothing to do with the pro-Kremlin standpoint? Drawing on Habermas (1996), journalism and political legitimacy are closely correlated since journalists constitute a crucial part of the liberal public

sphere which refers to the space of civil society situated between the legislative power and citizens. In this vein, the power of the media, as Habermas sees it, is "to understand themselves as mandatory of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they at once presuppose, demand and reinforce; like the judiciary, they ought to preserve their independence from political and social pressure" (p. 378).

In other words, at least ideally, the media should act in a socially responsible manner, serving the public interest by providing objective reporting, thereby enhancing civil dialogue and critical engagement. The question of how media should act in theory, and how do they act in practice, of course, is contested even within the Western tradition but such a discussion goes beyond the goals of this thesis. What is important here is that major and dominant news media outlets in Russia, and *Izvestiia* certainly fits into this category, serve a different purpose from their Western counterparts.

Regardless of the fact that the 1993 Constitution of Russia guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, the specifics of the Russian cultural, historical, and political identity, used by those in power, hinder the influence of Western models.[68] Those in power encourage a specific Russian adaptation of liberal-democratic concepts to create journalistic principles that have little or nothing to do with core liberal imperatives such as free speech or plurality of voices. This might have been expected during the Soviet era, but one of the more surprising findings from the *Izvestiia* study is the extent to which Putin has *blatantly* appropriated Soviet discursive strategies and tactics.

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[68] See Article 29 (5), Конституция Российской Федерации. [Constitution of the Russian Federation] Retrieved from http://www.constitution.ru/.

If there is a difference, it is that Putin's regime of truth operates by looking back to a glorified and largely mythical Russian *pre*-Soviet past, rather than forward to the creation of a just and dynamic "real" New Russia. Of course, this maintains the privilege of those in power, but does little to address current problems or future concerns. It is a strangely conservative worldview, but one that seems to work. The absence of rational and critical debate in *Izvestiia*'s texts has not hurt Vladimir Putin in the least. The vast majority of Russians support their president and continue to vote for him.

In this regard, the pro-Kremlin news media may be viewed as the key to understanding the complexities of political life in Russia. This opens the possibility for further research, an empirical study in support of a wider exploration of the impact of news media – *all* news media in Russia – on political decision-making processes. In addition, further research into the Cold War framework, contrasting both Russian and Western news media as a mobilizing factor for political approval, would update our understanding of the differences and similarities between the two journalistic forms. This is important for the understanding of how journalism operates in different socio-cultural contexts. Such a study would include an exploration of media effects on audiences, something that is largely relegated to anecdote in the *Izvestiia* study.

In some respects this is already happening. Most current scholars understand that it is naive to characterize the Russian public as a passive mass bystander reduced, in Lippmann's terms, to a "phantom" that merely observes the Kremlin's strategic game. In fact, the results of a series of recent focus groups conducted across Russia demonstrate that "Russian citizens are surprisingly sophisticated when it comes to decoding media messages" (Voltmer, 2010, p. 148). Moreover, most Russian "news consumers" are

aware of the biases in news reports and are able to question the underlying communicative intentions in a story. At the same time, representative surveys carried out after the Duma elections in Russia in 1999 and 2003 show a close correlation between voter choice and exposure to television news (Voltmer, 2010, p. 148).

The surveys reveal that voters who relied mainly on state television were significantly more likely to vote for the Kremlin-supported party, United Russia, than those who watched commercial television. This is further evidence that the Kremlin fully understands the power of control over news media as a powerful mobilizing factor for will-formation. The degree to which the pro-Kremlin oriented channels contribute to a political mobilization and engagement, however, deserves further examination.

A final possibility for future research arising from the *Izvestiia* study is to address journalists and editors who work for the pro-Kremlin news media. This object of study recognizes that reducing the Russian news media to mere ideological machines runs the risk of neglecting the subjective perceptions and motivations of those who produce the Kremlin's content. Of course, it can be assumed that some of these journalists have no choice but to do what they are told. However, structured and semi-structured interviews with editors, reporters and other journalistic contributors such as "experts" would reveal personal motives, agendas and general perceptions that would significantly enhance our insight into the way that Russian journalists deal with institutional control mechanisms. Such a study might include a comparison between what journalists think of offline and online/alternative domestic Russian media, and domestic and international pro-Kremlin channels. This has the potential to enrich the range of comprehension on journalistic values and the Russian way of practicing journalism.

To conclude, if the press texts serve as barometers of social and political change, the *Izvestiia* study indicates that little has changed significantly in terms of media-power dynamics in Russia. The news coverage continues to follow the Kremlin's line and portrays the world in the long-established way of Us versus Them binary. Indeed, the Kremlin has had some success in exporting this basic communication strategy. When Canada's Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, recently suggested that Russia will be unable to return to the G7 talks as long as Vladimir Putin is in power, Putin responded by saying that the United States would make the decision on whether he would have a seat at the table. "I don't want to offend anyone, but if the United States says Russia should be returned to the G8, [Canada's] prime minister will change his opinion," Putin told journalists.[69] This was the equivalent of an international slap in the face, a suggestion that Harper should keep quiet and let the big historic players – Russia and the US – make the decisions. It is no secret that Harper has been an adamant critic of the Russian annexation of Crimea and a staunch supporter of Ukraine. It should come as no surprise that Putin would infer that Canada is to America what Ukraine is to Russia: a wrongheaded upstart in need of "education."

As for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, recently released statistics re-affirm the efficacy of the Kremlin's approach. A survey conducted by the *Levada Center* (a Russian non-governmental research organization) in March 2014 – the month of the referendum in Crimea – showed that almost 90 per cent of Russians supported the unification with Crimea, while the majority of respondents – 62 per cent – believed that Russia has been

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[69] Putin is Convinced Canada Will Change Its G8 Stance if US Says So. (2015, June 20). *Sputnik*. Retrieved from http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150620/1023615458.html.

guided in its policy towards Ukraine "by a desire to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in Crimea and Ukraine and to ensure their prosperity."[70] In July 2014, Putin's approval rating grew to a record-breaking 86 per cent among Russians, a level at which it remains as of this chapter's writing in June 2015.[71] Further illustrating the effectiveness of Cold War discourse across a period of decades, Russian disapproval of the US rises every month while approval by Russians of the West, in general, continues to fall.[72]

As Russia continues to redraw the map in Ukraine, the media narrative is once again split between East and West. *Izvestiia* has shown us that the resurrection of Cold War rhetoric is not only evident, but effective. Is it at all possible to recognize the *Truth* in the different journalistic portrayals of the events in Ukraine? As Foucault (1980) suggests, it is important to think of the political problems not in terms of ideologies but in terms of "truth" and "power" (p. 132). Within the new media battle over Ukraine, the *Truth* remains an open question. The "power" behind the "truth" is there for all to see.

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[70] About 90% of Russians back Crimea's self-identification. (2014, March 27). *The Voice of Russia.* Retrieved from http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_03_27/About-90-of-Russians-back-Crimea-s-self-identification-4667/.

[71] See Appendix 9.

[72] Podosenov, S. (2014, April 2). Россияне обиделись на Запад из-за Украины [Russians feel slighted by the West over Ukraine]. *Izvestiia.* Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/568476; Adomanis, M. (2014, July 23). Russian Opinion Of The United States Is At An All-Time Low. *Forbes.* Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/07/23/russian-opinion-of-the-united-states-is-at-an-all-time-low/.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:

Izvestiia's report on the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014.

17 июля 2014, 23:46 | Общество | Андрей Гридасов, Герман Петелин | написать авторам

Крушение малайзийского Boeing унесло жизни 298 человек

Комментарии 161 Нравится 128 28 Твитнуть 77 +1 5

Руководство Новороссии считает уничтожение лайнера спланированной провокацией Киева

Фото: ИЗВЕСТИЯ/Семен Пегов

В четверг вечером в Донецкой области в районе боевых действий потерпел крушение самолет Boeing 777 авиакомпании Malaysia Airlines, совершавший рейс MH17 из Амстердама в Куала-Лумпур. На его борту находилось 295 человек — 283 пассажира и 15 членов экипажа. Все они погибли.

Малайзийский авиалайнер исчез с экранов радаров примерно в 17.20 мск за 10 минут до выхода из украинского воздушного пространства перед границей с Россией. Примерно в это же время в милицию Тореза поступил звонок о том, что неподалеку от города неизвестный самолет упал на землю.

Appendix 2

A sample of selected items from January to June 1968, representative of the general themes, organized by theme, key words, date of publication, and type of publication – factual news, opinion piece, interview or official statement.

#	Theme	Key Words	Date	Type
0005	Positive/Abstract	Brothers, unity, comradeship, working people, cordiality	June 27	Factual
0008	Positive/Abstract	Comradeship, fraternal Czechoslovakia, productive cooperation (плодотворное сотрудничество), great principles of Marxism-Leninism	June 26	Factual
0010	Positive/Aggressive	Friends, young people, Warsaw Pact, peace efforts, against revenge-seeking tendencies in West Germany	June 25	Factual
0012	Pathetic/Aggressive	Human history, military partnership (боевое содружество), defensive union, brotherhood, American imperialists, enemies of Soviet Russia	June 23	Statement (General of the Soviet Army)
0013	Pathetic/Aggressive	Czechoslovakia, strong unit of the Warsaw Pact, fight for democracy and peace on Earth, progressive/working people on Earth against world capitalism	June 22	Statement (Czech Minister of defense)
0018	Abstract	National Front of Czechoslovakia, Socialist values, union, anti-fascist fighters	June 18	Statement of the National Front of CZ
0019	Positive/Abstract	A friendly talk, Czech friends, a friendly visit, Brezhnev	June 16	Factual
0039	Pathetic/Abstract	Communist Party, working class, Lenin, history, imperialist circles, crafty slogan of liberalisation	May 11	Opinion (Stepanov)
0041	Positive/Abstract	Dear comrades, comradeship, Nazi occupation, 23th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi German fascism	May 11	Statement (Czech representatives)
0042	Pathetic/Abstract	Mutual cooperation, unity and cohesion, military cooperation, international communist movement	May 9	Interview (Dubček)
0043	Pathetic/Abstract	A feat (подвиг!), Soviet victory over Nazi German Fascism, antifascist coalition, including CZ	May 9	Statement (Soviet Marshal)
0044	Pathetic/Abstract	Liberation of Prague, heroic fight of the Soviet army on Czech territory, free, independent, socialist CZ	May 7	Opinion (Memoirs of a Soviet Marshal)
0045	Positive	Czech ambassador, solidarity, military cooperation, progress of humanity	May 7	Factual
0047	Positive	Visit, Czech delegation, Moscow, sincere, friendly atmosphere	May 6	Factual
0049	Pathetic/Positive	Slogan: Workers of the world, unite! Marxism-Leninism, triumph, 150th anniversary Karl Marx, truth, unconquerable	May 5	Factual

0052	Positive	"Made in CSR," export, leading, manufacture	May 1	Factual
0053	Pathetic/Positive	May 1, solidarity of working people on the planet, one family, Workers of the world, unite!	May 1	Factual
0055	Pathetic	Fight for Brno, past, memory, history	Apr.27	Opinion (Memoirs of Soviet Colonel-General)
0059	Pathetic/Positive	Leninism, immortal, progress of humanity, 98th anniversary of Lenin	Apr.23	Factual
0069	Positive	Important decisions, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)	Apr.12	Factual (dispatches)
0072	Aggr./Negative	Problems, international situation, fight of the CPSU for cohesion and solidarity, enemy ideology	Apr.11	Statement of the CC of CPSU
0075	Aggr./Negative	Socialist democracy, rule of the people (народовластие), freedom of the little man, dictatorship of bourgeoisie	Apr. 6	Opinion (by-line)
0076	Pathetic/Negative	Cohesion of the forward marching [countries], the world against imperialism	Apr. 6	Opinion (by-line)
0078	Pathetic/Negative	Party, society, historical opportunities, American aggression	Apr. 4	Statement (Dubček)
0079	Positive	Unbreakable, unity, people, party, fraternal countries	Mar.31	Factual (dispatches)
0081	Positive	Equality, economic, science, technological progress, export	Mar.29	Opinion (by-line)
0084	Aggr./Negative	Threat, world, American aggression in Vietnam	Mar.10	Statement (all)
0087	Pathetic/Positive	Mighty guardian of the world, brotherhood, Party's leadership, patriotism, glorious, Marxism-Leninism, 50th ann. Soviet army	Feb.25	Factual (dispatches)
0088	Pathetic/Positive	Prague, progress, socialism, world, comradeship, great fight	Feb.24	Opinion (correspond.)
0089	Pathetic/Positive	Legendary, glory, progress of humanity, 50th ann. Soviet army	Feb.24	Statement
0090	Pathetic/Positive	Big holiday, celebrations, guests, Victorious February (Feb. 21 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with Soviet backing, assumed undisputed control over the government of CZ)	Feb.23	Statement (Dubček)
0092	Pathetic/Abstract	Victory, bourgeois, people's revolution	Feb.22	Stat. (Novotny)

Appendix 3

A sample of selected items from January to August 2014, representative of the general themes, organized by theme, key words, date of publication, and type of publication – factual news, opinion piece, interview or official statement.

#	Theme	Key words	Date	Type
09_01	Pathetic/Abstract Critical/Negative	Memory (память), past, preservation of traditions (сохранение традиций), great champions, great athletes, heroes, loud victories (громкие победы), Soviet slogan "Oh sport, you [are] the world!," heroes of the sport, Саша Белый, длинноногая грудастая Ирина Шейх, Lev Yashin (Лев Яшин), Mario Lemieux (Super Mario), oblivion (забвение)	Jan.9	Opinion Mikhail Shakhnazarov, Journalist
09_01 (3)	Pathetic/Abstract/ Negative	Common duty (общее дело), National idea, ideological crisis, war, fire, catastrophe, survive only together, Russia as unique societal entity (уникальное общинное образование), Dostoevsky, Fyodorov (Nikolai Fyodorovich Fyodorov, philosopher), moral, protect the comrade, unity (единение), solidarity	Jan.9	Opinion Maksim Kantor, Writer and Painter
13_01	Negative/Abstract	Merkel, Russia-Germany, intersection points (точек пересечения), common interests, Eurozone, gloomy leers from Washington (хмурые взгляды из Вашингтона), liberals, Ukraine, Russophobes, Anglo-Saxon bloc, global players (глобальных игроков), Putin as spiritual chief of the Other Europe defending conservative Christian values as opposed to ultraliberal and postmodern Western Europe	Jan.13	Opinion Kirill Benediktov
13_01 (1)	Negative/Abstract	Ukraine, Sochi, western media, the Arab spring, RU real assessment vs Western "romantic" images of victory of liberal democracy in the Middle East	Jan.13	Opinion Alexandr Rar
16_01	Aggressive/Negative	RU, Western Europe, civilizational conflict, gay marriages, Putin as the most valuable European in Europe (самый ценимый европеец в Европе), crisis, the Third Rome (Eastern Orthodox tradition)	Jan.16	Opinion Boris Mezhuev
20_01	Pathetic/Abstract	Past, history, textbooks, fascism, ideologies, Putin, the Great Patriotic War	Jan.20	Factual
22_01	Aggressive/Negative	Maidan, Russian nationalists, conspiracy, illness (болезнь), territory, religion, integration to Russia	Jan. 22	Opinion Maksim Kononenko
22_01 (1)	Aggressive	Independent Ukraine but Russian city of Kyiv, reptile (гадина), aliens (пришельцы), incomprehensible, provocateurs, neo-Nazis, lost girl, western sponsors	Jan.22	Opinion Oleg Bondarenko
22_01 (2)	Negative/Abstract	Украіна, mother, language, speech (речь), literature, two Ukraine (s) – left bank and Kyiv-Westernish (киевско-западенскую)	Jan.22	Eduard Limonov
22_01 (4)	Negative	Magnitsky Act, Cold War, illiterate, the US Congress, haughtiness, Social contract, irresponsibility	Jan.22	Opinion John Laughland
23_01 (1)	Aggressive, Negative	Concern, anti-Semitism, attacks, radicalization, Radicals=Right Sector, Banderovtsy, anarchy, outrages, dangerous situation, malevolence (неприязнь)	Jan.23	Opinion,Ianina Sokolovskaia, Konstantin Volkov

23_01 (2)	Abstract/Negative	Civil diplomacy, new geopolitical bloc, ideological mirages, new doctrine, great countries, superpower (сверхдержава), territory, defend RU interests, nostalgic phantoms	Jan.23	Natalia Bashlykova
24_01	Abstract/Negative	Hitler with a tail, anti-Semitism, Nazism, civilized regression, ancient course, Judas, Right sector, Banderovcy, Kyiv, revolt, euro integration	Jan.24	Igor Karaulov
24_01 (2)	Abstract/Negative	Fight for European integration has led to blood, radicalized protest	Jan.24	Iurii Matsarskii
28_01	Abstract/Negative	Gangsters, Romanian revolution, foreigners, Western politicians	Jan.28	Eduard Limonov
29_01	Abstract/Pathetic	The siege of Leningrad, Putin, Crimea, Kyiv, friends, our blood brothers (братьев родных)	Jan.29	Factual Egor Sozaev-Gurev
29_01 (2)	Abstract/Negative	Harkov, We, the second capital of Ukraine, pro-Russian, cultural center, healthy logic, extremism, revolutionary ideology	Jan.29	Opinion Sergei Roganov, Philosopher
29_01 (3)	Abstract/Negative Pathetic	Leningrad, We, holiday, patriots, motherland, common national relics (общенациональные святыни), fascists, logics, pathos	Jan.29	
30_01	Negative	The Europeans (европейцы), the Eastern Partnership, Достоевски, Barroso, Putin, new dividing lines in Europe, help (помощь), home affairs (внутренние дела), intervene (вмешиваться) inadmissible, civilized (цивилизованные) methods of fight, historical and cultural links, restraint (сдержанность), misunderstanding (недопонимание)	Jan.30	Factual Meeting RU-EU
31_01 (2)	Abstract/Pathetic	One country – two civilizations, cleavage, federalization, East Ukraine=antibodies against the West's decadent virus (антитела против западенского вируса), Crimea – the peninsula of Russian glory, Russia's weighty word (веское слово), different history, East-West, need for decision	Jan.31	Opinion Igor Karaulov, Poet and translator
31_01 (4)	Abstract/Negative	Germany, history, 100th anniversary of WWI, whoever wins in the fight for Ukraine (в борьбе Москвы и Брюсселя за Украину), take into consideration (Moscow, Berlin, Kyiv)	Jan.31	Ivan Preobrazhenskii, Political scientist
04_02	Abstract/Negative	The romantic side of people's violence (Irony), movie, everyone is watching without understanding (except RU), the image of Ukraine, people (народ), need for decision, indefiniteness	Feb.4	Opinion Anna Fedorova, Writer
04_02 (1)	Aggressive/Negative	Slavonic Anti-Fascist Front in Crimea vs Euromaidan, post-soviet space, colonial revolt directed by foreign puppeteers (заграничными кукловодами), neo-Fascism, Russophobia, anti-Semitism, the situation in UKR – not an internal affair anymore, Putin to protect the Russian-speaking population from the fascist terror	Feb.4	Factual Sergei Podosenov
06_02	Aggressive/Negative	The generation of hamburgers, the US, nationalism's infection, history, us vs them, a gulf between two concepts of the world (мировоззренческая пропасть)	Feb.6	Opinion Vsevolod Nepogodin, Writer
06_02 (2)	Abstract	Federalization, Euro regions	Feb.6	Opinion Vadim Shtepa

07_02	Positive	Soviet sport, past and present	Feb.6	Factual Olga Zavialova
07_02 (1)	Positive	Putin’s Media triumph, the Russian Gulliver vs lilliputs	Feb.7	Factual Boris Mezhuev
07_02 (2)	Negative	Videogames, fascists tanks vs soviet machines, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet content	Feb.7	Factual D.Runkevich
12_02 (1)	Pathetic/Critical	Return of the firebird, Russian culture vs cultural provincialism, West, Russian cultural greatness (величие), Rublev, Kandinsky, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Tchaikovsky, Stravinsky, for civilized world the Russian culture is not a bear with vodka, us vs them	Feb.12	Opinion Egor Kholmogorov
14_02	Critical	Need for new ideological platform, Russia as the keeper of one fifth of the water on the planet, the imperial idea, three postulates	Feb.14	First Line Sergei Podosenov
20_02	Negative	The protests in Kyiv crossed the red line, Right sector, weapons, radical forces	Feb.20	First Line Ianina Sokolovskaia
21_02	Negative	Church, we can only pray (hopelessness)	Feb.21	Interview Bishop Augustin
21_02 (2)	Aggressive/Abstract	Indulgence for extremism, Western politicians and their “clients”, East-West, Russia’s enemies, civil war, two civilized unities – European and Eurasian, two civilizations	Feb.21	Opinion Boris Mezhuev, Philosopher and journalist, Deputy Chief Editor of Izvestiia
21_02 (5)	Abstract/Pathetic	Total lie of the world media, Ukraine as a territory, not a country, where a huge number of Russians live, protect them, combat readiness	Feb.21	Opinion Maksim Kononenko
27_02 (2)	Negative/Alarming	[Russia] must not abandon Russian people, Russia has to help Crimea, must to help, Russian people, 70% Russian-speakers, Russia We are with you, Putin, Our President	Feb.27	Factual World-News Elizaveta Maetnaia
27_02 (3)	Negative/Alarming	Coup d’état, Russian language, Russian-speakers, to support the youth from fraternal country (братской нам страны)	Feb.27	Factual Russia-News Dmitrii Runkevich, Elena Malai
27_02 (5)	Negative/Alarming	Crimean people are scared, buses burned, beaten by radicals in masks, the air in Crimea is electrified, they afraid, they organize themselves, arm themselves in order to say “no” to what is happening in Ukraine, women’s mobilization, Internet video showing armed radicals from Right sector beating people; burning question from Crimean people – to find arms if they come to us with weapons, referendum (first mentioned!)	Feb.27	Interview World-News The head of the City council in Simferopol
27_02 (6)	Negative/Alarming	Volunteers from Russia ready to help East Ukraine, request for assistance (просьба о помощи), moral support (моральной поддержки), unrests in Ukraine – especially danger for Crimea	Feb.27	World-News Konstantin Volkov
27_02 (7)	Negative/Alarming	Provocations, civilizational skirmish (цивилизационная схватка), collapse of the Russian-speaking space, We won’t leave our brothers and more than 1 million compatriots	Feb.27	Interview Russia-News Leonid Slutskii

27_02 (8)	Negative/Alarming	Anti-Russian attitudes, moves, media, Status “a non-citizen of Ukraine”	Feb.27	Russia-News Dmitrii Runkevich, Elena Malai
28_02	Negative/Aggressive	Valkyries and Muses, cultural revolutions	Feb.28	Opinion Maksim Kononenko
28_02	Aggressive/Abstract	Ukrainian conundrum	Feb.28	Opinion Andranik Migranian
28_02 (1)	Negative/Alarming	Russian language, classics, theatres in Ukraine, Chekhov,	Feb.28/ Feb.26 online	Opinion Culture, Oleg Karmunin
28_02 (2)	Negative/Aggressive	Ramzan Kadyrov, coup d’état, help, Russia should not leave in trouble those who need its help, chaos, Ukrainian friends, the West	Feb.28	Interview Ramzan Kadyrov
28_02 (5)	Positive	Putin’s rating reached Olympic heights	Feb.28	Factual Aleksandr Iunashev
28_02 (8)	Negative/Alarming	Russia to protect its sovereignty, the USSR, Ukrainian coup d’état, Kyiv junta, Nazis, useful idiots for liberal gentlemen, At this moment the course of world history is fighting out (в эти минуты определяется ход мировой истории)	Feb.28	Opinion, Alexandr Dugin, Philosopher
03_03	Negative/Aggressive	Diplomatic demarches have not frightened Moscow, diplomatic war, normalization, West, sanctions, Russia strikes back (boomerang effect - отвечает ударом на удар), the EU’s hysteria, double standards in international affairs (whataboutism), logic	Mar.3	First Line Mariia Gorkovskaia
03_03 (1)	Pathetic	People’s support (rallies) in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Thank you for not throwing us (Спасибо, что не бросаете нас); Thank you, dear, for not leaving us [03_03 (2)]	Mar.3	First Line Alena Sivkova, Dmitrii Runkevich
03_03 (4)	Negative/Pathetic	The use of armed forces permitted until stabilization in the country, gross violation of human rights and persecution of people based on political, religious, national and other traits, fraternal country (братское государство), people are intimidated by three months of outrages and injustice, to bring back the situation in Ukraine in the normal constitutional track, a threat for the life of Russian people, questioning NATO’s reasons for sending troops, protect Russian-speakers in East Ukraine	Mar.3	Opinion Russia-Ukraine Natalia Bashlykova
03_03 (5)	Negative	Russian citizenship, passports, anti-people laws	Mar.3	Factual Dmitrii Runkevich
03_03 (8)	Aggressive	Mad Yarosh, Umarov, terrorist attacks, brothers, to live in peace and harmony, Russian President Vladimir Putin has never declared or will declare war on Ukraine and its people. We are talking about the need to protect hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens	Mar.3	Opinion Ramzan Kadyrov
03_03 (9)	Aggressive/Pathetic	Post-Soviet Russia does not conduct intervention on its own territories, on its own people, the Americans theoreticians cannot understand that vs logic, the rumors about the dead of the USSR as superpower turned out to be premature, history, absolute indivisibility of the Soviet	Mar.3	Opinion Sergei Roganov, Philosopher

		space. The last events witness the spirit, will and might of the USSR, Ahead – new great history		
03_03 (10)	Aggressive/Pathetic	Russia is not occupying and is not annexing. The course of events has placed Russia, against its will, in a position of the only guarantee of the sovereignty of a neighboring country, West cannot guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine, West has failed, For a period of three months RU has restrained from interference, protect brothers	Mar.3	Opinion Igor Karaulov, Poet and Translator
03_03 (11)	Aggressive/Pathetic	Russia's readiness to settle the conflict in Ukraine including military forces as an invitation to dialogue, rather than as confrontation	Mar.3	Opinion Kirill Benediktov Writer and Politician
05_03 (6)	Pathetic	History, to stop Hitler, 1938	Mar.5	Opinion Maksim Grigorev
05_03 (7)	Negative/Pathetic	Our territories, fraternal people, referendum, West, Soviet song: "What we've conquered, we would never give it up to the enemy"	Mar.5	Opinion Eduard Limonov, Writer and politician
06_03	Negative	Sanctions, adequate measures, When we, the Russian lawyers, read the constitution of Ukraine, we have the impression that what happened in Ukraine is an anti-constitutional coup d'état. However, our European and American colleagues call it a revolution	Mar.6	Interview Andrei Klishas
06_03 (1)	Negative/Pathetic	The goal of the military operation (Putin): to warn Kyiv that for any impudent action towards the residents of the eastern regions they will have to pay. Russia cannot leave its own people in trouble	Mar.6	First Line Boris Mezhuev Philosopher and journalist, Deputy Chief Editor of Izvestiia
06_03 (7)	Negative/Pathetic	Hard but necessary choice to protect our own Russian-speaking people, Putin, the US, we are not the ones who first started (whataboutism)	Mar.6	Opinion Anna Fedorova, Writer
11_03	Negative/Pathetic	Gathering of Russian lands, Historical mistake, Crimea, absurd, the USSR	Mar.11	First Line Egor Kholmogorov
11_03 (1)	Pathetic	Crimea boosts the historical process of reunification with Russia	Mar.11	First Line Natalia Bashlykova
11_03 (4)	Pathetic/Negative	Historical revenge, 1991, fear of Apocalypses, struggle for new peace would look like a sequence of local diplomatic clashes. Such collisions we have already seen around Libya and Syria. There are no rules	Mar.11	Opinion Timofei Bordachev, Political scientist
11_03 (5)	Aggressive/Abstract	Crushing defeat of Western Ukraine and of West in Ukraine (world play), schizophrenic, Cold War, whataboutism	Mar.11	Opinion Andranik Migranian, Political scientist
12_03 (2)	Abstract/Pathetic	Russian Crimea as the precious, 1991, historical mistake, Russian spiritual spring, Tolstoy, Russians are awakening, shake off the dust (firebird)	Mar.12	First Line Aleksandr Prokhanov
13_03 (3)	Positive	Most of the Crimean people want to see themselves as citizens of Russia	Mar.13	Factual Ruben Garsiia

13_03 (5)	Negative	Cold War	Mar.13	Opinion Dmitrii'Drobnitskii
14_03	Positive	Church, Crimean Diocese registered in Russia	Mar.14	Factual
14_03 (6)	Aggressive/Abstract	Kissinger, realism, the US, West, a blackmail: we can, but you cannot (нам можно, вам нет), whataboutism	Mar.14	Opinion Alexandr Dugin
08_04	Aggressive/Abstract	Double standards, the revolts of the population of the Southeast (Donetsk, Lugansk) against the " junta " were predictable, Russian spring	Apr.8	Opinion Vsevolod Nepogodin
14_04	Abstract	Maria Vladimirovna, Grand Duchess of Russia (a great-great-granddaughter in the male-line of Emperor Alexander II of Russia), Crimea as unique case, not revenge	Mar.14	Interview
27_04	Aggressive/Abstract	America's goal in Ukraine - the transformation of this Slavic country into a bloody mess, in unstoppable chaos, in a civil war like the one they [the US] designed in Iraq, Libya, Syria	Apr.27	Opinion Alexandr Prohanov, Writer
06_05	Abstract/Aggressive	Southeast, Russian-speakers, history, anticolonial fight against Galician украинизаторов (worldplay) and Kyiv's progressors, Russia, which claims to be the leader of the "Russian world"	May 6	Opinion Sergei Birjukov, Political scientist
06_05 (1)	Aggressive/Pathetic	Meet New Russia, history, first – independence of Donetsk and Lugansk regions (referendums on May 11 on their political independence) and then other close regions of New Russia – seen as federation of southeast republics – an unity among them, but not with Kyiv, the term New Russia – indicating the idea of independence but also indissoluble tie with RU, 23 years of Ukrainian independence = beheaded hen (обезглавленной курицы)	May 6	Opinion Igor Karaulov Poet and translator
07_05	Negative	Referendum Donetsk and Lugansk, May 11, militias (ополченцы), ready for military clashes after the referendum	May 7	World T. Baikova, Konstantin Volkov
11_05	Positive	Референдум приблизил юго-восток Украины к созданию Новороссии, киевская хунта	May 11	World T. Baikova
12_05	Positive	Donetsk and Lugansk declared independence, Kremlin respects the decision, people's republics	May 12	Factual World
13_05 15_05	Alarming	Kyiv is trying to liquidate the leaders of people's republics Kyiv tightens the actions against People's guards, militias (ополченцев), civilians are dying	May 13, 15	World Konstantin Volkov
28_05	Pathetic/Abstract	Useless indifference (Бесполезное равнодушие), why Russia cannot leave the Southeast of Ukraine	May 28	Opinion Igor Karaulov
29_05	Pathetic/Negative	If there is a war coming, we have to protect our people, Libya, whataboutism,	May 29	Opinion Oleg Bondarenko, Political scientists
01_06	Pathetic/Negative	Everything went according to the plan (Все прошло по плану), American models and European values vs the newest history of Ukraine and Russia, the whole post-Soviet space has just started, Putin's strategy – silent but effective	June 1	Opinion Sergei Roganov, Philosopher

03_06	Pathetic/Negative	Area of law, New Russia, Russian world and culture vs Ukrainian nationalists and Western Nazis, marauding (мародерства), criminal unities, the law above everything	June 5	Opinion Alexandr Chalenko
10_06	Negative	Militia do not trust Kyiv, humanitarian corridor, catastrophe, Russia submitted a draft resolution on Ukraine that wasn't approved	June 10	Factual World Daria Tsoy
16_06	Pathetic/Negative	People's Front (Народный фронт) – sociopolitical coalition created in Donetsk May 24, its goal – to protect civilians from Nazis bands, sponsored by oligarchs and foreign special services, Russia is helping the refugees from Ukraine, humanitarian help	June 16	Factual World Konstantin Volkov
23_06	Negative	Ukrainian refugees, aggravation of the situation in the south- eastern Ukraine (обострения ситуации на юго-востоке Украины), people wanting help from Russia	June 23	Factual World Tatiana Baikova
23_06 (1)	Alarming	Negotiations for a ceasefire in Southeastern Ukraine with Kyiv	June 23	Factual World Konstantin Volkov
26_06	Positive/Pathetic	Putin: Главное — надежно защищать наших граждан от потенциальных военных угроз. Ваш долг не только научить солдат пользоваться современным вооружением и техникой. Но вы должны и воспитывать их на примерах патриотизма, стойкости и мужества, и всегда помните высказывание великого Суворова: «Мне солдат дороже себя», — обратился к военным Владимир Путин	June 26	Factual Politics Egor Gurev
25_06	Pathetic	Federation Council (the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) agrees то cancel the decision for use of military forces on Ukraine territory for the sake of peace and stability in Ukraine, normalisation, will keep humanitarian help	June 25	Factual
26_06 (1)	Pathetic/Aggressive	Deadly logic, even not a woman's logic, irony, TV propaganda, war	June 26	Opinion Writer Vadim Levental
30_06	Pathetic	Refugees, Children from Southeastern Ukraine can rely on school and kinder garden	June 30	Factual
10_07	Pathetic	Presentation of the book "Neo-Nazis and Euromaidan – from democracy to dictatorship," book about the origin and development of radical nationalism in Ukraine from 1991 to 2014; Russian propaganda; Europeans want to know alternative point of view	July 10	Interview
17_07	Negative/Aggressive	The crash of Malaysian Boeing, New Russia (Donetsk), Kyiv's provocation, political dividends, bad condition of Ukrainian military equipment, accidental shooting by Ukrainian fighter	July 17	Society section Andrei Gridasov German Petelin
17_07 Путин	Negative	Putin, the "boomerang effect"	July 17	Factual
29_07	Negative	Ukrainian soldiers opened artillery fire on civilians, evacuation of the population	July 29	Factual
29_07	Negative	Cold War, the epoch of power diplomacy, the US, Washington's choice in favor of fighting, not a compromise with Moscow, clashes of interests, not a Cold War, West	July 29	Opinion Timophei Bordachev, Political scientist

29_07 (1)	Negative/Aggressive	The battle for Ukraine as a stage in the fight for a new world order, West, the existence of Russia as a state is at stake; it is important for Russia to have a friendly country in such a sensitive [for it] region in military, political and ethno cultural terms, Boeing, Western propaganda, the battle for Ukraine as decisive for the world history		Opinion Andranik Migranian, Political scientist
29_07 (2)	Negative	Boeing, Russia vs the US, a new stage of confrontation, Russia under Vladimir Putin is increasingly seen as a resurgent great power**,** dangerous logic	July 29	Opinion Dmitri Simes President of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and publisher of the foreign policy journal The National Interest
29_07 (5)	Positive	Russians are less and less concerned by the sanctions against Russia	July 29	Factual Poll
31_07	Negative	The UN has no proof of Russia's arms supplies to Ukrainian militias	July 31	Factual
31_07 Новороссия	Pathetic/Abstract	Russians and the way they stand up for their interests, historical destination, nation, Russian Idea, Nation-wide Russian support (Всенародная российская поддержка Донецка и Луганска), New Russia – dual meaning: former Russian territories, New Russia (Little Russia that follows the Russian Federation)	July 31	Opinion Sergei Mironov
07_08	Positive	Sanctions, Russia can live without hamon (ham), oysters and Roquefort, import, export, balance	Aug.7	Factual
06_08	Positive	The West got the appropriate sanctions, Putin's decree in support of domestic products and protection of national interests, sanctions won't increase the prices, benefit (на пользу), will boost the national products "with no chemistry" and will have a beneficial effect on people's health	Aug.6	Factual
13_08	Negative	Patriotism as a threat for the business, humanitarian convoy, irony	Aug.13	Opinion Eduard Limonov, Writer and politician
30_08	Positive	Putin, fratricidal war, the US, patriotism	Aug.30	Factual

Appendix 4:

Titles (1968)

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

СОВЕТОВ ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ СССР

СПЛОЧЕННОСТЬ ИДУЩИХ ВПЕРЕД

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА

ПРИЕМ Н. В. ПОДГОРНЫМ

СОВЕТСКО-ИРАНСКИЕ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ

ПЕРВЕНЕЦ ИРАНСКОЙ МЕТАЛЛУРГИИ

ЕДИНСТВО—ГАРАНТИЯ ПОБЕД

БРАТИСЛАВСКОЕ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ШЕСТИ БРАТСКИХ ПАРТИЙ—В ЦЕНТРЕ ВНИМАНИЯ МИРОВОЙ ПЕЧАТИ

БОЛИВИЙСКИЙ КРИЗИС

СНОВА КОЛЮЧАЯ ПРОВОЛОКА

ПИКЕТЫ У БЕЛОГО ДОМА

ПУСТЬ КРЕПНЕТ ДРУЖБА

РЕШИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПРОТЕСТ

КОШМАРЫ ХУНТЫ


ЗАЩИТА СОЦИАЛИЗМА—ВЫСШИЙ ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ДОЛГ

Appendix 5:

Pravda's two-page article reprinted by *Izvestiia* under the headline "The Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty" on August 23, two days after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.



ЗАЩИТА СОЦИАЛИЗМА—ВЫСШИЙ ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ДОЛГ

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

ЗАЩИТА СОЦИАЛИЗМА—ВЫСШИЙ ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ДОЛГ

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

Appendix 6:

The invasion of Czechoslovakia, as reported by *TASS* and reprinted by *Izvestiia* on August 21.

AUGUST

21

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

СОВЕТОВ ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ СССР

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ТАСС

ЭНЕРГИЯ ПЛАНЕТЫ

ДЛЯ ПРИГОРОДНЫХ ЛИНИЙ

И КАЧЕСТВО, И КОЛИЧЕСТВО

ВОКРУГ ОКИНАВЫ

ЗАРУБЕЖНЫЕ НОВОСТИ

СВЯЗИ КРЕПНУТ

БОИ В ЮЖНОМ ВЬЕТНАМЕ

РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ОТМЕНЕНЫ

НАПАДКИ НА АКТЕРА

Appendix 7:

The frame of "conspiracy" and "plot" as reported by *Izvestiia* on August 23.

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

СОВЕТОВ ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ СССР

СООБЩЕНИЕ ТАСС

НЕПОБЕДИМО ДЕЛО СОЦИАЛИЗМА

СОВЕТСКИЕ ЛЮДИ ЕДИНОДУШНО ОДОБРЯЮТ РЕШЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА

МАРШРУТЫ ЖАТВЫ

СИБИРСКИЙ ХЛЕБ

НА ТРУДОВОЙ ВАХТЕ

КАК СОЗДАВАЛОСЬ КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦИОННОЕ ПОДПОЛЬЕ В ЧЕХОСЛОВАКИИ

КТО СКРЫВАЕТСЯ ПОД ВЫВЕСКАМИ РАЗЛИЧНЫХ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ КЛУБОВ ✦ «ОППОЗИЦИЯ» ИЗ УЗНИКОВ БЫВШИХ ✦ ВОССОЗДАНИЕ СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ ✦ НИТИ ЗАГОВОРА ВЕДУТ НА ЗАПАД

ПРОВАЛ ПРОВОКАТОРОВ НЕИЗБЕЖЕН

ЛАБИРИНТЫ РЕКЛАМЫ

В ОБЪЕКТИВЕ—АФРИКА

КОСМОС—ЗЕМНОЙ МЕДИЦИНЕ

Appendix 8:

A *normalization* frame reported as *TASS* dispatches “Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia.”

SEPTEMBER 27

К ПОЛОЖЕНИЮ В ЧЕХОСЛОВАКИИ

ВЕРНОСТЬ ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛИЗМУ

ПУТЬ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

ТЕГЕРАН: ГЛАВНАЯ ТЕМА ГАЗЕТ

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЕ ПРИНЯТО

ОПРОВЕРЖЕНИЕ АГЕНТСТВА БТА

ИНТРИГА И ДЕЗИНФОРМАЦИЯ — ОРУДИЕ ВРАЖДЕБНОЙ ПРОПАГАНДЫ

ЗАСЕДАНИЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА ЧССР

НЕОПРАВДАННОЕ БЕСПОКОЙСТВО

БЕСЕДА В КРЕМЛЕ

КЛЮЧ К РЕШЕНИЮ

КНИГА О СОБЫТИЯХ В ЧЕХОСЛОВАКИИ

КОГДА ТАЙНОЕ

Appendix 9:

Source: *Levada Center*. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/eng/.



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