Heidegger and Derrida on Animals and World: Questioning the Purity of the Animal-Human Difference in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*

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Abstract:

This paper questions Heidegger’s interpretation of animals in his 1929-1930 seminar, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Heidegger denies that animals have access to the ‘as such,’ to beings *as such*, and yet it must be asked if he can maintain this. His course is open to two interpretations: *either* we deny that the binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting that Heidegger attributes to animals are possibilities for animals, and we thereby make the animal what I call ‘the impossible’—and I provide additional reasons against this option by arguing against Heidegger’s interpretation of the central bee experiments—*or* we retain binding, encountering, struggling and adapting in line with my argument and thereby see animals as diversified: each kind of animal has different drives/disinhibitions, and so each is in a different kind of ‘world.’ To make this argument, Derrida’s later work on this seminar is drawn upon. Derrida’s particular deconstructive strategy of asking whether the human actually has what it attributes to itself is not pursued here; however, a related deconstructive strategy, concerning questioning the purity of the animal realm, is deployed. Making the animal realm pure is the result of an operation of a sacrificial structure: animals are sacrificed to maintain the abyssal difference of the human. This sacrifice, and the suffering it allows, is enabled by the denial that animals are open to beings ‘as such.’
**Introduction:**

Heidegger’s 1929-1930 seminar course—*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*—offers his most sustained treatment on the theme of animality. In this course, Heidegger famously puts forward three theses: “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man [i.e., *Dasein*] is world-forming” (FCM 183). Despite the attention he gives to the topic of animality, many have found his conclusions unsatisfactory, especially Heidegger’s location of the ground of the animal’s poverty of world in a denial of access to beings *as* beings (i.e., beings ‘*as such*’). My thesis is that, against Heidegger’s claim that there is a radical abyssal break between humans and animals, as two rigidly delimited and deeply different groups, we should read Heidegger as saying that there are ways in which animals and humans are more alike one another, in terms of access to ‘world,’ than his language of abyss might suggest. This is not, however, to deny that there are abysses, first, between humans and animals, and, second, amongst kinds of animals.

I will draw on Derrida to pursue this project. Much of Derrida’s later work is involved with questions of animality, and, while Heidegger was so insightful and revolutionary in many ways with questions regarding humans, Derrida is helpful in pointing out how Heidegger remains very much Cartesian regarding animals (TATTIA 146). This is a fertile site for thought, as witnessed in the abundance of recent scholarship. I claim that we have resources within Heidegger’s text to listen to Derrida’s call to take seriously the various ontological differences between different kinds of animals. I will not, however, explicitly focus on Derrida’s specific deconstructive strategy that consists in questioning whether humans actually have access to what they have claimed for themselves (TATTIA 95, 135). The reason is that I think we need to use Derrida’s strategy from and for the animal side, so to speak. If Derrida’s larger strategy could be...
characterized as questioning the purity and presence of supposedly un-contaminated privileged realms (see TNS 29-30, 47), then I think we can bring it to bear on the supposed ‘purity’ of the animal realm. My paper thus aims to offer a new reading of Heidegger by drawing on Derrida’s writings to show that Heidegger’s conclusions focus on differences between humans and animals, disregarding important similarities between them, such that animals are not pure of that which Heidegger claims exclusively for the human. Indeed, I suggest that some of the key differences are an artefact of a sacrificial logic, discussed below.

I pursue these questions, in part, to be able to implicitly problematize Heidegger’s concept of world. A fertile concept, it is at the heart of many texts by Heidegger, and is the most central fundamental concept in the 1929-1930 seminar course; it is also at the heart of many of Derrida’s analyses of Heidegger’s works. Derrida will even say: “the question of the meaning of being, the being of the entity and of the transcendental origin of the world—of the world-ness of the world—must be patiently and rigorously worked through” (OG 50). It is my contention that Derrida is right here: this central concept should be thought through, and tested at its limits, for example, with regards to animality as limit case. My project’s focus, while on animal philosophy, also, then, has implications, somewhat in the background, for a way to re-examine fundamental ontology by rethinking world.

Drawing on Heidegger’s own argument, I pursue my points by claiming that animals should have ‘more,’ or ‘different kinds’ of, access to beings than he grants: I argue that there is a similarity between humans and animals in the interplay of freeing-binding. In reading Heidegger’s text, I claim that we are ultimately left with two alternatives, which I refer to as the “two alternatives claim.” The first is to take away the binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting that Heidegger attributes to animals, and thereby make the animal what I call ‘the
impossible’ (since they are closed off to the possibilities of other beings, and it would be impossible for us to transpose ourselves imaginatively or otherwise into this kind of closedness to being). Analysis of this impossibility speaks against this alternative, as does the argument that I provide against Heidegger’s interpretation of the central bee experiments. The second alternative is to retain binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting, in line with my argument below, and thereby see animals as diversified: each kind of animal has different drives/disinhibitions, and so each is in a different ‘world.’ This brings humans and animals closer together vis-à-vis world.

To argue for this, I show, first, that there is a tension between Heidegger’s ideas concerning the animal’s access to beings and the animal’s drivenness. Next, I characterize this tension, first, as revealing an impossibility in Heidegger’s account of the animal, and, second, in its regional ontological status and complicity in traditional sacrificial structures. I claim here that the interest in rendering animals as ‘the animal,’ and hence as impossibility, is a strategic-performative element on Heidegger’s behalf that distances the reader/listener from animality. Heidegger, I suggest, achieves this distance through a sacrificial structure in which animals are rendered appropriate for rendering, a structure in which they are purified of commonalities with the human; this enables them to be processed in, e.g., slaughterhouses, by allowing, as we will see, for a sort of purification of the animal-human difference. When I speak of this animal-human difference, I mean this abyssal difference, before all other differences, that cleanly distinguishes ‘the’ human from ‘the’ animal. Although animals in this account are, as I will later elaborate, Edenic and lacking in originary violence, this is the condition that opens them to the horrific systemic and systematic violence to which we subject them. To close the first section of my paper, I then question the evidence for Heidegger’s position, i.e., in the bee experiments. In
the second section, I suggest that if animals are not the impossibility they were made out to be—if they are open to the possibilities of other beings—then, drawing more explicitly on Derrida, we should open our theories to diversifications of ways of being: we should multiply the differences of and amongst animals.

The stakes and larger background context of this paper, then, also involve our ever-expanding use of animals in technological industrialized agribusiness. Articles like Carruthers’s (“Brute Experience”), for example, show that the kind of view Heidegger was grounding ontologically is still prominent: Carruthers’s article is a few years old (1989), but we witness something akin to his belief at play in our societal practices. Some form of the position Heidegger is developing has been operative for most of the Western tradition. We see it re-emerging in stimulus accounts of animals (an account Heidegger will ontologically ground in the seminar (FCM 254, 256), in bringing together pioneering animal ethologist Jakob von Uexküll’s account (FCM 263-4)—which involves something much more radical than mere stimuli—with something like a stimulus account); or in the claims that animals are machines or machine-like, that they only react and never properly respond (e.g., TATTIA 8). The stakes, then, are high: to challenge Heidegger’s view on animals is simultaneously to challenge the views that have enabled mass animal slaughter, experimentation and use, as well as those views that have been a constant touchstone for us on our way to defining ourselves.

I. Animals and Impossibility

Heidegger claims that the essence of animality is to be captivated (FCM 258). The animal is encircled by a ring of drives such that when the animal encounters a disinhibitor, a particular drive is disinhibited and the animal responds accordingly (i.e., a drive is unleashed, and the
animal behaves in a particular way). In each and every case, the animal is fully absorbed in its drives—it is fully *taken* by them (FCM 242, 247)—such that it never encounters its disinhibitors *as such* (FCM 257). Indeed, while Heidegger denies the animal many of the traditional things—language, tool-use, asking questions, encountering objects, awareness of death—for Heidegger, these are all rooted in the animal’s inability to encounter beings *as* beings, and perhaps this way of putting it is Heidegger’s novel contribution to the tradition: that animals are deprived of the ‘as,’ of the ‘as such’ (i.e., they cannot encounter beings *as such*). There is an important distinction here: beings vs. beings *as such*; animals can encounter the former, but not the latter. Conversely, the human, as *Dasein*, is that which has access to beings *as* beings (grounded in the possibility of access to language, technology, objects, etc.). That is, for example, while an animal encounters an apple in the apple’s unleashing of the animal’s drive to eat it, *Dasein* can encounter the apple as raising the question of what it is for an apple to be an apple, what it is for the apple to be *as such*. Because *Dasein* has access to beings and to beings ‘as a whole,’ *Dasein* ‘has’ world or, better, *Dasein* is world-forming.

Another way to put this is that animal behaviour, for Heidegger, reveals itself to us to have a fundamentally eliminative character (FCM 249-53). The animal does not encounter the entity *as* an entity (since this entity is always eliminated through behaviour); but rather, and only from our perspective, the animal encounters the entity ‘as’ disinhibitor (FCM 252). When an animal’s drive, disinhibited by a disinhibitor, is satisfied, the drive is reinhibited in this satisfaction, i.e., in the elimination of a particular entity’s character as disinhibitor (e.g., the apple is eaten, and the disinhibitor is eliminated).

To develop a challenge to Heidegger’s claim that only humans encounter beings *as* beings, and to show how animals in fact have a different kind of access than he would allow, I
will first study his claim that the animal is *bound* to its environment. Heidegger makes two claims that seem contradictory. He claims, first, that the animal’s “being *bound* to the environment, the self-encircling which is open to disinhibition, belongs to the inner essence of behaviour” (FCM 258, my emphasis), and, second, in his discussion of *Dasein*, that something can be *bound* only if it is also *free*: “only where there is *freedom* do we find the possibility of something having a *binding* character” (FCM 339, my emphases). This freedom is the open access to beings as beings: precisely what Heidegger denies of animals. It is hard to reconcile these claims. Should we see animals as also free in their being bound?

However, it may immediately be objected that Heidegger clearly does not mean the same thing by being-bound in these two contexts: in the one, animals; in the other, *Dasein*. Heidegger is insistent on the abyss between these two (e.g., FCM 264). Furthermore, and more detrimental, while the English translation enables a connection, the German reveals that Heidegger does not use the same words that get translated as “bound”: in the first case, for animals, he uses *Verbundenheit*, and in the second case, for *Dasein*, *Verbindlichkeit*. Finally, as his course progresses, Heidegger moves away from “binding” to speak of a “unity” of organism and environment (FCM 258).

Rather than address these objections head on (though I will note in passing that there is an ambiguity in the use of the roots of these two German terms (e.g., FCM 327, 329)⁴; and I will also note that even in such “unity,” there is still a question of binding to particular entities encountered), I wish to make the following claim, which is a form of the “two alternatives claim” foregrounded in the introduction: either we accept Heidegger’s stated position that there is a radical break between human and animal binding, or we believe there is good reason to think that there is a similarity in binding that Heidegger overlooks. One possibility (i.e., the latter), then, is
that, regardless of whether animals encounter beings \textit{as such} or not, we should adhere to Heidegger’s (translated) statement that all binding requires freeing. I will, however, spend most of this section examining the other alternative: first, characterizing it and the stakes involved and, then, examining the evidence for it.

It may be objected, with regard to the possibility that all binding requires freeing, that I am getting entangled within the concept of binding, which in many cases does not require any kind of freedom, for do we not say that a proton is \textit{bound} to an atom, or that an apple on the table \textit{is bound} (through gravity) to the table? Surely in these cases, such binding does not require freedom. While this may be so, such examples are different from the case of animals, insofar as the context of the latter is one of access-transposition (FCM 201-12). That is, we do not usually say that the proton or apple accesses beings, but Heidegger does want to say that animals have a kind of access (FCM 204). We do not even need to think now of animals as being subjects or conscious for them to be in the play of freeing-binding. What is at stake here is whether there is a ‘there’ for animals. But is freedom not what Heidegger touches upon when he claims that animals have an \textit{openness} (FCM 253-5): never an openness to beings \textit{as such}, yet an openness to beings nonetheless?

We need to know what kind of openness animals have to beings for Heidegger, and so, to pursue this, let us note that, in line with denying that animals encounter beings \textit{as beings}, Heidegger would deny that animals encounter the other \textit{as other}. Nonetheless, he would affirm that animals encounter others (just not ‘as such’), where by ‘other’ I do not simply mean other ‘agents’ but other beings at all. “When we say that the lizard [i.e., one example among many] is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word ‘rock’ in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given \textit{in some way} for the lizard, and yet is not known to the lizard
as a rock” (FCM 198). But can we say that animals actually encounter what we would call ‘an other’ if they cannot encounter an other as such?

To encounter an other there must be something akin to a self (see Jonas 67-8; Thompson 99). Heidegger, however, denies that the animal has a self; yet he does claim that animals have a “proper being” (Eigentum) (FCM 233),\(^5\) enabling them to be open to the other (FCM 253-4). As we will see, however, this openness to the other, as lacking the openness to and of the self, is not really an openness. The other, which can be interpreted as a stimulus (FCM 254, 256-7), is never really an ‘other,’ as it is always already encountered within a prescribed, driven response of the animal (FCM 229, 255). The ‘other’ merely disinhibits a drive without being encountered: the animal is entirely taken by its drives, and is not open to the ‘other’ which disinhibits its drive. Further, the only ‘others’ to which an animal is ever open are already enfolded ‘within’ it, delineated by it, and so are in some sense always already a part of it. As Heidegger puts it: “that which disinhibits [i.e., the disinhibitor] correlatively belongs to such behaviour” (FCM 256, my emphasis). I claim, then, that Heidegger’s account not only does not enable the animal to encounter an other as such, but also does not actually enable the animal to encounter an other, despite his claims to the contrary (FCM 254).

How are we to understand the animal if it not only does not encounter the other as other, but also does not really encounter the other except as already enfolded in its own properness? Clearly the animal needs the other to act as disinhibitor (which the animal does not encounter as such, or as disinhibitor), but in becoming such for the animal, the other is already encoded within the animal’s disinhibiting ring. The animal is taken in its drivenness such that we can say that the animal is nothing but this being taken: the animal is the drivenness of its drives, always fully contained and fully gathered, in its captivated absorption. The animal is but the play of drives:
the driven push-pull in a wordless worldless ‘void’—not even a void, as the animal does not even encounter nothing, which is ontologically grounded in being; the animal is withheld from being and nothing (FCM 252-3). An implication is that from Heidegger’s position, we also could not really say that the animal encounters at all. Heidegger says that things should be crossed out when we speak of them ‘for’ animals (e.g., FCM 198) because animals do not encounter things as things. We could go further and say that the ‘animal,’ as merely a locus of proper drives, could itself be crossed out, as all access is inaccessible for ‘the animal’ (see OS 53)—in being driven the animal does not encounter itself nor others, it is just taken.

If this is the case, what could Heidegger mean when he speaks of animal leeway? With regards to animal leeway (Spielraum), Heidegger writes: “the organism can adapt a particular environment into itself only insofar as openness for . . . belongs to its essence, and to the extent that […] a certain leeway is created within which whatever is encountered can be encountered in such and such a way, i.e., […] through its disinhibiting function” (FCM 264, my emphases; see also 248). Yet, as we have seen, the relation between drives and disinhibitors is so interwoven that there is no room for freedom. Heidegger cannot mean by leeway a choice of how to respond to a situation, for there is nowhere for choice to enter. Rather, the leeway would have to be a non-exact coinciding of the disinhibitor to the drive such that what is adapted to is ‘within the range’ of the drive’s prescribed responses. So the only way an animal can actually adapt is if it is already open to a particular adaptable pathway as within its range.

My point here is that if animals are open—if they are free—in their binding to the environment, such openness must be open, beyond any predelineation. With regards to both openness and animal leeway, I claim that animals, for Heidegger, are not actually in a free relation. Heidegger writes around the same time (1930): “To free oneself for a binding
bindende directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an open region” (P 142). The question is whether it is possible for there to be an openness that is so circumscribed as to be only open to that which is prescribed for the entity in question, or whether this is “an openness without openness” (EWCS 277), or a freedom without freeing. This is a question of limits and totalities. Can an openness be open if it is only limited to what is always already enfolded in the entity, such that it never really leaves itself nor encounters an other as such? Can there be a boundedness that is total? Or must we say that to be open is to be open beyond any such prescriptions and circumscriptions, and to always be open for an outside and others that are always already impinging upon any attempt to delimit an inside (see TATTIA 95)? That is, for Heidegger, if an animal is to encounter a disinhibitor—which it also never encounters as a disinhibitor, but which nonetheless somehow ‘triggers’ the disinhibition of a drive—then does it not seem as though we should say that the animal in question must be free, beyond a pure circumscription within the animal, to encounter it: must it not be open beyond what is inscribed for it to be able to encounter it (and if so then the being in question can no longer be a pure disinhibitor either)? Or, is the animal total? 

I am pointing to a tension I detect between Heidegger’s claims about, on the one hand, the animal’s openness and access to beings and, on the other, his description of animals in terms of drives. This is also a question of the “two alternatives claim”—do we take the animal as open (i.e., to freeing and encountering) or not (i.e., freeing and encountering are mere external descriptions)? To further develop the “two alternatives claim,” I claim that one implication of Heidegger’s position is that it seems inconsistent to say, as Heidegger does, that animals struggle or adapt, unless Heidegger is speaking only of observations from our external perspective. Heidegger claims that life is encircling and struggling (FCM 257). Further, he claims that
animals have always already “carve[d] out” (FCM 257) an environment that is adapted into themselves (FCM 264). Yet, how can the animal adapt, carve out, or struggle, if there is only an openness to what is given as encounterable by its disinhibiting ring, and nothing ever endures over-and-against it (FCM 242, 256)? To be more precise, I disambiguate “adaptation” into two senses: evolutionary (i.e., species adaptation may involve something like a leeway) and individual (i.e., the individual ‘adapts’ its behaviour, which is related to the notion of struggle). For the evolutionary sense, I claim that such a leeway should not be taken in a Heideggerian sense, i.e., as pre-programmed, pre-enfolded; but, rather, it should be understood as part of a dialogic encounter with an environment. I am arguing for a stronger emphasis on the role of animals, as beings struggling with and interacting with (i.e., in a give-and-take relation with) a shifting and changing environment.

For Heidegger, a disinhibitor is always matched up with a drive, which is matched up with a capability of the organism (e.g., FCM 221, 231-2). But how could the organism be originarility capable, or how could its capabilities change, if it is not open to a leeway beyond prescription? Capability must refer to and be directed by and to an environment—a particular capability has to ‘fit’ with an organism and an environment—and so it must come to be, or to change, through an openness to an environment that cannot be preelineated.

Otherwise, with regards to Heidegger’s account, how could a struggle exist? There is ‘nothing’ with which the animal could struggle or to which it could adapt. We would have to say that there is a struggle without struggle, or a struggle only from our ‘external’ perspective. And so, to return to our “two alternatives claim”: do we take struggle and adapting as connected with an openness, or not?
To pursue this question on struggle, let us turn to Leung (2010) who questions Heidegger’s denial of world on the basis of drives (248-9). Leung points us to a passage from *Being and Time* where Heidegger claims that we cannot accept a theory of *Dasein* in terms of willing, drives, and resistances, because “[with] such willing, however, something must already have been disclosed which one’s drive and one’s will are out for” (B&T 210/253). While in the context it is clear that Heidegger is speaking only of *Dasein*, it does seem Leung and I agree here: for this is related to my point on how there must be an openness beyond prescription. Leung writes: “it is hardly comprehensible how the [animal] can be driven or taken by its food if it is not in a position to *recognize* its food as food in the first place” (248-9, my emphasis). “If the behavior of the animal is driven, is it not also necessary that what its drive is out for must also have been already disclosed?” (249). Furthermore, and to relate back to my discussion on struggle, I think that the passage from *Being and Time* holds further potential. Later in this passage, we read: “The experience of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one’s endeavors—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of world” (B&T 210/253). It seems right that resistance—struggle—cannot itself be a ‘struggle with struggle’ unless there is something like the openness to which Heidegger points in *Being and Time* (see also Heidegger (1997), 52).

My claim—the “two alternatives claim” again—is that if there is no openness to the interplay of freeing and binding, then struggling, adaptation, and even encountering must be understood as descriptions of animal behaviour from *our* perspective, and not as resistance as encountered *by* and *for* an animal. At this point in my argument, this position still seems to be possible, even though it emerges from a tension within Heidegger’s text (i.e., the two alternatives) and it is in need of further clarification. At any rate, Krell touches on a similar point
when he writes: “The animal wrestles (ringt) in the ring of its world-relation, its having in not-having; wrestles in order to eradicate beings that were never there at hand for it in the first place” (DL 127). Krell is pointing to the same blankness (epitomized in Heidegger’s Durchstreichung: the crossing-out) I pointed to above: the animal wrestles-struggles with ‘ghosts,’ which are never-there for it.

We will return to the idea of the never-there. To lead to this, I claim that a central issue in our discussion concerns how we relate to animals in the first place to make the sorts of claims that Heidegger does, and the way this would require a transposition of ourselves into the place of an animal, either in order to claim that we can know and access what is going on with the animal, or to compare our being to that of the animal, to claim that we are not that sort of entity.9 In attempting to do such a transposition, I claim, we run up against limits: we cannot fully transpose ourselves into the animal, either epistemologically or ontologically, with priority given to the latter. That is, prior to the epistemological limit of not knowing what it is like to be an animal, there is an ontological limit of not being that entity. In this part of the paper, I will draw our attention to two kinds of impossibility stemming from this observation: first, that fully accessing an animal is impossible; second, that, for Heidegger, transposing into the animal is impossible because it is not open to the possibility of encountering things due to its disinhibiting ring.

This terminology of the impossible comes from Derrida (B&S 148), and I will begin by discussing the impossible ontological limit. My observation is that the ontological limit of transposition with regard to the animal is in some ways akin to the sort of limit that Derrida discusses in relation to our death (B&S 148). As part of Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s oft-made claim that humans encounter death as such whereas animals do not (i.e., animals just
perish: e.g., FCM 267),

death is understood in terms of the impossible: our thoughts of our own
death are structurally such that we are always still ‘there,’ we always survive in the fantasy of
our death (B&S 117, 148-50, 157, 170, 233). This is linked to the spectrality—the phantasm—of
death in life, of the imagination that gives death a home, lets death ‘live’ in life. My claim is that
our access to animals is in some ways analogous to our access of death: animals are those into
which we imaginatively project—but it is impossible for us to fully accomplish this projection.
This is what I indicate when I speak of our transposition into the animal as ‘impossible’: it is
impossible for us to be, or fully know, or even fully imagine other animals.

Crucially, it is because there is a necessary ontological limit—the impossibility—that we
must imaginatively project into animals as well as into death. This projection is not, however,
something we occasionally fall into: rather, we have always already projected. We always
already have an understanding of death just as we do of animals. Our imaginative projection has
necessarily violated, transgressed, the impossible borderline, and has done so such that it informs
our experience on ‘this side’ of the line, which is always already both sides. We have a sense of
animals and of death, not restricted to particular regional spheres; rather, such understandings
permeate a sense of who we are.

Of course, it may be objected that this is also the case for other ‘experiences’ of which we
do not have ‘direct’ experience, whereas, on the other hand, Heidegger’s discussion of death has
to do with death as primordially constitutive and individuating. In reply, I jump ahead a bit in the
argument: I claim, while in general the analogy may be weak due to that which the objection
points out, in Heidegger’s case there is an analogous priority and role for animals: animals and
death are as limits of the ‘as such.’ In other words, our being-there (Dasein) lost in death is the
being-there that depends on animality when it thinks itself as exclusively open to the ‘as such’;
both death and animals function as an impetus to awaken us to our *Dasein*. In addition, we cannot not imaginatively project, barring a life without animals (and who could imagine this? (see TATTIA 79-80, 102)): they are always already encountered within traditional, historic ways of relating to them. But, more fundamentally, animals are constitutive insofar as *we are like them*: our animate organism is like theirs. Our likeness is immediately apparent, and needs to be—in one way or another (and hence the traditional, historic ways)—reckoned with.

Recall that Heidegger argues for a possibility of transposition, of accessibility, into the animal (FCM 201-4). Yet, by the end of Heidegger’s analysis, we see that this is in some sense misleading: we are not able to transpose if we think of transposition as our taking up a *place* occupied by the animal, because the animal fundamentally does not occupy place in the same way as *Dasein* does as being-there. There is no ‘there’ for animals; there is no *place* in which the animal could occur. As touched on before, just as the other is never-there for the animal, so the animal is never-there for itself, either. For Heidegger, the animal is a kind of no-place, and, additionally, is deprived of any possibilities that it could sense as possibilities (see Agamben 68). Our transposition into the animal thus involves a particular kind of phantasmatics of the animal, an impossible, imaginary projection into the animal that ‘discovers’ the projection as *additional* impossibility; Heidegger’s account of the animal as outside of the play of freeing-binding, I claim, *doubles* the impossibility. For him, the animal is *suspended* (FCM 248): between self and other (FCM 233), “between itself and its environment” (FCM 248), between being open and being closed (FCM 248), between having and not having world, between permanence and change (FCM 254). Heidegger’s projection beyond the unavoidable ontological limit of animals reveals a utopic uniformity: u-topic in the sense of no-place, and uniformity in the sense that this is supposed to be the essence of *all* animals—*the* animal (FCM 186).
In other words, this second impossibility is as follows: Heidegger projects across the first impossibility—he transposes across the limit—to report back that transposition is impossible: to say there is no place, he takes up a place. Heidegger accesses the animal to say that access for it and to it is impossible. From a Heideggerian perspective, then, it is impossible to imagine the animal’s being from the ‘inside’—there could not be such an interiority/perspective. Therefore, from Heidegger’s place, he finds the animal as placeless, as utterly inhospitable: to try to imagine Heidegger’s animal from the ‘inside,’ one must imagine oneself away: one must imagine one’s utter absence, the absence of all possibilities, i.e., the impossible absence of being-there—one’s death. The animal is, imaginatively, death: its alterity, for Heidegger, confronts us with something as radical as the impossibility of death. Just as Derrida points out the impossibility of Dasein accessing death as such (for then the impossibility of our possibilities would be a possibility (see Derrida (1993), 75), or, as put earlier, we would survive the fantasy), so too it is impossible to project into animals understood as the loss or absence of being-there for the exact same reason: there is the parasitic structure of our survival (of our “there”). As death is not a possible phenomenon for us, neither, on Heidegger’s account, is transposition into the animal. But let us say, instead of speaking of an animal’s perspective, we take a Heideggerian perspective from ‘outside’ the animal: we observe its behaviour, for instance, and conclude that the animal is poor in world. Nonetheless, such evidence—and the bee experiments will be examined in detail later—must be related to the animal’s being, i.e., it must relate to a transposition.

In short, the second impossibility has a double sense in which, first, the animal, which is supposed to have access (FCM 201-12), cannot have any possibilities of its own (e.g., encountering beings); and, second, therefore Dasein does not have the possibility of imagining
animal access—animals are impossible to comprehend because they do not have possibilities. Finally, then, Heidegger’s projection is impossible because Heidegger does imagine animal access as a possibility.

The phantasm of the doubly impossible animal is an imaginary projection into the animal. On what terms, on whose terms, does such a projection occur? How can we best understand Heidegger’s take on animality in this seminar? I draw here on an article by Withy (2013).

Heidegger’s seminar is basically made up of four sections on: a) philosophy/metaphysics; b) profound boredom (as a way to study Dasein’s fundamental attunement to the world); c) world, through a comparative analysis between, primarily, Dasein and the animal; and d) the structure of the logos, by working through Aristotle. Commentators have at times been confused as to the unity of this seminar, and Withy convincingly argues for one. Withy notes that in the section on boredom, the everyday way of being of Dasein seems animal-like: Dasein is fascinated, turning towards beings, forgetful of itself as Dasein. Withy helps us see that the section on animality fits into the overall project insofar as it spells out how the apparent similarity between Dasein and animality is mistaken, and that humans are not like animals in important ways (e.g., FCM 282). Heidegger’s project is to use animality—as he conceives it—as a way to draw out Dasein’s central, and I claim anthropocentric, role vis-à-vis being. That is, for Heidegger, being requires Dasein as that which is open to it; this is anthropocentric because it presumes only humans are open to being. In other words, Heidegger’s conception of the animal/human difference neglects the kind of openness—pointed to in one alternative of the “two alternatives claim”—that I am arguing we find in animals. In this respect, Withy helpfully indicates how ‘the animal’ is, for Heidegger, a kind of strategic caricature meant to therapeutically motivate us (Withy 170, 172-3,
175), to make us stop being the “ape[s] of civilization” (FCM 5; see also 161, 179), and to grasp the central role of Dasein.

In other words, Heidegger’s imaginary projection into animals is meant to distinguish Dasein as essentially non-animal. The animal is precisely that being like us that nonetheless is abyssally not-us because the animal is ‘prior’ to the disruption that enables the ontological difference—the difference between beings and being, which is at the root of the ‘as such.’ The animal has not been, and presumably for Heidegger will never be, gripped or disrupted essentially by ontological difference—that is, as I will say, the animal is ‘pre-ontological difference.’ As an amendment to the claims made that animals are incapable of grasping the ontological difference (see Calarco (2004), 22; Franck 144), I claim that, as a precondition, the ontological difference has not gripped them. The desire on Heidegger’s behalf is to situate, to awaken Dasein—precisely at the cost of sacrificing animals for this purpose, that is, sacrificing and purifying the being of animals for the sake of rendering an all too clear difference between humans and animals. Drawing on Lawlor, we can call this a “scapegoat structure” (TNS 98): through a play of substitution, that which is inside is expelled to the outside to symbolize the expulsion of the contaminating force. In the case of animals, there is a twofold structure: first, we ‘conceptually’ sacrifice them to affirm their purity and our impurity (as will be seen) through denying our kinship with animals, which also affirms the pure separation of human/animal; second, this then enables, for example, religious rites of purification for ourselves.

The hidden “sacrificial structure” (EWCS 278-283, passim; VAA 71), operating first and foremost on an ontological level, is not unique to Heidegger, but rather shows its rootedness further back in our tradition. Animals are ‘revealed’ as a pre-ontological difference. Lacking originary violence, they are not cast out into the play of difference (i.e., difference of being and
beings, and difference amongst beings); they are not gripped, called upon, or, I claim, chosen; they are not in history. They are not gripped by Walten—an originary sovereign force, a German word that Derrida draws our attention to in *The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II* as permeating Heidegger’s work (e.g., FCM 26, 34, 349, 362, 365). Animals are not open for an ‘es gibt’ (P 254-5), the givenness of beings, the generosity—only for Dasein (hence, I claim, why Heidegger speaks of the poverty of animals, that animals are poor in world). Animals are not dis-placed from themselves and others such that there is a difference between self and other. These points connect Heidegger back to the Judeo-Christian tradition: animals are pre-binaries; paradisiacal; Edenic. Animals have not been thrown, they do not fall, they are no-where, u-topos. They are not aware of themselves. Animals are a ‘space,’ a gap, that cannot be filled, cannot be spoken: they are not a being-there.

We, however, are essentially disrupted (P 145): this displacement creates, allows for, place. Suddenly, in an Edenic way, we encounter death as death; we also encounter the possibility of ethics (violence is opened), technology, language, etc. The paradisiacal, however, exists as an imaginary projection—it is a violent projection, the impossible, in which what is projected is the unviolated, unviolable: the animal as total, pure, paradisiacal. *We cannot harm it,* so we say. (Being told you are Edenic is one of the worst violences that could be done to you (see TNS 23).)

The originary violence enables Dasein’s being as ek-static, whereas animal being is only static. Even while eliminating the disinhibitors in their disinhibiting role, the animal is immured in its captivated absorption; thus, even though the animal is a constant drivenness (FCM 243), it is also a constant stasis. This is contrary to Dasein, who “ex-sists” (FCM 365; e.g., P 247): “The stasis of the ecstatic consists […] in standing in the “out” and “there” of unconcealedness, which
prevails as the essence of Being itself” (P 284). Dasein is ek-static in its violent emergence from itself in which it never leaves itself behind (FCM 363).18

In other words, and in line with Derrida (see TATTIA, passim; OS 110-3), Heidegger’s conception of the human/animal difference very much resonates with a Judeo-Christian understanding. This is a way to suggest that Heidegger’s fundamental ontological project retains traces of regional ontologies; there are, of course, always traces and never a blank slate, never blankness. Relatedly, we could also note that insofar as Heidegger’s project aims to reveal the pre-grounding of the sciences, he makes a decision to foreclose on other kinds of disclosures of truth. For instance, in removing the stone from discussion (the stone is worldless, he claims, and then focuses on animal and Dasein), Heidegger states that it is possible for the stone to be seen as animated—but, nonetheless, we will stay within our particular truth-disclosure: “What is at issue here is […] the distinction between quite different kinds of possible truth. But for the moment [which is the ‘moment’ of the entire seminar, and beyond], in accordance with the subject under consideration, we shall remain within that dimension of truth pertaining to scientific and metaphysical knowledge” (FCM 204).19 In other words, as he points to the possibility of other disclosures, he also immediately forecloses on their investigation.

If we accept that the phantasm is necessary with regards to animals, that there is the primary impossibility of transposition (due to the ontological limit), then we are led to the following question: why think in Heidegger’s way? At this point, just as a particular onto-theological tradition that has devalued animals makes itself known to us, just as we have seen some of the investments involved with taking one alternative of the “two alternatives claim,” it becomes important to ask: why not think in other ways? Why Heidegger’s? Why not take the other alternative of the “two alternatives claim”? One site to further tease out these investments
while simultaneously questioning further Heidegger’s account is in examining the evidence Heidegger marshals in support for his position: in particular, the central bee experiments (FCM 241-3).

Leading up to the bee experiments, Heidegger states that while his terminology might seem arbitrary, it is grounded in a substantive interpretation (FCM 236-7), and so he promises to examine his recently-made bold claims (FCM 240). He discusses the bee flying in a meadow (the bee, he claims, is exemplary (FCM 241)): peppering the passage with questions, he asks whether the bee encounters presence (i.e., does it encounter a being as a being, such that the being presences?), then, frustratingly, merely asserts that it does not (FCM 241).

To force the issue, he then discusses an experiment in which a bee is placed in a lab in front of a bowl of honey. The bee drinks it up and flies away. However, when the bee’s abdomen is cut off while it is drinking, the bee continues to drink as honey runs out of its backside. For Heidegger, this shows that animals do not encounter beings as present: the bee does not encounter the presence of the honey, nor even the absence of its abdomen, but merely drinks until its urge to drink, which was disinhibited, is satisfied; of course, this does not occur in this case, because its abdomen, that ‘location’ which registers such ‘satiation,’ is gone (FCM 242-3). Therefore, the bee does not encounter presence nor the ‘as such,’ and this helps confirm Heidegger’s interpretation of the animal’s essence as captivation.

It is because the bee is taken in by the food—or, more accurately, by its drive as disinhibited by the disinhibitor (honey)—that it cannot stand over-against or opposed to the honey as such. The evidence for this claim is found in the behaviour: the bee does not respond or react to either its abdomen being cut off nor to the copious amounts of honey being ‘consumed.’
In other words, it is because the bee’s behaviour is modified, insofar as it no longer stops doing what it otherwise would stop doing, that we must say its responses/reactions must be pre-programmed (FCM 243). Heidegger’s claim is that such a drivenness does not clear the space for the ‘as such.’ Notice the leap here: behaviour indicates the lack of the ‘as such’ insofar as the behaviour does not proceed along lines anticipated by a human observer (e.g., investigation by the bee of the place where its abdomen used to be). First assumption: drivenness precludes the ‘as such.’ Second assumption: access to the ‘as such’ enables a particular range of response. This range would not involve simply continuing along ‘regular’ lines (that is, if the bee had flown away as usual, though this for Heidegger enables what he takes to be a misinterpretation (i.e., that the bee encounters presence), it could still also be interpreted in Heidegger’s way (i.e., the abdomen was not the ‘location’ of satiation, yet the bee is still simply taken)). Nor would this range simply involve continuing what would otherwise be stopped (e.g., ceaselessly sucking up the honey). Rather, it would involve picking up a new kind of behaviour—perhaps located in questioning (*Fragen*), which Heidegger denies of animals (FCM 364). But what kind of behaviour—across which threshold—would indicate an animal’s access to the ‘as such’?

This further raises the question of what enables the particular behaviours described by Heidegger to stand in for all behaviour (see Calarco (2004), 26; Leung 244)? What enables the bee to be taken as exemplary for all animals? Why should the bee (rather: a bee (Morris (2005), 53)) stand in for apes, dolphins, turtles, pigeons, and squirrels (see TATTIA; Calarco (2004), 26; Calarco (2008), 23)?

In addition, as Buchanan (2008) points out, there is a problem in Heidegger’s interpretation of the bee experiment insofar as the loss of organic unity—the cutting off of the abdomen—should, by Heidegger’s earlier points, fundamentally affect behaviour:
One would have to think that the removal of the bee’s abdomen is not simply the removal of a part from the whole, which would suggest a mechanist view [which Heidegger spends much time arguing against (FCM 212-36)], but that its removal affects the bee’s being as a whole. Remove an arm or a leg, to say nothing of an internal organ like a stomach or the bee’s abdomen, and you witness a disruption in the overall behaviour (Buchanan 82; see also Morris (2005), 59).

If the loss of organic unity would affect behaviour through and through, then we should not say that the experiment shows the ‘location’ of what registers satiation, but instead that it reveals Heidegger’s position as presupposed. This is the case because the experiment—operating with a loss of organic unity, with an over-generalization of animals as well as behaviours, and with undefended assumptions about the ‘as such’—does not provide evidence for Heidegger’s position on its own.

There also seems to be a particular kind of irony here insofar as, in this experiment, we deprive a bee of its organic unity in order to make a point about its deprivation in world (i.e., that the animal is poor in world). Is this actual deprivation of the bee’s ‘world’—its literal crossing-out—a necessary precondition to demonstrate the bee’s (supposed) ontological deprivation of world? Is the suffering of the bee—disregarded by both experimenter and Heidegger—necessary at all? The experiments which, for Heidegger, reveal ‘the’ animal’s previously concealed ontological orientation (i.e., concealed in its natural setting: we must interrupt its regular course) tend to involve deprivation, alteration, and working on ‘the’ animal’s vulnerabilities: they deprive animals of their environment, of that with which they are familiar: e.g., by putting them in labs, by moving the bees’ homes, etc. (FCM 242-6).
In this cruelty (a poverty) that does not see itself as such, the bee is *sacrificed* (see Calarco (2004), 26). Further, I claim this sacrifice has a tripartite structure: first, the bee is *actually* killed in the experiment; second, the bee—*this* particular bee—is sacrificed as an *example*, as a *representative of the* animal in order to confirm the essential difference between animal and *Dasein* (see Calarco (2004), 26); third, *all* animals (each particular animal—e.g., emus, aardvarks, and even bees) have *already* been sacrificed and purified to ‘conceptually’ become ‘*the* animal,’ such that *this* bee can act as confirmation of the animal as lacking in essential openness. Subsequent to the ‘conceptual’ work, sacrificial re-enactments, or demonstrations founded on such, can easily hearken to ‘the animal’ as self-evident. Each animal, in its likeness to us, is purified of this likeness—of the originary violence—to be then put outside the play of violence. Each sacrificed animal reaffirms this decision, and reaffirms the animal as pure.

While *this* particular sacrifice occurs in the context of a scientific experiment, Heidegger does not draw attention to how modern techno-science may be playing into how the bee appears for us. Heidegger will later claim that science consists in a “projection within some realm of what is […] of a fixed ground plan of natural events” (QCT 118), wherein the projection “secures for itself its sphere of objects” (QCT 118; see also 122-3). As pointed out by Calarco (2004), bees are placed in labs as objects for us to work on, as resources for experimentation in which any given bee (of a particular kind) could be substituted for any other, and in which an essential disruption is made to its environmental-being (from meadow to lab), as well as to its group-being (from hive to isolated bee) (Morris (2005), 53, 55): “it is highly revealing […] that Heidegger has nothing to say about the domination of life in these experiments […] despite his railings against the techno-scientific domination of nature” (Calarco 25-6).
Elsewhere, Heidegger relates various animal behaviours and ‘objects’ of animal behaviours: nourishment, propulsion, enemies/hostilities, escape/pursuit, prey/seizing/devouring, assimilation, growth, digesting/organic processes, inheritance of acquired characteristics, reproduction/sexual mating, nest-building, rearing young, seeing, hearing, playing, “and so on” (FCM 198, 204, 234, 237, 239, 250). While such a list seems exhaustive, there are problems with it. The delimitation of behaviours out of a manifold of ‘activity’ is not simply neutral. Rather, it is a particular way that animal activities are allowed to appear such that they are encapsulatable as particular behaviours, able to be perceived by the human, able to be catalogued, observed, and followed. These behaviours can act as objects for the scientist (e.g., QCT 118, 122-3), but animals’ activities are never, I claim, so drily delineated: nourishment is never just ‘nourishment.’ Derrida says: “Of course, the animal doesn’t eat like us, but neither does any one person eat in the same way; there are structural differences, even when one eats from the same plate! . . . But what I wanted to suggest […] is that these differences are not those between “as such” and “not as such”” (TATTIA 159). Though it clearly is possible in certain circumstances that for us nourishment is just ‘nourishment’ (e.g., under scientific gaze), there is always a ‘more’ in actions.

All of these ways of encapsulating activities as behaviours and animals as ‘the animal’ lead me to coin, drawing on Heidegger’s ‘standing-reserve’ [Bestand] (e.g., QCT 17) and on Derrida’s work on sacrifice (e.g., EWCS 278-283, passim; TATTIA, passim; VAA 71), the term ‘sacrificial-reserve’: in other words, there is a reservoir of animals, standing by, ready to be sacrificed so as to symbolically extract and muster the human/animal difference. This reserve is always being drawn on to maintain sacrificial relations both for human exceptionalisms and, intimately related, for animal purification. Just as modern technology has made factory farms
standing-reserves, and modern science has made experimental animals research objects, so too
‘the animal’ ensures that animals are sacrificial-reserves: we can tap them for our reaffirmation
of their sacrificial nature. This is then written into the human itself: the human is, in our familiar
axiomatics, a ‘sacrificial subject,’ constituted by excluding and sacrificing others (see TNS 98;
TATTIA and EWCS, passim).20

The animal as sacrificial-reserve is forgotten because it founds the animal as marketable,
fungible and liquid, abstracted into the general circulatory flow in the system of value. Animals
are exchanged, meat is exchanged. But this exchange is predicated on a separation that is
instantiated by a suppressed and yet recurrent and ongoing sacrifice. Derrida’s phrase seems
fitting here: we can call this a “war of the species” (TATTIA 31; see Coetzee 58-9). Humans
keep animals as sacrificial-reserve to continuously carry out the operation of purification: my
claim is that humans have made animals—as ‘the’ animal—a realm of purity, wherein such
purity is reaffirmed through ‘demonstration,’ a demonstration that reveals our abyssal difference
(e.g., through the bee experiments).

In summary, the bee experiments do not show what they intend: rather, they are riddled
with questionable assumptions and so I have interpreted them as a sacrificial enactment; they end
up showing more than they allege to show when we grasp what is underneath. As such, the
evidence Heidegger marshals for his take on animals as doubly impossible—that is, not only due
to the necessary ontological limit which makes full access impossible, but also due to the
impossibility of transposition into a being that, as the never-there deprived of possibilities as
possibilities, is supposed to have access (i.e., for Heidegger, the imaginary projection across the
impossible limit accesses an additional impossibility: he projects in, crosses the impossible limit,
to report back that one impossibly cannot go in)—is questionable.
To conclude this first section, I again put forward the “two alternatives claim”: either we modify Heidegger’s account of animality to remove the ideas of binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting (taking them explicitly as external descriptions on our part)\textsuperscript{21} thereby making ‘the animal’ the \textit{doubly} impossible (or, perhaps more accurately: making ‘the animal’ completely machine-like, a \textit{pure} stimulus being\textsuperscript{22}), or we retain these ideas (i.e., binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting, \textit{as} possible for animals) and thereby modify parts of the rest of the account. If we choose the former, we need to explain why we would accept Heidegger’s account, and I believe my analysis of the bee experiments and of the doubly impossible nature of Heidegger’s account helps to throw this into question (i.e., his account, while it is a—I do not say logical, but perhaps rather imaginative—possibility, is also an implausibility). If, however, we choose the latter, then animals are freed to have ‘more’ access to beings, for then we cannot take the other as merely enfolded within a particular animal.\textsuperscript{23}

However, in using the word ‘more,’ I do not merely mean to return us to the pre-theoretical position Heidegger initially criticizes, \textit{viz.} difference in access as quantitative difference (i.e., that we can access more things than the animal can) (FCM 195). As we have seen, for Heidegger, ‘poverty in world’ is not that humans can access more beings than animals: it is that animals do not have access to beings as such at all (FCM 193-4). So instead, I mean this ‘more’ in relation to Heidegger’s end point. In other words, Heidegger situates animals as absolutely deprived, all equally deprived of, as I have claimed, the ‘\textit{es gibt}’ (of being-given). To ‘free’ animals for ‘more’ access means, first, to deny the particular impossibility of Heidegger’s account; and, second, to diversify animals, to multiply the differences, so each has its own different relations. So, first, ‘more’ relative to absolute deprivation; and, second, ‘more’ in
internal complications and diversifications within what was formerly thought (by Heidegger, for example) as ‘the animal.’ I am arguing for fundamentally different kinds of openness.

II. Derrida: Multiplying the Differences

In this section, I argue, as I have done implicitly or explicitly throughout, that we must, following Derrida, reject the construct that is ‘the animal,’ as well as reject the dichotomy between the ‘as such’ and the ‘not as such’: a dichotomy that for Heidegger clearly maps onto Dasein/the animal. If, first, we take the disjunction from the last section as suggesting that we should think of animals as having ‘more’ access to beings, and if, second, we take seriously Heidegger when he begins to differentiate between kinds of animals—as explained below—then I think our analysis joins up with these two key points in Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am. This section, then, aims to offer some sense of direction in which a different account of animality may take root.

To pursue this, we need to take stock of what Heidegger says to differentiate kinds of animals. His overall analysis is explicitly about animality in general: it is meant to apply to each and every animal (FCM 186). Nonetheless, he does allow that different animals have different disinhibiting rings with different disinhibitors (FCM 257). If, however, as I have argued, we think that animals are in the play of freeing-binding, and if different kinds of animal have different kinds of rings, then I claim we should think of animals, in each case, as different in their access to beings, based on the kind of animal.24 In other words, we can proceed to diversify our account of ‘the animal’; that is, we see how each kind of animal has different ‘drives’/‘disinhibitions’ and so each is in its own, unique and different, ‘kind of world.’ That is, there is not just one abyss; rather, there are many, between different kinds of animals.
In other words, maybe animals do not encounter beings like we do. But there are many ways to interpret this, to phantasize about it. Access requires freeing-binding. To be able to ‘reach out’ from one’s being requires the freedom to bind oneself to an other ‘outside’ of one’s self, which requires a freedom to let the other be. In Heidegger’s terms, there are different disinhibiting rings for different kinds of animals. While it is true that there is an account of difference here, it is only ever as diversifications of the same: i.e., without access to the ‘as such.’ “[I]ndividual animals and species of animals are restricted to a quite specific manifold of possible stimuli” (FCM 257, my emphases; see also 247, 265). That is, all animals are animals; they are, as Derrida puts it, l’animot. Rather, building off of my previous argument, let us actually diversify, let us turn to the phenomena themselves: as each animal has different drives/disinhibitions, so each, in its own variegated way, encounters what it encounters.

The two key points my analysis joins up with are Derrida’s points on l’animot and on the ‘as such’/‘not as such’ dichotomy, and I follow these as clarified by Toadvine (2010). First, Derrida’s use of l’animot (e.g., TATTIA 37, 40-1, 47-8; see also 23-4, 31, 34) is such that, in French, it sounds like the word for the plural of animal (animaux) but it singularizes it (le; l’): that is, we hear, jarringly, the singularization in the plural. In addition, while animot sounds like animaux, l’animot is spelled differently, so as to chimerically combine the words for animal and word (mot). Derrida’s point with this word is at least threefold: first, it draws our attention to the discrepancy between those in the Western tradition (e.g., Heidegger) who have consistently spoken of ‘animal’ but as one large category which lacks something in relation to humans, and so are actually speaking of ‘the animal’; second, in its chimerical roots, it mimics the way that ‘the animal’ as catch-all category is meant to denote such disparate kinds of beings from an emu to a whale (i.e., it combines disparate animals into one ‘thing,’ one concept, analogous to the
Chimera (TATTIA 41-2)); finally, it shows that ‘the animal’ is constructed as a word, a category that we who call ourselves humans have created.

Derrida’s point is that we should rigorously question the violence imposed by, and enabled by, a category such as ‘the animal’ (see also OS 57): the emu and whale are not assimilable, from a phenomenological perspective, to this one concept. This violence relates to the earlier point that Heidegger’s desire is to sacrifice animals for Dasein: to distinguish Dasein, Heidegger sacrifices all animals to l’animot. Therefore, contra-McNeill (1999; see also Schalow (2006)), who says Heidegger’s focus on Dasein is justified as laying the ground for ethics (McNeill 245), we must see ethics earlier, in the enabling violence itself (see Calarco (2008)).

However, as Toadvine clarifies, Derrida nonetheless maintains an abyssal difference between humans and animals; this is because we are multiplying the differences (Toadvine 251): there are abyssal differences not only between humans and different kinds of animals, but also amongst kinds of animals (VAA 66, 72-3): for example, the emu and whale. The solution to anthropocentrism is not a biologism wherein we argue that we too are animals, as this ‘solution’ merely preserves the categorical problem and attempts to efface or ignore essential difference (see TNS 72; Toadvine 244-5, 248-54; OS 39-40, 56, 73).

Connected with this point is Derrida’s move to deny the opposition of the ‘as such’ and the ‘not as such’ (TATTIA 156): for Heidegger, Dasein has access to the ‘as such,’ and animals do not. But what does it mean to say that entities are either given as beings or not given (‘as such’)? Derrida wants to contest that there are only two options: that being is some kind of binary on/off switch (‘on’ for Dasein, ‘off’ for animals). Rather, we must multiply how beings can appear. This joins up with Heidegger’s own project of paying attention to the kinds of being to which we are responding: he criticizes everyday theorizing for taking the beings of nature as
all equally ‘just there’ “like the wall that it becomes when turned into an object” (FCM 278). Ironically, he then erects ‘animals’ as just such a wall: all animals have the same ontological sense. In doing so, he maintains perhaps the key element of traditional metaphysics: anthropocentrism (Calarco (2008), 33).

While I am not entirely clear on how the project called for by Derrida would play itself out, I want to offer a few further preliminary thoughts here. A non-anthropocentric view would not, I contend, find the solution in dismantling the basic binary of ‘as such’/‘not as such’ and then replacing it with a continuum ranging from ‘as such’ on one side to ‘not as such’ on the other. Undoubtedly, in such a conception, we would place ourselves on the side closest to ‘as such’ and lifeforms like single-celled organisms closest to the opposite side of ‘not as such’; however, our goal is not to reinstate a ‘great chain of being.’ Rather, we need to explode this way of thinking: it is not clear why we should think we are most in the open; it is not clear why there should be a hierarchy at all.  

Furthermore, one obvious difficulty in such a project of diversification is that no outward signs or behaviour could help us directly pinpoint an animal’s kind of access (i.e., we cannot completely eradicate the phantasm). It is clear, however, that certain things matter to certain animals; different things matter, have a different sense, in different ways to different animals. And, I claim, animals do ask questions in their behaviour: for example, the dog who smells the dead sea animal seems to behaviourally ask, “is this food?” Strolling down the street, encountering another canine, a dog seems to ask, “are you friend or enemy?” This is an openness and responsibility. Things matter to animals and they differentiate (themselves and others, in the play of differences): “Sense entails differences that make a difference” (Morris (2013), 329).
Animals, in this sense, consciously or not, suffer. For Derrida, Bentham’s great question—“Can they suffer?”—derives its power specifically from its overturning of the whole tradition of basing the human/animal difference on an ability, a power, that the human has and animals do not (e.g., the ability to encounter beings as beings: i.e., the ‘as such’). Bentham’s intervention is to ask about animals’ “power as non-power” (i.e., are they able to suffer; are they able to not be able): that is, their vulnerability, their passivity and passion, “the first possibility as non-power that we share with the animal, whence compassion” (B&S 243-4). Furthermore, Derrida argues that power has at its heart a vulnerability, a non-power: while each power grants what is granted to it, each power also reveals an impotence in the necessity to be granted and to maintain itself in this granting of the power (B&S 235; see also TATTIA 27-29; and Heidegger (1997), 151-2). Therefore, poverty reveals itself as primary for all lifeforms (see Oliver 123).

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, I claim that this point about the pervasiveness of poverty was clearly already at work earlier in my argument, insofar as my concern was to criticize the view that animals are static and only *Dasein* is ek-static. In other words, we need to question the move that makes ‘the’ animal the pre-ontological difference, the pre-originary violence, thereby making it a bastion outside violence and harm. Such a move enables the horrific treatment of animals in factory farms, etc., as extractive resources outside of all (or much) moral concern. My arguments were meant to question the animal in its purity as instead always already contaminated: in other words, the *fall* from pre-ontological difference which institutes ethics, politics, etc., is not an originary-constant falling from an originary total purity. Rather, animals in their various kinds of being, similar to *Dasein*, are always already exposure, ek-stasis, violence, and disruption. It is by
denying this, through sacrifice, that animals are taken as purified, yet their kinship here with us is primary.

That which calls on us as condition of anything else calling upon us (as one who can be called) (see Derrida on the Zusage: OS 94, 129-132; TATTIA 166) is this disruption, which enables differences to matter. If this is true, if there is this releasing that releases all releasing—frees all freedom—then how can we deny it of animals? How can animals be denied this, if they are able to encounter anything at all? Suffering is originary. Vulnerability, ruin, and death are always already imprinted, even of course beyond animality. Heidegger, then, tries to seal off play (freeing-binding) to indicate a realm of purity, the uncontamination of the animal. But it is hard (impossible) to imagine any totality that is not always already open to its ruination.27

My response, then, has been to claim that Heidegger takes animals as doubly impossible. I examined Heidegger’s evidence for his position in the bee experiments and cast doubt on whether these do what they are supposed to do. Rather, to maintain Heidegger’s position, some other evidence would be required, and this would also have to rule out animals as open to others. In addition, my discussion of the bee experiments suggests difficulties for just such a project. Specifically, I argued that the evidence that Heidegger extracts is not (barring further arguments) convincing since it relies on: the loss of organic unity; the hasty over-generalization of several particular forms of behaviour; the hasty over-generalization of animals as ‘the animal’; the assumption that drivenness precludes the ‘as such’; the assumption that the ‘as such’ enables an opening to particular kinds of responsivity; and the way that a particular animal is made to appear to us within the context of a techno-scientific lab experiment.

These challenges, combined with, first, the Derridean insights from the final section (i.e., l’animot; the ‘as such’/‘not as such’; originary suffering/violence), and, second, the
characterization and criticisms of Heidegger’s account as the doubly impossible (i.e., the never-there of self or other for animals), casts doubt on an easy recuperation of the project. Rather, I have offered some preliminary thoughts on rethinking animals as well as Heidegger’s concept of world: I think neither can be taken as realms of exclusive purity, enacted through the sacrificial structure’s constant purge as described.
Key to Principal Works Cited:


B&T: Being and Time, Martin Heidegger.

DL: Daimon Life, David Farrell Krell.

EWCS: ‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject, Jacques Derrida.

FCM: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger.

OG: Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida.


P: Pathmarks, Martin Heidegger.

QCT: The Question Concerning Technology, Martin Heidegger.

TATTIA: The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida.

TNS: This is Not Sufficient, Leonard Lawlor.


References:


Franck, Didier. "Being and the Living." Who Comes After the Subject. Ed. Eduardo Cadava,


Derrida traces it through Plato (TATTIA 40), Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan, for instance (TATTIA 14), as well as Genesis and Greek myths (e.g., TATTIA 15-8, 42).

While Heidegger only uses *Verbundenheit*, and not *Verbindlichkeit*, to speak of the organism’s boundedness to its environment (FCM 258, 261, 264), he *does* importantly use *Verbindung* (FCM 258). Typically, Heidegger uses *Verbind* words when he speaks of *Dasein*’s binding or non-binding in relation to boredom (FCM 135, 139, 165, 179, 182). *Verbindlichkeit* is mostly reserved for *Dasein*’s binding character (e.g., twenty times from FCM 339-365). However, with all that said, there does not seem to be any strict or rigorous division between the two *root* terms (*Verbund* and *Verbind*) in his later discussion of the apophantic statements (FCM 307-331, *passim*). As two examples: “‘Is’ and being then mean connectedness [*Verbundenheit*], ‘is’ means: something is connected [verbunden] with, stands in connection [*Verbindung*] with” (FCM 327); and: “The copula is no mere connecting [*Verbindung*] of words, but intervenes in the meaning of the words of an assertion, organizes them around one thing, makes them connected [verbunden] in this deeper sense” (FCM 329). That is, the root of the term that is used to describe the animal’s boundedness to its environment (*Verbund*) is also used to describe the
deep ontological boundedness of the copula (the ‘is’), and so too is the root of the word that characterizes Dasein’s boundedness to beings (Verbind*).

5 Regarding this “proper being,” Heidegger writes: “in this instinctual ‘toward’, the capacity as such becomes and remains proper to itself—and does so without any [...] relating back to itself [...] We shall reserve the expression ‘self’ [...] to characterize the specifically human peculiarity [...]” (FCM 233).

6 The disinhibitor is a conceptual way for us to understand a being in its role for the animal: a disinhibitor disinhibits a prescribed drive. Yet, if animals are open beyond a prescription, if they have a different kind of leeway than Heidegger claims, then a ‘disinhibitor’ is too narrow of a way to characterize how beings would ‘appear,’ because the being’s role would be expanded or altered (e.g., the being may be engaged with, or it may not).

7 As such a totality, the animal would risk collapsing into the same (or similar) category of beings as the previously discussed apple and proton, insofar as it would lack access. The animal would have drivenness to distinguish it, but its drives are driven without any openness to its disinhibitors. It merely reacts to X, kind of like a fire would to breath.

8 I put “external” in single quotes as it is questionable whether the animal, for Heidegger, can even have a perspective: i.e., perhaps the only perspectives are ours, as humans.

9 If we absolutely could not go along with an animal, this would mean that we could not know anything about the animal. We must be able to go along with, even if such going along is, for Heidegger’s position, a not-going-along-with (see FCM 211). We must have access to the being in question, even if there is no question of it actually having access itself.

10 For more on Derrida’s work on Heidegger and death, see, for e.g., Of Spirit (p 120), Aporias, The Animal That Therefore I Am, The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II.
11 We should keep in mind Heidegger’s methodological considerations: transposition “consists
precisely in we ourselves being precisely ourselves, and only in this way first bringing about the
possibility of ourselves being able to go along with the other being while remaining other with
respect to it” (FCM 203).

12 While Derrida does not discuss this in *The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II*, perhaps the
impossibility could also relate to our birth.

13 By *pre*-ontological difference I mean not only that animals *precede* ontological difference,
precede the enabling disruption, but also that animals come *before* us, we come *after* them (see
TATTIA 10-11).

14 Derrida writes: “writing, obliteration of the proper classed in the play of differences, is the
originary violence itself” (OG 110). Though this quote emerges in a very different context, it is
pertinent here. Writing (arche-writing) is characterized by *différance* (see Derrida (1982), 3-27):
the ‘constant’ deferral of meaning as part of a process of differentiation based on the unavoidable
instability (spatial and temporal) of any given context. The proper, in my context, refers to the
properness of the totality of animality: sealed, the animal is not exposed, whereas *Dasein is*
exposed (P 144: i.e., ek-sistent), to beings/being.

15 Agamben writes: “What the animal is precisely unable to do is suspend and deactivate its
relationship with the ring of its specific disinhibitors” (68).

16 Heidegger claims, without clarifying what he means, that “that which disinhibits, with all the
various forms of disinhibition it entails, brings an *essential disruption* into the essence of the
animal” (FCM 273). However, if the animal is always open to . . . , how is it disrupted? If the
responses are pre-given, prescribed, how is there a disruption? Perhaps Heidegger means in
terms of the eliminative need: disinhibitors force the animal to motion and response even though
the animal’s default position is, ontologically, absolute stasis (i.e., even if it is continually driven (FCM 243), it never ‘leaves,’ transcends, itself as Dasein does). I claim that what we have here is a disruption without disruption: the animal never leaves itself (nor, of course, does it ever find itself: one would have to resort again to crossing-out).

17 Upon transgression, humans are open to death (Genesis 3:3, 3:19), knowledge of good and evil (ethics) (Genesis 2:9, 2:17, 3:5, 3:7), and struggle (Genesis 3:16-19).

18 In Heidegger’s seminar, such ek-stasis is taken up as: first, originary projection (ursprüngliche Entwurf) (FCM 362-6); as well as—and Derrida helps us to see the following two—second, being-driven (Getriebenheit) (FCM 5; see B&S 101-2); and, third, Walten (FCM 26, 362, 365; see B&S 32, 38-44, 104, 116, 191, 215, 252, 278-90).

19 As Krell puts it, “There are moments when for the sake of an endangered species of interpretation, [Heidegger] dispenses with his critique of modernity: Galileo and Descartes may initiate the epoch of subjectivity and calculative thinking, but at least they know that matter is extended, the moon pockmarked, and rocks lifeless” (DL 116). While there are some inaccuracies here, the point is that Heidegger simply brushes off other kinds of truth by insisting on the need to stay within the scientific-metaphysical approach. The only justification he gives is that this dimension of truth has “long since determined the way in which we conceive of truth in our everyday reflection and judgement, in our ‘natural’ way of knowing” (FCM 204), though this is an odd kind of justification, coming from Heidegger.

Derrida touches on this problem: but “if one said to [Heidegger] that this repetition [towards the most originary] adds, invents or discovers nothing, that it merely redoubles hollowly […], Heidegger, I imagine, would reply: “in what you call the path of repetition which adds nothing (but what do you want to add? Do you find that what we have in our memory, the
abyss of our memory, is not enough?), the thinking of this [...] is going towards what is quite other than what you recognize. It is indeed not a new content. [...] The entirely other announces itself in the most rigorous repetition”” (OS 112-3). Yet, as Derrida points out, this is not always sufficient (see Derrida (1982), 134-6) and it remains regional (see OS 107-13).

Furthermore, it should be noted that while it may be thought that Heidegger is open to the other forms of truth-disclosure as quoted, insofar as he does not simply dismiss animism, he may not be as open as may initially appear: he is careful to relegate such truth-disclosure to either *myth* or *art* (FCM 204). Yet, it may be problematic to do so (e.g., myth and art derive their sense from their pairing within binaries, and much would depend on how such terms and such binaries are understood). In our current context, which is not Derrida’s in *Of Spirit*, we could respond: yes, perhaps there is a need to go back, perhaps there is a need to repeat, but—and here we transition—such a tracing back could be older or other, either going further back or opening up to other accounts (e.g., in other traditions), so as to call into question such distinctions (art and myth / science and metaphysics) or matter/living/human (i.e., stone/animal/Dasein).

20 Just as the standing-reserve is critiqued by Heidegger for its implications and effects for us (QCT 26-8), so too the sacrificial-reserve is impoverishing for us. I can only sketch out how this is so. The sacrificial-reserve is bound up with: the possibility of dehumanization; the constant work on ourselves to reaffirm our ‘non-animal’ nature; the suppression of concerns pertaining to vulnerability (see next section); the particular constitution of various binaries (e.g., reason/emotion); the smooth operation of the standing-reserve; and a sense of being ‘alone’ in the ‘world,’ in a monophonic or homophonic relation instead of a polyphonic one.
In other words, we strike them out ‘for’ the animal: “a generalized Durchstreichung” (TATTIA 158), in which we cross-out not only all beings for the animal, including its self, but also all verbs, all actions.

Heidegger is careful to distinguish animals (and organs) from machines (FCM 213-29), and so the latter—pure stimulus being—is more accurate.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to venture a full positive account; nonetheless, I take this conclusion as a productive starting point.

While I do not offer a theory of how to delimit a ‘kind’ of animal, this is the kind of difficulty that can lead to future fruitful thought.

There is a problem of examples with animals because there is a problem with the category; for example, it is a problem to take emus or whales as exemplary. It could be responded, however, that there is an obvious different intent between Heidegger and myself: Heidegger maintains the example as exemplary whereas I use the example to question its exemplarity.

Along these lines, it should be noted that, like Heidegger, I have let plants slide and focused on animals. That is, Heidegger begins by focusing on life and organisms and explicitly mentions plants and animals (and plants occasionally return later, too) (e.g., FCM 62, 177, 179, 188, 191, 207), but he then mostly drops plants at some point (e.g., FCM 177-8, 185, 209). Further thought should be given to plants.

This brings us back to a limithrophy—called for in The Animal That Therefore I Am (TATTIA 29-31), and partly enacted in Aporias. See also Violence Against Animals (VAA 66, 72-3).