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Cryptanalysis of Some AES-based Cryptographic Primitives

Title:

Cryptanalysis of Some AES-based Cryptographic Primitives

AlTawy, Riham (2016) Cryptanalysis of Some AES-based Cryptographic Primitives. PhD thesis, Concordia University.

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Abstract

Current information security systems rely heavily on symmetric key cryptographic primitives
as one of their basic building blocks. In order to boost the efficiency of the security systems, designers
of the underlying primitives often tend to avoid the use of provably secure designs. In fact, they adopt
ad hoc designs with claimed security assumptions in the hope that they resist known cryptanalytic
attacks. Accordingly, the security evaluation of such primitives continually remains an open field. In
this thesis, we analyze the security of two cryptographic hash functions and one block cipher. We
primarily focus on the recent AES-based designs used in the new Russian Federation cryptographic
hashing and encryption suite GOST because the majority of our work was carried out during the open
research competition run by the Russian standardization body TC26 for the analysis of their new
cryptographic hash function Streebog. Although, there exist security proofs for the resistance of AES-
based primitives against standard differential and linear attacks, other cryptanalytic techniques such as
integral, rebound, and meet-in-the-middle attacks have proven to be effective. The results presented in
this thesis can be summarized as follows:
Initially, we analyze various security aspects of the Russian cryptographic hash function GOST
R 34.11-2012, also known as Streebog or Stribog. In particular, our work investigates five security
aspects of Streebog. Firstly, we present a collision analysis of the compression function and its in-
ternal cipher in the form of a series of modified rebound attacks. Secondly, we propose an integral
distinguisher for the 7- and 8-round compression function. Thirdly, we investigate the one wayness of Streebog with respect to two approaches of the meet-in-the-middle attack, where we present a
preimage analysis of the compression function and combine the results with a multicollision attack
to generate a preimage of the hash function output. Fourthly, we investigate Streebog in the context
of malicious hashing and by utilizing a carefully tailored differential path, we present a backdoored
version of the hash function where collisions can be generated with practical complexity. Lastly, we
propose a fault analysis attack which retrieves the inputs of the compression function and utilize it to
recover the secret key when Streebog is used in the keyed simple prefix and secret-IV MACs, HMAC,
or NMAC. All the presented results are on reduced round variants of the function except for our analysis
of the malicious version of Streebog and our fault analysis attack where both attacks cover the full
round hash function.
Next, we examine the preimage resistance of the AES-based Maelstrom-0 hash function which is
designed to be a lightweight alternative to the ISO standardized hash function Whirlpool. One of the
distinguishing features of the Maelstrom-0 design is the proposal of a new chaining construction called
3CM which is based on the 3C/3C+ family. In our analysis, we employ a 4-stage approach that uses
a modified technique to defeat the 3CM chaining construction and generates preimages of the 6-round
reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function.
Finally, we provide a key recovery attack on the new Russian encryption standard GOST R 34.12-
2015, also known as Kuznyechik. Although Kuznyechik adopts an AES-based design, it exhibits a
faster diffusion rate as it employs an optimal diffusion transformation. In our analysis, we propose
a meet-in-the-middle attack using the idea of efficient differential enumeration where we construct
a three round distinguisher and consequently are able to recover 16-bytes of the master key of the
reduced 5-round cipher. We also present partial sequence matching, by which we generate, store, and
match parts of the compared parameters while maintaining negligible probability of matching error,
thus the overall online time complexity of the attack is reduced.

Divisions:Concordia University > Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science > Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering
Item Type:Thesis (PhD)
Authors:AlTawy, Riham
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:Ph. D.
Program:Information and Systems Engineering
Date:March 2016
Thesis Supervisor(s):Youssef, Amr
ID Code:981311
Deposited By: RIHAM AL TAWY
Deposited On:09 Nov 2016 15:20
Last Modified:18 Jan 2018 17:52
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